Good-faith possessor in indigenous territory prevails over INDER decisionPoseedor de buena fe en territorio indígena prevalece sobre decisión del INDER

VOTO N° 1042-F-21 TRIBUNAL AGRARIO. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ.- At seventeen hours twenty-eight minutes on the twenty-sixth of October of two thousand twenty-one.- ORDINARY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE OF THE NATIONAL PLAN FOR THE RECOVERY OF INDIGENOUS TERRITORIES (PLAN RTI), established by INSTITUTE OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT, legal identification number CED1 - - - ; represented by its secretary general [Nombre1] ; against [Nombre2] known as [Nombre2] , of legal age, identity card number CED2 - - . The licensee Carlos Enrique Ulloa Rojas, bar number two thousand four hundred seventy-eight, acts as directing attorney for the administered party. The process is handled at the Institute of Rural Development, Guatuso Indigenous Territory.-

RESULTANDO:

1.- The Institute of Rural Development, in Article N° 9 of Ordinary Session N° 7, held on the first of March of two thousand twenty-one, resolved: 1) This directing body recommends that Mr. [Nombre2] NOT be considered a possessor in good faith (poseedor de buena fe), in the terms established in the indigenous law, in that sense, the right to payment of any compensation for the property that at some point he was a possessor of and which is affected by the Guatuso Indigenous Territory does NOT proceed," (folio 93).- 2.- This Court hears the improper hierarchical appeal (recurso jerárquico impropio de apelación) filed by the administered party [Nombre2] known as [Nombre2] , against the resolution of the Institute of Rural Development, (folios 94 to 95).- 3.- In the substantiation of the process, the legal prescriptions have been observed, and the existence of errors or omissions capable of producing the nullity of the ruling is not noted.- Judge Picado Vargas writes, and;

