Nature of Sanctions in Wildlife Law Offenses and Statute of LimitationsNaturaleza de la sanción de los tipos penales de la Ley de Vida Silvestre y prescripción

CRIMINAL CASSATION COURT. SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSE, GOICOECHEA. At ten hours forty minutes of the sixteenth of January of two thousand three.

CASSATION APPEAL filed in the present case against [Nombre1], of legal age, married, Nicaraguan, daughter of [Nombre2] and [Nombre3], resident of Guadalupe, Montelimar, for the crime of VIOLATION OF THE WILDLIFE CONSERVATION LAW, to the detriment of WILDLIFE. The judges Fernando Cruz Castro, [Nombre4] and [Nombre5] are involved in the decision of the appeal. The Attorney [Nombre6] appeared in Cassation as the Environmental Agrarian Prosecutor of the Public Prosecutor's Office.

WHEREAS:

• 1)That by means of a Definitive Dismissal (Sobreseimiento Definitivo) judgment issued at eight hours forty minutes of the twenty-eighth of November of two thousand one, the Trial Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Goicoechea, resolved: “THEREFORE In accordance with Constitutional Articles 39 and 41, Articles 31 and 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 96 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, Article 8 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary, the criminal action initiated in this matter is declared time-barred (prescrita), issuing a judgment of TOTAL DISMISSAL (SOBRESEIMIENTO TOTAL) in favor of the defendant [Nombre1], for the crime of VIOLATION OF THE WILDLIFE CONSERVATION LAW, to the detriment of WILDLIFE, which has been attributed to her in this matter, all in accordance with Constitutional Articles 39 and 41, Articles 31 and 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 96 of the Wildlife Conservation Law. This matter is resolved without special condemnation in costs, the expenses of the process being borne by the State. NOTIFY.- [Nombre7], TRIAL JUDGE.” (sic).- 2) That against the above pronouncement, Attorney [Nombre6] filed a Cassation Appeal.
• 3)That having verified the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of Article 450 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court considered the issues raised in the Appeal.
• 4)That in the proceedings, the relevant legal prescriptions have been observed.

Written by the Cassation Judge [Nombre8]; and,

WHEREAS:

I.- CONTENT OF THE CHALLENGE: Breach of the statute of limitations rules. Supported by the provisions of Articles 31, 33, 369, 422 et seq., 443 et seq. of the 1996 Code of Criminal Procedure; and 96 of the Wildlife Law, the environmental agrarian prosecutor of the Public Prosecutor's Office files a cassation appeal against the dismissal judgment issued by the trial court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, with the first of his grounds, as a matter of substance, arguing the following: a) In the challenged resolution, by which the statute of limitations for the criminal action was decreed, Article 96 of the Wildlife Law was violated, when it was reasoned that the crime provided for by said norm is sanctioned only with a fine (multa) of ¢20,000.00 to ¢30,000.00. The trial judge cites the ruling of the Constitutional Chamber Voto 1781-97, which declared unconstitutional the conversion of fine-days into a custodial sentence provided for by the contravention of Article 109 of the aforementioned Law, applying it by analogy to the crime sanctioned by Article 96 ibid. Based on this, the judge considers that this last norm does not contemplate a custodial sentence, but only a pecuniary one, so that -then- for the purposes of calculating the statute of limitations, he opts to apply a term of two years (subsection b of Article 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Such reasoning, in the opinion of the challenging prosecutor, is erroneous, as it leads him to outline the fallacious assertion that all articles containing the phrase “convertible into a prison sentence of 4 to 8 months” were “repealed” by the Constitutional Chamber. In reality, the appellant argues, the ruling does not distinguish between crimes and contraventions, since the cited Voto only referred to Article 109. However, the trial court assumes that it was an evident omission or material error, in not having decreed the unconstitutionality of the other articles, despite the fact that the Constitutional Chamber centered its pronouncement only on contraventions, in attention to the abysmal differences in both forms of sanction. Due to the foregoing, and since numeral 96 maintains the custodial sentence, in this case the statute of limitations has not operated, given that at the time of the notification that first summoned a preliminary hearing, which constitutes an interrupting act, only 1 year, 5 months and 28 days had elapsed; b) Although after Voto N° 1781-97, the Constitutional Chamber rulings Voto N° 5646-97 of September 16, 1997, and Voto N° 8360-M-97 of December 5, 1997, were issued, which declare unconstitutional the phrase “convertible into a prison sentence of 4 to 8 months” contained in the crimes typified in Articles 94 and 90 of the cited substantive Law, the truth is that this was never extended to the other criminal types, since in the first it was expressly clarified that no pronouncement was made regarding Articles 95 to 104 because the cause giving rise to the consultation referred only to 94; c) Notwithstanding the jurisprudential line developed in these two rulings, the most recent pronouncement of the Constitutional Chamber (resolution N° 6133-98 at 16:21 hrs. of August 26, 1998, where an unconstitutionality action against the last paragraph of Article 132 was heard) varies said criterion, by maintaining that the option between the fine or prison is upheld. In the only objection on procedural grounds, the prosecutor alleges a lack of reasoning, since there is no pronouncement by the Constitutional Chamber that has annulled the phrase “convertible into a prison sentence of 4 to 8 months” contained in Article 96 of the Wildlife Law.

