Public domain and private rights in maritime-terrestrial zone within a Wildlife RefugeDominio público y derechos privados en zona marítimo-terrestre dentro de Refugio de Vida Silvestre

Case File Case File 98-100136-425-CA No. 35-2007.

CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL. SECTION FOUR. SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, at eight hours forty-five minutes on the thirteenth of August of two thousand seven.

Ordinary Contentious Proceeding brought by PRIMERA COMPAÑÍA UNIDA DE DESARROLLO, S.A., represented by Silvia Nora Gutiérrez Alarcón, who is of legal age, widowed, ecologist-conservationist, of Chilean nationality, with residency card number 425-69983-240, resident of Aguirre, Refugio de Fauna Silvestre Portalón; against MARÍA DEL ROSARIO MONGE BALTODANO, of legal age, married, businesswoman, Costa Rican, with identity card number 6-067-721, and INVERSIONES TURÍSTICAS LOS TUCANES, S.A., represented by the same María del Rosario Monge Baltodano, and as an interested party THE STATE, represented by the Environmental and Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Attorney, Doctor José Joaquín Barahona Vargas, of unspecified details. The Special Judicial Representative of the plaintiff is Doctor Alberto Agid Zelaya Martínez, of legal age, married, Costa Rican, with identity card number 8-064-497, attorney.

WHEREAS:

1.- That, having set the amount in controversy in this matter at two hundred million colones based on the facts set forth and legal citations adduced; the claim seeks a judgment wholly upholding the action for nullity, recovery of possession (reinvindicación), and damages in the following points:

“A.- That the sole owner and possessor of the properties claimed in this lawsuit, as well as their areas, is the plaintiff: PRIMERA COMPAÑÍA UNIDA DE DESARROLLO, S.A.; that consequently, possession and any other right in rem derived from its title of ownership belong to it.

B.- That the private document sale agreement (Carta-venta) signed by the representative of PRIMERA COMPAÑÍA UNIDA DE DESARROLLO S.A., Valerie Havill Nicholson, and the defendant: MARÍA DEL ROSARIO MONGE BALTODANO, on May 17, 1985, as well as the sale signed between MARÍA DEL ROSARIO MONGE BALTODANO and the Co-defendant INVERSIONES TURÍSTICAS LOS TUCANES, S.A., represented by MONGE BALTODANO herself, in San José, on January 18, 1987, this latter sale being a legal consequence derived from the private sale agreement through which the defendant MONGE BALTODANO acquired, ARE ABSOLUTELY NULL and of no legal value against the right of ownership and other rights in rem proven by the plaintiff.

B.- [sic] That the plaintiff: PRIMERA COMPAÑÍA UNIDA DE DESARROLLO, S.A., is the sole occupant and legitimately entitled to exploit the area situated within the maritime zone (vía marítima) and which the defendant has illegally maintained; this area was occupied by the defendants with two houses built of three floors each.

C.- That Mrs. MARÍA DEL ROSARIO MONGE BALTODANO and the co-defendant company must immediately vacate all the properties claimed in this lawsuit, the ownership and legitimacy of which have been demonstrated in favor of the plaintiff, and deliver them to said party as the rightful owner.

D.- That the defendant must pay the plaintiff all damages caused during the time of the illegal possession of the recovered properties; likewise, it must answer for any loss, deterioration, or destruction of the assets that may have existed in the houses in the maritime zone area occupied by the plaintiff at the time of the illegal invasion carried out by the defendant.

E.- That all resulting damages shall be liquidated in execution of judgment.

F.- That the defendant may not claim any improvements made in good faith on the recovered properties, since its possession has been without just cause or just title throughout the entire duration of said possession.

G.- That any subsequent legal act derived from the documents annulled in this ordinary proceeding is also annulled as a consequence of the annulment of the legal act that gave rise to it.

H.- That the defendant must pay the plaintiff the personal and procedural costs caused by this declaratory proceedings.” (Folios 371 to 373.)

2.- That the defendants answered belatedly—after the declaration of default (resolution of the Civil Court of Aguirre and Parrita at thirteen hours thirty minutes on September fourth, nineteen ninety-eight, folio 388)—, in which they raised the defenses of formal and material res judicata (cosa juzgada formal y material), statute of limitations (prescripción), lack of active and passive standing (falta de acción ad causam activa y pasiva), lack of right, and the generic defense sine actione agit (folios 409 to 429).

3.- That the state representative appeared, in protection of the direct (institutional) interest he has in the defense of the public domain (demanio público), and therefore requests that the absolute nullity be declared sua sponte of any act, contractual stipulation, or agreement discussed in this proceeding that entails an appropriation, detention, use, enjoyment, transfer, or illicit exploitation of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone (Zona Marítimo Terrestre), of state domain, and therefore any declaration that implies a direct or indirect recognition of private rights in favor of the parties, against the affectation created by that regime, must be dismissed in the judgment (folios 391 to 402) 4.- Licenciada Nancy Allen Umaña, Judge of the trial court, in judgment number 719-2005, at eight hours ten minutes on July fourteenth, two thousand five, resolved:

"A partial inadmissibility of the action is declared, in the ordinary proceeding brought by the company Primera Compañía Unidad de Desarrollo against María Monge Baltodano and Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes, on the grounds that res judicata exists with respect to the following claims: a. That the sole owner and possessor of the properties claimed in this lawsuit, as well as their areas, is the plaintiff, and that consequently, possession and any other right in rem derived from its title of ownership belong to it. b. That the private document sale agreement (Carta-venta) signed by the representative of Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo S.A., Valerie Havill Nicholson, and the defendant, on May seventeenth, nineteen eighty-five, as well as the sale signed between María del Rosario Monge Baltodano and the Co-defendant Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes, represented by Monge Baltodano, in San José, on January eighteenth, nineteen eighty-seven, this latter sale being a legal consequence derived from the private sale agreement through which the defendant Monge Baltodano acquired, are absolutely null and of no legal value against the right of ownership and other rights in rem proven by the plaintiff. d. That Monge Baltodano and the co-defendant company must immediately vacate all the properties claimed. e. That the defendant must pay the plaintiff all damages caused during the time of the illegal possession of the recovered properties; f. That the defendant may not claim any improvements made in good faith on the recovered properties. g. That any subsequent legal act derived from the documents annulled in this ordinary proceeding is also annulled as a consequence of the annulment of the legal act that gave rise to it.” With regard to the claims: “c. That the plaintiff is the sole occupant and legitimately entitled to exploit the area situated within the maritime zone (vía marítima). e…; and must answer for any loss, deterioration, or destruction of the assets that may have existed in the houses in the maritime zone area occupied by the plaintiff at the time of the illegal invasion carried out by the defendant”, the claim is dismissed. The plaintiff is ordered to pay both sets of costs of this action. Notify." (Folios 835 back and 836.)

5.- Disagreeing with the ruling of the lower court, the plaintiff and the representative of the State appeal, remedies that were admitted, and by virtue of which this Tribunal hears the case on appeal.

5.- In the proceedings, the applicable procedural requirements have been observed, without any grounds for nullity capable of invalidating the actions taken being noted.

Judge Fernández Brenes drafts; and,

WHEREAS:

I.- REGARDING THE EVIDENCE OFFERED FOR BETTER PROVISION.- By brief filed on June eighth, two thousand six, the representative of the State requests that the certification issued by the Director General of the National System of Conservation Areas of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía), regarding the state-owned coastal public domain areas comprising the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre, Mixed Category, be admitted as evidence for a better resolution. Because this Tribunal deems it unnecessary, as its content is determined not only in the decree creating said protected area but also in the rest of the evidence provided, such as cadastral maps and in the parties' own arguments in this claim, the admission of the offered evidence is denied.

II.- REGARDING THE PROVEN FACTS.- For a better understanding of the facts deemed proven, those determined by the Trial Judge are substituted, as there are a series of omissions in their consignment, so that they are deemed as follows: 1.) That the properties registered in the folio real under registration numbers 22641-000 and 22633-000, both in the sixth canton of Aguirre, second district (Savegre), Province of Puntarenas, are owned by the corporation Primera Compañía Unida, S.A., whose registered boundaries are as follows: north with Guillermo Rodríguez Rodríguez, south with the nautical mile (milla marítima) and Guillermo Rodríguez Rodríguez, east with río Portalón, and west with Guillermo Rodríguez Rodríguez, for the first; and north with quebrada salada in between another, south with the nautical mile (milla marítima), east with Manuel Arias Chinchilla, and west with Alicia Bonilla Ramírez, for the second (folios 6 to 11 of the judicial file); 2.) That on May 18, 1985, Valerie Havill Nicholson, in her capacity as unlimited general power of attorney of the corporation Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo, sold, by means of a private document sale, to Rosario Monge Baltodano a property located in Matapalo, second district of Savegre, canton of Aguirre, Province of Puntarenas, which was unregistered land, but which the seller had possessed for more than ten years in a quiet, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted manner, for the sum of five hundred thousand colones, with the following boundaries: North, with the río Matapalo in between, partly property of the Garitas and the same seller; South, with the Pacific Ocean; East, with Rodrigo Ruíz Solórzano; and West, with the mouth of the río Portalón, forming an irregularly shaped point; measuring approximately, on the east some four hundred meters, on the west some three hundred meters at its widest part, on the North and South some three thousand meters, which totals an approximate ninety-five hectares, comprising a poorly maintained flat pasture, with a poorly maintained airstrip, partly fenced, with two three-story dwelling houses roofed with zinc ricalit that have been abandoned, a small wooden house in poor condition, two sheds for the protection of electrical plants semi-enclosed with zinc, which is in poor condition, there are two electrical plants in poor condition, as well as an electric pump to dry water from a well (private sale agreement folios 22 and 23, fact 3 of the claim, folio 350 of the judicial file); 3.) That Notary Public José Luis Barletta Blanco affixed the certain date to the aforementioned private sale agreement on January 12, 1987 (notation on the copy of the deed, folio 24 of the judicial file); 4.) That the portion of land sold overlapped part of the registered properties, registration numbers 22641-000 and 22633-000, and includes part of the maritime-terrestrial zone (cadastral maps numbers 350390-97, 350397-79, parcel map 115 of the Instituto de Tierras y Colonización, and overlay of cadastral maps P-49305-98, P-350397-79, and P-13238-74 made by the Catastro Nacional Sistema de Información Territorial Catastral, folios 1, 2, 4, and 665 of the judicial file, and statements by the defendants, folios 410 back, 411, 414, 415, 415 back, 416 back of the judicial file); 5.) That on January 18, 1987, Mrs. Monge Baltodano sold the aforementioned property by means of a private sale agreement to Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes, said defendant being the representative of this corporation, for the sum of five hundred thousand colones (folios 25 and 26 of the judicial file); 6.) That by means of deed number eighty-eight, before Notary Public Allen Ramírez Henderson, on January 2, 1994, Mrs. Silvia Nora Gutiérrez Alarcón, representing Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo S.A., and María del Rosario Monge Baltodano, representing Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes S.A., reached an agreement with the purpose of ending the dispute that arose concerning Playa Portalón in Savegre, Aguirre, rendering null and void the sales contract entered into between Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo S.A. and Mrs. Monge Baltodano personally on May 18, 1985, whereby the corporation Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes, S.A. received at that act the sum of two million colones, which is credited to the price it paid for said lands, as well as the payment it had to make to Terciopelo, S.A. to enter into possession of the lands, and for any damage or loss during that time. By virtue of the foregoing, the corporation Primera Compañía de Desarrollo Unida, S.A. was recognized the possibility of continuing in possession of said lands. And they finally agreed to waive any type of indemnification conflict for the property contained in the dwelling houses (folio 119 of the judicial file); 7.) That the Juzgado Mixto de Puriscal, Agrario por Ministerio de Ley, Santiago, by resolution at 3:00 p.m. on January 18, 1995, resolved the following: “Having analyzed this proceeding, we see that in October nineteen eighty-eight, it was suspended because the sale document presented by the plaintiff was challenged as false. After more than six years of procedural inactivity, the defendant presents a notarial agreement, signed by the representatives of the corporations contending here, in which they agree: ‘that with the purpose of ending the dispute that arose concerning Playa Portalón in Savegre, Aguirre, the sales contract entered into between Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo S.A. and Mrs. Monge Baltodano personally, on May eighteenth, nineteen eighty-five, is rendered null and void, for which Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes S.A receives at this act the sum of two million colones, which is credited to the price it paid for said lands, as well as the payment it had to make to Tercio Pelo S.A. to enter into possession of the lands, as well as payment for any damage or loss arising during this time. Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo S.A. may in exchange continue in possession of the lands as it has been doing since nineteen ninety-one…’. This document was brought to the attention of the plaintiff, as well as the defendant's petition that the proceeding be terminated, and it did not manifest anything. This being the case, the filing of the case file is ordered and let the corresponding entry be made in the case entry book. (Ordinary proceeding of INVERSIONES TURÍSTICAS LOS TUCANES S.A. against PRIMERA COMPAÑÍA UNIDA DE DESARROLLO S.A.).” (folio 298 of the judicial file); 8.) That by means of Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) number 25139-MINAE, of February 16, 1996, the Ministry of Environment and Energy declared the Playa Portalón area of Matapalo, Province of Puntarenas, Cantón Aguirre, Distrito Savegre, a Mixed Category Wildlife Refuge (Refugio de Fauna Silvestre de Categoría Mixta), in which the properties belonging to the corporation Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo, Sociedad Anónima are located (fact six of the claim, folio 354 of the judicial file, and statements by the Procuraduría General de la República and the Minister of Environment and Energy, folios 391 to 402, 512 to 526 of the judicial file, executive decree, folio 401 of the administrative file, volume 5); 9.) That in October 1997, the forest regent, Engineer Rodolfo Sequeira Herrera, prepared a management plan for the payment for environmental services (Pago de Servicios Ambientales) of the Mixed Category Wildlife Refuge of Portalón, to submit for approval to the Programa de Incentivos para la Protección de Bosques C.P.B. of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, which only includes conservation activities (folios 191 to 202 of the judicial file); and, 10.) That in 1998, the State (Procuraduría General de la República) brought criminal actions to safeguard the public domain asset (maritime-terrestrial zone) on the occasion of the acts of possession by the company Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes, S.A. and its legal representative (María del Rosario Monge Baltodano) given her disobedience in removing fences (reply from the Chief of the Regional Office of Aguirre and Parrita of the Ministry of Environment and Energy to the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), on the occasion of the writ of amparo filed by the company, processed in case file number 5004-98-0007-CO, folios 251 to 254 of the administrative file, volume 5).

III.- REGARDING THE UNPROVEN FACTS.- Important for the resolution of this matter, the following are deemed unproven facts: 1.) That the corporation Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo, S.A. has a permit or authorization granted by the Ministry of Environment and Energy for the use and exploitation of the areas comprising the maritime-terrestrial zone of Playa Portalón; and, 2.) That the plaintiff has the status of occupant of the maritime-terrestrial zone.

IV.- REGARDING THE GRIEVANCES OF THE PLAINTIFF.- In briefs filed on the first and the third of August (folios 843 and 844 the first, and 846 to 849), the plaintiff files an appeal solely regarding the order to pay both sets of costs imposed upon it in judgment number 719-2005, at eight hours ten minutes on July fourteenth, two thousand five, because it does "not find it in accordance with law", as Article 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure was erroneously applied, based on the following considerations: a.) because each of the claims sought in the lawsuit was granted to it, through the sua sponte introduction of a defense of material res judicata, notwithstanding—it asserts—that "it is only today that for the first time there is a judgment expressly stating each of the points on which res judicata exists"; b.) having acted with evident good faith, and c.) that to impose such an order, the damages caused on the occasion of the defendants' illegitimate possession were not assessed; reasons for which it requests the reversal of the judgment on this point, so that it is resolved accordingly. By brief filed on October tenth, two thousand five (folios 893 to 8986), it requests the dismissal in all its points of the appeal filed by the Procuraduría General de la República, declaring instead its status as a "settler (pobladora)", having proven procedures for the granting of the respective concession and the payment of the respective fee, up to nineteen ninety-three. By brief filed on May fifteenth, two thousand seven (visible at folios 938 to 939), outside the deadline for formulating grievances, which expired on October twelfth, two thousand five, the plaintiff formulates more grievances to challenge the cited resolution, namely for having admitted a defense introduced sua sponte by the Trial Judge, without granting it the hearing contained in Article 307 of the Code of Civil Procedure, causing defenselessness. Due to the untimeliness of this last argument, no ruling will be made on it, and the analysis of the appeal is confined solely to the point initially challenged.

V.- REGARDING THE GRIEVANCES OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE STATE.- The grounds for challenge by the representative of the State center on the fact that the judgment does not make an exception for the public domain lands included in the property sought to be recovered, which is also located within the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre, Mixed Category (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre de Categoría Mixta); considering that this ruling admitted there is no permit for such property regarding its use and exploitation; so that, in the operative part, it recognizes the existence of a right of ownership, possession, and other rights in rem derived from ownership over such lands, without clarifying that it does not include the areas of the maritime-terrestrial zone, which is not limited to the two hundred meters from the coast, but also the ria—which is the part of the river near the sea entrance and up to where the tides reach—, the mangroves—which are public property, regardless of their extension—, and the estuary, which are state public domain. By virtue of which, possessory acts, titling, or judicial discussions relating to the ownership or possession of this type of property, which belong to the State by operation of law, are unacceptable.

VI.- REGARDING THE INTERVENTION OF THE PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA IN THIS PROCEEDING.- This Tribunal considers that, prior to resolving the appeal filed by the State's representation, it is pertinent to make a brief analysis regarding the justification for this institution's intervention in this proceeding, as it cannot be considered a coadjuvant, since it does not act as a mere adhesory intervenor to the claims or situation of any of the parties appearing in this proceeding, but rather, as indicated in its various interventions (in the brief by which it appears in the proceeding—filed on November twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-eight, visible at folios 391 to 402 of the judicial file—, in the brief by which it defends the jurisdiction of this Jurisdiction to hear this claim—of December sixth, nineteen ninety-six—) its participation in this matter derives from that institution's interest in the objective defense of the public domain (demanio público), as the conflict concerns a property that includes the maritime-terrestrial zone, in accordance with the competence assigned to that institution by legal mandate. It must be recalled that, per the first article of the Organic Law of the Procuraduría General de la República, number 6815, of September twenty-seventh, nineteen eighty-two, this institution is held as the "superior consultative, technical-legal body of the Public Administration and legal representative of the State in matters within its competence," to which an important control function has been assigned regarding the effective protection of the environment—since, among its essential tasks, it is entrusted with:

"i) To act in defense of the national patrimony, of the resources existing in the maritime-terrestrial zone, the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf.

To take the appropriate legal actions to safeguard the environment, in order to guarantee the constitutional right of every person to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment.

To ensure the correct application of conventions, international treaties, laws, regulations, and other provisions on these matters.

To investigate, ex officio or at the request of a party, any action or omission that violates the indicated regulations" (as relevant, subsection i of Article 3 of the cited Law number 6815).

Likewise, Article 4 of the Law of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone (Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre), number 6043, of February seventeenth, nineteen seventy-seven, recognizes in this consultative body of the Administration the power to "[...] proprio motu or at the request of any state entity or institution or an interested party," exercise "[...] legal control for the due compliance with the provisions of this law. Consequently, it shall make the pertinent arrangements regarding any actions that violate or tend to infringe these provisions or related laws, or that seek to obtain rights or recognition thereof against those norms, or to annul concessions, permits, contracts, acts, agreements, or provisions obtained in contravention thereof. The foregoing is without prejudice to what corresponds to other institutions or agencies in accordance with their legal powers." Thus, the Procuraduría exercises an active control function in this matter, which legitimizes it to file and appear in jurisdictional proceedings, in defense, precisely, of the public domain.

VII.- REGARDING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN NATURE OF THE MARITIME-TERRESTRIAL ZONE AND ITS LEGAL REGIME.- Throughout the history of humanity, the great economic, commercial, and also security importance—pertaining to national defense—that the coast has for any country or state organization has been noted. Thus, with respect to our country, since colonial times, the coastline has remained destined for public use. Initially, the reserved area was one mile wide, which is why it was known—and still is in our time—as the "nautical mile (milla marítima)." The most important regulations governing the Costa Rican coastal zone begin with Law number 162, of June twenty-eighth, eighteen twenty-eight, shortly after independence from the Spanish Crown was declared, and during the formative stage of the Costa Rican State, which took up an earlier precept from the colonial era (Royal Decree (Real Cédula), of October fifteenth, seventeen fifty-four), by establishing the reservation of a nautical mile on the coasts of both seas, which was maintained throughout the legislation issued in the 19th century. This same public domain condition was recognized in the General Code of eighteen forty-one, which considered the ebb and flow of the sea and its shores as public domain; in Law number 7, of August thirty-first, eighteen sixty-eight, in which the "unclaimability (indenunciabilidad)" of the lands of the nautical mile was ratified; in the Water Law (Ley de Aguas), number 8, of May twenty-sixth, eighteen eighty-four, which designated that strip of land with the name "maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre)", which was expressly designated as a public domain asset, and consequently, was incorporated into the national patrimony; and finally, in the Fiscal Code of eighteen eighty-five, the prohibition was established on alienating the lands included in a mile of latitude along the coast of both seas. Already in the 20th century, the first regulation referring to the maritime-terrestrial zone was Law number 75, of August thirtieth, nineteen twenty-four, which reaffirmed the public domain character of these lands, as well as the impossibility of exploiting and usufructing them. Likewise, Law number 11, of October 22nd, nineteen twenty-two, specified with exactitude its extension, delimiting it at one thousand seven hundred sixty-two meters—the exact measurement of one mile—, from the ordinary high-water line (pleamar ordinaria), and five hundred meters along both banks of the rivers.