CONSIDERANDO

I.- The list of facts taken as proven is endorsed as it is consistent with the body of evidence.- II.- The only unproven fact is not shared, since Mr. [Nombre2] was a child of five years in the year 1968 and came to live on the property with his family nucleus. Of this nature, it is deemed unproven: 1.- That Mr. [Nombre2] was a possessor in bad faith (poseedor de mala fe) (There is no evidence in this regard).- III.- The administered party [Nombre2] known as [Nombre2] , files an improper hierarchical appeal against the cited resolution of the Institute of Rural Development, stating the following: GRIEVANCES: "1.- In the first Considerando, of proven facts, II, it is not true that my farm does not have a cadastral map (plano catastrado), the same is indeed included in the cadastral map number A-23349-75, dated November 27, 1975, my farm, does not include the entire area because my father [Nombre3] , when he was the owner of the entire area, donated part of it to two of my siblings, [Nombre4] and [Nombre5] . That fact VI is wrongly recorded and must be corrected, because the undersigned is considered a possessor in good faith (poseedor de buena fe) by the Integral Development Association of the Guatuso Indigenous Reserve (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena de Guatuso), Alajuela, and not as recorded, see folio 33 of the administrative file. With respect to the second Considerando, unproven facts, sole, I estimate and consider that it is confusing in its wording since before the indigenous reserve was established, the undersigned was already living in said area, as the son of [Nombre3] . Regarding the third Considerando, on the legal regime of indigenous territories, the undersigned is confused with another person, namely, [Nombre6] , in relation to the administrative file RTI-PA-0002-2020-GUATUSO. 2.- With regard to the Considerando, assessment of the evidence, the merits of the matter and the determination of the legal consequence, I must indicate that the directing body incurs a violation of due process (debido proceso), of the right to defense in trial, in section VII by diminishing the probative value of the certification issued by the Integral Development Association of the Guatuso Indigenous Reserve, where they certify me as a possessor in good faith (poseedor de buena fe), however, the directing body, without any reason or motive, indicates that said certification cannot be taken as truthful and most seriously that it is not admitted for said process. The directing body contradicts itself because precisely in the Considerando of proven facts, in fact VI, I am deemed a possessor in good faith by said association and by the same body. Now then, if said certification is diminished in probative value and is not admitted in the process, for what reason does it serve as a probative basis to accredit that the undersigned is a possessor in good faith (poseedor de buena fe) on the farm he possesses in the reserve? Hence the contradictions that exist in said agreement and the request for its revocation. 3.- I estimate and consider that the undersigned does qualify to be compensated, by virtue of being a possessor in good faith (poseedor de buena fe) through a donation made to me by my father who acquired the entirety of the farm before the declaration of the indigenous reserve and even drew up a cadastral map for the entire area he acquired in 1968 from [Nombre7] . It is true that I acquired the farm after said declaration, but through inheritance, by the own will of my father, who could not be prohibited from making the donation to me, especially since the State never paid him for said farm, he being a possessor and owner of the property before the declaration. Now then, if your authority considers that I am not a beneficiary of the compensation, then, my mother, who is alive, would be the beneficiary, as the spouse of my father, who has lived within the indigenous reserve for many years before the declaration." (folios 94 to 95).- IV.- ON THE FRAMING OF THE CASE: In this specific case, the land subject to the administrative proceeding is a piece of land that, before the indigenous reserve declaration, was not registered in the National Registry and was possessed by Mr. [Nombre3] since the year 1968 together with his family, and to this day, it is in the possession of the awardee, his son [Nombre2] , who is not an indigenous person and was declared a possessor in good faith (poseedor de buena fe) by the Integral Development Association of the Guatuso Indigenous Reserve, Alajuela. For this reason, and based on the provisions of numerals 5 and 6 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena) (which refers to Law 2825 regarding procedures), 1, 3, 75 to 80 of the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización) Nº2825 of October 14, 1961) and 1, 3, 4, 5, 14, 15 and 80 of Law 9036 of May 11, 2012, which Transforms the Institute of Agrarian Development (IDA) into the Institute of Rural Development (Inder), regarding the purposes of rural development (which requires adequate territorial planning), it is possible to review what was resolved in the administrative proceeding in which the appealed resolution was issued, processed to determine the good or bad faith of anyone who has a right of possession over a land located within indigenous territory, for compensation purposes.- V.- ON THE GROUNDS FOR NULLITY ALLEGED BY THE APPELLANT AS A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (DEBIDO PROCESO) DUE TO A CONTRADICTION IN THE ASSESSMENT OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE: What is alleged as grounds for nullity are, in reality, substantive grievances, aimed at challenging the way the documentary evidence was analyzed or assessed, concretely, the certification of the appellant as a possessor in good faith (poseedor de buena fe) from the Indigenous Association, therefore the claim to annul the appealed resolution is rejected. Those arguments will be analyzed together with the remaining ones (article 54 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law (Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria)) in the following Considerandos.- VI.- ON THE SUBSTANTIVE GRIEVANCES: The appellant is correct. It must be indicated that article 5 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena) establishes only possession and good faith (buena fe) as a requirement for compensation. But it is transcendental that this possession was exercised prior to the indigenous reserve declaration. The rule states: "Article 5. In the case of non-indigenous persons who are owners or possessors in good faith (poseedores de buena fe) within the indigenous reserves, ITCO must relocate them to other similar lands, if they so desire; if relocation is not possible or they do not accept relocation, it must expropriate and compensate them in accordance with the procedures established in Law n.° 2825 of October 14, 1961 and its reforms. The expropriation and compensation studies and procedures shall be carried out by ITCO in coordination with CONAI. If there were a subsequent invasion of non-indigenous persons into the reserves, the competent authorities must immediately proceed to their eviction, without payment of any compensation." Note that the rule denies the right to compensation to those who invade the indigenous zone after the declaration. On the other hand, Convention No. 169 of the International Labour Organization held in Geneva in June 1989, concerning indigenous and tribal peoples, which regarding the topic of property of these groups indicates that the right of ownership and possession of the interested peoples over the lands they traditionally occupy must be recognized, adding that removal from the lands they occupy shall not occur, and if necessary, it may only be carried out with their consent and must involve compensation. The title to the indigenous reserves is held by the indigenous community according to article 2 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), and through Regulation Executive Decree No. 13568 of April 30, 1982, it is established that the Integral Development Associations have the legal representation of the Indigenous Communities and act as their local government. Furthermore, article 3 states that indigenous reserves are inalienable and imprescriptible, non-transferable, and exclusive to the indigenous communities that inhabit them. The mentioned Convention also establishes the obligation to respect indigenous uses and customs and customary law (derecho consuetudinario indígena). Regarding the effectiveness of the agreements reached by indigenous communities, on the issues of agrarian possession, it has also been indicated: “Agrarian Courts cannot deny jurisdictional protection to problems of indigenous possession. On the contrary, they must have a special sensitivity towards such types of conflicts, and even understand their customs, to thereby achieve the imposition of the respect that the agreements reached in administrative headquarters deserve. While it is true that the regime of indigenous agrarian property is an exception, in terms of collective property, it is not possible to disregard the legitimate possession exercised in our country by each indigenous family. Therefore, if an administrative solution has not been reached, through the Association or the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs (CONAI), or if having been reached, the agreements are disrespected, the Agrarian Courts in the final instance must restore the corresponding rights, in order to provide the Indigenous Community with adequate protection for their cultural forms. In the present case, the legitimate possession exercised by the plaintiff [Nombre8] , and her husband, over the land in conflict, which they had dedicated to forest reserves (reservas forestales), is clearly demonstrated. (Tribunal Agrario, Voto No. 429 at 15:30 hours on July 24, 1997). This interpretation by the Agrarian Court regarding the substantive norms of indigenous agrarian property, as special property, finds perfect support in the constitutional jurisprudence that recognizes the administrative powers of the indigenous local governments, under the figures of the Associations, to make the necessary decisions for the defense of their rights. Otherwise, “…the fundamental right of Indigenous Peoples to have their own representative bodies and to be able to act autonomously in the defense of their rights would be disregarded…” (Sala Constitucional, No. 2005-06856, at 10:02 hours on June 1, 2005). In this way, our constitutional jurisprudence recognizes a higher