II.- For the reasons that will be stated, with the note of co-judge [Nombre9], both grounds are declared without merit. Taking into account that the present challenge focuses on the nature of the sanction provided for by the criminal types incorporated by the Wildlife Law, it is necessary to point out what the position maintained in this regard by the jurisprudence of this Cassation Court has been: “… In a second point, this time accusing a substantive defect, Attorney … considers that the judgment of the Alajuela Court based in San Ramón, has incurred in erroneous interpretation and application of the Wildlife Conservation Law (Article 132, Law No. 7317 of October 30, 1992), as well as numerals 30 subsection c) and 311 subsection d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and of the Constitutional Chamber Voto No. 6133 of seventeen hours eleven minutes of August twenty-six, nineteen ninety-eight. In support of his criterion, the appellant says that the judgment in question takes into account, for dismissing, that the accused managed the cancellation of the maximum amount of the fine (multa) provided for in said Article 132 of the L.C.V.S., reason for which, based on provision 30 subsection c) of the Procedural Code, the Judge considers the criminal action extinguished and issued the corresponding dismissal. The challenger adds that, according to the trial court, furthermore, the said Article 132 provides for the penalty of a fine and only subsidiarily, that is, in the event that it is not made effective, the conversion to a custodial sentence would correspond, it being in any case that, upon declaring unconstitutional the possibility of converting a fine into prison, according to the Constitutional Chamber's pronouncement regarding Article 56 of the Penal Code, what subsists is only the fine penalty, so that the norm contained in 30 subsection c) of the C.p.p. is applicable. This reasoning, in the criterion of the Criminal Attorney is absolutely erroneous besides falling into frank disrespect for the binding and obligatory nature of the resolutions of the Constitutional Court, since this high jurisdictional authority has pronounced itself in a completely opposite sense to how the trial judge does. The interested party adds that when precisely resolving an action of unconstitutionality regarding Articles 130 and 132 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, the Constitutional Chamber has said that: “...regarding the applicable sanction, it must be interpreted that it is a fine or prison, that is, the judge can apply one or the other, since the fine should not be imposed together with the custodial sentence, but alone, since the fine pursues, among other ends, precisely avoiding the imposition of a custodial sentence...” (Voto No. 6133-98 of 17:21 hours of August 26, 1998). The challenger insists that the judge's error consists of interpreting that the prison sentence provided for in Article 132 L.C.V.S. only applies when there is no effective payment of the fine, a case in which it becomes the principal penalty, whereas the Constitutional Chamber has established that this norm refers to a fine or prison penalty, it being understood that this “or” is disjunctive and not supplementary. For the stated reasons, the appellant requests the annulment of the judgment and its remission to the court of origin so that the applicable regulations can be heard and properly defined. The claim is not admissible. The fundamental core of the reasoning made by the trial Judge is, in effect, the following: “...even though the norm of Article 132 of the wildlife conservation law (sic) also contains the custodial sentence when the fine is not cancelled, the truth is that it functions in the absence of payment of that one, converting it into a basic and principal penalty, and given that the conversion for non-payment had been annulled by the Constitutional Chamber when it analyzed numeral 56 of the Penal Code, it will proceed to accept the accused's request...” Such development is, in the criterion of this Court, correct, notwithstanding the jurisprudential citation made by the appellant. It must be taken into account first of all that, in what is of interest, Article 132 of the Wildlife Conservation Law textually reads: “Those who do not comply with the stipulations in this article shall be fined with amounts ranging from fifty thousand colones (50,000) to one hundred thousand colones (100,000), convertible into a prison sentence of one to two years.” (the underlining is ours). Even though it is true that in the last lines of the Constitutional Chamber Voto No. 6133-98, it is said that one is before an alternative criminal provision, that the judge may, in the case of Article 132 of the L.C.V.S., either impose a fine penalty, or opt for deprivation of liberty, the truth of the matter is that this same high Constitutional Court has drawn a diverse jurisprudential line, which is, in our criterion, the one that should prevail. Such is the case of Voto No. 1054-94 of fifteen hours twenty-four minutes of February twenty-two, nineteen ninety-four, where, upon declaring unconstitutional the phrase of Article 56 of the Penal Code “...this shall be converted at a rate of one day of prison per fine-day...” the consequence was drawn that, in the case of contraventions, it was contrary to the Constitution -Articles 38 and 39 of the Magna Carta- to convert a fine (debt in favor of the State) into a prison sentence, since in essence it meant applying imprisonment for debts, affecting especially vulnerable social sectors due to their economic limitations. In this decision of the Constitutional Chamber, generic affirmations are already made regarding the unconstitutionality of converting a fine into prison that point to the fact that it is necessary to prohibit the said conversion not only in the case of contraventions. Such is the case of affirmations made in that resolution that indicate, for example that: “No matter from which point of view we analyze the figure of the conversion of a fine to prison, the result is always the same: the insolvency of the convict costs them their personal liberty...”, or when it is affirmed that: “it is unconstitutional that the substitute penalty, of a different nature from the substituted penalty, is of greater severity than the latter, attending to reasons alien to the culpability or unlawfulness of the act, such as the patrimonial conditions of the convict”. Likewise, this line of jurisprudential thought is maintained in Voto No. 1781-97 where a judicial consultation of constitutionality is resolved and where it is specifically said that the phrase “... convertible into a prison sentence...” is contrary to the Constitution, referring to the fine provided for in Articles 105 to 119 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, No. 7317 of October thirty, nineteen ninety-two. This same turn, despite the interpretation made in Voto 6133 that the appellant mentions, is the one expressly used in numeral 132 of the same Law, here under discussion. So, for this Cassation Court, what has been said insistently and amply in those constitutional resolutions that have dealt with the specific topic of the impossibility of converting a fine into prison has preponderant value and, on the contrary, an isolated reference from a ruling that, although later, does not concretely address the point of conversion does not have that preponderance. The trial Judge therefore did well in considering that, with the jurisprudential antecedents of the case, any conversion of a fine into prison is prohibited and, in those cases where the criminal type provides for it, it must be understood that only the patrimonial sanction of a fine remains subsistent and, therefore, numeral 30 subsection c), as well as 311 subsection d) of the current Code of Criminal Procedure, are applicable. …”, Criminal Cassation Court, Voto N° 0029-00, of January 14, 2000. In accordance with the foregoing, and despite the appellant's objections, it is the criterion of the majority of this Court that the decision of the trial judge is correct, since -in effect- Article 96 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, by resorting to the conversion of the pecuniary penalty into a custodial sentence, incorporates a legislative practice that, according to the jurisprudential guidelines outlined since the Constitutional Chamber Voto N° 1054-94, of 15:24 hrs. of February 22, 1994, is contrary to the guiding principles embodied in our Political Constitution, whence it must be understood that said criminal type only provides for a fine penalty and not a custodial one. Starting from this premise, we would have that in accordance with the proceedings that have been carried out in this process, it is clear to the majority of this cassation court, with the note of co-judge [Nombre9], that the trial court's resolution, insofar as it considered the term of the statute of limitations for the criminal action to have elapsed, thereby decreeing its extinction, did not incur in any of the interpretive errors that are denounced. Before pronouncing on the substance of the matter, it is necessary to note that in Voto N° 1058-01, of 09:50 hours of December 21, 2001, this Cassation Court -on the occasion of the legislative reform introduced to Article 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by Law N° 8146 of October 30, 2001, published in La Gaceta N° 227 of Monday, November 26, 2001- re-elaborated the interpretation that regarding the scope of said provision had been held in Voto N° 372-01, of May 18, 2001. In that pronouncement, the following was clarified: (i). As was held in the cited Voto N° 372-01, issued based on the original wording of Article 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law N° 7594), without the mentioned reform, in matters of the statute of limitations for the criminal action, several guidelines had to be followed, namely: a) The initiation of the proceeding interrupts the statute of limitations, reducing the periods established in art. 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by half; b) For the proceeding to be initiated, an act of singling out a concrete person as the perpetrator or participant in a criminal act is required, for which reason, with respect to the various perpetrators or participants, the initiation of the proceeding that interrupts the statute of limitations and reduces its periods will occur independently; c) The first formal accusation (imputación formal) is the formulation of the indictment, requiring notification of its existence to the defendant so that they can pronounce on it and raise the respective exceptions, it not being necessary that said notification be made to them personally; (ii). On the occasion of the legislative reform introduced by Law N° 8146, it is now considered that in matters where it is applicable, the initiation of the proceeding does not have interrupting effects nor does it reduce the periods by half, and it is held that the first formal accusation is the first statement that regarding the facts is taken from the accused, where the notification of the facts (intimación) is carried out; (iii). Starting from the premise that the statute of limitations has a procedural nature, and that the principle in this matter is that the norm in force at the time of the procedural act to be carried out is applied, it is concluded that what is important for the purposes of the interruption of the statute of limitations is whether the act was contemplated as an interrupting event at the time of its realization, since if it was foreseen as such, even if the rules on interruption were subsequently changed, the interruption would have occurred. Conversely, if at the time the act was carried out it was not foreseen as an interruptor of the statute of limitations, but it is subsequently established that it does interrupt, it could not be considered that said interruption occurred. This being the case, starting from the premise that Law N° 8146, which modified art. 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, took effect from its publication, it must be understood that depending on the date on which the procedural act in question was carried out, either before or after November 26, 2001, the guidelines outlined in Voto N° 372-01 or those defined in Voto N° 1058-01 will prevail. This being the case, and according to the study of the procedural actions carried out in the case before us, we would have the following: i) If true, the investigated facts date from November 10, 1999, as the prosecutor's indictment on folios 9 to 14 places them in time; ii) Taking into account that the complaint prepared by the Ministry of Environment and Energy is dated November 15, 1999, in accordance with the parameters outlined in Voto 372-01, of May 18, 2001, the 2-year term defined by Article 31 ibidem (remember that it is a criminal type sanctioned with a pecuniary penalty), was interrupted on the date of the complaint and began to run again but reduced this time by half; c) By means of a notification certificate notified via facsimile visible on folio 17, it is recorded that the indictment was notified to the defense attorney, representative of the defendant, on May eleven of the year two thousand one (see folio 18). Based on the foregoing, it must be understood that since this action was carried out before November 26, 2001, the guidelines outlined in Voto N° 372-01 of this Court must be applied to it, according to which said notification constitutes the first formal accusation that numeral 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure incorporated, according to its original text, which as such caused the interruption of the computation of the statute of limitations in progress. Notwithstanding the foregoing, as reasoned by the trial judge, by May 11, 2001, after the cause for interruption had operated due to the initiation of the proceeding, 1 year, 5 months and 25 days had already elapsed, from which it is inferred that by then the twelve-month term had more than expired. This being the case, it is clear that when this last interrupting act occurred, the statute of limitations term had already elapsed, so the dismissal judgment being challenged, insofar as it thereby considered the criminal action extinguished, did not incur the interpretive error that the challenger criticizes it for. This being so, the two grounds of the appeal filed by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office are declared without merit.

THEREFORE (POR TANTO):

The two grounds of the cassation appeal presented by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office are declared without merit. NOTIFY.

Fernando Cruz Castro [Nombre4] [Nombre10] [Nombre11] Edo.

[Nombre6] as Environmental Agrarian Prosecutor of the Public Ministry.

**WHEREAS:** **1)** That by a judgment of Definitive Dismissal issued at eight hours forty minutes on November twenty-eighth, two thousand one, the Trial Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Goicoechea, resolved: “**THEREFORE** Pursuant to Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution, 31, 33 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 96 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, 8 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, the criminal action brought in this matter is declared time-barred, entering a judgment of **TOTAL DISMISSAL** in favor of the defendant **[Nombre1]**, for the crime of **VIOLATION OF THE WILDLIFE CONSERVATION LAW**, to the detriment of **WILDLIFE**, which has been attributed to her in this matter, all in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution, 31, 33 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and 96 of the Wildlife Conservation Law. This matter is resolved without special award of costs, with the expenses of the proceeding borne by the State. **NOTIFY.- [Nombre7], TRIAL JUDGE.**” (sic).- **2)** That against the foregoing ruling, Lic. [Nombre6] filed a Cassation Appeal.

**3)** That having conducted the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of Article 450 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court considered the issues raised in the Appeal.

