Outright dismissal of unconstitutionality action against INVU urban planning regulationsRechazo de plano de acción de inconstitucionalidad contra normativa urbanística del INVU

04242 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.- San José, at sixteen hours twenty-four minutes on the twentieth of August, nineteen ninety-six.

Action of Unconstitutionality brought by Nombre129193, of legal age, married, attorney, resident of San José, identity card number CED57932, in his capacity as special judicial representative of the company _REFINADORA COSTARRICENSE DE METALES PRECIOSOS, SOCIEDAD ANONIMA_, against Article 115 of Law number 7015, of the twenty-second of November, nineteen eighty- five, which is the Law Modifying the Ordinary Budget for the Fiscal Period for nineteen ninety-five, which modified

Transitory Provision II of the Urban Planning Law, number 4240

of the fifteenth of November, nineteen sixty-eight and its amendments, the Construction Regulations (Reglamento de Construcciones), issued by the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, specifically in Articles I.1 through XI.26.3, and their amendments also agreed upon by the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo; and by association, against Article 5, subsection a.) of the Organic Law of the INVU, number 1788, of the twenty-fourth of August, nineteen fifty-four. Appearing are Licenciado Farid Beirute Brenes, in his capacity as Deputy Attorney General of the Republic, and the Acting Director of the Dirección de Urbanismo, Rodolfo Sancho Rojas.

Resultando:

1.- The representative of the company _Refinadora Costarricense de Metales Preciosos, Sociedad Anónima_, brings an action against Article 115 of Law number 7015, of the twenty-second of November, nineteen eighty-five, which is the Law Modifying the Ordinary Budget for the Fiscal Period for nineteen ninety-five, which modified Transitory Provision II of the Urban Planning Law, number 4240 of the fifteenth of November, nineteen sixty-eight and its amendments, insofar as it exceeds constitutional limits regarding normative regulation via budget laws, as it is an atypical norm; the Construction Regulations (Reglamento de Construcciones), issued by the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo (INVU), specifically in Articles I.1 through XI.26.3, and their amendments also agreed upon by the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, insofar as it was issued based on a competence granted by an atypical norm, and thereby exceeding the limits of the regulatory power, which corresponds exclusively to the Executive Branch or to local governments -Municipalities- in what refers to their jurisdiction (cantonal), since the regulatory competence of the INVU refers only to its internal organization or the provision of its services; and by association, against Article 5, subsection a.) of the Organic Law of the INVU, number 1788, of the twenty-fourth of August, nineteen fifty-four, insofar as it establishes procedures related to the obtainment of a municipal license in matters concerning roads or sidewalks, in which there is no competence derived from law, as its administration corresponds to municipal entities or the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. It also indicates that the legal powers to regulate matters of urban planning, construction, etc., belong exclusively to local corporations, and not to the INVU or any other entity.

2.- Appearing as a prior matter is the administrative claim being processed before the Dirección de Urbanismo of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, for the denial of operating permits for a hotel. It also bases its standing to bring this action on the consideration that in this particular case, the existence of a pending matter is not necessary, _since it concerns the defense of diffuse interests that concern the community as a whole (Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction)._ 3.- By resolution at thirteen hours forty-five minutes on the seventh of May of the current year, the action was admitted, granting a hearing to the Procuraduría General de la República and the Dirección de Urbanismo of the Instituto de Vivienda y Urbanismo.

4.- The Procuraduría General de la República, in responding to the hearing granted, requests that the action be rejected outright as inadmissible, insofar as, in the case serving as the basis for the action, the party exhausting the administrative procedure (vía administrativa) is the Executive Branch, in accordance with the provisions of Article 13 of the Urban Planning Law, and at the time of filing the action, an appeal before the Dirección de Urbanismo is pending; likewise, it indicates that, in this specific case, there are no diffuse interests or ones that concern the community as a whole. Regarding the merits, it considers that the challenged regulations are not contrary to Articles 140, subsection 3.), 169, and 170 of the Political Constitution, nor do they violate the principle of municipal autonomy, and therefore recommends that the action be dismissed. In relation to Article 115 of Law 7015, of November, nineteen ninety-five, it indicates that according to the administrative and jurisprudential background, it considers there is no discussion whatsoever regarding the assessment that the content of

Transitory Provision II of the Urban Planning Law is not a matter

proper to budget execution, and therefore, it is contrary to the constitutional norms regulating the budget, since it should have been approved through the ordinary legislative procedure. However, it indicates that if declared unconstitutional, this norm would cause the text of the Transitory Provision approved by ordinary law number 5900, of the nineteenth of April, nineteen seventy-six, to come back into force, thereby maintaining the _supplementary_ nature of the INVU regulations in cases where there is no promulgation of Regulatory Plans (Planes Reguladores) issued by the respective municipalities. It alleges that both Transitory Provision II of the Urban Planning Law and Article 5 of the Organic Law of the INVU do not deny the competence of local governments in urban planning matters, _quite the contrary_, they recognize it and make it prevail over the general regulation of the INVU. It seems rather that the unconstitutionality derives from the omission or inertia of the municipalities in issuing their regulatory plans (planes reguladores) and regulations in urban planning matters. The constitutionality of the Construction Regulations (Reglamento de Construcciones) issued by the INVU derives from these norms, in relation to the provisions of Article 21 of the Urban Planning Law; therefore, the regulations drafted by this institution, except for internal ones, are, like the regulatory plans, of supplementary application, which implies they would be applicable in the event of inertia by the municipality in the respective matter. The foregoing is grounded in the public interest of not leaving this matter without regulation.

