Unconstitutionality action against articles 13, 14, 16 and 17 of AyA Services and Easements RegulationAcción de inconstitucionalidad contra artículos 13, 14, 16 y 17 del Reglamento de Servicios y Servidumbres del AyA

*200037950007CO* Res. Nº 2020004969 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine twenty-five hours on March eleventh, two thousand twenty.

Action of unconstitutionality brought by [Nombre 001], older adult, pensioner, resident of San Pablo de Heredia, identity card No. [Valor 001], against Articles 13, 14, 16 and 17 of the Reglamento para la Prestación de los Servicios de Acueductos y Alcantarillados y el Reglamento para la Constitución e Inscripción de Servidumbre de Acueducto y/o Alcantarillado y de paso a favor del AyA para otorgamiento de servicios.

Resultando:

1.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 13:01 hours on February 26, 2020, the claimant requests that Articles 13, 14, 16 and 17 of the Reglamento para la Prestación de los Servicios de Acueductos y Alcantarillados y el Reglamento para la Constitución e Inscripción de Servidumbre de Acueducto y/o Alcantarillado y de paso a favor del AyA para otorgamiento de servicios be declared unconstitutional. She alleges, to this effect, that she is the owner of the property in the Heredia registration district, real folio number 246506-000. She adds that she filed a request for water service before the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados and was told that water was available, but in order to provide the service she had to remove the gate located at the beginning of an easement (servidumbre) that encumbers her property and is established in favor of said institution. She asserts that the establishment of such easement (servidumbre) is based on the regulations challenged in the present action. She argues that the free exercise and disposition of her property is being limited by a regulation that is imposing an encumbrance (gravamen) on her. She considers that this infringes the right to property and the principle of legal reserve (principio de reserva de ley). She alleges that she is an older adult, and therefore her right to a dignified life must be guaranteed. She maintains that the decision by the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, insofar as it conditions the provision of the service on the removal of the gate, infringes her right as an older adult to adequate housing, health, and security. The foregoing, based on a regulation that imposes a limitation on property through the establishment of an easement (servidumbre), in violation—as she already indicated—of the right to property and the principle of legal reserve (principio de reserva de ley). She considers that Articles 11, 28, 45 and 140, subsections 3) and 18), of the Political Constitution are infringed, insofar as a limitation on the fundamental right to full use and enjoyment of private property was imposed by a regulation, which is only possible by law. She believes that Article XXIII of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights have also been violated. She adds, furthermore, that in this case there is a directly affected person who is an older adult, and therefore Article 51 of the Constitution is also infringed.

2.- In order to substantiate the standing (legitimación) they hold to bring this action of unconstitutionality, the claimant alleges that the appeal filed against the certificate of availability of aqueduct and sewerage services No. SIGDD-2020-00019522-1-2-1, the water request No. P11112020020007, and official letter No. SG-GSGAM-2020-00245, filed on February 21, 2020, is pending resolution before the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados. She affirms that, therefore, she has standing (legitimación) under Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional to appear before this Chamber in defense of the right to property and the principle of legal reserve (principio de reserva de ley). She maintains that, in this case, she also has standing (legitimación) based on the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, given that there is harm to the community as a whole.

3.- By resolution at 10:38 hours on February 27, 2020, the claimant was warned that “within the period of THREE DAYS, counted from the day following the notification of this resolution and under warning of denying the processing of the action in the event of non-compliance, she must provide a literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged regulations was invoked in the underlying matter, prior to the filing of this action, as well as certify the procedural status in which such matter finds itself. The foregoing, in accordance with Articles 75, 79 and 80 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.” 4.- By means of a brief received in this Chamber on February 3, 2020, the claimant indicates that she is providing the administrative file corresponding to the underlying matter. She reiterates that, to date, the file is under appeal from the denial of the water service.

5.- Article 9 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition submitted for its consideration that proves to be manifestly inadmissible, or when it considers there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it involves the simple reiteration or reproduction of a previously rejected identical or similar petition.

Drafted by Judge Castillo Víquez; and,

Considerando:

I.- ON THE STANDING (LEGITIMACIÓN) REQUIREMENTS FOR FILING THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the action of unconstitutionality is a process with certain formalities, which, if not met, prevent this Court from ruling on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regulates standing (legitimación) to file actions of unconstitutionality and provides for different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in a judicial forum—including habeas corpus or amparo appeals—or in an administrative forum—in the procedure for exhausting this avenue—, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action—the underlying matter is not required—in the following cases: a) when by the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury; b) it involves the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República and the Defensor de los Habitantes. In judgment No. 04190-95 of 11:33 hours on July 28, 1995, this Court specified that the action of unconstitutionality is:

“(…) a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, meaning that the existence of a matter pending resolution—either before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative avenue—is required in order to access the constitutional avenue, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on that pending process, insofar as it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in that matter; and only by exception does the legislation allow direct access to this avenue—requirements of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional …”.

In accordance with the foregoing, this Chamber has indicated that “the action process is, principally, of an incidental nature, and therefore a matter pending resolution in the administrative avenue—in the administrative challenge procedure against the final act—or judicial avenue is required for the action to proceed. Thus, only in exceptional cases established by law will this requirement not be necessary” (judgment No. 2018-018560 of 9:20 hours on November 7, 2018). It has also clarified that “the cases contained in paragraph 2 of Article 75 constitute an exception to the rule established in paragraph 1 (incidental avenue) that must be carefully assessed” (judgment No. 2018-008413 of 9:20 hours on May 30, 2018).

II.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE PRESENT ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY DUE TO LACK OF INVOCATION IN THE UNDERLYING MATTER. As indicated, Article 75, first paragraph, in fine, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional presupposes, for the purposes of the admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality, in the case of concrete or incidental review, the existence of a main matter pending resolution, either before the courts—including habeas corpus or amparo—or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative avenue, in which such unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. Such requirements are not merely a formal matter, as simple compliance is not enough; rather, it is also required that the norm challenged through this avenue have a direct impact on the matter serving as a basis, so that what is resolved in the action serves as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest injured in the prior matter. A contrario sensu, if there is no direct connection between the object of discussion in the underlying matter and what is challenged in the action, it is not possible for this Chamber to rule on it. It is for this reason that, in accordance with Articles 75 and 79 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, the claimants must certify and provide a literal certification of the brief in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the norms in the underlying matter, in order to verify their impact on that matter. Regarding the requirements that said invocation brief must meet, this Chamber has repeatedly indicated that:

“(…) although an extensive substantiation is not required in the invocation of unconstitutionality of the norm, the truth is that it is necessary that in the underlying matter the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action be expressly invoked... and the constitutional norms considered infringed be indicated…”. (Judgment No. 2014-000851 of 14:30 hrs. on January 22, 2014).” (Judgment No. 2017-007744 of 9:15 hours on May 24, 2017).