hierarchy to International Conventions, such as that of the ILO, No. 169 (Law 7316 of November 3, 1992), which even grant a superior degree of protection to indigenous persons, that is, a “high level of protection” regarding those human rights contemplated in the Political Constitution itself, and which therefore demand respect, in the ordinary Courts, for the decisions that through custom and the self-determination of said indigenous peoples derive from the communities themselves and their representatives. In the case at hand, the administered party [Nombre9] was declared a possessor in good faith (poseedor de buena fe) by the Integral Development Association of the Guatuso Indigenous Reserve of Alajuela in its capacity as local government; invoking both the powers of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), as well as the referenced International Convention and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) (folio 33). The appellant is correct in that the appealed resolution is contradictory because, on the one hand, it diminishes the probative value of said certification, and on the other, it includes it within the list of proven facts. But even beyond that, this Court considers that the final agreement of INDER violates Convention 169 of the ILO because it disregards indigenous customary law (derecho consuetudinario indígena) and the powers of the association as a local government by diminishing the value and probative effectiveness of said declaration of possessory good faith. In addition to this, article 286 of the Civil Code states that good faith (buena fe) in possession is presumed unless there is proof to the contrary, and in the administrative proceeding, the bad faith (mala fe) of the administered party [Nombre2] was not demonstrated, and therefore, this Court deems it as an unproven fact. In the same way, the grievance relating to the fact deemed unproven is admissible, since Mr. [Nombre2] was a child of five years in the year 1968 and came to live on the property with his family nucleus; thus, his situation does not fit within the assumption of the final paragraph of article 5 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), in the sense that the appellant did not invade the indigenous zone after its declaration; but rather, when his father acquired the land in 1968 from a previous possessor (as stated in the private sale letter on folios 37 to 28); he came to live with his family nucleus in plain view and with the patience of the entire community, as recounted by the witnesses [Nombre10] , who has known the land for 64 years and attests that they have always lived there (folio 60). The witness [Nombre11] , who, like the witness [Nombre10] , is also an indigenous person, has known the farm since 1964, went to school with Mr. [Nombre2] and indicates that only his family has lived there, that Mr. [Nombre2]'s father raised his family on the land and "bequeathed" it to him later in life (folio 61). For his part, the witness [Nombre12] says he has known the land since 1968, that he even knew [Nombre7] and recognizes him as the previous possessor who transferred the property in 1969 to Mr. [Nombre13] , the father of the appellant, who is very beloved by the indigenous people (folio 62). This "inheritance", in reality a lifetime donation, executed in a private donation letter in 1996, is recognized as such by the indigenous community, and proof of this is the testimony of [Nombre14] , who is an indigenous person, who recognizes that inheritance, even explains how it is determined if a person is indigenous or not, and accepts that the appellant has lived his whole life on the land (folio 64). Finally, the witness [Nombre15] , who besides being an indigenous person is the President of the referenced association, ratifies the certification that the appellant is a possessor in good faith (poseedor de buena fe) because the community recognizes him as such, that he has lived with his family there, and that upon his father's death, he continued to work the land (folio 64). The directing body and the final agreement err by demanding from the association a registry of previous possessors and, based on this, diminishing the probative value of the cited certification of a possessor in good faith (poseedor de buena fe) on folio 33, because it does not respect the indigenous customary law (derecho consuetudinario indígena) established in the constitutional jurisprudence and Convention 169 of the ILO, in light of the jurisprudence on the human rights of indigenous peoples, emanating from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In the judgment of August 31, 2001 (Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community VS. Nicaragua), the following was stated, which is relevant to this case: “146. The terms of an international human rights treaty have an autonomous meaning, for which reason they cannot be equated to the meaning attributed to them in domestic law. Moreover, such human rights treaties are living instruments whose interpretation must adapt to the evolution of the times, and, in particular, to current living conditions. 147. In turn, Article 29.b of the Convention establishes that no provision may be interpreted in the sense of “limiting the enjoyment and exercise of any right or freedom that may be recognized in accordance with the laws of any of the States Parties or in accordance with another convention to which one of said States is a party”. 148. Through an evolutionary interpretation of international human rights protection instruments, taking into account the applicable rules of interpretation and, in accordance with Article 29.b of the Convention—which prohibits a restrictive interpretation of rights—, this Court considers that Article 21 of the Convention protects the right to property in a sense that comprises, among others, the rights of the members of indigenous communities within the framework of communal property, which is also recognized in the Political Constitution of Nicaragua. 149. Given the characteristics of the present case, it is necessary to make some clarifications regarding the concept of property in indigenous communities. Among indigenous peoples, there is a communal tradition regarding a communal form of collective ownership of the land, in the sense that the belonging to it is not centered on an individual but on the group and its community. Indigenous peoples, by the mere fact of their existence, have the right to live freely in their own territories; the close relationship that indigenous peoples maintain with the land must be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival. For indigenous communities, the relationship with the land is not merely a matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual element that they must fully enjoy, including to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations…151. The customary law (derecho consuetudinario) of indigenous peoples must be especially taken into account, for the purposes at hand. As a product of custom, the possession of the land should suffice for indigenous communities that lack a real title to the land property to obtain official recognition of said property and the subsequent registration…” (The underlining is not from the original). On the other hand, the mentioned article 5 does not require just title or a transferable title for the right to compensation, precisely because indigenous lands are not subject to usucapion. It must be taken into account, according to the evidence received and the reality and the uses and customs, that it is absolutely normal that in a family nucleus, the members thereof exercise co-possession on a land where they have settled prior to the declaration of the indigenous reserve, and that the donation made by the appellant's father in 1996 only formalized a co-possession that the appellant has exercised on the land since childhood. Therefore, considering the appellant as a person who has invaded the indigenous zone does not fit if he has lived there since 1968, eight years before the reserve declaration. This is because, although this Court is not giving validity and legal efficacy to said donation, but rather for the fact that the appellant exercised possession long before, together with his father, mother, and siblings, as a member of a family nucleus, and has been recognized as a possessor in good faith (poseedor de buena fe) by both the Association and the indigenous community. This has been established by the jurisprudence of this Court, indicating that although a transfer occurred after the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), it does not take away the validity of the possession acquired in good faith acquired prior to said law: "That, according to the criteria currently in force regarding the protection of indigenous territories, said title is invalid, does not imply that its original acquisition by the appellant's representative's relatives in 1974 was in good faith." TRIBUNAL AGRARIO, Voto No. 582-F-2021 at fourteen hours thirty-seven minutes on the twenty-fourth of June of two thousand twenty-one. Furthermore, the right to compensation had already been consolidated in 1977 with the entry into force of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), since the appellant, like his father, had possession in good faith since 1968. Consequently, the administrative resolution 9 of March 1, 2021, of the Board of Directors of the Institute of Rural Development, administrative proceeding RTI-PA-00002-2020-GUATUSO, which contains the agreement of Article 9 of Ordinary Session 7, held on March 1, 2021, is revoked, in so far as it resolved not to consider [Nombre2] as a possessor in good faith (poseedor de buena fe) and thereby deny the payment of compensation established in numeral 5 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena). In its place, he is deemed a possessor in good faith (poseedor de buena fe) of said land for the purposes of the referenced compensation.

POR TANTO

The administrative resolution 9 of March 1, 2021, of the Board of Directors of the Institute of Rural Development, administrative proceeding RTI-PA-00002-2020-GUATUSO, which contains the agreement of Article 9 of Ordinary Session 7, held on March 1, 2021, is revoked, in so far as it resolved not to consider [Nombre2] as a possessor in good faith (poseedor de buena fe) and thereby deny the payment of compensation established in numeral 5 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena). In its place, he is deemed a possessor in good faith (poseedor de buena fe) of said land for the purposes of the referenced compensation.

