Plurality of pension regimes does not violate the ConstitutionPluralidad de regímenes de pensiones no viola la Constitución

**Recitals** **1.-** By a writing received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 11:19 a.m. on August 11, 2017, the petitioner requests that article 81, subsection 12), and Title IX of the Organic Law of the Judiciary, concerning the judicial retirement and pension regime and its administration by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, be declared unconstitutional. He alleges, to that effect, that the Political Constitution (articles 73 and 74) creates a single public pension regime, applicable equitably to all workers, and therefore there is no possibility of privileged pensions. He insists that said regime has been established, administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, as the sole, universal, and mandatory one, such that all workers, public or private, are obligated to belong to it and no exceptions are contemplated—such as that of the Poder Judicial—through which a sector of public workers could separate from the universal regime and appropriate the tripartite revenues to administer them by itself. He adds that the Costa Rican State cannot lawfully make contributions to pension regimes other than the one administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, in light of the principle of legality (ordinal 11 of the Political Constitution). He points out that article 177 of the Constitution reaffirms the exclusivity of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, from which it follows that the Poder Ejecutivo can only budget, and the Asamblea Legislativa approve, State contributions for the regime administered by the cited institution. He indicates that subsections 1) and 2) of article 236 of Title IX of the Organic Law of the Judiciary provide that the mandatory contributions of the State, employers, and workers, established by ordinal 73 of the Political Constitution, are transferred in their entirety to the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, thereby violating the express prohibition contained in that constitutional norm against transferring such contributions. It also infringes upon what is provided in that numeral with respect to the administration of social security, since, while the Political Constitution provides that they be administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, the judicial regime provides that they be administered by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial. He indicates that, in this way, with the approval and sanction of the judicial retirement and pension regime of the Poder Judicial, the Asamblea Legislativa and the President of the Republic infringed the principle of legality by arrogating to themselves a function that does not correspond to them, namely, breaking the universality, generality, and equality of social security. They also infringed articles 33 and 74 of the Political Constitution, given that they created a special regime that violates the principle of equality established in those norms. He additionally charges that the Poder Judicial substitutes the Poder Ejecutivo in the initiative to prepare the national budget. He maintains, to that effect, that the Poder Ejecutivo must submit to the increases for the Fund that the Corte Suprema de Justicia unilaterally decrees in the following items: a) the contribution of Poder Judicial workers, which brings with it the corresponding increase in the state contribution, and b) the increase in the amounts of retirements and pensions for cost of living, at the will of the Poder Judicial, regardless of whether or not the Poder Ejecutivo increases the public sector for that concept. The foregoing, according to the provisions of article 229 of Title IX of the Organic Law of the Judiciary. He considers that this infringes article 177 of the Political Constitution. He also considers that the principle of equality, established by article 74 of the Constitution, is violated by the judicial retirement and pension regime, inasmuch as from its provisions a great difference emerges in favor of the judicial regime compared with the regime of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. To which is added that the retirement and pension regime of the Poder Judicial has other revenues that the one of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social does not have, such as the interest from the administration of judicial deposits, interest from the investment of judicial deposits belonging to abandoned cases, etc. He charges that the unilateral increases in the workers' contribution and the increase in retirements and pensions for cost of living that the Poder Judicial itself decrees for its workers imply an increase in the national budget that must be paid by all taxpayers through taxes. He requests that, definitively, the present action be granted.

**2.-** For the purpose of substantiating the standing he holds to bring this unconstitutionality action, the petitioner affirms that he has standing to invoke the unconstitutionality of the challenged regulations as a citizen taxpayer of the State, which provides resources to the Poder Judicial.

**3.-** The proprietary magistrates Ernesto Jinesta Lobo, Fernando Cruz Castro, Fernando Castillo Víquez, Paul Rueda Leal, Nancy Hernández López, and Luis Fdo. Salazar Alvarado, and the substitute magistrate José Paulino Hernández Gutiérrez, filed requests for recusal.

**4.-** By resolution of 9:32 a.m. on September 7, 2017, the Acting Presidency of the Sala Constitucional ordered the separation from the knowledge of this proceeding of magistrates Jinesta Lobo, Cruz Castro, Castillo Víquez, Rueda Leal, Hernández López, Salazar Alvarado, and Hernández Gutiérrez, and ordered that the pertinent communication be made to the Presidency of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, for the purpose of proceeding with their substitution.

**5.-** The Presidency of the Corte Suprema de Justicia conducted the corresponding drawing of lots, resulting in the election of substitute magistrates Rosa María Abdelnour Granados, Carlos M. Estrada Navas, Yerma Campos Calvo, Alicia Salas Torres, Ronald Salazar Murillo, Ana María Picado Brenes, and Jorge Araya García.

**6.-** The substitute magistrates Alicia Salas Torres, Ana María Picado Brenes, Yerma Campos Calvo, Carlos M. Estrada Navas, and Ronald Salazar Murillo filed recusals.

**7.-** Because the constitutional term of appointment as substitute magistrates of Carlos M. Estrada Navas, Yerma Campos Calvo, and Rosa María Abdelnour Granados had concluded, the Presidency of the Corte Suprema de Justicia was requested to appoint three magistrates for the purpose of integrating the Tribunal.

**8.-** The Presidency of the Corte Suprema de Justicia conducted the corresponding drawings of lots, resulting in the election of substitute magistrates Hubert Fernández Argüello, Lucila Monge Pizarro, and Marta Esquivel Rodríguez.

**9.-** The substitute magistrates Lucila Monge Pizarro, Hubert Fernández Argüello, and Marta Esquivel Rodríguez raised recusals.

**10.-** By resolution of 9:45 a.m. on March 1, 2018, the Acting Presidency of the Sala Constitucional ordered the separation from the knowledge of this proceeding of substitute magistrates Ronald Salazar Murillo, Lucila Monge Pizarro, Hubert Fernández Argüello, Marta Esquivel Rodríguez, Alicia Salas Torres, and Ana María Picado Brenes; it ordered that the pertinent communication be made to the Presidency of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, for the purpose of proceeding with their substitution.

**11.-** By a writing dated March 7, 2018, magistrate Ernesto Jinesta Lobo raised additional arguments for recusal. He stated that: “As is publicly and notoriously known, ever since, in the Corte Plena Session of June 20, 2016, the topic of the reform to the retirement and pension regime of the Poder Judicial was addressed, just as I announced at that moment and by public communiqué in subsequent days, as of that moment I would recuse myself from hearing and resolving any matter, even those of other regimes different from that of the Poder Judicial, where a reform thereof was discussed. Since that moment, I have recused myself and 449 recusals have been granted to me, which are broken down as follows: 87 in unconstitutionality actions, 361 in amparos, and 1 in legislative consultations. Consequently, it would be a legal contradiction that 449 recusals have been granted to me to hear topics related to the reform of other retirement regimes and that I be enabled to resolve the specific topic of the reform of the Poder Judicial regime, which was the primary reason for my recusal. I attach to these additional reasons the list of the 449 case files where I recused myself and the recusal was granted. None of the other proprietary Magistrates is in my situation, so my recusal carries greater weight given that I was previously separated in 449 matters heard by the Sala Constitucional.” **12.-** The Presidency of the Corte Suprema de Justicia conducted the corresponding drawings of lots, resulting in the election of Substitute magistrates Anamari Garro Vargas, Mauricio Chacón Jiménez, Alejandro Delgado Faith, and Ileana Sánchez Navarro. The Presidency of the Court specified that “because the Chamber had originally requested 6 Substitutes, and there are only 4 available, the drawing was conducted with the substitutes who are available.” **13.-** The substitute magistrates Mauricio Chacón Jiménez, Ileana Sánchez Navarro, and Anamari Garro Vargas raised recusals.

**14.-** By resolution of 10:43 a.m. on March 20, 2018, the Acting Presidency of the Sala Constitucional ordered the separation from the knowledge of this proceeding of substitute magistrates Mauricio Chacón Jiménez, Ileana Sánchez Navarro, and Anamari Garro Vargas.

**15.-** By resolution of 08:45 a.m. on March 23, 2018, the Acting Presidency of the Sala Constitucional declared magistrates Fernando Cruz Castro, Fernando Castillo Víquez, Paul Rueda Leal, Nancy Hernández López, and Luis Fdo. Salazar Alvarado enabled to hear the present matter.

**16.-** By a writing received in this Chamber at 9:29 a.m. on September 14, 2018, the petitioner indicates that, at the time, he stated that the substitute magistrates could not be active or retired Poder Judicial officials, as there exists an impediment due to direct interest. He points out that, in this case, before all the recusals, the Presidency of the Corte Suprema de Justicia appointed as substitute magistrates two retirees from its regime and active judges. Said substitutes, as is natural, recused themselves. He maintains that the proper course is for the Presidency of the Corte Suprema de Justicia to request the Asamblea Legislativa to elect substitute magistrates from among persons who do not incur the aforementioned ground for impediment, as this is the only legally viable procedure. He points out that the resolution of this Chamber, of March 20, 2018, accepts the last three recusals and orders that the processing of this proceeding continue, but does not indicate how, and therefore the case file is at a dead end.