Likewise, this Court has resolved that the invocation of unconstitutionality must be made in the underlying matter prior to the filing of the action (see, for example, vote No. 2016-009868 of 9:20 hours on July 13, 2016).

In the sub judice, the claimant was expressly warned that she had to “provide a literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged regulations was invoked in the underlying matter, prior to the filing of this action.” Although the claimant submitted a brief in response to such warning, the truth is that she made no mention whatsoever of the existence of such an invocation brief. What she did, according to her own statement, was to provide a certified copy of the file that would correspond to the underlying matter, but from reading it, it cannot be verified that the unconstitutionality of the challenged regulations was invoked at any time. By virtue of the foregoing, the requirement provided for in the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional is not met.

III.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION DUE TO THE CLAIMANT'S LACK OF DIRECT STANDING (LEGITIMACIÓN). The claimant also alleges that she has standing (legitimación) to file the present action based on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, given that there is “harm to the community as a whole.” However, the claimant does not substantiate or justify why she believes that such a standing (legitimación) requirement would be met in this particular case. In any case, it should be noted that the Chamber has specified—in various votes—that, through the expression “interests that concern the community as a whole,” contained in the aforementioned Article 75, second paragraph, the “legislator sought to refer to the standing (legitimación) held by a corporate entity, when it acts through its representatives in defense of the rights and interests of the persons that make up its associative base, provided that it involves the questioning of norms or provisions that affect that core of rights or interests that constitutes the raison d'être and the cohesive factor of the group” (judgment No. 2014-20446 of 09:30 hours on December 17, 2014). A hypothesis that is not realized in the case under study, as the claimant does not demonstrate that she holds the formal representation of a corporate entity as described.

Nor can it be considered that we are in the presence of any of the other direct standing (legitimación) requirements provided in Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. It cannot be considered that, in this case, there is no individual or direct injury, because, in the sub lite, the claimant herself repeatedly alleges that the challenged regulations cause her an individual and direct harm, arguing that based on them a limitation has been imposed on her private property, in violation of her fundamental rights. Nor can it be considered that this is a case of defending diffuse interests. This Chamber has been specifying in its case law the scope and content of diffuse interests and has indicated that:

“Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and even more difficult to identify, cannot be in our Law—as this Chamber has already stated—merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that determined persons or personalized groups, whose standing would derive not from diffuse interests but from corporate interests or those that concern a community as a whole, are identified or easily identifiable in relation to them. It involves, then, individual interests, but, at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive a benefit or a detriment, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, which is why it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the groups of people who find themselves in certain situations and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, since they are at once collective—being common to a generality—and individual, and thus can be claimed in such capacity.” (judgment No. 3705-93 of 15 hours on July 30, 1993; the emphasis does not correspond to the original) Likewise, in judgment No. 2007-02958 of 9:23 hours on March 02, 2007, this Court added:

“In relation to diffuse interests, which is the standing (legitimación) alleged by the claimant, this Court has said that it involves that personal interest related to a right or legal situation of a special and particular nature, which may be shared by other persons, all those interested forming a determined group or category. Thus, the violation of that right may affect everyone in general and/or each one in particular, hence any member of that group may file the action to protect the right considered injured. The interest, in these cases, is diffused, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. Judgment number 03705-93, of 15:00 hours on July 30, 1993, illustrates what has been understood as diffuse interests; as does judgment 360-99 of 15:51 hours on January 20, 1999:

"It has been pointed out that it is a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of the collective interest just defined in the preceding recital (considerando), but which cannot become so broad and generic that it is confused with the right recognized to all members of society to ensure constitutional legality, since the latter—as has been repeatedly stated—is excluded from the current system of constitutional review. It is therefore an interest distributed among each of the administered, mediate if you will, and diluted, but no less verifiable for that reason, for the defense, in this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. It is the special characteristics of these rights themselves and not the particular situation of the subjects who may hold them that is the key to distinguishing and determining the presence of so-called diffuse interests as manifested in various resolutions such as 03705-93 of fifteen hours on July thirty for the right to the environment, number 05753-93 of fourteen forty-five on November nine of that same year for the defense of historical heritage, and number 00980-91 of thirteen thirty on May twenty-fourth of nineteen ninety-one for electoral matters." In this sense, although that interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality (which would imply the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), neither can it be so concrete as to allow an individual claim, since in such a case, standing (legitimación) would derive from the latter. Examples of such interests are the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, the defense of historical heritage, electoral matters, the defense of the right to health, and the oversight of public funds.” (the emphasis does not correspond to the original) In which case, it is clear that in the present matter, action is being taken to safeguard a notoriously individual interest, clearly circumscribed to those specific owners, as would be the singular case of the claimant, to whom the questioned regulations are particularly applicable. Given the content of the challenged regulations and the claimant's main objections—related, directly or indirectly, to an alleged violation of the right to property—it is patent that the regulations in question could give rise—as already indicated—to individual harms capable of generating concrete claims, regarding a limited group of persons who are easily determinable and identifiable. Therefore, it cannot be considered that the sub judice involves a case of defending diffuse interests.

IV.- IN CONCLUSION. As a corollary of the foregoing, it is appropriate to reject the action outright, as is hereby ordered.

V.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE FILE. The parties are warned that if any paper document, object, or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic, or new-technology-produced device has been provided, it must be retrieved from the office within a maximum period of 30 working days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, any material not retrieved within this period will be destroyed, pursuant to the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", approved by the Corte Plena in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

Por tanto:

The action is rejected outright.

Fernando Castillo V.

Fernando Cruz C.

Paul Rueda L.

Nancy Hernández L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

Anamari Garro V.

Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador -- *AUWPORVR43D461* Requests that the appeal be granted, the challenged norm be annulled, and the respondent authority be ordered to provide her with potable water service, without imposing as a condition that the access gate to the easement (servidumbre) be removed.

**2.-** In order to substantiate the legal standing (legitimación) they hold to bring this action of unconstitutionality, the plaintiff alleges that an appeal filed against the certificate of availability of water and sewer services No. SIGDD-2020-00019522-1-2-1, the water application No. P11112020020007, and official letter No. SG-GSGAM-2020-00245, filed on February 21, 2020, is pending resolution before the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados. She affirms that, therefore, she has legal standing (legitimación) under Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional to appear before this Chamber in defense of the right to property and the principle of legal reserve. She maintains that, in this case, she also has legal standing (legitimación) based on the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, inasmuch as there is harm to the community as a whole.

