Confirmation of extradition to Belgium for document forgery and fraudulent bankruptcyConfirmación de extradición a Bélgica por falsificación documental y bancarrota fraudulenta

RES.: [Telf1] CRIMINAL COURT OF CASSATION. Second Judicial Circuit of San José. Goicoechea, at fifteen hours ten minutes on May seventh, two thousand four.

EXTRADITION APPEAL PROCESS, filed in the present case against [Name1], of legal age, married, born in Belgium, condominium administrator. For EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS promoted by THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM. Judges Guillermo Sojo Picado, [Name2], and [Name3] participate in the decision on the appeal. Attorneys [Name4] and [Name5], in their capacity as private defense counsel for the person sought for extradition, and [Name6], representative of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, and [Name7] appeared.

WHEREAS:

1. That by means of a resolution issued at seven hours on January twenty-first, two thousand four, the Court of Guanacaste, Santa Cruz Division, resolved: "THEREFORE: The extradition of the person sought for extradition, [Name1], is granted so that he may be tried by the State of Belgium for the acts constituting falsification of documents that are being pursued before the court of first instance of Antwerp, file 235/96 reference 235/96AN61.982422-96, and for the acts constituting falsification of documents and use of a false document that are being pursued before the court of first instance of Belgium, file number 29/01 reference 29/01/AN75.98.499-99; for the other acts referred to in the extradition request and the additional ones that have been processed in this proceeding, extradition is denied. The detention of the person sought for extradition is ordered from his capture until his effective delivery to the State of Belgium. LET IT BE NOTIFIED. [Name8]. JUDGE. ".

2. That against the previous ruling, Attorneys [Name4] and [Name5] filed an Appeal. Likewise, Attorney [Name9] appeals on behalf of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic.

3. That once the respective deliberation was carried out, the Court considered the questions raised in the Appeal.

4. That in the proceedings, the pertinent legal prescriptions have been observed.

DRAFTS the Cassation Judge SOJO PICADO; and,

CONSIDERING:

I- Having examined the two appeals filed by the defense of the person sought for extradition, as well as the one filed by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, and considering that they satisfactorily meet the legal requirements prescribed in the criminal procedural legislation, they are admitted for processing. Likewise, considering that in this case the oral hearing has been requested and carried out, a proceeding in which the grounds of the appeal were not expanded upon, we proceed to resolve the appeals filed as follows.

II- APPEAL FILED BY [Name10] and [Name11] IN THEIR CAPACITY AS DEFENSE COUNSEL FOR [Name12]. (folios 1510 to 1549 front) It is requested that the extradition initiated against their client be set aside and the capture order issued against him be revoked. Several aspects, in the opinion of the appellants, justify the cited claim: 1- The extradition request and its supplements do not have an official translation. After transcribing Article 1 of the Extradition Law and agreeing that this matter must be processed based on the Extradition Treaty in force between Costa Rica and Belgium, it is insisted that the three extradition requests that have been filed have as a common denominator that there is no official translation of the instruments that were filed to support the requests. It is indicated that in this specific case, the Embassy of Belgium set itself up as an expert translator of its own evidence, so there is not a single document that has been translated by an official translator appointed by a Judge, or by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, in order to legalize them, and for them to be deemed public. It is a general principle of justice that acts or proceedings that have been prepared by some of the parties in conflict cannot be permitted or taken as elements of proof, especially when the translation is evidence, and in any case, recusals and the objections deemed pertinent can be filed. It is insisted that translation is an activity regulated by Law and can only be done by official translators. It goes on to say that the Embassy of Belgium cannot obligate us through the Court to abide by the translation as an exact science, nor to assume their procedural loyalty, nor can it obligate the defense or the Office of the Attorney General to carry it out. The appellants challenge proven fact F- set forth in the judgment on the merits, in which it is stated that: "At the request of Attorney [Name13], the official translator of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Republic of Costa Rica, appointed by agreement number 005 DJ of September 10, 1998, published in Gazette number 198 of October 13, nineteen hundred ninety-eight, selectively translated from the Dutch language into the Spanish language the original file that served as the basis for the supplement of the extradition ordered against the person sought for extradition," since this refers to the second and last supplement of extradition that in any case was rejected by the Judge for being time-barred. Finally, it is indicated that the last supplement of the extradition is absolutely unintelligible, which demonstrates the lack of an official translation. 2- The extradition request and its supplements do not include the documents of conviction referred to in Article 9 subsection c- of the Extradition Law. The ground for the appeal is developed by indicating that this article is of particular relevance in that it obliges – among other aspects – the requesting State to provide an authentic copy of the proceedings of the process that supply evidence or at least reasonable indications of guilt of the person in question. Although it is not a matter of carrying out a process to determine the guilt of the subject, it is required that – besides reviewing the formal prerequisites – the necessary evidence be attached to examine the merits of the accusation, the degree of probability, the possible participation, so that the detention order or the judgment is not sufficient. In this specific case, the Kingdom of Belgium limited itself to furnishing, as documentation, the detention orders, with a summary of the acts charged, this in the first two requests. Regarding the third request, it also furnished the detention order and the summary of the acts from the judgment rendered in absentia. Consequently, it suffers from the defects noted. The appellant concludes by saying that the Costa Rican judge in extradition matters is not a simple observer of formal prerequisites, but rather must issue, at the moment of granting or denying extradition, a judgment of probability concerning the commission of the act and the participation of the accused. 3- Non-curability of the absence of suitable documents. It is argued that the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic of Costa Rica – the body that represents the Kingdom of Belgium – did not use its power to promote evidence to supplement the absence of suitable documents, translated according to the law, but rather limited itself to providing – after a hearing conferred by the Court pursuant to Article 9 of the Extradition Law – insufficient, poorly translated, and non-legalized documentation that in any case already existed in the file. This defect and negligence is no longer curable, and what remains is to examine the validity and effectiveness of the evidence offered by the petitioning State. 4- All the crimes referred to in the extradition requests are sanctioned at their minimum end with a penalty of less than two years, whereby they do not meet the minimum penalty referred to in Article 2 in fine of the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium, which requires that the crime not be less than 2 years of imprisonment. Lack of minimum penalty. It is alleged that in accordance with the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium, it is required that: "... the acts for which extradition is requested must carry, according to the law of the requesting country, a penalty of not less than two years of imprisonment." In accordance with the foregoing norm, all infractions of labor legislation are excluded without further analysis from the first request, as they are sanctioned, in accordance with the informal documentation itself filed by the requesting State, with day-fines. From the second extradition request, the crimes of simple and fraudulent bankruptcy are excluded, as they have a minimum penalty of one month of imprisonment, all in accordance with Articles 489 bis and 489 ter of the Belgian Criminal Code. In the third extradition request, the first conviction is excluded because it is for 12 months of imprisonment. It goes on to say that there is no documentation supporting the extradition petition, since the translations are not official and the documents are not public, so the crimes of falsification and use of a false document contemplated in the first and second extradition request also do not meet the minimum penalty required by the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium. The appellants say that one only has to look at the documentation provided by the requesting State to realize that the possible crimes of falsification and use of a false document are of very low seriousness in Belgium, which is why they are not considered crimes but rather infractions, and that as such, under Belgian law they carry a correctional penalty and not one of reclusion, as they classify as infractions and not crimes, and with a possible penalty of less than two years. Therefore, they fall below the minimum penalty required by the referred Treaty. Through the last supplement of extradition, where acts of the same nature, typified as use of a false document and falsification, Mr. [Name14] is sentenced to just 12 months. Among the acts in the last supplement, visible at folio 302, and the second extradition request, they are the same crimes and the same articles of the Criminal Code. Regarding this latter legal body, it turns out that Articles 193, 196, and 197, which are the provisions relating to the crimes of falsification of documents and use of a false document, are punished with a penalty of reclusion of five years, so if this is so, the appellants question how and despite what, dealing with the same articles (crimes of falsehood and use of a false document), in the first case referred to in the last supplement the penalty was 12 months. It goes on to indicate that the apparent contradiction between the reclusion penalties for the crimes of falsification and use of a false document mentioned by the requesting State and the penalty of 12 months for an equal case, but one that has a judgment and not a simple accusation, is contained not only in the accusation of the first supplement of the extradition, but is repeated in the very detention order for default issued by the Court of First Instance of Antwerp. In sum, the grievance is concluded by stating that in the appealed judgment there is a serious flaw in reasoning on the part of the Judge, because two things cannot be the same and different at the same time; that is, that the minimum penalty for the crimes of falsification and use of a false document is 5 years (minimum end of reclusion) as the Judge states in his judgment, and the requesting State in the first two extradition requests; or that the minimum penalty is one year, as the Judge and the Kingdom of Belgium also state, in the instruments accompanying the second and third extradition petition. The foregoing makes it impossible to grant extradition in this case. 5- In the fifth allegation, the atypical nature of the accused conduct and the breach of the principle of double criminality is insisted upon. Despite the fact that the extradition request cites the articles referring to the falsification of documents and the first supplement cites the criminal type relating to the use of a false document, the truth is that the acts on which the initial request is based and its respective supplement reveal that the conduct attributed to [Name15] [Name16] is atypical. There is therefore an error in classification by the Belgian State. Regarding the initial extradition request, it contains a very laconic description, as it only indicates that regarding the "... acts of 30/4/94 [Name17] worked as delegated managing administrator of various companies in industrial piping and refrigeration techniques established in Antwerp, among others BVBA Intermontage, NV Montrex, NV Euro Engineering, NV Polytech. In this manner, he has sent in the same period fictitious invoices for 44 million Belgian francs to BVBA Genes, Mdgalenastraat 28 in Antwerp, and consequently he could not pay his employees officially." The description of the conduct was very important, because regarding the crime of falsification of documents, the Belgian criminal system requires that the requirements of Articles 193 in relation to 196 of that country's Criminal Code be met. Thus, it is necessary to demonstrate the intent to harm, and that the falsification is carried out through one of the forms referred to in Article 196 cited. The charges forming the basis of the extradition do not indicate the manner in which the person sought for extradition carried out the alleged falsification, nor is the intent to falsify any document attributed to him, nor is it indicated that the accused sent the invoices with knowledge that they were fictitious. Mr. [Name15] is only attributed with having sent the invoices, not that he falsified them, or that he acted with intent (dolo), so the conduct is atypical, and the mere act of sending a fictitious invoice does not constitute the crime in question. Regarding the first supplement of the extradition, the conduct attributed does not consist of personally falsifying the documents, nor sending them to third parties, but rather of having "Recorded in his accounting at least 63.1 million FB, as some fictitious invoices," an act that cannot give rise to any crime. Finally, the appellants comment that the problem seems to be limited not to the material adulteration of the invoices but to the fact that these contained false data not corresponding to reality, and that in any case, with respect to this type of material falsehood, called ideological by the doctrine, it is only possible with respect to public or equivalent documents, never to simple private documents such as invoices. In the last ground, and because it is related to this point 5-, it is transcribed in this section, it is pointed out that the principle of double criminality is not met. The appellants indicate that if Articles 193 and 196 of the Belgian Criminal Code are observed, it is necessary to conclude that they are not crimes similar to those contained in Costa Rican legislation. Thus, Belgian legislation requires "fraudulent intent or the intent to harm," while in Costa Rica – as regulated in Articles 359 and 361 of the Criminal Code – harm is required, so they are diverse criminal types. In Belgium, these are crimes of mere conduct, while in Costa Rica they are result-oriented crimes and as such require patrimonial injury. 6- Impossibility of determining the time of commission of the punishable act. In all the extradition requests, it is not possible to know with certainty when the allegedly criminal conduct would have taken place. Thus, with regard to the first request, it is not known whether they are acts that began on 30/4/94 and ended on 20/2/98, or whether they are acts that were carried out on a continuous basis. In short, from this laconic statement of the facts it is not possible to know clearly if the social infractions were being committed, this continuously, or if Mr. [Name15] continued sending or falsifying the invoices, a doubt from which one cannot escape as long as the Kingdom of Belgium did not even furnish a copy of the respective accusation. The same happens with the second extradition request, which limits itself to indicating a vague period that would run from 6/11/95 to 4/2/99, without indicating the precise moment of the commission of the crimes. 7- Statute of limitations. Determining the moment of commission of the punishable act is an essential aspect for determining everything related to the statute of limitations for the criminal action. If the starting point is taken as 30/4/94, then the crime of use of a false document would have been time-barred on April 30, 2000, under Costa Rican law. Indeed, the detention order for default, which is the only document in the file that can be taken as the starting point of the investigation in Belgium, is dated October 2, 2000. It is argued that if the extradition request is not clear as to the moment of commission of the punishable act, this circumstance cannot be held against the person sought for extradition. Nor can it be assumed that the crime would have ceased to be committed on the last date indicated in the request, i.e., 20/2/98, but rather the most favorable date, which is 30/4/94. The same happens with the second extradition request, which limits itself to indicating a vague period that would run from 6/11/95 to 4/2/98, without indicating the specific moment of the commission of the crimes. The appellants are of the opinion that under Belgian law the crimes are time-barred, as they are sanctioned with penalties of one year of imprisonment. If the acts of the first case date from the year 86, they are currently time-barred, and equally, if in the second case the acts go from 5/6/94 to 11/9/95, they are also time-barred. Article 5 of the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium must be considered, which stipulates that "Extradition shall not be granted when, under the legislation of the country in which the accused person is found, the penalty or the criminal action has become time-barred." It goes on to say that in relation to the crime of falsification, in reality the crime of falsification of a private document is charged, given that the classification is not given by the requesting State but by the acts charged. In Costa Rica, the falsification of invoices is not a crime of falsification of a public document, nor is it falsification of an equivalent document, but rather a falsification of a private document, which in our Costa Rican legal system is punishable by two years of reclusion.

IV- Having examined the arguments put forth by the defense, this Court proceeds to resolve them as follows:

1. Regarding the point of the need for an official translation of the documents furnished by the requesting State to justify the extradition, this Court has indicated the following in ruling 662 of 9:30 hours on August 29, 2002: "II. In the second ground of the appeal, a lack of authenticity of the documentation furnishes by the United States of America and a lack of official translation are claimed, breaching Article 369 subsection d) of the Criminal Procedure Code. It points out that the documents are not authentic nor were they officially translated into Spanish. It indicates that the requesting State was warned, but it did not comply. It indicates that the law states what an official translation is. It says that if the translation was done abroad, it should have been authenticated. It states that the Extradition Treaty does not exempt the authentication of the translation. The ground is declared without merit. Article 9 subsection 6) of the Extradition Treaty with the United States of America says: 'All documents provided by the Requesting State shall be translated, either in the Requesting State or in the Requested State, into the language of the Requested State.' This implies that it is not required that the translation of documents be done in accordance with the Law on Official Translations and Interpretations, which in any case in its Article 3) indicates that the official translation of the document must be done 'when so required.' At folios 604-608 it is recorded that the translation of the documents found in the file was carried out by [Name18], a member of the Association of Interpreters and Translators of the United States of America, the respective documentation having been filed with the Consulate of Costa Rica for its authentication, the same as later before the Authentication Officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (folio 604), so no defect is noted. It is important that the challenger alleges a lack of reasoning in the extradition judgment with respect to the authentication of the documentation. However, said defect does not exist, the reasons why it is not considered that there was any defect being given in the resolution. Thus it says: 'The defense of the person sought for extradition has objected to the translation of the documents. Law no. 8142 is invoked, which indicates that any document, prepared in a language different from Spanish, with a view to producing legal effects in our country, must be officially translated. That same law defines as an official translation only that which is carried out by a translator authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship. In the interests of such objections, the Requesting State was warned to provide such official status. Certification was provided that the translations of all the documents, on which the Extradition request is based, were carried out by a translator from the Association of Judicial Interpreters and Translators of the United States – folios 599 to 610 -. Such documents are sufficient to prove the suitability of the translations. Despite the official definition made by our legislation, we cannot, in cases of Extradition with the United States, require the Requesting State to provide translations prepared by national translators authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship. The Treaty – of superior rank to the law – empowers that translations be prepared in either of the two countries – Article 9 subsection 6'. In accordance with what has been indicated, no defect is noted in the Court's reasoning, which gives the reasons in that regard, which are consistent with the legal regulations. Therefore, this ground is declared without merit." In a similar vein, drafted by Dr. [Name19], this same Court ruled in ruling 2002-0909 of 16:20 hours on November eighth, two thousand two, when it was indicated in the relevant points: "The procedural nature of extradition, the agility it requires, only requires a procedure that authenticates the verisimilitude and credibility of the documentation, without certification like that referred to by the appellant being necessary, because the effects of such documentation are very limited in our jurisdiction; evidence is not even received, nor is its full legitimacy assumed. It is sufficient that there exist legitimate elements of judgment that justify, in principle, the intervention of the requesting State and the limitation on the liberty of the person sought for extradition, but the Costa Rican State does not fully assume the content and scope of the evidence or documents that support the extradition petition, whose content and claim will have full effect in the jurisdiction of the requesting State and not in the Costa Rican jurisdiction... The objections regarding the translation of the documents are not convincing, because the sixth paragraph of Article nine of the Treaty does not require an official translation: the commented rule contains a very flexible norm, as it allows the translation to be done in the requested State and in the requesting State." In this specific case, the non-compliance is directed at questioning the absence of an official translation, and it must be added that – as indicated by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic – the requesting State did furnish the translation into the Spanish language of all the documentation. This is observed at folios 1062 to 1387 of volume II of this process. It must be added that in any case, by application of the principle of agility in this type of proceedings, as has already been pointed out with citation of case law from this Chamber, what is required is precisely the verisimilitude and credibility in the documentation, without the appellants demonstrating that this is not the case. It must be added that the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium does not properly require an official translation, but rather according to the second paragraph of Article 6 – in relation to the documents – it indicates: "They shall be produced in original or in authentic testimony and shall be accompanied, whenever possible, by a translation in the language of the requested country, and by the description of the individual claimed." Note that it is not required that this translation be official as is alleged. Consequently, and based on the foregoing, the claim must be denied.

2. As for the second allegation according to which "The extradition request and its supplements do not include the documents of conviction referred to in Article 9 subsection c of the Extradition Law," the ground is rejected. One must not lose sight of the fact that extradition does not properly imply an analysis of conviction, since as the Constitutional Chamber itself has already recognized in Ruling 886-95, the analysis carried out in an extradition procedure does not prejudge the guilt of the person sought for extradition, this in the sense that – as that resolution indicates – "It is not for the national Courts to determine whether the appellant committed the crimes of which he is accused nor his degree of participation, since that is the competence of the courts of the requesting State." (Constitutional Chamber Exp. No. 0422-V-95 Ruling 0886-95 of 16:39 hours on February 15, 1995) What the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium requires in this case is precisely the fulfillment of certain formal requirements, those pursuant to Article 6, insofar as the crimes for which extradition is requested, the existing evidence, and the applicable substantive norms are demonstrated. Consequently, the claim is rejected.

3. Regarding the third claim alleging the non-curability of suitable documents, since the requesting State has furnished insufficient, shoddy, and non-legalized documentation that in any case already existed in the file, it must – equally – be rejected. One of the aspects that has occupied the present extradition process throughout its proceeding has been precisely the authenticity and reliability of the documentation furnished by the requesting State. However, it should be considered that, pursuant to the resolution of this Court Ruling 2001-939 of eleven hours thirty minutes on November 16, 2001, (visible at folio 933 to 943 of Volume I of these proceedings), upon resolving the formality of the documents, the following was indicated: "ARGUMENTS OF THE DEFENSE COUNSEL. The lawyers for the person requested opposed the appeal filed. They indicate that it is not true that everything not derived from the text of the treaty implies a contravention by the contracting parties. They point out that the Constitutional Chamber and the Court of Cassation have required authentication. They say that the responsibility for the lack of authentication lies with the government of Belgium and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, the latter in not making the warnings to the former. They state that the argument that the crime of fraudulent bankruptcy is not included in the treaty is irrelevant, since it is not sanctioned in Belgium with a penalty of more than two years, so the requirement of the minimum penalty is not met. They indicate that the argument of the Office of the Attorney General that the final resolution should be reserved until the defect was cured is not admissible, because it goes against the principles of self-responsibility, preclusion, and procedural loyalty. As for the fact that the last extradition petition was not resolved, they say that any omission must be of such magnitude that it generates a conclusion different from the one reached in the ruling. However, - they state – this lacks relevance due to the lack of authentication. In a subsidiary manner, they indicate that if the ruling is totally or partially annulled, their client should be released. In a writ filed subsequently, the defense counsel again make their arguments, referring to the fact that the authenticated documents were not furnished. "II. ARGUMENTS OF THE DEFENSE COUNSEL. The lawyers for the person requested opposed the appeal filed. They indicate that it is not true that everything not derived from the text of the treaty implies a contravention by the contracting parties. They point out that the Constitutional Chamber and the Court of Cassation have required authentication. They say that the responsibility for the lack of authentication lies with the government of Belgium and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, the latter in not making the warnings to the former.

They state that the argument that the offense of fraudulent bankruptcy is not included in the treaty is irrelevant, since it is not punishable in Belgium by a penalty exceeding two years, and therefore the requirement of minimum penalty is not met. They indicate that the Attorney General's Office's argument that the final decision should be reserved until the defect was remedied is inadmissible, because it runs counter to the principles of self-responsibility, preclusion, and procedural loyalty. As for the failure to resolve the last extradition request, they say that any omission must be of such magnitude as to lead to a conclusion different from that reached in the ruling. However—they state—this lacks relevance due to the lack of authentication. In the alternative, they state that if the ruling is annulled in whole or in part, their client should be released. In a subsequently filed brief, the defense counsel return to their arguments, referring to the fact that the authenticated documents were not submitted. III. IT IS RESOLVED: The first aspect to analyze with respect to the challenged resolution concerns the lack of authentication of the documentation by the consul of Costa Rica in Belgium, in accordance with the chain of authentications required by the Ley de Servicio Consular. The challenged resolution states: “Regarding the authenticity that the documents supporting the extradition request must maintain, Article 6 of the Convention between Belgium and Costa Rica provides that the documents on which the extradition is based shall be produced in original or in authentic certified copies and shall be accompanied, whenever possible, by a translation in the language of the requested country, and by the personal identification (filiación) of the claimed individual. For its part, subsection 2 of Article 9 of the current Ley de Extradición provides that among the documents that the requesting government must present are ‘an authentic copy of the proceedings of the case, which provide proof or at least reasonable indications of the guilt in question.’ For its part, the Ley Orgánica del Servicio Consular No. 46 of July 7, 1925 and its amendments grants the consuls of the Republic the status of notaries and has authority to attest, in accordance with the laws, to acts and contracts. They shall also legalize documents and signatures of the authorities of the country in which they operate, when such certificates and documents are to have effect in Costa Rica, even if involving foreigners, see Articles 66, 67-69 and 81 of the aforementioned law. But in addition, the signature of this official must be authenticated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores), as provided in Article 294 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). Reviewing the documents presented by the requesting authority, we find that they were not legalized by the consul of Costa Rica in Belgium, nor was the signature of this official authenticated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as was correct, because they were intended to have legal effects in Costa Rica. In those documents, only the authentication of the consul of Belgium in Costa Rica appears, that is, the documents that have served to support the requested extradition were not legitimized by our authorities, ergo, they are not suitable to support the requested extradition. It is noteworthy that the court that initially intervened did not make the warning (prevención) to the requesting authority to comply with this requirement, a warning that at this stage is inappropriate, because the extradition request must already be resolved, given that the extraditable individual [Name20] has been in pretrial detention (prisión preventiva) for many months. As the extradition request made against the extraditable individual [Name1] suffers from a lack of authenticity, it is rejected and his release is ordered once this resolution becomes final.” This Tribunal, after studying the rulings of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) cited by both the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) and the defense of the requested person, together with a study of constitutional jurisprudence according to the Judicial Branch's (Poder Judicial) computer systems, finds that with respect to the authentication of signatures pursuant to the Ley de Servicio Consular, the Constitutional Chamber expressly referred to it in ruling 903-92 of April 3, 1992: “VII. The allegation of lack of authentication of the documents provided by the requesting party deserves separate consideration. The resolutions of the Full Court (Corte Plena) of September 27, 1982, Article VII, and December 24, 1984, Article III) indicate that the lack of authentication of signatures is remedied by the referral of the extradition proceedings by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia). However, the Chamber considers that what was indicated on that occasion by the Full Court and the administrative and jurisdictional practice that was subsequently consolidated in light of what was resolved, conflicts with the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 80 and 81 of the Ley Orgánica del Servicio Consular, which requires that documents originating from abroad must be authenticated by the Consul of Costa Rica in that country and the signatures thereof by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see Article 291 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). In the extradition proceedings being processed against [Name21] [Name22], the authentication of the signature of the Costa Rican consul by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is missing from the documents provided by the Government of the United States of America, an omission of a legal formality which, in the Chamber's view, prevents the documentation presented from being considered complete. In the Chamber's view, the omission by the Costa Rican State—to some extent motivated by the resolutions under comment—prevents the documentation presented from being considered complete. However, this omission is not of such an identity as to nullify the actions taken by the Tribunal; on the contrary, the Chamber considers that it is a remediable defect (defecto subsanable) and not attributable to the requesting country, and therefore the Court of Santa Cruz (Juzgado de Santa Cruz) must request, as soon as possible, the authentication, in order to continue with the proceedings normally. The foregoing implies that in the Chamber's view there has been no violation of the fundamental rights of the appellant and, therefore, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.” Furthermore, the Constitutional Chamber has indicated in various rulings that the lack of authentication of documents in an extradition is a remediable defect. Thus, in ruling 4317-93 of September 3, 1993, it stated: “This Tribunal has already indicated in other rulings—incidentally referring to the same matter—that the lack of authentication of the documentation neither produces any nullity nor prevents the initiation of the extradition procedure, as it is a remediable defect.” In the same vein: Constitutional Chamber, ruling 3637-93 of July 28, 1993, and ruling 3678-93 of July 30, 1993. In accordance with what is stated in said rulings, it must be concluded that the Ley de Servicio Consular (Art. 67) is applicable, with no conflict arising between it and the Extradition Treaty with Belgium, since the latter in its Art. 6 requires that the “original document” or an “authentic certified copy” must be presented, but does not state that the procedure for the recognition of documents pursuant to the Ley de Servicio Consular should not be followed, which in any case was enacted in accordance with international consular practices. It must be taken into account that the Constitutional Chamber in ruling 903-92 expressly required that the legal procedure be followed, including authentication by the consul of Costa Rica in the country of the requesting State. The situation would be different if the Treaty included a rule like that of Art. 7 of the Model Treaty on Extradition, mentioned by the appellant party, which expressly provides that no certification or authentication of extradition requests shall be required. However, the lack of authentication of the documentation, as the Constitutional Chamber has stated in various rulings, mentioned above, including ruling 903-92 itself, is not grounds for rejecting the extradition request, but rather the respective warning must be made to the requesting State to remedy the defect, which was not done in this case. The foregoing in accordance with Art. 9 subsection d) of the Ley de Extradición, of supplementary application. Regarding the warning, see, in addition to the cited rulings, ruling 2490-96 of May 28, 1996, ordered by the Constitutional Chamber. Regarding the warning for the presentation of missing documentation and the annulment of the resolution on extradition to remedy the defect, ruling 516-F-96 of September 5, 1996, issued by the Tribunal de Casación Penal, is important. It has even been stated by this Tribunal, in a case governed by the Ley de Extradición and not by the Treaty between Belgium and Costa Rica, that the failure to present the authentic documents within the required timeframe does not in itself imply that the extradition must be denied if they are subsequently provided, although it has implications regarding the procedure (Ruling 643-2001 of August 27, 2001). It should be highlighted that the same judgment acknowledges that the lack of authentication of the documents is a remediable defect, but contradictorily indicates that because the extraditable individual has been detained for a long time, it is not appropriate to make the warning to the requesting State, as would be procedurally correct. In this sense it is stated: “It is noteworthy that the Tribunal that initially intervened did not make the warning to the requesting authority to comply with that requirement, a warning that at this stage is inappropriate because the extradition request must already be resolved, given that the extraditable individual [Name15] [Name16] has been in pretrial detention for many months” (folio 844). Contrary to what is inferred from that reasoning, the long duration of the provisional detention, according to rules of derivation, may be related to whether or not the extraditable individual’s release should be ordered during the proceedings thereof, but it has no connection with the decision on the merits of the extradition, such that it definitively results in the denial of the request for it; therefore, the defense counsel are not correct in their arguments when invoking the principles of self-responsibility, preclusion, and procedural loyalty. Rather, in accordance with the principle of loyalty between the contracting parties to the international Treaty, the warnings must be made to the requesting State to correct a defect in the documentation, especially since this requirement is derived from Costa Rica's domestic legislation. Thus, if what was appropriate was to grant a hearing to remedy the defect in the documentation, the procedure should have been in that sense, which was not done by the Trial Tribunal (Tribunal de Juicio). Therefore, the appropriate course is to grant the appeal, annul the challenged resolution, ordering the referral back (reenvío), so that the corresponding warning is made. As unnecessary, the other arguments of the appeal are not addressed.” The foregoing implies recognizing—independently of the discussion raised by the Attorney General's Office—regarding the usefulness of requiring formalities in the documentation, the reality is that our legislation and even the erga omnes binding precedents of the Constitutional Chamber require compliance with certain requirements. In the specific case, it is noted that at folios 1062 to 1387 of volume II, a series of certificates duly legalized and authenticated were presented by the Embassy of Belgium, which contain the following aspects: Regarding the first extradition request: 1- The identification of the extraditable individual and his personal data. 2- The formal extradition request, the statement of the detention order issued in absentia (rebeldía) on 6 / 10 / 2002 by the Investigating Judge (Juez de Instrucción) Ms. [Name23] in Antwerp reference 235 / 96 AN61 98. 2422- 96. 3- The indication of the facts for which extradition is requested, according to which the interested party is guilty of being a co-perpetrator (coautor) of offenses regarding social legislation and document falsification in Antwerp, from 30 / 4 / until 20 / 2) 1998. 4- The indication of the penalty for the offenses and the applicable rules, and the possible date of prescription (prescripción) of the offenses. 5- At folio 1079 to 1080 appears, duly authenticated, the detention order in absentia of 6 / 10 / 2000 case file 325- 96 issued by Judge [Name23] Investigating Judge of the Court of First Instance (Tribunal de Primera Instancia) of Antwerp, the facts subject to the proceeding. 6- Certified copy of the applicable legislation for these offenses (folio 1196 and following). Regarding the second extradition request: 1- The extradition request is supplemented based on a detention order in absentia on 21/ 3/ 2001 by the Investigating Judge [Name24] reference 29 / 01 / AN 75. 98. 499- 99 in which it is stated that the extradited individual is guilty of the acts of document falsification and use and simple and fraudulent bankruptcy in Antwerp, Belgium, from 6 / 11 / 95 to 4 / 12 / 1999. 2- The articles criminalizing the conduct are indicated, specifically rules 1 to 11, 193, 196, 197, 213, 214, and 489 ter and 489 bis of the Belgian Penal Code, with the indication that the penalties exceed the minimum duration provided for in the Agreement between Costa Rica and Belgium of 25 / 4 / 1902, and the indication of the prescription dates for the charges. 3- At folio 1234 appears the detention order for the offenses of document falsification and use, fraudulent and simple bankruptcy (articles 489 ter and 489 bis of the Belgian Penal Code). 4- Likewise, at the indicated folio there is a transcription of the facts for which—among others—extradition is requested, as well as the detention order in absentia (folio 1239 and 1240). Regarding the third additional extradition request. The following are considered duly certified and legalized: 1- The basis for the present additional request “Based on a judgment handed down by the Court of Appeal of Antwerp on 4/ 10/ 2000…”. 2- The facts for which extradition is requested are for the offenses of document falsification and use of a false document knowing it was false—as co-perpetrator of NV Europa United States of America (EURUSA) declared bankrupt upon declaration—has made the books or documents and the annual accounts of the companies disappear, partially or entirely has embezzled or concealed assets—breach of trust (abuso de confianza)—infractions of the Income Tax Code and the VAT Code.” 3- At that same folio, the penalties and the possible date of prescription are indicated. 4- A copy of the judgment in contumacy (sentencia en contumacia) is attached. 5- Certified copy of the applicable legislation. (Folios 1336 and following). So it is not true that the documents provided—as the appellants claim—are defective or insufficient, but rather on the contrary they allow the deduction of what the attributed offenses are, the penalties, the procedural status of the cases, all of which justifies the rejection of the ground for appeal. In any case, as the Attorney General rightly argues when responding to the respective hearing for the purposes of the summons (emplazamiento) (Art. 446 of the C.P.P.), the Extradition Agreement with Belgium, regarding what it requires and demands—this concerning the documentation—clearly indicates in its Article 6 that: “Extradition shall only be granted upon the production either of a conviction, or of an order of procedure (auto de procedimiento) that formally decrees or obligates by operation of law the appearance of the accused before the repressive jurisdiction, or, finally, of a prison order (auto de prisión) or any other document having the same force. These documents shall indicate the precise nature of the incriminated facts and the criminal provision applicable to them. They shall be produced in original or in authentic certified copy and shall be accompanied, whenever possible, by a translation into the language of the requested country and by the personal identification of the claimed individual.” In accordance with the foregoing, in this case the legal requirements regarding this contested point are met and therefore the claim is rejected.

