Constitutionality of Law 8955 on Paid Passenger Transport and the Elimination of Private PorteoConstitucionalidad de la Ley 8955 sobre transporte remunerado de personas y eliminación del porteo privado

**Constitutional Chamber** **Resolution No. 00279 - 2017** **Date of Resolution:** 08:45 on February 22, 2017 **Case File:** 15-015456-0007-CO **Drafted by:** Fernando Cruz Castro **Type of Matter:** Action of unconstitutionality **Analyzed by:** CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER **Judgment with Dissenting Vote** **Text of the resolution** *150154560007CO* Case File: 15-015456-0007-CO Res. No. 2017002791 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at eleven forty-five on February twenty-second, two thousand seventeen.

Actions of unconstitutionality brought by OTTO GUEVARA GUTH, and NATALIA DÍAZ QUINTANA; and by JUAN RICARDO FERNÁNDEZ RAMÍREZ, in his capacity as President of the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FREE CONSUMERS (ASOCIACIÓN NACIONAL DE CONSUMIDORES LIBRES); and others, seeking a declaration that Law No. 8955: "Reform of Law No. 3284, Commerce Code, of April 30, 1964, and of Law 7969, Regulatory Law for the Public Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality, of December 22, 1999" is unconstitutional; deeming it contrary to Articles 7, 46, 129, and 140 of the Political Constitution. Also participating in the proceeding were the representative of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and the Minister of Public Works and Transport.

**Whereas:** **1.-** By written submission received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 1:00 p.m. on October 16, 2015, the petitioners request, in summary, that: The unconstitutionality of Law No. 8955: "Reform of Law No. 3284, Commerce Code, of April 30, 1964, and of Law 7969, Regulatory Law for the Public Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality, of December 22, 1999" be declared. For the purpose of substantiating the standing they hold to bring this action of unconstitutionality, the petitioners argue that it stems from the defense of diffuse interests, as it concerns the right to work. They argue that in legislative file No. 17874—in which the current challenged law was processed—the statement of motives indicated that it was intended to: "… create legislation that guarantees better conditions and lower costs for the user, seeking the benefit and well-being of the vast majorities. In this way, the porteo of persons is eliminated, but porteo itself is not eliminated, meaning what is being eliminated is the word person" from Article 323 of the Commerce Code, but the transport of things, articles, money, correspondence, etc., can continue. (…) Given the elimination of the word "person," a new figure is created within the Regulatory Law for the Public Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality, No. 7969, called "stable special taxi service (transporte especial estable de taxi)," which preserves the nature of the residual special service that porteo provides today, but protected and regulated to give a sense of responsibility to those interested parties who would be accrediting it. " They explain that the statement of motives indicates that the figure of porteo of persons was erroneously regulated in the Commerce Code, by including the word persons in provision 323 of that normative body; therefore, the intention was to create new legislation that would benefit the user, such that the figure of "porteo of persons" was prohibited, with the State monopolizing that economic activity, whereby it went from private transport to public transport of persons, meaning it can no longer be carried out in accordance with what is established in Article 323 of the Commerce Code. They argue that said law eliminates private transport of persons and converts it into public transport; which was manifested throughout the challenged regulations, since by means of Article 1, the figure of porteo of persons was eliminated. They point out that Article 1 reforms provisions 323 and 334 of the Commerce Code, so that they would state the following: "Article 323.- By the transport contract, the carrier (persona porteadora) is obligated to transport things or news from one place to another in exchange for a price. Transport may be performed by public or private enterprises. Public enterprises are those that announce and open to the public establishments of that nature, committing to transport for determined prices, conditions, and periods, whenever their services are required in accordance with the bases of their prospectuses, itineraries, and rates. Private enterprises are those that provide these services on a discretionary basis, under conditions and by conventional adjustments. The transport contract regulated in this article does not authorize the transport of persons by means of motor vehicles." Based on this, they consider that a carrier is that person dedicated to transporting things or news, not persons. They point out that, prior to the cited amendment, Article 323 of the Commerce Code was the basis for carrying out private transport of persons under the so-called figure of porteo, but with the reform, the legislator limited the porteo contract to the transport of things or news, categorically excluding the transport of persons, as indicated supra. In the cited Law No. 8955, Law No. 7969, Regulatory Law for the Public Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality, was also modified and added to, such that the repealed porteo of persons contract became incorporated into this regulation under the name of stable special taxi services (servicios especiales estables de taxi, SEETAXI), thus constituting remunerated transport of persons in its different modalities as a public service. It is necessary to indicate that during the discussion of the Bill, important interventions took place, such as that of Deputy Quintana Porras: (…) On the merits, I want it on the record that throughout the entire discussion of this Bill, we have pointed out (…) that the approval of this Bill would unjustly affect persons who for all or much of their time have been engaged in a totally legal activity. (…) There are many rights recognized by our Magna Carta, such as free trade, freedom of assembly, and freedom of transit, which are threatened by this Bill. Therefore, provided that the porteo activity complies with the parameters established in our legislation, it will be a legal and essential activity for our commercial dynamics. (…) We have the opportunity to say no to a project that affects constitutional rights and that also limits an entirely legal work activity that provides a livelihood to many Costa Ricans. Let us not impoverish (…) Costa Rica with our decisions; let us not curtail one more freedom by approving this Bill in second debate. " They note that the result of the approval of the challenged rule was the monopolization of the private transport of persons service by the State. Likewise, they indicate that Article 2 of the cited law established a series of requirements and limitations on the economic activity of remunerated transport of persons in the taxi modality; creating a public monopoly comprised of two modalities of the transport service in the taxi modality. The first of these forms was that it required, for taxis regulated by Law No. 7969, a Concession title—when the State delegates to an individual or legal entity the possibility of providing a service originally corresponding to the State—; the Concession implying an administrative real right for the Concessionaire, and its revocation only possible due to the violation of previously established grounds and Due Process, otherwise the State must indemnify. They state that the second of these forms is a "residual" one of the public transport service in the taxi modality, known today as SEETAXI, or stable special taxi permit, to absorb a part of the carriers under the figure of the Permit. They consider that the SEETAXI modality is inherently contradictory, because in Public Law, the Permit is a precarious figure which, as an enabling title, does not constitute any administrative right; in principle, it could be revoked at any time and no indemnity corresponds. They add that the impossibility of carrying out porteo of persons (private transport of persons) is fully established through reiterated administrative jurisprudence of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, developed after the entry into force of Law #8955, as detailed in legal opinion OJ154-2014, upon reforming Article 323 of the Commerce Code, in which the remunerated transport of persons in the taxi modality is considered a public service to be exploited through the figure of the administrative concession in accordance with the procedures established in the law and its regulations, or through the permit in the case of stable special taxi services, as provided in subsection a) of Article 7 of the cited law. In the same vein, opinion C416-2014 and legal opinion OJ-011-2015 indicated that remunerated transport of persons in its different modalities constitutes a public service, such that it cannot be carried out by private individuals except by means of a permit or concession granted by the State. They deduce that no private individual may provide the service of remunerated transport of persons, in its different modalities, if they do not have a concession or permit from the State; that is, this activity leaves commerce among individuals to be monopolized, regardless of the type of motor vehicle used or the persons to whom it is directed, whether offered to the general public or to users of specific groups. As a consequence of which, no private person—individual or legal entity—may provide the service of remunerated transport of persons if, prior to doing so, they do not have the respective authorization—concession or permit—according to the modality in question, conferred by the Public Transport Council (Consejo de Transporte Público) through the procedures established by the laws regulating the cited public service. They consider that this statization of the private transport of persons service violates Article 46 of the Political Constitution, since the creation of public monopolies requires the approval of at least 38 deputies, a procedure that was violated because Bill No. 17874, which gave rise to Law No. 8955, was approved in a Commission with Full Legislative Power, which lacked competence to approve a law requiring a qualified majority of votes. They add that a monopoly in favor of the State is mainly characterized by the elimination of competition and the prohibition of carrying out the activity by third parties, and that Law No. 8955 manifestly establishes the prohibition of carrying out this activity by eliminating the word person in Article 323 of the Commerce Code and adding a final paragraph to that article, which for all effects states that it does not authorize the transport of persons by means of motor vehicles, creating an express prohibition on the provision of this service by private individuals; that is, a service that was regulated without any problem in the Commerce Code and was done as part of the meeting of the minds between the parties, governed by the free will to decide what best suits each one according to their economic interests and the needs of that moment, is statized. They point out that in Opinion number C-376-2003, the Office of the Attorney General stated that porteo was not a legal transaction resulting from chance or actions aimed at the collective, but rather the product of a discreet relationship, previously arranged between the carrier (porteador) and the traveler; which entailed the impossibility of making contracts on public roads, since the ownership of said public service is held by the State. They assert that the porteo of persons obeys a meeting of the minds, an agreement that does not arise by chance but is made freely and discreetly between the parties, through the weighing of prices, routes, schedules; because it is an aspect pertaining to the private sphere of citizens in which the principle of autonomy of will governs, and in which the State should not intervene. Therefore, they argue that by eliminating the possibility of private transport of persons, Article 46 of the Political Constitution is violated, which provides for the creation of monopolies of a private nature, and indicates that to establish new monopolies in favor of the State or municipalities, the approval of two-thirds of the total membership of the Legislative Assembly is required. This implies that public authorities are constitutionally obligated to promote competition within the framework of a market economy; likewise, they indicate that the challenged rule established a public monopoly in the matter of public transport of persons in the taxi modality—a constitution which was carried out through the approval of a law, outside the internal regulations of the Legislative Assembly, since it was done in a commission with full legislative power, given that this project was non-delegable because it required a qualified majority—at least 38 votes—for its approval. They explain that said bill should have been discussed in the Legislative Plenary, as its voting procedure so requires, meaning the Second Full Commission was constitutionally barred from hearing this project and even more so from approving it, violating the procedure established in Article 46 of the Political Constitution. They clarify that they are not questioning the constitution of the monopoly, since it can be established provided the procedure required in Article 46 is fulfilled. They assert that the existence of the monopoly on private transport of persons became more evident with the arrival of UBER, a digital platform that connects providers of passenger transport services in the taxi modality with people who need to be transported, and they explain that to reinforce that Law No. 8955 created a monopoly in favor of the State, Vice-Minister Sebastián Urbina indicated that all remunerated transport of persons must go through the CTP and affirmed that no private individual may engage in remunerated transport of persons without a permit from the State. Therefore, they affirm that the approval of Law 8955 contradicts the principle of the supremacy of reality because it prevents the use of alternative technological means for the transport service. Likewise, they assert that the challenged rule violates the approval of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, since it determined that the possibility of private transport service could not be excluded or restricted, because at the time of approval, Costa Rica had private transport services in the taxi modality, under the figure of porteo of persons, and there was no Law that had established a public monopoly on public transport in the taxi modality; ergo, there was no prohibition on providing private transport services in the taxi modality. In view of which, in Chapter 11 of said Treaty, "cross-border trade in services," Costa Rica did not establish any reservation regarding this commercial activity, which is why Law No. 8955 violates an Agreement incorporated into our Legal System, since beyond this situation, it must offer foreign investors the "national treatment" that we had at the time of signing the Treaty; rather, Costa Rica negotiated the liberalization of services, including private transport of persons in the taxi modality, in Class 6431; Regular road passenger transport services (porteo); Subclass 64312: Special regular urban and suburban road passenger transport services (taxis); According to the above, "regular services" should be understood as "non-occasional," with the "Passenger transport service" being synonymous—in commercial legal doctrine—with porteo of persons directed at a specific segment of users, which is equivalent to a closed group where predetermined itineraries and fees prevail, that is, previously agreed upon (between the carrier and the passenger), as was the case before the approval of the challenged law. They explain that through Annex I of CAFTA (Costa Rica's List), various "non-conforming measures" are included that allow the Costa Rican State to legislate and regulate matters of "Land Transport Services, Passenger Transport"; even contrary to Articles 11.2 (National Treatment), 11.3 (Most-Favored-Nation Treatment), and 11.4 (Market Access) of CAFTA; said non-conforming measures include several articles of Law No. 7969, "Regulatory Law for the Public Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality," which grant the MOPT the power to "... annually set the number of concessions to be granted in each district, canton, and province for taxi services." (CAFTA, Annex I, page 13), in addition to matters related to tariff regulation. However, Article 11.6 of CAFTA allows the non-application of Articles 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, and 11.5 (of CAFTA) to: "any existing non-conforming measure that is maintained by a Party (…) provided that such modification does not decrease the degree of conformity of the measure as it was in effect immediately before the modification (…)" (CAFTA page 11-3). They assert that the aforementioned non-conforming measures refer to public passenger transport, which is the only one regulated in Law 7969 before its modification in June 2011, since Law No. 8955 dates from June 16, 2011; however, CAFTA entered into force on January 1, 2009; therefore, with the approval of this law, the obligations agreed to by our country in the cited treaty are overlooked. They reiterate that in the challenged rule, "porteo of persons" becomes a "public service," by eliminating the possibility of its exercise in private form, which violates the text of Article 11.6 of CAFTA by diminishing "the degree of conformity" with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access); thereby, the Legislative Assembly exceeds a competence that the Constitution does not grant it, since it modifies a treaty in terms of its content, when according to the Constitution, its function must be limited to approving or disapproving a treaty. They argue that international treaties have a dual legal dimension: from an international standpoint, it entails a commitment to fulfill what was agreed upon before the other subjects of international law, and from a state standpoint, it implies the acceptance of the internal effects derived from the commitment for both public authorities and citizens—Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Therefore, they consider that the approval of Law No. 8955 not only violates the Constitution but also the Vienna Convention in its general part, since it constitutes a violation of the principle of hierarchy of norms, because by means of a lower-ranking norm, a commercial activity is restricted, overlooking the agreements signed in CAFTA, entering into open confrontation with its fundamental objectives, which are: to stimulate the expansion and diversification of trade in the region, eliminate trade barriers, facilitate the cross-border movement of goods and services, promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade zone, substantially increase investment opportunities, among others. They request that the challenged rule be declared unconstitutional.

**2.-** By written submission received in the Secretariat of this Chamber at 1:14 p.m. on January 19, 2016, Juan Ricardo Fernández Ramírez, in his capacity as President of the National Association of Free Consumers (Asociación Nacional de Consumidores Libres), requests, in summary, that: The unconstitutionality of Law No. 8955: "Reform of Law No. 3284, Commerce Code, of April 30, 1964, and of Law 7969, Regulatory Law for the Public Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality, of December 22, 1999" be declared. For the purpose of substantiating the standing they hold to bring this action of unconstitutionality, the petitioners argue that it stems from the defense of diffuse and collective interests. They state that the challenged legislation made a clear distinction between the three modalities of remunerated transport of persons and assigned a particular regulation to each, namely: remunerated transport of persons in the taxi modality; stable special taxi service (servicio especial estable de taxi); and porteo of persons (stable and non-stable). They indicate that, for the taxi transport modality, the challenged rule kept it intact, so it is not the object of this action. They assert that in relation to the Stable Special Taxi Service, the challenged rule created a special modality of remunerated transport of persons, which was also considered a public service for all legal effects, exploited through the figure of the permit; which is limited and subject to traditional taxi concessions. They state that under these conditions, there is an obligation to present the original contracts with the persons to whom the service will be provided, and that the number of permits could not exceed 3% of traditional taxi concessions per base of operation; the State may authorize only the necessary number of permits per zone, avoiding competition that could affect traditional taxis; they may not offer their services to the public; and they may not park on public roads except for the boarding and alighting of their users. In view of which, they assert that the only permitted transport services are traditional taxis or the limited stable special taxi service; prohibiting any other type of remunerated transport of persons in vehicles between private legal entities. Now, in relation to the porteo of persons (stable and non-stable), they assert that said service was completely banned; by virtue of which, two private legal subjects cannot freely agree on the transport of a person in exchange for remuneration; and indicating that said type of service was public and that the State was its sole owner; and granting—through Transitory Provision I—a maximum period of one month for those who were engaged in porteo of persons to submit a series of requirements to the State in order to obtain an administrative permit for stable special taxi service and convert their private activity into this new modality. Therefore, they consider there is no remaining doubt about the prohibition on entering into porteo of persons contracts between private individuals; since it left traditional taxis and SEETAXIS as the only two permitted modalities of remunerated transport of persons by automobile, both exclusively owned by the State; in view of which, they consider that the challenged rule completely eliminated private remunerated transport of persons. They argue that the challenged law is unconstitutional because it created a public monopoly without a qualified majority, since it established the State as the exclusive owner of remunerated transport of persons and prohibited porteo, eliminating private initiative and leaving the enabling titles detailed in the law as the only option for exploitation. In view of which, they argue that ownership will always belong exclusively to the State; and it creates, delimits, grants, and revokes the enabling titles. They indicate that the concessionaires or permit holders will always operate as collaborators of the State and under a different, limited, and temporary legal regime; the defect not consisting in declaring this type of transport a public service, but in the creation of a monopoly to secure it. Therefore, they mention that this Court established the prohibition on delegating to commissions with legislative power matters that require a qualified majority. They assert that, on the contrary, the most significant public services, such as education and health, are not governed by a state monopoly as is this case, which shows that the importance of the activity does not per se justify its nationalization. On the other hand, they point out that the challenged rule violates Articles 28, 39, 41, 45, and 46 of the Political Constitution; likewise, the principles of freedom, private initiative, freedom of trade, freedom of contract, and freedom of choice for consumers. They explain that fundamental freedoms are the axis of a Rule of Law, which can be limited for the sake of an imperative public interest and in the least restrictive manner possible; the challenged rule does not satisfy the imperative public interest and limits fundamental freedoms in the most restrictive manner possible. They assert that the legislative records prove that it is unquestionable that the interest in regulating the activity of remunerated transport of persons was to solve the conflict between taxi drivers and carriers; but not to benefit consumers who need to transport themselves by such a means. They state that the current economic and legal trends adopted in Costa Rica support free competition as the ideal regulator of any economic activity and, if state intervention is deemed necessary, it is considered that this should be carried out with the least possible intensity. In this case, the true beneficiary of the public service in question has been lost sight of: the consumer. They point out that the legislator had the option of regulating the private activity as a way to ensure user protection but opted for the most restrictive way: statization. This contrary to health and education, which are examples of public services of supreme importance that allow private initiative and are only regulated, not statized. They consider that the challenged rule violated clause 11.4 "Market Access" of Chapter Eleven of the FTA; by virtue of the fact that state parties are prohibited from issuing measures that impose limitations on the number of service providers, whether in the form of numerical quotas, monopolies, or exclusive service providers. They assert that the prohibition on providing a private transport service for persons (porteo), as a result of the reform introduced by Law No. 8955 to Article 323 of the Commerce Code, and the statization of the activity, limits the number of service providers. Therefore, the only scenario in which this law is not contrary to said regulation is if it were included in the non-conforming measures that Costa Rica extracted from the application of the Treaty; given that the only reservations on land passenger transport were included in Annex I of the Treaty. They state that remunerated transport of persons was not reserved in Annex I of the Treaty, by virtue of the fact that it referred only to laws, regulations, or measures in force at the time of signing the Treaty that are non-conforming with what was agreed upon and that the State Party decided to maintain. This is not about reservations to sectors or activities in general that the State may regulate at pleasure, but the decision to maintain existing rules. This is because Law 8955 was enacted years after the Treaty, so they would be new measures that cannot be interpreted as existing ones intended to be maintained. On the other hand, they assert that no State Party could increase the degree of non-conformity of its reserved existing measures, and any reform to any of them could not decrease their degree of conformity. Given that the challenged rule established new measures. They assert that, even if it could be interpreted that the regulation was reserved in Annex I, it is unquestionable that Law No. 8955 represented modifications that increased the restrictions existing at the time of signing the Treaty; something expressly prohibited. On the other hand, they assert that in Annex II of the Treaty, on the other hand, it was possible for the State Parties to make reservations on issues or sectors on which they could impose new measures or regulate them in the future. They state that Costa Rica did not make any reservation regarding remunerated transport of persons in Annex II, meaning that any restrictive measure on the matter was directly contrary to the Treaty. They state that the challenged rule unquestionably nationalized remunerated transport of persons and created a monopoly in favor of the State. This is because the transport of persons was of a mixed nature; and thus public remunerated transport of persons, such as traditional taxis, and private remunerated transport of persons, in the porteo modality, coexisted; however, they argue that private remunerated transport of persons in the porteo modality was eliminated from the legal system. It being unobjectionable that remunerated transport of persons, in any of its modalities, was instituted as a public service with the State as its sole owner.

It states that by means of the fully private contract of carriage (porteo), private individuals or companies could offer the remunerated passenger transport service, either by offering fares and conditions to the general public or by tailoring them to each particular case; however, by eliminating the word “persons” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and adding an express prohibition on transporting persons, that type of contract was nationalized, forcing all those engaged in private carriage (porteo privado)—pursuant to Transitory Provision I of the challenged rule—to transform their activity into a public one, by availing themselves of the established special taxi service. Consequently, there is no doubt that a new legal monopoly was created in favor of the State. It argues that it is necessary to develop the evolution of the concept of public service and, above all, the difference between the regulation of an economic activity and its nationalization as means of ensuring the service. Such that the nationalization of the activity was not the only legal way to ensure the public service, and that regulation was a possible option existing in our legal system. It asserts that it is necessary to establish a distinction between state regulation of a private activity for the purpose of protecting the interests of users and the nationalization of a private activity that forces private legal subjects to obtain an authorization to operate as collaborators of the State; which is the sole holder of the particular service; however, the creation of a public monopoly was chosen, something the constitution empowers provided there is justified public interest and a law approved by a qualified majority. It argues that the traditional notion of public service consists of an activity satisfying collective needs, the ownership and strict regulation and oversight of which is assumed by the State; since the State is the sole holder of the service, setting the conditions under which it is provided and overseeing it directly. In response to this, a new modern and objective notion of public service emerged, one that does not imply exclusive ownership by the State and allows private initiative; a provision of fundamental interest to society in which the State may intervene and ensure its satisfaction; which does not imply its exclusive ownership unlike the traditional notion, and includes the possibility of intervening through regulations or corrections of the private market. Likewise, it cites European doctrine (folio 56), and indicated that the constitutional framework admits a plurality of organizational solutions, ranging from the extreme represented by the unregulated market, passing through the entire range of restrictions, to the other extreme which is the exclusion of the market and the exclusive reservation for the administration; therefore, the public service may allow the legislator to order an adequate congruence of public and private activities in order to satisfy public needs. And it reiterates that the evolution of the concept of public service not only fails to justify the nationalization of an economic activity without a qualified majority, but also that the current of change of the concept is heading toward liberalization. It argues that the concepts of regulation and nationalization are fundamentally different, since when speaking of regulation, the State's action operates upon pre-existing legal situations and rights arising from the freedom of private action. Opposite is the regime for a nationalized activity, where the State creates and delimits the legal situations and the administered party may have new and limited exploitation rights by means of a concession. It explains that this is evidently a state monopoly of an economic activity private by its nature, and not its simple regulation. For its part, it adds that nationalization entails converting a private activity to the exclusive ownership of the State, such that only through its authorization could a private subject participate. As the exclusive holder of said activity, the State may reject, regulate in detail, oversee, or revoke the operating permits of private subjects. As such, it is not necessary to leave public services under the exclusive ownership of the administration in order to ensure or regulate them, since they have not been exempt from the international shift toward de-nationalization, and various examples currently subsist of services that are not under the sole ownership of the State. Therefore, it adds, the public monopoly created by Law No. 8955 is unconstitutional, by virtue of the fact that it should have been created through a qualified majority, in accordance with numeral 4 of the Constitutional Charter. In the alternative, it requests that the unconstitutionality of Article 1 of the challenged rule be declared, by virtue of the fact that it eliminated the carriage of persons (porteo de personas) from the Commercial Code; likewise, Article 2 which establishes the exclusive ownership of the State. The foregoing because said annulment would permit private carriage of persons (porteo privado de personas) simultaneously with the SEETAXI service and traditional taxis, eliminating the public monopoly by allowing private initiative in said economic activity. It considers that fundamental freedoms were compromised through the approval of said law. And it indicates that from the legislative records, it is extracted that the interest in regulating the activity of remunerated passenger transport was to resolve the union conflict between taxi drivers and carriers (portadores); opting for the most restrictive form, which was nationalization. It asserts that any private commercial activity may be subject to legal limitations and regulations adopted for the sake of protecting the public interest; however, they cannot be excessive regulations on an activity private by its nature. That is, to limit the principle of freedom, the legislator should have opted for the least restrictive option in order to satisfy an imperative social need. It asserts that the challenged rule does not satisfy any imperative public interest; since the common good must be extracted from the constitutional order, never from what a particular administration considers important. Therefore, it asserts that the reasons for the challenged law arose from a negotiation process between the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), together with the National Chamber of Bus Transport (Cámara Nacional de Transporte en Autobús), the National Federation of Taxis (Federación Nacional de Taxis) and the Chamber of Carriers (Cámara de Porteadores), and sought to settle the conflicts arising among taxi drivers, bus drivers, and carriers, not the imperative public interest under the terms required by the Constitutional Charter. It considers that freedom of competition is the ideal way to satisfy the public interest. It affirms that the challenged law was issued with the purpose of settling a union-type political difference among various sectors; however, the legitimate interests of consumers were sacrificed, reducing their options and their right to choose. With this, it considers that particular and union interests were prioritized over the interests of the community. It asserts that the challenged rule infringes constitutional Article 46, given that it establishes the right to free choice for consumers. On one hand, the State's duty to promote the greatest number of consumer options and alternatives, and on the other, the possibility to freely choose among said options. In the same sense, it cites the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and indicates that the purpose of market regulations is to increase consumer welfare, guaranteeing on one hand access and supply to the market so that consumers have adequate choices, and on the other guaranteeing that consumers can exercise said choices effectively. It argues that consumer freedom of choice is protected not only by allowing them to choose freely among the options available in the market, but also by refraining from excluding alternatives and options except where a valid justification exists; a principle known in economic theory as consumer sovereignty, which is precisely what is protected, and was infringed under numeral 46 of the Constitutional Charter. As such, the law artificially declared as a public service the carriage (porteo) and any other type of passenger transport service that resembles or is similar to it, depriving consumers of the possibility of accessing a series of legitimate services and options, without any justification or technical basis and without considering or weighing the legitimate interests of consumers. It asserts that the legislator's purpose was to satisfy the union interests of the taxi drivers, carriers (porteadores) and bus drivers who were in the midst of a dispute at that time, and that the interests of consumers were not duly protected. That is, the consumer's right to choose was unduly limited, their consumption options and alternatives being reduced without foundation to protect the interests of a specific union. Therefore, the legislator eliminated all private transport options for persons, instead of fulfilling its task of analyzing and justifying which services within the transport sector should effectively be declared as public services, allowing consumers to choose and contract the rest freely. It argues that the constitutional principle was violated, according to which, in the supply of goods and services to the community, economic competition is presumed as the normal and ordinary state, and exclusion from market activities is the exception—which must be justified and grounded in the benefit of the community and the common interest. It admits that economic activities require regulations based on public order and the common good; however, when issuing such regulations, the rights and legitimate interests of consumers must necessarily be considered, weighed, and protected, as they are the final recipients of the regulation. Therefore, it considers that we are faced with an unconstitutional rule that limits consumer freedom of choice by reducing their options and alternatives. That being the case, it considers that the challenged Law must be declared unconstitutional, because it unjustifiably restricts consumer freedom of choice, reducing their options without technical basis or foundation. Additionally, it unduly privileges the particular interests of a specific union, without considering, weighing, or protecting the rights and legitimate interests of consumers and the community. Therefore, not only does the Law fail to meet the constitutional standard, but it is also contrary to the imperative public interest of the consumers who are the recipients of this public service. Following jurisprudence and doctrine, it affirms that nationalization or publicatio is the most restrictive and forceful form of State intervention, which lacks justification in this case. It is possible to ensure the public service with a less restrictive measure—such as regulation—which per se constitutes a defect of unconstitutionality. There exists no valid argument whatsoever about the measure used to ensure the public service, when the technical rules of economics and the legal trends prevailing in our constitution advocate for freedom of commerce as the best way to satisfy consumer needs. It argues that the challenged rule contravenes Article 7 of the Political Constitution; therefore, it affirms that the Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America, the Dominican Republic, and Central America (hereinafter "FTA") is an international instrument of a commercial nature, approved and ratified by Costa Rica, whose main objective is the removal of tariff, legal, economic, and political obstacles to the free commercial transfer of goods and services among the State Parties. Thus, the purpose of the Treaty is to serve as an instrument for the liberalization of trade in goods and services among the State Parties, guaranteeing foreign investment and promoting conditions of fair competition, with the consequent attainment of noticeable benefits for national users and consumers. Likewise, it emphasizes that, as derived from the aforementioned subsection 2, the legal operator must resort to said objectives when interpreting the will of the parties and the proper meaning of the text of the Treaty. Broadly, it indicates that said agreement establishes the obligation of the signatory States not to impose on service providers of another State Party access restrictions—whether material or regulatory in nature—to the various economic sectors of the service market of another State; it expressly prohibits adopting laws, regulations, or procedures that restrict the number of service providers by limiting their participation or access to the market or by creating, for example, numerical quotas or monopolies that grant access, ownership, or control of the provision of that service to a single provider or a few providers, resorting to limiting or discriminatory measures. Therefore, it asserts that the FTA excludes from the application of said provision (Article 11.4 Market Access) the activities or service sectors contained in a list of Non-Conforming Measures. Likewise, it asserts that the prohibition of carriage (porteo) (stable and non-stable) contravenes clause 11.4 of "Market Access" of the FTA. This by virtue of the fact that the challenged rule caused three effects: the repeal and prohibition of the private contract for passenger transport in porteo, regulated in Article 323 of the Commercial Code; the creation of a new mode of remunerated transport service: the Special Stable Taxi Service (Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi), which joined the already existing "taxi" mode; and, as a consequence of both; the "publicatio" or nationalization of the service of all private remunerated passenger transport, by declaring it under the exclusive ownership of the State. The question lies in how the express prohibition, introduced with the reform, of providing a transport service without the due concession and absolute oversight of the State, implies a measure that imposes a limitation on the number of service providers, in the form of numerical quotas, monopolies, or exclusive service providers, or through the requirement of an economic needs test, in the literal terms of subparagraph i), paragraph a) of clause 11.4 of the Treaty. It asserts the foregoing by virtue of the fact that the Commercial Code regulated, since its enactment in 1964, the transport contract, also known as carriage (porteo) of persons, goods, among others. It was a private and commercial contract governed by the autonomy of the will and the principle of freedom. The Commercial Code regulated a series of formal and essential prerequisites for the validity of the contract, the obligations of the parties, as well as the liability regime and the grounds for termination or nullity of that contract. The logical consequence of the private nature of the transport contract lay in the fact that for its provision, a formal concession from the State was not necessary, by virtue of the fact that it was not a public service of which the State was the exclusive holder. Private individuals were also empowered to provide the service under their own rules, in accordance with what was stipulated by the Commercial Code. The degree of State intervention was minimal and was limited to the general verification of requirements applicable to the generality of persons who wished to drive a motor vehicle: driver's license (after a medical opinion endorsing the physical and mental fitness to drive), respect for the norms of the Traffic Law, vehicle in optimal condition according to the Vehicle Technical Inspection (Revisión Técnica Vehicular), among others; rules imposed by virtue of the general interest that exists in ensuring the safety of persons given the naturally risky condition of any vehicle driving. However, by expressly prohibiting the private passenger transport contract previously regulated in the Commercial Code and by excluding it from private ownership, any person who does not have the status of "concessionaire" is prevented from providing a private remunerated passenger transport service under a regime of contractual autonomy and freedom—as recognized by the Commercial Code. This illegitimately restricts access to the market inherent to the transport service. The prohibition implies that if a private transport service provider company originating from a State Party wished to access the transport services sector in our country, it could be subjected to a series of unreasonable limitations contemplated by Law No. 8955, contrary to clause 11.4 of the FTA, and which were not expressly included in the list of non-conforming measures in Annex 1 of the FTA. That is, with the reform introduced by Law No. 8955 in 2011, while the FTA was fully in force, the activity of carriage (porteo) is completely prohibited. Thus, it asserts that it is of transcendental importance for the purposes of this action to understand that the prohibition of freely exercising an activity and, simultaneously, creating a special modality to attend to a residual and limited demand (SEETAXI) of that service, is nothing but an unjustified limitation, by negative regulation, on the number of service providers. This particular effect of the challenged Law is clearly contrary to clause 11.4 of the FTA. A distinction must be made between the activity of carriage (porteo) (prohibited in its totality) and the SEETAXI activity (limited to 3% of the number of taxis in the area). This subsection corresponds to the first activity; however, we anticipate that both have been unconstitutionally limited. As seen previously, a regulated private activity and a public activity granted under concession are completely different in terms of their nature and legal regime, so it is necessary to analyze them individually. Companies from the State Parties have been totally prohibited from providing the carriage (porteo) service and substantially limited in the possibility of providing a distinct SEETAXI service. The fact of classifying the activity as a public service "of which the State is the holder" implies that no private subject is authorized to provide the transport service freely and directly, under the regime of freedom and autonomy that prevailed prior to the reform of Article 323 of the Commercial Code. In summary, it asserts that the elimination and prohibition of porteo and of any private passenger transport contract, regulated in its time by the Commercial Code (Art. 1 Law 8955) and by the freedom of contract of every person, constitute a violation of Art. 11.4 of the FTA and, more importantly, a limitation not endorsed by the List of Non-Conforming Measures of the FTA. It explains that private carriage of persons (porteo privado de personas) is not included in the Non-Conforming Measures of the FTA (folio 93); since Costa Rica contemplated non-conforming measures in the Treaty that empowered it to remove certain regulatory rules of the transport sector from the scope of clause 11.4 Market Access. Specifically, in Costa Rica's List in Annex 1, a non-conforming measure was included relating to Land Transport Services. What was reserved in Annex I of the Treaty, according to its text and explanatory notes, refers solely to laws, regulations, or measures in force at the time of the Treaty's subscription, which are non-conforming with what was agreed and the State Party decides to maintain. These are not reservations on sectors or activities in general that the State may regulate subsequently, but rather the decision to conserve measures in force. Law 8955 was enacted years after the Treaty, so they are new measures that cannot be interpreted as existing measures that were intended to be maintained. Secondly, it indicates that in accordance with the Treaty, no State Party may increase the degree of non-conformity of its reserved existing measures, and any reform to any of them may not diminish its degree of conformity. Law 8955 establishes new measures. However, even erroneously interpreting that this regulation was reserved in Annex I, it is unquestionable that they are measures representing an increase in the restrictions existing at the time of subscribing to the Treaty, something expressly prohibited. And lastly, it argues that in Annex II of the Treaty, on the other hand, the State Parties were able to make reservations on topics or sectors in which they could impose new measures or regulate them in the future. Costa Rica did not make any reservation regarding remunerated land transport of persons in Annex II, so any new restrictive measure on this topic is directly contrary to the Treaty. It explains that Annex I of the Treaty details laws, regulations, or measures in force at the time of subscribing to the Treaty that a State wishes only to maintain. Annex II, for its part, was conceived to include the sectors or activities for which a State reserves the possibility of restricting or regulating with new measures; this it analyzes and exemplifies on folio 99 of the file. And it asserts that none of the norms modified by Article 1 of Law No. 8955 (Articles 323 and 334 of the Commercial Code) were incorporated in Costa Rica's List, Annex 1, at the time of subscribing to the treaty. Furthermore, Law 8955 had not been enacted at that time, so evidently a reservation was not made to maintain it. These are new measures that, by pure temporal logic, could not have been reserved in Annex I. Therefore, any modification of those norms was possible only to the extent that the degree of conformity of the measure was not diminished, as it was in force immediately before the modification of Articles 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, and 11.5; a criterion confirmed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade (Ministerio de Comercio Exterior) (folio 105). Therefore, it cannot be omitted that Article 2 of Law 7969 increases the degree of non-conformity of Article 2 in force at the time of subscribing to the Treaty. This new measure, more than a modification, implies an absolute innovation, since it delegates to the State the exclusive ownership of the service (something the previous Law No. 7969 did not do), thereby restricting the number of service providers, concentrating it in a single one: The State. Likewise, the fact of creating a new modality such as SEETAXI, but restricted to 3% of the concessions granted in favor of the taxi modality, clearly entails a measure, in the terms of point 633 of the Explanatory Note to Annex I of the Treaty. Absolutely discriminatory. Thus, the measure expressly opposes clause 11.4 on Market Access of the Treaty, which promotes a greater number of service providers and minimal regulation of the activity, in accordance with the liberalization objectives of the Treaty. Consequently, by increasing the degree of non-conformity of an existing measure (Article 2 Law 7969) with clause 11.4 of the Treaty, Law No. 8955 is contrary to Article 11.6, paragraph 1, subparagraph c), cited above. From the foregoing, it is unquestionably inferred that the non-conforming measures in Annex I of the FTA do not empower the elimination of the legal figure of porteo from the Commercial Code and the nationalization of any remunerated passenger transport. Moreover, it argues that porteo was not reserved as a subject to regulate in the future in Annex II (folio 108); Evidently, land passenger transport was not included, so it is not possible to impose new restrictions on this sector. The only restrictions permitted, then, are those that were in force at the time of the Treaty's subscription and were reserved in Annex I (rules that cannot be modified in a more restrictive manner). Any other subject or sector not contemplated in said annex cannot be created or modified to the detriment of the Market Access obligation imposed by Article 11.4 of the Treaty. For all the foregoing, it asserts that it is unquestionable that the norms of Law 8955 that prohibited porteo and left all remunerated passenger transport under the exclusive ownership of the State were not in force at the time of the Treaty's subscription and therefore were not reserved in Annex I. The possibility of restricting these sectors subsequently was also not reserved in Annex II of the Treaty, so the Law is directly contrary to Article 11.4 of the FTA. It is insisted that to proscribe a private economic activity that was freely deployed in the exercise of freedom of commerce in all the forms provided for by clause 11.4 on "Market Access" implies limiting the number of service providers, discourages investment, and completely undermines all the objectives of the Free Trade Agreement. Likewise, prohibiting, after the FTA's approval, the private provision of the transport service constitutes a clear unconstitutional obstacle to trade in services (clause 1.2.b) among the State Parties. In simple words, through a law of the Republic, breaching the principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda and all the cited clauses of the Treaty, the Legislative Assembly modified and expanded the content of the non-conforming measures contained in the Agreement, for instance, reforming an International Treaty through a law, violating not only Article 7 of our own Political Constitution, but also Articles 26 and especially 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. And it concludes that the carriage of persons (porteo de personas), regulated in Article 323 of the Commercial Code prior to the reform, was not contemplated within the list of "measures" or notes of Annex 1 that the State reserved the right to keep in force even contrary to the Treaty, which demonstrates its conformity with the instrument; neither were they contemplated in Costa Rica's List in Annex 2 of the Treaty, an annex that specifically contemplates—according to the Explanatory Note—the subjects that the State reserved the right to regulate in the future regarding Cross-Border Trade in Services, even contrary to the Treaty. The modification of Article 2 of Law 7969, indeed contemplated as a non-conforming measure in Annex 1, was modified granting exclusive ownership to the State over the activity of remunerated passenger transport; the degree of conformity of the measure with the Treaty was diminished. Non-conforming measures were extended via legislation against the Treaty. For all the foregoing, it is unquestionable that the norms of Law 8955 that prohibited porteo and left all remunerated passenger transport under the exclusive ownership of the State were not in force at the time of the Treaty's subscription and therefore were not reserved in Annex I. The possibility of restricting these sectors subsequently was also not reserved in Annex II of the Treaty, so the Law is directly contrary to Article 11.4 of the FTA. On the other hand, it indicates that Article 2 of Law No. 7969, contemplated as a non-conforming measure in Annex 1 of the Treaty, did not regulate the SEETAXI modality, so the reform introduced to said article by Law No. 8955 cannot be considered a "modification" but rather an innovation, not protected by paragraph c) of Article 11.6, paragraph 1 of the Treaty. In any event, the creation of a Special Stable Taxi Service, which satisfies a residual and limited market demand, implies a decrease in the degree of conformity of the Law with clause 11.4 of the Treaty, since it grants interested parties a mere precarious permit, instead of a formal concession, like that enjoyed by those engaged in the "taxi" modality. Likewise, since it is a modality that seeks to satisfy a "residual and limited" demand, with the reform SEETAXI permits can only be granted for 3% of the concessions authorized per operating base, which clearly decreases the degree of conformity of Article 2 of Law No. 7969 with clause 11.4 of the Treaty. Therefore, there is no doubt that porteo and SEETAXI are completely different economic activities; however, it has been argued on some occasions that they are the same activity. Even under this interpretation, the nationalization of a private activity to subject it to strict regulations and a maximum of 3% of the taxis in each zone is a restriction incompatible with the treaty in question. Finally, it emphasizes that Law No. 8955 prohibits what the FTA permits and promotes. By enacting an ordinary Law contrary to an international Treaty of higher hierarchy, Article 7 of the Political Constitution is contravened; therefore, we attentively request that the evident unconstitutionality of Law No. 8955 of July 7, 2011, be declared. It requests that Law No. 8955 be annulled as unconstitutional; and in the alternative, it requests that Article 1 of Law No. 8955 be annulled, and consequently the reforms operated on Articles 323 and 334 of the Commercial Code, Law No. 3284 of April 30, 1964, which eliminated the legal figure of private carriage (porteo privado), and that it be restored accordingly; and the paragraph of Article 2 of Law No. 8955, which introduced a second paragraph to Article 2 of Law No.

7969, which granted the State the exclusive ownership of the service.

3.- By resolution issued at 3:58 p.m. on February 11, 2016 (visible at folio 022 of the case file), the unconstitutionality actions processed in case files 15-015456-0007-CO and 16-000852-0007-CO were admitted; these were consolidated by means of vote No. 2016-002010 at 9:30 a.m. on February 10, 2016, granting a hearing to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) and the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes).

4.- The notices referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) were published in numbers 50, 51, and 52 of the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial), on March 11, 14, and 15, 2016 (folio 485).

5.- Through briefs received at the Secretariat of this Chamber at 11:10 a.m. on March 1, 2016; and at 1:36 p.m. on March 2, 2016, a joinder (coadyuvancia) is filed by Carolina Alfaro Sojo, in her capacity as generalísima attorney-in-fact without sum limit for Transportes Privados Carolina Sociedad Anónima; Pablo Enrique Soto Alfaro, in his capacity as generalísimo attorney-in-fact without sum limit for Soluciones Avanzadas Sociedad Anónima de Capital Variable; and Wilbert Navarro Cordero, in his capacity as President with powers of Generalísimo Attorney-in-Fact without sum limit for Transportes Privados Marvey Sociedad Anónima; both argue that they have been conducting private transport activities for persons since 2000, always under the scope of Art. 323 of the Commercial Code. With the reform applied to the Commercial Code in 1999, the figure of the “Special Stable Taxi Service” (Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi) was implemented; this same figure is subsumed under the 3-year concessions issued by the State. They report that their permits expired on July 7, 2015, so they took steps to reactivate private transport operations. They expand that since 2000, they have worked jointly with Soluciones Avanzadas S.A. de C.V.; where they provide services in cantons of the province of Alajuela. They explain that this transnational activity and negotiation is protected under Chapter II of the FTA (TLC) approved in 2007, which is titled “Cross-Border Trade in Services.” They report that, with the enactment of the law being challenged (No. 8955), a monopolization system was established, managed by the Public Transportation Council (Consejo de Transporte Pública), an agency that issues, or does not issue, taxi permits. They assert that said law violated the natural formation process, since the challenged law allows the creation of monopolies and for this it must have the approval of at least 38 deputies; on the contrary, said law was approved by a Commission with full legislative power (Comisión con potestad legislativa plena), which is unable to approve laws requiring a qualified majority of votes. Therefore, they request that the rules challenged by the petitioners be declared admissible and unconstitutional (see folios 130-198 of the virtual case file).

6.- By brief received at the Secretariat of this Chamber at 3:16 p.m. on March 2, 2016, Alejandro Salas Blanco, in his capacity as Mayor of Zarcero, requests clarification as to whether the suspension of any pending resolution against Seetaxi vehicles is true (folio 199).

7.- By brief filed at 1:06 p.m. on March 4, 2016, Gilbert Rojas Rojas, in his capacity as Generalísimo Attorney-in-Fact without sum limit for the company Transportistas Naranjeños Unidos Sociedad Anónima, appears before this Chamber in order to intervene as an active co-helper (coadyuvante activo) in this unconstitutionality action, legitimized by Article 83 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction. He indicates that the company Transportistas Naranjeños Unidos Sociedad Anónima was incorporated on May 6, 2004, and among its objectives the following was agreed: "...The company's corporate purpose shall be general commerce including the transport of persons and goods. As of this year, our company began to engage in the activity of transporting persons under the contract of carriage (contrato de porteo) modality, as provided by Article 323 of the Commercial Code. On July 7, 2011, the law now challenged, Law number 8955, was published in the Gazette, which eliminated the word 'persons' from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and instead provided for the creation of the Special Stable Taxi Service (Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi). When the questioned law was approved, the legislator included three transitional provisions, in order to separate the future application of the reform to Law No. 7966 in its Articles 2 and 29, for those 'carriers' (porteadores) who, at the time of its publication, could demonstrate that they had been engaged in the private transport of persons in accordance with the provisions of Article 323 et seq. of the Commercial Code, this with the purpose of protecting, in some way, the acquired rights thereof. In such a way that the rule contemplated in the reform to Law No. 7969 through Law No. 8955, would apply to those persons who subsequently wished to carry out the Special Stable Taxi Service, and to those who had been engaged in this economic activity and who were to be transferred from the private service of person transport to the remunerated public transport service of persons, whether in their capacity as 'sedans' or by microbuses. The first transitional provision of the challenged law, number 8955, contains a temporary authorization for the former carriers to continue providing the transport service. This power or permit for the former 'carriers' to become part of the Special Stable Taxi Service was granted to those who wished to prove this condition and in exchange would be authorized for periods of three years, 'extendable,' according to the express text of the law, so that henceforth we would no longer carry out a carriage activity but rather a special stable taxi permit, known as S.E.E.T.A.X.I. In accordance with the legal reform, the company TRANSPORTISTAS NARANJEÑOS UNIDOS SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, in its capacity as 'carriers,' submitted the rigorous requirements contemplated in the referred Law No. 8955, and thus, by means of agreement 5.1.5 of Ordinary Session No. 34-2012 of the Board of Directors of the Public Transportation Council, the accreditation was authorized to operate this new modality of public service, also known by the acronym 'S.E.E.T.A.X.l.', under permit number 30, which allowed them the use of thirty-nine (39) units in the Canton of Naranjo in Alajuela, starting in July 2012. As of the formal acts of habilitation for the Special Stable Taxi Service, issued in due course by the Costa Rican State, each of the thirty-nine drivers affiliated with the company began their operations lawfully, starting in July of 2012. Notwithstanding the foregoing, during 2015 (the date of expiration of the permits), the Public Transportation Council interpreted and decided that the extension of the permits was admissible for a single time, but that it had to be limited to a maximum of thirty percent (30%) of the concessions authorized for each base of operation of the authorized taxis ('red' taxis). Thus, through ordinary session number 37-2015, held on July 1, 2015, official communication DAJ 2015-002164 was fully heard and approved, which, in addition to admitting the extension, made it clear that the extension was limited, but with a limit of 30% for each base of operation of the 'red' taxis or authorized concessions. As a consequence of the foregoing interpretation, given that in the canton of Naranjo, Alajuela, there are 50 licensed taxis, upon applying the 30% percentage, the number to be extended amounted to only fifteen units. That is, from 39 permits that our company had, it went to 15 for the entire canton, which implied that those 15 permits had to be distributed between two companies, which meant that in favor of his company only seven permits were authorized and not thirty-nine as it had. Due to the foregoing, by means of the resolution contained in Article 7.1.11, ordinary session number 49-2015 of August 20, 2015, of the Public Transportation Council, the request for extension of the special stable taxi service permit of the represented company was rejected, for the reasons that were duly notified at the time, and as the extension was prevented and private transport of persons was not in force due to the existence of the law now challenged, they are in a situation of illegality that prevents them from carrying out the transport activity, so the challenged law, which reformed Article 323 of the Commercial Code, is definitively causing them serious harm. Moreover, as of October 1, 2015, precise instructions were issued to the Traffic Police (Policía de Tránsito) to remove the documents or codes they used, as it was considered that the same had expired as of July 7, 2015. According to the above description, the aforementioned company, as an organization that has had the carriage activity among its objectives, is the holder of a legitimate interest. This unconstitutionality action challenges and requests the unconstitutionality of Law No. 8955, which corresponds to the 'Reform to Law No. 3284, Commercial Code, of April 30, 1964, and to Law No. 7969, Regulating Law of the Remunerated Public Transport Service of Persons in Vehicles under the Taxi Modality of December 22, 1999.' Like the petitioners, this party considers that the cited law is contrary to Articles 7, 28, 39, 41, 45, 46, 129 and 140 of the Political Constitution and the principles of normative hierarchy, reasonableness and proportionality, private initiative, freedom of commerce, contractual freedom, and free choice of consumers, as the petitioners indicate, and I will now outline some comments on aspects related to the alleged unconstitutional infractions. Regarding the violation of Article 46 of the Political Constitution, he agrees with the petitioner in the sense that the challenged regulations provided for the creation of a public monopoly without a qualified legislative majority, which violates Article 46 of the Political Constitution. The questioned law expressly established that the State is the exclusive owner of the transport of persons and prohibited the contract of carriage. In effect, according to the amendment introduced to Article 2 of the Regulating Law of the Remunerated Public Transport Service of Persons in Vehicles under the Taxi Modality, No. 7969 of December 22, 1999: 'The remunerated transport of persons, carried out by means of buses, mini-buses, microbuses, taxis, automobiles and any other type of motor vehicle, whether offered to the general public, to users or to specific groups of users with specific needs that constitute special demands, is a public service of which the State is the owner. The foregoing regardless of the degree of state intervention in the determination of the operating system of the service or in its oversight. [...].' Under the argument of considering the public interest that supposedly involves all the activity of remunerated person transport, the legislator opted to declare it a public service, regardless of the modality involved and the degree of state intervention in the determination of the operating system or its oversight. Without a doubt, the circumstance that the entire activity of remunerated person transport was declared a 'public service' and the consequent elimination of the legal figure of the carriage of persons (porteo de personas), replaced by the figure 'special stable taxi service,' signifies a flagrant violation of constitutional rights. By regulating this economic activity through the figure of a concession, private initiative was completely eliminated and the only alternative for exploitation was left to the assumptions provided in the law. With this, the classification as a public service for any type of private transport of persons is contrary to Article 46 of the Political Constitution, since for the creation of public monopolies it is necessary that the law be approved by at least 38 deputies (qualified majority). And in this sense, Law No. 8955 was approved in a Commission with Full Legislative Power, lacking competence to approve a law requiring a qualified majority of votes. As is well indicated in the briefs filing this action, the monopoly in favor of the State is characterized mainly by the elimination of competition and the prohibition of carrying out the activity by third parties. Law No. 8955 expressly establishes the prohibition of the exercise of this carriage activity, by eliminating the word 'person' in Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and adding a last paragraph to that article, which states: 'The transport contract regulated in this article does not authorize the transport of persons by means of motor vehicles.' Through this paragraph, an express prohibition is created on the provision of that service by private individuals, that is, an activity that was regulated under commercial law rules, and which originated as part of the agreement of wills between the parties, in which the free will to decide what best suits each one, according to their economic interests and the needs of that moment, governs. Therefore, by means of Law No. 8955, by eliminating the possibility of private transport of persons, Article 46 of the Political Constitution is violated. As is well stated in this action, Law 8955 established a public monopoly in the matter of public transport of persons, an aspect that did not exist before the enactment of that regulation. The constitution of this monopoly was carried out through the approval of a law, outside the internal regulation of the Legislative Assembly, since it was approved in a Commission with full legislative power. Specifically, he considers that there is a violation of Article 208 bis of the Regulation of the Legislative Assembly (Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa), since the challenged legal text contains matters of public contracting, as well as the opening of a monopoly, two of the assumptions in which said article of the Regulation of the Legislative Assembly cannot be applied, which endangers legal certainty, the principle of singular non-derogability of regulations (principio de inderogabilidad singular de los reglamentos), and the principle of legality. As has been explained, the challenged law created a new model of public transport (S.E.E.T.A.X.I.) using a figure similar to a public concession, which implies the creation of a state monopoly. In his opinion, the approval of said rule through the abbreviated legislative route was not appropriate. Regarding the violation of Article 28 of the Political Constitution, he indicates that this article establishes material limits on state action and a principle derived from that rule is the 'legal order of freedom' that guides our Constitution. According to this article, the legislator is only allowed to intervene in the regulation of private actions that may harm morality, public order, or the rights of third parties. Regarding the concept of private actions excluded by their nature from state intrusion, it is true that the monopolized activities (private transport of persons) are of a private nature or character, since, in general terms, they are simply commercial operations between persons, who agree upon a simple transport service and which can well be carried out by them through the system of free contracting, exchange, and minimal regulation (market economies). In simple terms, with the declaration as a public service of any type of person transport and the elimination of the carriage figure, the sphere of private freedom was interfered with, since there is no need for state intervention in this type of transport. It even becomes irrational and disproportionate that for the transport of goods there is no state regulation, while for agreeing upon a transport of persons, there is clear interference by public authorities. On the other hand, it is contradictory that this Constitutional Chamber itself – whose jurisprudence is binding erga omnes – also ruled on the validity and constitutionality of Article 323 of the Commercial Code, which regulated the 'carriage of persons,' at that time. By judgment No. 2004-3580, at 2:43 p.m. on April 14, 2004, this Chamber clearly established the difference between the remunerated public transport service of persons and the transport contract regulated in the Commercial Code, known as a 'contract of carriage' (contrato de porteo), stating: 'Regarding carriers in the Commercial Code and transport as a public service. Article 323 of the Commercial Code establishes the following: [...] The carrier or transporter is a commercial auxiliary. The transport contract regulated in commercial legislation has the purpose of regulating the transfer of persons, goods, and other items. It is an important commercial contract for a country's economy, as it serves as a link between the producer or marketer of goods and services and the final consumer. It arose from the merchant's need to move from one place to another with or without their trade goods, so that initially it served as an instrument for the merchant's transport in their activity. Although the doctrine does not use the means of transport to classify the carrier, it can be said that there exists the land form (such as a cart, or cargo vehicle, or railroad), aquatic (panga, falúa, or transatlantic cruise), and air (glider, small airplane, or jet-propelled airplane), even admitting that it can be carried out by man's strength, that of a pack animal, or a motor vehicle. But given its wide diversity and economic importance for the country, there are areas regulated by the State in attention to the protection of the general interest, declaring some forms as public service. Therefore, this contractual figure is very restricted and it is necessary to identify the origin of the transport contract to determine if it is a commercial agreement or if it is intended to satisfy an activity that the State declared a public service. If it is the latter, it cannot take the place of activities previously regulated by law, such as, for example, air transport, which was regulated by Law No. 5150, General Civil Aviation Law, in which case, for a private individual to offer it, be it a natural or legal person, they must hold an operating certificate for air transport. Likewise, cargo services, railways, and maritime services could be in this contractual category, but if the transcendence they have for society goes beyond the satisfaction of a private need, this will determine the state's legitimacy to enact public order rules. Thus, in the case of the transport of persons, it depends on how the contractual relationship originates; the activity becomes illegal if it is directed at satisfying a need of the general public, thus supplanting the concessionaires of public transport, in which case the Executive Decree correctly considers it an activity outside the law. It is precisely here where the problem raised by the petitioner lies, as he argues that he is not allowed to carry out the various contracts for the transport of persons, thus interfering with his free will and contractual freedom. But the relevant legal fact in discussion is the transfer of persons in exchange for a price, with or without their belongings, as an unrestricted activity, when since the enactment of Law No. 3503 and later Law No. 7593, the remunerated transport of persons in the taxi modality has been declared a public service, and consequently, this converted the contract of carriage into a limited and residual activity. In the same vein, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, through legal opinion number 043 of 03/20/2013, admitted the existence of the commercial contract for the transport of persons. As can be seen from the foregoing, in the pronouncements and transcribed judgment, the contract of carriage, in its modality of person transport, constituted a limited and residual activity, making it illegal, for example, for carriers to travel on public roads casually negotiating or offering their services coincidentally with the public taxi service, or in search of the demand for passenger transport on public roads. However, with the reform introduced and now challenged, such concepts and rulings were eliminated and the possibility of contracting freely was seriously diminished, which greatly undermines Article 28 of the Constitution. Regarding the violation of Article 7 of the Constitution, he indicates that the questioned law further transgresses the approval and integration into our legal system of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, in violation of Article 7 of our Political Constitution. The mentioned International Treaty determined that the possibility of private transport service could not be excluded or restricted. Given that Costa Rica, at the time of the treaty's approval (December 2007), had private person transport services, in the figure of the carriage of persons. But furthermore, there was no Law that had established a public monopoly on public transport in the taxi modality. In Chapter II 'Cross-Border Trade in Services' of the mentioned Treaty, Costa Rica did not establish any reservation in relation to this commercial activity. For this reason, Law No. 8955 of 2011, comes to violate an Agreement incorporated into our Legal System. Beyond this situation, it must offer foreign investors the 'national treatment' that existed at the time of signing the Treaty. Costa Rica instead negotiated the liberalization of services including private transport of persons, in the taxi modality. Specifically, we can locate it in: Class 6431: Regular passenger road transportation services (carriage). Subclass 64312: Special regular urban and suburban passenger road transportation services (taxis). With the law that is challenged, a special regulation for this sector is introduced (special stable taxi service), transgressing the text of Article 11.6 of CAFTA, because the law diminishes 'the degree of conformity' with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Access to Markets), the Legislative Assembly transgressing the treaty and thereby assuming a power not granted by the Constitution, since it modifies a treaty in its content, when according to the Constitution its function must be limited to approving or rejecting a treaty, with the clear breach of Articles 7, 129 and 140 subsections 3) and 10) of the Constitution. Some argue that the possibility of prohibiting carriage and converting all remunerated transport of persons as a public service was reserved by Costa Rica in the non-conforming measures included in Annex I. However, we consider such an argument questionable, for the following reasons: 1) What was reserved in Annex 1 of the Treaty, according to Costa Rica's List, regarding Land Transportation - Passenger Transport, refers solely to laws and regulations in force at the time of the Treaty's signing, which are non-conforming with what was agreed and which Costa Rica wishes to maintain. Nor can we interpret that Costa Rica reserved either the economic sector or the transport activity in general as a non-conforming measure. The challenged law was enacted years after the Treaty's approval, and therefore must be interpreted as 'new measures' that were not foreseen in the Treaty and that consequently are contrary to this agreement. 2) On the other hand, according to the Treaty, no State Party may increase the degree of non-conformity of its existing reserved measures, and any reform to any of them may not decrease its degree of conformity. The questioned law not only establishes a new measure - elimination of the contract of carriage - but also represents a modification that increases the existing restriction on Public Transport, which is definitively prohibited by the treaty. 3) In Annex II of the Treaty, Costa Rica also did not make a reservation or note any non-conformity regarding any specific sector in order to impose future measures or regulations. Specifically, Costa Rica did not make any reservation regarding remunerated person transport in Annex II, so the questioned legal reform is restrictive and contrary to the commercial agreement under study. An example of the above is found in the Health and Education sectors, where Costa Rica allows private initiative and they are only regulated, not nationalized or monopolized. There is no doubt that we are facing an internal reform, carried out by Costa Rica, that affects or transgressed the commented treaty. He requests that this unconstitutionality action be granted, and therefore, that the judgment order the following: That the unconstitutionality of Law No. 8955, 'Reform to Law No. 3284, Commercial Code, and Reform to Law No. 7969, Regulating Law of the Remunerated Public Transport Service of Persons in Vehicles under the Taxi Modality, of December 22, 1999' be declared for violation of Articles: 28, 39, 41, 45. 46, 129 and 140 of the Political Constitution and the principles of normative hierarchy, reasonableness and proportionality, private initiative, freedom of commerce, contractual freedom, and free choice of consumers.

8.- By brief filed at 1:36 p.m. on March 2, 2016, Wilbert Navarro Cordero, in his capacity as President with powers of Generalísimo Attorney-in-Fact without sum limit for Transportes Privados Marvey Sociedad Anónima, appears before this Chamber in order to intervene as an active co-helper (coadyuvante activo) of the plaintiff in this unconstitutionality action, based on Article 83 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction, according to which "The parties that appear in matters pending as of the date of filing the action, as well as those with a legitimate interest, may appear within it, in order to assist in the arguments that might justify its admissibility or inadmissibility, or to expand, where appropriate, the grounds for unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that interests them." He bases his active standing on the provisions of Article 75, second paragraph, of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction, which recognizes the possibility of filing an unconstitutionality action without an underlying case, in those cases where, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those affecting the community as a whole. Regarding this last aspect - or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests - this Chamber has already clarified that the legislator refers to the standing held by active citizens because it involves the right to work. He indicates that the company Transportes Privados Marvey Sociedad Anónima has been engaged in the private transport of persons (carriage) since 2008 through the present legal figure, and since 2005 as a de facto company, through the system of affiliations, use of motor vehicles, and through private contracts related to the provision of the service, all of the foregoing initially under the protection of the provisions of Article 323 of the Commercial Code in force before its reform, this commercial activity reaffirmed by the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, approved in December 2007, located in class 6431: Regular passenger road transportation services (carriage). With the Reform of Law 3284, Commercial Code, and of Law No. 7969, Regulating Law of the Remunerated Public Transport Service of Persons in Vehicles under the Taxi Modality, of December 22, 1999, the word 'person' is eliminated from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and a new figure called 'Special stable taxi service' is created within the Regulating Law of the remunerated public transport service of persons in vehicles under the taxi modality, No. 7969, which conserves the nature of the residual service that carriage provides today, but protected and regulated by operating permits granted by the State. We were forced to subsist in carrying out our work under this new figure with a three-year operating permit for all units affiliated with us, without the possibility of renewal, which expired on July 7, 2015. As of this date, and having our operating permits expired, we reactivated our service again as 'private carriers' making use of our operational bases in the cantons where we provide the service and under a platform system for the carriage service of persons by means of motor vehicles. A service we have been providing uninterruptedly in the Cantons of San Marcos de Tarrazú and Santa María de Dota, in the Province of San José, Costa Rica, making use of the operational bases in those cantons since 2005, and using the municipal business licenses and operating permits valid as of the current date.

In compliance with the provisions of Chapter II "Cross-Border Trade in Services" of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic and Central America, in Class: 6431: Regular urban and suburban special passenger road transport services (porteo). The present acción de inconstitucionalidad challenges Ley N° 8955, since as of its entry into force, no private person – natural or legal – may provide the service of remunerated transport of persons unless, prior thereto, they have the respective authorization – concession (concesión) or permit (permiso), depending on the modality in question, granted by the Consejo de Transporte Público, through the procedures established by the laws that regulate the aforementioned public service. Said nationalization of the private passenger transport service violates Article 46 of the Constitución Política, since the creation of public monopolies requires the approval of at least 38 deputies, a procedure that was breached because bill N° 17874, which gave rise to Ley N° 8955, was approved in a Committee with full legislative power (Comisión con potestad legislativa plena), which lacked jurisdiction to approve a law requiring a qualified majority of votes. As is correctly indicated in the present acción, a monopoly in favor of the State is characterized mainly by the elimination of competition and the prohibition of the activity being carried out by third parties. Ley N° 8955 explicitly establishes the prohibition of exercising this activity by eliminating the word "person" in Article 323 of the Código de Comercio, and adding a final paragraph to that article, which for all relevant purposes states: “The transport contract regulated in this article does not authorize the transport of persons by means of motor vehicles.” Through this paragraph, an express prohibition is created on the provision of that service by private individuals, that is, as indicated by the Procuraduría, a service that was regulated without any problem in the Código de Comercio is nationalized, and which arose as part of a meeting of the minds between the parties, in which the free will to decide what best suits each party, according to their economic interests and the needs of the moment, prevails. Therefore, by means of Ley N° 8955, by eliminating the possibility of private passenger transport, Article 46 of the Constitución Política is violated. As is well set forth in the present acción, with Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, and de la Ley 7969, a public monopoly was established in the field of public passenger transport in the taxi modality. The constitution of this monopoly was carried out through the approval of a law, outside the internal regulations of the Asamblea Legislativa, since it was done in a committee with full legislative power (comisión con potestad legislativa plena). Therefore, that bill could not be delegated to a full legislative committee, since its approval required a qualified majority (at least 38 votes), thereby violating Article 46 of the Constitución Política, by making it impossible to meet the constitutional requirement of legislative approval by two-thirds of the total membership of the Asamblea Legislativa. The approval of Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi," effective as of 2011, violates the approval and integration into our legal system of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic and Central America, in violation of Article 7 of our Constitución Política. The aforementioned International Treaty determined that the possibility of private transport service could not be excluded or restricted, since at the time of its approval (December 2007) Costa Rica had private taxi-mode transport services, in the form of passenger porteo. Moreover, there was no law that had established a public monopoly on public transport in the taxi modality. Ergo, there was no prohibition on the provision of private taxi-mode transport services. In Chapter II "Cross-Border Trade in Services" of the mentioned Treaty, Costa Rica did not establish any reservation in relation to this commercial activity. For this reason, Ley N°8955 of 2011 comes to violate an agreement incorporated into our Legal System. Beyond this situation, it must offer foreign investors the "national treatment" (trato nacional) that we had at the time of signing the Treaty. Costa Rica rather negotiated the liberalization of services, including private passenger transport, in the taxi modality. Specifically, we can locate it in: Class 6431: Regular passenger road transport services (porteo). Subclass 64312: Regular urban and suburban special passenger road transport services (taxis). It is necessary to reiterate that with the approval of Ley N° 8955, "passenger porteo" becomes a "public service" because it eliminates the possibility of its exercise in a private form by removing the word "person" from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio, which states: "The transport contract regulated in this article does not authorize the transport of persons by means of motor vehicles." With this same law, a special regulation is introduced for this sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), violating the text of Article 11.6 of CAFTA, because the law diminishes "the degree of conformity" with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access), and with this there is an excess of legislative power, as the Asamblea Legislativa assumes a competence not granted by the Constitution, by modifying a treaty in terms of its content, when according to the Constitution its function should be limited to approving or disapproving a treaty, with the clear breach of Articles 7, 129, and 140 subsections 3) and 10) of the Constitution. They consider that the arguments presented denote with absolute clarity that the challenged norms violate the principles of free trade, freedom of work, and freedom of transit, transgress the Constitución Política and, therefore, are unconstitutional. Taking into account the foregoing, and as coadjutors (coadyuvantes) of the plaintiff in this matter, they request that the present acción de inconstitucionalidad be granted, and therefore, that the judgment order the following: That the unconstitutionality of Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" be declared for violation of Articles: 7, 46, 129, 140, of the Constitución Política, as well as the principles of Supremacía de la Realidad and Jerarquía normativa.

9.- By brief filed at 09:20 hours on March 7, 2016, Byron Rodolfo Marcos Marcos, in his capacity as President with powers as Generalísimo Attorney-in-Fact without limit of sum of the corporation Porteadores León Trece SJT Sociedad Anónima, appears before this Chamber to intervene as active coadjutor (coadyuvante activo) of the plaintiff in the present acción de inconstitucionalidad, based on Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, according to which "Parties appearing in matters pending as of the date of the filing of the acción or those with a legitimate interest may appear within it, in order to coadjuvate in the allegations that might justify its appropriateness or inappropriateness, or to expand, as the case may be, the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that interests them." He bases his standing (legitimación activa) on the provisions of Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which recognizes the possibility of filing an acción de inconstitucionalidad without a base case, in cases where, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm, or it involves the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos), or those that concern the community as a whole. Regarding this last aspect – or if it involves the defense of diffuse interests –, the Chamber has already specified that the legislator refers to the standing held by active citizens because it concerns the right to work. He indicates that the company PORTEADORES LEON TRECE SJ.T. SOCIEDAD ANONIMA has been dedicated to the private transport of persons (porteo) since 2005 under this legal figure, and since 1995 as a de facto partnership, through the system of affiliations, use of motor vehicles, and through private contracts related to the provision of the service, all of the above initially under the protection of the provisions of Article 323 of the Commercial Code in force before its reform, this commercial activity reaffirmed by the Free Trade Agreement with... road (porteo). With the Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, of December 22, 1999, the word "person" is eliminated from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio, and a new figure called "Servicio especial estable de taxi" is created from the Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N° 7969, which retains the nature of the residual service that porteo provides today, but protected and regulated by operating permits (permisos de operación) granted by the State. They are forced to subsist in the performance of their work under this new figure with a three-year operating permit for all the units affiliated to us, without the possibility of renewal, which expired on July 7, 2015. From that date forward, and having had their operating permits expire, they reactivated the service once again as "private porters" using our operational bases in the cantons where they provide the service and under a platform system for passenger porteo services by means of motor vehicles. A service they have been providing uninterruptedly in the Cantón de San José, of the Provincia de San José, Costa Rica, using the operational base in that canton since 2005, and using the municipal business license and operating permits in force to date. In compliance with the provisions of Chapter II "Cross-Border Trade in Services" of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic and Central America, in Class: 6431: regular urban and suburban special passenger road transport services (porteo). The present acción de inconstitucionalidad challenges Ley N° 8955, since as of its entry into force, no private person – natural or legal – may provide the service of remunerated transport of persons unless, prior thereto, they have the respective authorization – concession (concesión) or permit (permiso), depending on the modality in question, granted by the Consejo de Transporte Público, through the procedures established by the laws that regulate the aforementioned public service. Said nationalization of the private passenger transport service violates Article 46 of the Constitución Política, since the creation of public monopolies requires the approval of at least 38 deputies, a procedure that was breached because bill N° 17874, which gave rise to Ley N° 8955, was approved in a Committee with full legislative power (Comisión con potestad legislativa plena), which lacked jurisdiction to approve a law requiring a qualified majority of votes. As is correctly indicated in the present acción, a monopoly in favor of the State is characterized mainly by the elimination of competition and the prohibition of the activity being carried out by third parties. Ley N° 8955 explicitly establishes the prohibition of exercising this activity by eliminating the word "person" in Article 323 of the Código de Comercio, and adding a final paragraph to that article, which for all relevant purposes states: “The transport contract regulated in this article does not authorize the transport of persons by means of motor vehicles.” Through this paragraph, an express prohibition is created on the provision of that service by private individuals, that is, as indicated by the Procuraduría, a service that was regulated without any problem in the Código de Comercio is nationalized, and which arose as part of a meeting of the minds between the parties, in which the free will to decide what best suits each party, according to their economic interests and the needs of the moment, prevails. Therefore, he indicates that by means of Ley N° 8955, by eliminating the possibility of private passenger transport, Article 46 of the Constitución Política is violated. As is well set forth in the present acción, with Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, and de la Ley 7969, a public monopoly was established in the field of public passenger transport in the taxi modality. The constitution of this monopoly was carried out through the approval of a law, outside the internal regulations of the Asamblea Legislativa, since it was done in a committee with full legislative power (comisión con potestad legislativa plena). Therefore, that bill could not be delegated to a full legislative committee, since its approval required a qualified majority (at least 38 votes), thereby violating Article 46 of the Constitución Política, by making it impossible to meet the constitutional requirement of legislative approval by two-thirds of the total membership of the Asamblea Legislativa. The approval of Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi," effective as of 2011, violates the approval and integration into our legal system of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic and Central America, in violation of Article 7 of our Constitución Política. The aforementioned International Treaty determined that the possibility of private transport service could not be excluded or restricted. Since at the time of its approval (December 2007), Costa Rica had private taxi-mode transport services, in the form of passenger porteo. Moreover, there was no law that had established a public monopoly on public transport in the taxi modality. Ergo, there was no prohibition on the provision of private taxi-mode transport services. In Chapter II "Cross-Border Trade in Services" of the mentioned Treaty, Costa Rica did not establish any reservation in relation to this commercial activity. For this reason, Ley N°8955 of 2011 comes to violate an agreement incorporated into our Legal System. Beyond this situation, it must offer foreign investors the "national treatment" (trato nacional) that we had at the time of signing the Treaty. Costa Rica rather negotiated the liberalization of services, including private passenger transport, in the taxi modality. Specifically, we can locate it in: Class 6431: Regular passenger road transport services (porteo). Subclass 64312: Regular urban and suburban special passenger road transport services (taxis). It is necessary to reiterate that with the approval of Ley N° 8955, "passenger porteo" becomes a "public service" because it eliminates the possibility of its exercise in a private form by removing the word "person" from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio, which states: "The transport contract regulated in this article does not authorize the transport of persons by means of motor vehicles." With this same Law, a special regulation is introduced for this sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), violating the text of Article 11.6 of CAFTA, because the law diminishes "the degree of conformity" with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access), and with this there is an excess of legislative power, as the Asamblea Legislativa assumes a competence not granted by the Constitution, by modifying a treaty in terms of its content, when according to the Constitution its function should be limited to approving or disapproving a treaty, with the clear breach of Articles 7, 129, and 140 subsections 3) and 10) of the Constitution. He considers that the arguments presented denote with absolute clarity that the challenged norms violate the principles of free trade, freedom of work, and freedom of transit, transgress the Constitución Política and, therefore, are unconstitutional. Taking into account the foregoing, and as coadjutors (coadyuvantes) of the plaintiff in this matter, they request that the present acción de inconstitucionalidad be granted, and therefore, that the judgment order the following: That the unconstitutionality of Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" be declared for violation of Articles: 7, 46, 129, 140, of the Constitución Política, as well as the principles of Supremacía de la Realidad and Jerarquía normativa.

10.- By brief filed at 09:28 hours on March 7, 2016, Roberth Rodríguez Hernández, in his capacity as President with powers as Generalísimo Attorney-in-Fact without limit of sum of the corporation SE M TRA SAN RAFAEL SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, appears before this Chamber to intervene as active coadjutor (coadyuvante activo) of the plaintiff in the present acción de inconstitucionalidad, based on Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, according to which "Parties appearing in matters pending as of the date of the filing of the acción or those with a legitimate interest may appear within it, in order to coadjuvate in the allegations that might justify its appropriateness or inappropriateness, or to expand, as the case may be, the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that interests them." He bases his standing (legitimación activa) on the provisions of Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which recognizes the possibility of filing an acción de inconstitucionalidad without a base case, in cases where, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm, or it involves the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos), or those that concern the community as a whole. Regarding this last aspect – or if it involves the defense of diffuse interests –, the Chamber has already specified that the legislator refers to the standing held by active citizens because it concerns the right to work. He indicates that the company SE M TRA SAN RAFAEL SOCIEDAD ANONIMA has been dedicated to the private transport of persons (porteo) since 2005 under this legal figure, and since 1995 as a de facto partnership, through the system of affiliations, use of motor vehicles, and through private contracts related to the provision of the service, all of the above initially under the protection of the provisions of Article 323 of the Commercial Code in force before its reform, this commercial activity reaffirmed by the Free Trade Agreement with... road (porteo). With the Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, of December 22, 1999, the word "person" is eliminated from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio, and a new figure called "Servicio especial estable de taxi" is created from the Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N° 7969, which retains the nature of the residual service that porteo provides today, but protected and regulated by operating permits (permisos de operación) granted by the State. They are forced to subsist in the performance of their work under this new figure with a three-year operating permit for all the units affiliated to them, without the possibility of renewal, which expired on July 7, 2015. From that date forward, and having had their operating permits expire, they reactivated their service once again as "private porters" using the operational bases in the cantons where they provide the service and under a platform system for passenger porteo services by means of motor vehicles, a service they have been providing uninterruptedly in the Cantón de San Rafael, of the Provincia de Heredia, Costa Rica, using the operational base in that canton since 2005, and using the municipal business license and operating permits in force to date. In compliance with the provisions of Chapter II "Cross-Border Trade in Services" of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic and Central America, in Class: 6431: Regular urban and suburban special passenger road transport services (porteo). The present acción de inconstitucionalidad challenges Ley N° 8955, since as of its entry into force, no private person – natural or legal – may provide the service of remunerated transport of persons unless, prior thereto, they have the respective authorization – concession (concesión) or permit (permiso), depending on the modality in question, granted by the Consejo de Transporte Público, through the procedures established by the laws that regulate the aforementioned public service. Said nationalization of the private passenger transport service violates Article 46 of the Constitución Política, since the creation of public monopolies requires the approval of at least 38 deputies, a procedure that was breached because bill N° 17874, which gave rise to Ley N° 8955, was approved in a Committee with full legislative power (Comisión con potestad legislativa plena), which lacked jurisdiction to approve a law requiring a qualified majority of votes. As is correctly indicated in the present acción, a monopoly in favor of the State is characterized mainly by the elimination of competition and the prohibition of the activity being carried out by third parties. Ley N° 8955 explicitly establishes the prohibition of exercising this activity by eliminating the word "person" in Article 323 of the Código de Comercio, and adding a final paragraph to that article, which for all relevant purposes states: “The transport contract regulated in this article does not authorize the transport of persons by means of motor vehicles.” Through this paragraph, an express prohibition is created on the provision of that service by private individuals, that is, as indicated by the Procuraduría, a service that was regulated without any problem in the Código de Comercio is nationalized, and which arose as part of a meeting of the minds between the parties, in which the free will to decide what best suits each party, according to their economic interests and the needs of the moment, prevails. Therefore, he indicates that by means of Ley N° 8955, by eliminating the possibility of private passenger transport, Article 46 of the Constitución Política is violated. As is well set forth in the present acción, with Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, and de la Ley 7969, a public monopoly was established in the field of public passenger transport in the taxi modality. The constitution of this monopoly was carried out through the approval of a law, outside the internal regulations of the Asamblea Legislativa, since it was done in a committee with full legislative power (comisión con potestad legislativa plena). Therefore, that bill could not be delegated to a full legislative committee, since its approval required a qualified majority (at least 38 votes), thereby violating Article 46 of the Constitución Política, by making it impossible to meet the constitutional requirement of legislative approval by two-thirds of the total membership of the Asamblea Legislativa. The approval of Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi," effective as of 2011, violates the approval and integration into our legal system of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic and Central America, in violation of Article 7 of our Constitución Política. The aforementioned International Treaty determined that the possibility of private transport service could not be excluded or restricted. Since at the time of its approval (December 2007), Costa Rica had private taxi-mode transport services, in the form of passenger porteo. Moreover, there was no law that had established a public monopoly on public transport in the taxi modality. Ergo, there was no prohibition on the provision of private taxi-mode transport services. In Chapter II "Cross-Border Trade in Services" of the mentioned Treaty, Costa Rica did not establish any reservation in relation to this commercial activity. For this reason, Ley N°8955 of 2011 comes to violate an agreement incorporated into our Legal System. Beyond this situation, it must offer foreign investors the "national treatment" (trato nacional) that we had at the time of signing the Treaty. Costa Rica rather negotiated the liberalization of services, including private passenger transport, in the taxi modality. Specifically, we can locate it in: Class 6431: Regular passenger road transport services (porteo). Subclass 64312: Regular urban and suburban special passenger road transport services (taxis). It is necessary to reiterate that with the approval of Ley N° 8955, "passenger porteo" becomes a "public service" because it eliminates the possibility of its exercise in a private form by removing the word "person" from Article 323 of the Código de Comercio, which states: "The transport contract regulated in this article does not authorize the transport of persons by means of motor vehicles." With this same Law, a special regulation is introduced for this sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), violating the text of Article 11.6 of CAFTA, because the law diminishes "the degree of conformity" with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access), and with this there is an excess of legislative power, as the Asamblea Legislativa assumes a competence not granted by the Constitution, by modifying a treaty in terms of its content, when according to the Constitution its function should be limited to approving or disapproving a treaty, with the clear breach of Articles 7, 129, and 140 subsections 3) and 10) of the Constitution. They consider that the arguments presented denote with absolute clarity that the challenged norms violate the principles of free trade, freedom of work, and freedom of transit, transgress the Constitución Política and, therefore, are unconstitutional. Taking into account the foregoing, and as coadjutors (coadyuvantes) of the plaintiff in this matter, they request that the present acción de inconstitucionalidad be granted, and therefore, that the judgment order the following: That the unconstitutionality of Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" be declared for violation of Articles: 7, 46, 129, 140, of the Constitución Política, as well as the principles of Supremacía de la Realidad and Jerarquía normativa.

11.- By brief filed at 09:37 hours on March 7, 2016, Edwin Gerardo Zamora Salas, in his capacity as President with powers as Generalísimo Attorney-in-Fact without limit of sum of the corporation TRANSPORTES PRIVADOS HNOS ZAMORA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, appears before this Chamber to intervene as coadjutor (coadyuvante) of the plaintiff in the present acción de inconstitucionalidad, based on Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, according to which "Parties appearing in matters pending as of the date of the filing of the acción or those with a legitimate interest may appear within it, in order to coadjuvate in the allegations that might justify its appropriateness or inappropriateness, or to expand, as the case may be, the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that interests them." He bases his standing (legitimación activa) on the provisions of Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which recognizes the possibility of filing an acción de inconstitucionalidad without a base case, in cases where, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm, or it involves the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos), or those that concern the community as a whole. Regarding this last aspect – or if it involves the defense of diffuse interests –, the Chamber has already specified that the legislator refers to the standing held by active citizens because it concerns the right to work. He indicates that the company TRANSPORTES PRIVADOS HNOS ZAMORA SOCIEDAD ANONIMA has been dedicated to the private transport of persons (porteo) since 2010 under this legal figure, and since 2003, as a de facto partnership, through the system of affiliations, use of motor vehicles, and through private contracts related to the provision of the service, all of the above initially under the protection of the provisions of Article 323 of the Commercial Code in force before its reform, this commercial activity reaffirmed by the Free Trade Agreement with... road (porteo).

With the Reform of Law 3284, Commerce Code, and of Law No. 7969, Law Regulating the Public Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Vehicles under the Taxi Modality, of December 22, 1999, the word "person" is eliminated from Article 323 of the Commerce Code, and a new figure called "Servicio especial estable de taxi" is created from Law Regulating the Public Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons under the Taxi Modality, No. 7969, which retains the nature of the residual service currently provided by private transport of persons (porteo), but is protected and regulated by operation permits (permisos de operación) granted by the State. They are forced to subsist in carrying out their work under this new figure with a three-year operation permit for all units affiliated with them, without the possibility of renewal, which expired on July 7, 2015. As of that date, and having had their operation permits expire, they reactivated their service once again as "private carriers (porteadores privados)" making use of the operational bases in the cantons where they provide the service and under a platform system for services of private transport of persons (porteo de personas) by means of motor vehicles. A service they have been providing uninterruptedly in the Cantón de Poas, of the Provincia de Alajuela, Costa Rica, making use of the operation base in that canton since 2010, and using the municipal patent and operating permits valid to date. In accordance with the provisions of Chapter II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios" of the free trade agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, in Class 6431. Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). The present constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) challenges Law No. 8955, since as of its entry into force, no private person - individual or legal entity - may provide the service of remunerated transport of persons if, prior to doing so, they do not have the respective authorization - concession (concesión) or permit (permiso), depending on the modality in question - granted by the Consejo de Transporte Público, through the procedures established by the laws regulating the cited public service. This statization (estatización) of the private person transport service violates Article 46 of the Political Constitution, as the creation of public monopolies requires the approval of at least 38 deputies, a procedure that was violated because Bill No. 17874 that gave rise to Law No. 8955 was approved in a Committee with full legislative power (Comisión con potestad legislativa plena), which lacked the competence to approve a law that required a qualified majority of votes. As is correctly indicated in this action, the monopoly in favor of the State is mainly characterized by the elimination of competition and the prohibition of the activity being carried out by third parties. Law No. 8955 expressly establishes the prohibition of the exercise of this activity by eliminating the word person in Article 323 of the Commerce Code, and adding a final paragraph to that article, which for all effects provides: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores." Through this paragraph, an express prohibition is created regarding the provision of that service by private parties; that is to say, it statizes, as the Procuraduría indicates, a service that was regulated without any problem in the Commerce Code, and that arose as part of the agreement of wills between the parties, in which the free will to decide what best suits each person, according to their economic interests and the needs of the moment, prevails. Therefore, it indicates that through Law No. 8955, by eliminating the possibility of private transport of persons, Article 46 of the Political Constitution is violated. As is well stated in this action, with Law 8955, Reform of Law 3284, and of Law 7969, a public monopoly was established in the matter of public transport of persons under the taxi modality. The constitution of this monopoly was carried out through the approval of a law, outside the internal regulations of the Legislative Assembly, since it was done in a committee with full legislative power. Therefore, that bill was non-delegable to a full legislative committee, as its approval required a qualified majority (at least 38 votes), which violates Article 46 of the Political Constitution by rendering impossible the constitutional requirement of legislative approval by two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly. The approval of Law No. 8955 "Reforma a la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi," in force as of 2011, violates the approval and integration into our legal system of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, in violation of Article 7 of our Political Constitution. The mentioned International Treaty determined that the possibility of the private transport service could not be excluded or restricted. Since at the time of approval (December 2007), Costa Rica had private transport services under the taxi modality, in the form of private transport of persons (porteo de personas). Moreover, there was no law that had established a public monopoly of public transport under the taxi modality. Ergo, there was no prohibition on the provision of private transport services under the taxi modality. In Chapter II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" of the mentioned Treaty, Costa Rica did not establish any reservation in relation to this commercial activity. For this reason, Law No. 8955 of 2011 violates an agreement incorporated into our legal system (Ordenamiento Jurídico). Beyond this situation, it must offer foreign investors the "national treatment (trato nacional)" that existed at the time of signing the Treaty. Costa Rica, rather, negotiated the liberalization of services, including private transport of persons, under the taxi modality. Specifically, it can be located in: Class 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclass 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). It is necessary to reiterate that with the approval of Law No. 8955, "private transport of persons (porteo de personas)" is turned into a "public service (servicio público)," as it eliminates the possibility of its private exercise by eliminating the word "person" from Article 323 of the Commerce Code, which states: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores." With this same Law, a special regulation for this sector is introduced (servicio especial estable de taxi), violating the text of Article 11.6 of CAFTA, because the law diminishes "the degree of conformity (grado de conformidad)" with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Access to Markets), thus constituting an excess of legislative power, as the Legislative Assembly assumes a competence that the Constitution does not grant it, because it modifies a treaty in terms of its content, when according to the Constitution its function must be limited to approving or rejecting a treaty, with the clear breach of Articles 7, 129 and 140 subsections 3) and 10) of the Constitution. They consider that the arguments set forth denote with crystal clarity that the challenged norms violate the principles of free trade, freedom of labor, and freedom of transit, transgress the Political Constitution, and therefore, are unconstitutional. Taking into account the foregoing, and as coadjuvants of the plaintiff in this matter, they request that this constitutional challenge be upheld, and therefore, that the judgment order the following: That the unconstitutionality of Law No. 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, of December 22, 1999" be declared for violation of Articles: 7, 46, 129, 140, of the Political Constitution, as well as the principles of Supremacy of Reality (Supremacía de la Realidad) and Normative Hierarchy (Jerarquía normativa).

12.- By brief filed at 09:39 hours on March 7, 2016, Irma Isabel Loría Araya, in her capacity as President with the powers of a Generalisimo Attorney-in-Fact without limit of amount of the company SERVICIO DE TRANSPORTES PRIVADOS LUMA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, appears before this Chamber in order to intervene as coadjuvant of the plaintiff in this constitutional challenge, based on Article 83 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, according to which "The parties appearing in matters pending at the date of the filing of the action or those with a legitimate interest may appear within it, in order to coadjuvate in the allegations that might justify its admissibility or inadmissibility, or to expand, as the case may be, the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that concerns them." She bases her active standing on the provisions of Article 75, second paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which recognizes the possibility of filing a constitutional challenge without an underlying case (asunto base), in cases where, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm, or it involves the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos), or those that concern the community as a whole. Regarding this last aspect – or if it involves the defense of diffuse interests –, the Chamber has already specified that the legislator refers to the standing held by active citizens because it concerns the right to work. She indicates that the company SERVICIO DE TRANSPORTES PRIVADOS LUMA SOCIEDAD ANONIMA has been dedicated to the private transport of persons (porteo) since 2007 under this legal figure, and since 2005 as a de facto company, through the affiliation system, use of motor vehicles, and through private contracts related to the provision of the service, all of the above initially under the protection of the provisions of Article 323 of the Commerce Code in force before its reform, this commercial activity being reaffirmed by the Free Trade Agreement with highway (porteo). With the Reform of Law 3284, Commerce Code, and of Law No. 7969, Law Regulating the Public Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Vehicles under the Taxi Modality, of December 22, 1999, the word "person" is eliminated from Article 323 of the Commerce Code, and a new figure called "Servicio especial estable de taxi" is created from Law Regulating the Public Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons under the Taxi Modality, No. 7969, which retains the nature of the residual service currently provided by private transport of persons (porteo), but is protected and regulated by operation permits (permisos de operación) granted by the State. They are forced to subsist in carrying out their work under this new figure with a three-year operation permit for all units affiliated with them, without the possibility of renewal, which expired on July 7, 2015. As of that date, and having had their operation permits expire, they reactivated their service once again as "private carriers (porteadores privados)" making use of the operational bases in the cantons where they provide the service and under a platform system for services of private transport of persons (porteo de personas) by means of motor vehicles. A service they have been providing uninterruptedly in the Cantón de Cañas, of the Provincia de Guanacaste, Costa Rica, making use of the operation base in that canton since 2007, and using the municipal patent and operating permits valid to date. In accordance with the provisions of Chapter II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios" of the free trade agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, in Class 6431. Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). The present constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) challenges Law No. 8955, since as of its entry into force, no private person - individual or legal entity - may provide the service of remunerated transport of persons if, prior to doing so, they do not have the respective authorization - concession (concesión) or permit (permiso), depending on the modality in question - granted by the Consejo de Transporte Público, through the procedures established by the laws regulating the cited public service. This statization (estatización) of the private person transport service violates Article 46 of the Political Constitution, as the creation of public monopolies requires the approval of at least 38 deputies, a procedure that was violated because Bill No. 17874 that gave rise to Law No. 8955 was approved in a Committee with full legislative power (Comisión con potestad legislativa plena), which lacked the competence to approve a law that required a qualified majority of votes. As is correctly indicated in this action, the monopoly in favor of the State is mainly characterized by the elimination of competition and the prohibition of the activity being carried out by third parties. Law No. 8955 expressly establishes the prohibition of the exercise of this activity by eliminating the word person in Article 323 of the Commerce Code, and adding a final paragraph to that article, which for all effects provides: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores." Through this paragraph, an express prohibition is created regarding the provision of that service by private parties; that is to say, it statizes, as the Procuraduría indicates, a service that was regulated without any problem in the Commerce Code, and that arose as part of the agreement of wills between the parties, in which the free will to decide what best suits each person, according to their economic interests and the needs of the moment, prevails. Therefore, it indicates that through Law No. 8955, by eliminating the possibility of private transport of persons, Article 46 of the Political Constitution is violated. As is well stated in this action, with Law 8955, Reform of Law 3284, and of Law 7969, a public monopoly was established in the matter of public transport of persons under the taxi modality. The constitution of this monopoly was carried out through the approval of a law, outside the internal regulations of the Legislative Assembly, since it was done in a committee with full legislative power. Therefore, that bill was non-delegable to a full legislative committee, as its approval required a qualified majority (at least 38 votes), which violates Article 46 of the Political Constitution by rendering impossible the constitutional requirement of legislative approval by two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly. The approval of Law No. 8955 "Reforma a la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi," in force as of 2011, violates the approval and integration into our legal system of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, in violation of Article 7 of our Political Constitution. The mentioned International Treaty determined that the possibility of the private transport service could not be excluded or restricted. Since at the time of approval (December 2007), Costa Rica had private transport services under the taxi modality, in the form of private transport of persons (porteo de personas). Moreover, there was no law that had established a public monopoly of public transport under the taxi modality. Ergo, there was no prohibition on the provision of private transport services under the taxi modality. In Chapter II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" of the mentioned Treaty, Costa Rica did not establish any reservation in relation to this commercial activity. For this reason, Law No. 8955 of 2011 violates an agreement incorporated into our legal system (Ordenamiento Jurídico). Beyond this situation, it must offer foreign investors the "national treatment (trato nacional)" that existed at the time of signing the Treaty. Costa Rica, rather, negotiated the liberalization of services, including private transport of persons, under the taxi modality. Specifically, it can be located in: Class 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclass 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). It is necessary to reiterate that with the approval of Law No. 8955, "private transport of persons (porteo de personas)" is turned into a "public service (servicio público)," as it eliminates the possibility of its private exercise by eliminating the word "person" from Article 323 of the Commerce Code, which states: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores." With this same Law, a special regulation for this sector is introduced (servicio especial estable de taxi), violating the text of Article 11.6 of CAFTA, because the law diminishes "the degree of conformity (grado de conformidad)" with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Access to Markets), thus constituting an excess of legislative power, as the Legislative Assembly assumes a competence that the Constitution does not grant it, because it modifies a treaty in terms of its content, when according to the Constitution its function must be limited to approving or rejecting a treaty, with the clear breach of Articles 7, 129 and 140 subsections 3) and 10) of the Constitution. They consider that the arguments set forth denote with crystal clarity that the challenged norms violate the principles of free trade, freedom of labor, and freedom of transit, transgress the Political Constitution, and therefore, are unconstitutional. Taking into account the foregoing, and as coadjuvants of the plaintiff in this matter, they request that this constitutional challenge be upheld, and therefore, that the judgment order the following: That the unconstitutionality of Law No. 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, of December 22, 1999" be declared for violation of Articles: 7, 46, 129, 140, of the Political Constitution, as well as the principles of Supremacy of Reality (Supremacía de la Realidad) and Normative Hierarchy (Jerarquía normativa).

13.- By brief filed at 13:09 hours on March 7, 2016, Carlos Rigoberto Solís Castro, in his capacity as President with the powers of a Generalisimo Attorney-in-Fact without limit of amount of the company Transportes CR Porteadores Sociedad Anónima, appears before this Chamber in order to intervene as active coadjuvant of the plaintiff in this constitutional challenge, based on Article 83 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, according to which "The parties appearing in matters pending at the date of the filing of the action or those with a legitimate interest may appear within it, in order to coadjuvate in the allegations that might justify its admissibility or inadmissibility, or to expand, as the case may be, the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that concerns them." He bases his active standing on the provisions of Article 75, second paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which recognizes the possibility of filing a constitutional challenge without an underlying case (asunto base), in cases where, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm, or it involves the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos), or those that concern the community as a whole. Regarding this last aspect – or if it involves the defense of diffuse interests –, the Chamber has already specified that the legislator refers to the standing held by active citizens because it concerns the right to work. He indicates that the company TRANSPORTES CR PORTEADORES SOCIEDAD ANONIMA has been dedicated to the private transport of persons (porteo) since 2006 under this legal figure, and since 2005 as a de facto company, through the affiliation system, use of motor vehicles, and through private contracts related to the provision of the service, all of the above initially under the protection of the provisions of Article 323 of the Commerce Code in force before its reform, this commercial activity being reaffirmed by the Free Trade Agreement with highway (porteo). With the Reform of Law 3284, Commerce Code, and of Law No. 7969, Law Regulating the Public Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Vehicles under the Taxi Modality, of December 22, 1999, the word "person" is eliminated from Article 323 of the Commerce Code, and a new figure called "Servicio especial estable de taxi" is created from Law Regulating the Public Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons under the Taxi Modality, No. 7969, which retains the nature of the residual service currently provided by private transport of persons (porteo), but is protected and regulated by operation permits (permisos de operación) granted by the State. They are forced to subsist in carrying out their work under this new figure with a three-year operation permit for all units affiliated with them, without the possibility of renewal, which expired on July 7, 2015. As of that date, and having had their operation permits expire, they reactivated their service once again as "private carriers (porteadores privados)" making use of the operational bases in the cantons where they provide the service and under a platform system for services of private transport of persons (porteo de personas) by means of motor vehicles. A service they have been providing uninterruptedly in the Cantón de Valverde Vega, of the Provincia de Alajuela, Costa Rica, making use of the operation base in that canton since 2006, and using the municipal patent and operating permits valid to date. In accordance with the provisions of Chapter II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios" of the free trade agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, in Class 6431. Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). The present constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) challenges Law No. 8955, since as of its entry into force, no private person - individual or legal entity - may provide the service of remunerated transport of persons if, prior to doing so, they do not have the respective authorization - concession (concesión) or permit (permiso), depending on the modality in question - granted by the Consejo de Transporte Público, through the procedures established by the laws regulating the cited public service. This statization (estatización) of the private person transport service violates Article 46 of the Political Constitution, as the creation of public monopolies requires the approval of at least 38 deputies, a procedure that was violated because Bill No. 17874 that gave rise to Law No. 8955 was approved in a Committee with full legislative power (Comisión con potestad legislativa plena), which lacked the competence to approve a law that required a qualified majority of votes. As is correctly indicated in this action, the monopoly in favor of the State is mainly characterized by the elimination of competition and the prohibition of the activity being carried out by third parties. Law No. 8955 expressly establishes the prohibition of the exercise of this activity by eliminating the word person in Article 323 of the Commerce Code, and adding a final paragraph to that article, which for all effects provides: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores." Through this paragraph, an express prohibition is created regarding the provision of that service by private parties; that is to say, it statizes, as the Procuraduría indicates, a service that was regulated without any problem in the Commerce Code, and that arose as part of the agreement of wills between the parties, in which the free will to decide what best suits each person, according to their economic interests and the needs of the moment, prevails. Therefore, it indicates that through Law No. 8955, by eliminating the possibility of private transport of persons, Article 46 of the Political Constitution is violated. As is well stated in this action, with Law 8955, Reform of Law 3284, and of Law 7969, a public monopoly was established in the matter of public transport of persons under the taxi modality. The constitution of this monopoly was carried out through the approval of a law, outside the internal regulations of the Legislative Assembly, since it was done in a committee with full legislative power. Therefore, that bill was non-delegable to a full legislative committee, as its approval required a qualified majority (at least 38 votes), which violates Article 46 of the Political Constitution by rendering impossible the constitutional requirement of legislative approval by two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly. The approval of Law No. 8955 "Reforma a la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi," in force as of 2011, violates the approval and integration into our legal system of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, in violation of Article 7 of our Political Constitution. The mentioned International Treaty determined that the possibility of the private transport service could not be excluded or restricted. Since at the time of approval (December 2007), Costa Rica had private transport services under the taxi modality, in the form of private transport of persons (porteo de personas). Moreover, there was no law that had established a public monopoly of public transport under the taxi modality. Ergo, there was no prohibition on the provision of private transport services under the taxi modality. In Chapter II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" of the mentioned Treaty, Costa Rica did not establish any reservation in relation to this commercial activity. For this reason, Law No. 8955 of 2011 violates an agreement incorporated into our legal system (Ordenamiento Jurídico). Beyond this situation, it must offer foreign investors the "national treatment (trato nacional)" that existed at the time of signing the Treaty. Costa Rica, rather, negotiated the liberalization of services, including private transport of persons, under the taxi modality. Specifically, it can be located in: Class 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclass 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). It is necessary to reiterate that with the approval of Law No. 8955, "private transport of persons (porteo de personas)" is turned into a "public service (servicio público)," as it eliminates the possibility of its private exercise by eliminating the word "person" from Article 323 of the Commerce Code, which states: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores." With this same Law, a special regulation for this sector is introduced (servicio especial estable de taxi), violating the text of Article 11.6 of CAFTA, because the law diminishes "the degree of conformity (grado de conformidad)" with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Access to Markets), thus constituting an excess of legislative power, as the Legislative Assembly assumes a competence that the Constitution does not grant it, because it modifies a treaty in terms of its content, when according to the Constitution its function must be limited to approving or rejecting a treaty, with the clear breach of Articles 7, 129 and 140 subsections 3) and 10) of the Constitution. They consider that the arguments set forth denote with crystal clarity that the challenged norms violate the principles of free trade, freedom of labor, and freedom of transit, transgress the Political Constitution, and therefore, are unconstitutional.

Taking into account the foregoing, and in their capacity as coadjuvants of the plaintiff in this matter, they request that this action of unconstitutionality be granted, and therefore, that the judgment order the following: That the unconstitutionality of Law No. 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" be declared for violation of Articles: 7, 46, 129, 140, of the Political Constitution, as well as the principles of Supremacy of Reality and Normative Hierarchy.

14.- By written submission presented at 10:03 a.m. on March 7, 2016, Luis Enrique Moreno Carmona, in his capacity as President with powers of Generalísimo Attorney-in-Fact without limit of sum of the company Unión de Porteadores LÑMC dos mil seis sociedad anónima, appears before this Chamber in order to intervene as coadjuvant of the plaintiff in this action of unconstitutionality, based on Article 83 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, according to which "The parties that appear in matters pending on the date of filing the action or those with a legitimate interest may appear within it, in order to coadjuvate in the allegations that might justify its admissibility or inadmissibility, or to expand, as applicable, the grounds for unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that interests them." He bases his active standing on the provisions of Article 75, second paragraph, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, which recognizes the possibility of filing an action of unconstitutionality without a base case, in cases where, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it involves the defense of diffuse interests, or those concerning the community as a whole. Regarding this last aspect — or involving the defense of diffuse interests — the Chamber has already clarified that the legislator refers to the standing held by active citizens because it concerns the right to work. He indicates that the company UNIÓN DE PORTEADORES LÑMC DOS MIL SEIS SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA has been dedicated to the private transportation of persons (porteo) since 2006 through this legal form, and since 2000 as a de facto partnership (sociedad de hecho), through a membership system, use of motor vehicles, and private contracts related to the provision of the service, all of the above initially under the protection of the provisions of Article 323 of the Commercial Code in force before its amendment, this commercial activity reaffirmed by the Free Trade Agreement with highway (porteo). With the Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de Comercio, and of Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, of December 22, 1999, the word "person" is eliminated from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and from the Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N° 7969, a new category is created called "Servicio especial estable de taxi," which retains the nature of the residual service that porteo currently provides, but protected and regulated by operation permits granted by the State. They are forced to subsist in carrying out their work under this new category with a three-year operation permit for all units affiliated with them, without the possibility of renewal, which expired on July 7, 2015. From this date, and having the operation permits expired, they reactivated the service again as "porteadores privados" (private transporters) making use of the operating bases in the cantons where they provide the service and under a system platform for porteo services of persons through motor vehicles. A service they had been providing uninterruptedly in the Canton of Santa Cruz, of the Province of Guanacaste, Costa Rica, making use of the operating base in that canton since 2006, and the use of the municipal license (patente municipal) and operating permits in force to date. In accordance with the provisions of Chapter II "Cross-Border Trade in Services" of the free trade agreement with the United States, Dominican Republic, and Central America, in Class 6431. Regular special urban and suburban passenger transport services by road (porteo). This action of unconstitutionality challenges Law No. 8955, since as of its entry into force, no private individual — individual or legal entity (persona física o jurídica) — may provide the service of paid transportation of persons if, prior to that, they do not have the respective authorization — concession (concesión) or permit, according to the modality in question conferred by the Consejo de Transporte Público, through the procedures established by the laws regulating said public service. Said nationalization (estatización) of the private transportation service of persons is a violation of Article 46 of the Political Constitution, since the creation of public monopolies requires the approval of at least 38 deputies, a procedure that was violated because bill N° 17874, which gave rise to Law No. 8955, was approved in a Committee with Full Legislative Powers (Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena), which lacked the competence to approve a law that requires a qualified majority of votes. As is well stated in this action, the monopoly in favor of the State is characterized mainly by the elimination of competition and the prohibition of carrying out the activity by third parties. Law No. 8955 clearly establishes the prohibition of exercising this activity, by eliminating the word person in Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and adding a last paragraph to that article, which for these purposes states: "The transportation contract regulated in this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by means of motor vehicles." Through this paragraph, an express prohibition is created on the provision of this service by private individuals, that is, it nationalizes, as the Procuraduría indicates, a service that was regulated without any problem in the Commercial Code, and which arose as part of the meeting of wills between the parties, in which the free will to decide what best suits each person, according to their economic interests and the needs of that moment, prevails. Therefore, he indicates that through Law No. 8955, by eliminating the possibility of private transportation of persons, Article 46 of the Political Constitution is violated. As is well stated in this action, with Law 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, and of Ley 7969, a public monopoly was established in the matter of public transportation of persons in the taxi modality. The constitution of this monopoly was carried out through the approval of a law, outside the internal regulations of the Legislative Assembly, since it was done in a committee with full legislative powers. Therefore, that bill could not be delegated to a full legislative committee, since it required a qualified majority (at least 38 votes) for its approval, thus violating Article 46 of the Political Constitution, by preventing the constitutional requirement of legislative approval by two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly. The approval of Law No. 8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, in force as of 2011, violates the approval and integration into our legal system of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, Dominican Republic, and Central America, in violation of Article 7 of our Political Constitution. The mentioned International Treaty determined that the possibility of private transportation service could not be excluded or restricted. Since at the time of approval (December 2007), Costa Rica had private transportation services in the taxi modality, in the category of porteo of persons. But furthermore, there was no law that had established a public monopoly on public transportation in the taxi modality. Therefore, there was no prohibition on the provision of private transportation services in the taxi modality. In Chapter II "Cross-Border Trade in Services" of the aforementioned Treaty, Costa Rica did not establish any reservation in relation to this commercial activity. Reason for which Law No. 8955 of 2011 comes to violate an agreement incorporated into our Legal System. Beyond this situation, it must offer foreign investors the "national treatment" we had at the time of signing the Treaty. Costa Rica rather negotiated the liberalization of services, including that of private transportation of persons, in the taxi modality. Concretely, we can locate it in: Class 6431: Regular passenger transport services by road (porteo). Subclass 64312: Regular special urban and suburban passenger transport services by road (taxis). It is necessary to reiterate that with the approval of Law No. 8955, the "porteo of persons" becomes a "public service" because it eliminates the possibility of its exercise in private form by eliminating the word "person" from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, which states: "The transportation contract regulated in this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by means of motor vehicles." With this same Law, a special regulation is introduced for this sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), violating the text of Article 11.6 of CAFTA, because the law reduces "the degree of conformity" with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access), thereby leading to an excess of legislative power, as the Legislative Assembly assumes a competence not granted by the Constitution, since it modifies a treaty's content, when according to the Constitution its function must be limited to approving or rejecting a treaty, with the clear breach of Articles 7, 129, and 140, subsections 3) and 10) of the Constitution. They consider that the arguments presented clearly denote that the contested norms violate the principles of free trade, freedom of work, and freedom of transit, transgress the Political Constitution, and therefore, are unconstitutional. Taking into account the foregoing, and in their capacity as coadjuvants of the plaintiff in this matter, they request that this action of unconstitutionality be granted, and therefore, that the judgment order the following: That the unconstitutionality of Law No. 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" be declared for violation of Articles: 7, 46, 129, 140, of the Political Constitution, as well as the principles of Supremacy of Reality and Normative Hierarchy.

