Forestry Law 7032 unconstitutional for lack of supermajority voteLey Forestal 7032 inconstitucional por vicio en votación calificada

00546 Voto 546-90 Date: 22-5-90 Time: 14:30 Petitioner: Nombre44484 , Nombre44484 Challenges: Articles 60, 62, and 122 subsections a) and f) of the Ley Forestal No. 7032 For violating: Articles 45 and 46 of the Constitución Política LEY FORESTAL Limitations on property Defects in the formation of the law CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fourteen hours and thirty minutes on the twenty-second of May, nineteen hundred and ninety.

Action of unconstitutionality filed by Nombre44484 against articles 60, 62 and 122 subsections a) and f) of the Ley Forestal number seven thousand thirty-two (7032) of the second of May, nineteen hundred and eighty-six, considering them contrary to articles 45 and 46 of the Constitución Política. In addition to the petitioner, the Procuraduría General de la República participates.

WHEREAS:

I.- That in the Juzgado de Instrucción de Liberia, a case is proceeding against Nombre44484 and Nombre44485 for the crime of deforestation to the detriment of natural resources (expediente No. 599-F-88), defined in the Ley Forestal. In a brief filed by Nombre44484 within said proceeding, the unconstitutionality of articles 60, 62 and 122 subsections a) and f) of the Ley Forestal was invoked, considering them contrary to articles 45 and 46 of the Constitución Política, and on April 13, 1989, an action of unconstitutionality was filed against said articles, noting that such provisions infringe upon constitutional articles 45 and 46 by curtailing rights derived from the property over trees and forests and the commercialization of such forest resources, in addition to the fact that no provision is recorded in the Ley Forestal demonstrating that it was approved by two-thirds of the total members of the Asamblea Legislativa. The unconstitutionality challenge was granted leave to proceed by resolution of the Presidency of the Corte Suprema de Justicia on May 29, 1989.

II.- That the Procuraduría General de la República responded to the hearing conferred upon it in a brief filed on June 20, 1989, in which it considers that forest property is a particular institution of agrarian property, which has as distinctive features social utility, the restriction of the autonomy of will, a special legal regime, and a specific modality of enjoyment. Thus, although the owner's title is not disregarded, their property right is regulated to fulfill objectives of general interest. Regarding the infringement of constitutional article 46, it alleges that such freedom of commerce is not unrestricted, but rather, in its exercise, the person holding such right must submit to the regulations established by law in protection of the general interest. Finally, regarding the petitioner's argument about the requirement of a qualified vote for the bill, it is asserted that it is not duly demonstrated that the regulations of articles 60 and 62 of the Ley Forestal and their corresponding criminal sanctions constitute a limitation on the property right, which would be the situation provided for in the second paragraph of constitutional article 45. Furthermore, based on a jurisprudence of the Corte Suprema, it considers that the approval of the limitations on property by the qualified majority required by the Constitución Política must be presumed, even if not expressly recorded.

III.- That this matter was transferred to the Constitutional Chamber on September 29, 1989, which assumed its jurisdiction on November 2 of the same year, and on December 21 last, the oral hearing referred to in article 10 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional was held, with the participation of the petitioner and their lawyer. The resolution is issued outside the legal term, but based on Transitorio II of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

Drafted by Magistrate Mora Mora; and,

WHEREAS:

I.- By Law number seven thousand thirty-two (7032) of the second of May, nineteen hundred and eighty-six, the Ley Forestal was enacted, which completely amended the previous law on that matter, number four thousand four hundred sixty-five (4465) of the twenty-fifth of November, nineteen hundred and sixty-nine, and its amendments.

II.- Article 60 of this law establishes the prohibition for any person to eliminate or cut down trees, carry out the use of the forest and other forest products, on privately owned land, without the prior authorization of the Dirección General Forestal and the approval of the corresponding municipality. This provision obviously imposes restrictions on the property right, since the holder thereof cannot dispose of the trees and forest products existing on their land, as products thereof, unless done with the prior authorization of two bodies of the Public Administration. It is clear that, in principle, the owner could freely dispose of the product of their property, except when, for reasons of public necessity, such right is limited and the use of those products is regulated.

III.- Article 62 authorizes the Dirección General Forestal to prohibit the use of certain equipment or machinery in tasks of cutting, extraction, transportation, and primary transformation, when said Directorate considers that its use affects the regeneration of the forest resource or any of its other uses or benefits. Within an individualistic conception, the owner can exploit the resources of their domain in the manner they wish; this thesis is rejected by our Constitution, by allowing the Public Authority to impose limitations of social interest on property. It is clear that the prohibition that could be derived from the cited legal article constitutes a limitation on the property right, as it prevents the owner from freely exploiting the forest resources that are part of their land, and subjects them to the permits and regulations of the Dirección General Forestal.

IV.- The second paragraph of article 45 of the Constitución Política authorizes the Asamblea Legislativa to impose limitations of social interest on property, for reasons of public necessity, through the vote of two-thirds of the total of its members. Before analyzing whether the limitations established by articles 60 and 62 of the Ley Forestal, and the consequence derived from the first of such articles in subsection a) of article 122 thereof, are such, it is necessary to verify compliance with the requirement demanded by said constitutional norm, because if it is proven that the formality established by the constituent power was not complied with, it becomes pointless to address the remaining allegations made by the petitioner.

