Validity of State Regulation of Paid Passenger TransportValidez de la regulación estatal del transporte remunerado

Decision No. 2017002791 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at eleven forty-five on veintidos de febrero de dos mil diecisiete.

Constitutional challenges (acciones de inconstitucionalidad) filed by OTTO GUEVARA GUTH and NATALIA DÍAZ QUINTANA; and by JUAN RICARDO FERNÁNDEZ RAMÍREZ, in his capacity as President of the ASOCIACIÓN NACIONAL DE CONSUMIDORES LIBRES; and others, seeking a declaration that Ley No. 8955: “Amendment to Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, of 30 de abril de 1964, and Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, of 22 de diciembre de 1999,” is unconstitutional, on the grounds that they consider it contrary to Articles 7, 46, 129, and 140 of the Constitución Política. The representative of the Procuraduría General de la República and the Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes also participated in the proceedings.

Findings of Fact:

1. 1In a brief received by the Secretariat of the Chamber at 13:00 hours on 16 de octubre de 2015, the petitioners request, in summary, that: Ley No. 8955, “Amendment to Ley No. 3284, Commercial Code, of 30 de abril de 1964, and Ley 7969, Law Regulating the Public Service of Paid Transportation of Persons in Taxi-Mode Vehicles, of 22 de diciembre de 1999,” be declared unconstitutional. To establish their standing to bring this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad), the petitioners assert that it arises from the defense of diffuse interests, because the right to work is involved. They contend that the statement of reasons in legislative expediente No. 17874—in which the challenged law currently in force was processed—stated that its purpose was: “…to create legislation that guarantees better conditions and lower costs for users, seeking the benefit and well-being of the great majority.In this manner, the carriage of persons (porteo de personas) is eliminated, but carriage (porteo) itself is not eliminated; that is, what is being eliminated is the word ‘person’” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, although things, articles, money, correspondence, etc., may continue to be transported. (…) With the removal of the word “person,” a category called “permanent special taxi transportation” is created within Ley N.° 7969, Law Regulating the Public Service of Paid Transportation of Persons in Taxi-Mode Vehicles; it retains the nature of the residual special service currently provided through carriage, but is authorized and regulated in order to impose a sense of responsibility upon those interested parties who would be accredited to provide it.” They explain that the statement of reasons indicates that the carriage of persons was improperly regulated in the Commercial Code through the inclusion of the word “persons” in Article 323 of that Code; consequently, the intent was to create new legislation that would benefit users, in such a manner that “carriage of persons” was prohibited and that economic activity was monopolized by the State, thereby changing from private transportation to public transportation of persons—that is, it may no longer be conducted under Article 323 of the Commercial Code.They contend that the law eliminates private transportation of persons and converts it into public transportation; this is reflected throughout the challenged legislation, since Article 1 eliminated the category of carriage of persons. They state that Article 1 amends Articles 323 and 334 of the Commercial Code so that they read as follows: “Article 323.- Under a contract of carriage (contrato de transporte), the carrier undertakes to transport things or communications from one place to another in exchange for a price. Transportation may be performed by public or private companies. Public companies are those that advertise and open an establishment of that kind to the public, undertaking to provide transportation at specified prices and under specified conditions and schedules whenever their services are requested in accordance with the terms of their brochures, routes, and rates. Private companies are those that provide such services at their discretion, under conventionally agreed conditions and arrangements.The contract of carriage governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicles.” Accordingly, they consider a carrier to be a person engaged in transporting things or communications, not persons. They state that, before the cited amendment, Article 323 of the Commercial Code provided the legal basis for the private transportation of persons under the category known as carriage, but that the amendment restricted the contract of carriage to the transportation of things or communications, categorically excluding the transportation of persons, as stated supra. The cited Ley N° 8955 also amended and supplemented Ley N° 7969, Law Regulating the Public Service of Paid Transportation of Persons in Taxi-Mode Vehicles, such that the repealed contract for the carriage of persons was incorporated into that legislation under the name permanent special taxi services (servicios especiales estables de taxi, SEETAXI), thereby establishing paid transportation of persons in its various forms as a public service.It should be noted that significant statements were made during debate on the bill, including the following by Deputy Quintana Porras: (…) On the merits, I want the record to reflect that throughout the debate on this bill, we have stated (…) that passage of this bill would unfairly affect persons who have long, or for their entire lives, engaged in an entirely lawful activity. (…) Many rights recognized by our Constitution, such as freedom of commerce, freedom of assembly, and freedom of movement, are threatened by this bill. Therefore, provided that carriage complies with the parameters established in our legislation, it will remain a lawful activity essential to our commercial dynamics. (…) We have the opportunity to say no to a bill that affects constitutional rights and also restricts an entirely lawful occupation that supports many Costa Ricans. Let us not impoverish (…) Costa Rica through our decisions; let us not curtail yet another freedom by passing this bill on second reading.They note that passage of the challenged provision resulted in the State’s monopolization of the private transportation service for persons. They likewise indicate that Article 2 of the cited law established a series of requirements and restrictions on the economic activity of paid transportation of persons in the taxi mode, creating a public monopoly comprising two forms of taxi transportation service. The first of those forms required taxis governed by Ley No 7969 to hold an enabling concession (concesión)—whereby the State delegates to a natural or legal person the ability to provide a service that originally belongs to the State. A concession grants the concessionaire an administrative property right (derecho real administrativo), and it may be revoked only for violation of grounds established in advance and following due process (debido proceso); otherwise, the State must pay compensation.They state that the second form is the “residual” form of the public taxi transportation service, now known as SEETAXI, or a permanent special taxi permit, intended to absorb some carriers under the permit (permiso) category. They consider the SEETAXI form inherently contradictory because, under public law (Derecho Público), a permit is a precarious legal mechanism that, as an enabling instrument (título habilitante), creates no administrative right; in principle, it may be revoked at any time and no compensation is payable. They add that the impossibility of engaging in the carriage of persons (private transportation of persons) is conclusively established by the consistent administrative case law of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, developed after Ley #8955 entered into force, as detailed in legal opinion OJ154-2014: following the amendment of Article 323 of the Commercial Code, paid transportation of persons in the taxi mode is deemed a public service that may be operated through an administrative concession (concesión administrativa), in accordance with the procedures established by law and its regulations, or through a permit in the case of permanent special taxi services, as provided in Article 7(a) of the cited law.Similarly, opinion C416-2014 and legal opinion OJ-011-2015 stated that paid transportation of persons in its various forms constitutes a public service and therefore may be performed by private parties only through a permit or concession granted by the State. They conclude that no private party may provide paid transportation of persons in any of its forms without a concession or permit from the State; in other words, this activity is withdrawn from private commerce and monopolized, regardless of the type of motor vehicle used or the persons for whom it is intended, whether it is offered to the general public or to users belonging to specific groups. Consequently, no private natural or legal person may provide paid transportation of persons without first obtaining the applicable authorization—a concession or permit, depending on the form involved—granted by the Public Transportation Council through the procedures established in the laws governing that public service.They consider that this nationalization of the private transportation service for persons violates Article 46 of the Political Constitution because the creation of public monopolies requires approval by at least 38 deputies, a procedure that was contravened because bill No. 17874, which gave rise to Ley No. 8955, was passed by a Full Legislative Powers Committee, which lacked jurisdiction to enact a law requiring a qualified majority of votes. They add that a monopoly in favor of the State is characterized principally by the elimination of competition and the prohibition against third parties engaging in the activity, and that Ley No. 8955 expressly establishes a prohibition against engaging in this activity by removing the word “person” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code and adding a final paragraph to that article providing that it does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicles.This created an express prohibition against private parties providing the service; in other words, it nationalized a service that had been governed without difficulty by the Commercial Code and formed part of the mutual agreement between the parties, in which the freedom to decide what best serves each person’s economic interests and immediate needs prevails. They state that, in Opinion number C-376-2003, the Office of the Attorney General explained that carriage was a legal transaction (negocio jurídico) arising neither by chance nor from actions directed toward the public at large, but rather from a discrete relationship previously agreed upon between the carrier and the traveler; this entailed the impossibility of entering into contracts on public roads, since the State holds title to that public service. They assert that the carriage of persons is based on mutual assent (acuerdo de voluntades), an agreement that does not arise by chance but is entered into freely and discreetly between the parties after considering prices, routes, and schedules, because it is a matter belonging to the private sphere of citizens, in which the principle of freedom of contract (autonomía de la voluntad) governs and the State should not intervene.They therefore contend that eliminating the possibility of private transportation of persons violates Article 46 of the Political Constitution, which provides for the creation of private monopolies and states that establishing new monopolies in favor of the State or municipalities requires the approval of two-thirds of all members of the Legislative Assembly.

This implies that public authorities are constitutionally required to promote competition within the framework of a market economy. It further states that the challenged provision established a public monopoly (monopolio público) over public passenger transportation in the taxi modality, which was created through the enactment of a law outside the Standing Orders of the Legislative Assembly, since it was enacted by a committee vested with full legislative authority, even though the bill could not be delegated because its approval required a qualified majority (mayoría calificada)—at least 38 votes. They explain that the bill should have been debated by the Legislative Plenary because the required vote so demanded; therefore, the Second Full Legislative Committee was constitutionally barred from considering the bill and, all the more so, from approving it, thereby violating the procedure established in Article 46 of the Political Constitution.

They clarify that they do not challenge the creation of the monopoly, since such a monopoly may be established provided that the procedure required by Article 46 is followed. They assert that the existence of the monopoly over private passenger transportation became more evident with the arrival of UBER, a digital platform that connects providers of passenger transportation services in the taxi modality with persons who need transportation. They explain that, further confirming that Ley No. 8955 created a monopoly in favor of the State, Vice-Minister Sebastián Urbina stated that all compensated passenger transportation had to go through the CTP and affirmed that no private party may provide compensated passenger transportation without State authorization. They therefore contend that the enactment of Ley 8955 contradicts the principle of the primacy of reality (principio de supremacía de la realidad), because it prevents the use of technological alternatives for transportation services, just as Likewise, they assert that the challenged provision violates the approval of the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement, because the Agreement established that the possibility of providing private transportation services could not be excluded or restricted.

At the time of its approval, Costa Rica had private taxi-modality transportation services through the carriage of persons (porteo de personas), and no law had established a public monopoly over public transportation in the taxi modality; therefore, there was no prohibition against providing private transportation services in the taxi modality. Accordingly, in Chapter 11 of that Agreement, “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” Costa Rica established no reservation concerning this commercial activity. For that reason, Ley No. 8955 violates an Agreement incorporated into our Legal System, since, beyond this circumstance, Costa Rica must afford foreign investors the “national treatment” that existed when the Agreement was signed. Indeed, Costa Rica negotiated the liberalization of services, including private passenger transportation in the taxi modality, under Class 6431: Scheduled Road Transport Services of Passengers (carriage); Subclass 64312: Urban and Suburban Special Scheduled Road Transport Services of Passengers (taxis).

Under the foregoing, “scheduled services” must be understood to mean “non-occasional services,” while “passenger transport service” is synonymous—in commercial legal doctrine—with the carriage of persons intended for a specific segment of users. This is equivalent to a closed group in which predetermined routes and fees prevail, meaning those agreed upon in advance between the carrier (porteador) and the passenger, as occurred before the challenged provision was enacted. They explain that Anexo I of CAFTA (Costa Rica’s Schedule) includes various “non-conforming measures” (medidas disconformes) that allow the Costa Rican State to legislate and regulate “Road Transportation Services—Passenger Transportation,” even contrary to Articles 11.2 (National Treatment), 11.3 (Most-Favored-Nation Treatment), and 11.4 (Market Access) of CAFTA. Those non-conforming measures include several articles of Ley No. 7969, “Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxis,” which grant MOPT the authority to “…determine annually the number of concessions to be granted in each district, canton, and province for taxi services.” (CAFTA, Anexo I. page 13), as well as authority concerning fare regulation.

However, Article 11.6 of CAFTA permits Articles 112, 11.3. 11.4, and 11.5 (of CAFTA) not to apply to: “any existing non-conforming measure maintained by a Party (…) provided that the amendment does not decrease the conformity of the measure, as it existed immediately before the amendment (…)” (CAFTA page 11-3). They assert that the aforementioned non-conforming measures concern public passenger transportation, which was the only form regulated by Ley 7969 before its amendment in June 2011, since Ley No, 8955 is dated 16 de junio del 2011, whereas CAFTA entered into force on 1 de enero de 2009. Thus, the enactment of that law disregarded the obligations undertaken by our country under the cited Agreement. They reiterate that, under the challenged provision, the “carriage of persons” becomes a “public service” (servicio público) by eliminating the possibility of providing it privately, thereby violating the text of Article 11.6 of CAFTA by decreasing “the degree of conformity” with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access).

In doing so, the Legislative Assembly exceeded the authority granted to it by the Constitution because it amended the content of a treaty, although under the Constitution its role must be limited to approving or rejecting a treaty. They argue that international treaties have a dual legal dimension: internationally, they entail an obligation to comply with the terms agreed upon vis-à-vis other subjects of international law; domestically, they entail acceptance of the internal effects arising from that obligation for both public authorities and citizens—Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. They therefore consider that the enactment of Ley No. 8955 violates not only the Constitution but also the general provisions of the Vienna Convention, since it violates the principle of hierarchy of norms (principio de jerarquía de la norma): a lower-ranking provision restricts a commercial activity while disregarding the agreements entered into under CAFTA and directly conflicting with its fundamental objectives, which include encouraging the expansion and diversification of trade in the region, eliminating barriers to trade, facilitating the cross-border movement of goods and services, promoting conditions of fair competition within the free-trade area, and substantially increasing investment opportunities, among others. They request that the challenged provision be declared unconstitutional.

1. 2In a written submission received by the Secretariat of this Chamber at 13:14 hours on 19 January 2016, Juan Ricardo Fernández Ramírez, in his capacity as President of the Asociación Nacional de Consumidores Libres, requests, in summary, that: Law No. 8955, “Amendment to Law No. 3284, Commercial Code, of 30 April 1964, and to Law 7969, Law Regulating the Public Service of Paid Passenger Transportation in Taxi-Mode Vehicles, of 22 December 1999,” be declared unconstitutional. In support of their standing (legitimación) to bring this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad), the petitioners contend that it arises from the defense of diffuse and collective interests (intereses difusos y colectivos). He states that the challenged legislation drew a clear distinction among the three forms of paid passenger transportation and assigned specific regulations to each, namely: paid passenger transportation in the taxi mode; stable special taxi service (servicio especial estable de taxi); and private carriage of passengers (porteo de personas), whether stable or non-stable.He indicates that the challenged provision left the taxi transportation mode unchanged and that it is therefore not the subject of this action. He asserts that, with respect to the Stable Special Taxi Service, the challenged provision created a special form of paid passenger transportation that was also deemed a public service (servicio público) for all legal purposes and operated under a permit (permiso); such permits are limited and subordinate to traditional taxi concessions (concesiones). He asserts that, under those conditions, the original contracts with the persons to whom the service would be provided had to be submitted, and that the number of permits could not exceed 3% of the traditional taxi concessions per operating base; the State could authorize only the number of permits needed in each area, thereby preventing competition that could affect traditional taxis; permit holders could not offer their services to the public; and they could not park on public roads except for the boarding and disembarking of their users.Accordingly, he asserts that the only permitted transportation services are traditional taxis and the limited Stable Special Taxi Service, prohibiting any other type of paid passenger transportation in vehicles pursuant to agreements between private-law persons. With respect to private carriage of passengers, whether stable or non-stable, he asserts that this service was completely prohibited; consequently, two private-law persons may not freely agree on the transportation of a person in exchange for payment. He further states that this type of service was declared public and that the State was made its sole holder; and that, through Transitory Provision I, those engaged in the private carriage of passengers were granted a maximum period of one month to submit a series of requirements to the State in order to obtain an administrative permit for the Stable Special Taxi Service and convert their private activity into that new mode.He therefore considers there to be no doubt that private carriage contracts (contratos de porteo de personas) between private parties are prohibited, since traditional taxis and SEETAXIS were left as the only two permitted forms of paid passenger transportation by automobile, both exclusively held by the State. Accordingly, he considers that the challenged provision completely eliminated private paid passenger transportation. He contends that the challenged law is unconstitutional because it created a public monopoly (monopolio público) without a qualified majority (mayoría calificada), since it made the State the exclusive holder of paid passenger transportation and prohibited private carriage, eliminating private enterprise and leaving the enabling instruments (títulos habilitantes) specified in the law as the only means of operating the activity. Accordingly, he argues that ownership will always belong exclusively to the State, which creates, defines, grants, and revokes those enabling instruments.He indicates that concessionaires (concesionarios) or permit holders (permisiarios) will always operate as collaborators of the State and under a distinct, limited, and temporary legal regime; the defect lies not in declaring this type of transportation a public service, but in creating a monopoly to ensure its provision. He therefore notes that this Court established that matters requiring a qualified majority may not be delegated to committees vested with legislative authority. He asserts that, by contrast, public services of greater significance, such as education and health, are not governed by a State monopoly as in this case, demonstrating that the importance of the activity does not per se justify its nationalization. He further states that the challenged provision violates Articles 28, 39, 41, 45, and 46 of the Political Constitution, as well as the principles of liberty, private enterprise, freedom of commerce, freedom of contract, and consumers’ freedom of choice.He explains that fundamental freedoms are a cornerstone of the rule of law (Estado de Derecho) and may be restricted in pursuit of a compelling public interest and in the least restrictive manner possible; the challenged provision neither serves a compelling public interest nor restricts fundamental freedoms in the least restrictive manner possible. He asserts that the legislative record demonstrates beyond question that the purpose of regulating paid passenger transportation was to resolve the dispute between taxi drivers and private carriers, rather than to benefit consumers requiring transportation by such means. He maintains that current economic and legal trends adopted in Costa Rica support free competition as the ideal regulator of any economic activity and that, where State intervention is deemed necessary, it should be carried out with the least possible intensity. In this case, sight has been lost of the true intended recipient of the public service at issue: the consumer.He states that the legislature could have regulated the private activity as a means of ensuring user protection, but instead chose the most restrictive approach: State takeover (estatización). This contrasts with health and education, which are examples of public services of paramount importance that allow private enterprise and are merely regulated, not taken over by the State. He considers that the challenged provision violated Section 11.4, “Market Access,” of Chapter Eleven of the FTA (TLC), because it prohibits the States Parties from adopting measures that impose limitations on the number of service suppliers, whether in the form of numerical quotas, monopolies, or exclusive service suppliers. He asserts that the prohibition on providing a private passenger transportation service, arising from the amendment introduced by Law No. 89558 to Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and the nationalization of the activity limit the number of service suppliers.Thus, the only circumstance in which this law would not conflict with that provision would be if it were included among the non-conforming measures (medidas disconformes) that Costa Rica exempted from application of the Treaty; the only reservations concerning land passenger transportation were included in Annex I of the Treaty. He states that paid passenger transportation was not reserved in Annex I of the Treaty because that Annex referred solely to laws, regulations, or measures in force when the Treaty was signed that did not conform to the agreed terms and that the State Party chose to retain. These were not reservations covering sectors or activities in general that the State could regulate at will, but rather a decision to retain existing rules. This is because Law 8955 was enacted years after the Treaty and therefore constituted new measures that cannot be construed as existing measures intended to be retained.He further asserts that no State Party could increase the degree of non-conformity of its reserved existing measures and that any amendment to one of them could not reduce its degree of conformity. The challenged provision established new measures. He asserts that, even if the legislation could be construed as having been reserved in Annex I, it is beyond question that Law No. 8955 introduced amendments that increased the restrictions existing when the Treaty was signed, something expressly prohibited. By contrast, under Annex II of the Treaty, the States Parties were permitted to make reservations concerning matters or sectors on which they could impose new measures or regulate in the future. He states that Costa Rica made no reservation concerning paid passenger transportation in Annex II, and therefore any restrictive measure on the matter was directly contrary to the Treaty. He states that the challenged provision unquestionably nationalized paid passenger transportation and created a monopoly in favor of the State.This is because passenger transportation had been mixed in nature: public paid passenger transportation, such as traditional taxis, coexisted with private paid passenger transportation in the form of private carriage. Nevertheless, he contends that private paid passenger transportation in the private-carriage mode was eliminated from the legal system (ordenamiento jurídico). It is therefore indisputable that paid passenger transportation, in any of its forms, was established as a public service, with the State as its sole holder. He states that, under a wholly private carriage contract, private persons or companies could offer paid passenger transportation services, either by offering rates and conditions to the general public or tailoring them to each particular case. However, by deleting the word “persons” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code and adding an express prohibition on transporting persons, that type of contract was nationalized, compelling everyone engaged in private carriage—through Transitory Provision I of the challenged provision—to transform their activity into a public one by joining the Stable Special Taxi Service.Thus, there is no doubt that a new legal monopoly (monopolio legal) was created in favor of the State. He contends that it is necessary to explain the development of the concept of public service and, in particular, the distinction between regulating an economic activity and nationalizing it as alternative means of ensuring the service. Thus, nationalizing the activity was not the only legal means of ensuring the public service, and regulation was a possible option available under our legal system. He asserts that a distinction must be drawn between State regulation of a private activity for the purpose of protecting users’ interests and nationalization of a private activity, which requires private-law persons to obtain authorization (habilitación) to operate as collaborators of the State, the sole holder of the particular service. Nevertheless, the legislature chose to create a public monopoly, which the Constitution permits provided that there is a justifying public interest and a law enacted by a qualified majority.

It argues that the traditional notion of public service (servicio público) consists of an activity aimed at satisfying collective needs, ownership of which, together with its strict regulation and oversight, is assumed by the State; thus, the State is the sole holder of the service, determines the conditions under which it is provided, and directly oversees it. In response to this, a new, modern, and objective notion of public service emerged, which does not entail exclusive State ownership and allows private initiative: a service of fundamental interest to society in which the State may intervene and ensure that the need is met; unlike the traditional notion, it does not presuppose exclusive State ownership and includes the possibility of intervening through regulations or corrections to the private market. It also cites European legal scholarship (folio 56) and states that the constitutional framework permits a plurality of organizational solutions, ranging from the extreme represented by the market alone, through the entire spectrum of restrictions, to the opposite extreme, namely the exclusion of the market and exclusive reservation to the public administration; accordingly, public service may allow the legislature to establish appropriate coordination between public and private activities in order to satisfy public needs.

It reiterates that the evolution of the concept of public service not only justifies the state takeover (estatización) of an economic activity without a qualified majority, but that the trend in the changing concept is toward liberalization. It argues that the concepts of regulation (regularización) and nationalization (nacionalización) are fundamentally different, since, when regulation is involved, State action operates upon preexisting legal situations and rights arising from freedom of private action. The regime applicable to a nationalized activity is the opposite: the State creates and defines the legal situations, and the governed party (administrado) may obtain new and limited operating rights through a concession (concesión). It explains that this is plainly a State monopoly over an activity that is private by nature, rather than mere regulation of that activity. It further adds that nationalization entails converting a private activity into one exclusively owned by the State, such that a private party could participate only through authorization from the State.

As the exclusive holder of that activity, the State may deny, regulate and closely oversee, or revoke operating permits granted to private parties. Public services need not be left under the exclusive ownership of the public administration in order to ensure or regulate them, since they have not been exempt from the international shift toward privatization, and various examples currently remain of services that are not exclusively owned by the State. It therefore adds that the public monopoly created by Law No. 8955 is unconstitutional because it should have been created by a qualified majority, in accordance with numeral 4 of the Constitutional Charter. In the alternative, it requests that Article 1 of the challenged statute be declared unconstitutional because it removed passenger carriage (porteo de personas) from the Commercial Code; likewise, it challenges Article 2, which establishes exclusive State ownership.

Such annulment would allow private passenger carriage to operate simultaneously with the SEETAXI service and traditional taxis, eliminating the public monopoly by permitting private initiative in that economic activity. It considers that fundamental freedoms were compromised through the enactment of that law. It states that the legislative record shows that the interest in regulating the compensated transportation of persons (transporte remunerado de personas) was to resolve the trade dispute between taxi drivers and passenger carriers, and that the most restrictive approach—state takeover—was chosen. It asserts that every private commercial activity may be subject to statutory limitations and regulations adopted to protect the public interest; however, regulations governing an activity that is private by nature may not be excessive. In other words, to limit the principle of freedom, the legislature should have selected the least restrictive option capable of satisfying a compelling social need.

It asserts that the challenged statute does not serve any compelling public interest, since the common good must be derived from the constitutional order, never from what a particular administration considers important. It therefore asserts that the reasons for the challenged law arose from negotiations among the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, the Cámara Nacional de Transporte en Autobús, the Federación Nacional de Taxis, and the Cámara de Porteadores, and that they sought to resolve the disputes that had arisen among taxi drivers, bus operators, and passenger carriers, rather than to serve a compelling public interest under the terms required by the Constitutional Charter. It considers freedom of competition to be the appropriate means of satisfying the public interest. It states that the challenged law was enacted to settle a political and trade-related dispute among various sectors; nevertheless, the legitimate interests of consumers were sacrificed, reducing their options and their right to choose.

It considers that this prioritized private and trade interests over the interests of the community. It asserts that the challenged statute violates Article 46 of the Constitution because that provision establishes consumers’ right to freedom of choice: on the one hand, the State’s duty to promote the greatest possible number of consumer options and alternatives and, on the other, the ability to choose freely among those options. Along the same lines, it cites the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and states that the purpose of market regulation is to increase consumer welfare by ensuring, on the one hand, access to and supply in the market so that consumers have adequate choices and, on the other, that consumers can exercise those choices effectively. It argues that consumers’ freedom of choice is protected not only by allowing them to choose freely among the options available in the market, but also by refraining from excluding alternatives and choices as to how to obtain services, unless there is a valid justification; this principle is known in economic theory as consumer sovereignty, which is precisely what is protected by, and was infringed under, numeral 46 of the Constitutional Charter.

The law artificially declared passenger carriage and any other type of passenger transportation service resembling it to be a public service, thereby depriving consumers of the ability to access a range of legitimate services and options, without justification or a technical basis and without considering or weighing consumers’ legitimate interests. It asserts that the legislature’s purpose was to satisfy the trade interests of taxi drivers, passenger carriers, and bus operators who were then involved in a dispute, and that consumer interests were not adequately protected. In other words, consumers’ right to choose was improperly restricted by reducing, without justification, their consumption options and alternatives in order to protect the interests of a specific trade group. Accordingly, instead of fulfilling its duty to analyze and justify which services within the transportation sector should actually be declared public services, the legislature eliminated all private passenger transportation options, denying consumers the freedom to choose and contract for the remainder.

It argues that this violated the constitutional principle under which, in the supply of goods and services to the community, economic competition is presumed to be the normal and ordinary rule, while the exclusion of activities from the market is the exception—which must be justified and grounded in the benefit of the community and the common interest. It acknowledges that economic activities require regulations based on public order and the common good; however, when such regulations are enacted, the rights and legitimate interests of consumers must necessarily be considered, weighed, and protected because consumers are the ultimate beneficiaries of the regulation. It therefore considers this to be an unconstitutional statute that limits consumers’ freedom of choice by reducing their options and alternatives. Thus, it considers that the challenged Law must be declared unconstitutional because it unjustifiably restricts consumers’ freedom of choice, reducing their options without any technical basis or justification.

Additionally, it improperly favors the private interests of a specific trade group without considering, weighing, or protecting the rights and legitimate interests of consumers and the community. Por tanto, not only does the Law fail to meet the constitutional standard, but it is also contrary to the compelling public interest of consumers, who are the recipients of this public service. Relying on case law and legal scholarship, it asserts that nationalization, or publicatio, is the most restrictive and forceful form of State intervention and lacks justification in this case. The public service can be ensured through a less restrictive measure—such as regulation—which per se constitutes a constitutional defect. There is no valid rationale whatsoever for the measure used to ensure the public service when the technical principles of economics and the legal trends prevailing under our Constitution support freedom of commerce as the best means of satisfying consumers’ needs.

It argues that the challenged statute contravenes Article 7 of the Political Constitution; accordingly, it states that the Free Trade Agreement among the United States of America, the Dominican Republic, and Central America (hereinafter “TLC”) is an international commercial instrument approved and ratified by Costa Rica, the principal purpose of which is to remove tariff, legal, economic, and political barriers to the free commercial transfer of goods and services among the States Parties. Thus, the Treaty is intended to serve as an instrument for liberalizing trade in goods and services among the States Parties, guaranteeing foreign investment and promoting conditions of fair competition, with the resulting attainment of tangible benefits for domestic users and consumers. It also emphasizes that, as follows from the aforementioned subsection 2, the legal decision-maker must refer to those objectives when interpreting the intent of the parties and the proper meaning of the Treaty’s text.

Broadly speaking, it indicates that the provision establishes the obligation of the signatory States not to impose on service suppliers of another State Party restrictions on access—whether material or regulatory—to the various economic sectors of the services market of another State, and expressly prohibits the adoption of laws, regulations, or procedures that restrict the number of suppliers of a service by limiting their participation in or access to the market or by creating, for example, numerical quotas or monopolies that grant access to, ownership of, or control over the provision of that service to a single supplier or a small number of suppliers through restrictive or discriminatory measures. It therefore asserts that the FTA excludes from the application of that provision (Article 11.4 Market Access) the service activities or sectors contained in a list of Non-Conforming Measures (Medidas Disconformes).

It likewise asserts that the prohibition of private carriage (porteo) (stable and non-stable) contravenes FTA clause 11.4, “Market Access.” This is because the challenged provision produced three effects: the repeal and prohibition of the private contract for the carriage of persons, regulated by Article 323 of the Commercial Code; the creation of a new form of compensated transportation service: the Stable Special Taxi Service (Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi), which was added to the already existing “taxi” category; and, as a consequence of both, the “publicatio,” or nationalization, of all private compensated transportation of persons, by declaring it to be under the exclusive ownership of the State. The question is how the express prohibition introduced by the reform against providing a transportation service without the proper concession (concesión) and absolute oversight by the State constitutes a measure imposing a limitation on the number of service suppliers, in the form of numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers, or through the requirement of an economic needs test, in the literal terms of subparagraph i), paragraph a) of clause 11.4 of the Treaty.

It asserts this because, since its enactment in 1964, the Commercial Code had regulated the contract of carriage (contrato de transporte), also known as the private carriage of persons, goods, among others. It was a private commercial contract governed by freedom of contract (autonomía de la voluntad) and the principle of freedom. The Commercial Code regulated a series of formal and essential requirements for the validity of the contract, the obligations of the parties, and the liability regime and grounds for termination or nullity of that contract. The logical consequence of the private nature of the contract of carriage was that its provision did not require a formal concession from the State, because it was not a public service (servicio público) exclusively owned by the State. Private parties were also authorized to provide the service under their own rules, in accordance with the provisions of the Commercial Code.

The degree of State intervention was minimal and was limited to the general verification of requirements applicable to all persons wishing to drive a motor vehicle: a driver’s license (following a medical opinion certifying the physical and mental fitness to drive), compliance with the rules of the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito), a vehicle in optimal condition according to the Technical Vehicle Inspection (Revisión Técnica Vehicular), among others; these rules are imposed by virtue of the general interest in ensuring people’s safety in view of the inherently hazardous nature of operating any vehicle. However, by expressly prohibiting the private contract for the carriage of persons previously regulated by the Commercial Code and removing it from private ownership, any person who is not a “concession holder” (concesionario) is prevented from providing compensated private transportation of persons under a regime of contractual autonomy and freedom—as recognized by the Commercial Code.

This unlawfully restricts access to the transportation-services market. The prohibition means that if a supplier of private transportation services originating in a State Party sought access to the transportation-services sector in our country, it could be subjected to a series of unreasonable limitations established by Law No. 8955, contrary to clause 11.4 of the FTA, which were not expressly included in the list of non-conforming measures in Anexo 1 of the FTA. In other words, the reform introduced by Law No. 8955 in 2011, while the FTA was fully in force, completely prohibits private carriage. Accordingly, it asserts that, for purposes of this action, it is critically important to understand that prohibiting the free exercise of an activity while simultaneously creating a special category to meet a residual and limited demand for that service (SEETAXI) is nothing other than an unjustified limitation, through restrictive regulation, on the number of suppliers of a service.

This particular effect of the challenged Law is clearly contrary to FTA clause l 1.4. A distinction must be drawn between the private-carriage activity (prohibited in its entirety) and the SEETAXI activity (limited to 3% of the number of taxis in the area). This section concerns the former activity, although we note in advance that both have been unconstitutionally restricted. As previously discussed, a regulated private activity and a public activity granted under concession are entirely different in terms of their nature and legal regime, and they must therefore be analyzed individually. Companies from the States Parties have been completely prohibited from providing private-carriage services and substantially restricted in their ability to provide the separate SEETAXI service. Classifying the activity as a public service “owned by the State” means that no private party is authorized to provide transportation services freely and directly under the regime of freedom and autonomy that prevailed before the reform of Article 323 of the Commercial Code.

In summary, it asserts that the elimination and prohibition of private carriage and of any private contract for the carriage of persons, formerly regulated by the Commercial Code (art. 1 Law 8955) and by every person’s freedom of contract, constitute a violation of art. 11.4 of the FTA and, more importantly, a limitation not authorized by the FTA’s List of Non-Conforming Measures. It explains that the private carriage of persons is not covered by the FTA’s Non-Conforming Measures (folio 93), because Costa Rica included non-conforming measures in the Treaty that authorized it to exclude certain regulations governing the transportation sector from the scope of clause 11.4, Market Access. Specifically, Costa Rica’s List in Anexo l included a non-conforming measure concerning Land Transportation Services. According to its text and explanatory notes, what was reserved in Anexo I of the Treaty refers solely to laws, regulations, or measures in force when the Treaty was signed that are inconsistent with its provisions and that the State Party decides to maintain.

These are not reservations concerning sectors or activities in general that the State may subsequently regulate, but rather decisions to preserve measures already in force. Law 8955 was enacted years after the Treaty and therefore consists of new measures that cannot be construed as existing measures intended to be maintained. Second, it indicates that, under the Treaty, no State Party may increase the degree of non-conformity of its reserved existing measures, and any amendment to any such measure may not reduce its degree of conformity. Law 8955 establishes new measures. Nevertheless, even under the erroneous interpretation that this legislation was reserved in Anexo I, it is indisputable that these measures represent an increase in the restrictions existing when the Treaty was signed, which is expressly prohibited. Lastly, it argues that, under Anexo ll of the Treaty, the States Parties were permitted to make reservations regarding matters or sectors on which they could impose new measures or regulate in the future.

Costa Rica made no reservation concerning compensated land transportation of persons in Anexo ll; therefore, any new restrictive measure concerning this matter is directly contrary to the Treaty. It explains that Anexo I of the Treaty specifies the laws, regulations, or measures in force when the Treaty was signed that a State wishes solely to maintain. Anexo ll, in turn, was designed to include the sectors or activities for which a State reserves the possibility of imposing restrictions or regulations through new measures; this is analyzed and illustrated at folio 99 of the case file. It further asserts that none of the provisions amended by article l of Law No. 8955 (Articles 323 and 334 of the Commercial Code) were included in Costa Rica’s List, Anexo l, when the Treaty was signed. Moreover, Law 8955 had not been enacted at that time, so no reservation was made to maintain it. These are new measures that, as a matter of temporal logic, could not have been reserved in Anexo I. Accordingly, any amendment of those provisions was permissible provided that it did not reduce the degree of conformity of the measure as it was in force immediately before the amendment of Articles 11.2, 11.3, 11,4 and 11,5; a criterion confirmed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade (Ministerio de Comercio Exterior) (folio 105).

Accordingly, it cannot be overlooked that Article 2 of Law 7969 increases the degree of non-conformity of Article 2 as in force when the Treaty was signed. More than an amendment, this new measure constitutes an absolute innovation, because it vests exclusive ownership of the service in the State (which the previous Law No. 7969 did not do), thereby restricting the number of service suppliers and concentrating the service in a single supplier: the State. Similarly, creating a new category such as SEETAXI while restricting it to 3% of the concessions granted for the taxi category is plainly a measure within the meaning of point 633 of the Explanatory Note to Anexo l of the Treaty. It is wholly discriminatory. Thus, the measure expressly conflicts with the Treaty’s clause 1 1.4 on Market Access, which promotes a greater number of service suppliers and minimal regulation of the activity, consistent with the Treaty’s liberalization objectives.

Consequently, by increasing the degree of non-conformity of an existing measure (Article 2 of Law 7969) with Treaty clause I 1.4, Law No. 8955 is contrary to Article 1 1.6, paragraph I, subparagraph c), cited above. It follows indisputably from the foregoing that the non-conforming measures in Anexo I of the FTA do not authorize the elimination of the private-carriage category from the Commercial Code or the nationalization of all compensated transportation of persons. It further argues that private carriage was not reserved in Anexo II as a matter to be regulated in the future (folio 108). Land transportation of persons was clearly not included, and therefore no new restrictions may be imposed on this sector.

The only permissible restrictions, then, are those that were in force when the Treaty was signed and were reserved in Anexo I (rules that may not be amended in a more restrictive manner). No other matter or sector not covered by that annex may be created or amended to the detriment of the Market Access obligation imposed by Article 11.4 of the Treaty. In light of all the foregoing, it asserts that there can be no question that the provisions of Ley 8955 that prohibited private carriage services (porteo) and placed all compensated passenger transportation under the exclusive ownership of the State were not in force when the Treaty was signed and therefore were not reserved in Anexo l. Nor was the possibility of subsequently restricting these sectors reserved in Anexo ll of the Treaty; accordingly, the Law is directly contrary to Article 11.4 of the Free Trade Agreement (Tratado de Libre Comercio, TLC).

It reiterates that prohibiting a private economic activity that had been freely conducted in the exercise of freedom of commerce, in all the forms contemplated by the “Market Access” clause 11.4, entails limiting the number of service providers, discourages investment, and completely undermines all the objectives of the Free Trade Agreement. Likewise, prohibiting the private provision of transportation services after the TLC was approved constitutes a clear and unconstitutional obstacle to trade in services (clause l.2.b) among the States Parties. Put simply, through a law of the Republic, in breach of the pacta sunt servanda principle and all the cited provisions of the Treaty, the Legislative Assembly amended and expanded the content of the non-conforming measures (medidas disconformes) contained in the Agreement; that is, it amended an international treaty through a law, thereby violating not only Article 7 of our own Political Constitution, but also Articles 26 and, especially, 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

It concludes that the private carriage of passengers, governed by Article 323 of the Commercial Code prior to the amendment, was not included in the list of “measures” or notes in Anexo 1 that the State reserved the right to keep in force even contrary to the Treaty, which demonstrates its conformity with that instrument; nor was it included in Costa Rica’s Schedule in Anexo 2 of the Treaty, an annex that specifically covers—according to its Explanatory Note—the matters that the State reserved the right to regulate in the future with respect to Cross-Border Trade in Services, even contrary to the Treaty. The amendment of Article 2 of Ley 7969, which was included as a non-conforming measure in Anexo 1, granted the State exclusive ownership of the compensated passenger transportation activity, thereby reducing the measure’s degree of conformity with the Treaty. Non-conforming measures were expanded through legislation contrary to the Treaty.

In light of all the foregoing, there can be no question that the provisions of Ley 8955 that prohibited private carriage services and placed all compensated passenger transportation under the exclusive ownership of the State were not in force when the Treaty was signed and therefore were not reserved in Anexo I. Nor was the possibility of subsequently restricting these sectors reserved in Anexo ll of the Treaty; accordingly, the Law is directly contrary to Article l 1.4 of the TLC. Furthermore, it states that Article 2 of Ley No. 7969, included as a non-conforming measure in Anexo 1 of the Treaty, did not regulate the SEETAXI arrangement (modalidad de SEETAXI); therefore, the amendment introduced to that article by Ley No. 8955 cannot be deemed an “amendment,” but rather an innovation not covered by paragraph c) of Article 1 1.6, subsection 1, of the Treaty. In any event, the creation of a Permanent Special Taxi Service (Servicio Especial Estable de Taxis), which meets residual and limited market demand, entails a reduction in the Law’s degree of conformity with clause l 1.4 of the Treaty, because it grants interested parties merely a revocable permit (permiso en precario), rather than a formal concession (concesión formal) like that enjoyed by those engaged in the “taxi” arrangement.

Likewise, because this arrangement seeks to meet “residual and limited” demand, the amendment allows SEETAXI permits to be granted for only 3% of the concessions authorized per operating base, which plainly reduces the degree of conformity of Article 2 of Ley No. 7969 with clause 11.4 of the Treaty. Although there is no doubt that private carriage services and SEETAXI are entirely different economic activities, it has nevertheless been argued on some occasions that they are the same activity. Even under this interpretation, the nationalization of a private activity in order to subject it to strict regulations and to a maximum of 3% of the taxis in each area is a restriction incompatible with the Treaty in question. Finally, it emphasizes that Ley No. 8955 prohibits what the TLC permits and promotes. The enactment of an ordinary law contrary to a higher-ranking international treaty contravenes Article 7 of the Political Constitution; accordingly, we respectfully request that the manifest unconstitutionality of Ley No. 8955 of 7 July 2011 be declared.

It requests that Ley No. 8955 be annulled as unconstitutional; in the alternative, it requests that Article 1 of Ley No. 8955 be annulled, and consequently the amendments made to Articles 323 and 334 of the Commercial Code, Ley N° 3284, of 30 April 1964, which abolished the institution of private carriage services, which would therefore be reinstated; and the paragraph of Article 2 of Ley No. 8955 that introduced a second paragraph into Article 2 of Ley No. 7969, granting the State exclusive ownership of the service.

1. 3By resolution issued at 15:58 on 11 de febrero de 2016 (appearing at folio 022 of the case file), the constitutional challenges (acciones de inconstitucionalidad) processed under case files 15-015456-0007-CO and 16-000852-0007-CO were admitted; these cases were consolidated by decision No. 2016-002010 at 09:30 hrs. on 10 de febrero de 2016, and the Procuraduría General de la República and the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes were granted a hearing.
2. 4The notices (edictos) referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional were published in issues 50, 51 and 52 of the Boletín Judicial, dated 11, 14 y 15 de marzo del 2016 (folio 485).
3. 5By pleadings received by the Secretariat of the Chamber at 11:10 on 1 de marzo de 2016 and at 13:36 on 2 de marzo de 2016, motions to intervene in support (coadyuvancia) were filed by Carolina Alfaro Sojo, acting as general attorney-in-fact with unlimited authority as to amount (apoderada generalísima sin límite de suma) for Transportes Privados Carolina Sociedad Anónima; Pablo Enrique Soto Alfaro, acting as general attorney-in-fact with unlimited authority as to amount for Soluciones Avanzadas Sociedad Anónima de Capital Variable; and Wilbert Navarro Cordero, acting as President with the powers of a general attorney-in-fact with unlimited authority as to amount for Transportes Privados Marvey Sociedad Anónima. They argue that they have engaged in the private transportation of passengers since 2000, always pursuant to art. 323 of the Código de Comercio. The 1999 amendment to the Código de Comercio introduced the category of “Permanent Special Taxi Service” (“Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi”), which is subject to three-year concessions issued by the State.They report that their permits expired on 7 de julio de 2015 and that they therefore took steps to resume private transportation operations. They further state that they have worked jointly with Soluciones Avanzadas S.A. de C.V since 2000, providing services in cantons of the province of Alajuela. They explain that this activity and cross-border transaction are protected under Cap. ll of the TLC approved in 2007, entitled “Cross-Border Trade in Services” (“Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios”). They state that the enactment of the challenged law (No. 8955) established a monopolistic system administered by the Consejo de Transporte Pública, the body that decides whether to issue taxi permits. They contend that the law violated the ordinary legislative enactment process because the challenged law allows monopolies to be created, which requires the approval of at least 38 members of the Legislative Assembly; instead, the law was approved by a Commission vested with full legislative authority, which lacks the power to approve laws requiring a qualified majority of votes. Accordingly, they request that the provisions challenged by the petitioners be declared admissibly challenged and unconstitutional (see folios 130-198 of the electronic case file).
4. 6By a pleading received by the Secretariat of this Chamber at 15:16 on 2 de marzo de 2016, Alejandro Salas Blanco, acting in his capacity as Mayor of Zarcero, requests clarification as to whether proceedings on any pending decision concerning Seetaxi vehicles have in fact been stayed (folio 199).
5. 7In a written submission filed at 13:06 hours on 04 de marzo de 2016, Gilbert Rojas Rojas, in his capacity as general attorney-in-fact without limitation as to amount (Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma) of Transportistas Naranjeños Unidos Sociedad Anónima, appeared before this Chamber to intervene as an active supporting party (coadyuvante activo) in this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad), with standing under Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. He states that Transportistas Naranjeños Unidos Sociedad Anónima was incorporated on seis de mayo de dos mil cuatro and that the following was established as one of its purposes: “...The corporation shall have as its purpose commerce in general, including the transportation of persons and goods. Beginning that year, our company commenced operations in the transportation of persons under the carriage-contract arrangement (contrato de porteo), as provided in Article 323 of the Código de Comercio.On 07 de julio de 2011, the law now challenged, Law number 8955, was published in La Gaceta; it removed the word ‘persons’ from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio and instead provided for the creation of the Special Permanent Taxi Service (Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi). When the challenged law was enacted, the legislature included three transitional provisions (transitorios) in order to distinguish the future application of the amendment to Law No. 7966, in Articles 2 and 29 thereof, with respect to those ‘carriers’ (porteadores) who, at the time of its publication, could demonstrate that they had been providing private transportation of persons in accordance with Article 323 and the following and related provisions of the Código de Comercio, for the purpose of protecting, in some manner, their vested rights (derechos adquiridos). Thus, the provision contained in the amendment to Law No. 7969 through Law No. 8955 would apply to persons who subsequently wished to provide the Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi and to those who had already been engaged in this economic activity and were required to be transferred from the private transportation service for persons to the remunerated public transportation service for persons, whether as ‘sedans’ or through minibuses.The first transitional provision of challenged Law number 8955 contains temporary authorization for the former carriers to continue providing transportation services. This authority or permit allowing the former ‘carriers’ to become part of the Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi was granted to those wishing to establish that status, in exchange for which they would be authorized for three-year periods, ‘renewable,’ according to the express wording of the law; therefore, henceforth we would no longer engage in carriage services but would instead operate under a special permanent taxi permit, known as S.E.E.T.A.X.I. Pursuant to the statutory amendment, TRANSPORTISTAS NARANJEÑOS UNIDOS SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, in its capacity as a ‘carrier,’ submitted the mandatory requirements set forth in the aforementioned Law N° 8955, and thus, through Decision 5.1.5 of Ordinary Session N° 34-2012 of the Board of Directors of the Consejo de Transporte Público, accreditation was authorized for it to operate under this new form of public service, also known by the acronym ‘S.E.E.T.A.X.l.,’ under permit number 30, which allowed it to use thirty-nine (39) vehicles in the Cantón de Naranjo de Alajuela, beginning in julio del año 2012.Following the formal acts authorizing the Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi, duly issued at the time by the Costa Rican State, each of the thirty-nine drivers affiliated with the company lawfully commenced operations beginning in julio del año dos mil doce. Notwithstanding the foregoing, during el año 2015 (the permit expiration date), the Consejo de Transporte Público interpreted and decided that the permits could be renewed only once, and that such renewal had to be limited to a maximum of thirty percent (30%) of the concessions authorized for each operating base of the authorized taxis (‘red’ taxis). Thus, at Ordinary Session number 37-2015, held on 1 de julio de 2015, memorandum DAJ 2015-002164 was considered and approved in full; in addition to allowing renewal, it made clear that renewal was restricted to a limit of 30% for each operating base of the ‘red’ taxis or authorized concessions.As a consequence of the foregoing interpretation, because there are 50 concessioned taxis in the cantón de Naranjo de Alajuela, applying the 30% percentage resulted in only fifteen vehicles being eligible for renewal. In other words, our company went from holding 39 permits to there being 15 for the entire canton, which meant that those 15 permits had to be divided between two companies; consequently, only seven permits were authorized for its company, rather than the thirty-nine it previously held. In view of the foregoing, through the decision contained in Article 7.1.11 of Ordinary Session number 49-2015 of 20 de agosto de 2015, the Consejo de Transporte Público denied the application to renew the represented company’s special permanent taxi service permit for the reasons communicated to it at the time. Because renewal was denied and the private transportation of persons was no longer legally available due to the existence of the law now challenged, they are in an unlawful position that prevents them from engaging in transportation activities; therefore, the challenged law, which amended Article 323 of the Código de Comercio, is causing them serious harm.Moreover, since 01 de octubre del 2015, precise instructions have been issued to the Policía de Tránsito to confiscate the documents or codes they used, because those documents or codes were deemed to have expired on 07 de julio de 2015. Based on the foregoing description, the aforementioned company, as an organization whose purposes have included carriage activities, holds a legitimate interest (interés legítimo). This constitutional challenge contests and seeks a declaration that Law No. 8955 is unconstitutional; that law corresponds to the ‘Reforma a la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, de 30 de abril de 1964 y de la Ley No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi 22 de diciembre de 1999.’ Like the petitioners, this party considers that the aforementioned law is contrary to Articles 7, 28, 39, 41, 45, 46, 129 v 140 of the Constitución Política and to the principles of hierarchy of norms (jerarquía normativa), reasonableness and proportionality, private enterprise, freedom of commerce, freedom of contract, and freedom of consumer choice, as stated by the petitioners; I will now outline several observations concerning matters related to the alleged constitutional violations.Regarding the violation of Article 46 of the Constitución Política, it agrees with the petitioner that the challenged legislation established a public monopoly without a qualified legislative majority, in violation of Article 46 of the Constitución Política. The challenged law expressly established that the State is the exclusive holder of the transportation of persons and prohibited carriage contracts. Indeed, pursuant to the amendment made to Article 2 of the Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad Taxi, N.° 7969 del 22 de diciembre de 1999: ‘The remunerated transportation of persons, carried out by buses, small buses, minibuses, taxis, automobiles, and any other type of motor vehicle, whether offered to the public at large, to users, or to specified groups of users with particular needs constituting special demand, is a public service held by the State.The foregoing applies irrespective of the degree of state intervention in determining the service’s operating system or in overseeing it. [...].’ On the premise that the public interest is purportedly implicated in all remunerated transportation of persons, the legislature elected to declare it a public service, regardless of the form involved or the degree of state intervention in determining the operating system or overseeing it. Undoubtedly, the fact that all remunerated transportation of persons was declared a ‘public service,’ together with the consequent elimination of the legal mechanism (figura jurídica) of carriage of persons and its replacement with the ‘servicio especial estable de taxi,’ constitutes a flagrant violation of constitutional rights. By regulating this economic activity through the concession mechanism (concesión), private enterprise was eliminated entirely, leaving the circumstances provided for by law as the only means of operating it.Accordingly, classifying every type of private transportation of persons as a public service is contrary to Article 46 of the Constitución Política, because the creation of public monopolies requires the law to be approved by at least 38 deputies (a qualified majority). In this regard, Law No. 8955 was approved by a Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, which lacked jurisdiction to enact a law requiring a qualified majority vote. As correctly stated in the filings initiating this action, a State monopoly is characterized primarily by the elimination of competition and the prohibition against third parties engaging in the activity. Law N° 8955 expressly establishes the prohibition against engaging in this carriage activity by deleting the word ‘person’ from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio and adding a final paragraph to that article, which provides: ‘The transportation contract governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicles.’ Through this paragraph, an express prohibition is created against private parties providing that service; in other words, an activity previously governed by commercial-law rules and arising from the parties’ mutual agreement is declared a public service, even though it had been governed by the parties’ freedom to decide what best suited each of them according to their economic interests and needs at that time.Therefore, through Law N° 8955, the elimination of the possibility of privately transporting persons violates Article 46 of the Constitución Política. As correctly explained in this action, Law 8955 established a public monopoly over the public transportation of persons, which did not exist before that legislation was enacted. This monopoly was established through the enactment of a law in disregard of the Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, because it was approved by a Comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Specifically, it considers that Article 208 bis of the Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa was violated because the challenged statutory text addresses public procurement matters as well as the establishment of a monopoly, two circumstances in which that article of the Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa may not be applied, thereby endangering legal certainty, the principle prohibiting singular derogation from regulations (principio de inderogabilidad singular de los reglamentos), and the principle of legality.

As has been explained, the challenged law created a new public transportation model (S.E.E.T.A.X.I.) using a mechanism similar to a public concession (concesión pública), which entails the creation of a state monopoly. In his view, that statute should not have been approved through the expedited legislative procedure (vía legislativa abreviada). Regarding the violation of Article 28 of the Political Constitution, he states that this article establishes substantive limits on state action and that one principle derived from that provision is the “legal order of freedom” (“orden jurídico de libertad”) that guides our Fundamental Charter. Under this article, the legislature may regulate only private actions that could harm morality, public order, or the rights of third parties. With respect to the concept of private actions that, by their nature, are excluded from state interference, it is indeed true that the monopolized activities (private passenger transportation) are private in kind or nature, because, in general terms, they are simply commercial transactions between persons who agree upon a basic transportation service and who may readily conduct them through a system of freedom of contract, exchange, and minimal regulation (market economies).

In simple terms, declaring every form of passenger transportation to be a public service and eliminating the contract-carriage arrangement (porteo) interfered with the sphere of individual freedom, since there is no need for state intervention in this type of transportation. It is even irrational and disproportionate that goods transportation is not subject to state regulation, while an agreement for passenger transportation is clearly subject to interference by public authorities. Moreover, it is contradictory that the Constitutional Chamber itself—whose case law is binding erga omnes—also ruled on the validity and constitutionality of Article 323 of the Commercial Code, which at that time regulated “passenger carriage” (“porteo de personas”). In judgment No. 2004-3580, issued at 14:43 on April 14, 2004, the Chamber clearly distinguished between the public service of compensated passenger transportation and the transportation contract regulated by the Commercial Code, known as a “carriage contract” (“contrato de porteo”), stating: “Carriers under the Commercial Code and transportation as a public service.

Article 323 of the Commercial Code provides as follows: [...] A carrier or transporter is a commercial auxiliary. The transportation contract regulated by commercial legislation is intended to govern the conveyance of persons, merchandise, and other property. It is a commercial contract that is important to a country’s economy because it links producers or sellers of goods and services with final consumers. It arose from merchants’ need to travel from one place to another, with or without their commercial goods, and thus initially served as an instrument for transporting merchants in the course of their activities. Although legal scholarship does not classify carriers according to the means of transportation used, it may be said that transportation may be by land (such as by cart, cargo vehicle, or railroad), water (skiff, felucca, or transatlantic cruise ship), or air (glider, light aircraft, or jet aircraft); it is even accepted that transportation may be carried out through human power, a pack animal, or a motorized vehicle.

However, given its broad diversity and economic importance to the country, certain areas are regulated by the State in order to protect the general interest, with some forms being declared public services. It is therefore a highly restricted contractual mechanism, and the origin of the transportation contract must be identified to determine whether it constitutes a commercial agreement or is intended to provide an activity that the State has declared to be a public service. If it is the latter, it cannot take the place of activities already regulated by law, such as air transportation, which was regulated through Law No. 5150, General Civil Aviation Law, in which case a private party, whether a natural or legal person, must hold an operating certificate for air transportation in order to offer it. Likewise, cargo, railroad, and maritime services could fall within this contractual category; however, if their significance to society goes beyond satisfying a private need, that will determine the State’s authority to enact public-order rules.

Thus, in the case of passenger transportation, depending on how the contractual relationship originates, the activity is unlawful if it is intended to meet a need of the general public, thereby supplanting public-transportation concessionaires, in which case the Executive Decree is correct in treating it as an activity conducted outside the law. This is precisely the basis of the problem raised by the claimant, who maintains that he is not permitted to enter into various passenger transportation contracts, thereby interfering with his free will and freedom of contract. However, the legally relevant fact under discussion is the conveyance of persons, with or without their belongings, in exchange for payment, as an unrestricted activity, when, since the enactment of Law No. 3503 and subsequently Law No. 7593, compensated passenger transportation in the taxi modality has been declared a public service, consequently making the carriage contract a limited and residual activity.

Likewise, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, in opinion number 043 of 20/03/2013, acknowledged the existence of the commercial contract for passenger transportation. As may be seen from the foregoing, in the opinions and judgment transcribed above, the contract of carriage, in its passenger-transportation modality, constituted a limited and residual activity. It was therefore unlawful, for example, for carriers to travel on public roads casually negotiating or offering their services in a manner coinciding with the public taxi service, or seeking passenger-transportation demand on public roads. However, through the amendment introduced and now challenged, those concepts and rulings were eliminated, and the ability to contract freely was seriously curtailed, which substantially infringes Article 28 of the Constitution. Regarding the violation of Article 7 of the Constitution, he states that the challenged law also contravenes the approval and incorporation into our legal system of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, in violation of Article 7 of our Political Constitution.

That International Treaty established that the possibility of providing private transportation services could not be excluded or restricted. At the time the treaty was approved (December 2007), Costa Rica had private passenger-transportation services under the passenger-carriage arrangement. Moreover, there was no law establishing a public monopoly over public transportation in the taxi modality. In Chapter II, “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” of the aforementioned Treaty, Costa Rica made no reservation concerning this commercial activity. For this reason, Law N°8955 of 2011 violates an Agreement incorporated into our Legal System. Beyond this circumstance, foreign investors must be afforded the “national treatment” (“trato nacional”) that existed when the Treaty was signed. Costa Rica instead negotiated the liberalization of services, including private passenger transportation in the taxi modality.

Specifically, it may be found under: Class 6431: Regular road passenger transportation services (carriage). Subclass 64312: Special regular urban and suburban road passenger transportation services (taxis). The challenged law introduces special regulations for this sector (stable special taxi service), thereby contravening Article 11.6 of CAFTA because the law reduces “the degree of conformity” with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access). In doing so, the Legislative Assembly contravenes the treaty and assumes authority not granted to it by the Constitution, since it modifies the substance of a treaty when, under the Constitution, its role must be limited to approving or rejecting a treaty, in clear violation of Articles 7, 129, and 140, subsections 3) and 10), of the Constitution. Some argue that Costa Rica reserved the possibility of prohibiting carriage and converting all compensated passenger transportation into a public service through the non-conforming measures included in Anexo 1. However, we consider that argument questionable for the following reasons:

• 1)According to Costa Rica’s Schedule, the reservation in Anexo 1 of the Treaty concerning Transportation by Land—Passenger Transportation refers solely to laws and regulations in force when the Treaty was signed that are inconsistent with its provisions and that Costa Rica wishes to maintain. Nor may we interpret it to mean that Costa Rica reserved an economic sector or transportation activity in general as a non-conforming measure (medida disconforme). The challenged law was enacted years after the Treaty was approved and must therefore be construed as establishing “new measures” that were not contemplated in the Treaty and are consequently contrary to that agreement.
• 2)Moreover, under the Treaty, no State Party may increase the degree of nonconformity of its reserved existing measures, and any amendment to any such measure may not reduce its degree of conformity. The challenged measure not only establishes a new measure—the elimination of the carriage contract—but also constitutes an amendment that increases the existing restriction on Public Transportation, which is expressly prohibited by the treaty.
• 3)In Anexo 2 of the Treaty, Costa Rica likewise made no reservation or notation of nonconformity concerning any specific sector for the purpose of imposing future measures or regulations. Specifically, Costa Rica made no reservation concerning compensated passenger transportation in Anexo 2; the challenged statutory amendment is therefore restrictive and contrary to the trade agreement under consideration. An example may be found in the Health and Education sectors, in which Costa Rica permits private enterprise; those sectors are merely regulated, rather than nationalized or monopolized. There is no doubt that this is an internal amendment adopted by Costa Rica that affects or contravenes the treaty discussed above. He requests that this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) be granted and that the judgment consequently order the following: That Law N° 8955, “Amendment to Law N° 3284, Commercial Code, and Amendment to Law N° 7969, Law Regulating the Public Service of Compensated Passenger Transportation in Taxi-Modality Vehicles, of December 22, 1999,” be declared unconstitutional for violating Articles 28, 39, 41, 45, 46, 129, and 140 of the Political Constitution and the principles of hierarchy of laws, reasonableness and proportionality, private enterprise, freedom of trade, freedom of contract, and consumers’ freedom of choice.

1. 8In a written submission filed at 13:36 on 02 de marzo de 2016, Wilbert Navarro Cordero, in his capacity as President with the powers of a general attorney-in-fact without limitation as to amount (Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma) of Transportes Privados Marvey Sociedad Anónima, appears before this Chamber for the purpose of participating as an active supporting intervenor (coadyuvante activo) for the plaintiff in this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad), pursuant to Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which provides: “The parties appearing in matters pending on the date the action is filed, or those having a legitimate interest, may enter an appearance therein in order to support the arguments that could justify granting or denying it or, where appropriate, to expand the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter in which they have an interest.” He bases his standing (legitimación activa) on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which recognizes the possibility of filing a constitutional challenge without an underlying case (asunto base) where, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or where the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or interests concerning the community as a whole is involved.Regarding the latter circumstance—or where the defense of diffuse interests is involved—the Chamber has already specified that the legislature refers to the standing held by active citizens because the right to work is at issue. He states that Transportes Privados Marvey Sociedad Anónima has engaged in the private transportation of persons (porteo) under this legal arrangement since 2008, and since 2005 as a de facto company (sociedad de hecho), through a membership system, the use of motor vehicles, and private contracts relating to the provision of the service. All of the foregoing was initially conducted under Article 323 of the Código de Comercio in force before its amendment, and this commercial activity was reaffirmed by the Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana, y Centroamérica, approved in diciembre del 2007, under Class 6431: Regular road passenger transportation services (porteo).The Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de 1999, deleted the word “person” from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio and created, within Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi, N° 7969, a new arrangement called the “Stable special taxi service” (“Servicio especial estable de taxi”), which retains the nature of the residual service currently provided through porteo, but is authorized and regulated through operating permits (permisos de operación) issued by the State. We were thereby compelled to continue performing our work under this new arrangement, with a three-year operating permit for all vehicles affiliated with us, without the possibility of renewal, which expired on 07 de Julio del 2015.From that date, following the expiration of our operating permits, we resumed our service as “private porteadores,” using our operating bases in the cantons where we provide the service and a service-platform system for the porteo of persons by motor vehicle. We have provided this service without interruption in the Cantones de San Marcos de Tarrazú y Santa María de Dota, de la Provincia de San José, Costa Rica, using operating bases in those cantons since 2005 and municipal business licenses (patentes municipales) and operating permits that remain valid as of this date. This is in accordance with Chapter II, “Cross-Border Trade in Services” (“Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios”), of the Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, under Class 6431: Special regular urban and suburban road passenger transportation services (porteo). This constitutional challenge contests Ley N° 8955 because, since its entry into force, no private individual or legal entity may provide compensated passenger transportation services without first holding the corresponding authorization—a concession (concesión) or permit, depending on the applicable category—granted by the Consejo de Transporte Público through the procedures established by the laws regulating that public service.This nationalization (estatización) of private passenger transportation services violates Article 46 of the Political Constitution because the creation of public monopolies requires approval by at least 38 deputies. That procedure was breached because Bill N° 17874, which gave rise to Ley N° 8955, was approved by a committee with full legislative authority, which lacked jurisdiction to approve a law requiring a qualified majority (mayoría calificada) of votes. As correctly stated in this action, a State monopoly is characterized primarily by the elimination of competition and the prohibition against third parties engaging in the activity. Ley N° 8955 expressly establishes the prohibition against engaging in this activity by deleting the word “person” from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio and adding a final paragraph to that article, which provides for these purposes: “The carriage contract (contrato de transporte) governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicle.” This paragraph creates an express prohibition against private parties providing that service; in other words, as the Procuraduría states, it nationalizes a service that had been regulated without difficulty by the Código de Comercio and arose from the parties’ mutual agreement, under which each party’s freedom to decide what best suited that party prevailed, according to their economic interests and needs at that time.Therefore, by eliminating the possibility of privately transporting persons, Ley N° 8955 violates Article 46 of the Political Constitution. As correctly explained in this action, Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, established a State monopoly over public passenger transportation in the taxi category. This monopoly was established through the enactment of a law in disregard of the internal rules of the Asamblea Legislativa, because it was enacted by a committee with full legislative authority. Accordingly, that bill could not be delegated to a full legislative committee because its approval required a qualified majority—at least 38 votes—thereby violating Article 46 of the Political Constitution by making it impossible to satisfy the constitutional requirement of legislative approval by two-thirds of all members of the Asamblea Legislativa. The enactment of Ley N°8955, “Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi,” in force since 2011, violates the approval and incorporation into our legal system of the Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, in breach of Article 7 of our Political Constitution.That international treaty provided that the possibility of offering private transportation services could neither be excluded nor restricted because, at the time of its approval (Diciembre 2007), Costa Rica had private taxi-category transportation services in the form of the porteo of persons. Furthermore, there was no law establishing a State monopoly over public transportation in the taxi category. Ergo, there was no prohibition against providing private taxi-category transportation services. In Chapter ll, “Cross-Border Trade in Services” (“Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios”), of the aforementioned Treaty, Costa Rica established no reservation concerning this commercial activity. Consequently, Ley N°8955 of 2011 violates an agreement incorporated into our legal system. Beyond this circumstance, foreign investors must be afforded the “national treatment” (“trato nacional”) that existed when the Treaty was signed.Costa Rica instead negotiated the liberalization of services, including private passenger transportation in the taxi category. Specifically, it may be found under Class 6431: Regular road passenger transportation services (porteo). Subclass 64312: Special regular urban and suburban road passenger transportation services (taxis). It must be reiterated that, with the enactment of Ley N° 8955, the “porteo of persons” became a “public service” because the law eliminated the possibility of performing it privately by deleting the word “person” from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio, which states: “The carriage contract governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicle.” That same law introduced special regulation for this sector—the stable special taxi service—thereby breaching Article 11.6 of CAFTA because the law reduced “the degree of conformity” with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access).This constitutes an excess of legislative authority because the Asamblea Legislativa assumed a power not granted to it by the Constitution, modifying the content of a treaty when, under the Constitution, its role must be limited to approving or rejecting a treaty, in clear violation of Articles 7, 129, and 140, subsections 3) and 10), of the Constitution. They consider that the arguments presented demonstrate with absolute clarity that the contested provisions violate the principles of free trade, freedom of work, and freedom of movement, breach the Political Constitution, and are therefore unconstitutional. In view of the foregoing, and in their capacity as supporting intervenors for the plaintiff in this matter, they request that this constitutional challenge be granted and, consequently, that the judgment order the following: That Ley N° 8955, “Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999,” be declared unconstitutional for violating Articles 7, 46, 129, and 140 of the Political Constitution, as well as the principles of Primacy of Reality (Supremacía de la Realidad) and hierarchy of norms (Jerarquía normativa).
2. 9By written submission filed at 09:20 hours on 07 de marzo de 2016, Byron Rodolfo Marcos Marcos, in his capacity as President with the powers of a Generalissimo Attorney-in-Fact without limitation as to amount (Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma) of Porteadores León Trece SJT Sociedad Anónima, appears before this Chamber for the purpose of intervening as an active supporting party (coadyuvante activo) on behalf of the plaintiff in this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad), pursuant to Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which provides: “The parties appearing in matters pending as of the date the action is filed, or those having a legitimate interest, may appear therein for the purpose of supporting the arguments that may justify granting or denying it, or, where appropriate, of expanding the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter in which they have an interest.” He bases his standing (legitimación activa) on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which recognizes the possibility of filing a constitutional challenge without an underlying case (asunto base) in cases where, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or where the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or interests concerning the community as a whole is involved.Regarding this latter aspect—or where the defense of diffuse interests is involved—the Chamber has already clarified that the legislature refers to the standing held by active citizens because the right to work is at issue. He states that PORTEADORES LEON TRECE SJ.T. SOCIEDAD ANONIMA has engaged in the private transportation of persons (porteo) since 2005 under this legal arrangement, and since 1995 as a de facto company (sociedad de hecho), through a membership system, the use of motor vehicles, and private contracts relating to the provision of the service, all initially under Article 323 of the Commercial Code in force before its amendment; this commercial activity was reaffirmed by the Free Trade Agreement with respect to road transportation (porteo). With the amendment of Ley 3284, Código de comercio, and Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, of 22 de Diciembre de 1999, the word “person” was removed from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transpone remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N° 7969, created a new category called “Permanent Special Taxi Service” (Servicio especial estable de taxi), which retains the nature of the residual service currently provided through porteo, but is authorized and regulated by operating permits issued by the State.They were compelled to continue performing their work under this new category, with three-year operating permits for all units affiliated with them, without any possibility of renewal, which expired on 7 de Julio del 2015. From that date, after the operating permits had expired, they resumed the service as “private carriers” (porteadores privados), using their operations in the cantons where they provide the service and a platform-based system for transporting persons by motor vehicle. They have provided this service continuously in the Cantón de San José, Provincia de San José, Costa Rica, using their operating base in that canton since 2005 and pursuant to a municipal business license (patente municipal) and operating permits that remain valid to date. This is in accordance with Chapter II, “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” of the Free Trade Agreement with Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, under Class: 6431: regular special urban and suburban passenger transportation services by road (porteo).This constitutional challenge contests Ley N° 8955 because, since its entry into force, no private person—natural or legal—may provide remunerated passenger transportation services unless that person first holds the corresponding authorization—a concession or permit, depending on the applicable mode—granted by the Consejo de Transporte Público through the procedures established by the laws governing that public service. Such nationalization of private passenger transportation services violates Article 46 of the Constitución Política because the creation of public monopolies requires the approval of at least 38 legislators, a procedure that was violated because bill N° 17874, which gave rise to Ley N° 8955, was approved by a committee vested with full legislative authority, which lacked jurisdiction to approve a law requiring a qualified majority vote. As correctly stated in this action, a State monopoly is principally characterized by the elimination of competition and the prohibition against third parties engaging in the activity.Ley N° 8955 expressly establishes the prohibition against engaging in this activity by removing the word “person” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code and adding a final paragraph to that article, which provides: “The transportation contract governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicle.” This paragraph creates an express prohibition against private parties providing that service; that is, as the Procuraduría indicates, it nationalizes a service that had been governed without difficulty by the Commercial Code and arose from the parties’ mutual agreement, under which each party was free to decide what best suited that party’s economic interests and needs at the time. Therefore, he states that Ley N° 8955, by eliminating the possibility of private passenger transportation, violates Article 46 of the Constitución Política. As correctly explained in this action, Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, established a public monopoly over public passenger transportation services in the taxi mode.This monopoly was created through the enactment of a law contrary to the internal regulations of the Asamblea Legislativa, because it was enacted by a committee vested with full legislative authority. Accordingly, that bill could not be delegated to a full legislative committee because its approval required a qualified majority (at least 38 votes), thereby violating Article 46 of the Constitución Política by precluding compliance with the constitutional requirement that it be approved by two-thirds of the entire membership of the Asamblea Legislativa. The enactment of Ley N°8955, “Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011,” violates the approval and incorporation into our legal system of the Free Trade Agreement with Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, in violation of Article 7 of our Constitución Política.That international treaty established that the possibility of providing private transportation services could not be excluded or restricted. At the time of its approval (Diciembre 2007), Costa Rica had private taxi-mode transportation services through the carriage of persons. Moreover, no law had established a public monopoly over public taxi-mode transportation. Therefore, there was no prohibition against providing private taxi-mode transportation services. In Chapter II, “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” of that treaty, Costa Rica made no reservation concerning this commercial activity. For that reason, Ley N°8955 of 2011 violates an agreement incorporated into our legal system. Beyond this, foreign investors must be afforded the “national treatment” that existed when the treaty was signed. Costa Rica instead negotiated the liberalization of services, including private passenger transportation in the taxi mode.Specifically, it may be found under: Class 6431: Regular passenger transportation services by road (porteo). Subclass 64312: Regular special urban and suburban passenger transportation services by road (taxis). It must be reiterated that, with the enactment of Ley N° 8955, “passenger carriage” (porteo de personas) becomes a “public service” because the possibility of privately engaging in it was eliminated by removing the word “person” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, which provides: “The transportation contract governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicle.” That same law introduced special regulations for this sector (permanent special taxi service), thereby violating Article 11.6 of CAFTA because the law reduces “the degree of conformity” with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access). This constitutes an excess of legislative power because the Asamblea Legislativa assumed authority not granted to it by the Constitution by modifying the substantive content of a treaty, when, under the Constitution, its role must be limited to approving or rejecting a treaty, in clear violation of Articles 7, 129, and 140, subsections 3) and 10), of the Constitution.He considers that the arguments presented make it abundantly clear that the challenged provisions violate the principles of free trade, freedom of work, and freedom of movement, contravene the Constitución Política, and are therefore unconstitutional. In view of the foregoing, and in their capacity as supporting parties for the plaintiff in this matter, they request that this constitutional challenge be granted and, consequently, that the judgment order the following: that Ley N° 8955, “Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999,” be declared unconstitutional for violating Articles 7, 46, 129, and 140 of the Constitución Política, as well as the principles of primacy of reality (Supremacía de la Realidad) and hierarchy of norms (Jerarquía normativa).
3. 10By a written submission filed at 09:28 hours on 07 de marzo de 2016, Roberth Rodríguez Hernández, in his capacity as President with powers of general attorney-in-fact without limitation as to amount of SE M TRA SAN RAFAEL SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, appeared before this Chamber to participate as an active supporting intervenor (coadyuvante activo) for the plaintiff in this action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad), pursuant to Article 83 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Act (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), which provides: “The parties appearing in matters pending on the date the action is filed, or those having a legitimate interest, may appear therein to support the arguments that may justify granting or denying it or, where appropriate, to expand the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter in which they have an interest.” It bases its standing (legitimación activa) on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Act, which recognizes the possibility of filing an action of unconstitutionality without an underlying case (asunto base) where, because of the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or where the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or interests concerning the community as a whole is involved.Regarding this latter aspect—or where the defense of diffuse interests is involved—the Chamber has already clarified that the legislature refers to the standing held by active citizens because the right to work is at issue. It states that SE M TRA SAN RAFAEL SOCIEDAD ANONIMA has engaged in the private transportation of persons (porteo) since 2005 through this legal arrangement, and since 1995 as a de facto company (sociedad de hecho), using a membership system, motor vehicles, and private contracts concerning the provision of the service. All of the foregoing was initially carried out under Article 323 of the Commercial Code in force before its amendment, and this commercial activity was reaffirmed by the Free Trade Agreement with respect to carriage by road (porteo). The amendment of Ley 3284, Commercial Code, and Ley N° 7969, Act Regulating the Public Service of Paid Transportation of Persons by Vehicles in the Taxi Modality, of 22 de Diciembre de1999, removed the word “person” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code and created, under Ley N° 7969, Act Regulating the Public Service of Paid Transportation of Persons in the Taxi Modality, a new arrangement called the “Permanent Special Taxi Service” (Servicio especial estable de taxi), which retains the nature of the residual service currently provided through private carriage but is covered and regulated by operating permits issued by the State.They were thus compelled to continue performing their work under this new arrangement, with three-year operating permits for all vehicles affiliated with them, without the possibility of renewal, which expired on 7 de Julio del 2015. From that date, following the expiration of their operating permits, they resumed their service as “private carriers” (portadores privados), using operating bases in the cantons where they provide the service and a platform system for the carriage of persons by motor vehicles. They have provided this service without interruption in the Cantón de San Rafael, Provincia de Heredia, Costa Rica, using the operating base in that canton since 2005 and relying on the municipal business license (patente municipal) and operating permits currently in force. This is in accordance with Chapter II, “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” of the Free Trade Agreement with Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, under Class 6431: Special regular urban and suburban passenger transportation services by road (porteo).This action of unconstitutionality challenges Ley N° 8955 because, since its entry into force, no private person—natural or legal—may provide paid passenger transportation services unless that person first possesses the respective authorization—a concession or permit, depending on the applicable modality—granted by the Consejo de Transporte Público through the procedures established by the laws governing that public service. This nationalization of private passenger transportation services violates Article 46 of the Political Constitution because the creation of public monopolies requires the approval of at least 38 deputies. That procedure was violated because bill N° 17874, which gave rise to Ley N° 8955, was approved by a Full Legislative Powers Committee (Comisión con potestad legislativa plena), which lacked jurisdiction to approve a law requiring a qualified majority of votes. As correctly stated in this action, a State monopoly is characterized primarily by the elimination of competition and the prohibition against third parties carrying out the activity.Ley N° 8955 expressly establishes a prohibition against engaging in this activity by removing the word “person” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code and adding a final paragraph to that article, which provides, for the relevant purposes: “The contract of carriage governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicles.” This paragraph creates an express prohibition against private parties providing that service; in other words, as the Procuraduría states, it nationalizes a service that had been governed without any difficulty by the Commercial Code and arose from the parties’ mutual agreement, under which each person’s freedom to decide what best suited that person prevailed, according to their economic interests and needs at the time. Therefore, it states that Ley N° 8955, by eliminating the possibility of private passenger transportation, violates Article 46 of the Political Constitution.As correctly explained in this action, Ley 8955, amending Ley 3284 and Ley 7969, established a public monopoly over public passenger transportation in the taxi modality. This monopoly was established through the enactment of a law in contravention of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Assembly because it was enacted by a Full Legislative Powers Committee. That bill could not be delegated to such a committee because its approval required a qualified majority—at least 38 votes—and Article 46 of the Political Constitution was therefore violated by preventing compliance with the constitutional requirement of legislative approval by two-thirds of all members of the Legislative Assembly. The enactment of Ley N°8955, “Amendment to Ley N°3284, Commercial Code, and Ley 7969, Act Regulating the Public Service of Paid Transportation of Persons by Vehicles in the Taxi Modality,” effective as of 2011, violates the approval and incorporation into our legal system of the Free Trade Agreement with Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, in breach of Article 7 of our Political Constitution.That international treaty established that the possibility of providing private transportation services could not be excluded or restricted. This is because, when it was approved (Diciembre 2007), Costa Rica had private taxi-modality transportation services through the arrangement for the private carriage of persons. Moreover, no law had established a public monopoly over public transportation in the taxi modality. Therefore, there was no prohibition against providing private transportation services in the taxi modality. In Chapter II, “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” of that Treaty, Costa Rica established no reservation regarding this commercial activity. Accordingly, Ley N°8955 of 2011 violates an agreement incorporated into our legal system. Beyond this circumstance, foreign investors must be afforded the “national treatment” (trato nacional) that existed when the Treaty was signed. Costa Rica instead negotiated the liberalization of services, including private passenger transportation in the taxi modality.Specifically, it can be found under Class 6431: Regular passenger transportation services by road (porteo). Subclass 64312: Special regular urban and suburban passenger transportation services by road (taxis). It must be reiterated that, with the enactment of Ley N° 8955, the “private carriage of persons” became a “public service” because the possibility of engaging in it privately was eliminated through the removal of the word “person” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, which provides: “The contract of carriage governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicles.” That same Law introduced special regulations for this sector—the Permanent Special Taxi Service—thereby contravening Article 11.6 of CAFTA because the Law reduced “the degree of conformity” with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access). This constitutes an excess of legislative authority because the Legislative Assembly assumed a power not granted to it by the Constitution: it modified the substance of a treaty even though, under the Constitution, its role must be limited to approving or rejecting a treaty, in clear violation of Articles 7, 129, and 140, subsections 3) and 10), of the Constitution.They consider that the arguments presented make it abundantly clear that the challenged provisions violate the principles of free trade, freedom of work, and freedom of movement, contravene the Political Constitution, and are therefore unconstitutional. In view of the foregoing, and in their capacity as supporting intervenors for the plaintiff in this matter, they request that this action of unconstitutionality be granted and, consequently, that the judgment order the following: that Ley N° 8955, “Amendment to Ley N° 3284, Commercial Code, and Amendment to Ley N° 7969, Act Regulating the Public Service of Paid Transportation of Persons by Vehicles in the Taxi Modality, of 22 de diciembre de l.999,” be declared unconstitutional for violating Articles 7, 46, 129, and 140 of the Political Constitution, as well as the principles of Primacy of Reality (Supremacía de la Realidad) and Hierarchy of Norms (Jerarquía normativa).
4. 11In a written submission filed at 09:37 on 07 de marzo de 2016, Edwin Gerardo Zamora Salas, in his capacity as President vested with powers of a general attorney-in-fact without limit as to amount (Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma) of TRANSPORTES PRIVADOS HNOS ZAMORA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, appears before this Chamber to participate as a supporting intervenor (coadyuvante) for the plaintiff in this action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad), pursuant to Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which provides: “The parties appearing in matters pending on the date the action is filed, or those having a legitimate interest, may enter an appearance therein in order to support the arguments that may justify granting or denying it or, where appropriate, to expand the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter in which they have an interest.” He bases his standing (legitimación activa) on the provisions of Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which recognizes the possibility of filing an action of unconstitutionality without an underlying case (asunto base) where, because of the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or where the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos), or interests concerning the community as a whole, is involved.Regarding this latter aspect—or where the defense of diffuse interests is involved—the Chamber has already clarified that the legislature refers to the standing held by active citizens because the right to work is at issue. He states that TRANSPORTES PRIVADOS HNOS ZAMORA SOCIEDAD ANONIMA has engaged in the private transportation of persons (porteo) since 2010 under the present legal form and, since 2003, as a de facto company (sociedad de hecho), through a membership system, the use of motor vehicles, and private contracts relating to the provision of the service, all initially pursuant to Article 323 of the Commercial Code in force before its amendment, with this commercial activity being reaffirmed by the Free Trade Agreement with respect to road transportation (porteo). The amendment of Ley 3284, Código de Comercio, and Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transpone remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, of 22 de Diciembre de1999, removed the word “person” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code and created, under Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N° 7969, a new category called “Permanent Special Taxi Service” (Servicio especial estable de taxi), which preserves the nature of the residual service currently provided through private carriage, but is covered and regulated by operating permits issued by the State.They were thereby compelled to continue performing their work under this new category, with a three-year operating permit for all vehicles affiliated with them, without any possibility of renewal, which expired on 7 de Julio del 2015. From that date, after their operating permits had expired, they resumed their service as “private carriers” (porteadores privados), using operating bases in the cantons where we provide the service and a platform-based system for the private carriage of persons by motor vehicle. We have provided this service continuously in Cantón de Poas, Provincia de Alajuela, Costa Rica, using the operating base in that canton since 2010 and using the municipal business license (patente municipal) and operating permits that remain valid to date. This is in accordance with Chapter II, “Cross-Border Trade in Services” (Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios), of the Free Trade Agreement with Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, under Class 6431: Regular special urban and suburban passenger transportation services by road (porteo).This action of unconstitutionality challenges Ley N° 8955 because, since its entry into force, no private individual or entity may provide paid passenger transportation services unless it first holds the corresponding authorization—a concession or permit, depending on the applicable mode—granted by the Consejo de Transporte Público through the procedures established by the laws governing that public service. Such nationalization (estatización) of the private passenger transportation service violates Article 46 of the Constitución Política because the creation of public monopolies requires approval by at least 38 legislators, and that procedure was violated because bill N° 17874, which gave rise to Ley N° 8955, was approved by a committee vested with full legislative authority, which lacked jurisdiction to approve a law requiring a qualified majority of votes. As correctly stated in this action, a monopoly in favor of the State is characterized primarily by the elimination of competition and the prohibition against third parties engaging in the activity.Ley N° 8955 expressly establishes the prohibition against engaging in this activity by removing the word “person” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code and adding a final paragraph to that article, which provides for these purposes: “The transportation contract governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicle.” This paragraph creates an express prohibition against private parties providing that service; in other words, as the Procuraduría states, it nationalizes a service that had been governed without difficulty by the Commercial Code and arose from the parties’ mutual agreement, under which each party’s freedom to decide what best suited that party prevailed, according to their economic interests and needs at that time. Accordingly, he states that Ley N° 8955, by eliminating the possibility of private passenger transportation, violates Article 46 of the Constitución Política.As correctly explained in this action, Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, established a public monopoly over public passenger transportation in the taxi mode. This monopoly was created through the enactment of a law in disregard of the internal regulations of the Asamblea Legislativa, because it was approved by a committee vested with full legislative authority. That bill could not therefore be delegated to a full legislative committee because its approval required a qualified majority (at least 38 votes), thereby violating Article 46 of the Constitución Política by preventing compliance with the constitutional requirement that it be approved by two-thirds of the entire membership of the Asamblea Legislativa. The enactment of Ley N°8955, “Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi,” effective since 2011, violates the approval and incorporation into our legal system of the Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, in violation of Article 7 of our Constitución Política.That international treaty established that the possibility of providing private transportation services could neither be excluded nor restricted. At the time of its approval (Diciembre 2007), Costa Rica had private taxi-mode transportation services under the category of private carriage of persons. Furthermore, no law had established a public monopoly over public transportation in the taxi mode. Therefore, there was no prohibition against providing private transportation services in the taxi mode. In Chapter II, “Cross-Border Trade in Services” (Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios), of that Treaty, Costa Rica established no reservation concerning this commercial activity. For that reason, Ley N°8955 of 2011 violates an agreement incorporated into our legal system. Beyond this, it must offer foreign investors the “national treatment” (trato nacional) that existed when we signed the Treaty.Costa Rica instead negotiated the liberalization of services, including private passenger transportation in the taxi mode. Specifically, it may be found under: Class 6431: Regular passenger transportation services by road (porteo). Subclass 64312: Regular special urban and suburban passenger transportation services by road (taxis). It must be reiterated that, with the enactment of Ley N° 8955, the “private carriage of persons” (porteo de personas) becomes a “public service” because the removal of the word “person” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code eliminates the possibility of providing it privately; that article states: “The transportation contract governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicle.” That same Law introduces special regulations for this sector (permanent special taxi service), thereby violating the text of Article 11.6 of CAFTA because the Law reduces the “degree of conformity” with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access), constituting an excess of legislative power because the Asamblea Legislativa assumed authority not granted to it by the Constitution: it modifies the content of a treaty when, under the Constitution, its function must be limited to approving or rejecting a treaty, in clear violation of Articles 7, 129, and 140, subsections 3) and 10), of the Constitution.They consider that the arguments presented demonstrate with unmistakable clarity that the challenged provisions violate the principles of free trade, freedom to work, and freedom of movement; contravene the Constitución Política; and are therefore unconstitutional. In view of the foregoing, and in their capacity as supporting intervenors for the plaintiff in this matter, they request that this action of unconstitutionality be granted and, consequently, that the judgment order the following: That Ley N° 8955, “Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999,” be declared unconstitutional for violating Articles 7, 46, 129, and 140 of the Constitución Política, as well as the principles of the Primacy of Reality (Supremacía de la Realidad) and Hierarchy of Norms (Jerarquía normativa).
5. 12By a written submission filed at 09:39 hours on 07 de marzo de 2016, Irma Isabel Loría Araya, in her capacity as President with the powers of a general attorney-in-fact without limitation as to amount of SERVICIO DE TRANSPORTES PRIVADOS LUMA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, appeared before this Chamber to intervene as a supporting intervenor (coadyuvante) for the petitioner in this action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad), pursuant to Article 83 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), which provides: “The parties appearing in matters pending as of the date on which the action is filed, and those having a legitimate interest, may enter an appearance therein in order to support the arguments that may justify granting or denying it, or, where appropriate, to expand the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter in which they have an interest.” It bases its standing (legitimación activa) on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, which recognizes the possibility of filing an action of unconstitutionality without an underlying case (asunto base) where, owing to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, where the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) is involved, or where the matter concerns the community as a whole.Regarding this last aspect—or where the defense of diffuse interests is involved—the Chamber has already clarified that the legislature refers to the standing held by active citizens because the right to work is at issue. It states that SERVICIO DE TRANSPORTES PRIVADOS LUMA SOCIEDAD ANONIMA has engaged in the private transportation of persons (porteo) since 2007 under this legal arrangement and, since 2005, as a de facto company (sociedad de hecho), through a membership system, the use of motor vehicles, and private contracts concerning the provision of the service, initially pursuant to Article 323 of the Commercial Code in force before its amendment; this commercial activity was reaffirmed by the Free Trade Agreement with respect to road transportation (porteo). Through the amendment of Ley 3284, Commercial Code, and Ley N° 7969, Law Regulating the Public Service of Paid Transportation of Persons in Taxi-Mode Vehicles, of 22 de Diciembre de 1999, the word “person” was removed from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and a new category called the “Permanent Special Taxi Service” (Servicio especial estable de taxi) was created under the Law Regulating the Public Service of Paid Transportation of Persons in Taxi Mode, N°7969; it retained the nature of the residual service currently provided through private carriage, but was subject to and regulated by operating permits issued by the State.They were compelled to continue performing their work under this new category, with a three-year operating permit for all vehicles affiliated with them, without the possibility of renewal, which expired on 7 de Julio del 2015. From that date, after their operating permits had expired, they resumed their service as “private carriers” (porteadores privados), using operating bases in the cantons where they provide the service and a platform-based system for the carriage of persons by motor vehicle. They have provided this service continuously in the Cantón de Cañas, Provincia de Guanacaste, Costa Rica, using their operating base in that canton since 2007 and operating under a municipal business license (patente municipal) and operating permits that remain in force to date. This is in accordance with Chapter II, “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” of the Free Trade Agreement with Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, under Class 6431: Regular special urban and suburban road passenger-transport services (porteo).This action of unconstitutionality challenges Ley N° 8955 because, since its entry into force, no private individual or legal entity may provide paid passenger-transport services unless it first obtains the corresponding authorization—a concession or permit, depending on the applicable mode—granted by the Public Transportation Council (Consejo de Transporte Público) through the procedures established by the laws governing that public service. Such nationalization of the private passenger-transport service violates Article 46 of the Political Constitution because the creation of public monopolies requires approval by at least 38 legislators. That procedure was violated because bill N° 17874, which gave rise to Ley N° 8955, was approved by a Commission with Full Legislative Powers (Comisión con potestad legislativa plena), which lacked jurisdiction to approve a law requiring a qualified majority of votes.As correctly stated in this action, a State monopoly is characterized primarily by the elimination of competition and the prohibition against third parties carrying out the activity. Ley N° 8955 expressly establishes the prohibition against engaging in this activity by removing the word “person” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code and adding a final paragraph to that article, which provides for these purposes: “The contract of carriage governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicle.” This paragraph creates an express prohibition against private parties providing that service; in other words, as the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría) states, it nationalizes a service that had been regulated without difficulty under the Commercial Code and that arose from the parties’ mutual agreement, governed by their freedom to decide what best suited each of them according to their economic interests and needs at the time.Por tanto, it states that Ley N° 8955, by eliminating the possibility of privately transporting persons, violates Article 46 of the Political Constitution. As correctly explained in this action, Ley 8955, amending Ley 3284 and Ley 7969, established a public monopoly over the public transportation of persons by taxi. This monopoly was established through the enactment of a law outside the framework of the Legislative Assembly’s internal rules because it was enacted by a commission with full legislative powers. Accordingly, the bill could not be delegated to a Full Legislative Commission because its approval required a qualified majority of at least 38 votes; Article 46 of the Political Constitution was thus violated by making it impossible to satisfy the constitutional requirement of approval by two-thirds of all members of the Legislative Assembly. The enactment of Ley N°8955, “Amendment to Ley N°3284, Commercial Code, and Ley 7969, Law Regulating the Public Service of Paid Transportation of Persons in Taxi-Mode Vehicles,” in force since 2011, violates the approval and incorporation into our legal system of the Free Trade Agreement with Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, contrary to Article 7 of our Political Constitution.That international treaty established that the possibility of providing private transportation services could neither be excluded nor restricted. At the time of its approval (Diciembre 2007), Costa Rica had private taxi-mode transportation services under the arrangement for the private carriage of persons. Moreover, no law had established a public monopoly over public taxi transportation. Therefore, there was no prohibition against providing private taxi-mode transportation services. In Chapter II, “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” of the aforementioned Treaty, Costa Rica made no reservation concerning this commercial activity. Ley N°8955 of 2011 therefore violates an agreement incorporated into our legal system. Beyond this circumstance, Costa Rica must provide foreign investors with the “national treatment” that existed when the Treaty was signed. Costa Rica instead negotiated the liberalization of services, including private passenger transportation by taxi.Specifically, it can be found under: Class 6431: Regular road passenger-transport services (porteo). Subclass 64312: Regular special urban and suburban road passenger-transport services (taxis). It must be reiterated that, with the enactment of Ley N° 8955, the “private carriage of persons” (porteo de personas) became a “public service” because the law eliminated the possibility of providing it privately by removing the word “person” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, which states: “The contract of carriage governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicle.” That same Law introduced special regulations for this sector (permanent special taxi service), thereby violating Article 11.6 of CAFTA because the law diminished “the degree of conformity” with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access). This constitutes an excess of legislative authority because the Legislative Assembly assumed a power not granted to it by the Constitution: it amended the substance of a treaty even though, under the Constitution, its role must be limited to approving or rejecting a treaty, in clear violation of Articles 7, 129, and 140, subsections 3) and 10), of the Constitution.They consider that the foregoing arguments make it abundantly clear that the challenged provisions violate the principles of free trade, freedom to work, and freedom of movement; contravene the Political Constitution; and are therefore unconstitutional. In view of the foregoing, and in their capacity as supporting intervenors for the petitioner in this matter, they request that this action of unconstitutionality be granted and, consequently, that the judgment order the following: that Ley N° 8955, “Amendment to Ley N° 3284, Commercial Code, and Amendment to Ley N° 7969, Law Regulating the Public Service of Paid Transportation of Persons in Taxi-Mode Vehicles, of 22 de diciembre de l.999,” be declared unconstitutional for violating Articles 7, 46, 129, and 140 of the Political Constitution, as well as the principles of primacy of reality (Supremacía de la Realidad) and hierarchy of norms (Jerarquía normativa).
6. 13By a written submission filed at 13:09 hours on 07 de marzo de 2016, Carlos Rigoberto Solís Castro, in his capacity as President with the powers of a general agent with fullest powers and no monetary limit (Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma) of Transportes CR Porteadores Sociedad Anónima, appears before this Chamber for the purpose of intervening as an active supporting intervenor (coadyuvante activo) for the petitioner in this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad), pursuant to Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which provides: “The parties appearing in matters pending on the date the challenge is filed, or those with a legitimate interest, may enter an appearance therein for the purpose of supporting the arguments that may justify granting or denying it or, where appropriate, expanding the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter in which they have an interest.” He bases his standing (legitimación activa) on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which recognizes the possibility of filing a constitutional challenge without an underlying case (asunto base) when, owing to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or when the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or interests concerning the community as a whole is involved.Regarding this latter circumstance—or the defense of diffuse interests—the Chamber has already clarified that the legislature refers to the standing held by active citizens because the right to work is involved. He states that TRANSPORTES CR PORTEADORES SOCIEDAD ANONIMA has been engaged in the private transportation of persons (porteo) since 2006 through this legal arrangement, and since 2005 as a de facto company (sociedad de hecho), using an affiliation system, motor vehicles, and private contracts relating to the provision of the service, all initially under Article 323 of the Código de Comercio in force before its amendment, with this commercial activity reaffirmed by the Free Trade Agreement regarding road transportation (porteo). With the amendment of Ley 3284, Código de Comercio, and Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, of 22 de Diciembre de 1999, the word “person” was removed from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio, and a new category called “Permanent Special Taxi Service” (“Servicio especial estable de taxi”) was created under Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N° 7969.This category retains the nature of the residual service currently provided through porteo, but is authorized and regulated through operating permits (permisos de operación) issued by the State. They were compelled to continue performing their work under this new category, with a three-year operating permit for all units affiliated with them, without the possibility of renewal, which expired on 7 de Julio del 2015. From that date, after the operating permits had expired, they resumed the service as “private porteadores,” using operating bases in the cantons where they provide the service and a motor-vehicle-based platform system for the porteo of persons. They have provided this service continuously in the Cantón de Valverde Vega, Provincia de Alajuela, Costa Rica, using an operating base in that canton since 2006 and holding a municipal business license (patente municipal) and operating permits that remain valid as of this date.This is in accordance with Chapter II, “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” of the Free Trade Agreement with Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, under Class 6431: Regular urban and suburban special passenger transportation services by road (porteo). This constitutional challenge contests Ley N° 8955 because, since its entry into force, no private person—natural or legal—may provide compensated passenger transportation services unless that person has first obtained the corresponding authorization—a concession or permit, depending on the type of service—granted by the Consejo de Transporte Público through the procedures established by the laws governing that public service. Such nationalization (estatización) of private passenger transportation services violates Article 46 of the Constitución Política because the creation of public monopolies requires approval by at least 38 legislators, a procedure that was violated because bill N° 17874, which gave rise to Ley N° 8955, was approved by a Committee with Full Legislative Powers (Comisión con potestad legislativa plena), which lacked jurisdiction to approve a law requiring a qualified majority of votes.As correctly stated in this challenge, a State monopoly is characterized primarily by the elimination of competition and the prohibition against third parties engaging in the activity. Ley N° 8955 expressly establishes a prohibition against engaging in this activity by removing the word “person” from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio and adding a final paragraph to that article, which provides for these purposes: “The contract of carriage governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicles.” This paragraph creates an express prohibition against private parties providing that service; in other words, as the Procuraduría states, it nationalizes a service that had been governed without difficulty by the Código de Comercio and that arose from the parties’ mutual agreement, under which each party’s freedom to decide what was most suitable according to its economic interests and needs at that time prevailed.Accordingly, he states that Ley N° 8955, by eliminating the possibility of private passenger transportation, violates Article 46 of the Constitución Política. As correctly explained in this challenge, Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, established a public monopoly over public passenger transportation in the taxi modality. This monopoly was created through the enactment of a law in disregard of the internal rules of the Asamblea Legislativa, because it was enacted by a committee with full legislative powers. That bill therefore could not be delegated to such a committee because its approval required a qualified majority (at least 38 votes), thereby violating Article 46 of the Constitución Política by preventing compliance with the constitutional requirement that it be approved by two-thirds of all members of the Asamblea Legislativa. The enactment of Ley N°8955, “Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi,” in force since 2011, contravenes the approval and incorporation into our legal system of the Free Trade Agreement with Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, in violation of Article 7 of our Constitución Política.That international treaty established that the possibility of providing private transportation services could not be excluded or restricted. At the time of its approval (Diciembre 2007), Costa Rica had private taxi transportation services under the arrangement known as porteo of persons. Moreover, no law had established a public monopoly over public transportation in the taxi modality. Therefore, there was no prohibition against providing private transportation services in the taxi modality. In Chapter II, “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” of that Treaty, Costa Rica made no reservation concerning this commercial activity. For that reason, Ley N°8955 of 2011 violates an agreement incorporated into our legal system. Beyond this situation, Costa Rica must offer foreign investors the “national treatment” (“trato nacional”) applicable when the Treaty was signed. Costa Rica instead negotiated the liberalization of services, including private passenger transportation in the taxi modality.Specifically, it can be found under: Class 6431: Regular passenger transportation services by road (porteo). Subclass 64312: Regular urban and suburban special passenger transportation services by road (taxis). It must be reiterated that, upon the enactment of Ley N° 8955, the “porteo of persons” became a “public service” because the law eliminated the possibility of privately engaging in it by removing the word “person” from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio, which states: “The contract of carriage governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicles.” That same law introduced special regulation for this sector (Permanent Special Taxi Service), thereby contravening the text of Article 11.6 of CAFTA because the law reduces “the degree of conformity” with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access). This constitutes an excess of legislative power because the Asamblea Legislativa assumed authority not granted to it by the Constitución: it modifies the substantive content of a treaty even though, under the Constitución, its function must be limited to approving or rejecting a treaty, in clear violation of Articles 7, 129, and 140, subsections 3) and 10), of the Constitución.They consider that the arguments presented demonstrate with absolute clarity that the challenged provisions violate the principles of free trade, freedom of work, and freedom of movement, contravene the Constitución Política, and are therefore unconstitutional. In view of the foregoing, and in their capacity as supporting intervenors for the petitioner in this matter, they request that this constitutional challenge be granted and, consequently, that the judgment order the following: Ley N° 8955, “Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999,” shall be declared unconstitutional for violating Articles 7, 46, 129, and 140 of the Constitución Política, as well as the principles of primacy of reality (Supremacía de la Realidad) and hierarchy of legal norms (Jerarquía normativa).
7. 14By a written submission filed at 10:03 hours on 07 de marzo de 2016, Luis Enrique Moreno Carmona, in his capacity as President with powers of a general attorney-in-fact without limitation as to amount (Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma) of Unión de Porteadores LÑMC dos mil seis sociedad anónima, appeared before this Chamber in order to participate as an intervenor (coadyuvante) supporting the petitioner in this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad), pursuant to Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which provides: “The parties appearing in matters pending on the date the action is filed, or those having a legitimate interest, may enter an appearance therein in order to support the arguments that may justify granting or denying it or, where appropriate, to expand the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter in which they have an interest.” He bases his standing (legitimación activa) on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which recognizes the possibility of filing a constitutional challenge without an underlying proceeding (asunto base) in cases where, because of the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, where the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) is involved, or where the matter concerns the community as a whole.Regarding this latter aspect—or where the defense of diffuse interests is involved—the Chamber has already specified that the legislature refers to the standing held by active citizens because the right to work is at issue. He states that UNIÓN DE PORTEADORES LÑMC DOS MIL SEIS SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA has engaged in the private transportation of persons (porteo) since 2006 through the present legal entity, and since 2000 as a de facto company (sociedad de hecho), through a membership system, the use of motor vehicles, and private contracts relating to the provision of the service, all of the foregoing initially under Article 323 of the Código de Comercio in force before its amendment, with this commercial activity being reaffirmed by the tratado de Libre Comercio con carretera (porteo). With the amendment of Ley 3284, Código de comercio, and Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de 1999, the word “persona” was removed from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio, and a new category called “Servicio especial estable de taxi” was created under the Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N° 7969.This category retains the nature of the residual service currently provided through porteo, but is authorized and regulated by operating permits issued by the State. They were thereby required to continue performing their work under this new category, with a three-year operating permit for all units affiliated with them, without the possibility of renewal, which expired on 7 de Julio del 2015. From that date, after the operating permits had expired, they resumed the service as “porteadores privados,” using operating bases in the cantons where they provide the service and operating under a platform system for the service of transporting persons by motor vehicle. They had provided this service uninterruptedly in the Cantón de Santa Cruz, Provincia de Guanacaste, Costa Rica, using the operating base in that canton since 2006 and using a municipal business license (patente municipal) and operating permits valid as of the date hereof.This was done pursuant to Capitulo II “Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios” of the tratado de libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, under Clase 6431. Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regula res de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). This constitutional challenge contests Ley N° 8955 because, since its entry into force, no private individual or legal entity may provide compensated passenger transportation services unless it first holds the corresponding authorization—a concession or permit, depending on the applicable category—granted by the Consejo de Transporte Público through the procedures established by the laws governing that public service. This nationalization (estatización) of private passenger transportation services violates Article 46 of the Constitución Política because the creation of public monopolies requires the approval of at least 38 legislators.That procedure was violated because bill N° 17874, which gave rise to Ley N° 8955, was approved by a committee vested with full legislative authority, which lacked jurisdiction to approve a law requiring a qualified majority of votes. As correctly stated in this action, a State monopoly is characterized primarily by the elimination of competition and the prohibition against third parties carrying out the activity. Ley N° 8955 expressly establishes a prohibition against engaging in this activity by removing the word “persona” from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio and adding a final paragraph to that article, which provides for these purposes: “The contract of carriage (contrato de transporte) governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicle.” This paragraph creates an express prohibition against private parties providing that service; in other words, as the Procuraduría states, it nationalizes a service that had been regulated without difficulty in the Código de Comercio and that arose from the parties’ mutual consent, under which each person’s freedom to decide what best served them prevailed, according to their economic interests and their needs at the time.Therefore, he states that Ley N° 8955, by eliminating the possibility of private passenger transportation, violates Article 46 of the Constitución Política. As correctly explained in this action, Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, established a public monopoly over public passenger transportation in the taxi category. This monopoly was created through the enactment of a law outside the internal rules of the Asamblea Legislativa, because it was enacted by a committee vested with full legislative authority. Accordingly, that bill could not be delegated to a full legislative committee because its approval required a qualified majority (at least 38 votes), thereby violating Article 46 of the Constitución Política by making it impossible to satisfy the constitutional requirement that it be approved by two-thirds of all members of the Asamblea Legislativa. The enactment of Ley N°8955, “Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi,” in force since 2011, violates the approval and incorporation into our legal system of the Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, in violation of Article 7 of our Constitución Política.That international treaty established that the possibility of providing private transportation services could not be excluded or restricted. At the time of its approval (Diciembre 2007), Costa Rica had private taxi-category transportation services in the form of passenger porteo. Moreover, no law had established a public monopoly over public transportation in the taxi category. Therefore, there was no prohibition against providing private transportation services in the taxi category. In Capítulo II “Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios” of that treaty, Costa Rica made no reservation regarding this commercial activity. For that reason, Ley N°8955 of 2011 violates an agreement incorporated into our legal system (Ordenamiento Jurídico). Beyond this circumstance, Costa Rica must afford foreign investors the “national treatment” (trato nacional) that existed when the treaty was signed. Costa Rica instead negotiated the liberalization of services, including private passenger transportation services in the taxi category.Specifically, this can be found under: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). It must be reiterated that, with the enactment of Ley N° 8955, “porteo de personas” became a “servicio público,” because the removal of the word “persona” from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio eliminated the possibility of privately engaging in that activity. The article states: “The contract of carriage governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicle.” That same law introduced special regulations for this sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), thereby violating Article 11.6 of CAFTA because the law reduces the “degree of conformity” with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access). This constitutes an excess of legislative authority, because the Asamblea Legislativa assumed a power not granted to it by the Constitución, modifying the substance of a treaty when, under the Constitución, its role must be limited to approving or rejecting a treaty, in clear violation of Articles 7, 129 and 140, subsections 3) and 10), of the Constitución.They consider that the arguments presented show with absolute clarity that the challenged provisions violate the principles of free trade, freedom to work, and freedom of movement; contravene the Constitución Política; and are therefore unconstitutional. In view of the foregoing, and in their capacity as intervenors supporting the petitioner in this matter, they request that this constitutional challenge be granted and, consequently, that the judgment order the following: that Ley N° 8955, “Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999,” be declared unconstitutional for violating Articles 7, 46, 129, and 140 of the Constitución Política, as well as the principles of primacy of reality (Supremacía de la Realidad) and normative hierarchy (Jerarquía normativa).
8. 15The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic submitted its written report, which was received by the Clerk’s Office of this Chamber at 14:30 hours on March 7, 2016 (folio 310 of the case file). Regarding the merits of the matter, it states that the petitioners contend that Law No. 8955 is unconstitutional because it creates a public monopoly over paid passenger transportation (transporte remunerado de personas) in taxi vehicles without following the legislative procedure established for such purposes (qualified-majority vote), and because it violates the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America. In this regard, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic considers that the petitioners’ objections are unfounded and that, to the contrary, it is not true that the challenged law infringes the cited constitutional rules and principles.It explains that paid passenger transportation, in its various forms, constitutes a public service (servicio público). Indeed, the Law Regulating Paid Passenger Transportation in Motor Vehicles, No. 3503 of May 10, 1965, classifies paid passenger transportation in collective motor vehicles as a regulated, controlled, and supervised public service under the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation, the provision of which may be delegated to private parties who are expressly authorized, in accordance with the rules established in that law (Articles 1 and 2). Along the same lines, it states that the Law Regulating the Public Service of Paid Passenger Transportation in Taxi Vehicles, No. 7969 of December 22, 1999, defined this means of transportation as a public service operated through an administrative concession (concesión administrativa), under the special procedures established in that law and its regulations (Article 2).It further notes that the amendment to Article 2 of Law 7969, introduced specifically by Article 2 of Law 8955 of June 16, 2011, establishes paid passenger transportation in any type of motor vehicle as a public service. It states, however, that the concept of public service is not static but, rather, is a changing concept, since it depends on the legislature’s classification of an economic activity at a particular historical moment. “Public service designation” (“publicatio”) is precisely the constitutional or statutory declaration defining an activity as a public service. This declaration may consist simply of defining the activity as being in the public interest, or of expressly classifying the activity as a public service. It further asserts that, concerning the concept and defining characteristics of public services, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic has stated that, according to French and Spanish legal scholarship, a public service is an administrative activity whose purpose is to provide a public service in order to meet a collective need.It also states that a public service has three characteristics: it is an activity inherent to the Administration; it seeks to provide a service to the public; and it guarantees that the service will be provided effectively. Accordingly, it notes that a public service is inherently the responsibility of the Administration, without excluding the possibility of private-party participation in public administration through a public-service concession (concesión de un servicio público). It states, in accordance with Spanish legal scholarship, that a public service, in the strict sense, constitutes a form of administrative activity intended to make useful services available to private parties, and that it entails a decision by public authorities to guarantee such provision—public service designation. It explains that the service is characterized by public ownership—from which private initiative is excluded—and by the provision of services that satisfy the community’s general interests in order to ensure a decent quality of life for the population.Accordingly, it states that its public nature presupposes a declaration by public authorities and notes that non-state actors may participate in providing the service, provided that they obtain authorization from the State. Regarding the effects of declaring a particular activity to be a public service, it states that, first, this entails its nationalization (nacionalización), vesting ownership in the State so that only the State or an authorized private party may provide the service; and, second, the activity is removed from private commerce, meaning that private parties may engage in it only through State concessions or permits. It further states that there can be no doubt that paid passenger transportation in motor vehicles—in its various bus and taxi forms—constitutes a public service; through the challenged law, the legislature, within the framework permitted by the Political Constitution, chose to declare all paid passenger transportation activity a public service, given the importance of that activity to Costa Rican society.Indeed, it notes that, under the amendment made by the cited law to Law No. 7969, paid passenger transportation constitutes a public service regardless of the type of motor vehicle used, the persons for whom it is intended—whether offered to the general public or to users from specified groups—or State involvement in determining the operating system or oversight. It states that, consequently, since Law No. 8955 entered into force, no private person—whether an individual or legal entity—may provide paid passenger transportation without first obtaining the corresponding authorization—a concession or permit—granted by the Public Transportation Council through the procedures established in the laws governing that public service. Given its nature as a public service, it is logical that paid passenger transportation must be provided by the State on a monopoly basis; it may, however, be delegated to private parties through a concession or permit, depending on the form of transportation involved.It cites several constitutional precedents and notes that this Court recognizes that public services, by their nature, must be provided by the State under monopoly conditions. Nevertheless, it recognizes that they may be undertaken by private parties through a concession or permit, as authorized by the laws governing paid passenger transportation. It further explains that the petitioners are likewise incorrect in arguing that the challenged law creates a public monopoly in favor of the State and therefore should have been approved by a qualified majority (38 votes). It reiterates that what the law in question does is declare all paid passenger transportation activity to be a public service, and that such regulation could indeed be delegated to a Commission with Full Legislative Authority (Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena). Moreover, the Constitutional Chamber had already upheld the constitutionality of the procedure followed in approving the law challenged here, through Decision No. 2011-04778; it notes that, when reviewing the constitutionality of the bill that became the challenged law, the Chamber stated categorically, first, that it did not create any monopoly or monopolistic practice; second, that Article 46 of the Political Constitution does not establish a heightened statutory-reservation requirement (reserva de ley agravada) for imposing regulations or limits on freedom of commerce; and third, that delegation of a bill of that nature to a Commission with Full Legislative Authority was indeed proper.Finally, it explains that it is likewise untrue that the challenged law violates the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America—particularly Chapter 11 of that Treaty—by restricting the possibility of providing private transportation services and thereby violating the obligation to afford foreign investors the national treatment (trato nacional) that existed when the Treaty was signed. In this regard, the Office of the Attorney General considers that Chapter 11 of the referenced Treaty does not apply to public services. It so stated in Legal Opinion No. 111-2015 of September 25, 2015, issued in response to an inquiry from a Deputy regarding the possible authorization of the company UBER. As relevant here, the Office of the Attorney General stated that Chapter Eleven of that Treaty governs “Cross-Border Trade in Services” (“Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios”) and the legal concept of “national treatment”; it notes that the referenced Free Trade Agreement expressly establishes that Chapter Eleven, concerning Cross-Border Trade in Services, does not apply to services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority, defining such services as “(…) any service that is supplied neither on a commercial basis nor in competition with one or more service suppliers.” Therefore, in the opinion of the Office of the Attorney General, there can be no doubt that public services—and particularly paid passenger transportation in its various forms—are, by reason of their nationalization, the responsibility of the State and may be provided only by the State or by persons whom it expressly authorizes.Indeed, the service in question may not be freely provided by interested individuals or legal entities, since prior authorization—a concession or permit, depending on the form of transportation involved—from the Public Transportation Council is necessarily required. It also notes that the legal concept of national treatment, enshrined in Section 11.2.1 of the referenced Free Trade Agreement, is likewise inapplicable here. The restriction or requirement of obtaining prior authorization from the Public Transportation Council to provide paid passenger transportation is imposed because of the public nature of the service, not because of the nationality of the person or company seeking to provide it. In other words, the restriction on providing the service applies to both domestic and foreign individuals and legal entities, so there is no discrimination whatsoever based on the nationality of the interested company.It further states that the provisions established in Chapter 11 of CAFTA do not apply to paid passenger transportation because the Treaty itself, specifically Article 11.1.6, excludes from its application services provided in the exercise of governmental authority. There can be no doubt that public services—and particularly paid passenger transportation in its various forms—are, by reason of their nationalization, the responsibility of the State and may be provided only by the State or by persons whom it expressly authorizes. It requests that the constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) be dismissed because it finds no constitutional conflict whatsoever in the challenged Law.
9. 16According to the notation at folio 489, there is no indication that the Minister of Public Works and Transportation submitted any written pleading or document in response to the hearing granted (folio 489 of the digital case file).
10. 17By means of a brief filed at 11:10 hours on 8 de marzo de 2016, Byron Rojas, in his capacity as a private carrier (porteador), appears before this Chamber to intervene as an active supporting party (coadyuvante activo), stating that private carriers are being subjected to terrible persecution by the traffic police. However, the matter no longer affects only those who drive vehicles; it concerns the livelihoods of many people and their families. He states that there is an evident employment problem among persons over 35 years of age, a situation that increases the unemployment rate because many transnational companies are leaving the country. He requests that judgment be rendered as promptly as possible on the constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) filed.
11. 18By a brief filed at 11:09 hours on 08 de marzo de 2016, Carlos Luis Montero Martínez, in his capacity as President, with powers as a general attorney-in-fact without limitation as to amount (Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma) of Corporación Manuel Antonio Travel Sociedad Anónima, appears before this Chamber to intervene as a supporting party (coadyuvante) for the petitioner in this constitutional challenge, pursuant to Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which provides: “The parties appearing in matters pending as of the date the challenge is filed, or those having a legitimate interest, may enter an appearance therein to support the arguments that may justify granting or denying it or, where applicable, to expand the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter in which they have an interest.” He bases his standing (legitimación activa) on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which recognizes the possibility of filing a constitutional challenge without an underlying case (asunto base) where, because of the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or where the matter concerns the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos), or interests affecting the community as a whole.Regarding the latter aspect—or where the matter concerns the defense of diffuse interests—the Chamber has already clarified that the legislature was referring to the standing held by active citizens because the matter concerns the right to work. He states that CORPORACION MANUEL ANTONIO TRAVEL SOCIEDAD ANONIMA has engaged in the private transportation of persons (porteo) under this legal arrangement since 2005, and since 1995 as a de facto company (sociedad de hecho), through a membership system, the use of motor vehicles, and private contracts relating to the provision of the service, all initially under Article 323 of the Commercial Code in force before its amendment; this commercial activity was reaffirmed by the Free Trade Agreement with respect to regular special urban and suburban road passenger transportation services (porteo). With the amendment of Ley 3284, Código de comercio, and Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de 1999, the word “person” was removed from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and under Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N°7969, a new arrangement called the “Stable Special Taxi Service” (Servicio especial estable de taxi) was created, retaining the nature of the residual service currently provided by private carriers, but protected and regulated by operating permits issued by the State.They were compelled to continue performing their work under this new arrangement, with a three-year operating permit for all vehicles affiliated with them, without the possibility of renewal, which expired on 7 de Julio del 2015. From that date, after the operating permits had expired, they resumed the service as “private carriers,” using operating bases in the cantons where they provide the service and a platform system for private passenger-carrier services using motor vehicles. They have provided this service continuously in Cantón de Aguirre-Quepos, Provincia de Puntarenas, Costa Rica, using the operating base in that canton since 2005, as well as a municipal business license (patente municipal) and operating permits that remain valid as of this date. This is in accordance with Chapter II, “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” of the Free Trade Agreement with Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, under Class 6431, Regular special urban and suburban road passenger transportation services (porteo).This constitutional challenge contests Ley N° 8955 because, since its entry into force, no private person—natural or legal—may provide compensated passenger transportation services without first obtaining the corresponding authorization—a concession or permit, depending on the applicable mode—granted by the Consejo de Transporte Público through the procedures established by the laws governing that public service. This nationalization of private passenger transportation services violates Article 46 of the Constitución Política because the creation of public monopolies requires approval by at least 38 deputies, a procedure that was violated because bill N° 17874, which gave rise to Ley N° 8955, was approved by a committee with full legislative powers, which lacked jurisdiction to approve a law requiring a qualified majority of votes. As correctly stated in this challenge, a State monopoly is primarily characterized by the elimination of competition and the prohibition against third parties engaging in the activity.Ley N° 8955 expressly establishes the prohibition against engaging in this activity by removing the word “person” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code and adding a final paragraph to that article, which provides for these purposes: “The contract of carriage (contrato de transporte) governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicle.” This paragraph creates an express prohibition against private parties providing that service; that is, as the Procuraduría states, it nationalizes a service that had been governed without difficulty by the Commercial Code and arose from the parties’ mutual agreement, under which each party’s freedom to decide what best suited that party prevailed according to the party’s economic interests and needs at that time. Therefore, he states that by eliminating the possibility of private passenger transportation, Ley N° 8955 violates Article 46 of the Constitución Política.As correctly explained in this challenge, Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, established a public monopoly over public passenger transportation by taxi. This monopoly was created through the enactment of a law outside the internal regulations of the Asamblea Legislativa because it was enacted by a committee with full legislative powers. Accordingly, that bill could not be delegated to a full legislative committee because its approval required a qualified majority—at least 38 votes—thereby violating Article 46 of the Constitución Política by making it impossible to satisfy the constitutional requirement of legislative approval by two-thirds of the entire membership of the Asamblea Legislativa. The approval of Ley N°8955, “Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi,” in force since 2011, violates the approval and incorporation into our legal system of the Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, in violation of Article 7 of our Constitución Política.That international treaty established that the possibility of providing private transportation services could not be excluded or restricted. At the time of its approval (Diciembre 2007), Costa Rica had private taxi transportation services under the arrangement for the private carriage of persons. Moreover, no law had established a public monopoly over public taxi transportation. Therefore, there was no prohibition against providing private taxi transportation services. In Chapter II, “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” of that Treaty, Costa Rica made no reservation concerning this commercial activity. For that reason, Ley N°8955 del 2011 violates an agreement incorporated into our legal system. Beyond this situation, Costa Rica must offer foreign investors the “national treatment” (trato nacional) that existed when the Treaty was signed. Costa Rica instead negotiated the liberalization of services, including private passenger transportation by taxi.Specifically, it can be found under: Class 6431: Regular road passenger transportation services (porteo). Subclass 64312: Regular special urban and suburban road passenger transportation services (taxis). It must be reiterated that, with the approval of Ley N° 8955, the “private carriage of persons” became a “public service” because the law eliminated the possibility of providing it privately by removing the word “person” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, which states: “The contract of carriage governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicle.” The same law introduced special regulations for this sector—the Stable Special Taxi Service—thereby violating Article 11.6 of CAFTA because the law reduces “the degree of conformity” with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access). This constitutes an excess of legislative power because the Asamblea Legislativa assumed authority not granted to it by the Constitución, modifying the substance of a treaty when, under the Constitución, its role must be limited to approving or rejecting a treaty, in clear violation of Articles 7, 129, and 140, subsections 3) and 10), of the Constitución.They consider that the arguments presented demonstrate with absolute clarity that the challenged provisions violate the principles of free trade, freedom to work, and freedom of movement, infringe the Constitución Política and, therefore, are unconstitutional. In view of the foregoing, and in their capacity as supporting parties for the petitioner in this matter, they request that this constitutional challenge be granted and, consequently, that the judgment order the following: Ley N° 8955, “Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999,” shall be declared unconstitutional for violating Articles 7, 46, 129, and 140 of the Constitución Política, as well as the principles of the primacy of reality (Supremacía de la Realidad) and hierarchy of norms (Jerarquía normativa).
12. 19In a written submission filed at 16:40 hours on 08 de marzo de 2016, José Alexis Lara Jiménez, in his capacity as President, with powers as a Generalissimo Attorney-in-Fact without limitation as to amount, of Transportes Unidos RUALFA Sociedad Anónima, appears before this Chamber for the purpose of intervening as an active supporting intervenor (coadyuvante activo) for the petitioner in this action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad), pursuant to Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which provides that: “The parties appearing in matters pending on the date the action is filed, or those with a legitimate interest, may enter an appearance therein in order to support the arguments that could justify granting or denying it or, where appropriate, to expand the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter in which they have an interest.” He bases his standing (legitimación activa) on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which recognizes the possibility of filing an action of unconstitutionality without an underlying case (asunto base) where, because of the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or where the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos), or interests concerning the community as a whole, is involved.Regarding this latter aspect—or where the defense of diffuse interests is involved—the Chamber has already clarified that the legislature refers to the standing held by active citizens because the right to work is at issue. He states that Unión Nacional de Porteadores- UNAPORTE has engaged in the private transportation of persons (porteo) since 2004 through the present legal arrangement, and since 2002 as a de facto company (sociedad de hecho), through a membership system, the use of motor vehicles, and private contracts concerning the provision of the service, all of the foregoing initially under Article 323 of the Commercial Code in force before its amendment, with this commercial activity being reaffirmed by the Free Trade Agreement as road transportation (porteo). Through the Amendment to Ley 3284, Commercial Code, and Ley N° 7969, Law Regulating the Public Service of Remunerated Transportation of Persons in Taxi-Mode Vehicles, of 22 de Diciembre de 1999, the word “person” was removed from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and a new arrangement called the “Stable Special Taxi Service” (Servicio especial estable de taxi) was created under Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N°7969; it retains the nature of the residual service currently provided by private carriage, but is authorized and regulated through operating permits issued by the State.This forced them to continue performing their work under this new arrangement, with a three-year operating permit for all vehicles affiliated with them, without any possibility of renewal, which expired on 7 de Julio del 2015. From that date, after the operating permits had expired, they resumed the service as “private carriers” (porteadores privados), using operating bases in the cantons where they provide the service and a service-platform system for the private carriage of persons by motor vehicle. They have provided this service continuously in the Cantón de Alfaro Ruiz, Provincia de Alajuela, Costa Rica, using the operating base in that canton since 2004 and using the municipal business license and operating permits that remain valid to date. This is in accordance with Chapter II, “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” of the Free Trade Agreement with Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, under Class 6431: Special regular urban and suburban road passenger transportation services (porteo).This action of unconstitutionality challenges Ley N° 8955 because, since its entry into force, no private individual or entity may provide remunerated passenger transportation services unless it first holds the corresponding authorization—either a concession or permit, depending on the applicable mode—granted by the Consejo de Transporte Público through the procedures established by the laws regulating that public service. Such nationalization (estatización) of private passenger transportation services violates Article 46 of the Constitución Política because the creation of public monopolies requires the approval of at least 38 deputies, a procedure that was violated because bill N° 17874, which gave rise to Ley N° 8955, was approved by a Commission with Full Legislative Powers, which lacked jurisdiction to approve a law requiring a qualified majority of votes. As correctly stated in this action, a State monopoly is characterized primarily by the elimination of competition and the prohibition against third parties engaging in the activity.Ley N° 8955 expressly establishes the prohibition against engaging in this activity by removing the word “person” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code and adding a final paragraph to that article, which provides for these purposes: “The transportation contract (contrato de transporte) governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicles.” This paragraph creates an express prohibition against private parties providing that service; in other words, as the Procuraduría indicates, it nationalizes a service that had been regulated without any difficulty by the Commercial Code and that arose from the parties’ mutual agreement, governed by their freedom to decide what best suited each of them according to their economic interests and the needs existing at that time. Por tanto, he states that Ley N° 8955, by eliminating the possibility of private passenger transportation, violates Article 46 of the Constitución Política.As correctly explained in this action, Ley 8955, amending Ley 3284 and Ley 7969, established a State monopoly over public passenger transportation in the taxi mode. This monopoly was established through the enactment of a law in disregard of the internal regulations of the Asamblea Legislativa, because it was enacted by a commission with full legislative powers. That bill could not therefore be delegated to a full legislative commission, since its approval required a qualified majority of at least 38 votes; consequently, Article 46 of the Constitución Política was violated by making it impossible to satisfy the constitutional requirement that the legislation be approved by two-thirds of the entire membership of the Asamblea Legislativa. The approval of Ley N°8955, “Amendment to Ley N°3284, Commercial Code, and to Ley 7969, Law Regulating the Public Service of Remunerated Transportation of Persons in Taxi-Mode Vehicles,” effective from 2011, violates the approval and incorporation into our legal system of the Free Trade Agreement with Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, in violation of Article 7 of our Constitución Política.That International Treaty provided that the possibility of providing private transportation services could neither be excluded nor restricted. At the time of its approval (Diciembre 2007), Costa Rica had private taxi-mode transportation services under the arrangement for the private carriage of persons. Moreover, no law establishing a State monopoly over public taxi-mode transportation existed. Ergo, there was no prohibition against providing private taxi-mode transportation services. In Chapter II, “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” of the aforementioned Treaty, Costa Rica made no reservation concerning this commercial activity. Ley N°8955 of 2011 therefore violates an agreement incorporated into our Legal System. Beyond this circumstance, Costa Rica must offer foreign investors the “national treatment” (trato nacional) in effect when the Treaty was signed. Costa Rica instead negotiated the liberalization of services, including private passenger transportation in the taxi mode.Specifically, it appears under: Class 6431: Regular road passenger transportation services (porteo). Subclass 64312: Special regular urban and suburban road passenger transportation services (taxis). It must be reiterated that, with the approval of Ley N° 8955, the “private carriage of persons” (porteo de personas) became a “public service” (servicio público), because the law eliminated the possibility of privately engaging in it by deleting the word “person” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, which states: “The transportation contract governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicles.” That same Law introduced special regulations for this sector—the stable special taxi service—thereby violating Article 11.6 of CAFTA, because the law reduces “the degree of conformity” with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access); this constitutes an excess of legislative power, because the Asamblea Legislativa assumed authority not conferred upon it by the Constitution by modifying the content of a treaty, when, under the Constitution, its role must be limited to approving or rejecting a treaty, in clear violation of Articles 7, 129, and 140, subsections 3) and 10), of the Constitution.They consider that the arguments set forth demonstrate with unmistakable clarity that the challenged provisions violate the principles of free trade, freedom of work, and freedom of movement; contravene the Constitución Política; and are therefore unconstitutional. In view of the foregoing, and in their capacity as supporting intervenors for the petitioner in this matter, they request that this action of unconstitutionality be granted and, consequently, that the judgment order the following: That Ley N° 8955, “Amendment to Ley N° 3284, Commercial Code, and Amendment to Ley N° 7969, Law Regulating the Public Service of Remunerated Transportation of Persons in Taxi-Mode Vehicles, of 22 de diciembre de l.999,” be declared unconstitutional for violating Articles 7, 46, 129, and 140 of the Constitución Política, as well as the principles of Primacy of Reality (Supremacía de la Realidad) and hierarchy of norms (Jerarquía normativa).
13. 20By written submission filed at 11:06 hours on 08 de marzo de 2016, Maribel Porras Arrieta, Felipe Di Bella Porras, and others appeared before this Chamber to intervene as active supporting parties (coadyuvantes activos) for the plaintiff in this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad). They assert that Law No. 8955 is unlawful because it is unconstitutional; the procedure by which it was enacted was defective and contrary to law. Bill No. 17874, which in turn gave rise to Law 8955, was approved by a Full Legislative Committee that lacked jurisdiction to approve such a law pursuant to Article 46 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica, because neither that Committee nor any other committee may consider and approve a law requiring a qualified-majority vote (38 votes), as constitutionally mandated; therein lies the unconstitutionality of Law No. 8955. The provisions relating to the carriage and paid transportation of persons under the special stable taxi service category clearly and openly violate Articles 07, 46, 129, and 140 of our Constitution.Moreover, the restrictions imposed arise not only from the law but also from administrative acts (actos administrativos). Thus, pursuant to Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, this matter involving the paid transportation of persons under the special stable taxi service category remains pending before numerous bodies as of today; various administrative-litigation proceedings (procesos contenciosos administrativos) remain open. This is a matter of public concern, because new wine has been poured into old wineskins, and they have burst. Our Political Constitution enshrines the right to freedom of commerce, which has been extensively developed through case law; those principles have been violated by the amendment to Section 323 of the Commercial Code. Likewise, that amendment to Article 323, contrary to its intended effect, does not create an environment of equity and justice in a democratic and social state governed by the rule of law, but instead causes collective harm having a dual dimension.Before the amendments and the unconstitutional enactment of Law 8955, the activity of carrying persons had a legal framework; after Law 8955 and the related laws and regulations, it went from enjoying legal protection to suffering a lack of legal protection. Law No. 8955 is indeed contrary to the legal framework that preceded it, specifically Article 323 of the Commercial Code, Article 46 of the Political Constitution, and the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America. Law No. 8955 restricts freedom of commerce while also disregarding the principle of the primacy of reality and the hierarchy of legal norms. Once again, there is a trend toward a state monopoly, but one placed in the hands of a group of red-taxi drivers (concession holders). In other words, Law 7969 transformed the private transportation of persons into public transportation, hence the new legal nature that must be protected by our legal system.Law 8955 amended and supplemented Law 7969 and, together with the amendment to Article 323 of the Commercial Code, created the SEETAXI category, thereby making the paid transportation of persons a general public service. This gives rise to two legal scenarios. First, Law No. 8955 must be declared unconstitutional and, consequently, Article 323 of the Commercial Code, which permitted the carriage of persons as a form of passenger transportation, must be restored to its original wording. This is because, when Law No. 8955 was approved, the bill did not receive the votes of at least 38 members of the Legislative Assembly; therefore, Law No. 8955 was approved in violation of the Internal Rules of the Legislative Assembly and in direct contravention of the Political Constitution. By express constitutional mandate, the Second Full Committee should not have considered and approved Law No. 8955.Moreover, Law 8955 is wholly inconsistent with the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America (FTA). That Treaty did comply with the required formalities and legal requirements, and upon ratification by the Legislative Assembly, it was not only incorporated into our legal system but also took precedence over it, as provided by our own Constitution and international law. Accordingly, pursuant to the execution and approval of the FTA, even foreign investors must be afforded the “national treatment” that existed when the Treaty was signed. It is therefore valid to state that, through approval of the FTA, Costa Rica actually liberalized services, including the private transportation of persons. Costa Rica is obligated to incorporate and honor the Treaty’s provisions within its legal system, and the country must therefore comply with them, which the already challenged Law 8955 fails to do.In light of all the foregoing, it is clear that there was legal shortsightedness when Law 8955 and the amendment to Article 323 of the Commercial Code were enacted. Because of the haste involved, the proper legislative process was disregarded, and provisions that were—and remain—binding because they are set forth in international treaties were overlooked. The effects must therefore be rolled back and the commitments made in the FTA must be vindicated by restoring everything to its original condition, declaring Law No. 8955 unconstitutional, and restoring Article 323 of the Commercial Code to its original wording, as it stood before being amended by unconstitutional Law No. 8955. The FTA established that the possibility of providing private transportation services may neither be excluded nor restricted. Our country made no statutory reservation regarding the commercial activity of privately transporting persons; Law 8955 therefore clearly and conclusively violates and conflicts with the FTA, which was duly ratified by the Legislative Assembly.Under the second legal scenario, if Law No. 8955 is not declared unconstitutional—which would itself be a serious error—then an authoritative interpretation of Law 8955 establishes the public nature of passenger transportation in the taxi category and, consequently, opens that transportation monopoly. The State must not intervene in that activity, but must merely oversee and regulate it and may in no way restrict the provision of the service, given its public nature. This entails applying the principle that the majority prevails over the minority; that is, the collective interest prevails over the individual interest. The former (collective interest) should be understood as the interest of a large segment of the population requiring transportation, and the latter (individual interest) as the red-taxi association. Voto 2011-04778 held that “passenger transportation service in its entirety has been declared a public service.” The Law of 22 de diciembre de 1999 established a monopoly over taxi transportation, contrary to Article 46 of the Political Constitution.The legal chronology shows that the amendments to the Commercial Code and Law 7969 are unconstitutional because they have unfairly affected a great many people who had long been—and have continued—engaging in this activity in accordance with the law, first under former Article 323 of the Commercial Code and subsequently, for several years, pursuant to Law 8955. We see no obstacle or distinction with respect to the State delegating to natural or legal persons the ability to provide a service for which it was originally responsible, whether under a concession (concesión) or a special SEETAXI permit (permiso especial). Both mechanisms—a concession or a permit—seek in some manner to achieve the same purpose: providing a service to the applicant. Beyond the particular term used, in practice a concession and a permit produce the same result. In any event, the purpose of the law is to establish a service that is now a reality but is improperly governed by Law No. 8955, because Article 323 of the Commercial Code formerly contained the word “persons,” and that is what the legislature removed through Law 8955, which is tainted by unconstitutionality.There are numerous reasons why the Costa Rican State must regulate and guarantee SEETAXI operations. Both administratively and through case law, paid passenger transportation in the taxi category has been declared to be public in nature. In that regard, consideration should be given to legal opinion OJ-1 54-2014 of the PGR, which states that “paid passenger transportation in the taxi category is considered a public service that shall be operated under a concession or permit...” Thus, the public interest prevails as a result of this determination and must take precedence over the interests of a particular association, namely the red-taxi association. In the same vein, the Public Services Regulatory Authority provides several definitions of public service, including “any activity that, by reason of its importance to the country’s sustainable development, is classified as such by the Legislative Assembly.” This means that, more than a matter of legality, it is one of reality, opportunity and expediency, and supply and demand, Judgment No. 51 7-98.What obstacle is there to the State authorizing a private party to provide the service? It has done so for a long time through concessions; why not supplement them with a special permit that may be renewed upon expiration, subject to compliance with certain requirements? Many Costa Ricans engaged in SEETAXI have replaced their vehicles with newer models, incurring debts with financial institutions because they were told that one requirement for an extension after the three-year term of the special permit expired was to upgrade the vehicle model. Under Law No. 3503 of 10 de mayo de 1965, paid passenger transportation in collective motor vehicles is classified as a public service regulated, controlled, and supervised by the State through MOPT, the provision of which may be delegated to private parties. Two conclusions follow from the foregoing: first, as already stated, the nature and public character of paid passenger transportation services; and second, the State’s obligation to exercise oversight and supervision over those providing the service.As to the carriage activity, the concept of carriage was not actually removed from our legislation; only the phrase “carriage of persons” was removed, leaving in its place the carriage of goods or news and creating a statutory patch through Law No. 8955. The SEETAXI paid passenger transportation activity is directed toward a closed group of persons who, whether by their express choice or because the red taxis are unable to serve them, constitute a segment of the Costa Rican population with a basic and essential need that must be addressed immediately. This is a matter of supply and demand, which ultimately governs commercial activity. Article 56 of our Political Constitution enshrines the principle of the right to work as a right of the individual and imposes upon the State the obligation to ensure that everyone has honest and useful employment and to prevent the establishment of conditions that in any way impair human freedom or dignity.

