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Res. 01827-2025 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo · 27/02/2025
OutcomeResultado
The court dismissed the indemnity claim and declared the State's counterclaim inadmissible.Se declaró improcedente la demanda indemnizatoria y se declaró inadmisible la reconvención del Estado.
SummaryResumen
The Costa Rican Contentious-Administrative Tribunal denied a claim by Desarrollos La Piedrona S.A. against the State, INDER, and SINAC for material and moral damages. The plaintiff argued that the denial of cadastral plan approvals for its property—located within the Tivives Protected Zone—emptied its property right, frustrating a tourism development. The property had been acquired in 2008 from previous INDER adjudicatees, with no registry annotations about the protected zone. The Tribunal found that the suit only sought liability for lawful conduct, not an annulment of the administrative acts. It held that land-use restrictions in a protective zone (limited to agricultural and forestry activities) do not constitute a hollowing-out of property rights; the plaintiff failed to prove special damage (few affected or exceptional intensity), and was contributorily negligent by not investigating permissible uses before purchase. The State's counterclaim seeking annulment of the property title was declared inadmissible as a disguised lesividad action.El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo resolvió una demanda de Desarrollos La Piedrona S.A., sociedad que reclamaba al Estado, al INDER y al SINAC indemnización por daño material y moral, alegando que la negativa de visado de planos sobre su finca —ubicada dentro de la Zona Protectora Tivives— vaciaba de contenido su derecho de propiedad, impidiendo un proyecto turístico. La empresa había adquirido el inmueble en 2008, derivado de una adjudicación del IDA en 1993, sin anotaciones registrales sobre su condición de zona protectora. El Tribunal, tras analizar que la demanda no impugnaba la legalidad de los actos administrativos sino que solo reclamaba responsabilidad patrimonial por conducta lícita, declaró improcedente la indemnización. Consideró que las limitaciones de uso en zona protectora (solo actividades agrícolas y forestales) no constituyen un vaciamiento del derecho de propiedad; que la parte actora no demostró un daño especial por pequeña proporción de afectados o intensidad excepcional, y que medió culpa de la víctima al no investigar el régimen de uso del suelo. Además, rechazó la reconvención estatal que pedía la nulidad del inmueble, por constituir una acción de lesividad encubierta inadmisible.
Key excerptExtracto clave
Notably, denying a land-use permit for urban purposes to the owner of a plot located within a protected zone does not disregard a vested right protected by the principle of registry publicity, nor the guarantee that subjective rights created through formal administrative action can only be extinguished following a lesividad proceeding, these guarantees being an expression of the protection of acquired rights under Article 34 of the Constitution, account also being taken of Article 456 of the Civil Code: "Registration does not validate registered acts or contracts that are null or voidable according to law. However, acts or contracts executed or granted by a person who appears in the Registry with the right to do so, once registered, shall not be invalidated with respect to a third party, even if the grantor's right is subsequently annulled or resolved by virtue of an unregistered title, or implicit causes, or causes that, although explicit, do not appear in the Registry." Furthermore, it is also clear (see the proven facts) that this property lies within the Tivives Protected Zone, created by Executive Decree No. 17023 of May 6, 1986 (effective June 2 of that year). In any event, if the plaintiff company, when purchasing the property from its prior owners (IDAs adjudicatees), failed to exercise minimal diligence in investigating which activities could be carried out on the site where the Tivives Protected Zone had previously been established, it must bear the cost of that omission and cannot claim compensable damage arising therefrom.Cabe indicar que el hecho de negar permiso de uso de suelo para fines urbanísticos a un propietario de un terreno ubicado dentro de una zona protectora, no es desconocer un derecho adquirido de un particular protegido por el principio de publicidad registral, lo mismo que la garantía que establece que los derechos subjetivos creados a partir de actividad administrativa formal, solo pueden ser eliminados de la vida jurídica, previa sustanciación del proceso de lesividad, siendo esas garantías expresión del principio de protección de derechos adquiridos del artículo 34 constitucional, debiéndose tomar en cuenta también lo que establece el numeral 456 del Código Civil: "La inscripción no convalida los actos o contratos inscritos que sean nulos o anulables conforme a la ley. Sin embargo, los actos o contratos que se ejecuten u otorguen por persona que en el Registro aparezca con derecho para ello, una vez inscritos, no se invalidarán en cuanto a tercero, aunque después se anule o resuelva el derecho del otorgante en virtud de título no inscrito, o de causas implícitas, o de causas que aunque explícitas no constan en el Registro". Ahora bien, también es claro (véase el elenco de hechos probados), que esa propiedad está ubicada dentro de la Zona Protectora Tivives, que fue creada por el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 17023 de 6 de mayo de 1986 (vigente a partir del 2 de junio de ese año). En todo caso, si la sociedad actora cuando adquirió el bien de sus anteriores propietarios (adjudicatarios del IDA), no tuvo la diligencia mínima de investigar cuáles actividades se podían realizar en el sitio donde previamente se había constituido la Zona Protectora Tivives, debe asumir el costo de esa omisión, no pudiendo alegar daño indemnizable a partir de esa omisión.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"En todo caso, si la sociedad actora cuando adquirió el bien de sus anteriores propietarios (adjudicatarios del IDA), no tuvo la diligencia mínima de investigar cuáles actividades se podían realizar en el sitio donde previamente se había constituido la Zona Protectora Tivives, debe asumir el costo de esa omisión, no pudiendo alegar daño indemnizable a partir de esa omisión."
"In any event, if the plaintiff company, when purchasing the property from its prior owners (IDA adjudicatees), failed to exercise minimal diligence in investigating which activities could be carried out on the site where the Tivives Protected Zone had previously been established, it must bear the cost of that omission and cannot claim compensable damage arising therefrom."
Considerando X
"En todo caso, si la sociedad actora cuando adquirió el bien de sus anteriores propietarios (adjudicatarios del IDA), no tuvo la diligencia mínima de investigar cuáles actividades se podían realizar en el sitio donde previamente se había constituido la Zona Protectora Tivives, debe asumir el costo de esa omisión, no pudiendo alegar daño indemnizable a partir de esa omisión."
Considerando X
"Véase que esa acción es inadmisible por contrariar el numeral 34.5 CPCA, que dispone: "La pretensión de lesividad no podrá deducirse por la vía de la contrademanda"."
"Note that this action is inadmissible because it contravenes Article 34.5 CPCA, which provides: "The claim of lesividad may not be brought by way of counterclaim.""
Considerando XII
"Véase que esa acción es inadmisible por contrariar el numeral 34.5 CPCA, que dispone: "La pretensión de lesividad no podrá deducirse por la vía de la contrademanda"."
Considerando XII
"Ahora bien, también es claro (véase el elenco de hechos probados), que esa propiedad está ubicada dentro de la Zona Protectora Tivives... el hecho que exista un inmueble de dominio privado dentro de los límites de una zona protectora, implica necesariamente que dichas heredades solo se puedan dedicar a actividades agrícolas y forestales, que cumplan con el fin de dicha área silvestre."
"It is also clear (see the proven facts) that this property lies within the Tivives Protected Zone... the fact that a privately owned property exists within the boundaries of a protected zone necessarily means that such parcels may only be used for agricultural and forestry activities that fulfill the purpose of said wild area."
Considerando VIII
"Ahora bien, también es claro (véase el elenco de hechos probados), que esa propiedad está ubicada dentro de la Zona Protectora Tivives... el hecho que exista un inmueble de dominio privado dentro de los límites de una zona protectora, implica necesariamente que dichas heredades solo se puedan dedicar a actividades agrícolas y forestales, que cumplan con el fin de dicha área silvestre."
Considerando VIII
Full documentDocumento completo
PROCEEDING:
ORDINARY PROCEEDINGS PLAINTIFF:
DESARROLLOS LA PIEDRONA S.A.
DEFENDANT:
THE STATE N° 2025001827 CONTENTIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, SAN JOSÉ, GOICOECHEA, at fifteen hours and twenty-six minutes of the twenty-seventh of February of two thousand twenty-five.- In compliance with the order of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, this panel proceeds to issue a new judgment on the merits, in the ordinary proceeding involving: Desarrollos La Piedrona, Sociedad Anónima, legal identification number 3-101-554923, represented by its president with powers of unlimited general attorney-in-fact, Arturo Acosta Mora, dentist and businessman, resident of Jaboncillo de Escazú, identity card number 1-603-134 and its special judicial attorney, Roberto Suñol Prego, professional license number 2695 (as plaintiff and counter-defendant); the State, represented by the prosecutor Gloria Solano Martínez, professional license number 10343 (as defendant and counter-plaintiff); the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, represented by its special judicial attorney, Jonathan Jiménez Ruiz, professional license number 18493 (as defendant) and the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, represented by its special judicial attorney, Hazel Hernández Calderón, professional license number 21707 (as defendant and interested third party with its own claims in the counterclaim). All the natural persons mentioned are of legal age and the legal representatives are also attorneys by profession.-
Considering:
Regarding the complaint:
These requests were granted by resolution No. 2451-2017 at 15:15 hours on October 30, 2017, which led to SINAC, in its capacity as an organ with instrumental legal personality, filing a negative answer to said action, by brief presented on April 16, 2018, raising the defenses of statute of limitations for the claim for damages, constitutional res judicata, and lack of right (images 297-301, 310-311, 455-458, and 472-490); 5) Desarrollos La Piedrona filed a reply to the answers to the action, by briefs dated September 7, 2017 -the first two- and April 30, 2018 -the last one-, which appear at images 362-371, 376-385, and 510-518; Regarding the counterclaim:
It addressed SINAC's request in the same terms (images 428-431 and 527); 8) In its brief presented on April 18, 2018, SINAC addressed the counterclaim filed by the State, further requesting to be considered an interested third party with its own claims in that counterclaim (images 487-490); 9) The State addressed Desarrollos la Piedrona's answer to the counterclaim (image 538); 10) At the preliminary hearing, SINAC was recognized as an interested third party with its own claims (listen around minute 23); 11) By resolutions at 13:11 hours on May 2, 2018, and at 10:30 hours on August 23 of that year, notice of the pendency of this case was ordered to be recorded on property 6-85766-001 and 002, registered in the name of Desarrollos La Piedrona (images 530 and 548); 12) The preliminary hearing was held on June 6, 2019, and was conducted by Judge Carlos Góngora Fuentes, with the presence of the representatives mentioned in the heading. At that time, SINAC was recognized as an interested third party with its own claims in the counterclaim; the claims of the complaint and the counterclaim were defined; by oral resolution No. 1386-2018-T, the defense of constitutional res judicata raised by the State and SINAC was dismissed, and the defenses of expiration and statute of limitations were reserved for resolution in the judgment, as they were neither evident nor manifest; the contested facts were established; documentary and testimonial evidence was admitted; and the file was referred to the corresponding Section to conduct the oral and public trial (listen to the corresponding recording); 13) At the preliminary hearing, new documentary evidence was presented, consisting of literal certifications of farm No. 6-85766, rights 001 and 002; payment receipts made to the Municipalidad de Esparza, and various photographs. Following the corresponding hearing, the opposing parties objected to their admission in writing (images 563-588; 602-603, 607-608, and 611-612); 14) The oral and public trial was held on September 9, 2020, by the Eighth Section of this Court, composed of judges Rosa María Cortés Morales, Paulo André Alonso Soto, and Jonatán Canales Hernández, and with the presence of the parties' representatives. At that time, among other activities, the admitted testimony was received, and due to the health emergency, it was decided to receive the closing arguments in writing, which were received the following day (listen to the corresponding recording); 15) This Court issued judgment No. 114-2020 at fifteen hours on September thirtieth, two thousand twenty, which was subsequently annulled, and a remand to the same original Section was also ordered, by resolution No. 1715-F-S1-2024 at nine hours and twenty-one minutes on December fifth, two thousand twenty-four, of the First Chamber of Cassation. The fundamental reasoning for that decision was: "IV (...) This Chamber considers that the drafting of said reasoning lacks clarity and precision, as the drafting judges expressly state they are unsure of what is being requested. The previously mentioned considerations begin with phrases that denote uncertainty about the claim. Given that, in accordance with article 90.1.a of the CPCA, the claims of the complaint, counterclaim, and answer must be delimited from the preliminary hearing (a procedural act recorded at images 553 to 551 of the electronic file). Added to the above, canon 95 of the CPCA grants the Court the authority, ex officio or upon a party's request, to ask the parties to clarify the claims and the grounds alleged. Consequently, if the Court had doubts about the arguments or the request, it could have requested the pertinent clarification at the appropriate procedural moment. However, from the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff's claims were clear and refer solely to the claim for moral and material damages, as shown in image 22 of the electronic file. Added to the above, the judgment's reasoning is contradictory, since in Considerando VII of the ruling, it is clearly stated, in the Court's opinion, that the subject matter of the proceeding is the claim for moral and material damages, and in Considerando XI, it proceeds to declare the legality of the administrative acts SINAC-ACOPAC-D-RES-67-2015 at 11:00 hours on August 20, 2015; SINAC-ACOPAC-D-RES-78-2015 at 14:30 hours on the 28th of that month and year; and SINAC-ACOPAC-D-RES-68-2015 at 11:00 hours on the 20th of that month and year. Consequently, this Chamber finds a total lack of clarity and coherence in the analyzed judgment and a serious contradiction in its reasoning, a circumstance that requires upholding the challenge"; 16) By virtue of the foregoing, this Section, composed of judges Rosa María Cortés Morales, Paulo André Alonso Soto, and Jonatán Canales Hernández, proceeds to issue this resolution, after deliberation and unanimously, under the authorship of the last-mentioned judge.- II) The subject matter of the complaint is as follows: 1. The State and the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER) shall be ordered to pay material damages in the amount of four million six hundred fifty thousand dollars (US$4,650,000.00). 