Constitutional limits of Judicial Inspection over jurisdictional criteriaLímites constitucionales de la Inspección Judicial sobre criterios jurisdiccionales

Inconstitutionality Action No. 2548-91 Felipe Gutiérrez Salicetti CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.- San José, at fifteen hours thirty-six minutes on March seventh, nineteen ninety-five.

Inconstitutionality action brought by [NOMBRE001], of legal age, married, attorney, identity card number [CED62], against articles 120 to 124, 211 to 219 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, number 8 of November twenty-ninth, nineteen thirty-seven, and its reforms, in their text and interpretation, and by connection articles 29 subsection 4), 30 subsection 2.), 71 subsection 4.) of the same law; article 44 of the Civil Service Statute, the interpretation by the Full Court of article 64 of the Judicial Service Statute, and articles 49, 50, and 51 of the Law of the Judicial Investigation Agency.

Whereas:

1.- The petitioner files an action of unconstitutionality against articles 120 to 124, 211 to 219 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, number 8 of November twenty-ninth, nineteen thirty, and its reforms, in their text and interpretation, insofar as the Judicial Inspection has exceeded constitutional limits in its functions, since, being an administrative body, it acts as a jurisdictional one by interpreting laws; using procedures outside the disciplinary procedure, by referring to civil procedure, which is incompatible and unsuitable for disciplinary matters because the judicial disciplinary regime is prone to sanctioning, thus violating the protective principles, the presumption of innocence, and legal certainty, and those that constitute due process (concentration of the investigation and judgment in the same body, impossibility of appealing procedural and final resolutions, absence of regulations, lack of specificity, proportionality, and gradation in provisional and definitive sanctions), considering that the judicial disciplinary regime was repealed with the enactment of the Labor Code and the General Law of Public Administration, because they contain principles more favorable to the weaker party in the relationship; and imposing sanctions of a disciplinary nature for criteria issued in jurisdictional resolutions, that is, for functions inherent to the judge, and also for violation of the principle of specificity, by establishing and imposing a disciplinary sanction of reprimand without detailing what the offense is; by connection, articles 29 subsection 4.), 30 subsection 2.), 71 subsection 4.) of the same law; article 44 of the Civil Service Statute; the interpretation by the Full Court of article 64 of the Judicial Service Statute in the sense that it has established the temporary loss of salary increases obtained annually due to sanctions of a disciplinary nature; and articles 49, 50, and 51 of the Law of the Judicial Investigation Agency, due to their relationship of absolute dependence on the challenged norms, against the provisions of articles 9, 11, 35, 42, 154, and 156 of the Political Constitution.

2.- The ordinary labor lawsuit brought by the petitioner against the State, processed under case file number 905-91 before the First Labor Court of San José, appears as a prior matter to this action.

3.- In accordance with the second paragraph of article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, this Chamber is empowered to resolve on the merits the actions brought before it when it considers that there are sufficient grounds for judgment or they are the same or similar to previously rejected ones, there being no reasons to vary the criterion or reasons of public interest that justify reconsidering the question.

Drafted by Magistrate Mora Mora, and;

Considering:

I.ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE INCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTION. In a general sense, the petitioner challenges a regulation by virtue of which he considers that a disciplinary sanction was imposed on him by an administrative entity -the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection-, based on criteria or acts eminently of a jurisdictional nature ordered by him as a judge, the competence of said tribunal referring solely to the disciplinary sphere, considering that this violates the principle of internal independence of the judge, since the resolutions of a jurisdictional body can only be examined by higher-ranking jurisdictional authorities and through the remedies that the law expressly indicates, in addition to arrogating to itself criteria for interpreting norms, using procedures, and imposing sanctions that are only authorized for jurisdictional bodies, for which reason we can consider that the action is directed against a specific subjective act of the Administration. However, despite being in such a situation, the matter raised is susceptible to being heard in this unconstitutionality action, by virtue of the provisions of article 73 subsection b.) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which states:

"The unconstitutionality action shall be appropriate:

a.) ...

b.) Against subjective acts of public authorities, when they infringe, by action or omission, any constitutional norm or principle, if they are not susceptible to the remedies of habeas corpus or amparo." In the case under study, the petitioner filed an amparo action against the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection, which was processed under case file number 1803-91, considering that the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for criteria of a jurisdictional nature constitutes interference in the independence of the judge, implying that the Inspection arrogates to itself interpretation criteria, using procedures and imposing sanctions authorized only for jurisdictional bodies, and the violation of due process in various manifestations, an appeal that was declared without merit by resolution number 320-93, at nine hours fifty-one minutes on January twenty-second, nineteen ninety-three, considering that in the amparo route it was not possible to determine whether there was merit or not for the disciplinary sanction imposed, and it refers to ordinary labor legislation for whatever corresponds; "As the acts challenged by the appellant have to do with the exercise of the disciplinary function of the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection, in order to determine whether or not there was merit for the imposition of a sanction in the exercise of service, it is evident to the Chamber that a constitutional matter is not at issue, but rather one of mere legality that must be heard by the competent courts, in the ordinary labor jurisdiction, which are responsible for evaluating the evidence and grounds of the parties, in order to decide the legality of the challenged actions. The appeal being inadmissible, it is appropriate for the Chamber to declare it without merit, as is hereby ordered." The petitioner filed the ordinary labor lawsuit, which is processed before the Labor Court of San José, under case file number 905-91, invoking in this proceeding the unconstitutionality of the norms against which this action is directed, which he subsequently filed, as a reasonable means to protect the interests and rights considered harmed in the main matter. Consequently, given that the substantive issue raised challenges a subjective act of an administrative entity for violation of constitutional norms and principles, a matter that this same Tribunal considered was not susceptible to being heard in the amparo route, the unconstitutionality action is appropriate, pursuant to the provisions of the cited article 73 subsection b.).

II.ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CHALLENGE. Regarding the specific challenge made by the petitioner, it is directed against articles 120 to 124, 211 to 219 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, number 8, of November twenty-ninth, nineteen thirty-seven, and its reforms, in their text and interpretation, insofar as the Judicial Inspection has exceeded constitutional limits in its functions, since, being an administrative body, it acts as a jurisdictional one by interpreting laws, using procedures outside the disciplinary procedure, and imposing sanctions of a disciplinary nature for criteria issued in jurisdictional resolutions, that is, for functions inherent to the judge, and also for violation of the principle of specificity, by establishing and imposing disciplinary sanctions of reprimand without detailing what the offense committed was; and by connection, articles 29 subsection 4.), 30 subsection 2.), 71 subsection 4.) of the same law. It must be mentioned that such regulation was repealed with the enactment of the new Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, number 7333, of May fifth, nineteen ninety-three, which came into effect on the first of nineteen ninety-four, in which it was expressly provided on the point now at issue, in article 199, which states:

"Any complaint that refers exclusively to problems of interpretation of legal norms shall be rejected outright." Notwithstanding the foregoing, the challenged regulation is analyzed because in the disciplinary proceeding brought against Licentiate Felipe Gutiérrez Salicetti, articles 120 to 124, 217, and 219 of the previous Organic Law of the Judicial Branch were specifically applied, and now in the labor jurisdiction it may be applied depending on what is resolved in this constitutional route in this case.

III.THE DISCIPLINARY POWER OF THE STATE. Among the inherent powers of the State -and of the Public Administration in general- is the sanctioning power, which can be classified into corrective power and disciplinary power. The object of the former is to sanction violations of the orders or mandates of the Public Administration, that is, the unlawful actions or omissions of individuals, whether or not they are public agents, and the content of the norms that regulate it constitutes administrative criminal law. The latter has the exclusive objective of sanctioning violations by public agents of their functional legal duties, and the content of the norms that regulate it constitutes disciplinary criminal law. This regime is a species of the "sanctioning" power of the State, from which it emanates; a power that is inherent and proper to the Public Administration, translating into the power of, at least, a "minimum" of authority for it to apply disciplinary sanctions to its officials or employees when they fail in their duties. The disciplinary power is inherent to every public or private organization, that is, it is not exclusive to the Public Administration, as it is an indispensable power for the orderly management of public and private responsibility, but its foundation is diverse. Thus, the private disciplinary power has its foundation in a civil obligation, by virtue of the legal equality of the parties that informs all legal relationships under private law. For example, it occurs within the family, with the parents exercising that power, not only for the correction of children but also for the preservation of the moral unity of the family, and reprimand is given not for what has been done but so that it is not done again; in the private work sphere -industrial and commercial-, the employer exercises it in defense of the regularity of the work sphere; in professional associations, etc. In contrast, the disciplinary power of the public sector is created by virtue of a bilateral act, but in its development, the activity of the public official remains exclusively subject to the will of the Public Administration, from the creation to the extinction of the relationship, so that the servant finds himself in a status of special dependence with respect to the State. The individual voluntarily accepts the appointment but places himself in a sphere of subjection with respect to the Administration, regulated by Objective Law, where the situation of legal inequality of the parties in the public employment relationship is unquestionable; the Public Administration consequently assumes a superiority or preeminence that translates into hierarchical power, the correlative of which is the disciplinary power. This power, by its very purpose, is confined to the circle of the agent's functional duties, and therefore, disciplinary sanctions cannot, legally, be imposed except during the existence of the employment relationship, that is, while the status of dependence persists. Thus, the disciplinary power and its sanctions are always conditional on the legal exercise of public employment or function, so that without the existence of the vinculum iuris between the Administration and the agent, disciplinary sanctions are inapplicable.

IV.TYPES OF RESPONSIBILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS. Disciplinary responsibility presupposes a disciplinary power of the Administration. The vinculum iuris that exists between the Public Administration and the public agent or servant necessarily implies a series of duties and rights, so that transgression of the former determines the employee's responsibility, which is regulated or disciplined differently by Objective Law depending on the legal nature of the responsibility. The transgression of a duty can be caused by an action or omission, which produce harmful effects for the Administration (internal) or for the administered parties or third parties external to the public employment relationship (external), facts or omissions that are relevant insofar as the infraction consists of non-compliance with a duty of the function or employment, which consequently causes responsibility and its correlative sanction. The transgression of a duty does not always have univocal effects, since it may consist of the violation of a purely disciplinary norm, without other consequences, or it may constitute a crime under criminal law, or it may imply the financial compensation for the damage caused. This multiplicity of effects determines the different classes of responsibility of the official: disciplinary or administrative, criminal, and civil or financial. These responsibilities are not mutually exclusive, so that the same fact in violation of a legal duty of the servant can generate the three types of responsibility, and therefore, three different types of sanctions. Here the principles of "non bis in idem" or "noter in idem" are inapplicable because it involves three distinct types of responsibility, each with its own domain; the three responsibilities have specific and unmistakable purposes, so that the classical principle would be violated only in the event of responsibilities and sanctions of the same kind. Thus, in judgment number 3484-94, at twelve hours on July eighth of last year, this Chamber considered:

"Now, while it is true that there is independence between the administrative sanctioning procedure and the judgment of facts in the criminal venue, it cannot be interpreted, without contradicting the right to due process and the principle of 'non bis in idem,' that if a fact is judged in the criminal venue and the accused is acquitted, they can be disciplinary sanctioned in the administrative venue for the same facts. It is recognized that one of the limits of the sanctioning power of the Administration is its subordination to the Judicial Authority. If there is a collision between a jurisdictional action and an administrative action, it must be resolved in favor of the former. From this same principle derives the need for the res judicata to be respected. In this regard, the Spanish Constitutional Court stated, in judgment number 77 of October third, nineteen eighty-three:

'The principle non bis in idem determines an interdiction against the duplication of administrative and criminal sanctions regarding the same facts, but it also leads to the impossibility that, when the legal system allows a duality of procedures, and in each of them a judgment and a qualification of the same facts must occur, the judgment and qualification that may occur on the legal plane be made independently, if they result from the application of different regulations, but that the same cannot occur with regard to the assessment of the facts, since it is clear that the same facts cannot exist and cease to exist for the organs of the State. A consequence of what has been said, connected with the rule of the subordination of the sanctioning action of the Administration to the action of the Courts of Justice, is that the former, as previously stated, cannot act while the latter have not done so and must in all respects respect, when acting a posteriori, the factual assessment that those have made, ...'" Notwithstanding that the three types of responsibilities have diverse structures, the sanctions of the three have a common objective: to maintain and ensure, in a preventive and repressive manner, the normal functioning of the public service, directly or indirectly obligating officials and employees to comply with all their functional duties. Thus, the procedures to enforce the responsibility of officials are applied by virtue of the diversity of the legal norms that regulate it; criminal responsibility has its main source in the Code of repressive matters and in special laws, it being possible to affirm the unity and systematization of criminal acts, as well as the procedure for prosecuting their perpetrators; civil responsibility is disciplined by the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code; in contrast, administrative responsibility is subject to a variety of legal systems lacking unity and systematization. From what has been discussed, it can be concluded that offenses committed by officials in the exercise of their position, breaching the internal order of the administration, give rise to disciplinary responsibility, insofar as the disciplinary offense entails a maladjustment of the employee to their function, affecting the very essence of the administrative system: without prejudice to criminal and civil responsibilities, all with the exception that regarding the facts was previously noted, a matter on which no pronouncement can be made in the administrative venue that contradicts what has been deemed duly accredited in the jurisdictional venue. Therefore, the purpose of disciplinary responsibility is to ensure compliance with the rules of subordination and, in general, the exact fulfillment of all the duties of the function assigned. Thus, disciplinary law presupposes a relationship of subordination between the body subject to discipline and the body that establishes or applies it, more to punish, to correct, and even to educate the offender of the norm, hence the corrective nature of disciplinary sanctions."

V.SPHERE OF APPLICATION OF DISCIPLINARY POWER. The application of the disciplinary regime is limited to the activities of the individual in their capacity as a public agent or official, to compel and ensure, preventively and repressively, the fulfillment of the legal duties of the employment, function, or position. The offenses generating this responsibility are many and varied, such as, for example, negligence, apathy, carelessness, absenteeism, incorrectness with superiors, equals, or subordinates, and with the public, irregular social conduct, lack of probity, abandonment of the position, etc., which according to their seriousness are classified as minor, serious, or very serious. The duties of officials derive, like their rights, from the law and from the nature of the position or function they perform, that is, they have an objective character. The duties of officials are of two classes: general, which pertain to every official by the mere fact of being one, and special, imposed in relation to the specific administrative function performed. Thus, for example, obedience is a duty for every public official, but the duty of obedience of a professor is not the same as the duty of a police officer. Some general duties are: the duty of obedience, which consists of respect and obedience to higher hierarchical authorities; and the provision of service, which consists of the official's duty to perform the tasks inherent to their position, which is given by the nature of the function, for better public service, performance, or productivity in services, with officials being obligated to faithfully fulfill the function or position, complying with the regulatory working hours, and must loyally collaborate with their superiors and coworkers for the improvement of services and the achievement of the goals of the administrative unit in which they are assigned. The provision of service must be personal, by virtue of the official presumption in favor of the competence of the assigned official. Also constituting general duties are the duty of confidentiality, which consists of the obligation to proceed with due discretion in the performance of the position, maintaining opportune silence in cases where the nature of the function requires it -in the public sector, the breach of secrecy can generate severe disciplinary sanctions, and even criminal ones, as in the case of the diplomatic disciplinary sphere and the Judicial Branch, where the revelation of secrets affects State security or the interests of the parties, causing serious harm-; and the duty of decorum requires that the public office be attended to by its holder with due respect and correctness, both professionally and socially, by reason of the institution they represent. The duty to dedicate oneself entirely and with all zeal and decorum to the assigned position prohibits the official from exercising other positions or functions, as it would make good service in both impossible. On occasions, the nature of the employment excludes the exercise of certain professions; thus, a judge cannot hold management or advisory positions for private companies. The public official may not act in the service of third parties in matters in which they are intervening by reason of their position, nor in those that are in process or pending resolution in the office where they work, nor may they be an attorney, legal representative, or expert for a third party in any type of litigation against the State. Incurring any of these incompatibilities shall be classified as a serious or very serious offense, and offenses or absences, delays, carelessness, informalities, or negligence originating in the exercise of compatible activities must also be sanctioned.

VI.THE JUDGE AS A SUBJECT OF THE DISCIPLINARY REGIME. THE DUTIES OF THE JUDGE. The foregoing is to determine that the judge, as a public official, vested with certain State powers (an organ in the legal-material sense), to whom an essential function of the State, the jurisdictional function, is assigned, and as a primary element of each of the administrative units that make up the Judicial Branch, is subject to the disciplinary regime of the Branch they represent, that is, to the disciplinary regime of the Judicial Branch. The incompatibilities imposed on judges -prohibition of the simultaneous exercise of another public office or professional activity, not only the practice of law, but any other liberal profession, with the exception of university teaching or study commissions, of extrajudicially advising, sponsoring, and representing in litigation in any jurisdiction, of participating in any political-party activity, of engaging in commerce and lucrative activities, all with the aim of ensuring the greatest dedication of judges to their specific functions, as well as preventing these from being interfered with by economic or partisan interests, or performing acts contrary to the dignity of the position, because the status of the judge imposes the duty to observe public conduct that places them beyond all suspicion and doubt regarding their honorability- constitute duties for them, insofar as they impose on them the observance of conduct consisting of abstaining from performing certain acts. These are duties of non-action or prohibitions, the breach of which may entail disciplinary responsibility, without prejudice to civil, and even criminal responsibility. In this way, the primary and fundamental duty of judges is to provide the services incumbent upon them as State officials, that is, to administer justice in accordance with the legal system, each time such activity is required of them in a specific case. This duty, to exercise the jurisdictional function, derives from the public employment relationship that links the judge with the State, being governed, as such, by the general principles of administrative law, and by the right that the parties or petitioners have that their claims be resolved or addressed, regardless of the content of the respective decision. Non-compliance with this duty, or its irregular compliance, authorizes, on the one hand, the application of disciplinary sanctions, and may even justify the dismissal or removal of the judge, and on the other, may generate civil and criminal responsibilities. The fact of "failing to judge under the pretext of silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws" constitutes a transgression that particularly determines this type of responsibility. Within this great duty, the judge is obliged to resolve in accordance with the legal deadlines and terms -the contrary would imply denial of justice-, the reasoning for decisions -as a way to ensure adequate control over the decision-making activity of judges and to avoid possible arbitrariness-, and to direct the proceeding -having to concentrate as much as possible all the proceedings that need to be carried out, point out the defects and omissions that the filing suffers from before processing it, ordering them to be corrected within a legal deadline, and order ex officio any proceeding that is necessary to prevent nullities, maintain the legal equality of the parties involved in the proceeding, ensure that in the processing of the case the greatest procedural economy is sought, prevent and sanction any act contrary to the duty of loyalty, probity, and good faith, and grant a hearing to the parties-.

VII. THE DISCIPLINARY REGIME OF JUDGES. The repealed Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, in article 211, provided

"The Full Court, the [Nombre9143] of the Court, the Chambers of the Court, the other Collegiate Tribunals, the Judges, the Court Clerks, the Mayors, and the Prosecutors may disciplinary correct:

...

3.) Judicial officials and employees for offenses they commit in the performance of their position and employment.

...

The Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection shall also exercise the disciplinary regime with respect to all the officials and employees indicated above, except as established for special cases, or when it involves offenses attributed to the Judicial Inspectors themselves."; a norm from which the general principle derived that all officials working in the Judicial Branch are subject to the disciplinary regime established by its organic law. Thus, in the new law, this principle was expressly included in Title VIII -Disciplinary Regime-, with article 175 providing that:

"All judicial servants are subject to disciplinary responsibility in the cases and with the guarantees established in this Law."; servants among whom judges and court clerks are obviously found, because said disciplinary regime "... has as its object to ensure the efficiency, correctness, and decorum of the functions entrusted to the Judicial Branch and to guarantee citizens a correct administration of justice. For such purposes, there shall exist the necessary, agile, and reliable control mechanisms." (Article 174 of the current Organic Law of the Judicial Branch.)

By reason of the foregoing, broad powers of investigation and control over all judicial servants were conferred upon the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection, for which purpose it may monitor the proper fulfillment of duties, process complaints filed against them, instruct investigations upon learning of any irregularity, and resolve what is appropriate regarding the disciplinary regime, without prejudice to the powers that other bodies and officials of the Judicial Branch may have in the matter, as provided in article 120 of the repealed Law, functions that are recognized by article 184 of the new Organic Law of the Judicial Branch.

This Chamber has already so indicated, in judgment number 5891-93, of twelve hours fifty-seven minutes on the twelfth of November, nineteen ninety-three, when it stated:

"The Judicial Inspection Tribunal shall also exercise the disciplinary regime with respect to the officials indicated above—the collegiate Tribunals, the Judges, the Actuaries, the Mayors, and the Prosecuting Agents—except in special cases. The Judicial Inspection is therefore a body dependent on the Supreme Court of Justice, whose primary functions are: to exercise regular and constant oversight over all dependencies of the Judicial Branch, as well as to monitor the proper performance of the duties of the servants, processing complaints filed against them and applying the disciplinary regime, without prejudice to the powers that other bodies and officials of the Judicial Branch may have in this matter. (Article 120 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch.) The appellant is not correct in asserting that the appealed body lacked the authority to impose a warning sanction, since in accordance with articles 120 and following of the cited law—now 184 and following—the Judicial Inspection is empowered to exercise the disciplinary regime against a judicial official when, through due process, it has been demonstrated that they have failed to observe the functions inherent to the position they hold, a circumstance that is met in the case at hand, since through an investigation process, in which the appellant had the opportunity to provide for their defense—as is evident from the administrative file that has been reviewed—it was demonstrated that by delegating the practice of an ocular inspection proceeding to the secretary of their office, they incurred in a breach of the functions that the law imposes upon them. (Article 210 of the Code of Criminal Procedure)."

VIII.REGARDING THE INTERFERENCE OF THE JUDICIAL INSPECTION IN THE JUDGE'S OWN FUNCTIONS. The claimant argues that the Judicial Inspection Tribunal is arrogating to itself functions that do not correspond to it, because it is a disciplinary and not a jurisdictional body, by interpreting laws, a function that corresponds solely and exclusively to jurisdictional bodies, thereby exceeding constitutional limits—article 156 of the Political Constitution. In this regard, article 199 of the current Organic Law of the Judicial Branch states:

"Any complaint that refers exclusively to problems of interpretation of legal norms shall be rejected outright."; so that, neither by express provision of the law, nor by interpretation of the applicable regulations, can it be understood that extensive powers are granted to the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, such as those indicated by the claimant, but only those that the law confers upon it—and were previously discussed—, much less that said Tribunal can arrogate to itself powers that the law does not contemplate, because that would be contrary to the nature of the function entrusted to it, which is solely the application of the disciplinary regime of the Judicial Branch. This norm was not in the repealed Organic Law of the Judicial Branch; however, due to the nature of the functions entrusted to the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, the principle was indeed effectively applied, since its scope is solely the disciplinary field, not the technical-legal assessment of the judge's work in specific cases. It should be noted that the oversight activity of the Tribunal cannot interfere with the jurisdictional function, because these sanctions—the disciplinary ones—do not have the effect of annulling or altering jurisdictional resolutions, or of directly influencing the matter in question, and the rulings of the Judicial Inspection Tribunal shall never produce res judicata with respect to the sub judice case, as these are two completely separate things: the legal content of the judgment, and the judge's conduct as a public official. The Judicial Inspection Tribunal, in relation to the disciplinary regime, must assess the judge in two respects: on the one hand, everything that produces efficient public service, for which it must examine and investigate the normal functioning of the offices, the activity performed, the processing of files, procedures, personnel hiring, etc.; and on the other hand, it must assess the efficiency of the judge as a public official, such that the content of their judgments demonstrates their professional capacity and suitability for the position they hold—that is, whether they correctly know and apply the law—because the Superior Tribunals see this oversight limited to their own competence, and cannot impose sanctions of this category, only those derived from arbitrary activity in the file. This implies that a judge can only be subject to a sanction of this type—disciplinary—when, through an investigation procedure, in which their rights derived from due process are guaranteed, the breach of the functions inherent to them by reason of the position they hold is proven, but not for criteria expressed in rulings and decisions of a jurisdictional nature, which shall only be subject to review by the superior when the legal remedies are filed, except when a clear conviction arises from them of their failure to perform the position for which they were appointed. In other words, the Judicial Inspection Tribunal may assess the generic activity of the judge through the study of their pronouncements, but only to determine their suitability for the position they hold; it may not directly influence a specific case, pointing out the errors of interpretation it believes the judge incurred in when applying the law, because this is an eminently jurisdictional function, and said instance is of an administrative nature. Therefore, the Judicial Inspection needs a plurality of cases, and cannot assess the capacity or competence of a judge based on a single pronouncement—unless it involves a manifestly absurd and highly serious error—because that would empower it to evaluate the legal content of jurisdictional rulings, which is not possible under any point of view. It must be clear that, for the proper performance of the tasks entrusted to the Inspection, it is empowered to visit judicial offices and keep control of what has been resolved, of pending matters, delays, etc., all to verify the official's aptitude for the position they hold, and ultimately, to ensure a better administration of justice. It should not be forgotten that article 30, subsection 4.) of the former Organic Law of the Judicial Branch—now article 28, subsection 4.)—allows for the dismissal, following the established procedure and with the prior opportunity for defense, of the servant:

"4.- Who proves to be incompetent or inadequate for the performance of their position."; therefore, if it is proven that the employee does not fulfill the functions entrusted to them in their capacity as judge—which primarily entails the administration of justice in accordance with the law—, a disciplinary sanction may be imposed on them, as the Judicial Inspection Tribunal deems appropriate. Thus, the plurality of errors incurred by the judge, such as ruling contrary to the provisions of the law, erring in reasoning, failing to issue a properly legal criterion on a particular point, determine the incompetence or lack of suitability of the official for the performance of the position for which they were appointed.