**3.-** By ruling at 10:38 on February 27, 2020, the plaintiff was warned that "*within a period of THREE DAYS, counted from the day following notification of this ruling and under penalty of having the action dismissed in case of non-compliance, she must provide a literal certification of the pleading in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged regulations was invoked in the underlying proceeding, prior to the filing of this action, as well as prove the procedural status of said proceeding. The foregoing, in accordance with Articles 75, 79, and 80 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.*" **4.-** By means of a brief received by this Chamber on February 3, 2020, the plaintiff indicates that she is providing the administrative file corresponding to the underlying proceeding. She reiterates that, to date, the file is under appeal of the denial of the water service.

**5.-** Article 9 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional empowers the Chamber to reject summarily or on the merits, at any time, including from its presentation, any petition brought to its attention that proves to be manifestly inadmissible, or when it considers there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a simple reiteration or reproduction of a previous, identical or similar petition that was rejected.

Drafted by Magistrate Castillo Víquez; and, **Considering:** **I.- ON THE ASSUMPTIONS OF LEGAL STANDING (LEGITIMACIÓN) FOR FILING THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.** This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the action of unconstitutionality is a process with specific formalities which, if not met, make it impossible for this Court to rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regulates legal standing (legitimación) for filing actions of unconstitutionality and provides for different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in a judicial forum—including habeas corpus or amparo appeals—or in an administrative forum—in the procedure for exhausting this remedy—, in which the unconstitutionality of the questioned norm is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest deemed injured in the main proceeding. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action—which does not require an underlying proceeding—in the following cases: a) when due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury; b) it involves the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los Habitantes. In judgment No. 04190-95 at 11:33 on July 28, 1995, this Court specified that the action of unconstitutionality is:

"(...) *a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, meaning that the existence of a matter pending resolution—whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative remedy—is required in order to access the constitutional jurisdiction, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right deemed injured in the main proceeding, so that the resolution of the Constitutional Court positively or negatively impacts said pending proceeding, as it manifests on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter; and only by exception does the legislation permit direct access to this jurisdiction—as provided in the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional* ...".

In line with the foregoing, this Chamber has indicated that "*the action process is, primarily, of an incidental nature, therefore, a matter pending resolution in the administrative forum—in the administrative procedure of appeal against the final act—or judicial forum is required for the action to succeed. Thus, only in exceptional cases established by law will the existence of that requirement not be necessary*" (judgment No. 2018-018560 at 9:20 on November 7, 2018). It has also clarified that "*the cases contained in the 2nd paragraph of Article 75 constitute an exception to the rule established in the 1st paragraph (incidental means) which must be carefully assessed*" (judgment No. 2018-008413 at 9:20 on May 30, 2018).

**II.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY DUE TO LACK OF INVOCATION IN THE UNDERLYING PROCEEDING.** As indicated, Article 75, first paragraph, *in fine*, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional presupposes, for the purposes of admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality, in the case of concrete or incidental review, the existence of a main matter pending resolution, whether before the courts—including habeas corpus or amparo—or in the procedure for exhausting the administrative remedy, in which such unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest deemed injured. Such requirements do not translate into a merely formal issue, as mere compliance with them is not sufficient; rather, it is also required that the norm challenged through this means has a direct impact on the matter serving as the basis, such that the resolution in the action serves as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest injured within the prior proceeding. *A contrario sensu*, if there is no direct connection between the object of discussion in the underlying proceeding and what is challenged in the action, it is not possible for this Chamber to rule on the matter. It is for this reason that, in accordance with Articles 75 and 79 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, the plaintiffs must prove and provide literal certification of the pleading in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the norms in the underlying proceeding, in order to verify its impact on said proceeding. Regarding the requirements that the cited invocation pleading must meet, this Chamber has repeatedly indicated that:

"(...) *although the invocation of unconstitutionality of the norm does not require an extensive legal argument, the truth is that it is necessary that in the underlying proceeding, the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action is expressly invoked... and the constitutional norms considered infringed are indicated...*". (Judgment No. 2014-000851 at 14:30 on January 22, 2014)." (Judgment No. 2017-007744 at 9:15 on May 24, 2017).

Likewise, this Court has resolved that the invocation of unconstitutionality must be made in the underlying proceeding prior to the filing of the action (see, for example, voto No. 2016-009868 at 9:20 on July 13, 2016).

In the *sub judice* case, the plaintiff was expressly warned that she had to "*provide literal certification of the pleading in which she invoked in the underlying proceeding, prior to the filing of this action, the unconstitutionality of the challenged regulations*". Although the plaintiff submitted a brief in response to such warning, the truth is that she made no mention whatsoever of the existence of such an invocation pleading. What she did, according to her own statement, was to provide a certified copy of the file that would correspond to the underlying proceeding, but from reading it, it cannot be verified that the unconstitutionality of the challenged regulations was invoked at any time. By virtue of the foregoing, the requirement provided for in the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional is not met.

**III.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION DUE TO LACK OF DIRECT LEGAL STANDING (LEGITIMACIÓN) OF THE PLAINTIFF.** The plaintiff also alleges that she has legal standing (legitimación) to file this action based on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, as there is "*harm to the community as a whole*". However, the plaintiff does not substantiate or justify why she believes that in this particular case such an assumption of legal standing (legitimación) would be configured. In any case, it should be noted that the Chamber has specified—in various rulings—that through the expression "*interests that concern the community as a whole*", contained in the cited Article 75, second paragraph, the "*legislator wished to refer to the legal standing (legitimación) held by a corporate entity, when it acts through its representatives in defense of the rights and interests of the people who make up its associative base, and provided it involves the questioning of norms or provisions that affect that core of rights or interests that constitutes the reason for being and the binding factor of the group*" (judgment No. 2014-20446 at 09:30 on December 17, 2014). A hypothesis that does not materialize in the case under study, insofar as the plaintiff does not prove she holds the formal representation of a corporate entity as described.