2. The State and the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER) shall be ordered to pay subjective moral damages in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars (US$100,000.00), in favor of the officers of the plaintiff corporation. 3. The State and the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER) shall be ordered to pay the corresponding consequential damages, which shall be the interest on the indicated amounts, calculated from the moment the action was filed until the moment the judgment becomes final, with eventual enforcement of the corresponding award. 4. The State and the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER) shall be ordered to pay the procedural and personal costs of this action (see the complaint at image 23; the clarification made by the plaintiff, accepted by the opposing parties and the Court, at minutes 35-37 of the preliminary hearing; and the clarification of the nature of the moral damages as subjective and their beneficiaries, made at the oral and public trial).- Likewise, the subject matter of the counterclaim is: "1) The absolute nullity of property 6-85766-001 and 002, plan P-142131-1993, originating as Lot 64 by adjudication of the IDA Board of Directors, agreement No. 6 adopted in article VI of Session No. 89-93 of November 22, 1993, for improperly including lands of the Patrimonio Natural del Estado, of public domain, where the powers of self-protection under the responsibility of MINAE-SINAC shall apply"; 2) Upon said declaration of nullity, the cancellation of the aforementioned property and its current entries shall be ordered; 3) The counter-defendant must vacate the aforementioned property within a period of eight business days from the finality of the judgment, under warning that otherwise it will be evicted by MINAE-SINAC, with the assistance of the Public Force; 4) In case of opposition, the opposing party shall be ordered to pay both costs and their interest, to be borne by the counter-defendant corporation (see the brief at image 353 and what was resolved at the preliminary hearing at minute 42).- SINAC's claims, in its capacity as an interested third party within the counterclaim, were taken as follows: to declare with merit the complaint filed by the Procuraduría General de la República in all its aspects and, in addition, to order the Registro Inmobiliario to register in the name of the Estado-MINAE the land described in plan P-0143131-1993, given that SINAC is the administrator of the Patrimonio Natural del Estado, for which purpose SINAC shall prepare a new cadastral plan in the name of MINAE-SINAC (see image 490 and the modification made at approximately minute 45 of the preliminary hearing); III) The following are considered proven facts of importance for resolving this case:
Regarding the moral damage, it invokes articles 190 and 191 of the General Law of Public Administration (hereinafter, "LGAP"), stating that in this case it is obvious that it occurred, "(...) because as a result of the violation or forced expropriation of the property in question, a personal or individual injury is caused to those of us who, in our capacity as partners, make up the governing bodies of the company that acquired the property with the purpose of giving it a destiny and a development that we have carefully described in this claim.// In the case at hand, the damage occurs with an enormous feeling of frustration on the part of the indicated directors and partners, knowing that after the investment undertaken by each of us through the acquiring company (...) it loses its patrimony as a result of the acquired property containing limitations imposed a posteriori and applied retroactively, thus rendering the acquired good useless.// The foregoing generates sufferings of disappointment, anguish, frustration, and a feeling of loss, from the very moment it is assumed that the permits to build the proposed and planned development were denied, to our damage and detriment and that of the purchasing company".- The different co-defendants, in their response to the action, stated: INDER stated that: the plaintiff confesses that it acquired the property in 2008, when the Constitutional Chamber had already issued ruling No. 7294-98 of 3:15 p.m. on October 3, 1998, in which article 71 of the Forest Law, which modified the Tivives Protective Zone, had been annulled, indicating that Executive Decree No. 17023-MAG is understood and remains in force, which is why any legal transaction carried out in 2008 implied that the acquirer had to investigate and verify the characteristics of the good in order to carry out the condominium development that interested them. Based on the foregoing, we find ourselves before the exemption from liability of the victim's fault (numeral 190.1 LGAP). It explains that within the Tivives Protective Zone, on lands where land ownership is private, it is possible, with prior authorization and according to the type and suitability of soils, to submit to the respective forestry regime, as provided in article 37, paragraph II of the Organic Environmental Law (hereinafter, "LOA"). It emphasizes, in the previous sense, that the realization of tourism or recreational developments is not contemplated in the Tivives Protective Zone. It details that the INDER certification of October 15, 2013, refers solely to the conclusion of the fifteen-year limitations established in article 67 of the Land and Colonization Law, referring to the typical agrarian land allocation contract. It argues that in any case, the establishment of the Tivives Protective Zone is due to a public interest, such as environmental protection, and this interest must prevail over the private interest. It rejects the compensation requested from INDER, for various reasons: 1) Article 71 of the Forest Law, which reduces the area of the Tivives Protective Zone, was a "general administrative act issued by the State", which was subsequently annulled by the Constitutional Chamber, and in any case, this situation is unrelated to INDER, placing us before the hypothesis of an act of a third party, in the terms of numeral 190.1 LGAP; 2) The document prepared by Lic. Luis Rodríguez Astúa lacks objectivity and impartiality, consequently violating the procedural regime; 3) The Decree that created the Tivives Protective Zone allowed the realization of forestry, agricultural, or livestock activities, upon prior obtaining of permits, in the terms of article 3, third paragraph LOA, which is why if the plaintiff carried out any legal transaction, they did so with the implications this would entail; 4) and 5) Compensation is not applicable because there is no suitable evidence proving any type of useful improvement to the property, nor the existence of any type of damage. Regarding the issue of the moral damage for which compensation is requested, it affirms that legal persons (such as the plaintiff) do not suffer any type of moral affectation by their very nature, and any damage to representatives, directors, and partners is rejected for lack of standing. Furthermore, it indicates that any expectation of a future tourism or recreational development project are simply expectations or intentions that never existed, so something future that never existed cannot be harmed.- The State affirmed that the claim must be rejected given that the cited property is in the public domain, in accordance with numerals 18 of Law 4465; 32, 33 and 35 of Law 7174; 13, 14 and 15 of Law 7575; 32 of the LOA; Decree 17023 and constitutional ruling 1763-94, with these goods being excluded from legal commerce, and this quality can only be modified by Law, as provided in articles 261 and 262 of the Civil Code. It establishes that the action for annulment does not prescribe or expire because it involves public domain goods, as provided in articles 18 of Law 4465; 32, 22 and 35 of Law 7174; 13, 14 and 15 of Law 7575; 32 of Law 7554. It requests that this claim be dismissed in its entirety.- SINAC indicated that the property spoken of by the plaintiffs is a public domain good, as was declared by constitutional ruling No. 1763-94. It explains that regarding the creation of the Tivives Protective Zone, in accordance with articles 32 LOA and 15 of the Forest Law, upon declaring a protected area, the state lands included within its official demarcation become administered by MINAE, so in the case of that protective zone, lands administered by the IDA were included at the time of its creation, which is why upon making "(...) the declaration of a protected wild area, the 'forestry' classification of the lands is presumed, resulting in an automatic transfer to the State's Natural Heritage (formerly Forest Heritage), and therefore, of competencies.// Consequently, once said Decree came into effect, the Agrarian Development Institute, now INDER, became incompetent regarding the management and disposal of the lands incorporated into the Tivives Protective Zone.// A situation ratified by the Constitutional Chamber in Ruling No. 1763 of April 13, 1994, which established that IDA allocations of the Salinas Farm subsequent to the approval of Executive Decree 17-023-MAG of June 2, 1986, which creates the Tivives Protective Zone, are not valid.// In the specific case, the plaintiff acquires the property in 2008, with full knowledge of the legal affectation of the State's Natural Heritage, so it is not appropriate that 9 years later it files the present claim before us and seeks compensation for a good that is not susceptible to private appropriation.// Additionally, since it was allocated by INDER, in 1994, according to Volume 408, Entry 10525, to Adilia Barboza Mena and Isidro Rojas Porras, in accordance with Board of Directors agreement No. VI of Session 89-93 of November 22, 1993, it does not correspond to the exception of lands allocated without prejudice before May 6, 1986, according to the constitutional ruling, so in no way does any damage or abuse of the administration exist; rather, the acts of my represented party, which is SINAC, constitute part of the power-duty to administer and protect the State's Natural Heritage that legally falls to it".- VI) ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES (continued): In the counterclaim filed by the State against the plaintiff company, the state representation alleges that the property of the Puntarenas District, farm No. 85766, rights 001 and 002, described in survey plan No. P-142131-1993, originated as Lot 64 by allocation of the Board of Directors of the IDA, agreement No. 6 adopted in article VI of session No. 89-93 of November 22, 1993, is registered in the name of Desarrollos La Piedrona, with said property being located within the Tivives Protective Zone, and that which was acted upon is vitiated in the terms of constitutional ruling No. 1763-94, it being estimated that said property forms part of the Natural Heritage in accordance with Laws 4465, article 18; 7174, numerals 32, 33 and 35; 7575, articles 13, 14 and 15; Organic Environmental Law, article 32 and Decree No. 17023, then invoking ruling No. 1070-F-S1-2010 of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and resolutions 1842-2009 and 38-2010 of the Sixth Section of this Court. On that occasion it was requested that, in accordance with numeral 15.1).b) CPCA, SINAC be considered an interested party.- In the response given by Desarrollos La Piedrona, it argues that the acquisition of the good was made from Messrs. Francisco Brenes and Haydee Méndez, who were owners of the registered farm without restrictions, limitations, or exclusions of any nature, this acquisition having occurred free of all types of encumbrances, annotations, restrictions, and limitations, counting only two affectations (easement (servidumbre) for an included road and a specific reserve in relation to the Water Law), with no annotation or registry warning existing from INDER or the State that would prevent the free circulation of the good for legitimate acquisition. It considers that this action constitutes a reckless attempt to execute a forced expropriation without due payment as ordered by the Political Constitution. It objected to the intervention of SINAC as an interested party, because that body is integrated into the Ministry of Environment and Energy and as such, is duly represented by the Attorney General's Office of the Republic.- In the intervention as an interested third party with its own claims by SINAC, it is indicated that in accordance with articles 18 and 19 of the Forest Law, No. 4465 of November 25, 1969, as well as laws numbers 7032 of May 2, 1986 and 7174 of June 28, 1990, the concepts of State Forest Heritage and State Natural Heritage are defined, pointing out that the lands that constitute the State's Natural Heritage are public domain goods, which cannot have their ownership transferred to private individuals, as the Constitutional Chamber has repeatedly understood, citing for this purpose ruling 1763-94, arguing that the farm allocated by INDER (formerly "IDA"), in 1994, according to volume 408, entry 10525, does not constitute one of the exceptions of those beneficiaries whose land was allocated prior to May 6, 1986, according to the aforementioned constitutional ruling, which is why it is requested that the State's claim be granted and the farm described in plan P-0143131-1993 be registered, with SINAC being the administrator of the State's Natural Heritage. The plaintiff and counterclaimed company responded to what was raised by SINAC in the same terms in which it responded to the State (image 527).- In the reply to the response to the counterclaim, the state representation affirms that regarding, "(...) the counterclaimed party's argument that it legitimately acquired a property without registry warning, I allow myself to reiterate that the principles of inalienability and imprescriptibility that characterize public domain goods and the legal publicity of the domain prevent the figure of the registry third party from being wielded against them to consolidate private property illicitly removed from that regime (Administrative Litigation Court, resolutions 175-2013-I, 84-2004-II, 116-2015-II, 868-2001-III, 35-2007-IV, 2569-2009-IV, 681-2008-V, 19-2009-VII and 81-2010-VIII).//In this specific case, the property in dispute is of public domain in the terms of constitutional ruling No. 1763-1994, which is why its annulment and cancellation were requested by way of counterclaim".