IX.The claimant further alleges that, with the intrusion of the Judicial Inspection into the judge's own work, their independence is being seriously harmed. This has been understood as the economic, political, and functional autonomy of the jurisdictional bodies with respect to the other Branches of Government; however, this concept goes further, implying the effective fulfillment of the functions entrusted to judges, that is, judges are able to administer justice on the condition of acting with independence. This independence implies: a.) the deprivation of hierarchical superiors of any power to interfere in the properly jurisdictional or adjudicative function that their subordinates exercise in each specific case, except when they hear the same matter by virtue of legal remedies, and safeguarding the power of those superiors to issue instructions concerning the service of justice in abstract terms; b.) the prohibition for governmental and administrative powers to alter the functional statute of judges regarding entry and promotions during their term of office, which constitutes the immovability of the official; and c.) the abstention of the judge from hearing matters in which, due to family or social relationships, they may influence the resolutions (inhibition, excuse, or recusal). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the independence of the judge cannot be understood in such a way as to justify and sanctify any of their activities; the non-interference of external influences in decisions and rulings of a jurisdictional nature is justified by their scientific nature and justice, that is, so that they can be guided exclusively by reasons of knowledge in legal science. By reason of the above, article 154 of the Political Constitution determines that the judge is subject to the Constitution and the laws, from which it is understood that their activity cannot be arbitrary, but must be duly founded and be in accordance with the law. The Constitution imposes on them the duty to state the grounds and legal and factual foundations on which the solution agreed upon for the issues raised in the process is based, this being the only means through which the parties can verify the justice of jurisdictional decisions and verify their conformity with the prevailing legal assessments; thereby demonstrating that judgments are a reasoned application of the law in force and not the product of their individual will. This also derives from the right of defense (articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution), that is, from the possibility of obtaining jurisdictional protection of rights, which presupposes the delivery of judgments in accordance with the law and in relation to the disputed facts, because otherwise there is only a mere act of arbitrariness or caprice by the judge, and not a true judgment in the sense required by the Constitution. This concept had already been developed by this Chamber, when considering:

"The principle of independence that governs the performance of the jurisdictional function has the purpose of guaranteeing that the subjects who administer justice are solely subject to the Constitution and the Laws; thus, the resolutions they issue in matters within their competence shall not impose upon them any responsibilities other than those expressly indicated in the laws. Now, the fact that the Judicial Inspection imposes a disciplinary sanction—within its competence—on a judicial official who has failed to observe the duties inherent to the investiture they hold, does not imply, as the appellant claims, that the former is arrogating competences that do not correspond to it or that it modifies the proceeding challenged in the complaint; but rather, on the contrary, determines whether those servants have acted negligently in the fulfillment of their duties or whether they have improperly exercised the powers the law confers upon them, as a means of guaranteeing their adequate performance." (judgment number 5891-93.)

It is concluded from the above that it cannot be affirmed that there is a violation of the judge's independence when a disciplinary sanction is imposed for breach of the duties inherent to them by reason of the position they hold, following a prior investigation process; but it would indeed be contrary to this principle if this type of sanction were imposed by reason of the criterion expressed in a particular ruling or resolution of a jurisdictional nature, for considering that the decision given by the judge is not appropriate or in accordance with the law, or that the interpretation given to the regulations applied to the specific case is not correct.

X.THE SANCTION IMPOSED ON THE CLAIMANT BY THE JUDICIAL INSPECTION TRIBUNAL. In the case under study, the Judicial Inspection imposed a disciplinary sanction on the claimant for not allowing Nombre95825 to participate in an auction, considering that they could not participate in it if they did not make the corresponding deposit in cash or by certified check at the cashier's office of the Court, since they had only presented a copy of a record of judicial deposit that had not been entered into the Court's cashier, in which the process for which said deposit was made was not indicated, an action that was confirmed when the motion to annul proceedings and resolutions filed by the affected party was denied; that is, the disciplinary sanction of reprimand was imposed on them for considering that they had incorrectly applied the law in a specific case. The claimant alleges that they applied the provisions of article 652 of the Civil Procedure Code, which states, in relevant part:

"The auction shall be presided over by the president, the judge, or the mayor, with the assistance of the secretary and the intervention of an auctioneer. On the designated day and time, the auctioneer shall announce the auction, the bids being made, and the improvements being presented, and the act shall conclude when there is no one to improve upon the last bid. No bid that does not cover the base price and that is not in cash shall be admitted.

Only bidders who, at the auction, deposit in cash or by certified check fifteen percent of the base price given for the goods shall be admitted, unless the executing party, in writing or orally, relieves them of this authority." In view of the complaint filed by Nombre95825 for not having been allowed to participate in an auction, by resolution number 326-91, of fourteen hours forty minutes on the thirteenth of May, nineteen ninety-one, the Judicial Inspection Tribunal considered:

"It was demonstrated, without any doubt whatsoever, that Mr. Nombre95825 attended, even before the start of the auction, to carry out the pertinent procedures to participate in it. Furthermore, it was also fully demonstrated that beforehand—on the twenty-eighth of December of the immediately preceding year—they had deposited, to the order of the Court, the ten percent—that was required—of the base price, with which they could make an offer to acquire the property to be auctioned. They showed a copy of the deposit; such that there was indeed certainty of the existence of that money in the Court's current account. In any event, if at that moment they delivered the money in cash, it would have to be deposited to the order of the Court, in the event the property was awarded to them. The truth of the matter is that, due to a futile and unnecessary formalism, resulting from a poor interpretation of the respective Code, they were not allowed to participate. Such decision, which was exclusively that of the Actuary, was made dependent on the authorization or lack thereof from the plaintiff's representative, which is a possibility, in another scenario or case indicated by numeral 652 of the Civil Procedure Code. In the Tribunal's judgment, Mr. Nombre95825 acquired the right to participate in that auction and was unjustifiably not allowed to make an offer. For this purpose, it is worth repeating, the necessary money or percentage was even in the possession of or to the order of the Court. Of course, the complainant was harmed, at least as a potential bidder in the purchase of the property. Subsequently, it became clear that they were not allowed any other intervention in the process, since every procedural step they took was rejected for not being a party. Consequently, they had no procedural opportunity for any error committed to their detriment to be corrected. In addition, the fault is indeed subject to the disciplinary regime under the charge of this Tribunal." It is concluded from the above that, in this particular case, the Judicial Inspection Tribunal does extend the powers entrusted to it, since it does not limit itself to the purely disciplinary sphere, but has applied its sanctioning power to criteria that are eminently of a legal nature expressed in rulings and resolutions of a jurisdictional nature, thereby harming the independence of the judge.

XI.THE PRINCIPLE OF TYPICALITY IN THE DISCIPLINARY REGIME. The claimant also challenges the disciplinary regime of the Judicial Branch, considering that it is contrary to the principle of typicality, since the faults established in the laws—the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and the Judicial Service Statute—are vague and imprecise, and in addition, indeterminate and vague concepts are used in the definition of the "types." They specifically question article 30, subsection 2.) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, which stated:

"They shall be dismissed from their employment:

...

2.) That, due to proven improprieties or failures in the exercise of their position or in their private life, they have made themselves deserving of this sanction, in the judgment of the Full Court."; which corresponds to article 28, subsection 2.) of the new law, which provides:

"They may be dismissed from their position, following the established procedure and with the prior opportunity for defense, the servant:

2.- That, due to improprieties or failures in the exercise of their position or in their private life, which may affect the good service or the image of the Judicial Branch, has made themselves deserving of this sanction." As noted above, disciplinary liability usually concerns acts of a general nature, as the disciplinary authorities may use a discretionary power of extensive interpretation in the classification of facts. Thus, the norms regulating disciplinary law are mainly generic, the figures do not have solutions of continuity, and it is theoretically and practically difficult, not to say impossible, to affirm when a perfectly defined figure exists. In this regime, the principle of typicality—"nullum crimen sine lege, and nulla poena sine lege"—does not have the rigorous application that it has in criminal law, its domain being more extended. In this regard, by judgment number 5594-94, of fifteen hours forty-eight minutes on the twenty-seventh of last September, this Chamber considered:

"III. THE PRINCIPLE OF TYPICALITY IN THE DISCIPLINARY REGIME. The existence of a set of duties of the officials—and at the same time of their powers—, whether duties comprised in the obligation of the function or service they perform, or those deriving from hierarchical subordination, demands norms established to regulate these relations, and sanctions for when such obligations are violated. The principle of typicality is an application of the principle of legality and requires the concrete delimitation of the conducts that are made reprehensible for the purpose of their sanction. However, in disciplinary matters, the principle of typicality is not applied in the same manner as in criminal matters, in accordance with article 39 of the Constitution, as this Chamber has repeatedly stated, noting that:

"For a conduct to constitute a crime, it is not sufficient that it is unlawful—contrary to law—; it must be typified, that is, it must be fully described in a norm; this is due to unsuppressible demands of legal certainty, since repressive subject matter involves the greatest intervention in the important legal rights of citizens, to guarantee them against the State, it is necessary that they can have full knowledge of which actions they must refrain from committing, under penalty of incurring criminal liability ..." (resolution number 1877-90, of sixteen hours two minutes on the nineteenth of December, nineteen ninety).

It can be affirmed that the principle of typicality constitutes a fundamental principle in disciplinary liability, but not in the same form as in the criminal-legal field, since the principles "nullum crimen sine lege," "nullum poena sine lege" do not have the rigidity and requirement that characterize them in substantive criminal law, because the sanctioning activity of a criminal nature and that of a disciplinary nature correspond to different legal fields, and the parameters of discretion that are proper to the exercise of administrative disciplinary power are broader than those of the criminal sanctioning power of the State. Thus, in criminal law, in relation to crimes, every penalty must be established in the law with respect to the incriminated act, excluding, by its generality, any possibility of reference to so-called indeterminate legal concepts, or open or indeterminate clauses; if the conduct is not fully defined, there is no penalty. In disciplinary law, by reason of the purpose it pursues, which is the protection of the general social order, and the subject matter it regulates—discipline—, the determination of the disciplinary infraction is less demanding than the criminal sanction, since it comprises acts that can be classified as a violation of the official's duties, which in some legislations are not specified, and in others, they are. So that, the exercise of this power is discretionary, hence it is appropriate to apply sanctions for any breach of functional duties, without the need for them to be detailed concretely as a sanctionable act, for which reason, the enumeration of punishable acts made through regulations does not have a limiting character. Motivated by the variety of causes that can generate its application, by the frequent imprecision of its precepts, and by the sphere of application, it is not always organic or clear in its literal expression, reason for which breaches not specifically foreseen, but understood to be included in the text, can be sanctioned discretionally, provided they result from the verification of the disciplinary fault, by means of a procedure created for that purpose. The disciplinary fault or infraction has been defined as a violation of the functioning of any duty proper to their condition, even when it has not been specially defined though it is foreseen. The acts that determine disciplinary faults are innumerable, as they depend on the nature of the behaviors or conducts of the "subordinate" subjects, behaviors or conducts that are truly unlimited in number given their variety; therefore, the existence of three elements of the disciplinary fault is deduced: 1.- a material element: which is an act or omission; 2.- a moral element: which is the imputation of the act to a free will; and 3.- a formal element: which is the disturbance to the functioning of the service or immediate or possible impairment of its efficiency.

IV.INDETERMINATE LEGAL CONCEPTS IN THE DISCIPLINARY REGIME. By reason of the sanction to be applied—criminal or disciplinary—it can be taken into consideration to determine the greater or lesser requirement regarding the guarantees of due process, among which the principle of typicality is found, since, the greater the sanction, the greater the guarantees must be, which translates, in the case under study—in the disciplinary process—, into the lesser rigidity of this principle. Therefore, based on the subject matter it regulates and the endless variety of conducts it involves, in the disciplinary sphere it would not be easy to conclude the elimination of all types of infraction defined in open terms, such as those that refer to indeterminate legal concepts. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it cannot be affirmed that the definition of the conducts to be sanctioned in application of the principle of legality, and more specifically of typicality, can be completely obviated. Therefore, it must be understood that the types stated in apparently deontological terms must be converted into perfectly technical legal types, in the sense of formulating determinable concepts, for which reason the indeterminate legal concepts of conducts must be concretized or completed through a detailed analysis of the facts and an interpretation of them based on the values that are defined in said concepts. In this way, more or less imprecise types—in the sense of the technique of indeterminate legal concepts—or open types, are indispensable for use in the disciplinary sphere, given the very indeterminacy of the professional and disciplinary duties they aim to guarantee, which can only be stated in very general terms. But this cannot justify totally open and non-specific assessments, assessments "in conscience," both with respect to the breadth of the professional duty or conduct the breach of which is reproached; rather, it must be applied to the reality of the reproached conduct, thus making the principle of legality—article 39 of the Constitution—effective, but adapted to the administrative subject matter. Thus, for example, it shall by no means be sufficient to limit oneself to reproaching an official for a lack of probity, in the abstract; rather, it is necessary to specify, in the specific conduct that is being judged, where said fault is concretely attributable, from the perspective of the positive duties of the official, to which they have defaulted. As a consequence of the above, when interpreting a norm, it must be done in relation to the activity it regulates; in the case under study, it must be done in the context of Education, thereby avoiding arbitrariness in the use of "indeterminate legal concepts."

V.The concepts used by laws can be determinate or indeterminate. The former delimit the sphere of reality to which they refer in a precise and unequivocal manner, such as the age of majority, deadlines for filing appeals, etc. By contrast, with the technique of the indeterminate legal concept, the law refers to a sphere of reality whose limits are not well defined in its statement; nonetheless, it is clear that it attempts to delimit a concrete scenario—concepts such as good faith, lack of probity, morality, good customs, etc. Thus, although the law does not clearly determine the limits ..., because these are concepts that do not admit quantification or rigorous determination, in any case, it is manifest that by them it is referring to a scenario of reality that, notwithstanding the indeterminacy of the concept, admits being specified at the moment of application. The law uses concepts of value—good faith, standard of conduct of the good father of a family, public order, just price, morality—or of experience—incapacity for the exercise of their functions, premeditation, irresistible force—because the realities referred to do not admit any other type of more precise determination. But it is clear that, by referring to concrete scenarios and not to imprecise or contradictory vaguenesses, as is the case with the determination of disciplinary infractions or faults, the application of such concepts to the classification of concrete circumstances admits only one solution: either it occurs or it does not occur ...; either there is good faith or there is not, or there are actions contrary to public order or there are not, or there are actions contrary to morality or there are not, etc. In this lies the essence of this type of concept, such that the indeterminacy of the statement does not translate into an indeterminacy of its applications, which only allow a "unity of just solution" in each case. The technique of indeterminate legal concepts, which despite their name are concepts of value or experience used by the laws, occurs in all branches of law, as for example in civil law—good faith, diligence of the good father of a family, negligence—in commercial law—corporate interest—in procedural law—pertinence of interrogations, adequate measures to promote execution, irreparable harm—or in criminal law—treachery, dishonest acts—are just some of the examples that can be cited. In Administrative Law, there is no differentiation regarding the use of concepts such as urgency, public order, just price, public calamity, adequate or proportionate measures, public necessity, or public interest, etc., not allowing a plurality of just solutions, but only one solution for each concrete case."

Article 219 of the repealed Organic Law of the Judicial Branch contained the disciplinary sanctions to be applied; these were:

"The disciplinary measures imposable on judicial officials and employees, when the fault or faults committed do not justify the revocation of the appointment, shall be:

1.) Warning or admonishment; 2.) Reprimand; 3.) Suspension not exceeding one month from the exercise of the position or employment."; which were imposed by reason of the seriousness of the acts that motivated the application of the disciplinary regime.

In this regard, the new Organic Law of the Judicial Branch contains a chapter referring to the faults and sanctions of the disciplinary regime—Articles 190 to 196—which is clear in all its aspects, as it defines which actions motivate a disciplinary sanction and the corresponding sanctions, according to the seriousness of the facts. Therefore, and based on the reasons given above, it can be affirmed that the disciplinary regime of the Judicial Branch is not contrary to the principle of legality (principio de tipicidad).

XII.ON THE DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Finally, in relation to the disciplinary regime, the claimant points out that the application of the judicial disciplinary regime is inappropriate, since the pertinent thing is to apply the provisions of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) and the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), as they are subsequent to the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, and because it was repealed by the principles most favorable to the worker. He also questions the procedure established to apply it, considering that the referral to civil procedural law is incompatible and inadequate with disciplinary matters, being more repressive, and therefore prone to sanctioning, in violation of the protective (tuitivo), innocence, and legal certainty principles, as well as those that comprise due process (debido proceso), because there is a concentration of the investigation (instrucción) and the judgment (sentencia) in the same body, there is no possibility of appealing resolutions on the proceeding nor the final ones, only the possibility of revocation exists, there is an absence of regulation, since the procedure is disaggregated in a regulation lacking coherence, and a lack of precision and gradation between provisional and definitive faults. In the first place, the claimant must bear in mind that the Judicial Branch, despite being a Branch of the State and governed by Administrative Law, has a special regime by reason of the function it performs; and in matters of public employment relations, although the general principles are set forth in Administrative Law and Labor Law—as parameters—the specifications are regulated in accordance with the regulations that specifically refer to the Judicial Branch. Thus, it is governed in accordance with the provisions of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, the Judicial Service Statute, the Regulation on background competition for appointing officials who administer justice, the Organic Law of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), the Regulation on the Evaluation for Employees of the Judicial Branch, etc. As observed, this is a special regulation, which cannot be tacitly repealed by a subsequent general norm, as the claimant asserts. Regarding the procedure of the judicial disciplinary regime, this Chamber does not observe that it results in a violation of any fundamental right; quite the contrary, in both the repealed law and the new Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, the guarantees that comprise due process (debido proceso) are respected, with opportunity to exercise the right of defense. As this Tribunal has indicated on repeated occasions, the right of appeal referred to in the Pact of San José—in its Articles 8 and 25—can only be claimed in criminal matters in cases of resolutions that end a proceeding, so there is no right of appeal in an indiscriminate manner, as the claimant intends. In the case under study, the server subjected to disciplinary procedure found this possibility in Article 211, fourth paragraph, which provided:

"The corrections imposed by the Superior Tribunals, the other Collegiate Tribunals, Judges, Court Clerks (Actuarios), Mayors (Alcaldes), Prosecutorial Agents (Agentes Fiscales), and the Heads of Administrative Departments that have disciplinary authority, on the servers of their own office, shall have a recourse of appeal before the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection (Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial). The recourse must be filed directly with the Tribunal, within the three days following the imposition of the disciplinary measure."; likewise, the second paragraph of Article 124 stated:

"If the Tribunal decrees the removal of the server, the latter may appeal before the Court, by telegraphic means or in writing on plain paper, addressing the Tribunal of the Inspection (Tribunal de la Inspección) itself, within the three days following notification of the resolution: or verbally upon being notified. The Tribunal shall admit the recourse, summon the appellant to appear before the Superior and make his pleadings within the subsequent three days, and then shall forward the information to the Full Court (Corte Plena) so that it resolves definitively." The claimant himself had the opportunity to promote a recourse of revocation against resolution number 326, of fourteen hours forty minutes on May thirteenth, nineteen ninety-one, of the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection (Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial), by written submission filed on June eighteenth of that same year, which was declared without merit by resolution number 423, of fourteen hours forty minutes on June twenty-fourth of that same year, by the same Tribunal. The new Organic Law is much clearer, specifying in Article 209:

"Whenever a suspension or the revocation of the appointment is imposed on the accused party, they may appeal the final resolution of the Tribunal of the Inspection (Tribunal de la Inspección), within the three days following notification. Their recourse shall be heard by the Superior Council (Consejo Superior)"; therefore, the alleged violation does not exist. Regarding the absence of regulation, the promoter himself points out that in the repealed law, such regulation existed, only that it was dispersed in the law; with the new Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, the procedure is regulated in a systematic manner. Regarding the determination and gradation of sanctions, reference is made to what was said in Considerando XI of this resolution. Finally, as this Chamber has pointed out on other occasions, the guarantees and procedural principles of a fundamental nature that comprise due process (debido proceso), which derive from Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution, and more specifically from the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), are applicable not only in the jurisdictional sphere, but also in administrative procedures. Among those principles, the following can be cited:

"... a.) Notification to the interested party of the nature and ends of the procedure; b.) right to be heard, and opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and produce the evidence they deem pertinent; c.) opportunity for the administered party to prepare their pleading, which necessarily includes access to the information and administrative records, linked to the matter in question; ch.) right of the administered party to be represented and advised by lawyers; d.) adequate notification of the decision issued by the Administration and the reasons on which it is based; and e.) right of the interested party to appeal the decision issued." (sentence number 15-90, of sixteen hours forty-five minutes on January fifth, nineteen ninety.)

Based on the reasons given and on the provision in the second paragraph of Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), it is appropriate to reject this action on the merits in this regard.

XIII.CHALLENGE OF ARTICLES 49, 50, AND 51 OF THE LAW OF THE JUDICIAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY (LEY DEL ORGANISMO DE INVESTIGACION JUDICIAL). The challenge of Articles 49, 50, and 51 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Ley Orgánica del Organismo de Investigación Judicial) is inadmissible, because they establish the subjection to the disciplinary regime of the officials who work in said institution—a regime which, it is worth noting, is founded on the same reasons given for the case of judges—whereby this action does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed in the main matter, given that the claimant is not an official of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), and such challenged regulation is not applied to him in this specific case. Consequently, the outright rejection of the action proceeds in relation to these points, in accordance with the provision in Article 9, first paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

XIV.ON THE INTERPRETATION BY THE FULL COURT (CORTE PLENA) OF ARTICLE 64 OF THE JUDICIAL SERVICE STATUTE. Finally, the claimant challenges the interpretation that the Full Court (Corte Plena) has made of Article 64 of the Judicial Service Statute, insofar as it has established the temporary loss of annually obtained salary increases by reason of disciplinary sanctions. The promoter points out that the application of this norm is unconstitutional because, by virtue of the same fact, he is being sanctioned doubly. However, such interpretation is not contrary to a constitutional provision or principle in this sense, since although there is a prohibition on being tried two or more times for the same act—Article 42, first paragraph, of the Political Constitution—this does not entail that a double sanction cannot be imposed in relation to the same fact, as occurs in criminal jurisdiction, where an individual can be penalized with a prison sentence as well as the imposition of a fine, without prejudice to the eventual civil liabilities of the committed crime, or other consequences of the conviction (for example, disqualification). Therefore, if by virtue of an investigation process, in which the guarantees and principles of due process (debido proceso) are respected, the disciplinary responsibility of a judicial server is proven, and the corresponding disciplinary sanction is imposed, agreed upon by reason of the inefficiency demonstrated in the performance of the position, it is not only legal but constitutional to automatically suspend what it represents in the annual salary increases related to that period; it being only by express provision of the Full Court (Corte Plena) that this sanction does not operate. In this sense, Article 64 expressly provides, in what is relevant:

"The imposition of any disciplinary correction shall interrupt the accumulated time for the increase, unless the Full Court (Corte Plena) resolves otherwise considering the nature of the correction, the facts that motivated it, and the service record of the interested party."; so there is no interpretation contrary to the spirit of the law, but rather application in accordance with it, and with the Political Constitution. On the other hand, it is rather by interpretation of the Full Court (Corte Plena) that this sanction operates automatically for the disciplinary sanctions of written reprimand (amonestación escrita) and suspension, ceasing to be applied in the case of warnings (advertencias). Therefore, in accordance with the provision in the second paragraph of Article 9 of the law that governs this Jurisdiction, it is appropriate to reject the action on the merits in this regard.

Therefore (Por tanto):

The challenged norms are interpreted in such a way that it is contrary to the constitutional order to extend the powers granted to the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection (Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial) to sanction disciplinarily based on legal criteria issued in the rulings and resolutions of a jurisdictional nature; consequently, the disciplinary sanction imposed on the claimant by the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection (Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial) by resolution number 326-91, of fourteen hours and forty minutes on May thirteenth, nineteen ninety-one, is deemed null and void (tenido por no puesta). The action is rejected outright in relation to the challenge of Articles 49, 50, and 51 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Ley Orgánica del Organismo de Investigación Judicial). The action is rejected on the merits regarding the other challenges. Let this pronouncement be communicated to the Full Court (Corte Plena) and to the Judicial Inspection (Inspección Judicial). Let it be summarized in the official journal La Gaceta and published in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial). Let it be notified.

Luis Paulino Mora M.

Nombre9143.

R. E. Piza E. Jorge E. Castro B.

Nombre45289 C. Eduardo Sancho G.

Nombre57862 . R. Nombre58935 M.

REGARDING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTION. In a general sense, the petitioner challenges a set of regulations by virtue of which he considers that a disciplinary sanction was imposed on him by an administrative entity—the Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial—based on criteria or acts of an eminently jurisdictional nature ordered by him as a judge, given that the competence of said tribunal refers solely to the disciplinary sphere, because he considers that this violates the principle of the internal independence of the judge, since the resolutions of a jurisdictional body can only be examined by the higher jurisdictional hierarchical superiors and through the appeals that the law expressly indicates, in addition to arrogating to itself criteria for the interpretation of norms, the use of procedures, and the imposition of sanctions that are only authorized for jurisdictional bodies, for which reason we can consider that the action is directed against a specific subjective act of the Administration. However, despite finding ourselves in such a scenario, the matter raised is susceptible to being heard in this unconstitutionality action, by virtue of the provisions of Article 73, subsection b.) of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which states:

"The unconstitutionality action shall be admissible: a.) ... b.) Against subjective acts of public authorities, when they infringe, by action or omission, any constitutional norm or principle, if they are not susceptible to the remedies of habeas corpus or amparo." In the case under study, the petitioner filed an amparo appeal against the Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, which was processed under case file number 1803-91, considering that the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for criteria of a jurisdictional nature constitutes interference in the independence of the judge, implying that the Inspección arrogates to itself criteria of interpretation, using procedures and imposing sanctions authorized only for jurisdictional bodies, and the violation of due process in various manifestations, an appeal that was declared without merit by resolution number 320-93, at nine hours and fifty-one minutes on the twenty-second of January of nineteen ninety-three, because it was considered that in the amparo proceeding it was not possible to determine whether or not there was merit for the disciplinary sanction imposed, and it refers to ordinary labor legislation for what corresponds; "Since the acts challenged by the appellant have to do with the exercise of the disciplinary function of the Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, in order to determine whether or not there was merit for the imposition of a sanction in the exercise of service, it is evident to the Chamber that a matter of constitutionality is not at stake, but rather one of mere legality that must be heard by the competent courts, in the ordinary labor proceeding, to whom it corresponds to evaluate the evidence and the arguments of the parties, in order to decide the legality of the challenged actions. The appeal being inadmissible, it is incumbent upon the Chamber to declare it without merit, as is hereby ordered." The petitioner initiated the ordinary labor proceeding, which is being processed before the Juzgado de Trabajo de San José, under case file number 905-91, invoking in this process the unconstitutionality of the norms against which this action is directed, which he subsequently filed, as a reasonable means to protect the interests and rights considered harmed in the main matter. Consequently, given that the substantive issue raised challenges a subjective act of an administrative entity for violation of constitutional norms and principles, a matter that this same Court considered was not susceptible to being heard in the amparo proceeding, the unconstitutionality action is admissible, pursuant to the provisions of the cited Article 73, subsection b.).