15.- The Procuraduría General de la República submitted its report by writing received in the Secretariat of this Chamber at 2:30 p.m. on March 7, 2016 (folio 310 of the case file). On the merits of the matter, it points out that the plaintiffs consider that Law No. 8955 is unconstitutional for creating a public monopoly in the matter of paid transportation of persons in vehicles in the taxi modality, without following the legislative procedure established for such purposes (qualified vote) and for violating the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, Dominican Republic, and Central America. On this matter, the Procuraduría General de la República considers that the plaintiffs are not right in their objections and, on the contrary, it is not true that the challenged law infringes the indicated constitutional norms and principles. It explains that the paid transportation of persons, in its various modalities, constitutes a public service. Indeed, the Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores, n.° 3503 of May 10, 1965, qualifies the paid transportation of persons in collective motor vehicles as a public service regulated, controlled, and monitored by the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, whose provision may be delegated to private individuals who are expressly authorized, in accordance with the norms established in that law (Articles 1 and 2). In the same sense, it asserts that the Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, n.° 7969 of December 22, 1999, defined this means of transport as a public service exploited through the figure of administrative concession (concesión administrativa), with the special procedures established in this law and its regulation (Article 2). And it indicates that through the amendment introduced to Article 2 of Law 7969, precisely by Article 2 of Law 8955, of June 16, 2011, the paid transportation of persons in any type of motor vehicle is established as a public service. Now then, it indicates that the concept of public service is not static but, on the contrary, it is a changing concept, as it depends on the classification made by the legislator of an economic activity at a given historical moment. The “publicatio” is, precisely, the constitutional or legal declaration that defines an activity as a public service. This declaration may simply consist of defining the activity as of public interest, or in the express classification of the activity as a public service. For its part, it argues that the Procuraduría General de la República, in relation to the concept and characteristic notes of public services, has pointed out that, according to French and Spanish doctrine, a public service is an administrative activity whose purpose is the provision of a public service in order to satisfy a collective need. Likewise, it affirms that public service has three characteristics: an activity proper to the Administration; it procures a benefit to the population; and it guarantees said benefit effectively. In view of this, it notes that public service is proper to the Administration, without excluding the possibility of participation by private individuals in public management through the concession of a public service. It indicates, according to Spanish doctrine, that public service in its strict sense constitutes a variety of administrative activity in order to make benefits useful to private individuals available to them; and it indicates that it presupposes the decision of the public power to guarantee said benefit –publicatio–. It explains that the service is characterized by having public ownership –removed from private initiative–; and the benefit satisfies the general interests of the community, in order to ensure a dignified quality of life for the population. In view of which, it indicates that the public nature presupposes the declaration by the public power; and it points out that the participation of non-state subjects in said provision is possible, as long as they obtain State authorization. In relation to the effects of declaring a certain activity as a public service, it asserts that, in the first place, it implies its nationalization –attributing its ownership to the State, in such a way that only the State or an authorized private individual may provide the service–; and in the second place, said activity exits the commerce of men, such that private individuals may only engage in it through state concessions or permits. Now then, it indicates that, in relation to the paid transportation of persons in motor vehicles –in its different modalities, buses and taxis–, there is no doubt that it constitutes a public service; such that through the challenged law, the legislator, within the framework permitted by the Political Constitution, chose to declare all activity of paid transportation of persons as a public service, in view of the importance that said activity has for Costa Rican society. Indeed, it points out that, according to the modification introduced by the cited law to Law No. 7969, the paid transportation of persons, regardless of the type of motor vehicle used, the persons to whom it is directed –whether offered to the general public or to users of specific groups– and the state intervention in determining the operating system or oversight (fiscalización), constitutes a public service. And it states that, consequently, as of the entry into force of Law No. 8955, no private individual –individual or legal entity– may provide the service of paid transportation of persons if, prior to that, they do not have the respective authorization –concession or permit– conferred by the Consejo de Transporte Público through the procedures established by the laws regulating said public service. Now then, due to its nature as a public service, it is logical that the paid service of persons must be provided by the State under monopoly conditions; however, it may well be delegated to private individuals through a concession or permit, depending on the modality in question. It cites several constitutional precedents and notes that this Tribunal recognizes that public services, by their nature, must be provided by the State under monopoly conditions. However, it recognizes that they may be assumed by private individuals, via concession or permit, as authorized by the laws regulating the paid transportation service of persons. On the other hand, it explains that the plaintiffs are also not correct in the sense that the challenged law creates a public monopoly in favor of the State and that, for this reason, it should have been approved by a qualified majority (38 votes). And it insists that what the law in question does is declare all activity of paid transportation of persons as a public service, and such regulation could be delegated to a Committee with Full Legislative Powers. Moreover, this Constitutional Chamber already endorsed the constitutionality of the procedure followed in the approval of the Law challenged here, through resolution number 2011-04778; and it notes that when analyzing the constitutionality of the bill that gave rise to the law challenged here, it was categorical in affirming, first, that it does not create any monopoly or monopolistic practice, second, that Article 46 of the Political Constitution does not create an aggravated law reservation for the imposition of regulations or limits on freedom of commerce, and, third, that the delegation of a bill of such nature to a Committee with Full Legislative Powers was indeed admissible. Finally, it explains that it is also not true that the challenged Law violates the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, Dominican Republic, and Central America and, in particular, Chapter 11 of said Treaty, by restricting the possibility of private transportation service and thereby the obligation to offer foreign investors the national treatment we had at the time of signing the Treaty. On this matter, the Procuraduría considers that Chapter 11 of the Treaty in question is not applicable in the case of public services. And it made this known through Legal Opinion No. 111-2015, of September 25, 2015, when resolving a query made by a Deputy about the possible authorization of the company UBER. In relevant part, the Procuraduría indicated that said Treaty, in Chapter Eleven, regulates matters related to "Cross-Border Trade in Services" and the legal concept of "national treatment"; it notes that the same Free Trade Agreement in question expressly establishes that Chapter Eleven, concerning Cross-Border Trade in Services, does not apply in the case of services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority, defining such as "(…) any service that is not supplied under commercial conditions or in competition with one or more service providers." Therefore, in the opinion of the Procuraduría, there is no doubt that public services, and in particular the paid transportation service of persons, in its different modalities, by reason of their nationalization, are the responsibility of the State and only the State or the persons it expressly authorizes may provide it. Indeed, the service in question cannot be freely provided by interested individuals or legal entities, as a prior authorization –concession or permit, depending on the transportation modality in question– from the Consejo de Transporte Público is necessarily required. Likewise, it points out that the legal concept of "national treatment," enshrined in numeral 11.2.1 of the referred Free Trade Agreement, is also not applicable in this instance. The limitation or requirement of having prior authorization from the Consejo de Transporte Público to provide the paid transportation service of persons is imposed due to the public nature of the service and not based on the nationality of the person or company seeking to provide it. In other words, the limitation to provide the service applies to both national and foreign individuals or legal entities, such that there is no discrimination based on the nationality of the interested company. And it indicates that the clauses established in Chapter 11 of CAFTA are not applicable to the paid transportation service of persons, since the Treaty itself, specifically in Article 11.1.6, excludes from its application services provided in the exercise of governmental authority. And there is no doubt that public services, and in particular the paid transportation service of persons, in its different modalities, by reason of their nationalization, are the responsibility of the State and only the State or the persons it expressly authorizes may provide it. It requests that the action of unconstitutionality be dismissed, by virtue of the fact that it finds no constitutional friction in the questioned Law.

16.- According to the certificate on folio 489, it does not appear that the Minister of Obras Públicas y Transportes presented any writing or document for the hearing granted (folio 489 of the digital case file).

17.- Through a written submission presented at 11:10 a.m. on March 8, 2016, Byron Rojas, in his capacity as a transporter (porteador), appears before this Chamber in order to intervene as an active coadjuvant indicating that there is terrible persecution by the traffic police against transporters, however, the matter not only affects people who drive a vehicle, but it is a question of work for many people and their families. He indicates that there is an evident employment problem in people over 35 years of age, a situation that increases the unemployment rate since many transnational companies leave the country. He requests that the judgment on the filed action of unconstitutionality be issued as soon as possible.

18.- By written submission presented at 11:09 a.m. on March 8, 2016, Carlos Luis Montero Martínez, in his capacity as President with powers of Generalísimo Attorney-in-Fact without limit of sum of the company Corporación Manuel Antonio Travel Sociedad Anónima, appears before this Chamber in order to intervene as coadjuvant of the plaintiff in this action of unconstitutionality, based on Article 83 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, according to which "The parties that appear in matters pending on the date of filing the action or those with a legitimate interest may appear within it, in order to coadjuvate in the allegations that might justify its admissibility or inadmissibility, or to expand, as applicable, the grounds for unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that interests them." He bases his active standing on the provisions of Article 75, second paragraph, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, which recognizes the possibility of filing an action of unconstitutionality without a base case, in cases where, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it involves the defense of diffuse interests, or those concerning the community as a whole. Regarding this last aspect — or involving the defense of diffuse interests — the Chamber has already clarified that the legislator refers to the standing held by active citizens because it concerns the right to work. He indicates that the company CORPORACION MANUEL ANTONIO TRAVEL SOCIEDAD ANONIMA has been dedicated to the private transportation of persons (porteo) since 2005 through this legal form, and since 1995 as a de facto partnership, through a membership system, use of motor vehicles, and private contracts related to the provision of the service, all of the above initially under the protection of the provisions of Article 323 of the Commercial Code in force before its amendment, this commercial activity reaffirmed by the Free Trade Agreement with highway (porteo). With the Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de Comercio, and of Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, of December 22, 1999, the word "person" is eliminated from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and from the Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N°7969, a new category is created called "Servicio especial estable de taxi," which retains the nature of the residual service that porteo currently provides, but protected and regulated by operation permits granted by the State. They are forced to subsist in carrying out their work under this new category with a three-year operation permit for all units affiliated with them, without the possibility of renewal, which expired on July 7, 2015. From this date, and having the operation permits expired, they reactivated the service again as "porteadores privados" making use of the operating bases in the cantons where they provide the service and under a system platform for porteo services of persons through motor vehicles. A service they have been providing uninterruptedly in the Canton of Aguirre-Quepos, of the Province of Puntarenas, Costa Rica, making use of the operating base in that canton since 2005, and the use of the municipal license and operating permits in force to date. In accordance with the provisions of Chapter II "Cross-Border Trade in Services" of the free trade agreement with the United States, Dominican Republic, and Central America, in Class 6431. Regular special urban and suburban passenger transport services by road (porteo). This action of unconstitutionality challenges Law No. 8955, since as of its entry into force, no private individual — individual or legal entity — may provide the service of paid transportation of persons if, prior to that, they do not have the respective authorization — concession or permit, according to the modality in question conferred by the Consejo de Transporte Público, through the procedures established by the laws regulating said public service. Said nationalization of the private transportation service of persons is a violation of Article 46 of the Political Constitution, since the creation of public monopolies requires the approval of at least 38 deputies, a procedure that was violated because bill N° 17874, which gave rise to Law No. 8955, was approved in a Committee with Full Legislative Powers, which lacked the competence to approve a law that requires a qualified majority of votes. As is well stated in this action, the monopoly in favor of the State is characterized mainly by the elimination of competition and the prohibition of carrying out the activity by third parties. Law No. 8955 clearly establishes the prohibition of exercising this activity, by eliminating the word person in Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and adding a last paragraph to that article, which for these purposes states: "The transportation contract regulated in this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by means of motor vehicles." Through this paragraph, an express prohibition is created on the provision of this service by private individuals, that is, it nationalizes, as the Procuraduría indicates, a service that was regulated without any problem in the Commercial Code, and which arose as part of the meeting of wills between the parties, in which the free will to decide what best suits each person, according to their economic interests and the needs of that moment, prevails. Therefore, he indicates that through Law No. 8955, by eliminating the possibility of private transportation of persons, Article 46 of the Political Constitution is violated. As is well stated in this action, with Law 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, and of Ley 7969, a public monopoly was established in the matter of public transportation of persons in the taxi modality. The constitution of this monopoly was carried out through the approval of a law, outside the internal regulations of the Legislative Assembly, since it was done in a committee with full legislative powers.

Therefore, that bill could not be delegated to a full legislative committee, since its approval required a qualified majority (at least 38 votes), thereby violating Article 46 of the Political Constitution, by making it impossible to meet the constitutional requirement of legislative approval by two-thirds of the total membership of the Legislative Assembly. The approval of Law No. 8955, "Reform of Law No. 3284, Commercial Code, and of Law 7969, the Law Regulating the Public Service of Remunerated Transportation of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Mode," effective as of 2011, violates the approval and integration into our legal system of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, in violation of Article 7 of our Political Constitution. The aforementioned International Treaty determined that the possibility of private transportation service could not be excluded or restricted. Indeed, at the time of its approval (December 2007), Costa Rica had private transportation services in the taxi mode, in the form of the private transport of persons (porteo de personas). Furthermore, there was no law that had established a public monopoly on public transportation in the taxi mode. Ergo, there was no prohibition on the provision of private transportation services in the taxi mode. In Chapter II, "Cross-Border Trade in Services" of the aforementioned Treaty, Costa Rica did not establish any reservation regarding this commercial activity. For this reason, Law No. 8955 of 2011 violates an agreement incorporated into our legal system. Beyond this situation, it must offer foreign investors the "national treatment" we had at the time of signing the Treaty. Costa Rica instead negotiated the liberalization of services, including private transportation of persons in the taxi mode. Specifically, it can be located in: Class 6431: Regular passenger road transportation services (porteo). Subclass 64312: Special regular urban and suburban passenger road transportation services (taxis). It is necessary to reiterate that with the approval of Law No. 8955, the "private transport of persons (porteo de personas)" becomes a "public service," as it eliminates the possibility of its private exercise with the elimination of the word "person" from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, which states: "The transportation contract regulated in this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by means of motor vehicles." With this same law, a special regulation for this sector (special stable taxi service) is introduced, violating the text of Article 11.6 of CAFTA, because the law diminishes "the degree of conformity" with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access), thereby causing an excess of legislative power, as the Legislative Assembly assumes a competence that the Constitution does not grant it, amending a treaty in terms of its content, when according to the Constitution its function should be limited to approving or disapproving a treaty, with a clear breach of Articles 7, 129, and 140, subsections 3) and 10) of the Constitution. They consider that the arguments presented demonstrate with crystal clarity that the challenged norms violate the principles of free trade, freedom to work, and freedom of movement, transgress the Political Constitution, and therefore are unconstitutional. Taking into account the foregoing, and in the capacity of coadjuvants to the petitioner in this matter, they request that this action of unconstitutionality be granted, and therefore, that the judgment order the following: That Law No. 8955; "Reform of Law No. 3284, Commercial Code, and Reform of Law No. 7969, Law Regulating the Public Service of Remunerated Transportation of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Mode, of December 22, 1999," be declared unconstitutional for violation of Articles: 7, 46, 129, 140, of the Political Constitution, as well as the principles of Supremacy of Reality and Normative Hierarchy.

19.- By brief filed at 4:40 p.m. on March 8, 2016, José Alexis Lara Jiménez, in his capacity as President with powers of Generalisimo Proxy without limit of amount of the company Transportes Unidos RUALFA Sociedad Anónima, appears before this Chamber to intervene as an active coadjuvant of the petitioner in this action of unconstitutionality, based on Article 83 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, according to which "The parties listed in matters pending at the date of filing the action, or those with a legitimate interest, may appear within it, in order to coadjuvate in the allegations that could justify its admissibility or inadmissibility, or to expand, as the case may be, the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that concerns them." He grounds his active standing in the provisions of Article 75, second paragraph, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, which recognizes the possibility of filing an action of unconstitutionality without an underlying matter, in cases where, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those that pertain to the community as a whole. Regarding this last aspect - or concerning the defense of diffuse interests - the Chamber has already clarified that the legislator refers to the standing held by active citizens because it concerns the right to work. He indicates that the company Unión Nacional de Porteadores - UNAPORTE has been dedicated to the private transport of persons (porteo) since 2004 through the present legal figure, and since 2002 as a de facto company, through a system of affiliations, the use of motor vehicles, and private contracts relating to the provision of the service, all of the foregoing initially under the protection of Article 323 of the Commercial Code in force before its reform, this commercial activity reaffirmed by the Free Trade Agreement with road transportation (porteo). With the Reform of Law 3284, Commercial Code, and of Law No. 7969, the Law Regulating the Public Service of Remunerated Transportation of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Mode, of December 22, 1999, the word "person" is eliminated from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and a new figure is created from the Law Regulating the public service of remunerated transportation of persons in the taxi mode, No. 7969, called the "Special stable taxi service," which retains the nature of the residual service that porteo currently provides, but protected and regulated by operation permits granted by the State. Forcing them to subsist in carrying out their work under this new figure with a three-year operation permit for all units affiliated with them, without the possibility of renewal, which expired on July 7, 2015. As of this date, and having the operation permits expired, they reactivated the service again as "private transporters (porteadores privados)" using the operational bases in the cantons where they provide the service and under a platform system for private transport of persons (porteo de personas) services by means of motor vehicles. A service they have been providing uninterruptedly in the Canton of Alfaro Ruiz, in the Province of Alajuela, Costa Rica, using the operation base in that canton since 2004, and using the municipal license and operating permits valid to date. In accordance with the provisions of Chapter II, "Cross-Border Trade in Services," of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, in Class 6431. Special regular urban and suburban passenger road transportation services (porteo). This action of unconstitutionality challenges Law No. 8955, since from its entry into force, no private person - natural or juridical - can provide remunerated transportation of persons unless, prior to doing so, they have the respective authorization - concession or permit, depending on the mode in question - granted by the Public Transportation Council, through the procedures established by the laws regulating the cited public service. Said nationalization (estatización) of the private transportation service of persons is a violation of Article 46 of the Political Constitution, because the creation of public monopolies requires the approval of at least 38 deputies, a procedure that was violated because Legislative Bill No. 17874, which gave rise to Law No. 8955, was approved in a Committee with full legislative power (Comisión con potestad legislativa plena), which lacked the competence to approve a law requiring a qualified majority of votes. As is well indicated in this action, the monopoly in favor of the State is characterized mainly by the elimination of competition and the prohibition of the activity being carried out by third parties. Law No. 8955 manifestly establishes the prohibition of the exercise of this activity, by eliminating the word "person" in Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and adding a last paragraph to that article, which for these purposes provides: "The transportation contract regulated in this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by means of motor vehicles." Through this paragraph, an express prohibition is created on the provision of that service by private individuals, that is, a service that was regulated without any problem in the Commercial Code, and which arose as part of the meeting of the minds between the parties, in which the free will to decide what best suits each one, according to their economic interests and the needs of the moment, is nationalized (estatiza), as indicated by the Procuraduría. Therefore, he indicates that by means of Law No. 8955, with the elimination of the possibility of private transport of persons, Article 46 of the Political Constitution is violated. As is well set forth in this action, with Law 8955, Reform of Law 3284, and of Law 7969, a public monopoly was established in the field of public transportation of persons in the taxi mode. The creation of this monopoly was carried out through the approval of a law, outside the internal regulations of the Legislative Assembly, since it was done in a committee with full legislative power (comisión con potestad legislativa plena). Therefore, that bill could not be delegated to a full legislative committee, since its approval required a qualified majority (at least 38 votes), thereby violating Article 46 of the Political Constitution, by making it impossible to meet the constitutional requirement of legislative approval by two-thirds of the total membership of the Legislative Assembly. The approval of Law No. 8955, "Reform of Law No. 3284, Commercial Code, and of Law 7969, the Law Regulating the Public Service of Remunerated Transportation of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Mode," effective as of 2011, violates the approval and integration into our legal system of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, in violation of Article 7 of our Political Constitution. The aforementioned International Treaty determined that the possibility of private transportation service could not be excluded or restricted. Indeed, at the time of its approval (December 2007), Costa Rica had private transportation services in the taxi mode, in the form of the private transport of persons (porteo de personas). Furthermore, there was no Law that had established a public monopoly on public transportation in the taxi mode. Ergo, there was no prohibition on the provision of private transportation services in the taxi mode. In Chapter II, "Cross-Border Trade in Services" of the aforementioned Treaty, Costa Rica did not establish any reservation regarding this commercial activity. For this reason, Law No. 8955 of 2011 violates an agreement incorporated into our Legal System. Beyond this situation, it must offer foreign investors the "national treatment" we had at the time of signing the Treaty. Costa Rica instead negotiated the liberalization of services, including private transportation of persons in the taxi mode. Specifically, we can locate it in: Class 6431: Regular passenger road transportation services (porteo). Subclass 64312: Special regular urban and suburban passenger road transportation services (taxis). It is necessary to reiterate that with the approval of Law No. 8955, the "private transport of persons (porteo de personas)" becomes a "public service," as it eliminates the possibility of its private exercise with the elimination of the word "person" from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, which states: "The transportation contract regulated in this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by means of motor vehicles." With this same Law, a special regulation for this sector (special stable taxi service) is introduced, violating the text of Article 11.6 of CAFTA, because the law diminishes "the degree of conformity" with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access), thereby causing an excess of legislative power, as the Legislative Assembly assumes a competence that the Constitution does not grant it, amending a treaty in terms of its content, when according to the Constitution its function should be limited to approving or disapproving a treaty, with a clear breach of Articles 7, 129, and 140, subsections 3) and 10) of the Constitution. They consider that the arguments presented demonstrate with crystal clarity that the challenged norms violate the principles of free trade, freedom to work, and freedom of movement, transgress the Political Constitution, and therefore are unconstitutional. Taking into account the foregoing, and in the capacity of coadjuvants to the petitioner in this matter, they request that this action of unconstitutionality be granted, and therefore, that the judgment order the following: That Law No. 8955; "Reform of Law No. 3284, Commercial Code, and Reform of Law No. 7969, Law Regulating the Public Service of Remunerated Transportation of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Mode, of December 22, 1999," be declared unconstitutional for violation of Articles: 7, 46, 129, 140, of the Political Constitution, as well as the principles of Supremacy of Reality and Normative Hierarchy.

20.- By brief filed at 11:06 a.m. on March 8, 2016, Maribel Porras Arrieta, Felipe Di Bella Porras, and others, appear before this Chamber to intervene as active coadjuvants of the petitioner in this action of unconstitutionality; Law No. 8955 is illegal, because it is unconstitutional; the procedure for its creation is flawed, contrary to law; in the procedure for Legislative Bill No. 17874, which in turn gave rise to Law 8955, it was approved in a Full Legislative Committee (Comisión legislativa Plena), without the competence to approve such a law by legal imperative of Article 46 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica, since said Committee and no Committee can hear and approve a Law that requires a qualified majority vote (38 votes), by constitutional legal imperative; herein lies the unconstitutionality of Law No. 8955. The regulations related to porteo and remunerated transportation of persons in the special stable taxi mode clearly and openly violate Articles 07, 46, 129, 140 of our Magna Carta, coupled with the fact that the limitations imposed derive not only from the law but also from administrative acts; and as per the wording of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, to this day, this matter of remunerated transportation of persons in the special stable taxi mode remains pending resolution in many instances; there are various open administrative contentious proceedings; it is a matter of a public nature in that new wine has been poured into old wineskins and they have burst. Our Political Constitution enshrines the right to commercial freedom, broadly developed through case law, principles that have been violated with the reform of Article 323 of the Commercial Code; likewise, said reform of Article 323 has the opposite effect of creating an environment of equity and justice in a democratic Social State governed by the rule of law, instead creating a collective injury also of a dual nature. Before the unconstitutional reforms and creation of Law 8955, the activity of private transport of persons (porteo de personas) actually had a legal framework; after Law 8955 and related laws and regulations, there has been a change from a legal protection to a legal lack of protection. Law No. 8955 is indeed contrary to the legal system that preceded it, specifically Article 323 of the Commercial Code, Article 46 of the Political Constitution, and the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America. Law No. 8955 restricts commercial freedom, while simultaneously disregarding the principle of the supremacy of reality and the hierarchy of norms. There is once again a tendency towards a State Monopoly but in the hands of a group of red (concessionary) taxi drivers (taxistas rojos (concesionarios)); stated another way, Law 7969 changed private transportation of persons into public transportation, hence the new nature that must be protected by our legal system. Law 8955 modified and added to Law 7969, which, together with the reform of Article 323 of the Commercial Code, created the SEETAXI figure, which constitutes Remunerated Transportation of Persons as a general and public service. The foregoing leads to two legal scenarios. First: Law No. 8955 must be declared unconstitutional, and consequently, Article 323 of the Commercial Code, which permitted porteo as transportation of persons, must revert to its original state. This is because, at the time Law No. 8955 was approved, the voting requirement for the legislative bill by at least 38 deputies was not met. Therefore, Law No. 8955 was approved outside the Internal Regulations of the Legislative Assembly and in open contravention to the Political Constitution; the Second Full Committee (Comisión Plena Segunda) should not have, by express constitutional mandate, heard and approved Law No. 8955. On the other hand, Law 8955 is completely opposed to the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America (TLC). This Treaty did comply with the formalities and legal requirements, and upon being ratified by the Legislative Assembly, it was not only integrated into our legal system but also prevails over it, according to the provisions of our own Constitution and International Law. Therefore, under the terms of the signing and approval of the TLC, foreign investors must even be offered the "national treatment" that existed at the time of signing the Treaty. Thus, it is valid to affirm that Costa Rica, in fact, liberalized services, including private transportation of persons, with the approval of the TLC. Since Costa Rica is obligated to introduce and respect its provisions within the legal system, they must be respected by the country, which violates the already questioned Law 8955. For all the foregoing, it is clear that there was legal myopia when issuing Law 8955 and the reform of Article 323 of the Commercial Code; due to the haste, the proper course of law-making was overlooked, and regulations that were and remain prevailing because they are established in International Treaties were set aside. The effects must be retraced and what was signed in the TLC must be vindicated, returning everything to its original state, declaring Law No. 8955 unconstitutional, and reverting Article 323 of the Commercial Code to its original state, as it was before being modified by unconstitutional Law No. 8955. The TLC determined that the possibility of private transportation service cannot be excluded or restricted. Since our country did not establish a reservation of law regarding the commercial activity of private transportation of persons, Law 8955 is clearly and reliably violative of and opposed to the TLC, which was duly ratified by the Legislative Assembly. Second legal scenario: if the unconstitutionality of Law No. 8955 is not declared, which in itself is a serious error, then upon authentically interpreting Law 8955, the monopoly on the transportation of persons in the taxi mode is declared to be of a public nature and, therefore, open. The State should not intervene in said activity, but merely monitor and control it, but in no way limit the provision of the service, due to its public nature, leading to the application of the principle of majorities over minorities. That is to say: the interest of the community, seen first (collectivity), as the interest of a large sector of the population that requires transportation, prevails over the individual interest, seen second (individuality), as the guild of red taxis (taxis rojos). Ruling 2011-04778 provided that "the transportation service of persons in its entirety has been declared a public service." The Law of December 22, 1999, established a monopoly regarding transportation in the taxi mode, contrary to what Article 46 of the Political Constitution establishes. The legal chronology shows us that the modifications to the Commercial Code and to Law 7969 are unconstitutional because they have unjustly affected many people who, over time, had been, and have been, carrying out this activity in accordance with the Law, under the former Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and then, for several years, in accordance with Law 8955. We do not see what the impediment or difference is regarding the State delegating to natural or juridical persons the possibility of providing a service that originally corresponded to it, whether under concession or special SEETAXI permit. Both figures, concession or permit, seek, in some way, the same end, which is to provide a service to the user; concession or permit, in practice, yields the same result. The spirit of the law, in any case, is to establish a service that is now a reality and that is mistakenly protected by Law No. 8955, since previously the Commercial Code contained the word "persons" in its Article 323, and that is what the legislator eliminated, through the regulation 8955, which is tainted with unconstitutionality. There are numerous reasons why the Costa Rican State must organize and guarantee the SEETAXI activity. Both through administrative channels and through case law, the Remunerated transportation of persons in the taxi mode has been declared of a public nature. In this regard, see and weigh the indication of legal opinion OJ-1 54-2014 of the PGR, which affirms that "remunerated transportation of persons in the taxi mode is considered a public service that will be exploited by concession or permit..." Thus, the public interest, upon this pronouncement being made, prevails and must be imposed over the interests of a particular guild, which is the guild of red taxi drivers (taxistas rojos). In the same vein, if the Regulatory Authority for Public Services contains various definitions of public service, such as "any activity that, due to its importance for the sustainable development of the country, is classified as such by the Legislative Assembly," this implies that, more than legality, it is reality, opportunity, convenience, supply and demand, Judgment No. 51 7-98. What is the obstacle to the State authorizing a private individual to provide the service? It has already done so for a long time through concessions; why not complement it with a special permit that is renewable once the term has expired, subject to compliance with certain requirements? Many Costa Ricans dedicated to SEETAXI have changed their vehicle for a better model, incurring debts with financial entities, because they were told that a requirement for the extension, once the three-year term of the special permit expired, was to upgrade the vehicle model. In light of Law No. 3503 of May 10, 1965, it classifies remunerated transportation of persons in collective motor vehicles as a public service regulated, controlled, and monitored by the State through the MOPT, the provision of which may be delegated to private individuals. Two things emerge from the foregoing: as already indicated, the public nature and character of the remunerated transportation service of persons, and second, the obligation of the State to exercise control and vigilance over those who provide the service. The porteo activity, because in reality the figure of porteo was not eliminated from our legislation, but only the phrase private transport of persons (porteo de personas), in order to instead leave porteo of goods or news, creating a legal patch through Law No. 8955. The SEETAXI remunerated transportation activity of persons is aimed at a closed group of people who, either by their express wish or because the red taxis (taxis rojos) cannot provide them with the service, constitutes a basic and fundamental need of a sector of the Costa Rican population, which must be addressed immediately. It is a matter of supply and demand, which, after all, is what governs commercial activity. Our Political Constitution, in Article 56, enshrines the principle of the right to work, as an individual right and an obligation for the State to strive so that everyone has honest and useful employment and to prevent conditions from being established that in any way diminish the freedom or dignity of man. "The State guarantees the right of free choice of work." Evidently, with the actions deployed by the CTP, the modification of arbitrary laws, the modification of Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and other administrative acts, the Costa Rican State has violated Article 56 of the Constitution, since it is not striving so that everyone has employment; on the contrary, it is promoting unemployment and the impoverishment of Costa Rican society, while also endangering the family. As the SEETAXI activity is a direct and sole source of income for thousands of Costa Rican families, we are undoubtedly in the presence of a transcendental matter: the well-being of thousands of Costa Rican families and their eventual lack of protection. The defense of the right to work as a fundamental constitutional principle and all its derivations justifies this proceeding, due process, and a state of necessity of the signatories and all those who are in equal conditions. In everything in which this coadjuvant brief may be silent, they adhere to what is stated and expressed in the main action of unconstitutionality, initiated by Mr. Otto Guevara Guth and Natalia Díaz Quintana.

21.- By brief filed at 3:50 p.m. on March 9, 2016, María Lorena Cordero Ávila, in her capacity as President with powers of Generalisimo Proxy without limit of amount of the company Unión Nacional de Porteadores - UNAPORTE, appears before this Chamber to intervene as an active coadjuvant of the petitioner in this action of unconstitutionality, based on Article 83 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, according to which "The parties listed in matters pending at the date of filing the action, or those with a legitimate interest, may appear within it, in order to coadjuvate in the allegations that could justify its admissibility or inadmissibility, or to expand, as the case may be, the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that concerns them." She grounds her active standing in the provisions of Article 75, second paragraph, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, which recognizes the possibility of filing an action of unconstitutionality without an underlying matter, in cases where, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those that pertain to the community as a whole. Regarding this last aspect - or concerning the defense of diffuse interests - the Chamber has already clarified that the legislator refers to the standing held by active citizens because it concerns the right to work. She indicates that the company Unión Nacional de Porteadores - UNAPORTE has been dedicated to the private transport of persons (porteo) since 2004 through the present legal figure, and since 2002 as a de facto company, through a system of affiliations, the use of motor vehicles, and private contracts relating to the provision of the service, all of the foregoing initially under the protection of Article 323 of the Commercial Code in force before its reform, this commercial activity reaffirmed by the Free Trade Agreement with road transportation (porteo). With the Reform of Law 3284, Commercial Code, and of Law No. 7969, the Law Regulating the Public Service of Remunerated Transportation of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Mode, of December 22, 1999, the word "person" is eliminated from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and a new figure is created from the Law Regulating the public service of remunerated transportation of persons in the taxi mode, No. 7969, called the "Special stable taxi service," which retains the nature of the residual service that porteo currently provides, but protected and regulated by operation permits granted by the State. Forcing them to subsist in carrying out their work under this new figure with a three-year operation permit for all units affiliated with them, without the possibility of renewal, which expired on July 7, 2015.

After this date and with the operating permits having expired, they reactivated the service again as “private carriers (porteadores privados)” making use of the operating bases in the cantons where they provide the service and under a platform system for passenger transport (porteo) services via motor vehicles. A service that they have been providing uninterruptedly in the Canton of Alfaro Ruiz, in the Province of Alajuela, Costa Rica, making use of the operating base in that canton since 2004, and using the municipal license and operating permits valid to date. In accordance with the provisions of Chapter II “Cross-Border Trade in Services” of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, under Class 6431. Regular urban and suburban special passenger road transport services (porteo). The present constitutional challenge action contests Law No. 8955, since, as of its entry into force, no private individual – natural or legal person – may provide the paid passenger transport service unless they have the respective authorization – concession or permit, depending on the modality in question – granted by the Public Transport Council (Consejo de Transporte Público), through the procedures established by the laws regulating said public service. Said nationalization of the private passenger transport service violates Article 46 of the Political Constitution, since the creation of public monopolies requires the approval of at least 38 legislators, a procedure that was violated because the legislative bill No. 17874 that gave rise to Law No. 8955 was approved in a Committee with full legislative authority (Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena), which lacked the competence to approve a law requiring a qualified majority of votes.

As is well stated in the present action, the monopoly in favor of the State is mainly characterized by the elimination of competition and the prohibition of carrying out the activity by third parties. Law No. 8955 clearly establishes the prohibition of exercising this activity by eliminating the word "person" in Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and adding a final paragraph to that article, which, for all purposes, states: “The transport contract regulated in this article does not authorize the transport of persons by motor vehicles.” Through this paragraph, an express prohibition is created on the provision of that service by private individuals; that is, as indicated by the Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría), a service that was regulated without any problem in the Commercial Code, and that arose as part of the agreement of wills between the parties, in which the free will to decide what best suits each one prevails, according to their economic interests and the needs of the moment, is nationalized. Therefore, it indicates that by means of Law No. 8955, with the elimination of the possibility of private passenger transport, Article 46 of the Political Constitution is violated.

As well stated in the present action, with Law 8955, Reform of Law 3284 and Law 7969, a public monopoly was established regarding the paid public passenger transport service in the taxi modality. The constitution of this monopoly was carried out through the approval of a law, outside the internal regulations of the Legislative Assembly, since it was done in a committee with full legislative authority. Therefore, that bill could not be delegated to a full legislative committee, as it required a qualified majority for its approval (at least 38 votes), thereby violating Article 46 of the Political Constitution, by making impossible the constitutional requirement of legislative approval by two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly.

The approval of Law No. 8955 “Reform of Law No. 3284, Commercial Code, and of Law 7969, Regulatory Law of the Paid Public Passenger Transport Service by Motor Vehicles in the Taxi Modality,” in force since 2011, violates the approval and integration into our legal system of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, in violation of Article 7 of our Political Constitution. The aforementioned International Treaty determined that the possibility of the private transport service could not be excluded or restricted. Since at the time of its approval (December 2007), Costa Rica had private taxi-modality transport services, in the form of passenger transport (porteo). But, in addition, there was no law that had established a public monopoly on public transport in the taxi modality. Ergo, there was no prohibition on providing private transport services in the taxi modality. In Chapter II “Cross-Border Trade in Services” of the mentioned Treaty, Costa Rica did not establish any reservation regarding this commercial activity. Reason why Law No. 8955 of 2011 violates an agreement incorporated into our Legal System. Beyond this situation, it must offer foreign investors the “national treatment” we had at the time of signing the Treaty. Costa Rica rather negotiated the liberalization of services, including private passenger transport in the taxi modality. Specifically, we can locate it in: Class 6431: Regular passenger road transport services (porteo). Subclass 64312: Regular urban and suburban special passenger road transport services (taxis).

It is necessary to reiterate that with the approval of Law No. 8955, “passenger transport (porteo de personas)” becomes a “public service,” as it eliminates the possibility of its private exercise with the removal of the word “person” from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, which states: “The transport contract regulated in this article does not authorize the transport of persons by motor vehicles.” With this same law, a special regulation is introduced for this sector (stable special taxi service), transgressing the text of Article 11.6 of CAFTA, because the law reduces “the degree of conformity” with Article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access), thus causing an excess of legislative power, as the Legislative Assembly assumes a power not granted by the Constitution, since it modifies a treaty regarding its content, when, according to the Constitution, its function should be limited to approving or disapproving a treaty, thereby clearly violating Articles 7, 129, and 140 sections 3) and 10) of the Constitution. They consider that the arguments set forth clearly demonstrate that the challenged norms violate the principles of free trade, freedom to work, and freedom of transit, transgress the Political Constitution, and are therefore unconstitutional.

Taking into account the foregoing, and in their capacity as co-adjuvants (coadyuvantes) of the plaintiffs in this matter, they request that the present constitutional challenge action be granted, and therefore, that the judgment order the following: That the unconstitutionality of Law No. 8955, “Reform of Law No. 3284, Commercial Code, and Reform of Law No. 7969, Regulatory Law of the Paid Public Passenger Transport Service by Vehicles in the Taxi Modality, of December 22, 1999,” be declared for violation of Articles 7, 46, 129, 140 of the Political Constitution, as well as the principles of Supremacy of Reality and Normative Hierarchy.

22.- By brief filed at 2:47 p.m. on March 10, 2016, Marco Tulio Víquez, as President of the Heredia Bus Operators Chamber Association (Asociación Cámara de Autobuseros de Heredia), Miguel Badilla Castro, as President of the Atlantic Bus Operators Chamber Association (Asociación Cámara de Autobuseros del Atlántico), Jorge Arredondo Espinoza, as Attorney-in-Fact with sufficient power of attorney for the Association Chamber of United Bus Operators and Transport Entrepreneurs of the Province of Guanacaste (Asociación Cámara de Empresarios Autobuseros y Transportistas Unidos de la Provincia de Guanacaste) and others, appear before this Chamber in order to intervene as passive co-adjuvants in this constitutional challenge action, and indicate that they are organizations representing individuals who would be directly affected if the unconstitutionality of the challenged regulations were declared, therefore, insofar as they represent those corporate interests, they hold a legitimate interest in maintaining the validity of the challenged regulations. They point out that the arguments of unconstitutionality put forward by the plaintiffs are of two types: a) procedural and b) alleged substantive violations.

The alleged procedural defects: The appellants' arguments. The main argument of the appellants is that Law 8955 turned passenger transport (porteo) into a public service by repealing Articles 333 and 334 of the Commercial Code. The cited law was approved by a Legislative Committee with Full Legislative Authority. According to the appellants, such repeal could only have been carried out by the Plenary through a law approved by 2/3 of its members because the cited law created a new monopoly in favor of the State. Indeed, according to Article 46 of the Constitution, creating new state monopolies requires a qualified majority of 2/3 of the total number of legislators, which did not occur in this case, given that Law 8955 was not even approved by the Legislative Plenary. Under these conditions, Law 8955 is absolutely null and void due to an essential defect in its approval procedure.

The non-existence of the alleged procedural defects: Article 1 of Law 3503 declared all modalities of providing the paid passenger transport service on public land roads to be a public service; the Commercial Code entered into force on June 1, 1964, and Law 3503 did so on May 10, 1965. This law was approved by a qualified majority. From that moment onwards, paid passenger transport, in any of its modalities, became a public service. Indeed, the legislator created a new monopoly in favor of the State with the possibility of delegating its exercise to private individuals through the administrative figures of concession or permit. Consequently, since that date, passenger transport (porteo de personas), originally regulated in Articles 323 and 324 of the Commercial Code, became a public service, as the aforementioned norms of the Commercial Code were tacitly repealed upon the entry into force of Article 1 of Law 3503. From the legal point of view, what occurred was a tacit repeal of the term "persons" contemplated in Articles 323 and 324 of the Commercial Code, due to supervening normative incompatibility upon the promulgation of Article 1 of Law 3503, which came to make public all modalities of paid passenger transport by motor vehicles, transforming them into a new monopoly in favor of the State.

Article 1 of Law 3503 is emphatic in indicating that "The paid passenger transport by motor vehicles carried out on streets, highways, and roads within the territory of the Republic is a public service whose provision is exclusive to the State, which may exercise it directly or through private individuals expressly authorized according to the norms established herein...". The norm under comment makes no distinction between taxis and carriers (porteadores), as it considers both transport modalities as integral parts of a public service. Therefore, it is clear that the unequivocal intention of the 1965 legislator was to convert all paid passenger land transport, in any type of motor vehicle and under any modality of provision, into a public service, turning it into a new state monopoly.

Within this line of reasoning, the tacit repeal of a law results from the objective incompatibility between the new normative provision and the preceding ones. This incompatibility, in turn, has two manifestations: a) a true contradiction of one norm with another, so that the interpreter must opt for the second, and b) a supervening incompatibility, also called implicit, for a prior norm on a specific subject matter that is subsequently regulated ex novo by a successive normative source. In this latter hypothesis, it concerns two disciplines on the same subject matter that succeed each other in time. It is not, consequently, a specific incompatibility, but rather a new regulation that renders the previous one ineffective. This hypothesis is more difficult to occur in practice because prior norms are not always in specific contradiction with supervening norms. Tacit repeal is intimately founded on the double principle of the inextinguishability of power and the prohibition of antinomies. In this case, what is relevant is the repeal effect, linked to the entry into force of the successive norm, as a necessary condition for it to freely innovate the legal order and thus deploy the function inherent to it.

8.- In the present case, Article 1 of Law 3503 partly came to regulate ex novo the same subject matter previously regulated by Articles 323 and 324 of the Commercial Code. Indeed, the new regulation came to include passenger transport (porteo) as part of the public service of paid passenger transport on land routes, which, before its promulgation, was considered a private activity carried out under the principle of legal freedom (Article 28 PC) and entrepreneurial freedom (Article 46 PC). However, Article 1 of Law 3503, by converting paid passenger land transport in all its modalities into a public service, tacitly repealed Articles 323 and 324 of the Commercial Code to the extent they considered passenger transport (porteo) a private activity. Subsequently, Law 5406 of November 26, 1973, was promulgated, which specifically regulated paid passenger transport in the taxi modality. This law entered into force 8 years after all paid passenger transport by motor vehicles, regardless of modality (buses, taxis, porteo, etc.), had been declared a public service. Article 22 of Law 5406 provided that "Article 22.- This law repeals, insofar as they oppose it, the provisions of Law No. 3503 of May 10, 1965, and repeals Law No. 3560 of October 27, 1965." Evidently, Article 1 of Law 3503 did not oppose it, but rather, on the contrary, provided a foundation for the declaration as a public service of the paid passenger transport service in the taxi modality. In other words, Article 1 of Law 3503 constituted the generic regulation governing the various modalities of paid land passenger transport, while Article 1 of Law 5406 specifically regulated the taxi modality. Article 1 of Law 3503 remains in force to this day, as neither Law 7969 nor Law 8955 repealed it.

Within this line of reasoning, Annex I of CAFTA itself recognizes the validity of Article 1 of Law 3503 at the time of its approval by expressly including it as one of the non-conforming measures regarding land transport. Consequently, and given that Law 8955 did not repeal said norm, it must be concluded that Article 1 of Law 3503 remains in force. Thus, the argument of the plaintiffs to the effect that Law Number 8955 had to be approved by two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly is not acceptable, because the public monopoly on paid passenger transport, in any of its modalities (buses, taxis, porteo, etc.), was created by Article 1 of Law 3503 of May 10, 1965, a norm that still remains in force, as demonstrated above. The challenged regulation was actually unnecessary to promulgate, since passenger transport (porteo de personas) had already ceased to exist legally since 1965, when the paid passenger transport service in any of its modalities (buses, taxis, porteo, etc.) was declared, by a qualified majority of the Legislative Assembly, to be a public monopoly, susceptible of having its provision delegated to private individuals through the administrative figures of concession and permit. Therefore, the eventual declaration of unconstitutionality of the challenged regulation would have no practical effect, as the provision of the paid passenger transport service in any of its modalities has been a public service since 1965. But, in any event, Law 8955 was issued within the normative framework of Article 1 of Law 3503 and only came to regulate the porteo modality, under the name "SEETAXI," a public service that for almost 50 years was exercised freely without any type of regulation. Consequently, the challenged law did not need to be approved by two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly, as it simply came to regulate one modality of providing the paid passenger transport service, which had already been declared a public service since 1965.

This Chamber already established that Law 8955 was validly approved by a Legislative Committee with Full Legislative Authority, in Ruling (Voto) 4778-2011, issued in the constitutional consultation on the draft Law 8955 formulated by the Movimiento Libertario; the Chamber clearly established that the cited bill could be validly approved by a Legislative Committee with Full Legislative Authority.

The plaintiffs' thesis on the alleged violation of CAFTA - According to the plaintiffs, Law 8955 violates several clauses of CAFTA because, when this treaty was approved, the issue of eliminating passenger transport (porteo) was not included as a reservation or non-conforming measure, so now entrepreneurial freedom cannot be limited in an activity not reserved by the Costa Rican State at the time of signing said treaty. According to the appellants, the elimination of passenger transport (porteo) is not included as a non-conforming measure in Article 11.6 in relation to Annex I of the Treaty.

The alleged violation of Articles 28 and 46 of the Political Constitution and the constitutional principle of reasonableness: one of the plaintiffs further alleges the alleged violation of Articles 28 and 46 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of reasonableness. Their argument centers on the fact that Articles 323 and 324 of the Commercial Code, insofar as they regulated passenger transport (porteo de personas), were directly founded on those constitutional norms and principles. On Article 28 of the Constitution, which enshrines the principle of legal freedom, according to which private individuals may carry out all conduct that is expressly or implicitly authorized by the legal system, and on Article 46 of the same constitutional text, which enshrines entrepreneurial freedom. This norm also requires that the creation of new monopolies in favor of the State be approved by a qualified majority of two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly, which did not occur in the case of Law 8955, which was approved by a Legislative Committee with Full Legislative Authority. According to one of the plaintiffs, Law 8955 violates both constitutional norms, as it prohibited a lawful activity, carried out under the protection of two express constitutional provisions. Therefore, prohibiting a lawful private activity, which is contrary neither to morality nor to good customs, constitutes a legislative excess contrary to Constitutional Law, specifically to the two aforementioned norms. The constitutional principle of reasonableness is also invoked as violated, since, in the plaintiff's view, it is not convenient, necessary, or proportional to prohibit the activity of passenger transport (porteo de personas), as the country needs to modernize in all fields of entrepreneurial activity. Passenger transport (porteo de personas), in the modern world, constitutes an efficient and more economical mechanism than the traditional taxi service modality because it uses modern tools and guarantees that the service is provided with efficiency, safety, and speed.

The non-existence of the alleged substantive defects. Law 8955 did not violate CAFTA; the first substantive argument is intimately related to the alleged procedural defect. Indeed, the plaintiffs' argument is that, since Law 8955 was enacted after CAFTA entered into force, the figure of passenger transport (porteo) was not included as a non-conforming measure in Annex I of the Treaty, relating to public transport. 2.- The Costa Rican negotiators did not include passenger transport (porteo) as an exception to the application of CAFTA in Annex I of the Treaty, for the simple reason that this modality of providing the paid passenger transport service had been a public service since 1965, and therefore it was logically included within the exceptions specified in that same Annex I of the Treaty relating to the public service of paid passenger transport. According to Article 11.6. Non-Conforming Measures of the Treaty: "1. Articles 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, and 11.5 do not apply to any existing non-conforming measure that is maintained by a Party at the central level of government, as set out by that Party in its Schedule to Annex I." In Annex I, it states in this regard: "Sector: Land Transport Services - Passenger Transport. Obligations Concerned: National Treatment (Articles 10.4 and 11.3). Most-Favored-Nation Treatment (Articles 10.4 and 11.3). Market Access (Article 11.4). Level of Government: Central. Measures: Law 3503 of May 10, 1965. Regulatory Law for Paid Passenger Transport by Motor Vehicles. Arts 1, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, and 25." From the reading of the cited norms of CAFTA, it is clear that Article 1 of Law 3503 was a non-conforming measure that the Costa Rican State reserved regarding motorized land transport at the time of approving the cited Treaty. Within that norm, passenger transport (porteo) is included as a public service, as demonstrated above. Therefore, all the plaintiffs' arguments lack legal foundation, since Article 1 of Law 3503 was included in CAFTA as a non-conforming measure of Costa Rica, and it was precisely that norm that eliminated passenger transport (porteo) as a private activity and converted it into a public service since 1965. There was, therefore, no violation of any of the invoked CAFTA clauses upon the promulgation of Law 8955; Law 8955 did not violate Articles 28 and 46 of the Constitution nor the principle of legal reasonableness; Law 8955 was unnecessary to promulgate, since passenger transport (porteo de personas) became a public service in 1965. What one part of this law does is repeal norms that had already been repealed 51 years prior. The other part regulates the public service of "SEETAXI," that is, passenger transport (porteo de personas), a public transport modality that since 1965 had not been regulated and which, until that date, operated as if it were a private activity, without any state regulation. Law 8955 could not have incurred in the alleged unconstitutionality defects claimed by the plaintiff—that is, violation of Articles 28 and 46 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of reasonableness—for the simple reason that no new monopoly was created in favor of the State, as this monopoly had existed since as far back as 1965. All arguments run aground on the incontrovertible fact that Article 1 of Law 3503, approved in 1965 and currently in force, elevated all modalities of paid passenger transport on public roads to the category of public service. Consequently, Law 8955 incurred in no unconstitutionality defect, given that the only matter it legislated on ex novo was the regulation of the public service modality called "SEETAXI," which, inexplicably, operated freely, without any State regulation, from 1965 until the promulgation of Law 8955.

23.- By brief filed at 11:05 a.m. on March 11, 2016, Gilberth Maikell Barboza, in his capacity as Legal Attorney-in-Fact with powers of Generalisimo Attorney-in-Fact without limit of sum for Corporación B&A Transportes Privados Atenas, appears before this Chamber in order to intervene as an active co-adjuvant in this constitutional challenge action, and indicates that in the particular case of his represented entity, it was granted the Stable Special Taxi Permit, SEETAXI, which is a paid public passenger transport service aimed at a closed group of users that satisfies a limited, residual, exclusive, and stable demand, and therefore he adheres in all respects to the action filed by the plaintiffs.

24.- By brief filed at 1:04 p.m. on March 14, 2016, Heiner Gerardo Chávez Luna, in his capacity as President with powers of Generalisimo Attorney-in-Fact without limit of sum of the company Transportes Privados Rigoberto Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada, appears before this Chamber in order to intervene as active co-adjuvants of the plaintiffs in this constitutional challenge action, based on Article 83 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), according to which "The parties involved in matters pending at the date of filing the action, or those with a legitimate interest, may appear within it in order to co-adjuvate in the allegations that might justify its appropriateness or inappropriateness, or to expand, as applicable, the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that interests them." He bases his active legal standing on the provisions of Article 75, second paragraph, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, which recognizes the possibility of filing a constitutional challenge action without a base case, in instances where, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm, or where it involves the defense of diffuse interests, or those that concern the community as a whole. Regarding this latter aspect - or where it involves the defense of diffuse interests - the Chamber has already specified that the legislator refers to the standing held by active citizens because it concerns the right to work. He indicates that the company Transportes Privados Rigoberto Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada has been dedicated to the private transport of persons (porteo) since 2005 through the present legal entity, and since 2002 as a de facto company (sociedad de hecho), through a system of affiliations, use of motor vehicles, and through private contracts relating to the provision of the service, all of the foregoing initially under the provisions of Article 323 of the Commercial Code in force before its reform, this commercial activity reaffirmed by the Free Trade Agreement under [Class 6431] road passenger transport (porteo). With the Reform of Law 3284, Commercial Code, and of Law No. 7969, Regulatory Law of the Paid Public Passenger Transport Service by Vehicles in the Taxi Modality, of December 22, 1999, the word "person" is eliminated from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and a new figure is created from the Regulatory Law of the paid public passenger transport service in the taxi modality, No. 7969, called "Stable Special Taxi Service," which retains the nature of the residual service that passenger transport (porteo) currently provides, but protected and regulated by operating permits granted by the state. They are forced to subsist in carrying out their work under this new figure with a three-year operating permit for all units affiliated with them, with no possibility of renewal, which expired on July 7, 2015. After this date and with the operating permits having expired, they reactivated the service again as “private carriers (porteadores privados)” making use of the operating bases in the cantons where they provide the service and under a platform system for passenger transport (porteo) services via motor vehicles. A service that they have been providing uninterruptedly in the Canton of San Pedro de Poas, in the Province of Alajuela, Costa Rica, making use of the operating base in that canton since 2005, and using the municipal license and operating permits valid to date. In accordance with the provisions of Chapter II “Cross-Border Trade in Services” of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, under Class 6431. Regular urban and suburban special passenger road transport services (porteo). This constitutional challenge action contests Law No. 8955, since, as of its entry into force, no private individual – natural or legal person – may provide the paid passenger transport service unless they have the respective authorization – concession or permit, depending on the modality in question – granted by the Public Transport Council (Consejo de Transporte Público), through the procedures established by the laws regulating said public service. Said nationalization of the private passenger transport service violates Article 46 of the Political Constitution, since the creation of public monopolies requires the approval of at least 38 legislators, a procedure that was violated because the legislative bill No. 17874 that gave rise to Law No. 8955 was approved in a Committee with full legislative authority, which lacked the competence to approve a law requiring a qualified majority of votes.

As is clearly indicated in the present action, the monopoly in favor of the State is characterized mainly by the elimination of competition and the prohibition of the activity being carried out by third parties. Law No. 8955 explicitly establishes the prohibition of the exercise of this activity, by eliminating the word person in article 323 of the Commercial Code, and adding a final paragraph to that article, which for the relevant purposes provides: "The transportation contract regulated in this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by means of automotive vehicles." Through this paragraph, an express prohibition is created on the provision of that service by private individuals, that is, a service that was regulated without any problem in the Commercial Code, and that arose as part of the agreement of wills between the parties, in which the free will to decide what best suits each individual, according to their economic interests and the needs of that moment, governs, is nationalized (estatiza) as indicated by the Attorney General's Office. Therefore, it indicates that through Law No. 8955, by eliminating the possibility of private transportation of persons, Article 46 of the Political Constitution is violated.

As is clearly set forth in the present action, with Law 8955, Reform of Law 3284, and of Law 7969, a public monopoly was established in the matter of public transportation of persons in the taxi modality. The constitution of this monopoly was carried out through the approval of a law, outside the internal regulations of the Legislative Assembly, since it was done in committee with full legislative power. Therefore, that bill was undelegable to a full legislative committee, as it required a qualified majority for its approval (at least 38 votes), thereby violating Article 46 of the Political Constitution, by making the constitutional requirement of legislative approval by two-thirds of the total membership of the Legislative Assembly impossible. The approval of Law No. 8955 "Reform of Law No. 3284, Commercial Code, and of Law 7969, Regulatory Law of the Public Service of Remunerated Transportation of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality," effective from 2011, violates the approval and integration into our legal system of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, Dominican Republic, and Central America, in violation of Article 7 of our Political Constitution. The aforementioned International Treaty determined that the possibility of private transportation service could not be excluded or restricted. Since at the time of its approval (December 2007), Costa Rica had private transportation services in the taxi modality, in the form of the carriage of persons (porteo de personas). But furthermore, there was no Law that had established a public monopoly on public transportation in the taxi modality. Ergo, there was no prohibition on the provision of private transportation services in the taxi modality. In Chapter II "Cross-Border Trade in Services" of the mentioned Treaty, Costa Rica did not establish any reservation in relation to this commercial activity. This is the reason why Law No. 8955 of 2011 violates an agreement incorporated into our Legal System. Beyond this situation, it must offer foreign investors the "national treatment" we had at the time of signing the Treaty. Costa Rica, rather, negotiated the liberalization of services, including the private transportation of persons, in the taxi modality. Specifically, we can locate it in: Class 6431: Regular passenger road transportation services (carriage, porteo). Subclass 64312: Regular urban and suburban special passenger road transportation services (taxis). It is necessary to reiterate that with the approval of Law No. 8955, the "carriage of persons (porteo de personas)" becomes a "public service" as it eliminates the possibility of its exercise in a private form with the elimination of the word "person" from article 323 of the Commercial Code, which states: "The transportation contract regulated in this article does not authorize the transportation of persons by means of automotive vehicles." With this same Law, a special regulation is introduced for this sector (special established taxi service, servicio especial estable de taxi), transgressing the text of article 11.6 of CAFTA, because the law diminishes "the degree of conformity" with article 11.4 of CAFTA (Market Access), this constitutes an excess of legislative power, as the Legislative Assembly assumes a competence not granted by the Constitution, since it modifies a treaty in terms of its content, when according to the Constitution its function should be limited to approving or disapproving a treaty, with the clear breach of articles 7, 129 and 140 subsections 3) and 10) of the Constitution. They consider that the arguments presented denote with crystal clarity that the challenged norms violate the principles of free trade, freedom of labor, and freedom of transit, transgress the Political Constitution and, therefore, are unconstitutional. Taking into account the foregoing, and in the capacity of coadjuvants of the plaintiff party in this matter, they request that the present unconstitutionality action be granted, therefore, that the judgment order the following: That the unconstitutionality of Law No. 8955; "Reform of Law No. 3284, Commercial Code, and Reform of Law No. 7969, Regulatory Law of the Public Service of Remunerated Transportation of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality, of December 22, 1999" be declared for violation of articles: 7, 46, 129, 140, of the Political Constitution, as well as the principles of Supremacy of Reality and Normative Hierarchy.

25.- Through a brief filed at 09:58 hours on March 15, 2016, Rubén Vargas Campos, in his capacity as Secretary General and Representative with sufficient powers of the social organization named Unión de Taxistas Costarricenses and others, appear before this Chamber in order to intervene as passive coadjuvants of the plaintiff party in the present unconstitutionality action, and indicate that the present action becomes inadmissible because it is said to have been filed in supposed protection of diffuse and/or collective interests of users, given that the action evidently presents the sole purpose of seeking to defend the private interests of a transnational company, which does not have a certain legal domicile in our country, such as the firm "Uber", likewise the so-called Asociación Nacional de Consumidores seeks the same. Regarding the dilemma between the possible coexistence of remunerated transportation of persons, in automotive vehicles, as a public service or as a private activity, it is held that since 1965 with the enactment of Law No. 3503: "regulatory law of remunerated transportation of persons", it was clearly provided that all types of remunerated transportation of persons were a public service, regulated by the State, from which it derived that all remunerated transportation of persons, in any of its modalities, was a public service and could only be provided with State authorization, thus eliminating the possibility of private remunerated transportation of persons in automotive vehicles, such general provisions were retaken, regulated and sanctioned in traffic Law No. 7331 (of 1993), in the law, among others, which were prior to the Free Trade Agreement and all maintaining their validity and fullness regarding regulating, restricting and sanctioning any management of remunerated transportation of persons that could be generated even in the absence of Law No. 8955, that is to say: even if Law No. 8955 were eliminated as unconstitutional, there are moreover norms that entail the same effect that it simply came to unify and clarify, to avoid further "interpretations" and suspicions regarding the situation and impossibility of remunerated transportation of persons in automotive vehicles in a private form (carriage, porteo). The bill that is challenged was voted on by the plenary, through the figure of delegation to one of the legislative committees with full powers and was voted by absolute majority in it. No public monopoly has been generated, the regulatory capacity of the State gives rise to a public service exercised by thousands of workers (the taxi drivers) under conditions fully determined and established by the regulating State. Regarding the issue of the violation of the Free Trade Agreement, it has been determined that the carriage of persons (porteo de personas) is not considered a major commercial activity, but rather a limited and residual labor. Therefore, it would not be of real coverage by the FTA, furthermore, it has been made clear that the partial modification to numeral 323 of the commercial code does not entail the creation of any monopoly and, per se, the conditions of the FTA are not affected, it has also been fully determined that the Costa Rican State made, regarding the FTA or CAFTA and its scopes, certain due reservations and one of them was in the matter of remunerated transportation of persons in automotive vehicles, taxi type, and of Law No. 7969, so the provisions of the FTA would not be affected in that sense either and only as an exception not invoked by anyone, the FTA allows the applied restrictions to be valued or renegotiated but that does not determine them as unconstitutional, finally and as has been well determined supra, many norms prior to the FTA exist, of public order, special for public transportation and traffic, which determine that the remunerated transportation of persons in automotive vehicles and in other disciplines of public service (airplanes, trains and ships), is a public service, which can only be provided with prior authorization from the State, therefore, by recapitulating through Law No. 8955 on the subject, it does not legislate ex novo, but rather retakes, summarizes and concretizes what was already legislated before, thus not existing any violation of the FTA, much less any unconstitutionality.

26.- Through a brief filed at 11:05 hours on March 15, 2016, Alexander Rodríguez Aguilar in his capacity as General Attorney-in-Fact without limit of sum of Inversiones Transportistas Los Guidos Sociedad Anónima and others, appear before this Chamber in order to intervene as active coadjuvants in the present unconstitutionality action, and indicate that they are duly legitimized by having a direct interest in the resolution on the merits of the present unconstitutionality action, by reason of having been accredited with permit number 11 and codes numbered from 321 to 346 of Special Established Taxi Service (Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi), with a formal Appeal pending resolution before the Administrative Transport Tribunal, under file No. TAT-31 7-2015. In the year two thousand eleven, after a facultative consultation before the Constitutional Chamber, bill number 17,874 was approved in second debate, to later be sanctioned by the Executive Branch and published in Supplement (Alcance) No. 40 of Gazette No. 131 of July 7, 2011 as Special Law No. 8955. All the discussion and approval process of the referred file was processed in the Second Committee with Full Legislative Powers, as a consequence of a delegatory motion approved by the Legislative Plenary in ordinary session No. 88 of October 14, 2009 and under the figure of an abbreviated legislative procedure (208 bis RAL), approved in the Legislative Plenary in ordinary session No. 109 of November 26, 2009. In the same way in 2011, Law No. 8955 was challenged before the Chamber with two unconstitutionality actions, processed under files 11-01 1857-0007-CO and 11-010289- 0007-CO, which were declared without merit. Both the statements made in the text of the facultative consultation and those outlined in the filing of the two unconstitutionality actions indicated above, were directed differently from those described in the present action. Law No. 8955 violates article 46 of the political constitution and the legislative procedure for the establishment of a public monopoly, in that it reforms article 2 of Law No. 7969: "Regulatory Law of the Public Service of Remunerated Transportation of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality", given that despite the monopoly on the exclusive provision of the collective remunerated service of persons having been established through the approval of Law No. 3503 of May 20, 1965 and the exclusive nationalization of remunerated transportation of persons in vehicles in the taxi modality determined by the approval of Law No. 5406 of January 16, 1974 repealed through article 63 of Law No. 7969 of December 22, 1999, the monopoly decreed in these two regulations are exclusive and unique for the services indicated therein, be it the collective remunerated transportation of persons through Law No. 3503 and then the nationalization of remunerated transportation of persons in the taxi modality through Law No. 5406, repealed by the current Law No. 7969, called the Taxi Law. None of the previous regulations declares the entirety of remunerated transportation of persons as a public service, but rather both laws limited themselves to declaring the State as the holder of each of those two specific activities, the private contract for transportation of persons remaining in force under the commercial figure of the carrier of persons (porteador de personas), however, through Law No. 8955 a total monopoly over remunerated transportation of persons is effectively declared, by determining that all remunerated transportation of persons carried out by means of buses, minibuses, microbuses, taxis, automobiles and any other type of automotive vehicle, which is also directed at any group of users, is a public service of which the State is the holder and that, for its provision, a permit or concession is required. The nationalization of remunerated transportation of persons through collective transportation in buses and taxis, through the approval of two concrete and specific laws, cannot be interpreted in the same way as the creation of the monopoly and the prohibition of carrying out any type of remunerated transportation of persons from the private sphere. This occurs, exclusively, through the approval of Law No. 8955, which disallows this type of service through the elimination of the word "persons" from article 323 of the commercial code and simultaneously decrees that all types of remunerated transportation of persons will henceforth be a public service and that, for its execution, a State permit will be required, the creation of the monopoly on the entirety of remunerated transportation of persons occurs through the approval of Law No. 8955. This being so, in observance of Article 46 of our Political Constitution, bill No. 17,874 should never have been delegated to a Committee with Legislative Powers, since, these committees being composed of only 19 deputies, it could not meet the minimum number required for approval of at least 38 deputies, in accordance with constitutional article 46, it results in a clear violation of the legislative procedure and of the Fundamental Charter itself and, consequently, in the unconstitutionality of the approved law. Law No. 8955 violates the principle of equality before the law and the norms relating to the concession of public transportation services for persons. It must be kept in mind that bill No. 13,511, which gave rise to Law No. 7969, explicitly stated in its original articles that taxi concessions would be granted for a non-extendable term of twenty years. However, the legislator of the time considered it prudent not to carry the term beyond ten years and through a motion approved by the majority of them, the term was established at ten non-extendable years. Through the reform made by Law No. 8955 to article 29 of Law No. 7969, it delivers, in perpetuity, the public service of remunerated transportation of persons in the taxi modality to the current concessionaires, which becomes unconstitutional, since the State can delegate the provision of public services to private individuals, but the legislator does not have the power to designate a specific group of private individuals to carry out a public service in perpetuity, without complying with the administrative contracting procedures stipulated in the original law, in clear detriment to the principle of equality before the law for the rest of the inhabitants of the Republic, as well as for those offerors who, for not having the 100 points accredited in the First Abbreviated Procedure to those who held taxi permits at that time, some of them with 80 points, are rendered unable to participate in the new bidding process for taxi concessions, in the second opportunity under equal conditions since, as the previous norm states, the current concessionaire is given an undue and illegal advantage over others interested in providing said service, by indicating that the renewal of taxi concessions must be granted automatically each period, upon the mere request of the concessionaire and the C-1 type license being up to date. This reform completely closes a monopoly, in perpetuity, with names and surnames, which became a funnel in favor of a very small group of Costa Ricans, in clear detriment to the immense majority, which, once the ten years of the term authorized for the concessions by Law No. 7969 had elapsed, would allow all citizens to opt to be an offeror under conditions of equality among equals. At least in terms of experience, to more than 30,000 taxi drivers whom Law No. 8955 leaves with no option. This norm adds, to the unconstitutionality established in the reform to article 29 of Law No. 7969, through Law No. 8955, the power of the concessionaire to "INHERIT", generation after generation, to their relatives, the ownership of the taxi concession, including under conditions different from those established in the First Abbreviated Procedure carried out under the protection of Law 7969 and its regulations, delivering the concession to a private individual who was not evaluated at the opportune procedural moment and exempting them from obligations such as the mandatory requirement to present a code and C-1 license and drive the taxi a minimum of eight hours a day. Not only does the State deliver a public service in perpetuity to a private individual, whose original law granted them the exploitation for a period of only ten years, but subsequently the individual is empowered to inherit the granted concession. They reiterate that not even the ordinary legislator has the power to deliver in perpetuity the exploitation of a public service that is a State monopoly to a specific group of citizens since the legal figure does not exist. For this, it would be required to decree the existence of a private monopoly, no longer a state one, which would entail friction with Article 46 of the Political Constitution and that, in no way, could be achieved with the affirmative vote of only 16 deputies in a Committee with Full Legislative Powers, automatically extending the validity periods of the concession. On this point, Law No. 8955 is also unconstitutional. Law No. 8955 violates the scopes of the approval and integration of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, Central America and the Dominican Republic: with the signing of the free trade agreement with the United States, Central America and the Dominican Republic and its subsequent integration into the national legal system, it becomes clearly evident, in reference to the reservations that the Country defended, specifically on the topic of passenger transportation by land routes, which activities and related regulations Costa Rica could, in the future, reform. It is thus in the area of Cross-Border Services and Investment, Costa Rica reserves a series of norms for the purpose of maintaining State control over certain activities declared as public services, these being: The monopoly on remunerated transportation of persons in buses, which includes the so-called "special transportation services for students, workers and tourism". The monopoly on remunerated transportation of persons in vehicles in the taxi modality, the monopoly on railway transportation. The reservations made by Costa Rica as a State Party, visible in Annex I, concretely indicate which laws and executive decrees it may modify after the entry into force of CAFTA: As can be inferred from all the reservations made by Costa Rica, as part of these, Law No. 3284, Commercial Code of April 30, 1964, does not appear. This law, approved since 1964, kept the private transportation of persons under the figure of the carrier of persons (porteador de personas) through article 323, following and concordant articles. In view of the foregoing, it is simple to deduce that, with articles 323, following and concordant articles of the Commercial Code being in force since 1964, the activity of remunerated transportation of persons through the figure of the carrier of persons (porteador de personas) was exercised privately and absolutely lawfully, from that date, even after the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, Central America and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA) was approved, ratified and put into effect. It is not until June 7, 2011 that Law No. 8955, dated June 16, 2011, is published, that those of us who exercised the private transportation of persons through the figure of the carrier (porteador) were forced to accredit requirements to be migrated from the Commercial Code, in force until that day, to the remunerated public service of persons through the new figure of Special Established Taxi Service (Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi). We were forced to migrate to the public transportation of persons because Law No. 8955 explicitly repealed the private contract for transportation of persons through article 323, following and concordant articles of the Commercial Code, in a clear and evident violation of the scopes of what was negotiated in subsections a) and b) of article 11.4 of CAFTA. From a legal perspective, it is reasonably clear that the First Committee with Full Legislative Powers, with the vote of only 16 deputies, was never empowered by Constitutional Law to eliminate the word "persons" from article 323 of the Commercial Code and thus eliminate the activity carried out under the protection of the private contract for remunerated transportation of persons. On the other hand, the main purpose of the approval of Law No. 8955, as reflected in the explanatory memorandum of bill No. 17,874, was to regulate and transfer the carriers (porteadores) who had been exercising this private transportation activity of persons to the public service. This will of the legislator, reflected in the inclusion of three material transitory provisions in the aforementioned law, incorporated via motion, in addition to the norm that they came to regulate the situation of the carriers (porteadores) of that time, has been materially destroyed by the current Administration, making erroneous "interpretations" of their scope and thus proceeding to eliminate the permits of more than 90% of them in the first three-year term and all of them in the following period, so that the validity of Law No. 8955 no longer has any practical sense, understanding that the will of the legislator of the time with the approval of Special Law No. 8955 was precisely and praetorianly, to ensure the continuity of the commercial activity of the carriers (porteadores) of that time.

27.- Through a brief filed at 10:40 hours on March 15, 2016, Javier Cortes Montoya, in his capacity as taxi driver, appears before this Chamber in order to intervene as a passive coadjuvant in the present unconstitutionality action, and indicates his disagreement with what is stated in Law No. 8955 in its article 1, which converts the carriers of persons (porteadores de personas) into a special established taxi service, SEETAXI, also indicates that articles 323 and 334 of Law 3284, should have been regulated via executive decree issued by the President of the Republic and by the Minister of MOPT. He points out that the plaintiffs' argument regarding the creation of the former law and its monopolization lacks legal basis, given that public transportation is held by the Costa Rican State, which transfers it to third parties through the figure of administrative permits or concessions, for both buses and taxis, whose exploitation rights were awarded to third parties through a public bidding process in 2000, given that they were under permit conditions, so in that same year, the Public Transportation Council tendered 13,675 administrative taxi concessions, with only one concession being awarded per participant. The cited Law No. 8955 does not prohibit the figure of carriage (porteo), it only modifies articles 323 and 334 of the commercial code law and keeps carriage (porteo) in force. The argument that clause 11.4 on market access of the Free Trade Agreement between Costa Rica and the United States along with Central America and the Dominican Republic, is contrary to Law 8955, is not valid, given that in Annex 1 of safeguard measures of Costa Rica's chapter, there is a list of laws and decrees that all signatory nations must respect.

28.- Through a brief filed at 15:07 hours on March 18, 2016, William Solano Campos and others, appear before this Chamber in order to intervene as active coadjuvants in the present unconstitutionality action, and indicate that they are duly legitimized in their condition as users of transportation services, as they hold a legitimate interest, in the terms of article 83 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, it being possible to identify three reasons, the first of them being that with the enactment of the cited law, the creation of a state monopoly occurs without the legislative procedure having been carried out with a qualified majority in the voting, the remunerated transportation of persons has been created as a public service, the State being its sole holder, with the declaration of unconstitutionality sought, private carriage of persons (porteo privado de personas) would be permitted, simultaneously with the SEETAXI service and traditional taxis, thereby eliminating the public monopoly created by the law under comment, by allowing private initiative in the economic activity, secondly, an infraction of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality of norms occurs, the principle of freedom, private initiative, freedom of commerce, contractual freedom, freedom of choice for consumers. Law 8955 is unconstitutional because it fails to meet two applicable constitutional criteria, on one hand it does not satisfy an imperative public interest and on the other hand it limits fundamental freedoms in the most restrictive way possible, as the third point the cited norm contravenes the Free Trade Agreement with the USA, therefore it is contrary to what is provided in Article 7 of the Political Constitution, given that its purpose is to serve as an instrument for the liberalization of trade in goods and services between the State Parties, guaranteeing foreign investment and promoting conditions of fair competition, with the consequent attainment of ostensible benefits for national users and consumers, by virtue of its transcendence, chapter eleven of the treaty must be examined, titled “Cross-Border Trade in Services” and specifically the subtitle “11.4. Market Access” given that this clause in particular is the one that Law No. 8955 clearly contravenes, there the obligation of the subscribing States is established not to impose on service providers of another State Party, access restrictions, whether material or regulatory in nature, to the different economic sectors of the services market of another State.

29.- Through briefs filed before the Secretariat of this Chamber at 15:17 hours on March 18, 2016, Alberto de Armas Pereira and others, all of them in their capacity as partners of the Club de Colaboración para la autosatisfacción de necesidades de movilidad Común S.A., appear before this Chamber in order to intervene as active coadjuvants of the plaintiff party in the present unconstitutionality action. The foregoing based on article 83 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, according to which "The parties appearing in matters pending at the date of the filing of the action and those with a legitimate interest, may appear within it, in order to coadjuvate in the allegations that might justify its admissibility or inadmissibility, or to expand, in their case, the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that interests them". They base their active legitimacy on what is established in article 75, second paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which recognizes the possibility of filing an unconstitutionality action without an underlying case, in cases where due to the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those that pertain to the community as a whole. Regarding this last aspect - or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests - the Chamber has already specified that the legislator refers to the legitimacy held by active citizens insofar as it concerns the right to work. The coadjuvants, all of them collaborators of the UBER platform in Costa Rica, base their allegation on a supposed unconstitutionality of Law No. 8955, Reform of Law No.

Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, and of Ley No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, considering them contrary to Articles 50, first paragraph, and 46 of the Constitución Política. They explain that Law No. 8955 creates a monopoly that does not stimulate Costa Rica's domestic production but rather limits it, "by establishing the activity only for a privileged sector." They consider that said law curtails the possibility, for hundreds of people, of securing an "honest and useful occupation" (ocupación honesta y útil), which entails a curtailment of any individual's right to choose their own position "that allows them to earn a living"; they understand that this is a "limitation on the free choice of work." They cite, in their argumentation, a fragment of the legislative discussion during the processing of Law No. 8955, making express allusion to the records of the former bill, in summary, such fragment refers to a "negotiation process in which the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes and its authorities, together with the Cámara Nacional de Trasporte en Autobús, the Federación Nacional de Taxis, and the Cámara de Porteadores as representative of the sector, held a permanent discussion session, seeking a consensus formulation to solve the situation of the señores porteadores and señoras porteadoras"; as a result of that process, the baseline information "allowed a solution proposal to recognize the right and operability of those persons who were effectively providing the porteo service," emphasizing that said proposal "fundamentally responds to a specific and punctual need." For their part, the coadjuvants conclude, in relation to the foregoing, that the Asamblea Legislativa's reason for derogating the figure of porteo and "publificar" any type of remunerated transportation of persons carried out by means of private vehicles directed at a closed group of users and satisfying a limited, residual, exclusive, and stable demand, was "to settle the conflicts that arose between taxistas, autobuseros, and porteadores," they believe they are facing a norm that limits fundamental freedoms, "by generating a supposed benefit for one group, but a great impact on the community." They support the additional allegations of the claimants, in summary referring to the fact that Law No. 8955 is unconstitutional for not complying with the legislative procedure, in relation to it not being approved by a qualified majority, but by a Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, considering that such norm creates a state monopoly, all of which is contrary to Article 46 of the Constitución Política. They take as a reference the Tratado de Libre Comercio between the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, approved through Law No. 8622, Law No. 21 of November 2007; from which they expressly quote Article 11.4 of said Law. On this point, they conclude that such norm "expressly prohibits adopting laws, regulations, or procedures that restrict the number of providers of a service limited by their participation or market access or creating, for example, numerical quotas or monopolies that grant access, ownership, or control of the provision of that service to a single provider or few providers, resorting to limiting or discriminatory measures." They end by indicating that Law No. 8955 violates the constitutional principle of hierarchy of norms because its provisions contravene an international treaty (Law No. 8622) and Article 7 of the Constitución Política.

30.- Through writings filed before the Secretariat of this Chamber at 16:12 hours on March 18, 2016, Mauricio Muñoz Brenes and others, all of them in their capacity as members of the Club de Colaboración para la autosatisfacción de necesidades de movilidad Común S.A., appear before this Chamber in order to intervene as active coadjuvants of the claimant party in this acción de inconstitucionalidad. The foregoing based on Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, according to which "The parties appearing in matters pending as of the date of filing the action and those with a legitimate interest may appear within it, in order to coadyuvate in the allegations that might justify its admissibility or inadmissibility, or to expand, as the case may be, the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that interests them." They base their active standing on the provisions of Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which recognizes the possibility of filing an acción de inconstitucionalidad without a base matter, in cases where, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or matters that concern the community as a whole. Regarding this last aspect - or concerning the defense of diffuse interests - the Chamber has already specified that the legislator refers to the standing held by active citizens because it concerns the right to work. The coadjuvants, all of them collaborators of the UBER platform in Costa Rica, base their allegation on a supposed unconstitutionality of Law No. 8955, Reform of Law No. 3284, Código de Comercio, and of Law No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, considering them contrary to Articles 50, first paragraph, and 46 of the Constitución Política. They explain that Law No. 8955 creates a monopoly that does not stimulate Costa Rica's domestic production but rather limits it, "by establishing the activity only for a privileged sector." They consider that said law curtails the possibility, for hundreds of people, of securing an "honest and useful occupation," which entails a curtailment of any individual's right to choose their own position "that allows them to earn a living"; they understand that this is a "limitation on the free choice of work." They cite, in their argumentation, a fragment of the legislative discussion during the processing of Law No. 8955, making express allusion to the records of the former bill, in summary, such fragment refers to a "negotiation process in which the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes and its authorities, together with the Cámara Nacional de Trasporte en Autobús, the Federación Nacional de Taxis, and the Cámara de Porteadores as representative of the sector, held a permanent discussion session, seeking a consensus formulation to solve the situation of the señores porteadores and señoras porteadoras"; as a result of that process, the baseline information "allowed a solution proposal to recognize the right and operability of those persons who were effectively providing the porteo service," emphasizing that said proposal "fundamentally responds to a specific and punctual need." For their part, the coadjuvants conclude, in relation to the foregoing, that the Asamblea Legislativa's reason for derogating the figure of porteo and "publificar" any type of remunerated transportation of persons carried out by means of private vehicles directed at a closed group of users and satisfying a limited, residual, exclusive, and stable demand, was "to settle the conflicts that arose between taxistas, autobuseros, and porteadores," they believe they are facing a norm that limits fundamental freedoms, "by generating a supposed benefit for one group, but a great impact on the community." They support the additional allegations of the claimants, in summary referring to the fact that Law No. 8955 is unconstitutional for not complying with the legislative procedure, in relation to it not being approved by a qualified majority, but by a Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, considering that such norm creates a state monopoly, all of which is contrary to Article 46 of the Constitución Política. They take as a reference the Tratado de Libre Comercio between the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, approved through Law No. 8622, Law No. 21 of November 2007; from which they expressly quote Article 11.4 of said Law. On this point, they conclude that such norm "expressly prohibits adopting laws, regulations, or procedures that restrict the number of providers of a service limited by their participation or market access or creating, for example, numerical quotas or monopolies that grant access, ownership, or control of the provision of that service to a single provider or few providers, resorting to limiting or discriminatory measures." They end by indicating that Law No. 8955 violates the constitutional principle of hierarchy of norms because its provisions contravene an international treaty (Law No. 8622) and Article 7 of the Constitución Política.

31.- Through writings filed before the Secretariat of this Chamber at 15:00 hours on March 30, 2016, Carlos Bastos Chacón and others, all of them in their capacity as members of the Club de Colaboración para la autosatisfacción de necesidades de movilidad Común S.A., appear before this Chamber in order to intervene as active coadjuvants of the claimant party in this acción de inconstitucionalidad. The foregoing based on Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, according to which "The parties appearing in matters pending as of the date of filing the action and those with a legitimate interest may appear within it, in order to coadyuvate in the allegations that might justify its admissibility or inadmissibility, or to expand, as the case may be, the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that interests them." They base their active standing on the provisions of Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which recognizes the possibility of filing an acción de inconstitucionalidad without a base matter, in cases where, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or matters that concern the community as a whole. Regarding this last aspect - or concerning the defense of diffuse interests - the Chamber has already specified that the legislator refers to the standing held by active citizens because it concerns the right to work. The coadjuvants, all of them collaborators of the UBER platform in Costa Rica, base their allegation on a supposed unconstitutionality of Law No. 8955, Reform of Law No. 3284, Código de Comercio, and of Law No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, considering them contrary to Articles 50, first paragraph, and 46 of the Constitución Política. They explain that Law No. 8955 creates a monopoly that does not stimulate Costa Rica's domestic production but rather limits it, "by establishing the activity only for a privileged sector." They consider that said law curtails the possibility, for hundreds of people, of securing an "honest and useful occupation," which entails a curtailment of any individual's right to choose their own position "that allows them to earn a living"; they understand that this is a "limitation on the free choice of work." They cite, in their argumentation, a fragment of the legislative discussion during the processing of Law No. 8955, making express allusion to the records of the former bill, in summary, such fragment refers to a "negotiation process in which the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes and its authorities, together with the Cámara Nacional de Trasporte en Autobús, the Federación Nacional de Taxis, and the Cámara de Porteadores as representative of the sector, held a permanent discussion session, seeking a consensus formulation to solve the situation of the señores porteadores and señoras porteadoras"; as a result of that process, the baseline information "allowed a solution proposal to recognize the right and operability of those persons who were effectively providing the porteo service," emphasizing that said proposal "fundamentally responds to a specific and punctual need." For their part, the coadjuvants conclude, in relation to the foregoing, that the Asamblea Legislativa's reason for derogating the figure of porteo and "publificar" any type of remunerated transportation of persons carried out by means of private vehicles directed at a closed group of users and satisfying a limited, residual, exclusive, and stable demand, was "to settle the conflicts that arose between taxistas, autobuseros, and porteadores," they believe they are facing a norm that limits fundamental freedoms, "by generating a supposed benefit for one group, but a great impact on the community." They support the additional allegations of the claimants, in summary referring to the fact that Law No. 8955 is unconstitutional for not complying with the legislative procedure, in relation to it not being approved by a qualified majority, but by a Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, considering that such norm creates a state monopoly, all of which is contrary to Article 46 of the Constitución Política. They take as a reference the Tratado de Libre Comercio between the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, approved through Law No. 8622, Law No. 21 of November 2007; from which they expressly quote Article 11.4 of said Law. On this point, they conclude that such norm "expressly prohibits adopting laws, regulations, or procedures that restrict the number of providers of a service limited by their participation or market access or creating, for example, numerical quotas or monopolies that grant access, ownership, or control of the provision of that service to a single provider or few providers, resorting to limiting or discriminatory measures." They end by indicating that Law No. 8955 violates the constitutional principle of hierarchy of norms because its provisions contravene an international treaty (Law No. 8622) and Article 7 of the Constitución Política.

32.- Through writings filed before the Secretariat of this Chamber at 8:21 hours on April 1, 2016, Orlando Chaves Matarrita and others, all of them in their capacity as members of the Club de Colaboración para la autosatisfacción de necesidades de movilidad Común S.A., appear before this Chamber in order to intervene as active coadjuvants of the claimant party in this acción de inconstitucionalidad. The foregoing based on Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, according to which "The parties appearing in matters pending as of the date of filing the action and those with a legitimate interest may appear within it, in order to coadyuvate in the allegations that might justify its admissibility or inadmissibility, or to expand, as the case may be, the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that interests them." They base their active standing on the provisions of Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which recognizes the possibility of filing an acción de inconstitucionalidad without a base matter, in cases where, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or matters that concern the community as a whole. Regarding this last aspect - or concerning the defense of diffuse interests - the Chamber has already specified that the legislator refers to the standing held by active citizens because it concerns the right to work. The coadjuvants, all of them collaborators of the UBER platform in Costa Rica, base their allegation on a supposed unconstitutionality of Law No. 8955, Reform of Law No. 3284, Código de Comercio, and of Law No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, considering them contrary to Articles 50, first paragraph, and 46 of the Constitución Política. They explain that Law No. 8955 creates a monopoly that does not stimulate Costa Rica's domestic production but rather limits it, "by establishing the activity only for a privileged sector." They consider that said law curtails the possibility, for hundreds of people, of securing an "honest and useful occupation," which entails a curtailment of any individual's right to choose their own position "that allows them to earn a living"; they understand that this is a "limitation on the free choice of work." They cite, in their argumentation, a fragment of the legislative discussion during the processing of Law No. 8955, making express allusion to the records of the former bill, in summary, such fragment refers to a "negotiation process in which the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes and its authorities, together with the Cámara Nacional de Trasporte en Autobús, the Federación Nacional de Taxis, and the Cámara de Porteadores as representative of the sector, held a permanent discussion session, seeking a consensus formulation to solve the situation of the señores porteadores and señoras porteadoras"; as a result of that process, the baseline information "allowed a solution proposal to recognize the right and operability of those persons who were effectively providing the porteo service," emphasizing that said proposal "fundamentally responds to a specific and punctual need." For their part, the coadjuvants conclude, in relation to the foregoing, that the Asamblea Legislativa's reason for derogating the figure of porteo and "publificar" any type of remunerated transportation of persons carried out by means of private vehicles directed at a closed group of users and satisfying a limited, residual, exclusive, and stable demand, was "to settle the conflicts that arose between taxistas, autobuseros, and porteadores," they believe they are facing a norm that limits fundamental freedoms, "by generating a supposed benefit for one group, but a great impact on the community." They support the additional allegations of the claimants, in summary referring to the fact that Law No. 8955 is unconstitutional for not complying with the legislative procedure, in relation to it not being approved by a qualified majority, but by a Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, considering that such norm creates a state monopoly, all of which is contrary to Article 46 of the Constitución Política. They take as a reference the Tratado de Libre Comercio between the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, approved through Law No. 8622, Law No. 21 of November 2007; from which they expressly quote Article 11.4 of said Law. On this point, they conclude that such norm "expressly prohibits adopting laws, regulations, or procedures that restrict the number of providers of a service limited by their participation or market access or creating, for example, numerical quotas or monopolies that grant access, ownership, or control of the provision of that service to a single provider or few providers, resorting to limiting or discriminatory measures." They end by indicating that Law No. 8955 violates the constitutional principle of hierarchy of norms because its provisions contravene an international treaty (Law No. 8622) and Article 7 of the Constitución Política.

33.- Through writings filed before the Secretariat of this Chamber at 10:55 hours on April 1, 2016, Marco Madrigal Herrera and others, all of them in their capacity as members of the Club de Colaboración para la autosatisfacción de necesidades de movilidad Común S.A., appear before this Chamber in order to intervene as active coadjuvants of the claimant party in this acción de inconstitucionalidad. The foregoing based on Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, according to which "The parties appearing in matters pending as of the date of filing the action and those with a legitimate interest may appear within it, in order to coadyuvate in the allegations that might justify its admissibility or inadmissibility, or to expand, as the case may be, the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that interests them." They base their active standing on the provisions of Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which recognizes the possibility of filing an acción de inconstitucionalidad without a base matter, in cases where, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or matters that concern the community as a whole. Regarding this last aspect - or concerning the defense of diffuse interests - the Chamber has already specified that the legislator refers to the standing held by active citizens because it concerns the right to work. The coadjuvants, all of them collaborators of the UBER platform in Costa Rica, base their allegation on a supposed unconstitutionality of Law No. 8955, Reform of Law No. 3284, Código de Comercio, and of Law No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, considering them contrary to Articles 50, first paragraph, and 46 of the Constitución Política. They explain that Law No. 8955 creates a monopoly that does not stimulate Costa Rica's domestic production but rather limits it, "by establishing the activity only for a privileged sector." They consider that said law curtails the possibility, for hundreds of people, of securing an "honest and useful occupation," which entails a curtailment of any individual's right to choose their own position "that allows them to earn a living"; they understand that this is a "limitation on the free choice of work." They cite, in their argumentation, a fragment of the legislative discussion during the processing of Law No. 8955, making express allusion to the records of the former bill, in summary, such fragment refers to a "negotiation process in which the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes and its authorities, together with the Cámara Nacional de Trasporte en Autobús, the Federación Nacional de Taxis, and the Cámara de Porteadores as representative of the sector, held a permanent discussion session, seeking a consensus formulation to solve the situation of the señores porteadores and señoras porteadoras"; as a result of that process, the baseline information "allowed a solution proposal to recognize the right and operability of those persons who were effectively providing the porteo service," emphasizing that said proposal "fundamentally responds to a specific and punctual need." For their part, the coadjuvants conclude, in relation to the foregoing, that the Asamblea Legislativa's reason for derogating the figure of porteo and "publificar" any type of remunerated transportation of persons carried out by means of private vehicles directed at a closed group of users and satisfying a limited, residual, exclusive, and stable demand, was "to settle the conflicts that arose between taxistas, autobuseros, and porteadores," they believe they are facing a norm that limits fundamental freedoms, "by generating a supposed benefit for one group, but a great impact on the community." They support the additional allegations of the claimants, in summary referring to the fact that Law No. 8955 is unconstitutional for not complying with the legislative procedure, in relation to it not being approved by a qualified majority, but by a Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, considering that such norm creates a state monopoly, all of which is contrary to Article 46 of the Constitución Política. They take as a reference the Tratado de Libre Comercio between the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Central America, approved through Law No. 8622, Law No. 21 of November 2007; from which they expressly quote Article 11.4 of said Law. On this point, they conclude that such norm "expressly prohibits adopting laws, regulations, or procedures that restrict the number of providers of a service limited by their participation or market access or creating, for example, numerical quotas or monopolies that grant access, ownership, or control of the provision of that service to a single provider or few providers, resorting to limiting or discriminatory measures." They end by indicating that Law No. 8955 violates the constitutional principle of hierarchy of norms because its provisions contravene an international treaty (Law No. 8622) and Article 7 of the Constitución Política.

34.- By writing filed at 14:04 hours on April 01, 2016, Rogelio Fernández Ramírez and others appear before this Chamber in order to intervene as active coadjuvants in this acción de inconstitucionalidad, and indicate that they are duly legitimized in their capacity as users of transportation services, as they are assisted by a legitimate interest, in the terms of Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, it being possible to identify three reasons, the first of which is that with the enactment of the cited law, the creation of a state monopoly occurred without the legislative procedure having involved a qualified majority in the voting; the remunerated transportation of persons has been created as a public service, the State being its sole titleholder; with the declaration of unconstitutionality sought, the private porteo of persons would be permitted, simultaneously with the SEETAXI service and traditional taxis, thereby eliminating the public monopoly created by the law under comment, by permitting private initiative in economic activity. Secondly, there is an infraction of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality of norms, the principle of freedom, private initiative, freedom of commerce, contractual freedom, and freedom of choice for consumers. Law 8955 is unconstitutional because it fails to comply with two applicable constitutional criteria: on one hand, it does not satisfy an imperative public interest, and on the other hand, it limits fundamental freedoms in the most restrictive manner possible. As a third point, the cited norm contravenes the Tratado de Libre Comercio with the USA; therefore, it is contrary to the provisions of Article 7 of the Constitución Política, given that its purpose is to serve as an instrument for the liberalization of trade in goods and services between the State parties, guaranteeing foreign investment and promoting conditions of fair competition, with the consequent obtaining of ostensible benefits for national users and consumers; by virtue of its transcendence, Chapter Eleven of the treaty must be examined, titled "Cross-Border Trade in Services" and specifically the subtitle "11.4. Market Access," given that said clause, in particular, is the one that Law No. 8955 clearly contravenes, establishing therein the obligation of the subscribing States not to impose on service providers of another State party access restrictions, whether material or of a normative nature, to the different economic sectors of the service market of another State.

35.- By writing filed at 9:27 hours on April 4, 2016, Paola Rojas Anchía and others appear before this Chamber in order to intervene as active coadjuvants in this acción de inconstitucionalidad, and indicate that they are duly legitimized in their capacity as users of transportation services, as they are assisted by a legitimate interest, in the terms of Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, it being possible to identify three reasons, the first of which is that with the enactment of the cited law, the creation of a state monopoly occurred without the legislative procedure having involved a qualified majority in the voting; the remunerated transportation of persons has been created as a public service, the State being its sole titleholder; with the declaration of unconstitutionality sought, the private porteo of persons would be permitted, simultaneously with the SEETAXI service and traditional taxis, thereby eliminating the public monopoly created by the law under comment, by permitting private initiative in economic activity. Secondly, there is an infraction of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality of norms, the principle of freedom, private initiative, freedom of commerce, contractual freedom, and freedom of choice for consumers.

Law 8955 is unconstitutional because it fails to satisfy two applicable constitutional criteria: on one hand, it does not serve an imperative public interest, and on the other, it restricts fundamental freedoms in the most restrictive way possible. As a third point, the aforementioned statute contravenes the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, and is therefore contrary to the provisions of Article 7 of the Political Constitution, given that its purpose is to serve as an instrument for the liberalization of trade in goods and services between the State Parties, guaranteeing foreign investment and promoting conditions of fair competition, with the consequent attainment of ostensible benefits for national users and consumers. By virtue of its importance, Chapter Eleven of the treaty must be examined, titled "Cross-Border Trade in Services," and specifically the subtitle "11.4. Market Access," since it is this particular clause that Law No. 8955 clearly contravenes. That clause establishes the obligation of the signatory States not to impose on service providers of another State Party access restrictions, whether material or normative in nature, to the various economic sectors of the services market of another State.

36.- By a writing filed with the Secretariat of this Chamber at 4:13 p.m. on April 5, 2016, Jorge Vargas Corrales, in his capacity as president and legal representative of the corporation whose legal identification number is 3-101-549995, appears before this Chamber for the purpose of intervening as an active coadjuvant in this action of unconstitutionality. He grounds his active standing in the provisions of Article 83 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, since he considers that his represented party has a legitimate interest in this action of unconstitutionality being granted, because the challenged legal norm directly affects the activity they have been carrying out. He explains that an appeal proceeding, initiated by his represented party, is currently pending against articles 7.8.1 and 7.8.10 of ordinary session 37-2017 [sic] of the Public Transport Council (Consejo de Transporte Público), by which the coadjuvant company's application to provide the Special Taxi Service (SEETAXI) was denied. He relates that upon the approval of Law No. 8955, the authorizations for engaging in the carriage of persons (porteo de personas), an activity the coadjuvant company had been authorized to conduct before the Public Transport Council, were revoked. He indicates that through a transitional provision of the cited law, they were granted a term to continue carrying out the activity, now under the SEETAXI modality, but subject to compliance with a series of requirements. He cites, among those requirements, having the infrastructure characteristics of a public lot but with a municipal license for private parking, which was fulfilled and the exercise of the activity was authorized. He states that a carriage license (patente de porteo) was never requested from them. In 2012, the Public Transport Council denied the coadjuvant company's application for authorization to be granted the special taxi permits, a rejection based on the failure to meet all requirements demanded by the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República); he indicates they were granted a one-month deadline to comply, which they ultimately did not meet. He relates that the entire fleet under the responsibility of the appealing company has been working in the area of San Ramón and Palmares under the authorization of the Public Transport Council, while the resolution process for the administrative appeals filed concludes, as made possible by directive VTTAV 0626-2016 issued by the Vice Minister of Transport. The reason for the aforementioned directive, according to the coadjuvant company, is the protection of the recipient users of the public service provided by the coadjuvant company. He relates that the company's affiliates have been fined and their vehicle license plates removed because, according to traffic officers, they continue engaging in the carriage of persons (porteo de personas), which entails a failure by the traffic authorities to comply with the mentioned directive. He considers that, contrary to what the Public Transport Council maintains, the aforementioned directive is still in force, since no later directive to the contrary or higher-ranking norm exists. He states that he shares the arguments regarding the object of this action, since he believes that eliminating the carriage activity (porteo), through the reform of Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and subjecting that activity to Law No. 8955, violates the legal system; the foregoing, first due to the infringement of the legislative procedure rules regarding the qualified majority required to approve Law No. 8955, and second, because the normative hierarchy is violated, especially with respect to international treaties in force in Costa Rica.

37.- By a writing filed at 2:05 p.m. on April 6, 2016, Luis Ángel Delgado González, in his capacity as General Manager of Cooperativa Nacional de Servicios Múltiples y Transportes para Asociados, R.L., appears before this Chamber for the purpose of intervening as an active coadjuvant in this action of unconstitutionality, and indicates that he is duly legitimized for having a direct interest in the resolution. He indicates that upon the approval of the mentioned law, the authorizations for engaging in the carriage of persons (porteo de personas), which his represented parties exercised, were revoked, thereby limiting their exercise of a person-transport activity authorized in Article 323 of the Commercial Code, through its repeal by a law approved in an unconstitutional manner. The public administration's conduct of suspending the carriage activity (porteo) through the application of said law has caused not only harm to the community but also damages and losses to the company and to the carriers (porteadores) that make up the vehicle fleet, for which reason they filed an ordinary proceeding against the Public Transport Council, within which they requested the non-application of the reform to Article 323 of the Commercial Code. By subjecting all person-transport activity to the Public Transport Council under Law 8955, a state monopoly is being created.

38.- By a writing filed at 11:34 a.m. on April 7, 2016, Ernesto Solano León and others appear before this Chamber for the purpose of intervening as active coadjuvants in this action of unconstitutionality.

39.- By a writing filed at 2:39 p.m. on April 8, 2016, Luis Alfredo Villalobos Salazar, in his capacity as President of the Board of Directors of the Association Cámara Nacional de Autobuseros -CANABUS-, appears before this Chamber for the purpose of intervening as a passive coadjuvant in this action of unconstitutionality. He indicates that the paid carriage of persons (transporte remunerado de personas) responds to a public interest which is regulated by the State. Within that structure of regular services, and for those persons or places where this service does not reach, special services exist as a complement, as well as preferential services for those users who do not wish to use the services described above. With the issuance of Law 8955, what was intended—without it being necessary—was to clarify the lingering issue of the word "carriage" (porteo) in Article 323 of the Commercial Code. The laws regulating the matter of public transport are clear and were issued subsequently, making it clear that public transport is a public service, regardless of its modality. Likewise, there is no violation of the provisions of the International Free Trade Treaty, which excludes public services, including the paid carriage of persons (transporte remunerado de personas) as such.

40.- By a writing filed at 3:31 p.m. on April 8, 2016, Rolf Erwin Richard Mangel, in his capacity as legal representative of the company named Syniverse Technologies, S.R.L Costa Rica, appears before this Chamber for the purpose of intervening as an active coadjuvant in this action of unconstitutionality. He indicates that on October 14, 2015, he made a written inquiry to the Public Transport Council about the possibility of implementing a vehicle-sharing policy within the company. The Council responded that the proposal presented distinctive features characteristic of public transport, basing this especially on the norms currently in force and which are a product of the Reform of the Commercial Code and the Law Regulating the Public Service of Paid Carriage of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality, both given concrete form through Law No. 8955 of June 16, 2011. In his judgment, the state regulation has become excessive. He indicates that Law No. 8955 has nationalized the paid carriage of persons (transporte remunerado de personas) and has created a monopoly in favor of the State, given that it was approved by a committee with full legislative power, failing to comply with the constitutional procedure established for that purpose. With a declaration of unconstitutionality, private carriage of persons (porteo privado de personas) would be permitted, as a contract arising from the autonomy of the will, simultaneously with the SEETAXI service and traditional taxis, thereby eliminating the public monopoly created by the law. There is a violation of the principles of freedom, commerce, contract, and consumer choice. Law 8955 is unconstitutional because it fails to satisfy two applicable constitutional criteria: on one hand, it does not serve an imperative public interest, and on the other, it restricts fundamental freedoms in the most restrictive way possible. As a third point, the aforementioned statute contravenes the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, and is therefore contrary to the provisions of Article 7 of the Political Constitution, given that its purpose is to serve as an instrument for the liberalization of trade in goods and services between the State Parties, guaranteeing foreign investment and promoting conditions of fair competition, with the consequent attainment of ostensible benefits for national users and consumers. By virtue of its importance, Chapter Eleven of the treaty must be examined, titled "Cross-Border Trade in Services," and specifically the subtitle "11.4. Market Access," since it is this particular clause that Law No. 8955 clearly contravenes. That clause establishes the obligation of the signatory States not to impose on service providers of another State Party access restrictions, whether material or normative in nature, to the various economic sectors of the services market of another State.

41.- By a resolution issued at 2:38 p.m. on April 25, 2016, those appearing between March 1 and April 8, 2016, were admitted as coadjuvants. Furthermore, the hearing granted to the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) was deemed to have been answered, and the hearing granted to the Minister of Public Works and Transport (Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes) was deemed not answered (folio 1053-1054 of the digital case file).

42.- Out of time, CARLOS VILLALTA VILLEGAS appears, in his capacity as Minister of Public Works and Transport (Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes), to indicate he is rendering a report, stated in summary as follows: In accordance with the provisions of Article 11 of the General Public Administration Law and in relation to Articles 11 and 129 of the Political Constitution, the Administration, through public officials—in this case, the traffic authorities—is only responsible for ensuring compliance with the law, without being authorized to disapply it. As a consequence of the foregoing, the aforementioned Law No. 8955 having been enacted, it falls to the Public Transport Council to ensure its compliance through the competent authorities, without any criterion being able to be alleged to postpone its due compliance. From the perspective of this Ministry as "executor" of the referred legislation—enforcement in the pertinent matters corresponds to the Public Transport Council, except for matters concerning the Traffic Police—the plaintiffs challenge Law No. 8955 as allegedly unconstitutional, insofar as it reformed: Law No. 3284, the Commercial Code of April 30, 1964, and Law No. 7969, the Law Regulating the Public Service of Paid Carriage of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality of December 22, 1999. The plaintiffs consider that the indicated Law No. 8955 is contrary to Articles 7, 28, 39, 41, 46, 129, and 140 of the Political Constitution and to "the principles of the supremacy of reality in labor matters, normative hierarchy, as well as the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, private initiative, freedom of trade, freedom of contract, and free choice of consumers." The carriage service (servicio de porte) has been a commercial activity of significant use regarding the transport of goods, whereas regarding persons it was for many years "residual." During all that period, the latter was provided by natural persons, mainly in remote places where authorized public transport modalities did not operate, frequently found along crossings of secondary roads with main routes. In the last years before the enactment of Law No. 8955, and thanks to various positions taken in administrative and judicial channels, the "spectrum" of providing the carriage of persons (porte de personas) activity expanded, becoming a business no longer of natural persons but of legal entities that quickly established "branches" in the main county seats of the country, a phenomenon that generated a conflict with the public taxi service, which is a State activity. The paid carriage of persons (transporte remunerado de personas), under the current legal system, is and must be a State activity, because a clear and specific public interest is involved. When a conflict arose between carriage (porteo)—already massive due to being undertaken by legal entities—and the public taxi service, the option that the Legislative Assembly determined at that time to be legally viable was to approve Law 8955, by which it reformed, among others, the Commercial Code, so that henceforth the figure of carriage of persons (porteo de personas) would be excluded from commercial regulation. The right to operate the taxi service belongs to the State, which temporarily grants it to private parties who meet certain requirements. In this way, the figure of carriage of persons (porte de personas) is improper in form and substance, as it conflicts with a State service, thus established by Law No. 7969. Law No. 8955 certainly suppressed the figure of carriage of persons (porte de personas)—not of goods—in the Commercial Code, but through the reform introduced to Law No. 7969, it made it possible for those who were operating, by then already massively integrated into legal entities as "carriers" (porteadores), to integrate into a service under State control, called "special stable taxi services" known as "SEETAXI." What the plaintiffs appear to seek with the unconstitutionality action is a historical, technical, and operational rollback, unleashing onto the market an open number (númerus apertus) of new carriers (porteadores), and for this they claim that with the Law they now challenge, Articles 7, 28, 39, 41, 46, 129, and 140 of the Political Constitution are being violated. Regarding Article 7: It is not true that the provisions of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States are being violated, since the paid carriage of persons (transporte remunerado de personas) does not correspond to a commercial activity but constitutes a public service of the State, based first on Law No. 3503 of May 10, 1965, and its reforms; subsequently, in accordance with Law No. 5406 on the Public Taxi Service, now repealed, and finally, with the currently valid Law No. 7969. Article 28: The content of this constitutional norm is distorted since, precisely, anyone attempting to operate as a carrier of persons (porteador de personas) would be breaking the law, as the paid carriage of persons (transporte remunerado de personas) is a public service. Article 39: It is inapplicable to the specific case, since if someone who is currently de facto engaging in the carriage of persons (porte de personas) is sanctioned, it is because said activity is not permitted, having been defined by law from 1965 to date that the paid carriage of persons in motor vehicles is a public service. Article 41: Also inapplicable to the present case in its substance, since it constitutes a procedural guarantee to have recourse to Justice, but without any infringement being demonstrated in the specific case by reason of the enactment of Law No. 8955. Articles 45 and 46: We are not in the presence of a "private monopoly," much less a "public monopoly" recently constituted, because since 1965, with Law No. 3503, it was established that the paid carriage of persons in motor vehicles is a public service of the State; subsequently, Law 5406 reaffirmed it, and Law No. 7969 reiterates it, with Law No. 8955 constituting a regulation complementary to the foregoing. Article 129: There is no infringement of this constitutional provision; rather, the appellants are the ones who seek to "legitimize" the carriage of persons (porte de personas) despite its legal nonexistence. Article 140: This corresponds to the powers of the President of the Republic and the respective Minister, that is, the Executive Branch. (See folios 1181-1188 of the digital case file).