4- Regarding the argument of the absence of the minimum penalty requirement, since it is alleged that all the offenses referred to in the extradition requests are punishable by a penalty of less than two years, thus failing to meet the prerequisite of the minimum penalty referred to in Article 2 in fine of the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium. This Tribunal considers that the appellants are not correct and therefore rejects the claim. It is true that the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium signed in Brussels on April 25, 1902 and duly ratified, in Article 2, last paragraph, states that: “In any case, the facts on the basis of which extradition is requested must entail, under the law of the requesting country, a penalty of not less than two years of imprisonment, and extradition may only be carried out when the similar act is punishable under the legislation of the requested country.” It is a principle of extradition matters that States are not interested in prosecuting minor offenses, and therefore certain rules are established in this regard. Even the Ley de Extradición itself incorporates this principle, called the principle of non-surrender for minor infractions (mínima non curat praetor), by stating in Art. 3 subsection e) of the Ley de Extradición that extradition shall not proceed: “When the penalty assigned to the imputed acts, according to their provisional or definitive classification by the competent judge or court of the State requesting extradition, is less than one year of deprivation of liberty and the imprisonment or preventive detention of the accused has been authorized or ordered, if there is not yet a final judgment. This must be one of deprivation of liberty.” The indicated rule of the Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium, which also protects this principle, must be understood as relating to the penalties provided for in the criminal types considered in the abstract and not in relation to the penalties imposed in each specific case. That is, what governs is the penalty of the offenses; or in other terms, for those offenses whose minimum penalty is less than two years, granting extradition is not appropriate. As argued by the representative of the Attorney General's Office, the element of the minimum penalty refers to the law of the requesting country, and the penalty provided for in the respective criminal types, such that the penalty to be considered to determine the appropriateness of extradition must be that contained in the rule and which may be equal to or greater than two years. In the specific case, according to the various extradition requests from the Kingdom of Belgium, the trial court (Tribunal de instancia), in the appealed resolution, rules on the facts that in its view justify granting extradition, namely: “On February 14, 2001, the Investigating Judge of the Court of First Instance based in Antwerp issued a detention order in absentia, issued in case file No. 235- 96 against the extraditable individual [Name17] for the following facts: From 30- 4- -94 to 20 –2 – 98, [Name17] worked as Manager or delegate Administrator of various industrial piping and refrigeration technique companies established in Antwerp, among them BVBA Intermitaje, NV Montrex, NV EURO Enginering, NV Poliytech. In this manner, during the same period, he sent fictitious invoices for 44 million Belgian francs to BVBA Genex, Madgaenastraat 28 in Antwerp and consequently could not pay his employees officially. Therefore, he is considered a suspect of being the author of infractions of social legislation, document falsification, acts classified as crime and/or offense (delito) under Articles 193, 196 of the Penal Code and under Articles 22 to 32 of the Royal Decree of 20- 7- 1967, regarding the employment of employees of foreign nationality, Articles 44 of the Law of 24- 7- 1987 regarding temporary work, interim work and the provision of employees to users, Articles 31 to 39 of the Law of 27- 6- 1969 amending the decision of 28- 12 – 1944 regarding the social security of workers, Articles 11 to 15 of the Royal Decree of 23- 10- 1978 regarding the maintenance of social documents; Articles 11 to 15 of the Decree of 6-3- 1991 regarding the regulation for knowing employment agencies in the Flemish region and punishable by a principal correctional prison sentence (pena de prisión principal correccional) of one year and by a more severe penalty.” (cf. Folios 1444 and 1445 of the ruling). Likewise, the trial judge, in the appealed resolution, with respect to the second block of facts for which extradition is granted, refers: “3- On March 23 of this year, the Government of Belgium supplemented the extradition request based on a detention order in absentia issued on March 21, 2001 against the extraditable individual [Name25], by the Investigating Judge of First Instance based in Antwerp, in case file No. 29- 01 for the following facts: ‘From the incorporation on 6 – 11- 95 [Name26] was the actual manager of BVBA General Engennering based in Brecht. This company was declared bankrupt by the Commercial Court of Antwerp on 4- 2-1999. This company left a debt, among others, to the Ministry of Finance (Ministerio de Hacienda) for failure to pay taxes of 207 million BF. It turns out from the investigation that the suspect recorded in his accounting at least 63.1 million BF as fictitious invoices. Therefore, the extraditable individual is accused of document falsification and use, infraction of Article 489 ter 8 formerly fraudulent bankruptcy, infraction of Article 489 bis 8 formerly simple bankruptcy. Acts classified as crime and / or offense under Articles 193, 196, 197, 213, 214, 489 ter and 489 bis of the Penal Code and punishable by a principal correctional prison sentence of one year or by a more severe penalty.’” (cf. proven facts of the ruling under appeal). Likewise, in the judgment, the Tribunal points out that the offenses for which extradition is requested are DOCUMENT FALSIFICATION, INFRACTIONS OF SOCIAL LAWS, USE OF FALSE DOCUMENT, FRAUDULENT BANKRUPTCY AND SIMPLE BANKRUPTCY, it being that in the appealed judgment it is granted for the offenses of DOCUMENT FALSIFICATION (case file 235-96 reference 235- 96- AN61. 982422- 96) and for the facts constituting DOCUMENT FALSIFICATION AND USE OF FALSE DOCUMENT being pursued against him in the Court of First Instance of Belgium, case file No. 29- 01 reference 29- 01 AN 75. 98. 4999- 99. Those offenses have penalties that in their maximum exceed the penalty of two years of imprisonment, so that this requirement is met, and therefore the claim is denied.

5- Regarding the fifth argument in which it is stated that the facts for which the extradition of [Name15] [Name16] is requested are atypical, the claim is likewise rejected. One must not lose sight of what the essence, purposes and nature of the extradition procedure are. Regarding the legal nature of the extradition procedure, recognized doctrine has stated that “… it does not constitute a trial per se, which prejudges the innocence or guilt of the requested person, as it only tends to reconcile the requirements of the administration of repressive justice in civilized countries, with the rights of the asylee.” (cf. [Name27]. Code of Procedures in Criminal Matters for the Federal Justice and the Ordinary Courts of the Federal Capital and National Territories. Abeledo Perrot Publishing. Buenos Aires. 1972, p. 593, cited by [Name28] et al. La Extradición en Costa Rica. Nueva Década Publishing. San José Costa Rica, 1989. 14). Similarly, along the same lines of thought, this Tribunal de Casación Penal has indicated: “… in this regard it must be reiterated that we are not hearing a guilt process, in which it is appropriate to assess the evidence and its legitimacy according to our legislation, but rather a summary proceeding, aimed at establishing whether or not the surrender of Mr. [Name29] to the Government of the United States is appropriate, for some acts for which it is affirmed that he was convicted, according to due process under the legislation of the requesting State, or for which he is being prosecuted. So, the evidence alluded to only matters to establish the existence of evidentiary elements that serve as a basis for the accusation or a prosecution that serve as ‘reasonable indications of guilt,’ according to the requirement contained in point two of subsection c- of the Article of the Ley de Extradición….” (cf. ruling 238. F of 11:30 a.m. on July 14, 1994, an excerpt appearing in: Jurisprudence of the Tribunal de Casación Penal. Judicial School. November 1995, p.113). Other more recent rulings of this Tribunal have maintained this line in the sense of the inappropriateness of assessing evidence or establishing a judgment of guilt. Thus, in ruling 2002- 00666 of 10:00 a.m. on August 29, 2002 it was stated: “This Tribunal de Casación has repeatedly stated that in the review procedure (sic) the assessment of evidence is not carried out, in order to determine the existence of a crime, since it is not about determining whether the person for whom extradition is requested has committed a typical, unlawful, culpable and punishable act, which will have to be determined in the trial for which it is requested, in the event that there is no conviction, or has already been established by the requesting country, in the event that one already exists (see ruling of the Tribunal de Casación Penal 1999—583, 200- 407, 2000 – 073, among others).” In the specific case of the extradition request promoted for [Name30] [Name17], the appellants resort to the argument of considering the atypicality of the conduct, and classification errors by the Belgian State, the lack of precision in the facts for which this measure is requested, the failure to expressly prove the intention to harm, as well as the knowledge of the falsehood, as well as the thesis that these offenses are falsehoods that doctrine calls “ideological,” (which are not configured in cases of private documents like the appellants claim the invoices are), are all substantive aspects proper to be examined in due course by the requesting state and at the time when it subjects the extradited person to trial. But they are not properly aspects that must be assessed in this venue, since, as the jurisprudence of this Tribunal de Casación Penal has already indicated, “If we were to assume what the defense counsel states, that the evidence must be examined to determine the existence of the objective type (tipo objetivo), there would be no reason not to do so also regarding unlawfulness (antijuricidad) (examining the existence or non-existence of justification defenses), and guilt (culpabilidad) (assessing the existence or non-existence of exculpatory defenses) applying domestic criminal law for that purpose and without conducting the trial, when precisely what is intended with extradition is to enable the application of the law of the requesting State to the extradited person for his trial (juicio), or for him to serve the sentence already imposed pursuant to the criminal law of that country. The opposite, i.e., the assessment of evidence to determine the objective type, would convert the extradition procedure into a procedure for the ‘review’ of trials or judgments handed down in other countries, in accordance with our own criteria of evidence assessment, and without there being a trial, which is clearly not reasonable.” (Tribunal de Casación Penal Ruling 2002- 0666 of 10:00 a.m. on August 29, 2002). Based on the foregoing considerations and citations of the invoked precedents, the analysis of the substantive aspects that the appellants refer to is not appropriate, but rather this is proper to the process to which the extraditable individual is subjected in the country requesting the measure, and therefore the claim is denied.

6. In grievance 6 of the appeal brief, the defense counsel argue “the impossibility of determining the time of commission of the punishable act,” a thesis that this Tribunal does not admit and therefore rejects the claim. As set forth in ground II, through the transcription of the facts subject to the proceeding that is being heard, the facts are clearly set forth in the conditions of manner, time and place. Note that the documentation provided defines the time of commission of the offenses, thus we have that in the first request it is indicated that the extradited person is guilty of being the author of infractions regarding social legislation and document falsification in Antwerp, Belgium from 30/ 4/ 1994 to 20 / 2/ 1998; and the same occurs with the charges in the second request in which it is indicated that the extraditable individual is being investigated for document falsification, and use and simple and fraudulent bankruptcy in that same Belgian locality, acts occurring from 6/11/ 1995 to 4/ 2/99. The discussion of whether we are facing a continuing offense (delito continuado), this under the terminology of our Penal Code, being properly a matter of legal classification, cannot be examined in this venue.

7. Regarding prescription, also the subject of an appeal by the defense counsel, it is this Tribunal's thesis that they are not correct. We have already established that by application of Article 5 of the Extradition Agreement between Costa Rica and Belgium, for the purposes of establishing prescription, the regulation of the country in which the accused is located governs.

Regarding this point, the Treaty provides in Article: “There shall be no grounds for extradition when, according to the legislation of the country in which the accused is found, the penalty or the criminal action has prescribed.” Having reviewed the facts for which extradition is requested and granted, we find that with respect to the first request, the conclusion of the action on 2/20/1998 must be taken into account, given that the acts of document falsification carry a penalty of up to six years of imprisonment (cf. Article 359 of the Costa Rican Criminal Code), such that – also considering the statute of limitations (prescripción) rules established in Articles 31 et seq. of the Criminal Procedure Code – it must be stated that this period has not elapsed. Note that Article 31, subsection a- of the Criminal Procedure Code establishes that “If criminal prosecution has not been initiated, the action shall prescribe: a) After a period equal to the maximum penalty has elapsed, for offenses punishable by imprisonment, but in no case may it exceed ten years, nor be less than three.” In the specific case, the offense of falsification has a penalty at its maximum limit of six years, such that if the facts of the first extradition request occurred from 4/30/94 until 2/20/98, they would prescribe as of that last date, without considering the grounds for interruption and suspension, among them those established in Article 34, subsections d-) and f-) of the Costa Rican Criminal Procedure Code. This provision states – insofar as relevant for the resolution of this matter – that: “Suspension of the computation of prescription. The computation of the statute of limitations (prescripción) shall be suspended: Subsection d- While the extradition proceedings are underway abroad,” and subsection f-) literally states: “Due to the contumacy of the accused. In this case, the suspension period may not exceed a time equal to the prescription of the criminal action; once this period has elapsed, the term shall continue to run.” That is, in these cases, prescription is suspended from the moment extradition is requested until it is executed. (cf. Llobet Rodríguez, Javier. Proceso Penal Comentado. (Código Procesal Penal Comentado) Second Edition. Editorial Jurídica Continental. 2003. p. 113). In the case at bar, it is noted that the extradition request was received on February 26, 2001 by the Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José (cf. Folios 1 to 4 of Volume I), a date from which the computation of prescription has been suspended. The same applies to the facts of the second extradition request, which has as its starting date for the respective computation 2/4/1999, it being evident that the prescription period has not elapsed either, as alleged. Consequently, the claim is dismissed.

V. APPEAL FILED BY ATTORNEY [Nombre9] ON BEHALF OF THE PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA. (folios 1587 to 1593)

It is argued that the Embassy of Belgium presented the extradition request against [Nombre31] [Nombre17] on two charges: infraction of social legislation and falsification of documents, which was expanded first by four charges: falsification of documents, use of false documents, simple bankruptcy (bancarrota simple), and fraudulent bankruptcy (bancarrota fraudulenta), and subsequently by another two charges of falsification of documents and use of false documents. The claim is directed at indicating, on the part of the representative of the Procuraduría General de la República, disagreement with the denial of the charges of fraudulent bankruptcy (bancarrota fraudulenta) and simple bankruptcy (bancarrota simple). There are two grounds set forth in the appeal along those lines of the denial of extradition for certain crimes: FIRST GROUND. The two grounds of the appeal presented by the Procuraduría General de la República, being closely related, are set forth and resolved in a single section. The first is that the charge of fraudulent bankruptcy (bancarrota fraudulenta) does comply with the principle of minimum penalty. In this ground of the appeal presented, the argument of the lower court judge is challenged, according to which even though the principle of identity is met in relation to the offense of fraudulent bankruptcy, the other requirement of minimum penalty is not met, which according to the judge is one month of imprisonment under the Belgian Code. The appellant disagrees with that reasoning inasmuch as she considers that the offense of fraudulent bankruptcy (bancarrota fraudulenta) does meet the requirement of minimum penalty, since the Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium establishes that the facts upon which the extradition request is based must have a minimum penalty of no less than two years of imprisonment, under the legislation of the requesting State; that is, for extradition to proceed, it must involve a crime with a penalty of two or more years of imprisonment. Furthermore, it must be taken into account that the governing parameter regarding the penalty is the maximum limit, so as to reflect the seriousness of the conduct. In any event, citing the Belgian Criminal Code, Article 489 ter establishes for the offense of fraudulent bankruptcy a penalty of one month to five years and a fine of 100 to five hundred thousand francs. It is requested that extradition be ordered for that charge. II. SECOND GROUND. The second ground consists of alleging that the offense of “simple bankruptcy (bancarrota simple)” does find identity in Costa Rican legislation. The Court of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste, denied the charge of simple bankruptcy (bancarrota simple) indicating it has no identity, without explaining the reasoning by which that conclusion was reached, even though it is clear that – after reviewing the charges of the first extradition request – those facts fit the offense of fraudulent bankruptcy provided for in Article 213 of the Costa Rican Criminal Code. After transcribing the facts of the first extradition request, according to which “From the date of incorporation until 11/6/95, [Nombre17] and [Nombre32] were the real managers of BVBA Engenerin based in Brecht. This company was declared bankrupt by the Commercial Court of Antwerp on 12/4/1999. This company left a debt, among others, to the Ministry of Finance for not having paid taxes of 207 million FB. The investigation shows that the suspect recorded in his accounting at least 63.1 million FB as fictitious invoices.” The appellant highlights that for purposes of the principle of identity, what matters is not that there is an identity in the nomenclature of the offenses, but rather that the facts are the same without the need for them to correspond to the same criminal figure. In support of her thesis, she cites Voto 294-F-97 of 8:00 a.m. on April 15, 1997, from the Criminal Cassation Court. Finally, it is requested that extradition be granted for the offense of simple bankruptcy (bancarrota simple). The first claim is granted, and extradition is also granted for the offense of fraudulent bankruptcy (bancarrota fraudulenta), but not for the offense of simple bankruptcy (bancarrota simple). The lower court of Guanacaste, Santa Cruz Venue, in the contested decision states: “… in relation to the offense called fraudulent bankruptcy (bancarrota fraudulenta) regulated in Article 489 ter of the Belgian Criminal Code, it finds identity with the offense of fraudulent bankruptcy regulated in our Criminal Code in Article 231 of said normative body; there is no identity with the offense of simple bankruptcy (bancarrota simple) regulated in Article 489 bis of the Belgian Criminal Code.” (cf. folio 1450). Later, the Court states the following: “… we find that even though the principle of identity is met in relation to the offense of fraudulent bankruptcy, the other requirement of minimum penalty, which for said offense in Belgium is one month of imprisonment, is not met; consequently, the request for expansion of extradition must be denied with respect to the offenses of simple bankruptcy (bancarrota simple) and fraudulent bankruptcy (bancarrota fraudulenta).” (cf. folio 1454). It must be stated that indeed, according to the reports and documents presented by the Belgian State, and according to the copy of the duly translated legal texts, the offense of simple bankruptcy (bancarrota simple) carries a penalty of one month to two years and of one hundred to five hundred thousand francs. This is evidenced by the text of Article 489 bis of the Belgian Criminal Code, provided to these proceedings at folio 1276 of Volume II. As for the offense of fraudulent bankruptcy (bancarrota fraudulenta), numeral 489 ter of the Belgian Criminal Code establishes a penalty of imprisonment of one month to five years and of one hundred to five hundred thousand francs. The foregoing means that with respect to the offense of fraudulent bankruptcy (bancarrota fraudulenta), the requirement of the minimum penalty required by the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium is met, and therefore the claim of the Procuraduría General de la República is upheld.

THEREFORE:

The appeal filed by the defense attorneys of the extraditable [Nombre1] is denied, and the judgment is affirmed. The appeal filed by the Procuraduría General de la República is partially granted, and extradition is also granted for the offense of FRAUDULENT BANKRUPTCY (BANCARROTA FRAUDULENTA), reversing the appealed decision with respect to this offense. In all other respects, the ruling remains unaltered. Let this be notified.

Guillermo Sojo Picado [Nombre3] [Nombre2] Judges of Criminal Cassation Mec While it is not a matter of carrying out a process to determine the guilt of the individual, it is required that – besides reviewing the formal prerequisites – the necessary evidence be provided to examine the merit of the accusation, the degree of probability of the possible participation, so that the arrest warrant or the sentence is not sufficient. In the specific case, the Kingdom of Belgium limited itself to presenting as documentation the arrest warrants, with a summary of the charged acts, in the first two requests. As for the third request, it also presented the arrest warrant and a summary of the facts of the sentence handed down in absentia. Consequently, it suffers from the noted defects. The appellant concludes by stating that the Costa Rican judge in extradition matters is not a simple observer of formal prerequisites, but must issue, at the time of granting or denying the extradition, a judgment of probability regarding the commission of the act and the participation of the accused. **3- Unremediable nature of the absence of suitable documents.** It is argued that the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic of Costa Rica (Procuraduría General de la República de Costa Rica) – the body representing the Kingdom of Belgium – did not use its power to promote evidence to supplement the absence of suitable documents, translated in accordance with the law, but rather limited itself to providing – after a hearing granted by the Court pursuant to Article 9 of the Extradition Law (Ley de Extradición) – insufficient, poorly translated, and non-legalized documentation that already existed in the case file anyway. This defect and negligence is no longer curable, and it only remains to examine the validity and effectiveness of the evidence offered by the requesting State. **4- All offenses referred to in the extradition requests are punished at their lower end with a penalty of less than two years, and therefore do not meet the minimum penalty referred to in Article 2 in fine of the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium, which requires that the offense not carry less than 2 years of imprisonment. Lack of minimum penalty.** It is argued that according to the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium, it is required that: *“… the acts for which extradition is requested must carry, according to the law of the requesting country, a penalty of no less than two years of imprisonment”.* In accordance with the above rule, all infractions of labor legislation are excluded without further analysis from the first request, being punishable, according to the informal documentation presented by the requesting State itself, with fine-days. From the second extradition request, the offenses of simple and fraudulent bankruptcy are excluded, as they carry a minimum penalty of one month of imprisonment, all in accordance with Articles 489 bis and 489 ter of the Belgian Criminal Code. In the third extradition request, the first conviction is excluded because it is for 12 months of imprisonment. It continues by stating that there is no documentation supporting the extradition request, as the translations are not official and the documents are not public, such that the offenses of forgery and use of a forged document contemplated in the first and second extradition request also fail to meet the minimum penalty required by the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium. The appellants state that it is enough to look at the documentation provided by the requesting State to realize that the potential offenses of forgery and use of a forged document are of very little gravity in Belgium, which is why they are not considered crimes but rather infractions, and that as such, according to Belgian legislation, they carry a correctional penalty and not imprisonment, as they qualify as infractions and not crimes, and with a possible penalty of less than two years. Therefore, they fall below the minimum penalty required by the referred Treaty. Through the last expansion of the extradition request, in which acts of the same nature and classified as use of a forged document and forgery, Mr. [Name14] is sentenced to only 12 months. Among the acts of the last expansion, visible on folio 302, and the second extradition request, the same offenses and the same articles of the Criminal Code are involved. As for this latter legal body, it turns out that articles 193, 196 and 197, which are the numerals relating to the offenses of document forgery and use of a forged document, are punished with a five-year prison sentence, so if this is the case, the appellants question how and despite what, dealing with the same articles (offenses of falsehood and use of a forged document), in the first case referred to in the last expansion, the penalty was 12 months. It continues to be indicated that the apparent contradiction between the prison sentences for the offenses of forgery and use of a forged document mentioned by the requesting State and the 12-month penalty for an equal case, but one that has a sentence and not just a simple accusation, is contained not only in the accusation of the first expansion of the extradition, but is repeated in the arrest warrant for default issued by the Court of First Instance of Antwerp. In summary, the grievance concludes by stating that in the appealed judgment there is a serious flaw in reasoning by the Judge, inasmuch as two things cannot be equal and distinct at the same time; that is, that the minimum penalty for the offenses of forgery and use of a forged document be 5 years (lower end of imprisonment) as stated by the Judge in his judgment, and the requesting State in the first two extradition requests; or that the minimum penalty be one year, as also stated by the Judge and the Kingdom of Belgium, in the records accompanying the second and third extradition request. The foregoing makes it impossible for the extradition to be granted in this case. **5- In the fifth argument, the atypical nature of the accused conduct and the non-compliance with the principle of double criminality (principio de doble incriminación) are insisted upon.** Despite the fact that the extradition request cites the articles referring to document forgery and the first expansion cites the criminal type relating to the use of a forged document, the truth is that the acts on which the initial request and its respective expansion are based reveal that the conduct attributed to [Name15] [Name16] is atypical. There is therefore an error in classification by the Belgian State. Regarding the initial extradition request, it contains a very laconic description, as it merely indicates that regarding the *“… acts of 30/4/94 [Name17] worked as delegated managing director of several companies in industrial piping and refrigeration techniques established in Antwerp, among others BVBA Intermontage, NV Montrex, NV Euro Engenering, NV Polytech. In this manner, he has remitted in the same period fictitious invoices of 44 million Belgian francs to BVBA Genes, Mdgalenastraat 28 in Antwerp, and consequently could not pay his employees in an official manner”.* The description of the conduct was very important, as for the offense of document forgery, the Belgian penal system requires that the prerequisites of Article 193 in relation to Article 196 of that country's Criminal Code be met. Thus, it is necessary to demonstrate the intent to harm, and that the forgery is carried out through one of the forms referred to in the cited Article 196. In the charges underlying the extradition, the manner in which the extraditable person carried out the alleged forgery is not indicated, nor is the intent to falsify any document attributed to him, nor is it indicated that the accused sent the invoices knowing they were fictitious. Mr. [Name15] is only attributed with having remitted the invoices, not that he falsified them, or that he acted with deceit (dolo), so the conduct is atypical, and the mere act of remitting a fictitious invoice does not constitute the offense in question. Regarding the first expansion of the extradition, the conduct attributed does not consist of personally forging the documents, nor of sending them to third parties, but rather of having *“Recorded in his accounting at least 63.1 million FB, as some fictitious invoices”,* an act that cannot give rise to any offense. Finally, the appellants comment that the problem seems to be constrained not to the material alteration of the invoices but to the fact that these contained false data not corresponding to reality, and that in any case, with respect to this type of material falsehood, called ideological by the doctrine, it is only possible with respect to public or equivalent documents, never with simple private documents such as invoices. In the last ground, and which, being related to this point 5-, is transcribed in this section, it is pointed out that the principle of double criminality is not met. The appellants indicate that if Articles 193 and 196 of the Belgian Criminal Code are observed, it is necessary to conclude that these are not offenses similar to those contained in Costa Rican legislation. Thus, Belgian legislation requires *“fraudulent intent or the intent to harm”,* while in Costa Rica – as regulated in Articles 359 and 361 of the Criminal Code – the harm is required, meaning that they are different criminal types. In Belgium, they are offenses of mere conduct, while in Costa Rica they are result-oriented offenses and, as such, require patrimonial injury. **6- Impossibility of determining the time of commission of the punishable act.** In all the extradition requests, it is impossible to know for certain when the allegedly criminal conduct would have taken place. Thus, regarding the first request, it is not known if they are acts that began on 30/4/94 and ended on 20/2/98, or if they are acts that were carried out in a continuous manner. In short, from this laconic statement of facts it cannot be known with clarity if it was the social infractions that were being committed continuously, or if Mr. [Name15] kept sending or forging the invoices, a doubt that cannot be resolved since the Kingdom of Belgium did not even present a copy of the respective accusation. The same happens with the second extradition request, which is limited to indicating a vague period that would run from 6/11/95 until 4/2/99, without indicating the precise time of the commission of the offenses. **7- Statute of limitations (Prescripción).** The determination of the time of commission of the punishable act is an essential aspect for determining everything related to the statute of limitations of the criminal action. If 30/4/94 is taken as the starting point, the offense of use of a forged document would have been time-barred on April 30, 2000, according to Costa Rican legislation. Indeed, the arrest warrant for default, which is the only document in the file that can be taken as the starting point of the investigation in Belgium, is dated October 2, 2000. It is argued that if the extradition request is unclear regarding the time of commission of the punishable act, this circumstance cannot be used against the extraditable person. Nor can it be assumed that the offense ceased to be committed on the last date indicated in the request, that is, 20/2/98, but rather the most favorable date, which is 30/4/94. The same happens with the second extradition request, which is limited to indicating a vague period that would run from 6/11/95 until 4/2/98, without indicating the specific time of the commission of the offenses. The appellants are of the opinion that according to Belgian legislation, the offenses are time-barred, since they are punishable with one-year prison sentences. If the acts of the first case date back to 1986, they are now time-barred, and equally, if in the second case the acts run from 5/6/94 to 11/9/95, they are also time-barred. Article 5 of the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium must be considered, which establishes that *“There shall be no extradition when, in accordance with the legislation of the country where the accused is located, the penalty or the criminal action has prescribed”.* It continues to be stated that regarding the offense of forgery, in reality the offense charged is the forgery of a private document, and the classification is not provided by the requesting State but by the charged acts. In Costa Rica, the forgery of invoices is not an offense of public document forgery, nor is it the forgery of an equivalent document, but rather a forgery of a private document, which in our Costa Rican legal system is punished with two years of imprisonment.

