Administrative court jurisdiction over challenges to salt extraction fee decreesCompetencia contencioso-administrativa para impugnar decretos de cánones sobre extracción de sal

01507 Unconstitutionality Date: 29/03/1996 Time: 9:24 AM CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine twenty-four hours on the twenty-ninth of March, nineteen hundred and ninety-six.

Action of Unconstitutionality filed by Nombre74478, of legal age, married, businessman, identity card number CED46324, as representative of the "Cooperativa Nacional de Productores de Sal, Responsabilidad Limitada", against Article 5 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 22550-MIRENEM of the fourteenth of September, nineteen hundred and ninety-three, and subsection b), part II of Article 76 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 19886-MIRENEM, called "Reglamento a la Ley Forestal", amended by Decreto Ejecutivo number 23109-MIRENEM of the eighteenth of March, nineteen hundred and ninety-four.

Resultando:

1.- Nombre74478, as representative of the company "Cooperativa Nacional de Productores de Sal, Responsabilidad Limitada", files an action of unconstitutionality against Article 5 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 22550-MIRENEM and subsection b), part II of Article 76 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 19886-MIRENEM, amended by Decreto Ejecutivo number 23109-MIRENEM, by which he challenges said legal norms, considering them contrary to Articles 11, 34, 121 subsection 1, and 140 subsections 3) and 18). It is alleged that each of the questioned articles establishes an amount to be paid as a concession fee (canon) by those engaged in the activity of salt extraction on wetlands owned by the State, but such amounts are dissimilar, which is why the entity in charge charges the higher one, thereby causing a breach of the principle of legality (principio de legalidad), since it should charge the other one, having been set by a later rule. Apart from that, there is a clear arbitrariness and deviation of power (desvío de poder) in regulating matters related to a mineral such as salt, within laws related to forestry and wildlife. Finally, a prohibited legislative delegation is alleged, as the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre does not set any fixed or variable fee for the concept of a canon (canon) to be paid for the use of State lands, but rather leaves it to the discretion of the regulation. All of the foregoing makes the norms unconstitutional and the Chamber should so decree.

2.- That Article 9 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional empowers the Chamber to summarily reject (rechazar de plano) any petition when it is inadmissible or unfounded.

Drafted by Judge Mora Mora; and

Considerando:

I.- The action is directed against Article 5 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 22550-MIRENEM and subsection b), part II of Article 76 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 19886-MIRENEM, amended by Decreto Ejecutivo number 23109-MIRENEM, which, respectively, state in relevant part:

"Article 5.- All natural or legal persons who are owners, lessees, or administrators of saltworks (salinas) and aquaculture projects, established on State lands, within Wetland areas, under the regulations set forth herein, must pay an annual canon (canon) of five thousand colones per hectare granted in concession (concesión)." "Article 76.- Natural or legal persons who request concessions (concesiones) or use permits in lands of the State's forest patrimony (patrimonio forestal del Estado), must pay the following fees to the Fondo Forestal:

a)...

• b)A surface canon (canon superficial) per hectare granted in permit, which shall be the following for the requested activity:

i)...

• ii)If it concerns permits for salt production, the canon (canon) shall be two thousand colones per hectare per year." II.- The problem raised by the petitioner can be divided into two aspects that must be reviewed separately: the first refers to the violation, by the challenged articles, of the principle of administrative legality (principio de legalidad administrativa) derived from Constitutional Articles 11, 49, 121, and 140. It is noted that said infringement occurs —with respect to Article 5 of Decreto Ejecutivo 22550-MIRENEM— because it has no legal basis for the collection of any fee for the concept of a canon (canon) for salt production, given that the legal rules that supposedly authorize it (Articles 7 and 17 of Ley number 7317 de Conservación de Vida Silvestre) do not permit it, apart from the fact that the regulation has no relation to the salt-producing (salinera) field. In relation to Article 76 of the Reglamento a la Ley Forestal, although there is a legal norm that allows the setting of amounts to be paid for cánones (cánones), it is claimed that the salt-producing field is completely unrelated to the purpose of the Fondo Forestal, for whose benefit the canon (canon) is paid, thereby constituting a deviation from the legally established purposes.