Nor can it be considered that any of the other assumptions of direct legal standing (legitimación) provided for in Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional are present. It cannot be considered that, in this specific case, there is no individual or direct injury, inasmuch as, in the *sub lite* matter, the plaintiff herself repeatedly alleges that the challenged regulations cause her individual and direct harm, while she argues that based on them, a limitation has been imposed on her private property, in violation of her fundamental rights. Nor can it be considered that this is a case of defense of diffuse interests. This Chamber has been clarifying in its jurisprudence the scope and content of diffuse interests and has indicated that:

"*Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our Law—as this Chamber has already stated—merely collective interests;* ***nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that identified or easily identifiable specific persons****, or personalized groups, can be determined against them, whose legal standing (legitimación) would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones or those that concern a community as a whole. It concerns, then, individual interests, but, at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive a benefit or harm, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, so it is rightly said that these are equal interests of the groups of people who find themselves in certain situations and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, since they are simultaneously collective—being common to a generality—and individual, which is why they can be claimed in such capacity.*" (Judgment No. 3705-93 at 15:00 on July 30, 1993; the emphasis does not correspond to the original) Likewise, in judgment No. 2007-02958 at 9:23 on March 2, 2007, this Court added:

"*Regarding diffuse interests, which is the legal standing (legitimación) alleged by the plaintiff, this Court has stated that it concerns that personal interest related to a right or legal situation of a special and particular nature, which may be shared by other persons, with all the interested parties forming a specific group or category. Thus, the violation of that right can affect everyone in general and/or each one in particular, hence any member of that group can file the action to protect the right deemed injured. The interest, in these cases, is dissipated, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. Judgment number 03705-93, at 15:00 on July 30, 1993, illustrates what has been understood as diffuse interests; as does judgment 360-99 at 15:51 on January 20, 1999:* "*It has been pointed out that it concerns a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of the collective interest just defined in the preceding considering clause,* ***but which cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with that recognized for all members of society to watch over constitutional legality, since the latter—as has been repeatedly stated—is excluded from the current system of constitutional review***. *It concerns, then, an interest distributed among each of the administered, mediate if you will, and diluted, but no less verifiable for that, for the defense, in this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. The special characteristics of these rights in themselves, and not the particular situation of the subjects who may hold them in respect thereof, are the key to the distinction and determination of the presence of so-called diffuse interests, as stated in various decisions such as 03705-93 at fifteen hours on July thirtieth for the right to the environment, number 05753-93 at fourteen hours forty-five on November ninth of that same year for the defense of historical patrimony, and number 00980-91 at thirteen hours thirty on May twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-one for electoral matters.*" ***In this sense, although that interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to watch over constitutional legality (which would imply the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), it also cannot be so concrete that it allows for individual claim, because in such case, legal standing (legitimación) would derive from the latter***. *Examples of such interests are the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, the defense of historical patrimony, electoral matters, the defense of the right to health, and the oversight of public funds.*" (the emphasis does not correspond to the original) In which case, it is clear that in the present matter, action is being taken in protection of a notoriously individual interest, clearly circumscribed to those specific owners, as would be the singular case of the plaintiff, to whom the questioned regulations are of particular application. By reason of the content of the challenged regulations and the main complaints of the plaintiff—related, directly or indirectly, to an alleged infringement of property rights—it is patent that the regulations in question could give rise—as already indicated—to individual impacts susceptible to generating specific claims, regarding a limited group of easily determinable and identifiable persons. Therefore, it cannot be considered that in the *sub judice* case, there is a case of defense of diffuse interests.

**IV.- IN CONCLUSION.** As a corollary of the foregoing, it is appropriate to reject the action summarily, as hereby ordered.

**V.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE FILE.** The parties are warned that if any paper document has been provided, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment.

Otherwise, any material not removed within this period shall be destroyed, as provided in the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial," approved by the Corte Plena in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

Por tanto:

The action is rejected on its face.

| Fernando Castillo V.

| | | | | | | | Fernando Cruz C. | | |

| Nancy Hernández L. | | | | | | | | Luis Fdo.

**Document Digitally Signed** **-- Verification Code --** *AUWPORVR43D461* **EXPEDIENTE N° 20-003795-0007-CO** Telephones: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2295-3712 / 2549-1633. Email: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Sabana Sur, Calle Morenos, 100 mts. South of the Perpetuo Socorro church). Reception of matters from vulnerable groups: Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6.

\*200037950007CO\* **Exp: 20-003795-0007-CO** **Res. N° 2020004969** **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine twenty-five on the eleventh of March, two thousand twenty.** An unconstitutionality action brought by [Name 001], an older adult, pensioner, resident of San Pablo de Heredia, identity card No. [Value 001], against Articles 13, 14, 16, and 17 of the *Reglamento para la Prestación de los Servicios de Acueductos y Alcantarillados* and the *Reglamento para la Constitución e Inscripción de Servidumbre de Acueducto y/o Alcantarillado y de paso a favor del AyA para otorgamiento de servicios*.

**Resultando:** **1.-** By written submission received at the Chamber's Secretariat at 1:01 p.m. on February 26, 2020, the plaintiff requests that Articles 13, 14, 16, and 17 of the *Reglamento para la Prestación de los Servicios de Acueductos y Alcantarillados* and the *Reglamento para la Constitución e Inscripción de Servidumbre de Acueducto y/o Alcantarillado y de paso a favor del AyA para otorgamiento de servicios* be declared unconstitutional. She alleges, to that effect, that she is the owner of the property in the Heredia district with real folio number 246506-000. She adds that she submitted a request for water service to the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados and was told that water availability existed, but in order to provide the service, she had to remove the gate located at the start of an easement (servidumbre) that burdens her property and is constituted in favor of said institution. She asserts that the constitution of such easement (servidumbre) is based on the regulations challenged in this action. She argues that the free exercise and disposition of her property is being limited through a regulation that is imposing a lien (gravamen) on her. She believes this violates the right to property and the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley). She alleges that she is an older adult, and therefore, her right to a dignified life must be guaranteed. She argues that what was decided by the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, by conditioning the provision of the service on her removing the gate, violates her right as an older adult to optimal housing, health, and security. The foregoing, based on a regulation that imposes a limitation on property through the constitution of an easement (servidumbre), in violation—as already indicated—of the right to property and the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley). She considers Articles 11, 28, 45, and 140, subsections 3) and 18), of the Political Constitution to have been violated, in that a limitation on the fundamental right to the full use and enjoyment of private property was imposed by means of a regulation, something only possible by law. She also believes that Articles XXIII of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights have been violated. She further adds that in this case, there is a directly affected party who is an older adult, such that Article 51 of the Constitution is also violated. She requests that the appeal be granted, the challenged norm be annulled, and the respondent authority be ordered to grant her potable water service, without imposing as a condition that she remove the access gate to the easement (servidumbre).