#### IV- Having seen the arguments set forth by the defense, this Court proceeds to resolve them as follows:

**1.** Regarding the point of the need for an official translation of the documents presented by the requesting State to justify the extradition, this Court has indicated the following in vote 662 at 9:30 a.m. on August 29, 2002: *“II. In the second ground of the appeal, a lack of authenticity of the documentation presented by the United States of America and a lack of official translation is claimed, failing to comply with Article 369 subsection d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal). It points out that the documents are not authentic nor were they officially translated into Spanish. It states that the requesting State was warned, but it did not comply. It indicates that the law defines what an official translation is. It says that if the translation was done abroad, it should have been authenticated. It states that the Extradition Treaty does not exempt the authentication of the translation.* ***The ground is declared without merit*** *.* *Article 9 subsection 6) of the Extradition Treaty with the United States of America states: "All documents provided by the Requesting State shall be translated, either in the Requesting State or in the Requested State, into the language of the Requested State.” This implies that it is not required that the translation of the documents be done in accordance with the Law on Official Translations and Interpretations (Ley de Traducciones e Interpretaciones Oficiales), which in any case states in its Article 3) that the official translation of the document must be done “when so required”. On folios 604-608 it is recorded that the translation of the documents found in the file was performed by [Name18], a member of the Association of Interpreters and Translators of the United States of America, with the respective documentation having been presented before the Consulate of Costa Rica for its authentication, and subsequently before the Authentications Officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores) (folio 604), so no defect is observed. It is important that the appellant alleges a lack of reasoning of the extradition judgment with respect to the authentication of the documentation. However, said defect does not exist, as the resolution provides the reasons why it is not considered that any defect existed. It states as follows: “The defense of the extradited person has objected to the translation of the documents. Law No. 8142 is invoked, indicating that any document, drafted in a language other than Spanish, for the purpose of producing legal effects in our country, must be officially translated. That same law defines as an official translation only that carried out by a translator authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship. In view of such objections, the Requesting State was warned to provide such officiality. A certification was provided that the translations of all the documents upon which the Extradition request is based were performed by a translator from the Association of Legal Interpreters and Translators of the United States – folios 599 to 610 -. Such documents are sufficient to prove the suitability of the translations. Despite the official definition provided by our legislation, we cannot, in cases of Extradition with the United States, require the Requesting State to provide translations prepared by national translators authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship. The Treaty – which is higher in rank than the law – empowers that the translations be prepared in either of the two countries – Article 9 subsection 6”. In accordance with what has been indicated, no defect is observed in the reasoning of the Court, which provides the reasons in this regard, which are consistent with the legal regulations. Therefore, this ground is declared without merit”.* In a similar sense, with the drafting of Dr. [Name19], this same Court ruled in vote 2002-0909 at 4:20 p.m. on November 8, two thousand two, when it was indicated in the points of interest: *“The procedural nature of extradition, the agility it requires, only requires a procedure that authenticates the verisimilitude and credibility of the documentation, without a certification like the one the appellant refers to being necessary, because the effects of such documentation are very limited in our jurisdiction; evidence is not even received, nor is its full legitimacy assumed. It is sufficient that there are legitimate elements for consideration that justify, in principle, the intervention of the requesting State and the limitation on the liberty of the extradited person, but the Costa Rican State does not fully assume the content and scope of the evidence or documents that support the extradition request, whose content and claim will have full effect in the jurisdiction of the requesting State and not in the Costa Rican jurisdiction…The objections regarding the translation of the documents are not convincing, because the sixth section of Article nine of the Treaty does not require an official translation: the commented rule contains a very flexible rule, as it allows the translation to be done in the requested State and in the requesting State”.* In the specific case, the disagreement is directed at questioning the absence of an official translation, and it must be added that – as indicated by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic – the requesting State did present the translation into the Spanish language of all the documentation. This is observed on folios 1062 to 1387 of Volume II of this proceeding. It must be added that in any case, by application of the principle of agility in this type of proceeding, as was already pointed out with a citation of case law of this Chamber, what is required is precisely the verisimilitude and credibility in the documentation, without the appellants demonstrating that this is not the case. It must be added that the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium does not strictly require an official translation, but rather, according to the second paragraph of Article 6 – regarding the documents – indicates: *“They shall be produced in original or in authentic copy and shall be accompanied, whenever possible, by a translation in the language of the requested country, and by the personal description of the claimed individual”.* It is seen that it is not required that this translation be official as alleged. Consequently, and in accordance with the foregoing, the claim must be denied.

**2.** Regarding the second argument that **"The extradition request and its amplifications do not include the evidentiary documents referred to in Article 9(c) of the Ley de Extradición,"** the ground is rejected. It should not be overlooked that extradition does not properly imply an analysis of conviction, given that, as the Constitutional Chamber itself has already recognized in Voto 886-95, the analysis carried out in an extradition proceeding does not prejudge the guilt of the extraditable person, in the sense that—as that resolution indicates—*"It is not for the national Courts to determine whether the appellant committed the offenses of which he is accused or his degree of participation, since that is the competence of the courts of the requesting State"* (Sala Constitucional Exp. N-0422-V-95 Voto 0886-95 of 4:39 p.m. on February 15, 1995). What the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium requires in this case is precisely the fulfillment of certain formal requirements, which, pursuant to Article 6, insofar as the crimes for which extradition is requested, the existing evidence, and the applicable substantive rules are demonstrated. Consequently, the claim is rejected.

**3.** Regarding the third claim in which the irremediable inadequacy of suitable documents is alleged, since the requesting State has presented insufficient, battered, and legalized documentation that in any event already existed in the file, it must—likewise—be rejected. One of the aspects that has occupied the present extradition process throughout its proceedings has been precisely the authenticity and reliability of the documentation presented by the requesting State. However, it should be considered that, pursuant to the resolution of this Court, Voto 2001-939 of eleven hours thirty minutes on November 16, 2001, (visible at folios 933 to 943 of Volume I of these proceedings), when ruling on the formality of the documents, the following was stated: *"ARGUMENTS OF THE DEFENSE COUNSEL. The requested person's lawyers opposed the appeal filed. They indicate that it is not true that everything not set forth in the text of the treaty constitutes a contravention of the contracting parties. They point out that the Constitutional Chamber and the Court of Cassation have required authentication. They say that the responsibility for the lack of authentication lies with the government of Belgium and the Procuraduría General de la República, the latter for not having warned the former. They state that the argument that the crime of fraudulent bankruptcy is not included in the treaty is irrelevant, since it is not punishable in Belgium with a penalty exceeding two years, so the minimum penalty requirement is not met. They indicate that the argument of the Procuraduría that the final resolution should be reserved until the defect was remedied is not admissible, because it goes against the principles of self-responsibility, preclusion, and procedural loyalty. Regarding the fact that the latest extradition request was not resolved, they say that any omission must be of such magnitude as to generate a conclusion different from that reached in the ruling. However, they state, this lacks relevance due to the lack of authentication. On a subsidiary basis, they indicate that if the ruling is annulled totally or partially, their client should be released. In a brief submitted subsequently, the defense counsel again present arguments, referring to the fact that the authenticated documents were not presented. III. IT IS RESOLVED: The first aspect to analyze with respect to the challenged resolution concerns the lack of authentication of the documentation by the consul of Costa Rica in Belgium, in accordance with the chain of authentications required by the Ley de Servicio Consular. The challenged resolution states: 'Regarding the authenticity that the documents supporting the extradition request must maintain, Article 6 of the Convention between Belgium and Costa Rica provides that the documents on which the extradition is based shall be produced in original or in authentic copies and shall be accompanied, whenever possible, by a translation in the language of the requested country, and by the identification of the claimed individual. For its part, subsection 2 of Article 9 of the current Ley de Extradición provides that among the documents that the requesting government must present are "an authentic copy of the proceedings of the case, which provide evidence or at least reasonable indications of the guilt at issue". For its part, the Ley Orgánica del Servicio Consular No. 46 of July 7, 1925, and its reforms, grants the consuls of the Republic the character of notaries and has authority to attest, in accordance with the laws, to acts and contracts. They shall also legalize documents and signatures of the authorities of the country in which they operate, when such certificates and documents are to take effect in Costa Rica, even if they deal with foreigners, see articles 66, 67-69, and 81 of the cited law. But furthermore, the signature of this official must be authenticated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as provided in Article 294 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Reviewing the documents presented by the requesting authority, we find that they were not legalized by the consul of Costa Rica in Belgium, nor was the signature of this official authenticated by the Ministry of Public Relations, as was correct, because they were intended to have legal effects in Costa Rica. In those documents, only the authentication of the consul of Belgium in Costa Rica appears, meaning that the documents that have served to support the requested extradition were not legitimized by our authorities, ergo, they are not suitable to support the requested extradition. It is striking that the court that initially intervened did not make the warning to the requesting authority to comply with this requirement, a warning that is now inopportune, because the extradition request must already be resolved, given that the extraditable [Name20] has been in pre-trial detention for many months. Consequently, lacking authenticity, the extradition request brought against the extraditable [Name1] is rejected, and it is ordered that he be released once this resolution becomes final.' This Court, after studying the rulings of the Constitutional Chamber cited by both the Procuraduría General de la República and the defense of the requested person, together with the study of constitutional jurisprudence according to the computer systems of the Judicial Branch, finds that with respect to the authentication of signatures pursuant to the Ley de Servicio Consular, the Constitutional Chamber expressly referred to it in Voto 903-92 of April 3, 1992: 'VII. The allegation of the lack of authentication of the documents provided by the requester deserves separate consideration. The resolutions of the Full Court of September 27, 1982, article VII, and of December 24, 1984, article III) indicate that the lack of authentication of signatures is remedied by the referral of the extradition proceedings by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Supreme Court of Justice. However, the Chamber considers that what was indicated on that occasion by the Full Court and the administrative and jurisdictional practice that was subsequently consolidated in light of what was resolved, contravenes the provisions of articles 66, 67, 80, and 81 of the Ley Orgánica del Servicio Consular, which requires that documents from abroad be authenticated by the Consul of Costa Rica in that country and the signatures of the latter by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see Article 291 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). In the extradition process being conducted against [Name21] [Name22], the authentication of the signature of the Costa Rican consul by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is notably missing from the documents provided by the Government of the United States of America, an omission of a legal formality which, in the Chamber's opinion, prevents the presented documentation from being considered complete. For the Chamber, the omission of the Costa Rican State—to some extent motivated by the resolutions under comment—prevents the presented documentation from being considered complete. However, this omission is not of such an identity as to annul what was done by the Court; on the contrary, the Chamber considers that it is a remediable defect and not attributable to the requesting country, so the Juzgado de Santa Cruz should request, as soon as possible, the authentication, in order to continue with the proceedings normally. The foregoing implies that for the Chamber, there has been no violation of the appellant's fundamental rights and, therefore, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.' On the other hand, the Constitutional Chamber in various rulings has indicated that the lack of authentication of documents in an extradition is a remediable defect. Thus, in Voto 4317-93 of September 3, 1993, it stated: 'This Court has already indicated in other rulings—incidentally referring to the same matter—that the lack of authentication of the documentation does not produce any nullity, nor does it prevent the initiation of the extradition procedure, being a remediable defect.' In the same vein: Sala Constitucional, Voto 3637-93 of July 28, 1993, and Voto 3678-93 of July 30, 1993. In accordance with what is indicated in said rulings, it must be concluded that the Ley de Servicio Consular (Art. 67) is applicable, there being no conflict between it and the Extradition Treaty with Belgium, since the latter, in its Art. 6, requires that the "original document" or an "authentic copy" be presented, but does not state that the procedure for the recognition of documents pursuant to the Ley de Servicio Consular should not be followed, which was in any case enacted in accordance with international consular practices. It should be borne in mind that the Constitutional Chamber, expressly in Voto 903-92, required that the legal procedure be followed, including authentication by the consul of Costa Rica in the country of the requesting State. The situation would be different if the Treaty included a norm like that of Art. 7 of the Model Extradition Treaty, mentioned by the appellant party, which expressly provides that certification or authentication of extradition requests shall not be required. However, the lack of authentication of the documentation, as the Constitutional Chamber has stated in various rulings mentioned above, including Voto 903-92 itself, is not a ground for rejecting the extradition request; rather, the respective warning must be made to the requesting State to remedy the defect, which was not done in this case. The foregoing is in accordance with Art. 9(d) of the Ley de Extradición, of supplementary application. Regarding the warning, see, in addition to the cited rulings, Voto 2490-96 of May 28, 1996, ordered by the Constitutional Chamber. Regarding the warning for the presentation of missing documentation and the annulment of the resolution on extradition so that the defect can be remedied, Voto 516-F-96 of September 5, 1996, ordered by the Tribunal de Casación Penal, is important. This Court has even stated, in a case governed by the Ley de Extradición and not by the Treaty between Belgium and Costa Rica, that the failure to present authentic documents within the required period does not in itself imply that the extradition must be declared groundless if they are provided subsequently, although it has implications regarding the procedure (Voto 643-2001 of August 27, 2001). It should be emphasized that the same judgment recognizes that the lack of authentication of the documents is a remediable defect, but contradictorily indicates that because the extraditable person has been detained for a long time, it is not appropriate to make the warning to the requesting State, as would be procedurally correct. In this sense, it is stated: "It is striking that the Court that initially intervened did not make the warning to the requesting authority to comply with that requirement, a warning that is now inopportune because the extradition request must already be resolved, given that the extraditable [Name15] [Name16] has been in pre-trial detention for many months" (folio 844). Contrary to what is extracted from this reasoning, the long duration of provisional detention, according to rules of derivation, may be related to whether or not the extraditable person should be released during the proceedings thereof, but it has no connection with the substantive resolution of the extradition, so as to ultimately give rise to the denial of the request for it; therefore, the defense counsels are not correct in their arguments when invoking the principles of self-responsibility, preclusion, and procedural loyalty. Rather, in accordance with the principle of loyalty between the contracting parties to the international Treaty, the warnings must be made to the requesting State to correct a defect in the documentation, especially since this requirement is derived from Costa Rica's internal legislation. Thus, if what was appropriate was to grant a hearing so that the defect in the documentation could be remedied, it was necessary to proceed in that sense, which was not done by the Trial Court. Therefore, the appropriate course is to grant the appeal, annul the challenged resolution, and order remand, so that the corresponding warning can be made. As unnecessary, the other arguments of the appeal are not addressed." The foregoing implies recognizing—independently of the discussion raised by the Procuraduría General de la República—regarding the usefulness of requiring formalities in the documentation, the reality is that our legislation and even the binding precedents *erga omnes* of the Constitutional Chamber require compliance with certain requirements. In the specific case, it is observed that at folios 1062 to 1387 of volume II, a series of records, duly legalized and authenticated, were presented by the Embassy of Belgium, containing the following aspects: **Regarding the first extradition request:** 1- The identification of the extraditable person and their personal data. 2- The formal extradition request, the statement of the arrest warrant issued in absentia on 6/10/2002 by the Judge of Instruction Ms. [Name23] in Antwerp, reference 235/96 AN61 98.2422-96. 3- The indication of the facts for which extradition is requested, according to which the interested party is guilty of being a co-perpetrator of offenses related to social legislation and document forgery in Antwerp, from 30/4/ to 20/2) 1998. 4- The indication of the penalty for the crimes and the applicable rules, and the possible date of the statute of limitations for the crimes. 5- At folio 1079 to 1080, the arrest warrant in absentia dated 6/10/2000, case file 325-96, issued by Judge [Name23], Judge of Instruction of the Court of First Instance of Antwerp, and the facts that are the subject of the proceeding, appear duly authenticated. 6- Certified copy of the applicable legislation for these offenses (folio 1196 et seq.). **Regarding the second extradition request:** 1- The extradition request is supplemented based on an arrest warrant in absentia on 21/3/2001 by the Judge of Instruction [Name24], reference 29/01/AN 75.98.499-99, stating that the extradited person is guilty of the acts of document forgery and use and simple and fraudulent bankruptcy in Antwerp, Belgium, from 6/11/95 until 4/12/1999. 2- The articles that penalize the conduct are indicated, specifically norms 1 to 11, 193, 196, 197, 213, 214, and 489 ter and 489 bis of the Belgian Criminal Code, with the indication that the penalties exceed the minimum duration provided for in the Convention between Costa Rica and Belgium of 25/4/1902, and the indication of the dates of the statute of limitations for the charges. 3- At folio 1234, the arrest warrant appears for the crimes of document forgery and use, fraudulent and simple bankruptcy (articles 489 ter and 489 bis of the Belgian Criminal Code). 4- Likewise, at the indicated folio, a transcription is made of the facts for which—among others—extradition is requested, as well as the arrest warrant in absentia (folio 1239 and 1240). **Regarding the third additional extradition request.** The following are deemed duly certified and legalized: 1- The basis for this additional request *"Based on a judgment handed down by the Court of Appeal of Antwerp on 4/10/2000…"*. 2- The facts for which extradition is requested are for the crimes *of document forgery and use of a false document knowing they were false—as co-perpetrator of NV Europa United States of America (EURUSA) declared bankrupt by declaration—has caused the books or documents and the annual accounts of the companies to disappear, partially or entirely misappropriated or concealed assets—breach of trust—infringements of the Income Tax Code and the VAT Code."* 3- At the same folio, the penalties and the possible date of the statute of limitations are indicated. 4- A copy of the judgment in contumacy is attached. 5- Certified copy of the applicable legislation (Folios 1336 et seq.). Thus, it is not true that the documents provided—as the appellants claim—are battered or insufficient; on the contrary, they allow deducing which crimes are attributed, the penalties, and the procedural status of the cases, all of which justifies the rejection of the ground. In any case, as the Prosecutor rightly alleges when responding to the respective hearing for the purposes of the summons (art. 446 of the C.P.P.), what the Extradition Convention with Belgium requires and demands—this regarding the documentation—is clearly indicated in its Article 6: *"Extradition shall only be granted upon the production either of a conviction, or of an order of proceedings that formally decrees or obliges by operation of law the appearance of the accused before the repressive jurisdiction, or, finally, of an arrest warrant or any other document having the same force. These documents shall indicate the precise nature of the incriminating facts and the criminal provision applicable. They shall be produced in original or in an authentic copy and shall be accompanied, whenever possible, by a translation in the language of the requested country and the identification of the claimed individual."* In accordance with the above, in this case, the legal requirements regarding this contested point are met, and therefore the claim is rejected.

4- Regarding the argument of the absence of the minimum penalty requirement, since it is alleged that all the crimes referred to in the extradition requests are punishable by a penalty of less than two years, thus failing to satisfy the prerequisite of the minimum penalty referred to in article 2 in fine of the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium. This Court considers that the appellants are not correct and therefore rejects the claim. It is true that the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium, signed in Brussels on April 25, 1902, and duly ratified, states in article 2, last paragraph, that: “In any case, the acts by reason of which extradition is requested must carry, according to the law of the requesting country, a penalty of not less than two years of imprisonment, and extradition may only be carried out when the similar act is punishable according to the legislation of the requested country.” It is a principle of extradition matters that States are not interested in prosecuting minor offenses, and therefore some rules are set in this regard. Even the Law of Extradition itself incorporates this principle called the principle of non-surrender for minor offenses (mínima non curat praetor) by stating in art. 3 subsection e) of the Law of Extradition that extradition shall not proceed: “When the penalty assigned to the acts alleged, according to their provisional or final classification by the competent judge or court of the State requesting extradition, is less than one year of deprivation of liberty and the preventive imprisonment or detention of the accused has been authorized or ordered, if there is not yet a final judgment. This must be a custodial sentence.” The aforementioned rule of the Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium, which also safeguards this principle, must be understood to relate to the penalties provided for in the criminal provisions considered in the abstract, and not in relation to the penalties imposed in each specific case. That is, what governs is the penalty for the crimes; or in other terms, for those crimes whose minimum penalty is less than two years, granting extradition is not appropriate. As argued by the representative of the Procuraduría General de la República, the element of minimum penalty refers to the law of the requesting country, and the penalty provided for in the respective provisions, so that the penalty to be considered for determining the appropriateness of extradition must be that contained in the rule and which may be equal to or greater than two years. In the specific case, pursuant to the various extradition requests submitted by the Kingdom of Belgium, the trial court in the appealed ruling pronounces on the acts which, in its view, justify granting extradition, namely: “On February 14, 2001, the Investigating Judge of the Court of First Instance based in Antwerp issued an arrest warrant for default, issued in file No. 235-96 against the extraditable person [Nombre17] for the following acts: From 30-4-94 and 20-2-98, [Nombre17] worked as Manager or thin Administrator of various industrial piping and refrigeration technique companies established in Antwerp, among others BVBA Intermitaje, NV Montrex, NV EURO Enginering, NV Poliytech. In this manner, he submitted, during the same period, fictitious invoices of 44 million Belgian francs to BVBA Genex, Madgaenastraat 28 in Antwerp and consequently could not pay his employees officially. For this reason, he is suspected of being the author of violations of social legislation, forgery of documents, acts classified as a crime and/or offense by articles 193, 196 of the Penal Code and by articles 22 to 32 of the Royal Decree of 20-7-1967, regarding the employment of employees of foreign nationality, articles 44 of the law of 24-7-1987 regarding temporary work, interim work and the provision of user employees, articles 31 to 39 of the law of 27-6-1969 amending the decision of 28-12-1944 regarding the social security of workers, articles 11 to 15 of the Royal Decree of 23-10-1978 regarding the maintenance of social documents; articles 11 to 15 of the decree of 6-3-1991 regarding the regulation for knowing employment agencies in the Flemish region and punishable with a principal correctional prison sentence of one year and by a more severe penalty.” (cf. Folios 1444 and 1445 of the judgment). Likewise, the trial Judge, in the appealed ruling, regarding the second block of acts for which extradition is granted, states: “3- On March 23 of the current year, the Government of Belgium supplemented the extradition request based on an arrest warrant for default issued on March 21, 2001, against the extraditable person [Nombre25], by the Investigating Judge of First Instance based in Antwerp, in file No. 29-01 for the following acts: ‘From the incorporation on 6-11-95 [Nombre26] was the real manager of BVBA Gneral Engennering based in Brecht. This company was declared bankrupt by the Commercial Court of Antwerp on 4-2-1999. This company left a debt, among others to the Ministry of Finance for not having paid taxes of 207 million FB. It turns out that the investigation shows that the suspect recorded in his accounting at least 63.1 million FB as fictitious invoices. For this reason, the extraditable person is accused of forgery of documents and use, violation of article 489 ter 8 fraudulent bankruptcy, violation of article 489 bis 8 simple bankruptcy. Acts classified as a crime and/or offense by articles 193, 196, 197, 213, 214, 489 ter and 489 bis of the Penal Code and punishable by a principal correctional prison sentence of one year or by a more serious penalty’.” (cf. proven acts of the judgment under appeal). Likewise, in the judgment, the Court specifies that the crimes for which extradition is requested are FORGERY OF DOCUMENTS, VIOLATIONS OF SOCIAL LAWS, USE OF A FALSE DOCUMENT, FRAUDULENT BANKRUPTCY AND SIMPLE BANKRUPTCY, and that the appealed judgment grants it for the crimes of FORGERY OF DOCUMENTS (file 235-96 reference 235-96-AN61. 982422-96) and for the acts constituting FORGERY OF DOCUMENTS AND USE OF FALSE DOCUMENT being pursued by the Court of First Instance of Belgium, file no. 29-01 reference 29-01 AN 75. 98. 4999-99. Those crimes carry penalties whose maximum exceeds two years of imprisonment, so this requirement is met, and therefore the claim is denied.

5- Regarding the fifth argument, in which it is stated that the acts for which the extradition of [Nombre15] [Nombre16] is requested are atypical, the claim is equally rejected. One must not lose sight of the essence, the purposes, and the nature of the extradition proceeding. Regarding the legal nature of the extradition proceeding, recognized doctrine has stated that: “… it does not constitute a trial proper, which prejudges the innocence or guilt of the requested person, since it only aims to reconcile the demands of the administration of repressive justice in civilized countries with the rights of the asylum seeker.” (cf. [Nombre27]. Código de Procedimientos en Materia Penal para la Justicia Federal y los Tribunales Ordinarios de la Capital Federal y Territorios Nacionales. Editorial Abeledo Perrot. Buenos Aires. 1972, p. 593, cited by [Nombre28] and others. La Extradición en Costa Rica. Editorial Nueva Década. San José Costa Rica, 1989. 14). Similarly, along the same line of thought, this Court of Criminal Cassation has indicated: “… in this regard it must be reiterated that we are not hearing a guilt proceeding, in which it is appropriate to assess the evidence and its legitimacy according to our legislation, but rather a very summary proceeding, aimed at determining whether or not the surrender of Mr. [Nombre29] to the Government of the United States is appropriate, for acts for which it is affirmed he was convicted, according to a due process in accordance with the legislation of the requesting State, or for which he is being prosecuted. So, the evidence referred to is only relevant for establishing the existence of evidentiary elements that serve as a basis for the accusation or a prosecution that serves as ‘reasonable indicia of guilt’, according to the requirement contained in point two of subsection c- of the article of the Law of Extradition…” (cf. vote 238. F of 11:30 a.m. on July 14, 1994, excerpt appearing in: Jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Casación Penal. Escuela Judicial. November 1995, p.113). Other more recent votes of this Court have maintained this line regarding the impropriety of assessing evidence or establishing a judgment of guilt. Thus, in vote 2002-00666 of 10:00 a.m. on August 29, 2002, it was said: “This Court of Cassation has repeatedly stated that in the review (sic) proceeding the evidence is not assessed for the purpose of determining the existence of a crime, since it is not about determining whether the person whose extradition is requested has committed a typical, unlawful, culpable, and punishable act, which must be determined in the trial for which he is required, in the event that no conviction exists, or has already been established by the requesting country, in the event that one already exists (see vote of the Court of Criminal Cassation 1999-583, 200-407, 2000-073, among others).” In the specific case of the extradition request promoted against [Nombre30] [Nombre17], the appellants resort to the argument of considering the atypical nature of the conduct, and errors of classification by the Belgian State, the lack of precision in the acts for which this measure is requested, the failure to expressly prove the intention to cause harm, as well as knowledge of the falsehood, as well as the thesis that these crimes are falsehoods of what doctrine calls “ideological” falsehoods (which are not configured in cases of private documents as the appellants say the invoices are), are all substantive aspects appropriate to be examined in due course by the requesting State and at the time it subjects the extradited person to trial. But they are not exactly aspects that should be assessed in this venue, since, as the jurisprudence of this Court of Criminal Cassation has already indicated: “If we were to assume what the defense counsel expresses, that the evidence must be examined to determine the existence of the objective elements of the crime, there would be no reason not to do so also regarding unlawfulness (examining the existence or non-existence of justification grounds), and culpability (assessing the existence or non-existence of exculpation grounds) applying domestic criminal law for that purpose and without holding a trial, when precisely what is sought with extradition is to make possible the application of the law of the State that requests the extradited person for his prosecution (trial), or for him to serve the sentence already imposed according to the criminal law of that country. To do the opposite, that is, assessing the evidence to determine the objective elements of the crime, would turn the extradition proceeding into a ‘review’ procedure of proceedings or judgments handed down in other countries, according to our own criteria for assessing evidence, and without a trial, which is clearly not reasonable.” (Court of Criminal Cassation Vote 2002-0666 of 10:00 a.m. on August 29, 2002). Based on the foregoing considerations and citations of the invoked precedents, the analysis of the substantive aspects referred to by the appellants is not appropriate, as that belongs to the proceedings to which the extraditable person is subjected in the country requesting the measure, and for this reason the claim is denied.

6. In grievance 6 of the appeal brief, the defense counsel argues “the impossibility of determining the time of commission of the punishable act,” a thesis that this Court does not admit and, therefore, rejects the claim. As set forth in ground II, through the transcription of the acts that are the subject of the proceeding being heard, the acts are clearly set forth regarding the conditions of manner, time, and place. Note that the documentation provided defines the moment of commission of the crimes; thus, we have that in the first request it is indicated that the extradited person is guilty of being the author of violations of social legislation and forgery of documents in Antwerp, Belgium from 30/4/1994 to 20/2/1998; and the same applies to the charges of the second request in which it is indicated that the extraditable person is being investigated for forgery of documents, and use and simple and fraudulent bankruptcy in that same Belgian locality, acts occurring from 6/11/1995 to 4/2/99. The discussion of whether we are dealing with a continuing offense, this under the terminology of our Penal Code, being properly a matter of legal classification, cannot be examined in this venue.

7. Regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción), also the subject of appeal by the defense counsel, it is this Court's thesis that they are not correct. We have already established that by application of article 5 of the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium, for the purposes of establishing the statute of limitations, the regulation of the country where the accused is located governs. On this point, the Treaty provides in its article: “Extradition shall not take place when, according to the legislation of the country where the accused is located, the penalty or the criminal action has prescribed.” Given the acts for which extradition is requested and granted, we have that regarding the first request, the end of the action on 20/2/1998 must be taken into account, given that the acts of forgery of documents carry a penalty of up to six years of imprisonment (cf. article 359 of the Costa Rican Penal Code), so that – also considering the rules on the statute of limitations established in articles 31 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure – it must be indicated that this period has not elapsed. Note that article 31 subsection a- of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes that: “If criminal prosecution has not been initiated, the action shall prescribe: a) After a period equal to the maximum penalty has elapsed, in crimes punishable by imprisonment, but in no case may it exceed ten years, nor be less than three.” In the specific case, the crime of forgery has a penalty at its upper extreme of six years, so that if the acts in the first extradition request occur from 30/4/94 until 20/2/98, they will prescribe from that latter date, this without considering the causes of interruption and suspension, among them those established in article 34 subsections d-) and f-) of the Costa Rican Code of Criminal Procedure. This rule provides – insofar as it is relevant for the resolution of this matter – that: “Suspension of the calculation of the statute of limitations. The calculation of the statute of limitations shall be suspended: Subsection d- While the extradition proceeding lasts abroad,” and subsection f-) literally provides: “Due to the default (rebeldía) of the accused. In this case, the term of suspension may not exceed a time equal to the statute of limitations of the criminal action; once this occurs, the period shall continue to run.” That is, in these cases, the statute of limitations is suspended from the moment extradition is requested until it is executed. (cf. Llobet Rodríguez, Javier. Proceso Penal Comentado. (Código Procesal Penal Comentado) Second Edition. Editorial Jurídica Continental. 2003. p. 113). In the case being heard on appeal, it is established that the extradition request was received on February 26, 2001, at the Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José (cf.