- VII) ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES (continued): In the oral and public trial, the representatives of the parties made the following opening statements: Desarrollos La Piedrona: The reason for the claim and the duly established claims are reiterated. It is explained that the company disposed of that property, constituting mortgages on three different occasions, with the mortgage system, so the good is in the commerce of men. It was annotated and immobilized only after the preliminary hearing. That land is not property of the State, if the respective compensation is not received. The State was neglectful and negligent and never communicated to the National Registry the restrictions that those properties had since 1986. When Doctors Acosta and Báez acquired the good, there was no annotation. It considers that article 45 of the Constitution is being violated, and because it is done in that manner, there is unlawful conduct in the terms of the LGAP. Regarding the exceptions of prescription and expiration, they must be rejected under any of the hypotheses, because the counterparts copied each other and it could not be proven that the State had communicated the restrictions, and it was not communicated to the Public Registry. They became aware of that situation when they approached SINAC, and the Registry was only informed when the annotation was made in this process (after the preliminary hearing). Regarding the exception of expiration, it is presented idly, because the exercise of the plaintiff's rights rests on the CPCA and it is after the effectiveness of that norm that the right is claimed. That exception must be rejected, as well. The State: the claim was communicated to the State on June 5, 2017. It is in 2013 that the certification from INDER is obtained, and it is said that the certification was obtained and from there the legal hypothesis is built. Any existing damage is due to the victim's fault, because the minimum due diligence was to determine if there was land use permission for the realization on the farm. Damage is neither proven nor demonstrated, nor will it be proven. The Tivives Protective Zone is a manifestation of the exercise of public powers of the State and constitutes lawful and normal conduct; it is a valuable legal tool for the protection of natural resources. Regarding the land when the Tivives Protective Zone was created, that good was affected for a direct purpose. The declaration of annulment by the Constitutional Chamber includes all allocations made from May 6, 1986, to 1994, involving the allocation to Isidro Rojas Porras of 1993 (which is the one that originates the plaintiffs' farm). It is reckless to say that a right is being expropriated or eliminated. The defenses of res judicata (article 42 Political Constitution) are maintained, as it is a declaratory ruling in favor of the State, noting that the decree was published on June 2, 1986, and therein the Tivives Protective Zone was created, and it is from that moment that the Tivives Protective Zone creates that erga omnes right. It maintains the defenses of prescription and expiration. SINAC: affirms that its actions have been in accordance with the law, because once the visit and location were made, we are within the Tivives Protective Zone. Lot 64 to which reference is made was part of a farm that belonged to INDER, so when the Tivives Protective Zone is created, with the previous forestry legislation, it was part of the State Forest Heritage and then with the current regulation it is part of the State's Natural Heritage. That protected area was created to protect the drainage network and the preservation of the aquifer recharge for current and future generations. It protects the marine species that are caught in the country's Pacific and that are what the fishermen of the Gulf of Nicoya fish. The matter was amply prescribed, because the publication occurred in 1986 and in relation to what was indicated by the Constitutional Chamber and in the 1994 ruling, it ordered that all INDER allocations be declared null, and consultations with SINAC necessarily had to be made. They adhere to the State's counterclaim. INDER: makes a reference to the declaration of the Tivives Protective Zone and its legal nature, establishing that agricultural activities can be carried out or one can submit to the forestry regime. The acquisition of a right in 2008, we find ourselves in article 190.1 LGAP, due to the victim's fault. The 2013 certification means solely and exclusively that the typical land allocation contract had been fulfilled. It affirms that any right to compensation has prescribed because the ten-year prescription of the Civil Code has operated. If counted from October 13, 1998, to October 7, 2017, the four-year term has also operated.- In the written conclusions, referring to both the claim and the counterclaim, the parties' representations stated: Desarrollos La Piedrona stated that said company acquired the farm in question through a public deed from its owners Francisco Brenes Guillén and Haydee Méndez Coto (each owning one half), with only two affectations: a road easement (servidumbre) and a specific reserve in relation to the Water Law. It emphasizes that the only requirement demanded by law for the acquisition of a property is the appearance of the parties before a Notary Public, to grant the respective act of transfer of ownership, which is then processed in the Public Registry, and in the present case, based on the principle of registry publicity, it was verified that at the date of its acquisition, there was no type of encumbrance, annotation or restriction, legal reserve, registry alert, annotation, or any impediment for the acquisition of the property selected for purchase. It estimates that failing to make the corresponding warnings constitutes acts of omission or negligence that give rise to the compensation for damages and losses requested in this process. It details that INDER even documentarily certified the availability of the good, and the representation of that entity could not affirm in the complementary hearing that the certification only said that it had been released from the fifteen-year legal restriction for the disposal of the good. It questions that the counterparts wish to cause the company to lose its property right, in violation of article 45 of the Constitution, without the corresponding compensation, arising from the same negligence of the public entities in warning about the situation of the farm in question. It then rejects the exceptions of prescription, res judicata, expiration, and lack of right, which were reiterated in the opening statement of the oral and public trial. The State affirmed that "(...) From the factual relationship, the admitted and evacuated evidence and the invoked law, it is concluded that all material claims deduced in the plaintiff's claim are prescribed, without there having been causes for interruption prior to the expiration of the term. Indeed, regarding the lawful and normal conduct of my represented party (which is not subject to challenge), this is limited to the creation of a protected wild area: the Tivives Protective Zone (Zona Protectora Tivives), by executive decree No. 17023 of May 6, 1986, published in La Gaceta 101, of June 2, 1986. Its creation occurs then by a general act in accordance with article 121.1 of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP), which was communicated with that publication, as provided in numeral 240.1 ibid., a moment from which it acquired effectiveness (140 and 141.1 ibid.). The claim was notified to the State on June 5, 2017, that is, more than 31 years after the Decree's effectiveness, by which time the term of article 198 of the LGAP had already been exceeded, the three years must be counted from the publication of the decree (...) The three-year term must be counted from the publication of the decree responsible for constituting the forest reserve, protective zone or wildlife refuge." It being "an act of a general nature, provided for in article 240 of the General Law of Public Administration, so the term for prescription begins to run with its publication, and not with the individualization of the effects" (First Chamber, ruling No. 26 of 11:15 a.m. on May 13, 1994, and No. 623-F-99 of October 12, 1999, among others).// 2) The plaintiff did not demonstrate what the causal link is between the damages, quantified at more than five million dollars, and the administrative acts issued by the National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC). In any case, one must ask, what do they consist of and what is their nature?". It then cites resolution ACOPAC-D-RES-41-2012 of 8:20 a.m. on December 17, 2012, arguing that "(...) the procedure that the plaintiff presented before SINAC is related to the approval of a 'survey plan' with a rejection slip (of registration) by the National Cadastre of the National Registry. That is, an attempt was made to obtain an approval (a non-constitutive, but declarative act) on a survey drawing not yet cadastrally registered. And it was rejected based on the decree creating the Tivives Protective Zone and constitutional ruling No. 1763-94 of 4:45 p.m. on April 13, 1994. This being so, what is the motive and causal link with the damages claimed? None. It does not even concern acts relating to plan P-142131-1993, whose annulment is requested in the counterclaim (which is registered in the National Cadastre). In any case, as it is a public domain good, both the expropriation procedure and compensation claims, such as the one raised here, are improper (First Chamber, No. 104-1996; constitutional ruling No. 8098-2007 and Administrative Litigation Court, ruling No. 35-07-IV. In a similar sense, from the same Court, resolution No. 2569-09-IV).// 3) The documentary elements and the statements of the witnesses offered by the plaintiff are useless: it failed to prove the existence of the damages valued at more than five million dollars. The documents at images 267 to 283 lack evidentiary value: their only support is the interested party's own appreciations. Note that nine of its pages are the transcription of the claim. And in a scant three lines, the amount of the material and subjective moral damage is 'justified'. Which is a disproportionate, abusive, and unproven figure. In the land appraisal document, it is admitted that there are no constructions on the lot, but even so, it is valued at more than four million dollars, based on a simple subjective premise that 'with a view of the master plan, the success of the project was assured'. A complete lack of seriousness. And the statements of the two witnesses testified that the purchase of the lot occurred because 'it had a nice view'. And regarding the business, 'the following year, the permit process was started' (Free transcription of the statements. The literal recording is in the custody of the office).// 4) The subjective moral damage claimed is improper. The jurisprudential line is absolutely conclusive in denying the granting of non-pecuniary damage in favor of legal persons. Only objective moral damage is potentially admissible (subject to the demonstration of its existence). And although, in an inexplicable way, it is attempted to argue that it is requested in favor of the 'partners', it is evident that Agrarian Development (IDA, today INDER. Images 3 and 5 of the administrative file presented by INDER. Images 233 and 357 of the judicial file). 8) It is duly accredited that the allocation of parcel 64 (now property registration number 85766) was granted to Mr. Isidro Rojas Porras, seven years after the creation of the Tivives Protective Zone, that is, on November 22, 1993 (images 2 and 5 of the administrative file presented by INDER). And he, in turn, transferred the parcel - with authorization from the IDA - to Haydee María Méndez Coto and Francisco Brenes Guillén (image 13 of the administrative file presented by INDER). They knew that the land forms part of the Tivives Protective Zone (image 14 of the administrative file provided by INDER) (...)". INDER explained that it was accredited "(....) in the first fact of the claim, that the plaintiff confessed that it acquired the property Puntarenas-85763-001-002 in 2008. However, by that date, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling number 7294-98 of three fifteen p.m. on October thirteenth, nineteen ninety-eight, had accepted the unconstitutionality action and annulled article 71 of the Forest Law that modified the limits of the Tivives Protective Zone, indicating that Decree 17023-MAG published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta 101 of June 2, 1986, which creates and delimits the Tivives Protective Zone, is understood and remains in force. The Tivives sector is characterized by what the law calls a Protective Zone, established in article 32 of the Organic Environmental Law. This category includes all those forested areas or forestry lands that are destined for soil protection, to maintain and regulate the water regime, to protect the contour of springs (nacientes), or have the function of windbreak curtains, or act as climate regulating agents, but where land tenure is private, with prior authorization, it is permitted to carry out agricultural activities according to regulations based on the type and suitability of soils, or else, submit to the respective forestry regime according to article 37, paragraph II of the Organic Environmental Law. If the plaintiff carried out any type of legal transaction with that property in 2008, it did so with the implications this would entail; therefore, it was the acquirer's responsibility to investigate and verify the characteristics of the good for the supposed condominium development. In this case we are before an exemption from liability contemplated in article 190, subsection 1) of the General Law of Public Administration due to the victim's fault". Then, it makes a lengthy exposition where the arguments on the exceptions of prescription and expiration are repeated and concludes by affirming, to support the defenses of lack of right and lack of standing, that "(...) The plaintiff lacks the right to claim any monetary amount. Any monetary amount claiming the economic value of the property must be rejected in its entirety. In the first place, article 71 of the Forest Law that reduced the limits of the Tivives Protective Zone was issued by the Legislative Power. It was a general administrative act issued by the State with the purpose of modifying the Protective Zone, where subsequently the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling number 7294-98 of three fifteen p.m. on October thirteenth, nineteen ninety-eight, accepted the unconstitutionality action and annulled article 71 of the Forest Law that modified the limits of the Tivives Protective Zone, indicating that Decree 17023-MAG published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta 101 of June 2, 1986, which creates and delimits the Tivives Protective Zone, is understood and remains in force. Given this circumstance, the Institution finds itself before an exemption from liability contemplated in article 190, subsection 1) because it is the act of a third party. In the second place: the document prepared by Lic. Luis. A. Rodríguez Astúa lacks objectivity and impartiality, consequently violating the procedural regime, so the amount of money the plaintiff seeks to obtain must be rejected in its entirety. In the third place: article 3 of Decree 17023-MAG published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta 101 of June 2, 1986, which creates the Tivives Protective Zone, permitted the carrying out of forestry, agricultural, or livestock activities that were to be undertaken upon prior obtaining of permits, or, depending on the case, submitting to the respective forestry regime according to article 37, paragraph II of the Organic Environmental Law. Therefore, if the plaintiff carried out any type of legal transaction with that property in 2008, it did so with the implications this would entail; therefore, it was the acquirer's responsibility to investigate and verify the characteristics of the good for the supposed condominium development. In this case we are before an exemption from liability contemplated in article 190, subsection 1) of the General Law of Public Administration due to the victim's fault. The plaintiff does not provide evidence proving, with respect to the Institute I represent, acts tending to make impossible the carrying out of forestry, agricultural, or livestock activities within the Tivives Protective Zone. Decree 17023 in its article 3 permitted forestry, agricultural, or livestock activities within the Protective Zone with the prior obtaining of permits. In the fourth place: The plaintiff lacks the right to claim the recovery of sums allegedly invested. There is no suitable evidence proving any type of useful improvement to the property. In the fifth place: No type of damage exists. It was the plaintiff itself who decided, at its own account and risk, to buy the property for four million colones from Messrs. Francisco Brenes Guillén and Haydee María Méndez Coto and now claims exaggerated and hypothetical amounts for thousands of dollars, so any amount of money against the Institution is rejected in its entirety.- Furthermore, no amount is appropriate for moral damages. In the first place, legal entities including corporations do not suffer any type of moral harm by their very nature. Likewise, any amount for damages claimed by the representatives, directors, or partners is rejected in all respects, for lack of standing (...) Therefore, I request that the objection of lack of standing be granted and the claim against the Institute of Rural Development be dismissed in all respects, ordering the plaintiff to pay both costs as well as legal interest generated until effective payment." VI) OF THE CLAIM: As a matter of logic and clarity of exposition, the defense of statute of limitations must be addressed before considering the merits of the claim. Thus, to resolve it, we find that if it is claimed that the denial of three plan approvals (visados) caused material damage and moral damage, we must examine when the denial occurred and count from the knowledge of that denial by the interested party, to determine whether the four-year statute of limitations of Article 198 LGAP has elapsed.