**4)** That the pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by the Cassation Judge [Nombre8]; and, **CONSIDERING:** **I.- CONTENT OF THE CHALLENGE**: *Violation of the rules on statute of limitations*. Shielded by the provisions of Articles 31, 33, 369, 422 et seq., 443 et seq. of the 1996 Criminal Procedure Code; and 96 of the Wildlife Law, the Environmental Agrarian Prosecutor of the Public Ministry files a cassation appeal against the dismissal judgment issued by the trial court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, alleging the following as a matter of substance in the first of his grounds: **a)** In the challenged resolution, by which the statute of limitations on the criminal action was decreed, Article 96 of the Wildlife Law was violated, by reasoning that the crime provided for in that statute is punishable only with a fine of between ¢20,000.°° and ¢30,000.°°. The trial judge cites ruling of the Constitutional Chamber No. 1781-97, which declared unconstitutional the conversion of day-fines into a custodial sentence provided for in the *violation* of Article 109 of the aforementioned Law, applying it by analogy to the *crime* punishable under Article 96 ibid. Based on this, the judge considers that this latter statute does not contemplate a custodial sentence, but only a monetary one, and therefore – for the purposes of calculating the statute of limitations – opts to apply a term of two years (subsection b of Article 31 of the Criminal Procedure Code). Such reasoning, in the opinion of the challenging prosecutor, is erroneous, as it leads him to outline the fallacious assertion that all articles containing the phrase “*convertible to a prison sentence of 4 to 8 months*” were “derogated” by the Constitutional Chamber. In reality, the appellant argues, the ruling does not distinguish between crimes and violations, since the aforementioned vote only referred to Article 109. However, the lower court assumes that this was an evident omission or material error, in not having decreed the unconstitutionality of the other articles, despite the fact that the Constitutional Chamber centered its pronouncement only on violations, in light of the abysmal differences between both forms of sanction. Due to the foregoing, and since section 96 maintains the custodial sentence, in this case the statute of limitations has not elapsed, since at the time of the notification that first summoned to a preliminary hearing, which constitutes an interrupting act, only 1 year, 5 months, and 28 days had passed; **b)** Although Constitutional Chamber rulings No. 5646-97 of September 16, 1997, and No. 8360-M-97 of December 5, 1997, came after ruling No. 1781-97, which declare unconstitutional the phrase “*convertible to a prison sentence of 4 to 8 months*” contained in the *crimes* defined in Articles 94 and 90 of the cited substantive Law, the truth is that this was never extended to the other criminal provisions, since the former expressly clarified that no pronouncement was being issued regarding Articles 95 to 104 because the cause giving rise to the inquiry referred only to Article 94; **c)** Notwithstanding the line of jurisprudence developed in these two rulings, the most recent pronouncement of the Constitutional Chamber (resolution No. 6133-98 of 16:21 hrs. on August 26, 1998, where an action of unconstitutionality against the last paragraph of Article 132 was heard) varies this criterion, by holding that the option between the fine or imprisonment is maintained. In the **sole objection on procedural grounds**, the prosecutor alleges a failure to state reasons (lack of legal grounds), since there is no pronouncement from the Constitutional Chamber that has annulled the phrase “*convertible to a prison sentence of 4 to 8 months*” contained in Article 96 of the Wildlife Law.

**II.-** *For the reasons that will be stated, with the note of co-judge [Nombre9], both grounds are declared without merit*. Taking into account that the present challenge focuses on the nature of the sanction provided for in the criminal provisions incorporated by the Wildlife Law, it is necessary to point out the position that the jurisprudence of this Court of Cassation has maintained on the matter: “… *On a second point, this time alleging a substantive defect, Lic. …* *considers that the judgment of the Alajuela Court based in San Ramón has incurred an erroneous interpretation and application of the Wildlife Conservation Law (Article 132, Law No. 7317 of October 30, 1992), as well as sections 30 subsection c) and 311 subsection d) of the Criminal Procedure Code and Constitutional Chamber Ruling No. 6133 of seventeen hours eleven minutes on August twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred ninety-eight.* *In support of his criterion,* *the appellant states that the judgment in question takes into account, for purposes of dismissal, that the accused sought the cancellation of the maximum amount of the fine provided for in the cited Article 132 of the W.C.L., which is why, based on provision 30 subsection c) of the governing Procedure Code, the Judge deems the criminal action extinguished and issued the corresponding dismissal.* *The challenger adds that, according to the* ***A quo,*** *furthermore, the said Article 132 provides for the penalty of a fine and only subsidiarily, that is, in the event that it is not made effective, conversion to a custodial sentence would apply, it being in any case that, upon the unconstitutionality of the possibility of converting a fine into imprisonment being declared, according to a pronouncement of the Constitutional Chamber regarding Article 56 of the Penal Code,* *only the penalty of the fine subsists, so the rule contained in Article 30 subsection c) of the C.p.p. is applicable.* *This reasoning, in the opinion of the Penal Prosecutor, is absolutely erroneous in addition to falling into a frank disrespect of the binding and obligatory nature of the Constitutional Court's resolutions, since this high jurisdictional authority has pronounced itself in a sense completely opposite to that of the sentencing judge. The interested party adds that upon resolving precisely an action of unconstitutionality regarding Articles 130 and 132 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, the Constitutional Chamber has stated that:* ***“...regarding the applicable sanction, it must be interpreted as referring to a fine or imprisonment, that is, the judge may apply one or the other, since the fine should not be imposed together with the custodial sentence, but alone, given that the fine is intended, among other purposes, precisely to avoid the imposition of a custodial sentence...”*** *(Ruling No. 6133-98 of 17:21 hours on August 26, 1998). The challenger insists that the judge's error consists in interpreting that the prison sentence provided for in Article 132* *W.C.L. is only applied when there is no effective payment of the fine, at which point it becomes the principal penalty, whereas the Constitutional Chamber has established that this rule refers to a penalty of a fine or imprisonment,* *it being understood that this “or” is disjunctive and not supplementary.* *For the reasons stated, the appellant requests the nullity of the judgment and its remittance to the court of origin so that it may hear the matter* *and properly define the applicable law.* ***The claim is not admissible.*** *The fundamental core of the reasoning made by the Sentencing Judge is, in effect, the following:* ***“...even though the rule of Article 132 of the Wildlife Conservation Law (sic) also contains the custodial sentence when the fine is not paid, it is true that it operates in the event of non-payment of the former, converting it into the basic and principal penalty, and given that the conversion for non-payment had been annulled by the Constitutional Chamber when it analyzed section 56 of the Penal Code, the accused's request shall be granted...”*** *Such development is, in the opinion of this Court, correct, notwithstanding the jurisprudential citation made by the appellant. It should be kept in mind above all that, as relevant, Article 132 of the Wildlife Conservation Law textually reads:* ***“Those who fail to comply with the stipulations in this article shall be fined** **with amounts ranging from fifty thousand colones (50,000) to one hundred thousand colones (100,000),** **convertible to a prison sentence of one to two years.” (emphasis is ours).