Folio 1 to 4 of Volume I), a date from which the calculation of the statute of limitations has been suspended. The same applies to the facts of the second extradition request, which has as its starting date for the respective calculation 4/2/1999, making it evident that the statute of limitations period has not elapsed, as alleged. Consequently, the claim is dismissed.

V-APPEAL FILED BY LIC. [Nombre9] ON BEHALF OF THE PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA. (folios 1587 to 1593) It is argued that the Embassy of Belgium submitted the extradition request against [Nombre31] [Nombre17] on two charges: infringement of social legislation and forgery of documents (falsificación de documentos), which was first expanded to include four charges: forgery of documents, use of false documents, simple bankruptcy (bancarrota simple), and fraudulent bankruptcy (bancarrota fraudulenta), and subsequently by another two charges of forgery of documents and use of false documents. The claim is directed at indicating, on the part of the representative of the Procuraduría General de la República, disagreement with the rejection of the charges of fraudulent bankruptcy and simple bankruptcy. There are two grounds set out in the appeal along those lines of the denial of extradition for certain crimes: FIRST GROUND. The two grounds for the appeal filed by the Procuraduría General de la República, which, being closely related, are set out and resolved in a single section. The first is that the charge of fraudulent bankruptcy does comply with the principle of minimum penalty. In this ground of the filed appeal, the argument of the trial judge is contested, according to which, even though the principle of identity is satisfied in relation to the crime of fraudulent insolvency, the other requirement of the minimum penalty is not met, which according to the Judge is one month of imprisonment under the Belgian Code. The appellant disagrees with that reasoning, considering that the crime of fraudulent bankruptcy does meet the requirement of minimum penalty, since it is established in the Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium that the facts on which the extradition request is based must carry a minimum penalty of no less than two years of imprisonment, according to the legislation of the requesting State, meaning that, for extradition to proceed, the offense must carry a penalty of two or more years of imprisonment. Furthermore, it must be taken into account that the governing parameter regarding the penalty is the maximum term, so that the seriousness of the conduct is reflected. In any case, citing the Belgian Penal Code, Article 489 ter establishes for the crime of fraudulent insolvency a penalty of one month to five years and a fine of 100 to five hundred thousand francs. It is requested that extradition be granted for this charge. II- SECOND GROUND. The second ground consists of alleging that the crime of “simple bankruptcy” does find identity in Costa Rican legislation. The Tribunal of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste, rejected the charge of simple bankruptcy, stating that it lacks identity, without explaining the reason by which that conclusion was reached, even though it is clear that – after reviewing the charges of the first extradition request – that such facts fit within the crime of fraudulent insolvency provided for in Article 213 of the Costa Rican Penal Code. After transcribing the facts of the first extradition request, according to which “From the incorporation on 6/11/95, [Nombre17] and [Nombre32] was the actual manager of BVBA Engenerin, with headquarters in Brecht. This company was declared bankrupt by the Commercial Court of Antwerp on 4/12/1999. This company has left a debt, among others, to the Ministry of Finance for non-payment of taxes amounting to 207 million FB. It emerges from the investigation that the suspect recorded in his accounting at least 63.1 million FB as fictitious invoices.” The appellant highlights that, for the purposes of the principle of identity, what matters is not that there is an identity in the nomenclature of the crimes, but that the facts are the same without the need for them to constitute the same criminal category. In support of her thesis, she cites vote 294-F-97 of 8:00 a.m. on April 15, 1997, from the Tribunal de Casación Penal. Finally, it is requested that extradition be granted for the crime of simple bankruptcy. The first claim is granted and extradition is also granted for the crime of fraudulent bankruptcy, but not for the crime of simple bankruptcy. The trial court of Guanacaste, Santa Cruz Seat, in the decision being challenged, states: “…in relation to the crime called fraudulent bankruptcy regulated in Article 489 ter of the Belgian Penal Code, it finds identity with the crime of fraudulent insolvency regulated in our Penal Code in Article 231 of said normative body; there is no identity with the crime of simple bankruptcy regulated in Article 489 bis of the Belgian Penal Code.” (cf. folio 1450). Further on, the Court indicates the following: “…we have that, even though the principle of identity is satisfied in relation to the crime of fraudulent insolvency, the other requirement of the minimum penalty is not met, which for said crime is in Belgium one month of imprisonment; consequently, the request for expansion of the extradition regarding the crimes of simple bankruptcy and fraudulent bankruptcy must be rejected.” (cf. folio 1454). It must be stated that, indeed, according to the attestations and documents submitted by the Belgian State, and according to the copy of the duly translated legal texts, the crime of simple bankruptcy carries a penalty of one month to two years and a fine of one hundred to five hundred thousand francs. This is evident from the text of Article 489 bis of the Belgian Penal Code, provided to these proceedings at folio 1276 of Volume II. Regarding the crime of fraudulent bankruptcy, numeral 489 ter of the Belgian Penal Code establishes a penalty of imprisonment of one month to five years and a fine of one hundred to five hundred thousand francs. The foregoing means that, regarding the crime of fraudulent bankruptcy, the requirement of the minimum penalty demanded by the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium is met, and therefore the claim of the Procuraduría General de la República is upheld.

POR TANTO

The appeal filed by the defense attorneys of the extraditable individual [Nombre1] is dismissed without merit, and the ruling is confirmed. The appeal of the Procuraduría General de la República is partially granted, and extradition is also granted for the crime of FRAUDULENT BANKRUPTCY, revoking the appealed decision regarding this crime. In all other respects, the judgment remains unchanged.

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Guillermo Sojo Picado [Nombre3] [Nombre2] Judges of Criminal Cassation Mec In the specific case, the disagreement is directed at questioning the absence of an official translation, and it must be added that—as indicated by the Procuraduría General de la República—the requesting State did submit the Spanish-language translation of all the documentation. This is observed at folios 1062 to 1387 of volume II of the present proceeding. It must be added that in any event, by application of the principle of agility in this type of proceeding, as already pointed out with citations of case law from this Chamber, what is required is precisely the plausibility and credibility of the documentation, without the appellants demonstrating that this is not the case. It must be added that the Treaty of Extradition between Costa Rica and Belgium does not strictly require an official translation; rather, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 6—in relation to the documents—it states: *"They shall be produced in original or in authentic copies and shall be accompanied, whenever possible, by a translation into the language of the requested country, and the filiation of the claimed individual."* Note that it does not require that such translation be official, as alleged. Consequently, and in accordance with the foregoing, the claim must be denied. 2. As to the second argument that “The extradition request and its supplements do not include the evidentiary documents referred to in Article 9(c) of the Ley de Extradición,” the ground is rejected. It must not be lost sight of that extradition does not strictly involve an analysis of conviction, given that, as the Constitutional Chamber itself has recognized in Voto 886-95, the analysis carried out in an extradition proceeding does not prejudge the guilt of the individual sought, in the sense that—according to that ruling— *“It is not for the national Courts to determine whether the appellant committed the offenses accused or the degree of his participation, since that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts of the requesting State.”* (Constitutional Chamber, Exp. N-0422- V-95, Voto 0886-95 of 16:39 hours on February 15, 1995). What the Treaty of Extradition between Costa Rica and Belgium requires in this case is precisely the fulfillment of certain formal requirements, which, pursuant to Article 6, insofar as the offenses for which extradition is sought, the existing evidence, and the applicable substantive rules are demonstrated. Consequently, the claim is rejected. 3. Regarding the third claim, in which it is argued that the suitable documents are incurably defective because the requesting State has presented insufficient, battered, and legalized documentation that in any event already existed in the case file, it must—likewise—be rejected. One of the aspects that has occupied this extradition proceeding throughout its course has been precisely the authenticity and reliability of the documentation submitted by the requesting State. However, it should be considered that, pursuant to the ruling of this Court, Voto 2001-939 of eleven hours and thirty minutes on November 16, 2001 (visible at folios 933 to 943 of Volume I of the present proceedings), when ruling on the formality of the documents, the following was stated: *"ARGUMENTS OF DEFENSE COUNSEL. The requested person’s attorneys opposed the appeal filed. They state that it is not true that everything not derived from the text of the treaty constitutes a violation by the contracting parties. They point out that the Constitutional Chamber and the Court of Cassation have required authentication. They say that the responsibility for the lack of authentication falls on the Belgian government and the Procuraduría General de la República, the latter for not having advised the former. They state that the argument that the offense of fraudulent bankruptcy is not included in the treaty is irrelevant, since it is not punishable in Belgium by a penalty exceeding two years, and therefore the minimum penalty requirement is not met. They state that the argument of the Procuraduría that the final resolution should be reserved until the defect is cured is inadmissible, because it violates the principles of self-responsibility, preclusion, and procedural fairness. As for the claim that the last extradition request was not resolved, they say that any omission must be of such magnitude that it leads to a conclusion different from the one reached in the decision. However—they state—this is irrelevant due to the lack of authentication. In the alternative, they request that if the decision is annulled wholly or partially, their client be released. In a subsequently submitted brief, the defense attorneys reiterate their arguments, referring to the fact that the authenticated documents were not presented. III. IT IS RESOLVED: The first aspect to be analyzed with respect to the challenged resolution concerns the lack of authentication of the documentation by the consul of Costa Rica in Belgium, in accordance with the chain of authentications required by the Ley del Servicio Consular. The challenged resolution states: ‘As to the authenticity that the documents supporting the extradition request must possess, Article 6 of the Convention between Belgium and Costa Rica provides that the documents supporting the extradition shall be produced in original or in authentic copies and shall be accompanied, whenever possible, by a translation into the language of the requested country and the filiation of the claimed individual. For its part, Article 9(2) of the current Ley de Extradición provides that among the documents that the requesting government must present are “authentic copies of the proceedings of the case, which provide proof or at least reasonable indicia of the guilt in question.” Moreover, the Ley Orgánica del Servicio Consular No. 46 of July 7, 1925, and its amendments, grant the consuls of the Republic the status of notaries and authority to attest, in accordance with the laws, to acts and contracts. They shall also legalize documents and signatures of the authorities of the country in which they serve, when such certificates and documents are to take effect in Costa Rica, even if they concern foreigners; see Articles 66, 67-69, and 81 of that law. But in addition, the signature of this official must be authenticated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as provided in Article 294 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Reviewing the documents submitted by the requesting authority, we find that they were not legalized by the consul of Costa Rica in Belgium, nor was the signature of this official authenticated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as would have been correct, because they were intended to have legal effects in Costa Rica. In these documents, only the authentication of the consul of Belgium in Costa Rica appears; that is, the documents that served to support the requested extradition were not legitimized by our authorities, ergo, they are not suitable to support the requested extradition. It is noteworthy that the court that initially intervened did not make a warning to the requesting authority to fulfill this requirement, a warning that at this stage is inappropriate, because the extradition request must now be resolved, given that the extraditable [Name3] [Name4] has been held in pretrial detention for many months. The extradition request made against the extraditable [Name5] therefore suffering from a lack of authenticity, it is rejected, and his release is ordered once this resolution becomes final.’ This Court, after studying the rulings of the Constitutional Chamber cited by both the Procuraduría General de la República and the requested person’s defense, together with a study of constitutional jurisprudence through the Judicial Branch’s computer systems, finds that, regarding the authentication of signatures pursuant to the Ley del Servicio Consular, the Constitutional Chamber expressly addressed this in voto 903-92 of April 3, 1992: ‘VII.—The argument regarding the lack of authentication of the documents provided by the requesting party deserves separate consideration. The resolutions of the Corte Plena of September 27, 1982, article VII, and December 24, 1984, article III, state that the lack of authentication of signatures is cured by the referral of the extradition proceedings by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Supreme Court of Justice. However, the Chamber considers that what was stated on that occasion by the Corte Plena and the administrative and judicial practice that subsequently consolidated in light of that ruling conflicts with the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 80, and 81 of the Ley Orgánica del Servicio Consular, which require that documents from abroad must be authenticated by the Consul of Costa Rica in that country, and that consul’s signature must be authenticated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see Article 291 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). In the extradition proceeding being processed against [Name6], the authentication of the signature of the Costa Rican consul by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is notably absent from the documents provided by the Government of the United States of America, an omission of a legal formality that, in the Chamber’s opinion, prevents the submitted documentation from being considered complete. In the Chamber’s view, the omission by the Costa Rican State—to some extent motivated by the resolutions under comment—prevents the submitted documentation from being considered complete. However, that omission is not of such a nature as to nullify the actions of the Court; on the contrary, the Chamber considers it a curable defect not attributable to the requesting country, and therefore the Juzgado de Santa Cruz should request, with the greatest possible speed, the authentication in order to continue with the proceedings normally. The foregoing implies that, in the Chamber’s view, there has been no violation of the fundamental rights of the appellant, and for that reason, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.’ Moreover, the Constitutional Chamber has stated in various rulings that the lack of authentication of documents in an extradition is a curable defect. Thus, in voto 4317-93 of September 3, 1993, it said: ‘This Court has already indicated in other rulings—incidentally referring to the same matter—that the lack of authentication of the documentation neither produces any nullity nor prevents the initiation of the extradition proceeding, as it is a curable defect.’ In the same vein: Constitutional Chamber, voto 3637-93 of July 28, 1993, and voto 3678-93 of July 30, 1993. In accordance with what is stated in those rulings, it must be concluded that the Ley del Servicio Consular (Art. 67) is indeed applicable, and no conflict arises between it and the Extradition Treaty with Belgium, since the latter in its Art. 6 requires that the “original document” or an “authentic copy” be presented, but does not state that the procedure for the recognition of documents under the Ley del Servicio Consular should not be followed, which in any event was enacted in accordance with international consular practices. It should be borne in mind that the Constitutional Chamber, in voto 903-92, expressly required that the legal procedure be followed, including authentication by the consul of Costa Rica in the requesting State’s country. The situation would be different if the Treaty included a norm like Art. 7 of the Model Treaty on Extradition, mentioned by the appellant, which expressly provides that certification or authentication of extradition requests shall not be required. However, the lack of authentication of the documentation, as the Constitutional Chamber has stated in the various rulings cited above, including voto 903-92 itself, is not a ground for rejecting the extradition request; rather, the respective warning to the requesting State to cure the defect must be made, which was not done in this case. The foregoing is in accordance with Art. 9(d) of the Ley de Extradición, of supplementary application. Regarding the warning, see, in addition to the cited rulings, voto 2490-96 of May 28, 1996, ordered by the Constitutional Chamber. With regard to the warning to present the missing documentation and the annulment of the resolution on extradition so that the defect can be cured, voto 516-F-96 of September 5, 1996, rendered by the Tribunal de Casación Penal, is important. This Court has even held, in a case governed by the extradition law and not by the Treaty between Belgium and Costa Rica, that the failure to present authentic documents within the required period does not in itself mean that the extradition must be denied if they are subsequently provided, although it does have implications regarding the proceeding (Voto 643-2001 of August 27, 2001). It must be emphasized that the same judgment acknowledges that the lack of authentication of the documents is a curable defect, but, contradictorily, states that because the extraditable has been detained for a long time, it is not appropriate to issue the warning to the requesting State, as would otherwise be proper. In this regard, it states: “It is noteworthy that the Court that initially intervened did not issue the warning to the requesting authority to fulfill that requirement, a warning that at this stage is inappropriate because the extradition request must now be resolved, given that the extraditable [Name3] [Name7] has been held in pretrial detention for many months” (folio 844). Contrary to what is derived from that reasoning, the long duration of the provisional detention, under rules of derivation, may be related to whether or not the release of the extraditable should be ordered during the proceeding itself, but it has no connection with the substantive resolution of the extradition, such that it would ultimately lead to the denial of the request. Therefore, the defense attorneys’ arguments invoking the principles of self-responsibility, preclusion, and procedural fairness are without merit. Rather, it is in accordance with the principle of fairness between the contracting parties to the international Treaty that the warnings should be issued to the requesting State to correct a defect in the documentation, especially since that requirement derives from Costa Rica’s internal legislation. Thus, if what was appropriate was to provide an opportunity for the defect in the documentation to be cured, it should have been proceeded with in that manner, which was not done by the Trial Court. For the foregoing, the appropriate action is to grant the appeal, annul the challenged resolution, and order a remand, so that the corresponding warning may be issued. For reasons of mootness, the other arguments of the appeal are not addressed.” The foregoing implies recognizing—independently of the discussion raised by the Procuraduría General de la República—regarding the utility of requiring formalities in the documentation, the reality is that our legislation and even the binding *erga omnes* precedents of the Constitutional Chamber compel compliance with certain requirements. In the specific case, it is observed that at folios 1062 to 1387 of volume II, the Embassy of Belgium submitted a series of certificates duly legalized and authenticated, which establish the following aspects: Regarding the first extradition request: 1- The identification of the extraditable and his personal data. 2- The formal extradition request, the statement of the arrest warrant issued in absentia on 6/10/2002 by the Investigative Magistrate Doña [Name8] in Antwerp, reference 235/96 AN61 98.2422-96. 3- The indication of the facts for which extradition is requested, according to which the interested party is guilty as a co-perpetrator of offenses relating to social legislation and falsification of documents in Antwerp, from 30/4/ until 20/2 1998. 4- The indication of the penalty for the offenses and the applicable norms, and the possible date of prescription of the offenses. 5- At folio 1079 to 1080, the arrest warrant in absentia of 6/10/2000, file 325-96, issued by Judge [Name8], Investigative Magistrate of the Court of First Instance of Antwerp, appears duly authenticated, along with the facts subject to the proceeding. 6- Certified copy of the applicable legislation for these offenses (folio 1196 and following). Regarding the second extradition request: 1- The extradition request is supplemented based on an arrest warrant in absentia dated 21/3/2001 by Investigative Magistrate [Name9], reference 29/01/ AN 75.98.499-99, stating that the extradited is guilty of the acts of falsification of documents and use, and simple and fraudulent bankruptcy in Antwerp, Belgium, from 6/11/95 until 4/12/1999. 2- The articles penalizing the conduct are indicated, specifically norms 1 to 11, 193, 196, 197, 213, 214, and 489 ter and 489 bis of the Belgian Penal Code, with the indication that the penalties exceed the minimum duration provided in the Convention between Costa Rica and Belgium of 25/4/1902, and the indication of the prescription dates of the charges. 3- At folio 1234 appears the arrest warrant for the offenses of falsification of documents and use, fraudulent and simple bankruptcy (articles 489 ter and 489 bis of the Belgian Penal Code). 4- Likewise, at the indicated folio, a transcription is made of the facts for which—among others—extradition is requested, as well as the arrest warrant in absentia (folio 1239 and 1240). Regarding the third additional extradition request. The following is considered duly certified and legalized: 1- The basis for this additional request *“On the basis of a judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals of Antwerp on 4/10/2000…”.* 2- The facts for which extradition is requested are for the crimes *of falsification of documents and use of false documents knowing they were false—as co-perpetrator of the NV Europa United States of America (EURUSA) declared bankrupt on declaration—having caused the disappearance of the companies’ books or documents and annual accounts, partially or entirely embezzled or concealed assets—breach of trust—infractions of the Income Tax Code and the VAT Code.”* 3- At that same folio, the penalties and the possible prescription date are indicated. 4- A copy of the judgment in absentia is attached. 5- Certified copy of the applicable legislation (Folios 1336 and following). Therefore, it is not true that the documents provided—as the appellants claim—are battered or insufficient; on the contrary, they allow the deduction of what crimes are attributed, the penalties, the procedural status of the cases, all of which justifies the rejection of the ground. In any event, as the Señor Procurador rightly argues in responding to the respective hearing for the purposes of the joinder of issue (art.

446 of the C.P.P.), the Extradition Treaty with Belgium, what it requires and demands – this with respect to the documentation – clearly indicates in its Article 6 that: *“Extradition shall only be granted upon the production of either a final sentence of conviction, or an order of procedure formally decreeing or obligating as a matter of law the appearance of the accused before the repressive jurisdiction, or, finally, a warrant of arrest or any other document having the same force. These documents shall indicate the precise nature of the incriminated acts and the criminal provision applicable thereto. They shall be produced in original or in authentic copy and shall be accompanied, whenever possible, by a translation into the language of the requested country and by the description of the individual claimed.”* In accordance with the foregoing, in this specific case, the legal requirements regarding this contested point are met, and therefore the claim is rejected.

4- Regarding the allegation of the absence of the minimum penalty requirement, since it is alleged that all the crimes to which the extradition requests refer are punishable by a penalty of less than two years, thereby failing to meet the minimum penalty prerequisite referred to in Article 2 in fine of the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium. *This Court considers that the appellants are mistaken and therefore rejects the claim.* It is true that the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium, signed in Brussels on April 25, 1902, and duly ratified, states in Article 2, last paragraph, that: *“In any case, the acts for which extradition is requested must entail, according to the law of the requesting country, a penalty of not less than two years' imprisonment, and extradition may not take place except when the similar act is punishable under the legislation of the requested country.”* It is a principle of extradition law that States are not interested in prosecuting minor offenses, and therefore certain rules are established in this regard. Even the national Extradition Law (Ley de Extradición) itself incorporates this principle, called the principle of non-surrender for minor offenses *(mínima non curat praetor)*, when it indicates in Art. 3, subsection e) of the Extradition Law (Ley de Extradición) that extradition shall not proceed: *“When the penalty assigned to the imputed acts, according to their provisional or final classification by the competent judge or court of the State requesting extradition, is less than one year of deprivation of liberty and the pre-trial detention or remand of the accused has been authorized or ordered, if there is not yet a final judgment. This must be a custodial sentence.”* The indicated provision of the Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium, which also protects that principle, must be understood as relating to the penalties provided for in the criminal statutes considered abstractly and not in relation to the penalties imposed in each specific case. That is, what governs is the penalty for the crimes; or in other terms, in those crimes whose minimum penalty is less than two years, it is not appropriate to grant extradition. As argued by the representative of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República), the element of the minimum penalty refers to the law of the requesting country, and the penalty provided for in the respective statutes, so that the penalty to be considered in determining whether extradition is appropriate must be that contained in the norm and which can be equal to or greater than two years. In the specific case, in accordance with the various extradition requests made by the Kingdom of Belgium, the lower court, in the appealed decision, rules on the acts which, in its view, justify granting extradition, namely: *“On February 14, 2001, the Investigating Judge of the Court of First Instance based in Antwerp issued a default arrest warrant, issued in case file No. 235-96 against the person sought for extradition [Name10] for the following acts: From 30-4-94 and 20-2-98, [Name10] worked as Manager or delegated Administrator of various industrial piping and refrigeration technique companies established in Antwerp, including BVBA Intermitaje, NV Montrex, NV EURO Engineering, NV Poliytech. In this manner, he submitted, during the same period, fictitious invoices for 44 million Belgian francs to BVBA Genex, Madgaenastraat 28 in Antwerp, and consequently could not pay his employees officially. Therefore, he is suspected of being the perpetrator of violations of social legislation, forgery of documents, acts classified as crime and/or offense under Articles 193, 196 of the Penal Code and under Articles 22 to 32 of the Royal Decree of 20-7-1967, regarding the employment of employees of foreign nationality, Article 44 of the Law of 24-7-1987 regarding temporary work, interim work, and the making available of employees to a user, Articles 31 to 39 of the Law of 27-6-1969 amending the decision of 28-12-1944 regarding the social security of workers, Articles 11 to 15 of the Royal Decree of 23-10-1978 regarding the keeping of social documents; Article 11 to 15 of the Decree of 6-3-1991 regarding the regulation for the recognition of employment agencies in the Flemish region and punishable by a principal correctional prison sentence of one year and by a more severe penalty.”* (cf. Pages 1444 and 1445 of the ruling). Also, the lower court judge, in the appealed decision, with respect to the second block of acts for which extradition is granted, states: *“3- On March 23 of the current year, the Government of Belgium supplemented the extradition request based on a default arrest warrant issued on March 21, 2001, against the person sought for extradition [Name11], by the Investigating Judge of the Court of First Instance based in Antwerp, in case file No. 29-01 for the following acts: ‘From its incorporation on 6-11-95, [Name12] was the actual manager of BVBA General Engineering based in Brecht. This company was declared bankrupt by the Commercial Court of Antwerp on 4-2-1999. This company left a debt, among others, to the Ministry of Finance for non-payment of taxes of 207 million FB. It results from the investigation that the suspect recorded in his accounting at least 63.1 million FB as fictitious invoices. Therefore, the person sought for extradition is accused of forgery of documents and use thereof, violation of Article 489 ter 8, formerly fraudulent bankruptcy, violation of Article 489 bis 8, formerly simple bankruptcy. Acts classified as crime and/or offense under Articles 193, 196, 197, 213, 214, 489 ter and 489 bis of the Penal Code and punishable by a principal correctional prison sentence of one year or by a more serious penalty.’”* (cf. proven facts of the appealed judgment). Likewise, in its judgment, the Court specifies that the crimes for which extradition is requested are those of FORGERY OF DOCUMENTS, VIOLATIONS OF SOCIAL LAWS, USE OF A FALSE DOCUMENT, FRAUDULENT BANKRUPTCY, AND SIMPLE BANKRUPTCY, it being that in the appealed judgment, it is granted for the crimes of FORGERY OF DOCUMENTS (case file 235-96 reference 235-96-AN61.982422-96) and for the acts constituting FORGERY OF DOCUMENTS AND USE OF A FALSE DOCUMENT being prosecuted by the Court of First Instance of Belgium, case file No. 29-01 reference 29-01 AN 75.98.4999-99. These crimes have penalties that exceed, in their maximum, the penalty of two years' imprisonment, so that this requirement is met, and therefore the claim is denied.

5- Regarding the fifth argument, in which it is stated that the acts for which the extradition of [Name3] [Name7] is requested are atypical, *likewise, the claim is rejected.* One must not lose sight of what the essence, purposes, and nature of the extradition procedure are. Regarding the legal nature of the extradition procedure, recognized doctrine has stated that *“… it does not constitute a trial per se, which prejudges the innocence or guilt of the person requested, as it only seeks to reconcile the requirements of the administration of repressive justice in civilized countries, with the rights of the person taking refuge.”* (cf. [Name13], [Name14]. Code of Procedure in Criminal Matters for the Federal Justice and the Ordinary Courts of the Federal Capital and National Territories. Editorial Abeledo Perrot. Buenos Aires. 1972, p. 593, cited by [Name15], [Name16] and others. Extradition in Costa Rica (La Extradición en Costa Rica). Editorial Nueva Década. San José Costa Rica, 1989. 14). Also, along the same line of thought, this Court of Criminal Cassation has indicated: *“… in this regard, it must be reiterated that we are not hearing a guilt process, in which it is appropriate to assess the evidence and its legitimacy according to our legislation, but rather a summary proceeding, aimed at establishing whether or not the surrender of Mr. [Name17] to the Government of the United States is appropriate, for acts for which it is affirmed he was convicted, according to a due process under the legislation of the requesting State, or for which he is being prosecuted. Thus, the evidence alluded to only matters to establish the existence of evidentiary elements that serve as support for the accusation or a prosecution that serves as ‘reasonable indicia of guilt’, according to the requirement contained in point two of subsection c- of the article of the Extradition Law (Ley de Extradición)…”* (cf. decision 238. F of 11:30 a.m. on July 14, 1994, excerpt appearing in: Jurisprudence of the Court of Criminal Cassation (Jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Casación Penal). Judicial School. November 1995, p.113). Other more recent decisions of this Court have maintained that line, in the sense of the inappropriateness of assessing evidence or establishing a judgment of guilt. Thus, in decision 2002-00666 of 10:00 a.m. on August 29, 2002, it was stated: *“This Court of Cassation has repeatedly stated that in the review procedure (sic), the assessment of evidence is not carried out to determine the existence of a crime, since it is not about determining whether the person whose extradition is requested has committed a typical, unlawful, culpable, and punishable act, which will have to be determined in the trial for which it is requested, in the event there is no conviction, or has already been established by the requesting country, in the event it already exists (see decision of the Court of Criminal Cassation 1999—583, 200-407, 2000-073, among others).”* In the specific case of the extradition request promoted on behalf of [Name18] [Name10], the appellants resort to the argument of considering the atypicality of the conduct, and errors of classification by the Belgian State, the lack of precision in the acts for which this measure is requested, the failure to expressly demonstrate the intention to cause harm, as well as the knowledge of the falsehood, as well as the thesis that these crimes are falsehoods which doctrine calls “ideological” (which are not applicable in cases of private documents, as the appellants claim the invoices are), are all substantive aspects proper to be examined in due course by the requesting state and at the time it submits the extradited person to trial. But they are not properly aspects that should be evaluated in this forum, because as the jurisprudence of this Court of Criminal Cassation has already indicated, *“If we were to assume what the defense counsel states, that the evidence must be examined to determine the existence of the objective elements of the crime, there would be no reason why it should not also be done regarding unlawfulness (examining the existence or non-existence of justifications), and culpability (assessing the existence or non-existence of exculpatory causes), applying domestic criminal law for this and without holding a trial, when precisely what is intended with extradition is to enable the application of the law of the State that requests the extradited person for their trial, (judgment), or for them to serve the sentence already imposed according to the criminal law of that country. To do otherwise, that is, assessing the evidence to determine the objective elements of the crime, would turn the extradition procedure into a procedure for the ‘review’ of proceedings or sentences handed down in other countries, according to our own criteria for evaluating evidence, and without a trial, which is clearly unreasonable.”* (Court of Criminal Cassation, Decision 2002-0666 of 10:00 a.m. on August 29, 2002). Based on the foregoing considerations and citations of the invoked precedents, the analysis of the substantive aspects referred to by the appellants is not appropriate; rather, this is proper to the proceeding to which the person sought for extradition is subjected in the country requesting the measure, and therefore the claim is denied.