This Chamber has examined the original legislative record of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal), No. 7032 of May 2, 1986 (amendments to the Forest Law No. 4465 of November 25, 1969 and its amendments), which consists of four volumes and 1105 folios. In its first debate proceeding, the bill was approved unanimously, with thirty-eight deputies present, from which it is easily concluded that it had the two-thirds majority of the total number of legislators (minutes No. 128, session of February 20, 1986, folio 904). The bill was approved in the second debate on February 24 of the same year without recording the number of votes, since, in accordance with Article 57 of the Regulations of Order, Direction and Internal Discipline of the Legislative Assembly (Reglamento de Orden, Dirección y Disciplina Interior de la Asamblea Legislativa), in that proceeding the discussion is reduced to formal aspects, and, if none exist, the bill is considered approved, this vote being understood as unanimous. The third debate proceeding began in minutes No. 131, session of February 26, folios 911 and following. It is important to cite the intervention of Deputy Chaverri Soto, which appears at folio 935:

"Fellow deputies: another aspect I wish to consult the chair on is the majority required for the approval of this law, because according to Article 45 of the Constitution, final paragraph which reads (he reads it). Is there, Mr. President, any study that determines the scope of the limitations on private property established by this article, and could the chair tell me what qualified majority, if any, is required for the approval of this Law?

"The response of the Vice President, acting as President, Deputy Víquez Víquez, was the following:

"In response, I tell you that it is being studied, considered, and that by tomorrow, God willing, we can give you the most exact answer." However, such a response was never produced, and the bill was voted on in the third debate on March 10, 1986. It is important to transcribe the words of the acting President, which appear at folio 1048:

"There are thirty-eight deputies present (then the above bill was approved. The President ordered it passed to the Drafting Committee (Comisión de Redacción)). The above bill obtained thirty-seven affirmative votes.

There is no record in the legislative record of any intervention questioning the decision to consider the bill approved, despite the doubt raised by Deputy Chaverri Soto on February 26. The legislative decree was sanctioned by the President of the Republic and the Minister of Agriculture on May 2, and the law was published in La Gaceta No. 85 of May 7, 1986.

From the foregoing, it follows with absolute clarity that the Forest Law did not have the number of votes required to be approved, because, since it contains limitations on the right of property in Articles 60, 62, and 122 subsection a) challenged, among others, it should have been voted on by at least thirty-eight deputies.

V.- The thesis outlined by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), that it must be presumed that the legislative approval of norms imposing limitations on property was given with the majority required by the Political Constitution, is not acceptable, because in this case it is expressly recorded, in the legislative record, that the law was not approved with the number of votes required by the Constitution, so the infringement of the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Constitution is evident. This is a matter, not only of a formal requirement, but of the requirement of the express will of a qualified majority for the imposition of limitations on the aforementioned right. In the opinion of the Chamber, the qualified majority that the Constitution requires to impose limitations on the right of property cannot be presumed; on the contrary, it must be expressly recorded in the minutes of the law's approval.

VI.- That Article 89 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) empowers the Chamber so that when declaring the unconstitutionality of a legal norm, it may also do so with respect to the other precepts thereof, or of any other, whose annulment is evidently necessary by connection or consequence. It is clear that the total amendment to the Forest Law, enacted by Law No. 7032 of May 2, 1986, some of whose articles are challenged in this action, required for its approval a favorable vote of at least thirty-eight deputies; the absence of this requirement produces the unconstitutionality of the entirety of the legislative provision, since the challenged articles form an integral, indivisible, and inseparable part with the rest of the provisions of the Forest Law. Thus, it is necessary to declare the unconstitutionality of all the amendments introduced to said legislation by virtue of Law No. 7032, because these are not diverse legislative acts whose approvals must be carried out with different types of voting; it is a single legislative act that should have been approved with at least thirty-eight votes, and the omission of this requirement makes the entirety of the law unconstitutional.

VII.- That by annulling the amendments introduced by Law No. 7032, Article 1 of the same also becomes null, which textually establishes:

"Article 1: The Forest Law, No. 4465 of November 25, 1969, and its modifications, are amended, whose text shall read:..." Thus, with the entirety of Law No. 7032 left insubsistent, it is clear that the Forest Law must be read, as of this declaration of unconstitutionality, with the text in force as of May 7, 1986, the effective date of the aforementioned Law No. 7032. This is so because the annulment of these amendments cannot generate the disappearance of the Forest Law preceding them; since those provisions were modified by those now declared unconstitutional, meaning that if the latter are vitiated by the greatest possible nullity, which is unconstitutionality, the former maintain their validity and the amendment remains insubsistent; it reverts to the text of the law as it read on May 7, 1986, without this Chamber questioning, as it has not been posed the question, the constitutionality or not of the norms to which validity is now granted.

VIII.- Articles 91 and 94 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law establish the obligation for the Chamber to pronounce on the effects of the declaration of unconstitutionality. In the sub júdice, it is evident that the declaration must be retroactive to May 7, 1986, the date of publication and consequent entry into force of Law No. 7032. However, it cannot impair rights acquired in good faith, such as the benefits and incentives that individuals received for the use of forestry resources on privately owned lands. That is, the monetary and other resources received by individuals for this concept need not be returned to the State, because their beneficiaries acted in good faith, but since their obligations become insubsistent, by virtue of this declaration of unconstitutionality, the State also cannot continue recognizing such incentives. To avoid grave dislocations of social security, justice, or peace, this last consequence must be graduated in time, estimating it prudent to maintain the indicated incentives in force, in accordance with the contracts already agreed upon, until their expiration, without being renewable in accordance with the law that is the subject of this appeal; the maintenance of said contracts will apply with respect to those who accept the obligations derived from them in favor of the State. This Chamber considers that it cannot grant retroactive effect to this declaration regarding the collection of taxes established in the cited law, because they were collected as a requirement for timber harvesting (aprovechamiento de la madera), which the taxpayers subsequently carried out. It would be illogical to reverse the effects to the point of demanding the return of the amounts paid, because the interested parties benefited from timber exploitation (explotación de la madera) based on unconstitutional legislation; for the same reasons as above, no retroactive effect is granted for the collection of sums of money paid based on tax provisions of Law No. 7032. Nor is retroactive effect granted for the collection of sums paid to the Forestry Fund (Fondo Forestal) for obtaining concessions for areas on State forest heritage lands (terrenos de patrimonio forestal del Estado), and, considering that these are rights acquired in good faith, such concessions are kept in force until their expiration, without being renewable in accordance with Law No. 7032. The same is ruled for operating permits for industrial forestry activities. Regarding infractions, sanctions, and procedures, in accordance with Article 92 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, the retroactive effect is full and absolute, therefore the nullity of Articles 117 through 126 of Law No. 7032 applies since May 7, 1986, in favor of those indicted and convicted by virtue of such provisions.

