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Res. 00018-2022 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo · 11/01/2022
OutcomeResultado
The interim measure is denied due to failure to prove periculum in mora, as the applicant did not demonstrate serious, actual, or potential harm.Se declara sin lugar la medida cautelar por falta de demostración del peligro en la demora, ya que el solicitante no probó el daño grave, actual o potencial.
SummaryResumen
The Administrative Contentious Court denied an interim measure sought by a private individual requesting the immediate suspension of Executive Decree 39150-MINAE-MAG-PLAN-TUR (2015) and its amendment via Decree 42562 (2020), which regulate the inclusion of the environmental variable in regulatory plans. The petitioner argued that the decrees contain legal and technical inaccuracies, create confusion by allowing undefined substitute methodologies, and contradict the methodology of Decree 32967-MINAE. The court held that, although there is a fumus boni iuris (the main claim is not frivolous), the petitioner failed to demonstrate periculum in mora: he provided no evidence of serious, actual, or potential harm he would suffer, nor did he prove urgency, given that the norms have been in force since 2015 and 2020. Lacking this essential requirement, the precautionary measure was denied without costs. The objection of lack of active standing was reserved for the main proceedings.El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo rechaza la medida cautelar solicitada por un particular que pretendía la suspensión inmediata del Decreto Ejecutivo 39150-MINAE-MAG-PLAN-TUR (2015) y su modificación mediante Decreto 42562 (2020), normas que regulan la introducción de la variable ambiental en los planes reguladores. El solicitante argumentó que los decretos contienen imprecisiones jurídicas y técnicas, generan confusión al permitir metodologías sustitutivas no definidas y contradicen la metodología del Decreto 32967-MINAE. El tribunal consideró que, si bien existe apariencia de buen derecho (la demanda principal no es temeraria), el gestionante no demostró el peligro en la demora: no aportó prueba del daño grave, actual o potencial que sufriría, ni acreditó urgencia, pues las normas están vigentes desde 2015 y 2020. Al faltar este presupuesto esencial, se rechaza la cautelar sin condenatoria en costas. La excepción de falta de legitimación activa se reserva para el proceso principal.
Key excerptExtracto clave
V) CRITERION OF THIS COURT: Having examined the record in light of the evidentiary elements and arguments put forward by the parties, this Court considers that not all the elements for ordering an interim measure in this matter are met, in accordance with the requirements established in Articles 21 and 22 of the Code of Contentious Administrative Procedure. (...) We insist: it is not enough to allege the existence of harm or injury; it must be proven, which, as is known, is a procedural burden borne by the interested party, which was not raised by the plaintiff, let alone duly proven in this case. (...) As stated, it is clear that the challenge concerns not only the implementation of the cited Executive Decree but also its amendment; but what is unclear, in the absence of evidence to that effect, is the magnitude of the harm that the plaintiff here, appearing in his personal capacity, might experience or be experiencing. (...) Therefore, this Court cannot consider the element or requirement under analysis to be satisfied, given the lack of proof of harm, which cannot be automatically admitted merely on the word of the requesting party.V) CRITERIO DE ESTE JUZGADOR: Estudiados los autos a la luz de los elementos probatorios y argumentos esbozados por las partes, este Tribunal considera que no concurren en su totalidad los elementos para dictar una medida cautelar en este asunto acorde a los requerimientos establecidos en los numerales 21 y 22 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. (...) Se insiste no basta con alegar la existencia del daño o perjuicio sino que debe probarse, lo cual como ya se sabe, es una carga procesal que asume la parte interesada, que no fue alegado por la parte actora; menos aún fue debidamente demostrado en este caso. (...) Como se indicó, se tiene claridad que lo que se cuestiona no es solo la puesta en marcha del Decreto Ejecutivo citado; sino su modificación, pero de lo que no se tiene claridad a falta de prueba en ese sentido es la magnitud del daño que pudiera experimentar o estar experimentando el aquí actor, que ha comparecido en su calidad personal. (...) Por lo anterior este Tribunal no podría tener por superado el elemento o presupuesto analizado, por la falta de demostración del daño, el cual no podría ser admitido de forma automática solo por el dicho de la parte promovente.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"No basta con alegar la existencia del daño o perjuicio sino que debe probarse, lo cual como ya se sabe, es una carga procesal que asume la parte interesada."
"It is not enough to allege the existence of harm or injury; it must be proven, which, as is known, is a procedural burden borne by the interested party."
Considerando V
"No basta con alegar la existencia del daño o perjuicio sino que debe probarse, lo cual como ya se sabe, es una carga procesal que asume la parte interesada."
Considerando V
"La apariencia de buen derecho en sí, es un juicio de probabilidades que hace el Juez del resultado eventual del proceso, lo cual al encontrarnos ante una medida cautelar y mas aún como la presente que es ante causam, es prematuro advertir la procedencia de la misma."