43.- By a resolution issued at 2:43 p.m. on April 28, 2016, it is indicated that, the proceedings being ready, this action was passed to the Magistrate whose turn it is.

44.- A writing is filed by MARIO HUMBERTO ZARATE SANCHEZ, in his capacity as Acting Executive Director of the Public Transport Council, on May 4, 2016, stated in summary as follows: In adherence to the literal text of the norm challenged via this unconstitutionality action, the Public Transport Council, as a Deconcentrated Body attached to the Ministry of Public Works, with autonomous competence in relation to public transport matters, is the entity that, on behalf of the State, assumes the power to authorize the special stable taxi service permits (SEETAXI), thus becoming an executor by legal mandate of the provisions of Law No. 8955. It is by virtue of such empowerment and in accordance with Article 83 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, that as a coadjuvant in the capacity of executor of the law being challenged, this report is rendered. Regarding the paid carriage of persons (transporte remunerado de personas) (public service), Article 2 of Law No. 7969 refers to the nature of the service provision, and in that sense provides that for all legal and benefit purposes, the paid carriage of persons in the taxi modality is considered a public service that will be operated through the figure of administrative concession (concesión administrativa) with the special procedures established in said law and its regulations, or through a permit (permiso) in the case of special stable taxi services, in accordance with the provisions of subsection a) of Article 7 of the same law. Likewise, the cited numeral states that the paid carriage of persons, carried out by means of buses, minibuses (busetas), micro-buses, taxis, automobiles, and any other type of motor vehicle, whether offered to the general public, to users, or to specific groups of users with specific needs constituting special demands, is a public service of which the State is the holder, regardless of the degree of state intervention in determining the service's operating system or in its supervision. At the moment of subjecting Law No. 8955 to constitutional control, the Constitutional Chamber indicated that, as a consequence of declaring the paid carriage of persons a public service in either of its two modalities, the legislator sought to abstract from the private sphere the provision of the person-transport service, which in its entirety has been declared a public service by the legislature, and means that other rules of the game and legal principles apply. For this, private parties become collaborators of the Public Administration in providing that service, which, due to its characteristics and the existence of a public interest, must be assumed by the State, without the principles and rights governing private relationships being involved, such as the principle of autonomy of the will or freedom of commerce—Resolution No. 2011-04778 of 2:31 p.m. on April 13, 2011, issued by the Constitutional Chamber. Consequently, as cited by the constitutional body, the legislator sought and declared the various modalities of paid carriage of persons as a public service by virtue of the significance or impact that said activity has on society. In this regard, the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), in its Opinion C-288-2014, stated that "no private party may provide the paid carriage of persons service, in its various modalities, unless they have a concession/permit from the State," specifically from the Public Transport Council, a deconcentrated body of the MOPT. In conclusion, the public service of paid carriage of persons in its various modalities may only be provided by those natural or juridical persons who previously hold the respective authorization (permit or concession), granted by the Public Transport Council in accordance with the procedures established in the laws that regulate the paid carriage of persons for that purpose (Opinion C-288-2014). According to the analysis conducted, regarding the issue of paid carriage of persons and its modalities, pursuant to Law No. 7969, the public transport service operated through the taxi modality is regulated, with the selection process par excellence being public bidding. Likewise, said law regulates the special stable taxi service (SEETAXI, formerly carriage [porteo]), which is authorized through the precarious figure of a permit (permiso), and closes off any possibility of transporting persons from the private sphere. For its part, Law No. 3503 provides for the paid carriage of persons in the bus modality, which can be obtained either as a result of a public bidding process or, failing that, through a permit, as stipulated in Article 25 of Law No. 3503. In this type of concession, the Administration must guarantee the economic and financial equilibrium of the contracts. Similarly, there are special service permits, of which there are three: students, workers, and tourism, regulated in Executive Decree No. 15203-MOPT, with specific standards having been issued for the application of the tourism permit. These special service permits are based, respectively, on the existence of contracts with parents or educational centers, contracts with companies or workers, and authorization from the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Turismo). These services, as their term indicates, are special, and cannot solicit passengers on demand; their provision is directed solely toward the authorized purpose and may be provided in micro-bus, minibus (buseta), or bus. Each public paid carriage of persons service satisfies specific demand needs. Regarding this, if it concerns the paid carriage of persons in the bus modality, its origin and application are reflected in a technical study, which meticulously reflects the needs in service provision for one or several communities. For this service, the Public Transport Council defines routes, schedules, optimal fleet, and operational scheme, while matters related to fares, by provision of law, fall under the competence of the Public Services Regulatory Authority (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, Aresep). In the case of the taxi service, a supply and demand study is conducted, given that this service is awarded on a per-operation-base basis, and although each taxi concession is strictly personal, it is attached to an operation base in order to maintain the economic and financial equilibrium of the concession contracts of each taxi concessionaire. The taxi service is characterized by several factors: some operate by operation base, respond to demand, is an open, public, and notorious service, operates by soliciting passengers on demand, operates on a rotation system (se ruletea), is identified by a previously defined logo and color, and has a single fare authorized by ARESEP. Law No. 7969 also regulates the special stable taxi service known as SEETAXI, which before the repeal of Article 323 of the Commercial Code was carried out as a carriage activity (actividad de porteo), conceived as a door-to-door service, to satisfy a need for limited, residual service directed to a closed group of persons, different from that provided by the taxi service. The SEETAXI, for its implementation, requires, among other things, a geographic area defined by a municipal license (patente municipal), and the existence of written contracts between the parties. For this, permits in the special stable taxi service modality must be issued by the Public Transport Council, upon prior presentation of the certified copy of the contract or contracts signed with the persons, institutions, or companies using its service, and other legally established requirements. The special stable taxi service is a service directed at a residual and limited demand—that which requires a door-to-door trip, upon prior conclusion of a contract between the parties, which inherently includes the price of said service. In this case, the user calls the permit-holding company and requests the transport service, agreeing on the price between the SEETAXI permit holder and the client, which corresponds to the trip made. The legislator's interest, as noted by the Constitutional Chamber, by virtue of the service's significance to society, was to abstract this private service to treat it as a public service, also considering the economic activity involved and the general interest (residual, limited, closed user). The SEETAXI is prohibited from soliciting passengers on demand, operating on a rotation system (el ruleteo), and other aspects established in Law No. 7969 following the reform introduced by Law No. 8955 on July 7, 2011. In accordance with the above, we can confirm that, as stated in Law No. 7969, all paid carriage of persons provided using automobiles, minibuses (busetas), micro-buses, and buses is owned by the State, and for its provision or operation, the respective authorization from the Public Transport Council must mediate. With the entry into force of Law No. 8955, the private service loses applicability, with all person-transport being framed within the public service sphere. Said norm leaves no room for exceptions or interpretations, as it is a clear and specific norm. Thus, no monopoly can be alleged, because the public service concession is obtained through public bidding, in which there is free participation. Likewise, to obtain a public service permit, any person may apply for it, with authorization depending on compliance with legal requirements. The Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), based on Articles 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Law No. 6815, the Organic Law of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic, issued a binding opinion regarding the inquiry made by the Internal Auditor of this Council, the subject of the inquiry being the special stable taxi service (SEETAXI) as of Law No. 8955. This entailed an analysis by the prosecuting body regarding the figure of carriage of persons (porteo de personas) regulated until July 6, 2011, in Article 323 of the Commercial Code, repealed in its entirety by said law. Three characteristic features of public service can be highlighted: a) It is an activity proper to the Administration; b) It tends to procure a service for the population; and c) That service must be guaranteed effectively. However, although in principle public service is an activity proper to the Administration, this does not exclude the possibility of participation by private parties in public management, especially through the public service concession, as often happens with transport and services in ports and airports. Two previously mentioned matters that must be reiterated at this time take on special relevance. First, the public nature that a particular service activity may involve presupposes the respective declaration by the public authority, a publicatio which, in our legal system, is a matter strictly reserved to law, due to the restrictions on freedom of enterprise that it entails. Second, it is also worth insisting that the participation of non-state actors in providing public services is possible, and also increasingly frequent, with the authorization and under the control and supervision of the State; although, as previously noted, not every private activity of interest or public activity constitutes a public service.

It follows from the foregoing that designating a specific economic activity as a public service implies its nationalization. That is, it assigns ownership (titularidad) to the State, such that only the State or an authorized private party may provide the service. Another effect of the public service designation is that the economic activity is removed from the commerce of men, and they cannot freely engage in it. The only way to engage in it is through a concession or permit from the State. However, even in such cases, the State retains ownership of the service, and the private party is limited solely to its effective provision. In the case of paid transportation of persons in motor vehicles —in its various modalities, buses and taxis— there is no doubt that it constitutes a public service. Indeed, the Regulatory Law on Paid Transportation of Persons in Motor Vehicles, No. 3503 of May 10, 1965, classifies paid transportation of persons in collective motor vehicles as a public service regulated, controlled, and supervised by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, the provision of which may be delegated to private parties who are expressly authorized, in accordance with the rules established in said law (Articles 1 and 2). The same classification derives from the provisions of Article 5, subsection f) of the Law Creating the Regulatory Authority for Public Services, No. 7593 of August 9, 1996, which classifies paid transportation of persons as a public service. In the same vein, the Regulatory Law on the Public Service of Paid Transportation of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality, No. 7969 of December 22, 1999, defines this mode of transportation as a public service operated under the figure of administrative concession, with the special procedures established in this law and its regulations (Article 2). And through the reform introduced to Article 2 of Law 7969, precisely by Article 2 of Law 8955, of June 16, 2011, paid transportation of persons in any type of motor vehicle is established as a public service, regardless of the degree of state intervention. The second paragraph of the rule in question provides: "Paid transportation of persons carried out by means of buses, minibuses, micro-buses, taxis, automobiles, and any other type of motor vehicle, whether offered to the general public, to users, or to specific groups of users with specific needs constituting special demands, is a public service owned by the State. The foregoing regardless of the degree of state intervention in determining the service's operating system or in its oversight." No private party may provide the service of paid transportation of persons, in its various modalities, without a concession or permit from the State. And this is precisely what Article 112 of the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes establishes, which prohibits vehicle owners or drivers from engaging in public transportation activity without the respective authorizations and legally awarded plates. Regarding the legal figure of "porteo de personas" (carriage of persons), despite the fact that paid transportation of persons constitutes a public service and, in principle, only those persons authorized by the State could provide it, those land transportation services for persons that are not subsumable within the public transportation service through collective motor vehicles and taxis may be managed by private subjects, actions that could not be prohibited or sanctioned, given that they are outside the scope of the law and are the result of the exercise of two important public freedoms (freedom of enterprise and freedom of contract). In other words, if private subjects, resorting to the principle of freedom and the indicated economic freedoms, discover or create new modalities of transporting persons in vehicles, which, given their nature, differ from the two that are nationalized, they have every right to carry out that economic activity; today, several modalities of transporting persons by land coexist in our environment. Some regulated by Public Law, others by Private Law, more specifically by Mercantile or Commercial Law. Private subjects may develop person transportation activities like any other economic activity, provided these do not entail the provision of the public transportation service through collective motor vehicles or the taxi modality. Regarding the repeal of the figure of "porteo de personas" and the creation of the figure "servicio especial estable de taxi" (stable special taxi service). By virtue of the multiple problems arising between taxi drivers, bus drivers, and portadores (carriers), the representatives of the three groups (National Chamber of Bus Transportation, National Federation of Taxis, and Chamber of Carriers), together with the authorities of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, met on multiple occasions and reached a consensus to regulate the activity of the portadores. To this end, Deputy Viviana Martin drafted a bill by which the figure of "porteo de personas" was eliminated from the Commercial Code and the regulation of that activity was transferred, under the name of "servicio especial estable de taxi," to the Regulatory Law on the Public Service of Paid Transportation of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality, No. 7969, of December 22, 1999. It was thus that, considering the consensual proposal of the representatives of the paid transportation of persons sector, the Legislative Assembly, under expediente No. 17874, processed the bill that culminated in the approval of Law No. 8955, of June 16, 2011. In this way, "porteo de personas" is eliminated, but "porteo" itself is not eliminated; that is, what is being eliminated is the word "persona" from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, but one can continue transporting things, articles, money, correspondence, etc. Bearing in mind the public interest involved and heeding the consensus achieved by the interested parties, the legislator chose to declare the transportation of persons as a public service, regardless of the modality involved and the degree of state intervention in determining the operating system or its oversight. At the same time, it regulated the activity of "porteo de personas," which was renamed "servicio especial estable de taxi," maintaining the same residual service condition that "porteo de personas" had. In fact, the "servicio especial estable de taxi" was defined as the "public service of paid transportation of persons directed at a closed group of users and that satisfies a limited, residual, exclusive, and stable demand." (Article 1, subsection I) of Law No. 7969, added by Law No. 8955). Regarding the requirements and conditions for engaging in the activity of transporting persons under the modality "servicio especial estable de taxi." Through Law No. 8955, of June 16, 2011, not only was Article 323 of the Commercial Code reformed, eliminating the figure of "porteo de personas," but also the activity was regulated, denominating it "servicio especial estable de taxi," in the Regulatory Law on the Public Service of Paid Transportation of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality. The "servicio especial estable de taxi" maintains the same residual and limited condition that "porteo de personas" had. Now, regarding the requirements and conditions for engaging in the activity of the special taxi service, Articles 2 and 29 of the Regulatory Law on the Public Service of Paid Transportation of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality, according to the reform introduced by the cited Law No. 8955. The service of paid transportation of persons, in its various modalities (bus, taxi, seetaxi, micro-bus, and others), constitutes a public service. The public service is an administrative activity whose object is a provision; it is characterized by the fact that it tends to procure a provision to the population, its purpose being to positively ensure the satisfaction of a collective need. The public service is a service provided to the public, regardless of the social stratum in which it is situated. It is characterized by being an activity proper to the Administration, it tends to procure a provision to the population, and that provision must be effectively guaranteed. Designating a specific economic activity as a public service implies its nationalization; it assigns ownership to the State, such that only the State or an authorized private party may provide the service. Likewise, the public service designation means that the economic activity is removed from the commerce of men, and they cannot freely engage in it. The only way to engage in it is through a concession or permit from the State; even in such cases, the State retains ownership of the service, and the private party is limited solely to its effective provision, provided it complies with the current regulations governing the transportation of persons, which is constituted as a public service in any modality intended to be implemented. In the case of transporting persons in motor vehicles—in its various modalities—it constitutes a public service, regulated, controlled, and supervised by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, the provision of which may be delegated to private parties who are expressly authorized in accordance with the rules established in the Legal System for that purpose. If there is a concurrence of operators in a quantity greater than the demand or unauthorized persons, competition arises that may be ruinous for the already-authorized concessionaires and permit holders, and the State shall be responsible if such competition is tolerated. The now-repealed activity of "porteo de personas" was renamed "servicio especial estable de taxi," maintaining the same residual service condition, but as a public service. The "servicio especial estable de taxi" was defined as the public service of paid transportation of persons directed at a closed group of users and that satisfies a limited, residual, exclusive, and stable demand. Regarding the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, known as CAFTA, entered into force on January 1, 2009, which was published through Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, published in Scope No. 40 to Gazette No. 246 of December 21, 2007; the treaty regulates commercial and investment relations between Central America, the United States, and the Dominican Republic. In the case of Costa Rica, this treaty constitutes one of the main instruments of commercial policy, as it regulates trade with the country's main trading partner. The treaty allowed the modernization of Costa Rican legislation in matters of intellectual property, insurance, telecommunications, and distribution contracts, as well as facilitating mechanisms to ensure the effective application of labor and environmental legislation. The plaintiffs argue that Law No. 8955 violates the scope of the referred Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA); in this regard, it was verified that in Anexo 1 (Annex I), List of Costa Rica of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, the sector denominated in said annex as "Servicios de Transporte por Vía Terrestre- Transporte de Pasajeros" (Land Transportation Services - Passenger Transportation) is specifically referenced, along with all measures pertaining to said service, among which are included Decreto Ejecutivo No. 26 of November 10, 1965, Law No. 3503, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31 180-MOPT, Law No. 7969, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 5743-T, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 28913-MOPT, Law No. 5066, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 28337-MOPT, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 15203-MOPT, and Law No. 7593. And regarding the description, "Cross-Border Services and Investment," the following is textually provided: "Cross-Border Services and Investment Costa Rica reserves the right to limit the number of concessions to operate domestic routes for paid transportation of persons in motor vehicles (including special person transportation services defined in Articles 2 and 3 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 15203-MOPT of February 22, 1984 - Regulation for the Exploitation of Special Services of Paid Automotive Transportation of Persons). Such concessions must be awarded through a bidding process, and the operation of a line shall only be tendered when the Ministry of Public Works and Transport has established the need to provide the service, in accordance with the respective technical studies. In the event of multiple offers, including one from a Costa Rican provider that meets all requirements to the same degree, the Costa Rican offer shall be preferred over the foreign one, whether from natural persons or companies. A permit to operate an international paid transportation of persons service shall be granted only to companies incorporated under the Legislation of Costa Rica or those whose capital is composed of at least 60 percent contributions from Central American nationals. In addition to the restriction described above, in granting permits to carry out international paid transportation of persons services, the principle of reciprocity shall apply. A permit shall be required to provide paid land passenger transportation services. New concessions may be awarded if justified by the demand for the service. Priority shall be given to the concessionaires that are currently providing the service. Costa Rica reserves the right to limit the number of permits or concessions to provide domestic paid land passenger transportation services, based on the demand for the service. Priority shall be given to the concessionaires that are currently providing the service. The Ministry of Public Works and Transport reserves the right to annually set the number of concessions to be awarded in each district, canton, and province for taxi services. Only one taxi concession may be awarded per natural person, and each concession grants the right to operate only one vehicle. Bids for taxi concessions are awarded based on a points system, which grants an advantage to existing providers. Each concession to provide regular public services of paid transportation of persons in motor vehicles, excluding taxis, may only be awarded to one person, unless evidence of economic necessity demonstrates the need for additional providers. Additionally, a natural person may not own more than two companies nor be a majority shareholder in more than three companies operating different routes. Permits to provide non-tourist bus transportation services for persons within the Greater Metropolitan Area of the Central Valley of Costa Rica must be granted only once it has been demonstrated that the regular public bus service cannot meet the demand. Costa Rica reserves the right to maintain a monopoly on rail transportation. However, the State may award concessions to private parties. Concessions may be awarded if justified by the demand for the service. Priority shall be given to the concessionaires that are currently providing the service." In accordance with the transcribed text, it is clear that our Government guarantees and reserves for itself in the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement the ownership and everything related to the transportation of persons, including international passenger transportation and special services (students, workers, and tourism). Consequently, anyone intending to enter our country, insofar as it relates to the transportation of persons, must comply with the Internal Legal System, since our country has guaranteed within Anexo 1 of the referred treaty the application of the regulations linked to those public services and their various modalities. This implies that authorization from the Public Transport Council is required to start the paid transportation of persons service intended to be provided, in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 7969 and its reform, which does not transgress or violate the constitutional norms enshrined in numerals 7, 46, 129, and 140 of our Magna Carta. (See folios 1215-1247 of the digital expediente).

45.- Subsequent to the date on which this Chamber resolved to admit joinders (coadyuvancias), the following briefs were filed: On July 15, 2016, the National Federation of Taxi Cooperatives (Federación Nacional de Cooperativas de Taxi, Fenacootaxi) requested a hearing. On June 21, 2016, Rubén Vargas Campos, in his capacity as General Secretary of the Union of Costa Rican Taxi Drivers (Unión de Taxistas Costarricenses), requested that the action be declared without merit. On July 23, 2016, by Miguel Angel Salas Castro, requesting to be admitted as a passive coadjuvant. On September 5, 2016, by legal representatives of the National Union of Porteadores (Unión Nacional de Porteadores), requesting to be admitted as active coadjuvants. On October 12, 2016, the National Chamber of Bus Operators Association (Asociación Cámara Nacional de Autobuseros, CANABUS) requested that this action be resolved promptly. On October 20, 2016, Edwin Barboza Guzman, Manager of Fenacootaxi, requested justice. On October 26, 2016, a member of the National Committee of Former Porteadores and Seetaxi requested a hearing. On October 31, 2016, a member of the National Committee of Former Porteadores and Seetaxi requested a hearing.

46.- The plaintiff, President of the National Association of Free Consumers (Asociación Nacional de Consumidores Libre, ACL), filed a brief on July 4 and 8, 2016, referring to the arguments of the state bodies, indicating that the public service designation does not imply a state monopoly, that the reform of Law 8955 increased the non-conformity with the FTA (TLC), and therefore requests that the joinders of MOPT and CTP be rejected. Regarding the report of the PGR, he indicates that the reform does not serve the public interest represented by the consumer, did not improve service conditions for users, and contravenes the FTA.

47.- By means of a brief dated July 15, 2016, the representatives of the National Federation of Taxi Cooperatives Fenacootaxi R.L and others requested a hearing with the Investigating Magistrate.

48.- By means of a brief filed on July 23, 2016, Miguel Angel Salas Castro indicates that, although out of time, he appears as a passive coadjuvant.

49.- By means of a brief filed on September 5, 2016, representatives of the National Union of Porteadores –UNAPORTE S.A.– appeared as active coadjuvants, requesting a hearing before the Constitutional Chamber.

50.- By means of a response dated September 14, 2016, the Investigating Magistrate addressed the hearing requests.

51.- By means of a brief dated October 20, 2016, the National Chamber of Bus Operators Association CANABUS, as passive coadjuvants, requested that this action of unconstitutionality be resolved as promptly as possible.

52.- By means of a brief dated October 20, 2016, the General Manager of the National Federation of Taxi Cooperatives requested the prompt resolution of this action.

53.- By means of a brief filed on October 26, 2016 (reiterated on October 31, 2016), a member of the National Committee of Former Porteadores and Seetaxis appeared, requesting a hearing.

54.- By means of resolution number 2016-016314 at 10:00 hours on November 4, 2016, the Chamber resolved to separate the filing brief of amparo appeal number 16-015165-0007-CO to this expediente, wherein it requests the suspension of the collection of the marchamo for the 2017 period from all concessionaires of the public service of paid transportation of persons in the taxi modality, until the action is resolved, because some of the items are linked to the laws being challenged.

55.- By means of a brief filed on November 9, 2016, the President of Auto Transportes para socios San Jorge S.A. requested that the Chamber rule on the non-compliance by COSEVI, as they are carrying out sanctioning processes for illegal transportation of persons in the sedan vehicle modality.

56.- By means of a brief filed on November 11, 2016, the Legal Representative of the National Union of Porteadores UNAPORTE S.A. appeared, indicating that she does so as an active coadjuvant.

57.- By means of a response dated November 11, 2016, the Investigating Magistrate addressed the hearing requests.

58.- By means of a resolution at 15:07 hours on January 10, 2017, the Minister of Foreign Trade was requested to provide evidence to better resolve, so that he could address the facts alleged in the unconstitutionality action.

59.- By means of a record dated December 21, 2016, the Investigating Magistrate recorded that the action was submitted for a vote that day, without being able to conclude its analysis, as it was ordered to be put to a vote with Proprietary Magistrates in the month of January 2017.

60.- By means of a brief filed on January 24, 2017, ALEXANDER MORA DELGADO, in his capacity as Minister of Foreign Trade, referred to the aforementioned evidence, indicating in summary that, given that this Ministry is the representative of the Costa Rica Party before the Free Trade Commission and before the dispute resolution mechanisms in which the country is a party, this institution must refrain from referring to the facts and arguments regarding whether the challenged law transgresses constitutional and international commercial norms and principles pointed out by the plaintiffs, since the analysis of these, on one hand, falls outside the competence of COMEX and, on the other, would inevitably lead to revealing a priori arguments that another Party to the Treaty could use before a potential dispute resolution mechanism against Costa Rica.

61.- By means of a brief filed on January 24, 2017, the plaintiff Otto Guevara Guth provided as evidence official letter DM-1325-5 of December 16, 2005, issued by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, wherein it issued an opinion on a project similar to the challenged law, where it expressed that said project contravenes the provisions of Chapter 11 on Cross-Border Trade in Services of the Free Trade Agreement. Likewise, on January 31, 2017, he provided a publication made by a deputy regarding the company UBER and CAFTA.

62. By means of resolution number 2017-001922 at 11 hours on February 8, 2017, the Chamber resolved on the recusal filed against the Investigating Magistrate, to reject the motion filed and declare Magistrate Fernando Cruz Castro authorized to hear this matter.

63.- By means of a brief filed on February 8, 2017, the Legal Representative of the National Union of Porteadores UNAPORTE S.A. indicated that she adhered to the recusal filed.

64.- By means of a brief filed on February 13, 2017, Rubén Vargas Campos appeared, requesting that the intended mockery of our laws be taken into account.

65.- The hearing set forth in Articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by numeral 9 ibidem, deeming this resolution sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Court.

66.- The prescriptions of law have been complied with in the proceedings.

Drafted by Magistrate Cruz Castro; and,

Considering:

I.- Object of the challenge.- The plaintiffs challenge Law No. 8955, of June 16, 2011, which is the “Reform of Law No. 3284, Commercial Code, of April 30, 1964, and of Law No. 7969, Regulatory Law on the Public Service of Paid Transportation of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality, of December 22, 1999”. They deem it contrary to what is established in Articles 7, 28, 39, 41, 45, 46, 129, and 140 of the Political Constitution and the principles of supremacy of reality in labor matters, normative hierarchy, reasonableness and proportionality, private initiative, freedom of trade, freedom of contract, and free choice of consumers. They explain that, through the challenged Law, Article 323 of the Commercial Code was reformed, eliminating the figure of "porteo de personas," and Law 7969 regarding Taxis was reformed and added to, concerning the stable special taxi service (SEETAXI). The plaintiffs estimate that such norm is unconstitutional by virtue of violating:

• A)First allegation (creation of a monopoly without the necessary majority): The Law is unconstitutional for having created a public monopoly in the area of transportation in the taxi modality, without having been approved with the qualified majority required by Article 46 of the Political Constitution. The approval of Law No. 8955 was carried out outside the Internal Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, since it was done through the Second Commission with Full Legislative Powers, whereas, because it created a public monopoly, its approval required a qualified majority (38 votes), as required by Article 46 of the Political Constitution.
• B)Second allegation (violation of Art. 28 on freedom and Art. 46 on freedom of trade): Through the challenged Law, a public monopoly in the service of paid transportation of persons in the taxi modality is created, preventing private parties from engaging in such activity as it was regulated, without any problem, by the Commercial Code and which arose as an agreement of wills between the parties, in which the free will or convenience of each party governed. For this reason, they affirm, it should not have been prohibited, as it is an aspect pertaining to the private sphere of citizens, in which the principle of autonomy of will governs and in which the State should not interfere. The existence of the monopoly in the area of person transportation becomes more evident today with the arrival of UBER, a digital platform that allows connecting providers of person transportation services with persons needing to be transported.
• C)Third allegation (violation of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, Dominican Republic, and Central America): The plaintiffs estimate that the challenged Law violates the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, Dominican Republic, and Central America, at points 11.4 and 11.6. They indicate that the referred Treaty determined that the possibility of private transportation service, which was permitted at the time of its approval, cannot be excluded or restricted. They add that Costa Rica did not establish any reservation regarding the commercial activity in transportation matters, therefore the challenged Law violates Chapter 11 of the Treaty in question, denominated “Cross-Border Trade in Services,” besides the fact that it must offer foreign investors the national treatment that existed at the time of signing the Treaty.

For their part, the active coadjuvants that were admitted ratify the previous arguments. The only new argument is found in the brief filed at 11:05 hours on March 15, 2016, by the Legal Representative of Inversiones Transportistas Los Guidos S.A. and others, when they indicate that:

• D)Fourth allegation (violation of the principle of equality): Law No. 8955 violates the principle of equality, under the argument that in said law the concession is granted in perpetuity, so the legislator designated a specific group of private parties to perform a public service in perpetuity, to the detriment of the rest of the inhabitants and of the offerors who were not awarded. They indicate that this reform completely closes off a monopoly, in perpetuity, with first and last names, which became a funnel in favor of a reduced group of Costa Ricans. They mention that Law No. 9027 of February 2012 establishes the concessionaire's power to "inherit" the ownership of the concession. Regarding this allegation, this Chamber proceeds to reject it for analysis, given that in this case, the allegation refers to another norm, and not to the one being challenged, since at heart it is not an allegation of violation of the principle of equality (one cannot compare those who became concessionaires with the rest of the population or those who did not) but rather a matter of political convenience or opportunity, and given that coadjuvants may broaden the grounds for unconstitutionality but not challenge other norms, the analysis of this allegation is therefore dismissed.

Now, Law No. 8955 states literally as follows:

“REFORM OF LAW No. 3284, COMMERCIAL CODE, OF APRIL 30, 1964, AND OF LAW No. 7969, REGULATORY LAW ON THE PUBLIC SERVICE OF PAID TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONS IN VEHICLES IN THE TAXI MODALITY, OF DECEMBER 22, 1999 ARTICLE 1.- Reforms to the Commercial Code Reform Articles 323 and 334 of the Commercial Code, Law No. 3284, of April 30, 1964, and its reforms.

The texts shall read:

"Article 323.- By the contract of carriage the carrier (persona porteadora) undertakes to transport goods or news from one place to another in exchange for a price. The transport may be performed by public or private enterprises. Public enterprises are those that advertise and open to the public establishments of that nature, committing to transport for determined prices, conditions, and periods, whenever their services are required in accordance with the terms of their prospectuses, itineraries, and rates. Private enterprises are those that provide such services on a discretionary basis, under conventional conditions and agreements.

The contract of carriage regulated in this article does not authorize the transport of persons by means of automotive vehicles." "Article 334.- The consignor (remitente) has the right:

[...]

• b)To be allowed to have employees of its company travel with all legally required insurance up to date and duly identified, to care for live animals or any other object requiring attention during the journey.

[...]" ARTICLE 2.- Reforms to Law No. 7969, Regulatory Law for the Public Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Mode, of December 22, 1999, and its reforms Articles 2 and 29 of Law No. 7969, Regulatory Law for the Public Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Mode, of December 22, 1999, and its reforms, are modified. The texts shall read:

"Article 2.- Nature of the provision of the service For all legal and service provision purposes, the remunerated transport of persons in the taxi mode is considered a public service to be exploited by means of the administrative concession (concesión administrativa) figure with the special procedures established in this law and its regulation, or by permit in the case of stable special taxi services, in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph a) of article 7 of this law.

The remunerated transport of persons, performed by means of buses, minibuses, micro-buses, taxis, automobiles, and any other type of automotive vehicle, whether offered to the general public, to users, or to specific groups of users with specific needs constituting special demands, is a public service of which the State is the owner. The foregoing is independent of the degree of state intervention in determining the operating system of the service or in its oversight.

A concession shall be required:

To operate the remunerated automotive transport of persons in the taxi mode, in duly authorized operation bases, in accordance with the provisions of subparagraphs b) and c) of article 1 of this law. This mode also includes the provision of the service to the domicile or place where the user is located, in response to the express request thereof to the provider of the regular taxi service, by any of the means available for such purposes.

A permit shall be required:

To operate the remunerated automotive transport of persons in the stable special taxi service mode, in cases where the service is provided door-to-door, to satisfy a need for a limited, residual service directed at a closed group of persons different from that provided under the preceding paragraph.

Permits to operate the automotive transport of persons in the stable special taxi service mode shall be issued by the Public Transport Council (Consejo de Transporte Público), upon prior submission of a certified copy of the contract or contracts signed with the persons, institutions, or companies using its service. Each natural person shall be granted only one permit; such persons may group together into a legal entity, acquiring joint and several liability. The vehicle covered by the permit must be owned or leased through a financial lease. If the conditions under which the permit was originally granted are breached, it may be revoked by a reasoned decision of the Public Transport Council.

Without prejudice to other sanctions provided for by the legal system, the permit shall be canceled, after due process and right to defense, for the following causes:

• a)When the obligations, duties, and prohibitions set forth in this law, its regulation, and related laws and regulations are breached.
• b)When falsity or inaccuracy in the documentation submitted to the Public Transport Council is proven.
• c)In the event of a transfer or assignment of the permit to a third party, without prior authorization from the Council.
• d)For the illegal provision of the service outside the area authorized by the permit, except in cases where the origin of the service is the authorized area and the destination is outside it.
• e)When, by a final act or ruling, the authorized business license (patente) for the corresponding geographical area of the permit holder is canceled or revoked, in administrative or judicial proceedings. Likewise, it shall be a reason to cancel the permit when the permit holder waives the granted business license.
• f)When the vehicle used to provide the stable special taxi service has the characteristics typical of the taxi mode vehicles authorized by virtue of a concession, violating the provisions established in that regard in article 29 of this law.
• g)When the permit holder does not have the insurance policies up to date, as established in article 29 of this law.
• h)The permit for the vehicle authorized to provide the stable special taxi service shall be canceled when the authorized vehicle travels on public roads in search of passengers.

Permits do not grant subjective rights to the holder and shall be extended for a term of up to three years, provided they comply with the requirements established for that purpose.

The Public Transport Council must publish, once a year, in the official gazette La Gaceta and in a nationally circulated newspaper, the lists of natural or legal persons duly accredited to provide the stable special taxi service." "Article 29.- Prior administrative concession or permit for stable special taxi services 1.- To provide the taxi service, a prior administrative concession granted by the Council is required, subject to the following conditions:

• a)Administrative concessions for the remunerated service of persons in the taxi mode shall be subordinated to the technical studies of supply and demand approved by the Council.
• b)Concessions shall be granted per operation base, according to the corresponding technical criteria, for renewable periods of ten years at the request of the concession holder, subject to prior compliance with an up-to-date C-1 license. The Council may authorize the existence of special operation bases for tourism purposes, depending on the characteristics of the zone or geographical area, which shall be determined by a special regulation, in accordance with the fundamental principles of this law.
• c)A single administrative concession shall be granted per individual, which shall cover the operation of the public service with one vehicle.
• d)No person awarded a concession may share, in whole or in part, the concession rights awarded to another who, in turn, is awarded another concession for the remunerated public service of persons, in other land transport modes.
• e)Concessions shall be granted through the special summary procedure provided for in these provisions. No interested developer of ports and airports may be a concession holder of the remunerated public transport services of persons in the taxi mode; nor shall they be allowed to provide this service in any mode.

2.- To provide the stable special taxi service, referred to in article 2 of this law, a permit granted by the Public Transport Council is required, subject to the following conditions:

• a)The special stable taxi permit holders of this service shall be limited to providing the service within a geographical area to be determined based on the authorized business license.
• b)No permit holder may share, in whole or in part, the rights of the permit granted to another who, in turn, holds another permit for the remunerated public service of persons.
• c)The vehicles used to provide the public service in the stable special taxi mode may not have the characteristics typical of the taxi mode vehicles authorized by virtue of a concession to provide the service at a specific operation base authorized by the Public Transport Council, such as the color red, the use of luminous or non-luminous signs, decals, the use of a taximeter, and other similar features, as defined by the relevant regulation, as well as any other distinctive mark that could mislead the users of the taxi service. In addition, they must comply with the circulation requirements established by Law No. 7331, Law on Transit on Public Land Routes, and its reforms. These vehicles may not be more than ten years old, counted from their year of manufacture.
• d)Vehicles authorized for the stable special taxi service may not park or pick up or drop off persons at stops dedicated to other public transport modes. The operation bases of the stable special taxi service must be located at a minimum distance of one hundred fifty meters from the official bus and taxi terminals.
• e)Permit holders of the stable special taxi service may not park in any place on public roads to offer their services to the general public. Nor may they travel on public roads in search of passengers.
• f)When vehicles must stop in front of public buildings, parks, educational centers, shopping centers, docks, ports, airports, churches, hospitals, or similar places, it shall be for the time strictly necessary to allow the boarding and alighting of their own users.
• g)Anyone submitting an application to operate a stable special taxi service must submit certification that they are duly registered and up to date with their obligations with the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, CCSS); registered as a taxpayer with the Ministry of Finance; up to date in the payment of income tax; have an insurance policy that fully covers their civil liability for injury or death of third parties and damage to third-party property, and keep it in force for the entire period of the permit and the corresponding municipal business license, in accordance with current legislation and other applicable regulatory requirements.
• h)By virtue of the principles of proportionality, reasonableness, and necessity, the authorized percentage of stable special taxi services may not exceed three percent (3%) of the authorized concessions per operation base.
• i)The State has the obligation to guarantee the economic and financial equilibrium of the contract to the concession holders, avoiding competition that could be ruinous, resulting from a number of operators in a given area that may exceed the need of that residual demand in the operational area where the provision of the service is authorized, given that each area presents different characteristics, authorizing the number of permits it deems necessary.
• j)Once the permit is granted, the permit holders must carry the original or a certified copy of the contract signed with the persons to whom the service is provided.

Breach of any of the foregoing conditions shall be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 7331, Law on Transit on Public Land Routes, and its reforms, without prejudice to the Public Transport Council's ability to cancel the permit." ARTICLE 3.- Addition and reform to Law No. 7969, Regulatory Law for the Public Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Mode, of December 22, 1999, and its reforms Addition of a subparagraph l) to article 1 and reform of a subparagraph e) to article 62 of Law No. 7969, Regulatory Law for the Public Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Mode, of December 22, 1999, and its reforms. The texts shall read:

"Article 1.- Definitions [.]

• l)Stable special taxi service: public service of remunerated transport of persons directed at a closed group of users and that satisfies a limited, residual, exclusive, and stable demand.

Permits for the remunerated transport of persons by micro-buses, minibuses, and buses shall be governed by the provisions of Law No. 3503, Regulatory Law for the Remunerated Transport of Persons in Automotive Vehicles, of May 10, 1965, and its reforms, or any other that replaces it in the future." "Article 62.- Reforms to Law No. 7331, The Law on Transit on Public Land Routes, of April 13, 1993, is modified in the following provisions:

[.]

• e)A subparagraph d) is added to article 145, whose text shall read:

Article 145.- [...]

• d)To provide the public transport service in any of its modes, without the respective authorizations, violating numeral 1 of subparagraph a), or numeral 1) of subparagraph b), both of article 98 and article 113 of this law. To apply the sanction regulated by this numeral and for its adjudication, the judicial authorities shall fully apply the regime of proof by presumptions and clear and concordant indicia, as defined by both civil and criminal procedural legislation, as well as the rules of logic, convenience, opportunity, reasonableness, and sound judgment. The habitual nature of the provision of the unauthorized service or the external and internal signs placed on vehicles to attract the user's attention, in order to induce them to use the vehicle using an authorized taxi, shall be taken as presumptions and indicia." II.- Standing in this case.- Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction regulates the prerequisites that determine the admissibility of unconstitutionality actions, requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution in an administrative or judicial venue in which the unconstitutionality is invoked, a requirement that is not necessary in the cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when due to the nature of the norm there is no individual or direct harm; when it is based on the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole, or when it is filed by the Attorney General of the Republic, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, or the Ombudsman, in these latter cases, within their respective spheres of competence. In accordance with the second of the scenarios provided for by paragraph 2 of article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the possibility of acting in defense of "diffuse interests" is provided, which are those whose ownership belongs to groups of persons not formally organized, but united based on a specific social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a specific personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is diffused, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. This Chamber has listed various rights that it has classified as "diffuse," such as the environment, cultural heritage, defense of the country's territorial integrity, proper management of public spending, and the right to health, among others. Furthermore, the enumeration made by the Constitutional Chamber is not exhaustive. Based on what was stated in the preceding paragraph, it is clear that the plaintiffs have sufficient standing to claim the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms, without it being necessary for them to have a prior matter serving as the basis for this action. The foregoing because they act in defense of an interest that concerns the national community as a whole, such as the right of users of the public transport service of persons. Precisely because the provision of a public service is at stake, this Chamber understands that we are dealing with an action seeking the protection of interests concerning the national community as a whole, and therefore the plaintiffs are perfectly legitimized to act directly, in light of the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. Moreover, this is, indeed, a matter whose constitutionality must be reviewed in this venue, namely, a law. In addition, the plaintiffs fulfilled the requirements stipulated in numerals 78 and 79 of the governing Law. In conclusion, this action is admissible, and therefore the object and merits of the matter must be discussed immediately.

III.- Preliminary clarification and on the methodology of analysis of the action.- As in any unconstitutionality action, what corresponds to this Constitutional Jurisdiction is the comparison of the challenged regulations with the Law of the Constitution, and nothing more. It is observed from all the joined briefs, both by the active and passive parties, that the issue transcends the constitutional sphere, as some set forth in their writings the specific difficulties in the provision of the remunerated service of persons and even raise the issue of the platform known as UBER. However, the regulation or legality of such a platform is not a matter that has been raised in this proceeding. It is the sovereign decision of the legislator to determine whether a particular service should be nationalized or liberalized. For neither nationalization nor liberalization is unconstitutional per se. The decision is political and not legal. Nor does it correspond to this Jurisdiction to examine whether UBER's activity is currently prohibited in our legal system or to analyze specific cases of Seetaxi or transport companies, and their legality. The analysis in this action is limited to examining the challenged law regarding the allegations of unconstitutionality. Now, to facilitate the study of the challenged regulations, in the following recitals an examination of the treatment given to the remunerated transport service of persons in Costa Rica will be conducted. To then examine the challenged law in general and finally analyze each of the arguments presented by the plaintiffs and joining parties.

IV.- On the remunerated transport service of persons in Costa Rica.- In this recital, the treatment our legal system has given to the remunerated transport service of persons, particularly the taxi mode, will be examined. Highlighting whether said service is considered a public service, who may provide it, and whether private transport of persons is admissible. However, before that, it is appropriate to recall two basic concepts: what a public service is, the different types of public service management that exist, and the general legal framework for the remunerated transport of persons in Costa Rica.

1. The concept of public service is dynamic: The concept of public service has been the subject of discussion in the legal field for decades, and in this regard, different theories can be outlined regarding its definition, ranging from the organic or subjective criterion (service provided by the State), functional (service of a general interest nature), and material (service whose regulation is governed by Public Law). However, what there is consensus on is that it is a concept that is not static, that is, it is a changing concept, according to variables of time (what at a given time was a public service may not be years later) and space (what in a given legal system is a public service may not be in another). In our legal system, the Constitutional Chamber has recognized this changing nature of the concept of public service, when it has stated:

"For example, article 3 of the Law of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services contains several definitions, among them that of public service, as any activity that due to its importance for the sustainable development of the country is so qualified by the Legislative Assembly, in order to subject it to the regulations of this law. As can be seen, the determination of whether a need is of public interest is not a legal question, but factual and circumstantial, which requires – as already stated – a judgment of opportunity and convenience. There are no activities that 'by nature' or imperatives of Constitutional Law are inherent to public service; rather, that will depend on each society, its needs, and the sphere – private or public – in which these are best satisfied." Decision No. 517-98, of 14:32 hours of August 26, 1998.

When a specific activity or service is declared – constitutionally, legally, or jurisprudentially – to be a public service, it is known in doctrine as the "publicatio" or the "publicization" of the service. This declaration may consist simply of defining the activity as being of public interest, or of expressly qualifying the activity as a public service. The consequences of said declaration are up to each Legal System, which may refer to: the special legal framework for its regulation, the owner of the service and the service providers, and the withdrawal of the service from commerce among men. This translates, for example, in the transport service of persons, to the State being able to demand a concession or permit, set schedules, rates, etc. As a general rule, when a service is declared a public service, it is the State that assumes it (through its various institutions if it is an administrative public service or through the creation of a state-owned enterprise if it is an economic public service). However, this does not exclude the possibility of private individuals participating in public management, which is called indirect management, by means of the public service concession, as often occurs with transportation and services at ports and airports.

2. Types of management of the public service of remunerated transport of persons (direct management and indirect management): Examining specifically the public service of remunerated transport of persons, by its nature as a public service, it is logical that it can be provided directly by the State. However, it may well be delegated to private individuals through a concession or permit, depending on the mode in question. Thus, there are basically two types of management of this public service: direct management (by the State) and indirect management (by private subjects). In this sense, each Legal System will define which activities are considered public services, who shall be the provider of such services, and whether they can be undertaken by private individuals, via concession or permit. In the case of remunerated transport of persons, as is the case under examination, direct management is also admissible when the State assumes its provision, generally through a state-owned enterprise. But, particularly in the taxi service, through indirect management, when the State grants a concession or permit to private subjects.

3. The legal framework for remunerated transport of persons in Costa Rica: In our Legal System, remunerated transport of persons, in its various modes, constitutes a public service. This is evident from several regulations:

First, the Regulatory Law for the Remunerated Transport of Persons in Automotive Vehicles, No. 3503 of May 10, 1965, whose articles 1 and 2 classify the remunerated transport of persons in collective automotive vehicles as a public service regulated, controlled, and supervised by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, as indicated:

"Article 1.- The remunerated transport of persons in collective automotive vehicles, except for taxi service automobiles regulated in another law, which is carried out on streets, highways, and roads within the national territory, is a public service regulated, controlled, and supervised by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. Its provision is delegated to private individuals whom it expressly authorizes, in accordance with the rules established herein.

(...)" "Article 2.- The Ministry of Transport has jurisdiction over matters relating to traffic and automotive transport of persons in the country. This Ministry may undertake the provision of these public services either directly or through other State institutions, or grant rights to private entrepreneurs to operate them. The Ministry of Public Works and Transport shall exercise oversight, control, and regulation of traffic and automotive transport of persons. The control of the concessioned or authorized public transport services shall be carried out jointly with the Regulatory Authority of Public Services, to guarantee the correct application of the services and full compliance with the corresponding contractual provisions.

(...)" The same classification derives from the provisions of article 5, subparagraph f) of the Law creating the Regulatory Authority of Public Services, No. 7593 of August 9, 1996:

"Article 5.- Functions In the public services defined in this article, the Regulatory Authority shall set prices and rates; in addition, it shall ensure compliance with the norms of quality, quantity, reliability, continuity, timeliness, and optimal delivery, according to article 25 of this law. The aforementioned public services are:

(...)

• f)Any means of public remunerated transport of persons, except air transport.

(...)" In a more specific sense, the current Regulatory Law for the Public Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Mode, No. 7969 of December 22, 1999, defines this means of transport as a public service that is operated through the figure of administrative concession, according to its article 2:

"Article 2.- Nature of the provision of the service For all legal and service provision purposes, the remunerated transport of persons in the taxi mode is considered a public service to be exploited by means of the administrative concession figure with the special procedures established in this law and its regulation, or by permit in the case of stable special taxi services, in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph a) of article 7 of this law.

(...)" However, since the previous law, No. 5406 of 1973 (a law no longer in force), this transport mode had been defined as a public service, in its article 1:

"Article 1.- The remunerated land transport of persons in automotive taxi vehicles shall be considered a public service." Currently, through the reform introduced to article 2 of Law 7969, precisely by article 2 of Law 8955, of June 16, 2011, the remunerated transport of persons in any type of automotive vehicle is established as a public service. The second paragraph of the rule in question provides:

"The remunerated transport of persons, performed by means of buses, minibuses, micro-buses, taxis, automobiles, and any other type of automotive vehicle, whether offered to the general public, to users, or to specific groups of users with specific needs constituting special demands, is a public service of which the State is the owner. The foregoing is independent of the degree of state intervention in determining the operating system of the service or in its oversight." From all the foregoing, it is clear that the remunerated transport of persons in automotive vehicles – in its different modes of buses and taxi – constitutes a public service in the Costa Rican Legal System. And the Constitutional Chamber has ruled to this effect, on repeated occasions.

For example, in ruling no. 2011-04778, at 2:30 p.m. on April 13, 2011, when addressing a facultative legislative consultation of constitutionality filed by several deputies regarding the bill that gave rise to the Law challenged here, the following was stated, as relevant:

"XIV.- (...) This Tribunal considers it necessary to refer first to the legislator's decision to declare all paid transportation of persons a public service and then whether this measure implies a limitation on the freedom of commerce. The bill under consultation originates, according to its statement of motives, from the fact that 'for several weeks this year, an arduous negotiation process took place in which the Ministry of Public Works and Transport and its authorities, together with the Cámara Nacional de Transporte de Autobús, the Federación Nacional de Taxis, and the Cámara de Porteadores as representatives of the sector, held a permanent discussion session, seeking a consensus formulation to solve the situation of the porteadoras and porteadoras.' (folio 2 of the certified copy of the legislative file, Volume I). As a result of that discussion, the bill under consultation, in broad terms, eliminates the word 'persons' from Article 323 of the Code of Commerce; incorporates the figure of the special stable taxi service into Law No. 7969; and declares it as one of the forms in which the public service of paid transportation of persons is exploited.

XV.- Initially, all activity developed by the State was considered a public service, whose fulfillment had to be ensured, regulated, and controlled by the rulers. Later, it was restricted to certain activities of the Public Administration, developed exclusively by state entities. However, currently, the public service can not only be provided or performed by state entities but also by private persons or entities, according to regulations issued by public authorities. Public service is understood, then, as any activity of the Public Administration or of private parties or administered persons aimed at satisfying needs or interests of a general nature, whose nature or importance is governed or framed by Public Law, insofar as control by public authorities is required. The traditional conception limits public service to the activity carried out by the Administration directly or indirectly, whose creation is due to a formal act—through formal law—or the behavior of public authorities—an administrative act. Likewise, the jurisprudence of this Tribunal has pointed out two trends that identify the determining element of public services: a) the pursued end, considering as such the satisfaction of a general need or interest, for which purpose it was created, whether through the Administration or through private parties; or b) the subjection of this activity to the Public Law regime, that is, to rules of subjection and subordination regarding the regulation of the activity even when there are no express rules establishing it, precisely by virtue of the public interest intended to be satisfied (in this sense, rulings number 2005-00846 at eleven hours twenty-eight minutes on January twenty-eighth, two thousand five, and number 5403-95 at sixteen hours six minutes on October third, nineteen ninety-five). Another necessary clarification, for the case under study, is that the constituent authority did not list all services of a public nature in the text of the Constitution. The Political Constitution leaves it to the ordinary legislator the competence to establish which services must be defined in that way, attending, of course, to the political model imposed by the Political Constitution, which is that of a social democratic state governed by the rule of law.

XVI.- The State, for quite some time now, has considered the activity of transporting persons as a prevailing social necessity whose validity is essential, as a fundamental condition for the maintenance of the rule of law and social peace. For this reason, it has enacted a series of laws, the most important currently in this matter being the Ley Reguladora de Transporte Remunerado Personas Vehículos Automotores (Law No. 3503) and the Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi (Law No. 7969), whose reform is under review in this consultation. In the last five-year period, it is public and notorious that this issue of transporting persons has been acquiring greater transcendence for Costa Rican society, not only from a social but also an economic point of view, becoming an issue of general interest that goes beyond the satisfaction of a merely private need, requiring the State's intervention to provide a solution. The State—in this case, the ordinary legislator—may, within the framework permitted by the Political Constitution and legal norms, opt for the solution it considers most opportune. As just stated, one of those possible solutions is to regulate said activity and declare it a public service, which is precisely what the bill under consultation does, necessarily fulfilling the two elements previously mentioned. By virtue of the foregoing, the Chamber does not consider the reform to Article 2 of Law No. 7969 contrary to the Political Constitution, to consider the paid transportation of persons in the taxi modality as a public service of which the State is the owner and which will be exploited through the figure of an administrative concession or the permit in the case of special stable taxi services.

XVII.- As a consequence of declaring the paid transportation of persons in the taxi modality a public service, in any of its two forms of provision, the bill under consultation reforms Article 323 of the Code of Commerce to eliminate the word 'persons' from said article and thus eliminate the porteo of persons. With this reform, the legislator seeks, once and for all, to abstract from the private sphere the provision of the person transport service, which in its entirety has been declared a public service by the legislator, and makes other rules of the game and applicable legal principles apply: Private parties become collaborators of the Public Administration in the provision of that service, which, due to its characteristics and the evident existence of a public interest, must, in principle, be assumed by the State without the principles and rights governing private relations, such as the principle of autonomy of will or freedom of commerce, standing in the way. Consequently, the Tribunal considers that the bill under consultation does not violate Articles 28, 45, 46, and 56 of the Political Constitution. (...)." As the previous ruling notes, through the challenged law, the legislator, within the framework permitted by the Political Constitution, opted to declare all activity of paid transportation of persons as a public service, in consideration of the transcendence that said activity has for Costa Rican society. Such that, paid transportation of persons, regardless of the type of motor vehicle used, the persons to whom it is directed—whether offered to the general public or to users of specific groups—and the state intervention in determining the operating system or oversight, would be considered a public service. Due to this, despite the fact that since 1965, with Law No. 3503, the paid transportation of persons in motor vehicles carried out on streets, highways, and roads within the territory of the Republic had already been declared a public service; given that rules 323 and 334 of the Code of Commerce persisted, it is as of the entry into force of Law No. 8955 (which reforms said rules of the Code of Commerce) that the legislator has intended to make it clear that no private individual—natural or legal person—can provide the service of paid transportation of persons if, prior to doing so, they do not have the respective authorization—concession or permit—granted by the Consejo de Transporte Público through the procedures established by the laws regulating said public service.

V.- On the challenged Law in general.- The challenged Law, "Reform of Law No. 3284, Code of Commerce, of April 30, 1964, and of Law No. 7969, Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, of December 22, 1999," which is Law No. 8955 of June 16, 2011, contains three rules. Through them:

- Articles 323 and 334 of the Code of Commerce are reformed, eliminating the word "persons" from the porteo. - The Ley de Taxis, No. 7969, is reformed and added to, to regulate what was defined as the special stable taxi service (SEETAXI), which "preserves the nature of the residual special service currently provided by the porteo, but protected and regulated to give a sense of responsibility to those interested parties who would be accrediting it" (according to the statement of motives of the original bill).

Thus, through the challenged Law, rules of the Code of Commerce were reformed, eliminating the figure of the porteo of persons, an activity that became regulated under the so-called Ley de Taxis, No. 7969, under the name of special stable taxi service (SEETAXI). The bill, processed under file no. 17874, was presented to the Legislative Assembly on September 29, 2010, and it is worth highlighting the following from its statement of motives to understand the kind of "transformation" of the porteo of persons, governed until then by the Code of Commerce, into the special taxi service that will be governed by Law No. 7969 Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi:

"With this initiative, it is intended very categorically to establish, within the regulatory framework of the Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi, No. 7969, a service that is a reality today and that has been wrongly protected, being covered only by the word 'persons' in the Code of Commerce, in order to create legislation that guarantees better conditions and lower costs for the user, seeking the benefit and well-being of the vast majorities.

In this way, the porteo of persons is eliminated, but the porteo itself is not eliminated, meaning that what is being eliminated is the word 'person' from Article 323 of the Code of Commerce, but one can continue transporting things, articles, money, correspondence, etc.

Given the elimination of the word 'person,' a figure called 'special stable taxi transport' is created within the Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi, No. 7969, which preserves the nature of the residual special service currently provided by the porteo, but protected and regulated to give a sense of responsibility to those interested parties who would be accrediting it.

The special stable taxi service will be fully distinguished from the regular taxi service because it will always be door-to-door, with the private contract between the parties prevailing, and it must be accredited that it forms part of a commercial activity, that they must also have the corresponding licenses, and that it may be developed in this first stage by natural persons or legal persons who can demonstrate before the Consejo de Transporte Público, within a period that has been proposed as peremptory, of three years (3 years), for them to develop this activity because it must be understood that its growth is very particular and sporadic; today it may serve for a certain time because there is a contract, but that does not mean it will remain over time, which is why a permit of up to three years is mentioned.

It is not a concession because it does not arise from a public bidding process, but rather arises from a permit and fundamentally obeys a specific and punctual need.

(...) so that anyone who is providing that special service without the respective accreditation would be operating under a range of illegality, because there is no figure either in the Code of Commerce or in the Traffic Law that allows carrying out that activity." Said bill was delegated to the Second Commission with Full Legislative Authority. After being approved in the first debate on March 15, 2011, it was sent to the Constitutional Chamber through a facultative consultation (resolved by vote number 2011-04778, where it was resolved that the bill under consultation contained no essential procedural defects or unconstitutional provisions). Finally, it was approved in the second debate on May 24, 2011. It was published on July 7, 2011, the date it entered into force. It is important to highlight that this Chamber, through the vote resolving said facultative consultation of constitutionality, already examined the questions regarding whether the bill under consultation was creating a monopoly and whether it violated freedom of commerce, as will be stated in the following recitals. Thus, after clarifying the foregoing, the examination of each of the three claims of unconstitutionality proceeds. The first being a claim regarding the procedure and the rest, claims on the merits.

VI.- On the first claim: Violation of the legislative procedure for having approved the challenged law in a Commission with Full Legislative Authority.- The plaintiffs consider that the challenged Law is unconstitutional for having created a public monopoly in the matter of taxi modality transport, without having been approved by the qualified majority required by Article 46 of the Political Constitution. They indicate that the approval of Law No. 8955 was carried out outside the Internal Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, since it was done through the Second Commission with Full Legislative Authority, given that, for creating a public monopoly, it required a qualified majority (38 votes) for its approval, as required by Article 46 of the Political Constitution.

The Procuraduría General de la República considers that the plaintiffs are not correct in the sense that the challenged law creates a public monopoly favoring the State and that, for this reason, it should have been approved by a qualified majority (38 votes). What the law in question does is declare all activity of paid transportation of persons as a public service, and such regulation could indeed be delegated to a Commission with Full Legislative Authority. Moreover, the Constitutional Chamber already endorsed the constitutionality of the procedure followed in the approval of the Law challenged here, through ruling No. 2011-04778. When analyzing the constitutionality of the bill that gave rise to the law challenged here, it was categorical in affirming, first, that it does not create any monopoly or monopolistic practice, because the creation of a public service does not create a monopoly, according to the constitutional provisions; second, that Article 46 of the Political Constitution does not create an aggravated law reserve for the imposition of regulations or limits on freedom of commerce; and third, that the delegation of a bill of such a nature to a Commission with Full Legislative Authority was indeed appropriate.

For its part, the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes considers that we are not in the presence of a private monopoly, much less a public monopoly, since as of 1965 it was determined, through Law No. 3503, that the paid transportation of persons in motor vehicles is a public service of the State. The Consejo de Transporte Público considers that the State's ownership cannot be confused with a monopoly, given that, for the provision of paid transportation of persons, the bidding process is the quintessential means. The argument does not proceed because from its origin the Law in question was not submitted or treated as a state monopoly. The legislator did not intend the creation of a monopoly; it only analyzed that said service should be considered public and thus eliminate the porteo of persons from the private sphere, concluding in Resolution No. 2011-04778, which resolved the legislative consultation, that said bill "Is not unconstitutional, either for its content or for the legislative procedure used for its approval." Finally, the admitted active co-adjuvancies ratify the plaintiffs' arguments, adding that it is the challenged law that subjects the entirety of the activity to public service. The admitted passive co-adjuvancies indicate that the unambiguous intention of the 1965 legislator was to convert all paid transportation of persons overland in any type of motor vehicle and under any form of provision into a public service, converting it into a new state monopoly. Thus, the plaintiffs' argument to the effect that Law No. 8955 had to be approved by two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly is not acceptable, since the public monopoly in the matter of paid transportation of persons, in any of its modalities (buses, taxis, porteo, etc.), was created by Article 1 of Law 3503 of May 10, 1965, a rule that is still in force. The challenged regulations being, in reality, unnecessarily enacted, since the porteo of persons had already legally ceased to exist since 1965, when the service of paid transportation of persons in any of its modalities (buses, taxis, porteo, etc.) was declared, by a qualified majority of the Legislative Assembly, as a public monopoly, susceptible to having its provision delegated to private parties through the administrative figures of concession and permit. Consequently, the challenged law did not need to be approved by two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly, as it simply came to regulate a modality of providing the paid transportation of persons service, which had already been declared a public service since 1965.

In this regard, as observed, this claim refers to the legislative procedure, insofar as it is argued that, since this law is creating a monopoly and that the final paragraph of Article 46 of the Constitution establishes that the approval of two-thirds of the totality of the members of the Legislative Assembly is required to establish new monopolies in favor of the State, then the approval in the Second Commission with Full Legislative Authority (where the indicated majority cannot be achieved) incurred a procedural defect. However, to accept this argument as correct, one must agree with all its premises. However, in this case, the first premise is invalid, because this law is NOT creating a monopoly. As stated through ruling number 2011-04778, where it was resolved that the bill under consultation contained no essential procedural defects or unconstitutional provisions, this Chamber already resolved this point, indicating specifically the following:

"IX.- Second aspect consulted: Delegation of the bill processed in legislative file number 17874 to the Second Commission with Full Legislative Authority. The consulting deputies consider that, since the bill under consultation eliminates the freedom to create porteo companies, only the Legislative Plenary would be empowered to approve said bill through a qualified vote. They consider that the bill should not have been delegated to the Second Commission with Full Legislative Authority under the terms of Articles 28, 121 subsection 7, and 124 of the Political Constitution and Articles 160 and 208 Bis of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly. Therefore, the delegation made implied a violation of the legislative procedure. (...) The bill under consultation does not create any monopoly or monopolistic practice, but rather establishes another modality for providing the public service of transporting persons, which is the 'special stable taxi service,' and sets out the requirements to provide it. Contrary to what is maintained by the consulting deputies, the bill does not configure the situation regulated in Article 121 subsection 7) of the Political Constitution, since this refers to what is known in doctrine as the law of exception, understood as the set of extraordinary measures provided for in constitutional texts so that the legal system itself can confront an emergency situation that may result in a crisis of the State." Thus, it is clear that the bill under consultation does not create any monopoly or monopolistic practice. To further elaborate, in a similar case, in which the vehicle technical inspection service was questioned as a monopoly, through ruling No. 2005-04190 at sixteen hours forty-two minutes on April twentieth, two thousand five, the Chamber considered that, in the case of concessions, it was inappropriate to speak of a monopoly:

"IV.- Concessions for the provision of a public service do not constitute a private monopoly.- Every public concession is an administrative contract made by the Administration with the objective of 'delegating' to a third party either the provision of a specific service that would correspond to the State itself to provide or the construction of a public work, but which, for certain reasons of opportunity or convenience, it decides to request the collaboration of private subjects. One of the particularities of a concession for public services is that whoever is awarded the contract must possess certain highly personal characteristics. Said awardee cannot cede or transfer that concession to third parties. This is so precisely because it was those particular characteristics of the awardee that were weighed when making the selection among all those who participated in the public bidding process. On the other hand, regarding the decision to choose a single awardee, the Public Administration has the power to do so in accordance with its constitutional competencies and according to criteria of opportunity and convenience that are not for this Jurisdiction to analyze. As for the owner of the public service, it is the Administration that retains ownership of the public service, even if a private third party ultimately provides it. That is why saying that a concession for the provision of a public service is a private monopoly would have a double contradiction, both regarding the fact that it is 'private' because the State, a public subject, is the true owner of the concessioned service; and regarding the fact that it is a 'monopoly' because it is not a market situation nor the provision of private services, but a situation within the public sphere for the provision of a public service." What the State is establishing in the case of paid transportation of persons is that it is an activity defined as a public service. This implies the so-called "publicatio," which is the constitutional or legal declaration that defines an activity as a public service. But in this case, the State is not assuming its provision as a monopoly. Rather, the possibility of private parties' participation in public management (called indirect management) is established by means of the concession for public service and the special taxi permit. Thus, we find ourselves with a multiplicity of private subjects who, once authorized, can provide this public service of paid transportation of persons. Therefore, it cannot be considered a state monopoly, since it is not even the State that directly provides the service, and in the case of authorized private subjects, it is not a single subject either, but a multiplicity of them. There is no way to classify the system this law is creating as a monopoly; it is simply a ratification that the activity is a public service (and as such, abstracted from commerce among men) which may be provided by private subjects, upon prior concession or permit granted by the State. In conclusion, given that the challenged law is not creating any type of state monopoly, but only ratifying that the service of paid transportation of persons, taxi modality, is a public service, there is no procedural defect whatsoever due to the fact that this law was approved in a Commission with Full Legislative Authority or without the majority established in the final paragraph of Article 46 of the Constitution. Consequently, this claim of unconstitutionality is dismissed.

VII.- On the second claim: Violation of the principles of autonomy of will and free commerce.

The plaintiffs consider that through the challenged Law, a public monopoly is created in the service of paid transportation of persons in the taxi modality, preventing private parties from engaging in such activity as regulated by the Code of Commerce, that is, under an agreement of wills between the parties, in which the free will or convenience of each party governs. For this reason, they affirm, it should not have been prohibited, as it is an aspect belonging to the private sphere of citizens, in which the principle of autonomy of will governs and in which the State should not interfere. They add that the existence of a monopoly in the matter of transporting persons becomes more evident currently with the arrival of UBER, a digital platform that allows connecting providers of person transport services with people who need to be transported.

The Procuraduría General de la República considers in this regard that the declaration of a specific economic activity as a public service implies its nationalization. That is, it attributes its ownership to the State, so that only the State or an authorized private party can provide the service. Another effect of the declaration of a public service is that the economic activity is removed from commerce among men, who cannot freely develop it. The only way to engage in it is through a concession or permit from the State. However, even in such cases, the State maintains ownership of the service, the private party being limited only to its effective provision. In the case of paid transportation of persons in motor vehicles—in its different modalities, buses and taxis—there is no doubt that it constitutes a public service. And the Constitutional Chamber has ruled to that effect on repeated occasions. For example, in ruling No. 2011-04778, at 2:30 p.m. on April 13, 2011, when addressing a facultative legislative consultation of constitutionality filed by several deputies regarding the bill that gave rise to the Law challenged here.

For its part, the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes considers that the paid transportation of persons, under the current legal system, is and must be an activity of the State, as a clear and specific public interest is involved. The Consejo de Transporte Público considers that the legislator sought to abstract from the private sphere the provision of the person transport service, which in its entirety has been declared a public service by the legislator, and makes other rules of the game and applicable legal principles apply. For this, private parties become collaborators of the Public Administration in the provision of that service, which, due to its characteristics and the existence of a public interest, must be assumed by the State without the principles and rights governing private relations, such as the principle of autonomy of will or freedom of commerce, standing in the way.

Finally, the admitted active co-adjuvancies ratify the plaintiffs' arguments, and the admitted passive co-adjuvancies indicate that no new monopoly was created in favor of the State, as that monopoly already existed since the distant year 1965. All arguments crash against the incontrovertible fact that Article 1 of Law 3503, approved in 1965 and in force to date, elevated all modalities of paid transportation of persons on public roads to the category of public service. Consequently, Law 8955 contains no defect of unconstitutionality, given that the only thing it legislated ex novo was the regulation of the public service modality called "seetaxi," which, inexplicably, operated freely, without any State regulation from 1965 until the enactment of Law 8955.

In this regard, in the same terms that have been developed, the establishment of an activity as a "public service" does not imply any violation of freedom of commerce. Certainly, even before the challenged law was enacted, the service of providing paid transportation of persons had already been generically classified as a public service. What Article 1 of the challenged law came to reform (regarding Articles 323 and 334 of the Code of Commerce) was to ratify it.

Similarly, this argument was already examined by this Chamber through the judgment that resolved the facultative constitutional consultation no. 11-004778, where it indicated, regarding whether the consulted project violated Constitutional articles 28, 45, 46, and 56, the following:

"XII.- Third aspect consulted: Violation of articles 28, 45, 46, and 56 of the Constitution, due to the elimination of the word \"person\" from article 323 of the Code of Commerce. The consultants consider that the activity of transporting persons (porteo de personas) is developed based on article 323 and following of the Code of Commerce and that the consulted bill proposes to eliminate the possibility that in the future private parties may venture into that activity, substituting it with a public figure with a quantitative limit. They add that being a private activity, the legislator lacks the competence to regulate it and that it is exceeding the limits of its competence since there is no evidence whatsoever in the record that proves that the private activity of transport (porteo) harms morality, public order, or affects third parties in the terms of article 28 of the Political Constitution. They add that, as constitutional jurisprudence has indicated, every person has the right to choose, without restrictions, the legally permitted business activity that best suits their interests; this is what the transporters (porteadores) have done, choose and exercise an activity legally permitted for many years. They consider that the State, despite the monopoly and control of public transportation through the granting of taxi licenses (placas de taxi), also left to the free will of citizens the use of any other form of contracting private transportation, based on articles 28 and 46 of the Political Constitution, which guarantee freedom of action and freedom of enterprise to develop that activity through schemes of voluntary union of service providers protected by freedom of association (article 25 of the Political Constitution). They request that the Chamber reaffirm that the activity of transport (porteo) is developed in accordance with the law and that the regulation that eliminates from the text of article 323 of the Code of Commerce the word \"persons\" and the figure of transporting them violates, by omission, articles 25, 28, 46, and 56 of the Political Constitution.

(...)

This Tribunal considers it necessary to refer first to the legislator's decision to declare all remunerated transportation of persons a public service and then whether this measure implies or not a limitation on freedom of commerce.

(...)

Another necessary precision, for the case under study, is that the constituent did not list all services of a public nature in the text of the Constitution. The Political Constitution leaves to the ordinary legislator the competence to establish which services must be defined in that way, attending, of course, to the political model imposed by the Political Constitution, which is that of a social democratic rule-of-law regime.

XVI.- The State, for quite some time now, has considered the activity of transporting persons as a prevailing social necessity whose validity is essential, as a fundamental condition for maintaining the rule of law and social peace. For this reason, it has promulgated a series of laws being, currently, the most important in this matter the Regulating Law for Remunerated Transportation of Persons in Automotive Vehicles (Ley Reguladora de Transporte Remunerado Personas Vehículos Automotores) (Law No. 3503) and the Regulating Law for the Public Service of Remunerated Transportation of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Mode (Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi) (Law No. 7969), whose reform is known in this consultation. In the last five years, it is public and notorious that this issue of transporting persons has been acquiring greater importance for Costa Rican society, not only from a social point of view but also economic, until becoming a matter of general interest, which goes beyond the satisfaction of a merely private need, requiring the intervention of the State to provide a solution. The State—in this case the ordinary legislator—may, within the framework permitted by the Political Constitution and legal norms, opt for the solution it considers most opportune. As was just stated, one of those possible solutions is to regulate said activity and declare it a public service, which is precisely what the consulted project does, complying, necessarily, with the two elements previously indicated. By virtue of the foregoing, the Chamber does not consider the reform to article 2 of Law number 7969 to be contrary to the Political Constitution, to consider remunerated transportation of persons in the taxi mode a public service of which the State is the holder and which will be exploited through the figure of the administrative concession (concesión administrativa) or the permit in the case of special stable taxi services.

XVII.- As a consequence of declaring remunerated transportation of persons in the taxi mode a public service, in either of its two forms of provision, the consulted bill reforms article 323 of the Code of Commerce to eliminate the word \"persons\" from said article and thus eliminate the transport of persons (porteo de personas). With this reform, the legislator seeks, once and for all, to abstract from the private sphere the provision of the person transportation service that in its entirety has been declared a public service by the legislator and makes the rules of the game and applicable legal principles different: Private parties become collaborators of the Public Administration in the provision of that service which, by its characteristics and the evident existence of a public interest, must, in principle, be assumed by the State without the principles and rights governing private relationships being involved, such as the principle of autonomy of will (autonomía de la voluntad) or freedom of commerce. Consequently, the Tribunal considers that the consulted bill does not violate articles 28, 45, 46, and 56 of the Political Constitution. (...)." Thus, given that the ordinary legislator may opt for the solution it considers most opportune to regulate the person transportation service, and that, with this reform, the legislator sought to abstract from the private sphere the provision of the person transportation service, by declaring it a public service, it makes the rules of the game and applicable legal principles different. Therefore, the principles and rights governing private relationships cannot be involved, such as the principle of autonomy of will or freedom of commerce. Consequently, the Tribunal considered in the transcribed judgment (number 11-004778), and does so again in this one, that the challenged law does not violate the constitutional principles of autonomy of will (art. 28) nor freedom of commerce (art. 46) because the declaration of a service as a public service is not a violation of freedom of commerce and the legislator sought to abstract from the private sphere (and its norms and principles) the provision of the person transportation service, by declaring it a public service.

VIII.- Regarding the third allegation: Violation of the Free Trade Agreement. MAGISTRATE JINESTA LOBO DRAFTS. REGARDING THE ALLEGED INFRACTIONS TO THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, CENTRAL AMERICA, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. The core point to elucidate on this matter is whether the referred Free Trade Agreement forms part of the constitutionality parameters against which this Tribunal must contrast the validity of a norm or act subject to Public Law that is challenged as unconstitutional. That instrument is what is called a regional trade or investment agreement, which, per se, is subject to the dynamic changes of the market, the economy, and free trade, such that it could even be renegotiated and modified. Certainly, in the Costa Rican case, in light of article 7 of the Political Constitution, the referred regional trade agreement assumed the legal form of a “Treaty,” which clearly has an infra-constitutional but supra-legal rank. In principle, the international treaties or conventions that form part of the constitutionality parameters are those of Public International Law referring to human rights, as derived from the terms and doctrine that inform articles 48 of the Political Constitution, and 38, paragraph 2, and 74 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Indeed, such instruments of Public International Law of human rights may, eventually, have a constitutional or supra-constitutional rank, for example, when they offer persons a threshold of protection superior to constitutional precepts (doctrine of the primacy of the most favorable clause or of the principles in dubio pro homine or pro libertate). Under that understanding, it is considered that this Constitutional Tribunal lacks the competence to determine whether a legal norm violates or not a regional trade agreement that assumed the legal form of a treaty. All aspects related to whether a specific law infringes or not a regional trade agreement with supra-legal, but infra-constitutional rank, are the responsibility of the ordinary judge to hear and resolve, and not the constitutional judges. Obviously, this Tribunal does have competence to examine the constitutionality of the referred regional trade agreements, as it has exercised it in the past.

IX.- Conclusions.- 1) Given that the challenged law is not creating any type of state monopoly, but only the ratification that the service of remunerated transportation of persons is a public service, there is no procedural defect whatsoever due to the fact that this law was approved in a Committee with full legislative power (Comisión con potestad legislativa plena) or without the majority established in the final paragraph of Constitutional article 46. Consequently, this allegation of unconstitutionality is dismissed. 2) The Tribunal considered in the transcribed judgment (number 11-004778), and does so again in this one, that the challenged law does not violate the constitutional principles of autonomy of will (art. 28) nor freedom of commerce (art. 46) because the legislator sought to abstract from the private sphere the provision of the person transportation service, by declaring it a public service. 3) This Constitutional Tribunal lacks the competence to determine whether a legal norm violates or not a regional trade agreement that assumed the legal form of a treaty. All aspects related to whether a specific law infringes or not a regional trade agreement with supra-legal, but infra-constitutional rank, are the responsibility of the ordinary judge to hear and resolve, and not the constitutional judges. In view of the foregoing, this action is declared without merit, as is hereby done. The foregoing is without prejudice to the legislator's powers to determine or reform what it deems appropriate regarding the regulation or illegality of any other platform that intends the private remunerated transportation of persons.

X.- DIFFERENT REASONS OF MAGISTRATE CASTILLO VÍQUEZ.- The reasons that drive me to declare this unconstitutionality action without merit are different from those put forth in the judgment. In the first place, I am clear that, unlike what others argue, the Law being challenged – no. 8955 – nationalized in favor of the State –excluded from the commerce of men– a private activity –the provision of a service–, which was governed by the principle of freedom –everything that is not prohibited is permitted– and its two essential components –the principles of autonomy of will and equality of the contracting parties–. The reason for this position is elementary and logical, and it is that when the State nationalized –reserved for the public sector that activity– the transportation of persons in the taxi mode, it did not include within that legislative act the transport of persons (porteo de personas) in accordance with article 323 of the Code of Commerce. Before the entry into force of Law no. 8955, the activity of transporting persons (porteo de personas) was a lawful activity governed by the provisions of article 28 of the Fundamental Charter. The irrefutable proof of what I am affirming is based on three unquestionable facts. First: the need to promulgate Law no. 8955 to nationalize the activity of transporting persons (porteo de personas). Second: the abundant jurisprudence of this Tribunal, in the sense that the transport of persons (porteo de personas) was authorized by the legal system. Third: the abundant administrative jurisprudence of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) coinciding with the judicial jurisprudence.

Starting from the previous premise –that the transport of persons (porteo de personas) was permitted before the entry into force of Law no. 8955– one of the constitutionality questions raised in this constitutional process is of the utmost relevance, I refer specifically to the fact whether a limitation on freedom of enterprise –the nationalization of a private activity where the State assumes its ownership– requires a Law and, if so, whether it is also necessary for its approval to be by a qualified majority of two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly in accordance with the provisions of the fourth paragraph of constitutional article 46.

I have not the slightest doubt that to adopt a measure in which a private economic activity exits the commerce of men and the State assumes its ownership, in such a way that only the State or those who have an enabling title –permit, concession, etc.– may exercise it, requires a formal Law, in the terms established by articles 28 and 46 of the Political Constitution in relation to article 31 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The foregoing means, in plain terms, that an approving act of the Legislative Assembly in exercise of the power to legislate is needed, and that, in turn, has the approval of the Executive Branch –in our environment this fundamental organ of the State is a co-legislator–, and where the reasons of general interest that justify the promulgation of the Law are clearly demonstrated, and it is an exceptional or extraordinary measure. In this direction, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights reminds us of the following:

In Advisory Opinion 6/86, in which the Oriental Republic of Uruguay consults about the scope of the expression “laws” in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, the Court concludes the following: the question is limited to inquiring about the meaning of the word laws in article 30 of the Convention. It is not, consequently, a matter of giving an answer applicable to all cases in which the Convention uses expressions such as "laws", "law", "legislative provisions", "legal provisions", "legislative measures", "legal restrictions" or "domestic laws". On each occasion when such expressions are used, their meaning must be determined specifically.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the criteria of article 30 are applicable to all those cases in which the expression law or equivalent locutions are used by the Convention regarding the restrictions that it itself authorizes with respect to each of the protected rights. Indeed, the Convention does not limit itself to proclaiming the set of rights and freedoms whose inviolability is guaranteed to every human being, but also refers to the particular conditions under which it is possible to restrict the enjoyment or exercise of such rights or freedoms without violating them. Article 30 cannot be interpreted as a sort of general authorization to establish new restrictions on the rights protected by the Convention, which would be added to the limitations permitted in the particular regulation of each one of them. On the contrary, what the article intends is to impose an additional condition so that the singularly authorized restrictions are legitimate.

When reading article 30 in concordance with others in which the Convention authorizes the imposition of limitations or restrictions on certain rights and freedoms, it is observed that it requires the concurrent fulfillment of the following conditions for establishing them:

a. That it is a restriction expressly authorized by the Convention and under the particular conditions in which it has been permitted; b. That the ends for which the restriction is established are legitimate, that is, that they respond to "reasons of general interest" and do not depart from the "purpose for which they were established". This teleological criterion, whose analysis has not been required in this consultation, establishes a control for misuse of power; and c. That such restrictions are provided by laws and are applied in accordance with them.

The meaning of the word laws must be sought as a term included in an international treaty. It is not, consequently, a matter of determining the meaning of the noun laws in the domestic law of a State Party.

In this sense, the Court takes into account the fact that the legal systems of the States Parties to the Convention derive from different traditions.

The meaning of the word laws within the context of a regime for the protection of human rights cannot be separated from the nature and origin of such a regime. Indeed, the protection of human rights, especially the civil and political rights contained in the Convention, starts from the affirmation of the existence of certain inviolable attributes of the human person that cannot be legitimately impaired by the exercise of public power. These are individual spheres that the State cannot violate or into which it can only penetrate in a limited manner. Thus, in the protection of human rights, the notion of restriction on the exercise of state power is necessarily included.

Therefore, the protection of human rights requires that state acts that fundamentally affect them not be left to the discretion of public power, but be surrounded by a set of guarantees aimed at ensuring that the inviolable attributes of the person are not violated, among which, perhaps the most relevant has to be that the limitations are established by a law adopted by the Legislative Power, in accordance with what is established by the Constitution. Through this procedure, such acts are not only invested with the assent of popular representation, but minority groups are also allowed to express their disagreement, propose different initiatives, participate in the formation of political will, or influence public opinion to prevent the majority from acting arbitrarily. In truth, this procedure does not prevent in all cases that a law approved by Parliament could turn out to be a violation of human rights, a possibility that calls for the need for some posterior control regime, but it certainly is an important obstacle to the arbitrary exercise of power.

The reservation of law for all acts of intervention in the sphere of freedom, within democratic constitutionalism, is an essential element so that the rights of man can be legally protected and exist fully in reality. For the principles of legality and reservation of law to constitute an effective guarantee of the rights and freedoms of the human person, not only its formal proclamation is required, but also the existence of a regime that effectively guarantees its application and adequate control of the exercise of the competences of the organs.

The expression laws, within the framework of the protection of human rights, would be meaningless if it did not allude to the idea that the sole determination of the public power is not enough to restrict such rights. The opposite would be equivalent to recognizing an absolute virtuality to the powers of the governors vis-à-vis the governed. In contrast, the word laws takes on its full logical and historical meaning if considered as a requirement of the necessary limitation on the interference of public power in the sphere of the rights and freedoms of the human person. The Court concludes that the expression laws, used by article 30, cannot have any other meaning than that of a formal law, that is, a legal norm adopted by the legislative organ and promulgated by the Executive Power, according to the procedure required by the domestic law of each State.

The Convention does not limit itself to requiring a law so that restrictions on the enjoyment and exercise of rights and freedoms are legally licit. It requires, additionally, that these laws be issued "for reasons of general interest and with the purpose for which they have been established". The criterion according to which permitted restrictions must be applied "with the purpose for which they have been established" was already recognized in the Draft Convention on Human Rights prepared by the Inter-American Council of Jurisconsults (1959), in which it was expressed that such restrictions "may not be applied with any other purpose or design than that for which they have been foreseen".

The requirement according to which laws must be issued for reasons of general interest means that they must have been adopted in function of the "common good" (art. 32.2), a concept that must be interpreted as an integral element of the public order of the democratic state, whose main purpose is "the protection of the essential rights of man and the creation of circumstances that allow him to progress spiritually and materially and achieve happiness" ("American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man").

"Common good" and "public order" in the Convention are terms that must be interpreted within its system, which has its own conception according to which the American states "require the political organization of the same on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy" (Charter of the OAS, art. 3.d); and the rights of man, which "are founded upon the attributes of the human personality", must be the subject of international protection (American Declaration, Recitals, para. 2; American Convention, Preamble, para. 2).

The law in the democratic state is not simply a mandate of authority vested with certain necessary formal elements. It implies content and is directed towards a purpose. The concept of laws referred to in article 30, interpreted in the context of the Convention and taking into account its object and purpose, cannot be considered solely in accordance with the principle of legality. This principle, within the spirit of the Convention, must be understood as that in which the creation of legal norms of a general character must be done in accordance with the procedures and by the organs established in the Constitution of each State Party, and all public authorities must strictly adjust their conduct to it. In a democratic society, the principle of legality is inseparably linked to that of legitimacy, by virtue of the international system found at the base of the Convention itself, relative to the "effective exercise of representative democracy", which translates, inter alia, into the popular election of the law-making organs, respect for the participation of minorities, and the ordering towards the common good.

It is not possible to separate the meaning of the expression laws in article 30 from the purpose of all American states expressed in the Preamble of the Convention "to consolidate in this Continent, within the framework of democratic institutions, a regime of personal liberty and social justice, founded upon respect for the essential rights of man" (American Convention, Preamble, para. 1). Representative democracy is determinant in the entire system of which the Convention forms a part. It is a "principle" reaffirmed by the American states in the Charter of the OAS, the fundamental instrument of the Inter-American System. The regime of the Convention itself expressly recognizes political rights (art. 23), which are those that, in the terms of article 27, cannot be suspended, which is indicative of the force they have in that system.

The laws referred to in article 30 are normative acts directed towards the common good, emanating from the democratically elected Legislative Power and promulgated by the Executive Power. This meaning corresponds fully to the general context of the Convention within the philosophy of the Inter-American System. Only the formal law, understood as the Court has done, has the aptitude to restrict the enjoyment or exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention.

The foregoing does not forcefully contradict the possibility of legislative delegations in this matter, provided that such delegations are authorized by the Constitution itself, that they are exercised within the limits imposed by it and by the delegating law, and that the exercise of the delegated power is subject to effective controls, so that it does not distort, nor can be used to distort, the fundamental character of the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention.

The necessary existence of the elements proper to the concept of law in article 30 of the Convention allows concluding that the concepts of legality and legitimacy coincide for the purposes of the interpretation of this norm, since only the law adopted by the democratically elected and constitutionally empowered organs, guided by the common good, can restrict the enjoyment and exercise of the rights and freedoms of the human person.

Therefore, in response to the question from the Government of Uruguay on the interpretation of the word laws in article 30 of the Convention, the word laws in article 30 of the Convention means a legal norm of a general character, guided by the common good, emanating from the constitutionally foreseen and democratically elected legislative organs, and elaborated according to the procedure established by the constitutions of the States Parties for the formation of laws.

Regarding the economic model adopted by our Constituent –a market economy sufficiently open that admits different variables, be it a liberal market economy, a social market economy, a mixed economy, and even strong state interventionism in the economy, provided that the essential content of economic freedoms is respected–, the position I follow prevents this economic model from being substituted by a centrally planned or socialist model, since if it were not so, we would fall into the legal pathology that, accurately, some scholars of Constitutional Law have called constitutional fraud. Recapitulating: For a private economic activity to be nationalized, it is necessary that it be done through a formal Law, that there exist reasons of general interest that justify its promulgation, and that it be an exceptional measure.

The other aspect to unravel in this constitutional process is whether the Law must be approved by a qualified majority of two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly. This question acquires capital relevance, given that the challenged Law was approved in a Permanent Committee with Full Legislative Power (Comisión Permanente con Potestad Legislativa Plena), where, evidently, that extraordinary majority was not obtained. According to the plaintiff and the active coadjuvants, this requirement is imposed by the fourth paragraph of constitutional article 46.

Reviewing the background of this constitutional article, we find that the Political Constitution of 1949 enshrines freedom of commerce in article 46. Indeed, it is indicated, in what is relevant, that private monopolies are prohibited, and any act, even if originating in a law, that threatens or restricts freedom of commerce, agriculture, and industry. The action of the State aimed at preventing all monopolistic practices or tendencies is declared of public interest. Furthermore, companies constituted as de facto monopolies must be subjected to special legislation. Finally, to establish new monopolies in favor of the State or the Municipalities, the approval of two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly is required.

This text is different from what was found in article 23 of the Political Constitution of 1871, especially in that the current one imposes the constitutional duty on the State to prevent all monopolistic practices or tendencies, as well as to subject de facto monopolies to special legislation. Deputy Facio Brenes justified these innovations, noting that despite the fact that monopolies were prohibited in the Constitution of 1871, in practice they occurred.

Likewise, he pointed out that the State must subject those monopolies to a special regulatory regime, for the benefit of the producer or consumer groups that might become victims of them, and, if necessary, for reasons of public interest, proceed to their expropriation.

Deputy Esquivel, who presented a motion together with other constituents that reproduced the text of the 1871 Constitution, opposed the motion of the Social Democratic Fraction, because it admitted the possibility of the State expropriating private enterprises; a practice he considered extremely dangerous for the economic interests of the nation. Furthermore, for him, such a concept signified direct intervention by the State in the sphere of private business. Finally, he pointed out that both motions agreed on prohibiting monopolies; but they differed on the manner in which the State should act in the face of such situations. At the end of the debate, the motion of the Social Democratic deputies was approved with some modifications, which constitutes the text of Article 46 of the Political Constitution, without the amendment introduced by Law No. 7697 of May 29, 1996.

Ostensibly, the records of the National Constituent Assembly do not provide major elements of judgment regarding the fourth paragraph of constitutional numeral 46. However, a logical and continuous reading of that article starting from its second paragraph leads me to conclude that when it speaks of monopolies, it is referring to a strictly economic concept, specifically: a market situation in which the supply of a product or service is reduced to a single seller.

It is important to clarify that when a reservation is made through law in favor of the public sector –nationalization– of a good or a service, this may obey different motivations. A first justification may be that we are in the presence of a strategic or essential service for the State or the Nation, as occurs with the goods and services found in numeral 121, subsection 14; what doctrine has termed the constitutional public domain (demanio constitucional). A second motive would be that the provision of the service or the exploitation of the good is carried out under conditions of inefficiency and ineffectiveness by the private sector, which makes State intervention necessary –principle of subsidiarity (principio de subsidiariedad)–. A third scenario would be the fact that, given the high investments, the risk, the profitability of the project, etc., the private sector decides not to intervene, which justifies the State acting in this case. Another scenario would be when a determined economic activity is the object of a monopoly, in which case the State would have a reasonable motive to reserve that activity for its own benefit. Finally, State intervention would also be justified when one is in the presence of a public service.

It must be borne in mind that when a reservation is made in favor of the public sector and a private subject is affected in their property or in the economic activity they have been developing through their company –in its different modalities–, the State is obligated to indemnify them through a fair price. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the fact that a service is essential for the community does not necessarily mean that said service must be nationalized, since it is clear that in a social and democratic state governed by the rule of law, which has opted for a market economy, certain essential activities can be satisfied by private initiative.

There is no doubt that the discussion of this legal controversy is related to the subject of public service. It is well known that a public service is characterized by being a service-provision activity not consubstantial to the State –it is not a public function that entails the exercise of authority by the Administration–, but it is indispensable for social life, which is why the State must guarantee that it is developed in a universal, continuous, efficient, adaptable, and non-discriminatory manner, in order to satisfy the collective interest or need. As a matter of principle, the ownership of the service corresponds to the State, which is justified by the interest the activity represents for the community, which is why private parties require a special enabling title from the Administration to manage the service –indirect provision of a public service–. Given the interest that the provision of the public service represents for the community, even when it involves indirect management of a public service, the Administration retains important powers over the service, besides being able to set the conditions under which the private party must manage the activity. Likewise, the management of the public service can have different modalities. In addition to the indirect management of the public service as referenced, there is also direct management, when the Public Administration itself provides it. On the other hand, we have the case of objective, virtual, or improper public services, which, in general terms, are those cases of activities of general interest –for example education, health, financial intermediation, etc.–, in which an enabling title from the Public Administration is not required, but merely an authorization. Nor can one ignore those cases of essential activities for the community that are provided directly by the private sector, in exercise of the principle of freedom and freedom of enterprise, as explained supra, for not every activity essential to the community must necessarily be reserved to the public sector. Finally, there are economic management activities –in this case, a qualified majority would indeed be necessary–, which differ from public service, as the latter presupposes an activity of doing, whereas the former refer to the conveyance of goods to the market or when dealing with ordinary industrial or commercial companies, when due to their overall regime and the requirements of their business, they may be considered as such –see Article 3, subsection 2 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)–.

Adopting the foregoing as a frame of reference, I conclude that the Constituent Power, when using the term monopoly, was not referring to the “publicatio” –the ownership that the State assumes over an activity due to the general interest it represents for society, which entails a public action justifying the State appropriating it–, but rather to a specific case of an economic activity: the exploitation of a good or the provision of a non-essential economic service by a single seller. From my perspective, not even the case of direct provision of public service –where the State or a public agent, exclusively, provides the public service– would justify the requirement of a qualified majority, given that the reservation of essential services for the community by means of law was not contemplated by the Constituent Power when establishing the limitations on freedom of enterprise. Much less so in cases of indirect management of the public service –as occurs with public transport in the taxi modality–, where the service is provided in a regime of competition among all those who hold an enabling title –concession (concesión) or permit (permiso)–. Note that in the case at hand, we are in the latter scenario, since the Law being challenged opts for the indirect modality of service provision, by establishing that a permit will be required for the exploitation of the remunerated passenger transport service, special stable taxi service modality, in cases where the service is provided door-to-door, to satisfy a limited, residual service need, directed at a closed group of people different from the one being provided.

Article 73, subsection d, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes that a vice of unconstitutionality can be incurred when a Law or general provision infringes Article 7, first paragraph, of the Constitution, by opposing a public treaty or international convention. We are, then, in the case of what doctrine has termed indirect unconstitutionality, since the Law or general provision, by breaching the international Treaty, by reflective effect, violates constitutional numeral 7.

This norm, upon reviewing the legislative history –Organic Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley Orgánica de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), legislative file No. 10.273, did not provoke major controversy. The only observation was made by the Supreme Court of Justice which, in what is relevant and referring to what was expressed about Article 2 of the draft law, stated the following:

Article 2 also deals with international instruments, by pointing out the matters subject to Constitutional Jurisdiction. Subsection b) includes the control that must be carried out “for the conformity of the internal legal order with international or community law.” There it speaks broadly of the “internal legal order,” without restricting that control to the clash between norms of the Political Charter and norms of a treaty. Hence, when any possible collision between common norms of internal law and norms of an international treaty is discussed, it will always be up to the Chamber (Sala) to resolve the point, and in this way the power of ordinary judges to determine the law in force is suppressed, a power they have been able to use, as long as no constitutional norm prohibits it. Now, according to the Assembly’s draft, if a common law were implicitly modified by a treaty, in accordance with the principle that later norms modify earlier ones in everything that opposes them, especially if one of the instruments is of higher hierarchy, in such a scenario the problem would have to be brought before the Constitutional Chamber, in accordance with the cited subsection b) of Article 2. (Folio 1586).

There is no need to resort to the Constitutional Chamber in all such cases, since judges can perfectly well decide which norm is in force, acting within the scope of their powers.

The Court limits itself to pointing this out, although it understands that sometimes problems or obstacles may arise for the application of a treaty, specifically because it requires complementary legislation. This may occur more frequently with treaties subsequent to the law; but there is also the possibility that it may occur with prior treaties, when the legislator, instead of conforming to the treaty, dictates norms that contradict it or fails to dictate those that it should. In summary, as these are complex problems, in which the legislative power of the State may be involved, this could indeed justify the decision being placed within the competence of the Constitutional Chamber.

Moreover, if those complex situations do not arise, the Chamber could deny the action of unconstitutionality when the conflict is only between a treaty and prior laws and the problem is limited to determining the law in force, without this depending on the application of constitutional norms.” (Folio 1587).

From my perspective, the issue of indirect unconstitutionality is a matter of its own complexity, not so much because of the difficulty in approaching the question, but because a task of integration and harmonization must be carried out between Public International Law and internal Law, especially Constitutional Law and Constitutional Procedural Law.

For a long time, it was a fundamental thesis in Public International Law that the only recognized legal persons were States. That is, States were recognized as having international legal personality, legal capacity, and capacity to act, and consequently, to be subjects that could contract international rights and obligations. Thus, it was States that were recognized as having the capacity to assume international rights and duties within the international legal system. With the passage of time, international legal personality was also recognized for international organizations, atypical subjects of International Law –the Holy See, the Sovereign Order of Malta, and the International Committee of the Red Cross–, belligerent communities, etc., and, more recently, regarding International Human Rights Instruments, individuals have been recognized as subjects of International Law and, therefore, with active standing (legitimación activa) to claim and request reparation for non-compliance with International Human Rights Law, since being the victims of the acts and omissions of the State, they can demand responsibility from the State for the violation of their human rights. Thus, the individual, regarding International Human Rights Law, has active standing before National and International Courts to demand responsibility for the violation of their rights, and passive standing, to respond directly when their actions have violated the human rights of persons, this latter point having been reinforced with the entry into force of the International Treaty of the International Criminal Court and its commencement of operations.

As is well known, in addition to the case of International Human Rights Law, doctrine has discussed, in other areas, whether individuals can be subjects of rights and obligations in accordance with Public International Law. In the case of International Economic Law, treaties have been issued that recognize certain rights to individuals, for example: the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States –ICSID–, which allows individuals to resort to arbitration proceedings against States. The North American Free Trade Agreement –NAFTA– which grants private parties the right of access to binational committees for the resolution of disputes. The foregoing means that to determine whether individuals have active standing to invoke non-compliance with an international convention in those not relating to human rights, where the matter is clear, its content must be analyzed. From what we have said, important rules are drawn, among them: if the Treaty does not grant them active standing, it will be the State parties who claim its non-compliance. If it grants active standing to the individual to claim its non-compliance, this standing must necessarily be limited to what the Treaty establishes.

In the case at hand, the Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Central America established two scenarios for dispute resolution. Chapter Ten, relating to investment, which provides in its Section B for the resolution of Investor-State disputes; therein it establishes that, in the event of a dispute, the claimant and the respondent must attempt to resolve the dispute through consultation and negotiation. In the event that the parties do not reach an agreement through the mechanism of consultations or negotiations, and provided that six months have elapsed since the events giving rise to the claim took place, the claimant (or the claimant acting on behalf of a legal person owned by them or which they control directly or indirectly) who has incurred losses or damages by reason of the alleged violation, may submit their claim to arbitration, either to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) (in the event that the contending party and the claimant are parties to it); or the ICSID Additional Facility Rules (in the event that only one of the two parties is a party to the ICSID Convention); or to the rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).

On the other hand, Chapter Twenty establishes the general mechanism for dispute resolution. This is divided into two sections; the first deals with the resolution of disputes between States, while the second refers to the matter of internal procedures and the resolution of commercial and private disputes. In the first of the sections, the possibility of resorting to different procedures is established, such as: arbitration, direct negotiations between the parties, or with the mediation of the Free Trade Commission. In the second of the sections, it is provided that when a question of interpretation or application of this Treaty arises in an internal judicial or administrative proceeding of a party and any other party considers that its intervention is warranted, or when a court or administrative body requests the opinion of any of the parties, that party shall notify the others. The Commission shall endeavor, as promptly as possible, to provide an adequate response. The party in whose territory the court or administrative body is located shall submit to the parties any interpretation agreed upon by the Commission, in accordance with the procedures of that forum. When the Commission fails to reach an agreement, any of the parties may submit its own opinion to the court or administrative body.

Thus, if the Treaty contains procedures through which the parties and investors must channel their claims when a legal controversy arises regarding the interpretation and application of the Agreement in connection with the issuance of a State act, whether legislative or executive, the first thing that must be observed are those procedures to resolve it. This stance has a series of positive consequences from a legal standpoint and is in accordance with elementary principles of justice, logic, and convenience. First, it respects what the Treaty itself stipulates, which materializes the principles of Pacta sunt servanda, bona fides, and the principle of interpretation and application of treaties of effect utile (ut res magis valeat quam pereat); otherwise, the Treaty would be violated, a fact that this Court cannot allow or propitiate. One would fall into the paradox that in the interest of safeguarding the Treaty, this Court would violate it by exercising jurisdiction in a case where indirect unconstitutionality is invoked. Second, it allows the parties and investors to express, under equal conditions –principle of equality of arms (principio de igualdad de armas)– their different theses about the correct interpretation and application of the Treaty. In the case of the Government of Costa Rica, one must bear in mind what the Minister of Foreign Trade expresses in his written submission filed in the judicial file in response to the order issued at fifteen hours and seven minutes on January ten, two thousand seventeen by the instructing magistrate at the request of the undersigned, when he states the following: “(...) subsections a), b) and d) of Article 2 of Law No. 7638 of October 30, 1996; it is the responsibility of this Ministry to define and direct Costa Rica's trade and investment negotiations and, furthermore, to represent the country in international trade forums where trade and investment issues are discussed. So that, in the event that there exist possible disagreements or discrepancies between the Parties regarding compliance, application, or interpretation of any provision of international free trade treaties, agreements, and instruments of foreign trade in force; COMEX is the entity called upon to represent the country in the respective bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral forums and bodies in which such matters are discussed, it is worth mentioning that said competence comprises per se the conduction and coordination of the State's defense strategy under the distinct dispute resolution mechanisms instituted in the treaties, agreements, and international instruments on trade and investment matters.

Thus, with regard to the alleged violation attributed to Law No. 8955 of June 16, 2011, in relation to any of the provisions of Chapter 11 "Cross-Border Trade in Services" of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, Approval Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, or its Annexes, this Ministry considers it neither opportune nor appropriate to comment on what has been expressed by the claimants before the constitutional jurisdiction. In that sense, this Ministry must refrain from issuing a criterion or opinion on the constitutionality or otherwise of the challenged norms and their conformity or not under the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, since if it were to proceed otherwise, the country's position and defense strategy would be revealed and advanced publicly to the other State Parties, given the possibility that –under the rules of the Treaty in question– any Party might feel affected by the resolution of this matter and might activate the dispute resolution mechanism.” Note that the Minister of Foreign Trade, among other things, judiciously and reasonably refrains from issuing an opinion, as this would imply revealing his defense strategy for the State of Costa Rica in the face of an eventual legal controversy that might arise between the State of Costa Rica and an investor or another State party, which means, no more and no less, that the Costa Rican State has not exercised its right of defense in its favor in this case. On the other hand, although the Minister of Foreign Trade does not state it expressly, it is inferred from his note, without a doubt, that the normal channel for resolving this legal controversy is the one provided for in the Treaty, and not in this venue. Finally, although Magistrate Rueda Leal and I have repeatedly held that in order to resort to ICSID it is necessary to exhaust internal procedures, the truth of the matter is that the appellant party does not demonstrate in the judicial file that it has followed the rules provided for in the Treaty for the resolution of disputes, nor that it has exhausted the internal route. Lastly, it is neither logical nor fair for this Court to issue a judgment of constitutionality, in the sense of whether the Law violates the Treaty or not, without having access to the distinct positions of the parties, the investors, the technical bodies, bilateral, plurilateral, multilateral bodies, etc., arguments, counter-arguments, etc., which must be presented in the instances provided for in the Treaty for the resolution of disputes.

Thus, I conclude that only once the Treaty provisions on dispute resolution have been observed and, therefore, the respective procedures exhausted, might this Court eventually have jurisdiction to examine the constitutional grievance raised, in the sense of whether the challenged Law violates the Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America and Central America. Ergo, I outright reject this grievance and, consequently, I abstain from issuing any judgment in this regard.

XI.- Magistrate Rueda Leal issues a dissenting vote (salva el voto) and declares the unconstitutionality of the amendments made through Law No. 8955 of June 16, 2011, to Articles 323 and 334 subsection b) of the Code of Commerce (Código de Comercio); and the additions and amendments to Articles 1 subsection l), 2, 29, and 62 subsection e) of Law No. 7969, Regulatory Law of the Public Remunerated Passenger Transport Service in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality (Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi) of December 22, 1999.

Prior to analyzing the substance of what is challenged, it is important to explain what the changes made through Law No. 8955 of June 16, 2011, consisted of, which will allow us to have a clearer vision of their scope.

In this regard, the challenged legislation altered the following norms:

1.- Amendment to numerals 323 and 334 subsection b), of the Code of Commerce (Law No. 3284 of April 30, 1964).

Regarding ordinal 323:

- The version prior to the amendment stated:

· Article 323. “By means of the transport contract, the carrier (porteador) is obligated to transport persons, things, or news from one place to another in exchange for a price. Transport may be carried out by public or private companies. Public companies are those that announce and open establishments of that nature to the public, undertaking to transport for determined prices, conditions, and periods, whenever their services are requested in accordance with the bases of their prospectuses, itineraries, and tariffs. Private companies are those that provide these services in a discretionary manner, under conditions and by conventional adjustments.” (Emphasis not original).

- The amended version states:

· Article 323. “By means of the transport contract, the person acting as carrier is obligated to transport things or news from one place to another in exchange for a price. Transport may be carried out by public or private companies. Public companies are those that announce and open establishments of that nature to the public, undertaking to transport for determined prices, conditions, and periods, whenever their services are requested in accordance with the bases of their prospectuses, itineraries, and tariffs. Private companies are those that provide these services in a discretionary manner, under conditions and by conventional adjustments.

The transport contract regulated in this article does not authorize the transport of persons by means of automotive vehicles.” (Emphasis not original).

From the foregoing, it follows that the figure that enabled the remunerated transport of persons, which had been regulated by the Code of Commerce, was completely eliminated.

With respect to numeral 334 subsection b):

- The version prior to the amendment stated:

· Article 334. The sender (remitente) has the right:

(…)

• b)To be allowed to have their own employees travel at their expense to care for live animals, or any other object requiring attention, during the journey; and (…)

- The amended version provides:

· Article 334. The sender has the right:

(…)

• b)To be allowed to have the employees of their company travel, with all legally required insurance up to date and duly identified, to care for live animals or any other object requiring attention during the journey; and (…)

From the aforementioned amendment, the creation of a regulation for the accessory transport of persons with respect to the transport of live animals or any other object requiring attention, under the conditions indicated in that numeral, is inferred.

2.- Amendment to ordinals 2 and 29 of Law No. 7969, Regulatory Law of the Public Remunerated Passenger Transport Service in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality, of December 22, 1999.

With respect to numeral 2:

- The version prior to the amendment stated:

· “ARTICLE 2. Nature of the service provision For all legal and service provision purposes, remunerated passenger transport in the taxi modality is considered a public service that shall be exploited through the figure of the administrative concession, with the special procedures established in this law and its regulation.

- The amended version establishes:

· “Article 2.-Nature of the service provision For all legal and service provision purposes, remunerated passenger transport in the taxi modality is considered a public service that shall be exploited through the figure of the administrative concession, with the special procedures established in this law and its regulation, or the permit in the case of special stable taxi services, in accordance with what is established in subsection a) of article 7 of this law.

Remunerated passenger transport, carried out by means of buses, minibuses, microbuses, taxis, automobiles, and any other type of automotive vehicle, whether offered to the general public, to users, or to determined groups of users with specific needs that constitute special demands, is a public service of which the State is the owner (titular). The foregoing is independent of the degree of state intervention in determining the service's operating system or its oversight (fiscalización).

A concession shall be necessary:

To exploit the automotive remunerated passenger transport service, taxi modality, at duly authorized operation bases, in accordance with what is established in subsections b) and c) of article 1 of this law. This modality also includes the provision of service to the domicile or place where the user is located, in response to an express request from the latter to the regular taxi service provider, through any of the means the provider has for such purposes.

A permit shall be required:

To exploit the automotive remunerated passenger transport service, special stable taxi service modality, in cases where the service is provided door-to-door, to satisfy a limited, residual service need, directed at a closed group of people different from the one provided according to the preceding paragraph.

The permits to exploit automotive passenger transport in the special stable taxi service modality shall be issued by the Public Transport Council (Consejo de Transporte Público), upon prior presentation of the certified copy of the contract or contracts signed with the persons, institutions, or companies that make use of their service. Only one permit shall be granted to each natural person; these persons may group together into a legal person, acquiring joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria).

The vehicle covered by the permit must be owned or leased through a financial lease. If the conditions under which the permit was originally granted are breached, it may be revoked by a justified decision of the Public Transport Council (Consejo de Transporte Público).

Without prejudice to other sanctions provided by the legal system, the permit shall be canceled, following due process and the right to defense, for the following causes:

• a)When the obligations, duties, and prohibitions established in this law, its regulations, and related laws and regulations are breached.
• b)When the falsity or inaccuracy of the documentation submitted to the Public Transport Council is proven.
• c)In the event of the transfer or assignment of the permit in favor of a third party, without prior authorization from the Council.
• d)For the illegal provision of the service outside the area authorized by the permit, except in cases where the service originates in the authorized area and the destination is outside it.
• e)When the authorized license (patente) for the corresponding geographical area of the permit holder is canceled or revoked by a firm act or resolution, through administrative or judicial channels. Likewise, the cancellation of the permit shall also be warranted when the permit holder renounces the granted license (patente).
• f)When the vehicle used to provide the stable special taxi service has the characteristics typical of taxi-mode vehicles authorized under a concession (concesión), violating the provisions established in that regard in Article 29 of this law.
• g)When the permit holder does not have the required insurance policies up to date, as established in Article 29 of this law.
• h)The permit for a vehicle authorized to provide the stable special taxi service shall be canceled when the authorized vehicle circulates on public roads seeking passengers.

