Inadmissibility of direct unconstitutionality action on distributed energy withdrawal limitInadmisibilidad de acción de inconstitucionalidad directa sobre límite de retiro de energía distribuida

*200007160007CO* Res. No. 2020001780 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine forty hours of the twenty-ninth of January of two thousand twenty.

An action of unconstitutionality brought by [Name 001], of legal age, bearer of identity card number [Value 001], against ARTICLE 34 OF EXECUTIVE DECREE 39220.

**Resultando:** 1.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 8:06 a.m. on January 15, 2020, the claimant questions the constitutionality of Article 34 of Executive Decree number 39220 “Reglamento de Generación Distribuida para Autoconsumo con Fuentes Renovables Modelo de Contratación Neta Sencilla”. He affirms that his standing comes from the provisions of the second paragraph of article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, insofar as diffuse interests are present. In that sense, he argues that in the specific case the challenged norm cannot be challenged by means of an amparo appeal or a habeas corpus, since it is a provision emanating from Public Law subjects; where its eventual unconstitutionality can only be questioned through an action of unconstitutionality, without the need for a previous case. He indicates that on October 8, 2015, the Reglamento de Generación Distribuida para Autoconsumo Modelo de Contratación Neta Sencilla entered into force, which regulates a contractual model that is not considered a public service, insofar as it is an activity carried out by subscribers who decide to produce their own electric energy to cover their energy needs –through solar panels–, with the aim of obtaining savings on electrical billing. He argues that the impugned article provides that the subscriber who produces their own energy does not have the right to withdraw all the energy deposited into the distribution network as a result of surpluses; since it limits that percentage to 49%. He considers that the foregoing is contrary to the principles of legality, transparency, linkage to science and technique, and legitimate purpose, insofar as the prohibition lacks technical foundation and, furthermore, does not meet the purpose criterion, since both the Ministry of Environment and Energy and the energy distribution companies have not been able to prove the existence of studies that serve as support for the percentage set by the Reglamento. He states that as the article is not endowed with adequate, clear, and transparent parameters, it also does not allow the achievement of the personal, environmental, social, or economic purposes for which the installation of the photovoltaic panels was destined. In that sense, the norm places the energy distribution companies in an advantageous condition, since it assures them perpetual electricity consumption, while the producing subscriber chooses to use the distribution network as a "battery" to inject energy surpluses. The foregoing stagnates the energy market, since the companies do not see the need to incentivize, improve, or invest in new technologies or operation improvement, thus avoiding a true democratization of energy. Likewise, Article 34 of the Reglamento de Generación Distribuida is arbitrary, harms the rights of the producing subscribers and, therefore, causes a patrimonial affectation to the producing subscriber, who is forced to buy energy from the distribution company at a much higher price. He estimates that in the impugned numeral there is an unfounded excess of the regulatory power that contradicts aspects related to fundamental rights protected in turn by constitutional provisions and principles, but, faced with an arbitrary, disproportionate norm without technical reasoning that produces a direct affectation to the patrimony of the subscriber-producers, who have to disburse more than 51% of energy that comes from the energy distribution company. On the other hand, he estimates that the norm whose constitutionality is impugned infringes the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality, insofar as it does not meet the requirements of necessity, suitability, and proportionality. He considers that the norm whose constitutionality is questioned harms constitutional Article 50, insofar as it prevents the country's inhabitants from developing in a healthy and balanced environment, by limiting access to low-cost and clean energy. By virtue of the foregoing, he requests that the action be upheld, with its consequences.

2.- Article 9 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition presented to its knowledge that turns out to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is the simple reiteration or reproduction of a previous equal or similar rejected petition.

Drafted by Magistrate Castillo Víquez; and, **Considerando:** I.-Object of the action. In the present matter, the claimant questions the constitutionality of Article 34 of Executive Decree number 39220 “Reglamento de Generación Distribuida para Autoconsumo con Fuentes Renovables Modelo de Contratación Neta Sencilla”, which provides the following:

Article 34.-Authorization for storage and withdrawal of energy. The producer-consumer may deposit unconsumed energy into the distribution network, and shall have the right to withdraw up to a maximum of forty-nine percent (49%) of the total energy generated, to use it in the following month or months within an annual period.