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[Nombre16] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A ???????????????

[Nombre17] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A ???????????????

[Nombre18] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A The process is handled by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, Territorio Indígena de Guatuso.

**WHEREAS:** **1.-** The Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, in Article 9 of Ordinary Session No. 7, held on March 1, two thousand twenty-one, resolved: *1) This directing body recommends that Mr. [Name2] NOT be considered a good-faith possessor, under the terms established in the Indigenous Law; therefore, the right to payment of any indemnification for the property of which he was at some point the possessor and which is affected by the Territorio Indígena de Guatuso DOES NOT proceed,"* (folio 93).- **2.-** This Court hears the improper hierarchical appeal filed by the petitioner [Name2], known as [Name2], against the decision of the Instituto Desarrollo Rural, (folios 94 to 95).- **3.-** In the substantiation of the process, the legal requirements have been observed, and no errors or omissions capable of causing the nullity of the ruling are noted.- Judge Picado Vargas writes, and; **CONSIDERING** **I.-** The list of facts considered proven is adopted, as they are consistent with the evidentiary record.- **II.-** The sole fact not proven is not shared, given that Mr. [Name2] was a five-year-old child in 1968 and moved into the property with his family group. Of this nature, the following is considered not proven: 1.- That Mr. [Name2] was a possessor in bad faith (There is no evidence in this regard).- **III.-** The petitioner [Name2], known as [Name2], files an improper hierarchical appeal against the aforementioned decision of the Instituto Desarrollo Rural, stating the following: GRIEVANCES: "1.- In the first considering clause, of proven facts, II, it is not true that my farm does not have a cadastral map; the same is included in cadastral map number A-23349-75, dated November 27, 1975. My farm does not include the entire area because my father [Name3], when he was the owner of the entire area, donated part of it to two of my brothers, [Name4] and [Name5]. That fact VI is incorrectly recorded and must be corrected, because the undersigned is considered a good-faith possessor by the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena de Guatuso, Alajuela, and not as recorded, see folio 33 of the administrative file. Regarding the second considering clause, facts not proven, sole, I assess and consider that it is confusing in its wording because before the indigenous reserve was established, the undersigned was already living in said area, as the son of [Name3]. With regard to the third considering clause, on the legal regime of indigenous territories, a confusion is made of the undersigned with another person, namely [Name6], in relation to administrative file RTI-PA-0002-2020-GUATUSO. 2.- Regarding the considering clause, evidentiary assessment, the merits of the matter, and the determination of the legal consequence, I must state that the directing body incurs a violation of due process and the right to defense in trial, in part VII by diminishing the probative value of the certification issued by the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena de Guatuso, where they certify me as a good-faith possessor; however, the directing body, without any reason or motive whatsoever, indicates that said certification cannot be taken as truthful and, more seriously, that it is not admitted for said process. The directing body contradicts itself because precisely in the considering clause of proven facts, in fact VI, I am considered a good-faith possessor by said association and by the body itself. Now, if said certification is stripped of probative value and is not admitted in the process, for what reason does it serve as evidentiary grounds to accredit that the undersigned is a good-faith possessor of the farm he possesses in the reserve? Hence the contradictions that exist in said agreement and the request for its revocation. 3.- I assess and consider that the undersigned does qualify to be indemnified, by virtue of being a good-faith possessor through a donation made to me by my father, who acquired the entire farm before the declaration of the indigenous reserve and even obtained a cadastral map for the entire area he acquired in 1968 from [Name7]. It is true that I acquired the farm after said declaration, but by inheritance, by my father's own will, who could not be prohibited from making the donation to me, especially since the State never paid him for said farm, he being a possessor and owner of the property before the declaration. Now, if your authority considers that I am not a beneficiary of the indemnification, then my mother, who is alive, would be the beneficiary, being my father's spouse, who has lived within the indigenous reserve for many years before the declaration." (folios 94 to 95).- **IV.- ON THE FRAMING OF THE CASE:** In this specific case, the land that is the subject of the administrative proceeding is land that, before the declaration of the indigenous reserve, was not registered in the Registro Nacional and was possessed by Mr. [Name3] since 1968 together with his family, and to this day, is in the possession of the grantee, his son [Name2], who is not an indigenous person and was declared a good-faith possessor by the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena de Guatuso, Alajuela. Therefore, and based on the provisions of numerals 5 and 6 of the Ley Indígena (which refers to Law 2825 regarding procedures), 1, 3, 75 to 80 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización No. 2825 of October 14, 1961) and 1, 3, 4, 5, 14, 15 and 80 of Law 9036 of May 11, 2012, which Transforms the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA) into the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER), regarding the purposes of rural development (which requires adequate land-use planning), it is possible to review what was resolved in the administrative proceeding in which the appealed decision was issued, processed to determine the good or bad faith of anyone who has a right of possession over land located within an indigenous territory, for indemnification purposes.- **V.- ON THE GROUNDS FOR NULLITY ALLEGED BY THE APPELLANT AS A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS DUE TO CONTRADICTION IN THE ASSESSMENT OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE:** What is alleged as grounds for nullity are actually substantive grievances, aimed at challenging the way the documentary evidence was analyzed or assessed, specifically, the certification of the appellant as a good-faith possessor from the indigenous Association; therefore, the claim to annul the appealed decision is rejected. Those arguments will be analyzed together with the remaining ones (Article 54 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria) in the following considering clauses.- **VI.- ON THE SUBSTANTIVE GRIEVANCES:** The appellant is correct. It must be noted that Article 5 of the Ley Indígena establishes only possession and good faith as requirements for indemnification. However, it is crucial that said possession was exercised prior to the declaration of the indigenous reserve. The norm states: *"Article 5. In the case of non-indigenous persons who are owners or good-faith possessors within the indigenous reserves, ITCO must relocate them to other similar lands, should they so desire; if relocation is not possible or they do not accept the relocation, it must expropriate and indemnify them according to the procedures established in Law No. 2825 of October 14, 1961 and its amendments. The studies and expropriation and indemnification procedures shall be carried out by ITCO in coordination with CONAI. If there is a subsequent invasion of non-indigenous persons into the reserves, the competent authorities must immediately proceed to their eviction, without any payment of indemnification."* Note that the norm denies the right to indemnification to those who invade the indigenous zone after the declaration. Furthermore, Convention No. 169 of the International Labour Organization held in Geneva in June 1989, concerning indigenous and tribal peoples, which regarding the topic of property of these groups states that the right of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognized, adds that the lands they occupy may not be transferred; if necessary, it may only take place with their consent and must involve indemnification. The title to the indigenous reserves is held by the indigenous community according to Article 2 of the Ley Indígena, and through Reglamento Decreto Ejecutivo No. 13568 of April 30, 1982, it is established that the Asociaciones de Desarrollo Integral have the legal representation of the Indigenous Communities and act as their local government. Moreover, Article 3 establishes that indigenous reserves are inalienable and imprescriptible, non-transferable, and exclusive for the indigenous communities that inhabit them. The aforementioned Convention also establishes the obligation to respect the uses and customs and the indigenous customary law. In relation to the effectiveness of agreements reached by indigenous communities on matters of agrarian possession, it has also been stated: *“The Agrarian Courts cannot deny jurisdictional protection to indigenous possession problems. On the contrary, they must have a special sensitivity towards such types of conflicts, and even know their customs, to thereby achieve the enforcement of the respect that agreements reached in administrative venues deserve. While it is true that the regime of indigenous agrarian property is an exception, regarding collective property, it is not possible to disregard the legitimate possession that each indigenous family exercises in our country. Therefore, if an administrative solution has not been reached, through the Association or the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, or if having been reached, the agreements are disrespected, the Agrarian Courts must ultimately restore the corresponding rights, in order to provide the Indigenous Community adequate protection for their cultural forms. In the present case, the legitimate possession exercised by the plaintiff [Name8], and her husband, over the land in dispute, which they had dedicated to forest reserves, is clearly demonstrated."* (Tribunal Agrario, Voto No. 429 of 3:30 p.m. on July 24, 1997). This interpretation by the Tribunal Agrario, referring to the substantive norms of indigenous agrarian property as special property, finds perfect support in constitutional jurisprudence that recognizes the administrative powers of local indigenous governments, under the figure of the Associations, to make the necessary decisions for the defense of their rights. Otherwise, “…the fundamental right of Indigenous people to have their own representative bodies and to be able to act autonomously in the defense of their rights would be disregarded…” (Sala Constitucional, No. 2005-06856, of 10:02 a.m. on June 1, 2005). In this way, our constitutional jurisprudence recognizes a higher hierarchy to International Conventions, such as ILO Convention No. 169 (Law 7316 of November 3, 1992), which even grant a higher degree of protection to indigenous persons, that is, an “elevated level of protection” regarding those human rights contemplated in the Political Constitution itself, and which therefore demand respect, in ordinary courts, for the decisions derived from the communities themselves and their representatives via custom and self-determination of said indigenous peoples. In the case at hand, the petitioner [Name9] was declared a good-faith possessor by the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena de Guatuso de Alajuela in its capacity as local government; invoking both the powers of the Ley Indígena, the aforementioned International Convention, and the jurisprudence of the Sala Constitucional (folio 33). The appellant is correct in that the appealed decision is contradictory because, on one hand, it diminishes the probative value of said certification and, on the other, includes it within the list of proven facts. But even beyond that, this Court considers that the final agreement of INDER violates ILO Convention 169 because it disregards indigenous customary law and the powers of the association as local government by diminishing the value and probative effectiveness of said declaratory of possessory good faith. In addition, Article 286 of the Civil Code states that good faith in possession is presumed unless there is proof to the contrary, and in the administrative proceeding, the bad faith of the petitioner [Name2] was not demonstrated; therefore, this Court holds it as not proven. Likewise, the grievance regarding the fact held as not proven is acceptable, given that Mr. [Name2] was a five-year-old child in 1968 and moved into the property with his family group; therefore, his situation does not fit within the assumption of the final paragraph of Article 5 of the Ley Indígena, in the sense that the appellant did not invade the indigenous zone after its declaration; but rather, when his father acquired the land in 1968 from a previous possessor (as recorded in the private bill of sale on folios 37 to 28); he moved in with his family group in full view and with the tolerance of the entire community, as related by the witnesses: [Name10], who has known the land for 64 years and attests that they have always lived there (folio 60). The witness [Name11], who, like the witness [Name10], is also an indigenous person, has known the farm since 1964, went to school with Mr. [Name2], and states that only his family has lived there, that Mr. [Name2]'s father raised his family on the land and later «bequeathed» it to him in life (folio 61). For his part, the witness [Name12] says he has known the land since 1968, that he even knew [Name7] and recognizes him as the previous possessor who transferred the property in 1969 to Mr. [Name13], the appellant's father, who is highly esteemed by the indigenous people (folio 62). This "inheritance", in reality a lifetime donation, executed in a private deed of donation in 1996, is recognized as such by the indigenous community, and proof of this is the testimony of [Name14], who is an indigenous person, who recognizes that inheritance, even explains how it is determined whether a person is indigenous or not, and accepts that the appellant has lived his entire life on the land (folio 64). Finally, the witness [Name15], who in addition to being an indigenous person is the President of said association, ratifies the certification that the appellant is a good-faith possessor because the community recognizes him as such, that he has lived there with his family, and that upon his father's death, he continued working the land (folio 64). The directing body and the final agreement err by demanding from the association a registry of previous possessors and, based on that, diminishing the probative value of the cited certification of good-faith possessor on folio 33, because it does not respect the indigenous customary law established in constitutional jurisprudence and ILO Convention 169, in light of the jurisprudence on the human rights of indigenous peoples, emanating from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In the judgment of August 31, 2001 (Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua), the following was stated, insofar as relevant to this case: “*146. The terms of an international human rights treaty have an autonomous meaning, so they cannot be equated with the meaning attributed to them in domestic law. Additionally, said human rights treaties are living instruments whose interpretation must adapt to the evolution of times, and, in particular, to current living conditions. 147. In turn, Article 29.b of the Convention establishes that no provision may be interpreted in the sense of “limiting the enjoyment and exercise of any right or freedom that may be recognized in accordance with the laws of any of the States Parties or in accordance with another convention to which one of said States is a party”. 148. Through an* *evolutionary interpretation of international instruments for the protection of human rights*, *taking into account the applicable rules of interpretation and, in accordance with Article 29.b of the Convention - which prohibits a restrictive interpretation of rights -, this Court considers that Article 21 of the Convention protects the right to property in a sense that includes, among others, the rights of the members of indigenous communities within the framework of communal property, which is also recognized in the Political Constitution of Nicaragua. 149. Given the characteristics of the present case, some clarifications are necessary regarding the concept of property in indigenous communities.* *Among indigenous peoples, there exists a communal tradition regarding a communal form of collective ownership of land, in the sense that belonging to it is not centered on an individual but on the group and its community. Indigenous peoples, by the fact of their very existence, have the right to live freely in their own territories; the close relationship that indigenous peoples maintain with the land must be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival. For indigenous communities, the relationship with the land is not merely a question of possession and production but a material and spiritual element which they must fully enjoy*, *including to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations… 151.* *The customary law of indigenous peoples must be especially taken into account, for the purposes herein. As a product of custom, possession of the land should suffice for indigenous communities that lack real title over the property of the land to obtain official recognition of said property* *and the consequent registration…”* (The underlining is not from the original). Moreover, the aforementioned Article 5 does not require just title or a translative title for the right to be indemnified, precisely because indigenous lands are not subject to usucapion. It must be taken into account, according to the evidence received and the reality and the uses and customs, that it is absolutely normal that within a family group, the members thereof exercise co-possession on land where they settled prior to the declaration of the indigenous reserve, and that the donation made by the appellant's father in 1996 merely formalized a co-possession that the appellant has exercised on the land since he was a child. It is not fitting, then, to consider the appellant as a person who has invaded the indigenous zone if he has lived in it since 1968, eight years before the declaration of the reserve. This is so because, although this Court is not giving validity and legal efficacy to said donation, it is doing so based on the fact that the appellant exercised possession together with his father, mother, and siblings as a member of a family group long before and has been recognized as a good-faith possessor by both the Association and the indigenous community. Thus, it has been established in the jurisprudence of this Court, when stating that if a transfer occurs subsequent to the Ley Indígena, it does not invalidate the possession acquired in good faith prior to said law: *"The fact that, according to the criteria currently in force regarding the protection of indigenous territories, said title is invalid, does not imply that its original acquisition by the relatives of the appellant's representative in 1974 was in bad faith."* TRIBUNAL AGRARIO, Voto No. 582-F-2021 of two thirty-seven p.m. on June twenty-fourth, two thousand twenty-one. In addition, the right to indemnification had already been consolidated in 1977 with the entry into force of the Ley Indígena, since the appellant, like his father, had had good-faith possession since 1968. Consequently, the administrative decision 9 of March 1, 2021, of the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, administrative proceeding RTI-PA-00002-2020-GUATUSO, containing the agreement of Article 9 of Ordinary Session 7, held on March 1, 2021, is revoked insofar as it ordered not to consider [Name2] as a good-faith possessor and, therefore, to deny the payment of indemnification established in numeral 5 of the Ley Indígena. Instead, he is considered a good-faith possessor of said land for the purposes of the aforementioned indemnification.