The State guarantees the right to freely choose one’s work.” Evidently, through the actions undertaken by CTP, the amendment of arbitrary laws, the amendment of section 323 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio), and other administrative acts (actos administrativos), the Costa Rican State has violated Article 56 of the Constitution, because it is not endeavoring to ensure that everyone has employment; on the contrary, it is promoting unemployment and the impoverishment of Costa Rican society, while also undermining the family, since SEETAXI’s activity is the direct and sole source of income for thousands of Costa Rican families. We are undoubtedly faced with a matter of paramount importance: the well-being of thousands of Costa Rican families and their potential abandonment. The defense of the right to work as a fundamental constitutional principle and all its implications justifies this application, due process (debido proceso), and the state of necessity (estado de necesidad) of the signatories and all those who are similarly situated. To the extent that this supporting intervention (coadyuvancia) is silent on any matter, they adopt the arguments set forth in the principal constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) filed by Otto Guevara Guth and Natalia Díaz Quintana.

1. 21In a written submission filed at 15:50 hours on 09 de marzo de 2016, María Lorena Cordero Ávila, in her capacity as President with powers of a general attorney-in-fact without limitation as to amount (Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma) of Unión Nacional de Porteadores- UNAPORTE, appears before this Chamber for the purpose of participating as an active supporting party (coadyuvante activo) on behalf of the petitioner in this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad), pursuant to Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which provides: “The parties appearing in proceedings pending on the date the action is filed, or those having a legitimate interest, may appear therein for the purpose of supporting the arguments that may justify granting or denying the action or, where applicable, of expanding the grounds of unconstitutionality concerning the matter in which they have an interest.” She bases her standing (legitimación activa) on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which recognizes the possibility of filing a constitutional challenge without an underlying case (asunto base) where, because of the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or where the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or interests concerning the community as a whole is involved.Regarding this latter aspect—or where the defense of diffuse interests is involved—the Chamber has already clarified that the legislature refers to the standing held by active citizens because the right to work is at issue. She states that Unión Nacional de Porteadores- UNAPORTE has engaged in the private transportation of persons (porteo) since 2004 through this legal arrangement, and since 2002 as a de facto company (sociedad de hecho), through a membership system, the use of motor vehicles, and private contracts relating to the provision of the service, all initially under Article 323 of the Commercial Code in force before its amendment, with this commercial activity being reaffirmed by the Free Trade Agreement with respect to road transportation (porteo). Through the Amendment to Ley 3284, Commercial Code, and Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, of 22 de Diciembre de 1999, the word “person” was removed from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and a new legal category called “Permanent Special Taxi Service” (Servicio especial estable de taxi) was created under Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N°7969.This category retains the nature of the residual service currently provided through porteo, but is authorized and regulated through operating permits (permisos de operación) issued by the State. They were thereby compelled to continue performing their work under this new category, with a three-year operating permit for all vehicles affiliated with them and no possibility of renewal, which expired on 7 de Julio del 2015. From that date, after the operating permits had expired, they resumed the services as “private carriers” (porteadores privados), using operating bases in the cantons where they provide the service and a platform-based system for transporting persons by motor vehicle. They have provided this service continuously in Cantón de Alfaro Ruiz, Provincia de Alajuela, Costa Rica, using an operating base in that canton since 2004 and under a municipal business license (patente municipal) and operating permits that remain valid to date.This is in accordance with Chapter II, “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” of the Free Trade Agreement with Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, under Class 6431, Regular special urban and suburban road passenger transportation services (porteo). This constitutional challenge contests Ley N° 8955 because, since its entry into force, no private person—natural or legal—may provide compensated passenger transportation services unless that person first holds the corresponding authorization—a concession or permit, depending on the applicable category—granted by the Consejo de Transporte Público through the procedures established by the laws governing that public service. This nationalization (estatización) of private passenger transportation services violates Article 46 of the Constitución Política because the creation of public monopolies requires the approval of at least 38 legislators, a procedure that was breached because bill N° 17874, which gave rise to Ley N° 8955, was approved by a committee with full legislative authority, which lacked jurisdiction to approve a law requiring a qualified majority of votes.As correctly stated in this action, a State monopoly is characterized principally by the elimination of competition and the prohibition against third parties engaging in the activity. Ley N° 8955 expressly establishes a prohibition against engaging in this activity by removing the word “person” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code and adding a final paragraph to that article, which provides: “The contract of carriage (contrato de transporte) governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicles.” This paragraph creates an express prohibition against private parties providing that service; in other words, as the Procuraduría states, it nationalizes a service that had been governed without any difficulty by the Commercial Code and that arose from the parties’ mutual agreement, under which each party was free to decide what best suited that party’s economic interests and current needs.Por tanto, she states that Ley N° 8955, by eliminating the possibility of private passenger transportation, violates Article 46 of the Constitución Política. As properly explained in this action, Ley 8955, Amendment to Ley 3284 and Ley 7969, established a public monopoly over public passenger transportation in the taxi category. This monopoly was established through the enactment of a law in disregard of the internal rules of the Asamblea Legislativa, because it was enacted by a committee with full legislative authority. Accordingly, that bill could not be delegated to a full legislative committee because its approval required a qualified majority (at least 38 votes), thereby violating Article 46 of the Constitución Política by making it impossible to satisfy the constitutional requirement that legislation be approved by two-thirds of the entire membership of the Asamblea Legislativa. The approval of Ley N°8955, “Amendment to Ley N°3284, Commercial Code, and Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi,” in force since 2011, contravenes the approval and incorporation into our legal system of the Free Trade Agreement with Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, in violation of Article 7 of our Constitución Política.That international treaty provided that the possibility of offering private transportation services could not be excluded or restricted. This is because, when it was approved (Diciembre 2007), Costa Rica had private taxi-category transportation services under the legal arrangement of passenger porteo. Moreover, no law had established a public monopoly over public transportation in the taxi category. Therefore, there was no prohibition against providing private taxi-category transportation services. In Chapter II, “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” of that Treaty, Costa Rica made no reservation concerning this commercial activity. Consequently, Ley N°8955 of 2011 violates an agreement incorporated into our legal system. Beyond this circumstance, Costa Rica must offer foreign investors the “national treatment” (trato nacional) that existed when the Treaty was signed. Costa Rica instead negotiated the liberalization of services, including private passenger transportation in the taxi category.Specifically, it may be found under Class 6431: Regular road passenger transportation services (porteo). Subclass 64312: Regular special urban and suburban road passenger transportation services (taxis). It must be reiterated that, with the approval of Ley N° 8955, “passenger porteo” became a “public service” because the possibility of providing it privately was eliminated through the removal of the word “person” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, which states: “The contract of carriage governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicles.” That same law introduced special regulations for this sector (permanent special taxi service), violating the text of Article 11.6 of CAFTA because the law reduces the “degree of conformity” with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access). This constitutes an excess of legislative authority because the Asamblea Legislativa assumed a power not granted to it by the Constitution, modifying the content of a treaty when, under the Constitution, its role must be limited to approving or rejecting a treaty, in clear violation of Articles 7, 129 and 140, subsections 3) and 10), of the Constitution.They contend that the arguments presented demonstrate with absolute clarity that the challenged provisions violate the principles of free trade, freedom of work, and freedom of movement; contravene the Constitución Política; and are therefore unconstitutional. In view of the foregoing, and in their capacity as supporting parties (coadyuvantes) for the petitioner in this matter, they request that this constitutional challenge be granted and, consequently, that the judgment order the following: That Ley N° 8955, “Amendment to Ley N° 3284, Commercial Code, and Amendment to Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, of 22 de diciembre de l.999,” be declared unconstitutional for violating Articles 7, 46, 129 and 140 of the Constitución Política, as well as the principles of Primacy of Reality (Supremacía de la Realidad) and hierarchy of norms (Jerarquía normativa).
2. 22By a written submission filed at 14:47 hours on 10 de marzo de 2016, Marco Tulio Víquez, in his capacity as President of the Asociación Cámara de Autobuseros de Heredia; Miguel Badilla Castro, in his capacity as President of the Asociación Cámara de Autobuseros del Atlántico; Jorge Arredondo Espinoza, in his capacity as attorney-in-fact with sufficient authority (Apoderado con poder suficiente) of the Asociación Cámara de Empresarios Autobuseros y Transportistas Unidos de la Provincia de Guanacaste; and others appeared before this Chamber to participate as passive intervenors (coadyuvantes pasivos) in this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad). They state that they are organizations representing the persons who would be directly affected if the challenged provisions were declared unconstitutional and that, insofar as they represent those corporate interests, they hold a legitimate interest (interés legítimo) in maintaining the validity of the challenged provisions.They assert that the applicants’ arguments concerning unconstitutionality fall into two categories: a) procedural and b) alleged substantive violations. The alleged procedural defects (vicios procedimentales): The applicants’ arguments. The applicants’ principal argument is that Ley 8955 converted private carriage (porteo) into a public service (servicio público) by repealing Articles 333 and 334 of the Código de Comercio. That law was enacted by a Legislative Committee with Full Legislative Authority (Comisión Legislativa con Potestad Legislativa Plena). According to the applicants, that repeal could only have been carried out by the Plenary through a law approved by 2/3 of its members because that law created a new monopoly in favor of the State. Indeed, under Article 46 of the Constitution, the creation of new state monopolies requires a qualified majority (mayoría calificada) of 2/3 of all deputies, which did not occur here, since Ley 8955 was not even approved by the Legislative Plenary.Under those circumstances, Ley 8955 is absolutely null and void due to an essential defect in its enactment procedure. The nonexistence of the alleged procedural defects: Article 1 of Ley 3503 declared all forms of providing passenger transportation for compensation on public land routes to be a public service; the Código de Comercio entered into force on 1 de junio de 1964, and Ley 3503 did so on 10 de mayo de 1965. That law was approved by a qualified majority. From that point onward, passenger transportation for compensation, in any of its forms, became a public service. Indeed, the legislature created a new monopoly in favor of the State, with the possibility of delegating its operation to private parties through the administrative mechanisms of a concession (concesión) or permit (permiso). Consequently, from that date onward, the private carriage of persons, originally governed by Articles 323 and 324- of the Código de Comercio, became a public service, because the aforementioned provisions of the Código de Comercio were impliedly repealed (derogadas tácitamente) when Article 1 of Ley 3503 entered into force.From a legal standpoint, what occurred was an implied repeal (derogación tácita) of the term “persons” contained in Articles 323 and 324 of the Código de Comercio because of the subsequent statutory incompatibility (incompatibilidad normativa sobreviniente) created by the enactment of Article 1 of Ley 3503, which brought all forms of passenger transportation for compensation in motor vehicles into the public-service domain by transforming them into a new monopoly in favor of the State. Article 1 of Ley 3503 is unequivocal in stating that “Passenger transportation for compensation in motor vehicles carried out on streets, highways, and roads within the territory of the Republic is a public service whose provision is reserved exclusively to the State, which may provide it directly or through private parties whom it expressly authorizes in accordance with the rules established herein....” The provision under discussion makes no distinction between taxis and private carriers, since it considers both forms of transportation to be integral parts of a public service.Therefore, it is clear that the unequivocal intention of the 1965 legislature was to convert all passenger transportation for compensation by land, in any type of motor vehicle and under any mode of provision, into a public service, thereby making it a new state monopoly. In this connection, the implied repeal of a law results from the objective incompatibility between the new statutory provision and the preceding provisions. Such incompatibility, in turn, has two manifestations: a) a genuine contradiction between one provision and another, in which case the interpreter must choose the latter; and b) a subsequent incompatibility, also known as an implicit incompatibility, affecting an earlier provision on a particular subject that is later regulated anew (ex novo) by a successive legal source. In the latter situation, there are two sets of rules governing the same subject that succeed one another over time.It is therefore not a matter of a specific incompatibility, but rather of new legislation that renders the prior legislation ineffective. This situation is more difficult to encounter in practice because earlier provisions are not always in specific contradiction with subsequent provisions. Implied repeal is closely grounded in the dual principles that governmental power cannot be extinguished (inextinguibilidad del poder) and that statutory conflicts are prohibited (prohibición de antinomias). Relevant here is the repealing effect associated with the entry into force of the successive provision, as a necessary condition for it to freely modify the legal system and thereby perform its proper function. 8.- In the present case, Article 1 of Ley 3503 partly came to regulate anew the same subject previously governed by Articles 323 and 324 of the Código de Comercio. Indeed, the new legislation included private carriage as part of the public service of passenger transportation for compensation on land routes; before its enactment, private carriage had been considered a private activity conducted under the principle of legal freedom (principio de libertad jurídica) (art 28 CP) and freedom of enterprise (libertad empresarial) (art 46 CP).However, by converting passenger transportation for compensation on land routes in all its forms into a public service, Article 1 of Ley 3503 impliedly repealed Articles 323 and 324 of the Código de Comercio insofar as they treated private carriage as a private activity. Subsequently, Ley 5406 of 26 de noviembre de 1973 was enacted, specifically regulating passenger transportation for compensation in the form of taxis. That law entered into force 8 years after all passenger transportation for compensation in motor vehicles, regardless of its form (buses, taxis, private carriage, etc.), had been declared a public service. Article 22 of Ley 5406 provided: “Article 22.- This law repeals, to the extent that they are inconsistent with it, the provisions of Law No. 3503 of 10 de mayo de 1965 and repeals Law No. 3560 of 27 de octubre de 1965.” Article 1 of Ley 3503 was plainly not inconsistent with it; on the contrary, it provided the basis for declaring the provision of passenger transportation for compensation in the form of taxis to be a public service.In other words, Article 1 of Ley 3503 constituted the general legislation governing the various forms of passenger transportation for compensation by land, whereas Article 1 of Ley 5406 specifically governed the taxi form. Article 1 of Ley 3503 remains in force to this day, since neither Ley 7969 nor Ley 8955 repealed it. In this connection, Anexo I of CAFTA itself recognizes that Article 1 of Ley 3505 was in force at the time of its approval by expressly including it as one of the non-conforming measures (medidas disconformes) relating to land transportation. Moreover, because Ley 8955 did not repeal that provision, it must be concluded that Article 1 of Ley 3503 remains in force. Accordingly, the applicants’ argument that Ley 8955 had to be approved by two-thirds of all members of the Asamblea Legislativa is without merit, because the public monopoly over passenger transportation for compensation, in any of its forms (buses, taxis, private carriage, etc.), was created by Article 1 of Ley 3503 of 10 de mayo de 1965, a provision that remains in force, as demonstrated above.Enactment of the challenged provisions was, in fact, unnecessary because the private carriage of persons had already ceased to exist legally in 1965, when the service of passenger transportation for compensation in any of its forms (buses, taxis, private carriage, etc.) was declared by a qualified majority of the Asamblea Legislativa to be a public monopoly whose provision could be delegated to private parties through the administrative mechanisms of concessions and permits. Therefore, any declaration that the challenged provisions are unconstitutional would have no practical effect, since the provision of passenger transportation for compensation in any of its forms has been a public service since 1965. In any event, Ley 8955 was enacted within the statutory framework of Article 1 of Ley 3503 and merely regulated the private-carriage form under the name “seetaxi,” a public service that for nearly 50 years had been provided freely without any type of regulation.Consequently, the challenged law did not need to be approved by two-thirds of all members of the Asamblea Legislativa, because it merely regulated one form of providing passenger transportation for compensation, which had already been declared a public service in 1965. This Chamber has already established that Ley 8955 was validly approved by a Legislative Committee with Full Legislative Authority. In Voto 4778-2011, issued in the constitutional consultation (consulta de constitucionalidad) concerning the Ley 8955 bill submitted by Movimiento Libertario, the Chamber clearly established that the bill could validly be approved by a Legislative Committee with Full Legislative Authority. The applicants’ position concerning the alleged violation of CAFTA—According to the applicants, Ley 8955 violates several CAFTA provisions because, when that treaty was approved, the elimination of private carriage was not included as a reservation or non-conforming measure; therefore, freedom of enterprise in an activity not reserved by the Costa Rican State when that treaty was signed cannot now be restricted.According to the applicants, the elimination of private carriage is not included as a non-conforming measure in Article 11.6 in relation to Anexo I of the Treaty. The alleged violation of Articles 28 and 46 of the Constitución Política and of the constitutional principle of reasonableness (principio constitucional de razonabilidad): one of the applicants also alleges a violation of Articles 28 and 46 of the Constitution and of the constitutional principle of reasonableness. Her argument centers on the assertion that Articles 323 and 324 of the Código de Comercio, insofar as they governed the private carriage of persons, were founded directly on those constitutional provisions and that principle.

In section 28 of the Constitution, which enshrines the principle of legal freedom, under which private individuals may engage in all conduct expressly or implicitly authorized by the legal system, and in Article 46 of the same constitutional text, which enshrines freedom of enterprise. This provision also requires that the creation of new monopolies in favor of the State be approved by a qualified majority of two thirds of all members of the Asamblea Legislativa, which did not occur in the case of Ley 8955, which was approved by a Legislative Committee with Full Legislative Authority. According to one of the petitioners, Ley 8955 violates both constitutional provisions because it prohibited a lawful activity carried out under two express constitutional provisions. Por tanto, prohibiting a lawful private activity that is contrary neither to morality nor to accepted standards of conduct constitutes a legislative excess contrary to Constitutional Law, specifically the two aforementioned provisions.

The constitutional principle of reasonableness is also invoked as having been violated because, in the petitioner’s view, prohibiting the contract carriage of passengers (porteo de personas) is neither appropriate, necessary, nor proportionate, since the country needs to modernize in every area of business activity. In the modern world, the contract carriage of passengers constitutes a more efficient and economical mechanism than the traditional taxi-service model because it uses modern tools and ensures that the service is provided efficiently, safely, and promptly. The absence of the alleged substantive defects. Ley 8955 did not violate CAFTA; the first substantive argument is closely related to the alleged procedural defect. Indeed, the petitioners argue that because Ley 8955 was enacted after CAFTA entered into force, contract carriage was not included as a non-conforming measure (medida disconforme) in Annex I of the Treaty concerning public transportation. 2.- The Costa Rican negotiators did not include contract carriage as an exception to the application of CAFTA in Annex I of the Treaty for the simple reason that this form of providing compensated passenger transportation service (servicio remunerado de personas) had been a public service (servicio público) since 1965 and was therefore logically included among the exceptions specified in that same Anexo 1 of the Treaty concerning the public service of compensated passenger transportation.

According to Article 11.6, Non-Conforming Measures, of the Treaty: “1. Articles 11.2, 11.3, 11.4 and 11.5 do not apply to any existing non-conforming measure maintained by a Party at the central level of government, as set out by that Party in its Schedule to Annex I.” Annex I states in this regard: “Sector: Land Transportation Services—Passenger Transportation. Obligations Concerned: National Treatment (Articles 10.4 and 11.3). Most-Favored-Nation Treatment (Articles 10.4 and 11.3). Market Access (Article 11.4). Level of Government: Central. Measures: Ley 3503 of May 10, 1965. Ley Reguladora de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores. Arts l, 3, 4.6, 10, II and 25.” A reading of the cited CAFTA provisions makes clear that Article 1 of Ley 3503 was a non-conforming measure that the Costa Rican State reserved in the area of motor-vehicle transportation by land routes when approving the aforementioned Treaty.

That provision includes contract carriage as a public service, as demonstrated supra. Por tanto, all of the petitioners’ arguments lack legal basis, because Article l of Ley 3503 was included in CAFTA as a Costa Rican non-conforming measure, and that very provision eliminated contract carriage as a private activity and converted it into a public service in 1965. Therefore, the enactment of Ley 8955 did not violate any of the invoked CAFTA clauses. Ley 8955 violated neither Articles 28 and 46 of the Constitution nor the principle of legal reasonableness; it was unnecessary to enact Ley 8955 because the contract carriage of passengers became a public service in 1965. One portion of this law repeals provisions that had already been repealed 51 years earlier. The other portion regulates the “seetaxi” public service, that is, the contract carriage of passengers, a form of public transportation (transporte público) that had not been regulated since 1965 and that, until that date, operated as though it were a private activity, without any State regulation.

Ley 8955 could not have incurred the constitutional defects alleged by the petitioner—namely, violation of Articles 28 and 46 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of reasonableness—for the simple reason that no new monopoly was created in favor of the State, since that monopoly had already existed since 1965. All of the arguments founder on the incontrovertible fact that Article 1 of Ley 3503, approved in 1965 and still in force, elevated all forms of compensated passenger transportation on public roads to the category of public service. Consequently, Ley 8955 incurred no constitutional defect, since the only matter on which it legislated ex novo was the regulation of the form of public service known as “seetaxi,” which, inexplicably, operated freely and without any State regulation from 1965 until the enactment of Ley 8955.

1. 23By written submission filed at 11:05 on 11 de marzo de 2016, Gilberth Maikell Barboza, acting as legal representative with powers of general power of attorney without limitation as to amount for Corporación B&A Transportes Privados Atenas, appears before this Chamber to intervene as an active supporting party (coadyuvante activo) in this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad), and states that, in the particular case of the company he represents, it was granted the stable special taxi permit, SEETAXI, which is a compensated public passenger transportation service intended for a closed group of users that meets limited, residual, exclusive, and stable demand; he therefore joins in all respects the action filed by the petitioners.
2. 24By written submission filed at 13:04 on 14 de marzo de 2016, Heiner Gerardo Chávez Luna, acting as President with powers of general power of attorney without limitation as to amount for Transporte privados Rigoberto Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada, appears before this Chamber to intervene as an active supporting party for the petitioning party in this constitutional challenge, pursuant to Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, according to which: “The parties appearing in matters pending on the date the action is filed, or those having a legitimate interest, may appear therein in order to support the arguments that may justify granting or denying it or, where appropriate, to expand the grounds of unconstitutionality concerning the matter in which they have an interest.” He bases his standing (legitimación activa) on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which recognizes the possibility of filing a constitutional challenge without an underlying case (asunto base) when, because of the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or when the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or interests concerning the community as a whole is involved.Regarding this last aspect—or where the defense of diffuse interests is involved—the Chamber has already clarified that the legislature refers to the standing held by active citizens because the right to work is at issue. He states that Transporte privados Rigoberto Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada has engaged in the private transportation of persons (porteo) since 2005 through this legal arrangement, and since 2002 as a de facto company, through a membership system, the use of motor vehicles, and private contracts concerning the provision of the service, all of the foregoing initially under Article 323 of the Commercial Code in force before its amendment, with this commercial activity being reaffirmed by the Free Trade Agreement concerning road transportation (porteo). The amendment of Ley 3284, Código de Comercio, and Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, of 22 de Diciembre de 1999, deleted the word “person” from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio and created, under Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N° 7969, a new arrangement known as the “stable special taxi service,” which retains the nature of the residual service currently provided through private carriage but is protected and regulated by operating permits issued by the State.They were required to continue performing their work under this new arrangement, with a three-year operating permit for all vehicles affiliated with them, without the possibility of renewal, which expired on 7 de Julio del 2015. From that date, after the operating permits had expired, they resumed the service as “private carriers,” using operating bases in the cantons where we provide the service and a platform-based system for the carriage of persons by motor vehicles. They have provided this service continuously in the Cantón de San Pedro de Poas, Provincia de Alajuela, Costa Rica, using the operating base in that canton since 2005 and operating under a municipal business license and operating permits valid as of the present date. This is in accordance with Chapter II, “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” of the Free Trade Agreement with Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, under Class 6431, regular special urban and suburban road passenger transportation services (porteo).This constitutional challenge contests Ley N° 8955 because, since its entry into force, no private individual or legal entity may provide compensated passenger transportation unless that person or entity first holds the corresponding authorization—a concession or permit, depending on the mode involved—granted by the Consejo de Transporte Público through the procedures established by the laws governing that public service. Such nationalization of the private passenger transportation service violates Article 46 of the Constitución Política because the creation of public monopolies requires approval by at least 38 legislators, a procedure that was contravened because Bill N° 17874, which gave rise to Ley N° 8955, was approved by a Full Legislative Powers Committee, which lacked jurisdiction to approve a law requiring a qualified majority of votes. As correctly stated in this action, a State monopoly is characterized primarily by the elimination of competition and the prohibition against third parties engaging in the activity.Ley N° 8955 expressly establishes the prohibition against engaging in this activity by deleting the word “person” from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio and adding a final paragraph to that article, which provides: “The transportation contract governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicles.” This paragraph creates an express prohibition against private parties providing that service; that is, as the Procuraduría states, it nationalizes a service that had been governed without difficulty by the Código de Comercio and that arose from the parties’ mutual agreement, under which each person’s freedom to decide what best suited that person, according to their economic interests and needs at that time, prevailed. Therefore, he states that Ley N° 8955, by eliminating the possibility of private passenger transportation, violates Article 46 of the Constitución Política.As correctly explained in this action, Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, established a public monopoly over public passenger transportation in the taxi mode. This monopoly was established through the enactment of a law in violation of the internal regulations of the Asamblea Legislativa, because it was enacted by a Full Legislative Powers Committee. That bill could therefore not be delegated to a Full Legislative Powers Committee because its approval required a qualified majority of at least 38 votes; consequently, Article 46 of the Constitución Política was violated by preventing compliance with the constitutional requirement that it be approved by two-thirds of all members of the Asamblea Legislativa. The enactment of Ley N°8955, “Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi,” in force since 2011, violates the approval and incorporation into our legal system of the Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, in violation of Article 7 of our Constitución Política.That international treaty established that the possibility of providing private transportation services could not be excluded or restricted. At the time of its approval (Diciembre 2007), Costa Rica had private taxi-mode transportation services under the arrangement for the carriage of persons. Moreover, no law had established a public monopoly over public taxi-mode transportation. Therefore, there was no prohibition against providing private taxi-mode transportation services. In Chapter II, “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” of the aforementioned Treaty, Costa Rica established no reservation concerning this commercial activity. For that reason, Ley N°8955 of 2011 violates an agreement incorporated into our legal system. Beyond this circumstance, Costa Rica must offer foreign investors the “national treatment” that existed when the Treaty was signed. Indeed, Costa Rica negotiated the liberalization of services, including private passenger transportation in the taxi mode.Specifically, it may be found under: Class 6431: Regular road passenger transportation services (porteo). Subclass 64312: Special regular urban and suburban road passenger transportation services (taxis). It must be reiterated that, with the enactment of Ley N° 8955, the “carriage of persons” becomes a “public service” because the law eliminates the possibility of providing it privately by deleting the word “person” from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio, which states: “The transportation contract governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicles.” That same law introduced special regulations for this sector (stable special taxi service), thereby violating the text of Article 11.6 of CAFTA because the law reduces the “degree of conformity” with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access); this constitutes an excess of legislative power, as the Asamblea Legislativa assumed authority not granted to it by the Constitution by modifying the content of a treaty, when, under the Constitution, its function must be limited to approving or rejecting a treaty, in clear violation of Articles 7, 129, and 140, subsections 3) and 10), of the Constitution.They consider that the arguments presented demonstrate with complete clarity that the challenged provisions violate the principles of free trade, freedom to work, and freedom of movement, contravene the Constitución Política, and are therefore unconstitutional. In view of the foregoing, and in their capacity as supporting parties for the petitioning party in this matter, they request that this constitutional challenge be granted and, consequently, that the judgment order the following: That Ley N° 8955, “Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999,” be declared unconstitutional for violating Articles 7, 46, 129, and 140 of the Constitución Política, as well as the principles of Primacy of Reality (Supremacía de la Realidad) and the hierarchy of legal norms (Jerarquía normativa).
3. 25In a written submission filed at 09:58 on 15 de marzo de 2016, Rubén Vargas Campos, in his capacity as Secretary General and Representative with sufficient authority of the social organization known as Unión de Taxistas Costarricenses, and others appear before this Chamber for the purpose of intervening as passive supporting parties (coadyuvantes pasivos) for the petitioner in this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad), and state that this action is inadmissible because it is purportedly filed to protect the alleged diffuse and/or collective interests (intereses difusos y/o colectivos) of users, when the action clearly has the sole purpose of seeking to defend the private interests of a transnational company that has no established headquarters in Costa Rica, namely the firm “Uber”; the Asociación Nacional de Consumidores likewise seeks the same. Regarding the question of the possible coexistence of compensated passenger transportation (transporte remunerado de personas) in motor vehicles as a public service or as a private activity, since 1965, with the enactment of law No. 3503, “ley reguladora del transporte remunerado de personas,” it was clearly provided that every type of compensated passenger transportation constituted a public service regulated by the State.It followed that compensated passenger transportation in any form was a public service and could be provided only with authorization from the State, thereby eliminating the possibility of private compensated passenger transportation in motor vehicles. Those general provisions were restated, regulated, and sanctioned in traffic law no. 7331 (del año 1993) and in other laws, all of which predated the Free Trade Agreement and remain fully in force with respect to regulating, restricting, and sanctioning any compensated passenger transportation operation that might arise even in the absence of law No. 8955; that is, even if law no. 8955 were struck down as unconstitutional, there are numerous other provisions having the same effect, which that law merely unified and clarified in order to prevent further “interpretations” and suspicions concerning the status and impossibility of privately providing compensated passenger transportation in motor vehicles (private carriage (porteo)).The bill for the challenged Law was voted on by the plenary through delegation to one of the legislative committees with full legislative authority and was approved there by an absolute majority. No public monopoly has been created; the State’s regulatory authority gives rise to a public service performed by thousands of workers (taxi drivers) under conditions fully determined and established by the regulatory State. Regarding the alleged violation of the Free Trade Agreement, it has been determined that the private carriage of passengers (porteo de personas) is not considered a major commercial activity, but rather a limited and residual activity. Consequently, it would not actually fall within the scope of the FTA. Moreover, it has been made clear that the partial amendment of section 323 of the Commercial Code does not entail the creation of any monopoly and, per se, does not affect the conditions of the FTA.It has also been conclusively established that, with respect to the FTA or CAFTA and its scope, the Costa Rican State made certain appropriate reservations, one of which concerned compensated passenger transportation in taxi-type motor vehicles and law No. 7969; thus, the provisions of the FTA would not be affected in that respect either. Solely as an exception not invoked by anyone, the FTA allows the restrictions imposed to be reviewed or renegotiated, but this does not render them unconstitutional. Finally, as has been duly established above, there are many public-order provisions predating the FTA that specifically govern public transportation and traffic and establish that compensated passenger transportation in motor vehicles and in other branches of public service (airplanes, trains, and ships) is a public service that may be provided only with prior authorization from the State. Accordingly, by restating the matter through law No. 8955, the legislature did not legislate ex novo, but instead restated, summarized, and specified what had already been enacted; therefore, there is no violation of the FTA, much less any unconstitutionality.
4. 26In a written submission filed at 11:05 hours on 15 de marzo de 2016, Alexander Rodríguez Aguilar, in his capacity as holder of a general power of attorney without monetary limit (Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma) for Inversiones Transportistas Los Guidos Sociedad Anónima and others, appeared before this Chamber to participate as active supporting intervenors (coadyuvantes activos) in this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad), and stated that they have proper standing because they have a direct interest in the decision on the merits in this constitutional challenge, since they were accredited under permit number 11 and numbered codes 321 through 346 for the Permanent Special Taxi Service (Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi), with a formal appeal (Recurso de Apelación) pending resolution before the Tribunal Administrativo de Transportes under expediente N° TAT-31 7-2015.In the year two thousand eleven, following an optional consultation (consulta facultativa) before the Sala Constitucional, bill number 17,874 was approved on second reading, subsequently signed into law by the Poder Ejecutivo and published in Alcance N° 40 of La Gaceta N° 131 dated 7 de julio de 2011 as Ley Especial N° 8955. The entire process of debating and approving that expediente was conducted by the Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena Segunda as a consequence of a delegation motion approved by the Plenario Legislativo at ordinary session N° 88 of 14 de octubre de 2009 and under the mechanism of an expedited legislative procedure (procedimiento legislativo abreviado) (208 bis RAL), approved by the Plenario Legislativo at ordinary session N° 109 of 26 de noviembre de 2009. Similarly, in 2011, Ley N° 8955 was challenged before the Chamber through two constitutional challenges, processed under expedientes 11-01 1857-0007-CO and 11-010289- 0007-CO, both of which were dismissed.Both the arguments made in the text of the optional consultation and those outlined in the filing of the two aforementioned constitutional challenges differed from those described in the present challenge. Ley no 8955 violates Article 46 of the Constitución Política and the legislative procedure for establishing a public monopoly, because it amends Article 2 of Ley N° 7969: “Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi”; although the monopoly over the exclusive provision of compensated collective passenger transportation was established through the enactment of Ley N° 3503 of 20 de mayo de 1965, and the exclusive nationalization of compensated passenger transportation in taxi-type vehicles was established by the enactment of Ley N° 5406 of 16 de enero de 1974, repealed by Article 63 of Ley N° 7969 of 22 de diciembre de 1999, the monopolies decreed by those two laws are exclusive and limited to the services specified therein: compensated collective passenger transportation under Ley N° 3503, and subsequently the nationalization of compensated passenger transportation by taxi under Ley N° 5406, repealed by the current Ley N° 7969, known as Ley de Taxis.Neither of the foregoing laws declares all compensated passenger transportation to be a public service; rather, both laws merely declared the State to be the holder of each of those two specific activities, while the private contract for passenger transportation remained in force under the commercial arrangement of a passenger carrier (porteador de personas). Ley No. 8955, however, effectively declares a total monopoly over compensated passenger transportation by providing that all compensated passenger transportation carried out by buses, minibuses, microbuses, taxis, automobiles, or any other type of motor vehicle, and directed at any group of users, is a public service held by the State and that its provision requires a permit or concession. The nationalization of compensated passenger transportation through collective transportation by buses and taxis, by means of the enactment of two specific laws, cannot be interpreted in the same manner as the creation of a monopoly and the prohibition against providing any type of compensated passenger transportation privately.The latter occurred exclusively through the enactment of Ley No. 8955, which disallows this type of service by removing the word “persons” from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio and, in turn, decrees that every type of compensated passenger transportation shall henceforth be a public service and shall require a State permit. The monopoly over all compensated passenger transportation was created through the enactment of Ley N° 8955. Accordingly, in compliance with Article 46 of our Constitución Política, bill N° 17,874 should never have been delegated to a Comisión con Potestad Legislativa because, since such committees consist of only 19 deputies, it could not satisfy the minimum requirement for approval by at least 38 deputies pursuant to Article 46 of the Constitution. This constitutes a clear violation of the legislative procedure and of the Carta Fundamental itself and, therefore, renders the enacted law unconstitutional.Ley No. 8955 violates the principle of equality before the law and the rules governing concessions for public passenger-transportation services. It must be borne in mind that bill N° 13.511, which gave rise to Ley N° 7969, expressly provided in its original articles that taxi concessions would be granted for a nonrenewable term of twenty years. The legislature at that time, however, considered it prudent not to extend the term beyond ten years and, through a motion approved by a majority of its members, established a nonrenewable term of ten years. Through the amendment made by Ley N° 8955 to Article 29 of Ley N° 7969, the compensated public passenger-transportation service by taxi is granted in perpetuity to the current concessionaires. This is unconstitutional because, although the State may delegate the provision of public services to private parties, the legislature has no authority to designate a particular group of private parties to provide a public service in perpetuity without complying with the administrative procurement procedures (procedimientos de contratación administrativa) prescribed by the original law.This clearly infringes the principle of equality before the law to the detriment of the remaining inhabitants of the Republic, as well as those bidders who failed to obtain the 100 points awarded under the Primer Procedimiento Abreviado to persons holding taxi permits on those dates—some of whom had 80 points—and who are prevented from participating in the new tendering process (proceso licitatorio) for taxi concessions with an equal second opportunity. As the preceding provision states, current concessionaires are given an improper and unlawful advantage over other persons interested in providing that service, since it provides that taxi concessions must be renewed automatically during each period upon the concessionaire’s request and presentation of a current type C-1 license. This amendment permanently closes the monopoly, in perpetuity, to specifically identified persons, turning it into a bottleneck benefiting a very small group of Costa Ricans to the clear detriment of the vast majority, who, once the ten-year term authorized for concessions under Ley N° 7969 had elapsed, would have been able to bid on equal terms with one another.Regarding experience alone, Ley N° 8955 leaves more than 30,000 taxi drivers without any opportunity. In addition to the unconstitutionality established by the amendment to Article 29 of Ley N° 7969, this provision, through Ley N° 8955, grants concessionaires the authority to “INHERIT,” generation after generation, title to the taxi concession in favor of their relatives, even under conditions different from those established in the Primer Procedimiento Abreviado conducted pursuant to Ley 7969 and its regulations, thereby granting the concession to a private party who was not evaluated at the proper procedural stage and exempting that person from obligations such as the requirement to present a code and a C-1 license and to drive the taxi for a minimum of eight hours per day. Not only does the State grant a public service in perpetuity to a private party, even though the original law granted the right to operate it for a period of only ten years, but the private party is subsequently authorized to bequeath the granted concession.They reiterate that not even the ordinary legislature has the authority to grant, in perpetuity and to a specific group of citizens, the operation of a public service that is a State monopoly, because no such legal mechanism exists. Doing so would require declaring the existence of a private monopoly rather than a State monopoly, which would conflict with Article 46 of the Constitución Política and could in no way be accomplished by the affirmative vote of only 16 deputies in a Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, automatically extending the concession’s terms of validity. On this point as well, Ley N° 8955 is unconstitutional. Ley no 8955 violates the scope of the approval and incorporation of the Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República Dominicana: the signing of the Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República Dominicana and its subsequent incorporation into the national legal system clearly demonstrate, with reference to the reservations defended by the Country—specifically regarding passenger transportation by land—which related activities and regulations Costa Rica would be permitted to amend in the future.Thus, in the area of Cross-Border Services and Investment, Costa Rica reserves a series of provisions in order to maintain State control over certain activities declared to be public services, namely: the monopoly over compensated passenger transportation by bus, including the so-called “special transportation services for students, workers, and tourists”; the monopoly over compensated passenger transportation in taxi-type vehicles; and the monopoly over rail transportation. The reservations made by Costa Rica as a State Party, appearing in Anexo I, specifically identify the laws and executive decrees that it may amend after CAFTA entered into force. As may be inferred from all the reservations made by Costa Rica, Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio of 30 de abril de 1964, does not appear among them. That law, enacted in 1964, maintained private passenger transportation under the passenger-carrier arrangement pursuant to Article 323 and the following and related articles.In view of the foregoing, it may readily be concluded that, because Article 323 and the following and related articles of the Código de Comercio had been in force since 1964, the activity of compensated passenger transportation under the passenger-carrier arrangement was conducted privately and entirely lawfully from that date, including after the Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República Dominicana (CAFTA) was approved, ratified, and entered into force.

It was not until June 7, 2011, that Ley N° 8955, dated June 16, 2011, was published, requiring those of us who provided private passenger transportation as private carriers (porteadores) to demonstrate compliance with certain requirements in order to be transferred from the Código de Comercio, which remained in force until that day, to the compensated public passenger transportation service under the new Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi category. We were compelled to transition to public passenger transportation because Ley N° 8955 explicitly repealed the private passenger transportation contract (contrato privado de transporte de personas) through Article 323 and the following and related provisions of the Código de Comercio, in a clear and evident violation of the scope of what had been negotiated in subsections a) and b) of Article 11.4 of CAFTA. From a legal perspective, it is reasonably clear that the Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena I, with the votes of only 16 legislators, was never empowered under constitutional law (Derecho de la Constitución) to remove the word “passengers” from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio and thereby eliminate the activity carried out under private compensated passenger transportation contracts.

Moreover, as reflected in the explanatory statement (exposición de motivos) for bill N° 17.874, the principal purpose of enacting Ley N° 8955 was to regulate and transfer to the public service those private carriers who had been engaged in this private passenger transportation activity. This legislative intent, reflected in the inclusion in the aforementioned law of three substantive transitional provisions (transitorios de carácter material), incorporated by motion in addition to the provision intended to regulate over time the circumstances of the private carriers then operating, has been effectively shattered by the current Administration, which has made erroneous “interpretations” of their scope and consequently revoked the permits of more than 90% of those carriers during the initial three-year term and of all the remaining carriers during the subsequent period. Accordingly, Ley No 8955 no longer serves any practical purpose, given that the intent of the legislature at the time in enacting Ley Especial N° 8955 was specifically and unequivocally to ensure the continued commercial activity of the private carriers then operating.

1. 27By a written submission filed at 10:40 hours on 15 de marzo de 2016, Javier Cortes Montoya, in his capacity as a taxi driver, appears before this Chamber for the purpose of intervening as a passive supporting party (coadyuvante pasivo) in this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad), and states his disagreement with Article 1 of Ley No. 8955, which converts passenger carriers (porteadores de personas) into the Stable Special Taxi Service, SEETAXI. He further states that Articles 323 and 334 of Ley 3284 should have been regulated by an executive decree issued by the President of the Republic and the Minister of MOPT. He asserts that the petitioners’ argument concerning the enactment of the aforementioned law and its monopolistic effect lacks legal support, because public transportation is held by the Costa Rican State, which transfers it to third parties through administrative permits or concessions (concesiones administrativas), for both buses and taxis.The operating rights were awarded to third parties through a public tender (licitación pública) in 2000, because they had previously been operating under permits; accordingly, in that same year, the Consejo de Transporte Público put 13.675 administrative taxi concessions out to tender, with only one concession to be granted per participant. The cited Ley No. 8955 does not prohibit the institution of contract carriage (porteo); it merely amends Articles 323 and 334 of the Código de Comercio and leaves contract carriage in force. The argument that market-access clause 11.4 of the Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Costa Rica y Estados Unidos junto con Centroamérica y República Dominicana conflicts with Ley 8955 is invalid, because Anexo 1 concerning safeguard measures in the Costa Rica chapter contains a list of laws and decrees that all signatory nations must respect.
2. 28By a written submission filed at 15:07 hours on 18 de marzo de 2016, William Solano Campos and others appear before this Chamber for the purpose of intervening as active supporting parties (coadyuvantes activos) in this constitutional challenge, and state that they have proper standing (legitimación) in their capacity as users of transportation services because they possess a legitimate interest (interés legítimo), within the meaning of Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Three grounds may be identified. The first is that the enactment of the cited law created a state monopoly without the legislative procedure having obtained a qualified majority vote. Paid passenger transportation (transporte remunerado de personas) was established as a public service (servicio público), with the State as its sole holder. The declaration of unconstitutionality sought would permit private passenger carriage to operate concurrently with SEETAXI and traditional taxi services, thereby eliminating the public monopoly created by the law under discussion by allowing private enterprise in the economic activity.Second, there is a violation of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality of laws, the principle of freedom, private enterprise, freedom of commerce, freedom of contract, and consumers’ freedom of choice. Ley 8955 is unconstitutional because it fails to satisfy two applicable constitutional standards: on the one hand, it does not serve a compelling public interest, and on the other, it restricts fundamental freedoms in the most restrictive manner possible. Third, the cited provision contravenes the Tratado de Libre Comercio con EEUU and is therefore contrary to Article 7 of the Constitución Política, since the treaty’s purpose is to serve as an instrument for liberalizing trade in goods and services among the States Parties, guaranteeing foreign investment and promoting conditions of fair competition, with the resulting attainment of substantial benefits for domestic users and consumers.In view of its significance, Chapter Eleven of the treaty, entitled “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” and specifically the subtitle “11.4. Market Access,” must be examined, because that particular clause is the one clearly contravened by Ley No. 8955. It establishes the obligation of the signatory States not to impose on service providers from another State Party any material or regulatory access restrictions affecting the various economic sectors of another State’s services market.
3. 29By written submissions filed with the Secretariat of this Chamber at 15:17 hours on 18 de marzo del 2016, Alberto de Armas Pereira and others, all in their capacity as members of Club de Colaboración para la autosatisfacción de necesidades de movilidad Común S.A., appear before this Chamber for the purpose of intervening as active supporting parties for the petitioning party in this constitutional challenge. They do so pursuant to Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, under which: “The parties appearing in matters pending as of the date the challenge is filed, or those with a legitimate interest, may enter an appearance therein for the purpose of supporting the arguments that may justify its admissibility or inadmissibility or, where appropriate, expanding the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter in which they have an interest.” They base their active standing (legitimación activa) on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which recognizes the possibility of filing a constitutional challenge without an underlying case (asunto base) where, because of the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, where the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) is involved, or where the matter concerns the community as a whole.Regarding this latter aspect—or where the defense of diffuse interests is involved—the Chamber has already clarified that the legislature refers to the standing held by active citizens because the right to work is at issue. The supporting parties, all of whom are collaborators on the UBER platform in Costa Rica, base their claim on the alleged unconstitutionality of Ley No. 8955, Reforma la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, and Ley No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, because they consider those laws contrary to Articles 50, first paragraph, and 46 of the Constitución Política. They explain that Ley No. 8955 creates a monopoly that does not encourage domestic production in Costa Rica but instead restricts it “by reserving the activity exclusively for a privileged sector.” They consider that this law curtails the ability of hundreds of people to pursue an “honest and useful occupation,” thereby abridging every individual’s right to choose a position of their own “that enables them to earn a living”; they understand this to constitute a “restriction on the free choice of work.” In support of their argument, they cite a passage from the legislative debate during the consideration of Ley No. 8955, expressly referring to the records of the former bill.In summary, that passage states that this was a “negotiation process in which the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes and its authorities, together with the Cámara Nacional de Trasporte en Autobús, the Federación Nacional de Taxis, and the Cámara de Porteadores as representative of the sector, maintained an ongoing discussion aimed at reaching a consensus-based formulation to resolve the situation of male and female passenger carriers.” As a result of that process, the underlying information “made it possible to propose a solution recognizing the right and ability to operate of those persons who were in fact providing contract-carriage services”; they emphasize that this proposal “arises fundamentally because this is a specific and particular need.”

For their part, the supporting parties conclude, in relation to the foregoing, that the reason the Asamblea Legislativa repealed the institution of contract carriage and “made public” any type of paid passenger transportation conducted in private vehicles, directed toward a closed group of users, and satisfying limited, residual, exclusive, and stable demand was “to resolve the disputes that had arisen among taxi drivers, bus operators, and passenger carriers.” They consider this to be a provision that restricts fundamental freedoms “by creating a purported benefit for one group while causing substantial harm to the community.” They support the petitioners’ additional arguments, which, in summary, assert that Ley No. 8955 is unconstitutional because it failed to comply with the legislative procedure, in that it was not approved by a qualified majority but by a Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, even though the provision creates a state monopoly, all of which is contrary to Article 46 of the Constitución Política.

They rely on the Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, approved by Ley No. 8622, Ley No. 21 de noviembre del 2007, from which they expressly cite Article 11.4. On this point, they conclude that the provision “expressly prohibits the adoption of laws, regulations, or procedures that restrict the number of providers of a service by limiting their participation in or access to the market or by creating, for example, numerical quotas or monopolies that grant access to, ownership of, or control over the provision of that service to a single provider or a small number of providers through restrictive or discriminatory measures.” They conclude by stating that Ley No. 8955 violates the constitutional principle of hierarchy of norms (jerarquía de las normas) because its provisions contravene an international treaty (Ley No. 8622) and Article 7 of the Constitución Política.

1. 30By pleadings filed with the Office of the Clerk of this Chamber at 16:12 on 18 de marzo del 2016, Mauricio Muñoz Brenes and others, all acting as members of the Club de Colaboración para la autosatisfacción de necesidades de movilidad Común S.A., appear before this Chamber to participate as active supporting intervenors (coadyuvantes activos) for the petitioning party in this action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad). They do so pursuant to Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which provides: “The parties appearing in matters pending on the date the action is filed, or those with a legitimate interest, may enter an appearance therein in order to support the arguments that may justify granting or denying it or, where appropriate, to expand the grounds of unconstitutionality relating to the matter in which they are interested.” They base their standing (legitimación activa) on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which recognizes the possibility of filing an action of unconstitutionality without an underlying case (asunto base) where, because of the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, where the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) is involved, or where the matter concerns the community as a whole.With regard to this latter aspect—or where the defense of diffuse interests is involved—the Chamber has already clarified that the legislature was referring to the standing held by active citizens because the right to work is at issue. The supporting intervenors, all of whom are partners of the UBER platform in Costa Rica, base their argument on the alleged unconstitutionality of Ley No. 8955, Reforma la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, and Ley No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, on the ground that they are contrary to Articles 50, first paragraph, and 46 of the Constitución Política. They explain that Ley No. 8955 creates a monopoly that does not stimulate domestic production in Costa Rica but instead restricts it “by limiting the activity to a privileged sector.” They contend that this law denies hundreds of people the opportunity to obtain “honest and useful employment,” thereby curtailing every individual’s right to choose a position of their own “that allows them to earn a living”; they understand it to constitute a “restriction on the freedom to choose one’s work.” In support of their argument, they quote a passage from the legislative debate during the consideration of Ley No. 8955, expressly referring to the records of the former bill.In summary, that passage states that there was a “negotiation process in which the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes and its authorities, together with the Cámara Nacional de Trasporte en Autobús, the Federación Nacional de Taxis and the Cámara de Porteadores as the sector’s representative, maintained an ongoing discussion, seeking a consensus-based proposal to resolve the situation of male and female private carriers”; as a result of that process, the underlying information “made possible a proposed solution recognizing the right and continued operation of those persons who were in fact providing private-carriage services (servicio de porteo),” and they emphasize that the proposal “is fundamentally based on the fact that this is a specific and discrete need.”

For their part, the supporting intervenors conclude in this regard that the Asamblea Legislativa’s reason for abolishing the institution of private carriage (porteo) and “making public” any form of compensated passenger transportation provided by private vehicles, directed toward a closed group of users, and satisfying limited, residual, exclusive, and stable demand was “to resolve the disputes that had arisen among taxi drivers, bus operators, and private carriers.” They believe that this is a provision restricting fundamental freedoms “by generating a purported benefit for one group while causing substantial harm to the community.” They support the petitioners’ additional arguments, asserting in summary that Ley No. 8955 is unconstitutional because it did not comply with the legislative procedure, insofar as it was not approved by a qualified majority but by a Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, and because that provision creates a state monopoly, all of which is contrary to Article 46 of the Constitución Política.

They refer to the Free Trade Agreement among the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, approved by Ley No. 8622, Ley No. 21 de noviembre del 2007, and expressly quote Article 11.4 thereof. On this point, they conclude that this provision “expressly prohibits the adoption of laws, regulations, or procedures that restrict the number of providers of a service by limiting their participation in or access to the market or by creating, for example, numerical quotas or monopolies that grant access to, ownership of, or control over the provision of that service to a single provider or a small number of providers through restrictive or discriminatory measures.” They conclude by stating that Ley No. 8955 violates the constitutional principle of hierarchy of laws (principio constitucional de jerarquía de las normas) because its provisions contravene an international treaty (Ley No. 8622) and Article 7 of the Constitución Política.

1. 31By pleadings filed with the Office of the Clerk of this Chamber at 15:00 on 30 de marzo del 2016, Carlos Bastos Chacón and others, all acting as members of the Club de Colaboración para la autosatisfacción de necesidades de movilidad Común S.A., appear before this Chamber to participate as active supporting intervenors for the petitioning party in this action of unconstitutionality. They do so pursuant to Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which provides: “The parties appearing in matters pending on the date the action is filed, or those with a legitimate interest, may enter an appearance therein in order to support the arguments that may justify granting or denying it or, where appropriate, to expand the grounds of unconstitutionality relating to the matter in which they are interested.” They base their standing on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which recognizes the possibility of filing an action of unconstitutionality without an underlying case where, because of the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, where the defense of diffuse interests is involved, or where the matter concerns the community as a whole.With regard to this latter aspect—or where the defense of diffuse interests is involved—the Chamber has already clarified that the legislature was referring to the standing held by active citizens because the right to work is at issue. The supporting intervenors, all of whom are partners of the UBER platform in Costa Rica, base their argument on the alleged unconstitutionality of Ley No. 8955, Reforma la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, and Ley No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, on the ground that they are contrary to Articles 50, first paragraph, and 46 of the Constitución Política. They explain that Ley No. 8955 creates a monopoly that does not stimulate domestic production in Costa Rica but instead restricts it “by limiting the activity to a privileged sector.” They contend that this law denies hundreds of people the opportunity to obtain “honest and useful employment,” thereby curtailing every individual’s right to choose a position of their own “that allows them to earn a living”; they understand it to constitute a “restriction on the freedom to choose one’s work.” In support of their argument, they quote a passage from the legislative debate during the consideration of Ley No. 8955, expressly referring to the records of the former bill.In summary, that passage states that there was a “negotiation process in which the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes and its authorities, together with the Cámara Nacional de Trasporte en Autobús, the Federación Nacional de Taxis and the Cámara de Porteadores as the sector’s representative, maintained an ongoing discussion, seeking a consensus-based proposal to resolve the situation of male and female private carriers”; as a result of that process, the underlying information “made possible a proposed solution recognizing the right and continued operation of those persons who were in fact providing private-carriage services,” and they emphasize that the proposal “is fundamentally based on the fact that this is a specific and discrete need.”

For their part, the supporting intervenors conclude in this regard that the Asamblea Legislativa’s reason for abolishing the institution of private carriage and “making public” any form of compensated passenger transportation provided by private vehicles, directed toward a closed group of users, and satisfying limited, residual, exclusive, and stable demand was “to resolve the disputes that had arisen among taxi drivers, bus operators, and private carriers.” They believe that this is a provision restricting fundamental freedoms “by generating a purported benefit for one group while causing substantial harm to the community.” They support the petitioners’ additional arguments, asserting in summary that Ley No. 8955 is unconstitutional because it did not comply with the legislative procedure, insofar as it was not approved by a qualified majority but by a Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, and because that provision creates a state monopoly, all of which is contrary to Article 46 of the Constitución Política.

They refer to the Free Trade Agreement among the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, approved by Ley No. 8622, Ley No. 21 de noviembre del 2007, and expressly quote Article 11.4 thereof. On this point, they conclude that this provision “expressly prohibits the adoption of laws, regulations, or procedures that restrict the number of providers of a service by limiting their participation in or access to the market or by creating, for example, numerical quotas or monopolies that grant access to, ownership of, or control over the provision of that service to a single provider or a small number of providers through restrictive or discriminatory measures.” They conclude by stating that Ley No. 8955 violates the constitutional principle of hierarchy of laws because its provisions contravene an international treaty (Ley No. 8622) and Article 7 of the Constitución Política.

1. 32By filings submitted to the Clerk’s Office of this Chamber at 8:21 on 1° de abril del 2016, Orlando Chaves Matarrita and others, all of them in their capacity as members of the Club de Colaboración para la autosatisfacción de necesidades de movilidad Común S.A., appear before this Chamber to intervene as active supporting intervenors (coadyuvantes activos) for the petitioning party in this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad). They do so pursuant to Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which provides: “The parties appearing in matters pending on the date the action is filed, or those with a legitimate interest, may enter an appearance therein in order to support the arguments that could justify granting or denying it or, where appropriate, to expand the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter in which they have an interest.” They base their standing (legitimación activa) on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which recognizes the possibility of filing a constitutional challenge without an underlying case (asunto base) where, because of the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, where the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) is involved, or where the matter concerns the community as a whole.Regarding this last aspect—or the defense of diffuse interests—the Chamber has already clarified that the legislature refers to the standing held by active citizens where the right to work is concerned. The supporting intervenors, all of whom are collaborators on the UBER platform in Costa Rica, base their argument on the alleged unconstitutionality of Ley No. 8955, amending Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, and Ley No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, because they consider them contrary to Articles 50, first paragraph, and 46 of the Constitución Política. They explain that Ley No. 8955 creates a monopoly that does not stimulate domestic production in Costa Rica but instead restricts it “by limiting the activity to a privileged sector.” They contend that this law curtails the opportunity for hundreds of people to obtain an “honest and useful occupation,” which entails restricting every individual’s right to choose a position of their own “that allows them to earn a living”; they understand this to be a “restriction on the freedom to choose one’s work.” In support of their argument, they quote an excerpt from the legislative debate during the passage of Ley No. 8955, expressly referring to the records of the former bill.In summary, that excerpt states that this involved a “negotiation process in which the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes and its authorities, together with the Cámara Nacional de Trasporte en Autobús, the Federación Nacional de Taxis, and the Cámara de Porteadores as the sector’s representative, remained in continuous deliberation, seeking a consensus-based formula to resolve the situation of the male and female contract carriers”; as a result of that process, the underlying information “made possible a proposed solution recognizing the right and ability to operate of those persons who were in fact providing contract-carriage services (servicio de porteo).” They emphasize that the proposal “arises fundamentally because this is a specific and discrete need.”

For their part, the supporting intervenors conclude from the foregoing that the Asamblea Legislativa’s reason for abolishing the institution of contract carriage (porteo) and “bringing under public regulation” (“publificar”) any form of paid passenger transportation carried out in private vehicles, directed toward a closed group of users, and serving limited, residual, exclusive, and stable demand was “to settle the disputes that had arisen among taxi drivers, bus operators, and contract carriers.” They consider this to be a provision that restricts fundamental freedoms “by generating an alleged benefit for one group while causing substantial harm to the community.” They support the petitioners’ additional arguments, stating in summary that Ley No. 8955 is unconstitutional because the legislative procedure was not followed, insofar as it was not approved by a qualified majority but by a Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, and because that provision creates a state monopoly, all of which is contrary to Article 46 of the Constitución Política.

They rely on the Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, approved by Ley No. 8622, Ley No. 21 de noviembre del 2007, expressly quoting Article 11.4 of that law. On this point, they conclude that the provision “expressly prohibits the adoption of laws, regulations, or procedures that restrict the number of suppliers of a service by limiting their participation in or access to the market or by creating, for example, numerical quotas or monopolies that grant access to, ownership of, or control over the provision of that service to a single supplier or a small number of suppliers through restrictive or discriminatory measures.” They conclude by stating that Ley No. 8955 violates the constitutional principle of hierarchy of laws because its provisions contravene an international treaty (Ley No. 8622) and Article 7 of the Constitución Política.

1. 33By filings submitted to the Clerk’s Office of this Chamber at 10:55 on 1° de abril del 2016, Marco Madrigal Herrera and others, all of them in their capacity as members of the Club de Colaboración para la autosatisfacción de necesidades de movilidad Común S.A., appear before this Chamber to intervene as active supporting intervenors for the petitioning party in this constitutional challenge. They do so pursuant to Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which provides: “The parties appearing in matters pending on the date the action is filed, or those with a legitimate interest, may enter an appearance therein in order to support the arguments that could justify granting or denying it or, where appropriate, to expand the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter in which they have an interest.” They base their standing on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which recognizes the possibility of filing a constitutional challenge without an underlying case where, because of the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, where the defense of diffuse interests is involved, or where the matter concerns the community as a whole.Regarding this last aspect—or the defense of diffuse interests—the Chamber has already clarified that the legislature refers to the standing held by active citizens where the right to work is concerned. The supporting intervenors, all of whom are collaborators on the UBER platform in Costa Rica, base their argument on the alleged unconstitutionality of Ley No. 8955, amending Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, and Ley No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, because they consider them contrary to Articles 50, first paragraph, and 46 of the Constitución Política. They explain that Ley No. 8955 creates a monopoly that does not stimulate domestic production in Costa Rica but instead restricts it “by limiting the activity to a privileged sector.” They contend that this law curtails the opportunity for hundreds of people to obtain an “honest and useful occupation,” which entails restricting every individual’s right to choose a position of their own “that allows them to earn a living”; they understand this to be a “restriction on the freedom to choose one’s work.” In support of their argument, they quote an excerpt from the legislative debate during the passage of Ley No. 8955, expressly referring to the records of the former bill.In summary, that excerpt states that this involved a “negotiation process in which the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes and its authorities, together with the Cámara Nacional de Trasporte en Autobús, the Federación Nacional de Taxis, and the Cámara de Porteadores as the sector’s representative, remained in continuous deliberation, seeking a consensus-based formula to resolve the situation of the male and female contract carriers”; as a result of that process, the underlying information “made possible a proposed solution recognizing the right and ability to operate of those persons who were in fact providing contract-carriage services.” They emphasize that the proposal “arises fundamentally because this is a specific and discrete need.”

For their part, the supporting intervenors conclude from the foregoing that the Asamblea Legislativa’s reason for abolishing contract carriage and “bringing under public regulation” any form of paid passenger transportation carried out in private vehicles, directed toward a closed group of users, and serving limited, residual, exclusive, and stable demand was “to settle the disputes that had arisen among taxi drivers, bus operators, and contract carriers.” They consider this to be a provision that restricts fundamental freedoms “by generating an alleged benefit for one group while causing substantial harm to the community.” They support the petitioners’ additional arguments, stating in summary that Ley No. 8955 is unconstitutional because the legislative procedure was not followed, insofar as it was not approved by a qualified majority but by a Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, and because that provision creates a state monopoly, all of which is contrary to Article 46 of the Constitución Política.

They rely on the Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, approved by Ley No. 8622, Ley No. 21 de noviembre del 2007, expressly quoting Article 11.4 of that law. On this point, they conclude that the provision “expressly prohibits the adoption of laws, regulations, or procedures that restrict the number of suppliers of a service by limiting their participation in or access to the market or by creating, for example, numerical quotas or monopolies that grant access to, ownership of, or control over the provision of that service to a single supplier or a small number of suppliers through restrictive or discriminatory measures.” They conclude by stating that Ley No. 8955 violates the constitutional principle of hierarchy of laws because its provisions contravene an international treaty (Ley No. 8622) and Article 7 of the Constitución Política.

1. 34In a written submission filed at 14:04 hours on 01 de abril de 2016, Rogelio Fernández Ramírez and others appear before this Chamber to intervene as active supporting parties (coadyuvantes activos) in this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad), and state that they have proper standing (legitimación) in their capacity as users of transportation services because they have a legitimate interest (interés legítimo), under the terms of Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. They identify three grounds. First, the enactment of the cited law created a state monopoly without the legislative procedure having obtained a qualified majority vote. Paid passenger transportation (transporte remunerado de personas) was established as a public service (servicio público), with the State as its sole holder. The requested declaration of unconstitutionality (declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad) would allow the private carriage of passengers (porteo privado de personas) alongside the SEETAXI service and traditional taxis, thereby eliminating the public monopoly created by the law in question by permitting private enterprise in the economic activity.Second, there is an infringement of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality of laws, the principle of freedom, private enterprise, freedom of commerce, freedom of contract, and consumers’ freedom of choice. Ley 8955 is unconstitutional because it fails to satisfy two applicable constitutional criteria: on the one hand, it does not serve a compelling public interest and, on the other, it restricts fundamental freedoms in the most restrictive manner possible. As a third point, the cited provision contravenes the Free Trade Agreement with the United States and is therefore contrary to Article 7 of the Constitución Política, since its purpose is to serve as an instrument for liberalizing trade in goods and services among the States Parties, guaranteeing foreign investment and promoting conditions of fair competition, with the resulting attainment of clear benefits for domestic users and consumers.Given its significance, Chapter Eleven of the treaty, entitled “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” and specifically the subtitle “11.4. Market Access,” must be examined, since that clause in particular is clearly contravened by Ley No. 8955. It establishes the obligation of the signatory States not to impose access restrictions, whether material or regulatory, on service suppliers from another State Party in the various economic sectors of another State’s services market.
2. 35In a written submission filed at 9:27 hours on 4 de abril de 2016, Paola Rojas Anchía and others appear before this Chamber to intervene as active supporting parties in this constitutional challenge, and state that they have proper standing in their capacity as users of transportation services because they have a legitimate interest, under the terms of Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. They identify three grounds. First, the enactment of the cited law created a state monopoly without the legislative procedure having obtained a qualified majority vote. Paid passenger transportation was established as a public service, with the State as its sole holder. The requested declaration of unconstitutionality would allow the private carriage of passengers alongside the SEETAXI service and traditional taxis, thereby eliminating the public monopoly created by the law in question by permitting private enterprise in the economic activity.Second, there is an infringement of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality of laws, the principle of freedom, private enterprise, freedom of commerce, freedom of contract, and consumers’ freedom of choice. Ley 8955 is unconstitutional because it fails to satisfy two applicable constitutional criteria: on the one hand, it does not serve a compelling public interest and, on the other, it restricts fundamental freedoms in the most restrictive manner possible. As a third point, the cited provision contravenes the Free Trade Agreement with the United States and is therefore contrary to Article 7 of the Constitución Política, since its purpose is to serve as an instrument for liberalizing trade in goods and services among the States Parties, guaranteeing foreign investment and promoting conditions of fair competition, with the resulting attainment of clear benefits for domestic users and consumers.Given its significance, Chapter Eleven of the treaty, entitled “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” and specifically the subtitle “11.4. Market Access,” must be examined, since that clause in particular is clearly contravened by Ley No. 8955. It establishes the obligation of the signatory States not to impose access restrictions, whether material or regulatory, on service suppliers from another State Party in the various economic sectors of another State’s services market.
3. 36In a written submission filed with the Secretariat of this Chamber at 16:13 hours on 5 de abril del 2016, Jorge Vargas Corrales, in his capacity as president and legal representative (apoderado) of the corporation whose legal entity identification number is 3-101-549995, appears before this Chamber to intervene as an active supporting party in this constitutional challenge. He bases his standing to bring the action (legitimación activa) on Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, because he considers that the entity he represents has a legitimate interest in having this constitutional challenge upheld, insofar as the challenged statutory provision directly affects the activity it has been conducting. He explains that an appeal proceeding filed by the entity he represents is currently pending against Articles 7.8.1 and 7.8.10 of Ordinary Session 37-2017 [sic] of the Consejo de Transporte Público, through which the supporting corporation’s application to provide the Servicio Especial de Taxi (SEETAXI) was denied.He recounts that when Ley No. 8955 was enacted, the authorizations to engage in the carriage of passengers (porteo de personas), an activity that the supporting corporation had been authorized to conduct by the Consejo Transporte Público, were revoked. He states that a transitional provision (vía transitoria) of the cited law granted them a period in which to continue conducting the activity, now under the SEETAXI model, but subject to compliance with a series of requirements. Among those requirements, he cites having the infrastructural characteristics of a public parking facility while holding a municipal business license (patente municipal) for a private parking facility; this requirement was met, and the corporation was authorized to conduct the activity. He states that it was never asked to obtain a passenger-carriage business license (patente de porteo). In 2012, the Consejo de Transporte Público denied the supporting corporation’s application for authorization to receive special taxi permits.The denial was based on its failure to meet all the requirements imposed by the Procuraduría General de la República; he states that it was granted a period of one month to comply but ultimately failed to satisfy the requirements. He recounts that the entire vehicle fleet managed by the appellant corporation has continued operating in the San Ramón and Palmares area under the authorization of the Consejo de Transporte Público while the process for deciding the administrative remedies (recursos administrativos) filed is completed, as permitted by Directive VTTAV 0626-2016 issued by the Viceministra de Transportes. According to the supporting corporation, the purpose of that directive is to protect the users who receive the public service provided by the supporting corporation. He recounts that the corporation’s affiliates have been fined and their vehicle license plates removed because, according to traffic officers, they continue to engage in the carriage of passengers, which constitutes noncompliance with the aforementioned directive by the traffic authorities.He considers that, contrary to the position maintained by the Consejo de Transporte Público, that directive remains in force because there is no subsequent directive to the contrary or any higher-ranking provision. He states that he shares the arguments concerning the subject matter of this action because he believes that eliminating the carriage activity through an amendment to Article 323 of the Código de Comercio and subjecting that activity to Ley No. 8955 violates the legal order (ordenamiento jurídico): first, because of the infringement of the legislative procedural rules governing the qualified majority required to enact Ley No. 8955; and second, because it violates the hierarchy of legal norms (jerarquía normativa), particularly with respect to the international treaties in force in Costa Rica.
4. 37In a written submission filed at 14:05 hours on 06 de abril de 2016, Luis Ángel Delgado González, in his capacity as General Manager of Cooperativa Nacional de Servicios Múltiples y Transportes para Asociados, R.L, appears before this Chamber to intervene as an active supporting party in this constitutional challenge and states that he has proper standing because he has a direct interest in the decision. He indicates that when the aforementioned law was enacted, the authorizations to engage in the carriage of passengers held by the entities he represents were revoked, thereby restricting their ability to conduct a passenger transportation activity authorized under Article 323 of the Código de Comercio, through its repeal by a law enacted unconstitutionally. The public administration’s conduct in suspending the carriage activity through the application of that law has not only harmed the community but has also caused loss and damage (daños y perjuicios) to the company and the carriers comprising the vehicle fleet. They therefore brought an ordinary proceeding (proceso ordinario) against the Consejo de Transporte Público, in which they requested that the amendment to Article 323 of the Código de Comercio not be applied. By subjecting all passenger transportation activities to the Consejo de Transporte Público pursuant to Ley 8955, a state monopoly is being created.
5. 38In a written submission filed at 11:34 hours on 07 de abril de 2016, Ernesto Solano León and others appear before this Chamber to intervene as active supporting parties in this constitutional challenge.
6. 39By written submission filed at 14:39 hours on 08 de abril de 2016, Luis Alfredo Villalobos Salazar, in his capacity as President of the Board of Directors of the Asociación Cámara Nacional de Autobuseros -CANABUS-, appears before this Chamber for the purpose of intervening as a supporting party for the respondent (coadyuvante pasivo) in this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad), and states that the remunerated transportation of persons (transporte remunerado de personas) serves a public interest regulated by the State. Within this structure, there are regular services, while special services operate as a complement for persons or places not reached by regular service, as do premium services for users who do not wish to use the services described above. The purpose of enacting Law 8955, although it was unnecessary, was to clarify the lingering use of the word “private carriage” (“porteo”) in Article 323 of the Commercial Code. The laws governing public transportation are clear and were enacted subsequently, making it clear that public transportation is a public service, regardless of its form. Likewise, there is no violation whatsoever of the provisions of the International Free Trade Agreement, which excludes public services and, as such, the remunerated transportation of persons.
7. 40By written submission filed at 15:31 hours on 08 de abril de 2016, Rolf Erwin Richard Mangel, in his capacity as legal representative of the company known as Syniverse Technologies, S.R.L Costa Rica, appears before this Chamber for the purpose of intervening as a supporting party for the petitioner (coadyuvante activo) in this constitutional challenge, and states that on 14 de octubre de 2015 he submitted a written inquiry to the Consejo de Transporte Público regarding the possibility of implementing a carpooling policy (política de vehículo compartido) within the company. The Council replied that the proposal exhibited distinctive characteristics inherent to public transportation, based particularly on the rules currently in force resulting from the Reform of the Commercial Code and the Regulatory Law for the Public Service of Remunerated Transportation of Persons in Taxi-Mode Vehicles, both implemented through Law No. 8955 of 16 de junio de 2011; in his view, this state regulation is excessive.He states that Law No. 8955 has nationalized the remunerated transportation of persons and created a monopoly in favor of the State, since it was enacted by a committee vested with full legislative authority, in violation of the constitutionally established procedure. A declaration of unconstitutionality would allow the private carriage of persons, as a contract arising from freedom of contract (autonomía de la voluntad), to operate alongside the SEETAXI service and traditional taxis, thereby eliminating the public monopoly created by the law. The principles of individual freedom, freedom of commerce, freedom of contract, and consumer choice have been violated. Law 8955 is unconstitutional because it fails to satisfy two applicable constitutional standards: first, it does not serve a compelling public interest; and second, it restricts fundamental freedoms in the most restrictive manner possible.Third, the cited provision contravenes the Free Trade Agreement with the United States and is therefore contrary to Article 7 of the Political Constitution, because the Agreement is intended to serve as an instrument for liberalizing trade in goods and services among the States Parties, guaranteeing foreign investment and promoting conditions of fair competition, with the resulting attainment of tangible benefits for domestic users and consumers. Given its significance, Chapter Eleven of the Agreement, entitled “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” and specifically the subtitle “11.4. Market Access,” must be examined, since this particular clause is clearly contravened by Law No. 8955. It establishes the obligation of the signatory States not to impose restrictions, whether substantive or regulatory, on access by service providers from another State Party to the various economic sectors of that State’s services market.
8. 41By order issued at 14:38 hours on 25 de abril del 2016, those who appeared between 1ero de marzo and 8 de abril del 2016 were admitted as supporting parties (coadyuvantes). In addition, the response of the Procuraduría General de la República to the hearing granted to it was deemed filed, while the hearing granted to the Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes was deemed unanswered (folios 1053-1054 of the digital case file).
9. 42CARLOS VILLALTA VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes, filed an untimely submission stating that he was rendering a report, in which he asserted, in summary, as follows: Pursuant to Article 11 of the General Law of Public Administration and in relation to Articles 11 and 129 of the Political Constitution, the Administration, through public officials—in this case, the traffic authorities—is responsible solely for ensuring compliance with those provisions and is not authorized to decline to apply them. Consequently, once the aforementioned Law No. 8955 had been enacted, the Consejo de Transporte Público was responsible for enforcing it through the competent authorities, and no grounds could be invoked to postpone its proper enforcement. From the standpoint of this Ministry as the “enforcing authority” for the aforementioned legislation—although enforcement, where applicable, falls to the Consejo de Transporte Público, except for matters under the jurisdiction of the Policía de Tránsito—the petitioners challenge Law No. 8955 as allegedly unconstitutional insofar as it amended: Law No. 3284, Commercial Code of 30 de abril de 1964, and Law No. 7969, Regulatory Law for the Public Service of Remunerated Transportation of Persons in Taxi-Mode Vehicles of 22 de diciembre de 1999.The petitioners contend that the aforementioned Law No. 8955 is contrary to Articles 7,28, 39, 41, 46, 129 and 140 of the Political Constitution and to “the principles of primacy of reality in labor matters, hierarchy of norms, reasonableness and proportionality, private initiative, freedom of commerce, freedom of contract, and consumer choice.” Carriage-for-hire services (servicio de porte) have been widely used as a commercial activity for the transportation of goods, whereas for the transportation of persons they were “residual” for many years. Throughout that period, the latter service was provided by natural persons, principally in remote locations where authorized forms of public transportation did not operate, and such providers were frequently found at intersections between secondary roads and main routes. In the years preceding the enactment of Law No. 8955, owing to various positions adopted in administrative and judicial proceedings, the “scope” of the provision of carriage-for-hire services for persons expanded, becoming a business operated not by natural persons but by legal entities, which quickly established “branches” in the principal seats of the country’s cantons.This phenomenon generated a conflict with the public taxi service, which is a State activity. Under the legal system currently in force, the remunerated transportation of persons is and must be a State activity because it involves a clear and specific public interest. When a conflict arose between private carriage—which had become widespread because it was being operated by legal entities—and the public taxi service, the option that the Asamblea Legislativa determined at the time to be legally viable was to enact Law 8955, which amended, among other legislation, the Commercial Code so that the institution of private carriage of persons would thereafter be excluded from commercial regulation. The right to operate the taxi service belongs to the State, which grants it temporarily to private parties who satisfy certain requirements. Thus, the institution of carriage of persons is inadmissible both procedurally and substantively because it conflicts with a State service established as such by Law No. 7969.Law No. 8955 did indeed remove the institution of carriage of persons—but not of goods—from the Commercial Code; however, through the amendment introduced to Law No. 7969, it allowed those already operating at that time, by then extensively organized as legal entities and acting as “private carriers” (“porteadores”), to join a service under State control known as “stable special taxi services” (“servicios especiales estables de taxi”), commonly known as “SEETAXI.” Through this constitutional challenge, the petitioners apparently seek a historical, technical, and operational regression by opening the market to a “numerus apertus” of new private carriers, and to that end they invoke the claim that the law they now challenge violates Articles 7, 28, 39, 41, 46, 129 and 140 of the Political Constitution. Regarding Article 7: It is not true that the provisions of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States are violated, because the remunerated transportation of persons is not a commercial activity but rather a public service of the State, first under Law No. 3503 of 10 de mayo de 1965 and its amendments; subsequently under Law No. 5406 on the Public Taxi Service, since repealed; and finally under the currently effective Law No. 7969.Article 28: The content of this constitutional provision is distorted because anyone seeking to operate as a private carrier of persons would, precisely, be violating the law, since the remunerated transportation of persons is a public service. Article 39: It is inapplicable to the specific case because, if a person currently engaging in the carriage of persons is penalized, it is because that activity is not permitted, given that the remunerated transportation of persons in motor vehicles has been defined by law as a public service from 1965 to the present. Article 41: It is also substantively inapplicable to the present case because it constitutes a procedural guarantee of access to justice, but no violation arising from the enactment of Law No. 8955 has been demonstrated in this specific case. Articles 45 and 46: This is neither a “private monopoly” nor, still less, a newly established “public monopoly,” because Law No. 3503 established in 1965 that the remunerated transportation of persons in motor vehicles is a public service of the State; Law 5406 subsequently reaffirmed this, and Law No. 7969 reiterates it, while Law No. 8955 constitutes legislation supplementary to the foregoing laws.Article 129: There is no violation whatsoever of this constitutional provision; rather, it is the petitioners who seek to “legitimize” the carriage of persons despite its lack of legal existence. Article 140: This concerns the powers of the President of the Republic and the respective Minister, that is, the Executive Branch. (See folios 1181-1188 of the digital case file).
10. 43By order issued at 14:43 hours on 28 de abril del 2016, it was stated that, the record being ready, this action had been referred to the Magistrate assigned in rotation.
11. 44A brief was filed by MARIO HUMBERTO ZARATE SANCHEZ, in his capacity as Acting Executive Director of the Consejo de Transporte Público, on May 4, 2016, stating, in summary, that: In strict adherence to the wording of the provision challenged through the constitutional action, the Consejo de Transporte Público, as a decentralized body attached to the Ministerio de Obras Públicas, with autonomous authority over public transportation matters, is the entity that, on behalf of the State, assumes the power to authorize permits for stable special taxi service (servicio especial estable de taxi, seetaxi), thereby becoming, by operation of law, an implementing authority for the provisions of Law No. 8955; and it is by virtue of that authorization and in accordance with section 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción constitucional that this report is submitted in the capacity of an assisting party acting as an implementing authority for the challenged law.Regarding the paid transportation of persons (public service), Article 2 of Law No. 7969 refers to the nature of the provision of the service and, in that regard, provides that, for all legal and service-related purposes, the paid transportation of persons by taxi shall be deemed a public service operated under an administrative concession (concesión administrativa), following the special procedures established in that law and its regulations, or under a permit in the case of stable special taxi services, in accordance with subsection (a) of Article 7 of that same law. The cited provision likewise states that the paid transportation of persons by buses, minibuses, microbuses, taxis, automobiles, and any other type of motor vehicle—whether offered to the general public, to users, or to specified groups of users with specific needs constituting special demand—is a public service vested in the State, irrespective of the degree of state intervention in determining the service’s operating system or supervising it.When bill No. 8955 was submitted for constitutional review, the Sala Constitucional stated that, by declaring the paid transportation of persons a public service in either of its two forms, the legislature sought to remove the provision of passenger transportation services—which the legislature had declared in their entirety to be a public service—from the private sphere, thereby changing the applicable rules and legal principles. To that end, private parties become collaborators of the Public Administration in providing a service that, because of its characteristics and the existence of a public interest, must be undertaken by the State, without the involvement of principles and rights governing private relationships, such as the principle of freedom of contract or freedom of commerce—decision No. 201 1-04778 at 14:31 hours on April 13, 2011, issued by the Sala Constitucional. Consequently, as cited by the constitutional body, the legislature sought to and did declare the various forms of paid transportation of persons to be a public service because of the significance or impact of that activity on society.In this regard, the Procuraduría General de la República stated in its Opinion C-288-2014 that “no private party may provide paid transportation services for persons, in any of their various forms, unless that party holds a concession ‘or permit from the State,’ specifically from the Consejo de Transporte Público, a decentralized body of MOPT. In conclusion, the public service of paid transportation of persons in its various forms may be provided only by those natural or legal persons who have previously obtained the corresponding authorization (permit or concession) granted by the Consejo de Transporte Público pursuant to the procedures established by the laws regulating the paid transportation of persons for that purpose” (Opinion C-288-2014). According to the foregoing analysis of paid transportation of persons and its various forms, Law No. 7969 regulates the public transportation service provided by taxi, for which the standard selection process is a public competitive procedure (concurso público).That law also regulates stable special taxi service (seetaxi, formerly porteo), which is authorized through the revocable legal mechanism of a permit, and forecloses any possibility of providing passenger transportation within the private sphere. Law No. 3503, in turn, governs paid transportation of persons by bus, authorization for which may be obtained either through a public tendering process or, alternatively, through a permit, as stipulated in Article 25 of Law No. 3503. For concessions of this kind, the Administration must guarantee the economic and financial balance of the contracts. The same applies to special-service permits, of which there are three types—student, worker, and tourism transportation—regulated by Executive Decree No. 15203-MOPT, although specific rules have been issued for the application of tourism permits. These special-service permits are based, respectively, on the existence of contracts with parents or educational institutions, contracts with companies or workers, and authorization from the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo.As their name indicates, these services are special and may not solicit passengers; they may be provided solely for the authorized purpose and may be operated using a microbus, minibus, or bus. Each public service for the paid transportation of persons meets demand-related needs. In the case of paid transportation of persons by bus, its appropriateness and implementation are reflected in a technical study detailing the service needs of one or more communities. For this service, the Consejo de Transporte Público determines the route, schedules, optimal fleet, and operating scheme, while rates, by operation of law, fall within the authority of the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (Aresep). In the case of taxi service, a supply-and-demand study is conducted because the service is awarded by operating base. Although each taxi concession is strictly personal (personalísima), it is assigned to an operating base to preserve the economic and financial balance of each taxi concessionaire’s concession contract.Taxi service is characterized by several factors: taxis operate from an operating base, respond to demand, constitute an open, public, and readily apparent service, actively seek passengers, cruise for fares, are identified by a previously established logo and color, and charge a uniform rate authorized by ARESEP. Law No. 7969 also regulates the stable special taxi service known as SEETAXI, which, before the repeal of Article 323 of the Código de Comercio, was conducted as the activity of porteo, understood as a door-to-door service intended to meet a limited, residual service need and directed toward a closed group of persons distinct from those served by taxi service. For its operation, seetaxi requires, among other things, a geographical area defined by a municipal business license and written contracts between the parties. Accordingly, permits for stable special taxi service must be issued by the Consejo de Transporte Público upon submission of a certified copy of the contract or contracts entered into with the persons, institutions, or companies using the service, as well as satisfaction of other legally established requirements.Stable special taxi service is directed toward residual and limited demand requiring a door-to-door route, subject to the prior conclusion of a contract between the parties, which implicitly includes the price of the service. In this case, the user calls the permit-holding company and requests transportation, with the SEETAXI permit holder and the customer agreeing on the price corresponding to the route traveled. As the Sala Constitucional observed, the legislature’s intent, given the service’s significance to society, was to remove this private service from the private sphere and treat it as a public service, also taking into account the underlying economic activity and the public interest (residual, limited, closed group of users). Seetaxi is prohibited from soliciting passengers, cruising for fares, and engaging in other conduct specified in Law No. 7969 following the amendment introduced by Law No. 8955 on July 7, 2011.Based on the foregoing, it may be concluded that, as stated in Law No. 7969, all paid transportation of persons provided by automobiles, minibuses, microbuses, and buses is vested in the State, and its provision or operation requires the corresponding authorization from the Consejo de Transporte Público. Upon the entry into force of Law No. 8955, private service ceased to be applicable, as all passenger transportation falls within the sphere of public service; that provision admits neither exceptions nor interpretations because it is clear and specific. Accordingly, no monopoly can be alleged, since a public-service concession is obtained through a public tender in which participation is open; likewise, any person may apply for a public-service permit, authorization of which depends on compliance with the legal requirements. On the basis of Articles 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Law No. 6815, Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República, the Procuraduría General de la República issued a binding opinion concerning the inquiry submitted by this Council’s Internal Auditor.The subject of the inquiry was stable special taxi service (seetaxi) following Law No. 8955, which required the advisory body to address the practice of transporting persons for hire (porteo de personas), regulated until July 6, 2011, by Article 323 of the Código de Comercio, which was repealed in its entirety by that law. Three defining features of public service may be identified: (a) it is an activity belonging to the Administration; (b) it seeks to provide a service to the population; and (c) that service must be effectively guaranteed. Nevertheless, although public service is, in principle, an activity belonging to the Administration, this does not preclude private parties from participating in public administration, particularly through a public-service concession, as frequently occurs with transportation and services at ports and airports. Two previously mentioned matters are especially relevant and must now be emphasized.First, the public nature that a particular service activity may possess presupposes a corresponding declaration by the public authorities—a designation as public service (publicatio) that, under our legal system, is a matter strictly reserved to statute because of the resulting restrictions on freedom of enterprise.