6. In grievance 6 of the appeal brief, the defense counsels argue “the impossibility of determining the time of commission of the punishable act,” a thesis which this Court does not admit, and therefore rejects the claim. As set forth in point II, through the transcription of the acts subject to the known proceedings, the acts are clearly set forth in terms of manner, time, and place. Note that the documentation provided defines the moment of commission of the crimes; thus, we have that in the first request it is indicated that the extradited person is guilty of being the perpetrator of the violations of social legislation and forgery of documents in Antwerp, Belgium, from 4/30/1994 to 2/20/1998; and the same occurs with the charges in the second request, where it is indicated that the person sought for extradition is being investigated for forgery of documents, use thereof, and simple and fraudulent bankruptcy in that same Belgian locality, acts that occurred from 11/6/1995 to 2/4/99. The discussion of whether we are facing a continuing offense, this under the terminology of our Penal Code, being properly a question of legal classification, cannot be examined in this forum.

7. On the point of the statute of limitations, also the subject of an appeal by the defense counsels, it is the thesis of this Court that they are mistaken. We have already established that by application of Article 5 of the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium, for the purposes of establishing the statute of limitations, the regulation of the country where the accused is located governs. On this point, that Treaty provides in the article: *“Extradition shall not take place when, according to the legislation of the country in which the accused is located, the penalty or the criminal action has prescribed.”* Having seen the acts for which extradition is requested and granted, we have that with respect to the first request, the conclusion of the action must be taken into account, 2/20/1998, it being that the acts of forgery of documents carry a penalty of up to six years' imprisonment (cf. Article 359 of the Costa Rican Penal Code), so that – also considering the rules on the statute of limitations established in Articles 31 and following of the Code of Criminal Procedure – it must be indicated that this term has not elapsed.

See that Article 31, subsection a)- of the Criminal Procedure Code establishes that "If criminal prosecution has not been initiated, the action will prescribe: a) After a period equal to the maximum penalty has elapsed, for crimes punishable by imprisonment, but in no case may it exceed ten years, nor be less than three." In the specific case, the crime of forgery (falsificación) carries a penalty at its upper extreme of six years, so if the facts of the first extradition request occurred from 30/4/94 until 20/2/98, they will prescribe as of that latter date, this without considering the grounds for interruption and suspension, among them those established in Article 34, subsections d-) and f-) of the Costa Rican Criminal Procedure Code. This rule provides – insofar as relevant for the resolution of this matter – that: "Suspension of the prescription calculation. The calculation of the prescription shall be suspended: Subsection d- While the extradition process is ongoing abroad," and subsection f-) literally provides: "Due to the contumacy (rebeldía) of the accused. In this case, the term of suspension may not exceed a time equal to the prescription of the criminal action; once this has elapsed, the period shall continue to run." That is, in these cases, the prescription is suspended from the moment the extradition is requested until it is executed. (cf. Llobet Rodríguez, Javier. Comentario Procesal Penal. (Comentado Código Procesal Penal) Second Edition. Editorial Jurídica Continental. 2003. p. 113). In the matter on appeal, it is noted that the extradition request was received on 26 February 2001 at the Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José (cf. Folios 1 to 4 of volume I), a date from which the calculation of the prescription has been suspended. The same applies to the facts of the second extradition request, which has a starting date for the respective calculation of 4/2/1999, it being evident that the prescription period has not elapsed either, as alleged. Consequently, the claim is dismissed.

V-APPEAL FILED BY LIC. [Nombre19] ON BEHALF OF THE PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA. (folios 1587 to 1593) It is argued that the Embassy of Belgium presented the extradition request against [Nombre20] [Nombre10] on two charges: infraction of social legislation and forgery of documents, which was later expanded, first to four charges: forgery of documents, use of false documents, simple bankruptcy (bancarrota simple), and fraudulent bankruptcy (bancarrota fraudulenta), and subsequently to two other charges of forgery of documents and use of false documents. The claim is directed at indicating, on behalf of the representative of the Procuraduría General de la República, disagreement with the rejection of the charges of fraudulent bankruptcy and simple bankruptcy. There are two grounds presented in the appeal along these lines regarding the denial of extradition for some crimes:

FIRST GROUND. The two grounds of the appeal filed by the Procuraduría General de la República, being closely related, are set forth and resolved in a single section. The first is that the charge of fraudulent bankruptcy does satisfy the principle of minimum penalty. In this ground of the filed appeal, the argument of the trial judge is challenged, according to which, even though the principle of identity is satisfied in relation to the crime of fraudulent insolvency (quiebra fraudulenta), the other requirement of the minimum penalty is not satisfied, which according to the judge is one month of imprisonment under the Belgian Code. The appellant disagrees with that reasoning, considering that the crime of fraudulent bankruptcy does satisfy the minimum penalty requirement, as it is established in the Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium that the facts underlying the extradition request must have a minimum penalty of no less than two years' imprisonment, according to the legislation of the requesting State; that is, for extradition to proceed, it must involve a crime with a penalty of two or more years' imprisonment. Furthermore, it should be taken into account that the parameter governing the penalty is the upper extreme, so that it reflects the seriousness of the conduct. In any case, citing the Belgian Criminal Code, Article 489 ter establishes for the crime of fraudulent insolvency a penalty of one month to five years and a fine of 100 to five hundred thousand francs. It is requested that extradition be ordered for that charge.

II- SECOND GROUND. The second ground consists of alleging that the crime of "simple bankruptcy" does find identity in Costa Rican legislation. The Court of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste rejected the charge of simple bankruptcy, indicating that it lacks identity, without explaining the reasoning through which that conclusion was reached, even though it is clear – after reviewing the charges of the first extradition request – that such facts fit within the crime of fraudulent insolvency provided for in Article 213 of the Costa Rican Criminal Code. After transcribing the facts of the first extradition request, according to which "From the incorporation on 6/11/95 [Nombre10] and [Nombre21] was the actual manager of BVBA Engenerin based in Brecht. This company was declared bankrupt by the Commercial Court of Antwerp on 4/12/1999. This company left a debt, among others to the Ministry of Finance for not having paid taxes amounting to 207 million FB. The investigation reveals that the suspect recorded in his accounting at least 63.1 million FB as fictitious invoices." The appellant emphasizes that for the purposes of the principle of identity, what is important is not that there is an identity in the nomenclature of the crimes, but that the facts are the same without the need for it to be the exact same criminal figure. In support of her thesis, she cites decision (voto) 294-F-97 of 8:00 a.m. on 15 April 1997 from the Tribunal de Casación Penal. Finally, it is requested that extradition be granted for the crime of simple bankruptcy.

The first claim is granted, and extradition is also granted for the crime of fraudulent bankruptcy, but not for the crime of simple bankruptcy.

The trial court of Guanacaste, Sede Santa Cruz, in the appealed resolution, states: "...in relation to the crime called fraudulent bankruptcy regulated in Article 489 ter of the Belgian Criminal Code, it finds identity with the crime of fraudulent insolvency regulated in our Criminal Code in Article 231 of that normative body; there is no identity with the crime of simple bankruptcy regulated in Article 489 bis of the Belgian Criminal Code." (cf. folio 1450). Later, the Court indicates the following: "...we find that even though the principle of identity is met in relation to the crime of fraudulent insolvency, the other requirement of the minimum penalty is not met, which for said crime in Belgium is one month of imprisonment; consequently, the request for expansion of the extradition concerning the crimes of simple bankruptcy and fraudulent bankruptcy must be rejected." (cf. folio 1454).

It must be said indeed that, according to the affidavits and documents presented by the Belgian State, and according to the copy of the legal texts duly translated, the crime of simple bankruptcy carries a penalty of one month to two years and one hundred to five hundred thousand francs. This is evident from the text of Article 489 bis of the Belgian Criminal Code, provided to these proceedings at folio 1276 of volume II. As for the crime of fraudulent bankruptcy, numeral 489 ter of the Belgian Criminal Code establishes a penalty of imprisonment from one month to five years and one hundred to five hundred thousand francs. The foregoing means that regarding the crime of fraudulent bankruptcy, the requirement of the minimum penalty demanded by the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium is met; thus, the claim of the Procuraduría General de la República is upheld." That, having verified the respective deliberation, the Tribunal addressed the questions raised in the Appeal.

4. That the pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

DRAFTED BY the Judge of Cassation SOJO PICADO; and,

WHEREAS:

I- Having reviewed the two appeals filed by the defense of the person sought for extradition as well as the one filed by the Procuraduría General de la República, and considering that they satisfactorily meet the legal requirements prescribed in criminal procedural legislation, the same are admitted for processing. Likewise, considering that in this case an oral hearing was requested and held, a proceeding in which the grounds of the appeal were not expanded upon, we proceed to resolve the appeals filed as follows.

II- APPEAL FILED BY [Name10] AND [Name11] IN THEIR CAPACITY AS DEFENDERS OF [Name12] (pages 1510 to 1549 front).

It is requested that the extradition initiated against their represented party be set aside and that the arrest warrant issued against him be revoked. Several are the aspects which, in the appellants' opinion, justify the aforementioned claim: 1-The extradition request and its extensions do not have the official translation. After transcribing Article 1 of the Extradition Law and agreeing that this matter must be processed based on the Extradition Treaty in force between Costa Rica and Belgium, they insist that the three extradition requests that have been filed have the common denominator that there is no official translation of the records filed to support the proceedings. It is indicated that in this specific case, the Embassy of Belgium set itself up as a translator expert of its own evidence, such that there is not a single document that has been translated by an official translator appointed by a Judge, or by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, in order to thereby legalize them, and for them to be considered public. It is a general principle of justice that acts or proceedings that have been prepared by some of the conflicting parties cannot be permitted or taken as elements of proof, especially when the translation is evidence, and in any case, challenges and objections deemed pertinent can be raised. They insist that translation is an activity regulated by Law and can only be done by official translators. They go on to say that the Embassy of Belgium cannot oblige us through the Tribunal to abide by the translation as an exact science, nor to take its procedural loyalty for granted, nor can it oblige the defense or the Procuraduría to perform it. The appellants challenge proven fact F- contained in the judgment on the merits, which states that: "At the request of Lic. [Name13], the official translator of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Republic of Costa Rica, appointed by agreement number 005 DJ of September 10, 1998, published in Gazette n- 198 of October 13, one thousand nine hundred ninety-eight, selectively translated from the Dutch language into the Spanish language, the original file that served as the basis for the extension of the extradition ordered against the person sought," since this refers to the second and final extradition extension which, in any case, was rejected by the Judge for being time-barred. Finally, it is indicated that the last extension of the extradition is absolutely unintelligible, which demonstrates the non-existence of an official translation. 2- The extradition request and its extensions do not have the evidentiary documents referred to in Article 9, subsection c, of the Extradition Law. The ground of the appeal is developed by indicating that this article is of particular relevance insofar as it obliges—among other aspects—the requesting State to present an authentic copy of the proceedings of the process that provide evidence or at least reasonable indications of guilt of the person in question. Although it is not a matter of carrying out a process to determine the guilt of the individual, it is required that—aside from reviewing the formal requirements—the necessary proofs be attached to examine the merit of the accusation, the degree of probability, the possible participation, such that the arrest warrant or the judgment is not sufficient. In this specific case, the Kingdom of Belgium limited itself to presenting as documentation the arrest warrants, with a summary of the accused facts, this in the first two requests. Regarding the third request, it also presented the arrest warrant and the summary of the facts of the judgment handed down in absentia. Consequently, it suffers from the defects noted. The appellant concludes by saying that the Costa Rican judge in extradition matters is not a simple observer of formal requirements, but rather must issue, upon granting or rejecting the extradition, a judgment of probability relating to the commission of the act and the participation of the accused. 3- Irremediability of the absence of suitable documents. It is argued that the Procuraduría General de la República of Costa Rica—the body representing the Kingdom of Belgium—did not use its power to promote evidence to supplement the absence of suitable, legally translated documents, but rather limited itself to providing—after a hearing granted by the Tribunal pursuant to Article 9 of the Extradition Law—insufficient, poorly translated, and non-legalized documentation that, in any event, already existed in the file. This defect and negligence is no longer rectifiable, and it only remains to examine the validity and effectiveness of the evidence offered by the petitioning State. 4- All the crimes referred to in the extradition requests are punishable at their lower end by a sentence of less than two years, and therefore do not meet the minimum penalty referred to in Article 2 in fine of the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium, which requires that the crime not carry less than 2 years of imprisonment. Lack of minimum penalty. It is argued that, in accordance with the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium, it is required that: "... the acts for which extradition is requested must carry, according to the law of the requesting country, a penalty of not less than two years of imprisonment." In accordance with the foregoing norm, all violations of labor legislation are excluded from the first request without further analysis, as they are punishable, according to the informal documentation itself presented by the requesting State, with day-fines. From the second extradition request, the crimes of simple and fraudulent bankruptcy are excluded, as they have a minimum penalty of one month of imprisonment, all in accordance with Articles 489 bis and 489 ter of the Belgian Criminal Code. In the third extradition request, the first conviction is excluded as it is for 12 months of imprisonment. They go on to say that there is no documentation supporting the extradition petition, since the translations are not official and the documents are not public, such that the crimes of forgery and use of a false document contemplated in the first and second extradition request also do not meet the minimum penalty required by the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium. The appellants say that one only has to look at the documentation provided by the requesting State to realize that the eventual crimes of forgery and use of a false document are of very little gravity in Belgium, which is why they are not considered crimes but rather offenses (infracciones), and that as such, according to Belgian legislation, they carry correctional and not prison penalties (pena correccional y no de reclusión), as they qualify as offenses (infracciones) and not crimes, and with a possible penalty of less than two years. Therefore, they fall below the minimum penalty required by the referred-to Treaty. Through the last extension of the extradition, where acts of the same nature and classified as use of a false document and forgery, Mr. [Name14] is sentenced to only 12 months. Between the facts of the last extension, visible on page 302, and the second extradition request, they concern the same crimes and the same articles of the Criminal Code. Regarding this latter legal text, it turns out that Articles 193, 196, and 197, which are the provisions relating to the crimes of document forgery and use of a false document, are punished with a prison term (pena de reclusión) of five years, such that if this is the case, the appellants question how and despite what, dealing with the same articles (crimes of falsehood and use of a false document) in the first case referred to in the last extension, the penalty was 12 months. It is further indicated that the apparent contradiction between the prison penalties (penas de reclusión) for the crimes of forgery and use of a false document mentioned by the requesting State and the penalty of 12 months for an identical case, but one that has a judgment and not a mere accusation, is contained not only in the accusation of the first extension of the extradition, but is repeated in the arrest warrant for default (rebeldía) issued by the Court of First Instance of Antwerp. In sum, the grievance is concluded by stating that in the appealed judgment there is a serious flaw in reasoning by the Judge, since two things cannot be equal and different at the same time; that is, that the minimum penalty for the crimes of forgery and use of a false document is 5 years (lower end of reclusion range) as affirmed by the Judge in his judgment, and by the requesting State in the first two extradition requests; or that the minimum penalty is one year, as also affirmed by the Judge and the Kingdom of Belgium, in the records accompanying the second and third extradition petition. The foregoing makes it impossible for extradition to be granted in this case. 5- In the fifth argument, they insist on the atypical nature of the alleged conduct and the non-compliance with the principle of dual criminality. Despite the fact that the extradition request cites the articles referring to document forgery and the first extension cites the criminal offense relating to the use of a false document, the truth is that the facts on which the initial request and its respective extension are based reveal that the conduct attributed to [Name15] [Name16] is atypical. Therefore, there is an error of classification by the Belgian State. Regarding the initial extradition request, it contains a very laconic description, since it is only indicated that regarding the "... acts of 4/30/94 [Name17] worked as delegated managing administrator of various companies in industrial piping and refrigeration technology established in Antwerp, among others BVBA Intermontage, NV Montrex, NV Euro Engenering, NV Polytech. In this way, he sent during the same period fictitious invoices for 44 million Belgian francs to BVBA Genes, Mdgalenastraat 28 in Antwerp, and consequently could not pay his employees officially." The description of the conduct was very important, because regarding the crime of document forgery, the Belgian criminal system requires that the conditions of Articles 193 in relation to 196 of the Criminal Code of that country be met. Thus, it is necessary to demonstrate the intent to cause harm, and that the forgery is carried out through one of the forms referred to in cited Article 196. In the base charges of the extradition, the manner in which the person sought carried out the alleged forgery is not indicated, nor is the intent to falsify any document attributed to him, nor is it indicated that the accused sent the invoices knowing they were fictitious. Mr. [Name15] is only attributed with having sent the invoices, not that he forged them, or that he acted with intent (dolo), such that the conduct is atypical, and the mere act of sending a fictitious invoice does not constitute the crime in question. Regarding the first extension of the extradition, the attributed conduct does not consist of personally forging the documents, nor of sending them to third parties, but rather of having "Recorded in his accounting at least 63.1 million FB as some fictitious invoices," a fact that cannot give rise to any crime. Finally, the appellants remark that the problem seems to be limited not to the material alteration of the invoices but to the fact that these contained false data not corresponding to reality, given that in any case, with respect to this type of material falsehood, called ideological by doctrine, it is only applicable with respect to public or equivalent documents, never to simple private documents like invoices. In the last ground, and because it is related to this point 5, it is transcribed in this section, it is noted that the principle of dual criminality is not met. The appellants indicate that if Articles 193 and 196 of the Belgian Criminal Code are observed, it is necessary to conclude that they are not crimes similar to those contained in Costa Rican legislation. Thus, Belgian legislation requires "the fraudulent intent or the intent to cause harm", while in Costa Rica—as regulated in Articles 359 and 361 of the Criminal Code—harm is required, such that they are different criminal offenses. In Belgium, they are crimes of mere conduct, while in Costa Rica they are result crimes and as such require patrimonial injury. 6- Impossibility of determining the time of commission of the punishable act. In all the extradition requests, it is not possible to know with certainty when the supposedly criminal conduct would have occurred. Thus, we have that regarding the first request, it is not known whether they are acts that began on 4/30/94 and ended on 2/20/98, or whether they are acts carried out continuously. In short, from this laconic statement of facts, it cannot be clearly known whether it was the labor violations that were being committed, this continuously, or whether Mr. [Name15] kept sending or forging invoices, a doubt that cannot be resolved as long as the Kingdom of Belgium did not even present a copy of the respective accusation. The same happens with the second extradition request, which limits itself to indicating a vague period that would run from 6/11/95 to 4/2/99, without indicating the precise moment of the commission of the crimes. 7- Statute of limitations (Prescription). The determination of the moment of commission of the punishable act is an essential aspect for determining everything related to the statute of limitations of the criminal action. If 4/30/94 is taken as a starting point, the crime of use of a false document would have expired on April 30, 2000, according to Costa Rican legislation. In effect, the arrest warrant for default (rebeldía), which is the only document existing in the file that can be taken as the starting point of the investigation in Belgium, is dated October 2, 2000. It is argued that if the extradition request is not clear regarding the moment of commission of the punishable act, that circumstance cannot be used against the person sought. Nor can it be assumed that the crime would have ceased to be committed on the last date indicated in the request, that is, 2/20/98, but rather the most favorable date, which is 4/30/94. The same happens with the second extradition request, which limits itself to indicating a vague period that would run from 6/11/95 to 4/2/98, without indicating the concrete moment of the commission of the crimes. The appellants opine that according to Belgian legislation, the crimes are time-barred, as they are punishable by sentences of one year of imprisonment. If the facts of the first case date from the year '86, they are currently time-barred, and likewise, if in the second case the facts run from 6/5/94 to 9/11/95, they are also time-barred. Article 5 of the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium must be considered, which establishes that "Extradition shall not take place when, according to the legislation of the country in which the accused is located, the penalty or the criminal action has expired." It is further stated that regarding the crime of forgery, in reality the crime charged is forgery of a private document, given that the classification is not provided by the requesting State but by the facts charged. In Costa Rica, the forgery of invoices is not a crime of forgery of a public document, nor is it forgery of an equivalent document, but rather a forgery of a private document, which in our Costa Rican legal system is punishable by two years of imprisonment (reclusión).

</span></p><h4 style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; page-break-after:avoid; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">IV- Having examined the arguments presented by the defense, this Court proceeds to resolve them as follows: </span></h4><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">1.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> Regarding the point of the need for an official translation of the documents presented by the requesting State to justify the extradition, this Court has indicated</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> the following in Voto 662</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> of 9:30 a.m. on August 29, 2002: “ </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">II. In the second ground of the appeal, the appellant claims a lack of authenticity of the documentation presented by the United States of America and a lack of official translation, in non-compliance with Article 369(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal). He points out that the documents are not authentic nor were they officially translated into Spanish. He indicates that the requesting State was warned, but it did not comply. He states that the law specifies what constitutes an official translation. He says that if the translation was done abroad, it should have been authenticated. He argues that the Extradition Treaty does not exempt the authentication of the translation. </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">The ground is declared without merit</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">. Article 9(6) of the Extradition Treaty with the United States of America states: “All documents submitted by the Requesting State shall be translated, either in the Requesting State or in the Requested State, into the language of the Requested State”. This implies that it is not required that the translation of the documents be done in accordance with the Law on Official Translations and Interpretations (Ley de Traducciones e Interpretaciones Oficiales), which in any case states in its Article 3) that the official translation of the document must be done “when so required”. At folios 604-608, it is recorded that the translation of the documents found in the file was performed by [Name18], a member of the Association of Interpreters and Translators of the United States of America, with the respective documentation having been presented before the Consulate of Costa Rica for authentication, and likewise subsequently before the Authentication Officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (folio 604), so no defect is perceived. It is important that the appellant alleges a lack of reasoning in the extradition ruling regarding the authentication of the documentation. However, such a defect does not exist, as the ruling provides the reasons for why it is not considered that any defect existed. It states: “The defense of the extradited person has objected to the translation of the documents. Law No. 8142 is invoked, which indicates that any document, drafted in a language other than Spanish, with a view to producing legal effects in our country, must be officially translated. That same law defines as an official translation only that performed by a translator authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship. In light of such objections, the Requesting State was warned to provide such official status. Certification was provided that the translations of all the documents on which the Extradition request is based were performed by a translator from the Association of Legal Interpreters and Translators of the United States – folios 599 to 610 -. Such documents are sufficient to accredit the suitability of the translations. Despite the official definition established by our legislation, we cannot, in cases of Extradition with the United States, demand that the Requesting State provide translations performed by national translators authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship. The Treaty – having a rank superior to the law – empowers that the translations be performed in either of the two countries – Article 9(6)”. In accordance with the foregoing, no defect is perceived in the reasoning of the Court, which provides the reasons in this regard, which are consistent with the legal provisions. Therefore, this ground is declared without merit”. </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">In a similar vein, with drafting by Dr. [Name19],</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> this same Court ruled in Voto 2002-0909 of 4:20 p.m. on November 8, 2002, when it was indicated in the relevant points:</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">“The procedural nature of extradition, the agility it requires, only necessitates a procedure that authenticates the plausibility and credibility of the documentation, without the need for a certification as referenced by the appellant, because the effects of such documentation are very limited in our jurisdiction; evidence is not even received nor is its full legitimacy assumed.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> It is sufficient that there are legitimate elements of judgment</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> that justify, in principle, the intervention of the requesting State and the limitation on the liberty of the extradited person, but the Costa Rican State does not fully assume the content and scope of the evidence or documents supporting the extradition request, whose content and claim will have full effect in the jurisdiction of the requesting State and not in the Costa Rican jurisdiction... The objections regarding the translation of the documents are not convincing, because paragraph</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> six of Article Nine of the Treaty does not require an official translation : the commented rule contains a very flexible norm, since it allows the translation to be done in the requested State and in the requesting State”. </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">In the specific case, the disagreement is aimed at questioning the absence of an official translation, and it must be added that – as the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) indicates – the requesting State did present the translation into the Spanish language of all the documentation. This is observed at folios 1062 to 1387 of Volume II of the present proceeding. It must be added that in any case, by application of the principle of agility in this type of proceedings, as already specified with citation of jurisprudence from this Chamber, what is required is precisely plausibility and credibility in the documentation, and the appellants do not demonstrate that this is not the case. It must be added that the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium does not strictly require an official translation, but rather, according to the second paragraph of Article 6 – regarding the documents – indicates: </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">“They shall be produced in original</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> or in authentic copy and shall be accompanied, whenever possible, by a translation in the language of the requested country, and by the personal description of the individual claimed”. </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">Note that it is not required that this translation be official, as alleged. Consequently, and in accordance with the foregoing,</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> it is appropriate to deny the claim. </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">2. </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">As to the second argument, according to which </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">“The extradition request</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\"> and its supplemental filings do not contain the evidentiary documents referred to in Article 9(c) of the Extradition Law (Ley de Extradición)”,</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\"> the ground is rejected. </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">It must not be lost sight of that extradition does not strictly imply an analysis of conviction, given that, as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) itself has already recognized in Voto 886-95, the analysis carried out in an extradition proceeding does not prejudge the guilt of the person sought for extradition (extraditable), this in the sense that – as that ruling indicates – </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\"> It is not for the national Courts to determine whether the appellant committed the crimes of which he is accused or his degree of participation, since that is the competence of the courts of the requesting State” </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">. (Constitutional Chamber, File No. N-0422-V-95, Voto 0886-95 of 4:39 p.m. on February 15, 1995)</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; text-decoration:underline\"> What</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium requires in this case is precisely the fulfillment of certain formal requirements, which, pursuant to Article 6, insofar as it is possible to demonstrate the crimes for which extradition is requested, the existing evidence, and the applicable substantive norms. Consequently, the claim is rejected. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold\">3. </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">Regarding the third claim, in which it is argued that suitable documents cannot be cured (insubsanabilidad), because the requesting State has presented insufficient, damaged, and already existing documentation in the file, this must – likewise – be rejected. One of the aspects that has occupied the present extradition process throughout its proceeding has been precisely the authenticity and reliability of the documentation presented by the requesting State. However, consider that, according to the ruling of this Court in Voto 2001-939 of 11:30 a.m. on November 16, 2001, (visible</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> at folio 933 to 943 of Volume I of these proceedings), when ruling on the</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> formality</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> of the documents, the following was indicated: “</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">ARGUMENTS OF THE DEFENSE ATTORNEYS.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> The attorneys for the sought person opposed the filed appeal. They indicate that it is not true that everything not derived from the text of the treaty constitutes a violation by the contracting parties. They point out that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) and the Court of Cassation (Tribunal de Casación) have required authentication. They say that the responsibility for the lack of authentication lies with the government of Belgium and the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República), the latter for not issuing warnings to the former. They argue that the argument that the crime of fraudulent bankruptcy is not included in the treaty is irrelevant, since it is not punishable in Belgium by a penalty exceeding two years, thus the minimum penalty requirement is not met. They indicate that the argument of the Office of the Attorney General that the final resolution should be reserved until the defect was cured is not admissible, because it goes against the principles of self-responsibility, preclusion, and procedural loyalty. As to the fact that the last extradition request was not resolved, they say that any omission must be of such magnitude that it generates a conclusion different from the one reached in the judgment. However, – they argue – this lacks relevance due to the lack of authentication. In a subsidiary manner, they indicate that if the judgment is annulled</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> totally or partially, their client should be released. </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">In a subsequently filed brief, the</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> defense attorneys again</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> presented</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> arguments,</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> making reference</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> to the fact that the authenticated documents were not presented. “II. ARGUMENTS OF THE DEFENSE ATTORNEYS.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> The attorneys for the sought person opposed the filed appeal. They indicate that it is not true that everything not derived from the text of the treaty constitutes a violation by the contracting parties. They point out that the Constitutional Chamber and the Court of Cassation have required authentication. They say that the responsibility for the lack of authentication lies with the government of Belgium and the Office of the Attorney General, the latter for not issuing warnings to the former. They argue that the argument that the crime of fraudulent bankruptcy is not included in the treaty is irrelevant, since it is not punishable in Belgium by a penalty exceeding two years, thus the minimum penalty requirement is not met. They indicate that the argument of the Office of the Attorney General that the final resolution should be reserved until the defect was cured is not admissible, because it goes against the principles of self-responsibility, preclusion, and procedural loyalty. As to the fact that the last extradition request was not resolved, they say that any omission must be of such magnitude that it generates a conclusion different from the one reached in the judgment. However, – they argue – this lacks relevance due to the lack of authentication. In a subsidiary manner, they indicate that if the judgment is annulled totally or partially, their client should be released. In a subsequently filed brief, the defense attorneys again presented arguments, making reference to the fact that the authenticated documents were not presented. III. IT IS RESOLVED: The first aspect to analyze with respect to the appealed resolution is the one concerning the lack of authentication of the documentation by the consul of Costa Rica in Belgium, in accordance with the chain of authentications required by the Law on Consular Service (Ley de Servicio Consular). The appealed resolution states: “Regarding the authenticity that the documents supporting the extradition request must maintain, Article 6 of the Convention between Belgium and Costa Rica provides that the documents on which the extradition is based shall be produced in original or in authentic copies and shall be accompanied, whenever possible, by a translation into the language of the requested country, and by the personal description of the individual claimed. For its part, subsection 2 of Article 9 of the Extradition Law in force provides that among the documents that the requesting government must present are ‘authentic copies of the proceedings of the case, which provide proof or at least reasonable indicia of the guilt in question’. For its part, the Organic Law of the Consular Service (Ley Orgánica del Servicio Consular) No. 46 of July 7, 1925, and its amendments, grants the consuls of the Republic the character of notaries and has the authority to attest, in accordance with the laws, to acts and contracts. They shall also legalize documents and signatures of the authorities of the country in which they operate, when such certificates and documents are to have effect in Costa Rica, even if involving foreigners, see Articles 66, 67-69, and 81 of the cited law. But in addition, the signature of this official must be authenticated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as provided in Article 294 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Reviewing the documents presented by the requesting authority, we find that they were not legalized by the consul of Costa Rica in Belgium, nor was the signature of this official authenticated by the Ministry of Public Relations, as was correct, because they were intended to have legal effects in Costa Rica. In these documents, only the authentication of the consul of Belgium in Costa Rica appears, meaning that the documents that have served to support the requested extradition were not legitimized by our authorities, ergo, they are not suitable to support the requested extradition. It is striking that the court which initially intervened did not issue the warning (prevención) to the requesting authority to comply with this requirement, a warning that at this stage is inappropriate, because the extradition request must already be resolved, given that the person sought for extradition (extraditable) [Name20] has been in pretrial detention for many months. Therefore, the extradition request filed against the person sought for extradition (extraditable) [Name1] lacks authenticity, it is rejected, and it is ordered that he be released once this resolution becomes final.”</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> This Court, after studying the rulings (votos) of the Constitutional Chamber cited by both the Office of the Attorney General and the defense of the sought person, together with the study of constitutional jurisprudence according to the computer systems of the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial), finds that regarding the authentication of signatures in accordance with the Law on Consular Service, the Constitutional Chamber expressly referred to this in Voto 903-92 of April 3, 1992: “VII.- The allegation of lack of authentication of the documents provided by the requesting party deserves separate consideration. The Full Court (Corte Plena) resolutions of September 27, 1982, Article VII, and of December 24, 1984, Article III) indicate that the lack of authentication of signatures is cured by the referral of the extradition proceedings by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia). However, the Chamber considers that what was indicated on that occasion by the Full Court and the administrative and jurisdictional practice that was subsequently consolidated in light of what was resolved, encroaches upon the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 80, and 81 of the Organic Law of the Consular Service, which requires that documents coming from abroad must be authenticated by the Consul of Costa Rica in that country and his signature authenticated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see Article 291 of the General Law of Public Administration). In the extradition process being processed against [Name21] [Name22], the authentication of the signature of the Costa Rican consul by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is missing from the documents provided by the Government of the United States of America, an omission of a legal formality which, in the Chamber’s opinion, prevents considering the documentation as complete. For the Chamber, the omission by the Costa Rican State – to some extent motivated by the resolutions commented upon – prevents considering the documentation presented as complete. However, this omission is not of such a nature that it annuls what has been acted upon by the Court; on the contrary, the Chamber considers that it is a curable defect and not attributable to the requesting country, so the Court of Santa Cruz should request, as soon as possible, the authentication, in order to continue with the procedures normally. The foregoing implies that, for the Chamber, there has been no violation of the fundamental rights of the appellant and, therefore, the appeal must be declared without merit in all its aspects”. On the other hand, the Constitutional Chamber, in various rulings, has indicated that the lack of authentication of documents in an extradition is a curable defect. Thus, in Voto 4317-93 of September 3, 1993, it stated: “This Court has already pointed out in other rulings – incidentally referring to the same matter – that the lack of authentication of the documentation neither produces any nullity nor prevents the initiation of the extradition procedure, as it is a curable defect”. In this same sense: Constitutional Chamber, Voto 3637-93 of July 28, 1993, and Voto 3678-93 of July 30, 1993. In accordance with what is indicated in said rulings, it must be concluded that the Law on Consular Service (Art. 67) is applicable, and no conflict exists between it and the Extradition Treaty with Belgium, since the latter in its Art. 6 requires that the “original document” or an “authentic copy” must be presented, but it does not state that the procedure for the recognition of documents pursuant to the Law on Consular Service should not be followed, as that Law was in any case enacted in accordance with international consular practices. It should be noted that the Constitutional Chamber, expressly in Voto 903-92, demanded that the legal procedure be followed, including authentication by the consul of Costa Rica in the country of the requesting State. The situation would be different if the Treaty included a norm like that of Art. 7 of the Model Extradition Treaty, mentioned by the appellant, which expressly provides that certification or authentication of extradition requests will not be required. However, the lack of authentication of the documentation, as the Constitutional Chamber has stated in various rulings, mentioned above, including Voto 903-92 itself, is not a cause to reject the extradition request, but rather the respective warning (prevención) must be made to the requesting State to cure the defect, which was not done in this case. The foregoing pursuant to Art. 9(d) of the extradition law, of supplementary application. Regarding the warning, see, in addition to the cited rulings, Voto 2490-96 of May 28, 1996, ordered by the Constitutional Chamber. With respect to the warning to present the missing documentation and the annulment of the extradition ruling to cure the defect, Voto 516-F-96 of September 5, 1996, ordered by the Criminal Court of Cassation (Tribunal de Casación Penal), is important. It has even been stated by this Court, in a case governed by the extradition law and not by the Treaty between Belgium and Costa Rica, that the failure to present the authentic documents within the required period does not in itself imply that the extradition must be declared without merit if they are provided subsequently, although it has implications regarding the procedure (Voto 643-2001 of August 27, 2001). It must be highlighted that the same judgment recognizes that the lack of authentication of the documents is a curable defect, but contradictorily indicates that because the person sought for extradition has been detained for a long time, it is not appropriate to issue the warning to the requesting State, as would be appropriate. In this sense, it states: “It is striking that the Court which initially intervened did not issue the warning to the requesting authority to comply with that requirement, a warning that at this stage is inappropriate because the extradition request must already be resolved, given that the person sought for extradition (extraditable) [Name15] [Name16] has been in pretrial detention for many months” (folio 844). Contrary to what is extracted from that reasoning, the long duration of provisional detention, according to rules of derivation, may be related to whether or not the release of the person sought for extradition should be ordered during the process thereof, but it has no connection to the substantive resolution of the extradition, such that it ultimately gives rise to the denial of the request for it; therefore, the defense attorneys are not correct in their arguments when invoking the principles of self-responsibility, preclusion, and procedural loyalty. Rather, it is in accordance with the principle of loyalty between the contracting parties to the international Treaty that warnings must be given to the requesting State to correct a defect in the documentation, especially given that this requirement derives from the internal legislation of Costa Rica.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> Thus, if what was appropriate was to grant a hearing to cure the defect in the documentation, it should have been proceeded with in that manner, which was not done by the Trial Court (Tribunal de Juicio). Therefore, the appropriate action is to declare the appeal granted, annul the appealed resolution, and order the referral back, so that the corresponding warning may be issued. Due to being unnecessary, the other allegations of the appeal are not addressed”.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> The foregoing implies recognizing</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> – independent of the discussion raised by the Office of the Attorney General – about the usefulness of requiring formalities in the documentation, the reality is that our legislation and even the binding precedents </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\">erga omnes</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; letter-spacing:-0.15pt\"> of the Constitutional Chamber, compel compliance with certain requirements.</span></p> In the specific case, it is observed that at folios 1062 to 1387 of volume II, a series of duly legalized and authenticated attestations were presented by the Embassy of Belgium, which record the following aspects: **Regarding the first extradition request:** 1- The identification of the extraditable person and their personal data. 2- The formal extradition request, the statement of the arrest warrant issued in absentia on 6/10/2002 by the Investigating Judge [Name23] in Antwerp, reference 235/96 AN61 98. 2422- 96. 3- The indication of the facts for which extradition is requested, according to which the interested party is guilty of being a co-perpetrator of offenses against social legislation and forgery of documents in Antwerp, from 30/4/ until 20/2) 1998. 4- The indication of the penalty for the crimes and the applicable rules, and the possible statute of limitations date for the crimes. 5- At folio 1079 to 1080, the arrest warrant in absentia of 6/10/2000, file 325-96, issued by Judge [Name23], Investigating Judge of the Court of First Instance of Antwerp, appears duly authenticated, along with the facts subject to the proceeding. 6- A certified copy of the legislation applicable to these offenses (folio 1196 and following). **Regarding the second extradition request:** 1- The extradition request is supplemented based on an arrest warrant in absentia on 21/3/2001 by Investigating Judge [Name24], reference 29/01/ AN 75. 98. 499- 99, in which it is stated that the extradited person is guilty of forgery of documents and use, and simple and fraudulent bankruptcy in Antwerp, Belgium, from 6/11/95 until 4/12/1999. 2- The articles that penalize the conduct are indicated, specifically rules 1 to 11, 193, 196, 197, 213, 214, and 489 ter and 489 bis of the Belgian Criminal Code, with the indication that the penalties exceed the minimum duration provided for in the Convention between Costa Rica and Belgium of 25/4/1902, and the indication of the statute of limitations dates for the charges. 3- At folio 1234, the arrest warrant appears for the crimes of forgery of documents and use, fraudulent and simple bankruptcy (articles 489 ter and 489 bis of the Belgian Criminal Code). 4- Likewise, at the indicated folio, a transcription is made of the facts for which – among others – extradition is requested, as well as the arrest warrant in absentia (folio 1239 and 1240). **Regarding the third additional extradition request.** The following is considered duly certified and legalized: 1- The basis for this additional request *"Based on a judgment handed down by the Court of Appeal of Antwerp on 4/10/2000…".* 2- The facts for which extradition is requested are for the crimes *of forgery of documents and use of a false document knowing they were false – as co-perpetrator of the NV Europa United States of América (EURUSA) declared bankrupt upon declaration – has caused the books or documents and the annual accounts of the companies to disappear, partially or entirely has embezzled or concealed assets – breach of trust – offenses under the Income Tax Code and the VAT Code".* 3- The penalties and the possible statute of limitations date are indicated at that same folio. 4- A copy of the judgment in contumacy is attached. 5- A certified copy of the applicable legislation. (Folios 1336 and following). Therefore, it is not true that the documents provided – as alleged by the appellants – are deficient or insufficient, but rather, on the contrary, they allow one to deduce the crimes attributed, the penalties, the procedural status of the cases, all of which justifies rejecting the ground for appeal. In any case, as rightly argued by the Solicitor General when responding to the respective hearing for the purposes of the summons (Art. 446 of the C.P.P.), what the Extradition Convention with Belgium requires and demands – this regarding documentation – is clearly indicated in its Article 6: *“Extradition shall only be granted upon the production either of a conviction, or of an order of procedure formally indicting the accused or obligating him as of full right to appear before the criminal jurisdiction, or, finally, of a committal order or any other document having the same force. These documents shall indicate the precise nature of the incriminating acts and the criminal provision applicable thereto. They shall be produced in original or in authentic copy and shall be accompanied, whenever possible, by a translation in the language of the requested country and by the personal description of the individual claimed.”* In accordance with the foregoing, in this case, the legal requirements are met regarding this specific point being alleged, and for this reason, the claim is rejected.