**THEREFORE** The administrative decision 9 of March 1, 2021, of the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, administrative proceeding RTI-PA-00002-2020-GUATUSO, containing the agreement of Article 9 of Ordinary Session 7, held on March 1, 2021, is revoked insofar as it ordered not to consider [Name2] as a good-faith possessor and, therefore, to deny the payment of indemnification established in numeral 5 of the Ley Indígena.

Instead, he is considered a possessor in good faith of said land for the purposes of the referenced compensation.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span style="-aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span style="-aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span style="-aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:22pt"><span style="font-family:Script; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center"><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:23.25pt"><span style="font-weight:bold; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:23.25pt"><span style="font-weight:bold; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:23.25pt"><span style="width:36pt; display:inline-block">&#xa0;</span></p><table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="border-collapse:collapse"><tr><td style="width:150pt; padding-right:3.25pt; padding-left:3.25pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:23.25pt"><span style="font-size:12pt; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p></td><td style="width:150pt; 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padding-right:3.25pt; padding-left:3.25pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:23.25pt"><span style="font-size:12pt; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p></td><td style="width:150pt; padding-right:3.25pt; padding-left:3.25pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:23.25pt"><span style="font-size:12pt; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p></td></tr></table><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:23.25pt"><span style="-aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><div style="-aw-headerfooter-type:footer-primary; clear:both"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>EXP: EXPN1</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:1pt; text-align:center"><span>II Circuito Judicial San José, [Dirección1] ,</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span>, [Dirección2]</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span>de Goicoechea frente al parqueo del Hospital Hotel La Católica Teléfonos: [Telf1]. Fax: [Telf2] ó [Telf3].</span></p></div> "VI.-[...]But even beyond that, this Court considers that the final agreement of the INDER violates ILO Convention 169 because it disregards indigenous customary law (derecho consuetudinario indígena) and the powers of the association as local government by detracting from the value and probative efficacy of said declaration of good-faith possession (buena fe posesoria)." The directing body contradicts itself because precisely in the recital of proven facts, in fact VI, I am held to be a possessor in good faith (poseedor de buena fe) by said association and by the same body. Now then, if said certification is stripped of probative value and is not admitted in the proceeding, for what reason does it serve as probative foundation to accredit that the undersigned is a possessor in good faith on the farm (finca) he possesses in the reserve? Hence the contradictions that exist in said agreement and the request for its revocation. 3.- I estimate and consider that the undersigned does qualify to be compensated, by virtue of being a possessor in good faith by donation made to me by my father who acquired the entirety of the farm before the declaration of the indigenous reserve and even had a cadastral plan (plano catastrado) drawn up for the entire area he acquired in 1968 from [Nombre7]. It is true that I acquired the farm after said declaration, but by inheritance, by my father's own will, who could not be prohibited from making the donation to me, especially since the State never paid him for said farm, he being possessor and owner of the property before the declaration. Now then, if your authority considers that I am not a beneficiary of the compensation, then my mother, who is alive, would be the beneficiary, as my father's spouse, who has lived within the indigenous reserve for many years prior to the declaration." (folios 94 to 95).- **IV.- ON THE CASE STATEMENT:** In this specific case, the land subject to the administrative proceeding is a piece of land that, before the declaration of the indigenous reserve, was not registered in the National Registry (Registro Nacional) and was possessed by Mr. [Nombre3] since 1968 together with his family, and to this day, it is in the possession of the awardee, his son [Nombre2], who is not an indigenous person and was declared a possessor in good faith by the Integral Development Association of the Guatuso Indigenous Reserve, Alajuela (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena de Guatuso, Alajuela). Therefore, and based on the provisions of numerals 5 and 6 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena) (which refers to Law 2825 regarding procedures), 1, 3, 75 to 80 of the Land and Colonization Law No. 2825 of October 14, 1961, and 1, 3, 4, 5, 14, 15, and 80 of Law 9036 of May 11, 2012, which Transforms the Institute of Agrarian Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, IDA) into the Institute of Rural Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, INDER), regarding the aims of rural development (which requires adequate territorial planning), it is possible to review what was decided in the administrative proceeding in which the appealed resolution was issued, processed to determine the good or bad faith of whoever holds a right of possession over a land located within indigenous territory, for compensation purposes.- **V.- ON THE GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT ALLEGED BY THE APPELLANT AS A LACK OF DUE PROCESS DUE TO CONTRADICTION IN THE ASSESSMENT OF THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE:** What is alleged as grounds for annulment are actually substantive grievances, aimed at contesting the manner in which the documentary evidence was analyzed or assessed, specifically, the certification of the appellant as a possessor in good faith from the indigenous Association. Therefore, the claim to annul the appealed resolution is rejected. These arguments will be analyzed together with the remaining ones (Article 54 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law, Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria) in the following recitals.- **VI.- ON THE SUBSTANTIVE GRIEVANCES:** The appellant is correct. It must be noted that Article 5 of the Indigenous Law establishes only possession and good faith as requirements for compensation. But it is crucial that this possession was exercised prior to the declaration of the indigenous reserve. The law states: *"Article 5. In the case of non-indigenous persons who are proprietors (propietarias) or possessors in good faith within the indigenous reserves, the ITCO must relocate them to other similar lands, if they so desire; if relocation is not possible or they do not accept the relocation, it must expropriate them and compensate them in accordance with the procedures established in Law No. 2825 of October 14, 1961, and its amendments. The studies and procedures for expropriation and compensation shall be carried out by the ITCO in coordination with CONAI. If there is subsequently an invasion of non-indigenous persons into the reserves, the competent authorities must immediately proceed with their eviction, without any payment of compensation whatsoever."* Note that the law denies the right to compensation to those who invade the indigenous zone after the declaration. Furthermore, Convention No. 169 of the International Labour Organization held in Geneva in June 1989, on indigenous and tribal peoples, regarding the issue of the property of these groups, states that the right of ownership and possession over the lands they traditionally occupy must be recognized, adding that their lands cannot be transferred, and if necessary, this can only be done with their consent and must involve compensation. The title of the indigenous reserves is vested in the indigenous community according to Article 2 of the Indigenous Law, and through Regulation Executive Decree No. 13568 of April 30, 1982, it is established that the Integral Development Associations (Asociaciones de Desarrollo Integral) have the legal representation of the Indigenous Communities and act as their local government. Furthermore, Article 3 states that indigenous reserves are inalienable and imprescriptible (inalienables e imprescriptibles), non-transferable, and exclusive to the indigenous communities that inhabit them. The mentioned Convention also establishes the obligation to respect indigenous uses and customs and customary law (derecho consuetudinario indígena). Regarding the effectiveness of agreements made by indigenous communities on matters of agrarian possession, it has also been stated: *"The Agrarian Tribunals cannot deny jurisdictional protection to indigenous possession problems. On the contrary, they must have special sensitivity towards such conflicts, and even be aware of their customs, in order to thus impose the respect that agreements reached in administrative proceedings deserve. While it is true that the indigenous agrarian property regime is an exception regarding collective property, it is not possible to disregard the legitimate possession that each indigenous family exercises in our country. Therefore, if an administrative solution has not been reached through the Association or the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs (Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, CONAI), or if having been reached, the agreements are disregarded, the Agrarian Tribunals, as a last resort, must restore the corresponding rights, to provide the Indigenous Community with adequate protection for their cultural forms. In the present case, the legitimate possession exercised by the plaintiff [Nombre8] and her spouse over the land in conflict, which they had dedicated to forest reserves, is clearly demonstrated."* (Agrarian Tribunal, Voto No. 429 at 15:30 hours on July 24, 1997). This interpretation by the Agrarian Tribunal referring to the substantive norms of indigenous agrarian property, as special property, finds perfect support in the constitutional jurisprudence that recognizes the administrative powers of the indigenous local governments, under the form of the Associations, to make the necessary decisions for the defense of their rights. Otherwise, *"...the fundamental right of the Indigenous to have their own representative organizations and to be able to act autonomously in the defense of their rights would be disregarded..."* (Constitutional Chamber, Sala Constitucional, No. 2005-06856, at 10:02 hours on June 1, 2005). In this way, our constitutional jurisprudence recognizes a superior hierarchy to International Conventions, such as ILO No. 169 (Law 7316 of November 3, 1992), which even grant a higher degree of protection to indigenous persons, that is, a "high level of protection" regarding those human rights contemplated in the Political Constitution itself, and which therefore require respect in the ordinary Courts for the decisions that, through custom and self-determination of said indigenous peoples, derive from the communities themselves and their representatives. In the case before us, the administered party [Nombre9] was declared a possessor in good faith by the Integral Development Association of the Guatuso Indigenous Reserve of Alajuela in its capacity as local government, invoking both the powers of the Indigenous Law and the referenced International Convention and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (folio 33). The appellant is correct in that the appealed resolution is contradictory because, on one hand, it strips said certification of probative value, and on the other, it includes it within the list of proven facts. But even beyond that, this Tribunal considers that the final agreement of INDER violates ILO Convention 169 because it disregards indigenous customary law and the powers of the association as local government by stripping said declaration of possessory good faith of its value and probative effectiveness. Added to this, Article 286 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) states that good faith in possession is presumed unless there is proof to the contrary, and in the administrative proceeding, the bad faith of the administered party [Nombre2] was not demonstrated, and as such, this Tribunal holds it as an unproven fact. Likewise, the grievance regarding the fact held as unproven is accepted, given that Mr. [Nombre2] was a five-year-old child in 1968 and entered to live on the property with his nuclear family; thus, his situation does not fit within the premise of the final paragraph of Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, in the sense that the appellant did not invade the indigenous zone after its declaration; rather, when his father acquired the land in 1968 from a previous possessor (as recorded in the private bill of sale, carta de venta privada, from folios 37 to 28), he entered to live with his nuclear family in plain view and with the tolerance of the entire community, as recounted by the witnesses: [Nombre10], who has known the land for 64 years and attests that they have always lived there (folio 60); the witness [Nombre11], who, like the witness [Nombre10], is also an indigenous person, has known the farm since 1964, went to school with Mr. [Nombre2], and indicates that only his family has lived there, that Mr. [Nombre2]'s father raised his family on the land and subsequently "bequeathed" it to him during his lifetime (folio 61). For his part, the witness [Nombre12] says he has known the land since 1968, that he even met [Nombre7] and recognizes him as the previous possessor who transferred the property in 1969 to Mr. [Nombre13], the appellant's father, who is very beloved by the indigenous people (folio 62). This "inheritance," actually a lifetime donation (donación en vida), effected in a private deed of donation in 1996, is recognized as such by the indigenous community, and proof of this is the testimony of [Nombre14], who is an indigenous person and recognizes that inheritance, even explaining how it is determined if a person is indigenous or not, and accepts that the appellant has lived his entire life on the land (folio 64). Finally, the witness [Nombre15], who besides being an indigenous person is the President of the referred association, ratifies the certification that the appellant is a possessor in good faith because the community recognizes him as such, that he has lived there with his family, and that upon his father's death, he continued working the land (folio 64). The directing body and the final agreement err in requiring the association to have a registry of previous possessors and, based on that, stripping probative value from the cited certification of possessor in good faith of folio 33, because it does not respect the indigenous customary law established in constitutional jurisprudence and ILO Convention 169, in light of the jurisprudence on indigenous human rights emanating from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos). In the judgment of August 31, 2001 (Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingny Community VS. Nicaragua), the following was stated relevant to this case: *"146. The terms of an international human rights treaty have an autonomous meaning, for which reason they cannot be equated with the meaning attributed to them in domestic law. Furthermore, such human rights treaties are living instruments whose interpretation must adapt to the evolution of the times, and, in particular, to current living conditions. 147. In turn, Article 29.b of the Convention establishes that no provision may be interpreted as 'restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party.' 148. Through an* <span style="font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">*evolutionary interpretation of international instruments for the protection of human rights*</span>*, taking into account the applicable rules of interpretation and, in accordance with Article 29.b of the Convention – which prohibits a restrictive interpretation of rights – this Court considers that Article 21 of the Convention protects the right to property in a sense that includes, among others, the rights of the members of indigenous communities within the framework of communal property, which is also recognized in the Political Constitution of Nicaragua. 149. Given the characteristics of the present case, it is necessary to make some clarifications regarding the concept of property in indigenous communities.* <span style="font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">*Among indigenous peoples, there is a communitarian tradition regarding a communal form of collective land ownership, in the sense that belonging to it is not centered on an individual but on the group and its community. Indigenous peoples, by the mere fact of their existence, have the right to live freely in their own territories; the close relationship that indigenous peoples maintain with the land must be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival. For indigenous communities, the relationship with the land is not merely a question of possession and production but a material and spiritual element that they must enjoy fully*</span>*, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations…151.* <span style="font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">*The customary law of indigenous peoples must be especially taken into account for the purposes in question. As a product of custom, the possession of the land should suffice for indigenous communities that lack a formal title of land ownership to obtain the official recognition of said ownership*</span>* and the subsequent registration…"* (The underlining is not from the original). Furthermore, the mentioned Article 5 does not require just title (justo título) or a transfer of title for the right to compensation, precisely because indigenous lands cannot be acquired through adverse possession (usucapión). It must be taken into account, according to the evidence received and the reality and the uses and customs, that it is absolutely normal that in a nuclear family, its members exercise co-possession (coposesión) on a land where they settled prior to the declaration of the indigenous reserve, and that the donation made by the appellant's father in 1996 only formalized a co-possession that the appellant has exercised on the land since childhood. It does not fit, then, to consider the appellant as a person who invaded the indigenous zone if he has lived in it since 1968, eight years before the declaration of the reserve. This is because, although this Tribunal is not granting legal validity and effectiveness to said donation, but rather because the appellant had exercised possession since long before together with his father, mother, and siblings as a member of a nuclear family and has been recognized as a possessor in good faith by the Association and by the indigenous community. This has been established by the jurisprudence of this Tribunal, stating that even if a transfer occurs after the Indigenous Law, it does not invalidate the possession acquired in good faith prior to said law: *"The fact that, according to the criteria currently in force regarding the protection of indigenous territories, said title is invalid, does not imply that its original acquisition by the relatives of the appellant's representative in 1974 was not in good faith."* AGRARIAN TRIBUNAL, Voto No. 582-F-2021 at fourteen hours thirty-seven minutes on June twenty-fourth, two thousand twenty-one. Added to this, the right to compensation had already been consolidated in 1977 with the entry into force of the Indigenous Law, since the appellant, like his father, had possession in good faith since 1968. Consequently, the administrative resolution 9 of March 1, 2021, from the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of the Institute of Rural Development, administrative proceeding RTI-PA-00002-2020-GUATUSO, containing the agreement of Article 9 of Ordinary Session 7, held on March 1, 2021, is revoked, insofar as it ruled not to hold [Nombre2] as a possessor in good faith and thereby deny the payment of compensation established in numeral 5 of the Indigenous Law. In its place, he is held as a possessor in good faith of said land for the purposes of the referenced compensation.