Secondly, it should also be emphasized that the participation of non-State actors in the provision of public services (servicios públicos), with the authorization and under the control and oversight of the State, is possible and increasingly common; although, as noted, not every private activity of public interest or public activity constitutes a public service. It follows from the foregoing that declaring a particular economic activity to be a public service entails its nationalization (nacionalización). That is, ownership thereof is vested in the State, such that only the State or an authorized private party may provide the service. Another effect of declaring an activity to be a public service is that the economic activity is removed from private commerce and may not be freely conducted by private parties. The only way to engage in it is through a State concession (concesión) or permit (permiso).

Even in such cases, however, the State retains ownership of the service, while the private party is limited solely to its actual provision. There can be no doubt that the compensated transportation of persons in motor vehicles—in its various bus and taxi modalities—constitutes a public service. Indeed, the Act Regulating the Compensated Transportation of Persons in Motor Vehicles, No. 3503 of 10 de mayo de 1965, classifies the compensated transportation of persons in collective motor vehicles as a public service regulated, controlled, and overseen by the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, the provision of which may be delegated to expressly authorized private parties in accordance with the rules established in that Act (Articles 1 and 2). The same classification follows from Article 5, subsection f), of the Act Creating the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, No. 7593 of 9 de agosto de 1 996, which classifies the compensated transportation of persons as a public service.

Similarly, the Act Regulating the Public Service of Compensated Transportation of Persons in Taxi-Mode Vehicles, No. 7969 of 22 de diciembre de 1999, defines this means of transportation as a public service operated through an administrative concession (concesión administrativa), pursuant to the special procedures established in that Act and its regulations (Article 2). Moreover, the amendment made to Article 2 of Ley 7969, specifically by Article 2 of Ley 8955, of 16 de junio del 2011, establishes the compensated transportation of persons in any type of motor vehicle as a public service, regardless of the degree of State intervention. The second paragraph of the provision in question states: “The compensated transportation of persons carried out by means of buses, minibuses, microbuses, taxis, automobiles, and any other type of motor vehicle, whether offered to the general public, to users, or to specific groups of users with specific needs that constitute special demand, is a public service owned by the State.

The foregoing applies regardless of the degree of State intervention in determining the service’s operating system or in its oversight.” No private party may provide the compensated transportation service for persons, in any of its modalities, without a concession or permit from the State. This is precisely what Article 112 of the Road Traffic Act prohibits: owners or drivers of vehicles may not engage in public transportation without the respective authorizations and legally assigned license plates. Regarding the legal concept of the “private carriage of persons” (porteo de personas), although the compensated transportation of persons constitutes a public service and, in principle, could be provided only by persons authorized by the State, those land transportation services for persons that cannot be subsumed within the public transportation service provided through collective motor vehicles and taxis may be operated by private parties.

Such activities could not be prohibited or penalized because they fall outside the scope of the law and result from the exercise of two important public freedoms: freedom of enterprise and freedom of contract. Put differently, if private parties, relying on the principle of freedom and the aforementioned economic freedoms, discover or create new modalities for transporting persons in vehicles which, by their nature, differ from the two nationalized modalities, they have every right to conduct that economic activity. Several modalities of land transportation for persons currently coexist in Costa Rica. Some are governed by Public Law and others by Private Law, more specifically by Mercantile or Commercial Law. Private parties may conduct activities involving the transportation of persons like any other economic activity, provided that those activities do not entail providing the public transportation service through collective motor vehicles or under the taxi modality.

Regarding the repeal of the private carriage of persons framework and the creation of the “stable special taxi service” (servicio especial estable de taxi): Because of the many disputes that arose among taxi drivers, bus operators, and private carriers, representatives of the three groups (Cámara Nacional de Transporte en Autobús, Federación Nacional de Taxis, and Cámara de Porteadores), together with the authorities of the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, met on numerous occasions and reached a consensus on regulating the activities of private carriers. To that end, Deputy Viviana Martin drafted a bill eliminating the private carriage of persons framework from the Código de Comercio and transferring regulation of that activity, under the name “stable special taxi service,” to the Act Regulating the Public Service of Compensated Transportation of Persons in Taxi-Mode Vehicles, No. 7969, of 22 de diciembre de 1999.

Accordingly, acting on the consensus proposal of the representatives of the compensated passenger transportation sector, the Asamblea Legislativa processed the bill under expediente No. 17874, culminating in the enactment of Ley No. 8955, of 16 de junio del 2011. The private carriage of persons was thus eliminated, but private carriage itself was not; in other words, what was eliminated was the word “persons” from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio, while goods, articles, money, correspondence, etc., may continue to be transported. Considering the public interest involved and the consensus reached by the interested parties, the legislature chose to declare the transportation of persons a public service, regardless of the modality involved or the degree of State intervention in determining the operating system or overseeing it. At the same time, it regulated the private carriage of persons, which was renamed the stable special taxi service, retaining the same status as a residual service that the private carriage of persons had previously held.

Indeed, the stable special taxi service was defined as the “public service for the compensated transportation of persons, intended for a closed group of users and meeting limited, residual, exclusive, and stable demand.” (Article 1, subsection I), of Ley No. 7969, added by Ley No. 8955). Regarding the requirements and conditions for conducting the transportation of persons under the “stable special taxi service” modality: Ley No. 8955, of 16 de junio del 2011, not only amended Article 323 of the Código de Comercio by eliminating the private carriage of persons framework, but also regulated the activity, naming it the “stable special taxi service” in the Act Regulating the Public Service of Compensated Transportation of Persons in Taxi-Mode Vehicles. The stable special taxi service retains the same residual and limited status that the private carriage of persons previously had. As regards the requirements and conditions for conducting the special taxi service activity, Articles 2 and 29 of the Act Regulating the Public Service of Compensated Transportation of Persons in Taxi-Mode Vehicles, as amended by the aforementioned Ley No. 8955, apply.

The compensated transportation service for persons, in its various modalities (bus, taxi, seetaxi, microbus, and others), constitutes a public service. A public service is an administrative activity whose purpose is to provide a service; it is characterized by seeking to furnish a service to the population, with the aim of affirmatively ensuring that a collective need is met. A public service is a service provided to the public, regardless of the social stratum to which its members belong. It is characterized as an activity inherent to the Administration, seeks to furnish a service to the population, and must be effectively guaranteed. Declaring a particular economic activity to be a public service entails its nationalization and vests ownership thereof in the State, such that only the State or an authorized private party may provide the service. Likewise, declaring an activity to be a public service removes the economic activity from private commerce, so that private parties may not conduct it freely.

The only way to engage in it is through a State concession or permit; even in such cases, the State retains ownership of the service, while the private party is limited solely to its actual provision, provided that it complies with the current regulations governing the transportation of persons, which constitutes a public service under any modality that may be implemented. The transportation of persons in motor vehicles—in its various modalities—constitutes a public service regulated, controlled, and overseen by the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, the provision of which may be delegated to private parties expressly authorized in accordance with the rules established for that purpose in the Legal System. If the number of operators exceeds demand, or if unauthorized persons operate, competition may arise that could be ruinous for already authorized concession holders and permit holders, and the State will be liable if it tolerates such competition.

The now-repealed private carriage of persons activity was renamed the stable special taxi service, retaining the same status as a residual service, but as a public service. The stable special taxi service was defined as the public service for the compensated transportation of persons intended for a closed group of users and meeting limited, residual, exclusive, and stable demand. Regarding the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement, known as CAFTA, entered into force on 01 de enero de 2009 and was published through Ley No. 8622 of 21 de noviembre de 2007, published in Alcance No. 40 to La Gaceta No. 246 of 21 de diciembre de 2007. The Agreement governs trade and investment relations among Centroamérica, Estados Unidos, and República Dominicana.

In the case of Costa Rica, this treaty constitutes one of the principal instruments of trade policy, insofar as it regulates trade with the country’s principal trading partner. The treaty made it possible to modernize Costa Rican legislation concerning intellectual property, insurance, telecommunications, and distribution contracts, as well as to facilitate mechanisms to ensure the effective enforcement of labor and environmental legislation. The petitioners (accionantes) contend that Law No. 8955 violates the scope of the aforementioned Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). In this regard, it was verified that Anexo I, Costa Rica Schedule to the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, includes the sector designated therein as “Land Transportation Services—Passenger Transportation” and specifically references all measures pertaining to that service, including Decreto Ejecutivo No. 26 del 10 de noviembre de 1965, Law No. 3503, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31 180-MOPT, Law No. 7969, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 5743-T, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 28913-MOPT, Law No. 5066, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 28337-MOPT, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 15203-MOPT, and Law No. 7593.

With respect to the description, “Cross-Border Services and Investment,” it provides verbatim as follows: “Cross-Border Services and Investment: Costa Rica reserves the right to limit the number of concessions (concesiones) to operate domestic routes for the compensated transportation of persons in motor vehicles (including special passenger transportation services as defined in Articles 2 and 3 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 15203-MOPT del 22 de febrero de 1984 - Reglamento para la Explotación de Servicios Especiales de Transporte Automotor Remunerado de Personas). Such concessions must be awarded through competitive bidding (licitación), and the operation of a route shall be put out to bid only when the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes has established the need to provide the service, in accordance with the relevant technical studies. Where there are multiple bids, including one from a Costa Rican supplier that equally satisfies all requirements, preference shall be given to the Costa Rican bid over the foreign bid, whether submitted by natural persons or companies.

A permit (permiso) to operate an international compensated passenger transportation service shall be granted only to companies incorporated under Costa Rican legislation or to those whose capital is composed of at least 60 percent contributions from Central American nationals. In addition to the restriction described above, the principle of reciprocity shall apply when granting permits to provide international compensated passenger transportation services. A permit shall be required to provide compensated land passenger transportation services. New concessions may be granted if justified by demand for the service. Priority shall be given to concession holders currently providing the service. Costa Rica reserves the right to limit the number of permits or concessions for providing domestic compensated land passenger transportation services, ANEXO I, Costa Rica Schedule I-CR-13, based on demand for the service.

Priority shall be given to concession holders currently providing the service. The Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes reserves the right to determine annually the number of concessions to be granted in each district, canton, and province for taxi services. Only one taxi concession may be granted to each natural person, and each concession confers the right to operate only one vehicle. Competitive bidding processes for taxi concessions are awarded based on a point system that gives an advantage to existing suppliers. Each concession to provide regular public compensated passenger transportation services in motor vehicles, excluding taxis, may be granted to only one person, unless an economic needs test (prueba de necesidades económicas) demonstrates the need for additional suppliers. Furthermore, a natural person may not own more than two companies or be a majority shareholder in more than three companies operating different routes.

Permits to provide passenger transportation services in non-tourist buses within the Gran Área Metropolitana del Valle Central de Costa Rica shall be granted only after it has been demonstrated that the regular public bus service cannot meet demand. Costa Rica reserves the right to maintain a monopoly over rail transportation. However, the State may grant concessions to private parties. Concessions may be granted if justified by demand for the service. Priority shall be given to concession holders currently providing the service.” In accordance with the foregoing quotation, it is clear that, under the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, our Government guarantees and reserves to itself authority over, and all matters related to, passenger transportation, including international passenger transportation and special services (students, workers, and tourism).

Consequently, anyone seeking to enter our country’s market in connection with passenger transportation must comply with the domestic legal system (Ordenamiento Jurídico Interno), since under Anexo I of the aforementioned treaty our country is guaranteed the right to apply the regulations governing those public services and their various forms. This means that authorization from the Consejo de Transporte Público is required to commence the compensated passenger transportation service intended to be provided, in accordance with Law No. 7969 and its amendment, which neither contravenes nor violates the constitutional provisions enshrined in Articles 7 46, 129, and 140 of our Carta Magna. (See folios 1215-1247 of the digital case file (expediente digital)).

1. 45After the date on which this Chamber decided to admit interventions (coadyuvancias), the following submissions were filed: On 15 de julio del 2016, the Federación Nacional de Cooperativas de Taxi Fenacootaxi requested a hearing. On 21 de junio del 2016, Rubén Vargas Campos, in his capacity as Secretary General of the Unión de Taxistas Costarricenses, requested that the action be dismissed. On 23 de julio del 2016, Miguel Angel Salas Castro requested recognition as a supporting intervenor for the respondent (coadyuvante pasivo). On 05 de setiembre del 2016, representatives of the Unión Nacional de Porteadores requested recognition as supporting intervenors for the claimants (coadyuvantes activos). On 12 de octubre del 2016, the Asociación Cámara Nacional de Autobuseros CANABUS requested that this action be decided promptly. On 20 de octubre del 2016, Edwin Barboza Guzman, Manager of Fenacootaxi, requested justice. On 26 de octubre del 2016, a member of the Comité Nacional de ex porteadores y seetaxi requested a hearing. On 31 de octubre del 2016, a member of the Comité Nacional de ex porteadores y seetaxi requested a hearing.
2. 46The claimant, President of the Asociación Nacional de Consumidores Libre (ACL), filed submissions on 4 y el 8 de julio del 2016 addressing the arguments of the state bodies and stating that designation as a public service does not entail a state monopoly and that the amendment enacted by Ley 8955 increased the inconsistency with the FTA; he therefore requests that the interventions of MOPT and CTP be rejected. Regarding the report of PGR, he states that the amendment does not satisfy the public interest represented by consumers, did not improve service conditions for users, and contravenes the FTA.
3. 47By submission dated 15 de julio del 2016, the representatives of the Federación Nacional de Cooperativas de Taxi Fenacootaxi R.L y otros requested a hearing with the Reporting Justice (Magistrado Instructor).
4. 48By submission filed on 23 de julio del 2016, Miguel Angel Salas Castro states that, although the deadline had passed, he appears as a supporting intervenor for the respondent.
5. 49By submission filed on 05 de setiembre del 2016, representatives of the Unión Nacional de Porteadores –UNAPORTE S.A.-, already supporting intervenors for the claimants, appeared to request a hearing before the Sala Constitucional.
6. 50In a response dated 14 de setiembre del 2016, the Reporting Justice addressed the requests for a hearing.
7. 51By submission dated 20 de octubre del 2016, the Asociación Cámara Nacional de Autobuseros CANABUS, acting as supporting intervenors for the respondents, requested that this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) be decided as promptly as possible.
8. 52By submission dated 20 de octubre del 2016, the General Manager of the Federación Nacional de Cooperativas de Taxi requested a prompt decision on this action.
9. 53By submission filed on 26 de octubre del 2016 (reiterated on 31 de octubre del 2016), a member of the Comité Nacional de ex porteadores y seetaxis appeared to request a hearing.
10. 54By resolution number 2016-016314 at 10:00 hours on 04 de noviembre del 2016, the Chamber ordered that the filing initiating amparo proceeding (recurso de amparo) number 16-015165-0007-CO be separated and added to this case file. That filing requests suspension of the collection of the vehicle registration fee (marchamo) for period 2017 from all concession holders providing the public service of compensated passenger transportation in the taxi modality until the action has been decided, because some of the charges are linked to the challenged laws.
11. 55By submission filed on 09 de noviembre del 2016, the President of Auto Transportes para socios San Jorge S.A. requests that the Chamber rule on COSEVI’s noncompliance, because penalty proceedings (procesos sancionatorios) are being conducted for the illegal transportation of passengers using sedan vehicles.
12. 56By submission filed on 11 de noviembre del 2016, the Attorney-in-Fact of the Unión Nacional de Porteadores UNAPORTE S.A. appeared and stated that she did so as a supporting intervenor for the claimant.
13. 57In a response dated 11 de noviembre del 2016, the Reporting Justice addressed the requests for a hearing.
14. 58By resolution issued at 15:07 hours on 10 de enero del 2017, the Minister of Foreign Trade was asked to provide evidence for a more informed ruling (prueba para mejor resolver) addressing the facts alleged in the constitutional challenge.
15. 59By certification dated 21 de diciembre del 2016, the Reporting Justice placed on record that the action had been submitted to a vote that day, but that its analysis could not be completed because it was decided that it would be brought to a vote before the Regular Justices in enero del 2017.
16. 60By submission filed on 24 de enero del 2017, ALEXANDER MORA DELGADO, in his capacity as Minister of Foreign Trade, addressed the foregoing evidence, stating in summary that, because that Ministry represents Costa Rica as a Party before the Free Trade Commission and in dispute-settlement mechanisms to which the country is a party, that institution must refrain from addressing the facts and arguments concerning whether the challenged law violates the constitutional and international trade rules and principles cited by the claimants, since analyzing them would, on the one hand, fall outside COMEX’s jurisdiction and, on the other, inevitably reveal in advance arguments that another Party to the Treaty could use in a potential dispute-settlement mechanism against Costa Rica.
17. 61By submission filed on 24 de enero del 2017, claimant Otto Guevara Guth submitted as evidence official letter DM-1325-5 of 16 de diciembre del 2005, issued by the Ministerio de Comercio Exterior, in which it provided its opinion on a bill similar to the challenged law and stated that the bill contravened the provisions of Chapter 11 on Cross-Border Trade in Services of the Free Trade Agreement. He also submitted, on 31 de enero del 2017, a publication by a legislator concerning the company UBER and CAFTA.

62. By resolution number 2017-001922 at 11 hours on 08 de febrero del 2017, the Chamber ruled on the motion to recuse (recusación) the Reporting Justice, denying the motion and declaring Justice Fernando Cruz Castro eligible to hear the present matter.

1. 63By submission filed on 08 de febrero del 2017, the Attorney-in-Fact of the Unión Nacional de Porteadores UNAPORTE S.A. states that she joins the motion to recuse.
2. 64By submission filed on 13 de febrero del 2017, Rubén Vargas Campos appeared and requested that consideration be given to the mockery intended to be made of our laws.
3. 65The hearing provided for in Articles 10 and 85 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional is dispensed with pursuant to the authority granted to the Chamber by Article 9 thereof, because this resolution is deemed sufficiently supported by clear principles and rules, as well as by the case law of this Court.
4. 66The statutory requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Justice Cruz Castro authors the opinion; and,

Considering:

I.Subject matter of the challenge.- The claimants challenge Ley n.° 8955, of 16 de junio del 2011, entitled “Amendment of Ley n.º 3284, Commercial Code, of 30 de abril de 1964, and Ley n.º 7969, Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, of 22 de diciembre de 1999.” They consider it contrary to Articles 7, 28, 39, 41, 45, 46, 129 and 140 of the Constitución Política and to the principles of primacy of reality in labor matters (supremacía de la realidad en materia laboral), hierarchy of norms (jerarquía normativa), reasonableness and proportionality, private enterprise, freedom of commerce, freedom of contract, and consumers’ freedom of choice. They explain that the challenged law amended Article 323 of the Código de Comercio, eliminating the legal concept of private carriage of passengers (porteo de personas), and amended and supplemented the Ley de Taxis, n.° 7969, concerning the stable special taxi service (servicio especial estable de taxi, SEETAXI). The claimants consider that provision unconstitutional because it violates:

• A)First argument (creation of a monopoly without the necessary majority): The Law is unconstitutional because it created a public monopoly over transportation in the taxi modality without having been approved by the qualified majority required by Article 46 of the Constitución Política. Ley n.° 8955 was approved in disregard of the Reglamento Interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, since it was enacted through the Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena Segunda, even though, because it created a public monopoly, its approval required a qualified majority (38 votes), as required by Article 46 of the Constitución Política.
• B)Second argument (violation of art. 28 concerning liberty and art. 46 concerning freedom of commerce): The challenged law creates a public monopoly over the compensated passenger transportation service in the taxi modality, preventing private persons from engaging in that activity as it had been regulated, without any difficulty, by the Código de Comercio and as it arose through an agreement of wills between the parties, governed by each person’s free will or convenience. For that reason, they assert, it should not have been prohibited, because it concerns a matter within citizens’ private sphere, governed by the principle of freedom of contract (autonomía de la voluntad), in which the State should not interfere. The existence of a monopoly over passenger transportation is even more evident today with the arrival of UBER, a digital platform that connects providers of passenger transportation services with persons who need transportation.
• C)Third argument (violation of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, Dominican Republic, and Central America): The claimants consider that the challenged law violates the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, Dominican Republic, and Central America, specifically points 11.4 and 11.6. They state that the Treaty established that the possibility of providing private transportation services, which was permitted when it was approved, may neither be excluded nor restricted. They add that Costa Rica established no reservation regarding commercial transportation activity and that the challenged law therefore violates Chapter 11 of the Treaty in question, entitled “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” in addition to the requirement that foreign investors be afforded the national treatment in effect when the Treaty was signed.

For their part, the supporting intervenors for the claimants who were admitted affirm the foregoing arguments. Only one new argument appears in the submission filed at 11:05 hours on 15 de marzo del 2016 by the Attorney-in-Fact of Inversiones Transportistas Los Guidos S.A. y otros, when they state that:

• D)Fourth claim (violation of the equality principle (principio de igualdad)):

Ley no.8955 violates the equality principle on the grounds that said law grants the concession (concesión) in perpetuity, such that the legislature designated a specific group of private individuals to provide a public service (servicio público) in perpetuity, to the detriment of the remaining inhabitants and the bidders who were not awarded concessions. They state that this reform completely closes off a monopoly, in perpetuity, with specifically identified beneficiaries, which has become a bottleneck favoring a small group of Costa Ricans. They mention that Ley no.9027 de febrero del 2012 establishes the concessionaire’s authority to “bequeath” ownership of the concession. Regarding this claim, this Chamber rejects it for purposes of analysis because, in this case, the claim concerns another provision and not the one being challenged, since, in substance, it is not a claim alleging violation of the equality principle (those who were awarded concessions cannot be compared with the rest of the population or with those who were not awarded concessions), but rather one of political expediency or advisability; and because intervenors (coadyuvantes) may expand upon the grounds of unconstitutionality but may not challenge other provisions. Accordingly, analysis of this claim is dismissed.

That said, Ley no.8955 literally provides as follows:

“AMENDMENT TO LEY N.º 3284, COMMERCIAL CODE, OF 30 DE ABRIL DE 1964, AND TO LEY N.º 7969, LAW REGULATING THE PUBLIC SERVICE OF COMPENSATED PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION IN TAXI-MODE VEHICLES, OF 22 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1999 ARTICLE 1.- Amendments to the Commercial Code Articles 323 and 334 of the Commercial Code, Ley N.º 3284, de 30 de abril de 1964, and its amendments, are hereby amended. The provisions shall read as follows:

"Article 323.- Under a contract of carriage (contrato de transporte), the carrier undertakes to transport goods or communications from one place to another in exchange for payment. Transportation may be provided by public or private companies. Public companies are those that advertise and open an establishment of this kind to the public, undertaking to provide transportation at specified prices, under specified conditions, and for specified periods, whenever their services are requested in accordance with the terms of their prospectuses, routes, and rates. Private companies are those that provide such services at their discretion, under conditions and arrangements established by agreement.

The contract of carriage governed by this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicle." "Article 334.- The sender is entitled:

[...]

• b)To have employees of its company permitted to travel, with all legally required insurance policies current and with proper identification, in order to care for live animals or any other item requiring attention while in transit.

[...]" ARTICLE 2.- Amendments to Ley N.º 7969, Law Regulating the Public Service of Compensated Passenger Transportation in Taxi-Mode Vehicles, of 22 de diciembre de 1999, and its amendments Articles 2 and 29 of Ley N.º 7969, Law Regulating the Public Service of Compensated Passenger Transportation in Taxi-Mode Vehicles, of 22 de diciembre de 1999, and its amendments, are hereby amended. The provisions shall read as follows:

"Article 2.- Nature of the provision of the service For all legal and benefit-related purposes, compensated passenger transportation in the taxi mode shall be deemed a public service operated under an administrative concession (concesión administrativa), pursuant to the special procedures established in this law and its regulations, or under a permit (permiso) in the case of established special taxi services (servicios especiales estables de taxi), in accordance with subsection a) of Article 7 of this law.

Compensated passenger transportation provided by buses, small buses, minibuses, taxis, automobiles, or any other type of motor vehicle—whether offered to the general public, to users, or to specific groups of users with particular needs that constitute special demand—is a public service vested in the State. This shall apply regardless of the degree of State involvement in determining the service’s operating system or overseeing it.

A concession shall be required:

To operate compensated motor-vehicle passenger transportation in the taxi mode from duly authorized operating bases (bases de operación), in accordance with subsections b) and c) of Article 1 of this law. This mode also includes providing service at the user’s home or wherever the user is located, in response to the user’s express request to the regular taxi-service provider through any of the means available to the provider for that purpose.

A permit shall be required:

To operate compensated motor-vehicle passenger transportation as an established special taxi service in cases where door-to-door service is provided to meet a limited and residual need for service directed toward a closed group of persons, distinct from the service provided pursuant to the preceding paragraph.

Permits to operate motor-vehicle passenger transportation as an established special taxi service shall be issued by the Public Transportation Council (Consejo de Transporte Público), upon submission of a certified copy of the contract or contracts entered into with the persons, institutions, or companies that use the service. Only one permit shall be granted to each natural person; such persons may organize as a legal entity, thereby assuming joint and several liability. The vehicle covered by the permit must be owned by the permit holder or leased under a finance lease. If the conditions under which the permit was originally granted are breached, the permit may be revoked by a reasoned decision of the Public Transportation Council.

Without prejudice to other penalties provided for by the legal system, the permit shall be canceled, following due process and the opportunity to present a defense, on the following grounds:

• a)Failure to comply with the obligations, duties, and prohibitions established in this law, its regulations, and related laws and regulations.
• b)A finding that the documentation submitted to the Public Transportation Council contains false or inaccurate information.
• c)Transfer or assignment of the permit to a third party without the Council’s prior authorization.
• d)Unlawful provision of the service outside the area authorized by the permit, except where the service originates within the authorized area and its destination lies outside that area.
• e)Cancellation or revocation, by a final act or decision in administrative or judicial proceedings, of the permit holder’s business license (patente) for the corresponding geographic area. The permit shall also be canceled if the permit holder relinquishes the business license granted.
• f)When the vehicle used to provide the established special taxi service has the features characteristic of taxi-mode vehicles authorized under a concession, in violation of Article 29 of this law.
• g)When the permit holder does not maintain current insurance policies, as established in Article 29 of this law.
• h)The permit for a vehicle authorized to provide an established special taxi service shall be canceled when the authorized vehicle travels on public roads soliciting passengers.

Permits confer no subjective rights (derechos subjetivos) upon their holders and shall remain valid for a term of up to three years, provided they comply with the requirements established for that purpose.

Once a year, the Public Transportation Council shall publish in the official gazette La Gaceta and in a newspaper of nationwide circulation the lists of natural or legal persons duly accredited to provide established special taxi services." "Article 29.- Prior administrative concession or permit for established special taxi services

1. 1Provision of taxi service requires the prior procurement of an administrative concession granted by the Council, subject to the following conditions:

• a)Administrative concessions for compensated passenger service in the taxi mode shall be subject to the supply-and-demand technical studies approved by the Council.
• b)Concessions shall be granted by operating base, in accordance with the applicable technical criteria, for renewable terms of ten years at the concessionaire’s request, provided that the C-1 license is current. The Council may authorize special operating bases for tourism purposes, depending on the characteristics of the zone or geographic area; these shall be determined by special regulations in accordance with the fundamental principles of this law.
• c)Only one administrative concession shall be granted to each private individual, and it shall authorize operation of the public service using one vehicle.
• d)No person awarded a concession may share, in whole or in part, the concession rights awarded with another person who has likewise been awarded another concession for compensated passenger public service in other modes of land transportation.
• e)Concessions shall be granted through the special expedited procedure (procedimiento especial abreviado) established in these provisions. No interested operator of ports or airports may hold a concession for compensated passenger public transportation services in the taxi mode, nor may such an operator provide this service in any mode.

1. 2Provision of the established special taxi service referred to in Article 2 of this law requires a permit granted by the Public Transportation Council, subject to the following conditions:

• a)Holders of established special taxi permits for this service shall be limited to providing the service within a geographic area determined by reference to the authorized business license.
• b)No permit holder may share, in whole or in part, the rights under the permit granted with another person who is also the holder of another permit for compensated passenger public service.
• c)Vehicles used to provide public service in the established special taxi mode may not have the features characteristic of taxi-mode vehicles authorized under a concession to provide service from a specific operating base authorized by the Public Transportation Council, such as the color red, illuminated or non-illuminated signs, decals, use of a taximeter, and other similar features, as defined by the applicable regulations, or any other distinguishing feature that could mislead taxi-service users. In addition, they must comply with the road-use requirements established by Ley N.º 7331, Road Traffic Law, and its amendments. These motor vehicles may not be more than ten years old, calculated from their year of manufacture.
• d)Vehicles authorized for standing special taxi service may not park or pick up or drop off persons at stops designated for the other forms of public transportation. The operating bases for standing special taxi service must be located at least one hundred fifty meters from official bus and taxi terminals.
• e)Holders of permits for standing special taxi service may not park anywhere on public roads to offer their services to the general public. Nor may they travel on public roads in search of passengers.
• f)When motor vehicles must stop in front of public buildings, parks, educational institutions, shopping centers, docks, ports, airports, churches, hospitals, or similar places, they may do so only for the time strictly necessary to allow their own users to board and disembark.
• g)Anyone submitting an application to operate a standing special taxi service must provide certification that they are duly registered and current with their obligations to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS); be registered as a taxpayer with the Ministerio de Hacienda; be current on payment of income tax; hold an insurance policy that fully covers their civil liability (responsabilidad civil) for injury to or death of third parties and damage to third-party property, and keep it in force throughout the term of the permit and the corresponding municipal business license (patente municipal), in accordance with current legislation and any other requirements established by regulation.
• h)By virtue of the principles of proportionality, reasonableness, and necessity, the authorized percentage of standing special taxi services may not exceed three percent (3%) of the concessions authorized per operating base.
• i)The State is obligated to guarantee concession holders the economic and financial equilibrium of the contract, preventing competition that could be ruinous as a result of a concentration of operators in a given area exceeding the needs of the residual demand in the operational area where the provision of the service is authorized, given that each area has characteristics different from those of another, by authorizing the number of permits it deems necessary.
• j)Once the permit has been granted, permit holders must carry the original or a certified copy of the contract entered into with the persons to whom the service is provided.

Failure to comply with any of the foregoing conditions shall be penalized in accordance with Ley N.º 7331, Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, and its amendments, without prejudice to the authority of the Consejo de Transporte Público to revoke the permit." ARTICLE 3.- Addition and amendment to Ley N.º 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, of 22 de diciembre de 1999, and its amendments Addition of subsection l) to Article 1 and amendment of subsection e) of Article 62 of Ley N.º 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, of 22 de diciembre de 1999, and its amendments. The provisions shall read:

"Article 1.- Definitions [.]

• l)Standing special taxi service: a public passenger transportation service for compensation intended for a closed group of users and meeting limited, residual, exclusive, and stable demand.

Permits for passenger transportation for compensation by minibuses, small buses, and buses shall be governed by Ley N.º 3503, Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores, of 10 de mayo de 1965, and its amendments, or any other law that may replace it in the future." "Article 62.- Amendments to Ley N.º 7331. Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, of 13 de abril de 1993, is hereby amended as follows:

[.]

• e)A subsection d) is added to Article 145, which shall read:

Article 145.- [...]

• d)Providing public transportation service in any of its forms without the respective authorizations, in violation of item 1 of subsection a), or item 1) of subsection b), both of Article 98, and Article 113 of this Law. For the imposition of the penalty governed by this provision and for adjudication, the judicial authorities shall fully apply the evidentiary framework of presumptions and clear, consistent circumstantial evidence (indicios), as defined by both civil and criminal procedural legislation, as well as the rules of logic, suitability, expediency, reasonableness, and sound judicial discretion (sana crítica). The habitual provision of the unauthorized service or the external and internal signs placed on vehicles to attract a user’s attention and induce that person to use the vehicle in the manner of an authorized taxi shall be considered presumptions and circumstantial evidence."

II.Standing in this case.- Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional governs the prerequisites determining the admissibility of constitutional challenges (acciones de inconstitucionalidad), requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution in administrative or judicial proceedings in which the unconstitutionality is invoked. This requirement is unnecessary in the cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, namely, when the nature of the provision entails no individual or direct injury; when the challenge is based on the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or interests concerning the community as a whole; or when it is filed by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, or the Defensor de los Habitantes, in the latter cases within their respective spheres of authority.

Under the second circumstance provided for in paragraph 2° of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, an action may be brought in defense of “diffuse interests,” which are interests held by groups of persons who are not formally organized but are united by a particular social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a particular personal or ideological orientation, consumption of a certain product, etc. In such cases, the interest is dispersed, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of persons. This Chamber has listed various rights that it has characterized as “diffuse,” including the environment, cultural heritage, protection of the country’s territorial integrity, sound management of public expenditure, and the right to health, among others. Moreover, the list established by the Constitutional Chamber is not exhaustive. Based on the foregoing paragraph, it is clear that the petitioners have sufficient standing to challenge the constitutionality of the contested provisions, without needing a prior matter to serve as the basis for this action.

This is because they appear in defense of an interest concerning the national community as a whole, namely, the rights of users of the public passenger transportation service. Precisely because the provision of a public service is at issue, this Chamber understands that this is an action seeking to protect interests concerning the national community as a whole; accordingly, the petitioners have full standing to bring a direct action in light of paragraph 2° of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Furthermore, the matter is indeed one whose constitutionality may be reviewed in these proceedings, namely, a law. In addition, the petitioners complied with the requirements set forth in Articles 78 and 79 of the applicable procedural law. In conclusion, this action is admissible, and the subject matter and merits of the case must therefore be addressed immediately.

III. Preliminary clarification and methodology for analyzing the action.-

As in every constitutional challenge, the role of this Constitutional Jurisdiction is to compare the contested legislation with the Law of the Constitution (Derecho de la Constitución), and nothing more. It is apparent from all the supporting interventions (coadyuvancias) filed, both in support of and in opposition to the action, that the issue extends beyond the constitutional sphere, as some submissions describe specific difficulties in providing passenger transportation services for compensation and even raise the issue of the platform known as UBER. However, neither the regulation nor the legality of such a platform is an issue that has been raised in these proceedings. It is the legislature’s sovereign decision to determine whether a particular service should be brought under state control or liberalized. Neither state control nor liberalization is unconstitutional per se. The decision is political, not legal.

Nor is it for this Jurisdiction to examine whether UBER’s activity is currently prohibited under our Legal System, or to analyze specific cases involving Seetaxi or contractual carriage (porteo) companies and their legality. The analysis in this action is limited to reviewing the challenged law in light of the claims of unconstitutionality. To facilitate the study of the challenged legislation, however, the following recitals (considerandos) will examine the treatment given to passenger transportation services for compensation in Costa Rica. The challenged law will then be examined generally, followed finally by an analysis of each argument presented by the petitioners and supporting intervenors.

IV.Passenger transportation services for compensation in Costa Rica.- This recital will examine the treatment that our Legal System has given to passenger transportation services for compensation, particularly the taxi form of service. It will emphasize whether such service is considered a public service, who may provide it, and whether private passenger transportation is permissible. Before doing so, however, it is useful to recall two basic concepts: what constitutes a public service, the different types of public-service management that exist, and the general legal framework governing passenger transportation for compensation in Costa Rica.

1. The concept of public service is dynamic: The concept of public service has been debated in the legal sphere for decades, and various theories may be outlined regarding its definition, ranging among the organic or subjective criterion (a service provided by the State), the functional criterion (a service that is of general interest), and the substantive criterion (a service whose regulation falls within the purview of Public Law). There is consensus, however, that this concept is not static; rather, it changes according to variables of time (what was a public service at one point may cease to be one years later) and place (what is a public service in one legal system may not be one in another). In our legal system, the Constitutional Chamber has recognized the changing nature of the concept of public service, stating:

“For example, Article 3 of the Law on the Regulatory Authority for Public Services contains several definitions, including that of a public service (servicio público), defined as any activity that, because of its importance to the country’s sustainable development, is classified as such by the Legislative Assembly for the purpose of subjecting it to the regulations of this law. As can be seen, determining whether a need is in the public interest is not a legal question, but rather a factual and circumstantial one, requiring—as already noted—an assessment of expediency and advisability. There are no activities that, by their ‘nature’ or by imperatives of Constitutional Law, inherently constitute public services; rather, this will depend on each society, its needs, and the sphere—private or public—in which those needs are best met.” Judgment (Sentencia) No. 517-98, at 14:32 hours on 26 August 1998.

When a particular activity or service is declared—constitutionally, statutorily, or through case law—to be a public service, this is known in legal scholarship as the “publicatio” or “publicization” (“publificación”) of the service. Such a declaration may consist simply of defining the activity as being in the public interest, or expressly classifying the activity as a public service. The consequences of such a declaration are determined by each legal system (Ordenamiento Jurídico) and may concern the special legal framework governing the service, the entity holding authority over the service and the entities providing it, and the removal of the service from private commerce. In the case of passenger transportation services, for example, this means that the State may require a concession (concesión) or permit (permiso), establish a route and fares, and so forth. As a general rule, when a service is declared a public service, it is assumed by the State (through its various institutions in the case of an administrative public service, or by creating a state-owned enterprise in the case of an economic public service).

Nevertheless, this does not preclude private parties from participating in public management, which is known as indirect management (gestión indirecta), through a public service concession (concesión de servicio público), as often occurs with transportation and services at ports and airports.

2. Types of management of the public passenger transportation service (direct management and indirect management): Examining the public passenger transportation service specifically, given its nature as a public service, it may logically be provided directly by the State. It may, however, be delegated to private parties through a concession or permit, depending on the particular mode involved. Accordingly, there are essentially two types of management for this public service: direct management (gestión directa) (by the State) and indirect management (by private parties). In this regard, each legal system will define which activities are considered public services, who will provide such services, and whether private parties may undertake them through a concession or permit. In the case of passenger transportation for compensation, which is the matter under examination, direct management is also permissible when the State assumes responsibility for providing the service, generally through a state-owned enterprise. Taxi service, however, is provided in particular through indirect management, whereby the State grants a concession or permit to private parties.

3. The legal framework governing passenger transportation for compensation in Costa Rica: Under our legal system, passenger transportation for compensation, in its various modes, constitutes a public service. This follows from several provisions:

First, the Law Regulating Passenger Transportation for Compensation in Motor Vehicles, No. 3503 of 10 May 1965, Articles 1 and 2 of which classify passenger transportation for compensation in collective motor vehicles as a public service regulated, controlled, and supervised by the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation, as follows:

“Article 1.- Passenger transportation for compensation in collective motor vehicles, except for taxi-service automobiles governed by another law, when conducted on streets, highways, and roads within the national territory, is a public service regulated, controlled, and supervised by the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation. Provision of the service is delegated to private parties expressly authorized by the Ministry in accordance with the rules established herein.

(…)” “Article 2.- Matters relating to motor-vehicle traffic and passenger transportation in the country fall within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transportation. This Ministry may assume responsibility for providing these public services, either directly or through other State institutions, or it may grant private operators the right to provide them. The Ministry of Public Works and Transportation shall supervise, control, and regulate motor-vehicle traffic and passenger transportation. Concessioned or authorized public transportation services shall be controlled jointly with the Regulatory Authority for Public Services to ensure the proper provision of services and full compliance with the corresponding contractual provisions.

(…)” The same classification follows from Article 5(f) of the Law Creating the Regulatory Authority for Public Services, No. 7593 of 9 August 1996:

“Article 5.- Functions For the public services defined in this article, the Regulatory Authority shall set prices and rates; it shall also ensure compliance with standards of quality, quantity, reliability, continuity, timeliness, and optimal service provision, pursuant to Article 25 of this law. The aforementioned public services are:

(…)

• f)Any means of public passenger transportation for compensation, except air transportation.

(…)” More specifically, the current Law Regulating the Public Service of Passenger Transportation for Compensation in Vehicles Operating as Taxis, No. 7969 of 22 December 1999, defines this means of transportation as a public service operated through an administrative concession (concesión administrativa), pursuant to Article 2:

“Article 2.- Nature of service provision For all legal and benefits-related purposes, passenger transportation for compensation by taxi shall be considered a public service operated through an administrative concession under the special procedures established in this law and its regulations, or through a permit in the case of stable special taxi services (servicios especiales estables de taxi), in accordance with Article 7(a) of this law.

(…)” However, the preceding law, No.5406 of 1973 (a law no longer in force), had already defined this mode of transportation as a public service in Article 1:

“Article 1.- Ground transportation of passengers for compensation in motorized taxi vehicles shall be considered a public service.” Currently, through the amendment introduced to Article 2 of Law 7969, specifically by Article 2 of Law 8955, of 16 June 2011, passenger transportation for compensation in any type of motor vehicle is established as a public service. The second paragraph of the provision in question states:

“Passenger transportation for compensation provided by buses, minibuses, microbuses, taxis, automobiles, and any other type of motor vehicle, whether offered to the general public, to users, or to specified groups of users with specific needs that constitute special demand, is a public service vested in the State. The foregoing applies regardless of the degree of State intervention in determining the service’s operating system or in supervising it.” It follows from all the foregoing that passenger transportation for compensation in motor vehicles—in its various bus and taxi modes—constitutes a public service under the Costa Rican legal system. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has so held on numerous occasions. For example, in Decision No. 2011-04778, at 14:30 hours on 13 April 2011, when responding to an optional legislative consultation on constitutionality (consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad) submitted by several legislators concerning the bill that gave rise to the Law challenged herein, the Chamber stated, insofar as relevant:

“XIV.- (…) This Court considers it necessary to address first the legislature’s decision to declare all passenger transportation for compensation a public service, and then whether this measure entails a restriction on freedom of commerce (libertad de comercio). According to its explanatory statement, the bill under consultation arose because ‘during several weeks of this year, an arduous negotiation process took place in which the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation and its authorities, together with the Cámara Nacional de Transporte de Autobús, the Federación Nacional de Taxis, and the Cámara de Porteadores as the sector’s representative, maintained an ongoing discussion aimed at reaching a consensus-based solution to the situation of male and female contract carriers.’ (folio 2 of the certified copy of the legislative record (expediente legislativo), Volume I). As a result of that discussion, the bill under consultation, broadly speaking, removes the word ‘persons’ from Article 323 of the Commercial Code; incorporates the category of stable special taxi service into Law number 7969; and declares it to be one of the means by which the public service of passenger transportation for compensation is operated.

XV.Initially, all activity carried out by the State was considered a public service (servicio público), the performance of which had to be ensured, regulated, and supervised by government authorities. The concept was later restricted to certain activities of the Public Administration (Administración Pública), carried out exclusively by State entities. At present, however, a public service may be provided or performed not only by State agencies but also by private persons or entities, in accordance with regulations issued by public authorities. Public service is therefore understood as any activity of the Public Administration or of private individuals or governed persons that is intended to satisfy needs or interests of a general nature and whose character or significance is governed or framed by Public Law (Derecho Público), insofar as supervision by public authorities is required. The traditional conception limits public service to activities performed directly or indirectly by the Administration, the establishment of which results from a formal act—through a formal statute—or from conduct by public authorities—an administrative act (acto administrativo).

Likewise, the case law of this Court has identified two approaches concerning the determining element of public services: a) the purpose pursued, understood as satisfying the general need or interest for which the service was created, whether through the Administration or through private individuals; or b) the subjection of the activity to the Public Law regime, that is, to rules of subjection and subordination governing the regulation of the activity, even when there are no express provisions so establishing, precisely by virtue of the public interest that the activity seeks to satisfy (to this effect, judgments number 2005-00846, issued at eleven hours and twenty-eight minutes on veintiocho de enero del dos mil cinco, and number 5403-95, issued at sixteen hours and six minutes on tres de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y cinco). Another clarification necessary for the case under review is that the constituent authority did not list in the text of the Constitution all services of a public nature.

The Political Constitution (Constitución Política) leaves it to the ordinary legislature to determine which services must be defined as such, subject, of course, to the political model imposed by the Political Constitution, namely, a social democratic state governed by the rule of law.

XVI.For quite some time, the State has regarded passenger transportation as a pressing social need whose continued availability is essential as a fundamental condition for maintaining the rule of law and social peace. For this reason, it has enacted a series of statutes, the most important currently governing this subject being the Law Regulating Paid Transportation of Persons by Motor Vehicles (Ley Reguladora de Transporte Remunerado Personas Vehículos Automotores) (Ley No. 3503) and the Law Regulating the Public Service of Paid Transportation of Persons by Vehicles in the Taxi Mode (Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi) (Ley No. 7969), whose amendment is the subject of this consultation. During the last five-year period, it has been publicly and widely known that passenger transportation has acquired greater importance for Costa Rican society, not only socially but also economically, to the point of becoming a matter of general interest that goes beyond satisfying a merely private need and requires State intervention to provide a solution.

Within the framework permitted by the Political Constitution and statutory provisions, the State—in this case, the ordinary legislature—may choose the solution it considers most appropriate. As just stated, one possible solution is to regulate that activity and declare it a public service, which is precisely what the bill under consultation does, necessarily satisfying the two elements noted above. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber does not consider the amendment to Article 2 of Law number 7969 contrary to the Political Constitution insofar as it deems paid passenger transportation in the taxi mode a public service vested in the State, which shall be operated through an administrative concession (concesión administrativa), or through a permit (permiso) in the case of stable special taxi services.

XVII.As a consequence of declaring paid passenger transportation in the taxi mode a public service, in either of its two forms of provision, the bill under consultation amends Article 323 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio) by removing the word “persons” from that article, thereby eliminating the private carriage of persons (porteo de personas). Through this amendment, the legislature seeks, once and for all, to remove from the private sphere the provision of passenger transportation services, all of which the legislature has declared to be a public service, thereby changing the applicable ground rules and legal principles: Private individuals become collaborators of the Public Administration in providing that service, which, because of its characteristics and the evident existence of a public interest, must in principle be undertaken by the State, without the involvement of principles and rights governing private relationships, such as the principle of freedom of contract (principio de autonomía de la voluntad) or freedom of trade (libertad de comercio). Consequently, the Court finds that the bill under consultation does not violate Articles 28, 45, 46, and 56 of the Political Constitution. (…).”

As the preceding judgment notes, through the challenged Law, the legislature, within the framework permitted by the Political Constitution, chose to declare all paid passenger transportation activity a public service, in view of the importance of that activity to Costa Rican society. Thus, paid passenger transportation, regardless of the type of motor vehicle used, the persons for whom it is intended—whether offered to the general public or to users belonging to specified groups—or State involvement in determining the operating system or oversight, would be considered a public service. Accordingly, although Ley No.3503 had already declared in 1965 that paid transportation of persons in motor vehicles conducted on streets, highways, and roads within the territory of the Republic was a public service, because Articles 323 and 334 of the Commercial Code remained in force, it was only upon the entry into force of Ley n.° 8955—which amends those provisions of the Commercial Code—that the legislature sought to make clear that no private person—natural or legal—may provide paid passenger transportation without first obtaining the corresponding authorization (autorización)—a concession or permit—granted by the Consejo de Transporte Público through the procedures established by the laws governing that public service.

V.General considerations concerning the challenged Law.-The challenged Law, “Amendment of Law n.º 3284, Commercial Code, of 30 de abril de 1964, and of Law n.º 7969, Law Regulating the Public Service of Paid Transportation of Persons by Vehicles in the Taxi Mode, of 22 de diciembre de 1999,” which is Law no. 8955 of 16 de junio del 2011, contains three provisions. Through them:

-Articles 323 and 334 of the Commercial Code are amended by removing the word “persons” from private carriage (porteo).

-The Ley de Taxis, n.° 7969, is amended and supplemented to regulate what was defined as the stable special taxi service (servicio especial estable de taxi, SEETAXI), which “retains the nature of the residual special service currently provided through private carriage, but is recognized and regulated so as to impose responsibility on those interested parties who would be obtaining accreditation for it” (as stated in the explanatory memorandum (exposición de motivos) to the original bill).

Thus, through the challenged Law, provisions of the Commercial Code were amended to eliminate private carriage of persons, an activity that came to be regulated under the so-called Ley de Taxis, n.° 7969, under the name stable special taxi service (SEETAXI). The bill, processed under expediente no.17874, was submitted to the Asamblea Legislativa on 29 de setiembre del año 2010. The following portion of its explanatory memorandum should be highlighted in order to understand the nature of the “transformation” of private carriage of persons, until then governed by the Commercial Code, into the special taxi service that would be governed by Ley no.7969, Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi:

“This initiative very categorically seeks to establish, within the regulatory framework of the Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi, N.º 7969, a service that is currently a reality but is improperly regulated because its only legal basis is the word ‘persons’ in the Commercial Code, in order to create legislation that guarantees better conditions and lower costs for users, seeking the benefit and well-being of the great majority.

In this manner, private carriage of persons is eliminated, but private carriage itself is not eliminated; that is, what is being removed is the word ‘person’ from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, while things, articles, money, correspondence, etc., may continue to be transported.

Upon removal of the word ‘person,’ a category called ‘stable special taxi transportation’ (transporte especial estable de taxi) is created within the Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi, N.º 7969. It retains the nature of the residual special service currently provided through private carriage, but is recognized and regulated so as to impose responsibility on those interested parties who would be obtaining accreditation for it.

The stable special taxi service will be clearly distinguished from the regular taxi service because it will always be door-to-door, the private contract between the parties will prevail, and it must be shown that the service forms part of a commercial activity, that the operators also hold the required business licenses (patentes), and that, during this initial stage, it may be carried out by natural persons or legal entities that can demonstrate eligibility before the Consejo de Transporte Público, within a proposed mandatory period of three years (3 años), to carry out this activity. It must be understood that its growth is highly particular and sporadic: it may currently operate for a specified period because a contract exists, but that does not mean it will continue over time; this is why a permit of up to three years is contemplated.

This is not a concession because it does not arise from a public tender (licitación pública); rather, it arises from a permit and is fundamentally based on a specific, particular need.

(…) so that any man or woman providing that special service without the corresponding accreditation would be operating illegally, because neither the Commercial Code nor the Ley de tránsito contains any legal category permitting that activity.” That bill was delegated to the Second Commission with Full Legislative Powers (Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena Segunda). After being approved in the first debate on 15 de marzo del 2011, it was referred to the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) through an optional constitutional consultation (consulta facultativa), resolved by judgment number 2011-04778, which held that the bill under consultation contained neither material procedural defects nor unconstitutional provisions. Finally, it was approved in the second debate on 24 de mayo del 2011. It was published on 7 de julio del 2011, the date on which it entered into force. It should be emphasized that this Chamber, through the judgment resolving that optional constitutional consultation, had already examined the issues of whether the bill under consultation created a monopoly and whether it violated freedom of trade, as will be discussed in the following recitals (considerandos).

Accordingly, having clarified the foregoing, the Court proceeds to examine each of the three claims of unconstitutionality. The first concerns procedure, while the remaining claims concern the merits.

VI.Regarding the first claim: Violation of the legislative procedure because the challenged law was approved by a Commission with Full Legislative Powers.-

The petitioners (accionantes) consider the challenged Law unconstitutional because it created a public monopoly in the field of taxi transportation without having been approved by the qualified majority required by Article 46 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). They state that Law No. 8955 was approved in disregard of the Internal Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Assembly (Reglamento Interno de la Asamblea Legislativa), because it was done through the Second Commission with Full Legislative Powers, whereas, because it created a public monopoly, its approval required a qualified majority (38 votes), as required by Article 46 of the Political Constitution.

The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) considers that the petitioners are incorrect in asserting that the challenged law creates a public monopoly in favor of the State and that, for that reason, it should have been approved by a qualified majority (38 votes). What the law in question does is declare all compensated passenger transportation activity (transporte remunerado de personas) to be a public service (servicio público), and such regulation could indeed be delegated to a Commission with Full Legislative Powers. Moreover, the Constitutional Chamber already upheld the constitutionality of the procedure followed in approving the Law challenged here through judgment No. 2011-04778. In analyzing the constitutionality of the bill that gave rise to the law challenged here, it stated categorically, first, that the bill creates neither a monopoly nor a monopolistic practice, because the establishment of a public service does not create a monopoly under the constitutional provisions; second, that Article 46 of the Political Constitution does not establish a heightened statutory reservation (reserva de ley agravada) for imposing regulations or limits on freedom of trade; and third, that delegating a bill of this nature to a Commission with Full Legislative Powers was indeed permissible.

For its part, the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes considers that this is neither a private monopoly, much less a public monopoly, because since 1965, Law No.3503 has established that compensated passenger transportation in motor vehicles is a State public service. The Consejo de Transporte Público considers that State ownership cannot be confused with a monopoly, since compensated passenger transportation is provided primarily through a competitive bidding process (proceso licitatorio). The argument is unfounded because, from its inception, the Law in question was neither submitted nor treated as establishing a State monopoly. The legislature did not intend to create a monopoly; it merely determined that the service should be regarded as public and that the private carriage of passengers (porteo de personas) should therefore be removed from the private sphere. Judgment No.2011-04778, which resolved the legislative consultation, concluded that the bill “Is not unconstitutional, either in its content or because of the legislative procedure used for its approval.” Finally, the admitted supporting interventions on behalf of the petitioners (coadyuvancias activas) endorse the petitioners’ arguments, adding that it is the challenged law that subjects the entire activity to the public-service regime.

The admitted supporting interventions on behalf of the respondents (coadyuvancias pasivas) state that the unequivocal intent of the 1965 legislature was to make all compensated overland passenger transportation, in every type of motor vehicle and under every form of service provision, a public service, thereby converting it into a new State monopoly. Accordingly, the petitioners’ argument that Law number 8955 had to be approved by two-thirds of the entire membership of the Legislative Assembly is inadmissible, because the public monopoly over compensated passenger transportation in any of its forms (buses, taxis, private carriage, etc.) was created by Article 1 of Law 3503 of 10 de mayo de 1965, a provision that remains in force. The promulgation of the challenged legislation was, in fact, unnecessary because private carriage of passengers had already ceased to exist legally in 1965, when compensated passenger transportation in any of its forms (buses, taxis, private carriage, etc.) was declared by a qualified majority of the Legislative Assembly to be a public monopoly whose provision could be delegated to private parties through the administrative mechanisms of a concession (concesión) and a permit (permiso).

Consequently, the challenged law did not need to be approved by two-thirds of the entire membership of the Legislative Assembly because it merely regulated one form of providing compensated passenger transportation, which had already been declared a public service in 1965.

In this regard, as can be seen, this claim concerns the legislative procedure. It is argued that, because this law creates a monopoly and because the final paragraph of Article 46 of the Constitution provides that the establishment of new monopolies in favor of the State requires the approval of two-thirds of the entire membership of the Legislative Assembly, its approval by the Second Commission with Full Legislative Powers—where the stated majority cannot be attained—constituted a procedural defect. However, for that argument to be accepted as correct, all its premises must be valid. In this case, however, the first premise is invalid because this law does NOT create a monopoly. As stated in judgment number 2011-04778, which held that the bill under consultation contained neither material procedural defects nor unconstitutional provisions, this Chamber has already resolved this issue, specifically stating as follows:

“IX.- Second matter under consultation: Delegation to the Second Commission with Full Legislative Powers of the bill being processed under legislative expediente number 17874. The consulting legislators believe that, because the bill under consultation eliminates the freedom to establish private-carriage businesses (empresas de porteo), only the Legislative Plenary (Plenario Legislativo) would have authority to approve the bill by a qualified vote. They consider that the bill should not have been delegated to the Second Commission with Full Legislative Powers under Articles 28, 121 subsection 7, and 124 of the Political Constitution and Articles 160 and 208 Bis of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Assembly (Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa). The delegation therefore constituted a violation of the legislative procedure. (…) The bill under consultation creates neither a monopoly nor a monopolistic practice; instead, it establishes another method of providing public passenger transportation services, namely the ‘permanent special taxi service’ (‘servicio especial estable de taxi’), and the requirements for providing it.

Contrary to the assertions of the consulting legislators, the bill does not fall within the circumstances governed by Article 121 subsection 7) of the Political Constitution, since that provision concerns what legal scholarship calls emergency powers (derecho de excepción), understood as the set of extraordinary measures established in constitutional texts so that the legal system itself may address an emergency that could result in a crisis of the State.” It is therefore clear that the bill under consultation creates neither a monopoly nor a monopolistic practice. Furthermore, in a similar case in which the vehicle technical inspection service (servicio de revisión técnica vehicular) was challenged as a monopoly, the Chamber held in judgment No. 2005-04190de las dieciséis horas con cuarenta y dos minutos del veinte de abril del dos mil cinco that it was improper to speak of a monopoly in the case of concessions:

“IV.- Concessions for the provision of a public service do not constitute a private monopoly.- Every public concession (concesión pública) is an administrative contract (contrato administrativo) entered into by the Administration for the purpose of ‘delegating’ to a third party either the provision of a particular service that the State itself would otherwise be responsible for providing or the construction of a public work, but for which, for certain reasons of expediency or convenience, it decides to request the cooperation of private parties. One characteristic of a public-service concession is that the successful bidder (adjudicatario) must possess certain strictly personal qualifications. That successful bidder may not assign or transfer the concession to third parties. This is because those particular qualifications of the successful bidder were precisely what carried weight when the selection was made among all those who participated in the public tender (licitación pública).

Furthermore, regarding the decision to select a single successful bidder, the Public Administration has the authority to do so under its constitutional powers and in accordance with criteria of expediency and convenience that it is not for this Jurisdiction to examine. As to the holder of the public service, the Administration retains ownership of the public service, even though it is ultimately provided by a private third party. Thus, describing a concession for the provision of a public service as a private monopoly would be doubly contradictory: first, because it cannot be ‘private,’ since the State, a public entity, is the true holder of the concessioned service; and second, because it cannot be a ‘monopoly,’ since it does not involve a market situation or the provision of private services, but rather a situation within the public sphere involving the provision of a public service.” What the State is establishing in the case of for-hire passenger transportation (transporte remunerado de personas) is that it is an activity defined as a public service (servicio público).

This entails what is known as “publicatio,” that is, the constitutional or statutory declaration defining an activity as a public service. In this case, however, the State is not undertaking to provide it as a monopoly. Rather, provision is made for private parties to participate in public administration—known as indirect management (gestión indirecta)—through a public-service concession (concesión de servicio público) and a special taxi permit (permiso especial de taxi). We therefore have a multiplicity of private parties who, once authorized, may provide this public service of for-hire passenger transportation. Accordingly, it cannot be regarded as a State monopoly, since the State itself does not even provide the service directly and, as regards authorized private parties, there is not a single provider but a multiplicity of them. There is no basis for characterizing the system created by this law as a monopoly; it merely confirms that the activity is a public service (and, as such, removed from private commerce), which may be provided by private parties pursuant to a concession or permit granted by the State.

In conclusion, because the challenged law does not create any type of State monopoly but merely confirms that for-hire passenger transportation in the taxi modality is a public service, there is no procedural defect arising from the fact that this law was approved by a Commission vested with full legislative authority or without the majority required by the final paragraph of Article 46 of the Constitution. This claim of unconstitutionality is therefore dismissed.

VII. Regarding the second claim: Violation of the principles of freedom of contract and freedom of commerce

The petitioners contend that the challenged Law creates a public monopoly over for-hire passenger transportation in the taxi modality, preventing private parties from engaging in that activity as regulated by the Código de Comercio—that is, under a voluntary agreement between the parties, governed by each party’s free choice or convenience. For that reason, they assert, it should not have been prohibited, because it is a matter belonging to the private sphere of citizens, where the principle of freedom of contract (autonomía de la voluntad) applies and in which the State should not interfere. They add that the existence of a monopoly over passenger transportation has become even more evident today with the arrival of UBER, a digital platform that connects passenger-transportation service providers with persons who need transportation.

The Procuraduría General de la República considers in this regard that declaring a particular economic activity to be a public service entails its nationalization (nacionalización). In other words, it vests ownership of the service in the State, so that only the State or an authorized private party may provide it. Another effect of declaring an activity a public service is that the economic activity is removed from private commerce and may not be freely conducted by private parties. The only way to engage in it is through a State concession or permit. Even in such cases, however, the State retains ownership of the service, while the private party is limited solely to its actual provision. There can be no doubt that for-hire passenger transportation in motor vehicles—in its various bus and taxi modalities—constitutes a public service. The Sala Constitucional has so held on repeated occasions. For example, in decision no. 2011-04778, issued at 14:30 on 13 de abril del 2011, when ruling on an optional legislative consultation on constitutionality (consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad) submitted by several deputies concerning the bill that became the Law challenged here.

For its part, the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes considers that, under the current legal system, for-hire passenger transportation is and must remain a State activity because it involves a clear and specific public interest. The Consejo de Transporte Público considers that the legislature sought to remove the provision of passenger-transportation services from the private sphere; the service in its entirety has been declared a public service by the legislature, which means that different rules and legal principles apply. To that end, private parties become collaborators of the Administración Pública in providing a service that, because of its characteristics and the existence of a public interest, must be undertaken by the State without the application of principles and rights governing private relationships, such as freedom of contract or freedom of commerce (libertad de comercio).

Lastly, the admitted supporting interventions for the petitioners (coadyuvancias activas) affirm the petitioners’ arguments, while the admitted supporting interventions for the respondents (coadyuvancias pasivas) state that no new monopoly was created in favor of the State, because that monopoly had already existed since 1965. All the arguments fail in the face of the incontrovertible fact that Article 1 of Ley 3503, enacted in 1965 and still in force, elevated all modalities of for-hire passenger transportation on public roads to the status of public services. Consequently, Ley 8955 contains no defect of unconstitutionality, because the only matter on which it legislated ex novo was the regulation of the public-service modality known as “seetaxi,” which, inexplicably, operated freely and without any State regulation from 1965 until the enactment of Ley 8955.

In this regard, consistent with the foregoing analysis, designating an activity as a “public service” does not entail any violation of freedom of commerce. Indeed, even before the challenged law was enacted, the provision of for-hire passenger transportation had already been classified generally as a public service. The amendment made by Article 1 of the challenged law—as regards Articles 323 and 334 of the Código de Comercio—served to confirm that classification. This argument was likewise previously examined by this Sala in the judgment resolving optional consultation on constitutionality no.11-004778, which stated the following as to whether the bill under consultation violated Articles 28, 45, 46 and 56 of the Constitution:

“XII.- Third matter under consultation: Violation of Articles 28, 45, 46 and 56 of the Constitution through the removal of the word ‘person’ from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio. The requesting parties believe that the activity of private contract carriage of persons (porteo de personas) is conducted pursuant to Article 323 and the following articles of the Código de Comercio, and that the bill under consultation proposes eliminating the possibility that private parties may engage in that activity in the future, replacing it with a public-law mechanism subject to a quantitative limit. They add that, because it is a private activity, the legislature lacks authority to regulate it and is exceeding the limits of its authority, since the record contains no evidence demonstrating that the private activity of contract carriage harms morality or public order or adversely affects third parties within the meaning of Article 28 of the Constitución Política.

They further state that, as constitutional case law has recognized, every person has the right to choose, without restriction, the legally permitted business activity that best serves that person’s interests; this is what contract carriers (porteadores) have done by choosing and engaging in an activity legally permitted for many years. They consider that the State, despite its monopoly and control over public transportation through the granting of taxi plates, also left citizens free to use any other form of private transportation contract, pursuant to Articles 28 and 46 of the Constitución Política, which guarantee freedom of action and freedom of enterprise to conduct that activity through voluntary association arrangements among service providers protected by freedom of association (Article 25 of the Constitución Política). They request that the Sala reaffirm that contract carriage is conducted in accordance with law and that the provisions removing the word ‘persons’ and the institution of their contract carriage from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio violate Articles 25, 28, 46 and 56 of the Constitución Política by omission.

(…)

This Tribunal considers it necessary to address first the legislature’s decision to declare all for-hire passenger transportation a public service and then whether that measure does or does not limit freedom of commerce.

(…)

Another necessary clarification for the case under consideration is that the constituent authority did not list all services of a public nature in the text of the Constitution. The Constitución Política leaves it to the ordinary legislature to determine which services must be defined in that manner, subject, of course, to the political model established by the Constitución Política, namely, a social democratic State governed by the rule of law.

XVI.For quite some time, the State has regarded passenger transportation as a compelling social need whose continued availability is essential as a fundamental condition for maintaining the rule of law and social peace. For that reason, it has enacted a series of laws, the most important currently governing this subject being the Ley Reguladora de Transporte Remunerado Personas Vehículos Automotores (Ley No. 3503) and the Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi (Ley No. 7969), whose amendment is under consideration in this consultation. Over the last five years, it has become publicly and widely known that passenger transportation has acquired greater significance for Costa Rican society, not only socially but also economically, to the point of becoming a matter of general interest that extends beyond satisfying a merely private need and requires State intervention to provide a solution.

The State—in this case, the ordinary legislature—may, within the framework permitted by the Constitución Política and statutory provisions, choose the solution it considers most appropriate. As just stated, one possible solution is to regulate that activity and declare it a public service, which is precisely what the bill under consultation does, necessarily satisfying the two elements identified above. In light of the foregoing, the Sala does not consider the amendment to Article 2 of Ley número 7969 contrary to the Constitución Política insofar as it treats for-hire passenger transportation in the taxi modality as a public service owned by the State and operated through an administrative concession (concesión administrativa), or through a permit in the case of stable special taxi services.”

XVII.As a consequence of declaring compensated passenger transportation in the taxi mode, in either of its two forms of operation, to be a public service, the bill under review amends Article 323 of the Commercial Code to remove the word “persons” from that article and thereby eliminate the private carriage of persons (porteo de personas). Through this amendment, the legislature seeks, once and for all, to remove the provision of passenger transportation services from the private sphere, since that service in its entirety has been declared a public service by the legislature, thereby making it subject to different rules and legal principles: Private parties become collaborators of the Public Administration in providing that service, which, due to its characteristics and the evident existence of a public interest, must in principle be undertaken by the State, without the involvement of principles and rights governing private relationships, such as the principle of freedom of contract (autonomía de la voluntad) or freedom of commerce (libertad de comercio). Consequently, the Court finds that the bill under review does not violate Articles 28, 45, 46, and 56 of the Political Constitution. (…).”

Thus, given that the ordinary legislature may choose the solution it considers most appropriate for regulating passenger transportation services, and that, through this amendment, the legislature sought to remove the provision of passenger transportation services from the private sphere by declaring it a public service, different rules and legal principles apply. Therefore, principles and rights governing private relationships, such as freedom of contract or freedom of commerce, cannot be controlling. Consequently, in the judgment transcribed above (number 11-004778), the Court found—and finds again here—that the challenged law does not violate the constitutional principles of freedom of contract (art.28) or freedom of commerce (art.46), because declaring a service to be a public service does not violate freedom of commerce, and the legislature sought to remove the provision of passenger transportation services from the private sphere—and from its rules and principles—by declaring it a public service.

VIII.Regarding the third allegation: Violation of the Free Trade Agreement. DRAFTED BY JUSTICE JINESTA LOBO. REGARDING THE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT. The central issue to be resolved in this regard is whether that Free Trade Agreement forms part of the standard of constitutional review (parámetro de constitucionalidad) against which this Court must assess the validity of a rule or act governed by Public Law that has been challenged as unconstitutional. That instrument is what is known as a regional trade or investment agreement, which, per se, is subject to dynamic changes in the market, the economy, and free trade and could therefore even be renegotiated and amended. Certainly, in Costa Rica, in light of Article 7° of the Political Constitution, that regional trade agreement assumed the legal form of a “Treaty,” and therefore clearly ranks below the Constitution but above statutes.

In principle, the international treaties or conventions that form part of the standard of constitutional review are those pertaining to Public International Law concerning human rights, as may be inferred from the wording and doctrine underlying Article 48 of the Political Constitution and Articles 38, paragraph 2°, and 74 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law. Indeed, such instruments of International Human Rights Law may, in some circumstances, have constitutional or supra-constitutional rank, for example, when they provide persons with a higher threshold of protection than constitutional provisions do (the doctrine of the primacy of the most favorable clause or the principles in dubio pro homine or pro libertate). Under that understanding, this Constitutional Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to determine whether a statutory provision violates a regional trade agreement that assumed the legal form of a treaty.

All matters concerning whether a particular statute violates a regional trade agreement that ranks above statutes but below the Constitution must be heard and decided by the ordinary courts, not by constitutional judges. This Court obviously does have jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of such regional trade agreements, as it has done in the past.

IX.Conclusions.-

• 1)Because the challenged law does not create any form of State monopoly, but merely reaffirms that compensated passenger transportation is a public service, there is no procedural defect arising from the fact that this law was approved by a Committee with Full Legislative Powers (Comisión con potestad legislativa plena) or without the majority established in the final paragraph of constitutional Article 46. Consequently, this allegation of unconstitutionality is rejected.
• 2)In the judgment transcribed above (number 11-004778), the Court found—and finds again here—that the challenged law does not violate the constitutional principles of freedom of contract (art.28) or freedom of commerce (art.46), because the legislature sought to remove the provision of passenger transportation services from the private sphere by declaring it a public service.
• 3)This Constitutional Court lacks jurisdiction to determine whether a statutory provision violates a regional trade agreement that assumed the legal form of a treaty. All matters concerning whether a particular statute violates a regional trade agreement that ranks above statutes but below the Constitution must be heard and decided by the ordinary courts, not by constitutional judges. In view of the foregoing, this action is hereby dismissed, as is indeed ordered. The foregoing is without prejudice to the legislature’s authority to determine or amend whatever it deems appropriate concerning the regulation or illegality of any other platform seeking to provide private compensated passenger transportation.

X.JUSTICE CASTILLO VÍQUEZ’S DIFFERING REASONS.- My reasons for dismissing this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) differ from those advanced in the judgment. First, it is clear to me that, contrary to what others argue, the challenged statute—Law n.° 8955—nationalized a private activity—the provision of a service—in favor of the State, thereby withdrawing it from private commerce; that activity had been governed by the principle of liberty—everything not prohibited is permitted—and its two essential components: the principles of freedom of contract and equality of the contracting parties. The reason for this position is elementary and logical: when the State nationalized—reserved for the public sector—the transportation of persons in the taxi mode, it did not include within that legislative act the private carriage of persons pursuant to Article 323 of the Commercial Code.

Before Law n.° 8955 entered into force, the private carriage of persons was a lawful activity governed by Article 28 of the Fundamental Charter. The irrefutable proof of what I have stated rests on three indisputable facts. First: the need to enact Law n.° 8955 to nationalize the activity of privately carrying persons. Second: this Court’s extensive case law holding that the private carriage of persons was authorized by the legal system. Third: the extensive administrative precedent of the Procuraduría General de la República, which is consistent with the judicial case law.

Starting from the foregoing premise—that the private carriage of persons was permitted before Law n.° 8955 entered into force—one of the constitutional questions raised in this constitutional proceeding is of the utmost importance. I refer specifically to whether a restriction on freedom of enterprise (libertad de empresa)—the nationalization of a private activity whose ownership the State assumes—requires a statute and, if so, whether its approval also requires a qualified majority (mayoría calificada) of two-thirds of the entire membership of the Legislative Assembly, pursuant to the fourth paragraph of constitutional Article 46.

I have no doubt whatsoever that adopting a measure whereby a private economic activity is withdrawn from private commerce and the State assumes ownership of it, such that only the State or those holding an enabling title (título habilitante)—a permit, concession, etc.—may carry it out, requires a formal statute (Ley formal), under the terms established by Articles 28 and 46 of the Political Constitution in relation to Article 31 of the American Convention on Human Rights. In plain terms, this means that an act of approval by the Legislative Assembly, exercising its legislative power, is required; that act must also receive the assent of the Executive Branch—in our system, this fundamental organ of the State is a co-legislator—and must clearly demonstrate the public-interest reasons justifying the enactment of the statute, which must be an exceptional or extraordinary measure. In this regard, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights reminds us of the following:

In Advisory Opinion 6/86, in which the República Oriental del Uruguay requested clarification regarding the scope of the term “laws” in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, the Court concluded as follows: the question is limited to ascertaining the meaning of the word laws in Article 30 of the Convention. Accordingly, it does not seek an answer applicable to every instance in which the Convention uses expressions such as “laws,” “law,” “legislative provisions,” “legal provisions,” “legislative measures,” “legal restrictions,” or “domestic laws.” Each time such expressions are used, their meaning must be determined specifically.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the criteria of Article 30 are applicable to all cases in which the term law or equivalent expressions are used by the Convention in connection with the restrictions that the Convention itself authorizes with respect to each protected right. Indeed, the Convention does not merely proclaim the set of rights and freedoms whose inviolability is guaranteed to every human being; it also refers to the particular conditions under which the enjoyment or exercise of those rights or freedoms may be restricted without violating them. Article 30 cannot be interpreted as a form of general authorization to establish new restrictions on the rights protected by the Convention, in addition to the limitations permitted by the specific regulation of each right. On the contrary, the article is intended to impose an additional condition for specifically authorized restrictions to be legitimate.

Reading Article 30 in conjunction with others in which the Convention authorizes the imposition of limitations or restrictions on certain rights and freedoms, it is apparent that the concurrent fulfillment of the following conditions is required in order to establish them:

a. The restriction must be expressly authorized by the Convention and imposed under the particular conditions in which it has been permitted; b. The purposes for which the restriction is established must be legitimate; that is, they must respond to “reasons of general interest” and must not depart from “the purpose for which they were established.” This purposive criterion, an analysis of which has not been requested in the present consultation, establishes a safeguard against misuse of power (desviación de poder); and c. Such restrictions must be prescribed by laws and applied in accordance with them.

The meaning of the word “laws” must be sought as a term included in an international treaty. Accordingly, the issue is not to determine the meaning of the noun “laws” under the domestic law of a State Party.

In this regard, the Court takes into account the fact that the legal systems of the States Parties to the Convention derive from different traditions.

The meaning of the word “laws” within the context of a system for the protection of human rights cannot be separated from the nature and origin of that system. Indeed, the protection of human rights, particularly the civil and political rights enshrined in the Convention, begins with the affirmation that human beings possess certain inviolable attributes that cannot legitimately be impaired through the exercise of public power. These are individual spheres that the State may not violate or may enter only to a limited extent. Thus, the protection of human rights necessarily encompasses the notion of restricting the exercise of state power.

For this reason, the protection of human rights requires that state acts fundamentally affecting those rights not be left to the discretion of public authorities, but instead be surrounded by a set of safeguards designed to ensure that the inviolable attributes of the individual are not violated. Perhaps the most important of these safeguards is the requirement that limitations be established by a law enacted by the Legislative Branch in accordance with the Constitution. Through this procedure, such acts not only receive the assent of the people’s representatives, but minorities are also allowed to express their disagreement, propose alternative initiatives, participate in shaping the political will, or influence public opinion in order to prevent the majority from acting arbitrarily. Admittedly, this procedure does not always prevent a law enacted by Parliament from violating human rights—a possibility that necessitates some system of subsequent review—but it is undoubtedly an important obstacle to the arbitrary exercise of power.

The reservation of law (reserva de ley) for all acts of interference in the sphere of liberty is, within democratic constitutionalism, an essential element if human rights are to be legally protected and fully realized in practice. For the principle of legality (principio de legalidad) and the reservation of law to constitute an effective safeguard of the rights and freedoms of the individual, their formal proclamation alone is insufficient; there must also be a system that effectively guarantees their application and adequate oversight of the exercise of the powers vested in public bodies.

The expression “laws,” within the framework of human-rights protection, would be meaningless if it did not convey the idea that a mere determination by public authorities is insufficient to restrict such rights. The contrary would be equivalent to recognizing that those who govern have virtually absolute power over those who are governed. By contrast, the word “laws” acquires its full logical and historical meaning when understood as a requirement that interference by public authorities in the sphere of individual rights and freedoms be necessarily limited. The Court concludes that the expression “laws,” as used in Article 30, can have no meaning other than formal statute (ley formal), that is, a legal rule enacted by the legislative body and promulgated by the Executive Branch in accordance with the procedure required by the domestic law of each State.

The Convention does not merely require a law in order for restrictions on the enjoyment and exercise of rights and freedoms to be legally permissible. It also requires that those laws be enacted “for reasons of general interest and for the purpose for which they were established.” The criterion that permitted restrictions must be applied “for the purpose for which they were established” had already been recognized in the Draft Convention on Human Rights prepared by the Inter-American Council of Jurists (1959), which stated that such restrictions “may not be applied for any purpose or design other than that for which they were provided.” The requirement that laws be enacted for reasons of general interest means that they must have been adopted in pursuit of the “common good” (art. 32.2), a concept that must be interpreted as an integral component of the public order (orden público) of the democratic State, whose principal purpose is “the protection of the essential rights of man and the creation of circumstances that will enable him to achieve spiritual and material progress and attain happiness” (“American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man”).

“Common good” and “public order” are terms in the Convention that must be interpreted within its own system, which embodies a particular conception according to which the American States “require the political organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy” (OAS Charter, art. 3.d); and human rights, which “are based upon attributes of the human personality,” must be afforded international protection (American Declaration, Whereas Clauses, para. 2; American Convention, Preamble, para. 2).

Law in a democratic State is not merely a command issued by an authority and clothed with certain necessary formal elements. It entails substantive content and is directed toward a purpose. The concept of “laws” referred to in Article 30, interpreted within the context of the Convention and in light of its object and purpose, cannot be considered solely in accordance with the principle of legality. Within the spirit of the Convention, this principle must be understood as requiring legal rules of general applicability to be created in accordance with the procedures and by the bodies established in the Constitution of each State Party, and all public authorities must strictly conform their conduct to those rules. In a democratic society, the principle of legality is inseparably linked to the principle of legitimacy (principio de legitimidad) by virtue of the international system underlying the Convention itself, relating to the “effective exercise of representative democracy,” which is reflected, inter alia, in the popular election of lawmaking bodies, respect for minority participation, and orientation toward the common good.

The meaning of the expression “laws” in Article 30 cannot be separated from the purpose of all the American States, expressed in the Preamble to the Convention, “to consolidate in this hemisphere, within the framework of democratic institutions, a system of personal liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights of man” (American Convention, Preamble, para. 1). Representative democracy is a determining factor throughout the system of which the Convention forms part. It is a “principle” reaffirmed by the American States in the OAS Charter, the foundational instrument of the Inter-American System. The Convention’s own system expressly recognizes political rights (art. 23), which are among those that, under Article 27, may not be suspended, indicating the importance they hold within that system.

The laws referred to in Article 30 are normative acts directed toward the common good, enacted by the democratically elected Legislative Branch and promulgated by the Executive Branch. This meaning fully accords with the general context of the Convention and the philosophy of the Inter-American System. Only a formal statute, as understood by the Court, is capable of restricting the enjoyment or exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention.

The foregoing is not necessarily inconsistent with the possibility of legislative delegations (delegaciones legislativas) in this area, provided that such delegations are authorized by the Constitution itself, are exercised within the limits imposed by the Constitution and the delegating statute, and the exercise of the delegated authority is subject to effective oversight, so that it neither undermines, nor can be used to undermine, the fundamental character of the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention.

The necessary presence of the elements inherent in the concept of law under Article 30 of the Convention supports the conclusion that the concepts of legality and legitimacy coincide for purposes of interpreting this provision, because only a law enacted by democratically elected and constitutionally empowered bodies, and directed toward the common good, may restrict the enjoyment and exercise of individual rights and freedoms.

Por tanto, in response to the question submitted by the Government of Uruguay concerning the interpretation of the word “laws” in Article 30 of the Convention, the word “laws” in Article 30 of the Convention means a legal rule of general applicability, directed toward the common good, emanating from the constitutionally established and democratically elected legislative bodies, and enacted in accordance with the procedure established by the constitutions of the States Parties for the formation of laws.

With regard to the economic model adopted by our Constituent Assembly—a sufficiently open market economy that accommodates various forms, whether a liberal market economy, a social market economy, a mixed economy, or even substantial state intervention in the economy, provided that the essential content of economic freedoms is respected—the position I follow prevents this economic model from being replaced by a centralist or socialist model. Otherwise, this would give rise to the legal pathology that some scholars of Constitutional Law have aptly termed constitutional fraud (fraude constitucional). To summarize: For a private economic activity to be nationalized, this must be done through a formal statute, there must be reasons of general interest justifying its enactment, and it must constitute an exceptional measure.

The other aspect to be resolved in this constitutional proceeding (proceso constitucional) is whether the Law must be approved by a qualified majority (mayoría calificada) of two-thirds of all the members of the Legislative Assembly. This issue is of paramount importance, since the challenged Law was approved by a Full Legislative Powers Standing Committee (Comisión Permanente con Potestad Legislativa Plena), where, evidently, that extraordinary majority was not obtained. According to the petitioner (accionante) and the supporting parties (coadyuvantes activos), this requirement is imposed by the fourth paragraph of Article 46 of the Constitution.

Upon reviewing the background of this constitutional provision, we find that the Political Constitution of 1949 enshrines freedom of commerce (libertad de comercio) in Article 46. Specifically, insofar as relevant, it states that private monopolies (monopolios de carácter particular) and any act—even if originating in a law—that threatens or restricts freedom of commerce, agriculture, and industry are prohibited. State action aimed at preventing any monopolistic practice or tendency is declared to be in the public interest (interés público). Furthermore, enterprises constituting de facto monopolies (monopolios de hecho) must be subject to special legislation. Lastly, the establishment of new monopolies in favor of the State or the Municipalities requires the approval of two-thirds of all the members of the Legislative Assembly.

This text differs from that contained in Article 23 of the Political Constitution of 1871¹, particularly because the current text imposes on the State the constitutional duty to prevent any monopolistic practice or tendency and to subject de facto monopolies to special legislation. Deputy Facio Brenes justified these innovations by noting that, although monopolies were prohibited under the Constitution of 1871, they nevertheless arose in practice. He also stated that the State was required to subject such monopolies to a special regulatory regime (régimen especial de reglamentación) for the benefit of producer or consumer groups that became their victims and, where appropriate and on grounds of public interest, even to expropriate them.

Deputy Esquivel, who, together with other members of the Constituent Assembly, introduced a motion reproducing the text of the Constitution of 1871, opposed the Social Democratic Caucus’s motion because it allowed the State to expropriate private enterprises, a practice he considered extremely dangerous to the nation’s economic interests. In addition, he believed that such a concept entailed direct State intervention in the sphere of private business. Lastly, he stated that both motions agreed on prohibiting monopolies, but differed as to how the State should act in such situations. At the end of the debate, the motion submitted by the Social Democratic deputies was approved with certain amendments. It constitutes the text of Article 46 of the Political Constitution, without the amendment introduced by Law No. 7697 of May 29, 1996.

The records of the National Constituent Assembly do not appear to provide any further guidance regarding the fourth paragraph of Article 46 of the Constitution. Nevertheless, a logical and continuous reading of that article beginning with its second paragraph leads me to conclude that, when it refers to monopolies, it is referring to a strictly economic concept—specifically, a market situation in which the supply of a product or service is limited to a single seller.

It is important to clarify that when a Law reserves an asset or service to the public sector—nationalization (nacionalización)—this may be based on various grounds. One initial justification may be that the service is strategic or essential to the State or the Nation, as occurs with the assets and services identified in Article 121, subsection 14, which legal scholarship has termed the constitutional public domain (demanio constitucional). A second reason may be that the private sector provides the service or exploits the asset inefficiently and ineffectively, making State intervention necessary—the principle of subsidiarity (principio de subsidiariedad). A third situation may arise when, given the large investments, risk, profitability of the project, and so forth, the private sector decides not to participate, thereby justifying State action. Another situation may arise when a particular economic activity is subject to a monopoly, in which case the State would have reasonable grounds to reserve that activity to itself. Lastly, State intervention would also be justified when a public service (servicio público) is involved.

It must be borne in mind that when an activity is reserved to the public sector and a private party’s property or the economic activity it has been carrying out through its enterprise—in any of its forms—is adversely affected, the State is obligated to compensate that party by paying a fair price. It should also be emphasized that the fact that a service is essential to the community does not necessarily mean that it must be nationalized, since it is clear that, in a social and democratic State governed by the rule of law (Estado social y democrático de derecho) that has adopted a market economy, certain essential activities may be provided through private initiative.

There can be no doubt that the discussion of this legal dispute is related to the issue of public service. It is well known that a public service is characterized as a service-providing activity (actividad prestacional) that is not inherent to the State—it is not a public function (función pública) involving the exercise of governmental authority by the Administration—but is indispensable to social life. The State must therefore ensure that it is provided universally, continuously, efficiently, adaptably, and without discrimination, in order to satisfy the collective interest or need. As a general rule, the State holds title to the service, which is justified by the importance of the activity to the community; private parties therefore require a special enabling title (título habilitante) from the Administration in order to operate the service—indirect provision of a public service (prestación indirecta de un servicio público).

Given the importance of providing the public service to the community, even where a public service is managed indirectly, the Administration retains significant powers over the service and may also establish the conditions under which the private party must conduct the activity. Public-service management may likewise take different forms. In addition to the indirect management of a public service (gestión indirecta del servicio público) referred to above, there is also direct management (gestión directa), in which the Public Administration provides the service. There are also objective, virtual, or nontraditional public services (servicios públicos objetivos, virtuales o impropios), which, generally speaking, are activities of general interest—such as education, healthcare, financial intermediation, and so forth—for which an enabling title from the Public Administration is not required, but only an authorization.

Nor may one disregard those activities essential to the community that are provided directly by the private sector in the exercise of the principle of freedom and freedom of enterprise (libertad de empresa), as explained supra, since not every activity essential to the community must necessarily be reserved to the public sector. Lastly, there are economic-management activities (actividades de gestión económica)—for which a qualified majority would indeed be required—which differ from public services because the latter presuppose the performance of an activity, whereas the former concern bringing goods to market or ordinary industrial or commercial enterprises that, based on their overall regulatory framework and the requirements of their business operations, may be regarded as such—see Article 3, subsection 2, of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública).

Taking the foregoing as the frame of reference, I conclude that, in using the term monopoly, the Constituent Assembly was not referring to “publicatio”—the State’s assumption of title to an activity because of the general interest it represents to society, entailing public action that justifies the State’s appropriation of it—but rather to a specific instance of economic activity: the exploitation of an asset or the provision of a nonessential economic service by a single seller. From my perspective, not even the direct provision of a public service—where the State or a public entity provides the public service exclusively—would justify requiring a qualified majority, since the Constituent Assembly did not contemplate the reservation by Law of services essential to the community when establishing restrictions on freedom of enterprise. This is even less so in cases involving the indirect management of a public service—as occurs with taxi-based public transportation—where the service is provided under a competitive system by all those holding an enabling title—a concession or permit.

It should be noted that the case before us falls within the latter situation, since the challenged Law adopts the indirect form of service provision by establishing that a permit is required to operate the paid passenger transportation service (servicio de transporte remunerado de personas) in the form of a stable special taxi service (servicio especial estable de taxi), where the service is provided door-to-door to meet a limited, residual service need directed toward a closed group of persons different from that served by the existing service.

Article 73, subsection d, of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes that a defect of unconstitutionality (vicio de inconstitucionalidad) may arise when a Law or general provision infringes Article 7, first paragraph, of the Constitution by conflicting with a public treaty or international convention. This is therefore a case of what legal scholarship has termed indirect unconstitutionality (inconstitucionalidad indirecta), because when the Law or general provision violates the international Treaty, it indirectly violates Article 7 of the Constitution.

A review of the legislative history of this provision—Organic Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley Orgánica de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), legislative file No. 10.273—shows that it did not prompt significant controversy. The only observation was made by the Supreme Court of Justice, which, insofar as relevant and referring to what had been stated regarding Article 2 of the bill, expressed the following:

Article 2 also addresses international instruments when identifying the matters subject to Constitutional Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Constitucional). Subsection b) includes the review that must be undertaken “to ensure the conformity of domestic law with international or Community law.” It broadly refers there to “internal legal order (ordenamiento interno),” without restricting such review to conflicts between provisions of the Political Constitution and provisions of a treaty. Thus, when any possible conflict arises between ordinary provisions of domestic law and provisions of an international treaty, it will always fall to the Constitutional Chamber to decide the issue, thereby eliminating the authority of ordinary judges to determine the law in force, which they have been able to exercise as long as no constitutional provision prevents them from doing so. Now, under the Assembly’s bill, if an ordinary law were implicitly amended by a treaty, in accordance with the principle that later provisions amend earlier ones insofar as they conflict, especially if one of the instruments is higher in rank, then the matter would have to be brought before the Constitutional Chamber, pursuant to the aforementioned subsection b) of Article 2. (Folio 1586).

There appears to be no need to resort to the Constitutional Chamber in all such cases, since judges are fully capable of determining which provision is in force while acting within the scope of their authority.

The Court limits itself to making that observation, although it does recognize that problems or obstacles may sometimes arise in applying a treaty, specifically because complementary legislation is required. This may occur more frequently with treaties adopted after the law; however, it may also occur with earlier treaties when the legislature, instead of conforming to the treaty, enacts provisions that contradict it or fails to enact the provisions that it should. In short, because these are complex issues that may involve the State’s legislative authority, this could indeed justify placing the decision within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Chamber.

Furthermore, if such complex situations do not arise, the Chamber could deny the action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) where the conflict is solely between a treaty and earlier laws and the matter is confined to determining the law in force, without this depending on the application of constitutional provisions.” (Folio 1587).

From my perspective, indirect unconstitutionality (inconstitucionalidad indirecta) is inherently a complex matter, not so much because of the difficulty of addressing the issue, but because it requires integrating and harmonizing Public International Law and domestic law, particularly Constitutional Law and Constitutional Procedural Law.

For a long time, it was a foundational proposition of Public International Law that the only recognized legal persons were States. In other words, States were recognized as having international legal personality, legal capacity, and capacity to act and, consequently, as being subjects capable of assuming international rights and obligations. It was therefore States that were recognized as having the capacity to assume international rights and duties within the international legal system. Over time, international legal personality was also recognized for international organizations; atypical subjects of International Law—the Holy See, Sovereign Order of Malta, and International Committee of the Red Cross—belligerent communities, etc.; and, more recently, with respect to International Human Rights Instruments, individuals have been recognized as subjects of International Law and therefore as having standing (legitimación activa) to seek relief and request reparation for breaches of International Human Rights Law, since, as victims of acts and omissions by the State, they may hold it accountable for violations of their human rights.

Accordingly, with respect to International Human Rights Law, individuals have standing before National and International Courts to seek accountability for violations of their rights, as well as legal capacity to be sued (legitimación pasiva), making them directly accountable when their actions have violated the human rights of others; this latter point has been reinforced by the entry into force of the International Criminal Court Treaty and the commencement of its operations.

As is well known, apart from International Human Rights Law, legal scholarship has debated in other fields whether individuals may be subjects of rights and obligations under Public International Law. In International Economic Law, treaties have been adopted that recognize certain rights of individuals, for example, the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States—ICSID—which allows individuals to institute arbitration proceedings against States. The North American Free Trade Agreement—NAFTA—grants private parties the right of access to binational panels for the settlement of disputes. This means that, in order to determine whether individuals have standing to invoke a breach of an international agreement in matters not concerning human rights, where the issue is clear, the agreement’s content must be examined. Important rules follow from the foregoing, including the following: if the Treaty does not recognize their standing, the States Parties shall be the ones to claim a breach. If it recognizes an individual’s standing to claim a breach, that standing must necessarily be confined to what the Treaty provides.

In the matter before us, the United States–Central America Free Trade Agreement established two mechanisms for the settlement of disputes. Chapter ten, concerning investment, provides in Section B for the settlement of Investor-State disputes and establishes that, in the event of a dispute, the claimant and the respondent must attempt to resolve it through consultation and negotiation. If the parties fail to reach an agreement through consultation or negotiation, and provided that six months have elapsed since the events giving rise to the claim, a claimant who has incurred loss or damage by reason of the alleged violation—or who files on behalf of a legal entity that the claimant owns or directly or indirectly controls—may submit the claim to arbitration under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) if both the disputing party and the claimant are parties thereto; under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules if only one of the two parties is a party to the ICSID Convention; or under the rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).

Chapter twenty, in turn, establishes the general dispute-settlement mechanism. It is divided into two sections: the first concerns dispute settlement between States, while the second concerns domestic proceedings and the settlement of private commercial disputes. The first section establishes the possibility of resorting to various procedures, such as arbitration, direct negotiations between the parties, or mediation by the Free Trade Commission. The second section provides that, when an issue concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty arises in a party’s domestic judicial or administrative proceeding and any other party considers that its intervention is warranted, or when a court or administrative body requests the opinion of any party, that party shall notify the others. The Commission must endeavor to provide an appropriate response as soon as possible. The party in whose territory the court or administrative body is located must submit to that court or body any interpretation agreed upon by the Commission, in accordance with the procedures of that forum. When the Commission is unable to reach an agreement, any party may submit its own opinion to the court or administrative body.

Accordingly, if the Treaty establishes procedures through which the parties and investors must channel their claims when a legal dispute arises over the interpretation and application of the Agreement in connection with the issuance of a State act, whether legislative or executive, those procedures must first be followed to resolve it. This position has several positive consequences from a legal perspective and accords with elementary principles of justice, logic, and expediency. First, it observes the provisions of the Treaty itself, thereby giving concrete effect to the principles of pacta sunt servanda, bona fides, and the effet utile principle of treaty interpretation and application; otherwise, the Treaty would be violated, something this Court can neither permit nor encourage. This Court would fall into the paradox of violating the Treaty in an effort to safeguard it by exercising jurisdiction in a case alleging indirect unconstitutionality.

Second, it allows the parties and investors to present, on equal terms—the principle of equality of arms (principio de igualdad de armas)—their respective positions regarding the correct interpretation and application of the Treaty. In the case of the Government of Costa Rica, account must be taken of the statement made by the Minister of Foreign Trade in the filing submitted in the judicial record in response to the order issued at fifteen hours and seven minutes on diez de enero del dos mil diecisiete by the reporting justice at the undersigned’s request, where he states: “(…) under subsections a), b), and d) of Article 2 of Ley N° 7638 del 30 de octubre de 1996, this Ministry is responsible for defining and directing Costa Rica’s trade and investment negotiations and also for representing the country before international trade forums in which trade and investment matters are discussed.

Thus, where potential disagreements or differences exist between the Parties regarding compliance with, application of, or interpretation of any provision of the international free-trade treaties, agreements, and foreign-trade instruments in force, COMEX is the entity called upon to represent the country before the respective bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral forums and bodies in which such matters are discussed. It should be noted that this authority encompasses per se the conduct and coordination of the State’s defense strategy under the various dispute-settlement mechanisms established in international treaties, agreements, and instruments concerning trade and investment Thus, with respect to the alleged violation attributed to Law No. 8955 of June 16, 2011, in relation to any of the provisions of Chapter 11, “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, Approval Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, or its Annexes, this Ministry considers it neither appropriate nor advisable to express an opinion on the statements made by the petitioners before the constitutional jurisdiction.

Accordingly, this Ministry must refrain from issuing a determination or opinion regarding whether the challenged provisions are constitutional and whether they comply with the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, because failure to do so would publicly disclose in advance to the other States Parties the country’s position and defense strategy in the event that—under the rules of the Agreement in question—any Party considered itself adversely affected by the resolution of this matter and proceeded to activate the dispute-settlement mechanism.” Note that the Minister of Foreign Trade, among other things, judiciously and reasonably refrains from issuing a determination, because doing so would entail revealing the defense strategy of the State of Costa Rica in the event of a legal dispute between the State of Costa Rica and an investor or another State Party, which means, quite simply, that the Costa Rican State has not exercised its right of defense in this case.

Moreover, although the Minister of Foreign Trade does not state so expressly, it may undoubtedly be inferred from his note that the proper avenue for resolving this legal dispute is the one provided for in the Agreement, and not in this forum. Lastly, although I have repeatedly maintained, together with Justice Rueda Leal, that domestic remedies must be exhausted before resorting to ICSID, the fact remains that the appellant has not established in the judicial record that it followed the procedures provided for in the Agreement for dispute resolution or that it exhausted domestic remedies. Finally, it is neither logical nor fair for this Court to issue a constitutional ruling as to whether the Law violates the Agreement without having access to the various positions of the parties, the investors, the technical bodies, bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral bodies, etc., or to the arguments, counterarguments, etc., that must be presented before the bodies provided for in the Agreement for dispute resolution.

Accordingly, I conclude that only after the Agreement’s dispute-settlement provisions have been observed and, therefore, the respective procedures have been exhausted, might this Court have jurisdiction to examine the constitutional claim raised as to whether the challenged Law violates the Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America and Central America. Ergo, I summarily dismiss this claim and, consequently, refrain from issuing any ruling on the matter.

XI.Justice Rueda Leal dissents and declares unconstitutional the amendments made by Law No. 8955 of June 16, 2011, to Articles 323 and 334(b) of the Commercial Code, as well as the additions and amendments to Articles 1(l), 2, 29, and 62(e) of Law No. 7969, Regulatory Law of the Public Service of Paid Transportation of Persons in Taxi-Mode Vehicles, of December 22, 1999.

Before analyzing the merits of the challenge, it is important to explain the changes made by Law No. 8955 of June 16, 2011, which will provide a clearer understanding of their scope.

In this regard, the challenged legislation amended the following provisions:

1. 1Amendment of Articles 323 and 334(b) of the Commercial Code (Law No. 3284 of April 30, 1964).

Regarding Article 323:

- The version preceding the amendment stated:

· Article 323. “Under a contract of carriage (contrato de transporte), the carrier undertakes to transport persons, things, or messages from one place to another in exchange for a fee. Transportation may be provided by public or private companies. Public companies are those that advertise and open an establishment of this nature to the public, undertaking to provide transportation at specified prices, under specified conditions, and for specified periods whenever their services are requested in accordance with the terms of their prospectuses, schedules, and rates. Private companies are those that provide such services on a discretionary basis, under conditions and pursuant to contractual arrangements.” (Emphasis not in the original).

- The amended version provides:

· Article 323. “Under a contract of carriage, the carrier undertakes to transport things or messages from one place to another in exchange for a fee. Transportation may be provided by public or private companies. Public companies are those that advertise and open an establishment of this nature to the public, undertaking to provide transportation at specified prices, under specified conditions, and for specified periods whenever their services are requested in accordance with the terms of their prospectuses, schedules, and rates. Private companies are those that provide such services on a discretionary basis, under conditions and pursuant to contractual arrangements.

The contract of carriage governed by this Article does not authorize the transportation of persons by motor vehicles.” (Emphasis not in the original).

It follows from the foregoing that the legal mechanism authorizing the paid transportation of persons, which had been governed by the Commercial Code, was eliminated in its entirety.

Regarding Article 334(b):

- The version preceding the amendment stated:

· Article 334. The sender is entitled:

(…)

• b)To have its own employees permitted to travel at its expense in order to care for live animals, or any other item requiring attention, during transit; and (…)

- The amended version provides:

· Article 334. The sender is entitled:

(…)

• b)To have the employees of its company permitted to travel, provided that all legally required insurance is current and that they are properly identified, in order to care for live animals or any other item requiring attention during transit; and (…)

The aforementioned amendment creates regulations governing the incidental transportation of persons in connection with the transportation of live animals or any other item requiring attention, subject to the conditions set forth in that Article.

1. 2Amendment of Articles 2 and 29 of Law No. 7969, Regulatory Law of the Public Service of Paid Transportation of Persons in Taxi-Mode Vehicles, of December 22, 1999.

Regarding Article 2:

- The version preceding the amendment provided:

· “ARTICLE 2. Nature of the provision of the service For all legal and benefits-related purposes, the paid transportation of persons by taxi shall be deemed a public service operated under an administrative concession (concesión administrativa), pursuant to the special procedures established in this Law and its regulations.

- The amended version provides:

· “Article 2.- Nature of the provision of the service For all legal and benefits-related purposes, the paid transportation of persons by taxi shall be deemed a public service operated under an administrative concession, pursuant to the special procedures established in this Law and its regulations, or under a permit (permiso) in the case of stable special taxi services, in accordance with Article 7(a) of this Law.

The paid transportation of persons by buses, minibuses, microbuses, taxis, automobiles, and any other type of motor vehicle, whether offered to the general public, users, or specific groups of users with particular needs constituting special demand, is a public service vested in the State. The foregoing applies regardless of the degree of State involvement in determining the service’s operating system or in supervising it.

A concession shall be required:

To operate the paid motor-vehicle transportation service for persons in the taxi mode from duly authorized operating bases, in accordance with Article 1(b) and (c) of this Law. This mode also includes providing service to the home or location of the user in response to the user’s express request to the regular taxi-service provider through any of the means available to the provider for such purposes.

A permit shall be required:

To operate the paid motor-vehicle transportation service for persons in the stable special taxi-service mode when the service is provided door-to-door to meet a limited, residual service need directed at a closed group of persons different from that served pursuant to the preceding paragraph.

Permits to operate the motor-vehicle transportation of persons in the stable special taxi-service mode shall be issued by the Public Transportation Council upon submission of a certified copy of the contract or contracts executed with the persons, institutions, or companies using the service. Each natural person shall be granted only one permit; such persons may form a legal entity and thereby assume joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria). The vehicle covered by the permit must be owned by the permit holder or leased through a finance lease. If the conditions under which the permit was originally granted are breached, the permit may be revoked by a reasoned decision of the Public Transportation Council.

Without prejudice to other penalties provided for by the legal system, the permit shall be canceled, following due process and observance of the right of defense, on the following grounds:

• a)Failure to comply with the obligations, duties, and prohibitions established in this Law, its regulations, and related laws and regulations.
• b)A finding that the documentation submitted to the Public Transportation Council contains false or inaccurate information.
• c)Transfer or assignment of the permit to a third party without the Council’s prior authorization.
• d)Unlawful provision of the service outside the area authorized by the permit, except when the service originates within the authorized area and its destination lies outside that area.
• e)Cancellation or revocation, by a final administrative or judicial act or decision, of the business license (patente) authorized for the permit holder in the corresponding geographical area. The permit holder’s surrender of the granted business license shall likewise constitute grounds for canceling the permit.
• f)When the vehicle used to provide the stable special taxi service has the characteristics of taxi-mode vehicles authorized under a concession, in violation of Article 29 of this Law.
• g)When the permit holder does not maintain current insurance policies, as required by Article 29 of this Law.
• h)The permit of a vehicle authorized to provide the regular special taxi service (servicio especial estable de taxi) shall be canceled when the authorized vehicle travels on public roads seeking passengers.

Permits confer no vested rights (derechos subjetivos) upon their holders and shall be extended for a term of up to three years, provided they comply with the requirements established for that purpose.

Once a year, the Consejo de Transporte Público shall publish, in the official gazette La Gaceta and in a newspaper of nationwide circulation, lists of the natural or legal persons duly accredited to provide the regular special taxi service.” (Emphasis not in the original).

The quoted text shows that the amendment incorporated an express declaration that all compensated transportation of persons by motor vehicle constitutes a public service (servicio público) owned by the State, irrespective of the degree of State involvement in determining the service’s operating system or overseeing it. In addition, the regular special taxi service was regulated.

Regarding section 29:

- The version preceding the amendment provided:

· ARTICLE 29. Prior administrative concession (concesión administrativa) To provide taxi service, a prior administrative concession granted by the Consejo must be obtained, subject to the following conditions:

• a)Administrative concessions for compensated passenger service in the taxi mode shall be subject to the supply-and-demand technical studies approved by the Consejo. b) Concessions shall be granted by operating base (base de operación), in accordance with the applicable technical criteria, for a nonrenewable term of ten years. The Consejo may authorize special operating bases for tourism purposes, depending on the characteristics of the zone or geographical area; these shall be determined by special regulations in accordance with the fundamental principles of this law.
• c)Only one administrative concession shall be granted per individual, authorizing the operation of the public service with one vehicle.
• d)No concession awardee may share, in whole or in part, the concession rights awarded with another person who is also the awardee of another concession for compensated public passenger service in other modes of land transportation.
• e)Concessions shall be granted through the special expedited procedure (procedimiento especial abreviado) established in these provisions. No interested operator of ports or airports may hold a concession for compensated public passenger transportation services in the taxi mode, nor shall such an operator be permitted to provide this service in any mode.” - The amended version provides:

· Article 29.-Prior administrative concession or permit for regular special taxi services.

1. 1To provide taxi service, a prior administrative concession granted by the Consejo must be obtained, subject to the following conditions:

• a)Administrative concessions for compensated passenger service in the taxi mode shall be subject to the supply-and-demand technical studies approved by the Consejo.
• b)Concessions shall be granted by operating base, in accordance with the applicable technical criteria, for renewable ten-year terms at the concessionaire’s request, provided that the C-1 license is current. The Consejo may authorize special operating bases for tourism purposes, depending on the characteristics of the zone or geographical area; these shall be determined by special regulations in accordance with the fundamental principles of this law.
• c)Only one administrative concession shall be granted per individual, authorizing the operation of the public service with one vehicle.
• d)No concession awardee may share, in whole or in part, the concession rights awarded with another person who is also the holder of another concession for compensated public passenger service in other modes of land transportation.
• e)Concessions shall be granted through the special expedited procedure established in these provisions. No interested operator of ports or airports may hold a concession for compensated public passenger transportation services in the taxi mode, nor shall such an operator be permitted to provide this service in any mode.

1. 2To provide the regular special taxi service referred to in article 2 of this law, a permit granted by the Consejo de Transporte Público must be obtained, subject to the following conditions:

• a)Holders of regular special taxi permits for this service shall be limited to providing the service within a geographical area determined on the basis of the authorized business license (patente).
• b)No permit holder may share, in whole or in part, the rights under the permit granted with another person who is also the holder of another permit for compensated public passenger service.
• c)Vehicles used to provide the public service in the regular special taxi mode may not have the features of taxi-mode vehicles authorized under a concession to provide the service at a particular operating base authorized by the Consejo de Transporte Público, such as the color red, illuminated or non-illuminated signs, decals, the use of a taximeter, and other similar features, as defined by the applicable regulations, or any other distinguishing feature that could mislead taxi-service users. They must also comply with the requirements for operation established by Ley N. º 7331, Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, and its amendments. These motor vehicles may not be more than ten years old, calculated from their year of manufacture.
• d)Vehicles authorized for the regular special taxi service may not park or pick up or drop off persons at stops designated for other modes of public transportation. The operating bases of the regular special taxi service must be located at least one hundred and fifty meters from official bus and taxi terminals.
• e)Holders of regular special taxi service permits may not park anywhere on a public road to offer their services to the general public. Nor may they travel on public roads seeking passengers.
• f)When motor vehicles must stop in front of public buildings, parks, educational institutions, shopping centers, docks, ports, airports, churches, hospitals, or similar places, they may do so only for the time strictly necessary to allow their own users to board and disembark.
• g)Any person submitting an application to operate a regular special taxi service must submit certification that the person is duly registered with and current on all obligations to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS); be registered as a taxpayer with the Ministerio de Hacienda; be current on income-tax payments; have an insurance policy that fully covers civil liability (responsabilidad civil) for injury to or death of third parties and damage to third-party property, and keep it in force throughout the term of the permit; hold the corresponding municipal business license, in accordance with current legislation; and satisfy any other requirements established by regulation.
• h)In view of the principles of proportionality, reasonableness, and necessity, the authorized percentage of regular special taxi services may not exceed three percent (3%) of the concessions authorized per operating base.
• i)The State is obligated to guarantee the economic and financial equilibrium of the contract (equilibrio económico y financiero del contrato) for concessionaires by preventing potentially ruinous competition resulting from a concentration of operators in a particular zone that may exceed the needs of the residual demand in the operating zone where provision of the service is authorized, given that each zone has characteristics that differ from those of other zones, and by authorizing the number of permits it considers necessary.
• j)Once the permit has been granted, permit holders must carry the original or a certified copy of the contract entered into with the persons receiving the service.