The total energy produced and the unconsumed energy shall be accounted for monthly for a period of one year within the billing process, with its annual cut-off date being an agreement of the parties within the interconnection contract.

Excepted from these limitations, upon prior evaluation and authorization of the distribution company, are the distributed generation systems that use agro-industrial waste or hydraulic power for the generation of electricity.

II.- On the admissibility requirements for the action of unconstitutionality. This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the action of unconstitutionality is a process with certain formalities, which, if not met, make it impossible for this Chamber to rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes the admissibility prerequisites for actions of unconstitutionality and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in the judicial venue – including habeas corpus or amparo appeals – or in the administrative venue – in the procedure of exhaustion of this route, that is, in the administrative procedure of challenge against the final act –, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked, as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest that is considered harmed in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action – the base matter is not required – in the following cases: a) when due to the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury; b) it concerns the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los Habitantes. Regarding the requirement of a matter pending resolution, this Chamber, through judgment No. 04190-95 of 11:33 hrs. on July 28, 1995, indicated the following:

“(...) Firstly, it is a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a matter pending resolution is required - whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route - to be able to access the constitutional route, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered harmed in the main matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on said process pending resolution, since it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter; and only by exception does the legislation allow direct access to this route - prerequisites of the second and third paragraphs of article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional …”.

Likewise, in judgment No. 1319-1997 of 14:51 hrs. on March 4, 1997, the following was considered:

“(...) Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes as one of the prerequisites for filing the action of unconstitutionality, the existence of a matter pending resolution, as it constitutes the connection point that must exist between the process in which the norm reputed unconstitutional is applied with the object of the constitutional process and the foundation that legitimizes the claimant's pretension as the last procedural remedy, in the exercise of the right to constitutional jurisdiction. The rigor in standing to access constitutional jurisdiction, more than constituting an obstacle to prevent the control of the constitutionality of laws, constitutes the channel of the right of access to justice, derived from the existence of a 'previous matter' that has motivated that discordance or contradiction between the law and the Constitution, to maintain the jurisdictional function - special - and not distort the purity of the system of relations of the constitutional powers of the State, of which the Chamber is a part, because as a member of those, it is not entirely free and unlimited in its actions. For this reason, it is that the action of unconstitutionality needs its existence - of the previous matter - as a reasonable means to protect the defense of the right or interest that is considered harmed. However, the reasonableness of the action of unconstitutionality as a means of defense of the claimant should not be analyzed only within the context of the previous matter, but immersed in the constitutional legal framework that governs the actions of this Chamber. It is not, then, a particular consideration of the unconstitutionality of a normative provision, to file an action without requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution, but rather, it is necessary to demonstrate that it constitutes a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest that is deemed harmed. (...)”

Based on the cited precedents and the jurisprudential line of this Chamber, it is inferred that the action process is, mainly, of an incidental nature, so a matter pending resolution in the administrative route – in the administrative procedure of challenge against the final act – or judicial route is required for the action to prosper. Thus, only in exceptional cases established by law, will the existence of this requirement not be necessary.

I.-Object of the action. In the present matter, the claimant questions the constitutionality of Article 34 of Executive Decree number 39220 “Reglamento de Generación Distribuida para Autoconsumo con Fuentes Renovables Modelo de Contratación Neta Sencilla”, which provides the following:

Article 34.-Authorization for storage and withdrawal of energy. The producer-consumer may deposit unconsumed energy into the distribution network, and shall have the right to withdraw up to a maximum of forty-nine percent (49%) of the total energy generated, to use it in the following month or months within an annual period.

The total energy produced and the unconsumed energy shall be accounted for monthly for a period of one year within the billing process, with its annual cut-off date being an agreement of the parties within the interconnection contract.

Excepted from these limitations, upon prior evaluation and authorization of the distribution company, are the distributed generation systems that use agro-industrial waste or hydraulic power for the generation of electricity.