5.- Rodolfo Sancho Rojas, in his capacity as Acting Director of the Dirección de Urbanismo, indicates that in the case under study there is no pending matter to be resolved, as mandated by Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, since it is based on the appeal for reconsideration or appeal before the hierarchical superior that exhausts the administrative procedure (vía administrativa), that this requirement is met. In this regard, he indicates that: 1.- on the twenty-ninth of August, nineteen ninety-four, the Dirección de Urbanismo of the INVU rejected the remodeling permit for an office building to convert it into a hotel, because the submitted plans suffered from a series of non-compliances, in relation to the Construction Regulations (Reglamento de Construcciones); which were not corrected, a regulation whose mandatory compliance was indicated to them; 2.- on the tenth of May, nineteen ninety-five, the Junta Directiva of the INVU, in session number 4505 in Article VI, declared without merit the appeal (recurso de apelación) brought by the plaintiff company against the resolutions of the Dirección de Urbanismo UR-101, of the twenty-third of January and UR-398, of the thirteenth of March, both of nineteen ninety-five, and upheld the criterion issued by the Dirección de Urbanismo of not granting the approval for use, because the project violates Article 5 of the Construction Law and Articles III.4.1. and IV.13 of the Construction Regulations (Reglamento de Construcciones) (folio 61); 3.- on the seventh of June of the same year, in session number 4513, in Article XIII, it rejected as improper the appeal for reconsideration (recurso de reconsideración) brought against the previous resolution (ordinary session of the Junta Directiva number 4505, Article VI.), and furthermore, it was indicated that it was not the responsibility of that instance to declare the administrative procedure (vía administrativa) exhausted, but rather it corresponds to the Executive Branch (folio 62); 4.- on the nineteenth of July of the same year, in session number 4525, in Article IX, it rejected as improper the motion to nullify (incidente de nulidad) filed against the resolution of the Junta Directiva in session number 4513, Article XIII (folio 64). The plaintiff has not demonstrated that it filed the reconsideration with the Executive Branch of the decisions made by the Junta Directiva of the INVU, as provided in Article 13 of the Urban Planning Law. Regarding the merits, it argues that the challenged regulations do not prove contrary to Articles 140, subsections 3.), 169, and 170 of the Political Constitution, since if the amendment to Transitory Provision II of the Urban Planning Law, given in Law number 7015, were declared unconstitutional, the text approved by ordinary law number 5900 would remain in force, which maintains the supplementary competence of the INVU in urban planning matters, insofar as local governments have not issued the respective norms. This competence of the INVU is also framed within the provisions of Article 5 of the Organic Law of the INVU.

6.- The notices referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were published in Judicial Bulletins (Boletines Judiciales) numbers 97, 98, and 99 on the days twenty-second, twenty-third, and twenty-fourth of May of the current year.

7.- The first paragraph of Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers this Chamber to, at any procedural stage, reject outright the actions brought before it, when it considers them manifestly improper and unfounded.

Drafted by Judge Mora Mora, and

Considerando:

I. ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION. Article 75 of the

Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the prerequisites for admissibility in actions of unconstitutionality, and regulates three different situations: in the first paragraph, it requires the existence of a pending matter to be resolved, whether in a judicial venue, including habeas corpus or amparo appeals, or in the administrative venue, in the procedure for exhausting this procedure (vía), in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the principal matter; in the second and third paragraphs, the direct action is regulated -the underlying matter is not required-, in the following cases: when by the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury, or when it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those that concern the community as a whole; and when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los Habitantes.

II. The requirement for the existence of a pending matter to

be resolved, established in the first paragraph of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, as noted above, has been interpreted by this Chamber in such a way that the mere existence of that matter is not sufficient, nor is the simple invocation of unconstitutionality of the challenged norm, but rather the action of unconstitutionality must constitute a _reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured_, as provided by the norm under discussion, that is, the mere invocation of unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is not enough; rather, it must be applicable -directly or indirectly- to the matter that supports the action; as this Chamber has repeatedly stated, among others, see rulings 1668-90, 4085-93, 0798-94, 3615-94, 0409-I-95, 0851-95, 4190-95, 0791-96.

III. Indeed, the Procuraduría General de la República

and the representative of the Dirección de Urbanismo of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo (INVU) are correct in stating that the action is inadmissible. In the case under study, the company _Refinadora Costarricense de Metales Preciosos, Sociedad Anónima_ indicates that it has the municipal license for the operation of lucrative activities, and that for the operation of a hotel, it had the municipal remodeling permits authorized and supervised by the Municipality of Tibás; but that prior to authorizing the license for hotel operation, it was indicated that it needed the approval of the Urbanismo Office of the INVU. On the twenty-third of January, nineteen ninety-five, it was notified that since the twenty-ninth of August of the previous year, its remodeling request had been rejected because the submitted plans suffered from a series of non-compliances in relation to the Construction Regulations (Reglamento de Construcciones) -a regulation whose mandatory compliance was indicated- which were not corrected. On the tenth of May, nineteen ninety-five, the Junta Directiva of the INVU in session number 4505 in Article VI, declared without merit the appeal (recurso de apelación) brought by the plaintiff company against the resolutions of the Dirección de Urbanismo that denied its request, upholding the criterion issued by the Dirección de Urbanismo of not granting the approval for use, because the project violates Article 5 of the Construction Law and Articles III.4.1. and IV.13 of the Construction Regulations (Reglamento de Construcciones) (folio 61). On the seventh of June of the same year, in session number 4513, in Article XIII, the Junta Directiva of the INVU rejected as improper the appeal for reconsideration (recurso de reconsideración) brought against the previous resolution (ordinary session of the Junta Directiva number 4505, Article VI), and furthermore, it was indicated that it was not the responsibility of that instance to declare the administrative procedure (vía administrativa) exhausted, but rather it corresponded to the Executive Branch (folio 62). On the nineteenth of July of the same year, in session number 4525, in Article IX, it rejected as improper the motion to nullify (incidente de nulidad) filed against the resolution of the Junta Directiva in session number 4513, Article XIII (folio 64). This action of unconstitutionality was filed on the tenth of April, nineteen ninety-five, that is, at the time of filing, it was not at the stage of exhausting the administrative procedure (vía), as required by the first paragraph of the cited Article 75, but rather the appeal (recurso de apelación) brought by the plaintiff company before the Junta Directiva of the INVU against the resolutions of the Dirección de Urbanismo denying the requested permit (UR-101, of the twenty-third of January and UR-398, of the thirteenth of March, both of nineteen ninety-five) was still pending resolution. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that Article 13 of the Urban Planning Law establishes:

_Municipalities and affected parties may request the Junta Directiva of the Institute to review the decisions of the Dirección de Urbanismo.

Against what the Junta Directiva resolves in the matters included in subsections 1.), 2.), and 4.) of Article 10, an appeal may be filed within a period of fifteen business days, counted from the date on which the resolution is notified, before the Executive Branch, which will hear, when it deems it appropriate, the opinion of the Junta Directiva of the _Colegio de Ingenieros y Arquitectos_ within a period that it will set for this purpose and which may not exceed thirty days. After that period, the Executive Branch will resolve within the thirty following days and the administrative procedure (vía administrativa) will be exhausted._; and Article 10 of the Urban Planning Law, in the subsections of interest, provides:

_It is also the responsibility of the Dirección de Urbanismo, within the control functions assigned to it by subsection 4.) of Article 7, the following:

1.) Review and approve the regulatory plans (planes reguladores) and their regulations, prior to their adoption by the municipalities; 2.) Examine and approve, in an unavoidable manner, the plans corresponding to urbanization projects or subdivision (fraccionamiento) projects for urbanization purposes, prior to their municipal approval; [...]