**17.-** The proprietary magistrate Cruz Castro formulated a new recusal.

**18.-** By resolution of 2:42 p.m. on June 21, 2019, the Acting President of the Sala Constitucional ordered the separation from the knowledge of this proceeding of proprietary magistrate Cruz Castro. In the same manner, and by virtue of being appointed, by drawing of lots, to the vacant position of this Chamber, substitute magistrate Marta Esquivel Rodríguez was declared enabled to hear the present matter, in application of article 14 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction and article 29, subsection 2), of the Organic Law of the Judiciary.

**19.-** The proprietary magistrate Jorge Araya García formulated a request for recusal.

**20.-** By resolution of 11:17 a.m. on January 24, 2020, the Acting President of the Sala Constitucional rejected the petition formulated by magistrate Araya García and declared him enabled for the hearing of this action.

**21.-** Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction authorizes the Chamber to reject on procedural grounds or on the merits, at any time, even from its filing, any petition presented for its consideration that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that sufficient elements of judgment exist to reject it, or that it is the simple reiteration or reproduction of a previous, equal or similar, rejected petition.

Drafted by Magistrate Castillo Víquez; and, **Considering:** **I.- PRELIMINARY.** In consideration of the writing presented by the petitioner on September 14, 2018, it must be indicated that the Acting President of the Sala Constitucional, through resolutions of 8:45 a.m. on March 23, 2018, 2:42 p.m. on June 21, 2019, and 11:17 a.m. on January 24, 2020, has already ordered the enabling of magistrates Castillo Víquez, Rueda Leal, Hernández López, Salazar Alvarado, Araya García, and Esquivel Rodríguez to hear the present matter, by legal mandate, in accordance with the provisions of article 29, subsection 2), of the Organic Law of the Judiciary and in application of the general principles of Law of the inalienability of competences, the hermetic completeness of the legal system, and the natural judge. To which is added that substitute magistrate Delgado Faith was elected to hear the present case, who presents no grounds for recusal. Therefore, this Tribunal is now duly integrated to hear this unconstitutionality action.

**II.- ON STANDING.** It is deemed that the actor, Galo Vicente Guerra Cobo, has standing to bring this unconstitutionality action, in the terms of article 75, paragraph 2, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, insofar as he acts in defense of public funds.

**III.- OBJECT OF THE ACTION.** The actor requests that the unconstitutionality be declared of article 81, subsection 12), and Title IX, on Judicial Retirements and Pensions, of the Organic Law of the Judiciary, inasmuch as he alleges that said regulation creates a privileged pension regime, administered by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, which must be financed by all taxpayers through the payment of taxes, despite the Political Constitution providing for a single pension and retirement regime, administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. He maintains that the foregoing infringes articles 11, 33, 73, 74, and 177 of the Political Constitution.

**IV.- ON THE MERITS OF THE ACTION.** It is appropriate to reject the present action on the merits, pursuant to article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, given that there is reiterated jurisprudence of this Tribunal to the effect that the existence of diverse pension regimes does not, per se, infringe the Law of the Constitution. One may cite, in the first place, Voto No. 3063-95 of 3:30 p.m. on June 13, 1995, in relation to the unconstitutionality action brought against the Ley Marco de Pensiones, No. 7302, an occasion in which it was resolved:

“VI. ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REGIMES AND PRIVILEGES. Regarding the alleged unconstitutionality of the Ley Marco de Pensiones in relation to the establishment of diverse regimes and situations of privilege, deeming it contrary to the principle of equality—article 33 of the Constitution—the petitioners must abide by what was previously stated by this Chamber in judgment 0846-92, cited above:

"Inquire in the same sense the constitutional permissibility of special regimes, understanding by such retirement systems different from the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, the admission of distinct norms in all or some of the aspects that are to be taken into account, and, in the event that the regimes are considered viable, whether it would be permissible to establish distinct rules in retirement aspects, for example in ages, contribution time, etc. The Chamber considers that, if the primary purpose of the constituent power was to maintain social security to strengthen social welfare, there is no reason to question the plurality of regimes. It is assumed that the constituent power sought a minimum of protection for workers, leaving the door open for the future regulation of new social security systems, which is the fruit of a historical process in which the current situation is a consequence of actions or deficiencies that occurred in the past and, in turn, is the origin of the actions that will occur in the future. Social security, that is, the public system of coverage of social, individual, and economic needs developed from the historical action of social welfare, structured in our country on the basis of pensions and retirements, together with the tutelary intervention of the State in the sphere of labor relations, has come to become, over time, without the slightest reservation, one of the main identifying signs of the social or welfare State. Therefore, it cannot be surprising that in the index or agenda of the essential issues that permeate the social policy of the modern State, insofar as it refers to social security, different retirement and pension regimes are found. When different regimes exist, it is logical that each has its own rules and legal criteria for granting the constitutional right to retirement and pension, without it even being possible to think that such coexistence is unconstitutional.

(...)

It is clear from the foregoing that there is no constitutional impossibility to establishing different pension regimes." In contrast, Voto No. 2084-96 of 2:30 p.m. on May 7, 1996, examined, specifically, the pension and retirement regime of the Poder Judicial and resolved, with support from the cited Voto No. 846-92, the following:

“(…) DIVERSITY OF RETIREMENT REGIMES.— Upon resolving a legislative consultation on the draft of the Ley Marco de Pensiones y Jubilaciones, the Chamber, in its resolution No. 846-92, of one thirty in the afternoon on March twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-two, expressed the following:

"B).- Inquire in the same sense the constitutional permissibility of special regimes, understanding by such retirement systems different from the one of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, the admission of distinct norms in all or some of the aspects that are to be taken into account, and, in the event that the regimes were considered viable, whether it would be permissible to establish distinct rules in retirement aspects, for example, by ages, contribution time, etc. The Chamber considers that, if the primary purpose of the constituent power was to maintain social security to strengthen social welfare, there is no reason to question the existence of a plurality of regimes. It is assumed that the constituent power sought a minimum of protection for workers, leaving the door open for the future regulation of new social security systems, which is the fruit of a historical process in which the current situation is a consequence of actions or deficiencies that occurred in the past and, in turn, is the origin of the actions that will occur in the future. Social security, that is, the public system of coverage of social, individual, and economic needs developed from the historical action of social welfare, structured in our country on the basis of pensions and retirements, together with the tutelary intervention of the State in the sphere of labor relations, has come to become, over time, without the slightest reservation, one of the main identifying signs of the social or welfare State. Therefore, it cannot be surprising that in the index or agenda of the essential issues that permeate the social policy of the modern State, insofar as it refers to social security, different retirement and pension regimes are found. When different regimes exist, it is logical that each has its own rules and legal criteria for granting the constitutional right to retirement and pension, without it even being possible to think that such coexistence is unconstitutional..." All the foregoing means that it is not unconstitutional for diverse retirement regimes to exist, on condition that certain essential requirements are met, such as the apportionment of the burdens under equal conditions, an aspect not questioned in this action. But as the Chamber has stated in the highlighted previous transcription, "it is logical that each one (of the regimes) has its own rules and legal criteria for granting the constitutional right to retirement." That is, the specialized norms aimed at guaranteeing the very existence of the regime do not necessarily have to be identical within that variety of regimes that may exist." A position reiterated later in judgment No. 2013-014400 of 3:00 p.m. on October 30, 2013. Thus, after analyzing the jurisprudence of the Sala Constitucional, it is verified that the existence of diverse pension regimes—including, specifically, the pension and retirement regime of the Poder Judicial—with its special regulation—in pursuit of guaranteeing the very existence of the regime, as well as its own administration—does not constitute a violation of the constitutional articles cited by the petitioner, nor—in general—of the Law of the Constitution. As already indicated, if "the primary purpose of the constituent power was to maintain social security to strengthen social welfare, there is no reason to question the plurality of regimes." **V.- CONCLUSION.** As a corollary to the above, the rejection on the merits of the action is mandatory, as is hereby ordered.