"The fumus boni iuris itself is a judgment of probabilities that the Judge makes regarding the eventual outcome of the proceedings, which, when we are dealing with an interim measure and even more so one such as this that is ante causam, makes it premature to determine its appropriateness."
Considerando V
"La apariencia de buen derecho en sí, es un juicio de probabilidades que hace el Juez del resultado eventual del proceso, lo cual al encontrarnos ante una medida cautelar y mas aún como la presente que es ante causam, es prematuro advertir la procedencia de la misma."
Considerando V
"Al no concurrir en su totalidad los presupuestos legales necesarios, se debe de declarar sin lugar la medida cautelar solicitada en los términos que fue planteada."
"Since not all the necessary legal requirements are met, the interim measure requested as formulated must be denied."
Considerando VIII
"Al no concurrir en su totalidad los presupuestos legales necesarios, se debe de declarar sin lugar la medida cautelar solicitada en los términos que fue planteada."
Considerando VIII
Full documentDocumento completo
**TRANSLATION** **CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL** **Resolution No. 00018 - 2022** **Date of Resolution:** January 11, 2022 at 15:45 **Case File:** 21-004617-1027-CA **Drafted by:** Rodrigo Huertas Durán **Type of Matter:** Precautionary measure *ante causam* **Analyzed by:** CENTRO DE INFORMACIÓN JURISPRUDENCIAL **Type of Content:** Majority Vote **Topics (descriptors):** Precautionary measures in the contentious-administrative process **Subtopics:** Requirements for granting them and considerations regarding the burden of proof. **Topics (descriptors):** Burden of proof in contentious-administrative matters **Subtopics:** It corresponds to the plaintiff when formulating their claim. Decisions in the same vein **Text of the resolution** **CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL** Central 2545-0003. Fax 2545-0033. Email ...01 Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Anexo A (Antiguo edificio Motorola) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ **CASE FILE:** 21-004617-1027-CA **PROCESS:** PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE *ANTE CAUSAM*.
**PROMOTED BY:** Nombre30219 **DEFENDANT:** THE STATE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- **No. 18-2022** **CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ - ANEXO A** - Goicoechea, at fifteen hours forty-five minutes on the eleventh day of January of the year two thousand twenty-two.- A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE *ANTE CAUSAM* is heard, filed by Mr. Nombre30219 against THE STATE.- **WHEREAS:** **I)** At ten hours on the twenty-eighth day of July of the year two thousand twenty-one, Mr. Nombre30219 appeared in this process, filing a precautionary measure *ante causam*, requesting from this Tribunal what is transcribed literally below: "(...) an IMMEDIATE and PRECAUTIONARY SUSPENSION [sic] of the application of decree 39150 and its reform is requested, considering that it has serious substantive inaccuracies and that, consequently, it generates confusion and uncertainty in the process of introducing the environmental variable in the regulatory plans (planes reguladores)." (see filing of the precautionary measure dated 07/28/2021).- **II)** By means of the ruling issued at sixteen hours twenty-five minutes on the twenty-eighth day of July of the year two thousand twenty-one, this Tribunal rejected the request in an extremely provisional (*provisionalísima*) capacity, and granted a hearing to the State representation so that it could address it (see ruling of 07/28/2021).- **III)** By means of the filing dated the tenth of September of the year two thousand twenty-one, the State representation responded negatively to the present precautionary request, seeking its rejection. It raised the exception of Lack of Active Standing (*Legitimación activa*) (see filing dated 09/10/2021).