4.) Order the suspension of any work in which the infractions contemplated in the previous subsection have occurred when, after a reasonable period has elapsed since the respective complaint was filed, the municipality does not act as it should, in the sense of preventing or correcting the noted transgression; [...]_; whereby it is clear that in cases where a work suspension is ordered, as in the case at hand, the party that exhausts the administrative procedure (vía administrativa) is the Executive Branch. Likewise, as confirmed by the response of the Acting Director of the Dirección de Urbanismo, the matter supporting this action has already been definitively resolved by the Junta Directiva of the INVU, without the plaintiff company, upon being notified of the rejection of the motion to nullify (incidente de nulidad) brought against Article XIII of session number 4513 of the seventh of June, nineteen ninety-five, filing the respective appeal before the Executive Branch, to have the administrative procedure (vía administrativa) exhausted, even though the Junta Directiva itself had clarified that it was not the responsibility of that institution to exhaust that procedure (vía).

IV. Finally, in this specific case, we are definitely not

faced with the defense of a diffuse interest, which this Chamber has characterized as:

"That concept of 'diffuse interests' aims to develop a form of standing, which in recent times has constituted one of the traditional principles of standing and has been gaining ground, especially in the field of administrative law, as a final broadening, novel but necessary, so that it is increasingly more effective and efficient. Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our Law -as this Chamber has already stated- merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership blends with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that against them determined or easily identifiable persons, or personalized groups, are identified, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones or those that concern a community as a whole. It concerns, then, individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive a benefit or a detriment, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, for which it is rightly said that it concerns equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them.

That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, as they are at once collective -for being common to a generality- and individual, for which they can be claimed in that capacity." (Ruling number 3750-93); Nor are we faced with an interest that concerns the community as a whole, or a corporate interest, since the plaintiff brings this action in his personal capacity, and not in representation of any legally organized association or group whose purpose is to defend the interests of the guild it associates. Finally, by virtue of the nature of the matter raised, an individual and direct injury is indeed produced, to the detriment of the persons to whom the challenged regulations are applied, which implies the need for a pending matter to be resolved, under the terms established in the cited Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.

V. Based on the foregoing reasons, it is appropriate to

reject the action outright, under the protection of the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 9 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction.

Por tanto:

The action is rejected outright Luis Paulino Mora Mora Luis Fernando Solano C. Nombre44110 .

Carlos Arguedas R. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

José Luis Molina Q. Fernando Albertazzi H.

It further points out that the legal authority to regulate matters of urban planning, construction, etc., belongs exclusively to local corporations, and not to the INVU or any other entity.

2.- The prior matter is the administrative claim being processed before the Urban Planning Directorate (Dirección de Urbanismo) of the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism (Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo), regarding the denial of operating permits for a hotel. It also bases its standing to promote this proceeding on the consideration that, in this particular case, the existence of a pending matter is not required, *since it concerns the defense of diffuse interests that pertain to the community as a whole (article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).* 3.- By resolution at one forty-five in the afternoon on May seventh of the current year, the action was admitted, and a hearing was granted to the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) and the Urban Planning Directorate of the Institute of Housing and Urbanism.

4.- The Office of the Attorney General, in responding to the granted hearing, requests that the action be summarily dismissed as inadmissible, given that, in the case serving as the basis for the action, it is the Executive Branch that exhausts the administrative channel, in accordance with the provisions of article 13 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), and at the time the action was filed, an appeal before the Urban Planning Directorate was known to be pending; likewise, it points out that, in the specific case, there are no diffuse interests or those pertaining to the community as a whole. Regarding the merits, it considers that the challenged regulations are not contrary to articles 140 subsection 3.), 169, and 170 of the Political Constitution, nor do they violate the principle of municipal autonomy, and therefore it recommends that the action be dismissed. In relation to article 115 of Law 7015, of November nineteen ninety-five, it points out that according to administrative and jurisprudential precedents, it considers there is no discussion whatsoever regarding the assessment that the content of Transitory Provision II of the Urban Planning Law is not a matter proper to budget execution, and therefore, it is contrary to the constitutional norms regulating the budget, as it should have been approved through the ordinary legislative procedure. However, it points out that if this norm were declared unconstitutional, the text of the Transitory Provision approved by ordinary law number 5900, of April nineteenth nineteen seventy-six, would come back into effect, thereby maintaining the *supplementary* nature of the INVU regulations in cases where there are no enacted Regulatory Plans (Planes Reguladores) issued by the respective municipalities. It alleges that both Transitory Provision II of the Urban Planning Law and article 5 of the Organic Law of the INVU (Ley Orgánica del INVU) do not deny the competence of local governments in matters of urban planning; *quite the contrary*, they recognize it and make it prevail over the general regulation of the INVU. It would seem rather that the unconstitutionality derives from the omission or inertia of the municipalities in issuing their regulatory plans and regulations on urban planning. The constitutionality of the Construction Regulations (Reglamento de Construcciones) issued by the INVU derives from these norms, in relation to what is established in article 21 of the Urban Planning Law; therefore, the regulations prepared by this institution, except for internal ones, are, like the regulatory plans, of supplementary application, which implies they would be applicable in the event of municipal inertia in the respective matter. The foregoing is based on the public interest of not leaving this matter without regulation.

5.- Rodolfo Sancho Rojas, in his capacity as Acting Director of the Urban Planning Directorate, points out that in the case under study, there is no pending matter to be resolved, as ordered by article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, since it is through the motion for reconsideration or appeal before the superior hierarchical authority that exhausts the administrative channel, that this requirement is fulfilled. In this regard, he points out that: 1.- on August twenty-ninth nineteen ninety-four, the Urban Planning Directorate of the INVU rejected the remodeling permit for an office building to convert it into a hotel, because the submitted plans suffered from a series of non-compliances, in relation to the Construction Regulations, which were not corrected, and which regulation was indicated to them as mandatory; 2.- on May tenth nineteen ninety-five, the Board of Directors of the INVU, in session number 4505, article VI, dismissed the appeal filed by the plaintiff company against the resolutions of the Urban Planning Directorate UR-101, of January twenty-third and UR-398, of March thirteenth, both of nineteen ninety-five, and upheld the criterion issued by the Urban Planning Directorate not to grant the certificate of use approval (visto bueno de uso), because the project fails to comply with article 5 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones) and articles III.4.1. and IV.13 of the Construction Regulations (folio 61); 3.- on June seventh of the same year, in session number 4513, article XIII, it rejected as inadmissible the motion for reconsideration filed against the previous resolution (ordinary session of the Board of Directors number 4505, article VI.), and furthermore, it was indicated that it was not for that instance to deem the administrative channel exhausted, but that it is the responsibility of the Executive Branch (folio 62); 4.- on July nineteenth of the same year, in session number 4525, article IX, the nullity motion filed against the resolution of the Board of Directors in session number 4513, article XIII was rejected as inadmissible (folio 64). The plaintiff has not demonstrated that it filed for reconsideration before the Executive Branch of the decisions made by the Board of Directors of the INVU, as provided by article 13 of the Urban Planning Law. Regarding the merits, it argues that the challenged regulations are not contrary to articles 140 subsections 3.), 169, and 170 of the Political Constitution, since if the reform of Transitory Provision II of the Urban Planning Law, enacted in Law number 7015, were declared unconstitutional, the wording from ordinary law number 5900 would remain in force, which maintains the supplementary competence of the INVU in the matter of urban planning, as long as the local governments have not issued the respective rules. This competence of the INVU is also framed within the provisions of article 5 of the Organic Law of the INVU.