**VI.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE.** The parties are advised that, if they have provided any paper documents, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, informatic, magnetic, optical, telematic, or new-technology-produced device, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, any material not withdrawn within this period shall be destroyed, in accordance with the provisions of the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial," approved by the Corte Plena in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI, and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

**Por tanto:** The action is rejected on the merits.

It adds that the Costa Rican State cannot, lawfully, make contributions to pension regimes other than the one administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), in accordance with the principle of legality (ordinal 11 of the Political Constitution). It points out that Article 177 of the Constitution reaffirms the exclusivity of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), from which it follows that the Executive Branch may only budget, and the Legislative Assembly may only approve, State contributions for the regime administered by the aforementioned institution. It indicates that subsections 1) and 2) of Article 236 of Title IX of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) provide that the mandatory contributions from the State, employers, and workers, as established by ordinal 73 of the Political Constitution, are transferred, in their entirety, to the Judicial Branch Retirement and Pension Fund (Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial), thereby violating the express prohibition contained in this constitutional norm against transferring such contributions. It also infringes upon the provisions of that same numeral regarding the administration of social security, since, while the Political Constitution mandates that they be administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), the judicial regime stipulates that they be administered by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial). It indicates that, in this way, by approving and sanctioning the Judicial Branch retirement and pension regime, the Legislative Assembly and the President of the Republic violated the principle of legality by arrogating a function that does not correspond to them, which is to break the universality, generality, and equality of social security. They also violated Articles 33 and 74 of the Political Constitution, given that they created a special regime that violates the principle of equality established in those norms. It additionally accuses that the Judicial Branch substitutes the Executive Branch in the initiative to prepare the national budget. It maintains, to this effect, that the Executive Branch must submit to the increases for the Fund that are unilaterally decreed by the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) in the following line items: a) the contribution of Judicial Branch workers, which entails the corresponding increase in the State contribution, and b) the increase in the amounts of retirement and pension payments for cost of living, at the will of the Judicial Branch, regardless of whether the Executive Branch increases the public sector for such a concept or not. The foregoing, in accordance with the provisions of Article 229 of Title IX of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial). It considers that this violates Article 177 of the Political Constitution. It also judges that the principle of equality, established in Article 74 of the Constitution, is transgressed by the judicial retirement and pension regime, given that its provisions reveal a great difference in favor of the judicial regime compared to the regime of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social). This is compounded by the fact that the Judicial Branch retirement and pension regime has other income streams that the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) regime does not, such as interest from the administration of judicial deposits, interest from the investment of judicial deposits belonging to abandoned lawsuits, etc. It accuses that the unilateral increases in worker contributions and the increases in retirement and pension payments for cost of living decreed by the Judicial Branch itself for its employees imply an increase in the national budget, which all taxpayers must pay through taxes. It requests that, ultimately, this action be upheld.

**2.-** In order to substantiate the standing (legitimación) he holds to bring this action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad), the plaintiff states that he is authorized to invoke the unconstitutionality of the challenged regulations as a citizen taxpayer of the State, which provides resources to the Judicial Branch.

**3.-** The permanent justices (magistrados propietarios) Ernesto Jinesta Lobo, Fernando Cruz Castro, Fernando Castillo Víquez, Paul Rueda Leal, Nancy Hernández López, and Luis Fdo. Salazar Alvarado, and the substitute justice (magistrado suplente) José Paulino Hernández Gutiérrez, filed a recusal request (inhibitoria).

**4.-** By resolution at 9:32 a.m. on September 7, 2017, the acting Presidency of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) ordered the removal of Justices (magistrados) Jinesta Lobo, Cruz Castro, Castillo Víquez, Rueda Leal, Hernández López, Salazar Alvarado, and Hernández Gutiérrez from hearing this case and ordered that the pertinent information be communicated to the Presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), in order for it to proceed with their substitution.

**5.-** The Presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) conducted the corresponding lottery (sorteo), resulting in the election of substitute justices (magistrados suplentes) Rosa María Abdelnour Granados, Carlos M. Estrada Navas, Yerma Campos Calvo, Alicia Salas Torres, Ronald Salazar Murillo, Ana María Picado Brenes, and Jorge Araya García.

**6.-** The substitute justices (magistrados suplentes) Alicia Salas Torres, Ana María Picado Brenes, Yerma Campos Calvo, Carlos M. Estrada Navas, and Ronald Salazar Murillo filed a recusal request (inhibitoria).

**7.-** Because the constitutional term of appointment as substitute justices (magistrados suplentes) for Carlos M. Estrada Navas, Yerma Campos Calvo, and Rosa María Abdelnour Granados had concluded, the Presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) was requested to appoint three justices (magistrados) to integrate the Court.

**8.-** The Presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) conducted the corresponding lotteries (sorteos), resulting in the election of substitute justices (magistrados suplentes) Hubert Fernández Argüello, Lucila Monge Pizarro, and Marta Esquivel Rodríguez.

**9.-** The substitute justices (magistrados suplentes) Lucila Monge Pizarro, Hubert Fernández Argüello, and Marta Esquivel Rodríguez raised a recusal request (inhibitoria).

**10.-** By resolution at 9:45 a.m. on March 1, 2018, the acting Presidency of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) ordered the removal of substitute justices (magistrados suplentes) Ronald Salazar Murillo, Lucila Monge Pizarro, Hubert Fernández Argüello, Marta Esquivel Rodríguez, Alicia Salas Torres, and Ana María Picado Brenes from hearing this case; it ordered that the pertinent information be communicated to the Presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), in order for it to proceed with their substitution.

**11.-** By writing dated March 7, 2018, Justice (magistrado) Ernesto Jinesta Lobo raised additional arguments for recusal (inhibitoria). He stated that: "*As is public and notorious knowledge, since the topic of the reform to the Judicial Branch retirement and pension regime was discussed in the Full Court Session (Sesión de Corte Plena) on June 20, 2016, as I announced at that moment and through a public statement in the days following, from that moment on, I would recuse myself from hearing and deciding any matter, including those of other regimes distinct from the Judicial Branch's, where a reform thereof was discussed. Since that moment, I have recused myself and 449 recusals have been granted to me, broken down as follows: 87 in actions of unconstitutionality (acciones de inconstitucionalidad), 361 in amparo proceedings (amparos), and 1 in legislative consultations (consultas legislativas). Consequently, it would be a legal contradiction that 449 recusals have been granted to me to hear topics related to the reform of other retirement regimes, and I be enabled to decide the specific topic of the reform to the Judicial Branch regime, which was the principal reason for my recusal. I attach to these additional reasons the list of the 449 case files where I recused myself and the recusal was granted. None of the other permanent Justices (Magistrados propietarios) are in my situation, so my recusal has greater weight given that I have been previously removed in 449 matters before the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)*." **12.-** The Presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) conducted the corresponding lotteries (sorteos), resulting in the election of Substitute Justices (Magistrados Suplentes) Anamari Garro Vargas, Mauricio Chacón Jiménez, Alejandro Delgado Faith, and Ileana Sánchez Navarro. The Presidency of the Court specified that "*because the Chamber had originally requested 6 Substitutes, and there are only 4 available, the lottery was held with the available substitutes*." **13.-** The substitute justices (magistrados suplentes) Mauricio Chacón Jiménez, Ileana Sánchez Navarro, and Anamari Garro Vargas raised a recusal request (inhibitoria).

**14.-** By resolution at 10:43 a.m. on March 20, 2018, the acting Presidency of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) ordered the removal of substitute justices (magistrados suplentes) Mauricio Chacón Jiménez, Ileana Sánchez Navarro, and Anamari Garro Vargas from hearing this case.

**15.-** By resolution at 08:45 a.m. on March 23, 2018, the acting Presidency of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) declared Justices (magistrados) Fernando Cruz Castro, Fernando Castillo Víquez, Paul Rueda Leal, Nancy Hernández López, and Luis Fdo. Salazar Alvarado qualified to hear this matter.

**16.-** By means of a writing received in this Chamber at 9:29 a.m. on September 14, 2018, the plaintiff indicates that he previously stated that the substitute justices (magistrados suplentes) could not be active or retired employees of the Judicial Branch, due to an impediment based on direct interest. He points out that, in this case, in the face of all the recusals, the Presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) appointed as substitute justices (magistrados suplentes) two retirees from its regime and active judges. Said substitutes, as is natural, recused themselves. He maintains that the proper course is for the Presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) to request that the Legislative Assembly elect substitute justices (magistrados suplentes) from among persons who do not incur the aforementioned grounds for impediment, as this is the only legally viable procedure. He points out that the resolution of this Chamber, dated March 20, 2018, accepts the last three recusals and orders that the processing of this case continue, but does not indicate how, so the case file (expediente) is left at a standstill.

**17.-** The permanent justice (magistrado propietario) Cruz Castro filed a new recusal (inhibitoria).

**18.-** By resolution at 14:42 hrs. on June 21, 2019, the acting president of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) ordered the removal of the permanent justice (magistrado propietario) Cruz Castro from hearing this case. In the same manner, and given that she was appointed, by lottery (sorteo), to the vacant position in this Chamber, substitute justice (magistrada suplente) Marta Esquivel Rodríguez was declared qualified to hear this matter, in application of Article 14 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) and Article 29, subsection 2), of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial).

**19.-** The permanent justice (magistrado propietario) Jorge Araya García filed a recusal request (inhibitoria).

**20.-** By resolution at 11:17 a.m. on January 24, 2020, the acting president of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) rejected the motion filed by Justice (magistrada) Araya García, and she was declared qualified to hear this action.