**POR TANTO** The administrative resolution 9 of March 1, 2021, from the Board of Directors of the Institute of Rural Development, administrative proceeding RTI-PA-00002-2020-GUATUSO, containing the agreement of Article 9 of Ordinary Session 7, held on March 1, 2021, is revoked, insofar as it ruled not to hold [Nombre2] as a possessor in good faith and thereby deny the payment of compensation established in numeral 5 of the Indigenous Law.

Instead, he is deemed a possessor in good faith of said land for the purposes of the referenced compensation.

VOTO N° 1042-F-21 TRIBUNAL AGRARIO. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ.- A las diecisiete horas veintiocho minutos del veintiséis de octubre de dos mil veintiuno.- PROCEDIMIENTO ADMINISTRATIVO ORDINARIO DEL PLAN NACIONAL DE RECUPERACIÓN DE TERRITORIOS INDÍGENAS (PLAN RTI), establecido por INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL, cédula jurídica número CED1 - - - ; representado por su secretario general [Nombre1] ; contra [Nombre2] conocido como [Nombre2] , mayor, cédula de identidad número CED2 - - . Actúa como abogado director del administrado, el licenciado Carlos Enrique Ulloa Rojas, colegiado dos mil cuatrocientos setenta y ocho. El proceso se tramita en el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, Territorio Indígena de Guatuso.-

RESULTANDO:

1.- El Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, en el artículo N° 9 de la Sesión Ordinaria N° 7, celebrada el primero de marzo del dos mil veintiuno, resolvió: 1) Este órgano director recomienda que NO se tenga al señor [Nombre2] como poseedor de buena fe, en los términos establecidos en la ley indígena, en ese sentido NO procede el derecho de pago de indemnización alguna de la propiedad que algún momento fue poseedor y que se encuentra afectada por el Territorio Indígena de Guatuso," (folio 93).- 2.- Conoce este Tribunal del recurso jerárquico impropio de apelación formulado por el administrado [Nombre2] conocido como [Nombre2] , contra la resolución del Instituto Desarrollo Rural, (folios 94 a 95).- 3.- En la substanciación del proceso se han observado las prescripciones legales, y no se nota la existencia de errores u omisiones capaces de producir la nulidad del fallo.- Redacta el juez Picado Vargas, y;