6.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were published in Judicial Bulletins (Boletines Judiciales) numbers 97, 98, and 99 of the twenty-second, twenty-third, and twenty-fourth of May of the current year.

7.- The first paragraph of article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers this Chamber to summarily dismiss, at any procedural stage, the proceedings brought before it, when it considers them to be manifestly improper and unfounded.

Prepared by Magistrate Mora Mora, and

Considering:

I.ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the prerequisites for admissibility in unconstitutionality actions and regulates three distinct situations: in the first paragraph, it requires the existence of a pending matter to be resolved, whether in a judicial venue, including habeas corpus or amparo appeals, or in the administrative venue, in the procedure for exhausting this channel, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter; in the second and third paragraphs, direct action is regulated—the base matter is not required—in the following cases: when, by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those pertaining to the community as a whole; and when the action is brought by the Attorney General, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, and the Ombudsperson.

II.The requirement of the existence of a pending matter to be resolved, established in the first paragraph of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, as previously noted, has been interpreted by this Chamber in such a way that the mere existence of that matter is not sufficient, nor is the simple invocation of the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm, but rather the unconstitutionality action must constitute a *reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured*, as provided by the norm under discussion; that is, the mere invocation of the unconstitutionality of the questioned norm is not sufficient, but it must be applicable—directly or indirectly—in the matter supporting the action; as this Chamber has repeatedly stated, see, among others, rulings 1668-90, 4085-93, 0798-94, 3615-94, 0409-I-95, 0851-95, 4190-95, 0791-96.

III.Indeed, the Office of the Attorney General and the representative of the Urban Planning Directorate of the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism (INVU) are correct in pointing out that the action is inadmissible. In the case under study, the company *Refinadora Costarricense de Metales Preciosos, Sociedad Anónima* states that it has the municipal license for operating lucrative activities, and that for the operation of a hotel, it obtained municipally authorized and supervised remodeling permits from the Municipality of Tibás; but prior to authorizing the license for hotel operation, it was told it needed the approval from the Urbanism Office of the INVU. On January twenty-third nineteen ninety-five, it was notified that since August twenty-ninth of the previous year, its remodeling application had been rejected because the submitted plans suffered from a series of non-compliances in relation to the Construction Regulations—regulation indicated as mandatory—that were not corrected. On May tenth nineteen ninety-five, the Board of Directors of the INVU, in session number 4505, article VI, dismissed the appeal filed by the plaintiff company against the resolutions of the Urban Planning Directorate that denied its application, upholding the criterion issued by the Urban Planning Directorate not to grant the certificate of use approval, because the project fails to comply with article 5 of the Construction Law and articles III.4.1. and IV.13 of the Construction Regulations (folio 61). On June seventh of the same year, in session number 4513, article XIII, the Board of Directors of the INVU rejected as inadmissible the motion for reconsideration filed against the previous resolution (ordinary session of the Board of Directors number 4505, article VI), and furthermore, it was indicated that it was not for that instance to deem the administrative channel exhausted, but that it was the responsibility of the Executive Branch (folio 62). On July nineteenth of the same year, in session number 4525, article IX, the nullity motion filed against the resolution of the Board of Directors in session number 4513, article XIII was rejected as inadmissible (folio 64). This unconstitutionality claim was filed on April tenth nineteen ninety-five; that is, at the time it was filed, it was not in the stage of exhausting the administrative channel, as required by the first paragraph of the cited article 75; rather, the appeal filed by the plaintiff company before the Board of Directors of the INVU against the resolutions of the Urban Planning Directorate denying the requested permit (UR-101, of January twenty-third and UR-398, of March thirteenth, both of nineteen ninety-five) was still pending resolution. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that article 13 of the Urban Planning Law establishes: *The municipalities and the affected parties may request the Board of Directors of the Institute to review the decisions of the Urban Planning Directorate. Decisions made by the Board of Directors on matters covered in subsections 1.), 2.), and 4.) of article 10 may be appealed, within a period of fifteen working days counted from the date the resolution is notified, before the Executive Branch, which shall hear, when it deems it appropriate, the opinion of the Board of Directors of the College of Engineers and Architects within the period it shall set for that purpose, which may not exceed thirty days. After that period, the Executive Branch shall rule within the following thirty days and the administrative channel shall be deemed exhausted.*; and article 10 of the Urban Planning Law, in the relevant subsections, provides: *It also falls to the Urban Planning Directorate, within the control functions assigned to it by subsection 4.) of article 7, the following: 1.) To review and approve regulatory plans and their regulations, before their adoption by the municipalities; 2.) To examine and certify (visar), in an unavoidable manner, the plans for urbanization projects or subdivisions for urbanization purposes, prior to their municipal approval; [...] 4.) To order the suspension of any construction work where the infractions contemplated in the previous subsection have occurred when, after a reasonable period has elapsed since it filed the respective complaint, the municipality fails to act as it should, in order to prevent or correct the noted transgression; [...]; making it clear that in cases where a work suspension is ordered, as in the case before us, it is the Executive Branch that exhausts the administrative channel. Likewise, as is confirmed by the response of the Acting Director.

of the Urban Planning Department (Dirección de Urbanismo), the matter that provides the basis for this action was already definitively resolved by the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of INVU, without the plaintiff company, upon being notified of the rejection of the motion to set aside (incidente de nulidad) filed against article XIII of session number 4513 of June seventh, nineteen ninety-five, having filed the respective recourse before the Executive Branch, in order to have the administrative remedy exhausted (agotada la vía administrativa), despite the fact that the Board of Directors itself had clarified that it was not that institution's responsibility to exhaust that remedy.