Now then, we find that the first approval of three cadastral plans was requested on March 26, 2011, and was denied by resolution ACOPAC-D-RES-41-2012 at 8:20 a.m. on December 17, 2012. Given that the transfer of the claim was notified to the State on June 5, 2017 (image 302); to INDER on the 7th of that month and year (image 303); and to SINAC on February 23, 2018 (image 470), applying the four-year statute of limitations mentioned above, it is evident that the indemnity claim with respect to that denial of the approval is time-barred.
As for the two other plan approval applications, both made on November 21, 2014, the first was denied by final act SINAC-ACOPAC-D-RES-67-2015 at 11:00 a.m. on August 20, 2015, and the second was denied by final act SINAC-ACOPAC-D-RES-68-2015 on the same date and time, meaning the four-year period of Article 198 LGAP could not have elapsed, as it was interrupted by the notification of the transfer of the claim made on the dates mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
It should be noted that for purposes of the statute of limitations, it is not relevant that the Executive Decree creating the Tivives Protective Zone was published on June 2, 1986, given that the plaintiff did not purchase the land (which had no registry annotation) until December 2008, and that administrative act of general scope cannot prejudice the plaintiff for purposes of challenging the emptying of the content of the property right. Having resolved the foregoing, the admissibility of the indemnity claim regarding the two plan approval applications made on November 21, 2014, will be analyzed, the 2011 application being time-barred.
Thus, we will analyze in the following recitals whether we are faced with a hypothesis of indemnity for patrimonial liability for formally lawful conduct, under the terms of Articles 190, 194, 195, 196, and 197 LGAP, which provide: "Article 190.- 1. The Administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party. 2. The Administration shall be liable pursuant to this article, even when it cannot be liable under the following sections of this Chapter, but liability for a lawful act (acto lícito) or normal functioning shall occur only under the terms of the following Third Section." "Article 194.- 1. The Administration shall be liable for its lawful acts and for its normal functioning when they cause damage to the rights of the administered party in a special manner, due to the small proportion of affected parties or the exceptional intensity of the injury. 2. In this case, the indemnity shall cover the value of the damages at the time of payment, but not lost profits. 3. The State shall be liable for damages caused directly by a law, which are special in accordance with this article." "Article 195.- Neither the State nor the Administration shall be liable, even if they cause special damage in the foregoing terms, when the injured interest is not legitimate or is contrary to public order, morality, or good customs, even if said interest was not expressly prohibited before or at the time of the damaging act." "Article 196.- In all cases, the alleged damage must be effective, assessable, and individualizable in relation to a person or group." "Article 197.- There shall be liability for the damage to purely moral interests, as well as for the moral suffering and physical pain caused by death or by the injury inflicted, respectively." Note that the plaintiff corporation neither challenges the application of the Executive Decree that created the Tivives Protective Zone in 1986, nor the clear fact that the property it acquired from certain assignees of the IDA is located within that protective zone. Nor, as we said, is the legality of the aforementioned acts of SINAC disputed; rather, the argument is that that decision empties the content of its property right, because it could not carry out a real estate development. We must therefore examine whether, in order to award the indemnities for material damage and moral damage sought, we find ourselves in the particular and very limited circumstances provided for by the LGAP for indemnity for lawful conduct, namely:
In this regard, the Land and Colonization Law (No. 2825 of October 14, 1961, and its amendments) provides:
"Article 2.- Within its limits and rules, this law guarantees: 1.- The right of every individual or group of individuals forming a cooperative, suitable for agricultural or livestock work and lacking land or possessing it in insufficient quantities, to be endowed with ownership of economically exploitable lands, preferably in the areas where they work or live, and when circumstances so advise, in properly selected areas." "Article 16.- The Institute shall have capacity to buy, sell, and lease movable and immovable property, securities, and businesses within the purposes of its creation; to lend, finance, and mortgage; and for any other form of commercial and legal management necessary for the performance of its task, within the ordinary contracting norms its financial situation allows, without incurring undue risks for the stability of the institution. In cases where there is more than one offer capable of fulfilling the objectives pursued for a given purpose, the bidding procedure shall be followed. The purchase, sale, and lease of lands shall be considered ordinary traffic operations of the Institute, for purposes of Article 110 of the Financial Administration Law of the Republic." "Article 30.- The Board of Directors of the Institute shall have the following duties: (...) 16) To approve the adjudication of lands to grant the respective titles." "Article 49.- The Institute may effect the parceling of its lands to fulfill, among others, the following immediate purposes: a) A better distribution of land; b) Resolution of inconvenient de facto situations, adapting them to the purposes of this law; and c) Colonization purposes." Next, it must be clear that in 1993, the IDA, applying the aforesaid Law, adjudicated a parcel (No. 64 of the Salinas II Settlement located in the canton of Esparza) to a beneficiary named Isidro Rojas Porras. Afterwards, the same entity accepted, in 1996, the transfer of the parcel to two other beneficiaries, Messrs. Francisco Brenes Guillén and Haydee María Méndez Coto. That transfer of lands administered by the IDA to beneficiaries is done under a land assignment contract, regulated by the Law itself, signed between the Institute and the assignee of a property, which documents the rights and obligations of said assignment or lease, in accordance with the purposes of the Land and Colonization Law itself, specifically the following provisions:
"Article 65.- Once the adjudication of the parcels by sale is agreed, the Institute shall issue a Provisional Possession Title in favor of the occupant, documenting their rights and obligations. If the occupant has cultivated the minimum indicated by the Institute and satisfactorily fulfilled all other obligations, they shall have the right to be granted a title of ownership, guaranteeing the payment with a mortgage on their parcel." "Article 67.- The beneficiary may not transfer the ownership of their property, nor encumber, lease, or subdivide it without authorization from the Institute, except when fifteen years have elapsed since the acquisition of the parcel and all obligations to said agency are cancelled. Nor may they, without such authorization and during the same term, encumber the crops, seeds, animals, tools, utensils, or equipment necessary for the exploitation of the parcel, unless all their obligations to the Institute are cancelled. To authorize the encumbrance of the real property, four affirmative votes of the Board of Directors are required. Any contract entered into without compliance with the preceding provisions shall be absolutely null. After fifteen years have elapsed and the property right has been acquired, any disposal of a parcel that, in the judgment of the Institute, may produce excessive concentration or subdivision (subdivisión excesiva) of property shall give the Institute the right to acquire the parcel or parcels offered for sale at the price set by experts appointed by the parties, or by a third party in case of disagreement. Said third expert shall be appointed by the other two experts. The Public Registry shall take note of the limitations referred to in this article" (emphasis added).
Having established the foregoing, it was not until 2008, when their full property right was already consolidated, that Messrs. Francisco Brenes Guillén and Haydee María Méndez Coto sold the property for the sum of four million colones to Desarrollos La Piedrona, and it is from that moment that the record shows various acts of disposition have been carried out regarding said property, including mortgaging the property and requesting several self-initiated plan approvals to effect an urban development on the site.
It should also be noted that at the registry level, the aforementioned real property is a privately owned property that bears, as Reservations, those established in the Water Law and the Road Law, and has no annotations, liens, or encumbrances, notwithstanding which – as we shall see below – it is located in a protective zone and has the limitations on private property derived from that location.