This measure remained in place until nineteen forty-two, when, starting with Laws number 19, of November twelfth, and Law number 201, of January twenty-sixth, nineteen forty-three, its extent was reduced to two hundred meters for both coasts; thus causing the first reclassifications (desafectaciones) of this property, in relation to all those lands beyond the determination made, and their consequent private appropriation; that is, from these two provisions onward, and with the exception of the two hundred meters measured from the ordinary high tide line (pleamar ordinaria), the remaining one thousand six hundred seventy-two meters ceased to be public domain (dominio público) from the moment they could be reduced to private domain. However, the lands contained within the two hundred meters excepted by the two aforementioned laws continued to be public domain assets, not reducible to private domain because they are inalienable (inalienables) and imprescriptible (imprescriptibles). This measurement of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre), together with the public domain character of the lands comprised therein, was reaffirmed in the then-current Article 7 of the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización), number 2825, of October fourteenth, nineteen sixty-one, and was repeated in the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), number 4465, of November twenty-fifth, nineteen sixty-nine, and in the Law for the Tourist Urbanization of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone (Ley de Urbanización Turística de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre), number 4558, of April twenty-second, nineteen seventy. It must be noted that, with Law number 4558, of April twenty-second, nineteen seventy, in its Transitory Provision III (Transitorio III), one hundred fifty meters of the two hundred meters were reclassified (desafectaron), after the first fifty meters, measured from the high tide line, by authorizing private individuals who had possessed, for more than thirty years, in a quiet, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted manner, lots or properties (fincas) in that sector, to register them through the procedure of possessory information (informaciones posesorias) before jurisdictional authorities—not administrative ones. Given the great number of abuses that were committed under the validity of this provision, that is, from May twelfth, nineteen seventy, it was repealed by Law number 5602, of November fourth, nineteen seventy-one, which entered into force upon its publication in La Gaceta number 206, of October fourteenth of that year; meaning it was in effect for seventeen months and two days. Finally, on March second, nineteen seventy-seven, the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law (Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre), number 6043, currently in force, was enacted, which maintained the public domain status of the two hundred meters along the country's coastline. By reason of the foregoing historical account of the normative regulation of the maritime-terrestrial zone, it must necessarily be concluded that it was always given the classification and treatment of a public domain asset (bien demanial) (dominical, demanio, or de dominio público), which makes it subject to all the characteristics of public domain status, namely, its inalienability, imprescriptibility, immunity from seizure (inembargabilidad), as well as subjection to the police power (poder de policía) regarding its use and exploitation, as indicated by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) in judgment number 7, at fifteen hours five minutes on January twentieth, nineteen ninety-three:

"It is clear then, without detriment to the colonial-era antecedent noted, that since the birth of Costa Rica as an independent State, the reserve of land along both coastlines has not been part of the unclaimed lands (baldíos)—the crown lands (tierras realengas) of the Colony—but has always been subject to a different legal regime, that of public domain assets (bienes de dominio público) and, therefore, not reducible to private property. In the legislation on the matter enacted throughout the 20th century—culminating in the current Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law No. 6043 of March 2, 1977—the classification of the lands comprised in said zone as public domain assets was, obviously, maintained. As a result of the legislative evolution of the 19th century, the maritime-terrestrial zone comprised the part of the coasts of both seas bathed by the ebb and flow, extending inland to a distance of one mile. It also comprised the banks of rivers up to the point where they were navigable or were affected by the tides. The legislation of this century specified the extent of the zone as well as the elements that formed part of it, but at no time denied its character as a public domain asset and, consequently, its imprescriptibility and inalienability; [...] From this brief study of the legislation concerning the maritime-terrestrial zone, it is easy to reach the conclusion that the strip of 200 meters from the ordinary high tide line along both coasts defined as part of the maritime-terrestrial zone by Article 9 of the current Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law, has been public domain—and the lands comprised therein, public domain assets—since 1828, at least. The variations that the legislation of the last century and the present one have introduced on the matter have never generally reclassified (desafectado) these 200 meters, rather, the legislation prior to 1942 and 1943 established a strip greater in extent—the so-called maritime mile (milla marítima)—but never less." (Considering II. The highlighting is not from the original.)

By virtue of the foregoing, and in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), the maritime-terrestrial zone acquires the status of a public domain asset of the Nation, a consideration that is reinforced by Article 3.1 of the Water Law (Ley de Aguas), "Article 3.- The following are likewise national property:

I.- The beaches and maritime zones"; and Article 1 of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law, insofar as it textually provides:

"The maritime-terrestrial zone constitutes part of the national patrimony (patrimonio nacional), belongs to the State, and is inalienable and imprescriptible. Its protection, as well as its natural resources, is an obligation of the State, its institutions, and all the inhabitants of the country. Its use and exploitation are subject to the provisions of this Law." In the same vein, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) ruled in judgments number 2000-10466 and 2002-3821; as did the Third Section of the Contentious Court (Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso), acting as administrative head, in resolution number 128-2001, at eight hours on February sixteenth, two thousand one:

"VI.- Correlatively to what has been said, the maritime-terrestrial zone constitutes part of the national patrimony, belongs to the State, and is inalienable and imprescriptible. Its protection is an obligation of the State and its institutions—including, of course, the corresponding Municipalities—and even of all the inhabitants of the country. Its use and exploitation are subject to the provisions of Law No. 6043 on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone." VIII.- Having determined the special affectation of the maritime-terrestrial zone, it is now of interest to know precisely which assets or areas this special regime of legal protection comprises. And it is Law number 6043 itself which, in its Article 9, tells us:

"[...] the strip of two hundred meters wide along the entire length of the Atlantic and Pacific coastlines of the Republic, whatever its nature, measured horizontally from the line of the ordinary high tide and the lands and rocks left uncovered by the sea at low tide.

For legal purposes, the maritime-terrestrial zone comprises the islands, islets, and maritime rocks, as well as all land or natural formation that protrudes above the ocean level within the territorial sea of the Republic. Cocos Island (Isla del Coco), which shall be under the direct domain and possession of the State, is excepted, as are those other islands whose domain or administration is determined in this law or special laws." Likewise, according to Article 4 of the Regulation to this Law, Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) number 7841-P, of December sixteenth, nineteen seventy-seven, it encompasses:

"[...] the mangroves (manglares) or salt forests (bosques salados) existing on the continental or insular coastlines and estuaries (esteros) of the maritime-terrestrial territory, constitute Forest Reserve (Reserva Forestal) and are affected by the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) and all the provisions of that decree [number 7210-A, of July nineteenth, nineteen seventy-seven]. Starting from the vegetation line at the edge of the estuaries and the limit of the mangroves or salt forests when these extend more than fifty meters from the ordinary high tide line, the restricted zone (zona restringida) begins." The maritime-terrestrial zone is divided into two zones: the public zone (zona pública), which comprises the strip of fifty meters wide, measured from the ordinary high tide line, composed of the littoral, shore, or sea coast that extends through the rías (rías) and permanent estuaries (esteros permanentes), up to where these are appreciably affected by the tides and present defined marine characteristics (Article 2, subsection h) of the Regulation to the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law, Executive Decree number 7841-P); and the restricted zone (zona restringida), constituted by the remaining one hundred fifty meters. By virtue of the foregoing, the following are part of the public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone: the ría, defined as the part of the river near its entrance into the sea, and up to where the tides reach (subsection f) of Article 2 of the cited Executive Decree number 7841-P); so that, in relation to the provisions of Article 9 of the Law governing this matter, the strip of two hundred meters contiguous to the rías is also maritime-terrestrial zone; "the islets, rocks, and other small areas and natural formations that protrude from the sea" (final paragraph of Article 10 of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law); the mangroves, pursuant to the provisions of Article 11 of the cited Law:

"The public zone is also, whatever its extent, the area occupied by all the mangroves of the continental and insular coastlines and estuaries of the national territory"; whose incorporation into the public domain (demanio) dates back to nineteen forty-two, with the Water Law, a circumstance that prevents their titling by private individuals. It is noted that Article 4 of the Regulation establishes that the restricted zone in these cases starts from the vegetation line at the edge of the estuaries and the limit of the mangroves or salt forests, when these extend more than fifty meters from the ordinary high tide line; which is of great importance, as it extends the concept of maritime-terrestrial zone to portions of the national territory that may be located kilometers from the coast, so that the lands adjacent to the mangrove cannot be the object of legitimate possession. In view of the ecological importance of mangroves, Article 44 of the Forestry Law, in concordance with Article 17 of the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente), requires the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía) to carry out the respective environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental), prior to the granting of any permit for their exploitation; and, the islands, islets, maritime rocks, and the lands and rocks left uncovered by the sea at low tide, in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 9 of Law number 6043, a condition that had already been granted since the Water Law, number 276, of August twenty-seventh, nineteen forty-two, in its Article 75, by stating:

"Islands already formed or that may form in the maritime-terrestrial zone or in the navigable part of rivers and in the rías and river mouths are the property of the State"; and which was maintained by Decree-Law number 11, of July twenty-seventh, nineteen forty-eight, reformed by number 803, of November second of the following year, in the following terms:

"confirms and proclaims National Sovereignty over the entire submarine platform or continental and insular shelf adjacent to the continental and insular coasts of the national territory, whatever the depth at which it is found, reaffirming the inalienable right of the Nation to all natural riches that exist on, in, or under said shelf or platform"; and subsection c) of Article 7 of the Land and Colonization Law, number 2825, of October fourteenth, nineteen sixty-one. It must be clarified that in the case of rocks, the concept of public zone applies to the entire natural formation, and in the case of islands, to the fifty meters contiguous to the high tide line, with the remaining lands considered restricted zone (Article 10 of Law number 6042), unless a mangrove exists, in which case, it is considered public zone, as indicated previously.

IX.- It is worth recalling that the public zone has been designated for the free use, access, and transit of all; so that any permit or concession, as well as the charging of the respective fee (canon) located in the public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone, is null (as resolved in administrative resolution number 6424-97, at nine hours on April seventeenth, nineteen ninety-seven, of the Contentious Administrative Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo)), except for those having a public purpose, such as:

"[...] the construction of industrial plants, sport or artisanal fishing facilities, port works, mariculture programs, or other similar establishments or installations, ..." (Article 18 of Law 6043); whose location near the sea is indispensable for their proper functioning. In any case, they must have the due authorizations from the MOPT, INVU, ICT, and the respective municipality, attending, in any case and at all times, "[...] to the public use for which they are intended, or that it involves the establishment and operation of state tourist facilities of notable convenience for the country" (first paragraph of Article 22 of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law).

Likewise, in the case of the natural resource contained in the public zone, it is noted that neither can the flora and fauna be exploited, trees cut, or products extracted from the coast, except with the due authorization—permit or concession—, in this case, from the Wildlife Directorate (Dirección de Vida Silvestre), of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, following an environmental impact assessment, in accordance with the provisions of Article 17 of the Organic Environmental Law. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the respective municipalities to facilitate access to the beaches for the enjoyment and transit of people, so that the local government must prevent any limiting action that impedes this free access to the beaches. This oversight function also concerns the eviction of invaders, and even destroying or demolishing the constructions, installations, or works carried out, whether they involve simple fences, shanties, sales stands, or dwelling houses, without any responsibility (as considered by the Contentious Administrative Court, Third Section, in resolution number 7900-98). According to Article 39 of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law, it is only possible to grant concessions in the restricted zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone, which are the responsibility of the municipalities (Article 40 of the cited Law); except in cases where a protected wilderness area exists—forest reserves (reservas forestales), protection zones (zonas protectoras), national parks (parques nacionales), biological reserves (reservas biológicas), national wildlife refuges (refugios nacionales de vida silvestre), wetlands (humedales), natural monuments (monumentos naturales)—which, according to Articles 32 of the Organic Environmental Law and 73 of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law, are under the administration of the Ministry of Environment and Energy.

X.- ON THE BOUNDARIES OF THE PROPERTIES OF THE PLAINTIFF.- According to the content of the appealed judgment (and this point having not been objected to by any of the parties), it is taken as a starting point that the plaintiff is the registered titleholder of the properties registered in the real folio system (folio real) with registration numbers 22641-000 and 22533-000, both in the sixth canton of Aguirre, second district (Savegre), of the Province of Puntarenas, at Portalón beach, properties over which the Trial Judge recognized all the attributes of the right of ownership. However, and according to the evidence provided in the case file (expediente), it is also true that the property whose ownership was sought to be recovered (reivindicar) in this proceeding comprises part of the previous properties, and that it is unregistered land, precisely because of its condition of being a public domain asset, as it comprises part of the maritime-terrestrial zone of Portalón beach; a circumstance that means that the boundaries (linderos) of both properties registered in the real folio system with registration numbers 22641-000 and 22533-000, are not the Pacific Ocean nor the Portalón River, but rather the maritime-terrestrial zone area, which comprises the ría of the mouth of the Portalón River, the estuary (estero), and the mangrove existing in the zone, so that the measurement of the properties must exclude the protection area of such public domain assets, that is, two hundred meters contiguous to the ría and one hundred fifty meters along the vegetation line at the edge of the estuaries and the limit of the mangroves and salt estuaries, if they extend more than fifty meters from the ordinary high tide line; boundaries that must be modified in the Public Property Registry (Registro Público de la Propiedad), as well as the respective cadastral plans. It is further noted that it is improper and openly contrary to the regulations governing the matter to recognize any right of ownership or its attributes (possession (posesión), usufruct (usufructo), transformation (transformación) and alienation (enajenación), defense and exclusion (defensa y exclusión), restitution and indemnification (restitución e indemnización), pursuant to Article 264 of the Civil Code (Código Civil)) to the plaintiff, due to the legal nature of the asset in question, which takes it outside the commerce of men (inalienabilidad), besides which its acquisition or loss is not possible through the procedure of decennial possession—usucapion (usucapión)—(imprescriptibilidad). Therefore, no possession is possible, neither by the plaintiff, nor by the defendants, nor by any third party, considering that, as explained previously, such zones have had the condition of public domain status (demanialidad) since the colonial era. Finally, it must be noted that the plaintiff does not have the status of occupant (ocupante), which refers to those natural persons who, without meeting the condition of settlers (pobladores)—who had a lot in the maritime mile (milla marítima) before the enactment of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law, that is, before nineteen seventy-seven, and for a period greater than ten years—had occupied the maritime-terrestrial zone, even in an unauthorized manner, prior to the entry into force of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law, by virtue of which they hold no permit whatsoever, subjects with respect to whom the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law itself, number 6043, in its Articles 44, 70, and Transitory VII, constitutes two exceptions to the parameters of private utilization in the maritime-terrestrial zone, and with respect to whom the granting of use permits is indeed legitimate, which has special conditions, insofar as it is only admitted "[...] for those cases in which the conditions of the zone are not affected, nor the free use of the public zone hindered, and whose execution in no way limits the future implementation of the Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador). (Article 19 of Law 6043)." (Resolution number 10163-99, of the Third Section of the Contentious Administrative Court); and which allows municipalities to charge a fee (canon). But which in no way should be taken as the recognition of a right of possession over such areas, but solely as a priority right for the granting of future concessions, once the respective coastal regulatory plan (plan regulador costero) has been approved; hence, under equal conditions, the administration must prefer to grant the concession to whomever has possessed in a quiet, public, and peaceful continuous manner, which denotes subjection to territorial regulations.

XII.- ON COSTS (COSTAS).- The plaintiff requests in its appeal that the award of costs be reviewed because it has demonstrated that it acted in good faith. According to the provisions of Article 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), applied supplementarily according to the provisions of Article 103 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), the losing party must be ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs. This Tribunal considers that the appellant is correct, insofar as, it is true that upon admitting the exception of res judicata (cosa juzgada), each and every one of the claims of the complaint were recognized; but it is also not possible to order the defendants to pay, considering that it is deemed there was sufficient motive to litigate, a circumstance that is covered in subsection c) of Article 98 of the Regulatory Law of this Jurisdiction. By virtue of which, the appealed judgment must be reversed on this point, to declare it without a special award of costs.

THEREFORE (POR TANTO):

The evidence offered for a better provision of justice (mejor proveer) presented by the State's representative is rejected. The judgment brought on appeal is modified, in the sense that the properties registered in the real folio system with registration numbers 22641-000 and 22633-000, both located in the sixth canton of Aguirre, second district, Savegre, Province of Puntarenas, do not border the Pacific Ocean or the Portalón River, but rather the maritime-terrestrial zone, which comprises the ría of the mouth of the Portalón River, estuary, and mangrove. It is noted that it is not possible to consider PRIMERA COMPAÑÍA DE DESARROLLO, SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, as the legitimate occupant or possessor of the public domain areas that are excluded herein, insofar as their exploitation is subject to the granting of the corresponding authorization (permit or concession) from the Ministry of Environment and Energy, because the Portalón Mixed Category Wildlife Refuge (Refugio de Vida Silvestre Categoría Mixto Portalón) was declared via Executive Decree number 25.139-MINAE, which it did not demonstrate having in this proceeding. Once this judgment is final, let it be registered in the Public Registry, in the margin of the cited properties. The judgment brought on appeal is reversed regarding the order of costs, to declare it without a special award in this aspect.

José Paulino Hernández Silvia C. Fernández Brenes Lorena Montes de Oca Monge Ordinary Proceeding Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo S. A. v/ María del Rosario Monge Baltodano, Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes S. A. and the State Appearing as Special Judicial Representative of the plaintiff is Doctor Alberto Agid Zelaya Martínez, of legal age, married, Costa Rican, with identity card number 8-064-497, attorney.

**WHEREAS:** **1.-** That having set the amount in controversy in this matter at **two hundred million colones** based on the facts set forth and legal citations adduced; the claim is for the judgment to declare the action for nullity, replevin (reivindicación), and damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) granted in all its terms on the following points:

"*A.- That the sole owner and possessor of the farms (fincas) claimed in this trial, as well as of their areas, is the plaintiff: PRIMERA COMPAÑÍA UNIDA DE DESARROLLO, S.A.; that consequently, possession and any other real right (derecho real) derived from its title of ownership belongs to it.* *B.- That the Private Sale Agreement (Carta-venta) in a private document signed by the representative of PRIMERA COMPAÑÍA UNIDA DE DESARROLLO S.A., Valerie Havill Nicholson, and the defendant: MARÍA DEL ROSARIO MONGE BALTODANO, on the 17th day of May 1985, as well as the sale signed between MARÍA DEL ROSARIO MONGE BALTODANO and the Co-defendant INVERSIONES TURÍSTICAS LOS TUCANES, S.A., presided over by the same MONGE BALTODANO, in San José, on the 18th day of January 1987, this latter sale being a legal consequence derived from the private Sale Agreement whereby the defendant MONGE BALTODANO acquired, ARE ABSOLUTELY NULL and without any legal value before the right of ownership and other real rights accredited by the plaintiff.* *B.- [sic] That the plaintiff: PRIMERA COMPAÑÍA UNIDAD DE DESARROLLO, S.A., is the sole occupant and legitimately authorized to operate (explorar) the area situated within the maritime way (vía marítima) and which the defendant party has illegally maintained; this area was occupied by the defendants with two constructed houses of three floors each.* *C.- That Mrs. MARÍA DEL ROSARIO MONGE BALTODANO and the co-defendant company must immediately vacate (desalojar) all the property claimed in this trial, the ownership and legitimacy of which have been demonstrated in favor of the plaintiff party, and deliver them to said party as the legitimate owner.* *D.- That the defendant party must pay the plaintiff party all damages and losses caused during the time the illegal tenure (tenencia) of the replevied property lasted; likewise, [sic] it must answer for any loss, deterioration, or destruction of the property that may have existed in the houses in the maritime area occupied by the plaintiff at the time of the illegal invasion carried out by the defendant party.* *E.- That all resulting damages and losses shall be liquidated in execution of judgment.* *F.- That the defendant party may not claim any improvement (mejora) made in good faith on the replevied property, since its tenure has been without just cause (justa causa) or just title (justo título) during the entire time of said tenure.* *G.- That any subsequent legal act (acto jurídico) derived from the documents annulled in this ordinary trial is also annulled as a consequence of the legal act that gave rise to it having been annulled.* *H.- That the defendant party must pay the plaintiff party the personal and procedural costs (costas personales y procesales) caused by this declaratory trial." (Sheets 371 to 373.)

**2.-** That the defendants answered in an untimely manner—after the entry of default (resolución of the Civil Court of Aguirre and Parrita at thirteen hours and thirty minutes on September 4, 1998, sheet 388)—, in which they raised the defenses (excepciones) of formal and material res judicata (cosa juzgada formal y material), statute of limitations (prescripción), lack of active and passive standing to sue (falta de acción ad causam activa y pasiva), lack of right, and the generic *sine actione agit* (sheets 409 to 429).

**3.-** That the State representative appeared, **in protection of the direct** (institutional) **interest** it holds in the defense of the public domain (demanio público), and therefore requests the absolute nullity be declared ex officio of any act, contractual stipulation, or agreement ventilated in this proceeding that entails an appropriation, holding, use, enjoyment, transfer, or illicit exploitation of the Maritime Terrestrial Zone (Zona Marítimo Terrestre), of state domain, and therefore any declaration implying a direct or indirect recognition of private rights, in favor of the parties, against the encumbrance created by that regime must be dismissed in judgment (sheets 391 to 402).