Regarding the possible restitution of sums paid, or products seized by the State as a monetary penalty or compensation, the declaration of unconstitutionality has full retroactive effects. The amendment to Article 7 of the Possessory Information Law (Ley de Informaciones Posesorias), No. 139 of July 14, 1941 (Article 2 of Law No. 7032) and the repeals contained in Article 3 are left insubsistent, the nullity of Law No. 7032, because as already stated, the approval of Law No. 7032 is a single legislative act, which had to be carried out through a qualified vote. This procedural, formal defect extends to the entire content of said law, so Article 7 of Law No. 139 must be read with the wording prior to said amendment, and the repealed norms maintain their validity. Regarding the other situations contained in Law No. 7032, the retroactive effect is full, and its nullity is declared since May 7, 1986. It is undoubtable that the regulations to the law now declared unconstitutional must be declared null, since their existence depends on the law they regulate, and when that law disappears in its legal validity, the same necessarily occurs with the decrees of the Executive Branch that regulated it in the exercise of the powers conferred upon that Branch by Articles 140 subsection 3) of the Political Constitution and 6 subsection d) of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública).

THEREFORE (POR TANTO):

Law number seven thousand thirty-two (7032) of May two, nineteen hundred eighty-six and the amendment to its transitory article I by Law number seven thousand sixty-four (7064) of April twenty-nine, nineteen hundred eighty-seven are declared unconstitutional and consequently annulled, because the first was approved in contravention of the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Political Constitution, which requires a qualified vote to impose social interest limitations on property. All regulations of the Executive Branch based on the cited Law number seven thousand thirty-two (7032) are declared null. The Forest Law number four thousand four hundred sixty-five (4465) of November twenty-five, nineteen hundred sixty-nine is declared in force, with the modifications in force as of May seven, nineteen hundred eighty-six. Retroactive effects are granted to this declaration to the indicated date, except in the following situations:

FIRST. Natural or legal persons who enjoy benefits or incentives in accordance with Law No. 7032 and its regulations will continue to enjoy them, in accordance with the provisions of the respective contract or agreement, until their expiration, without being renewable in accordance with the law that is the subject of this appeal; the maintenance of said contracts will apply with respect to those who accept the obligations derived from them in favor of the State.

SECOND. Taxes paid by taxpayers based on Law No. 7032 may not be reclaimed from the State.

THIRD. Permits for the harvesting (aprovechamiento) of forestry products granted and used between May seven, nineteen hundred eighty-six and the publication date of this judgment will not be affected by this pronouncement.

FOURTH. Concessions granted in areas of State forest heritage lands (terrenos del patrimonio forestal del Estado) and operating permits for industrial forestry activities will remain in force until their expiration, without being renewable in accordance with Law No. 7032.

FIFTH. The nullity in relation to Articles 117 through 126 of Law No. 7032 applies fully and absolutely since May 7, 1986, in favor of those indicted and convicted by virtue of such provisions.

SIXTH. Sums paid as a fine or compensation must be returned, as well as products that were seized.

SEVENTH. The amendments and repeals contained in Articles 2 and 3 of Law No. 7032 are also annulled, by connection or consequence. Notify and publish.

Alejandro Rodríguez Vega, Rodolfo E. Nombre43956 ., Nombre44486 , Jorge Castro Bolaños, Juan L. Arias Arias, Luis Paulino Mora Mora, Nombre44178 , Juan Carlos Castro L., Secretary.

It is clear that, in principle, the owner could freely dispose of the products of his property, unless, for reasons of public necessity, such right is limited and the use of those products is regulated.

III.- Article 62 authorizes the Dirección General Forestal to prohibit the use of certain equipment or machinery in tasks of cutting, extraction, transport, and primary transformation, when said Directorate considers that its use affects the regeneration of the forest resource or any of its other uses or benefits. Within an individualistic conception, the owner may exploit the resources of his domain in any way he wishes; this thesis is rejected by our Constitution, by allowing the Public Power to impose limitations of social interest on property. It is clear that the prohibition that could derive from the cited legal article constitutes a limitation on the right to property, as it prevents the owner from freely exploiting the forest resources that are part of his land, and subjects him to the permits and regulations of the Dirección General Forestal.

IV.- The second paragraph of Article 45 of the Political Constitution authorizes the Legislative Assembly to impose limitations of social interest on property, for reasons of public necessity, by a vote of two-thirds of its total membership. Before analyzing whether the limitations established by Articles 60 and 62 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal), and the consequence derived from the first of such articles in subsection a) of Article 122 of the same law, comply with the requirement demanded by said constitutional norm, it is necessary to verify the fulfillment of the requirement, because if it is proven that the formality established by the constituent power was not met, it becomes unnecessary to refer to the remaining allegations made by the appellant. This Chamber had before it the original legislative record (expediente legislativo) of the Forest Law, No. 7032 of May 2, 1986 (reforms to Forest Law No. 4465 of November 25, 1969, and its reforms), which consists of four volumes and 1105 folios. In its first debate proceeding, the bill was approved unanimously, with thirty-eight deputies present, from which it is easily concluded that it had the two-thirds of the total number of legislators (Record No. 128, session of February 20, 1986, folio 904). The bill was approved in second debate on February 24 of the same year without recording the number of votes, since, in accordance with Article 57 of the Reglamento de Orden, Dirección y Disciplina Interior de la Asamblea Legislativa, in that proceeding the discussion is reduced to formal aspects, and, if none exist, the bill is deemed approved, this vote being understood as unanimous. The third debate proceeding began in Record No. 131, session of February 26, folios 911 and following. It is important to quote the intervention of Deputy Chaverri Soto, which is recorded at folio 935:

"Gentlemen deputies: another aspect that I want to consult the chair on is the majority required for the approval of this law, because in accordance with Article 45 of the Constitution, final paragraph which reads (he reads it). Is there, Mr. President, any study that determines the scope of the limitations on private property established by this article, and could the chair tell me what qualified majority or not is required for the approval of this Law?