This lack of challenge determines that it must be considered that in this matter the principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima), which has constitutional roots (provisions 34 and 45 of the Fundamental Charter), applies. This principle has been developed repeatedly for many years, with Judgment No. 2016-8000 at 11:52 a.m. on June 10, 2016, of the Constitutional Chamber, stating the following: "III.- Regarding the principle of legitimate expectations. Formerly, it was axiomatically assumed that, inevitably, any illegal act of favorable content could be set aside by the Administration in any type of situation, without regard to any particular circumstance.// However, since the mid-fifties, both doctrine and case law began to detect that a blind and rigid application of the aforementioned rule seriously injured the trust placed by the administered in the Administration, as well as good faith and legal certainty.// Thus, by judgment of May 14, 1956, the Administrative Litigation Court of Berlin developed the principle of legitimate expectations, which was later adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Community in its rulings of March 22, 1961, and July 13, 1965 (Lemmerz-Werk), and which basically underpins citizens' trust insofar as, in certain circumstances of the specific case, reasons of equity and good faith prevent the Administration from taking measures contrary to the hope induced by the reasonable stability of its decisions, based on which individuals have adopted certain measures (...) Indeed, the ratio iuris of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations consists in the fact that the development of legal relationships requires an environment of trust, in which the rules of the game, once given, are respected. This is more relevant in the case of relationships with the Administration, since, in this case, the relational legal instrument is the administrative act, which is nothing but a unilateral manifestation of the will of the State. Ergo, the citizen needs legal instruments to defend against the unilaterality and superiority of the Administration.// Now, we are dealing with a principle of jurisprudential origin evidently linked to issues of equity, which is why its application must be analyzed in each specific case. Let us remember that it has been conceived as a reaction of the judge to protect the trust of the administered when the Administration surprises them with an unexpected change in its conduct (...) In summary, the principle of legitimate expectations rests on the basis that the citizen assumes behavior trusting that they act correctly, since the constant, stable conduct over time of the Administration reasonably generates such expectation; in other words, the Administration has issued external signs that have come to guide the citizen toward a certain conduct and have made them trust in good faith that such situation will persist." It should be indicated that denying a land use permit for urban purposes to an owner of land located within a protective zone is not denying a vested right (derecho adquirido) of an individual protected by the principle of registry publicity, nor the guarantee that subjective rights created from formal administrative activity can only be eliminated from legal life after the processing of the lesividad process, as these guarantees are an expression of the principle of protection of vested rights under Article 34 of the Constitution. Also to be taken into account is what is established by provision 456 of the Civil Code: "Registration does not validate registered acts or contracts that are null or voidable according to law. However, acts or contracts executed or granted by a person who appears in the Registry with the right to do so, once registered, shall not be invalidated with respect to a third party, even if the right of the grantor is subsequently annulled or resolved by virtue of an unregistered title, or implicit causes, or causes that, although explicit, do not appear in the Registry." VIII) Location of the property registered in favor of Desarrollos La Piedrona within the Tivives Protective Zone and administrative authorization regime for carrying out agricultural and forestry activities: Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is clear to this Court that the property currently registered in the name of the plaintiff corporation was part of an IDA Settlement called "Salinas II," also known as Cambalache, located in the canton of Esparza, province of Puntarenas, specifically parcel 64. That parcel was first adjudicated (with a suppletory title of ownership being granted) to a beneficiary of that entity (1993), who later (with the entity's authorization) transferred the property to two other beneficiaries (1996), so that finally, when the period for consolidation of the right under Article 67 of the Land and Colonization Law had already expired, they sold the full ownership right to Desarrollos La Piedrona.
Now then, it is also clear (see the list of proven facts) that that property is located within the Tivives Protective Zone, which was created by Executive Decree No. 17023 of May 6, 1986 (effective as of June 2 of that year).
It must be kept in mind that at the date the Tivives Protective Zone was created, "protective zones" were defined by Article 83 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal), No. 4465 of November 25, 1969, as follows: "Protective zones shall be understood to mean those areas of forests or forest lands (terrenos forestales) that, established by provisions of law or by decree of the Executive Branch, are destined to protect soils, maintain and regulate the hydrological regime, or act as agents regulating climate or the environment" (emphasis added).
Now then, the fact that there is a privately owned real property within the boundaries of a protective zone necessarily implies that said properties may only be dedicated to agricultural and forestry activities that fulfill the purpose of said wild area, namely soil protection, the maintenance or regulation of the hydrological regime, with the carrying out of any of those activities being subject to an authorization regime by some administrative body, initially the General Forestry Directorate and currently SINAC. In this regard, review Executive Decree No. 17023 (which created the Tivives Protective Zone), which establishes (emphasis added):
"Article 2.- The administration and management of the Tivives Protective Zone shall be the responsibility of the General Forestry Directorate, in coordination with the Central Pacific Regional Agricultural Center, the Esparza Cantonal Agricultural Center, and the Municipality of Esparza." "Article 3.- The forestry, agricultural, or livestock activities to be carried out in the Protective Zone must have the respective authorization issued by the General Forestry Directorate, in coordination with the Inter-institutional Committee mentioned in the preceding article." "Article 4.- A buffer strip of 20 meters bordering the mangrove limit is established." "Article 5.- The following are prohibited on state and private real properties within the boundaries indicated in the preceding article: a) Felling and/or cutting trees and extracting, collecting forest waste products of any species without the authorization of the General Forestry Directorate. b) Hunting wild animals. c) The practice of burns." X) On the merits of the claim for material damage and subjective moral damage in the lawsuit: Based on what we have seen before, what is being claimed in this case is solely the matter of patrimonial liability for lawful conduct, that is, by exclusion, that which does not imply a transgression of the legal system (Articles 190, 191 and 192 LGAP). It must be analyzed whether we find ourselves in the situations of Articles 194 and 195 ejusdem, cited above.
The above conclusion is reached because even this Court, in its latest resolution, at nine o'clock and five minutes on the nineteenth of December two thousand twenty-four, warned (see in particular what is underlined here): "Pursuant to provision 150.1 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, and given that the Honorable First Division of Cassation annulled the final resolution issued by this Court, a new judgment shall be issued by the same panel that conducted the trial. In the same vein: it is clear that the object of the claim for patrimonial liability made in the lawsuit is the lawful conduct of the Public Administrations, and the legality of any administrative act is not being questioned; the foregoing is concluded based on the annulling resolution discussed," without any of the parties to this proceeding making any observation.
Having made the foregoing explicit, with respect to patrimonial liability for lawful conduct, the principal drafter of the General Law of Public Administration, Lic. Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz, stated before the corresponding Legislative Commission the following: "This is due to the principle we explained yesterday regarding so-called public law indemnity, for a lawful act or for normal functioning of the Administration. But here it is clearly established under what conditions that indemnity will be admitted, only when those affected by normal functioning or the lawful act are very few or the injury inflicted is exceptionally serious. // Extraordinary or abnormal in relation to the members of the rest of the community. (...) We say that when it concerns very few, or a very intense grievance or damage, that indemnity shall be applicable. We have to recognize that this has a certain margin of indeterminacy. How many are few and how many are many? That is something fundamentally for judicial appreciation. When the injury inflicted is very intense or extraordinary or abnormal, that is something left to the judge's appreciation. But in reality it is a risk, and we consider that all laws run it. The second paragraph simply affirms the following, when the doctrine of this type of liability sustains the following principle: When a property of the administered is damaged by a lawful act or normal functioning, the Administration must restore the owner to the prior state with respect to that property, not to the patrimonial state the owner would have had if the property had not suffered the damage, because it is considered that this is not a liability which is a sanction for an illegal act, but rather an act of justice to compensate a citizen for the sacrifice made for the benefit of the community. Thus, in the same spirit of solidarity, the citizen is imposed a loss of their lost profits, albeit limited, in the sense that lost profits cannot be collected. The doctrine usually formulates this rule by saying: the damage to the injured property is compensated; the damage caused to the owner is not compensated. The damage to the injured property may be less than that caused to the owner, when the owner, as a consequence of the injury, has failed to receive certain profits. In that case, it is not compensated. (...) In these cases, the State acts in an act of social solidarity and justice with the individual..." (Quirós Coronado, Roberto -compiler-, General Law of Public Administration, Concorded and Annotated with the Legislative Debate and Constitutional Case Law, San José, Aselex S.A., 1996, p. 295; emphasis added).
Having established the foregoing, it is observed that in the present case, carrying out a real estate development, such as that intended on the farm of the plaintiff corporation, goes against environmental public order, and an indemnity for material damage, as claimed, cannot be agreed. This is because, as we saw earlier, in a protective zone only agricultural and forestry activities that fulfill the purpose of said wild area may be carried out, namely soil protection, the maintenance or regulation of the hydrological regime, with the carrying out of any of those activities being subject to an authorization regime by some administrative body, initially the General Forestry Directorate and currently SINAC (after the entry into force of Biodiversity Law No. 7788 of 1998). In any case, we also do not find that we are in either of the two hypotheses provided for in Article 194 LGAP for awarding damages for lawful conduct: that the damage is of a special character, due to the small proportion of affected parties or the exceptional intensity of the injury. Note that the fact of not being able to carry out urban development activities on a private farm located within a Protective Zone does not imply an exceptional intensity of the injury, since agricultural and forestry activities can indeed be carried out under an administrative authorization regime, and it cannot be considered that in the present case the property right has been emptied. In any case, if the plaintiff corporation, when it acquired the property from its previous owners (assignees of the IDA), did not exercise the minimum diligence to investigate which activities could be carried out on the site where the Tivives Protective Zone had previously been established, it must bear the cost of that omission, and it cannot claim compensable damages based on that omission.
Recall that the certificate of land use (certificado de uso del suelo) is the administrative act, issued at the request of the interested party, that certifies the conformity of the use being given or intended to be given to a land, in relation to what is established in the corresponding zoning regulation, with Articles 28 and 29 of the Urban Planning Law (No. 4240, of November 15, 1968) providing the following: "Article 28.- It is prohibited to use or dedicate lands, buildings, structures to any use incompatible with the established zoning.// Henceforth, interested owners must obtain a municipal certificate certifying the conformity of use with the zoning requirements. Existing non-conforming uses must also be recorded with a certificate expressing such circumstance.// Each zoning regulation shall set the date from which said certificates shall be mandatory." "Article 29.- Without the corresponding use certificate, business or industrial licenses shall not be granted. In case of contravention, the premises shall be closed, without prejudice to the criminal liability incurred." In accordance with the foregoing, the claim for material damages must be rejected, because we are not faced with the scenarios of Article 194 LGAP for recognizing that type of liability in the case of lawful conduct by the Administration.
Nor can legal interest be awarded, because Article 194 ejúsdem rejects the possibility of awarding consequential damages (perjuicios) in the case of liability for lawful conduct.
Finally, compensation for subjective moral damages cannot be awarded in favor of the representatives of the company Desarrollos La Piedrona, because if the representatives of that company were not directly a party to this proceeding, the plaintiff company lacks standing to seek compensation on their behalf; moreover, a commercial company, which is a legal person, cannot possibly be the object of that type of harm, which is expressed in feelings such as .
Regarding the statute-of-limitations defense (excepción de caducidad), it is understood to be the one under Article 35 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo) and is manifestly inapplicable in this case, because what is being brought is not an action for nullity of any formal administrative act, but rather a civil treasury claim (demanda civil de hacienda), which does not involve the nullity of any act.
As to the defense of constitutional res judicata (cosa juzgada constitucional), it is likewise not admissible. The Court is not unaware of the existence of Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) judgments, numbers 1763-94 and N° 7294-98, which prohibit IDA from awarding parcels to its beneficiaries located within the perimeter of the Tivives Protected Zone, establishing that those lands must be transferred to the State for environmental protection purposes. However, those judgments would not be applicable to the present case, because if the plaintiff company acquired one of those lands (originating from the Salinas II Settlement), it did so with the knowledge of the State and SINAC, which knew that after those judgments, IDA continued awarding parcels without taking any protective measures for the public domain (demanio), such as filing the corresponding lesividad claims to subsequently achieve the eviction of private parties from those lands. It is considered that, based on that situation and the principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima), the aforementioned constitutional judgments are not enforceable against (oponibles) the defendant company.
The defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) must be upheld regarding the indemnification claim arising from the two denials of plan approvals presented on November 21, 2014, based on the foregoing considerations.
The State and SINAC request that the registration of the property inscribed in favor of the plaintiff company be annulled and that ownership be reclaimed in favor of the State, it being a public-domain asset based on two Constitutional Chamber judgments (numbers 1763-94 and N° 7294-98), which establish that the IDA settlements located in the Tivives Protected Zone, particularly the Salinas II Settlement (where the property in question originated), were public-domain assets. Notwithstanding the foregoing, that action must be rejected, because this Court considers it to be a disguised lesividad action, which does not solely attack the registration but omits to challenge the disposal acts of the IDA Board of Directors from 1993 and 1996, which, contravening the first constitutional judgment, awarded lots that should have been transferred to the Dirección General Forestal for conservation purposes and which gave rise to the property in question. It is evident that this action is inadmissible because it contravenes numeral 34.5 CPCA, which provides: "A lesividad claim may not be brought by way of a counterclaim (contrademanda)." In the preceding sense: it is striking that the State and SINAC, which knew since the amparo of constitutional judgment number 1763-94 was granted, that the IDA Board of Directors had the practice of awarding parcels to farmers located in the Tivives Protected Zone, did not, until now—more than twenty years later, when a private party files a lawsuit in relation to those lands—request the nullity of the registration, without providing the guarantees of the lesividad action, namely: a reasoned declaration of harm to the economic or legal interests of the State; notice to the entity responsible for having carried out the act; notice to the private parties who derive rights from the subjective right (in this case, the right of property) that is sought to be annulled; an independent lesividad proceeding, not subordinated to a main action, as required by Article 34.5 CPCA.