III.- Thus, what is requested of the Chamber is to make the principle of legality (principio de legalidad) prevail by determining the violation of legal precepts by regulatory norms; but it turns out that this task has been assigned by the Constituent Power itself to the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), as derived from Article 49 of the Carta Fundamental, which requires a systematic interpretation of the constitutional text and an understanding that questions of legality must be submitted to the aforementioned jurisdiction, in order to maintain a uniform distribution of competencies and respect for all the rules that make up the Constitución Política. Obviously, any challenge such as the one raised implicitly entails a presumed violation of the Constitución Política, since the entire legal system derives from it, but there is clearly established in the Constitution itself a distribution of competencies to guarantee the citizen a way to protect the different classes of rights and interests they possess. Thus, the administrative litigation (contenciosa) and labor jurisdictions are regulated in the Constitución Política (Articles 49 and 70), and it is within this context that the Constitutional Jurisdiction must be embedded, on the understanding that its competence complements and does not overlap with those indicated, for the purposes of protecting the citizen. This interpretive solution —which in amparo (amparo) proceedings already has broad jurisprudential support— has been upheld in judgments such as number 0843-95 at fifteen forty-five hours on the fourteenth of February, nineteen hundred and ninety-five, in which it was stated:

"THIRD. Regarding subsection 9 of Article 140 of the Constitución Política.

It is the duty of the Executive to 'execute and enforce everything resolved or ordered by the courts of justice and electoral bodies in matters within their competence, at their request.' This provision is invoked 'because in setting the minimum wages made by the challenged norms, Articles 5 and 7 of the specific award (laudo) for professionals, nor Article 4 of the award (laudo) for the appellant technicians were NOT applied....' (folio 9). The constitutional jurisdiction is entrusted with 'exercising control over the constitutionality of norms of any nature and of acts subject to Public Law' (Article 2 b), Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). To claim the breach of the invoked awards (laudos) because the amount of the salary increases is lower than what they prescribe, the workers must resort to a typical ordinary process that the constitutional jurisdiction cannot substitute. Delimiting this from the ordinary jurisdiction becomes delicate in the face of duties such as that established by the cited subsection, which offers certain characteristics similar to Constitutional Article 11, which proclaims the principle of legality (principio de legalidad). The importance of the latter, the core of public law, does not prevent it from being fruitfully invoked only if at least one other constitutional norm or principle has been violated, when it comes to constitutional jurisdiction. The contrary opinion would end up diluting the distinction between constitutional matters and matters of mere legality —if we speak of Article 11— just as violations of the Constitution could not be differentiated from the incidents of compliance with judicial rulings where the State is the obligor —if we allude to 140,9— especially if we observe that the breach of the invoked awards (laudos) would not be subject to sentence execution proceedings, since as a professional law, the award (laudo) is claimed in the respective labor lawsuits." Likewise, in judgment number 0404-96 at fifteen thirty-three hours on the twenty-third of January last, it was stated on the subject:

"I.- The appellant intends to base his petition for annulment of Decreto Ejecutivo number 24158-MIRENEM-S on the fact that it infringes several constitutional articles. The first of these is Article 11, which establishes the principle of legality (principio de legalidad), because the Executive Branch has acted contrary to it by establishing a burden for businessmen engaged in the activities contemplated in the Decree; however, there is no way to equate the requirement of a laboratory test with the concept used in Article 124 of the Ley General de Administración Pública, which refers to 'exactions, taxes, fines, or other similar charges.' Apart from that, the problem does not exceed the scope of legality, because it does not fit within the assumptions set forth in Articles 18 and 121 subsection 13 of the Constitución Política, which serve as the basis for the infra-constitutional normative development regarding taxes and contributions, so that —respecting the constitutional system of competency distribution itself— it would have to be resolved in the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa)." In summary, even though it can be validly stated that questions of legality have a direct relationship with Article 11 of the Constitución Política, the fact is that the issue of the conformity of executive decrees with the laws that support them falls within the specialty of the matter that Constitutional Article 49 assigned to the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa); therefore, in compliance with said legal norm, it is concluded that in this case the Chamber must yield its general competence in favor of the specially established one and allow the issue raised to be heard and resolved in the administrative litigation venue (sede contenciosa).