II.REGARDING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CHALLENGE. As for the specific challenge made by the petitioner, it is directed against Articles 120 to 124, 211 to 219 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, number 8, of the twenty-ninth of November of nineteen thirty-seven, and its amendments, in their text and interpretation, insofar as the Inspección Judicial has exceeded constitutional limits in its functions, since being an administrative body it acts as a jurisdictional one by interpreting the laws, using procedures alien to the disciplinary procedure, and imposing disciplinary sanctions for criteria issued in jurisdictional resolutions, that is, for functions proper to the judge, also for violation of the principle of specificity (tipicidad), by establishing and imposing disciplinary sanctions of reprimand without detailing what the committed fault is; and by connection, Articles 29 subsection 4.), 30 subsection 2.), 71 subsection 4.) of the same law. Mention must be made that such regulations were repealed with the enactment of the new Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, number 7333, of the fifth of May of nineteen ninety-three, and which entered into force on the first of nineteen ninety-four, in which it was expressly provided on the point now of interest, in Article 199, which states:

"Any complaint that refers exclusively to problems of interpretation of legal norms shall be rejected outright." Notwithstanding the foregoing, the challenged regulations are analyzed because in the disciplinary proceeding brought against Licenciado Felipe Gutiérrez Salicetti, specifically Articles 120 to 124, 217, and 219 of the former Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial were applied, and now in the labor jurisdiction it may be applied depending on what is resolved in this constitutional proceeding in this case.

III.THE DISCIPLINARY POWER OF THE STATE. Among the powers inherent to the State—and to the Public Administration in general—is the sanctioning power (potestad sancionatoria), which can be classified into corrective power and disciplinary power. The former aims to sanction infractions of the orders or mandates of the Public Administration, that is, the unlawful actions or omissions of individuals, whether or not they are public agents, and the content of the norms regulating it constitutes administrative criminal law. The latter has the exclusive objective of sanctioning the violations by public agents of their functional legal duties, and the content of the norms regulating it constitutes disciplinary criminal law. This regime is a species of the "sanctioning" power of the State, from which it emanates; a power that is inherent and proper to the Public Administration, translating into the faculty of, at least, a "minimum" of power for it to apply disciplinary sanctions to its officials or employees when they fail in their duties. Disciplinary power is inherent to every public or private organization, that is, it is not exclusive to the Public Administration, as it is an indispensable power for the orderly management of public and private responsibility, but its foundation is diverse. Thus, private disciplinary power has its foundation in a civil obligation, by virtue of the legal equality of the parties that informs every legal relationship of private law. Thus, for example, it occurs in the family, where parents exercise that power, not only for the correction of children, but also for the preservation of the moral unity of the family, and it is reprimanded not for what has been done, but so that it is not done again; in the private labor sphere—industrial and commercial—, it is exercised by the employer in defense of the regularity of the work sphere; in professional associations, etc. In contrast, the disciplinary power of the public sector is created by virtue of a bilateral act, but in its development, the activity of the public official remains exclusively subject to the will of the Public Administration, from the creation to the extinction of the relationship, so that the server finds themselves in a status of special dependence with respect to the State. The individual voluntarily accepts the appointment, but places themselves in a sphere of subjection with respect to the Administration, regulated by Objective Law, where the situation of legal inequality of the parties in the public employment relationship is unquestionable; the Public Administration assumes, consequently, a superiority or preeminence that translates into hierarchical power, whose correlative is disciplinary power. This power, by its very purpose, stops at the circle of the functional duties of the agent, and therefore, disciplinary sanctions cannot, legally, be imposed on them except during the existence of the employment relationship, that is, while the status of dependence lasts. So that, disciplinary power and its sanctions are always conditioned on the legal exercise of public employment or function, for which reason, without the existence of the vinculum iuris between the Administration and the agent, disciplinary sanctions are inapplicable.

IV.TYPES OF LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS. Disciplinary liability presupposes a disciplinary power of the Administration. The vinculum iuris that exists between the Public Administration and the public agent or server necessarily implies a series of duties and rights, so that the transgression of the former determines the liability of the employee, which is regulated or disciplined differently by Objective Law depending on the legal nature of the liability. The transgression of a duty can be caused by an action or omission, which produce harmful effects for the Administration (internal) or for the administered parties or third parties outside the public employment relationship (external), acts or omissions that are relevant insofar as the infraction consists of the non-fulfillment of a duty of the function or employment, which consequently cause liability and its correlative sanction. The transgression of a duty does not always have univocal effects, since it may consist of the violation of a merely disciplinary norm, without other consequences, or it may constitute a crime under criminal law, or it may imply the financial compensation (resarcimiento patrimonial) of the damage caused. This multiplicity of effects determines the different classes of liability of the official: disciplinary or administrative, criminal, and civil or financial. These liabilities are not mutually exclusive, so the same act violating a legal duty of the server can generate the three types of liability, and therefore, three different types of sanctions. Here the principles of "non bis in idem" or "noter in idem" are inapplicable because it concerns three distinct kinds of liability, each with its own domain; the three liabilities have specific and unmistakable purposes, so the classic principle would be violated only in the case of liabilities and sanctions of the same species. Thus, by judgment number 3484-94, at twelve o'clock on the eighth of July of last year, this Chamber considered:

"Now then, although it is true that there is independence between the administrative sanctioning procedure and the judging of the facts in the criminal proceeding, it cannot be interpreted, without contravening the right to due process and the principle of 'non bis in idem,' that if an act is judged in the criminal proceeding and the accused is acquitted, they can be disciplinarily sanctioned in the administrative proceeding for the same acts. It is recognized that one of the limits of the sanctioning power of the Administration is its subordination to the Judicial Authority. Should there be a collision between a jurisdictional action and an action of the administration, it must be resolved in favor of the former. From this same principle derives the need for res judicata to be respected. In this regard, the Spanish Constitutional Court, in judgment number 77 of the third of October of nineteen eighty-three, stated: 'The principle non bis in idem determines a prohibition of the duplication of administrative and criminal sanctions regarding the same acts, but it also leads to the impossibility that, when the legal system allows a duality of procedures, and in each of them a judgment and a classification of the same acts must be produced, the judgment and classification that may occur on the legal plane are made independently, if they result from the application of different regulations, but the same cannot occur with regard to the assessment of the facts, since it is clear that the same acts cannot exist and cease to exist for the organs of the State. A consequence of the foregoing, placed in connection with the rule of subordination of the sanctioning action of the Administration to the action of the Courts of Justice, is that the former, as previously stated, cannot act until the latter have done so and must in any case respect, when acting a posteriori, the factual approach that those have carried out, ...'" Notwithstanding that the three types of liabilities have diverse structures, the sanctions of the three have a common objective: to maintain and ensure, in a preventive and repressive manner, the normal functioning of the public service, directly or indirectly obligating officials and employees to fulfill all their functional duties. Thus, the procedures for enforcing the liability of officials are applied by virtue of the diversity of the legal norms that regulate it; criminal liability has its main source in the Code of the repressive matter and in special laws, being able to affirm the unity and systematization of the criminal acts, as well as the procedure for the prosecution of their authors; civil liability is disciplined by the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code; in contrast, administrative liability is subject to a variety of legal systems lacking unity and systematization. From what has been commented, it can be concluded that, the faults committed by officials in the exercise of their position, breaking the internal order of the administration, gives rise to disciplinary liability, because the disciplinary fault entails a maladjustment of the employee to their function, affecting the very essence of the administrative order: without prejudice to criminal and civil liabilities, all with the caveat that in relation to the facts was indicated previously, a matter in which no pronouncement can be made in administrative proceedings that contradicts what has been deemed duly proven in the jurisdictional proceeding. For this reason, the purpose of disciplinary liability is to ensure the observance of the norms of subordination and, in general, of the exact fulfillment of all the duties of the function entrusted to them. Thus, disciplinary law presupposes a relationship of subordination between the body subject to discipline and the body that establishes or applies it, more to punish, to correct, and even educate the infringer of the norm, hence the corrective nature of disciplinary sanctions."

V.SPHERE OF APPLICATION OF DISCIPLINARY POWER. The application of the disciplinary regime is limited to the activities of the individual in their capacity as a public agent or official, to compel and ensure, preventively and repressively, the fulfillment of the legal duties of the employment, function, or position. The faults generating this liability are many and varied, such as, for example, negligence, apathy, carelessness, absenteeism (inasistencia), discourtesy (incorreción) towards superiors, equals, or subordinates and the public, irregular social conduct, lack of probity, abandonment of the position, etc., which according to their gravity are classified as minor, serious, or very serious. The duties of officials derive, like their rights, from the law and the nature of the position or function they perform, that is, they have an objective character. The duties of officials are of two classes: general duties, which concern every official by the mere fact of being one, and special duties, imposed in relation to the specific administrative function performed. Thus, for example, obedience is a duty for every public official, but the duty of obedience of a professor is not the same as the duty of a police officer. Some general duties are: that of obedience, which consists of respect for and obedience to superior hierarchical authorities; and the provision of service, which consists of the duty of the official to carry out the tasks proper to their position, which is given by the nature of the function, for better public service, performance, or productivity in the services, officials being obligated to faithfully fulfill the function or position, completing the regulatory workday, and must collaborate loyally with their superiors and co-workers, for the improvement of the services and the achievement of the goals of the administrative unit in which they are assigned. The provision of service must be personal, by virtue of the official presumption in favor of the competence of the assigned official. Also constituting general duties are the duty of confidentiality (reserva), which consists of the obligation to proceed with due discretion in the performance of the position, maintaining opportune silence in cases where the nature of the function requires it—in the public sector, the breach of secrecy can generate severe disciplinary sanctions, and even criminal ones, as is the case in the diplomatic disciplinary sphere and in the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial), where the revelation of secrets affects State security, or the interests of the parties, causing serious harm—; and the duty of decorum demands that the public office be attended to by its holder with due respect and correctness, both professionally and socially, by reason of the institution they represent. The duty to dedicate oneself entirely and with all zeal and decorum to the assigned position prohibits the official from exercising other positions or functions, as it would make the proper service of both impossible. On occasions, the nature of the employment excludes the exercise of certain professions, thus a judge cannot hold management or advisory positions for private companies. The public official may not act in the service of third parties in matters in which they are intervening by reason of their position, nor in those that are being processed or are pending resolution in the office where they work, nor may they be a lawyer (abogado), solicitor (procurador), or expert for a third party in any kind of litigation against the State. Incurring any of these incompatibilities shall be classified as a serious or very serious fault, and faults or absences, delays, carelessness, informalities, or negligence originating in the exercise of compatible activities must also be sanctioned.

VI. THE JUDGE AS A SUBJECT OF THE DISCIPLINARY REGIME

THE DUTIES OF THE JUDGE. The foregoing serves to determine that the judge, as a public official, vested with certain state powers (an organ in the legal-material sense), who is assigned an essential function of the State, the jurisdictional function, and as a primary element of each of the administrative units that make up the Judicial Branch, is subject to the disciplinary regime of the Branch he represents, that is, to the disciplinary regime of the Judicial Branch. The incompatibilities imposed on judges —the prohibition against simultaneously holding another public office or engaging in professional activity, not only the practice of law, but any other liberal profession, with the exception of university teaching or study commissions, from providing extrajudicial advice, sponsorship, and representation in litigation of any jurisdiction, from participating in any political-party activity, from engaging in commerce and lucrative activities, all for the purpose of ensuring the greatest dedication of judges to their specific functions, as well as preventing these from being interfered with by economic or partisan interests, or from performing acts contrary to the dignity of the office, because the status of the judge imposes the duty to observe public conduct that shields them from all suspicion and conjecture regarding their honorability— constitute duties for them, insofar as they impose on them the observance of conduct consisting of abstaining from performing certain acts. These are duties of omission or prohibitions, the breach of which can entail disciplinary liability, without prejudice to civil liability, and even criminal liability. In this way, the primary and fundamental duty of judges is to provide the services incumbent upon them as officials of the State, that is, to **administer justice in accordance with the legal system**, each time such activity is required of them in a specific case. This duty, to exercise the jurisdictional function, derives from the public employment relationship that binds the judge to the State, being governed, as such, by the general principles of administrative law, and by the right of the parties or petitioners to have their claims resolved or provided for, regardless of the content of the respective decision. The breach of this duty, or its irregular fulfillment, authorizes, on the one hand, the application of disciplinary sanctions, and may even justify the dismissal or removal of the judge, and on the other, may generate civil and criminal liabilities. The act of "failing to judge under the pretext of silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws" particularly constitutes a transgression that determines this type of liability. Within this great duty, the judge is obligated to resolve in accordance with the time limits and terms of the law —the contrary would imply a denial of justice—, the reasoning of decisions —as a way to ensure adequate control over the decision-making activity of judges, and to avoid possible arbitrary actions—, and to direct the process —being obligated to concentrate, as much as possible, all the procedures that need to be carried out, to point out the defects and omissions from which the proceeding suffers before processing it, ordering that they be corrected within a legal time limit, and to order, on their own initiative, any procedure that is necessary to avoid void acts, to maintain the legal equality of the parties involved in the process, to ensure that the greatest procedural economy is sought in the processing of the case, to prevent and sanction any act contrary to the duty of loyalty, probity, and good faith, and to grant a hearing to the parties—.

VII. THE DISCIPLINARY REGIME FOR JUDGES. The repealed Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, in Article 211, provided

"The Full Court, the President of the Court, the Chambers of the Court, the other Collegiate Tribunals, the Judges, the Clerks, the Mayors, and the Prosecutors, may take disciplinary action:

...

3.) **Against judicial officials and employees for the faults they commit in the performance of their office and employment**.

...

The Judicial Inspection Tribunal shall also exercise the disciplinary regime with respect **to all the officials and employees indicated above**, except as established for special cases, or when dealing with faults attributed to the Judicial Inspectors themselves."; a rule from which the general principle derived that all officials who work in the Judicial Branch are subject to the disciplinary regime established by its organic law. Thus, in the new law this principle was expressly included in Title VIII —Disciplinary Regime—, with Article 175 stipulating that:

"**All judicial servants are subject to disciplinary liability in the cases and with the guarantees established in this Law.**"; servants among which judges and clerks are obviously found, since said disciplinary regime "... has the purpose of ensuring the efficiency, correctness, and decorum of the functions entrusted to the Judicial Branch and of guaranteeing citizens a correct administration of justice. For such purposes, the necessary, agile, and reliable control mechanisms shall exist." (Article 174 of the current Organic Law of the Judicial Branch.)

For the foregoing reason, broad powers of investigation and control were conferred **over all judicial servants** to the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, for which it may monitor the proper fulfillment of duties, process complaints filed against them, initiate inquiries upon learning of any irregularity, and resolve what is appropriate regarding the disciplinary regime, without prejudice to the powers that other bodies and officials of the Judicial Branch have in this matter, as provided in Article 120 of the repealed Law, functions recognized by Article 184 of the new Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. This Chamber has already indicated this, by judgment number 5891-93, of twelve hours fifty-seven minutes of November twelfth, nineteen ninety-three, stating:

"**The Judicial Inspection Tribunal shall also exercise the disciplinary regime with respect to the officials indicated above —the Collegiate Tribunals, the Judges, the Clerks, the Mayors, and the Prosecutors—, except in special cases. The Judicial Inspection is, therefore, a body dependent on the Supreme Court of Justice, whose primary functions are: to exercise regular and constant control over all units of the Judicial Branch, as well as to monitor the proper performance of the servants' duties, processing complaints filed against them and applying the disciplinary regime, without prejudice to the powers that other bodies and officials of the Judicial Branch have in this matter**. (Article 120 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch.) The appellant is not correct in asserting that the appealed body lacked the authority to impose a warning sanction, since in accordance with Article 120 and following of the cited law —now 184 and following—, the Judicial Inspection is empowered to exercise the disciplinary regime against a judicial official when, through due process, it has been demonstrated that they have failed to observe the functions inherent to the position they hold, a premise that is fulfilled in the case before us, since through an investigation process, in which the appellant had the opportunity to provide for their defense —as is evident from the administrative file that has been reviewed— it was demonstrated that by delegating the practice of an ocular inspection procedure to the clerk of their office, they incurred a breach of the functions that the law imposes on them. (Article 210 of the Code of Criminal Procedure)."

VIII.ON THE INTERFERENCE OF THE JUDICIAL INSPECTION IN THE JUDGE'S OWN FUNCTIONS. The petitioner argues that the Judicial Inspection Tribunal is arrogating functions that do not correspond to it, as it is a disciplinary and not a jurisdictional body, by interpreting laws, a function that corresponds solely and exclusively to the jurisdictional bodies, thereby exceeding constitutional limits —Article 156 of the Political Constitution—. In this regard, Article 199 of the current Organic Law of the Judicial Branch states:

"**Any complaint that refers exclusively to problems of interpretation of legal norms shall be summarily rejected.**"; so that, neither by express provision of the law, nor by interpretation of the current regulations, can it be understood that extensive powers are granted to the Judicial Inspection Tribunal as those indicated by the petitioner, but only those that the law confers upon it —and were previously commented on—, and much less, that said Tribunal may arrogate attributions that the law does not contemplate, because that would be contrary to the nature of the function entrusted to it, which is solely the application of the disciplinary regime of the Judicial Branch. This rule was not in the repealed Organic Law of the Judicial Branch; however, due to the nature of the functions entrusted to the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, the principle was indeed effectively applied, since only the disciplinary sphere corresponds to it, not the technical-legal assessment of the judge's work in specific cases. It should be noted that the supervisory activity of the Tribunal cannot interfere with the jurisdictional function, because these sanctions —the disciplinary ones— do not have the effect of annulling or altering jurisdictional resolutions, or of directly influencing the matter in question, and the rulings of the Judicial Inspection Tribunal shall never produce res judicata with respect to the case under consideration, as they are two completely separate things: the legal content of the judgment, and the conduct of the judge as a public official. The Judicial Inspection Tribunal, in relation to the disciplinary regime, must assess, on the one hand, everything that produces efficient public service, for which it must examine and investigate the normal function of the offices, the activity performed, the processing of files, the procedures, the hiring of personnel, etc.; and on the other hand, it must assess the efficiency of the judge as a public official, such that the content of their judgments demonstrates their professional capacity and suitability for the position they hold, that is, whether they know and correctly apply the law, since the Higher Courts have that oversight limited to their own competence, and cannot impose sanctions of this category, only those derived from arbitrary activity in the file. This implies that a disciplinary sanction of this type can only be imposed on a judge when, through an investigation procedure, in which their rights derived from due process are guaranteed, the breach of the functions proper to the position they hold is verified, but not for criteria expressed in jurisdictional rulings and decisions, which are only susceptible to review by a higher authority, when legal remedies are filed, unless a clear conviction of their breach to perform the position for which they were appointed is derived from them. In other words, the Judicial Inspection Tribunal can assess the generic activity of the judge by studying their pronouncements, but only to determine their suitability for the position they hold; it may not directly intervene in a specific case, pointing out the errors of interpretation it believes the judge incurred when applying the law, since this is an eminently jurisdictional function, and said body is of an administrative nature. Therefore, the Judicial Inspection requires a plurality of cases, and cannot assess the capacity or competence of a judge by a single pronouncement —unless it involves a clearly absurd and very serious error—, because that would empower it to evaluate the legal content of jurisdictional rulings, which is under no point of view possible. It must be clear that, for the proper performance of the tasks entrusted to the Inspection, it is empowered to visit judicial offices, and keep control of what has been resolved, of pending matters, delays, etc., all to verify the aptitude of the official for the position they hold, and ultimately, to ensure a better administration of justice. It should not be forgotten that Article 30, subsection 4.) of the former Organic Law of the Judicial Branch —now Article 28, subsection 4.)— allows the dismissal, following the established procedure and with prior opportunity for defense, of the servant:

"**4.- Who proves to be incompetent or inadequate for the performance of their position.**"; therefore, if it is proven that the employee does not fulfill the functions entrusted to them in their capacity as a judge, which implies first and foremost the **administration of justice according to law**, a disciplinary sanction may be imposed on them, as the Judicial Inspection Tribunal deems appropriate. Thus, the plurality of errors incurred by the judge, such as resolving contrary to the provisions of the law, falling into error in reasoning, or failing to issue a properly legal criterion on a particular point, determine the incompetence or lack of suitability of the official for the performance of the position for which they were appointed.

IX.The petitioner further alleges that with the intrusion of the Judicial Inspection into the judge's own work, their independence is being seriously harmed. This has been understood as the economic, political, and functional autonomy of the jurisdictional bodies with respect to the other Branches of Government; however, this concept goes further, such that it implies the effective fulfillment of the functions entrusted to judges, that is, judges can administer justice on the condition of acting with independence. This independence implies: a.) depriving hierarchical superiors of any power to interfere in the properly jurisdictional or adjudicative function exercised by their subordinates in each specific case, except when they hear the same matter by virtue of legal remedies, and safeguarding the power of those superiors to issue instructions concerning the service of justice in abstract terms; b.) the prohibition of governmental and administrative powers to alter the functional status of judges regarding entry and promotions, during their time of service, which constitutes the tenure of the official; and c.) the abstention of the judge from hearing matters in which, for reasons of family or social relationships, they may influence the resolutions (disqualification, excuse, or recusal). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the independence of the judge cannot be understood in such a sense as to justify and sanctify any of their activities; the non-interference of external influences in jurisdictional decisions and judgments is justified by their scientific nature and justice, that is, so that they can be guided exclusively by reasons of knowledge in legal science. For this reason, Article 154 of the Political Constitution determines that the judge is subject to the Constitution and to the laws, from which it is understood that their activity cannot be arbitrary, but must be duly substantiated and result in accordance with law. The Constitution imposes on them the duty to state the motives and foundations of fact and of law on which the solution agreed upon for the questions raised in the process is based, it being the sole means through which the parties can verify the justice of the jurisdictional decisions and check their adequacy to the current legal valuations; this demonstrates that judgments are a reasoned adaptation of current law and not the product of their individual will. This also stems from the right of defense (Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution), that is, from the possibility of obtaining jurisdictional protection of rights, which presupposes the pronouncement of judgments in accordance with the law and in relation to the disputed facts, because otherwise there is only a mere act of arbitrariness or caprice by the adjudicator and not a true judgment in the sense required by the Constitution. This concept had already been developed by this Chamber, when considering:

"**The principle of independence that governs the performance of the jurisdictional function has the purpose of guaranteeing that the subjects who administer justice are only subject to the Constitution and to the Laws; in this way, the resolutions they issue in the matters within their competence shall not impose on them liabilities other than those expressly indicated in the laws.**" Now, the fact that the Judicial Inspection imposes a disciplinary sanction – within the scope of its competence – on a judicial official who has failed to observe the duties inherent in the office they hold, does not imply, as the appellant claims, that the former is arrogating powers that do not belong to it or that it is modifying the procedure being challenged in the complaint. On the contrary, it determines whether those servants have acted negligently in fulfilling their duties or have improperly exercised the powers conferred on them by law, as a means of guaranteeing their adequate performance." (Judgment number 5891-93.)

From the foregoing, it is concluded that it cannot be affirmed that there is a violation of the judge's independence when a disciplinary sanction is imposed for non-compliance with the duties inherent to the position they hold, following a prior investigation process in this regard; however, it would be contrary to this principle if such a sanction were imposed based on the criteria expressed in a particular ruling or jurisdictional decision, because it is considered that the decision given by the judge is not appropriate or in accordance with law, or that the interpretation given to the regulations applied to the specific case is not the correct one.

**X. OF THE SANCTION IMPOSED BY THE JUDICIAL INSPECTION TRIBUNAL ON THE PLAINTIFF.** In the case under study, the Judicial Inspection imposed a disciplinary sanction on the plaintiff for not allowing Nombre95825 to participate in a public auction, considering that he could not participate in it if he did not make the corresponding deposit in cash or by certified check at the Office's cashier, since he had only presented a copy of a judicial deposit receipt that had not been entered into the Court's cashier, in which it was not indicated for which proceeding said deposit was made, an action that was confirmed when the motion to annul proceedings and resolutions filed by the affected party was denied; that is, a disciplinary sanction of reprimand was imposed on him for considering that he had misapplied the law in a specific case. The plaintiff alleges that he applied the provisions of Article 652 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), which states, in relevant part:

"The public auction shall be presided over by the president, the judge, or the mayor, with the assistance of the secretary and the intervention of an auctioneer. On the appointed day and time, the auctioneer shall announce the auction, the bids that are being made and the improvements that are being presented, and the act shall end when no one improves upon the last bid. No bid that does not cover the base price and is not in cash shall be admitted.