Permits do not grant subjective rights to the holder and shall be extended for a term of up to three years, provided they comply with the requirements established for that purpose.

The Public Transport Council must publish, once a year, in the official gazette La Gaceta and in a nationally circulated newspaper, the lists of natural or legal persons who are duly accredited to provide the stable special taxi service." (The emphasis is not original).

From the above, it is observed that through the reform, the express declaration of public service and State ownership of all remunerated transportation of persons in motor vehicles was incorporated, regardless of the degree of state intervention in determining the service's operating system or in its oversight. Additionally, the regulation of the Stable Special Taxi Service was established.

Regarding numeral 29:

- The version prior to the reform regulated:

· ARTICLE 29. Prior administrative concession (Concesión administrativa previa) For the provision of taxi service, it is necessary to obtain in advance an administrative concession (concesión administrativa) granted by the Council, subject to the following conditions:

• a)Administrative concessions for remunerated passenger service in taxi mode shall be subject to the technical supply and demand studies approved by the Council. b) Concessions shall be granted per operating base, according to the corresponding technical criteria, for a non-extendable term of ten years. The Council may authorize the existence of special operating bases for tourism purposes, depending on the characteristics of the zone or geographical area, which shall be determined through a special regulation, in accordance with the fundamental principles of this law.
• c)Only one administrative concession shall be granted per individual, which shall cover the operation of the public service with one vehicle.
• d)No concession awardee may share, in whole or in part, the concession rights awarded to another who, in turn, is the awardee of another concession for remunerated public passenger service in other modes of land transportation.
• e)Concessions shall be granted through the special abbreviated procedure set forth in these norms. No interested port or airport manager may be a concessionaire of remunerated public passenger transportation services in taxi mode; nor shall they be permitted to provide this service in any mode.

- The reformed version proposes:

· Article 29.-Prior administrative concession or permit for stable special taxi services.

1.-For the provision of taxi service, it is necessary to obtain in advance an administrative concession granted by the Council, subject to the following conditions:

• a)Administrative concessions for remunerated passenger service in taxi mode shall be subject to the technical supply and demand studies approved by the Council.
• b)Concessions shall be granted per operating base, according to the corresponding technical criteria, for renewable terms of ten years at the request of the concessionaire, subject to prior compliance with an up-to-date C-1 license. The Council may authorize the existence of special operating bases for tourism purposes, depending on the characteristics of the zone or geographical area, which shall be determined through a special regulation, in accordance with the fundamental principles of this law.
• c)Only one administrative concession shall be granted per individual, which shall cover the operation of the public service with one vehicle.
• d)No concession awardee may share, in whole or in part, the concession rights awarded to another who, in turn, is the awardee of another concession for remunerated public passenger service in other modes of land transportation.
• e)Concessions shall be granted through the special abbreviated procedure set forth in these norms. No interested port or airport manager may be a concessionaire of remunerated public passenger transportation services in taxi mode; nor shall they be permitted to provide this service in any mode.

2.-For the provision of the stable special taxi service referred to in Article 2 of this law, it is necessary to obtain a permit granted by the Public Transport Council, subject to the following conditions:

• a)The stable special taxi permit holders for this service shall be limited to providing the service within a geographical area to be determined based on the authorized license (patente).
• b)No permit holder may share, in whole or in part, the rights of the permit granted to another who, in turn, holds another permit for remunerated public passenger service.
• c)The vehicles used to provide the stable special taxi mode public service shall not have the characteristics typical of the taxi-mode vehicles authorized under a concession to provide the service in a specific operating base authorized by the Public Transport Council, such as the color red, the use of illuminated or non-illuminated roof signs, decals, the use of the taximeter, and other similar features, as defined by the relevant regulation, as well as any other distinctive feature that could mislead taxi service users. Additionally, they must comply with the circulation requirements established by Law No. 7331, Law of Transit on Public Land Routes, and its reforms. These motor vehicles may not be older than ten years, counting from their year of manufacture.
• d)Vehicles authorized for the stable special taxi service may not park or pick up or drop off persons at stops designated for other modes of public transportation. The operating bases for the stable special taxi service must be located at a minimum distance of one hundred fifty meters from official bus and taxi terminals.
• e)Stable special taxi service permit holders may not park in any place on public roads to offer their services to the general public. Nor may they circulate on public roads seeking passengers.
• f)When motor vehicles must stop in front of public buildings, parks, educational centers, shopping centers, wharves, ports, airports, churches, hospitals, or similar places, it shall be for the time strictly necessary to allow the boarding and alighting of their own users.
• g)Anyone submitting an application to operate a stable special taxi service must present certification that they are duly registered and current with their obligations with the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (CCSS); registered as a taxpayer with the Ministry of Finance; current in the payment of income tax; hold an insurance policy that fully covers their civil liability for injury or death of third parties and damage to the property of third parties, and keep it in force throughout the entire term of the permit and the corresponding municipal license (patente municipal), in accordance with current legislation and other requirements established by regulation.
• h)Based on the principles of proportionality, reasonableness, and necessity, the authorized percentage of stable special taxi services may not exceed three percent (3%) of the concessions authorized per operating base.
• i)The State is obliged to guarantee the economic and financial equilibrium of the contract to the concessionaires, avoiding competition that may be ruinous, resulting from a concurrence of operators in a given zone that may exceed the need for that residual demand in the operational zone where the provision of the service is authorized, given that each zone presents different characteristics from one another, authorizing the number of permits deemed necessary.
• j)Once the permit is granted, the permit holders must carry the original or a certified copy of the contract signed with the persons to whom the service is provided.

Breach of any of the foregoing conditions shall be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 7331, Law of Transit on Public Land Routes, and its reforms, without prejudice to the Public Transport Council's authority to cancel the permit." (The emphasis is not original).

From the transcribed reform, the regulation in Law No. 7969 of the requirements for obtaining permits for the provision of the stable special taxi service, as well as the conditions for cancellation, is observed.

3.- Addition of subsection l) to Article 1 and reform of subsection e) of Article 62, both of Law No. 7969, Regulatory Law of the Public Service of Remunerated Transportation of Persons in Vehicles in Taxi Mode, of December 22, 1999, and its reforms.

Regarding subsection l) of Article 1.

- The added subsection establishes the following:

· "Article 1.- Definitions [.]

• l)Stable special taxi service: public remunerated passenger transportation service directed at a closed group of users and which satisfies a limited, residual, exclusive, and stable demand.

Permits for the remunerated transportation of persons via microbuses, small buses, and buses shall be governed by the provisions of Law No. 3503, Regulatory Law of Remunerated Transportation of Persons in Motor Vehicles, of May 10, 1965, and its reforms, or any other that replaces it in the future." In that regard, through this addition, the so-called "stable special taxi service" was defined, and the regulation of other modes of remunerated passenger transportation was delimited.

Regarding subsection e) of ordinal 62.

- The version prior to the reform provided:

· "ARTICLE 62.- Reforms to Law No. 7331 Law of transit on public land routes, No. 7331, of April 13, 1993, is amended in the following provisions: (...)

• e)Addition of a subsection d) to Article 144, the text of which shall state:

"Article 144.- [...]

• d)Providing public transportation service in any of its modes, without the respective authorizations, violating numeral 1 of subsection a), or numeral 1) of subsection b), both of Article 97 and Article 112 of this law." - The amended version establishes:

· "ARTICLE 62.- Reforms to Law No. 7331 Law of transit on public land routes, No. 7331, of April 13, 1993, is amended in the following provisions: (...)

• e)A subsection d) is added to Article 145, the text of which shall state:

Article 145.- [...]

• d)Providing public transportation service in any of its modes, without the respective authorizations, violating numeral 1 of subsection a), or numeral 1) of subsection b), both of Article 98 and Article 113 of this law. To apply the sanction regulated by this numeral and for adjudication, the judicial authorities shall fully impose the evidentiary regime based on presumptions and clear and concordant indications, as defined by both civil and criminal procedural laws, as well as the rules of logic, suitability, opportunity, reasonableness, and sound judgment. Habituality in the provision of the unauthorized service or the external and internal signs placed on vehicles to attract the attention of the user, to induce them to use a vehicle used by an authorized taxi, shall be taken as presumptions and indications." (The emphasis is not original).

Thus, with the changes made, offenses committed by persons providing public transportation service in any mode without the corresponding authorizations came to be regulated.

From these modifications, it is concluded that the challenged reform not only eliminated the figure of "porteo de personas" (carriage of persons) in the Commercial Code, but simultaneously introduces and regulates the so-called "stable special taxi service". Additionally, it undoubtedly came to establish that remunerated transportation of persons in any other type of motor vehicle and under any mode is a public service of which the State is the sole owner.

Taking into consideration the foregoing, I proceed to examine the arguments of the unconstitutionality action.

I.Regarding the first claim: Violation of the legislative procedure because the challenged law was approved in a Committee with Full Legislative Authority.-

Having seen the new arguments raised in this sub examine, I conclude that a monopoly (monopolio) in favor of the State has indeed been constituted for the following reasons.

The reform via Law No. 8955 of June 16, 2011, provides that all transportation of persons in a motor vehicle must be considered a public service, the ownership of which corresponds to the State.

Now, it cannot be ignored that since the 1960s there have been laws declaring the transportation of persons as a public service (an aspect that will be developed further on). However, I emphasize that together with the remunerated transportation of persons, classified as a public service, private-commercial transportation of persons (which allowed carriers to transport persons in exchange for a price) also coexisted from the entry into force of the Commercial Code on May 27, 1964, until the reform by Law 8955, which took effect on July 7, 2011.

In this way, the commercial regulation known as "porteo de personas" (carriage of persons) was in force throughout the referenced period, existing as a fully valid legal transaction and, from a factual standpoint, as an undeniable reality that enabled remunerated transportation of persons in the free private market (so much so that this legal and factual truth, in order to change it, had to be expressly repealed by a law).

Regarding "porteo de personas", this Court ruled in Judgment No. 2004-3580 of 2:43 p.m. on April 14, 2004:

"V.- Regarding carriers in the Commercial Code and transportation as a public service. (...)

The carrier or transporter is a commercial auxiliary. The transportation contract regulated in commercial law aims to regulate the transfer of persons, merchandise, and other goods. It is an important commercial contract for a country's economy, as it serves as a link between the producer or marketer of goods and services and the final consumer. It was born out of the necessity of merchants to move from one place to another, with or without their trade goods, so that initially it served as an instrument of transportation for the merchant in their activity. Although doctrine does not use the means of transportation to classify the carrier, it can be said that there exists a terrestrial form (such as in a cart, or cargo vehicle or railroad), water-based (panga, launch or transatlantic cruise ship), and aerial form (glider, light aircraft, or jet plane), even admitting that it may be carried out by the strength of a man, a pack animal, or a motorized vehicle. But given its broad diversity and economic importance for the country, there are areas regulated by the State, in attention to the protection of the general interest, declaring some forms as a public service. Therefore, it turns out to be a very restricted contractual figure, and it is necessary to identify the origin of the transportation contract to determine whether it is a commercial agreement or whether it is aimed at satisfying an activity that the State declared a public service. (...) But the relevant legal fact in dispute is the transfer of persons in exchange for a price, with or without their belongings, as an unrestricted activity, when since the enactment of Law No. 3503 and later Law No. 7593, remunerated transportation of persons in taxi mode has been declared a public service, and consequently, this converted the carriage (porte) contract into a limited and residual activity.

VI.- Regarding Unfair Competition. (...) Evidently, the transportation contract has diverse characteristics, among them being an onerous and non-formal contract, its object may be the transfer of persons, things, and news, as a commercial auxiliary, but being a residual contract for the transportation of persons, the public must belong to a closed group of users, (...).

VIII.- The specific case of the transportation of persons contract as a restricted activity. The arguments set forth in the action seek to demonstrate that the Ministry of Public Works and Transport does not have the competence to regulate the activity of the carrier, protected under commercial law that allows them to transport persons from one place to another, as well as things and news. But the jurisprudence of this Chamber precisely defines the dividing line between activities belonging to private law and those of public law. A private activity that satisfies needs or interests of a general nature will be the object of state interest, and the State will be legitimized to intervene in it through legislation declaring it a public service. The individual may carry out activities that do not leave their private sphere, but if they become involved with a previously declared general interest, it is legitimate for the State to assert compliance with its legislation. (...)" From the cited precedent, the validity of the carriage of persons in the Costa Rican legal system prior to the reform challenged on this occasion is once again evident. The foregoing is regardless of whether the constitutionality of the declaration of State ownership over any type of remunerated transportation of persons in motor vehicles is later questioned, and with the clarification that I do not share that the "carriage" of persons was classified as a limited or residual activity.

Taking into consideration what has been transcribed, it should be noted that a private activity may affect matters of general interest; however, that quality alone does not justify its ownership becoming a monopoly of the State. Rather, as explained below, there may be proper and improper public services; according to this classification, such will be the degree of state intervention.

Furthermore, it must be highlighted that the preamble of Law No. 8955 of June 16, 2011 (which, as I have already indicated, came to eliminate the carriage of persons from commercial law and to establish the so-called "stable special taxi service" in the Regulatory Law of the Public Service of Remunerated Transportation of Persons in Vehicles in Taxi Mode) indicated the following:

"With this initiative, it is intended in a very categorical manner to establish, within the regulatory framework of the regulatory law of the public service of remunerated transportation of persons in vehicles in taxi mode, No. 7969, a service that is a reality today and that is mistakenly protected by being covered only under the word 'persons' in the Commercial Code, with the aim of creating legislation that guarantees better conditions and lower costs for the user, seeking the benefit and well-being of the great majorities.

In this way, the carriage of persons is eliminated, but carriage itself is not eliminated, that is, what is being eliminated is the word 'person' from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, but things, articles, money, correspondence, etc., can continue to be transported.

Upon the elimination of the word 'person', a figure called 'stable special taxi transport' is created within the regulatory law of the public service of remunerated transportation of persons in vehicles in taxi mode, No. 7969, which preserves the nature of the residual special service currently provided by carriage, but protected and regulated to give a sense of responsibility to those interested parties who would be accrediting it.

The stable special taxi service will be fully distinguished from the regular taxi service, because it will always be door-to-door, with the private contract between the parties prevailing, and it must be demonstrated that it is part of a commercial activity, that they must also have the licenses (patentes), and that it may be developed in this first stage by natural or legal persons who can demonstrate before the Public Transport Council, within a peremptory period of three years (3 years) that has been proposed, to develop this activity because it must be understood that its growth is very particular and sporadic; today it may serve for a certain time because there is a contract, but that does not mean it remains over time, which is why a permit of up to three years is mentioned.

It is not a concession (concesión) because it does not arise from a public bidding process, but rather arises from a permit and fundamentally responds to the fact that it is a specific and punctual need.

(...) so that anyone who is providing that special service without the respective accreditation would be operating under a range of illegality, because there is no figure in the Commercial Code or in the Traffic Law that allows carrying out that activity." (The emphasis is not original).

From what has been explained, it is clear that prior to the reform in question, the carriage of persons had full force and existence in the Costa Rican transportation market; indeed, according to what was transcribed, the object of the new regulation was supposedly to provide better conditions and lower costs for the user, seeking the benefit and well-being of the great majorities.

Therefore, based on the foregoing, I conclude that: 1- with the elimination of the carriage of persons from commercial regulation, 2- the simultaneous creation of the stable special taxi service to regulate this type of legal transaction but as a public service, and 3- the express provision to consider all remunerated transportation of persons in any type of motor vehicle as a public service of which only the State is the owner, a complete public monopoly was imposed on that type of activity within the market. I emphasize that the positive legal regulation as well as reality indicate that prior to the challenged reform, two modes of remunerated transportation of persons coexisted in the country, one of a public nature, the other handled by the private sector (the carriage option). With the absorption of the latter by the State, a public monopoly was imposed on the market, which the Political Constitution regulates in the following manner:

"ARTICLE 46.- Monopolies of a private nature, and any act, even if originating in a law, that threatens or restricts the freedom of commerce, agriculture, and industry, are prohibited.

(...)

To establish new monopolies in favor of the State or the Municipalities, the approval of two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly shall be required." (The emphasis is not original).

In this regard, it is incontrovertible that Law No. 8955 of June 16, 2011, was approved by a Committee with Full Legislative Authority; therefore, as I have expressed, upon verifying that said regulation created a monopoly in favor of the State, it necessarily had to comply with the qualified majority prescribed by the aforementioned numeral. By not having complied with that provision in the approval of the regulation in question, a defect of constitutionality has been configured.

By virtue of the foregoing, I consider that with the reforms approved through Law No. 8955 to numerals 323 and 334 subsection b), of the Commercial Code, and to ordinals 2, 29, and 62 (subsection e), along with the addition of subsection l) to Article 1, all of Law No. 7969, Regulatory Law of the Public Service of Remunerated Transportation of Persons in Vehicles in Taxi Mode, a legitimate commercial activity was extracted from the private free market, to then confer it (certainly with different regulation) upon the State, in its capacity as the sole owner thereof, regardless of its degree of intervention or oversight. That is to say, from the aforementioned modification onward, no private individual can any longer be the owner of said activity; rather, it now belongs only to the State, and the private subject must merely settle for aspiring to its operation, in the event they receive the corresponding permit from the State.

II.Regarding the second claim: Violation of the principles of freedom of will and free commerce. Regarding this point, I deem it necessary to clarify certain aspects.

A.- Free competition and the legal monopoly.

In the previous section, I pointed out the unconstitutionality of the challenged reforms caused by the fact that Law No. 8955 of June 16, 2011, was not approved by a qualified majority, in application of what is set forth in Article 46 of the Political Constitution.

Now, independently of such defect, I consider that the creation of a state monopoly must not only be subject to the qualified approval of all members of the Legislative Assembly, but additionally, other requirements derived from a systemic analysis of the Fundamental Law must be weighed, for which purposes it must be remembered that the legal meaning of a constitutional mandate can often only be revealed when the various principles, values, goods, and constitutional rights that coexist in that supreme normative body are taken into consideration and weighed. Our Constitution, among other qualities, is characterized by the promotion of individual and social rights, tending to seek a balance between them, for example, between the requirements of a solidarity state and the Christian principle of social justice, and those conditions that for their healthy development require free competition and freedom of enterprise.

Thus, for the purposes of the sub lite, it is appropriate to recall what was determined in Judgment No. 2008-004569 of 2:30 p.m. on March 26, 2008:

"1) CONSTITUTIONAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN LEGAL AND DE FACTO MONOPOLY AND TYPE OF LAW REQUIRED TO SUPPRESS EITHER OF THESE. The original constituent, in Article 46 of the Political Constitution, does distinguish between a legal monopoly (monopolio de derecho) and a de facto monopoly (monopolio de hecho). (...) In the logic of that numeral, the monopoly is an exceptional situation in the market or the economy, since the 1st paragraph establishes as a general rule the proscription of private monopolies, while the 2nd paragraph emphasizes that 'The action of the State aimed at preventing any monopolistic practice or tendency is of public interest,' which means, a contrario sensu, that public authorities are constitutionally obligated to promote competition within the framework of a market economy. The 4th paragraph provides that 'To establish new monopolies in favor of the State or the Municipalities, the approval of two-thirds of the total members of the Legislative Assembly shall be required,' thereby emphasizing the rule contained in the “economic constitution” – that is, the set of values, principles, and precepts that regulate the economy and the market in the fundamental text – of freedom of enterprise and free competition and, consequently, the qualified exception of the monopoly – including public ones – given that a reinforced law and, consequently, a considerable consensus of the political forces represented in the Legislative Assembly is required to establish a public legal monopoly.

It is clear that this 4th paragraph of Article 46 of the Constitution, by admitting, exceptionally, a monopoly by virtue of a reinforced law, contemplates and enshrines the de jure monopoly. (…) The requirement of a reinforced law to constitute a de jure monopoly is imposed insofar as this figure limits or restricts the freedom of enterprise (libertad de empresa), which is the normal or ordinary rule according to the Law of the Constitution. On this matter, it is necessary to emphasize that the intrinsic and extrinsic limits of fundamental rights are a matter of legal reserve. (…) Article 46 of the Political Constitution, in its first four paragraphs which have not undergone variation, arose from a motion presented by the Social Democratic Fraction, as is evident from the Minutes of the National Constituent Assembly No. 101, article 3, Volume II, pages 439-444. Thus, Deputy Facio Brenes stated that “(…) We are, of course, in favor of the prohibition of monopolies, as well as any other act that tends to threaten or restrict the freedom of commerce, agriculture, and industry” and later added that the motion “(…) translates a universal opinion or sentiment that tends every day to become more widespread, against monopolistic practices or tendencies. So much so that all modern Constitutions have abandoned texts similar to that of our repealed statute, in order to place upon the State a special action against de facto monopolies. (…)”. Constituent member Acosta Jiménez stated that “The Social Democrat's motion (…) concretizes a universal aspiration against monopolies, just as it translates a democratic desire”. Finally, representative Arias indicated that “(…) he agreed that the country must defend itself from monopolies, which are highly detrimental to the national economy. We properly cannot say that we have de jure monopolies, but due to special circumstances, there are several de facto monopolizing companies”. (The emphasis is not original).

Furthermore, this Chamber indicated in judgment No. 2017-1104 at 9:05 a.m. on January 24, 2017:

“IV.- ON THE MERITS. This Chamber has repeatedly ruled on the transcendence of economic competition and free concurrence (libre concurrencia) for the proper functioning of the market and for the benefit of consumers or users, as this imposes on companies the obligation to offer better quality, innovation, and prices. One of the fundamental principles of the Economic Constitution is that of free competition or concurrence, so much so that it is an imperative for public authorities to ensure freedom of commerce, industry, and enterprise (voto No. 4569-08 at 2:30 p.m. on March 26, 2008), avoiding any anticompetitive and monopolistic action or practice (Article 46 of the Political Constitution). In development of the aforementioned Article 46 and in protection of the process of competition and free concurrence, the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor) has been enacted, in which various practices that, by their purpose or effects, constitute monopolistic practices are defined, prohibited, and sanctioned. Regarding this point, this Chamber, in judgment No. 2004-01922 at 2:54 p.m. on February 25, 2004, stated the following:

V.- Right to free concurrence. Article 46 of the Political Constitution, in its original text and after the reform carried out by Law number 7607 of May twenty-ninth, two thousand three, recognizes a fundamental principle of our economic system, such as freedom of commerce and, particularly, the assurance of free competition as an element of the social market system. Said article expressly proscribes the formation of private monopolies, as well as practices that threaten the freedom of commerce, agriculture, and industry. It also limits the constitution of public monopolies and orders the express regulation of de facto monopolies. It also highlights that the State's action aimed at preventing any monopolizing practice or tendency is of public interest. Currently, the constitutional protection of free concurrence must be understood in close relation to the position of real inferiority that the consumer usually has in their actions within the market, and the State's duty to protect them against the power of other economic agents. In that sense, the elimination (or restriction) of effective competition could lead to consequences directly opposed to those sought by the market system, exposing users to having to submit to the unilateral designs of the one or few suppliers, particularly when it comes to products of scarce elasticity, which oblige the consumer to acquire or use them, even under openly unfavorable or unfair conditions. By guaranteeing free competition, the State allows the consumer to have several alternatives from which to choose the most favorable, according to their interests and possibilities. Likewise, it promotes that companies, in order to win the preference of their clients, make the best product or service available to them at the most convenient price. Article 46 of the Constitution, in fact, prohibits not only the formation of private monopolies, but even practices that lead to consequences restrictive of the freedom of enterprise (libertad de empresa). This Chamber, in much of its jurisprudence, has developed the essential content of the constitutional principle of free concurrence, declaring unconstitutional the norms and practices that create particular monopolies and prevent the free access of suppliers to the market of goods and services. (Cf. judgments numbers 0550-95, 1144-90, 5056-94 and 7044-96, among others) (…)” (The emphasis is not original).

As relevant, from the cited precedents it is evident that in Costa Rica, due to the market economy model chosen by the constituent power, freedom of enterprise (libertad de empresa) and free competition are the general rule, while monopoly is the exception, since such a burdensome measure against freedom as excluding a certain economic good from free commerce can only occur in highly qualified cases with a noted public interest.

Therefore, the crux is to determine if any type of activity that exploits an economic good can be monopolized by the State through the mere approval of a law with a qualified majority, the mere fulfillment of a formal or procedural aspect being sufficient.

Regarding this point, it is vital to note that the Chamber, in judgment No. 11518-2000 at 2:52 p.m. on December 21, 2000, provided:

“IV.- It is important to bring up the judgment of this Chamber number 5532-2000 at three hours and five minutes in the afternoon of July fifth, two thousand (in the same sense judgment number 7044-96 at ten hours and nine minutes in the morning of December twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-six), which, as relevant, states: “(…) the monopolized activities (importation, refining, and wholesale distribution of fuels) are of a private nature or type, because, in general, they are simply commercial operations with certain economic goods, which form part of the broader group consisting of the exchanges of goods and services in a given economy, and which, in no case, are exclusive to private subjects, as they can well be carried out by these through the system of free contracting, exchange, and minimal regulation (market economies), or by the State (in cases of centralized economies), and even –as in the majority of countries– through a combination of both systems, leaving some sectors to private individuals for their free action, and restricting others for the exclusive action of the State. The foregoing is intended to establish that monopolized activities are not necessarily and per se of a private nature, so that in light of our Constitution, they can validly be left to the management of private individuals with State oversight, or be subject to state intervention, insofar as this is authorized by the Constitution and the laws and is justified according to the purposes pursued.” (The emphasis is not original).

In accordance with what has been cited, from the constitutional rights to freedom of enterprise (libertad de empresa), free competition, and property, it is extracted that the State's intervention through the monopolization of activities that exploit a certain economic good, to be constitutionally viable, must meet at least two requirements: 1) that it is authorized by the Political Constitution and the laws; and 2) that it is justified according to the intended purposes. Regarding this last point, the justification must satisfy the demands of the constitutional principle of reasonableness (razonabilidad) and proportionality (proporcionalidad), whose content the Chamber understands as follows (judgment No. 2007-17204 at 3:57 p.m. on November 27, 2007):

“IV.- Principles of liberty, legality, and reasonableness. Article 28 of the Political Constitution establishes, as relevant: 'No one may be disturbed or persecuted for the expression of their opinions or for any act that does not violate the law. Private actions that do not harm public morality or order, or that do not harm a third party, are outside the action of the law.' From the first paragraph of the transcribed text, it is possible to derive the 'principle of liberty' (principio de libertad), according to which, for human beings, 'everything that is not prohibited is permitted'. This general principle of liberty, harmonized with the provisions of the second paragraph of the norm in question, also allows us to construct the notion of the 'system of liberty' (sistema de libertad), which establishes not only the possibility that human beings can do everything the law does not prohibit them, but also the guarantee that not even the law may invade their intangible sphere of liberty. (…) the Costa Rican State model postulates a special form of subjection of authorities and public institutions to the legal system, since they can only issue those legal acts and carry out those material conducts that are expressly or implicitly authorized by the legal system. However, the principles of liberty and legality are not the only limits on action that the Law of the Constitution imposes on State organs vis-à-vis private individuals. As the Chamber has developed in repeated pronouncements, the 'principle of reasonableness' (principio de razonabilidad) or substantive due process also constitutes a fundamental requirement for the Public Administration, so that its acts must conform to the elements that make up this principle, namely, suitability (idoneidad), necessity (necesidad), and proportionality in the strict sense. Suitability translates as the adequacy of the means to the end, that is, the norm must be suitable to effectively achieve the intended objective. Necessity refers to the nature or magnitude of the limitation that a right or freedom must endure through that means, so that among a variety of possible means, the one chosen must be the one that represents a lesser limitation. Proportionality means that, although the chosen means is the one that represents a lesser limitation, this limitation must be proportionate, that is, it must not be of such magnitude that it implies emptying the right or freedom in question of its minimum essential content.” (The emphasis is not original).

Therefore, the constitution of a de jure monopoly in favor of the State irremediably comes to affect the constitutional rights to freedom of enterprise (libertad de empresa), free competition, and property, so that together with the procedural requirement consisting of the qualified majority contemplated in numeral 46 of the Fundamental Law, the safeguarding of such rights demands that the principle of reasonableness (principio de razonabilidad) and proportionality (proporcionalidad) be respected in relation to the public purposes sought to be achieved, in such a way that only a noted public interest may justify the imposition of such a burdensome and extraordinary measure as removing from the free market a certain activity that exploits an economic good, which our economic constitution only admits as an extraordinary and exceptional matter.

Therefore, the statement of reasons for the law creating a monopoly in favor of the State must expressly explain why a specific business activity must be subjected to such a burdensome measure as suppressing it from the market to become a State monopoly. Furthermore, it must forcefully explain the reasons why the public interest could only be satisfied if the activity in question is monopolized in favor of the State. Such justification may respond, evidently, to a historically determined moment, in such a way that what in certain circumstances could be considered reasonable, in others would not be.

B.- On the remunerated service of transport of persons in Costa Rica in the taxi modality. To determine if the service of remunerated transport of persons is an activity susceptible to being monopolized by the State, it is necessary to study the context in which it has developed.

1. Historical regulation of the service in Costa Rica.

In its beginnings, the activity of remunerated transport of persons in automobiles (different from that of collective vehicles for regular and permanent transport between localities or determined points which did have exhaustive regulation) did not have specific State control.

The Law on Transport (Ley sobre el Trasporte) (sic, due to the fact that it was written that way at the time), created by Decree Nº 7 of November 24, 1909, established some characteristics of the general principles of public service and even regulated "Special Rules Concerning the Public Service of Transport" ("Reglas Especiales Referentes al Servicio Público de Transportes"); however, it made no reference whatsoever to rental vehicles and garages (vehículos de alquiler y de garages) (sic, this is how they were named and even later, how it was recorded in the regulation), as they were called at that time, as will be seen later.

Later, the General Law of Remunerated Transport of Persons, Nº 1277 of April 24, 1951, contained norms referring to public transport services and required a bidding process for new collective transport services for persons. However, its Article 2 expressly excluded the services of rental cars and public service garages (garages de servicio público):

"Article 2 'This law comprises only the public transport services for persons that are carried out in a regular and permanent manner between localities or determined points and will not be applied, therefore, to extraordinary or exceptional services, excursions, express and tourism trips, political mobilizations, or any other kind, which may continue to be carried out freely. Nor will this law be applied to the services of rental cars and public service garages (sic).'" Later, that article was amended by Law Nº 1499 of September 30, 1952, in which rental cars and public service garages (sic) were included under the following conditions:

"The services of rental cars and public service garages (sic) or those of other similar vehicles, will only be subject to this law when they are provided in a regular and permanent manner, between places or determined points, all in the judgment of the Higher Transit Council (Consejo Superior de Tránsito)." From the foregoing, it is inferred that, at that time, only that type of person transport was subject to regulation, i.e., a contrario sensu, the services of rental cars and garages that were not provided in a regular and permanent manner were in conditions of free competition and, therefore, the ownership (titularidad) of the service could not belong to the State.

Later, the Law of Public Services (Ley de Servicios Públicos), Nº 2658 of November 16, 1960 (amended by Law Nº 2887 of November 24, 1961), was issued, which became the first normative body that directly regulated the rental car service, attributing to it the character of a public service. Likewise, it kept Law Nº 1277 and the Regulation of Garages for Public Service Vehicles (Reglamento de Garages para vehículos de servicio público) in force, which established that only having a garage (garage) would plates be granted for the cars that would be used for the public passenger service. This Law of Public Services did not grant the State the ownership (titularidad) of the rental car service, since although its articles spoke of exploitation concessions, it is no less true that they did not have the characteristics typical of a concession, nor were they granted through bidding procedures, although tariffs were controlled and the service was supervised, which made the figure more akin to an authorization or permit in a broad sense. As we will see later, not every public service necessarily implies that the State holds ownership (titularidad) over it.

Years later, the Regulatory Law of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Automotive Vehicles (Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores), N° 3503 of May 10, 1965, came into force, in which it was considered that the remunerated transport of persons in automotive vehicles constituted a public service regulated, controlled, and supervised by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes). The original version of its Article 1 stated that the remunerated transport of persons in automotive vehicles that took place on streets, highways, and roads within the territory of the Republic was a public service whose provision was the exclusive faculty of the State, which could exercise it directly or through private individuals whom it expressly authorized. Furthermore, Article 2 indicated that the Ministry of Transport (Ministerio de Transportes) was competent for everything related to traffic and automotive transport of persons in the country; likewise, that said Ministry could take charge of the provision of that public service directly or through other State institutions, or grant rights to exploit it to private entrepreneurs, and that in any case, it would exercise the supervision, control, and regulation of that activity, with the purpose of guaranteeing the interests of the public.

Based on what is regulated in the mentioned numerals, I consider that it was from that moment onward that it was established that the public service of remunerated transport of persons in automobiles, including the service today known as taxi, became the ownership (titularidad) of the State, since it was indicated that the provision of the remunerated person transport service was the exclusive faculty of the State and it could provide it directly or through private individuals. However, that normative body had the peculiarity that when it referred to the operation of public service automobiles, it referred to the figure of the permit (permiso) as the sole means to exercise said activity. In that sense, Article 3 stated:

"CHAPTER III Requirements for the Exploitation of the Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Automotive Vehicles Article 3.- For the provision of the public service to which this law refers, prior authorization from the Ministry of Transport (Ministerio de Transportes) will be required, whatever the type of vehicle to be used and its propulsion system.

The referred authorization may consist of a concession (concesión) or a permit (permiso), the granting of which will be subject to the planning needs of traffic and transport in the territory of the Republic, in accordance with the studies carried out for this purpose by the departments of Planning and Automotive Transport of the Ministry of Transport.

A concession (concesión) will be necessary:

(…)

A permit (permiso) will be required:

(…)

• e)To operate public service automobiles." (The emphasis is not original) It is important to highlight that said law placed greater emphasis on collective remunerated transport of persons, which was later reinforced with subsequent reforms that expressly excluded the taxi service from its scope of application.

Thus, the Regulatory Law of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Taxi Vehicles (Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Taxis), Nº 5406 of November 26, 1973, repealed any norm of Law Nº 3503 that was contrary to it and established a special regime for that type of service. In this regard, in Articles 1, 2, and 4, it was determined:

"Article 1- The remunerated land transport of persons in automotive taxi vehicles shall be considered a public service.

Article 2.- It is the competence of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes) everything related to traffic and taxi transport of persons in the country; the Ministry may take charge of the provision of this public service directly or through other State institutions, or grant rights to exploit it to cooperatives duly registered with the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (Ministerio de Trabajo y Bienestar Social).

The Ministry of Public Works and Transport will exercise, in any case, the supervision, control, and regulation of this activity, with the purpose of guaranteeing the interests of the public.

In order to comply with this obligation, the Ministry may:

• a)Set stops, conditions, and tariffs, for the benefit of the user; b) Issue the regulations it deems pertinent regarding traffic and taxi transport in the territory of the Republic; and c) Adopt the measures that are appropriate so that the needs of vehicle traffic and person transport are efficiently satisfied, as well as those of uniformity, security, user attention, etc.

Article 4- For the provision of the public service to which this law refers, a concession (concesión) from the Ministry of Public Works and Transport will be required, whatever the type of vehicle to be used and its propulsion system." (The emphasis is not original).

Taking into consideration the cited regulation, I consider that from this point onward, the confusion between permit (permiso) and concession (concesión) contained in Law Nº 3503 was overcome, since it was established that in addition to the possibility of providing the service directly (ownership/titularidad), the State could grant rights for its exploitation, and moreover, the obligation to obtain a concession (concesión) from the Ministry of Public Works and Transport to operate that service was clearly established.

Additionally, Law Nº 7593 of August 9, 1996, delimited the scope of application of Law Nº 3503 to collective automotive vehicles, by modifying its Article 1 as follows: “The remunerated transport of persons in collective automotive vehicles, except for taxi service automobiles regulated in another law, that takes place on streets, highways, and roads within the national territory, is a public service regulated, controlled, and supervised by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. The provision is delegated to private individuals whom it expressly authorizes, in accordance with the norms established herein.” (The emphasis is not original).

Three years later, the Regulatory Law of the Public Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality (Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi), N° 7969 of December 22, 1999, repealed Law Nº 5406 and provided that the nature of remunerated transport of persons in the taxi modality was considered a public service that had to be exploited through the figure of the administrative concession (concesión administrativa), subject to the special procedures established in that law and its regulations. Likewise, it indicated the procedure and the conditions for granting such a concession. This was basically maintained until, through Law N.° 8955 of June 16, 2011, the State's ownership (titularidad) over all types of remunerated transport of persons in automotive vehicles (not only referring to taxis as had traditionally been delimited) was expressly provided, regardless of its degree of intervention in the determination of the operating system or in supervision. This situation led to the elimination of the figure of carriage of persons from the Commerce Code (Código de Comercio) and the normative inclusion of the figure of the “special stable taxi service” (servicio especial estable de taxi), through the regulation of the granting of permits (permisos) for its provision as a public service.

2. On the concept of public service and its ownership.

Regarding the public service of remunerated transport of persons in Costa Rica, this Court, through resolution Nº 2012-12741 at 9:05 a.m. on September 14, 2012, and referring to voto Nº 2011-04778 at 2:31 p.m. on April 13, 2011 (a ruling that resolved the consultation on the constitutionality of Law Nº 8955), indicated the following:

“IV. - On the concept of public service. This concept was developed on that occasion by noting that it can not only be provided or performed by state organizations, but also by individuals or private persons or entities, in accordance with regulations issued by public authorities; and that these are services that tend to satisfy needs or interests of a general nature, which is why they require control by public authorities. The determining element of public services is, then, their purpose - the satisfaction of the general need or interest for which it was created - or the subjection of the activity to the Public Law regime that regulates it, precisely by virtue of the public interest intended to be satisfied (Considerando XV). It was also indicated that The State, for quite some time now, has considered the activity of person transport as a prevailing social necessity whose validity is essential, as a fundamental condition for maintaining the rule of law and social peace. For this reason, it has enacted a series of laws, with the most important currently in this matter being the Regulatory Law of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Automotive Vehicles (Ley Reguladora de Transporte Remunerado Personas Vehículos Automotores, Law No. 3503) and the Regulatory Law of the Public Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality (Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, Law No. 7969), whose reform is known in this consultation. In the last five years, it is public and notorious that this issue of transporting persons has been acquiring greater transcendence for Costa Rican society, not only from a social but also from an economic point of view, to the point of becoming a topic of general interest, which goes beyond the satisfaction of a merely private need, requiring State intervention to find a solution. The State—in this case, the ordinary legislator—can, within the framework permitted by the Political Constitution and statutory norms, opt for the solution it considers most opportune. As was just said, one of those possible solutions is to regulate said activity and declare it a public service, which is precisely what the consulted bill does, necessarily complying with the two elements previously mentioned. By virtue of the foregoing, the Chamber does not consider contrary to the Political Constitution the reform to Article 2 of Law number 7969 to consider the remunerated transport of persons in the taxi modality a public service of which the State holds ownership (titularidad) and which will be exploited through the figure of the administrative concession (concesión administrativa) or the permit (permiso) in the case of special stable taxi services (servicios especiales estables de taxi) (Considerando XVI). In this way, the challenged reform intends to abstract the provision of the service of person transport—which in its entirety has been declared a public service by the legislator—from the private sphere, to convert private individuals into collaborators of the Public Administration, and to apply the regulations that govern the provision of public services. For this reason, it is not considered that Articles 28, 45, 46, and 56 of the Political Constitution are violated; nor that the petitioner is correct when she accuses that the challenged regulation transformed the activity she had been developing into an illegal one.” However, under a better assessment and taking into consideration the arguments set forth in the sub examine, I must indicate the following.

While I maintain the general notion that a public service can be provided in certain cases by both the State and by private individuals, in accordance with the respective regulations issued by the competent public authority, since they are economic activities vested with an evident general interest, I consider it inappropriate that in the specific case of the services of remunerated transport of persons in the taxi modality and special stable taxi service, the State is the only one that can hold ownership (titularidad) over services of that nature, that is, that private individuals can exploit it only through a concession (concesión) or permit (permiso).

It should be noted that the reasoning this Court used to validate the declaration of the aforementioned services as public was the transcendence they have been acquiring from the social and economic point of view to the point of being vested with general interest; however, the fact that an activity is of general interest does not mean that irremediably only the State must be its titleholder.

For such purposes, it is transcendental to distinguish between proper and improper public service. This Chamber has already specified these concepts, although not specifically referring to remunerated transport of persons.

In that sense, through voto Nº 2004-1791 at 9:02 a.m. on February 20, 2004, reiterated on numerous occasions, this Court stated:

“EDUCATION AS A PUBLIC SERVICE.

Education cannot be conceived of solely as a right of citizens, but also as a public service, that is, as a positive benefit provided to the inhabitants of the republic by public administrations—the State through the Ministry of Public Education and the Public Universities—making it a proper public service, or by private individuals through collective organizations governed by private law—e.g., foundations, associations, or companies—in the case of private schools, high schools, and universities, in which case it is an improper public service. In this latter case, we speak of an improper public service since private individuals—natural or legal persons—provide it subject to an intense and detailed public-law regime regarding the creation, operation, and oversight of those private centers. Public services, insofar as they provide vital effective benefits for life in society, must adhere to a series of principles such as continuity, regularity, efficiency, efficacy, equality, and universality, which, in the case of improper public services, are attenuated or nuanced, especially since the user chooses to use them. Consequently, the public education service, proper or improper, cannot be interrupted or suspended unless there are objective and serious reasons or justifications, as could eventually be, in the case of education, the student's breach of the educational center's disciplinary regime. (The emphasis is not original).

From the foregoing, it is concluded that a proper public service is one provided by the State directly or through a private-law entity, while an improper one is that provided directly by a private individual, albeit subject to strong and specific public-law control given the degree of importance of the corresponding activity for the public interest, as occurs with private health centers and pharmacies.

Additionally, through vote No. 9676-2001 of 11:25 a.m. on September 26, 2001, the Chamber established:

"IV.- (...) currently, a significant sector of doctrine and jurisprudence maintains that a public service can not only be provided or performed by state bodies, but also by private persons or entities (concessionaires), in accordance with regulations (sic) not (sic) general rules issued by public authorities. Thus, public service should be understood as any activity of the Public Administration or of private individuals or administrated persons aimed at satisfying needs or interests of a general nature, whose character or gravity is governed or framed by Public Law, insofar as control by public authorities is required. The traditional conception limits public service to the activity performed by the Administration directly or indirectly (through concessionaires), whose creation is due to a formal act—through a formal law—or conduct of the public authorities—administrative act—; however, the most modern doctrine denominates as an 'improper public service' that activity carried out by private individuals, whose character does not derive from an express state act or a fact, but from its own nature or essence, insofar as they are activities that, by their function, satisfy a general need or interest, as would be the case of sales or supplies of basic necessities, such as basic food basket products or medicines; activities that, despite being developed under the private law regime, are subject to state regulations and controls—subordination rules—, such as price fixing for these articles, quality control, the obligation to provide the service to whoever requests it, etc. These are activities that, by engaging vital needs of the community, transcend the merely private, to enter the social sphere, leaving the strict scope of private law, and placing themselves in a zone regulated by public law." (The emphasis is not original).

Furthermore, Magistrate Jinesta Lobo, in issue No. 275-276 of the Ivstitia journal of November-December 2009, in his article titled "Constitutional and Legal Regime of Telecommunications," clearly explained this differentiation:

"So that there is a substantial difference between regulated services and public services, since not every service subject to strong regulation or a Public Law regime is public, hence the doctrine has distinguished between proper and improper or virtual public services, the former being those that have been qualified as such and are provided directly by public entities or indirectly through private-law entities. Whereas a virtual, improper, or regulated public service is one provided by a private-law entity under a strong and intense Public Law regime." Given the foregoing, to define when a public service is proper or improper, the difference must be specified between: 1) the provision of the service by the State but indirectly through a private-law entity (for example, a concessionaire); and 2) the provision of the service directly by a private-law entity (although subject to intense and specific regulation).

In this regard, it becomes necessary to distinguish between the concession, the permit, and the authorization that the State may grant for the provision of a public service.

a. Regarding the concession, this Tribunal, according to judgment No. 3451-96 of 3:33 p.m. on July 9, 1996, precisely referring to the remunerated transport of persons, including taxis, ordered, indicated:

"(...) b.- the concession.- through the public service concession, the State satisfies general needs by availing itself of the voluntary collaboration of the administrated persons in the provision of public services. By the public service concession contract, a person - natural or legal - is entrusted, for a determined time, with the organization and operation of a determined public service. The concessionaire carries out its task, at its own account and risk, receiving for its labor the corresponding remuneration, which may consist of the price or rates paid by the users, in subsidies or guarantees satisfied by the State, or both at the same time. The concessionaire is subject to the control inherent to any administrative contract; that is, it is permanently subject to the oversight of the State, since in this type of contract a public interest is always involved, the concessionaire is bound to the Public Administration as co-contractor and also enters into a relationship with the users in whose interest the concession was granted. In this type of contract, the concessionaire has a perfect and declared subjective right; that is, it derives a patrimonial right in the constitutional sense of the term, because when granting a public service concession, an administrative contract in the strict sense is formalized. (...) The concessionaire must enjoy a reasonable period to engage in the activity in question, so that, by definition, indefinite or short-duration periods are excluded from the concession and are rather characteristic of permits, which are revocable at any time as stated. Furthermore, it should be noted that the concession belongs to the category of administrative contracts that the doctrine calls 'collaboration' contracts and its duration is temporary, but it must be for a period such that it reasonably allows the amortization of invested capital and the obtaining of an adequate profit for the concessionaire. It is convenient to finally indicate that on some occasions, the concession contract may include special deals for the concessionaire, related to its activity. The doctrine admits as possible that the administration undertakes the commitment not to grant new concessions for the same service, if these could affect its provision. (...) c.- the bidding process: the bidding procedure contemplated in Article 182 of the Constitution is of interest not only to the State but also to the administrated persons. In general terms, we can indicate that the State is interested in obtaining the greatest possibilities of success in fulfilling its purposes, including the provision of public services in the qualities of the service provided to users, and, depending on the nature of the object, obtaining the best economic conditions both from the perspective of the contractor and the cost to users. From the perspective of private individuals, the bidding procedure is characterized by the principle of publicity, which in turn guarantees free concurrence in conditions of absolute equality of participation. The system tends to avoid preferential and unfair treatment and is therefore the most desirable instrument for the processing of administrative contracts. Given its characteristics, the bidding becomes a guarantee for the public interest (...)."

Likewise, resolution No. 2001-11657 of 2:43 p.m. on November 14, 2001, indicated:

"(...) It differs from other figures such as the concession of public works and services in that in the latter, a true transfer of the provision and exploitation of the service occurs; likewise, in the concession, the remuneration of the private individual occurs from the payments received directly from the public, and the responsibility always rests with the concessionaire." (The emphasis is not original)

b. Regarding permits, the Chamber, in judgment No. 2007-4467 of 5:29 p.m. on March 28, 2007, indicated:

"This Chamber has held in reiterated jurisprudence that the permit recognizes a right to the administrated person on a precarious basis that can be revoked without any liability for the Administration for reasons qualified as opportunity or convenience. In this sense, it is necessary to make clear that although the Administration can annul or revoke a permit, it is not obliged to initiate an ordinary administrative procedure for this, by virtue of the fact that the permit does not grant any subjective right to the permit holder. This revocation or annulment cannot be untimely or arbitrary in accordance with the provisions of Article 154 of the General Law of the Public Administration." (The emphasis is not original).

Also, through judgment No. 2443-03 of 9:57 a.m. on March 21, 2003, it indicated:

"III.- ON THE NATURE OF PERMITS. The permit is an act that authorizes a person – administrated – for the exercise of a right, in principle, prohibited by the legal system itself. It is a special exemption from a general prohibition for the benefit of whoever requests it. With the permit, it is tolerated or allowed to do something very specific and determined. Its nature consists of removing a legal obstacle for the exercise of a pre-existing power; it is said to be a concession of restricted scope, since it grants rights of lesser intensity and greater precariousness. The characteristics of the permit are the following: a) it creates an individual juridical situation conditioned on compliance with the law, its non-compliance implying the expiration of the permit; b) it is given intuito personae in consideration of its motives and the beneficiary, in principle its assignment and transfer are prohibited; c) it confers a weakened right or a legitimate interest, the precariousness of the permit holder's right is based on the fact that the permit constitutes a tolerance of the respective Public Administration that acts discretionally; d) it is precarious, which is why the Public Administration can revoke it at any time, without the right to compensation or indemnity; e) its granting depends on administrative discretion, so the Public Administration can assess whether the requested permit does or does not conform to the general interest." c. Regarding authorization, this Tribunal, through judgment No. 1996-02981 of 2:33 p.m. on June 19, 1996, stated:

"III. ON ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORIZATIONS. The 'authorization' is an administrative act that acts as a condition of validity for a determined activity to be developed, or the behavior to be carried out, legitimately. The authorization does not attribute a new power or right to the person to whom it has been granted; rather, it only attributes the faculty to exercise an already existing power or right (as in the case under study, the existence of business or commercial freedom), that is, it implies only the removal of a legal obstacle for the exercise of an existing power or right; in this way, the effects of the authorization begin to run from the moment it was issued. (...)" That is, taking the cited precedents into consideration, I consider that in a proper public service, the ownership pertains only to the State, but its exploitation can be exercised by the State directly or it can delegate it (e.g., through a concession) to a private individual, the State itself always maintaining ownership of the service. The permit is another modality for the State to cede its exploitation to a private individual, except that in this case, a right to the administrated person is recognized on a precarious basis that, in principle, can be revoked without any liability for the Administration for reasons qualified as opportunity or convenience.

On the other hand, in an improper public service, the ownership pertains to a private individual, but due to the general interest the activity represents, an authorization is required for its provision, that is, the enabling by the State for its exercise.

This being the case, the fact that the activity provided is of general interest does not inexorably imply that only the State can be the owner of it.

3. Nature of the remunerated transport of persons in non-collective motor vehicles in Costa Rica.

As I clarified above, the remunerated transport of persons in non-collective motor vehicles in our country had its genesis in the private sector of the economy. Indeed, in its origins it was subject to scant state supervision and was expressly excluded from the regulation of collective transport.

In this regard, with Law No. 3503 of May 10, 1965, it was established that the public service of remunerated transport of persons in automobiles, including the service known today as taxi, became the ownership of the State, but with the particularity that when it referred to the operation of public service automobiles, it referred to the figure of the permit.

With the entry into force of the Regulatory Law for the Remunerated Transport of Persons in Taxi Vehicles, No. 5406 of November 26, 1973, the power of the State to provide the service directly or to grant rights to a private individual to exploit it via a concession from the Ministry of Works and Transport was established. This aspect has been maintained up to the present day with the Regulatory Law for the Public Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality, No. 7969 of December 22, 1999.

As already indicated, the fact that a service satisfies a general interest does not mean that its ownership must pass ipso facto and ineluctably to the State. I consider that for an activity to be removed from the free commerce of men and its ownership assumed under monopoly conditions by the State, the constitutional principle of reasonableness and proportionality must be respected with regard to the public purposes sought to be achieved, such that only a strong public interest could justify the imposition of such a burdensome and extraordinary measure as the exclusion from the free market of a certain activity that exploits an economic good (to which, of course, must be added the qualified vote demanded by Article 46 of the Political Constitution).

Therefore, the rationale of the law creating a monopoly in favor of the State must expressly explain why a particular business activity has to be subjected to such a burdensome measure as removing it from the market to transfer it to form a State monopoly. Furthermore, in light of the constitutional principle of reasonableness and proportionality, the reasons why the public interest could only be satisfied if the activity in question is monopolized in favor of the State must be compellingly set forth. Such justification may respond, evidently, to a historically determined moment, such that what in certain circumstances could be considered justified, in others would not be.

In this regard, in laws No. 3503, 5406, and 7969 (before the reform challenged in this action), no technical or public-interest reasons so relevant and sustained were expressly stated as to justify a commercial activity such as the taxi service, whose ownership had historically belonged to the private sector, now passing into the hands of the State (which could grant its exploitation but never its ownership), that is, transforming it from an improper public service into a proper one.

Having noted the foregoing, prior to the reform that is the subject of this action, the positive-legal and real existence of the legal business called "person transport (porteo de personas)" for more than 45 years demonstrates, however much one might try to argue that this commercial figure responded to a residual demand, the presence of an economic good of the free market, whose ownership belonged to private individuals, conditioned both it and its exploitation on compliance with the respective requirements.

Regarding this point, our Political Constitution recognizes freedom of commerce and, particularly, free competition (essential elements of the market economy), which explains why at the constitutional level the State has been assigned the obligation to prevent any monopolizing practice or tendency. Likewise, it is clear that the right to property finds shelter in our Fundamental Law.

Now, the reform introduced by Law No. 8955 of June 16, 2011, not only eliminates the figure of "person transport (porteo de personas)" and creates the "special stable taxi service," but also, concomitantly and for the first time expressly, establishes that all transport of persons in a motor vehicle must be considered a public service, whose ownership belongs to the State regardless of the degree of governmental intervention in the determination of the operating system of the service or in its oversight.

On this point, once the legislative background was examined, from the viewpoint of Constitutional Law, I observe that insufficient technical or economic arguments were set forth to justify that the taxi service should become a proper public service, whose ownership is exclusive to the State (the foregoing becomes applicable in general to the remunerated transport of persons in non-collective vehicles).

Furthermore, with the reform under study, the State was allowed to maintain ownership of the service by granting "permits" without resorting to the bidding procedure, a strange situation because when dealing with a public service that the law aspires to have as "proper" (although economic reality demonstrates it is but an "improper" one), the figure of the permit should be the exception, while the concession, the rule. If the special stable taxi service is considered public and property of the State, in principle it should not operate through the figure of the permit, which is precarious in nature. Indeed, the imposition of requirements for obtaining the aforementioned permit, assimilable to those of a concession, without granting the same rights and conditions as the latter, constitutes a legal invention, the sole purpose of which was to resolve a conflictive political situation—the derogation of "person transport (porteo de personas)" from the Commerce Code—without entering into considerations of substance or correct legal technique.

Regarding the sub judice matter, this Chamber, in judgment No. 3451-96 of 3:33 p.m. on July 9, 1996, precisely referring to the remunerated transport of persons, including taxis, ordered:

" I.- The remunerated transport of persons, in its various modalities, whether by bus, 'busetas,' or taxis, is a public service whose provision may be granted by the State to private individuals, entering into concession contracts with them, and only exceptionally, through temporary permits for the exploitation of the service. (...)

II ).- The legislator has provided, and the Chamber has confirmed in its jurisprudence, that the exploitation of the remunerated transport of persons is granted to private individuals by resorting to the bidding procedure and consequently, in this matter the permit as a means of assigning the exploitation of the service is exceptional; therefore the permit yields to the obtaining of a concession through a bidding process and hence its characteristics of temporariness, precariousness, and exceptionality. (...) For the Chamber, the administrative practice being questioned has subverted the sources of law and has turned the exception, conceived by the legislator as an extreme case to address unique circumstances, into the ordinary rule, thereby disrespecting the constitutional order and the binding decisions of the Chamber, among others, vote number 2101-91 of 8:40 a.m. on October 18, 1991. And such a position assumed by the Administration leads to serious violations of the current legal system: a. violation of the principle of legality: the administrative practice of authorizing the exploitation of the remunerated transport of persons, preferentially, through the figure of the permit subverts the sources of law, which implies the empowerment of the discretionary administrative act over what the law - of public order - indicates and, of course, over Article 182 of the Constitution, which for this Chamber is inadmissible; b) violation of equality: the competitive bidding or public tender procedure for granting concessions in the public service of remunerated transport of persons, in turn, enhances one of the guiding principles of administrative contracting, that of free participation in conditions of absolute equality, which is evidently absent in the figure of the permit, especially when the administrative act so providing has no objective and reasonable justification. The time it may take the administration preparing the competitive bidding does not justify disregarding, through the generalized use of the permit, fundamental values and principles of our legal system. It is true that the Technical Transport Commission has legal and regulatory backing to grant 'permits' for the exploitation of the Remunerated Transport of Persons; however, this must always be seen from the perspective of the exception, something the sued authorities have obviously lost sight of: (...)." Therefore, the "special stable taxi service" is nothing more than an attempt by the State to regulate an activity that should never have been considered a proper public service, whose ownership could only belong to the State. The foregoing does not mean that the non-collective remunerated transport of persons service is considered free of regulations, since, rather, the general interest it represents justifies the imposition of requirements for its exploitation, such as, for example, those referring to the safety of persons. This does not prevent, however, the ownership of said activity from belonging to the private world, as has historically occurred with person transport (porteo). In fact, the emergence of various phenomena in the real world regarding this activity (Piratas, Uber, Cabify) demonstrates the tendency that economic realities, sooner or later, end up imposing themselves over legal fictions, since it is up to Law to supervise and control such phenomena, but not to fall into the chimera of denying them.

This being the case, in the matter at hand, I consider that in the declaration of ownership in favor of the State of all types of remunerated transport of persons in motor vehicles, it was not justified why such a measure was preferred over others less harmful to the constitutional rights to freedom of enterprise, free competition, and property, the latter in accordance with the constitutional principle of reasonableness and proportionality. I emphasize that even at the time of the legislative consultation of Law No. 8955 of June 16, 2011, through vote No. 2011-04778 of 2:30 p.m. on April 13, 2011, this Tribunal noted that the bill had its origin in a negotiation process between representatives of the State and of the chambers and federations (representing taxi drivers and carriers), which does not constitute sufficient motivation for an action that affects society in general and extracts from the free market an activity that exploits an economic good.

By virtue of the foregoing, I consider that the fact that in our country the service of remunerated transport of persons is a proper service monopolized in favor of the State violates the constitutional rights to free competition, freedom of enterprise, and property, as well as the constitutional principle of reasonableness and proportionality.

There being sufficient reasons to grant this action due to severe and manifest violations of the constitutional order, it becomes unnecessary to rule on the remaining claims, just as has been the thesis of this Chamber from the outset in a number of cases (see judgments numbers 2014-008481, 2011-016592, 2001-004027, 2000-010996, 1993-001633, 1990-001463, among others).

XII.- Dissenting vote of Magistrate Hernández López.- Introduction.

1. I respectfully separate myself from the decision of the majority of the Tribunal in this case and grant the action filed because I consider that the challenged regulations establish an absolute deprivation of the fundamental right to freedom of commerce and enterprise in the activity of land transport of persons, which—in the absence of reasons or motivations capable of justifying it—makes it a constitutionally illegitimate exercise of the power to legislate. Next, I set forth the reasons on which I base my opinion, clarifying that I refer only to the subject matter of the process—as appropriate—, that is, to the person transport (porteo) and its elimination from the legal system, without this opinion being able to be given any other connotation. That is, this opinion does not refer to the legitimacy or not of the transport modality called Uber, nor to illegal transport services known as "pirates" which are not the object of this process.

Before analyzing the facts of the case, I would like to express my concern about the trend that can be observed in countries in various regions of the world—including our own—of abandoning the healthy reserve that societies and individuals had maintained regarding the appropriate exercise of power by the State, in safeguarding fundamental freedoms. Strangely—naively—in different latitudes, more and more powers over their activities are being given to state bodies, in the hope that they will be capable of exercising them without abusing their power and in the process solve an endless array of issues deriving from life in society.

It is of no use that day after day, from the historical era in which Nation States were consolidated—to travel no further in time—, state agents, and States in general, have demonstrated—time and again—their tendency to abuse their authority to the detriment of people's rights.

This is dangerous because state dynamics do not recognize degrees in their exercise of authority—or its deviations—, and it is exercised without any attenuation due to the subject, so that the essential and the important merge with the small and less significant, generating a state intervention that entails a loss of freedom for individuals.

I believe Costa Rican society would do well to reflect on its contradictory position regarding the role of the State, which it relentlessly disparages on one hand, but on the other invokes and turns to it so that it increasingly intervenes in aspects inherent to the freedom and autonomy of individuals.

In this case, once again—but this time via jurisprudence—the State is given practically a blank check to sequester a segment of commerce (an essential freedom of democracy), as long as it formally complies with a law, without respect for the essential content of the right. This is how democracies in the region began to implode, until they ceased to be so. This is a bad symptom, which adds to other exorbitant powers that have been created little by little—without the judicial system having exercised the counterweight corresponding to it—and to others yet in the legislative pipeline, to the detriment of fundamental freedoms, which can easily be abused by transitory majorities to put the democratic system in check.

The facts of the case.

2.

Although this proceeding has also alleged violations of an international treaty, I consider any elaboration on that point unnecessary, given the existence of a violation of constitutional norms whose declaration renders further considerations irrelevant. For the resolution of the case, I deem it sufficient to focus on the claims regarding violation of Articles 28 and 46 of the Fundamental Charter.

3. According to the above delimitation, the facts framing the Chamber's decision are not complicated:

• i)in 1964, the Commercial Code was enacted, which contained in its articles (Article 323) a regulation for the activity of private transport of persons; ii) one year later, in 1965, Law 3503 came into force, declaring remunerated transport of persons in motor vehicles by land to be an “exclusive function of the State” and providing that it may be provided directly or by means of private individuals expressly authorized; iii) in 1973, Law No. 5406 was issued, providing that remunerated transport of persons “in motor taxi vehicles” is a “public service” and proceeds to regulate it. It makes no mention whatsoever of private contracts for the transport of persons; iv) in 1996, Law 7593 amends Article 1 of Law 3503 (fact ii) so that henceforth, the remunerated land transport of persons regulated therein will refer exclusively to that carried out “in collective vehicles”. Neither does this amendment include any provision regarding the private contract for the transport of persons by automobile.
• v)in 1999, Law 7969 was enacted to specifically reorganize the taxi service, and for that purpose, Law 5406 (fact iii) was repealed. It reiterates the concept that remunerated transport of persons “in the taxi modality” is a public service that may only be provided through a concession or a permit. On this occasion, the regulation also does not include any provision to regulate the private transport service of persons in automobiles; vi) After twelve years had passed, in 2011, Law 8955 —discussed here— was enacted, amending both Article 323 of the Commercial Code (fact i) to eliminate the regulation of the contract for the carriage of persons, and Law 7969 (fact v) to extend state ownership to any modality of remunerated transport carried out “...by buses, minibuses, microbuses, taxis, automobiles, and any other type of motor vehicle, whether offered to the general public, to users, or to specific groups of users with specific needs that constitute special demands” Statement of the dispute.

4. A review of the factual background allows excluding from any consideration both the collective transport of persons and the activity of remunerated transport of persons in the taxi modality, since the law under discussion had no negative impact on them. These two activities underwent a nationalization process long ago, and the interested parties are careful not to challenge such decisions. In that sense, the claim of the plaintiff and the active coadjuvants is very specific and consists, in summary, of the assertion that Law 8955 removed from the sphere of freedom of enterprise and commerce the activity of private transport of persons, which had survived the legislative changes and, moreover, was, in practice, carried out by private individuals as a subsidiary and marginal activity. With that action, it is alleged, the qualified majority rule for the creation of monopolies established in Article 46 of the Political Constitution was violated, and a material violation was also caused to said article and to Article 28, which establish freedom of commerce and the general freedom to act.

5. In its report, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), as well as those interested in defending the challenged law, affirm the non-existence of any violation, supported by what was stated in the judgment of this Chamber number 2011-4778. They maintain that no monopoly was created or completed therein, since it merely reaffirmed the already existing state ownership over remunerated land transport of persons, such that, the activity being state-owned, the concept of a monopoly is not applicable, even more so in this case, which has left open the possibility of participation by different persons as concessionaires.

6. The alleged violation of the general freedom to act and the freedom of commerce and enterprise established in the Political Constitution is also contested, referring again to what was said by the Chamber in judgment 2011-4778, where it is stated that the creation of a special taxi service and the reservation of ownership decreed for the rest of remunerated land transport of persons does not reach the point of violating such freedoms, since the creation of a special taxi service is an exercise of the legislator's discretion and ownership over those activities in which state intervention is deemed necessary through the declaration of a public service headed by the State.

Beyond legal labels.

7. We see that the claim is directed against the legislative action by which the State finally appropriated ownership of all activity related to the remunerated transport of persons by land. Plaintiffs and active coadjuvants maintain that such act encompassed a portion of that economic activity that had been freely accessible and that private individuals had validly carried out until 2011, in harmony with the provisions of the Commercial Code, Articles 28 and 46 of the Political Constitution, and the needs of a sector of the population. In the responses of the interested parties and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, it can be seen that, in essence, they coincide with that approach: they affirm that Law 8955 came to “complete” the state process aimed at gaining ownership of all forms of remunerated land transport of persons. It is affirmed that the foregoing is constitutionally valid insofar as it involved a “publicatio,” that is to say, a declaration of a public service by the Legislative Assembly, the constitutionally legitimized body to do so.

8. It is therefore relevant to define whether, as seems to emerge from those responses, the stamping of a “public service” or “publicatio” label through a formally adopted legislative decision is sufficient to constitutionally validate the extraction of an economic activity from the scope of individuals' freedom of commerce and enterprise; in other words, whether the formal and unequivocal declaration of an activity as a public service of state ownership (the publicatio) is enough for this Constitutional Court to be satisfied with respect to its task of ensuring the constitutionality of the exercise of state power. In this aspect, the majority vote combines a full acceptance of that thesis with a notable silence in the face of the arguments raised by the parties to combat that way of thinking. My view is that the Chamber's position should be completely different and one of broad and forceful rejection of such approaches.

9. I have maintained in other decisions —in my dissenting vote to judgment number 2015-00146 of this Constitutional Chamber, issued at 11:02 a.m. on January 7, 2015— that the notion of public service imperatively demands a profound “aggiornamento” to be acceptable as a constitutionally legitimate expression of state power. The reason is that such concept originates in a constitutional framework (the French one of the second half of the 19th century) that differs in substantial aspects from the one currently prevailing in the majority of the countries of our legal environment.

The political constitutions emerging from post-WWII Europe, including our own, proudly sink their roots in liberal thought and its essential maxims; among them are the primacy of the human being and their intrinsic dignity —the sole reason for the State and the exercise of state power— and the existence of fundamental rights (natural according to the denomination of the era) inherent to that human condition of their holders, which constitute a limit to the exercise of sovereignty and state power. Nothing is further removed from the authoritarian imprints that during the 19th century marked the development of the French Legislative State and whose dynamics and way of thinking are reflected in the concept of public service, by granting the law —as the highest expression of the body of national representation— a preponderance before which the rights of individuals had to surrender.

10. It is therefore entirely improper in a constitutional framework like Costa Rica's to employ an uncritical and servile use of the notion of public service to legitimize legislative action without genuine scrutiny, all on the basis that it is sufficient that the State has fulfilled the requirement of a “formal and legal declaration” of an activity as a public service. Improper not only from the historical-legal perspective, but also from the point of view of the role that corresponds to this Chamber in the dynamic of functions designed by the constituent and which assigns it the duty, precisely, of disregarding labels and judging legislative acts against the parameters of constitutionality, not out of a scruple to insert a stick into the gears of state activity, but to ensure that said state mechanisms are balanced against the obligatory respect that the State owes to the fundamental rights of individuals and their dignity. And the illustration provided by the parties on the new conceptions of public service and its dynamic quality that now allows the State greater freedom of action with a more flexible administrative legal framework contributes nothing substantial to this end. Perhaps in the field of administrative law this bears fruit, but when the question touches upon Constitutional Law and the required balance between authority and liberty, such embellishments become irrelevant for the purposes of this Constitutional Chamber fulfilling its duty.

11. This same idea has been expressed very clearly throughout the entire existence of this Court. For example, in judgment number 1992-3495, which clearly established the thesis that has been maintained:

“IV- The Law of the Constitution, composed of both constitutional norms and principles and those of International Law and, particularly, those of its human rights instruments, as primary foundations of the entire positive legal order, transmits to it its own logical structure and axiological sense, based on values even prior to the legislated texts themselves, which are, in turn, the source of every normative system characteristic of society organized under the concepts of the Rule of Law, the constitutional regime, democracy, and freedom, in such a way that any norm or act that violates those values or principles —among them rationality, reasonableness, and proportionality, which are, by definition, criteria of constitutionality— or that leads to absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations, or to dead ends for individuals or the State, cannot be constitutionally valid. Regarding such values and general principles, the Chamber has expressed, in its Judgment No. 1739-92 of 11:45 a.m. on July 1, 1992 —on general criteria of due process in criminal matters— that:

\"public and even private norms and acts, as a requirement of their own constitutional validity...must conform not only to the specific norms or precepts of the Constitution, but also to the sense of justice contained therein, which implies, in turn, compliance with fundamental requirements of equity, proportionality, and reasonableness, understood as suitability for achieving the proposed ends, the supposed principles, and the presupposed values in the Law of the Constitution. Hence, laws and, in general, norms and acts of authority require for their validity not only having been enacted by competent bodies and due procedures, but also passing substantive review for their concordance with the supreme norms, principles, and values of the Constitution —formal and material— such as those of order, peace, security, justice, freedom, etc., which are configured as patterns of reasonableness. That is, a public or private norm or act is only valid when, in addition to its formal conformity with the Constitution, it is reasonably founded and justified according to the constitutional ideology. In this way, it is sought not only that the law not be irrational, arbitrary, or capricious, but also that the selected means have a real and substantial relationship with their object. A distinction is then made between technical reasonableness, which is, as stated, the proportionality between means and ends; legal reasonableness, or the adaptation to the Constitution in general, and especially to the rights and freedoms recognized or assumed by it; and finally, reasonableness of the effects on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on those rights other limitations or burdens than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, nor greater than those indispensable for them to function reasonably in the life of society\".

Position also clearly reinforced in judgment number 2003-5090 of 2:44 p.m. on June 11, 2003:

“The Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of its materially legislative function of issuing norms of a general and abstract nature, that is, laws in the formal and material sense (Article 121, subsection 1°, of the Political Constitution), enjoys broad freedom of configuration to develop the constitutional program established by the Constituent Power. That extensive margin of maneuver regarding the regulated matter has also been called legislative discretion, understood as the possibility that body has, before a determined need of the social body, to choose the normative solution or rule of Law it deems most just, adequate, and suitable to satisfy it, all within the range or plurality of political options freely offered by the electoral body through the system of legislative representation (…) The freedom of legislative configuration is not unrestricted, since it has as its limit the Law of the Constitution, that is, the constitutional block formed by constitutional precepts and customs, the values and principles —among which those of proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness, non-discrimination, due process, and defense stand out— of that nature, and the jurisprudence issued by this Court for similar cases”.

12. In such a way, legal operators and especially the persons who make up the bodies for the protection of individuals' fundamental rights cannot lose sight of the fact that our mission requires an attentive reading of legal concepts, far beyond labels, to ensure they adhere to the set of values promoted by our Fundamental Charter. An oversight in this regard, omitting the study of well-founded questioning of the exercise of state authority, will surely end up opening opportunities for the authoritarian exercise of power. In Latin America, there are clear examples of the abuse of state authority to nationalize services traditionally reserved for the exercise of commerce, to the detriment of essential freedoms, which ultimately, among other factors, ended democracies that seemed stable. (e.g., Venezuela, whose government declared naturally private services to be “strategic,” as an excuse to sequester freedom of commerce and convert private companies into “socialist companies”) Following the clear line indicated in opinion C-376-2003 of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, signed by the then Attorney General Castillo Víquez, we must bear in mind that when the State assumes ownership of an economic activity, the sphere of freedom that the Law of the Constitution recognizes in favor of the person is reduced. This occurs, as a general rule, when an activity is declared a public service by the Legislative and, consequently, can only be provided by it directly or by private individuals through the techniques of the indirect provision of public services. In these cases, as is well stated in the cited opinion, the presence of the State in the economy is broadened, and the sphere of individuals' freedom is reduced. That is why an act of such a nature is subject to legal reservation, but additionally, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality must be respected (it is, moreover, and must be, exceptional). Further on, applying the most recognized doctrine, it is indicated that whenever in doubt, freedom must be favored, in application of the pro libertate principle, developed in judgment 3173-93, which, as relevant, stated:

“…the pro libertate principle, which, together with the pro homine principle, constitutes the core of the doctrine of human rights; according to the former, everything that favors freedom must be interpreted extensively, and everything that limits it restrictively; according to the latter, the law must always be interpreted and applied in the manner that favors the human being”.

Along the same lines, the Inter-American Court, in its advisory opinion OC-5-85, indicates that while it is true that fundamental freedoms may be subject to certain restrictions, they must be “those necessary, but nothing more than those necessary for the validity of democratic and constitutional values, and points out that for a restriction to be ‘necessary,’ it is not sufficient that it be ‘useful,’ ‘reasonable,’ or ‘opportune,’ but rather it must imply the ‘existence of an imperative social need’ that supports the restriction”.

The plain truth, in this case, as will be seen, has not been clearly justified where that imperative social need to eliminate the private carriage (porteo) exists. The legislator does not validly explain why it gives the same legal treatment to activities of a diverse nature, such as private carriage and the remunerated transport of persons in the taxi modality. As is known, the contract for private carriage is very limited, because it was conceived to be a service of a residual nature, which, furthermore, can only be exercised on a discretionary basis. It is not an activity directed at the general public, regardless of whether it is advertised or not. It is a typically private activity, of a personal nature. Unlike what occurs in the public service, the legal transaction is not the result of chance or actions aimed at the community, but rather the product of a discreet relationship, previously arranged between the carrier and the traveler. It is normal for the service to be provided “door to door,” which entails the impossibility of making contracts on public roads (cruising for fares). As can be observed, it is a contract with very special characteristics, which differs from the public service activity” (Opinion C-376-2003) Freedom of commerce and enterprise in our Fundamental Charter.

13. Previously, the presence in our Political Constitution of a liberal substratum that sides with the individual and with the effective exercise of the broadest possible freedom in all spheres of their life was noted: economic, social, religious, intellectual, and, of course, in those of their most private sphere. Such aspirations are clearly embodied in our fundamental legal norm and therefore must be rescued and protected by the constitutional judiciary as the interpreter of that normative instrument, above political fluctuations and the attacks of forces and interest groups of the most diverse signs. In economic matters and for what is relevant in this case, that liberal movement embraced by our constituents chooses the market economy as the basis of the economic constitution. To that idea, the necessary corrections will later be added to culminate in the so-called social market economy, openly applied and defended as the best existing model for democracies to organize the various economic resources of a society. Such is the backdrop against which the actions of state authorities must be contrasted, seeking to maintain the line of the constituent in that sense and, at the same time, charging the holders of power with the obligation to sufficiently justify measures that deviate from such model.

14. This same principle has been upheld by this Court, as can be concluded without great effort from the following text, which is broadly illustrative:

“VIII.- ALLEGED MISAPPLICATION OF ARTICLE 208 BIS OF THE REGULATIONS OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY IN THE CASE OF A BILL PROVIDING FOR THE OPENING OF A MONOPOLY. (…)1)(…) In the logic of that numeral...[refers to Article 46 of the Political Constitution]... a monopoly is an exceptional situation in the market or the economy, since paragraph 1° establishes the prohibition of private monopolies as a general rule, while paragraph 2° underscores that ‘State action aimed at preventing any monopolistic practice or tendency is a matter of public interest,’ which means, a contrario sensu, that public powers are constitutionally obliged to promote competition within the framework of a market economy. Paragraph 4° provides that ‘The approval of two-thirds of the total membership of the Legislative Assembly shall be required to establish new monopolies in favor of the State or the Municipalities,’ thereby emphasizing the rule contained in the ‘economic constitution’ —that is, the set of values, principles, and precepts that regulate the economy and the market in the fundamental text— of freedom of enterprise and free competition and, consequently, the qualified exception of the monopoly —including public ones—, given that a reinforced law and, therefore, a considerable consensus of the political forces represented in the Legislative Assembly is required to establish a de jure public monopoly. (…) It should be noted that the original constituent did not provide that the suppression of a de jure monopoly or a de facto one subject to a subsequent law must be done by a reinforced law, given that, in the economic constitution, what is normal and ordinary is freedom of enterprise and free competition. (…) The requirement of a reinforced law to constitute a de jure monopoly is imposed insofar as this figure limits or restricts freedom of enterprise, which is the normal or ordinary rule according to the Law of the Constitution. On this point, it is necessary to emphasize that the intrinsic and extrinsic limits of fundamental rights are subject to legal reservation. (…) Not even the application of the principle of parallelism of forms from Public Law can justify an aggravated requirement to return to the normal and ordinary conditions of a market economy —freedom of enterprise and free competition— imposed by the economic constitution. (…)” (Judgment number 2008-004569 of 2:30 p.m. on March 26, 2008) 15- More specifically, regarding freedom of commerce and enterprise, the jurisprudential lines established by the Chamber in the aforementioned judgment number 1992-3495 must be taken very much into account, from which it is important to review the following excerpts:

“VI- Implicit in those values and principles of freedom, the dimension of this freedom in the economic field occupies a fundamental place. In this matter, the Constitution is particularly precise, establishing a regime composed of norms that safeguard the existing links between persons and the different classes of goods; that is, the relationship of the former with the world of ‘having,’ through provisions such as those contained or implied in Articles 45 and 46, which, although they must yield to needs normally more intense for the very existence of man —such as life or personal freedom and integrity— do not thereby create second-class rights, but rather rights as fundamental as those, and of the same rank —not in vain have the General Assembly of the United Nations and all the international bodies and tribunals dealing with human rights invariably characterized them as ‘indivisible’ and ‘interdependent’—. Thus, the Constitution establishes an economic order of freedom that basically translates into the rights of private property (Art. 45) and freedom of commerce, agriculture, and industry (Art. 46) —which, in turn, presuppose freedom of contract—. The latter explicitly prohibits not only the restriction of that freedom, but also its threat, even if originating in a law; and to these are added others, such as freedom to work and others that complete the general framework of economic freedom.

(…)

VIII- Furthermore, the Constitution recognizes another series of ‘instrumental rights’ or ‘guarantees,’ which are rather means of protecting ‘rights of enjoyment’ or content immediately useful for human life, and which, in synthesis, can be sheltered under the concept of ‘due process’; this refers not only to the protection of personal freedom and integrity or to procedural guarantees in judicial and administrative proceedings but also entails, for all the cited categories —owner, consumer, entrepreneur, worker, taxpayer, etc.—, the protection of the framework of rationality, reasonableness, and proportionality to which reference has been made, which comprises, in turn, the substantial content of the rights and freedoms that the legal order cannot undermine or alter, nor permit to be undermined or altered, even by law, or, less so, by norms or acts of lower rank. In any case, the suppression, diminution, or substitution of legal situations favorable to the individual can and must only occur through the declaration —juris-dictio— of a judicial Court and through the necessary guarantees of due process.” (…)

XIII- Starting from the constitutional recognition of the principle and system of freedom, in general (Art. 28), of the right to private property (Art. 45), and of freedom of enterprise (Art. 46), the principle of freedom of contract is inscribed as a constitutional principle, conditio sine qua non for the exercise of both, whose essential content the Chamber summarizes in four elements, namely:

• a)The freedom to choose the co-contractor; b) Freedom in choosing the very object of the contract and, therefore, the main provision that gives it concrete form; c) Freedom in determining the price, content, or economic value of the contract stipulated as consideration; d) The balance of the positions of both parties and between their mutual provisions; a balance that demands, in turn, respect for the fundamental principles of equality, reasonableness, and proportionality, according to which the position of the parties and the content and scope of their reciprocal obligations must be reasonably equivalent to each other and, furthermore, proportionate to the nature, object, and purposes of the contract.

(…)

The aforementioned contractual freedoms can only be restricted in the cases provided for in Article 28 of the Constitution, that is, insofar as their exercise harms social morality, public order, rigorously considered, or the equal or superior rights of third parties. From this it follows that both the meeting of wills involved in the contractual relationship and the determination of the thing, object, and price of this agreement can and must be freely stipulated by the parties, as long as they do not cross those limits; and here it is essential to clarify that the stipulation of a specific currency in a contract normally cannot be harmful to social morality or public order because, although the fiscal and trade deficit may pose a public problem —which would indeed empower the legislator to impose provisions aimed at the country's macroeconomic stability—, the problem of the price and the determination of the method of payment of a private obligation is not in itself public, but rather private inter partes, at least normally. Without denying the transcendence that all of this could eventually have on the overall direction of the economy, nor the possibility that, in exceptional cases, the freedom to contract in foreign currency could prove objectively harmful to the country's general economic situation, this could never empower the legislator to violate the essential contents of fundamental rights —in what is relevant here, those of freedom in general, private property, freedom of enterprise, and freedom of contract”.

16- And in Judgment No. 2008-001571 of 2008, it was explained:

“The essential content of the freedom [of commerce] under study includes, at least, the following: a) The right of its holders to undertake, choose, and develop the economic activity they desire; b) the power to organize the enterprise and to program its activities in the manner most convenient to their interests; c) the right to free competition; and d) the right to a reasonable profit in the exercise of the undertaken activity.” Nonetheless, this guarantee, in accordance with what constitutional provision 28 stipulates to that effect, is susceptible to being limited and regulated by the State, as long as the aforementioned essential content is respected; that is, provided that limits are not imposed that hinder the activity beyond what is reasonable, that make it impracticable, or that make it entirely unprofitable. By virtue of the foregoing, it is affirmed that freedom of commerce is not absolute or unlimited, and therefore, as stated, it must be subject to legal and regulatory regulations with legal coverage that must necessarily be complied with beforehand. In line with the above, entrepreneurial freedom thus implies that the exercise of the activity—agricultural, commercial, industrial, etc.—must be carried out in accordance with the reasonable regulations issued by the Administration, with the purpose of protecting other economic agents, consumers, and third parties.

17.- In conclusion, freedom of commerce and enterprise make up the roster of fundamental rights that Costa Ricans enjoy in economic matters, without—as stated in the cited ruling—them having to be considered second-class rights because in certain circumstances they must yield to achieve the effective exercise and protection of others of equal rank. The legislator does not hold a privileged position over them that allows restricting them—much less abolishing them regarding an activity—without the appropriate justification in accordance with Article 28 of the Constitution and without respecting the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.

Unreasonableness and disproportion of the analyzed legislative measure.

18. Precisely in this case, it is requested to define whether the legislative act contained in Law 8955, through which the activity of the paid service of overland transport of persons arranged autonomously between subjects of private law (porteo) was extracted, complies with the demands of reasonableness and proportionality that this Chamber has gathered since its first years of existence.

19. In the dissenting vote (voto salvado) to ruling 2015-00146 of this Chamber from 11:02 hours on January 7, 2015, a useful summary of this topic was made with the purpose, precisely, of analyzing another excess of the legislator contained in the law regulating paid overland transport of persons in the taxi modality. On that occasion we said the following:

"This Chamber has indicated that fundamental rights (such as the rights to equality and freedom of commerce in this case) can be limited by the legislator but with respect for the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, and that it corresponds to its competence to monitor their compliance in the exercise of the power to legislate. That is, the legislator is not only subject to the obligation to act, in its limiting work, exclusively with adherence to and in following the authorizations contained in the various articles of the Political Constitution (understood in a restricted manner), but also, such limiting actions must demonstrate their reasonableness and proportionality regarding the fulfillment of the constitutional objectives and purposes that are sought to be fulfilled with the limiting activity. This was clearly established in ruling 2001-0732, which established the validity of the criteria of reasonableness and proportionality of norms as a parameter for analyzing the validity of establishing limits on fundamental rights.

"V.- ON THE PRINCIPLE OF REASONABLENESS AS A CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETER. Constitutional jurisprudence has been clear and consistent in considering the principle of reasonableness as a parameter of constitutionality. It is worth recalling, first, that the 'reasonableness of the law' was born as part of 'substantive due process of law,' a guarantee created by the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, in line with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In the initial conception, 'due process' was directed at the procedural prosecution of the legislative act and its effect on substantive rights. At the end of the 19th century, however, that procedural conception that had given it origin was overcome, and it was elevated to an axiological resource that limits the actions of the legislative body. From then on, we can speak of due process as a generic guarantee of freedom, that is, as a substantive guarantee. The overcoming of 'due process' as a procedural guarantee basically stems from the fact that even a law that has adjusted to the established procedure and is valid and effective can harm the Law of the Constitution. To carry out the judgment of reasonableness, U.S. doctrine invites examining, first, the so-called 'technical reasonableness,' within which the norm in specific is examined (law, regulation, etc.). Once it is established that the norm is adequate to regulate a specific matter, it must be examined whether there is proportionality between the chosen means and the intended goal. Once the criterion of 'technical reasonableness' is passed, one must analyze 'legal reasonableness.' For this, this doctrine proposes examining: a) balancing (ponderativa) reasonableness, which is a type of legal assessment resorted to when, given the existence of a certain antecedent (e.g., income), a certain provision (e.g., tax) is demanded, it being necessary in this case to establish if it is equivalent or proportional; b) reasonableness of equality, is the type of legal assessment that starts from the premise that equal antecedents must have equal consequences, without arbitrary exceptions; c) reasonableness in the end, at this point it is assessed whether the objective to be achieved does not offend the purposes foreseen by the legislator with its approval. Within this same analysis, it is not enough to affirm that a means is reasonably adequate to an end; it is also necessary to verify the nature and the size of the limitation that a personal right must endure through that means. Thus, if the same end can be reached by seeking another means that produces a less burdensome limitation on personal rights, the chosen means is not reasonable. It was in ruling number 01739-92, at eleven hours forty-five minutes on July 1, 1992, where an attempt was first made to define this principle, in the following way:

'Reasonableness as a parameter of constitutional interpretation. But an even further step was taken in the Anglo-North American jurisprudential tradition, by extending the concept of due process to what in that tradition is known as substantive due process of law, which, in reality, although it does not refer to any procedural matter, constituted an ingenious mechanism devised by the United States Supreme Court to assert its jurisdiction over the federated states, in line with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, but which among us, above all lacking that need, would simply amount to the principle of reasonableness of laws and other public or even private norms or acts, as a requirement of their own constitutional validity, in the sense that they must adjust not only to the norms or concrete precepts of the Constitution but also to the sense of justice contained within it, which implies, in turn, the fulfillment of fundamental demands of equity, proportionality, and reasonableness, understood as suitability to achieve the proposed ends, the assumed principles, and the presupposed values in the Law of the Constitution. Hence, laws and, in general, norms and acts of authority require for their validity not only having been enacted by competent bodies and due procedures but also passing the substantive review for their concordance with the supreme norms, principles, and values of the Constitution (formal and material), such as those of order, peace, security, justice, freedom, etc., which are configured as patterns of reasonableness. That is, a norm or public or private act is only valid when, in addition to its formal conformity with the Constitution, it is reasonably grounded and justified in accordance with the constitutional ideology. In this way, it is sought not only that the law is not irrational, arbitrary, or capricious but also that the selected means have a real and substantial relationship with their objective. A distinction is then made between technical reasonableness, which is, as said, the proportionality between means and ends; legal reasonableness, or the adequacy to the Constitution in general, and in particular, to the rights and freedoms recognized or assumed by it; and finally, reasonableness of the effects on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on those rights other limitations or burdens than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, nor greater than those indispensable for them to function reasonably in the life of society.' German doctrine made an important contribution to the topic of 'reasonableness' by successfully identifying, in a very clear manner, its components: legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality stricto sensu, ideas that it develops by affirming that they have already been recognized by constitutional jurisprudence:

'... Legitimacy refers to the fact that the objective intended with the challenged act or provision must not be, at least, legally prohibited; Suitability indicates that the questioned state measure must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective; necessity means that among several measures equally apt to achieve such objective, the competent authority must choose that which affects the legal sphere of the person the least; and proportionality stricto sensu dictates that, apart from the requirement that the norm be apt and necessary, what is ordered by it must not be out of proportion with respect to the intended objective, that is, it must not be 'inexigible' to the individual... (Ruling of this Chamber number 03933-98, at nine hours fifty-nine minutes on June 12, 1998)." 20. Also, in the aforementioned dissenting vote (voto salvado), I expressed my dissatisfaction with the option taken by the majority of the Court to set aside the use of the reasonableness and proportionality test to analyze the norm questioned at that time, despite having been expressly requested by the parties. Now we once again encounter the same attitude towards the same subject matter, namely, the pure and simple deactivation of the essential content of fundamental rights such as equality, freedom of commerce, and freedom of contracting, in paid overland transport of persons, as if the Law of the Constitution did not govern this activity.

21. This time, the measure submitted to scrutiny is, as explained, the absolute extraction of a facet of the activity of overland transport of persons (porteo de personas) that had not been subject to nationalization, namely, service provided upon an individualized and specific agreement of wills on the provision and price between the private individuals interested in contracting a point-to-point service. I do not conceive, in this specific topic, a measure more harmful to the freedom of commerce and to freedom in general that persons must enjoy, than the option chosen by the State in this law to order such activity. This facilitates, from the constitutional procedural perspective, the application of the proportionality and reasonableness test because it allows concentrating the analysis on the so-called proportionality of the measure, and also eliminates to a large extent the danger of substituting the legislator's decision with some other regulatory measure more to the judge's liking. In this case, I repeat, none of that occurs, so it only remains to verify whether the State has provided reasons that justify the magnitude of such a dispossession.

22. The plaintiffs insist on indicating that the nationalization of that remainder of the activity of paid overland transport of persons by automobile could have been regulated in a more benign manner and in adherence to the current trends of the concept of public service that point towards regulation and not nationalization. In this sense, they mention as examples of great importance health and education, whose primordial importance nobody disputes and which—nevertheless—have found appropriate mechanisms more respectful of fundamental rights, such as regulation versus nationalization. Against this, the State, through the Procuraduría General de la República and the Ministry of Transport, as well as the passive coadjutants, offer general reasons and indeterminate concepts lacking any support to justify the decision. There is talk of the existence of "a clear public interest immersed" in the activity or of "a state decision given the relevance of the activity...", but nothing is concretized in plausible demonstrations and arguments, beyond such declarations.

23. In fact, the fundamental axis of the defense of the norm runs through the considerations given by the Chamber when it heard a legislative consultation regarding the bill that became the law now being challenged (ruling number 2011-04778 at 14:30 on April 13, 2011) where it elaborated on this question and affirmed that the nationalization of every manifestation of the activity of paid transport of persons by overland routes did not harm freedom of commerce. However, a reading of that ruling allows one to see that the Chamber omitted any consideration regarding the reasonableness and proportionality of said nationalization and, on the other hand, settles the question of the harm to freedom of commerce with a simply erroneous reasoning:

"...With this reform, the legislator seeks, once and for all, to abstract from the private sphere the provision of the transport service of persons which in its entirety has been declared a public service by the legislator, and causes other rules of the game and legal principles to apply: Private individuals become collaborators of the Public Administration in the provision of that service which, due to its characteristics and the evident existence of a public interest, must in principle be assumed by the State without the principles and rights that govern private relations, such as the principle of autonomy of will or freedom of commerce, being involved. Consequently, the Court considers that the consulted bill does not harm articles 28, 45, 46, and 56 of the Political Constitution." (cited ruling 2011-4778) (the highlighting is not from the original) One can clearly see the fundamental error of the reasoning when it is pointed out that the autonomy of will and freedom of commerce "govern private relations" without being able to validly oppose the state's will, if it takes an activity for itself. It is the negation, not only of the overwhelming contrary line that this Court has held, but also the devaluation of the concept of fundamental right and freedom gathered in the Political Constitution precisely as a limit to state power, as explained.

24. In this manner, there is nothing in this file that merits being qualified as a sufficient argument to justify and make acceptable the radical decision to deprive persons of their freedom of enterprise and commerce in the matter of paid transport of persons in the modality of porteo de personas. Nothing points to understanding that "essentiality for the maintenance of the Rule of Law" of which ruling 2011-4778 speaks to us, or the "relevant public interest immersed" that the Procuraduría and the Ministry of Public Works and Transport cite. It is not alleged, much less proven, the need to protect constitutional principles or values, such as the concretion of the principle of solidarity, rules for a better distribution of wealth, among others.

One could even—abandoning the role of impartial judge that the Chamber fulfills—seek support in the defense of vulnerable populations, concretion of principles of solidarity, rules for a better distribution of wealth, among others, but none of this has been alleged, and in fact, it is evidently forced.

25. Moreover, in some excerpts from the bill's statement of motives, reasons are discovered that accentuate the insufficiency of valid motives. One reads in the legislative file:

"...during several weeks of this year, an arduous negotiation process was carried out in which the Ministry of Public Works and Transport and its authorities, together with the Cámara Nacional de Transporte de Autobús, the Federación Nacional de Taxis, and the Cámara de Porteadores as representative of the sector, maintained a permanent session of discussion, seeking a consensus formulation to solve the situation of the porteadoras and porteadoras." (... )

"With this initiative, it is intended very categorically, to establish within the regulatory framework of the Law Regulating the Public Service of Paid Transport of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality, No. 7969, a service that today is a reality and that is erroneously protected by being covered only under the word 'persons' in the Commercial Code, in order to create legislation that guarantees better conditions and lower costs for the user, seeking the benefit and well-being of the great majorities..." (... )

"It is not a concession because it does not arise from the product of a public tender, but arises from a permit and is fundamentally due to the fact that it is a specific and punctual need." "The above because at the moment the word 'persons' is eliminated, there are those who effectively carry out that activity within the framework of legality of Article 323 of the Commercial Code, so that, based on the referred Article 34 of our Constitution, the rights acquired by these persons must be respected." "Additionally, three transitional provisions are incorporated with the object that the Ministry of Public Works and Transport assumes the responsibility of supervising the porteo service of persons in both automobile modality and microbus modality, through the Consejo de Transporte Público, which is the instrument that the legislator has created to regulate this matter." "It is important to keep in mind that it is a transitional situation for any interested person who manages to demonstrate and meet the requirements before the Consejo de Transporte Público and can be accredited in the subsequent two-month period, because those who do not meet them will not be able to operate as they would be acting illegally, since they would no longer operate under the framework of porteo or transport." "Equally, it is intended to give a security regulatory framework to all those users to be able to supervise the responsibility of those companies or persons that provide this service, which today are protected only under the Commercial Code through the Defensoría del Consumidor. Those who breach the new established regulations will be subject to due process and could lose the permit or code that allows them to carry out that activity, just as it operates in the formal taxi service." 26.- It is clear that the full and complete exclusion of the exercise of a fundamental freedom such as freedom of commerce and enterprise has been decided with the purpose of ordering the particular situation of an easily determinable group of people who had been exercising the activity of porteo, a work that it is decided to end, paradoxically, for "better conditions and lower costs for the user, seeking the benefit and well-being of the great majorities" and to resolve the problems that have arisen from the inefficiency and lack of capacity of the State to order and monitor, and mainly protect, the adequate provision of the public taxi service. The State clearly confesses its inability to supervise the illegal public taxi transport service and decides instead to seize a fundamental freedom of commerce and contracting. From my perspective, these objectives are not valid, nor do they meet the test of constitutional reasonableness.

27. With things thus presented, it is indefensible that the vicissitudes in contracting an automobile transport service agreed directly between adult persons legally capable of looking after their interests and defending their rights impose a State intervention in the most contemptuous way towards general freedom and commerce freedom in particular.

Conclusions.

28. From the factual set, it is demonstrated that the legislator did innovate the legal order with the issuance of Law 8955, as it not only proclaimed its ownership over any form of paid transport of persons by overland route but also eliminated porteo de personas from the list of contracts regulated by the Commercial Code.

This action, due to its radical nature, cannot but impose on the State a broad and convincing labor of justification in the face of claims that, as in this case, may be raised by persons who consider themselves affected in their fundamental rights to freedom and particularly to freedom of commerce and enterprise, because, as explained supra, it is not enough for the State to decide to declare a commercial activity as of "public interest" for it to be valid from a constitutional perspective. With that argument, the entire content of the economic rights of our Political Constitution can be emptied, for example, to dispossess services traditionally exercised in competition such as education or health.

From my perspective, those interested in the defense of the norm have not wanted or have not been able to provide concrete and acceptable reasons from a constitutional point of view to support a measure as radical as the nationalization of that activity, which, it is not superfluous to repeat, mostly involves persons in full use of their capacities and freedoms, negotiating provisions and prices over an activity omnipresent in our society, such as the transfer of persons from one point to another. For all that has been said, I consider it appropriate to declare the action with merit and annul the challenged norm with its consequences.

XIII.- Dissenting vote (Voto salvado) of Magistrate Salazar Alvarado: With due respect, I dissent from the criterion of the majority of the plenary of this Constitutional Court, which rejected the unconstitutionality action, which I uphold in the minority, for the reasons that I allow myself to set out below.

As the first point in the exposition of my criterion, it is necessary to highlight the recognition of the Political Constitution as a legal norm endowed with normative force, which implies its supremacy in the formal framework, placing it at the apex of the legal system, as the supreme source of the sources of law, with the power to organize the State, to define the political regime, and providing a series of guarantees in favor of all persons. Thus, the Fundamental Charter, which has governed since 1949, possesses a series of norms, values, and principles that correspond to limitations on the exercise of power and thereby try to guarantee the freedom of persons, which, as I will point out in later lines, I consider violated by the regulations challenged in the present unconstitutionality process.

Within this framework, the need is established to analyze, on the part of this Constitutional Court, the validity of a norm, that is, to elucidate whether the content of Law No. 8955 of September 26, 2011, "Reform of the Commercial Code - Law No. 3284 of April 30, 1964- and of the Law Regulating the Public Service of Paid Transport of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality - Law No. 7969 of December 22, 1999-" finds regularity with our Political Constitution, which is the founding norm of the Costa Rican legal order and from which the validity of all the norms that comprise it derives.

Having said the above, the Political Constitution of our country, based on its Articles 1, 9, 11, 28, 50, and 74, defines the system of government as a Social and Democratic State of Law, which implies, as this Chamber has pointed out—e.g., Ruling No. 13323-06, at 17:26 hours on September 6, 2006—the existence of reciprocal relations between various public instances of a constitutional and legal order, including the members of civil society, which imposes on the State the obligation to guarantee that persons develop in the most favorable way for their dignity, freedom, and the respect and effectiveness of their fundamental rights.

This makes a series of values and principles demandable, among which the principle of legality, the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, and the principle of respect for fundamental freedoms and rights stand out, all under conditions of equality. In the specific case, and from this Constitutional Jurisdiction, I consider that the full effectiveness of such principles must be analyzed from two perspectives: the first, regarding the interests of the consumer or the freedom of persons as consumers of the transport service; and a second, concerning the freedom of commerce.

The principle of respect for freedom, intelligible from the content of Article 28 of the Political Constitution, establishes that every person possesses an individual sphere in which they can, through their will, choose their life options and make the decisions that best favor their integral development. Although this entails the obligation that their actions do not contravene the legal order, as well as moral norms and good customs, the truth is that the law must not invade the intangible sphere of freedom.

The State of Law, through the division of powers and jurisdictional control thereof, imposes the full validity of the principle of legality, subjecting the Administration to the Law, with the interdiction of arbitrariness providing a framework of legal security to persons, which guarantees their personal freedom. Thus, fundamental freedoms correspond to one of the most solid bases of the Social and Democratic State of Law. In the sub-examine, I consider that what is provided in Law No. 8955 "Reform of the Commercial Code - Law No. 3284- and of the Law Regulating the Public Service of Paid Transport of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality - Law No. 7969-" enters into a strong collision with the prerogative cited, as it has a direct impact on the freedom of persons to choose and to contract, as consumers and as users of transport services, the modality of service that is most convenient for them, which results in a gross intrusion into the particular conditions of each individual. The demand for goods and services, in this case of the transport service, aims at satisfying the interests of each person, so that, prior to externalizing consent for their acquisition, individuals should have the necessary elements of judgment that allow expressing it with complete freedom—e.g., Ruling No. 4463-96, at 9:45 hours on August 30, 1996—and in accordance with their needs, where the multiplicity of operators finds high value.

Likewise, this Chamber has pointed out—see in that sense, among others, Rulings No. 0490-94 at 16:15 hours on January 25, 1994, No. 6116-96 at 15:21 hours on November 12, 1996, and No. 6497-96 at 11:42 hours on December 2, 1996—that within the elements of judgment for the selection of a service offer, several constitutional principles must be included, in a harmonious mix, that contemplate the state concern in favor of the broadest sectors of the population when its individuals act as consumers, the reaffirmation of individual freedom by facilitating private individuals' free disposition of their assets with the aid of the greatest possible knowledge of the good or service to be acquired, the ordering and systematization of the reciprocal relations between the interested parties, the harmonization of international commercial practices with the domestic system, and the greatest protection of persons regarding the means of subsistence.

The literal text of the cited Ruling No. 6497-96, in which the Tribunal's position set forth in the other equally mentioned rulings is reiterated and which is maintained to our days, indicates:

"...it is notorious that the consumer is at the end of the chain formed by the production, distribution, and commercialization of consumer goods that they need to acquire for their personal satisfaction, and their participation in that process does not respond to technical or professional reasons, but rather in the constant celebration of contracts in a personal capacity. Therefore, the relationship in that commercial sequence is one of inferiority and requires special protection against the providers of goods and services, to the effect that, prior to issuing their contractual consent, they have all the necessary elements of judgment that allow them to express it with complete freedom, and that implies thorough knowledge of the goods and services offered." Included in the above, in a harmonious blend, are several constitutional principles, such as the state's concern for the broadest sectors of the population when they act as consumers, the reaffirmation of individual freedom by enabling private parties to freely dispose of their assets with the greatest possible knowledge of the good or service to be acquired, the protection of health when it is involved, the ordering and systematization of reciprocal relations among interested parties, the harmonization of international commercial practices with the domestic system, and ultimately, the greatest protection of the individual’s functioning in their means of subsistence." Furthermore, consumer rights also find support in norms of International Law. In this framework, the provisions of the United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection stand out, which indicate that government policies should endeavor, to the extent possible, for consumers to obtain the maximum benefit from their economic resources and, additionally, should endeavor to establish adequate distribution procedures, fair business practices, informative marketing, and effective protection against practices that may harm the economic interests of consumers and the possibility of choice in the market. Furthermore, it points out the need to implement all necessary efforts to ensure that all parties involved in the provision of goods and services comply with the mandatory laws and standards in force. This translates into the need to restrict restrictive or abusive business practices that may harm consumers.

With the foregoing, the need to satisfy the interests of individuals when purchasing a service is made manifest, which is also evident when trying to define a public service (servicio público). According to legal doctrine, public service can be conceptualized, based on a polysemic characteristic intrinsic to it, as the provision, administrative or not, of a service for the purpose of satisfying a public need, which justifies, on the one hand, state intervention, but also entails the possibility of participation by private parties. Thus, the aforementioned state intervention should be limited solely to establishing a series of minimum norms, of general scope, that allow participation, under conditions of equality, for all those interested in the sale of the transportation service, with the consequent expansion of service options in favor of individuals.

Furthermore, at the beginning of this dissenting vote (voto disidente), I pointed out the need to analyze the specific case, additionally, from the perspective of freedom of commerce (libertad de comercio). The challenged norm eliminated the word "person" from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, which entails the nationalization of the passenger transportation service by the State, with the consequence that this activity falls outside the commerce of men, so that any interested party outside the State and its agents—defined, for this specific case, as those who hold a concession (concesión) or permit (permiso)—seeking to participate in the transportation market is left with a residual possibility of intervention, since they could only do so regarding the matter of merchandise, articles, and money. Such a restriction, in the opinion of the undersigned, is contrary to Constitutional Law.

Regarding freedom of commerce, this Constitutional Court, among others, in Judgment (Sentencia) N° 4936-12 of 15:33 hours on April 18, 2012, stated:

"VIII.– For its part, the freedom of enterprise or commerce, contained in Article 46 of the Political Constitution, lies in the right of every citizen to freely choose the economic activity they wish to pursue. However, this is not an unlimited right, as the State may limit such activity for reasons of public order, morality, and the protection of the rights of third parties. Once a person chooses the economic activity they wish to pursue, they must comply with the requirements and guidelines that the legal system demands to carry out the activity." In this pronouncement and based on the content of Article 46 of the Political Charter, it recognizes that freedom of commerce means that every citizen has the right to freely choose the economic activity they wish to pursue. However, it also recognizes that this guarantee is not unrestricted and that the State may restrict such activity, but, in my own view, the limitation must be imposed solely for reasons of public order, morality, and the protection of the rights of third parties.

In other words, freedom of commerce can be subject to regulation and legal restrictions, but they must pass the test of proportionality and reasonableness, so that the exercise of the fundamental right is not rendered nugatory. Based on this conception, it has been defined that the law cannot, nor should, be irrational and must guarantee proportionality between means and ends, which also implies an alignment of the norm with the content of the Constitution, with special reference to fundamental rights.

In the specific case, I consider that the restriction imposed by the challenged norm does not meet such criteria, especially if one takes into consideration the current junctures that the transportation sector is going through, in which the interests of individuals are frankly and directly affected by the lack of effectiveness of the service, the relationship between quality and the price that must be paid for it, and the lack of options or providers of an optimal service.

Thus, as a matter of principle, my opinion is based on the recognition and safeguarding of the minimum content of two fundamental rights. The first of these is freedom, contained in Article 28 of the Political Constitution, from the standpoint of individuals as consumers of the transportation service. The second corresponds to the right contained in Article 46 of the Political Constitution, referring to freedom of commerce. This is because I believe that the restriction imposed by the challenged regulations is far from the criteria of reasonableness and proportionality, given that the nationalization of the automotive transportation service in the Taxi and Seetaxi modes curtails the power of selection and contracting to which users are entitled, in accordance with their interests, preferences, and needs.

Additionally, it limits active participation in the market for the sale of the transportation service, as previously indicated. While state intervention is necessary, it must be minimal, establishing a regulatory framework that sets the minimum rules to allow all interested parties in the sale of the transportation service to participate under conditions of equality; however, without the excesses that the nationalization of the service entails, since the interests of individuals (users of transportation) must prevail over those of the State.

For this reason and in consideration of the common good and the interests of each individual, the opening of the service is of greater convenience for individuals; this, without losing sight of the fact that the content of the services and the relationship between provider and consumer entails the right of the latter to receive the benefits provided for in terms of quantity and quality—aspects previously defined—which can be regulated by the State without needing to nationalize the service, which also contemplates the obligation of compensation in cases where damage occurs due to the poor functioning of the service.

Finally, the provision of the transportation service should not be understood in terms of its origin, in which severe state intervention and its direct management by the Administration might be justified, but rather must be understood—and defined—based on its recipient, which justifies the development of what might be called a kind of improper public service (servicio público impropio) of transportation, in safeguarding the initiative of any party interested in managing the service, for which the State could establish minimum rules without needing to nationalize the service.