IV.- The other aspect to be analyzed is the alleged infringement of Article 34 of the Constitución Política by the challenged articles. However, it is easily verifiable from their text that they do not contain any regulation for situations prior to their enactment, and their effectiveness is clearly prospective. What the appellant resents is rather the application being made of such legal norms by the authorities responsible for collecting the canon (canon); such a situation clearly fits within the provisions of Articles 29 and 30 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, and therefore it must be resolved through the amparo (amparo) procedure and not through the unconstitutionality procedure, in accordance with the provisions of subsection b) of Article 73 of the law just cited.

V.- In conclusion, it must be noted that the action must be summarily rejected (rechazada de plano) since, regarding the violation of the principle of legality (principio de legalidad), competence corresponds to the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), and in relation to the infringement of Constitutional Article 34, the issue must be resolved through the amparo (amparo) procedure and not the unconstitutionality procedure.

Por tanto:

The action is summarily rejected (Se rechaza de plano la acción).

Luis Paulino Mora Mora Nombre43951. Nombre44110.

Nombre54598 R. Nombre62715.

Hernando Arias G. Mauro Murillo A.

??

San José, at nine hours twenty-four minutes on the twenty-ninth of March, nineteen ninety-six.

An action of unconstitutionality filed by Nombre74478, of legal age, married, businessman, identity card number CED46324, as representative of the "Cooperativa Nacional de Productores de Sal, Responsabilidad Limitada", against Article 5 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 22550-MIRENEM of the fourteenth of September, nineteen ninety-three, and subsection b), part II of Article 76 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 19886-MIRENEM, denominated "Reglamento a la Ley Forestal", amended by Decreto Ejecutivo number 23109-MIRENEM of the eighteenth of March, nineteen ninety-four.

Resultando:

1.- Nombre74478, as representative of the company "Cooperativa Nacional de Productores de Sal, Responsabilidad Limitada", files an action of unconstitutionality against Article 5 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 22550-MIRENEM and subsection b), part II of Article 76 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 19886-MIRENEM, amended by Decreto Ejecutivo number 23109-MIRENEM, by means of which he challenges said legal norms, deeming them contrary to Articles 11, 34, 121 subsection 1, and 140 subsections 3) and 18). It is alleged that each of the questioned articles establishes an amount to be paid as a concession (concesión) fee by those engaged in the activity of salt extraction on wetlands owned by the State, but such amounts are dissimilar, for which reason the responsible entity charges the higher one, thereby producing a breach of the principle of legality, since it should charge the other one, having been set by a later norm. Apart from that, there is a clear arbitrariness and deviation of power in regulating matters related to a mineral such as salt, within laws related to forestry and wildlife. Lastly, a prohibited legislative delegation is alleged, as the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre does not set any fixed or variable tariff for the concept of a fee (canon) to be paid for the use of State lands, but rather leaves it to the discretion of the regulation. All of the foregoing makes the norms unconstitutional, and the Chamber must so decree.

2.- That Article 9 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional empowers the Chamber to summarily reject any petition when it is improper or unfounded.

Drafted by Judge Mora Mora; and

Considerando:

I.- The action is directed against Article 5 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 22550-MIRENEM and subsection b), part II of Article 76 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 19886-MIRENEM, amended by Decreto Ejecutivo number 23109-MIRENEM, which, in order, state in what is relevant:

"Article 5.- All natural or legal persons who are owners, lessees, or administrators of saltworks (salinas) and aquaculture projects, established on State lands, within wetland areas, under the regulations set forth herein, must pay an annual fee (canon anual) of five thousand colones for each hectare granted in concession." "Article 76.- Natural or legal persons who request concessions or use permits on lands of the State's forest heritage (patrimonio forestal del Estado), must pay to the Fondo Forestal the following rights:

a)...

• b)A surface fee (canon superficial) for each hectare granted under a permit, which shall be the following for the requested activity:

i)...