**IV)** The statutory requirements have been observed in the proceedings, and no defects or omissions are noted that could cause defenselessness to the parties or future nullities.- **CONSIDERING:** **I) GENERALITIES FOR THE GRANTING OF A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE.** As developed by the Constitutional Chamber (*Sala Constitucional*), precautionary justice responds to the need to guarantee the constitutional principle of prompt and complete justice, by preserving the indispensable real conditions for the issuance and execution of the judgment. (Resolution 7190-1994, at 15:24 hours on December 6). In this same sense, Article 19 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (*Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo*) establishes that the purpose of ordering a precautionary measure is to protect and guarantee, provisionally, the object of the process and the effectiveness of the judgment. The doctrine has indicated that precautionary justice does not have the purpose of declaring a fact or a liability, nor of constituting a legal relationship, nor of executing an order and satisfying the right that is held without being discussed, nor of settling a litigation, but rather of preventing the damages that the litigation may cause or that may derive from an abnormal situation (Gallegos Fedriani, Pablo. *Las medidas cautelares contra la Administración Pública*. 2 ed. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ábaco, 2006). Having clarified the foregoing, the judge, observing the provisions of Article 21 of the indicated procedural rule, must determine the appropriateness of a request for a precautionary measure, verifying for this purpose that the claim of the main proceeding is not reckless or, in a manifest manner, lacking in seriousness, which constitutes a preliminary assessment of the merits to determine if there exists in the case at hand what doctrine and jurisprudence have called the appearance of a good right or *fumus boni iuris*. The rule under analysis also establishes the appropriateness of the precautionary measure when the execution or permanence of the conduct subject to the process produces serious damages or harm, current or potential, a situation that has been defined in doctrine as the *periculum in mora* or danger in delay, that is, that by virtue of the pathological delay of the judicial process, there is a current, real, and objective danger that serious damage will be caused to the promoting party (Jinesta Lobo, Ernesto. *Manual del Proceso Contencioso-Administrativo*. 1 ed. San José, Costa Rica, Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2008). Along the same line of thought, Article 22 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code establishes the obligation of the judge to carry out, in light of the principle of proportionality, a balancing of the interests at stake, that is, between the circumstance of the individual, on the one hand, and the public interest and the interests of third parties that may be affected by the adoption of the precautionary measure, on the other. Additionally, and from the same cited numeral 22, it is required that the precautionary measure be instrumental and provisional.- **II) ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMITTING A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE.** In this regard, it has been said that for the fulfillment of precautionary protection, as a fundamental right derived from constitutional numeral 41, which is the right to obtain prompt and complete justice, the jurisdictional body must assess for its effective materialization, in addition to the fulfillment of the requirements known in doctrine as Appearance of a Good Right (*Fumus Boni Iuris*), Danger in Delay (*Periculum in Mora*), as well as the balancing of interests at stake, which will be detailed below, the verification of the presence or existence of what have been termed the structural characteristics of the precautionary measure. The foregoing refers to instrumentality, provisionality, urgency, and *summaria cognitio* or summary nature of the proceeding. Both the indicated requirements and the stated characteristics must be present for the granting of the measure that has been requested with the purpose of protecting and guaranteeing, provisionally, the object of the process and the effectiveness of the judgment. Regarding the necessary requirements for granting the precautionary measure, we find the following: a) Appearance of a Good Right: for the appropriateness of the precautionary measure, there must be "seriousness in the claim," that is, a probability of success such that the claim does not appear, at a simple glance, manifestly lacking in seriousness, or, where appropriate, reckless. For the doctrine, this is nothing other than the probable subsequent estimation of the party's material right in the judgment, through an analysis typical of a summary process that in no way can or should determine a pronouncement on the merits of the matter raised, but rather, and instead, only an approximation of it with the elements present at the time of issuing the decision that grants or denies the measure; b) Danger in Delay: this consists of the objectively founded and reasonable fear that the substantial legal situation alleged will be seriously damaged or harmed in a grave and irreparable manner, during the time necessary to issue a judgment in the main process. This requirement necessitates the presence of two elements: the serious damage or harm and the delay in the main proceeding, without losing sight, of course, that within this requirement is what the doctrine has called the "Bilateral Nature of the *Periculum in Mora*" or, as it is commonly known, the balancing of the interests at stake. The requirement alludes to the characteristic that must be found in the damages claimed, which are susceptible to occurring—currently or potentially—if the required measure is not adopted. Damages that must be established as serious, in addition to being considered as derived from the alleged situation. The claimed harms must at least be proven through the rational principle of proof, so it is not enough to allege the damage in those terms, but the circumstances must be accredited to be considered a damage and for it to be serious. In that sense, it must be emphasized that it is not enough to allege the existence of the damage or harm, serious, current, or potential, but it must be proven, which, as referred to above, is a procedural burden that the interested party must assume to prove their claim, Article 41 of the Civil Procedural