CONSIDERANDO

I.- Se prohíja el elenco de hechos tenidos por demostrados por ser acordes al acervo probatorio.- II.- No se comparte el único hecho no probado, toda vez que el señor [Nombre2] era un niño en el año 1968 de cinco años y entró a vivir al inmueble con su núcleo familiar. De esta naturaleza se tiene por no probado: 1.- Que el señor [Nombre2] haya sido poseedor de mala fe (No hay prueba al respecto).- III.- El administrado [Nombre2] conocido como [Nombre2] , interpone recurso jerárquico impropio contra la citada resolución del Instituto Desarrollo Rural, manifestando lo siguiente: AGRAVIOS: "1.- En el considerando primero, de hechos probados, II, no es cierto que mi finca no posee, plano catastrado, la misma, si está incluida en el plano catastrado número A-23349-75, con fecha del 27 de noviembre de 1975, mi finca, no incluye toda el área porque mi papá [Nombre3] , cuando fue dueño de toda el área, donó parrte de la misma a dos de mis hermanos, [Nombre4] y [Nombre5]. Que el hecho VI está mal consignado y debe corregirse, porque el suscrito es considerado poseedor de buena fe por parte de la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena de Guatuso, Alajuela, y no como se consignó, ver folio 33 del expediente administrativo. En lo que respecta al considerando segundo, hechos no probados, único, estimo y considero que el mismo está confuso en su redacción ya que antes de establecerse la reserva indígena el suscrtio ya vivía en dicha zona, como hijo de [Nombre3] . En lo que se refiere al considerando tercero, sobre el régimen jurídico de los territorios indígenas, se hace una confusión del suscrito, con otra persona, a saber, [Nombre6] , en relación al expediente administrativo RTI-PA-0002-2020-GUATUSO. 2.- En lo que se refiere al considerando, valoración de la pruena, el fondo del asunto y la fijación de la consecuencia jurídica, debo indicar que el órgano director incurre en una violación al debido proceso, al derecho de defensa en juicio, en el aparte VII al restarle valor probatorio a la certificación que emitió la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena de Guatuso, donde me certifican como poseedor de buena fe, empero, el órgano director, sin razón ni motivo alguno, indica que dicha certificación no puede ser tomada como veraz y lo más grave que no es admitida para dicho proceso. El órgano director se contradice porque precisamente en el considerando de hechos probados, en el hecho VI, se me tiene como poseedor de buena fe por parte de dicha asociación y por parte del mismo órgano. Ahora bien, si a dicha certificación se le resta valor probatorio y no es admitida en el proceso, ¿por qué motivo sí sirve de fundamento probatorio para acreditar que el suscrito es poseedor de buena fe en la finca que posee en la reserva?. De ahí las contradicciones que existen en dicho acuerdo y la solicitud de revocatoria del mismo. 3.- Estimo y considero que el suscrito sí califica para ser indemnizado, en virtud de que soy poseedor de buena fe por donación que me hizo mi padre el cual adquirió la totalidad de la finca antes de la declaratoria de reserva indígena e incluso sacó plano castarado a todo el área que adquirió en 1968 de [Nombre7] . Es cierto que adquirií la finca después de dicha declaratoria, pero por herencia, por voluntad propia de mi padre, al cual no se le podía prohibir que me hiciera la donación, máxime que el Estado nunca le pagó dicha finca, siendo poseedor y dueño del inmueble antes de la declaratoria. Ahora bien, si su autoridad considera que no soy beneficiario de la indenmización, entonces, mi madre, que está viva, sí sería la beneficiaria, por ser cónyuge de mi padre, la cual vive dentro de la reserva indígena desde hace muchos años antes de la declaratoria." (folios 94 a 95).- IV.- SOBRE EL PLANTEAMIENTO DEL CASO: En este caso en concreto, el terreno objeto del procedimiento administrativo, se trata de un terreno que antes de declaratoria de reserva indígena no se encontraba inscrito en el Registro Nacional y fue poseído por el señor [Nombre3] desde el año 1968 junto con su familia, y al día de hoy, se encuentra en posesión del adjudicatario, su hijo [Nombre2] , quien no es persona indígena y fue declarado como poseedor de buena fe por la Asociación e Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena de Guatuso, Alajuela. Por ello y con base en lo dispuesto en los numerales 5 y 6 de Ley Indígena (que remite a la Ley 2825 en cuanto a procedimientos), 1, 3, 75 a 80 de Ley de Tierras y Colonización Nº2825 de 14 de octubre de 1961) y 1, 3, 4, 5, 14, 15 y 80 de Ley 9036 de 11 mayo de 2012, que Transforma el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA) en el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (Inder), en cuanto a los fines del desarrollo rural (que requiere un adecuado ordenamiento territorial), es posible revisar lo resuelto en el procedimiento administrativo en que se dictó la resolución recurrida, tramitado para determinar la buena o mala fe de quien tenga un derecho de posesión sobre un terreno ubicado dentro de territorio indígena, para efectos indemnizatorios.- V.- SOBRE EL MOTIVO DE NULIDAD ALEGADO POR EL RECURRENTE COMO FALTA AL DEBIDO PROCESO POR CONTRADICCIÓN EN LA VALORACIÓN DE LA PRUEBA DOCUMENTAL: Lo que se alega como motivos de nulidad, en realidad son agravios de fondo, dirigidos a combatir la forma como se analizó o valoró la prueba documental, concretamente, la certificación de poseedor de buena fe del recurrente de parte de la Asociación indígena, por lo que se rechaza el reclamo de anular la resolución recurrida. Esos argumentos se analizarán en conjunto con los restantes (artículo 54 Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria) en los siguientes considerandos.- VI.- SOBRE LOS AGRAVIOS DE FONDO: Lleva razón el recurrente. Debe indicarse que el artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena establece como requisito para indemnización únicamente la posesión y la buena fe. Pero resulta trascendental que esa posesión haya sido ejercida con anterioridad a la declaratoria de reserva indígena. Dice la norma: "Artículo 5. En el caso de personas no indígenas que sean propietarias o poseedoras de buena fe dentro de las reservas indígenas, el ITCO deberá reubicarlas en otras tierras similares, si ellas lo desearen; si no fuere posible reubicarlas o ellas no aceptaren la reubicación, deberá expropiarlas e indemnizarlas conforme a los procedimientos establecidos en la Ley n.° 2825 de 14 de octubre de 1961 y sus reformas. Los estudios y trámites de expropiación e indemnización serán efectuados por el ITCO en coordinación con la CONAI. Si posteriormente hubiera invasión de personas no indígenas a las reservas, de inmediato las autoridades competentes deberán proceder a su desalojo, sin pago de indemnización alguna." Nótese que la norma niega el derecho de indemnización a quienes invadan la zona indígena a quienes invadan los mismos con posterioridad a la declaratoria. Por otra parte, el Convenio N° 169 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo celebrado en Ginebra en junio de 1989, sobre pueblos indígenas y tribales, que en lo relativo al tema la propiedad de esos grupos señala que, deberá reconocerse a los pueblos interesados el derecho de propiedad y de posesión sobre las tierras que tradicionalmente ocupan, agrega no se podrá hacer traslado de las tierras que ocupan, de ser necesario, sólo podrá realizarse con su consentimiento y debe mediar indemnización. La titularidad de las reservas indígenas la tiene la comunidad indígena según el artículo 2 de la Ley Indígena, y mediante Reglamento Decreto Ejecutivo No. 13568 de 30 de abril de 1982, se establece que las Asociaciones de Desarrollo Integral tienen la representación legal de las Comunidades Indígenas y actúan como gobierno local de éstas. Por otra parte, el artículo 3 las reservas indígenas son inalienables e imprescriptibles, no transferibles y exclusivas para las comunidades indígenas que las habitan. También el mencionado Convenio establece la obligatoriedad de respetar los usos y costumbres y el derecho consuetudinario indígena. En relación con la eficacia de los acuerdos tomados por las comunidades indígenas, sobre los temas de posesión agraria, también se ha indicado: “Los Tribunales agrarios no pueden negar protección jurisdiccional a los problemas de posesión indígena. Al contrario, deben tener una especial sensibilidad hacia dicho tipo de conflictos, he incluso conocer sus costumbres, para lograr de esa forma imponer el respeto que merecen los acuerdos pactados en sede administrativa. Si bien es cierto, el régimen de la propiedad agraria indígena es una excepción, en cuanto a la propiedad colectiva, no es posible desconocer la posesión legítima que ejercita en nuestro país cada familia indígena. Por ello si no se ha alcanzado una solución administrativa, a través de la Asociación o de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, o si habiéndose alcanzado, se irrespetan los acuerdos, los Tribunales Agrarios en última instancia deberán restablecer los derechos que correspondan, a fin de brindar a la Comunidad Indígena, una tutela adecuada a sus formas culturales. En el presente caso, está claramente demostrada la posesión legítima que ejercía la actora [Nombre8] , y su esposo, sobre el terreno en conflicto, el cual lo tenían dedicado a reservas forestales. (Tribunal Agrario, Voto No. 429 de las 15:30 horas del 24 de julio de 1997). Esta interpretación del Tribunal Agrario referida a las normas sustantivas de la propiedad agraria indígena, como propiedad especial, encuentra perfecto respaldo en la jurisprudencia constitucional que reconoce las potestades administrativas de los gobiernos locales indígenas, bajo las figuras de las Asociaciones, a tomar las decisiones necesarias para la defensa de sus derechos. De lo contrario, “…se estaría desconociendo el derecho fundamental de los Indígenas a tener sus propios organismos representativos y a poder actuar en forma autónoma en la defensa de sus derechos…” (Sala Constitucional, No. 2005-06856, de las 10:02 horas del 1 de junio del 2005). Reconoce de esa forma, nuestra jurisprudencia constitucional, una jerarquía superior a los Convenios Internacionales, tales como el de la OIT, No. 169 (Ley 7316 del 3 de noviembre de 1992), que otorgan inclusive un grado de tutela superior a las personas indígenas, es decir, un “nivel elevado de protección” respecto de aquellos derechos humanos contemplados en la propia Constitución Política, y que por ende exigen el respeto, en los Tribunales ordinarios, de las decisiones que por la vía de la costumbre y la autodeterminación de dichos pueblos indígenas se deriven de las propias comunidades y sus representantes. En el caso que nos ocupa, el administrado [Nombre9] fue declarado como poseedor de buena fe por la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena de Guatuso de Alajuela en su carácter de gobierno local; invocando tanto las facultades de la Ley Indígena, como el referido Convenio Internacional y la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional (folio 33). Lleva razón el recurrente en cuanto a que la resolución recurrida es contradictorio pues por un lado le resta valor probatorio a dicha certificación y por otro, lo incluye dentro del elenco de hechos probados. Pero aún más allá de eso, este Tribunal considera que el acuerdo final del INDER violenta el Convenio 169 de la OIT pues desconoce el derecho consuetudinario indígena y las potestades de la asociación como gobierno local al restar valor y eficacia probatoria a dicha declaratoria de buena fe posesoria. Aunado a ello, el artículo 286 del Código Civil dice que la buena fe en la posesión se presume salvo prueba en contrario y en el procedimiento administrativo no se demostró la mala fe del administrado [Nombre2] y por tal, este Tribunal lo tiene como hecho no probado. De igual modo, el agravio relativo al hecho tenido por no probado es de recibo, toda vez que que el señor [Nombre2] era un niño en el año 1968 de cinco años y entró a vivir al inmueble con su núcleo familiar; por lo que su situación no encaja dentro del supuesto del párrafo final del artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena, en el sentido de que el recurrente no invadió la zona indígena con posterioridad a su declaratoria; sino que, al adquirir su padre en el año 1968 el terreno de un anterior poseedor (según consta en la carta de venta privada de folios 37 a 28); entró a vivir con su núcleo familiar a vista y paciencia de toda la comunidad, según lo relatan los testigos [Nombre10] , quien tiene 64 años de conocer el terreno y da fe que siempre han vivido ahí (folio 60). El testigo [Nombre11] , quien al igual que la testigo [Nombre10] es también persona indígena, conoce la finca desde el año 1964, fue a la escuela junto a don [Nombre2] e indica que solo su familia ha vivido ahí, que el padre de don [Nombre2] crió su familia en el terreno y se lo "heredó "en vida posteriormente (folio 61). Por su parte, el testigo [Nombre12] dice conocer el terreno desde 1968, que incluso conoció a [Nombre7] y lo reconoce como el anterior poseedor que le traspasó en 1969 la propiedad a don [Nombre13] padre del recurrente, quien es muy querido por el pueblo indígena (folio 62). Esta "herencia" , en realidad donación en vida, efectuada en carta de donación privada en 1996, es reconocida como tal por la comunidad indígena y prueba de ello es el testimonio de [Nombre14] , quien es persona indígena, quien reconoce esa herencia, explica incluso como se determina si una persona es indígena o no y acepta que el recurrente ha vivido toda su vida en el terreno (folio 64). Finalmente, el testigo [Nombre15] , quien además de ser persona indígena es el Presidente de la referida asociación, ratifica la certificación de que el recurrente es poseedor de buena fe porque la comunidad lo reconoce como tal, que ha vivido con su familia ahí y que al morir su padre siguió trabajando la tierra (folio 64). Yerra el órgano director y el acuerdo final al exigir a la asociación registro de anteriores poseedores y con base en ello restar valor probatorio a la citada certificación de poseedor de buena fe de folio 33, pues no respeta el derecho consuetudinario indígena establecido en la jurisprudencia constitucional y el Convenio 169 de la OIT, a la luz de la jurisprudencia sobre derechos humanos de los indígenas, emanada de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. En la sentencia del 31 de agosto del 2001 (Caso de la Comunidad Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingny VS. Nicaragua), se señaló en lo que interesa para este caso lo siguiente: “146. Los términos de un tratado internacional de derechos humanos tienen sentido autónomo, por lo que no pueden ser equiparados al sentido que se les atribuye en el derecho interno. Además, dichos tratados de derechos humanos son instrumentos vivos cuya interpretación tiene que adecuarse a la evolución de los tiempos, y, en particular, a las condiciones de vida actuales. 147. A u vez, el artículo 29.b de la Convención establece que ninguna disposición puede ser interpretada en el sentido de “limitar el goce y ejercicio de cualquier derecho o libertad que pueda estar reconocido de acuerdo con las leyes de cualquiera de los Estados partes o de acuerdo con otra convención en que sea parte uno de dichos Estados”. 148. Mediante una interpretación evolutiva de los instrumentos internacionales de protección derechos humanos, tomando en cuenta las normas de interpretación aplicables y, de conformidad con el artículo 29.b de la Convención- que prohibe una interpretación restrictiva de los derechos-, esta Corte considera que el artículo 21 de la Convención protege el derecho a la propiedad en un sentido que comprende, entre otros, los derechos de los miembros de las comunidades indígenas en el marco de la propiedad comunal, la cual también está reconocida en la Constitución Política de Nicaragua. 149. Dadas las características del presente caso, es menester hacer algunas precisiones respecto del concepto de propiedad en las comunidades indígenas. Entre los indígenas existe una tradición comunitaria sobre una forma comunal de la propiedad colectiva de la tierra, en el sentido de que la pertenencia a ésta no se centra en un individuo sino en el grupo y su comunidad. Los indígenas por el hecho de su propia existencia tienen derecho a vivir libremente en sus propios territorios; la estrecha relación que los indígenas mantienen con la tierra debe de ser reconocida y comprendida como la base fundamental de sus culturas, su vida espiritual, su integridad y su supervivencia económica. Para las comunidades indígenas la relación con la tierra no es meramente una cuestión de posesión y producción sino un elemento material y espiritual del que deben gozar plenamente, inclusive para preservar su legado cultural y transmitirlo a las generaciones futuras…151. El derecho consuetudinario de los pueblos indígenas debe ser tenido especialmente en cuenta, para los efectos de que se trata. Como producto de la costumbre, la posesión de la tierra debería bastar para que las comunidades indígenas que carezcan de un título real sobre la propiedad de la tierra obtengan el reconocimiento oficial de dicha propiedad y el consiguiente registro…” (Lo subrayado no es del original). Por otra parte, el mencionado artículo 5 no exige justo título o título traslativo para el derecho a indemnizar, justamente porque las tierras indígenas no son objeto de usucapión. Debe tomarse en cuenta, de acuerdo a la prueba recibida y la realidad y los usos y costumbres, que es absolutamente normal que en un núcleo familiar los miembros del mismo ejercen coposesión en un terreno donde se han asentado con anterioridad a la declaratoria de reserva indígena y que la donación realizada por el padre del recurrente, en 1996, lo único que hizo fue formalizar una coposesión que desde niño el recurrente ha ejercido en el terreno. No encaja, entonces, considerar al recurrente como una persona que haya invadido la zona indígena si vive en ella desde 1968, ocho años antes de la declaratoria de reserva. Ello por cuanto si bien este Tribunal no le está dando validez y eficacia jurídica a dicha donación, sino por el hecho de que la posesión la ejercía desde mucho antes el recurrente junto a su padre, madre y hermanos como miembro de un núcleo familiar y ha sido reconocido como poseedor de buena fe por la Asociación como por la comunidad indígena. Así lo ha establecido la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal, al indicar que si bien se da un traspaso posterior a la Ley Indígena no le quita validez a la posesión adquirida de buena adiquirida con anterioridad a dicha ley: "El que de acuerdo con los criterios vigentes actualmente sobre tutela de territorios indígenas, dicho título sea inválido, no implica que su adquisición original por los familiares del representante de la apelante en 1974 haya sido de buena fe." TRIBUNAL AGRARIO, Voto No. 582-F-2021 de las catorce horas treinta y siete minutos del veinticuatro de junio de dos mil veintiuno. Aunado a ello, el derecho a indemnización ya se había consolidado en el año 1977 con la entrada en vigencia de la Ley Indígena, ya que el recurrente, como su padre, tenían posesión de buena fe desde el año 1968. En consecuencia, se revoca la resolución la resolución administrativa 9 de 1 de marzo 2021, de la Junta Directiva del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, procedimiento administrativo RTI-PA-00002-2020-GUATUSO, que contiene el acuerdo del artículo 9 de la Sesión Ordinaria 7, celebrada el 1 de marzo de 2021, en cuanto se dispuso no tener como poseedor de buena fe a [Nombre2] y por ello denegar el de pago de indemnización establecido en el numeral 5 de la Ley Indígena. En su lugar se le tiene como poseedor de buena fe de dicho terreno para efectos de la indemnización referida.

POR TANTO

Se revoca la resolución la resolución administrativa 9 de 1 de marzo 2021, de la Junta Directiva del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, procedimiento administrativo RTI-PA-00002-2020-GUATUSO, que contiene el acuerdo del artículo 9 de la Sesión Ordinaria 7, celebrada el 1 de marzo de 2021, en cuanto se dispuso no tener como poseedor de buena fe a [Nombre2] y por ello denegar el de pago de indemnización establecido en el numeral 5 de la Ley Indígena. En su lugar se le tiene como poseedor de buena fe de dicho terreno para efectos de la indemnización referida.

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[Nombre16] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A ???????????????

[Nombre17] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A ???????????????

[Nombre18] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A