**2.-** In order to substantiate the standing (legitimación) she holds to bring this unconstitutionality action, the plaintiff alleges that the appeal filed against the water service availability certificate (constancia de disponibilidad de servicios de acueductos y alcantarillados) No. SIGDD-2020-00019522-1-2-1, water request No. P11112020020007, and official letter No. SG-GSGAM-2020-00245, filed on February 21, 2020, is pending resolution before the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados. She affirms that, therefore, she is granted standing by Article 75 of the *Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional* to come before this Chamber in defense of the right to property and the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley). She argues that, in this case, she is also granted standing based on the second paragraph of Article 75 of the *Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional*, since there is harm to the community as a whole.

**3.-** By resolution at 10:38 a.m. on February 27, 2020, the plaintiff was warned that "*within a period of THREE DAYS, counted from the day following the notification of this resolution and under warning of denying the processing of the action in case of non-compliance, she must provide a literal certification of the writing in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms was invoked in the underlying matter, prior to the filing of this action, as well as certify the procedural status of that matter. The foregoing, in accordance with Articles 75, 79, and 80 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.*" **4.-** By written submission received at this Chamber on February 3, 2020, the plaintiff indicates that she provides the administrative file corresponding to the underlying matter. She reiterates that, as of that date, the file is under appeal regarding the denial of water service.

**5.-** Article 9 of the *Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional* empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its submission, any petition brought to its attention that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers there are sufficient grounds for judgment to reject it, or that it is a simple reiteration or reproduction of a prior, equal, or similar rejected petition.

Drafted by Magistrate **Castillo Víquez**; and, **Considerando:** **I.- ON THE STANDING (LEGITIMACIÓN) REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FILING OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTION.** This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the unconstitutionality action is a process with certain formalities, which, if not met, make it impossible for this Court to rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the *Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional* regulates standing (legitimación) to file unconstitutionality actions and provides for different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in a judicial venue—including habeas corpus or amparo appeals—or in the administrative venue—in the procedure for exhausting this channel—in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action—the underlying matter is not required—in the following cases: a) when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm; b) it involves the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los Habitantes. In judgment No. 04190-95 at 11:33 a.m. on July 28, 1995, this Court clarified that the unconstitutionality action is:

"(…) *a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a matter pending resolution—whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative channel—is required to be able to access the constitutional channel, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered harmed in the main matter, so that what is decided by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on that process pending resolution, insofar as it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in that matter; and only exceptionally does the legislation allow direct access to this channel—circumstances of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional* …".

In line with the foregoing, this Chamber has indicated that "*the action process is, mainly, of an incidental nature, so a matter pending resolution in the administrative channel—in the administrative challenge procedure against the final act—or judicial channel is required for the action to succeed. Thus, only in exceptional cases established by law will the existence of that requirement not be necessary*" (judgment No. 2018-018560 at 9:20 a.m. on November 7, 2018). It has also clarified that "*the circumstances contained in paragraph 2 of Article 75 constitute an exception to the rule established in paragraph 1 (incidental channel) that must be carefully assessed*" (judgment No. 2018-008413 at 9:20 a.m. on May 30, 2018).

**II.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTION DUE TO LACK OF INVOCATION IN THE UNDERLYING MATTER.** As indicated, Article 75, first paragraph, *in fine*, of the *Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional* presupposes, for the purposes of the admissibility of an unconstitutionality action, in the case of concrete or incidental review, the existence of a main matter pending resolution, whether before the courts—including habeas corpus or amparo—or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative channel, in which that unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed. Such requirements do not translate into a merely formal issue, as the simple fulfillment of them is insufficient; it is also required that the norm challenged through this channel have a direct impact on the matter serving as a basis, such that what is decided in the action serves as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest harmed within the prior matter. *A contrario sensu*, if there is no direct connection between the object of discussion in the underlying matter and what is challenged in the action, it is not possible for this Chamber to rule on it. It is for this reason that, in accordance with Articles 75 and 79 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, plaintiffs must certify and provide a literal certification of the writing in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the norms in the underlying matter, in order to verify its impact on that matter. Regarding the requirements that the cited invocation writing must meet, this Chamber has repeatedly indicated that:

"(…)*although an extensive substantiation is not required in the invocation of the unconstitutionality of the norm, it is true that it is necessary that the underlying matter expressly invoke the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action... and indicate the constitutional norms considered infringed*…". (Judgment No. 2014-000851 at 2:30 p.m. on January 22, 2014)." (Judgment No. 2017-007744 at 9:15 a.m. on May 24, 2017).

Furthermore, this Court has ruled that the invocation of unconstitutionality must be made in the underlying matter prior to the filing of the action (see, for example, Voto No. 2016-009868 at 9:20 a.m. on July 13, 2016).

In the *sub judice* case, the plaintiff was expressly warned that they had to “provide a literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged regulations was invoked in the underlying matter, prior to the filing of this action.” Although the plaintiff submitted a brief in response to that warning, the truth is that they made no mention whatsoever of the existence of such an invocation brief. What they did, according to their own statement, was to provide a certified copy of the file that would correspond to the underlying matter, but from reading it, it cannot be verified that the unconstitutionality of the challenged regulations was invoked at any time. By virtue of the foregoing, the requirement set forth in the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction is not fulfilled.

**III.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION DUE TO THE PLAINTIFF'S LACK OF DIRECT STANDING.** The plaintiff also alleges that they have standing to file this action based on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction, due to the existence of “damage to the community as a whole.” However, the plaintiff does not substantiate or justify why they believe that such a standing assumption is configured in this particular case. In any case, it is worth noting that the Chamber has specified –in various rulings– that, through the expression “interests that concern the community as a whole,” contained in the cited Article 75, second paragraph, the “legislator intended to refer to the standing held by a corporate entity, when it acts through its representatives in defense of the rights and interests of the people who make up its associative base, provided that it involves the challenge of norms or provisions that affect that core of rights or interests that constitutes the group's reason for being and unifying factor” (judgment No. 2014-20446 of 09:30 hours on December 17, 2014). This hypothesis is not realized in the case under study, as the plaintiff does not prove that they hold the formal representation of a corporate entity as described.