**21.-** Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) empowers the Chamber to reject, outright or on the merits, at any time, including upon filing, any motion brought before it that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a mere reiteration or reproduction of a previous, equal or similar motion that was rejected.

Drafted by Justice (Magistrado) **Castillo Víquez**; and, **Considering:** **I.- PRELIMINARY.** In response to the writing filed by the plaintiff on September 14, 2018, it must be indicated that the acting president of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), through resolutions at 8:45 a.m. on March 23, 2018, 14:42 hrs. on June 21, 2019, and 11:17 hrs. on January 24, 2020, has already ordered that Justices (magistrados) Castillo Víquez, Rueda Leal, Hernández López, Salazar Alvarado, Araya García, and Esquivel Rodríguez be qualified to hear this matter, by mandate of law, in accordance with the provisions of Article 29, subsection 2), of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) and in application of the general principles of Law regarding the inalienability of jurisdiction, the hermetic plenitude of the legal system, and the natural judge. To this is added that substitute justice (magistrado suplente) Delgado Faith was elected to hear this case, and he presents no grounds for recusal (inhibitoria). Therefore, this Court is now duly integrated to hear this action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad).

**II.- REGARDING STANDING (LEGITIMACIÓN).** It is deemed that the plaintiff, Galo Vicente Guerra Cobo, has standing (legitimación) to bring this action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad), under the terms of Article 75, paragraph 2, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), insofar as the action is brought in defense of public funds.

III.- SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ACTION. The plaintiff requests that the unconstitutionality of article 81, subsection 12), and Title IX, on Judicial Retirements and Pensions (Jubilaciones y Pensiones Judiciales), of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) be declared, alleging that said regulation creates a privileged pension regime, administered by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), which must be financed by all taxpayers through tax payments, even though the Political Constitution provides for a single system of pensions and retirements, administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social). He maintains that the foregoing violates articles 11, 33, 73, 74, and 177 of the Political Constitution.

IV.- ON THE MERITS OF THE ACTION. It is appropriate to reject this action on the merits, pursuant to article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), given that there is reiterated jurisprudence of this Court to the effect that the existence of diverse pension regimes does not infringe, *per se*, the Law of the Constitution. First, one can cite vote No. 3063-95 of 15:30 hrs. on June 13, 1995, regarding the unconstitutionality action filed against the Framework Law on Pensions (Ley Marco de Pensiones), No. 7302, on which occasion it was resolved:

“**VI. ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REGIMES AND PRIVILEGES.** Regarding the alleged unconstitutionality of the Framework Law on Pensions in relation to the establishment of diverse regimes and situations of privilege, considering it contrary to the principle of equality -article 33 of the Constitution-, the plaintiffs must abide by what was previously stated by this Chamber in ruling 0846-92, cited above:

"They likewise consult on the constitutional appropriateness of special regimes, understanding as such retirement systems other than that of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, the admission of different rules in all or some of the aspects to be taken into account and, in the event that regimes are considered viable, whether it would be appropriate to establish different rules regarding retirement aspects, for example, in ages, contribution time, etc. The Chamber considers that, if the primary purpose of the constituent was to maintain social security to strengthen social welfare, there is no reason to question the plurality of regimes. The starting point is that the constituent sought a minimum of protection for workers, leaving the door open for future regulation of new social security systems, which is the fruit of a historical process in which the current situation is a consequence of actions or deficiencies occurring in the past and, in turn, is the origin of actions to be taken in the future. Social security, that is, the public system for covering social, individual, and economic needs developed from the historical action of social welfare, structured in our country on the basis of pensions and retirements, alongside the tutelary intervention of the State in the sphere of labor relations, has come to be over time, without any reservation, one of the main hallmarks of the social or welfare state. Therefore, it cannot be surprising that in the index or agenda of essential issues that permeate the social policy of the modern State, with regard to insurance, different retirement and pension regimes are found. Given that different regimes exist, it is logical that each one has its own legal rules and criteria for granting the constitutional right to retirement and pension, without it even being conceivable that such coexistence is unconstitutional.

(...)

It is clear from the foregoing that there is no constitutional impossibility to establishing different pension regimes." While in vote No. 2084-96 of 14:30 hrs. on May 7, 1996, the pension and retirement regime of the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial) was specifically examined and resolved, based on the cited vote No. 846-92, the following:

"(...) **DIVERSITY OF RETIREMENT REGIMES.-** In evacuating a legislative consultation on the draft Framework Law on Pensions and Retirements (Ley Marco de Pensiones y Jubilaciones), the Chamber in its ruling No. 846-92, of thirteen hours thirty minutes on March twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-two, expressed the following:

"B).- They likewise consult on the constitutional appropriateness of special regimes, understanding as such retirement systems other than that of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, the admission of different rules in all or some of the aspects to be taken into account and, in the event that regimes were considered viable, whether it would be appropriate to establish different rules regarding retirement aspects, for example, by ages, contribution time, etc. The Chamber considers that, if the primary purpose of the constituent was to maintain social security to strengthen social welfare, there is no reason to question the existence of a plurality of regimes. The starting point is that the constituent sought a minimum of protection for workers, leaving the door open for future regulation of new social security systems, which is the fruit of a historical process in which the current situation is a consequence of actions or deficiencies occurring in the past and, in turn, is the origin of actions to be taken in the future. Social security, that is, the public system for covering social, individual, and economic needs developed from the historical action of social welfare, structured in our country on the basis of pensions and retirements, alongside the tutelary intervention of the State in the sphere of labor relations, has come to be over time, without any reservation, one of the main hallmarks of the social or welfare state. Therefore, it cannot be surprising that in the index or agenda of essential issues that permeate the social policy of the modern State, with regard to insurance, different retirement and pension regimes are found. **Given that different regimes exist, it is logical that each one has its own legal rules and criteria for granting the constitutional right to retirement and pension, without it even being conceivable that such coexistence is unconstitutional...**" All of the foregoing means that it is not unconstitutional for diverse retirement regimes to exist, provided that certain essential requirements are met, such as the distribution of burdens under equal conditions, an aspect that is not questioned in this action. But as the Chamber has stated in the highlighted transcription above, **"it is logical that each one (of the regimes) has its own legal rules and criteria for granting the constitutional right to retirement."** That is, the special nature of the rules, which are intended to guarantee the very existence of the regime, need not necessarily be identical across that variety of regimes that may exist." Position reiterated, subsequently, in ruling No. 2013-014400 of 15 hours on October 30, 2013. Thus, after analyzing the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), it is verified that the existence of diverse pension regimes –including, specifically, the pension and retirement regime of the Judicial Branch–, with their special regulation –in pursuit of guaranteeing the very existence of the regime, as well as its own administration–, does not constitute a violation of the constitutional articles cited by the plaintiff, nor –in general– of the Law of the Constitution. As already indicated, if "*the primary purpose of the constituent was to maintain social security to strengthen social welfare, there is no reason to question the plurality of regimes*." V.- CONCLUSION. As a corollary to the foregoing, the rejection on the merits of the action is required, as is hereby ordered.

VI.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE. The parties are warned that if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer-based, magnetic, optical, telematic device, or one produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this ruling. Otherwise, all material not withdrawn within this period shall be destroyed, pursuant to the provisions of the "Regulation on the Electronic Case File before the Judicial Branch (Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial)", approved by the Full Court (Corte Plena) in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in Judicial Newsletter (Boletín Judicial) number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

**Por tanto:** The action is rejected on the merits.

Fernando Castillo V. Acting President (Presidente a.i.)

| Paul Rueda L.

| | Nancy Hernández L. | | Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

| | Jorge Araya G.

| | Marta E. Esquivel R. | | Alejandro Delgado F.