**Only bidders who, at an act of the auction, deposit in cash or a certified check fifteen percent of the base price given to the assets shall be admitted, unless the executing party, in writing or orally, relieves them of this power.**" Regarding the complaint filed by Nombre95825 for not having been allowed to participate in an auction, by resolution number 326-91, at fourteen hours and forty minutes on May thirteenth, nineteen ninety-one, the Judicial Inspection Tribunal (Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial) considered:

"It was demonstrated, without any doubt whatsoever, that Mr. Nombre95825 appeared, from before the start of the auction, to perform the pertinent steps to participate in it. Furthermore, it was also fully demonstrated that beforehand - on December twenty-eighth of the immediately preceding year - he had deposited, to the order of the Court, ten percent - which was required - of the base price, with which he could make an offer to acquire the asset to be auctioned. He showed a copy of the deposit; so there was indeed certainty of the existence of that money in the Court's current account. In any event, if he delivered the money in cash at that moment, it would have to be deposited to the order of the Court in the event the asset was awarded to him. **The truth of the matter is that due to a futile and unnecessary formality, the product of a misinterpretation of the respective Code, he was not allowed to participate.** Such a decision, which was exclusively that of the Clerk of the Court, was made dependent on the authorization or not of the plaintiff's representative, which is a possibility in another case or situation indicated by numeral 652 of the Civil Procedure Code. In the opinion of the Tribunal, Mr. Nombre95825 acquired the right to participate in that auction and was unjustifiably not permitted to make an offer. To this end, it is worth repeating, the necessary money or percentage was even held by or to the order of the Court. Of course, the complainant was indeed harmed, at least as a potential bidder in the purchase of the asset. Subsequently, it became clear that no other intervention in the proceeding was allowed him, as every step he took was rejected for not being a party. Consequently, he had no procedural opportunity to have any error committed to his detriment corrected. In addition, the fault is indeed subject to the disciplinary regime under the charge of this Tribunal." From the foregoing, it is concluded that, in this particular case, the Judicial Inspection Tribunal does indeed extend the powers entrusted to it, since it does not limit itself to the purely disciplinary sphere, but has applied its sanctioning power to criteria of an eminently legal nature issued in rulings and resolutions of a jurisdictional nature, thereby injuring the independence of the judge.

**XI. THE PRINCIPLE OF TYPICALITY IN THE DISCIPLINARY REGIME.** The plaintiff also challenges the Judicial Branch's disciplinary regime, considering it contrary to the principle of typicality (principio de tipicidad), because the offenses established in the laws – Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) and Judicial Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Judicial) – are vague and imprecise, in addition to the fact that indeterminate and vague concepts are used in the definition of the "types." He specifically questions Article 30, subsection 2.) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, which read:

"He shall be dismissed from his employment:

...

2.) That for proven improprieties or failures in the exercise of his position or in his private life, he has become deserving of that sanction, in the opinion of the Full Court."; which corresponds to Article 28, subsection 2.) of the new law, which provides:

"The servant may be dismissed from his position, following the established procedure and with the prior opportunity for defense, who:

2.- That, for improprieties or failures in the exercise of his position or in his private life, which may affect the good service or the image of the Judicial Branch, he has become deserving of that sanction." As noted previously, disciplinary responsibility often concerns acts of a general nature, as disciplinary authorities may use a discretionary power of extensive interpretation in classifying the facts. Thus, the rules regulating disciplinary law are primarily generic, the figures lack clear boundaries, and it is theoretically and practically difficult, not to say impossible, to affirm when a perfectly defined figure exists. In this regime, the principle of typicality – "nullum crimen sine lege, and nulla poena sine lege" – does not have the rigorous application it has in criminal law, its domain being more expansive. In this regard, by judgment number 5594-94, at fifteen hours and forty-eight minutes on September twenty-seventh last, this Chamber considered:

"**III. THE PRINCIPLE OF TYPICALITY IN THE DISCIPLINARY REGIME.** The existence of a set of duties of officials – and at the same time their powers – whether duties included in the obligation of the function or service they perform, or those deriving from hierarchical subordination, requires rules established to regulate those relations, and sanctions for when such obligations are violated. The principle of typicality is an application of the principle of legality and requires the concrete delimitation of the conducts that are made reprehensible for the purposes of their sanction. However, in disciplinary matters, the principle of typicality is not applied in the same way as it is in criminal matters, in accordance with constitutional Article 39, as this Chamber has repeatedly stated, pointing out that:

'For a conduct to constitute a crime, it is not sufficient that it is unlawful – contrary to law – it must be typified, that is, it must be fully described in a norm; this is due to insuppressible requirements of legal certainty, since repressive matters represent the greatest intervention in the important legal rights of citizens; to guarantee these against the State, it is necessary that they be able to have full knowledge of which actions they must refrain from committing, under penalty of incurring criminal responsibility ...' (resolution number 1877-90, at sixteen hours and two minutes on December nineteenth, nineteen ninety).

It can be affirmed that the principle of typicality constitutes a fundamental principle in disciplinary responsibility, but not in the same form as in the criminal-legal field, since the principles 'nullum crimen sine lege', 'nullum poena sine lege' do not have the rigidity and requirement that characterize them in substantive criminal law, because the sanctioning activity of a criminal nature and that of a disciplinary nature correspond to different legal fields, and the parameters of discretion inherent to the exercise of administrative disciplinary power are broader than those of the State's criminal sanctioning power. Thus, in criminal law, regarding crimes, every penalty must be established in the law with respect to the incriminated act, excluding, due to its generality, any possibility of reference to so-called indeterminate legal concepts, or open or indeterminate clauses; if the conduct is not fully defined, there is no penalty. **In disciplinary law, by reason of the purpose it pursues, which is the protection of the general social order, and the subject matter it regulates - discipline -, the determination of the disciplinary infraction is less demanding than criminal sanction, since it includes acts that can be classified as violations of the duties of the position, which in some pieces of legislation are not specified, and in others, they are. So, the exercise of this power is discretionary, hence it is appropriate to apply sanctions for any breach of functional duties, without the need for them to be detailed concretely as a sanctionable act, and therefore, the enumeration of punishable acts made by regulation does not have a limiting character. Motivated by the variety of causes that can generate its application, the frequent imprecision of its precepts, and the sphere of application, it is not always organic or clear in its literal expression, which is why unprovided-for offenses not concretely defined but understood to be included in the text can be sanctioned discretionally, provided they result from the verification of the disciplinary infraction through a procedure created for this purpose. The disciplinary infraction or offense has been defined by saying that it is a violation of the functioning of any duty proper to one's condition, even when not especially defined, though provided for. The determining facts of disciplinary offenses are innumerable, since they depend on the nature of the behaviors or conducts of the 'subordinate' subjects, behaviors or conducts that are truly unlimited in number given their variety; therefore, the existence of three elements of the disciplinary offense is deduced: 1.- a material element: which is an act or an omission; 2.- a moral element: which is the imputation of the act to a free will; and 3.- a formal element: which is the disturbance to the functioning of the service or the immediate or possible affection of its effectiveness.

**IV. INDETERMINATE LEGAL CONCEPTS IN THE DISCIPLINARY REGIME.** By reason of the sanction to be applied – criminal or disciplinary – it can be taken into consideration to determine the greater or lesser requirement regarding due process guarantees, among which the principle of typicality is found, since the greater the sanction, the greater the guarantees must be, which translates, in the case under study – in the disciplinary process –, into the lesser rigidity of this principle. Therefore, based on the subject matter it regulates and the endless variety of conducts it involves, in the disciplinary sphere it would not be easy to conclude the elimination of all types of infraction defined in open terms, such as those referring to indeterminate legal concepts (conceptos jurídicos indeterminados). Notwithstanding the foregoing, it cannot be affirmed that the definition of the conducts to be sanctioned in application of the principle of legality, and more specifically that of typicality, can be totally obviated. Therefore, it must be understood that the types enunciated in apparently deontological terms **must become perfectly technical legal types, in the sense of formulating determinable concepts, which is why indeterminate legal concepts of conducts must be specified or completed through a detailed analysis of the facts and an interpretation of them based on the values defined in said concepts**. Thus, **more or less imprecise types – in the sense of the technique of indeterminate legal concepts – or open types, are of indispensable use in the disciplinary sphere, given the very indetermination of the professional and disciplinary duties they seek to guarantee, which are only susceptible to being enunciated in very general terms**. But the foregoing cannot justify totally open and unspecific assessments, 'in conscience' estimates, whether regarding the extent of the professional or behavioral duty whose breach is reproached; rather, it must be applied to the reality of the reproached conduct, thus making effective the principle of legality – constitutional Article 39 – but adapted to administrative matters. Thus, for example, it will in no way be sufficient to limit oneself to reproaching an official for a lack of probity, in the abstract, but it is necessary to specify, in the specific conduct being judged, where said fault is concretely attributable, from the perspective of the official's positive duties to which they have failed. As a consequence of the foregoing, at the moment of interpreting a norm, it must be done in relation to the activity that it regulates; in the case under study, it must be done based on **Education**, thereby avoiding arbitrariness in the use of 'indeterminate legal concepts'.

**V.** The concepts used by the laws can be determined or indeterminate. The former delimit the sphere of reality to which they refer in a precise and unequivocal manner, such as the age of majority, time limits for filing remedies and appeals, etc. Conversely, **with the technique of the indeterminate legal concept, the law refers to a sphere of reality whose limits do not appear well specified in its statement, notwithstanding which, it is clear that it attempts to delimit a concrete supposition**, concepts such as good faith, lack of probity, morals, good customs, etc.

Thus, although the law does not clearly determine the limits ..., because these are concepts that do not admit quantification or rigorous determination, but which in any case, it is manifest that they are referring to a real scenario that, despite the indeterminacy of the concept, can be specified at the moment of application. The law uses value-based concepts—good faith, the standard of conduct of a good family father, public order, just price, morals—or experience-based concepts—incapacity to perform one's duties, premeditation, irresistible force—because the realities referred to do not admit any other type of more precise determination. But it is clear that by referring to concrete scenarios and not to imprecise or contradictory vagueness, as is the case in the determination of disciplinary infractions or faults, the application of such concepts to the qualification of concrete circumstances admits only one solution: either it occurs or it does not occur ...; either there is good faith or there is not, or there are actions contrary to public order or there are not, or there are actions contrary to morals or there are not, etc. This is the essence of this type of concept, so that the indeterminacy of the statement does not translate into an indeterminacy of its applications, which only allow a "single just solution" in each case. The technique of indeterminate legal concepts, which despite their name, are value-based or experience-based concepts used by laws, occurs in all branches of law, for example in civil law—good faith, diligence of a good family father, negligence—in commercial law—corporate interest—in procedural law—relevance of interrogatories, adequate measures to promote execution, irreparable harm—or in criminal law—treachery, lascivious acts—are just some of the examples that can be cited. In Administrative Law, there is no differentiation regarding the use of concepts such as urgency, public order, just price, public calamity, adequate or proportional measures, public necessity or public interest, etc., which do not allow a plurality of just solutions, but only one solution for each specific case." The repealed Article 219 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial contained the applicable disciplinary sanctions, which were:

"Disciplinary corrections imposable on judicial officials and employees, when the fault or faults committed do not justify the revocation of the appointment, shall be:

1.) Advertencia or apercibimiento; 2.) Reprimand; 3.) Suspension not exceeding one month from the exercise of the position or employment."; which were imposed based on the severity of the acts that motivated the application of the disciplinary regime. In this sense, the new Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial contains a chapter referring to the faults and sanctions of the disciplinary regime—Articles 190 to 196—which is clear in all its aspects, as it defines what actions motivate a disciplinary sanction, and the corresponding sanctions, according to the severity of the acts, for which reason, and based on the reasons given previously, it can be affirmed that the disciplinary regime of the Judicial Branch is not contrary to the principle of legality (principio de tipicidad).

XII.REGARDING THE DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Finally, in relation to the disciplinary regime, the petitioner points out that the application of the judicial disciplinary regime is inadequate, because it is pertinent to apply the provisions of the Código de Trabajo and the Ley General de la Administración Pública, as they are subsequent to the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, and because it was repealed by the principles more favorable to the worker. He also questions the procedure established to apply it, considering that the referral to civil procedural legislation is incompatible and inappropriate for disciplinary matters, being more repressive, and therefore prone to sanctioning, in violation of the protective principles, the principle of innocence, and legal certainty, as well as those that make up due process, because there is a concentration of investigation and judgment in the same body, there is no possibility to appeal resolutions on procedure or final ones, only the possibility of revocation exists, there is an absence of regulation, since the procedure is fragmented in a normative framework lacking coherence, and a lack of specificity and gradation between provisional and definitive faults. Firstly, the petitioner must take into account that the Judicial Branch, despite being a Branch of the State and being governed by Administrative Law, has a special regime due to the function it performs; and regarding public employment relations, although the general principles are given in Administrative Law and Labor Law—as parameters—the specifications are regulated according to the norms that refer specifically to the Judicial Branch. Thus, it is governed in accordance with the provisions of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, the Estatuto de Servicio Judicial, the Reglamento sobre concurso de antecedentes para nombrar funcionarios que administren justicia, the Ley Orgánica del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, the Reglamento sobre la Calificación para los Empleados del Poder Judicial, etc. As can be observed, it is a special body of norms, which cannot be tacitly repealed by a subsequent general norm, as the petitioner affirms. Regarding the procedure of the judicial disciplinary regime, this Chamber does not observe that it violates any fundamental right; quite the opposite, both in the repealed law and in the new Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, the guarantees that constitute due process are respected, with an opportunity to exercise the right of defense. As this Court has indicated on repeated occasions, the right of appeal referred to in the Pacto de San José—in its Articles 8 and 25—can only be claimed in criminal matters in cases of resolutions that put an end to a proceeding, so that there is no right of appeal in an indiscriminate manner, as the petitioner claims. In the case under study, this possibility was found by the servant subjected to disciplinary procedure in the fourth paragraph of Article 211, which provided:

"Corrections imposed by Superior Courts, other Collegiate Courts, Judges, Actuarios, Alcaldes, Agentes Fiscales, and Heads of Administrative Departments who have disciplinary power, on the servants of their own office, shall have a recourse of appeal (recurso de apelación) before the Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial. The recourse must be presented directly to the Tribunal, within three days following the imposition of the disciplinary measure."; likewise, the second paragraph of Article 124 stated:

"If the Tribunal decrees the removal of the servant, the latter may appeal before the Court, by telegraphic means or in writing on plain paper, addressing the Tribunal de la Inspección itself, within three days following notification of the resolution; or verbally upon being notified. The Tribunal shall admit the recourse (recurso), summon the appellant to appear before the Superior and make their allegations within the following three days, and then shall forward the information to Corte Plena for it to resolve definitively." The petitioner himself had the opportunity to promote a recourse of revocation against resolution number 326 of fourteen hours forty minutes on May thirteen, nineteen ninety-one, of the Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, by writing presented on June eighteenth of that same year, which was declared without merit by resolution number 423 of fourteen hours forty minutes on June twenty-fourth of the same year, by the same Tribunal. The new Ley Orgánica is much clearer, specifying in Article 209:

"Whenever a suspension or revocation of appointment is imposed on him, the accused may appeal the final resolution of the Tribunal de la Inspección, within three days following notification. His recourse shall be heard by the Consejo Superior"; therefore, the alleged violation does not exist. Regarding the absence of regulation, the same petitioner points out that in the repealed law such regulation existed, only dispersed in the law; with the new Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, the procedure is systematically regulated. Regarding the determination and gradation of sanctions, reference is made to what was stated in Considerando XI of this resolution. Finally, as this Chamber has stated on other occasions, the fundamental procedural guarantees and principles that constitute due process, derived from Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution, and more specifically from the Ley General de la Administración Pública, are applicable not only in the jurisdictional sphere but also in administrative procedures. Among these principles can be cited:

"... a.) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purpose of the procedure; b.) the right to be heard, and the opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and produce the evidence they deem pertinent; c.) the opportunity for the administered party to prepare their allegation, which necessarily includes access to information and administrative records, linked to the matter in question; d.) the right of the administered party to be represented and advised by lawyers; e.) adequate notification of the decision issued by the Administration and the grounds on which it is based; and f.) the right of the interested party to appeal the decision issued." (Judgment number 15-90, of sixteen hours forty-five minutes on January fifth, nineteen ninety.)

Based on the reasons given and on the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 9 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, it is appropriate to dismiss this action on the merits in this respect.

XIII.CHALLENGE OF ARTICLES 49, 50, AND 51 OF THE LEY DEL ORGANISMO DE INVESTIGACIÓN JUDICIAL. The challenge of Articles 49, 50, and 51 of the Ley Orgánica del Organismo de Investigación Judicial is inadmissible, because they establish the subjection to the disciplinary regime of the officials who work in that institution—a regime that, it is worth noting, is based on the same reasons given for the case of judges—therefore, this action does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured in the main matter, given that the petitioner is not an official of the Organismo de Investigación Judicial, and such challenged norms are not applicable to him in the specific case. Consequently, the flat rejection of the action in relation to these aspects proceeds, in accordance with the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 9 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

XIV.REGARDING THE INTERPRETATION BY CORTE PLENA OF ARTICLE 64 OF THE ESTATUTO DE SERVICIO JUDICIAL. Finally, the petitioner challenges the interpretation that Corte Plena has made of Article 64 of the Estatuto de Servicio Judicial, insofar as it has established the temporary loss of annual salary increments obtained due to disciplinary sanctions. The petitioner indicates that the application of this norm is unconstitutional because by virtue of the same act he is being sanctioned twice. However, such interpretation is not contrary to a constitutional provision or principle in that sense, because, although there is a prohibition against being tried two or more times for the same act—first paragraph of Article 42 of the Constitución Política—this does not imply that a double sanction cannot be imposed in relation to the same act, as occurs in criminal jurisdiction, where an individual can be punished with a prison sentence in addition to the imposition of a fine, without prejudice to the potential civil liabilities arising from the committed crime, or other consequences of the conviction (for example, disqualification). Therefore, if by virtue of an investigation process, in which the guarantees and principles of due process are respected, the disciplinary responsibility of a judicial servant is proven, and the corresponding disciplinary sanction is imposed, agreed upon due to the inefficiency demonstrated in the performance of the position, it is not only legal but constitutional to automatically suspend what is represented in the related annual salary increments for that period; it is only by express provision of Corte Plena that this sanction does not operate. In this sense, Article 64 expressly provides, in relevant part:

"The imposition of any disciplinary correction shall interrupt the accumulated time for the increase, unless Corte Plena resolves otherwise considering the nature of the correction, the facts that motivated it, and the service record of the interested party."; so there is no interpretation contrary to the spirit of the law, but rather an application consistent with it, and with the Constitución Política. Moreover, it is rather by interpretation of Corte Plena that this sanction operates automatically for the disciplinary sanctions of written reprimand and suspension, ceasing to apply in the case of warnings. Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 9 of the law governing this Jurisdiction, it is appropriate to dismiss the action on the merits in this respect.

Therefore:

The challenged norms are interpreted in such a way that it is contrary to the constitutional order to extend the powers granted to the Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, to sanction disciplinarily for legal criteria issued in judgments and resolutions of a jurisdictional nature; consequently, the disciplinary sanction imposed on the petitioner by the Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial by resolution number 326-91, of fourteen hours and forty minutes on May thirteenth, nineteen ninety-one, is deemed not imposed. The action is flatly rejected in relation to the challenge of Articles 49, 50, and 51 of the Ley Orgánica del Organismo de Investigación Judicial. The action is dismissed on the merits regarding the other challenges. Communicate this ruling to Corte Plena and to the Inspección Judicial. Summarize in the official journal La Gaceta and publish in the Boletín Judicial.

Notifíquese.

Luis Paulino Mora M.

Nombre9143.

R. E. Piza E.

Jorge E. Castro B.

Nombre45289 C.

Eduardo Sancho G.

Nombre57862 . R.

Nombre58935 M.

2548-M-91. No.1265-95.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.- San José, at fifteen hours thirty-six minutes on March seventh, nineteen ninety-five.

Action of unconstitutionality brought by [NOMBRE001], of legal age, married, attorney, identity card number [CED62 ], against articles 120 to 124, 211 to 219 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, number 8 of November twenty-ninth, nineteen thirty-seven, and its reforms, in their text and interpretation and by connection articles 29 subsection 4), 30 subsection 2.), 71 subsection 4.) of the same law; article 44 of the Civil Service Statute, the interpretation by the Full Court of article 64 of the Judicial Service Statute, and articles 49, 50 and 51 of the Law of the Judicial Investigation Agency.

Resultando:

1.- The claimant files an action of unconstitutionality against articles 120 to 124, 211 to 219 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, number 8 of November twenty-ninth, nineteen thirty, and its reforms, in their text and interpretation, inasmuch as the Judicial Inspectorate has exceeded constitutional limits in its functions, since being an administrative body it acts as a jurisdictional one by interpreting laws; using procedures alien to the disciplinary procedure, by referring to the civil procedure, which is incompatible and inadequate with disciplinary matters because the judicial disciplinary regime is prone to sanction, thus violating the protective principle, the principle of innocence and legal certainty, and those that make up due process (concentration of the investigation and judgment in the same body, impossibility of appealing procedural and final resolutions, absence of regulation, lack of specificity, proportionality and gradation in provisional and definitive sanctions), considering that the judicial disciplinary regime was repealed with the enactment of the Labor Code and the General Law of Public Administration, as they contain principles more favorable to the weaker party in the relationship; and imposing disciplinary sanctions for criteria issued in jurisdictional resolutions, that is, for functions inherent to the judge, also for violation of the principle of legality regarding offenses, by establishing and imposing a disciplinary sanction of reprimand without detailing what the fault is; by connection articles 29 subsection 4.), 30 subsection 2.), 71 subsection 4.) of the same law; article 44 of the Civil Service Statute; the interpretation by the Full Court of article 64 of the Judicial Service Statute in the sense that it has established the temporary loss of salary increases obtained annually due to disciplinary sanctions; and articles 49, 50 and 51 of the Law of the Judicial Investigation Agency, due to their absolute dependence on the challenged norms, against the provisions of articles 9, 11, 35, 42, 154 and 156 of the Political Constitution.

2.- The ordinary labor lawsuit filed by the claimant against the State, processed under case file number 905-91, before the First Labor Court of San José, appears as a prior matter to this action.

3.- In accordance with the second paragraph of article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, this Chamber is empowered to resolve on the merits the petitions brought before it when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment or they are identical or similar to previously rejected ones, there being no reasons to vary the criterion or reasons of public interest that justify reconsidering the issue.

Drafted by Judge Mora Mora, and;

Considering:

I.ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. In a general sense, the claimant challenges a regulation by virtue of which he considers that a disciplinary sanction has been imposed on him by an administrative entity -Tribunal of the Judicial Inspectorate-, due to criteria or acts eminently of a jurisdictional nature issued by him as a judge, given that the competence of said tribunal refers only to the disciplinary sphere, considering that this violates the principle of internal independence of the judge, since the resolutions of a jurisdictional body can only be examined by hierarchical jurisdictional superiors and through the remedies that the law expressly indicates, in addition to arrogating criteria for interpreting norms, using procedures and imposing sanctions that are only authorized for jurisdictional bodies, for which we can consider that the action is directed against a specific subjective act of the Administration. However, despite being in such a situation, the matter raised is susceptible to being heard in this action of unconstitutionality, by virtue of the provisions of article 73 subsection b.) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which states:

"The action of unconstitutionality shall be admissible:

a.) ...

b.) Against the subjective acts of public authorities, when they infringe, by action or omission, any constitutional norm or principle, if they are not susceptible to the remedies of habeas corpus or amparo." In the case under study, the claimant filed an amparo remedy against the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspectorate, which was processed under case file number 1803-91, considering that the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for criteria of a jurisdictional nature constitutes interference in the independence of the judge, implying that the Inspectorate arrogates criteria of interpretation, using procedures and imposing sanctions authorized only for jurisdictional bodies, and the violation of due process in various manifestations, a remedy that was declared without merit by resolution number 320-93, at nine hours fifty-one minutes on January twenty-second, nineteen ninety-three, considering that in the amparo route it was not possible to determine whether or not there was merit in the disciplinary sanction imposed, and it refers to ordinary labor legislation for what is appropriate; "Since the acts challenged by the appellant relate to the exercise of the disciplinary function of the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspectorate, in order to determine whether or not there was merit for the imposition of a sanction in the exercise of service, it is evident to the Chamber that a matter of constitutionality is not at stake, but rather one of mere legality that must be heard by the competent courts, in the ordinary labor route, which are responsible for evaluating the evidence and arguments of the parties, in order to decide the legality of the challenged actions. The remedy being inadmissible, it falls to the Chamber to declare it without merit, as is hereby ordered." The claimant filed the ordinary labor lawsuit, which is processed before the Labor Court of San José, under case file number 905-91, invoking in this process the unconstitutionality of the norms against which this action is directed, which he subsequently filed, as a reasonable means to protect the interests and rights considered injured in the main matter. Consequently, since the substance raised challenges a subjective act of an administrative entity for violation of constitutional norms and principles, a matter that this same Court considered was not susceptible to being heard in the amparo route, the action of unconstitutionality proceeds, pursuant to the provisions of the cited article 73 subsection b.).

II.ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CHALLENGE. Regarding the particular challenge made by the claimant, he directs it against articles 120 to 124, 211 to 219 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, number 8, of November twenty-ninth, nineteen thirty-seven, and its reforms, in their text and interpretation, insofar as the Judicial Inspectorate has exceeded constitutional limits in its functions, since being an administrative body it acts as a jurisdictional one by interpreting laws, using procedures alien to the disciplinary procedure and imposing disciplinary sanctions for criteria issued in jurisdictional resolutions, that is, for functions inherent to the judge, also for violation of the principle of legality regarding offenses, by establishing and imposing disciplinary sanctions of reprimand without detailing what the fault committed is; and by connection articles 29 subsection 4.), 30 subsection 2.), 71 subsection 4.) of the same law. It must be mentioned that such regulation was repealed with the enactment of the new Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, number 7333, of May fifth, nineteen ninety-three, and which entered into force on the first of nineteen ninety-four, in which it was expressly provided on the point now of interest, in article 199, which states:

"Any complaint that refers exclusively to problems of interpretation of legal norms shall be rejected outright." Notwithstanding the foregoing, the challenged regulation is analyzed because in the disciplinary process brought against Licentiate Felipe Gutiérrez Salicetti, articles 120 to 124, 217 and 219 of the previous Organic Law of the Judicial Branch were specifically applied, and now in the labor jurisdiction it may be applied depending on what is resolved in this constitutional route in this case.