Nor can it be considered that any of the other direct standing assumptions provided for in Article 75, second paragraph, of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction are present. It cannot be considered that, in this instance, no individual or direct injury exists, because, in the *sub lite* case, the plaintiff repeatedly alleges that the challenged regulations cause them individual and direct harm, given that they argue that based on these regulations, a limitation has been imposed on their private property, in violation of their fundamental rights. Nor can it be considered that this is a case of defending diffuse interests. This Chamber has been specifying in its jurisprudence the scope and content of diffuse interests and has indicated that:

“Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our Law –as this Chamber has already stated– merely collective interests; **nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that specific or easily identifiable determined persons accrue from them**, or personalized groups, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate interests or those that concern a community in its entirety. It is, then, a matter of individual interests, but, at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive a benefit or a detriment, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, so it is rightly said that these are equal interests of the groups of people who find themselves in certain situations and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, since they are at once collective –because they are common to a general group– and individual, so they can be claimed in that capacity.” (judgment No. 3705-93 of 15:00 hours on July 30, 1993; emphasis not in original) Likewise, in judgment No. 2007-02958 of 9:23 hours on March 2, 2007, this Tribunal added:

“In relation to diffuse interests, which is the standing adduced by the plaintiff, this Tribunal has stated that it is that personal interest related to a right or legal situation of a special and particular nature, which may be shared by other persons, all the interested parties forming a specific group or category. Thus, the violation of that right can affect everyone in general and/or each one in particular, hence any member of that group can file the action to protect the right considered injured. The interest, in these cases, is spread out, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. Judgment number 03705-93, of 15:00 hours on July 30, 1993, illustrates what has been understood as diffuse interests; as does judgment 360-99 of 15:51 hours on January 20, 1999:

"It has been pointed out that it is a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of the collective interest just defined in the preceding recital, **but which cannot become so broad and generic that it is confused with the right recognized to all members of society to ensure constitutional legality, since the latter -as has been repeatedly stated- is excluded from the current system of constitutional review**. It is, therefore, an interest distributed in each of the administered parties, mediate if you will, and diluted, but no less verifiable for that, for the defense, in this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance to the adequate and harmonious development of society. It is the special characteristics of these rights in themselves and not the particular situation of the subjects who may hold them, the key to distinguishing and determining the presence of the so-called diffuse interests, as stated in various resolutions such as 03705-93 of fifteen hours on July thirty for the right to the environment, number 05753-93 of fourteen hours forty-five on November nine of that same year for the defense of historical heritage, and number 00980-91 of thirteen thirty on May twenty-four, nineteen ninety-one, for electoral matters." **In this sense, while that interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality (which would entail the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction), neither can it be so concrete that it allows an individual claim, for in such a case, standing would derive from the latter**. Examples of such interests are the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, the defense of historical heritage, electoral matters, the defense of the right to health, and the oversight of public funds.” (emphasis not in original) In which case, it is clear that in the present matter, action is being taken in protection of a notoriously individual interest, clearly circumscribed to those specific owners, such as the singular case of the plaintiff, to whom the questioned regulations are particularly applicable. Due to the content of the challenged decrees and the plaintiff's main objections –related, directly or indirectly, to an alleged violation of the right to property– it is evident that the regulations in question could give rise –as already indicated– to individual harms capable of generating concrete claims, concerning a limited group of easily determinable and identifiable persons. Therefore, it cannot be considered that the *sub judice* case involves an assumption of the defense of diffuse interests.

**IV.- IN CONCLUSION.** As a corollary of the foregoing, it is appropriate to summarily dismiss the action, as so ordered.

**V.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE FILE.** The parties are warned that if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 working days counted from the notification of this judgment.

Otherwise, any material not removed within this period will be destroyed, pursuant to the provisions of the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", approved by the Corte Plena in session N° 27-11 on August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 on January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session N° 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

Therefore:

The action is summarily dismissed.

| | <img src="" align="middle" width="162" height="73" border="0" alt="graphic"/> Fernando Castillo V. Presidente | | | <img src="" align="middle" width="163" height="73" border="0" alt="graphic"/> Fernando Cruz C. | | | <img 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align="middle" width="162" height="73" border="0" alt="graphic"/> Paul Rueda L. | | | <img 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align="middle" width="162" height="73" border="0" alt="graphic"/> Nancy Hernández L. | | | | | <img 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" align="middle" width="162" height="73" border="0" alt="graphic"/> Luis Fdo. | Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

&nbsp; Anamari Garro V.

Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador -- *AUWPORVR43D461*

*200037950007CO* Res. Nº 2020004969 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas veinticinco minutos del once de marzo de dos mil veinte .

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por [Nombre 001], adulta mayor, pensionada, vecina de San Pablo de Heredia, cédula de identidad No. [Valor 001] , contra los artículos 13, 14, 16 y 17 del Reglamento para la Prestación de los Servicios de Acueductos y Alcantarillados y el Reglamento para la Constitución e Inscripción de Servidumbre de Acueducto y/o Alcantarillado y de paso a favor del AyA para otorgamiento de servicios.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 13:01 horas del 26 de febrero de 2020, la accionante solicita se declaren inconstitucionales los artículos 13, 14, 16 y 17 del Reglamento para la Prestación de los Servicios de Acueductos y Alcantarillados y el Reglamento para la Constitución e Inscripción de Servidumbre de Acueducto y/o Alcantarillado y de paso a favor del AyA para otorgamiento de servicios. Alega, al efecto, que es propietaria de la finca del partido de Heredia número de folio real 246506-000. Añade que formuló solicitud de servicio de agua ante el Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados y se le contestó que existía disponibilidad de agua, pero para poder brindar el servicio debía retirar el portón que se encuentra al inicio de una servidumbre que pese sobre su propiedad y que está constituida a favor de dicha institución. Asevera que la constitución de tal servidumbre tiene sustento en la reglamentación impugnada en la presente acción. Argumenta que se está limitando el libre ejercicio y disposición de su propiedad, mediante un reglamento que le está imponiendo un gravamen. Considera que esto infringe el derecho de propiedad y el principio de reserva de ley. Alega que ella es una persona adulta mayor, por lo que se le debe garantizar su derecho a una vida digna. Sostiene que lo resuelto por el Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, en tanto condiciona la prestación del servicio a que retire el portón, infringe su derecho como persona adulta mayor a una vivienda óptima, a la salud y a la seguridad. Lo anterior, con sustento en un reglamento que impone una limitación a la propiedad mediante la constitución de una servidumbre, en infracción –como ya indicó- del derecho de propiedad y del principio de reserva de ley. Considera infringidos los artículos 11, 28, 45 y 140, incisos 3) y 18), de la Constitución Política, en tanto se impuso, mediante un reglamento, una limitación al derecho fundamental al pleno uso y goce sobre la propiedad privada, lo que solo resulta posible vía legal. Estima que también se han violentado los artículos XXIII de la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre y 21 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Añade, además, que en este caso existe un afectado directo que es una persona adulta mayor, por lo que también se infringe el artículo 51 constitucional. Solicita que se declare con lugar el recurso, se anula la norma impugnada y se ordene a la autoridad recurrida que se le otorgue el servicio de agua potable, sin imponerle como condición que se elimine el portón de acceso a la servidumbre.