III.- On the inadmissibility of the present action of unconstitutionality. In the present matter, the claimant adduces that he has standing to file this action of unconstitutionality, insofar as diffuse interests are present. In that sense, he argues that in the specific case the challenged norm cannot be challenged by means of an amparo appeal or a habeas corpus, since it is a provision emanating from Public Law subjects, where its eventual unconstitutionality can only be questioned through an action of unconstitutionality, without the need for a previous case. On the particular, it must be mentioned that, at this Court's criterion, in the present matter the provisions of the second paragraph of article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional are not met, since in the filing brief the claimant does not allude to a case that can be cataloged as a diffuse interest, in the terms that this Chamber has developed said concept. Likewise, it is not a case in which there is no individual or direct injury, since from the reading of the impugned norm it is clear that it does allow cases of particular application, which would make possible the existence of a previous case in which the affected person could eventually question the constitutionality of the norm, and which serves as a basis to file an action of unconstitutionality before this Court. In any case, it is worth noting that the claimant seems to confuse what is established by article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, since the fact that a norm cannot be challenged by means of amparo or habeas corpus, does not negate the possibility that it can be challenged through a judicial process of another kind, or an administrative procedure. Given this panorama, the Court deems that the action must be rejected.

IV.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE EXPEDIENTE. The parties are warned that if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material that is not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, pursuant to the provisions of the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", approved by the Corte Plena in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

**Por tanto:** The action is rejected outright.

Fernando Castillo V. President Fernando Cruz C. Paul Rueda L. Nancy Hernández L. Luis Fdo. Salazar A. Jorge Araya G. Marta Eugenia Esquivel R.

Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador -- *XABQY0OKAZ461* **I.-Object of the action.** In the present matter, the petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Article 34 of Decreto Ejecutivo número 39220 “Reglamento de Generación Distribuida para Autoconsumo con Fuentes Renovables Modelo de Contratación Neta Sencilla”, which provides as follows:

*Article 34.-Authorization for storage and withdrawal of energy. The producer-consumer may deposit unconsumed energy into the distribution network and shall have the right to withdraw up to a maximum of forty-nine percent (49%) of the total energy generated, to be used in the following month or months within an annual period.* *The total energy produced and the unconsumed energy shall be accounted for monthly over a period of one year within the billing process, with its annual cut-off date being an agreement between the parties within the interconnection contract.* *Excepted from these limitations, upon prior evaluation and authorization by the distribution company, are distributed generation systems that use agro-industrial waste or hydraulic force for electricity generation.* **II.- Of the admissibility requirements for the action of unconstitutionality.** This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the action of unconstitutionality is a process with certain formalities, which, if not met, make it impossible for this Chamber to rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes the prerequisites for admissibility for actions of unconstitutionality and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, either in judicial proceedings – including habeas corpus or amparo appeals – or in administrative proceedings – in the procedure for exhausting this avenue, namely, in the administrative challenge procedure against the final act – in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered harmed in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action – a base matter is not required – in the following cases: a) when, by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm; b) when it involves the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los Habitantes. Regarding the requirement of a matter pending resolution, this Chamber, through judgment No. 04190-95 of 11:33 hrs. on July 28, 1995, stated the following:

"(...) In the first place, it is a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a matter pending resolution is required -whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative avenue- to access the constitutional avenue, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right deemed harmed in the main matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on said pending process, since it manifests on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in that matter; and only by exception does the legislation allow direct access to this avenue - prerequisites of the second and third paragraphs of article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional ...".

Likewise, in judgment No. 1319-1997 of 14:51 hrs. on March 4, 1997, the following was considered:

"(...) Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes as one of the prerequisites for filing an action of unconstitutionality, the existence of a matter pending resolution, as this constitutes the connecting point that must exist between the process in which the norm deemed unconstitutional is applied and the object of the constitutional process and the foundation that legitimizes the petitioner's claim as the last procedural remedy, in the exercise of the right to constitutional jurisdiction. The rigor in the standing to access constitutional jurisdiction, rather than constituting an obstacle to prevent the control of the constitutionality of laws, constitutes the channel for the right of access to justice, derived from the existence of a 'prior matter' that has motivated that discordance or contradiction between the law and the Constitution, to maintain the -special- jurisdictional function, and not distort the purity of the system of relations of the constitutional powers of the State, of which the Chamber is a part, because as a member of those, it is not entirely free and unlimited in its actions. For this reason, the action of unconstitutionality requires its existence -of the prior matter- as a reasonable means to protect the defense of the right or interest considered harmed. However, the reasonableness of the action of unconstitutionality as a means of defense for the petitioner should not be analyzed solely within the context of the prior matter, but immersed in the constitutional legal framework that governs the actions of this Chamber. It is not, therefore, a particular consideration of the unconstitutionality of a normative provision, to file an action without requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution, but rather, it is necessary to demonstrate that it constitutes a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest that is considered harmed. (...)"