"The response of the vice president, acting as president, Deputy Víquez Víquez, was the following:

"In response, I tell you that it is being studied, considered, and that by tomorrow, God willing, we can give you the most accurate answer." However, such a response was never produced, and the bill was voted on in third debate on March 10, 1986. It is important to transcribe the words of the acting president, which are recorded at folio 1048:

"There are thirty-eight deputies present (the previous bill was then approved. The president ordered it sent to the Drafting Committee). The previous bill obtained thirty-seven affirmative votes." The legislative record contains no intervention questioning the decision to consider the bill as approved, despite the doubt raised by Deputy Chaverri Soto on February 26. The legislative decree was sanctioned by the President of the Republic and the Minister of Agriculture on May 2, and the law was published in La Gaceta No. 85 on May 7, 1986.

From the foregoing, it follows with absolute clarity that the Forest Law did not have the number of votes required to be approved, since, because it contains limitations on the right to property in the challenged Articles 60, 62, and 122 subsection a), among others, it should have been voted on by at least thirty-eight deputies.

V.- The thesis outlined by the Procuraduría General de la República, that it must be presumed that the legislative approval of norms imposing limitations on property occurred with the majority required by the Political Constitution, is not acceptable, because in this case it is expressly recorded in the legislative record that the law was not approved with the number of votes required by the Constitution, so the violation of the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Constitution is evident. This is a matter, not only of a formal requirement, but of the requirement for an express will of a qualified majority for the imposition of limitations on the cited right. In the Chamber's opinion, the qualified majority that the Constitution requires to impose limitations on the right to property cannot be presumed; on the contrary, it must be expressly recorded in the records of the law's approval.

VI.- That Article 89 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) authorizes the Chamber so that when declaring the unconstitutionality of a legal norm, it may also do so with respect to the other precepts thereof, or of any other norm, whose annulment is evidently necessary by connection or consequence. It is clear that the total reform of the Forest Law, enacted by Law No. 7032 of May 2, 1986, some of whose articles are challenged in this action, required for its approval the favorable vote of at least thirty-eight deputies; the absence of this requirement produces the unconstitutionality of the entirety of the legislative provision, since the challenged articles form an integral, indivisible, and inseparable part with the rest of the provisions of the Forest Law. Thus, it is necessary to declare the unconstitutionality of all the reforms introduced to said legislation by virtue of Law No. 7032, because it is not a matter of diverse legislative acts, whose approvals must be carried out with different types of voting; it is a single legislative act that should have been approved with at least thirty-eight votes, and the omission of this requirement makes the entirety of the law unconstitutional.

VII.- That by annulling the reforms introduced by Law No. 7032, Article 1 of the same also becomes null, which textually establishes:

"Article 1: The Forest Law, No. 4465 of November 25, 1969, and its modifications, is reformed, the text of which shall read:..." Thus, since the entirety of Law No. 7032 is rendered void, it is clear that the Forest Law must be read, as of this declaration of unconstitutionality, with the text in force as of May 7, 1986, the effective date of the aforementioned Law No. 7032. This is so because the annulment of these reforms cannot cause the disappearance of the Forest Law prior to them; for those provisions were modified by those now declared unconstitutional, which means that if the latter are vitiated with the greatest possible nullity, such as unconstitutionality, the preceding ones maintain their validity and the reform becomes void; it reverts to the text of the law as drafted on May 7, 1986, without this Chamber making an issue, since it was not raised, of the constitutionality or not of the norms to which validity is now granted.

VIII.- Articles 91 and 94 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establish the Chamber's obligation to rule on the effects of the declaration of unconstitutionality. In the case sub judice, it is evident that the declaration must be retroactive to May 7, 1986, the publication date and consequent entry into force of Law No. 7032. However, it cannot vitiate rights acquired in good faith, such as the benefits and incentives that individuals received for the use of the forest resource on privately owned lands. That is, the monetary and other resources received by individuals for this concept must not be returned to the State, for their beneficiaries acted in good faith; but since their obligations become void by operation of this declaration of unconstitutionality, the State also cannot continue recognizing such incentives. To avoid serious dislocations of social security, justice, or peace, this last consequence must be graded over time, deeming it prudent to keep the indicated incentives in force, in accordance with the contracts already agreed upon, until their expiration, without them being able to be renewed in accordance with the law that is the subject of this appeal; the maintenance of said contracts shall be with respect to those who accept the obligations derived from them in favor of the State. This Chamber considers that it cannot grant retroactive effect to this declaration regarding the collection of the taxes established in the cited law, since they were charged as a requirement for the use of timber, which the taxpayers subsequently carried out. It would be illogical to reverse the effects to the point of demanding the return of the amounts paid, because the interested parties benefited from the timber exploitation based on unconstitutional legislation; for the same reasons above, no retroactive effect is conferred for the collection of sums of money paid based on tax provisions of Law No. 7032. Nor is retroactive effect conferred for the collection of sums paid to the Fondo Forestal for obtaining concessions for areas on state forest heritage lands, and, considering that these are rights acquired in good faith, such concessions remain in force until their expiration, without them being able to be renewed in accordance with Law No. 7032. The same is ordered for operating permits for industrial forest activities. Regarding infractions, sanctions, and procedures, in accordance with Article 92 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the retroactive effect is full and absolute, whereby the nullity of Articles 117 to 126 of Law No. 7032 governs as of May 7, 1986, in favor of those accused and convicted by virtue of such provisions.