IV.Finally, in the specific case, we are definitively not faced with the defense of a diffuse interest (interés difuso), which this Chamber has characterized as:

"That concept of 'diffuse interests' (intereses difusos) aims to develop a form of standing (legitimación), which in recent times has constituted one of the traditional principles of standing and has been making its way, especially in the field of administrative law, as a final, novel but necessary broadening, so that it becomes increasingly more effective and efficient. Diffuse interests (intereses difusos), although difficult to define and even more difficult to identify, cannot under our Law -as this Chamber has already stated- be merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that against them, specific persons or personalized groups are identifiable or easily identifiable, whose standing (legitimación) would derive, not from diffuse interests (intereses difusos), but from corporate interests or those that concern a community as a whole. It is, then, a matter of individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive a benefit or a harm, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, for which reason it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each of them. That is, diffuse interests (intereses difusos) share a dual nature, since they are at once collective -because they are common to a generality- and individual, for which reason they can be claimed in that capacity." (Judgment number 3750-93); Neither are we faced with an interest that concerns the community as a whole, or a corporate interest, since the plaintiff brings this action in his personal capacity, and not as a representative of any legally organized association or group, whose purpose is to defend the interests of the guild it associates. Finally, by virtue of the nature of the matter raised, an individual and direct harm is indeed produced, to the detriment of the persons to whom the challenged regulations are applied, which implies the need for a matter pending resolution, in the terms established in the cited article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

V.Based on the foregoing reasons, it is appropriate to dismiss the action outright (rechazar de plano la acción), under the provisions of the first paragraph of article 9 of the Law that governs this Jurisdiction.

Therefore (Por tanto):

The action is dismissed outright (Se rechaza de plano la acción) Luis Paulino Mora Mora President Luis Fernando Solano C. Nombre44110 .

Carlos Arguedas R. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

José Luis Molina Q. Fernando Albertazzi H.

The authority of INVU is also framed within the provisions of Article 5 of the INVU Organic Law.

6.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law were published in Judicial Bulletins numbers 97, 98, and 99 of the twenty-second, twenty-third, and twenty-fourth of May of the current year.

7.- The first paragraph of Article 9 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law empowers this Chamber to, at any procedural stage, summarily dismiss claims brought before it when it considers them to be manifestly improper and unfounded.

Drafted by Magistrate Mora Mora, and

Considering:

I.ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION. Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law establishes the admissibility requirements for unconstitutionality actions and regulates three distinct situations: in the first paragraph, it requires the existence of a pending matter to be resolved, whether in a judicial venue, including habeas corpus or amparo remedies, or in the administrative venue, at the exhaustion of administrative remedies stage, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed in the principal matter; the second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action—no underlying matter is required—in the following cases: when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those that affect the community as a whole; and when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los Habitantes.

II.The requirement of the existence of a pending matter to be resolved, established in the first paragraph of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, as noted above, has been interpreted by this Chamber in such a way that the mere existence of that matter, or the simple invocation of the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm, is not sufficient; rather, the unconstitutionality action must constitute a *reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed*, just as the norm under discussion provides. That is, the simple invocation of the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is not enough; instead, it must be applicable—directly or indirectly—in the matter that supports the action; as this Chamber has repeatedly stated, among others, see judgments 1668-90, 4085-93, 0798-94, 3615-94, 0409-I-95, 0851-95, 4190-95, 0791-96.

III.Indeed, the Procuraduría General de la República and the representative of the Dirección de Urbanismo of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo (INVU) are correct in pointing out that the action is inadmissible. In the case under study, the company *Refinadora Costarricense de Metales Preciosos, Sociedad Anónima* states that it holds the municipal license to operate for-profit activities, and that for the operation of a hotel, it had the authorized municipal remodeling permits supervised by the Municipalidad de Tibás; but that prior to authorizing the license for hotel operation, it was told that it required the approval of the INVU Office of Urbanism. On January twenty-third, nineteen ninety-five, it was notified that since August twenty-ninth of the previous year, its remodeling application had been rejected because the submitted plans suffered from a series of non-compliances regarding the Construction Regulations—rules that were indicated as mandatory—which were not corrected. On May tenth, nineteen ninety-five, the INVU Board of Directors, in session number 4505, Article VI, denied the appeal filed by the claimant company against the resolutions of the Dirección de Urbanismo that denied its application, maintaining the criterion issued by the Dirección de Urbanismo of not granting the land-use approval (visto bueno de uso), because the project fails to comply with Article 5 of the Construction Law and Articles III.4.1. and IV.13 of the Construction Regulations (folio 61). On June seventh of the same year, in session number 4513, Article XIII, the INVU Board of Directors rejected as improper the reconsideration remedy filed against the previous resolution (ordinary session of the Board of Directors number 4505, Article VI), and it was also indicated to the party that it was not for that body to deem the administrative route exhausted, but rather that this corresponded to the Poder Ejecutivo (folio 62). On July nineteenth of the same year, in session number 4525, Article IX, the motion to nullify filed against the Board of Directors' resolution in session number 4513, Article XIII, was rejected as improper (folio 64). This unconstitutionality claim was filed on April tenth, nineteen ninety-five; that is, at the time of filing, it was not at the administrative remedies exhaustion stage, as required by the first paragraph of the aforementioned Article 75, but rather the appeal filed by the claimant company before the INVU Board of Directors against the resolutions of the Dirección de Urbanismo that denied the requested permit (UR-101, of January twenty-third and UR-398, of March thirteenth, both of nineteen ninety-five) was still pending resolution. In this regard, it must be kept in mind that Article 13 of the Urban Planning Law establishes: *The municipalities and the affected parties may request the Institute’s Board of Directors review of the decisions of the Dirección de Urbanismo. From what the Board of Directors resolves on matters included in subsections 1.), 2.), and 4.) of Article 10, an appeal may be filed within fifteen business days, counted from the date the resolution is notified, before the Poder Ejecutivo, which shall hear, when it deems appropriate, the opinion of the Board of Directors of the *Colegio de Ingenieros y Arquitectos* within the deadline it shall set for that purpose, which may not exceed thirty days. Once that deadline has passed, the Poder Ejecutivo shall resolve within the following thirty days, and the administrative route shall be exhausted.*; and Article 10 of the Urban Planning Law, in the relevant subsections, provides: *It also corresponds to the Dirección de Urbanismo, within the control functions assigned to it by subsection 4.) of Article 7, the following: 1.) Review and approve regulatory plans and their regulations, prior to their adoption by the municipalities; 2.) Examine and approve, in an unavoidable manner, the plans corresponding to urbanization projects or subdivision (fraccionamiento) projects for urbanization purposes, prior to their municipal approval; [...] 4.) Order the suspension of any work where the infractions contemplated in the previous subsection have occurred when, after a reasonable period has elapsed since the respective complaint was filed, the municipality does not act as it should, in the sense of preventing or correcting the noted transgression; [...]*; with which it is clear that in cases where a work suspension is ordered, as in the case before us, it is the Poder Ejecutivo that exhausts the administrative route. Likewise, as confirmed by the response of the Acting Director of the Dirección de Urbanismo, the matter supporting this action was already definitively resolved by the INVU Board of Directors, without the claimant company, upon being notified of the rejection of the motion to nullify filed against Article XIII of session number 4513 of June seventh, nineteen ninety-five, having filed the corresponding remedy before the Poder Ejecutivo to have the administrative route considered exhausted, even though the Board of Directors itself had clarified to it that it was not for that institution to exhaust that route.