2.- A efecto de fundamentar la legitimación que ostentan para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, la accionante alega que se encuentra pendiente de resolver, ante el Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, la apelación interpuesta contra la constancia de disponibilidad de servicios de acueductos y alcantarillados No. SIGDD-2020-00019522-1-2-1, la solicitud de agua No. P11112020020007 y el oficio No. SG-GSGAM-2020-00245, presentada el 21 de febrero de 2020. Afirma que, por ende, se encuentra legitimada por el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional para acudir a esta Sala en defensa del derecho a la propiedad y el principio de reserva de ley. Sostiene que, en este caso, también está legitimada con sustento el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, por cuanto, existe un daño a la colectividad en su conjunto.

3.- Por resolución de las 10:38 horas del 27 de febrero de 2020, se previno a la accionante que “ dentro del plazo de TRES DÍAS, contado a partir del día siguiente a la notificación de esta resolución y bajo apercibimiento de denegarle el trámite a la acción en caso de incumplimiento, deberá aportar certificación literal del escrito en el que se invocó en el asunto base, con anterioridad a la interposición de esta acción, la inconstitucionalidad de la normativa impugnada, así como acreditar el estado procesal en que se encuentra tal asunto. Lo anterior, de conformidad a los artículos 75, 79 y 80 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. ” 4.- Mediante escrito recibido en esta Sala el 3 de febrero de 2020, la accionante indica que aporta el apelación del rechazo del servicio de agua.

5.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar rechazada.

Redacta el Magistrado Castillo Víquez ; y,

Considerando:

I.- SOBRE LOS SUPUESTOS DE LEGITIMACIÓN PARA LA INTERPOSICIÓN DE LA ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. Esta Sala ha señalado, de forma reiterada, que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso con determinadas formalidades, que, si no se reúnen, imposibilitan que este Tribunal se pronuncie sobre el fondo del asunto. El artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regula la legitimación para interponer acciones de inconstitucionalidad y prevé situaciones distintas. En el párrafo primero se exige la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sea en sede judicial –incluyendo los recursos de hábeas corpus o de amparo- o en la administrativa –en el procedimiento de agotamiento de esta vía-, en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado en el asunto principal. En los párrafos segundo y tercero se regula la acción directa –no se requiere del asunto base-, en los siguientes supuestos: a) cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa; b) se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto; y c) cuando la acción sea promovida por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes. En sentencia No. 04190-95 de las 11:33 horas del 28 de julio de 1995, este Tribunal precisó que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es:

“(…) un proceso de naturaleza incidental, y no de una acción directa o popular, con lo que se quiere decir que se requiere de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver -sea ante los tribunales de justicia o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa- para poder acceder a la vía constitucional, pero de tal manera que, la acción constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho considerado lesionado en el asunto principal, de manera que lo resuelto por el Tribunal Constitucional repercuta positiva o negativamente en dicho proceso pendiente de resolver, por cuanto se manifiesta sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas que deberán ser aplicadas en dicho asunto; y únicamente por excepción es que la legislación permite el acceso directo a esta vía -presupuestos de los párrafos segundo y tercero del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional …”.

En consonancia con lo anterior, esta Sala ha indicado que “ el proceso de acción es, principalmente, de naturaleza incidental, por lo que se requiere de un asunto pendiente de resolver en vía administrativa –en el procedimiento administrativo de impugnación contra el acto final- o judicial, para que prospere la acción. De esta manera, solo en casos excepcionales que la ley establece, no será necesaria la existencia de ese requisito” (sentencia No. 2018-018560 de las 9:20 horas del 7 de noviembre de 2018). También ha aclarado que “ los supuestos contenidos en el párrafo 2o. del artículo 75, constituyen una excepción a la regla establecida en el párrafo 1o. (vía incidental) que deben ser valorados cuidadosamente” (sentencia No. 2018-008413 de las 9:20 horas del 30 de mayo de 2018).

II.- DE LA INADMISIBILIDAD DE LA PRESENTE ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD POR FALTA DE INVOCACIÓN EN EL ASUNTO BASE. Según se indicó, el artículo 75, párrafo primero, in fine, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional presupone, para efectos de la admisibilidad de una acción de inconstitucionalidad, en el caso del control concreto o incidental, la existencia de un asunto principal pendiente de resolver, ya sea ante los tribunales –inclusive de hábeas corpus o de amparo- o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa, en que se invoque esa inconstitucionalidad como medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considere lesionado. Tales requisitos no se traducen en una cuestión meramente formal, pues no basta con el simple cumplimiento de los mismos, sino que se requiere, además, que la norma impugnada a través de esta vía tenga una incidencia directa sobre el asunto que sirve como base, de tal suerte, que lo resuelto en la acción sirva como un medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés lesionado dentro del asunto previo. A contrario sensu, si no existe una conexidad directa entre el objeto de discusión del asunto base y lo impugnado en la acción, no resulta posible que esta Sala se pronuncie al respecto. Es por lo anterior, que, de conformidad con los artículos 75 y 79 de la Ley que rige a esta Jurisdicción, los accionantes deben acreditar y aportar certificación literal del escrito en el que invocaron la inconstitucionalidad de las normas en el asunto base, a efecto de verificar su incidencia en tal asunto. En cuanto a los requisitos que debe cumplir el citado escrito de invocación, esta Sala ha señalado, de forma reiterada, que:

“(…) si bien, en la invocatoria de inconstitucionalidad de la norma, no se exige una extensa fundamentación, lo cierto es, que sí resulta necesario que en el asunto base se invoque normas constitucionales que se consideren infringidas…”. (Sentencia No. 2014-000851 de las 14:30 hrs. del 22 de enero de 2014).” (Sentencia No. 2017-007744 de las 9:15 horas del 24 de mayo de 2017).

Asimismo, este Tribunal ha resuelto que la invocación de inconstitucionalidad debe efectuarse en el asunto base de previo a la interposición de la acción (véase, por ejemplo, voto No. 2016-009868 de las 9:20 horas del 13 de julio de 2016).