Regarding the possible restitution of sums paid, or the products confiscated by the State as a monetary penalty or compensation, the declaration of unconstitutionality has full retroactive effects. The reform to Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, No. 139 of July 14, 1941 (Article 2 of Law No. 7032) and the repeals contained in Article 3 are declared void, and the nullity of Law No. 7032 is declared, because as already stated, the approval of Law No. 7032 is a single legislative act, which should have been carried out by a qualified vote. This procedural, formal defect extends to the entire content of said law, whereby Article 7 of Law No. 139 must be read as drafted prior to said reform, and the repealed norms maintain their validity. Regarding the other situations contained in Law No. 7032, the retroactive effect is full, and its nullity is declared as of May 7, 1986. There is no doubt that the regulations to the law now declared unconstitutional must be declared null, since their existence depends on the law they regulate, and as that law disappears in its legal validity, the same necessarily occurs with the decrees of the Executive Branch that regulated it in exercise of the powers conferred on that Branch by Articles 140 subsection 3) of the Political Constitution and 6 subsection d) of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública).

THEREFORE (POR TANTO):

It is declared unconstitutional and consequently annulled Law number seven thousand thirty-two (7032) of May two, nineteen hundred and eighty-six, and the reform to its transitory article I pursuant to Law number seven thousand sixty-four (7064) of April twenty-nine, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven, for the first having been approved in contravention of the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Political Constitution, which requires a qualified vote to impose limitations of social interest on property. All regulations of the Executive Branch based on the cited Law number seven thousand thirty-two (7032) are declared null. Forest Law number four thousand four hundred sixty-five (4465) of November twenty-five, nineteen hundred and sixty-nine, is declared in force, with the modifications in effect as of May seven, nineteen hundred and eighty-six. This declaration is conferred retroactive effects to the indicated date, except in the following situations:

FIRST. Natural or legal persons who enjoy benefits or incentives in accordance with Law No. 7032 and its regulations shall continue enjoying them, as indicated by the respective contract or agreement, until their expiration, without them being able to be renewed in accordance with the law that is the subject of this appeal; the maintenance of said contracts shall be with respect to those who accept the obligations derived from them in favor of the State.

SECOND. Taxes paid by taxpayers, based on Law No. 7032, may not be recovered from the State.

THIRD. Permits for the use of forest products granted and used between May seven, nineteen hundred and eighty-six, and the publication date of this ruling shall not be affected by this pronouncement.

FOURTH. Concessions granted in areas of state forest heritage lands and operating permits for industrial forest activities shall remain in force until their expiration, without them being able to be renewed in accordance with Law No. 7032.

FIFTH. The nullity in relation to Articles 117 to 126 of Law No. 7032 fully and absolutely governs as of May 7, 1986, in favor of those accused and convicted by virtue of such provisions.

SIXTH. Sums paid as a fine or compensation must be returned, as well as the products that were confiscated.

SEVENTH. The reforms and repeals contained in Articles 2 and 3 of Law No. 7032 are also annulled, by connection or consequence. Notify and publish.

Alejandro Rodríguez Vega, Rodolfo E. Nombre43956 ., Nombre44486 , Jorge Castro Bolaños, Juan L. Arias Arias, Luis Paulino Mora Mora, Nombre44178 , Juan Carlos Castro L., secretary.

00546 Voto 546-90 Fecha: 22-5-90 Hora: 14:30 Accionante: Nombre44484 , Nombre44484 Impugna: Artículos 60, 62, y 122 incisos a) y f) de la Ley Forestal No. 7032 Por violar: Artículos 45 y 46 de la Constitución Política Redacta: Magistrado Mora Mora LEY FORESTAL Limitaciones a la propiedad Vicios en la formación de la ley SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce horas treinta minutos del veintidós de mayo de mil novecientos noventa.

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por Nombre44484 contra los artículos 60, 62 y 122 incisos a) y f) de la Ley Forestal número siete mil treinta y dos (7032) de dos de mayo de mil novecientos ochenta y seis, por estimarlos contrarios a los artículos 45 y 46 de la Constitución Política. Interviene además del accionante la Procuraduría General de la República.

RESULTANDO:

I.- Que en el Juzgado de Instrucción de Liberia se sigue causa contra los señores Nombre44484 y Nombre44485 por el delito de deforestación en perjuicio de los recursos naturales (expediente No. 599-F-88), tipificado en la Ley Forestal. En escrito interpuesto por Nombre44484 dentro de dicho proceso, invocó la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 60, 62 y 122 incisos a) y f) de la Ley Forestal, por considerarlos contrarios a los artículos 45 y 46 de la Constitución Política y el 13 de abril de 1989 interpuso una acción de inconstitucionalidad contra dichos artículos apuntando que tales disposiciones infringen los artículos 45 y 46 constitucionales, al cercenar derechos derivados de la propiedad sobre los árboles y bosques y la comercialización de tales recursos forestales, además de que no se hace constar en la Ley Forestal ninguna disposición que demuestre que la misma fue aprobada por las dos terceras partes de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. Al recurso de inconstitucionalidad se le dio curso en resolución de la Presidencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, el 29 de mayo de 1989.