III.THE DISCIPLINARY POWER OF THE STATE. Within the powers inherent to the State -and to the Public Administration in general- is the sanctioning power, which can be classified into corrective power and disciplinary power. The first has the object of sanctioning infractions of the orders or mandates of the Public Administration, that is, the anti-juridical actions or omissions of individuals, whether or not they are public agents, and the content of the norms that regulate it constitutes administrative criminal law. The second has the exclusive objective of sanctioning the violations by public agents of their functional legal duties, whereby the content of the norms that regulate it constitutes disciplinary criminal law. This regime is a species of the "sanctioning" power of the State, from which it emanates; a power that is inherent and proper to the Public Administration, translating into the faculty of, at least, a "minimum" of power for it to apply disciplinary sanctions to its officials or employees when they fail in their duties. Disciplinary power is inherent to every public or private organization, that is, it is not exclusive to the Public Administration, as it is an indispensable power for the orderly management of public and private responsibility, but its foundation is diverse. Thus, private disciplinary power has its foundation in a civil obligation, by virtue of the legal equality of the parties that informs every legal relationship of private law. For example, it occurs in the family, where parents exercise that power, not only for the correction of children, but also for the preservation of the moral unity of the family, and one is reprimanded not for what has been done, but so that it is not done again; in the private labor field -industrial and commercial-, the employer exercises it in defense of the regularity of the work sphere; in professional associations, etc. In contrast, the disciplinary power of the public sector is created by virtue of a bilateral act, but in its development, the activity of the public official remains exclusively subject to the will of the Public Administration, from the creation to the extinction of the relationship, such that the servant finds themselves in a status of special dependence with respect to the State. The individual voluntarily accepts the appointment, but places themselves in a sphere of subjection with respect to the Administration, governed by Objective Law, where the situation of legal inequality of the parties in the public employment relationship is unquestionable; the Public Administration assumes, consequently, a superiority or preeminence that translates into hierarchical power, whose correlative is disciplinary power. This power, by its very purpose, stops at the circle of the agent's functional duties, and therefore, disciplinary sanctions cannot, legally, be imposed on them except during the existence of the employment relationship, that is, while the status of dependence lasts. Thus, disciplinary power and its sanctions are always conditioned on the legal exercise of public employment or function, so that, without the existence of the vinculum iuris between the Administration and the agent, disciplinary sanctions are inapplicable.

IV. TYPES OF LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS. Disciplinary liability presupposes a disciplinary power of the Administration

The *vinculum iuris* that exists between the Public Administration and the agent or public servant necessarily entails a series of duties and rights, such that the transgression of the former determines the employee's liability, which is regulated or disciplined differently by Objective Law depending on the legal nature of the liability. The transgression of a duty may be caused by an action or omission, which produces harmful effects for the Administration (internal) or for the administered parties or third parties outside the public employment relationship (external), facts or omissions that are relevant insofar as the infraction consists of the non-fulfillment of a duty of the function or employment, which consequently cause liability and its correlative sanction. The transgression of a duty does not always have unambiguous effects, since it may consist of the violation of a merely disciplinary rule, without other consequences, or it may constitute a crime under criminal law, or it may imply the patrimonial compensation for the damage caused. This multiplicity of effects determines the different classes of official liability: disciplinary or administrative, criminal, and civil or patrimonial. These liabilities are not mutually exclusive, so a single act violating a legal duty of the servant can generate the three types of liability, and therefore, three different types of sanctions. Here the principles of "*non bis in idem*" or "*noter in idem*" are inapplicable because these are three distinct types of liability, each with its own domain; the three liabilities have specific and unmistakable purposes, so the classic principle would be violated only in the event of liabilities and sanctions of the same kind. Thus, in judgment number 3484-94, at twelve o'clock on the eighth of July of last year, this Chamber considered:

"Now then, while it is true that there is independence between the administrative sanctioning procedure and the trial of the facts in the criminal jurisdiction, it cannot be interpreted, without contravening the right to due process and the principle of 'non bis in idem,' that if an act is tried in the criminal jurisdiction and the accused is acquitted, they can be disciplinarily sanctioned in the administrative jurisdiction for the same facts. It is recognized that one of the limits of the sanctioning power of the Administration is its subordination to the Judicial Authority. Should there be a collision between a jurisdictional action and an administrative action, it must be resolved in favor of the former. From this same principle derives the need to respect res judicata. In this regard, the Spanish Constitutional Court stated in judgment number 77 of October three, nineteen eighty-three:

'The principle non bis in ídem determines a prohibition against the duplication of administrative and criminal sanctions for the same facts, but it also leads to the impossibility that, when the legal system permits a duality of proceedings, and in each of them a trial and a qualification of the same facts must be produced, the trial and the qualification that may occur on the legal plane be conducted independently, if they result from the application of different regulations, but that the same cannot occur with regard to the appreciation of the facts, since it is clear that the same facts cannot exist and cease to exist for the organs of the State. A consequence of the foregoing, connected with the rule of the subordination of the sanctioning action of the Administration to the action of the Courts of justice, is that the former, as previously stated, cannot act until the latter have done so and must in all cases respect, when acting a posteriori, the factual assessment that those have made, ...'" Notwithstanding that the three types of liabilities have diverse structures, the sanctions of all three have a common objective: to maintain and ensure, in a preventive and repressive manner, the normal functioning of the public service, directly or indirectly compelling officials and employees to fulfill all their functional duties. Thus, the procedures to enforce the liability of officials are applied by virtue of the diversity of the legal rules that regulate it; criminal liability has its main source in the Code on the repressive matter and in special laws, being able to affirm the unity and systematization of criminal acts, as well as the procedure for the prosecution of their perpetrators; civil liability is disciplined by the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code; whereas, administrative liability is subject to a variety of regulations lacking unity and systematization. From what has been discussed, it can be concluded that the faults committed by officials in the exercise of their position, disrupting the internal order of the administration, originate disciplinary liability, since the disciplinary fault entails a misalignment of the employee with their function, affecting the very essence of administrative organization: without prejudice to criminal and civil liabilities, all with the exception that regarding the facts was previously indicated, a matter in which no ruling can be made in the administrative jurisdiction that contradicts what has been deemed duly proven in the jurisdictional venue. Therefore, **the purpose of disciplinary liability is to ensure the observance of the rules of subordination and, in general, the exact fulfillment of all the duties of the function entrusted to them.** Thus, disciplinary law presupposes a relationship of subordination between the organ subject to discipline and the organ that establishes or applies it, **more to punish, to correct, and even to educate the violator of the rule,** hence the corrective character of disciplinary sanctions." **V. SPHERE OF APPLICATION OF DISCIPLINARY POWER.** The application of the disciplinary regime is limited to the activities of the individual in their character as an agent or public official, to compel and ensure, preventively and repressively, the fulfillment of the legal duties of the employment, function, or position. The faults generating this liability are many and varied, such as, for example, negligence, apathy, carelessness, absenteeism, discourtesy towards superiors, equals, or subordinates and the public, irregular social conduct, lack of probity, abandonment of position, etc., which according to their gravity are classified as minor, serious, or very serious. The duties of officials derive, like their rights, from the law and from the nature of the position or function they perform, that is, they have an objective character. The duties of officials are of two classes, the general ones, which concern every official merely by being one, and the special ones, imposed in relation to the specific administrative function performed. Thus, for example, obedience is a duty for every public official, but the duty of obedience of a professor is not the same as that of a police officer. Some general duties are: that of obedience, which consists of respect and obedience to hierarchically superior authorities; and the provision of service, which consists of the official's duty to perform the tasks proper to their position, given by the nature of the function, for the better public service, performance, or productivity in the services, the officials being obliged to faithfully fulfill the function or position, completing the regulatory workday, and loyally collaborating with their superiors and coworkers for the improvement of services and the achievement of the aims of the administrative unit to which they are assigned. The provision of the service must be personal, by virtue of the official presumption in favor of the assigned official's competence. Also constituting general duties are the duty of confidentiality, which rests on the obligation to proceed with due discretion in the performance of the position, keeping opportune silence in cases where the nature of the function requires it—in the public sector, breach of secrecy can generate severe disciplinary sanctions, and even criminal ones, as is the case in the diplomatic disciplinary sphere and the Judicial Branch, where the revelation of secrets affects State security, or the interests of the parties, causing serious harm—; and the duty of decorum requires that the public office be attended to by its holder with due respect and correctness, both professionally and socially, by reason of the institution they represent. The duty to devote oneself entirely and with all zeal and decorum to the assigned position forbids the official from exercising other positions or functions, as it would make the good service of both impossible. On occasions, the nature of the employment excludes the exercise of certain professions; thus, a judge cannot hold management or advisory positions in private companies. The public official may not act in the service of third parties in matters in which they are intervening by reason of their position, nor in those that are being processed or pending resolution in the office where they work, nor may they be a lawyer, legal representative, or expert for a third party in any kind of litigation against the State. Incurring in any of these incompatibilities shall be classified as a serious or very serious fault, and furthermore, faults or absences, delays, carelessness, informalities, or negligence originating from the exercise of compatible activities must be sanctioned.

**VI. THE JUDGE AS A SUBJECT OF THE DISCIPLINARY REGIME. THE DUTIES OF THE JUDGE.** The foregoing serves to determine that the judge, as a public official, invested with certain state powers (an organ in the legal-material sense), to whom an essential function of the State, the jurisdictional one, is assigned, and as a primary element of each of the administrative units that make up the Judicial Branch, is subject to the disciplinary regime of the Branch they represent, that is, to the disciplinary regime of the Judicial Branch. The incompatibilities imposed on judges—prohibition of the simultaneous exercise of another public office or professional activity, not only the practice of law, but any other liberal profession, with the exception of university teaching or study commissions; of providing extrajudicial advice, sponsorship, and representation in trial whatsoever the jurisdiction may be; of participating in any political-party activity; of engaging in commerce and lucrative activities; all for the purpose of ensuring the greatest dedication of judges to their specific functions, as well as to prevent these from being interfered with by economic or partisan interests, or performing acts contrary to the dignity of the position, because the status of the judge imposes the duty to observe a public conduct that places them beyond all suspicion regarding their honorability—constitute duties for them, to the extent that they impose on these officials the observance of conduct consisting of abstaining from performing certain acts. These are duties of omission or prohibitions whose non-fulfillment can entail disciplinary liability, without prejudice to civil, and even criminal liability. Thus, the primary and fundamental duty of judges is to provide the services incumbent upon them as State officials, that is, to **administer justice in accordance with the legal system**, each time such activity is required of them in a specific case. Such duty, to exercise the jurisdictional function, derives from the public employment relationship that binds the judge to the State, being governed, as such, by the general principles of administrative law, and by the right that the parties or petitioners have that their claims be resolved or acted upon, regardless of the content of the respective decision. The non-fulfillment of this duty, or its irregular fulfillment, authorizes, on one hand, the application of disciplinary sanctions, and may even justify the dismissal or removal of the judge, and on the other, can generate civil and criminal liabilities. The act of "refusing to judge under the pretext of silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws" particularly constitutes a transgression that determines these types of liabilities. Within this great duty, the judge is obliged to resolve in accordance with the legal deadlines and terms—the contrary would imply denial of justice—, the reasoning of decisions—as a means to ensure adequate control over the judges' decision-making activity and to prevent possible arbitrariness—, and to direct the process—having to concentrate, as far as possible, all the proceedings that may need to be carried out, pointing out the defects and omissions that the filing suffers from before processing it, ordering that they be corrected within a legal deadline, and ordering ex officio any proceeding that may be necessary to avoid nullities, maintain the legal equality of the parties intervening in the process, ensure that the greatest procedural economy is sought in the processing of the case, prevent and sanction any act contrary to the duty of loyalty, probity, and good faith, and grant a hearing to the parties—.

**VII. THE DISCIPLINARY REGIME FOR JUDGES.** The repealed Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, in Article 211, provided:

"The Full Court, the Nombre9143 of the Court, the Chambers of the Court, the other collegiate Tribunals, the Judges, the Clerks of the Court (Actuarios), the Mayors (Alcaldes), and the Prosecutors (Agentes Fiscales), may correct disciplinarily:

...

3.) **Judicial officials and employees for the faults they commit in the performance of their position and employment.** ...

The Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection (Inspección Judicial) shall also exercise the disciplinary regime over **all the officials and employees aforementioned**, except as established for special cases, or when it concerns faults attributed to the Judicial Inspectors themselves."; a rule from which the general principle derived that all officials working in the Judicial Branch are subject to the disciplinary regime established by its organic law. Thus, in the new law this principle was expressly included in Title VIII—Disciplinary Regime—, with Article 175 providing that:

"All judicial servants are subject to disciplinary liability in the cases and with the guarantees established in this Law."; servants among whom judges and clerks of the court (actuarios) are obviously found, since said disciplinary regime "... has the purpose of ensuring the efficiency, correctness, and decorum of the functions entrusted to the Judicial Branch and guaranteeing citizens a correct administration of justice. For such effects, there shall exist the agile and reliable control mechanisms that are necessary." (Article 174 of the current Organic Law of the Judicial Branch.)

For this reason, broad powers of investigation and control **over all judicial servants** were granted to the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection (Inspección Judicial), for which it may monitor the proper fulfillment of duties, process complaints filed against them, conduct investigations upon learning of any irregularity, and resolve what is appropriate regarding the disciplinary regime, without prejudice to the powers that other organs and officials of the Judicial Branch may have in the matter, as provided in Article 120 of the repealed law, functions that are recognized by Article 184 of the new Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. This Chamber has already indicated as much, in judgment number 5891-93, at twelve hours fifty-seven minutes on the twelfth of November, nineteen ninety-three, by stating:

"The Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection (Inspección Judicial) shall also exercise the disciplinary regime over the officials aforementioned—the collegiate Tribunals, **the Judges**, the Clerks of the Court (Actuarios), the Mayors (Alcaldes), and the Prosecutors (Agentes Fiscales)—except in special cases. The Judicial Inspection is therefore an organ dependent on the Supreme Court of Justice, whose primary functions are: to exercise regular and constant control over all the dependencies of the Judicial Branch, **as well as to monitor the proper functioning of the servants' duties, processing the complaints filed against them and applying the disciplinary regime, without prejudice to the powers that other organs and officials of the Judicial Branch may have in the matter.** (Article 120 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch.) The appellant is incorrect in affirming that the appealed organ lacked the power to impose a warning sanction, since in accordance with Articles 120 and following of the cited law—now 184 and following—, the Judicial Inspection is empowered to exercise the disciplinary regime against a judicial official when, through due process, it has been demonstrated that they have failed to observe the functions inherent to the position they hold, a supposition that is met in the case before us, since through an investigation process, in which the appellant had the possibility to provide for their defense—as is evident from the administrative file that has been reviewed—it was demonstrated that by delegating the practice of an ocular inspection proceeding to the secretary of their office, they incurred a non-fulfillment of the functions that the law imposes on them. (Article 210 of the Code of Criminal Procedure)." **VIII.** REGARDING THE INTERFERENCE OF THE JUDICIAL INSPECTION IN FUNCTIONS PROPER TO THE JUDGE. The petitioner points out that the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection is arrogating functions that do not correspond to it, by reason of being a disciplinary and not a jurisdictional body, by interpreting laws, a function that belongs solely and exclusively to the jurisdictional bodies, thereby exceeding constitutional limits—Article 156 of the Political Constitution. In this regard, Article 199 of the current Organic Law of the Judicial Branch states:

"Any complaint that refers exclusively to problems of interpretation of legal norms shall be rejected outright."; so that, neither by express provision of the law, nor by interpretation of the current regulations, can it be understood that extensive powers are granted to the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection like those indicated by the petitioner, but only those that the law confers upon it—and were previously commented upon—, and much less, that said Tribunal may arrogate attributions that the law does not contemplate, because that would be contrary to the nature of the function entrusted to it, which is solely the application of the disciplinary regime of the Judicial Branch. This norm was not in the repealed Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, however, by reason of the nature of the functions entrusted to the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection, the principle was indeed effectively applied, because it only corresponds to the disciplinary sphere, not the technical-legal assessment of the judge's work in specific cases. It must be noted that the supervisory activity of the Tribunal cannot interfere with the jurisdictional function, because these sanctions—the disciplinary ones—do not have the effect of annulling or altering jurisdictional resolutions, or of directly influencing the matter in question, and the rulings of the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection will never produce res judicata regarding the case sub judice, as these are two entirely separate things: the legal content of the judgment, and the judge's conduct as a public official. The Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection, in relation to the disciplinary regime, must assess the judge on the one hand, everything that produces efficient public service, for which it must examine and investigate the normal function of the offices, the activity performed, the processing of case files, the procedures, the hiring of personnel, etc.; and on the other hand, it must assess the efficiency of the judge as a public official, so that the content of his judgments demonstrates his professional capacity and suitability in the position he holds, that is, whether he knows and correctly applies the law, because the Superior Tribunals see that supervision limited to their own competence, and cannot impose sanctions of this category, only those derived from arbitrary activity in the case file. This implies that a judge can only be imposed a sanction of this type—disciplinary—when, through an investigation procedure, in which his rights derived from due process are guaranteed, the breach of the functions proper to him by reason of the position he holds is proven, but not for criteria expressed in rulings and decisions of a jurisdictional nature, which shall only be subject to review by the superior, when legal remedies are interposed, except if from them a clear conviction of his breach in performing the position for which he was appointed is derived. In other words, the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection can assess the generic activity of the judge through the study of his pronouncements, but only to determine his suitability in the position he holds; it cannot directly affect a specific case, pointing out the errors of interpretation in which it believes the judge incurred when applying the law, because this is an eminently jurisdictional function, and said instance is of an administrative nature. Therefore, the Judicial Inspection requires a plurality of cases, being unable to assess the capacity or competence of a judge by a single pronouncement—unless it involves a manifestly absurd and very serious error—because that would be authorizing it to evaluate the legal content of jurisdictional rulings, which is under no point of view possible. It must be clear that, for the proper performance of the tasks entrusted to the Inspection, it is empowered to visit judicial offices, and keep control of what has been resolved, of pending matters, backlogs, etc., all to verify the aptitude of the official for the position he holds, and ultimately, to ensure a better administration of justice. It must not be forgotten that Article 30 subsection 4.) of the former Organic Law of the Judicial Branch—now Article 28 subsection 4.)—allows the dismissal, following the established procedure and with the prior opportunity for defense, of the servant:

"4.- That he proves to be incompetent or inadequate for the performance of his position."; for which, if it is proven that the employee does not fulfill the functions entrusted to him in his capacity as judge, which implies primarily the administration of justice according to law, a disciplinary sanction may be imposed on him, as the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection deems appropriate. Thus, the plurality of errors in which the judge incurs, such as resolving against what is provided in the law, falling into error in reasoning, not issuing a properly legal criterion on a particular point, determine the incompetence or lack of suitability of the official for the performance of the position for which he was appointed.

IX.The petitioner further alleges that with the intrusion of the Judicial Inspection into the proper work of the judge, his independence is being seriously harmed. This has been understood as the economic, political, and functional autonomy of the jurisdictional bodies with respect to the other Branches of the State; however, this concept goes further, so that it implies the effective fulfillment of the functions entrusted to judges, that is, judges are able to administer justice on the condition of acting with independence. This independence implies: a.) the deprivation of hierarchical superiors of any power to interfere in the properly jurisdictional or adjudicative function that their subordinates exercise in each specific case, except when they hear the same matter by virtue of legal remedies, and safeguarding the power of those superiors to issue instructions concerning the service of justice in abstract terms; b.) the prohibition of governmental and administrative powers to alter the functional statute of judges regarding entry and promotions, during the time of exercise, which constitutes the irremovability (inamovilidad) of the official; and c.) the abstention of the judge from hearing matters in which for reasons of family or social relationships he may influence the resolutions (disqualification, excuse, or recusal). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the independence of the judge cannot be understood in such a sense that it justifies and sanctifies any activity of his; the non-interference of external influences in decisions and rulings of a jurisdictional nature is justified in their scientific nature and justice, that is, so that he can be guided exclusively by reasons of knowledge in legal science. By reason of the foregoing, Article 154 of the Political Constitution determines that the judge is subject to the Constitution and the laws, from which it is understood that his activity cannot be arbitrary, but must be duly reasoned and in accordance with the law. The Constitution imposes on him the duty to state the reasons and foundations of fact and law on which the solution agreed upon for the questions raised in the process is based, this being the only means through which the parties can verify the justice of jurisdictional decisions and verify their conformity with the legal assessments in force; this demonstrates that judgments are reasoned adaptation of the law in force and not the product of his individual will. This also derives from the right of defense (Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution), that is, from the possibility of obtaining jurisdictional protection of rights, which supposes the issuance of judgments in accordance with the law and in relation to the disputed facts, because otherwise there exists only a mere act of arbitrariness or caprice of the judge and not a true judgment in the sense required by the Constitution. This concept had already been developed by this Chamber, when considering:

"The principle of independence that governs the performance of the jurisdictional function, has the purpose of guaranteeing that the subjects who administer justice are only subject to the Constitution and the Laws, in this way, the resolutions they issue in the matters of their competence will not impose responsibilities other than those expressly indicated in the laws. Now then, the fact that the Judicial Inspection imposes a disciplinary sanction—within the scope of its competence—on a judicial official who has failed to observe the duties inherent in the investiture he holds, does not imply, as the appellant claims, that it is arrogating competences that do not correspond to it or that it modifies the diligence challenged in the complaint, but on the contrary, to determine if those servants have acted negligently in the fulfillment of their duties or if they have improperly exercised the powers that the law confers upon them, as a means of guaranteeing the adequate performance thereof." (judgment number 5891-93.)

From the foregoing, it is concluded that it cannot be affirmed that there is a violation of the independence of the judge, when a disciplinary sanction is imposed for the breach of the duties proper to him by reason of the position he holds, after an investigation process in this regard; but it would indeed be contrary to this principle, if this type of sanction were imposed by reason of the criterion expressed in a particular ruling or resolution of a jurisdictional nature, for considering that the decision given by the judge is not appropriate or in accordance with the law, or that the interpretation given to the regulations applied to the specific case is not correct.

X.OF THE SANCTION IMPOSED BY THE TRIBUNAL OF THE JUDICIAL INSPECTION ON THE PETITIONER. In the case under study, the Judicial Inspection imposed a disciplinary sanction on the petitioner for not allowing Nombre95825 to participate in an auction, considering that he could not participate in it if he did not make the corresponding deposit in cash or by certified check at the office's cashier, since he had only presented a copy of a proof of judicial deposit that had not been entered into the Court's cashier, in which it was not indicated for which case said deposit was made, an action that was confirmed, when the incident of nullity of proceedings and resolutions raised by the affected person was denied; that is, the disciplinary sanction of reprimand was imposed on him for considering that he had applied the law incorrectly in a specific case. The petitioner alleges that he applied the provisions of Article 652 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which states in the pertinent part:

"The auction shall be presided over by the president, the judge, or the mayor, with the assistance of the secretary and the intervention of an auctioneer. On the indicated day and time, the auctioneer shall announce the auction, the bids that are being made and the improvements that are being presented, and the act shall end when no one improves the last bid. No bid that does not cover the base and that is not for cash shall be admitted.

Only bidders who, in an act of the auction, deposit in cash or by certified check, fifteen percent of the base given to the goods shall be admitted, unless the judgment creditor, in writing or verbally, relieves them of this power." Given the complaint filed by Nombre95825 for not having been allowed to participate in an auction, by resolution number 326-91, of fourteen hours forty minutes on the thirteenth of May of one thousand nine hundred and ninety-one, the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection considered:

"It was demonstrated, without any doubt whatsoever, that Mr. Nombre95825 attended from before the start of the auction to carry out the relevant procedures to participate in it. Furthermore, it was also fully demonstrated that beforehand—on the twenty-eighth of December of the immediately preceding year—he had deposited, to the order of the Court, the ten percent—which was required—of the base, with which he could make an offer to acquire the goods to be auctioned. He showed a copy of the deposit; so there was indeed certainty of the existence of that money in the Court's checking account. In any event, if at that moment he delivered the money in cash, it would have to be deposited to the order of the Court, in the event that the goods were awarded to him. The truth of the matter is that due to a futile and unnecessary formalism, the product of a poor interpretation of the respective Code, he was not allowed to participate. Such a decision, which was exclusively that of the Mr. Actuario, was made to depend on the authorization or not of the plaintiff's representative, which is a possibility, in another assumption or case indicated by numeral 652 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the opinion of the Tribunal, Mr. Nombre95825 acquired the right to participate in that auction and unjustifiably was not allowed to bid. For this, it is worth repeating, the necessary money or percentage was even in the possession or to the order of the Court. Of course, the complainant was harmed, at least as a potential bargainer in the purchase of the goods. Subsequently, it was clear that no other intervention in the process was allowed to him, since every step he took was rejected for not being a party. Consequently, he did not have the procedural opportunity for any error committed to his detriment to be corrected. Additionally, the fault is indeed subject to the disciplinary regime under the charge of this Tribunal." From the foregoing, it is concluded that, in this particular case, the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection does extend the powers entrusted to it, since it does not limit itself to the merely disciplinary sphere, but has applied its sanctioning power to eminently criteria of a legal nature expressed in rulings and resolutions of a jurisdictional nature, thereby harming the independence of the judge.

XI.THE PRINCIPLE OF TYPICITY IN THE DISCIPLINARY REGIME. The petitioner also challenges the disciplinary regime of the Judicial Branch for considering that it is contrary to the principle of typicity, since the faults established in the laws—Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and Judicial Service Statute—are vague and imprecise, in addition to the fact that in the definition of the "types" indeterminate and vague concepts are used. Specifically, he questions Article 30 subsection 2.) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, which stated:

"He shall be dismissed from his employment:

...

2.) That through proven incorrect acts or faults in the exercise of his position or in his private life he has become deserving of that sanction, in the judgment of the Plenary Court."; which corresponds to Article 28 subsection 2.) of the new law, which provides:

"The servant may be dismissed from his position, following the established procedure and with the prior opportunity for defense:

2.- That, through incorrect acts or faults in the exercise of his position or in his private life, which may affect good service or the image of the Judicial Branch, he has become deserving of that sanction." As noted previously, disciplinary liability usually concerns acts of a general nature, because the disciplinary authorities can use a discretionary power of extensive interpretation in the classification of facts. Thus, the rules regulating disciplinary law are mainly generic, the figures have no solutions of continuity, and it is theoretically and practically difficult, not to say impossible, to assert when a perfectly defined figure exists. In this regime, the principle of typicity—"nullum crimen sine lege, and nulla poena sine lege"—does not have the rigorous application that criminal law has, its domain being more dilated.