Code (*Código Procesal Civil*). Regarding delay in the main proceeding: This requirement refers to the situation generated by jurisdictional processes that require for their development and subsequent conclusion, the performance of a series of acts through which not only due process is guaranteed but also the issuance of a decision that, if it cannot be carried out promptly, is at least fair. Putting an end to a main proceeding demands time, and this is precisely where precautionary protection acquires special relevance, because while that decision is pending, serious damages are being avoided, which, if they were to occur, would render the right claimed nugatory. With the entry into force of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, there was a significant improvement for those processes that took years and even decades; today, despite the efforts made, although processes last less time due to the benefits of orality, different stages must be completed, scheduling hearings, against the backdrop of very saturated calendars, etc., which mean that processes last a reasonable time, but time nonetheless. Regarding the bilateral nature of the *periculum in mora*: Under this designation, reference is made to the balancing of interests at stake, linked to the public interest that may need protection, compared to the interests of third parties and, of course, the interest of the party filing via a precautionary measure. These must be assessed comparatively, with the denial of the measure being imposed when the harm suffered or potentially caused to the community or third parties is greater than what the applicant for the measure could experience.- **III) STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE:** As indicated, in addition to the requirements already stated, it is necessary that the measure to be adopted structurally possesses the following characteristics: instrumentality, meaning they maintain a marked relationship of accessoriness with the final judgment, since ultimately, they serve as an instrument to maintain the validity of the object of the process in the terms set forth; provisionality, which is nothing other than what is agreed upon regarding the precautionary measure, will remain in effect and conditioned on what is decided in the main proceeding. It bears highlighting that it can also be terminated or modified at any time, given the variability of the conditions that originally gave rise to it, or alternatively, the measure that was previously rejected could be adopted, as established by numeral 29 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code. Therefore, its effectiveness is exhausted at the moment the judgment on the merits is issued, or in other words, its effects are subject to the provision adopted in the main process; urgency, to avoid the danger in delay; as well as *summaria cognitio*—that is—that these types of measures are adopted by virtue of an extremely summary cognition performed by the jurisdictional body without prejudging the merits of the matter, which in no way could substitute the stages of the main proceeding. Based on the foregoing normative framework of analysis and the required elements for granting a precautionary measure, an examination of the specific case proceeds.- **IV) REGARDING THE SPECIFIC CASE.** The applicant herein, Mr. Nombre30219, regarding what is of interest for the resolution of this precautionary request, has indicated that this request is filed against the Executive Decree (*Decreto Ejecutivo*) No. 39150 MINAE - MAG - PLAN - TUR of September 3, 2015, and its modification made by Executive Decree No. 42562-MINAE-MAG-TUR-PLAN-MIVAH of September 2, 2020. As is more than evident, the applicant herein questions not only Executive Decree No. 39150 MINAE - MAG - PLAN - TUR, in force practically since September 3, 2015, but also questions a modification made to it, through Executive Decree No. 42562-MINAE-MAG-TUR-PLAN-MIVAH, a modification made since September 2, 2020. As could be seen, the applicant herein makes a broad and detailed exposition of their opinion regarding the adverse consequences of the Decree and its modification, which, as reported, will be the subject of analysis before this jurisdiction. The plaintiff considers that there is a significant legal-technical-administrative vacuum by leaving open the possibility of using a substitute methodology without it being duly defined and officially published. They point out that Decree 39150 itself and its modification of October 2020 establish a 2-year period for the substitute methodology to be developed, thereby recognizing that it does not exist, and considering that this produces a clear and evident legal contradiction due to the fact that SETENA is already using said tool. In the applicant's opinion, what was logical and correct in this case was to state that the methodology of Decree 32967, which remains in force, should continue to be applied until such time as all procedures were completed and a methodology to replace it was published. They emphasize that at this point, a clear and evident contradiction is shown in Decree 39150 and its modification, and hence its challenge is posed due to its legal and administrative inconsistency. The applicant finds it important to point out that this situation of legal and technical vacuum generates great confusion, which materializes through the specific fact that the Strategic Environmental Assessment Department (*Departamento de Evaluación Ambiental Estratégica*) of SETENA is applying, in its review process of the environmental reports for regulatory plans, subsection "c" of Article 23 of Decree 39150 and its modification. They state that this situation is evidenced in the documents that Department issues to municipalities when it presents observations on the reports under review. In their consideration, no clear and well-supported technical justification for the substitute methodology is developed to propose the substitution of the existing methodology for introducing the environmental variable in the regulatory plans, which, in their opinion, leaves open the non-use of the technical methodology established by Decree 32967 in favor of other uncertain methodologies that have not been reviewed and duly authorized by the State's environmental authorities. They stress that this matter is extremely important, since if the use of any substitute methodology is permitted, one that is uncertain and without any technical basis, it would be in clear contradiction with the current regulations (Reglamento General de EIA and Decree 32967 - MINAE) and all current environmental