Based on the cited precedents and the jurisprudential line of this Chamber, it is inferred that the action process is, primarily, of an incidental nature, so a matter pending resolution in administrative proceedings – in the administrative challenge procedure against the final act – or judicial proceedings is required for the action to prosper. In this way, only in exceptional cases established by law will the existence of that requirement not be necessary.

**I.-Object of the action.** In the present matter, the petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Article 34 of Decreto Ejecutivo número 39220 “Reglamento de Generación Distribuida para Autoconsumo con Fuentes Renovables Modelo de Contratación Neta Sencilla”, which provides as follows:

*Article 34.-Authorization for storage and withdrawal of energy. The producer-consumer may deposit unconsumed energy into the distribution network and shall have the right to withdraw up to a maximum of forty-nine percent (49%) of the total energy generated, to be used in the following month or months within an annual period.* *The total energy produced and the unconsumed energy shall be accounted for monthly over a period of one year within the billing process, with its annual cut-off date being an agreement between the parties within the interconnection contract.* *Excepted from these limitations, upon prior evaluation and authorization by the distribution company, are distributed generation systems that use agro-industrial waste or hydraulic force for electricity generation.* **III.- Of the inadmissibility of the present action of unconstitutionality.** In the present matter, the petitioner argues that he has standing to file this action of unconstitutionality, as this involves diffuse interests. In that sense, he claims that, in this case, the challenged norm cannot be challenged through an amparo appeal or a habeas corpus, as it is a provision issued by subjects of Public Law, where its eventual unconstitutionality can only be challenged through an action of unconstitutionality, without the need for a prior case. On this point, it must be mentioned that, in the opinion of this Court, the present matter does not comply with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, because in the filing brief the petitioner makes no reference to a situation that could be categorized as a diffuse interest, in the terms that this Chamber has developed for said concept. Similarly, this is not a case in which there is no individual or direct harm, since from the reading of the challenged norm it is clear that it does allow for instances of particular application, which would make possible the existence of a prior case in which the affected person could eventually challenge the constitutionality of the norm, and which would serve as a basis to raise an action of unconstitutionality before this Court. In any case, it should be noted that the petitioner seems to confuse what Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes, because the fact that a norm cannot be challenged by way of amparo or habeas corpus, does not negate the possibility that it could be challenged through a judicial process of another nature, or an administrative procedure. Given this scenario, the Court deems that the action must be rejected.

**IV.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE EXPEDIENTE.** The parties are warned that if any document on paper has been provided, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be removed from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment.

Otherwise, all material that is not removed within this period will be destroyed, as provided in the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", approved by the Corte Plena in session N° 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session N° 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

Therefore:

The action is rejected outright.

|  Nancy Hernández L. | |  Luis Fdo.