En el sub judice, se previno expresamente a la parte accionante que debía “ aportar certificación literal del escrito en el que se invocó en el asunto base, con anterioridad a la interposición de esta acción, la inconstitucionalidad de la normativa impugnada”. Si bien la accionante presentó un escrito en respuesta a tal prevención, lo cierto es que no hizo mención alguna a la existencia de tal escrito de invocación. Lo que hizo, según su propio dicho, fue aportar una copia certificada del expediente que correspondería al asunto base, pero de la lectura del mismo no se puede constatar que se haya invocado, en momento alguno, la inconstitucionalidad de la normativa impugnada. En virtud de lo anterior, no se cumple el requerimiento previsto por el párrafo primero del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

III.- DE LA INADMISIBILIDAD DE LA ACCIÓN POR FALTA DE LEGITIMACIÓN DIRECTA DE LA ACCIONANTE. La parte accionante también alega que se encuentra legitimada para interponer la presente acción con sustento en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, por existir “ un daño a la colectividad en su conjunto”. Sin embargo, la accionante no fundamenta o justifica por qué estima que en este caso en particular se configuraría tal supuesto de legitimación. En todo caso, cabe indicar que Sala ha precisado –en diversos votos- que, a través de la expresión “intereses que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto ”, contenida en el citado ordinal 75, párrafo segundo, el “legislador quiso referirse a la legitimación que ostenta una entidad corporativa, cuando actúa por intermedio de sus representantes en defensa de los derechos e intereses de las personas que conforman su base asociativa y siempre y cuando se trate del cuestionamiento de normas o disposiciones que incidan en aquel núcleo de derechos o intereses que constituye la razón de ser y el factor aglutinante de la agrupación” (sentencia No. 2014-20446 de las 09:30 horas del 17 de diciembre de 2014). Hipótesis que no se concreta en el caso en estudio, en tanto que la accionante no acredita ostentar la representación formal de una entidad corporativa como la descrita.

Tampoco puede estimarse que se esté en presencia de alguno de los otros supuestos de legitimación directa previstos en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. No puede considerarse que, en la especie, no exista lesión individual o directa, por cuanto, en el sub lite , la propia accionante alega de forma reiterada que la normativa impugnada le genera una afectación individual y directa, en tanto argumenta que con sustento en la misma se le ha impuesto una limitación a su propiedad privada, en infracción de sus derechos fundamentales. Ni puede estimarse que se esté ante un supuesto de defensa de intereses difusos. Esta Sala ha venido precisando en su jurisprudencia el alcance y contenido de los intereses difusos y ha señalado que:

“Los intereses difusos, aunque de difícil definición y más difícil identificación, no pueden ser en nuestra Ley -como ya lo ha dicho esta Sala- los intereses meramente colectivos; ni tan difusos que su titularidad se confunda con la de la comunidad nacional como un todo, ni tan concretos que frente a ellos resulten identificadas o fácilmente identificables personas determinadas , o grupos personalizados, cuya legitimación derivaría, no de los intereses difusos, sino de los corporativos o que atañen a una comunidad en su conjunto. Se trata, entonces, de intereses individuales, pero, a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y, por ende, reciben un beneficio o un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos igual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que se trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos de personas que se encuentran en determinadas situaciones y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas. Es decir, los intereses difusos participan de una doble naturaleza, ya que son a la vez colectivos -por ser comunes a una generalidad- e individuales, por lo que pueden ser reclamados en tal carácter. ” (sentencia No. 3705-93 de las 15 horas del 30 de julio de 1993; el destacado no corresponde al original) Asimismo, en sentencia No. 2007-02958 de las 9:23 horas del 02 de marzo de 2007, este Tribunal agregó:

“En relación con los intereses difusos, que es la legitimación aducida por el accionante, este Tribunal ha dicho se que se trata de aquel interés personal relacionado con un derecho o situación jurídica de naturaleza especial y particular, que puede ser compartido por otras personas, formando todos los interesados un grupo o categoría determinada. Así, la vulneración de ese derecho puede afectar a todos en general y/o a cada uno en particular, de ahí que cualquier miembro de esa agrupación puede interponer la acción para proteger el derecho que se estima lesionado. El interés, en estos casos, se encuentra difuminado, diluido (difuso) entre una pluralidad no identificada de sujetos. La sentencia número 03705-93, de las 15:00 horas del 30 de julio de 1993, ilustra lo que se ha entendido como intereses difusos; así como también la sentencia 360-99 de las 15:51 horas del 20 de enero de 1999:

"Se ha señalado que se trata un tipo especial de interés, cuya manifestación es menos concreta e individualizable que la del colectivo recién definido en el considerando anterior, pero que no puede llegar a ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el reconocido a todos los miembros de la sociedad de velar por la legalidad constitucional, ya que éste último -como se ha dicho reiteradamente- está excluido del actual sistema de revisión constitucional . Se trata pues de un interés distribuido en cada uno de los administrados, mediato si se quiere, y diluido, pero no por ello menos constatable, para la defensa, en esta Sala, de ciertos derechos constitucionales de una singular relevancia para el adecuado y armónico desarrollo de la sociedad. Son las especiales características de éstos derechos por sí mismas y no la particular situación frente a ellos de los sujetos que puedan ostentarlos, la clave para la distinción y determinación de la presencia de los llamados intereses difusos tal y como se manifestado en distintas resoluciones como la 03705-93 de las quince horas del treinta de julio para el derecho al ambiente, la número 05753-93 de las catorce horas cuarenta y cinco del nueve de noviembre de ese mismo año para la defensa del patrimonio histórico y la número 00980-91 de las trece y treinta del veinticuatro de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y uno para la materia electoral." En este sentido, si bien ese interés no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional (lo que supondría la instauración tácita de acción popular no contemplada por la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de éste. Ejemplos de tales intereses son el derecho a un ambiente sano y armonioso, la defensa del patrimonio histórico, la materia electoral, la defensa del derecho a la salud y la fiscalización de los fondos públicos.” (el destacado no corresponde al original) En cuyo caso, es claro que en el presente asunto se está accionando en resguardo de un interés notoriamente individual, claramente circunscrito a aquellos propietarios específicos, como sería el caso singular de la accionante, a quienes les resulta de aplicación particular la normativa cuestionada. En razón del contenido de los reglamentos impugnados y de los principales reproches de la accionante –relacionados, directa o indirectamente, con una presunta infracción al derecho de propiedad-, es patente que la normativa en cuestión podría dar origen –como ya se indicó- a afectaciones individuales susceptibles de generar reclamos concretos, respecto de un grupo acotado de personas fácilmente determinables e identificables. Por lo que no puede estimarse que el sub judice se esté en presencia de un supuesto de defensa de intereses difusos.

IV.- EN CONCLUSIÓN. Como corolario de lo anterior, procede rechazar de plano la acción, como así se dispone.

V.- DOCUMENTACIÓN APORTADA AL EXPEDIENTE . Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza de plano la acción.

Fernando Castillo V.

Fernando Cruz C.

Paul Rueda L.

Nancy Hernández L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

Anamari Garro V.

Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador -- *AUWPORVR43D461* Morenos, 100 mts.Sur de la iglesia del Perpetuo Socorro). Recepción de asuntos de grupos vulnerables: Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6