Having argued the foregoing, the counterclaim in question must be declared inadmissible.
Therefore (Por tanto):
Regarding the lawsuit: The defenses of constitutional res judicata and statute of limitations (caducidad) are rejected. The defense of lack of active and passive legal standing raised by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural is upheld, as is the statute-of-limitations defense (excepción de prescripción) regarding the indemnification claim arising from the denial of plan approval requested on March 26, 2011. The statute-of-limitations defense is rejected regarding the indemnification claim arising from the denial of the two plan approvals requested on November 21, 2014, and the defense of lack of right is upheld regarding the indemnification claim for those dates. Consequently, the lawsuit filed by Desarrollos La Piedrona, Sociedad Anónima against the State, the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, and the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural is declared without merit in all its aspects. Regarding the counterclaim: The counterclaim filed by the State, which has the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación as an interested third party with its own claims, is declared inadmissible. Each party must bear its own costs.- Jonatán Canales Hernández, Rosa María Cortés Morales, Paulo André Alonso Soto, Judges.
Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Clase de asunto: Proceso de conocimiento Analizado por: CENTRO DE INFORMACIÓN JURISPRUDENCIAL Sentencias del mismo expediente *170047621027CA* CONOCIMIENTO ACTOR/A:
DESARROLLOS LA PIEDRONA S.A.
DEMANDADO/A:
EL ESTADO N° 2025001827 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL, SAN JOSÉ, GOICOECHEA, a las quince horas con veintiseis minutos del veintisiete de Febrero del dos mil veinticinco.- En cumplimiento de lo dispuesto por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, procede esta integración a emitir nueva sentencia de fondo, en el proceso de conocimiento que tiene como partes a: Desarrollos La Piedrona, Sociedad Anónima, cédula jurídica N° 3-101-554923, representada por su presidente con facultades de apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma, Arturo Acosta Mora, odontólogo y empresario, vecino de Jaboncillo de Escazú, cédula de identidad N° 1- 603-134 y su apoderado especial judicial, Roberto Suñol Prego, carné profesional N° 2695 (como actora y reconvenida); el Estado, representado por la procuradora Gloria Solano Martínez, carné profesional N° 10343 (como demandado y reconventor); el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, representado por su apoderado especial judicial, Jonathan Jiménez Ruiz, carné profesional N° 18493 (como demandado) y el Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, representada por su apoderada especial judicial, Hazel Hernández Calderón, carné profesional N° 21707 (como demandado y tercero interesado con pretensiones propias en la reconvención). Toda las personas físicas mencionadas, son mayores de edad y los representantes legales, son además, de profesión abogados.-
Considerando:
De la demanda:
Esa gestiones fueron acogidas por resolución N° 2451-2017 de las 15:15 horas del 30 de octubre del 2017, lo que dio lugar a que el SINAC, en su condición de órgano con personalidad jurídica instrumental, contestara negativamente dicha acción, por escrito presentado el 16 de abril del 2018, oponiéndose las excepciones de prescripción del reclamo de daños y perjuicios, cosa juzgada constitucional y falta de derecho (imágenes 297-301, 310-311, 455-458 y 472-490); 5) Que Desarrollos La Piedrona, presentó réplica a la contestación de la acción, por escritos fechados el 7 de setiembre del 2017 -los dos primeros- y 30 de abril del 2018 -el último-, que se aprecian a imágenes 362-371, 376-385 y 510-518; De la reconvención:
En los mismo términos se refirió a la solicitud del SINAC (imágenes 428-431 y 527); 8) Que el SINAC en su escrito presentado el 18 de abril del 2018, se refirió al reconvención realizada por el Estado, solicitando además ser tenido como tercero interesado con pretensiones propias, en esa reconvención (imágenes 487-490); 9) Que el Estado se refirió a la contestación de la reconvención realizada por Desarrollos la Piedrona (imagen 538); 10) Que en la audiencia preliminar, se tuvo como tercero interesado con pretensiones propias, al SINAC (escúchese alrededor del minuto 23); 11) Que por resoluciones de las 13:11 horas del 2 de mayo del 2018 y de las 10:30 horas del 23 de agosto de ese año, se ordenó la anotación del presente expediente sobre el inmueble 6-85766-001 y 002, inscrito a nombre de Desarrollos La Piedrona (imágenes 530 y 548); 12) Que la audiencia preliminar se realizó el 6 de junio del 2019 y fue dirigida por el Juez Carlos Góngora Fuentes, con la presencia de los representantes mencionados en el encabezado. En esa oportunidad, se tuvo al SINAC como tercero interesado con pretensiones propias en la reconvención; se fijaron las pretensiones de la demanda y de la reconvención; por resolución oral N° 1386-2018-T, se rechazó la defensa de cosa juzgada constitucional establecida por el Estado y el SINAC y se reservaron para ser resueltas en sentencia, las excepciones de caducidad y prescripción, en virtud de no ser evidentes ni manifiestas; se estableció el elenco de hechos controvertidos; se admitió la prueba documental y testimonial y se remitió el expediente a la Sección correspondiente para que realice el juicio oral y público (escúchese la grabación correspondiente); 13) En la audiencia preliminar se presentó prueba documental nueva, consistente en certificaciones literales de la finca N° 6-85766, derechos 001 y 002; recibos de pago realizados a la Municipalidad de Esparza y diversas fotografías. Dada la audiencia correspondiente, las contrapartes se opusieron a su admisión por escrito (imágenes 563-588; 602-603 607-608 y 611-612); 14) El juicio oral y público fue realizado en fecha 9 de setiembre del 2020, por la Sección Octava de este Tribunal, integrada por los jueces Rosa María Cortés Morales, Paulo André Alonso Soto y Jonatán Canales Hernández y con la presencia de las representaciones de las partes. En esa oportunidad, entre otras actividades, se recibieron los testimonios admitidos y en razón de la emergencia sanitaria, se decidió recibir las conclusiones por escrito, que fueron recibidas al día siguiente (escúchese la grabación correspondiente); 15) Que este Tribunal emitió la sentencia N° 114-2020 de las quince horas del treinta de setiembre del dos mil veinte, que posteriormente fue anulada, ordenándose además el reenvío a la misma Sección original, por resolución N° 1715-F-S1-2024 de las nueve horas veintiún minutos del cinco de diciembre del dos mil veinticuatro, de la Sala Primera de Casación. Para tomar esa decisión se tuvo como razonamiento fundamental: "IV (...) Considera esta Cámara, que la redacción de dicha fundamentación carece de claridad y precisión al encontrarse expresamente dicho por los jueces redactores, que no tienen seguridad de lo que se está solicitando. Puesto que se inician los considerandos anteriormente mencionados, con frases de que denotan incertidumbre sobre lo reclamado. Siendo que de conformidad con el artículo 90.1. a del CPCA, desde la audiencia preliminar se deben tener delimitados los extremos de la demanda, contrademanda y contestación (acto procesal que consta a imágenes de las 553 a la 551 del expediente electrónico). Sumado lo anterior, el canon 95 del CPCA le da la facultad al Tribunal, de oficio o a gestión de parte, de solicitarle a las partes aclarar, las pretensiones y los fundamentos alegados. Por consiguiente, si el Tribunal tenía dudas de los argumentos o de lo pedido, pudo en el momento procesal oportuno pedir la aclaración pertinente. No obstante, desde la interposición de la demanda, las pretensiones de la parte actora fueron claras, y únicamente hacen referencia al cobro de daño moral y material, según consta a imagen 22 del expediente electrónico. Sumado a lo anterior, la fundamentación de la sentencia resulta contradictoria, puesto que en el considerando VII del fallo, se expone con claridad, a criterio del Tribunal, que el objeto del proceso es el cobro de daño moral y material, y en el considerando XI, se entra a declarar la legalidad de los actos administrativos SINAC-ACOPAC-D-RES-67-2015 de las 11:00 horas del 20 de agosto del 2015; SINAC-ACOPAC-D-RES-78-2015 de las 14:30 horas de fecha 28 de ese mes y año y SINAC-ACOPAC-D-RES-68-2015 de las 11:00 horas de fecha 20 de ese mes y año. Por consiguiente, considera esta Sala, que hay una falta de claridad y coherencia total en la sentencia analizada y una grave contradicción en la motivación, circunstancia que obliga a acoger el cargo"; 16) En virtud de lo anterior, procede esta Sección integrada por los jueces Rosa María Cortés Morales, Paulo André Alonso Soto y Jonatán Canales Hernández a emitir la presente resolución, previa deliberación y por unanimidad, bajo la ponencia del último juez mencionado.- II) Que el objeto de la demanda, es el siguiente: 1. Se condene al Estado y al Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER) al pago del daño material por la suma de cuatro millones seiscientos cincuenta mil dólares (US$ 4,650,000.00). 2. Se condene al Estado y al Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER) al pago del daño moral subjetivo por la suma de cien mil dólares (US$ 100,000,00), a favor de los personeros de la empresa actora. 3. Se condene al Estado y al Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER) al pago de los perjuicios respectivos, que serán los intereses sobre las sumas indicadas, que se calcularán desde el momento en que se planteó la acción y hasta el momento en que quede firme la demanda, con eventual condenatoria la ejecución correspondiente. 4. Se condene al Estado y al Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER) al pago de las costas procesales y personales de la presente acción (véase la demanda a imagen 23; la acotación realizada por la parte actora, aceptada por las contrapartes y el Tribunal, a minutos 35-37 de la audiencia preliminar y la aclaración de la naturaleza del daño moral como de carácter subjetivo y sus destinatarios, realizada en el juicio oral y público).- Asimismo, el objeto de la reconvención, es: "1) La nulidad absoluta del inmueble 6-85766-001 y 002, plano P-142131-1993, originado como Lote 64 por adjudicación de la Junta Directiva del IDA, acuerdo N° 6 adoptado en el artículo VI de la Sesión N° 89-93 del 22 de noviembre de 1993, por comprender indebidamente terrenos del Patrimonio Natural del Estado, de dominio público, donde regirán las potestades de autotutela a cargo del MINAE-SINAC"; 2) Ante dicha declaratoria de nulidad, se ordenará la cancelación del inmueble antecitado y sus asientos vigentes; 3) La reconvenida deberá desocupar el inmueble antecitado, dentro del plazo de ocho días hábiles a partir de la firmeza de la sentencia, bajo el apercibimiento de que en caso contrario será desalojada por el MINAE-SINAC, con auxilio de la Fuerza Pública; 4) En caso de oposición, deberá condenarse a la contraparte al pago de ambas costas y sus intereses a cargo de la sociedad reconvenida (véase el escrito de imagen 353 y lo resuelto en la audiencia preliminar a minuto 42).- Se tuvo como pretensiones del SINAC, en su condición de tercero interesado dentro de la reconvención, la siguiente: declarar con lugar la demanda interpuesta por la Procuraduría General de la República en todos sus extremos y además Se ordene al Registro Inmobiliario la inscripción registral a favor del Estado-MINAE, del terreno descrito en el plano P-0143131-1993, siendo que el SINAC es el administrador del Patrimonio Natural del Estado, para lo cual el SINAC elaborará un nuevo plano catastrado a nombre del MINAE-SINAC (véase imagen 490 y modificación realizada aproximadamente a minuto 45 de la audiencia preliminar); III) De importancia para resolver el presente caso, se tienen como probados los siguientes hechos:
"Artículo 2º.- Dentro de sus límites y normas, la presente ley garantiza: 1.- El derecho de todo individuo o grupo de individuos que formen una cooperativa, aptos para trabajos agrícolas o pecuarios y que carezcan de tierra o la posean en cantidades insuficientes, a ser dotados en propiedad de tierras económicamente explotables, preferentemente en las zonas en donde trabajen o habiten, y cuando las circunstancias lo aconsejen, en zonas debidamente seleccionadas" "Artículo 16.- El Instituto tendrá capacidad para comprar, vender y arrendar bienes muebles e inmuebles, valores y empresas dentro de los propósitos de su creación; para emprestar, financiar e hipotecar, y para toda otra forma gestión comercial y legal que sea necesaria para el desempeño de su cometido, dentro de las normas corrientes de contratación que su situación financiera le permita, sin incurrir en riesgo indebidos para la estabilidad de la institución. En los casos en que haya más de una posibilidad de oferta capaz de llenar lo objetivos perseguidos para determinado fin, se seguirá el trámite de licitación. Las compras, ventas y arrendamiento de tierras se considerarán operaciones de tráfico ordinario del Instituto, para los efectos del artículo 110 de la Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República" "Artículo 30.- La Junta Directiva del Instituto tendrá los siguientes deberes: (...) 16) Aprobar la adjudicación de tierras para otorgar los respectivos títulos" "Artículo 49.- El Instituto podrá efectuar la parcelación de sus tierras para llenar, entre otros, los siguientes fines inmediatos: a) Una mejor distribución de la tierra; b) Resolución de situaciones de hecho inconvenientes, adecuándolas a los fines de esta ley; y c) Propósitos de colonización" Luego, hay que tener claro que en el año 1993, el IDA en aplicación de la Ley ejúsdem le adjudicó a una parcela (la N° 64 del Asentamiento Salinas II ubicado en el cantón de Esparza), a un beneficiario de nombre Isidro Rojas Porras, aceptando después esa misma entidad, en el año 1996, el traspaso de la parcela a otros dos beneficiarios, los señores Francisco Brenes Guillén y Haydee María Méndez Coto. Esa cesión de terrenos administrados por el IDA, a beneficiarios, se hace al amparo de un contrato de asignación de tierras, regulado por la propia Ley, suscrito entre el Instituto y la persona asignataria de un predio, en el que constan los derechos y obligaciones de dicha asignación o arrendamiento, conforme a los fines de la propia Ley de Tierras y Colonización, específicamente de las siguientes normas:
"Artículo 65.- Una vez acordada la adjudicación de las parcelas por venta, el Instituto expedirá a favor del ocupante un título de Posesión Provisional en que consten sus derechos y obligaciones. Si el ocupante ha cultivado el mínimo señalado por el Instituto y cumplido a satisfacción de éste todas las demás obligaciones, tendrá derecho a que se le otorgue título de propiedad, garantizando el pago con hipoteca de su parcela.