**4.-** Licenciada Nancy Allen Umaña, Judge of the corresponding Court, in judgment number 719-2005, at eight hours and ten minutes on July 14, 2005, resolved: "A partial inadmissibility of the action is declared, in the ordinary proceeding brought by the company Primera Compañía Unidad de Desarrollo against María Monge Baltodano and Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes, considering that res judicata exists with respect to the following claims: a. That the sole owner and possessor of the farms claimed in this trial, as well as of their areas, is the plaintiff, and consequently, possession and any other real right derived from its title of ownership belong to it. b. That the Private Sale Agreement in a private document signed by the representative of Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo S.A., Valerie Havill Nicholson, and the defendant, on May 17, 1985, as well as the sale signed between María del Rosario Monge Baltodano and the Co-defendant Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes, presided over by Monge Baltodano, in San José, on January 18, 1987, this latter sale being a legal consequence derived from the private Sale Agreement whereby the defendant Monge Baltodano acquired, are absolutely null and without any legal value before the right of ownership and other real rights accredited by the plaintiff. d. That Monge Baltodano and the co-defendant company must immediately vacate all the claimed property. e. That the defendant party must pay the plaintiff party all damages and losses caused during the time the illegal tenure of the replevied property lasted; f. That the defendant party may not claim any improvement made in good faith on the replevied property. g. That any subsequent legal act derived from the documents annulled in this ordinary trial is also annulled as a consequence of the legal act that gave rise to it having been annulled." Regarding the claims: "c. That the plaintiff is the sole occupant and legitimately authorized to operate the area situated within the maritime way. e…; thus, it must answer for any loss, deterioration, or destruction of the property that may have existed in the houses in the maritime area occupied by the plaintiff at the time of the illegal invasion carried out by the defendant party," the claim is declared improper. The plaintiff is ordered to pay both costs (costas) of this action. Notify. (Sheets 835 verso and 836.)

**5.-** Disagreeing with the resolution of the A-quo, the plaintiff and the State representative appeal, remedies that were admitted, and by virtue of which this Court hears the matter on appeal.

**5.-** In the proceedings, the mandatory rules of procedure have been observed, and no grounds for nullity capable of invalidating the actions taken are noted.

**Judge Fernández Brenes writes; and,** **CONSIDERING:** **I.- OF THE EVIDENCE OFFERED FOR BETTER PROVISION.-** By means of a brief filed on June 8, 2006, the State representative requests that a certificate issued by the Director General of the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación) of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía) on the coastal public domain areas, of state ownership, comprising the Mixed Category National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre, Categoría Mixta) be admitted as evidence for better decision. As this Court deems it unnecessary, since its content is determined not only in the decree creating said protected area but also in the rest of the evidence provided, such as cadastral maps (planos catastrados) and in the arguments of the parties in this claim, the admission of the offered evidence is denied.

**II.- OF THE PROVEN FACTS.-** For a better understanding of the facts held as proven, the ones determined by the Trial Judge are substituted, due to a series of omissions in their setting down, so that they shall be held as follows: **1.)** That the farms (fincas) registered on real folio with registration number 22641-000 and 22633-000, both of the sixth canton of Aguirre, second district (Savegre), of the Province of Puntarenas, are the property of the company Primera Compañía Unida, S.A., whose registered boundaries (linderos) are as follows: to the north with Guillermo Rodríguez Rodríguez, to the south with the maritime mile (milla marítima) and Guillermo Rodríguez Rodríguez, to the east with Portalón River, and to the west with Guillermo Rodríguez Rodríguez, the first; and to the north with Salada creek in the middle another, to the south with the maritime mile, to the east with Manuel Arias Chinchilla and to the west with Alicia Bonilla Ramírez, regarding the second (sheets 6 to 11 of the judicial file); **2.)** That on ***May 18, 1985***, Valerie Havill Nicholson, in her capacity as unlimited general representative (apoderada generalísimo sin limite de suma) of the company ***Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo, sold by means of a private sale-purchase agreement in a private document to Rosario Monge Baltodano a property located in Matapalo, second district of Savegre, canton of Aguirre, Province of Puntarenas***, which was an unregistered land, but which the seller had possessed for more than ten years in a quiet, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted manner for the sum of five hundred thousand colones, with the following boundaries: to the North, with the Matapalo River in the middle, partly property of the Garita family and of the seller itself, to the South, with the Pacific Ocean, to the East with Rodrigo Ruíz Solórzano, and to the West, with the mouth of the Portalón River, forming an irregular plate-shaped point; measuring approximately, to the east some four hundred meters, to the west some three hundred meters at its widest part, to the North and to the South some three thousand meters, which results in an approximate area of ninety-five hectares, comprising a poorly maintained flat pasture, with a poorly maintained airstrip, partly fenced, with two three-story dwelling houses roofed with zinc ricalit that have been abandoned, a small wooden house in poor condition, two semi-enclosed sheds for protecting electric plants made of zinc, which are in poor condition, there are two electric plants in poor condition, as well as an electric pump to drain water from a well (private sale-purchase agreement, sheets 22 and 23, fact 3 of the claim, sheet 350 of the judicial file); **3.)** That to the aforementioned private sale-purchase agreement, Notary Public José Luis Barletta Blanco affixed a fixed date (fecha cierta) on January 12, 1987 (notation on the copy of the deed, sheet 24 of the judicial file); **4.)** That the portion of land sold overlapped part of the registered properties with registration numbers 22641-000 and 22633-000 and comprises part of the maritime terrestrial zone (cadastral maps numbers 350390-97, 350397-79, parcel map 115 of the Institute of Lands and Colonization (Instituto de Tierras y Colonización), and montage of the cadastral maps P-49305-98, P-350397-79 and P-13238-74 made by the National Cadastre Territorial Information System (Catastro Nacional Sistema de Información Territorial Catastral), sheets 1, 2, 4 and 665 of the judicial file, and statements of the defendants, sheets 410 verso, 411, 414, 415, 415 verso, 416 verso of the judicial file); **5.)** That on ***January 18, 1987***, Mrs. Monge Baltodano sold the aforementioned property by means of a private sale-purchase agreement to Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes, said defendant being the representative of this company, for the sum of five hundred thousand colones (sheets 25 and 26 of the judicial file); **6.)** That ***by means of deed number eighty-eight, before notary public Allen Ramírez Henderson, on January 2, 1994***, Mrs. Silvia Nora Gutiérrez Alarcón representing Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo S.A. and María del Rosario Monge Baltodano representing Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes S.A. reached an agreement with the purpose of ending the dispute that arose in relation to Portalón Beach in Savegre, Aguirre, rendering without value and effect the sale contract signed between Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo S.A. and Mrs. Monge Baltodano personally on May 18, 1985, for which, the company Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes, S.A. received in that act the sum of two million colones which are credited against the price it paid for said lands, as well as the payment it had to make to Terciopelo, S.A. to enter into possession of the lands, and that of any damage or loss during that time. By virtue of the foregoing, the company Primera Compañía de Desarrollo Unida, S. A. was recognized the possibility to continue with possession of said lands. And finally, they agreed to waive any type of conflict of an indemnification nature for the property comprised in the dwelling houses (sheet 119 of the judicial file); **7.)** That the ***Mixed Court of Puriscal, Agrarian by Ministry of Law, Santiago, by means of a resolution at 15:00 hours on January 18, 1995*** resolved the following: "*After analyzing this process, we see that in October 1988, it was suspended because the sale-purchase document presented by the plaintiff was alleged to be false. After more than six years of procedural inactivity, the defendant presents a notarial agreement, signed by the representatives of the companies contending here where they agree: ‘that with the purpose of ending the dispute that arose in relation to Portalón beach in Savegre, Aguirre, it renders without value and effect the sale contract signed between Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo S.A. and Mrs. Monge Baltodano personally, on May 18, 1985, for which Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes S.A. receives in this act the sum of two million colones which are credited against the price it paid for said lands, as well as the payment it had to make to Tercio Pelo S. A., to enter into possession of the lands, as well as the payment of any damage or loss arising during this time. Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo S.A. may in exchange continue with the possession of the lands as it has been doing since 1991…*". "*This document was made known to the plaintiff, as well as the defendant's petition to conclude the proceeding, and it made no statement. **Therefore, it is ordered that the file be archived and note it be made in the entry book.** (Ordinary proceeding of INVERSIONES TURÍSTICAS LOS TUCANES S.A. against PRIMERA COMPAÑÍA UNIDA DE DESARROLLO S.A.)." (sheet 298 of the judicial file); **8.)** That by means of ***Executive Decree number 25139-MINAE, of February 16, 1996***, the Ministry of Environment and Energy declared the area of Portalón Beach, Matapalo, Province of Puntarenas, Canton of Aguirre, District of Savegre, a Mixed Category Wildlife Refuge, in which the properties (inmuebles) belonging to the company Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo, Sociedad Anónima are located (sixth fact of the claim, sheet 354 of the judicial file, and statements of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) and the Minister of Environment and Energy, sheets 391 to 402, 512 to 526 of the judicial file, executive decree, sheet 401 of the administrative file, volume 5); **9.)** That in October 1997, the forest regent (regente forestal) Engineer Rodolfo Sequeira Herrera prepared a management plan (plan de manejo) for the payment of environmental services (pago de servicios ambientales) of the Portalón Mixed Category Wildlife Refuge, to submit it for approval to the Incentives Program for forest protection C.P.B. of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, which comprises solely conservation activities (sheets 191 to 202 of the judicial file); and, **10.)** That in **1998 the State** (Office of the Attorney General) brought criminal actions to safeguard the public domain property (bien demanial) (maritime terrestrial zone) on the occasion of the acts of possession by the company Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes, S.A. and its representative (María del Rosario Monge Baltodano) due to the latter's disobedience to remove fences (response of the Head of the Regional Office of Aguirre and Parrita of the Ministry of Environment and Energy before the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), on the occasion of the amparo remedy filed by the company, which was processed in file number 5004-98-0007-CO, sheets 251 to 254 of the administrative file, volume 5).

**III.- OF THE UNPROVEN FACTS.-** Of importance for the resolution of this matter, the following are held as unproven facts: **1.)** That the company Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo, S.A. has a permit or authorization granted by the Ministry of Environment and Energy for the use and exploitation of the areas comprising the maritime terrestrial zone of Portalón Beach; and, **2.)** That the plaintiff has the status of ***occupant*** of the maritime terrestrial zone.

**IV.- OF THE GRIEVANCES OF THE PLAINTIFF.-** In briefs filed on August first and third (sheets 843 and 844 the first and 846 to 849) the plaintiff files an appeal (recurso de apelación) solely with respect to the ***award of the payment of both costs imposed upon it in judgment number 719-2005, at eight hours ten minutes on July 14, 2005***, for "*not finding it in accordance with law*", due to an erroneous application of Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), based on the following considerations: **a.)** for having been granted each of the claims requested in the complaint, through the ex officio incorporation of a defense of material res judicata, despite—it claims—that "*it is only today that for the first time there exists a judgment expressly stating each of the points on which res judicata exists*"; **b.)** having acted with evident good faith, and **c.)** that to impose such an award, the damages and losses caused on the occasion of the illegitimate possession of the defendants were not assessed; grounds for which it requests the reversal (revocatoria) of the judgment on this point, so that it be resolved accordingly. By means of a brief filed on October 10, 2005 (sheets 893 to 8986), it requests that the appeal filed by the Office of the Attorney General be dismissed in all its aspects, declaring instead its condition as a "*settler*" (pobladora), having accredited procedures for the granting of the respective concession (concesión) and the payment of the respective fee (canon), up to 1993. By means of a brief filed on May 15, 2007 (visible on sheets 938 to 939), outside the term to formulate grievances which expired on October 12, 2005, the plaintiff formulates more grievances to challenge the cited resolution, that is for having admitted a defense introduced ex officio by the Trial Judge, without being granted the hearing contained in Article 307 of the Civil Procedure Code, causing it defenselessness (indefensión). Due to the untimeliness of this latter argument, no pronouncement will be made on it, limiting the analysis of the appeal solely to the point initially challenged.

**V.- OF THE GRIEVANCES OF THE STATE REPRESENTATIVE.-** The grounds for the challenge by the State representative focus on the fact that the judgment does not make an exception for the public domain lands that the property sought to be replevied incorporates, which is also located within the Mixed Category National Wildlife Refuge; taking into account that said ruling admitted that there is no permit over such property regarding its use and exploitation; so that, in the operative part, it recognizes the existence of a right of ownership, possession, and other real rights derived from dominion over such estates (fundos), without clarifying that it does not comprise the areas of the ***maritime terrestrial zone***, which is not limited to the two hundred meters from the coast, but also the ***ría***—which is the part of the river near the sea entrance and up to where the tides reach—, the mangroves—which are public property (bienes públicos), regardless of their extension—, and the **estuary** (estero), which are of state public domain.

By virtue of which, possessory actions, titling, or judicial discussions related to the ownership or possession of this type of property, which belongs to the State by operation of law, are unacceptable.

**VI.- THE INTERVENTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA) IN THIS PROCEEDING.-** This Tribunal considers that, prior to resolving the appeal filed by the State's representation, it is pertinent to make a brief analysis regarding the justification for this institution's intervention in this proceeding, since it cannot be considered a coadjuvant, as **it does not act as a mere participant adhering to the claims or situation of any of the parties appearing in this proceeding**, but rather, as indicated in its various interventions (in the brief by which it appeared in the proceeding – filed on November twenty-fourth, nineteen hundred ninety-eight, visible at folios 391 to 402 of the judicial file–, in the brief defending the competence of this Jurisdiction to hear this lawsuit – dated December sixth, nineteen hundred ninety-six–) its participation in this matter derives from the **interest of that institution in the objective defense of the public domain (demanio público), as the conflict concerns a property comprising the maritime-terrestrial zone, in accordance with the competence assigned to that institution by legal mandate**. It must be remembered that under the terms of article one of the Organic Law of the Office of the Attorney General, number 6815, of September twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred eighty-two, this institution is considered the "*superior consultative, technical-legal body of the Public Administration and the legal representative of the State in matters within its competence*", to which an important control function has been assigned regarding the effective protection of the environment–, since, among its essential tasks, it is entrusted:

Likewise, article 4 of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law, number 6043, of February seventeenth, nineteen hundred seventy-seven), recognizes this consultative body of the Administration the power to "[...] *by itself or at the request of any entity or institution of the State or an interested party*", exercise "[...] *legal control for the due fulfillment of the provisions of this law. Consequently, it shall carry out the pertinent procedures regarding any actions that violate or tend to infringe these provisions or related laws, or that seek to obtain rights or recognition thereof against those norms, or to annul concessions, permits, contracts, acts, agreements, or provisions obtained in contravention thereof. The foregoing is without prejudice to what corresponds to other institutions or dependencies in accordance with their legal powers.*" Thus, the Office of the Attorney General exercises an **active control** function in this matter, which legitimizes it to file and appear in jurisdictional proceedings, in defense, precisely, of the public domain.

**VII.- THE PUBLIC DOMAIN CHARACTER OF THE MARITIME-TERRESTRIAL ZONE AND ITS LEGAL REGIME**.- Throughout the history of humanity, the great economic, commercial, and also security importance – regarding national defense – that the coast has for any country or state organization has been noted. Thus, regarding our country, since the colonial era, the coastline has remained destined for public use. Initially, the reserved area was one **mile wide**, for which it was known – and still in our time – as the "**maritime mile (milla marítima)**". The most relevant regulations governing the Costa Rican coastal zone begin with **Law number 162, of June twenty-eighth, eighteen hundred twenty-eight**, just after independence was declared from the Spanish Crown, and during the formation stage of the Costa Rican State, which adopted an earlier precept from the colonial era (Royal Decree (Real Cédula), of October fifteenth, seventeen hundred fifty-four), by establishing the reservation of one maritime mile on the coasts of both seas, which was maintained throughout all the legislation issued in the 19th century. That same condition of public domain character was recognized in the **General Code of eighteen hundred forty-one**, which considered the ebb and flow of the sea and its shores as public domain; in **Law number 7, of August thirty-first, eighteen hundred sixty-eight**, which ratified the "**unreportability (indenunciabilidad)**" **of the maritime mile lands**; in the **Water Law, number 8, of May twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred eighty-four**, which named that strip of land with the appellation "**maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre)**", which was expressly affected as a public domain asset, and consequently, incorporated into the national heritage; and finally, in the **Fiscal Code of eighteen hundred eighty-five**, the prohibition on alienating the lands comprised within one mile of latitude along the coast of both seas was established. Already in the 20th century, the first regulation referring to the maritime-terrestrial zone was **Law number 75, of August thirtieth, nineteen hundred twenty-four**, which reaffirmed the public domain character of these lands, as well as the impossibility of exploiting and usufructing them. Likewise, **Law number 11, of October 22nd, nineteen hundred twenty-two**, precisely defined its extent, delimiting it at one thousand seven hundred sixty-two meters – the exact measure of one mile – from the ordinary high tide line, and five hundred meters along both margins of the rivers. This measurement was maintained until nineteen hundred forty-two, when as of **Laws number 19, of November twelfth**, and **Law number 201, of January twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred forty-three**, its extent was reduced to two hundred meters for both coasts; thus causing the first disaffectations of this property, regarding all lands beyond the determination made, and their consequent private appropriation; that is, from these two provisions onward, and with the exception of the two hundred meters counted from the ordinary high tide line, the remaining one thousand six hundred seventy-two meters ceased to be public domain from the moment they could be reduced to private ownership. However, **the lands contained in the two hundred meters excepted by the two aforementioned laws, continued to be public domain assets, not reducible to private ownership as they are inalienable and imprescriptible**. This measurement of the maritime-terrestrial zone, together with the public domain character of the lands comprised therein, was reaffirmed in the then-current **article 7 of the Lands and Colonization Law, number 2825, of October fourteenth, nineteen hundred sixty-one**, and was repeated in **the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), number 4465, of November twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred sixty-nine**, and in the **Tourism Urbanization Law of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, number 4558, of April twenty-second, nineteen hundred seventy**. It must be noted that, with **Law number 4558, of April twenty-second, nineteen hundred seventy, in its Transitory Provision III**, one hundred fifty meters of the two hundred meters were disaffected, after the first fifty meters, counted from the high tide line, by authorizing private individuals who had possessed for more than thirty years, in a quiet, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted manner, lots or properties in that sector, to register them through the procedure of possessory information before the jurisdictional authorities – not administrative –. Given the large number of abuses committed under the validity of this provision, that is, from May twelfth, nineteen hundred seventy, it was repealed by **Law number 5602, of November fourth, nineteen hundred seventy-one**, which entered into force upon its publication in La Gaceta number 206, of October fourteenth of that year; meaning it was in force for seventeen months and two days. Finally, on March second, nineteen hundred seventy-seven, the **Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law, number 6043, current to date**, was enacted, which maintained the public domain character of the two hundred meters along the country's coastline. By reason of the foregoing historical account of the regulatory regime of the maritime-terrestrial zone, it must necessarily be concluded that **it was always given the qualification and treatment of public domain property (bien demanial) (dominical, demanio, or public domain), which makes it entitled to all the characteristics of public domain character, that is, its inalienability, imprescriptibility, non-attachability, as well as subjection to police power regarding its use and exploitation**, as indicated by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in ruling number 7, at fifteen hours five minutes on January twentieth, nineteen hundred ninety-three:

"*It is clear then, without demerit to the colonial era antecedent indicated, that since the birth of Costa Rica as an independent State, the land reserve along both coastlines has not been part of the unowned lands (baldíos) – the royal lands of the Colony– but rather has always been subject to a different legal regime, that proper to public domain assets and, therefore, not reducible to private property. In the legislation on the matter enacted throughout the 20th century – culminating with the current Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone No. 6043 of March 2, 1977– the qualification of public domain assets for the lands comprised in said zone was, obviously, maintained. As a result of the legislative evolution of the 19th century, the maritime-terrestrial zone comprised the part of the coasts of both seas washed by the ebb and flow, extending up to a distance of one mile inland. It also comprised the banks of rivers up to the point where they were navigable or were affected by the tides. The legislation of this century progressively specified the extent of the zone as well as the elements that formed part of it, but **at no time did it deny its character as a public domain asset and, consequently, its imprescriptibility and inalienability**;* [...] *From this brief study of the legislation on the maritime-terrestrial zone, it is easy to reach the conclusion that the 200-meter strip from the ordinary high tide line along both coasts defined as part of the maritime-terrestrial zone by article 9 of the current Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, has been public domain – and the lands comprised therein, public domain assets – since 1828, at least. The variations that the legislation of the last century and the present have introduced on the matter have never disaffected these 200 meters in a generalized manner, since the legislation prior to 1942 and 1943 established a strip larger in extent – the so-called maritime mile– but never smaller.*" (Considering II. The highlighting is not from the original.)