In this regard, by judgment number 5594-94, at fifteen hours forty-eight minutes on the twenty-seventh of last September, this Chamber considered:

"III. THE PRINCIPLE OF TYPIFICATION IN THE DISCIPLINARY REGIME. The existence of a set of duties for officials —and at the same time their powers—, whether duties included in the obligation of the function or service they perform, or those deriving from hierarchical subordination, requires established rules to govern these relations, and sanctions for when such obligations are violated. The principle of typification is an application of the principle of legality and requires the concrete delimitation of the conducts that are made reproachable for the purpose of sanction. However, in disciplinary matters, the principle of typification is not applied in the same way as it is in criminal matters, in accordance with Article 39 of the Constitution, as this Chamber has repeatedly stated, pointing out that: "For a conduct to constitute a crime, it is not sufficient that it be unlawful —contrary to law—, it must be typified, that is, it must be fully described in a rule; this is due to unavoidable requirements of legal certainty, since repressive matters involve the greatest interference in citizens' important legal rights, to guarantee them against the State, it is necessary that they can have full knowledge of which actions they must refrain from committing, under penalty of incurring criminal liability ..." (resolution number 1877-90, at sixteen hours two minutes on the nineteenth of December, nineteen ninety). It can be affirmed that the principle of typification constitutes a fundamental principle in disciplinary liability, but not in the same form as in the criminal-legal sphere, since the principles "nullum crimen sine lege", "nullum poena sine lege" do not have the rigidity and exactness that characterize them in substantive criminal law, because the sanctioning activity of a criminal nature and that of a disciplinary nature correspond to different legal fields, and the parameters of discretion that are characteristic of the exercise of administrative disciplinary power are broader than those of the State's criminal sanctioning power. Thus, in criminal law, in relation to crimes, every penalty must be established in law with respect to the incriminated act, excluding, due to their generality, any possibility of reference to so-called undefined legal concepts, or open or undefined clauses; if the conduct is not fully defined, there is no penalty. In disciplinary law, due to the purpose it pursues, which is the protection of the general social order, and the subject matter it regulates —discipline—, the determination of the disciplinary infraction is less demanding than the criminal sanction, as it comprises acts that can be classified as a violation of the duties of the position, which in some legislations are not specified, and in others, they are. Thus, the exercise of this power is discretionary, hence it is appropriate to apply sanctions for any breach of functional duties, without the need for them to be concretely detailed as sanctionable acts, for which reason the enumeration of punishable acts made by regulation is not limitative in nature. Motivated by the variety of causes that can generate its application, the frequent imprecision of its precepts, and the sphere of application, it is not always organic or clear in its literal expression, which is why breaches not concretely foreseen, but which are understood to be included in the text, can be sanctioned discretionally, provided they result from the verification of the disciplinary infraction, through a procedure created for that purpose. The disciplinary breach or infraction has been defined by saying that it is a violation of the functioning of any duty inherent to one's condition, even when it has not been specifically defined, although it is foreseen. The determining acts of disciplinary infractions are innumerable, since they depend on the nature of the behaviors or conduct of the "subordinate" subjects, behaviors or conduct that are in truth unlimited in number given their variety; therefore, the existence of three elements of the disciplinary infraction is deduced: 1.- a material element: which is an act or an omission; 2.- a moral element: which is the imputation of the act to a free will; and 3.- a formal element: which is the disturbance to the functioning of the service or an immediate or possible affection of its efficacy. IV. UNDEFINED LEGAL CONCEPTS IN THE DISCIPLINARY REGIME. Based on the sanction to be applied —criminal or disciplinary— this can be taken into consideration to determine the greater or lesser requirement regarding due process guarantees, among which the principle of typification is found, because the greater the sanction, the greater the guarantees must be, which is translated, in the case under study —in the disciplinary process—, into the lesser rigidity of this principle. Therefore, grounded in the subject matter it regulates and in the endless variety of conducts it involves, in the disciplinary sphere it would not be easy to conclude the elimination of all types of infractions defined in open terms, such as those that refer to undefined legal concepts. Notwithstanding the above, it cannot be affirmed that the definition of the conducts to be sanctioned can be totally ignored in application of the principle of legality, and more specifically that of typification. For this reason, it must be understood that the types enunciated in apparently deontological terms must become perfectly technical legal types, in the sense of formulating determinable concepts, for which reason the undefined legal concepts of conducts must be specified or completed through the detailed analysis of the facts and an interpretation of them based on the values defined in said concepts. In this way, more or less imprecise types —in the sense of the technique of undefined legal concepts— or open types, are indispensable for use in the disciplinary sphere, given the very indeterminacy of the professional and disciplinary duties that are intended to be guaranteed, which can only be enunciated in very general terms. But the foregoing cannot justify totally open and unspecific assessments, estimations "in conscience," as much regarding the scope of the professional duty or conduct whose breach is reproached, but rather it must be applied to the reality of the reproached conduct, thus making effective the principle of legality —Article 39 of the Constitution— but adapted to the administrative subject matter. In such a way, for example, it will in no way be sufficient to merely reproach an official for a lack of probity, in the abstract, but it is necessary to specify in the specific conduct being judged, where said breach is concretely attributable, from the perspective of the positive duties of the official, to which they have failed. As a consequence of the foregoing, when interpreting a norm, it must be done in relation to the activity it regulates; in the case under study, it must be done in terms of Education, thereby avoiding arbitrariness in the use of "undefined legal concepts." V. The concepts used by laws can be determined or indeterminate. The former delimit the sphere of reality to which they refer in a precise and unequivocal manner, such as the age of majority, deadlines for filing remedies and appeals, etc. On the contrary, with the technique of the undefined legal concept, the law refers to a sphere of reality whose limits do not appear well specified in its enunciation, notwithstanding which, it is clear that it attempts to delimit a concrete supposition, concepts such as good faith, lack of probity, morals, good customs, etc. Thus, although the law does not clearly determine the limits ..., because these are concepts that do not admit quantification or rigorous determination, but in any case, it is manifest that they are thereby referring to a supposition of reality that, notwithstanding the indeterminacy of the concept, admits being specified at the moment of application. The law uses concepts of value —good faith, standard of conduct of the good father of a family, public order, fair price, morals—, or of experience —incapacity for the exercise of one's functions, premeditation, irresistible force—, because the realities referred to do not admit any other type of more precise determination. But it is clear that by referring to concrete suppositions and not to imprecise or contradictory vaguenesses, as is the case with the determination of disciplinary infractions or breaches, the application of such concepts to the qualification of concrete circumstances admits no more than one solution: either it occurs or it does not occur ...; either there is good faith or there is not, or actions contrary to public order or there are not, or there are actions contrary to morals or there are not, etc. This is where the essence of this type of concept lies, so that the indeterminacy of the enunciation does not translate into an indeterminacy of the applications of the same, which only permit "one unitary just solution" in each case. The technique of undefined legal concepts, which despite their denomination are concepts of value or experience used by laws, occurs in all branches of law, for example in civil law —good faith, diligence of the good father of a family, negligence—, in commercial law —corporate interest—, in procedural law —pertinence of interrogations, adequate measures to promote execution, irreparable harm—, or in criminal law —treachery (alevosía), dishonest abuse—, these are just some of the examples that can be cited. In Administrative Law, there is no differentiation regarding the use of concepts such as urgency, public order, fair price, public calamity, adequate or proportionate measures, public necessity or public interest, etc., not allowing a plurality of just solutions, but only one solution for each specific case." Article 219 of the repealed Organic Law of the Judicial Branch contained which disciplinary sanctions were to be applied, these were: "The disciplinary corrections imposable on judicial officials and employees, when the committed breach or breaches do not justify the revocation of appointment, shall be: 1.) Warning or admonishment; 2.) Reprimand; 3.) Suspension not exceeding one month from the exercise of the position or employment."; which were imposed based on the gravity of the acts that motivated the application of the disciplinary regime. In this sense, the new Organic Law of the Judicial Branch contains a chapter referring to the breaches and sanctions of the disciplinary regime —Articles 190 to 196—, which is clear in all its aspects, in that it defines what actions motivate a disciplinary sanction, and the corresponding sanctions, according to the gravity of the acts, for which reason, and based on the reasons given previously, it can be affirmed that the disciplinary regime of the Judicial Branch is not contrary to the principle of typification.

XII.ON THE DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Finally, in relation to the disciplinary regime, the claimant points out that the application of the judicial disciplinary regime is inadequate, in that what is pertinent is to apply the provisions of the Labor Code and the General Law of Public Administration, as they are subsequent to the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, and because it has been repealed by the principles most favorable to the worker. Likewise, he questions the procedure established to apply it, considering that the referral to civil procedural legislation is incompatible and inadequate with the disciplinary subject matter, because it is more repressive, and therefore prone to sanctioning, in violation of the protective (tuitivo) principles, the principle of innocence, and legal certainty, as well as those that integrate due process, because there is a concentration of the investigation and the judgment in the same body, there is no possibility of appealing resolutions on procedural matters nor final ones, only the possibility of revocation exists, there is an absence of regulation, since the procedure is disaggregated in a normative body lacking coherence, and a lack of precision and gradation between provisional and definitive breaches. In the first place, the claimant must bear in mind that the Judicial Branch, despite being a Branch of the State and governed by Administrative Law, has a special regime due to the function it performs; and in matters of public employment relations, although the general principles are given in Administrative Law and Labor Law —as parameters—, the specifications are regulated in accordance with the regulations that refer specifically to the Judicial Branch, thus, it is governed in accordance with the provisions of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, the Judicial Service Statute, the Regulation on competitive evaluation of background for appointing officials who administer justice, the Organic Law of the Judicial Investigation Organization, the Regulation on Performance Evaluation for Employees of the Judicial Branch, etc. As observed, this is a special set of regulations, which cannot be tacitly repealed by a later rule of a general nature, as the claimant affirms. Regarding the procedure of the judicial disciplinary regime, this Chamber does not observe that it violates any fundamental right, quite the contrary, both in the repealed law and in the new Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, the guarantees that integrate due process are respected, with the opportunity to exercise the right of defense. As this Court has indicated on repeated occasions, the right of appeal referred to in the San José Pact —in its Articles 8 and 25— can only be claimed in criminal matters in cases of resolutions that put an end to a process, such that the right of appeal does not exist indiscriminately, as the claimant intends. In the case under study, this possibility was found by the employee subject to disciplinary procedure in Article 211, fourth paragraph, which provided: "The corrections imposed by Superior Courts, other Collegiate Courts, Judges, Court Clerks (Actuarios), Mayors, Prosecutors, and Heads of Administrative Departments who have disciplinary power, on employees of their own office, shall have appeal recourse before the Court of Judicial Inspection. The recourse must be presented directly to the Court, within three days following the imposition of the disciplinary measure."; likewise, the second paragraph of Article 124 stated: "If the Court decrees the removal of the employee, the latter may appeal before the Court, via telegraph or in writing on plain paper, addressing the Court of Inspection itself, within three days following the notification of the resolution: or verbally upon being notified. The Court shall admit the recourse, summon the appellant to appear before the Superior and make their allegations within three subsequent days, and then shall forward the information to the Full Court (Corte Plena) so that it may resolve definitively."

The claimant himself had the opportunity to file a revocation recourse against resolution number 326, at fourteen hours forty minutes on the thirteenth of May, nineteen ninety-one of the Court of Judicial Inspection, by written submission presented on the eighteenth of June of that same year, which was declared without merit by resolution number 423, at fourteen hours forty minutes on the twenty-fourth of June of the same year, by the same Court. The new Organic Law is much clearer, specifying in Article 209: "Whenever a suspension or revocation of appointment is imposed, the accused may appeal the final resolution of the Court of Inspection, within three days following notification. Their recourse shall be heard by the Superior Council"; therefore, the alleged violation does not exist. Regarding the absence of regulation, the petitioner himself points out that in the repealed law such regulation existed, only dispersed within the law; with the new Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, the procedure is regulated in a systematic manner. Regarding the determination and gradation of sanctions, it refers to what was said in Considerando XI of this resolution. Finally, as this Chamber has pointed out on other occasions, the fundamental procedural guarantees and principles that integrate due process, which derive from Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution, and more specifically from the General Law of Public Administration, are applicable not only in the jurisdictional sphere, but also in administrative procedures.

Within these principles, the following may be cited:

"... a.) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the proceeding; b.) right to be heard, and opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and produce evidence it deems pertinent; c.) opportunity for the administered party to prepare its allegation, which necessarily includes access to information and administrative records linked to the matter in question; ch.) right of the administered party to be represented and advised by attorneys; d.) adequate notification of the decision issued by the Administration and of the grounds on which it is based; and e.) right of the interested party to appeal the decision issued." (judgment number 15-90, at sixteen hours forty-five minutes on January fifth, nineteen ninety.)

Based on the reasons given and on the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), it is appropriate to dismiss on the merits this action on this point.

XIII.CHALLENGE TO ARTICLES 49, 50 AND 51 OF THE LAW OF THE JUDICIAL INVESTIGATION ORGANISM. The challenge to Articles 49, 50 and 51 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Investigation Organism is inadmissible, since they establish the subjection to the disciplinary regime of the officials who work in that institution—a regime that, it is worth noting, is based on the same reasons given for the case of judges—wherefore, this action is not a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed in the main matter, given that the claimant is not an official of the Judicial Investigation Organism, and such challenged regulations do not apply to him in this specific case. Consequently, the outright rejection of the action in relation to these points is appropriate, in accordance with the provisions of Article 9, first paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

XIV.REGARDING THE FULL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 64 OF THE JUDICIAL SERVICE STATUTE. Finally, the claimant challenges the interpretation that the Full Court (Corte Plena) has made of Article 64 of the Judicial Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Judicial), insofar as it has established the temporary loss of annually obtained salary increases due to disciplinary sanctions. The petitioner indicates that the application of this rule is unconstitutional because, by virtue of the same act, he is being sanctioned twice. However, such an interpretation is not contrary to any constitutional provision or principle in that sense, since, although there is a prohibition against being tried two or more times for the same act—Article 42, first paragraph, of the Political Constitution—this does not entail that a double sanction cannot be imposed in relation to the same act, as happens in criminal jurisdiction, where an individual can be punished with a prison sentence in addition to the imposition of a fine, without prejudice to any civil liabilities arising from the crime committed, or to other consequences of the conviction (for example, disqualification). Wherefore, if by virtue of an investigation process, in which the guarantees and principles of due process (debido proceso) are respected, the disciplinary responsibility of a judicial servant is proven, and the corresponding disciplinary sanction is imposed, agreed upon due to the inefficiency demonstrated in the performance of the position, it is not only legal but constitutional to automatically suspend what is represented in the annual salary increases related to that period; it is only by express provision of the Full Court (Corte Plena) that this sanction does not operate. In this sense, Article 64 expressly provides, in the pertinent part:

"The imposition of any disciplinary correction shall interrupt the accumulated time for the increase, unless the Full Court resolves otherwise, considering the nature of the correction, the acts that motivated it, and the service record of the interested party."; such that there is no interpretation contrary to the spirit of the law, but rather an application in accordance with it, and with the Political Constitution. Moreover, it is instead by interpretation of the Full Court (Corte Plena) that this sanction operates automatically for the disciplinary sanctions of written reprimand and suspension, ceasing to be applied in the case of warnings. Wherefore, in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 9 of the law governing this Jurisdiction, it is appropriate to dismiss on the merits the action on this point.

Therefore:

The challenged rules are interpreted such that it is contrary to the constitutional order to extend the powers granted to the Tribunal of Judicial Inspection (Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial) to sanction disciplinarily for legal criteria issued in judgments and resolutions of a jurisdictional nature; consequently, the disciplinary sanction imposed on the claimant by the Tribunal of Judicial Inspection (Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial) by resolution number 326-91, at fourteen hours forty minutes on May thirteenth, nineteen ninety-one, is considered not imposed. The action is rejected outright in relation to the challenge of Articles 49, 50 and 51 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Investigation Organism. The action is dismissed on the merits regarding the other challenges. Let this pronouncement be communicated to the Full Court (Corte Plena) and to the Judicial Inspection (Inspección Judicial). Let it be summarized in the official gazette La Gaceta and published in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial). Notify.

Luis Paulino Mora M.

Nombre9143.

R. E. Piza E. Jorge E. Castro B.

Nombre45289 C. Eduardo Sancho G.

Nombre57862 . R. Nombre58935 M.

Acción de Inconstitucionalidad N.2548-91 Felipe Gutiérrez Salicetti SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.- San José, a las quince horas treinta y seis minutos del siete de marzo mil novecientos noventa y cinco.

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por [NOMBRE001], mayor, casado, abogado, cédula de identidad número [CED62 ], contra los artículos 120 a 124, 211 a 219 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, número 8 de veintinueve de noviembre de mil novecientos treinta y siete, y sus reformas, en su texto e interpretación y por conexión los artículos 29 inciso 4), 30 inciso 2.), 71 inciso 4.) de la misma ley; el artículo 44 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, la interpretación de Corte Plena del artículo 64 del Estatuto de Servicio Judicial, y los artículos 49, 50 y 51 de la Ley del Organismo de Investigación Judicial.

Resultando:

1.- El accionante presenta acción de inconstitucionalidad contra los artículos 120 a 124, 211 a 219 de la ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, número 8 de veintinueve de noviembre de mil novecientos treinta, y sus reformas, en su texto e interpretación, por cuanto la Inspección Judicial ha sobrepasado los límites constitucionales en sus funciones, ya que siendo un órgano administrativo actúa como uno jurisdiccional al interpretar las leyes; usar procedimientos ajenos al procedimientos disciplinario, al remitir al procedimiento civil, el cual resulta incompatible e inadecuado con la materia disciplinaria por cuanto el régimen disciplinario judicial es proclive a sancionar, violando así los principios tuitivo, de inocencia y seguridad jurídica, y los que integran el debido proceso (concentración de la instrucción y sentencia en el mismo órgano, imposibilidad de apelar las resoluciones de trámite y finales, ausencia de reglamentación, falta de concreción, proporcionalidad y gradación en las sanciones provisionales y definitivas), considerando que el régimen disciplinario judicial fue derogado con la promulgación del Código de Trabajo y la Ley General de la Administración Pública, por contener principios más favorables a la parte más débil en la relación; e imponer sanciones de índole disciplinaria por criterios emitidos en resoluciones jurisdiccionales, es decir, por funciones propias del juez, además por violación al principio de tipicidad, al establecer e imponer una sanción disciplinaria de represión sin que esté detallada cual es la falta; por conexión los artículos 29 inciso 4.), 30 inciso 2.), 71 inciso 4.) de la misma ley; el artículo 44 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil; la interpretación de Corte Plena del artículo 64 del Estatuto de Servicio Judicial en el sentido en que ha establecido la pérdida temporal de los incrementos salariales obtenidos anualmente por motivo de sanciones de índole disciplinaria; y los artículos 49, 50 y 51 de la Ley del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, por su relación de dependencia absoluta con las normas impugnadas, en contra de los dispuesto en los artículos 9, 11, 35, 42, 154 y 156 de la Constitución Política.

2.- Figura como asunto previo de esta acción el juicio ordinario laboral promovido por el accionante contra el Estado, que se tramita bajo expediente número 905-91, ante el Juzgado Primero de Trabajo de San José.

3.- De conformidad con el párrafo segundo del artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, esta Sala está facultada para resolver por el fondo las gestiones promovidas ante ella cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes o resulten iguales o similares a anteriores rechazadas, no existiendo motivos para variar el criterio o razones de interés público que justifiquen reconsiderar la cuestión.

Redacta el Magistrado Mora Mora, y;

Considerando:

I.DE LA PROCEDENCIA DE LA ACCION DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. En sentido general, el accionante impugna una normativa en virtud de la cual considera que le ha sido impuesta una sanción disciplinaria por un ente administrativo -Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial-, en razón de criterios o actos eminentemente de naturaleza jurisdiccional por él dispuestos como juez, siendo que la competencia de dicho tribunal se refiere únicamente al ámbito disciplinario, por considerar que con ello se viola el principio de independencia interna del juez, ya que las resoluciones de un órgano jurisdiccional sólo pueden ser examinadas por los superiores jerárquicos jurisdiccionales y mediante los recursos que la ley expresamente señala, además de arrogarse criterios de interpretación de las normas, utilización de procedimientos e imposición de sanciones que únicamente son autorizadas para los órganos jurisdiccionales, por lo cual podemos considerar que la acción se dirige contra un acto subjetivo concreto de la Administración. Sin embargo, no obstante encontrarnos en tal supuesto, el asunto planteado es susceptible de ser conocido en esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, en virtud de lo dispuesto en el artículo 73 inciso b.) de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que dice:

"Cabrá la acción de inconstitucionalidad:

a.) ...

b.) Contra los actos subjetivos de las autoridades públicas, cuando infrinjan, por acción u omisión, alguna norma o principio constitucional, si no fueren susceptibles de los recursos de hábeas córpus o de amparo." En el caso en estudio, el accionante promovió recurso de amparo contra el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, el cual se tramitó bajo expediente número 1803-91, por considerar que constituye una interferencia en la independencia del juez la imposición de sanciones disciplinarias por criterios de naturaleza jurisdiccional, implicando ello que la Inspección se arroga criterios de interpretación, utilizando procedimientos e imponiendo sanciones autorizadas sólamente para los órganos jurisdiccionales, y la violación del debido proceso en diversas manifestaciones, recurso que fue declarado sin lugar por resolución número 320-93, de las nueve horas cincuenta y un minutos del veintidós de enero de mil novecientos noventa y tres, por considerar que en la vía del amparo no era posible determinar si hubo o no mérito de la sanción disciplinaria impuesta, y remite a la legislación ordinaria laboral para lo que corresponda; "Como los actos impugnados por el recurrente, tienen que ver con el ejercicio de la función disciplinaria del Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, en orden a determinar si hubo o no mérito para la imposición de una sanción en el ejercicio del servicio, resulta evidente para la Sala que no está de por medio un asunto de constitucionalidad, sino de mera legalidad que debe ser conocido por los tribunales competentes, en la vía ordinaria laboral, a quienes corresponde evaluar las pruebas y fundamentos de las partes, a efecto de decidir la legalidad de las actuaciones impugnadas. Siendo el recurso improcedente, corresponde a la Sala declararlo sin lugar, como en efecto se dispone." El accionante promovió el ordinario laboral, que se tramita ante el Juzgado de Trabajo de San José, bajo expediente número 905-91, invocando en este proceso la inconstitucionalidad de las normas contra las que se dirige esta acción, la que posteriormente presentó, como medio razonable para amparar los intereses y derechos considerados lesionados en el asunto principal. En consecuencia, siendo que el fondo planteado impugna un acto subjetivo de un ente administrativo por violación de normas y principios constitucionales, asunto que este mismo Tribunal consideró que no era susceptible de ser conocido en la vía del amparo, procede la acción de inconstitucionalidad, al tenor de lo dispuesto en el citado artículo 73 inciso b.).

II.DE LA PROCEDENCIA DE LA IMPUGNACION. En cuanto a la impugnación en particular que hace el accionante, la dirige contra los artículos 120 a 124, 211 a 219 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, número 8, de veintinueve de noviembre de mil novecientos treinta y siete, y sus reformas, en su texto e interpretación, en cuanto la Inspección Judicial ha sobrepasado los límites constitucionales en sus funciones, ya que siendo un órgano administrativo actúa como uno jurisdiccional al interpretar las leyes, usar los procedimientos ajenos al procedimiento disciplinario e imponer sanciones de índole disciplinaria por criterios emitidos en resoluciones jurisdiccionales, es decir, por funciones propias del juez, además por violación al principio de tipicidad, al establecer e imponer sanciones disciplinarias de represión sin que esté detallada cual es la falta cometida; y por conexión los artículos 29 inciso 4.), 30 inciso 2.), 71 inciso 4.) de la misma ley. Debe hacerse mención que tal normativa fue derogada con la promulgación de la nueva Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, número 7333, de cinco de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y tres, y que entró en vigencia el primero de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, en la que expresamente se dispuso sobre el punto que ahora interesas, en el artículo 199, que dispone:

"Será rechazada de plano toda queja que se refiera exclusivamente a problemas de interpretación de normas jurídicas." No obstante lo anterior, se analiza la normativa impugnada en razón de que en el proceso disciplinario llevado contra el Licenciado Felipe Gutiérrez Salicetti se aplicó, concretamente los artículos 120 a 124, 217 y 219 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial anterior, y ahora en la jurisdicción laboral puede ser aplicada dependiendo de lo resuelto en esta vía constitucional en este caso.

III.LA FACULTAD DISCIPLINARIA DEL ESTADO. Dentro de las facultades propias del Estado -y de la Administración Pública en general- se encuentra la potestad sancionatoria, la cual puede clasificarse en potestad correctiva y en potestad disciplinaria. La primera tiene por objeto sancionar las infracciones a las órdenes o mandatos de la Administración Pública, es decir, a las acciones u omisiones antijurídicas de los individuos, sean o no agentes públicos, y el contenido de las normas que la regulan constituye el derecho penal administrativo. La segunda tiene como objetivo exclusivo sancionar las violaciones de los agentes públicos a sus deberes jurídicos funcionales, siendo que el contenido de las normas que la regulan constituye el derecho penal disciplinario. Este régimen es una especie de la potestad "sancionadora" del Estado, de la que dimana; potestad que es inherente y propia de la administración Pública, traduciéndose en la facultad de, por lo menos, un "mínimo" de poder para que ésta aplique sanciones disciplinarias a sus funcionarios o empleados cuando falten a sus deberes. El poder disciplinario es inherente a toda organización pública o privada, es decir, no es exclusiva de la Administración Pública, por ser un poder imprescindible para la gestión ordenada de la responsabilidad pública y privada, pero su fundamento es diverso. Así, el poder diciplinario privado tiene su fundamento en una obligación civil, en virtud de la igualdad jurídica de las partes que informan toda la relación jurídica de derecho privado. Así por ejemplo, se da en la familia, ejerciendo ese poder los padres, no sólo para corrección de los hijos, sino también para la preservación de la unidad moral de la familia, y se reprende no por lo que se ha hecho, sino para que no se vuelva a hacer; en el campo laboral privado -industrial y comercial-, lo ejerce el patrón en defensa de la regularidad de la esfera de trabajo; en los colegios profesionales, etc. En cambio, el poder diciplinario del sector público es creado en virtud de un acto bilateral, pero en su desenvolvimiento, la actividad del funcionario público queda exclusivamente sujeta a la voluntad de la Administración Pública, desde la creación hasta la extinción de la relación, de manera que el servidor se encuentra en un status de especial dependencia con respecto al Estado. El individuo voluntariamente acepta la designación, pero se sitúa en una esfera de sujeción con respecto a la Administración, reglada por el Derecho Objetivo, donde es incuestionable la situación de desigualdad jurídica de las partes en la relación de empleo público; la Administración Pública asume, en consecuencia, una superioridad o preeminencia que se traduce en el poder jerárquico, cuyo correlativo es el poder diciplinario. Este poder, por su propia finalidad se detiene en el círculo de los deberes funcionales del agente, y por lo tanto, las sanciones disciplinarias no pueden, jurídicamente, serle impuestas sino durante la existencia de la relación de empleo, es decir, mientras perdure el status de dependencia. De manera que, el poder disciplinario y sus sanciones están condicionados siempre al ejercicio jurídico del empleo público o de la función, por lo que, sin la existencia del vinculum iuris entre la Administración y el agente, las sanciones disciplinarias son inaplicables.