Failure to comply with any of the foregoing conditions shall be penalized in accordance with Ley N. º 7331, Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, and its amendments, without prejudice to the authority of the Consejo de Transporte Público to cancel the permit.” (Emphasis not in the original).

The transcribed amendment shows that Ley Nº 7969 regulates the requirements for obtaining permits to provide the regular special taxi service, as well as the conditions for cancellation.

1. 3Addition of subsection l) to article 1 and amendment of subsection e) of article 62, both of ley N.º 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, de 22 de diciembre de 1999, and its amendments.

Regarding subsection l) of article 1.

- The added subsection provides as follows:

· “Article 1.- Definitions [.]

• l)Regular special taxi service: public compensated passenger transportation service intended for a closed group of users and satisfying limited, residual, exclusive, and stable demand.

Permits for compensated passenger transportation by minibuses, midibuses, and buses shall be governed by Ley N. º 3503, Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores, de 10 de mayo de 1965, and its amendments, or by any other law that may replace it in the future.” In this regard, that addition defined the so-called “regular special taxi service” and delimited the regulation of other modes of compensated passenger transportation.

Regarding subsection e) of section 62.

- The version preceding the amendment provided:

· “ARTICLE 62.- Amendments to Ley No. 7331 Ley de tránsito por vías públicas y terrestres, No. 7331, de 13 de abril de 1993, is hereby amended as follows: (…)

• e)Addition of a subsection d) to article 144, the text of which shall read:

“Article 144.- [...]

• d)Providing public transportation service in any of its modes without the respective authorizations, in violation of paragraph 1 of subsection a), or paragraph 1) of subsection b), both of article 97, and article 112 of this law.” - The amended version provides:

· “ARTICLE 62.- Amendments to Ley No. 7331 Ley de tránsito por vías públicas y terrestres, No. 7331, de 13 de abril de 1993, is hereby amended as follows: (…)

• e)A subsection d) is hereby added to article 145, the text of which shall read:

Article 145.- [...]

• d)Provide public transportation service (servicio de transporte público) in any of its forms without the respective authorizations, in violation of numeral 1 of subsection a), or numeral 1) of subsection b), both of Article 98, and Article 113 of this law. For purposes of imposing the penalty governed by this numeral and conducting the trial, the judicial authorities shall fully apply the evidentiary framework based on presumptions and clear, consistent circumstantial evidence, as defined by both civil and criminal procedural legislation, as well as the rules of logic, appropriateness, timeliness, reasonableness, and sound judicial assessment (sana crítica). The habitual provision of the unauthorized service or the external and internal signs placed on vehicles to attract the attention of users and induce them to use the vehicle employed by an authorized taxi shall be deemed presumptions and circumstantial evidence.” (Emphasis not in the original).

Thus, the amendments came to regulate violations committed by persons who provide public transportation service in any form without the corresponding authorizations.

It follows from those amendments that the challenged reform not only eliminated the concept of “carriage of persons” (porteo de personas) from the Commercial Code, but also introduced and regulated the so-called “stable special taxi service” (servicio especial estable de taxi). In addition, it unquestionably established that the transportation of persons for compensation (transporte remunerado de personas), in any other type of motor vehicle and under any arrangement, is a public service (servicio público) vested exclusively in the State.

Taking the foregoing into consideration, I shall examine the arguments raised in the constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad).

I.Regarding the first claim: Violation of the legislative procedure because the challenged law was approved by a Full Legislative Powers Committee (Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena).—

Upon reviewing the new arguments raised in the sub examine, I conclude that a monopoly in favor of the State has indeed been created, for the following reasons.

The reform enacted through law N° 8955 of 16 de junio de 2011 provides that all transportation of persons in a motor vehicle must be regarded as a public service vested in the State.

It cannot now be overlooked that, since the decade of 1960, there have been laws declaring the transportation of persons to be a public service (an issue that will be discussed further below). I emphasize, however, that alongside the transportation of persons for compensation, classified as a public service, private commercial transportation of persons (which allowed carriers to transport persons in exchange for payment) also existed from the entry into force of the Commercial Code on 27 de mayo de 1964 until the reform enacted through law 8955, which entered into force on 7 de julio de 2011.

Accordingly, the commercial arrangement known as “carriage of persons” remained in force throughout the aforementioned period, existing as a fully valid legal transaction (negocio jurídico) and, from a factual standpoint, as an undeniable reality that made possible the transportation of persons for compensation in the private and free market (so much so that this legal and factual reality could be changed only by expressly repealing it through legislation).

Regarding “carriage of persons,” this Court held in judgment Nº 2004-3580 at 14:43 hours on 14 de abril de 2004:

“V.— Regarding carriers under the Commercial Code and transportation as a public service. (…)

A carrier or transporter is a commercial auxiliary (auxiliar mercantil). The contract of carriage (contrato de transporte) governed by commercial legislation is intended to regulate the transportation of persons, merchandise, and other property. It is a commercial contract important to a country’s economy because it serves as a link between the producer or marketer of goods and services and the final consumer. It arose from merchants’ need to travel from one place to another, with or without their commercial goods, and thus initially served as an instrument for transporting merchants in the course of their activities. Although legal scholarship does not use modes of transportation to classify carriers, it may be said that transportation can take place by land (such as by cart, freight vehicle, or railroad), by water (small boat, launch, or transatlantic cruise ship), and by air (glider, light aircraft, or jet aircraft); it is even accepted that it may be carried out through human effort, by a pack animal, or by a motorized vehicle.

However, given its broad diversity and economic importance to the country, certain areas are regulated by the State to protect the public interest, with some forms being declared public services. It is therefore a highly restricted contractual concept, and the origin of the contract of carriage must be identified in order to determine whether it is a commercial agreement or is intended to satisfy an activity that the State has declared a public service. (…) The legally relevant fact under discussion, however, is the unrestricted transportation of persons, with or without their belongings, in exchange for payment, when, since the enactment of Law No. 3503 and subsequently Law No. 7593, the transportation of persons for compensation by taxi has been declared a public service, thereby making the contract of carriage a limited and residual activity.

VI.Regarding Unfair Competition (Competencia Desleal). (…) Clearly, the contract of carriage has various characteristics, including that it is a contract for consideration (contrato oneroso) and is not subject to formal requirements; its purpose may be the transportation of persons, things, and messages as a commercial auxiliary activity. However, because it is a residual contract for the transportation of persons, the public served must belong to a closed group of users, (…).

VIII.The specific case of the contract for the transportation of persons as a restricted activity. The arguments outlined in the action seek to demonstrate that the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation lacks authority to regulate the carrier’s activity, which is protected by commercial legislation allowing the carrier to transport persons, as well as things and messages, from one place to another. However, the case law of this Chamber precisely defines the dividing line between activities governed by private law and those governed by public law. A private activity that satisfies needs or interests of a general nature shall become a matter of State concern, and the State shall be authorized to regulate it through legislation declaring it a public service. A private party may engage in activities that remain within the private sphere, but if that party becomes involved with a previously declared public interest, the State may legitimately enforce compliance with its legislation. (…)”

The precedent cited again demonstrates that carriage of persons remained in force within the Costa Rican legal system prior to the reform challenged on this occasion. This is without prejudice to my later questioning of the constitutionality of the declaration vesting the State with ownership of every type of transportation of persons for compensation in motor vehicles, and subject to the clarification that I do not agree that carriage of persons should have been classified as a limited or residual activity.

Taking the quoted text into consideration, it bears emphasizing that a private activity may affect matters of public interest; however, that characteristic alone does not justify making ownership of the activity a State monopoly. Rather, as explained below, there may be direct and indirect public services (servicios públicos propios e impropios); the degree of State intervention will depend on that classification.

It must also be emphasized that the explanatory statement (exposición de motivos) for Law N.° 8955 of 16 de junio de 2011 (which, as I have already indicated, eliminated carriage of persons from commercial legislation and established the so-called stable special taxi service under the Law Regulating the Public Service of Transportation of Persons for Compensation in Taxi-Mode Vehicles) stated as follows:

“This initiative very categorically seeks to establish, within the regulatory framework of the Law Regulating the Public Service of Transportation of Persons for Compensation in Taxi-Mode Vehicles, N.º 7969, a service that is now a reality but is incorrectly protected solely by the word ‘persons’ in the Commercial Code, in order to create legislation that guarantees better conditions and lower costs for users, seeking the benefit and well-being of the great majority.

In this manner, carriage of persons is eliminated, but carriage itself is not eliminated; in other words, what is being eliminated is the word ‘person’ from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, while things, articles, money, correspondence, etc., may continue to be transported.

Following the elimination of the word ‘person,’ a concept called ‘stable special taxi transportation’ (transporte especial estable de taxi) is created within the Law Regulating the Public Service of Transportation of Persons for Compensation in Taxi-Mode Vehicles, N. º 7969. It retains the nature of the special residual service currently provided through carriage, but is legally protected and regulated so as to impose accountability on those interested in obtaining authorization.

The stable special taxi service will be clearly distinguishable from regular taxi service because it will always be door-to-door, the private contract between the parties will prevail, and it must be shown to form part of a commercial activity, which must also have the required business licenses. During this first stage, it may be provided by natural persons or legal entities capable of demonstrating to the Public Transportation Council, within a strict period proposed as three years (3 años), that they provide this activity. It must be understood that its growth is highly particular and sporadic: it may provide service today for a certain period because there is a contract, but that does not mean it will continue over time, which is why the authorization is described as lasting up to three years.

It is not a concession (concesión) because it does not arise from a public bidding process (licitación pública), but rather from a permit (permiso), and it fundamentally addresses a specific, particular need.

(…) such that any man or woman providing that special service without the respective authorization would be operating illegally, because there is no legal concept in either the Commercial Code or the Traffic Law that permits that activity.” (Emphasis not in the original).

It follows from the foregoing that, prior to the reform at issue, carriage of persons was fully valid and present in Costa Rica’s transportation market. Indeed, according to the quoted text, the purported purpose of the new regulation was to provide better conditions and lower costs for users, seeking the benefit and well-being of the great majority.

Therefore, based on the foregoing, I conclude that: 1- through the removal of private carriage (porteo) of persons from commercial regulation, 2- the simultaneous creation of the permanent special taxi service to regulate that type of legal transaction, but as a public service, and 3- the express provision deeming all carriage of persons for compensation in any type of motor vehicle to be a public service held exclusively by the State, a complete public monopoly was imposed on that type of market activity. I emphasize that both positive law and reality indicate that, prior to the challenged reform, two forms of carriage of persons for compensation coexisted in the country: one public and the other operated by the private sector (the private-carriage option). By absorbing the latter, the State imposed a public monopoly on the market, which the Political Constitution regulates as follows:

“ARTICLE 46.- Private monopolies and any act, even if originating in a law, that threatens or restricts the freedom of commerce, agriculture, and industry are prohibited.

(…)

The establishment of new monopolies in favor of the State or the Municipalities shall require the approval of two thirds of the entire membership of the Legislative Assembly.” (Emphasis not in the original).

In this regard, it is undisputed that Law Nº8955 of 16 de junio de 2011 was approved by a Full Legislative Powers Committee; therefore, as I stated, upon finding that those provisions created a monopoly in favor of the State, they necessarily had to satisfy the qualified majority (mayoría calificada) required by the aforementioned provision. Because that requirement was not observed in approving the legislation at issue, a constitutional defect has arisen.

In view of the foregoing, I consider that the amendments enacted through Law N.° 8955 to sections 323 and 334 subsection b) of the Commercial Code, and to sections 2, 29, and 62 (subsection e), together with the addition of subsection l) to Article 1, all of Law Nº 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, removed a legitimate commercial activity from the private and free market in order to confer it—albeit under different regulations—upon the State, as its sole holder, irrespective of the degree of State intervention or oversight. In other words, following the aforementioned amendment, no private party may any longer hold the right to conduct that activity; it now belongs exclusively to the State, and a private party must settle merely for seeking to operate it if the corresponding permit is granted by the State.

II.Regarding the second claim: Violation of the principles of freedom of contract (autonomía de la voluntad) and free trade (libre comercio). With respect to this point, I deem it necessary to clarify certain matters.

A.- Free competition (libre competencia) and legal monopoly (monopolio de derecho).

In the preceding section, I noted that the challenged amendments were unconstitutional because Law N.° 8955 of 16 de junio de 2011 was not approved by a qualified majority, as required by Article 46 of the Political Constitution.

Now, irrespective of that defect, I consider that the creation of a State monopoly should not only be subject to qualified approval by the entire membership of the Legislative Assembly, but must also take into account other requirements arising from a systemic analysis of the Fundamental Law. For these purposes, it should be recalled that the legal meaning of a constitutional mandate can often be discerned only by considering and weighing the various constitutional principles, values, interests, and rights that coexist within that supreme body of law. Among its other qualities, our Constitution is characterized by its promotion of individual and social rights and its endeavor to strike a balance between them—for example, between the requirements inherent in a solidarity-based State and the Christian principle of social justice, on the one hand, and the conditions that free competition and freedom of enterprise (libertad de empresa) require for their sound development, on the other.

Accordingly, for purposes of the case at bar (sub lite), it is appropriate to recall what was held in judgment Nº 2008-004569 at 14:30 on 26 de marzo de 2008:

“1) CONSTITUTIONAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN LEGAL AND DE FACTO MONOPOLIES AND THE TYPE OF LAW REQUIRED TO ABOLISH EITHER. In Article 46 of the Political Constitution, the original constituent authority does distinguish between a legal monopoly and a de facto monopoly (monopolio de hecho). (…) Under the logic of that provision, a monopoly is an exceptional condition of the market or economy, since paragraph 1° establishes the prohibition of private monopolies as a general rule, while paragraph 2° emphasizes that ‘State action aimed at preventing any monopolistic practice or tendency is in the public interest.’ This means, a contrario sensu, that public authorities are constitutionally required to promote competition within a market economy. Paragraph 4° provides that ‘The establishment of new monopolies in favor of the State or the Municipalities shall require the approval of two thirds of the entire membership of the Legislative Assembly.’ This emphasizes the rule embodied in the ‘economic constitution’ (constitución económica)—that is, the body of values, principles, and provisions governing the economy and the market in the fundamental text—of freedom of enterprise and free competition and, consequently, the qualified exception represented by monopolies, including public monopolies, given that an enhanced-majority law (ley reforzada), and therefore a considerable consensus among the political forces represented in the Legislative Assembly, is required to establish a public legal monopoly.

It is clear that paragraph 4° of constitutional Article 46, by exceptionally permitting a monopoly pursuant to an enhanced-majority law, contemplates and enshrines the legal monopoly. (…) The requirement of an enhanced-majority law to establish a legal monopoly applies because this legal construct limits or restricts freedom of enterprise, which is the normal or ordinary rule under Constitutional Law. In this regard, it must be emphasized that the intrinsic and extrinsic limitations on fundamental rights are matters reserved to statute (reserva de ley). (…) The first four paragraphs of Article 46 of the Political Constitution, which have remained unchanged, arose from a motion submitted by the Social Democratic Caucus, as reflected in the Minutes of the National Constituent Assembly No. 101, Article 3°, Volume II, pages 439-444. Thus, Representative Facio Brenes stated: ‘(…) We are, of course, in favor of prohibiting monopolies, as well as any other act tending to threaten or restrict the freedom of commerce, agriculture, and industry.’ He then added that the motion ‘(…) reflects a universal opinion or sentiment that is becoming increasingly widespread in opposition to monopolistic practices or tendencies.

This is so much the case that all modern Constitutions have abandoned provisions similar to that of our repealed charter and have instead charged the State with taking specific action against de facto monopolies. (…)’ Constituent Assembly member Acosta Jiménez stated that ‘The Social Democratic motion (…) embodies a universal aspiration against monopolies and gives expression to a democratic ideal.’ Finally, Representative Arias indicated that ‘(…) he agreed that the country must defend itself against monopolies, which are highly detrimental to the national economy. Strictly speaking, we cannot say that we have legal monopolies, but because of special circumstances, several de facto monopolistic enterprises exist.’” (Emphasis not in the original).

Furthermore, this Chamber stated in judgment Nº 2017-1104 at 9:05 on 24 de enero de 2017:

“IV.- ON THE MERITS. This Chamber has repeatedly addressed the importance of economic competition and open competition (libre concurrencia) to the proper functioning of the market and for the benefit of consumers or users, insofar as they compel enterprises to offer better quality, innovation, and prices. One of the fundamental principles of the Economic Constitution is free competition or open competition, to such an extent that public authorities are obligated to safeguard freedom of commerce, industry, and enterprise (voto No. 4569-08 at 14:30 on 26 de marzo de 2008), preventing all anticompetitive and monopolistic conduct or practices (Article 46 of the Political Constitution). To implement the aforementioned Article 46 and protect the competitive process and open competition, the Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor was enacted, defining, prohibiting, and penalizing various practices that, by their purpose or effect, are monopolistic. Regarding this point, this Chamber stated the following in judgment No. 2004-01922 at 14:54 hrs. on 25 de febrero de 2004:

V.Right to Free Competition (derecho a la libre concurrencia). Article 46 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), both in its original text and following the amendment enacted by Law number 7607 of twenty-nine May two thousand three, recognizes a fundamental principle of our economic system: freedom of commerce and, particularly, the safeguarding of free competition as an element of the social market system. That article expressly prohibits the formation of private monopolies, as well as practices that threaten freedom of commerce, agriculture, and industry. It also limits the establishment of public monopolies and requires the express regulation of de facto monopolies. It further emphasizes that State action aimed at preventing any monopolistic practice or tendency is in the public interest. At present, the constitutional protection of free competition must be understood in close connection with the position of actual disadvantage that consumers commonly occupy when participating in the market, and with the State’s duty to protect them against the power of other economic actors.

In this regard, the elimination (or restriction) of effective competition could lead to consequences directly contrary to those sought by the market system, forcing users to submit to the unilateral dictates of the sole supplier or the few suppliers, particularly in the case of products with low elasticity, which consumers are compelled to acquire or use even under manifestly unfavorable or unfair conditions. By guaranteeing free competition, the State ensures that consumers have several alternatives from which to choose the most favorable one, according to their interests and means. It also encourages businesses, in order to win their customers’ preference, to offer them the best product or service at the most advantageous price. Article 46 of the Constitution, in fact, prohibits not only the formation of private monopolies, but also practices that result in restrictions on freedom of enterprise.

In much of its case law, this Chamber has developed the essential content of the constitutional principle of free competition, declaring unconstitutional those rules and practices that create private monopolies and prevent suppliers from freely entering the market for goods and services. (Cf. judgments numbers 0550-95, 1144-90, 5056-94, and 7044-96, among others) (…)” (Emphasis not in the original).

For present purposes, the cited precedents establish that in Costa Rica, by virtue of the market-economy model chosen by the constituent authority, freedom of enterprise and free competition are the general rule, while monopoly is the exception, since a measure so burdensome to freedom as removing a particular economic good from free commerce may be adopted only in exceptionally compelling cases involving a clearly demonstrated public interest.

Accordingly, the crux of the matter is to determine whether any type of activity involving the exploitation of an economic good may be monopolized by the State merely through the enactment of a law by a qualified majority, with simple compliance with a formal or procedural requirement being sufficient for that purpose.

Regarding this point, it is essential to note that the Chamber, in judgment Nº 11518-2000 at 14:52 hours on 21 December 2000, held:

“IV.- It is important to refer to judgment number 5532-2000 of this Chamber, issued at fifteen hours and five minutes on five July two thousand (to the same effect, judgment number 7044-96, issued at ten hours and nine minutes on twenty-four December nineteen ninety-six), which states, insofar as relevant: ‘(…) the monopolized activities (the importation, refining, and wholesale distribution of fuels) are private in character or nature because, generally speaking, they are simply commercial transactions involving certain economic goods, forming part of the broader category comprising exchanges of goods and services in a given economy, and in no case are they reserved exclusively for private parties, since they may readily be carried out by such parties through a system of freedom of contract, exchange, and minimal regulation (market economies), or by the State (in the case of centralized economies), or even—as in most countries—through a combination of both systems, leaving certain sectors open to private parties for their unrestricted activity and reserving others for the exclusive activity of the State.

The foregoing is intended to establish that monopolized activities are not necessarily and per se private in nature; therefore, under our Constitution, they may validly be entrusted to private parties subject to State oversight or be subject to State intervention, insofar as this is authorized by the Constitution and the laws and is justified in accordance with the purposes pursued.’” (Emphasis not in the original).

Consistent with the foregoing, the constitutional rights to freedom of enterprise, free competition, and property establish that, for State intervention through the monopolization of activities involving the exploitation of a particular economic good to be constitutionally permissible, it must satisfy at least two requirements: 1) it must be authorized by the Political Constitution and the laws; and 2) it must be justified in accordance with the purposes sought. Regarding the latter requirement, the justification must satisfy the demands of the constitutional principle of reasonableness and proportionality (principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad), whose content the Chamber understands as follows (judgment No. 2007-17204 at 15:57 hours on 27 November 2007):

“IV.- Principles of freedom, legality, and reasonableness.

Article 28 of the Political Constitution provides, insofar as relevant: ‘No one may be disturbed or persecuted for expressing their opinions or for any act that does not violate the law. Private actions that do not harm morality or public order, or prejudice third parties, lie beyond the reach of the law.’ From the first paragraph of the quoted text, it is possible to derive the ‘principle of freedom,’ under which, for human beings, ‘everything that is not prohibited is permitted.’ This general principle of freedom, read in harmony with the second paragraph of the provision at issue, also allows us to construct the notion of a ‘system of freedom,’ which establishes not only that human beings may do anything the law does not prohibit, but also the guarantee that not even the law may intrude upon their inviolable sphere of freedom. (…) the Costa Rican model of the State establishes a particular form of subjection of public authorities and institutions to the legal system, since they may issue only those legal acts and engage in only those material conduct expressly or implicitly authorized by the legal system.

However, the principles of freedom and legality are not the only constraints that constitutional law imposes on the actions of State bodies in relation to private parties. As the Chamber has developed in repeated rulings, the ‘principle of reasonableness,’ or substantive due process (debido proceso sustantivo), also constitutes a fundamental requirement for the Public Administration, such that its acts must conform to the elements comprising this principle, namely suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense. Suitability means that the means must be appropriate to the end; that is, the rule must be capable of effectively attaining the intended objective. Necessity refers to the nature or magnitude of the limitation that a right or freedom must bear as a result of those means, such that, among various possible means, the one chosen must be that which imposes the lesser limitation.

Proportionality means that, even if the chosen means imposes the lesser limitation, that limitation must be proportionate; that is, it may not be of such magnitude that it deprives the right or freedom at issue of its minimum essential content.” (Emphasis not in the original).

Accordingly, the establishment of a legal monopoly (monopolio de derecho) in favor of the State inevitably affects the constitutional rights to freedom of enterprise, free competition, and property. Therefore, in addition to the procedural requirement of the qualified majority contemplated in provision 46 of the Fundamental Law, safeguarding those rights requires observance of the principle of reasonableness and proportionality in relation to the public purposes sought, such that only a clearly demonstrated public interest could justify imposing a measure as burdensome and extraordinary as removing from the free market a particular activity involving the exploitation of an economic good, which our economic constitution permits only as an extraordinary and exceptional matter.

For this reason, the statement of grounds for a law creating a monopoly in favor of the State must expressly explain why a particular business activity must be subjected to a measure as burdensome as removing it from the market and making it a State monopoly. It must also explain conclusively why the public interest could be satisfied only if the activity in question were monopolized in favor of the State. Such justification may clearly correspond to a particular historical moment, so that what might be considered reasonable under certain circumstances would not be reasonable under others.

B.- On the Remunerated Passenger Transportation Service (servicio remunerado de transporte de personas) in Costa Rica in the Taxi Modality. To determine whether the remunerated passenger transportation service is an activity capable of being monopolized by the State, it is necessary to examine the context in which it has developed.

1. Historical Regulation of the Service in Costa Rica.

In its early stages, the activity of remunerated passenger transportation by automobile (as distinct from regular and permanent collective transportation by vehicles between specified localities or stops, which was comprehensively regulated) was not subject to specific State oversight.

The Ley sobre el Trasporte (sic, because that was the spelling used at the time), created by Decreto Nº 7 de 24 de noviembre de 1909, established certain features of the general principles governing public services and even regulated “Special Rules Concerning the Public Transportation Service”; however, it made no reference whatsoever to vehicles for hire or garages (sic, as they were called at that time and as the term was subsequently recorded in the regulations), as will be seen below.

Subsequently, the Ley General de Transporte Remunerado de Personas, Nº1277 de 24 de abril de 1951, contained rules concerning public transportation services and required a competitive bidding procedure (licitación) for new collective passenger transportation services. Nevertheless, Article 2 expressly excluded public-service automobiles for hire and garages (sic):

“Article 2. This law covers only public passenger transportation services provided regularly and permanently between specified localities or stops and shall therefore not apply to extraordinary or exceptional services, excursions, express and tourist trips, political mobilizations, or mobilizations of any other kind, which may continue to be provided freely. Nor shall this law apply to rental automobile services or public-service garages (sic).”

That article was subsequently amended by Law Nº1499 of 30 de setiembre de 1952, which included rental automobiles and public-service garages (sic) under the following conditions:

“Rental automobile services and public-service garage (sic) services, or those involving other similar vehicles, shall be subject to this law only when provided regularly and permanently between specified places or points, all as determined by the Higher Traffic Council (Consejo Superior de Tránsito).” It follows from the foregoing that, at that time, only that type of passenger transportation was subject to regulation; that is, a contrario sensu, rental automobile and garage services that were not provided regularly and permanently operated under conditions of free competition and, therefore, ownership of the service could not belong to the State.

Subsequently, the Public Services Law (Ley de Servicios Públicos), Nº 2658 of 16 de noviembre de 1960 (amended by Law Nº 2887 of 24 de noviembre de 1961), was enacted, becoming the first body of legislation to regulate rental automobile services directly and classifying them as a public service (servicio público). It also left Law Nº 1277 and the Regulation on Garages (sic) for Public-Service Vehicles (Reglamento de Garages (sic) para vehículos de servicio público) in force, which provided that license plates for cars to be used for public passenger service would be issued only to those having a garage (sic). This Public Services Law did not grant the State ownership (titularidad) of the rental automobile service because, although its provisions referred to operating concessions (concesiones de explotación), it is no less true that they did not possess the defining characteristics of a concession (concesión), nor were they granted through bidding procedures (procedimientos de licitación), although fares were controlled and the service was supervised; consequently, the legal arrangement more closely resembled an authorization (autorización) or permit (permiso) in the broad sense. As will be discussed below, not every public service necessarily entails State ownership.

Years later, the Regulatory Law on Paid Passenger Transportation in Motor Vehicles (Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores), N° 3503 of 10 de mayo de 1965, entered into force. It deemed paid passenger transportation (transporte remunerado de personas) in motor vehicles to be a public service regulated, controlled, and supervised by the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes). The original version of Article 1 stated that paid passenger transportation in motor vehicles conducted on streets, highways, and roads within the territory of the Republic was a public service whose provision was the exclusive prerogative of the State, which could exercise it directly or through private parties whom it expressly authorized. In addition, Article 2 stated that the Ministry of Transportation (Ministerio de Transportes) had jurisdiction over all matters relating to traffic and motor-vehicle passenger transportation in the country; it also provided that the Ministry could undertake direct provision of that public service itself or through other State institutions, or grant private entrepreneurs rights to operate it, and that, in all cases, it would supervise, control, and regulate that activity to safeguard the public interest.

Based on the provisions of the cited articles, I consider that it was from that time onward that the paid public passenger transportation service in automobiles, including the service now known as taxi service, became State-owned, because the provision of paid passenger transportation services was declared to be the exclusive prerogative of the State and could be provided directly by it or through private parties. Nevertheless, that body of legislation had the particular feature that, when referring to the operation of public-service automobiles, it designated a permit as the sole means of engaging in that activity. In that regard, Article 3 stated:

“CHAPTER III Requirements for Operating the Paid Passenger Transportation Service in Motor Vehicles Article 3.- Prior authorization from the Ministry of Transportation shall be required to provide the public service referred to in this law, regardless of the type of vehicle to be used or its propulsion system.

Such authorization may consist of a concession or a permit, the granting of which shall be subject to traffic and transportation planning needs within the territory of the Republic, in accordance with the studies conducted for that purpose by the Planning and Motor Transportation Departments (*) of the Ministry of Transportation.

A concession shall be required:

(…)

A permit shall be required:

(…)

• e)To operate public-service automobiles.” (Emphasis not in the original) It is important to emphasize that this law placed greater emphasis on paid collective passenger transportation (transporte colectivo remunerado de personas), an approach reinforced by subsequent amendments that expressly excluded taxi service from its scope of application.

Thus, the Regulatory Law on Paid Passenger Transportation in Taxi Vehicles (Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Taxis), Nº 5406 of 26 de noviembre de 1973, repealed every provision of Law Nº 3503 that conflicted with it and established a special regime (régimen especial) for that type of service. In this regard, Articles 1, 2, and 4 provided:

“Article 1- Paid ground transportation of persons in taxi motor vehicles shall be deemed a public service.

Article 2º.- The Ministry of Public Works and Transportation shall have jurisdiction over all matters relating to traffic and taxi transportation of persons in the country; the Ministry may undertake the direct provision of this public service itself or through other State institutions, or may grant rights to operate it to cooperatives duly registered with the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (Ministerio de Trabajo y Bienestar Social).

In all cases, the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation shall supervise, control, and regulate this activity to safeguard the public interest.

To fulfill this obligation, the Ministry may:

• a)Establish taxi stands, conditions, and fares for the benefit of users; b) Issue such regulations as it deems appropriate regarding traffic and taxi transportation within the territory of the Republic; and c) Adopt such measures as may be necessary to ensure that vehicle traffic and passenger transportation needs, as well as requirements relating to uniformity, safety, service to users, etc., are met efficiently.

Article 4- A concession from the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation shall be required to provide the public service referred to in this law, regardless of the type of ‘vehicle to be used or its propulsion system.” (Emphasis not in the original).

Taking the cited provisions into consideration, I believe that the confusion between permits and concessions contained in Law Nº 3503 was resolved at this point, since it was established that, in addition to the possibility of providing the service directly in its capacity as owner, the State could grant rights for its operation and, furthermore, the obligation to obtain a concession from the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation in order to operate that service was clearly established.

Additionally, Law Nº 7593 of 9 de agosto de 1996 limited the scope of application of Law Nº 3503 to collective motor vehicles by amending its Article 1 as follows: “Paid passenger transportation in collective motor vehicles, except for public taxi-service automobiles regulated by another law, conducted on streets, highways, and roads within the national territory, is a public service regulated, controlled, and supervised by the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation. Its provision is delegated to private parties whom it expressly authorizes, in accordance with the rules established herein.” (Emphasis not in the original).

Three years later, the Regulatory Law on the Public Service of Paid Passenger Transportation in Taxi-Mode Vehicles (Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi), N° 7969 of 22 de diciembre de 1999, repealed Law Nº 5406 and provided that paid passenger transportation in the taxi modality (modalidad de taxi) was, by its nature, a public service that had to be operated through an administrative concession (concesión administrativa), subject to the special procedures established in that law and its regulations. It also established the procedure and conditions for granting such a concession. This framework essentially remained in place until Law N.° 8955 of 16 de junio de 2011 expressly established State ownership of every type of paid passenger transportation in motor vehicles—not only taxis, to which it had traditionally been limited—regardless of the degree of State intervention in determining the operating system or exercising oversight. This situation led to the removal from the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio) of the legal institution of passenger carriage (porte de personas) and the statutory inclusion of the “stable special taxi service” (“servicio especial estable de taxi”), by regulating the issuance of permits for its provision as a public service.

2. On the concept of public service and its ownership.

Regarding the public service of paid passenger transportation in Costa Rica, this Court, in decision Nº 2012-12741 at 9:05 hours on 14 de setiembre de 2012, referring to decision Nº 2011-04778 at 14:31 hours on 13 de abril de 2011 (the ruling that decided the constitutional consultation (consulta de constitucionalidad) concerning Law Nº 8955), stated as follows:

“IV. - On the concept of public service (servicio público). On that occasion, this concept was developed by noting that public service may be provided or performed not only by state agencies, but also by private persons or entities, in accordance with regulations issued by public authorities; and that such services seek to satisfy needs or interests of a general nature and therefore require oversight by public authorities. The defining element of public services is, therefore, their purpose—the satisfaction of the general need or interest for which they were created—or the subjection of the activity to the public-law regime (régimen de Derecho Público) governing it, precisely by virtue of the public interest that it is intended to satisfy (Considerando XV). It was also stated that the State has, for quite some time, regarded the transportation of persons as a pressing social need whose continued availability is essential as a fundamental condition for maintaining the rule of law and social peace.

For this reason, it has enacted a series of laws, the most important currently governing this subject being the Law Regulating the Paid Transportation of Persons by Motor Vehicles (Ley No. 3503) and the Law Regulating the Public Service for the Paid Transportation of Persons in Vehicles Operating as Taxis (Ley No. 7969), the amendment to which is the subject of this consultation. Over the last five-year period, it has become publicly and widely known that the transportation of persons has acquired greater significance for Costa Rican society, not only from a social standpoint but also from an economic one, to the point of becoming a matter of general interest that extends beyond satisfying a merely private need and requires State intervention to provide a solution. The State—in this case, the ordinary legislature—may, within the framework permitted by the Political Constitution and statutory provisions, choose the solution it considers most appropriate.

As just stated, one possible solution is to regulate that activity and declare it a public service, which is precisely what the bill under review does, necessarily satisfying the two elements identified above. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber does not consider the amendment to Article 2 of Ley número 7969 unconstitutional insofar as it designates the paid transportation of persons by taxi as a public service vested in the State and operated through an administrative concession (concesión administrativa), or through a permit (permiso) in the case of stable special taxi services (Considerando XVI). The challenged amendment thus seeks to remove the provision of passenger-transportation services—which the legislature has declared in their entirety to be a public service—from the private sphere, to make private parties collaborators of the Public Administration, and to apply the rules governing the provision of public services.

Accordingly, Articles 28, 45, 46, and 56 of the Political Constitution are not deemed to have been infringed; nor is the claimant correct in alleging that the challenged provisions rendered unlawful the activity she had been carrying out.” Nevertheless, upon fuller consideration and taking into account the arguments presented in the sub examine, I must state the following.

Although I maintain the general proposition that, in certain cases, a public service may be provided both by the State and by private parties in accordance with the relevant regulations issued by the competent public authority, because such services are economic activities imbued with a clear general interest, I consider it improper that, specifically in the case of paid passenger-transportation services by taxi and stable special taxi service, the State should be the only entity in which services of that nature may be vested—that is, that private parties may operate them only through a concession or permit.

It should be noted that the rationale used by this Court to uphold the designation of the aforementioned services as public services was the significance they have acquired from social and economic standpoints, to the point of becoming imbued with a general interest. However, the fact that an activity is of general interest does not mean that it must inevitably be vested solely in the State.

For these purposes, it is essential to distinguish between a public service in the strict sense (servicio público propio) and a public service in the broad sense (servicio público impropio). This Chamber has already clarified those concepts, although not specifically with reference to the paid transportation of persons.

In that regard, in voto Nº2004-1791 at 9:02 on 20 de febrero de 2004, reiterated on numerous occasions, this Court stated:

“EDUCATION AS A PUBLIC SERVICE. Education may be conceived not only as a right of citizens, but also as a public service; that is, as a positive service provided to the inhabitants of the Republic by public administrations—the State through the Ministerio de Educación Pública and the Universidades Públicas—in which case it is a public service in the strict sense, or by private parties through collective organizations governed by private law—e.g., foundations, associations, or companies—in the case of private schools, secondary schools, and universities, in which case it is a public service in the broad sense. In the latter situation, we speak of a public service in the broad sense because private parties—natural or legal persons—provide it subject to an extensive and detailed public-law regime governing the establishment, operation, and supervision of those private institutions. Because public services provide effective benefits that are vital to life in society, they must be subject to a series of principles, including continuity, regularity, efficiency, effectiveness, equality, and universality.

In the case of public services in the broad sense, these principles are attenuated or qualified, particularly insofar as the user chooses to use such services. Consequently, the public service of education, whether in the strict or broad sense, may not be interrupted or suspended unless this is warranted by objective and serious reasons or justifications, such as, potentially in the field of education, a student’s violation of the educational institution’s disciplinary rules.” (Emphasis not in the original).

It follows from the foregoing that a public service in the strict sense is one provided by the State directly or through a private-law entity, whereas a public service in the broad sense is one provided directly by a private party, albeit subject to strong and specific public-law oversight because of the degree of importance of the relevant activity to the public interest, as occurs with private healthcare facilities and pharmacies.

In addition, through voto Nº 9676-2001 at 11:25 on 26 de setiembre de 2001, the Chamber held:

“IV.- (…) Currently, a significant body of legal scholarship and case law maintains that a public service may be provided or performed not only by state agencies, but also by private persons or entities (concessionaires), in accordance with regulations (sic), not (sic) general rules, issued by public authorities. Thus, public service must be understood as any activity of the Public Administration or of private parties or administered persons that seeks to satisfy needs or interests of a general nature and whose character or significance is governed or framed by public law, insofar as oversight by public authorities is required. The traditional conception limits public service to activities performed directly or indirectly by the Administration (through concessionaires), whose creation results from a formal act—through a formal statute—or conduct by public authorities—an administrative act (acto administrativo).

More modern legal scholarship, however, uses the term ‘public service in the broad sense’ for an activity performed by private parties whose character does not derive from an express state act or an event, but from its own nature or essence, insofar as such activities, by their function, satisfy a general need or interest, as would be the case with the sale or supply of essential goods, such as basic-basket products or medicines. Although these activities are conducted under the private-law regime, they are subject to state regulations and controls—rules of subordination—such as price-setting for those items, quality control, the obligation to provide the service to anyone who requests it, and so forth. Because they involve the vital needs of the community, these activities go beyond the merely private and acquire social significance, leaving the strict sphere of private law and entering an area regulated by public law.” (Emphasis not in the original).

Furthermore, Magistrado Jinesta Lobo, writing in Ivstitia Nº 275-276 of noviembre-diciembre de 2009, clearly explained this distinction in his article entitled “Régimen constitucional y legal de las telecomunicaciones”:

“Accordingly, there is a substantial difference between regulated services and public services, since not every service subject to stringent regulation or to a public-law regime is public. Legal scholarship has therefore distinguished between public services in the strict sense and public services in the broad or virtual sense. The former are those designated as such and provided directly by public entities or indirectly through private-law entities. A virtual, broad-sense, or regulated public service, by contrast, is provided by a private-law entity under a strong and intensive public-law regime.” In view of the foregoing, to determine when a public service is in the strict or broad sense, it is necessary to specify the difference between: 1) provision of the service by the State, but indirectly through a private-law entity (for example, a concessionaire); and 2) provision of the service directly by a private-law entity (although subject to intensive and specific regulation).

In this respect, it is necessary to distinguish among the concession, permit, and authorization (autorización) that the State may grant for the provision of a public service.

a. With regard to concessions, this Court, in sentencia Nº 3451-96 at 15:33 on 9 de julio de 1996, which specifically concerned the paid transportation of persons, including taxis, ruled as follows:

“(…) b.- the concession (concesión).- Through a public-service concession (concesión de servicio público), the State meets general needs by relying on the voluntary collaboration of private parties (administrados) in the provision of public services. Under a public-service concession contract (contrato de concesión de servicio público), a person—whether an individual or legal entity—is entrusted, for a specified period, with the organization and operation of a particular public service. The concessionaire performs this task at its own risk and expense, receiving the corresponding remuneration for its work, which may consist of the price or rates paid by users, subsidies or guarantees paid by the State, or both. The concessionaire is subject to the oversight inherent in every administrative contract (contrato administrativo); that is, it remains permanently subject to State supervision because a public interest is always involved in this type of contract.

The concessionaire is bound to the Public Administration as a co-contracting party and also enters into a relationship with the users in whose interest the concession was granted. Under this type of contract, the concessionaire has a vested and recognized subjective right (derecho subjetivo); that is, it acquires a property right within the constitutional meaning of the term because the granting of a public-service concession formalizes an administrative contract in the strict sense. (…) The concessionaire must be afforded a reasonable term within which to engage in the activity concerned; thus, by definition, indefinite or short terms are excluded from concessions and are instead characteristic of permits (permisos), which, as stated, may be revoked at any time. Furthermore, it should be noted that a concession belongs to the category of administrative contracts that legal doctrine calls contracts of “collaboration,” and its duration is temporary, but it must extend for a period that reasonably allows the invested capital to be amortized and the concessionaire to earn an adequate profit.

Finally, it should be noted that, on some occasions, a concession contract may include special terms for the concessionaire related to its activity. Legal doctrine recognizes that the Administration may undertake not to grant new concessions for the same service if they could affect its provision. (…) c.- competitive bidding (licitación): the competitive-bidding procedure contemplated in Article 182 of the Constitution is of interest not only to the State but also to private parties. In general terms, it may be said that the State is interested in obtaining the greatest likelihood of successfully fulfilling its purposes, including the provision of public services at appropriate levels of quality for users and, depending on the nature of the subject matter, obtaining the best economic conditions from both the contractor’s perspective and that of the cost to users. From the perspective of private parties, the competitive-bidding procedure is characterized by the principle of publicity (principio de publicidad), which in turn guarantees open competition under conditions of absolute equality of participation.

The system seeks to prevent preferential and unfair treatment and is therefore the most desirable instrument for processing administrative contracts. Given its characteristics, competitive bidding becomes a (sic) a safeguard of the public interest (…). ” Likewise, judgment Nº 2001-11657, issued at 14:43 hours on 14 de noviembre de 2001, stated:

“(…) It differs from other mechanisms, such as public-works and public-service concessions, insofar as the latter entail an actual transfer of the provision and operation of the service; moreover, under a concession, the private party’s remuneration comes from payments received directly from the public, and responsibility always rests with the concessionaire.” (Emphasis not in the original) b. Regarding permits, the Chamber, in judgment Nº 2007-4467, issued at 17:29 hours on 28 de marzo de 2007, stated:

“This Chamber has repeatedly held in its case law that a permit grants a private party a right on a precarious basis (título precario), which may be revoked without any liability on the part of the Administration for duly established reasons of expediency or convenience. In this regard, it must be made clear that, although the Administration may annul or revoke a permit, it is not required to initiate ordinary administrative proceedings (procedimiento administrativo ordinario) for that purpose because the permit grants the permit holder no subjective right. In accordance with Article 154 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, such revocation or annulment may not be abrupt or arbitrary.” (Emphasis not in the original).

It also stated, in judgment Nº 2443-03, issued at 9:57 hours on 21 de marzo de 2003:

“III.- NATURE OF PERMITS. A permit is an act authorizing a person—a private party—to exercise a right that is, in principle, prohibited by the legal system itself. It is a special exemption from a general prohibition for the benefit of the applicant. A permit tolerates or allows something highly specific and defined to be done. Its nature consists of removing a legal obstacle to the exercise of a preexisting power; it is said to be a concession of limited scope because it grants rights that are less extensive and more precarious. The characteristics of a permit are as follows: a) it creates an individual legal status (situación jurídica individual) conditioned upon compliance with the law, and noncompliance results in the permit’s expiration (caducidad); b) it is granted intuitu personae in consideration of its grounds and the beneficiary, and its assignment or transfer is generally prohibited; c) it confers a weakened right or legitimate interest (interés legítimo), and the precarious nature of the permit holder’s right is based on the fact that the permit constitutes a tolerance by the relevant Public Administration, acting at its discretion; d) it is precarious, and therefore the Public Administration may revoke it at any time without any right to compensation or indemnification; e) its issuance depends on administrative discretion, meaning that the Public Administration may determine whether the requested permit is consistent with the general interest.” c. Regarding authorization (autorización), this Court stated in judgment Nº 1996-02981, issued at 14:33 hours on 19 de junio de 1996:

“III. ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORIZATIONS. An ‘authorization’ is an administrative act (acto administrativo) that operates as a condition of validity for a particular activity to be lawfully carried out or conduct to be lawfully undertaken. Authorization does not confer a new power or right upon the person to whom it has been granted; it merely confers the authority to exercise a preexisting power or right (as in the case under consideration, the existence of freedom of enterprise or commerce). In other words, it entails only the removal of a legal obstacle to the exercise of an existing power or right; accordingly, the effects of the authorization begin to run from the time it was issued. (…)” That is, taking the cited precedents into consideration, I believe that, in a proper public service (servicio público propio), ownership lies exclusively with the State, but the service may be operated directly by the State or delegated to a private party—for example, through a concession—while the State retains ownership of the service. A permit is another mechanism by which the State may transfer operation to a private party, except that, in this case, the private party is granted a right on a precarious basis that, in principle, may be revoked without any liability on the part of the Administration for duly established reasons of expediency or convenience.

For its part, in an improper public service (servicio público impropio), ownership lies with a private party, but because the activity serves the general interest, its provision requires authorization—that is, State permission to carry it out.

Accordingly, the fact that the activity performed serves the general interest does not inexorably mean that only the State may own it.

3. Nature of the for-hire transportation of persons in non-collective motor vehicles in Costa Rica.

As I clarified above, the for-hire transportation of persons in non-collective motor vehicles in our country originated in the private sector of the economy. Indeed, in its early stages it was subject to little State supervision and was expressly excluded from the regulation of collective transportation.

In this regard, N° 3503 de 10 de mayo de 1965 established that ownership of the public service consisting of the for-hire transportation of persons in automobiles, including the service now known as taxi service, passed to the State, but with the particular feature that, when referring to the operation of public-service automobiles, it relied on the permit mechanism.

When the Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Taxis, Nº 5406 de 26 de noviembre de 1973 entered into force, it established the State’s authority to provide the service directly or to grant a private party rights to operate it through a concession from the Ministerio de Obras y Transportes. This arrangement has remained in place to the present day under the Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, N° 7969 de 22 de diciembre de 1999.

As already noted, the fact that a service satisfies a general interest does not mean that ownership of it must ipso facto and inevitably pass to the State. I believe that, for an activity to be withdrawn from private commerce (libre comercio de los hombres) and its ownership assumed by the State as a monopoly, the constitutional principle of reasonableness and proportionality (principio constitucional de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad) must be respected in relation to the public purposes sought, such that only a compelling public interest could justify imposing a measure as burdensome and extraordinary as excluding from the free market a particular activity involving the commercial exploitation of an economic good (to which, of course, must be added the qualified vote required by Article 46 of the Constitución Política).

Therefore, the statement of reasons for a law creating a State monopoly must expressly explain why a particular business activity must be subjected to a measure as burdensome as removing it from the market and transferring it to a State monopoly. Moreover, in light of the constitutional principle of reasonableness and proportionality, it must conclusively set forth the reasons why the public interest could be satisfied only if the activity in question were monopolized by the State. Such justification may, evidently, reflect a particular historical moment, such that what might be considered justified under certain circumstances would not be justified under others.

In this regard, Laws Nos. 3503, 5406, and 7969 (prior to the amendment challenged in this action) did not expressly set forth technical or public-interest grounds sufficiently significant and well supported to justify transferring a commercial activity such as taxi service, ownership of which had historically belonged to the private sector, to the State (which could grant the right to operate it, but never ownership thereof), thereby transforming it from an ancillary public service (servicio público impropio) into a State-owned public service (servicio público propio).

In light of the foregoing, before the amendment at issue in this action, the positive-law and actual existence, for more than 45 years, of the legal transaction (negocio jurídico) known as “porteo de personas” demonstrates—regardless of any attempt to argue that this commercial arrangement responded to residual demand—the existence of an economic good in the free market, ownership of which belonged to private parties, with such ownership and its operation being subject to compliance with the applicable requirements.

With respect to this point, our Political Constitution recognizes freedom of commerce and, in particular, free competition (essential elements of the market economy), which explains why the State has been assigned, at the constitutional level, the obligation to prevent all monopolistic practices or tendencies. Likewise, it is clear that the right to property is protected by our Fundamental Law.

Now, the amendment introduced by Ley N° 8955 de 16 de junio de 2011 not only eliminates the institution of “porteo de personas” and creates the “servicio especial estable de taxi,” but also, concomitantly and expressly for the first time, provides that all transportation of persons in a motor vehicle must be regarded as a public service, ownership of which belongs to the State regardless of the degree of government intervention in determining the service’s operating system or in overseeing it.

In this regard, after examining the legislative history from the standpoint of Constitutional Law, I note that insufficient technical or economic arguments were presented to justify converting taxi service into a State-owned public service, exclusively owned by the State (the foregoing applies generally to the service of compensated transportation of persons in non-collective vehicles).

Moreover, the amendment under review allowed the State to retain ownership of the service by granting “permits” without resorting to a competitive-bidding procedure (licitación), an unusual situation because, when dealing with a public service that the law seeks to treat as “State-owned” (although economic reality shows that it is merely “ancillary”), permits should be the exception, while concessions (concesiones) should be the rule. If the “servicio especial estable de taxi” is considered public and owned by the State, as a matter of principle it should not operate under permits, which are inherently precarious. Indeed, imposing requirements for obtaining the permit in question that are comparable to those for a concession, without granting the same rights and conditions afforded by the latter, constitutes a legal invention whose sole purpose was to resolve a politically contentious situation—the repeal of “porteo de personas” from the Commercial Code—without addressing either substantive considerations or proper legal technique.

With respect to the sub judice matter, this Chamber, in Judgment No. 3451-96 at 15:33 hours on 9 de julio de 1996, specifically concerning the compensated transportation of persons, including taxis, held:

“ I.- The compensated transportation of persons, in its various forms, whether by buses, minibuses (‘busetas’), or taxis, is a public service whose provision may be entrusted by the State to private parties by entering into concession agreements with them and, only as an exception, through temporary permits to operate the service. (…)

II ).- The legislature has provided, and the Chamber has confirmed in its case law, that the operation of compensated passenger transportation shall be awarded to private parties through a competitive-bidding procedure and, consequently, in this area, permits as a means of assigning operation of the service are exceptional; accordingly, a permit yields to the award of a concession through competitive bidding, hence its characteristics of temporariness, precariousness, and exceptionality. (…) In the Chamber’s view, the challenged administrative practice has subverted the sources of law and has turned the exception—conceived by the legislature as an extreme measure for addressing particular circumstances—into the ordinary rule, thereby disregarding the constitutional order and the Chamber’s binding decisions, including Voto número 2101-91 de las 8:40 horas del 18 de octubre de l991. The position adopted by the Administration thus results in serious violations of the legal system currently in force: a.- violation of the principle of legality (principio de legalidad): the administrative practice of authorizing the operation of compensated passenger transportation primarily through permits subverts the sources of law, entailing the elevation of discretionary administrative acts over what is prescribed by the law—which is a matter of public policy—and, of course, over Article 182 of the Constitution, which this Chamber finds inadmissible; b) violation of equality: the public competitive-selection or bidding procedure for granting concessions to operate the public service of compensated passenger transportation, in turn, gives effect to one of the governing principles of public procurement, namely free participation under conditions of absolute equality, which is plainly absent in the case of a permit, particularly when the administrative act so providing lacks any objective and reasonable justification.

The time the Administration may require to prepare the competitive process does not justify disregarding, through the generalized use of permits, the fundamental values and principles of our legal system. It is true that the Comisión Técnica de Transportes has statutory and regulatory authority to grant ‘permits’ to operate the Compensated Transportation of Persons; however, this must always be viewed as an exception, something that the respondent authorities have plainly lost sight of: (…).” Accordingly, the “servicio especial estable de taxi” is nothing more than an attempt by the State to regulate an activity that should never have been regarded as a State-owned public service whose ownership could belong only to the State. This does not mean that non-collective compensated passenger transportation should be considered free from regulation; rather, the public interest it represents justifies imposing requirements on its operation, such as those concerning personal safety.

This does not preclude ownership of that activity from remaining in the private sphere, however, as has historically been the case with porteo. Indeed, the emergence of various real-world phenomena in connection with this activity (Piratas, Uber, Cabify) demonstrates the tendency of economic realities, sooner or later, to prevail over legal fictions, because the role of the law is to supervise and control such phenomena, not to indulge in the illusion of denying them.

Thus, in the case at hand, I consider that the declaration vesting ownership in the State of every form of compensated transportation of persons in motor vehicles failed to justify why that measure was preferred over others less harmful to the constitutional rights of freedom of enterprise, free competition, and property, pursuant to the constitutional principle of reasonableness and proportionality (principio constitucional de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad). I emphasize that even at the time of the legislative consultation regarding Ley N.° 8955 de 16 de junio de 2011, in Voto N° 2011-04778 de las 14:30 horas de 13 de abril de 2011, this Court stated that the bill originated in a negotiation process among representatives of the State and of the chambers and federations (representing taxi drivers and porteadores), which does not constitute sufficient justification for an action that affects society as a whole and removes from the free market an activity involving the exploitation of an economic good.

In view of the foregoing, I consider that the fact that, in our country, compensated passenger transportation is a State-owned service monopolized in favor of the State infringes the constitutional rights to free competition, freedom of enterprise, and property, as well as the constitutional principle of reasonableness and proportionality.

Because sufficient grounds exist to grant this action on account of severe and manifest violations of the constitutional order, it is unnecessary to rule on the remaining claims, as has been this Chamber’s position from the outset in numerous matters (see Judgments Nos. 2014-008481, 2011-016592, 2001-004027, 2000-010996, 1993-001633, 1990-001463, among others).

XII. Dissenting opinion (voto salvado) of Justice Hernández López.-

Introduction.

1. I respectfully dissent from the Court majority’s decision in this case and would grant the action brought because I consider that the challenged provisions establish an absolute deprivation of the fundamental right to freedom of commerce and enterprise in the activity of land transportation of persons, which—in the absence of reasons or grounds capable of justifying it—renders them a constitutionally illegitimate exercise of legislative power. I set forth below the reasons supporting my position, clarifying that I refer solely to the subject matter of these proceedings—as is appropriate—namely, porteo and its elimination from the legal system, and that no other meaning may be attributed to this opinion. In other words, this opinion does not address the legality or illegality of the transportation arrangement known as Uber, or the illegal transportation services known as “piratas,” which are not at issue in these proceedings.

Before analyzing the facts of the case, I wish to express my concern about the trend observable in countries across various regions of the world—including our own—of abandoning the prudent caution that societies and individuals had maintained regarding the proper exercise of power by the State in safeguarding fundamental freedoms. Strangely—and naively—in various parts of the world, state bodies are being granted ever greater powers over people’s activities, in the hope that they will be capable of exercising them without abusing their authority and, in the process, resolving an endless array of issues arising from life in society.

It has been of no avail that, day after day, since the historical period in which nation-states were consolidated—not to go further back in time—state officials, and States generally, have demonstrated time and again their tendency to abuse their authority to the detriment of individual rights.- This is dangerous because the dynamics of the State recognize no degrees in the exercise of its authority—or in its deviations—and such authority is exercised without any moderation on account of the subject matter, so that what is essential and important merges with what is minor and less consequential, generating State intervention that entails a loss of individual freedom.

I believe Costa Rican society would do well to reflect on its contradictory position regarding the role of the State, which, on the one hand, it disparages incessantly, yet, on the other, invokes and turns to so that it may intervene ever more deeply in matters pertaining to individual freedom and autonomy.- In this case, once again—but this time through case law—the State is essentially given a blank check to seize a segment of commerce (an essential freedom of democracy), provided only that it formally complies with a law, without respecting the essential content of the right. This is how democracies in the region began to implode, until they ceased to be democracies. This is an ominous sign, compounded by other exorbitant powers that have gradually been created—without the judicial system exercising its proper counterweight—and by still others currently moving through the legislative process, to the detriment of fundamental freedoms, which can easily be abused by temporary majorities to jeopardize the democratic system.

The facts of the case.

2. Although violations of an international treaty have also been alleged in these proceedings, I consider any discussion of that point unnecessary because there is a violation of constitutional provisions whose declaration renders further considerations irrelevant.- To decide the case, I consider it sufficient to focus on the claims alleging violations of Articles 28 and 46 of the Fundamental Charter.

3. In accordance with the foregoing delimitation, the facts framing the Chamber’s decision are not complicated:

• i)in 1964, the Commercial Code was enacted and included among its provisions (Article 323) regulations governing the private transportation of persons; ii) one year later, in 1965, Law 3503 entered into force, declaring the remunerated transportation of persons by motor vehicles over land routes to be an “exclusive power of the State” and providing that it could be rendered directly or through expressly authorized private parties; iii) in 1973, Law number 5406 was enacted, providing that the remunerated transportation of persons “in motorized taxi vehicles” is “a public service” and proceeding to regulate it. It made no mention whatsoever of private contracts for the transportation of persons; iv) in 1996, Law 7593 amended Article 1 of Law 3503 (fact ii), so that thereafter the remunerated land transportation of persons governed therein would refer exclusively to transportation provided “in collective vehicles.” This amendment likewise included no provision concerning private contracts for the transportation of persons by automobile.- v) in 1999, Law 7969 was enacted specifically to reorganize taxi service and, for that purpose, Law 5406 (fact iii.) was repealed.

It reiterated the concept that the remunerated transportation of persons “in the taxi modality” is a public service that may be provided only under a concession (concesión) or permit (permiso). On this occasion, the legislation likewise contained no provision regulating the private transportation of persons by automobile; vi) After twelve years had elapsed, in 2011, Law 8955—the law challenged here—was enacted, amending both Article 323 of the Commercial Code (fact i) to remove from it the regulation of contracts for the private carriage of persons (contrato de porteo de personas), and Law 7969 (fact v) to extend State ownership to every form of remunerated transportation provided “...by means of buses, minibuses, microbuses, taxis, automobiles, and any other type of motor vehicle, whether offered to the general public, to users, or to specified groups of users with specific needs constituting special demands” Statement of the controversy.

4. A review of the factual background makes it possible to exclude from consideration both the collective transportation of persons and the remunerated transportation of persons in the taxi modality, because the challenged law did not adversely affect them. These two activities underwent a process of nationalization (nacionalización) long ago, and the interested parties have been careful not to challenge those decisions.- In that regard, the claim of the plaintiff and the supporting intervenors (coadyuvantes activos) is very specific and may be summarized as follows: Law 8955 removed the private transportation of persons—which had survived the legislative changes and which, in practice, private parties performed as a subsidiary and marginal activity—from the sphere of freedom of enterprise and commerce. It is asserted that this action violated the qualified-majority rule (regla de mayoría calificada) for the creation of monopolies contained in Article 46 of the Political Constitution and also substantively violated that article and Article 28, which enshrine freedom of commerce and the general freedom to act.

5. In its report, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), as well as the parties interested in defending the challenged law, assert that no violation exists, relying on the reasoning set forth in this Chamber’s judgment number 2011-4778. They maintain that the law neither created nor completed any monopoly, because it merely reaffirmed the State’s preexisting ownership of the remunerated land transportation of persons; thus, because the activity belongs to the State, the concept of monopoly is inapplicable, particularly in this case, where the possibility of participation by different persons as concessionaires (concesionarios) has remained open.

6. They also dispute the alleged violation of the general freedom to act and the freedoms of commerce and enterprise established in the Political Constitution, again referring to the Chamber’s statements in judgment 2011-4778, which explains that the creation of a special taxi service and the reservation of State ownership decreed for the remainder of the remunerated land transportation of persons do not violate those freedoms, because creating a special taxi service is an exercise of the legislature’s discretion and authority over activities in which State intervention is deemed necessary through their declaration as a public service vested in the State.

Beyond legal labels.

7. We see that the claim is directed against the legislative action through which the State completed its appropriation of ownership of every activity related to the remunerated transportation of persons over land routes. The plaintiffs and supporting intervenors maintain that this act encompassed a portion of that economic activity that had been freely accessible and that private parties had validly performed until 2011, in harmony with the provisions of the Commercial Code, Articles 28 and 46 of the Political Constitution, and the needs of a segment of the population. The responses of the interested parties and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic show that, at bottom, they essentially agree with that position: they state that Law 8955 “completed” the State’s process of acquiring ownership of every form of remunerated land transportation of persons. It is asserted that this is constitutionally valid insofar as it constituted a “publicatio,” that is, a declaration of public service by the Legislative Assembly, the constitutional body authorized to make such a declaration.

1. 8It is therefore important to determine whether, as those responses appear to suggest, affixing the label “public service” or “publicatio” through a formally adopted legislative decision is sufficient to render constitutionally valid the removal of an economic activity from the scope of individuals’ freedom of commerce and enterprise; in other words, whether the formal and unequivocal declaration of an activity as a State-owned public service (the publicatio) is enough for this Constitutional Court to consider its duty to safeguard the constitutionality of the exercise of State power fulfilled.- In this respect, the majority opinion combines full acceptance of that thesis with a notable silence concerning the arguments advanced by the parties to challenge that line of reasoning. In my view, the Chamber’s position should be entirely different and should broadly and forcefully reject such arguments.

9. I have maintained in other decisions—in my dissenting opinion (voto salvado) from judgment number 2015-00146 of this Constitutional Chamber, issued at 11:02 on 7 de enero de 2015—that the concept of public service imperatively requires a profound “aggiornamento” if it is to be accepted as a constitutionally legitimate expression of State power.- The reason is that this concept originated within a constitutional framework (that of France in the second half of the 19th century) that differs in substantial respects from the framework currently prevailing in most countries within our legal sphere.

The political constitutions that emerged in post–Second World War Europe, including our own, proudly have their roots in liberal thought and its essential principles; among these are the primacy of the human being and the human being’s intrinsic dignity—the sole rationale for the existence of the State and the exercise of State power—and the existence of fundamental rights (natural rights, according to the terminology of the era) inherent in the human condition of their holders, which impose a limit on the exercise of sovereignty and State power. Nothing could be further removed from the authoritarian imprint that shaped the development of the French Legislative State during the 19th century, whose dynamics and mode of thought are reflected in the concept of public service by granting the law—as the supreme expression of the national representative body—a preeminence before which individual rights were required to yield.- 10.

It is therefore wholly improper, within a constitutional framework such as Costa Rica’s, to make uncritical and servile use of the notion of public service (servicio público) to legitimize legislative action without genuine scrutiny, solely on the basis that it is sufficient for the State to have fulfilled the requirement of a “formal and legal declaration” of an activity as a public service. This is improper not only from a historical and legal perspective, but also from the standpoint of the role assigned to this Chamber within the allocation of functions designed by the constituent authority, which specifically imposes upon it the duty to disregard labels and judge legislative acts against constitutional standards—not out of a desire to throw a wrench into the machinery of State activity, but to ensure that those State mechanisms are properly balanced against the respect that the State is required to afford individuals’ fundamental rights and dignity.

Nor does the parties’ discussion of the new conceptions of public service and its dynamic nature—which now allows the State greater freedom of action within a more flexible administrative-law framework—make any substantial contribution toward that end. Perhaps this may bear fruit in the field of administrative law, but when the issue concerns Constitutional Law and the required balance between authority and freedom, such embellishments become irrelevant to the Constitutional Chamber’s performance of its duty.

11. This same idea has been expressed very clearly throughout the entire existence of this Court. For example, judgment number 1992-3495 clearly established the position being advanced here:

“IV—The Law of the Constitution (Derecho de la Constitución), comprising both constitutional rules and principles and those of International Law—particularly those embodied in its human-rights instruments—as the primary foundations of the entire body of positive law, transmits to it its own logical structure and axiological meaning, based on values that even predate the enacted texts themselves. Those values are, in turn, the source of every normative system belonging to a society organized under the concepts of the Rule of Law, constitutional government, democracy, and freedom. Accordingly, any rule or act that violates those values or principles—including rationality, reasonableness, and proportionality, which are, by definition, criteria of constitutionality—or that leads to absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations, or to dead ends for private individuals or the State, cannot be constitutionally valid. With respect to such general values and principles, the Chamber stated in judgment N 1739-92 at 11:45 hours on 1 de julio de 1992—concerning the general standards of due process (debido proceso) in criminal matters—that:

‘As a requirement for their own constitutional validity, public rules and acts, and even private ones, ... must conform not only to the Constitution’s specific rules or provisions, but also to the sense of justice contained therein. This, in turn, entails compliance with fundamental requirements of equity, proportionality, and reasonableness, understood as fitness to achieve the proposed purposes, the underlying principles, and the values presupposed by the Law of the Constitution. It follows that laws and, in general, rules and acts of authority require, for their validity, not only that they have been enacted by competent bodies through proper procedures, but also that they undergo substantive review for consistency with the supreme rules, principles, and values of the Constitution—both formal and substantive—such as order, peace, security, justice, freedom, etc., which serve as standards of reasonableness.

In other words, a public or private rule or act is valid only when, in addition to formally conforming to the Constitution, it is reasonably grounded and justified in accordance with constitutional ideology. This seeks to ensure not only that the law is not irrational, arbitrary, or capricious, but also that the means selected bear a real and substantial relationship to its purpose. A distinction is therefore drawn among technical reasonableness, which, as stated, is proportionality between means and ends; legal reasonableness, or conformity with the Constitution generally and, in particular, with the rights and freedoms recognized or presupposed by it; and, finally, the reasonableness of the effects on personal rights, meaning that such rights must not be subjected to limitations or burdens other than those reasonably arising from the nature and legal regime of the rights themselves, or greater than those indispensable for their reasonable functioning in the life of society.’” This position was also clearly reinforced in judgment number 2003-5090 at 14:44 hours on 11 de junio de 2003:

“In exercising its substantively legislative function of issuing general and abstract rules—that is, laws in both the formal and substantive senses (artículo 121, inciso 1°, de la Constitución Política)—the Legislative Assembly enjoys broad freedom of legislative configuration (libertad de conformación) to implement the constitutional program established by the Constituent Power. This extensive latitude regarding the subject matter regulated has also been called legislative discretion (discrecionalidad legislativa), understood as that body’s ability, when faced with a particular need of society, to choose the normative solution or rule of law it considers fairest, most appropriate, and best suited to satisfy that need, all from among the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electorate through the system of legislative representation (…) Freedom of legislative configuration is not unlimited, since its limit is the Law of the Constitution—that is, the body of constitutional law (bloque de constitucionalidad) comprising constitutional provisions and customs, constitutional values and principles—including, most notably, proportionality, the prohibition of arbitrariness, nondiscrimination, due process, and the right of defense—and the case law issued by this Court in similar cases.” 12.

Accordingly, legal practitioners—and especially those of us who serve on bodies charged with protecting individuals’ fundamental rights—must not lose sight of the fact that our mission requires a careful reading of legal concepts, far beyond mere labels, to ensure that they adhere to the body of values promoted by our Fundamental Charter. Any neglect in this regard, by omitting consideration of well-founded challenges to the exercise of State authority, will surely end up creating opportunities for the authoritarian exercise of power. Latin America offers clear examples of the abuse of State authority to nationalize services traditionally reserved for commerce, to the detriment of essential freedoms, which ultimately, among other factors, brought an end to democracies that had appeared stable. (E.g., Venezuela, whose government declared services that are private by nature to be “strategic,” as a pretext for suppressing freedom of trade and converting private enterprises into “socialist enterprises.”) Following the clear approach set forth in opinion C-376-2003 of the Procuraduría General de la República, signed by the then Procurador Castillo Víquez, we must bear in mind that when the State assumes ownership of an economic activity, the sphere of freedom recognized in favor of the individual by the Law of the Constitution is reduced.

As a general rule, this occurs when an activity is declared a public service by the Legislature and, consequently, may be provided only by the State directly or by private parties through indirect public-service delivery mechanisms. In such cases, as correctly noted in the cited opinion, the State’s presence in the economy expands and individuals’ sphere of freedom contracts. That is why an act of this nature is subject to the statutory-reservation principle (reserva de ley); in addition, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality must be respected (and such an act is and must be exceptional). The opinion later applies the most widely accepted doctrine and states that, whenever doubt exists, freedom must prevail under the pro libertate principle, developed in judgment 3173-93, which stated, insofar as relevant:

“…the pro libertate principle, which, together with the pro homine principle, constitutes the core of human-rights doctrine; under the former, everything that favors freedom must be interpreted broadly and everything that limits it restrictively; under the latter, the law must always be interpreted and applied in the manner most favorable to the human being.” Along the same lines, the Inter-American Court, in its advisory opinion OC-5-85, states that although fundamental freedoms may be subject to certain restrictions, those restrictions must be “necessary, but no more than necessary, for the continued existence of democratic and constitutional values,” and it states that for a restriction to be “necessary,” it is not sufficient for it to be “useful,” “reasonable,” or “appropriate”; rather, there must be a “compelling social need” supporting the restriction.

The plain truth is that, in this case, as will be seen, it has not been clearly established where the compelling social need to eliminate private carriage (porteo) lies. The legislature does not validly explain why it accords the same legal treatment to activities of differing natures, such as private carriage and the for-hire transportation of passengers by taxi. As is well known, a private-carriage contract (contrato de porteo) is very limited because it was conceived as a service of a residual nature, which, moreover, may be performed only on a discretionary basis. It is not an activity directed toward the general public, regardless of whether it is advertised. It is a typically private activity of a personal nature. Unlike a public service, the legal transaction (negocio jurídico) is not the result of chance or of actions directed toward the community; rather, it is the product of a discreet relationship arranged in advance between the carrier and the traveler. Ordinarily, the service is provided “door to door,” which makes it impossible to enter into contracts on public roads (cruising for passengers (ruleteo)). As may be observed, this is a contract with very special characteristics, distinct from a public-service activity” (Opinion C-376-2003) Freedom of trade and enterprise in our Fundamental Charter.

13. The presence in our Political Constitution of a liberal foundation that favors the individual and the effective exercise of the broadest possible freedom in every sphere of life—economic, social, religious, intellectual, and, of course, in the most private sphere—was noted above. Such aspirations are clearly embodied in our fundamental legal norm and must therefore be upheld and protected by the constitutional judiciary, as the interpreter of that normative instrument, above political vicissitudes and attacks by forces and interest groups of the most varied kinds. In economic matters and for purposes of this case, that liberal movement embraced by our constituent assembly adopts the market economy as the basis of the economic constitution (constitución económica). That concept would later be supplemented by the necessary adjustments, culminating in the so-called social market economy (economía social de mercado), openly applied and defended as the best existing model for democracies to organize a society’s various economic resources.—Such is the backdrop against which the actions of state authorities must be assessed, seeking to maintain the course established by the constituent assembly in that regard while simultaneously placing upon those who wield power the obligation to provide sufficient justification for measures that depart from that model.

14. This Court has likewise held as much, as may readily be concluded from the following highly illustrative text:

“VIII.—ALLEGED IMPROPER APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 208 BIS OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY TO A BILL PROVIDING FOR THE OPENING OF A MONOPOLY. (…)1)(…) Under the logic of that provision...[referring to Article 46 of the Political Constitution]...a monopoly is an exceptional market or economic situation, since paragraph 1 establishes as a general rule the prohibition of private monopolies, while paragraph 2 emphasizes that ‘State action aimed at preventing any monopolistic practice or tendency is in the public interest,’ which means, a contrario sensu, that public authorities are constitutionally required to promote competition within the framework of a market economy. Paragraph 4 provides that ‘The establishment of new monopolies in favor of the State or Municipalities shall require the approval of two thirds of the entire membership of the Legislative Assembly,’ thereby emphasizing the rule contained in the ‘economic constitution’—that is, the set of values, principles, and provisions governing the economy and the market in the fundamental text—of freedom of enterprise (libertad de empresa) and free competition (libre competencia), and, consequently, the qualified exception represented by a monopoly—even a public one—given that an enhanced-majority statute (ley reforzada) and, consequently, substantial consensus among the political forces represented in the Legislative Assembly are required to establish a public legal monopoly (monopolio público de derecho).

(...) It should be noted that the original constituent assembly did not provide that the elimination of a legal monopoly (monopolio de derecho), or of a de facto monopoly (monopolio de hecho) subject to a subsequent statute, must be effected through an enhanced-majority statute, since freedom of enterprise and free competition are the normal and ordinary conditions under the economic constitution. (…) The requirement of an enhanced-majority statute to establish a legal monopoly is imposed because that mechanism limits or restricts freedom of enterprise, which is the normal or ordinary rule under Constitutional Law (Derecho de la Constitución). In this regard, it must be emphasized that the intrinsic and extrinsic limits of fundamental rights are matters reserved to statute (reserva de ley). (...) Not even application of the public-law principle of parallelism of forms (principio del paralelismo de las formas) can justify a heightened requirement for returning to the normal and ordinary conditions of a market economy—freedom of enterprise and free competition—mandated by the economic constitution.

(…)” (Judgment number 2008-004569, issued at 14:30 hrs. on 26 de marzo de 2008) 15- More specifically, regarding freedom of commerce (libertad de comercio) and freedom of enterprise, careful consideration must be given to the lines of precedent established by the Chamber in the aforementioned judgment number 1992-3495, from which it is important to review the following excerpts:

“VI- Implicit in those values and principles of freedom, its economic dimension occupies a paramount place. In this area, the Constitution is particularly precise in establishing a system composed of rules that safeguard the relationships existing between persons and the different classes of property; that is, their relationship with the world of ‘having,’ through provisions such as those contained in or implied by Articles 45 and 46. Although these provisions must yield to needs that are ordinarily more compelling for human existence itself—such as life or personal liberty and integrity—they do not thereby create second-class rights, but rights as fundamental as the former and of equal rank—not without reason have the United Nations General Assembly and all international bodies and courts dealing with human rights invariably characterized them as ‘indivisible’ and ‘interdependent.’ Thus, the Constitution establishes an economic order of freedom that is expressed primarily through the rights of private property (Article 45) and freedom of commerce, agriculture, and industry (Article 46)—which, in turn, presuppose freedom of contract (libre contratación).

The latter explicitly prohibits not only restrictions on that freedom but also threats to it, even when arising from a statute; these rights are supplemented by others, such as freedom of labor and the other rights that complete the general framework of economic freedom (libertad económica).

(…)

VIII- Moreover, the Constitution recognizes another series of ‘instrumental rights’ or ‘guarantees,’ which are instead means of protecting ‘rights of enjoyment’ or rights whose content is immediately useful to human life and which, in summary, may be encompassed within the concept of ‘due process’ (debido proceso). This concept refers not only to the protection of personal liberty and integrity or to procedural safeguards in judicial and administrative proceedings, but also entails, for all the categories mentioned—property owner, consumer, entrepreneur, worker, taxpayer, etc.—protection of the framework of rationality, reasonableness, and proportionality referred to above. That framework, in turn, encompasses the substantive content of the rights and freedoms that the legal system may neither impair nor alter, nor permit to be impaired or altered, even by statute and still less by lower-ranking rules or acts. In any event, the elimination, reduction, or substitution of legal positions favorable to an individual may and must occur solely through a judicial ruling—juris-dictio—issued by a court and with the necessary guarantees of due process.” (…)

XIII- Based on the constitutional recognition of the principle and system of freedom in general (Article 28), the right to private property (Article 45), and freedom of enterprise (Article 46), freedom of contract is established as a constitutional principle and a conditio sine qua non for the exercise of both rights. The Chamber summarizes its essential content in four elements, namely:

• a)Freedom to choose the contracting party; b) Freedom to choose the subject matter of the contract itself and, consequently, the principal performance (prestación principal) through which it is given effect; c) Freedom to determine the price, content, or economic value of the contract stipulated as consideration (contraprestación); d) Balance between the positions of both parties and between their mutual performances; a balance that, in turn, requires respect for the fundamental principles of equality, reasonableness, and proportionality, pursuant to which the parties’ positions and the content and scope of their reciprocal obligations must be reasonably equivalent to one another and, moreover, proportionate to the nature, subject matter, and purposes of the contract.

(…)

Those contractual freedoms may be restricted only in the circumstances contemplated by Article 28 of the Constitution; that is, insofar as their exercise harms social morality, public order, strictly construed, or the equal or superior rights of third parties. It follows that both the meeting of the minds (acuerdo de voluntades) inherent in the contractual relationship and the determination of the thing, subject matter, and price covered by that agreement may and must be freely stipulated by the parties, provided that they do not exceed those limits. Here it is essential to clarify that specifying a particular currency in a contract ordinarily cannot be harmful to social morality or public order because, although the fiscal and trade deficits pose a public problem—which would indeed empower the legislature to impose provisions aimed at the country’s macroeconomic stability—the issue of price and the determination of the method of payment for a private obligation is not in itself public, but private inter partes, at least ordinarily.

Without denying the significance that all of this might ultimately have for the overall course of the economy, or the possibility that, in exceptional cases, freedom to contract in foreign currency might prove objectively harmful to the country’s general economic situation, this could never empower the legislature to violate the essential content of fundamental rights—insofar as relevant here, the rights to freedom in general, private property, freedom of enterprise, and freedom of contract.” 16 - And in judgment No. 2008-001571, from 2008, it was explained:

“The essential content of the freedom [of commerce] under consideration includes, at a minimum, the following: a) The right of its holders to undertake, choose, and pursue the economic activity they desire; b) the power to organize the business and plan its activities in the manner most advantageous to their interests; c) the right to free competition; and d) the right to earn a reasonable profit from the activity undertaken. Nevertheless, pursuant to Article 28 of the Constitution, that guarantee may be limited and regulated by the State, provided that the aforementioned essential content is respected; that is, provided that no limits are imposed that hinder the activity beyond what is reasonable, render it impracticable, or make it wholly unprofitable. By virtue of the foregoing, freedom of commerce is neither absolute nor unlimited and therefore, as stated, must be subject to the statutory and regulatory provisions authorized by statute that must necessarily be complied with in advance. Accordingly, freedom of enterprise therefore means that the activity—whether agricultural, commercial, industrial, etc.—must be conducted in accordance with reasonable regulations issued by the Administration for the purpose of protecting other economic actors, consumers, and third parties.”

1. 17In conclusion, freedom of commerce and enterprise form part of the body of fundamental rights enjoyed by Costa Ricans in economic matters and, as stated in the cited judgment, must not be regarded as second-class rights merely because, under certain circumstances, they must yield to ensure the effective exercise and protection of other rights of equal rank. The legislature does not hold a privileged position over those rights that would allow it to restrict them—and still less to abolish them with respect to an activity—without appropriate justification in accordance with Article 28 of the Constitution and without observing the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.

Unreasonableness and disproportionality of the legislative measure under review.

18. In this case, the Court is specifically asked to determine whether the legislative act contained in Ley 8955, through which the activity consisting of compensated ground transportation of persons autonomously agreed upon between private-law parties—private carriage (porteo)—was removed from the realm of private activity, satisfies the requirements of reasonableness and proportionality that this Chamber has recognized since its earliest years.

19. In the dissenting opinion to the judgment of this Chamber 2015-00146, issued at 11:02 on siete de enero de 2015, a useful summary of this issue was provided precisely for the purpose of analyzing another legislative excess contained in the law governing compensated ground transportation of persons by taxi. On that occasion, we stated the following:

“This Chamber has held that fundamental rights (such as the rights to equality and freedom of commerce in this case) may be limited by the legislature, but only in observance of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, and that this Chamber has jurisdiction to monitor compliance with those principles in the exercise of legislative power. That is, in carrying out its restrictive function, the legislature is not only subject to the obligation to act exclusively in adherence to and pursuant to the authorizations contained in the various articles of the Political Constitution (construed narrowly), but those restrictive actions must also demonstrate their reasonableness and proportionality in relation to the fulfillment of the constitutional objectives and purposes sought through the restrictive activity. This was clearly established in judgment 2001-0732, which confirmed the validity of the criteria of reasonableness and proportionality of legal provisions as parameters for analyzing the validity of imposing limits on fundamental rights.

“V.- THE PRINCIPLE OF REASONABLENESS AS A CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETER. Constitutional case law has been clear and consistent in holding that the principle of reasonableness constitutes a parameter of constitutionality. It should first be recalled that the ‘reasonableness of the law’ arose as part of ‘substantive due process’ (substantive due process of law), a guarantee created by the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States of America in connection with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In its initial conception, ‘due process’ was directed toward the procedural review of legislative acts and their effect on substantive rights. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, that original procedural conception had been superseded, and due process was elevated into an axiological mechanism limiting the actions of the legislative body. From that point onward, due process may be understood as a general guarantee of liberty, that is, as a substantive guarantee.

The evolution of ‘due process’ beyond a procedural guarantee is due primarily to the fact that even a law that has complied with the established procedure and is valid and effective may violate the Law of the Constitution (Derecho de la Constitución). To conduct the reasonableness inquiry, United States legal doctrine calls first for an examination of what is known as ‘technical reasonableness,’ within which the specific provision (law, regulation, etc.) is examined. Once it has been established that the provision is suitable for regulating a given subject, it must then be determined whether the means chosen are proportional to the end sought. After the ‘technical reasonableness’ criterion has been satisfied, ‘legal reasonableness’ must be analyzed. For this purpose, that doctrine proposes examining: a) balancing reasonableness, a type of legal assessment undertaken when, given the existence of a particular antecedent circumstance (e.g., income), a particular obligation (e.g., a tax) is required, in which case it must be determined whether the obligation is equivalent or proportionate; b) equality-based reasonableness, a type of legal assessment based on the principle that equal antecedent circumstances must produce equal consequences, without arbitrary exceptions; and c) reasonableness of purpose, which assesses whether the objective to be achieved offends the purposes contemplated by the legislature in approving the measure.

Within this same analysis, it is not enough to assert that a means is reasonably suited to an end; it is also necessary to verify the nature and extent of the limitation that a personal right must bear as a result of that means. Thus, if the same end can be achieved through another means that imposes a less burdensome limitation on personal rights, the chosen means is not reasonable. It was in judgment number 01739-92, issued at once hours forty-five minutes on primero de julio de mil novecientos noventa y dos, that an attempt was first made to define this principle, as follows:

“Reasonableness as a parameter of constitutional interpretation. Yet the North American jurisprudential tradition went one step further by extending the concept of due process to what that tradition calls substantive due process of law, which, although it does not actually refer to any procedural matter, constituted an ingenious mechanism devised by the Supreme Court of the United States to assert its jurisdiction over the federated States under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In our system, however, particularly in the absence of that need, it would simply be equivalent to the principle of reasonableness of laws and other public, or even private, rules or acts as a requirement for their own constitutional validity, in the sense that they must conform not only to the Constitution’s specific rules or provisions, but also to the sense of justice embodied therein. This, in turn, entails compliance with the fundamental requirements of equity, proportionality, and reasonableness, understood as suitability for achieving the proposed ends, the underlying principles, and the values presupposed by the Law of the Constitution.

Accordingly, for laws and, in general, rules and acts of authority to be valid, they must not only have been enacted by competent bodies through proper procedures but must also pass substantive review for consistency with the supreme rules, principles, and values of the Constitution, both formal and substantive, such as order, peace, security, justice, liberty, and others, which serve as standards of reasonableness. In other words, a public or private rule or act is valid only when, in addition to formally conforming to the Constitution, it is reasonably grounded and justified in accordance with constitutional ideology. This seeks to ensure not only that the law is not irrational, arbitrary, or capricious, but also that the selected means bear a real and substantial relationship to their purpose. A distinction is therefore drawn between technical reasonableness, which, as stated, is the proportionality between means and ends; legal reasonableness, meaning conformity with the Constitution in general and, in particular, with the rights and freedoms recognized or presupposed by it; and, finally, the reasonableness of the effects on personal rights, in the sense that such rights must not be subjected to limitations or burdens other than those reasonably arising from the nature and legal regime of the rights themselves, nor to limitations or burdens greater than those indispensable for their reasonable functioning in social life.” German legal doctrine made an important contribution to the subject of ‘reasonableness’ by identifying its components very clearly: legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense. It develops these concepts by stating that they have already been recognized by constitutional case law:

“... Legitimacy means that the objective sought by the challenged act or provision must not, at a minimum, be legally prohibited; suitability means that the challenged state measure must be capable of effectively achieving the intended objective; necessity means that, among several measures equally capable of achieving that objective, the competent authority must choose the one that affects the person’s legal sphere as little as possible; and proportionality in the strict sense requires that, in addition to the rule being suitable and necessary, what it mandates must not be disproportionate to the intended objective—that is, it must not impose an ‘unreasonable demand’ on the individual ... (Judgment of this Chamber number 03933-98, issued at nine hours fifty-nine minutes on doce de junio de mil novecientos noventa y ocho).” 20. In the aforementioned dissenting opinion, I also expressed my dissatisfaction with the majority of the Court’s decision to refrain from applying the reasonableness and proportionality test to analyze the provision challenged at that time, even though the parties had expressly requested it.

We now encounter the same approach to the same issue, namely, the outright nullification of the essential content of fundamental rights such as equality, freedom of commerce, and freedom of contract in the compensated ground transportation of persons, as though the Law of the Constitution did not govern that activity.

21. This time, as explained, the measure under scrutiny is the complete removal of an aspect of the activity of ground transportation of persons—private carriage of persons—that had not been subject to state control, namely, a service provided pursuant to an individualized and specific agreement between the interested private parties concerning the service and its price for point-to-point transportation. On this specific issue, I cannot conceive of a measure more harmful to freedom of commerce and to the freedom that persons must generally enjoy than the option chosen by the State in this law to regulate that activity. From the perspective of constitutional procedure, this facilitates application of the proportionality and reasonableness test because it allows the analysis to focus on what is known as the proportionality of the measure and also largely eliminates the risk of replacing the legislature’s decision with some other regulatory measure more to the judge’s liking. In this case, I repeat, none of that occurs, and therefore it remains only to determine whether the State has provided reasons justifying the magnitude of such a deprivation.

22. The petitioning parties insist that the state takeover (estatalización) of this residual portion of the activity of compensated land transportation of persons by automobile could have been regulated in a less restrictive manner and in keeping with current trends in the concept of public service (servicio público), which favor regulation rather than nationalization (nacionalización). In this regard, they mention health and education as highly significant examples, whose paramount importance no one disputes and which, nevertheless, have found appropriate mechanisms that are more respectful of fundamental rights, such as regulation, as opposed to nationalization. In response, the State, through the Procuraduría General de la República and the Ministerio de Transportes, as well as the supporting respondents (coadyuvantes pasivos), offer general reasons and indeterminate concepts lacking any support to justify the decision. Reference is made to the existence of “a clear public interest inherent” in the activity or to a “State decision given the significance of the activity...,” but no concrete demonstrations or plausible arguments are provided beyond those assertions.

23. In fact, the principal basis for defending the provision rests on the considerations set forth by the Chamber when it heard a legislative consultation (consulta legislativa) concerning the bill that became the law now being challenged (judgment number 2011-04778 of 14:30 on 13 de abril de 2011), in which this issue was discussed and it was held that the nationalization of every form of compensated land transportation of persons did not infringe freedom of commerce (libertad de comercio).- However, a reading of that judgment shows that the Chamber omitted any consideration of the reasonableness and proportionality of that nationalization and, furthermore, resolved the issue of infringement of freedom of commerce through reasoning that was simply erroneous:

“...Through this reform, the legislature seeks, once and for all, to remove from the private sphere the provision of the transportation service for persons, which in its entirety has been declared a public service by the legislature, thereby changing the applicable rules of the game and legal principles: Private parties become collaborators of the Public Administration in providing that service, which, because of its characteristics and the evident existence of a public interest, must in principle be undertaken by the State, without the involvement of the principles and rights governing private relationships, such as the principle of freedom of contract (autonomía de la voluntad) or freedom of commerce. Consequently, the Court finds that the bill under consultation does not infringe Articles 28, 45, 46 and 56 of the Political Constitution.” (cited judgment number 2011-4778) (emphasis not in the original) The fundamental error in this reasoning can be clearly seen where it states that freedom of contract and freedom of commerce “govern private relationships,” as though they could not validly be asserted against the will of the State if the State takes an activity for itself.- This not only repudiates the emphatic line of authority to the contrary maintained by this Court, but also diminishes the concept of fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Political Constitution precisely as a limitation on State power, as explained above.- 24.

Accordingly, nothing in this case file (expediente) warrants being characterized as a sufficient argument to justify and render acceptable the radical decision to deprive persons of their freedom of enterprise and commerce in the field of compensated transportation of persons under the carriage-of-persons arrangement (porteo de personas).- Nothing supports the purported “essential nature for maintaining the rule of law” discussed in judgment 2011-4778 or the “significant public interest inherent” cited by the Procuraduría and the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes.- There is no allegation, much less proof, of the need to protect constitutional principles or values, such as the implementation of the principle of solidarity, rules for a more equitable distribution of wealth, among others.

One might even—with the Chamber abandoning its role as an impartial judge—seek support in the protection of vulnerable populations, the implementation of principles of solidarity, rules for a more equitable distribution of wealth, among others, but none of this has been alleged and, in fact, it is plainly contrived.- 25. Moreover, certain excerpts from the explanatory statement (exposición de motivos) to the bill reveal reasons that underscore the insufficiency of valid grounds. The legislative record states:

“...for several weeks during this year, an arduous negotiation process took place in which the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes and its authorities, together with the Cámara Nacional de Transporte de Autobús, the Federación Nacional de Taxis and the Cámara de Porteadores as the sector’s representative, remained in continuous discussions, seeking a consensus-based formulation to resolve the situation of the male and female carriage operators.” (...)

“This initiative very categorically seeks to establish, within the regulatory framework of the Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi, N.º 7969, a service that is now a reality and is incorrectly protected because it is covered only by the word ‘persons’ in the Commercial Code, in order to create legislation that guarantees better conditions and lower costs for users, seeking the benefit and well-being of the great majority...” (...)

“This is not a concession (concesión) because it does not arise from a public bidding process (licitación pública); rather, it arises from a permit (permiso) and is fundamentally based on the existence of a specific and particular need.” “The foregoing is because, when the word ‘persons’ is removed, there are individuals who are in fact carrying out that activity lawfully under Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and therefore, pursuant to the aforementioned Article 34 of our Constitution, the vested rights (derechos adquiridos) of these persons must be respected.” “Three transitional provisions (transitorios) are also included so that the Ministerio de Obras y Transportes, through the Consejo de Transporte Público, which is the instrument created by the legislature to regulate this subject matter, assumes responsibility for overseeing the carriage-of-persons service in both automobile and minibus form.” “It is important to bear in mind that this is a transitional situation for every interested person who succeeds in demonstrating and satisfying the requirements before the Consejo de Transporte Público and can obtain accreditation during the subsequent two-month period, because those who fail to meet those requirements will not be permitted to operate, as they would be acting unlawfully, since they would no longer be operating under the framework of carriage or transportation.” “The initiative likewise seeks to provide a regulatory framework ensuring safety for all users, so as to oversee the liability of the companies or persons providing this service, who today are protected only under the Commercial Code through the Defensoría del Consumidor.

Those who violate the newly established regulations will be subject to due process (debido proceso) and could lose the permit or code authorizing them to perform that activity, just as occurs with the formal taxi service.”

1. 26It is clear that the full and complete exclusion of the exercise of a fundamental freedom such as freedom of commerce and enterprise was decided for the purpose of regularizing the particular situation of an easily identifiable group of persons who had been engaged in carriage activity—an occupation that the decision paradoxically seeks to eliminate in order to provide “better conditions and lower costs for users, seeking the benefit and well-being of the great majority”—and to resolve the problems arising from the State’s inefficiency and lack of capacity to organize, supervise and, above all, protect the proper provision of the public taxi service. The State plainly acknowledges its inability to monitor the unlawful public taxi transportation service and instead decides to seize a fundamental freedom of commerce and contracting. From my perspective, these objectives are neither valid nor capable of satisfying the constitutional reasonableness test (test de razonabilidad constitucional).

27. With matters thus presented, it is indefensible that the complications involved in contracting for automobile transportation services directly agreed upon between adults who are legally competent to safeguard their interests and defend their rights should impose State intervention in a form displaying the greatest possible disregard for freedom in general and freedom of commerce in particular.

Conclusions.

28. The factual record demonstrates that the legislature did alter the legal system through the enactment of Ley 8955, because it not only proclaimed its ownership of every form of compensated land transportation of persons, but also removed the carriage of persons from the list of contracts regulated by the Commercial Code.

Because of its radical nature, that action necessarily imposes upon the State a broad and persuasive duty of justification in response to claims brought, as in this case, by persons who consider their fundamental rights to freedom—and particularly their freedom of commerce and enterprise—to have been infringed, because, as explained supra, it is not enough for the State to decide to declare a commercial activity to be of “public interest” for that decision to be valid from a constitutional perspective. Such an argument could be used to strip the economic rights contained in our Political Constitution of their entire substance, for example, by taking over services traditionally provided through competition, such as education or health.- From my perspective, those interested in defending the provision have been unwilling or unable to provide concrete and constitutionally acceptable reasons to support a measure as radical as the nationalization of this activity, which—at the risk of repetition—largely involves persons fully exercising their capacities and freedoms while negotiating services and prices for an activity as ubiquitous in our society as transporting persons from one place to another. For all the foregoing reasons, I find that the action should be granted and the challenged provision annulled, together with its consequences.

XIII.Dissenting opinion (voto salvado) of Justice Salazar Alvarado: With due respect, I dissent from the opinion of the majority of the full bench of this Constitutional Court, which dismissed the constitutional challenge (demanda de constitucionalidad), which I would grant in the minority, for the reasons I set forth below.

As the first point in setting out my position, it is necessary to emphasize the recognition of the Political Constitution as a legal norm endowed with binding force, which entails its supremacy within the formal framework, placing it at the apex of the legal system as the supreme source of the sources of law, with the power to organize the State and define the political system, while providing a series of guarantees for all persons. Thus, the Fundamental Charter, which has been in force since 1949, contains a series of rules, values, and principles that operate as limitations on the exercise of power and thereby seek to guarantee individual freedom; as I will explain below, I consider that freedom to have been violated by the provisions challenged in this constitutional challenge proceeding (proceso de inconstitucionalidad).

Within this framework, this Constitutional Court must analyze the validity of a legal provision; that is, it must determine whether the content of Law N° 8955 of 26 September 2011, “Amendment to the Commercial Code—Law N° 3284 of 30 April 1964—and to the Law Regulating the Public Service of Paid Passenger Transportation in Taxi-Mode Vehicles—Law N° 7969 of 22 December 1999—,” is consistent with our Political Constitution, which is the foundational norm of the Costa Rican legal system and from which all the rules comprising that system derive their validity.

Having said this, our country’s Political Constitution, through Articles 1, 9, 11, 28, 50, and 74, defines the system of government as a Social and Democratic State under the Rule of Law (Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho). As this Chamber has held—e.g., Judgment N° 13323-06, issued at 17:26 on 6 September 2006—this entails reciprocal relationships among various public bodies of constitutional and statutory rank, including members of civil society, and imposes upon the State the obligation to ensure that persons are able to conduct their lives in the manner most favorable to their dignity and freedom and to the respect for and effective exercise of their fundamental rights.

This renders enforceable a series of values and principles, most notably the principle of legality (principio de legalidad), the principle of reasonableness and proportionality (principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad), and the principle of respect for fundamental freedoms and rights (principio de respeto de las libertades y derechos fundamentales), all under conditions of equality. In this specific case, and from the perspective of this Constitutional Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Constitucional), I consider that the full effectiveness of those principles must be analyzed from two perspectives: first, with regard to consumer interests or the freedom of persons as consumers of transportation services; and second, with regard to freedom of trade (libertad de comercio).

The principle of respect for freedom (principio de respeto de la libertad), as may be understood from the content of Article 28 of the Political Constitution, establishes that every person possesses an individual sphere within which that person may, through the exercise of free will, choose among life options and make the decisions most conducive to their comprehensive development. Although this entails the obligation not to act contrary to the legal system, moral standards, or accepted standards of conduct, the law must not intrude upon the inviolable sphere of freedom.

Through the separation of powers and judicial review (control jurisdiccional) thereof, the State under the Rule of Law ensures the full force of the principle of legality by subjecting the Administration to the law. The prohibition against arbitrariness (interdicción de la arbitrariedad) provides persons with a framework of legal certainty, thereby guaranteeing their personal freedom. Fundamental freedoms are thus among the strongest foundations of the Social and Democratic State under the Rule of Law. In the matter under review, I consider that the provisions of Law N° 8955, “Amendment to the Commercial Code—Law N° 3284—and to the Law Regulating the Public Service of Paid Passenger Transportation in Taxi-Mode Vehicles—Law N° 7969—,” directly conflict with the aforementioned prerogative because they directly affect the freedom of persons, as consumers and users of transportation services, to choose and contract for the type of service most convenient to them, constituting a gross intrusion into each individual’s particular circumstances.

Demand for goods and services—in this case, transportation services—is intended to satisfy each person’s interests. Accordingly, before giving consent to acquire them, individuals should have the information necessary to provide that consent in complete freedom—e.g., Judgment N° 4463-96, issued at 9:45 on 30 August 1996—and in accordance with their needs, for which the availability of multiple operators is highly valuable.

Likewise, this Chamber has held—see, to that effect, among others, Judgments N° 0490-94, issued at 16:15 on 25 January 1994; N° 6116-96, issued at 15:21 on 12 November 1996; and N° 6497-96, issued at 11:42 on 2 December 1996—that the information considered when selecting a service offer must harmoniously incorporate several constitutional principles: the State’s concern for the broadest sectors of the population when individuals act as consumers; the reaffirmation of individual freedom by facilitating private persons’ free disposal of their assets with the fullest possible knowledge of the goods or services to be acquired; the organization and systematization of reciprocal relationships among the interested parties; the harmonization of international commercial practices with the domestic system; and greater protection of persons with respect to their means of subsistence.

The exact wording of the aforementioned Judgment N° 6497-96, which reiterates the Court’s position set forth in the other judgments also cited and which remains applicable today, states:

“...it is evident that the consumer is situated at the end of the chain formed by the production, distribution, and marketing of the consumer goods that the consumer needs to acquire for personal satisfaction, and the consumer’s participation in that process is not based on technical or professional considerations but on the continual execution of contracts in a personal capacity. Consequently, the relationship within that commercial sequence is one of inferiority and requires special protection vis-à-vis suppliers of goods and services, so that, before expressing contractual consent, the consumer has all the information necessary to express it in complete freedom; this entails full knowledge of the goods and services offered. The foregoing harmoniously incorporates several constitutional principles, such as the State’s concern for the broadest sectors of the population when they act as consumers; the reaffirmation of individual freedom by facilitating private persons’ free disposal of their assets with the fullest possible knowledge of the goods or services to be acquired; the protection of health when it is involved; the organization and systematization of reciprocal relationships among the interested parties; the harmonization of international commercial practices with the domestic system; and, ultimately, greater protection of individuals in matters concerning their means of subsistence.” Moreover, consumer rights are also grounded in rules of International Law.

In this context, particular significance attaches to the United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection, which state that government policies should seek, insofar as possible, to enable consumers to obtain the greatest benefit from their economic resources and should also seek to establish appropriate distribution procedures, fair business practices, informative marketing, and effective protection against practices that may harm consumers’ economic interests and their ability to choose in the marketplace. They further identify the need to make every necessary effort to ensure that all parties interested in participating in the provision of goods and services comply with applicable mandatory laws and regulations. This translates into the need to restrict anticompetitive or abusive business practices that may harm consumers.

The foregoing demonstrates the need to satisfy the interests of persons purchasing a service, as is also apparent when attempting to define a public service (servicio público). According to legal scholarship, a public service may be conceptualized, based on its inherently polysemous nature, as the provision, whether administrative or otherwise, of a service intended to satisfy a public need. This justifies State intervention, while also allowing for participation by private persons. Such State intervention must therefore be limited solely to establishing a series of minimum, generally applicable rules that allow all parties interested in selling transportation services to participate under conditions of equality, thereby expanding the service options available to individuals.

At the beginning of this dissenting opinion (voto disidente), I also noted the need to analyze this specific case from the perspective of freedom of trade. The challenged provision removed the word “person” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, thereby nationalizing passenger transportation services on behalf of the State, with the consequence that this activity is withdrawn from private commerce. Accordingly, any party other than the State and its agents—defined in this particular case as those holding a concession (concesión) or permit (permiso)—that is interested in participating in the transportation market is left with only a residual possibility of doing so, because it may participate solely with respect to merchandise, goods, and money. In the undersigned’s opinion, such a restriction is contrary to the Law of the Constitution (Derecho de la Constitución).

With regard to freedom of trade, this Constitutional Court stated, among other decisions, in Judgment N° 4936-12, issued at 15:33 on 18 April 2012:

“VIII.—For its part, freedom of enterprise or trade (libertad de empresa o comercio), enshrined in Article 46 of the Political Constitution, consists of every citizen’s right to choose freely the economic activity they wish to pursue. However, this is not an unlimited right, because the State may restrict such activity for reasons of public order, morality, and the protection of third-party rights. Once a person chooses the economic activity they wish to pursue, they must comply with the requirements and guidelines imposed by the legal system for carrying out that activity.” In this decision, based on the content of Article 46 of the Political Charter, the Court recognizes that freedom of trade means that every citizen has the right to choose freely the economic activity they wish to pursue. Nevertheless, it also recognizes that this guarantee is not unrestricted and that the State may limit such activity; in my view, however, any such limitation may be imposed solely for reasons of public order, morality, and the protection of third-party rights.

In other words, freedom of trade (libertad de comercio) may be subject to regulation and legal restrictions, but these must satisfy the test of proportionality and reasonableness so that the exercise of the fundamental right is not rendered meaningless. Based on this understanding, it has been established that the law cannot and must not be irrational and must ensure proportionality between means and ends, which also entails that the rule must conform to the content of the Constitution, with particular reference to fundamental rights (derechos fundamentales).

In this specific case, I consider that the restriction imposed by the challenged provision does not meet those criteria, particularly when the current circumstances facing the transportation sector are taken into account, in which people’s interests are plainly and directly affected by the service’s lack of effectiveness, the relationship between its quality and the price that must be paid for it, and the lack of options or providers offering an optimal service.

Thus, as a matter of principle, my position is based on recognizing and safeguarding the minimum content of two fundamental rights. The first is liberty, enshrined in Article 28 of the Constitución Política, from the standpoint of persons as consumers of the transportation service. The second is the right enshrined in Article 46 of the Constitución Política, concerning freedom of trade. This is because I consider that the restriction imposed by the challenged legislation falls far short of the standards of reasonableness and proportionality, since the nationalization (nacionalización) of the Taxi and Seetaxi motor-vehicle transportation service curtails users’ right to choose and enter into contracts according to their interests, preferences, and needs.

Moreover, it limits active participation in the market for the sale of transportation services, as previously noted. Although State intervention is necessary, it must be minimal, establishing a regulatory framework (marco regulatorio) that lays down the minimum rules allowing all parties interested in selling transportation services to participate under equal conditions, but without the excesses entailed by nationalization of the service, because the interests of persons—transportation users—must prevail over those of the State.

For that reason, and in the interests of the common good and of each individual, opening the service to competition is more advantageous for people. This is without losing sight of the fact that the substance of the services and the relationship between provider and consumer entail the latter’s right to receive the stipulated services in terms of quantity and quality—previously defined aspects—which may be regulated by the State without nationalizing the service. This also encompasses the obligation to provide compensation in cases where harm results from the service’s malfunctioning.

Finally, the provision of the transportation service must not be understood from the standpoint of its origin, which might justify severe State intervention and its direct administration by the Government, but must instead be understood—and defined—from the standpoint of its recipient. This justifies developing what may be termed a form of nontraditional public transportation service (servicio público impropio de transporte), safeguarding the initiative of every interested party to operate the service, for which the State could establish minimum rules without nationalizing the service.

Having set forth the foregoing considerations, I declare the challenged provision unconstitutional, with the corresponding consequences. With regard to Article 1 of Ley N° 8955 de 19 de junio de 2011, the word “personas” shall be restored to Article 323 of the Código de Comercio. The Executive and Legislative Branches are ordered, within the scope of their respective powers, to enact the corresponding regulations to ensure the foregoing prerogatives.

Por tanto:

By majority vote, the consolidated actions (acciones acumuladas) are dismissed. Justice Castillo Víquez provides different grounds for dismissal, except with respect to the claim concerning violation of the principle of equality (principio de igualdad). Justice Rueda Leal dissents and would grant the consolidated actions on the grounds that a monopoly was created in favor of the State by means of a law that did not receive the approval of two-thirds of the entire membership of the Asamblea Legislativa, and that the fundamental rights to property and freedom of enterprise (libertad de empresa), as well as the general principle of liberty, were violated. Justices Hernández López and Salazar Alvarado dissent in part and would grant the actions filed on the grounds that they violate the freedom of enterprise protected by Articles 28 and 46 of the Constitución Política. Consequently, they annul Articles 1 and 2 of Ley 8955 del 16 de junio de 2011: the first solely insofar as it removed the word “personas” from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio, and the second solely and exclusively insofar as it declared the activity of transporting persons for hire (porteo de personas) under the Código de Comercio to be a public service (servicio público).— Ernesto Jinesta L.

Presiding Justice Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.

Paul Rueda L. Nancy Hernández L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A. José Paulino Hernández G.

SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las once horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintidos de febrero de dos mil diecisiete.

Acciones de inconstitucionalidad promovidas por OTTO GUEVARA GUTH, y NATALIA DÍAZ QUINTANA; y por JUAN RICARDO FERNÁNDEZ RAMÍREZ, en su condición de Presidente de la ASOCIACIÓN NACIONAL DE CONSUMIDORES LIBRES; y otros, para que se declare inconstitucional de la Ley No. 8955: “Reforma a la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, del 30 de abril de 1964, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, del 22 de diciembre de 1999”;por estimarlos contrario a los artículos 7, 46, 129 y 140 de la Constitución Política. Intervinieron también en el proceso el representante de la Procuraduría General de la República, y el Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes.