Artículo 67.- El beneficiario no podrá traspasar el dominio de su predio ni gravarlo, arrendarlo o subdividirlo sin autorización del Instituto, excepto que hayan transcurrido quince años desde la adquisición de la parcela y de que todas las obligaciones con dicho organismo estuvieren canceladas. Tampoco podrá, sin esa autorización y durante el mismo término, gravar las cosechas, semillas, animales, enseres, útiles o equipos necesarios para la explotación de la parcela, a menos que todas sus obligaciones con el Instituto estuvieren canceladas. Para autorizar el gravamen del inmueble se requieren cuatro votos conformes de la Junta Directiva. Será absolutamente nulo cualquier contrato que se celebre sin que se cumplan las disposiciones anteriores. Transcurridos los quince años y adquirido el derecho de propiedad, cualquier enajenación de parcela que, a juicio del Instituto, pueda producir la concentración o subdivisión excesiva de la propiedad, dará derecho a éste para adquirir la o las parcelas que se ofrezcan en venta por el precio que fijen los peritos nombrados por las partes, o por un tercero, en caso de discordia. Este tercer perito será nombrado por los otros dos expertos. El Registro Público tomará nota de las limitaciones a que se refiere este artículo" (los subrayados son propios).- Establecido lo anterior, no es sino hasta el año 2008, cuando ya tenían consolidado su derecho pleno de propiedad, que los señores Francisco Brenes Guillén y Haydee María Méndez Coto, le vendieron el bien en la suma de cuatro millones de colones a Desarrollos La Piedrona y es a partir de ese momento en que consta en autos, que se han realizado diversos actos de disposición sobre dicho bien, entre ellas hipotecar el bien y solicitar varios visados en cabeza propia, para efecto de realizar un desarrollo urbanístico en el sitio.- Cabe también señalar que a nivel registral, el inmueble mencionado, es un bien de dominio privado que soporta como Reservas, las establecidas en la Ley de Aguas y la Ley de Caminos y no tiene anotaciones, gravámenes o afectaciones, no obstante lo cual -como veremos de seguido-, está ubicado en una zona protectora y tiene las limitaciones a la propiedad privada, derivada de esa ubicación.- IX) Aplicación del principio de confianza legítima al presente caso: Debe señalarse que antes de la interposición de la presente acción, no consta que en sede administrativa o judicial, ningún ente u órgano público haya cuestionado que el inmueble tantas veces mencionado, sea propiedad de Desarrollos La Piedrona, como lo hacen en este expediente, el Estado y el SINAC, que piden que se anule la inscripción del bien como bien de dominio privado, al afirmarse que ese es un bien de dominio público.- Esa falta de cuestionamiento determina que deba considerarse que en este asunto, se aplica el principio de confianza legítima que tiene raigambre constitucional (numerales 34 y 45 de la Carta Fundamental). Ese principio ha sido desarrollado de forma reiterada, desde hace muchos años, afirmándose en la sentencia N° 2016-8000 de las 11:52 horas del 10 de junio del 2016 de la Sala Constitucional, lo siguiente: "III.- Sobre el principio de confianza legítima. Antaño se asumió de manera axiomática que, irremediablemente, todo acto ilegal de contenido favorable podía ser dejado sin efecto por parte de la Administración en cualquier tipo de situación, sin atender a ninguna circunstancia en particular.// No obstante, desde mediados de los cincuentas, tanto la doctrina como la jurisprudencia empezaron a detectar que una aplicación ciega y rígida de la regla antedicha lesionaba seriamente la confianza depositada por los administrados en la Administración, así como la buena fe y la seguridad jurídica.// De este modo, mediante sentencia de 14 de mayo de 1956, el Tribunal Contencioso-Administrativo de Berlín desarrolló el principio de confianza legítima, que luego fue adoptado por el Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Europea en sus pronunciamientos de 22 de marzo de 1961 y 13 de julio de 1965 (Lemmerz-Werk), y que básicamente apuntala la confianza de los ciudadanos en la medida que, en ciertas circunstancias del caso concreto, razones de equidad y buena fe le impiden a la Administración tomar medidas contrarias a la esperanza inducida por la razonable estabilidad de sus decisiones, en función de las cuales los particulares han adoptado determinadas medidas (...) En efecto, la ratio iuris del principio de protección a la confianza legítima consiste en que el desarrollo de las relaciones jurídicas requiere de un ambiente de confianza, en el que las reglas de juego, una vez dadas, se respetan. Lo anterior resulta de mayor relevancia en el caso de las relaciones para con la Administración, toda vez que, en este caso, el instrumento jurídico relacional es el acto administrativo, el cual no es sino una manifestación unilateral de voluntad del Estado. Ergo, el ciudadano necesita de instrumentos jurídicos para defenderse de la unilateralidad y superioridad de la Administración.// Ahora bien, estamos ante un principio de origen jurisprudencial evidentemente ligado a cuestiones de equidad, motivo por el que su aplicación debe ser analizada en cada caso concreto. Recordemos que el mismo ha sido concebido como una reacción del juez para resguardar la confianza del Administrado, cuando la Administración lo sorprende con un cambio inesperado en su proceder (...) En resumen, el principio de confianza legítima descansa sobre la base de que el ciudadano asume un comportamiento confiando en que actúa de manera correcta, toda vez que la conducta constante, estable y a lo largo del tiempo de la Administración le genera razonablemente tal expectativa; dicho de otra forma, la Administración ha emitido signos externos que han venido a orientar al ciudadano hacia una cierta conducta y le han hecho confiar de buena fe en que tal situación persistirá".- Cabe indicar que el hecho de negar permiso de uso de suelo para fines urbanísticos a un propietario de un terreno ubicado dentro de una zona protectora, no es desconocer un derecho adquirido de un particular protegido por el principio de publicidad registral, lo mismo que la garantía que establece que los derechos subjetivos creados a partir de actividad administrativa formal, solo pueden ser eliminados de la vida jurídica, previa sustanciación del proceso de lesividad, siendo esas garantías expresión del principio de protección de derechos adquiridos del artículo 34 constitucional, debiéndose tomar en cuenta también lo que establece el numeral 456 del Código Civil: "La inscripción no convalida los actos o contratos inscritos que sean nulos o anulables conforme a la ley. Sin embargo, los actos o contratos que se ejecuten u otorguen por persona que en el Registro aparezca con derecho para ello, una vez inscritos, no se invalidarán en cuanto a tercero, aunque después se anule o resuelva el derecho del otorgante en virtud de título no inscrito, o de causas implícitas, o de causas que aunque explícitas no constan en el Registro".- VIII) Ubicación del bien inscrito a favor de Desarrollos La Piedrona en la Zona Protectora Tivives y régimen de autorización administrativa para realizar actividades agrícolas y forestales: Sin perjuicio de lo antes expuesto es claro para este Tribunal, que el bien que está actualmente inscrito a nombre de la sociedad actora, era parte de un Asentamiento del IDA denominado "Salinas II", también conocido como Cambalache, ubicado en el cantón de Esparza, provincia de Puntarenas, específicamente la parcela 64. Esa parcela fue adjudicada primeramente (otorgándosele título supletorio de dominio) a un beneficiario de esa entidad (año 1993), que luego (con autorización de la entidad), traspasó el bien a otros dos beneficiarios (año 1996), para que finalmente cuando ya habían vencido el plazo de consolidación del derecho del artículo 67 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, le vendieron el derecho de dominio pleno a Desarrollos La Piedrona.- Ahora bien, también es claro (véase el elenco de hechos probados), que esa propiedad está ubicada dentro de la Zona Protectora Tivives, que fue creada por el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 17023 de 6 de mayo de 1986 (vigente a partir del 2 de junio de ese año).- Téngase presente que para la fecha en que se creó la Zona Protectora Tivives, las "zonas protectoras" eran definidas por el artículo 83 de la Ley Forestal, N° 4465 de 25 de noviembre de 1969, de la siguiente manera: "Se entenderá por zonas protectoras, aquellas áreas de bosques o terrenos forestales que, establecidas por disposiciones de la ley o por decreto del Poder Ejecutivo, sean destinadas a proteger los suelos, mantener y regular el régimen hidrológico, o actúen como agentes reguladores del clima o medio ambiente" (los subrayados son propios).- Ahora bien, el hecho que exista un inmueble de dominio privado dentro de los límites de una zona protectora, implica necesariamente que dichas heredades solo se puedan dedicar a actividades agrícolas y forestales, que cumplan con el fin de dicha área silvestre, a saber la protección de los suelos, el mantenimiento o regulación del régimen hidrológico, estando sometida la realización de cualquiera de esas actividades, a un régimen de autorización de parte de algún órgano administrativo, inicialmente la Dirección General Forestal y en la actualidad el SINAC. En ese sentido revísese el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 17023 (que creó la Zona Protectora Tivives), en que se establece (los subrayados son propios):
"Artículo 2°-La administración y manejo de la Zona Protectora Tivives estará a cargo de la Dirección General Forestal, en coordinación con el Centro Agrícola Regional Pacífico Central, Centro Agrícola Cantonal de Esparza y la Municipalidad de Esparza.
Artículo 3°-Las actividades forestales, agrícolas o ganaderas que se fueran a realizar en la Zona Protectora, deberán contar con la respectiva autorización extendida por la Dirección General Forestal, en coordinación con el Comité Interinstitucional que se menciona en el artículo anterior.
Artículo 4°-Se establece una franja de amortiguamiento de 20 metros que bordeará el límite del manglar.