legislation. This is because the "technical rules" for introducing the environmental variable according to the country's current regulatory framework would not be clearly defined, as they are in the case of Decree 32967; therefore, they consider there is a serious defect of illegality in the process of applying Decree 39150 and its reform, which needs to be corrected as soon as possible. It is the applicant's opinion that Decree 39150 and its modification, regarding the provision of technical tools that facilitate the preparation of the environmental report for the regulatory plan to be submitted to SETENA, far from improving the existing situation with the application of the current methodology (Decree 32967 - MINAE), rather complicates it. They add that the fact that the application of a substitute methodology is left open, one that is not yet in force and duly officialized, to the point that the rule has many legal and technical inaccuracies that generate confusion or induce error, is why they consider there are sufficient arguments to request that the rule in question is inappropriate and must therefore be suspended until all the elements indicated herein are duly clarified and resolved. They consider that introducing the environmental variable into a regulatory plan for a country like Costa Rica, which has a "thick package of environmental legislation" that must be incorporated and harmonized into the land-use (*uso del suelo*) proposal of the regulatory plan, allows the situation to shift from an orderly system (with the application of Executive Decree No. 32967 -MINAE, in force since May 2006) to a chaotic, confusing, and overly open-to-interpretation system with the application of Decree 39150 and its modification. They assert that this is an extremely delicate matter, and hence the present request is filed. The applicant finds it important to stress that from 2016 to the present, the methodology of Decree 32967 - MINAE has been functioning, and as part of it, more than 50 land-use plans (*planes de ordenamiento territorial*) have been approved by SETENA and several of them also by the Urban Planning Directorate (*Dirección de Urbanismo*) of INVU.; thereby considering that the suspension of Decree 39150 and its reform, which they request, does not generate any disturbance to the process; quite the contrary, it allows the distortions created by this Executive Decree and its reform to be eliminated. For its part, the STATE representation, regarding what is of interest for the resolution of this precautionary request, has expressed its opposition and has even questioned the applicant's standing (*legitimación*) to bring the matter (lack of active standing). It considers there is a failure to meet the Precautionary Requirements to grant the precautionary measure, affirming that it lacks the minimum, basic, and necessary rigor to request a suspension in the contentious-administrative jurisdiction of a formal activity of the Public Administration, ensuring that it lacks urgency, instrumentality, and provisionality. It points out that the petitioner did not provide a single piece of evidence to demonstrate the damage, considering that their arguments are matters of merit that are not appropriate to resolve in this *summaria cognitio*. It emphasizes that the plaintiff does not prove their claim, contributes no evidence whatsoever to demonstrate a damage or its imminence, much less that it is serious. It adds that it is not enough for the conduct to cause an injury to the legal sphere of the party seeking justice, but that this injury must be of special relevance, which is its gravity, and there is an obligation on the party seeking precautionary protection to prove the existence of this damage. It states that the applicant's theory of the case is a matter of merit that must be demonstrated at trial, and therefore, they do not prove the urgency or gravity of what is requested. Regarding the Appearance of a Good Right, it comments that the way in which the party's feeling of "confusion and uncertainty" was raised is not sufficient to prove this requirement, and consequently, it must be rejected. It asserts that the conduct of its represented party is fully in accordance with the Law, hence it is not capable of causing damage to the promoting party. Urgency is directly related to danger in delay; that is, for the adoption of an extremely provisional precautionary measure, not only must the current or potential damages and harm be serious, but their existence or eventuality must create a situation of extreme urgency, which in its opinion is not proven in the present request, and it is the duty of the party promoting it, in accordance with numeral 41.1 of the Civil Procedural Code. Regarding the Balancing of Interests at stake, it notes that the plaintiff files a precautionary request to suspend the application of Decree 39150 and its reform, and does not even mention the corresponding normative requirements—appearance of a good right, danger in delay, nor the balancing of interests—it only establishes the precautionary request without indicating—broadly—or conducting an exhaustive analysis or even a summary one of the precautionary requirements; which is completely lacking in substantiation, this being a procedural burden of the claimant. It insists that merely requesting precautionary protection is insufficient; rather, the interested party must set forth each of its requirements in order to analyze in a palpable and objective manner the petition alleged by the party bringing the action. Therefore, it requests the rejection of the precautionary petition.- **V) CRITERIA OF THIS JUDGE:** Having examined the case file in light of the evidentiary elements and arguments outlined by the parties, this Tribunal considers that the elements necessary to issue a precautionary measure in this matter, in accordance with the requirements established in numerals 21 and 22 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, do not all concur. The following addresses the elements for its appropriateness. Let us see: REGARDING THE APPEARANCE OF A GOOD RIGHT: So we are all placed on the same level, as a first point, we must be aware that we are dealing with a regulatory rule of general scope, which entered into force in 2015, and which, as reported, underwent a modification in September 2020. Within the plaintiff's arguments, they attack the Decree itself. They claim that there is a clear contradiction between it and its modification, questioning that no clear and well-supported technical justification was developed to propose the substitution of the existing methodology