By virtue of the foregoing, and under the terms provided in article 6 of the Political Constitution, the maritime-terrestrial zone acquires the condition of public domain asset of the Nation, a consideration reinforced by article 3.1 of the Water Law, "*Article 3.- **The following are likewise national property**:* *I.- Beaches and maritime zones*"; and article 1 of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law, insofar as it textually states:

"*The maritime-terrestrial zone **constitutes part of the national heritage, belongs to the State and is inalienable and imprescriptible.** Its protection, as well as its natural resources, is an obligation of the State, its institutions, and all the inhabitants of the country. Its use and exploitation are subject to the provisions of this Law.*" In the same sense, the Constitutional Chamber ruled in ruling number 2000-10466 and 2002-3821; as well as the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, acting as administrative head, in resolution number 128-2001, at eight hours on February sixteenth, two thousand one:

"**VI.-** *Correlatively to what has been said, **the maritime-terrestrial zone constitutes part of the national heritage, belongs to the State and is inalienable and imprescriptible**. Its protection is an obligation of the State and its institutions – including of course the corresponding Municipalities – and even of all the inhabitants of the country. Its use and exploitation are subject to the provisions of Law No. 6043 on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone.*" **VIII.-** Having determined the special affectation of the maritime-terrestrial zone, it is now of interest to know precisely what assets or areas this special regime of legal protection covers. And it is Law number 6043 itself that tells us in its article 9:

"[...] *the strip two hundred meters wide along the entire length of the Atlantic and Pacific coastlines of the Republic, whatever its nature, measured horizontally from the ordinary high tide line and the lands and rocks that the sea exposes at low tide.* *For legal purposes, the maritime-terrestrial zone comprises the maritime islands, islets, and rocks (peñascos marítimos), as well as any land or natural formation that protrudes above ocean level within the territorial sea of the Republic. Isla del Coco is excepted, which shall be under the direct control and possession of the State, and those other islands whose control or administration is determined in this law or special laws.*" Likewise, in accordance with article 4 of the Regulation to this Law, Executive Decree number 7841-P, of December sixteenth, nineteen hundred seventy-seven, it encompasses:

"[...] *the mangroves (manglares) or salt forests that exist on the continental or insular coastlines and estuaries (esteros) of the maritime-terrestrial territory, constitute Forest Reserve and are affected to the Forestry Law and to all the provisions of that decree* [number 7210-A, of July nineteenth, nineteen hundred seventy-seven]. *Starting from the vegetation line at the edge of the estuaries and the limit of the mangroves or salt forests when they extend for more than fifty meters from the ordinary high tide line, the restricted zone begins*." The maritime-terrestrial zone is divided into two zones: **the public zone (zona pública)**, which comprises the fifty-meter-wide strip, counted from the ordinary high tide line, composed of the coastline, shore, or seafront that extends through the **rias (rías)** and **permanent estuaries (esteros permanentes)**, until where they are appreciably affected by the tides, and present defined marine characteristics (article 2, subsection h) of the Regulation to the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law, Executive Decree number 7841-P); and **the restricted zone (zona restringida)**, constituted by the remaining one hundred fifty meters. By virtue of the foregoing, the following are part of the **public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone**: **the ria (ría)**, defined as the part of the river near its entrance into the sea, and up to where the tides reach (subsection f) of article 2 of the cited Executive Decree number 7841-P); such that, in relation to the provisions of article 9 of the Law governing this matter, the two-hundred-meter strip adjacent to the rias is also maritime-terrestrial zone; "**the islets, rocks, and other small areas and natural formations that protrude from the sea**" (final paragraph of article 10 of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law); **the mangroves (manglares)**, under the terms of article 11 of the cited Law "*The public zone is also, whatever its extent, that occupied by all the mangroves of the continental and insular coastlines and estuaries of the national territory*"; whose incorporation into the public domain dates from nineteen hundred forty-two, with the Water Law, a circumstance that prevents their titling by private individuals. It is noted that article 4 of the Regulation establishes that the restricted zone in these cases starts from the vegetation line at the edge of the estuaries and from the limit of the mangroves or salt forests, when they extend for more than fifty meters from the ordinary high tide line; which is of great importance, as it extends the concept of maritime-terrestrial zone to portions of the national territory that may be located kilometers from the coast, such that **the lands adjacent to the mangrove cannot be the object of legitimate possession**. In consideration of the ecological importance of the mangroves, article 44 of the Forestry Law, in concordance with article 17 of the Organic Environment Law, requires the Ministry of Environment and Energy to conduct the respective environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental), prior to granting any permit for their exploitation; and, **the maritime islands, islets, and rocks and the lands and rocks that the sea exposes at low tide**, in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of article 9 of Law number 6043), a condition that had already been granted since the **Water Law, number 276**, of August twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred forty-two in its article 75, by stating "*The islands already formed or that form in the maritime-terrestrial zone or in the navigable part of the rivers and in the rias and river mouths are property of the State*"; and which was maintained by **Decree-Law number 11**, of July twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred forty-eight, amended by number 803, of November second of the following year in the following terms:

"*confirms and proclaims National Sovereignty over the entire submarine platform or continental and insular shelf (zócalo continental e insular) adjacent to the continental and insular coasts of the national territory, whatever the depth at which it is found, reaffirming the inalienable right of the Nation to all the natural riches that exist upon, in, or under said shelf or platform*"; and subsection c) of article 7) of the **Lands and Colonization Law**, number 2825, of October fourteenth, nineteen hundred sixty-one. It must be clarified that in the case of rocks, the concept of public zone applies to the entire natural formation, and in the case of islands, to the fifty meters adjacent to the high tide line, with the remaining lands considered restricted zone (article 10 of Law number 6042), unless mangrove exists, in which case, it is considered public zone, as indicated above.

**IX.-** It is worth recalling that the **public zone (*zona pública*)** has been designated for the free use, access, and transit of all; so that **any permit or concession, as well as the collection of the respective fee located in the public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone (*zona marítimo terrestre*) is null and void** (as resolved in administrative resolution number 6424-97, at nine o'clock on April seventeenth, nineteen ninety-seven, of the Administrative Litigation Tribunal), except for those having a public purpose, such as "[...] *the construction of industrial plants, sport or artisanal fishing facilities, port works, mariculture programs, or other similar establishments or installations, ...*" (article 18 of Ley 6043); whose location near the sea is indispensable for their proper functioning. In any case, they must have the proper authorizations from MOPT, INVU, ICT, and the respective municipality, attending, in any case and at all times, "[...] *to the public use to which they are destined, or that it concerns the establishment and operation of state tourist facilities of notorious convenience for the country*" (first paragraph of article 22 of the Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre).

Likewise, regarding the natural resource contained in the public zone, it is warned that it is also not possible to exploit the flora and fauna, cut down trees, or extract products from the coast, except with the proper authorization – permit or concession – in this case, from the Dirección de Vida Silvestre, of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, following an environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental), pursuant to the provisions of article 17 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the respective municipalities to facilitate access to the beaches for the enjoyment and transit of people, so the local government must prevent any limiting action that impedes this free access to the beaches. This oversight duty also concerns the eviction of invaders, and even the destruction or demolition of constructions, installations, or works carried out, whether they are simple fences, hovels, sales stands, or dwelling houses, with no liability whatsoever (as considered by the Administrative Litigation Tribunal, Third Section in resolution number 7900-98). In accordance with article 39 of the Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, concessions can only be granted in the **restricted zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone (*zona restringida de la zona marítimo terrestre*)**, under the charge of the municipalities (article 40 of the cited Law); except in cases where there is a protected wilderness area (área silvestre protegida) – forest reserves (reservas forestales), protective zones (zonas protectoras), national parks (parques nacionales), biological reserves (reservas biológicas), national wildlife refuges (refugios nacionales de vida silvestre), wetlands (humedales), natural monuments (monumentos naturales) – which, pursuant to articles 32 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente and 73 of the Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, are under the administration of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía.

**X.- REGARDING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTIES.-** In accordance with the content of the appealed judgment (and this point having not been objected by any of the parties), the starting point is that the **plaintiff is the registered titleholder of the properties registered in folio real with titles 22641-000 and 22533-000**, both in the sixth canton of Aguirre, second district (Savegre), of the Province of Puntarenas, at Playa Portalón, properties over which the Trial Judge recognized all the attributes of property rights. However, and according to the evidence provided to the case file, it is also true that **the property sought to be recovered (reivindicar) in this proceeding comprises part of the aforementioned properties, and it is unregistered land, precisely due to its condition of being a public domain asset (*bien demanial*), as it encompasses part of the maritime-terrestrial zone of Playa Portalón**; a circumstance which means that **the boundaries of both properties registered in folio real with titles 22641-000 and 22533-000 are not the Pacific Ocean nor the Portalón River, but rather the maritime-terrestrial zone area, which includes the ria of the mouth of the Portalón River, the estuary (*estero*), and existing mangrove (*manglar*) in the area**, such that the measurement of the properties must exclude the protection area of such public domain assets, that is, two hundred meters contiguous to the ria and one hundred fifty meters along the vegetation line at the edge of the estuaries and the limit of the mangroves and saltwater estuaries, if they extend more than fifty meters from the ordinary high-water mark; **boundaries that must be modified in the Public Registry of Property, as well as the respective cadastral plans**. It is further warned that it is improper and openly contrary to the regulations governing the matter to recognize any property right or its attributes (possession, usufruct, transformation and alienation, defense and exclusion, restitution and indemnification, pursuant to article 264 of the Civil Code) to the plaintiff, due to the legal nature of the asset in question, which removes it from commerce among men (inalienability - *inalienabilidad*), as well as it not being possible to acquire or lose it through the procedure of ten-year possession – usucapion – (imprescriptibility - *imprescriptibilidad*). Therefore, **no possession is possible, neither by the plaintiff, nor by the defendants, nor by any third party**, considering that, as explained previously, such zones have had the status of public domain (*demanialidad*) since the colonial era. Finally, it must be warned that **the plaintiff does not hold the status of occupant (*ocupante*)** , which applies to those natural persons who, without meeting the status of settlers (*pobladores*) – who had a lot in the maritime mile before the enactment of the Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, that is, before nineteen seventy-seven, and for a period greater than ten years – have occupied the maritime-terrestrial zone, even in an unauthorized manner, prior to the entry into force of the Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, by virtue of which they do not hold any permit, subjects regarding whom the same Ley de la Zona Marítimo-Terrestre, number 6043, in its articles 44, 70 and Transitory VII, constitute two exceptions to the parameters for private use in the maritime-terrestrial zone, and regarding whom the granting of use permits is indeed legitimate, which have special conditions, insofar as it is only admitted "[...] for those cases in which the zone's conditions are not affected, nor do they hinder the free use of the public zone, and their execution does not absolutely limit the future implementation of the Regulating Plan. (Article 19 of Ley 6043)." (Resolution number 10163-99, of the Third Section of the Administrative Litigation Tribunal); and which allows municipalities to charge a fee. But that **in no way should it be taken as the recognition of the right of possession of such areas, but rather solely as a priority right for the granting of future concessions**, once the respective coastal regulating plan has been approved; whence, under equal conditions, the administration must prefer to grant the concession to whoever has possessed quietly, publicly, and peacefully continuously, which denotes subjection to territorial regulations.

**XII.- REGARDING COSTS.-** The plaintiff requests in her appeal that the ruling on costs be reviewed for having demonstrated that she has acted in good faith. Pursuant to the provisions of article 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is applicable suppletorily by virtue of the provisions of article 103 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, the losing party must be ordered to pay personal and procedural costs. This Tribunal considers that the appellant is correct, since it is true that, upon the admission of the exception of res judicata, each and every one of the claims of the complaint were recognized; but it is also not possible to order the defendants to pay costs, considering that it is deemed there was sufficient cause to litigate, a circumstance covered in subsection c) of article 98 of the Ley Reguladora de esta Jurisdicción. By virtue of which, the appealed judgment must be reversed on this point, to declare it without a special ruling on costs.

**THEREFORE:** The evidence offered for better provision provided by the State representative is rejected. The appealed judgment is modified, in the sense that the properties registered in folio real with titles 22641-000 and 22633-000, both located in the sixth canton of Aguirre, second district, Savegre, Province of Puntarenas, do not border on the Pacific Ocean nor the Portalón River, but rather on the maritime-terrestrial zone, which includes the ria of the mouth of the Portalón River, estuary, and mangrove. It is warned that it is not possible to hold PRIMERA COMPAÑÍA DE DESARROLLO, SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, as the legitimate occupant or possessor of the public domain areas that are excluded here, insofar as their use is subject to the granting of the corresponding authorization (permit or concession) from the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, because the Refugio de Vida Silvestre Categoría Mixto Portalón has been declared, by Decreto Ejecutivo number 25.139-MINAE, which was not demonstrated in this proceeding. Once this judgment becomes final, register it in the Public Registry, on the margin of the cited properties. The appealed judgment is reversed regarding the ruling on costs, to declare it without a special ruling in this aspect.

**José Paulino Hernández** **Silvia C. Fernández Brenes Lorena Montes de Oca Monge** **Exp: 98-100136-426-CI** **Proceso Ordinario** **Primera Compañía Unidad de Desarrollo S. A. v. María del Rosario Monge Baltodano, Inversiones** **Turísticas Los Tucanes S. A.** **VII.- ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN CHARACTER OF THE MARITIME-TERRESTRIAL ZONE AND ITS LEGAL REGIME** .- Throughout the history of humanity, the great economic, commercial, and also security importance – regarding national defense – of the coast for any country or state organization has been noted. Thus, with respect to our country, since the colonial era, the shoreline has remained destined for public use. Initially, the reserved area was one **mile wide**, for which it was known – and still is in our time – as the "**maritime mile**". The most relevant regulation of the Costa Rican coastal zone begins with **Law number 162, of June twenty-eighth, eighteen twenty-eight**, recently declared independence from the Spanish Crown, and in the formative stage of the Costa Rican State, in which a prior precept from the colonial era was collected (Royal Decree, of October fifteenth, seventeen fifty-four), establishing the reservation of one maritime mile on the coasts of both seas, which was maintained throughout all legislation issued in the 19th century. This same public domain condition was recognized in the **General Code of eighteen forty-one**, which considered the flow and ebb of the sea and its banks as public domain; in **Law number 7, of August thirty-first, eighteen sixty-eight**, in which the "**unclaimability**" **of the maritime mile lands** was ratified; in the **Water Law, number 8, of May twenty-sixth, eighteen eighty-four**, which named that strip of land with the designation of "**maritime-terrestrial zone**", which was expressly affected as a public domain asset, and consequently, incorporated into the national patrimony; and finally, in the **Fiscal Code of eighteen eighty-five**, the prohibition of alienating the lands comprised within one mile of latitude along the coast of both seas was provided. Already in the 20th century, the first regulation that referred to the maritime-terrestrial zone was **Law number 75, of August thirtieth, nineteen twenty-four**, which reaffirmed the public domain character of these lands, as well as the impossibility of exploiting and usufructing them. Likewise, **Law number 11, of October 22nd, nineteen twenty-two**, precisely specified its extension, delimiting it at one thousand seven hundred and sixty-two meters – the exact measure of one mile –, from the ordinary high tide, and five hundred meters along both banks of the rivers. This measurement was maintained until nineteen forty-two, when starting from **Laws number 19, of November twelfth**, and **Law number 201, of January twenty-sixth, nineteen forty-three**, its extension was reduced to two hundred meters for both coasts; thus provoking the first declassifications of this asset, in relation to all those lands beyond the determination made, and their consequent private appropriation; that is, from these two provisions, and with the exception of the two hundred meters counted from the ordinary high tide, the rest of the one thousand six hundred and seventy-two meters ceased to be public domain from the moment they could be reduced to private domain. However, **the lands contained within the two hundred meters excepted by the two aforementioned laws continued to be public domain assets, not reducible to private domain because they are inalienable and imprescriptible**. This measurement of the maritime-terrestrial zone, together with the public domain character of the lands comprised therein, was reaffirmed in the then current **Article 7 of the Land and Colonization Law, number 2825, of October fourteenth, nineteen sixty-one**, and was repeated in the **Forest Law (Ley Forestal), number 4465, of November twenty-fifth, nineteen sixty-nine** and in the **Tourist Urbanization Law of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, number 4558, of April twenty-second, nineteen seventy**. The warning must be made that, with **Law number 4558, of April twenty-second, nineteen seventy, in its Transitory Provision III**, one hundred and fifty meters of the two hundred meters were declassified, after the first fifty meters, counted from the high tide, by authorizing private individuals who had possessed, for more than thirty years, in a quiet, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted manner, lots or properties in that sector, to register them through the procedure of possessory informations before jurisdictional authorities – not administrative ones. Given the great number of abuses that were committed under the validity of this provision, that is, from May twelfth, nineteen seventy, it was repealed by **Law number 5602, of November fourth, nineteen seventy-one**, which came into force upon its publication in La Gaceta number 206, of October fourteenth of that year; meaning it was valid for seventeen months and two days. Finally, on March second, nineteen seventy-seven, the **Law of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, number 6043, current to date**, was promulgated, which maintained the public domain character of the two hundred meters along the country's shoreline. By reason of the foregoing historical recount of the regulatory framework of the maritime-terrestrial zone, it must necessarily be concluded that **it was always given the qualification and treatment of a public domain asset (dominical, demanio, or of public domain), which makes it entitled to all the characteristics of public domain, that is, its inalienability, imprescriptibility, unseizability, as well as subjection to the police power regarding its use and exploitation**, as indicated by the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice in judgment number 7, of fifteen hours five minutes of January twentieth, nineteen ninety-three:

"It is clear then, without detriment to the indicated antecedent from the colonial era, that since the birth of Costa Rica as an independent State, the reserve of land along both coastlines has not been part of the vacant lands – the Crown lands of the Colony – but has always been subject to a different legal regime, that proper to public domain assets and, therefore, not reducible to private property. In the legislation on the matter promulgated throughout the 20th century – culminating with the current Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone (Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre) No. 6043 of March 2, 1977 – the qualification of public domain assets for the lands comprised in said zone was, obviously, maintained. As a result of the legislative evolution of the 19th century, the maritime-terrestrial zone comprised the part of the coasts of both seas bathed by the flow and ebb, extending to a distance of one mile inland. It comprised, moreover, the banks of the rivers up to the point where they were navigable or were affected by the tides. The legislation of this century specified the extension of the zone as well as the elements that formed part of it, but **at no time denied its character as a public domain asset and, consequently, its imprescriptibility and inalienability**; [...] From this brief study of the legislation concerning the maritime-terrestrial zone, it is easy to reach the conclusion that the strip of 200 meters from the ordinary high tide along both coasts defined as part of the maritime-terrestrial zone by Article 9 of the current Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, has been of public domain – and the lands comprised therein, public domain assets – since 1828, at least. The variations that the legislation of the past century and of the present have introduced on the matter have never declassified these 200 meters in a generalized manner, with it being the case that the legislation prior to 1942 and 1943 established a strip greater in extension – the so-called maritime mile – but never lesser." (Considerando II. The highlighting is not from the original.)

By virtue of the foregoing, and in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), the maritime-terrestrial zone acquires the condition of a public domain asset of the Nation, a consideration that is reinforced by Article 3.1 of the Water Law, "*Article 3.- **The following are equally of national property**:* I.- *The beaches and maritime zones*"; and Article 1 of the Law of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, insofar as it textually provides:

"*The maritime-terrestrial zone **constitutes part of the national patrimony, belongs to the State and is inalienable and imprescriptible.** Its protection, as well as its natural resources, is an obligation of the State, of its institutions, and of all the inhabitants of the country. Its use and exploitation are subject to the provisions of this Law.*" In a similar sense, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) ruled in judgments number 2000-10466 and 2002-3821; as well as the Third Section (Sección Tercera) of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, acting as administrative hierarch, in resolution number 128-2001, of eight hours on February sixteenth, two thousand one:

"***VI.-** Correlatively to what has been said, **the maritime-terrestrial zone constitutes part of the national patrimony, belongs to the State and is inalienable and imprescriptible**. Its protection is an obligation of the State and its institutions – including of course the corresponding Municipalities – and even of all the inhabitants of the country.*" Its use and exploitation are subject to the provisions of Law No. 6043 on the maritime-terrestrial zone (Zona Marítimo Terrestre).