*** *Although it is true that in the last lines* *of Constitutional Chamber Ruling No. 6133-98, it is stated that this is an alternative penal provision, that the judge in the case of Article 132 of the W.C.L. may either impose a penalty of a fine, or opt for deprivation of liberty, the truth of the matter is that this same high Constitutional Court has traced a different jurisprudential line, which is, in our view, the one that should prevail. Such is the case of Ruling No. 1054-94 of fifteen hours twenty-four minutes on February twenty-second, nineteen hundred ninety-four, where, upon declaring the phrase of Article 56 of the Penal Code unconstitutional* ***“...it shall be converted at a rate of one day of imprisonment per day-fine...”*** *the consequence was drawn that, in the case of violations, it was contrary to the Constitution* *- Articles 38 and 39 of the Magna Carta - to convert a fine (debt in favor of the State) into a prison sentence, since this fundamentally meant applying imprisonment for debts, affecting especially vulnerable social sectors due to their economic limitations. In this decision of the Constitutional Chamber, generic affirmations are already made regarding the unconstitutionality of converting a fine into imprisonment, which point towards the need to prohibit the said conversion not only in the case of violations.* *Such is the case of affirmations made in that resolution that indicate, for example, that:* ***“No matter from what point of view we analyze the figure of the conversion of a fine to imprisonment, the result is always the same: the insolvency of the convicted person costs them their personal liberty...”,*** *or when it is affirmed that:* ***“it is unconstitutional for the substitute penalty, of a different nature from the substituted penalty, to be more severe than the latter, due to reasons unrelated to the culpability or unlawfulness of the act, such as the convicted person's financial circumstances.”*** *Likewise, this line of jurisprudential thought is maintained in Ruling No. 1781-97, which resolves a judicial consultation on constitutionality and in which it is specifically stated that the phrase* ***“...convertible to a prison sentence...”*** *is contrary to the Constitution, referring to the fine provided for in Articles 105 to 119 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, No. 7317 of October thirtieth, nineteen hundred ninety-two.* *This same wording, despite the interpretation made in Ruling 6133 mentioned by the appellant, is the one expressly used in section 132 of the same Law, under discussion here. Therefore, for this Court of Cassation, what has been said insistently and extensively in those constitutional resolutions that have dealt with the specific topic of the impossibility of converting a fine into imprisonment has preponderant value, and, conversely,* *an isolated reference in a ruling that, although later, does not specifically address the point of conversion, does not have that preponderance.** **The Sentencing Judge therefore correctly held that, with the jurisprudential background of the case, all conversion of a fine into imprisonment is prohibited and, in those cases where the criminal provision provides for it, it must be understood that only the patrimonial sanction of the fine remains in force, and, therefore, section 30 subsection c), as well as 311 subsection d) of the current Criminal Procedure Code are applicable.* …”, Criminal Cassation Court, ruling No. 0029-00, of January 14, 2000. In accordance with the foregoing, and despite the appellant's objections, it is the opinion of the majority of this Court that the trial judge's decision is correct, since – indeed – Article 96 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, by resorting to the conversion of a monetary penalty into a custodial sentence, incorporates a legislative practice which, according to the jurisprudential guidelines outlined since Constitutional Chamber ruling No. 1054-94, of 15:24 hrs. on February 22, 1994, is contrary to the guiding principles embodied in our Political Constitution, from which it must be understood that said criminal provision only provides for a penalty of a fine and not a custodial one. Based on that premise, we would have that in accordance with the procedural acts that have been carried out in this case, it is clear to the majority of this court of cassation, with the note of co-judge [Nombre9], that the lower court's resolution, inasmuch as it considered the term of the statute of limitations on the criminal action to have elapsed, thereby decreeing its extinguishment, did not incur any of the interpretative errors alleged. Before ruling on the merits of the matter, it is necessary to note that in ruling No. 1058-01, of 09:50 hours on December 21, 2001, this Court of Cassation – on the occasion of the legislative reform introduced to Article 33 of the Criminal Procedure Code through Law No. 8146 of October 30, 2001, published in La Gaceta No. 227 of Monday, November 26, 2001 – reworked the interpretation regarding the scope of said provision that had been maintained in ruling No. 372-01, of May 18, 2001. In that pronouncement, the following was clarified: **(i).** As held in the cited ruling No. 372-01, issued based on the original wording of Article 33 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Law No. 7594), without the mentioned reform, in matters concerning the statute of limitations on the criminal action, several guidelines were to be followed, namely: a) The initiation of the proceeding interrupts the statute of limitations, reducing the time limits established in Art. 31 of the Criminal Procedure Code by half; b) For the proceeding to be initiated, an act identifying a specific person as the perpetrator or participant in a criminal act is required, so that with respect to the various perpetrators or participants, the initiation of the proceeding that interrupts the statute of limitations and reduces its time limits will occur independently; c) The first formal accusation is the formulation of the charges, requiring notification of its existence to the accused, so that they may pronounce on it and raise the respective exceptions, it not being necessary for said notification to be given in person; **(ii).** By reason of the legislative reform introduced by Law N° 8146, it is now considered that in matters where it is applicable, the initiation of the proceeding has no interrupting effects nor does it reduce the time limits by half, and the first formal charge (imputación formal) is understood to be the first statement regarding the facts received from the accused (encartado), in which the notification of the charges (intimación de los hechos) is carried out; (iii). Starting from the premise that the statute of limitations (prescripción) is procedural in nature, and that the principle in this matter is that the norm in force at the time of the procedural act to be performed applies, it is concluded that what matters for the purposes of interrupting the statute of limitations (prescripción) is whether the act was contemplated as an interrupting act at the time of its execution, since if it was provided for as such, even if the rules on interruption were later changed, that interruption would have occurred. Conversely, if at the time the act was performed it was not provided for as an interruptor of the statute of limitations (prescripción), but is later established as such, it could not be considered that said interruption occurred. Thus, starting from the premise that Law N° 8146, which amended Art. 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), took effect upon its publication, it must be understood that depending on the date on which the procedural act in question was performed, whether before or after November 26, 2001, the guidelines outlined in Voto N° 372-01 or those defined in Voto N° 1058-01 will prevail. Thus, and according to the study of the procedural actions carried out in the case at hand, we would have the following: i) If true, the investigated facts date back to November 10, 1999, as they are temporally located by the prosecutorial accusation (acusación fiscal) on folios 9 to 14; ii) Taking into account that the complaint (denuncia) prepared by the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía) is dated November 15, 1999, in accordance with the parameters outlined in Voto 372-01 of May 18, 2001, the 2-year term defined by Article 31 ibidem (remember that this is a criminal offense sanctioned with a pecuniary penalty) was interrupted on the date of the complaint (denuncia) and began to run again, but reduced this time by half; c) By means of a notification certificate (acta de notificación) notified via facsimile, visible at folio 17, it is recorded that the accusation was notified to the defense attorney, representative of the accused (imputado), on May 11, two thousand one (see folio 18).