Having set out the foregoing considerations, I declare the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm, with its consequences. In reference to Article 1 of the cited Law N° 8955 of June 19, 2011, the word “persons” must be restored in Article 323 of the Commercial Code. The Executive and Legislative Branches are ordered, within the scope of their competencies, to promulgate the corresponding regulations to guarantee the prerogatives indicated above.

Por tanto:

By majority, the accumulated actions are dismissed. Judge Castillo Víquez gives different reasons to support the dismissal, with the exception of the grievance relating to the infringement of the principle of equality. Judge Rueda Leal dissents (salva el voto) and upholds the accumulated actions, due to the creation of a monopoly in favor of the State through a law that did not have the approval of two-thirds of the total membership of the Legislative Assembly, and for violating the fundamental rights to property and freedom of enterprise, as well as the general principle of freedom. Judges Hernández López and Salazar Alvarado partially dissent (salvan el voto parcialmente) and uphold the actions filed for violation of the freedom of enterprise protected in Articles 28 and 46 of the Political Constitution. Consequently, they annul Articles 1 and 2 of Law 8955 of June 16, 2011, the first, only insofar as it eliminated the word "persons" from Article 323 of the Commercial Code, and the second, solely and exclusively, insofar as it declared the activity of carrying persons from the Commercial Code as a public service.- Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.

Paul Rueda L. Nancy Hernández L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A. José Paulino Hernández G.

ECUBEROJ/402/FCC 1 The text, including the reform by Law No. 16 of June 8, 1927, stated the following:

"The Republic does not recognize hereditary titles or venal employments, nor does it permit the founding of entails (mayorazgos). Also prohibited in the Republic are monopolies, privileges, and any other act, even if originating in law, that impairs or threatens freedom of commerce, agriculture, and industry, except those that the State has established to date or those it establishes in the future for its subsistence, to prevent social ills, for the encouragement of ingenuity, for the execution of works, or for the development of enterprises of indisputably national interest that, without monopoly or privilege, could not be executed or carried out, in the judgment of the Legislative Branch, by a majority of two-thirds of its total membership, and also except those that the Municipalities have established until now or those they establish in the future for the same purposes with the due authorization of the Legislative Branch, given by the indicated majority."

Sala Constitucional Clase de asunto: Acción de inconstitucionalidad Analizado por: SALA CONSTITUCIONAL Sentencia con Voto Salvado *150154560007CO* Res. Nº 2017002791 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las once horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintidos de febrero de dos mil diecisiete.

Acciones de inconstitucionalidad promovidas por OTTO GUEVARA GUTH, y NATALIA DÍAZ QUINTANA; y por JUAN RICARDO FERNÁNDEZ RAMÍREZ, en su condición de Presidente de la ASOCIACIÓN NACIONAL DE CONSUMIDORES LIBRES; y otros, para que se declare inconstitucional de la Ley No. 8955: “Reforma a la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, del 30 de abril de 1964, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, del 22 de diciembre de 1999”; por estimarlos contrario a los artículos 7, 46, 129 y 140 de la Constitución Política. Intervinieron también en el proceso el representante de la Procuraduría General de la República, y el Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 13:00 horas del 16 de octubre de 2015, los accionantes solicitan en resumen que: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley No. 8955: “Reforma a la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, del 30 de abril de 1964, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, del 22 de diciembre de 1999”. A efecto de fundamentar la legitimación que ostentan para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, los accionantes aducen que proviene de la defensa de intereses difusos por tratarse del derecho al trabajo. Aducen que en el expediente legislativo No. 17874 -en el cual se tramitó la actual ley impugnada-, en su exposición de motivos indicó que se pretendía: "… crear una legislación que garantice mejores condiciones y costos más bajos para el usuario, buscando el beneficio y el bienestar de las grandes mayorías. De esta forma se elimina el porteo de personas, pero no se elimina el porteo en sí, es decir lo que se está eliminando es la palabra persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, pero se puede seguir transportando cosas, artículos, dineros, correspondencia, etc. (…) Ante la eliminación de la palabra "persona", se crea dentro de la Ley reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad Taxi, N. ° 7969, una figura que se llama "transporte especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio especial residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado para darle sentido de responsabilidad a aquellos interesados que lo estarían acreditando. " Explica que la exposición de motivos indica que la figura de porteo de personas se encontraba erróneamente regulada en el Código de Comercio, al incluir la palabra personas en el numeral 323 de dicho cuerpo normativo; por lo que se pretendió crear una nueva legislación que beneficiara al usuario, de forma tal que se prohibió la figura del “porteo de personas”, monopolizándose por parte del Estado dicha actividad económica, por lo que pasó de ser transporte privado a transporte público de personas, es decir, ya no puede ser ejercido de acuerdo a lo establecido en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio. Aduce que dicha ley elimina el transporte privado de personas y lo convierte en transporte público; lo cual se manifestó a lo largo de la normativa impugnada, pues por medio del artículo 1 se eliminó la figura del porteo de personas. Señala que el artículo 1 reforma los numerales 323 y 334 del Código de Comercio, de forma tal que indicaran lo siguiente: “Artículo 323.- Por el contrato de transporte la persona porteadora se obliga a transportar cosas o noticias de un lugar a otro a cambio de un precio. El transporte puede ser realizado por empresas públicas o privadas. Son empresas públicas las que anuncian y abren al público establecimiento de esa índole, comprometiéndose a transportar por precios, condiciones y periodos determinados, siempre que se requieran sus servicios de acuerdo con las bases de sus prospectos, itinerarios y tarifas. Son empresas privadas las que prestan esos servicios en forma discrecional, bajo condiciones y por ajustes convencionales. EI contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores." A tenor de lo cual, consideran que es porteador aquella persona dedicada a transportar cosas o noticias, no personas. Señalan que, anterior a la enmienda citada, el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, era el fundamento para llevar a cabo el transporte privado de personas bajo la denominada figura del porteo, pero con la reforma, el legislador limitó el contrato de porteo al transporte de cosas o noticias, excluyendo de manera categórica el transporte de personas, tal como se indico supra. En la citada Ley N° 8955 también se modificó y adicionó la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos modalidad de Taxi, de modo tal, que el derogado contrato de porteo de personas quedó incorporado en esta normativa bajo la denominación de servicios especiales estables de taxi (SEETAXI), constituyéndose así el transporte remunerado de personas en sus distintas modalidades, como un servicio público. Es necesario indicar que durante la discusión del proyecto de Ley, se dieron importantes participaciones como la de la Diputada Quintana Porras: (...) Por el fondo quiero que quede en actas que durante toda la discusión de este proyecto de Ley, hemos señalado (…) que la aprobación de este proyecto de Ley afectaría de manera injusta a personas que durante todo el tiempo o mucho tiempo se han dedicado a una actividad totalmente legal. (…) Son muchos los derechos reconocidos por nuestra Carta Magna, como el libre comercio, la libertad de reunión y la libertad de tránsito que se ven amenazados en este proyecto de Ley. Por lo tanto siempre que la actividad de porteo cumpla con los parámetros establecidos en nuestra legislación, será una actividad legal y esencial para nuestra dinámica comercial. (…) Tenemos la oportunidad de decirle no a un proyecto que afecta derechos constitucionales y que además limita una actividad laboral totalmente legal, que da sustento a muchos costarricenses. No empobrezcamos (…) a Costa Rica con nuestras decisiones; no cercenemos una libertad más aprobando en segundo debate este proyecto de Ley. “Apunta que el resultado de la aprobación de la norma impugnada fue la monopolización del servicio de transporte privado de personas por parte del Estado. Asimismo, indican que el artículo 2 de la citada ley estableció una serie de requisitos y limitaciones a la actividad económica del transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi; creando un monopolio público comprendido por dos modalidades del servicio de transporte modalidad taxi. La primera de dichas formas fue que exigió para los taxis regulados por la Ley No 7969, el título habitante de Concesión – cuando el Estado delega en una persona física o jurídica la posibilidad de brindar un servicio que originalmente corresponde al Estado-; siendo que la Concesión implica un derecho real administrativo para el Concesionario, y su revocación solo es posible por la violación de causales previstas con anterioridad y un Debido Proceso, caso contrario el Estado debe indemnizar. Expresa que la segunda de dichas formas es "residual" del servicio público de transporte modalidad taxi, conocido hoy como SEETAXI, o permiso especial estable de taxi, para absorber una parte de los porteadores bajo la figura del Permiso. Considera que la modalidad de SEETAXI es en sí contradictoria, ello por cuanto en Derecho Público, el Permiso es una figura precaria que como titulo habilitante no constituye ningún derecho administrativo, en principio podría ser revocado en cualquier momento y no corresponde indemnización alguna. Añade que la imposibilidad del ejercicio del porteo de personas (transporte privado de personas) queda totalmente establecida a través de reiterada jurisprudencia administrativa de la Procuraduría General de la República, desarrollada luego de entrada en vigencia Ley #8955 tal y como lo detalla en la opinión jurídica OJ154-2014, al reformarse el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, en el cual el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad taxi, se considera un servicio público que se explotará mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa de acuerdo con los procedimientos establecidos en la ley y su reglamento, o del permiso en el caso de servicios especiales estables de taxi, conforme lo dispone el inciso a) del artículo 7 de la ley de cita. En el mismo sentido, el dictamen C416-2014 y la opinión jurídica OJ-011-2015, indicaron que el transporte remunerado de personas en sus distintas modalidades constituye un servicio público, de forma tal que no puede realizarse por particulares sino es por medio de un permiso o concesión otorgado por el Estado. Deducen que ningún particular puede prestar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, en sus distintas modalidades, si no cuenta con una concesión o permiso de parte del Estado, es decir esta actividad sale del comercio de los hombres para ser monopolizada, esto independientemente del tipo de vehículo automotor que se utilice, de las personas a las que vaya dirigido, ya sea que se ofrezca al público en general o a personas usuarias de grupos determinados. Consecuencia de lo cual, ninguna persona particular -física o jurídica- puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas si previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva -concesión o permiso-, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Considera que dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatoria del artículo 46 de la Carta Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley No. 17874, que dio origen a la ley No. 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos. Añade que el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros, y que la ley No. 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone que no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores, creándose una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de este servicio por particulares, es decir, se estatiza un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio y que hacia como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento. Señalan que en el Dictamen número C-376-2003, la Procuraduría señaló que el porteo no era un negocio jurídico no producto del azar o de acciones encaminadas a la colectividad, sino, más bien, el producto de una relación discreta, previamente concertada entre el porteador y el viajero; lo cual conllevaba la imposibilidad de realizar contratos en la vía pública, toda vez que la titularidad de dicho servicio público la ejerce el Estado. Asegura que el porteo de personas obedece a un acuerdo de voluntades, a un acuerdo que no surge al azar, sino que es realizado libremente y de forma discreta entre las partes, a través de la ponderación de precios, rutas, horarios; pues se trata de un aspecto propio de la esfera privada de los ciudadanos en la que rige el principio de autonomía de la voluntad, y en la cual el Estado no debe intervenir. Por lo que aduce que al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, que disponerla creación de monopolios de carácter particular, e indica que para establecer nuevos monopolios a favor del Estado o de las municipalidades se requerirá de la aprobación de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. Lo cual implica que los poderes públicos están constitucionalmente obligados a promover la competencia en el marco de una economía de mercado; asimismo, indica que la norma impugnada estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi, constitución la cual fue realizada por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en una comisión con potestad legislativa plena, siendo que ese proyecto era indelegable pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada -al menos 38 votos-. Explican que dicho proyecto de ley debió ser discutido en el Plenario Legislativo, pues así lo requiere su votación, por lo que la Comisión Plena Segunda estaba impedida por mandato constitucional de conocer este proyecto y con más razón impedida para aprobarlo, violando el procedimiento establecido en el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Aclaran que no se cuestiona la constitución del monopolio, ya que este puede establecerse siempre y cuando se cumpla el procedimiento requerido en el artículo 46. Aseguran que la existencia del monopolio del transporte privado de personas se hace más evidente con la llegada de UBER, una plataforma digital que permite conectar a proveedores de servicio de personas en modalidad de taxi con personas que necesitan ser transportadas, y explican que para reforzar que la Ley No. 8955 creó un monopolio en favor del Estado, el Vice-Ministro Sebastián Urbina indicó que todo transporte remunerado de personas tenía que pasar por el CTP, y afirmó que ningún particular puede hacer transporte remunerado de personas sin permiso del Estado. Por lo que afirma que la aprobación de la Ley 8955 contradice el principio de supremacía de la realidad pues impide la utilización de medios tecnológicos alternativos al servicio de transporte, tal y como Asimismo, asegura que la norma impugnada violenta la aprobación el Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, ya que este determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transporte privado, por cuanto al momento de la aprobación Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas, y no existía una Ley que hubiera establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi; ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transporte privados modalidad taxi. Ante lo cual, en el capítulo 11 de dicho Tratado, "comercio transfronterizo de servicios", Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial, razón por la cual, la ley No. 8955 vulnera un Acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico, pues más allá de esta situación debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el "trato nacional "que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado; más bien, Costa Rica negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas en la modalidad taxi, en la Clase 6431; Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo); Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis); Según lo anterior por "servicios regulares" ha de entenderse "no ocasionales" siendo el "Servicio de transpone de pasajeros" sinónimo -en la doctrina jurídica comercial- de porteo de personas dirigido a un segmento específico de usuarios, lo que equivale a un grupo cerrado en donde privan los itinerarios y los honorarios predeterminados, es decir previamente concertados (entre el porteador y el pasajero), tal y como ocurría antes de la aprobación de la impugnada. Explica que mediante el Anexo I del CAFTA (Lista de Costa Rica) se incluyen diversas "medidas disconformes" que permiten al Estado costarricense legislar y reglamentar en materia de "Servicios de Transporte por Vía Terrestre Transporte de Pasajeros"; aún a contra de los artículos 11.2 (Trato Nacional), 11.3 (Trato de Nación Más Favorecida) y 11.4 (Acceso a Mercados) del CAFTA; dichas medidas disconformes incluyen varios artículos de la Ley No. 7969 "Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxis" que otorgan potestad al MOPT de "...fijar anualmente el número de concesiones que se otorgarán en cada distrito, cantón y provincia para los servicios de taxi". (CAFTA, Anexo I. página 13), además de lo relativo a la regulación en materia de tarifas. Sin embargo, el artículo 11.6 del CAFTA permite la no aplicación de los artículos 112 11.3. 11.4 y 11.5 (del CAFTA) a: "cualquier medida disconforme existente que sea mantenida por una parte (…) siempre que dicha modificación no disminuya el grado de conformidad de la medida, tal y como estaba en vigor inmediatamente antes de la modificación (…)” (CAFTA página 11-3). Asegura que las medidas disconformes anteriormente mencionadas se refieren al transporte público de pasajeros, que es el único regulado en la Ley 7969 antes de su modificación en junio de 2011, pues la Ley No, 8955 data del 16 de junio del 2011, sin embargo el CAFTA entro en vigencia el 1 de enero de 2009; por lo que con la aprobación de esta ley se pasa por alto las obligaciones acordadas por nuestro país en el citado tratado. Reitera que en la norma impugnada el "porteo de personas" se convierte en "servicio público", al eliminar la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada, lo cual transgrede el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA por disminuir "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con lo cual, la Asamblea Legislativa excede una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado Aducen que los tratados internacionales tienen una doble dimensión jurídica: desde el punto de vista internacional trae consigo un compromiso de cumplir lo pactado frente a los demás sujetos de derecho internacional y desde el punto de vista estatal implica la aceptación de los efectos internos derivados del compromiso tanto para los poderes públicos como para los ciudadanos - Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados-. Por lo cual, consideran que la aprobación de la Ley No. 8955, no solamente violenta la Constitución; sino la Convención de Viena en su parte general, ya que constituye una violación al principio de jerarquía de la norma, pues por medio de una norma de inferior rango se restringe una actividad comercial pasando por alto los acuerdos suscritos en el CAFTA, entrando en franca confrontación con sus objetivos fundamentales que son: el estimular la expansión y diversificación del comercio en la región, eliminar los obstáculos al comercio, facilitar la circulación transfronteriza de mercancías y servicios, promover condiciones de competencia leal en la zona de libre comercio, aumentar sustancialmente las oportunidades de inversión, entre otros. Solicitan que se declare inconstitucional la norma impugnada.

2.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de esta Sala a las 13:14 horas del 19 de enero de 2016, Juan Ricardo Fernández Ramírez, en su condición de Presidente de la Asociación Nacional de Consumidores Libres, solicita en resumen que: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley No. 8955: “Reforma a la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, del 30 de abril de 1964, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, del 22 de diciembre de 1999”. A efecto de fundamentar la legitimación que ostentan para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, los accionantes aducen que proviene de la defensa de intereses difusos y colectivos. Manifiesta que la legislación impugnada realizó una clara distinción entre las tres modalidades de transporte remunerado de personas, y asignó una regulación particular a cada una, a saber: transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi; servicio especial estable de taxi; y porteo de personas (estable y no estable). Indica que, para la modalidad de transporte de taxi, la norma impugnada lo mantuvo incólume, por lo cual no es objeto de la presente acción. Asegura que en relación al Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi, la norma impugnada creó una modalidad especial de transporte remunerado de personas, que también fue considerado como un servicio público para todos los efectos legales, explotado mediante la figura del permiso; el cual es limitado y supeditado a las concesiones de taxis tradicionales. Asegura que en dichas condiciones se da la obligación de presentar los contratos originales con las personas a las cuales se les brindará el servicio, y que la cantidad de permisos no podría superar el 3% de las concesiones de taxis tradicionales por base de operación; siendo que el Estado podrá autorizar únicamente la cantidad de permisos necesarios por zona, evitando una competencia que pueda afectar a los taxis tradicionales; no pudiendo ofrecer sus servicios al público; y sin poder estacionarse en las vías públicas salvo para el abordaje y des abordaje de sus usuarios. Ante lo cual, asegura que los únicos servicios de transporte permitidos son los taxis tradicionales o de limitado servicio especial estable de taxi; prohibiendo cualquier otro tipo de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos entre personas de derecho privado. Ahora bien, en relación al porteo de personas (estable y no estable), asegura que dicho servicio fue totalmente vedado; en virtud de lo cual, dos sujetos de derecho privado no pueden pactar libremente el transporte de una persona a cambio de una remuneración; e indicando que dicho tipo de servicio era público y que el Estado era su único titular; y otorgándole –mediante el Transitorio I-, un plazo máximo de un mes para que quienes se dedicaban al porteo de personas a presentar ante el Estado una serie de requisitos con el fin de obtener un permiso administrativo de servicio especial estable de taxi y convertir su actividad privada en esa nueva modalidad. Por lo cual, considera que no subsiste duda sobre la prohibición de suscribir contratos de porteo de personas entre particulares; ya que dejó a los taxis tradicionales y a los SEETAXIS como las únicas dos modalidades de transporte remunerado de personas en automóvil permitidas, ambas de titularidad exclusiva del Estado; ante lo cual, considera que la norma impugnada eliminó completamente el transporte privado remunerado de personas. Aduce que la ley impugnada es inconstitucional por cuanto creó un monopolio público sin una mayoría calificada, ya que estableció al Estado como exclusivo titular del transporte remunerado de personas y prohibió el porteo, eliminando la iniciativa privada y dejando como única opción de explotación los títulos habilitantes detallados en la ley. Ante lo cual, argumenta que la titularidad siempre pertenecerá al Estado de manera excluyente; y éste crea, delimita, otorga y revoca los títulos habilitantes. Indica que los concesionarios o permisiarios siempre operaran como colaboradores del Estado y bajo un régimen jurídico distinto, limitado y temporal; siendo que el vicio no considera en declarar servicio público este tipo de transporte, sino en la creación de un monopolio para asegurarlo. Por lo cual, menciona que este Tribunal estableció la prohibición de delegar en comisiones con potestad legislativa asuntos que requieran de mayoría calificada. Asegura que, por el contrario, los servicios públicos de mayor trascendencia, como la educación y la salud, no están regidos por un monopolio estatal como es este caso, lo que evidencia que la importancia de la actividad no justica per se su nacionalización. Por otra parte, señala que la norma impugnada viola los artículos 28, 39, 41, 45 y 46 de la Constitución Política; asimismo, los principios de libertad, iniciativa privada, libertad de comercio, libertad contractual y libertad de elección de los consumidores. Explica que las libertades fundamentales son eje de un Estado de Derecho, las cuales pueden ser limitadas en aras de un interés público imperativo y de la manera menos restrictiva posible; siendo que la norma impugnada no satisface el interés publico imperativo y limita las libertades fundamentales de la manera más restrictiva posible. Asegura que de las actas legislativas se comprueba que es incuestionable que el interés de regular la actividad del transporte remunerado de personas era solucionar el conflicto de lo taxistas y porteadores; pero no beneficiar a los consumidores que necesiten transportarse por un medio como este. Asevera que las actuales tendencias económicas y jurídicas adoptadas en Costa Rica, respaldan a la libre competencia como el regulador idóneo de cualquier actividad económica y en caso de estimarse necesaria intervención estatal, se considera que esta debe perpetrarse con la menor intensidad posible. En este caso, se ha perdido de vista el verdadero destinatario del servicio público de marras; el consumidor. Señala que el legislador contaba con la posibilidad de regulación de la actividad privada como opción para asegurar a la protección del usuario, pero optó por la manera más restrictiva: la estatación. Ello contrario a la salud y a la educación, los cuales son ejemplos de servicios públicos de suprema trascendencia que permiten la iniciativa privada y únicamente están regulados, no estatizados. Considera que la norma impugnada vulneró la cláusula 11.4 “Acceso a Mercados” del Capítulo Once del TLC; ello en virtud de que se prohíbe a los estados parte dictar medidas que impongan limitaciones sobre el numero de proveedores de servicios, ya sea a manera de contingentes numéricos, monopolios o proveedores exclusivos de servicios. Asegura que la prohibición de prestar un servicio privado de transporte de personas (porteo), producto de la reforma introducida con la Ley No. 89558, al artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y la estatización de la actividad, limita el número de proveedores de servicios. Por lo que el único supuesto en que esta ley no contrapone dicha normativa, es que estuviese contemplado en las medidas disconformes que Costa Rica extrajo de la aplicación del Tratado; siendo que las únicas reservadas sobre el transporte terrestre de personas se incluyeron en el Anexo I del Tratado. Expresa que, el transporte remunerado de personas no fue reservado en el Anexo I del Tratado, ello en virtud de que se refirió únicamente a leyes, reglamentos o medidas vigentes al momento de la suscripción del Tratado, que son disconformes con el pactado y que el Estado Parte decidía mantener. Siendo que no se trata de reservas a sectores o actividades en general, que el Estado podrá regular a placer, sino la decisión de conservar normas vigentes. Ello por cuanto la Ley 8955 fue promulgada años después del Tratado, por lo que serían medidas nuevas que no pueden interpretarse como existentes que se pretendían mantener. Por otra parte, asegura que ningún Estado Parte podría incrementar el grado de disconformidad de sus medidas existentes reservadas y cualquier reforma a alguna de ellas no podría disminuir su grado de conformidad. Siendo que, la norma impugnada, estableció medidas nuevas. Asegura que, incluso si se lograse interpretar que la normativa fue reservada en el Anexo I, resulta incuestionable que la Ley No. 8955 representaba modificaciones que incrementaron la restricciones existentes al momento de suscribir el Tratado; algo expresamente prohibido. Por otra parte, asegura que el Anexo II del Tratado, por otra parte, los Estados Partes sí les era posible hacer reservas sobre temas o sectores en los cuales podrían imponer nuevas medidas o regularlos a futuro. Expresa que Costa Rica no hizo reserva alguna sobre el transporte remunerado de personas en el Anexo II, por lo que resultaba directamente contraria al Tratado cualquier medida restrictiva sobre el tema. Expresa que la norma impugnada incuestionablemente nacionalizó el transporte remunerado de personas creó un monopolio a favor del Estado. Ello por cuanto el transporte de personas era de carácter mixto; y así convivía el transporte público remunerado de personas como las taxis tradicionales y el transporte privado remunerado de personas con la modalidad del porteo; no obstante, aduce que el transporte privado remunerado de personas en la modalidad de porteo fue eliminado del ordenamiento jurídico. Resultando inobjetable que el transporte remunerado de personas, en cualquiera de sus modalidades, fue instituido como servicio publico ya el Estado como su único titular. Afirma que mediante el contrato plenamente privado de porteo, las personas o empresas privadas podían ofrecer el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, y fuese ofreciendo tarifas y condiciones al público en general o acomodándolos en cada caso particular; no obtente, al eliminar la palabra “personas” del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y añadiendo una prohibición expresa de transportar personas, ese tipo de contrato fue nacionalizado, obligando a todos los que se dedicaban al porteo privado –mediante el Transitorio I de la norma impugnada- a transformar su actividad en pública, acogiéndose al servicio especial estable de taxi. Siendo que, no cabe duda, se creó un nuevo monopolio legal a favor del Estado. Aduce que es menester desarrollar la evolución del concepto de servicio público y sobre todo la diferencia entre la regulación de una actividad económica y su nacionalización como medios para asegurar el servicio. De forma tal que la nacionalización de la actividad no era la única manera jurídica de asegurar el servicio público, y que la regulación era una opción posible y existente en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico. Asegura que es necesario acotar una distinción entre la regulación estatal de una actividad privada en aras de proteger el interés de los usuarios y la nacionalización de una actividad privada que obliga a los sujetos de derecho privado a obtener una habilitación para operar como colaboradores del Estado; que es el único titular del servicio particular; no obstante, se optó por la creación de un monopolio público, algo que la constitución faculta mientras medie un interés público justificante y una ley aprobada por mayoría calificada. Aduce que la noción de servicio público tradicional consiste en una actividad de satisfacción de necesidades colectivas cuya titularidad y estricta regulación y fiscalización es asumida por el Estado; siendo que es el Estado el único titular del servicio, quién fija las condiciones en las que se presta y lo fiscaliza directamente. Ante lo cal, surgió una nueva noción moderna y objetiva del servicio público, la cual no implica la titularidad excluida del Estado y permite la iniciativa privada; una prestación de fundamental interés para la sociedad en la que el Estado puede intervenir y asegurar su satisfacción; la cual no supone su exclusiva titularidad a diferencia de la noción tradicional e incluye la posibilidad de intervenir mediante regulaciones o correcciones del mercado privado. Asimismo, cita doctrina europea (folio 56), e indicó que el marco constitucional admite una pluralidad de soluciones organizativas, que van desde el extremo representado por el mercado sin más, pasando por toda la gama de restricciones, hasta el otro extremo que es la exclusión del mercado y la reserva exclusiva de la administración.; por lo que el servicio público puede permitir al legislador ordenar una adecuada congruencia de las actividades públicas y privadas a fin de satisfacer las necesidades públicas. Y reitera que la evolución del concepto de servicio público no solo justifica la estatización de una actividad económica sin una mayoría calificada, sino que la corriente de cambio del concepto se dirige en la liberalización. Aduce que los conceptos de regularización y nacionalización son fundamentalmente distintos, ya que cuando se habla de regulación la actuación del Estado opera sobre situaciones jurídicas y derechos preexistentes que parten de la libertad de actuación privada. Opuesto es el régimen ante una actividad nacionalizada, donde el Estado crea y delimita las situaciones jurídicas y el administrado puede tener derechos nuevos y limitados de explotación por medio de una concesión. Explica que evidentemente se está en un monopolio estatal de una actividad económica privada por su naturaleza, y no su simple regulación. Por su parte, añade que, la nacionalización supone convertir una actividad privada a la titularidad exclusiva del Estado, por lo que únicamente a través de su habilitación, un sujeto privado podría ser partícipe. Por ser el titular exclusivo de dicha actividad, se puede rechazar, regular y detalladamente, fiscalizar o revocar los permisos de operación a los sujetos privados. Siendo que, no sea necesario dejar a la exclusiva titularidad de la administración, los servicios públicos para asegurarlos o regularlos, ya que no han estado exentos del giro internacional hacia la desestatización y actualmente subsisten distintos ejemplos de servicios que no son titularidad única del Estado. Por lo cual, añade, que el monopolio publico creado por la Ley No. 8955 es inconstitucional, en virtud de que debía haberse creado mediante una mayoría calificada, de conformidad con el numeral 4 de la Carta Constitucional. Subsidiariamente, solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del artículo 1 de la norma impugnada, ello en virtud de que eliminó el porteo de personas del Código de Comercio; asimismo, el artículo 2 que establece la titularidad exclusiva del Estado. Lo anterior con motivo de que dicha anulación permitiría el porteo privado de personas simultáneamente con el servicio SEETAXI, y los taxis tradicionales, eliminando el monopolio público al permitir la iniciativa privada en dicha actividad económica. Considera que las libertades fundamentales fueron comprometidas mediante la aprobación de dicha ley. E indica que de las actas legislativas, se extrae que el interés de regular la actividad de transporte remunerado de personas era solucionar el conflicto gremial de los taxistas y los portadores; optando por la forma más restrictiva, que era la estatización. Asegura que toda actividad comercial privada puede estar sujeta a limitaciones y regulaciones legales adoptadas en aras de proteger el interés público; sin embargo, no pueden ser regulaciones excesivas a una actividad privada por su naturaleza. Es decir, para limitar el principio de libertad, el legislador debió optar por la opción menos restrictiva a fin de satisfacer una necesidad social imperiosa. Asegura que la norma impugnada no satisface ningún interés público imperativo; siendo que el bien común debe extraerse del orden constitucional, nunca de lo que una administración particular considere como importante. Por lo cual, asegura que, los motivos de la ley impugnada provinieron de un proceso de negociación entre el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, junto con la Cámara Nacional de Transporte en Autobús, la Federación Nacional de Taxis y la Cámara de Porteadores, y proponían dirimir los conflictos sucintados entre taxistas, autobuseros y portadores, no el interés público imperativo en los términos exigidos por la Carta Constitucional. Considera que la libertad de competencia es la forma idónea de satisfacer el interés público. Afirma que la ley impugnada, se emitió con el propósito de zanjar una diferencia de tipo político gremial, entre diversos sectores; no obstante, se sacrificaron los legítimos intereses de los consumidores, reduciendo sus opciones y su derecho de elección. Con ello, considera que se priorizó el interés particular y gremial por encima d ellos intereses de la colectividad. Asegura que la norma impugnada infringe el artículo 46 constitucional, ello por cuanto se establece el derecho a la libre elección de los consumidores. Por un lado, el deber del Estado a promover la mayor cantidad de opciones y alternativas de consumo, y por el otro, la posibilidad de elegir con libertad entre dichas opciones. En igual sentido, cita a la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Comercio y Desarrollo, e indica que el propósito de las regulaciones al mercado es el aumentar el bienestar de los consumidores, garantizando por un lado el acceso y el suministro al mercado para que los consumidores tengan opciones de elecciones adecuadas, y por el otro garantizar que los consumidores puedan ejercer dichas opciones con eficacia. Aduce que la libertad de elección de los consumidores se protege no solo permitiéndole a estos elegir libremente entre las opciones disponibles en el mercado, sino también absteniéndose de excluir alternativas y opciones de como salvo que medie una justificación valida; principio conocido en la teoría económica como la soberanía del consumidor, la cual es precisamente la que es tutelada, y fue infringida en el numeral 46 de la Carta Constitucional. Siendo que, la ley declaró artificialmente como servicio público el porteo y cualquier otro tipo de servicio de transporte de personas que se le parezca o asemeje, privando a los consumidores de la posibilidad de acceder a una serie de servicios y opciones legitimas, sin mediar una justificación ni base técnica, y sin considerar ni ponderar los intereses legítimos de los consumidores. Asegura que el propósito del legislador fue satisfacer los intereses gremiales de los taxistas, porteadores y autobuseros que estaban en ese momento en medio de una disputa, y que los intereses de los consumidores no fueron debidamente protegidos. Es decir, se limitó indebidamente el derecho a la elección del consumidor, reduciéndole sin fundamento sus opciones y alternativas de ocumo para proteger los intereses de un gremio especifico. Por lo cual, el legislador eliminó todas las opciones de transporte privado de personas, en lugar de cumplir con su tarea de analizar y justificar cuáles prestaciones dentro del sector de transporte deben ser efectivamente declaradas como servicio público, permitiendo a los consumidores elegir y contratar el resto con libertad. Arguye que se violentó el principio constitucional, según el cual en el suministro de bienes y servicios a la colectividad, se presume la competencia económica como lo normas y ordinario, y se excluye de actividades del mercado como la excepción –la cual debe ser justificada y fundamentada en el beneficio de la colectividad y del interés común. Admite que las actividades económicas requieren regulaciones basadas en el orden público y el bien común; sin embargo, al emitir dichas regulaciones se deben necesariamente considerar, ponderar y proteger los derechos y legítimos intereses de los consumidores, por ser éstos los destinatarios finales de la regulación. Por ello, considera que se está ante una norma inconstitucional que limita la libertad de elección de los consumidores al reducirle sus opciones y alternativas. Así la cosa, considera que la Ley impugnada debe declararse inconstitucional, porque restringe injustificadamente la libertad de elección de los consumidores, reduciendo sus opciones sin base técnica ni fundamento. Adicionalmente, privilegia indebidamente los intereses particulares de un gremio específico, sin considerar, ponderar ni proteger los derechos y legítimos intereses de los consumidores y de la colectividad. Por tanto, no sólo la Ley no cumple el estándar constitucional, sino que es contrario al interés público imperativo de los consumidores que son los destinatarios de este servicio público. Siguiendo la jurisprudencia y doctrina, afirma que la nacionalización o publicatio es la forma más restrictiva y enérgica de intervención Estatal, que carece de justificación en este caso. Es posible asegurar el servicio público con una medida menos restrictiva -como la regulación- lo que per se constituye un vicio de inconstitucionalidad. No existe argumentación válida alguna sobre la medida utilizada para asegurar el servicio público, cuando las reglas técnicas de la economía y las tendencias jurídicas que imperan en nuestra constitución, abogan por la libertad de comercio como la mejor manera de satisfacer las necesidades de los consumidores. Aduce que la norma impugnada contraviene el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política; por lo que afirma que, el Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos de América, República Dominicana y Centroamérica (en adelante "TLC") es un instrumento internacional de carácter comercial, aprobado y ratificado por Costa Rica, cuyo principal objeto es la remoción de los obstáculos arancelarios, jurídicos, económicos y políticos a la libre transferencia comercial de bienes y servicios entre los Estados parte. De forma tal, que el Tratado tiene como fin el de servir de instrumento para la liberalización del comercio de bienes y servicios entre los Estados parte, garantizando la inversión extranjera y promoviendo condiciones de competencia leal, con la consecuente obtención de beneficios ostensibles para los usuarios y consumidores nacionales. Asimismo, recalca que, como se deriva del inciso 2 aludidos, el operador jurídico debe recurrir a dichos objetivos al momento de interpretar la voluntad de las partes y el sentido propio del texto del Tratado. A grandes rasgos, indica que, allí se establece la obligación de los Estados suscriptores de no imponer a los proveedores de servicios de otro Estado parte, restricciones de acceso -ya sean materiales o de orden normativo- a los distintos sectores económicos del mercado de servicios de otro Estado prohíbe expresamente adoptar leyes, reglamentos, o procedimientos que restrinjan el número de proveedores de un servicio limitando su participación o acceso al mercado o creando, por ejemplo, contingentes numéricos o monopolios que concedan acceso, titularidad o control de la prestación de ese servicio, a un solo proveedor o pocos proveedores, recurriendo a medidas limitantes o discriminatorias. Por lo que asegura que el TLC excluye de la aplicación de dicha disposición (Artículo 11.4 Acceso a los Mercados), a las actividades o sectores de Servicios, contenidos en una lista de Medidas Disconformes. Asimismo, asegura que la prohibición del porteo (estable y no estable) contraviene la clausula 11.4 de “Acceso a los Mercados”, del TLC. Ello en virtud de que, la norma impugnada provocó tres efectos: la derogación y la prohibición del contrato privado de transporte de personas en porteo, regulado en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio; la creación de una nueva modalidad de servicio remunerado de transporte: Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi, que vino a unirse a la modalidad ya existente de "taxi", y, como consecuencia de ambas; La "publicatio" o nacionalización del servicio de todo transporte privado remunerado de personas, al declararlo de exclusiva titularidad del Estado. La interrogante radica en cómo la prohibición expresa, introducida con la reforma, de prestar un servicio de transporte sin la debida concesión y fiscalización absoluta del Estado, implica una medida que imponga una limitación sobre el número de proveedores de servicios, en forma de contingentes numéricos, monopolios o proveedores exclusivos de servicios o mediante la exigencia de una prueba de necesidades económicas, en los términos literales del sub inciso i), inciso a) de la cláusula 11.4 del Tratado. Asegura lo anterior, en virtud de que el Código de Comercio regulaba, desde su promulgación en 1964, el contrato de transporte, también conocido como porteo de persona, cosas, entre otros. Se trataba de un contrato privado y comercial regido por la autonomía de la voluntad y el principio de libertad. El Código de Comercio regulaba una serie de presupuestos formales y esenciales para la validez del contrato, las obligaciones de las partes, así como el régimen de responsabilidad y las causales de extinción o nulidad de ese contrato. La consecuencia lógica del carácter privado del contrato de transporte, radicaba en que para su prestación, no era necesaria una concesión formal del Estado, en virtud de que no se trataba de un servicio público del cual fuere titular exclusivo el Estado. Los particulares también estaban facultados para prestar el servicio bajo sus propias reglas, en apego a lo estipulado por el Código de Comercio. El grado de intervención del Estado era mínimo y se limitaba a la verificación general de requisitos que aplican para la generalidad de personas que quisieran conducir un vehículo automotor: licencia de conducir (previo dictamen médico que avale las aptitudes físicas y mentales para conducir), respeto a las normas de la Ley de Tránsito, vehículo en estado óptimo según Revisión Técnica Vehicular, entre otros; reglas que se imponen en virtud del interés general que existe en asegurar la seguridad de las personas ante la condición riesgosa natural de toda conducción de vehículos. Sin embargo, al prohibirse expresamente el contrato de transporte privado de personas antes regulado en el Código de Comercio y al excluirlo de la titularidad privada, se impide que cualquier persona que no tenga el carácter de "concesionario", preste un servicio de transpone privado remunerado de personas bajo un régimen de autonomía y libertad contractual -como lo reconocía el Código de Comercio-. Con lo cual se restringe de manera ilegítima el acceso al mercado propio del servicio de transpones. La prohibición implica que si una empresa proveedora de servicios de transpone privado, originaria de un Estado pone, quisiera acceder al sector de servicios de transporte en nuestro país, podría sometérsele a una serie de limitaciones irrazonables contempladas por la Ley No. 8955, contrarias a la cláusula 11.4 del TLC, y que no fueron incluidas expresamente dentro de la lista de medidas disconformes del Anexo 1 del TLC. Es decir, con la reforma introducida por la Ley No. 8955 en el 2011, estando plenamente vigente el TLC, se prohíbe completamente la actividad de porteo. Así las cosas, asegura que es de trascendental incidencia para efectos de esta acción, comprender que la prohibición de ejercer libremente una actividad y, simultáneamente, crear una figura especial para atender una demanda residual y limitada (SEETAXI) de ese servicio, no es sino limitar injustificadamente y por regulación negativa, el número de proveedores de un servicio. Este particular efecto de la Ley cuestionada, es claramente contrario a la cláusula l 1.4 del TLC. Debe distinguirse entre la actividad de porteo (prohibida en su totalidad) y la actividad de SEETAXI (limitado a un 3% de la cantidad de taxis en la zona). Este acápite corresponde a la primera actividad, sin embargo adelantamos que ambos han sido limitados inconstitucionalmente. Como se vio con anterioridad, una actividad privada regulada y una actividad pública dada en concesión, son completamente distintas en cuanto a su naturaleza y régimen jurídico, por lo que es menester analizarlos individualmente. A las empresas provenientes de los Estados parte se les ha prohibido en su totalidad la prestación del servicio de porteo y limitado sustancialmente la posibilidad de prestar un servicio distinto de SEETAXI. El hecho de calificar la actividad como servicio público "del cual es titular el Estado" implica que ningún sujeto privado está habilitado para prestar el servicio de transporte libre y directamente, bajo el régimen de libertad y autonomía que imperaba previo a la reforma del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio. En resumen, asegura que, la eliminación y prohibición del porteo y de cualquier contrato de transporte privado de personas, regulado en su momento por el Código de Comercio (art. 1 Ley 8955) y por la libertad de contratación de toda persona, constituyen una violación al art. 11.4 del TLC y, lo que es más importante, una limitación no avalada por la Lista de Medidas Disconformes del TLC. Explica que el porteo privado de personas no está comprendido en las Medidas Disconformes del TLC (folio 93); ya que Costa Rica contempló medidas disconformes en el Tratado que la facultaron a extraer del alcance de la cláusula 11.4 Acceso a Mercados, algunas normas reguladoras del sector transpones. Concretamente, en la Lista de Costa Rica del Anexo l se incluyó una medida disconforme relativa al Servicio de Transpone por vía terrestre. Lo reservado en el Anexo I del Tratado, según su texto y notas explicativas, se refiere únicamente a leyes, reglamentos o medidas vigentes; al momento de la suscripción del Tratado, que son disconformes con lo pactado y el Estado Parte decide mantener. No se trata de reservas a sectores o actividades en general, que el Estado podrá regular posteriormente, sino la decisión de conservar medidas vigentes. La Ley 8955 fue promulgada años después del Tratado por lo que son medidas nuevas que no pueden interpretarse como medidas existentes que se pretendían mantener. En segundo lugar, indica que de conformidad con el Tratado, ningún Estado Parte podrá incrementar el grado de disconformidad de sus medidas existentes reservadas y cualquier reforma a alguna de ellas no podrá disminuir su grado de conformidad. La Ley 8955 establece medidas nuevas. Empero, incluso interpretando erróneamente que esta normativa fue reservada en el Anexo I, resulta incuestionable que son medidas que representan un incremento en las restricciones existentes al momento de suscribir el Tratado, algo expresamente prohibido. Y por último, aduce que en el Anexo ll del Tratado, por otra parte, a los Estados panes sí les era posible hacer reservas sobre temas o sectores en los cuales podrían imponer nuevas medidas o regularlos a futuro. Costa Rica no hizo reserva alguna sobre el transporte terrestre remunerado de personas en el Anexo ll, por lo que resulta directamente contraria al Tratado cualquier medida restrictiva nueva sobre este tema. Explica que, en el Anexo I del Tratado se detallan leyes, reglamentos o medidas vigentes al momento de suscribir el Tratado que un Estado desea mantener únicamente. Por su parte, el Anexo ll fue concebido para incluir los sectores o actividades que un Estado se reserva la posibilidad de restringir o regular con medidas nuevas, ello lo analiza y ejemplifica en el folio 99 del expediente. Y asegura que ninguna de las normas modificadas por el artículo l de la Ley No. 8955 (artículo 323 y 334 del Código de Comercio) estaban incorporadas en la Lista de Costa Rica, Anexo l, al momento de suscribir el tratado. Además, la Ley 8955 no había sido promulgada para ese momento, por lo que evidentemente no se hizo una reserva para mantenerla. Se trata de medidas nuevas que por pura lógica temporal no pudieron ser reservadas en el Anexo I. ante lo cual, cualquier modificación de esas normas era posible en tanto no se disminuyera el grado de conformidad de la medida, tal y como estaba en vigor inmediatamente antes de la modificación de los artículos 11.2, 11.3, 11,4 y 11,5; criterio confirmado por el Ministerio de Comercio Exterior (folio 105). Por ello, no se puede omitir que el artículo 2 de la Ley 7969, aumenta el grado de disconformidad del artículo 2 vigente al momento de suscribirse el Tratado. Esta nueva medida, más que una modificación, implica una innovación absoluta, ya que delega en el Estado la titularidad exclusiva del servicio (lo que la Ley No. 7969 anterior no hacía) con lo que restringe la cantidad de proveedores del servicio, concentrándolo en uno solo: El Estado. De igual manera, el hecho de crear una modalidad nueva como lo es SEETAXI, pero restringida a un 3% de las concesiones otorgadas a favor de la modalidad taxi. Implica a todas luces una medida, en los términos del punto 633 de la Nota explicativa al Anexo l del Tratado. Absolutamente discriminatoria. Así, la medida se opone expresamente a la cláusula 1 1.4 de Acceso a Mercados del Tratado que promueve una mayor cantidad de proveedores del servicio, y una mínima regulación sobre la actividad, en atención a los objetivos de liberalización del Tratado. De manera que al aumentar el grado de disconformidad de una medida existente (artículo 2 Ley 7969) con la cláusula I 1.4 del Tratado, la Ley No. 8955 resulta contraria al artículo 1 1.6, inciso I, sub inciso c), supra citado. De lo expuesto se colige incuestionablemente que las medidas disconformes en el Anexo I del TLC, no facultan a eliminar la figura del porteo del Código de Comercio y a estatizar cualquier traspone remunerado de personas. Por otra parte, aduce que el porteo no fue reservado como materia a regular en el futuro en por el Anexo II (folio 108); Evidentemente no se incluyó el transporte terrestre de personas, por lo que con este sector no es posible imponer nuevas restricciones. Las únicas restricciones permitidas, entonces, son las que estaban vigentes al momento de la suscripción del Tratado y fueron reservadas en el Anexo I (normas que no pueden ser modificadas de forma más restrictiva) Cualquier otra materia o sector no contemplado en dicho anexo, no puede crearse ni modificarse en perjuicio de la obligación de Acceso al Mercado impuesta por el artículo 11.4 del Tratado. Por todo lo anterior, asegura que es incuestionable que las normas de la Ley 8955 que prohibieron el porteo y dejaron a la titularidad exclusiva del Estado todo transpone remunerado de personas, no estaban vigentes al momento de la suscripción del Tratado y por lo tanto no fueron reservados en el Anexo l. La posibilidad de restringir estos sectores posteriormente tampoco fue reservado en el Anexo ll del Tratado, por lo que la Ley es directamente contraria al artículo 11.4 del TLC. Se insiste, que proscribir una actividad económica privada que se desplegaba libremente en ejercicio de la libertad de comercio en todas las formas previstas por la cláusula 11.4 de "Acceso a Mercados", implica limitar la cantidad de proveedores del servicio, desincentiva la inversión y socava absolutamente todos los objetivos del Tratado de Libre Comercio. Asimismo. Prohibir, después de aprobado el TLC, la prestación privada del servicio de transpone, constituye un claro obstáculo inconstitucional al comercio de servicios (cláusula l.2.b) entre los Estados Parte. En palabras simples, mediante una ley de la República. Quebrantando el principio de Pacta Sunt Servanta y todas las cláusulas citadas del Tratado. La Asamblea Legislativa modificó Y expandió el contenido de las medidas disconformes contenidas en el Convenio, verbigracia. Reformó un Tratado Internacional a través de una ley. conculcando no solo el artículo 7 de nuestra propia Constitución Política, sino además los artículos 26, y especialmente el 27 de la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados. Y concluye que el porteo de personas, regulado en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio anterior a la reforma, no estaba contemplado dentro de la lista de "medidas" o notas del Anexo 1 que el Estado se reservaba el derecho de mantener vigentes incluso en contra del Tratado, lo que demuestra su confinidad con el instrumento; tampoco fueron contemplados en la Lista de Costa Rica del Anexo 2 del Tratado, anexo que contempla específicamente -según Nota Explicativa- las materias que el Estado se reservaba regular a ñxturo en materia de Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios, incluso en contra del Tratado. La modificación del artículo 2 de la Ley 7969 sí contemplado como medida disconforme en el Anexo 1 fue modificado otorgando titularidad exclusiva al Estado sobre la actividad de transporte remunerado de personas, se disminuyó el grado de conformidad de la medida con el Tratado. Se extendieron medidas disconformes vía legislativa en contra del Tratado. Por todo lo anterior es incuestionable que las normas de la Ley 8955 que prohibieron el porteo y dejaron a la titularidad exclusiva del Estado todo transporte remunerado de personas, no estaban vigentes al momento de la suscripción del Tratado y por lo tanto no fueron reservados en el Anexo I. La posibilidad de restringir estos sectores posteriormente tampoco fue reservado en el Anexo ll del Tratado, por lo que la Ley es directamente contraria al artículo l 1.4 del TLC. Por otra parte, indica que el artículo 2 de la Ley No. 7969, contemplada como medida disconforme en el Anexo 1 del Tratado. No regulaba la modalidad de SEETAXI, de manera que la reforma introducida a dicho artículo por la Ley No. 8955, no puede tenerse como una "modificación", sino como una innovación, no amparada por el párrafo c) del artículo 1 1.6, inciso 1 del Tratado. En todo caso, la creación de un Servicio Especial Estable de Taxis, que satisface una demanda residual y limitada del mercado, implica una disminución del grado de conformidad de la Ley con la cláusula l 1.4 del Tratado, ya que otorga a los interesados un mero permiso en precario, en lugar de una concesión formal, como laque gozan quienes se dedican a la modalidad "taxi" Asimismo, al tratarse de una modalidad que busca satisfacer una demanda "residual y limitada", con la reforma sólo se pueden otorgar permisos de SEETAXI para un 3% de las concesiones autorizadas por base de operación, lo que a todas luces disminuye el grado de conformidad del artículo 2 de la Ley No. 7969 con la cláusula 11.4 del Tratado. Siendo que, no existe duda que el porteo y el SEETAXI son actividades económicas completamente diferentes, sin embargo se ha querido argumentar en algunas oportunidades que se trata de la misma actividad. Incluso bajo esta interpretación la nacionalización de una actividad privada para sujetarla a estrictas regulaciones y a un máximo de 3% de los taxis en cada zona, es una restricción incompatible con el tratado en cuestión Por último, resalta que la Ley No. 8955 prohíbe lo que el TLC permite y fomenta. Al promulgarse una Ley ordinaria contraria a un Tratado internacional de mayor jerarquía se contraviene el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política, de manera que atentos solicitamos se declare la evidente inconstitucionalidad de la Ley No. 8955 del 7 de julio de 2011. Solicita que se anule por inconstitucional la Ley No. 8955; y de forma subsidiaria, solicita que se anule el artículo 1 de la Ley No. 8955, y por ende las reformas operadas sobre los artículos 323 y 334 del Código de Comercio, Ley N° 3284, de 30 de abril de 1964, que eliminaron la figura del porteo privado. Que se restablecerá en consecuencia; y el párrafo del artículo 2 de la Ley No. 8955, que introdujo un párrafo segundo al artículo 2 de la Ley No. 7969, que otorgó al Estado la titularidad exclusiva del servicio.

3.- Por resolución de las 15:58 horas del 11 de febrero de 2016 (visible a folio 022 del expediente), se le dio curso a las acciones de inconstitucionalidad tramitadas en los expedientes 15-015456-0007-CO y 16-000852-0007-CO; acumuladas mediante voto No. 2016-002010 de las 09:30 hrs. del 10 de febrero de 2016, confiriéndole audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la República y al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes.

4.- Los edictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional fueron publicados en los números 50, 51 y 52 del Boletín Judicial, de los días 11, 14 y 15 de marzo del 2016 (folio 485).

5.- Por escritos recibidos en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 11:10 horas del 1 de marzo de 2016; y a las 13:36 horas del 2 de marzo de 2016, se presenta coadyuvancia por parte de Carolina Alfaro Sojo, en condición de apoderada generalísima sin límite de suma de Transportes Privados Carolina Sociedad Anónima, Pablo Enrique Soto Alfaro, en condición de apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma de Soluciones Avanzadas Sociedad Anónima de Capital Variable; y Wilbert Navarro Cordero, en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de Transportes Privados Marvey Sociedad Anónima; ambos argumentan que, realizan actividades de transporte privado de personas desde el año 2000, siempre bajo la luz del art. 323 del Código de Comercio. Con la reforma aplicada al Código de comercio en 1999, se implementó la figura del “Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi”; misma queda subsumida a las concesiones por 3 años que el Estado emite. Informan que el 7 de julio de 2015 vencieron sus permisos, por lo que gestionaron para reactivar las operaciones de transporte privado. Amplían que desde el 2000 se trabaja conjunto a Soluciones Avanzadas S.A. de C.V; donde brindan servicios en cantones de la provincia de Alajuela. Explican, que dicha actividad y negociación transnacional se ampara en el Cap. ll del TLC aprobado en 2007, mismo que se titula “Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios”. Informan que, con la promulgación de la ley que se impugna (No. 8955), se estableció un sistema de monopolización que maneja el Consejo de Transporte Pública, órgano que emite, o no, los permisos de taxi. Aseguran que dicha ley violentó el proceso natural de formación, ya que, la impugnada, permite la creación de monopolios y para ello debe contarse con la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados; al contrario, dicha ley fue aprobada por una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, con imposibilidad de aprobar leyes que exigen mayoría calificada de votos. Por lo anterior, solicitan se declare proceden e inconstitucional las normas accionadas por los recurrentes (ver folios 130-198 del expediente virtual).

6.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de esta Sala a las 15:16 horas del 2 de marzo de 2016, Alejandro Salas Blanco, en su condición de Alcalde de Zarcero, solicita que se le aclare si es cierta la suspensión de cualquier resolución pendiente contra los vehículos Seetaxi (folio 199).

7.- Por escrito presentado a las 13:06 horas del 04 de marzo de 2016, Gilbert Rojas Rojas en su condición de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad Transportistas Naranjeños Unidos Sociedad Anónima, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, legitimado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Indica que la empresa Transportistas Naranjeños Unidos Sociedad Anónima se constituyó desde el seis de mayo de dos mil cuatro y dentro de sus objetivos se pactó el siguiente: "...La sociedad tendrá por objeto el comercio en general incluido el transporte de personas y de mercadería. A partir de este año, nuestra empresa se empezó a desempeñar en la actividad del transporte de personas bajo la modalidad de contrato de porteo, según lo disponía el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio. El día 07 de julio de 2011 se publica en la Gaceta, la ley ahora impugnada, Ley número 8955, que eliminó la palabra "personas" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y en su lugar dispuso crear el Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi. Cuando fue aprobada la ley cuestionada, el legislador incluyó tres transitorios, con el fin de separar la aplicación futura de la reforma a la Ley No. 7966 en sus artículos 2 y 29, para aquellos "porteadores" que a la hora de la publicación de la misma, pudieran demostrar que habían estado ejerciendo el transporte privado de personas apegados a lo establecido en el artículo 323 siguientes y concordantes del Código de Comercio, esto con la finalidad de proteger de alguna forma, los derechos adquiridos por éstos. De forma tal que la norma contemplada en la reforma a la Ley No. 7969 mediante la Ley No. 8955, se aplicase para aquellas personas que posteriormente desearan realizar el Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi, y para aquéllos que se venían dedicándose a esta actividad económica y que debían ser trasladados al servicio privado de transporte de personas al servicio de transporte público remunerado de personas, ya sea en su condición de "sedanes" o mediante microbuses. El primer transitorio de la ley impugnada, número 8955, contiene una autorización temporal para que los antiguos porteadores continuaran brindando el servicio de transporte. Esta facultad o permiso para que los antiguos "porteadores" entraran a formar parte del Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi, se concedía a quienes quisieran acreditar esta condición y a cambio se les autorizaría por periodos de tres años, "prorrogables", según texto expreso de la ley, por lo que en adelante ya no realizaríamos una actividad de porteo sino de permiso especial estable de taxi, conocido como S.E.E.T.A.X.I. De conformidad con la reforma legal, la empresa TRANSPORTISTAS NARANJEÑOS UNIDOS SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, en su condición de "porteadores", presentó los requisitos de rigor, contemplados en la referida Ley N° 8955, y así, por medio del acuerdo 5.1.5 de la Sesión Ordinaria N° 34-2012 de la Junta Directiva del Consejo de Transporte Público, se autorizó la acreditación para operar esta nueva modalidad de servicio público, también conocida con las siglas "S.E.E.T.A.X.l.", bajo el permiso número 30, el cual les permitió la utilización de treinta y nueve (39) unidades en el Cantón de Naranjo de Alajuela, a partir de julio del año 2012. A partir de los actos formales de habilitación del Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi, dictaminados en su oportunidad por el Estado costarricense, cada uno de los treinta y nueve conductores afiliados a la empresa inició sus operaciones a derecho, a partir del mes de julio del año dos mil doce. No obstante lo anterior, durante el año 2015 (fecha de vencimiento de los permisos), el Consejo de Transporte Público, interpretó y decidió que era admisible la prórroga de los permisos por una única vez, pero que la misma debía limitarse a un máximo del treinta por ciento (30%) de las concesiones autorizadas por cada base de operación de los taxis autorizados (taxis "rojos"). De esta forma, mediante sesión ordinaria número 37-2015, celebrada el 1 de julio de 2015, se conoció y aprobó integralmente el oficio DAJ 2015-002164, el cual, además de admitir la prórroga dejaba claro que se limitaba la prórroga, pero con un límite del 30% por cada base de operación de los taxis "rojos" o concesiones autorizadas. Como consecuencia de la interpretación anterior, siendo que en el cantón de Naranjo de Alajuela existen 50 taxis concesionados, al aplicarse el porcentaje del 30%, la cifra por prorrogar ascendió a tan solo quince unidades. O sea, que de 39 permisos que tenía nuestra empresa, se pasó a 15 para todo el cantón, lo que implicó que esos 15 permisos se debían de repartir entre dos empresas, lo cual significaba, que a favor de su empresa solamente se autorizaron siete permisos y no treinta y nueve como tenía. Debido a lo anterior, mediante resolución contenida en el artículo 7.1.11, sesión ordinaria número 49-2015 del 20 de agosto de 2015 del Consejo de Transporte Público, rechazó la solicitud de prórroga del permiso de servicio especial estable de taxi de la empresa representada, por las razones que en su momento les fue notificado, al impedirse la prórroga y al no estar vigente el transporte privado de personas debido a la existencia de la ley ahora impugnada, están en una situación de ilegalidad que les impide realizar la actividad de transporte, por lo que definitivamente la ley impugnada, y que reformó al artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, les está provocando graves perjuicios. Es más, desde el 01 de octubre del 2015, se giraron instrucciones precisas a la Policía de Tránsito para que retiren los documentos o códigos que utilizaban, por cuanto se consideró que los mismos habían vencido desde el 07 de julio de 2015. De acuerdo con la anterior descripción, la citada empresa, como organización que ha tenido dentro de sus objetivos la actividad del porteo, es titular de un interés legítimo. Esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, impugna y solicita la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley No. 8955 que corresponde a la "Reforma a la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, de 30 de abril de 1964 y de la Ley No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi 22 de diciembre de 1999. Al igual que los recurrentes, esta parte valora que la ley citada, es contraria a los artículos 7, 28, 39, 41, 45, 46, 129 v 140 de la Constitución Política y los principios de jerarquía normativa, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, iniciativa privada, libertad de comercio, libertad contractual y libre elección de los consumidores, como lo indican los recurrentes y a continuación me permito esbozar algunos comentarios sobre aspectos relacionados con las infracciones inconstitucionales acusadas. Sobre la violación al artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, coincide con el recurrente en el sentido de que la normativa impugnada, dispuso la creación de un monopolio público sin una mayoría legislativa calificada, lo cual es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. La ley cuestionada expresamente estableció que el Estado es el titular exclusivo del transporte de personas y prohibió el contrato de porteo. En efecto, según modificación introducida al artículo 2 de la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad Taxi, N.° 7969 del 22 de diciembre de 1999:" El transporte remunerado de personas, que se realiza por medio de autobuses, busetas, microbuses, taxis, automóviles y cualquier otro tipo de vehículo automotor, ya sea que se ofrezca al público en general, a personas usuarias o a grupos determinados de personas usuarias con necesidades específicas que constituyen demandas especiales, es un servicio público del cual es titular el Estado. Lo anterior independientemente del grado de intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo del servicio o en su fiscalización. [...].". Bajo el argumento de considerar el interés público que involucra supuestamente toda la actividad del transporte remunerado de personas, el legislador optó por declararlo como servicio público, independientemente de la modalidad de que se trate y del grado de intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo o de su fiscalización. Sin duda alguna, la circunstancia de que toda la actividad del transporte remunerado de personas fue declarado "servicio público" y la consecuente eliminación de la figura jurídica del porteo de personas, sustituida por la figura "servicio especial estable de taxi", significa una flagrante violación a derechos constitucionales. Al regular, mediante la figura de la concesión, esta actividad económica, se eliminó por completo la iniciativa privada y se dejó como única alternativa de explotación, los supuestos previstos en la ley. Con ello, la calificación de servicio público para cualquier tipo de transporte privado de personas resulta contrario al artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesario que la ley sea aprobada por al menos 38 diputados (mayoría calificada). Y en este sentido, la Ley No. 8955, fue aprobada en una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, carente de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos. Como bien se indica en los escritos de interposición de la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado, se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja expresamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad del porteo, al eliminar la palabra "persona" en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores". A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se declara servicio público, una actividad que se regulaba bajo normas del derecho mercantil, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entro lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento. Por tanto, por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se expone en la presente acción, con la Ley 8955, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas, aspecto que no existía antes de la promulgación de esa normativa. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, por cuanto se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Concretamente, considera que existe violación del artículo 208 bis del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, por cuanto el texto legal impugnado, contiene materia de contratación pública, así como la apertura de un monopolio, dos de los supuestos en los que no se puede aplicar dicho artículo del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, lo que pone en peligro la seguridad jurídica, el principio de inderogabilidad singular de los reglamentos y el principio de legalidad. Como se ha explicado, la ley impugnada, creó un modelo nuevo de transporte público (S.E.E.T.A.X.I.) empleando una figura semejante a la concesión pública, lo cual implica la creación de un monopolio estatal. En su criterio, no procedía la aprobación de dicha norma por medio de la vía legislativa abreviada. Sobre la violación al artículo 28 de la Constitución Política, indica que este artículo establece límites materiales a la actuación estatal y un principio derivado de dicha norma es el "orden jurídico de libertad" que orienta nuestra Carta Fundamental. De acuerdo con este artículo, se le permite al legislador incursionar únicamente en la regulación de las acciones privadas que puedan dañar la moral, el orden público o los derechos de terceros. Relativo al concepto de acciones privadas excluidas por su naturaleza de la intromisión estatal, resulta cierto que las actividades monopolizadas (transporte privado de personas) sea de índole o naturaleza privada, por cuanto, en términos generales, se trata simplemente de operaciones mercantiles entre personas, que pactan un simple servicio de transporte y que bien pueden llevarse a cabo por éstos mediante el sistema de libre contratación, intercambio y regulación mínima (economías de mercado). En términos simples, con la declaratoria de servicio público a cualquier tipo de transporte de personas y la eliminación de la figura del porteo se interfirió en el ámbito de la libertad particular, pues no estriba la necesidad de que en este tipo de transporte exista intervención estatal. Incluso, se torna irracional y desproporcionado que para el transporte de mercancías no exista regulación estatal, mientras que para convenir un transporte de personas, si exista una clara interferencia por parte de los poderes públicos. De otro lado, resulta contradictorio, que la propia Sala Constitucional –cuya jurisprudencia es vinculante erga omnes - también se pronunció respecto de la vigencia y constitucionalidad del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, que regulaba el "porteo de personas", en aquél momento. Mediante sentencia n.° 2004-3580, de las 14:43 horas del 14 de abril del 2004, la Sala estableció claramente la diferencia entre el servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas y el contrato de transporte regulado en el Código de Comercio, conocido como "contrato de porteo”, señalando: "Sobre los porteadores en el Código de Comercio y el transporte como servicio público. El artículo 323 del Código de Comercio establece lo siguiente: [...] El porteador o transportista es un auxiliar mercantil. El contrato de transporte regulado en la legislación mercantil tiene como finalidad regular el traslado de personas mercaderías y otros bienes. Es un contrato comercial importante para la economía de un país, pues sirve de enlace entre el productor o el comercializador de bienes y servicios con el consumidor final. Nació como necesidad de los mercantes de trasladarse de un lugar a otro con o sin sus bienes de comercio de modo que en principio sirvió como un instrumento de transporte del mercader en su actividad. Si bien, la doctrina no utiliza los medios de transporte para hacer una clasificación del porteador puede decirse que existe la forma terrestre (como sería en una carreta, o vehículo de carga o ferrocarril), acuática (panga, falúa o crucero trasatlántico) y aérea (planeador, avioneta o avión a propulsión), admitiéndose incluso que se lleve a cabo mediante la fuerza del hombre, la de un animal de carga o de un vehículo motorizado. Pero dada su amplia diversidad e importancia económica para el país, existen áreas reguladas por el Estado en atención a la protección del interés general, declarando algunas formas como servicio público. Por ello resulta ser una figura contractual muy restringida y resulta necesario identificar el origen del contrato de transporte para determinar si se trata de un acuerdo comercial o si se dirige a satisfacer una actividad que el Estado declaró servicio público. Si es esto último, no puede ocupar el lugar de actividades previamente regladas normativamente como lo sería por ejemplo, el transporte aéreo, que la reguló mediante la Ley No. 5150, Ley General de Aviación Civil, en cuyo caso para ofrecerlo un particular, sea persona física o jurídica, debe ostentar un certificado de explotación para transporte aéreo. De igual modo los servicios de carga, los ferroviarios, y marítimos, podrían estar en esta categoría contractual, pero, si la trascendencia que tienen para la sociedad va más allá de la satisfacción de una necesidad privada, ello determinará la legitimidad estatal en la promulgación de normas de orden público. De este modo, en el caso de transporte de personas depende de cómo se origina la relación contractual, la actividad resulta ilícita si se dirige a satisfacer una necesidad del público en general, suplantando así a los concesionarios de transporte público, en cuyo caso el Decreto Ejecutivo acierta en considerado una actividad al margen de la ley. Es precisamente aquí donde radica el problema planteado por el accionante pues sostiene que no se le permite llevar a cabo los diversos contratos de transporte de personas, con lo que interfiere en su libre voluntad y su libertad contractual. Pero el hecho jurídico relevante en discusión es el traslado de personas a cambio de un precio, con sus pertenencias o no, como una actividad irrestricta, cuando desde la promulgación de la Ley No. 3503 y luego la de la Ley No. 7593, se ha declarado como servicio público el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad taxi, y consecuentemente ello convirtió al contrato de porte en una actividad limitada y residual. En igual sentido la Procuraduría General de la República, mediante dictamen número 043 del 20/03/2013, admitió la existencia del contrato mercantil de transporte de personas. Como se aprecia de lo anterior, en los pronunciamientos y sentencia transcrita, el contrato de porte, en su modalidad de transporte de personas, constituía una actividad limitada y residual, resultando ilegal, por ejemplo, que los porteadores transitaran por las vías públicas negociando casualmente u ofertando sus servicios coincidentemente con el servicio público de taxis, o en busca de la demanda de transporte de pasajeros en la vía pública. Sin embargo, con la reforma introducida y ahora impugnada tales conceptos y pronunciamientos fueron eliminados y la posibilidad de contratar libremente se vio seriamente disminuida, lo cual atenta en buena medida con el artículo 28 Constitucional. Sobre la violación al artículo 7 de la Constitución, indica que la ley cuestionada además transgrede la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política. El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se podía excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transporte privado. Siendo que Costa Rica, para el momento de la aprobación del tratado (Diciembre 2007), contaba con servicios privados de transporte de personas, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una Ley que hubiera establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. En el Capítulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual, la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un Acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el "trato nacional" que se tenía al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Con la ley que se impugna, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), transgrediendo la Asamblea Legislativa, el tratado y con ello atribuyéndose una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales. Algunos aducen que la posibilidad de prohibir del porteo y de convertir todo transporte remunerado de personas como un servicio público, fue reservada por Costa Rica en las medidas disconformes incluidas en el Anexo I. Sin embargo, consideramos cuestionable tal argumento, por lo siguiente: 1) Lo reservado en el Anexo 1 del Tratado, según Lista de Costa Rica, en lo referente a Transporte por Vía Terrestre - Transporte de Pasajeros, se refiere únicamente a leyes y reglamentos vigentes al momento de la suscripción del Tratado, que resultan disconformes con lo pactado y que Costa Rica desea mantener. Tampoco podemos interpretar que Costa Rica se reservó o sector económico o la actividad del transporte en general como una medida disconforme. La ley impugnada fue promulgada años después de la aprobación del Tratado, por lo que debe interpretarse como "medidas nuevas" que no fueron previstas en el Tratado y que en consecuencia resultan contrarias a este convenio. 2) De otro lado, según el Tratado, ningún Estado Parte podrá incrementar el grado de disconformidad de sus medidas existentes reservadas y cualquier reforma a alguna de ellas no podrá disminuir su grado de conformidad. La cuestionada, no solamente establece una medida nueva -eliminación del contrato de porteo- sino que además representa una modificación que incrementa la restricción existente sobre Transporte Público, lo cual definitivamente está prohibido por el tratado. 3) En el anexo II del Tratado, tampoco Costa Rica hizo reserva o anotó disconformidad sobre algún sector específico a fin de imponer futuras medidas o regulaciones. Específicamente Costa Rica no hizo reserva alguna sobre el transporte remunerado de personas en el Anexo II, por lo que la reforma legal cuestionada resulta restrictiva y contraria al acuerdo comercial en estudio. Un ejemplo de lo anterior lo encontramos en los sectores de Salud y Educación, donde Costa Rica, permite la iniciativa privada y únicamente están regulados no estatizados o monopolizados. No hay duda que estamos frente a una reforma interna, realizada por Costa Rica, que afecta o transgredió el tratado comentado. Solicita se declare con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955, "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de 1999" por violación de los artículos: 28, 39, 41, 45. 46, 129 v 140 de la Constitución Política y los principios de jerarquía normativa, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, iniciativa privada, libertad de comercio, libertad contractual y libre elección de los consumidores.

8.- Por escrito presentado a las 13:36 horas del 02 de marzo de 2016, Wilbert Navarro Cordero en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de Transportes Privados Marvey Sociedad Anónima, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, la empresa Transportes Privados Marvey Sociedad Anónima, se ha dedicado al transporte privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2008 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde el 2005 como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediante contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servicio, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio vigente antes de su reforma reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana, y Centroamérica, aprobado en diciembre del 2007, ubicada en la clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de 1999, se elimina la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea dentro de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi, N° 7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado por permisos de operación dados por el Estado. Obligándosenos a subsistir en la realización de nuestra labor bajo esta nueva figura con un permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a nosotros afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 07 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido nuestros permisos de operación reactivamos nuestro servicio nuevamente como "porteadores privados" haciendo uso de nuestras bases operativas en los cantones donde brindamos el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicio de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores. Servicio que venimos prestando ininterrumpidamente en los Cantones de San Marcos de Tarrazú y Santa María de Dota, de la Provincia de San José, Costa Rica, haciendo uso de las bases de operación en esos cantones desde el año 2005, y uso de las patentes municipales y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capítulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase: 6431: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas, es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos. Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como lo indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento. Por tanto, por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se expone en la presente acción, con la Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política. El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transporte privado, ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi. En el Capítulo ll "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el "trato nacional" que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores". Con esta misma ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución, su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales. Consideran que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales. Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.

9.- Por escrito presentado a las 09:20 horas del 07 de marzo de 2016, Byron Rodolfo Marcos Marcos en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad Porteadores León Trece SJT Sociedad Anónima, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, la empresa PORTEADORES LEON TRECE SJ.T. SOCIEDAD ANONIMA, se ha dedicado al transporte privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2005 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde el 1995 como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediantes contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servicio, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del código de comercio vigente antes de su reforma , reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el tratado de Libre Comercio con carretera (porteo). Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de 1999, se elimina la palabra "persona "del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transpone remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N° 7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado por permisos de operación dados por el estado. Obligándoseles a subsistir en la realización de su labor bajo esta nueva figura con permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a nosotros afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 7 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido los permisos de operación reactivaron el servicio nuevamente como "porteadores privados" haciendo uso de nuestras las operativas en los cantones donde brindan el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicios de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores. Servicio que vienen prestando ininterrumpidamente en el Cantón de San José, de la Provincia de San José, Costa Rica, haciendo usos de la base de operación en ese cantón desde el año 2005, y uso de la patente municipal y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capitulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios " del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase: 6431: servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos. Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como la indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento. Por tanto, indica que por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se expone en la presente acción, con la Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política. El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transpone privado. Ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi. En el Capítulo II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el "trato nacional" que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores". Con esta misma Ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales. Considera que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales. Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.

10.- Por escrito presentado a las 09:28 horas del 07 de marzo de 2016, Roberth Rodríguez Hernández en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad SE M TRA SAN RAFAEL SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, la empresa SE M TRA SAN RAFAEL SOCIEDAD ANONIMA, se ha dedicado al transpone privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2005 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde el 1995 como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediantes contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servicio, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del código de comercio vigente antes de su reforma , reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el tratado de Libre Comercio con carretera (porteo). Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de1999, se elimina la palabra "persona "del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N° 7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado por permisos de operación dados por el Estado. Obligándoseles a subsistir en la realización de su labor bajo esta nueva figura con permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a ellos afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 7 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido sus permisos de operación reactivaron su servicio nuevamente como " portadores privados" haciendo uso de las bases operativas en los cantones donde brindan el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicios de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores, servicio que vienen prestando ininterrumpidamente en el Cantón de San Rafael, de la Provincia de Heredia, Costa Rica , haciendo usos de la base de operación en ese cantón desde el año 2005, y uso de la patente municipal y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capitulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios del tratado de libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase: 6431: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos. Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este articulo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como la indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento. Por tanto, indica que por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se expone en la presente acción, con la Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política. El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transporte privado. Ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi. En el Capítulo II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el “trato nacional” que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores". Con esta misma Ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales. Consideran que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales. Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.

11.- Por escrito presentado a las 09:37 horas del 07 de marzo de 2016, Edwin Gerardo Zamora Salas en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad TRANSPORTES PRIVADOS HNOS ZAMORA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, la empresa TRANSPORTES PRIVADOS HNOS ZAMORA SOCIEDAD ANONIMA, se ha dedicado al transporte privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2010 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde el 2003, como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediantes contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servicio, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del código de comercio vigente antes de su reforma , reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el tratado de Libre Comercio con carretera (porteo). Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transpone remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de1999, se elimina la palabra "persona "del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N° 7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado por permisos de operación dados por el estado. Obligándoseles a subsistir en la realización de su labor bajo esta nueva figura con permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a ellos afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 7 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido sus permisos de operación reactivaron su servicio nuevamente como "porteadores privados" haciendo uso de las bases operativas en los cantones donde brindamos el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicios de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores. Servicio que venimos prestando ininterrumpidamente en el Cantón de Poas, de la Provincia de Alajuela, Costa Rica, haciendo usos de la base de operación en ese cantón desde el año 2010, y uso de la patente municipal y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capitulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios "del tratado de libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase 6431. Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regula res de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos. Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como la indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento. Por tanto, indica que por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se expone en la presente acción, con la Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política. El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transpone privado. Ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi. En el Capítulo II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el “trato nacional” que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores". Con esta misma Ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales. Consideran que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales. Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.

12.- Por escrito presentado a las 09:39 horas del 07 de marzo de 2016, Irma Isabel Loría Araya en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad de SERVICIO DE TRANSPORTES PRIVADOS LUMA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, la empresa SERVICIO DE TRANSPORTES PRIVADOS LUMA. SOCIEDAD ANONIMA, se ha dedicado al transporte privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2007 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde el 2005, como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediante contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servicio, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del código de comercio vigente antes de su reforma , reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el tratado de Libre Comercio con carretera (porteo). Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de 1999, se elimina la palabra "persona "del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N°7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado por permisos de operación dados por el estado. Obligándoseles a subsistir en la realización de su labor bajo esta nueva figura con permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a ellos afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 7 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido sus permisos de operación reactivaron su servicio nuevamente como "porteadores privados" haciendo uso de las bases operativas en los cantones donde brindamos el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicios de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores. Servicio que vienen prestando ininterrumpidamente en el Cantón de Cañas, de la Provincia de Guanacaste, Costa Rica, haciendo usos de la base de operación en ese cantón desde el año 2007, y uso de la patente municipal y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capitulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios "del tratado de libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase 6431. Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regula res de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos. Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como la indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento. Por tanto, indica que por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se expone en la presente acción, con la Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política. El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transpone privado. Ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi. En el Capítulo II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el “trato nacional” que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores". Con esta misma Ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales. Consideran que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales. Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.

13.- Por escrito presentado a las 13:09 horas del 07 de marzo de 2016, Carlos Rigoberto Solís Castro en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad Transportes CR Porteadores Sociedad Anónima, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, la empresa TRANSPORTES CR PORTEADORES SOCIEDAD ANONIMA, se ha dedicado al transporte privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2006 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde el 2005 como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediantes contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servicio, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del código de comercio vigente antes de su reforma, reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el tratado de Libre Comercio con carretera (porteo). Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de 1999, se elimina la palabra "persona "del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N° 7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado v regulado por permisos de operación dados por el estado. Obligándoseles a subsistir en la realización de la labor bajo esta nueva figura con permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a ellos afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 7 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido los permisos de operación reactivaron el servicio nuevamente como “porteadores privados" haciendo uso de las bases operativas en los cantones donde brindan el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicios de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores. Servicio que vienen prestando ininterrumpidamente en el Cantón de Valverde Vega, de la Provincia de Alajuela, Costa Rica, haciendo usos de la base de operación en ese cantón desde el año 2006, y uso de la patente municipal y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capitulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios "del tratado de libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase 6431. Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regula res de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos. Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como la indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento. Por tanto, indica que por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se expone en la presente acción, con la Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política. El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transpone privado. Ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi. En el Capítulo II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el “trato nacional” que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores". Con esta misma Ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales. Consideran que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales. Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.

14.- Por escrito presentado a las 10:03 horas del 07 de marzo de 2016, Luis Enrique Moreno Carmona en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad Unión de Porteadores LÑMC dos mil seis sociedad anónima, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, la empresa UNIÓN DE PORTEADORES LÑMC DOS MIL SEIS SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, se ha dedicado al transporte privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2006 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde el 2000 como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediantes contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servicio, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del código de comercio vigente antes de su reforma, reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el tratado de Libre Comercio con carretera (porteo). Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de 1999, se elimina la palabra "persona "del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N° 7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado por permisos de operación dados por el estado. Obligándoseles a subsistir en la realización de su labor bajo esta nueva figura con permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a ellos afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 7 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido los permisos de operación reactivaron el servicio nuevamente como “porteadores privados" haciendo uso de las bases operativas en los cantones donde brindan el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicios de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores. Servicio que venían prestando ininterrumpidamente en el Cantón de Santa Cruz, de la Provincia de Guanacaste, Costa Rica, haciendo usos de la base de operación en ese cantón desde el año 2006, y uso de la patente municipal y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capitulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios "del tratado de libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase 6431. Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regula res de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos. Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este articulo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como la indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento. Por tanto, indica que por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se expone en la presente acción, con la Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política. El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transpone privado. Ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi. En el Capítulo II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el “trato nacional” que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores". Con esta misma Ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales. Consideran que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales. Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.

15.- La Procuraduría General de la República rindió su informe por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de esta Sala a las 14:30 horas del 7 de marzo de 2016 (folio 310 del expediente). Sobre el fondo del asunto, señala que los accionantes consideran que la Ley n.° 8955, es inconstitucional por crear un monopolio público en materia de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos modalidad taxi, sin seguir el procedimiento legislativo establecido para tales efectos (votación calificada) y por violentar el Tratado de Libre Comercio con los Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica. Sobre el particular, considera la Procuraduría General de la República que no llevan razón los accionantes en sus reparos y, por el contrario, no es cierto que la ley impugnada infrinja las normas y principios constitucionales indicados. Explica que el transporte remunerado de personas, en sus diversas modalidades, constituye un servicio público. En efecto, la Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores, n.° 3503 del 10 de mayo de 1965, califica al transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores colectivos como un servicio público regulado, controlado y vigilado por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, cuya prestación puede ser delegada en los particulares a quienes se autorice expresamente, de acuerdo con las normas establecidas en esa ley (artículos 1 y 2). En el mismo sentido, asegura que la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, n.° 7969 del 22 de diciembre de 1999, definió a este medio de transporte como un servicio público que se explota mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa, con los procedimientos especiales establecidos en esta ley y su reglamento (artículo 2). E indica que mediante la reforma introducida al artículo 2 de la Ley 7969, precisamente por el artículo 2 de la Ley 8955, del 16 de junio del 2011, se establece como servicio público el transporte remunerado de personas en cualquier tipo de vehículo automotor. Ahora bien, indica que el concepto de servicio público no es estático sino que, por el contrario, se trata de un concepto cambiante, pues depende de la calificación que realice el legislador de una actividad económica en un momento histórico determinado. La “publicatio” es, precisamente, la declaratoria constitucional o legal que define una actividad como servicio público. Esta declaratoria puede consistir, simplemente, en la definición de la actividad como de interés público, o bien, en la calificación expresa de la actividad como servicio público. Por su parte, aduce que la Procuraduría General de la República, en relación con el concepto y las notas características de los servicios públicos, ha señalado que, según la doctrina francesa y española, el servicio público es una actividad administrativa que tiene por objeto la prestación de un servicio público a fin de satisfacer una necesidad colectiva. Asimismo, afirma que el servicio público tiene tres características: actividad propia de la Administración; procura una prestación a la población; y garantiza dicha prestación de forma efectiva. Ante ello, anota que el servicio público es propio de la Administración, sin excluir la posibilidad de participación de los particulares en la gestión pública; mediante la concesión de un servicio público. Indica, de acuerdo con la doctrina española, que el servicio público en su acepción estricta, constituye una variedad de la actividad administrativa a fin de poner en disposición de los particulares las prestaciones que le sean útiles; e indica que supone la decisión del poder público de garantizar dicha prestación –publicatio-. Explica que el servicio se caracteriza por tener titularidad pública –sustraída de la iniciativa privada-; y la prestación que satisfaga los intereses generales de la comunidad, a fin de asegurar a la población una digna calidad de vida. Ante lo cual, indica que la naturaleza pública presupone la declaratoria por parte del poder público; y señala que es posible la participación de sujetos no estatales en dicha prestación, en tanto obtengan la autorización del Estado. En relación a los efectos de la declaratoria de una determinada actividad como servicio público, asegura que, en primer lugar implica su nacionalización -atribuyéndole al Estado su titularidad, de forma tal que solo éste o un particular autorizado, puede brindar el servicio-; y en segundo lugar, dicha actividad sale del comercio de los hombres, siendo que los particulares sólo pueden dedicarse a ella mediante concesiones o permisos estatales. Ahora bien, indica que, en relación al transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores –en sus distintas modalidades autobuses y taxi-, no cabe ninguna duda de que constituye un servicio público; siendo que por medio de la ley impugnada, el legislador, dentro del marco permitido por la Constitución Política, optó por declarar como servicio público toda la actividad del transporte remunerado de personas, en atención a la trascendencia que dicha actividad tiene para la sociedad costarricense. En efecto, apunta que, según la modificación introducida por la citada ley a la Ley n.° 7969, el transporte remunerado de personas, independientemente del tipo de vehículo automotor que se utilice, de las personas a las que vaya dirigido –ya sea que se ofrezca al público en general o a personas usuarias de grupos determinados- y de la intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo o fiscalización, constituye un servicio público. Y expresa que, en consecuencia, a partir de la vigencia de la Ley n.° 8955, ninguna persona particular –física o jurídica- puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva –concesión o permiso- conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Ahora bien, por su naturaleza de servicio público, es lógico que el servicio remunerado de personas deba ser brindado por el Estado con carácter de monopolio; empero, bien puede ser delegado en particulares mediante concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate. Cita varios precedentes constitucionales y apunta que este Tribunal reconoce que los servicios públicos, por su naturaleza, deben ser brindados por el Estado en condiciones de monopolio. No obstante, reconoce que puedan ser asumidos por particulares, vía concesión o permiso, tal y como lo autorizan las leyes que regulan el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas. Por otra parte, explica que tampoco llevan razón los accionantes en el sentido de que la ley impugnada crea un monopolio público a favor del Estado y que, por tal razón, debió ser aprobada con mayoría calificada (38 votos). E insiste que, lo que la ley en cuestión hace es declarar toda la actividad del transporte remunerado de personas como servicio público y tal regulación sí podía delegarse en una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena. Inclusive, ya la Sala Constitucional avaló la constitucionalidad del procedimiento seguido en la aprobación de la Ley aquí impugnada, mediante la resolución número 2011-04778; y aprecia que al analizar la constitucionalidad del proyecto de ley que dio lugar a la ley aquí impugnada, fue categórica en afirmar, primero, que no crea ningún monopolio ni práctica monopolística, segundo, que el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política no crea una reserva de ley agravada para la imposición de regulaciones o límites a la libertad de comercio y, tercero, que sí resultaba procedente la delegación de un proyecto de ley de tal naturaleza en una la Comisión con Potestad Plena Legislativa. Finalmente, explica que tampoco es cierto que la Ley impugnada violente el Tratado de Libre Comercio con los Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica y, en particular, el Capítulo 11 de dicho Tratado, al restringir la posibilidad de servicio de transporte privado y con ello la obligación de ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el trato nacional que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Sobre el particular, la Procuraduría considera que el Capítulo 11 del Tratado en referencia, no resulta aplicable en tratándose de servicios públicos. Y así lo puso de manifiesto mediante la Opinión Jurídica n.° 111-2015, del 25 de setiembre del 2015, al evacuar una consulta formulada por un señor Diputado sobre la posible autorización de la empresa UBER. En lo que interesa, la Procuraduría indicó que dicho Tratado, en el Capítulo Once, regula lo referente al “Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios” y la figura jurídica de “trato nacional”; aprecia que el mismo Tratado de Libre Comercio en referencia, de manera expresa, establece que el Capítulo Once, referente al Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios, no aplica en el caso de servicios suministrados en el ejercicio de facultades gubernamentales, definiendo como tales “(…) todo servicio que no se suministre en condiciones comerciales ni en competencia con uno o varios proveedores de servicios.” Por lo cual, a juicio de la Procuraduría, no cabe duda que los servicios públicos y en particular el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, en sus diferentes modalidades, en razón de su nacionalización, le competen al Estado y solo éste o las personas a las que expresamente autorice, podrían brindarlo. En efecto, el servicio en cuestión no puede ser brindado a la libre por las personas físicas o jurídicas interesadas, pues se requiere, necesariamente, de una autorización previa –concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de transporte de que se trate- de parte del Consejo de Transporte Público. Asimismo, apunta que tampoco resulta aplicable en la especie la figura jurídica del “trato nacional”, consagrada en el numeral 11.2.1 del referido Tratado de Libre Comercio. La limitante o requisito de contar con una autorización previa de parte del Consejo de Transporte Público para brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, se impone en razón de la naturaleza pública del servicio y no con ocasión de la nacionalidad de la persona o empresa que pretenda brindarlo. En otras palabras, la limitante para brindar el servicio alcanza tanto a las personas físicas o jurídicas nacionales como a las extranjeras, de modo que no hay discriminación alguna en razón de la nacionalidad de la empresa interesada. E indica que, las cláusulas establecidas en el Capítulo 11 del CAFTA no resultan aplicables al servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, toda vez que el mismo Tratado, concretamente en el artículo 11.1.6, excluye de su aplicación los servicios que se brindan en ejercicio de las facultades gubernamentales. Y no cabe duda que los servicios públicos y en particular el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, en sus diferentes modalidades, en razón de su nacionalización, le competen al Estado y solo éste o las personas a las que expresamente autorice podrían brindarlo. Solicita que se declare sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad, en virtud de que no aprecia roce constitucional alguno en la Ley cuestionada.

16.- Según constancia al folio 489 no aparece que el Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes haya presentado escrito o documento alguno, para la audiencia conferida (folio 489 del expediente digital).

17.- Por medio de escrito presentado a las 11:10 horas del 8 de marzo de 2016, Byron Rojas en su condición de porteador se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo indicando que existe una terrible persecución de parte de la policía de tránsito a los porteadores, sin embargo, el asunto ya no solo afecta a las personas que se dedican a manejar un vehículo, sino que es cuestión de trabajo de muchas personas y sus familias. Indica que existe una evidente problemática laboral en personas mayores de 35 años, situación que incrementa el porcentaje de desempleo pues muchas empresas transnacionales se van del país. Solicita que con la mayor brevedad se dicte la sentencia de la acción de inconstitucionalidad planteada.

18.- Por escrito presentado a las 11:09 horas del 08 de marzo de 2016, Carlos Luis Montero Martínez en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad Corporación Manuel Antonio Travel Sociedad Anónima, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos -, ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, la empresa CORPORACION MANUEL ANTONIO TRAVEL SOCIEDAD ANONIMA, se ha dedicado al transporte privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2005 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde 1995 como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediantes contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servido, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del código de comercio vigente antes de su reforma , reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el tratado de Libre Comercio con carretera (porteo). Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de 1999, se elimina la palabra "persona "del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N°7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado por permisos de operación dados por el estado. Obligándoseles a subsistir en la realización de su labor bajo esta nueva figura con permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a ellos afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 7 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido los permisos de operación reactivaron el servicio nuevamente como " porteadores privados" haciendo uso de las bases operativas en los cantones donde brindan el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicios de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores. Servicio que han venido prestando ininterrumpidamente en el Cantón de Aguirre-Quepos, de la Provincia de Puntarenas, Costa Rica, haciendo usos de la base de operación en ese cantón desde el año 2005, y uso de la patente municipal y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capitulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios "del tratado de libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase 6431. Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regula res de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos. Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como la indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento. Por tanto, indica que por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se expone en la presente acción, con la Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política. El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transpone privado. Ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi. En el Capítulo II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el “trato nacional” que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente se puede ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores". Con esta misma ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales. Consideran que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales. Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.

19.- Por escrito presentado a las 16:40 horas del 08 de marzo de 2016, José Alexis Lara Jiménez, en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad Transportes Unidos RUALFA Sociedad Anónima, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, la sociedad Unión Nacional de Porteadores- UNAPORTE, se ha dedicado al transporte privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2004 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde el 2002 como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediantes contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servido, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del código de comercio vigente antes de su reforma, reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el tratado de Libre Comercio con carretera (porteo). Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de 1999, se elimina la palabra "persona "del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N°7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado por permisos de operación dados por el Estado. Obligándoles a subsistir en la realización de su labor bajo esta nueva figura con permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a ellos afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 7 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido los permisos de operación reactivaron el servicio nuevamente como "porteadores privados" haciendo uso de las bases operativas en los cantones donde brindan el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicios de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores. Servicio que han venido prestando ininterrumpidamente en el Cantón de Alfaro Ruiz, de la Provincia de Alajuela, Costa Rica, haciendo usos de la base de operación en ese cantón desde el año 2004, y uso de la patente municipal y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capitulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios "del tratado de libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase 6431. Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos. Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este articulo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como la indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento. Por tanto, indica que por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se expone en la presente acción, con la Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política. El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transpone privado. Ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una Ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi. En el Capítulo II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el “trato nacional” que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores". Con esta misma Ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales. Consideran que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales. Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan se declare con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.

20.- Por escrito presentado a las 11:06 horas del 08 de marzo de 2016, Maribel Porras Arrieta, Felipe Di Bella Porras y otros, se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, la ley N° 8955, resulta ilegal, esto por cuanto es inconstitucional, el procedimiento de su creación es viciado, contrario a derecho, en el procedimiento del proyecto de ley N° 17874 que a su vez dio origen a la ley 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión legislativa Plena, sin la competencia para aprobar tal ley por imperativo legal del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política de la República de Costa Rica, ya que dicha Comisión y ninguna Comisión puede conocer y aprobar una Ley que requiere de votación de calificada de mayoría (38 votos), por imperativo legal Constitucional, he aquí la inconstitucionalidad de la ley N°8955. La normativa relacionada al porteo y transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad especial estable de taxi, violenta en forma clara y abiertamente los artículos 07, 46, 129, 140 de nuestra Carta Magna, aunado a ello las limitantes que se imponen no derivan solo de la ley sino de los actos administrativos, es como al tenor del artículo 75 de la Ley de jurisdicción constitucional, al día de hoy este asunto de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad especial estable de taxi, se encuentra pendiente de resolver en muchas instancias, existen diversos procesos contenciosos administrativos abiertos, es una cuestión de carácter público por cuanto se ha echado vino en odres viejos y los mismos se han roto. Nuestra Constitución Política consagra el derecho de libertad comercial, ampliamente desarrollado jurisprudencialmente, principios que ha sido violentado con la reforma al numeral 323 del código de comercio, así mismo dicha reforma al artículo 323, deviene contrario sensu a crear un ambiente de equidad y justicia en un Estado democrático Social de Derecho, a más bien crear una lesión colectiva también de doble connotación, antes de la reformas y creación inconstitucional de la ley 8955, la actividad de porteo de personas, más bien tenía un marco jurídico, después de la ley 8955 y leyes y reglamentos conexos se camba de un amparo legal, a un desamparo legal. Efectivamente la Ley N°8955 es contraria al ordenamiento jurídico que le precedía, en concreto el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, la Constitución Política artículo 46, y el Tratado de libre Comercio con Estados Unidos República Dominicana y Centroamérica, la ley N° 8955, restringe la libertad de comercio, al mismo tiempo que irrespeta el principio de supremacía de la realidad y jerarquía de las normas. Nuevamente se tiende al Monopolio del Estado pero en manos de un grupo de taxistas rojos (concesionarios), dicho de otra forma, la ley 7969, pasó el transporte privado de personas a público, de ahí la nueva naturaleza que ha de ser amparada por nuestro ordenamiento jurídico. La ley 8955 modificó y adiciono la ley 7969, que en conjunto con la reforma al artículo 323 del código de Comercio, creó la figura de SEETAXI, lo que constituye el Transporte remunerado de personas como un servicio general y público, lo anterior conlleva a dos escenarios jurídicos, primero: debe declararse inconstitucional la ley N°8955, y por lo consiguiente volver a su estado original el artículo 323 del código de Comercio que permitía el porteo como transporte de personas, esto por cuanto al momento de aprobarse la ley N°8955, no se cumplió con la votación del proyecto de ley por al menos 38 diputados(as), por lo tanto la ley N°8955 se aprobó al margen del Reglamento Interno de la Asamblea Legislativa y en abierta contraposición a la Constitución Política, no debió la Comisión Plena Segunda por mandato expreso constitucional conocer y aprobar la ley N°8955 por otro lado la ley 8955, es totalmente opuesta al Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos República Dominicana y Centroamérica (TLC), este Tratado si cumplió con el formalismo y requisitos legales y al ser ratificado por la Asamblea Legislativa, no solo se integró a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, sino que prevalece sobre el mismo según lo dispone nuestra propia Constitución y el Derecho Internacional, por lo tanto al tenor de la suscripción y aprobación del TLC, se debe ofrecer inclusive al inversionista extranjero el "trato nacional" que existía al momento de suscribir el Tratado, por lo que es válido afirmar que Costa Rica, más bien liberó los servicios entre ellos el transporte privado de personas, con la aprobación del TLC, siendo que Costa Rica se obliga a introducir y respetar dentro del ordenamiento jurídico sus disposiciones, por lo que las mismas deben ser respetadas por el país, lo cual violenta la ya cuestionada ley 8955, por todo lo anterior es claro que existió una miopía jurídica a la hora de emitir la Ley 8955 y la reforma al artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, debido a la premura, se pasó por alto el debido camino de la elaboración de la ley, y se dejó de lado normativa que era y sigue siendo imperante por estar estatuida en Tratados Internacionales, siendo que se debe retrotraer los efectos y reivindicar lo suscrito en el TLC, regresando todo a su estado original , declarando inconstitucional la ley N°8955, y modificando el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio a su estado original como antes de ser modificado por la ley inconstitucional N° 8955. El TLC, determino que no se puede excluir, ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transporte privado, siendo que nuestro país, no estableció reserva de ley al respecto de la actividad comercial de transporte privado de personas por lo cual la ley 8955, es clara y fehacientemente violatoria y opositora al TLC, que fue debidamente ratificado por la Asamblea Legislativa, segundo escenario jurídico, de no declararse la inconstitucionalidad de la ley N°8955, lo cual por sí mismo es un grave error entonces al interpretar auténticamente la ley 8955, se declara de carácter público y por ende abierto el monopolio del transporte de personas en modalidad taxi, siendo que el Estado no debe intervenir en dicha actividad, sino simplemente vigilar y controlar pero de ninguna forma limitar la prestación del servicio, por la naturaleza pública del mismo, conllevando la aplicación del principio de mayorías sobre minorías, es decir: se impone el interés de la colectividad sobre el interés individual, véase lo primero (colectividad) como el interés de un gran sector de la población que requiere del transporte, y lo segundo (individualidad), como el gremio de taxis rojos. El Voto 2011-04778, dispuso que "el servicio de transporte de personas en su totalidad ha sido declarado servicio público". La Ley del 22 de diciembre de 1999, estableció un monopolio en relación al transporte modalidad taxi, contrario a lo que establece el numeral 46 de la constitución Política, la cronología jurídica nos demuestra que las modificaciones al código de Comercio y a la Ley 7969, son inconstitucionales por cuanto ha afectado de manera injusta a muchísimas personas que a lo largo del tiempo habían, y han venido desarrollando esta actividad al apego de la Ley articulo 323 antiguo del código de Comercio, y luego ya durante varios años conforme a la ley 8955, no vemos cual es el impedimento o diferencia en cuanto al Estado delegue en personas físicas o jurídicas la posibilidad de brindar un servicio que originalmente le correspondía, ya sea bajo concesión o permiso especial de SEETAXI, ambas figuras concesión o permiso, buscan de alguna manera un mismo fin, el cual es brindar un servicio al optante que más que un vocablo, concesión o permiso en la práctica da el mismo resultado. El espíritu de la ley en todo caso es establecer un servicio que hoy es una realidad y que esta tutelado de manera equivocada por la ley N°8955, ya que con antelación el Código de Comercio contenía en su numeral 323, la palabra personas, y eso fue lo que elimino el legislador, mediante la normativa 8955, que está revestida de inconstitucionalidad. Son múltiples las razones por las que el Estado Costarricense debe ordenar y garantizar la actividad de SEETAXI, tanto vía administrativa, como jurisprudencial se ha declarado de carácter público, el Transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, en tal sentido véase y sopese lo que indica la opinión jurídica OJ-1 54-2014 de la PGR, afirma que "el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad taxi se considera un servicio público que será explotado mediante concesión o permiso...", entonces priva el interés público al hacerse este pronunciamiento y ha de imponerse sobre los intereses de un gremio particular cual es el gremio de taxistas rojos, en un mismo sentido sí la Autoridad reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, contiene varias definiciones de servicio público, como "toda actividad que por su importancia para el desarrollo sostenible del país sea calificada por la Asamblea Legislativa", lo que conlleva que más que legalidad es realidad, oportunidad y conveniencia, oferta y demanda Sentencia N°51 7-98. ¿Cuál es el obstáculo de que el Estado autorice a un particular a brindar el servicio? ya lo ha hecho durante largo tiempo mediante concesiones por qué no complementar con un permiso especial que sea renovable una vez cumplido el plazo, bajo cumplimiento de ciertos requisitos. Muchos costarricenses dedicados a al SEETAXI, han cambiado su vehículo por un mejor modelo, adquiriendo deudas con entidades financieras, porque se les dijo que un requisito de prorroga una vez cumplido el plazo de tres años del permiso especial, era mejorar el modelo del vehículo, a la luz de la Ley N° 3503 del 10 de mayo de 1965, la misma califica al transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores colectivos como un servicio público regulado, controlado y vigilado por el Estado mediante el MOPT, cuya prestación puede ser delegada en particulares, de lo anterior se desprende dos cosas, como ya se indicado la naturaleza y carácter público del servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, y segundo la obligación del Estado de ejercer un control y vigilancia sobre quienes brindan el servicio. La actividad de porteo, porque en realdad no se eliminó la figura de porteo de nuestra legislación , sino tan sólo la palabra porteo de personas, para en su lugar dejar porteo de cosas o noticias, creando un parche de ley mediante la Ley N°8955, la actividad de transporte remunerado de personas SEETAXI, va dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas que ya sea por su expresa voluntad o porque los taxis rojos no alcanzan a darles el servicio, constituye entonces una necesidad básica y primordial de un sector de la población costarricense, que debe ser atendida de manera inmediata, figura de oferta y demanda, que al fin y al cabo es lo que rige la actividad comercial. Nuestra Constitución Política en su artículo 56, consagra el principio del derecho al trabajo, como un derecho del individuo, y una obligación para el Estado de procurar que todos tengan ocupación honesta y útil e impedir que se establezcan condiciones que en alguna forma menoscaben la libertad o dignidad del hombre. El Estado garantiza el derecho de libre elección de trabajo", evidentemente con las acciones desplegadas por CTP, modificación de leyes arbitrarias, modificación del numeral 323 del Código de comercio y demás actos administrativos, el Estado costarricense ha violentado el artículo 56 de la Constitución, ya que no está procurando que todos tengan ocupación contrario sensu, se está promoviendo el desempleo y empobrecimiento de la sociedad costarricense, a la vez que se atenta contra la familia, al ser la actividad de SEETAXI una fuente directa y única para miles de familias costarricenses indubitablemente estamos en presencia, de un asunto trascendental, el bienestar de miles de familias costarricenses y su eventual desamparo, la defensa del derecho al trabajo como principio fundamental constitucional y todas sus derivaciones, justifica la presente gestión el debido proceso y un estado de necesidad de los firmantes y todos aquellos que se encuentran en igualdad de condiciones. En todo lo que la presente diligencia de coadyuvancia, sea omisa, se adhieren a lo que indica y versa la acción principal de inconstitucionalidad, incoada por el señor Otto Guevara Guth y Natalia Díaz Quintana.

21.- Por escrito presentado a las 15:50 horas del 09 de marzo de 2016, María Lorena Cordero Ávila en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad Unión Nacional de Porteadores- UNAPORTE, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, la sociedad Unión Nacional de Porteadores- UNAPORTE, se ha dedicado al transporte privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2004 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde el 2002 como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediantes contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servido, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del código de comercio vigente antes de su reforma , reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el tratado de Libre Comercio con carretera (porteo). Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de 1999, se elimina la palabra "persona "del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N°7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado por permisos de operación dados por el Estado. Obligándoseles a subsistir en la realización de su labor bajo esta nueva figura con permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a ellos afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 7 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido los permisos de operación reactivaron los servicio nuevamente como "porteadores privados" haciendo uso de las bases operativas en los cantones donde brindan el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicios de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores. Servicio que vienen prestando ininterrumpidamente en el Cantón de Alfaro Ruiz, de la Provincia de Alajuela, Costa Rica, haciendo usos de la base de operación en ese cantón desde el año 2004, y uso de la patente municipal y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capitulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios "del tratado de libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase 6431. Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regula res de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos. Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este articulo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como la indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento. Por tanto, indica que por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se expone en la presente acción, con la Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política. El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transpone privado. Ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi. En el Capítulo II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el “trato nacional” que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores". Con esta misma ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales. Consideran que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales. Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.