**VIII.-** Having determined the special affectation of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo-terrestre), it is now important to know precisely which goods or areas this special regime of legal protection comprises. And it is the same Law number 6043 which, in its article 9, indicates to us: "[...] *the strip of land two hundred meters wide along the entire length of the Atlantic and Pacific coastlines of the Republic, whatever its nature, measured horizontally from the ordinary high tide line (línea de la pleamar ordinaria) and the lands and rocks left uncovered by the sea at low tide.* *For legal purposes, the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) includes maritime islands, islets, and rocks, as well as any land or natural formation that protrudes from the level of the ocean within the territorial sea of the Republic. Cocos Island is excepted, which shall be under the direct domain and possession of the State, and those other islands whose domain or administration are determined in this law or special laws.*" Likewise, pursuant to article 4 of the Regulation to this Law, Executive Decree number 7841-P, of December sixteenth, nineteen hundred seventy-seven, it covers: "[...] *the mangroves (manglares) or salt forests that exist on the continental or insular coastlines and estuaries (esteros) of the terrestrial maritime territory, constitute a Forest Reserve and are affected by the Forest Law (Ley Forestal) and all the provisions of that decree* [number 7210-A, of July nineteenth, nineteen hundred seventy-seven]. *Starting from the vegetation line at the edge of the estuaries (esteros) and the limit of the mangroves (manglares) or salt forests when these extend for more than fifty meters from the ordinary high tide line, the restricted zone begins*." The maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) is divided into two zones: **the public zone (zona pública)**, which comprises the strip fifty meters wide, counted from the ordinary high tide line, composed of the littoral, shore, or coast of the sea that extends through the **rías (rías)** and **permanent estuaries (esteros permanentes)**, up to where these are noticeably affected by the tides and present defined marine characteristics (subsection h) of article 2 of the Regulation to the Law of the maritime-terrestrial zone (Zona Marítimo Terrestre), Executive Decree number 7841-P); and **the restricted zone (zona restringida)**, constituted by the remaining one hundred fifty meters. By virtue of the foregoing, the following are part of the **public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona pública de la zona marítimo-terrestre)**: **the ría (ría)**, defined as the part of the river near its entrance to the sea, and up to where the tides reach (subsection f) of article 2 of the cited Executive Decree number 7841-P); so that, in relation to the provisions of article 9 of the Law governing this matter, the strip of two hundred meters contiguous to the rías (rías) is also maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre); "**islets, rocks, and other small areas and natural formations that protrude from the sea**" (final paragraph of article 10 of the Law of the maritime-terrestrial zone (Zona Marítimo Terrestre)); **mangroves (manglares)**, according to the provisions of article 11 of the cited Law "*The public zone (zona pública) is also, whatever its extent, the area occupied by all the mangroves (manglares) of the continental and insular coastlines and estuaries (esteros) of the national territory*"; whose incorporation into the public domain (demanio) dates back to nineteen hundred forty-two, with the Water Law, a circumstance that prevents their titling by private individuals. It is noted that article 4 of the Regulation establishes that the restricted zone (zona restringida) in these cases starts from the vegetation line at the edge of the estuaries (esteros) and the limit of the mangroves (manglares) or salt forests, when these extend for more than fifty meters from the ordinary high tide line; which is of great importance, because it extends the concept of maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) to portions of the national territory that may be located kilometers from the coast, so that **lands adjacent to the mangrove cannot be the object of legitimate possession**. In consideration of the ecological importance of mangroves (manglares), article 44 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal), in accordance with article 17 of the Organic Environmental Law, requires the Ministry of Environment and Energy to conduct the respective environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental), prior to the granting of any permit for their exploitation; and, **the maritime islands, islets, and rocks and the lands and rocks that the sea leaves uncovered at low tide**, in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of article 9 of Law number 6043), a condition that had already been granted since the **Water Law, number 276**, of August twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred forty-two, in its article 75, by stating "*Islands already formed or that may form in the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) or in the navigable part of rivers and in rías (rías) and river mouths are property of the State*"; and which was maintained by **Decree-Law number 11**, of July twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred forty-eight, reformed by number 803, of November second of the following year, in the following terms:

"*confirms and proclaims the National Sovereignty over the entire submarine platform or continental and insular shelf adjacent to the continental and insular coasts of the national territory, whatever the depth at which it is found, reaffirming the inalienable right of the Nation to all the natural riches that exist on, in, or under said shelf or platform*"; and subsection c) of article 7) of the **Land and Colonization Law**, number 2825, of October fourteenth, nineteen hundred sixty-one. It must be clarified that in the case of rocks, the concept of public zone (zona pública) applies to the entire natural formation, and in that of islands, to the fifty meters contiguous to the high tide line, with the remaining lands being considered restricted zone (zona restringida) (article 10 of Law number 6042), unless a mangrove exists, in which case, it is considered public zone (zona pública), as indicated previously.

**IX.-** It is worth recalling that the **public zone (zona pública)** has been designated for the free use, access, and transit of all; so that **any permit or concession is null, as well as the collection of the respective fee located in the public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona pública de la zona marítimo terrestre)** (as resolved in administrative resolution number 6424-97, of nine o'clock on April seventeenth, nineteen hundred ninety-seven of the Administrative Dispute Tribunal), except for those that have a public purpose, such as "[...] *the construction of industrial plants, sport or artisanal fishing installations, port works, mariculture programs, or other similar establishments or installations...*" (article 18 of Law 6043); whose location near the sea is indispensable for their proper functioning. In any case, they must have the proper authorizations from the MOPT, INVU, ICT, and the respective municipality, attending, in any case and at all times, "[...] *to the public use for which they are intended, or that it concerns the establishment and operation of state tourism facilities of notorious convenience for the country*" (first paragraph of article 22 of the Law of the maritime-terrestrial zone (Zona Marítimo Terrestre)). Likewise, in the case of the natural resource contained in the public zone (zona pública), it is also noted that the flora and fauna cannot be exploited, nor trees cut, nor products extracted from the coast, except with the proper authorization—permit or concession—, in this case, from the Wildlife Directorate, of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, after an environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental), according to the provisions of article 17 of the Organic Environmental Law. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the respective municipalities to facilitate access to the beaches for the enjoyment and transit of the people, so that the local government must prevent any limiting action that impedes this free access to the beaches. This oversight function also concerns the eviction of invaders, and even, the destruction or demolition of constructions, installations, or works carried out, whether they are simple fences, shacks, sales stalls, or dwelling houses, without any liability (as considered by the Administrative Dispute Tribunal, Third Section in resolution number 7900-98). Pursuant to article 39 of the Law of the maritime-terrestrial zone (Zona Marítimo Terrestre), it is only possible to grant concessions in the **restricted zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona restringida de la zona marítimo terrestre)**, under the charge of the municipalities (article 40 of the cited Law); except in cases where there is a protected wildlife area (área silvestre protegida)—forest reserves, protective zones, national parks, biological reserves, national wildlife refuges, wetlands, natural monuments—which, pursuant to articles 32 of the Organic Environmental Law and 73 of the Law of the maritime-terrestrial zone (Zona Marítimo Terrestre), are under the administration of the Ministry of Environment and Energy. “ E.- That all resulting damages and losses shall be liquidated in the enforcement of judgment stage.

F.- That the defendant party may not claim any improvement made in good faith on the reclaimed property, given that their possession has been without just cause or just title throughout the entire time of said possession.

G.- That any subsequent legal act deriving from the documents annulled in this ordinary proceeding is also annulled as a consequence of the annulment of the legal act that gave rise to it.

H.- That the defendant party must pay the plaintiff party the personal and procedural costs occasioned by this declaratory action." (Folios 371 to 373.)

**2.-** That the defendants filed their answer untimely—after the declaration of default (ruling of the Civil Court of Aguirre and Parrita at thirteen hours thirty minutes on September 4, 1998, folio 388)—in which they raised the defenses of formal and material res judicata (cosa juzgada formal y material), statute of limitations (prescripción), lack of active and passive cause of action (falta de acción ad causam activa y pasiva), lack of right, and the generic plea of *sine actione agit* (folios 409 to 429).

**3.-** That the State representative appeared, **in safeguarding the direct (institutional) interest** that it holds in the defense of the public domain (demanio público), and therefore requests a sua sponte declaration of the absolute nullity of any act, contractual stipulation, or agreement ventilated in this proceeding that entails an appropriation, detention, use, enjoyment, transfer, or illegal exploitation of the Maritime Terrestrial Zone (Zona Marítimo Terrestre), which is State-owned, and therefore any declaration implying a direct or indirect recognition of private rights, in favor of the parties, against the encumbrance created by that regime must be dismissed in the judgment (folios 391 to 402).

**4.-** Attorney Nancy Allen Umaña, Judge of the corresponding Court, in judgment number 719-2005, at eight hours ten minutes on July 14, 2005, resolved:

"A partial inadmissibility of the action is declared, in the ordinary proceeding brought by the company Primera Compañía Unidad de Desarrollo against María Monge Baltodano and Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes, considering that res judicata (cosa juzgada) exists with respect to the following claims: a. That the sole owner and possessor of the properties claimed in this proceeding, as well as their areas, is the plaintiff, and that consequently, the possession and any other real right derived from its ownership title belong to it. b. That the Letter-sale in a private document signed by the representative of Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo S.A. Valerie Havill Nicholson and the defendant, on May 17, 1985, as well as the sale executed between María del Rosario Monge Baltodano and the Co-defendant Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes, presided over by Monge Baltodano, in San José, on January 18, 1987, this latter sale being a legal consequence derived from the private Letter-sale where the defendant Monge Baltodano acquired, are absolutely null and without any legal value before the right of ownership and other real rights accredited by the plaintiff. d. That Monge Baltodano and the co-defendant company must immediately vacate all the claimed property. e. That the defendant party must pay the plaintiff party all the damages and losses caused during the time the illegal possession of the recovered property lasted; f. That the defendant party may not claim any improvement made in good faith on the recovered property. g. That any subsequent legal act deriving from the documents annulled in this ordinary proceeding is also annulled as a consequence of the annulment of the legal act that gave rise to it.” With respect to the claims: “c. That the plaintiff is the sole occupant and legitimately entitled to exploit the area situated within the maritime zone... e…; so it must be liable for any loss, deterioration, or destruction of the property that may have existed in the houses in the maritime zone occupied by the plaintiff, at the time of the illegal invasion carried out by the defendant party,” the lawsuit is declared inadmissible. The plaintiff party is ordered to pay both sets of costs of this action. Let it be notified." (Folios 835 verso and 836.)

**5.-** Dissatisfied with the ruling of the lower court (A-quo), the plaintiff and the State representative appeal, remedies which were admitted, and by virtue of which this Court hears the matter on appeal.

**5.-** The prescribed procedures have been observed in the proceedings, without any grounds for nullity capable of invalidating what has been done being noted.

**Drafted by Judge Fernández Brenes; and,** **WHEREAS (CONSIDERANDO):** **I.- ON THE EVIDENCE OFFERED FOR BETTER PROVISION (PRUEBA PARA MEJOR PROVEER).-** By means of a brief filed on June 8, 2006, the State representative requests that the certification issued by the Director General of the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación) of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, regarding the coastal public domain areas, of State property, comprising the National Wildlife Refuge, Mixed Category, be admitted as evidence for better resolution. Since this Court finds it unnecessary, as its content is determined not only in the decree creating said protected area, but also in the rest of the evidence provided, such as cadastral maps and in the very arguments of the parties to this lawsuit, the admission of the offered evidence is denied.

**II.- ON THE PROVEN FACTS (HECHOS PROBADOS).-** For a better understanding of the facts deemed proven, those determined by the Court of First Instance are replaced, as there are a series of omissions in their recording, so that they are taken as follows: **1.)** That the properties registered in the real estate folio with registration numbers 22641-000 and 22633-000, both of the sixth canton of Aguirre, second district (Savegre), of the Province of Puntarenas, are owned by the company Primera Compañía Unida, S.A., whose registered boundaries are as follows: north with Guillermo Rodríguez Rodríguez, south with the maritime mile (milla marítima) and Guillermo Rodríguez Rodríguez, east with the Portalón River, and west with Guillermo Rodríguez Rodríguez, for the first; and north with Quebrada Salada in between another, south with the maritime mile (milla marítima), east with Manuel Arias Chinchilla, and west with Alicia Bonilla Ramírez, for the second (folios 6 to 11 of the judicial file); **2.)** That on **May 18, 1985**, Valerie Havill Nicholson, in her capacity as general power of attorney without limit of sum for the company **Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo, sold by private sale and purchase agreement to Rosario Monge Baltodano a property located in Matapalo, second district of Savegre, canton of Aguirre, Province of Puntarenas**, which was an unregistered piece of land, but which the seller had possessed for more than ten years quietly, publicly, peacefully, and without interruption, for the sum of five hundred thousand colones, with the following boundaries: North, with the Matapalo River in between, partly property of the Garitas and of the seller herself, South, with the Pacific Ocean, East with Rodrigo Ruíz Solórzano, and West, with the mouth of the Portalón River, forming an irregularly shaped flat point; measuring approximately, to the east about four hundred meters, to the west about three hundred meters at its widest part, to the North and to the South about three thousand meters, giving an approximate total of ninety-five hectares, comprising a poorly maintained flat pasture, with a poorly maintained airstrip, partly with fences, with two three-story dwelling houses roofed with zinc-ricalit that have been abandoned, a small wooden house in poor condition, two sheds for protecting semi-enclosed electric plants with zinc, which is in poor condition, there are two electric plants in poor condition, as well as an electric pump to dry water from a well (private sale and purchase, folio 22 and 23, fact 3 of the lawsuit, folio 350 of the judicial file); **3.)** That Public Notary José Luis Barletta Blanco affixed a fixed date to the aforementioned private sale and purchase on January 12, 1987 (notation on the copy of the deed, folio 24 of the judicial file); **4.)** That the portion of land sold overlapped part of the registered properties with registration numbers 22641-000 and 22633-000 and comprises part of the maritime terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) (cadastral maps numbers 350390-97, 350397-79, map of parcel 115 from the Institute of Lands and Colonization, and the overlay of cadastral maps P-49305-98, P-350397-79, and P-13238-74 prepared by the National Cadastre, Territorial Cadastral Information System, folios 1, 2, 4, and 665 of the judicial file, and statements of the defendants, folios 410 verso, 411, 414, 415, 415 verso, 416 verso of the judicial file); **5.)** That on **January 18, 1987**, Mrs. Monge Baltodano sold the previous property by private sale and purchase to Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes, the said defendant being the representative of this company, for the sum of five hundred thousand colones (folios 25 and 26 of the judicial file); **6.)** That **by deed number eighty-eight, before public notary Allen Ramírez Henderson, on January 2, 1994**, Mrs. Silvia Nora Gutiérrez Alarcón representing Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo S.A. and María del Rosario Monge Baltodano representing Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes S.A. reached an agreement with the purpose of putting an end to the dispute that arose in relation to Playa Portalón in Savegre de Aguirre, rendering null and void the sale contract entered into between Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo S.A. and Mrs. Monge Baltodano personally on May 18, 1985, for which reason, the company Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes, S.A. received at that act the sum of two million colones to be credited against the price she paid for said lands, as well as the payment she had to make to Terciopelo, S.A. to enter into possession of the lands, and for any damage or loss during that time. By virtue of the foregoing, the company Primera Compañía de Desarrollo Unida, S. A.'s possibility to continue with the possession of said lands was recognized. And finally, they agreed to waive any type of conflict of an indemnity nature regarding the property comprised in the dwelling houses (folio 119 of the judicial file); **7.)** That the **Mixed Court of Puriscal, Agrarian by Ministry of Law, Santiago, by ruling at 15:00 hours on January 18, 1995** resolved the following: “*Having analyzed this proceeding, we see that in October 1988, it was suspended because the sale and purchase document presented by the plaintiff was alleged to be false. After more than six years of procedural inactivity, the defendant presents a deed agreement, executed by the representatives of the companies contending here, wherein they agree: “that with the purpose of putting an end to the dispute that arose in relation to Playa Portalón in Savegre de Aguirre, it renders null and void the sale contract entered into between Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo S.A. and Mrs. Monge Baltodano personally, on May 18, 1985, for which Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes S.A. receives at this act the sum of two million colones to be credited against the price she paid for said lands, as well as the payment she had to make to Tercio Pelo S.A. to enter into possession of the lands, as well as the payment of any damage or loss arising during this time. Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo S.A. may in exchange continue with the possession of the lands as it has been doing since 1991…”*. This document was made known to the plaintiff, as well as the defendant's request that the proceeding be terminated, and she did not state anything. **Therefore, it is ordered to archive the file and let the annotation be made in the entry book**. (Ordinary proceeding of INVERSIONES TURÍSTICAS LOS TUCANES S.A. against PRIMERA COMPAÑÍA UNIDA DE DESARROLLO S.A.)” (folio 298 of the judicial file); **8.)** That by **Executive Decree number 25139-MINAE, of February 16, 1996**, the Ministry of Environment and Energy declared the area of Playa Portalón in Matapalo, Province of Puntarenas, Canton of Aguirre, District of Savegre, as a Mixed Category Wildlife Refuge, in which the properties belonging to the company Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo, Sociedad Anónima are located (sixth fact of the lawsuit, folio 354 of the judicial file, and statements of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) and of the Minister of Environment and Energy, folios 391 to 402, 512 to 526 of the judicial file, executive decree, folio 401 of the administrative file, volume 5); **9.)** That in October 1997, the forestry regent (regente forestal) Engineer Rodolfo Sequeira Herrera prepared a management plan for the payment of environmental services (Pago de Servicios Ambientales) of the Portalón Mixed Category Wildlife Refuge, to submit it for approval to the Incentive Program for the Protection of Forests C.P.B. of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, which comprises only conservation activities (folios 191 to 202 of the judicial file); and, **10.)** That in **1998 the State** (Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República)) brought criminal actions to safeguard the public domain property (bien demanial) (maritime terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre)) on the occasion of the acts of possession by the company Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes, S.A. and its legal representative (María del Rosario Monge Baltodano) in the face of her disobedience to remove fences (response from the Head of the Regional Office of Aguirre and Parrita of the Ministry of Environment and Energy to the Constitutional Chamber, on the occasion of the constitutional remedy (recurso de amparo) filed by the company, processed in case file number 5004-98-0007-CO, folios 251 to 254 of the administrative file, volume 5).

**III.- ON THE UNPROVEN FACTS (HECHOS NO PROBADOS).-** Of importance for the resolution of this matter, the following are deemed unproven facts: **1.)** That the company Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo, S.A. has a permit or authorization granted by the Ministry of Environment and Energy for the use and exploitation of the areas comprising the maritime terrestrial zone (zona marítimo-terrestre) of Playa Portalón; and, **2.)** That the plaintiff has the status of **occupant (ocupante)** of the maritime terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre).

**IV.- ON THE APPELLANT’S GRIEVANCES (AGRAVIOS) OF THE PLAINTIFF.-** In briefs filed on August first and third (folios 843 and 844 for the first and 846 to 849) the plaintiff only appeals **the order to pay both sets of costs imposed on it in judgment number 719-2005, at eight hours ten minutes on July 14, 2005**, for "**not finding it in accordance with law**", as Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code was erroneously applied, based on the following considerations: **a.)** because each of the claims requested in the lawsuit was granted to it, through the sua sponte incorporation of a defense of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material), despite—it affirms—that "*it is only today that a judgment exists for the first time expressly stating each of the points on which res judicata exists*"; **b.)** having acted with evident good faith and, **c.)** that to make such an order, the damages and losses caused on the occasion of the defendants' illegitimate possession were not assessed; reasons for which it requests the revocation of the judgment on this point, so that it be resolved accordingly. By means of a brief filed on October 10, 2005 (folios 893 to 896), it requests that the appeal filed by the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) be dismissed on all points, and that instead its condition as "**settler (pobladora)**" be declared, having accredited procedures for the granting of the respective concession and the payment of the respective canon (canon), until 1993. By means of a brief filed on May 15, 2007 (appearing at folios 938 to 939), outside the period for formulating grievances which expired on October 12, 2005, the plaintiff formulates more grievances to challenge the cited resolution, namely, for having admitted a defense introduced sua sponte by the Court of First Instance, without being granted the hearing provided for in Article 307 of the Civil Procedure Code, thereby causing defenselessness. Due to the untimeliness (extemporaneidad) of this latter argument, no ruling will be made on it, limiting the analysis of the appeal solely to the point initially challenged.

**V.- ON THE APPELLANT’S GRIEVANCES (AGRAVIOS) OF THE STATE REPRESENTATIVE.-** The State representative's grounds for challenge center on the fact that the judgment does not make a reservation regarding the public domain lands that the property sought to be recovered incorporates, which is also located within the Mixed Category National Wildlife Refuge; taking into account that the ruling admitted that there is no permit over such property regarding its use and exploitation; so that the operative part recognizes the existence of a right of ownership, possession, and other real rights derived from dominion over such estates, without clarifying that it does not include the areas of the **maritime terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre)**, which is not limited to the two hundred meters from the coast, but also the **ria (ría)**—which is the part of the river near the sea entrance and up to where the tides reach—, the **mangroves (manglares)** —which are public property, regardless of their extension—, and the **estuary (estero)**, which are State public domain property. By virtue of which, the possessory acts, titling, or judicial discussions relating to the ownership or possession of this type of property, which the State owns by full right, are unacceptable.

**VI.- ON THE INTERVENTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA) IN THIS PROCEEDING.-** This Court deems that prior to resolving the appeal filed by the State's representation, it is pertinent to make a brief analysis regarding the justification for this institution's intervention in this proceeding, since it cannot be considered a coparty (coadyuvante), as **it does not act as a mere adhesive intervener to the claims or situation of any of the parties appearing in this proceeding**, but rather, as it indicates in its various interventions (in the brief by which it appears in the proceeding—filed on November 24, 1998, visible at folios 391 to 402 of the judicial file—, in the brief where it defends the jurisdiction of this Court to hear this lawsuit—of December 6, 1996) its participation in this matter derives from the **interest of that institution in the objective defense of the public domain (demanio público), as the conflict concerns a property that comprises the maritime terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre), according to the competence assigned to that institution by legal mandate**. It must be recalled that according to Article one of the Organic Law of the Office of the Attorney General (Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República), number 6815, of September 27, 1982, this institution is considered the "*superior consultative, technical-legal body of the Public Administration and legal representative of the State in matters within its competence*", to which an important control function has been assigned regarding the effective protection of the environment—, given that, among its essential duties, it is entrusted with:

"***i) Act in defense of the national heritage**, of the resources existing in the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo-terrestre), the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf.* *Take the appropriate legal actions in safeguarding the environment, in order to guarantee the constitutional right of every person to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment.* *Ensure the correct application of international conventions, treaties, laws, regulations, and other provisions on these matters.* *Investigate, sua sponte or at the request of a party, any action or omission that infringes the indicated regulations*" (as relevant, subsection i of Article 3 of the cited Law number 6815).

Likewise, Article 4 of the Law of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, number 6043, of the seventeenth of February, nineteen seventy-seven, recognizes in this advisory body of the Administration the power to, by itself or at the request of any entity or institution of the State or an interested party, exercise "[...] the legal control for the due compliance with the provisions of this law. Consequently, it shall undertake the pertinent actions regarding any actions that violate or tend to infringe these provisions or related laws, or that seek to obtain rights or recognition thereof against those norms, or to annul concessions, permits, contracts, acts, agreements, or provisions obtained in contravention thereof. The foregoing is without prejudice to what corresponds to other institutions or dependencies in accordance with their legal powers." Thus, the Attorney General's Office exercises an active control function in this matter, which legitimizes it to file and appear in jurisdictional processes, precisely in defense of the public domain.