Based on the foregoing, it must be understood that since said action was carried out before November 26, 2001, the guidelines outlined in Voto N° 372-01 of this Court must be applied to it, according to which said notification constitutes the first formal charge (imputación formal) that incorporated numeral 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), according to its original text, which as such caused the interruption of the computation of the statute of limitations (prescripción) in progress. Notwithstanding the foregoing, as reasoned by the trial judge (juez de instancia), by May 11, 2001, after the ground for interruption had operated due to the initiation of the proceeding, 1 year, 5 months, and 25 days had already elapsed, from which it is inferred that by then the twelve-month term had more than expired. Thus, it is clear that when this last interrupting act occurred, the term for the statute of limitations (prescripción) had already elapsed, and therefore the dismissal judgment (sentencia de sobreseimiento) being challenged, insofar as it deemed the criminal action (acción penal) extinguished, did not incur in the interpretive error that the challenger attributes to it. This being the case, the two grounds of the appeal filed by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) are declared without merit.

POR TANTO:

The two grounds of the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) are declared without merit. NOTIFÍQUESE.

Fernando Cruz Castro [Nombre4] [Nombre10] [Nombre11] Edo.

The fundamental core of the reasoning made by the trial judge is, indeed, the following: "...even though the norm of Article 132 of the Wildlife Conservation Law (sic) also contains a custodial sentence when the fine is not paid, the fact is that it operates upon the non-payment of the former, converting it into a basic and principal penalty, and given that the conversion for non-payment had been annulled by the Constitutional Chamber when it analyzed Article 56 of the Criminal Code, the defendant's petition will be granted..." In the opinion of this Court, such reasoning is correct, notwithstanding the jurisprudential citation made by the appellant. It must be borne in mind, first of all, that what is relevant here is that Article 132 of the Wildlife Conservation Law literally reads: "Those who fail to comply with the provisions of this article shall be fined amounts ranging from fifty thousand colones (50,000) to one hundred thousand colones (100,000), convertible into a prison sentence of one to two years [Nombre2] (emphasis added). Although it is true that in the final lines of Constitutional Chamber Vote No. 6133-98, it is stated that this is an alternative criminal provision, and that in the case of Article 132 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, the judge may either impose a fine or opt for a custodial sentence, the truth of the matter is that this same high Constitutional Court has charted a different jurisprudential course, which, in our opinion, is the one that must prevail. Such is the case of Vote No. 1054-94, at fifteen hours twenty-four minutes on the twenty-second of February, nineteen ninety-four, where, upon declaring the phrase in Article 56 of the Criminal Code unconstitutional, "...it shall be converted at a rate of one day of imprisonment per day fine..." the consequence was drawn that, in the case of infractions, it was contrary to the Constitution—Articles 38 and 39 of the Magna Carta—to convert a fine (a debt owed to the State) into a prison sentence, since this essentially meant imposing imprisonment for debt, thus affecting social sectors that are especially vulnerable due to their economic limitations. In this decision of the Constitutional Chamber, generic statements are already made regarding the unconstitutionality of converting a fine into imprisonment, pointing out that this conversion must be prohibited not only in the case of infractions. Such is the case of the statements made in that ruling that indicate, for example, that: "No matter from which standpoint we analyze the figure of converting a fine to imprisonment, the result is always the same: the insolvency of the convicted person costs them their personal freedom...", or when it is affirmed that: "it is unconstitutional for the substitute penalty, of a different nature from the substituted penalty, to be more severe than the latter, based on reasons unrelated to the guilt or unlawfulness of the act, such as the convicted person's financial circumstances." Likewise, this line of jurisprudential thought is maintained in Vote No. 1781-97, where a judicial consultation on constitutionality is resolved, and where it is specifically stated that the phrase "[Nombre2] convertible into a prison sentence..." is contrary to the Constitution, referring to the fine provided for in Articles 105 to 119 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, No. 7317 of the thirtieth of October, nineteen ninety-two. This same wording, despite the interpretation made in Vote 6133 mentioned by the appellant, is expressly used in Article 132 of the same Law, which is under discussion here. Therefore, for this Court of Cassation, the preponderant value is given to what has been insisted upon and amply stated in those constitutional rulings that have dealt with the specific issue of the impossibility of converting a fine into imprisonment, and conversely, an isolated reference in a vote that, although later, does not address the specific point of conversion in detail does not carry that preponderance. The trial judge was therefore correct in considering that, given the relevant jurisprudential precedents, any conversion of a fine into imprisonment is prohibited, and in those cases where the criminal statute provides for it, it must be understood that only the monetary penalty of the fine remains in effect, and therefore, subsection c) of Article 30, as well as subsection d) of Article 311 of the current Criminal Procedure Code, are applicable. …”, Penal Court of Cassation, Vote No. 0029-00, of January 14, 2000. In accordance with the foregoing, and notwithstanding the appellant's objections, it is the opinion of the majority of this Court that the decision of the trial judge was correct, since—indeed—Article 96 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, by resorting to the conversion of the monetary penalty into a custodial sentence, incorporates a legislative practice that, according to the jurisprudential guidelines outlined since Constitutional Chamber Vote No. 1054-94, of 15:24 hrs. on February 22, 1994, is contrary to the guiding principles enshrined in our Political Constitution; hence, it must be understood that said criminal statute only provides for a fine and not a custodial sentence. Starting from that premise, we would have that pursuant to the actions undertaken in this process, it is clear to the majority of this Court of Cassation, with a note from co-judge [Nombre1], that the decision of the lower court, insofar as it deemed the statute of limitations (prescripción) for the criminal action to have expired, consequently decreeing its extinction, did not incur any of the interpretive errors alleged. Before ruling on the merits of the matter, it is necessary to point out that in Vote No. 1058-01, at 09:50 hours on December 21, 2001, this Court of Cassation—by reason of the legislative reform introduced to Article 33 of the Criminal Procedure Code through Law No. 8146 of October 30, 2001, published in La Gaceta No. 227 of Monday, November 26, 2001—reworked the interpretation regarding the scope of that provision that had been held in Vote No. 372-01, of May 18, 2001. In that pronouncement, the following was clarified: (i). As was held in the aforementioned Vote No. 372-01, issued based on the original wording of Article 33 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Law No. 7594), without the mentioned reform, several guidelines had to be followed regarding the statute of limitations for the criminal action, namely: a) The initiation of the proceeding interrupts the statute of limitations, reducing the periods established in Art. 31 of the Criminal Procedure Code by half; b) For the proceeding to be initiated, an act is required that identifies a specific person as the perpetrator or participant in a criminal act, such that, with respect to the various perpetrators or participants, the initiation of the proceeding that interrupts the statute of limitations and reduces its periods will occur independently; c) The first formal charge (imputación formal) is the filing of the accusation, requiring notification of its existence to the accused so that they may respond to it and raise the respective exceptions, without it being necessary for said notification to be made personally; (ii). By reason of the legislative reform introduced by Law No. 8146, it is now considered that in matters where it is applicable, the initiation of the proceeding has neither interruptive effects nor reduces the periods by half [Nombre2], and the first formal charge (imputación formal) is considered to be the first statement regarding the facts received from the defendant, where the notification of the facts (intimación de los hechos) occurs; (iii). Based on the premise that the statute of limitations (prescripción) is procedural in nature, and that the principle in this matter is that the rule in force at the time of the procedural act to be performed applies, it is concluded that what matters for the purposes of interrupting the statute of limitations is whether the act was contemplated as interruptive at the time of its performance, since if it was so provided, even if the rules on interruption were subsequently changed, the interruption would have occurred. Conversely, if at the time the act was performed it had not been provided for as interrupting the statute of limitations, but it is later established that it does interrupt, it could not be considered that such interruption occurred. That being the case, starting from the premise that Law No. 8146, which modified Art. 33 of the Criminal Procedure Code, took effect from its publication, it must be understood that depending on the date on which the procedural act in question was performed, whether before or after November 26, 2001, the guidelines outlined in Vote No. 372-01 or those defined in Vote No. 1058-01 will prevail. Thus, and according to the study of the procedural actions carried out in the case at hand, we have the following: i) If accurate, the investigated facts date back to November 10, 1999, as they are temporally situated by the prosecutorial accusation on folios 9 through 14; ii) Taking into account that the complaint (denuncia) prepared by the Ministry of Environment and Energy is dated November 15, 1999, pursuant to the parameters outlined in Vote 372-01, of May 18, 2001, the 2-year term defined in Article 31 ibidem (recall that this is a criminal statute sanctioned with a monetary penalty), was interrupted on the date of the complaint and began to run again, but this time reduced by half; c) By means of a notification certificate (acta de notificación) served via facsimile, visible on folio 17, it is recorded that the accusation was notified to the defense attorney, representative of the accused, on the eleventh of May, two thousand and one (see folio 18). Based on the foregoing, it must be understood that since this action was carried out before November 26, 2001, the guidelines outlined in Vote No. 372-01 of this Court must be applied to it, according to which said notification constituted the first formal charge (imputación formal) that was incorporated in Article 33 of the Criminal Procedure Code, according to its original text, and as such, triggered the interruption of the ongoing calculation of the statute of limitations (prescripción). Notwithstanding the foregoing, as reasoned by the trial judge, by May 11, 2001, after the cause for interruption had occurred due to the initiation of the proceeding, 1 year, 5 months, and 25 days had already elapsed, from which it is inferred that by then the twelve-month term had more than expired. That being the case, it is clear that when this last interrupting act occurred, the statute of limitations period had already elapsed, and therefore the appealed stay of proceedings judgment (sobreseimiento), insofar as it deemed the criminal action extinguished, did not incur the interpretive error the appellant reproaches it for. Consequently, the two grounds of the appeal filed by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office are declared without merit.

However, the appellant assumes that this was an evident omission or material error, in that the unconstitutionality of the remaining articles was not decreed, despite the fact that the Constitutional Chamber focused its ruling only on the contraventions, given the abysmal differences between the two forms of sanction. Due to the foregoing, and given that numeral 96 maintains the custodial sentence, in this case the statute of limitations has not run, since at the time of the notification that first summoned to a preliminary hearing, which constitutes an interrupting act, only 1 year, 5 months, and 28 days had elapsed; b) Although after vote No. 1781-97, the Constitutional Chamber issued votes No. 5646-97 of September 16, 1997, and No. 8360-M-97 of December 5, 1997, which declare unconstitutional the phrase “convertible into a prison sentence of 4 to 8 months” contained in the *offenses* typified in articles 94 and 90 of the aforementioned substantive Law, the truth is that this was never extended to the other criminal types, since in the former it was expressly clarified that no ruling was issued with respect to articles 95 to 104 because the case giving rise to the consultation referred only to 94; c) Notwithstanding the jurisprudential line developed in these two votes, the most recent pronouncement of the Constitutional Chamber (resolution No. 6133-98 at 16:21 hrs. on August 26, 1998, in which an action of unconstitutionality was heard against the last paragraph of article 132) varies this criterion, by maintaining that the option between the fine or imprisonment remains. In the ***sole objection on procedural grounds***, the prosecutor alleges a lack of reasoning, since there is no pronouncement from the Constitutional Chamber that has annulled the phrase “convertible into a prison sentence of 4 to 8 months” contained in article 96 of the Wildlife Law.