**4-** Regarding the allegation of the absence of the minimum penalty requirement, since it is alleged that all the crimes to which the extradition requests refer are punishable by a penalty of less than two years, thus failing to satisfy the minimum penalty requirement referred to in Article 2 in fine of the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium. **This Court considers that the appellants are not correct and therefore rejects the claim.** It is true that the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium, signed in Brussels on April 25, 1902, and duly ratified, states in Article 2, last paragraph, that: *“In any case, the acts by reason of which extradition is requested must carry, according to the law of the requesting country, a penalty of not less than two years' imprisonment, and extradition may only be carried out when the similar act is punishable according to the legislation of the requested country.”* It is a principle of extradition law that States are not interested in prosecuting petty crimes, and therefore some rules are established in this regard. Even the Extradition Law itself incorporates this principle called **principle of non-surrender for minor offenses** *(mínima non curat praetor)* by indicating in Art. 3, subsection e) of the Extradition Law that extradition shall not proceed: *"When the penalty assigned to the acts charged, according to their provisional or definitive classification by the competent judge or court of the State requesting extradition, is less than one year of deprivation of liberty and the preventive imprisonment or detention of the accused has been authorized or ordered, if there is not yet a final judgment. This must be a custodial sentence."* The indicated provision of the Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium, which also safeguards that principle, must be understood as relating to the penalties provided for in the criminal types considered in the abstract and not in relation to the penalties imposed in each specific case. That is, what governs is the penalty for the crimes; or in other terms, for those crimes whose minimum penalty is less than two years, it is not appropriate to grant extradition. As argued by the representative of the Office of the Solicitor General of the Republic, the element of the minimum penalty refers to the law of the requesting country, and the penalty provided for in the respective criminal types, so that the penalty to be considered for determining whether or not extradition is appropriate must be that contained in the statute and which may be equal to or greater than two years. In the specific case, according to the various extradition requests made by the Kingdom of Belgium, the trial court, in the appealed resolution, rules on the facts which, in its view, justify granting extradition, namely: *“On February 14, 2001, the Investigating Judge of the Court of First Instance based in Antwerp issued an arrest warrant in absentia, issued in file No. 235-96 against the extraditable person [Name17] for the following facts: From 30-4-94 and 20-2-98, [Name17] worked as Manager or Administrator delegate of various industrial piping and refrigeration technology companies established in Antwerp, including BVBA Intermitaje, NV Montrex, NV EURO Engeniering, NV Poliytech. In this manner, during the same period, he sent fictitious invoices totaling 44 million Belgian francs to BVBA Genex, Madgaenastraat 28 in Antwerp, and consequently could not pay his employees officially. For this reason, he is considered a suspect of being the perpetrator of offenses against social legislation, forgery of documents, acts classified as crimes and/or misdemeanors under articles 193, 196 of the Criminal Code and under articles 22 to 32 of the Royal Decree of 20-7-1967, regarding the employment of employees of foreign nationality, articles 44 of the law of 24-7-1987 regarding temporary work, interim work, and the provision of user employees, articles 31 to 39 of the law of 27-6-1969 amending the decision of 28-12-1944 regarding the social security of workers, articles 11 to 15 of the Royal Decree of 23-10-1978 regarding the maintenance of social documents; article 11 to 15 of the decree of 6-3-1991 regarding the regulation for the recognition of employment agencies in the Flemish Region and punished by a principal correctional prison sentence of one year and by a more severe penalty.”* (cf. Folios 1444 and 1445 of the ruling). Likewise, the trial judge, in the appealed resolution, with respect to the second set of facts for which extradition is granted, refers: *“3- On March 23 of this year, the Government of Belgium supplemented the extradition request based on an arrest warrant in absentia issued on March 21, 2001, against the extraditable person [Name25], by the Investigating Judge of the First Instance Court based in Antwerp, in file No. 29-01 for the following facts: 'From the incorporation on 6-11-95, [Name26] was the real manager of BVBA Gneral Engennering based in Brecht. This company was declared bankrupt by the Commercial Court of Antwerp on 4-2-1999. This company left a debt, among others, to the Ministry of Finance for non-payment of taxes amounting to 207 million FB. It turns out from the investigation that the suspect recorded in his accounting at least 63.1 million FB as fictitious invoices. For this reason, the extraditable person is accused of forgery of documents and use, an offense under article 489 ter 8 previously fraudulent bankruptcy, an offense under article 489 bis 8 previously simple bankruptcy. Acts classified as crimes and/or misdemeanors under articles 193, 196, 197, 213, 214, 489 ter and 489 bis of the Criminal Code and punishable by a principal correctional prison sentence of one year or by a more serious penalty.'”* (cf. proven facts of the ruling under appeal). Likewise, in the judgment, the Court points out that the crimes for which extradition is requested are those of FORGERY OF DOCUMENTS, OFFENSES AGAINST SOCIAL LAWS, USE OF A FALSE DOCUMENT, FRAUDULENT BANKRUPTCY, AND SIMPLE BANKRUPTCY, it being the case that the appealed judgment grants it for the crimes of FORGERY OF DOCUMENTS (file 235-96 reference 235-96- AN61. 982422-96) and for the acts constituting FORGERY OF DOCUMENTS AND USE OF A FALSE DOCUMENT being pursued in the Court of First Instance of Belgium, file no. 29-01 reference 29-01 AN 75. 98. 4999- 99. These crimes carry penalties whose maximum exceeds two years of imprisonment, thus that requirement is met, and for this reason, the claim is denied.

**5-** Regarding the fifth argument, in which it is stated that the acts for which the extradition of [Name15] [Name16] is requested are atypical, **the claim is likewise rejected.** One must not lose sight of the essence, purposes, and nature of the extradition procedure. Regarding the legal nature of the extradition procedure, recognized doctrine has stated that *“… it does not constitute a trial in the proper sense, which prejudges the innocence or guilt of the requested person, as it only tends to reconcile the demands of the administration of criminal justice in civilized countries with the rights of the asylum seeker.”* (cf. [Name27]. Código de Procedimientos en Materia Penal para la Justicia Federal y los Tribunales Ordinarios de la Capital Federal y Territorios Nacionales. Editorial Abeledo Perrot. Buenos Aires. 1972, p. 593, cited by [Name28] and others. La Extradición en Costa Rica. Editorial Nueva Década. San José Costa Rica, 1989. 14). Likewise, along the same line of thought, this Court of Criminal Cassation has indicated: *“… in this regard, it must be reiterated that we are not trying a guilt proceeding, in which it is appropriate to assess the evidence and its legitimacy according to our legislation, but rather we are before a very summary proceeding, aimed at establishing whether or not the surrender of Mr. [Name29] to the Government of the United States is appropriate, for some acts for which it is affirmed that he was convicted, according to due process under the legislation of the requesting State, or for which he is being prosecuted. So, the evidence referred to is only relevant to establish the existence of evidentiary elements that serve as a basis for the accusation or a prosecution that serve as 'reasonable indication of guilt,' according to the requirement contained in point two of subsection c) of the article of the Extradition Law….”* (cf. vote 238. F of 11:30 a.m. on July 14, 1994, excerpt appearing in: Jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Casación Penal. Escuela Judicial. November 1995, p. 113). Other more recent votes of this Court have maintained that line regarding the inappropriateness of assessing the evidence or establishing a finding of guilt. Thus, in vote 2002-00666 of 10:00 a.m. on August 29, 2002, it was stated: *“This Court of Cassation has repeatedly stated that in the review procedure (sic), the assessment of evidence is not carried out for the purpose of determining the existence of a crime, since it is not a matter of determining whether the person whose extradition is requested has committed a typical, unlawful, culpable, and punishable act, which will have to be determined at the trial for which the person is required, in the event that there is no conviction, or has already been established by the requesting country, in the event that one already exists (see vote of the Court of Criminal Cassation 1999—583, 200- 407, 2000 – 073, among others)."* In the specific case of the extradition request being pursued against [Name30] [Name17], the appellants resort to the argument of considering the atypicality of the conduct, and errors in classification by the Belgian State, the lack of precision in the facts for which this measure is requested, the failure to expressly prove the intent to cause harm, as well as knowledge of the falsehood, as well as the thesis that these crimes are falsehoods that doctrine calls “ideological" (which are not configured in cases of private documents, as the appellants say the invoices are), are all substantive aspects proper to be examined in due course by the requesting State and at the time it subjects the extradited person to trial.

But these are not properly aspects that must be assessed in this forum, as the case law of this Court of Criminal Cassation has already indicated, “If we were to assume what the defense counsel states, that the evidence must be examined to determine the existence of the objective type, there would be no reason not to also do so with respect to unlawfulness (antijuricidad) (examining the existence or non-existence of grounds for justification), and culpability (culpabilidad) (assessing the existence or non-existence of grounds for exculpation), applying domestic criminal law for that purpose and without holding a trial, when precisely what is sought through extradition is to enable the application of the law of the State requesting the extradited person for their prosecution (trial), or for them to serve the sentence already imposed under that country's criminal law. The contrary, that is, the assessment of evidence to determine the objective type, would turn the extradition proceeding into a procedure of ‘review’ of proceedings or sentences handed down in other countries, in accordance with our own criteria for assessing evidence, and without there being a trial, which is clearly unreasonable.” (Court of Criminal Cassation, Voto 2002-0666 of 10:00 a.m. on August 29, 2002). Based on the foregoing considerations and citations of the invoked precedents, the analysis of the substantive aspects referred to by the appellants is not appropriate; rather, that is a matter for the proceeding to which the extraditable person is subjected in the country requesting the measure, and the claim is therefore denied.

**6.** In grievance 6 of the appeal brief, the defense counsels allege “the impossibility of determining the time of commission of the punishable act,” a thesis this Court does not admit and, therefore, rejects the claim. As stated in reason II, through the transcription of the facts subject to the proceeding, it is known that the facts are clearly set forth in terms of manner, time, and place. Note that the documentation provided defines the time of commission of the offenses; thus, the first request indicates that the extradited person is guilty of being the perpetrator of the infractions regarding social legislation and forgery of documents in Antwerp, Belgium, from 30/4/1994 until 20/2/1998; and the same applies to the charges in the second request, wherein it is indicated that the extraditable person is investigated for forgery of documents, use of forged documents, and simple and fraudulent bankruptcy (bancarrota simple y fraudulenta) in that same Belgian locality, events occurring from 6/11/1995 until 4/2/99. The discussion of whether we are dealing with a continued offense (delito continuado), using the terminology of our Penal Code, being properly a matter of legal classification, cannot be examined in this forum.

**7.** Regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción), also the subject of the appeal by the defense counsels, it is this Court’s thesis that they are not correct. We have already established that by application of Article 5 of the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium, for the purposes of determining the statute of limitations, the regulation of the country in which the accused is located governs. On this point, the Treaty states in its article: “Extradition shall not be granted when, in accordance with the legislation of the country in which the accused is located, the sentence or the criminal action has prescribed.” In view of the facts for which extradition is requested and granted, with regard to the first request, the end of the action must be taken into account: 20/2/1998. Given that the facts of forgery of documents carry a penalty of up to six years of imprisonment (cf. Article 359 of the Costa Rican Penal Code), therefore—also considering the statute of limitations rules established in Articles 31 and following of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal)—it must be noted that this period has not elapsed. See that Article 31, subsection a-) of the Criminal Procedure Code establishes that “If criminal prosecution has not been initiated, the action shall prescribe: a) After a period equal to the maximum penalty has elapsed, for offenses punishable by imprisonment, but in no case may it exceed ten years or be less than three.” In the specific case, the offense of forgery carries a penalty in its maximum extremity of six years, so if the facts of the first extradition request occurred from 30/4/94 until 20/2/98, they would prescribe starting from this latter date, without counting the grounds for interruption and suspension, among them those established in Article 34, subsections d-) and f-) of the Costa Rican Criminal Procedure Code. This rule provides—in what is relevant for the resolution of this matter—that: “Suspension of the computation of the statute of limitations. The computation of the statute of limitations shall be suspended: Subsection d-) While the extradition proceeding is underway abroad,” and subsection f-) literally provides: “Due to the default (rebeldía) of the accused. In this case, the term of suspension may not exceed a period equal to the statute of limitations for the criminal action; once this period has elapsed, the limitation period shall continue to run.” That is, in these cases, the statute of limitations is suspended from the moment extradition is requested until it is executed (cf. Llobet Rodríguez, Javier. Proceso Penal Comentado. (Código Procesal Penal Comentado) Second Edition. Editorial Jurídica Continental. 2003. p. 113). In the case under review on appeal, the extradition request was received on February 26, 2001, by the Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José (cf. Pages 1 to 4 of Volume I), a date from which the computation of the statute of limitations has been suspended. The same applies to the facts of the second extradition request, which has 4/2/1999 as the starting date for the respective computation, it being evident that the limitation period has not elapsed as alleged. Consequently, the claim is dismissed.

**V-APPEAL (RECURSO DE APELACIÓN) FILED BY LIC. [Name9] ON BEHALF OF THE PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA. (pages 1587 to 1593)** It is argued that the Embassy of Belgium submitted the extradition request against [Name31] [Name17] on two charges: infraction regarding social legislation and forgery of documents, which was first extended by four charges: forgery of documents, use of forged documents, simple bankruptcy (bancarrota simple), and fraudulent bankruptcy (bancarrota fraudulenta), and subsequently by another two charges of forgery of documents and use of forged documents. The claim is directed at indicating, on the part of the representative of the Procuraduría General de la República, disagreement with the rejection of the charges of fraudulent bankruptcy and simple bankruptcy. There are two reasons set forth in the appeal along these lines regarding the denial of extradition for some offenses: **FIRST REASON.** **The two reasons for the appeal filed by the Procuraduría General de la República, being closely related, are set forth and resolved in a single section. The first is that the charge of fraudulent bankruptcy does comply with the principle of minimum penalty.** In this reason of the appeal filed, the argument of the judge of first instance is contested, according to which, even though the principle of identity is fulfilled in relation to the offense of fraudulent bankruptcy (quiebra fraudulenta), the other requirement of minimum penalty is not met, which according to the Judge is one month of imprisonment under the Belgian Code. The appellant disagrees with that reasoning, considering that the offense of fraudulent bankruptcy does meet the minimum penalty requirement, since the Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium establishes that the facts on which the extradition request is based must have a minimum penalty of no less than two years of imprisonment, according to the legislation of the requesting State, meaning that for extradition to proceed, it must involve an offense with a penalty of two or more years of imprisonment. Furthermore, it must be taken into account that the parameter governing the penalty is the maximum extremity, so that the seriousness of the conduct is reflected. In any case, citing the Belgian Penal Code, Article 489 ter establishes for the offense of fraudulent bankruptcy a penalty of one month to five years and a fine of 100 to five hundred thousand francs. It is requested that extradition be ordered for this charge. **II-SECOND REASON. The second reason consists of alleging that the offense of “simple bankruptcy” does find identity in Costa Rican legislation.** The Court of Santa Cruz, Guanacaste, rejected the charge of simple bankruptcy, indicating that it lacks identity, without explaining the reasoning through which this conclusion was reached, even though it is clear that—upon reviewing the charges of the first extradition request—such facts fit the offense of fraudulent bankruptcy provided for in Article 213 of the Costa Rican Penal Code. After transcribing the facts of the first extradition request, according to which **“From its incorporation on 6/11/95, [Name17] and [Name32] were the actual managers of BVBA Engenerin, based in Brecht. This company was declared bankrupt by the Commercial Court of Antwerp on 4/12/1999. This company has left a debt, among others to the Ministry of Finance for not having paid taxes for 207 million FB. The investigation reveals that the suspect recorded in his accounting at least 63.1 million FB as fictitious invoices.”** The appellant highlights that for the purposes of the principle of identity, what is important is not that there is an identity in the nomenclature of the offenses, but that the facts are the same, without it being necessary for them to constitute the same criminal figure. In support of her thesis, she cites Voto 294-F-97 of 8:00 a.m. on April 15, 1997, from the Court of Criminal Cassation. Finally, it is requested that extradition be granted for the offense of simple bankruptcy. ***The first claim is upheld, and extradition is also granted for the offense of fraudulent bankruptcy, but not for the offense of simple bankruptcy.*** The Court of first instance of Guanacaste, Santa Cruz Venue, in the contested resolution states: “…in relation to the offense called fraudulent bankruptcy regulated in Article 489 ter of the Belgian Penal Code, it finds identity with the offense of fraudulent bankruptcy regulated in our Penal Code in Article 231 of said normative body; there is no identity with the offense of simple bankruptcy regulated in Article 489 bis of the Belgian Penal Code.” (cf. page 1450). Further on, the Court indicates the following: “…we have that even though the principle of identity is fulfilled in relation to the offense of fraudulent bankruptcy, the other requirement of the minimum penalty, which for said offense in Belgium is one month of imprisonment, is not met; consequently, the request to expand the extradition with respect to the offenses of simple bankruptcy and fraudulent bankruptcy must be rejected.” (cf. page 1454). It must be stated that, indeed, according to the records and documents submitted by the Belgian State, and according to the copy of the duly translated legal texts, the offense of simple bankruptcy carries a penalty of one month to two years and a fine of one hundred to five hundred thousand francs. This is clear from the text of Article 489 bis of the Belgian Penal Code, provided to these proceedings on page 1276 of Volume II. As for the offense of fraudulent bankruptcy, numeral 489 ter of the Belgian Penal Code establishes a penalty of imprisonment from one month to five years and a fine of one hundred to five hundred thousand francs. This means that for the offense of fraudulent bankruptcy, the minimum penalty requirement demanded by the Extradition Treaty between Costa Rica and Belgium is met, and therefore the claim of the Procuraduría General de la República is accepted.

**THEREFORE (POR TANTO)** The appeal filed by the defense counsels of the extraditable person [Name1] is hereby denied, and the judgment is confirmed. The appeal of the Procuraduría General de la República is partially granted, and extradition is also granted for the offense of FRAUDULENT BANKRUPTCY (BANCARROTA FRAUDULENTA), revoking the contested resolution with respect to this offense. In all other respects, the ruling remains unchanged.

Notify.

Guillermo Sojo Picado [Name3] Judges of Criminal Cassation Mec

RES.: [Telf1] TRIBUNAL DE CASACION PENAL. Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José. Goicoechea, a las quince horas diez minutos del siete de mayo de dos mil cuatro.

PROCESO DE APELACION DE EXTRADICION, interpuesto en la presente causa seguida contra [Nombre1], mayor, casado, nacido en Bélgica, administrador de condominios. Por DILIGENCIAS DE EXTRADICIÓN que promueve la EL REINO DE BELGICA. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso los Jueces Guillermo Sojo Picado, [Nombre2] y [Nombre3]. Se apersonaron los Licenciados [Nombre4] y [Nombre5], en su carácter de defensores particulares del extraditable y [Nombre6], representante de la Procuraduría General de la República y [Nombre7].

RESULTANDO:

1. Que mediante resolución dictada a las siete horas del veintiuno de enero de dos mil cuatro, el Tribunal de Guanacaste, Sede Santa Cruz, resolvió: “POR TANTO: Se concede la extradición del extraditable [Nombre1] para que sea juzgado por el Estado de Bélgica por los hechos constitutivos de falsificación de documentos que se siguen ante el tribunal de primera instancia de Amberes, expediente 235/96 referencia 235/96AN61.982422-96 y por los hechos constitutivos falsificación de documentos y uso de documento falso que se le siguen ante el tribunal de primera instancia de Bélgica, expediente número 29/01 referencia 29/01/AN75.98.499-99; por los demás hechos que refiere la solicitud de extradición y las adicionales que se han tramitado en este proceso se deniega la extradición. Se ordena la detención del extraditable desde su captura y hasta su efectiva entrega al Estado de Bélgica. NOTIFÍQUESE. [Nombre8]. JUEZ. ”.

2. Que contra el anterior pronunciamiento, los Licenciados [Nombre4] y [Nombre5] interpusieron Recurso de Apelación. Igualmente la Lic. [Nombre9] recurre en representación de la Procuraduría General de la República.

3. Que verificada la deliberación respectiva, el Tribunal se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en el Recurso.

4. Que en los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.

REDACTA el Juez de Casación SOJO PICADO; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I- Vistos los dos recursos de apelación que promueven la defensa del extraditable así como el presentado por la Procuraduría General de la República, considerando que reúnen a satisfacción los requisitos legales preceptuados en la legislación procesal penal, se admiten los mismos para su trámite. Igualmente considerando que en la especie se ha solicitado y llevado a cabo la audiencia oral, diligencia en que no se ampliaron los fundamentos del recurso, se proceden a resolver las apelaciones presentadas como sigue.