| 12), and Title IX of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, concerning the judicial retirement and pension regime (régimen de jubilaciones y pensiones judiciales) and its administration under the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch. He alleges, in this regard, that the Political Constitution (Articles 73 and 74) creates a single public pension regime, applicable, equitably, to all workers, so there is no possibility of privileged pensions. He insists that this regime has been established, administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), as unique, universal, and mandatory, so all employees, public or private, are obligated to belong to it, and no exceptions are contemplated —such as that of the Judicial Branch— whereby a sector of public employees could separate itself from the universal regime and take over the tripartite revenues to administer them themselves. He adds that the Costa Rican State cannot, lawfully, make contributions to pension regimes other than the one administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, in accordance with the principle of legality (ordinal 11 of the Political Constitution). He points out that Article 177 of the Constitution reaffirms the exclusivity of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, from which it follows that the Executive Branch can only budget, and the Legislative Assembly approve, State contributions for the regime administered by that institution. He indicates that subsections 1) and 2) of Article 236 of Title IX of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch provide that the mandatory contributions of the State, employers, and workers, as established by ordinal 73 of the Political Constitution, are transferred, in their entirety, to the Judicial Branch Retirement and Pension Fund (Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial), thus violating the express prohibition contained in that constitutional norm against transferring such contributions. Furthermore, it infringes upon what is provided in that numeral regarding the administration of social insurance, because, while the Political Constitution provides that they be administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, the judicial regime provides that they be administered by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch. He indicates that, in this way, with the approval and enactment of the judicial retirement and pension regime, the Legislative Assembly and the President of the Republic infringed the principle of legality, by arrogating to themselves a function that does not correspond to them, namely, breaking the universality, generality, and equality of social insurance. They also infringed Articles 33 and 74 of the Political Constitution, given that they created a special regime that violates the principle of equality established in those norms. He additionally accuses that the Judicial Branch substitutes the Executive Branch in the initiative for preparing the national budget. He argues, to this effect, that the Executive Branch must submit to the increases for the Fund that the Supreme Court of Justice unilaterally decrees in the following items: a) the contribution of Judicial Branch workers which brings with it the corresponding increase in the state contribution and b) the increase in retirement and pension amounts for cost of living, at the will of the Judicial Branch, regardless of whether or not the Executive Branch increases that concept for the public sector. The foregoing, in accordance with the provisions of Article 229 of Title IX of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. He considers that this infringes Article 177 of the Political Constitution. He also regards that the principle of equality, established by Article 74 of the Constitution, is transgressed by the judicial retirement and pension regime, inasmuch as its provisions reveal a great difference in favor of the judicial regime compared to the regime of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund. To which is added that the Judicial Branch retirement and pension regime has other revenues that the Costa Rican Social Security Fund does not, such as interest from the administration of judicial deposits, interest on investment of judicial deposits belonging to abandoned lawsuits, etc. He accuses that the unilateral increases in worker contributions and the increase in retirements and pensions for cost of living decreed by the Judicial Branch itself for its employees imply an increase in the national budget, which must be paid by all taxpayers through taxes. He requests that, ultimately, this action be granted.

**2.-** In order to substantiate the standing he holds to bring this unconstitutionality action (acción de inconstitucionalidad), the petitioner affirms that he is legitimized to invoke the unconstitutionality of the challenged regulations as a taxpaying citizen of the State, which provides resources to the Judicial Branch.

**3.-** The permanent magistrates Ernesto Jinesta Lobo, Fernando Cruz Castro, Fernando Castillo Víquez, Paul Rueda Leal, Nancy Hernández López, and Luis Fdo. Salazar Alvarado and substitute magistrate José Paulino Hernández Gutiérrez filed a request for recusal (inhibitoria).

**4.-** By resolution at 9:32 a.m. on September 7, 2017, the acting Presidency of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) disqualified magistrates Jinesta Lobo, Cruz Castro, Castillo Víquez, Rueda Leal, Hernández López, Salazar Alvarado, and Hernández Gutiérrez from hearing this proceeding and ordered the Presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice to be notified accordingly, so that it may proceed with their substitution.

**5.-** The Presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice conducted the corresponding draw, resulting in the selection of substitute magistrates Rosa María Abdelnour Granados, Carlos M. Estrada Navas, Yerma Campos Calvo, Alicia Salas Torres, Ronald Salazar Murillo, Ana María Picado Brenes, and Jorge Araya García.

**6.-** Substitute magistrates Alicia Salas Torres, Ana María Picado Brenes, Yerma Campos Calvo, Carlos M. Estrada Navas, and Ronald Salazar Murillo filed a recusal.

**7.-** Because the constitutional term of appointment as substitute magistrates for Carlos M. Estrada Navas, Yerma Campos Calvo, and Rosa María Abdelnour Granados had concluded, the Presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice was requested to appoint three magistrates in order to integrate the Tribunal.

**8.-** The Presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice conducted the corresponding draws, resulting in the selection of substitute magistrates Hubert Fernández Argüello, Lucila Monge Pizarro, and Marta Esquivel Rodríguez.

**9.-** Substitute magistrates Lucila Monge Pizarro, Hubert Fernández Argüello, and Marta Esquivel Rodríguez raised a recusal.

**10.-** By resolution at 9:45 a.m. on March 1, 2018, the acting Presidency of the Constitutional Chamber disqualified substitute magistrates Ronald Salazar Murillo, Lucila Monge Pizarro, Hubert Fernández Argüello, Marta Esquivel Rodríguez, Alicia Salas Torres, and Ana María Picado Brenes from hearing this proceeding; it ordered the Presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice to be notified accordingly, so that it may proceed with their substitution.

**11.-** By brief dated March 7, 2018, magistrate Ernesto Jinesta Lobo raised additional arguments for recusal. He stated that: “*As is publicly and notoriously known, since the subject of the reform to the Judicial Branch retirement and pension regime was addressed in the Full Court Session of June 20, 2016, just as I announced at that moment and through a public communiqué in subsequent days, from that moment on I would recuse myself from hearing and deciding any matter, including those of regimes other than that of the Judicial Branch, where a reform to them was discussed. From that moment on, I have recused myself and 449 recusals have been accepted, broken down as follows: 87 in unconstitutionality actions, 361 in amparos, and 1 in legislative consultations. Consequently, it would be a legal contradiction that 449 recusals have been accepted for me regarding matters related to the reform of other retirement regimes, yet I am enabled to decide the specific matter of the reform to the Judicial Branch regime, which was the main reason for my recusal. Attached to these additional reasons is the list of the 449 case files from which I recused myself and the recusal was accepted. None of the other permanent Magistrates are in my situation, so my recusal has a superior weight, having previously been separated in 449 matters before the Constitutional Chamber*.” **12.-** The Presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice conducted the corresponding draws, resulting in the selection of Substitute Magistrates Anamari Garro Vargas, Mauricio Chacón Jiménez, Alejandro Delgado Faith, and Ileana Sánchez Navarro. The Presidency of the Court specified that “*because the Chamber had originally requested 6 Substitutes, and there are only 4 available, the draw was conducted with the substitutes who are available*.” **13.-** Substitute magistrates Mauricio Chacón Jiménez, Ileana Sánchez Navarro, and Anamari Garro Vargas raised a recusal.

**14.-** By resolution at 10:43 a.m. on March 20, 2018, the acting Presidency of the Constitutional Chamber disqualified substitute magistrates Mauricio Chacón Jiménez, Ileana Sánchez Navarro, and Anamari Garro Vargas from hearing this proceeding.

**15.-** By resolution at 8:45 a.m. on March 23, 2018, the acting Presidency of the Constitutional Chamber declared magistrates Fernando Cruz Castro, Fernando Castillo Víquez, Paul Rueda Leal, Nancy Hernández López, and Luis Fdo. Salazar Alvarado enabled to hear the present matter.

**16.-** Through a brief received by this Chamber at 9:29 a.m. on September 14, 2018, the petitioner indicates that he previously stated that the substitute magistrates could not be active or retired employees of the Judicial Branch, due to an impediment for direct interest. He points out that, in this case, given all the recusals, the Presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice appointed as substitute magistrates two retirees from its regime and active judges. These substitutes, naturally, recused themselves. He argues that the appropriate course is for the Presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice to request the Legislative Assembly to elect substitute magistrates from among persons who do not incur the aforementioned ground for impediment, as this is the only legally viable procedure. He points out that this Chamber's resolution of March 20, 2018, accepts the last three recusals and orders that the processing of this proceeding continue, but does not indicate how, leaving the case file at a dead end.

**17.-** Permanent magistrate Cruz Castro filed a new recusal.

**18.-** By resolution at 2:42 p.m. on June 21, 2019, the acting president of the Constitutional Chamber disqualified permanent magistrate Cruz Castro from hearing this proceeding. Likewise, and because she was appointed, by draw, to the vacant position in this Chamber, substitute magistrate Marta Esquivel Rodríguez was declared enabled to hear the present matter, pursuant to Article 14 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) and Article 29, subsection 2), of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch.

**19.-** Permanent magistrate Jorge Araya García filed a request for recusal.

**20.-** By resolution at 11:17 a.m. on January 24, 2020, the acting president of the Constitutional Chamber rejected the motion filed by magistrate Araya García, and he was declared enabled to hear this action.

**21.-** Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any motion brought before it that proves to be manifestly inadmissible, or when it considers that there are sufficient grounds for judgment to reject it, or that it is merely the reiteration or reproduction of a previous equal or similar rejected motion.

Drafted by Magistrate **Castillo Víquez**; and, **Whereas:** **I.- PRELIMINARY MATTER.** In response to the brief submitted by the petitioner on September 14, 2018, it must be noted that the acting president of the Constitutional Chamber, through rulings issued at 8:45 a.m. on March 23, 2018, 2:42 p.m. on June 21, 2019, and 11:17 a.m. on January 24, 2020, has already ordered that justices Castillo Víquez, Rueda Leal, Hernández López, Salazar Alvarado, Araya García, and Esquivel Rodríguez be enabled to hear the present matter, by operation of law, pursuant to the provisions of Article 29, subsection 2), of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial and in application of the general principles of Law regarding the non-waivability of jurisdiction, the hermetic plenitude of the legal system, and the natural judge. To which it is added that substitute justice Delgado Faith was elected to hear the present case and presents no grounds for disqualification. Consequently, this Court is now duly constituted to hear this action of unconstitutionality.