Resultando:

1. 1Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 13:00 horas del 16 de octubre de 2015, los accionantes solicitan en resumen que: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley No. 8955: “Reforma a la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, del 30 de abril de 1964, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, del 22 de diciembre de 1999”. A efecto de fundamentar la legitimación que ostentan para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, los accionantes aducen que proviene de la defensa de intereses difusos por tratarse del derecho al trabajo. Aducen que en el expediente legislativo No. 17874 -en el cual se tramitó la actual ley impugnada-, en su exposición de motivos indicó que se pretendía: "… crear una legislación que garantice mejores condiciones y costos más bajos para el usuario, buscando el beneficio y el bienestar de las grandes mayorías.De esta forma se elimina el porteo de personas, pero no se elimina el porteo en sí, es decir lo que se está eliminando es la palabra persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, pero se puede seguir transportando cosas, artículos, dineros, correspondencia, etc. (…) Ante la eliminación de la palabra "persona", se crea dentro de la Ley reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad Taxi, N. ° 7969, una figura que se llama "transporte especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio especial residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado para darle sentido de responsabilidad a aquellos interesados que lo estarían acreditando. " Explica que la exposición de motivos indica que la figura de porteo de personas se encontraba erróneamente regulada en el Código de Comercio, al incluir la palabra personas en el numeral 323 de dicho cuerpo normativo; por lo que se pretendió crear una nueva legislación que beneficiara al usuario, de forma tal que se prohibió la figura del “porteo de personas”, monopolizándose por parte del Estado dicha actividad económica, por lo que pasó de ser transporte privado atransporte público de personas, es decir, ya no puede ser ejercido de acuerdo a lo establecido en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio.Aduce que dicha ley elimina el transporte privado de personas y lo convierte en transporte público; lo cual se manifestó a lo largo de la normativa impugnada, pues por medio del artículo 1 se eliminó la figura del porteo de personas. Señala que el artículo 1 reforma los numerales 323 y 334 del Código de Comercio, de forma tal que indicaran lo siguiente: “Artículo 323.- Por el contrato de transporte la persona porteadora se obliga a transportar cosas o noticias de un lugar a otro a cambio de un precio. El transporte puede ser realizado por empresas públicas o privadas. Son empresas públicas las que anuncian y abren al público establecimiento de esa índole, comprometiéndose a transportar por precios, condiciones y periodos determinados, siempre que se requieran sus servicios de acuerdo con las bases de sus prospectos, itinerarios y tarifas. Son empresas privadas las que prestan esos servicios en forma discrecional, bajo condiciones y por ajustes convencionales.EI contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores." A tenor de lo cual, consideran que es porteador aquella persona dedicada a transportar cosas o noticias, no personas. Señalan que, anterior a la enmienda citada, el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, era el fundamento para llevar a cabo el transporte privado de personas bajo la denominada figura del porteo, pero con la reforma, el legislador limitó el contrato de porteo al transporte de cosas o noticias, excluyendo de manera categórica el transporte de personas, tal como se indico supra. En la citada Ley N° 8955 también se modificó y adicionó la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos modalidad de Taxi, de modo tal, que el derogado contrato de porteo de personas quedó incorporado en esta normativa bajo la denominación de servicios especiales estables de taxi (SEETAXI), constituyéndose así el transporte remunerado de personas en sus distintas modalidades, como un servicio público.Es necesario indicar que durante la discusión del proyecto de Ley, se dieron importantes participaciones como la de la Diputada Quintana Porras: (...) Por el fondo quiero que quede en actas que durante toda la discusión de este proyecto de Ley, hemos señalado (…) que la aprobación de este proyecto de Ley afectaría de manera injusta a personas que durante todo el tiempo o mucho tiempo se han dedicado a una actividad totalmente legal. (…)Son muchos los derechos reconocidos por nuestra Carta Magna, como el libre comercio, la libertad de reunión y la libertad de tránsito que se ven amenazados en este proyecto de Ley. Por lo tanto siempre que la actividad de porteo cumpla con los parámetros establecidos en nuestra legislación, será una actividad legal y esencial para nuestra dinámica comercial. (…) Tenemos la oportunidad de decirle no a un proyecto que afecta derechos constitucionales y que además limita una actividad laboral totalmente legal, que da sustento a muchos costarricenses.No empobrezcamos (…) a Costa Rica con nuestras decisiones; no cercenemos una libertad más aprobando en segundo debate este proyecto de Ley. “Apunta que el resultado de la aprobación de la norma impugnada fue la monopolización del servicio de transporte privado de personas por parte del Estado. Asimismo, indican que el artículo 2 de la citada ley estableció una serie de requisitos y limitaciones a la actividad económica del transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi; creando un monopolio público comprendido por dos modalidades del servicio de transporte modalidad taxi. La primera de dichas formas fue que exigió para los taxis regulados por la Ley No 7969, el título habitante de Concesión – cuando el Estado delega en una persona física o jurídica la posibilidad de brindar un servicio que originalmente corresponde al Estado-; siendo que la Concesión implica un derecho real administrativo para el Concesionario, y su revocación solo es posible por la violación de causales previstas con anterioridad y un Debido Proceso, caso contrario el Estado debe indemnizar.Expresa que la segunda de dichas formas es "residual" del servicio público de transporte modalidad taxi, conocido hoy como SEETAXI, o permiso especial estable de taxi, para absorber una parte de los porteadores bajo la figura del Permiso. Considera que la modalidad de SEETAXI es en sí contradictoria, ello por cuanto en Derecho Público, el Permiso es una figura precaria que como titulo habilitante no constituye ningún derecho administrativo, en principio podría ser revocado en cualquier momento y no corresponde indemnización alguna. Añade que la imposibilidad del ejercicio del porteo de personas (transporte privado de personas) queda totalmente establecida a través de reiterada jurisprudencia administrativa de la Procuraduría General de la República, desarrollada luego de entrada en vigencia Ley #8955 tal y como lo detalla en la opinión jurídica OJ154-2014, al reformarse el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, en el cual el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad taxi, se considera un servicio público que se explotará mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa de acuerdo con los procedimientos establecidos en la ley y su reglamento, o del permiso en el caso de servicios especiales estables de taxi, conforme lo dispone el inciso a) del artículo 7 de la ley de cita.En el mismo sentido, el dictamen C416-2014 y la opinión jurídica OJ-011-2015, indicaron que el transporte remunerado de personas en sus distintas modalidades constituye un servicio público, de forma tal que no puede realizarse por particulares sino es por medio de un permiso o concesión otorgado por el Estado. Deducen que ningún particular puede prestar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, en sus distintas modalidades, si no cuenta con una concesión o permiso de parte del Estado, es decir esta actividad sale del comercio de los hombres para ser monopolizada, esto independientemente del tipo de vehículo automotor que se utilice, de las personas a las que vaya dirigido, ya sea que se ofrezca al público en general o a personas usuarias de grupos determinados. Consecuencia de lo cual, ninguna persona particular -física o jurídica- puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas si previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva -concesión o permiso-, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público.Considera que dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatoria del artículo 46 de la Carta Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley No. 17874, que dio origen a la ley No. 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos. Añade que el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros, y que la ley No. 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone que no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores, creándose una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de este servicio por particulares, es decir, se estatiza un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio y que hacia como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento.Señalan que en el Dictamen número C-376-2003, la Procuraduría señaló que el porteo no era un negocio jurídico no producto del azar o de acciones encaminadas a la colectividad, sino, más bien, el producto de una relación discreta, previamente concertada entre el porteador y el viajero; lo cual conllevaba la imposibilidad de realizar contratos en la vía pública, toda vez que la titularidad de dicho servicio público la ejerce el Estado. Asegura que el porteo de personas obedece a un acuerdo de voluntades, a un acuerdo que no surge al azar, sino que es realizado libremente y de forma discreta entre las partes, a través de la ponderación de precios, rutas, horarios; pues se trata de un aspecto propio de la esfera privada de los ciudadanos en la que rige el principio de autonomía de la voluntad, y en la cual el Estado no debe intervenir. Por lo que aduce que al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, que disponerla creación de monopolios de carácter particular, e indica que para establecer nuevos monopolios a favor del Estado o de las municipalidades se requerirá de la aprobación de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa.Lo cual implica que los poderes públicos están constitucionalmente obligados a promover la competencia en el marco de una economía de mercado; asimismo, indica que la norma impugnada estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi, constitución la cual fue realizada por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en una comisión con potestad legislativa plena, siendo que ese proyecto era indelegable pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada -al menos 38 votos-. Explican que dicho proyecto de ley debió ser discutido en el Plenario Legislativo, pues así lo requiere su votación, por lo que la Comisión Plena Segunda estaba impedida por mandato constitucional de conocer este proyecto y con más razón impedida para aprobarlo, violando el procedimiento establecido en el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política.Aclaran que no se cuestiona la constitución del monopolio, ya que este puede establecerse siempre y cuando se cumpla el procedimiento requerido en el artículo 46. Aseguran que la existencia del monopolio del transporte privado de personas se hace más evidente con la llegada de UBER, una plataforma digital que permite conectar a proveedores de servicio de personas en modalidad de taxi con personas que necesitan ser transportadas, y explican que para reforzar que la Ley No. 8955 creó un monopolio en favor del Estado, el Vice-Ministro Sebastián Urbina indicó que todo transporte remunerado de personas tenía que pasar por el CTP, y afirmó que ningún particular puede hacer transporte remunerado de personas sin permiso del Estado. Por lo que afirma que la aprobación de la Ley 8955 contradice el principio de supremacía de la realidad pues impide la utilización de medios tecnológicos alternativos al servicio de transporte, tal y como Asimismo, asegura que la norma impugnada violenta la aprobación el Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, ya que este determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transporte privado, por cuanto al momento de la aprobación Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas, y no existía una Ley que hubiera establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi; ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transporte privados modalidad taxi.Ante lo cual, en el capítulo 11 de dicho Tratado, "comercio transfronterizo de servicios", Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial, razón por la cual, la ley No. 8955 vulnera un Acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico, pues más allá de esta situación debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el "trato nacional "que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado; más bien, Costa Rica negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas en la modalidad taxi, en la Clase 6431; Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo); Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis); Según lo anterior por "servicios regulares" ha de entenderse "no ocasionales" siendo el "Servicio de transpone de pasajeros" sinónimo -en la doctrina jurídica comercial- de porteo de personas dirigido a un segmento específico de usuarios, lo que equivale a un grupo cerrado en donde privan los itinerarios y los honorarios predeterminados, es decir previamente concertados (entre el porteador y el pasajero), tal y como ocurría antes de la aprobación de la impugnada.Explica que mediante el Anexo I del CAFTA (Lista de Costa Rica) se incluyen diversas "medidas disconformes" que permiten al Estado costarricense legislar y reglamentar en materia de "Servicios de Transporte por Vía Terrestre Transporte de Pasajeros"; aún a contra de los artículos 11.2 (Trato Nacional), 11.3 (Trato de Nación Más Favorecida) y 11.4 (Acceso a Mercados) del CAFTA; dichas medidas disconformes incluyen varios artículos de la Ley No. 7969 "Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxis" que otorgan potestad al MOPT de "...fijar anualmente el número de concesiones que se otorgarán en cada distrito, cantón y provincia para los servicios de taxi". (CAFTA, Anexo I. página 13), además de lo relativo a la regulación en materia de tarifas. Sin embargo, el artículo 11.6 del CAFTA permite la no aplicación de los artículos 112 11.3. 11.4 y 11.5 (del CAFTA) a: "cualquier medida disconforme existente que sea mantenida por una parte (…) siempre que dicha modificación no disminuya el grado de conformidad de la medida, tal y como estaba en vigor inmediatamente antes de la modificación (…)” (CAFTA página 11-3).Asegura que las medidas disconformes anteriormente mencionadas se refieren al transporte público de pasajeros, que es el único regulado en la Ley 7969 antes de su modificación en junio de 2011, pues la Ley No, 8955 data del 16 de junio del 2011, sin embargo el CAFTA entro en vigencia el 1 de enero de 2009; por lo que con la aprobación de esta ley se pasa por alto las obligaciones acordadas por nuestro país en el citado tratado. Reitera que en la norma impugnada el "porteo de personas" se convierte en "servicio público", al eliminar la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada, lo cual transgrede el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA por disminuir "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con lo cual, la Asamblea Legislativa excede una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado Aducen que los tratados internacionales tienen una doble dimensión jurídica: desde el punto de vista internacional trae consigo un compromiso de cumplir lo pactado frente a los demás sujetos de derecho internacional y desde el punto de vista estatal implica la aceptación de los efectos internos derivados del compromiso tanto para los poderes públicos como para los ciudadanos - Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados-.Por lo cual, consideran que la aprobación de la Ley No. 8955, no solamente violenta la Constitución; sino la Convención de Viena en su parte general, ya que constituye una violación al principio de jerarquía de la norma, pues por medio de una norma de inferior rango se restringe una actividad comercial pasando por alto los acuerdos suscritos en el CAFTA, entrando en franca confrontación con sus objetivos fundamentales que son: el estimular la expansión y diversificación del comercio en la región, eliminar los obstáculos al comercio, facilitar la circulación transfronteriza de mercancías y servicios, promover condiciones de competencia leal en la zona de libre comercio, aumentar sustancialmente las oportunidades de inversión, entre otros. Solicitan que se declare inconstitucional la norma impugnada.
2. 2Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de esta Sala a las 13:14 horas del 19 de enero de 2016, Juan Ricardo Fernández Ramírez, en su condición de Presidente de la Asociación Nacional de Consumidores Libres, solicita en resumen que: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley No. 8955: “Reforma a la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, del 30 de abril de 1964, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, del 22 de diciembre de 1999”.A efecto de fundamentar la legitimación que ostentan para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, los accionantes aducen que proviene de la defensa de intereses difusos y colectivos. Manifiesta que la legislación impugnada realizó una clara distinción entre las tres modalidades de transporte remunerado de personas, y asignó una regulación particular a cada una, a saber: transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi; servicio especial estable de taxi; y porteo de personas (estable y no estable).Indica que, para la modalidad de transporte de taxi, la norma impugnada lo mantuvo incólume, por lo cual no es objeto de la presente acción. Asegura que en relación al Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi, la norma impugnada creó una modalidad especial de transporte remunerado de personas, que también fue considerado como un servicio público para todos los efectos legales, explotado mediante la figura del permiso; el cual es limitado y supeditado a las concesiones de taxis tradicionales. Asegura que en dichas condiciones se da la obligación de presentar los contratos originales con las personas a las cuales se les brindará el servicio, y que la cantidad de permisos no podría superar el 3% de las concesiones de taxis tradicionales por base de operación; siendo que el Estado podrá autorizar únicamente la cantidad de permisos necesarios por zona, evitando una competencia que pueda afectar a los taxis tradicionales; no pudiendo ofrecer sus servicios al público; y sin poder estacionarse en las vías públicas salvo para el abordaje y des abordaje de sus usuarios.Ante lo cual, asegura que los únicos servicios de transporte permitidos son los taxis tradicionales o de limitado servicio especial estable de taxi; prohibiendo cualquier otro tipo de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos entre personas de derecho privado. Ahora bien, en relación al porteo de personas (estable y no estable), asegura que dicho servicio fue totalmente vedado; en virtud de lo cual, dos sujetos de derecho privado no pueden pactar libremente el transporte de una persona a cambio de una remuneración; e indicando que dicho tipo de servicio era público y que el Estado era su único titular; y otorgándole –mediante el Transitorio I-, un plazo máximo de un mes para que quienes se dedicaban al porteo de personas a presentar ante el Estado una serie de requisitos con el fin de obtener un permiso administrativo de servicio especial estable de taxi y convertir su actividad privada en esa nueva modalidad.Por lo cual, considera que no subsiste duda sobre la prohibición de suscribir contratos de porteo de personas entre particulares; ya que dejó a los taxis tradicionales y a los SEETAXIS como las únicas dos modalidades de transporte remunerado de personas en automóvil permitidas, ambas de titularidad exclusiva del Estado; ante lo cual, considera que la norma impugnada eliminó completamente el transporte privado remunerado de personas. Aduce que la ley impugnada es inconstitucional por cuanto creó un monopolio público sin una mayoría calificada, ya que estableció al Estado como exclusivo titular del transporte remunerado de personas y prohibió el porteo, eliminando la iniciativa privada y dejando como única opción de explotación los títulos habilitantes detallados en la ley. Ante lo cual, argumenta que la titularidad siempre pertenecerá al Estado de manera excluyente; y éste crea, delimita, otorga y revoca los títulos habilitantes.Indica que los concesionarios o permisiarios siempre operaran como colaboradores del Estado y bajo un régimen jurídico distinto, limitado y temporal; siendo que el vicio no considera en declarar servicio público este tipo de transporte, sino en la creación de un monopolio para asegurarlo. Por lo cual, menciona que este Tribunal estableció la prohibición de delegar en comisiones con potestad legislativa asuntos que requieran de mayoría calificada. Asegura que, por el contrario, los servicios públicos de mayor trascendencia, como la educación y la salud, no están regidos por un monopolio estatal como es este caso, lo que evidencia que la importancia de la actividad no justica per se su nacionalización. Por otra parte, señala que la norma impugnada viola los artículos 28, 39, 41, 45 y 46 de la Constitución Política; asimismo, los principios de libertad, iniciativa privada, libertad de comercio, libertad contractual y libertad de elección de los consumidores.Explica que las libertades fundamentales son eje de un Estado de Derecho, las cuales pueden ser limitadas en aras de un interés público imperativo y de la manera menos restrictiva posible; siendo que la norma impugnada no satisface el interés publico imperativo y limita las libertades fundamentales de la manera más restrictiva posible. Asegura que de las actas legislativas se comprueba que es incuestionable que el interés de regular la actividad del transporte remunerado de personas era solucionar el conflicto de lo taxistas y porteadores; pero no beneficiar a los consumidores que necesiten transportarse por un medio como este. Asevera que las actuales tendencias económicas y jurídicas adoptadas en Costa Rica, respaldan a la libre competencia como el regulador idóneo de cualquier actividad económica y en caso de estimarse necesaria intervención estatal, se considera que esta debe perpetrarse con la menor intensidad posible.En este caso, se ha perdido de vista el verdadero destinatario del servicio público de marras; el consumidor. Señala que el legislador contaba con la posibilidad de regulación de la actividad privada como opción para asegurar a la protección del usuario, pero optó por la manera más restrictiva: la estatación. Ello contrario a la salud y a la educación, los cuales son ejemplos de servicios públicos de suprema trascendencia que permiten la iniciativa privada y únicamente están regulados, no estatizados. Considera que la norma impugnada vulneró la cláusula 11.4 “Acceso a Mercados” del Capítulo Once del TLC; ello en virtud de que se prohíbe a los estados parte dictar medidas que impongan limitaciones sobre el numero de proveedores de servicios, ya sea a manera de contingentes numéricos, monopolios o proveedores exclusivos de servicios. Asegura que la prohibición de prestar un servicio privado de transporte de personas (porteo), producto de la reforma introducida con la Ley No. 89558, al artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y la estatización de la actividad, limita el número de proveedores de servicios.Por lo que el único supuesto en que esta ley no contrapone dicha normativa, es que estuviese contemplado en las medidas disconformes que Costa Rica extrajo de la aplicación del Tratado; siendo que las únicas reservadas sobre el transporte terrestre de personas se incluyeron en el Anexo I del Tratado. Expresa que, el transporte remunerado de personas no fue reservado en el Anexo I del Tratado, ello en virtud de que se refirió únicamente a leyes, reglamentos o medidas vigentes al momento de la suscripción del Tratado, que son disconformes con el pactado y que el Estado Parte decidía mantener. Siendo que no se trata de reservas a sectores o actividades en general, que el Estado podrá regular a placer, sino la decisión de conservar normas vigentes. Ello por cuanto la Ley 8955 fue promulgada años después del Tratado, por lo que serían medidas nuevas que no pueden interpretarse como existentes que se pretendían mantener.Por otra parte, asegura que ningún Estado Parte podría incrementar el grado de disconformidad de sus medidas existentes reservadas y cualquier reforma a alguna de ellas no podría disminuir su grado de conformidad. Siendo que, la norma impugnada, estableció medidas nuevas. Asegura que, incluso si se lograse interpretar que la normativa fue reservada en el Anexo I, resulta incuestionable que la Ley No. 8955 representaba modificaciones que incrementaron la restricciones existentes al momento de suscribir el Tratado; algo expresamente prohibido. Por otra parte, asegura que el Anexo II del Tratado, por otra parte, los Estados Partes sí les era posible hacer reservas sobre temas o sectores en los cuales podrían imponer nuevas medidas o regularlos a futuro. Expresa que Costa Rica no hizo reserva alguna sobre el transporte remunerado de personas en el Anexo II, por lo que resultaba directamente contraria al Tratado cualquier medida restrictiva sobre el tema.Expresa que la norma impugnada incuestionablemente nacionalizó el transporte remunerado de personas creó un monopolio a favor del Estado. Ello por cuanto el transporte de personas era de carácter mixto; y así convivía el transporte público remunerado de personas como las taxis tradicionales y el transporte privado remunerado de personas con la modalidad del porteo; no obstante, aduce que el transporte privado remunerado de personas en la modalidad de porteo fue eliminado del ordenamiento jurídico. Resultando inobjetable que el transporte remunerado de personas, en cualquiera de sus modalidades, fue instituido como servicio publico ya el Estado como su único titular. Afirma que mediante el contrato plenamente privado de porteo, las personas o empresas privadas podían ofrecer el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, y fuese ofreciendo tarifas y condiciones al público en general o acomodándolos en cada caso particular; no obtente, al eliminar la palabra “personas” del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y añadiendo una prohibición expresa de transportar personas, ese tipo de contrato fue nacionalizado, obligando a todos los que se dedicaban al porteo privado –mediante el Transitorio I de la norma impugnada- a transformar su actividad en pública, acogiéndose al servicio especial estable de taxi.Siendo que, no cabe duda, se creó un nuevo monopolio legal a favor del Estado. Aduce que es menester desarrollar la evolución del concepto de servicio público y sobre todo la diferencia entre la regulación de una actividad económica y su nacionalización como medios para asegurar el servicio. De forma tal que la nacionalización de la actividad no era la única manera jurídica de asegurar el servicio público, y que la regulación era una opción posible y existente en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico. Asegura que es necesario acotar una distinción entre la regulación estatal de una actividad privada en aras de proteger el interés de los usuarios y la nacionalización de una actividad privada que obliga a los sujetos de derecho privado a obtener una habilitación para operar como colaboradores del Estado; que es el único titular del servicio particular; no obstante, se optó por la creación de un monopolio público, algo que la constitución faculta mientras medie un interés público justificante y una ley aprobada por mayoría calificada.Aduce que la noción de servicio público tradicional consiste en una actividad de satisfacción de necesidades colectivas cuya titularidad y estricta regulación y fiscalización es asumida por el Estado; siendo que es el Estado el único titular del servicio, quién fija las condiciones en las que se presta y lo fiscaliza directamente. Ante lo cal, surgió una nueva noción moderna y objetiva del servicio público, la cual no implica la titularidad excluida del Estado y permite la iniciativa privada; una prestación de fundamental interés para la sociedad en la que el Estado puede intervenir y asegurar su satisfacción; la cual no supone su exclusiva titularidad a diferencia de la noción tradicional e incluye la posibilidad de intervenir mediante regulaciones o correcciones del mercado privado. Asimismo, cita doctrina europea (folio 56), e indicó que el marco constitucional admite una pluralidad de soluciones organizativas, que van desde el extremo representado por el mercado sin más, pasando por toda la gama de restricciones, hasta el otro extremo que es la exclusión del mercado y la reserva exclusiva de la administración.; por lo que el servicio público puede permitir al legislador ordenar una adecuada congruencia de las actividades públicas y privadas a fin de satisfacer las necesidades públicas.Y reitera que la evolución del concepto de servicio público no solo justifica la estatización de una actividad económica sin una mayoría calificada, sino que la corriente de cambio del concepto se dirige en la liberalización. Aduce que los conceptos de regularización y nacionalización son fundamentalmente distintos, ya que cuando se habla de regulación la actuación del Estado opera sobre situaciones jurídicas y derechos preexistentes que parten de la libertad de actuación privada. Opuesto es el régimen ante una actividad nacionalizada, donde el Estado crea y delimita las situaciones jurídicas y el administrado puede tener derechos nuevos y limitados de explotación por medio de una concesión. Explica que evidentemente se está en un monopolio estatal de una actividad económica privada por su naturaleza, y no su simple regulación. Por su parte, añade que, la nacionalización supone convertir una actividad privada a la titularidad exclusiva del Estado, por lo que únicamente a través de su habilitación, un sujeto privado podría ser partícipe.Por ser el titular exclusivo de dicha actividad, se puede rechazar, regular y detalladamente, fiscalizar o revocar los permisos de operación a los sujetos privados. Siendo que, no sea necesario dejar a la exclusiva titularidad de la administración, los servicios públicos para asegurarlos o regularlos, ya que no han estado exentos del giro internacional hacia la desestatización y actualmente subsisten distintos ejemplos de servicios que no son titularidad única del Estado. Por lo cual, añade, que el monopolio publico creado por la Ley No. 8955 es inconstitucional, en virtud de que debía haberse creado mediante una mayoría calificada, de conformidad con el numeral 4 de la Carta Constitucional. Subsidiariamente, solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del artículo 1 de la norma impugnada, ello en virtud de que eliminó el porteo de personas del Código de Comercio; asimismo, el artículo 2 que establece la titularidad exclusiva del Estado.Lo anterior con motivo de que dicha anulación permitiría el porteo privado de personas simultáneamente con el servicio SEETAXI, y los taxis tradicionales, eliminando el monopolio público al permitir la iniciativa privada en dicha actividad económica. Considera que las libertades fundamentales fueron comprometidas mediante la aprobación de dicha ley. E indica que de las actas legislativas, se extrae que el interés de regular la actividad de transporte remunerado de personas era solucionar el conflicto gremial de los taxistas y los portadores; optando por la forma más restrictiva, que era la estatización. Asegura que toda actividad comercial privada puede estar sujeta a limitaciones y regulaciones legales adoptadas en aras de proteger el interés público; sin embargo, no pueden ser regulaciones excesivas a una actividad privada por su naturaleza. Es decir, para limitar el principio de libertad, el legislador debió optar por la opción menos restrictiva a fin de satisfacer una necesidad social imperiosa.Asegura que la norma impugnada no satisface ningún interés público imperativo; siendo que el bien común debe extraerse del orden constitucional, nunca de lo que una administración particular considere como importante. Por lo cual, asegura que, los motivos de la ley impugnada provinieron de un proceso de negociación entre el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, junto con la Cámara Nacional de Transporte en Autobús, la Federación Nacional de Taxis y la Cámara de Porteadores, y proponían dirimir los conflictos sucintados entre taxistas, autobuseros y portadores, no el interés público imperativo en los términos exigidos por la Carta Constitucional. Considera que la libertad de competencia es la forma idónea de satisfacer el interés público. Afirma que la ley impugnada, se emitió con el propósito de zanjar una diferencia de tipo político gremial, entre diversos sectores; no obstante, se sacrificaron los legítimos intereses de los consumidores, reduciendo sus opciones y su derecho de elección.Con ello, considera que se priorizó el interés particular y gremial por encima d ellos intereses de la colectividad. Asegura que la norma impugnada infringe el artículo 46 constitucional, ello por cuanto se establece el derecho a la libre elección de los consumidores. Por un lado, el deber del Estado a promover la mayor cantidad de opciones y alternativas de consumo, y por el otro, la posibilidad de elegir con libertad entre dichas opciones. En igual sentido, cita a la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Comercio y Desarrollo, e indica que el propósito de las regulaciones al mercado es el aumentar el bienestar de los consumidores, garantizando por un lado el acceso y el suministro al mercado para que los consumidores tengan opciones de elecciones adecuadas, y por el otro garantizar que los consumidores puedan ejercer dichas opciones con eficacia. Aduce que la libertad de elección de los consumidores se protege no solo permitiéndole a estos elegir libremente entre las opciones disponibles en el mercado, sino también absteniéndose de excluir alternativas y opciones de como salvo que medie una justificación valida; principio conocido en la teoría económica como la soberanía del consumidor, la cual es precisamente la que es tutelada, y fue infringida en el numeral 46 de la Carta Constitucional.Siendo que, la ley declaró artificialmente como servicio público el porteo y cualquier otro tipo de servicio de transporte de personas que se le parezca o asemeje, privando a los consumidores de la posibilidad de acceder a una serie de servicios y opciones legitimas, sin mediar una justificación ni base técnica, y sin considerar ni ponderar los intereses legítimos de los consumidores. Asegura que el propósito del legislador fue satisfacer los intereses gremiales de los taxistas, porteadores y autobuseros que estaban en ese momento en medio de una disputa, y que los intereses de los consumidores no fueron debidamente protegidos. Es decir, se limitó indebidamente el derecho a la elección del consumidor, reduciéndole sin fundamento sus opciones y alternativas de ocumo para proteger los intereses de un gremio especifico. Por lo cual, el legislador eliminó todas las opciones de transporte privado de personas, en lugar de cumplir con su tarea de analizar y justificar cuáles prestaciones dentro del sector de transporte deben ser efectivamente declaradas como servicio público, permitiendo a los consumidores elegir y contratar el resto con libertad.Arguye que se violentó el principio constitucional, según el cual en el suministro de bienes y servicios a la colectividad, se presume la competencia económica como lo normas y ordinario, y se excluye de actividades del mercado como la excepción –la cual debe ser justificada y fundamentada en el beneficio de la colectividad y del interés común. Admite que las actividades económicas requieren regulaciones basadas en el orden público y el bien común; sin embargo, al emitir dichas regulaciones se deben necesariamente considerar, ponderar y proteger los derechos y legítimos intereses de los consumidores, por ser éstos los destinatarios finales de la regulación. Por ello, considera que se está ante una norma inconstitucional que limita la libertad de elección de los consumidores al reducirle sus opciones y alternativas. Así la cosa, considera que la Ley impugnada debe declararse inconstitucional, porque restringe injustificadamente la libertad de elección de los consumidores, reduciendo sus opciones sin base técnica ni fundamento.Adicionalmente, privilegia indebidamente los intereses particulares de un gremio específico, sin considerar, ponderar ni proteger los derechos y legítimos intereses de los consumidores y de la colectividad. Por tanto, no sólo la Ley no cumple el estándar constitucional, sino que es contrario al interés público imperativo de los consumidores que son los destinatarios de este servicio público. Siguiendo la jurisprudencia y doctrina, afirma que la nacionalización o publicatio es la forma más restrictiva y enérgica de intervención Estatal, que carece de justificación en este caso. Es posible asegurar el servicio público con una medida menos restrictiva -como la regulación- lo que per se constituye un vicio de inconstitucionalidad. No existe argumentación válida alguna sobre la medida utilizada para asegurar el servicio público, cuando las reglas técnicas de la economía y las tendencias jurídicas que imperan en nuestra constitución, abogan por la libertad de comercio como la mejor manera de satisfacer las necesidades de los consumidores.Aduce que la norma impugnada contraviene el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política; por lo que afirma que, el Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos de América, República Dominicana y Centroamérica (en adelante "TLC") es un instrumento internacional de carácter comercial, aprobado y ratificado por Costa Rica, cuyo principal objeto es la remoción de los obstáculos arancelarios, jurídicos, económicos y políticos a la libre transferencia comercial de bienes y servicios entre los Estados parte. De forma tal, que el Tratado tiene como fin el de servir de instrumento para la liberalización del comercio de bienes y servicios entre los Estados parte, garantizando la inversión extranjera y promoviendo condiciones de competencia leal, con la consecuente obtención de beneficios ostensibles para los usuarios y consumidores nacionales. Asimismo, recalca que, como se deriva del inciso 2 aludidos, el operador jurídico debe recurrir a dichos objetivos al momento de interpretar la voluntad de las partes y el sentido propio del texto del Tratado.A grandes rasgos, indica que, allí se establece la obligación de los Estados suscriptores de no imponer a los proveedores de servicios de otro Estado parte, restricciones de acceso -ya sean materiales o de orden normativo- a los distintos sectores económicos del mercado de servicios de otro Estado prohíbe número de proveedores de un servicio limitando su participación o acceso al mercado o creando, por ejemplo, contingentes numéricos o monopolios que concedan acceso, titularidad o control de la prestación de ese servicio, a un solo proveedor o pocos proveedores, recurriendo a medidas limitantes o discriminatorias. Por lo que asegura que el TLC excluye de la aplicación de dicha disposición (Artículo 11.4 Acceso a los Mercados), a las actividades o sectores de Servicios, contenidos en una lista de Medidas Disconformes. Asimismo, asegura que la prohibición del porteo (estable y no estable) contraviene la clausula 11.4 de “Acceso a los Mercados”, del TLC.Ello en virtud de que, la norma impugnada provocó tres efectos: la derogación y la prohibición del contrato privado de transporte de personas en porteo, regulado en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio; la creación de una nueva modalidad de servicio remunerado de transporte: Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi, que vino a unirse a la modalidad ya existente de "taxi", y, como consecuencia de ambas; La "publicatio" o nacionalización del servicio de todo transporte privado remunerado de personas, al declararlo de exclusiva titularidad del Estado. La interrogante radica en cómo la prohibición expresa, introducida con la reforma, de prestar un servicio de transporte sin la debida concesión y fiscalización absoluta del Estado, implica una medida que imponga una limitación sobre el número de proveedores de servicios, en forma de contingentes numéricos, monopolios o proveedores exclusivos de servicios o mediante la exigencia de una prueba de necesidades económicas, en los términos literales del sub inciso i), inciso a) de la cláusula 11.4 del Tratado.Asegura lo anterior, en virtud de que el Código de Comercio regulaba, desde su promulgación en 1964, el contrato de transporte, también conocido como porteo de persona, cosas, entre otros. Se trataba de un contrato privado y comercial regido por la autonomía de la voluntad y el principio de libertad. El Código de Comercio regulaba una serie de presupuestos formales y esenciales para la validez del contrato, las obligaciones de las partes, así como el régimen de responsabilidad y las causales de extinción o nulidad de ese contrato. La consecuencia lógica del carácter privado del contrato de transporte, radicaba en que para su prestación, no era necesaria una concesión formal del Estado, en virtud de que no se trataba de un servicio público del cual fuere titular exclusivo el Estado. Los particulares también estaban facultados para prestar el servicio bajo sus propias reglas, en apego a lo estipulado por el Código de Comercio.El grado de intervención del Estado era mínimo y se limitaba a la verificación general de requisitos que aplican para la generalidad de personas que quisieran conducir un vehículo automotor: licencia de conducir (previo dictamen médico que avale las aptitudes físicas y mentales para conducir), respeto a las normas de la Ley de Tránsito, vehículo en estado óptimo según Revisión Técnica Vehicular, entre otros; reglas que se imponen en virtud del interés general que existe en asegurar la seguridad de las personas ante la condición riesgosa natural de toda conducción de vehículos. Sin embargo, al prohibirse Código de Comercio y al excluirlo de la titularidad privada, se impide que cualquier persona que no tenga el carácter de "concesionario", preste un servicio de transpone privado remunerado de personas bajo un régimen de autonomía y libertad contractual -como lo reconocía el Código de Comercio-.Con lo cual se restringe de manera ilegítima el acceso al mercado propio del servicio de transpones. La prohibición implica que si una empresa proveedora de servicios de transpone privado, originaria de un Estado pone, quisiera acceder al sector de servicios de transporte en nuestro país, podría sometérsele a una serie de limitaciones irrazonables contempladas por la Ley No. 8955, contrarias a la cláusula 11.4 del TLC, y que no fueron incluidas expresamente dentro de la lista de medidas disconformes del Anexo 1 del TLC. Es decir, con la reforma introducida por la Ley No. 8955 en el 2011, estando plenamente vigente el TLC, se prohíbe completamente la actividad de porteo. Así las cosas, asegura que es de trascendental incidencia para efectos de esta acción, comprender que la prohibición de ejercer libremente una actividad y, simultáneamente, crear una figura especial para atender una demanda residual y limitada (SEETAXI) de ese servicio, no es sino limitar injustificadamente y por regulación negativa, el número de proveedores de un servicio.Este particular efecto de la Ley cuestionada, es claramente contrario a la cláusula l 1.4 del TLC. Debe distinguirse entre la actividad de porteo (prohibida en su totalidad) y la actividad de SEETAXI (limitado a un 3% de la cantidad de taxis en la zona). Este acápite corresponde a la primera actividad, sin embargo adelantamos que ambos han sido limitados inconstitucionalmente. Como se vio con anterioridad, una actividad privada regulada y una actividad pública dada en concesión, son completamente distintas en cuanto a su naturaleza y régimen jurídico, por lo que es menester analizarlos individualmente. A las empresas provenientes de los Estados parte se les ha prohibido en su totalidad la prestación del servicio de porteo y limitado sustancialmente la posibilidad de prestar un servicio distinto de SEETAXI. El hecho de calificar la actividad como servicio público "del cual es titular el Estado" implica que ningún sujeto privado está habilitado para prestar el servicio de transporte libre y directamente, bajo el régimen de libertad y autonomía que imperaba previo a la reforma del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio.En resumen, asegura que, la eliminación y prohibición del porteo y de cualquier contrato de transporte privado de personas, regulado en su momento por el Código de Comercio (art. 1 Ley 8955) y por la libertad de contratación de toda persona, constituyen una violación al art. 11.4 del TLC y, lo que es más importante, una limitación no avalada por la Lista de Medidas Disconformes del TLC. Explica que el porteo privado de personas no está comprendido en las Medidas Disconformes del TLC (folio 93); ya que Costa Rica contempló medidas disconformes en el Tratado que la facultaron a extraer del alcance de la cláusula 11.4 Acceso a Mercados, algunas normas reguladoras del sector transpones. Concretamente, en la Lista de Costa Rica del Anexo l se incluyó una medida disconforme relativa al Servicio de Transpone por vía terrestre. Lo reservado en el Anexo I del Tratado, según su texto y notas explicativas, se refiere únicamente a leyes, reglamentos o medidas vigentes; al momento de la suscripción del Tratado, que son disconformes con lo pactado y el Estado Parte decide mantener.No se trata de reservas a sectores o actividades en general, que el Estado podrá regular posteriormente, sino la decisión de conservar medidas vigentes. La Ley 8955 fue promulgada años después del Tratado por lo que son medidas nuevas que no pueden interpretarse como medidas existentes que se pretendían mantener. En segundo lugar, indica que de conformidad con el Tratado, ningún Estado Parte podrá incrementar el grado de disconformidad de sus medidas existentes reservadas y cualquier reforma a alguna de ellas no podrá disminuir su grado de conformidad. La Ley 8955 establece medidas nuevas. Empero, incluso interpretando erróneamente que esta normativa fue reservada en el Anexo I, resulta incuestionable que son medidas que representan un incremento en las restricciones existentes al momento de suscribir el Tratado, algo expresamente prohibido. Y por último, aduce que en el Anexo ll del Tratado, por otra parte, a los Estados panes sí les era posible hacer reservas sobre temas o sectores en los cuales podrían imponer nuevas medidas o regularlos a futuro.Costa Rica no hizo reserva alguna sobre el transporte terrestre remunerado de personas en el Anexo ll, por lo que resulta directamente contraria al Tratado cualquier medida restrictiva nueva sobre este tema. Explica que, en el Anexo I del Tratado se detallan leyes, reglamentos o medidas vigentes al momento de suscribir el Tratado que un Estado desea mantener únicamente. Por su parte, el Anexo ll fue concebido para incluir los sectores o actividades que un Estado se reserva la posibilidad de restringir o regular con medidas nuevas, ello lo analiza y ejemplifica en el folio 99 del Ley No. 8955 (artículo 323 y 334 del Código de Comercio) estaban incorporadas en la Lista de Costa Rica, Anexo l, al momento de suscribir el tratado. Además, la Ley 8955 no había sido promulgada para ese momento, por lo que evidentemente no se hizo una reserva para mantenerla. Se trata de medidas nuevas que por pura lógica temporal no pudieron ser reservadas en el Anexo I. ante lo cual, cualquier modificación de esas normas era posible en tanto no se disminuyera el grado de conformidad de la medida, tal y como estaba en vigor inmediatamente antes de la modificación de los artículos 11.2, 11.3, 11,4 y 11,5; criterio confirmado por el Ministerio de Comercio Exterior (folio 105).Por ello, no se puede omitir que el artículo 2 de la Ley 7969, aumenta el grado de disconformidad del artículo 2 vigente al momento de suscribirse el Tratado. Esta nueva medida, más que una modificación, implica una innovación absoluta, ya que delega en el Estado la titularidad exclusiva del servicio (lo que la Ley No. 7969 anterior no hacía) con lo que restringe la cantidad de proveedores del servicio, concentrándolo en uno solo: El Estado. De igual manera, el hecho de crear una modalidad nueva como lo es SEETAXI, pero restringida a un 3% de las concesiones otorgadas a favor de la modalidad taxi. Implica a todas luces una medida, en los términos del punto 633 de la Nota explicativa al Anexo l del Tratado. Absolutamente discriminatoria. Así, la medida se opone expresamente a la cláusula 1 1.4 de Acceso a Mercados del Tratado que promueve una mayor cantidad de proveedores del servicio, y una mínima regulación sobre la actividad, en atención a los objetivos de liberalización del Tratado.De manera que al aumentar el grado de disconformidad de una medida existente (artículo 2 Ley 7969) con la cláusula I 1.4 del Tratado, la Ley No. 8955 resulta contraria al artículo 1 1.6, inciso I, sub inciso c), supra citado. De lo I del TLC, no facultan a eliminar la figura del porteo del Código de Comercio y a estatizar cualquier traspone remunerado de personas. Por otra parte, aduce que el porteo no fue reservado como materia a regular en el futuro en por el Anexo II (folio 108); Evidentemente no se incluyó el transporte terrestre de personas, por lo que con este sector no es posible imponer nuevas restricciones. Las únicas restricciones permitidas, entonces, son las que estaban vigentes al momento de la suscripción del Tratado y fueron reservadas en el Anexo I (normas que no pueden ser modificadas de forma más restrictiva) Cualquier otra materia o sector no contemplado en dicho anexo, no puede crearse ni modificarse en perjuicio de la obligación de Acceso al Mercado impuesta por el artículo 11.4 del Tratado.Por todo lo anterior, asegura que es incuestionable que las normas de la Ley 8955 que prohibieron el porteo y dejaron a la titularidad exclusiva del Estado todo transpone remunerado de personas, no estaban vigentes al momento de la suscripción del Tratado y por lo tanto no fueron reservados en el Anexo l. La posibilidad de restringir estos sectores posteriormente tampoco fue reservado en el Anexo ll del Tratado, por lo que la Ley es directamente contraria al artículo 11.4 del TLC. Se insiste, que proscribir una actividad económica privada que se desplegaba libremente en ejercicio de la libertad de comercio en todas las formas previstas por la cláusula 11.4 de "Acceso a Mercados", implica limitar la cantidad de proveedores del servicio, desincentiva la inversión y socava absolutamente todos los objetivos del Tratado de Libre Comercio. Asimismo. Prohibir, después de aprobado el TLC, la prestación privada del servicio de transpone, constituye un claro obstáculo inconstitucional al comercio de servicios (cláusula l.2.b) entre los Estados Parte.En palabras simples, mediante una ley de la República. Quebrantando el principio de Pacta Sunt Servanta y todas las cláusulas citadas del Tratado. La Asamblea Legislativa modificó Y expandió el contenido de las medidas disconformes contenidas en el Convenio, verbigracia. Reformó un Tratado Internacional a través de una ley. conculcando no solo el artículo 7 de nuestra propia Constitución Política, sino además los artículos 26, y especialmente el 27 de la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados. Y concluye que el porteo de personas, regulado en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio anterior a la reforma, no estaba contemplado dentro de la lista de "medidas" o notas del Anexo 1 que el Estado se reservaba el derecho de mantener vigentes incluso en contra del Tratado, lo que demuestra su confinidad con el instrumento; tampoco fueron contemplados en la Lista de Costa Rica del Anexo 2 del Tratado, anexo que contempla específicamente -según Nota Explicativa- las materias que el Estado se reservaba regular a ñxturo en materia de Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios, incluso en contra del Tratado.La modificación del artículo 2 de la Ley 7969 sí contemplado como medida disconforme en el Anexo 1 fue modificado otorgando titularidad exclusiva al Estado sobre la actividad de transporte remunerado de personas, se disminuyó el grado de conformidad de la medida con el Tratado. Se extendieron medidas disconformes vía legislativa en contra del Tratado. Por todo lo anterior es incuestionable que las normas de la Ley 8955 que prohibieron el porteo y dejaron a la titularidad exclusiva del Estado todo transporte remunerado de personas, no estaban vigentes al momento de la suscripción del Tratado y por lo tanto no fueron reservados en el Anexo I. La posibilidad de restringir estos sectores posteriormente tampoco fue reservado en el Anexo ll del Tratado, por lo que la Ley es directamente contraria al artículo l 1.4 del TLC. Por otra parte, indica que el artículo 2 de la Ley No. 7969, contemplada como medida disconforme en el Anexo 1 del Tratado.No regulaba la modalidad de SEETAXI, de manera que la reforma introducida a dicho artículo por la Ley No. 8955, no puede tenerse como una "modificación", sino como una innovación, no amparada por el párrafo c) del artículo 1 1.6, inciso 1 del Tratado. En todo caso, la creación de un Servicio Especial Estable de Taxis, que satisface una demanda residual y limitada del mercado, implica una disminución del grado de conformidad de la Ley con la cláusula l 1.4 del Tratado, ya que otorga a los interesados un mero permiso en precario, en lugar de una concesión formal, como laque gozan quienes se dedican a la modalidad "taxi" Asimismo, al tratarse de una modalidad que busca satisfacer una demanda "residual y limitada", con la reforma sólo se pueden otorgar permisos de SEETAXI para un 3% de las concesiones autorizadas por base de operación, lo que a todas luces disminuye el grado de conformidad del artículo 2 de la Ley No. 7969 con la cláusula 11.4 del Tratado.Siendo que, no existe duda que el porteo y el SEETAXI son actividades económicas completamente diferentes, sin embargo se ha querido argumentar en algunas oportunidades que se trata de la misma actividad. Incluso bajo esta interpretación la nacionalización de una actividad privada para sujetarla a estrictas regulaciones y a un máximo de 3% de los taxis en cada zona, es una restricción incompatible con el tratado en cuestión Por último, resalta que la Ley No. 8955 prohíbe lo que el TLC permite y fomenta. Al promulgarse una Ley ordinaria contraria a un Tratado internacional de mayor jerarquía se contraviene el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política, de manera que atentos solicitamos se declare la evidente inconstitucionalidad de la Ley No. 8955 del 7 de julio de 2011. Solicita que se anule por inconstitucional la Ley No. 8955; y de forma subsidiaria, solicita que se anule el artículo 1 de la Ley No. 8955, y por ende las reformas operadas sobre los artículos 323 y 334 del Código de Comercio, Ley N° 3284, de 30 de abril de 1964, que eliminaron la figura del porteo privado.Que se restablecerá en consecuencia; y el párrafo del artículo 2 de la Ley No. 8955, que introdujo un párrafo segundo al artículo 2 de la Ley No. 7969, que otorgó al Estado la titularidad exclusiva del servicio.
3. 3Por resolución de las 15:58 horas del 11 de febrero de 2016 (visible a folio 022 del expediente), se le dio curso a las acciones de inconstitucionalidad tramitadas en los expedientes 15-015456-0007-CO y 16-000852-0007-CO; acumuladas mediante voto No. 2016-002010 de las 09:30 hrs. del 10 de febrero de 2016, confiriéndole audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la República y al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes.
4. 4Los edictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional fueron publicados en los números 50, 51 y 52 del Boletín Judicial, de los días 11, 14 y 15 de marzo del 2016 (folio 485).
5. 5Por escritos recibidos en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 11:10 horas del 1 de marzo de 2016; y a las 13:36 horas del 2 de marzo de 2016, se presenta coadyuvancia por parte de Carolina Alfaro Sojo, en condición de apoderada generalísima sin límite de suma de Transportes Privados Carolina Sociedad Anónima, Pablo Enrique Soto Alfaro, en condición de apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma de Soluciones Avanzadas Sociedad Anónima de Capital Variable; y Wilbert Navarro Cordero,en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de Transportes Privados Marvey Sociedad Anónima; ambos argumentan que, realizan actividades de transporte privado de personas desde el año 2000, siempre bajo la luz del art. 323 del Código de Comercio. Con la reforma aplicada al Código de comercio en 1999, se implementó la figura del “Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi”; misma queda subsumida a las concesiones por 3 años que el Estado emite.Informan que el 7 de julio de 2015 vencieron sus permisos, por lo que gestionaron para reactivar las operaciones de transporte privado. Amplían que desde el 2000 se trabaja conjunto a Soluciones Avanzadas S.A. de C.V; donde brindan servicios en cantones de la provincia de Alajuela. Explican, que dicha actividad y negociación transnacional se ampara en el Cap. ll del TLC aprobado en 2007, mismo que se titula “Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios”. Informan que, con la promulgación de la ley que se impugna (No. 8955), se estableció un sistema de monopolización que maneja el Consejo de Transporte Pública, órgano que emite, o no, los permisos de taxi. Aseguran que dicha ley violentó el proceso natural de formación, ya que, la impugnada, permite la creación de monopolios y para ello debe contarse con la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados; al contrario, dicha ley fue aprobada por una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, con imposibilidad de aprobar leyes que exigen mayoría calificada de votos. Por lo anterior, solicitan se declare proceden e inconstitucional las normas accionadas por los recurrentes (ver folios 130-198 del
6. 6Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de esta Sala a las 15:16 horas del 2 de marzo de 2016, Alejandro Salas Blanco, en su condición de Alcalde de Zarcero, solicita que se le aclare si es cierta la suspensión de cualquier resolución pendiente contra los vehículos Seetaxi (folio 199).
7. 7Por escrito presentado a las 13:06 horas del 04 de marzo de 2016, Gilbert Rojas Rojas en su condición de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad Transportistas Naranjeños Unidos Sociedad Anónima, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, legitimado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Indica que la empresa Transportistas Naranjeños Unidos Sociedad Anónima se constituyó desde el seis de mayo de dos mil cuatro y dentro de sus objetivos se pactó el siguiente: "...La sociedad tendrá por objeto el comercio en general incluido el transporte de personas y de mercadería. A partir de este año, nuestra empresa se empezó a desempeñar en la actividad del transporte de personas bajo la modalidad de contrato de porteo, según lo disponía el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio. El día 07 de julio de 2011 se publica en la Gaceta, la ley ahora impugnada, Ley número 8955, que eliminó la palabra "personas" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y en su lugar dispuso crear el Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi.Cuando fue aprobada la ley cuestionada, el legislador incluyó tres transitorios, con el fin de separar la aplicación futura de la reforma a la Ley No. 7966 en sus artículos 2 y 29, para aquellos "porteadores" que a la hora de la publicación de la misma, pudieran demostrar que habían estado ejerciendo el transporte privado de personas apegados a lo establecido en el artículo 323 siguientes y concordantes del Código de Comercio, esto con la finalidad de proteger de alguna forma, los derechos adquiridos por éstos. De forma tal que la norma contemplada en la reforma a la Ley No. 7969 mediante la Ley No. 8955, se aplicase para aquellas personas que posteriormente desearan realizar el Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi, y para aquéllos que se venían dedicándose a esta actividad económica y que debían ser trasladados al servicio privado de transporte de personas al servicio de transporte público remunerado de personas, ya sea en su condición de "sedanes" o mediante microbuses.El primer transitorio de la ley impugnada, número 8955, contiene una autorización temporal para que los antiguos porteadores continuaran brindando el servicio de transporte. Esta facultad o permiso para que los antiguos "porteadores" entraran a formar parte del Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi, se concedía a quienes quisieran acreditar esta condición y a cambio se les autorizaría por periodos de tres años, "prorrogables", según texto expreso de la ley, por lo que en adelante ya no realizaríamos una actividad de porteo sino de permiso especial estable de taxi, conocido como S.E.E.T.A.X.I. De conformidad con la reforma legal, la empresa TRANSPORTISTAS NARANJEÑOS UNIDOS SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, en su condición de "porteadores", presentó los requisitos de rigor, contemplados en la referida Ley N° 8955, y así, por medio del acuerdo 5.1.5 de la Sesión Ordinaria N° 34-2012 de la Junta Directiva del Consejo de Transporte Público, se autorizó la acreditación para operar esta nueva modalidad de servicio público, también conocida con las siglas "S.E.E.T.A.X.l.", bajo el permiso número 30, el cual les permitió la utilización de treinta y nueve (39) unidades en el Cantón de Naranjo de Alajuela, a partir de julio del año 2012.A partir de los actos formales de habilitación del Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi, dictaminados en su oportunidad por el Estado costarricense, cada uno de los treinta y nueve conductores afiliados a la empresa inició sus operaciones a derecho, a partir del mes de julio del año dos mil doce. No obstante lo anterior, durante el año 2015 (fecha de vencimiento de los permisos), el Consejo de Transporte Público, interpretó y decidió que era admisible la prórroga de los permisos por una única vez, pero que la misma debía limitarse a un máximo del treinta por ciento (30%) de las concesiones autorizadas por cada base de operación de los taxis autorizados (taxis "rojos"). De esta forma, mediante sesión ordinaria número 37-2015, celebrada el 1 de julio de 2015, se conoció y aprobó integralmente el oficio DAJ 2015-002164, el cual, además de admitir la prórroga dejaba claro que se limitaba la prórroga, pero con un límite del 30% por cada base de operación de los taxis "rojos" o concesiones autorizadas.Como consecuencia de la interpretación anterior, siendo que en el cantón de Naranjo de Alajuela existen 50 taxis concesionados, al aplicarse el porcentaje del 30%, la cifra por prorrogar ascendió a tan solo quince unidades. O sea, que de 39 permisos que tenía nuestra empresa, se pasó a 15 para todo el cantón, lo que implicó que esos 15 permisos se debían de repartir entre dos empresas, lo cual significaba, que a favor de su empresa solamente se autorizaron siete permisos y no treinta y nueve como tenía. Debido a lo anterior, mediante resolución contenida en el artículo 7.1.11, sesión ordinaria número 49-2015 del 20 de agosto de 2015 del Consejo de Transporte Público, rechazó la solicitud de prórroga del permiso de servicio especial estable de taxi de la empresa representada, por las razones que en su momento les fue notificado, al impedirse la prórroga y al no estar vigente el transporte privado de personas debido a la existencia de la ley ahora impugnada, están en una situación de ilegalidad que les impide realizar la actividad de transporte, por lo que definitivamente la ley impugnada, y que reformó al artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, les está provocando graves perjuicios.Es más, desde el 01 de octubre del 2015, se giraron instrucciones precisas a la Policía de Tránsito para que retiren los documentos o códigos que utilizaban, por cuanto se consideró que los mismos habían vencido desde el 07 de julio de 2015. De acuerdo con la anterior descripción, la citada empresa, como organización que ha tenido dentro de sus objetivos la actividad del porteo, es titular de un interés legítimo. Esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, impugna y solicita la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley No. 8955 que corresponde a la "Reforma a la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, de 30 de abril de 1964 y de la Ley No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi 22 de diciembre de 1999. Al igual que los recurrentes, esta parte valora que la ley citada, es contraria a los artículos 7, 28, 39, 41, 45, 46, 129 v 140 de la Constitución Política y los principios de jerarquía normativa, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, iniciativa privada, libertad de comercio, libertad contractual y libre elección de los consumidores, como lo indican los recurrentes y a continuación me permito esbozar algunos comentarios sobre aspectos relacionados con las infracciones inconstitucionales acusadas.Sobre la violación al artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, coincide con el recurrente en el sentido de que la normativa impugnada, dispuso la creación de un monopolio público sin una mayoría legislativa calificada, lo cual es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. La ley cuestionada personas y prohibió el contrato de porteo. En efecto, según modificación introducida al artículo 2 de la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad Taxi, N.° 7969 del 22 de diciembre de 1999:" El transporte remunerado de personas, que se realiza por medio de autobuses, busetas, microbuses, taxis, automóviles y cualquier otro tipo de vehículo automotor, ya sea que se ofrezca al público en general, a personas usuarias o a grupos determinados de personas usuarias con necesidades específicas que constituyen demandas especiales, es un servicio público del cual es titular el Estado.Lo anterior independientemente del grado de intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo del servicio o en su fiscalización. [...].". Bajo el argumento de considerar el interés público que involucra supuestamente toda la actividad del transporte remunerado de personas, el legislador optó por declararlo como servicio público, independientemente de la modalidad de que se trate y del grado de intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo o de su fiscalización. Sin duda alguna, la circunstancia de que toda la actividad del transporte remunerado de personas fue declarado "servicio público" y la consecuente eliminación de la figura jurídica del porteo de personas, sustituida por la figura "servicio especial estable de taxi", significa una flagrante violación a derechos constitucionales. Al regular, mediante la figura de la concesión, esta actividad económica, se eliminó por completo la iniciativa privada y se dejó como única alternativa de explotación, los supuestos previstos en la ley.Con ello, la calificación de servicio público para cualquier tipo de transporte privado de personas resulta contrario al artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesario que la ley sea aprobada por al menos 38 diputados (mayoría calificada). Y en este sentido, la Ley No. 8955, fue aprobada en una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, carente de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos. Como bien se indica en los escritos de interposición de la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado, se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja al eliminar la palabra "persona" en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores".A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se declara servicio público, una actividad que se regulaba bajo normas del derecho mercantil, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entro lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento. Por tanto, por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se expone en la presente acción, con la Ley 8955, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas, aspecto que no existía antes de la promulgación de esa normativa. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, por cuanto se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena.Concretamente, considera que existe violación del artículo 208 bis del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, por cuanto el texto legal impugnado, contiene materia de contratación pública, así como la apertura de un monopolio, dos de los supuestos en los que no se puede aplicar dicho artículo del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, lo que pone en peligro la seguridad jurídica, el principio de inderogabilidad singular de los reglamentos y el principio de legalidad. Como se ha (S.E.E.T.A.X.I.) empleando una figura semejante a la concesión pública, lo cual implica la creación de un monopolio estatal. En su criterio, no procedía la aprobación de dicha norma por medio de la vía legislativa abreviada. Sobre la violación al artículo 28 de la Constitución Política, indica que este artículo establece límites materiales a la actuación estatal y un principio derivado de dicha norma es el "orden jurídico de libertad" que orienta nuestra Carta Fundamental.De acuerdo con este artículo, se le permite al legislador incursionar únicamente en la regulación de las acciones privadas que puedan dañar la moral, el orden público o los derechos de terceros. Relativo al concepto de acciones privadas excluidas por su naturaleza de la intromisión estatal, resulta cierto que las actividades monopolizadas (transporte privado de personas) sea de índole o naturaleza privada, por cuanto, en términos generales, se trata simplemente de operaciones mercantiles entre personas, que pactan un simple servicio de transporte y que bien pueden llevarse a cabo por éstos mediante el sistema de libre contratación, intercambio y regulación mínima (economías de mercado). En términos simples, con la declaratoria de servicio público a cualquier tipo de transporte de personas y la eliminación de la figura del porteo se interfirió en el ámbito de la libertad particular, pues no estriba la necesidad de que en este tipo de transporte exista intervención estatal.Incluso, se torna irracional y desproporcionado que para el transporte de mercancías no exista regulación estatal, mientras que para convenir un transporte de personas, si exista una clara interferencia por parte de los poderes públicos. De otro lado, resulta contradictorio, que la propia Sala Constitucional –cuya jurisprudencia es vinculante erga omnes - también se pronunció respecto de la vigencia y constitucionalidad del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, que regulaba el "porteo de personas", en aquél momento. Mediante sentencia n.° 2004-3580, de las 14:43 horas del 14 de abril del 2004, la Sala estableció claramente la diferencia entre el servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas y el contrato de transporte regulado en el Código de Comercio, conocido como "contrato de porteo”, señalando: "Sobre los porteadores en el Código de Comercio y el transporte como servicio público.El artículo 323 del Código de Comercio establece lo siguiente: [...] El porteador o transportista es un auxiliar mercantil. El contrato de transporte regulado en la legislación mercantil tiene como finalidad regular el traslado de personas mercaderías y otros bienes. Es un contrato comercial importante para la economía de un país, pues sirve de enlace entre el productor o el comercializador de bienes y servicios con el consumidor final. Nació como necesidad de los mercantes de trasladarse de un lugar a otro con o sin sus bienes de comercio de modo que en principio sirvió como un instrumento de transporte del mercader en su actividad. Si bien, la doctrina no utiliza los medios de transporte para hacer una clasificación del porteador puede decirse que existe la forma terrestre (como sería en una carreta, o vehículo de carga o ferrocarril), acuática (panga, falúa o crucero trasatlántico) y aérea (planeador, avioneta o avión a propulsión), admitiéndose incluso que se lleve a cabo mediante la fuerza del hombre, la de un animal de carga o de un vehículo motorizado.Pero dada su amplia diversidad e importancia económica para el país, existen áreas reguladas por el Estado en atención a la protección del interés general, declarando algunas formas como servicio público. Por ello resulta ser una figura contractual muy restringida y resulta necesario identificar el origen del contrato de transporte para determinar si se trata de un acuerdo comercial o si se dirige a satisfacer una actividad que el Estado declaró servicio público. Si es esto último, no puede ocupar el lugar de actividades previamente regladas normativamente como lo sería por ejemplo, el transporte aéreo, que la reguló mediante la Ley No. 5150, Ley General de Aviación Civil, en cuyo caso para ofrecerlo un particular, sea persona física o jurídica, debe ostentar un certificado de explotación para transporte aéreo. De igual modo los servicios de carga, los ferroviarios, y marítimos, podrían estar en esta categoría contractual, pero, si la trascendencia que tienen para la sociedad va más allá de la satisfacción de una necesidad privada, ello determinará la legitimidad estatal en la promulgación de normas de orden público.De este modo, en el caso de transporte de personas depende de cómo se origina la relación contractual, la actividad resulta ilícita si se dirige a satisfacer una necesidad del público en general, suplantando así a los concesionarios de transporte público, en cuyo caso el Decreto Ejecutivo acierta en considerado una actividad al margen de la ley. Es precisamente aquí donde radica el problema planteado por el accionante pues sostiene que no se le permite llevar a cabo los diversos contratos de transporte de personas, con lo que interfiere en su libre voluntad y su libertad contractual. Pero el hecho jurídico relevante en discusión es el traslado de personas a cambio de un precio, con sus pertenencias o no, como una actividad irrestricta, cuando desde la promulgación de la Ley No. 3503 y luego la de la Ley No. 7593, se ha declarado como servicio público el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad taxi, y consecuentemente ello convirtió al contrato de porte en una actividad limitada y residual.En igual sentido la Procuraduría General de la República, mediante dictamen número 043 del 20/03/2013, admitió la existencia del contrato mercantil de transporte de personas. Como se aprecia de lo anterior, en los pronunciamientos y sentencia transcrita, el contrato de porte, en su modalidad de transporte de personas, constituía una actividad limitada y residual, resultando ilegal, por ejemplo, que los porteadores transitaran por las vías públicas negociando casualmente u ofertando sus servicios coincidentemente con el servicio público de taxis, o en busca de la demanda de transporte de pasajeros en la vía pública. Sin embargo, con la reforma introducida y ahora impugnada tales conceptos y pronunciamientos fueron eliminados y la posibilidad de contratar libremente se vio seriamente disminuida, lo cual atenta en buena medida con el artículo 28 Constitucional. Sobre la violación al artículo 7 de la Constitución, indica que la ley cuestionada además transgrede la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política.El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se podía excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transporte privado. Siendo que Costa Rica, para el momento de la aprobación del tratado (Diciembre 2007), contaba con servicios privados de transporte de personas, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una Ley que hubiera establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. En el Capítulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual, la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un Acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el "trato nacional" que se tenía al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi.Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Con la ley que se impugna, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), transgrediendo la Asamblea Legislativa, el tratado y con ello atribuyéndose una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales. Algunos aducen que la posibilidad de prohibir del porteo y de convertir todo transporte remunerado de personas como un servicio público, fue reservada por Costa Rica en las medidas disconformes incluidas en el Anexo I. Sin embargo, consideramos cuestionable tal argumento, por lo siguiente:1) Lo reservado en el Anexo 1 del Tratado, según Lista de Costa Rica, en lo referente a Transporte por Vía Terrestre - Transporte de Pasajeros, se refiere únicamente a leyes y reglamentos vigentes al momento de la suscripción del Tratado, que resultan disconformes con lo pactado y que Costa Rica desea mantener. Tampoco podemos interpretar que Costa Rica se reservó o sector económico o la actividad del transporte en general como una medida disconforme. La ley impugnada fue promulgada años después de la aprobación del Tratado, por lo que debe interpretarse como "medidas nuevas" que no fueron previstas en el Tratado y que en consecuencia resultan contrarias a este convenio.2) De otro lado, según el Tratado, ningún Estado Parte podrá incrementar el grado de disconformidad de sus medidas existentes reservadas y cualquier reforma a alguna de ellas no podrá disminuir su grado de conformidad. La cuestionada, no solamente establece una medida nueva -eliminación del contrato de porteo- sino que además representa una modificación que incrementa la restricción existente sobre Transporte Público, lo cual definitivamente está prohibido por el tratado.3) En el anexo II del Tratado, tampoco Costa Rica hizo reserva o anotó disconformidad sobre algún sector específico a fin de imponer futuras medidas o regulaciones. Específicamente Costa Rica no hizo reserva alguna sobre el transporte remunerado de personas en el Anexo II, por lo que la reforma legal cuestionada resulta restrictiva y contraria al acuerdo comercial en estudio. Un ejemplo de lo anterior lo encontramos en los sectores de Salud y Educación, donde Costa Rica, permite la iniciativa privada y únicamente están regulados no estatizados o monopolizados. No hay duda que estamos frente a una reforma interna, realizada por Costa Rica, que afecta o transgredió el tratado comentado. Solicita se declare con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955, "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de 1999" por violación de los artículos: 28, 39, 41, 45. 46, 129 v 140 de la Constitución Política y los principios de jerarquía normativa, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, iniciativa privada, libertad de comercio, libertad contractual y libre elección de los consumidores.
8. 8Por escrito presentado a las 13:36 horas del 02 de marzo de 2016, Wilbert Navarro Cordero en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de Transportes Privados Marvey Sociedad Anónima, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto.En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, la empresa Transportes Privados Marvey Sociedad Anónima, se ha dedicado al transporte privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2008 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde el 2005 como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediante contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servicio, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio vigente antes de su reforma reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana, y Centroamérica, aprobado en diciembre del 2007, ubicada en la clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo).Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de 1999, se elimina la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea dentro de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi, N° 7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado por permisos de operación dados por el Estado. Obligándosenos a subsistir en la realización de nuestra labor bajo esta nueva figura con un permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a nosotros afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 07 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido nuestros permisos de operación reactivamos nuestro servicio nuevamente como "porteadores privados" haciendo uso de nuestras bases operativas en los cantones donde brindamos el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicio de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores.Servicio que venimos prestando ininterrumpidamente en los Cantones de San Marcos de Tarrazú y Santa María de Dota, de la Provincia de San José, Costa Rica, haciendo uso de las bases de operación en esos cantones desde el año 2005, y uso de las patentes municipales y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capítulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase: 6431: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público.Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas, es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos. Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como lo indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento.Por tanto, por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se expone en la presente acción, con la Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa.La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política. El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transporte privado, ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi.En el Capítulo ll "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el "trato nacional" que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores".Con esta misma ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución, su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales. Consideran que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales.Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.
9. 9Por escrito presentado a las 09:20 horas del 07 de marzo de 2016, Byron Rodolfo Marcos Marcos en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad Porteadores León Trece SJT Sociedad Anónima, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto.En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, la empresa PORTEADORES LEON TRECE SJ.T. SOCIEDAD ANONIMA, se ha dedicado al transporte privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2005 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde el 1995 como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediantes contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servicio, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del código de comercio vigente antes de su reforma , reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el tratado de Libre Comercio con carretera (porteo). Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de 1999, se elimina la palabra "persona "del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transpone remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N° 7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado por permisos de operación dados por el estado.Obligándoseles a subsistir en la realización de su labor bajo esta nueva figura con permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a nosotros afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 7 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido los permisos de operación reactivaron el servicio nuevamente como "porteadores privados" haciendo uso de nuestras las operativas en los cantones donde brindan el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicios de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores. Servicio que vienen prestando ininterrumpidamente en el Cantón de San José, de la Provincia de San José, Costa Rica, haciendo usos de la base de operación en ese cantón desde el año 2005, y uso de la patente municipal y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capitulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios " del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase: 6431: servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo).La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos.Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como la indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento.Por tanto, indica que por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se expone en la presente acción, con la Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa.La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política. El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transpone privado. Ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi.En el Capítulo II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el "trato nacional" que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores".Con esta misma Ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales. Considera que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales.Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.
10. 10Por escrito presentado a las 09:28 horas del 07 de marzo de 2016, Roberth Rodríguez Hernández en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad SE M TRA SAN RAFAEL SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto.En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, la empresa SE M TRA SAN RAFAEL SOCIEDAD ANONIMA, se ha dedicado al transpone privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2005 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde el 1995 como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediantes contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servicio, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del código de comercio vigente antes de su reforma , reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el tratado de Libre Comercio con carretera (porteo). Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de1999, se elimina la palabra "persona "del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N° 7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado por permisos de operación dados por el Estado.Obligándoseles a subsistir en la realización de su labor bajo esta nueva figura con permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a ellos afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 7 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido sus permisos de operación reactivaron su servicio nuevamente como " portadores privados" haciendo uso de las bases operativas en los cantones donde brindan el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicios de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores, servicio que vienen prestando ininterrumpidamente en el Cantón de San Rafael, de la Provincia de Heredia, Costa Rica , haciendo usos de la base de operación en ese cantón desde el año 2005, y uso de la patente municipal y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capitulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios del tratado de libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase: 6431: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo).La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos.Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este articulo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como la indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento.Por tanto, indica que por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se expone en la presente acción, con la Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa.La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política. El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transporte privado. Ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi.En el Capítulo II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el “trato nacional” que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores".Con esta misma Ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales. Consideran que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales.Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.
11. 11Por escrito presentado a las 09:37 horas del 07 de marzo de 2016, Edwin Gerardo Zamora Salas en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad TRANSPORTES PRIVADOS HNOS ZAMORA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto.En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, la empresa TRANSPORTES PRIVADOS HNOS ZAMORA SOCIEDAD ANONIMA, se ha dedicado al transporte privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2010 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde el 2003, como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediantes contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servicio, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del código de comercio vigente antes de su reforma , reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el tratado de Libre Comercio con carretera (porteo). Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transpone remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de1999, se elimina la palabra "persona "del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N° 7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado por permisos de operación dados por el estado.Obligándoseles a subsistir en la realización de su labor bajo esta nueva figura con permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a ellos afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 7 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido sus permisos de operación reactivaron su servicio nuevamente como "porteadores privados" haciendo uso de las bases operativas en los cantones donde brindamos el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicios de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores. Servicio que venimos prestando ininterrumpidamente en el Cantón de Poas, de la Provincia de Alajuela, Costa Rica, haciendo usos de la base de operación en ese cantón desde el año 2010, y uso de la patente municipal y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capitulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios "del tratado de libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase 6431.Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regula res de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos.Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como la indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento.Por tanto, indica que por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política.El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transpone privado. Ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi. En el Capítulo II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el “trato nacional” que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado.Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores". Con esta misma Ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales.Consideran que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales. Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.
12. 12Por escrito presentado a las 09:39 horas del 07 de marzo de 2016, Irma Isabel Loría Araya en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad de SERVICIO DE TRANSPORTES PRIVADOS LUMA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto.En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, la empresa SERVICIO DE TRANSPORTES PRIVADOS LUMA. SOCIEDAD ANONIMA, se ha dedicado al transporte privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2007 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde el 2005, como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediante contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servicio, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del código de comercio vigente antes de su reforma , reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el tratado de Libre Comercio con carretera (porteo). Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de 1999, se elimina la palabra "persona "del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N°7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado por permisos de operación dados por el estado.Obligándoseles a subsistir en la realización de su labor bajo esta nueva figura con permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a ellos afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 7 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido sus permisos de operación reactivaron su servicio nuevamente como "porteadores privados" haciendo uso de las bases operativas en los cantones donde brindamos el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicios de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores. Servicio que vienen prestando ininterrumpidamente en el Cantón de Cañas, de la Provincia de Guanacaste, Costa Rica, haciendo usos de la base de operación en ese cantón desde el año 2007, y uso de la patente municipal y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capitulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios "del tratado de libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase 6431.Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regula res de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos.Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como la indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento.Por tanto, indica que por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se expone en la presente acción, con la Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa.La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política. El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transpone privado. Ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi.En el Capítulo II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el “trato nacional” que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores".Con esta misma Ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales. Consideran que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales.Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.
13. 13Por escrito presentado a las 13:09 horas del 07 de marzo de 2016, Carlos Rigoberto Solís Castro en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad Transportes CR Porteadores Sociedad Anónima, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto.En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, la empresa TRANSPORTES CR PORTEADORES SOCIEDAD ANONIMA, se ha dedicado al transporte privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2006 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde el 2005 como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediantes contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servicio, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del código de comercio vigente antes de su reforma, reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el tratado de Libre Comercio con carretera (porteo). Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de 1999, se elimina la palabra "persona "del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N° 7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado v regulado por permisos de operación dados por el estado.Obligándoseles a subsistir en la realización de la labor bajo esta nueva figura con permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a ellos afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 7 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido los permisos de operación reactivaron el servicio nuevamente como “porteadores privados" haciendo uso de las bases operativas en los cantones donde brindan el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicios de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores. Servicio que vienen prestando ininterrumpidamente en el Cantón de Valverde Vega, de la Provincia de Alajuela, Costa Rica, haciendo usos de la base de operación en ese cantón desde el año 2006, y uso de la patente municipal y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capitulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios "del tratado de libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase 6431.Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regula res de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos.Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como la indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento.Por tanto, indica que por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política.El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transpone privado. Ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi. En el Capítulo II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el “trato nacional” que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado.Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores". Con esta misma Ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales.Consideran que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales. Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.
14. 14Por escrito presentado a las 10:03 horas del 07 de marzo de 2016, Luis Enrique Moreno Carmona en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad Unión de Porteadores LÑMC dos mil seis sociedad anónima, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto.En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, la empresa UNIÓN DE PORTEADORES LÑMC DOS MIL SEIS SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, se ha dedicado al transporte privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2006 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde el 2000 como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediantes contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servicio, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del código de comercio vigente antes de su reforma, reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el tratado de Libre Comercio con carretera (porteo). Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de 1999, se elimina la palabra "persona "del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N° 7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado por permisos de operación dados por el estado.Obligándoseles a subsistir en la realización de su labor bajo esta nueva figura con permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a ellos afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 7 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido los permisos de operación reactivaron el servicio nuevamente como “porteadores privados" haciendo uso de las bases operativas en los cantones donde brindan el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicios de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores. Servicio que venían prestando ininterrumpidamente en el Cantón de Santa Cruz, de la Provincia de Guanacaste, Costa Rica, haciendo usos de la base de operación en ese cantón desde el año 2006, y uso de la patente municipal y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capitulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios "del tratado de libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase 6431.Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regula res de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos.Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este articulo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como la indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento.Por tanto, indica que por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se expone en la presente acción, con la Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa.La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política. El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transpone privado. Ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi.En el Capítulo II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el “trato nacional” que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores".Con esta misma Ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales. Consideran que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales.Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.
15. 15La Procuraduría General de la República rindió su informe por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de esta Sala a las 14:30 horas del 7 de marzo de 2016 (folio 310 del expediente). Sobre el fondo del asunto, señala que los accionantes consideran que la Ley n.° 8955, es inconstitucional por crear un monopolio público en materia de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos modalidad taxi, sin seguir el procedimiento legislativo establecido para tales efectos (votación calificada) y por violentar el Tratado de Libre Comercio con los Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica. Sobre el particular, considera la Procuraduría General de la República que no llevan razón los accionantes en sus reparos y, por el contrario, no es cierto que la ley impugnada infrinja las normas y principios constitucionales indicados. Explica que el transporte remunerado de personas, en sus diversas modalidades, constituye un servicio público.En efecto, la Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores, n.° 3503 del 10 de mayo de 1965, califica al transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores colectivos como un servicio público regulado, controlado y vigilado por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, cuya prestación puede ser delegada en los particulares a quienes se autorice En el mismo sentido, asegura que la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, n.° 7969 del 22 de diciembre de 1999, definió a este medio de transporte como un servicio público que se explota mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa, con los procedimientos especiales establecidos en esta ley y su reglamento (artículo 2). E indica que mediante la reforma introducida al artículo 2 de la Ley 7969, precisamente por el artículo 2 de la Ley 8955, del 16 de junio del 2011, se establece como servicio público el transporte remunerado de personas en cualquier tipo de vehículo automotor.Ahora bien, indica que el concepto de servicio público no es estático sino que, por el contrario, se trata de un concepto cambiante, pues depende de la calificación que realice el legislador de una actividad económica en un momento histórico determinado. La “publicatio” es, precisamente, la declaratoria constitucional o legal que define una actividad como servicio público. Esta declaratoria puede consistir, simplemente, en la definición de la actividad como de interés público, o bien, en la calificación expresa de la actividad como servicio público. Por su parte, aduce que la Procuraduría General de la República, en relación con el concepto y las notas características de los servicios públicos, ha señalado que, segúnla doctrina francesa y española, el servicio público es una actividad administrativa que tiene por objeto la prestación de un servicio público a fin de satisfacer una necesidad colectiva.Asimismo, afirma que el servicio público tiene tres características: actividad propia de la Administración; procura una prestación a la población; y garantiza dicha prestación de forma efectiva. Ante ello, anota que el servicio público es propio de la Administración, sin excluir la posibilidad de participación de los particulares en la gestión pública; mediante la concesión de un servicio público. Indica, de acuerdo con la doctrina española, que el servicio público en su acepción estricta, constituye una variedad de la actividad administrativa a fin de poner en disposición de los particulares las prestaciones que le sean útiles; e indica que supone la decisión del poder público de garantizar dicha prestación –publicatio-.Explica que el servicio se caracteriza por tener titularidad pública –sustraída de la iniciativa privada-; y la prestación que satisfaga los intereses generales de la comunidad, a fin de asegurar a la población una digna calidad de vida.Ante lo cual, indica que la naturaleza pública presupone la declaratoria por parte del poder público; y señala que es posible la participación de sujetos no estatales en dicha prestación, en tanto obtengan la autorización del Estado. En relación a los efectos de la declaratoria de una determinada actividad como servicio público, asegura que, en primer lugar implica su nacionalización -atribuyéndole al Estado su titularidad, de forma tal que solo éste o un particular autorizado, puede brindar el servicio-; y en segundo lugar, dicha actividad sale del comercio de los hombres, siendo que los particulares sólo pueden dedicarse a ella mediante concesiones o permisos estatales. Ahora bien, indica que, en relación al transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores –en sus distintas modalidades autobuses y taxi-, no cabe ninguna duda de que constituye un servicio público; siendo que por medio de la ley impugnada, el legislador, dentro del marco permitido por la Constitución Política, optó por declarar como servicio público toda la actividad del transporte remunerado de personas, en atención a la trascendencia que dicha actividad tiene para la sociedad costarricense.En efecto, apunta que, según la modificación introducida por la citada ley a la Ley n.° 7969, el transporte remunerado de personas, independientemente del tipo de vehículo automotor que se utilice, de las personas a las que vaya dirigido –ya sea que se ofrezca al público en general o a personas usuarias de grupos determinados- y de la intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo o fiscalización, constituye un servicio público. Y expresa que, en consecuencia, a partir de la vigencia de la Ley n.° 8955, ninguna persona particular –física o jurídica- puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva –concesión o permiso- conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Ahora bien, por su naturaleza de servicio público, es lógico que el servicio remunerado de personas deba ser brindado por el Estado con carácter de monopolio; empero, bien puede ser delegado en particulares mediante concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate.Cita varios precedentes constitucionales y apunta que este Tribunal reconoce que los servicios públicos, por su naturaleza, deben ser brindados por el Estado en condiciones de monopolio. No obstante, reconoce que puedan ser asumidos por particulares, vía concesión o permiso, tal y como lo autorizan las leyes que regulan el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas. Por otra parte, impugnada crea un monopolio público a favor del Estado y que, por tal razón, debió ser aprobada con mayoría calificada (38 votos). E insiste que, lo que la ley en cuestión hace es declarar toda la actividad del transporte remunerado de personas como servicio público y tal regulación sí podía delegarse en una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena. Inclusive, ya la Sala Constitucional avaló la constitucionalidad del procedimiento seguido en la aprobación de la Ley aquí impugnada, mediante la resolución número 2011-04778; y aprecia que al analizar la constitucionalidad del proyecto de ley que dio lugar a la ley aquí impugnada, fue categórica en afirmar, primero, que no crea ningún monopolio ni práctica monopolística, segundo, que el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política no crea una reserva de ley agravada para la imposición de regulaciones o límites a la libertad de comercio y, tercero, que sí resultaba procedente la delegación de un proyecto de ley de tal naturaleza en una la Comisión con Potestad Plena Legislativa.Finalmente, Comercio con los Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica y, en particular, el Capítulo 11 de dicho Tratado, al restringir la posibilidad de servicio de transporte privado y con ello la obligación de ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el trato nacional que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Sobre el particular, la Procuraduría considera que el Capítulo 11 del Tratado en referencia, no resulta aplicable en tratándose de servicios públicos. Y así lo puso de manifiesto mediante la Opinión Jurídica n.° 111-2015, del 25 de setiembre del 2015, al evacuar una consulta formulada por un señor Diputado sobre la posible autorización de la empresa UBER. En lo que interesa, la Procuraduría indicó que dicho Tratado, en el Capítulo Once, regula lo referente al “Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios” y la figura jurídica de “trato nacional”; aprecia que el mismo Tratado de Libre Comercio en referencia, de manera expresa, establece que el Capítulo Once, referente al Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios, no aplica en el caso de servicios suministrados en el ejercicio de facultades gubernamentales, definiendo como tales “(…) todo servicio que no se suministre en condiciones comerciales ni en competencia con uno o varios proveedores de servicios.” Por lo cual, a juicio de la Procuraduría, no cabe duda que los servicios públicos y en particular el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, en sus diferentes modalidades, en razón de su nacionalización, le competen al Estado y solo éste o las personas a las que expresamente autorice, podrían brindarlo.En efecto, el servicio en cuestión no puede ser brindado a la libre por las personas físicas o jurídicas interesadas, pues se requiere, necesariamente, de una autorización previa –concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de transporte de que se trate- de parte del Consejo de Transporte Público. Asimismo, apunta que tampoco resulta aplicable en la especie la figura jurídica del “trato nacional”, consagrada en el numeral 11.2.1 del referido Tratado de Libre Comercio. La limitante o requisito de contar con una autorización previa de parte del Consejo de Transporte Público para brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, se impone en razón de la naturaleza pública del servicio y no con ocasión de la nacionalidad de la persona o empresa que pretenda brindarlo. En otras palabras, la limitante para brindar el servicio alcanza tanto a las personas físicas o jurídicas nacionales como a las extranjeras, de modo que no hay discriminación alguna en razón de la nacionalidad de la empresa interesada.E indica que, las cláusulas establecidas en el Capítulo 11 del CAFTA no resultan aplicables al servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, toda vez que el mismo Tratado, concretamente en el artículo 11.1.6, excluye de su aplicación los servicios que se brindan en ejercicio de las facultades gubernamentales. Y no cabe duda que los servicios públicos y en particular el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, en sus diferentes modalidades, en razón de su nacionalización, le competen al Estado y solo éste o las personas a las que expresamente autorice podrían brindarlo. Solicita que se declare sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad, en virtud de que no aprecia roce constitucional alguno en la Ley cuestionada.
16. 16Según constancia al folio 489 no aparece que el Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes haya presentado escrito o documento alguno, para la audiencia conferida (folio 489 del expediente digital).
17. 17Por medio de escrito presentado a las 11:10 horas del 8 de marzo de 2016, Byron Rojas en su condición de porteador se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo indicando que existe una terrible persecución de parte de la policía de tránsito a los porteadores, sin embargo, el asunto ya no solo afecta a las personas que se dedican a manejar un vehículo, sino que es cuestión de trabajo de muchas personas y sus familias. Indica que existe una evidente problemática laboral en personas mayores de 35 años, situación que incrementa el porcentaje de desempleo pues muchas empresas transnacionales se van del país. Solicita que con la mayor brevedad se dicte la sentencia de la acción de inconstitucionalidad planteada.
18. 18Por escrito presentado a las 11:09 horas del 08 de marzo de 2016, Carlos Luis Montero Martínez en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad Corporación Manuel Antonio Travel Sociedad Anónima, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto.En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos -, ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, la empresa CORPORACION MANUEL ANTONIO TRAVEL SOCIEDAD ANONIMA, se ha dedicado al transporte privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2005 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde 1995 como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediantes contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servido, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del código de comercio vigente antes de su reforma , reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el tratado de Libre Comercio con carretera (porteo). Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de 1999, se elimina la palabra "persona "del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N°7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado por permisos de operación dados por el estado.Obligándoseles a subsistir en la realización de su labor bajo esta nueva figura con permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a ellos afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 7 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido los permisos de operación reactivaron el servicio nuevamente como " porteadores privados" haciendo uso de las bases operativas en los cantones donde brindan el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicios de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores. Servicio que han venido prestando ininterrumpidamente en el Cantón de Aguirre-Quepos, de la Provincia de Puntarenas, Costa Rica, haciendo usos de la base de operación en ese cantón desde el año 2005, y uso de la patente municipal y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capitulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios "del tratado de libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase 6431.Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regula res de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos.Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como la indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento.Por tanto, indica que por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se expone en la presente acción, con la Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa.La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política. El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transpone privado. Ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi.En el Capítulo II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el “trato nacional” que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente se puede ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores".Con esta misma ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales. Consideran que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales.Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.
19. 19Por escrito presentado a las 16:40 horas del 08 de marzo de 2016, José Alexis Lara Jiménez, en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad Transportes Unidos RUALFA Sociedad Anónima, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto.En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, la sociedad Unión Nacional de Porteadores- UNAPORTE, se ha dedicado al transporte privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2004 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde el 2002 como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediantes contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servido, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del código de comercio vigente antes de su reforma, reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el tratado de Libre Comercio con carretera (porteo). Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de 1999, se elimina la palabra "persona "del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N°7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado por permisos de operación dados por el Estado.Obligándoles a subsistir en la realización de su labor bajo esta nueva figura con permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a ellos afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 7 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido los permisos de operación reactivaron el servicio nuevamente como "porteadores privados" haciendo uso de las bases operativas en los cantones donde brindan el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicios de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores. Servicio que han venido prestando ininterrumpidamente en el Cantón de Alfaro Ruiz, de la Provincia de Alajuela, Costa Rica, haciendo usos de la base de operación en ese cantón desde el año 2004, y uso de la patente municipal y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capitulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios "del tratado de libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase 6431.Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos.Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este articulo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como la indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento.Por tanto, indica que por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política.El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transpone privado. Ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una Ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi. En el Capítulo II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el “trato nacional” que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado.Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores". Con esta misma Ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales.Consideran que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales. Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan se declare con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.
20. 20Por escrito presentado a las 11:06 horas del 08 de marzo de 2016, Maribel Porras Arrieta, Felipe Di Bella Porras y otros, se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, la ley N° 8955, resulta ilegal, esto por cuanto es inconstitucional, el procedimiento de su creación es viciado, contrario a derecho, en el procedimiento del proyecto de ley N° 17874 que a su vez dio origen a la ley 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión legislativa Plena, sin la competencia para aprobar tal ley por imperativo legal del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política de la República de Costa Rica, ya que dicha Comisión y ninguna Comisión puede conocer y aprobar una Ley que requiere de votación de calificada de mayoría (38 votos), por imperativo legal Constitucional, he aquí la inconstitucionalidad de la ley N°8955. La normativa relacionada al porteo y transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad especial estable de taxi, violenta en forma clara y abiertamente los artículos 07, 46, 129, 140 de nuestra Carta Magna, aunado a ello las limitantes que se imponen no derivan solo de la ley sino de los actos administrativos, es como al tenor del artículo 75 de la Ley de jurisdicción constitucional, al día de hoy este asunto de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad especial estable de taxi, se encuentra pendiente de resolver en muchas instancias, existen diversos procesos contenciosos administrativos abiertos, es una cuestión de carácter público por cuanto se ha echado vino en odres viejos y los mismos se han roto.Nuestra Constitución Política consagra el derecho de libertad comercial, ampliamente desarrollado jurisprudencialmente, principios que ha sido violentado con la reforma al numeral 323 del código de comercio, así mismo dicha reforma al artículo 323, deviene contrario sensu a crear un ambiente de equidad y justicia en un Estado democrático Social de Derecho, a más bien crear una lesión colectiva también de doble connotación, antes de la reformas y creación inconstitucional de la ley 8955, la actividad de porteo de personas, más bien tenía un marco jurídico, después de la ley 8955 y leyes y reglamentos conexos se camba de un amparo legal, a un desamparo legal. Efectivamente la Ley N°8955 es contraria al ordenamiento jurídico que le precedía, en concreto el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, la Constitución Política artículo 46, y el Tratado de libre Comercio con Estados Unidos República Dominicana y Centroamérica, la ley N° 8955, restringe la libertad de comercio, al mismo tiempo que irrespeta el principio de supremacía de la realidad y jerarquía de las normas.Nuevamente se tiende al Monopolio del Estado pero en manos de un grupo de taxistas rojos (concesionarios), dicho de otra forma, la ley 7969, pasó el transporte privado de personas a público, de ahí la nueva naturaleza que ha de ser amparada por nuestro ordenamiento jurídico. La ley 8955 modificó y adiciono la ley 7969, que en conjunto con la reforma al artículo 323 del código de Comercio, creó la figura de SEETAXI, lo que constituye el Transporte remunerado de personas como un servicio general y público, lo anterior conlleva a dos escenarios jurídicos, primero: debe declararse inconstitucional la ley N°8955, y por lo consiguiente volver a su estado original el artículo 323 del código de Comercio que permitía el porteo como transporte de personas, esto por cuanto al momento de aprobarse la ley N°8955, no se cumplió con la votación del proyecto de ley por al menos 38 diputados(as), por lo tanto la ley N°8955 se aprobó al margen del Reglamento Interno de la Asamblea Legislativa y en abierta contraposición a la Constitución Política, no debió la Comisión Plena Segunda por mandato expreso constitucional conocer y aprobar la ley N°8955 por otro lado la ley 8955, es totalmente opuesta al Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos República Dominicana y Centroamérica (TLC), este Tratado si cumplió con el formalismo y requisitos legales y al ser ratificado por la Asamblea Legislativa, no solo se integró a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, sino que prevalece sobre el mismo según lo dispone nuestra propia Constitución y el Derecho Internacional, por lo tanto al tenor de la suscripción y aprobación del TLC, se debe ofrecer inclusive al inversionista extranjero el "trato nacional" que existía al momento de suscribir el Tratado, por lo que es válido afirmar que Costa Rica, más bien liberó los servicios entre ellos el transporte privado de personas, con la aprobación del TLC, siendo que Costa Rica se obliga a introducir y respetar dentro del ordenamiento jurídico sus disposiciones, por lo que las mismas deben ser respetadas por el país, lo cual violenta la ya cuestionada ley 8955, por todo lo anterior es claro que existió una miopía jurídica a la hora de emitir la Ley 8955 y la reforma al artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, debido a la premura, se pasó por alto el debido camino de la elaboración de la ley, y se dejó de lado normativa que era y sigue siendo imperante por estar estatuida en Tratados Internacionales, siendo que se debe retrotraer los efectos y reivindicar lo suscrito en el TLC, regresando todo a su estado original , declarando inconstitucional la ley N°8955, y modificando el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio a su estado original como antes de ser modificado por la ley inconstitucional N° 8955.El TLC, determino que no se puede excluir, ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transporte privado, siendo que nuestro país, no estableció reserva de ley al respecto de la actividad comercial de transporte privado de personas por lo cual la ley 8955, es clara y fehacientemente violatoria y opositora al TLC, que fue debidamente ratificado por la Asamblea Legislativa, segundo escenario jurídico, de no declararse la inconstitucionalidad de la ley N°8955, lo cual por sí mismo es un grave error entonces al interpretar auténticamente la ley 8955, se declara de carácter público y por ende abierto el monopolio del transporte de personas en modalidad taxi, siendo que el Estado no debe intervenir en dicha actividad, sino simplemente vigilar y controlar pero de ninguna forma limitar la prestación del servicio, por la naturaleza pública del mismo, conllevando la aplicación del principio de mayorías sobre minorías, es decir: se impone el interés de la colectividad sobre el interés individual, véase lo primero (colectividad) como el interés de un gran sector de la población que requiere del transporte, y lo segundo (individualidad), como el gremio de taxis rojos.El Voto 2011-04778, dispuso que "el servicio de transporte de personas en su totalidad ha sido declarado servicio público". La Ley del 22 de diciembre de 1999, estableció un monopolio en relación al transporte modalidad taxi, contrario a lo que establece el numeral 46 de la constitución Política, la cronología jurídica nos demuestra que las modificaciones al código de Comercio y a la Ley 7969, son inconstitucionales por cuanto ha afectado de manera injusta a muchísimas personas que a lo largo del tiempo habían, y han venido desarrollando esta actividad al apego de la Ley articulo 323 antiguo del código de Comercio, y luego ya durante varios años conforme a la ley 8955, no vemos cual es el impedimento o diferencia en cuanto al Estado delegue en personas físicas o jurídicas la posibilidad de brindar un servicio que originalmente le correspondía, ya sea bajo concesión o permiso especial de SEETAXI, ambas figuras concesión o permiso, buscan de alguna manera un mismo fin, el cual es brindar un servicio al optante que más que un vocablo, concesión o permiso en la práctica da el mismo resultado.El espíritu de la ley en todo caso es establecer un servicio que hoy es una realidad y que esta tutelado de manera equivocada por la ley N°8955, ya que con antelación el Código de Comercio contenía en su numeral 323, la palabra personas, y eso fue lo que elimino el legislador, mediante la normativa 8955, que está revestida de inconstitucionalidad. Son múltiples las razones por las que el Estado Costarricense debe ordenar y garantizar la actividad de SEETAXI, tanto vía administrativa, como jurisprudencial se ha declarado de carácter público, el Transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, en tal sentido véase y sopese lo que indica la opinión jurídica OJ-1 54-2014 de la PGR, afirma que "el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad taxi se considera un servicio público que será explotado mediante concesión o permiso...", entonces priva el interés público al hacerse este pronunciamiento y ha de imponerse sobre los intereses de un gremio particular cual es el gremio de taxistas rojos, en un mismo sentido sí la Autoridad reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, contiene varias definiciones de servicio público, como "toda actividad que por su importancia para el desarrollo sostenible del país sea calificada por la Asamblea Legislativa", lo que conlleva que más que legalidad es realidad, oportunidad y conveniencia, oferta y demanda Sentencia N°51 7-98.¿Cuál es el obstáculo de que el Estado autorice a un particular a brindar el servicio? ya lo ha hecho durante largo tiempo mediante concesiones por qué no complementar con un permiso especial que sea renovable una vez cumplido el plazo, bajo cumplimiento de ciertos requisitos. Muchos costarricenses dedicados a al SEETAXI, han cambiado su vehículo por un mejor modelo, adquiriendo deudas con entidades financieras, porque se les dijo que un requisito de prorroga una vez cumplido el plazo de tres años del permiso especial, era mejorar el modelo del vehículo, a la luz de la Ley N° 3503 del 10 de mayo de 1965, la misma califica al transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores colectivos como un servicio público regulado, controlado y vigilado por el Estado mediante el MOPT, cuya prestación puede ser delegada en particulares, de lo anterior se desprende dos cosas, como ya se indicado la naturaleza y carácter público del servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, y segundo la obligación del Estado de ejercer un control y vigilancia sobre quienes brindan el servicio.La actividad de porteo, porque en realdad no se eliminó la figura de porteo de nuestra legislación , sino tan sólo la palabra porteo de personas, para en su lugar dejar porteo de cosas o noticias, creando un parche de ley mediante la Ley N°8955, la actividad de transporte remunerado de personas SEETAXI, va dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas que ya sea por su expresa voluntad o porque los taxis rojos no alcanzan a darles el servicio, constituye entonces una necesidad básica y primordial de un sector de la población costarricense, que debe ser atendida de manera inmediata, figura de oferta y demanda, que al fin y al cabo es lo que rige la actividad comercial. Nuestra Constitución Política en su artículo 56, consagra el principio del derecho al trabajo, como un derecho del individuo, y una obligación para el Estado de procurar que todos tengan ocupación honesta y útil e impedir que se establezcan condiciones que en alguna forma menoscaben la libertad o dignidad del hombre.El Estado garantiza el derecho de libre elección de trabajo", evidentemente con las acciones desplegadas por CTP, modificación de leyes arbitrarias, modificación del numeral 323 del Código de comercio y demás actos administrativos, el Estado costarricense ha violentado el artículo 56 de la Constitución, ya que no está procurando que todos tengan ocupación contrario sensu, se está promoviendo el desempleo y empobrecimiento de la sociedad costarricense, a la vez que se atenta contra la familia, al ser la actividad de SEETAXI una fuente directa y única para miles de familias costarricenses indubitablemente estamos en presencia, de un asunto trascendental, el bienestar de miles de familias costarricenses y su eventual desamparo, la defensa del derecho al trabajo como principio fundamental constitucional y todas sus derivaciones, justifica la presente gestión el debido proceso y un estado de necesidad de los firmantes y todos aquellos que se encuentran en igualdad de condiciones.En todo lo que la presente diligencia de coadyuvancia, sea omisa, se adhieren a lo que indica y versa la acción principal de inconstitucionalidad, incoada por el señor Otto Guevara Guth y Natalia Díaz Quintana.
21. 21Por escrito presentado a las 15:50 horas del 09 de marzo de 2016, María Lorena Cordero Ávila en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad Unión Nacional de Porteadores- UNAPORTE, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto.En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, la sociedad Unión Nacional de Porteadores- UNAPORTE, se ha dedicado al transporte privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2004 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde el 2002 como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediantes contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servido, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del código de comercio vigente antes de su reforma , reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el tratado de Libre Comercio con carretera (porteo). Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de 1999, se elimina la palabra "persona "del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N°7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado por permisos de operación dados por el Estado.Obligándoseles a subsistir en la realización de su labor bajo esta nueva figura con permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a ellos afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 7 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido los permisos de operación reactivaron los servicio nuevamente como "porteadores privados" haciendo uso de las bases operativas en los cantones donde brindan el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicios de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores. Servicio que vienen prestando ininterrumpidamente en el Cantón de Alfaro Ruiz, de la Provincia de Alajuela, Costa Rica, haciendo usos de la base de operación en ese cantón desde el año 2004, y uso de la patente municipal y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capitulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios "del tratado de libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase 6431.Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regula res de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos.Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este articulo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como la indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento.Por tanto, indica que por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política.El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transpone privado. Ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi. En el Capítulo II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el “trato nacional” que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado.Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores". Con esta misma ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales.Consideran que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales. Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.
22. 22Por escrito presentado a las 14:47 horas del 10 de marzo de 2016, Marco Tulio Víquez en su condición de Presidente de la Asociación Cámara de Autobuseros de Heredia, Miguel Badilla Castro en su condición de Presidente de la Asociación Cámara de Autobuseros del Atlántico, Jorge Arredondo Espinoza en su condición de Apoderado con poder suficiente de la Asociación Cámara de Empresarios Autobuseros y Transportistas Unidos de la Provincia de Guanacaste y otros, se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes pasivos en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indican que son organizaciones que representamos a las personas que se verían directamente afectadas si se llegare a declarar la inconstitucionalidad de la normativa impugnad, por tanto, en cuanto representan esos intereses corporativos, son titulares de un interés legítimo para que se mantenga la validez de la normativa impugnada.Señalan que los argumentos de la inconstitucionalidad esgrimidos por los actores son de dos órdenes: a) procedimentales y b) de supuestas violaciones de fondo. Los supuestos vicios procedimentales: Los argumentos de los recurrentes. El argumento principal de los recurrentes es que la Ley 8955 convirtió el porteo en un servicio público, al derogar los artículos 333 y 334 del Código de Comercio. La citada ley fue aprobada por una Comisión Legislativa con Potestad Legislativa Plena. Según los recurrentes tal derogatoria sólo podía haberla realizado el Plenario mediante una ley aprobada por 2/3 de sus miembros porque la citada ley creó un nuevo monopolio a favor del Estado. En efecto, según el artículo 46 de la Constitución, para crear nuevos monopolios estatales, se requiere una mayoría calificada de 2/3 del total de los diputados, lo cual no ocurrió en la especie, dado que la Ley 8955 ni siquiera fue aprobada por el Plenario legislativo.En tales condiciones, la Ley 8955 está viciada de nulidad absoluta por un vicio esencial en su procedimiento de aprobación. La inexistencia de los supuestos vicios procedimentales: El artículo 1 de la Ley 3503 declaró como servicio público todas las modalidades de prestación del servicio remunerado de personas por las vías públicas terrestres, el Código de Comercio entró en vigor el 1 de junio de 1964 y la Ley 3503 lo hizo el 10 de mayo de 1965. Esta ley fue aprobada por una mayoría calificada. A partir de este momento, el transporte remunerado de personas, en cualquiera de sus modalidades, se convirtió en un servicio público. En efecto el legislador creó un nuevo monopolio a favor del Estado con la posibilidad de delegar su ejercicio en los particulares por medio de las figuras administrativas de la concesión o del permiso. En consecuencia, desde esa fecha, el porteo de personas, regulado originalmente en los artículos 323 y 324- del Código de Comercio se convirtió en un servicio público, pues las precitadas normas del Código de Comercio quedaron derogadas tácitamente por la entrada en vigor del artículo 1 de la Ley 3503.Desde el punto de vista jurídico, lo que se produjo fue una derogación tácita del término "personas" contemplado en los artículos 323 y 324 del Código de Comercio, por incompatibilidad normativa sobreviniente al promulgarse el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503 que vino a publicitar todas las modalidades del transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores, al transformarlas en un nuevo monopolio a favor del Estado. El artículo 1 de la Ley 3503 es contundente al indicar que "El transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores que se lleve a cabo por calles, carreteras y caminos dentro del territorio de la República, es un servicio público cuya prestación es exclusiva del Estado, el cual la podrá ejercer directamente o a través de particulares a quienes expresamente autorice de acuerdo con las normas que aquí se establecen...". La norma en comentario no hace distinción entre taxis y porteadores, pues considera a ambas modalidades de transporte como partes integrantes de un servicio público.Por tanto, es claro que la intención unívoca del legislador de 1965, fue la de convertir en servicio público todo el transporte remunerado de personas por vía terrestre en cualquier tipo de vehículos automotores y bajo cualquier modalidad de prestación, convirtiéndolo en un nuevo monopolio estatal. Dentro de este orden de ideas, la derogatoria tácita de una ley resulta de la objetiva incompatibilidad entre la nueva disposición normativa y las precedentes. Tal incompatibilidad, por su parte, tiene dos manifestaciones: a) una verdadera contradicción de una norma con otra, por lo que el intérprete debe optar por la segunda y b) una incompatibilidad sobreviniente, denominada también implícita, para una norma anterior sobre una determinada materia que posteriormente es regulada ex novo por una fuente normativa sucesiva. En esta última hipótesis, se trata de dos disciplinas sobre la misma materia que se suceden en el tiempo.No se trata, en consecuencia, de una incompatibilidad puntual, sino más bien de una nueva normativa que deja sin vigor la anterior. Esta hipótesis es más difícil que se produzca en la praxis porque no siempre las normas anteriores se encuentran en específica contradicción con las normas sobrevinientes. La derogación tácita está íntimamente fundada sobre el doble principio de inextinguibilidad del poder y de la prohibición de antinomias. En este caso tiene relevancia sobre el efecto derogatorio, ligado a la entrada en vigor de la norma sucesiva, como condición necesaria para que pueda innovar libremente el ordenamiento y desplegar, de esa forma, la función que le es propia. 8.- En el presente caso, el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503 en parte vino a regular ex novo la misma materia que anteriormente regulaban los artículos 323 y 324 del Código de Comercio. En efecto, la nueva normativa vino a incluir, como parte del servicio público del transporte remunerado de personas por vías terrestres, al porteo, el cual, antes de su promulgación, se consideraba como una actividad privada ejercida al amparo del principio de libertad jurídica (art 28 CP) y de la libertad empresarial (art 46 CP).Sin embargo, el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503, al convertir en servicio público el transporte remunerado de personas por las vías terrestre en todas sus modalidades, derogó tácitamente los artículos 323 y 324 del Código de Comercio en la medida en que consideraban al porteo como una actividad privada. Posteriormente, se promulgó la Ley 5406 del 26 de noviembre de 1973, mediante la cual se reguló, de manera específica, el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxis. Esta ley entró en vigor 8 años después de que todo el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores, independientemente de su modalidad (autobuses, taxis, porteo, etc.) había sido declarado como un servicio público. El artículo 22 de la Ley 5406 dispuso que "Artículo 22.- Esta ley deroga en lo que se le opongan las disposiciones de la ley No. 3503 de 10 de mayo de 1965 y deroga la ley No. 3560 de 27 de octubre de 1965".Evidentemente el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503 no se oponía, sino que, por el contrario, le otorgaba fundamento a la declaratoria de servicio público de la prestación del servicio remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxis. En otros términos el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503 constituía la normativa genérica que regulaba a las diversas modalidades del transporte remunerado de personas por vía terrestre, en tanto que el artículo 1 de la Ley 5406, regulaba específicamente la modalidad de taxis. El artículo 1 de la Ley 3503, se mantiene en vigor hasta la fecha, pues ni la Ley 7969 ni la 8955 lo derogaron. Dentro de este orden de ideas, el propio Anexo I del CAFTA reconoce la vigencia del artículo 1 de la Ley 3505 al momento de su aprobación al incluirlo expresamente como una de las medidas disconformes en materia de transporte terrestre. Luego y dado que la Ley 8955 no derogó dicha norma, cabe concluir, que el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503 continúa vigente.Así las cosas, el argumento de los accionantes en el sentido de que la Ley número 8955 tenía que aprobarse por dos tercios del total de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa, no es de recibo, por cuanto el monopolio público en materia de transporte remunerado de personas, en cualquiera de sus modalidades (autobuses, taxis, porteo, etc.), fue creado por el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503 de 10 de mayo de 1965, norma que todavía se mantiene vigente según quedó demostrado supra. La normativa impugnada en realidad era innecesaria que se promulgara, pues el porteo de personas ya había dejado de existir jurídicamente desde 1965, cuando el servicio del transporte remunerado de personas en cualquiera de sus modalidades (autobuses, taxis, porteo, etc.) fue declarado, por mayoría calificada de la Asamblea Legislativa, como un monopolio público, susceptible de ser delegada su prestación en los particulares por medio de las figuras administrativas de la concesión y el permiso.Por tanto, la eventual declaración de inconstitucionalidad de la normativa impugnada no tendría ningún efecto práctico, pues la prestación del servicio remunerado de personas en cualquiera de sus modalidades es un servicio público desde 1965. Pero, en todo caso, la Ley 8955 se dictó dentro del marco normativo del artículo l de la Ley 3503 y sólo vino a regular la modalidad de porteo, bajo el nombre de "seetaxi, servicio público que durante casi 50 años fue ejercido a la libre sin ningún tipo de regulación. En consecuencia, la ley impugnada no necesitaba ser aprobada por dos tercios del coral de miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa, pues simplemente vino a regular una modalidad de prestación del servicio remunerado de personas, el cual había ya sido declarado como servicio público desde 1965. Esta Sala ya estableció que la Ley 8955, fue válidamente aprobada por una Comisión Legislativa con Potestad Legislativa Plena, en el Voto 4778-2011, dictado en la consulta de constitucionalidad sobre el proyecto de Ley 8955 formulada por el Movimiento Libertario, la Sala estableció claramente que el citado proyecto de ley podía aprobarse válidamente por una Comisión Legislativa con Potestad Legislativa Plena.La tesis de los accionantes sobre la supuesta violación del CAFTA - Según los actores, la Ley 8955 viola varias cláusulas del CAFTA porque cuando se aprobó este tratado el tema de la eliminación del porteo no se incluyó como una reserva o medida disconforme, por lo que ahora no puede limitarse la libertad empresarial en una actividad no reservada por el Estado costarricense al momento de firmarse el citado tratado. Según los recurrentes, la eliminación del porteo no está incluida como una medida disconforme en el

artículo 11.6 en relación con el Anexo I del Tratado. La supuesta violación de los artículos 28 y 46 de la Constitución Política y del principio constitucional de razonabilidad, una de las accionantes alega, además, la supuesta violación de los artículos 28 y 46 de la Constitución y el principio constitucional de razonabilidad. Su argumento se centra en que los artículos 323 y 324 del Código de Comercio, en cuanto regulaban el porteo de personas, se fundaban directamente en esas normas y principio constitucional. En el numeral 28 de la Constitución que consagra el principio de libertad jurídica, según el cual los particulares pueden realizar todas aquellas conductas que estén expresa o implícitamente autorizadas por el ordenamiento jurídico y en el artículo 46 del mismo texto constitucional, que consagra la libertad empresarial. Esta norma, además, exige que la creación de nuevos monopolios a favor del Estado sea aprobado por una mayoría calificada de dos tercios del total de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa, lo cual no ocurrió en el caso de la Ley 8955, la cual fue aprobada por una Comisión Legislativa con Potestad Legislativa Plena.

Según una de las accionantes, la Ley 8955 viola ambas normas constitucionales, por cuanto prohibió una actividad lícita, ejercida al amparo de dos disposiciones constitucionales expresas. Por tanto, prohibir una actividad privada lícita, que no es contraria ni a la moral ni a las buenas costumbres constituye un exceso legislativo contrario al Derecho de la Constitución, específicamente a las dos normas precitadas. También se invoca como violado el principio constitucional de razonabilidad, por cuanto, en criterio de la accionante, no resulta conveniente, necesario ni proporcional prohibir la actividad del porteo de personas, pues el país requiere modernizarse en todos los campos de la actividad empresarial. El porteo de personas, dentro del mundo moderno, constituye un mecanismo eficiente y más económico que la tradicional modalidad del servicio de taxi, porque utiliza herramientas modernas y garantiza que el servicio sea prestado con eficiencia, seguridad y rapidez.

La inexistencia de los supuestos vicios de fondo. La Ley 8955 no violó el CAFTA, el primer argumento de fondo está íntimamente relacionado con el supuesto vicio procedimental. En efecto, el argumento de los accionantes es que como la Ley 8955 fue posterior a la entrada en vigor del CAFTA, la figura del porteo no se incluyó como medida disconforme en el Anexos I del Tratado, relativo al transporte público. 2.- Los negociadores costarricenses no incluyeron al porteo como excepción a la aplicación del CAFTA en el Anexo I del Tratado, por la sencilla razón de que esa modalidad de prestación del servicio remunerado de personas era un servicio público desde 1965, por lo que lógicamente estaba incluida dentro de las excepciones especificadas en ese mismo Anexo 1 del Tratado relativo al servicio público del transporte remunerado de personas. Según el artículo 11.6. Medidas Disconformes del Tratado "1.