II-RECURSO DE APELACION INTERPUESTO POR [Nombre10] y [Nombre11] EN SU CONDICIÒN DE DEFENSORES DE [Nombre12]. ( folios 1510 a 1549 frente) Se pide que se deje sin efecto la extradición incoada contra su representado y se revoque la orden de captura girada en su contra. Varios son los aspectos que a juicio de los apelantes justifican la pretensión de cita: 1-La solicitud de extradición y sus ampliaciones no cuentan con la traducción oficial. Luego de transcribir el artículo 1 de la Ley de Extradición y de convenir que el presente asunto debe ser tramitado con fundamento en el Tratado de Extradición vigente entre Costa Rica y Bélgica, se insiste en que las tres solicitudes de extradición que se han presentado, tienen como común denominador que no hay traducción oficial de los atestados que se presentaron para fundamentar las gestiones. Se indica que en el caso concreto la Embajada de Bélgica se erigió en perito traductor de su propia prueba, de modo que no hay un solo documento que haya sido traducido por un traductor oficial nombrado por un Juez, o bien por el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Costa Rica, para de ese modo legalizarlos, y que se reputen como públicos. Es un principio general de justicia que no se pueden permitir o tomar como elementos de prueba, actos o actuaciones que hayan sido elaborados por algunas de las partes en conflicto, especialmente cuando la traducción es una prueba, y en todo caso, se pueden interponer recusaciones y las objeciones que se estimen pertinentes. Se insiste en que la traducción es una actividad reglada por la Ley y solo puede ser hecha por traductores oficiales. Se sigue diciendo que la Embajada de Bélgica no puede obligarnos a través del Tribunal a que nos atengamos a la traducción como ciencia exacta, ni a tener por sentada su lealtad procesal, ni se puede obligar a la defensa ni a la Procuraduría a realizarla. Combaten los recurrentes el hecho probado F- consignado en el fallo de mérito, en el cual se afirma que: “ A solicitud del Lic. [Nombre13], el traductor oficial del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto de la República de Costa Rica, nombrado por acuerdo número 005 DJ del 10 de setiembre de 1998, publicado en la Gaceta n- 198 del 13 de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y ocho tradujo selectivamente del idioma neerlandés al idioma español, el expediente original que dio base a la ampliación de la extradición dictada contra el extraditable”, toda vez que esto hace referencia a la segunda y última ampliación de extradición que en todo caso fue rechazada por el Juez por estar prescrita. Finalmente se indica que la última ampliación de la extradición es absolutamente ininteligible, lo que demuestra la inexistencia de una traducción oficial. 2- La solicitud de extradición y sus ampliaciones no cuentan con los documentos de convicción a que se hace referencia en el artículo 9 inciso c- de la Ley de Extradición. Se desarrolla el motivo del recurso indicando que este artículo es de particular relevancia en cuanto obliga – entre otros aspectos – al Estado requirente a presentar copia auténtica de las actuaciones del proceso que suministren pruebas o al menos indicios razonables de culpabilidad de la persona de que se trate. Si bien no se trata de llevar a cabo un proceso para determinar la culpabilidad del sujeto, se exige que – amén de revisar los presupuestos formales – se acompañen las probanzas necesarias para examinar el mérito de la acusación, el grado de probabilidad la posible participación, de modo que no basta la orden de detención o la sentencia. En el caso concreto, el Reino de Bélgica se limitó a presentar como documentación, las órdenes de detención, con un resumen de los hechos acusados, esto en las dos primeras solicitudes. En cuanto a la tercera solicitud presentó también la orden de detención y el resumen de los hechos de la sentencia dictada en ausencia. Se adolece en consecuencia de los defectos apuntados. Concluye diciendo el recurrente que el juez costarricense en materia de extradición no es un simple observador de presupuestos formales, sino que debe emitir, al momento de conceder o rechazar la extradición, un juicio de probabilidad relativo a la comisión del hecho y a la participación del acusado. 3- Insubsanabilidad de la ausencia de documentos idóneos. Se arguye que la Procuraduría General de la República de Costa Rica – órgano que representa al Reino de Bélgica – no usó su facultad de promoción de la prueba para complementar la ausencia de documentos idóneos, traducidos conforme a la ley, sino que se limitó a aportar –luego de una audiencia que le confirió el Tribunal conforme al artículo 9 de la Ley de Extradición – una documentación insuficiente, maltraducida y no legalizada que de todos modos ya existía en el expediente. Este defecto e incuria ya no es saneable, y solo queda por examinar la válidez y eficacia de la prueba ofrecida por el Estado peticionario. 4- Todos los delitos a que se refieren las solicitudes de extradición son sancionados en su extremo menor con una pena inferior a dos años, por lo cual no cumplen con la penalidad mínima a que hace referencia el artículo 2 in fine del Tratado de Extradición entre Costa Rica y Bélgica, que requiere que el delito no baje de 2 años de prisión. Falta de penalidad mínima. Se aduce que de conformidad con el Tratado de Extradición entre Costa Rica y Bélgica se exige que: “… los hechos en razón de los cuales se pide la extradición deben comportar, según la ley del país requirente, una pena que no baje de dos años de prisión”. Conforme con la anterior norma, quedan excluidas sin mayor análisis de la primera solicitud, todas las infracciones a la legislación laboral, por estar sancionadas, de conformidad con la propia documentación informal, presentada por el Estado requirente, con días multa. De la segunda solicitud de extradición, quedan excluidos los delitos de quiebra simple y fraudulenta, pues tiene una penalidad mínima de un mes de prisión, todo de conformidad con los artículos 489 bis y 489 ter, del Código Penal Belga. En la tercera solicitud de extradición está excluida la primera condena por ser de 12 meses de prisión. Se sigue diciendo que no existe documentación que sustente la petición de extradición, pues las traducciones no son oficiales y los documentos no son públicos, de modo que los delitos de falsificación y uso de falso documento contemplados en la primera y segunda solicitud de extradición, tampoco reúnen la penalidad mínima exigida por el Tratado de Extradición entre Costa Rica y Bélgica. Dicen los recurrentes que basta con mirar la documentación suministrada por el Estado requirente para darse cuenta que los eventuales delitos de falsificación y uso de falso documento tienen muy poca gravedad en Bélgica por lo que no se consideran crímenes sino infracciones, y que como tales, conforme a la legislación belga tienen pena correccional y no de reclusión, pues califican como infracciones y no crímenes, y con una posible penalidad inferior a dos años. Por lo tanto quedan por debajo de la penalidad mínima que exige el Tratado referido. A través de la última ampliación de extradición, en donde hechos de la misma naturaleza y tipificados como uso de documento falso y falsificación, se condena al señor [Nombre14] a tan solo 12 meses. Entre los hechos de la última ampliación, visible a folio 302, y el segundo pedido de extradición, se trata de los mismos delitos y los mismos artículos del Código Penal. En cuanto a este último cuerpo legal, resulta que los artículos 193, 196 y 197, que son los numerales relativos a los delitos de falsificación de documentos y uso de documento falso, se castigan pena de reclusión de cinco años, de modo que si esto resulta así, cuestionan los recurrentes cómo y a pesar de qué, tratándose de los mismos artículos ( delitos de falsedad y uso de documento falso) en la primera causa a que se refiere la última ampliación la pena fue de 12 meses. Se sigue indicando que la aparente contradicción entre las penas de reclusión para los delitos de falsificación y uso de documento falso que menciona el Estado requirente y la pena de 12 meses para un caso igual, pero que cuenta con sentencia y no con simple acusación, se contiene no solo en la acusación de la primera ampliación de la extradición, sino que se repite en la propia orden de detención por rebeldía emitida por el Tribunal de Primera Instancia de Amberes. En suma, se concluye el agravio exponiendo que en la sentencia recurrida existe un vicio grave de razonamiento por parte del Juez, por cuanto dos cosas no pueden ser iguales y distintas a la vez; es decir, que la pena mínima para los delitos de falsificación y uso de documento falso, sean 5 años ( extremo menor de la reclusión) como lo afirma el señor Juez en su sentencia, y el Estado requirente en las dos primeras solicitudes de extradición; o que la pena mínima sea un año, como también lo afirma el Juez y el Reino de Bélgica, en los atestados que acompañan a la segunda y tercera petición de extradición. Lo anterior hace imposible que se pueda conceder la extradición en este caso. 5- En el quinto alegato se insiste en el carácter atípico de la conducta acusada y en el incumplimiento del principio de doble incriminación. A pesar de que en la solicitud de extradición se citan los artículos referentes a la falsificación de documentos y en la primera ampliación se cita el tipo penal relativo al uso de documento falso, lo cierto es que los hechos en los que se funda la solicitud inicial y su respectiva ampliación revelan que la conducta atribuida a [Nombre15] [Nombre16] es atípica. Existe por ello un error de calificación por parte del Estado Belga. En cuanto a la solicitud inicial de extradición, contiene una descripción muy lacónica, pues únicamente se indica que en cuanto a los “… hechos del 30/4/94 [Nombre17] trabajaba como gerente administrador delegado de diversas empresas en piping industrial y técnicas de refrigeración establecidas en Amberes, entre otras la BVBA Intermontage, NV Montrex, NV Euro Engenering, NV Polytech. De esta manera ha remitido en el mismo periodo facturas ficticias de 44 millones de francos belgas a la BVBA Genes, Mdgalenastraat 28 en Amberes, y por consecuencia no podía pagar sus empleados de manera oficial”. La descripción de la conducta era muy importante, pues en cuando al delito de falsificación de documentos el sistema penal belga exige que se cumplan con los presupuestos de los artículos 193 con relación al 196 del Código Penal de ese país. Así, es necesario demostrar la intención de perjudicar, y que la falsificación se lleva a cabo a través de alguna de las formas a que hace referencia el artículo 196 citado. En los cargos base de la extradición no se indica el modo cómo el extraditable llevó a cabo la supuesta falsificación, ni se le atribuye la intención de falsificar algún documento, ni se indica que el justiciable haya remitido las facturas con conocimiento de que eran ficticias. Al señor [Nombre15] únicamente se le atribuye el haber remitido las facturas, no que las haya falsificado, o que actuara con dolo, de modo que la conducta es atípica, y el solo hecho de remitir una factura ficticia no configura el delito en cuestión. En cuanto a la primera ampliación de la extradición, la conducta atribuida no consiste en falsificar personalmente los documentos, ni en remitirlos a terceros, sino en haber “ Registrado en su contabilidad al menos 63, 1 millones de FB, como algunas facturas ficticias”, hecho que no puede dar lugar a delito alguno. Finalmente comentan los recurrentes que el problema parece constreñirse no a la adulteración material de las facturas sino al hecho de que estas contenían datos falsos no correspondientes a la realidad, siendo que en todo caso, con respecto a este tipo de falsedad material, denominada por la doctrina como ideológica, únicamente cabe con respecto a documentos públicos o equiparados, nunca a simples documentos privados como las facturas. En el último motivo, y que por estar relacionado con este punto 5-, se transcribe en este acápite, se señala que no se cumple con el principio de doble incriminación. Indican los recurrentes que si se observan los artículos 193 y 196 del Código Penal Belga, es preciso concluir que no se trata de delitos similares a los que contiene la legislación costarricense. Así la legislación belga exige “ la intención fraudulenta o la intención de perjudicar”, mientras que en Costa Rica – conforme lo regula en los artículos 359 y 361 del Código Penal – se requiere el perjuicio, de modo que se trata de tipos penales diversos. En Bélgica se trata de delitos de mera conducta, mientras que Costa Rica son delitos de resultado y como tales requieren la lesión patrimonial. 6- Imposibilidad de determinar el tiempo de comisión del hecho punible. En todas las solicitudes de extradición no se permite saber a ciencia cierta cuando se habría desarrollado la conducta supuestamente delictiva. Así tenemos que en lo que hace a la primera solicitud, no se sabe si se trata de hechos que iniciaron el 30/ 4/ 94 y terminaron el 20/2/ 98, o si se trata de hechos que se realizaron de manera continuada. En definitiva, de esta lacónica enunciación de los hechos no se puede saber con claridad si son las infracciones sociales las que se estuvieron cometiendo, esto de manera continua, o si el señor [Nombre15] se mantuvo remitiendo o falsificando las facturas, duda de la que no se puede salir en el tanto el Reino de Bélgica ni siquiera presentó copia de la acusación respectiva. Igual sucede con la segunda solicitud de extradición, la cual se limita a indicar un vago periodo que iría del 6 del 11 del 95 hasta el 4 del 2 del 99, sin indicarse el momento preciso de la comisión de los delitos. 7- Prescripción. La determinación del momento de comisión del hecho punible es un aspecto esencial para determinar todo lo relativo a la prescripción de la acción penal. Si se toma en cuenta como punto de partida el 30/ 4 / 94 hasta el delito de uso de documento falso estaría prescrito el 30 de abril del 2000 conforme a la legislación costarricense. En efecto, la orden de detención por rebeldía, que es el único documento que obra en el expediente y que puede tomarse como punto de partida de la investigación en Bélgica, tiene fecha 2 de octubre del 2000. Se aduce que si la solicitud de extradición no es clara en cuanto al momento de comisión del hecho punible, esa circunstancia no puede hacerse valer en contra del extraditable. Tampoco puede suponerse que el delito habría dejado de cometerse en la última fecha señalada en la solicitud, esto es, el 20 / 2 / 98, sino la fecha más favorable cual es 30 / 4 / 94. Igual sucede con la segunda solicitud de extradición, la cual se limita a indicar un vago periodo que iría del 6 del 11 del 95 hasta el 4 del 2 del 98, sin indicar el momento concreto de la comisión de los delitos. Opinan los recurrentes que conforme a la legislación belga los delitos están prescritos, pues están sancionados con penas de un año de prisión. Si los hechos de la primera causa datan del año 86, a la fecha están prescritos, e igualmente, si en la segunda causa los hechos van del 5 del 6 del 94 al 11 del 9 del 95 están también prescritos. Debe considerarse el artículo 5 del Tratado de Extradición entre Costa Rica y Bélgica, el cual estatuye que “ No habrá lugar a extradición cuando con arreglo a la legislación en que se halle el inculpado haya prescrito la pena o la acción criminal”. Se sigue diciendo que en lo relativo al delito de falsificación, en la realidad se imputa el delito de falsificación de documento privado, siendo que la calificación no la da el Estado requirente sino los hechos imputados. En Costa Rica la falsificación de facturas no es delito de falsificación de documento público, ni lo es falsificación de documento equiparado, sino una falsificación de documento privado, que en nuestro ordenamiento costarricense se pena con dos años de reclusión.

IV- Vistos los argumentos expuestos por la defensa, este Tribunal procede a resolverlos del modo como sigue:

1. Con respecto al punto de la necesidad de una traducción oficial de los documentos presentados por el Estado requirente para justificar la extradición, este Tribunal ha indicado lo siguiente en el voto 662 de las 9:30 horas del 29 de agosto del 2002: “ II. En el segundo motivo del recurso se reclama falta de autenticidad de la documentación presentada por los Estados Unidos de América y falta de traducción oficial, incumpliéndose el artículo 369 inciso d) del Código Procesal Penal. Señala que los documentos no son auténticos ni fueron traducidos oficialmente al español. Señala que se le previno al Estado requirente, pero este no cumplió. Indica que la ley señala lo que es una traducción oficial. Dice que si la traducción se hizo en el extranjero debió ser autenticada. Manifiesta que el Tratado de Extradición no exime de la autenticación de la traducción. El motivo se declara sin lugar. El artículo 9 inciso 6) del Tratado de Extradición con los Estados Unidos de América dice: “Todos los documentos aportados por el Estado Requirente deberán traducirse, ya sea en el Estado Requirente o en el Estado Requerido, en el idioma del Estado Requerido”. Ello implica que no se requiere que en la traducción de los documentos se haga conforme a la Ley de Traducciones e Interpretaciones Oficiales, la que de todas maneras en su artículo 3) señala que la traducción oficial del documento se debe hacer “cuando así se requiera”. A folios 604-608 consta que la traducción de los documentos que se encuentra en el expediente fue realizada por [Nombre18], miembro de la Asociación de Intérpretes y Traductores de los Estados Unidos de América, habiéndose presentado la documentación respectiva ante el Consulado de Costa Rica para su autenticación, lo mismo que luego ante el oficial de Autenticaciones del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (folio 604), por lo que no se aprecia ningún vicio. Importante es que el impugnante alega falta de fundamentación de la sentencia de extradición con respecto a la autenticación de la documentación. Sin embargo, dicho vicio no existe, dándose en la resolución las razones sobre por qué no se considera que haya existido algún vicio. Así dice: “La defensa del extradido ha objetado la traducción de los documentos. Se invoca la ley no. 8142 que indica que cualquier documento, confeccionado en idioma diferente al español, con miras a producir efectos legales en nuestro país debe ser traducido oficialmente. Esa misma ley define como traducción oficial solo la que efectúa un traductor autorizado por el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto. En aras de tales objeciones, se previno al Estado Requirente la aportación de tal oficialidad. Se aportó certificación de que las traducciones de todos los documentos, en la que se basa la solicitud de Extradición, fueron realizadas por una traductora de la Asociación de Intérpretes y Traductores Jurídicos de los Estados Unidos – folios 599 a 610 -. Tales documentos son suficientes para acreditar la idoneidad de las traducciones. Pese a la definición oficial que hace nuestra legislación, no podemos, en casos de Extradición con los Estados Unidos, exigir al Estado Requirente que aporte las traducciones confeccionadas por traductores nacionales autorizados por el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto. El Tratado – de rango superior a la ley – faculta que las traducciones se confeccionen en cualquiera de los dos países – artículo 9 inciso 6”. Conforme a lo indicado no se aprecia un vicio en la fundamentación del Tribunal, el que da las razones al respecto, las que son concordantes con la normativa legal. Por lo anterior se declara sin lugar este motivo”. En similar sentido, con redacción del Dr. [Nombre19], se pronunció este mismo Tribunal en el voto 2002- 0909 de las 16:20 horas del ocho de noviembre del dos mil dos, cuando se indicó en los puntos que interesan: “ La naturaleza procesal de la extradición, la agilidad que exige solo requiere un procedimiento que autentique la verosimilitud y credibilidad de la documentación, sin que sea necesaria una certificación como la que refiere el apelante, porque los efectos de tal documentación son muy limitados en nuestra jurisdicción; ni siquiera se reciben pruebas o se asume su legitimidad plena. Basta que existan elementos de juicio legítimos que justifiquen, en principio, la intervención del Estado requirente y la limitación a la libertad del extradido, pero el Estado costarricense no asume, íntegramente el contenido y alcance de las pruebas o documentos que sustentan la petición de extradición, cuyo contenido y pretensión tendrán plena vigencia en la jurisdicción del Estado requirente y no en la jurisdicción costarricense…Las objeciones sobre la traducción de los documentos no son convincentes, porque el apartado sexto del artículo nueve del Tratado no requiere una traducción oficial : la norma comentada contiene una norma muy flexible, pues permite que la traducción se haga en el Estado requerido y en el Estado requirente”. En el caso concreto la inconformidad se dirige a cuestionar la ausencia de traducción oficial, debiendo agregarse que – tal y como lo indica la Procuraduría General de la República – el Estado requirente si presentó la traducción al idioma español de toda la documentación. Así se observa a los folios 1062 a 1387 del tomo II del presente proceso. Debe agregarse que en todo caso, por aplicación del principio de agilidad en este tipo de diligencias, tal y como ya se puntualizó con cita de jurisprudencia de esta Cámara, lo que se requiere es precisamente la verosimilitud y credibilidad en la documentación, sin que los recurrentes demuestren que ello no sea así. Debe agregarse que el Tratado de Extradición entre Costa Rica y Bélgica, no exige propiamente una traducción oficial, sino que conforme al párrafo segundo del articulo 6 – en lo relativo a los documentos – indica: “ Serán producidos en original o en testimonio autentico y se acompañaran, siempre que sea posible, de una traducción en la lengua del país requerido, y de la filiación del individuo reclamado”. Véase que no se requiere que esa traducción sea oficial como se alega. En consecuencia, y conforme a lo expuesto, procede denegar el reclamo.

2. En cuanto al segundo alegato según el cual “ La solicitud de extradición y sus ampliaciones no cuentan con los documentos de convicción a que se hace referencia en el artículo 9 inciso c de la Ley de Extradición”, se rechaza el motivo. No debe perderse de vista que la extradición no implica propiamente un análisis de convicción, toda vez que como ya lo ha reconocido la propia Sala Constitucional en Voto 886- 95 el análisis que se efectúa en un procedimiento extradición no prejuzga sobre la culpabilidad del extraditable, esto en el sentido que – según lo indica esa resolución – “ No corresponde a los Tribunales nacionales determinar si el recurrente cometió las delincuencias que se le acusan ni su grado de participación, ya que ello es competencia de los tribunales del Estado requirente” . ( Sala Constitucional Exp. N- 0422- V- 95 Voto 0886- 95 de las 16: 39 horas del 15 de febrero de 1995) Lo que exige en este caso el Tratado de Extradición entre Costa Rica y Bélgica es precisamente el cumplimiento de ciertos requisitos formales, los que a tenor del artículo 6, en cuanto se logra demostrar los delitos por los que se pide la extradición, las pruebas existentes y las normas de fondo aplicables. En consecuencia, se rechaza el reclamo.

3. Respecto del tercer reclamo en que se aduce la insubsanabilidad de documentos idóneos, pues el Estado requirente ha presentado una documentación insuficiente, maltrecha y lo legalizada que de todos modos ya existía en el expediente, debe – igualmente – ser rechazado. Uno de los aspectos que ha ocupado el presente proceso de extradición a lo largo de su trámite ha sido precisamente la autenticidad y fiabilidad de la documentación presentada por el Estado requirente. Sin embargo, considérese que, conforme a la resolución de este Tribunal Voto 2001- 939 de las once horas treinta minutos del 16 de noviembre del 2001, (visible a folio 933 a 943 del Tomo I de las presentes diligencias), al resolverse sobre la formalidad de los documentos se indicó lo siguiente: “ALEGATOS DE LOS DEFENSORES. Los abogados del requerido se opusieron al recurso de apelación interpuesto. Indican que no es cierto que todo lo que no se desprenda del texto del tratado supone una contravención de las partes contratantes. Señalan que la Sala Constitucional y el Tribunal de Casación han exigido la autenticación. Dicen que la responsabilidad por la falta de autenticación es del gobierno de Bélgica y de la Procuraduría General de la República, ésta al no hacerle las advertencias al primero. Manifiestan que el argumento de que el delito de bancarrota fraudulenta no está incluido en el tratado es irrelevante, ya que no está sancionado en Bélgica con pena superior a dos años, por lo que no se cumple con el requisito de la penalidad mínima. Indican que no es admisible el argumento de la Procuraduría de que debía reservarse la resolución definitiva hasta que el defecto fuera subsanado, debido a que ello va en contra de los principios de autorresponsabilidad, preclusión y lealtad procesal. En cuanto a que no se resolvió la última petición de extradición dicen que toda omisión debe ser de tal magnitud que genere una conclusión distinta a la que se llegó en el fallo. Sin embargo, - manifiestan – ello carece de relevancia debido a la falta de autenticación. En forma subsidiaria indica que si se llega a anular total o parcialmente el fallo se ponga en libertad a su representado. En escrito presentado con posterioridad vuelven los defensores a realizar los alegatos, haciendo referencia a que no se presentaron los documentos autenticados. “II. ALEGATOS DE LOS DEFENSORES. Los abogados del requerido se opusieron al recurso de apelación interpuesto. Indican que no es cierto que todo lo que no se desprenda del texto del tratado supone una contravención de las partes contratantes. Señalan que la Sala Constitucional y el Tribunal de Casación han exigido la autenticación. Dicen que la responsabilidad por la falta de autenticación es del gobierno de Bélgica y de la Procuraduría General de la República, ésta al no hacerle las advertencias al primero. Manifiestan que el argumento de que el delito de bancarrota fraudulenta no está incluido en el tratado es irrelevante, ya que no está sancionado en Bélgica con pena superior a dos años, por lo que no se cumple con el requisito de la penalidad mínima. Indican que no es admisible el argumento de la Procuraduría de que debía reservarse la resolución definitiva hasta que el defecto fuera subsanado, debido a que ello va en contra de los principios de autorresponsabilidad, preclusión y lealtad procesal. En cuanto a que no se resolvió la última petición de extradición dicen que toda omisión debe ser de tal magnitud que genere una conclusión distinta a la que se llegó en el fallo. Sin embargo, - manifiestan – ello carece de relevancia debido a la falta de autenticación. En forma subsidiaria indica que si se llega a anular total o parcialmente el fallo se ponga en libertad a su representado. En escrito presentado con posterioridad vuelven los defensores a realizar los alegatos, haciendo referencia a que no se presentaron los documentos autenticados. III. SE RESUELVE: El primer aspecto a analizar con respecto a la resolución impugnada es el concerniente a la falta de autenticación de la documentación por el cónsul de Costa Rica en Bélgica, conforme a la cadena de autenticaciones que exige la Ley de Servicio Consultar. Se dice en la resolución impugnada: “En cuanto a la autenticidad que deben guardar los documentos que sirven de sustento a la solicitud de extradición, el artículo 6 de la Convención entre Bélgica y Costa Rica dispone que los documentos en que se sustenta la extradición, serán producidos en original o en testimonios auténticos y se acompañarán siempre que sea posible, de una traducción en la lengua del país requerido, y de la filiación del individuo reclamado. Por su parte el inciso 2 del artículo 9 de la Ley de Extradición vigente dispone que entre los documentos que el gobierno requirente debe presentar, están “copia auténtica de las actuaciones del proceso, que suministren prueba o al menos indicios razonables de la culpabilidad de que se trata". Por su parte la ley Orgánica del Servicio Consular No. 46 de 7 de julio de 1925 y sus reformas, otorga a los cónsules de la República el carácter de notarios y tiene autoridad para dar fe, conforme a las leyes, de los actos y contratos. También legalizarán documentos y firmas de las autoridades del país en que funcionen, cuando tales certificados y documentos hayan de surtir efecto en Costa Rica, aunque se trate de extranjeros, ver artículos 66, 67-69 y 81 de la citada ley. Pero además la firma de este funcionario debe ser autenticada por el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, según lo dispone el artículo 294 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Revisando los documentos presentados por la autoridad requirente, tenemos que los mismos no fueron legalizados por el cónsul de Costa Rica en Bélgica, ni la firma de este funcionario fue autenticada por el Ministerio de Relaciones Públicas, como era lo correcto, porque estaban destinados a surtir efectos legales en Costa Rica. En esos documentos solamente aparece la autenticación del cónsul de Bélgica en Costa Rica, es decir que los documentos que han servido para sustentar la extradición que se solicita no fueron legitimados por nuestras autoridades, ergo, los mismos no son idóneos para sustentar la extradición que se solicita. Llama la atención que el tribunal que intervino inicialmente, no hizo la prevención a la autoridad requirente para que cumpliera con este requisito, prevención que a estas alturas resulta improcedente, porque la solicitud de extradición ya debe ser resuelta, en virtud de que el extraditable [Nombre20] hace muchos meses está guardando prisión preventiva. Adoleciendo entonces de autenticidad la solicitud de extradición formulada contra el extraditable [Nombre1], se rechaza la misma y se ordena ponerlo en libertad una vez adquiera firmeza la presente resolución”. Este Tribunal luego del estudio de los votos de la Sala Constitucional citados tanto por la Procuraduría General de la República como por la defensa del requerido, unido al estudio de la jurisprudencia constitucional de acuerdo con los sistemas informáticos del Poder Judicial, encuentra que en lo relativo a la autenticación de firmas conforme a la Ley de Servicio Consular en forma expresa se refirió la Sala Constitucional en voto 903-92 del 3 de abril de 1992: “VII.- Consideración separada merece el alegato de la falta de autenticación de los documentos aportados por el requirente. Las resoluciones de Corte Plena del 27 de setiembre de 1982 artículo VII y del 24 de diciembre de 1984 artículo III) indican que la falta de autenticación de las firmas, se subsana con la remisión de las diligencias de extradición, por parte del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores a la Corte Suprema de Justicia. No obstante, considera la Sala que lo indicado en esa oportunidad por Corte Plena y la práctica administrativa y jurisdiccional que se consolidó posteriormente a la luz de lo resuelto, roza con las disposiciones de los artículos 66, 67, 80 y 81 de la Ley Orgánica del Servicio Consular, que exige que los documentos provenientes del extranjero, deban ser autenticados por el Cónsul de Costa Rica en aquel país y las firmas de éste por el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (ver artículo 291 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). En el proceso de extradición que se tramita contra [Nombre21] [Nombre22] se echa de menos en los documentos aportados por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América, la autenticación de la firma del Cónsul costarricense por parte del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, omisión de una formalidad legal que en criterio de la Sala, impide tener por completa la documentación presentada. Para la Sala, la omisión del Estado costarricense -en alguna medida motivada por las resoluciones de comentario- impide tener por completa la documentación presentada. Sin embargo, esa omisión, no es de tal identidad que anule lo actuado por el Tribunal; por el contrario, considera la Sala que es un defecto subsanable y no imputable al país requirente, por lo que deberá el Juzgado de Santa Cruz, solicitar a la mayor brevedad posible, la autenticación, a fin de continuar con los procedimientos normalmente. Lo anterior implica que para la Sala no ha existido violación a los derechos fundamentales del recurrente y por ello, debe declararse sin lugar el recurso en todos sus extremos”. Por otro lado, Sala Constitucional en diversos fallos ha indicado que la falta autenticación de los documentos en una extradición es un defecto subsanable. Así en el voto 4317-93 del 3 de setiembre de 1993 dijo: “Ya este Tribunal ha señalado en otros votos - por cierto referentes al mismo asunto- que la falta de autenticación de la documentación ni produce nulidad alguna ni impide dar inicio al procedimiento de extradición al ser un defecto subsanable”. En este mismo sentido: Sala Constitucional, voto 3637-93 del 28 de julio de 1993 y voto 3678-93 del 30 de julio de 1993. Conforme a lo indicado en dichos votos debe concluirse que la Ley de Servicio Consular (Art. 67) sí es aplicable, no presentándose conflicto entre ésta y el Tratado de Extradición con Bélgica, ya que este en su Art. 6 exige que debe presentarse el “documento original” o un “testimonio auténtico”, pero no señala que no deba seguirse el trámite para el reconocimiento de los documentos conforme a la Ley de Servicio Consular, la que de todas maneras fue dictada conforme a las prácticas internacionales de carácter consular. Téngase en cuenta que la Sala Constitucional expresamente en el voto 903-92 exigió que se siguiera el trámite de ley, incluyéndose la autenticación de parte el cónsul de Costa Rica en el país del Estado requirente. Distinta sería la situación si el Tratado incluyera una norma como la del Art. 7 del Tratado Modelo de Extradición, mencionado por la parte apelante, que expresamente dispone que no se exigirá certificación o autenticación de las solicitudes de extradición. Sin embargo, la falta de autenticación de la documentación, como lo ha dicho la Sala Constitucional en diversos fallos, arriba mencionados, incluido el mismo voto 903-92, no es una causal para rechazar la solicitud de extradición, sino debe hacerse la prevención respectiva al Estado requirente para que subsane el defecto, lo que no se hizo en este caso. Lo anterior de conformidad con el Art. 9 inciso d) de la ley de extradición, de aplicación supletoria. En cuanto a la prevención véase, además de los votos citados, el 2490-96 del 28 de mayo de 1996, ordenado por la Sala Constitucional. En lo atinente a la prevención de presentación de la documentación que faltara y a la anulación de la resolución sobre la extradición para que se subsane el defecto es importante el voto 516-F-96 del 5 de setiembre de 1996, dispuesto por el Tribunal de Casación Penal. Incluso se ha dicho por este Tribunal, en un caso que se regía por la ley de extradición y no por el Tratado entre Bélgica y Costa Rica, que la falta de presentación en el plazo requerido de los documentos auténticos no implica por sí que deba declararse sin lugar la extradición si son aportados con posterioridad, aunque tiene implicaciones con respecto al procedimiento (Voto 643-2001 del 27 de agosto del 2001). Debe resaltarse que en la misma sentencia se reconoce que la falta de autenticación de los documentos es un defecto subsanable, pero en forma contradictoria indica que debido a que el extraditable lleva mucho tiempo detenido no corresponde hacerle la prevención al Estado requirente, tal y como procedería. En este sentido se dice: “Llama la atención que el Tribunal que intervino inicialmente, no hizo la prevención, a la autoridad requirente para que cumpliera con ese requisito, prevención que a estas alturas resulta improcedente porque la solicitud de extradición ya debe ser resuelta, en virtud de que el extraditable [Nombre15] [Nombre16] hace muchos meses está guardando prisión preventiva” (folio 844). Contrario a lo que se extrae de dicho razonamiento, la larga duración de la detención provisional, conforme a reglas de la derivación, puede estar relacionada con sí debe disponerse o no la libertad del extraditable durante el proceso de la misma, pero no tiene ligamen con la resolución de fondo de la extradición, de modo que dé lugar en definitiva a la denegatoria de la solicitud de esta, por ello no llevan razón los defensores en sus argumentaciones al invocar los principios de autorresponsabilidad, preclusión y lealtad procesal. Más bien conforme al principio de lealtad entre las partes contratantes del Tratado internacional es que debe hacérsele las advertencias al Estado requirente de que corrija un defecto en la documentación, máxime que dicho requisito se extrae de la legislación interna de Costa Rica. Así si lo que correspondía era dar audiencia para que se subsanara el defecto de la documentación, debía procederse en ese sentido, lo que no se hizo por el Tribunal de Juicio. Por lo anterior lo procedente es declarar con lugar el recurso de apelación, anular la resolución impugnada, disponiéndose el reenvío, para que se haga la prevención correspondiente. Por innecesario no se entran a conocer los otros alegatos del recurso”. Lo anterior implica reconocer – independientemente de la discusión planteada por la Procuraduría General de la República – sobre la utilidad de la exigencia de formalidades en la documentación, la realidad es que la legislación nuestra y aún los precedentes vinculantes erga omnes de la Sala Constitucional, obligan al cumplimiento de algunos requisitos. En el caso concreto, se observa que a folios 1062 a 1387 del tomo II, se presentaron por la Embajada de Bélgica una serie de atestados debidamente legalizados y autenticados en que constan los siguientes aspectos: En cuanto a la primera solicitud de extradición: 1- La identificación del extraditable y sus datos personales. 2- La formal solicitud de extradición, la exposición de la orden de detención girada en rebeldía el 6 / 10 / 2002 por el Juez de Instrucción Doña [Nombre23] en Amberes referencia 235 / 96 AN61 98. 2422- 96. 3- La indicación de los hechos por los cuales se solicita la extradición según la cual el interesado es culpable de ser coautor de infracciones sobre legislación social y falsificación de documentos en Amberes, del 30 / 4 / hasta el 20/2) 1998. 4- La indicación de la penalidad de los delitos y las normas aplicables, y la posible fecha de prescripción de los delitos. 5- A folio 1079 a 1080 aparece debidamente autenticada la orden de detención por rebeldía del 6/ 10 7 2000 expediente 325- 96 emanada del Juez [Nombre23] Juez de Instrucción del Tribunal de Primera Instancia de Amberes, los hechos objeto del proceso. 6- Copia certificada de la legislación aplicable por estas figuras (folio 1196 y siguiente). En cuanto a la segunda solicitud de extradición: 1- Se adiciona la solicitud de extradición con fundamento en una orden de detención por rebeldía el 21/ 3/ 2001 por el Juez de Instrucción [Nombre24] referencia 29 / 01/ AN 75. 98. 499- 99 en cuanto se dice que el extraditado es culpable de los hechos de falsificación de documentos y uso y bancarrota simple y fraudulenta en Amberes, Bélgica, del 6 /11 / 95 hasta el 4 / 12/ 1999. 2- Se indican los artículos que penalizan las conductas, concretamente las normas 1 a 11, 193, 196, 197, 213, 214 , y 489 ter y 489 bis del Código Penal Belga, con la indicación que las penas superan la duración mínima prevista en el Convenio entre Costa Rica y Bélgica del 25 / 4 / 1902, y la indicación de las fechas de prescripción de los cargos. 3- A folio 1234 aparece la orden de detención por los delitos de falsificación de documentos y uso, bancarrota fraudulenta y simple ( artículos 489 ter y 489 bis del Código Penal Belga). 4- Igualmente al indicado folio se hace una transcripción de los hechos por los que – entre otros – se pide la extradición, así como la orden de detención por rebeldía ( folio 1239 y 1240). En cuanto a la tercera solicitud adicional de extradición. Se tienen por debidamente certificados y legalizados, lo siguiente: 1- La fundamentación de la presente solicitud adicional “ Con base en una sentencia dada por la Corte de Apelación de Amberes el 4/ 10/ 2000…”. 2- Los hechos por los que se pide la extradición es por los delitos de falsificación de documentos y uso de documento falso sabiendo que estaban falsos – como coautor de la NV Europa United States of América ( EURUSA) declarado en quiebra sobre declaración- ha hecho desaparecer los libros o documentos y las cuentas anuales de las empresas, parcialmente o enteramente ha malversar o esconder activo – abuso de confianza – infracciones del Código de los impuestos sobre los ingresos y el código de la IVA” 3- Se indican a ese mismo folio las penas y la posible fecha de prescripción. 4- Se adjunta copia de la sentencia en contumacia 5- Copia certificada de la legislación aplicable. ( Folios 1336 y siguientes). De modo que no es cierto que los documentos aportados – tal y como lo alegan los recurrentes – sea maltrecha o insuficiente, sino al contrario permite deducir cuáles son los delitos atribuidos, las penas, el estado procesal de las causas, todo lo cual justifica el rechazo del motivo. En todo caso, como bien lo alega el señor Procurador al contestar la audiencia respectiva para los efectos del emplazamiento (art. 446 del C.P.P.), el Convenio de Extradición con Bélgica lo que requiere y exige – esto en cuanto a la documentación – claramente indica en su artículo 6 que: “ La extradición solo se concederá mediante la producción ya de una sentencia condenatoria, ya de un auto de procedimiento que decrete formalmente u obligue de pleno derecho a la comparencia del inculpado ante la jurisdicción represiva ya, en fin, de un auto de prisión o de cualquier otro documento que tenga la misma fuerza. Estos documentos indicarán la naturaleza precisa de los hechos acriminados y la disposición criminal que le es aplicable. Serán producidos en original o en testimonio auténtico y se acompañarán, siempre que sea posible, de una traducción en lengua del país requerido y de la filiación del individuo reclamado”. Conforme con lo anterior, en la especie se cumple con las exigencias legales en cuanto a este extremo que se alega y por ello se rechaza el reclamo.