**II.-** ***For the reasons that will be stated, with a note from co-judge [Nombre9], both grounds are declared without merit***. Taking into account that this challenge centers on the nature of the sanction set forth for the criminal types incorporated in the Wildlife Law, it is necessary to point out the position that the jurisprudence of this Court of Cassation has maintained in this regard: “… *On a second point, this time alleging a substantive defect, Mr. …* * contends that the judgment of the Alajuela Court, based in San Ramón, has incurred in an erroneous interpretation and application of the Wildlife Conservation Law (article 132, Law No. 7317 of October 30, 1992), as well as of numerals 30 subsection c) and 311 subsection d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and of Vote of the Constitutional Chamber No. 6133 at seventeen hours and eleven minutes on August twenty-six, nineteen ninety-eight.* * In support of his view,* * the appellant states that the judgment in question considers for dismissal purposes that the accused managed the cancellation of the maximum amount of the fine provided for in the aforementioned article 132 of the Wildlife Conservation Law (L.C.V.S.), for which reason, based on provision 30 subsection c) of the Procedural Code, the Judge deems the criminal action extinguished and issued the corresponding dismissal.* * The challenger adds that, according to the* ***A quo,*** * furthermore, the said article 132 provides for a fine penalty and only subsidiarily, that is, in the event that this is not made effective, would the conversion to a custodial sentence apply, it being in any case that, upon declaring the possibility of converting a fine into imprisonment unconstitutional, according to a pronouncement of the Constitutional Chamber regarding article 56 of the Penal Code,* * what remains is only the penalty of a fine, so the rule contained in 30 subsection c) of the C.P.P. is applicable.* * This reasoning, in the opinion of the Public Prosecutor, is absolutely erroneous and also falls into a frank disrespect for the binding and obligatory nature of the Constitutional Court’s resolutions, since this high jurisdictional authority has ruled in a completely opposite sense to that of the trial judge. The interested party adds that upon resolving precisely an action of unconstitutionality regarding articles 130 and 132 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, the Constitutional Chamber has stated that:* ***“...regarding the applicable sanction, it must be interpreted as a fine or imprisonment, that is, the judge may apply one or the other, since the fine should not be imposed together with the custodial sentence, but alone, since the fine seeks, among other purposes, precisely to avoid the imposition of a custodial sentence...”*** *(Vote No. 6133-98 at 17:21 hours on August 26, 1998). The challenger insists that the error of the judge consists in interpreting that the prison sentence provided for in article 132* * of the L.C.V.S., only applies when there is no effective payment of the fine, an assumption in which it becomes the primary sentence, given that the Constitutional Chamber has established that this norm refers to a penalty of a fine or imprisonment,* * it being understood that this “or” is disjunctive and not supplementary.* * For the stated reasons, the appellant requests the annulment of the judgment and its remission to the court of origin so that it may hear* * and properly define the applicable regulations. ***The claim is not admissible***. ***The core of the reasoning made by the trial judge is, in effect, the following:*** ***“...even though the norm of 132 of the wildlife Fauna conservation law (sic) also contains the custodial sentence when the fine is not paid, the truth is that it operates upon non-payment of the former converting it into a basic and principal penalty and given that the conversion for non-payment had been annulled by the Constitutional Chamber when it analyzed numeral 56 of the Penal Code, it will proceed to grant the accused’s request...”*** *** ***Such development, in the opinion of this Court, is correct, despite the jurisprudential citation made by the appellant. Bear in mind, first of all, that in what is relevant, article 132 of the Wildlife Conservation Law literally states:*** ***“Those who do not comply with the stipulations in this article, will be fined*** *** with amounts ranging from fifty thousand colones (50,000) to one hundred thousand colones (100,000),*** ***convertible into a prison sentence of one to two years***.” (underline is ours). * *Even though it is true that in the last lines* * of Vote No. 6133-98 of the Constitutional Chamber, it is stated that this is an alternative criminal provision, that the judge may, in the case of article 132 of the L.C.V.S., either impose a fine or opt for the deprivation of liberty, the truth is that this same high Constitutional Court has drawn a different jurisprudential line, which is, in our opinion, the one that should prevail. Such is the case of Vote No. 1054-94 at fifteen hours and twenty-four minutes on February twenty-second, nineteen ninety-four, where, upon declaring unconstitutional the phrase of article 56 of the Penal Code* ***“...this shall be converted at a rate of one day of imprisonment per day-fine...”*** *the consequence was drawn that, in the case of contraventions, it was contrary to the Constitution* * -articles 38 and 39 of the Magna Carta- to convert a fine (a debt in favor of the State) into a prison sentence, since it essentially meant applying imprisonment for debts, affecting social sectors particularly vulnerable due to their economic limitations. In this decision of the Constitutional Chamber, generic affirmations are already made regarding the unconstitutionality of converting a fine into imprisonment that point to the need to prohibit said conversion not only in the case of contraventions.* * Such is the case of affirmations made in that resolution that state, for example, that:* ***“No matter from what angle we analyze the figure of converting a fine into imprisonment, the result is always the same: the insolvency of the convicted person costs them their personal liberty...”,*** *or when it is affirmed that* ***“it is unconstitutional for the substitute penalty, of a different nature from the substituted penalty, to be more severe than the latter, based on reasons unrelated to the culpability or unlawfulness of the act, such as the convicted person’s patrimonial conditions”.*** * Likewise, this line of jurisprudential thought is maintained in Vote No. 1781-97 where a judicial consultation of constitutionality is resolved and where it is specifically stated that the phrase* ***“...convertible into a prison sentence...”*** *is contrary to the Constitution, referring to the fine provided for in articles 105 to 119 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, No. 7317 of October thirtieth, nineteen ninety-two.* * This same wording, despite the interpretation made in Vote 6133 mentioned by the appellant, is the one expressly used in numeral 132 of the same Law, here under discussion. So that for this Court of Cassation, what has been insistently and extensively stated in those constitutional resolutions that have addressed the specific issue of the impossibility of converting a fine into imprisonment has preponderant value, and, conversely,* * an isolated reference from a vote that, although later, does not specifically address the point of conversion does not have that preponderance*. ***The trial judge therefore acted correctly in considering that, with the jurisprudential antecedents of the case, any conversion of a fine into imprisonment is prohibited and, in those cases where the criminal type provides for it, it must be understood that only the pecuniary sanction of a fine remains and, therefore, numeral 30 subsection c), as well as 311 subsection d) of the current Code of Criminal Procedure is applicable***. …”, Court of Criminal Cassation, vote No. 0029-00, of January 14, 2000. In accordance with the foregoing, and notwithstanding the appellant's objections, it is the opinion of the majority of this Court that the decision of the lower court judge is correct, because* * -in effect-* * article 96 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, by resorting to the conversion of the pecuniary penalty into a custodial sentence, incorporates a legislative practice that, in accordance with the jurisprudential guidelines outlined since the vote of the Constitutional Chamber No. 1054-94, at 15:24 hrs. on February 22, 1994, is contrary to the guiding principles enshrined in our Political Constitution, whence it must be understood that said criminal offense only provides for a fine and not a custodial sentence. Based on that premise, we would have that, in accordance with the proceedings carried out in this process, it is clear to the majority of this court of cassation, with a note from co-judge [Nombre9], that the lower court resolution, inasmuch as it considered that the term for the statute of limitations for the criminal action had run, thereby decreeing its extinction, did not incur in any of the interpretive errors alleged. Before ruling on the merits of the matter, it is necessary to note that in vote No. 1058-01, at 09:50 hours on December 21, 2001, this Court of Cassation* * -on the occasion of the legislative reform introduced to article 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by Law No. 8146 of October 30, 2001, published in La Gaceta No. 227 on Monday, November 26, 2001-* * reworked the interpretation regarding the scope of said provision that had been held in vote No. 372-01, of May 18, 2001. In that pronouncement, the following was clarified:* ***(i).** *According to what was held in the cited vote No. 372-01, issued based on the original wording of article 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law No. 7594), without the mentioned reform, regarding the statute of limitations for criminal action, several guidelines were to be followed, namely: a) The initiation of the proceeding interrupts the statute of limitations, reducing the terms established in art. 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by half; b) For the proceeding to be initiated, an act identifying a specific person as the author or participant in a criminal act is required, so that with respect to the various authors or participants, the initiation of the proceeding that interrupts* *the statute of limitations and reduces its terms will occur independently; c) The first formal imputation is the formulation of the accusation, requiring notification of its existence to the accused, so that they may respond to it and raise the respective defenses, it not being necessary for this notification to be made in person;* ***(ii).** *On the occasion of the legislative reform introduced by Law No. 8146, it is now considered that* ***in matters where it is applicable***, *the initiation of the proceeding does not have interrupting effects nor does it reduce the terms by half, and it is held that the first formal imputation is the first statement regarding the facts received from the defendant, where the formal advisement of the facts takes place;* ***(iii).** *Starting from the premise that the statute of limitations has a procedural nature, and that the principle in this matter is that the norm in force at the time of the procedural act to be performed applies, it is concluded that what is important for purposes of interrupting the statute of limitations is whether the act was contemplated as an interrupting one at the time of its performance, since if it was provided for as such, even if the rules on interruption were later changed, the interruption would have occurred. Conversely, if at the time of performing the act it had not been provided for as an interruption of the statute of limitations, but it is subsequently established as an interruption, it could not be considered that said interruption occurred. Thus, given that Law No. 8146, which amended art. 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, entered into force upon its publication, it shall be understood that depending on the date on which the procedural act in question took place, whether* *before* *or* *after* *November 26, 2001, the guidelines outlined in vote No. 372-01 or those defined in vote No. 1058-01 shall prevail. Thus, and according to the study of the procedural acts carried out in the case at hand, we would have the following:* **i)** *If true, the investigated facts date back to November 10, 1999, as the fiscal accusation on folios 9 to 14 temporally places them there;* **ii)** *Taking into account that the complaint prepared by the Ministry of Environment and Energy is dated November 15, 1999, in accordance with the parameters outlined in vote 372-01, of May 18, 2001, the 2-year term defined by article 31 ibidem (remember that this is a criminal offense punishable by a pecuniary penalty), was interrupted on the date of the complaint and began to run again but reduced this time by half;* **c)** *By means of a notification record notified via facsimile visible on folio 17, it is recorded that the accusation was notified to the defense attorney, the accused’s representative, on May eleventh, two thousand one (see folio 18).* * Based on the foregoing, it must be understood that since this action was carried out* *before* *November 26, 2001, the guidelines outlined in vote No. 372-01 of this Court must be applied to it, according to which said notification constitutes the first formal imputation that numeral 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure incorporated, according to its original text, which as such caused the interruption of the ongoing statute of limitations calculation. Despite the above, as reasoned by the lower court judge, by May 11, 2001, after the interruption cause had operated due to the initiation of the proceeding, 1 year, 5 months and 25 days had already elapsed, from which it is inferred that by then the twelve-month term had amply expired. Thus, it is clear that when this last interrupting act occurred, the statute of limitations period had already run, so the dismissal judgment being challenged, insofar as it deemed the criminal action extinguished for that reason, did not incur in the interpretive error that the challenger accuses it of. That being the case, the two grounds of the appeal filed by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office are declared without merit.

POR TANTO:

The two grounds of the cassation appeal filed by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office are dismissed. NOTIFY.

Fernando Cruz Castro [Nombre4] [Nombre10] [Nombre11] Edo.

TRIBUNAL DE CASACION PENAL. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSE, GOICOECHEA. A las diez horas cuarenta minutos del dieciséis de enero de dos mil tres.

RECURSO DE CASACION interpuesto en la presente causa seguida contra [Nombre1], mayor, casada, nicaragüense, hija de [Nombre2] y [Nombre3], vecina de Guadalupe, Montelimar, por el delito de INFRACCION A LA LEY DE CONSERVACION DE LA VIDA SILVESTRE, en perjuicio de LA VIDA SILVESTRE. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso, los jueces Fernando Cruz Castro, [Nombre4] y [Nombre5]. Se apersonó en Casación, el Lic. [Nombre6] como Fiscal Agrario Ambiental del Ministerio Público.