IV.TIPOS DE RESPONSABILIDAD DE LOS FUNCIONARIOS PUBLICOS. La responsabilidad disciplinaria presupone un poder disciplinario de la Administración. El vinculum iuris que se da entre la Administración Pública y el agente o servidor público implica necesariamente una serie de deberes y derechos, de manera que la transgresión a los primeros determina la responsabilidad del empleado, la cual es regulada o disciplinada distintamente por el Derecho Objetivo según sea la naturaleza jurídica de la responsabilidad. La transgresión a un deber puede ser ocasionada por una acción u omisión, que producen efectos dañosos para la Administración (interna) o para los administrados o terceros extraños a la relación de empleo público (externa), hechos u omisiones que tienen relevancia en cuanto la infracción consiste en el incumplimiento de un deber de la función o del empleo, que en consecuencia causan responsabilidad y su correlativa sanción. La transgresión de un deber no tiene siempre efectos unívocos, ya que puede consistir en la violación de una norma meramente disciplinaria, sin otras consecuencias, o puede configurar un delito del derecho penal, o puede implicar el resarcimiento patrimonial del daño causado. Esta multiplicidad de efectos determina las diferentes clases de responsabilidad del funcionario, la disciplinaria o administrativa, la penal y la civil o patrimonial. Estas responsabilidades no son excluyentes, por lo que un mismo hecho violatorio de un deber jurídico del servidor puede generar los tres tipos de responsabilidad, y por lo tanto, tres tipos diferentes de sanciones. Aquí los principios de "non bis in idem" o "noter in idem" son inaplicables por cuanto se trata de tres géneros distintos de responsabilidad, cada uno con su dominio propio; las tres responsabilidades tienen finalidades específicas e inconfundibles, por lo que el clásico principio sería violado únicamente en el supuesto de tratarse de responsabilidades y sanciones de la misma especie. Así, por sentencia número 3484-94, de las doce horas del ocho de julio del año pasado, esta Sala consideró:

"Ahora bien, si bien es cierto, que existe independencia entre el procedimiento administrativo sancionatorio y el juzgamiento de los hechos en la vía penal, no puede interpretarse, sin contrariar el derecho al debido proceso y el principio del "non bis in idem", que si se juzga un hecho en la vía penal y el imputado resulta absuelto, pueda ser disciplinariamente sancionado en la vía administrativa por los mismo hechos. Se reconoce que uno de los límites de la potestad sancionadora de la Administración es su subordinación a la Autoridad Judicial. De haber colisión entre una actuación jurisdiccional y una actuación de la administración, se debe resolver en favor de la primera. De este mismo principio se deriva la necesidad de que se respete la cosa juzgada. Al respecto dijo el Tribunal Constitucional Español, en sentencia número 77 del tres de octubre de mil novecientos ochenta y tres:

"El principio non bis in ídem determina una interdicción de la duplicidad de sanciones administrativas y penales respecto de unos mismos hechos, pero conduce también a la imposibilidad de que, cuando el ordenamiento permite una dualidad de procedimientos, y en cada uno de ellos ha de producirse un enjuiciamiento y una calificación de unos mismos hechos, el enjuiciamiento y la calificación que en el plano jurídico puedan producirse, se hagan con independencia, si resultan de la aplicación de normativas diferentes, pero que no pueda ocurrir lo mismo en lo que se refiere a la apreciación de los hechos, pues es claro que unos mismos hechos no pueden existir y dejar de existir para los órganos del Estado. Consecuencia de lo dicho, puesto en conexión con la regla de la subordinación de la actuación sancionadora de la Administración a la actuación de los Tribunales de justicia es que la primera, como con anterioridad se dijo, no puede actuar mientras no lo hayan hecho los segundos y deba en todo caso respetar, cuanto actúe a posteriori, el planteamiento fáctico que aquellos hayan realizado, ..." No obstante que los tres tipos de responsabilidades tienen estructuras diversas, las sanciones de las tres tienen un objetivo común, el de mantener y asegurar en forma preventiva y represiva el funcionamiento normal del servicio público, obligando directa o indirectamente a los funcionarios y empleados al cumplimiento de todos sus deberes funcionales. Así, los procedimientos para hacer efectiva la responsabilidad de los funcionarios, se aplica en virtud de la diversidad de las normas jurídicas que la regulan; la penal tiene su fuente principal en el Código de la materia represiva y en las leyes especiales, pudiendo afirmarse la unidad y sistematización de los hechos delictivos, así como el procedimiento para el enjuiciamiento de sus autores; la responsabilidad civil está disciplinada por las disposiciones pertinentes del Código Civil; en cambio, la responsabilidad administrativa está sujeta a una variedad de ordenamientos carentes de unidad y sistemantización. De lo que se ha comentado, se puede concluir que, las faltas cometidas por los funcionarios en el ejercicio de su cargo, quebrantando el orden interno de la administración, origina la responsabilidad disciplinaria, por cuanto la falta disciplinaria entraña un desajuste del empleado a su función, afectando la propia esencia de la ordenación administrativa: sin perjuicio de las responsabilidades penal y civil, todom con la salvedad que en relación a los hechos se señaló con anterioridad, materia en la que no puede hacerse pronunciamiento en vía administrativa, que contraría lo tenido como debidamente acreditado en la vía jurisdiccional. Por ello, el fin de la responsabilidad disciplinaria es asegurar la observancia de las normas de subordinación y, en general, del exacto cumplimiento de todos los deberes de la función que se le tiene encomendada. Así, el derecho disciplinario presupone una relación de subordinación entre el órgano sometido a la disciplina y el órgano que la establece o aplica, más para castigar, para corregir, e incluso educar al infractor de la norma, de ahí el carácter correctivo de las sanciones disciplinarias."

V.ESFERA DE APLICACION DEL PODER DISCIPLINARIO. La aplicación del régimen disciplinario se limita a las actividades del individuo en su carácter de agente o funcionario público, para compelir y asegurar, preventiva y represivamente, el cumplimiento de los deberes jurídicos del empleo, de la función o del cargo. Las faltas generadoras de esta responsabilidad son muchas y variadas, como por ejemplo, la desidia, apatía, descuido, inasistencia, incorreción con superiores, iguales o subordinados y con el público, conducta social irregular, falta de probidad, abandono del cargo, etc., que según su gravedad se clasifican de leves, graves o muy graves. Los deberes de los funcionarios derivan, como sus derechos, de la ley y de la naturaleza del cargo o función que desempeñan, es decir, tienen carácter objetivo. Los deberes de los funcionarios son de dos clases, los generales, que atañen a todo funcionario por el sólo hecho de serlo, y los especiales, impuestos en relación con la función administrativa específica desempeñada. Así por ejemplo, la obediencia es un deber para todo funcionario público, pero el deber de obediencia de un catedrático no resulta igual del deber de un policía. Algunos deberes generales son: el de obediencia, que consiste en el respeto y obediencia a las autoridades superiores jerárquicas; y la prestación del servicio, que consiste en el deber del funcionario de la realización de las prestaciones propias de su cargo, que viene dado por la naturaleza de la función, para el mejor servicio público, rendimiento o productividad en los servicios, quedando los funcionarios obligados al fiel cumplimiento de la función o cargo, cumpliendo la jornada de trabajo reglamentario, debiendo colaborar lealmente con sus jefes y compañeros de trabajo, para el mejoramiento de los servicios y consecución de los fines de la unidad administrativa en que se halle destinado. La prestación del servicio debe ser personal, en virtud de la presunción oficial en favor de la competencia del funcionario asignado. También constituyen deberes generales el deber de reserva, que estriba en la obligación de proceder con la debida discreción en el desempeño del cargo, guardando el oportuno silencio en los casos en que la índole de la función lo exija -en el sector público el quebrantamiento del secreto puede generar severas sanciones disciplinarias, e inclusive de tipo penal, como es el caso del ámbito disciplinario diplomático y del Poder Judicial, en la revelación de los secretos afectan la seguridad del Estado, o los intereses de las partes, causando graves daños-; y el deber del decoro exije que el oficio público sea atendido por su titular con el debido respeto y corrección, tanto en lo profesional como en lo social, en razón de la institución que representa. El deber de consagrarse por entero y con todo celo y decoro al cargo asignado, veda al funcionario el ejercicio de otros cargos o funciones, por cuanto imposibilitaría el buen servicio de ambos. En ocasiones la índole del empleo excluye el ejercicio de determinadas profesiones, así el juez no puede desempeñar cargos de dirección a asesoramiento a empresas particulares. El funcionario público no podrá actuar al servicio de terceros en asuntos en que esté interviniendo por razón de su cargo, ni de los que se hallen en tramitación o pendientes de resolución en la oficina en que labore, ni tampoco podrá ser abogado, procurador o perito de tercero en cualquier clase de litigio contra el Estado. El incurrir en alguna de estas incompatibilidades se calificará como falta grave o muy grave, debiéndose además sancionar las faltas o ausencias, retrasos, descuidos, informalidades o negligencias que se originen en el ejercicio de actividades compatibles.

VI.EL JUEZ COMO SUJETO DEL REGIMEN DISCIPLINARIO. LOS DEBERES DEL JUEZ. Lo anterior es para determinar que el juez, como funcionario público que es, investido de ciertas potestades estatales (órgano en sentido jurídico-material), al que se le tiene asignada una función esencial del Estado, la jurisdiccional, y como elemento primordial de cada una de las unidades administrativas que integran el Poder Judicial, está sujeto al régimen disciplinario del Poder que representa, es decir, al régimen disciplinario del Poder Judicial. Las incompatibilidades impuestas a los jueces -prohibición del ejercicio simultáneo de otro cargo público o de actividad profesional no sólo de la abogacía, sino de cualquier otra profesión liberal, a excepción de la docencia universitaria o comisiones de estudio, de asesorar extrajudicialmente el patrocinio y representación en juicio cualquiera que sea la jurisdicción, de participar en cualquier actividad político-partidista, del ejercicio del comercio y de las actividades lucrativas, todo ello con el fin de asegurar la mayor dedicación de los jueces a sus funciones específicas, así como de impedir que éstas se vean interferidas por intereses de carácter económico o partidistas, o efectuar actos contrarios a la dignidad del cargo, en razón de que el status del juez impone el deber de observar una conducta pública que le ponga a cubierto de toda suspicacia y sospecha con respecto a su honorabilidad-, constituyen deberes a los mismos, en la medida en que imponen a éstos la observancia de conductas consistentes en la abstención de realizar determinados actos. Se trata de deberes de no hacer o de prohibiciones cuyo incumplimiento puede conllevar responsabilidad disciplinaria, sin perjuicio de la civil, e incluso de la penal. De este modo constituye deber primario y fundamental de los jueces el prestar los servicios que les incumben como funcionarios del Estado, es decir, el de administrar justicia conforme al ordenamiento jurídico, cada vez que tal actividad les sea requerida en un caso concreto. Tal deber, de ejercer la función jurisdiccional, deriva de la relación de empleo público que vincula al juez con el Estado, hallándose regido, como tal, por los principios generales del derecho administrativo, y del derecho que tienen las partes o peticionarios en el sentido de que sus reclamos sean resueltos o proveídos, con prescindencia del contenido de la respectiva decisión. El incumplimiento de este deber, o su cumplimiento en forma irregular, autoriza, por una parte, la aplicación de sanciones disciplinarias, pudiendo justificar, inclusive, la destitución o remoción del juez, y por otra, puede generar las responsabilidades de orden civil y penal. Constituye particularmente una transgresión que determina ese tipo de responsabilidades el hecho de "dejar juzgar bajo pretexto de silencio, oscuridad o insufiencia de las leyes". Dentro de este gran deber, el juez está obligado a resolver conforme a los plazos y términos de ley -lo contrario implicaría denegación de justicia-, la motivación de las decisiones -como un modo de asegurar un adecuado control sobre la actividad decisoria de los jueces, y evitar posibles arbitrariedades-, y dirigir el proceso -debiendo concentrar en lo posible todas las diligencias que sean menester realizar, señalar los defectos y omisiones de que adolece la gestión antes de tramitarla, ordenando que se subsanen dentro de un plazo legal, y disponer de oficio toda diligencia que fuere necesaria para evitar nulidades, mantener la igualdad jurídica de las partes que intervienen en el proceso, vigilar para que en la tramitación de la causa se procure la mayor economía procesal, prevenir y sancionar todo acto contrario al deber de lealtad, probidad y buena fe, conferir audiencia a las partes-.

VII. EL REGIMEN DISCIPLINARIO DE LOS JUECES. La Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial derogada, en el artículo 211 disponía

"La Corte Plena, el Nombre9143 de la Corte, las Salas de la Corte, los demás Tribunales colegiados, los Jueces, los Actuarios, los Alcaldes y los Agentes Fiscales, podrán corregir disciplinariamente:

...

3.) A los funcionarios y empleados judiciales por las faltas que cometan en el desempeño de su cargo y empleo.

...

El Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial también ejercerá el régimen disciplinario respecto de todos los funcionarios y empleados antes indicados, salvo en lo establecido para los casos especiales, o cuando se trate de faltas atribuidas a los propios Inspectores Judiciales."; norma de la que derivó el principio general de que todos los funcionarios que laboren en el Poder Judicial están sujetos al régimen disciplinario establecido por su ley orgánica. Así, en la nueva ley este principio se recogió en forma expresa en el Título VIII -Régimen Disciplinario-, disponiendo el artículo 175 que:

"Todos los servidores judiciales están sujetos a responsabilidad disciplinaria en los casos y con las garantías establecidas en esta Ley."; servidores dentro de los cuáles obviamente se encuentran los jueces y los actuarios, por cuanto dicho régimen disciplinario "... tiene por objeto asegurar la eficiencia, corrección y decoro de las funciones encomendadas al Poder Judicial y garantizar a los ciudadanos una correcta administración de justicia. Para tales efectos, existirán los mecanismos de control, ágiles y confiables, que sean necesarios." (Artículo 174 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, vigente.)

En razón de lo anterior es que, se confirieron amplias facultades de investigación y control sobre todos los servidores judiciales al Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, para lo cual podrá vigilar, el buen cumplimiento de los deberes, tramitará las quejas que se presenten contra ellos, instruirá las informaciones al tener conocimiento de alguna irregularidad, y resolverá lo que proceda respecto del régimen disciplinario, sin perjuicio de las atribuciones que tengan en la materia otros órganos y funcionarios del Poder Judicial, según lo dispuesto en el artículo 120 de la Ley derogada, funciones que reconoce el artículo 184 de la nueva Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Así lo ha señalado ya esta Sala, por sentencia número 5891-93, de las doce horas cincuenta y siete minutos del doce de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y tres, al señalar:

"El Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial también ejercerá el régimen disciplinario respecto de los funcionarios antes indicados -los Tribunales colegiados, los Jueces, los Actuarios, los Alcaldes y los Agentes Fiscales-, salvo en casos especiales. La Inspección Judicial es entonces un órgano dependiente de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, que posee como funciones primordiales: ejercer un control regular y constante sobre todas las dependencias del Poder Judicial, así como vigilar el buen funcionamiento de los deberes de los servidores, dando trámite a las quejas contra ellos interpuestas y aplicando el régimen disciplinario, sin perjuicio de las atribuciones que tengan en la materia otros órganos y funcionarios del Poder Judicial. (Artículo 120 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial.) No lleva razón el recurrente al afirmar que el órgano recurrido no tenía facultad para imponerle una sanción de advertencia, toda vez que conforme a los artículos 120 y siguientes de la ley de cita -ahora 184 y siguientes-, la Inspección Judicial está facultada para ejercer el régimen disciplinario contra un funcionario judicial cuando a través de un debido proceso se haya demostrado que ha inobservado las funciones inherentes al cargo que ostenta, supuesto que se cumple en el caso que nos ocupa, ya que a través de un proceso de investigación, en el cual el recurrente tuvo la posibilidad de proveer a su defensa -tal y como se desprende del expediente administrativo que se ha tenido a la vista- se demostró que el delegar la práctica de una diligencia de la inspección ocular en el secretario de su despacho, incurrió en un incumplimiento de las funciones que la ley le impone. (Artículo 210 del Código de Procedimientos Penales)."

VIII.SOBRE LA INGERENCIA DE LA INSPECCION JUDICIAL EN FUNCIONES PROPIAS DEL JUEZ. Señala el accionante que el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial se está arrogando funciones que no le corresponden, en razón de tratarse de un órgano disciplinario y no jurisdiccional, al interpretar las leyes, función que corresponde única y exclusivamente a los órganos jurisdiccionales, sobrepasando con ello los límites constitucionales -artículo 156 de la Constitución Política-. A este respecto señala el artículo 199 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial vigente:

"Será rechazada de plano toda queja que se refiera exclusivamente a problemas de interpretación de normas jurídicas."; de manera que, ni por disposición expresa de la ley, ni por interpretación de la normativa vigente, puede entenderse que se otorgan facultades extensivas al Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial como las señaladas por el accionante, sino únicamente las que la ley le confiere -y anteriormente se comentaron-, y mucho menos, que dicho Tribunal se pueda arrogar atribuciones que la ley no contempla, porque ello sería contrario a la naturaleza de la función que se le tiene encomendada, que es únicamente la aplicación del régimen disciplinario del Poder Judicial. Esta norma no estaba en la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial derogada, sin embargo, en razón de la naturaleza de las funciones encomendadas al Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, el principio si era efectivamente aplicado, por cuanto únicamente le corresponde el ámbito de lo disciplinario, no la valoración técnico-jurídica de la labor del juez en los casos concretos. Debe anotarse que la actividad fiscalizadora del Tribunal no puede interferir sobre la función jurisdiccional, porque estas sanciones -las disciplinarias- no tienen el efecto de anular o alterar las resoluciones jurisdiccionales, o de influir directamente sobre el asunto en cuestión, y los fallos del Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial nunca producirán cosa juzgada respecto del caso subjudice, pues son dos cosas totalmente apartes: el contenido jurídico de la sentencia, y la actuación del juez como funcionario público. El Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, en relación con el régimen disciplinario, lo que debe valorar del juez es, por una parte, todo lo que produce el servicio público eficiente, por lo cual debe examinar e investigar la función normal de las oficinas, la actividad desempeñada, la tramitación de expedientes, los procedimientos, la contratación de personal, etc.; y por otra parte, debe valorar la eficiencia del juez como funcionario público, de manera que el contenido de sus sentencias lo que demuestra es su capacidad profesional e idoneidad en el puesto que desempeña, es decir, si conoce y aplica correctamente el derecho, por cuanto los Tribunales Superiores ven limitada esa fiscalización a su propia competencia, y no pueden imponer sanciones de esta categoría, únicamente las derivadas de la actividad arbitraria del expediente. Ello implica que, a un juez, únicamente puede imponérsele una sanción de este tipo -disciplinaria- cuando mediante un procedimiento de investigación, en el que se garanticen sus derechos derivados del debido proceso, se compruebe el incumplimiento de las funciones que le son propias en razón del cargo que desempeña, pero no por criterios vertidos en los fallos y decisiones de carácter jurisdiccional, los cuáles sólo serán susceptibles de la revisión por el superior, cuando medien los recursos de ley, excepto que de ellos se derive la convicción clara de su incumplimiento para desempeñar el cargo para el que fue nombrado. En otras palabras, el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial puede entrar a valorar la actividad genérica del juez mediante el estudio de sus pronunciamientos, pero únicamente para determinar su idoneidad en el puesto que desempeña; no podrá incidir directamente en un caso concreto, señalando los errores de interpretación en que estima incurrió el juez al aplicar el derecho, por cuanto ésta es una función eminentemente jurisdiccional, y dicha instancia es de carácter administrativo. Por ello, la Inspección Judicial necesita de una pluralidad de casos, no pudiendo valorar la capacidad o competencia de un juez por un sólo pronunciamiento -salvo que se trate de un error manifiestamente absurdo y de gran gravedad-, porque ello sería facultarlo para valuar el contenido jurídico de los fallos jurisdiccionales, lo que bajo ningún punto de vista es posible. Debe quedar claro que, para el buen desempeño de las labores encomendamos a la Inspección se le faculta para visitar los despachos judiciales, y llevar control de lo resuelto, de los pendientes, atrasos, etc., todo para verificar la aptitud del funcionario para el cargo que desempeña, y en última instancia, para asegurar una mejor administración de justicia. No debe olvidarse que el artículo 30 inciso 4.) de la antigua Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial -ahora artículo 28 inciso 4.)- permite la destitución, siguiendo el procedimiento establecido y con la previa oportunidad de defensa, del servidor:

"4.- Que resultare incompetente o inadecuado para el desempeño de su cargo."; por lo cual, de comprobarse que el empleado no cumple las funciones que se le tienen encomendadas en su carácter de juez, lo que implica en primer término la administración de justicia conforme a derecho, puede imponérsele una sanción disciplinaria, según lo considere el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial. Así, la pluralidad de errores en que incurre el juez, tales como resolver contra lo dispuesto en la ley, incidir en yerro en el razonamiento, no emitir criterio propiamente jurídico sobre un punto en particular, determinan la incompetencia o falta de idoneidad del funcionario para el desempeño del puesto para el cual fue nombrado.

IX.Alega además el accionante, que con la intromisión de la Inspección Judicial en la labor propia del juez, se está lesionando gravemente su independencia. Esta ha sido comprendida como la autonomía económica, política y funcional de los órganos jurisdiccionales con respecto a los otros Poderes del Estado; sin embargo, este concepto va más allá, de manera que implica el efectivo cumplimiento de las funciones encomendadas a los jueces, es decir, a los jueces les es posible administrar justicia a condición de moverse con independencia. Esta independencia implica: a.) la privación de los superiores jerárquicos de cualquier facultad de inmiscuirse en la función propiamente jurisdiccional o juzgadora que ejercen en cada caso concreto sus subordinados, salvo cuando conozcan del mismo asunto en virtud de recursos legales, y quedando a salvo la facultad de esos superiores para impartir instrucciones que atañen al servicio de la justicia en términos abstractos; b.) la prohibición de las facultades gubernativas y administrativas para alterar el estatuto funcional de los jueces en cuanto a ingreso y ascensos, durante el tiempo de ejercicio, lo cual constituye la inamovilidad del funcionario; y c.) la abstención del juez de conocer de los asuntos en los cuáles por razones de relaciones familiares o sociales pueda influir en las resoluciones (inhibición, excusa o recusación). No obstante lo anterior, la independencia del juez no puede entenderse en tal sentido que justifique y santifique cualquier actividad suya; la no interferencia de influencias externas en las decisiones y fallos de carácter jurisdiccional está justificada en la cientificidad y justicia de los mismos, es decir, para que pueda guiarse exclusivamente por razones de conocimiento en la ciencia jurídica. En razón de lo anterior es que, el artículo 154 de la Constitución Política determina que el juez está sometido a la Constitución y a las leyes, de lo cual se entiende que su actividad no puede ser arbitraria, sino que debe estar debidamente fundamentada y resultar conforme a derecho. La Constitución le impone el deber de enunciar los motivos y fundamentos de hecho y de derecho en que se base la solución acordada a las cuestiones planteadas en el proceso, siendo que la misma constituye el único medio a través del cual las partes pueden verificar la justicia de las decisiones jurisdiccionales y comprobar la adecuación de éstas a las valoraciones jurídicas vigentes; con ello se demuestra que las sentencias son adecuación razonada del derecho vigente y no producto de su voluntad individual. Ello también deviene del derecho de defensa (artículos 39 y 41 constitucionales), es decir, de la posibilidad de obtener amparo jurisdiccional de los derechos, lo cual supone el pronunciamiento de sentencias conforme a la ley y en relación con los hechos controvertidos, porque de lo contrario sólo existe un mero hecho de arbitrariedad o capricho del juzgador y no una verdadera sentencia en el sentido requerido por la Constitución. Este concepto ya había sido desarrollado por esta Sala, al considerar:

"El principio de la independencia que rige el desempeño de la función jurisdiccional, tiene como finalidad el garantizar que los sujetos que administran justicia únicamente se encuentren sometidos a la Constitución y a las Leyes, de esta manera, las resoluciones que dicten en los asuntos de su competencia no les impondrán otras responsabilidades que las expresamente señaladas en las leyes. Ahora bien, el hecho de que la Inspección Judicial imponga una sanción disciplinaria -en el ámbito de su competencia- a un funcionario judicial que ha inobservado los deberes inherentes a la investidura que ostenta, no implica como lo afirma el recurrente, que aquella se esté arrogando competencias que no le corresponden o que modifique la diligencia que se impugna en la queja, sino por el contrario, determinar si esos servidores han actuado negligentemente en el cumplimiento de sus deberes o si bien han ejercido indebidamente las facultades que la ley les confiere, como medio de garantizar el adecuado desempeño de las mismas." (sentencia número 5891-93.)

De lo anterior se concluye que no puede afirmarse que exista violación a la independencia del juez, cuando se imponga sanción disciplinaria por el incumplimiento de los deberes que le son propios en razón del cargo que desempeña, previo proceso de investigación al respecto; pero sí sería contrario a este principio, si se impusiera este tipo de sanción en razón del criterio emitido en algún fallo o resolución de carácter jurisdiccional en particular, por estimar que la decisión dada por el juez no es la apropiada o conforme a derecho, o que la interpretación dada a la normativa aplicada al caso en concreto no es la correcta.