IV.Finally, in this specific case, we are definitively not faced with the defense of a diffuse interest, which this Chamber has characterized as: "That concept of 'diffuse interests' aims to develop a form of standing which, in recent times, has constituted one of the traditional principles of standing and which has been gaining ground, especially in the field of Administrative Law, as the latest, novel but necessary expansion, so that it is increasingly effective and efficient. Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and even more difficult to identify, cannot be in our Law—as this Chamber has already stated—purely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership merges with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that, facing them, specific persons or personalized groups are identified or easily identifiable, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones or those that affect a community as a whole. It concerns, then, individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive a benefit or harm, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, which is why it is rightly said that these are equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, since they are simultaneously collective—being common to a generality—and individual, which is why they can be claimed in such capacity." (Judgment number 3750-93); Neither are we faced with an interest that affects the community as a whole, or a corporate interest, since the claimant brings this action in their personal capacity, and not as a representative of any legally organized association or group whose purpose is to defend the interests of the guild it associates. Finally, by virtue of the nature of the matter raised, an individual and direct harm is indeed produced, to the detriment of persons to whom the challenged regulations are applied, which implies the need for a pending matter to be resolved, in the terms established in the aforementioned Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law.

V.Based on the foregoing reasons, it is appropriate to summarily dismiss the action, under the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 9 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction.

Therefore:

The action is summarily dismissed.

Luis Paulino Mora Mora President Luis Fernando Solano C. Nombre44110 .

Carlos Arguedas R. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

José Luis Molina Q. Fernando Albertazzi H.

04242 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.- San José, a las dieciséis horas veinticuatro minutos del veinte de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y seis.

Acción de Inconstitucionalidad promovida por Nombre129193 , mayor, casado, abogado, vecino de San José, cédula de identidad número CED57932, en su condición de apoderado especial judicial de la empresa _REFINADORA COSTARRICENSE DE METALES PRECIOSOS, SOCIEDAD ANONIMA_, contra el artículo 115 de la Ley número 7015, del veintidós de noviembre de mil novecientos ochenta y cinco, que es Ley de Modificación del Presupuesto Ordinario del Período Fiscal para mil novecientos noventa y cinco, que modificó el Transitorio II de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, número 4240 del quince de noviembre de mil novecientos sesenta y ocho y sus reformas, el Reglamento de Construcciones, dictado por el Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, específicamente en los artículos I.1 hasta el XI.26.3, y sus reformas acordados también por el Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo; y por conexidad, contra el artículo 5 inciso a.) de la Ley Orgánica del INVU, número 1788, del veinticuatro de agosto de mil novecientos cincuenta y cuatro. Intervienen el Licenciado Farid Beirute Brenes, en su condición de Procurador General Adjunto de la República y el Director a.i. de la Dirección de Urbanismo, Rodolfo Sancho Rojas.

Resultando:

1.- El representante de la empresa _Refinadora Costarricense de Metales Preciosos, Sociedad Anónima_, promueve acción contra el artículo 115 de la Ley número 7015, del veintidós de noviembre de mil novecientos ochenta y cinco, que es Ley de Modificación del Presupuesto Ordinario del Período Fiscal para mil novecientos noventa y cinco, que modificó el Transitorio II de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, número 4240 del quince de noviembre de mil novecientos sesenta y ocho y sus reformas, en cuanto rebasa los límites constitucionales en lo que se refiere a la regulación normativa vía leyes de presupuesto, por tratarse de una norma atípica; el Reglamento de Construcciones, dictado por el Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo (INVU), específicamente en los artículos I.1 hasta el XI.26.3, y sus reformas acordados también por el Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, en cuanto fue dictado con fundamento en una competencia dada por una norma atípica, y excediendo con ello los límites de la potestad reglamentaria, la cual corresponde exclusivamente al Poder Ejecutivo o a los gobiernos locales -Municipalidades- en lo que se refiere a su jurisdicción (cantonal), ya que la competencia reglamentaria del INVU se refiere únicamente a su organización interna o a la prestación de sus servicios; y por conexidad, contra el artículo 5 inciso a.) de la Ley Orgánica del INVU, número 1788, del veinticuatro de agosto de mil novecientos cincuenta y cuatro, en cuanto establece gestiones atinentes a la obtención de una licencia municipal en la materia referente a las vías o aceras, en la cual no hay competencia derivada de ley, por corresponder su administración a los entes municipales o al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. Señala, además, que las facultades legales para ordenar la materia de urbanismo, construcción, etc., competen exclusivamente a las corporaciones locales, y no al INVU ni a ninguna otra entidad.

2.- Figura como asunto previo el reclamo administrativo que se tramita ante la Dirección de Urbanismo del Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, por la negación de permisos de funcionamiento de un hotel. También fundamenta su legitimación para promover esta gestión, en la consideración de que en el caso en particular, no es necesaria la existencia de un asunto pendiente, _pues se trata de la defensa intereses difusos y que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto (artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional)._ 3.- Por resolución de las trece horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del siete de mayo del año en curso, se le dio curso a la acción, confiriéndosele audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la República y a la Dirección de Urbanismo del Instituto de Vivienda y Urbanismo.