Los artículos 11.2, 11.3, 11.4 y 11.5 no se aplican a cualquier medida disconforme existente que sea mantenida por una parte en el gobierno a nivel central, tal y como lo establece esa parte en la Lista del Anexo I. En el Anexo I se dice al respecto: "Sector: Servicios de Transporte por Vía Terrestre- Transporte de pasajeros. Obligaciones Afectadas: Trato Nacional (Artículos 10.4 y 11.3). Trato de Nación Más Favorecida (artículos 10.4 y 11.3). Acceso a Mercados (Artículo 11.4) Nivel de Gobierno: Central. Medidas: Ley 3503 del 10 de mayo de 1965. Ley Reguladora de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores. Arts l, 3, 4.6, 10, II y 25". De la lectura de las normas citadas del CAFTA queda claro que el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503 fue una medida disconforme que el Estado costarricense se reservó en materia de transporte automotor por vías terrestres a la hora de aprobar el citado Tratado.

Dentro de esa norma está incluido el porteo como servicio público según quedó demostrado supra. Por tanto, toda la argumentación de los accionantes carece de fundamento jurídico, pues el artículo l de la Ley 3503 se incluyó en el CAFTA como una medida disconforme de Costa Rica y tal norma fue justamente la que eliminó el porteo como actividad privada y lo convirtió en servicio público desde 1965. No hubo, por tanto, ninguna violación de ninguna de las cláusulas invocadas del CAFTA al promulgarse la Ley 8955, la Ley 8955 no violó ni los artículos 28 y 46 de la Constitución ni el principio de razonabilidad jurídica, la ley 8955, era innecesaria que se promulgara, pues el porteo de personas se convirtió en un servicio público desde 1965. Lo que hace una parte de esta ley es derogar normas que ya estaban derogadas desde hacía 51 años. La otra parte regula el servicio público de "seetaxi", es decir del porteo de personas, modalidad de transporte público que desde 1965, no había sido regulada y que, hasta esa fecha, funcionaba como si fuera una actividad privada, sin ninguna regulación estatal.

La Ley 8955 no pudo haber incurrido en los vicios de inconstitucionalidad acusados por la accionante, es decir, violación de los artículos 28, 46 de la Constitución y el principio constitucional de razonabilidad, por la sencilla razón de no se creó ningún nuevo monopolio a favor del Estado, pues ese monopolio ya existía desde el lejano 1965. Todas las argumentaciones se estrellan ante el hecho incontrovertible de que el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503, aprobado en 1965 y vigente a la fecha elevó todas las modalidades del transporte remunerado de personas por vías públicas a la categoría de servicio público. En consecuencia, la Ley 8955 no incurrió en ningún vicio de inconstitucionalidad, dado que lo único en que legisló ex novo fue en la regulación de la modalidad de servido público denominada "seetaxi", la cual, de manera inexplicable, operó a la libre, sin ninguna regulación del Estado desde 1965 hasta la promulgación de la Ley 8955.

1. 23Por escrito presentado a las 11:05 horas del 11 de marzo de 2016, Gilberth Maikell Barboza, en su condición de apoderado Legal con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de Corporación B&A Transportes Privados Atenas, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indica que en el caso particular de su representada, se le otorgó el permiso especial estable de Taxi, SEETAXI, el cual es un servicio de transporte público remunerado de personas dirigido a un grupo cerrado de usuarios que satisface una demanda limitada, residual, exclusiva y estable, por lo que se adhiere en todos sus extremos a la acción presentada por los accionantes.
2. 24Por escrito presentado a las 13:04 horas del 14 de marzo de 2016, Heiner Gerardo Chávez Luna, en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad de Transporte privados Rigoberto Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto.En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, que la sociedad de Transporte privados Rigoberto Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada, se ha dedicado al transporte privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2005 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde el 2002 como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediantes contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servicio, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del código de comercio vigente antes de su reforma, reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el tratado de Libre Comercio con carretera (porteo). Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de 1999, se elimina la palabra "persona "del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N° 7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado v regulado por permisos de operación dados por el estado.Obligándoseles a subsistir en la realización de su labor bajo esta nueva figura con permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a ellos afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 7 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido los permisos de operación reactivaron el servicio nuevamente como “porteadores privados" haciendo uso de las bases operativas en los cantones donde brindamos el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicios de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores. Servicio que vienen prestando ininterrumpidamente en el Cantón de San Pedro de Poas, de la Provincia de Alajuela, Costa Rica, haciendo usos de la base de operación en ese cantón desde el año 2005, y uso de la patente municipal y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capitulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios "del tratado de libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase 6431.Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regula res de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos.Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este articulo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como la indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento.Por tanto, indica que por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se expone en la presente acción, con la Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa.La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política. El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transpone privado. Ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una Ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi.En el Capítulo II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el “trato nacional” que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores".Con esta misma Ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales. Consideran que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales.Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.
3. 25Por escrito presentado a las 09:58 horas del 15 de marzo de 2016, Rubén Vargas Campos, en su condición de Secretario General y Representante con facultades suficientes de la organización social denominada Unión de Taxistas Costarricenses y otros se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes pasivos de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indican que la presente acción deviene en improcedente pues la misma se dice como presentada en tutela supuesta de intereses difusos y/o colectivos de los usuarios, siendo que evidentemente la acción presenta la única finalidad de procurar defender los intereses privados de una empresa transnacional, la cual no presenta sede cierta en nuestro medio, como lo es la firma "Uber", asimismo la denominada Asociación Nacional de Consumidores busca lo mismo. En cuanto a la disyuntiva entre la posible coexistencia del transporte remunerado de personas, en vehículos automotores, como servicio público o como actividad privada, se tiene que desde el año 1965 con la promulgación de la ley No. 3503: "ley reguladora del transporte remunerado de personas", se dispuso claramente que todo tipo de transporte remunerado de personas era un servicio público, regulado por el Estado, de ahí se derivó que todo transporte remunerado de personas, en cualquiera de sus modalidades, era un servicio público y que solo se podía prestar con una autorización del Estado, teniéndose como eliminada la posibilidad del transporte remunerado privado de personas en vehículos automotores, tales disposiciones generales fueron retomadas, reguladas y sancionadas en la ley de tránsito no. 7331 (del año 1993), en la ley, entre otras, las cuales fueron anteriores al Tratado de Libre Comercio y todas manteniendo su vigencia y plenitud en cuanto a regular, restringir y sancionar cualquier gestión de transporte remunerado de personas que se pudiera generar aun en ausencia de la ley No. 8955, es decir: aunque la ley no. 8955 fuera eliminada por inconstitucional existen por demás normas que conllevan el mismo efecto que la misma vino simplemente a unificar y aclarar, para evitar más "interpretaciones" y suspicacias en cuanto a la situación e imposibilidad del transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores de forma privada (porteo).El proyecto de la Ley que se objeta, se voto por el plenario, mediante la figura de la delegación en una de las comisiones legislativas con potestad plena y se votó por mayoría absoluta en la misma. No se ha generado ningún monopolio público, la capacidad regulatoria del Estado da origen a un servicio público ejercido por miles de trabajadores (los taxistas) bajo condiciones plenamente determinadas y establecidas por el Estado regulador. En cuanto al tema de la violación al Tratado de Libre Comercio, se ha determinado en cuanto a que el porteo de personas no se estima como actividad comercial mayor, sino como una labor limitada y residual. Por ende, no sería de real cobertura por el TLC, además, ha quedado claro que la modificación parcial al numeral 323 del código de comercio no conlleva la creación de monopolio alguno y, per se, no se afectan las condiciones del TLC, también se ha determinado plenamente que el Estado costarricense realizó en cuanto al TLC o CAFTA y a sus alcances, ciertas reservas debidas y una de ellas fue en materia del transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores, tipo taxi, y de la ley No. 7969, así que las disposiciones del TLC tampoco en ese sentido se verían afectadas y solo como excepción no invocada por nadie, el TLC permite que las restricciones aplicadas puedan valorarse o renegociarse pero eso no las determina como inconstitucionales, finalmente y como bien se ha determinado supra, existen muchas normas previas al TLC, de orden público, especiales para el transporte público y el tránsito, que determinan que el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores y en otras disciplinas del servicio público (aviones, trenes y barcos), es un servicio público, el cual solo se puede brindar con autorización previa del Estado, por ende, al recapitularse mediante la ley No. 8955 en cuanto al tema, no se legisla ex novo, sino que se retoma, resume y concreta lo que antes ya estaba legislado, no existiendo así, ninguna violación al TLC y mucho menos ninguna inconstitucionalidad.
4. 26Por escrito presentado a las 11:05 horas del 15 de marzo de 2016, Alexander Rodríguez Aguilar en su condición de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de Inversiones Transportistas Los Guidos Sociedad Anónima y otros, se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indican que se encuentran debidamente, legitimados por tener interés directo en la resolución de fondo de la presente Acción de inconstitucionalidad, en razón de que fueron acreditados con el permiso número 11 y los códigos numerados del 321 al 346 de Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi, con formal Recurso de Apelación pendiente de resolución ante el Tribunal Administrativo de Transportes, bajo el expediente N° TAT-31 7-2015. En el año dos mil once, previa consulta facultativa ante la Sala Constitucional, se aprobó en segundo debate el proyecto de ley número 17,874, para luego ser sancionado por el Poder Ejecutivo y publicada en el Alcance N° 40 de la Gaceta N° 131 de 7 de julio de 2011 como la Ley Especial N° 8955.Todo el trámite de discusión y aprobación del referido expediente se tramitó en la Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena Segunda, como consecuencia de moción delegatoria aprobada por el Plenario Legislativo en la sesión ordinaria N° 88 de 14 de octubre de 2009 y bajo la figura de un procedimiento legislativo abreviado (208 bis RAL), aprobada en Plenario Legislativo en la sesión ordinaria N° 109 de 26 de noviembre de 2009. De la misma manera en el año 2011, la Ley N° 8955 es cuestionada ante la Sala con dos acciones de inconstitucional, tramitadas bajo los expedientes 11-01 1857-0007-CO y 11-010289- 0007-CO, mismas que fueron declaradas sin lugar. Tanto los señalamientos realizados en el texto de la consulta facultativa como los esbozados en la interposición de las dos acciones de inconstitucionalidad antes señaladas, fueron direccionados de manera diferente a los descritos en la presente acción.La ley no 8955 violenta el artículo 46 de la constitución política y el procedimiento legislativo para la instauración de un monopolio público, por cuanto reforma el artículo 2 de la Ley N° 7969: "Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi ", dado que pese a que el monopolio en la prestación exclusiva del servicio colectivo remunerado de personas se estableció mediante la aprobación de la Ley N° 3503 de 20 de mayo de 1965 y la nacionalización exclusiva del transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos modalidad taxi lo determinó la aprobación de la Ley N° 5406 de 16 de enero de 1974 derogada mediante artículo 63 de la Ley N° 7969 de 22 de diciembre de 1999, el monopolio decretado en estas dos normativas son exclusivos y únicos para los servicios que allí se indican, sean el transporte colectivo remunerado de personas mediante la Ley N° 3503 y luego la nacionalización del transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi mediante la Ley N° 5406, derogada con la actual Ley N° 7969, denominada Ley de Taxis.Ninguna de las anteriores normativas declara como servicio público la totalidad del transporte remunerado de personas, sino que ambas leyes se limitaron a declarar al Estado como titular de cada una de esas dos actividades específicas, permaneciendo vigente el contrato privado de transporte de personas en la figura comercial del porteador de personas, sin embargo, mediante la ley No. 8955 efectivamente se declara un monopolio total sobre el transporte remunerado de personas, al determinar que todo transporte remunerado de personas que se realice por medio de autobuses, busetas. Microbuses, taxis, automóviles y cualquier otro tipo de vehículo automotor, que además este dirigido a cualquier grupo de usuarios es un servicio público del cual es titular el Estado y que, para su prestación, se requiere de permiso o concesión. No se puede interpretar de la misma manera, la nacionalización del transporte remunerado de personas mediante el transporte colectivo en autobuses y taxis, mediante la aprobación de dos leyes concretas y específicas, que la creación del monopolio y la prohibición de realizar cualquier tipo de transporte remunerado de personas desde el ámbito privado.Esto se da, de manera exclusiva, mediante la aprobación de la ley No. 8955, que desautoriza este tipo de servicio mediante la eliminación de la palabra "personas" del artículo 323 del código de comercio y a su vez decreta que todo tipo de transporte remunerado de personas será en lo sucesivo un servicio público y que, para su realización, se requerirá permiso del Estado, la creación del monopolio de la totalidad del transporte remunerado de personas se da mediante la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955. Siendo así, en observancia del artículo 46 de nuestra Constitución Política el proyecto de ley N° 17,874 nunca debió ser delegado a una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa, ya que, al estar estas comisiones integradas por únicamente 19 diputados no pudo cumplir con el número mínimo requerido para la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, en concordancia con el artículo 46 constitucional, deviene en una clara violación al procedimiento legislativo y a la propia Carta Fundamental y, por ende, en la inconstitucionalidad de la ley aprobada.La ley No. 8955 violenta el principio de igualdad ante la ley y las normas relativas a la concesión de servicios públicos de transporte de personas. Debe tenerse presente, que el proyecto de ley N° 13.511, que dio origen a la Ley N° 7969, llevaba explícito en su articulado original, el que las concesiones de taxi se entregaran por un plazo improrrogable de veinte años. Sin embargo, el legislador de la época consideró prudente no llevar el plazo más allá de los diez años y mediante moción aprobada por la mayoría de ellos, el plazo se estableció en diez años improrrogables. Mediante la reforma realizada por la Ley N° 8955 al artículo 29 de la Ley N° 7969, le hace entrega, a perpetuidad, del servicio de transporte público remunerado de personas en la modalidad taxi a los actuales concesionarios, lo que deviene en inconstitucional, ya que el Estado puede delegar la prestación de los servicios públicos en particulares, más no cuenta el legislador con la facultad de designar a determinado grupo de particulares para que realicen un servicio público a perpetuidad, sin cumplir con los procedimientos de contratación administrativa estipulados en la ley original, en claro perjuicio al principio de igualdad ante la ley para el resto de habitantes de la República, así como de aquellos oferentes que por no contar con los 100 puntos acreditados en el Primer Procedimiento Abreviado a quienes contaban con permisos de taxi para esas fechas, algunos de ellos con 80 puntos, que quedan imposibilitados de participar en el nuevo proceso licitatorio de concesiones de taxi, en la segunda oportunidad en igualdad de condiciones ya que, como reza la norma anterior, al actual concesionario se le da una indebida e ilegal ventaja sobre los demás interesados en prestar dicho servicio, al indicar que la renovación de las concesiones de taxi se deben otorgar cada periodo de manera automática, con la sola solicitud del concesionario y la licencia tipo C-1 al día.Esta reforma cierra por completo un monopolio, a perpetuidad, con nombres y apellidos, que se convirtió en un embudo a favor de un grupo muy reducido de costarricenses, en claro perjuicio de la inmensa mayoría, que una vez transcurridos los diez años del plazo autorizado a las concesiones por la Ley N° 7969, le permitiría a todos los ciudadanos optar por ser oferente en condición de iguales entre iguales. Al menos en tema de experiencia, a más de 30,000 conductores de taxi a los que la Ley N° 8955 deja sin ninguna opción. Esta norma viene a adicionar, a la inconstitucionalidad establecida en la reforma al artículo 29 de la Ley N° 7969, mediante Ley N° 8955 la facultad del concesionario de "HEREDAR", generación tras generación, a sus parientes, la titularidad de la concesión de taxi, inclusive, bajo condiciones diferentes a las establecidas en el Primer Procedimiento Abreviado realizado al amparo de la Ley 7969 y sus reglamentos, entregando la concesión a un particular que no fue evaluado en su momento procedimental oportuno y eximiéndolo de obligaciones como la obligatoriedad de presentar código y licencia C-1 y conducir el taxi un mínimo de ocho horas diarias.No solamente el Estado entrega a perpetuidad un servicio público a un particular, cuya ley original le entregó la explotación por un periodo únicamente de diez años, sino que de manera posterior se faculta al particular a heredar la concesión otorgada. Reiteran que ni siquiera el legislador ordinario cuenta con la facultad para entregar a perpetuidad la explotación de un servicio público que es monopolio del Estado a un determinado grupo de ciudadanos ya que la figura jurídica no existe. Para ello se requeriría decretar la existencia de un monopolio privado, ya no estatal, lo que conllevaría un roce con el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política y que, de ninguna manera, podría lograrse con el voto afirmativo de únicamente 16 diputados en una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, ampliando automáticamente los plazos de vigencia de la concesión. En este punto también la Ley N° 8955 es inconstitucional.La ley no 8955 violenta los alcances de la aprobación e integración del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República Dominicana: con la suscripción del tratado de libre comercio con Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República Dominicana y su posterior integración al ordenamiento jurídico nacional, queda en evidencia clara, en referencia a las reservas que el País defendió, concretamente en el tema del transporte de pasajeros por vías terrestres, a cuales actividades y normativas relacionadas podría, Costa Rica, a futuro, realizar reformas. Es así como en el área de Servicios Transfronterizos e Inversión, Costa Rica se reserva una serie de normas a efecto de mantener el control del Estado sobre algunas actividades declaradas como servicios públicos, siendo estas: El monopolio del transporte remunerado de personas en autobuses, que incluye los denominados "servicios especiales de transporte de estudiantes trabajadores y turismo".El monopolio del transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, el monopolio del transporte por ferrocarril. Las reservas hechas por Costa Rica como Estado Parte, visibles en el Anexo I, señalan, de manera concreta, cuáles son las leyes y decretos ejecutivos que podrá modificar después de la entrada en vigencia del CAFTA: Tal y como se puede inferir de la totalidad de las reservas hechas por Costa Rica, como parte de estas, no aparece la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio de 30 de abril de 1964. Esta ley, aprobada desde el año 1964, mantuvo vigente el transporte privado de personas bajo la figura del porteador de personas mediante el artículo 323, siguientes y concordantes. A la vista de lo anterior, resulta sencillo deducir que estando vigentes los artículos 323, siguientes y concordantes del Código de Comercio desde el año 1964, la actividad del transporte remunerado de personas mediante la figura del porteador de personas se ejerció de manera privada y absolutamente lícita, desde esa fecha, aún después de aprobado, ratificado y puesto en vigencia el Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República Dominicana, (CAFTA).No es sino hasta el 7 de junio de 2011 que es publicada la Ley N° 8955, fechada 16 de junio de 2011, que quienes ejercíamos el transporte privado de personas a través de la figura del porteador fuimos obligados a acreditar requisitos para ser migrados del Código de Comercio, vigente hasta ese día, al servicio público remunerado de personas mediante la nueva figura de Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi. Fuimos obligados a migrar al transporte público de personas porque la Ley N° 8955 derogó de manera explícita el contrato privado de transporte de personas a través del artículo 323, siguientes y concordantes del Código de Comercio, en una clara y evidente violación a los alcances de lo negociado en los incisos a) y b) del artículo 11.4 del CAFTA. Desde la perspectiva jurídica, resulta razonablemente claro que la Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena I, con el voto de únicamente 16 diputados, nunca estuvo facultada por el Derecho de la Constitución a eliminar la palabra "personas" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio y eliminar así la actividad desarrollada al amparo del contrato privado de transporte remunerado de personas.Por otra parte, el fin principal de la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955, según se refleja en la exposición de motivos del proyecto de ley N° 17.874, fue la de regular y trasladar a los porteadores que venían ejerciendo esta actividad privada de transporte de personas al servicio público. Esta voluntad del legislador, reflejada en la inclusión de tres transitorios de carácter material en la supra citada ley, incorporados vía moción, adicional a la norma que venían a regular la situación de los porteadores de la época en el tiempo, ha sido materialmente destrozada por la actual Administración, realizando "interpretaciones" erróneas del alcance de los mismos y procediendo así a eliminar los permisos a más del 90% de ellos en el primer plazo de tres años y a la totalidad en el siguiente periodo, por Io que, la vigencia de la Ley No 8955 no tiene ya ningún sentido práctico, entendiendo que la voluntad del legislador de la época con la aprobación de la Ley Especial N° 8955 fue precisa y pretorianamente, el asegurar la continuidad de la actividad comercial de los porteadores de la época.
5. 27Por escrito presentado a las 10:40 horas del 15 de marzo de 2016, Javier Cortes Montoya, en su condición de taxista, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante pasivo en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indica su desacuerdo con lo indicado en la ley No. 8955 en su artículo 1, el cual convierte a los porteadores de personas en servicio especial estable de Taxi, SEETAXI, asimismo indica que los artículos 323 y 334 de la ley 3284, debieron haber sido reglamentados vía decreto ejecutivo emitido por el Presidente de la Republica y por el Ministro del MOPT. Señala que el argumento de los accionantes en cuanto a la creación de la anterior ley y su monopolización carece de sustento jurídico, dado que el transporte público lo tiene el Estado costarricense quien lo traslada a terceros mediante la figura de permisos o concesiones administrativas, tanto de autobuses como taxis, los cuales fueron adjudicados los derechos de encontraban en condiciones de permisos, por lo que en ese mismo año, el Consejo de Transporte Público licitó 13.675 concesiones administrativas de taxis, siendo que solo se entregaría una concesión por participante.La citada ley No. 8955, no prohíbe la figura del porteo, solo modifica los artículos 323 y 334 de la ley del código de comercio y deja vigente el porteo. El argumento de que la clausula 11.4 de acceso a mercados del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Costa Rica y Estados Unidos junto con Centroamérica y República Dominicana, es contraria a la ley 8955, no es válido, dado que en el anexo 1 de medidas de salvaguarda del capítulo de Costa Rica, existe una lista de leyes y decretos que todas las naciones firmantes deben de respetar.
6. 28Por escrito presentado a las 15:07 horas del 18 de marzo de 2016, William Solano Campos y otros, se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indican que se encuentran debidamente, legitimados en su condición de usuarios de los servicios de transporte, por asistirles un interés legitimo, en los términos del artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, siendo posible identificar tres motivos, el primero de ellos que con la promulgación de la citada ley se da la creación de un monopolio estatal sin que el procedimiento legislativo se haya dado con una mayoría calificada en la votación, el transporte remunerado de personas, ha sido creado como un servicio público, siendo el Estado su único titular, con la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad que se pretende, se permitiría el porteo privado de personas, simultáneamente con el servicio de SEETAXI y los taxis tradicionales, por lo que eliminaría el monopolio público creado por la ley en comentario, al permitir la iniciativa privada en la actividad económica, en segundo lugar se da una infracción a los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de las normas, principio de libertad, iniciativa privada, libertad de comercio, libertad contractual, libertad de elección de los consumidores.La ley 8955 es inconstitucional porque incumple dos criterios constitucionales al afecto aplicables, por un lado no satisface un interés público imperativo y por otro lado limita libertades fundamentales de la manera más restrictiva posible, como tercer punto la citada norma contraviene el Tratado de Libre Comercio con EEUU, por ende es contraria a lo dispuesto en el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política, dado que su finalidad es la de servir como instrumento para la liberalización del comercio de bienes y servicios entre los Estados parte, garantizando la inversión extranjera y promoviendo condiciones de competencia leal, con la consecuente obtención de beneficios ostensibles para los usuarios y consumidores nacionales, en virtud de su trascendencia se ha de examinar el capitulo once del tratado, titulado “Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios” y específicamente el subtítulo “11.4. Acceso a los Mercados” toda vez que dicha clausula en particular la que la ley No. 8955 contraviene claramente, allí se establece la obligación de los Estados suscriptores de no imponer a los proveedores de servicios de otro Estado parte, restricciones de acceso, ya sean materiales o de orden normativo, a los distintos sectores económicos del mercado de servicios de otro Estado.
7. 29Por escritos presentados ante la Secretaría de esta Sala a las 15:17 horas del 18 de marzo del 2016, Alberto de Armas Pereira y otros, todos ellos en su condición de socios del Club de Colaboración para la autosatisfacción de necesidades de movilidad Común S.A., se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad. Lo anterior con fundamento en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto.En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Los coadyuvantes, todos ellos colaboradores de la plataforma UBER en Costa Rica, basan su alegato en una supuesta inconstitucionalidad de la Ley No. 8955, Reforma la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, por estimarlas contrarias a los artículos 50, párrafo primero, y 46 de la Constitución Política. Explican que la Ley No. 8955 crea un monopolio que no estimula la producción interna de Costa Rica puesto que más bien la limita, “al establecer la actividad solo para un sector privilegiado”. Consideran que dicha ley coarta la posibilidad, para cientos de personas, de procurarse una “ocupación honesta y útil”, lo que supone un cercenamiento del derecho de cualquier individuo a que elija un puesto propio “que le permita ganarse la vida”; entienden que se trata de una “limitante a la libre elección del trabajo”.Citan, en su argumentación, un fragmento de la discusión legislativa, en la tramitación de la Ley No. 8955, haciendo alusión que se trató de un “proceso de negociación en el cual el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes y sus autoridades, junto con la Cámara Nacional de Trasporte en Autobús, la Federación Nacional de Taxis y la Cámara de Porteadores como representante del sector, mantuvieron una sesión permanente de discusión, buscando una formulación consenso para solucionar la situación de los señores porteadores y señoras porteadoras”; como resultado de ese proceso, la información de base “permitió una propuesta de solución para reconocer el derecho y la operatividad de aquellas personas que efectivamente estaban prestando el servicio de porteo”, enfatizan en que dicha propuesta “obedece fundamentalmente que es una necesidad específica y puntual”. Por su parte los coadyuvantes concluyen, en relación con lo anterior, que el motivo de la Asamblea Legislativa para derogar la figura del porteo y “publificar” cualquier tipo de transporte remunerado de personas que se realice por medio de vehículos particulares dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas usuarias y que satisfaga una demanda limitada, residual, exclusiva y estable, fue “dirimir los conflictos suscitados entre taxistas, autobuseros y porteadores”, estiman que se está frente a una norma que limita libertades fundamentales, “al generar un supuesto beneficio para un grupo, pero una gran afectación para la colectividad”.Apoyan los alegatos adicionales de los accionantes, en síntesis refiriéndose a que la Ley No. 8955 es inconstitucional por no cumplir con el procedimiento legislativo, en relación con que no fue aprobada por una mayoría calificada, sino por una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, considerando que tal norma crea un monopolio estatal, todo lo cual es contrario al artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Toman como referencia el Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, aprobado mediante Ley No. 8622, Ley No. 21 de noviembre del 2007; del cual citan expresamente el artículo 11.4 de dicha Ley. Sobre este punto, concluyen que tal norma “prohíbe expresamente adoptar leyes, reglamentos, o procedimientos que restrinjan el número de proveedores de un servicio de un servicio limitado por su participación o acceso al mercado o creando, por ejemplo, contingentes numéricos o monopolios que concedan acceso, titularidad o control de la prestación de ese servicio, a un solo proveedor o pocos proveedores, recurriendo a medidas limitantes o discriminatorias”.Terminan indicando que la Ley No. 8955 violenta el principio constitucional de jerarquía de las normas porque sus disposiciones contravienen un tratado internacional (Ley No. 8622) y el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política.
8. 30Por escritos presentados ante la Secretaría de esta Sala a las 16:12 horas del 18 de marzo del 2016, Mauricio Muñoz Brenes y otros, todos ellos en su condición de socios del Club de Colaboración para la autosatisfacción de necesidades de movilidad Común S.A., se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad. Lo anterior con fundamento en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto.En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Los coadyuvantes, todos ellos colaboradores de la plataforma UBER en Costa Rica, basan su alegato en una supuesta inconstitucionalidad de la Ley No. 8955, Reforma la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, por estimarlas contrarias a los artículos 50, párrafo primero, y 46 de la Constitución Política. Explican que la Ley No. 8955 crea un monopolio que no estimula la producción interna de Costa Rica puesto que más bien la limita, “al establecer la actividad solo para un sector privilegiado”. Consideran que dicha ley coarta la posibilidad, para cientos de personas, de procurarse una “ocupación honesta y útil”, lo que supone un cercenamiento del derecho de cualquier individuo a que elija un puesto propio “que le permita ganarse la vida”; entienden que se trata de una “limitante a la libre elección del trabajo”.Citan, en su argumentación, un fragmento de la discusión legislativa, en la tramitación de la Ley No. 8955, haciendo alusión que se trató de un “proceso de negociación en el cual el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes y sus autoridades, junto con la Cámara Nacional de Trasporte en Autobús, la Federación Nacional de Taxis y la Cámara de Porteadores como representante del sector, mantuvieron una sesión permanente de discusión, buscando una formulación consenso para solucionar la situación de los señores porteadores y señoras porteadoras”; como resultado de ese proceso, la información de base “permitió una propuesta de solución para reconocer el derecho y la operatividad de aquellas personas que efectivamente estaban prestando el servicio de porteo”, enfatizan en que dicha propuesta “obedece fundamentalmente que es una necesidad específica y puntual”. Por su parte los coadyuvantes concluyen, en relación con lo anterior, que el motivo de la Asamblea Legislativa para derogar la figura del porteo y “publificar” cualquier tipo de transporte remunerado de personas que se realice por medio de vehículos particulares dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas usuarias y que satisfaga una demanda limitada, residual, exclusiva y estable, fue “dirimir los conflictos suscitados entre taxistas, autobuseros y porteadores”, estiman que se está frente a una norma que limita libertades fundamentales, “al generar un supuesto beneficio para un grupo, pero una gran afectación para la colectividad”.Apoyan los alegatos adicionales de los accionantes, en síntesis refiriéndose a que la Ley No. 8955 es inconstitucional por no cumplir con el procedimiento legislativo, en relación con que no fue aprobada por una mayoría calificada, sino por una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, considerando que tal norma crea un monopolio estatal, todo lo cual es contrario al artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Toman como referencia el Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, aprobado mediante Ley No. 8622, Ley No. 21 de noviembre del 2007; del cual citan expresamente el artículo 11.4 de dicha Ley. Sobre este punto, concluyen que tal norma “prohíbe expresamente adoptar leyes, reglamentos, o procedimientos que restrinjan el número de proveedores de un servicio de un servicio limitado por su participación o acceso al mercado o creando, por ejemplo, contingentes numéricos o monopolios que concedan acceso, titularidad o control de la prestación de ese servicio, a un solo proveedor o pocos proveedores, recurriendo a medidas limitantes o discriminatorias”.Terminan indicando que la Ley No. 8955 violenta el principio constitucional de jerarquía de las normas porque sus disposiciones contravienen un tratado internacional (Ley No. 8622) y el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política.
9. 31Por escritos presentados ante la Secretaría de esta Sala a las 15:00 horas del 30 de marzo del 2016, Carlos Bastos Chacón y otros, todos ellos en su condición de socios del Club de Colaboración para la autosatisfacción de necesidades de movilidad Común S.A., se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad. Lo anterior con fundamento en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto.En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Los coadyuvantes, todos ellos colaboradores de la plataforma UBER en Costa Rica, basan su alegato en una supuesta inconstitucionalidad de la Ley No. 8955, Reforma la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, por estimarlas contrarias a los artículos 50, párrafo primero, y 46 de la Constitución Política. Explican que la Ley No. 8955 crea un monopolio que no estimula la producción interna de Costa Rica puesto que más bien la limita, “al establecer la actividad solo para un sector privilegiado”. Consideran que dicha ley coarta la posibilidad, para cientos de personas, de procurarse una “ocupación honesta y útil”, lo que supone un cercenamiento del derecho de cualquier individuo a que elija un puesto propio “que le permita ganarse la vida”; entienden que se trata de una “limitante a la libre elección del trabajo”.Citan, en su argumentación, un fragmento de la discusión legislativa, en la tramitación de la Ley No. 8955, haciendo alusión que se trató de un “proceso de negociación en el cual el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes y sus autoridades, junto con la Cámara Nacional de Trasporte en Autobús, la Federación Nacional de Taxis y la Cámara de Porteadores como representante del sector, mantuvieron una sesión permanente de discusión, buscando una formulación consenso para solucionar la situación de los señores porteadores y señoras porteadoras”; como resultado de ese proceso, la información de base “permitió una propuesta de solución para reconocer el derecho y la operatividad de aquellas personas que efectivamente estaban prestando el servicio de porteo”, enfatizan en que dicha propuesta “obedece fundamentalmente que es una necesidad específica y puntual”. Por su parte los coadyuvantes concluyen, en relación con lo anterior, que el motivo de la Asamblea Legislativa para derogar la figura del porteo y “publificar” cualquier tipo de transporte remunerado de personas que se realice por medio de vehículos particulares dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas usuarias y que satisfaga una demanda limitada, residual, exclusiva y estable, fue “dirimir los conflictos suscitados entre taxistas, autobuseros y porteadores”, estiman que se está frente a una norma que limita libertades fundamentales, “al generar un supuesto beneficio para un grupo, pero una gran afectación para la colectividad”.Apoyan los alegatos adicionales de los accionantes, en síntesis refiriéndose a que la Ley No. 8955 es inconstitucional por no cumplir con el procedimiento legislativo, en relación con que no fue aprobada por una mayoría calificada, sino por una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, considerando que tal norma crea un monopolio estatal, todo lo cual es contrario al artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Toman como referencia el Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, aprobado mediante Ley No. 8622, Ley No. 21 de noviembre del 2007; del cual citan expresamente el artículo 11.4 de dicha Ley. Sobre este punto, concluyen que tal norma “prohíbe expresamente adoptar leyes, reglamentos, o procedimientos que restrinjan el número de proveedores de un servicio de un servicio limitado por su participación o acceso al mercado o creando, por ejemplo, contingentes numéricos o monopolios que concedan acceso, titularidad o control de la prestación de ese servicio, a un solo proveedor o pocos proveedores, recurriendo a medidas limitantes o discriminatorias”.Terminan indicando que la Ley No. 8955 violenta el principio constitucional de jerarquía de las normas porque sus disposiciones contravienen un tratado internacional (Ley No. 8622) y el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política.
10. 32Por escritos presentados ante la Secretaría de esta Sala a las 8:21 horas del 1° de abril del 2016, Orlando Chaves Matarrita y otros, todos ellos en su condición de socios del Club de Colaboración para la autosatisfacción de necesidades de movilidad Común S.A., se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad. Lo anterior con fundamento en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto.En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Los coadyuvantes, todos ellos colaboradores de la plataforma UBER en Costa Rica, basan su alegato en una supuesta inconstitucionalidad de la Ley No. 8955, Reforma la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, por estimarlas contrarias a los artículos 50, párrafo primero, y 46 de la Constitución Política. Explican que la Ley No. 8955 crea un monopolio que no estimula la producción interna de Costa Rica puesto que más bien la limita, “al establecer la actividad solo para un sector privilegiado”. Consideran que dicha ley coarta la posibilidad, para cientos de personas, de procurarse una “ocupación honesta y útil”, lo que supone un cercenamiento del derecho de cualquier individuo a que elija un puesto propio “que le permita ganarse la vida”; entienden que se trata de una “limitante a la libre elección del trabajo”.Citan, en su argumentación, un fragmento de la discusión legislativa, en la tramitación de la Ley No. 8955, haciendo alusión que se trató de un “proceso de negociación en el cual el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes y sus autoridades, junto con la Cámara Nacional de Trasporte en Autobús, la Federación Nacional de Taxis y la Cámara de Porteadores como representante del sector, mantuvieron una sesión permanente de discusión, buscando una formulación consenso para solucionar la situación de los señores porteadores y señoras porteadoras”; como resultado de ese proceso, la información de base “permitió una propuesta de solución para reconocer el derecho y la operatividad de aquellas personas que efectivamente estaban prestando el servicio de porteo”, enfatizan en que dicha propuesta “obedece fundamentalmente que es una necesidad específica y puntual”. Por su parte los coadyuvantes concluyen, en relación con lo anterior, que el motivo de la Asamblea Legislativa para derogar la figura del porteo y “publificar” cualquier tipo de transporte remunerado de personas que se realice por medio de vehículos particulares dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas usuarias y que satisfaga una demanda limitada, residual, exclusiva y estable, fue “dirimir los conflictos suscitados entre taxistas, autobuseros y porteadores”, estiman que se está frente a una norma que limita libertades fundamentales, “al generar un supuesto beneficio para un grupo, pero una gran afectación para la colectividad”.Apoyan los alegatos adicionales de los accionantes, en síntesis refiriéndose a que la Ley No. 8955 es inconstitucional por no cumplir con el procedimiento legislativo, en relación con que no fue aprobada por una mayoría calificada, sino por una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, considerando que tal norma crea un monopolio estatal, todo lo cual es contrario al artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Toman como referencia el Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, aprobado mediante Ley No. 8622, Ley No. 21 de noviembre del 2007; del cual citan expresamente el artículo 11.4 de dicha Ley. Sobre este punto, concluyen que tal norma “prohíbe expresamente adoptar leyes, reglamentos, o procedimientos que restrinjan el número de proveedores de un servicio de un servicio limitado por su participación o acceso al mercado o creando, por ejemplo, contingentes numéricos o monopolios que concedan acceso, titularidad o control de la prestación de ese servicio, a un solo proveedor o pocos proveedores, recurriendo a medidas limitantes o discriminatorias”.Terminan indicando que la Ley No. 8955 violenta el principio constitucional de jerarquía de las normas porque sus disposiciones contravienen un tratado internacional (Ley No. 8622) y el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política.
11. 33Por escritos presentados ante la Secretaría de esta Sala a las 10:55 horas del 1° de abril del 2016, Marco Madrigal Herrera y otros, todos ellos en su condición de socios del Club de Colaboración para la autosatisfacción de necesidades de movilidad Común S.A., se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad. Lo anterior con fundamento en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto.En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Los coadyuvantes, todos ellos colaboradores de la plataforma UBER en Costa Rica, basan su alegato en una supuesta inconstitucionalidad de la Ley No. 8955, Reforma la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, por estimarlas contrarias a los artículos 50, párrafo primero, y 46 de la Constitución Política. Explican que la Ley No. 8955 crea un monopolio que no estimula la producción interna de Costa Rica puesto que más bien la limita, “al establecer la actividad solo para un sector privilegiado”. Consideran que dicha ley coarta la posibilidad, para cientos de personas, de procurarse una “ocupación honesta y útil”, lo que supone un cercenamiento del derecho de cualquier individuo a que elija un puesto propio “que le permita ganarse la vida”; entienden que se trata de una “limitante a la libre elección del trabajo”.Citan, en su argumentación, un fragmento de la discusión legislativa, en la tramitación de la Ley No. 8955, haciendo alusión que se trató de un “proceso de negociación en el cual el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes y sus autoridades, junto con la Cámara Nacional de Trasporte en Autobús, la Federación Nacional de Taxis y la Cámara de Porteadores como representante del sector, mantuvieron una sesión permanente de discusión, buscando una formulación consenso para solucionar la situación de los señores porteadores y señoras porteadoras”; como resultado de ese proceso, la información de base “permitió una propuesta de solución para reconocer el derecho y la operatividad de aquellas personas que efectivamente estaban prestando el servicio de porteo”, enfatizan en que dicha propuesta “obedece fundamentalmente que es una necesidad específica y puntual”. Por su parte los coadyuvantes concluyen, en relación con lo anterior, que el motivo de la Asamblea Legislativa para derogar la figura del porteo y “publificar” cualquier tipo de transporte remunerado de personas que se realice por medio de vehículos particulares dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas usuarias y que satisfaga una demanda limitada, residual, exclusiva y estable, fue “dirimir los conflictos suscitados entre taxistas, autobuseros y porteadores”, estiman que se está frente a una norma que limita libertades fundamentales, “al generar un supuesto beneficio para un grupo, pero una gran afectación para la colectividad”.Apoyan los alegatos adicionales de los accionantes, en síntesis refiriéndose a que la Ley No. 8955 es inconstitucional por no cumplir con el procedimiento legislativo, en relación con que no fue aprobada por una mayoría calificada, sino por una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, considerando que tal norma crea un monopolio estatal, todo lo cual es contrario al artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Toman como referencia el Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, aprobado mediante Ley No. 8622, Ley No. 21 de noviembre del 2007; del cual citan expresamente el artículo 11.4 de dicha Ley. Sobre este punto, concluyen que tal norma “prohíbe expresamente adoptar leyes, reglamentos, o procedimientos que restrinjan el número de proveedores de un servicio de un servicio limitado por su participación o acceso al mercado o creando, por ejemplo, contingentes numéricos o monopolios que concedan acceso, titularidad o control de la prestación de ese servicio, a un solo proveedor o pocos proveedores, recurriendo a medidas limitantes o discriminatorias”.Terminan indicando que la Ley No. 8955 violenta el principio constitucional de jerarquía de las normas porque sus disposiciones contravienen un tratado internacional (Ley No. 8622) y el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política.
12. 34Por escrito presentado a las 14:04 horas del 01 de abril de 2016, Rogelio Fernández Ramírez y otros, se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indican que se encuentran debidamente, legitimados en su condición de usuarios de los servicios de transporte, por asistirles un interés legitimo, en los términos del artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, siendo posible identificar tres motivos, el primero de ellos que con la promulgación de la citada ley se da la creación de un monopolio estatal sin que el procedimiento legislativo se haya dado con una mayoría calificada en la votación, el transporte remunerado de personas, ha sido creado como un servicio público, siendo el Estado su único titular, con la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad que se pretende, se permitiría el porteo privado de personas, simultáneamente con el servicio de SEETAXI y los taxis tradicionales, por lo que eliminaría el monopolio público creado por la ley en comentario, al permitir la iniciativa privada en la actividad económica, en segundo lugar se da una infracción a los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de las normas, principio de libertad, iniciativa privada, libertad de comercio, libertad contractual, libertad de elección de los consumidores.La ley 8955 es inconstitucional porque incumple dos criterios constitucionales al afecto aplicables, por un lado no satisface un interés público imperativo y por otro lado limita libertades fundamentales de la manera más restrictiva posible, como tercer punto la citada norma contraviene el Tratado de Libre Comercio con EEUU, por ende es contraria a lo dispuesto en el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política, dado que su finalidad es la de servir como instrumento para la liberalización del comercio de bienes y servicios entre los Estados parte, garantizando la inversión extranjera y promoviendo condiciones de competencia leal, con la consecuente obtención de beneficios ostensibles para los usuarios y consumidores nacionales, en virtud de su trascendencia se ha de examinar el capitulo once del tratado, titulado “Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios” y específicamente el subtítulo “11.4. Acceso a los Mercados” toda vez que dicha clausula en particular la que la ley No. 8955 contraviene claramente, allí se establece la obligación de los Estados suscriptores de no imponer a los proveedores de servicios de otro Estado parte, restricciones de acceso, ya sean materiales o de orden normativo, a los distintos sectores económicos del mercado de servicios de otro Estado.
13. 35Por escrito presentado a las 9:27 horas del 4 de abril de 2016, Paola Rojas Anchía y otros, se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indican que se encuentran debidamente, legitimados en su condición de usuarios de los servicios de transporte, por asistirles un interés legitimo, en los términos del artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, siendo posible identificar tres motivos, el primero de ellos que con la promulgación de la citada ley se da la creación de un monopolio estatal sin que el procedimiento legislativo se haya dado con una mayoría calificada en la votación, el transporte remunerado de personas, ha sido creado como un servicio público, siendo el Estado su único titular, con la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad que se pretende, se permitiría el porteo privado de personas, simultáneamente con el servicio de SEETAXI y los taxis tradicionales, por lo que eliminaría el monopolio público creado por la ley en comentario, al permitir la iniciativa privada en la actividad económica, en segundo lugar se da una infracción a los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de las normas, principio de libertad, iniciativa privada, libertad de comercio, libertad contractual, libertad de elección de los consumidores.La ley 8955 es inconstitucional porque incumple dos criterios constitucionales al afecto aplicables, por un lado no satisface un interés público imperativo y por otro lado limita libertades fundamentales de la manera más restrictiva posible, como tercer punto la citada norma contraviene el Tratado de Libre Comercio con EEUU, por ende es contraria a lo dispuesto en el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política, dado que su finalidad es la de servir como instrumento para la liberalización del comercio de bienes y servicios entre los Estados parte, garantizando la inversión extranjera y promoviendo condiciones de competencia leal, con la consecuente obtención de beneficios ostensibles para los usuarios y consumidores nacionales, en virtud de su trascendencia se ha de examinar el capitulo once del tratado, titulado “Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios” y específicamente el subtítulo “11.4. Acceso a los Mercados” toda vez que dicha clausula en particular la que la ley No. 8955 contraviene claramente, allí se establece la obligación de los Estados suscriptores de no imponer a los proveedores de servicios de otro Estado parte, restricciones de acceso, ya sean materiales o de orden normativo, a los distintos sectores económicos del mercado de servicios de otro Estado.
14. 36Por escrito presentado ante la Secretaría de esta Sala a las 16:13 horas del 5 de abril del 2016, Jorge Vargas Corrales en su condición de presidente y apoderado de la sociedad anónima cuya cédula jurídica es 3-101-549995, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad. Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo dispuesto por el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, toda vez que considera que existe un interés legítimo de su representada de que se acoja la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por cuanto la norma legal impugnada afecta directamente la actividad que han venido realizando. Explica que actualmente se encuentra en trámite un proceso de apelación, promovido por su representada, contra el artículo 7.8.1 y 7.8.10 de la sesión ordinaria 37-2017 [sic] del Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante la cual se deniega la solicitud de la sociedad coadyuvante para prestar el Servicio Especial de Taxi (SEETAXI).Relata que al aprobarse la Ley No. 8955 se revocaron las autorizaciones para el ejercicio del porteo de personas, actividad que tenía autorizada la sociedad coadyuvante ante el Consejo Transporte Público. Indica que por vía transitoria de la citada ley se les otorgó un plazo para continuar ejerciendo la actividad, ahora bajo la modalidad de SEETAXI, pero bajo el cumplimiento de una serie de requisitos. Cita, dentro de esos requisitos, el contar con las características de infraestructura de un parque público pero con la patente municipal para un parqueo privado, lo cual se cumplió y se le autorizó el ejercicio de la actividad. Refiere que nunca se le solicitó una patente de porteo. En 2012 el Consejo de Transporte Público le denegó a la sociedad coadyuvante la solicitud de autorización para que se le concedieran los permisos especiales de taxi, rechazo que se fundamentó en que no se habían cumplido todos los requisitos exigidos por la Procuraduría General de la República; indica que se le concedió un plazo de un mes para cumplir, finalmente no cumplió con lo requerido.Relata que toda la flotilla a cargo de la sociedad recurrente han venido trabajando en la zona de San Ramón y Palmares al amparado de la autorización del Consejo de Transporte Público, mientras culmina el proceso de resolución de los recursos administrativos que se presentaron, según lo posibilita la directriz VTTAV 0626-2016 emitida por la Viceministra de Transportes. El motivo de la anterior directriz, según refiere la sociedad coadyuvante, es la protección de los usurarios destinatarios del servicio público prestado por la sociedad coadyuvante. Relata que los afiliados de la sociedad han sido multados y se les han removido las placas de sus vehículos porque según los oficiales de tránsito ellos continúan ejerciendo el porteo de personas, lo cual comporta un no acatamiento de la mencionada directriz por parte de las autoridades de tránsito. Considera que, contrario a lo que sostiene el Consejo de Transporte Público, la anterior directriz todavía se encuentra vigente, puesto que no existe otra directriz posterior en sentido contrario o norma de mayor jerarquía.Expresa que comparte los argumentos respecto del objeto de esta acción, ya que estima que eliminándose la actividad del porteo, mediante reforma al artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y sujetándose tal actividad a la Ley No. 8955, se está violentando el ordenamiento jurídico; lo anterior, primero por la infracción de las normas del procedimiento legislativo referentes a la mayoría calificada para aprobar la Ley No. 8955 y, segundo, porque se violenta la jerarquía normativa, en especial, respecto de los tratados internacionales vigentes en Costa Rica.
15. 37Por escrito presentado a las 14:05 horas del 06 de abril de 2016, Luis Ángel Delgado González en su condición de Gerente General de Cooperativa Nacional de Servicios Múltiples y Transportes para Asociados, R.L, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indican que se encuentra debidamente, legitimado por tener interés directo en la resolución, indica que al aprobarse la mencionada ley se revocaron las autorizaciones para el ejercicio del porteo de personas, las cuales ejercían sus representadas, por lo que se les limitó el ejercicio de una actividad de transporte de personas autorizado en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, mediante la derogatoria con una ley aprobada de manera inconstitucional. La conducta de la administración pública de suspender la actividad de porteo mediante la aplicación de dicha ley, ha causado no solo un perjuicio a la colectividad sino que causo daños y perjuicios a la empresa y a los porteadores que componen la flotilla vehicular, por lo que interpusieron un proceso ordinario contra el Consejo de Transporte Público, dentro del cual se solicitó la no aplicación de la reforma del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, siendo que al sujetar toda actividad de transporte de personas, quede sometida según la ley 8955 al Consejo de Transporte Público, se está creando un monopolio estatal.
16. 38Por escrito presentado a las 11:34 horas del 07 de abril de 2016, Ernesto Solano León y otros, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad.
17. 39Por escrito presentado a las 14:39 horas del 08 de abril de 2016, Luis Alfredo Villalobos Salazar, en su condición de Presidente de la Junta Directiva de la Asociación Cámara Nacional de Autobuseros -CANABUS-, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante pasivo en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indica que el transporte remunerado de personas, obedece a un interés público el cual está regulado por el Estado, en dicha estructura de servicios regulares y para aquellas personas o lugares en donde no llegue éste servicio, existen como complemento los servicios de especiales, así como los servicios preferenciales, - para aquellos usuarios que no quieran usar los servicios antes descritos. Con la emisión de la ley 8955 sin ser necesario lo que se pretendía era aclarar el resabio de la palabra “porteo” en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, las leyes que regulan la materia de transporte público son claras y fueron emitidas con posterioridad, quedando claro que el transporte público es un servicio público, sea cual sea su modalidad, asimismo no existe violación alguna a lo establecido en el Tratado de Internacional de Libre Comercio, el cual excluye los servicios públicos y como tal el transporte remunerado de personas.
18. 40Por escrito presentado a las 15:31 horas del 08 de abril de 2016, Rolf Erwin Richard Mangel, en su condición de representante legal de la compañía denominada Syniverse Technologies, S.R.L Costa Rica, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indica que en fecha 14 de octubre de 2015, consultó por escrito ante el Consejo de Transporte Público sobre la posibilidad de implementar una política de vehículo compartido dentro de la empresa, siendo que dicho Consejo le respondió que la propuesta realizada presentaba rasgos distintivos y propios del transporte público, lo anterior en especial fundamento en las normas actualmente vigentes y que son producto de la Reforma al Código de Comercio y a la ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, ambas concretizadas mediante ley No. 8955 del 16 de junio de 2011, siendo que a su criterio la regulación estatal deviene excesiva.Indica que la ley No. 8955, ha nacionalizado el transporte remunerado de personas y ha creado un monopolio a favor del Estado, dado que la misma fue aprobada por una comisión con potestad legislativa plena, incumpliendo el procedimiento constitucional establecido al efecto, con la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad se permitiría el porteo privado de personas, como un contrato surgido de la autonomía de la voluntad, simultáneamente con el servicio de SEETAXI, y los taxis tradicionales, por lo que se eliminaría el monopolio público creado por la ley. Existe una violación a los principios de libertad, comercio, contractual y elección de los consumidores. La ley 8955 es inconstitucional porque incumple dos criterios constitucionales al afecto aplicables, por un lado no satisface un interés público imperativo y por otro lado limita libertades fundamentales de la manera más restrictiva posible, como tercer punto la citada norma contraviene el Tratado de Libre Comercio con EEUU, por ende es contraria a lo dispuesto en el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política, dado que su finalidad es la de servir como instrumento para la liberalización del comercio de bienes y servicios entre los Estados parte, garantizando la inversión extranjera y promoviendo condiciones de competencia leal, con la consecuente obtención de beneficios ostensibles para los usuarios y consumidores nacionales, en virtud de su trascendencia se ha de examinar el capitulo once del tratado, titulado “Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios” y específicamente el subtítulo “11.4.Acceso a los Mercados” toda vez que dicha clausula en particular la que la ley No. 8955 contraviene claramente, allí se establece la obligación de los Estados suscriptores de no imponer a los proveedores de servicios de otro Estado parte, restricciones de acceso, ya sean materiales o de orden normativo, a los distintos sectores económicos del mercado de servicios de otro Estado.
19. 41Mediante resolución de las 14:38 horas del 25 de abril del 2016 se admitieron como coadyuvantes aquellos que se apersonan entre el 1ero de marzo y el 8 de abril del 2016. Además, se tuvo por contestada la audiencia conferida a la Procuraduría General de la República, y por no contestada la audiencia conferida al Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes (folio 1053-1054 del expediente digital).
20. 42De forma extemporánea se presenta, CARLOS VILLALTA VILLEGAS, en su calidad de Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes, a indicar que rinde informe, manifestando en resumen que: Al tenor de lo establecido por el artículo 11 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y en relación con los artículos 11 y 129 de la Constitución Política, a la Administración por medio de los funcionarios públicos -en este caso a las autoridades del tránsito-, únicamente les corresponde velar por su cumplimiento, sin que estén autorizados para desaplicarlas. Como consecuencia de lo anterior, habiéndose promulgado la referida Ley No. 8955, compete al Consejo de Transporte Público su cumplimiento, por medio de las autoridades competentes, sin que pueda alegarse criterio alguno para posponer su debido cumplimiento, desde la óptica de este Ministerio en cuanto "ejecutor" de la referida legislación -la ejecución en lo conducente corresponde al Consejo de Transporte Público, salvo en lo que compete a la Policía de Tránsito-, los accionantes impugnan por supuestamente inconstitucional la Ley No. 8955, en cuanto reformó: La Ley No. 3284.Código de Comercio del 30 de abril de 1964 y La Ley No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi de 22 de diciembre de 1999. Consideran los accionantes que la indicada Ley No. 8955 resulta contraria a los artículos 7,28, 39, 41, 46, 129 y 140 de la Constitución Política y a "los principios de supremacía de la realidad en materia laboral, el de jerarquía normativa, así como los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, iniciativa privada, libertad de comercio, libertad contractual y libre elección de los consumidores". El servicio de porte ha sido una actividad comercial de uso significativa entratándose del transporte de mercaderías, en tanto que respecto a las personas fue durante muchos años "residual", siendo en todo ese periodo, este último, brindado por personas físicas, principalmente en sitios alejados donde las modalidades de transporte público autorizados no operaban, siendo frecuente encontrarlos a lo largo en cruces de caminos secundarios con las rutas principales, en los últimos años antes de la promulgación de la Ley No. 8955 y merced a diversas posiciones asumidas en vía administrativa y judicial, se abrió el "espectro" de prestación de la actividad de porte de personas, convirtiéndose en un negocio ya no de personas físicas sino de personas jurídicas que, rápidamente, establecieron "sucursales" en las principales cabeceras de cantón del país, fenómeno, que generó un conflicto con el servicio público de taxis, el cual es una actividad del Estado, el transporte remunerado de personas al tenor del ordenamiento jurídico vigente es y debe ser una actividad del Estado, por encontrarse inmerso un interés público claro y específico.Al generarse una contraposición entre el porteo, ya masivo por ser a cargo de personas jurídicas, frente al servicio público de taxis, la opción que por entonces la Asamblea Legislativa determinó como jurídicamente viable fue aprobar la Ley 8955, mediante la cual reformó, entre otros, el Código de Comercio, con el fin de que en lo sucesivo la figura del porteo de personas quedara excluida de regulación comercial. El derecho de explotación del servicio de taxis es del Estado, quien temporalmente lo otorga a particulares que cumplan determinados requisitos. De esta forma, la figura del porte de personas resulta improcedente por la forma y por el fondo, al contraponerse a un servicio del Estado, así establecido por ley No. 7969, la Ley No. 8955 ciertamente suprimió la figura del porte de personas -no de mercancías- en el Código de Comercio, pero por la reforma introducida a la Ley No. 7969 posibilitó que quienes estaban operando, ya para entonces masivamente integrados en personas jurídicas, como "porteadores", se integraran dentro de un servicio bajo el control del Estado, denominado “servicios especiales estables de taxi” conocidos como "SEETAXI".Los accionantes con la inconstitucionalidad lo que al parecer pretenden es que se retroceda histórica, técnica y operativamente, lanzando al mercado un "númerus apertus" de nuevos porteadores, y para ello invocan que con la Ley que ahora impugnan, se estarían violentando los artículos 7, 28, 39, 41, 46, 129 y 140 de la Constitución Política. Respecto al artículo 7: No es cierto que se violenten las disposiciones del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, ya que el transporte remunerado de personas no corresponde a una actividad comercial sino que constituye un servicio público del Estado, primero con base en la ley No. 3503 de 10 de mayo de 1965 y sus reformas; posteriormente, de acuerdo con la Ley No. 5406 del Servicio Público de Taxis, ya derogada y, finalmente, con la actualmente vigente Ley No. 7969. Artículo 28: Se distorsiona el contenido de esta norma constitucional ya que, precisamente, quien pretenda operar como porteador de personas estaría infringiendo la ley, ya que el transporte remunerado de personas es un servicio público.Artículo 39: Resulta inaplicable al caso concreto, puesto que si se sanciona a quien de hecho actualmente esté ejerciendo el porte de personas, es por cuanto dicha actividad no está permitida por encontrarse definido por ley desde el año 1965 y hasta la fecha que el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores es un servicio público, Artículo 41: Inaplicable también al presente caso en cuanto al fondo, ya que constituye una garantía procesal para acudir a la Justicia, pero sin que para el caso concreto se demuestre infracción alguna con motivo de la promulgación de la Ley No. 8955. Artículos 45 y 46, no estamos en presencia de un "monopolio privado" y menos aún de un "monopolio público" recién constituido, por cuanto desde el año 1965 con la Ley No. 3503 se estableció que el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores es un servicio público del Estado, posteriormente la Ley 5406 lo reafirmó y la Ley No. 7969 lo reitera, constituyendo la Ley No. 8955 una normativa complementaria a las anteriores.Artículo 129: No existe infracción alguna a esta disposición constitucional y más bien los recurrentes, son quienes pretenden "legitimar" el porte de personas a pesar de su inexistencia legal. Artículo 140: Corresponde a las atribuciones del Presidente de la República y el respectivo Ministro, es decir, al Poder Ejecutivo. (Ver folios 1181-1188 del expediente digital).
21. 43Mediante resolución de las 14:43 horas del 28 de abril del 2016 se indica que listos los autos se pasó esta acción al Magistrado que por turno corresponde.
22. 44Se presenta escrito de MARIO HUMBERTO ZARATE SANCHEZ, en su calidad de Director Ejecutivo a.i del Consejo de Transporte Público, en fecha 04 de mayo del 2016, en resumen que: En apego a la literalidad de la norma impugnada vía acción de inconstitucionalidad, el Consejo de Transporte Público como Órgano Desconcentrado adscrito al Ministerio de Obras Públicas, con competencia autónoma en relación a la materia de transporte público, es quien en representación del Estado, asume la potestad de autorizar los permisos de servicio especial estable de taxi (seetaxi), convirtiéndose así en un ejecutor por imperio legal de las disposiciones de la Ley No. 8955, y es en virtud de dicha facultación y en concordancia con el numeral 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción constitucional, que como coadyuvante en condición de ejecutor de la ley accionada, se rinde el presente informe. Sobre el transporte remunerado de personas (servicio público), el artículo 2 de la Ley No. 7969, refiere a la naturaleza de la prestación del servicio, y en tal sentido dispone que para todos los efectos legales y de prestaciones el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi se considera un servicio público que se explotará mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa con los procedimientos especiales establecidos en dicha ley y su reglamento o del permiso en el caso de servicios especiales estables de taxi, de conformidad con lo establecido en el inciso a) del artículo 7 de la ley ibídem.De igual forma, señala el citado numeral que el transporte remunerado de personas, que se realiza por medio de autobuses, busetas, microbuses, taxis, automóviles y cualquier otro tipo de vehículo automotor, ya sea que se ofrezca al público en general, a personas usuarias o a grupos determinados de personas usuarias con necesidades especificas que constituyen demandas especiales es un servicio público del cual es titular el Estado, esto, independientemente del grado de intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo del servicio o en su fiscalización. Al momento de someter al control constitucional el proyecto de ley No. 8955, la Sala Constitucional señaló, que como consecuencia de declarar servicio público el transporte remunerado de personas, en cualquiera de sus dos modalidades el legislador procuró, abstraer de la esfera privada la prestación del servicio de transporte de personas que en su totalidad ha sido declarado servicio público por el legislador y hace que sean otras las reglas del juego y principios jurídicos a aplicar.Para esto, los particulares se convierten en colaboradores de la Administración Pública en la prestación de ese servicio que por sus características y la existencia de un interés público, debe ser asumido por el Estado sin que estén de por medio principios y derechos que rigen las relaciones privadas, como el principio de autonomía de la voluntad o la libertad de comercio, -resolución No. 201 1-04778 de las 14:31 horas del 13 de abril del 2011, emitida por la Sala Constitucional-. Consecuentemente, tal y como lo cita el órgano constitucional, el legislador procuró y declaró como servicio público, las distintas modalidades de transporte remunerado de personas en virtud de la trascendencia o impacto que tiene dicha actividad en la sociedad. En este sentido la Procuraduría General de la República en su Dictamen C-288-2014, señaló que "ningún particular puede prestar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, en sus distintas modalidades, si no cuenta con una concesión “permiso de parte del Estado”, concretamente del Consejo de Transporte Público, órgano desconcentrado del MOPT.En conclusión el servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en sus diversas modalidades solo pueden brindarlo aquellas personas físicas o jurídicas. que de forma previa, cuentan con la autorización respectiva (permiso o concesión), conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público al tenor de los procedimientos que establecen las leyes, que para tal efecto regulan el transporte remunerado de personas (Dictamen C-288-2014). Conforme al análisis realizado, en cuanto al tema de transporte remunerado de personas y sus modalidades, conforme a la ley No. 7969, se regula el servicio de transporte público realizado a través de la modalidad taxi, siendo el proceso de selección por excelencia el concurso público, asimismo, dicha ley, regula el servicio especial estable de taxi (seetaxi, antes porteo), mismo que se autoriza mediante la figura precaria del permiso, y cierra toda posibilidad de realizar transporte de personas desde el ámbito privado.Por su parte, la Ley No. 3503 dispone lo relativo al transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad autobús, el cual puede obtenerse ya sea producto de un proceso o licitación pública, o en su defecto a través de un permiso, tal y como lo estipula el artículo 25 de la ley No. 3503, en este tipo de concesiones la Administración debe garantizar el equilibrio económico y financiero de los contratos. De igual forma, los permisos de servicio especial, que son tres a saber: estudiantes, trabajadores y turismo, regulados en el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 15203-MOPT, siendo que para el caso del permiso de turismo se han emitido normas específicas para su aplicación. Estos permisos de servicio especial, están fundados en su orden, a la existencia de contratos con padres de familia o centros educativos, contratos con empresas o trabajadores, y autorización del Instituto Costarricense de Turismo. Estos servicios como lo indica su término, son especiales, y no pueden realizar demanda de pasajeros, su prestación está dirigida para el fin de autorización únicamente y puede prestarse en microbús, buseta o autobús.Cada servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas, satisface necesidades de la demanda, sobre esto, si se trata del transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de autobús, su procedencia y aplicación se ven reflejadas en un estudio técnico, que pormenorizadamente refleja las necesidades en la prestación del servicio para una o varias comunidades, para este servicio, el Consejo de Transporte Público define, recorrido, horarios, flota óptima y esquema de operación, ya lo relativo a la tarifa, por disposición de ley, es competencia de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (Aresep). Tratándose del servido de taxi, se realiza un estudio de oferta y demanda, dado que este servicio se adjudica por base de operación, y a pesar que cada concesión de taxi es personalísima, la misma se encuentra adscrita a una base de operación, con el fin de mantener el equilibrio económico y financiero de los contratos de concesión de cada concesionario de taxi.El servicio de taxi, se caracteriza por algunos factores, siendo que algunos de ellos, operan por base de operación, responden a una demanda, es un servicio abierto, público y notorio, se realiza en demanda de pasajeros, se ruletea, se identifica a través de un logo y color definido previamente, tiene tarifa única autorizada por ARESEP. También, regula la ley No. 7969 el servicio especial estable de taxi conocido como SEETAXI y que antes de la derogatoria del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio se ejercía como actividad de porteo concebido como un servicio que se presta de puerta a puerta, para satisfacer una necesidad de servicio limitado, residual y dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas diferente del que se presta con el servicio de taxi. El seetaxi, para su aplicación requiere entre otros, de un área geográfica que se define mediante patente municipal, y la existencia de contratos escritos entre las partes.Para esto, los permisos en la modalidad servicio especial estable de taxi deben ser expedidos por el Consejo de Transporte Público, previa presentación de la copia certificada del contrato o los contratos suscritos con las personas, las instituciones o las empresas que hacen uso de su servicio y otros requisitos legalmente establecidos. El servicio especial estable de taxi, es un servicio que se encuentra dirigido a una demanda residual y limitada, aquella que requiere de un recorrido de puerta a puerta, previa concretización de un contrato entre las partes, lo que lleva implícito el precio de dicho servicio. En este caso, el usuario llama a la empresa permisionaria y requiere el servicio de transporte, pactando el precio permisionario SEETAXI con el cliente y que corresponde al recorrido realizado. El interés del legislador, tal y como lo acotó la Sala Constitucional, en virtud de la trascendencia del servicio respecto a la sociedad se abstrajo este servicio privado para darle el tratamiento de servicio público, considerando además la actividad económica que media, el interés general (usuario residual, limitado, cerrado).El seetaxi, tiene prohibida la demanda de pasajeros, el ruleteo y otros aspectos que se encuentran establecidos en la ley No. 7969 a partir de la reforma introducida con la ley No. 8955 el 07 de julio del 2011. Conforme a lo anterior, podemos concretar que tal y como lo enuncia la ley No. 7969, todo transporte remunerado de personas, que se preste con vehículos automóviles, busetas, microbuses y autobuses, es titularidad del Estado, y para su prestación o explotación, debe mediar la autorización respectiva del Consejo de Transporte Público, con la entrada en vigencia de la Ley No. 8955, pierde aplicabilidad el servicio privado, siendo que todo transporte de personas se enmarca en la esfera de servicio público, dicha norma no deja lugar a excepciones ni a interpretaciones, por cuanto es una norma clara y específica. Así las cosas, no puede alegarse monopolio alguno, debido a que la concesión de servicio público se obtiene por licitación pública, en la cual existe libre participación, asimismo, para poder obtener un permiso de servicio público cualquier persona puede solicitarlo, cuya autorización depende del cumplimiento de los requisitos legales.La Procuraduría General de la República con fundamento en los artículos 1, 2, 3, 4 de la Ley No. 6815, ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República, emitió un criterio vinculante en torno a la consulta efectuada por el Auditor Interno de este Consejo, siendo el tema consultado el servido especial estable de taxi (seetaxi) a partir de la Ley No. 8955, lo cual implicó un abordaje por parte del órgano procurador, en relación a la figura del porteo de personas regulado hasta el 06 de julio del 2011, en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, derogado en su totalidad por dicha ley. Se pueden rescatar tres notas características del servicio público: a) Que es una actividad propia de la Administración: b) Que tiende a procurar una prestación a la población, y c) Que esa prestación deber ser garantizada de manera efectiva. No obstante, ser en principio el servicio público una actividad propia de la Administración, ello no excluye la posibilidad de participación de los particulares en la gestión pública, por medio especialmente de la concesión de servicio público, como sucede a menudo con los transportes y servicios en puertos y aeropuertos.Cobran especial relevancia dos asuntos ya mencionados y que deben en este momento rescatarse. En primer lugar que la naturaleza pública que puede comportar una determinada actividad servicial, presupone la respectiva declaratoria por parte del poder público, publicatio que, en nuestro ordenamiento, es un asunto rigurosamente reservado a la ley, por las restricciones a la libertad de empresa que la misma acarrea. En segundo término, cabe también insistir en que es posible, y también cada vez más frecuente, la participación de sujetos no estatales en la prestación de los servicios públicos, con la autorización y bajo el control y vigilancia del Estado; aunque, como se advertía, no toda actividad privada de interés o actividad pública constituye servicio público. De lo anterior se desprende que la declaratoria de una determinada actividad económica como servicio público implica su nacionalización.Es decir le atribuye al Estado su titularidad, de forma tal que solo éste o un particular autorizado, puede brindar el servicio. Otro efecto de la declaratoria de servicio público es que la actividad económica sale del comercio de los hombres, no pudiendo estos desarrollarla en forma libre. La única forma de dedicarse a ella es mediante una concesión o permiso del Estado. Sin embargo, aún en tales casos, la titularidad del servicio la mantiene el Estado, limitándose el particular únicamente a su prestación efectiva. En el caso del transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores -en sus distintas modalidades autobuses y taxi-, no cabe ninguna duda de que constituye un servicio público. En efecto, la ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores, No. 3503 del 10 de mayo de 1965, califica al transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores colectivos como un servicio público regulado controlado y vigilado por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, cuya prestación puede ser delegada en los particulares, a quienes se autorice 2).En igual calificación se deriva de lo dispuesto en el artículo 5, inciso f) de la Ley de creación de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, No. 7593 del 9 de agosto de 1 996, que califica el transporte remunerado de personas como un servicio público. En el mismo sentido, la ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, No. 7969 del 22 de diciembre de 1999, define a este medio de transporte como un servicio público que se explota mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa, con los procedimientos especiales establecidos en esta ley y su reglamento (artículo 2). Y mediante la reforma introducida al artículo 2 de la Ley 7969, precisamente por el artículo 2 de la Ley 8955, del 16 de junio del 2011, se establece como servicio público el transporte remunerado de personas en cualquier tipo de vehículo automotor independientemente del grado de intervención estatal.El párrafo segundo de la norma en cuestión, dispone: "El transporte remunerado de personas que se realiza por medio de autobuses, busetas, microbuses, taxis, automóviles y cualquier otro tipo de vehículo automotor ya sea que se ofrezca al público en general, a personas usuarias o a grupos determinados de personas usuarias con necesidades especificas que constituyen demandas especiales, es un servicio público del cual es titular el Estado. Lo anterior independientemente del grado de intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo del servicio o en su fiscalización”. Ningún particular puede prestar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, en sus distintas modalidades, si no cuenta con una concesión o permiso de parte del Estado. Y ello es, precisamente, lo que establece el artículo 112 de la Ley de Tránsito por Vía Públicas Terrestres, que prohíbe a los propietarios o conductores de vehículos, dedicarse a la actividad del transporte público, sin contar con las respectivas autorizaciones y placas legalmente adjudicadas.Sobre la figura jurídica del "porteo de personas", a pesar de que el transporte remunerado de personas constituye un servicio público y, en principio, solo aquellas personas autorizadas por el Estado podrían brindarlo, aquellos servicios de transporte terrestre de personas que no son subsumibles dentro del servicio público de transporte a través de vehículos automotores colectivos y de taxi pueden ser gestionados por los sujetos privados, acciones estas que no podrían ser prohibidas ni sancionadas, en vista de que están fuera de la acción de la ley y son el resultado del ejercicio de dos importantes libertades públicas (la libertad de empresa y la libertad de contratación). Dicho de otra forma, si los sujetos privados, recurriendo al principio de libertad y a las libertades económicas indicadas, descubren o crean nuevas modalidades de transporte de personas en vehículos, las cuales, dada su naturaleza, se diferencian de las dos que están nacionalizadas, tienen todo el derecho de realizar esa actividad económica, hoy en nuestro medio conviven varias modalidades de transporte de personas por vía terrestre.Unas reguladas por el Derecho Público otras por el Derecho Privado, más específicamente por el Derecho Mercantil o Comercial. Los sujetos privados pueden desarrollar actividades de transporte de personas como cualquier otra actividad económica, siempre y cuando estas no conlleven la prestación del servicio público de transporte a través de vehículos automotores colectivos o de la modalidad taxi. Sobre la derogación de la figura del porteo de personas y la creación de la figura "servicio especial estable de taxi". En virtud de los múltiples problemas suscitados entre taxistas, autobuseros y porteadores, los representantes de los tres grupos (Cámara Nacional de Transporte en Autobús, la Federación Nacional de Taxis y la Cámara de Porteadores), conjuntamente con las autoridades del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, se reunieron en múltiples oportunidades y llegaron a un consenso para regular la actividad de los porteadores.A tal propósito, la Diputada Viviana Martin redactó un proyecto de ley mediante el cual se eliminó la figura del porteo de personas del Código de Comercio y trasladó la regulación de dicha actividad, bajo el nombre de “servicio especial estable de taxi'” a la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, No. 7969, del 22 de diciembre de 1999. Fue así como, atendiendo la propuesta consensuada de los representantes del sector transporte remunerado de personas, la Asamblea Legislativa, bajo el expediente No. 17874 tramitó el proyecto de ley que culminó con la aprobación de la Ley No. 8955, del 16 de junio del 2011. De esta forma se elimina el porteo de personas, pero no se elimina el porteo en sí es decir lo que se está eliminando es la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, pero se puede seguir transportando cosas, artículos, dineros, correspondencia, etc. Teniendo en consideración el interés público involucrado y atendiendo el consenso logrado por las partes interesadas, el legislador optó por declarar el transporte de personas como servicio público, independientemente de le modalidad de que se trate y del grado de intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo o de su fiscalización.A la vez, reguló la actividad del porteo de personas, la cual pasó a denominarse servicio especial estable de taxi, manteniendo la misma condición de servicio residual que tenía el porteo de personas. De hecho, el servicio especial estable de taxi, fue definido como el "servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas usuarias y que satisface una demanda limitada, residual, exclusiva y estable." (Artículo 1, inciso I) de la Ley No. 7969, adicionado por la Ley No. 8955). De los requisitos y condiciones para ejercer la actividad de transporte de personas bajo la modalidad "servicio especial estable de taxi". Mediante la Ley No. 8955, del 16 de junio del 2011, no solo se reformó el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, eliminando la figura del porteo de personas, sino que, además, se reguló la actividad, denominándola “servicio especial estable de taxi", en la ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi.El servicio especial estable de taxi, mantiene la misma condición residual y limitada que tenía el porteo de personas. Ahora bien, respecto de los requisitos y condiciones para ejercer la actividad del servicio especial de taxi, los artículos 2 y 29 de la ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, según reforma introducida por la citada Ley No. 8955. El servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, en sus diversas modalidades (autobús. taxi. seetaxi, microbús y otros), constituye un servicio público. El servicio público es una actividad administrativa que tiene por objeto una prestación, se caracteriza por el hecho que tiende a procurar una prestación a la población siendo su finalidad asegurar de forma positiva la satisfacción de una necesidad de la colectividad. El servicio público es un servicio prestado al público, sea cual sea el estrato social en el cual se ubique.Se caracteriza por ser una actividad propia de la Administración, tiende a procurar una prestación a la población, y esa prestación debe ser garantizada de manera efectiva. La declaratoria de una determinada actividad económica como servicio público, implica su nacionalización le atribuye al Estado su titularidad, de forma tal que solo éste o un particular autorizado puede brindar el servicio. Asimismo, la declaratoria de servicio público es que la actividad económica sale del comercio de los hombres, no pudiendo estos desarrollarla en forma libre. La única forma de dedicarse a ella es mediante una concesión o permiso del Estado, aún en tales casos, la titularidad del servicio la mantiene el Estado, limitándose el particular únicamente a su prestación efectiva, siempre que se ajuste a la normativa vigente que regula el transporte de personas mismo que se constituye como servicio público en cualquier modalidad que se quiera implementar.En el caso del transporte de personas en vehículos automotores -en sus distintas modalidades, constituye un servicio público, regulado, controlado y vigilado por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, cuya prestación puede ser delegada en los particulares, a quienes se autorice expresamente de acuerdo con las normas establecidas en el Ordenamiento Jurídico para tal efecto. Si existe concurrencia de operadores en una cantidad mayor a la demanda o de personas no autorizadas, se presenta una competencia que puede ser ruinosa para los concesionarios y los permisionarios ya autorizados y el Estado responderá por ello si se tolera tal competencia. La actividad del porteo de personas ya derogada pasó a denominarse servicio especial estable de taxi, manteniendo la misma condición de servicio residual, pero como servicio público. EI servicio especial estable de taxi fue definido como el servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas usuarias y que satisface una demanda limitada, residual exclusiva y estable.Respecto al tratado de Libre Comercio República Dominicana Centroamérica -Estados Unidos (CAFTA-DR), el Tratado de Libre Comercio República Dominica-Centroamérica-Estados Unidos conocido como CAFTA, entró en vigencia el 01 de enero de 2009, mismo que se publicó mediante la Ley No. 8622 del 21 de noviembre de 2007, publicada en el Alcance No. 40 a la Gaceta No. 246 del 21 de diciembre de 2007, el tratado regula las relaciones comerciales y de inversión entre Centroamérica, Estados Unidos y República Dominicana. En el caso de Costa Rica éste tratado constituye uno de los principales instrumentos de la política comercial, por cuanto regula el comercio con el principal socio comercial del país. El tratado permitió modernizar la legislación costarricense en materia de propiedad intelectual, seguros, telecomunicaciones y contratos de distribución, así como facilitar mecanismos para asegurar la efectiva aplicación de la legislación laboral y ambiental.Los accionantes, sostienen que la ley No. 8955, violenta los alcances del referido Tratado de Libre Comercio (CAFTA), al respecto, se verificó que el Anexo I, Lista de Costa Rica del Tratado de Libre Comercio República Dominicana- Centroamérica- Estados Unidos, el sector denominado en dicho anexo como "Servicios de Transporte por Vía Terrestre- Transporte de Pasajeros” y se hace referencia puntual de todas las medidas atinentes con dicho servicio, entre los que se abrigan el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 26 del 10 de noviembre de 1965, la Ley No. 3503, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31 180-MOPT, Ley No. 7969, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 5743-T. Decreto Ejecutivo No. 28913-MOPT, Ley No. 5066, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 28337-MOPT. Decreto Ejecutivo No. 15203-MOPT y la Ley No. 7593. Y en cuanto a la descripción, "Servicios Transfronterizos e Inversión", se dispone de manera textual lo siguiente: “Servicios Transfronterizos e Inversión Costa Rica se reserva el derecho de limitar el número de concesiones para operar las líneas domésticas de rutas de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores (incluyendo servicios especiales de transporte de personas definido en los Artículos 2 y 3 del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 15203-MOPT del 22 de febrero de 1984 - Reglamento para la Explotación de Servicios Especiales de Transporte Automotor Remunerado de Personas).Dichas concesiones deberán ser otorgadas mediante licitación, y únicamente se licitará la explotación de una línea cuando el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes haya establecido la necesidad de prestar el servicio, de acuerdo con los estudios técnicos respectivos. Cuando hubiere múltiples ofertas, incluyendo una de un proveedor costarricense que satisfaga todos los requerimientos en la misma medida, se preferirá la oferta costarricense antes que la extranjera, trátese de personas naturales o empresas. Un permiso para operar un servicio internacional de transporte remunerado de personas, será otorgado únicamente a empresas constituidas bajo la Legislación de Costa Rica o aquellas cuyo capital esté integrado al menos en un 60 por ciento con aportaciones de nacionales de Centroamérica. En adición a la restricción arriba descrita, en el otorgamiento de permisos para realizar servicios internacionales de transporte remunerado de personas, se aplicará el principio de reciprocidad.Se requerirá un permiso para prestar servicios de transporte remunerado de pasajeros por vía terrestre. Nuevas concesiones podrán ser otorgadas si lo justifica la demanda por el servicio. Se dará prioridad a los concesionarios que se encuentran suministrando el servicio. Costa Rica se reserva el derecho de limitar el número de permisos o concesiones para suministrar el servicio doméstico remunerado ANEXO I, Lista de Costa Rica I-CR-13 de transporte de pasajeros por vía terrestre, basado en la demanda por el servicio. Se dará prioridad a los concesionarios que se encuentran suministrando el servicio. El Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes se reserva el derecho de fijar anualmente el número de concesiones que se otorgarán en cada distrito, cantón y provincia para los servicios de taxi. Únicamente se podrá otorgar una concesión de taxi para cada persona natural y cada concesión otorga el derecho de operar únicamente un vehículo.Las licitaciones para concesión de taxis se conceden con base a un sistema de puntos, el cual otorga ventaja a los proveedores existentes. Cada concesión para prestar servicios públicos regulares de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores, excluyendo taxis, únicamente podrá ser otorgada a una persona, a menos que una prueba de necesidades económicas evidencia la necesidad de contar con proveedores adicionales. Adicionalmente, una persona natural no podrá poseer más de dos empresas ni podrá ser accionista mayoritario en más de tres empresas operando rutas diferentes. Los permisos para proveer servicios de transporte de personas en autobuses no turísticos dentro del Gran Área Metropolitana del Valle Central de Costa Rica, deberán ser otorgados únicamente una vez que se haya demostrado que el servicio regular de autobús público no puede satisfacer la demanda. Costa Rica se reserva el derecho de mantener monopolio del transporte por ferrocarriles.Sin embargo, el Estado podrá otorgar concesiones a paniculares. Las concesiones podrán ser otorgadas si lo justifica la demanda por el servicio. Se dará prioridad a los concesionarios que se encuentran suministrando el servicio." De conformidad con lo transcrito, es claro que nuestro Gobierno se garantiza y reserva en el tratado de libre comercio República Dominicana-Centroamérica-Estados Unidos. La titularidad y todo lo vinculado con el transporte de personas incluido el transporte internacional de pasajeros y los servicios especiales (estudiantes, trabajadores y turismo). En consecuencia, quien pretenda su incursión en nuestro país, en el tanto refiera al transporte de personas, debe sujetarse el Ordenamiento Jurídico Interno, ya que nuestro país tiene garantizado dentro del Anexo I del referido tratado, la aplicación de la normativa vinculada con dichos servicios públicos y sus diversas modalidades.Esto implica, que se requiere de la autorización del Consejo de Transporte Público, para poner en marcha el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas que se pretenda brindar, de conformidad con lo preceptuado por la Ley No. 7969 y su reforma, la cual no transgrede ni violenta la normativa constitucionalidad consagrada en los numerales, 7 46, 129 y 140 de nuestra Carta Magna. (Ver folios 1215-1247 del expediente digital).
23. 45Posterior a la fecha en que esta Sala definió admitir coadyuvancias, se presentan los siguientes escritos: El 15 de julio del 2016 la Federación Nacional de Cooperativas de Taxi Fenacootaxi, solicitan audiencia. El 21 de junio del 2016 Rubén Vargas Campos en su calidad de Secretario General de la Unión de Taxistas Costarricenses solicitando se declare sin lugar la acción. El 23 de julio del 2016 por Miguel Angel Salas Castro, solicitando ser tenido como coadyuvante pasivo. El 05 de setiembre del 2016 por apoderados de la Unión Nacional de Porteadores, solicitando ser tenidos como coadyuvantes activos. El 12 de octubre del 2016 la Asociación Cámara Nacional de Autobuseros CANABUS solicitando se resuelva esta acción a la brevedad. El 20 de octubre del 2016, Edwin Barboza Guzman, Gerente de Fenacootaxi solicitando justicia. El 26 de octubre del 2016 un miembro del Comité Nacional de ex porteadores y seetaxi solicitando una audiencia. El 31 de octubre del 2016 un miembro del Comité Nacional de ex porteadores y seetaxi solicitando una audiencia.
24. 46El accionante, Presidente de la Asociación Nacional de Consumidores Libre (ACL) presenta escrito el 4 y el 8 de julio del 2016, refiriéndose a los argumentos de los órganos estatales, indicando que la declaratoria de servicio público no implica el monopolio estatal, que la reforma de la Ley 8955 aumentó la disconformidad con el TLC, por lo que solicita se rechacen las coadyuvancias del MOPT y el CTP. En cuanto al informe de la PGR indica que la reforma no satisface el interés público representado por el consumidor, no mejoró las condiciones del servicio para los usuarios, contraviene el TLC.
25. 47Mediante escrito del 15 de julio del 2016 los representantes de la Federación Nacional de Cooperativas de Taxi Fenacootaxi R.L y otros, solicitan una audiencia con el Magistrado Instructor.
26. 48Mediante escrito presentado el 23 de julio del 2016, Miguel Angel Salas Castro indica que, aunque fuera de plazo se apersona como coadyuvante pasivo.
27. 49Mediante escrito presentado el 05 de setiembre del 2016, se apersonan representantes de la Unión Nacional de Porteadores –UNAPORTE S.A.- ya coadyuvantes activos, a solicitar audiencia a la Sala Constitucional.
28. 50Mediante respuesta del 14 de setiembre del 2016 el Magistrado Instructor se refiere a las solicitudes de audiencia.
29. 51Mediante escrito del 20 de octubre del 2016, la Asociación Cámara Nacional de Autobuseros CANABUS, en calidad de coadyuvantes pasivos, solicitan se resuelva a la mayor brevedad esta acción de inconstitucionalidad.
30. 52Mediante escrito del 20 de octubre del 2016 el Gerente General de la Federación Nacional de Cooperativas de Taxi, solicita la pronta resolución de esta acción.
31. 53Mediante escrito presentado el 26 de octubre del 2016 (reiterado el 31 de octubre del 2016) se apersona un miembro del Comité Nacional de ex porteadores y seetaxis, a solicitar audiencia.
32. 54Mediante resolución número 2016-016314 de las 10:00 horas del 04 de noviembre del 2016 la Sala resolvió desglosar el escrito de interposición del recurso de amparo número 16-015165-0007-CO a este expediente, donde solicita se suspenda el cobro del marchamo del periodo 2017 a todos los concesionarios del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas modalidad taxi, hasta tanto no se resuelva la acción, debido a que algunos de los rubros están vinculados a las leyes que se impugnan.
33. 55Mediante escrito presentado el 09 de noviembre del 2016 el Presidente de Auto Transportes para socios San Jorge S.A. solicita que la Sala se pronuncie sobre el incumplimiento de COSEVI, pues están llevando a cabo procesos sancionatorios por transporte ilegal de personas en la modalidad de vehículo sedán.
34. 56Mediante escrito presentado el 11 de noviembre del 2016 la Apoderada de la Unión Nacional de Porteadores UNAPORTE S.A. se apersona indicando que lo hace como coadyuvante activa.
35. 57Mediante respuesta del 11 de noviembre del 2016 el Magistrado Instructor se refiere a las solicitudes de audiencia.
36. 58Mediante resolución de las 15:07 horas del 10 de enero del 2017 se solicitó como prueba para mejor resolver al Ministro de Comercio Exterior, a fin de que se refiera a los hechos alegados en la acción de inconstitucionalidad.
37. 59Mediante constancia del 21 de diciembre del 2016 el Magistrado Instructor consigna que la acción fue sometida a votación ese día, sin que pudiese concluir su análisis, por cuanto se dispuso llevarlo a votación con Magistrados Propietarios en el mes de enero del 2017.
38. 60Mediante escrito presentado el 24 de enero del 2017, se refiere a la prueba anterior, ALEXANDER MORA DELGADO, en su calidad de Ministro de Comercio Exterior, indicando en resumen que dado que ese Ministerio es el representante de la Parte Costa Rica ante la Comisión de Libre Comercio y ante los mecanismos de solución de controversias en los que el país sea parte, esa institución debe de abstenerse de referirse a los hechos y argumentos acerca de si la ley impugnada trasgrede o no las normas constitucionales y comerciales internacionales y principios apuntados por los accionantes, toda vez que el análisis de estos, por una parte escapa de la competencia de COMEX y por otra, conllevaría irremediablemente a revelar a priori argumentos que podría utilizar otra Parte del Tratado ante un eventual mecanismo de solución de controversias contra Costa Rica.
39. 61Mediante escrito presentado el 24 de enero del 2017 el accionante Otto Guevara Guth aporta como prueba el oficio DM-1325-5 del 16 de diciembre del 2005 emitido por el Ministerio de Comercio Exterior donde este rinde criterio sobre un proyecto similar a la ley impugnada, donde expresó que dicho proyecto contraviene las disposiciones del capítulo 11 sobre Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios del Tratado de Libre Comercio. Asimismo aporta el 31 de enero del 2017, una publicación realizada por un diputado sobre la empresa UBER y CAFTA.

62. Mediante resolución número 2017-001922 de las 11 horas del 08 de febrero del 2017 la Sala resolvió sobre la recusación presentada en contra del Magistrado Instructor, rechazar la gestión planteada y declarar habilitado al Magistrado Fernando Cruz Castro para conocer el presente asunto.

1. 63Mediante escrito presentado el 08 de febrero del 2017 la Apoderada de la Unión Nacional de Porteadores UNAPORTE S.A. indica que se adhiere a la recusación presentada.
2. 64Mediante escrito presentado el 13 de febrero del 2017 se apersona Rubén Vargas Campos, donde solicita tomar en cuenta la burla que se pretende realizar a nuestras leyes.
3. 65Se prescinde de la vista señalada en los artículos 10 y 85 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, con base en la potestad que otorga a la Sala el numeral 9 ibídem, al estimar suficientemente fundada esta resolución en principios y normas evidentes, así como en la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal.
4. 66En los procedimientos se ha cumplido las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta el Magistrado Cruz Castro; y,

Considerando:

I.Objeto de la impugnación.- Los accionantes impugnan la Ley n.° 8955, del 16 de junio del 2011, que es “Reforma de la ley n.º 3284, Código de Comercio, de 30 de abril de 1964, y de la ley n.º 7969, Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de diciembre de 1999”. Por estimarla contraria a lo establecido en los artículos 7, 28, 39, 41, 45, 46, 129 y 140 de la Constitución Política y los principios de supremacía de la realidad en materia laboral, jerarquía normativa, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, iniciativa privada, libertad de comercio, libertad contractual y libre elección de los consumidores. Explican que, mediante la Ley impugnada se reformó el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, eliminando la figura del porteo de personas, y se reformó y adicionó la Ley de Taxis, n.° 7969, sobre el servicio especial estable de taxi (SEETAXI). Estiman los accionantes que tal norma es inconstitucional en virtud de que viola:

• A)Primer alegato (creación de monopolio sin la mayoría necesaria): La Ley es inconstitucional por haber creado un monopolio público en materia de transporte modalidad taxi, sin haber sido aprobada con la mayoría calificada que exige el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. La aprobación de la Ley n.° 8955, se realizó al margen del Reglamento Interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo a través de la Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena Segunda, siendo que, por crear un monopolio público, requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (38 votos), como lo exige el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política.
• B)Segundo alegato (violación al art. 28 sobre libertad y art. 46 sobre la libertad de comercio): Mediante la Ley impugnada se crea un monopolio público en el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad taxi, impidiendo a los particulares dedicarse a tal actividad como lo regulaba, sin ningún problema, el Código de Comercio y que nacía como acuerdo de voluntades entre las partes, en el que regía la libre voluntad o conveniencia de cada quien. Por tal razón, afirman, no debió prohibirse, pues se trata de un aspecto propio de la esfera privada de los ciudadanos, en el que rige el principio de autonomía de la voluntad y en el cual el Estado no debe interferir. La existencia del monopolio en materia de transporte de personas se hace más evidente en la actualidad con la llegada de UBER, una plataforma digital que permite conectar a proveedores de servicio de transporte de personas con personas que necesitan ser transportadas.
• C)Tercer alegato (violación al Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica): Los accionantes estiman que la Ley impugnada violenta el Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en los puntos el 11.4 y 11.6. Indican que, el referido Tratado determinó que no puedan excluirse ni restringirse la posibilidad de servicio de transporte privado, el cual era permitido al momento de su aprobación. Agregan que Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación con la actividad comercial en materia de transporte con lo cual, la Ley impugnada violenta el Capítulo 11 del Tratado en cuestión, denominado “Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios”, amén de que debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el trato nacional que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado.

Por su parte, los coadyuvantes activos que fueron admitidos, ratifican los argumentos anteriores. Encontrándose solamente un nuevo argumento en el escrito presentado a las 11:05 horas del 15 de marzo del 2016, por el Apoderado de Inversiones Transportistas Los Guidos S.A. y otros, cuando indican que:

• D)Cuarto alegato (violación al principio de igualdad): La Ley no.8955 violenta el principio de igualdad, bajo el argumento de que en dicha ley se entrega la concesión a perpetuidad, así que el legislador designó un determinado grupo de particulares para que realicen un servicio público a perpetuidad, en perjuicio del resto de habitantes y de los oferentes que no fueron adjudicatarios. Indican que esta reforma cierra por completo un monopolio, a perpetuidad, con nombres y apellidos, que se convirtió en un embudo a favor de un grupo reducido de costarricenses. Mencionan que la Ley no.9027 de febrero del 2012 establece la facultad del concesionario de “heredar” la titularidad de la concesión. Respeto de este alegato, esta Sala procede a rechazarlo para su análisis, dado que en este caso, el alegato se refiere a otra norma, y no a la que está siendo impugnada, dado que en el fondo no se trata de un alegato de violación al principio de igualdad (no se puede comparar a quienes sí resultaron concesionarios respecto del resto de la población o de quienes no resultaron concesionarios) sino de conveniencia u oportunidad política, y dado que los coadyuvantes pueden ampliar los motivos de inconstitucionalidad pero no impugnar otras normas, así que se procede a desestimar el análisis de este alegato.

Ahora bien, la ley no.8955 indica literalmente lo siguiente:

“REFORMA DE LA LEY N.º 3284, CÓDIGO DE COMERCIO, DE 30 DE ABRIL DE 1964, Y DE LA LEY N.º 7969, LEY REGULADORA DEL SERVICIO PÚBLICO DE TRANSPORTE REMUNERADO DE PERSONAS EN VEHÍCULOS EN LA MODALIDAD DE TAXI, DE 22 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1999 ARTÍCULO 1.- Reformas del Código de Comercio Refórmanse los artículos 323 y 334 del Código de Comercio, Ley N.º 3284, de 30 de abril de 1964, y sus reformas. Los textos dirán:

"Artículo 323.- Por el contrato de transporte la persona porteadora se obliga a transportar cosas o noticias de un lugar a otro a cambio de un precio. El transporte puede ser realizado por empresas públicas o privadas. Son empresas públicas las que anuncian y abren al público establecimiento de esa índole, comprometiéndose a transportar por precios, condiciones y períodos determinados, siempre que se requieran sus servicios de acuerdo con las bases de sus prospectos, itinerarios y tarifas. Son empresas privadas las que prestan esos servicios en forma discrecional, bajo condiciones y por ajustes convencionales.

El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores." "Artículo 334.- El remitente tiene derecho:

[...]

• b)A que se le permita que viajen los empleados de su empresa con todos los seguros de ley al día y debidamente identificados, para cuidar en el trayecto a los animales vivos o a cualquier otro objeto que requiera atención.

[...]" ARTÍCULO 2.- Reformas de la Ley N.º 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, de 22 de diciembre de 1999, y sus reformas Modifícanse los artículos 2 y 29 de la Ley N.º 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, de 22 de diciembre de 1999, y sus reformas. Los textos dirán:

"Artículo 2.- Naturaleza de la prestación del servicio Para todos los efectos legales y de prestaciones, el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi se considera un servicio público que se explotará mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa con los procedimientos especiales establecidos en esta ley y su reglamento, o del permiso en el caso de servicios especiales estables de taxi, de conformidad con lo establecido en el inciso a) del artículo 7 de esta ley.

El transporte remunerado de personas, que se realiza por medio de autobuses, busetas, microbuses, taxis, automóviles y cualquier otro tipo de vehículo automotor, ya sea que se ofrezca al público en general, a personas usuarias o a grupos determinados de personas usuarias con necesidades específicas que constituyen demandas especiales, es un servicio público del cual es titular el Estado. Lo anterior independientemente del grado de intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo del servicio o en su fiscalización.

Será necesaria concesión:

Para explorar el servicio de transporte automotor remunerado de personas modalidad taxi, en las bases de operación debidamente autorizadas, de conformidad con lo establecido en los incisos b) y c) del artículo 1 de esta ley. Esta modalidad también incluye la prestación del servicio al domicilio o lugar donde se encuentre la persona usuaria, en respuesta a la solicitud expresa de este al prestador del servicio regular de taxi, por alguno de los medios con que este cuenta para tales efectos.

Se requerirá permiso:

Para explotar el servicio de transporte automotor remunerado de personas modalidad servicio especial estable de taxi, en los casos en que el servicio se brinde de puerta a puerta, para satisfacer una necesidad de servicio limitado, residual y dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas diferente del que se presta, de conformidad con el párrafo anterior.

Los permisos para explotar el transporte automotor de personas en la modalidad servicio especial estable de taxi serán expedidos por el Consejo de Transporte Público, previa presentación de la copia certificada del contrato o los contratos suscritos con las personas, las instituciones o las empresas que hacen uso de su servicio. A cada persona física solo se le otorgará un permiso; estas personas podrán agruparse en una persona jurídica, adquiriendo responsabilidad solidaria. El vehículo amparado al permiso deberá ser propio o arrendado mediante leasing financiero. De incumplirse las condiciones en que originariamente se otorgó el permiso, este se podrá revocar por disposición justificada del Consejo de Transporte Público.

Sin perjuicio de otras sanciones previstas por el ordenamiento jurídico, se cancelará el permiso, previo debido proceso y derecho a la defensa, por las siguientes causas:

• a)Cuando se incumplan las obligaciones, los deberes y las prohibiciones fijados en la presente ley, su reglamento, las leyes y los reglamentos conexos.
• b)Cuando se compruebe la falsedad e inexactitud en la documentación presentada ante el Consejo de Transporte Público.
• c)En caso de traspaso o cesión del permiso a favor de un tercero, sin autorización previa del Consejo.
• d)Por prestación ilegal del servicio fuera del área que autorizó el permiso, salvo en los casos en que el origen del servicio sea el área autorizada y el destino fuera de ella.
• e)Cuando por acto o resolución firme se cancele o revoque la patente autorizada del área geográfica correspondiente a la persona permisionaria, en vía administrativa o judicial. Asimismo, será razón para cancelar el permiso cuando la persona permisionaria renuncie a la patente otorgada.
• f)Cuando el vehículo con que se preste el servicio especial estable de taxi tenga las características propias de los vehículos modalidad taxi que se autorizan en razón de una concesión, violando lo establecido al respecto en el artículo 29 de la presente ley.
• g)Cuando la persona permisionaria no cuente con las pólizas al día, tal y como lo establece el artículo 29 de la presente ley.
• h)Se cancelará el permiso al vehículo autorizado para la prestación del servicio especial estable de taxi, cuando el vehículo autorizado circule por las vías públicas en demanda de pasajeros.

Los permisos no conceden derechos subjetivos al titular y se prolongarán por un plazo hasta de tres años, si se ajustan a los requisitos que se establezcan al efecto.

El Consejo de Transporte Público deberá publicar, una vez al año, en el diario oficial La Gaceta y en un diario de circulación nacional, las listas de las personas físicas o jurídicas que se encuentren debidamente acreditadas para la prestación del servicio especial estable de taxi." "Artículo 29.- Concesión administrativa previa o permiso para servicios especiales estables de taxi

1. 1Para la prestación del servicio de taxi se requiere obtener de previo una concesión administrativa otorgada por el Consejo, sujeta a las siguientes condiciones:

• a)Las concesiones administrativas de servicio remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi estarán subordinadas a los estudios técnicos de oferta y demanda aprobados por el Consejo.
• b)Las concesiones se otorgarán por base de operación, según los criterios técnicos correspondientes, por plazos prorrogables de diez años a solicitud de la persona concesionaria, previo cumplimiento de la licencia C-1 al día. El Consejo podrá autorizar la existencia de bases de operación especiales con fines turísticos, dependiendo de las características de la zona o del área geográfica, las cuales se determinarán mediante un reglamento especial, de acuerdo con los principios fundamentales de esta ley.
• c)Se otorgará una sola concesión administrativa por particular, la cual amparará la explotación del servicio público con un vehículo.
• d)Ninguna persona adjudicataria de una concesión podrá compartir, total ni parcialmente, los derechos de concesión adjudicados a otra que, a su vez, sea adjudicataria de otra concesión de servicio público remunerado de personas, en otras modalidades de transporte terrestre.
• e)Las concesiones se otorgarán por medio del procedimiento especial abreviado dispuesto en las presentes normas. Ningún gestor interesado de puertos y aeropuertos podrá ser concesionario de los servicios de transporte público remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi; tampoco se le permitirá brindar este servicio en ninguna modalidad.

1. 2Para la prestación del servicio especial estable de taxi, a que se refiere el artículo 2 de esta ley, se requiere obtener un permiso otorgado por el Consejo de Transporte Público, sujeto a las siguientes condiciones:

• a)Las personas permisionarias especiales estables de taxi de este servicio estarán limitadas a prestar el servicio dentro de un área geográfica que se determinará en razón de la patente autorizada.
• b)Ninguna persona permisionaria podrá compartir, total ni parcialmente, los derechos del permiso otorgado a otro que a su vez sea titular de otro permiso de servicio público remunerado de personas.
• c)Los vehículos con los cuales se desarrolle la prestación de servicio público modalidad especial estable de taxi, no podrán tener las características propias de los vehículos modalidad taxi que se autorizan en razón de una concesión para prestar el servicio en una determinada base de operación autorizada por el Consejo de Transporte Público, tales como el color rojo, el uso de rótulos luminosos o no luminosos, calcomanías, el uso del taxímetro y otros similares, tal como lo defina el reglamento de rigor, así como cualquier otro distintivo que pueda inducir a error a las personas usuarias del servicio de taxi. Además, deberán cumplir los requisitos de circulación que establece la Ley N.º 7331, Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, y sus reformas. Estos automotores no podrán tener una antigüedad superior a los diez años, contados desde su año de fabricación.
• d)Los vehículos autorizados para el servicio especial estable de taxi no podrán estacionarse o realizar abordaje o desabordaje de personas en las paradas dedicadas a las demás modalidades de transporte público. Las bases de operación del servicio especial estable de taxi deberán estar ubicadas a una distancia de ciento cincuenta metros, como mínimo, de las terminales oficiales de autobuses y taxis.
• e)Las personas permisionarias de servicio especial estable de taxi no podrán estacionarse en ningún lugar de la vía pública para ofrecer sus servicios al público en general. Tampoco, podrán circular en demanda de pasajeros por las vías públicas.
• f)Cuando los automotores deban detenerse frente a edificaciones públicas, parques, centros educativos, centros comerciales, muelles, puertos, aeropuertos, iglesias, hospitales o lugares similares, será por el tiempo estrictamente necesario para permitir el abordaje y desabordaje de sus propias personas usuarias.
• g)Quien presente una solicitud para explotar un servicio especial estable de taxi deberá presentar certificación de que se encuentra debidamente inscrito y al día con sus obligaciones en la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS); estar inscrito como contribuyente en el Ministerio de Hacienda; estar al día en el pago del impuesto de la renta; contar con una póliza de seguros que cubra íntegramente su responsabilidad civil por lesión o muerte de terceros y daños a la propiedad de terceros, y mantenerla vigente durante todo el período que dure el permiso y la patente municipal correspondiente, de acuerdo con la legislación vigente y los demás requisitos que procedan reglamentariamente.
• h)En razón de los principios de proporcionabilidad, razonabilidad y necesidad, el porcentaje autorizado de servicios especiales estables de taxi no podrá superar el tres por ciento (3%) de las concesiones autorizadas por base de operación.
• i)El Estado está en la obligación de garantizarles el equilibrio económico y financiero del contrato a las personas concesionarias, evitando una competencia que pueda ser ruinosa, producto de una concurrencia de operadores en una zona determinada que pueda ser superior a la necesidad de esa demanda residual de la zona operacional donde se autorice la prestación del servicio, dado que cada zona presenta características diferentes entre una y otra, autorizando el número de permisos que considere necesarios.
• j)Una vez otorgado el permiso, las personas permisionarias deberán portar el original o la copia certificada del contrato suscrito con las personas a las que se les brinda el servicio.

El incumplimiento de cualquiera de las condiciones anteriores será sancionado de conformidad con lo establecido en la Ley N.º 7331, Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, y sus reformas, sin perjuicio de que el Consejo de Transporte Público pueda cancelar el permiso." ARTÍCULO 3.- Adición y reforma a la Ley N.º 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, de 22 de diciembre de 1999, y sus reformas Adición de un inciso l) al artículo 1 y reforma de un inciso e) al artículo 62 de la Ley N.º 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, de 22 de diciembre de 1999, y sus reformas. Los textos dirán:

"Artículo 1.- Definiciones [.]

• l)Servicio especial estable de taxi: servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas usuarias y que satisface una demanda limitada, residual, exclusiva y estable.

Los permisos para el transporte remunerado de personas mediante microbuses, busetas y autobuses, se regirán por lo dispuesto en la Ley N.º 3503, Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores, de 10 de mayo de 1965, y sus reformas, o cualquier otra que la sustituya en el futuro." "Artículo 62.- Reformas de la Ley N.º 7331, Modifícase la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, de 13 de abril de 1993, en las siguientes disposiciones:

[.]

• e)Adiciónase un inciso d) al artículo 145, cuyo texto dirá:

Artículo 145.- [...]

• d)Prestar el servicio de transporte público en cualquiera de sus modalidades, sin las respectivas autorizaciones, violando el numeral 1 del inciso a), o el numeral 1) del inciso b), ambos del artículo 98 y el artículo 113 de esta ley. Para aplicar la sanción regulada por este numeral y el juzgamiento, las autoridades judiciales impondrán plenamente el régimen de pruebas por presunciones e indicios claros y concordantes, que definen tanto las legislaciones procesales civiles como penales, así como las reglas de la lógica, la conveniencia, la oportunidad, la razonabilidad y la sana crítica. Se tomarán como presunciones e indicios la habitualidad en la prestación del servicio no autorizado o los signos externos e internos colocados en los vehículos para llamar la atención de la persona usuaria, a fin de inducirla a usar el vehículo que utiliza un taxi autorizado."

II.La legitimación en este caso.- El artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regula los presupuestos que determinan la admisibilidad de las acciones de inconstitucionalidad, exigiendo la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver en sede administrativa o judicial en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad, requisito que no es necesario en los casos previstos en los párrafos segundo y tercero de ese artículo, es decir, cuando por la naturaleza de la norma no haya lesión individual o directa; cuando se fundamente en la defensa de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto, o cuando sea presentada por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República o el Defensor de los Habitantes, en estos últimos casos, dentro de sus respectivas esferas competenciales. De acuerdo con el segundo de los supuestos previstos por el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, se prevé la posibilidad de acudir en defensa de "intereses difusos", que son aquellos cuya titularidad pertenece a grupos de personas no organizadas formalmente, pero unidas a partir de una determinada necesidad social, una característica física, su origen étnico, una determinada orientación personal o ideológica, el consumo de un cierto producto, etc. El interés, en estos casos, se encuentra difuminado, diluido (difuso) entre una pluralidad no identificada de sujetos.

Esta Sala ha enumerado diversos derechos a los que les ha dado el calificativo de "difusos", tales como el ambiente, el patrimonio cultural, la defensa de la integridad territorial del país, el buen manejo del gasto público, y el derecho a la salud, entre otros. Por otra parte, la enumeración que ha hecho la Sala Constitucional no es taxativa. A partir de lo dicho en el párrafo anterior, es claro que los actores ostentan legitimación suficiente para demandar la inconstitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas, sin que para ello resulte necesario que cuenten con un asunto previo que les sirva de base a esta acción. Lo anterior porque acuden en defensa de un interés que atañe a la colectividad nacional en su conjunto, como lo es el derecho de los usuarios del servicio público de transporte de personas. Precisamente por estar en juego la prestación de un servicio público esta Sala entiende que estamos ante una acción que pretende la tutela de intereses que atañen a la colectividad nacional en su conjunto, por lo que los actores se encuentran perfectamente legitimados para accionar en forma directa, a la luz de lo que dispone el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

Por lo demás, se trata, en efecto, de materia cuya constitucionalidad procede revisar en esta vía, a saber, una ley. Además, los actores cumplieron los requisitos estipulados en los numerales 78 y 79 de la Ley de rito. En conclusión, la presente acción es admisible, por lo que debe entrarse de inmediato a discutir el objeto y el fondo del asunto.

III.Aclaración previa y sobre la metodología de análisis de la acción.- Como en toda acción de inconstitucionalidad, lo que corresponde a esta Jurisdicción Constitucional es la confrontación de la normativa impugnada con el Derecho de la Constitución, y no más que eso. Se observa de todas las coadyuvancias presentadas, tanto las activas como las pasivas, que el tema trasciende el ámbito constitucional, pues algunos exponen en sus escritos las dificultades concretas en la prestación del servicio remunerado de personas y hasta se plantea la cuestión de la plataforma que se conoce como UBER. Sin embargo, la regulación o la legalidad de una plataforma tal, no es una cuestión que se haya planteado en este proceso. Es decisión soberana del legislador determinar si un determinado servicio debe ser estatizado o debe liberalizarse. Pues ni la estatización ni la liberalización resultan inconstitucionales per se.

La decisión es política y no jurídica. Tampoco corresponde a esta Jurisdicción examinar si la actividad de UBER está prohibida o no actualmente en nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico, ni analizar casos concretos de empresas de Seetaxi o porteo, y su legalidad. Se limita el análisis en esta acción, al examen de la ley impugnada en cuanto a los alegatos de inconstitucionalidad. Ahora bien, para facilitar el estudio de la normativa impugnada, en los considerandos siguientes se hará un examen del tratamiento que se le da al servicio de transporte remunerado de personas en Costa Rica. Para luego, examinar en general la ley impugnada y así finalmente, analizar cada uno de los argumentos expuestos por los accionantes y coadyuvantes.