RESULTANDO:

• 1)Que mediante sentencia de Sobreseimiento Definitivo dictada a las ocho horas cuarenta minutos del veintiocho de noviembre de dos mil uno, el Tribunal de Juicio del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Goicoechea, resolvió: “POR TANTO De conformidad con los artículos 39 y 41 Constitucionales, 31, 33 del Código Procesal Penal 96 de la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, 8 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, se declara prescrita la acción penal instaurada en este asunto, dictándose sentencia de SOBRESEIMIENTO TOTAL a favor de la imputada [Nombre1], por el delito de INFRACCION A LA LEY DE CONSERVACION DE VIDA SILVESTRE, en perjuicio de la VIDA SILVESTRE, se le ha venido atribuyendo en este asunto, ello de conformidad con los artículos 39 y 41 Constitucionales, 31, 33 del Código Procesal Penal y 96 de la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre. Se resuelve este asunto sin especial condenatoria en costas, corriendo los gastos del proceso a cargo del Estado. NOTIFIQUESE.- [Nombre7], JUEZ DE JUICIO." (sic).- 2) Que contra el anterior pronunciamiento, el Lic. [Nombre6] interpuso Recurso de Casación.
• 3)Que verificada la deliberación respectiva de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 450 del Código Procesal Penal, el Tribunal se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en el Recurso.
• 4)Que en los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.

Redacta el Juez de Casación [Nombre8]; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- CONTENIDO DE LA IMPUGNACIÓN: Quebranto de las reglas de prescripción. Amparado en lo dispuesto por los artículos 31, 33, 369, 422 y siguientes, 443 y siguientes del Código Procesal Penal de 1996; y 96 de la Ley de Vida Silvestre, el fiscal agrario ambiental del Ministerio Público plantea recurso de casación en contra de la sentencia de sobreseimiento dictada por el tribunal de juicio del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, siendo que en el primero de sus motivos, como una cuestión de fondo, aduce lo siguiente: a) En la resolución impugnada, mediante la cual se decretó la prescripción de la acción penal, se vulneró el artículo 96 de la Ley de Vida Silvestre, al razonarse que el delito previsto por dicha norma está sancionado sólo con pena de multa de ¢20.000,°° a ¢30.000,°°. El juez de instancia cita el voto de la Sala Constitucional N° 1781-97, que declaró inconstitucional la conversión de días multa en pena privativa de libertad prevista por la contravención del artículo 109 de la ya mencionada Ley, aplicándolo por analogía al delito sancionado por el 96 ibídem. A partir de ello, el juzgador considera que esta última norma no contempla una pena privativa de libertad, sino únicamente una pecuniaria, por lo que -entonces- a efectos del cómputo de la prescripción se inclina por aplicar un término de dos años (inciso b del artículo 31 del Código Procesal Penal). Tal razonamiento, en criterio del fiscal impugnante, es erróneo, pues le conduce a esbozar la falaz afirmación de que todos los artículos que contengan la frase “convertible en pena de prisión de 4 a 8 meses”, fueron “derogados” por la Sala Constitucional. En realidad, argumenta el recurrente, en el fallo no se distingue entre delitos y contravenciones, pues en el citado voto sólo se hizo referencia al artículo 109. Sin embargo, el aquo asume que se trató de una evidente omisión o error material, al no haberse decretado la inconstitucionalidad de los demás artículos, ello a pesar de que la Sala Constitucional centró su pronunciamiento sólo en las contravenciones, en atención a las abismales diferencias en ambas formas de sanción. Debido a lo anterior, y siendo que el numeral 96 mantiene la pena privativa de libertad, en este caso la prescripción no ha operado, ya que al momento de la notificación que convocó por primera vez a audiencia preliminar, que constituye un acto interruptor, sólo habían transcurrido 1 año, 5 meses y 28 días; b) Si bien después del voto N° 1781-97 recaen los votos de la Sala Constitucional N° 5646-97 del 16 de setiembre de 1997, y N° 8360-M-97 del 5 de diciembre de 1997, los que declaran inconstitucional la frase “convertible en pena de prisión de 4 a 8 meses” que contienen los delitos tipificados en los artículos 94 y 90 de la citada Ley de fondo, lo cierto es que ello nunca se hizo extensivo a los demás tipos penales, pues en el primero expresamente se aclaró que no se emitía pronunciamiento en cuanto a los artículos 95 a 104 debido a que la causa que daba pie a la consulta se refería sólo al 94; c) No obstante la línea jurisprudencial desarrollada en estos dos votos, el pronunciamiento más reciente de la Sala Constitucional (resolución N° 6133-98 de las 16:21 hrs. del 26 de agosto de 1998, donde se conoció una acción de inconstitucionalidad contra el último párrafo del artículo 132) varía dicho criterio, al sostener que se mantiene la opción entre la multa o la prisión. En el único reparo por aspectos de forma, el fiscal aduce una falta de fundamentación, por cuanto no existe pronunciamiento de la Sala Constitucional que haya anulado la frase “convertible en pena de prisión de 4 a 8 meses” contenida en el artículo 96 de la Ley de Vida Silvestre.