4.- La Procuraduría General de la República, al contestar la audiencia concedida, solicita que la acción sea rechazada de plano por resultar inadmisible, en cuanto, en el caso que figura como base de la acción, quien agota la vía administrativa es el Poder Ejecutivo, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 13 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, y en el momento de presentarse la acción, se conoce de una apelación ante la Dirección de Urbanismo; asimismo, señala que, en el caso en concreto, no existen intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. En cuanto al fondo, estima que la normativa impugnada no es contraria a los artículos 140 inciso 3.), 169 y 170 de la Constitución Política, ni quebranta el principio de autonomía municipal, por lo que recomienda se declare sin lugar la acción. En relación con el artículo 115 de la Ley 7015, de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, señala que de acuerdo con los antecedentes administrativos y jurisprudenciales, considera que no hay discusión alguna respecto a la valoración de que el contenido del

Transitorio II de la Ley de Planificación Urbana no es materia

propia de ejecución presupuestaria, por lo que, resulta contraria a las normas constitucionales que regulan el presupuesto, ya que debió haberse aprobado mediante el procedimiento legislativo ordinario. Sin embargo, señala que de declararse inconstitucional esta norma, entraría a regir nuevamente el texto del Transitorio aprobado mediante ley ordinaria número 5900, del diecinueve de abril de mil novecientos setenta y seis, manteniéndose con ello el carácter _supletorio_ de la normativa del INVU en los casos en que no exista promulgación de Planes Reguladores dictados por las respectivas municipalidades. Alega que tanto el Transitorio II de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, como el artículo 5 de la Ley Orgánica del INVU, no niegan la competencia de los gobiernos locales en la materia de urbanismo, _todo lo contrario_, la reconocen y hacen prevalecer frente a la regulación general del INVU. Pareciera más bien que la inconstitucionalidad deriva de la omisión o inercia de las municipalidades de dictar sus planes reguladores y reglamentos en la materia de urbanismo. La constitucionalidad del reglamento de Construcciones dictado por el INVU deriva de estas normas, en relación con lo establecido en el artículo 21 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana; por lo que los reglamentos que elabora esta institución, salvo el interno, son, al igual que los planes reguladores, de una aplicación supletoria, lo que implica que serían susceptibles de aplicar en el supuesto de inercia de la municipalidad en la materia respectiva. Lo anterior encuentra fundamento en el interés público de no dejar sin normativa esta materia.

5.- Rodolfo Sancho Rojas, en su condición de Director a.i. de la Dirección de Urbanismo, señala que en el caso en estudio no existe asunto pendiente de resolver, conforme lo ordena el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, ya que es con fundamento en el recurso de reconsideración o de alzada ante el superior jerarca que agota la vía administrativa, que se cumple este requisito. En este sentido señala que: 1.- el veintinueve de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, la Dirección de Urbanismo del INVU rechaza el permiso de remodelación de un edificio de oficinas para convertirlo en un hotel, por adolecer los planos presentados de una serie de incumplimientos, en relación con el Reglamento de Construcciones; que no fueron corregidos, normativa que se le señaló de acatamiento obligatorio; 2.- el diez de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, la Junta Directiva del INVU en sesión número 4505 en el artículo VI, declaró sin lugar el recurso de apelación promovido por la empresa accionante contra las resoluciones de la Dirección de Urbanismo UR-101, del veintitrés de enero y UR-398, del trece de marzo, ambas de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, y se mantiene el criterio emitido por la Dirección de Urbanismo de no otorgarle el visto bueno de uso, porque el proyecto incumple el artículo 5 de la Ley de Construcciones y los artículos III.4.1. y IV.13 del Reglamento de Construcciones (folio 61); 3.- el siete de junio del mismo año, en sesión número 4513, en el artículo XIII, rechazó por improcedente el recurso de reconsideración promovido contra la resolución anterior (sesión ordinaria de la Junta Directiva número 4505, artículo VI.), y además se le indicó que a esa instancia no le correspondía dar por agotada la vía administrativa, sino que corresponde al Poder Ejecutivo (folio 62); 4.- el diecinueve de julio del mismo año, en sesión número 4525, en el artículo IX, se rechazó por improcedente el incidente de nulidad interpuesto contra la resolución de la Junta Directiva en sesión número 4513, artículo XIII (folio 64). La accionante no ha demostrado que planteó ante el Poder Ejecutivo la reconsideración de las decisiones tomadas por la Junta Directiva del INVU, como lo dispone el artículo 13 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana. En cuanto al fondo, argumenta que la normativa impugnada no resulta contraria a los artículos 140 incisos 3.), 169 y 170 de la Constitución Política, ya que de declararse inconstitucional la reforma del Transitorio II de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, dada en la Ley número 7015, quedaría rigiendo la redacción de por la ley ordinaria número 5900, la cual mantiene la competencia supletoria del INVU en la materia de urbanismo, en el tanto los gobiernos locales no hayan dictado las normas respectivas. Esta competencia del INVU también se enmarca en lo dispuesto en el artículo 5 de la Ley Orgánica del INVU.

6.- Los edictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional fueron publicados en los Boletines Judiciales números 97, 98 y 99 de los días veintidós, veintitrés, y veinticuatro de mayo del año en curso.

7.- El párrafo primero del artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, faculta a esta Sala para que, en cualquier momento procesal, rechace de plano las gestiones ante ella promovidas, cuando considere que resultan manifiestamente improcedentes e infundadas.

Redacta el Magistrado Mora Mora, y

Considerando:

I. DE LA INADMISIBILIDAD DE LA ACCI_N. El artículo 75 de la

Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece los presupuestos de admisibilidad en las acciones de inconstitucionalidad, y regula tres situaciones distintas: en el párrafo primero, exige la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sea en sede judicial, incluyendo los recursos de hábeas corpus o de amparo, o en la administrativa, en el procedimiento de agotamiento de esta vía, en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho que se considera lesionado en el asunto principal; en los párrafos segundo y tercero, se regula la acción directa -no se requiere del asunto base-, en los siguientes supuestos: cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de la defensa de interes difusos, o que atañen en la colectividad en su conjunto; y cuando la acción sea promovida por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes.

II. La exigencia de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de

resolver, establecida en el párrafo primero de la Ley que rige esta Jurisdicción, como se anotó anteriormente, ha sido interpretada por esta Sala de manera tal que, no basta la mera existencia de ese asunto, ni la simple invocación de inconstitucionalidad de la norma impugnada, sino que la acción de inconstitucionalidad debe constituir _medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés considerado lesionado_, tal y como lo dispone la norma en comentario, es decir, no basta la mera invocación de inconstitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada, sino que la misma debe ser de aplicación -directa o indirecta- en el asunto que le da sustento a la acción; tal y como lo ha manifestado en forma reiterada esta Sala, entre otras, ver las sentencias 1668-90, 4085-93, 0798-94, 3615-94, 0409-I-95, 0851-95, 4190-95, 0791-96.