IV.Sobre el servicio remunerado de transporte de personas en Costa Rica.- En este considerando se examinará el tratamiento que nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico le ha dado al servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, en particular a la modalidad taxi. Resaltando si dicho servicio es considerado un servicio público, quién o quiénes pueden brindarlo y si es admisible el transporte privado de personas. Sin embargo, antes de ello conviene recordar dos conceptos básicos: qué es servicio público, los distintos tipos de gestión de servicio público que existen y el marco jurídico general del transporte remunerado de personas en Costa Rica.

1. Concepto de servicio público es dinámico : El concepto de servicio público ha sido objeto de discusión en el ámbito jurídico, durante décadas, y al respecto se pueden esbozar distintas teorías en cuanto a su definición que oscilan entre el criterio orgánico o subjetivo (servicio prestado por el Estado), funcional (servicio que reviste carácter de interés general) y material (servicio cuya regulación compete al Derecho Público). Sin embargo, en lo sí hay consenso es en que se trata de un concepto que no es estático, es decir, se trata de un concepto cambiante, según variables de tiempo (lo que en un momento dado fue servicio público puede no serlo años después) y espacio (lo que en un determinado ordenamiento jurídico es servicio público puede no serlo en otro). En nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, la Sala Constitucional ha reconocido ese carácter cambiante del concepto de servicio público, cuando ha dicho:

"Por ejemplo, el artículo 3 de la Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos contiene varias definiciones, entre ellas la de servicio público, como toda actividad que por su importancia para el desarrollo sostenible del país sea calificada como tal por la Asamblea Legislativa, con el fin de sujetarla a las regulaciones de esta ley. Como puede apreciarse, la determinación de si una necesidad es de interés público no es una cuestión jurídica, sino de hecho y circunstancial, que obliga –como ya se dijo- a un juicio de oportunidad y conveniencia. No existen actividades que por ‘naturaleza’ o imperativos del Derecho Constitucional sean propias del servicio público, sino que eso dependerá de cada sociedad, sus necesidades y en el ámbito –privado o público- en que estas se satisfagan de mejor manera." Sentencia n.° 517-98, de 14:32 horas del 26 de agosto de 1998.

Cuando una determinad actividad o servicio, es declarado –constitucional, legal o jurisprudencialmente- como un servicio público, en doctrina se conoce como la “publicatio” o la “publificación” del servicio. Esta declaratoria puede consistir, simplemente, en la definición de la actividad como de interés público, o bien, en la calificación expresa de la actividad como servicio público. Siendo disposición de cada Ordenamiento Jurídico las consecuencias de dicha declaratoria, las cuales se pueden referir: al marco jurídico especial de su regulación, al sujeto titular del servicio y a los sujetos prestadores del servicio, y a la sustracción del servicio del comercio de los hombres. Lo cual se traduce, por ejemplo, en el servicio de transporte de personas en que el Estado pueda exigir una concesión o permiso, fijarles un itinerario, tarifas, etc. Por regla general, al ser declarado un servicio como servicio público, es el Estado quien lo asume (a través de sus distintas instituciones si de un servicio público administrativo se trata o por medio de la creación de una empresa estatal si de un servicio público económico se trata).

Sin embargo, ello no excluye la posibilidad de participación de los particulares en la gestión pública, lo que se denomina como gestión indirecta, por medio de la concesión de servicio público, como sucede a menudo con los transportes y servicios en puertos y aeropuertos.

2. Tipos de gestión del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas (gestión directa y gestión indirecta): Examinando en concreto el servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas, por su naturaleza de servicio público, es lógico que pueda ser brindado directamente por el Estado. Empero, bien puede ser delegado en particulares mediante concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate. Así entonces, se conocen básicamente dos tipos de gestión de este servicio público: la gestión directa (por el Estado) y la gestión indirecta (por sujetos particulares). En este sentido, cada Ordenamiento Jurídico definirá cuáles actividades son consideradas servicios públicos, quien será el prestador de dichos servicios, y si pueden ser asumidos por particulares, vía concesión o permiso. En el caso del transporte remunerado de personas, como es el caso que se examina, también es admisible la gestión directa, cuando es el Estado asume su prestación, generalmente mediante una empresa estatal. Pero, particularmente en el servicio de taxi, mediante la gestión indirecta, cuando el Estado otorga una concesión o permiso a sujetos particulares.

3. El marco jurídico del transporte remunerado de personas en Costa Rica : En nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico, el transporte remunerado de personas, en sus diversas modalidades, constituye un servicio público. Así se desprende de varias normas:

En primer lugar, la Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores, n.° 3503 del 10 de mayo de 1965, cuyos artículos 1 y 2 califican al transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores colectivos como un servicio público regulado, controlado y vigilado por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, tal como se indica:

“Artículo 1.- El transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores colectivos, excepto los automóviles de servicio de taxi regulado en otra ley, que se lleva a cabo por calles, carreteras y caminos dentro del territorio nacional, es un servicio público regulado, controlado y vigilado por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. La prestación es delegada en particulares a quienes autoriza expresamente, de acuerdo con las normas aquí establecidas.

(…)” “Artículo 2.- Es competencia del Ministerio de Transportes lo relativo al tránsito y transporte automotor de personas en el país. Este Ministerio podrá tomar a su cargo la prestación de estos servicios públicos ya sea en forma directa o mediante otras instituciones del Estado, o bien conceder derechos a empresarios particulares para explotarlos. El Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes ejercerá la vigilancia, el control y la regulación del tránsito y del transporte automotor de personas. El control de los servicios de transporte público concesionados o autorizados, se ejercerá conjuntamente con la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, para garantizar la aplicación correcta de los servicios y el pleno cumplimiento de las disposiciones contractuales correspondientes.

(…) ” Igual calificación se deriva de lo dispuesto en el artículo 5, inciso f) de la Ley de creación de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, n.° 7593 del 9 de agosto de 1996:

“Artículo 5.- Funciones En los servicios públicos definidos en este artículo, la Autoridad Reguladora fijará precios y tarifas; además, velará por el cumplimiento de las normas de calidad, cantidad, confiabilidad, continuidad, oportunidad y prestación óptima, según el artículo 25 de esta ley. Los servicios públicos antes mencionados son:

(…)

• f)Cualquier medio de transporte público remunerado de personas, salvo el aéreo.

(…)” En un sentido más concreto, la actual Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, n.° 7969 del 22 de diciembre de 1999, define a este medio de transporte como un servicio público que se explota mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa, según su artículo 2:

“Artículo 2.- Naturaleza de la prestación del servicio Para todos los efectos legales y de prestaciones, el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi se considera un servicio público que se explotará mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa con los procedimientos especiales establecidos en esta ley y su reglamento, o del permiso en el caso de servicios especiales estables de taxi, de conformidad con lo establecido en el inciso a) del artículo 7 de esta ley.

(…)” Sin embargo, ya desde la ley anterior, No.5406 de 1973 (ley actualmente no vigente), se había definido esta modalidad de transporte como servicio público, en su artículo 1:

“Artículo 1º.- El transporte terrestre remunerado de personas en vehículos taxis automotores se considerará servicio público .” Actualmente, mediante la reforma introducida al artículo 2 de la Ley 7969, precisamente por el artículo 2 de la Ley 8955, del 16 de junio del 2011, se establece como servicio público el transporte remunerado de personas en cualquier tipo de vehículo automotor. El párrafo segundo de la norma en cuestión, dispone:

“El transporte remunerado de personas, que se realiza por medio de autobuses, busetas, microbuses, taxis, automóviles y cualquier otro tipo de vehículo automotor, ya sea que se ofrezca al público en general, a personas usuarias o a grupos determinados de personas usuarias con necesidades específicas que constituyen demandas especiales, es un servicio público del cual es titular el Estado. Lo anterior independientemente del grado de intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo del servicio o en su fiscalización.” De todo lo anterior se desprende que el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores –en sus distintas modalidades autobuses y taxi-, constituye un servicio público en el Ordenamiento Jurídico Costarricense. Y en tal sentido se ha pronunciado la Sala Constitucional, en reiteradas oportunidades. Por ejemplo, en la resolución n.° 2011-04778, de las 14:30 horas del 13 de abril del 2011, al evacuar una consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad formulada por varios diputados con respecto del proyecto de ley que dio origen a la Ley aquí impugnada, en lo que interesa, se indicó:

“XIV.- (…) Este Tribunal considera necesario referirse en primer lugar a la decisión de legislador de declarar servicio público todo el transporte remunerado de personas y luego si esta medida implica o no una limitación a la libertad de comercio. El proyecto de ley consultado tiene su origen, según la exposición de motivos, en que “durante varias semanas del presente año se llevó a cabo un arduo proceso de negociación en el cual el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes y sus autoridades, junto con la Cámara Nacional de Transporte de Autobús, la Federación Nacional de Taxis y la Cámara de Porteadores como representante del sector, mantuvieron una sesión permanente de discusión, buscando una formulación de consenso para solucionar la situación de los señores y señoras porteadoras”. (folio 2 de la copia certificada de expediente legislativo, Tomo I). Producto de esa discusión el proyecto de ley consultado, a grandes rasgos, elimina la palabra “personas” del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio; incorpora la figura del servicio especial estable de taxi en la Ley número 7969 y lo declara como una de las formas en que se explota el servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas.

XV.En un inicio, se consideró servicio público a toda la actividad desarrollada por el Estado, cuyo cumplimiento debía ser asegurado, reglado y controlado por los gobernantes. Después se restringió a cierta actividad de la Administración Pública, desarrollada exclusivamente por las entidades estatales. Sin embargo, en la actualidad, el servicio público no sólo puede ser prestado o realizado por organismos estatales, sino también por personas o entes particulares o privados, de acuerdo a reglamentaciones emitidas por las autoridades públicas. Por servicio público se entiende, entonces, toda actividad de la Administración Pública o de los particulares o administrados que tienda a la satisfacción de necesidades o intereses de carácter general, cuya índole o gravitación se encuentra regida o encuadrada por el Derecho Público, en tanto se requiere de un control por parte de las autoridades públicas.

La concepción tradicional limita el servicio público a la actividad que realiza la Administración directa o indirectamente, cuya creación se deba a un acto formal -a través de ley formal- o comportamiento de las autoridades públicas -acto administrativo-. Asimismo, la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal ha señalado dos tendencias que identifican el elemento determinante de los servicios públicos: a) el fin perseguido, teniendo por tal, la satisfacción de la necesidad o del interés general, para cuyo fin fue creado, sea a través de la Administración o por intermedio de los particulares; o b) la sujeción de esta actividad al régimen del Derecho Público, esto es, a normas de sujeción y subordinación en lo que se refiere a la regulación de la actividad aún cuando no existan normas expresas que así lo establezcan, precisamente en virtud del interés público que se intenta satisfacer (en este sentido sentencias número 2005-00846 de las once horas con veintiocho minutos del veintiocho de enero del dos mil cinco y número 5403-95 de las dieciséis horas seis minutos del tres de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y cinco).

Otra precisión necesaria, para el caso en estudio, es que el constituyente no enlistó en el texto de la Constitución todos los servicios de naturaleza pública. La Constitución Política deja al legislador ordinario la competencia para establecer cuáles servicios deben definirse de esa forma, atendiendo, claro está, al modelo político impuesto por la Constitución Política, cual es el de un régimen democrático social de derecho.

XVI.El Estado, desde hace ya bastante tiempo, ha considerado la actividad de transporte de personas como una necesidad social imperante cuya vigencia resulta esencial, como condición fundamental para el mantenimiento del estado de derecho y la paz social. Por esta razón ha promulgado una serie de leyes siendo, actualmente, las más importantes en esta materia la Ley Reguladora de Transporte Remunerado Personas Vehículos Automotores (Ley No. 3503) y la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi (Ley No. 7969), cuya reforma se conoce en esta consulta. En el último quinquenio, es público y notorio que este tema del transporte de personas ha ido adquiriendo mayor trascendencia para la sociedad costarricense, no sólo desde el punto de vista social sino también económico, hasta convertirse en un tema de interés general, que va más allá de la satisfacción de una necesidad meramente privada, requiriendo la intervención del Estado para darle una solución.

El Estado -en este caso el legislador ordinario- puede, dentro del marco permitido por la Constitución Política y las normas de carácter legal, optar por la solución que considere más oportuna. Como recién se dijo, una de esas posibles soluciones es regular dicha actividad y declararla servicio público, que es precisamente lo que hace el proyecto consultado, cumpliendo, necesariamente, con los dos elementos antes señalados. En virtud de lo al artículo 2 de la Ley número 7969 para considerar el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi un servicio público del cual es titular el Estado y que se explotará mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa o el permiso en el caso de servicios especiales estables de taxi.

XVII.Como consecuencia de declarar servicio público el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad taxi, en cualquiera de sus dos formas de prestación, el proyecto de ley consultado reforma el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio para eliminar la palabra “personas” de dicho artículo y así eliminar el porteo de personas. Con esta reforma el legislador busca, de una vez por todas, abstraer de la esfera privada la prestación del servicio de transporte de personas que en su totalidad ha sido declarado servicio público por el legislador y hace que sean otras las reglas del juego y principios jurídicos a aplicar: Los particulares se convierten en colaboradores de la Administración Pública en la prestación de ese servicio que, por sus características y la evidente existencia de un interés público, debe ser en principio, asumido por el Estado sin que estén de por medio principios y derechos que rigen las relaciones privadas, como lo son el principio de autonomía de la voluntad o la libertad de comercio. En consecuencia, el Tribunal estima que el proyecto de ley consultado no lesiona los artículos 28, 45, 46 y 56 de la Constitución Política. (…).”

Como apunta la sentencia anterior, mediante la ley impugnada, el legislador, dentro del marco permitido por la Constitución Política, optó por declarar como servicio público toda la actividad del transporte remunerado de personas, en atención a la trascendencia que dicha actividad tiene para la sociedad costarricense. Siendo que, el transporte remunerado de personas, independientemente del tipo de vehículo automotor que se utilice, de las personas a las que vaya dirigido –ya sea que se ofrezca al público en general o a personas usuarias de grupos determinados- y de la intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo o fiscalización, sería considerado un servicio público. Debido a ello, pese a que desde el año 1965 con la Ley No.3503 ya se había declarado el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores que se lleve a cabo por calles, carreteras y caminos dentro del territorio de la República, como un servicio público; al persistir las normas 323 y 334 del Código de Comercio, es a partir de la vigencia de la Ley n.° 8955 (que viene a reformar dichas normas del Código de Comercio) en que el legislador ha querido dejar claro que, ninguna persona particular –física o jurídica- puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva –concesión o permiso- conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público.

V.En general sobre la Ley impugnada.-La Ley impugnada, “Reforma de la ley n.º 3284, Código de Comercio, de 30 de abril de 1964, y de la ley n.º 7969, Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de diciembre de 1999” que es Ley no. 8955 del 16 de junio del 2011, contiene tres normas. Por medio de ellas se:

-Reforman los artículos 323 y 334 del Código de Comercio, eliminando la palabra “personas” del porteo.

-Reforma y adiciona la Ley de Taxis, n.° 7969, para regular lo que se definió como servicio especial estable de taxi (SEETAXI), que “conserva la naturaleza del servicio especial residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado para darle sentido de responsabilidad, a aquellos interesados que lo estarían acreditando” (según reza la exposición de motivos del proyecto original).

Así que, mediante la Ley impugnada se reformó normas del Código de Comercio, eliminando la figura del porteo de personas, actividad que pasó a estar regulada en la denominada Ley de Taxis, n.° 7969, bajo el nombre de servicio especial estable de taxi (SEETAXI). El proyecto de ley, tramitada bajo el expediente no.17874, fue presentado a la Asamblea Legislativa el 29 de setiembre del año 2010, cuya de “transformación” del porteo de personas regido hasta entonces por el Código de Comercio en el servicio especial de taxi que será regido por la Ley no.7969 Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi:

“Con esta iniciativa se pretende de manera muy categórica, establecer dentro del marco regulatorio de la Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi, N.º 7969, un servicio que hoy día es una realidad y que esta tutelado de manera equivocada al estar amparado solamente ante la palabra “personas” en el Código de Comercio, con el fin de crear una legislación que garantice mejores condiciones y costos más bajos para el usuario, buscando el beneficio y el bienestar de las grandes mayorías.

De esta forma se elimina el porteo de personas, pero no se elimina el porteo en sí, es decir lo que se está eliminando es la palabra “persona” del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, pero se puede seguir transportando cosas, artículos, dineros, correspondencia, etc.

Ante la eliminación de la palabra “persona”, se crea dentro de la Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi, N.º 7969, una figura que se llama “transporte especial estable de taxi”, que conserva la naturaleza del servicio especial residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado para darle sentido de responsabilidad, a aquellos interesados que lo estarían acreditando.

El servicio especial estable de taxi se distinguirá plenamente del servicio regular de taxis, porque será siempre de puerta a puerta, prevaleciendo el contrato privado entre las partes, y deberá acreditarse que forma parte de una actividad comercial, que además deben tener las patentes y que podrá ser desarrollado en esta primer etapa por personas físicas o personas jurídicas que puedan demostrar ante el Consejo de Transporte Público, en un plazo que se ha planteado perentorio de tres años (3 años), para que desarrollen esta actividad porque hay que entender que su crecimiento es muy particular y esporádico, hoy puede que sirva durante un tiempo determinado porque hay un contrato, pero eso no quiere decir que permanezca en el tiempo, por eso se habla de permiso hasta por tres años.

No se trata de una concesión porque no nace de un producto de una licitación pública, sino que nace de un permiso y obedece fundamentalmente que es una necesidad específica y puntual.

(…) de manera que aquel o aquella que esté brindando ese servicio especial sin la respectiva acreditación estaría operando bajo un rango de ilegalidad, porque no hay una figura ni en el Código de Comercio ni en la Ley de tránsito que permita realizar esa actividad.” Dicho proyecto fue delegado a la Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena Segunda. Luego de ser aprobado en primer debate el 15 de marzo del 2011, fue enviado a la Sala Constitucional mediante una consulta facultativa (resuelta mediante el voto número 2011-04778 donde se resolvió que el proyecto consultado no contenía vicios esenciales de procedimiento ni disposiciones inconstitucionales). Finalmente, fue aprobado en segundo debate el 24 de mayo del 2011. Publicándose el 7 de julio del 2011, fecha en la que entró a regir. Interesa resaltar que esta Sala, mediante el voto que resuelve dicha consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad, examinó ya las cuestiones relativas a si el proyecto consultado estaba creando un monopolio y si violentaba la libertad de comercio, según se dirá en los considerandos siguientes. Así entonces, luego de aclaro lo anterior, se procede el examen de cada uno de los tres alegatos de inconstitucionalidad. Siendo el primero un alegato sobre el procedimiento y el resto, alegatos sobre el fondo.

VI.Sobre el primer alegato: Violación al procedimiento legislativo por haberse aprobado la ley impugnada en una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena.-

Los accionantes consideran que la Ley impugnada es inconstitucional por haber creado un monopolio público en materia de transporte modalidad taxi, sin haber sido aprobada con la mayoría calificada que exige el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Indican que la aprobación de la Ley n.° 8955 se realizó al margen del Reglamento Interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo a través de la Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena Segunda, siendo que, por crear un monopolio público, requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (38 votos), como lo exige el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política.

La Procuraduría General de la República considera que no llevan razón los accionantes en el sentido de que la ley impugnada crea un monopolio público a favor del Estado y que, por tal razón, debió ser aprobada con mayoría calificada (38 votos). Lo que la ley en cuestión hace es declarar toda la actividad del transporte remunerado de personas como servicio público y tal regulación sí podía delegarse en una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena. Inclusive, ya la Sala Constitucional avaló la constitucionalidad del procedimiento seguido en la aprobación de la Ley aquí impugnada, mediante la resolución n.° 2011-04778, al analizar la constitucionalidad del proyecto de ley que dio lugar a la ley aquí impugnada, fue categórica en afirmar, primero, que no crea ningún monopolio ni práctica monopolística, porque la creación de un servicio público no crea un monopolio, conforme a las previsiones constitucionales; segundo, que el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política no crea una reserva de ley agravada para la imposición de regulaciones o límites a la libertad de comercio y, tercero, que sí resultaba procedente la delegación de un proyecto de ley de tal naturaleza en una la Comisión con Potestad Plena Legislativa.

Por su parte, el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes considera que, no estamos en presencia de un monopolio privado y menos aún de un monopolio público, por cuanto desde el año 1965 se determinó, mediante la Ley No.3503 que el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores es un servicio público del Estado. El Consejo de Transporte Público, considera que, no puede confundirse la titularidad del Estado con un monopolio, dado que para la prestación del transporte remunerado de personas, media por excelencia el proceso licitatorio. No procede la argumentación por cuanto desde su origen la Ley en cuestión no fue sometida ni tratada como monopolio estatal. El legislador no pretendió la creación de un monopolio, únicamente analizó que dicho servicio debía contemplarse como público y así eliminar de la esfera privada el porteo de personas, concluyéndose en la resolución No.2011-04778 que resolvió la consulta legislativa que dicho proyecto “No resulta inconstitucional, ni por su contenido, ni por el procedimiento legislativo utilizado para su aprobación”.

Finalmente, las coadyuvancias activasadmitidas ratifican los argumentos de los accionantes, agregando que, es la ley impugnada la que somete la totalidad de la actividad a servicio público. Las coadyuvancias pasivas admitidas indican que la intención unívoca del legislador de 1965 fue convertir en servicio público todo el transporte remunerado de personas por vía terrestre en cualquier tipo de vehículos automotores y bajo cualquier modalidad de prestación, convirtiéndolo en un nuevo monopolio estatal. Así las cosas, el argumento de los accionantes en el sentido de que la Ley número 8955 tenía que aprobarse por dos tercios del total de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa, no es de recibo, por cuanto el monopolio público en materia de transporte remunerado de personas, en cualquiera de sus modalidades (autobuses, taxis, porteo, etc.), fue creado por el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503 de 10 de mayo de 1965, norma que todavía se mantiene vigente.

Siendo, la normativa impugnada, en realidad de innecesaria promulgación, pues el porteo de personas ya había dejado de existir jurídicamente desde 1965, cuando el servicio del transporte remunerado de personas en cualquiera de sus modalidades (autobuses, taxis, porteo, etc.) fue declarado, por mayoría calificada de la Asamblea Legislativa, como un monopolio público, susceptible de ser delegada su prestación en los particulares por medio de las figuras administrativas de la concesión y el permiso. En consecuencia, la ley impugnada no necesitaba ser aprobada por dos tercios del total de miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa, pues simplemente vino a regular una modalidad de prestación del servicio remunerado de personas, el cual había ya sido declarado como servicio público desde 1965.

Al respecto, tal como se observa, este alegato está referido al procedimiento legislativo, en cuanto se argumenta que, como esta ley está creando un monopolio y que el párrafo final del artículo 46 Constitucional establece que para establecer nuevos monopolios a favor del Estado se requerirá la aprobación de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa, entonces la aprobación en la Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena Segunda (donde no se puede alcanzar la mayoría indicada), se incurrió en un vicio de procedimiento. Ahora bien, para tener por cierto dicho argumento, es necesario estar de acuerdo con todas sus premisas. Sin embargo, en este caso, la primera premisa resulta inválida, pues esta ley NO está creando un monopolio. Tal como se dijo mediante la resolución número 2011-04778 donde se resolvió que el proyecto consultado no contenía vicios esenciales de procedimiento ni disposiciones inconstitucionales, esta Sala resolvió ya este punto, indicando en concreto lo siguiente:

“IX.- Segundo aspecto consultado: Delegación del proyecto de leyque se tramita en el expediente legislativo número 17874 en la Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena Segunda. Los diputados consultantes estiman que como con el proyecto de ley consultado se suprime la libertad para crear empresas de porteo, sólo el Plenario Legislativo estaría facultado para aprobar dicho proyecto mediante una votación calificada. Consideran que el proyecto de ley no debió ser delegado en la Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena Segunda en los términos de los artículos 28, 121 inciso 7, y 124 de la Constitución Política y artículos 160 y 208 Bis del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa. Por ello la delegación efectuada implicó una violación al procedimiento legislativo. (…) El proyecto de ley consultado no crea ningún monopolio ni práctica monopolística, sino que viene a establecer otra modalidad de prestar el servicio de transporte público de personas como lo es el “servicio especial estable de taxi” y cuales con los requisitos para prestarlo.

Contrario a lo sostenido por los diputados consultantes, el proyecto de ley no configura el supuesto regulado en el artículo 121 inciso 7) de la Constitución Política, ya que éste se refiere a lo que se conoce en doctrina como el derecho de excepción, entendido como el conjunto de medidas extraordinarias previstas en los textos constitucionales para que el propio ordenamiento le haga frente a una situación de emergencia que puede traer como consecuencia una crisis del Estado.” Así entonces, resulta claro que el proyecto de ley consultado no crea ningún monopolio ni práctica monopolística. A mayor abundamiento, en un caso similar, en el que se cuestionaba como monopolio el servicio de la revisión técnica vehicular, mediante sentencia n.° 2005-04190de las dieciséis horas con cuarenta y dos minutos del veinte de abril del dos mil cinco, la Sala consideró, que en caso de concesiones era impropio hablar de monopolio:

“IV.- Las concesiones para la prestación de un servicio público no constituyen un monopolio privado.- Toda concesión pública es un contrato administrativo efectuado por la Administración con el objetivo de “delegar” en un tercero, sea la prestación de un determinado servicio que le correspondería prestar al mismo Estado, o sea la construcción de una obra pública, pero que por ciertas razones de oportunidad o conveniencia decide solicitar la colaboración a los sujetos particulares. Una de las particularidades de una concesión de servicios públicos es que, quien resulte adjudicatario debe reunir ciertas características personalísimas. No pudiendo, dicho adjudicatario ceder o traspasar a terceros esa concesión. Esto es así porque justamente fueron esas características particulares del adjudicatario las que pesaron a la hora de efectuar la escogencia entre todos los que participaron en la licitación pública.

Por otro lado, en cuanto a la decisión de elegir un solo adjudicatario, la Administración Pública tiene la potestad para hacerlo conforme a sus competencias constitucionales y de acuerdo a criterios de oportunidad y conveniencia que no corresponden a esta Jurisdicción analizar. En cuanto al titular del servicio público, es la Administración quien conserva la titularidad del servicio público, aunque sea finalmente un tercero particular el que lo presta. Por eso es que decir que una concesión para la prestación de un servicio público es un monopolio privado tendría un doble contrasentido , tanto de parte del hecho de que sea “privado” porque el Estado, sujeto público, es el verdadero titular del servicio concesionado; como de parte del hecho de que sea un “monopolio” porque no se trata de una situación de mercado ni de la prestación de servicios privados, sino de una situación dentro del ámbito público para la prestación de un servicio público.” Lo que el Estado está estableciendo en el caso del transporte remunerado de personas, es que se trata de una actividad definida como servicio público.

Ello lo que supone es la denominada “publicatio”, que es, la declaratoria constitucional o legal que define una actividad como servicio público. Pero en este caso, el Estado no está asumiendo su prestación en carácter de monopolio. Antes bien, se establece la posibilidad de participación de los particulares en la gestión pública (denominada gestión indirecta), por medio de la concesión de servicio público, y del permiso especial de taxi. Así entonces nos encontramos con una multiplicidad de sujetos privados, quienes una vez habilitados, pueden prestar este servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas. Por ello no se puede considerar que se trata de un monopolio estatal, pues ni siquiera es el Estado quien directamente brinda el servicio, y en el caso de los sujetos privados habilitados, tampoco se trata de un solo sujeto, sino de una multiplicidad de ellos. No hay forma de calificar el sistema que esta ley está creando, como un monopolio, de lo único que se trata es de la ratificación de que la actividad es un servicio público (y como tal abstraído del comercio de los hombres) el cual, puede ser prestado por sujetos privados, previa concesión o permiso otorgado por el Estado.

En conclusión, dado que con la ley impugnada no se está creando ningún tipo de monopolio estatal, sino sólo la ratificación de que el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, modalidad taxi, es un servicio público, no existe vicio alguno de procedimiento por el hecho de que esta ley haya sido aprobada en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena o sin la mayoría que establece el párrafo final del artículo 46 Constitucional. En consecuencia, se desestima este alegato de inconstitucionalidad.

VII. Sobre el segundo alegato: Violación de los principios de autonomía de la voluntad y libre comercio

Los accionantes consideran que mediante la Ley impugnada se crea un monopolio público en el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad taxi, impidiendo a los particulares dedicarse a tal actividad como lo regulaba el Código de Comercio, es decir, bajo un acuerdo de voluntades entre las partes, en el que rige la libre voluntad o conveniencia de cada quien. Por tal razón, afirman, no debió prohibirse, pues se trata de un aspecto propio de la esfera privada de los ciudadanos, en el que rige el principio de autonomía de la voluntad y en el cual el Estado no debe interferir. Agregan que, la existencia del monopolio en materia de transporte de personas se hace más evidente en la actualidad con la llegada de UBER, una plataforma digital que permite conectar a proveedores de servicio de transporte de personas con personas que necesitan ser transportadas.

La Procuraduría General de la República considera al respecto que, la declaratoria de una determinada actividad económica como servicio público implica su nacionalización. Es decir, le atribuye al Estado su titularidad, de forma tal que solo éste o un particular autorizado, puede brindar el servicio. Otro efecto de la declaratoria de servicio público es que la actividad económica sale del comercio de los hombres, no pudiendo estos desarrollarla en forma libre. La única forma de dedicarse a ella es mediante una concesión o permiso del Estado. Sin embargo, aún en tales casos, la titularidad del servicio la mantiene el Estado, limitándose el particular únicamente a su prestación efectiva. En el caso del transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores –en sus distintas modalidades autobuses y taxi-, no cabe ninguna duda de que constituye un servicio público. Y en tal sentido se ha pronunciado la Sala Constitucional, en reiteradas oportunidades. Por ejemplo, en la resolución n.° 2011-04778, de las 14:30 horas del 13 de abril del 2011, al evacuar una consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad formulada por varios diputados con respecto del proyecto de ley que dio origen a la Ley aquí impugnada.

Por su parte, el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes considera que, el transporte remunerado de personas al tenor del ordenamiento jurídico vigente es y debe ser una actividad del Estado, por encontrarse inmerso un interés público claro y específico. El Consejo de Transporte Público, consideran que, el legislador procuró, abstraer de la esfera privada la prestación del servicio de transporte de personas que en su totalidad ha sido declarado servicio público por el legislador y hace que sean otras las reglas del juego y principios jurídicos a aplicar. Para esto, los particulares se convierten en colaboradores de la Administración Pública en la prestación de ese servicio que por sus características y la existencia de un interés público, debe ser asumido por el Estado sin que estén de por medio principios y derechos que rigen las relaciones privadas, como el principio de autonomía de la voluntad o la libertad de comercio.

Finalmente, las coadyuvancias activas admitidas ratifican los argumentos de los accionantes y las coadyuvancias pasivas admitidas indican que no se creó ningún nuevo monopolio a favor del Estado, pues ese monopolio ya existía desde el lejano 1965. Todas las argumentaciones se estrellan ante el hecho incontrovertible de que el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503, aprobado en 1965 y vigente a la fecha elevó todas las modalidades del transporte remunerado de personas por vías públicas a la categoría de servicio público. En consecuencia, la Ley 8955 no contiene ningún vicio de inconstitucionalidad, dado que lo único en que legisló ex novo fue en la regulación de la modalidad de servido público denominada "seetaxi", la cual, de manera inexplicable, operó a la libre, sin ninguna regulación del Estado desde 1965 hasta la promulgación de la Ley 8955.

Al respecto, en los mismos términos en que se ha venido desarrollando, el establecimiento de una actividad como “servicio público” no implica violación alguna a la libertad de comercio. Ciertamente, aún antes del dictado de la ley impugnada, ya el servicio de prestación de transporte remunerado de personas había sido calificado, de forma genérica, como un servicio público. Lo que el artículo 1° de la ley impugnada vino a reformar (en cuanto a los artículos 323 y 334 del Código de Comercio) fue para ratificarlo. De igual forma, este argumento ya fue examinado por esta Sala mediante la sentencia que resolvió la consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad no.11-004778, donde se indicó en cuanto a si el proyecto consultado violentaba los artículos 28, 45, 46 y 56 Constitucionales, lo siguiente:

“XII.- Tercer aspecto consultado: Violación a los artículos 28, 45, 46 y 56 de la Constitución, por la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio.Estiman los consultantes que la actividad de porteo de personas se desarrolla a partir de los artículo 323 y siguientes del Código de Comercio y que el proyecto de ley consultado propone eliminar la posibilidad de que en el futuro los particulares puedan incursionar en esa actividad, sustituyéndola por una figura de carácter público con un límite cuantitativo. Añaden que al ser una actividad privada, el legislador no tiene competencia para regularla y que está excediendo los límites de su competencia ya que no existe prueba alguna en el expediente que acredite que la actividad privada del porteo lesiona la moral, el orden público, ni afecta a terceros en los términos del artículo 28 de la Constitución Política. Agregan que, como lo ha señalado la jurisprudencia constitucional, toda persona tiene derecho a escoger, sin restricciones, la actividad empresarial legalmente permitida que más convenga a sus intereses; esto es lo que han hecho los porteadores, escoger y ejercer una actividad legalmente permitida por muchos años.

Consideran que el Estado, pese al monopolio y control del transporte público mediante la concesión de placas de taxi, también dejó a la libre voluntad de los ciudadanos el uso de cualquier otra forma de contratación de transporte privado, con fundamento en los artículos 28 y 46 de la Constitución Política, que garantizan la libertad de acción y la libertad de empresa para desarrollar esa actividad mediante esquemas de unión voluntaria de los prestatarios de servicios amparados en la libertad de asociación (artículo 25 de la Constitución Política). Solicitan que la Sala reafirme que la actividad del porteo se desarrolla conforme a derecho y que la normativa que elimina del texto del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio la palabra “personas” y la figura del porteo de ellas viola, por omisión los artículos 25, 28, 46 y 56 de la Constitución Política.

(…)

Este Tribunal considera necesario referirse en primer lugar a la decisión de legislador de declarar servicio público todo el transporte remunerado de personas y luego si esta medida implica o no una limitación a la libertad de comercio.

(…)

Otra precisión necesaria, para el caso en estudio, es que el constituyente no enlistó en el texto de la Constitución todos los servicios de naturaleza pública. La Constitución Política deja al legislador ordinario la competencia para establecer cuáles servicios deben definirse de esa forma, atendiendo, claro está, al modelo político impuesto por la Constitución Política, cual es el de un régimen democrático social de derecho.

XVI.El Estado, desde hace ya bastante tiempo, ha considerado la actividad de transporte de personas como una necesidad social imperante cuya vigencia resulta esencial, como condición fundamental para el mantenimiento del estado de derecho y la paz social. Por esta razón ha promulgado una serie de leyes siendo, actualmente, las más importantes en esta materia la Ley Reguladora de Transporte Remunerado Personas Vehículos Automotores (Ley No. 3503) y la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi (Ley No. 7969), cuya reforma se conoce en esta consulta. En el último quinquenio, es público y notorio que este tema del transporte de personas ha ido adquiriendo mayor trascendencia para la sociedad costarricense, no sólo desde el punto de vista social sino también económico, hasta convertirse en un tema de interés general, que va más allá de la satisfacción de una necesidad meramente privada, requiriendo la intervención del Estado para darle una solución.

El Estado -en este caso el legislador ordinario- puede, dentro del marco permitido por la Constitución Política y las normas de carácter legal, optar por la solución que considere más oportuna. Como recién se dijo, una de esas posibles soluciones es regular dicha actividad y declararla servicio público, que es precisamente lo que hace el proyecto consultado, cumpliendo, necesariamente, con los dos elementos antes señalados. En virtud de lo al artículo 2 de la Ley número 7969 para considerar el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi un servicio público del cual es titular el Estado y que se explotará mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa o el permiso en el caso de servicios especiales estables de taxi.

XVII.Como consecuencia de declarar servicio público el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad taxi, en cualquiera de sus dos formas de prestación, el proyecto de ley consultado reforma el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio para eliminar la palabra “personas” de dicho artículo y así eliminar el porteo de personas. Con esta reforma el legislador busca, de una vez por todas, abstraer de la esfera privada la prestación del servicio de transporte de personas que en su totalidad ha sido declarado servicio público por el legislador y hace que sean otras las reglas del juego y principios jurídicos a aplicar: Los particulares se convierten en colaboradores de la Administración Pública en la prestación de ese servicio que, por sus características y la evidente existencia de un interés público, debe ser en principio, asumido por el Estado sin que estén de por medio principios y derechos que rigen las relaciones privadas, como lo son el principio de autonomía de la voluntad o la libertad de comercio. En consecuencia, el Tribunal estima que el proyecto de ley consultado no lesiona los artículos 28, 45, 46 y 56 de la Constitución Política. (…).”

Así entonces, dado que el legislador ordinario puede optar por la solución que considere más oportuna para regular el servicio de transporte de personas, y que, con esta reforma, el legislador buscó abstraer de la esfera privada la prestación del servicio de transporte de personas, al declararlo servicio público, hace que sean otras las reglas del juego y principios jurídicos a aplicar. Por lo tanto, no pueden estar de por medio principios y derechos que rigen las relaciones privadas, como lo son el principio de autonomía de la voluntad o la libertad de comercio. En consecuencia, el Tribunal estimó en la sentencia transcrita (número 11-004778), y lo hace de nuevo en esta, que la ley impugnada no lesiona los principios constitucionales de autonomía de la voluntad (art.28) ni la libertad de comercio (art.46) por cuanto, la declaratoria de un servicio como servicio público no es violatorio de la libertad de comercio y el legislador buscó abstraer de la esfera privada (y de sus normas y principios) la prestación del servicio de transporte de personas, al declararlo servicio público.

VIII.Sobre el tercer alegato: Violación al Tratado de Libre Comercio. REDACTA EL MAGISTRADO JINESTA LOBO. RESPECTO DE LAS PRESUNTAS INFRACCIONES AL TRATADO DE LIBRE COMERCIO REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA, CENTROAMERICA Y LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA. El punto medular a dilucidar sobre este particular es si el referido Tratado de Libre Comercio forma parte del parámetro de constitucionalidad con el que este Tribunal debe contrastar la validez de una norma o acto sujeto al Derecho Público que es impugnado por inconstitucional. Ese instrumento es lo que se denomina un acuerdo regional de comercio o de inversión, que, per se, está sujeto a los cambios dinámicos del mercado, la economía y libre comercio, por lo que, incluso, podría ser renegociado y modificado. Ciertamente, en el caso costarricense, a la luz del ordinal 7° de la Constitución Política, el referido acuerdo regional de comercio asumió la forma jurídica de un “Tratado”, por lo que, claramente, tiene rango infra constitucional pero supra legal.

En principio, los tratados o convenios internacionales que forman parte del parámetro de constitucionalidad son aquellos propios del Derecho Internacional Público referidos a los derechos humanos, así se desprende de los términos y doctrina que informa los artículos 48 de la Constitución Política, 38, párrafo 2°, y 74 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Incluso, tales instrumentos del Derecho Internacional Público de los derechos humanos, pueden tener, eventualmente, un rango constitucional o supra constitucional, por ejemplo, cuando le ofrecen a las personas un umbral de protección superior a los preceptos constitucionales (doctrina de la primacía de la cláusula más favorable o de los principios in dubio pro homine o pro libertate). Bajo esa inteligencia, se estima que este Tribunal Constitucional no tiene competencia para entrar a determinar si una norma legal violenta o no un acuerdo regional de comercio que asumió la forma jurídica de tratado.

Todos los extremos relativos a si una ley determinada infringe o no un acuerdo regional de comercio con rango supra legal, pero infra constitucional, le corresponde conocerlos y resolverlos al juez ordinario y no a los jueces constitucionales. Obviamente, este Tribunal sí tiene competencia para examinar la constitucionalidad de los referidos acuerdos regionales de comercio, tal y como la ha ejercido en el pasado.

IX.Conclusiones.-

• 1)Dado que con la ley impugnada no se está creando ningún tipo de monopolio estatal, sino sólo la ratificación de que el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas es un servicio público, no existe vicio alguno de procedimiento por el hecho de que esta ley haya sido aprobada en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena o sin la mayoría que establece el párrafo final del artículo 46 Constitucional. En consecuencia, se desestima este alegato de inconstitucionalidad.
• 2)El Tribunal estimó en la sentencia transcrita (número 11-004778), y lo hace de nuevo en esta, que la ley impugnada no lesiona los principios constitucionales de autonomía de la voluntad (art.28) ni la libertad de comercio (art.46) por cuanto, el legislador buscó abstraer de la esfera privada la prestación del servicio de transporte de personas, al declararlo servicio público.
• 3)Este Tribunal Constitucional no tiene competencia para entrar a determinar si una norma legal violenta o no un acuerdo regional de comercio que asumió la forma jurídica de tratado. Todos los extremos relativos a si una ley determinada infringe o no un acuerdo regional de comercio con rango supra legal, pero infra constitucional, le corresponde conocerlos y resolverlos al juez ordinario y no a los jueces constitucionales. En vista de lo anterior, se procede a la declaratoria sin lugar de esta acción, tal como en efecto se hace. Lo anterior, sin perjuicio de las competencias del legislador de determinar o reformar lo que estime conveniente sobre la regulación o ilegalidad de cualquier otra plataforma que pretenda el transporte privado remunerado de personas.

X.RAZONES DIFERENTES DEL MAGISTRADO CASTILLO VÍQUEZ.- Los motivos que me impulsan a declarar sin lugar esta acción de inconstitucionalidad son distintos a los que se esgrimen en la sentencia. En primer término, estoy claro que, a diferencia de los que otros argumentan, la Ley que se impugna – la n.° 8955- nacionalizó a favor del Estado –excluyó del comercio de los hombres- una actividad privada –la prestación de un servicio-, que estaba regido por el principio de libertad –todo lo que no está prohibido está permitido- y sus dos componentes esenciales –los principios de la autonomía de la voluntad y la igualdad de las partes contratantes-. La razón de esta postura es elemental y lógica, y es que cuando el Estado nacionalizó –reservó para el sector público esa actividad- el transporte de personas en la modalidad taxi, no incluyó dentro de ese acto legislativo el porteo de personas de conformidad con el numeral 323 del Código de Comercio.

Antes de la entrada en vigencia de la Ley n.° 8955, la actividad del porteo de personas era una actividad lícita regida por lo que dispone el numeral 28 de la Carta Fundamental. La prueba irrefutable de lo que vengo afirmando se sustenta en tres hechos incuestionables. Primero: la necesidad de promulgar la Ley n.° 8955 para nacionalizar la actividad del porteo de personas. Segundo: la abundante jurisprudencia de este Tribunal, en el sentido de que el porteo de personas estaba autorizado por el ordenamiento jurídico. Tercero: la abundante jurisprudencia administrativa de la Procuraduría General de la República coincidente con la jurisprudencia judicial.

Partiendo de la premisa anterior –que el porteo de personas estaba permitido antes de la entrada en vigencia de la Ley n.° 8955- una de las cuestiones de constitucionalidad que se plantea en este proceso constitucional resulta de la mayor relevancia, me refiero concretamente al hecho de si una limitación a la libertad de empresa –la nacionalización de una actividad privada donde el Estado asume su titularidad- requiere de Ley y, en caso afirmativo, es también necesario que su aprobación sea por una mayoría calificada de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa de conformidad con lo que dispone el párrafo cuarto del numeral 46 constitucional.

No tengo la menor duda que para adoptar una medida en la cual una actividad económica privada sale del comercio de los hombres y el Estado asume su titularidad, de forma tal que solo este o quienes cuente con un título habilitante –permiso, concesión, etc.- pueden ejercerla, requiere de una Ley formal, en los términos que establecen los numerales 28 y 46 de la Constitución Política en relación con el artículo 31 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Lo anterior significa, en buen castellano, que se necesita de un acto aprobatorio de la Asamblea Legislativa en ejercicio de la potestad de legislar, y que, a su vez, cuente con el beneplácito del Poder Ejecutivo –en nuestro medio este órgano fundamental del Estado es colegislador-, y donde quede claramente demostradas las razones de interés general que justifican la promulgación de la Ley, y se trate de una medida excepcional o extraordinaria. En esta dirección, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos nos recuerda lo siguiente:

En la Opinión Consultiva 6/86 , en la que la República Oriental del Uruguay consulta sobre el alcance de la expresión “leyes” en el Artículo 30 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, la Corte concluye lo siguiente la pregunta se limita a indagar sobre el sentido de la palabra leyes en el artículo 30 de la Convención. No se trata, en consecuencia, de dar una respuesta aplicable a todos los casos en que la Convención utiliza expresiones como " leyes ", " ley ", "disposiciones legislativas ", "disposiciones legales", "medidas legislativas ", " restricciones legales " o " leyes internas”. En cada ocasión en que tales expresiones son usadas, su sentido ha de ser determinado específicamente.

No obstante lo anterior, los criterios del artículo 30 sí resultan aplicables a todos aquellos casos en que la expresión ley o locuciones equivalentes son empleadas por la Convención a propósito de las restricciones que ella misma autoriza respecto de cada uno de los derechos protegidos. En efecto, la Convención no se limita a proclamar el conjunto de derechos y libertades cuya inviolabilidad se garantiza a todo ser humano, sino que también hace referencia a las condiciones particulares en las cuales es posible restringir el goce o ejercicio de tales derechos o libertades sin violarlos. E1 artículo 30 no puede ser interpretado como una suerte de autorización general para establecer nuevas restricciones a los derechos protegidos por la Convención, que se agregaría a las limitaciones permitidas en la regulación particular de cada uno de ellos. Por el contrario, lo que el artículo pretende es imponer una condición adicional para que las restricciones, singularmente autorizadas, sean legítimas.

Al leer el artículo 30 en concordancia con otros en que la Convención autoriza la imposición de limitaciones o restricciones a determinados derechos y libertades, se observa que exige para establecerlas el cumplimiento concurrente de las siguientes condiciones:

a. Que se trate de una restricción expresamente autorizada por la Convención y en las condiciones particulares en que la misma ha sido permitida; b. Que los fines para los cuales se establece la restricción sean legítimos, es decir, que obedezcan a " razones de interés general " y no se aparten del " propósito para el cual han sido establecidas”. Este criterio teleológico, cuyo análisis no ha sido requerido en la presente consulta, establece un control por desviación de poder; y c. Que tales restricciones estén dispuestas por las leyes y se apliquen de conformidad con ellas.

El significado del vocablo leyes ha de buscarse como término incluido en un tratado internacional. No se trata, en consecuencia, de determinar la acepción del sustantivo leyes en el derecho interno de un Estado Parte.

En este sentido, la Corte tiene en cuenta el hecho de que los sistemas jurídicos de los Estados Partes en la Convención se derivan de tradiciones diferentes.

El sentido de la palabra leyes dentro del contexto de un régimen de protección a los derechos humanos no puede desvincularse de la naturaleza y del origen de tal régimen. En efecto, la protección a los derechos humanos, en especial los derechos civiles y políticos recogidos en la Convención, parte de la afirmación de la existencia de ciertos atributos inviolables de la persona humana que no pueden ser legítimamente menoscabados por el ejercicio del poder público. Se trata de esferas individuales que el Estado no puede vulnerar o en las que sólo puede penetrar limitadamente. Así, en la protección a los derechos humanos, está necesariamente comprendida la noción de la restricción al ejercicio del poder estatal.

Por ello, la protección de los derechos humanos requiere que los actos estatales que los afecten de manera fundamental no queden al arbitrio del poder público, sino que estén rodeados de un conjunto de garantías enderezadas a asegurar que no se vulneren los atributos inviolables de la persona, dentro de las cuales, acaso la más relevante tenga que ser que las limitaciones se establezcan por una ley adoptada por el Poder Legislativo, de acuerdo con lo establecido por la Constitución. A través de este procedimiento no sólo se inviste a tales actos del asentimiento de la representación popular, sino que se permite a las minorías de la voluntad política o influir sobre la opinión pública para evitar que la mayoría actúe arbitrariamente. En verdad, este procedimiento no impide en todos los casos que una ley aprobada por el Parlamento llegue a ser violatoria de los derechos humanos, posibilidad que reclama la necesidad de algún régimen de control posterior, pero sí es, sin duda, un obstáculo importante para el ejercicio arbitrario del poder.

La reserva de ley para todos los actos de intervención en la esfera de la libertad, dentro del constitucionalismo democrático, es un elemento esencial para que los derechos del hombre puedan estar jurídicamente protegidos y existir plenamente en la realidad. Para que los principios de legalidad y reserva de ley constituyan una garantía efectiva de los derechos y libertades de la persona humana, se requiere no sólo su proclamación formal, sino la existencia de un régimen que garantice eficazmente su aplicación y un control adecuado del ejercicio de las competencias de los órganos.

La expresión leyes, en el marco de la protección a los derechos humanos, carecería de sentido si con ella no se aludiera a la idea de que la sola determinación del poder público no basta para restringir tales derechos. Lo contrario equivaldría a reconocer una virtualidad absoluta a los poderes de los gobernantes frente a los gobernados. En cambio, el vocablo leyes cobra todo su sentido lógico e histórico si se le considera como una exigencia de la necesaria limitación a la interferencia del poder público en la esfera de los derechos y libertades de la persona humana. La Corte concluye que la expresión leyes, utilizada por el artículo 30, no puede tener otro sentido que el de ley formal, es decir, norma jurídica adoptada por el órgano legislativo y promulgada por el Poder Ejecutivo, según el procedimiento requerido por el derecho interno de cada Estado.

La Convención no se limita a exigir una ley para que las restricciones al goce y ejercicio de los derechos y libertades sean jurídicamente lícitas. Requiere, además, que esas leyes se dicten " por razones de interés general y con el propósito para el cual han sido establecidas”. E1 criterio según el cual las restricciones permitidas han de ser aplicadas " con el propósito para el cual han sido establecidas " se encontraba ya reconocido en el Proyecto de Convención sobre Derechos Humanos elaborado por el Consejo Interamericano de Jurisconsultos (1959), en el que se expresaba que tales restricciones " no podrán ser aplicadas con otro propósito o designio que aquél para el cual han sido previstas”.

El requisito según la cual las leyes han de ser dictadas por razones de interés general significa que deben haber sido adoptadas en función del " bien común " (art. 32.2 ), concepto que ha de interpretarse como elemento integrante del orden público del Estado democrático, cuyo fin principal es " la protección de los derechos esenciales del hombre y la creación de circunstancias que le permitan progresar espiritual y materialmente y alcanzar la felicidad " ( " Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre ".

"Bien común " y " orden público " en la Convención son términos que deben interpretarse dentro del sistema de la misma, que tiene una concepción propia según la cual los Estados americanos " requieren la organización política de los mismos sobre la base del ejercicio efectivo de la democracia representativa " (Carta de la OEA, art. 3.d ); y los derechos del hombre, que " tienen como fundamento los atributos de la persona humana ", deben ser objeto de protección internacional ( Declaración Americana, Considerandos, párr. 2; Convención Americana, Preámbulo, párr. 2).

La ley en el Estado democrático no es simplemente un mandato de la autoridad revestido de ciertos necesarios elementos formales. Implica un contenido y está dirigida a una finalidad. El concepto de leyesa que se refiere el artículo 30, interpretado en el contexto de la Convención y teniendo en cuenta su objeto y fin, no puede considerarse solamente de acuerdo con el principio de legalidad. Este principio, dentro del espíritu de la Convención, debe entenderse como aquel en el cual la creación de las normas jurídicas de carácter general ha de hacerse de acuerdo con los procedimientos y por los órganos establecidos en la Constitución de cada Estado Parte, y a él deben ajustar su conducta de manera estricta todas las autoridades públicas. En una sociedad democrática el principio de legalidad está vinculado inseparablemente al de legitimidad, en virtud del sistema internacional que se encuentra en la base de la propia Convención, relativo al "ejercicio efectivo de la democracia representativa ", que se traduce, inter alia, en la elección popular de los órganos de creación jurídica, el respeto a la participación de las minorías y la ordenación al bien común.

No es posible desvincular el significado de la expresión leyes en el artículo 30 del propósito de todos los Estados americanos expresado en el Preámbulo de la Convención "de consolidar en este Continente, dentro del cuadro de las instituciones democráticas, un régimen de libertad personal y de justicia social, fundado en el respeto de los derechos esenciales del hombre " (Convención Americana, Preámbulo, párr. 1 ). La democracia representativa es determinante en todo el sistema del que la Convención forma parte. Es un " principio " reafirmado por los Estados americanos en la Carta de la OEA, instrumento fundamental del Sistema Interamericano. E1 régimen mismo de la Convención reconoce términos del artículo 27, no se pueden suspender, lo que es indicativo de la fuerza que ellos tienen en dicho sistema.

Las leyes a que se refiere el artículo 30 son actos normativos enderezados al bien común, emanados del Poder Legislativo democráticamente elegido y promulgados por el Poder Ejecutivo. Esta acepción corresponde plenamente al contexto general de la Convención dentro de la filosofía del Sistema Interamericano. Sólo la ley formal, entendida como lo ha hecho la Corte, tiene aptitud para restringir el goce o ejercicio de los derechos reconocidos por la Convención.

Lo anterior no se contradice forzosamente con la posibilidad de delegaciones legislativas en esta materia, siempre que tales delegaciones estén autorizadas por la propia Constitución, que se ejerzan dentro de los límites impuestos por ella y por la ley delegante, y que el ejercicio de la potestad delegada esté sujeto a controles eficaces, de manera que no desvirtúe, ni pueda utilizarse para desvirtuar, el carácter fundamental de los derechos y libertades protegidos por la Convención.

La necesaria existencia de los elementos propios del concepto de ley en el artículo 30 de la Convención, permite concluir que los conceptos de legalidad y legitimidad coinciden a los efectos de la interpretación de esta norma, ya que sólo la ley adoptada por los órganos democráticamente elegidos y constitucionalmente facultados, ceñida al bien común, puede restringir el goce y ejercicio de los derechos y libertades de la persona humana.

Por tanto, en respuesta a la pregunta del Gobierno del Uruguay sobre la interpretación de la palabra leyes en el artículo 30 de la Convención,que la palabra leyes en el artículo 30 de la Convención significa norma jurídica de carácter general, ceñida al bien común, emanada de los órganos legislativos constitucionalmente previstos y democráticamente elegidos, y elaborada según el procedimiento establecido por las constituciones de los Estados Partes para la formación de las leyes.

En lo atinente al modelo de economía que adoptó nuestro Constituyente –una economía de mercado lo suficientemente abierta que admite distintas variables, sea una economía de mercado liberal, una economía social de mercado, una economía mixta e incluso un fuerte intervencionismo del Estado en la economía, siempre y cuando se respete el contenido esencial de las libertades económicas-, la posición que sigo impide que se sustituya este modelo económico por un modelo de corte centralista o socialista, pues de no ser así, se caería en la patología jurídica que, acertadamente, algunos estudiosos del Derecho Constitucional han denominado el fraude constitucional. Recapitulando: Para que se nacionalice una actividad económica privada es necesario que se haga mediante Ley formal, que existan razones de interés general que justifiquen su promulgación y se trate de una medida excepcional.

El otro aspecto a desentrañar en este proceso constitucional, es si la Ley ha de aprobarse por una mayoría calificada de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. Esta cuestión adquiere una relevancia capital, toda vez que la Ley que se impugna fue aprobada en una Comisión Permanente con Potestad Legislativa Plena, donde, evidentemente, no se obtuvo esa mayoría extraordinaria. Según el accionante y los coadyuvantes activos esta exigencia la impone el párrafo cuarto del artículo 46 constitucional.

Revisando los antecedentes de este numeral constitucional, encontramos que la Constitución Política de 1949 recoge la libertad de comercio en el numeral 46. En efecto, se indica, en lo que interesa, que son prohibidos los monopolios de carácter particular, y cualquier acto, aunque fuere originado en una ley, que amenace o restrinja la libertad de comercio, agricultura e industria. Se declara de interés público la acción del Estado encaminada a impedir toda práctica o tendencia monopolizadora. Además, las empresas constituidas en monopolio de hecho deben ser sometidas a una legislación especial. Por último, para establecer nuevos monopolios a favor del Estado o de las Municipalidades, se requiere la aprobación de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa.

Este texto resulta diferente al que se encontraba en el numeral 23 de la Constitución Política de 1871 1, en especial en cuanto a que en el actual se le impone el deber constitucional al Estado de impedir toda práctica o tendencia monopolizadora, así como el someter a los monopolios de hecho a una legislación especial. El diputado Facio Brenes justificó estas innovaciones, señalando que pese a que en la Constitución de 1871 se prohibían los monopolios, en la práctica se dieron. Asimismo, señaló, que el Estado debía someter a esos monopolios a un régimen especial de reglamentación, en beneficio de los grupos productores o consumidores que resultaren víctimas de ellos y llegar, si fuere del caso, por causa de interés público, a su expropiación.

El diputado Esquivel, quien presentó junto con otros constituyentes una moción que reproducida el texto de la Constitución de 1871, se opuso a la moción de la Fracción Social Demócrata, porque en ella se admitía la posibilidad, por parte del Estado, de expropiar empresas particulares; práctica que consideraba sumamente peligrosa para los intereses económicos de la nación. Además, para él, tal concepto significaba una intervención directa del Estado en la esfera de los negocios privados. Por último, señaló, que ambas mociones están de acuerdo en prohibir los monopolios; pero que se discrepaba en la forma de actuar el Estado, ante esas situaciones. Al final del debate, fue aprobada la moción de los diputados Social Demócratas con algunas modificaciones, la que constituye el texto del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, sin la reforma que se le introdujo por medio de la Ley n° 7697 de 29 de mayo de 1996.

En apariencia las actas de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente no aportan mayores elementos de juicio sobre el cuarto párrafo del numeral 46 constitucional. Ahora bien, una lectura lógica y continúa de ese artículo a partir de su segundo párrafo, me hace concluir que cuando se habla de monopolios se está haciendo referencia a un concepto estrictamente económico, concretamente: a una situación del mercado en la que la oferta de un producto o servicio se reduce a un solo vendedor.

Es importante aclarar que cuando mediante Ley se hace una reserva a favor del sector público –nacionalización – de un bien o de un servicio ello puede obedecer a distintas motivaciones. Una primera justificación, puede ser que estemos en presencia de un servicio estratégico o esencial para el Estado o la Nación, tal y como ocurre con los bienes y servicios que se encuentran en el numeral 121, inciso 14; lo que la doctrina ha denominado el demanio constitucional. Un segundo motivo, sería que la prestación del servicio o la explotación de bien se realicen en condiciones de ineficiencia e ineficacia por parte del sector privado, lo que hace necesario la intervención del Estado –principio de subsidiariedad-. Un tercer supuesto, sería el hecho de que, dadas las altas inversiones, el riesgo, la rentabilidad del proyecto, etc., el sector privado decide no intervenir, lo que justifica que el Estado actúe en este caso. Otro supuesto, sería cuando una determinada actividad económica es objeto de monopolio, en cuyo caso el Estado tendría un motivo razonable para reservar esa actividad a su favor. Finalmente, también justificaría la intervención del Estado, cuando se está en presencia de un servicio público.

Hay que tener presente que cuando se hace una reserva a favor del sector público y a un sujeto privado se le afecta en su propiedad o en la actividad económica que viene desarrollando por medio de su empresa –en sus distintas modalidades-, el Estado está en la obligación de indemnizarlo mediante un precio justo. Además, se debe subrayar que el hecho de que un servicio sea esencial para la colectividad, no necesariamente significa que dicho servicio debe de ser nacionalizado, pues es claro que en un Estado social y democrático de derecho, que ha optado por una economía de mercado, determinadas actividades esenciales pueden ser satisfechas por la iniciativa privada.

No cabe duda que la discusión de esta controversia jurídica está relacionada con el tema del servicio público. Es bien sabido, que un servicio público se caracteriza por ser una actividad prestacional no consustancial al Estado –no es una función pública que conlleva el ejercicio de autoridad por parte de la Administración-, pero es indispensable para la vida social, por lo que el Estado debe garantizar que se desarrolle de forma universal, continua, eficiente, adaptable y sin discriminación, con el fin de satisfacer el interés o la necesidad colectiva. Por regla de principio, la titularidad del servicio corresponde al Estado, lo que está justificado por el interés que representa la actividad para la colectividad, por lo que los particulares requieren de un título habilitante especial de la Administración para gestionar el servicio –prestación indirecta de un servicio público-. Dado el interés que representa la prestación del servicio público para la colectividad, aun y cuando se trate de una gestión indirecta de un servicio público, la Administración conserva importantes potestades respecto al servicio, amén de que puede fijar las condiciones bajos las cuales el particular debe gestionar la actividad.

Asimismo, la gestión del servicio público puede tener distintas modalidades. Además de la gestión indirecta del servicio público a que se ha hecho referencia, también está la gestión directa, cuando es la Administración Pública quien lo presta. Por otra parte, tenemos el caso de los servicios públicos objetivos, virtuales o impropios, que, en términos generales, son aquellos casos de actividades de interés general –verbigracia la educación, la salud, la intermediación financiera, etc.-, en los cuales no se requiere de un título habilitante de la Administración Pública, sino únicamente una autorización. Tampoco puede desconocerse aquellos casos de actividades esenciales para la colectividad que son prestadas directamente por el sector privado, en ejercicio del principio de libertad y la libertad de empresa, tal y como se explicó supra, pues no toda actividad esencial para la colectividad ha de reservarse necesariamente al sector público.

Finalmente, están las actividades de gestión económica –en este caso sí sería necesario la mayoría calificada-, que se diferencia del servicio público, pues esta presupone una actividad de hacer, mientras que las primeras hacen referencia al acarreo de bienes para el mercado o cuando se trata de empresas industriales o comerciales comunes, cuando por su régimen de conjunto y los requerimiento de su giro, pueden estimarse como tales –véase el artículo 3, inciso 2 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública-.

Adoptando como marco de referencia lo anterior, concluyo que el Constituyente al utilizar el término monopolio no se estaba refiriendo a la “publicatio” –la titularidad que asume el Estado de una actividad a causa de interés general que representa para la sociedad, lo que conlleva una actuación pública que justifica que él se apropie de esta-, sino a un caso específico de una actividad económica: único vendedor. Desde mi perspectiva, ni el caso de la prestación directa del servicio público –donde el Estado o un agente público, de forma exclusiva, presta el servicio público- justificaría la exigencia de la mayoría calificada, toda vez que la reserva de servicios esenciales para la colectividad mediante Ley, no fue contemplado por el Constituyente a la hora de establecer las limitaciones a la libertad de empresa. Mucho menos en los casos de la gestión indirecta del servicio público –como ocurre con el transporte público modalidad taxi-, donde se presta el servicio en un régimen de competencia entre todos aquellos que cuentan con un título habilitante –concesión o permiso-.

Nótese que en el caso que nos ocupa, se está en el último supuesto, toda vez que la Ley que se impugna opta por la modalidad indirecta de la prestación del servicio, al establecer que se requerirá de un permiso para la explotación del servicio de transporte remunerado de personas modalidad servicio especial estable de taxi, en los casos en que el servicio se brinde de puerta a puerta, para satisfacer una necesidad de servicio limitado, residual, dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas diferente del que se presta.

El artículo 73, inciso d, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece que se puede incurrir en un vicio de inconstitucionalidad cuando una Ley o disposición general infrinja el artículo 7, párrafo primero, de la Constitución, por oponerse a un tratado público o convenio internacional. Estamos, pues, en el caso de lo que la doctrina ha denominado como una inconstitucionalidad indirecta, pues la Ley o la disposición general al quebrantar el Tratado internacional, por efecto reflejo, se violenta el numeral 7 constitucional.

Esta norma, revisando los antecedentes legislativos –Ley Orgánica de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, expediente legislativo n.° 10.273, no suscitó mayor polémica. La única observación fue la que hizo la Corte Suprema de Justicia la que, en lo que interesa y refiriéndose a lo expresado sobre el artículo 2 del proyecto de ley, manifestó lo siguiente:

El artículo 2° también se ocupa de los instrumentos internacionales, ello al señalar las materias sometidas a la Jurisdicción Constitucional. En el inciso b) se incluye el control que debe hacerse “para la conformidad del ordenamiento interno con el derecho internacional o comunitario”.

Se habla allí en forma amplia del “ordenamiento interno”, sin que se restrinja ese control al choque de normas de la Carta Política y normas de un tratado. De suerte, que, al discutirse alguna posible colisión entre normas comunes de derecho interno y normas de un tratado internacional, siempre corresponderá a la Sala resolver el punto, y de ese modo se suprime la potestad de los jueces ordinarios para determinar el derecho vigente, de la cual han podido hacer uso, mientras no exista norma constitucional que lo impida. Ahora, conforme al proyecto de la Asamblea, si una ley común fuere modificada implícitamente por un tratado, de acuerdo con el principio de que las normas posteriores modifican a las anteriores en todo lo que se les oponga, máxime si uno de los instrumentos es de superior jerarquía, en tal supuesto el problema tendría que plantearse ante de la Sala Constitucional, de conformidad con el citado inciso b) del artículo 2°. (Folio 1586).

No se ve la necesidad de acudir a la Sala Constitucional en todos esos casos, puesto que los jueces bien pueden decidir cuál es la norma vigente, actuando en la órbita de sus atribuciones.

La Corte se limita a señalarlo así, aunque no deja de comprender que algunas veces puedan suscitarse problemas u obstáculos para la aplicación de un tratado, concretamente por requerir de la legislación complementaria. Eso puede suceder con más frecuencia acerca de tratados posteriores a la ley; pero también existe la posibilidad de que ello ocurra respecto de tratados anteriores, cuando el legislador, en vez de ajustarse al tratado, dicta normas que lo contradicen o no dicta las que debiera. En resumen, como se trata de problemas complejos, en que puede estar involucrada la potestad legislativa del Estado, ello sí podría justificar que la decisión se radique en el ámbito de la Sala Constitucional.

Por lo demás, si no se presentaren esas situaciones de carácter complejo, la Sala podría denegar la acción de inconstitucionalidad cuando la pugna fuere sólo entre un tratado y leyes anteriores y el problema estuviere circunscrito a determinar el derecho vigente, sin que ello dependa de la aplicación de las normas constitucionales.” (Folio 1587).

Desde mi perspectiva, el tema de la inconstitucionalidad indirecta es asunto de suyo complejo, no tanto por la dificultad del abordaje de la cuestión, sino porque hay que realizar una labor de integración y armonización entre el Derecho Internacional Público y el Derecho interno, en especial el Derecho Constitucional y Procesal Constitucional.

Por mucho tiempo fue tesis de principio en el Derecho Internacional Público que las únicas personas jurídicas reconocidas eran los Estados. Es decir, se reconocía a los Estados una personalidad jurídica internacional, capacidad jurídica y capacidad de actuar y, por consiguiente, ser sujetos que podían contraer derechos y obligaciones internacionales. Eran, pues, los Estados a quienes se les reconocía capacidad para asumir derechos y deberes internacionales dentro del sistema jurídico internacional. Con el correr del tiempo, también se les reconoció la personalidad jurídica internacional a los organismos internacionales, a los sujetos de Derecho Internacional atípicos –la Santa Sede, Soberana Orden de Malta y el Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja-, a las comunidades beligerantes, etc. y, más recientemente, en lo referente a los Instrumentos Internacionales de Derechos Humanos, se ha reconocido a los individuos su condición de sujetos de Derecho Internacional y, por ende, legitimación activa para reclamar y pedir reparación por el incumplimiento del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, toda vez que al ser las víctimas de los actos y omisiones del Estado pueden exigirle responsabilidad a este por la vulneración de sus derechos humanos.

Así las cosas, el individuo, en lo referente al Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, tiene legitimación activa ante los Tribunales Nacionales e Internacionales para exigir responsabilidad por la violación de sus derechos, y legitimación pasiva, para responder directamente cuando sus actuaciones han quebrantando los derechos humanos de las personas, extremo este último que se ha visto reforzado con la entrada en vigencia del Tratado Internacional de la Corte Penal Internacional y su puesta en funcionamiento.

Como es bien sabido, además del caso del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, la doctrina ha discutido, en otros ámbitos, si los individuos pueden ser o no sujetos de derechos y obligaciones de conformidad con el Derecho Internacional Público. En el caso del Derecho Internacional Económico, se han dictado tratados que le reconocen ciertos derechos a los individuos, verbigracia: el Convenio sobre Arreglos de Diferencias Relativas a Inversiones entre Estados y Nacionales de otros Estados –CIADI-, que le permite a los individuos recurrir a procesos arbitrales en contra de los Estados. El Tratado de Libre Comercio de América Norte –NAFTA- que atribuye a los particulares el derecho de acceso a los comités binacionales para la solución de controversias. Lo anterior significa, que para determinar si los individuos tienen legitimación activa para invocar el incumplimiento de un convenio internacional en aquellos que no son relativos a los derechos humanos, donde la cuestión está clara, hay que analizar su contenido. De lo que llevamos dicho se extraen importantes reglas, entre ellas: si el Tratado no les reconoce la legitimación activa, serán los Estados partes quienes reclamen su incumplimiento. Si le reconoce legitimación activa al individuo para reclamar su incumplimiento, esta legitimación debe necesariamente circunscribirse a lo que establece el Tratado.

En el caso que nos ocupa, el Tratado de Libre Comercio de Estados Unidos con Centro América estableció dos supuestos de resolución de controversias. El capítulo diez, relativo a inversión, el que dispone en su sección B la solución de controversias Inversionista-Estado, en él se establece que, en caso de una controversia, el demandante y el demandado deben intentar resolver la disputa mediante consultas y negociación. En el supuesto de que las partes no lleguen a un acuerdo mediante el mecanismo de consultas o negociaciones, y siempre que hayan transcurrido seis meses desde que tuvieron lugar los hechos que dan origen a la demanda, el demandante (o el accionante en nombre de una persona jurídica propiedad suya o que controla directa o indirectamente) que haya incurrido en pérdidas o daños por razón de la violación alegada, puede someter su demanda a arbitraje, ya sea al Centro Internacional de Arreglo de Diferencias Relativas a Inversiones (CIADI) (en caso de que la parte contendiente y la demandante sean parte de él); o las Reglas del Mecanismo Complementario del CIADI (en caso de que únicamente una de las dos partes sean parte del Convenio del CIADI); o a las reglas de la Comisión de Naciones Unidas sobre Derecho Internacional Mercantil (CNUDMI).

Por otra parte, el capítulo veinte establece el mecanismo general de solución y controversias. Este se divide en dos secciones; la primera, trata de la solución de controversias y Estados, mientras que la segunda, se refiere a la cuestión de los procedimientos internos y solución de controversias comerciales y privadas. En la primera de las secciones, se establece la posibilidad de recurrir a distintos procedimientos, tales como: arbitrajes, negociaciones directas entre las partes, o con la mediación de la Comisión de Libre Comercio. En la segunda de las secciones, se dispone que cuando una cuestión de interpretación o de aplicación de este Tratado surja en un procedimiento judicial o administrativo interno de una parte y cualquier otra parte considere que amerita su intervención, o cuando un tribunal u órgano administrativo solicite la opinión de alguna de las partes, esa parte lo notificará a las otras. La Comisión debe procurar, a la brevedad posible, dar una respuesta adecuada. La parte en cuyo territorio se encuentre ubicado el tribunal o el órgano administrativo, debe presentar a las partes cualquier interpretación acordada por la Comisión, de conformidad con los procedimientos de ese foro. Cuando la Comisión no logre llegar a un acuerdo, cualquiera de las partes puede someter su propia opinión al tribunal o al órgano administrativo.

Así las cosas, si en el Tratado hay unos procedimientos a través de los cuales las partes y los inversionistas deben encauzar sus reclamos cuando hay una controversia jurídica sobre la interpretación y aplicación del Convenio a propósito del dictado de un acto del Estado, sea este legislativo o ejecutivo, lo primero que debe observarse son esos procedimientos para resolverla. Esta postura tiene una serie de consecuencias positivas desde la óptica jurídica y es acorde a principios elementales de justicia, lógica o conveniencia. En primer lugar, se observa lo que dispone el propio Tratado, lo que concretiza los principios de Pacta sunt servanda, bona fides y el principio de interpretación y aplicación de los tratados del effect utile; de lo contrario se estaría vulnerando el Tratado, hecho que este Tribunal no puede permitir ni propiciar. Se caería en la paradoja que en aras de resguardar el Tratado, este Tribunal lo vulneraría al ejercer la competencia en un caso donde se invoque una inconstitucionalidad indirecta.

En segundo término, le permite a las partes y a los inversionistas expresar en igualdad de condiciones –principio de igualdad de armas- sus distintas tesis acerca de la correcta interpretación y aplicación del Tratado. En el caso del Gobierno de Costa Rica, hay que tener presente lo que expresa el ministro de Comercio Exterior en su escrito presentado al expediente judicial en atención al auto de las quince horas y siete minutos del diez de enero del dos mil diecisiete dictado por el magistrado instructor a solicitud del suscrito, cuando afirma lo siguiente que: “(…) los incisos a), b) y d) del artículo 2 de la Ley N° 7638 del 30 de octubre de 1996; corresponde a este Ministerio definir y dirigir las negociaciones comerciales y de inversión de Costa Rica y, además, representar al país ante los foros comerciales internacionales en el que se discutan temas de comercio e inversión. De forma que, en caso de que existan posibles desavenencias o disconformidades entre las Partes en relación con el cumplimiento, aplicación o interpretación de alguna disposición de los tratados internacionales de libre comercio, acuerdos e instrumentos de comercio exterior vigentes; COMEX es el llamado a representar al país ante los foros y órganos bilaterales, plurilaterales y multilaterales respectivos en los que se discutan tales asuntos, valga mencionar que dicha competencia comprende per se la conducción y coordinación de la estrategia de defensa del Estado bajo los distintos mecanismos de solución de controversias instituidos en los tratados, acuerdos e instrumentos internacionales en materia de comercio e inversión Así que, en lo que atañe a la supuesta violación achacada a la Ley N° 8955 del 16 de junio de 2011 en relación alguna de las disposiciones del Capítulo 11 “Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios” del Tratado de Libre Comercio República Dominicana- Centroamérica- Estados Unidos, Ley de Aprobación N° 8622 del 21 de noviembre de 2007, o de sus Anexos, estima este Ministerio que no resulta oportuno ni conveniente manifestarse sobre lo expresado por los accionantes ante la jurisdicción constitucional.

En ese sentido, este Ministerio debe abstenerse de emitir criterio u opinión sobre la constitucionalidad o no de las normas impugnadas y su conformidad o no al amparo del Tratado de Libre Comercio República Dominicana- Centroamérica- Estados Unidos, pues de no proceder así, se develaría y adelantaría públicamente a los otros Estados Parte la posición y estrategia de defensa del país ante la posibilidad de que –bajo las reglas del Tratado en cuestión- alguna Parte se sintiera afectada con motivo de la resolución de este asunto y llegara a activar el mecanismo de solución de controversias”. Nótese que el ministro de Comercio Exterior, entre otras cosas, se abstiene de forma juiciosa y razonable de emitir un criterio, ya que ello implicaría revelar su estrategia de defensa del Estado Costa Rica ante una eventual controversia jurídica que se presente entre el Estado de Costa Rica y un inversionista u otro Estado parte, lo que significa, ni más ni menos, que el Estado costarricense no ha ejercido el derecho de defensa a su favor en este caso.

Por otra parte, si bien el ministro de Comercio Exterior no lo dice de forma expresa, de su nota se infiere, sin lugar a duda, que el cauce normal para resolver esta controversia jurídica es la que prevé el Tratado, y no en esta sede. Por último, si bien con el magistrado Rueda Leal, de forma reiterada, he sostenido que para acudir al CIADI es necesario agotar los procedimientos internos, lo cierto del caso es que la parte recurrente no acredita en el expediente judicial que haya seguido a las normas que prevé el Tratado para la resolución de controversias, ni que haya agotado la vía interna. Por último, no resulta lógico ni justo que este Tribunal emita un juicio de constitucionalidad, en el sentido de si la Ley viola o no el Tratado sin tener acceso a las distintas posiciones de las partes, de los inversionistas, los órganos técnicos, órganos bilaterales, plurilaterales, multilaterales, etc., argumentos, contraargumentos, etc. que se deben exponer en las instancias que prevé el Tratado para la resolución de controversias.

Así las cosas, concluyo que, una vez observada las disposiciones del Tratado sobre la solución de controversias y, por ende, agotados los procedimientos respectivos, es que este Tribunal eventualmente tendría competencia para examinar el agravio de constitucionalidad que se plantea, en el sentido de si la Ley impugnada vulnera el Tratado de Libre Comercio entre los Estados Unidos de América y Centro América. Ergo, rechazo de plano este agravio y, por consiguiente, me abstengo de emitir cualquier juicio al respecto.

XI.El Magistrado Rueda Leal salva el voto y declara la inconstitucionalidad de las reformas hechas por medio de la Ley N.° 8955 de 16 de junio de 2011 a los artículos 323 y 334 inciso b) del Código de Comercio; y de las adiciones y reformas a los artículos 1 inciso l), 2, 29 y 62 inciso e) de la Ley Nº 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personasen Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi de 22 de diciembre de 1999.

Previo a analizar el fondo de lo cuestionado, es importante explicar en qué consistieron los cambios realizados por medio de la Ley N.° 8955 de 16 de junio de 2011, lo que nos permitirá tener una visión más clara acerca de sus alcances.

Al respecto, la normativa impugnada varió las siguientes normas:

1. 1Reforma a los numerales 323 y 334 inciso b), del Código de Comercio (ley N. º 3284 de 30 de abril de 1964).

En cuanto al ordinal 323:

- La versión previa a la reforma indicaba:

· Artículo 323. “Por el contrato de transporte el porteador se obliga a transportar personas, cosas o noticias de un lugar a otro a cambio de un precio. El transporte puede ser realizado por empresas públicas o privadas. Son empresas públicas las que anuncian y abren al público establecimiento de esa índole, comprometiéndose a transportar por precios, condiciones y períodos determinados, siempre que se requieran sus servicios de acuerdo con las bases de sus prospectos, itinerarios y tarifas. Son empresas privadas las que prestan esos servicios en forma discrecional, bajo condiciones y por ajustes convencionales.” (El destacado no es original).

- La versión reformada señala:

· Artículo 323. “Por el contrato de transporte la persona porteadora se obliga a transportar cosas o noticias de un lugar a otro a cambio de un precio. El transporte puede ser realizado por empresas públicas o privadas. Son empresas públicas las que anuncian y abren al público establecimiento de esa índole, comprometiéndose a transportar por precios, condiciones y períodos determinados, siempre que se requieran sus servicios de acuerdo con las bases de sus prospectos, itinerarios y tarifas. Son empresas privadas las que prestan esos servicios en forma discrecional, bajo condiciones y por ajustes convencionales.

El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores.”(El destacado no es original).

De lo anterior, se deriva que se eliminó de manera total la figura que habilitaba el transporte remunerado de personas que venía siendo regulado por el Código de Comercio.

Con respecto al numeral 334 inciso b):

- La versión previa a la reforma consignaba:

· Artículo 334. El remitente tiene derecho:

(…)

• b)A que se le permita que viajen por su cuenta sus propios empleados para cuidar en el trayecto a los animales vivos, o a cualquier otro objeto que requiera atención; y (…)

- La versión modificada dispone:

· Artículo 334. El remitente tiene derecho:

(…)

• b)A que se le permita que viajen los empleados de su empresa con todos los seguros de ley al día y debidamente identificados, para cuidar en el trayecto a los animales vivos o a cualquier otro objeto que requiera atención.; y (…)

De la reforma antedicha se colige la creación de una regulación para el transporte accesorio de personas con respecto al transporte de animales vivos o cualquier otro objeto que requiera atención, en las condiciones señaladas en ese numeral.

1. 2Reforma a los ordinales 2 y 29 de la ley Nº 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, de 22 de diciembre de 1999.

Con respecto al numeral 2:

- La versión previa a la reforma contemplaba:

· “ARTÍCULO 2. Naturaleza de la prestación del servicio Para todos los efectos legales y de prestaciones, el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi se considera como un servicio público que se explotará mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa, con los procedimientos especiales establecidos en esta ley y su reglamento.

- La versión modificada estatuye:

· “Artículo 2.-Naturaleza de la prestación del servicio Para todos los efectos legales y de prestaciones, el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi se considera un servicio público que se explotará mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa con los procedimientos especiales establecidos en esta ley y su reglamento, o del permiso en el caso de servicios especiales estables de taxi, de conformidad con lo establecido en el inciso a) del artículo 7 de esta ley.

El transporte remunerado de personas, que se realiza por medio de autobuses, busetas, microbuses, taxis, automóviles y cualquier otro tipo de vehículo automotor, ya sea que se ofrezca al público en general, a personas usuarias o a grupos determinados de personas usuarias con necesidades específicas que constituyen demandas especiales, es un servicio público del cual es titular el Estado. Lo anterior independientemente del grado de intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo del servicio o en su fiscalización.

Será necesaria concesión:

Para explorar el servicio de transporte automotor remunerado de personas modalidad taxi, en las bases de operación debidamente autorizadas, de conformidad con lo establecido en los incisos b) y c) del artículo 1 de esta ley. Esta modalidad también incluye la prestación del servicio al domicilio o lugar donde se encuentre la persona usuaria, en respuesta a la solicitud expresa de este al prestador del servicio regular de taxi, por alguno de los medios con que este cuenta para tales efectos.

Se requerirá permiso:

Para explotar el servicio de transporte automotor remunerado de personas modalidad servicio especial estable de taxi, en los casos en que el servicio se brinde de puerta a puerta, para satisfacer una necesidad de servicio limitado, residual y dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas diferente del que se presta, de conformidad con el párrafo anterior.

Los permisos para explotar el transporte automotor de personas en la modalidad servicio especial estable de taxi serán expedidos por el Consejo de Transporte Público, previa presentación de la copia certificada del contrato o los contratos suscritos con las personas, las instituciones o las empresas que hacen uso de su servicio. A cada persona física solo se le otorgará un permiso; estas personas podrán agruparse en una persona jurídica, adquiriendo responsabilidad solidaria. El vehículo amparado al permiso deberá ser propio o arrendado mediante leasing financiero. De incumplirse las condiciones en que originariamente se otorgó el permiso, este se podrá revocar por disposición justificada del Consejo de Transporte Público.

Sin perjuicio de otras sanciones previstas por el ordenamiento jurídico, se cancelará el permiso, previo debido proceso y derecho a la defensa, por las siguientes causas:

• a)Cuando se incumplan las obligaciones, los deberes y las prohibiciones fijados en la presente ley, su reglamento, las leyes y los reglamentos conexos.
• b)Cuando se compruebe la falsedad e inexactitud en la documentación presentada ante el Consejo de Transporte Público.
• c)En caso de traspaso o cesión del permiso a favor de un tercero, sin autorización previa del Consejo.
• d)Por prestación ilegal del servicio fuera del área que autorizó el permiso, salvo en los casos en que el origen del servicio sea el área autorizada y el destino fuera de ella.
• e)Cuando por acto o resolución firme se cancele o revoque la patente autorizada del área geográfica correspondiente a la persona permisionaria, en vía administrativa o judicial. Asimismo, será razón para cancelar el permiso cuando la persona permisionaria renuncie a la patente otorgada.

f)Cuando el vehículo con que se preste el servicio especial estable de taxi tenga las características propias de los vehículos modalidad taxi que se autorizan en razón de una concesión, violando lo establecido al respecto en el artículo 29 de la presente ley.

• g)Cuando la persona permisionaria no cuente con las pólizas al día, tal y como lo establece el artículo 29 de la presente ley.
• h)Se cancelará el permiso al vehículo autorizado para la prestación del servicio especial estable de taxi, cuando el vehículo autorizado circule por las vías públicas en demanda de pasajeros.

Los permisos no conceden derechos subjetivos al titular y se prolongarán por un plazo hasta de tres años, si se ajustan a los requisitos que se establezcan al efecto.

El Consejo de Transporte Público deberá publicar, una vez al año, en el diario oficial La Gaceta y en un diario de circulación nacional, las listas de las personas físicas o jurídicas que se encuentren debidamente acreditadas para la prestación del servicio especial estable de taxi.”(El destacado no es original).

De lo citado se observa que mediante la reforma se incorporó la declaratoria de personas en vehículo automotor con independencia del grado de intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo del servicio o en su fiscalización. En adición, se dispuso la regulación del Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi.

En cuanto al numeral 29:

- La versión previa a la reforma regulaba:

· ARTÍCULO 29. Concesión administrativa previa Para la prestación del servicio de taxi, se requiere obtener de previo una concesión administrativa otorgada por el Consejo, sujeta a las siguientes condiciones:

• a)Las concesiones administrativas de servicio remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi, estarán subordinadas a los estudios técnicos de oferta y demanda aprobados por el Consejo. b) Las concesiones se otorgarán por base de operación, según los criterios técnicos correspondientes, por un plazo improrrogable de diez años. El Consejo podrá autorizar la existencia de bases de operación especiales con fines turísticos, dependiendo de las características de la zona o área geográfica, las cuales se determinarán mediante un reglamento especial, de acuerdo con los principios fundamentales de esta ley.
• c)Se otorgará una sola concesión administrativa por particular, la cual amparará la explotación del servicio público con un vehículo.
• d)Ninguna persona adjudicataria de una concesión podrá compartir, total ni parcialmente, los derechos de concesión adjudicados a otra que, a su vez, sea adjudicataria de otra concesión de servicio público remunerado de personas, en otras modalidades de transporte terrestre.
• e)Las concesiones se otorgarán por medio del procedimiento especial abreviado dispuesto en las presentes normas. Ningún gestor interesado de puertos y aeropuertos podrá ser concesionario de los servicios de transporte público remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi; tampoco se le permitirá brindar este servicio en ninguna modalidad.” - La versión reformada plantea:

· Artículo 29.-Concesión administrativa previa o permiso para servicios especiales estables de taxi.

1. 1Para la prestación del servicio de taxi se requiere obtener de previo una concesión administrativa otorgada por el Consejo, sujeta a las siguientes condiciones:

• a)Las concesiones administrativas de servicio remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi estarán subordinadas a los estudios técnicos de oferta y demanda aprobados por el Consejo.
• b)Las concesiones se otorgarán por base de operación, según los criterios técnicos correspondientes, por plazos prorrogables de diez años a solicitud de la persona concesionaria, previo cumplimiento de la licencia C-1 al día. El Consejo podrá autorizar la existencia de bases de operación especiales con fines turísticos, dependiendo de las características de la zona o del área geográfica, las cuales se determinarán mediante un reglamento especial, de acuerdo con los principios fundamentales de esta ley.
• c)Se otorgará una sola concesión administrativa por particular, la cual amparará la explotación del servicio público con un vehículo.

d)Ninguna persona adjudicataria de una concesión podrá compartir, total ni parcialmente, los derechos de concesión adjudicados a otra que, a su vez, sea adjudicataria de otra concesión de servicio público remunerado de personas, en otras modalidades de transporte terrestre.

• e)Las concesiones se otorgarán por medio del procedimiento especial abreviado dispuesto en las presentes normas. Ningún gestor interesado de puertos y aeropuertos podrá ser concesionario de los servicios de transporte público remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi; tampoco se le permitirá brindar este servicio en ninguna modalidad.

1. 2Para la prestación del servicio especial estable de taxi, a que se refiere el artículo 2 de esta ley, se requiere obtener un permiso otorgado por el Consejo de Transporte Público, sujeto a las siguientes condiciones:

• a)Las personas permisionarias especiales estables de taxi de este servicio estarán limitadas a prestar el servicio dentro de un área geográfica que se determinará en razón de la patente autorizada.

b)Ninguna persona permisionaria podrá compartir, total ni parcialmente, los derechos del permiso otorgado a otro que a su vez sea titular de otro permiso de servicio público remunerado de personas.

c)Los vehículos con los cuales se desarrolle la prestación de servicio público modalidad especial estable de taxi, no podrán tener las características propias de los vehículos modalidad taxi que se autorizan en razón de una concesión para prestar el servicio en una determinada base de operación autorizada por el Consejo de Transporte Público, tales como el color rojo, el uso de rótulos luminosos o no luminosos, calcomanías, el uso del taxímetro y otros similares, tal como lo defina el reglamento de rigor, así como cualquier otro distintivo que pueda inducir a error a las personas usuarias del servicio de taxi. Además, deberán cumplir los requisitos de circulación que establece la Ley N. º 7331, Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, y sus reformas. Estos automotores no podrán tener una antigüedad superior a los diez años, contados desde su año de fabricación.

• d)Los vehículos autorizados para el servicio especial estable de taxi no podrán estacionarse o realizar abordaje o desabordaje de personas en las paradas dedicadas a las demás modalidades de transporte público. Las bases de operación del servicio especial estable de taxi deberán estar ubicadas a una distancia de ciento cincuenta metros, como mínimo, de las terminales oficiales de autobuses y taxis.
• e)Las personas permisionarias de servicio especial estable de taxi no podrán estacionarse en ningún lugar de la vía pública para ofrecer sus servicios al público en general. Tampoco, podrán circular en demanda de pasajeros por las vías públicas.
• f)Cuando los automotores deban detenerse frente a edificaciones públicas, parques, centros educativos, centros comerciales, muelles, puertos, aeropuertos, iglesias, hospitales o lugares similares, será por el tiempo estrictamente necesario para permitir el abordaje y desabordaje de sus propias personas usuarias.

g)Quien presente una solicitud para explotar un servicio especial estable de taxi deberá presentar certificación de que se encuentra debidamente inscrito y al día con sus obligaciones en la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS); estar inscrito como contribuyente en el Ministerio de Hacienda; estar al día en el pago del impuesto de la renta; contar con una póliza de seguros que cubra íntegramente su responsabilidad civil por lesión o muerte de terceros y daños a la propiedad de terceros, y mantenerla vigente durante todo el período que dure el permiso y la patente municipal correspondiente, de acuerdo con la legislación vigente y los demás requisitos que procedan reglamentariamente.

• h)En razón de los principios de proporcionabilidad, razonabilidad y necesidad, el porcentaje autorizado de servicios especiales estables de taxi no podrá superar el tres por ciento (3%) de las concesiones autorizadas por base de operación.

i)El Estado está en la obligación de garantizarles el equilibrio económico y financiero del contrato a las personas concesionarias, evitando una competencia que pueda ser ruinosa, producto de una concurrencia de operadores en una zona determinada que pueda ser superior a la necesidad de esa demanda residual de la zona operacional donde se autorice la prestación del servicio, dado que cada zona presenta características diferentes entre una y otra, autorizando el número de permisos que considere necesarios.

• j)Una vez otorgado el permiso, las personas permisionarias deberán portar el original o la copia certificada del contrato suscrito con las personas a las que se les brinda el servicio.

El incumplimiento de cualquiera de las condiciones anteriores será sancionado de conformidad con lo establecido en la Ley N. º 7331, Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, y sus reformas, sin perjuicio de que el Consejo de Transporte Público pueda cancelar el permiso.” (El destacado no es original).

De la reforma transcrita, se observa la regulación en la Ley Nº 7969 de los requisitos para la obtención de permisos para la prestación del servicio especial estable de taxi, así como las condiciones de cancelación.

1. 3Adición del inciso l) al artículo 1 y reforma del inciso e) al artículo 62, ambos de la ley N.º 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, de 22 de diciembre de 1999, y sus reformas.

Con respecto al inciso l) del artículo 1.

- El inciso adicionado estatuye lo siguiente:

· "Artículo 1.- Definiciones [.]

• l)Servicio especial estable de taxi: servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas usuarias y que satisface una demanda limitada, residual, exclusiva y estable.

Los permisos para el transporte remunerado de personas mediante microbuses, busetas y autobuses, se regirán por lo dispuesto en la Ley N. º 3503, Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores, de 10 de mayo de 1965, y sus reformas, o cualquier otra que la sustituya en el futuro." En ese sentido, mediante dicha adición se definió el denominado “servicio especial estable de taxi” y se delimitó la regulación de otras modalidades de transporte remunerado de personas.

En cuanto al inciso e) del ordinal 62.

- La versión previa a la reforma disponía:

· “ARTÍCULO 62.- Reformas de la Ley No. 7331 Modificase la Ley de tránsito por vías públicas y terrestres, No. 7331, de 13 de abril de 1993, en las siguientes disposiciones: (…)

• e)Adición de un inciso d) al artículo 144, cuyo texto dirá:

"Artículo 144.- [...]

• d)Prestar el servicio de transporte público en cualquiera de sus modalidades, sin las respectivas autorizaciones, violando el numeral 1 del inciso a), o el numeral 1) del inciso b), ambos del artículo 97 y el artículo 112 de esta ley." - La versión modificada establece:

· “ARTÍCULO 62.- Reformas de la Ley No. 7331 Modificase la Ley de tránsito por vías públicas y terrestres, No. 7331, de 13 de abril de 1993, en las siguientes disposiciones: (…)

• e)Adiciónase un inciso d) al artículo 145, cuyo texto dirá:

Artículo 145.- [...]

d)Prestar el servicio de transporte público en cualquiera de sus modalidades, sin las respectivas autorizaciones, violando el numeral 1 del inciso a), o el numeral 1) del inciso b), ambos del artículo 98 y el artículo 113 de esta ley. Para aplicar la sanción regulada por este numeral y el juzgamiento, las autoridades judiciales impondrán plenamente el régimen de pruebas por presunciones e indicios claros y concordantes, que definen tanto las legislaciones procesales civiles como penales, así como las reglas de la lógica, la conveniencia, la oportunidad, la razonabilidad y la sana crítica. Se tomarán como presunciones e indicios la habitualidad en la prestación del servicio no autorizado o los signos externos e internos colocados en los vehículos para llamar la atención de la persona usuaria, a fin de inducirla a usar el vehículo que utiliza un taxi autorizado.”(El destacado no es original).

Así, con los cambios efectuados se vinieron a regular las infracciones a personas que presten el servicio de transporte público en cualquier modalidad sin las autorizaciones correspondientes.

Se concluye de tales modificaciones, que la reforma impugnada no solo eliminó la figura del “porteo de personas” en el Código de Comercio, sino que al mismo tiempo introduce y regula el llamado “servicio especial estable de taxi”. En adición, sin la menor duda vino a estatuir que el transporte remunerado de personas en cualquier otro tipo de vehículo automotor y bajo cualquier modalidad, es un servicio público del cual el único titular es el Estado.

Tomando en consideración lo expuesto, procedo a examinar los argumentos de la acción de inconstitucionalidad.

I.Sobre el primer alegato: Violación al procedimiento legislativo por haberse aprobado la ley impugnada en una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena.-

Visto los nuevos argumentos planteados en el sub examine, concluyo que efectivamente se ha venido a constituir un monopolio a favor del Estado por las siguientes razones.

La reforma vía ley N° 8955 de 16 de junio de 2011 dispone que todo transporte de personas en un vehículo automotor debe ser considerado como un servicio público, cuya titularidad corresponde al Estado.

Ahora, no se puede obviar que desde la década de 1960 existieron leyes que declararon el transporte de personas como servicio público (aspecto que se desarrollará más adelante). Sin embargo, destaco que junto con el transporte remunerado de personas, catalogado como servicio público, también el transporte de personas de naturaleza privada-comercial (que permitía a los porteadores transportar personas a cambio de un precio) coexistió con la entrada en vigencia del Código de Comercio el 27 de mayo de 1964 hasta la reforma por la ley 8955, que comenzó a regir el 7 de julio de 2011.

De esta forma, la regulación comercial conocida como el “ porteo de personas” estuvo vigente durante todo el lapso referido, existiendo como un negocio jurídico plenamente válido y, desde el punto de vista fáctico, como una realidad innegable que posibilitaba el transporte remunerado de personas en el mercado privado y libre (tanto así que tal verdad jurídica y fáctica, para variarla, tuvo que ser derogada de manera Sobre el “porteo de personas ”, este Tribunal dispuso en la sentencia Nº 2004-3580 de las 14:43 horas de 14 de abril de 2004:

“V.- Sobre los porteadores en el Código de Comercio y el transporte como servicio público. (…)

El porteador o transportista es un auxiliar mercantil. El contrato de transporte regulado en la legislación mercantil tiene como finalidad regular el traslado de personas, mercaderías y otros bienes. Es un contrato comercial importante para la economía de un país, pues sirve de enlace entre el productor o el comercializador de bienes y servicios con el consumidor final. Nació como necesidad de los mercantes de trasladarse de un lugar a otro, con o sin sus bienes de comercio, de modo que en principio sirvió como un instrumento de transporte del mercader en su actividad. Si bien, la doctrina no utiliza los medios de transporte para hacer una clasificación del porteador, puede decirse que existe la forma terrestre (como sería en una carreta, o vehículo de carga o ferrocarril), acuática (panga, falúa o crucero trasatlántico) y aérea (planeador, avioneta o avión a propulsión), admitiéndose incluso que se lleve a cabo mediante la fuerza del hombre, la de un animal de carga, o de un vehículo motorizado.

Pero dada su amplia diversidad e importancia económica para el país, existen áreas reguladas por el Estado, en atención a la protección del interés general, declarando algunas formas como servicio público. Por ello resulta ser una figura contractual muy restringida, y resulta necesario identificar el origen del contrato de transporte para determinar si se trata de un acuerdo comercial o si se dirige a satisfacer una actividad que el Estado declaró servicio público. (…) Pero el hecho jurídico relevante en discusión es el traslado de personas a cambio de un precio, con sus pertenencias o no, como una actividad irrestricta, cuando desde la promulgación de la Ley No. 3503 y luego la de la Ley No. 7593, se ha declarado como servicio público el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad taxi, y consecuentemente ello convirtió al contrato de porte en una actividad limitada y residual.

VI.Sobre la Competencia Desleal. (…) Evidentemente, el contrato de transporte tiene diversas características, entre ellas ser un contrato oneroso y no formal, su objeto puede ser el traslado de personas, cosas y noticias, como un auxiliar mercantil, pero siendo un contrato residual de transporte de personas, el público debe pertenecer a un grupo cerrado de usuarios, (…).

VIII.El caso concreto del contrato de transporte de personas como una actividad restringida. Los argumentos que se esbozan en la acción, pretenden demostrar que el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes no tiene competencia para regular la actividad del porteador, amparado a la legislación comercial que le permite transportar personas de un lugar a otro, así como cosas y noticias. Pero, la jurisprudencia de esta Sala define con precisión la línea divisoria entre las actividades que pertenecen al derecho privado de las del derecho público. Una actividad privada que satisface necesidades o intereses de carácter general, será objeto del interés estatal y estará legitimado el Estado para intervenirla mediante legislación declarándola servicio público. El particular puede ejercitar actividades que no salgan de su esfera privada, pero si llega a involucrarse con el interés general previamente declarado, resulta legítimo que el Estado haga valer el cumplimiento de su legislación. (…)”

Del precedente citado nuevamente se evidencia la vigencia del porteo de personasen el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense previo a la reforma que se impugna en esta ocasión. Lo anterior, con independencia de que más adelante cuestione la constitucionalidad de la declaratoria de titularidad del Estado sobre cualquier tipo de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores y bajo la aclaración de que no comparto que el “porteo” de personas haya sido catalogado como una actividad limitada o residual.

Tomando en consideración lo transcrito, cabe destacar que una actividad privada puede incidir en cuestiones de interés general; empero, esa sola cualidad no justifica que la titularidad de la misma pase a ser monopolio del Estado. Más bien, como se explica adelante, pueden existir servicios públicos propios e impropios; de acuerdo con dicha clasificación, así será el grado de intervención estatal.

Además, se debe resaltar que la exposición de motivos de la Ley N.° 8955 de 16 de junio de 2011 (que, como ya indiqué, vino a eliminar el porteo de personas de la legislación comercial y a instaurar el denominado “servicio especial estable de taxi” en la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad Taxi) señaló lo siguiente:

“Con esta iniciativa se pretende de manera muy categórica, establecer dentro del marco regulatorio de la Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi, N.º 7969, un servicio que hoy día es una realidad y que esta tutelado de manera equivocada al estar amparado solamente ante la palabra “personas” en el Código de Comercio, con el fin de crear una legislación que garantice mejores condiciones y costos más bajos para el usuario, buscando el beneficio y el bienestar de las grandes mayorías.

De esta forma se elimina el porteo de personas, pero no se elimina el porteo en sí, es decir lo que se está eliminando es la palabra “persona” del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, pero se puede seguir transportando cosas, artículos, dineros, correspondencia, etc.

Ante la eliminación de la palabra “persona”, se crea dentro de la Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi, N. º 7969, una figura que se llama “transporte especial estable de taxi”, que conserva la naturaleza del servicio especial residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado para darle sentido de responsabilidad, a aquellos interesados que lo estarían acreditando.

El servicio especial estable de taxi se distinguirá plenamente del servicio regular de taxis, porque será siempre de puerta a puerta, prevaleciendo el contrato privado entre las partes, y deberá acreditarse que forma parte de una actividad comercial, que además deben tener las patentes y que podrá ser desarrollado en esta primer etapa por personas físicas o personas jurídicas que puedan demostrar ante el Consejo de Transporte Público, en un plazo que se ha planteado perentorio de tres años (3 años), para que desarrollen esta actividad porque hay que entender que su crecimiento es muy particular y esporádico, hoy puede que sirva durante un tiempo determinado porque hay un contrato, pero eso no quiere decir que permanezca en el tiempo, por eso se habla de permiso hasta por tres años.

No se trata de una concesión porque no nace de un producto de una licitación pública, sino que nace de un permiso y obedece fundamentalmente que es una necesidad específica y puntual.

(…) de manera que aquel o aquella que esté brindando ese servicio especial sin la respectiva acreditación estaría operando bajo un rango de ilegalidad, porque no hay una figura ni en el Código de Comercio ni en la Ley de tránsito que permita realizar esa actividad.” (El destacado no es original).

De lo explicado se desprende que previo a la reforma en cuestión, el porteo de personas tenía plena vigencia y existencia en el mercado de transportes de Costa Rica; incluso, según lo transcrito, el objeto de la nueva regulación fue, supuestamente, brindar mejores condiciones y costos más bajos para el usuario, buscando el beneficio y el bienestar de las grandes mayorías.

Por lo cual, según lo referido concluyo que: 1- con la eliminación del porteo de personas de la regulación comercial, 2- la simultánea creación del servicio especial estable de taxi para regular ese tipo de negocio jurídico pero como un servicio público, y 3- la disposición expresa de considerar todotransporte remunerado de personas en cualquier tipo de vehículo automotor comoun servicio público del cual solo el Estado es titular, se vino a imponer un monopolio público completo en ese tipo de actividad dentro del mercado. Enfatizo que la regulación jurídico-positiva así como la realidad indica que previo a la reforma impugnada, en el país coexistían dos modalidades de transporte remunerado de personas, una de orden público, otra a cargo del sector privado (la opción del porteo). Con la absorción de este último por parte del Estado, se vino a imponer un monopolio público en el mercado, lo cual la Constitución Política regula de la siguiente forma:

“ARTÍCULO 46.- Son prohibidos los monopolios de carácter particular, y cualquier acto, aunque fuere originado en una ley, que amenace o restrinja la libertad de comercio, agricultura e industria.

(…)

Para establecer nuevos monopolios en favor del Estado o de las Municipalidades se requerirá la aprobación de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa.” (El destacado no es original).

Al respecto, resulta incontrovertido que la ley Nº8955 de 16 de junio de 2011 fue aprobada por medio de una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, por lo cual, tal y como lo expresé, al constatar que dicha normativa creó un monopolio a favor del Estado, necesariamente debía cumplir con la mayoría calificada que preceptúa el numeral antes citado. Al no haberse acatado esa disposición en la aprobación de la normativa de marras, se ha venido a configurar un vicio de constitucionalidad.

En virtud de lo expuesto, considero que con las reformas aprobadas por medio de la Ley N.° 8955 a los numerales 323 y 334 inciso b), del Código de Comercio y a los ordinales 2, 29 y 62 (inciso e), junto con la adición del inciso l) al artículo 1, todos de la Ley Nº 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, se extrajo del mercado privado y libre una actividad comercial legítima, para venírsela a conferir (ciertamente con una diferente regulación) al Estado, en su condición de único titular de la misma con independencia de su grado de intervención o fiscalización. Es decir, a partir de la susodicha modificación, ningún particular más puede ser titular de la mencionada actividad, sino que la misma ahora solo pertenece al Estado, debiendo conformarse el sujeto privado apenas con aspirar a su explotación, en caso de que recibiera el correspondiente permiso por parte del Estado.

II.Sobre el segundo alegato: Violación de los principios de autonomía de la voluntad y libre comercio. En cuanto a este punto, estimo necesario aclarar ciertos aspectos.

A.- La libre compre competencia y el monopolio de derecho.

En el apartado anterior hice notar la inconstitucionalidad de las reformas impugnadas causada porque la Ley N.° 8955 de 16 de junio de 2011 no fue aprobada por una mayoría calificada, en aplicación de lo consignado en el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política.

Ahora, independientemente de tal vicio, considero que la creación de un monopolio estatal no solo debe estar supeditada a la aprobación calificada de todos los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa, sino que en adición se deben ponderar otros requerimientos derivados de un análisis sistémico de la Ley Fundamental, para cuyos efectos se debe recordar que el sentido jurídico de un mandato constitucional muchas veces solo puede ser develado, cuando se toman en consideración y se ponderan los diversos principios, valores, bienes y derechos constitucionales que conviven en ese supremo cuerpo normativo. Nuestra Constitución, entre otras cualidades, se caracteriza por la promoción de derechos individuales y sociales, tendente a buscar un equilibrio entre los mismos, verbigracia entre los requerimientos propios de un estado solidario y del principio cristiano de justicia social, con aquellas condiciones que para su sano desenvolvimiento necesitan la libre competencia y la libertad de empresa.

Así las cosas, a los efectos del sub lite, conviene recordar lo que en la sentencia Nº 2008-004569 de las 14:30 horas de 26 de marzo de 2008 se determinó:

“1) DISTINCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL ENTRE MONOPOLIO DE DERECHO Y DE HECHO Y TIPO DE LEY REQUERIDA PARA SUPRIMIR CUALQUIERA DE ÉSTOS. El constituyente originario, en el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política sí distingue entre monopolio de derecho y de hecho. (…) En la lógica de ese numeral el monopolio es una situación excepcional del mercado o la economía, por cuanto el párrafo 1° establece como regla general la proscripción de los monopolios privados, tanto que el párrafo 2° subraya que “Es de interés público la acción del Estado encaminada a impedir toda práctica o tendencia monopolizadora”, lo que significa, a contrario sensu, que los poderes públicos están constitucionalmente obligados a promover la competencia en el marco de una economía de mercado. El párrafo 4° dispone que “Para establecer nuevos monopolios a favor del Estado o de las Municipalidades se requerirá la aprobación de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa”, con lo cual se enfatiza la regla contenida en la “constitución económica” -esto es, el conjunto de valores, principios y preceptos que regulan la economía y el mercado en el texto fundamental- de la libertad de empresa y la libre competencia y, por consiguiente, la excepción calificada del monopolio -incluso los públicos-, dado que, se precisa de una ley reforzada y, por consiguiente, de un considerable consenso de las fuerzas políticas representadas en la Asamblea Legislativa para establecer un monopolio público de derecho.

Es claro que este párrafo 4° del artículo 46 constitucional, al admitir, excepcionalmente, un monopolio por virtud de una ley reforzada, contempla y consagra el monopolio de derecho. (…) La exigencia de una ley reforzada para constituir un monopolio de derecho se impone en cuanto esta figura limita o restringe la libertad de empresa que es la regla normal u ordinaria según el Derecho de la Constitución. Sobre el particular es preciso enfatizar que los límites intrínsecos y extrínsecos de los derechos fundamentales son reserva de ley. (…) El artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, en sus primeros cuatro párrafos que no han sufrido variación, surge de una moción presentada por la Fracción Social Demócrata, según se desprende del Acta de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente No. 101, artículo 3°, Tomo II, páginas 439-444. Así el Diputado Facio Brenes manifestó que “(…) Estamos, desde luego, con la prohibición de los monopolios, así como de cualquier otro acto que tienda a amenazar o a restringir la libertad de comercio, agricultura e industria” y luego agregó que la moción “(…) traduce una opinión o un sentimiento universal que tiende cada día a generalizarse más, en contra de las prácticas o tendencias de carácter monopolista.

Tan es así que todas las Constituciones modernas han abandonado textos similares al de nuestro estatuto derogado, para poner a cargo del Estado una acción especial en contra de los monopolios de hecho. (…)”. El constituyente Acosta Jiménez manifestó que “La moción del Social Demócrata (…) concreta una aspiración universal en contra de los monopolios, así como viene a traducir un anhelo democrático”. Finalmente el representante Arias indicó que “(…) estaba de acuerdo en que el país debe defenderse de los monopolios que son altamente perjudiciales para la economía nacional. Nosotros propiamente no podemos decir que tenemos monopolios de derecho, pero por circunstancias especiales existen varias empresas monopolizadoras de hecho”. (El destacado no es original).