X.DE LA SANCION IMPUESTA POR EL TRIBUNAL DE LA INSPECCION JUDICIAL AL ACCIONANTE. En el caso en estudio, la Inspección Judicial impuso una sanción disciplinaria al accionante por no dejar participar a Nombre95825 en un remate, considerando que no podía participar en el mismo si no hacía el depósito correspondiente en dinero en efectivo o mediante cheque certificado en la caja del Despacho, ya que únicamente había presentado una copia de una constancia de depósito judicial que no había sido enterado a la caja del Juzgado, en la que no se señalaba para que proceso se hacía dicho depósito, actuación que fue confirmada, al ser denegado el incidente de nulidad de actuaciones y resoluciones planteado por el afectado; es decir, se le impuso la sanción disciplinaria de reprensión por considerar que había aplicado mal el derecho en un caso en concreto. El accionante alega que aplicó lo dispuesto en el artículo 652 del Código Procesal Civil, que dice en lo que interesa:

"El remate será presidido por el presidente, el juez o el alcalde, con la asistencia del secretario y la intervención de un pregonero. El día y la hora señalados, el pregonero anunciará el remate, las posturas que se vayan haciendo y las mejoras que se vayan presentando, y se terminará el acto cuando no haya quien mejore la última postura. No se admitirá postura que no cubra la base y que no sea al contado.

Sólo se admitirán postores que en un acto del remate depositen en dinero efectivo o en cheque certificado, el quince por ciento de la base dada a los bienes, salvo que el ejecutante, por escrito o de palabra, los releve de este poder." Ante la queja interpuesta por Nombre95825 por no habérsele permitido participar en un remate, por resolución número 326-91, de las catorce horas cuarenta minutos del trece de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y uno, el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial consideró:

"Quedó demostrado, sin ningún género de duda, que don Nombre95825 acudió desde antes del inicio del remate, a realizar las gestiones pertinentes para participar en el mismo. Además, también quedó plenamente demostrado que desde antes -el veintiocho de diciembre del año inmediato anterior- había depositado, a la orden del Juzgado, el diez por ciento -que se requería- de la base, con lo cual podía hacer oferta para adquirir el bien a subastar. Mostró copia del depósito; de manera que sí había seguridad de la existencia de ese dinero en la cuenta corriente del Juzgado. De toda suerte, si en ese momento entrega en efectivo el dinero, éste tendría que depositarse a la orden del Juzgado, en el evento de que se le adjudicare el bien. Lo cierto del caso es que por un formalismo fútil e innecesario, producto de una mala interpretación del Código respectivo, no se le dejó participar. Tal decisión que era exclusivamente del señor Actuario, se hizo depender de la autorización o no de la representante del actor, lo cual es una posibilidad, en otro supuesto o caso que señala el numeral 652 del Código Procesal Civil. A juicio del Tribunal, don Nombre95825 adquirió el derecho de participar en aquel remate e injustificadamente no se le permitió hacer oferta. Para ello, valga repetirlo, el dinero o porcentaje necesario estaba incluso en poder o a la orden del Juzgado. Desde luego que sí se perjudicó al quejoso, cuando menos como eventual forcejeador en la compra del bien. Luego, quedó claro que no se le permitió ninguna otra intervención en el proceso, por cuanto toda gestión que hizo se le rechazó por no ser parte. Consecuentemente, no tuvo oportunidad procesal de que se enmendara cualesquier yerro cometido en su perjuicio. Por añadidura, la falta sí está sujeta al régimen disciplinario a cargo de este Tribunal." De lo anterior se concluye que, en este caso en particular, el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial sí hace extensivas las facultades a él encomendadas, ya que no se limita a la esfera de lo meramente disciplinario, sino que ha aplicado su facultad sancionatoria a criterios eminentemente de naturaleza jurídica emitidos en fallos y resoluciones de carácter jurisdiccional, lesionando con ello la independencia del juez.

XI.EL PRINCIPIO DE TIPICIDAD EN EL REGIMEN DISCIPLINARIO. Impugna también el accionante el régimen disciplinario del Poder Judicial por estimar que el mismo resulta contrario al principio de tipicidad, ya que las faltas establecidas en las leyes -Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y Estatuto de Servicio Judicial- resultan vagas e imprecisas, además de que en la definición de los "tipos" se utilizan conceptos indeterminados y vagos. Específicamente cuestiona de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial el artículo 30 inciso 2.), que decía:

"Será destituido de su empleo:

...

2.) Que por incorrecciones o fallas comprobadas en el ejercicio de su cargo o en su vida privada se halla hecho acreedor a esa sanción, a juicio de la Corte Plena."; que corresponde al artículo 28 inciso 2.) de la nueva ley, el cual dispone:

"Podrá ser destituido de su cargo, siguiendo el procedimiento establecido y con la previa oportunidad de defensa, el servidor:

2.- Que, por incorrecciones o fallas en el ejercicio de su cargo o en su vida privada, que pueden afectar el buen servicio o la imagen del Poder Judicial, se haya hecho acreedor a esa sanción." Como se anotó anteriormente, la responsabilidad disciplinaria suele versar sobre actos de naturaleza general, por cuanto las autoridades disciplinarias pueden usar un poder discrecional de interpretación extensiva en la calificación de los hechos. Así, las normas reguladoras del derecho disciplinario son principalmente genéricas, las figuras no tienen soluciones de continuidad, y es teórica y prácticamente difícil, por no decir imposible, afirmar cuando existe una figura perfectamente definida. En este régimen, el principio de tipicidad -"nullum crimen sine lege, y nulla poena sine lege"- no tiene la rigurosa aplicación que tiene el derecho penal, siendo su dominio más dilatado. Al respecto, por sentencia número 5594-94, de las quince horas cuarenta y ocho minutos del veintisiete de setiembre último, esta Sala consideró:

"III. EL PRINCIPIO DE TIPICIDAD EN EL REGIMEN DISCIPLINARIO. La existencia de un conjunto de deberes de los funcionarios -y a la vez de sus atribuciones-, sean deberes comprendidos en la obligación de la función o del servicio que desempeñan, o los que derivan de la subordinación jerárquica, exige normas establecidas para reglar esas relaciones, y sanciones para cuando se violan tales obligaciones. El principio de tipicidad es una aplicación del principio de legalidad y exige la delimitación concreta de las conductas que se hacen reprochables a efectos de su sanción. Sin embargo, en materia disciplinaria, no se aplica el principio de tipicidad en la misma forma que se hace en materia penal, de conformidad con el artículo 39 constitucional, según lo ha manifestado en forma reiterada esta Sala, al señalar que:

"Para que una conducta sea constitutiva de delito, no es suficiente que sea antijurídica -contraria a derecho-, es necesario que esté tipificada, sea que se encuentre plenamente descrita en una norma, esto obedece a exigencias insuprimibles de seguridad jurídica, pues siendo la materia represiva la de mayor intervención en los bienes jurídicos importantes de los ciudadanos, para garantizar a éstos frente al Estado, es necesario que puedan tener cabal conocimiento de cuáles son las acciones que deben abstenerse de cometer, so pena de incurrir en responsabilidad criminal ..." (resolución número 1877-90, de las dieciséis horas dos minutos del diecinueve de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa).

Puede afirmarse que el principio de tipicidad constituye un principio fundamental en la responsabilidad disciplinaria, pero no en la misma forma que en ámbito jurídico-penal, ya que los principios "nullum crimen sine lege", "nullum poena sine lege" no tienen la rigidez y exigencia que les caracteriza en el derecho penal sustantivo, por cuanto la actividad sancionatoria de índole penal y la de índole disciplinaria corresponden a campos jurídicos diferentes, y los parámetros de discrecionalidad que son propios del ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria administrativa son más amplios que los de la potestad sancionatoria penal del Estado. Así, en el derecho penal, en relación con los delitos, toda pena debe estar establecida en la ley con respecto al hecho incriminado, excluyendo, por su generalidad, toda posibilidad de referencia a los llamados conceptos jurídicos indeterminados, o las cláusulas abiertas o indeterminadas; si la conducta no está plenamente definida no hay pena. En el derecho disciplinario, en razón del fin que persigue, cual es la protección del orden social general, y de la materia que regula, -la disciplina-, la determinación de la infracción disciplinaria es menos exigente que la sanción penal, ya que comprende hechos que pueden ser calificados como violación de los deberes del funcionamiento, que en algunas legislaciones no están especificados, y, en otras, sí. De manera que, el ejercicio de este poder es discrecional, de allí que proceda aplicar sanciones por cualquier falta a los deberes funcionales, sin necesidad de que estén detalladas concretamente como hecho sancionatorio, por lo cual, la enumeración que de los hechos punibles se haga vía reglamentaria no tiene carácter limitativo. Motivado en la variedad de causas que pueden generar su aplicación, en la imprecisión frecuente de sus preceptos y en la esfera de aplicación, no siempre es orgánico ni claro en la expresión literal, razón por la cual puede sancionarse discrecionalmente las faltas no previstas concretamente, pero que se entienden incluidas en el texto, siempre y cuando resulten de la comprobación de la falta disciplinaria, mediante un procedimiento creado al efecto. La falta o infracción disciplinaria se ha definido diciendo que es una violación al funcionamiento de cualquier deber propio de su condición, aún cuando no haya sido especialmente definida aunque si prevista. Los hechos determinantes de las faltas disciplinarias son innumerables, pues dependen de la índole de los comportamientos o conductas de los sujetos "subordinados", comportamientos o conductas en verdad ilimitados en número dada su variedad; por ello se deduce la existencia de tres elementos de la falta disciplinaria: 1.- un elemento material: que es un acto o una omisión; 2.- un elemento moral: que es la imputación del acto a una voluntad libre; y 3.- un elemento formal: que es la perturbación al funcionamiento del servicio o afección inmediata o posible de su eficacia.

IV.LOS CONCEPTOS JURIDICOS INDETERMINADOS EN EL REGIMEN DISCIPLINARIO. En razón de la sanción a aplicar -la penal o la disciplinaria- es que puede tomarse en consideración para determinar la mayor o menor exigencia en cuanto a las garantías del debido proceso, entre las que se encuentra el principio de tipicidad, por cuanto, a mayor sanción debe haber mayores garantías, la cual se traduce en el caso en estudio -en el proceso disciplinario-, en la menor rigidez de este principio. Por ello, fundamentado en la materia que regula y en la variedad sin fin de conductas que involucra, en la esfera disciplinaria no sería fácil concluir la eliminación de todo tipo de infracción definido en términos abiertos, como los que hacen referencia a conceptos jurídicos indeterminados. No obstante lo anterior, no puede afirmarse que se puede obviar totalmente la definición de las conductas que se han de sancionar en aplicación del principio de legalidad, y más específicamente del de tipicidad. Por ello, debe entenderse, que los tipos enunciados en términos aparentemente deontológicos deben convertirse en tipos jurídicos perfectamente tecnificados, en el sentido de formular conceptos determinables, por lo cual los conceptos jurídicos indeterminados de conductas habrán de ser concretados o completados a través del análisis pormenorizado de los hechos y de una interpretación de los mismos desde los valores que en dichos conceptos se define. De esta manera, los tipos más o menos imprecisos -en el sentido de la técnica de los conceptos jurídicos indeterminados- o abiertos, son de utilización imprescindible en la esfera disciplinaria, dada la indeterminación misma de los deberes profesionales y de disciplina que se intentan garantizar, que sólo en términos muy generales son susceptibles de enunciarse. Pero lo anterior no puede justificar apreciaciones totalmente abiertas e inespecíficas, estimaciones "en conciencia", tanto respecto a la amplitud del deber profesional o de conducta cuya falta se reprocha, sino que debe aplicarse sobre la realidad de la conducta reprochada, haciendo así efectivo el principio de legalidad -artículo 39 constitucional- pero adecuado a la materia administrativa. De tal manera, por ejemplo, no será en modo alguno suficiente limitarse a reprochar a un funcionario una falta de probidad, en abstracto, sino que es necesario concretar en la conducta específica que se enjuicia, dónde es imputable dicha falta en concreto, desde la perspectiva de los deberes positivos del funcionario, a los que ha faltado. Consecuencia de lo anterior, al momento de interpretar una norma, debe hacerse en relación con la actividad que ella regula; en el caso en estudio debe hacerse en función de la Educación, con lo cual se evita la arbitrariedad en la utilización de los "conceptos jurídicos indeterminados".

V.Los conceptos utilizados por las leyes pueden ser determinados o indeterminados. Los primeros delimitan el ámbito de realidad al que se refieren de una manera precisa e inequívoca, como lo son la mayoría de edad, plazos para promover recursos y apelaciones, etc. Por el contrario, con la técnica del concepto jurídico indeterminado, la ley refiere una esfera de realidad cuyos límites no aparecen bien precisados en su enunciado, no obstante lo cual, es claro que intenta delimitar un supuesto concreto, conceptos como lo son la buena fe, la falta de probidad, la moral, las buenas costumbres, etc. Así, aunque la ley no determine con claridad los límites ..., porque se trata de conceptos que no admiten cuantificación o determinación rigurosa, pero que en todo caso, es manifiesto que con ellos se está refiriendo a un supuesto de realidad que, no obstante la indeterminación del concepto, admite ser precisado en el momento de aplicación. La ley utiliza conceptos de valor -buena fe, estándar de conducta del buen padre de familia, orden público, justo precio, moral-, o de experiencia -incapacidad para el ejercicio de sus funciones, premeditación, fuerza irresistible-, porque las realidades referidas no admiten otro tipo de determinación más precisa. Pero resulta claro que al estarse refiriendo a supuestos concretos y no a vaguedades imprecisas o contradictorias, como es el caso de la determinación de las infracciones o faltas disciplinarias, la aplicación de tales conceptos a la calificación de circunstancias concretas no admite más que una solución: o se da o no se da ...; o hay buena fe o no la hay, o acciones contrarias al orden público o no las hay, o hay acciones contrarias a la moral o no las hay, etc. En esto radica lo esencial de este tipo de conceptos, de manera que la indeterminación del enunciado no se traduce en una indeterminación de las aplicaciones del mismo, las cuales sólo permiten una "unidad de solución justa" en cada caso. La técnica de los conceptos jurídicos indeterminados, que no obstante su denominación, son conceptos de valor o de experiencia utilizados por las leyes, se da en todas las ramas del derecho, como por ejemplo en la civil -buena fe, diligencia del buen padre de familia, negligencia-, en la comercial -interés social-, en la procesal -pertinencia de los interrogatorios, medidas adecuadas para promover la ejecución, perjuicio irreparable-, o en la penal -alevosía, abusos deshonestos-, son sólo algunos de los ejemplos que se pueden citar. En el Derecho Administrativo, no existe diferenciación en cuanto a la utilización de conceptos tales como la urgencia, el orden público, el justo precio, la calamidad pública, las medidas adecuadas o proporcionadas, la necesidad pública o el interés público, etc., no permitiendo una pluralidad de soluciones justas, sino sólo una solución a cada caso concreto."

El artículo 219 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial derogada contenía cuáles eran las sanciones disciplinarias a aplicar, éstas eran:

"Las correcciones disciplinarias imponibles a los funcionarios y empleados judiciales, cuando la falta o faltas cometidas no justifiquen la revocatoria del nombramiento, serán:

1.) Advertencia o apercibimiento; 2.) Reprensión; 3.) Suspensión que no exceda de un mes del ejercicio del cargo o empleo."; que eran impuestas en razón de la gravedad de los hechos que motivaban la aplicación del régimen disciplinario. En este sentido, la nueva Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, contiene un capítulo referente a las faltas y sanciones del régimen disciplinario -artículos 190 a 196-, el cual resulta claro en todo sus extremos, por cuanto define cuáles son las acciones que motivan una sanción disciplinaria, y las correspondientes sanciones, según la gravedad de los hechos, por lo cual, y con fundamento en las razones dadas anteriormente, es que puede afirmarse que el régimen disciplinario del Poder Judicial no resulta contrario al principio de tipicidad.

XII.SOBRE EL PROCEDIMIENTO DISCIPLINARIO. Por último, en relación con el régimen disciplinario, el accionante señala que la aplicación del régimen disciplinario judicial resulta inadecuado, por cuanto lo pertinente es aplicar las disposiciones del Código de Trabajo y la Ley General de la Administración Pública, por ser posteriores a la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, y por haber sido derogada por los principios más favorables al trabajador. Asímismo cuestiona el procedimiento establecido para aplicarlo, por estimar que la remisión a la legislación procesal civil resulta incompatible e inadecuada con la materia disciplinaria, por resultar más represiva, y por lo tanto proclive a sancionar, en violación de los principios tuitivo, de inocencia y seguridad jurídica, además de los que integran el debido proceso, por cuanto existe una concentración de la instrucción y de la sentencia en el mismo órgano, no hay posibilidad de apelar las resoluciones sobre el trámite ni las finales, sólo existe la posibilidad de la revocatoria, hay ausencia de reglamentación, ya que el procedimiento se encuentra disgregado en una normativa carente de coherencia, y falta de concreción y gradación entre las faltas provisionales y las definitivas. En primer término, debe el accionante tener en cuenta que el Poder Judicial, no obstante que es un Poder del Estado, y regirse por el Derecho Administrativo, tiene un régimen especial en razón de la función que desarrolla; y en materia de relación de empleo público, aunque los principios generales están dados en el Derecho Administrativo y en el Derecho Laboral -como parámetros-, las especificaciones se regulan de conformidad con la normativa que se refiere específicamente al Poder Judicial, así, se rige de conformidad con lo dispuesto en la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, el Estatuto de Servicio Judicial, el Reglamento sobre concurso de antecedentes para nombrar funcionarios que administren justicia, la Ley Orgánica del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, el Reglamento sobre la Calificación para los Empleados del Poder Judicial, etc. Como se observa, se trata de una normativa especial, que no puede ser derogada tácitamente por una norma posterior de carácter general, como afirma el accionante. En cuanto al procedimiento del régimen disciplinario judicial, no observa esta Sala que el mismo resulte violatorio de derecho fundamental alguno, todo lo contrario, tanto en la ley derogada como en la nueva Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, se respetan las garantías que integran el debido proceso, con oportunidad para ejercer el derecho de defensa. Como lo ha indicado este Tribunal en reiteradas ocasiones, sólo puede reclamarse el derecho de apelación a que se refiere el Pacto de San José -en sus artículos 8 y 25-, en materia penal en los casos de las resoluciones que ponen fin a un proceso, de manera que no existe el derecho de apelación en forma indiscriminada, como lo pretende el accionante. En el caso en estudio, esta posibilidad la encontraba el servidor sometido a procedimiento disciplinario en el artículo 211 párrafo cuarto, que disponía:

"Las correcciones que impongan los Tribunales Superiores, los demás Tribunales Colegiados, los Jueces, los Actuarios, los Alcaldes, los Agentes Fiscales y los Jefes de los Departamentos Administrativos que tengan potestad disciplinaria, a los servidores de su propia oficina, tendrán recurso de apelación ante el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial. El recurso deberá presentarse directamente al Tribunal, dentro de los tres días siguientes a la imposición de la medida disciplinaria."; asímismo el párrafo segundo del artículo 124 decía:

"Si el Tribunal decretare la remoción del servidor, éste podrá apelar ante la Corte, por la vía telegráfica o por escrito en papel común, dirigiéndose al propio Tribunal de la Inspección, dentro de los tres días siguientes en que se le notifique lo resuelto: o verbalmente al ser notificado. El Tribunal admitirá el recurso, emplazará al recurrente a fin de que se apersone ante el Superior y haga sus alegaciones dentro de los tres días posteriores, y luego remitirá la información a la Corte Plena para que ésta resuelva en definitiva." El propio accionante tuvo la oportunidad de promover recurso de revocatoria de la resolución número 326, de las catorce horas cuarenta minutos del trece de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y uno del Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, por escrito presentado el dieciocho de junio de ese mismo año, el cual fue declarado sin lugar por resolución número 423, de las catorce horas cuarenta minutos del veinticuatro de junio del mismo año, por el mismo Tribunal. La nueva Ley Orgánica es mucho más clara, al precisar en el artículo 209:

"Siempre que se le imponga una suspensión o la revocatoria del nombramiento, el denunciado podrá apelar de la resolución final del Tribunal de la Inspección, dentro de los tres días siguientes de la notificación. Su recurso será conocido por el Consejo Superior"; por lo cual, no existe la violación alegada. En cuanto a la ausencia de reglamentación, el mismo promovente señala que en la ley derogada existía tal reglamentación, sólo que dispersa en la ley; con la nueva Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, el procedimiento se encuentra regulado en forma sistemática. En cuanto a la determinación y gradación de las sanciones, se remite a lo dicho en el Considerando XI de esta resolución. Por último, como ha señalado en otras ocasiones esta Sala, las garantías y principios procesales de carácter fundamental que integran el debido proceso, que derivan de los artículos 39 y 41 constitucionales, y más específicamente de la ley General de la Administración Pública, son de aplicación no sólo en el ámbito jurisdiccional, sino también en los procedimientos administrativos. Dentro de esos principios se pueden citar:

"... a.) Notificación al interesado del carácter y fines del procedimiento; b.) derecho a ser oído, y oportunidad del interesado para presentar los argumentos y producir las pruebas que entienda pertinentes; c.) oportunidad para el administrado de preparar su alegación, lo que incluye necesariamente el acceso a la información y a los antecedentes administrativos, vinculados con la cuestión de que se trate; ch.) derecho del administrado de hacerse representar y asesorar por abogados; d.) notificación adecuada de la decisión que dicta la Administración y de los motivos en que ella se funde; y e.) derecho del interesado de recurrir la decisión dictada." (sentencia número 15-90, de las dieciséis horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del cinco de enero de mil novecientos noventa.)

Con fundamento en las razones dadas y en lo dispuesto en el párrafo segundo del artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, procede rechazar por el fondo esta acción en este extremo.

XIII.IMPUGNACION DE LOS ARTICULOS 49, 50 Y 51 DE LA LEY DEL ORGANISMO DE INVESTIGACION JUDICIAL. La impugnación de los artículos 49, 50 y 51 de la Ley Orgánica del Organismo de Investigación Judicial resulta improcedente, por cuanto en ellos se establece la sujeción al régimen disciplinario de los funcionarios que laboran en dicha institución -régimen que no está de más señalar que se fundamenta en las mismas razones dadas para el caso de los jueces-, por lo cual, esta acción no se constituye en medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés considerado lesionado en el asunto principal, dado que el accionante no es funcionario del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, no aplicándosele en el caso concreto tal normativa impugnada. En consecuencia procede el rechazo de plano de la acción en relación a estos extremos, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 9, párrafo primero, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

XIV.SOBRE LA INTERPRETACION DE CORTE PLENA DEL ARTICULO 64 DEL ESTATUTO DE SERVICIO JUDICIAL. Por último, impugna el accionante la interpretación que la Corte Plena ha hecho del artículo 64 del Estatuto de Servicio Judicial, en cuanto ha establecido la pérdida temporal de los incrementos salariales obtenidos anualmente por motivo de sanciones de índole disciplinaria. Señala el promovente que la aplicación de esta norma resulta inconstitucional por cuanto en virtud de un mismo hecho se le está sancionando doblemente. Sin embargo, tal interpretación no resulta contraria a disposición o principio constitucional en tal sentido, por cuanto, aunque si hay prohibición de ser juzgado dos o más veces por el mimo hecho -artículo 42, párrafo primero, de la Constitución Política-, ello no conlleva a que no se pueda imponer doble sanción en relación con un mismo hecho, tal como sucede en la jurisdicción penal, en que un individuo puede ser penado con pena de prisión además de la imposición de una multa, sin perjuicio de las eventuales responsabilidades civiles del delito cometido, o de otras consecuencias de la condenatoria (por ejemplo la inhabilitación). Por lo cual, si en virtud de un proceso de investigación, en el que se respeten las garantías y principios del debido proceso, se comprueba la responsabilidad disciplinaria de un servidor judicial, y se impone la correspondiente sanción disciplinaria, acordada en razón de la ineficiencia demostrada en el desempeño del cargo, resulta, no sólo legal sino constitucional, suspender, en forma automática, lo que represente en los incrementos salariales anuales relacionados con ese período; siendo únicamente por disposición expresa de la Corte Plena que esta sanción no opera. En este sentido, el artículo 64 expresamente dispone, en lo que interesa:

"La imposición de cualquier corrección disciplinaria interrumpirá el tiempo acumulado para el aumento, salvo que la Corte Plena resuelva lo contrario atendiendo a la índole de la correción, a los hechos que la motivaron y a la hoja de servicios del interesado."; de manera que no hay interpretación contraria al espíritu de la ley, sino aplicación conforme a ella, y a la Constitución Política. Por otra parte, más bien es por interpretación de la Corte Plena que esta sanción opera en forma automática para las sanciones disciplinarias de amonestación escrita y suspensión, dejando de aplicarse para el caso de las advertencias. Por lo cual, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el párrafo segundo del artículo 9 de la ley que rige esta Jurisdicción, procede rechazar por el fondo la acción en este extremo.

Por tanto:

Se interpretan las normas impugnadas de manera que resulta contrario al orden constitucional extender las facultades otorgadas al Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, para sancionar disciplinariamente por criterios jurídicos emitidos en los fallos y resoluciones de carácter jurisdiccional; en consecuencia se tiene por no puesta la sanción disciplinaria impuesta al accionante por el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial por resolución número 326-91, de las catorce horas con cuarenta minutos del trece de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y uno. Se rechaza de plano la acción en relación con la impugnación de los artículo 49, 50 y 51 de la Ley Orgánica del Organismo de Investigación Judicial. Se rechaza por el fondo la acción en cuanto a las demás impugnaciones. Comuníquese este pronunciamiento a Corte Plena y a la Inspección Judicial. Reséñese en el diario oficial La Gaceta y publíquese en el Boletín Judicial. Notifíquese.

Luis Paulino Mora M.

Nombre9143.

R. E. Piza E. Jorge E. Castro B.

Nombre45289 C. Eduardo Sancho G.

Nombre57862 . R. Nombre58935 M.