for introducing the environmental variable in regulatory plans. In the applicant's opinion, Executive Decree 39150 and its reform, regarding the provision of technical tools that facilitate the preparation of the environmental report for the regulatory plan to be submitted to SETENA, far from improving the current situation with the application of the current methodology (Decree 32967 - MINAE), rather complicates it; affirming that leaving open the application of a substitute methodology that is not yet in force and duly officialized generates confusion and induces error. They assert that the regulation has many legal and technical inaccuracies, considering there are sufficient arguments to request that the rule in question is inappropriate and must therefore be suspended until all the indicated elements are duly clarified and resolved. The plaintiff found it of the utmost importance to highlight that from 2016 to the present, the methodology of Decree 32967 - MINAE has been functioning, and as part of it, more than 50 land-use plans have been approved by SETENA, and several of them, also, by the Urban Planning Directorate of INVU; so they consider that the suspension of Executive Decree 39150 and its reform requested in this matter does not generate any disturbance to the process, quite the contrary, it allows the distortions created by this Executive Decree and its modification to be eliminated. For its part, the State representation affirms that the arguments of the applicant are matters of merit that should not be resolved in this precautionary petition. It comments that its represented party's conduct is fully in accordance with the Law, hence it is not capable of causing damage to the promoting party. This Tribunal agrees with the assessment of the State representation insofar as the majority of the arguments presented by the promoter of the precautionary measure pertain to questions of merit. Procedural and substantial defects attributed to the questioned Decree, which undoubtedly can be heard and debated in a main proceeding and not beforehand. It is the consideration of the undersigned that in this case, there are particular situations and a series of questions that could not be determined through a precautionary measure, but rather in the respective main proceeding. This highlights and suggests that the future lawsuit to be filed in this Jurisdiction has the necessary seriousness and could not be classified at this procedural stage as reckless or lacking seriousness. It must be taken into consideration that the questioning of the Executive Decree managed by the plaintiff, or its possible nullity, could only be decreed on the merits and not beforehand, as this would break the necessary instrumentality that these types of petitions must have with the main proceeding. In this Tribunal's opinion, given how the parties have addressed this case, it would indeed be possible to hear it on the merits of the main or plenary proceeding before this jurisdiction, thereby determining that the appearance of a good right does exist, at least to the minimum extent necessary to proceed via this channel. Added to this, we cannot overlook the competence of this jurisdiction, derived both from what is established in Article 49 of the Constitution and from what is established in the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, which makes it possible to exercise plenary control over the legality of the administrative function, implying declaring the legal non-conformity of those formal or material conducts that are contrary to the legality framework. The appearance of a good right is, in itself, a judgment of probabilities made by the Judge regarding the eventual outcome of the process. Therefore, as we are dealing with a precautionary measure, and even more so one that is *ante causam* like the present one, it is premature to indicate its appropriateness, since the arguments and proofs that will support the main proceeding could be different from those occupying us today. At this stage of the process, and without the presentation of the main case, it is very difficult to venture to question this requirement, in application of the constitutional principle guaranteeing that any person who feels affected by an administrative action can seek redress in this Jurisdiction, with access to Justice also being recognized as a fundamental right (Articles 41 and 49 of the Political Constitution). Thus, and at least *prima facie*, and without prejudging the matter or even determining the probabilities of success of the lawsuit, the truth is that it possesses the necessary seriousness to consider the analyzed requirement satisfied. REGARDING DANGER IN DELAY: Although we are faced with the questioning of the administratively adopted decision, we must not lose sight that it arises from the application of Executive Decree No. 39150 MINAE - MAG - PLAN - TUR, which has been in force since 2015; as well as the questioning of its modification made through Executive Decree No. 42562-MINAE-MAG-TUR-PLAN-MIVAH, which was made in September 2020. While it could be considered that this decree has those drawbacks questioned by the plaintiff, this does not exempt the party from proving the damage, much less allow this Tribunal to have to assess its magnitude. It cannot be overlooked that determining and demonstrating the degree of impact from the alleged implementation of the Executive Decree or its modification is a task incumbent upon the party, which must be done with the pertinent and conclusive evidence for such purpose. As indicated, it is clear that what is being questioned is not only the implementation of the cited Executive Decree but also its modification. However, what is not clear, due to the lack of evidence in this regard, is the magnitude of the damage that the plaintiff herein, who has appeared in a personal capacity, could be experiencing or may have been experiencing. The evidence provided relates directly precisely to the Executive Decree being questioned, as well as its modification; evidence that is evidently insufficient to overcome the element under analysis. While this evidence will be very useful in the main case, it is not useful to demonstrate the situation of the party appearing via this route, as it does not demonstrate the damage, much less its magnitude. If one seeks to prove the damage, one must provide the necessary, pertinent, and conclusive evidence for that purpose, as established by numeral 41 of the Civil Procedural Code, applicable to this matter by remission from numeral 220 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code.