22.- Por escrito presentado a las 14:47 horas del 10 de marzo de 2016, Marco Tulio Víquez en su condición de Presidente de la Asociación Cámara de Autobuseros de Heredia, Miguel Badilla Castro en su condición de Presidente de la Asociación Cámara de Autobuseros del Atlántico, Jorge Arredondo Espinoza en su condición de Apoderado con poder suficiente de la Asociación Cámara de Empresarios Autobuseros y Transportistas Unidos de la Provincia de Guanacaste y otros, se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes pasivos en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indican que son organizaciones que representamos a las personas que se verían directamente afectadas si se llegare a declarar la inconstitucionalidad de la normativa impugnad, por tanto, en cuanto representan esos intereses corporativos, son titulares de un interés legítimo para que se mantenga la validez de la normativa impugnada. Señalan que los argumentos de la inconstitucionalidad esgrimidos por los actores son de dos órdenes: a) procedimentales y b) de supuestas violaciones de fondo. Los supuestos vicios procedimentales: Los argumentos de los recurrentes. El argumento principal de los recurrentes es que la Ley 8955 convirtió el porteo en un servicio público, al derogar los artículos 333 y 334 del Código de Comercio. La citada ley fue aprobada por una Comisión Legislativa con Potestad Legislativa Plena. Según los recurrentes tal derogatoria sólo podía haberla realizado el Plenario mediante una ley aprobada por 2/3 de sus miembros porque la citada ley creó un nuevo monopolio a favor del Estado. En efecto, según el artículo 46 de la Constitución, para crear nuevos monopolios estatales, se requiere una mayoría calificada de 2/3 del total de los diputados, lo cual no ocurrió en la especie, dado que la Ley 8955 ni siquiera fue aprobada por el Plenario legislativo. En tales condiciones, la Ley 8955 está viciada de nulidad absoluta por un vicio esencial en su procedimiento de aprobación. La inexistencia de los supuestos vicios procedimentales: El artículo 1 de la Ley 3503 declaró como servicio público todas las modalidades de prestación del servicio remunerado de personas por las vías públicas terrestres, el Código de Comercio entró en vigor el 1 de junio de 1964 y la Ley 3503 lo hizo el 10 de mayo de 1965. Esta ley fue aprobada por una mayoría calificada. A partir de este momento, el transporte remunerado de personas, en cualquiera de sus modalidades, se convirtió en un servicio público. En efecto el legislador creó un nuevo monopolio a favor del Estado con la posibilidad de delegar su ejercicio en los particulares por medio de las figuras administrativas de la concesión o del permiso. En consecuencia, desde esa fecha, el porteo de personas, regulado originalmente en los artículos 323 y 324- del Código de Comercio se convirtió en un servicio público, pues las precitadas normas del Código de Comercio quedaron derogadas tácitamente por la entrada en vigor del artículo 1 de la Ley 3503. Desde el punto de vista jurídico, lo que se produjo fue una derogación tácita del término "personas" contemplado en los artículos 323 y 324 del Código de Comercio, por incompatibilidad normativa sobreviniente al promulgarse el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503 que vino a publicitar todas las modalidades del transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores, al transformarlas en un nuevo monopolio a favor del Estado. El artículo 1 de la Ley 3503 es contundente al indicar que "El transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores que se lleve a cabo por calles, carreteras y caminos dentro del territorio de la República, es un servicio público cuya prestación es exclusiva del Estado, el cual la podrá ejercer directamente o a través de particulares a quienes expresamente autorice de acuerdo con las normas que aquí se establecen...". La norma en comentario no hace distinción entre taxis y porteadores, pues considera a ambas modalidades de transporte como partes integrantes de un servicio público. Por tanto, es claro que la intención unívoca del legislador de 1965, fue la de convertir en servicio público todo el transporte remunerado de personas por vía terrestre en cualquier tipo de vehículos automotores y bajo cualquier modalidad de prestación, convirtiéndolo en un nuevo monopolio estatal. Dentro de este orden de ideas, la derogatoria tácita de una ley resulta de la objetiva incompatibilidad entre la nueva disposición normativa y las precedentes. Tal incompatibilidad, por su parte, tiene dos manifestaciones: a) una verdadera contradicción de una norma con otra, por lo que el intérprete debe optar por la segunda y b) una incompatibilidad sobreviniente, denominada también implícita, para una norma anterior sobre una determinada materia que posteriormente es regulada ex novo por una fuente normativa sucesiva. En esta última hipótesis, se trata de dos disciplinas sobre la misma materia que se suceden en el tiempo. No se trata, en consecuencia, de una incompatibilidad puntual, sino más bien de una nueva normativa que deja sin vigor la anterior. Esta hipótesis es más difícil que se produzca en la praxis porque no siempre las normas anteriores se encuentran en específica contradicción con las normas sobrevinientes. La derogación tácita está íntimamente fundada sobre el doble principio de inextinguibilidad del poder y de la prohibición de antinomias. En este caso tiene relevancia sobre el efecto derogatorio, ligado a la entrada en vigor de la norma sucesiva, como condición necesaria para que pueda innovar libremente el ordenamiento y desplegar, de esa forma, la función que le es propia. 8.- En el presente caso, el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503 en parte vino a regular ex novo la misma materia que anteriormente regulaban los artículos 323 y 324 del Código de Comercio. En efecto, la nueva normativa vino a incluir, como parte del servicio público del transporte remunerado de personas por vías terrestres, al porteo, el cual, antes de su promulgación, se consideraba como una actividad privada ejercida al amparo del principio de libertad jurídica (art 28 CP) y de la libertad empresarial (art 46 CP). Sin embargo, el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503, al convertir en servicio público el transporte remunerado de personas por las vías terrestre en todas sus modalidades, derogó tácitamente los artículos 323 y 324 del Código de Comercio en la medida en que consideraban al porteo como una actividad privada. Posteriormente, se promulgó la Ley 5406 del 26 de noviembre de 1973, mediante la cual se reguló, de manera específica, el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxis. Esta ley entró en vigor 8 años después de que todo el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores, independientemente de su modalidad (autobuses, taxis, porteo, etc.) había sido declarado como un servicio público. El artículo 22 de la Ley 5406 dispuso que "Artículo 22.- Esta ley deroga en lo que se le opongan las disposiciones de la ley No. 3503 de 10 de mayo de 1965 y deroga la ley No. 3560 de 27 de octubre de 1965". Evidentemente el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503 no se oponía, sino que, por el contrario, le otorgaba fundamento a la declaratoria de servicio público de la prestación del servicio remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxis. En otros términos el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503 constituía la normativa genérica que regulaba a las diversas modalidades del transporte remunerado de personas por vía terrestre, en tanto que el artículo 1 de la Ley 5406, regulaba específicamente la modalidad de taxis. El artículo 1 de la Ley 3503, se mantiene en vigor hasta la fecha, pues ni la Ley 7969 ni la 8955 lo derogaron. Dentro de este orden de ideas, el propio Anexo I del CAFTA reconoce la vigencia del artículo 1 de la Ley 3505 al momento de su aprobación al incluirlo expresamente como una de las medidas disconformes en materia de transporte terrestre. Luego y dado que la Ley 8955 no derogó dicha norma, cabe concluir, que el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503 continúa vigente. Así las cosas, el argumento de los accionantes en el sentido de que la Ley número 8955 tenía que aprobarse por dos tercios del total de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa, no es de recibo, por cuanto el monopolio público en materia de transporte remunerado de personas, en cualquiera de sus modalidades (autobuses, taxis, porteo, etc.), fue creado por el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503 de 10 de mayo de 1965, norma que todavía se mantiene vigente según quedó demostrado supra. La normativa impugnada en realidad era innecesaria que se promulgara, pues el porteo de personas ya había dejado de existir jurídicamente desde 1965, cuando el servicio del transporte remunerado de personas en cualquiera de sus modalidades (autobuses, taxis, porteo, etc.) fue declarado, por mayoría calificada de la Asamblea Legislativa, como un monopolio público, susceptible de ser delegada su prestación en los particulares por medio de las figuras administrativas de la concesión y el permiso. Por tanto, la eventual declaración de inconstitucionalidad de la normativa impugnada no tendría ningún efecto práctico, pues la prestación del servicio remunerado de personas en cualquiera de sus modalidades es un servicio público desde 1965. Pero, en todo caso, la Ley 8955 se dictó dentro del marco normativo del artículo l de la Ley 3503 y sólo vino a regular la modalidad de porteo, bajo el nombre de "seetaxi, servicio público que durante casi 50 años fue ejercido a la libre sin ningún tipo de regulación. En consecuencia, la ley impugnada no necesitaba ser aprobada por dos tercios del coral de miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa, pues simplemente vino a regular una modalidad de prestación del servicio remunerado de personas, el cual había ya sido declarado como servicio público desde 1965. Esta Sala ya estableció que la Ley 8955, fue válidamente aprobada por una Comisión Legislativa con Potestad Legislativa Plena, en el Voto 4778-2011, dictado en la consulta de constitucionalidad sobre el proyecto de Ley 8955 formulada por el Movimiento Libertario, la Sala estableció claramente que el citado proyecto de ley podía aprobarse válidamente por una Comisión Legislativa con Potestad Legislativa Plena. La tesis de los accionantes sobre la supuesta violación del CAFTA - Según los actores, la Ley 8955 viola varias cláusulas del CAFTA porque cuando se aprobó este tratado el tema de la eliminación del porteo no se incluyó como una reserva o medida disconforme, por lo que ahora no puede limitarse la libertad empresarial en una actividad no reservada por el Estado costarricense al momento de firmarse el citado tratado. Según los recurrentes, la eliminación del porteo no está incluida como una medida disconforme en el artículo 11.6 en relación con el Anexo I del Tratado. La supuesta violación de los artículos 28 y 46 de la Constitución Política y del principio constitucional de razonabilidad, una de las accionantes alega, además, la supuesta violación de los artículos 28 y 46 de la Constitución y el principio constitucional de razonabilidad. Su argumento se centra en que los artículos 323 y 324 del Código de Comercio, en cuanto regulaban el porteo de personas, se fundaban directamente en esas normas y principio constitucional. En el numeral 28 de la Constitución que consagra el principio de libertad jurídica, según el cual los particulares pueden realizar todas aquellas conductas que estén expresa o implícitamente autorizadas por el ordenamiento jurídico y en el artículo 46 del mismo texto constitucional, que consagra la libertad empresarial. Esta norma, además, exige que la creación de nuevos monopolios a favor del Estado sea aprobado por una mayoría calificada de dos tercios del total de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa, lo cual no ocurrió en el caso de la Ley 8955, la cual fue aprobada por una Comisión Legislativa con Potestad Legislativa Plena. Según una de las accionantes, la Ley 8955 viola ambas normas constitucionales, por cuanto prohibió una actividad lícita, ejercida al amparo de dos disposiciones constitucionales expresas. Por tanto, prohibir una actividad privada lícita, que no es contraria ni a la moral ni a las buenas costumbres constituye un exceso legislativo contrario al Derecho de la Constitución, específicamente a las dos normas precitadas. También se invoca como violado el principio constitucional de razonabilidad, por cuanto, en criterio de la accionante, no resulta conveniente, necesario ni proporcional prohibir la actividad del porteo de personas, pues el país requiere modernizarse en todos los campos de la actividad empresarial. El porteo de personas, dentro del mundo moderno, constituye un mecanismo eficiente y más económico que la tradicional modalidad del servicio de taxi, porque utiliza herramientas modernas y garantiza que el servicio sea prestado con eficiencia, seguridad y rapidez. La inexistencia de los supuestos vicios de fondo. La Ley 8955 no violó el CAFTA, el primer argumento de fondo está íntimamente relacionado con el supuesto vicio procedimental. En efecto, el argumento de los accionantes es que como la Ley 8955 fue posterior a la entrada en vigor del CAFTA, la figura del porteo no se incluyó como medida disconforme en el Anexos I del Tratado, relativo al transporte público. 2.- Los negociadores costarricenses no incluyeron al porteo como excepción a la aplicación del CAFTA en el Anexo I del Tratado, por la sencilla razón de que esa modalidad de prestación del servicio remunerado de personas era un servicio público desde 1965, por lo que lógicamente estaba incluida dentro de las excepciones especificadas en ese mismo Anexo 1 del Tratado relativo al servicio público del transporte remunerado de personas. Según el artículo 11.6. Medidas Disconformes del Tratado "1. Los artículos 11.2, 11.3, 11.4 y 11.5 no se aplican a cualquier medida disconforme existente que sea mantenida por una parte en el gobierno a nivel central, tal y como lo establece esa parte en la Lista del Anexo I. En el Anexo I se dice al respecto: "Sector: Servicios de Transporte por Vía Terrestre- Transporte de pasajeros. Obligaciones Afectadas: Trato Nacional (Artículos 10.4 y 11.3). Trato de Nación Más Favorecida (artículos 10.4 y 11.3). Acceso a Mercados (Artículo 11.4) Nivel de Gobierno: Central. Medidas: Ley 3503 del 10 de mayo de 1965. Ley Reguladora de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores. Arts l, 3, 4.6, 10, II y 25". De la lectura de las normas citadas del CAFTA queda claro que el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503 fue una medida disconforme que el Estado costarricense se reservó en materia de transporte automotor por vías terrestres a la hora de aprobar el citado Tratado. Dentro de esa norma está incluido el porteo como servicio público según quedó demostrado supra. Por tanto, toda la argumentación de los accionantes carece de fundamento jurídico, pues el artículo l de la Ley 3503 se incluyó en el CAFTA como una medida disconforme de Costa Rica y tal norma fue justamente la que eliminó el porteo como actividad privada y lo convirtió en servicio público desde 1965. No hubo, por tanto, ninguna violación de ninguna de las cláusulas invocadas del CAFTA al promulgarse la Ley 8955, la Ley 8955 no violó ni los artículos 28 y 46 de la Constitución ni el principio de razonabilidad jurídica, la ley 8955, era innecesaria que se promulgara, pues el porteo de personas se convirtió en un servicio público desde 1965. Lo que hace una parte de esta ley es derogar normas que ya estaban derogadas desde hacía 51 años. La otra parte regula el servicio público de "seetaxi", es decir del porteo de personas, modalidad de transporte público que desde 1965, no había sido regulada y que, hasta esa fecha, funcionaba como si fuera una actividad privada, sin ninguna regulación estatal. La Ley 8955 no pudo haber incurrido en los vicios de inconstitucionalidad acusados por la accionante, es decir, violación de los artículos 28, 46 de la Constitución y el principio constitucional de razonabilidad, por la sencilla razón de no se creó ningún nuevo monopolio a favor del Estado, pues ese monopolio ya existía desde el lejano 1965. Todas las argumentaciones se estrellan ante el hecho incontrovertible de que el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503, aprobado en 1965 y vigente a la fecha elevó todas las modalidades del transporte remunerado de personas por vías públicas a la categoría de servicio público. En consecuencia, la Ley 8955 no incurrió en ningún vicio de inconstitucionalidad, dado que lo único en que legisló ex novo fue en la regulación de la modalidad de servido público denominada "seetaxi", la cual, de manera inexplicable, operó a la libre, sin ninguna regulación del Estado desde 1965 hasta la promulgación de la Ley 8955.

23.- Por escrito presentado a las 11:05 horas del 11 de marzo de 2016, Gilberth Maikell Barboza, en su condición de apoderado Legal con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de Corporación B&A Transportes Privados Atenas, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indica que en el caso particular de su representada, se le otorgó el permiso especial estable de Taxi, SEETAXI, el cual es un servicio de transporte público remunerado de personas dirigido a un grupo cerrado de usuarios que satisface una demanda limitada, residual, exclusiva y estable, por lo que se adhiere en todos sus extremos a la acción presentada por los accionantes.

24.- Por escrito presentado a las 13:04 horas del 14 de marzo de 2016, Heiner Gerardo Chávez Luna, en su condición de Presidente con facultades de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad de Transporte privados Rigoberto Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, fundamentado en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Indica, que la sociedad de Transporte privados Rigoberto Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada, se ha dedicado al transporte privado de personas (porteo) desde el año 2005 mediante la presente figura jurídica, y desde el 2002 como sociedad de hecho, mediante el sistema de afiliaciones, uso de vehículos automotores, y mediantes contrataciones privadas relativas a la prestación del servicio, todo lo anterior primeramente al amparo de lo dispuesto por el artículo 323 del código de comercio vigente antes de su reforma, reafirmada esta actividad de comercio por el tratado de Libre Comercio con carretera (porteo). Con la Reforma de la Ley 3284, Código de comercio, y de la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de Diciembre de 1999, se elimina la palabra "persona "del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y se crea de la Ley Reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi, N° 7969, una nueva figura que se le llama "Servicio especial estable de taxi", que conserva la naturaleza del servicio residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado v regulado por permisos de operación dados por el estado. Obligándoseles a subsistir en la realización de su labor bajo esta nueva figura con permiso de operación de tres años para todas las unidades a ellos afiliadas, sin posibilidad de renovación, que venció el día 7 de Julio del 2015. A partir de esta fecha y habiendo vencido los permisos de operación reactivaron el servicio nuevamente como “porteadores privados" haciendo uso de las bases operativas en los cantones donde brindamos el servicio y bajo un sistema de plataforma de servicios de porteo de personas por medio de vehículos automotores. Servicio que vienen prestando ininterrumpidamente en el Cantón de San Pedro de Poas, de la Provincia de Alajuela, Costa Rica, haciendo usos de la base de operación en ese cantón desde el año 2005, y uso de la patente municipal y permisos de funcionamiento vigentes a la fecha. En apego a lo dispuesto por el Capitulo II "Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios "del tratado de libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en Clase 6431. Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regula res de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad impugna la Ley N° 8955, ya que a partir de su vigencia, ninguna persona particular - física o jurídica - puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva - concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público. Dicha estatización del servicio de transporte privado de personas es violatorio del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, pues para la creación de monopolios públicos es necesaria la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, procedimiento que se transgredió pues el proyecto de ley N° 17874 que dio origen a la Ley N° 8955, se aprobó en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena, la cual carecía de competencia para aprobar una ley que requiere mayoría calificada de votos. Como bien se indica en la presente acción, el monopolio a favor del Estado se caracteriza principalmente por la eliminación de la competencia y la prohibición de la realización de la actividad por terceros. La Ley N° 8955, deja manifiestamente establecido, la prohibición del ejercicio de esta actividad, al eliminar la palabra persona en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y adicionar un último párrafo a ese artículo, que para los efectos dispone: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este articulo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores” A través de este párrafo se crea una prohibición expresa, en la prestación de ese servicio por particulares, es decir se estatiza como la indica la Procuraduría, un servicio que se regulaba sin ningún problema en el Código de Comercio, y que nacía como parte del acuerdo de las voluntades entre las partes, en las que rige, la libre voluntad de decidir entre lo que mejor conviene a cada quien, según sus intereses económicos y a las necesidades de ese momento. Por tanto, indica que por medio de la Ley N° 8955, al eliminarse la posibilidad de transporte privado de personas, se violenta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Como bien se expone en la presente acción, con la Ley 8955, Reforma a la Ley 3284, y de la Ley 7969, se estableció un monopolio público en materia de transporte público de personas modalidad taxi. La constitución de este monopolio, se realiza por medio de la aprobación de una ley, al margen del reglamento interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo en comisión con potestad legislativa plena. Por lo que ese proyecto era indelegable a una comisión legislativa plena, pues requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (al menos 38 votos) con lo cual se violeta el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, al imposibilitar la exigencia constitucional de la aprobación legislativa de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. La aprobación de la Ley N°8955 "Reforma a la Ley N°3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, vigente a partir del 2011, violenta la aprobación e integración a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en violación del Artículo 7 de nuestra Constitución Política. El mencionado Tratado Internacional determinó que no se pudiera excluir ni restringir la posibilidad del servicio de transpone privado. Ya que al momento de la aprobación (Diciembre 2007) Costa Rica contaba con servicios privados de transporte modalidad taxi, en la figura del porteo de personas. Pero además no existía una Ley que había establecido un monopolio público de transporte público en modalidad taxi. Ergo, no existía una prohibición de prestación de servicios de transportes privados modalidad taxi. En el Capítulo II "Comercio Trasfronterizo de Servicios" del Tratado mencionado, Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación a esta actividad comercial. Razón por la cual la ley N°8955 del 2011, viene a violentar un acuerdo incorporado a nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico. Más allá de esta situación, debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el “trato nacional” que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado. Costa Rica más bien negoció la liberación de servicios incluido el de transporte privado de personas, en la modalidad taxi. Concretamente la podemos ubicar en: Clase 6431: Servicios regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (porteo). Subclase 64312: Servicios especiales urbanos y suburbanos regulares de transporte de pasajeros por carretera (taxis). Es necesario reiterar que con la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955 el "porteo de personas" se conviene en un "servicio público" pues elimina la posibilidad de su ejercicio en forma privada con la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio que indica: "El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores". Con esta misma Ley, se introduce una regulación especial para este sector (servicio especial estable de taxi), transgrediéndose el texto del artículo 11.6 del CAFTA, debido a que con la ley se disminuye "el grado de conformidad" con el artículo 11.4 del CAFTA (Acceso a los Mercados), con esto se da un exceso de poder legislativo, al asumir la Asamblea Legislativa una competencia que no le otorga la Constitución, pues modifica un tratado en cuanto a su contenido, cuando de acuerdo a la Constitución su función debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar un tratado, con el claro quebranto de los artículos 7, 129 y 140 incisos 3) y 10) Constitucionales. Consideran que los argumentos expuestos denotan con claridad meridiana que las normas impugnadas, violentan los principios del libre comercio, la libertad de trabajo, y la libertad de tránsito, transgreden la Constitución Política y por tanto, resultan inconstitucionales. Teniendo en cuenta lo anteriormente expuesto, y en condición de coadyuvantes de la parte actora en este asunto, solicitan con lugar la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por ende, que en sentencia ordene lo siguiente: Se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley N° 8955; "Reforma a la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio, y Reforma a la Ley N° 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, del 22 de diciembre de l.999" por violación de los artículos: 7, 46, 129, 140, de la Constitución Política, así como de los principios de Supremacía de la Realidad y Jerarquía normativa.

25.- Por escrito presentado a las 09:58 horas del 15 de marzo de 2016, Rubén Vargas Campos, en su condición de Secretario General y Representante con facultades suficientes de la organización social denominada Unión de Taxistas Costarricenses y otros se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes pasivos de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indican que la presente acción deviene en improcedente pues la misma se dice como presentada en tutela supuesta de intereses difusos y/o colectivos de los usuarios, siendo que evidentemente la acción presenta la única finalidad de procurar defender los intereses privados de una empresa transnacional, la cual no presenta sede cierta en nuestro medio, como lo es la firma "Uber", asimismo la denominada Asociación Nacional de Consumidores busca lo mismo. En cuanto a la disyuntiva entre la posible coexistencia del transporte remunerado de personas, en vehículos automotores, como servicio público o como actividad privada, se tiene que desde el año 1965 con la promulgación de la ley No. 3503: "ley reguladora del transporte remunerado de personas", se dispuso claramente que todo tipo de transporte remunerado de personas era un servicio público, regulado por el Estado, de ahí se derivó que todo transporte remunerado de personas, en cualquiera de sus modalidades, era un servicio público y que solo se podía prestar con una autorización del Estado, teniéndose como eliminada la posibilidad del transporte remunerado privado de personas en vehículos automotores, tales disposiciones generales fueron retomadas, reguladas y sancionadas en la ley de tránsito no. 7331 (del año 1993), en la ley, entre otras, las cuales fueron anteriores al Tratado de Libre Comercio y todas manteniendo su vigencia y plenitud en cuanto a regular, restringir y sancionar cualquier gestión de transporte remunerado de personas que se pudiera generar aun en ausencia de la ley No. 8955, es decir: aunque la ley no. 8955 fuera eliminada por inconstitucional existen por demás normas que conllevan el mismo efecto que la misma vino simplemente a unificar y aclarar, para evitar más "interpretaciones" y suspicacias en cuanto a la situación e imposibilidad del transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores de forma privada (porteo). El proyecto de la Ley que se objeta, se voto por el plenario, mediante la figura de la delegación en una de las comisiones legislativas con potestad plena y se votó por mayoría absoluta en la misma. No se ha generado ningún monopolio público, la capacidad regulatoria del Estado da origen a un servicio público ejercido por miles de trabajadores (los taxistas) bajo condiciones plenamente determinadas y establecidas por el Estado regulador. En cuanto al tema de la violación al Tratado de Libre Comercio, se ha determinado en cuanto a que el porteo de personas no se estima como actividad comercial mayor, sino como una labor limitada y residual. Por ende, no sería de real cobertura por el TLC, además, ha quedado claro que la modificación parcial al numeral 323 del código de comercio no conlleva la creación de monopolio alguno y, per se, no se afectan las condiciones del TLC, también se ha determinado plenamente que el Estado costarricense realizó en cuanto al TLC o CAFTA y a sus alcances, ciertas reservas debidas y una de ellas fue en materia del transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores, tipo taxi, y de la ley No. 7969, así que las disposiciones del TLC tampoco en ese sentido se verían afectadas y solo como excepción no invocada por nadie, el TLC permite que las restricciones aplicadas puedan valorarse o renegociarse pero eso no las determina como inconstitucionales, finalmente y como bien se ha determinado supra, existen muchas normas previas al TLC, de orden público, especiales para el transporte público y el tránsito, que determinan que el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores y en otras disciplinas del servicio público (aviones, trenes y barcos), es un servicio público, el cual solo se puede brindar con autorización previa del Estado, por ende, al recapitularse mediante la ley No. 8955 en cuanto al tema, no se legisla ex novo, sino que se retoma, resume y concreta lo que antes ya estaba legislado, no existiendo así, ninguna violación al TLC y mucho menos ninguna inconstitucionalidad.

26.- Por escrito presentado a las 11:05 horas del 15 de marzo de 2016, Alexander Rodríguez Aguilar en su condición de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de Inversiones Transportistas Los Guidos Sociedad Anónima y otros, se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indican que se encuentran debidamente, legitimados por tener interés directo en la resolución de fondo de la presente Acción de inconstitucionalidad, en razón de que fueron acreditados con el permiso número 11 y los códigos numerados del 321 al 346 de Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi, con formal Recurso de Apelación pendiente de resolución ante el Tribunal Administrativo de Transportes, bajo el expediente N° TAT-31 7-2015. En el año dos mil once, previa consulta facultativa ante la Sala Constitucional, se aprobó en segundo debate el proyecto de ley número 17,874, para luego ser sancionado por el Poder Ejecutivo y publicada en el Alcance N° 40 de la Gaceta N° 131 de 7 de julio de 2011 como la Ley Especial N° 8955. Todo el trámite de discusión y aprobación del referido expediente se tramitó en la Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena Segunda, como consecuencia de moción delegatoria aprobada por el Plenario Legislativo en la sesión ordinaria N° 88 de 14 de octubre de 2009 y bajo la figura de un procedimiento legislativo abreviado (208 bis RAL), aprobada en Plenario Legislativo en la sesión ordinaria N° 109 de 26 de noviembre de 2009. De la misma manera en el año 2011, la Ley N° 8955 es cuestionada ante la Sala con dos acciones de inconstitucional, tramitadas bajo los expedientes 11-01 1857-0007-CO y 11-010289- 0007-CO, mismas que fueron declaradas sin lugar. Tanto los señalamientos realizados en el texto de la consulta facultativa como los esbozados en la interposición de las dos acciones de inconstitucionalidad antes señaladas, fueron direccionados de manera diferente a los descritos en la presente acción. La ley no 8955 violenta el artículo 46 de la constitución política y el procedimiento legislativo para la instauración de un monopolio público, por cuanto reforma el artículo 2 de la Ley N° 7969: "Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi ", dado que pese a que el monopolio en la prestación exclusiva del servicio colectivo remunerado de personas se estableció mediante la aprobación de la Ley N° 3503 de 20 de mayo de 1965 y la nacionalización exclusiva del transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos modalidad taxi lo determinó la aprobación de la Ley N° 5406 de 16 de enero de 1974 derogada mediante artículo 63 de la Ley N° 7969 de 22 de diciembre de 1999, el monopolio decretado en estas dos normativas son exclusivos y únicos para los servicios que allí se indican, sean el transporte colectivo remunerado de personas mediante la Ley N° 3503 y luego la nacionalización del transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi mediante la Ley N° 5406, derogada con la actual Ley N° 7969, denominada Ley de Taxis. Ninguna de las anteriores normativas declara como servicio público la totalidad del transporte remunerado de personas, sino que ambas leyes se limitaron a declarar al Estado como titular de cada una de esas dos actividades específicas, permaneciendo vigente el contrato privado de transporte de personas en la figura comercial del porteador de personas, sin embargo, mediante la ley No. 8955 efectivamente se declara un monopolio total sobre el transporte remunerado de personas, al determinar que todo transporte remunerado de personas que se realice por medio de autobuses, busetas. Microbuses, taxis, automóviles y cualquier otro tipo de vehículo automotor, que además este dirigido a cualquier grupo de usuarios es un servicio público del cual es titular el Estado y que, para su prestación, se requiere de permiso o concesión. No se puede interpretar de la misma manera, la nacionalización del transporte remunerado de personas mediante el transporte colectivo en autobuses y taxis, mediante la aprobación de dos leyes concretas y específicas, que la creación del monopolio y la prohibición de realizar cualquier tipo de transporte remunerado de personas desde el ámbito privado. Esto se da, de manera exclusiva, mediante la aprobación de la ley No. 8955, que desautoriza este tipo de servicio mediante la eliminación de la palabra "personas" del artículo 323 del código de comercio y a su vez decreta que todo tipo de transporte remunerado de personas será en lo sucesivo un servicio público y que, para su realización, se requerirá permiso del Estado, la creación del monopolio de la totalidad del transporte remunerado de personas se da mediante la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955. Siendo así, en observancia del artículo 46 de nuestra Constitución Política el proyecto de ley N° 17,874 nunca debió ser delegado a una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa, ya que, al estar estas comisiones integradas por únicamente 19 diputados no pudo cumplir con el número mínimo requerido para la aprobación de al menos 38 diputados, en concordancia con el artículo 46 constitucional, deviene en una clara violación al procedimiento legislativo y a la propia Carta Fundamental y, por ende, en la inconstitucionalidad de la ley aprobada. La ley No. 8955 violenta el principio de igualdad ante la ley y las normas relativas a la concesión de servicios públicos de transporte de personas. Debe tenerse presente, que el proyecto de ley N° 13.511, que dio origen a la Ley N° 7969, llevaba explícito en su articulado original, el que las concesiones de taxi se entregaran por un plazo improrrogable de veinte años. Sin embargo, el legislador de la época consideró prudente no llevar el plazo más allá de los diez años y mediante moción aprobada por la mayoría de ellos, el plazo se estableció en diez años improrrogables. Mediante la reforma realizada por la Ley N° 8955 al artículo 29 de la Ley N° 7969, le hace entrega, a perpetuidad, del servicio de transporte público remunerado de personas en la modalidad taxi a los actuales concesionarios, lo que deviene en inconstitucional, ya que el Estado puede delegar la prestación de los servicios públicos en particulares, más no cuenta el legislador con la facultad de designar a determinado grupo de particulares para que realicen un servicio público a perpetuidad, sin cumplir con los procedimientos de contratación administrativa estipulados en la ley original, en claro perjuicio al principio de igualdad ante la ley para el resto de habitantes de la República, así como de aquellos oferentes que por no contar con los 100 puntos acreditados en el Primer Procedimiento Abreviado a quienes contaban con permisos de taxi para esas fechas, algunos de ellos con 80 puntos, que quedan imposibilitados de participar en el nuevo proceso licitatorio de concesiones de taxi, en la segunda oportunidad en igualdad de condiciones ya que, como reza la norma anterior, al actual concesionario se le da una indebida e ilegal ventaja sobre los demás interesados en prestar dicho servicio, al indicar que la renovación de las concesiones de taxi se deben otorgar cada periodo de manera automática, con la sola solicitud del concesionario y la licencia tipo C-1 al día. Esta reforma cierra por completo un monopolio, a perpetuidad, con nombres y apellidos, que se convirtió en un embudo a favor de un grupo muy reducido de costarricenses, en claro perjuicio de la inmensa mayoría, que una vez transcurridos los diez años del plazo autorizado a las concesiones por la Ley N° 7969, le permitiría a todos los ciudadanos optar por ser oferente en condición de iguales entre iguales. Al menos en tema de experiencia, a más de 30,000 conductores de taxi a los que la Ley N° 8955 deja sin ninguna opción. Esta norma viene a adicionar, a la inconstitucionalidad establecida en la reforma al artículo 29 de la Ley N° 7969, mediante Ley N° 8955 la facultad del concesionario de "HEREDAR", generación tras generación, a sus parientes, la titularidad de la concesión de taxi, inclusive, bajo condiciones diferentes a las establecidas en el Primer Procedimiento Abreviado realizado al amparo de la Ley 7969 y sus reglamentos, entregando la concesión a un particular que no fue evaluado en su momento procedimental oportuno y eximiéndolo de obligaciones como la obligatoriedad de presentar código y licencia C-1 y conducir el taxi un mínimo de ocho horas diarias. No solamente el Estado entrega a perpetuidad un servicio público a un particular, cuya ley original le entregó la explotación por un periodo únicamente de diez años, sino que de manera posterior se faculta al particular a heredar la concesión otorgada. Reiteran que ni siquiera el legislador ordinario cuenta con la facultad para entregar a perpetuidad la explotación de un servicio público que es monopolio del Estado a un determinado grupo de ciudadanos ya que la figura jurídica no existe. Para ello se requeriría decretar la existencia de un monopolio privado, ya no estatal, lo que conllevaría un roce con el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política y que, de ninguna manera, podría lograrse con el voto afirmativo de únicamente 16 diputados en una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, ampliando automáticamente los plazos de vigencia de la concesión. En este punto también la Ley N° 8955 es inconstitucional. La ley no 8955 violenta los alcances de la aprobación e integración del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República Dominicana: con la suscripción del tratado de libre comercio con Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República Dominicana y su posterior integración al ordenamiento jurídico nacional, queda en evidencia clara, en referencia a las reservas que el País defendió, concretamente en el tema del transporte de pasajeros por vías terrestres, a cuales actividades y normativas relacionadas podría, Costa Rica, a futuro, realizar reformas. Es así como en el área de Servicios Transfronterizos e Inversión, Costa Rica se reserva una serie de normas a efecto de mantener el control del Estado sobre algunas actividades declaradas como servicios públicos, siendo estas: El monopolio del transporte remunerado de personas en autobuses, que incluye los denominados "servicios especiales de transporte de estudiantes trabajadores y turismo". El monopolio del transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, el monopolio del transporte por ferrocarril. Las reservas hechas por Costa Rica como Estado Parte, visibles en el Anexo I, señalan, de manera concreta, cuáles son las leyes y decretos ejecutivos que podrá modificar después de la entrada en vigencia del CAFTA: Tal y como se puede inferir de la totalidad de las reservas hechas por Costa Rica, como parte de estas, no aparece la Ley N° 3284, Código de Comercio de 30 de abril de 1964. Esta ley, aprobada desde el año 1964, mantuvo vigente el transporte privado de personas bajo la figura del porteador de personas mediante el artículo 323, siguientes y concordantes. A la vista de lo anterior, resulta sencillo deducir que estando vigentes los artículos 323, siguientes y concordantes del Código de Comercio desde el año 1964, la actividad del transporte remunerado de personas mediante la figura del porteador de personas se ejerció de manera privada y absolutamente lícita, desde esa fecha, aún después de aprobado, ratificado y puesto en vigencia el Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República Dominicana, (CAFTA). No es sino hasta el 7 de junio de 2011 que es publicada la Ley N° 8955, fechada 16 de junio de 2011, que quienes ejercíamos el transporte privado de personas a través de la figura del porteador fuimos obligados a acreditar requisitos para ser migrados del Código de Comercio, vigente hasta ese día, al servicio público remunerado de personas mediante la nueva figura de Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi. Fuimos obligados a migrar al transporte público de personas porque la Ley N° 8955 derogó de manera explícita el contrato privado de transporte de personas a través del artículo 323, siguientes y concordantes del Código de Comercio, en una clara y evidente violación a los alcances de lo negociado en los incisos a) y b) del artículo 11.4 del CAFTA. Desde la perspectiva jurídica, resulta razonablemente claro que la Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena I, con el voto de únicamente 16 diputados, nunca estuvo facultada por el Derecho de la Constitución a eliminar la palabra "personas" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio y eliminar así la actividad desarrollada al amparo del contrato privado de transporte remunerado de personas. Por otra parte, el fin principal de la aprobación de la Ley N° 8955, según se refleja en la exposición de motivos del proyecto de ley N° 17.874, fue la de regular y trasladar a los porteadores que venían ejerciendo esta actividad privada de transporte de personas al servicio público. Esta voluntad del legislador, reflejada en la inclusión de tres transitorios de carácter material en la supra citada ley, incorporados vía moción, adicional a la norma que venían a regular la situación de los porteadores de la época en el tiempo, ha sido materialmente destrozada por la actual Administración, realizando "interpretaciones" erróneas del alcance de los mismos y procediendo así a eliminar los permisos a más del 90% de ellos en el primer plazo de tres años y a la totalidad en el siguiente periodo, por Io que, la vigencia de la Ley No 8955 no tiene ya ningún sentido práctico, entendiendo que la voluntad del legislador de la época con la aprobación de la Ley Especial N° 8955 fue precisa y pretorianamente, el asegurar la continuidad de la actividad comercial de los porteadores de la época.

27.- Por escrito presentado a las 10:40 horas del 15 de marzo de 2016, Javier Cortes Montoya, en su condición de taxista, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante pasivo en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indica su desacuerdo con lo indicado en la ley No. 8955 en su artículo 1, el cual convierte a los porteadores de personas en servicio especial estable de Taxi, SEETAXI, asimismo indica que los artículos 323 y 334 de la ley 3284, debieron haber sido reglamentados vía decreto ejecutivo emitido por el Presidente de la Republica y por el Ministro del MOPT. Señala que el argumento de los accionantes en cuanto a la creación de la anterior ley y su monopolización carece de sustento jurídico, dado que el transporte público lo tiene el Estado costarricense quien lo traslada a terceros mediante la figura de permisos o concesiones administrativas, tanto de autobuses como taxis, los cuales fueron adjudicados los derechos de explotación a terceros mediante licitación pública en el año 2000, dado que se encontraban en condiciones de permisos, por lo que en ese mismo año, el Consejo de Transporte Público licitó 13.675 concesiones administrativas de taxis, siendo que solo se entregaría una concesión por participante. La citada ley No. 8955, no prohíbe la figura del porteo, solo modifica los artículos 323 y 334 de la ley del código de comercio y deja vigente el porteo. El argumento de que la clausula 11.4 de acceso a mercados del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Costa Rica y Estados Unidos junto con Centroamérica y República Dominicana, es contraria a la ley 8955, no es válido, dado que en el anexo 1 de medidas de salvaguarda del capítulo de Costa Rica, existe una lista de leyes y decretos que todas las naciones firmantes deben de respetar.

28.- Por escrito presentado a las 15:07 horas del 18 de marzo de 2016, William Solano Campos y otros, se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indican que se encuentran debidamente, legitimados en su condición de usuarios de los servicios de transporte, por asistirles un interés legitimo, en los términos del artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, siendo posible identificar tres motivos, el primero de ellos que con la promulgación de la citada ley se da la creación de un monopolio estatal sin que el procedimiento legislativo se haya dado con una mayoría calificada en la votación, el transporte remunerado de personas, ha sido creado como un servicio público, siendo el Estado su único titular, con la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad que se pretende, se permitiría el porteo privado de personas, simultáneamente con el servicio de SEETAXI y los taxis tradicionales, por lo que eliminaría el monopolio público creado por la ley en comentario, al permitir la iniciativa privada en la actividad económica, en segundo lugar se da una infracción a los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de las normas, principio de libertad, iniciativa privada, libertad de comercio, libertad contractual, libertad de elección de los consumidores. La ley 8955 es inconstitucional porque incumple dos criterios constitucionales al afecto aplicables, por un lado no satisface un interés público imperativo y por otro lado limita libertades fundamentales de la manera más restrictiva posible, como tercer punto la citada norma contraviene el Tratado de Libre Comercio con EEUU, por ende es contraria a lo dispuesto en el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política, dado que su finalidad es la de servir como instrumento para la liberalización del comercio de bienes y servicios entre los Estados parte, garantizando la inversión extranjera y promoviendo condiciones de competencia leal, con la consecuente obtención de beneficios ostensibles para los usuarios y consumidores nacionales, en virtud de su trascendencia se ha de examinar el capitulo once del tratado, titulado “Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios” y específicamente el subtítulo “11.4. Acceso a los Mercados” toda vez que dicha clausula en particular la que la ley No. 8955 contraviene claramente, allí se establece la obligación de los Estados suscriptores de no imponer a los proveedores de servicios de otro Estado parte, restricciones de acceso, ya sean materiales o de orden normativo, a los distintos sectores económicos del mercado de servicios de otro Estado.

29.- Por escritos presentados ante la Secretaría de esta Sala a las 15:17 horas del 18 de marzo del 2016, Alberto de Armas Pereira y otros, todos ellos en su condición de socios del Club de Colaboración para la autosatisfacción de necesidades de movilidad Común S.A., se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad. Lo anterior con fundamento en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Los coadyuvantes, todos ellos colaboradores de la plataforma UBER en Costa Rica, basan su alegato en una supuesta inconstitucionalidad de la Ley No. 8955, Reforma la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, por estimarlas contrarias a los artículos 50, párrafo primero, y 46 de la Constitución Política. Explican que la Ley No. 8955 crea un monopolio que no estimula la producción interna de Costa Rica puesto que más bien la limita, “al establecer la actividad solo para un sector privilegiado”. Consideran que dicha ley coarta la posibilidad, para cientos de personas, de procurarse una “ocupación honesta y útil”, lo que supone un cercenamiento del derecho de cualquier individuo a que elija un puesto propio “que le permita ganarse la vida”; entienden que se trata de una “limitante a la libre elección del trabajo”. Citan, en su argumentación, un fragmento de la discusión legislativa, en la tramitación de la Ley No. 8955, haciendo alusión expresa a las actas del otrora proyecto de Ley, en resumen tal fragmento refiere que se trató de un “proceso de negociación en el cual el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes y sus autoridades, junto con la Cámara Nacional de Trasporte en Autobús, la Federación Nacional de Taxis y la Cámara de Porteadores como representante del sector, mantuvieron una sesión permanente de discusión, buscando una formulación consenso para solucionar la situación de los señores porteadores y señoras porteadoras”; como resultado de ese proceso, la información de base “permitió una propuesta de solución para reconocer el derecho y la operatividad de aquellas personas que efectivamente estaban prestando el servicio de porteo”, enfatizan en que dicha propuesta “obedece fundamentalmente que es una necesidad específica y puntual”. Por su parte los coadyuvantes concluyen, en relación con lo anterior, que el motivo de la Asamblea Legislativa para derogar la figura del porteo y “publificar” cualquier tipo de transporte remunerado de personas que se realice por medio de vehículos particulares dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas usuarias y que satisfaga una demanda limitada, residual, exclusiva y estable, fue “dirimir los conflictos suscitados entre taxistas, autobuseros y porteadores”, estiman que se está frente a una norma que limita libertades fundamentales, “al generar un supuesto beneficio para un grupo, pero una gran afectación para la colectividad”. Apoyan los alegatos adicionales de los accionantes, en síntesis refiriéndose a que la Ley No. 8955 es inconstitucional por no cumplir con el procedimiento legislativo, en relación con que no fue aprobada por una mayoría calificada, sino por una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, considerando que tal norma crea un monopolio estatal, todo lo cual es contrario al artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Toman como referencia el Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, aprobado mediante Ley No. 8622, Ley No. 21 de noviembre del 2007; del cual citan expresamente el artículo 11.4 de dicha Ley. Sobre este punto, concluyen que tal norma “prohíbe expresamente adoptar leyes, reglamentos, o procedimientos que restrinjan el número de proveedores de un servicio de un servicio limitado por su participación o acceso al mercado o creando, por ejemplo, contingentes numéricos o monopolios que concedan acceso, titularidad o control de la prestación de ese servicio, a un solo proveedor o pocos proveedores, recurriendo a medidas limitantes o discriminatorias”. Terminan indicando que la Ley No. 8955 violenta el principio constitucional de jerarquía de las normas porque sus disposiciones contravienen un tratado internacional (Ley No. 8622) y el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política.

30.- Por escritos presentados ante la Secretaría de esta Sala a las 16:12 horas del 18 de marzo del 2016, Mauricio Muñoz Brenes y otros, todos ellos en su condición de socios del Club de Colaboración para la autosatisfacción de necesidades de movilidad Común S.A., se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad. Lo anterior con fundamento en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Los coadyuvantes, todos ellos colaboradores de la plataforma UBER en Costa Rica, basan su alegato en una supuesta inconstitucionalidad de la Ley No. 8955, Reforma la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, por estimarlas contrarias a los artículos 50, párrafo primero, y 46 de la Constitución Política. Explican que la Ley No. 8955 crea un monopolio que no estimula la producción interna de Costa Rica puesto que más bien la limita, “al establecer la actividad solo para un sector privilegiado”. Consideran que dicha ley coarta la posibilidad, para cientos de personas, de procurarse una “ocupación honesta y útil”, lo que supone un cercenamiento del derecho de cualquier individuo a que elija un puesto propio “que le permita ganarse la vida”; entienden que se trata de una “limitante a la libre elección del trabajo”. Citan, en su argumentación, un fragmento de la discusión legislativa, en la tramitación de la Ley No. 8955, haciendo alusión expresa a las actas del otrora proyecto de Ley, en resumen tal fragmento refiere que se trató de un “proceso de negociación en el cual el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes y sus autoridades, junto con la Cámara Nacional de Trasporte en Autobús, la Federación Nacional de Taxis y la Cámara de Porteadores como representante del sector, mantuvieron una sesión permanente de discusión, buscando una formulación consenso para solucionar la situación de los señores porteadores y señoras porteadoras”; como resultado de ese proceso, la información de base “permitió una propuesta de solución para reconocer el derecho y la operatividad de aquellas personas que efectivamente estaban prestando el servicio de porteo”, enfatizan en que dicha propuesta “obedece fundamentalmente que es una necesidad específica y puntual”. Por su parte los coadyuvantes concluyen, en relación con lo anterior, que el motivo de la Asamblea Legislativa para derogar la figura del porteo y “publificar” cualquier tipo de transporte remunerado de personas que se realice por medio de vehículos particulares dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas usuarias y que satisfaga una demanda limitada, residual, exclusiva y estable, fue “dirimir los conflictos suscitados entre taxistas, autobuseros y porteadores”, estiman que se está frente a una norma que limita libertades fundamentales, “al generar un supuesto beneficio para un grupo, pero una gran afectación para la colectividad”. Apoyan los alegatos adicionales de los accionantes, en síntesis refiriéndose a que la Ley No. 8955 es inconstitucional por no cumplir con el procedimiento legislativo, en relación con que no fue aprobada por una mayoría calificada, sino por una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, considerando que tal norma crea un monopolio estatal, todo lo cual es contrario al artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Toman como referencia el Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, aprobado mediante Ley No. 8622, Ley No. 21 de noviembre del 2007; del cual citan expresamente el artículo 11.4 de dicha Ley. Sobre este punto, concluyen que tal norma “prohíbe expresamente adoptar leyes, reglamentos, o procedimientos que restrinjan el número de proveedores de un servicio de un servicio limitado por su participación o acceso al mercado o creando, por ejemplo, contingentes numéricos o monopolios que concedan acceso, titularidad o control de la prestación de ese servicio, a un solo proveedor o pocos proveedores, recurriendo a medidas limitantes o discriminatorias”. Terminan indicando que la Ley No. 8955 violenta el principio constitucional de jerarquía de las normas porque sus disposiciones contravienen un tratado internacional (Ley No. 8622) y el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política.

31.- Por escritos presentados ante la Secretaría de esta Sala a las 15:00 horas del 30 de marzo del 2016, Carlos Bastos Chacón y otros, todos ellos en su condición de socios del Club de Colaboración para la autosatisfacción de necesidades de movilidad Común S.A., se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad. Lo anterior con fundamento en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Los coadyuvantes, todos ellos colaboradores de la plataforma UBER en Costa Rica, basan su alegato en una supuesta inconstitucionalidad de la Ley No. 8955, Reforma la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, por estimarlas contrarias a los artículos 50, párrafo primero, y 46 de la Constitución Política. Explican que la Ley No. 8955 crea un monopolio que no estimula la producción interna de Costa Rica puesto que más bien la limita, “al establecer la actividad solo para un sector privilegiado”. Consideran que dicha ley coarta la posibilidad, para cientos de personas, de procurarse una “ocupación honesta y útil”, lo que supone un cercenamiento del derecho de cualquier individuo a que elija un puesto propio “que le permita ganarse la vida”; entienden que se trata de una “limitante a la libre elección del trabajo”. Citan, en su argumentación, un fragmento de la discusión legislativa, en la tramitación de la Ley No. 8955, haciendo alusión expresa a las actas del otrora proyecto de Ley, en resumen tal fragmento refiere que se trató de un “proceso de negociación en el cual el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes y sus autoridades, junto con la Cámara Nacional de Trasporte en Autobús, la Federación Nacional de Taxis y la Cámara de Porteadores como representante del sector, mantuvieron una sesión permanente de discusión, buscando una formulación consenso para solucionar la situación de los señores porteadores y señoras porteadoras”; como resultado de ese proceso, la información de base “permitió una propuesta de solución para reconocer el derecho y la operatividad de aquellas personas que efectivamente estaban prestando el servicio de porteo”, enfatizan en que dicha propuesta “obedece fundamentalmente que es una necesidad específica y puntual”. Por su parte los coadyuvantes concluyen, en relación con lo anterior, que el motivo de la Asamblea Legislativa para derogar la figura del porteo y “publificar” cualquier tipo de transporte remunerado de personas que se realice por medio de vehículos particulares dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas usuarias y que satisfaga una demanda limitada, residual, exclusiva y estable, fue “dirimir los conflictos suscitados entre taxistas, autobuseros y porteadores”, estiman que se está frente a una norma que limita libertades fundamentales, “al generar un supuesto beneficio para un grupo, pero una gran afectación para la colectividad”. Apoyan los alegatos adicionales de los accionantes, en síntesis refiriéndose a que la Ley No. 8955 es inconstitucional por no cumplir con el procedimiento legislativo, en relación con que no fue aprobada por una mayoría calificada, sino por una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, considerando que tal norma crea un monopolio estatal, todo lo cual es contrario al artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Toman como referencia el Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, aprobado mediante Ley No. 8622, Ley No. 21 de noviembre del 2007; del cual citan expresamente el artículo 11.4 de dicha Ley. Sobre este punto, concluyen que tal norma “prohíbe expresamente adoptar leyes, reglamentos, o procedimientos que restrinjan el número de proveedores de un servicio de un servicio limitado por su participación o acceso al mercado o creando, por ejemplo, contingentes numéricos o monopolios que concedan acceso, titularidad o control de la prestación de ese servicio, a un solo proveedor o pocos proveedores, recurriendo a medidas limitantes o discriminatorias”. Terminan indicando que la Ley No. 8955 violenta el principio constitucional de jerarquía de las normas porque sus disposiciones contravienen un tratado internacional (Ley No. 8622) y el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política.

32.- Por escritos presentados ante la Secretaría de esta Sala a las 8:21 horas del 1° de abril del 2016, Orlando Chaves Matarrita y otros, todos ellos en su condición de socios del Club de Colaboración para la autosatisfacción de necesidades de movilidad Común S.A., se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad. Lo anterior con fundamento en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Los coadyuvantes, todos ellos colaboradores de la plataforma UBER en Costa Rica, basan su alegato en una supuesta inconstitucionalidad de la Ley No. 8955, Reforma la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, por estimarlas contrarias a los artículos 50, párrafo primero, y 46 de la Constitución Política. Explican que la Ley No. 8955 crea un monopolio que no estimula la producción interna de Costa Rica puesto que más bien la limita, “al establecer la actividad solo para un sector privilegiado”. Consideran que dicha ley coarta la posibilidad, para cientos de personas, de procurarse una “ocupación honesta y útil”, lo que supone un cercenamiento del derecho de cualquier individuo a que elija un puesto propio “que le permita ganarse la vida”; entienden que se trata de una “limitante a la libre elección del trabajo”. Citan, en su argumentación, un fragmento de la discusión legislativa, en la tramitación de la Ley No. 8955, haciendo alusión expresa a las actas del otrora proyecto de Ley, en resumen tal fragmento refiere que se trató de un “proceso de negociación en el cual el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes y sus autoridades, junto con la Cámara Nacional de Trasporte en Autobús, la Federación Nacional de Taxis y la Cámara de Porteadores como representante del sector, mantuvieron una sesión permanente de discusión, buscando una formulación consenso para solucionar la situación de los señores porteadores y señoras porteadoras”; como resultado de ese proceso, la información de base “permitió una propuesta de solución para reconocer el derecho y la operatividad de aquellas personas que efectivamente estaban prestando el servicio de porteo”, enfatizan en que dicha propuesta “obedece fundamentalmente que es una necesidad específica y puntual”. Por su parte los coadyuvantes concluyen, en relación con lo anterior, que el motivo de la Asamblea Legislativa para derogar la figura del porteo y “publificar” cualquier tipo de transporte remunerado de personas que se realice por medio de vehículos particulares dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas usuarias y que satisfaga una demanda limitada, residual, exclusiva y estable, fue “dirimir los conflictos suscitados entre taxistas, autobuseros y porteadores”, estiman que se está frente a una norma que limita libertades fundamentales, “al generar un supuesto beneficio para un grupo, pero una gran afectación para la colectividad”. Apoyan los alegatos adicionales de los accionantes, en síntesis refiriéndose a que la Ley No. 8955 es inconstitucional por no cumplir con el procedimiento legislativo, en relación con que no fue aprobada por una mayoría calificada, sino por una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, considerando que tal norma crea un monopolio estatal, todo lo cual es contrario al artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Toman como referencia el Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, aprobado mediante Ley No. 8622, Ley No. 21 de noviembre del 2007; del cual citan expresamente el artículo 11.4 de dicha Ley. Sobre este punto, concluyen que tal norma “prohíbe expresamente adoptar leyes, reglamentos, o procedimientos que restrinjan el número de proveedores de un servicio de un servicio limitado por su participación o acceso al mercado o creando, por ejemplo, contingentes numéricos o monopolios que concedan acceso, titularidad o control de la prestación de ese servicio, a un solo proveedor o pocos proveedores, recurriendo a medidas limitantes o discriminatorias”. Terminan indicando que la Ley No. 8955 violenta el principio constitucional de jerarquía de las normas porque sus disposiciones contravienen un tratado internacional (Ley No. 8622) y el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política.

33.- Por escritos presentados ante la Secretaría de esta Sala a las 10:55 horas del 1° de abril del 2016, Marco Madrigal Herrera y otros, todos ellos en su condición de socios del Club de Colaboración para la autosatisfacción de necesidades de movilidad Común S.A., se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos de la parte actora en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad. Lo anterior con fundamento en el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según el cual "Las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha a la interposición de la acción a aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, afín de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa". Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo establecido en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que reconoce la posibilidad de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sin asunto base, en los casos en que por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. En cuanto a este último aspecto - o se tratare de la defensa de intereses difusos - , ya la Sala ha precisado que, el legislador se refiere a la legitimación que ostentan los ciudadanos activos por tratarse del derecho del trabajo. Los coadyuvantes, todos ellos colaboradores de la plataforma UBER en Costa Rica, basan su alegato en una supuesta inconstitucionalidad de la Ley No. 8955, Reforma la Ley No. 3284, Código de Comercio, y de la Ley No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, por estimarlas contrarias a los artículos 50, párrafo primero, y 46 de la Constitución Política. Explican que la Ley No. 8955 crea un monopolio que no estimula la producción interna de Costa Rica puesto que más bien la limita, “al establecer la actividad solo para un sector privilegiado”. Consideran que dicha ley coarta la posibilidad, para cientos de personas, de procurarse una “ocupación honesta y útil”, lo que supone un cercenamiento del derecho de cualquier individuo a que elija un puesto propio “que le permita ganarse la vida”; entienden que se trata de una “limitante a la libre elección del trabajo”. Citan, en su argumentación, un fragmento de la discusión legislativa, en la tramitación de la Ley No. 8955, haciendo alusión expresa a las actas del otrora proyecto de Ley, en resumen tal fragmento refiere que se trató de un “proceso de negociación en el cual el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes y sus autoridades, junto con la Cámara Nacional de Trasporte en Autobús, la Federación Nacional de Taxis y la Cámara de Porteadores como representante del sector, mantuvieron una sesión permanente de discusión, buscando una formulación consenso para solucionar la situación de los señores porteadores y señoras porteadoras”; como resultado de ese proceso, la información de base “permitió una propuesta de solución para reconocer el derecho y la operatividad de aquellas personas que efectivamente estaban prestando el servicio de porteo”, enfatizan en que dicha propuesta “obedece fundamentalmente que es una necesidad específica y puntual”. Por su parte los coadyuvantes concluyen, en relación con lo anterior, que el motivo de la Asamblea Legislativa para derogar la figura del porteo y “publificar” cualquier tipo de transporte remunerado de personas que se realice por medio de vehículos particulares dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas usuarias y que satisfaga una demanda limitada, residual, exclusiva y estable, fue “dirimir los conflictos suscitados entre taxistas, autobuseros y porteadores”, estiman que se está frente a una norma que limita libertades fundamentales, “al generar un supuesto beneficio para un grupo, pero una gran afectación para la colectividad”. Apoyan los alegatos adicionales de los accionantes, en síntesis refiriéndose a que la Ley No. 8955 es inconstitucional por no cumplir con el procedimiento legislativo, en relación con que no fue aprobada por una mayoría calificada, sino por una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, considerando que tal norma crea un monopolio estatal, todo lo cual es contrario al artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Toman como referencia el Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, aprobado mediante Ley No. 8622, Ley No. 21 de noviembre del 2007; del cual citan expresamente el artículo 11.4 de dicha Ley. Sobre este punto, concluyen que tal norma “prohíbe expresamente adoptar leyes, reglamentos, o procedimientos que restrinjan el número de proveedores de un servicio de un servicio limitado por su participación o acceso al mercado o creando, por ejemplo, contingentes numéricos o monopolios que concedan acceso, titularidad o control de la prestación de ese servicio, a un solo proveedor o pocos proveedores, recurriendo a medidas limitantes o discriminatorias”. Terminan indicando que la Ley No. 8955 violenta el principio constitucional de jerarquía de las normas porque sus disposiciones contravienen un tratado internacional (Ley No. 8622) y el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política.

34.- Por escrito presentado a las 14:04 horas del 01 de abril de 2016, Rogelio Fernández Ramírez y otros, se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indican que se encuentran debidamente, legitimados en su condición de usuarios de los servicios de transporte, por asistirles un interés legitimo, en los términos del artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, siendo posible identificar tres motivos, el primero de ellos que con la promulgación de la citada ley se da la creación de un monopolio estatal sin que el procedimiento legislativo se haya dado con una mayoría calificada en la votación, el transporte remunerado de personas, ha sido creado como un servicio público, siendo el Estado su único titular, con la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad que se pretende, se permitiría el porteo privado de personas, simultáneamente con el servicio de SEETAXI y los taxis tradicionales, por lo que eliminaría el monopolio público creado por la ley en comentario, al permitir la iniciativa privada en la actividad económica, en segundo lugar se da una infracción a los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de las normas, principio de libertad, iniciativa privada, libertad de comercio, libertad contractual, libertad de elección de los consumidores. La ley 8955 es inconstitucional porque incumple dos criterios constitucionales al afecto aplicables, por un lado no satisface un interés público imperativo y por otro lado limita libertades fundamentales de la manera más restrictiva posible, como tercer punto la citada norma contraviene el Tratado de Libre Comercio con EEUU, por ende es contraria a lo dispuesto en el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política, dado que su finalidad es la de servir como instrumento para la liberalización del comercio de bienes y servicios entre los Estados parte, garantizando la inversión extranjera y promoviendo condiciones de competencia leal, con la consecuente obtención de beneficios ostensibles para los usuarios y consumidores nacionales, en virtud de su trascendencia se ha de examinar el capitulo once del tratado, titulado “Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios” y específicamente el subtítulo “11.4. Acceso a los Mercados” toda vez que dicha clausula en particular la que la ley No. 8955 contraviene claramente, allí se establece la obligación de los Estados suscriptores de no imponer a los proveedores de servicios de otro Estado parte, restricciones de acceso, ya sean materiales o de orden normativo, a los distintos sectores económicos del mercado de servicios de otro Estado.

35.- Por escrito presentado a las 9:27 horas del 4 de abril de 2016, Paola Rojas Anchía y otros, se apersonan ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvantes activos en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indican que se encuentran debidamente, legitimados en su condición de usuarios de los servicios de transporte, por asistirles un interés legitimo, en los términos del artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, siendo posible identificar tres motivos, el primero de ellos que con la promulgación de la citada ley se da la creación de un monopolio estatal sin que el procedimiento legislativo se haya dado con una mayoría calificada en la votación, el transporte remunerado de personas, ha sido creado como un servicio público, siendo el Estado su único titular, con la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad que se pretende, se permitiría el porteo privado de personas, simultáneamente con el servicio de SEETAXI y los taxis tradicionales, por lo que eliminaría el monopolio público creado por la ley en comentario, al permitir la iniciativa privada en la actividad económica, en segundo lugar se da una infracción a los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de las normas, principio de libertad, iniciativa privada, libertad de comercio, libertad contractual, libertad de elección de los consumidores. La ley 8955 es inconstitucional porque incumple dos criterios constitucionales al afecto aplicables, por un lado no satisface un interés público imperativo y por otro lado limita libertades fundamentales de la manera más restrictiva posible, como tercer punto la citada norma contraviene el Tratado de Libre Comercio con EEUU, por ende es contraria a lo dispuesto en el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política, dado que su finalidad es la de servir como instrumento para la liberalización del comercio de bienes y servicios entre los Estados parte, garantizando la inversión extranjera y promoviendo condiciones de competencia leal, con la consecuente obtención de beneficios ostensibles para los usuarios y consumidores nacionales, en virtud de su trascendencia se ha de examinar el capitulo once del tratado, titulado “Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios” y específicamente el subtítulo “11.4. Acceso a los Mercados” toda vez que dicha clausula en particular la que la ley No. 8955 contraviene claramente, allí se establece la obligación de los Estados suscriptores de no imponer a los proveedores de servicios de otro Estado parte, restricciones de acceso, ya sean materiales o de orden normativo, a los distintos sectores económicos del mercado de servicios de otro Estado.

36.- Por escrito presentado ante la Secretaría de esta Sala a las 16:13 horas del 5 de abril del 2016, Jorge Vargas Corrales en su condición de presidente y apoderado de la sociedad anónima cuya cédula jurídica es 3-101-549995, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad. Fundamenta su legitimación activa en lo dispuesto por el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, toda vez que considera que existe un interés legítimo de su representada de que se acoja la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por cuanto la norma legal impugnada afecta directamente la actividad que han venido realizando. Explica que actualmente se encuentra en trámite un proceso de apelación, promovido por su representada, contra el artículo 7.8.1 y 7.8.10 de la sesión ordinaria 37-2017 [sic] del Consejo de Transporte Público, mediante la cual se deniega la solicitud de la sociedad coadyuvante para prestar el Servicio Especial de Taxi (SEETAXI). Relata que al aprobarse la Ley No. 8955 se revocaron las autorizaciones para el ejercicio del porteo de personas, actividad que tenía autorizada la sociedad coadyuvante ante el Consejo Transporte Público. Indica que por vía transitoria de la citada ley se les otorgó un plazo para continuar ejerciendo la actividad, ahora bajo la modalidad de SEETAXI, pero bajo el cumplimiento de una serie de requisitos. Cita, dentro de esos requisitos, el contar con las características de infraestructura de un parque público pero con la patente municipal para un parqueo privado, lo cual se cumplió y se le autorizó el ejercicio de la actividad. Refiere que nunca se le solicitó una patente de porteo. En 2012 el Consejo de Transporte Público le denegó a la sociedad coadyuvante la solicitud de autorización para que se le concedieran los permisos especiales de taxi, rechazo que se fundamentó en que no se habían cumplido todos los requisitos exigidos por la Procuraduría General de la República; indica que se le concedió un plazo de un mes para cumplir, finalmente no cumplió con lo requerido. Relata que toda la flotilla a cargo de la sociedad recurrente han venido trabajando en la zona de San Ramón y Palmares al amparado de la autorización del Consejo de Transporte Público, mientras culmina el proceso de resolución de los recursos administrativos que se presentaron, según lo posibilita la directriz VTTAV 0626-2016 emitida por la Viceministra de Transportes. El motivo de la anterior directriz, según refiere la sociedad coadyuvante, es la protección de los usurarios destinatarios del servicio público prestado por la sociedad coadyuvante. Relata que los afiliados de la sociedad han sido multados y se les han removido las placas de sus vehículos porque según los oficiales de tránsito ellos continúan ejerciendo el porteo de personas, lo cual comporta un no acatamiento de la mencionada directriz por parte de las autoridades de tránsito. Considera que, contrario a lo que sostiene el Consejo de Transporte Público, la anterior directriz todavía se encuentra vigente, puesto que no existe otra directriz posterior en sentido contrario o norma de mayor jerarquía. Expresa que comparte los argumentos respecto del objeto de esta acción, ya que estima que eliminándose la actividad del porteo, mediante reforma al artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, y sujetándose tal actividad a la Ley No. 8955, se está violentando el ordenamiento jurídico; lo anterior, primero por la infracción de las normas del procedimiento legislativo referentes a la mayoría calificada para aprobar la Ley No. 8955 y, segundo, porque se violenta la jerarquía normativa, en especial, respecto de los tratados internacionales vigentes en Costa Rica.

37.- Por escrito presentado a las 14:05 horas del 06 de abril de 2016, Luis Ángel Delgado González en su condición de Gerente General de Cooperativa Nacional de Servicios Múltiples y Transportes para Asociados, R.L, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indican que se encuentra debidamente, legitimado por tener interés directo en la resolución, indica que al aprobarse la mencionada ley se revocaron las autorizaciones para el ejercicio del porteo de personas, las cuales ejercían sus representadas, por lo que se les limitó el ejercicio de una actividad de transporte de personas autorizado en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, mediante la derogatoria con una ley aprobada de manera inconstitucional. La conducta de la administración pública de suspender la actividad de porteo mediante la aplicación de dicha ley, ha causado no solo un perjuicio a la colectividad sino que causo daños y perjuicios a la empresa y a los porteadores que componen la flotilla vehicular, por lo que interpusieron un proceso ordinario contra el Consejo de Transporte Público, dentro del cual se solicitó la no aplicación de la reforma del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, siendo que al sujetar toda actividad de transporte de personas, quede sometida según la ley 8955 al Consejo de Transporte Público, se está creando un monopolio estatal.

38.- Por escrito presentado a las 11:34 horas del 07 de abril de 2016, Ernesto Solano León y otros, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad.

39.- Por escrito presentado a las 14:39 horas del 08 de abril de 2016, Luis Alfredo Villalobos Salazar, en su condición de Presidente de la Junta Directiva de la Asociación Cámara Nacional de Autobuseros -CANABUS-, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante pasivo en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indica que el transporte remunerado de personas, obedece a un interés público el cual está regulado por el Estado, en dicha estructura de servicios regulares y para aquellas personas o lugares en donde no llegue éste servicio, existen como complemento los servicios de especiales, así como los servicios preferenciales, - para aquellos usuarios que no quieran usar los servicios antes descritos. Con la emisión de la ley 8955 sin ser necesario lo que se pretendía era aclarar el resabio de la palabra “porteo” en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, las leyes que regulan la materia de transporte público son claras y fueron emitidas con posterioridad, quedando claro que el transporte público es un servicio público, sea cual sea su modalidad, asimismo no existe violación alguna a lo establecido en el Tratado de Internacional de Libre Comercio, el cual excluye los servicios públicos y como tal el transporte remunerado de personas.

40.- Por escrito presentado a las 15:31 horas del 08 de abril de 2016, Rolf Erwin Richard Mangel, en su condición de representante legal de la compañía denominada Syniverse Technologies, S.R.L Costa Rica, se apersona ante esta Sala a fin de intervenir como coadyuvante activo en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, e indica que en fecha 14 de octubre de 2015, consultó por escrito ante el Consejo de Transporte Público sobre la posibilidad de implementar una política de vehículo compartido dentro de la empresa, siendo que dicho Consejo le respondió que la propuesta realizada presentaba rasgos distintivos y propios del transporte público, lo anterior en especial fundamento en las normas actualmente vigentes y que son producto de la Reforma al Código de Comercio y a la ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, ambas concretizadas mediante ley No. 8955 del 16 de junio de 2011, siendo que a su criterio la regulación estatal deviene excesiva. Indica que la ley No. 8955, ha nacionalizado el transporte remunerado de personas y ha creado un monopolio a favor del Estado, dado que la misma fue aprobada por una comisión con potestad legislativa plena, incumpliendo el procedimiento constitucional establecido al efecto, con la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad se permitiría el porteo privado de personas, como un contrato surgido de la autonomía de la voluntad, simultáneamente con el servicio de SEETAXI, y los taxis tradicionales, por lo que se eliminaría el monopolio público creado por la ley. Existe una violación a los principios de libertad, comercio, contractual y elección de los consumidores. La ley 8955 es inconstitucional porque incumple dos criterios constitucionales al afecto aplicables, por un lado no satisface un interés público imperativo y por otro lado limita libertades fundamentales de la manera más restrictiva posible, como tercer punto la citada norma contraviene el Tratado de Libre Comercio con EEUU, por ende es contraria a lo dispuesto en el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política, dado que su finalidad es la de servir como instrumento para la liberalización del comercio de bienes y servicios entre los Estados parte, garantizando la inversión extranjera y promoviendo condiciones de competencia leal, con la consecuente obtención de beneficios ostensibles para los usuarios y consumidores nacionales, en virtud de su trascendencia se ha de examinar el capitulo once del tratado, titulado “Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios” y específicamente el subtítulo “11.4. Acceso a los Mercados” toda vez que dicha clausula en particular la que la ley No. 8955 contraviene claramente, allí se establece la obligación de los Estados suscriptores de no imponer a los proveedores de servicios de otro Estado parte, restricciones de acceso, ya sean materiales o de orden normativo, a los distintos sectores económicos del mercado de servicios de otro Estado.

41.- Mediante resolución de las 14:38 horas del 25 de abril del 2016 se admitieron como coadyuvantes aquellos que se apersonan entre el 1ero de marzo y el 8 de abril del 2016. Además, se tuvo por contestada la audiencia conferida a la Procuraduría General de la República, y por no contestada la audiencia conferida al Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes (folio 1053-1054 del expediente digital).

42.- De forma extemporánea se presenta, CARLOS VILLALTA VILLEGAS, en su calidad de Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes, a indicar que rinde informe, manifestando en resumen que: Al tenor de lo establecido por el artículo 11 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y en relación con los artículos 11 y 129 de la Constitución Política, a la Administración por medio de los funcionarios públicos -en este caso a las autoridades del tránsito-, únicamente les corresponde velar por su cumplimiento, sin que estén autorizados para desaplicarlas. Como consecuencia de lo anterior, habiéndose promulgado la referida Ley No. 8955, compete al Consejo de Transporte Público su cumplimiento, por medio de las autoridades competentes, sin que pueda alegarse criterio alguno para posponer su debido cumplimiento, desde la óptica de este Ministerio en cuanto "ejecutor" de la referida legislación -la ejecución en lo conducente corresponde al Consejo de Transporte Público, salvo en lo que compete a la Policía de Tránsito-, los accionantes impugnan por supuestamente inconstitucional la Ley No. 8955, en cuanto reformó: La Ley No. 3284. Código de Comercio del 30 de abril de 1964 y La Ley No. 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi de 22 de diciembre de 1999. Consideran los accionantes que la indicada Ley No. 8955 resulta contraria a los artículos 7,28, 39, 41, 46, 129 y 140 de la Constitución Política y a "los principios de supremacía de la realidad en materia laboral, el de jerarquía normativa, así como los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, iniciativa privada, libertad de comercio, libertad contractual y libre elección de los consumidores". El servicio de porte ha sido una actividad comercial de uso significativa entratándose del transporte de mercaderías, en tanto que respecto a las personas fue durante muchos años "residual", siendo en todo ese periodo, este último, brindado por personas físicas, principalmente en sitios alejados donde las modalidades de transporte público autorizados no operaban, siendo frecuente encontrarlos a lo largo en cruces de caminos secundarios con las rutas principales, en los últimos años antes de la promulgación de la Ley No. 8955 y merced a diversas posiciones asumidas en vía administrativa y judicial, se abrió el "espectro" de prestación de la actividad de porte de personas, convirtiéndose en un negocio ya no de personas físicas sino de personas jurídicas que, rápidamente, establecieron "sucursales" en las principales cabeceras de cantón del país, fenómeno, que generó un conflicto con el servicio público de taxis, el cual es una actividad del Estado, el transporte remunerado de personas al tenor del ordenamiento jurídico vigente es y debe ser una actividad del Estado, por encontrarse inmerso un interés público claro y específico. Al generarse una contraposición entre el porteo, ya masivo por ser a cargo de personas jurídicas, frente al servicio público de taxis, la opción que por entonces la Asamblea Legislativa determinó como jurídicamente viable fue aprobar la Ley 8955, mediante la cual reformó, entre otros, el Código de Comercio, con el fin de que en lo sucesivo la figura del porteo de personas quedara excluida de regulación comercial. El derecho de explotación del servicio de taxis es del Estado, quien temporalmente lo otorga a particulares que cumplan determinados requisitos. De esta forma, la figura del porte de personas resulta improcedente por la forma y por el fondo, al contraponerse a un servicio del Estado, así establecido por ley No. 7969, la Ley No. 8955 ciertamente suprimió la figura del porte de personas -no de mercancías- en el Código de Comercio, pero por la reforma introducida a la Ley No. 7969 posibilitó que quienes estaban operando, ya para entonces masivamente integrados en personas jurídicas, como "porteadores", se integraran dentro de un servicio bajo el control del Estado, denominado “servicios especiales estables de taxi” conocidos como "SEETAXI". Los accionantes con la inconstitucionalidad lo que al parecer pretenden es que se retroceda histórica, técnica y operativamente, lanzando al mercado un "númerus apertus" de nuevos porteadores, y para ello invocan que con la Ley que ahora impugnan, se estarían violentando los artículos 7, 28, 39, 41, 46, 129 y 140 de la Constitución Política. Respecto al artículo 7: No es cierto que se violenten las disposiciones del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, ya que el transporte remunerado de personas no corresponde a una actividad comercial sino que constituye un servicio público del Estado, primero con base en la ley No. 3503 de 10 de mayo de 1965 y sus reformas; posteriormente, de acuerdo con la Ley No. 5406 del Servicio Público de Taxis, ya derogada y, finalmente, con la actualmente vigente Ley No. 7969. Artículo 28: Se distorsiona el contenido de esta norma constitucional ya que, precisamente, quien pretenda operar como porteador de personas estaría infringiendo la ley, ya que el transporte remunerado de personas es un servicio público. Artículo 39: Resulta inaplicable al caso concreto, puesto que si se sanciona a quien de hecho actualmente esté ejerciendo el porte de personas, es por cuanto dicha actividad no está permitida por encontrarse definido por ley desde el año 1965 y hasta la fecha que el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores es un servicio público, Artículo 41: Inaplicable también al presente caso en cuanto al fondo, ya que constituye una garantía procesal para acudir a la Justicia, pero sin que para el caso concreto se demuestre infracción alguna con motivo de la promulgación de la Ley No. 8955. Artículos 45 y 46, no estamos en presencia de un "monopolio privado" y menos aún de un "monopolio público" recién constituido, por cuanto desde el año 1965 con la Ley No. 3503 se estableció que el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores es un servicio público del Estado, posteriormente la Ley 5406 lo reafirmó y la Ley No. 7969 lo reitera, constituyendo la Ley No. 8955 una normativa complementaria a las anteriores. Artículo 129: No existe infracción alguna a esta disposición constitucional y más bien los recurrentes, son quienes pretenden "legitimar" el porte de personas a pesar de su inexistencia legal. Artículo 140: Corresponde a las atribuciones del Presidente de la República y el respectivo Ministro, es decir, al Poder Ejecutivo. (Ver folios 1181-1188 del expediente digital).

43.- Mediante resolución de las 14:43 horas del 28 de abril del 2016 se indica que listos los autos se pasó esta acción al Magistrado que por turno corresponde.

44.- Se presenta escrito de MARIO HUMBERTO ZARATE SANCHEZ, en su calidad de Director Ejecutivo a.i del Consejo de Transporte Público, en fecha 04 de mayo del 2016, en resumen que: En apego a la literalidad de la norma impugnada vía acción de inconstitucionalidad, el Consejo de Transporte Público como Órgano Desconcentrado adscrito al Ministerio de Obras Públicas, con competencia autónoma en relación a la materia de transporte público, es quien en representación del Estado, asume la potestad de autorizar los permisos de servicio especial estable de taxi (seetaxi), convirtiéndose así en un ejecutor por imperio legal de las disposiciones de la Ley No. 8955, y es en virtud de dicha facultación y en concordancia con el numeral 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción constitucional, que como coadyuvante en condición de ejecutor de la ley accionada, se rinde el presente informe. Sobre el transporte remunerado de personas (servicio público), el artículo 2 de la Ley No. 7969, refiere a la naturaleza de la prestación del servicio, y en tal sentido dispone que para todos los efectos legales y de prestaciones el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi se considera un servicio público que se explotará mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa con los procedimientos especiales establecidos en dicha ley y su reglamento o del permiso en el caso de servicios especiales estables de taxi, de conformidad con lo establecido en el inciso a) del artículo 7 de la ley ibídem. De igual forma, señala el citado numeral que el transporte remunerado de personas, que se realiza por medio de autobuses, busetas, microbuses, taxis, automóviles y cualquier otro tipo de vehículo automotor, ya sea que se ofrezca al público en general, a personas usuarias o a grupos determinados de personas usuarias con necesidades especificas que constituyen demandas especiales es un servicio público del cual es titular el Estado, esto, independientemente del grado de intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo del servicio o en su fiscalización. Al momento de someter al control constitucional el proyecto de ley No. 8955, la Sala Constitucional señaló, que como consecuencia de declarar servicio público el transporte remunerado de personas, en cualquiera de sus dos modalidades el legislador procuró, abstraer de la esfera privada la prestación del servicio de transporte de personas que en su totalidad ha sido declarado servicio público por el legislador y hace que sean otras las reglas del juego y principios jurídicos a aplicar. Para esto, los particulares se convierten en colaboradores de la Administración Pública en la prestación de ese servicio que por sus características y la existencia de un interés público, debe ser asumido por el Estado sin que estén de por medio principios y derechos que rigen las relaciones privadas, como el principio de autonomía de la voluntad o la libertad de comercio, -resolución No. 201 1-04778 de las 14:31 horas del 13 de abril del 2011, emitida por la Sala Constitucional-. Consecuentemente, tal y como lo cita el órgano constitucional, el legislador procuró y declaró como servicio público, las distintas modalidades de transporte remunerado de personas en virtud de la trascendencia o impacto que tiene dicha actividad en la sociedad. En este sentido la Procuraduría General de la República en su Dictamen C-288-2014, señaló que "ningún particular puede prestar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, en sus distintas modalidades, si no cuenta con una concesión “permiso de parte del Estado”, concretamente del Consejo de Transporte Público, órgano desconcentrado del MOPT. En conclusión el servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en sus diversas modalidades solo pueden brindarlo aquellas personas físicas o jurídicas. que de forma previa, cuentan con la autorización respectiva (permiso o concesión), conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público al tenor de los procedimientos que establecen las leyes, que para tal efecto regulan el transporte remunerado de personas (Dictamen C-288-2014). Conforme al análisis realizado, en cuanto al tema de transporte remunerado de personas y sus modalidades, conforme a la ley No. 7969, se regula el servicio de transporte público realizado a través de la modalidad taxi, siendo el proceso de selección por excelencia el concurso público, asimismo, dicha ley, regula el servicio especial estable de taxi (seetaxi, antes porteo), mismo que se autoriza mediante la figura precaria del permiso, y cierra toda posibilidad de realizar transporte de personas desde el ámbito privado. Por su parte, la Ley No. 3503 dispone lo relativo al transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad autobús, el cual puede obtenerse ya sea producto de un proceso o licitación pública, o en su defecto a través de un permiso, tal y como lo estipula el artículo 25 de la ley No. 3503, en este tipo de concesiones la Administración debe garantizar el equilibrio económico y financiero de los contratos. De igual forma, los permisos de servicio especial, que son tres a saber: estudiantes, trabajadores y turismo, regulados en el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 15203-MOPT, siendo que para el caso del permiso de turismo se han emitido normas específicas para su aplicación. Estos permisos de servicio especial, están fundados en su orden, a la existencia de contratos con padres de familia o centros educativos, contratos con empresas o trabajadores, y autorización del Instituto Costarricense de Turismo. Estos servicios como lo indica su término, son especiales, y no pueden realizar demanda de pasajeros, su prestación está dirigida para el fin de autorización únicamente y puede prestarse en microbús, buseta o autobús. Cada servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas, satisface necesidades de la demanda, sobre esto, si se trata del transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de autobús, su procedencia y aplicación se ven reflejadas en un estudio técnico, que pormenorizadamente refleja las necesidades en la prestación del servicio para una o varias comunidades, para este servicio, el Consejo de Transporte Público define, recorrido, horarios, flota óptima y esquema de operación, ya lo relativo a la tarifa, por disposición de ley, es competencia de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (Aresep). Tratándose del servido de taxi, se realiza un estudio de oferta y demanda, dado que este servicio se adjudica por base de operación, y a pesar que cada concesión de taxi es personalísima, la misma se encuentra adscrita a una base de operación, con el fin de mantener el equilibrio económico y financiero de los contratos de concesión de cada concesionario de taxi. El servicio de taxi, se caracteriza por algunos factores, siendo que algunos de ellos, operan por base de operación, responden a una demanda, es un servicio abierto, público y notorio, se realiza en demanda de pasajeros, se ruletea, se identifica a través de un logo y color definido previamente, tiene tarifa única autorizada por ARESEP. También, regula la ley No. 7969 el servicio especial estable de taxi conocido como SEETAXI y que antes de la derogatoria del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio se ejercía como actividad de porteo concebido como un servicio que se presta de puerta a puerta, para satisfacer una necesidad de servicio limitado, residual y dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas diferente del que se presta con el servicio de taxi. El seetaxi, para su aplicación requiere entre otros, de un área geográfica que se define mediante patente municipal, y la existencia de contratos escritos entre las partes. Para esto, los permisos en la modalidad servicio especial estable de taxi deben ser expedidos por el Consejo de Transporte Público, previa presentación de la copia certificada del contrato o los contratos suscritos con las personas, las instituciones o las empresas que hacen uso de su servicio y otros requisitos legalmente establecidos. El servicio especial estable de taxi, es un servicio que se encuentra dirigido a una demanda residual y limitada, aquella que requiere de un recorrido de puerta a puerta, previa concretización de un contrato entre las partes, lo que lleva implícito el precio de dicho servicio. En este caso, el usuario llama a la empresa permisionaria y requiere el servicio de transporte, pactando el precio permisionario SEETAXI con el cliente y que corresponde al recorrido realizado. El interés del legislador, tal y como lo acotó la Sala Constitucional, en virtud de la trascendencia del servicio respecto a la sociedad se abstrajo este servicio privado para darle el tratamiento de servicio público, considerando además la actividad económica que media, el interés general (usuario residual, limitado, cerrado). El seetaxi, tiene prohibida la demanda de pasajeros, el ruleteo y otros aspectos que se encuentran establecidos en la ley No. 7969 a partir de la reforma introducida con la ley No. 8955 el 07 de julio del 2011. Conforme a lo anterior, podemos concretar que tal y como lo enuncia la ley No. 7969, todo transporte remunerado de personas, que se preste con vehículos automóviles, busetas, microbuses y autobuses, es titularidad del Estado, y para su prestación o explotación, debe mediar la autorización respectiva del Consejo de Transporte Público, con la entrada en vigencia de la Ley No. 8955, pierde aplicabilidad el servicio privado, siendo que todo transporte de personas se enmarca en la esfera de servicio público, dicha norma no deja lugar a excepciones ni a interpretaciones, por cuanto es una norma clara y específica. Así las cosas, no puede alegarse monopolio alguno, debido a que la concesión de servicio público se obtiene por licitación pública, en la cual existe libre participación, asimismo, para poder obtener un permiso de servicio público cualquier persona puede solicitarlo, cuya autorización depende del cumplimiento de los requisitos legales. La Procuraduría General de la República con fundamento en los artículos 1, 2, 3, 4 de la Ley No. 6815, ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República, emitió un criterio vinculante en torno a la consulta efectuada por el Auditor Interno de este Consejo, siendo el tema consultado el servido especial estable de taxi (seetaxi) a partir de la Ley No. 8955, lo cual implicó un abordaje por parte del órgano procurador, en relación a la figura del porteo de personas regulado hasta el 06 de julio del 2011, en el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, derogado en su totalidad por dicha ley. Se pueden rescatar tres notas características del servicio público: a) Que es una actividad propia de la Administración: b) Que tiende a procurar una prestación a la población, y c) Que esa prestación deber ser garantizada de manera efectiva. No obstante, ser en principio el servicio público una actividad propia de la Administración, ello no excluye la posibilidad de participación de los particulares en la gestión pública, por medio especialmente de la concesión de servicio público, como sucede a menudo con los transportes y servicios en puertos y aeropuertos. Cobran especial relevancia dos asuntos ya mencionados y que deben en este momento rescatarse. En primer lugar que la naturaleza pública que puede comportar una determinada actividad servicial, presupone la respectiva declaratoria por parte del poder público, publicatio que, en nuestro ordenamiento, es un asunto rigurosamente reservado a la ley, por las restricciones a la libertad de empresa que la misma acarrea. En segundo término, cabe también insistir en que es posible, y también cada vez más frecuente, la participación de sujetos no estatales en la prestación de los servicios públicos, con la autorización y bajo el control y vigilancia del Estado; aunque, como se advertía, no toda actividad privada de interés o actividad pública constituye servicio público. De lo anterior se desprende que la declaratoria de una determinada actividad económica como servicio público implica su nacionalización. Es decir le atribuye al Estado su titularidad, de forma tal que solo éste o un particular autorizado, puede brindar el servicio. Otro efecto de la declaratoria de servicio público es que la actividad económica sale del comercio de los hombres, no pudiendo estos desarrollarla en forma libre. La única forma de dedicarse a ella es mediante una concesión o permiso del Estado. Sin embargo, aún en tales casos, la titularidad del servicio la mantiene el Estado, limitándose el particular únicamente a su prestación efectiva. En el caso del transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores -en sus distintas modalidades autobuses y taxi-, no cabe ninguna duda de que constituye un servicio público. En efecto, la ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores, No. 3503 del 10 de mayo de 1965, califica al transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores colectivos como un servicio público regulado controlado y vigilado por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, cuya prestación puede ser delegada en los particulares, a quienes se autorice expresamente, de acuerdo con las normas establecidas en dicha ley (artículos 1 y 2). En igual calificación se deriva de lo dispuesto en el artículo 5, inciso f) de la Ley de creación de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, No. 7593 del 9 de agosto de 1 996, que califica el transporte remunerado de personas como un servicio público. En el mismo sentido, la ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, No. 7969 del 22 de diciembre de 1999, define a este medio de transporte como un servicio público que se explota mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa, con los procedimientos especiales establecidos en esta ley y su reglamento (artículo 2). Y mediante la reforma introducida al artículo 2 de la Ley 7969, precisamente por el artículo 2 de la Ley 8955, del 16 de junio del 2011, se establece como servicio público el transporte remunerado de personas en cualquier tipo de vehículo automotor independientemente del grado de intervención estatal. El párrafo segundo de la norma en cuestión, dispone: "El transporte remunerado de personas que se realiza por medio de autobuses, busetas, microbuses, taxis, automóviles y cualquier otro tipo de vehículo automotor ya sea que se ofrezca al público en general, a personas usuarias o a grupos determinados de personas usuarias con necesidades especificas que constituyen demandas especiales, es un servicio público del cual es titular el Estado. Lo anterior independientemente del grado de intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo del servicio o en su fiscalización”. Ningún particular puede prestar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, en sus distintas modalidades, si no cuenta con una concesión o permiso de parte del Estado. Y ello es, precisamente, lo que establece el artículo 112 de la Ley de Tránsito por Vía Públicas Terrestres, que prohíbe a los propietarios o conductores de vehículos, dedicarse a la actividad del transporte público, sin contar con las respectivas autorizaciones y placas legalmente adjudicadas. Sobre la figura jurídica del "porteo de personas", a pesar de que el transporte remunerado de personas constituye un servicio público y, en principio, solo aquellas personas autorizadas por el Estado podrían brindarlo, aquellos servicios de transporte terrestre de personas que no son subsumibles dentro del servicio público de transporte a través de vehículos automotores colectivos y de taxi pueden ser gestionados por los sujetos privados, acciones estas que no podrían ser prohibidas ni sancionadas, en vista de que están fuera de la acción de la ley y son el resultado del ejercicio de dos importantes libertades públicas (la libertad de empresa y la libertad de contratación). Dicho de otra forma, si los sujetos privados, recurriendo al principio de libertad y a las libertades económicas indicadas, descubren o crean nuevas modalidades de transporte de personas en vehículos, las cuales, dada su naturaleza, se diferencian de las dos que están nacionalizadas, tienen todo el derecho de realizar esa actividad económica, hoy en nuestro medio conviven varias modalidades de transporte de personas por vía terrestre. Unas reguladas por el Derecho Público otras por el Derecho Privado, más específicamente por el Derecho Mercantil o Comercial. Los sujetos privados pueden desarrollar actividades de transporte de personas como cualquier otra actividad económica, siempre y cuando estas no conlleven la prestación del servicio público de transporte a través de vehículos automotores colectivos o de la modalidad taxi. Sobre la derogación de la figura del porteo de personas y la creación de la figura "servicio especial estable de taxi". En virtud de los múltiples problemas suscitados entre taxistas, autobuseros y porteadores, los representantes de los tres grupos (Cámara Nacional de Transporte en Autobús, la Federación Nacional de Taxis y la Cámara de Porteadores), conjuntamente con las autoridades del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, se reunieron en múltiples oportunidades y llegaron a un consenso para regular la actividad de los porteadores. A tal propósito, la Diputada Viviana Martin redactó un proyecto de ley mediante el cual se eliminó la figura del porteo de personas del Código de Comercio y trasladó la regulación de dicha actividad, bajo el nombre de “servicio especial estable de taxi'” a la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, No. 7969, del 22 de diciembre de 1999. Fue así como, atendiendo la propuesta consensuada de los representantes del sector transporte remunerado de personas, la Asamblea Legislativa, bajo el expediente No. 17874 tramitó el proyecto de ley que culminó con la aprobación de la Ley No. 8955, del 16 de junio del 2011. De esta forma se elimina el porteo de personas, pero no se elimina el porteo en sí es decir lo que se está eliminando es la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, pero se puede seguir transportando cosas, artículos, dineros, correspondencia, etc. Teniendo en consideración el interés público involucrado y atendiendo el consenso logrado por las partes interesadas, el legislador optó por declarar el transporte de personas como servicio público, independientemente de le modalidad de que se trate y del grado de intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo o de su fiscalización. A la vez, reguló la actividad del porteo de personas, la cual pasó a denominarse servicio especial estable de taxi, manteniendo la misma condición de servicio residual que tenía el porteo de personas. De hecho, el servicio especial estable de taxi, fue definido como el "servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas usuarias y que satisface una demanda limitada, residual, exclusiva y estable." (Artículo 1, inciso I) de la Ley No. 7969, adicionado por la Ley No. 8955). De los requisitos y condiciones para ejercer la actividad de transporte de personas bajo la modalidad "servicio especial estable de taxi". Mediante la Ley No. 8955, del 16 de junio del 2011, no solo se reformó el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, eliminando la figura del porteo de personas, sino que, además, se reguló la actividad, denominándola “servicio especial estable de taxi", en la ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi. El servicio especial estable de taxi, mantiene la misma condición residual y limitada que tenía el porteo de personas. Ahora bien, respecto de los requisitos y condiciones para ejercer la actividad del servicio especial de taxi, los artículos 2 y 29 de la ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad de Taxi, según reforma introducida por la citada Ley No. 8955. El servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, en sus diversas modalidades (autobús. taxi. seetaxi, microbús y otros), constituye un servicio público. El servicio público es una actividad administrativa que tiene por objeto una prestación, se caracteriza por el hecho que tiende a procurar una prestación a la población siendo su finalidad asegurar de forma positiva la satisfacción de una necesidad de la colectividad. El servicio público es un servicio prestado al público, sea cual sea el estrato social en el cual se ubique. Se caracteriza por ser una actividad propia de la Administración, tiende a procurar una prestación a la población, y esa prestación debe ser garantizada de manera efectiva. La declaratoria de una determinada actividad económica como servicio público, implica su nacionalización le atribuye al Estado su titularidad, de forma tal que solo éste o un particular autorizado puede brindar el servicio. Asimismo, la declaratoria de servicio público es que la actividad económica sale del comercio de los hombres, no pudiendo estos desarrollarla en forma libre. La única forma de dedicarse a ella es mediante una concesión o permiso del Estado, aún en tales casos, la titularidad del servicio la mantiene el Estado, limitándose el particular únicamente a su prestación efectiva, siempre que se ajuste a la normativa vigente que regula el transporte de personas mismo que se constituye como servicio público en cualquier modalidad que se quiera implementar. En el caso del transporte de personas en vehículos automotores -en sus distintas modalidades, constituye un servicio público, regulado, controlado y vigilado por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, cuya prestación puede ser delegada en los particulares, a quienes se autorice expresamente de acuerdo con las normas establecidas en el Ordenamiento Jurídico para tal efecto. Si existe concurrencia de operadores en una cantidad mayor a la demanda o de personas no autorizadas, se presenta una competencia que puede ser ruinosa para los concesionarios y los permisionarios ya autorizados y el Estado responderá por ello si se tolera tal competencia. La actividad del porteo de personas ya derogada pasó a denominarse servicio especial estable de taxi, manteniendo la misma condición de servicio residual, pero como servicio público. EI servicio especial estable de taxi fue definido como el servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas usuarias y que satisface una demanda limitada, residual exclusiva y estable. Respecto al tratado de Libre Comercio República Dominicana Centroamérica -Estados Unidos (CAFTA-DR), el Tratado de Libre Comercio República Dominica-Centroamérica-Estados Unidos conocido como CAFTA, entró en vigencia el 01 de enero de 2009, mismo que se publicó mediante la Ley No. 8622 del 21 de noviembre de 2007, publicada en el Alcance No. 40 a la Gaceta No. 246 del 21 de diciembre de 2007, el tratado regula las relaciones comerciales y de inversión entre Centroamérica, Estados Unidos y República Dominicana. En el caso de Costa Rica éste tratado constituye uno de los principales instrumentos de la política comercial, por cuanto regula el comercio con el principal socio comercial del país. El tratado permitió modernizar la legislación costarricense en materia de propiedad intelectual, seguros, telecomunicaciones y contratos de distribución, así como facilitar mecanismos para asegurar la efectiva aplicación de la legislación laboral y ambiental. Los accionantes, sostienen que la ley No. 8955, violenta los alcances del referido Tratado de Libre Comercio (CAFTA), al respecto, se verificó que el Anexo I, Lista de Costa Rica del Tratado de Libre Comercio República Dominicana- Centroamérica- Estados Unidos, el sector denominado en dicho anexo como "Servicios de Transporte por Vía Terrestre- Transporte de Pasajeros” y se hace referencia puntual de todas las medidas atinentes con dicho servicio, entre los que se abrigan el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 26 del 10 de noviembre de 1965, la Ley No. 3503, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31 180-MOPT, Ley No. 7969, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 5743-T. Decreto Ejecutivo No. 28913-MOPT, Ley No. 5066, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 28337-MOPT. Decreto Ejecutivo No. 15203-MOPT y la Ley No. 7593. Y en cuanto a la descripción, "Servicios Transfronterizos e Inversión", se dispone de manera textual lo siguiente: “Servicios Transfronterizos e Inversión Costa Rica se reserva el derecho de limitar el número de concesiones para operar las líneas domésticas de rutas de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores (incluyendo servicios especiales de transporte de personas definido en los Artículos 2 y 3 del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 15203-MOPT del 22 de febrero de 1984 - Reglamento para la Explotación de Servicios Especiales de Transporte Automotor Remunerado de Personas). Dichas concesiones deberán ser otorgadas mediante licitación, y únicamente se licitará la explotación de una línea cuando el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes haya establecido la necesidad de prestar el servicio, de acuerdo con los estudios técnicos respectivos. Cuando hubiere múltiples ofertas, incluyendo una de un proveedor costarricense que satisfaga todos los requerimientos en la misma medida, se preferirá la oferta costarricense antes que la extranjera, trátese de personas naturales o empresas. Un permiso para operar un servicio internacional de transporte remunerado de personas, será otorgado únicamente a empresas constituidas bajo la Legislación de Costa Rica o aquellas cuyo capital esté integrado al menos en un 60 por ciento con aportaciones de nacionales de Centroamérica. En adición a la restricción arriba descrita, en el otorgamiento de permisos para realizar servicios internacionales de transporte remunerado de personas, se aplicará el principio de reciprocidad. Se requerirá un permiso para prestar servicios de transporte remunerado de pasajeros por vía terrestre. Nuevas concesiones podrán ser otorgadas si lo justifica la demanda por el servicio. Se dará prioridad a los concesionarios que se encuentran suministrando el servicio. Costa Rica se reserva el derecho de limitar el número de permisos o concesiones para suministrar el servicio doméstico remunerado ANEXO I, Lista de Costa Rica I-CR-13 de transporte de pasajeros por vía terrestre, basado en la demanda por el servicio. Se dará prioridad a los concesionarios que se encuentran suministrando el servicio. El Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes se reserva el derecho de fijar anualmente el número de concesiones que se otorgarán en cada distrito, cantón y provincia para los servicios de taxi. Únicamente se podrá otorgar una concesión de taxi para cada persona natural y cada concesión otorga el derecho de operar únicamente un vehículo. Las licitaciones para concesión de taxis se conceden con base a un sistema de puntos, el cual otorga ventaja a los proveedores existentes. Cada concesión para prestar servicios públicos regulares de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores, excluyendo taxis, únicamente podrá ser otorgada a una persona, a menos que una prueba de necesidades económicas evidencia la necesidad de contar con proveedores adicionales. Adicionalmente, una persona natural no podrá poseer más de dos empresas ni podrá ser accionista mayoritario en más de tres empresas operando rutas diferentes. Los permisos para proveer servicios de transporte de personas en autobuses no turísticos dentro del Gran Área Metropolitana del Valle Central de Costa Rica, deberán ser otorgados únicamente una vez que se haya demostrado que el servicio regular de autobús público no puede satisfacer la demanda. Costa Rica se reserva el derecho de mantener monopolio del transporte por ferrocarriles. Sin embargo, el Estado podrá otorgar concesiones a paniculares. Las concesiones podrán ser otorgadas si lo justifica la demanda por el servicio. Se dará prioridad a los concesionarios que se encuentran suministrando el servicio." De conformidad con lo transcrito, es claro que nuestro Gobierno se garantiza y reserva en el tratado de libre comercio República Dominicana-Centroamérica-Estados Unidos. La titularidad y todo lo vinculado con el transporte de personas incluido el transporte internacional de pasajeros y los servicios especiales (estudiantes, trabajadores y turismo). En consecuencia, quien pretenda su incursión en nuestro país, en el tanto refiera al transporte de personas, debe sujetarse el Ordenamiento Jurídico Interno, ya que nuestro país tiene garantizado dentro del Anexo I del referido tratado, la aplicación de la normativa vinculada con dichos servicios públicos y sus diversas modalidades. Esto implica, que se requiere de la autorización del Consejo de Transporte Público, para poner en marcha el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas que se pretenda brindar, de conformidad con lo preceptuado por la Ley No. 7969 y su reforma, la cual no transgrede ni violenta la normativa constitucionalidad consagrada en los numerales, 7 46, 129 y 140 de nuestra Carta Magna. (Ver folios 1215-1247 del expediente digital).

45.- Posterior a la fecha en que esta Sala definió admitir coadyuvancias, se presentan los siguientes escritos: El 15 de julio del 2016 la Federación Nacional de Cooperativas de Taxi Fenacootaxi, solicitan audiencia. El 21 de junio del 2016 Rubén Vargas Campos en su calidad de Secretario General de la Unión de Taxistas Costarricenses solicitando se declare sin lugar la acción. El 23 de julio del 2016 por Miguel Angel Salas Castro, solicitando ser tenido como coadyuvante pasivo. El 05 de setiembre del 2016 por apoderados de la Unión Nacional de Porteadores, solicitando ser tenidos como coadyuvantes activos. El 12 de octubre del 2016 la Asociación Cámara Nacional de Autobuseros CANABUS solicitando se resuelva esta acción a la brevedad. El 20 de octubre del 2016, Edwin Barboza Guzman, Gerente de Fenacootaxi solicitando justicia. El 26 de octubre del 2016 un miembro del Comité Nacional de ex porteadores y seetaxi solicitando una audiencia. El 31 de octubre del 2016 un miembro del Comité Nacional de ex porteadores y seetaxi solicitando una audiencia.

46.- El accionante, Presidente de la Asociación Nacional de Consumidores Libre (ACL) presenta escrito el 4 y el 8 de julio del 2016, refiriéndose a los argumentos de los órganos estatales, indicando que la declaratoria de servicio público no implica el monopolio estatal, que la reforma de la Ley 8955 aumentó la disconformidad con el TLC, por lo que solicita se rechacen las coadyuvancias del MOPT y el CTP. En cuanto al informe de la PGR indica que la reforma no satisface el interés público representado por el consumidor, no mejoró las condiciones del servicio para los usuarios, contraviene el TLC.

47.- Mediante escrito del 15 de julio del 2016 los representantes de la Federación Nacional de Cooperativas de Taxi Fenacootaxi R.L y otros, solicitan una audiencia con el Magistrado Instructor.

48.- Mediante escrito presentado el 23 de julio del 2016, Miguel Angel Salas Castro indica que, aunque fuera de plazo se apersona como coadyuvante pasivo.

49.- Mediante escrito presentado el 05 de setiembre del 2016, se apersonan representantes de la Unión Nacional de Porteadores –UNAPORTE S.A.- ya coadyuvantes activos, a solicitar audiencia a la Sala Constitucional.

50.- Mediante respuesta del 14 de setiembre del 2016 el Magistrado Instructor se refiere a las solicitudes de audiencia.

51.- Mediante escrito del 20 de octubre del 2016, la Asociación Cámara Nacional de Autobuseros CANABUS, en calidad de coadyuvantes pasivos, solicitan se resuelva a la mayor brevedad esta acción de inconstitucionalidad.

52.- Mediante escrito del 20 de octubre del 2016 el Gerente General de la Federación Nacional de Cooperativas de Taxi, solicita la pronta resolución de esta acción.

53.- Mediante escrito presentado el 26 de octubre del 2016 (reiterado el 31 de octubre del 2016) se apersona un miembro del Comité Nacional de ex porteadores y seetaxis, a solicitar audiencia.

54.- Mediante resolución número 2016-016314 de las 10:00 horas del 04 de noviembre del 2016 la Sala resolvió desglosar el escrito de interposición del recurso de amparo número 16-015165-0007-CO a este expediente, donde solicita se suspenda el cobro del marchamo del periodo 2017 a todos los concesionarios del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas modalidad taxi, hasta tanto no se resuelva la acción, debido a que algunos de los rubros están vinculados a las leyes que se impugnan.

55.- Mediante escrito presentado el 09 de noviembre del 2016 el Presidente de Auto Transportes para socios San Jorge S.A. solicita que la Sala se pronuncie sobre el incumplimiento de COSEVI, pues están llevando a cabo procesos sancionatorios por transporte ilegal de personas en la modalidad de vehículo sedán.

56.- Mediante escrito presentado el 11 de noviembre del 2016 la Apoderada de la Unión Nacional de Porteadores UNAPORTE S.A. se apersona indicando que lo hace como coadyuvante activa.

57.- Mediante respuesta del 11 de noviembre del 2016 el Magistrado Instructor se refiere a las solicitudes de audiencia.

58.- Mediante resolución de las 15:07 horas del 10 de enero del 2017 se solicitó como prueba para mejor resolver al Ministro de Comercio Exterior, a fin de que se refiera a los hechos alegados en la acción de inconstitucionalidad.

59.- Mediante constancia del 21 de diciembre del 2016 el Magistrado Instructor consigna que la acción fue sometida a votación ese día, sin que pudiese concluir su análisis, por cuanto se dispuso llevarlo a votación con Magistrados Propietarios en el mes de enero del 2017.

60.- Mediante escrito presentado el 24 de enero del 2017, se refiere a la prueba anterior, ALEXANDER MORA DELGADO, en su calidad de Ministro de Comercio Exterior, indicando en resumen que dado que ese Ministerio es el representante de la Parte Costa Rica ante la Comisión de Libre Comercio y ante los mecanismos de solución de controversias en los que el país sea parte, esa institución debe de abstenerse de referirse a los hechos y argumentos acerca de si la ley impugnada trasgrede o no las normas constitucionales y comerciales internacionales y principios apuntados por los accionantes, toda vez que el análisis de estos, por una parte escapa de la competencia de COMEX y por otra, conllevaría irremediablemente a revelar a priori argumentos que podría utilizar otra Parte del Tratado ante un eventual mecanismo de solución de controversias contra Costa Rica.

61.- Mediante escrito presentado el 24 de enero del 2017 el accionante Otto Guevara Guth aporta como prueba el oficio DM-1325-5 del 16 de diciembre del 2005 emitido por el Ministerio de Comercio Exterior donde este rinde criterio sobre un proyecto similar a la ley impugnada, donde expresó que dicho proyecto contraviene las disposiciones del capítulo 11 sobre Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios del Tratado de Libre Comercio. Asimismo aporta el 31 de enero del 2017, una publicación realizada por un diputado sobre la empresa UBER y CAFTA.

62. Mediante resolución número 2017-001922 de las 11 horas del 08 de febrero del 2017 la Sala resolvió sobre la recusación presentada en contra del Magistrado Instructor, rechazar la gestión planteada y declarar habilitado al Magistrado Fernando Cruz Castro para conocer el presente asunto.

63.- Mediante escrito presentado el 08 de febrero del 2017 la Apoderada de la Unión Nacional de Porteadores UNAPORTE S.A. indica que se adhiere a la recusación presentada.

64.- Mediante escrito presentado el 13 de febrero del 2017 se apersona Rubén Vargas Campos, donde solicita tomar en cuenta la burla que se pretende realizar a nuestras leyes.

65.- Se prescinde de la vista señalada en los artículos 10 y 85 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, con base en la potestad que otorga a la Sala el numeral 9 ibídem, al estimar suficientemente fundada esta resolución en principios y normas evidentes, así como en la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal.

66.- En los procedimientos se ha cumplido las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta el Magistrado Cruz Castro; y,

Considerando:

I.- Objeto de la impugnación.- Los accionantes impugnan la Ley n.° 8955, del 16 de junio del 2011, que es “Reforma de la ley n.º 3284, Código de Comercio, de 30 de abril de 1964, y de la ley n.º 7969, Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de diciembre de 1999”. Por estimarla contraria a lo establecido en los artículos 7, 28, 39, 41, 45, 46, 129 y 140 de la Constitución Política y los principios de supremacía de la realidad en materia laboral, jerarquía normativa, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, iniciativa privada, libertad de comercio, libertad contractual y libre elección de los consumidores. Explican que, mediante la Ley impugnada se reformó el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, eliminando la figura del porteo de personas, y se reformó y adicionó la Ley de Taxis, n.° 7969, sobre el servicio especial estable de taxi (SEETAXI). Estiman los accionantes que tal norma es inconstitucional en virtud de que viola:

• A)Primer alegato (creación de monopolio sin la mayoría necesaria): La Ley es inconstitucional por haber creado un monopolio público en materia de transporte modalidad taxi, sin haber sido aprobada con la mayoría calificada que exige el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. La aprobación de la Ley n.° 8955, se realizó al margen del Reglamento Interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo a través de la Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena Segunda, siendo que, por crear un monopolio público, requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (38 votos), como lo exige el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política.
• B)Segundo alegato (violación al art. 28 sobre libertad y art. 46 sobre la libertad de comercio): Mediante la Ley impugnada se crea un monopolio público en el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad taxi, impidiendo a los particulares dedicarse a tal actividad como lo regulaba, sin ningún problema, el Código de Comercio y que nacía como acuerdo de voluntades entre las partes, en el que regía la libre voluntad o conveniencia de cada quien. Por tal razón, afirman, no debió prohibirse, pues se trata de un aspecto propio de la esfera privada de los ciudadanos, en el que rige el principio de autonomía de la voluntad y en el cual el Estado no debe interferir. La existencia del monopolio en materia de transporte de personas se hace más evidente en la actualidad con la llegada de UBER, una plataforma digital que permite conectar a proveedores de servicio de transporte de personas con personas que necesitan ser transportadas.
• C)Tercer alegato (violación al Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica): Los accionantes estiman que la Ley impugnada violenta el Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica, en los puntos el 11.4 y 11.6. Indican que, el referido Tratado determinó que no puedan excluirse ni restringirse la posibilidad de servicio de transporte privado, el cual era permitido al momento de su aprobación. Agregan que Costa Rica no estableció ninguna reserva en relación con la actividad comercial en materia de transporte con lo cual, la Ley impugnada violenta el Capítulo 11 del Tratado en cuestión, denominado “Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios”, amén de que debe ofrecer a los inversionistas extranjeros el trato nacional que teníamos al momento de suscribir el Tratado.