II.- ON STANDING. The plaintiff, Galo Vicente Guerra Cobo, is deemed to have standing to bring this action of unconstitutionality, under the terms of Article 75, paragraph 2°, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, insofar as the action is brought in defense of public funds.

III.- OBJECT OF THE ACTION. The plaintiff requests that the unconstitutionality of Article 81, subsection 12), and Title IX, concerning Judicial Pensions and Retirements, of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial be declared, because, it is alleged, said regulations create a privileged pension system, administered by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, which must be financed by all taxpayers through the payment of taxes, even though the Political Constitution provides for a single pension and retirement system, administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. It is maintained that the foregoing violates Articles 11, 33, 73, 74, and 177 of the Political Constitution.

IV.- ON THE MERITS OF THE ACTION. This action must be dismissed on the merits, pursuant to Article 9° of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, as there is reiterated jurisprudence of this Court to the effect that the existence of various pension systems does not infringe, per se, the Law of the Constitution. We may cite, in the first place, vote No. 3063-95 of 3:30 p.m. on June 13, 1995, in the action of unconstitutionality filed against the Ley Marco de Pensiones, No. 7302, on which occasion the Court ruled:

“VI. ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SYSTEMS AND PRIVILEGES. Regarding the alleged unconstitutionality of the Ley Marco de Pensiones in relation to the establishment of diverse systems and situations of privilege, considering it contrary to the principle of equality -Article 33 of the Constitution-, the plaintiffs must abide by what this Chamber previously stated in judgment 0846-92, cited above: \"They also consult on the constitutional appropriateness of special systems, understanding these to be retirement systems different from the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, the admission of different norms in all or some of the aspects to be taken into account and, in the event that such systems are considered viable, whether it would be appropriate to establish different rules in the retirement aspects, for example, in ages, contribution time, etc. The Chamber considers that, if the primary goal of the constituent was to maintain social insurance to strengthen social security, there is no reason to question the plurality of systems. The premise is that the constituent intended a minimum level of protection for workers, leaving the door open for future regulation on new social security systems, which is the fruit of a historical process in which the current situation is a consequence of actions or deficiencies from the past and, in turn, is the origin of actions that will occur in the future. Social security, that is, the public system for covering social, individual, and economic needs developed from the historical action of social provision, structured in our country on the basis of pensions and retirements, hand in hand with the State's tutelary intervention in the sphere of labor relations, has over time, without the slightest reservation, become one of the main identifying features of the social or welfare State. Therefore, it cannot be surprising that in the index or agenda of essential issues that permeate the social policy of the modern State, with regard to insurance, different retirement and pension systems are found. Since different systems exist, it is logical that each one has its own rules and legal criteria for granting the constitutional right to retirement and pension, without it being even thinkable that such coexistence is unconstitutional. (…) It is clear from the foregoing that there is no constitutional impossibility to establish different pension systems.\" Meanwhile, in vote No. 2084-96 of 2:30 p.m. on May 7, 1996, the pension and retirement system of the Judicial Branch was specifically examined, and the Court ruled, based on the aforementioned vote No. 846-92, as follows:

\"(…) DIVERSITY OF RETIREMENT SYSTEMS.- When addressing a legislative consultation on the draft of the Ley Marco de Pensiones y Jubilaciones, the Chamber, in its resolution No. 846-92 of one thirty p.m. on March twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-two, expressed the following: \"B).- They also consult on the constitutional appropriateness of special systems, understanding these to be retirement systems different from that of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, the admission of different norms in all or some of the aspects to be taken into account and, in the event that such systems were considered viable, whether it would be appropriate to establish different rules in the retirement aspects, for example, by ages, contribution time, etc. The Chamber considers that, if the primary goal of the constituent was to maintain social insurance to strengthen social security, there is no reason to question the existence of a plurality of systems. The premise is that the constituent intended a minimum level of protection for workers, leaving the door open for future regulation on new social security systems, which is the fruit of a historical process in which the current situation is a consequence of actions or deficiencies from the past and, in turn, is the origin of actions that will occur in the future. Social security, that is, the public system for covering social, individual, and economic needs developed from the historical action of social provision, structured in our country on the basis of pensions and retirements, hand in hand with the State's tutelary intervention in the sphere of labor relations, has over time, without the slightest reservation, become one of the main identifying features of the social or welfare State. Therefore, it cannot be surprising that in the index or agenda of essential issues that permeate the social policy of the modern State, with regard to insurance, different retirement and pension systems are found. Since different systems exist, it is logical that each one has its own rules and legal criteria for granting the constitutional right to retirement and pension, without it being even thinkable that such coexistence is unconstitutional...\" All of the foregoing means that it is not unconstitutional for diverse retirement systems to exist, provided that certain essential requirements are met, such as the distribution of burdens under equal conditions, an aspect not questioned in this action. But as the Chamber stated in the highlighted previous transcription, \"it is logical that each one (of the systems) has its own rules and legal criteria for granting the constitutional right to retirement.\" That is, the special nature of the norms, whose purpose is to guarantee the very existence of the system, need not be necessarily identical across that variety of systems that may exist.\" A position later reiterated in judgment No. 2013-014400 of 3:00 p.m. on October 30, 2013. Thus, after analyzing the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, it is verified that the existence of various pension systems –including, specifically, the pension and retirement system of the Judicial Branch–, with their special regulations –in an effort to guarantee the very existence of the system, as well as its own administration–, does not entail a violation of the constitutional articles cited by the plaintiff, nor –in general– of the Law of the Constitution. As already indicated, if \"the primary goal of the constituent was to maintain social insurance to strengthen social security, there is no reason to question the plurality of systems.\" V.- CONCLUSION. As a corollary of the foregoing, dismissal on the merits of the action is required, and is so ordered.

VI.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE. The parties are advised that if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computing, magnetic, optical, telematic device, or device produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not withdrawn within this period shall be destroyed, as provided in the \"Electronic Case File Regulations before the Judicial Branch,\" approved by the Corte Plena in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI and published in the Judicial Bulletin number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza por el fondo la acción.

Fernando Castillo V. Presidente a.i.

Paul Rueda L.

Nancy Hernández L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

Marta E. Esquivel R.

Alejandro Delgado F.

1  Res. Nº 2020-02841 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas y cuarenta minutos de doce de febrero de dos mil veinte.

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por Galo Vicente Guerra Cobo, mayor, casado, abogado, cédula de identidad No. 8-0048-0768, vecino de San José, contra el artículo 81, inc. 12), y el Título IX de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 11:19 hrs. del 11 de agosto de 2017, el accionante solicita que se declare inconstitucional el artículo 81, inc. 12), y el Título IX de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, referente al régimen de jubilaciones y pensiones judiciales y su administración a cargo del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial. Alega, al efecto, que en la Constitución Política (artículos 73 y 74) se crea un régimen público único de pensiones, aplicable, equitativamente, a todos los trabajadores, por lo que no hay posibilidad de pensiones privilegiadas. Insiste que se ha establecido dicho régimen, que administra la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, como único, universal y obligatorio, por lo que todos los servidores, públicos o privados, están obligados a pertenecer al mismo y no se contemplan excepciones –como la del Poder Judicial-, por la que un sector de servidores públicos pueda separarse del régimen universal y adjudicarse las rentas tripartitas para administrarlas por sí mismo. Añade que el Estado costarricense no puede, lícitamente, hacer aportes a regímenes de pensiones distintos del que administra la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, en atención al principio de legalidad (ordinal 11 de la Constitución Política). Señala que el artículo 177 constitucional reafirma la exclusividad de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, del que se deriva que el Poder Ejecutivo solo puede presupuestar y la Asamblea Legislativa aprobar aportes del Estado para el régimen que administra la citada institución. Indica que en los incisos 1) y 2) del artículo 236 del Título IX de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial se prevé que las contribuciones forzosas del Estado, patronos y trabajadores, que dispone el ordinal 73 de la Constitución Política, se transfieren, íntegramente, al Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, con lo que se viola la prohibición expresa contenida en tal norma constitucional de transferir tales contribuciones. Se infringe, además, lo dispuesto en ese numeral en lo que respecta a la administración de los seguros sociales, pues, mientras la Constitución Política dispone que sean administrados por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, el régimen judicial dispone que sean administrados por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial. Indica que, de esta forma, con la aprobación y sanción del régimen de jubilaciones y pensiones del Poder Judicial, la Asamblea Legislativa y el Presidente de la República infringieron el principio de legalidad, al arrogarse una función que no les corresponde, como lo es quebrar la universalidad, generalidad e igualdad de los seguros sociales. Infringieron, también, los artículos 33 y 74 de la Constitución Política, dado que, crearon un régimen especial que viola el principio de igualdad establecido en tales normas. Acusa, adicionalmente, que el Poder Judicial sustituye al Poder Ejecutivo en la iniciativa para elaborar el presupuesto nacional. Sostiene, al efecto, que el Poder Ejecutivo tiene que someterse a los incrementos para el Fondo que decrete, unilateralmente, la Corte Suprema de Justicia en los siguientes rubros: a) el aporte de los trabajadores del Poder Judicial que trae aparejado el correspondiente incremento del aporte estatal y b) el aumento de los montos de jubilaciones y pensiones por costo de vida, a voluntad del Poder Judicial, independientemente que el Poder Ejecutivo aumente o no al sector público por tal concepto. Lo anterior, conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo 229 del Título IX de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Considera que esto infringe el artículo 177 de la Constitución Política. Estima, también, que el principio de igualdad, que establece el artículo 74 constitucional, es transgredido por el régimen de jubilaciones y pensiones judiciales, por cuanto, de sus disposiciones se desprende una gran diferencia a favor del régimen judicial comparado con el régimen de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. A lo que se añade que el régimen de jubilaciones y pensiones del Poder Judicial tiene otras rentas que no tiene el de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, como los intereses por la administración de los depósitos judiciales, intereses por inversión de depósitos judiciales pertenecientes a juicios abandonados, etc. Acusa que los aumentos unilaterales del aporte de los trabajadores y el aumento de las jubilaciones y pensiones por costo de vida que decreta el propio Poder Judicial para sus servidores implican un incremento del presupuesto nacional, que tienen que pagarlo todos los contribuyentes por medio de los impuestos. Solicita que, en definitiva, se acoja la presente acción.