• ii)If it concerns permits for salt production, the fee shall be two thousand colones per hectare per year." II.- The problem raised by the petitioner can be divided into two aspects that must be reviewed separately: the first of these refers to the violation, by the challenged articles, of the principle of administrative legality derived from Articles 11, 49, 121, and 140 of the Constitution. It is indicated that said infraction arises—regarding Article 5 of Decreto Ejecutivo 22550-MIRENEM—because it has no legal basis whatsoever for the charging of any tariff as a fee for salt production, given that the legal norms that supposedly authorize it (Articles 7 and 17 of Ley number 7317 de Conservación de Vida Silvestre) do not permit it, aside from the fact that the regulation has no relation to the salt-producing matter. In relation to Article 76 of the Reglamento a la Ley Forestal, although a norm of legal rank exists that allows the setting of amounts to be paid as fees, it is challenged that the salt-producing matter bears no relation whatsoever to the purpose of the Fondo Forestal, in favor of which the fee is paid, thereby configuring a deviation from the legally established purposes.

III.- Thus, what is asked of the Chamber is to enforce the principle of legality by determining the violation of legal precepts by regulatory norms; but it turns out that this task has been assigned by the Constituent Power itself to the Administrative-Contentious Jurisdiction, as derived from Article 49 of the Constitution, which requires a systematic interpretation of the constitutional text and an understanding that questions of legality must be submitted to the said jurisdiction, in order to maintain a uniform distribution of competences and respect for all the rules that make up the Political Constitution. Obviously, any challenge such as the one raised implicitly entails a presumed violation of the Political Constitution, given that the entire legal system derives from it, but a distribution of competences is clearly established in the Constitution itself to guarantee the citizen a way to protect the different classes of rights and interests they possess. In this way, the contentious-administrative and labor jurisdictions are regulated in the Political Constitution (Articles 49 and 70), and it is within this context that the Constitutional Jurisdiction must be embedded, on the understanding that its competence complements and does not overlap with those indicated, for the purposes of protecting the citizen. This interpretive solution—which in the area of amparo already has broad jurisprudential support—has been upheld in rulings such as number 0843-95 of fifteen hours forty-five minutes on the fourteenth of February, nineteen ninety-five, in which it was stated:

"THIRD. Regarding subsection 9 of Article 140 of the Political Constitution.

It is the duty of the Executive to 'execute and enforce all that the courts of justice and electoral bodies resolve or order in matters within their competence, at their request.' That provision is invoked 'because in setting the minimum wages that the challenged norms carried out, they did NOT apply Articles 5 and 7 of the specific award (laudo) for professionals, nor Article 4 of the award for the recurring technicians....' (folio 9). The constitutional jurisdiction is entrusted with 'exercising control over the constitutionality of norms of any nature and of acts subject to Public Law' (Article 2 b), Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). To claim the non-compliance with the invoked awards because the amount of the salary increases is less than what those awards stipulate, the workers must resort to a typical ordinary process that the constitutional jurisdiction cannot substitute. Delimiting this jurisdiction from the ordinary one becomes delicate in the face of duties such as the one established by the cited subsection, which offers certain characteristics similar to Article 11 of the Constitution, which proclaims the principle of legality. The transcendence of the latter, the core of public law, does not prevent that it may only be fruitfully invoked if at least one other constitutional norm or principle has been breached, when it comes to constitutional jurisdiction. The contrary opinion would end up blurring the distinction between constitutional matters and matters of mere legality—if we speak of Article 11—just as infractions of the Constitution could not be differentiated from the incidents of compliance with judicial rulings in which the State is the obligor—if we allude to Article 140, subsection 9—especially if we observe that non-compliance with the invoked awards would not be susceptible to the procedures of judgment execution, since, as a professional law, the award is claimed in the respective labor trials." Likewise, in ruling number 0404-96 of fifteen hours thirty-three minutes on the twenty-third of January last, it was stated on the topic:

"I.- The petitioner intends to base his request for the annulment of Decreto Ejecutivo number 24158-MIRENEM-S on the fact that it violates several constitutional articles. The first of these is Article 11, which establishes the principle of legality, because the Executive Power has acted against it by establishing a burden for businessmen engaged in the activities contemplated in the Decree; however, there is no way to equate the requirement of a laboratory test with the concept used in Article 124 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, which refers to 'exactions, rates, fines, or other similar burdens.' Apart from that, the problem does not exceed the sphere of legality, because it does not fit within the premises set forth in Articles 18 and 121 subsection 13 of the Political Constitution, which are those that serve as the basis for the infra-constitutional regulatory development in matters of taxes and contributions, so that—in respect for the constitutional system itself of distributing competences—it would have to be resolved in the Administrative-Contentious Jurisdiction." In summary, even though it can be validly affirmed that questions of legality have a direct relationship with Article 11 of the Political Constitution, the truth is that the issue of the adaptation of executive decrees to the laws that support them falls within the specialty of the matter that Article 49 of the Constitution assigned to the Administrative-Contentious Jurisdiction, and therefore, in compliance with said legal norm, it is concluded that in this case, the Chamber must yield its general competence in favor of the specially established one and allow the issue raised to be heard and resolved in the contentious-administrative forum.

IV.- The other aspect to be analyzed is that referring to the supposed violation of Article 34 of the Political Constitution by the challenged articles. However, it is easily verifiable from their text that they contain no regulation whatsoever for situations prior to their enactment, and their validity is clearly towards the future. What the petitioner resents is, rather, the application being made of such legal norms by the authorities responsible for collecting the fee; such a situation clearly falls within the provisions of Articles 29 and 30 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, and therefore it must be resolved through the amparo procedure and not that of unconstitutionality, in accordance with what is established in subsection b) of Article 73 of the recently cited law.

V.- In conclusion, it must be stated that the action must be summarily rejected since, regarding the violation of the principle of legality, the competence corresponds to the Administrative-Contentious Jurisdiction, and, in relation to the violation of Article 34 of the Constitution, the issue must be resolved through the amparo procedure and not that of unconstitutionality.

Por tanto:

The action is summarily rejected.

Luis Paulino Mora Mora President Nombre43951. Nombre44110.

Nombre54598 R. Nombre62715.

Hernando Arias G. Mauro Murillo A.

??

01507 Inconstitucionalidad Fecha: 29/03/1996 Hora: 9:24 AM Redacta: MORA MORA SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas veinticuatro minutos del veintinueve de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y seis.

Acción de Inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por Nombre74478 , mayor, casado, empresario, cédula de identidad número CED46324, como representante de la "Cooperativa Nacional de Productores de Sal, Responsabilidad Limitada", contra el artículo 5 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 22550-MIRENEM del catorce de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y tres y el inciso b), aparte II del artículo 76 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 19886-MIRENEM, denominado "Reglamento a la Ley Forestal", reformado por el Decreto Ejecutivo número 23109-MIRENEM del dieciocho de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro.

Resultando:

1.- Nombre74478 , como representante de la empresa "Cooperativa Nacional de Productores de Sal, Responsabilidad Limitada" interpone acción de inconstitucionalidad contra el artículo 5 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 22550-MIRENEM y el inciso b), aparte II del artículo 76 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 19886-MIRENEM, reformado por el Decreto Ejecutivo número 23109-MIRENEM, por medio de la cual impugna dichas normas jurídicas por estimarlas contrarias a los artículos 11, 34, 121 inciso 1 y 140 incisos 3) y 18). Se alega que en cada uno de los artículos cuestionados se establece un monto a pagar por concepto de concesión por parte de quienes se dedican a la actividad de extracción de sal en los humedales propiedad del Estado, pero tales montos son disímiles por lo cual la entidad encargada cobra el más alto, con lo que se produce una quiebra del principio de legalidad, pues debería cobrar el otro al ser fijado por norma posterior. Aparte de ello, existe una clara arbitrariedad y desvío de poder al regularse temas referidos a un mineral como lo es la sal, dentro de leyes relacionadas con lo forestal y con la vida silvestre. Por último se alega una delegación legislativa prohibida al no fijarse en la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre ninguna tarifa fija o móvil por concepto de canon a pagar por el uso de terrenos del Estado, sino que se deja al arbitrio del reglamento. Todo lo anterior hace que las normas sean inconstitucionales y que la Sala deba decretarlo así.

2.- Que el artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala para rechazar de plano cualquier gestión cuando fuere improcedente o infundada.