VII.- ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN STATUS OF THE MARITIME-TERRESTRIAL ZONE AND ITS LEGAL REGIME.- Throughout the history of humanity, the great economic, commercial, and also security importance—regarding national defense—that the coast has for any country or state organization has been noted. Thus, with respect to our country, since the colonial era, the coastline has remained destined for public use. Initially, the reserved area was one mile wide, for which it was known—and still is in our time—as the "maritime mile." The most relevant regulations in the regulation of the Costa Rican coastal zone begin with Law number 162, of the twenty-eighth of June, eighteen twenty-eight, recently declared independence from the Spanish Crown, and in the formative stage of the Costa Rican State, in which an earlier precept from the colonial era was collected (Royal Decree, of the fifteenth of October, seventeen fifty-four), by establishing the reservation of one maritime mile on the coasts of both seas, which was maintained throughout all the legislation issued in the 19th century. That same condition of public domain status (demanialidad) was recognized in the General Code of eighteen forty-one, which considered the flow and ebb of the sea and its shores as public domain; in Law number 7, of the thirty-first of August, eighteen sixty-eight, in which the "unclaimability" of the lands of the maritime mile was ratified; in the Water Law, number 8, of the twenty-sixth of May, eighteen eighty-four, which named that strip of land with the designation "maritime-terrestrial zone," which was expressly affected as a public domain asset, and consequently, was incorporated into the national patrimony; and finally, in the Fiscal Code of eighteen eighty-five, the prohibition of alienating the lands comprised within one mile of latitude along the coast of both seas was established. Already in the 20th century, the first regulation that referred to the maritime-terrestrial zone was Law number 75, of the thirtieth of August, nineteen twenty-four, which reaffirmed the public domain character of these lands, as well as the impossibility of exploiting and usufructing them. Likewise, Law number 11, of the 22nd of October, nineteen twenty-two, precisely determined its extension, by delineating it at one thousand seven hundred sixty-two meters—the exact measure of one mile—from the ordinary high tide line, and five hundred meters along both banks of the rivers. This measure was maintained until nineteen forty-two, when through Laws number 19, of the twelfth of November, and Law number 201, of the twenty-sixth of January, nineteen forty-three, its extension was reduced to two hundred meters for both coasts; thus provoking the first de-affectations of this asset, in relation to all those lands beyond the determination made, and their consequent private appropriation; that is, from these two provisions onward, and with the exception of the two hundred meters counted from the ordinary high tide line, the remaining one thousand six hundred seventy-two meters ceased to be public domain from the moment they could be reduced to private domain. However, the lands contained within the two hundred meters excepted by the two aforementioned laws continued to be public domain assets, not reducible to private domain because they are inalienable and imprescriptible. This measure of the maritime-terrestrial zone, together with the public domain character of the lands comprised therein, was reaffirmed in the then-current Article 7 of the Law of Lands and Colonization, number 2825, of the fourteenth of October, nineteen sixty-one, and was repeated in the Forest Law, number 4465, of the twenty-fifth of November, nineteen sixty-nine, and in the Law of Tourist Urbanization of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, number 4558, of the twenty-second of April, nineteen seventy. A warning must be made that, with Law number 4558, of the twenty-second of April, nineteen seventy, in its Transitory III, one hundred fifty meters of the two hundred meters were de-affected, after the first fifty meters, counted from the high tide line, by authorizing private individuals who had possessed, for more than thirty years, in a quiet, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted manner, lots or properties in that sector, to register them through the procedure of possessory information before the jurisdictional authorities—not administrative ones. Given the great number of abuses that were committed under the validity of this provision, that is, from the twelfth of May, nineteen seventy, it was repealed by Law number 5602, of the fourth of November, nineteen seventy-one, which came into effect upon its publication in La Gaceta number 206, of the fourteenth of October of that year; meaning it was in effect for seventeen months and two days. Finally, on the second of March, nineteen seventy-seven, the Law of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, number 6043, currently in effect, was promulgated, which maintained the public domain status (demanialidad) of the two hundred meters along the country's coastline. By reason of the foregoing historical recount of the normative regulation of the maritime-terrestrial zone, it must necessarily be concluded that it was always given the qualification and treatment of a demanial asset (dominical, demanio, or public domain), which makes it deserving of all the characteristics of public domain status, namely, its inalienability, imprescriptibility, unattachability, as well as subjection to police power regarding its use and exploitation, as indicated by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in judgment number 7, at fifteen hours five minutes of the twentieth of January, nineteen ninety-three:

"It is clear then, without detriment to the aforementioned colonial era antecedent, that since the birth of Costa Rica as an independent State, the reservation of land along both coastlines has not been part of the vacant lands—the Crown lands of the Colony—but rather has always been subject to a distinct legal regime, that proper to public domain assets and, therefore, not reducible to private property. In the legislation on the matter promulgated throughout the 20th century—culminating with the current Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone No. 6043 of 2 March 1977—the qualification of the lands comprised in said zone as public domain assets was, obviously, maintained. As a result of the legislative evolution of the 19th century, the maritime-terrestrial zone comprised the part of the coasts of both seas bathed by the flow and ebb, extending to the distance of one mile inland. It also comprised the banks of the rivers up to the point where they were navigable or were affected by the tides. The legislation of this century specified the extension of the zone as well as the elements that formed part of it, but at no time denied its character as a demanial asset and, consequently, its imprescriptibility and inalienability; [...] From this brief study of the legislation regarding the maritime-terrestrial zone, it is easy to reach the conclusion that the strip of 200 meters from the ordinary high tide line along both coasts defined as part of the maritime-terrestrial zone by Article 9 of the current Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, has been public domain—and the lands comprised therein, demanial assets—since 1828, at least. The variations that the legislation of the last century and the present have introduced on the matter have never de-affected these 200 meters in a generalized manner, rather, the legislation prior to 1942 and 1943 established a strip of greater extension—the so-called maritime mile—but never smaller." (Considering II. The highlighting is not from the original.)

By virtue of the foregoing, and under the terms of Article 6 of the Political Constitution, the maritime-terrestrial zone acquires the condition of a demanial asset of the Nation, a consideration that is reinforced by Article 3.1 of the Water Law, "Article 3.- Are equally national property:

I.- The beaches and maritime zones"; and Article 1 of the Law of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, insofar as it textually provides:

"The maritime-terrestrial zone constitutes part of the national patrimony, belongs to the State and is inalienable and imprescriptible. Its protection, as well as its natural resources, is an obligation of the State, its institutions, and all the inhabitants of the country. Its use and exploitation are subject to the provisions of this Law." In the same sense, the Constitutional Chamber pronounced itself in judgments number 2000-10466 and 2002-3821; as did the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, acting as administrative head, in resolution number 128-2001, at eight hours of the sixteenth of February, two thousand one:

"VI.- Correlatively to what has been said, the maritime-terrestrial zone constitutes part of the national patrimony, belongs to the State and is inalienable and imprescriptible. Its protection is an obligation of the State and its institutions—including of course the corresponding Municipalities—and even of all the inhabitants of the country. Its use and exploitation are subject to the provisions of Law No. 6043 on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone." VIII.- Having determined the special affectation of the maritime-terrestrial zone, it is now of interest to know precisely which assets or areas this special regime of legal protection comprises. And it is Law number 6043 itself, which in its Article 9, tells us:

"[...] the strip of two hundred meters wide along the entire length of the Atlantic and Pacific coastlines of the Republic, whatever its nature, measured horizontally from the ordinary high tide line and the lands and rocks that the sea leaves exposed at low tide.

For legal purposes, the maritime-terrestrial zone comprises the maritime islands, islets, and crags, as well as all land or natural formation that rises above the ocean level within the territorial sea of the Republic. Isla del Coco is excepted, which shall be under the direct domain and possession of the State, and those other islands whose domain or administration is determined in this law or special laws." Likewise, pursuant to Article 4 of the Regulation to this Law, Executive Decree number 7841-P, of the sixteenth of December, nineteen seventy-seven, it encompasses:

"[...] the mangroves or salt forests that exist on the continental or insular coastlines and estuaries of the maritime-terrestrial territory, constitute a Forest Reserve and are affected to the Forest Law and all the provisions of that decree [number 7210-A, of the nineteenth of July, nineteen seventy-seven]. Starting from the line of vegetation at the edge of the estuaries and the limit of the mangroves or salt forests when they extend more than fifty meters from the ordinary high tide line, the restricted zone begins." The maritime-terrestrial zone is divided into two zones: the public zone, which comprises the strip of fifty meters wide, counted from the ordinary high tide line, composed of the littoral, shore, or coast of the sea that extends through the rias and permanent estuaries, up to where these are sensibly affected by the tides, and present defined marine characteristics (Article 2, subsection h) of the Regulation to the Law of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, Executive Decree number 7841-P); and the restricted zone, constituted by the remaining one hundred fifty meters. By virtue of the foregoing, part of the public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone includes: the ria, defined as the part of the river near its entrance to the sea, and up to where the tides reach (subsection f) of Article 2 of the cited Executive Decree number 7841-P); so that in relation to the provisions of Article 9 of the Law governing this matter, the strip of two hundred meters adjacent to the rias is also maritime-terrestrial zone; "the islets, crags, and other small areas and natural formations that rise above the sea" (final paragraph of Article 10 of the Law of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone); the mangroves, under the terms of Article 11 of the cited Law "The public zone is also, whatever its extension, that occupied by all the mangroves of the continental and insular coastlines and estuaries of the national territory"; whose incorporation into the public domain dates from nineteen forty-two, with the Water Law, a circumstance that prevents their titling by private individuals. It is noted that Article 4 of the Regulation establishes that the restricted zone in these cases starts from the line of vegetation at the edge of the estuaries and the limit of the mangroves or salt forests, when they extend more than fifty meters from the ordinary high tide line; which is of great importance, as it extends the concept of the maritime-terrestrial zone to portions of the national territory that may be located kilometers from the coast, such that the lands adjacent to the mangrove cannot be the object of legitimate possession. In consideration of the ecological importance of the mangroves, Article 44 of the Forest Law, in concordance with Article 17 of the Organic Law of the Environment, require the Ministry of Environment and Energy to carry out the respective environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental), prior to the granting of any permit for their exploitation; and, the maritime islands, islets, and crags and the lands and rocks that the sea leaves exposed at low tide, pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 9 of Law number 6043, a condition that had already been granted since the Water Law, number 276, of the twenty-seventh of August, nineteen forty-two in its Article 75, by stating "The islands already formed or that may form in the maritime-terrestrial zone or in the navigable part of the rivers and in the rias and estuary mouths are property of the State"; and which was maintained by Decree-Law number 11, of the twenty-seventh of July, nineteen forty-eight, reformed by number 803, of the second of November of the following year in the following terms:

"confirms and proclaims National Sovereignty over the entire submarine platform or continental and insular shelf adjacent to the continental and insular coasts of the national territory, whatever the depth at which it is found, reaffirming the inalienable right of the Nation to all the natural riches that exist on, in, or under said shelf or platform"; and subsection c) of Article 7 of the Law of Lands and Colonization, number 2825, of the fourteenth of October, nineteen sixty-one. It must be clarified that in the case of crags, the concept of public zone applies to the entire natural formation, and in that of islands, to the fifty meters contiguous to the high tide line, the remaining lands being considered restricted zone (Article 10 of Law number 6042), unless a mangrove exists, in which case, it is considered public zone, as indicated previously.

IX.- It is appropriate to recall that the public zone has been destined for the free use, access, and transit of all; such that any permit or concession, as well as the collection of the respective fee, that is located in the public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone is null (as resolved in administrative resolution number 6424-97, at nine hours of the seventeenth of April, nineteen ninety-seven of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal), except for those that have a public purpose, such as "[...] the construction of industrial plants, installations for sport or artisanal fishing, port works, mariculture programs, or other similar establishments or installations, ..." (Article 18 of Law 6043); whose location near the sea is indispensable for their due functioning. In any case, they must have the due authorizations from the MOPT, INVU, ICT, and the respective municipality, attending, in all cases and at all times, "[...] to the public use to which they are destined, or that it involves the establishment and operation of state tourist installations of notable convenience for the country" (first paragraph of Article 22 of the Law of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone).

Likewise, in the case of the natural resource contained in the public zone, it is noted that neither can the flora and fauna be exploited, trees cut, or products extracted from the coast, except with the due authorization—permit or concession—in this case, from the Directorate of Wildlife, of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, following an environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental), under the terms of Article 17 of the Organic Law of the Environment. Furthermore, the respective municipalities are responsible for facilitating access to the beaches for the enjoyment and transit of people, such that the local government must prevent any limiting action that impedes this free access to the beaches. This oversight duty also concerns the eviction of invaders, and even the destruction or demolition of constructions, installations, or works carried out, whether they are simple fences, shanties, sales stands, or dwelling houses, without any liability (as considered by the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, Third Section in resolution number 7900-98).

Pursuant to article 39 of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law (Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre), concessions in the <b><i>restricted zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona restringida de la zona marítimo terrestre)</i></b> may only be granted by the municipalities (article 40 of the cited Law); except in cases where there exists a protected wilderness area (área silvestre protegida) —forest reserves, protection zones, national parks, biological reserves, national wildlife refuges, wetlands, natural monuments— which, pursuant to articles 32 of the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente) and 73 of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law, are under the administration of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía).

**X.- OF THE BOUNDARIES OF THE PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTIES.-** Pursuant to the content of the appealed judgment (and this point not having been objected to by either party), it is assumed that the <b><i>plaintiff is the registered titleholder of the properties inscribed in the real folio system with registration numbers 22641-000 and 22533-000</i></b>, both in the sixth canton of Aguirre, second district (Savegre), Puntarenas Province, at Portalón beach, properties over which the lower-court Judge recognized all the attributes of the right of ownership. However, and in accordance with the evidence brought to the case file, it is also true that <b><i>the property sought to be recovered (reivindicar) in this proceeding comprises a part of the aforementioned properties, and is unregistered land, precisely because of its status as a public-domain asset (bien demanial), encompassing a portion of the maritime-terrestrial zone of Portalón beach</i></b>; a circumstance that means <b><i>the boundaries of both properties inscribed in the real folio system with registration numbers 22641-000 and 22533-000 are not the Pacific Ocean nor the Portalón River, but rather the maritime-terrestrial zone area, which includes the estuary (ría) of the mouth of the Portalón River, the salt marsh (estero), and the existing mangrove forest in the area</i></b>, such that the measurement of the properties must exclude the protection area of such public-domain assets, that is, two hundred meters adjacent to the estuary and one hundred fifty meters at the vegetation line at the shore of the salt marshes and the limit of the mangroves and salt-marsh areas, if they extend for more than fifty meters from the ordinary high-tide line; <b><i>boundaries that must be amended in the Public Property Registry, as must be the respective cadastral plans</i></b>. It is further warned that it is inappropriate and openly contrary to the regulations governing the matter to recognize any right of ownership or its attributes (possession, usufruct, transformation and alienation, defense and exclusion, restitution and indemnification, pursuant to article 264 of the Civil Code) in the plaintiff, due to the legal nature of the asset in question, which removes it from commerce (inalienability), in addition to it not being possible to acquire or lose it through the procedure of ten-year possession — adverse possession (usucapión) — (imprescriptibility). For this reason, <b><i>no possession is possible, neither by the plaintiff, nor by the defendants, nor by any third party</i></b>, given that, as explained previously, such zones have had the status of public domain (demanialidad) since the colonial era.<b><i> </i></b>Finally, it must be noted that <b><i>the plaintiff does not have the status of occupant</i></b>, which refers to those natural persons who, without meeting the condition of settlers (pobladores) —who held a plot in the maritime mile before the enactment of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law, that is, before nineteen seventy-seven, and for a period of more than ten years— have occupied the maritime-terrestrial zone, even in an unauthorized manner, prior to the entry into force of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law, and by virtue of this hold no permit whatsoever, subjects for whom the same Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law, number 6043, in its articles 44, 70, and Transitory Provision VII, constitutes two exceptions to the parameters of private use in the maritime-terrestrial zone, and for whom the granting of use permits is indeed legitimate, which has special conditions, as it is only permitted "[...] for those cases in which the conditions of the zone are not affected, nor free use of the public zone hindered, and in which their execution does not in any way limit the future implementation of the Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador). (Article 19 of Law 6043)." (Resolution number 10163-99, of the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal); and which allows municipalities to charge a fee. But <b><i>this must in no way be regarded as recognition of a right of possession of such areas, but solely as a right of priority for the granting of future concessions</i></b>, once the respective coastal regulatory plan has been approved; whence, under equal conditions, the administration must prefer to grant the concession to whoever has possessed the area in a quiet, public, and peaceful manner continuously, which denotes subjection to territorial regulations.

**XII.- OF THE COSTS.-** The plaintiff requests in its appeal that the award of costs be reviewed, claiming it has demonstrated that it acted in good faith. According to the provisions of article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code, applicable supplementarily per the provisions of article 103 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), the losing party must be ordered to pay personal and procedural costs. This Tribunal considers that the appellant is correct, in that it is true that, having admitted the exception of res judicata (cosa juzgada), each and every claim in the complaint was recognized; but it is also not possible to order the defendants to pay costs, given that it is considered there was sufficient reason to litigate, a circumstance that is covered in subparagraph c) of article 98 of the Regulatory Law of this Jurisdiction. By virtue of this, the appealed judgment must be overturned on this point, to declare it without special award of costs.

**THEREFORE (POR TANTO):** The evidence submitted for a better provision of justice (prueba para mejor proveer) offered by the State's representative is rejected. The appealed judgment is modified, to the effect that the properties inscribed in the real folio system with registration numbers 22641-000 and 22633-000, both located in the sixth canton of Aguirre, second district, Savegre, Puntarenas Province, do not border the Pacific Ocean nor the Portalón River, but rather the maritime-terrestrial zone, which encompasses the estuary of the mouth of the Portalón River, salt marsh, and mangrove forest. It is warned that it is not possible to consider PRIMERA COMPAÑÍA DE DESARROLLO, SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, as the legitimate occupant or possessor of the public-domain areas excluded herein, insofar as their use is subject to the granting of the corresponding authorization (permit or concession) by the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía), because it was declared a Mixed Category Wildlife Refuge (Refugio de Vida Silvestre Categoría Mixto) Portalón, by Executive Decree number 25.139-MINAE, which it did not demonstrate holding in this proceeding. Once this judgment is final, let it be inscribed in the Public Registry, in the margin of the cited properties. The appealed judgment is overturned regarding the award of costs, to declare it without special award in this respect.

**José Paulino Hernández** ** Silvia C. Fernández Brenes Lorena Montes de Oca Monge** **Exp: 98-100136-426-CI** **Ordinary Proceeding (Proceso Ordinario)** **Primera Compañía Unidad de Desarrollo S. A. v/ María del Rosario Monge Baltodano, Inversiones** **Turísticas Los Tucanes S. A., and the State**

No. 35-2007.

TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. SECCIÓN CUARTA. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, a las ocho horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del trece de agosto del dos mil siete.

Proceso Ordinario Contencioso promovido por PRIMERA COMPAÑÍA UNIDA DE DESARROLLO, S.A., representada por Silvia Nora Gutiérrez Alarcón, quien es mayor de edad, viuda, ecologista-conservacionista, de nacionalidad chilena, con cédula de residencia número 425-69983-240, vecina de Aguirre, Refugio de Fauna Silvestre Portalón; contra MARÍA DEL ROSARIO MONGE BALTODANO, mayor, casada, empresaria, costarricense, con cédula de identidad número 6-067-721, e INVERSIONES TURÍSTICAS LOS TUCANES, S.A., cuya representación la ostenta la misma María del Rosario Monge Baltodano, y como parte interesada EL ESTADO, representado por el Procurador Ambiental y de la Zona Marítimo-Terrestre, Doctor José Joaquín Barahona Vargas, de calidades no indicadas. Figura como Apoderado Especial Judicial de la actora el Doctor Alberto Agid Zelaya Martínez, mayor, casado, costarricense, con cédula de identidad número 8-064-497, abogado.

.RESULTANDO:

1.- Que fijada la cuantía de este asunto en doscientos millones de colones con base en los hechos que se exponen y citas legales aducidas; la demanda es para que en sentencia se declare con lugar en todos los extremos la acción de nulidad, reinvindicación y daños y perjuicios en los siguientes puntos:

“A.- Que la única propietaria y poseedora de las fincas reclamadas en el presente juicio, así como de sus áreas, es la parte actora: PRIMERA COMPAÑÍA UNIDA DE DESARROLLO, S.A.; que en consecuencia le pertenece la posesión y cualquier otro derecho real derivado de su titulo de propiedad.

B.- Que la Carta-venta en documento privado firmado por la representante de la PRIMERA COMPAÑÍA UNIDA DE DESARROLLO S.A. Valerie Havill Nicholson y la demandada: MARÍA DEL ROSARIO MONGE BALTODANO, el día 17 de mayo de 1985, así como la venta firmada entre MARÍA DEL ROSARIO MONGE BALTODANO y la Co-demandada INVERSIONES TURÍSTICAS LOS TUCANES, S.A., presidida por la misma MNGE BALTODANO, en San José, el día 18 de enero de 1987, por ésta última venta una consecuencia jurídica derivada de la Carta-venta privada en donde adquiere la demandada MONGE BALTODANO, SON ABSOLUTAMENTE NULAS y sin ningún valor legal ante el derecho de propiedad y demás derechos reales acreditados por la parte actora.