Salazar A.</sub></span></font></div> </td></tr> <tr> <td align="center" valign="top" width="195" style="border: solid #010101 0px;"><img src="" align="middle" width="163" height="73" border="0" alt="graphic"/> <div align="center"><font face="TIMES NEW ROMAN" color="#010101" size="2"><span style=" font-size:10pt">_{Jorge Araya G.}</span></font></div> </td> <td align="center" valign="top" width="194" style="border: solid #010101 0px;"> <div align="center"><span style="font-size: 10pt;">&nbsp;</span></div> </td> <td align="center" valign="top" width="194" style="border: solid #010101 0px;"><img src="" align="middle" width="162" height="73" border="0" alt="graphic"/> <div align="center"><font face="TIMES NEW ROMAN" color="#010101" size="2"><span style=" font-size:10pt">_{Marta Eugenia Esquivel R.}</span></font></div> </td></tr> </table> </div> <div align="center"><font face="TIMES NEW ROMAN" color="#010101" size="2"><span style=" font-size:10pt">_{<br />}</span></font></div><div align="center"><font face="TIMES NEW ROMAN" color="#010101" size="2"><span style=" font-size:10pt">_{<br />}</span></font></div><div align="left"><font face="TIMES NEW ROMAN" color="#010101" size="1"><span style=" font-size:8pt">_{Documento Firmado Digitalmente}</span></font></div> <div align="left"><font face="TIMES NEW ROMAN" color="#010101" size="1"><span style=" font-size:8pt">_{-- Código verificador --}</span></font></div> <div align="left"><font face="WASP 39 L" color="#010101" size="4"><span style=" font-size:14pt">_{*XABQY0OKAZ461*}</span></font></div> <div align="left"><font face="TAHOMA" color="#010101" size="4"><span style=" font-size:14pt">_{&#160;XABQY0OKAZ461}</span></font></div> <div align="right"><font face="TIMES NEW ROMAN" color="#010101" size="1"><span style=" font-size:8pt"><b>_{EXPEDIENTE N&#176;}</b></span></font> <font face="TIMES NEW ROMAN" size="1"><span style=" font-size:8pt"><b>_{20-000716-0007-CO}</b></span></font></div> <div align="left"><font face="TIMES NEW ROMAN" color="#010101" size="1"><span style=" font-size:8pt">_{<br />}</span></font></div><div style="border-top: solid 1px #010101; "><div align="center" style="margin-left:0mm; margin-right:0mm; text-indent:0mm; margin-top:0.35mm; margin-bottom:0.00mm;"><font face="TIMES NEW ROMAN" color="#010101" size="1"><span style=" font-size:8pt">_{Teléfonos: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2295-3712 / 2549-1633. Dirección electrónica: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Dirección: (Sabana Sur, Calle Morenos, 100 mts.Sur de la iglesia del Perpetuo Socorro). Recepción de asuntos de grupos vulnerables: Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6}</span></font></div> </div> </body> </html> I.- Purpose of the action. In the present matter, the petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Article 34 of Executive Decree number 39220 "Reglamento de Generación Distribuida para Autoconsumo con Fuentes Renovables Modelo de Contratación Neta Sencilla", which provides as follows:

***Article 34.-Authorization for storage and withdrawal of energy.** The producer-consumer may deposit unconsumed energy into the distribution network, and shall have the right to withdraw up to a maximum of forty-nine percent (49%) of the total energy generated, to use it in the following month or months within an annual period.* *The total energy produced and the unconsumed energy shall be accounted for monthly over a period of one year within the billing process, with its annual cut-off date being an agreement of the parties within the interconnection contract.* *Excepted from these limitations, subject to prior evaluation and authorization by the distribution company, are distributed generation systems that use agro-industrial waste or hydropower for the generation of electricity.* III.- On the inadmissibility of this unconstitutionality action. In the present matter, the petitioner argues that he has standing to file this unconstitutionality action, given that diffuse interests are present. In that regard, he alleges that in this case the challenged provision cannot be challenged by means of an amparo action or a habeas corpus, since it is a provision emanating from public law subjects, where its potential unconstitutionality can only be challenged by means of an unconstitutionality action, without the need for a prior case. On this point, it should be noted that, in the opinion of this Tribunal, the present matter does not comply with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, because in the petition the petitioner does not allude to a situation that could be classified as a diffuse interest, under the terms that this Chamber has developed for that concept. Likewise, this is not a case in which there is no individual or direct injury, since from a reading of the challenged provision it is clear that it does permit situations of particular application, which would make possible the existence of a prior case in which the affected person could eventually question the constitutionality of the provision, and which serves as a basis for filing an unconstitutionality action before this Tribunal. In any event, it is worth noting that the petitioner seems to confuse what is established in Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, since the fact that a provision cannot be challenged by way of amparo or habeas corpus does not negate the possibility that it could be challenged through a judicial process of another nature, or through an administrative proceeding. Given this situation, the Tribunal finds that the action must be dismissed.

IV.- DOCUMENTATION SUBMITTED TO THE CASE FILE . The parties are advised that if they have submitted any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment.