2.- A efecto de fundamentar la legitimación que ostenta para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, el accionante afirma que está legitimado para invocar la inconstitucional de la normativa impugnada como ciudadano contribuyente del Estado, el cual provee recursos al Poder Judicial.

3.- Los magistrados propietarios Ernesto Jinesta Lobo, Fernando Cruz Castro, Fernando Castillo Víquez, Paul Rueda Leal, Nancy Hernández López y Luis Fdo. Salazar Alvarado y el magistrado suplente José Paulino Hernández Gutiérrez formularon solicitud de inhibitoria.

4.- Por resolución de las 9:32 hrs. del 7 de setiembre de 2017, la Presidencia a.i. de la Sala Constitucional tuvo por separados del conocimiento de este proceso a los magistrados Jinesta Lobo, Cruz Castro, Castillo Víquez, Rueda Leal, Hernández López, Salazar Alvarado y Hernández Gutiérrez y dispuso comunicar lo pertinente a la Presidencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, a efecto de que proceda a su sustitución.

5.- La Presidencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia realizó el sorteo correspondiente resultando electos los magistrados suplentes Rosa María Abdelnour Granados, Carlos M. Estrada Navas, Yerma Campos Calvo, Alicia Salas Torres, Ronald Salazar Murillo, Ana María Picado Brenes y Jorge Araya García.

6.- Los magistrados suplentes Alicia Salas Torres, Ana María Picado Brenes, Yerma Campos Calvo, Carlos M. Estrada Navas y Ronald Salazar Murillo formularon inhibitoria.

7.- Por haber concluido el período constitucional de nombramiento como magistrados suplentes de Carlos M. Estrada Navas, Yerma Campos Calvo y Rosa María Abdelnour Granados se solicitó a la Presidencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia el nombramiento de tres magistrados con el fin de integrar el Tribunal.

8.- La Presidencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia realizó los sorteos correspondientes resultando electos los magistrados suplentes Hubert Fernández Argüello, Lucila Monge Pizarro y Marta Esquivel Rodríguez.

9.- Los magistrados suplentes Lucila Monge Pizarro, Hubert Fernández Argüello y Marta Esquivel Rodríguez plantearon inhibitoria.

10.- Por resolución de las 9:45 hrs. del 1° de marzo de 2018, la Presidencia a.i. de la Sala Constitucional tuvo por separados del conocimiento de este proceso a los magistrados suplentes Ronald Salazar Murillo, Lucila Monge Pizarro, Hubert Fernández Argüello, Marta Esquivel Rodríguez, Alicia Salas Torres y Ana María Picado Brenes; dispuso comunicar lo pertinente a la Presidencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, a efecto de que proceda a su sustitución.

11.- Por escrito de 7 de marzo de 2018, el magistrado Ernesto Jinesta Lobo planteó argumentos adicionales de inhibitoria. Manifestó que: “Como es de conocimiento público y notorio, desde que, en la Sesión de Corte Plena de 20 de junio de 2016 se trató el tema de la reforma al régimen de jubilaciones y pensiones del Poder Judicial, tal y como lo anuncié en ese instante y mediante comunicado público en días posteriores, a partir de ese momento me inhibiría de conocer y resolver cualquier asunto, incluso de otros regímenes diversos al del Poder Judicial, donde se discutiera una reforma de los mismos. Desde ese momento, me he inhibido y se me han acogido 449 inhibitorias, que se desglosan de la siguiente manera: 87 en acciones de inconstitucionalidad, 361 en amparos y 1 en consultas legislativas. Consecuentemente, sería un contrasentido jurídico que se me hayan acogido 449 inhibitorias para conocer temas relativos a la reforma de otros regímenes de jubilaciones y se me habilite para resolver el tema especifico de la reforma al régimen del Poder Judicial, que fue la razón principal de mi inhibitoria. Adjunto a estas razones adicionales, el listado de los 449 expedientes donde me inhibí y se me acogió la inhibitoria. Ninguno de los otros Magistrados propietarios se encuentra en mi situación, de modo que mi inhibitoria tiene un peso superior al habérseme separado, previamente, en 449 asuntos que conoce la Sala Constitucional”.

12.- La Presidencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia realizó los sorteos correspondientes resultando electos los magistrados Suplentes Anamari Garro Vargas, Mauricio Chacón Jiménez, Alejandro Delgado Faith e Ileana Sánchez Navarro. La Presidencia de la Corte precisó que “debido a que la Sala originalmente había pedido 6 Suplentes, y únicamente hay 4 disponibles, el sorteo se realizó con los suplentes que hay disponibles”.

13.- Los magistrados suplentes Mauricio Chacón Jiménez, Ileana Sánchez Navarro y Anamari Garro Vargas plantearon inhibitoria.

14.- Por resolución de las 10:43 hrs. del 20 de marzo de 2018, la Presidencia a.i. de la Sala Constitucional tuvo por separados del conocimiento de este proceso a los magistrados suplentes Mauricio Chacón Jiménez, Ileana Sánchez Navarro y Anamari Garro Vargas.

15.- Por resolución de las 08:45 hrs. del 23 de marzo de 2018, la Presidencia a.i. de la Sala Constitucional declaró habilitados, para conocer del presente asunto, a los magistrados Fernando Cruz Castro, Fernando Castillo Víquez, Paul Rueda Leal, Nancy Hernández López y Luis Fdo. Salazar Alvarado.

16.- Mediante escrito recibido en esta Sala, a las 9:29 hrs. del 14 de septiembre de 2018, el accionante indica que, en su momento, manifestó que los magistrados suplentes no podían ser funcionarios activos ni jubilados del Poder Judicial, por existir un impedimento por interés directo. Señala que, en este caso, ante todas las inhibitorias, la Presidencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia nombró como magistrados suplentes a dos jubilados de su régimen y a jueces activos. Dichos suplentes, como es natural, se inhibieron. Sostiene que lo procedente es que la Presidencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia solicite a la Asamblea Legislativa que elija magistrados suplentes entre personas que no incurran en la mencionada causal de impedimento, por ser este el único procedimiento legalmente viable. Señala que la resolución de esta Sala, del 20 de marzo de 2018, acepta las últimas tres inhibitorias y ordena que se continúe con la tramitación de este proceso, pero no indica cómo, por lo que el expediente queda en un punto muerto.

17.- El magistrado propietario Cruz Castro formuló nueva inhibitoria.

18.- Por resolución de las 14:42 hrs. del 21 de junio de 2019, el presidente a.i. de la Sala Constitucional tuvo por separado del conocimiento de este proceso al magistrado propietario Cruz Castro. Del mismo modo y por estar nombrada, por sorteo, en la plaza vacante de esta Sala, se declaró habilitada para conocer del presente asunto, en aplicación del artículo 14 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y 29, inciso 2), de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, a la magistrada suplente Marta Esquivel Rodríguez.

19.- El magistrado propietario Jorge Araya García formuló solicitud de inhibitoria.

20.- Por resolución de las 11:17 hrs. del 24 de enero de 2020, el presidente a.i. de la Sala Constitucional rechazó la gestión formulada por magistrada Araya García y se le declaró habilitado para el conocimiento de esta acción.

21.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar rechazada.