B.- [sic] Que la actora: PRIMERA COMPAÑÍA UNIDAD DE DESARROLLO, S.A., es la única ocupante y legitimada para explorar el área situada dentro de la vía marítima y que ha mantenido ilegalmente la parte demandada; esta área fue ocupada por los demandados con dos casas construidas de tres plantas cada una.

C.- Que la señora MARÍA DEL ROSARIO MONGE BALTODANO y la compañía co- demandada, deben desalojar inmediatamente todos los bienes reclamados en este juicio y cuya titularidad y legitimidad han sido demostrados en favor de la parte actora y entregarlos a dicha parte como legítima propietaria.

D.- Que la parte demandada debe pagar a la parte actora todos los daños y perjuicios ocasionados durante el tiempo que duró la tenencia ilegal de los bienes reivindicados; así mismo [sic] deberá responder por cualquier perdida, deterioro o destrucción de los bienes que hubiesen existido en las casas en el área marítima ocupada por la actora, al momento de la invasión ilegal realizada por la parte demandada.

E.- Que todo daño y perjuicio resultante se liquidará en ejecución de sentencia.

F.- Que la parte demandada no podrá reclamar ninguna mejora hecha de buena fe en los bienes reivindicados, toda vez que su tenencia ha sido sin justa causa ni justo título durante todo el tiempo de dicha tenencia.

G.- Que todo acto jurídico posterior y derivado de los documentos anulados en este juicio ordinario, también se anula como consecuencia de haber sido anulado el acto jurídico que le dio origen.

H.- Que la parte demandada debe pagar a la parte actora las costas personales y procesales ocasionadas por el presente juicio declarativo." (Folios 371 a 373.)

2.- Que las demandadas contestaron en forma extemporánea -con posterioridad a la declaratoria de rebeldía (resolución del Juzgado Civil de Aguirre y de Parrita de las trece horas treinta minutos del cuatro de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y ocho, folio 388)- , en la que opusieron las excepciones de cosa juzgada formal y material, prescripción, falta de acción ad causam activa y pasiva, la falta de derecho y la genérica sine actione agit (folios 409 a 429).

3.- Que el representante estatal se apersonó, en resguardo al interés directo (institucional) que tiene en la defensa del demanio público, por lo que solicita declarar de oficio la nulidad absoluta de todo acto, estipulación contractual o convenio ventilados en este proceso que conlleva una apropiación, detención, uso, goce, traspaso o aprovechamiento ilícito de la zona Marítimo Terrestre, de dominio estatal, por lo que debe desestimarse en sentencia cualquier declaratoria que implique un reconocimiento directo o indirecto de derechos privados, a favor de las partes, en contra de la afectación creada con ese régimen (folios 391 a 402) 4.- La Licenciada Nancy Allen Umaña, Juez del Juzgado de la materia, en sentencia número 719-2005, de las ocho horas diez minutos del catorce de julio del dos mil cinco, resolvió:

"Se declara una inadmisibilidad parcial de la acción, en proceso interpuesto ordinario por la empresa Primera Compañía Unidad de Desarrollo contra María Monge Baltodano e Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes, por considerar que existe cosa juzgada con respecto a las siguientes pretensiones: a. Que la única propietaria y poseedora de las fincas reclamadas en el presente juicio, así como de sus áreas, es la parte actora, que en consecuencia le pertenece la posesión y cualquier otro derecho real derivado de su titulo de propiedad. b. Que la Carta-venta en documento privado firmado por la representante de la Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo S.A. Valerie Havill Nicholson y la demandada, el diecisiete de mayo de mil novecientos ochenta y cinco, así como la venta firmada entre María del Rosario Monge Baltodano y la Co-demandada Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes, presidida por Monge Baltodano, en San José, el dieciocho de enero de mil novecientos ochenta y siete, por está última venta una consecuencia jurídica derivada de la Carta - venta privada en donde adquiere la demandada Monge Baltodano, son absolutamente nulas y sin ningún valor legal ante el derecho de propiedad y demás derechos reales acreditados por la parte actora. d. Que Monge Baltodano y la compañía co- demandada, deben desalojar inmediatamente todos los bienes reclamados. e. Que la parte demandada debe pagar a la parte actora todos los daños y perjuicios ocasionados durante el tiempo que duró la tenencia ilegal de los bienes reivindicados; f. Que la parte demandada no podrá reclamar ninguna mejora hecha de buena fe en los bienes reivindicados. g. Que todo acto jurídico posterior y derivado de los documentos anulados en este juicio ordinario, también se anula como consecuencia de haber sido anulado el acto jurídico que le dio origen.”. Con relación a las pretensiones: “c. Que la actora es la única ocupante y legitimada para explorar el área situada dentro de la vía marítima. e….;así que debe responder por cualquier perdida, deterioro o destrucción de los bienes que hubiesen existido en las casas en el área marítima ocupada por la actora, al momento de la invasión ilegal realizada por la parte demandada”, se declara improcedente la demanda. Se condena a la parte actora al pago de ambas costas de esta acción. Notifíquese." (Folios 835 vuelto y 836.)

5.- Inconforme con lo resuelto por el A-quo, apelan la actora y el representante del Estado, recursos que fueron admitidos, y en virtud de los cuales conoce este Tribunal en alzada.

5.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones de rigor, sin que se noten causales de nulidad susceptibles de invalidar lo actuado.

Redacta la Juez Fernández Brenes; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- DE LA PRUEBA OFRECIDA PARA MEJOR PROVEER.- Mediante escrito presentado el ocho de junio del dos mil seis, el representante del Estado solicita que se admita como prueba para mejor resolver la certificación expedida por el Director General del Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, sobre las áreas de dominio público costeras, de propiedad estatal, que comprende el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre, Categoría Mixta. Por estimar este Tribunal que no resulta necesaria, por cuanto su contenido está determinado, no sólo en el decreto que crea dicha área protegida, sino también en el resto de prueba aportada, tales como planos catastrados y en los propios alegatos de las partes de esta demanda, se deniega la recepción de la prueba ofrecida.

II.- DE LOS HECHOS PROBADOS.- Para una mejor comprensión de los hechos tenidos por probados, se sustituyen los que la Juez de Instancia determinó, por existir una serie de omisiones en su consignación, para que se tengan de la siguiente manera: 1.) Que las fincas inscritas a folio real con la matrícula 22641-000 y 22633-000, ambas del cantón sexto de Aguirre, distrito segundo (Savegre), de la Provincia de Puntarenas son propiedad de la sociedad Primera Compañía Unida, S.A., cuyos linderos inscritos son los siguientes: al norte con Guillermo Rodríguez Rodríguez, al sur con milla marítima y Guillermo Rodríguez Rodríguez, al este con río Portalón y al oeste con Guillermo Rodríguez Rodríguez, la primera; y al norte con quebrada salada en medio otro, al sur con la milla marítima, al este con Manuel Arias Chinchilla y al oeste con Alicia Bonilla Ramírez, respecto de la segunda (folios 6 a 11 del expediente judicial); 2.) Que el 18 de mayo de 1985, Valerie Havill Nicholson en su condición de apoderada generalísimo sin limite de suma de la sociedad Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo vendió mediante compraventa en documento privado a Rosario Monge Baltodano una propiedad ubicada en Matapalo, distrito segundo de Savegre del cantón de Aguirre, Provincia de Puntarenas, que era un terreno sin inscribir, pero que la vendedora había poseído por más de diez años en forma quieta, pública, pacífica y sin interrupción por la suma de quinientos mil colones, con los siguientes linderos: al Norte, con el río Matapalo en medio, en parte propiedad de los Garita y de la misma vendedora, al Sur, con el Mar Pacífico, al Este con Rodrigo Ruíz Solórzano, y al Oeste, con la desembocadura del río Portalón, formando una punta de plancha en forma irregular; que mide aproximadamente, al este unos cuatrocientos metros, por el oeste unos trescientos metros en su parte más ancha, por el Norte y por el Sur unos tres mil metros, lo que viene a dar un aproximado de noventa y cinco hectáreas, que comprende, un potrero llano mal atendido, con una pista de aterrizaje mal cuidada, en parte con cercas, con dos casas de habitación de tres plantas techadas con zinc ricalit que han estado abandonadas, una casa pequeña de madera en mal estado, dos casetas para protección de plantas eléctricas semi-cerradas con zinc, el cual está en mal estado, hay dos plantas eléctricas en mal estado, así como bomba eléctrica para secar el agua de un pozo (compraventa privada folio 22 y 23, hecho 3 de la demanda, folio 350 del expediente judicial); 3.) Que a la anterior compraventa privada, el Notario Público José Luis Barletta Blanco le puso fecha cierta el 12 de enero de 1987 (razón en la copia de la escritura, folio 24 del parte de los inmuebles inscritos matrícula 22641-000 y 22633-000 y comprende parte de la zona marítimo terrestre (planos catastrados números 350390-97, 350397-79, plano de parcela 115 del Instituto de Tierras y Colonización, y montaje de los planos catastrados P-49305-98, P-350397-79 y P-13238-74 realizado por el Catastro Nacional Sistema de Información Territorial Catastral, folios 1, 2, 4 y 665 del expediente judicial, y dicho de las demandadas, folios 410 vuelto, 411, 414, 415, 415 vuelto, 416 vuelto del señora Monge Baltodano vendió el inmueble anterior mediante la compra-venta privada a Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes, siendo dicha demandada la representante de esta sociedad, por la suma de quinientos mil colones (folios 25 y 26 del expediente judicial); 6.) Que mediante escritura número ochenta y ocho, ante el notario público Allen Ramírez Henderson, el 2 de enero de 1994, la señora Silvia Nora Gutiérrez Alarcón en representación de la Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo S.A. y María del Rosario Monge Baltodano en representación de Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes S.A. llegaron a un convenio con la finalidad de poner fin a la disputa surgida en relación con la Playa Portalón de Savegre de Aguirre, dejando sin valor y efecto el contrato de venta suscrito entre Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo S.A. y la señora Monge Baltodano en lo personal el día 18 de mayo de 1985, por lo que, la sociedad Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes, S.A. recibió en ese acto la suma de dos millones de colones que se abonan al precio que ella pagó por dichas tierras, así como el pago que tuvo que hacer a Terciopelo, S.A. para entrar en posesión de las tierras, y el de cualquier daño o perjuicio durante ese tiempo. En virtud de lo anterior, se reconoció a la sociedad Primera Compañía de Desarrollo Unida, S. A. la posibilidad de continuar con la posesión en dichas tierras. Y finalmente acordaron renunciar a cualquier tipo de conflicto de tipo indemnizatorio por los bienes comprendidos en las casas de habitación (folio 119 del expediente judicial); 7.) Que el Juzgado Mixto de Puriscal, Agrario por Ministerio de Ley, Santiago, mediante resolución de las 15:00 horas del 18 de enero de 1995 resolvió lo siguiente: “Analizado este proceso, vemos que en octubre de mil novecientos ochenta y ocho, fue suspendido por haber sido argüido de falso el documento de compraventa que presenta la actora. Luego de más de seis años de inactividad procesal, la demandada presenta un convenio de escritura, suscrita por las representantes de las sociedades aquí contendientes donde convienen en: “ que con la finalidad de poner fin a la disputa surgida con relación a la playa Portalón de Savegre de Aguirre deja sin valor y efecto el contrato de venta suscrito entre Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo S.A. y la señora Monge Baltodano en lo personal, el día dieciocho de mayo de mil novecientos ochenta y cinco, para lo cual Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes S.A, recibe en este acto la suma de dos millones de colones que se abonan al precio que ella pagó por dichas tierras, así como el pago que ésta tuvo que hacer a Tercio Pelo S. A., para entrar en posesión de las tierras, así como el pago de cualquier daño o perjuicio surgido durante este tiempo. Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo S.A. podrá a cambio continuar con la posesión de las tierras como lo ha venido haciendo desde mil novecientos noventa y uno…”. Este documento se le puso en conocimiento a la actora, así como la petición de la demandada de que se dé por terminado el proceso y ésta no manifestó nada. Así las cosas se ordena archivar el INVERSIONES TURÍSTICAS LOS TUCANES S.A. contra PRIMERA COMPAÑÍA UNIDA DE DESARROLLO S.A.).” (folio 298 del expediente judicial); 8.) Que mediante Decreto Ejecutivo número 25139-MINAE, del 16 de febrero de 1996, el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía declaró como Refugio de Fauna Silvestre de Categoría Mixta el área de Playa Portalón de Matapalo, Provincia de Puntarenas, Cantón Aguirre, Distrito Savegre, en el que se encuentran los inmuebles pertenecientes a la sociedad Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo, Sociedad Anónima (hecho sexto de la demanda, folio 354 del expediente judicial, y manifestaciones de la Procuraduría General de la República y del Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, folios 391 a 402, 512 a 526 del expediente judicial, decreto ejecutivo, folio 401 del expediente administrativo, volumen 5); 9.) Que en octubre de 1997, el regente forestal Ingeniero Rodolfo Sequeira Herrera elaboró un plan de manejo para el pago de servicios ambientales del Refugio de Fauna Silvestre de Categoría Mixto de Portalón, para someterlo a aprobación del Programa de Incentivos para la protección de bosques C.P.B. del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, en el que comprende únicamente actividades de conservación (folios 191 a 202 del expediente judicial); y, 10.) Que en 1998 el Estado (Procuraduría General de la República) interpuso acciones penales para salvaguardar el bien demanial (zona-marítimo terrestre) con ocasión de los actos de posesión que la empresa Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes, S.A. y su personera (María del Rosario Monge Baltodano) ante la desobediencia de esta de remover cercas (contestación del Jefe de la Oficina Regional de Aguirre y Parrita del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía ante la Sala Constitucional, con ocasión del recurso de amparo interpuesto por la sociedad, que se tramitó en expediente número 5004-98-0007-CO, folios 251 a 254 del expediente administrativo, volumen 5).

III.- DE LOS HECHOS NO PROBADOS.- De importancia para la resolución de este asunto, se tienen como hechos no aprobados el siguientes: 1.) Que la sociedad Primera Compañía Unida de Desarrollo, S.A. tenga un permiso o autorización otorgado por el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía para el uso y aprovechamiento de las áreas que comprende la zona marítimo-terrestre de la Playa Portalón; y, 2.) Que la actora tenga la condición de ocupante de la zona marítimo terrestre.

IV.- DE LOS AGRAVIOS DE LA ACTORA.- En escritos presentados el primero y el tres de agosto (folios 843 y 844 el primero y 846 a 849) la actora formula recurso de apelación únicamente respecto de la condenatoria del pago de ambas costas que le impone en la sentencia número 719-2005, de las ocho horas diez minutos del catorce de julio del dos mil cinco, por "no encontrarla ajustada a derecho", al aplicarse en forma errónea el artículo 221 del Código Procesal Civil, sobre la base de las siguientes consideraciones: a.) por habérsele concedido cada una de las pretensiones solicitadas en la demanda, por intermedio de la incorporación oficiosa de una excepción de cosa juzgada material, no obstante -afirma- que "es hasta hoy que por primera vez existe una sentencia diciendo haber actuado con evidente buena fe y, c.) que para hacer tal condenatoria no se valoraron los daños y perjuicios causados con ocasión de la ilegítima posesión de las demandadas; motivos por los cuales solicita la revocatoria de la sentencia en este extremo, de manera que se resuelva de conformidad. Mediante escrito presentado el diez de octubre del dos mil cinco (folios 893 a 8986) solicita desestimar en todos los extremos la apelación formulada por la Procuraduría General de la República, declarándose más bien su condición de "pobladora", al haber acreditado trámites para el otorgamiento de la respectiva concesión y el pago del canon respectivo, hasta mil novecientos noventa y tres. Mediante escrito presentado el quince de mayo del dos mil siete (visible a folios938 a 939), fuera del plazo para formular los agravios que venció el doce de octubre del dos mil cinco, la actora formula más agravios para impugnar la citada resolución, sea por haberse admitido una excepción introducida de manera oficiosa por la Juez de Instancia, sin que se le confiriese la audiencia contenida en el artículo 307 del Código Procesal Civil, causándosele indefensión. En virtud de la extemporaneidad de este último alegato, no se hará pronunciamiento sobre el mismo, circunscribiéndose el análisis de la apelación únicamente al extremo impugnado inicialmente.

V.- DE LOS AGRAVIOS DEL REPRESENTANTE DEL ESTADO.- Los motivos de impugnación del representante del Estado se centran en que la sentencia no hace salvedad de los terrenos de dominio público que incorpora el inmueble que se solicita reivindicar, el cual además se ubica dentro del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre de Categoría Mixta; teniéndose en cuenta que en ese fallo se admitió que no hay permiso sobre tales bienes en lo relativo a su uso y aprovechamiento; de manera que, en la parte dispositiva reconoce la existencia de un derecho de propiedad, posesión y otros derechos reales derivados del dominio sobre tales fundos, sin aclarar que no comprende las áreas de la zona marítimo terrestre, que no se circunscribe a los doscientos metros de la costa, sino también la ría - que es parte del río próxima a la entrada del mar y hasta donde llegan las mareas-, los manglares -que son bienes públicos, independientemente de su extensión-, y el estero, que son de dominio público estatal. En virtud de lo cual, resultan inaceptables las actuaciones posesorias, titulaciones o discusiones judiciales relativas a la titularidad o posesión de este tipo de bines, que de pleno derecho tiene el Estado.

VI.- DE LA INTERVENCIÓN DE LA PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA EN ESTE PROCESO.- Estima este Tribunal que previo a resolver la apelación formulada por la representación del Estado, resulta pertinente hacer un breve análisis en torno a la justificación de la intervención de esta institución en este proceso, toda vez que no puede tenérsele como coadyuvante, en tanto no actúa como mero interviniente adhesivo de las pretensiones o situación de ninguna de las partes que figuran en este proceso, sino, como lo indica en sus diversas intervenciones (en escrito en el que se apersona al proceso -presentado el veinticuatro de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y ocho, visible a folios 391 a 402 del expediente judicial-, en escrito en el que defiende la competencia de esta Jurisdicción para el conocimiento de esta demanda -del seis de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y seis-) su participación en este asunto deriva del interés de esa institución en la defensa objetiva del demanio público, al versar el conflicto sobre un inmueble que comprende la zona marítimo terrestre, conforme a la competencia asignada a esa institución por mandato legal. Debe recordarse que al tenor del artículo primero de la Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República, número 6815, del veintisiete de setiembre de mil novecientos ochenta y dos, se tiene a esta institución como "órgano superior consultivo, técnico-jurídico de la Administración Pública y de representante legal del Estado en las materias propias de su competencia", al que le ha sido asignada una importante función de control en lo relativo a la efectiva protección del ambiente–, toda vez que, entre sus cometidos esenciales se le encomienda:

"i) Actuar en defensa del patrimonio nacional, de los recursos existentes en la zona marítimo-terrestre, el mar territorial, la zona económica exclusiva y la plataforma continental.

Tomar las acciones legales procedentes en salvaguarda del medio, con el fin de garantizar el derecho constitucional de toda persona a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado.

Velar por la aplicación correcta de convenios, tratados internacionales, leyes, reglamentos y otras disposiciones sobre esas materias.

Investigar, de oficio o a petición de parte, toda acción u omisión que infrinja la normativa indicada" (en lo que interesa, inciso i del artículo 3 de la citada Ley número 6815).

Asimismo, el artículo 4 de la Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, número 6043, del diecisiete de febrero de mil novecientos setenta y siete), se le reconoce a éste órgano consultivo de la Administración, la potestad para que "[...] por sí o a instancia de cualquier entidad o institución del Estado o de parte interesada" , ejerza "[...] el control jurídico para el debido cumplimiento de las disposiciones de esta ley. En consecuencia, hará las gestiones pertinentes respecto a cualesquiera acciones que violaren o tendieren a infringir estas disposiciones o de leyes conexas, o que pretendan obtener derechos o reconocimiento de éstos contra aquellas normas, o para anular concesiones, permisos, contratos, actos, acuerdos o disposiciones obtenidos en contravención a las mismas. Lo anterior sin perjuicio de lo que corresponda a otras instituciones o dependencias de conformidad con sus facultades legales." De tal suerte, que la Procuraduría ejerce en esta materia una función de control activa, que la legitima para interponer y apersonarse en procesos jurisdiccionales, en defensa, precisamente del demanio público.