III. Efectivamente, llevan razón la Procuraduría General de la

República y el representante de la Dirección de Urbanismo del Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo (INVU), al señalar que la acción resulta inadmisible. En el caso en estudio, la empresa _Refinadora Costarricense de Metales Preciosos, Sociedad Anónima_ señala que tiene la patente municipal para funcionamiento de actividades lucrativas, y que para el funcionamiento de un hotel, contó con los permisos municipales de remodelación autorizados y supervisados por la Municipalidad de Tibás; pero que previo a autorizar la licencia para la explotación hotelera, se le indicó que debía contar con el visto bueno de la Oficina de Urbanismo del INVU. El veintitrés de enero de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, se le notifica que desde el veintinueve de agosto del año anterior, le fue rechazada su solicitud de remodelación, por adolecer los planos presentados de una serie de incumplimientos en relación con el Reglamento de Construcciones -normativa que se le señaló de acatamiento obligatorio-, que no fueron corregidos. El diez de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, la Junta Directiva del INVU en sesión número 4505 en el artículo VI, declaró sin lugar el recurso de apelación promovido por la empresa accionante contra las resoluciones de la Dirección de Urbanismo que denegaron su solicitud, manteniendo el criterio emitido por la Dirección de Urbanismo de no otorgarle el visto bueno de uso, porque el proyecto incumple el artículo 5 de la Ley de Construcciones y los artículos III.4.1. y IV.13 del Reglamento de Construcciones (folio 61). El siete de junio del mismo año, en sesión número 4513, en el artículo XIII, la Junta Directiva del INVU rechazó por improcedente el recurso de reconsideración promovido contra la resolución anterior (sesión ordinaria de la Junta Directiva número 4505, artículo VI), y además se le indicó que a esa instancia no le correspondía dar por agotada la vía administrativa, sino que le correspondía al Poder Ejecutivo (folio 62). El diecinueve de julio del mismo año, en sesión número 4525, en el artículo IX, se rechazó por improcedente el incidente de nulidad interpuesto contra la resolución de la Junta Directiva en sesión número 4513, artículo XIII (folio 64). Esta gestión de inconstitucionalidad fue promovida el diez de abril de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, es decir, al momento de interponerse, no se encontraba en la etapa de agotamiento de la vía administrativa, como lo exige el párrafo primero del citado artículo 75, sino que aún estaba pendiente de resolver el recurso de apelación promovido por la empresa accionante ante la Junta Directiva del INVU, contra las resoluciones de la Dirección de Urbanismo por las que se le denegó el permiso solicitado (UR-101, de veintitrés de enero y UR-398, del trece de marzo, ambas de mil novecientos noventa y cinco). Al respecto, debe tenerse presente que el artículo 13 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana establece:

_Las municipalidades y las partes afectadas podrán pedir a la Junta Directiva del Instituto revisión de las decisiones de la Dirección de Urbanismo.

De lo que resuelva la Junta Directiva en las materias comprendidas en los incisos 1.), 2.), y 4.) del artículo 10, podrá recurrise dentro del plazo de quince días hábiles que se contarán a partir de la fecha en que notifique la resolución, ante el Poder Ejecutivo, el cuál oirá cuando lo estimare conveniente, la opinión de la Junta Directiva del _Colegio de Ingenieros y Arquitectos_ dentro del plazo que le señalará al efecto y que no podrá ser mayor de treinta días. Pasado ese plazo, el Poder Ejecutivo resolverá dentro de los treinta días siguientes y quedará agotada la vía administrativa._; y el artículo 10 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana en los incisos que interesan, dispone:

_Corresponde asimismo a la Dirección de Urbanismo, dentro de las funciones de control que le asigna el inciso 4.) del artículo 7, las siguientes:

1.) Revisar y aprobar los planes reguladores y sus reglamentos, antes de su adopción por las municipalidades; 2.) Examinar y visar, en forma ineludible, los planes correspondientes a proyectos de urbanización o de fraccionamiento para efectos de urbanización, previamente a su aprobación municipal; [...]

4.) Ordenar la suspensión de aquella obra en que ha habido las infracciones contempladas en el inciso anterior cuando, después de transcurrido un término prudencial desde que formule la respectiva denuncia, no actúe la municipalidad como le corresponde, en el sentido de impedir o corregir la transgresión apuntada; [...]_; con lo cual queda claro, que en los casos en que se ordena una suspensión de obra, como en el caso que nos ocupa, quien agota la vía administrativa es el Poder Ejecutivo. Asimismo, según se constata con la contestación del Director a.i. de la Dirección de Urbanismo, el asunto que da sustento a esta acción, ya fue definitivamente resuelto por la Junta Directiva del INVU, sin que la empresa accionante, al ser notificada del rechazo del incidente de nulidad promovido contra el artículo XIII de la sesión número 4513 del siete de junio de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, promoviese el respectivo recurso ante el Poder Ejecutivo, para tener por agotada la vía administrativa, no obstante que la propia Junta Directiva le había aclarado que no le correspondía a esa institución agotar esa vía.

IV. Por último, en el caso en concreto, definitivamente no nos

encontramos frente a la defensa de un interés difuso, que esta Sala ha calificado como:

"Ese concepto de intereses difusos», tiene por objeto desarrollar una forma de legitimación, que en los últimos tiempos ha constituido uno de los principios tradicionales de la legitimación y que se ha venido abriendo paso, especialmente en el ámbito del derecho administrativo, como último ensanchamiento, novedoso pero necesario, para que sea cada vez más efectiva y eficaz. Los intereses difusos, aunque de difícil definición y más difícil identificación, no pueden ser en nuestra Ley -como ya lo ha dicho esta Sala- los intereses meramente colectivos; ni tan difusos que su titularidad se confunda con la de la comunidad nacional como un todo, ni tan concretos que frente a ellos resulten identificadas o fácilmente identificables personas determinadas, o grupos personalizados, cuya legitimación derivaría, no de los intereses difusos, sino de los corporativos o que atañen a una comunidad en su conjunto. Se trata, entonces de intereses individuales, pero a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y, por ende, reciben un beneficio o un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos igual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que se trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos que se encuentran en determinadas circunstancias y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas.

Es decir, los intereses difusos participan de una doble naturaleza, ya que son a la vez colectivos -por ser comunes a una genralidad- e individuales, por lo que pueden ser reclamados en tal carácter." (Sentencia número 3750-93); Tampoco nos encontramos frente a un interés que atañe a la colectividad en su conjunto, o un interés corporativo, por cuanto el accionante promueve esta acción en su condición personal, y no en representación de ninguna asociación o agrupación jurídicamente organizada, que tenga como objeto defender los intereses del gremio que asocia. Por último, en virtud de la naturaleza del asunto planteado, efectivamente sí se produce una lesión individual y directa, en perjuicio de las personas que se les aplique la normativa cuestionada, lo que implica la necesidad de un asunto pendiente de resolver, en los términos establecidos en el citado artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

V. Con fundamento en las anteriores razones es que procede

rechazar de plano la acción, al amparo de lo dispuesto en el párrafo primero del artículo 9 de la Ley que rige esta Jurisdicción.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza de plano la acción Luis Paulino Mora Mora Luis Fernando Solano C. Nombre44110 .

Carlos Arguedas R. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

José Luis Molina Q. Fernando Albertazzi H.