Por su parte, los coadyuvantes activos que fueron admitidos, ratifican los argumentos anteriores. Encontrándose solamente un nuevo argumento en el escrito presentado a las 11:05 horas del 15 de marzo del 2016, por el Apoderado de Inversiones Transportistas Los Guidos S.A. y otros, cuando indican que:

• D)Cuarto alegato (violación al principio de igualdad): La Ley no.8955 violenta el principio de igualdad, bajo el argumento de que en dicha ley se entrega la concesión a perpetuidad, así que el legislador designó un determinado grupo de particulares para que realicen un servicio público a perpetuidad, en perjuicio del resto de habitantes y de los oferentes que no fueron adjudicatarios. Indican que esta reforma cierra por completo un monopolio, a perpetuidad, con nombres y apellidos, que se convirtió en un embudo a favor de un grupo reducido de costarricenses. Mencionan que la Ley no.9027 de febrero del 2012 establece la facultad del concesionario de “heredar” la titularidad de la concesión. Respeto de este alegato, esta Sala procede a rechazarlo para su análisis, dado que en este caso, el alegato se refiere a otra norma, y no a la que está siendo impugnada, dado que en el fondo no se trata de un alegato de violación al principio de igualdad (no se puede comparar a quienes sí resultaron concesionarios respecto del resto de la población o de quienes no resultaron concesionarios) sino de conveniencia u oportunidad política, y dado que los coadyuvantes pueden ampliar los motivos de inconstitucionalidad pero no impugnar otras normas, así que se procede a desestimar el análisis de este alegato.

Ahora bien, la ley no.8955 indica literalmente lo siguiente:

“REFORMA DE LA LEY N.º 3284, CÓDIGO DE COMERCIO, DE 30 DE ABRIL DE 1964, Y DE LA LEY N.º 7969, LEY REGULADORA DEL SERVICIO PÚBLICO DE TRANSPORTE REMUNERADO DE PERSONAS EN VEHÍCULOS EN LA MODALIDAD DE TAXI, DE 22 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1999 ARTÍCULO 1.- Reformas del Código de Comercio Refórmanse los artículos 323 y 334 del Código de Comercio, Ley N.º 3284, de 30 de abril de 1964, y sus reformas. Los textos dirán:

"Artículo 323.- Por el contrato de transporte la persona porteadora se obliga a transportar cosas o noticias de un lugar a otro a cambio de un precio. El transporte puede ser realizado por empresas públicas o privadas. Son empresas públicas las que anuncian y abren al público establecimiento de esa índole, comprometiéndose a transportar por precios, condiciones y períodos determinados, siempre que se requieran sus servicios de acuerdo con las bases de sus prospectos, itinerarios y tarifas. Son empresas privadas las que prestan esos servicios en forma discrecional, bajo condiciones y por ajustes convencionales.

El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores." "Artículo 334.- El remitente tiene derecho:

[...]

• b)A que se le permita que viajen los empleados de su empresa con todos los seguros de ley al día y debidamente identificados, para cuidar en el trayecto a los animales vivos o a cualquier otro objeto que requiera atención.

[...]" ARTÍCULO 2.- Reformas de la Ley N.º 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, de 22 de diciembre de 1999, y sus reformas Modifícanse los artículos 2 y 29 de la Ley N.º 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, de 22 de diciembre de 1999, y sus reformas. Los textos dirán:

"Artículo 2.- Naturaleza de la prestación del servicio Para todos los efectos legales y de prestaciones, el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi se considera un servicio público que se explotará mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa con los procedimientos especiales establecidos en esta ley y su reglamento, o del permiso en el caso de servicios especiales estables de taxi, de conformidad con lo establecido en el inciso a) del artículo 7 de esta ley.

El transporte remunerado de personas, que se realiza por medio de autobuses, busetas, microbuses, taxis, automóviles y cualquier otro tipo de vehículo automotor, ya sea que se ofrezca al público en general, a personas usuarias o a grupos determinados de personas usuarias con necesidades específicas que constituyen demandas especiales, es un servicio público del cual es titular el Estado. Lo anterior independientemente del grado de intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo del servicio o en su fiscalización.

Será necesaria concesión:

Para explorar el servicio de transporte automotor remunerado de personas modalidad taxi, en las bases de operación debidamente autorizadas, de conformidad con lo establecido en los incisos b) y c) del artículo 1 de esta ley. Esta modalidad también incluye la prestación del servicio al domicilio o lugar donde se encuentre la persona usuaria, en respuesta a la solicitud expresa de este al prestador del servicio regular de taxi, por alguno de los medios con que este cuenta para tales efectos.

Se requerirá permiso:

Para explotar el servicio de transporte automotor remunerado de personas modalidad servicio especial estable de taxi, en los casos en que el servicio se brinde de puerta a puerta, para satisfacer una necesidad de servicio limitado, residual y dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas diferente del que se presta, de conformidad con el párrafo anterior.

Los permisos para explotar el transporte automotor de personas en la modalidad servicio especial estable de taxi serán expedidos por el Consejo de Transporte Público, previa presentación de la copia certificada del contrato o los contratos suscritos con las personas, las instituciones o las empresas que hacen uso de su servicio. A cada persona física solo se le otorgará un permiso; estas personas podrán agruparse en una persona jurídica, adquiriendo responsabilidad solidaria. El vehículo amparado al permiso deberá ser propio o arrendado mediante leasing financiero. De incumplirse las condiciones en que originariamente se otorgó el permiso, este se podrá revocar por disposición justificada del Consejo de Transporte Público.

Sin perjuicio de otras sanciones previstas por el ordenamiento jurídico, se cancelará el permiso, previo debido proceso y derecho a la defensa, por las siguientes causas:

• a)Cuando se incumplan las obligaciones, los deberes y las prohibiciones fijados en la presente ley, su reglamento, las leyes y los reglamentos conexos.
• b)Cuando se compruebe la falsedad e inexactitud en la documentación presentada ante el Consejo de Transporte Público.
• c)En caso de traspaso o cesión del permiso a favor de un tercero, sin autorización previa del Consejo.
• d)Por prestación ilegal del servicio fuera del área que autorizó el permiso, salvo en los casos en que el origen del servicio sea el área autorizada y el destino fuera de ella.
• e)Cuando por acto o resolución firme se cancele o revoque la patente autorizada del área geográfica correspondiente a la persona permisionaria, en vía administrativa o judicial. Asimismo, será razón para cancelar el permiso cuando la persona permisionaria renuncie a la patente otorgada.
• f)Cuando el vehículo con que se preste el servicio especial estable de taxi tenga las características propias de los vehículos modalidad taxi que se autorizan en razón de una concesión, violando lo establecido al respecto en el artículo 29 de la presente ley.
• g)Cuando la persona permisionaria no cuente con las pólizas al día, tal y como lo establece el artículo 29 de la presente ley.
• h)Se cancelará el permiso al vehículo autorizado para la prestación del servicio especial estable de taxi, cuando el vehículo autorizado circule por las vías públicas en demanda de pasajeros.

Los permisos no conceden derechos subjetivos al titular y se prolongarán por un plazo hasta de tres años, si se ajustan a los requisitos que se establezcan al efecto.

El Consejo de Transporte Público deberá publicar, una vez al año, en el diario oficial La Gaceta y en un diario de circulación nacional, las listas de las personas físicas o jurídicas que se encuentren debidamente acreditadas para la prestación del servicio especial estable de taxi." "Artículo 29.- Concesión administrativa previa o permiso para servicios especiales estables de taxi 1.- Para la prestación del servicio de taxi se requiere obtener de previo una concesión administrativa otorgada por el Consejo, sujeta a las siguientes condiciones:

• a)Las concesiones administrativas de servicio remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi estarán subordinadas a los estudios técnicos de oferta y demanda aprobados por el Consejo.
• b)Las concesiones se otorgarán por base de operación, según los criterios técnicos correspondientes, por plazos prorrogables de diez años a solicitud de la persona concesionaria, previo cumplimiento de la licencia C-1 al día. El Consejo podrá autorizar la existencia de bases de operación especiales con fines turísticos, dependiendo de las características de la zona o del área geográfica, las cuales se determinarán mediante un reglamento especial, de acuerdo con los principios fundamentales de esta ley.
• c)Se otorgará una sola concesión administrativa por particular, la cual amparará la explotación del servicio público con un vehículo.
• d)Ninguna persona adjudicataria de una concesión podrá compartir, total ni parcialmente, los derechos de concesión adjudicados a otra que, a su vez, sea adjudicataria de otra concesión de servicio público remunerado de personas, en otras modalidades de transporte terrestre.
• e)Las concesiones se otorgarán por medio del procedimiento especial abreviado dispuesto en las presentes normas. Ningún gestor interesado de puertos y aeropuertos podrá ser concesionario de los servicios de transporte público remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi; tampoco se le permitirá brindar este servicio en ninguna modalidad.

2.- Para la prestación del servicio especial estable de taxi, a que se refiere el artículo 2 de esta ley, se requiere obtener un permiso otorgado por el Consejo de Transporte Público, sujeto a las siguientes condiciones:

• a)Las personas permisionarias especiales estables de taxi de este servicio estarán limitadas a prestar el servicio dentro de un área geográfica que se determinará en razón de la patente autorizada.
• b)Ninguna persona permisionaria podrá compartir, total ni parcialmente, los derechos del permiso otorgado a otro que a su vez sea titular de otro permiso de servicio público remunerado de personas.
• c)Los vehículos con los cuales se desarrolle la prestación de servicio público modalidad especial estable de taxi, no podrán tener las características propias de los vehículos modalidad taxi que se autorizan en razón de una concesión para prestar el servicio en una determinada base de operación autorizada por el Consejo de Transporte Público, tales como el color rojo, el uso de rótulos luminosos o no luminosos, calcomanías, el uso del taxímetro y otros similares, tal como lo defina el reglamento de rigor, así como cualquier otro distintivo que pueda inducir a error a las personas usuarias del servicio de taxi. Además, deberán cumplir los requisitos de circulación que establece la Ley N.º 7331, Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, y sus reformas. Estos automotores no podrán tener una antigüedad superior a los diez años, contados desde su año de fabricación.
• d)Los vehículos autorizados para el servicio especial estable de taxi no podrán estacionarse o realizar abordaje o desabordaje de personas en las paradas dedicadas a las demás modalidades de transporte público. Las bases de operación del servicio especial estable de taxi deberán estar ubicadas a una distancia de ciento cincuenta metros, como mínimo, de las terminales oficiales de autobuses y taxis.
• e)Las personas permisionarias de servicio especial estable de taxi no podrán estacionarse en ningún lugar de la vía pública para ofrecer sus servicios al público en general. Tampoco, podrán circular en demanda de pasajeros por las vías públicas.
• f)Cuando los automotores deban detenerse frente a edificaciones públicas, parques, centros educativos, centros comerciales, muelles, puertos, aeropuertos, iglesias, hospitales o lugares similares, será por el tiempo estrictamente necesario para permitir el abordaje y desabordaje de sus propias personas usuarias.
• g)Quien presente una solicitud para explotar un servicio especial estable de taxi deberá presentar certificación de que se encuentra debidamente inscrito y al día con sus obligaciones en la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS); estar inscrito como contribuyente en el Ministerio de Hacienda; estar al día en el pago del impuesto de la renta; contar con una póliza de seguros que cubra íntegramente su responsabilidad civil por lesión o muerte de terceros y daños a la propiedad de terceros, y mantenerla vigente durante todo el período que dure el permiso y la patente municipal correspondiente, de acuerdo con la legislación vigente y los demás requisitos que procedan reglamentariamente.
• h)En razón de los principios de proporcionabilidad, razonabilidad y necesidad, el porcentaje autorizado de servicios especiales estables de taxi no podrá superar el tres por ciento (3%) de las concesiones autorizadas por base de operación.
• i)El Estado está en la obligación de garantizarles el equilibrio económico y financiero del contrato a las personas concesionarias, evitando una competencia que pueda ser ruinosa, producto de una concurrencia de operadores en una zona determinada que pueda ser superior a la necesidad de esa demanda residual de la zona operacional donde se autorice la prestación del servicio, dado que cada zona presenta características diferentes entre una y otra, autorizando el número de permisos que considere necesarios.
• j)Una vez otorgado el permiso, las personas permisionarias deberán portar el original o la copia certificada del contrato suscrito con las personas a las que se les brinda el servicio.

El incumplimiento de cualquiera de las condiciones anteriores será sancionado de conformidad con lo establecido en la Ley N.º 7331, Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, y sus reformas, sin perjuicio de que el Consejo de Transporte Público pueda cancelar el permiso." ARTÍCULO 3.- Adición y reforma a la Ley N.º 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, de 22 de diciembre de 1999, y sus reformas Adición de un inciso l) al artículo 1 y reforma de un inciso e) al artículo 62 de la Ley N.º 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, de 22 de diciembre de 1999, y sus reformas. Los textos dirán:

"Artículo 1.- Definiciones [.]

• l)Servicio especial estable de taxi: servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas usuarias y que satisface una demanda limitada, residual, exclusiva y estable.

Los permisos para el transporte remunerado de personas mediante microbuses, busetas y autobuses, se regirán por lo dispuesto en la Ley N.º 3503, Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores, de 10 de mayo de 1965, y sus reformas, o cualquier otra que la sustituya en el futuro." "Artículo 62.- Reformas de la Ley N.º 7331, Modifícase la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, de 13 de abril de 1993, en las siguientes disposiciones:

[.]

• e)Adiciónase un inciso d) al artículo 145, cuyo texto dirá:

Artículo 145.- [...]

• d)Prestar el servicio de transporte público en cualquiera de sus modalidades, sin las respectivas autorizaciones, violando el numeral 1 del inciso a), o el numeral 1) del inciso b), ambos del artículo 98 y el artículo 113 de esta ley. Para aplicar la sanción regulada por este numeral y el juzgamiento, las autoridades judiciales impondrán plenamente el régimen de pruebas por presunciones e indicios claros y concordantes, que definen tanto las legislaciones procesales civiles como penales, así como las reglas de la lógica, la conveniencia, la oportunidad, la razonabilidad y la sana crítica. Se tomarán como presunciones e indicios la habitualidad en la prestación del servicio no autorizado o los signos externos e internos colocados en los vehículos para llamar la atención de la persona usuaria, a fin de inducirla a usar el vehículo que utiliza un taxi autorizado." II.- La legitimación en este caso.- El artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regula los presupuestos que determinan la admisibilidad de las acciones de inconstitucionalidad, exigiendo la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver en sede administrativa o judicial en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad, requisito que no es necesario en los casos previstos en los párrafos segundo y tercero de ese artículo, es decir, cuando por la naturaleza de la norma no haya lesión individual o directa; cuando se fundamente en la defensa de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto, o cuando sea presentada por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República o el Defensor de los Habitantes, en estos últimos casos, dentro de sus respectivas esferas competenciales. De acuerdo con el segundo de los supuestos previstos por el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, se prevé la posibilidad de acudir en defensa de "intereses difusos", que son aquellos cuya titularidad pertenece a grupos de personas no organizadas formalmente, pero unidas a partir de una determinada necesidad social, una característica física, su origen étnico, una determinada orientación personal o ideológica, el consumo de un cierto producto, etc. El interés, en estos casos, se encuentra difuminado, diluido (difuso) entre una pluralidad no identificada de sujetos. Esta Sala ha enumerado diversos derechos a los que les ha dado el calificativo de "difusos", tales como el ambiente, el patrimonio cultural, la defensa de la integridad territorial del país, el buen manejo del gasto público, y el derecho a la salud, entre otros. Por otra parte, la enumeración que ha hecho la Sala Constitucional no es taxativa. A partir de lo dicho en el párrafo anterior, es claro que los actores ostentan legitimación suficiente para demandar la inconstitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas, sin que para ello resulte necesario que cuenten con un asunto previo que les sirva de base a esta acción. Lo anterior porque acuden en defensa de un interés que atañe a la colectividad nacional en su conjunto, como lo es el derecho de los usuarios del servicio público de transporte de personas. Precisamente por estar en juego la prestación de un servicio público esta Sala entiende que estamos ante una acción que pretende la tutela de intereses que atañen a la colectividad nacional en su conjunto, por lo que los actores se encuentran perfectamente legitimados para accionar en forma directa, a la luz de lo que dispone el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Por lo demás, se trata, en efecto, de materia cuya constitucionalidad procede revisar en esta vía, a saber, una ley. Además, los actores cumplieron los requisitos estipulados en los numerales 78 y 79 de la Ley de rito. En conclusión, la presente acción es admisible, por lo que debe entrarse de inmediato a discutir el objeto y el fondo del asunto.

III.- Aclaración previa y sobre la metodología de análisis de la acción.- Como en toda acción de inconstitucionalidad, lo que corresponde a esta Jurisdicción Constitucional es la confrontación de la normativa impugnada con el Derecho de la Constitución, y no más que eso. Se observa de todas las coadyuvancias presentadas, tanto las activas como las pasivas, que el tema trasciende el ámbito constitucional, pues algunos exponen en sus escritos las dificultades concretas en la prestación del servicio remunerado de personas y hasta se plantea la cuestión de la plataforma que se conoce como UBER. Sin embargo, la regulación o la legalidad de una plataforma tal, no es una cuestión que se haya planteado en este proceso. Es decisión soberana del legislador determinar si un determinado servicio debe ser estatizado o debe liberalizarse. Pues ni la estatización ni la liberalización resultan inconstitucionales per se. La decisión es política y no jurídica. Tampoco corresponde a esta Jurisdicción examinar si la actividad de UBER está prohibida o no actualmente en nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico, ni analizar casos concretos de empresas de Seetaxi o porteo, y su legalidad. Se limita el análisis en esta acción, al examen de la ley impugnada en cuanto a los alegatos de inconstitucionalidad. Ahora bien, para facilitar el estudio de la normativa impugnada, en los considerandos siguientes se hará un examen del tratamiento que se le da al servicio de transporte remunerado de personas en Costa Rica. Para luego, examinar en general la ley impugnada y así finalmente, analizar cada uno de los argumentos expuestos por los accionantes y coadyuvantes.

IV.- Sobre el servicio remunerado de transporte de personas en Costa Rica.- En este considerando se examinará el tratamiento que nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico le ha dado al servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, en particular a la modalidad taxi. Resaltando si dicho servicio es considerado un servicio público, quién o quiénes pueden brindarlo y si es admisible el transporte privado de personas. Sin embargo, antes de ello conviene recordar dos conceptos básicos: qué es servicio público, los distintos tipos de gestión de servicio público que existen y el marco jurídico general del transporte remunerado de personas en Costa Rica.

1. Concepto de servicio público es dinámico: El concepto de servicio público ha sido objeto de discusión en el ámbito jurídico, durante décadas, y al respecto se pueden esbozar distintas teorías en cuanto a su definición que oscilan entre el criterio orgánico o subjetivo (servicio prestado por el Estado), funcional (servicio que reviste carácter de interés general) y material (servicio cuya regulación compete al Derecho Público). Sin embargo, en lo sí hay consenso es en que se trata de un concepto que no es estático, es decir, se trata de un concepto cambiante, según variables de tiempo (lo que en un momento dado fue servicio público puede no serlo años después) y espacio (lo que en un determinado ordenamiento jurídico es servicio público puede no serlo en otro). En nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, la Sala Constitucional ha reconocido ese carácter cambiante del concepto de servicio público, cuando ha dicho:

"Por ejemplo, el artículo 3 de la Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos contiene varias definiciones, entre ellas la de servicio público, como toda actividad que por su importancia para el desarrollo sostenible del país sea calificada como tal por la Asamblea Legislativa, con el fin de sujetarla a las regulaciones de esta ley. Como puede apreciarse, la determinación de si una necesidad es de interés público no es una cuestión jurídica, sino de hecho y circunstancial, que obliga –como ya se dijo- a un juicio de oportunidad y conveniencia. No existen actividades que por ‘naturaleza’ o imperativos del Derecho Constitucional sean propias del servicio público, sino que eso dependerá de cada sociedad, sus necesidades y en el ámbito –privado o público- en que estas se satisfagan de mejor manera." Sentencia n.° 517-98, de 14:32 horas del 26 de agosto de 1998.

Cuando una determinad actividad o servicio, es declarado –constitucional, legal o jurisprudencialmente- como un servicio público, en doctrina se conoce como la “publicatio” o la “publificación” del servicio. Esta declaratoria puede consistir, simplemente, en la definición de la actividad como de interés público, o bien, en la calificación expresa de la actividad como servicio público. Siendo disposición de cada Ordenamiento Jurídico las consecuencias de dicha declaratoria, las cuales se pueden referir: al marco jurídico especial de su regulación, al sujeto titular del servicio y a los sujetos prestadores del servicio, y a la sustracción del servicio del comercio de los hombres. Lo cual se traduce, por ejemplo, en el servicio de transporte de personas en que el Estado pueda exigir una concesión o permiso, fijarles un itinerario, tarifas, etc. Por regla general, al ser declarado un servicio como servicio público, es el Estado quien lo asume (a través de sus distintas instituciones si de un servicio público administrativo se trata o por medio de la creación de una empresa estatal si de un servicio público económico se trata). Sin embargo, ello no excluye la posibilidad de participación de los particulares en la gestión pública, lo que se denomina como gestión indirecta, por medio de la concesión de servicio público, como sucede a menudo con los transportes y servicios en puertos y aeropuertos.

2. Tipos de gestión del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas (gestión directa y gestión indirecta): Examinando en concreto el servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas, por su naturaleza de servicio público, es lógico que pueda ser brindado directamente por el Estado. Empero, bien puede ser delegado en particulares mediante concesión o permiso, según la modalidad de que se trate. Así entonces, se conocen básicamente dos tipos de gestión de este servicio público: la gestión directa (por el Estado) y la gestión indirecta (por sujetos particulares). En este sentido, cada Ordenamiento Jurídico definirá cuáles actividades son consideradas servicios públicos, quien será el prestador de dichos servicios, y si pueden ser asumidos por particulares, vía concesión o permiso. En el caso del transporte remunerado de personas, como es el caso que se examina, también es admisible la gestión directa, cuando es el Estado asume su prestación, generalmente mediante una empresa estatal. Pero, particularmente en el servicio de taxi, mediante la gestión indirecta, cuando el Estado otorga una concesión o permiso a sujetos particulares.

3. El marco jurídico del transporte remunerado de personas en Costa Rica: En nuestro Ordenamiento Jurídico, el transporte remunerado de personas, en sus diversas modalidades, constituye un servicio público. Así se desprende de varias normas:

En primer lugar, la Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores, n.° 3503 del 10 de mayo de 1965, cuyos artículos 1 y 2 califican al transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores colectivos como un servicio público regulado, controlado y vigilado por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, tal como se indica:

“Artículo 1.- El transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores colectivos, excepto los automóviles de servicio de taxi regulado en otra ley, que se lleva a cabo por calles, carreteras y caminos dentro del territorio nacional, es un servicio público regulado, controlado y vigilado por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. La prestación es delegada en particulares a quienes autoriza expresamente, de acuerdo con las normas aquí establecidas.

(…)” “Artículo 2.- Es competencia del Ministerio de Transportes lo relativo al tránsito y transporte automotor de personas en el país. Este Ministerio podrá tomar a su cargo la prestación de estos servicios públicos ya sea en forma directa o mediante otras instituciones del Estado, o bien conceder derechos a empresarios particulares para explotarlos. El Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes ejercerá la vigilancia, el control y la regulación del tránsito y del transporte automotor de personas. El control de los servicios de transporte público concesionados o autorizados, se ejercerá conjuntamente con la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, para garantizar la aplicación correcta de los servicios y el pleno cumplimiento de las disposiciones contractuales correspondientes.

(…) ” Igual calificación se deriva de lo dispuesto en el artículo 5, inciso f) de la Ley de creación de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, n.° 7593 del 9 de agosto de 1996:

“Artículo 5.- Funciones En los servicios públicos definidos en este artículo, la Autoridad Reguladora fijará precios y tarifas; además, velará por el cumplimiento de las normas de calidad, cantidad, confiabilidad, continuidad, oportunidad y prestación óptima, según el artículo 25 de esta ley. Los servicios públicos antes mencionados son:

(…)

• f)Cualquier medio de transporte público remunerado de personas, salvo el aéreo.

(…)” En un sentido más concreto, la actual Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, n.° 7969 del 22 de diciembre de 1999, define a este medio de transporte como un servicio público que se explota mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa, según su artículo 2:

“Artículo 2.- Naturaleza de la prestación del servicio Para todos los efectos legales y de prestaciones, el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi se considera un servicio público que se explotará mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa con los procedimientos especiales establecidos en esta ley y su reglamento, o del permiso en el caso de servicios especiales estables de taxi, de conformidad con lo establecido en el inciso a) del artículo 7 de esta ley.

(…)” Sin embargo, ya desde la ley anterior, No.5406 de 1973 (ley actualmente no vigente), se había definido esta modalidad de transporte como servicio público, en su artículo 1:

“Artículo 1º.- El transporte terrestre remunerado de personas en vehículos taxis automotores se considerará servicio público.” Actualmente, mediante la reforma introducida al artículo 2 de la Ley 7969, precisamente por el artículo 2 de la Ley 8955, del 16 de junio del 2011, se establece como servicio público el transporte remunerado de personas en cualquier tipo de vehículo automotor. El párrafo segundo de la norma en cuestión, dispone:

“El transporte remunerado de personas, que se realiza por medio de autobuses, busetas, microbuses, taxis, automóviles y cualquier otro tipo de vehículo automotor, ya sea que se ofrezca al público en general, a personas usuarias o a grupos determinados de personas usuarias con necesidades específicas que constituyen demandas especiales, es un servicio público del cual es titular el Estado. Lo anterior independientemente del grado de intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo del servicio o en su fiscalización.” De todo lo anterior se desprende que el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores –en sus distintas modalidades autobuses y taxi-, constituye un servicio público en el Ordenamiento Jurídico Costarricense. Y en tal sentido se ha pronunciado la Sala Constitucional, en reiteradas oportunidades. Por ejemplo, en la resolución n.° 2011-04778, de las 14:30 horas del 13 de abril del 2011, al evacuar una consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad formulada por varios diputados con respecto del proyecto de ley que dio origen a la Ley aquí impugnada, en lo que interesa, se indicó:

“XIV.- (…) Este Tribunal considera necesario referirse en primer lugar a la decisión de legislador de declarar servicio público todo el transporte remunerado de personas y luego si esta medida implica o no una limitación a la libertad de comercio. El proyecto de ley consultado tiene su origen, según la exposición de motivos, en que “durante varias semanas del presente año se llevó a cabo un arduo proceso de negociación en el cual el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes y sus autoridades, junto con la Cámara Nacional de Transporte de Autobús, la Federación Nacional de Taxis y la Cámara de Porteadores como representante del sector, mantuvieron una sesión permanente de discusión, buscando una formulación de consenso para solucionar la situación de los señores y señoras porteadoras”. (folio 2 de la copia certificada de expediente legislativo, Tomo I). Producto de esa discusión el proyecto de ley consultado, a grandes rasgos, elimina la palabra “personas” del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio; incorpora la figura del servicio especial estable de taxi en la Ley número 7969 y lo declara como una de las formas en que se explota el servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas.

XV.- En un inicio, se consideró servicio público a toda la actividad desarrollada por el Estado, cuyo cumplimiento debía ser asegurado, reglado y controlado por los gobernantes. Después se restringió a cierta actividad de la Administración Pública, desarrollada exclusivamente por las entidades estatales. Sin embargo, en la actualidad, el servicio público no sólo puede ser prestado o realizado por organismos estatales, sino también por personas o entes particulares o privados, de acuerdo a reglamentaciones emitidas por las autoridades públicas. Por servicio público se entiende, entonces, toda actividad de la Administración Pública o de los particulares o administrados que tienda a la satisfacción de necesidades o intereses de carácter general, cuya índole o gravitación se encuentra regida o encuadrada por el Derecho Público, en tanto se requiere de un control por parte de las autoridades públicas. La concepción tradicional limita el servicio público a la actividad que realiza la Administración directa o indirectamente, cuya creación se deba a un acto formal -a través de ley formal- o comportamiento de las autoridades públicas -acto administrativo-. Asimismo, la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal ha señalado dos tendencias que identifican el elemento determinante de los servicios públicos: a) el fin perseguido, teniendo por tal, la satisfacción de la necesidad o del interés general, para cuyo fin fue creado, sea a través de la Administración o por intermedio de los particulares; o b) la sujeción de esta actividad al régimen del Derecho Público, esto es, a normas de sujeción y subordinación en lo que se refiere a la regulación de la actividad aún cuando no existan normas expresas que así lo establezcan, precisamente en virtud del interés público que se intenta satisfacer (en este sentido sentencias número 2005-00846 de las once horas con veintiocho minutos del veintiocho de enero del dos mil cinco y número 5403-95 de las dieciséis horas seis minutos del tres de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y cinco). Otra precisión necesaria, para el caso en estudio, es que el constituyente no enlistó en el texto de la Constitución todos los servicios de naturaleza pública. La Constitución Política deja al legislador ordinario la competencia para establecer cuáles servicios deben definirse de esa forma, atendiendo, claro está, al modelo político impuesto por la Constitución Política, cual es el de un régimen democrático social de derecho.

XVI.- El Estado, desde hace ya bastante tiempo, ha considerado la actividad de transporte de personas como una necesidad social imperante cuya vigencia resulta esencial, como condición fundamental para el mantenimiento del estado de derecho y la paz social. Por esta razón ha promulgado una serie de leyes siendo, actualmente, las más importantes en esta materia la Ley Reguladora de Transporte Remunerado Personas Vehículos Automotores (Ley No. 3503) y la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi (Ley No. 7969), cuya reforma se conoce en esta consulta. En el último quinquenio, es público y notorio que este tema del transporte de personas ha ido adquiriendo mayor trascendencia para la sociedad costarricense, no sólo desde el punto de vista social sino también económico, hasta convertirse en un tema de interés general, que va más allá de la satisfacción de una necesidad meramente privada, requiriendo la intervención del Estado para darle una solución. El Estado -en este caso el legislador ordinario- puede, dentro del marco permitido por la Constitución Política y las normas de carácter legal, optar por la solución que considere más oportuna. Como recién se dijo, una de esas posibles soluciones es regular dicha actividad y declararla servicio público, que es precisamente lo que hace el proyecto consultado, cumpliendo, necesariamente, con los dos elementos antes señalados. En virtud de lo expuesto, la Sala no estima contraria a la Constitución Política la reforma al artículo 2 de la Ley número 7969 para considerar el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi un servicio público del cual es titular el Estado y que se explotará mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa o el permiso en el caso de servicios especiales estables de taxi.

XVII.- Como consecuencia de declarar servicio público el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad taxi, en cualquiera de sus dos formas de prestación, el proyecto de ley consultado reforma el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio para eliminar la palabra “personas” de dicho artículo y así eliminar el porteo de personas. Con esta reforma el legislador busca, de una vez por todas, abstraer de la esfera privada la prestación del servicio de transporte de personas que en su totalidad ha sido declarado servicio público por el legislador y hace que sean otras las reglas del juego y principios jurídicos a aplicar: Los particulares se convierten en colaboradores de la Administración Pública en la prestación de ese servicio que, por sus características y la evidente existencia de un interés público, debe ser en principio, asumido por el Estado sin que estén de por medio principios y derechos que rigen las relaciones privadas, como lo son el principio de autonomía de la voluntad o la libertad de comercio. En consecuencia, el Tribunal estima que el proyecto de ley consultado no lesiona los artículos 28, 45, 46 y 56 de la Constitución Política. (…).” Como apunta la sentencia anterior, mediante la ley impugnada, el legislador, dentro del marco permitido por la Constitución Política, optó por declarar como servicio público toda la actividad del transporte remunerado de personas, en atención a la trascendencia que dicha actividad tiene para la sociedad costarricense. Siendo que, el transporte remunerado de personas, independientemente del tipo de vehículo automotor que se utilice, de las personas a las que vaya dirigido –ya sea que se ofrezca al público en general o a personas usuarias de grupos determinados- y de la intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo o fiscalización, sería considerado un servicio público. Debido a ello, pese a que desde el año 1965 con la Ley No.3503 ya se había declarado el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores que se lleve a cabo por calles, carreteras y caminos dentro del territorio de la República, como un servicio público; al persistir las normas 323 y 334 del Código de Comercio, es a partir de la vigencia de la Ley n.° 8955 (que viene a reformar dichas normas del Código de Comercio) en que el legislador ha querido dejar claro que, ninguna persona particular –física o jurídica- puede brindar el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas si, previo a ello, no cuenta con la autorización respectiva –concesión o permiso- conferida por el Consejo de Transporte Público mediante los procedimientos que establecen las leyes que regulan el citado servicio público.

V.- En general sobre la Ley impugnada.- La Ley impugnada, “Reforma de la ley n.º 3284, Código de Comercio, de 30 de abril de 1964, y de la ley n.º 7969, Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad de taxi, de 22 de diciembre de 1999” que es Ley no. 8955 del 16 de junio del 2011, contiene tres normas. Por medio de ellas se:

-Reforman los artículos 323 y 334 del Código de Comercio, eliminando la palabra “personas” del porteo.

-Reforma y adiciona la Ley de Taxis, n.° 7969, para regular lo que se definió como servicio especial estable de taxi (SEETAXI), que “conserva la naturaleza del servicio especial residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado para darle sentido de responsabilidad, a aquellos interesados que lo estarían acreditando” (según reza la exposición de motivos del proyecto original).

Así que, mediante la Ley impugnada se reformó normas del Código de Comercio, eliminando la figura del porteo de personas, actividad que pasó a estar regulada en la denominada Ley de Taxis, n.° 7969, bajo el nombre de servicio especial estable de taxi (SEETAXI). El proyecto de ley, tramitada bajo el expediente no.17874, fue presentado a la Asamblea Legislativa el 29 de setiembre del año 2010, cuya exposición de motivos conviene resaltar lo siguiente, para comprender la especie de “transformación” del porteo de personas regido hasta entonces por el Código de Comercio en el servicio especial de taxi que será regido por la Ley no.7969 Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi:

“Con esta iniciativa se pretende de manera muy categórica, establecer dentro del marco regulatorio de la Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi, N.º 7969, un servicio que hoy día es una realidad y que esta tutelado de manera equivocada al estar amparado solamente ante la palabra “personas” en el Código de Comercio, con el fin de crear una legislación que garantice mejores condiciones y costos más bajos para el usuario, buscando el beneficio y el bienestar de las grandes mayorías.

De esta forma se elimina el porteo de personas, pero no se elimina el porteo en sí, es decir lo que se está eliminando es la palabra “persona” del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, pero se puede seguir transportando cosas, artículos, dineros, correspondencia, etc.

Ante la eliminación de la palabra “persona”, se crea dentro de la Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi, N.º 7969, una figura que se llama “transporte especial estable de taxi”, que conserva la naturaleza del servicio especial residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado para darle sentido de responsabilidad, a aquellos interesados que lo estarían acreditando.

El servicio especial estable de taxi se distinguirá plenamente del servicio regular de taxis, porque será siempre de puerta a puerta, prevaleciendo el contrato privado entre las partes, y deberá acreditarse que forma parte de una actividad comercial, que además deben tener las patentes y que podrá ser desarrollado en esta primer etapa por personas físicas o personas jurídicas que puedan demostrar ante el Consejo de Transporte Público, en un plazo que se ha planteado perentorio de tres años (3 años), para que desarrollen esta actividad porque hay que entender que su crecimiento es muy particular y esporádico, hoy puede que sirva durante un tiempo determinado porque hay un contrato, pero eso no quiere decir que permanezca en el tiempo, por eso se habla de permiso hasta por tres años.

No se trata de una concesión porque no nace de un producto de una licitación pública, sino que nace de un permiso y obedece fundamentalmente que es una necesidad específica y puntual.

(…) de manera que aquel o aquella que esté brindando ese servicio especial sin la respectiva acreditación estaría operando bajo un rango de ilegalidad, porque no hay una figura ni en el Código de Comercio ni en la Ley de tránsito que permita realizar esa actividad.” Dicho proyecto fue delegado a la Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena Segunda. Luego de ser aprobado en primer debate el 15 de marzo del 2011, fue enviado a la Sala Constitucional mediante una consulta facultativa (resuelta mediante el voto número 2011-04778 donde se resolvió que el proyecto consultado no contenía vicios esenciales de procedimiento ni disposiciones inconstitucionales). Finalmente, fue aprobado en segundo debate el 24 de mayo del 2011. Publicándose el 7 de julio del 2011, fecha en la que entró a regir. Interesa resaltar que esta Sala, mediante el voto que resuelve dicha consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad, examinó ya las cuestiones relativas a si el proyecto consultado estaba creando un monopolio y si violentaba la libertad de comercio, según se dirá en los considerandos siguientes. Así entonces, luego de aclaro lo anterior, se procede el examen de cada uno de los tres alegatos de inconstitucionalidad. Siendo el primero un alegato sobre el procedimiento y el resto, alegatos sobre el fondo.

VI.- Sobre el primer alegato: Violación al procedimiento legislativo por haberse aprobado la ley impugnada en una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena.- Los accionantes consideran que la Ley impugnada es inconstitucional por haber creado un monopolio público en materia de transporte modalidad taxi, sin haber sido aprobada con la mayoría calificada que exige el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Indican que la aprobación de la Ley n.° 8955 se realizó al margen del Reglamento Interno de la Asamblea Legislativa, ya que se hizo a través de la Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena Segunda, siendo que, por crear un monopolio público, requería para su aprobación de mayoría calificada (38 votos), como lo exige el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política.

La Procuraduría General de la República considera que no llevan razón los accionantes en el sentido de que la ley impugnada crea un monopolio público a favor del Estado y que, por tal razón, debió ser aprobada con mayoría calificada (38 votos). Lo que la ley en cuestión hace es declarar toda la actividad del transporte remunerado de personas como servicio público y tal regulación sí podía delegarse en una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena. Inclusive, ya la Sala Constitucional avaló la constitucionalidad del procedimiento seguido en la aprobación de la Ley aquí impugnada, mediante la resolución n.° 2011-04778, al analizar la constitucionalidad del proyecto de ley que dio lugar a la ley aquí impugnada, fue categórica en afirmar, primero, que no crea ningún monopolio ni práctica monopolística, porque la creación de un servicio público no crea un monopolio, conforme a las previsiones constitucionales; segundo, que el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política no crea una reserva de ley agravada para la imposición de regulaciones o límites a la libertad de comercio y, tercero, que sí resultaba procedente la delegación de un proyecto de ley de tal naturaleza en una la Comisión con Potestad Plena Legislativa.

Por su parte, el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes considera que, no estamos en presencia de un monopolio privado y menos aún de un monopolio público, por cuanto desde el año 1965 se determinó, mediante la Ley No.3503 que el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores es un servicio público del Estado. El Consejo de Transporte Público, considera que, no puede confundirse la titularidad del Estado con un monopolio, dado que para la prestación del transporte remunerado de personas, media por excelencia el proceso licitatorio. No procede la argumentación por cuanto desde su origen la Ley en cuestión no fue sometida ni tratada como monopolio estatal. El legislador no pretendió la creación de un monopolio, únicamente analizó que dicho servicio debía contemplarse como público y así eliminar de la esfera privada el porteo de personas, concluyéndose en la resolución No.2011-04778 que resolvió la consulta legislativa que dicho proyecto “No resulta inconstitucional, ni por su contenido, ni por el procedimiento legislativo utilizado para su aprobación”.

Finalmente, las coadyuvancias activas admitidas ratifican los argumentos de los accionantes, agregando que, es la ley impugnada la que somete la totalidad de la actividad a servicio público. Las coadyuvancias pasivas admitidas indican que la intención unívoca del legislador de 1965 fue convertir en servicio público todo el transporte remunerado de personas por vía terrestre en cualquier tipo de vehículos automotores y bajo cualquier modalidad de prestación, convirtiéndolo en un nuevo monopolio estatal. Así las cosas, el argumento de los accionantes en el sentido de que la Ley número 8955 tenía que aprobarse por dos tercios del total de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa, no es de recibo, por cuanto el monopolio público en materia de transporte remunerado de personas, en cualquiera de sus modalidades (autobuses, taxis, porteo, etc.), fue creado por el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503 de 10 de mayo de 1965, norma que todavía se mantiene vigente. Siendo, la normativa impugnada, en realidad de innecesaria promulgación, pues el porteo de personas ya había dejado de existir jurídicamente desde 1965, cuando el servicio del transporte remunerado de personas en cualquiera de sus modalidades (autobuses, taxis, porteo, etc.) fue declarado, por mayoría calificada de la Asamblea Legislativa, como un monopolio público, susceptible de ser delegada su prestación en los particulares por medio de las figuras administrativas de la concesión y el permiso. En consecuencia, la ley impugnada no necesitaba ser aprobada por dos tercios del total de miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa, pues simplemente vino a regular una modalidad de prestación del servicio remunerado de personas, el cual había ya sido declarado como servicio público desde 1965.

Al respecto, tal como se observa, este alegato está referido al procedimiento legislativo, en cuanto se argumenta que, como esta ley está creando un monopolio y que el párrafo final del artículo 46 Constitucional establece que para establecer nuevos monopolios a favor del Estado se requerirá la aprobación de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa, entonces la aprobación en la Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena Segunda (donde no se puede alcanzar la mayoría indicada), se incurrió en un vicio de procedimiento. Ahora bien, para tener por cierto dicho argumento, es necesario estar de acuerdo con todas sus premisas. Sin embargo, en este caso, la primera premisa resulta inválida, pues esta ley NO está creando un monopolio. Tal como se dijo mediante la resolución número 2011-04778 donde se resolvió que el proyecto consultado no contenía vicios esenciales de procedimiento ni disposiciones inconstitucionales, esta Sala resolvió ya este punto, indicando en concreto lo siguiente:

“IX.- Segundo aspecto consultado: Delegación del proyecto de ley que se tramita en el expediente legislativo número 17874 en la Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena Segunda. Los diputados consultantes estiman que como con el proyecto de ley consultado se suprime la libertad para crear empresas de porteo, sólo el Plenario Legislativo estaría facultado para aprobar dicho proyecto mediante una votación calificada. Consideran que el proyecto de ley no debió ser delegado en la Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena Segunda en los términos de los artículos 28, 121 inciso 7, y 124 de la Constitución Política y artículos 160 y 208 Bis del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa. Por ello la delegación efectuada implicó una violación al procedimiento legislativo. (…) El proyecto de ley consultado no crea ningún monopolio ni práctica monopolística, sino que viene a establecer otra modalidad de prestar el servicio de transporte público de personas como lo es el “servicio especial estable de taxi” y cuales con los requisitos para prestarlo. Contrario a lo sostenido por los diputados consultantes, el proyecto de ley no configura el supuesto regulado en el artículo 121 inciso 7) de la Constitución Política, ya que éste se refiere a lo que se conoce en doctrina como el derecho de excepción, entendido como el conjunto de medidas extraordinarias previstas en los textos constitucionales para que el propio ordenamiento le haga frente a una situación de emergencia que puede traer como consecuencia una crisis del Estado.” Así entonces, resulta claro que el proyecto de ley consultado no crea ningún monopolio ni práctica monopolística. A mayor abundamiento, en un caso similar, en el que se cuestionaba como monopolio el servicio de la revisión técnica vehicular, mediante sentencia n.° 2005-04190 de las dieciséis horas con cuarenta y dos minutos del veinte de abril del dos mil cinco, la Sala consideró, que en caso de concesiones era impropio hablar de monopolio:

“IV.- Las concesiones para la prestación de un servicio público no constituyen un monopolio privado.- Toda concesión pública es un contrato administrativo efectuado por la Administración con el objetivo de “delegar” en un tercero, sea la prestación de un determinado servicio que le correspondería prestar al mismo Estado, o sea la construcción de una obra pública, pero que por ciertas razones de oportunidad o conveniencia decide solicitar la colaboración a los sujetos particulares. Una de las particularidades de una concesión de servicios públicos es que, quien resulte adjudicatario debe reunir ciertas características personalísimas. No pudiendo, dicho adjudicatario ceder o traspasar a terceros esa concesión. Esto es así porque justamente fueron esas características particulares del adjudicatario las que pesaron a la hora de efectuar la escogencia entre todos los que participaron en la licitación pública. Por otro lado, en cuanto a la decisión de elegir un solo adjudicatario, la Administración Pública tiene la potestad para hacerlo conforme a sus competencias constitucionales y de acuerdo a criterios de oportunidad y conveniencia que no corresponden a esta Jurisdicción analizar. En cuanto al titular del servicio público, es la Administración quien conserva la titularidad del servicio público, aunque sea finalmente un tercero particular el que lo presta. Por eso es que decir que una concesión para la prestación de un servicio público es un monopolio privado tendría un doble contrasentido, tanto de parte del hecho de que sea “privado” porque el Estado, sujeto público, es el verdadero titular del servicio concesionado; como de parte del hecho de que sea un “monopolio” porque no se trata de una situación de mercado ni de la prestación de servicios privados, sino de una situación dentro del ámbito público para la prestación de un servicio público.” Lo que el Estado está estableciendo en el caso del transporte remunerado de personas, es que se trata de una actividad definida como servicio público. Ello lo que supone es la denominada “publicatio”, que es, la declaratoria constitucional o legal que define una actividad como servicio público. Pero en este caso, el Estado no está asumiendo su prestación en carácter de monopolio. Antes bien, se establece la posibilidad de participación de los particulares en la gestión pública (denominada gestión indirecta), por medio de la concesión de servicio público, y del permiso especial de taxi. Así entonces nos encontramos con una multiplicidad de sujetos privados, quienes una vez habilitados, pueden prestar este servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas. Por ello no se puede considerar que se trata de un monopolio estatal, pues ni siquiera es el Estado quien directamente brinda el servicio, y en el caso de los sujetos privados habilitados, tampoco se trata de un solo sujeto, sino de una multiplicidad de ellos. No hay forma de calificar el sistema que esta ley está creando, como un monopolio, de lo único que se trata es de la ratificación de que la actividad es un servicio público (y como tal abstraído del comercio de los hombres) el cual, puede ser prestado por sujetos privados, previa concesión o permiso otorgado por el Estado. En conclusión, dado que con la ley impugnada no se está creando ningún tipo de monopolio estatal, sino sólo la ratificación de que el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas, modalidad taxi, es un servicio público, no existe vicio alguno de procedimiento por el hecho de que esta ley haya sido aprobada en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena o sin la mayoría que establece el párrafo final del artículo 46 Constitucional. En consecuencia, se desestima este alegato de inconstitucionalidad.

VII.- Sobre el segundo alegato: Violación de los principios de autonomía de la voluntad y libre comercio.

Los accionantes consideran que mediante la Ley impugnada se crea un monopolio público en el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad taxi, impidiendo a los particulares dedicarse a tal actividad como lo regulaba el Código de Comercio, es decir, bajo un acuerdo de voluntades entre las partes, en el que rige la libre voluntad o conveniencia de cada quien. Por tal razón, afirman, no debió prohibirse, pues se trata de un aspecto propio de la esfera privada de los ciudadanos, en el que rige el principio de autonomía de la voluntad y en el cual el Estado no debe interferir. Agregan que, la existencia del monopolio en materia de transporte de personas se hace más evidente en la actualidad con la llegada de UBER, una plataforma digital que permite conectar a proveedores de servicio de transporte de personas con personas que necesitan ser transportadas.

La Procuraduría General de la República considera al respecto que, la declaratoria de una determinada actividad económica como servicio público implica su nacionalización. Es decir, le atribuye al Estado su titularidad, de forma tal que solo éste o un particular autorizado, puede brindar el servicio. Otro efecto de la declaratoria de servicio público es que la actividad económica sale del comercio de los hombres, no pudiendo estos desarrollarla en forma libre. La única forma de dedicarse a ella es mediante una concesión o permiso del Estado. Sin embargo, aún en tales casos, la titularidad del servicio la mantiene el Estado, limitándose el particular únicamente a su prestación efectiva. En el caso del transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores –en sus distintas modalidades autobuses y taxi-, no cabe ninguna duda de que constituye un servicio público. Y en tal sentido se ha pronunciado la Sala Constitucional, en reiteradas oportunidades. Por ejemplo, en la resolución n.° 2011-04778, de las 14:30 horas del 13 de abril del 2011, al evacuar una consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad formulada por varios diputados con respecto del proyecto de ley que dio origen a la Ley aquí impugnada.

Por su parte, el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes considera que, el transporte remunerado de personas al tenor del ordenamiento jurídico vigente es y debe ser una actividad del Estado, por encontrarse inmerso un interés público claro y específico. El Consejo de Transporte Público, consideran que, el legislador procuró, abstraer de la esfera privada la prestación del servicio de transporte de personas que en su totalidad ha sido declarado servicio público por el legislador y hace que sean otras las reglas del juego y principios jurídicos a aplicar. Para esto, los particulares se convierten en colaboradores de la Administración Pública en la prestación de ese servicio que por sus características y la existencia de un interés público, debe ser asumido por el Estado sin que estén de por medio principios y derechos que rigen las relaciones privadas, como el principio de autonomía de la voluntad o la libertad de comercio.

Finalmente, las coadyuvancias activas admitidas ratifican los argumentos de los accionantes y las coadyuvancias pasivas admitidas indican que no se creó ningún nuevo monopolio a favor del Estado, pues ese monopolio ya existía desde el lejano 1965. Todas las argumentaciones se estrellan ante el hecho incontrovertible de que el artículo 1 de la Ley 3503, aprobado en 1965 y vigente a la fecha elevó todas las modalidades del transporte remunerado de personas por vías públicas a la categoría de servicio público. En consecuencia, la Ley 8955 no contiene ningún vicio de inconstitucionalidad, dado que lo único en que legisló ex novo fue en la regulación de la modalidad de servido público denominada "seetaxi", la cual, de manera inexplicable, operó a la libre, sin ninguna regulación del Estado desde 1965 hasta la promulgación de la Ley 8955.

Al respecto, en los mismos términos en que se ha venido desarrollando, el establecimiento de una actividad como “servicio público” no implica violación alguna a la libertad de comercio. Ciertamente, aún antes del dictado de la ley impugnada, ya el servicio de prestación de transporte remunerado de personas había sido calificado, de forma genérica, como un servicio público. Lo que el artículo 1° de la ley impugnada vino a reformar (en cuanto a los artículos 323 y 334 del Código de Comercio) fue para ratificarlo. De igual forma, este argumento ya fue examinado por esta Sala mediante la sentencia que resolvió la consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad no.11-004778, donde se indicó en cuanto a si el proyecto consultado violentaba los artículos 28, 45, 46 y 56 Constitucionales, lo siguiente:

“XII.- Tercer aspecto consultado: Violación a los artículos 28, 45, 46 y 56 de la Constitución, por la eliminación de la palabra "persona" del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio. Estiman los consultantes que la actividad de porteo de personas se desarrolla a partir de los artículo 323 y siguientes del Código de Comercio y que el proyecto de ley consultado propone eliminar la posibilidad de que en el futuro los particulares puedan incursionar en esa actividad, sustituyéndola por una figura de carácter público con un límite cuantitativo. Añaden que al ser una actividad privada, el legislador no tiene competencia para regularla y que está excediendo los límites de su competencia ya que no existe prueba alguna en el expediente que acredite que la actividad privada del porteo lesiona la moral, el orden público, ni afecta a terceros en los términos del artículo 28 de la Constitución Política. Agregan que, como lo ha señalado la jurisprudencia constitucional, toda persona tiene derecho a escoger, sin restricciones, la actividad empresarial legalmente permitida que más convenga a sus intereses; esto es lo que han hecho los porteadores, escoger y ejercer una actividad legalmente permitida por muchos años. Consideran que el Estado, pese al monopolio y control del transporte público mediante la concesión de placas de taxi, también dejó a la libre voluntad de los ciudadanos el uso de cualquier otra forma de contratación de transporte privado, con fundamento en los artículos 28 y 46 de la Constitución Política, que garantizan la libertad de acción y la libertad de empresa para desarrollar esa actividad mediante esquemas de unión voluntaria de los prestatarios de servicios amparados en la libertad de asociación (artículo 25 de la Constitución Política). Solicitan que la Sala reafirme que la actividad del porteo se desarrolla conforme a derecho y que la normativa que elimina del texto del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio la palabra “personas” y la figura del porteo de ellas viola, por omisión los artículos 25, 28, 46 y 56 de la Constitución Política.

(…)

Este Tribunal considera necesario referirse en primer lugar a la decisión de legislador de declarar servicio público todo el transporte remunerado de personas y luego si esta medida implica o no una limitación a la libertad de comercio.

(…)

Otra precisión necesaria, para el caso en estudio, es que el constituyente no enlistó en el texto de la Constitución todos los servicios de naturaleza pública. La Constitución Política deja al legislador ordinario la competencia para establecer cuáles servicios deben definirse de esa forma, atendiendo, claro está, al modelo político impuesto por la Constitución Política, cual es el de un régimen democrático social de derecho.

XVI.- El Estado, desde hace ya bastante tiempo, ha considerado la actividad de transporte de personas como una necesidad social imperante cuya vigencia resulta esencial, como condición fundamental para el mantenimiento del estado de derecho y la paz social. Por esta razón ha promulgado una serie de leyes siendo, actualmente, las más importantes en esta materia la Ley Reguladora de Transporte Remunerado Personas Vehículos Automotores (Ley No. 3503) y la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi (Ley No. 7969), cuya reforma se conoce en esta consulta. En el último quinquenio, es público y notorio que este tema del transporte de personas ha ido adquiriendo mayor trascendencia para la sociedad costarricense, no sólo desde el punto de vista social sino también económico, hasta convertirse en un tema de interés general, que va más allá de la satisfacción de una necesidad meramente privada, requiriendo la intervención del Estado para darle una solución. El Estado -en este caso el legislador ordinario- puede, dentro del marco permitido por la Constitución Política y las normas de carácter legal, optar por la solución que considere más oportuna. Como recién se dijo, una de esas posibles soluciones es regular dicha actividad y declararla servicio público, que es precisamente lo que hace el proyecto consultado, cumpliendo, necesariamente, con los dos elementos antes señalados. En virtud de lo expuesto, la Sala no estima contraria a la Constitución Política la reforma al artículo 2 de la Ley número 7969 para considerar el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi un servicio público del cual es titular el Estado y que se explotará mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa o el permiso en el caso de servicios especiales estables de taxi.

XVII.- Como consecuencia de declarar servicio público el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad taxi, en cualquiera de sus dos formas de prestación, el proyecto de ley consultado reforma el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio para eliminar la palabra “personas” de dicho artículo y así eliminar el porteo de personas. Con esta reforma el legislador busca, de una vez por todas, abstraer de la esfera privada la prestación del servicio de transporte de personas que en su totalidad ha sido declarado servicio público por el legislador y hace que sean otras las reglas del juego y principios jurídicos a aplicar: Los particulares se convierten en colaboradores de la Administración Pública en la prestación de ese servicio que, por sus características y la evidente existencia de un interés público, debe ser en principio, asumido por el Estado sin que estén de por medio principios y derechos que rigen las relaciones privadas, como lo son el principio de autonomía de la voluntad o la libertad de comercio. En consecuencia, el Tribunal estima que el proyecto de ley consultado no lesiona los artículos 28, 45, 46 y 56 de la Constitución Política. (…).” Así entonces, dado que el legislador ordinario puede optar por la solución que considere más oportuna para regular el servicio de transporte de personas, y que, con esta reforma, el legislador buscó abstraer de la esfera privada la prestación del servicio de transporte de personas, al declararlo servicio público, hace que sean otras las reglas del juego y principios jurídicos a aplicar. Por lo tanto, no pueden estar de por medio principios y derechos que rigen las relaciones privadas, como lo son el principio de autonomía de la voluntad o la libertad de comercio. En consecuencia, el Tribunal estimó en la sentencia transcrita (número 11-004778), y lo hace de nuevo en esta, que la ley impugnada no lesiona los principios constitucionales de autonomía de la voluntad (art.28) ni la libertad de comercio (art.46) por cuanto, la declaratoria de un servicio como servicio público no es violatorio de la libertad de comercio y el legislador buscó abstraer de la esfera privada (y de sus normas y principios) la prestación del servicio de transporte de personas, al declararlo servicio público.

VIII.- Sobre el tercer alegato: Violación al Tratado de Libre Comercio. REDACTA EL MAGISTRADO JINESTA LOBO. RESPECTO DE LAS PRESUNTAS INFRACCIONES AL TRATADO DE LIBRE COMERCIO REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA, CENTROAMERICA Y LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA. El punto medular a dilucidar sobre este particular es si el referido Tratado de Libre Comercio forma parte del parámetro de constitucionalidad con el que este Tribunal debe contrastar la validez de una norma o acto sujeto al Derecho Público que es impugnado por inconstitucional. Ese instrumento es lo que se denomina un acuerdo regional de comercio o de inversión, que, per se, está sujeto a los cambios dinámicos del mercado, la economía y libre comercio, por lo que, incluso, podría ser renegociado y modificado. Ciertamente, en el caso costarricense, a la luz del ordinal 7° de la Constitución Política, el referido acuerdo regional de comercio asumió la forma jurídica de un “Tratado”, por lo que, claramente, tiene rango infra constitucional pero supra legal. En principio, los tratados o convenios internacionales que forman parte del parámetro de constitucionalidad son aquellos propios del Derecho Internacional Público referidos a los derechos humanos, así se desprende de los términos y doctrina que informa los artículos 48 de la Constitución Política, 38, párrafo 2°, y 74 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Incluso, tales instrumentos del Derecho Internacional Público de los derechos humanos, pueden tener, eventualmente, un rango constitucional o supra constitucional, por ejemplo, cuando le ofrecen a las personas un umbral de protección superior a los preceptos constitucionales (doctrina de la primacía de la cláusula más favorable o de los principios in dubio pro homine o pro libertate). Bajo esa inteligencia, se estima que este Tribunal Constitucional no tiene competencia para entrar a determinar si una norma legal violenta o no un acuerdo regional de comercio que asumió la forma jurídica de tratado. Todos los extremos relativos a si una ley determinada infringe o no un acuerdo regional de comercio con rango supra legal, pero infra constitucional, le corresponde conocerlos y resolverlos al juez ordinario y no a los jueces constitucionales. Obviamente, este Tribunal sí tiene competencia para examinar la constitucionalidad de los referidos acuerdos regionales de comercio, tal y como la ha ejercido en el pasado.

IX.- Conclusiones.- 1) Dado que con la ley impugnada no se está creando ningún tipo de monopolio estatal, sino sólo la ratificación de que el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas es un servicio público, no existe vicio alguno de procedimiento por el hecho de que esta ley haya sido aprobada en una Comisión con potestad legislativa plena o sin la mayoría que establece el párrafo final del artículo 46 Constitucional. En consecuencia, se desestima este alegato de inconstitucionalidad. 2) El Tribunal estimó en la sentencia transcrita (número 11-004778), y lo hace de nuevo en esta, que la ley impugnada no lesiona los principios constitucionales de autonomía de la voluntad (art.28) ni la libertad de comercio (art.46) por cuanto, el legislador buscó abstraer de la esfera privada la prestación del servicio de transporte de personas, al declararlo servicio público. 3) Este Tribunal Constitucional no tiene competencia para entrar a determinar si una norma legal violenta o no un acuerdo regional de comercio que asumió la forma jurídica de tratado. Todos los extremos relativos a si una ley determinada infringe o no un acuerdo regional de comercio con rango supra legal, pero infra constitucional, le corresponde conocerlos y resolverlos al juez ordinario y no a los jueces constitucionales. En vista de lo anterior, se procede a la declaratoria sin lugar de esta acción, tal como en efecto se hace. Lo anterior, sin perjuicio de las competencias del legislador de determinar o reformar lo que estime conveniente sobre la regulación o ilegalidad de cualquier otra plataforma que pretenda el transporte privado remunerado de personas.

X.- RAZONES DIFERENTES DEL MAGISTRADO CASTILLO VÍQUEZ.- Los motivos que me impulsan a declarar sin lugar esta acción de inconstitucionalidad son distintos a los que se esgrimen en la sentencia. En primer término, estoy claro que, a diferencia de los que otros argumentan, la Ley que se impugna – la n.° 8955- nacionalizó a favor del Estado –excluyó del comercio de los hombres- una actividad privada –la prestación de un servicio-, que estaba regido por el principio de libertad –todo lo que no está prohibido está permitido- y sus dos componentes esenciales –los principios de la autonomía de la voluntad y la igualdad de las partes contratantes-. La razón de esta postura es elemental y lógica, y es que cuando el Estado nacionalizó –reservó para el sector público esa actividad- el transporte de personas en la modalidad taxi, no incluyó dentro de ese acto legislativo el porteo de personas de conformidad con el numeral 323 del Código de Comercio. Antes de la entrada en vigencia de la Ley n.° 8955, la actividad del porteo de personas era una actividad lícita regida por lo que dispone el numeral 28 de la Carta Fundamental. La prueba irrefutable de lo que vengo afirmando se sustenta en tres hechos incuestionables. Primero: la necesidad de promulgar la Ley n.° 8955 para nacionalizar la actividad del porteo de personas. Segundo: la abundante jurisprudencia de este Tribunal, en el sentido de que el porteo de personas estaba autorizado por el ordenamiento jurídico. Tercero: la abundante jurisprudencia administrativa de la Procuraduría General de la República coincidente con la jurisprudencia judicial.

Partiendo de la premisa anterior –que el porteo de personas estaba permitido antes de la entrada en vigencia de la Ley n.° 8955- una de las cuestiones de constitucionalidad que se plantea en este proceso constitucional resulta de la mayor relevancia, me refiero concretamente al hecho de si una limitación a la libertad de empresa –la nacionalización de una actividad privada donde el Estado asume su titularidad- requiere de Ley y, en caso afirmativo, es también necesario que su aprobación sea por una mayoría calificada de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa de conformidad con lo que dispone el párrafo cuarto del numeral 46 constitucional.

No tengo la menor duda que para adoptar una medida en la cual una actividad económica privada sale del comercio de los hombres y el Estado asume su titularidad, de forma tal que solo este o quienes cuente con un título habilitante –permiso, concesión, etc.- pueden ejercerla, requiere de una Ley formal, en los términos que establecen los numerales 28 y 46 de la Constitución Política en relación con el artículo 31 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Lo anterior significa, en buen castellano, que se necesita de un acto aprobatorio de la Asamblea Legislativa en ejercicio de la potestad de legislar, y que, a su vez, cuente con el beneplácito del Poder Ejecutivo –en nuestro medio este órgano fundamental del Estado es colegislador-, y donde quede claramente demostradas las razones de interés general que justifican la promulgación de la Ley, y se trate de una medida excepcional o extraordinaria. En esta dirección, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos nos recuerda lo siguiente:

En la Opinión Consultiva 6/86, en la que la República Oriental del Uruguay consulta sobre el alcance de la expresión “leyes” en el Artículo 30 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, la Corte concluye lo siguiente la pregunta se limita a indagar sobre el sentido de la palabra leyes en el artículo 30 de la Convención. No se trata, en consecuencia, de dar una respuesta aplicable a todos los casos en que la Convención utiliza expresiones como " leyes ", " ley ", "disposiciones legislativas ", "disposiciones legales", "medidas legislativas ", " restricciones legales " o " leyes internas”. En cada ocasión en que tales expresiones son usadas, su sentido ha de ser determinado específicamente.

No obstante lo anterior, los criterios del artículo 30 sí resultan aplicables a todos aquellos casos en que la expresión ley o locuciones equivalentes son empleadas por la Convención a propósito de las restricciones que ella misma autoriza respecto de cada uno de los derechos protegidos. En efecto, la Convención no se limita a proclamar el conjunto de derechos y libertades cuya inviolabilidad se garantiza a todo ser humano, sino que también hace referencia a las condiciones particulares en las cuales es posible restringir el goce o ejercicio de tales derechos o libertades sin violarlos. E1 artículo 30 no puede ser interpretado como una suerte de autorización general para establecer nuevas restricciones a los derechos protegidos por la Convención, que se agregaría a las limitaciones permitidas en la regulación particular de cada uno de ellos. Por el contrario, lo que el artículo pretende es imponer una condición adicional para que las restricciones, singularmente autorizadas, sean legítimas.

Al leer el artículo 30 en concordancia con otros en que la Convención autoriza la imposición de limitaciones o restricciones a determinados derechos y libertades, se observa que exige para establecerlas el cumplimiento concurrente de las siguientes condiciones:

a. Que se trate de una restricción expresamente autorizada por la Convención y en las condiciones particulares en que la misma ha sido permitida; b. Que los fines para los cuales se establece la restricción sean legítimos, es decir, que obedezcan a " razones de interés general " y no se aparten del " propósito para el cual han sido establecidas”. Este criterio teleológico, cuyo análisis no ha sido requerido en la presente consulta, establece un control por desviación de poder; y c. Que tales restricciones estén dispuestas por las leyes y se apliquen de conformidad con ellas.

El significado del vocablo leyes ha de buscarse como término incluido en un tratado internacional. No se trata, en consecuencia, de determinar la acepción del sustantivo leyes en el derecho interno de un Estado Parte.

En este sentido, la Corte tiene en cuenta el hecho de que los sistemas jurídicos de los Estados Partes en la Convención se derivan de tradiciones diferentes.

El sentido de la palabra leyes dentro del contexto de un régimen de protección a los derechos humanos no puede desvincularse de la naturaleza y del origen de tal régimen. En efecto, la protección a los derechos humanos, en especial los derechos civiles y políticos recogidos en la Convención, parte de la afirmación de la existencia de ciertos atributos inviolables de la persona humana que no pueden ser legítimamente menoscabados por el ejercicio del poder público. Se trata de esferas individuales que el Estado no puede vulnerar o en las que sólo puede penetrar limitadamente. Así, en la protección a los derechos humanos, está necesariamente comprendida la noción de la restricción al ejercicio del poder estatal.

Por ello, la protección de los derechos humanos requiere que los actos estatales que los afecten de manera fundamental no queden al arbitrio del poder público, sino que estén rodeados de un conjunto de garantías enderezadas a asegurar que no se vulneren los atributos inviolables de la persona, dentro de las cuales, acaso la más relevante tenga que ser que las limitaciones se establezcan por una ley adoptada por el Poder Legislativo, de acuerdo con lo establecido por la Constitución. A través de este procedimiento no sólo se inviste a tales actos del asentimiento de la representación popular, sino que se permite a las minorías expresar su inconformidad, proponer iniciativas distintas, participar en la formación de la voluntad política o influir sobre la opinión pública para evitar que la mayoría actúe arbitrariamente. En verdad, este procedimiento no impide en todos los casos que una ley aprobada por el Parlamento llegue a ser violatoria de los derechos humanos, posibilidad que reclama la necesidad de algún régimen de control posterior, pero sí es, sin duda, un obstáculo importante para el ejercicio arbitrario del poder.

La reserva de ley para todos los actos de intervención en la esfera de la libertad, dentro del constitucionalismo democrático, es un elemento esencial para que los derechos del hombre puedan estar jurídicamente protegidos y existir plenamente en la realidad. Para que los principios de legalidad y reserva de ley constituyan una garantía efectiva de los derechos y libertades de la persona humana, se requiere no sólo su proclamación formal, sino la existencia de un régimen que garantice eficazmente su aplicación y un control adecuado del ejercicio de las competencias de los órganos.

La expresión leyes, en el marco de la protección a los derechos humanos, carecería de sentido si con ella no se aludiera a la idea de que la sola determinación del poder público no basta para restringir tales derechos. Lo contrario equivaldría a reconocer una virtualidad absoluta a los poderes de los gobernantes frente a los gobernados. En cambio, el vocablo leyes cobra todo su sentido lógico e histórico si se le considera como una exigencia de la necesaria limitación a la interferencia del poder público en la esfera de los derechos y libertades de la persona humana. La Corte concluye que la expresión leyes, utilizada por el artículo 30, no puede tener otro sentido que el de ley formal, es decir, norma jurídica adoptada por el órgano legislativo y promulgada por el Poder Ejecutivo, según el procedimiento requerido por el derecho interno de cada Estado.

La Convención no se limita a exigir una ley para que las restricciones al goce y ejercicio de los derechos y libertades sean jurídicamente lícitas. Requiere, además, que esas leyes se dicten " por razones de interés general y con el propósito para el cual han sido establecidas”. E1 criterio según el cual las restricciones permitidas han de ser aplicadas " con el propósito para el cual han sido establecidas " se encontraba ya reconocido en el Proyecto de Convención sobre Derechos Humanos elaborado por el Consejo Interamericano de Jurisconsultos (1959), en el que se expresaba que tales restricciones " no podrán ser aplicadas con otro propósito o designio que aquél para el cual han sido previstas”.

El requisito según la cual las leyes han de ser dictadas por razones de interés general significa que deben haber sido adoptadas en función del " bien común " (art. 32.2 ), concepto que ha de interpretarse como elemento integrante del orden público del Estado democrático, cuyo fin principal es " la protección de los derechos esenciales del hombre y la creación de circunstancias que le permitan progresar espiritual y materialmente y alcanzar la felicidad " ( " Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre ".

"Bien común " y " orden público " en la Convención son términos que deben interpretarse dentro del sistema de la misma, que tiene una concepción propia según la cual los Estados americanos " requieren la organización política de los mismos sobre la base del ejercicio efectivo de la democracia representativa " (Carta de la OEA, art. 3.d ); y los derechos del hombre, que " tienen como fundamento los atributos de la persona humana ", deben ser objeto de protección internacional ( Declaración Americana, Considerandos, párr. 2; Convención Americana, Preámbulo, párr. 2).

La ley en el Estado democrático no es simplemente un mandato de la autoridad revestido de ciertos necesarios elementos formales. Implica un contenido y está dirigida a una finalidad. El concepto de leyes a que se refiere el artículo 30, interpretado en el contexto de la Convención y teniendo en cuenta su objeto y fin, no puede considerarse solamente de acuerdo con el principio de legalidad. Este principio, dentro del espíritu de la Convención, debe entenderse como aquel en el cual la creación de las normas jurídicas de carácter general ha de hacerse de acuerdo con los procedimientos y por los órganos establecidos en la Constitución de cada Estado Parte, y a él deben ajustar su conducta de manera estricta todas las autoridades públicas. En una sociedad democrática el principio de legalidad está vinculado inseparablemente al de legitimidad, en virtud del sistema internacional que se encuentra en la base de la propia Convención, relativo al "ejercicio efectivo de la democracia representativa ", que se traduce, inter alia, en la elección popular de los órganos de creación jurídica, el respeto a la participación de las minorías y la ordenación al bien común.

No es posible desvincular el significado de la expresión leyes en el artículo 30 del propósito de todos los Estados americanos expresado en el Preámbulo de la Convención "de consolidar en este Continente, dentro del cuadro de las instituciones democráticas, un régimen de libertad personal y de justicia social, fundado en el respeto de los derechos esenciales del hombre " (Convención Americana, Preámbulo, párr. 1 ). La democracia representativa es determinante en todo el sistema del que la Convención forma parte. Es un " principio " reafirmado por los Estados americanos en la Carta de la OEA, instrumento fundamental del Sistema Interamericano. E1 régimen mismo de la Convención reconoce expresamente los derechos políticos ( art. 23 ), que son de aquellos que, en los términos del artículo 27, no se pueden suspender, lo que es indicativo de la fuerza que ellos tienen en dicho sistema.

Las leyes a que se refiere el artículo 30 son actos normativos enderezados al bien común, emanados del Poder Legislativo democráticamente elegido y promulgados por el Poder Ejecutivo. Esta acepción corresponde plenamente al contexto general de la Convención dentro de la filosofía del Sistema Interamericano. Sólo la ley formal, entendida como lo ha hecho la Corte, tiene aptitud para restringir el goce o ejercicio de los derechos reconocidos por la Convención.

Lo anterior no se contradice forzosamente con la posibilidad de delegaciones legislativas en esta materia, siempre que tales delegaciones estén autorizadas por la propia Constitución, que se ejerzan dentro de los límites impuestos por ella y por la ley delegante, y que el ejercicio de la potestad delegada esté sujeto a controles eficaces, de manera que no desvirtúe, ni pueda utilizarse para desvirtuar, el carácter fundamental de los derechos y libertades protegidos por la Convención.

La necesaria existencia de los elementos propios del concepto de ley en el artículo 30 de la Convención, permite concluir que los conceptos de legalidad y legitimidad coinciden a los efectos de la interpretación de esta norma, ya que sólo la ley adoptada por los órganos democráticamente elegidos y constitucionalmente facultados, ceñida al bien común, puede restringir el goce y ejercicio de los derechos y libertades de la persona humana.

Por tanto, en respuesta a la pregunta del Gobierno del Uruguay sobre la interpretación de la palabra leyes en el artículo 30 de la Convención, que la palabra leyes en el artículo 30 de la Convención significa norma jurídica de carácter general, ceñida al bien común, emanada de los órganos legislativos constitucionalmente previstos y democráticamente elegidos, y elaborada según el procedimiento establecido por las constituciones de los Estados Partes para la formación de las leyes.

En lo atinente al modelo de economía que adoptó nuestro Constituyente –una economía de mercado lo suficientemente abierta que admite distintas variables, sea una economía de mercado liberal, una economía social de mercado, una economía mixta e incluso un fuerte intervencionismo del Estado en la economía, siempre y cuando se respete el contenido esencial de las libertades económicas-, la posición que sigo impide que se sustituya este modelo económico por un modelo de corte centralista o socialista, pues de no ser así, se caería en la patología jurídica que, acertadamente, algunos estudiosos del Derecho Constitucional han denominado el fraude constitucional. Recapitulando: Para que se nacionalice una actividad económica privada es necesario que se haga mediante Ley formal, que existan razones de interés general que justifiquen su promulgación y se trate de una medida excepcional.

El otro aspecto a desentrañar en este proceso constitucional, es si la Ley ha de aprobarse por una mayoría calificada de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa. Esta cuestión adquiere una relevancia capital, toda vez que la Ley que se impugna fue aprobada en una Comisión Permanente con Potestad Legislativa Plena, donde, evidentemente, no se obtuvo esa mayoría extraordinaria. Según el accionante y los coadyuvantes activos esta exigencia la impone el párrafo cuarto del artículo 46 constitucional.

Revisando los antecedentes de este numeral constitucional, encontramos que la Constitución Política de 1949 recoge la libertad de comercio en el numeral 46. En efecto, se indica, en lo que interesa, que son prohibidos los monopolios de carácter particular, y cualquier acto, aunque fuere originado en una ley, que amenace o restrinja la libertad de comercio, agricultura e industria. Se declara de interés público la acción del Estado encaminada a impedir toda práctica o tendencia monopolizadora. Además, las empresas constituidas en monopolio de hecho deben ser sometidas a una legislación especial. Por último, para establecer nuevos monopolios a favor del Estado o de las Municipalidades, se requiere la aprobación de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa.

Este texto resulta diferente al que se encontraba en el numeral 23 de la Constitución Política de 18711, en especial en cuanto a que en el actual se le impone el deber constitucional al Estado de impedir toda práctica o tendencia monopolizadora, así como el someter a los monopolios de hecho a una legislación especial. El diputado Facio Brenes justificó estas innovaciones, señalando que pese a que en la Constitución de 1871 se prohibían los monopolios, en la práctica se dieron. Asimismo, señaló, que el Estado debía someter a esos monopolios a un régimen especial de reglamentación, en beneficio de los grupos productores o consumidores que resultaren víctimas de ellos y llegar, si fuere del caso, por causa de interés público, a su expropiación.

El diputado Esquivel, quien presentó junto con otros constituyentes una moción que reproducida el texto de la Constitución de 1871, se opuso a la moción de la Fracción Social Demócrata, porque en ella se admitía la posibilidad, por parte del Estado, de expropiar empresas particulares; práctica que consideraba sumamente peligrosa para los intereses económicos de la nación. Además, para él, tal concepto significaba una intervención directa del Estado en la esfera de los negocios privados. Por último, señaló, que ambas mociones están de acuerdo en prohibir los monopolios; pero que se discrepaba en la forma de actuar el Estado, ante esas situaciones. Al final del debate, fue aprobada la moción de los diputados Social Demócratas con algunas modificaciones, la que constituye el texto del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, sin la reforma que se le introdujo por medio de la Ley n° 7697 de 29 de mayo de 1996.

En apariencia las actas de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente no aportan mayores elementos de juicio sobre el cuarto párrafo del numeral 46 constitucional. Ahora bien, una lectura lógica y continúa de ese artículo a partir de su segundo párrafo, me hace concluir que cuando se habla de monopolios se está haciendo referencia a un concepto estrictamente económico, concretamente: a una situación del mercado en la que la oferta de un producto o servicio se reduce a un solo vendedor.

Es importante aclarar que cuando mediante Ley se hace una reserva a favor del sector público –nacionalización – de un bien o de un servicio ello puede obedecer a distintas motivaciones. Una primera justificación, puede ser que estemos en presencia de un servicio estratégico o esencial para el Estado o la Nación, tal y como ocurre con los bienes y servicios que se encuentran en el numeral 121, inciso 14; lo que la doctrina ha denominado el demanio constitucional. Un segundo motivo, sería que la prestación del servicio o la explotación de bien se realicen en condiciones de ineficiencia e ineficacia por parte del sector privado, lo que hace necesario la intervención del Estado –principio de subsidiariedad-. Un tercer supuesto, sería el hecho de que, dadas las altas inversiones, el riesgo, la rentabilidad del proyecto, etc., el sector privado decide no intervenir, lo que justifica que el Estado actúe en este caso. Otro supuesto, sería cuando una determinada actividad económica es objeto de monopolio, en cuyo caso el Estado tendría un motivo razonable para reservar esa actividad a su favor. Finalmente, también justificaría la intervención del Estado, cuando se está en presencia de un servicio público.

Hay que tener presente que cuando se hace una reserva a favor del sector público y a un sujeto privado se le afecta en su propiedad o en la actividad económica que viene desarrollando por medio de su empresa –en sus distintas modalidades-, el Estado está en la obligación de indemnizarlo mediante un precio justo. Además, se debe subrayar que el hecho de que un servicio sea esencial para la colectividad, no necesariamente significa que dicho servicio debe de ser nacionalizado, pues es claro que en un Estado social y democrático de derecho, que ha optado por una economía de mercado, determinadas actividades esenciales pueden ser satisfechas por la iniciativa privada.

No cabe duda que la discusión de esta controversia jurídica está relacionada con el tema del servicio público. Es bien sabido, que un servicio público se caracteriza por ser una actividad prestacional no consustancial al Estado –no es una función pública que conlleva el ejercicio de autoridad por parte de la Administración-, pero es indispensable para la vida social, por lo que el Estado debe garantizar que se desarrolle de forma universal, continua, eficiente, adaptable y sin discriminación, con el fin de satisfacer el interés o la necesidad colectiva. Por regla de principio, la titularidad del servicio corresponde al Estado, lo que está justificado por el interés que representa la actividad para la colectividad, por lo que los particulares requieren de un título habilitante especial de la Administración para gestionar el servicio –prestación indirecta de un servicio público-. Dado el interés que representa la prestación del servicio público para la colectividad, aun y cuando se trate de una gestión indirecta de un servicio público, la Administración conserva importantes potestades respecto al servicio, amén de que puede fijar las condiciones bajos las cuales el particular debe gestionar la actividad. Asimismo, la gestión del servicio público puede tener distintas modalidades. Además de la gestión indirecta del servicio público a que se ha hecho referencia, también está la gestión directa, cuando es la Administración Pública quien lo presta. Por otra parte, tenemos el caso de los servicios públicos objetivos, virtuales o impropios, que, en términos generales, son aquellos casos de actividades de interés general –verbigracia la educación, la salud, la intermediación financiera, etc.-, en los cuales no se requiere de un título habilitante de la Administración Pública, sino únicamente una autorización. Tampoco puede desconocerse aquellos casos de actividades esenciales para la colectividad que son prestadas directamente por el sector privado, en ejercicio del principio de libertad y la libertad de empresa, tal y como se explicó supra, pues no toda actividad esencial para la colectividad ha de reservarse necesariamente al sector público. Finalmente, están las actividades de gestión económica –en este caso sí sería necesario la mayoría calificada-, que se diferencia del servicio público, pues esta presupone una actividad de hacer, mientras que las primeras hacen referencia al acarreo de bienes para el mercado o cuando se trata de empresas industriales o comerciales comunes, cuando por su régimen de conjunto y los requerimiento de su giro, pueden estimarse como tales –véase el artículo 3, inciso 2 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública-.

Adoptando como marco de referencia lo anterior, concluyo que el Constituyente al utilizar el término monopolio no se estaba refiriendo a la “publicatio” –la titularidad que asume el Estado de una actividad a causa de interés general que representa para la sociedad, lo que conlleva una actuación pública que justifica que él se apropie de esta-, sino a un caso específico de una actividad económica: explotación de un bien o la prestación de un servicio económico no esencial por un único vendedor. Desde mi perspectiva, ni el caso de la prestación directa del servicio público –donde el Estado o un agente público, de forma exclusiva, presta el servicio público- justificaría la exigencia de la mayoría calificada, toda vez que la reserva de servicios esenciales para la colectividad mediante Ley, no fue contemplado por el Constituyente a la hora de establecer las limitaciones a la libertad de empresa. Mucho menos en los casos de la gestión indirecta del servicio público –como ocurre con el transporte público modalidad taxi-, donde se presta el servicio en un régimen de competencia entre todos aquellos que cuentan con un título habilitante –concesión o permiso-. Nótese que en el caso que nos ocupa, se está en el último supuesto, toda vez que la Ley que se impugna opta por la modalidad indirecta de la prestación del servicio, al establecer que se requerirá de un permiso para la explotación del servicio de transporte remunerado de personas modalidad servicio especial estable de taxi, en los casos en que el servicio se brinde de puerta a puerta, para satisfacer una necesidad de servicio limitado, residual, dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas diferente del que se presta.

El artículo 73, inciso d, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece que se puede incurrir en un vicio de inconstitucionalidad cuando una Ley o disposición general infrinja el artículo 7, párrafo primero, de la Constitución, por oponerse a un tratado público o convenio internacional. Estamos, pues, en el caso de lo que la doctrina ha denominado como una inconstitucionalidad indirecta, pues la Ley o la disposición general al quebrantar el Tratado internacional, por efecto reflejo, se violenta el numeral 7 constitucional.

Esta norma, revisando los antecedentes legislativos –Ley Orgánica de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, expediente legislativo n.° 10.273, no suscitó mayor polémica. La única observación fue la que hizo la Corte Suprema de Justicia la que, en lo que interesa y refiriéndose a lo expresado sobre el artículo 2 del proyecto de ley, manifestó lo siguiente:

El artículo 2° también se ocupa de los instrumentos internacionales, ello al señalar las materias sometidas a la Jurisdicción Constitucional. En el inciso b) se incluye el control que debe hacerse “para la conformidad del ordenamiento interno con el derecho internacional o comunitario”.

Se habla allí en forma amplia del “ordenamiento interno”, sin que se restrinja ese control al choque de normas de la Carta Política y normas de un tratado. De suerte, que, al discutirse alguna posible colisión entre normas comunes de derecho interno y normas de un tratado internacional, siempre corresponderá a la Sala resolver el punto, y de ese modo se suprime la potestad de los jueces ordinarios para determinar el derecho vigente, de la cual han podido hacer uso, mientras no exista norma constitucional que lo impida. Ahora, conforme al proyecto de la Asamblea, si una ley común fuere modificada implícitamente por un tratado, de acuerdo con el principio de que las normas posteriores modifican a las anteriores en todo lo que se les oponga, máxime si uno de los instrumentos es de superior jerarquía, en tal supuesto el problema tendría que plantearse ante de la Sala Constitucional, de conformidad con el citado inciso b) del artículo 2°. (Folio 1586).

No se ve la necesidad de acudir a la Sala Constitucional en todos esos casos, puesto que los jueces bien pueden decidir cuál es la norma vigente, actuando en la órbita de sus atribuciones.

La Corte se limita a señalarlo así, aunque no deja de comprender que algunas veces puedan suscitarse problemas u obstáculos para la aplicación de un tratado, concretamente por requerir de la legislación complementaria. Eso puede suceder con más frecuencia acerca de tratados posteriores a la ley; pero también existe la posibilidad de que ello ocurra respecto de tratados anteriores, cuando el legislador, en vez de ajustarse al tratado, dicta normas que lo contradicen o no dicta las que debiera. En resumen, como se trata de problemas complejos, en que puede estar involucrada la potestad legislativa del Estado, ello sí podría justificar que la decisión se radique en el ámbito de la Sala Constitucional.

Por lo demás, si no se presentaren esas situaciones de carácter complejo, la Sala podría denegar la acción de inconstitucionalidad cuando la pugna fuere sólo entre un tratado y leyes anteriores y el problema estuviere circunscrito a determinar el derecho vigente, sin que ello dependa de la aplicación de las normas constitucionales.” (Folio 1587).

Desde mi perspectiva, el tema de la inconstitucionalidad indirecta es asunto de suyo complejo, no tanto por la dificultad del abordaje de la cuestión, sino porque hay que realizar una labor de integración y armonización entre el Derecho Internacional Público y el Derecho interno, en especial el Derecho Constitucional y Procesal Constitucional.

Por mucho tiempo fue tesis de principio en el Derecho Internacional Público que las únicas personas jurídicas reconocidas eran los Estados. Es decir, se reconocía a los Estados una personalidad jurídica internacional, capacidad jurídica y capacidad de actuar y, por consiguiente, ser sujetos que podían contraer derechos y obligaciones internacionales. Eran, pues, los Estados a quienes se les reconocía capacidad para asumir derechos y deberes internacionales dentro del sistema jurídico internacional. Con el correr del tiempo, también se les reconoció la personalidad jurídica internacional a los organismos internacionales, a los sujetos de Derecho Internacional atípicos –la Santa Sede, Soberana Orden de Malta y el Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja-, a las comunidades beligerantes, etc. y, más recientemente, en lo referente a los Instrumentos Internacionales de Derechos Humanos, se ha reconocido a los individuos su condición de sujetos de Derecho Internacional y, por ende, legitimación activa para reclamar y pedir reparación por el incumplimiento del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, toda vez que al ser las víctimas de los actos y omisiones del Estado pueden exigirle responsabilidad a este por la vulneración de sus derechos humanos. Así las cosas, el individuo, en lo referente al Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, tiene legitimación activa ante los Tribunales Nacionales e Internacionales para exigir responsabilidad por la violación de sus derechos, y legitimación pasiva, para responder directamente cuando sus actuaciones han quebrantando los derechos humanos de las personas, extremo este último que se ha visto reforzado con la entrada en vigencia del Tratado Internacional de la Corte Penal Internacional y su puesta en funcionamiento.

Como es bien sabido, además del caso del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, la doctrina ha discutido, en otros ámbitos, si los individuos pueden ser o no sujetos de derechos y obligaciones de conformidad con el Derecho Internacional Público. En el caso del Derecho Internacional Económico, se han dictado tratados que le reconocen ciertos derechos a los individuos, verbigracia: el Convenio sobre Arreglos de Diferencias Relativas a Inversiones entre Estados y Nacionales de otros Estados –CIADI-, que le permite a los individuos recurrir a procesos arbitrales en contra de los Estados. El Tratado de Libre Comercio de América Norte –NAFTA- que atribuye a los particulares el derecho de acceso a los comités binacionales para la solución de controversias. Lo anterior significa, que para determinar si los individuos tienen legitimación activa para invocar el incumplimiento de un convenio internacional en aquellos que no son relativos a los derechos humanos, donde la cuestión está clara, hay que analizar su contenido. De lo que llevamos dicho se extraen importantes reglas, entre ellas: si el Tratado no les reconoce la legitimación activa, serán los Estados partes quienes reclamen su incumplimiento. Si le reconoce legitimación activa al individuo para reclamar su incumplimiento, esta legitimación debe necesariamente circunscribirse a lo que establece el Tratado.

En el caso que nos ocupa, el Tratado de Libre Comercio de Estados Unidos con Centro América estableció dos supuestos de resolución de controversias. El capítulo diez, relativo a inversión, el que dispone en su sección B la solución de controversias Inversionista-Estado, en él se establece que, en caso de una controversia, el demandante y el demandado deben intentar resolver la disputa mediante consultas y negociación. En el supuesto de que las partes no lleguen a un acuerdo mediante el mecanismo de consultas o negociaciones, y siempre que hayan transcurrido seis meses desde que tuvieron lugar los hechos que dan origen a la demanda, el demandante (o el accionante en nombre de una persona jurídica propiedad suya o que controla directa o indirectamente) que haya incurrido en pérdidas o daños por razón de la violación alegada, puede someter su demanda a arbitraje, ya sea al Centro Internacional de Arreglo de Diferencias Relativas a Inversiones (CIADI) (en caso de que la parte contendiente y la demandante sean parte de él); o las Reglas del Mecanismo Complementario del CIADI (en caso de que únicamente una de las dos partes sean parte del Convenio del CIADI); o a las reglas de la Comisión de Naciones Unidas sobre Derecho Internacional Mercantil (CNUDMI).

Por otra parte, el capítulo veinte establece el mecanismo general de solución y controversias. Este se divide en dos secciones; la primera, trata de la solución de controversias y Estados, mientras que la segunda, se refiere a la cuestión de los procedimientos internos y solución de controversias comerciales y privadas. En la primera de las secciones, se establece la posibilidad de recurrir a distintos procedimientos, tales como: arbitrajes, negociaciones directas entre las partes, o con la mediación de la Comisión de Libre Comercio. En la segunda de las secciones, se dispone que cuando una cuestión de interpretación o de aplicación de este Tratado surja en un procedimiento judicial o administrativo interno de una parte y cualquier otra parte considere que amerita su intervención, o cuando un tribunal u órgano administrativo solicite la opinión de alguna de las partes, esa parte lo notificará a las otras. La Comisión debe procurar, a la brevedad posible, dar una respuesta adecuada. La parte en cuyo territorio se encuentre ubicado el tribunal o el órgano administrativo, debe presentar a las partes cualquier interpretación acordada por la Comisión, de conformidad con los procedimientos de ese foro. Cuando la Comisión no logre llegar a un acuerdo, cualquiera de las partes puede someter su propia opinión al tribunal o al órgano administrativo.

Así las cosas, si en el Tratado hay unos procedimientos a través de los cuales las partes y los inversionistas deben encauzar sus reclamos cuando hay una controversia jurídica sobre la interpretación y aplicación del Convenio a propósito del dictado de un acto del Estado, sea este legislativo o ejecutivo, lo primero que debe observarse son esos procedimientos para resolverla. Esta postura tiene una serie de consecuencias positivas desde la óptica jurídica y es acorde a principios elementales de justicia, lógica o conveniencia. En primer lugar, se observa lo que dispone el propio Tratado, lo que concretiza los principios de Pacta sunt servanda, bona fides y el principio de interpretación y aplicación de los tratados del effect utile; de lo contrario se estaría vulnerando el Tratado, hecho que este Tribunal no puede permitir ni propiciar. Se caería en la paradoja que en aras de resguardar el Tratado, este Tribunal lo vulneraría al ejercer la competencia en un caso donde se invoque una inconstitucionalidad indirecta. En segundo término, le permite a las partes y a los inversionistas expresar en igualdad de condiciones –principio de igualdad de armas- sus distintas tesis acerca de la correcta interpretación y aplicación del Tratado. En el caso del Gobierno de Costa Rica, hay que tener presente lo que expresa el ministro de Comercio Exterior en su escrito presentado al expediente judicial en atención al auto de las quince horas y siete minutos del diez de enero del dos mil diecisiete dictado por el magistrado instructor a solicitud del suscrito, cuando afirma lo siguiente que: “(…) los incisos a), b) y d) del artículo 2 de la Ley N° 7638 del 30 de octubre de 1996; corresponde a este Ministerio definir y dirigir las negociaciones comerciales y de inversión de Costa Rica y, además, representar al país ante los foros comerciales internacionales en el que se discutan temas de comercio e inversión. De forma que, en caso de que existan posibles desavenencias o disconformidades entre las Partes en relación con el cumplimiento, aplicación o interpretación de alguna disposición de los tratados internacionales de libre comercio, acuerdos e instrumentos de comercio exterior vigentes; COMEX es el llamado a representar al país ante los foros y órganos bilaterales, plurilaterales y multilaterales respectivos en los que se discutan tales asuntos, valga mencionar que dicha competencia comprende per se la conducción y coordinación de la estrategia de defensa del Estado bajo los distintos mecanismos de solución de controversias instituidos en los tratados, acuerdos e instrumentos internacionales en materia de comercio e inversión Así que, en lo que atañe a la supuesta violación achacada a la Ley N° 8955 del 16 de junio de 2011 en relación alguna de las disposiciones del Capítulo 11 “Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios” del Tratado de Libre Comercio República Dominicana- Centroamérica- Estados Unidos, Ley de Aprobación N° 8622 del 21 de noviembre de 2007, o de sus Anexos, estima este Ministerio que no resulta oportuno ni conveniente manifestarse sobre lo expresado por los accionantes ante la jurisdicción constitucional. En ese sentido, este Ministerio debe abstenerse de emitir criterio u opinión sobre la constitucionalidad o no de las normas impugnadas y su conformidad o no al amparo del Tratado de Libre Comercio República Dominicana- Centroamérica- Estados Unidos, pues de no proceder así, se develaría y adelantaría públicamente a los otros Estados Parte la posición y estrategia de defensa del país ante la posibilidad de que –bajo las reglas del Tratado en cuestión- alguna Parte se sintiera afectada con motivo de la resolución de este asunto y llegara a activar el mecanismo de solución de controversias”. Nótese que el ministro de Comercio Exterior, entre otras cosas, se abstiene de forma juiciosa y razonable de emitir un criterio, ya que ello implicaría revelar su estrategia de defensa del Estado Costa Rica ante una eventual controversia jurídica que se presente entre el Estado de Costa Rica y un inversionista u otro Estado parte, lo que significa, ni más ni menos, que el Estado costarricense no ha ejercido el derecho de defensa a su favor en este caso. Por otra parte, si bien el ministro de Comercio Exterior no lo dice de forma expresa, de su nota se infiere, sin lugar a duda, que el cauce normal para resolver esta controversia jurídica es la que prevé el Tratado, y no en esta sede. Por último, si bien con el magistrado Rueda Leal, de forma reiterada, he sostenido que para acudir al CIADI es necesario agotar los procedimientos internos, lo cierto del caso es que la parte recurrente no acredita en el expediente judicial que haya seguido a las normas que prevé el Tratado para la resolución de controversias, ni que haya agotado la vía interna. Por último, no resulta lógico ni justo que este Tribunal emita un juicio de constitucionalidad, en el sentido de si la Ley viola o no el Tratado sin tener acceso a las distintas posiciones de las partes, de los inversionistas, los órganos técnicos, órganos bilaterales, plurilaterales, multilaterales, etc., argumentos, contraargumentos, etc. que se deben exponer en las instancias que prevé el Tratado para la resolución de controversias.

Así las cosas, concluyo que, una vez observada las disposiciones del Tratado sobre la solución de controversias y, por ende, agotados los procedimientos respectivos, es que este Tribunal eventualmente tendría competencia para examinar el agravio de constitucionalidad que se plantea, en el sentido de si la Ley impugnada vulnera el Tratado de Libre Comercio entre los Estados Unidos de América y Centro América. Ergo, rechazo de plano este agravio y, por consiguiente, me abstengo de emitir cualquier juicio al respecto.

XI.- El Magistrado Rueda Leal salva el voto y declara la inconstitucionalidad de las reformas hechas por medio de la Ley N.° 8955 de 16 de junio de 2011 a los artículos 323 y 334 inciso b) del Código de Comercio; y de las adiciones y reformas a los artículos 1 inciso l), 2, 29 y 62 inciso e) de la Ley Nº 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi de 22 de diciembre de 1999.

Previo a analizar el fondo de lo cuestionado, es importante explicar en qué consistieron los cambios realizados por medio de la Ley N.° 8955 de 16 de junio de 2011, lo que nos permitirá tener una visión más clara acerca de sus alcances.

Al respecto, la normativa impugnada varió las siguientes normas:

1.- Reforma a los numerales 323 y 334 inciso b), del Código de Comercio (ley N. º 3284 de 30 de abril de 1964).

En cuanto al ordinal 323:

- La versión previa a la reforma indicaba:

· Artículo 323. “Por el contrato de transporte el porteador se obliga a transportar personas, cosas o noticias de un lugar a otro a cambio de un precio. El transporte puede ser realizado por empresas públicas o privadas. Son empresas públicas las que anuncian y abren al público establecimiento de esa índole, comprometiéndose a transportar por precios, condiciones y períodos determinados, siempre que se requieran sus servicios de acuerdo con las bases de sus prospectos, itinerarios y tarifas. Son empresas privadas las que prestan esos servicios en forma discrecional, bajo condiciones y por ajustes convencionales.” (El destacado no es original).

- La versión reformada señala:

· Artículo 323. “Por el contrato de transporte la persona porteadora se obliga a transportar cosas o noticias de un lugar a otro a cambio de un precio. El transporte puede ser realizado por empresas públicas o privadas. Son empresas públicas las que anuncian y abren al público establecimiento de esa índole, comprometiéndose a transportar por precios, condiciones y períodos determinados, siempre que se requieran sus servicios de acuerdo con las bases de sus prospectos, itinerarios y tarifas. Son empresas privadas las que prestan esos servicios en forma discrecional, bajo condiciones y por ajustes convencionales.

El contrato de transporte regulado en este artículo no autoriza el transporte de personas por medio de vehículos automotores.” (El destacado no es original).

De lo anterior, se deriva que se eliminó de manera total la figura que habilitaba el transporte remunerado de personas que venía siendo regulado por el Código de Comercio.

Con respecto al numeral 334 inciso b):

- La versión previa a la reforma consignaba:

· Artículo 334. El remitente tiene derecho:

(…)

• b)A que se le permita que viajen por su cuenta sus propios empleados para cuidar en el trayecto a los animales vivos, o a cualquier otro objeto que requiera atención; y (…)

- La versión modificada dispone:

· Artículo 334. El remitente tiene derecho:

(…)

• b)A que se le permita que viajen los empleados de su empresa con todos los seguros de ley al día y debidamente identificados, para cuidar en el trayecto a los animales vivos o a cualquier otro objeto que requiera atención.; y (…)

De la reforma antedicha se colige la creación de una regulación para el transporte accesorio de personas con respecto al transporte de animales vivos o cualquier otro objeto que requiera atención, en las condiciones señaladas en ese numeral.

2.- Reforma a los ordinales 2 y 29 de la ley Nº 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, de 22 de diciembre de 1999.

Con respecto al numeral 2:

- La versión previa a la reforma contemplaba:

· “ARTÍCULO 2. Naturaleza de la prestación del servicio Para todos los efectos legales y de prestaciones, el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi se considera como un servicio público que se explotará mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa, con los procedimientos especiales establecidos en esta ley y su reglamento.

- La versión modificada estatuye:

· “Artículo 2.-Naturaleza de la prestación del servicio Para todos los efectos legales y de prestaciones, el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi se considera un servicio público que se explotará mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa con los procedimientos especiales establecidos en esta ley y su reglamento, o del permiso en el caso de servicios especiales estables de taxi, de conformidad con lo establecido en el inciso a) del artículo 7 de esta ley.

El transporte remunerado de personas, que se realiza por medio de autobuses, busetas, microbuses, taxis, automóviles y cualquier otro tipo de vehículo automotor, ya sea que se ofrezca al público en general, a personas usuarias o a grupos determinados de personas usuarias con necesidades específicas que constituyen demandas especiales, es un servicio público del cual es titular el Estado. Lo anterior independientemente del grado de intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo del servicio o en su fiscalización.

Será necesaria concesión:

Para explorar el servicio de transporte automotor remunerado de personas modalidad taxi, en las bases de operación debidamente autorizadas, de conformidad con lo establecido en los incisos b) y c) del artículo 1 de esta ley. Esta modalidad también incluye la prestación del servicio al domicilio o lugar donde se encuentre la persona usuaria, en respuesta a la solicitud expresa de este al prestador del servicio regular de taxi, por alguno de los medios con que este cuenta para tales efectos.

Se requerirá permiso:

Para explotar el servicio de transporte automotor remunerado de personas modalidad servicio especial estable de taxi, en los casos en que el servicio se brinde de puerta a puerta, para satisfacer una necesidad de servicio limitado, residual y dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas diferente del que se presta, de conformidad con el párrafo anterior.

Los permisos para explotar el transporte automotor de personas en la modalidad servicio especial estable de taxi serán expedidos por el Consejo de Transporte Público, previa presentación de la copia certificada del contrato o los contratos suscritos con las personas, las instituciones o las empresas que hacen uso de su servicio. A cada persona física solo se le otorgará un permiso; estas personas podrán agruparse en una persona jurídica, adquiriendo responsabilidad solidaria. El vehículo amparado al permiso deberá ser propio o arrendado mediante leasing financiero. De incumplirse las condiciones en que originariamente se otorgó el permiso, este se podrá revocar por disposición justificada del Consejo de Transporte Público.

Sin perjuicio de otras sanciones previstas por el ordenamiento jurídico, se cancelará el permiso, previo debido proceso y derecho a la defensa, por las siguientes causas:

• a)Cuando se incumplan las obligaciones, los deberes y las prohibiciones fijados en la presente ley, su reglamento, las leyes y los reglamentos conexos.
• b)Cuando se compruebe la falsedad e inexactitud en la documentación presentada ante el Consejo de Transporte Público.
• c)En caso de traspaso o cesión del permiso a favor de un tercero, sin autorización previa del Consejo.
• d)Por prestación ilegal del servicio fuera del área que autorizó el permiso, salvo en los casos en que el origen del servicio sea el área autorizada y el destino fuera de ella.
• e)Cuando por acto o resolución firme se cancele o revoque la patente autorizada del área geográfica correspondiente a la persona permisionaria, en vía administrativa o judicial. Asimismo, será razón para cancelar el permiso cuando la persona permisionaria renuncie a la patente otorgada.

f)Cuando el vehículo con que se preste el servicio especial estable de taxi tenga las características propias de los vehículos modalidad taxi que se autorizan en razón de una concesión, violando lo establecido al respecto en el artículo 29 de la presente ley.

• g)Cuando la persona permisionaria no cuente con las pólizas al día, tal y como lo establece el artículo 29 de la presente ley.
• h)Se cancelará el permiso al vehículo autorizado para la prestación del servicio especial estable de taxi, cuando el vehículo autorizado circule por las vías públicas en demanda de pasajeros.

Los permisos no conceden derechos subjetivos al titular y se prolongarán por un plazo hasta de tres años, si se ajustan a los requisitos que se establezcan al efecto.

El Consejo de Transporte Público deberá publicar, una vez al año, en el diario oficial La Gaceta y en un diario de circulación nacional, las listas de las personas físicas o jurídicas que se encuentren debidamente acreditadas para la prestación del servicio especial estable de taxi.” (El destacado no es original).

De lo citado se observa que mediante la reforma se incorporó la declaratoria expresa de servicio público y titularidad del Estado de todo transporte remunerado de personas en vehículo automotor con independencia del grado de intervención estatal en la determinación del sistema operativo del servicio o en su fiscalización. En adición, se dispuso la regulación del Servicio Especial Estable de Taxi.

En cuanto al numeral 29:

- La versión previa a la reforma regulaba:

· ARTÍCULO 29. Concesión administrativa previa Para la prestación del servicio de taxi, se requiere obtener de previo una concesión administrativa otorgada por el Consejo, sujeta a las siguientes condiciones:

• a)Las concesiones administrativas de servicio remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi, estarán subordinadas a los estudios técnicos de oferta y demanda aprobados por el Consejo. b) Las concesiones se otorgarán por base de operación, según los criterios técnicos correspondientes, por un plazo improrrogable de diez años. El Consejo podrá autorizar la existencia de bases de operación especiales con fines turísticos, dependiendo de las características de la zona o área geográfica, las cuales se determinarán mediante un reglamento especial, de acuerdo con los principios fundamentales de esta ley.
• c)Se otorgará una sola concesión administrativa por particular, la cual amparará la explotación del servicio público con un vehículo.
• d)Ninguna persona adjudicataria de una concesión podrá compartir, total ni parcialmente, los derechos de concesión adjudicados a otra que, a su vez, sea adjudicataria de otra concesión de servicio público remunerado de personas, en otras modalidades de transporte terrestre.
• e)Las concesiones se otorgarán por medio del procedimiento especial abreviado dispuesto en las presentes normas. Ningún gestor interesado de puertos y aeropuertos podrá ser concesionario de los servicios de transporte público remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi; tampoco se le permitirá brindar este servicio en ninguna modalidad.” - La versión reformada plantea:

· Artículo 29.-Concesión administrativa previa o permiso para servicios especiales estables de taxi.

1.-Para la prestación del servicio de taxi se requiere obtener de previo una concesión administrativa otorgada por el Consejo, sujeta a las siguientes condiciones:

• a)Las concesiones administrativas de servicio remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi estarán subordinadas a los estudios técnicos de oferta y demanda aprobados por el Consejo.
• b)Las concesiones se otorgarán por base de operación, según los criterios técnicos correspondientes, por plazos prorrogables de diez años a solicitud de la persona concesionaria, previo cumplimiento de la licencia C-1 al día. El Consejo podrá autorizar la existencia de bases de operación especiales con fines turísticos, dependiendo de las características de la zona o del área geográfica, las cuales se determinarán mediante un reglamento especial, de acuerdo con los principios fundamentales de esta ley.
• c)Se otorgará una sola concesión administrativa por particular, la cual amparará la explotación del servicio público con un vehículo.

d)Ninguna persona adjudicataria de una concesión podrá compartir, total ni parcialmente, los derechos de concesión adjudicados a otra que, a su vez, sea adjudicataria de otra concesión de servicio público remunerado de personas, en otras modalidades de transporte terrestre.

• e)Las concesiones se otorgarán por medio del procedimiento especial abreviado dispuesto en las presentes normas. Ningún gestor interesado de puertos y aeropuertos podrá ser concesionario de los servicios de transporte público remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi; tampoco se le permitirá brindar este servicio en ninguna modalidad.

2.-Para la prestación del servicio especial estable de taxi, a que se refiere el artículo 2 de esta ley, se requiere obtener un permiso otorgado por el Consejo de Transporte Público, sujeto a las siguientes condiciones:

• a)Las personas permisionarias especiales estables de taxi de este servicio estarán limitadas a prestar el servicio dentro de un área geográfica que se determinará en razón de la patente autorizada.

b)Ninguna persona permisionaria podrá compartir, total ni parcialmente, los derechos del permiso otorgado a otro que a su vez sea titular de otro permiso de servicio público remunerado de personas.

c)Los vehículos con los cuales se desarrolle la prestación de servicio público modalidad especial estable de taxi, no podrán tener las características propias de los vehículos modalidad taxi que se autorizan en razón de una concesión para prestar el servicio en una determinada base de operación autorizada por el Consejo de Transporte Público, tales como el color rojo, el uso de rótulos luminosos o no luminosos, calcomanías, el uso del taxímetro y otros similares, tal como lo defina el reglamento de rigor, así como cualquier otro distintivo que pueda inducir a error a las personas usuarias del servicio de taxi. Además, deberán cumplir los requisitos de circulación que establece la Ley N. º 7331, Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, y sus reformas. Estos automotores no podrán tener una antigüedad superior a los diez años, contados desde su año de fabricación.