If damage was caused; what it was, what it consists of, at no point in his precautionary filing did he provide anything to demonstrate the damage, much less its magnitude. He speaks of the challenged Executive Decree generating confusion for the user, defenselessness for all citizens; however, this Court is completely unaware of what his particular situation is that generates the damage, there is no proof of it. To demonstrate that in this case there is no proven damage up to the present day, it suffices to refer to the initial precautionary filing which, it is recalled, was filed on the twenty-eighth day of July of the year two thousand twenty-one as a precautionary measure —pre-action— (without a substantive proceeding), wherein the plaintiff himself requested that the Executive Decree and its amendment be suspended "IMMEDIATELY". Well, if that is so, what has happened since the challenged Executive Decree and its amendment came into force? If we recall, this matter was addressed precisely on the day it was filed, it was analyzed and rejected as an interim measure by means of the resolution issued at sixteen hours twenty-five minutes on the twenty-eighth day of July of the year two thousand twenty-one; therefore, the applicant, having had his action rejected as an interim measure, has not had a precautionary measure that would have given him the possibility to suspend the Executive Decree he challenges, and subsequently, it is evident that no proof whatsoever was brought into the proceeding to reconsider the rejection of the precautionary measure as an interim measure (approximately five and a half months ago) in order to reverse that decision as established by numeral 29 subsection 2) of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), which demonstrates that the damage in this case was not, nor has it been, of such magnitude as to be considered serious by the person who resorted to this avenue. In this matter, as the State representation has rightly indicated and has been evident since the very day the action was filed, the plaintiff has not addressed any of the precautionary prerequisites; thereby obviously leaving aside one of the most important prerequisites for this type of action, since it rests on the party seeking to have his action granted, who must demonstrate his particular situation with suitable documentation as established by numeral 41.1 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil); since to date, lacking proof in that regard, the damage that the plaintiff could experience or be experiencing with the executive decree and its amendment he challenges is unknown. While each and every one of the prerequisites or elements of a precautionary measure are important among themselves, to the point that the absence of any one of them results in the rejection of the action, it is considered that the most relevant one and the one requiring faithful demonstration is the danger in delay; since the prerequisite of appearance of good law (apariencia de buen derecho), like the balancing of interests at stake (ponderación de intereses en juego), are matters for analysis, verification, and study by the Judge to assess compliance and determine whether the lawsuit may or may not be heard in a substantive proceeding before this Jurisdiction (appearance of good law), and whether the decision taken affects or does not affect the public interest or that of interested third parties (balancing of interests at stake); but as has been indicated, one of the prerequisites or requirements for the granting of the precautionary measure lies in the hands of the person resorting to this type of proceeding (DANGER IN DELAY), since the demonstration of damage is inherent to the person who suffers it, and it is he who must prove his claim with pertinent and conducing proof to that end, and it is precisely this prerequisite that was not supported and substantiated as was the duty and obligation of the plaintiff, this Court having no reason to supply the omissions noted in this section. If we compare the evidence provided versus the damage the plaintiff could experience, it in no way contributes to establishing damage, whether it actually exists, whether it has been caused or is being caused, and much less does it serve to establish the possibility of proving its magnitude. This Court could presume that damage exists, but determining its magnitude is an entirely different matter, since not just any damage can be protected through this type of action. It must be taken into consideration that when resorting to this type of action, what is protected is the eventual damage one could experience, both due to the delay in finding an answer in the substantive proceeding, but also due to the pressing situation one may be experiencing or could experience if the action is not granted, not being able to ignore that the damage sought to be prevented through this type of proceeding is of a serious nature, and hence the precautionary protection displaces the administrative execution or action, in order to guarantee that the damage does not occur or ceases to occur. It is insisted that it is not enough to allege the existence of the damage or harm, but it must be proved, which, as is already known, is a procedural burden assumed by the interested party, which was not alleged by the plaintiff, and even less was it duly demonstrated in this case. An "IMMEDIATE and PRECAUTIONARY" resolution is requested on 20 July 2021 for the suspension of an Executive Decree that has been in force since 2015, as well as the suspension of its amendment decreed since 2020, which likewise does not satisfy the structural element of urgency. For the foregoing reasons, this Court could not deem the analyzed element or prerequisite as satisfied, due to the lack of demonstration of damage, which could not be admitted automatically merely on the word of the petitioner, who, it is insisted, did not even address this precautionary prerequisite, much less demonstrated it with the necessary, pertinent, and conclusive proof for that purpose, which is precisely what did not occur in this instance, and hence the analyzed element cannot be deemed satisfied, resulting in the inevitable rejection of the precautionary measure, since for its pertinence all required prerequisites must be present, and the absence of any one of them results precisely in its rejection, as is hereby ordered. Regarding the BALANCING OF INTERESTS AT STAKE: This Judge considers that, the existence of serious damage not having been demonstrated, it cannot