VII.- DE LA DEMANIALIDAD DE LA ZONA MARÍTIMO-TERRESTRE Y SU RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO.- A lo largo de la historia de la humanidad, se ha denotado la gran importancia económica, comercial y también de seguridad -en lo atinente a la defensa nacional- que tiene la costa para cualquier país u organización estatal. Así, en lo que respecta a nuestro país, desde la época colonial, el litoral ha permanecido destinado al uso público. En un principio, el área reservada era de una milla de ancho, por lo que se le conocía -y aún en nuestra época- como la "milla marítima". La normativa de mayor relevancia en la regulación de la zona litoral costarricense inicia con la Ley número 162, de veintiocho de junio de mil ochocientos veintiocho, recién declarada la independencia de la Corona Española, y en la etapa de formación del Estado costarricense, en la que se recogió un precepto anterior, de la época colonial (Real Cédula, del quince de octubre de mil setecientos cincuenta y cuatro), al establecerse la reserva de una milla marítima en las costas de ambos mares, que se mantuvo a lo largo de toda la legislación emitida en el siglo XIX. Esa misma condición de demanialidad se reconoció en el Código General de mil ochocientos cuarenta y uno, que consideró el flujo y reflujo del mar y sus riberas de dominio público; en la Ley número 7, de treinta y uno de agosto de mil ochocientos sesenta y ocho, en que se ratificó la "indenunciabilidad" de los terrenos de la milla marítima; en la Ley de Aguas, número 8, de veintiséis de mayo de mil ochocientos ochenta y cuatro, que denominó esa franja de tierra con la advocación de "zona marítimo terrestre", la cual, expresamente fue afectada como bien de dominio público, y en consecuencia, se incorporó al patrimonio nacional; y por último, en el Código Fiscal de mil ochocientos ochenta y cinco se dispuso la prohibición de enajenar los terrenos comprendidos en una milla de latitud a lo largo de la costa de ambos mares. Ya en el siglo XX., la primera normativa a que hizo referencia la zona marítimo terrestre fue la Ley número 75, de treinta de agosto de mil novecientos veinticuatro, que reafirmó el carácter demanial de estas tierras, así como la imposibilidad de octubre de mil novecientos veintidós, precisó, con exactitud, su extensión, al delimitarla en mil setecientos sesenta y dos metros - medida exacta de una milla-, a partir de la pleamar ordinaria, y de quinientos metros a lo largo de ambos márgenes de los ríos. Esta medida se mantuvo hasta mil novecientos cuarenta y dos, en que a partir de las Leyes número 19, de doce de noviembre, y la Ley número 201, de veintiséis de enero de mil novecientos cuarenta y tres, se redujo su extensión, a doscientos metros para ambas costas; provocando así, las primeras desafectaciones de este bien, en relación a todos aquellos terrenos más allá de la determinación hecha, y su consecuente apropiación particular; es decir, a partir de estas dos disposiciones, y a excepción de los doscientos metros contados a partir de la pleamar ordinaria, el resto de los mil seiscientos setenta y dos metros dejaron de ser de dominio público desde el momento en que pudieron se reducidos a dominio privado. Sin embargo, los terrenos contenidos en los doscientos metros exceptuados por las dos leyes precitados, continuaron siendo bienes de dominio público, no reducibles a dominio privado por ser inalienables e imprescriptibles. Esta medida de la zona marítimo terrestre, junto con el carácter demanial de los terrenos allí comprendidos, se reafirmó en el entonces vigente artículo 7 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, número 2825, de catorce de octubre de mil novecientos sesenta y uno, y se repitió en la Ley Forestal, número 4465, de veinticinco de noviembre de mil novecientos sesenta y nueve y en la Ley de Urbanización Turística de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, número 4558, de veintidós de abril de mil novecientos setenta. Sí debe hacerse la advertencia que, con la Ley número 4558, de veintidós de abril de mil novecientos setenta, en su Transitorio III, se desafectaron ciento cincuenta metros de los doscientos metros, después de los primeros cincuenta metros, contados a partir de la pleamar, al autorizarse a los particulares que hubiesen poseído por más de treinta años, en forma quieta, pública, pacífica y sin interrupción, lotes o fincas en ese sector, a inscribirlos por medio del trámite de informaciones posesorias ante las autoridades jurisdiccionales -no administrativas-. Ante la gran cantidad de abusos que se cometieron al tenor de la vigencia de esta disposición, sea, desde el doce de mayo de mil novecientos setenta, es que se deroga mediante la Ley número 5602, de cuatro de noviembre de mil novecientos setenta y uno, la cual entra en vigencia a partir de su publicación en La Gaceta número 206, del catorce de octubre de ese año; sea que tuvo una vigencia de diecisiete meses y dos días. Finalmente, el dos de marzo de mil novecientos setenta y siete, se promulgó la Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, número 6043, vigente hasta la fecha, que mantuvo la demanialidad de los doscientos metros a lo largo del litoral del país. En razón del anterior recuento histórico de la regulación normativa de la zona marítimo-terrestre, necesariamente debe concluirse que siempre se le dio el calificativo y trato de bien demanial (dominical, demanio o de dominio público), lo cual le hace acreedora de todas las características de la demanialidad, sea, su inalienabilidad, imprescriptibilidad, inembargabilidad, así como la sujeción al poder de policía en lo relativo a su uso y aprovechamiento, como lo señaló la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en sentencia número 7, de las quince horas cinco minutos del veinte de enero de mil novecientos noventa y tres:

"Resulta claro entonces, sin demérito del antecedente de la época colonial señalado, que desde el nacimiento de Costa Rica como Estado independiente, la reserva de terreno a los largo de ambos litorales no ha sido parte de los baldíos -las tierras realengas de la Colonia- sino que siempre ha estado sometido a un régimen jurídico distinto, el propio de los bienes de dominio público y, por lo tanto, no reducibles a propiedad privada. En la legislación sobre la materia promulgada a lo largo del siglo XX -hasta culminar con la actual Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre No.6043 de 2 de marzo de 1977- se mantuvo, obviamente, el calificativo de bienes de dominio público de los terrenos comprendidos en dicha zona. Como resultado de la evolución legislativa del siglo XIX, la zona marítimo terrestre comprendía la parte de las costas de ambos mares bañadas por el flujo y reflujo, extendiéndose hasta la distancia de una milla tierra adentro. Comprendía, además, las márgenes de los ríos hasta el sitio en que fueran navegables o fueran afectados por las mareas. La legislación de este siglo fue precisando la extensión de la zona así como los elementos que formaban parte de ella, pero en ningún momento negó su carácter de bien demanial y, en consecuencia, su imprescriptibilidad e inalienabilidad; [...] De este somero estudio sobre la legislación acerca de la zona marítimo terrestre, es fácil llegar a la conclusión de que la franja de 200 metros a partir de la pleamar ordinaria a lo largo de ambas costas definida como parte de la zona marítimo terrestre por el artículo 9 de la actual Ley sobre la Zona marítimo terrestre, ha sido de dominio público -y los terrenos en ella comprendidos, bienes demaniales- desde 1828, por lo menos. Las variaciones que la legislación del siglo pasado y del presente han introducido sobre la materia nunca han desafectado en forma generalizada estos 200 metros, siendo más bien que la legislación anterior a 1942 y 1943, establecía una franja mayor en extensión -la llamada milla marítima- pero nunca menor." (Considerando II. El resaltado no es del original.)

En virtud de lo anterior, y al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 6 de la Constitución Política, la zona marítimo terrestre adquiere la condición de bien demanial de la Nación, consideración que es reforzada por el artículo 3.1 de la Ley de Aguas, "Artículo 3.- Son igualmente de propiedad nacional:

I.- Las playas y zonas marítimas"; y el artículo 1° de la Ley de la Zona marítimo terrestre, en tanto dispone textualmente:

"La zona marítimo terrestre constituye parte del patrimonio nacional, pertenece al Estado y es inalienable e imprescriptible. Su protección, así como sus recursos naturales, es obligación del Estado, de sus instituciones y de todos los habitantes del país. Su uso y aprovechamiento están sujetos a las disposiciones de esta Ley." En igual sentido, se pronunció la Sala Constitucional en sentencia número 2000- 10466 y 2002-3821; así como la Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso, en funciones de jerarca administrativo, en resolución número 128-2001, de las ocho horas del dieciséis de febrero del dos mil uno:

"VI.- Correlativamente a lo dicho, la zona marítimo terrestre constituye parte del patrimonio nacional, pertenece al Estado y es inalienable e imprescriptible. Su protección es obligación del Estado y sus instituciones –incluidas por supuesto las Municipalidades correspondientes- e incluso de todos los habitantes del país. Su uso y aprovechamiento están sujetos a las disposiciones de la Ley No. 6043 sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre." VIII.- Determinada la especial afectación de la zona marítimo-terrestre, interesa ahora saber con precisión, qué bienes o áreas comprende este régimen especial de tutela jurídica. Y es la misma Ley número 6043, la que en su artículo 9 nos lo indica:

"[...] la franja de los doscientos metros de ancho a todo lo largo de los litorales Atlántico y Pacífico de la República, cualquiera que sea su naturaleza, medidos horizontalmente a partir de la línea de la pleamar ordinaria y los terrenos y rocas que deje el mar al descubierto en la marea baja.

Para los efectos legales, la zona marítimo terrestre comprende las islas, islotes y peñascos marítimos, así como toda tierra o formación natural que sobresalga del nivel del océano dentro del mar territorial de la República. Se exceptúa la Isla del Coco que estará bajo dominio y posesión directos del Estado y aquellas otras islas cuyo dominio o administración se determinen en la presente ley o leyes especiales." Asimismo, conforme al artículo 4 del Reglamento de esta Ley, Decreto Ejecutivo número 7841-P, del dieciséis de diciembre de mil novecientos setenta y siete, abarca:

"[...] los manglares o bosques salados que existen en los litorales continentales o insulares y esteros del territorio marítimo terrestre, constituyen Reserva Forestal y están afectados a la Ley Forestal y a todas las disposiciones ese decreto [número 7210-A, del diecinueve de julio de mil novecientos setenta y siete]. Partiendo de la línea de vegetación a la orilla de los esteros y del límite de los manglares o bosques salados cuando éstos se extiendan por más de cincuenta metros de la pleamar ordinaria, comienza la zona restringida." La zona marítimo terrestre está divida en dos zonas: la pública, que comprende la faja de cincuenta metros de ancho, contados de la pleamar ordinaria, compuesta por la litoral, orilla o costa del mar que se extiende por las rías y esteros permanentes , hasta donde éstas sean sensiblemente afectadas por las mareas, y presenten características marinas definidas (artículo 2 inciso h) del Reglamento a la Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, Decreto Ejecutivo número 7841-P); y la restringida, constituida por los restantes ciento cincuenta metros. En virtud de lo anterior, son parte de la zona pública de la zona marítimo-terrestre: la ría, definida como la parte del río próxima a su entrada en el mar, y hasta donde llegan las mareas (inciso f) del artículo 2 del citado Decreto Ejecutivo número 7841-P); de manera que en relación con lo dispuesto en el artículo 9 de la Ley que rige esta materia, también es zona marítimo terrestre, la franja de los doscientos metros contigua a las rías; "los islotes, peñascos y demás áreas pequeñas y formaciones naturales que sobresalgan del mar" (párrafo final del artículo 10 de la Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre); los manglares, al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 11 de la citada Ley "Zona pública es también, sea cual fuere su extensión, la ocupada por todos los manglares de los litorales continentales e insulares y esteros del territorio nacional"; cuya incorporación al demanio data de mil novecientos cuarenta y dos, con la Ley de Aguas, circunstancia que impide su titulación por particulares. Se advierte que el artículo 4 del Reglamento estatuye que la zona restringida en estos casos, parte de la línea de vegetación a la orilla de los esteros y del límite de los manglares o bosques salados, cuando éstos se extiendan por más de cincuenta metros de pleamar ordinaria; lo cual es de gran importancia, por cuanto extiende el concepto de zona marítimo terrestre a porciones del territorio nacional que puede encontrarse a kilómetros de la costa, de manera que los terrenos aledaños al manglar no pueden ser objeto de posesión legítima. En atención a la importancia ecológica de los manglares, es que el artículo 44 de la Ley Forestal, en concordancia con el 17 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, exigen al Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía la realización del respectivo estudio de impacto ambiental, previo al otorgamiento de cualquier permiso para su aprovechamiento; y, las islas, islotes y peñascos marítimos y los terrenos y rocas que el mar deje al descubierto en la marea baja, conforme a lo dispuesto en el párrafo segundo del artículo 9 de la Ley número 6043), condición que ya había sido otorgada desde en la Ley de Aguas, número 276, de veintisiete de agosto de mil novecientos cuarenta y dos en su articulo 75, al consignar "Son propiedad del Estado las islas ya formadas o que se formen en la zona marítimo terrestre o en la parte navegable de los ríos y en las rías y desembocadura"; y que mantuvo el Decreto-Ley número 11, de veintisiete de julio de mil novecientos cuarenta y ocho, reformado por el número 803, de dos de noviembre del siguiente año en los siguientes términos:

"confirma y proclama la Soberanía Nacional sobre toda la plataforma submarina o zócalo continental e insular adyacente a las costas continentales e insulares del territorio nacional, cualquiera que sea la profundidad a que éste se encuentre, reafirmando el derecho inalienable de la Nación en todas las riquezas naturales que existen sobre, en o bajo dicho zócalo o plataforma"; y el inciso c) del artículo 7) de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, número 2825, de catorce de octubre de mil novecientos sesenta y uno. Debe aclararse que en el caso de los peñascos, se aplica el concepto de zona pública a toda la formación natural, y en el de las islas, a los cincuenta metros contiguos a la línea de pleamar, considerándose zona restringida a los demás terrenos (artículo 10 de la Ley número 6042), salvo que exista manglar, en cuyo caso, se considera como zona pública, según lo indicado anteriormente.

IX.- Conviene recordar que la zona pública ha sido destinada para el libre uso, acceso y tránsito de todos; de manera que es nula todo permiso o concesión, así como el cobro del canon respectivo que se ubique en la zona pública de la zona marítimo terrestre (como lo resolvió en resolución administrativa número 6424-97, de las nueve horas del diecisiete de abril de mil novecientos noventa y siete del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), salvo aquellas que tengan un fin público, tales como "[...] la construcción de plantas industriales, instalaciones de pesca deportiva o artesanales, de obras portuarias, programas de maricultura, u otros establecimientos o instalaciones similares, ..." (artículo 18 de la Ley 6043); cuya ubicación cerca del mar es indispensable para su debido funcionamiento. En todo caso, deben contar con las debidas autorizaciones del MOPT, INVU, ICT y la respectiva municipalidad, atendiendo, en todo caso y en todo momento, "[...] al uso público a que se destinen, o que se trate del establecimiento y operación de instalaciones turísticas estatales de notoria conveniencia para el país" (párrafo primero del artículo 22 de la Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre).

Asimismo, tratándose del recurso natural contenido en la zona pública, se advierte que tampoco se puede explotar la flora y la fauna, cortar árboles o extraer productos de la costa, si no es con la debida autorización -permiso o concesión-, en este caso, de la Dirección de Vida Silvestre, del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, previo estudio de impacto ambiental, al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 17 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente. Además, corresponde a las respectivas municipalidades el facilitamiento del acceso de las playas para el disfrute y tránsito de las personas, de manera que el gobierno local debe impedir cualquier acción limitativa que impida este libre acceso a las playas. Esta labor de fiscalización también concierne al desalojo de los invasores, e incluso, de destruir o demoler las construcciones, instalaciones u obras realizadas, ya sea que se trate de simples cercas, tugurios, puestos de venta, o casas de habitación, sin responsabilidad alguna (como lo consideró el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Tercera en resolución número 7900-98). Conforme al artículo 39 de la Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, sólo es posible otorgarse concesiones en la zona restringida de la zona marítimo terrestre, a cargo de las municipalidades (artículo 40 de la citada Ley); salvo en los supuestos en que exista un área silvestre protegida -reservas forestales, zonas protectoras, parques nacionales reservas biológicas, refugios nacionales de vida silvestre, humedales, monumentos naturales- que conforme a los artículo 32 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente y 73 de la Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, están bajo la administración del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía.

X.- DE LOS LINDEROS DE LAS FINCAS DE LA ACTORA.- Conforme al contenido de la sentencia apelada (y no habiendo sido objetado por ninguna de las partes este extremo), se parte de que la actora es la titular registral de las fincas inscritas a folio real con la matrícula 22641-000 y 22533-000, ambas en el cantón sexto de Aguirre, distrito segundo (Savegre), de la Provincia de Puntarenas, en playa Portalón, inmuebles sobre las que la Juez de Instancia reconoció todos los atributos del derecho de propiedad. Sin embargo, y conforme a las probanzas aportadas al expediente, es también lo cierto que el inmueble que se intentó reivindicar en este proceso comprende parte de las fincas anteriores, y que es terreno sin inscribir, precisamente por su condición de ser un bien demanial, al comprender parte de la zona marítimo terrestre de la playa Portalón; circunstancia que hace los linderos de ambas fincas inscritas a folio real con la matrícula 22641-000 y 22533-000, no sean el mar Pacífico ni el río Portalón, sino el área de zona marítimo-terrestre, que comprende la ría de la desembocadura del río Portalón, el estero y manglar existente en la zona, de manera que la medición de las fincas debe excluir el área de protección de tales bienes de dominio público, esto es, doscientos metros contiguos a la ría y ciento cincuenta metros en la línea de vegetación a la orilla de los esteros y del límite de los manglares y esteros salados, si se extienden por más de cincuenta metros de pleamar ordinaria; linderos que debe modificarse en el Registro Público de la Propiedad, al igual que los planos catastrados respectivos. Se advierte además que resulta improcedente y abiertamente contraria a la normativa que rige la materia reconocer algún derecho de propiedad o de sus atributos (posesión, usufructo, transformación y enajenación, defensa y exclusión, restitución e indemnización, conforme al artículo 264 del Código Civil) al actor, en razón de la naturaleza jurídica del bien de que se trata, que lo saca fuera del comercio de los hombres (inalienabilidad), además de que no resulta posible su adquisición o pérdida mediante el procedimiento de la posesión decenal - usucapión- (imprescriptibilidad). Por ello, no resulta posible ninguna posesión, ni de parte de la actora, ni tampoco de las demandadas, ni de tercero alguno, en atención a que, según se explicó anteriormente, tales zonas tienen la condición de demanialidad desde la época de la colonia. Por último, debe advertirse que la actora no tiene la condición de ocupante, que son aquellas personas físicas, que, sin reunir la condición de pobladores - que tenían un lote en la milla marítima antes de la promulgación de la Ley de la zona marítimo terrestre, sea, antes de mil novecientos setenta y siete, y por un plazo mayor de diez años- hayan ocupado la zona marítimo terrestre, aún de forma no autorizada, con antelación a la vigencia de la Ley de la zona marítimo terrestre, en virtud de lo cual, no ostentan permiso alguno, sujetos respecto de los cuales la misma Ley de la Zona Marítimo- Terrestre, número 6043, en sus artículos 44, 70 y Transitorio VII, se constituyen en dos excepciones a los parámetros de utilización privada en la zona marítimo terrestre, y respecto de los cuales sí resulta legítimo el otorgamiento de los permisos de uso, que tiene especiales condiciones, en tanto sólo se admite "[...] para aquellos casos en que no se afecten las condiciones de la zona, ni entorpezcan el libre aprovechamiento de la zona pública y que su ejecución no limite en absoluto la futura implementación del Plan Regulador. (Artículo 19 de la Ley 6043)." (Resolución número 10163-99, de la Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo); y que permite a las municipalidades el cobro de un cano. Pero que en modo alguno se debe tener como el reconocimiento del derecho de posesión de tales áreas, sino únicamente como un derecho de prioridad para el otorgamiento de futuras concesiones, una vez que haya sido aprobado el respectivo plan regulador costero; de donde, en igualdad de condiciones, la administración debe preferir otorgar la concesión a quien haya poseído en forma quieta, pública y pacíficamente en forma continua, lo que denota la sujeción a la normativa territorial.

XII.- DE LAS COSTAS.- Solicita la actora en su apelación que se revise la condenatoria en costas por haber demostrado que ha actuado de buena fe. Al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 221 del Código Procesal Civil, de aplicación supletoria al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 103 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, se debe condenar al vencido al pago de las costas personales y procesales. Estima este Tribunal que lleva razón la apelante, por cuanto, es lo cierto que al haberse admitido la excepción de cosa juzgada, se le reconocieron todas y cada una de las pretensiones de la demanda; pero tampoco resulta posible condenar a las demandadas, en atención a que se estima que hubo suficiente motivo para litigar, circunstancia que está recogida en el inciso c) del artículo 98 de la Ley Reguladora de esta Jurisdicción. En virtud de lo cual, se debe revocar en este extremo la sentencia apelada, para declararla sin especial condenatoria en costas.

POR TANTO:

Se rechaza la prueba ofrecida para mejor proveer aportada por el representante del Estado. Se modifica la sentencia venida en alzada, en el sentido de que las fincas inscritas a folio real con la matrícula 22641-000 y 22633-000, ambas ubicadas en el cantón sexto de Aguirre, distrito segundo, Savegre, Provincia de Puntarenas, no limitan con el mar Pacífico ni el río Portalón, sino con la zona marítimo-terrestre, que comprende la ría de la desembocadura del río Portalón, estero y manglar. Se advierte que no resulta posible tener a PRIMERA COMPAÑÍA DE DESARROLLO, SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, como la legítima ocupante ni poseedora de las áreas de dominio público que aquí se excluyen, en tanto su aprovechamiento está supeditado al otorgamiento de la correspondiente autorización (permiso o concesión) de parte del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, por haberse declarado Refugio de Vida Silvestre Categoría Mixto Portalón, mediante Decreto Ejecutivo número 25.139-MINAE, lo que no demostró tener en este proceso. Una vez firme esta sentencia, inscríbase en el Registro Público, al margen de las fincas citadas. Se revoca la sentencia venida en alzada respecto a la condena en costas, para declararla sin especial condenatoria en este aspecto.

José Paulino Hernández Silvia C. Fernández Brenes Lorena Montes de Oca Monge Proceso Ordinario Primera Compañía Unidad de Desarrollo S. A. c/ María del Rosario Monge Baltodano, Inversiones Turísticas Los Tucanes S. A. y el Estado