Artículo 5°-Queda prohibido en los inmuebles estatales y privados comprendidos dentro de los linderos señalados en el artículo anterior: a) Derribar y/o cortar árboles y extraer, recolectar productos de despojos forestales de cualquier especie sin la autorización de la Dirección General Forestal. b) La caza de animales silvestres. c) La práctica de las quemas" X) Sobre el fondo del reclamo de daño material y daño moral subjetivo en la demanda: A partir lo que vimos antes, lo que se está reclamando en este caso, es únicamente el tema de responsabilidad patrimonial por conducta lícita, sea, por exclusión la que no implica una transgresión al ordenamiento jurídico (artículos 190, 191 y 192 LGAP), debe analizarse, si no encontramos en los supuestos de los artículos 194 y 195 ejúsdem, antes citados.- Se llega a la anterior conclusión porque incluso este Tribunal en su última resolución, la de las nueve horas cinco minutos del diecinueve de diciembre de dos mil veinticuatro, advirtió (véase en particular lo aquí subrayado): "De conformidad con el numeral 150.1 del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo y visto que la honorable Sala Primera de Casación anuló la resolución final emitida por este Tribunal, emítase nueva sentencia, por la misma integración que realizó el juicio. En el mismo orden: se tiene claro que el objeto del reclamo por responsabilidad patrimonial hecho en la demanda, es la conducta lícita de las Administraciones Públicas y no se está cuestionando la legalidad de ningún acto administrativo; se concluye lo anterior a partir de la resolución anulatoria comentada", sin que ninguna de las partes de este proceso, realizara observación alguna.- Establecido lo anterior, se observa que en el presente caso, realizar un desarrollo inmobiliario, como el que se pretende desplegar en la finca de la sociedad actora, va contra el orden público ambiental y no se puede acordar una indemnización por daño material, como la que se pretende. Lo anterior por cuanto según vimos antes, en una zona protectora solamente se pueden realizar actividades agrícolas y forestales, que que cumplan con el fin de dicha área silvestre, a saber la protección de los suelos, el mantenimiento o regulación del régimen hidrológico, estando sometida la realización de cualquiera de esas actividades, a un régimen de autorización de parte de algún órgano administrativo, inicialmente la Dirección General Forestal y en la actualidad el SINAC (a partir de la vigencia de la Ley de Biodiversidad N° 7788 de 1998). En todo caso, tampoco se encuentra que nos encontremos bajo las dos hipótesis previstas en el artículo 194 LGAP para conceder el daño por conducta lícita: que el daño sea de carácter especial, por la pequeña proporción de afectados o por la intensidad excepcional de la lesión. Véase que el hecho de no poder realizar actividades de desarrollo urbanístico en una finca privada ubicada dentro de una Zona Protectora, no implica una intensidad excepcional de la lesión, por cuanto sí se pueden realizar actividades agrícolas y forestales bajo régimen de autorización administrativa, no pudiéndose considerar que en el presente caso, se haya vaciado el derecho de propiedad. En todo caso, si la sociedad actora cuando adquirió el bien de sus anteriores propietarios (adjudicatarios del IDA), no tuvo la diligencia mínima de investigar cuáles actividades se podían realizar en el sitio donde previamente se había constituido la Zona Protectora Tivives, debe asumir el costo de esa omisión, no pudiendo alegar daño indemnizable a partir de esa omisión.- Recuérdese que el certificado de uso del suelo es es el acto administrativo, emitido a solicitud de la parte interesada, que acredita la conformidad del uso que se le da o se pretende dar a un terreno, en relación con lo establecido en el reglamento de zonificación correspondiente, disponiéndose en los artículos 28 y 29 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana (N° 4240, del 15 de noviembre de 1968), lo siguiente: “Artículo 28.- Prohíbese aprovechar o dedicar terrenos, edificios, estructuras, a cualquier uso que sea incompatible con la zonificación implantada.// En adelante, los propietarios interesados deberán obtener un certificado municipal que acredite la conformidad de uso a los requerimientos de la zonificación. Los usos ya existentes no conformes, deberán hacerse constar también con certificado que exprese tal circunstancia.// Cada reglamento de zonificación fijará la fecha a partir de la cual dichos certificados serán obligatorios" "Artículo 29.- Sin el certificado de uso correspondiente, no se concederán patentes para establecimiento comerciales o industriales. En caso de contravención, se procederá a la clausura del local, sin perjuicio de la responsabilidad penal en que se incurra”. Conforme con lo anterior, se debe rechazar la indemnización por daño material, porque no nos encontramos ante los supuestos del artículo 194 LGAP, para reconocer ese tipo de responsabilidad tratándose de conducta forma lícita de la Administración.- Tampoco se pueden reconocer los intereses legales, porque el artículo 194 ejúsdem, rechaza la posibilidad que tratándose de responsabilidad por conducta lícita, se puedan reconocer los perjuicios.- Finalmente, no pueden reconocerse la indemnización por daño moral subjetivo a favor de los personeros de la sociedad Desarrollos La Piedrona, porque si los personeros de esa sociedad, no fueron parte de forma directa en este proceso, no está legitimada la sociedad actora, para pedir una indemnización a favor de ellos, además que una sociedad comercial que es una persona moral, es imposible que pueda ser un objeto de una afectación de ese tipo, que se expresa en sentimientos como .- XI) Otras excepciones: Las excepciones de falta de legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva del INDER, deben acogerse porque si lo que se reclama es el vaciamiento del contenido del derecho de propiedad es con base en las denegatorias de los visados de planos que realizó el SINAC, siendo el INDER completamente ajenos a esos actos que habrían provocado un daño, a pesar de su participación en la creación de un título de propiedad a favor de particulares, en una Zona Protectora.- En cuanto a la excepción de caducidad, se entiende que es la propia del artículo 35 del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo y es abiertamente improcedente en este caso, porque no se demanda la nulidad de ninguna actuación administrativa formal, sino es una demanda civil de hacienda, que no involucra la nulidad de acto alguno.- En cuanto a la defensa de cosa juzgada constitucional, tampoco es de recibo. El Tribunal no desconoce la existencia de las sentencias de la Sala Constitucional, números 1763-94 y N° 7294-98, que prohíben que el IDA adjudicara parcelas a sus beneficiarios, que se encuentren dentro del perímetro de la Zona Protectora Tivives, estableciendo que esos terrenos deben ser traspasados al Estado, para efectos de protección del ambiente, no obstante esas sentencias no serían aplicables al presente caso, porque si la sociedad actora adquirió uno de esos terrenos (proveniente del Asentamiento Salinas II), fue con el conocimiento del Estado y el SINAC, que sabían que posteriormente a esas sentencias, el IDA siguió adjudicando parcelas, sin tomar ninguna medida de protección para el demanio, como por ejemplo establecer las demandas de lesividad correspondientes, para luego lograr el desalojo de los particulares de esos terrenos. Se estima que a partir de esa situación y el principio de confianza legítima, las sentencias constitucionales comentadas, no le son oponibles a la sociedad demandada.- La excepción de falta de derecho, debe acogerse en cuanto al reclamo indemnizatorio derivado de las dos denegatorias del visado de planos, que fueron presentadas en fecha 21 de noviembre del 2014, con base en lo antes considerado.- XII) DE LA RECONVENCIÓN: Si se observa dicha acción del Estado (que tiene como tercero interesado con pretensiones propias al SINAC, como administrador por disposición legal del Patrimonio Natural del Estado), se solicita que "se anule un inmueble" inscrito en el Registro Nacional y que se elimine el asiento registral correspondiente, que tiene su origen en un acto administrativo del IDA del año 1993, que dispuso de terrenos que integran el demanio público. Ahora bien, esta reconvención tiene la particularidad que no se pide la nulidad del acto de adjudicación de un bien que supuestamente integra el demanio público, ni mucho menos se planteó una acción de lesividad, contra el acto que originó la supuesta disposición ilegal de un bien de dominio público, sino que se pide de forma directa la anulación del asiento registral que da publicidad de la creación del bien, creando una finca privada, que fue traspasada por unos adjudicatarios del IDA -en aplicación la Ley de Tierras y Colonización-, a la sociedad actora. Cabe indicar que esa situación (que se impugna la existencia de los asientos registrales de la finca, pero no el acto administrativo que dispuso de un bien de dominio público), tendrá consecuencias importantes para admisibilidad de la acción.- El Estado y el SINAC piden que se anule la inscripción de la finca inscrita a favor de la sociedad actora y se reivindique esa propiedad a favor del Estado, por ser bien de dominio público a partir de dos sentencias de la Sala Constitucional (números 1763-94 y N° 7294-98), que establecen que los asentamiento del IDA ubicados en la Zona Protectora Tivives y en particular, el Asentamiento Salinas II (donde se originó la finca de marras), eran bienes de dominio público. No obstante lo anterior debe rechazarse esa acción, porque considera este Tribunal que es una acción de lesividad encubierta, que no ataca únicamente la inscripción, sino que omite cuestionar los actos de disposición de la Junta Directiva del IDA, de los años 1993 y 1996, que contrariando la primera sentencia constitucional, adjudicaron lotes que se debieron haber traspasado a la Dirección General Forestal, para fines de conservación y que originaron la finca en cuestión. Véase que esa acción es inadmisible por contrariar el numeral 34.5 CPCA, que dispone: "La pretensión de lesividad no podrá deducirse por la vía de la contrademanda".- En el sentido anterior: llama la atención que el Estado y el SINAC que conocían desde que se declaró con lugar el amparo de la sentencia constitucional número 1763-94, que la Junta Directiva del IDA tenía la práctica de adjudicar parcelas a campesinos, ubicadas en la Zona Protectora Tivives, no sea sino hasta ahora más de veinte años después, que cuando un particular plantea una demanda con relación a esos terrenos, que pida la nulidad de la inscripción, sin dar las garantías de la acción de lesividad, a saber: declaratoria fundada de afectación de los intereses económicos o jurídicos del Estado; traslado a la entidad responsable de haber realizado el acto; traslado a los particulares que deriven derechos del derecho subjetivo (en este caso, derecho de propiedad), que se busca anular); proceso independiente de lesividad, no subordinado a una acción principal, tal como lo exige el artículo 34.5 CPCA.- Argumentado lo anterior, se debe declarar inadmisible la reconvención comentada.- XIII) En este caso existió vencimiento recíproco entre las partes, por cuanto fueron desestimadas tanto la demanda de Desarrollos La Piedrona, contra el Estado, el SINAC y el INDER, como se rechazó la reconvención del Estado (que tenía como tercero interesado con pretensiones propias al SINAC), contra la Desarrollos La Piedrona. En razón de lo anterior, nos encontramos ante la hipótesis de exoneración de costas al vencido del numeral 73.2.3 del Código Procesal Civil, que es aplicable a esta materia, por remisión del artículo 220 CPCA. Por ese motivo cada parte debe asumir sus propias costas.-
Por tanto:
Sobre la demanda: Se rechazan las defensas de cosa juzgada constitucional y caducidad. Se acoge la excepción de falta de legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva planteada por el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, lo mismo que la excepción de prescripción con respecto al reclamo indemnizatorio derivado del rechazo de visado de planos, solicitado en fecha 26 de marzo del 2011. Se rechaza la defensa de prescripción en cuanto al reclamo indemnizatorio derivado del rechazo de los dos visados de planos solicitados el 21 de noviembre del 2014 y se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho en cuanto al reclamo indemnizatorio de esas fechas. En consecuencia se declara improcedente en todos sus extremos, la demanda de planteada por Desarrollos La Piedrona, Sociedad Anónima contra el Estado, el Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación y el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural. Sobre la reconvención: Se declara inadmisible la reconvención planteada por el Estado, que tiene como tercero interesado con pretensiones propias al Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación. Cada parte debe asumir sus propias costas.- Jonatán Canales Hernández, Rosa María Cortés Morales, Paulo André Alonso Soto, Jueces.- JONATHAN CANALES HERNÁNDEZ - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A PAULO ANDRÉ ALONSO SOTO - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A ROSA MARÍA CORTES MORALES - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A
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