II.- Que la Procuraduría General de la República evacuó la audiencia que se le confirió en escrito presentado el 20 de junio de 1989, en el que estima que la propiedad forestal es un instituto particular de la propiedad agraria, que tiene como rasgos distintivos la utilidad social, la restricción de la autonomía de la voluntad, un régimen jurídico especial y una modalidad específica de goce. Así, aunque no se desconoce la titularidad del propietario, se regula su derecho de propiedad para cumplir con objetivos de interés general. En cuanto a la infracción al artículo 46 constitucional, alega que tal libertad de comercio, no es irrestricta, sino que en su ejercicio la persona titular de la misma debe someterse a las regulaciones que establezca la ley en protección del interés general. Finalmente, en cuanto al argumento del accionante acerca de la exigencia de una votación calificada del proyecto de ley, se afirma que no está debidamente demostrado que las regulaciones de los artículos 60 y 62 de la Ley Forestal y sus correspondientes sanciones penales constituyan una limitación al derecho de propiedad, cuyo caso se estaría en la situación prevista en el párrafo segundo del artículo 45 constitucional. Además, con fundamento en una jurisprudencia de la Corte Suprema, considera que debe presumirse la aprobación de las limitaciones a la propiedad por la mayoría calificada exigida por la Constitución Política, aunque no se hiciere constar expresamente.

III.- Que este asunto fue pasado a la Sala Constitucional el 29 de setiembre de 1989, la cual se arrogó su conocimiento el 2 de noviembre del mismo año y el 21 de diciembre pasado, se celebró la comparecencia oral a que se refiere el artículo 10 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, con la participación del recurrente y su abogada. La resolución se dicta fuera del plazo de ley, pero con fundamento en el Transitorio II de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

Redacta el Magistrado Mora Mora; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- Por Ley número siete mil treinta y dos (7032) del dos de mayo de mil novecientos ochenta y seis se promulgó la Ley Forestal, la cual modificó totalmente la anterior en esa materia número cuatro mil cuatrocientos sesenta y cinco (4465) del veinticinco de noviembre de mil novecientos sesenta y nueve y sus reformas.

II.- En el artículo 60 de esta ley se establece la prohibición, para toda persona, de eliminar o talar los árboles, llevar a cabo el aprovechamiento del bosque y demás productos forestales, en terrenos de dominio particular, sin la previa autorización de la Dirección General Forestal y el visto bueno de la municipalidad correspondiente. Esta disposición obviamente impone restricciones al derecho de propiedad, pues el titular del mismo no puede disponer de los árboles y productos forestales que existen en su fundo, como productos del mismo, si no lo hace con la autorización previa de dos órganos de la Administración Pública. Es claro que, en principio, el propietario podría disponer libremente del producto de su inmueble, salvo que, por motivos de necesidad pública, se le limite tal derecho y se regule la utilización de esos productos.

III.- El artículo 62 autoriza a la Dirección General Forestal para prohibir el uso de determinado equipo o maquinaria en faenas de corte, extracción, transporte y transformación primaria, cuando tal Dirección considere que su utilización afecte la regeneración del recurso forestal o alguno de sus otros usos o beneficios. Dentro de una concepción individualista, el propietario puede explotar los recursos de su dominio en la forma que lo desee, esta tesis es rechazada por nuestra Constitución, al permitirle el Poder Público imponerle a la propiedad limitaciones de interés social. Es claro que la prohibición que se podría derivar del artículo legal citado constituye una limitación al derecho de propiedad, pues impide al propietario explotar libremente los recursos forestales que son parte de su fundo, y lo somete a los permisos y regulaciones de la Dirección General Forestal.

IV.- El segundo párrafo del artículo 45 de la Constitución Política autoriza a la Asamblea Legislativa para imponer a la propiedad limitaciones de interés social, por motivos de necesidad pública, mediante el voto de los dos tercios de la totalidad de sus miembros. De previo a analizar si las limitaciones que establecen los artículos 60 y 62 de la Ley Forestal, y la consecuencia que deriva del primero de tales artículos en el inciso a) del 122 de la misma, es preciso comprobar el cumplimiento del requisito exigido por dicha norma constitucional, pues de probarse que se incumplió con la formalidad establecida por el constituyente, resulta ocioso referirse a las restantes alegaciones formuladas por el recurrente. Esta Sala tuvo a la vista el expediente legislativo original de la Ley Forestal, No. 7032 del 2 de mayo de 1986 (reformas a la Ley Forestal No. 4465 del 25 de noviembre de 1969 y sus reformas), que consta de cuatro tomos y 1105 folios. En su trámite de primer debate, el proyecto de ley fue aprobado en forma unánime, estando presentes treinta y ocho diputados, por lo cual se concluye fácilmente que contó con las dos terceras partes de la totalidad de los legisladores (acta No. 128, sesión del 20 de febrero de 1986, folio 904). El proyecto fue aprobado en segundo debate el 24 de febrero del mismo año sin que se hiciera constar el número de votos, pues, de conformidad el artículo 57 del Reglamento de Orden, Dirección y Disciplina Interior de la Asamblea Legislativa, en dicho trámite la discusión se reduce a aspectos formales, y, de no existir, el proyecto se da por aprobado, entendiéndose esta votación por unanimidad. El trámite de tercer debate se inició en el acta No. 131, sesión del 26 de febrero, folios 911 y siguientes. Es importante citar la intervención del Dip. Chaverri Soto, que consta al folio 935:

"Señores diputados: otro aspecto que yo quiero consultar a la mesa es el de la mayoría que se requiere para la aprobación de esta ley, porque de acuerdo con el artículo 45 de la Constitución, párrafo final que dice (lo lee). ¿Existe, señor presidente, algún estudio que determine los alcances a las limitaciones de la propiedad privada que establece este artículo y podría decirme la mesa, qué mayoría calificada o no se requiere para la aprobación de esta Ley?