Redacta el Magistrado Mora Mora; y

Considerando:

I.- La acción se dirige contra el artículo 5 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 22550-MIRENEM y el inciso b), aparte II del artículo 76 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 19886-MIRENEM, reformado por el Decreto Ejecutivo número 23109-MIRENEM, que por su orden, señalan en lo que interesa:

"Artículo 5.- Todas aquellas personas físicas o jurídicas que sean propietarias, arrendatarias, o administradores de salinas y proyectos de acuacultura, establecidos en terrenos del Estado, dentro de las áreas de Humedales, bajo las regulaciones aquí establecidas, deberán pagar un canon anual de cinco mil colones por cada hectárea dada en concesión." "Artículo 76.- Las personas físicas o jurídicas que soliciten concesiones o permisos de uso en terrenos del patrimonio forestal del Estado, deberán pagar al Fondo Forestal los siguientes derechos:

a)...

• b)Un canon superficial por cada hectárea dada en permiso el cual será el siguiente para la actividad solicitada:

i)...

• ii)Si se trata de permisos para la producción de sal, el canon será de dos mil colones por hectárea por año." II.- El problema planteado por el accionante puede dividirse en dos aspectos que deben ser revisados separadamente: el primero de ellos se refiere a la violación, por parte de los artículos cuestionados, del principio de legalidad administrativa que se desprende de los artículos 11, 49, 121 y 140 Constitucionales. Se señala que dicha infracción se presenta -en cuanto al artículo 5 del Decreto Ejecutivo 22550-MIRENEM- porque éste no tiene ningún asidero legal para el cobro de tarifa alguna por concepto de canon para la producción de sal, dado que las normas legales que supuestamente lo autorizan (artículos 7 y 17 de la Ley número 7317 de Conservación de Vida Silvestre) no se lo permiten, aparte de que la normativa no tiene ninguna relación con la materia salinera. En relación con el artículo 76 del Reglamento a la Ley Forestal, si bien existe norma de rango legal que permite la fijación de montos a pagar por concepto de cánones, se acusa que la materia salinera no se relaciona en nada con lo que constituye el objeto del Fondo Forestal, a favor del que se paga el canon, con lo cual se configura una desviación de los fines legalmente establecidos.

III.- Así las cosas, lo que se pide a la Sala es que haga prevalecer el principio de legalidad mediante la determinación de la violación de preceptos legales por parte de normas reglamentarias; pero resulta que esa labor ha sido asignada por el propio Constituyente a la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, según se desprende del artículo 49 de la Carta Fundamental, lo cual obliga a interpretar de forma sistemática el texto constitucional y entender que las cuestiones de legalidad han de someterse a la citada jurisdicción, ello con el fin de mantener una uniforme distribución de las competencias y el respeto de todas las reglas que conforman la Constitución Política. Obviamente, cualquier impugnación como la que se plantea, conlleva implícita una presunta violación a la Constitución Política, dado que de ella se deriva todo el ordenamiento jurídico, pero existe claramente establecido en la propia Constitución, un reparto de competencias con el fin de garantizar al ciudadano una manera de proteger las distintas clases de derechos e intereses que posee. De esa forma, se regulan en la Constitución Política, las jurisdicciones contenciosa y de trabajo (artículos 49 y 70) y es dentro de este contexto que debe incrustarse la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en el entendido que su competencia se complementa y no se superpone a las señaladas, a los fines de protección del ciudadano. Esta solución interpretativa -que en sede de amparo cuenta ya con amplio sustento jurisprudencial- ha sido sostenida en sentencias como la número 0843-95 de las quince horas con cuarenta y cinco minutos del catorce de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y cinco en la que se dijo:

"TERCERO. Sobre el inciso 9 del artículo 140 de la Constitución Política.