II.- Por las razones que se dirán, con nota del cojuez [Nombre9], se declaran sin lugar ambos motivos. Tomando en cuenta que la presente impugnación se centra en la naturaleza de la sanción prevista por los tipos penales que incorpora la Ley de Vida Silvestre, es necesario señalar cuál ha sido la posición que al respecto ha mantenido la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal de Casación: “… En un segundo punto, esta vez acusando un vicio de fondo, el Licenciado … estima que la sentencia del Tribunal de Alajuela con sede en San Ramón, ha incurrido en errónea interpretación y aplicación de la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre (artículo 132, Ley No. 7317 de 30 de octubre de 1992), así como de los numerales 30 inciso c) y 311 inciso d) del Código Procesal Penal y del Voto de la Sala Constitucional No. 6133 de diecisiete horas once minutos del veintiséis de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y ocho. En respaldo de su criterio, el recurrente dice que la sentencia en cuestión toma en cuenta para sobreseer, que el acusado gestionó la cancelación del monto máximo de la multa prevista en el citado artículo 132 de la L.C.V.S., razón por la cual, con fundamento en la disposición 30 inciso c) del Código de rito, la Jueza tiene por extinguida la acción penal y dictó el correspondiente sobreseimiento. Agrega el impugnante que, según el A quo, además, el artículo 132 dicho prevé la pena de multa y sólo subsidiariamente, es decir, para el caso en que ésta no se haga efectiva, correspondería la conversión a pena privativa de libertad, siendo en todo caso que, al declararse inconstitucional la posibilidad de convertir multa en prisión, según pronunciamiento de la Sala Constitucional respecto al artículo 56 del Código Penal, lo que subsiste es únicamente la pena de multa, por lo que la norma contenida en el 30 inciso c) del C.p.p. es aplicable. Este razonamiento, en criterio del Procurador Penal es absolutamente erróneo además de caer en un franco irrespeto frente al carácter vinculante y obligatorio de las resoluciones del Tribunal Constitucional, pues esta alta autoridad jurisdiccional se ha pronunciado en sentido completamente opuesto a como lo hace la jueza de sentencia. Agrega el interesado que al resolverse precisamente una acción de inconstitucional respecto a los artículos 130 y 132 de la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, la Sala Constitucional ha dicho que: “...en cuanto a la sanción aplicable, debe interpretarse que se trata de multa o prisión, es decir, el juzgador puede aplicar una u otra, pues la multa no debe imponerse juntamente con la pena privativa de libertad, sino sola, ya que con la multa se persigue, entre otros fines, precisamente evitar la imposición de una pena privativa de libertad...” (Voto No. 6133-98 de 17:21 horas del 26 de agosto de 1998). El impugnante insiste en que el error de la juzgadora consiste, en interpretar que la pena de prisión prevista en el artículo 132 L.C.V.S., sólo se aplica cuando no exista pago efectivo de la multa, supuesto en que se convierte en pena principal, siendo que la Sala Constitucional ha establecido que esa norma se refiere a pena de multa o de prisión, debiéndose entender que esa “o” es disyuntiva y no supletoria. Por las razones dichas, el recurrente pide la nulidad de la sentencia y su remisión al tribunal de procedencia para que se conozca y defina debidamente la normativa a aplicar. El reclamo no es procedente. El núcleo fundamental del razonamiento que hace la Jueza de sentencia es, en efecto, el siguiente: “...aun cuando la norma del 132 de la ley de conservación de la Fauna silvestre (sic) contiene también la pena privativa de libertad cuando no se cancele la multa es lo cierto que ella funciona ante el no pago de aquella convirtiéndola en básica y principal y dado que la conversión por el no pago había sido anulado por la Sala Constitucional cuando analizó el numeral 56 del Código Penal procederá a acoger la gestión del acusado...” Tal desarrollo es en criterio de este Tribunal acertado, no obstante la cita jurisprudencial que hace el recurrente. Téngase en cuenta ante todo que en lo que interesa, el artículo 132 de la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre textualmente reza: “Quienes no cumplan con lo estipulado en este artículo, serán multados con montos que irán de cincuenta mil colones (50.000) a cien mil colones (100.000), convertibles en pena de prisión de uno a dos años.” (el subrayado es nuestro). Si bien es cierto en las útimas líneas del Voto No. 6133-98 de la Sala Constitucional, se dice que se está ante una previsión penal alternativa, que el juez puede en el caso del artículo 132 de la L.C.V.S. bien imponer una pena de multa, bien optar por la privación de libertad, lo cierto del caso es que ese mismo alto Tribunal Constitucional, ha trazado una línea jurisprudencial diversa, que es, en nuestro criterio, la que debe prevalecer. Tal es el caso del Voto No. 1054-94 de quince horas veinticuatro minutos del veintidós de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, donde, al declararse inconstitucional la frase del artículo 56 del Código Penal “...ésta se convertirá a razón de un día de prisión por día multa...” se extrajo la consecuencia que, tratándose de contravenciones, era contrario a la Constitución -artículos 38 y 39 de la Carga Magna- convertir una multa (deuda a favor del Estado) en pena de prisión, ya que en el fondo significaba aplicar prisión por deudas, afectando a sectores sociales especialmente vulnerables en razón de sus limitaciones económicas. En esta decisión de la Sala Constitucional se hacen ya afirmaciones genéricas respecto a la inconstitucionalidad de convertir multa en prisión que apuntan a que no sólo en el caso de las contravenciones es necesario prohibir la citada conversión. Tal es el caso de afirmaciones que se hacen en esa resolución que señalan, por ejemplo que: “No importa desde qué punto de vista analicemos la figura de la conversión de multa a prisión, el resultado es siempre el mismo: la insolvencia del condenado le cuesta su libertad personal...”, o bien cuando se afirma que: “es inconstitucional que la pena sustitutiva, de diferente naturaleza a la pena sustituida, sea de mayor gravedad que ésta, atendiendo a razones ajenas a la culpabilidad o antijuridicidad del hecho, como lo son las condiciones patrimoniales del condenado”. Asimismo, esta línea de pensamiento jurisprudencial se mantiene en el Voto No. 1781-97 donde se resuelve consulta judicial de constitucionalidad y en donde específicamente se dice que resulta contrario a la Constitución la frase “... convertible en pena de prisión...” refiriéndose a la multa prevista en los artículos 105 a 119 de la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, No. 7317 de treinta de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y dos. Este mismo giro, pese a la interpretación que se hace en el Voto 6133 que menciona el recurrente, es el que expresamente se utiliza en el numeral 132 de la misma Ley, aquí en discusión. De manera que para este Tribunal de Casación tiene valor preponderante lo que se ha venido diciendo insistente y ampliamente en aquellas resoluciones constitucionales que han tratado el tema específico de la imposibilidad de convertir multa en prisión y, por el contrario, no tiene esa preponderancia una referencia aislada de un voto que, aunque posterior, no entra a conocer en concreto el punto de la conversión. Bien hizo entonces la Jueza de sentencia en estimar que, con los antecedentes jurisprudenciales del caso, toda conversión de multa en prisión está prohibida y, en aquellos casos donde el tipo penal la prevé, debe entenderse que queda subsistente sólo la sanción patrimonial de multa y, por tanto, es aplicable el numeral 30 inciso c), así como el 311 inciso d) del Código Procesal Penal vigente. …”, Tribunal de Casación Penal, voto N° 0029-00, del 14 de enero del 2000. De acuerdo con lo anterior, y no obstante las objeciones del recurrente, es criterio de la mayoría de este Tribunal que la decisión del juez de mérito resulta acertada, pues -en efecto- el artículo 96 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, al recurrir a la conversión de la pena pecuniaria en pena privativa de libertad, incorpora una práctica legislativa que, conforme a los lineamientos jurisprudenciales esbozados desde el voto de la Sala Constitucional N° 1054-94, de 15:24 hrs. del 22 de febrero de 1994, resulta contraria a los principios rectores que recoge nuestra Constitución Política, de donde ha de entenderse que dicho tipo penal sólo prevé una pena de multa y no la privativa de libertad. Partiendo de dicho supuesto, tendríamos que de conformidad con las actuaciones que se han cumplido en este proceso, resulta claro para la mayoría de este tribunal de casación, con nota del cojuez [Nombre9], que la resolución de instancia, en cuanto tuvo por operado el término de la prescripción de la acción penal, decretando en virtud de ello su extinción, no incurrió en ninguno de los yerros interpretativos que se denuncian. De previo a pronunciarnos en cuanto al fondo del asunto, es necesario hacer notar que en el voto N° 1058-01, de las 09:50 horas del 21 de diciembre del 2001, este Tribunal de Casación -con motivo de la reforma legislativa que se introdujo al artículo 33 del Código Procesal Penal mediante Ley N° 8146 del 30 de octubre del 2001, publicada en La Gaceta N° 227 del lunes 26 de noviembre del 2001- reelaboró la interpretación que en cuanto a los alcances de dicha disposición se había venido sosteniendo en el voto N° 372-01, del 18 de mayo del 2001. En dicho pronunciamiento se aclaró lo siguiente: (i). Según se sostuvo en el citado voto N° 372-01, dictado con base en la redacción original del artículo 33 del Código Procesal Penal (Ley N° 7594), sin la mencionada reforma, en materia de prescripción de la acción penal debían seguirse varios lineamientos, a saber: a) El inicio del procedimiento interrumpe la prescripción, reduciéndose los plazos establecidos en el art. 31 del Código Procesal Penal a la mitad; b) Para que se inicie el procedimiento se requiere de un acto de señalamiento de una persona concreta como autor o partícipe de un hecho delictivo, por lo que con respecto a los diversos autores o partícipes el inicio del procedimiento interruptor de la prescripción y reductor de los plazos de la misma se dará de manera independiente; c) La primera imputación formal es la formulación de la acusación, requiriéndose la notificación de la existencia de la misma al imputado, para que se pronuncie sobre ella y oponga las excepciones respectivas, no siendo necesario que dicha notificación le sea realizada en forma personal; (ii). Con motivo de la reforma legislativa introducida por la Ley N° 8146, ahora se estima que en los asuntos donde ésta sea aplicable, el inicio del procedimiento no posee efectos interruptores ni reduce los plazos a la mitad, y se tiene que la primera imputación formal lo es la primera declaración que en cuanto a los hechos se le recibe al encartado, donde se realiza la intimación de los hechos; (iii). Partiéndose de que la prescripción tiene una naturaleza de carácter procesal, y de que el principio en dicha materia es que se aplica la norma vigente al momento del acto procesal por realizar, se concluye que lo importante para efectos de la interrupción de la prescripción es si el acto estaba contemplado como interruptor al momento de su realización, ya que si estaba previsto como tal, aun cuando con posterioridad se cambiaran las reglas sobre la interrupción, se habría producido ésta. Al contrario, si al momento de realización del acto no se había previsto como interruptor de la prescripción, pero con posterioridad se establece que interrumpe, no podría estimarse que ocurrió dicha interrupción. Así las cosas, partiéndose de que la ley N° 8146, que modificó el art. 33 del Código Procesal Penal, rigió a partir de su publicación, habrá de entenderse que dependiendo de la fecha en la que se realizó el acto procesal de que se trate, ya sea antes o después del 26 de noviembre del 2001, prevalecerán los lineamientos esbozados en el voto N° 372-01 o los que se definieron en el voto N° 1058-01. Así las cosas, y según el estudio de las actuaciones procesales cumplidas en el caso que nos ocupa, tendríamos lo siguiente: i) De ser ciertos, los hechos investigados datan del 10 de noviembre de 1999, pues así los ubica temporalmente la acusación fiscal de folios 9 a 14; ii) Tomando en cuenta que la denuncia confeccionada por el Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía está fechada el 15 de noviembre de 1999, de conformidad con los parámetros que se esbozaron en el voto 372-01, del 18 de mayo del 2001, el término de 2 años que define el artículo 31 ibidem (recordemos que se trata de un tipo penal sancionado con pena pecuniaria), se interrumpió en la fecha de la denuncia y volvió a correr de nuevo pero reducido esta vez a la mitad; c) Mediante acta de notificación notificada vía facsímil visible a folio 17, consta que la acusación se le notificó al abogado defensor, representante del imputado, el once de mayo del año dos mil uno (ver folio 18). A partir de lo expuesto, debe entenderse que como dicha actuación se llevó a cabo antes del 26 de noviembre del 2001, a la misma deben serle aplicados los lineamientos esbozados en el voto N° 372-01 de este Tribunal, según los cuales dicha notificación constituye la primera imputación formal que incorporaba el numeral 33 del Código Procesal Penal, según su texto original, misma que como tal provocaba la interrupción del cómputo de la prescripción en curso. No obstante lo anterior, conforme lo razonó el juez de instancia, para el 11 de mayo del 2001, después de haber operado la causal de interrupción por haberse iniciado el procedimiento, ya había transcurrido 1 año, 5 meses y 25 días, de donde se infiere que para entonces el término de doce meses había de sobra fenecido. Así las cosas, es claro que cuando se produjo esta el último acto interruptor, el término de prescripción ya había transcurrido, por lo que la sentencia de sobreseimiento que se impugna, en el tanto tuvo por ello extinguida la acción penal, no incurrió en el yerro interpretativo que le reprocha el impugnante. Siendo ello así, se declaran sin lugar los dos motivos del recurso que interpone el representante del Ministerio Público.

POR TANTO:

Se declaran sin lugar los dos motivos del recurso de casación presentado por el representante del Ministerio Público.NOTIFÍQUESE.

Fernando Cruz Castro [Nombre4] [Nombre10] [Nombre11] Edo.