"La respuesta del vicepresidente, en ejercicio de la presidencia, Dip. Víquez Víquez, fue la siguiente:

"En respuesta le digo que se está estudiando, considerando, y que para el día de mañana, si Dios quiere, podemos darle la respuesta más exacta".

Sin embargo, tal respuesta nunca se produjo, y el proyecto fue votado en tercer debate el 10 de marzo de 1986. Es importante transcribir las palabras del presidente en ejercicio, que constan al folio 1048:

"Hay treinta y ocho señores diputados presentes (a continuación se aprobó el anterior proyecto de ley. El señor presidente ordenó pasarlo a la Comisión de Redacción). El anterior proyecto de ley obtuvo treinta y siete votos afirmativos.

No consta en el expediente legislativo ninguna intervención que cuestionara la decisión de considerar como aprobado el proyecto, a pesar de la duda planteada por el Dip. Chaverri Soto el 26 de febrero. El decreto legislativo fue sancionado por el presidente de la República y el ministro de Agricultura el 2 de mayo, y la ley fue publicada en La Gaceta No. 85 del 7 de mayo de 1986.

De lo anterior se desprende con absoluta claridad que la Ley Forestal no contó con el número de votos requeridos para ser aprobada, pues, por contener limitaciones al derecho de propiedad en los artículos 60, 62 y 122 inciso a) impugnados, entre otros, debió votarse al menos por treinta y ocho diputados.

V.- La tesis esbozada por la Procuraduría General de la República, de que debe presumirse que la aprobación legislativa de normas que impongan limitaciones a la propiedad se dio con la mayoría exigida por la Constitución Política, no es de recibo, pues en este caso consta expresamente, en el expediente legislativo, que la ley no fue aprobada con el número de votos exigido por la Constitución, por lo que la infracción al segundo párrafo del artículo 45 constitucional es evidente. Se trata en la especie, no solamente de un requisito formal, sino de la exigencia de una expresa voluntad de una mayoría calificada para la imposición de limitaciones al citado derecho. A criterio de la Sala la mayoría calificada que exige la Constitución para imponer limitaciones al derecho de propiedad no puede presumirse, por el contrario debe constar expresamente en las actas de aprobación de la ley.

VI.- Que el artículo 89 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala para que al declarar la inconstitucionalidad de una norma jurídica, lo haga también respecto de los demás preceptos de ella, o de cualquier otra, cuya anulación resulte evidentemente necesaria por conexión o consecuencia. Es claro que la reforma total a la Ley Forestal, promulgada por Ley No. 7032 del 2 de mayo de 1986, algunos de cuyos artículos se cuestionan en esta acción, debió constar para su aprobación con la votación favorable de al menos treinta y ocho diputados, la ausencia de este requisito produce la inconstitucionalidad de la totalidad de la disposición legislativa, por cuanto los artículos cuestionados forman parte integral, indivisible e inseparable, con el resto de las disposiciones de la Ley Forestal. Así, es preciso declarar la inconstitucionalidad de todas las reformas introducidas a dicha legislación en virtud de la Ley No. 7032, pues no se trata de diversos actos legislativos, cuyas aprobaciones deban efectuarse con diferentes tipos de votación; es un único acto legislativo que debió aprobarse con al menos treinta y ocho votos, y la omisión de este requisito hace inconstitucional la totalidad de la ley.

VII.- Que al anular las reformas introducidas por la Ley No. 7032, deviene también nulo el artículo 1 de la misma, el cual establece textualmente:

"Artículo 1: Refórmase la Ley Forestal, No. 4465 del 25 de noviembre de 1969 y sus modificaciones, cuyo texto dirá:..." Así, al quedar insubsistente la totalidad de la Ley No. 7032, es claro que la Ley Forestal debe leerse, a partir de esta declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad, con el texto vigente al 7 de mayo de 1986, fecha de entrada en vigor de la precitada Ley No. 7032. Ello es así porque la anulación de estas reformas no puede generar la desaparición de la Ley Forestal anterior a ellas; pues esas disposiciones fueron modificadas por las que ahora se declaran inconstitucionales, lo que significa que si éstas están viciadas de la mayor nulidad posible, como lo es la inconstitucionalidad, las precedentes mantienen su vigencia y la reforma queda insubsistente, se vuelve al texto de la ley según la redacción que tenía al 7 de mayo de 1986, sin hacerse cuestión esta Sala, por no habérsele planteado, sobre la constitucionalidad o no de las normas a las que ahora se les otorga vigencia.