Redacta el Magistrado Castillo Víquez; y,

Considerando:

I.- DE PREVIO. En atención al escrito presentado por el accionante el 14 de setiembre de 2018, debe indicarse que el presidente a. i. de la Sala Constitucional, mediante resoluciones de las 8:45 hrs. del 23 de marzo de 2018, 14:42 hrs. del 21 de junio de 2019 y 11:17 hrs. del 24 de enero de 2020, ya dispuso habilitar a los magistrados Castillo Víquez, Rueda Leal, Hernández López, Salazar Alvarado, Araya García y Esquivel Rodríguez, para conocer del presente asunto, por imperio de ley, conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo 29, inciso 2), de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y en aplicación de los principios generales del Derecho de la irrenunciabilidad de las competencias, de la plenitud hermética del ordenamiento jurídico y del juez natural. A lo que se añade que el magistrado suplente Delgado Faith resultó electo para conocer del presente caso, quien no presenta motivo de inhibitoria. Por lo que este Tribunal ya se encuentra debidamente integrado para conocer de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad.

II.- SOBRE LA LEGITIMACIÓN. Se estima que el actor, Galo Vicente Guerra Cobo, goza de legitimación para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, en los términos del artículo 75, párrafo 2°, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en tanto se acciona en defensa de los fondos públicos.

III.- OBJETO DE LA ACCIÓN. El actor solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del artículo 81, inc. 12), y el Título IX, de las Jubilaciones y Pensiones Judiciales, de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, por cuanto, alega que en dicha normativa se crea un régimen privilegiado de pensiones, administrado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, que debe ser financiado por todos los contribuyentes por medio del pago de impuestos, pese que la Constitución Política prevé un régimen único de pensiones y jubilaciones, administrado por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Sostiene que lo anterior infringe los artículos 11, 33, 73, 74 y 177 de la Constitución Política.

IV.- SOBRE EL FONDO DE LA ACCIÓN. Procede rechazar por el fondo la presente acción, a tenor del artículo 9° de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en tanto que existe reiterada jurisprudencia de este Tribunal en el sentido que la existencia de diversos regímenes de pensiones no infringe, per se, el Derecho de la Constitución. Se puede citar, en primer lugar, el voto No. 3063-95 de las 15:30 hrs. del 13 de junio de 1995, en razón de la acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta en contra de la Ley Marco de Pensiones, No. 7302, ocasión en que se resolvió:

“VI. DEL ESTABLECIMIENTO DE REGIMENES Y PRIVILEGIOS. En cuanto a la alegada inconstitucionalidad de la Ley Marco de Pensiones en relación al establecimiento de regímenes diversos y situaciones de privilegio, por considerarlo contrario al principio de igualdad -artículo 33 constitucional-, los accionantes deben atenerse a lo dicho con anterioridad por esta Sala en sentencia 0846-92, supra citado:

"Consultan en igual sentido la procedencia constitucional de regímenes especiales, entendiendo por tales sistemas jubilatorios distintos de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, la admisión de normas distintas en todos o algunos de los extremos que se han de tomar en cuenta y, en el supuesto de que se consideren viables los regímenes, sería procedente establecer en los extremos jubilatorios reglas distintas, por ejemplo en las edades, tiempo de cotización, etc. Considera la Sala que, si el fin primordial del constituyente fue mantener los seguros sociales para fortalecer la seguridad social, no hay razón para cuestionar la pluralidad de regímenes. Se parte de que el constituyente pretendió un mínimo de protección a los trabajadores, dejando la puerta abierta para que en un futuro se regulara sobre nuevos sistemas de seguridad social, que es el fruto de un proceso histórico en el que la situación actual es consecuencia de acciones o deficiencias dadas en el pasado y, a su vez, es origen de las acciones que se darán en el futuro. La seguridad social, esto es, el sistema público de cobertura de necesidades sociales, individuales y de naturaleza económica desarrollado a partir de la acción histórica de la previsión, social, estructurada en nuestro país sobre la base de las pensiones y jubilaciones, de la mano de la intervención tutelar del Estado en el ámbito de las relaciones de trabajo, ha llegado a convertirse en el tiempo, sin la menor reserva, en una de las señas de identidad principales del Estado social o de bienestar. Por ello, no puede extrañar que en el índice o agenda de las cuestiones esenciales que impregnan la política social del Estado moderno, en lo que se refiere a los seguros, encuentren diferentes regímenes de jubilaciones y pensiones. Al existir diferentes regímenes, es lógico que cada uno tenga sus propias reglas y criterios legales para el otorgamiento del derecho constitucional a la jubilación y a la pensión, sin que por ello pueda siquiera pensarse que tal coexistencia sea inconstitucional.

(…)

Queda claro de lo anterior, que no existe imposibilidad constitucional para establecer diferentes regímenes de pensiones.” Mientras que en el voto No. 2084-96 de las 14:30 hrs. del 07 de mayo de 1996 se examinó, específicamente, el régimen de pensiones y jubilaciones del Poder Judicial y se resolvió, con sustento el citado voto No. 846-92, lo que sigue:

“(…) DIVERSIDAD DE REGIMENES JUBILATORIOS.- Al evacuar una consulta legislativa sobre el proyecto de la Ley Marco de Pensiones y Jubilaciones, la Sala en su resolución No. 846-92, de las trece horas treinta minutos del veintisiete de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y dos, expresó lo siguiente:

"B).- Consultan en igual sentido la procedencia constitucional de regímenes especiales, entendiendo por tales sistemas jubilatorios distintos al de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, la admisión de normas distintas en todo o algunos de los extremos que se han de tomar en cuenta y, en el supuesto de que se consideraren viables los regímenes, si sería procedente establecer en los extremos jubilatorios reglas distintas, por ejemplo, por edades, tiempo de cotización, etc. Considera la Sala que, si el fin primordial del constituyente fue mantener los seguros sociales para fotralecer la seguridad social, no hay razón para cuestionar la existencia de pluralidad de regímenes. Se parte de que el constituyente pretendió un mínimo de protección a los trabajadores, dejando la puerta abierta para que en un futuro se regulara sobre nuevos sistemas de serguridad social, que es el fruto de un proceso histórico en el que la situación actual es consecuencia de acciones o deficiencias dadas en el pasado y, a su vez, es origen de las acciones que se darán en el futuro. La seguridad social, esto es, el sistema público de cobertura de necesidades sociales, individuales y de naturaleza económica desarrollado a partir de la acción histórica de la previsión social, estructurada en nuestro país sobre la base de las pensiones y jubilaciones, de la mano de la intervención tutelar del Estado en el ámbito de las relaciones de trabajo, ha llegado a convertirse con el tiempo, sin la menor reserva, en una de las señas de identidad principales del Estado social o de bienestar. Por ello, no puede extrañar que en el índice o agenda de las cuestiones esenciales que impregnan la política social del Estado moderno, en lo que se refiere a los seguros, se encuentren diferentes regímenes de jubilaciones y pensiones. Al existir diferentes regímenes, es lógico que cada uno tenga sus propias reglas y criterios legales para el otorgamiento del derecho constitucional a la jubilación y a la pensión, sin que por ello pueda siquiera pensarse que tal coexistencia sea inconstitucional..." Quiere todo lo anterior decir, que no es inconstitucional que existan regímenes jubilatorios diversos, a reserva que se cumplan ciertos requisitos esenciales, como la repartición de las cargas en igualdad de condiciones, aspecto que no se cuestiona en esta acción. Pero como lo ha dicho la Sala en la anterior transcripción resaltada, "es lógico que cada uno (de los regímenes) tenga sus propias reglas y criterios legales para el otorgamiento del derecho constitucional a la jubilación". Esto es, que la especialidad de las normas, que tengan como objeto garantizar la existencia misma del régimen, no tienen que ser necesariamente idénticas en esa variedad de regímenes que pueden existir.” Posición reiterada, luego, en la sentencia No. 2013-014400 de las 15 hrs. del 30 de octubre de 2013. De esta forma, tras analizar la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional, se constata que la existencia de diversos regímenes de pensiones –incluido, específicamente, el régimen de pensiones y jubilaciones del Poder Judicial-, con su normativa especial –en procura de garantizar la existencia misma del régimen, así como su propia administración-, no supone una violación a los artículos constitucionales citados por el accionante, ni –en general- al Derecho de la Constitución. Como ya se indicó, si “el fin primordial del constituyente fue mantener los seguros sociales para fortalecer la seguridad social, no hay razón para cuestionar la pluralidad de regímenes”.

V.- CONCLUSIÓN. Como corolario de lo expuesto, se impone el rechazo por el fondo de la acción, como así se dispone.

VI.- DOCUMENTACIÓN APORTADA AL EXPEDIENTE. Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, éstos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza por el fondo la acción.

Fernando Castillo V.

Presidente a.i.

Paul Rueda L.

Nancy Hernández L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

Marta E. Esquivel R.

Alejandro Delgado F.