Además, esta Sala indicó en la sentencia Nº 2017-1104 de las 9:05 horas de 24 de enero de 2017:

“IV.- SOBRE EL FONDO. Esta Sala se ha pronunciado, de forma reiterada, sobre la trascendencia de la competencia económica y la libre concurrencia para el adecuado funcionamiento del mercado y en beneficio de los consumidores o usuarios, en tanto que esto impone a las empresas la obligación de ofrecer mejor calidad, innovación y precios. Uno de losprincipios fundamentales de la Constitución Económica lo constituye el de la libre competencia o concurrencia, tanto que es un imperativo de los poderes públicos velar por la libertad de comercio, industria y de empresa (voto No. 4569-08 de las 14:30 horas del 26 de marzo de 2008) evitándose toda acción o práctica anticompetitiva y monopólica (artículo 46 de la Constitución Política). En desarrollo del citado ordinal 46 y en tutela del proceso de competencia y libre concurrencia, se ha dictado la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, en la que se definen, prohíben y sancionan diversas prácticas que, por su objeto o efectos, se constituyen en monopolísticas. En cuanto a este punto, esta Sala, en la sentencia No. 2004-01922 de las 14:54 hrs. del 25 de febrero de 2004, señaló lo siguiente:

V.Derecho a la libre concurrencia.El artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, en su texto original y luego de la reforma operada por Ley número 7607 de veintinueve de mayo de dos mil tres, reconoce un principio fundamental de nuestro sistema económico, como es la libertad de comercio y, particularmente, el aseguramiento de la libre competencia como elemento del sistema social de mercado. Dicho artículo proscribe expresamente la formación de monopolios privados, así como las prácticas que amenacen la libertad de comercio, agricultura e industria. Limita además la constitución de monopolios públicos y ordena la regulación expresa de los monopolios de hecho. Destaca también que es de interés público la acción del Estado tendiente a impedir toda práctica o tendencia monopolizadora.En la actualidad, la protección constitucional de la libre concurrencia debe ser entendida en estrecha relación con la posición de inferioridad real que el consumidor suele tener en su actuación dentro del mercado, y el deber del Estado de protegerlo ante el poder de los demás agentes económicos.

En ese sentido, la eliminación (o restricción) de la competencia efectiva podría llevar a consecuencias directamente opuestas a las buscadas por el sistema de mercado, exponiendo a los usuarios a tener que someterse a los designios unilaterales de el o los pocos oferentes, particularmente cuando se trata de productos de escasa elasticidad, que obligan al consumidor a adquirirlos o emplearlos, incluso en condiciones abiertamente desfavorables o injustas. Al garantizar la libre competencia, el Estado permite que el consumidor tenga varias alternativas dentro de las cuales elegir la más favorable, de acuerdo con sus intereses y posibilidades.Asimismo, promueve que las empresas, a efecto de ganar la preferencia de sus clientes, pongan a su disposición el mejor producto o servicio al precio más conveniente. El artículo 46 constitucional, de hecho, prohíbe no únicamente la formación de monopolios privados, sino incluso las prácticas que lleven a consecuencias restrictivas de la libertad de empresa.

Esta Sala en mucha de su jurisprudencia ha desarrollado el contenido esencial del principio constitucional de libre concurrencia, declarando inconstitucionales las normas y prácticas que creen monopolios particulares e impidan el libre acceso de oferentes al mercado de bienes y servicios. (Cfr. sentencias números 0550-95, 1144-90, 5056-94 y 7044-96, entre otras) (…)” (El destacado no es original).

En lo que interesa, de los precedentes citados se desprende que en Costa Rica, en razón del modelo de economía de mercado por el cual optó el constituyente, la libertad de empresa y la libre competencia son la regla general, mientras que el monopolio es la excepción, toda vez que una medida tan gravosa contra la libertad como excluir del libre comercio cierto bien económico, solo puede darse en casos sumamente calificados con un denotado interés público.

Por consiguiente, el quid consiste en determinar, si cualquier tipo de actividad que explote un bien económico, puede ser monopolizada por el Estado mediante la sola aprobación de una ley con mayoría calificada, bastando para ello el mero cumplimiento de un aspecto formal o de procedimiento.

Atinente a este punto, resulta vital acotar que la Sala, en sentencia Nº 11518-2000 de las 14:52 horas de 21 de diciembre de 2000, dispuso:

“IV.- Es importante traer a colación la sentencia de esta Sala número 5532-2000 de las quince horas con cinco minutos del cinco de julio de dos mil (en igual sentido la sentencia número 7044-96 de las diez horas nueve minutos del veinticuatro de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y seis), que en lo conducente señala: “(…) las actividades monopolizadas (importación, refinación y distribución al mayoreo de combustibles) sean de índole o naturaleza privada, porque, en general, se trata simplemente de operaciones mercantiles con ciertos bienes económicos, que integran el más amplio grupo conformado por los intercambios de bienes y servicios en una economía dada, y que, en ningún caso, son privativos de los sujetos privados, pues bien pueden llevarse a cabo por éstos mediante el sistema de libre contratación, intercambio y regulación mínima (economías de mercado), o por el Estado, (en los casos de economías centralizadas), e incluso –como en la mayoría de los países– mediante una combinación de ambos sistemas, dejando a los particulares unos sectores para su libre acción, y restringiendo otros para la acción exclusiva del Estado.

Con lo anterior quiere establecerse que las actividades monopolizadas no son necesariamente y per se, de naturaleza privada, de manera que a la luz de nuestra Constitución, pueden válidamente ser dejadas a la gestión de particulares con la fiscalización del Estado, o ser objeto de intervención estatal, en el tanto en que ello esté autorizado por la Constitución y las leyes y se justifique de acuerdo a los fines que se persigan.” (El destacado no es original).

En concordancia con lo citado, de los derechos constitucionales a la libertad de empresa, la libre competencia y la propiedad se extrae que la intervención del Estado a través de la monopolización de actividades que exploten cierto bien económico, para ser constitucionalmente viable debe cumplir al menos dos requerimientos: 1) que esté autorizado por la Constitución Política y las leyes; y 2) que se justifique de acuerdo con los fines pretendidos. En cuanto a este último punto, la justificación debe satisfacer las exigencias del principio constitucional de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, cuyo contenido lo entiende la Sala así (sentencia No. 2007-17204 de las 15:57 horas de 27 de noviembre de 2007):

“IV.- Principios de libertad, legalidad y razonabilidad. El artículo 28 de la Constitución Política establece, en lo conducente: “Nadie puede ser inquietado ni perseguido por la manifestación de sus opiniones ni por acto alguno que no infrinja la ley. Las acciones privadas que no dañen la moral o el orden público, o que no perjudiquen a tercero, están fuera de la acción de la ley’. Del primer párrafo del texto transcrito es posible derivar el ‘principio de libertad’, según el cual para el ser humano ‘todo lo que no está prohibido está permitido’. Este principio general de libertad, armonizado con lo dispuesto en el segundo párrafo de la norma en cuestión, nos permite construir además la noción del ‘sistema de libertad’, que establece no sólo la posibilidad de que el ser humano pueda hacer todo lo que la ley no le prohíba, sino también la garantía de que ni siquiera la ley podrá invadir su esfera intangible de libertad.

(…) el modelo de Estado costarricense postula una forma especial de sujeción de las autoridades e instituciones públicas al ordenamiento jurídico, pues sólo pueden dictar aquellos actos jurídicos y realizar aquellas conductas materiales que estén expresa o implícitamente autorizados por el ordenamiento jurídico. Sin embargo, los principios de libertad y legalidad no son los únicos límites de actuación que el Derecho de la Constitución impone a los órganos del Estado frente a los particulares. Como lo ha desarrollado la Sala en reiterados pronunciamientos, el ‘principio de razonabilidad’ o debido proceso sustantivo también constituye una exigencia fundamental para la Administración Pública, de manera que sus actos deberán ajustarse a los elementos que integran este principio, a saber, idoneidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad en sentido estricto. La idoneidad se traduce como la adecuación del medio al fin, es decir, que la norma debe ser apta para alcanzar efectivamente el objetivo pretendido.

La necesidad se refiere a la índole o magnitud de la limitación que por ese medio debe soportar un derecho o libertad, de manera que entre una variedad de medios posibles el elegido debe ser aquel que represente una limitación menor. La proporcionalidad significa que, aunque el medio elegido sea el que represente una limitación menor, esta limitación debe ser proporcionada, es decir, no podrá ser de tal magnitud que implique vaciar de su contenido mínimo esencial el derecho o libertad en cuestión.” (El destacado no es original).

Por consiguiente, la constitución de un monopolio de derecho a favor del Estado irremediablemente viene a afectar a los derechos constitucionales a la libertad de empresa, la libre competencia y la propiedad, de manera que junto con el requerimiento de procedimiento consistente en la mayoría calificada contemplada en el numeral 46 de la Ley Fundamental, la salvaguardia de tales derechos demanda que se respete el principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad en relación con los fines públicos que se pretenden conseguir, de tal manera que solo un denotado interés público pueda llegar a justificar la imposición de una medida tan gravosa y extraordinaria como la de extraer del libre mercado a cierta actividad que explota un bien económico, lo que nuestra constitución económica solo admite como una cuestión extraordinaria y excepcional.

Por ello, la fundamentación de la ley creadora de un monopolio a favor del Estado, de modo expreso, debe explicar por qué una determinada actividad empresarial tiene que ser sometida a una medida tan gravosa como la de suprimirla del mercado para pasar a ser monopolio del Estado. Además, de manera contundente debe explicar las razones por las que el interés público solo podría verse satisfecho, si la actividad en cuestión es monopolizada a favor del Estado. Tal justificación puede responder, evidentemente, a un momento históricamente determinado, de forma tal que lo que en ciertas circunstancias podría considerarse razonable, en otras no lo sería.

B.- Sobre el servicio remunerado de transporte de personas en Costa Rica en la modalidad taxi. Para determinar si el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas es una actividad susceptible de ser monopolizada por el Estado, resulta necesario estudiar el contexto en que se ha desarrollado.

1. Regulación histórica del servicio en Costa Rica.

En sus inicios, la actividad de transporte remunerado de personas en automóviles (distinto a la de vehículos colectivos de transporte regular y permanente entre localidades o puestos determinados que sí tenía una regulación exhaustiva) no tenía un control específico por parte del Estado.

La Ley sobre el Trasporte (sic, en razón de que en la época se escribía así), creada por el Decreto Nº 7 de 24 de noviembre de 1909, establecía algunas características de los principios generales del servicio público e incluso regulaba “Reglas Especiales Referentes al Servicio Público de Transportes”; sin embargo, no hacía referencia alguna a los vehículos de alquiler y de garages (sic , así se nombraban e incluso así, posteriormente, fue consignado en la regulación), tal y como se le llamaba en aquella época, como más adelante se verá.

Posteriormente, la Ley General de Transporte Remunerado de Personas, Nº1277 de 24 de abril de 1951, contenía normas referidas a los servicios públicos de transporte y exigía un trámite de licitación para nuevos servicios de transporte colectivo de personas. No obstante, en su artículo 2 excluía expresamente los servicios de los automóviles de alquiler y de los garages (sic) de servicio público:

“Artículo 2 "Esta ley comprende solamente los servicios públicos de transporte de personas que se hagan en forma regular y permanente entre localidades o puestos determinados y no se aplicará por tanto a los servicios extraordinarios o de excepción, excursiones, viajes expresos y de turismo, movilizaciones políticas o de cualquier otra índole, las cuales podrán seguirse haciendo libremente. Tampoco se aplicará esta ley a los servicios de los automóviles de alquiler y de los garages (sic) de servicio público”.

Luego, ese artículo fue reformado por la Ley Nº1499 de 30 de setiembre de 1952, en el cual se incluyó a los automóviles de alquiler y garages (sic ) de servicio público bajo las siguientes condiciones:

"Los servicios de los automóviles de alquiler y de los garages (sic) de servicio público o los de otros vehículos similares, solo estarán sometidos a esta ley cuando se presten en forma regular y permanente, entre lugares o puntos determinados, todos a juicio del Consejo Superior de Tránsito".

De lo anterior se colige que, para esa época solo ese tipo de transporte de personas estaba sujeto a regulación, es decir, a contrario sensu, los servicios de automóviles de alquiler y garajes que no se prestaban de forma regular y permanente, se encontraban en condiciones de libre competencia y, por tanto, la titularidad del servicio no le podía pertenecer al Estado.

Más adelante, se emitió la Ley de Servicios Públicos, Nº 2658 de 16 de noviembre de 1960 (reformada por la Ley Nº 2887 de 24 de noviembre de 1961), la cual vino a ser el primer cuerpo normativo que reguló directamente el servicio de automóviles de alquiler, atribuyéndole el carácter de servicio público. Asimismo, dejó vigente la ley Nº 1277 y el Reglamento de Garages (sic) para vehículos de servicio público que establecía que solo teniendo garage (sic), se concederían placas para los carros que se ocuparían del servicio público de pasajeros. Esta Ley de Servicios Públicos no otorgó al Estado la titularidad del servicio de automóviles de alquiler, ya que si bien su articulado hablaba de concesiones de explotación, no menos cierto es que no tenían las características propias de la concesión ni tampoco eran otorgadas mediante procedimientos de licitación, aunque sí se controlaban las tarifas y se fiscalizaba el servicio, por lo cual se asemejaba más la figura a una autorización o permiso en sentido amplio. Como veremos más adelante, no todo servicio público, necesariamente, implica que sea titularidad del Estado.

Años después entró en vigencia la Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores, N° 3503 de 10 de mayo de 1965, en la cual, se consideraba que el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores constituía un servicio público regulado, controlado y vigilado por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. La versión original de su artículo 1 señalaba que el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores que se llevara a cabo por calles, carreteras y caminos dentro del territorio de la República, era un servicio público cuya prestación era facultad exclusiva del Estado, el cual la podría ejercer directamente o a través de particulares a quienes expresamente autorizara. Además, el artículo 2indicaba que era competencia del Ministerio de Transportes todo lo relativo al tránsito y al transporte automotor de personas en el país; asimismo, que ese Ministerio podía tomar a su cargo la prestación de ese servicio público en forma directa o a través de otras instituciones del Estado, o bien conceder derechos para control y regulación de esa actividad, con el objeto de garantizar los intereses del público.

Con base en lo regulado en los numerales mencionados, considero que fue a partir de ese momento que se estableció que el servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en automóviles, incluido el servicio de que hoy se conoce como taxi, pasó a ser titularidad del Estado, ya que se indicó que la prestación del servicio de transporte remunerado de personas era facultad exclusiva del Estado y podía prestarlo directamente o por medio de particulares. No obstante, ese cuerpo normativo tuvo la particularidad de que cuando hacía referencia a la operación de automóviles de servicio público, remitía a la figura del permiso como único medio para ejercer dicha actividad. En ese sentido, el artículo 3 señalaba:

“CAPITULO III Requisitos para la Explotación del Servicio de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores Artículo 3.- Para la prestación del servicio público a que esta ley se refiere, se requerirá la autorización previa del Ministerio de Transportes, sea cual fuere el tipo de vehículo a emplear y su sistema de propulsión.

La referida autorización podrá consistir en una concesión o en un permiso, el otorgamiento de los cuales estará sujeto a las necesidades de planeamiento del tránsito y de los transportes en el territorio de la República, de acuerdo con los estudios que al efecto lleven a cabo los departamentos de Planificación y de Transporte Automotor(*) del Ministerio de Transportes.

Será necesaria concesión:

(…)

Se requerirá permiso:

(…)

• e)Para operar automóviles de servicio público.” (El destacado no es original) Es importante destacar que dicha ley hacía mayor énfasis en el transporte colectivo remunerado de personas, lo cual se vino a reforzar con las reformas posteriores que excluyeron expresamente el servicio de taxi de su ámbito de aplicación.

Así, la Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Taxis, Nº 5406 de 26 de noviembre de 1973, derogó toda norma de la Ley Nº 3503 que se le opusiera y estableció un régimen especial para ese tipo de servicio. Al respecto, en los artículos 1, 2 y 4, se determinó:

"Artículo 1- El transporte terrestre remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores taxis se considerará servicio público.

Artículo 2º.-Es de la competencia del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Trasporte todo lo relativo al tránsito y al transporte en taxi de personas en el país; el Ministerio podrá tomar a su cargo la prestación de este servicio público en forma directa o a través de otras instituciones del Estado, o bien conceder derechos para explotarlo a cooperativas debidamente inscritas en el Ministerio de Trabajo y Bienestar Social.

El Ministerio de Obra Públicas y Transportes ejercerá, en todo caso, la vigilancia, control y regulación de esta actividad, con el objeto de garantizar los intereses del público.

A fin de cumplir con esta obligación, el Ministerio podrá:

• a)Fijar paradas, condiciones y tarifas, en beneficio del usuario; b) Expedir los reglamentos que juzgue pertinentes sobre el tránsito y el transporte en taxi en el territorio de la República; y c) Adoptar las medidas que sean del caso para que se satisfagan en forma eficiente las necesidades del tránsito de vehículos y las del transporte de personas, así como las de uniformidad, seguridad, atención al usuario, etc.

Artículo 4- Para la prestación del servicio público a que esta ley se refiere, se requerirá concesión del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, sea cual fuere el tipo de 'vehículo a emplear y su sistema de propulsión". (El destacado no es original).

Tomando en consideración la regulación citada, estimo que desde aquí se superó la confusión entre permiso y concesión contenida en la Ley Nº 3503, ya que se consignó que además de la posibilidad de brindar el servicio de forma directa (titularidad), el Estado podía conceder derechos para su explotación y, además, se estableció de manera diáfana la obligación de obtener una concesión por parte del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes para operar ese servicio.

Adicionalmente, la ley Nº 7593 de 9 de agosto de 1996 delimitó el ámbito de aplicación de la Ley Nº 3503 a automotores colectivos, al modificar su artículo 1 de la siguiente manera: “El transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores colectivos, excepto los automóviles de servicio de taxi regulado en otra ley, que se lleva a cabo por calles, carreteras y caminos dentro del territorio nacional, es un servicio público regulado, controlado y vigilado por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. La prestación es delegada en particulares a quienes autoriza expresamente, de acuerdo con las normas aquí establecidas.” (El destacado no es original).

Tres años después, la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, N° 7969 de 22 de diciembre de 1999, derogó la ley Nº 5406 y dispuso que la naturaleza del transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi se consideraba como un servicio público que se debía explotar mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa, sujeta a los procedimientos especiales establecidos en esa ley y su reglamento. Asimismo, indicó el procedimiento y las condiciones para otorgar tal concesión. Esto básicamente se mantuvo hasta que por medio de la Ley N.° 8955 de 16 de junio de 2011 se dispuso de forma expresa la titularidad del Estado sobre todo tipo de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículo automotor (no solo refiriéndose a los taxis como tradicionalmente se había delimitado), con independencia de su grado de intervención en la determinación del sistema operativo o en la fiscalización. Esta situación conllevó la eliminación de la figura del porte de personas del Código de Comercio y la inclusión normativa de la figura del “servicio especial estable de taxi”, mediante la regulación del otorgamiento de permisos para su prestación en tanto servicio público.

2. Sobre el concepto de servicio público y su titularidad.

Sobre el servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en Costa Rica, este Tribunal, mediante resolución Nº 2012-12741 de las 9:05 horas de 14 de setiembre de 2012, y haciendo referencia al voto Nº 2011-04778 de las 14:31 horas de 13 de abril de 2011 (pronunciamiento que resolvió la consulta de constitucionalidad a la Ley Nº 8955), indicó lo siguiente:

“IV. - Sobre el concepto de servicio público. Este concepto fue desarrollado en esa ocasión señalando que éste no sólo puede ser prestado o realizado por organismos estatales, sino también por personas o entes particulares o privados, de acuerdo con reglamentaciones emitidas por las autoridades públicas; y que se trata de servicios que tienden a satisfacer necesidades o intereses de carácter general, por lo que requieren control por parte de las autoridades públicas. El elemento determinante de los servicios públicos es, entonces, su fin la satisfacción de la necesidad o interés general para cuyo fin fue creado- o la sujeción de la actividad al régimen de Derecho Público que la regula, precisamente en virtud del interés público que se intenta satisfacer (Considerando XV). Se indicó también que El Estado, desde hace ya bastante tiempo, ha considerado la actividad de transporte de personas como una necesidad social imperante cuya vigencia resulta esencial, como condición fundamental para el mantenimiento del estado de derecho y la paz social.

Por esta razón ha promulgado una serie de leyes siendo, actualmente, las más importantes en esta materia la Ley Reguladora de Transporte Remunerado Personas Vehículos Automotores (Ley No. 3503) y la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi (Ley No. 7969), cuya reforma se conoce en esta consulta. En el último quinquenio, es público y notorio que este tema del transporte de personas ha ido adquiriendo mayor trascendencia para la sociedad costarricense, no sólo desde el punto de vista social sino también económico, hasta convertirse en un tema de interés general, que va más allá de la satisfacción de una necesidad meramente privada, requiriendo la intervención del Estado para darle una solución. El Estado en este caso el legislador ordinario- puede, dentro del marco permitido por la Constitución Política y las normas de carácter legal, optar por la solución que considere más oportuna.

Como recién se dijo, una de esas posibles soluciones es regular dicha actividad y declararla servicio público, que es precisamente lo que hace el proyecto consultado, cumpliendo, necesariamente, con los dos elementos antes señalados. En virtud de lo expuesto, la Sala no estima contraria a la Constitución Política la reforma al artículo 2 de la Ley número 7969 para considerar el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi un servicio público del cual es titular el Estado y que se explotará mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa o el permiso en el caso de servicios especiales estables de taxi (Considerando XVI). De ese modo se pretende con la reforma cuestionada abstraer de la esfera privada la prestación del servicio de transporte de personas -que en su totalidad ha sido declarado servicio público por el legislador-, convertir a los particulares en colaboradores de la Administración Pública, y aplicar la normativa que rige la prestación de los servicios públicos.

Por ello, no se considera que se lesionen los artículos 28, 45, 46 y 56 de la Constitución Política; ni tampoco que lleve razón la accionante cuando acusa que la normativa impugnada transformó en ilegal la actividad que venía desarrollando.” No obstante, bajo una mejor ponderación y tomando en consideración los argumentos expuestos en el sub examine, debo indicar lo siguiente.

Si bien mantengo que la noción general de que un servicio público puede ser prestado en determinados casos tanto por el Estado como por particulares, de acuerdo con la normativa respectiva emitida por la autoridad pública competente, ya que son actividades económicas revestidas de un evidente interés general, estimo improcedente que en el caso concreto de los servicios de transporte remunerado de persona en la modalidad de taxi y servicio especial estable de taxi, sea el Estado el único que pueda ser titular de servicios de esa naturaleza, esto es, que los particulares puedan explotarlo solo por la vía de una concesión o permiso.

Nótese que la fundamentación que utilizó este Tribunal para validar la declaración de los servicios antedicho como públicos, fue la trascendencia que han ido adquiriendo desde el punto de vista social y económico hasta revestirse de interés general; sin embargo, el hecho de que una actividad sea de interés general, no quiere decir que irremediablemente solo el Estado deba ser su titular.

Para tales efectos, resulta trascendental distinguir entre servicio público propio e impropio. Esta Sala ya ha precisado dichos conceptos, aunque no específicamente refiriéndose al transporte remunerado de personas.

En ese sentido, mediante el voto Nº2004-1791 de las 9:02 horas de 20 de febrero de 2004, reiterado en cantidad de ocasiones, este Tribunal señaló:

“EDUCACIÓN COMO UN SERVICIO PÚBLICO . La educación no solo se puede concebir como un derecho de los ciudadanos, sino también como un servicio público, esto es, como una prestación positiva que brindan a los habitantes de la república las administraciones públicas -el Estado a través del Ministerio de Educación Pública y las Universidades Públicas- con lo cual es un servicio público propio o los particulares a través de organizaciones colectivas del derecho privado -v. gr. fundaciones, asociaciones o sociedades- en el caso de las escuelas, colegios y universidades privadas, siendo en este caso un servicio público impropio. En este último supuesto hablamos de un servicio público impropio toda vez que los particulares -personas físicas o jurídicas- lo hacen sometidos a un intenso y prolijo régimen de derecho público en cuanto a la creación, funcionamiento y fiscalización de esos centros privados.

Los servicios públicos, en cuanto brindan prestaciones efectivas vitales para la vida en sociedad deben sujetarse a una serie de principios tales como los de continuidad, regularidad, eficiencia, eficacia, igualdad y universalidad, los cuales, entratándose de los servicios públicos impropios se ven atenuados o matizados, sobre todo en cuanto el usuario opta por utilizarlos. Consecuentemente, el servicio público de educación, propio o impropio, no puede ser interrumpido o suspendido sino obedece a razones o justificaciones objetivas y graves, como podría ser, eventualmente, tratándose de la educación, la trasgresión por el educando del régimen disciplinario del centro de enseñanza.” (El destacado no es original).

De lo expuesto, se concluye que el servicio público propio es el que presta el Estado de manera directa o a través de un sujeto de derecho privado, mientras que el impropio es aquel prestado directamente por un particular eso sí sometido a un fuerte y específico control de derecho público en razón del grado de importancia para el interés público de la correspondiente actividad, como sucede con los centros de salud y farmacias privados.

En adición, por medio del voto Nº 9676-2001 de las 11:25 horas de 26 de setiembre de 2001, la Sala estableció:

“IV.- (…) actualmente, un sector importante de la doctrina y jurisprudencia sostiene que el servicio público no sólo puede ser prestado o realizado por organismos estatales, sino también por personas o entes particulares o privados (concesionarios), de acuerdo a reglamentaciones (sic) no (sic) normas generales emitidas por las autoridades públicas. Es así, como por servicio público deba entenderse toda actividad de la Administración Pública o de los particulares o administrados que tienda a la satisfacción de necesidades o intereses de carácter general, cuya índole o gravitación se encuentra regida o encuadrada por el Derecho Público, en tanto se requiere de un control por parte de las autoridades públicas. La concepción tradicional limita el servicio público a la actividad que realiza la Administración directa o indirectamente (a través de concesionarios), cuya creación se deba a un acto formal -a través de ley formal- o comportamiento de las autoridades públicas -acto administrativo-; sin embargo, la doctrina más moderna, denomina como "servicio público impropio", aquella actividad realizada por particulares, cuyo carácter no deriva de un acto estatal se trata de actividades que por su función, satisfacen una necesidad o interés general, como sería el caso de las ventas o suministros de primera necesidad, como lo son los productos de la canasta básica o medicamentos; actividades que no obstante desarrollarse bajo el régimen del derecho privado, están sujetas a regulaciones y controles estatales -normas de subordinación-, como lo son las fijaciones de precios de estos artículos, control de calidad, obligatoriedad de efectuar la prestación a quien la solicite, etc. Se trata de actividades que por comprometer necesidades vitales de la colectividad, trascienden lo meramente privado, para trascender en lo social, saliendo del estricto ámbito del derecho privado, y ubicarse en una zona regulada por el derecho público.” (El destacado no es original).

Además, el Magistrado Jinesta Lobo, en la revista Ivstitia Nº 275-276 de noviembre-diciembre de 2009, en su artículo denominado “Régimen constitucional y legal de las telecomunicaciones”, explicó de manera clara tal diferenciación:

“De modo que, existe una diferencia sustancial entre servicios regulados y servicios públicos, puesto que, no todo servicio sometido a una fuerte regulación o régimen de Derecho público es público, de ahí que la doctrina haya distinguido entre servicios públicos propios e impropios o virtuales, siendo los primeros los que se han calificados como tales y prestan directamente los entes públicos o indirectamente a través de sujetos de Derecho privado. En tanto que un servicio público virtual, impropio o regulado es el que presta un sujeto de Derecho privado bajo un fuerte e intenso régimen de Derecho Público.” En razón de lo expuesto, para definir cuándo un servicio público es propio o impropio, se debe precisar la diferencia entre: 1) la prestación del servicio por parte del Estado pero de modo indirecto a través de un sujeto de derecho privado (verbigracia un concesionario); y 2) la prestación del servicio directamente por un sujeto de derecho privado (aunque sometido a una intensa y específica regulación).

Al respecto, deviene necesario distinguir entre la concesión, el permiso y la autorización que pueden otorgar el Estado para la prestación de un servicio público.

a. Con respecto a la concesión, este Tribunal, según la sentencia Nº 3451-96 de las 15:33 horas de 9 de julio de 1996, precisamente referido al transporte remunerado de personas, incluyendo los taxis, dispuso, indicó:

“(…) b.- la concesión.-por medio de la concesión de servicio público el Estado satisface necesidades generales valiéndose para ello de la colaboración voluntaria de los administrados en la prestación de los servicios públicos. Por el contrato de concesión de servicio público se encomienda a una persona -física o jurídica-, por un tiempo determinado, la organización y el funcionamiento de un determinado servicio público. El concesionario lleva a cabo su tarea, por su cuenta y riesgo, percibiendo por su labor la retribución correspondiente, que puede consistir en el precio o tarifas pagadas por los usuarios, en subvenciones o garantías satisfechas por el Estado, o ambas a la vez. El concesionario queda supeditado al control propio de todo contrato administrativo; es decir, está sujeto permanentemente a la fiscalización del Estado, puesto que en este tipo de contrato siempre media un interés público, el concesionario queda vinculado a la Administración Pública como cocontratante y también entra en relación con los usuarios en cuyo interés se otorgó la concesión.

En este tipo de contrato el concesionario tiene un derecho subjetivo perfecto y declarado; es decir, deriva un derecho patrimonial en el sentido constitucional del término, porque al otorgar una concesión de servicio público, se formaliza un contrato administrativo en sentido estricto. (…) El concesionario debe gozar de un plazo razonable para dedicarse a la actividad de que se trate, de manera que por definición los tiempos indefinidos o de corta duración se encuentran excluidos de la concesión y resultan más bien propios de los permisos, que son revocables en cualquier momento como se dijo. Por lo demás, adviértase que la concesión pertenece a la categoría de contratos administrativos que la doctrina denomina de "colaboración" y su duración es temporaria, pero ha de serlo por un lapso tal que razonablemente permita la amortización de los capitales invertidos y la obtención de una ganancia adecuada para el concesionario.

Conviene indicar finalmente, que en algunas ocasiones el contrato de concesión puede incluir tratos especiales para el concesionario, relacionados con su actividad. La doctrina admite como posible que la administración asuma el compromiso de no otorgar nuevas concesiones para el mismo servicio, si éstas pueden afectar la prestación del mismo. (…) c.- la licitación: el procedimiento de licitación que contempla el artículo 182 constitucional resulta de interés no sólo para el Estado, sino, además, para los administrados. En términos generales podemos indicar que al Estado le interesa obtener las mayores posibilidades de acierto en el cumplimiento de sus fines, incluyendo la prestación de servicios públicos en las calidades de la prestación que se brinda a los usuarios, y, según sea la naturaleza del objeto, obtener las mejores condiciones económicas tanto desde el punto de vista del contratista como del costo para los usuarios.

Desde la perspectiva de los particulares el procedimiento de licitación está caracterizado por el principio de publicidad, lo que a su vez garantiza la libre concurrencia en condiciones de absoluta igualdad de participación.El sistema tiende a evitar tratos preferenciales e injustos y por ello es el más deseable instrumento para el trámite de los contratos administrativos. Dadas sus características, la licitación se convierte un (sic) una garantía para el interés público (…). ” De igual manera, la resolución Nº 2001-11657 de las 14:43 horas de 14 de noviembre de 2001, señaló:

“(…) Se diferencia de otras figuras tales como la concesión de obras y servicios públicos en el tanto en que en estas últimas ocurre una verdadera traslación de la prestación y retribución del particular se produce a partir de los pagos que reciba directamente del público, y la responsabilidad reposa siempre en el concesionario.” (El destacado no es original) b. En cuanto a los permisos, la Sala, en sentencia Nº 2007-4467 de las 17:29 horas de 28 de marzo de 2007, indicó:

“Esta Sala ha sostenido en reiterada jurisprudencia que el permisoreconoce un derecho al administrado a título precario que puede ser revocado sin ninguna responsabilidad para la Administración por razones calificadas de oportunidad o conveniencia. En este sentido, es necesario dejar claro que si bien, la Administración puede anular o revocar un permiso, no se encuentra obligada a incoar un procedimiento administrativo ordinario para ello, en virtud que el permiso no otorga ningún derecho subjetivo al permisionario. Esa revocación o anulación no puede ser intempestivo o arbitraria de conformidad con lo establece el artículo 154 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública.” (El destacado no es original).

También, mediante sentencia Nº 2443-03 de las 9:57 horas de 21 de marzo de 2003, señaló:

“III.- DE LA NATURALEZA DE LOS PERMISOS. El permiso es un acto que autoriza a una persona – administrado – para el ejercicio de un derecho, en principio, prohibido por el propio ordenamiento jurídico. Es una exención especial respecto de una prohibición general en beneficio de quien lo solicita. Con el permiso se tolera o permite realizar algo muy específico y determinado. Su naturaleza consiste en remover un obstáculo legal para el ejercicio de un poder preexistente, se dice que es una concesión de alcance restringido, puesto que, otorga derechos de menor intensidad y de mayor precariedad. Los caracteres del permiso son los siguientes: a) crea una situación jurídica individual condicionada al cumplimiento de la ley, siendo que su incumplimiento implica la caducidad del permiso; b) se da intuito personae en consideración a sus motivos y al beneficiario, en principio se prohíbe su cesión y transferencia; c) confiere un derecho debilitado o un interés legítimo, la precariedad del derecho del permisionario se fundamenta en que el permiso constituye una tolerancia de la Administración Pública respectiva que actúa discrecionalmente; d) es precario, razón por la cual la Administración Pública puede revocarlo en cualquier momento, sin derecho a resarcimiento o indemnización; e) su otorgamiento depende de la discrecionalidad administrativa, por lo que la Administración Pública pueda apreciar si el permiso solicitado se adecua o no al interés general.” c. Sobre la autorización, este Tribunal, mediante la sentencia Nº 1996- 02981 de las a las 14:33 horas de 19 de junio de 1996, expuso:

“III. DE LAS AUTORIZACIONES ADMINISTRATIVAS. La “autorización” es un acto administrativo que actúa como condición de validez para que una determinada actividad sea desarrollada, o el comportamiento sea realizado, en forma legítima. La autorización no le atribuye un nuevo poder o derecho a la persona a la que ha sido otorgado; sino que únicamente le atribuye la facultad de ejercer un poder o un derecho ya existente (como en el caso en estudio, la existencia de la libertad empresarial o de comercio), es decir, implica únicamente la remoción de un obstáculo legal para el ejercicio de un poder o de un derecho existente; de este modo, los efectos de la autorización comienzan a correr a partir del momento en que fue emitida. (…)” Es decir, tomando en consideración los precedentes citados, considero que en el servicio público propio, la titularidad solo atañe al Estado, pero su mediante concesión) en un particular, eso sí manteniendo el propio Estado la titularidad del servicio. El permiso es otra modalidad para que el Estado le ceda la administrado a título precario que en principio puede ser revocado sin ninguna responsabilidad para la Administración por razones calificadas de oportunidad o conveniencia.

Por su parte, en el servicio público impropio, la titularidad le atañe a un particular, pero debido al interés general que reviste la actividad, para su prestación se requiere una autorización, es decir la habilitación por parte del Estado para su ejercicio.

Así las cosas, el hecho de que la actividad prestada se revista de interés general, no implica que, inexorablemente, solo el Estado pueda ser titular de la misma.

3. Naturaleza del transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores no colectivos en Costa Rica.

Como aclaré líneas arriba, el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores no colectivos en nuestro país tuvo su génesis en el sector privado de la economía. Incluso, en sus orígenes estuvo sometido a escasa supervisión estatal y de forma expresa se le excluyó de la regulación del transporte colectivo.

Al respecto, con la N° 3503 de 10 de mayo de 1965, se estableció que el servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en automóviles, incluido el servicio de que hoy se conoce como taxi, pasó a ser titularidad del Estado, pero con la particularidad de que cuando hacía referencia a la operación de automóviles de servicio público remitía a la figura del permiso.

Con la entrada en vigencia de la Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Taxis, Nº 5406 de 26 de noviembre de 1973, se consignó la potestad del Estado de brindar el servicio de forma directa o bien de otorgar derechos a un particular para que lo explotara vía concesión del Ministerio de Obras y Transportes. Tal aspecto se ha mantenido hasta la actualidad con la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, N° 7969 de 22 de diciembre de 1999.

Como ya se indicó, el hecho de que un servicio satisfaga un interés general no supone que su titularidad deba pasar ipso facto y de modo ineluctable a favor del Estado. Considero que para que una actividad sea sacada del libre comercio de los hombres y su titularidad asumida en condición de monopolio por el Estado, se tiene que respetar el principio constitucional de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad con respecto a los fines públicos que se pretenden conseguir, de manera tal que solo un denotado interés público podría llegar a justificar la imposición de una medida tan gravosa y extraordinaria como la exclusión del libre mercado de cierta actividad que explote un bien económico (a lo que por supuesto se debe sumar la votación calificada que demanda el ordinal 46 de la Constitución Política).

Por ello, la fundamentación de la ley creadora de un monopolio a favor del Estado, de modo expreso, debe explicar por qué una determinada actividad empresarial tiene que ser sometida a una medida tan gravosa como la de suprimirla del mercado para trasladarla a conformar un monopolio del Estado. Además, a la luz del principio constitucional de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, de manera contundente deben exponerse las razones por las que el interés público solo podría verse satisfecho si la actividad en cuestión es monopolizada a favor del Estado. Tal justificación puede responder, evidentemente, a un momento históricamente determinado, de forma tal que lo que en ciertas circunstancias podría considerarse justificado, en otras no lo sería.

Al respecto, en las leyes Nº 3503, 5406 y 7969 (antes de la reforma que se impugna en esta acción), no se consignaron expresamente razones técnicas o de interés público tan relevantes y sustentadas como para justificar que una actividad comercial como la de taxi, cuya titularidad históricamente le había correspondido al sector privado, pasara ahora a manos del Estado (quien podría conceder su público impropio a uno propio.

Advertido lo expuesto, con anterioridad a la reforma objeto de esta acción, la existencia jurídico-positivo y real del negocio jurídico denominado “porteo de personas” durante más de 45 años, evidencia, por más que se pretenda argüir que esa figura comercial respondía a una demanda residual, la presencia de un bien económico del libre mercado, cuya titularidad correspondía a particulares, condicionada esta y su explotación al cumplimiento de los requerimientos respectivos.

Atinente al punto, nuestra Constitución Políticareconoce la libertad de comercio y, particularmente, la libre competencia (elementos esenciales de la economía de mercado), lo que explica el porqué de que a nivel constitucional se le haya asignado al Estado la obligación de impedir toda práctica o tendencia monopolizadora. Asimismo, es claro que el derecho de propiedad halla cobijo en nuestra Ley Fundamental.

Ahora, la reforma introducida por la ley N° 8955 de 16 de junio de 2011 no solo elimina la figura del “porteo de personas” y crea el “servicio especial estable de taxi”, sino que, concomitantemente y por primera vez de manera expresa, estatuye que todo transporte de personas en un vehículo automotor debe ser considerado como un servicio público, cuya titularidad corresponde al Estado con independencia del grado de intervención gubernamental en la determinación del sistema operativo del servicio o en su fiscalización.

Sobre el particular, una vez examinados los antecedentes legislativos, desde el punto de vista del Derecho de la Constitución, observo que no quedaron servicio de taxis pasara a ser un servicio público propio, cuya titularidad fuera exclusiva del Estado (lo anterior deviene aplicable en general al servicio de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos no colectivos).

Además, con la reforma en estudio se le permitió al Estado mantener la titularidad del servicio otorgando “permisos” sin recurrir al procedimiento de la licitación, situación extraña porque cuando se trata de un servicio público que la ley aspira a tenerlo como “propio” (aunque la realidad económica demuestre que no es sino uno “impropio”), la figura del permiso debe ser la excepción, mientras que la concesión, la regla. Si el servicio especial estable de taxi se considera público y propiedad del Estado, en tesis de principio no debería operar mediante la figura del permiso, que es de naturaleza precaria. Incluso, la imposición de requisitos para la obtención del permiso de marras asimilables a los de la concesión, sin otorgar los mismos derechos y condiciones de esta última, constituye una invención legal, cuya única finalidad fue solventar una situación político conflictiva –la derogación del “porteo de personas” del Código de Comercio–, sin entrar en consideraciones ni de fondo ni de correcta técnica jurídica.

Atinente al sub judice, esta Sala, en la sentencia Nº 3451-96 de las 15:33 horas de 9 de julio de 1996, precisamente referido al transporte remunerado de personas, incluyendo los taxis, dispuso:

" I.- El transporte remunerado de personas, en sus diversas modalidades, ya sea por medio de autobuses, "busetas", o taxis, es un servicio público cuya prestación puede ser otorgada por el Estado a los particulares, celebrando con ellos contratos de concesión, y solamente por excepción, por medio de permisos transitorios de explotación del servicio. (…)

II ).- El legislador ha dispuesto, y la Sala lo ha confirmado en su jurisprudencia, que la explotación del transporte remunerado de personas se otorgue a los particulares acudiendo al procedimiento de licitación y consiguientemente, en esta materia el permiso como modo de asignar la ante la obtención de una concesión por licitación y de ahí sus características de temporalidad, precariedad y excepcionabilidad. (…) Para la Sala la práctica administrativa que se cuestiona ha subvertido las fuentes del derecho y ha convertido la excepción, concebida por el legislador como caso extremo para atender singulares circunstancias, en la regla ordinaria, irrespetando de esta manera el orden constitucional y los fallos vinculantes de la Sala, entre otros, el voto número 2101-91 de las 8:40 horas del 18 de octubre de l991. Y tal posición asumida por la Administración, desemboca en graves infracciones al ordenamiento jurídico vigente a.- infracción al principio de legalidad : la práctica administrativa de autorizar la explotación del transporte remunerado de personas, preferentemente, mediante la figura del permiso subvierte las fuentes del derecho, lo que implica la potenciación del acto administrativo discrecional por sobre lo que indica la ley - de orden público- y, desde luego, por sobre el artículo 182 constitucional, lo que para esta Sala resulta inadmisible; b) infracción a la igualdad : el procedimiento de concurso o de licitación pública para otorgar concesiones en el servicio público del transporte remunerado de personas, a su vez, da realce a uno de los principios rectores de la contratación administrativa, de la libre participación en condiciones de absoluta igualdad, lo que evidentemente se encuentra ausente en la figura del permiso, sobre todo cuando el acto administrativo que así lo dispone, no tiene ninguna justificación objetiva y razonable.

El tiempo que puede tardar la administración preparando el concurso no justifica el desconocer, por la vía generalizada del permiso, valores y principios fundamentales de nuestro sistema jurídico. Es cierto que la Comisión Técnica de Transportes tiene respaldo legal y reglamentario para otorgar "permisos" para la explotación del Transporte Remunerado de Personas; sin embargo, ello debe verse, siempre, desde la óptica de la excepción, lo que obviamente han perdido de vista las autoridades accionadas: (…)." Por lo cual, el “servicio especial estable de taxi” no es más que un intento del Estado por regular una actividad que en ningún momento debió de ser considerada como un servicio público propio, cuya titularidad solo pudiera ser del Estado. Lo anterior no quiere decir que el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas no colectivo se considere libre de regulaciones, puesto que, más bien, el interés general que el mismo representa, justifica la imposición de requerimientos para su Esto no obsta, sin embargo, que la titularidad de dicha actividad pertenezca al mundo de lo privado, como históricamente ha ocurrido con el porteo.

De hecho, la irrupción de diversos fenómenos en el mundo del ser en cuanto a esta actividad (Piratas, Uber, Cabify), evidencian la tendencia a que las realidades económicas, tarde o temprano, terminan por imponerse sobre las ficciones jurídicas, puesto que al Derecho lo que le corresponde es fiscalizar y controlar tales fenómenos, mas no caer en la quimera de negarlos.

Así las cosas, en el caso de marras estimo que en la declaratoria de titularidad a favor del Estado de todo tipo de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores, no se justificó el porqué de que se prefiriera tal medida frente a otras menos lesivas a los derechos constitucionales a la libertad de empresa, libre competencia y propiedad, esto último conforme al principio constitucional de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Subrayo que incluso al momento de la consulta legislativa de la ley N.° 8955 de 16 de junio de 2011, mediante voto N° 2011-04778 de las 14:30 horas de 13 de abril de 2011, este Tribunal señaló que el proyecto de ley tuvo su origen en un proceso de negociación entre representantes del Estado y de las cámaras y federaciones (en representación de los taxistas y porteadores), lo cual no constituye suficiente motivación para una acción que afecta a la sociedad en general y extrae del libre mercado una actividad que explota un bien económico.

En virtud de lo expuesto, estimo que el hecho de que en nuestro país el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas sea un servicio propio monopolizado a favor del Estado, lesiona los derechos constitucionales a la libre competencia, la libertad de empresa y la propiedad, así como al principio constitucional de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad..

Al existir suficientes razones para declarar con lugar esta acción por violaciones severas y manifiestas al orden constitucional, deviene innecesario pronunciarse sobre el resto de reclamos, tal como desde un inicio ha sido la tesis de esta Sala en cantidad de asuntos (ver sentencias números 2014-008481, 2011-016592, 2001-004027, 2000-010996, 1993-001633, 1990-001463, entre otras).

XII. Voto salvado de la Magistrada Hernández López.-

Introducción.

1.Respetuosamente me separo de la decisión de la mayoría del Tribunal en este caso y declaro con lugar la acción planteada porque considero que la normativa impugnada establece una privación absoluta del derecho fundamental a la libertad de comercio y empresa en la actividad de transporte terrestre de personas, lo cual -en ausencia de razones o motivaciones capaces de justificarla-, la convierte en un ejercicio constitucionalmente ilegítimo de la potestad de legislar. Seguidamente, expongo las razones en que fundamento mi criterio, aclarando que me refiero únicamente al tema objeto del proceso –como corresponde-, es decir, al porteo y su eliminación del ordenamiento jurídico, sin que pueda dársele a esta opinión ninguna otra connotación. Es decir esta opinión no se refiere a la legitimidad o no de la modalidad de transporte denominada Uber, ni a los servicios ilegales de transporte conocidos como “piratas” que no son objeto de este proceso.

Antes de entrar a analizar los hechos del caso, quisiera expresar mi preocupación sobre la tendencia que puede observarse en países de diversas regiones del mundo –incluido el nuestro-, en abandonar la sana reserva que las sociedades y los individuos habían tenido en relación con el apropiado ejercicio del poder por parte del Estado, en resguardo de libertades fundamentales. Con extrañeza –ingenuamente- en distintas latitudes, se están dando cada vez más poderes sobre sus actividades a los órganos estatales, en la esperanza de que sean capaces de ejercerlos sin abusar de su poder y de paso resolver un sin fin de temas derivados de la vida en sociedad.

De nada sirve que día a día, desde la época histórica en que se consolidaron los Estados Nacionales -para no viajar más en el tiempo-, los agentes estatales y en general los Estados, hayan demostrado –una y otra vez -, su tendencia a abusar de su autoridad en detrimento de los derechos de las personas.- Esto resulta peligroso puesto que la dinámica estatal no reconoce grados en su ejercicio de autoridad –ni sus desviaciones-, y se ejerce sin atenuación alguna en razón del tema, de modo que, lo esencial y lo importante se funden con lo pequeño y menos trascendente, para generar una intervención estatal que conlleva una pérdida de libertad de las personas.

Creo que haría bien la sociedad costarricense en reflexionar sobre su contradictoria posición respecto del papel del Estado, al cual demeritan sin pausa por un parte, pero por otra lo invocan y acuden a él para que intervenga cada vez más en aspectos propios de la libertad y autonomía de las personas.- En este caso, una vez más -pero esta vez vía jurisprudencia-, se le da al Estado prácticamente un cheque en blanco para que secuestre un segmento del comercio (libertad esencial de la democracia), con solo que cumpla formalmente con una ley, sin respeto del contenido esencial del derecho. Así es como empezaron a implosionar democracias en la región, hasta dejar de serlo. Este es un mal síntoma, que se suma a otras potestades exorbitantes que se han ido creando poco a poco –sin que el sistema judicial haya ejercido el contrapeso que le corresponde- y a otras más que están en la corriente legislativa, en demérito de libertades fundamentales, las que fácilmente pueden ser abusadas por mayorías transitorias para poner en jaque el sistema democrático.

Los hechos del caso.

2. Si bien en este proceso se han alegado también infracciones a un tratado internacional, estimo innecesaria alguna elaboración sobre dicho punto, al existir una lesión de normas constitucionales cuya declaración torna irrelevante ulteriores consideraciones.- Para la resolución del caso estimo suficiente concentrarme en los reclamos por infracción de los artículos 28 y 46 de la Carta Fundamental.

3. De acuerdo a la delimitación anterior, los hechos que enmarcan la decisión de la Sala no son complicados:

• i)en 1964 se promulga el Código de Comercio que contenía en su articulado (artículo 323) una regulación para la actividad del transporte privado de personas; ii) un año después, en 1965 se pone en vigencia la ley 3503 en la que declara “facultad esclusiva del Estado” el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores por vía terrestre y dispone que podrá prestarse directamente o por medio de particulares que expresamente se autorice; iii) en 1973 se emite la ley número 5406 que dispone que el transporte remunerado de personas “en vehículos taxis automotores” es “un servicio público” y procede a regularlo. En ella no se hace incluye mención alguna de los contratos privados para el transporte de personas; iv) en 1996, la ley 7593 se modifica el artículo 1 de la ley 3503, (hecho ii) de manera que en adelante, el transporte terrestre remunerado de personas allí regulado se referirá exclusivamente al realizado “en vehículos colectivos” .

Tampoco en esta modificación se incluye alguna disposición en relación con el contrato privado de transporte de personas en automóvil.- v) para el año 1999 se promulga la ley 7969 para reordenar específicamente el servicio de taxi y para tal efecto se deroga la ley 5406 (hecho iii.). Se reitera el concepto de que el transporte remunerado de personas “en la modalidad de taxi” es un servicio público que solo puede prestarse mediante una concesión o un permiso. En esta oportunidad la normativa tampoco recoge ninguna disposición para regular el servicio de transporte privado de personas en autmóviles; vi)Luego de transcurridos doce años,en el año 2011, se promulga la ley 8955 -aquí discutida- que modifica, tanto el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio (hecho i) para eliminar de ella la regulación del contrato de porteo de personas, como la ley 7969 (hecho v) para extender la titularidad estatal a cualquier modalidad de transporte remunerado realizado “...por medio de autobuses, busetas, microbuses, taxis, automóviles y cualquier otro tipo de vehículo automotor, ya sea que se ofrezca al público en general, a personas usuarias o a grupos determinados de personas usuarias con necesidades específicas que constituyen demandas especiales” Planteo de la controversia.

4. La revisión del cuadro fáctico permite excluir de cualquier considerción tanto al transporte colectivo de personas como la actividad de transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi, puesto que sobre ellas no incidió negativamente la ley discutida. Estas dos actividades sufrieron hace mucho tiempo un proceso de nacionalización y los interesados se cuidan de atacar tales decisiones.- En ese sentido, el reclamo de la parte accionante y los coayuvantes activos es muy puntual y consiste, resumidamente, en que con la ley 8955 se extrajo del ámbito de la libertad de empresa y comercio la actividad de transporte privado de personas, que había sobrevivido a los cambios legislativos y además que, en los hechos, se realizaba por los particulares como una actividad subsidiaria y marginal. Con esa actuación, se afirma, se lesionó la regla de mayoría calificada para la creación de monopolios recogida en el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política y se produjo también una lesión material del citado artículo y del artículo 28 y que recogen la libetad de comercio y la libertad general de actuar.

5. En su informe la Procuraduría General de la República, así como los interesados en la defensa de la ley impugnada afirman la inexistencia de lesión alguna, con apoyo de lo expuesto en la sentencia de esta Sala número 2011-4778. Sostienen que en ella no se creó ni completó monopolio alguno, pues se reafirmó solamente la ya existente titularidad estatal sobre el transporte terrestre remunerado de personas, de manera que, siendo estatal la actividad, no le resulta aplicable el concepto de monopolio más aún en este caso que ha dejado abierta la posiblidad de participación de diferentes personas en calidad de concesionarios 6. Se contesta también la supuesta lesión a la libertad general de actuar y a la libertad de comercio y empresa establecidas en la Constitución Política, remitiendo nuevamente a lo dicho por la Sala en la sentencia 2011-4778 en donde se expone que la creación de un servicio especial de taxi y la reserva de titularidad que se decreta para el resto del transporte remunerado de personas por vía terrestre, no alcanza a lesionar tales libertades, al ser la creación de un servicio especial de taxi un ejercicio de discreción y titularidad del legislador sobre aquellas actividades en las que se estime necesaria la intervención del Estado a través de la declaratoria de servicio público en cabeza del Estado.

Mas allá de etiquetas jurídicas .

7. Vemos que el reclamo se dirige contra la actuación legislativa por la cual el Estado se terminó de apropiar de la titularidad de toda actividad relacionada con el transporte remunerado de personas por las vías terrestres. Accionantes y coadyuvantes activos sostienen que con tal acto se abarcó una porción de tal actividad económica que había sido de libre acceso y que los particulares realizaban hasta 2011 de manera válida y en armonía con las disposiciones del Código de Comercio, de los artículos 28 y 46 de la Constitución Política y las necesidades de un sector de la población. En las respuestas de los interesados y de la Procuraduría General de la República se aprecia que, en el fondo, coinciden en esencia con dicho planteamiento: afirman que la ley 8955 vino a “completar” el proceso estatal tendiente a hacerse con la titularidad de toda forma de transporte terrestre remunerado de personas. Se afirma que lo anterior es constitucionalmente válido en tanto se trató de una “publicatio” vale decir, de una declaratoria de servicio público por parte de la Asamblea Legislativa, el órgano constitucional legitimado para realizarlo.

1. 8Interesa por tanto, definir si, como parece desprenderse de dichas respuestas, el estampado de una etiqueta de “servicio público” o “publicatio” mediante una decisión legislativa formalmente tomada, es suficiente para validar constitucionalmente la extracción de una actividad económica del alcance de la libertad de comercio y empresa de las personas; en otras palabras, si basta la declaratoria formal e inequivoca de una actividad como servicio público de titularidad estatal (la publicatio) para que este Tribunal Constitucional se dé por satisfecho respecto de su labor de velar por la constitucionalidad del ejercicio del poder estatal.- En este aspecto, el voto de mayoría combina una aceptación plena de dicha tesis con un notable silencio frente a los argumentos planteados por las partes para combatir esa forma de pensar. Mi criterio es que la posición de la Sala debería ser completamente diferente y de un amplio y contundente rechazo a tales planteamientos.

9. He sostenido en otras decisiones - en mi voto salvado a la sentencia de esta Sala Constitucional número 2015-00146 de las 11:02 del 7 de enero de 2015- que la noción de servicio público, exige imperativamente un profundo “aggiornamento” para ser aceptable como expresión constitucionalmente legítima del poder estatal.- La razón es que tal concepto tiene su origen en un marco constitucional (el francés de la segunda mitad del siglo 19) que difiere en aspectos sustanciales del que impera actualmente en la mayoría de los países de nuestro entorno jurídico.

Las constituciones políticas emergidas de la Europa de la segunda pos-guerra, incluida la nuestra, hunden orgullosamente sus raíces en el pensamiento liberal y en sus máximas esenciales; entre ellas están la primacía del ser humano y su dignidad intrínseca -única razón de ser del Estado y del ejercicio del poder estatal- y la existencia de unos derechos fundamentales (naturales según la denominación de la época) inherentes a esa condición humana de sus titulares, que constituyen un tope al ejercicio de la soberanía y el poder estatal. Nada más alejado de las improntas autoritarias que durante el siglo 19 marcaron el desenvolvimiento del Estado Legislativo francés y cuya dinámica y forma de pensar se reflejan en el concepto de servicio público, al otorgar a la ley -como máxima expresión del organo de representación nacional- una preponderancia frente a la que debían rendirse los derechos de los individuos.- 10.

Resulta entonces por demás impropio en un marco constitucional como el costarricense, un empleo acrítico y cerval de la noción de servicio público, para legitimar una actuacion legislativa sin un verdadero escrutinio, todo sobre la base de que es suficiente que el Estado haya cumplido con el requisito de una “declaratoria formal y legal” de una actividad como servicio público. Impropio no solo desde la perspectiva histórico-jurídica, sino también desde el punto de vista del papel que le corresponde a esta Sala en la dinámica de funciones diseñada por el constituyente y que le asigna el deber, precisamente, de obviar las etiquetas y enjuiciar los actos legislativos frente a los parámetros de constitucionalidad, no por el prurito de insertar un bastón en los engranajes de la actividad estatal, sino para asegurar que dichos mecanismos estatales resulten equilibrados frente al obligado respeto que le debe el Estado a los derechos fundamentales de los individuos y su dignidad.

Y nada sustancial aporta a este fin, la ilustración que hacen las partes sobre las nuevas concepciones de servicio público y su cualidad dinámica que permite ahora al Estado una mayor libertad de acción con un marco jurídico administrativo más flexible. Quizás en el ámbito del derecho administrativo ello rinda frutos, pero en cuanto la cuestión toca el Derecho Constitucional y el exigido balance entre autoridad y libertad, semejantes florituras se tornan irrelevantes, a los efectos de que la Sala Constitucional cumpla con su deber.

11. Esta misma idea ha sido expresada muy claramente a lo largo de toda la existencia de este Tribunal. Por ejemplo en sentencia la número 1992-3495 que fijó claramente la tesis que se viene sustentando:

“IV- El Derecho de la Constituciòn, compuesto tanto por las normas y principios constitucionales, como por los del Internacional y, particularmente, los de sus instrumentos sobre derechos humanos, en cuanto fundamentos primarios de todo el orden jurìdico positivo, le transmiten su propia estructura lògica y sentido axiològico, a partir de valores incluso anteriores a los mismos textos legislados, los cuales son, a su vez, fuente de todo sistema normativo propio de la sociedad organizada bajo los conceptos del Estado de Derecho, el règimen constitucional, la democracia y la libertad, de modo tal que cualquier norma o acto que atente contra esos valores o principios -entre ellos los de racionalidad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, que son, por definiciòn, criterios de constitucionalidad-, o bien que conduzca a situaciones absurdas, dañinas o gravemente injustas, o a callejones sin salida para los particulares o para el Estado, no puede ser constitucionalmente vàlido. Respecto de tales valores y principios generales la Sala ha expresado, en su sentencia N 1739-92 de las 11:45 horas del 1 de julio de 1992 -sobre criterios generales del debido proceso en materia penal- que:

"las normas y actos pùblicos, incluso privados, como requisito de su propia validez constitucional...deben ajustarse, no sòlo a las normas o preceptos concretos de la Constituciòn, sino tambièn al sentido de justicia contenido en ella, el cual implica, a su vez, el cumplimiento de exigencias fundamentales de equidad, proporcionalidad y razonabilidad, entendidas como idoneidad para realizar los fines propuestos, los principios supuestos y los valores presupuestos en el Derecho de la Constituciòn. De allì que las leyes y, en general, las normas y los actos de autoridad requieran para su validez, no sòlo haber sido promulgados por òrganos competentes y procedimientos debidos, sino tambièn pasar la revisiòn de fondo por su concordancia con las normas, principios y valores supremos de la Constituciòn -formal y material-, como son los de orden, paz, seguridad, justicia, libertad, etc. que se configuran como patrones de razonabilidad.

Es decir, que una norma o acto pùblico o privado sòlo es vàlido cuando, ademàs de su conformidad formal con la Constituciòn, estè razonablemente fundado y justificado conforme a la ideologìa constitucional. De esta manera se procura, no sòlo que la ley no sea irracional, arbitraria o caprichosa, sino ademàs que los medios seleccionados tengan una relaciòn real y sustancial con su objeto. Se distingue entonces entre razonabilidad tècnica, que es, como se dijo, la proporcionalidad entre medios y fines; razonabilidad jurìdica, o la adecuaciòn a la Constituciòn, en general, y en especial, a los derechos y libertades reconocidos o supuestos por ella; y finalmente, razonabilidad de los efectos sobre los derechos personales, en el sentido de no imponer a esos derechos otras limitaciones o cargas que las razonablemente derivadas de la naturaleza y règimen de los derechos mismos, ni mayores que las indispensables para que funcionen razonablemente en la vida de la sociedad".

Posición reforzada también con nitidez en sentencia número 2003-5090 de las 14:44 horas del 11 de junio de 2003:

“La Asamblea Legislativa en el ejercicio de su función materialmente legislativa de dictar normas de carácter general y abstracto, esto es, leyes en sentido formal y material (artículo 121, inciso 1°, de la Constitución Política), goza de una amplia libertad de conformación para desarrollar el programa constitucional fijado por el Poder Constituyente. Ese extenso margen de maniobra en cuanto a la materia normada se ha denominado, también, discrecionalidad legislativa, entendida como la posibilidad que tiene ese órgano, ante una necesidad determinada del cuerpo social, de escoger la solución normativa o regla de Derecho que estime más justa, adecuada e idónea para satisfacerla, todo dentro del abanico o pluralidad de opciones políticas que ofrece libremente el cuerpo electoral a través del sistema de representación legislativa (…) La libertad de configuración legislativa no es irrestricta, puesto que, tiene como límite el Derecho de la Constitución, esto es, el bloque de constitucionalidad conformado por los preceptos y costumbres constitucionales, los valores y principios -dentro de los que destacan los de proporcionalidad, interdicción de la arbitrariedad, no discriminación, debido proceso y defensa- de esa índole y la jurisprudencia vertida por este Tribunal para casos similares”.

12. De tal manera, los operadores jurídicos y especialmente las personas que integramos los órganos de protección de los derechos fundamentales de las personas, no podemos perder de vista que nuestra misión requiere una atenta lectura de los conceptos jurídicos, mucho más allá de etiquetas, para asegurar que se apegan al conjunto de valores que promueve nuestra Carta fundamental.- Un descuido en este sentido, omitiendo el estudio de fundados cuestionamientos al ejercicio de la autoridad estatal, terminará seguramente, abriendo oportunidades para el ejercicio autoritario del poder. En América Latina hay claros ejemplos del abuso de la autoridad estatal para nacionalizar servicios tradicionalmente reservados al ejercicio del comercio, en perjuicio de las libertades esenciales, que a la postre, entre otros factores, terminó con democracias que parecían estables. (Ej.Venezuela cuyo gobierno declaró “estratégicos” servicios privados por naturaleza, como excusa para secuestrar la libertad de comercio y convertir empresas privadas en “empresas socialistas” ) Siguiendo la clara línea señalada en el dictamen C-376-2003 de la Procuraduría General de la República, suscrito por el entonces Procurador Castillo Víquez, debemos tener presente que cuando el Estado asume la titularidad de una actividad económica, se reduce el ámbito de libertad que el Derecho de la Constitución reconoce a favor de la persona.

Ello sucede, por regla general, cuando una actividad es declarada servicio público por el Legislativo y, por consiguiente, sólo puede prestarla él directamente o por medio de los particulares a través de las técnicas de la prestación indirecta de servicios públicos. En estos casos, como bien se señala en el dictamen de cita, se ensancha la presencia del Estado en la economía, y se reduce la esfera de libertad de las personas. Por eso es que un acto de tal naturaleza es de reserva de ley, pero además deben respetarse los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad (además es y debe ser excepcional). Más adelante, con la aplicación de la doctrina más reconocida se señala que siempre en caso de duda, debe favorecerse la libertad, en aplicación del principio pro libertate, desarrollado en la sentencia 3173-93 que en lo que interesa señaló:

“…el principio pro libertate, el cual, junto con el principio pro homine, constituyen el meollo de la doctrina de los derechos humanos; según el primero, debe interpretarse extensivamente todo lo que favorezca y restrictivamente todo lo que limite la libertad; según el segundo, el derecho debe interpretarse y aplicarse siempre de la mantera que favorezca al ser humano”.

En la misma línea, la Corte Interamericana en su consulta OC-5-85 señala que si bien es cierto las libertades fundamentales pueden estar sujetas a ciertas restricciones, deben ser “las necesarias, pero nada más que las necesarias a la vigencia de los valores democráticos y constitucionales, y señala que para que una restricción sea “necesaria” no es suficiente que sea “útil”, “razonable” u “oportuna”, sino que debe implicar la “existencia de una necesidad social imperiosa” que sustente la restricción”.

La pura verdad, en este caso, como se verá, no se ha justificado en forma clara, dónde se da esa necesidad social imperiosa de eliminar el porteo. No explica el legislador válidamente porqué le da el mismo trato jurídico a actividades de diversa naturaleza como son el porteo y el transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi. Como se sabe, el contrato de porteo es muy limitado, porque fue concebido para ser un servicio de naturaleza residual, el cual sólo puede ejercerse además en forma discrecional. No es una actividad que se dirige al público en general, independientemente de si se anuncia o no. Se trata de una actividad típicamente privada, de naturaleza personal. A diferencia de lo que ocurre en el servicio público el negocio jurídico no es el resultado del azar o de acciones encaminadas a la colectividad, sino más bien el producto de una relación discreta, previamente concertada entre el porteador y el viajero. Lo normal es que el servicio se preste “ de puerta a puerta”, lo que conlleva la imposibilidad de realizar contratos en la vía pública (ruleteo). Como puede observarse, se trata de un contrato con características muy especiales, que se diferencia de la actividad de servicio público” (Dictamen C-376-2003) Libertad de comercio y de empresa en nuestra Carta Fundamental.

13. Se señaló anteriormente la presencia en nuestra Constitución Política de un sustrato liberal que toma partido por el individuo y por el efectivo ejercicio de la más amplia libertad posible en todos los ámbitos de su vida: económico, social, religioso, intelectual y por su supuesto en los de su ámbito más privado. Tales aspiraciones están recogidas claramente por nuestra norma jurídica fundamental y por ello deben rescatarse y protegerse por la judicatura constitucional como intérprete de dicho instrumento normativo, por encima de los vaivenes políticos y los ataques de fuerzas y grupos de interés del más diverso signo. En materia económica y para lo que interesa en este caso, ese movimiento liberal acogido por nuestros constituyentes opta por la economía de mercado como base de la constitución económica. A esa idea se sumarán luego las necesarias correcciones para desembocar en la llamada economía social de mercado abiertamente aplicada y defendida como el mejor modelo existente para que las democracias organicen los distintos recursos económicos de una sociedad.- Tal es el telón de fondo contra el que deben contrastarse las actuaciones de las autoridades estatales, procurando mantener la línea del constituyente en dicho sentido y cargando al mismo tiempo a los detentadores del poder, con la obligación de justificar suficientemente las medidas que se aparten de tal modelo.

14. Esto mismo ha sido sostenido por este Tribunal como puede concluirse sin mayor esfuerzo del texto siguiente, que resulta ampliamente ilustrativo:

“VIII.- PRESUNTA APLICACIÓN INDEBIDA DEL ARTÍCULO 208 BIS DEL REGLAMENTO DE LA ASAMBLEA LEGISLATIVA AL TRATARSE DE UN PROYECTO DE LEY QUE DISPONE LA APERTURA DE UN MONOPOLIO. (…)1)(…) En la lógica de ese numeral...[se refiere al artículo 46 de la Constitución Política]... monopolio es una situación excepcional del mercado o la economía, por cuanto el párrafo 1° establece como regla general la proscripción de los monopolios privados, tanto que el párrafo 2° subraya que “Es de interés público la acción del Estado encaminada a impedir toda práctica o tendencia monopolizadora”, lo que significa, a contrario sensu, que los poderes públicos están constitucionalmente obligados a promover la competencia en el marco de una economía de mercado. El párrafo 4° dispone que “Para establecer nuevos monopolios a favor del Estado o de las Municipalidades se requerirá la aprobación de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa”, con lo cual se enfatiza la regla contenida en la “constitución económica” -esto es, el conjunto de valores, principios y preceptos que regulan la economía y el mercado en el texto fundamental- de la libertad de empresa y la libre competencia y, por consiguiente, la excepción calificada del monopolio -incluso los públicos-, dado que, se precisa de una ley reforzada y, por consiguiente, de un considerable consenso de las fuerzas políticas representadas en la Asamblea Legislativa para establecer un monopolio público de derecho.

(...) Cabe advertir que el constituyente originario no dispuso que la supresión de un monopolio de derecho o uno de hecho sometido a una ley posterior deba serlo por una ley reforzada, dado que, en la constitución económica lo normal y ordinario es la libertad de empresa y la libre competencia. (…) La exigencia de una ley reforzada para constituir un monopolio de derecho se impone en cuanto esta figura limita o restringe la libertad de empresa que es la regla normal u ordinaria según el Derecho de la Constitución. Sobre el particular es preciso enfatizar que los límites intrínsecos y extrínsecos de los derechos fundamentales son reserva de ley. (...) Ni siquiera la aplicación del principio del paralelismo de las formas del Derecho público, puede justificar un requisito agravado para retornar a las condiciones normales y ordinarias de una economía de mercado -libertad de empresa y libre competencia- que impone la constitución económica.

(…)” (Sentencia número 2008-004569 de las 14:30 hrs. del 26 de marzo de 2008) 15- Más concretamente, en lo que hace a la libertad de comercio y empresa deben tomarse muy en cuenta las líneas jurisprudenciales fijadas por la Sala en la sentencia número 1992-3495 antes citada, de la cual es importante repasar los siguientes extractos:

“VI- Implìcita en esos valores y principios de la libertad, ocupa lugar primordial la dimensiòn de ésta en el campo econòmico. En esta materia la Constituciòn es particularmente precisa, al establecer un règimen integrado por las normas que resguardan los vìnculos existentes entre las personas y las distintas clases de bienes; es decir, la relaciòn de aquèllas con el mundo del "tener", mediante previsones como las contenidas o implicadas en los artìculos 45 y 46, las cuales, aunque deban ceder ante necesidades normalmente màs intensas para la existencia misma del hombre -como la vida o a la libertad e integridad personales-, no crean por ello derechos de segunda clase, sino tan fundamentales como aquéllos, y con su mismo rango -no en vano la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas y todos los òrganos y tribunales internacionales que se ocupan de los derechos humanos han venido invariablemente caracterizàndolos como "indivisibles" e "interdependientes"-. Así, la Constitución establece un orden econòmico de libertad que se traduce bàsicamente en los derechos de propiedad privada (art. 45) y libertad de comercio, agricultura e industria (art. 46) -que suponen, a su vez, el de libre contrataciòn-. El segundo prohibe de manera amenaza, incluso originada en una ley; y a ellos se suman otros, como la libertad de trabajo y demàs que completan el marco general de la libertad econòmica.

(…)

VIII- Ademàs, la Constituciòn reconoce otra serie de "derechos instrumentales" o "garantìas", que son màs bien medios de tutela de los "de goce" o contenido inmediatamente ùtil para la vida humana, y que, en sìntesis, pueden cobijarse bajo el concepto del "debido proceso"; el cual no se refiere ùnicamente a la tutela de la libertad e integridad personales o a las garantìas procesales en vìa judicial y administrativa, sino que entraña tambièn, para todas las categorìas citadas -propietario, consumidor, empresario, trabajador, contribuyente, etc.-, la protecciòn del marco de racionalidad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad a que se ha aludido, el cual comprende, a su vez, el contenido sustancial de los derechos y libertades que el ordenamiento no puede menoscabar o alterar, ni permitir que se menoscaben o alteren, aun por ley o, menos, por normas o actos de rango inferior. En todo caso, la supresiòn, disminuciòn o sustitución de las situaciones jurìdicas favorable al particular, puede y debe ùnicamente producirse mediante la declaración -juris-dictio- de un Tribunal judicial y mediante las necesarias garantìas del debido proceso.” (…)

XIII- Partiendo del reconocimiento constitucional del principio y sistema de la libertad, en general (art. 28), del derecho a la propiedad privada (art. 45) y de la libertad de empresa (art. 46), se inscribe como principio constitucional, conditio sine qua non para el ejercicio de ambos, el de libre contrataciòn, cuyo contenido esencial la Sala resume en cuatro elementos, a saber:

• a)La libertad para elegir al co-contratante; b) La libertad en la escogencia del objeto mismo del contrato y, por ende, de la prestaciòn principal que lo concreta; c) La libertad en la determinaciòn del precio, contenido o valor econòmico del contrato que se estipula como contraprestaciòn; d) El equilibrio de las posiciones de ambas partes y entre sus mutuas prestaciones; equilibrio que reclama, a su vez, el respeto a los principios fundamentales de igualdad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, segùn los cuales la posiciòn de las partes y el contenido y alcances de sus obligaciones recìprocas han de ser razonablemente equivalentes entre sì y, ademàs, proporcionadas a la naturaleza, objeto y fines del contrato.

(…)

Las dichas libertades contractuales sólo pueden ser restringidas en los supuestos del artìculo 28 constitucional, es decir, en tanto su ejercicio dañe la moral social, el orden pùblico, rigurosamente considerado, o los derechos iguales o superiores de terceros. De ello se deriva que, tanto el acuerdo de voluntades implicado en la relaciòn contractual, como la determinaciòn de la cosa, objeto y precio de este acuerdo, pueden y deben ser libremente estipulados por las partes, mientras no traspasen aquellos lìmites; y aquì resulta imprescindible aclarar que la estipulación de una determinada moneda en un contrato normalmente no puede ser dañina a la moral social o al orden pùblico pues aunque el dèficit fiscal y comercial planteen un problema pùblico -lo que sì facultarìa al legislador para imponer disposiciones tendentes a la estabilidad macroeconòmica del paìs-, el problema del precio y la determinaciòn de la forma de pago de una obligaciòn privada no es en sì pùblico, sin privado inter partes, al menos normalmente.

Sin negar la trascendencia que todo esto eventualmente pudiera tener en el giro global de la economìa, ni la posibilidad de que en casos excepcionales la libertad para contratar en moneda extranjera pudiera resultar objetivamente perjudicial para la situaciòn econòmica general del paìs, esto no podría nunca facultar al legislador para violar los contenidos esenciales de los derechos fundamentales -en lo que aquì interesa, los de libertad en general, propiedad privada, libertad de empresa y libre contrataciòn”.

16 - Y en la sentencia No. 2008-001571, de las de 2008 se explicó:

“El contenido esencial de la libertad [de comercio] bajo estudio incluye, al menos, lo siguiente: a) El derecho de sus titulares para emprender, escoger y desarrollar la actividad económica que deseen; b) el poder de organizar la empresa y el de programar sus actividades en la forma más conveniente a sus intereses; c) el derecho a la libre competencia y d) el derecho a un lucro razonable en el ejercicio de la actividad emprendida. Sin embargo, dicha garantía, de conformidad con lo que al efecto dispone el numeral 28 constitucional, es susceptible de ser limitada y regulada por el Estado, en el tanto se respete el supra indicado contenido esencial; es decir, siempre y cuando, no se impongan límites que dificulten la actividad más allá de lo razonable, que la hagan impracticable o bien, no rentable del todo. En virtud de lo anterior, se afirma que libertad de comercio no es absoluta ni ilimitada, por lo que, como se dijo, debe someterse a las regulaciones legales y reglamentarias con cobertura en la ley que, necesariamente, deban cumplirse, previamente.

Al tenor de lo anterior, la libertad empresarial implica, entonces, que el ejercicio de la actividad -agrícola, comercial, industrial, etc.-, debe de realizarse conforme con las regulaciones razonables que dicte la Administración, con la finalidad de proteger a otros agentes económicos, consumidores y terceros" 17 .- En conclusión, la libertad de comercio y empresa, conforman el elenco de derechos fundamentales que disfrutan los costarricenses en materia económica, sin que –tal como se dijo en la sentencia citada- deban considerarse como derechos de segunda clase por el hecho de que en determinadas circunstancias deban ceder para lograr el efectivo ejercicio y protección de otros de igual rango. No tiene el legislador una posición de privilegio sobre ellos que le permita restringirlos –y menos aún abolirlos respecto de una actividad- sin que exista la apropiada justificación de conformidad con el artículo 28 Constitucional y sin que se respeten los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.

Irrazonabilidad y desproporción de la medida legislativa analizada.

18. Justamente en este caso, se pide definir si el acto legislativo contenido en la Ley 8955, a través del que se extrajo la actividad del servicio remunerado de transporte terrestre de personas acordado de manera autónoma entre sujetos de derecho privado (porteo), cumple con las exigencias de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad que esta Sala ha recogido desde sus primeros años de existencia.

19. En el voto salvado a la sentencia de esta Sala 2015-00146 de las 11:02 horas del siete de enero de 2015, se hizo un útil resumen de este tema con la finalidad, precisamente, de analizar otro exceso del legislador contenido en la ley que regula transporte terrestre remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi. Dijimos en aquella ocasión lo siguiente:

“Esta Sala ha señalado que los derechos fundamentales (como los derechos a la igualdad y libertad de comercio en este caso) pueden ser limitados por el legislador pero con respeto de los principios de razonabilidad y la proporcionalidad y que a ella le corresponde la competencia de vigilar su cumplimiento en el ejercicio del poder de legislar. Es decir, no solamente el legislador está sometido a la obligación de actuar, en su labor limitadora, exclusivamente con apego y en seguimiento de las autorizaciones contenidas en los distintos artículos de la Constitución Política (entendidos de manera restringida) sino que además de ello, tales actuaciones limitantes deben demostrar su razonabilidad y proporcionalidad respecto del cumplimiento de los objetivos y fines constitucionales que buscan cumplirse con la actividad limitadora. Esto quedó claramente establecido en la sentencia 2001-0732 que dejó establecida la validez de los criterios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de las normas como parámetro de análisis de la validez del establecimiento de límites a los derechos fundamentales.

"V.-DEL PRINCIPIO DE RAZONABILIDAD COMO PARÁMETRO CONSTITUCIONAL. La jurisprudencia constitucional ha sido clara y conteste en considerar que el principio de razonabilidad constituye un parámetro de constitucionalidad. Conviene recordar, en primer término, que la "razonabilidad de la ley" nació como parte del "debido proceso sustantivo" (substantive due process of law), garantía creada por la jurisprudencia de la Suprema Corte de los Estados Unidos de América, al hilo de la Enmienda XIV a la Constitución Federal. En la concepción inicial "debido proceso" se dirigió al enjuiciamiento procesal del acto legislativo y su efecto sobre los derechos sustantivos. Al finalizar el siglo XIX, sin embargo, se superó aquella concepción procesal que le había dado origen y se elevó a un recurso axiológico que limita el accionar del órgano legislativo. A partir de entonces podemos hablar del debido proceso como una garantía genérica de la libertad, es decir, como una garantía sustantiva.

La superación del "debido proceso" como garantía procesal obedece, básicamente, a que también la ley que se ha ajustado al procedimiento establecido y es válida y eficaz, puede lesionar el Derecho de la Constitución. Para realizar el juicio de razonabilidad la doctrina estadounidense invita a examinar, en primer término, la llamada "razonabilidad técnica" dentro de la que se examina la norma en concreto (ley, reglamento, etc.). Una vez establecido que la norma es la adecuada para regular determinada materia, habráque examinar si hay proporcionalidad entre el medio escogido y el fin buscado. Superado el criterio de "razonabilidad técnica' hay que analizar la "razonabilidad jurídica". Para lo cual esta doctrina propone examinar: a) razonabilidad ponderativa, que es un tipo de valoración jurídica a la que se concurre cuando ante la existencia de un determinado antecedente (ej. ingreso) se exige una determinada prestación (ej. tributo), debiendo en este supuesto establecerse si la misma es equivalente o proporcionada; b) la razonabilidad de igualdad, es el tipo de valoración jurídica que parte de que ante iguales antecedentes deben haber iguales consecuencias, sin excepciones arbitrarias; c) razonabilidad en el fin, en este punto se valora si el objetivo a alcanzar, no ofende los fines previstos por el legislador con su aprobación.

Dentro de este mismo análisis, no basta con afirmar que un medio sea razonablemente adecuado a un fin; es necesario, además, verificar la índole y el tamaño de la limitación que por ese medio debe soportar un derecho personal. De esta manera, si al mismo fin se puede llegar buscando otro medio que produzca una limitación menos gravosa a los derechos personales, el medio escogido no es razonable.Fue en la sentencia número 01739-92, de las once horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del primero de julio de mil novecientos noventa y dos, donde por primera vez se intentó definir este principio, de la siguiente manera:

“La razonabilidad como parámetro de interpretación constitucional. Pero aún se dio un paso más en la tradición jurisprudencial cinglo norteamericana, al extenderse el concepto del debido proceso a lo cpie en esa tradición se conoce como debido sustantivo o sustancial substantive díte process of law- cpie. en realidad, aunque no se refiere a ninguna materia procesal, constituyó un ingenioso mecanismo ideado por ¡a Corte Suprema de Ios Estados Unidos para afirmar su jurisdicción sobre ¡os Estados federados, al lulo de la Enmienda XIV a Ia C onstitucion Federal, pero c/ue entre nosotros, sobre todo a falta de esa necesidad, equivaldría sencillamente al principio de razonabilidad de las leyes y otras normas o actos públicos, o incluso privados, como requisito de su propia validez constitucional, en el sentido de que deben ajustarse, no sidoa las normas o preceptos concretos de la Constitución, sino también al sentido de justicia contenido en ella, el cual implica, a su vez. el cumplimiento de exigencias fundamentales de equidad, proporcionalidad y razonabilidad, entendidas éstas como idoneidad para realizar los fines propuestos.

Ios principios supuestos y los valores presupuestos en el Derecho de la Constitución.De allí que las leyes y, en general, las normas y los actos de autoridad requieran para su validez, no sólo haber sido promulgados por órganos competentes y procedimientos debidos, sino también pasar la revisión de fondo por su concordancia con las normas, principios y valores supremos de la Constitución (formal y material), como son los de orden, paz, seguridad, justicia, libertad, etc., que se configuran como patrones de razonabilidad. Es decir, que una norma o acto público o privado sólo es válido cuando, además de su conformidad formal con la Constitución, esté razonablemente fundado y justificado conforme a la ideología constitucional. De esta manera se procura, no sólo que la ley no sea irracional, arbitraria o caprichosa, sino además que los medios seleccionados tengan una relación real y sustancial con su objeto.

Se distingue entonces entre razonabilidad técnica, que es, como se dijo, la proporciocionalidad entre medios y fines; razonabilidad jurídica, o laadecuación a la Constitución en general, y en especial, a los derechos y libertades reconocidos o supuestos por ella; y linalmente, razonabilidad de los efectos sobre los derechos personales, en el sentido de no imponer a esos derechos otras limitaciones o cargas que las razonablemente derivadas de la naturaleza y régimen de los derechos mismos, ni mayores que las indispensables para que funcionen razonablemente en la vida de la sociedad." La doctrina alemana hizo un aporte importante al tema de la "razonabilidad" al lograr identificar, de una manera muy clara, sus componentes: legitimidad, idoneidad, necesidad v proporcionalidad en sentido estricto, ideas que desarrolla afirmando que ya han sido reconocidas por la jurisprudencia constitucional:

"... La legitimidadse refiere a que el objetivo pretendido con el acto o disposición impugnado no debe estar, al menos, legalmente prohibido: Idoneidadindica que la medida estatal cuestionada deber ser apta para alcanzar efectivamente el objetivo pretendido: la necesidadsignifica que entre varias medidas igualmente aptas para alcanzar tal objetivo, debe la autoridad competente elegir aquella que afecte lo menos posible la esfera jurídica de la persona: y la proporciocionalidaden sentido estricto dispone que aparte del requisito de que la norma sea apta y necesaria, lo ordenado por ella no debe estar fuera de proporción con respecto al objetivo pretendido, o sea. no le sea "inexigible" al individuo ...(Sentencia de esta Sala número 03933-98, de las nueve horas cincuenta y nueve minutos del doce de junio de mil novecientos noventa y ocho).” 20. También en el mencionada voto salvado expresé mi insatisfacción con la opción tomada por la mayoría del Tribunal de dejar de lado el empleo del test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad para analizar la norma cuestionada en su momento, a pesar de haber sido pedido expresamente por las partes.- Ahora volvemos a encontrar la misma actitud frente a la misma temática, a saber desactivación pura y simple del contenido esencial de derechos fundamentales como el de igualdad, libertad de comercio y libertad de contratación, en el transporte terrestre remunerado de personas, como si en esta actividad no rigiera el Derecho de la Constitución.

21. Esta vez la medida sometida a escrutinio es como se explicó, la extracción absoluta de una faceta de la actividad de transporte terrestre de personas (porteo de personas) que no había sido objeto de estatalización, a saber, servicio brindado previo un acuerdo de voluntades individualizado y concreto sobre la prestación y precio entre las personas privadas interesadas para contratar un servicio de punto a punto. No concibo, en este tema específico, una media más lesiva de la libertad de comercio y a libertad en general de la que deben gozar las personas, que la opción escogida por el Estado en esta ley para ordenar tal actividad. Esto facilita, desde la perspectiva procesal constitucional, la aplicación del test de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad porque permite concentrarse en el análisis en la llamada proporcionalidad de la medida, y además elimina en gran medida el peligro de sustituir la decisión del legislador por alguna otra medida regulatoria más del gusto del juez. En este caso, repito, nada de ello ocurre, de modo que solo queda verificar si el Estado ha aportado razones que justifiquen la magnitud de semejante despojo.

22. Las partes accionantes insisten en indicar que la estatalización de ese remanente de la actividad de transporte terrestre remunerado de personas en automóvil pudo regularse de forma más benigna y en apego a las tendencias actuales del concepto de servicio público que apuntan a la regulación y no la nacionalización. En este sentido mencionan como ejemplos de gran importancia la salud y la educación, cuya importancia primordial nadie discute y que -sin embargo han encontrado apropiados mecanismos más respetuosos de los derechos fundamentales como es la regulación, versus la nacionalización. En contra de ello el Estado, a través de la Procuraduría General de la República y el Ministerio de Transportes, así como los coadyuvantes pasivos, ofrecen razones generales y conceptos indeterminados carentes de algún respaldo para justificar la decisión. Se habla de la existencia de “un claro interés público inmerso” en la actividad o de “decisión estatal dada la relevancia de la actividad...”, pero nada se concreta en demostraciones y argumentos plausibles, más allá de tales declaraciones.

23. De hecho, el eje fundamental de la defensa de la norma discurre por vía de las consideraciones dadas por la Sala cuando conoció una consulta legislativa referente al proyecto que se convirtió en la ley que ahora se impugna (sentencia número 2011-04778 de las 14:30 del 13 de abril de 2011) en donde se elaboró sobre esta cuestión y se afirmó que la nacionalización de toda manifestación de la actividad de transporte remunerado de personas por vías terrestres no lesionaba la libertad de comercio.- Sin embargo, la lectura de dicha sentencia, permite ver que la Sala omitió cualquier consideración respecto a la razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de dicha nacionalización y, por otra parte, zanja la cuestión de la lesión a la libertad de comercio con un razonamiento simplemente erróneo:

“...Con esta reforma el legislador busca, de una vez por todas, abstraer de la esfera privada la prestación del servicio de transporte de personas que en su totalidad ha sido declarado servicio público por el legislador y hace que sean otras las reglas del juego y principios jurídicos a aplicar: Los particulares se convierten en colaboradores de la Administración Pública en la prestación de ese servicio que, por sus características y la evidente existencia de un interés público, debe ser en principio, asumido por el Estado sin que estén de por medio principios y derechos que rigen las relaciones privadas, como lo son el principio de autonomía de la voluntad o la libertad de comercio. En consecuencia, el Tribunal estima que el proyecto de ley consultado no lesiona los artículos 28, 45. 46 y 56 de la Constitución Política”. (sentencia número 2011-4778 citada) (el destacado no es del original) Puede verse nítidamente el error fundamental del razonamiento, cuando se señala que la autonomía de la voluntad y la libertad de comercio “rigen las relaciones privadas” sin que puedan oponerse válidamente a la voluntad estatal, si ella toma para sí una actividad.- Es la negación, no solo de la línea contundente en contrario que ha sostenido este Tribunal, sino también la desvalorización del concepto de derecho fundamental y libertad recogido en la Constitución Política justamente como límite al poder estatal según se explicó.- 24.

De tal modo, no existe en este expediente nada que amerite ser calificado como argumento suficiente para justificar y hacer aceptable la radical decisión de privar a las personas de su libertad de empresa y comercio en materia de transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad del porteo de personas.- Nada apunta a entender esa “esencialidad para el mantenimiento del Estado de Derecho” de la que nos habla la sentencia 2011-4778 o el “relevante interés público inmerso” que citan la Procuraduría y el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes.- No se alega, ni menos se prueba, la necesidad de proteger principios o valores constitucionales, como la concreción de principio de solidaridad, reglas de mejor reparto de riqueza, entre otras.

Podría incluso -con abandono del papel de juez imparcial que cumple la Sala- buscarse un soporte en la defensa de poblaciones vulnerables, concreción de principios de solidaridad, reglas de mejor reparto de riqueza, entre otras, pero nada de ello se ha alegado y en los hechos resulta evidentemente forzado.- 25. Más aún,en algunos extractos de la exposición de motivos del proyecto de Ley descubren razones que acentúan la insuficiencia de motivos válidos. Se lee en el expediente legislativo:

“…durante varias semanas del presente año se llevó a cabo un arduo proceso de negociación en el cual el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes y sus autoridades, junto con la Cámara Nacional de Transporte de Autobús, la Federación Nacional de Taxis y la Cámara de Porteadores como representante del sector, mantuvieron una sesión permanente de discusión, buscando una formulación de consenso para solucionar la situación de los señores y señoras porteadoras”.

(…)

“Con esta iniciativa se pretende de manera muy categórica, establecer dentro del marco regulatorio de la Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi, N.º 7969, un servicio que hoy día es una realidad y que esta tutelado de manera equivocada al estar amparado solamente ante la palabra “personas” en el Código de Comercio, con el fin de crear una legislación que garantice mejores condiciones y costos más bajos para el usuario, buscando el beneficio y el bienestar de las grandes mayorías…” (…)

“No se trata de una concesión porque no nace de un producto de una licitación pública, sino que nace de un permiso y obedece fundamentalmente que es una necesidad específica y puntual.” “Lo anterior por cuanto en el momento en que se elimine la palabra “personas”, hay quienes efectivamente desarrollan esa actividad en el marco de legalidad del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, por lo que con base en el referido artículo 34 de nuestra Constitución deben respetarse los derechos adquiridos por estas personas.” “Además se incorporan tres transitorios con el objeto de que el Ministerio de Obras y Transportes asuma la responsabilidad de tutelar el servicio de porteo de personas tanto en modalidad automóvil como en modalidad microbús a través del Consejo de Transporte Público, que es el instrumento que el legislador ha creado para regular esta materia.” “Es importante tener presente, que se trata de una situación transitoria para todo aquel interesado o interesada que logre demostrar y cumplir los requisitos ante el Consejo de Transporte Público y pueda acreditarse en el período posterior de dos meses, pues aquellos y aquellas que no cumplan con los mismos no podrán operar porque estarían actuando ilegalmente, pues ya no operarían bajo el marco del porteo ni de transportes.” “Igualmente se pretende darle un marco regulatorio de seguridad a todos aquellos usuarios para poder tutelar la responsabilidad de aquellas empresas o personas que brindan este servicio, que hoy día están tutelados solo bajo el Código de Comercio a través de la Defensoría del Consumidor.

Aquellos que incumplan la nueva normativa establecida serán sujetos del debido proceso y podrían perder el permiso o código que les permite desarrollar esa actividad, tal y como opera en el servicio de taxis formal.”

1. 26Resulta claro que la exclusión plena y completa del ejercicio de una libertad fundamental como la libertad de comercio y empresa, se ha decidido con la finalidad de ordenar la situación particular de un grupo de personas fácilmente determinable que venía ejerciendo la actividad del porteo, labor con la que se decide acabar, paradójicamente, para “mejores condiciones y costos más bajos para el usuario, buscando el beneficio y el bienestar de las grandes mayorías” y resolver los problemas que han surgido por la ineficiencia y falta de capacidad del Estado para ordenar y vigilar y principalmente proteger, la adecuada prestación del servicio público de taxi. El Estado confiesa claramente su incapacidad de fiscalizar el servicio ilegal de transporte público de taxi y decide a cambio, secuestrar una libertad fundamental de comercio y contratación . Desde mi perspectiva, estos objetivos no son válidos, ni cumplen con el test de razonabilidad constitucional.

27. Así expuestas las cosas, resulta indefendible que las vicisitudes en la contratación de un servicio de transporte en automóvil acordado directamente entre personas adultas y capaces jurídicamente de velar por sus intereses y defender sus derechos, impongan una intervención del Estado de la forma más despectiva posible hacia la libertad general y de comercio en particular.

Conclusiones.

28. Del elenco fáctico queda demostrado que el legislador sí innovó el ordenamiento jurídico con la emisión de la Ley 8955, pues no solo proclamó su titularidad sobre cualquier forma de transporte remunerado de personas por la vía terrestre, sino que eliminó el porteo de personas del listado de contratos regulados por el Código de Comercio.

Esa actuación, por su radicalidad, no puede menos que imponer al Estado una amplia y convincente labor de justificación frente a los reclamos que, como en este caso lleguen a plantear las personas que se consideran afectadas en sus derechos fundamentales a la libertad y en particular a la libertad de comercio y empresa, pues como se explicó supra, no basta que el estado decida declarar una actividad comercial como de “interés público” para que ésta sea válida desde una perspectiva constitucional. Con ese argumento, se puede vaciar el contenido completo de los derechos económicos de nuestra Constitución Política, por ejemplo, para despojar servicios tradicionalmente ejercidos en competencia como la educación o la salud.- Desde mi perspectiva, los interesados en la defensa de la norma no han querido o no han podido aportar razones concretas y aceptables desde un punto de vista constitucional, para sustentar una medida tan radical como la nacionalización de esa actividad, la cual no está por demás repetirlo, involucra mayoritariamente personas en pleno uso de sus capacidades y libertades, negociando prestaciones y precios sobre una actividad omnipresente en nuestra sociedad como lo es el traslado de personas de un punto a otro. Por todo lo dicho estimo que es procedente declarar con lugar la acción y anular la norma impugnada con sus consecuencias.

XIII.Voto salvado del Magistrado Salazar Alvarado: Con el respeto debido, disiento del criterio de la mayoría del pleno de este Tribunal Constitucional, que rechazó la demanda de constitucionalidad, la que acojo en minoría, por las razones que de seguido me permito exponer.

Como primer punto en la exposición de mi criterio, es necesario resaltar el reconocimiento de la Constitución Política como norma jurídica dotada de fuerza normativa, lo que importa su supremacía en el marco formal, ubicándola en la cúspide del ordenamiento jurídico, como fuente suprema de las fuentes del derecho, con potestad de organizar el Estado, de definir el régimen político y brindando una serie de garantías a favor de todas las personas. Así, la Carta Fundamental, que rige desde 1949, cuenta con una serie de normas, valores y principios que corresponden a limitaciones al ejercicio del poder y con ello, tratar de garantizar la libertad de las personas, lo cual, tal como señalaré en líneas posteriores, considero vulneradas con la normativa impugnada en el presente proceso de inconstitucionalidad.

En este marco, se establece la necesidad de analizar, por parte de este Tribunal Constitucional, la validez de una norma, es decir, dilucidar si el contenido de la Ley N° 8955 del 26 de setiembre de 2011 “Reforma al Código de Comercio -Ley N° 3284 del 30 de abril de 1964- y de la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi -Ley N° 7969 del 22 de diciembre de 1999- encuentra regularidad con nuestra Constitución Política, que es la norma fundante del ordenamiento jurídico costarricense y de la cual deriva la validez de todas las normas que lo conforman.

Dicho lo anterior, la Constitución Política de nuestro país, a partir de sus artículos 1, 9, 11, 28, 50 y 74, define el sistema de gobierno como un Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho, lo que implica, como lo ha señalado esta Sala -v.g. Sentencia N° 13323-06, de las 17:26 horas del 6 de setiembre de 2006-, la existencia de relaciones recíprocas entre diversas instancias públicas de orden constitucional y legal, incluyendo a los miembros de la sociedad civil, lo que impone, al Estado, la obligación de garantizar que las personas se desenvuelvan del modo más favorable a su dignidad, libertad y el respeto y efectividad de sus derechos fundamentales.

Esto vuelve exigibles una serie de valores y principios, dentro de los que resaltan el principio de legalidad, el principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad y el principio de respeto de las libertades y derechos fundamentales, todos en condiciones de igualdad. En el caso concreto, y desde esta Jurisdicción Constitucional, considero que la plena efectividad de tales principios se debe analizar desde dos ópticas, la primera, en torno a los intereses del consumidor o de la libertad de las personas como consumidoras del servicio de transporte; y, una segunda, referente a la libertad de comercio.

El principio de respeto de la libertad, inteligible a partir del contenido del artículo 28, de la Constitución Política, establece que toda persona posee una esfera individual en la cual puede, por medio de su voluntad, elegir sus opciones de vida y tomar las decisiones que mejor favorezcan a su desarrollo integral. Si bien, esto comporta la obligación que su actuar no contravenga el ordenamiento jurídico, así como las normas morales y las buenas costumbres, lo cierto es que la ley no debe invadir la esfera intangible de la libertad.

El Estado de Derecho, mediante la división de poderes y el control jurisdiccional de estos, impone la plena vigencia del principio de legalidad, sometiendo a la Administración al Derecho, siendo que la interdicción de la arbitrariedad brinda un marco de seguridad jurídica a las personas, lo que garantiza su libertad personal. De tal forma, las libertades fundamentales corresponden a una de las bases más sólidas del Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho. En el sub-examine, considero que lo dispuesto en la Ley N° 8955 “Reforma al Código de Comercio -Ley N° 3284- y de la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad Taxi -Ley N° 7969- entra en una fuerte colisión con la prerrogativa en cita, pues tiene una incidencia directa en la libertad de las personas de elegir y de contratar, como consumidores y como usuarios de los servicios de transporte, la modalidad del servicio que le sea de mayor conveniencia, lo que resulta una intromisión grosera en las condiciones particulares de cada individuo.

La demanda de bienes y servicios, en este caso del servicio de transporte, tiene como fin la satisfacción de los intereses de cada persona, por lo que, de previo a externar el consentimiento para la adquisición de estos, los individuos deberían contar con los elementos de juicio necesarios que permitan expresarlo con toda la libertad -v.g. Sentencia N° 4463-96, de las 9:45 horas del 30 de agosto de 1996- y de acuerdo con sus necesidades, donde encuentra un alto valor la multiplicidad de operadores.

Asimismo, esta Sala ha señalado -ver en ese sentido, entre otras, las Sentencias N° 0490-94 de las 16:15 horas del 25 de enero de 1994, N° 6116-96 de las 15:21 horas de 12 de noviembre de 1996 y N° 6497-96 de las 11:42 horas de 2 de diciembre de 1996- que dentro de los elementos de juicio para la selección de una oferta de servicio, deben incluirse, en una mezcla armónica, varios principios constitucionales que contemplan la preocupación estatal a favor de los más amplios sectores de la población cuando sus individuos actúan como consumidores, la reafirmación de la libertad individual al facilitar a los particulares la libre disposición del patrimonio con el concurso del mayor conocimiento posible del bien o del servicio a adquirir, el ordenamiento y la sistematización de las relaciones recíprocas entre los interesados, la homologación de las prácticas comerciales internacionales al sistema interno y la mayor protección de las personas de cara a los medios de subsistencia.

La literalidad de la citada Sentencia N° 6497-96, en la que se reitera la posición del Tribunal dispuesta en las otras sentencias igualmente mencionadas y que se mantiene a nuestros días, indica:

"...es notorio que el consumidor se encuentra en el extremo de la cadena formada por la producción, distribución y comercialización de los bienes de consumo que requiere adquirir para su satisfacción personal, y su participación en ese proceso, no responde a razones técnicas ni profesionales, sino en la celebración constante de contratos a título personal. Por ello la relación en esa secuencia comercial es de inferioridad y requiere de una especial protección frente a los proveedores de los bienes y servicios, a los efectos de que previo a externar su consentimiento contractual cuente con todos los elementos de juicio necesarios, que le permitan los bienes y servicios ofrecidos. Van incluidos por lo expresado, en una mezcla armónica, varios principios constitucionales, como la preocupación estatal a favor de los más amplios sectores de la población cuando actúan como consumidores, la reafirmación de la libertad individual al facilitar a los particulares la libre disposición del patrimonio con el concurso del mayor posible conocimiento del bien o servicio a adquirir, la protección de la salud cuando esté involucrada, el ordenamiento y la sistemación de las relaciones recíprocas entre los interesados, la homologación de las prácticas comerciales internacionales al sistema interno y en fin, la mayor protección del funcionamiento del habitante en los medios de subsistencia".

Además, los derechos de los consumidores también encuentran sustento en normas de Derecho Internacional. En este marco, destaca lo dispuesto por las Directrices de las Naciones Unidas para la Protección del Consumidor, las cuales señalan que las políticas de los gobiernos deben tratar, en la medida de lo posible, que los consumidores obtengan el máximo beneficio de sus recursos económicos y, además, deben tratar de establecer procedimientos adecuados de distribución, prácticas comerciales leales, comercialización informativa y protección efectiva contra las prácticas que puedan perjudicar los intereses económicos de los consumidores y la posibilidad de elegir en el mercado. Además, señala la necesidad de implementar todos los esfuerzos necesarios para garantizar que todos los interesados en participar en la provisión de bienes y servicios cumplan con las leyes y normas obligatorias vigentes. Lo dicho, se traduce en la necesidad de restringir prácticas comerciales restrictivas o de tipo abusivo que puedan perjudicar a los consumidores.

Con lo expuesto, se pone de manifiesto la necesidad de satisfacción de los intereses de las personas al comprar un servicio, lo cual, además, se evidencia al tratar de precisar una definición de servicio público. Según la doctrina, el servicio público se puede conceptualizar, a partir de una característica polisémica intrínseca a este, como la prestación, administrativa o no, de un servicio con fines de satisfacer una necesidad pública, lo que justifica, por un lado, la intervención del Estado, pero también conlleva la posibilidad de participación de particulares. Así, la citada intervención estatal se debe limitar, únicamente, a establecer una serie de normas mínimas, de alcance general, que permitan la participación, en condiciones de igualdad, a todos los interesados en la venta del servicio de transporte, con la consecuente ampliación de opciones de servicio a favor de las personas.

Por otra parte, al inicio de este voto disidente, señalé la necesidad de analizar el caso concreto, además, desde la perspectiva de libertad de comercio. La norma cuestionada eliminó la palabra "persona" del artículo 323, del Código de Comercio, lo que importa la nacionalización del servicio de transporte de personas por parte del Estado, con la consecuencia de que esa actividad queda fuera del comercio de los hombres, por lo que cualquier interesado ajeno al Estado y sus agentes -definidos, para este caso en concreto, como aquellos que cuentan con concesión o permiso- en participar en el mercado de transportes, quedan con una posibilidad de intervención residual, pues, únicamente, podría hacerlo en el tema de mercaderías, artículos y dineros. Tal restricción, en criterio del suscrito, resulta contraria al Derecho de la Constitución.

Sobre la libertad de comercio, este Tribunal Constitucional, entre otras, en Sentencia N° 4936-12 de las 15:33 horas del 18 de abril de 2012, indicó:

“VIII.- Por su parte, la libertad de empresa o comercio, contenida en el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, radica en el derecho de cada ciudadano de escoger libremente la actividad económica que desea desarrollar. Sin embargo, éste no es un derecho ilimitado, pues el Estado puede limitar dicha actividad por razones de orden público, la moral y la tutela de los derechos de terceros. Una vez que una persona escoge la actividad económica que desea desarrollar, debe ajustarse a los requisitos y lineamientos que el ordenamiento jurídico exige para llevar a cabo la actividad”.

En este pronunciamiento y a partir del contenido del artículo 46, de la Carta Política, reconoce que la libertad de comercio corresponde a que cada ciudadano tiene el derecho a escoger, libremente, la actividad económica que desea desarrollar. No obstante, también reconoce que esta garantía no es irrestricta y que el Estado puede restringir dicha actividad, pero, a criterio propio, la limitación debe darse, únicamente, por razones de orden público, la moral y la tutela de derechos de terceros.

En otras palabras, la libertad de comercio puede ser objeto de reglamentación y de restricciones legales, pero deberán superar el juicio de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad, de tal forma que no se vuelva nugatorio el ejercicio del derecho fundamental. A partir de esta concepción, se ha definido que la ley no pude, ni debe, ser irracional y debe garantizar una proporcionalidad entre medios y fines, lo que, además, implica una adecuación de la norma con el contenido de la Constitución, con especial referencia a los derechos fundamentales.

En el caso concreto, considero que la restricción impuesta por la norma impugnada no alcanza tales criterios, sobre todo si se toman en consideración las coyunturas actuales por las que atraviesa el sector transporte, en las que se afectan, franca y directamente, los intereses de las personas por la falta de efectividad del servicio, con la relación entre la calidad y el precio que se debe cancelar por este y la falta de opciones o proveedores de un óptimo servicio.

Así, en tesis de principio, mi criterio se basa en el reconocimiento y en la salvaguarda del contenido mínimo de dos derechos fundamentales. El primero de ellos, la libertad, contenida en el artículo 28, de la Constitución Política, desde la posición de las personas como consumidores del servicio de transporte. El segundo, corresponde al derecho contenido en el artículo 46, de la Constitución Política, referente a la libertad de comercio. Esto, porque estimo que la restricción impuesta por la normativa impugnada se encuentra lejos de criterios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, siendo que la nacionalización del servicio de transporte automotor modalidad Taxi y Seetaxi, cercena la potestad de selección y de contratación a la que tienen derechos los usuarios, conforme a sus intereses, preferencias y necesidades de las personas.

Además, limita la participación activa en el mercado de venta del servicio de transporte, conforme se señaló con anterioridad. Si bien es necesaria una intervención del Estado, esta debe de ser mínima, estableciendo un marco regulatorio que siente las reglas mínimas para que se permita, a todos los interesados, en la venta del servicio de transporte, para así participar en condiciones de igualdad; empero, sin los excesos que conlleva la nacionalización del servicio, pues más que los intereses del Estado, deben prevalecer los de las personas (usuarias del transporte).

Por tal motivo y en función del bien común y de los intereses de cada particular, la apertura del servicio resulta de mayor conveniencia para las personas; esto, sin perder de vista que el contenido de los servicios y de la relación entre prestatario y consumidor, comporta el derecho de los segundos a recibir las prestaciones previstas en términos de cantidad y calidad -aspectos previamente definidos- que pueden ser regulados por el Estado sin necesidad de la nacionalización del servicio, lo que, además, contempla la obligación de resarcimiento en los casos que se presentan daño por el mal funcionamiento del servicio.

Finalmente, la prestación del servicio de transporte no debe entenderse en el origen de este, en el que se podría justificar una severa intervención del Estado y su gestión directa por parte de la Administración, sino que debe entenderse -y definirse- a partir del destinatario de este, lo que justifica el desarrollo de lo que puede denominarse una especie de servicio público impropio de transporte, en salvaguarda de la iniciativa de todo interesado en gestionar el servicio, la cual, sin necesidad de la nacionalización del servicio, el Estado podría establecer reglas mínimas.

la norma atacada, con sus consecuencias. En referencia al artículo 1, de la citada Ley N° 8955 de 19 de junio de 2011, deberá restablecerse la palabra “personas” en el artículo 323, del Código de Comercio. Se ordena a los Poderes Ejecutivo y Legislativo, en el ámbito de sus competencias, la promulgación de la normativa correspondiente para que se garanticen las prerrogativas supra indicadas.

Por tanto:

Por mayoría, se declaran sin lugar las acciones acumuladas. El Magistrado Castillo Víquez da razones diferentes para fundar la desestimatoria, con excepción del agravio relativo a la infracción del principio de igualdad. El Magistrado Rueda Leal salva el voto y declara con lugar las acciones acumuladas, por la creación de un monopolio a favor del Estado mediante una ley que no contó con la aprobación de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa, y por vulnerar los derechos fundamentales a la propiedad y la libertad de empresa, así como el principio general de libertad. Los Magistrados Hernández López y Salazar Alvarado salvan el voto parcialmente y declaran con lugar las acciones planteadas por violación de la libertad de empresa protegida en los artículos 28 y 46 de la Constitución Política. En consecuencia, anulan los artículos 1 y 2 de la Ley 8955 del 16 de junio de 2011, el primero, únicamente en cuanto eliminó la palabra "personas" del artículo 323 el Código de Comercio y el segundo, única y exclusivamente, en cuanto declaró como servicio público la actividad del porteo de personas del Código de Comercio.- Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.

Paul Rueda L. Nancy Hernández L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A. José Paulino Hernández G.