VIII.- Los artículos 91 y 94 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establecen la obligación para la Sala de pronunciarse acerca de los efectos de la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad. En el subjúdice es evidente que la declaratoria debe ser retroactiva al 7 de mayo de 1986, fecha de publicación y consecuente entrada en vigencia de la Ley No. 7032. Sin embargo, la misma no puede enervar los derechos adquiridos de buena fe, como son los beneficios e incentivos que recibieron los particulares para el aprovechamiento del recurso forestal en terrenos de propiedad privada. Es decir, los recursos monetarios y de otra índole percibidos por los particulares por este concepto no deben ser devueltos al Estado, pues sus beneficiarios actuaron de buena fe, pero al quedar insubsistentes sus obligaciones, a tenor de esta declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad, tampoco puede el Estado continuar reconociendo tales incentivos. Para evitar graves dislocaciones de la seguridad, la justicia o la paz sociales, debe graduarse en el tiempo esta última consecuencia, estimándose prudente mantener vigentes los incentivos señalados, de conformidad con los contratos ya acordados, hasta su vencimiento, sin que puedan ser renovados de conformidad con la ley motivo del presente recurso; el mantenimiento de los señalados contratos se dará con respecto a quienes acepten las obligaciones que de ellos se derivan en favor del Estado. Esta Sala considera que no puede conceder efecto retroactivo a esta declaratoria en cuanto al cobro de los tributos que se establecen en la citada ley, pues los mismos se cobraron como requisito para el aprovechamiento de la madera, lo cual efectuaron posteriormente los contribuyentes. Sería ilógico revertir los efectos hasta exigir la devolución de los importes pagados, pues los interesados se beneficiaron de la explotación de la madera con fundamento en una legislación inconstitucional; por las mismas razones anteriores, no se confiere efecto retroactivo para el cobro de sumas de dinero pagadas con fundamento en disposiciones impositivas de la Ley No. 7032. Tampoco se confiere efecto retroactivo para el cobro de las sumas pagadas al Fondo Forestal para la obtención de concesiones de áreas en terrenos de patrimonio forestal del Estado, y, por considerar que se trata de derechos adquiridos de buena fe, se mantienen vigentes tales concesiones hasta su vencimiento, sin que puedan ser renovadas conforme con la Ley No. 7032. Lo mismo se dicta para los permisos de funcionamiento de las actividades industriales forestales. En cuanto a las infracciones, sanciones y procedimientos, de conformidad con el artículo 92 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, el efecto retroactivo es pleno y absoluto, por lo cual la nulidad de los artículos 117 al 126 de la Ley No. 7032 rige desde el 7 de mayo de 1986, en favor de los indiciados y condenados en virtud de tales disposiciones.

En cuanto a la posible restitución de las sumas pagadas, o los productos decomisados por el Estado por concepto de pena pecuniaria o indemnización, la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad tiene efectos retroactivos plenos. Se deja insubsistentes la reforma al artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, No. 139 del 14 de julio de 1941 (artículo 2 de la Ley No. 7032) y las derogatorias contenidas en el artículo 3, la nulidad de la Ley No. 7032, pues como ya se dijo la aprobación de la ley No. 7032 es un único acto legislativo, que debió efectuarse mediante una votación calificada. Este vicio procesal, formal, se extiende a todo el contenido de dicha ley, por lo que el artículo 7 de la Ley No. 139 debe leerse con la redacción anterior a dicha reforma, y las normas derogadas mantienen su vigencia. En cuanto a las otras situaciones contenidas en la Ley No. 7032, el efecto retroactivo es pleno, y su nulidad se declara desde el 7 de mayo de 1986. Es indudable que los reglamentos a la ley que ahora se declara inconstitucional, deben ser declarados nulos, pues su existencia depende de la ley que reglamenta y al desaparecer aquélla en su vigencia jurídica, necesariamente ocurre lo mismo con los decretos del Poder Ejecutivo que la reglamentaron en ejercicio de las facultades que le confieren a ese Poder los artículos 140 inciso 3) de la Constitución Política y 6 inciso d) de la Ley General de la Administración Pública.

POR TANTO:

Se declara inconstitucional y en consecuencia se anula la Ley número siete mil treinta y dos (7032) de dos de mayo de mil novecientos ochenta y seis y la reforma a su artículo transitorio I según Ley número siete mil sesenta y cuatro (7064) de veintinueve de abril de mil novecientos ochenta y siete, por haber sido aprobada la primera en contravención a lo dispuesto en el segundo párrafo del artículo 45 de la Constitución Política, que exige una votación calificada para imponer a la propiedad limitaciones de interés social. Se declaran nulos todos los reglamentos del Poder Ejecutivo que tengan como base la citada Ley número siete mil treinta y dos (7032). Se declara vigente la Ley Forestal número cuatro mil cuatrocientos sesenta y cinco (4465) del veinticinco de noviembre de mil novecientos sesenta y nueve, con las modificaciones vigentes al siete de mayo de mil novecientos ochenta y seis. Se confiere a esta declaratoria efectos retroactivos a la fecha indicada, salvo en las siguientes situaciones:

PRIMERA. Las personas físicas o jurídicas que gocen de beneficios o incentivos de conformidad con la Ley No. 7032 y sus reglamentos continuarán disfrutando de los mismos, a tenor de lo que señale el respectivo contrato o acuerdo, hasta su vencimiento, sin que puedan ser renovados de conformidad con la ley motivo del presente recurso; el mantenimiento de los señalados contratos se dará con respecto a quienes acepten las obligaciones que de, ellos se deriven en favor del Estado.

SEGUNDA. Los tributos pagados por los contribuyentes, con fundamento en la Ley No. 7032, no podrán ser repetidos frente al Estado.

TERCERA. Los permisos para el aprovechamiento de los productos forestales otorgados y utilizados entre el siete de mayo de mil novecientos ochenta y seis y la fecha de publicación de esta sentencia no serán afectados por este pronunciamiento.

CUARTA. Las concesiones otorgadas en áreas de terrenos del patrimonio forestal del Estado y los permisos de funcionamiento para las actividades industriales forestales continuarán vigentes hasta su vencimiento, sin que puedan ser renovadas de conformidad con la Ley No. 7032.

QUINTA. La nulidad en relación con los artículos 117 al 126 de la Ley No. 7032 rige en forma plena y absoluta desde el 7 de mayo de 1986 en favor de los indiciados y condenados en virtud de tales disposiciones.

SEXTA. Las sumas pagadas en concepto de multa o indemnización deberán ser devuelvas así como los productos que fueron decomisados.

SEPTIMA. Se anulan también las reformas y derogatorias contenidas en los artículos 2 y 3 de la Ley No. 7032, por conexión o consecuencia. Notifíquese y publíquese.

Alejandro Rodríguez Vega, Rodolfo E. Nombre43956 ., Nombre44486 , Jorge Castro Bolaños, Juan L. Arias Arias, Luis Paulino Mora Mora, Nombre44178 , Juan Carlos Castro L., secretario.