4- En cuanto al alegato de ausencia del requisito de penalidad mínima, pues según se alega todos los delitos a que se refieren las solicitudes de extradición son sancionados con pena inferior a dos años, con lo que no se cumple con el presupuesto de la penalidad mínima que hace referencia el artículo 2 in fine del Tratado de Extradición entre Costa Rica y Bélgica. Este Tribunal considera que no llevan razón los recurrentes y por ende rechaza el reclamo. Cierto es que el Tratado de Extradición entre Costa Rica y Bélgica firmado en Bruselas el 25 de abril de 1902 y debidamente ratificado, en el artículo 2, último párrafo, expone que: “ En todo caso, los hechos en razón de los cuales se pide la extradición deben comportar según la ley del país requirente, una pena que no baje de dos años de prisión, y la extradición no podrá verificarse sino cuando el hecho semejante sea penable según la legislación del país requerido”. Es un principio de la materia de extradición que a los Estados no les interesa perseguir delitos de poca monta, y por ello se fijan algunas reglas al respecto. Inclusive la misma Ley de Extradición recoge este principio denominado principio de la no entrega por infracciones leves (mínima non curat praetor) al indicarse: en el art. 3 inciso e) de la Ley de Extradición que no procederá la extradición:“Cuando la pena asignada a los hechos imputados, según su calificación provisional o definitiva por el juez o tribunal competente del Estado que solicita la extradición, sea menor de un año de privación de libertad y que esté autorizada o acordada la prisión o detención preventiva del procesado, si no hubiera aún sentencia firme. Esta debe ser privativa de la libertad”. La indicada norma del Tratado entre Costa Rica y Bélgica que también tutela ese principio, y debe entenderse que hace relación a las penas previstas en los tipos penales abstractamente considerados y no con relación a las penas impuestas en cada caso concreto. Es decir, lo que rige es la pena de los delitos; o en otros términos, en aquellos delitos cuya pena sea mínima sea menor a dos años no procede conceder la extradición. Tal y como lo alega el señor representante de la Procuraduría General de la República, el elemento de la mínima penalidad hace referencia a la ley del país requirente, y la pena prevista en los tipos respectivos, de modo que la pena atendible para fijar o no la procedencia de la extradición debe ser aquella contenida en la norma y que puede ser igual o mayor de dos años. En el caso concreto, conforme a las diversas solicitudes de extradición solicitudes por el Reino de Bélgica, el Tribunal de instancia en la resolución apelada se pronuncia sobre los hechos por los que a su modo de ver el asunto justifican conceder la extradición, a saber: “ El 14 de febrero del 2001 el Juez de Instrucción del Tribunal de Primera Instancia con sede en Amberes, emite una orden de detención por rebeldía, expedida en el expediente N- 235- 96 contra el extraditable [Nombre17] por los siguientes hechos: Del 30- 4- -94 y 20 –2 – 98, [Nombre17] trabajaba como Gerente o Administrador delgado de diversas empresas de piping industrial y tècnicas de refrigeración establecidas en Amberes, entre otras la BVBA Intermitaje, NV Montrex, NV EURO Enginering , NV Poliytech. De esta manera ha remitido en el mismo periodo, facturas ficticias de 44 millones de francos belgas a la BVBA Genex, Madgaenastraat 28 en Amberes y por consecuencia no podía pagar a sus empleados de manera oficial. Por ello se le tiene como sospechoso de ser el autor de infracciones de la legislación social, falsificación de documentos, hechos calificados como crimen y o delito por los artículos 193, 196 del Código Penal y por los artículos 22 hasta el 32 del Real Decreto del 20- 7- 1967, en cuanto al empleo de empleados de nacionalidad extranjera, artículos 44 de la ley del 24- 7- 1987 en cuanto al trabajo temporal, al trabajo interino y la puesta a disposición de empleados de usuario, artículos 31 hasta el 39 de la ley del 27- 6- 1969 modificando decisión del 28 d- 12 – 1944 en cuanto a la seguridad social de los trabajadores, artículos 11 al 15 del Real Decreto del 23- 10- 1978 en cuanto al mantenimiento de documentos sociales; artículo 11 hasta el 15 del decreto del 6-3- 1991 en cuanto a la regulación para conocer las agencias de empleo en la región flamenca y penalizados con una pena de prisión principal correccional de un año y por una pena más dura”. ( cf. Folios 1444 y 1445 del fallo). Igualmente el señor Juez de instancia, en la resolución apelada, con respecto al segundo bloque de hechos por los que se concede la extradición, refiere: “3- El 23 de marzo del año en curso, el Gobierno de Bélgica adicionó la solicitud de extradición con fundamento en una orden de detención de rebeldía emitida el 21 de marzo del 2001 contra el extraditable [Nombre25], por el Juez de Instrucción de Primera Instancia con sede en Amberes, en expediente N- 29- 01 por los siguientes hechos_ “ A partir de la constitución al 6 –11- 95 [Nombre26] era el gerente real de la BVBA Gneral Engennering con sede en Brecth. Esta sociedad ha sido declarada en quiebra por el tribunal de Comercio de Amberes el 4- 2-1999. Esta sociedad ha dejado una deuda, entre otras al Ministerio de Hacienda por no haber pagado impuestos de 207 millones de FB. Resulta que de la investigación que el sospechoso a registrado en su contabilidad al menos 63. 1 millones de FB, como facturas ficticias. Por ello se acusa al extraditable de falsificación de documentos y uso, infracción al artículo 489 ter 8 antes bancarrota fraudulenta, infracción al artículo 489 bis 8 antes bancarrota simple. Hechos calificados como crimen y / o delito por los artículos 193, 196, 197, 213, 214, 489 ter y 489 bis del Código Penal y penalizados por una pena de prisión capital correccional de un año o por una pena más grave”. ( cf. hechos probados del fallo venido en apelación). Igualmente en sentencia el Tribunal puntualiza que los delitos por los cuales se pide la extradición son los de FALSIFICACIÓN DE DOCUMENTOS, INFRACCIONES A LAS LEYES SOCIALES, USO DE DOCUMENTO FALSO, BANCARROTA FRAUDULENTA Y BANCARROTA SIMPLE, siendo que en sentencia apelada se concede por los delitos de FALSIFICACIÒN DE DOCUMENTOS (expediente 235-96 referencia 235- 96- AN61. 982422- 96) y por los hechos constitutivos de FALSIFICACIÒN DE DOCUMENTOS Y USO DE DOCUMENTO FALSO que se le siguen el Tribunal de Primera Instancia de Bélgica, expediente n- 29- 01 referencia 29- 01 AN 75. 98. 4999- 99. Esos delitos tienen penas que superan en el máximo la pena de dos años de prisión, de manera que se cumple con ese requisito, y por ello se deniega el reclamo.

5- Respecto al quinto alegato en que se expone que los hechos por los que se pide la extradición de [Nombre15] [Nombre16] son atípicos, igualmente se rechaza el reclamo. No debe perderse de vista cuál es la esencia, los fines y la naturaleza del procedimiento de extradición. Acerca de la naturaleza jurídica del procedimiento de extradición se ha dicho por reconocida doctrina que “… no constituye un juicio propiamente dicho, que prejuzgue sobre la inocencia o culpablidad del requerido, pues solo tiende a conciliar las exigencias de la administración de justicia represiva en los países civilizados, con los derechos del asilado”. (cf. [Nombre27]. Código de Procedimientos en Materia Penal para la Justicia Federal y los Tribunales Ordinarios de la Capital Federal y Territorios Nacionales. Editorial Abeledo Perrot. Buenos Aires. 1972, p. 593, citado por [Nombre28] y otros. La Extradición en Costa Rica. Editorial Nueva Década. San José Costa Rica, 1989. 14 ). Igualmente en esa misma línea de pensamiento, este Tribunal de Casación Penal ha indicado: “ … al respecto hay que reiterar que no estamos conociendo de un proceso de culpabilidad, en el que procede valorar la prueba y su legitimidad conforme a nuestra legislación, sino ante un proceso sumarísimo, tendiente a establecer si procede o no la entrega del señor [Nombre29]. al Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, por unos hechos por los cuales se afirma que fue condenado, según un debido proceso conforme a la legislación del Estado requiriente, o por los cuales se le sigue proceso. De modo que, las probanzas a las que se alude solo importan para establecer la existencia de elementos probatorios que sirvan de sustento a la acusación o un procesamiento que sirvan como “ indicios razonable de culpabilidad”, según la exigencia que contiene el punto dos del inciso c- del artículo de la Ley de Extradición…”. ( cf. voto 238. F de las 11: 30 horas del 14 de julio de 1994, extracto que aparece en: Jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Casación Penal. Escuela Judicial. Noviembre de 1995, p.113 ). Otros votos más recientes de este Tribunal ha mantenido esa línea en el sentido de la improcedencia de valorar las pruebas o establecer un juicio de culpabilidad. Así en el voto 2002- 00666 de las 10 horas del 29 de agosto del 2002 se dijo: “ Reiteradamente este Tribunal de Casación ha dicho que en el procedimiento de revisión ( sic) no se realiza la valoración de la prueba, a efecto de determinar la existencia de un delito, pues no se trata de determinar si a la persona a que se solicita la extradición ha cometido un hecho típico, antijurídico, culpable y punible, lo que se tendrá que determinar en el juicio para el que se requiere, en el caso que no exista condena, o ha sido ya establecido por el país requirente, en el supuesto de que la misma ya exista (vèase voto del Tribunal de Casación Penal 1999—583, 200- 407, 2000 – 073, entre otros”. En el caso concreto de la solicitud de extradición que se promueve a favor de [Nombre30] [Nombre17], los recurrentes echan mano al argumento de considerar la atipicidad de la conducta, y errores de calificación por parte del Estado Belga, la poca precisión en los hechos por los que se pide esa medida, la no acreditación de modo expreso de la intención de perjudicar, así como del conocimiento de la falsedad, así como la tesis de que estos delitos son falsedades de las que doctrina denomina “ ideológicas “, ( que no se configuran en casos de documentos privados como dicen los recurrentes son las facturas), son todos aspectos de fondo propios de ser examinados en su momento por el estado requirente y al momento en que someta al extradido a juicio. Pero no son propiamente aspectos que deban valorarse en esta sede, pues como ya lo ha indicado la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal de Casación Penal, “ Si asumiéramos lo que expresa el señor defensor, de que la prueba debe examinarse para determinar la existencia del tipo objetivo, no habrá razón para que no se hiciera también respecto de la antijuricidad ( examinando la existencia o no existencia de causas de justificación), y la culpabilidad ( valorando la existencia o inexistencia de causas de exculpación) aplicando para ello el derecho penal interno y sin la realización del juicio, cuando precisamente lo que se pretende con la extradición es posibilitar la aplicación del derecho del Estado que requiere al extradido para su juzgamiento, ( juicio), o para que cumpla la condena ya impuesta conforme al derecho penal de ese país. Lo contrario, sea la valoración de la prueba para determinar el tipo objetivo, convertiría en procedimiento de extradición, en un procedimiento de “revisión” de procesos o sentencias dictadas en otros países, conforme con nuestros propios criterios de valoración de pruebas, y sin que haya juicio, lo que a todas luces no es razonable”. ( Tribunal de Casación Penal Voto 2002- 0666 de las 10 horas del 29 de agosto del 2002). Con fundamento en las anteriores consideraciones y citas de los precedentes invocados, no procede el análisis de los aspectos de fondo que refieren los recurrentes, sino que ello es propio del proceso a que se somete el extraditable en el país que pide la medida, y por ello se deniega el reclamo.

6. En el agravio 6 del libelo de apelación los señores defensores aducen “ la imposibilidad de determinar el tiempo de comisión del hecho punible”, tesis que no admite este Tribunal y por lo tanto, rechaza el reclamo. Tal y como se expuso en el motivo II, mediante la transcripción de los hechos objeto del proceso que se conoce los hechos están claramente expuestos en las condiciones de modo, tiempo y lugar. Véase que la documentación aportada definen el momento de comisión de los delitos, así tenemos que en la primera solicitud se indica que el extradido es culpable de ser autor de las infracciones sobre legislación social y falsificación de documentos en Amberes, Bélgica del 30/ 4/ 1994 hasta el 20 / 2/ 1998; e igualmente sucede con los cargos de la segunda solicitud en que se indica que el extraditable se le investiga por falsificación de documentos, y uso y bancarrota simple y fraudulenta en esa misma localidad belga, hechos ocurridos del 6/11/ 1995 hasta el 4/ 2/99. La discusión si estamos ante un delito continuado, esto bajo la terminología de nuestro Código Penal, siendo propiamente una cuestión de calificación legal, no puede ser examinada en esta sede.

7. En punto a la prescripción, objeto también de recurso por los señores defensores, es tesis de este Tribunal que no llevan razón. Ya establecimos que por aplicación del artículo 5 del Convenio de Extradición entre Costa Rica y Bélgica, a los fines de establecer la prescripción rige la regulación del país en que se halle el inculpado. Sobre el punto, dispone ese Tratado en el artículo : “ No habrá lugar a extradición cuando, con arreglo a la legislación del país en que se halle el inculpado, haya prescrito la pena o la acción penal”. Vistos los hechos por los que se pide y concede la extradición, tenemos que en cuanto a la primera solicitud, se debe tomar en cuenta la finalización de la acción 20/2/ 1998, siendo que los hechos de falsificación de documentos tienen pena de hasta seis años de prisión (cf. artículo 359 del Código Penal costarricense), de modo que – considerando también las reglas de prescripción establecidas en los artículos 31 y siguientes del Código Procesal Penal – debe indicarse que ese plazo no ha transcurrido. Véase que el artículo 31 inciso a- del Código Procesal Penal establece que “ Si no se ha iniciado la persecución penal, la acción prescribirá: a) Después de transcurrido un plazo igual al máximo de la pena, en los delitos sancionados con prisión, pero en ningún caso, podrá exceder de diez años, ni ser inferior a tres”. En el caso concreto, el delito de falsificación tiene pena en su extremo mayor de seis años, de modo que si los hechos de la primera solicitud de extradición ocurren 30/4/ 94 hasta el 20/2 / 98, habrán de prescribir a partir de esa última fecha, esto sin contar con las causales de interrupción y suspensión, entre ellas la establecidas en el artículo 34 incisos d-) y f-) del Código Procesal Penal costarricense. Dispone esta norma – en lo que interesa para la resolución de este asunto – que: “ Suspensión del cómputo de la prescripción. El cómputo de la prescripción se suspenderá: Inciso d- Mientras dure, en el extranjero el trámite de la extradición”, y el inciso f-) en su literalidad dispone: “ Por la rebeldía del imputado. En este caso, el término de la suspensión no podrá exceder un tiempo igual al de la prescripción de la acción penal; sobrevenido este, continuará corriendo el plazo”. Es decir, en estos casos, la prescripción se suspende a partir del momento en que se solicita la extradición, hasta que se ejecuta la misma. ( cf. Llobet Rodríguez, Javier. Proceso Penal Comentado. ( Código Procesal Penal Comentado) Segunda Edición. Editorial Jurídica Continental. 2003. p. 113). En la especie que se conoce en alzada, se tiene que la solicitud de extradición fue recibida en fecha 26 de febrero del 2001 en el Tribunal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José ( cf. Folio 1 a 4 del tomo I), fecha a partir de la cual se ha suspendido el cómputo de la prescripción. Igual sucede con los hechos de la segunda solicitud de extradición que tiene como fecha de partida para el cómputo respectivo el 4/2/ 1999, siendo evidente que tampoco ha transcurrido el plazo de prescripción como se alega. En consecuencia se desestima el reclamo.

V-RECURSO DE APELACIÓN PRESENTADO POR LA LIC. [Nombre9] EN REPRESENTACIÓN DE LA PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA. ( folios 1587 a 1593 ) Se aduce que la Embajada de Bélgica presentó la solicitud de extradición contra [Nombre31] [Nombre17] por dos cargos: infracción sobre legislación social y falsificación de documentos, la cual fue ampliada primero por cuatro cargos: falsificación de documentos, uso de documentos falsos, bancarrota simple y bancarrota fraudulenta, y posteriormente por otros dos cargos de falsificación de documentos y uso de documentos falsos. El reclamo se dirige a indicar por parte de la representante de la Procuraduría General de la República la inconformidad con el rechazo de los cargos de bancarrota fraudulenta y bancarrota simple. Son dos los motivos que se exponen en el recurso en esa línea de la denegatoria de la extradición en algunos delitos: PRIMER MOTIVO. Dos son los motivos de la apelación presentada por la Procuraduría General de la República y que por estar en estrecha relación se enuncian y resuelven en un solo apartado, El primero es que el cargo de bancarrota fraudulenta sí cumple con el principio de mínima penalidad. En este motivo de la apelación presentada se combate el argumento del señor juez de instancia, según el cual aún cuando se cumple con el principio de identidad con relación al delito de quiebra fraudulenta no se cumple con el otro requisito de la penalidad mínima, que según el señor Juez es de un mes de prisión según el Código Belga. La recurrente discrepa de ese razonamiento en cuanto considera que el delito bancarrota fraudulenta si cumple el requisito de mínima penalidad, pues se establece en el Tratado entre Costa Rica y Bélgica que los hechos en que se fundamente el pedido de extradición deben tener como mínimo una pena que no baje de dos años de prisión, según la legislación del Estado requirente, es decir debe tratarse para que proceda la extradición de un delito con pena de dos o mas años de prisión. Además se debe tomar en cuenta que el parámetro que rige en cuanto a la pena, es el extremo mayor, para que de ese modo se refleje la gravedad de la conducta. En todo caso, citando el Código Penal belga, en el artículo 489 ter, le establece al delito de quiebra fraudulenta una pena de un mes hasta cinco años y de multa de 100 a quinientos mil francos. Se pide que se ordene la extradición por ese cargo. II- SEGUNDO MOTIVO. El segundo motivo consiste en alegar que el delito de “ bancarrota simple” si encuentra identidad en la legislación costarricense. El Tribunal de Santa Cruz, Guanacaste, rechazó el cargo de bancarrota simple indicado que no tiene identidad, sin que se explique la razón mediante la cual se llegó a esa conclusión, aun cuando es claro que – luego de repasar los cargos de la primera solicitud de extradición que – que tales hechos encuadran en el delito de quiebra fraudulenta previsto en el artículo 213 del Código Penal costarricense. Luego de transcribir los hechos de la primera solicitud de extradición, según los cuales “A partir de la constitución al 6 / 11 / 95 [Nombre17] y [Nombre32] era el gerente real de la BVBA Engenerin con sede en Brecht. Esta sociedad ha sido declarada en quiebra por el Tribunal de Comercio de Amberes el 4 / 12 / 1999. Esta sociedad ha dejado una deuda, entre otras al Ministerio de Hacienda por no hacer pagado impuestos por 207 millones de FB. Resulta de la investigación que el sospechoso ha registrado en su contabilidad al menos 63. 1 millones de FB, como facturas ficticias”. Destaca la recurrente que a los efectos del principio de identidad lo importante no es que exista una identidad en la nomenclatura de los delitos, sino que los hechos sean los mismos sin necesidad de que se trate de la misma figura delictiva. En apoyo de su tesis cita el voto 294- F- 97 de las 8 horas del 15 de abril de 1997 proveniente del Tribunal de Casación Penal. Finalmente se pide que se conceda la extradición por el delito de bancarrota simple. Se accede al primer reclamo y se concede también la extradición por el delito de bancarrota fraudulenta, no así por el delito de bancarrota simple. El Tribunal de instancia de Guanacaste, Sede Santa Cruz, en la resolución que se impugna señala: “ …en relación con el delito denominado bancarrota fraudulenta regulado en el artículo 489 ter del Código Penal Belga encuentra identidad con el delito de quiebra fraudulenta que se regula en nuestro Código Penal en el artículo 231 de dicho cuerpo normativo, no hay identidad con el delito de bancarrota simple regulado en el artículo 489 bis del código penal belga”. (cf. folio 1450). Más adelante indica el Tribunal lo siguiente: “ … tenemos que aún cuando se cumpla el principio de identidad en relación con el delito de quiebra fraudulenta no se cumple con el otro requisito de la penalidad mínima que para dicho delito es en Bélgica de un mes de prisión, en consecuencia se debe rechazar la solicitud de ampliación de la extradición respecto de los delitos de bancarrota simple y bancarrota fraudulenta”. (cf. folio 1454). Debe decirse que en efecto, conforme a los atestados y documentos presentados por el Estado Belga, y según la copia de los textos legales debidamente traducidos, los delitos de bancarrota simple, tiene una pena de un mes hasta dos años y de cien hasta quinientos mil francos. Así se desprende del texto del articulo 489 bis del Código Penal belga, aportado a estas diligencias a folio 1276 del tomo II. En cuanto al delito de bancarrota fraudulenta, el numeral 489 ter, del Código Penal belga, establece una penalidad de prisión de un mes hasta cinco años y de cien hasta quinientos mil francos. Lo anterior quiere decir que en cuanto al delito de bancarrota fraudulenta se cumple con el requisito de la penalidad mínima exigida por el Tratado de Extradición entre Costa Rica y Bélgica, por lo que se acoge el reclamo de la Procuraduría General de la República.

POR TANTO

Se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación de los señores defensores del extraditable [Nombre1] y se confirma la sentencia. Se declara con lugar parcialmente el recurso de la Procuraduría General de la República y se concede la extradición también por el delito de BANCARROTA FRAUDULENTA revocándose en cuanto a este delito la resolución recurrida. En lo demás el fallo permanece incólume. Notifíquese.

Guillermo Sojo Picado [Nombre3] [Nombre2] Jueces de Casación Penal Mec