Therefore:

The action is outrightly dismissed.

Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

Marta Eugenia Esquivel R.

Digitally Signed Document -- Verification code -- *XABQY0OKAZ461* Telephones: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2295-3712 / 2549-1633. Email: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Sabana Sur, Calle Morenos, 100 mts. South of the Perpetuo Socorro Church). Reception for matters of vulnerable groups: Supreme Court of Justice Building, San José, Catedral District, González Lahmann Neighborhood, streets 19 and 21, avenues 8 and 6

*200007160007CO* Res. Nº 2020001780 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas cuarenta minutos del veintinueve de enero de dos mil veinte .

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por [Nombre 001], mayor, portador de la cédula de identidad número [Valor 001], contra EL ARTÍCULO 34 DEL DECRETO EJECUTIVO 39220 .

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 8:06 del 15 de enero de 2020, el accionante cuestiona la constitucionalidad del artículo 34 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 39220 “Reglamento de Generación Distribuida para Autoconsumo con Fuentes Renovables Modelo de Contratación Neta Sencilla”. Afirma que su legitimación proviene de lo dispuesto por el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en tanto se está en presencia de intereses difusos. En ese sentido, alega que en la especie la norma cuestionada no es susceptible de ser impugnada por medio de un recurso de amparo o de un habeas corpus, ya se está ante una disposición emanada de sujetos de Derecho Público; en donde su eventual inconstitucionalidad solo es posible cuestionarla por medio de una acción de inconstitucionalidad, sin que haya necesidad de que exista un caso previo. Indica que el 8 de octubre de 2015 entró en vigor el Reglamento de Generación Distribuida para Autoconsumo Modelo de Contratación Neta Sencilla, el cual regula un modelo contractual que no es considerado como un servicio público, en tanto se trata de una actividad realizada por los abonados que deciden producir su propia energía eléctrica a efectos de cubrir sus necesidades de energía –mediante paneles solares-, con el fin de obtener un ahorro en la facturación eléctrica. Arguye que el artículo impugnado dispone que el abonado que produce su propia energía, no tiene derecho de retirar la totalidad de energía que depositó en la red de distribución producto de los excedentes; toda vez que limita ese porcentaje a un 49%. Considera que lo anterior resulta contrario a los principios de legalidad, transparencia, vinculación a la ciencia y técnica y finalidad legítima, en tanto la prohibición carece de fundamento técnico y, además, no cumple con el criterio de finalidad, ya que tanto el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía como las empresas distribuidoras de energía, no han sido capaces de probar la existencia de estudios que sirvan de sustento para el porcentaje que fija el Reglamento. Manifiesta que al no estar el artículo dotado de parámetros adecuados, claro y transparentes, tampoco permite la consecución de los fines personales, ambientales, sociales o económicos para los que se destinó la instalación de los paneles fotovoltaicos. En ese sentido, la norma coloca en una condición ventajosa a las empresas de distribución de energía, ya que les asegura un consumo perpetuo de electricidad, mientras que el abonado productor opte por utilizar la red de distribución como “batería” para inyectar los excedentes de energía. Lo anterior estaca el mercado de energía, ya que las empresas no ven la necesidad de incentivar, mejorar o invertir en nuevas tecnologías o mejoramiento de la operación, evitando así una verdadera democratización de la energía. De igual forma, el artículo 34 del Reglamento de Generación Distribuida es arbitrario, lesiona los derechos de los abonados productores y, por tanto, provoca una afectación patrimonial al abonado productor, que se ve obligado a comprar energía a la empresa distribuidora a un precio mucho más elevado. Estima que en el numeral impugnado hay un exceso infundado de la potestad reglamentaria que contraría en aspectos relativos a derechos fundamentales protegidos a su vez por disposiciones y principios constitucionales, pero, ante una norma arbitraria, desproporcional y sin razonamiento técnico que produce una afectación directa al patrimonio de los abonados-productores, que tienen que desembolsar más de un 51% de energía que proviene de la empresa de distribución de energía. Por otra parte, estima que la norma cuya constitucionalidad se impugna infringe los principios constitucionales de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, en tanto no cumple con los requerimientos de necesidad, idoneidad y proporcionalidad. Considera que ya norma cuya constitucionalidad es cuestionada lesiona el artículo 50 constitucional, en el tanto impide a los habitantes del país a desarrollarse en un ambiente sano y equilibrado, al limitar el acceso a la energía de bajo costo y limpia. En virtud de lo expuesto, pide que se acoja la acción, con sus consecuencias.