Es deber del Ejecutivo "ejecutar y hacer cumplir todo cuanto resuelvan o dispongan en los asuntos de su competencia los tribunales de justicia y los organismos electorales, a solicitud de los mismos". Se invoca esa disposición "porque en la fijación de los salarios mínimos que hicieron las normas impugnadas NO aplicaron los artículos 5 y 7 del laudo específico de los profesionales, ni el artículo 4 del laudo de los técnicos recurrentes...." (folio 9). A la jurisdicción constitucional se encomienda "ejercer el control de la constitucionalidad de las normas de cualquier naturaleza y de los actos sujetos al Derecho Público" (artículo 2 b), Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Para reclamar el incumplimiento de los laudos invocados porque el monto de los aumentos salariales es inferior al que aquellos estatuyen, los trabajadores han de ocurrir a un típico proceso ordinario que la jurisdicción constitucional no puede sustituir. Deslindar ésta de la común se torna delicado frente a deberes como el estatuido por el inciso que se citó, el cual ofrece ciertas características similares al artículo 11 constitucional, que proclama el principio de legalidad. No obsta la trascendencia de este último, meollo del derecho público, para que solo pueda invocárselo fructíferamente de haberse quebrantado, por lo menos, otra norma o principio constitucional, cuando de la jurisdicción constitucional se trata. La opinión contraria terminaría por diluir la distinción entre asuntos constitucionales y asuntos de mera legalidad -si hablamos del artículo 11- como no podrían diferenciarse las infracciones de la Constitución de las incidencias del cumplimiento de resoluciones judiciales en que el Estado es el obligado -si al 140,9 aludimos- en especial si observamos que el incumplimiento de los laudos invocados no sería susceptible de los trámites de ejecución de sentencia, pues como ley profesional el laudo se reclama en los respectivos juicios laborales." Igualmente, en la sentencia número 0404-96 de las quince horas treinta y tres minutos del veintitrés de enero pasado, se señaló sobre el tema:

"I.- El accionante pretende fundar su petición de anulación del Decreto Ejecutivo número 24158-MIRENEM-S en que éste infringe varios artículos constitucionales. El primero de ellos es el 11 que establece el principio de legalidad, porque el Poder Ejecutivo ha actuado en contra, al establecer una carga para los empresarios que se dedican a las actividades contempladas en el Decreto; sin embargo, no existe forma de asimilar la exigencia de una prueba de laboratorio con el concepto utilizado en el artículo 124 de la Ley General de Administración Pública, el cual se refiere a "exacciones, tasas, multas u otras cargas similares". Aparte de ello, el problema no excede el ámbito de la legalidad, porque no encuadra dentro de los presupuestos recogidos en los artículos 18 y 121 inciso 13 de la Constitución Política, que son los que sirven de base al desarrollo normativo infraconstitucional en materia de tributos y contribuciones, de manera que -en respeto del propio sistema constitucional de reparto de competencias- habría de ser resuelto en la jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa." En resumen, aún cuando puede válidamente afirmarse que las cuestiones de legalidad tienen una directa relación con el artículo 11 de la Constitución Política, lo cierto es que el tema de la adecuación de los decretos ejecutivos a las leyes que los fundamentan, encuadra dentro de la especialidad de la materia que el artículo 49 Constitucional, asignó a la jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, por lo que, en acatamiento de dicha norma jurídica, se concluye que en este caso la Sala ha de ceder en su competencia general en favor de la especialmente establecida y dejar que sea en sede contenciosa donde se conozca y resuelva la cuestión planteada.

IV.- El otro aspecto por analizar es el referido a la supuesta infracción al artículo 34 de la Constitución Política por parte de los artículos cuestionados. Sin embargo, fácilmente se constata de su texto que no contienen regulación alguna para situaciones anteriores a su promulgación y su vigencia es claramente hacia el futuro. Lo que el accionante resiente es más bien, la aplicación que se está haciendo de tales normas jurídicas por parte de las autoridades encargadas del cobro del canon; tal situación encuadra claramente dentro de las previsiones de los artículos 29 y 30 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, por lo que deben resolverse en la vía de amparo y no en la de inconstitucionalidad, de conformidad con lo establecido en el inciso b) del artículo 73 de la ley recién citada.

V.- Como conclusión, debe señalarse que la acción debe rechazarse de plano puesto que, en cuanto a la violación al principio de legalidad, la competencia corresponde a la jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y en relación con la infracción al artículo 34 Constitucional, la cuestión debe resolverse en la vía de amparo y no en la de inconstitucionalidad.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza de plano la acción.

Luis Paulino Mora Mora Nombre43951 . Nombre44110 .

Nombre54598 R. Nombre62715 .

Hernando Arias G. Mauro Murillo A.

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