but be concluded that the private interest of the petitioner must yield to the public interest represented by the necessity that the actions of public entities and private individuals conform to the parameters of legal certainty and legality established by the legal order, and therefore this precautionary prerequisite could not be deemed satisfied. As indicated in the section concerning Appearance of Good Law, the principal lawsuit could well at least seek the nullity of the Executive Decree he challenges, as well as its amendment; however, the lack of demonstration of damage, with the necessary, pertinent, and conclusive proof, makes it impossible to balance which interest should be protected in this matter, making it indisputable in this case to protect the regulatory powers conferred upon the Executive Branch over the interests of the petitioner, who, having failed to demonstrate that damage of serious proportions has been caused to him up to the present day by the implementation of a decree and its amendment that have been in force for a considerable time, could well await the outcome of the principal action, should he decide to file it. Under these conditions, it is opportune, convenient, and prudent for this Judge not to deem this analyzed element satisfied, until it is determined otherwise on the merits in the respective substantive proceeding.— VI) EXCEPTION OF LACK OF STANDING TO SUE: Within the opposition to this precautionary action, the State representation challenges the Standing of Mr. Nombre30219 to appear before this avenue. It is this Court's opinion that regarding exceptions, their filing and resolution correspond to other stages of the substantive proceeding, it being opportune to refer the parties to the opinion issued by the Appeals Court, specifically the Second Section of the Contentious Administrative Court, which has advanced on this topic. (see resolution No. 314-2020-II TRIBUNAL DE APELACIONES DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA DEL SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ, SECCIÓN SEGUNDA, at seven hours thirty minutes on the eleventh of June of two thousand twenty.) This Judge agrees that parties resorting to this type of action require a prompt resolution to settle the matter brought before the court, and therefore the Ad Causam Standing to sue of the petitioner will also be an issue that must be reserved for analysis in the principal action; this being something that Mr. Nombre30219 must take into consideration in due course, should he decide to litigate the principal action before this jurisdiction.— VII) COSTS: In the manner that the events unfolded at the administrative stage, the petitioner was given the opportunity to resort to this jurisdictional venue, in order to defend his rights and interests. As indicated in the preceding Recitals, through a precautionary action it is not appropriate to analyze the merits of the matter, and consequently whether the acting party is right or not is something that can only be determined in the principal action, should he decide to file it. However, and despite this, it cannot be overlooked that the reason for rejecting this precautionary action stemmed from a different situation, namely the verification of the damage he could experience if his claim were not granted; but within the review and analysis of the precautionary prerequisites it was determined that he possesses the necessary appearance to resort to this avenue, in protection of his interests and rights, and hence the prerequisite of Appearance of Good Law was deemed satisfied, which determines that he had sufficient reasons to appear before this avenue. In addition to this, regarding costs in this type of action, there are several pronouncements from the Appeals Court of the Contentious Administrative jurisdiction, and until there is a directive to the contrary, this Court considers that the preceding pronouncement must be issued without special award of costs, precisely due to the type of proceeding. (see, among others, RESOLUCIÓN 009-TA-11, 010-TA-11. SENTENCIA Nº 90 -2011 bis TRIBUNAL DE APELACIONES DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. Anexo A del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Dirección01 , at thirteen hours thirty minutes on the sixteenth of March of two thousand eleven). That being so, this matter is resolved without special award of costs.
THEREFORE:
The present precautionary action filed by Mr. Nombre30219 against the STATE is declared Without Merit. This matter is decided without award of costs. In due course, file the case record. NOTIFY. Lic. Rodrigo Huertas Durán. Judge.— *RTTICGJ431C861* RODRIGO HUERTAS DURÁN - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A It is a faithful copy of the original - Taken from Nexus.PJ on: 08-05-2026 17:30:21.
Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Clase de asunto: Medida cautelar ante causam Analizado por: CENTRO DE INFORMACIÓN JURISPRUDENCIAL Tipo de contenido: Voto de mayoría Temas (descriptores): Medidas cautelares en el proceso contencioso administrativo Subtemas: Presupuestos para su otorgamiento y consideraciones con respecto a la carga de la prueba. Temas (descriptores): Carga de la prueba en materia contencioso administrativa Subtemas: Corresponde a la parte actora al formular su pretensión. Sentencias en igual sentido TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Central 2545-0003. Fax 2545-0033. Correo Electrónico ...01 Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Anexo A (Antiguo edificio Motorola) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ PROCESO: MEDIDA CAUTELAR ANTE CAUSAM.
PROMUEVE: Nombre30219 DEMANDADO: EL ESTADO ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- N°18-2022 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO DEL SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ - ANEXO A - Goicoechea, al ser las quince horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del día once de Enero del año dos mil veintidós.- Se conoce MEDIDA CAUTELAR ANTE CAUSAM, interpuesta por el señor Nombre30219 en contra del ESTADO.-
RESULTANDO:
CONSIDERANDO:
POR TANTO:
Se declara sin Lugar la presente gestión cautelar interpuesta por el señor Nombre30219 en contra del ESTADO. Se falla este asunto sin condenatoria en costas. En su oportunidad archívese el expediente. NOTIFÍQUESE. Lic. Rodrigo Huertas Durán. Juez.- *RTTICGJ431C861* RODRIGO HUERTAS DURÁN - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A
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