2.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar rechazada.

Redacta el Magistrado Castillo Víquez; y,

Considerando:

I.-Objeto de la acción. En el presente asunto, el accionante cuestiona la constitucionalidad del artículo 34 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 39220 “Reglamento de Generación Distribuida para Autoconsumo con Fuentes Renovables Modelo de Contratación Neta Sencilla”, que dispone lo siguiente:

Artículo 34.-Autorización para almacenamiento y retiro de energía. El productor-consumidor podrá depositar en la red de distribución la energía no consumida, y tendrá derecho a retirar hasta un máximo del cuarenta y nueve por ciento (49%) de la energía total generada, para utilizarla en el mes o meses siguientes en un periodo anual.

La energía total producida y la energía no consumida serán contabilizadas de forma mensual por un período de un año dentro del proceso de facturación, siendo su fecha anual de corte un acuerdo de las partes dentro del contrato de interconexión.

Se exceptúan de estas limitaciones, previa evaluación y autorización de la empresa distribuidora, los sistemas de generación distribuida que utilicen residuos agroindustriales o la fuerza hidráulica para la generación de electricidad.

II.- De los requisitos de admisibilidad de la acción de inconstitucionalidad . Esta Sala ha señalado, de forma reiterada, que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso con determinadas formalidades, que, si no se reúnen, imposibilitan que esta Sala se pronuncie sobre el fondo del asunto. En el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional se establecen los presupuestos de admisibilidad para las acciones de inconstitucionalidad y se regulan situaciones distintas. En el párrafo primero se exige la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sea en sede judicial – incluyendo los recursos de hábeas corpus o de amparo- o en la administrativa – en el procedimiento de agotamiento de esta vía, sea, en el procedimiento administrativo de impugnación contra el acto final-, en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado en el asunto principal. En los párrafos segundo y tercero se regula la acción directa – no se requiere del asunto base-, en los siguientes supuestos: a) cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa; b) se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto; y c) cuando la acción sea promovida por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes. En cuanto a la exigencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, esta Sala, mediante sentencia No. 04190-95 de las 11:33 hrs. del 28 de julio de 1995, señaló lo siguiente:

“ (… ) En primer término, se trata de un proceso de naturaleza incidental, y no de una acción directa o popular, con lo que se quiere decir que se requiere de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver -sea ante los tribunales de justicia o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa- para poder acceder a la vía constitucional, pero de tal manera que, la acción constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho considerado lesionado en el asunto principal, de manera que lo resuelto por el Tribunal Constitucional repercuta positiva o negativamente en dicho proceso pendiente de resolver, por cuanto se manifiesta sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas que deberán ser aplicadas en dicho asunto; y únicamente por excepción es que la legislación permite el acceso directo a esta vía -presupuestos de los párrafos segundo y tercero del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional … ” .

Asimismo, en la sentencia No. 1319-1997 de las 14:51 hrs. de 4 de marzo de 1997, se consideró lo que sigue:

“ (… ) El artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece como uno de los presupuestos para interponer la acción de inconstitucionalidad, la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, por constituir el punto de conexión que ha de existir entre el proceso en que se aplica la norma que se reputa inconstitucional con el objeto del proceso constitucional y el fundamento que legitima la pretensión del accionante como último remedio procesal, en el ejercicio del derecho a la jurisdicción constitucional. El rigor en la legitimación para acceder a la jurisdicción constitucional, más que constituir un obstáculo para impedir el control de la constitucionalidad de las leyes, constituye el cauce del derecho de acceso a la justicia, derivado de la existencia de un "asunto previo" que haya motivado aquella discordancia o contradicción entre la ley y la Constitución, para mantener la función jurisdiccional -especial-, y no distorsionar la pureza del sistema de relación de los poderes constitucionales del Estado, del que es parte la Sala, porque como integrante de aquellos, no es enteramente libre e ilimitada en sus acciones. Por esta causa, es que la acción de inconstitucionalidad necesita de su existencia -del asunto previo- como medio razonable para amparar la defensa del derecho o interés que se considera lesionado. Empero, la razonabilidad de la acción de inconstitucionalidad como medio de defensa del accionante no debe analizarse solo dentro del contexto del asunto previo, sino inmersa en el marco jurídico constitucional que rige las actuaciones de esta Sala. No se trata, entonces, de una consideración particular de la inconstitucionalidad de una disposición normativa, para interponer una acción sin requerir la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sino, que es necesario que se demuestre que constituye un medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se estima lesionado. (… )” Con fundamento en los precedentes citados y la línea jurisprudencial de esta Sala, se colige que el proceso de acción es, principalmente, de naturaleza incidental, por lo que se requiere de un asunto pendiente de resolver en vía administrativa – en el procedimiento administrativo de impugnación contra el acto final- o judicial, para que prospere la acción. De esta manera, solo en casos excepcionales que la ley establece, no será necesaria la existencia de ese requisito.

I.-Objeto de la acción. En el presente asunto, el accionante cuestiona la constitucionalidad del artículo 34 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 39220 “Reglamento de Generación Distribuida para Autoconsumo con Fuentes Renovables Modelo de Contratación Neta Sencilla”, que dispone lo siguiente:

Artículo 34.-Autorización para almacenamiento y retiro de energía. El productor-consumidor podrá depositar en la red de distribución la energía no consumida, y tendrá derecho a retirar hasta un máximo del cuarenta y nueve por ciento (49%) de la energía total generada, para utilizarla en el mes o meses siguientes en un periodo anual.

La energía total producida y la energía no consumida serán contabilizadas de forma mensual por un período de un año dentro del proceso de facturación, siendo su fecha anual de corte un acuerdo de las partes dentro del contrato de interconexión.

Se exceptúan de estas limitaciones, previa evaluación y autorización de la empresa distribuidora, los sistemas de generación distribuida que utilicen residuos agroindustriales o la fuerza hidráulica para la generación de electricidad.

III.- De la inadmisibilidad de la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad. En el presente asunto, el accionante aduce que se encuentra legitimado para interponer esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, en tanto se está en presencia de intereses difusos. En ese sentido, alega que en la especie la norma cuestionada no es susceptible de ser impugnada por medio de un recurso de amparo o de un habeas corpus, ya se está ante una disposición emanada de sujetos de Derecho Público, en donde su eventual inconstitucionalidad solo es posible cuestionarla por medio de una acción de inconstitucionalidad, sin que haya necesidad de que exista un caso previo. Sobre el particular, debe mencionarse que, a criterio de este Tribunal, en el presente asunto no se cumple con lo dispuesto por el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, pues en el libelo de interposición el accionante no hace alusión a un supuesto que pueda ser catalogado como un interés difuso, en los términos que ha desarrollado dicho concepto esta Sala. De igual forma, no se está ante un caso en el que no haya una lesión individual o directa, ya que de la lectura de la norma impugnada se desprende que esta sí permite la supuestos de aplicación particular, que harían posible la existencia de un caso previo en el que eventualmente la persona afectada pueda cuestionar la constitucionalidad de la norma, y que sirva como base para plantear una acción de inconstitucionalidad ante este Tribunal. En todo caso, cabe destacar que el accionante parece confundir lo que establece el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, pues el hecho de que una norma no pueda ser impugnada por vía de amparo o habeas corpus, no enerva la posibilidad de que sí pueda serlo por medio de un proceso judicial de otra índole, o de un procedimiento administrativo. Ante dicho panorama, el Tribunal estima que la acción debe rechazarse.

IV.- DOCUMENTACIÓN APORTADA AL EXPEDIENTE . Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza de plano la acción.

Fernando Castillo V.

Fernando Cruz C.

Paul Rueda L.

Nancy Hernández L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

Marta Eugenia Esquivel R.

Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador -- *XABQY0OKAZ461* Morenos, 100 mts.Sur de la iglesia del Perpetuo Socorro). Recepción de asuntos de grupos vulnerables: Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6