• d)Los vehículos autorizados para el servicio especial estable de taxi no podrán estacionarse o realizar abordaje o desabordaje de personas en las paradas dedicadas a las demás modalidades de transporte público. Las bases de operación del servicio especial estable de taxi deberán estar ubicadas a una distancia de ciento cincuenta metros, como mínimo, de las terminales oficiales de autobuses y taxis.
• e)Las personas permisionarias de servicio especial estable de taxi no podrán estacionarse en ningún lugar de la vía pública para ofrecer sus servicios al público en general. Tampoco, podrán circular en demanda de pasajeros por las vías públicas.
• f)Cuando los automotores deban detenerse frente a edificaciones públicas, parques, centros educativos, centros comerciales, muelles, puertos, aeropuertos, iglesias, hospitales o lugares similares, será por el tiempo estrictamente necesario para permitir el abordaje y desabordaje de sus propias personas usuarias.

g)Quien presente una solicitud para explotar un servicio especial estable de taxi deberá presentar certificación de que se encuentra debidamente inscrito y al día con sus obligaciones en la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS); estar inscrito como contribuyente en el Ministerio de Hacienda; estar al día en el pago del impuesto de la renta; contar con una póliza de seguros que cubra íntegramente su responsabilidad civil por lesión o muerte de terceros y daños a la propiedad de terceros, y mantenerla vigente durante todo el período que dure el permiso y la patente municipal correspondiente, de acuerdo con la legislación vigente y los demás requisitos que procedan reglamentariamente.

• h)En razón de los principios de proporcionabilidad, razonabilidad y necesidad, el porcentaje autorizado de servicios especiales estables de taxi no podrá superar el tres por ciento (3%) de las concesiones autorizadas por base de operación.

i)El Estado está en la obligación de garantizarles el equilibrio económico y financiero del contrato a las personas concesionarias, evitando una competencia que pueda ser ruinosa, producto de una concurrencia de operadores en una zona determinada que pueda ser superior a la necesidad de esa demanda residual de la zona operacional donde se autorice la prestación del servicio, dado que cada zona presenta características diferentes entre una y otra, autorizando el número de permisos que considere necesarios.

• j)Una vez otorgado el permiso, las personas permisionarias deberán portar el original o la copia certificada del contrato suscrito con las personas a las que se les brinda el servicio.

El incumplimiento de cualquiera de las condiciones anteriores será sancionado de conformidad con lo establecido en la Ley N. º 7331, Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, y sus reformas, sin perjuicio de que el Consejo de Transporte Público pueda cancelar el permiso.” (El destacado no es original).

De la reforma transcrita, se observa la regulación en la Ley Nº 7969 de los requisitos para la obtención de permisos para la prestación del servicio especial estable de taxi, así como las condiciones de cancelación.

3.- Adición del inciso l) al artículo 1 y reforma del inciso e) al artículo 62, ambos de la ley N.º 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, de 22 de diciembre de 1999, y sus reformas.

Con respecto al inciso l) del artículo 1.

- El inciso adicionado estatuye lo siguiente:

· "Artículo 1.- Definiciones [.]

• l)Servicio especial estable de taxi: servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas dirigido a un grupo cerrado de personas usuarias y que satisface una demanda limitada, residual, exclusiva y estable.

Los permisos para el transporte remunerado de personas mediante microbuses, busetas y autobuses, se regirán por lo dispuesto en la Ley N. º 3503, Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores, de 10 de mayo de 1965, y sus reformas, o cualquier otra que la sustituya en el futuro." En ese sentido, mediante dicha adición se definió el denominado “servicio especial estable de taxi” y se delimitó la regulación de otras modalidades de transporte remunerado de personas.

En cuanto al inciso e) del ordinal 62.

- La versión previa a la reforma disponía:

· “ARTÍCULO 62.- Reformas de la Ley No. 7331 Modificase la Ley de tránsito por vías públicas y terrestres, No. 7331, de 13 de abril de 1993, en las siguientes disposiciones: (…)

• e)Adición de un inciso d) al artículo 144, cuyo texto dirá:

"Artículo 144.- [...]

• d)Prestar el servicio de transporte público en cualquiera de sus modalidades, sin las respectivas autorizaciones, violando el numeral 1 del inciso a), o el numeral 1) del inciso b), ambos del artículo 97 y el artículo 112 de esta ley." - La versión modificada establece:

· “ARTÍCULO 62.- Reformas de la Ley No. 7331 Modificase la Ley de tránsito por vías públicas y terrestres, No. 7331, de 13 de abril de 1993, en las siguientes disposiciones: (…)

• e)Adiciónase un inciso d) al artículo 145, cuyo texto dirá:

Artículo 145.- [...]

d)Prestar el servicio de transporte público en cualquiera de sus modalidades, sin las respectivas autorizaciones, violando el numeral 1 del inciso a), o el numeral 1) del inciso b), ambos del artículo 98 y el artículo 113 de esta ley. Para aplicar la sanción regulada por este numeral y el juzgamiento, las autoridades judiciales impondrán plenamente el régimen de pruebas por presunciones e indicios claros y concordantes, que definen tanto las legislaciones procesales civiles como penales, así como las reglas de la lógica, la conveniencia, la oportunidad, la razonabilidad y la sana crítica. Se tomarán como presunciones e indicios la habitualidad en la prestación del servicio no autorizado o los signos externos e internos colocados en los vehículos para llamar la atención de la persona usuaria, a fin de inducirla a usar el vehículo que utiliza un taxi autorizado.” (El destacado no es original).

Así, con los cambios efectuados se vinieron a regular las infracciones a personas que presten el servicio de transporte público en cualquier modalidad sin las autorizaciones correspondientes.

Se concluye de tales modificaciones, que la reforma impugnada no solo eliminó la figura del “porteo de personas” en el Código de Comercio, sino que al mismo tiempo introduce y regula el llamado “servicio especial estable de taxi”. En adición, sin la menor duda vino a estatuir que el transporte remunerado de personas en cualquier otro tipo de vehículo automotor y bajo cualquier modalidad, es un servicio público del cual el único titular es el Estado.

Tomando en consideración lo expuesto, procedo a examinar los argumentos de la acción de inconstitucionalidad.

I.Sobre el primer alegato: Violación al procedimiento legislativo por haberse aprobado la ley impugnada en una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena.-

Visto los nuevos argumentos planteados en el sub examine, concluyo que efectivamente se ha venido a constituir un monopolio a favor del Estado por las siguientes razones.

La reforma vía ley N° 8955 de 16 de junio de 2011 dispone que todo transporte de personas en un vehículo automotor debe ser considerado como un servicio público, cuya titularidad corresponde al Estado.

Ahora, no se puede obviar que desde la década de 1960 existieron leyes que declararon el transporte de personas como servicio público (aspecto que se desarrollará más adelante). Sin embargo, destaco que junto con el transporte remunerado de personas, catalogado como servicio público, también el transporte de personas de naturaleza privada-comercial (que permitía a los porteadores transportar personas a cambio de un precio) coexistió con la entrada en vigencia del Código de Comercio el 27 de mayo de 1964 hasta la reforma por la ley 8955, que comenzó a regir el 7 de julio de 2011.

De esta forma, la regulación comercial conocida como el “porteo de personas” estuvo vigente durante todo el lapso referido, existiendo como un negocio jurídico plenamente válido y, desde el punto de vista fáctico, como una realidad innegable que posibilitaba el transporte remunerado de personas en el mercado privado y libre (tanto así que tal verdad jurídica y fáctica, para variarla, tuvo que ser derogada de manera expresa por una ley).

Sobre el “porteo de personas”, este Tribunal dispuso en la sentencia Nº 2004-3580 de las 14:43 horas de 14 de abril de 2004:

“V.- Sobre los porteadores en el Código de Comercio y el transporte como servicio público. (…)

El porteador o transportista es un auxiliar mercantil. El contrato de transporte regulado en la legislación mercantil tiene como finalidad regular el traslado de personas, mercaderías y otros bienes. Es un contrato comercial importante para la economía de un país, pues sirve de enlace entre el productor o el comercializador de bienes y servicios con el consumidor final. Nació como necesidad de los mercantes de trasladarse de un lugar a otro, con o sin sus bienes de comercio, de modo que en principio sirvió como un instrumento de transporte del mercader en su actividad. Si bien, la doctrina no utiliza los medios de transporte para hacer una clasificación del porteador, puede decirse que existe la forma terrestre (como sería en una carreta, o vehículo de carga o ferrocarril), acuática (panga, falúa o crucero trasatlántico) y aérea (planeador, avioneta o avión a propulsión), admitiéndose incluso que se lleve a cabo mediante la fuerza del hombre, la de un animal de carga, o de un vehículo motorizado. Pero dada su amplia diversidad e importancia económica para el país, existen áreas reguladas por el Estado, en atención a la protección del interés general, declarando algunas formas como servicio público. Por ello resulta ser una figura contractual muy restringida, y resulta necesario identificar el origen del contrato de transporte para determinar si se trata de un acuerdo comercial o si se dirige a satisfacer una actividad que el Estado declaró servicio público. (…) Pero el hecho jurídico relevante en discusión es el traslado de personas a cambio de un precio, con sus pertenencias o no, como una actividad irrestricta, cuando desde la promulgación de la Ley No. 3503 y luego la de la Ley No. 7593, se ha declarado como servicio público el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad taxi, y consecuentemente ello convirtió al contrato de porte en una actividad limitada y residual.

VI.- Sobre la Competencia Desleal. (…) Evidentemente, el contrato de transporte tiene diversas características, entre ellas ser un contrato oneroso y no formal, su objeto puede ser el traslado de personas, cosas y noticias, como un auxiliar mercantil, pero siendo un contrato residual de transporte de personas, el público debe pertenecer a un grupo cerrado de usuarios, (…).

VIII.- El caso concreto del contrato de transporte de personas como una actividad restringida. Los argumentos que se esbozan en la acción, pretenden demostrar que el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes no tiene competencia para regular la actividad del porteador, amparado a la legislación comercial que le permite transportar personas de un lugar a otro, así como cosas y noticias. Pero, la jurisprudencia de esta Sala define con precisión la línea divisoria entre las actividades que pertenecen al derecho privado de las del derecho público. Una actividad privada que satisface necesidades o intereses de carácter general, será objeto del interés estatal y estará legitimado el Estado para intervenirla mediante legislación declarándola servicio público. El particular puede ejercitar actividades que no salgan de su esfera privada, pero si llega a involucrarse con el interés general previamente declarado, resulta legítimo que el Estado haga valer el cumplimiento de su legislación. (…)” Del precedente citado nuevamente se evidencia la vigencia del porteo de personas en el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense previo a la reforma que se impugna en esta ocasión. Lo anterior, con independencia de que más adelante cuestione la constitucionalidad de la declaratoria de titularidad del Estado sobre cualquier tipo de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores y bajo la aclaración de que no comparto que el “porteo” de personas haya sido catalogado como una actividad limitada o residual.

Tomando en consideración lo transcrito, cabe destacar que una actividad privada puede incidir en cuestiones de interés general; empero, esa sola cualidad no justifica que la titularidad de la misma pase a ser monopolio del Estado. Más bien, como se explica adelante, pueden existir servicios públicos propios e impropios; de acuerdo con dicha clasificación, así será el grado de intervención estatal.

Además, se debe resaltar que la exposición de motivos de la Ley N.° 8955 de 16 de junio de 2011 (que, como ya indiqué, vino a eliminar el porteo de personas de la legislación comercial y a instaurar el denominado “servicio especial estable de taxi” en la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad Taxi) señaló lo siguiente:

“Con esta iniciativa se pretende de manera muy categórica, establecer dentro del marco regulatorio de la Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi, N.º 7969, un servicio que hoy día es una realidad y que esta tutelado de manera equivocada al estar amparado solamente ante la palabra “personas” en el Código de Comercio, con el fin de crear una legislación que garantice mejores condiciones y costos más bajos para el usuario, buscando el beneficio y el bienestar de las grandes mayorías.

De esta forma se elimina el porteo de personas, pero no se elimina el porteo en sí, es decir lo que se está eliminando es la palabra “persona” del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, pero se puede seguir transportando cosas, artículos, dineros, correspondencia, etc.

Ante la eliminación de la palabra “persona”, se crea dentro de la Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi, N. º 7969, una figura que se llama “transporte especial estable de taxi”, que conserva la naturaleza del servicio especial residual que hoy presta el porteo, pero amparado y regulado para darle sentido de responsabilidad, a aquellos interesados que lo estarían acreditando.

El servicio especial estable de taxi se distinguirá plenamente del servicio regular de taxis, porque será siempre de puerta a puerta, prevaleciendo el contrato privado entre las partes, y deberá acreditarse que forma parte de una actividad comercial, que además deben tener las patentes y que podrá ser desarrollado en esta primer etapa por personas físicas o personas jurídicas que puedan demostrar ante el Consejo de Transporte Público, en un plazo que se ha planteado perentorio de tres años (3 años), para que desarrollen esta actividad porque hay que entender que su crecimiento es muy particular y esporádico, hoy puede que sirva durante un tiempo determinado porque hay un contrato, pero eso no quiere decir que permanezca en el tiempo, por eso se habla de permiso hasta por tres años.

No se trata de una concesión porque no nace de un producto de una licitación pública, sino que nace de un permiso y obedece fundamentalmente que es una necesidad específica y puntual.

(…) de manera que aquel o aquella que esté brindando ese servicio especial sin la respectiva acreditación estaría operando bajo un rango de ilegalidad, porque no hay una figura ni en el Código de Comercio ni en la Ley de tránsito que permita realizar esa actividad.” (El destacado no es original).

De lo explicado se desprende que previo a la reforma en cuestión, el porteo de personas tenía plena vigencia y existencia en el mercado de transportes de Costa Rica; incluso, según lo transcrito, el objeto de la nueva regulación fue, supuestamente, brindar mejores condiciones y costos más bajos para el usuario, buscando el beneficio y el bienestar de las grandes mayorías.

Por lo cual, según lo referido concluyo que: 1- con la eliminación del porteo de personas de la regulación comercial, 2- la simultánea creación del servicio especial estable de taxi para regular ese tipo de negocio jurídico pero como un servicio público, y 3- la disposición expresa de considerar todo transporte remunerado de personas en cualquier tipo de vehículo automotor como un servicio público del cual solo el Estado es titular, se vino a imponer un monopolio público completo en ese tipo de actividad dentro del mercado. Enfatizo que la regulación jurídico-positiva así como la realidad indica que previo a la reforma impugnada, en el país coexistían dos modalidades de transporte remunerado de personas, una de orden público, otra a cargo del sector privado (la opción del porteo). Con la absorción de este último por parte del Estado, se vino a imponer un monopolio público en el mercado, lo cual la Constitución Política regula de la siguiente forma:

“ARTÍCULO 46.- Son prohibidos los monopolios de carácter particular, y cualquier acto, aunque fuere originado en una ley, que amenace o restrinja la libertad de comercio, agricultura e industria.

(…)

Para establecer nuevos monopolios en favor del Estado o de las Municipalidades se requerirá la aprobación de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa.” (El destacado no es original).

Al respecto, resulta incontrovertido que la ley Nº8955 de 16 de junio de 2011 fue aprobada por medio de una Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, por lo cual, tal y como lo expresé, al constatar que dicha normativa creó un monopolio a favor del Estado, necesariamente debía cumplir con la mayoría calificada que preceptúa el numeral antes citado. Al no haberse acatado esa disposición en la aprobación de la normativa de marras, se ha venido a configurar un vicio de constitucionalidad.

En virtud de lo expuesto, considero que con las reformas aprobadas por medio de la Ley N.° 8955 a los numerales 323 y 334 inciso b), del Código de Comercio y a los ordinales 2, 29 y 62 (inciso e), junto con la adición del inciso l) al artículo 1, todos de la Ley Nº 7969, Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, se extrajo del mercado privado y libre una actividad comercial legítima, para venírsela a conferir (ciertamente con una diferente regulación) al Estado, en su condición de único titular de la misma con independencia de su grado de intervención o fiscalización. Es decir, a partir de la susodicha modificación, ningún particular más puede ser titular de la mencionada actividad, sino que la misma ahora solo pertenece al Estado, debiendo conformarse el sujeto privado apenas con aspirar a su explotación, en caso de que recibiera el correspondiente permiso por parte del Estado.

II.Sobre el segundo alegato: Violación de los principios de autonomía de la voluntad y libre comercio. En cuanto a este punto, estimo necesario aclarar ciertos aspectos.

A.- La libre compre competencia y el monopolio de derecho.

En el apartado anterior hice notar la inconstitucionalidad de las reformas impugnadas causada porque la Ley N.° 8955 de 16 de junio de 2011 no fue aprobada por una mayoría calificada, en aplicación de lo consignado en el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política.

Ahora, independientemente de tal vicio, considero que la creación de un monopolio estatal no solo debe estar supeditada a la aprobación calificada de todos los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa, sino que en adición se deben ponderar otros requerimientos derivados de un análisis sistémico de la Ley Fundamental, para cuyos efectos se debe recordar que el sentido jurídico de un mandato constitucional muchas veces solo puede ser develado, cuando se toman en consideración y se ponderan los diversos principios, valores, bienes y derechos constitucionales que conviven en ese supremo cuerpo normativo. Nuestra Constitución, entre otras cualidades, se caracteriza por la promoción de derechos individuales y sociales, tendente a buscar un equilibrio entre los mismos, verbigracia entre los requerimientos propios de un estado solidario y del principio cristiano de justicia social, con aquellas condiciones que para su sano desenvolvimiento necesitan la libre competencia y la libertad de empresa.

Así las cosas, a los efectos del sub lite, conviene recordar lo que en la sentencia Nº 2008-004569 de las 14:30 horas de 26 de marzo de 2008 se determinó:

“1) DISTINCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL ENTRE MONOPOLIO DE DERECHO Y DE HECHO Y TIPO DE LEY REQUERIDA PARA SUPRIMIR CUALQUIERA DE ÉSTOS. El constituyente originario, en el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política sí distingue entre monopolio de derecho y de hecho. (…) En la lógica de ese numeral el monopolio es una situación excepcional del mercado o la economía, por cuanto el párrafo 1° establece como regla general la proscripción de los monopolios privados, tanto que el párrafo 2° subraya que “Es de interés público la acción del Estado encaminada a impedir toda práctica o tendencia monopolizadora”, lo que significa, a contrario sensu, que los poderes públicos están constitucionalmente obligados a promover la competencia en el marco de una economía de mercado. El párrafo 4° dispone que “Para establecer nuevos monopolios a favor del Estado o de las Municipalidades se requerirá la aprobación de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa”, con lo cual se enfatiza la regla contenida en la “constitución económica” -esto es, el conjunto de valores, principios y preceptos que regulan la economía y el mercado en el texto fundamental- de la libertad de empresa y la libre competencia y, por consiguiente, la excepción calificada del monopolio -incluso los públicos-, dado que, se precisa de una ley reforzada y, por consiguiente, de un considerable consenso de las fuerzas políticas representadas en la Asamblea Legislativa para establecer un monopolio público de derecho. Es claro que este párrafo 4° del artículo 46 constitucional, al admitir, excepcionalmente, un monopolio por virtud de una ley reforzada, contempla y consagra el monopolio de derecho. (…) La exigencia de una ley reforzada para constituir un monopolio de derecho se impone en cuanto esta figura limita o restringe la libertad de empresa que es la regla normal u ordinaria según el Derecho de la Constitución. Sobre el particular es preciso enfatizar que los límites intrínsecos y extrínsecos de los derechos fundamentales son reserva de ley. (…) El artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, en sus primeros cuatro párrafos que no han sufrido variación, surge de una moción presentada por la Fracción Social Demócrata, según se desprende del Acta de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente No. 101, artículo 3°, Tomo II, páginas 439-444. Así el Diputado Facio Brenes manifestó que “(…) Estamos, desde luego, con la prohibición de los monopolios, así como de cualquier otro acto que tienda a amenazar o a restringir la libertad de comercio, agricultura e industria” y luego agregó que la moción “(…) traduce una opinión o un sentimiento universal que tiende cada día a generalizarse más, en contra de las prácticas o tendencias de carácter monopolista. Tan es así que todas las Constituciones modernas han abandonado textos similares al de nuestro estatuto derogado, para poner a cargo del Estado una acción especial en contra de los monopolios de hecho. (…)”. El constituyente Acosta Jiménez manifestó que “La moción del Social Demócrata (…) concreta una aspiración universal en contra de los monopolios, así como viene a traducir un anhelo democrático”. Finalmente el representante Arias indicó que “(…) estaba de acuerdo en que el país debe defenderse de los monopolios que son altamente perjudiciales para la economía nacional. Nosotros propiamente no podemos decir que tenemos monopolios de derecho, pero por circunstancias especiales existen varias empresas monopolizadoras de hecho”. (El destacado no es original).

Además, esta Sala indicó en la sentencia Nº 2017-1104 de las 9:05 horas de 24 de enero de 2017:

“IV.- SOBRE EL FONDO. Esta Sala se ha pronunciado, de forma reiterada, sobre la trascendencia de la competencia económica y la libre concurrencia para el adecuado funcionamiento del mercado y en beneficio de los consumidores o usuarios, en tanto que esto impone a las empresas la obligación de ofrecer mejor calidad, innovación y precios. Uno de los principios fundamentales de la Constitución Económica lo constituye el de la libre competencia o concurrencia, tanto que es un imperativo de los poderes públicos velar por la libertad de comercio, industria y de empresa (voto No. 4569-08 de las 14:30 horas del 26 de marzo de 2008) evitándose toda acción o práctica anticompetitiva y monopólica (artículo 46 de la Constitución Política). En desarrollo del citado ordinal 46 y en tutela del proceso de competencia y libre concurrencia, se ha dictado la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, en la que se definen, prohíben y sancionan diversas prácticas que, por su objeto o efectos, se constituyen en monopolísticas. En cuanto a este punto, esta Sala, en la sentencia No. 2004-01922 de las 14:54 hrs. del 25 de febrero de 2004, señaló lo siguiente:

V.- Derecho a la libre concurrencia. El artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, en su texto original y luego de la reforma operada por Ley número 7607 de veintinueve de mayo de dos mil tres, reconoce un principio fundamental de nuestro sistema económico, como es la libertad de comercio y, particularmente, el aseguramiento de la libre competencia como elemento del sistema social de mercado. Dicho artículo proscribe expresamente la formación de monopolios privados, así como las prácticas que amenacen la libertad de comercio, agricultura e industria. Limita además la constitución de monopolios públicos y ordena la regulación expresa de los monopolios de hecho. Destaca también que es de interés público la acción del Estado tendiente a impedir toda práctica o tendencia monopolizadora. En la actualidad, la protección constitucional de la libre concurrencia debe ser entendida en estrecha relación con la posición de inferioridad real que el consumidor suele tener en su actuación dentro del mercado, y el deber del Estado de protegerlo ante el poder de los demás agentes económicos. En ese sentido, la eliminación (o restricción) de la competencia efectiva podría llevar a consecuencias directamente opuestas a las buscadas por el sistema de mercado, exponiendo a los usuarios a tener que someterse a los designios unilaterales de el o los pocos oferentes, particularmente cuando se trata de productos de escasa elasticidad, que obligan al consumidor a adquirirlos o emplearlos, incluso en condiciones abiertamente desfavorables o injustas. Al garantizar la libre competencia, el Estado permite que el consumidor tenga varias alternativas dentro de las cuales elegir la más favorable, de acuerdo con sus intereses y posibilidades. Asimismo, promueve que las empresas, a efecto de ganar la preferencia de sus clientes, pongan a su disposición el mejor producto o servicio al precio más conveniente. El artículo 46 constitucional, de hecho, prohíbe no únicamente la formación de monopolios privados, sino incluso las prácticas que lleven a consecuencias restrictivas de la libertad de empresa. Esta Sala en mucha de su jurisprudencia ha desarrollado el contenido esencial del principio constitucional de libre concurrencia, declarando inconstitucionales las normas y prácticas que creen monopolios particulares e impidan el libre acceso de oferentes al mercado de bienes y servicios. (Cfr. sentencias números 0550-95, 1144-90, 5056-94 y 7044-96, entre otras) (…)” (El destacado no es original).

En lo que interesa, de los precedentes citados se desprende que en Costa Rica, en razón del modelo de economía de mercado por el cual optó el constituyente, la libertad de empresa y la libre competencia son la regla general, mientras que el monopolio es la excepción, toda vez que una medida tan gravosa contra la libertad como excluir del libre comercio cierto bien económico, solo puede darse en casos sumamente calificados con un denotado interés público.

Por consiguiente, el quid consiste en determinar, si cualquier tipo de actividad que explote un bien económico, puede ser monopolizada por el Estado mediante la sola aprobación de una ley con mayoría calificada, bastando para ello el mero cumplimiento de un aspecto formal o de procedimiento.

Atinente a este punto, resulta vital acotar que la Sala, en sentencia Nº 11518-2000 de las 14:52 horas de 21 de diciembre de 2000, dispuso:

“IV.- Es importante traer a colación la sentencia de esta Sala número 5532-2000 de las quince horas con cinco minutos del cinco de julio de dos mil (en igual sentido la sentencia número 7044-96 de las diez horas nueve minutos del veinticuatro de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y seis), que en lo conducente señala: “(…) las actividades monopolizadas (importación, refinación y distribución al mayoreo de combustibles) sean de índole o naturaleza privada, porque, en general, se trata simplemente de operaciones mercantiles con ciertos bienes económicos, que integran el más amplio grupo conformado por los intercambios de bienes y servicios en una economía dada, y que, en ningún caso, son privativos de los sujetos privados, pues bien pueden llevarse a cabo por éstos mediante el sistema de libre contratación, intercambio y regulación mínima (economías de mercado), o por el Estado, (en los casos de economías centralizadas), e incluso –como en la mayoría de los países– mediante una combinación de ambos sistemas, dejando a los particulares unos sectores para su libre acción, y restringiendo otros para la acción exclusiva del Estado. Con lo anterior quiere establecerse que las actividades monopolizadas no son necesariamente y per se, de naturaleza privada, de manera que a la luz de nuestra Constitución, pueden válidamente ser dejadas a la gestión de particulares con la fiscalización del Estado, o ser objeto de intervención estatal, en el tanto en que ello esté autorizado por la Constitución y las leyes y se justifique de acuerdo a los fines que se persigan.” (El destacado no es original).

En concordancia con lo citado, de los derechos constitucionales a la libertad de empresa, la libre competencia y la propiedad se extrae que la intervención del Estado a través de la monopolización de actividades que exploten cierto bien económico, para ser constitucionalmente viable debe cumplir al menos dos requerimientos: 1) que esté autorizado por la Constitución Política y las leyes; y 2) que se justifique de acuerdo con los fines pretendidos. En cuanto a este último punto, la justificación debe satisfacer las exigencias del principio constitucional de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, cuyo contenido lo entiende la Sala así (sentencia No. 2007-17204 de las 15:57 horas de 27 de noviembre de 2007):

“IV.- Principios de libertad, legalidad y razonabilidad. El artículo 28 de la Constitución Política establece, en lo conducente: “Nadie puede ser inquietado ni perseguido por la manifestación de sus opiniones ni por acto alguno que no infrinja la ley. Las acciones privadas que no dañen la moral o el orden público, o que no perjudiquen a tercero, están fuera de la acción de la ley’. Del primer párrafo del texto transcrito es posible derivar el ‘principio de libertad’, según el cual para el ser humano ‘todo lo que no está prohibido está permitido’. Este principio general de libertad, armonizado con lo dispuesto en el segundo párrafo de la norma en cuestión, nos permite construir además la noción del ‘sistema de libertad’, que establece no sólo la posibilidad de que el ser humano pueda hacer todo lo que la ley no le prohíba, sino también la garantía de que ni siquiera la ley podrá invadir su esfera intangible de libertad. (…) el modelo de Estado costarricense postula una forma especial de sujeción de las autoridades e instituciones públicas al ordenamiento jurídico, pues sólo pueden dictar aquellos actos jurídicos y realizar aquellas conductas materiales que estén expresa o implícitamente autorizados por el ordenamiento jurídico. Sin embargo, los principios de libertad y legalidad no son los únicos límites de actuación que el Derecho de la Constitución impone a los órganos del Estado frente a los particulares. Como lo ha desarrollado la Sala en reiterados pronunciamientos, el ‘principio de razonabilidad’ o debido proceso sustantivo también constituye una exigencia fundamental para la Administración Pública, de manera que sus actos deberán ajustarse a los elementos que integran este principio, a saber, idoneidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad en sentido estricto. La idoneidad se traduce como la adecuación del medio al fin, es decir, que la norma debe ser apta para alcanzar efectivamente el objetivo pretendido. La necesidad se refiere a la índole o magnitud de la limitación que por ese medio debe soportar un derecho o libertad, de manera que entre una variedad de medios posibles el elegido debe ser aquel que represente una limitación menor. La proporcionalidad significa que, aunque el medio elegido sea el que represente una limitación menor, esta limitación debe ser proporcionada, es decir, no podrá ser de tal magnitud que implique vaciar de su contenido mínimo esencial el derecho o libertad en cuestión.” (El destacado no es original).

Por consiguiente, la constitución de un monopolio de derecho a favor del Estado irremediablemente viene a afectar a los derechos constitucionales a la libertad de empresa, la libre competencia y la propiedad, de manera que junto con el requerimiento de procedimiento consistente en la mayoría calificada contemplada en el numeral 46 de la Ley Fundamental, la salvaguardia de tales derechos demanda que se respete el principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad en relación con los fines públicos que se pretenden conseguir, de tal manera que solo un denotado interés público pueda llegar a justificar la imposición de una medida tan gravosa y extraordinaria como la de extraer del libre mercado a cierta actividad que explota un bien económico, lo que nuestra constitución económica solo admite como una cuestión extraordinaria y excepcional.

Por ello, la fundamentación de la ley creadora de un monopolio a favor del Estado, de modo expreso, debe explicar por qué una determinada actividad empresarial tiene que ser sometida a una medida tan gravosa como la de suprimirla del mercado para pasar a ser monopolio del Estado. Además, de manera contundente debe explicar las razones por las que el interés público solo podría verse satisfecho, si la actividad en cuestión es monopolizada a favor del Estado. Tal justificación puede responder, evidentemente, a un momento históricamente determinado, de forma tal que lo que en ciertas circunstancias podría considerarse razonable, en otras no lo sería.

B.- Sobre el servicio remunerado de transporte de personas en Costa Rica en la modalidad taxi. Para determinar si el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas es una actividad susceptible de ser monopolizada por el Estado, resulta necesario estudiar el contexto en que se ha desarrollado.

1. Regulación histórica del servicio en Costa Rica.

En sus inicios, la actividad de transporte remunerado de personas en automóviles (distinto a la de vehículos colectivos de transporte regular y permanente entre localidades o puestos determinados que sí tenía una regulación exhaustiva) no tenía un control específico por parte del Estado.

La Ley sobre el Trasporte (sic, en razón de que en la época se escribía así), creada por el Decreto Nº 7 de 24 de noviembre de 1909, establecía algunas características de los principios generales del servicio público e incluso regulaba “Reglas Especiales Referentes al Servicio Público de Transportes”; sin embargo, no hacía referencia alguna a los vehículos de alquiler y de garages (sic, así se nombraban e incluso así, posteriormente, fue consignado en la regulación), tal y como se le llamaba en aquella época, como más adelante se verá.

Posteriormente, la Ley General de Transporte Remunerado de Personas, Nº1277 de 24 de abril de 1951, contenía normas referidas a los servicios públicos de transporte y exigía un trámite de licitación para nuevos servicios de transporte colectivo de personas. No obstante, en su artículo 2 excluía expresamente los servicios de los automóviles de alquiler y de los garages (sic) de servicio público:

“Artículo 2 "Esta ley comprende solamente los servicios públicos de transporte de personas que se hagan en forma regular y permanente entre localidades o puestos determinados y no se aplicará por tanto a los servicios extraordinarios o de excepción, excursiones, viajes expresos y de turismo, movilizaciones políticas o de cualquier otra índole, las cuales podrán seguirse haciendo libremente. Tampoco se aplicará esta ley a los servicios de los automóviles de alquiler y de los garages (sic) de servicio público”.

Luego, ese artículo fue reformado por la Ley Nº1499 de 30 de setiembre de 1952, en el cual se incluyó a los automóviles de alquiler y garages (sic) de servicio público bajo las siguientes condiciones:

"Los servicios de los automóviles de alquiler y de los garages (sic) de servicio público o los de otros vehículos similares, solo estarán sometidos a esta ley cuando se presten en forma regular y permanente, entre lugares o puntos determinados, todos a juicio del Consejo Superior de Tránsito".

De lo anterior se colige que, para esa época solo ese tipo de transporte de personas estaba sujeto a regulación, es decir, a contrario sensu, los servicios de automóviles de alquiler y garajes que no se prestaban de forma regular y permanente, se encontraban en condiciones de libre competencia y, por tanto, la titularidad del servicio no le podía pertenecer al Estado.

Más adelante, se emitió la Ley de Servicios Públicos, Nº 2658 de 16 de noviembre de 1960 (reformada por la Ley Nº 2887 de 24 de noviembre de 1961), la cual vino a ser el primer cuerpo normativo que reguló directamente el servicio de automóviles de alquiler, atribuyéndole el carácter de servicio público. Asimismo, dejó vigente la ley Nº 1277 y el Reglamento de Garages (sic) para vehículos de servicio público que establecía que solo teniendo garage (sic), se concederían placas para los carros que se ocuparían del servicio público de pasajeros. Esta Ley de Servicios Públicos no otorgó al Estado la titularidad del servicio de automóviles de alquiler, ya que si bien su articulado hablaba de concesiones de explotación, no menos cierto es que no tenían las características propias de la concesión ni tampoco eran otorgadas mediante procedimientos de licitación, aunque sí se controlaban las tarifas y se fiscalizaba el servicio, por lo cual se asemejaba más la figura a una autorización o permiso en sentido amplio. Como veremos más adelante, no todo servicio público, necesariamente, implica que sea titularidad del Estado.

Años después entró en vigencia la Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores, N° 3503 de 10 de mayo de 1965, en la cual, se consideraba que el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores constituía un servicio público regulado, controlado y vigilado por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. La versión original de su artículo 1 señalaba que el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores que se llevara a cabo por calles, carreteras y caminos dentro del territorio de la República, era un servicio público cuya prestación era facultad exclusiva del Estado, el cual la podría ejercer directamente o a través de particulares a quienes expresamente autorizara. Además, el artículo 2 indicaba que era competencia del Ministerio de Transportes todo lo relativo al tránsito y al transporte automotor de personas en el país; asimismo, que ese Ministerio podía tomar a su cargo la prestación de ese servicio público en forma directa o a través de otras instituciones del Estado, o bien conceder derechos para explotarlo a empresarios particulares y que en todo caso, ejercería la vigilancia, control y regulación de esa actividad, con el objeto de garantizar los intereses del público.

Con base en lo regulado en los numerales mencionados, considero que fue a partir de ese momento que se estableció que el servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en automóviles, incluido el servicio de que hoy se conoce como taxi, pasó a ser titularidad del Estado, ya que se indicó que la prestación del servicio de transporte remunerado de personas era facultad exclusiva del Estado y podía prestarlo directamente o por medio de particulares. No obstante, ese cuerpo normativo tuvo la particularidad de que cuando hacía referencia a la operación de automóviles de servicio público, remitía a la figura del permiso como único medio para ejercer dicha actividad. En ese sentido, el artículo 3 señalaba:

“CAPITULO III Requisitos para la Explotación del Servicio de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores Artículo 3.- Para la prestación del servicio público a que esta ley se refiere, se requerirá la autorización previa del Ministerio de Transportes, sea cual fuere el tipo de vehículo a emplear y su sistema de propulsión.

La referida autorización podrá consistir en una concesión o en un permiso, el otorgamiento de los cuales estará sujeto a las necesidades de planeamiento del tránsito y de los transportes en el territorio de la República, de acuerdo con los estudios que al efecto lleven a cabo los departamentos de Planificación y de Transporte Automotor(*) del Ministerio de Transportes.

Será necesaria concesión:

(…)

Se requerirá permiso:

(…)

• e)Para operar automóviles de servicio público.” (El destacado no es original) Es importante destacar que dicha ley hacía mayor énfasis en el transporte colectivo remunerado de personas, lo cual se vino a reforzar con las reformas posteriores que excluyeron expresamente el servicio de taxi de su ámbito de aplicación.

Así, la Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Taxis, Nº 5406 de 26 de noviembre de 1973, derogó toda norma de la Ley Nº 3503 que se le opusiera y estableció un régimen especial para ese tipo de servicio. Al respecto, en los artículos 1, 2 y 4, se determinó:

"Artículo 1- El transporte terrestre remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores taxis se considerará servicio público.

Artículo 2º.-Es de la competencia del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Trasporte todo lo relativo al tránsito y al transporte en taxi de personas en el país; el Ministerio podrá tomar a su cargo la prestación de este servicio público en forma directa o a través de otras instituciones del Estado, o bien conceder derechos para explotarlo a cooperativas debidamente inscritas en el Ministerio de Trabajo y Bienestar Social.

El Ministerio de Obra Públicas y Transportes ejercerá, en todo caso, la vigilancia, control y regulación de esta actividad, con el objeto de garantizar los intereses del público.

A fin de cumplir con esta obligación, el Ministerio podrá:

• a)Fijar paradas, condiciones y tarifas, en beneficio del usuario; b) Expedir los reglamentos que juzgue pertinentes sobre el tránsito y el transporte en taxi en el territorio de la República; y c) Adoptar las medidas que sean del caso para que se satisfagan en forma eficiente las necesidades del tránsito de vehículos y las del transporte de personas, así como las de uniformidad, seguridad, atención al usuario, etc.

Artículo 4- Para la prestación del servicio público a que esta ley se refiere, se requerirá concesión del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, sea cual fuere el tipo de 'vehículo a emplear y su sistema de propulsión". (El destacado no es original).

Tomando en consideración la regulación citada, estimo que desde aquí se superó la confusión entre permiso y concesión contenida en la Ley Nº 3503, ya que se consignó que además de la posibilidad de brindar el servicio de forma directa (titularidad), el Estado podía conceder derechos para su explotación y, además, se estableció de manera diáfana la obligación de obtener una concesión por parte del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes para operar ese servicio.

Adicionalmente, la ley Nº 7593 de 9 de agosto de 1996 delimitó el ámbito de aplicación de la Ley Nº 3503 a automotores colectivos, al modificar su artículo 1 de la siguiente manera: “El transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores colectivos, excepto los automóviles de servicio de taxi regulado en otra ley, que se lleva a cabo por calles, carreteras y caminos dentro del territorio nacional, es un servicio público regulado, controlado y vigilado por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. La prestación es delegada en particulares a quienes autoriza expresamente, de acuerdo con las normas aquí establecidas.” (El destacado no es original).

Tres años después, la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, N° 7969 de 22 de diciembre de 1999, derogó la ley Nº 5406 y dispuso que la naturaleza del transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi se consideraba como un servicio público que se debía explotar mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa, sujeta a los procedimientos especiales establecidos en esa ley y su reglamento. Asimismo, indicó el procedimiento y las condiciones para otorgar tal concesión. Esto básicamente se mantuvo hasta que por medio de la Ley N.° 8955 de 16 de junio de 2011 se dispuso de forma expresa la titularidad del Estado sobre todo tipo de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículo automotor (no solo refiriéndose a los taxis como tradicionalmente se había delimitado), con independencia de su grado de intervención en la determinación del sistema operativo o en la fiscalización. Esta situación conllevó la eliminación de la figura del porte de personas del Código de Comercio y la inclusión normativa de la figura del “servicio especial estable de taxi”, mediante la regulación del otorgamiento de permisos para su prestación en tanto servicio público.

2. Sobre el concepto de servicio público y su titularidad.

Sobre el servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en Costa Rica, este Tribunal, mediante resolución Nº 2012-12741 de las 9:05 horas de 14 de setiembre de 2012, y haciendo referencia al voto Nº 2011-04778 de las 14:31 horas de 13 de abril de 2011 (pronunciamiento que resolvió la consulta de constitucionalidad a la Ley Nº 8955), indicó lo siguiente:

“IV. - Sobre el concepto de servicio público. Este concepto fue desarrollado en esa ocasión señalando que éste no sólo puede ser prestado o realizado por organismos estatales, sino también por personas o entes particulares o privados, de acuerdo con reglamentaciones emitidas por las autoridades públicas; y que se trata de servicios que tienden a satisfacer necesidades o intereses de carácter general, por lo que requieren control por parte de las autoridades públicas. El elemento determinante de los servicios públicos es, entonces, su fin la satisfacción de la necesidad o interés general para cuyo fin fue creado- o la sujeción de la actividad al régimen de Derecho Público que la regula, precisamente en virtud del interés público que se intenta satisfacer (Considerando XV). Se indicó también que El Estado, desde hace ya bastante tiempo, ha considerado la actividad de transporte de personas como una necesidad social imperante cuya vigencia resulta esencial, como condición fundamental para el mantenimiento del estado de derecho y la paz social. Por esta razón ha promulgado una serie de leyes siendo, actualmente, las más importantes en esta materia la Ley Reguladora de Transporte Remunerado Personas Vehículos Automotores (Ley No. 3503) y la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi (Ley No. 7969), cuya reforma se conoce en esta consulta. En el último quinquenio, es público y notorio que este tema del transporte de personas ha ido adquiriendo mayor trascendencia para la sociedad costarricense, no sólo desde el punto de vista social sino también económico, hasta convertirse en un tema de interés general, que va más allá de la satisfacción de una necesidad meramente privada, requiriendo la intervención del Estado para darle una solución. El Estado en este caso el legislador ordinario- puede, dentro del marco permitido por la Constitución Política y las normas de carácter legal, optar por la solución que considere más oportuna. Como recién se dijo, una de esas posibles soluciones es regular dicha actividad y declararla servicio público, que es precisamente lo que hace el proyecto consultado, cumpliendo, necesariamente, con los dos elementos antes señalados. En virtud de lo expuesto, la Sala no estima contraria a la Constitución Política la reforma al artículo 2 de la Ley número 7969 para considerar el transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi un servicio público del cual es titular el Estado y que se explotará mediante la figura de la concesión administrativa o el permiso en el caso de servicios especiales estables de taxi (Considerando XVI). De ese modo se pretende con la reforma cuestionada abstraer de la esfera privada la prestación del servicio de transporte de personas -que en su totalidad ha sido declarado servicio público por el legislador-, convertir a los particulares en colaboradores de la Administración Pública, y aplicar la normativa que rige la prestación de los servicios públicos. Por ello, no se considera que se lesionen los artículos 28, 45, 46 y 56 de la Constitución Política; ni tampoco que lleve razón la accionante cuando acusa que la normativa impugnada transformó en ilegal la actividad que venía desarrollando.” No obstante, bajo una mejor ponderación y tomando en consideración los argumentos expuestos en el sub examine, debo indicar lo siguiente.

Si bien mantengo que la noción general de que un servicio público puede ser prestado en determinados casos tanto por el Estado como por particulares, de acuerdo con la normativa respectiva emitida por la autoridad pública competente, ya que son actividades económicas revestidas de un evidente interés general, estimo improcedente que en el caso concreto de los servicios de transporte remunerado de persona en la modalidad de taxi y servicio especial estable de taxi, sea el Estado el único que pueda ser titular de servicios de esa naturaleza, esto es, que los particulares puedan explotarlo solo por la vía de una concesión o permiso.

Nótese que la fundamentación que utilizó este Tribunal para validar la declaración de los servicios antedicho como públicos, fue la trascendencia que han ido adquiriendo desde el punto de vista social y económico hasta revestirse de interés general; sin embargo, el hecho de que una actividad sea de interés general, no quiere decir que irremediablemente solo el Estado deba ser su titular.

Para tales efectos, resulta trascendental distinguir entre servicio público propio e impropio. Esta Sala ya ha precisado dichos conceptos, aunque no específicamente refiriéndose al transporte remunerado de personas.

En ese sentido, mediante el voto Nº2004-1791 de las 9:02 horas de 20 de febrero de 2004, reiterado en cantidad de ocasiones, este Tribunal señaló:

“EDUCACIÓN COMO UN SERVICIO PÚBLICO. La educación no solo se puede concebir como un derecho de los ciudadanos, sino también como un servicio público, esto es, como una prestación positiva que brindan a los habitantes de la república las administraciones públicas -el Estado a través del Ministerio de Educación Pública y las Universidades Públicas- con lo cual es un servicio público propio o los particulares a través de organizaciones colectivas del derecho privado -v. gr. fundaciones, asociaciones o sociedades- en el caso de las escuelas, colegios y universidades privadas, siendo en este caso un servicio público impropio. En este último supuesto hablamos de un servicio público impropio toda vez que los particulares -personas físicas o jurídicas- lo hacen sometidos a un intenso y prolijo régimen de derecho público en cuanto a la creación, funcionamiento y fiscalización de esos centros privados. Los servicios públicos, en cuanto brindan prestaciones efectivas vitales para la vida en sociedad deben sujetarse a una serie de principios tales como los de continuidad, regularidad, eficiencia, eficacia, igualdad y universalidad, los cuales, entratándose de los servicios públicos impropios se ven atenuados o matizados, sobre todo en cuanto el usuario opta por utilizarlos. Consecuentemente, el servicio público de educación, propio o impropio, no puede ser interrumpido o suspendido sino obedece a razones o justificaciones objetivas y graves, como podría ser, eventualmente, tratándose de la educación, la trasgresión por el educando del régimen disciplinario del centro de enseñanza.” (El destacado no es original).

De lo expuesto, se concluye que el servicio público propio es el que presta el Estado de manera directa o a través de un sujeto de derecho privado, mientras que el impropio es aquel prestado directamente por un particular eso sí sometido a un fuerte y específico control de derecho público en razón del grado de importancia para el interés público de la correspondiente actividad, como sucede con los centros de salud y farmacias privados.

En adición, por medio del voto Nº 9676-2001 de las 11:25 horas de 26 de setiembre de 2001, la Sala estableció:

“IV.- (…) actualmente, un sector importante de la doctrina y jurisprudencia sostiene que el servicio público no sólo puede ser prestado o realizado por organismos estatales, sino también por personas o entes particulares o privados (concesionarios), de acuerdo a reglamentaciones (sic) no (sic) normas generales emitidas por las autoridades públicas. Es así, como por servicio público deba entenderse toda actividad de la Administración Pública o de los particulares o administrados que tienda a la satisfacción de necesidades o intereses de carácter general, cuya índole o gravitación se encuentra regida o encuadrada por el Derecho Público, en tanto se requiere de un control por parte de las autoridades públicas. La concepción tradicional limita el servicio público a la actividad que realiza la Administración directa o indirectamente (a través de concesionarios), cuya creación se deba a un acto formal -a través de ley formal- o comportamiento de las autoridades públicas -acto administrativo-; sin embargo, la doctrina más moderna, denomina como "servicio público impropio", aquella actividad realizada por particulares, cuyo carácter no deriva de un acto estatal expreso o de un hecho, sino de su propia naturaleza o esencia, en tanto se trata de actividades que por su función, satisfacen una necesidad o interés general, como sería el caso de las ventas o suministros de primera necesidad, como lo son los productos de la canasta básica o medicamentos; actividades que no obstante desarrollarse bajo el régimen del derecho privado, están sujetas a regulaciones y controles estatales -normas de subordinación-, como lo son las fijaciones de precios de estos artículos, control de calidad, obligatoriedad de efectuar la prestación a quien la solicite, etc. Se trata de actividades que por comprometer necesidades vitales de la colectividad, trascienden lo meramente privado, para trascender en lo social, saliendo del estricto ámbito del derecho privado, y ubicarse en una zona regulada por el derecho público.” (El destacado no es original).

Además, el Magistrado Jinesta Lobo, en la revista Ivstitia Nº 275-276 de noviembre-diciembre de 2009, en su artículo denominado “Régimen constitucional y legal de las telecomunicaciones”, explicó de manera clara tal diferenciación:

“De modo que, existe una diferencia sustancial entre servicios regulados y servicios públicos, puesto que, no todo servicio sometido a una fuerte regulación o régimen de Derecho público es público, de ahí que la doctrina haya distinguido entre servicios públicos propios e impropios o virtuales, siendo los primeros los que se han calificados como tales y prestan directamente los entes públicos o indirectamente a través de sujetos de Derecho privado. En tanto que un servicio público virtual, impropio o regulado es el que presta un sujeto de Derecho privado bajo un fuerte e intenso régimen de Derecho Público.” En razón de lo expuesto, para definir cuándo un servicio público es propio o impropio, se debe precisar la diferencia entre: 1) la prestación del servicio por parte del Estado pero de modo indirecto a través de un sujeto de derecho privado (verbigracia un concesionario); y 2) la prestación del servicio directamente por un sujeto de derecho privado (aunque sometido a una intensa y específica regulación).

Al respecto, deviene necesario distinguir entre la concesión, el permiso y la autorización que pueden otorgar el Estado para la prestación de un servicio público.

a. Con respecto a la concesión, este Tribunal, según la sentencia Nº 3451-96 de las 15:33 horas de 9 de julio de 1996, precisamente referido al transporte remunerado de personas, incluyendo los taxis, dispuso, indicó:

“(…) b.- la concesión.- por medio de la concesión de servicio público el Estado satisface necesidades generales valiéndose para ello de la colaboración voluntaria de los administrados en la prestación de los servicios públicos. Por el contrato de concesión de servicio público se encomienda a una persona -física o jurídica-, por un tiempo determinado, la organización y el funcionamiento de un determinado servicio público. El concesionario lleva a cabo su tarea, por su cuenta y riesgo, percibiendo por su labor la retribución correspondiente, que puede consistir en el precio o tarifas pagadas por los usuarios, en subvenciones o garantías satisfechas por el Estado, o ambas a la vez. El concesionario queda supeditado al control propio de todo contrato administrativo; es decir, está sujeto permanentemente a la fiscalización del Estado, puesto que en este tipo de contrato siempre media un interés público, el concesionario queda vinculado a la Administración Pública como cocontratante y también entra en relación con los usuarios en cuyo interés se otorgó la concesión. En este tipo de contrato el concesionario tiene un derecho subjetivo perfecto y declarado; es decir, deriva un derecho patrimonial en el sentido constitucional del término, porque al otorgar una concesión de servicio público, se formaliza un contrato administrativo en sentido estricto. (…) El concesionario debe gozar de un plazo razonable para dedicarse a la actividad de que se trate, de manera que por definición los tiempos indefinidos o de corta duración se encuentran excluidos de la concesión y resultan más bien propios de los permisos, que son revocables en cualquier momento como se dijo. Por lo demás, adviértase que la concesión pertenece a la categoría de contratos administrativos que la doctrina denomina de "colaboración" y su duración es temporaria, pero ha de serlo por un lapso tal que razonablemente permita la amortización de los capitales invertidos y la obtención de una ganancia adecuada para el concesionario. Conviene indicar finalmente, que en algunas ocasiones el contrato de concesión puede incluir tratos especiales para el concesionario, relacionados con su actividad. La doctrina admite como posible que la administración asuma el compromiso de no otorgar nuevas concesiones para el mismo servicio, si éstas pueden afectar la prestación del mismo. (…) c.- la licitación: el procedimiento de licitación que contempla el artículo 182 constitucional resulta de interés no sólo para el Estado, sino, además, para los administrados. En términos generales podemos indicar que al Estado le interesa obtener las mayores posibilidades de acierto en el cumplimiento de sus fines, incluyendo la prestación de servicios públicos en las calidades de la prestación que se brinda a los usuarios, y, según sea la naturaleza del objeto, obtener las mejores condiciones económicas tanto desde el punto de vista del contratista como del costo para los usuarios. Desde la perspectiva de los particulares el procedimiento de licitación está caracterizado por el principio de publicidad, lo que a su vez garantiza la libre concurrencia en condiciones de absoluta igualdad de participación. El sistema tiende a evitar tratos preferenciales e injustos y por ello es el más deseable instrumento para el trámite de los contratos administrativos. Dadas sus características, la licitación se convierte un (sic) una garantía para el interés público (…).” De igual manera, la resolución Nº 2001-11657 de las 14:43 horas de 14 de noviembre de 2001, señaló:

“(…) Se diferencia de otras figuras tales como la concesión de obras y servicios públicos en el tanto en que en estas últimas ocurre una verdadera traslación de la prestación y explotación del servicio; asimismo, en la concesión la retribución del particular se produce a partir de los pagos que reciba directamente del público, y la responsabilidad reposa siempre en el concesionario.” (El destacado no es original) b. En cuanto a los permisos, la Sala, en sentencia Nº 2007-4467 de las 17:29 horas de 28 de marzo de 2007, indicó:

“Esta Sala ha sostenido en reiterada jurisprudencia que el permiso reconoce un derecho al administrado a título precario que puede ser revocado sin ninguna responsabilidad para la Administración por razones calificadas de oportunidad o conveniencia. En este sentido, es necesario dejar claro que si bien, la Administración puede anular o revocar un permiso, no se encuentra obligada a incoar un procedimiento administrativo ordinario para ello, en virtud que el permiso no otorga ningún derecho subjetivo al permisionario. Esa revocación o anulación no puede ser intempestivo o arbitraria de conformidad con lo establece el artículo 154 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública.” (El destacado no es original).

También, mediante sentencia Nº 2443-03 de las 9:57 horas de 21 de marzo de 2003, señaló:

“III.- DE LA NATURALEZA DE LOS PERMISOS. El permiso es un acto que autoriza a una persona – administrado – para el ejercicio de un derecho, en principio, prohibido por el propio ordenamiento jurídico. Es una exención especial respecto de una prohibición general en beneficio de quien lo solicita. Con el permiso se tolera o permite realizar algo muy específico y determinado. Su naturaleza consiste en remover un obstáculo legal para el ejercicio de un poder preexistente, se dice que es una concesión de alcance restringido, puesto que, otorga derechos de menor intensidad y de mayor precariedad. Los caracteres del permiso son los siguientes: a) crea una situación jurídica individual condicionada al cumplimiento de la ley, siendo que su incumplimiento implica la caducidad del permiso; b) se da intuito personae en consideración a sus motivos y al beneficiario, en principio se prohíbe su cesión y transferencia; c) confiere un derecho debilitado o un interés legítimo, la precariedad del derecho del permisionario se fundamenta en que el permiso constituye una tolerancia de la Administración Pública respectiva que actúa discrecionalmente; d) es precario, razón por la cual la Administración Pública puede revocarlo en cualquier momento, sin derecho a resarcimiento o indemnización; e) su otorgamiento depende de la discrecionalidad administrativa, por lo que la Administración Pública pueda apreciar si el permiso solicitado se adecua o no al interés general.” c. Sobre la autorización, este Tribunal, mediante la sentencia Nº 1996- 02981 de las a las 14:33 horas de 19 de junio de 1996, expuso:

“III. DE LAS AUTORIZACIONES ADMINISTRATIVAS. La “autorización” es un acto administrativo que actúa como condición de validez para que una determinada actividad sea desarrollada, o el comportamiento sea realizado, en forma legítima. La autorización no le atribuye un nuevo poder o derecho a la persona a la que ha sido otorgado; sino que únicamente le atribuye la facultad de ejercer un poder o un derecho ya existente (como en el caso en estudio, la existencia de la libertad empresarial o de comercio), es decir, implica únicamente la remoción de un obstáculo legal para el ejercicio de un poder o de un derecho existente; de este modo, los efectos de la autorización comienzan a correr a partir del momento en que fue emitida. (…)” Es decir, tomando en consideración los precedentes citados, considero que en el servicio público propio, la titularidad solo atañe al Estado, pero su explotación puede ser ejercida por este directamente o la puede delegar (verbigracia mediante concesión) en un particular, eso sí manteniendo el propio Estado la titularidad del servicio. El permiso es otra modalidad para que el Estado le ceda la explotación a un particular, solo que en este caso se reconoce un derecho al administrado a título precario que en principio puede ser revocado sin ninguna responsabilidad para la Administración por razones calificadas de oportunidad o conveniencia.

Por su parte, en el servicio público impropio, la titularidad le atañe a un particular, pero debido al interés general que reviste la actividad, para su prestación se requiere una autorización, es decir la habilitación por parte del Estado para su ejercicio.

Así las cosas, el hecho de que la actividad prestada se revista de interés general, no implica que, inexorablemente, solo el Estado pueda ser titular de la misma.

3. Naturaleza del transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores no colectivos en Costa Rica.

Como aclaré líneas arriba, el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores no colectivos en nuestro país tuvo su génesis en el sector privado de la economía. Incluso, en sus orígenes estuvo sometido a escasa supervisión estatal y de forma expresa se le excluyó de la regulación del transporte colectivo.

Al respecto, con la N° 3503 de 10 de mayo de 1965, se estableció que el servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en automóviles, incluido el servicio de que hoy se conoce como taxi, pasó a ser titularidad del Estado, pero con la particularidad de que cuando hacía referencia a la operación de automóviles de servicio público remitía a la figura del permiso.

Con la entrada en vigencia de la Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Taxis, Nº 5406 de 26 de noviembre de 1973, se consignó la potestad del Estado de brindar el servicio de forma directa o bien de otorgar derechos a un particular para que lo explotara vía concesión del Ministerio de Obras y Transportes. Tal aspecto se ha mantenido hasta la actualidad con la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi, N° 7969 de 22 de diciembre de 1999.

Como ya se indicó, el hecho de que un servicio satisfaga un interés general no supone que su titularidad deba pasar ipso facto y de modo ineluctable a favor del Estado. Considero que para que una actividad sea sacada del libre comercio de los hombres y su titularidad asumida en condición de monopolio por el Estado, se tiene que respetar el principio constitucional de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad con respecto a los fines públicos que se pretenden conseguir, de manera tal que solo un denotado interés público podría llegar a justificar la imposición de una medida tan gravosa y extraordinaria como la exclusión del libre mercado de cierta actividad que explote un bien económico (a lo que por supuesto se debe sumar la votación calificada que demanda el ordinal 46 de la Constitución Política).

Por ello, la fundamentación de la ley creadora de un monopolio a favor del Estado, de modo expreso, debe explicar por qué una determinada actividad empresarial tiene que ser sometida a una medida tan gravosa como la de suprimirla del mercado para trasladarla a conformar un monopolio del Estado. Además, a la luz del principio constitucional de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, de manera contundente deben exponerse las razones por las que el interés público solo podría verse satisfecho si la actividad en cuestión es monopolizada a favor del Estado. Tal justificación puede responder, evidentemente, a un momento históricamente determinado, de forma tal que lo que en ciertas circunstancias podría considerarse justificado, en otras no lo sería.

Al respecto, en las leyes Nº 3503, 5406 y 7969 (antes de la reforma que se impugna en esta acción), no se consignaron expresamente razones técnicas o de interés público tan relevantes y sustentadas como para justificar que una actividad comercial como la de taxi, cuya titularidad históricamente le había correspondido al sector privado, pasara ahora a manos del Estado (quien podría conceder su explotación mas nunca su titularidad), esto es se transformara de un servicio público impropio a uno propio.

Advertido lo expuesto, con anterioridad a la reforma objeto de esta acción, la existencia jurídico-positivo y real del negocio jurídico denominado “porteo de personas” durante más de 45 años, evidencia, por más que se pretenda argüir que esa figura comercial respondía a una demanda residual, la presencia de un bien económico del libre mercado, cuya titularidad correspondía a particulares, condicionada esta y su explotación al cumplimiento de los requerimientos respectivos.

Atinente al punto, nuestra Constitución Política reconoce la libertad de comercio y, particularmente, la libre competencia (elementos esenciales de la economía de mercado), lo que explica el porqué de que a nivel constitucional se le haya asignado al Estado la obligación de impedir toda práctica o tendencia monopolizadora. Asimismo, es claro que el derecho de propiedad halla cobijo en nuestra Ley Fundamental.

Ahora, la reforma introducida por la ley N° 8955 de 16 de junio de 2011 no solo elimina la figura del “porteo de personas” y crea el “servicio especial estable de taxi”, sino que, concomitantemente y por primera vez de manera expresa, estatuye que todo transporte de personas en un vehículo automotor debe ser considerado como un servicio público, cuya titularidad corresponde al Estado con independencia del grado de intervención gubernamental en la determinación del sistema operativo del servicio o en su fiscalización.

Sobre el particular, una vez examinados los antecedentes legislativos, desde el punto de vista del Derecho de la Constitución, observo que no quedaron expuestos suficientes argumentos técnicos o económicos para justificar que el servicio de taxis pasara a ser un servicio público propio, cuya titularidad fuera exclusiva del Estado (lo anterior deviene aplicable en general al servicio de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos no colectivos).

Además, con la reforma en estudio se le permitió al Estado mantener la titularidad del servicio otorgando “permisos” sin recurrir al procedimiento de la licitación, situación extraña porque cuando se trata de un servicio público que la ley aspira a tenerlo como “propio” (aunque la realidad económica demuestre que no es sino uno “impropio”), la figura del permiso debe ser la excepción, mientras que la concesión, la regla. Si el servicio especial estable de taxi se considera público y propiedad del Estado, en tesis de principio no debería operar mediante la figura del permiso, que es de naturaleza precaria. Incluso, la imposición de requisitos para la obtención del permiso de marras asimilables a los de la concesión, sin otorgar los mismos derechos y condiciones de esta última, constituye una invención legal, cuya única finalidad fue solventar una situación político conflictiva –la derogación del “porteo de personas” del Código de Comercio–, sin entrar en consideraciones ni de fondo ni de correcta técnica jurídica.

Atinente al sub judice, esta Sala, en la sentencia Nº 3451-96 de las 15:33 horas de 9 de julio de 1996, precisamente referido al transporte remunerado de personas, incluyendo los taxis, dispuso:

" I.- El transporte remunerado de personas, en sus diversas modalidades, ya sea por medio de autobuses, "busetas", o taxis, es un servicio público cuya prestación puede ser otorgada por el Estado a los particulares, celebrando con ellos contratos de concesión, y solamente por excepción, por medio de permisos transitorios de explotación del servicio. (…)

II ).- El legislador ha dispuesto, y la Sala lo ha confirmado en su jurisprudencia, que la explotación del transporte remunerado de personas se otorgue a los particulares acudiendo al procedimiento de licitación y consiguientemente, en esta materia el permiso como modo de asignar la explotación del servicio, resulta ser excepcional; por ello el permiso cede ante la obtención de una concesión por licitación y de ahí sus características de temporalidad, precariedad y excepcionabilidad. (…) Para la Sala la práctica administrativa que se cuestiona ha subvertido las fuentes del derecho y ha convertido la excepción, concebida por el legislador como caso extremo para atender singulares circunstancias, en la regla ordinaria, irrespetando de esta manera el orden constitucional y los fallos vinculantes de la Sala, entre otros, el voto número 2101-91 de las 8:40 horas del 18 de octubre de l991. Y tal posición asumida por la Administración, desemboca en graves infracciones al ordenamiento jurídico vigente a.- infracción al principio de legalidad : la práctica administrativa de autorizar la explotación del transporte remunerado de personas, preferentemente, mediante la figura del permiso subvierte las fuentes del derecho, lo que implica la potenciación del acto administrativo discrecional por sobre lo que indica la ley - de orden público- y, desde luego, por sobre el artículo 182 constitucional, lo que para esta Sala resulta inadmisible; b) infracción a la igualdad : el procedimiento de concurso o de licitación pública para otorgar concesiones en el servicio público del transporte remunerado de personas, a su vez, da realce a uno de los principios rectores de la contratación administrativa, de la libre participación en condiciones de absoluta igualdad, lo que evidentemente se encuentra ausente en la figura del permiso, sobre todo cuando el acto administrativo que así lo dispone, no tiene ninguna justificación objetiva y razonable. El tiempo que puede tardar la administración preparando el concurso no justifica el desconocer, por la vía generalizada del permiso, valores y principios fundamentales de nuestro sistema jurídico. Es cierto que la Comisión Técnica de Transportes tiene respaldo legal y reglamentario para otorgar "permisos" para la explotación del Transporte Remunerado de Personas; sin embargo, ello debe verse, siempre, desde la óptica de la excepción, lo que obviamente han perdido de vista las autoridades accionadas: (…)." Por lo cual, el “servicio especial estable de taxi” no es más que un intento del Estado por regular una actividad que en ningún momento debió de ser considerada como un servicio público propio, cuya titularidad solo pudiera ser del Estado. Lo anterior no quiere decir que el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas no colectivo se considere libre de regulaciones, puesto que, más bien, el interés general que el mismo representa, justifica la imposición de requerimientos para su explotación, como por ejemplo aquellos referidos a la seguridad de las personas. Esto no obsta, sin embargo, que la titularidad de dicha actividad pertenezca al mundo de lo privado, como históricamente ha ocurrido con el porteo. De hecho, la irrupción de diversos fenómenos en el mundo del ser en cuanto a esta actividad (Piratas, Uber, Cabify), evidencian la tendencia a que las realidades económicas, tarde o temprano, terminan por imponerse sobre las ficciones jurídicas, puesto que al Derecho lo que le corresponde es fiscalizar y controlar tales fenómenos, mas no caer en la quimera de negarlos.

Así las cosas, en el caso de marras estimo que en la declaratoria de titularidad a favor del Estado de todo tipo de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores, no se justificó el porqué de que se prefiriera tal medida frente a otras menos lesivas a los derechos constitucionales a la libertad de empresa, libre competencia y propiedad, esto último conforme al principio constitucional de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Subrayo que incluso al momento de la consulta legislativa de la ley N.° 8955 de 16 de junio de 2011, mediante voto N° 2011-04778 de las 14:30 horas de 13 de abril de 2011, este Tribunal señaló que el proyecto de ley tuvo su origen en un proceso de negociación entre representantes del Estado y de las cámaras y federaciones (en representación de los taxistas y porteadores), lo cual no constituye suficiente motivación para una acción que afecta a la sociedad en general y extrae del libre mercado una actividad que explota un bien económico.

En virtud de lo expuesto, estimo que el hecho de que en nuestro país el servicio de transporte remunerado de personas sea un servicio propio monopolizado a favor del Estado, lesiona los derechos constitucionales a la libre competencia, la libertad de empresa y la propiedad, así como al principio constitucional de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad..

Al existir suficientes razones para declarar con lugar esta acción por violaciones severas y manifiestas al orden constitucional, deviene innecesario pronunciarse sobre el resto de reclamos, tal como desde un inicio ha sido la tesis de esta Sala en cantidad de asuntos (ver sentencias números 2014-008481, 2011-016592, 2001-004027, 2000-010996, 1993-001633, 1990-001463, entre otras).

XII.- Voto salvado de la Magistrada Hernández López.- Introducción.

1. Respetuosamente me separo de la decisión de la mayoría del Tribunal en este caso y declaro con lugar la acción planteada porque considero que la normativa impugnada establece una privación absoluta del derecho fundamental a la libertad de comercio y empresa en la actividad de transporte terrestre de personas, lo cual -en ausencia de razones o motivaciones capaces de justificarla-, la convierte en un ejercicio constitucionalmente ilegítimo de la potestad de legislar. Seguidamente, expongo las razones en que fundamento mi criterio, aclarando que me refiero únicamente al tema objeto del proceso –como corresponde-, es decir, al porteo y su eliminación del ordenamiento jurídico, sin que pueda dársele a esta opinión ninguna otra connotación. Es decir esta opinión no se refiere a la legitimidad o no de la modalidad de transporte denominada Uber, ni a los servicios ilegales de transporte conocidos como “piratas” que no son objeto de este proceso.

Antes de entrar a analizar los hechos del caso, quisiera expresar mi preocupación sobre la tendencia que puede observarse en países de diversas regiones del mundo –incluido el nuestro-, en abandonar la sana reserva que las sociedades y los individuos habían tenido en relación con el apropiado ejercicio del poder por parte del Estado, en resguardo de libertades fundamentales. Con extrañeza –ingenuamente- en distintas latitudes, se están dando cada vez más poderes sobre sus actividades a los órganos estatales, en la esperanza de que sean capaces de ejercerlos sin abusar de su poder y de paso resolver un sin fin de temas derivados de la vida en sociedad.

De nada sirve que día a día, desde la época histórica en que se consolidaron los Estados Nacionales -para no viajar más en el tiempo-, los agentes estatales y en general los Estados, hayan demostrado –una y otra vez -, su tendencia a abusar de su autoridad en detrimento de los derechos de las personas.- Esto resulta peligroso puesto que la dinámica estatal no reconoce grados en su ejercicio de autoridad –ni sus desviaciones-, y se ejerce sin atenuación alguna en razón del tema, de modo que, lo esencial y lo importante se funden con lo pequeño y menos trascendente, para generar una intervención estatal que conlleva una pérdida de libertad de las personas.

Creo que haría bien la sociedad costarricense en reflexionar sobre su contradictoria posición respecto del papel del Estado, al cual demeritan sin pausa por un parte, pero por otra lo invocan y acuden a él para que intervenga cada vez más en aspectos propios de la libertad y autonomía de las personas.- En este caso, una vez más -pero esta vez vía jurisprudencia-, se le da al Estado prácticamente un cheque en blanco para que secuestre un segmento del comercio (libertad esencial de la democracia), con solo que cumpla formalmente con una ley, sin respeto del contenido esencial del derecho. Así es como empezaron a implosionar democracias en la región, hasta dejar de serlo. Este es un mal síntoma, que se suma a otras potestades exorbitantes que se han ido creando poco a poco –sin que el sistema judicial haya ejercido el contrapeso que le corresponde- y a otras más que están en la corriente legislativa, en demérito de libertades fundamentales, las que fácilmente pueden ser abusadas por mayorías transitorias para poner en jaque el sistema democrático.

Los hechos del caso.

2. Si bien en este proceso se han alegado también infracciones a un tratado internacional, estimo innecesaria alguna elaboración sobre dicho punto, al existir una lesión de normas constitucionales cuya declaración torna irrelevante ulteriores consideraciones.- Para la resolución del caso estimo suficiente concentrarme en los reclamos por infracción de los artículos 28 y 46 de la Carta Fundamental.

3. De acuerdo a la delimitación anterior, los hechos que enmarcan la decisión de la Sala no son complicados:

• i)en 1964 se promulga el Código de Comercio que contenía en su articulado (artículo 323) una regulación para la actividad del transporte privado de personas; ii) un año después, en 1965 se pone en vigencia la ley 3503 en la que declara “facultad esclusiva del Estado” el transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores por vía terrestre y dispone que podrá prestarse directamente o por medio de particulares que expresamente se autorice; iii) en 1973 se emite la ley número 5406 que dispone que el transporte remunerado de personas “en vehículos taxis automotores” es “un servicio público” y procede a regularlo. En ella no se hace incluye mención alguna de los contratos privados para el transporte de personas; iv) en 1996, la ley 7593 se modifica el artículo 1 de la ley 3503, (hecho ii) de manera que en adelante, el transporte terrestre remunerado de personas allí regulado se referirá exclusivamente al realizado “en vehículos colectivos”. Tampoco en esta modificación se incluye alguna disposición en relación con el contrato privado de transporte de personas en automóvil.- v) para el año 1999 se promulga la ley 7969 para reordenar específicamente el servicio de taxi y para tal efecto se deroga la ley 5406 (hecho iii.). Se reitera el concepto de que el transporte remunerado de personas “en la modalidad de taxi” es un servicio público que solo puede prestarse mediante una concesión o un permiso. En esta oportunidad la normativa tampoco recoge ninguna disposición para regular el servicio de transporte privado de personas en autmóviles; vi) Luego de transcurridos doce años, en el año 2011, se promulga la ley 8955 -aquí discutida- que modifica, tanto el artículo 323 del Código de Comercio (hecho i) para eliminar de ella la regulación del contrato de porteo de personas, como la ley 7969 (hecho v) para extender la titularidad estatal a cualquier modalidad de transporte remunerado realizado “...por medio de autobuses, busetas, microbuses, taxis, automóviles y cualquier otro tipo de vehículo automotor, ya sea que se ofrezca al público en general, a personas usuarias o a grupos determinados de personas usuarias con necesidades específicas que constituyen demandas especiales” Planteo de la controversia.

4. La revisión del cuadro fáctico permite excluir de cualquier considerción tanto al transporte colectivo de personas como la actividad de transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi, puesto que sobre ellas no incidió negativamente la ley discutida. Estas dos actividades sufrieron hace mucho tiempo un proceso de nacionalización y los interesados se cuidan de atacar tales decisiones.- En ese sentido, el reclamo de la parte accionante y los coayuvantes activos es muy puntual y consiste, resumidamente, en que con la ley 8955 se extrajo del ámbito de la libertad de empresa y comercio la actividad de transporte privado de personas, que había sobrevivido a los cambios legislativos y además que, en los hechos, se realizaba por los particulares como una actividad subsidiaria y marginal. Con esa actuación, se afirma, se lesionó la regla de mayoría calificada para la creación de monopolios recogida en el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política y se produjo también una lesión material del citado artículo y del artículo 28 y que recogen la libetad de comercio y la libertad general de actuar.

5. En su informe la Procuraduría General de la República, así como los interesados en la defensa de la ley impugnada afirman la inexistencia de lesión alguna, con apoyo de lo expuesto en la sentencia de esta Sala número 2011-4778. Sostienen que en ella no se creó ni completó monopolio alguno, pues se reafirmó solamente la ya existente titularidad estatal sobre el transporte terrestre remunerado de personas, de manera que, siendo estatal la actividad, no le resulta aplicable el concepto de monopolio más aún en este caso que ha dejado abierta la posiblidad de participación de diferentes personas en calidad de concesionarios 6. Se contesta también la supuesta lesión a la libertad general de actuar y a la libertad de comercio y empresa establecidas en la Constitución Política, remitiendo nuevamente a lo dicho por la Sala en la sentencia 2011-4778 en donde se expone que la creación de un servicio especial de taxi y la reserva de titularidad que se decreta para el resto del transporte remunerado de personas por vía terrestre, no alcanza a lesionar tales libertades, al ser la creación de un servicio especial de taxi un ejercicio de discreción y titularidad del legislador sobre aquellas actividades en las que se estime necesaria la intervención del Estado a través de la declaratoria de servicio público en cabeza del Estado.

Mas allá de etiquetas jurídicas.

7. Vemos que el reclamo se dirige contra la actuación legislativa por la cual el Estado se terminó de apropiar de la titularidad de toda actividad relacionada con el transporte remunerado de personas por las vías terrestres. Accionantes y coadyuvantes activos sostienen que con tal acto se abarcó una porción de tal actividad económica que había sido de libre acceso y que los particulares realizaban hasta 2011 de manera válida y en armonía con las disposiciones del Código de Comercio, de los artículos 28 y 46 de la Constitución Política y las necesidades de un sector de la población. En las respuestas de los interesados y de la Procuraduría General de la República se aprecia que, en el fondo, coinciden en esencia con dicho planteamiento: afirman que la ley 8955 vino a “completar” el proceso estatal tendiente a hacerse con la titularidad de toda forma de transporte terrestre remunerado de personas. Se afirma que lo anterior es constitucionalmente válido en tanto se trató de una “publicatio” vale decir, de una declaratoria de servicio público por parte de la Asamblea Legislativa, el órgano constitucional legitimado para realizarlo.

8.- Interesa por tanto, definir si, como parece desprenderse de dichas respuestas, el estampado de una etiqueta de “servicio público” o “publicatio” mediante una decisión legislativa formalmente tomada, es suficiente para validar constitucionalmente la extracción de una actividad económica del alcance de la libertad de comercio y empresa de las personas; en otras palabras, si basta la declaratoria formal e inequivoca de una actividad como servicio público de titularidad estatal (la publicatio) para que este Tribunal Constitucional se dé por satisfecho respecto de su labor de velar por la constitucionalidad del ejercicio del poder estatal.- En este aspecto, el voto de mayoría combina una aceptación plena de dicha tesis con un notable silencio frente a los argumentos planteados por las partes para combatir esa forma de pensar. Mi criterio es que la posición de la Sala debería ser completamente diferente y de un amplio y contundente rechazo a tales planteamientos.

9. He sostenido en otras decisiones - en mi voto salvado a la sentencia de esta Sala Constitucional número 2015-00146 de las 11:02 del 7 de enero de 2015- que la noción de servicio público, exige imperativamente un profundo “aggiornamento” para ser aceptable como expresión constitucionalmente legítima del poder estatal.- La razón es que tal concepto tiene su origen en un marco constitucional (el francés de la segunda mitad del siglo 19) que difiere en aspectos sustanciales del que impera actualmente en la mayoría de los países de nuestro entorno jurídico.

Las constituciones políticas emergidas de la Europa de la segunda pos-guerra, incluida la nuestra, hunden orgullosamente sus raíces en el pensamiento liberal y en sus máximas esenciales; entre ellas están la primacía del ser humano y su dignidad intrínseca -única razón de ser del Estado y del ejercicio del poder estatal- y la existencia de unos derechos fundamentales (naturales según la denominación de la época) inherentes a esa condición humana de sus titulares, que constituyen un tope al ejercicio de la soberanía y el poder estatal. Nada más alejado de las improntas autoritarias que durante el siglo 19 marcaron el desenvolvimiento del Estado Legislativo francés y cuya dinámica y forma de pensar se reflejan en el concepto de servicio público, al otorgar a la ley -como máxima expresión del organo de representación nacional- una preponderancia frente a la que debían rendirse los derechos de los individuos.- 10. Resulta entonces por demás impropio en un marco constitucional como el costarricense, un empleo acrítico y cerval de la noción de servicio público, para legitimar una actuacion legislativa sin un verdadero escrutinio, todo sobre la base de que es suficiente que el Estado haya cumplido con el requisito de una “declaratoria formal y legal” de una actividad como servicio público. Impropio no solo desde la perspectiva histórico-jurídica, sino también desde el punto de vista del papel que le corresponde a esta Sala en la dinámica de funciones diseñada por el constituyente y que le asigna el deber, precisamente, de obviar las etiquetas y enjuiciar los actos legislativos frente a los parámetros de constitucionalidad, no por el prurito de insertar un bastón en los engranajes de la actividad estatal, sino para asegurar que dichos mecanismos estatales resulten equilibrados frente al obligado respeto que le debe el Estado a los derechos fundamentales de los individuos y su dignidad. Y nada sustancial aporta a este fin, la ilustración que hacen las partes sobre las nuevas concepciones de servicio público y su cualidad dinámica que permite ahora al Estado una mayor libertad de acción con un marco jurídico administrativo más flexible. Quizás en el ámbito del derecho administrativo ello rinda frutos, pero en cuanto la cuestión toca el Derecho Constitucional y el exigido balance entre autoridad y libertad, semejantes florituras se tornan irrelevantes, a los efectos de que la Sala Constitucional cumpla con su deber.

11. Esta misma idea ha sido expresada muy claramente a lo largo de toda la existencia de este Tribunal. Por ejemplo en sentencia la número 1992-3495 que fijó claramente la tesis que se viene sustentando:

“IV- El Derecho de la Constituciòn, compuesto tanto por las normas y principios constitucionales, como por los del Internacional y, particularmente, los de sus instrumentos sobre derechos humanos, en cuanto fundamentos primarios de todo el orden jurìdico positivo, le transmiten su propia estructura lògica y sentido axiològico, a partir de valores incluso anteriores a los mismos textos legislados, los cuales son, a su vez, fuente de todo sistema normativo propio de la sociedad organizada bajo los conceptos del Estado de Derecho, el règimen constitucional, la democracia y la libertad, de modo tal que cualquier norma o acto que atente contra esos valores o principios -entre ellos los de racionalidad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, que son, por definiciòn, criterios de constitucionalidad-, o bien que conduzca a situaciones absurdas, dañinas o gravemente injustas, o a callejones sin salida para los particulares o para el Estado, no puede ser constitucionalmente vàlido. Respecto de tales valores y principios generales la Sala ha expresado, en su sentencia N 1739-92 de las 11:45 horas del 1 de julio de 1992 -sobre criterios generales del debido proceso en materia penal- que:

"las normas y actos pùblicos, incluso privados, como requisito de su propia validez constitucional...deben ajustarse, no sòlo a las normas o preceptos concretos de la Constituciòn, sino tambièn al sentido de justicia contenido en ella, el cual implica, a su vez, el cumplimiento de exigencias fundamentales de equidad, proporcionalidad y razonabilidad, entendidas como idoneidad para realizar los fines propuestos, los principios supuestos y los valores presupuestos en el Derecho de la Constituciòn. De allì que las leyes y, en general, las normas y los actos de autoridad requieran para su validez, no sòlo haber sido promulgados por òrganos competentes y procedimientos debidos, sino tambièn pasar la revisiòn de fondo por su concordancia con las normas, principios y valores supremos de la Constituciòn -formal y material-, como son los de orden, paz, seguridad, justicia, libertad, etc. que se configuran como patrones de razonabilidad. Es decir, que una norma o acto pùblico o privado sòlo es vàlido cuando, ademàs de su conformidad formal con la Constituciòn, estè razonablemente fundado y justificado conforme a la ideologìa constitucional. De esta manera se procura, no sòlo que la ley no sea irracional, arbitraria o caprichosa, sino ademàs que los medios seleccionados tengan una relaciòn real y sustancial con su objeto. Se distingue entonces entre razonabilidad tècnica, que es, como se dijo, la proporcionalidad entre medios y fines; razonabilidad jurìdica, o la adecuaciòn a la Constituciòn, en general, y en especial, a los derechos y libertades reconocidos o supuestos por ella; y finalmente, razonabilidad de los efectos sobre los derechos personales, en el sentido de no imponer a esos derechos otras limitaciones o cargas que las razonablemente derivadas de la naturaleza y règimen de los derechos mismos, ni mayores que las indispensables para que funcionen razonablemente en la vida de la sociedad".

Posición reforzada también con nitidez en sentencia número 2003-5090 de las 14:44 horas del 11 de junio de 2003:

“La Asamblea Legislativa en el ejercicio de su función materialmente legislativa de dictar normas de carácter general y abstracto, esto es, leyes en sentido formal y material (artículo 121, inciso 1°, de la Constitución Política), goza de una amplia libertad de conformación para desarrollar el programa constitucional fijado por el Poder Constituyente. Ese extenso margen de maniobra en cuanto a la materia normada se ha denominado, también, discrecionalidad legislativa, entendida como la posibilidad que tiene ese órgano, ante una necesidad determinada del cuerpo social, de escoger la solución normativa o regla de Derecho que estime más justa, adecuada e idónea para satisfacerla, todo dentro del abanico o pluralidad de opciones políticas que ofrece libremente el cuerpo electoral a través del sistema de representación legislativa (…) La libertad de configuración legislativa no es irrestricta, puesto que, tiene como límite el Derecho de la Constitución, esto es, el bloque de constitucionalidad conformado por los preceptos y costumbres constitucionales, los valores y principios -dentro de los que destacan los de proporcionalidad, interdicción de la arbitrariedad, no discriminación, debido proceso y defensa- de esa índole y la jurisprudencia vertida por este Tribunal para casos similares”.

12. De tal manera, los operadores jurídicos y especialmente las personas que integramos los órganos de protección de los derechos fundamentales de las personas, no podemos perder de vista que nuestra misión requiere una atenta lectura de los conceptos jurídicos, mucho más allá de etiquetas, para asegurar que se apegan al conjunto de valores que promueve nuestra Carta fundamental.- Un descuido en este sentido, omitiendo el estudio de fundados cuestionamientos al ejercicio de la autoridad estatal, terminará seguramente, abriendo oportunidades para el ejercicio autoritario del poder. En América Latina hay claros ejemplos del abuso de la autoridad estatal para nacionalizar servicios tradicionalmente reservados al ejercicio del comercio, en perjuicio de las libertades esenciales, que a la postre, entre otros factores, terminó con democracias que parecían estables. (Ej.Venezuela cuyo gobierno declaró “estratégicos” servicios privados por naturaleza, como excusa para secuestrar la libertad de comercio y convertir empresas privadas en “empresas socialistas” ) Siguiendo la clara línea señalada en el dictamen C-376-2003 de la Procuraduría General de la República, suscrito por el entonces Procurador Castillo Víquez, debemos tener presente que cuando el Estado asume la titularidad de una actividad económica, se reduce el ámbito de libertad que el Derecho de la Constitución reconoce a favor de la persona. Ello sucede, por regla general, cuando una actividad es declarada servicio público por el Legislativo y, por consiguiente, sólo puede prestarla él directamente o por medio de los particulares a través de las técnicas de la prestación indirecta de servicios públicos. En estos casos, como bien se señala en el dictamen de cita, se ensancha la presencia del Estado en la economía, y se reduce la esfera de libertad de las personas. Por eso es que un acto de tal naturaleza es de reserva de ley, pero además deben respetarse los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad (además es y debe ser excepcional). Más adelante, con la aplicación de la doctrina más reconocida se señala que siempre en caso de duda, debe favorecerse la libertad, en aplicación del principio pro libertate, desarrollado en la sentencia 3173-93 que en lo que interesa señaló:

“…el principio pro libertate, el cual, junto con el principio pro homine, constituyen el meollo de la doctrina de los derechos humanos; según el primero, debe interpretarse extensivamente todo lo que favorezca y restrictivamente todo lo que limite la libertad; según el segundo, el derecho debe interpretarse y aplicarse siempre de la mantera que favorezca al ser humano”.

En la misma línea, la Corte Interamericana en su consulta OC-5-85 señala que si bien es cierto las libertades fundamentales pueden estar sujetas a ciertas restricciones, deben ser “las necesarias, pero nada más que las necesarias a la vigencia de los valores democráticos y constitucionales, y señala que para que una restricción sea “necesaria” no es suficiente que sea “útil”, “razonable” u “oportuna”, sino que debe implicar la “existencia de una necesidad social imperiosa” que sustente la restricción”.

La pura verdad, en este caso, como se verá, no se ha justificado en forma clara, dónde se da esa necesidad social imperiosa de eliminar el porteo. No explica el legislador válidamente porqué le da el mismo trato jurídico a actividades de diversa naturaleza como son el porteo y el transporte remunerado de personas en modalidad taxi. Como se sabe, el contrato de porteo es muy limitado, porque fue concebido para ser un servicio de naturaleza residual, el cual sólo puede ejercerse además en forma discrecional. No es una actividad que se dirige al público en general, independientemente de si se anuncia o no. Se trata de una actividad típicamente privada, de naturaleza personal. A diferencia de lo que ocurre en el servicio público el negocio jurídico no es el resultado del azar o de acciones encaminadas a la colectividad, sino más bien el producto de una relación discreta, previamente concertada entre el porteador y el viajero. Lo normal es que el servicio se preste “ de puerta a puerta”, lo que conlleva la imposibilidad de realizar contratos en la vía pública (ruleteo). Como puede observarse, se trata de un contrato con características muy especiales, que se diferencia de la actividad de servicio público” (Dictamen C-376-2003) Libertad de comercio y de empresa en nuestra Carta Fundamental.

13. Se señaló anteriormente la presencia en nuestra Constitución Política de un sustrato liberal que toma partido por el individuo y por el efectivo ejercicio de la más amplia libertad posible en todos los ámbitos de su vida: económico, social, religioso, intelectual y por su supuesto en los de su ámbito más privado. Tales aspiraciones están recogidas claramente por nuestra norma jurídica fundamental y por ello deben rescatarse y protegerse por la judicatura constitucional como intérprete de dicho instrumento normativo, por encima de los vaivenes políticos y los ataques de fuerzas y grupos de interés del más diverso signo. En materia económica y para lo que interesa en este caso, ese movimiento liberal acogido por nuestros constituyentes opta por la economía de mercado como base de la constitución económica. A esa idea se sumarán luego las necesarias correcciones para desembocar en la llamada economía social de mercado abiertamente aplicada y defendida como el mejor modelo existente para que las democracias organicen los distintos recursos económicos de una sociedad.- Tal es el telón de fondo contra el que deben contrastarse las actuaciones de las autoridades estatales, procurando mantener la línea del constituyente en dicho sentido y cargando al mismo tiempo a los detentadores del poder, con la obligación de justificar suficientemente las medidas que se aparten de tal modelo.

14. Esto mismo ha sido sostenido por este Tribunal como puede concluirse sin mayor esfuerzo del texto siguiente, que resulta ampliamente ilustrativo:

“VIII.- PRESUNTA APLICACIÓN INDEBIDA DEL ARTÍCULO 208 BIS DEL REGLAMENTO DE LA ASAMBLEA LEGISLATIVA AL TRATARSE DE UN PROYECTO DE LEY QUE DISPONE LA APERTURA DE UN MONOPOLIO. (…)1)(…) En la lógica de ese numeral...[se refiere al artículo 46 de la Constitución Política]... monopolio es una situación excepcional del mercado o la economía, por cuanto el párrafo 1° establece como regla general la proscripción de los monopolios privados, tanto que el párrafo 2° subraya que “Es de interés público la acción del Estado encaminada a impedir toda práctica o tendencia monopolizadora”, lo que significa, a contrario sensu, que los poderes públicos están constitucionalmente obligados a promover la competencia en el marco de una economía de mercado. El párrafo 4° dispone que “Para establecer nuevos monopolios a favor del Estado o de las Municipalidades se requerirá la aprobación de dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa”, con lo cual se enfatiza la regla contenida en la “constitución económica” -esto es, el conjunto de valores, principios y preceptos que regulan la economía y el mercado en el texto fundamental- de la libertad de empresa y la libre competencia y, por consiguiente, la excepción calificada del monopolio -incluso los públicos-, dado que, se precisa de una ley reforzada y, por consiguiente, de un considerable consenso de las fuerzas políticas representadas en la Asamblea Legislativa para establecer un monopolio público de derecho. (...) Cabe advertir que el constituyente originario no dispuso que la supresión de un monopolio de derecho o uno de hecho sometido a una ley posterior deba serlo por una ley reforzada, dado que, en la constitución económica lo normal y ordinario es la libertad de empresa y la libre competencia. (…) La exigencia de una ley reforzada para constituir un monopolio de derecho se impone en cuanto esta figura limita o restringe la libertad de empresa que es la regla normal u ordinaria según el Derecho de la Constitución. Sobre el particular es preciso enfatizar que los límites intrínsecos y extrínsecos de los derechos fundamentales son reserva de ley. (...) Ni siquiera la aplicación del principio del paralelismo de las formas del Derecho público, puede justificar un requisito agravado para retornar a las condiciones normales y ordinarias de una economía de mercado -libertad de empresa y libre competencia- que impone la constitución económica. (…)” (Sentencia número 2008-004569 de las 14:30 hrs. del 26 de marzo de 2008) 15- Más concretamente, en lo que hace a la libertad de comercio y empresa deben tomarse muy en cuenta las líneas jurisprudenciales fijadas por la Sala en la sentencia número 1992-3495 antes citada, de la cual es importante repasar los siguientes extractos:

“VI- Implìcita en esos valores y principios de la libertad, ocupa lugar primordial la dimensiòn de ésta en el campo econòmico. En esta materia la Constituciòn es particularmente precisa, al establecer un règimen integrado por las normas que resguardan los vìnculos existentes entre las personas y las distintas clases de bienes; es decir, la relaciòn de aquèllas con el mundo del "tener", mediante previsones como las contenidas o implicadas en los artìculos 45 y 46, las cuales, aunque deban ceder ante necesidades normalmente màs intensas para la existencia misma del hombre -como la vida o a la libertad e integridad personales-, no crean por ello derechos de segunda clase, sino tan fundamentales como aquéllos, y con su mismo rango -no en vano la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas y todos los òrganos y tribunales internacionales que se ocupan de los derechos humanos han venido invariablemente caracterizàndolos como "indivisibles" e "interdependientes"-. Así, la Constitución establece un orden econòmico de libertad que se traduce bàsicamente en los derechos de propiedad privada (art. 45) y libertad de comercio, agricultura e industria (art. 46) -que suponen, a su vez, el de libre contrataciòn-. El segundo prohibe de manera explìcita, no sólo la restricciòn de aquella libertad, sino también su amenaza, incluso originada en una ley; y a ellos se suman otros, como la libertad de trabajo y demàs que completan el marco general de la libertad econòmica.

(…)

VIII- Ademàs, la Constituciòn reconoce otra serie de "derechos instrumentales" o "garantìas", que son màs bien medios de tutela de los "de goce" o contenido inmediatamente ùtil para la vida humana, y que, en sìntesis, pueden cobijarse bajo el concepto del "debido proceso"; el cual no se refiere ùnicamente a la tutela de la libertad e integridad personales o a las garantìas procesales en vìa judicial y administrativa, sino que entraña tambièn, para todas las categorìas citadas -propietario, consumidor, empresario, trabajador, contribuyente, etc.-, la protecciòn del marco de racionalidad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad a que se ha aludido, el cual comprende, a su vez, el contenido sustancial de los derechos y libertades que el ordenamiento no puede menoscabar o alterar, ni permitir que se menoscaben o alteren, aun por ley o, menos, por normas o actos de rango inferior. En todo caso, la supresiòn, disminuciòn o sustitución de las situaciones jurìdicas favorable al particular, puede y debe ùnicamente producirse mediante la declaración -juris-dictio- de un Tribunal judicial y mediante las necesarias garantìas del debido proceso.” (…)

XIII- Partiendo del reconocimiento constitucional del principio y sistema de la libertad, en general (art. 28), del derecho a la propiedad privada (art. 45) y de la libertad de empresa (art. 46), se inscribe como principio constitucional, conditio sine qua non para el ejercicio de ambos, el de libre contrataciòn, cuyo contenido esencial la Sala resume en cuatro elementos, a saber:

• a)La libertad para elegir al co-contratante; b) La libertad en la escogencia del objeto mismo del contrato y, por ende, de la prestaciòn principal que lo concreta; c) La libertad en la determinaciòn del precio, contenido o valor econòmico del contrato que se estipula como contraprestaciòn; d) El equilibrio de las posiciones de ambas partes y entre sus mutuas prestaciones; equilibrio que reclama, a su vez, el respeto a los principios fundamentales de igualdad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, segùn los cuales la posiciòn de las partes y el contenido y alcances de sus obligaciones recìprocas han de ser razonablemente equivalentes entre sì y, ademàs, proporcionadas a la naturaleza, objeto y fines del contrato.

(…)

Las dichas libertades contractuales sólo pueden ser restringidas en los supuestos del artìculo 28 constitucional, es decir, en tanto su ejercicio dañe la moral social, el orden pùblico, rigurosamente considerado, o los derechos iguales o superiores de terceros. De ello se deriva que, tanto el acuerdo de voluntades implicado en la relaciòn contractual, como la determinaciòn de la cosa, objeto y precio de este acuerdo, pueden y deben ser libremente estipulados por las partes, mientras no traspasen aquellos lìmites; y aquì resulta imprescindible aclarar que la estipulación de una determinada moneda en un contrato normalmente no puede ser dañina a la moral social o al orden pùblico pues aunque el dèficit fiscal y comercial planteen un problema pùblico -lo que sì facultarìa al legislador para imponer disposiciones tendentes a la estabilidad macroeconòmica del paìs-, el problema del precio y la determinaciòn de la forma de pago de una obligaciòn privada no es en sì pùblico, sin privado inter partes, al menos normalmente. Sin negar la trascendencia que todo esto eventualmente pudiera tener en el giro global de la economìa, ni la posibilidad de que en casos excepcionales la libertad para contratar en moneda extranjera pudiera resultar objetivamente perjudicial para la situaciòn econòmica general del paìs, esto no podría nunca facultar al legislador para violar los contenidos esenciales de los derechos fundamentales -en lo que aquì interesa, los de libertad en general, propiedad privada, libertad de empresa y libre contrataciòn”.

16- Y en la sentencia No. 2008-001571, de las de 2008 se explicó:

“El contenido esencial de la libertad [de comercio] bajo estudio incluye, al menos, lo siguiente: a) El derecho de sus titulares para emprender, escoger y desarrollar la actividad económica que deseen; b) el poder de organizar la empresa y el de programar sus actividades en la forma más conveniente a sus intereses; c) el derecho a la libre competencia y d) el derecho a un lucro razonable en el ejercicio de la actividad emprendida. Sin embargo, dicha garantía, de conformidad con lo que al efecto dispone el numeral 28 constitucional, es susceptible de ser limitada y regulada por el Estado, en el tanto se respete el supra indicado contenido esencial; es decir, siempre y cuando, no se impongan límites que dificulten la actividad más allá de lo razonable, que la hagan impracticable o bien, no rentable del todo. En virtud de lo anterior, se afirma que libertad de comercio no es absoluta ni ilimitada, por lo que, como se dijo, debe someterse a las regulaciones legales y reglamentarias con cobertura en la ley que, necesariamente, deban cumplirse, previamente. Al tenor de lo anterior, la libertad empresarial implica, entonces, que el ejercicio de la actividad -agrícola, comercial, industrial, etc.-, debe de realizarse conforme con las regulaciones razonables que dicte la Administración, con la finalidad de proteger a otros agentes económicos, consumidores y terceros" 17.- En conclusión, la libertad de comercio y empresa, conforman el elenco de derechos fundamentales que disfrutan los costarricenses en materia económica, sin que –tal como se dijo en la sentencia citada- deban considerarse como derechos de segunda clase por el hecho de que en determinadas circunstancias deban ceder para lograr el efectivo ejercicio y protección de otros de igual rango. No tiene el legislador una posición de privilegio sobre ellos que le permita restringirlos –y menos aún abolirlos respecto de una actividad- sin que exista la apropiada justificación de conformidad con el artículo 28 Constitucional y sin que se respeten los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.

Irrazonabilidad y desproporción de la medida legislativa analizada.

18. Justamente en este caso, se pide definir si el acto legislativo contenido en la Ley 8955, a través del que se extrajo la actividad del servicio remunerado de transporte terrestre de personas acordado de manera autónoma entre sujetos de derecho privado (porteo), cumple con las exigencias de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad que esta Sala ha recogido desde sus primeros años de existencia.

19. En el voto salvado a la sentencia de esta Sala 2015-00146 de las 11:02 horas del siete de enero de 2015, se hizo un útil resumen de este tema con la finalidad, precisamente, de analizar otro exceso del legislador contenido en la ley que regula transporte terrestre remunerado de personas en la modalidad de taxi. Dijimos en aquella ocasión lo siguiente:

“Esta Sala ha señalado que los derechos fundamentales (como los derechos a la igualdad y libertad de comercio en este caso) pueden ser limitados por el legislador pero con respeto de los principios de razonabilidad y la proporcionalidad y que a ella le corresponde la competencia de vigilar su cumplimiento en el ejercicio del poder de legislar. Es decir, no solamente el legislador está sometido a la obligación de actuar, en su labor limitadora, exclusivamente con apego y en seguimiento de las autorizaciones contenidas en los distintos artículos de la Constitución Política (entendidos de manera restringida) sino que además de ello, tales actuaciones limitantes deben demostrar su razonabilidad y proporcionalidad respecto del cumplimiento de los objetivos y fines constitucionales que buscan cumplirse con la actividad limitadora. Esto quedó claramente establecido en la sentencia 2001-0732 que dejó establecida la validez de los criterios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de las normas como parámetro de análisis de la validez del establecimiento de límites a los derechos fundamentales.

"V.-DEL PRINCIPIO DE RAZONABILIDAD COMO PARÁMETRO CONSTITUCIONAL. La jurisprudencia constitucional ha sido clara y conteste en considerar que el principio de razonabilidad constituye un parámetro de constitucionalidad. Conviene recordar, en primer término, que la "razonabilidad de la ley" nació como parte del "debido proceso sustantivo" (substantive due process of law), garantía creada por la jurisprudencia de la Suprema Corte de los Estados Unidos de América, al hilo de la Enmienda XIV a la Constitución Federal. En la concepción inicial "debido proceso" se dirigió al enjuiciamiento procesal del acto legislativo y su efecto sobre los derechos sustantivos. Al finalizar el siglo XIX, sin embargo, se superó aquella concepción procesal que le había dado origen y se elevó a un recurso axiológico que limita el accionar del órgano legislativo. A partir de entonces podemos hablar del debido proceso como una garantía genérica de la libertad, es decir, como una garantía sustantiva. La superación del "debido proceso" como garantía procesal obedece, básicamente, a que también la ley que se ha ajustado al procedimiento establecido y es válida y eficaz, puede lesionar el Derecho de la Constitución. Para realizar el juicio de razonabilidad la doctrina estadounidense invita a examinar, en primer término, la llamada "razonabilidad técnica" dentro de la que se examina la norma en concreto (ley, reglamento, etc.). Una vez establecido que la norma es la adecuada para regular determinada materia, habrá que examinar si hay proporcionalidad entre el medio escogido y el fin buscado. Superado el criterio de "razonabilidad técnica' hay que analizar la "razonabilidad jurídica". Para lo cual esta doctrina propone examinar: a) razonabilidad ponderativa, que es un tipo de valoración jurídica a la que se concurre cuando ante la existencia de un determinado antecedente (ej. ingreso) se exige una determinada prestación (ej. tributo), debiendo en este supuesto establecerse si la misma es equivalente o proporcionada; b) la razonabilidad de igualdad, es el tipo de valoración jurídica que parte de que ante iguales antecedentes deben haber iguales consecuencias, sin excepciones arbitrarias; c) razonabilidad en el fin, en este punto se valora si el objetivo a alcanzar, no ofende los fines previstos por el legislador con su aprobación. Dentro de este mismo análisis, no basta con afirmar que un medio sea razonablemente adecuado a un fin; es necesario, además, verificar la índole y el tamaño de la limitación que por ese medio debe soportar un derecho personal. De esta manera, si al mismo fin se puede llegar buscando otro medio que produzca una limitación menos gravosa a los derechos personales, el medio escogido no es razonable. Fue en la sentencia número 01739-92, de las once horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del primero de julio de mil novecientos noventa y dos, donde por primera vez se intentó definir este principio, de la siguiente manera:

“La razonabilidad como parámetro de interpretación constitucional. Pero aún se dio un paso más en la tradición jurisprudencial cinglo norteamericana, al extenderse el concepto del debido proceso a lo cpie en esa tradición se conoce como debido sustantivo o sustancial substantive díte process of law- cpie. en realidad, aunque no se refiere a ninguna materia procesal , constituyó un ingenioso mecanismo ideado por ¡a Corte Suprema de Ios Estados Unidos para afirmar su jurisdicción sobre ¡os Estados federados, al lulo de la Enmienda XIV a Ia C onstitucion Federal, pero c/ue entre nosotros, sobre todo a falta de esa necesidad, equivaldría sencillamente al principio de razonabilidad de las leyes y otras normas o actos públicos, o incluso privados , como requisito de su propia validez constitucional, en el sentido de que deben ajustarse, no sido a las normas o preceptos concretos de la Constitución, sino también al sentido de justicia contenido en ella, el cual implica, a su vez. el cumplimiento de exigencias fundamentales de equidad, proporcionalidad y razonabilidad, entendidas éstas como idoneidad para realizar los fines propuestos. Ios principios supuestos y los valores presupuestos en el Derecho de la Constitución. De allí que las leyes y, en general, las normas y los actos de autoridad requieran para su validez, no sólo haber sido promulgados por órganos competentes y procedimientos debidos, sino también pasar la revisión de fondo por su concordancia con las normas, principios y valores supremos de la Constitución (formal y material), como son los de orden, paz, seguridad, justicia, libertad, etc., que se configuran como patrones de razonabilidad. Es decir, que una norma o acto público o privado sólo es válido cuando, además de su conformidad formal con la Constitución, esté razonablemente fundado y justificado conforme a la ideología constitucional. De esta manera se procura, no sólo que la ley no sea irracional, arbitraria o caprichosa, sino además que los medios seleccionados tengan una relación real y sustancial con su objeto. Se distingue entonces entre razonabilidad técnica, que es, como se dijo, la proporciocionalidad entre medios y fines; razonabilidad jurídica, o la adecuación a la Constitución en general, y en especial, a los derechos y libertades reconocidos o supuestos por ella; y linalmente, razonabilidad de los efectos sobre los derechos personales, en el sentido de no imponer a esos derechos otras limitaciones o cargas que las razonablemente derivadas de la naturaleza y régimen de los derechos mismos, ni mayores que las indispensables para que funcionen razonablemente en la vida de la sociedad." La doctrina alemana hizo un aporte importante al tema de la "razonabilidad" al lograr identificar, de una manera muy clara, sus componentes: legitimidad, idoneidad, necesidad v proporcionalidad en sentido estricto, ideas que desarrolla afirmando que ya han sido reconocidas por la jurisprudencia constitucional:

"... La legitimidad se refiere a que el objetivo pretendido con el acto o disposición impugnado no debe estar, al menos, legalmente prohibido: Idoneidad indica que la medida estatal cuestionada deber ser apta para alcanzar efectivamente el objetivo pretendido: la necesidad significa que entre varias medidas igualmente aptas para alcanzar tal objetivo, debe la autoridad competente elegir aquella que afecte lo menos posible la esfera jurídica de la persona: y la proporciocionalidad en sentido estricto dispone que aparte del requisito de que la norma sea apta y necesaria, lo ordenado por ella no debe estar fuera de proporción con respecto al objetivo pretendido, o sea. no le sea "inexigible" al individuo ... (Sentencia de esta Sala número 03933-98, de las nueve horas cincuenta y nueve minutos del doce de junio de mil novecientos noventa y ocho).” 20. También en el mencionada voto salvado expresé mi insatisfacción con la opción tomada por la mayoría del Tribunal de dejar de lado el empleo del test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad para analizar la norma cuestionada en su momento, a pesar de haber sido pedido expresamente por las partes.- Ahora volvemos a encontrar la misma actitud frente a la misma temática, a saber desactivación pura y simple del contenido esencial de derechos fundamentales como el de igualdad, libertad de comercio y libertad de contratación, en el transporte terrestre remunerado de personas, como si en esta actividad no rigiera el Derecho de la Constitución.

21. Esta vez la medida sometida a escrutinio es como se explicó, la extracción absoluta de una faceta de la actividad de transporte terrestre de personas (porteo de personas) que no había sido objeto de estatalización, a saber, servicio brindado previo un acuerdo de voluntades individualizado y concreto sobre la prestación y precio entre las personas privadas interesadas para contratar un servicio de punto a punto. No concibo, en este tema específico, una media más lesiva de la libertad de comercio y a libertad en general de la que deben gozar las personas, que la opción escogida por el Estado en esta ley para ordenar tal actividad. Esto facilita, desde la perspectiva procesal constitucional, la aplicación del test de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad porque permite concentrarse en el análisis en la llamada proporcionalidad de la medida, y además elimina en gran medida el peligro de sustituir la decisión del legislador por alguna otra medida regulatoria más del gusto del juez. En este caso, repito, nada de ello ocurre, de modo que solo queda verificar si el Estado ha aportado razones que justifiquen la magnitud de semejante despojo.

22. Las partes accionantes insisten en indicar que la estatalización de ese remanente de la actividad de transporte terrestre remunerado de personas en automóvil pudo regularse de forma más benigna y en apego a las tendencias actuales del concepto de servicio público que apuntan a la regulación y no la nacionalización. En este sentido mencionan como ejemplos de gran importancia la salud y la educación, cuya importancia primordial nadie discute y que -sin embargo han encontrado apropiados mecanismos más respetuosos de los derechos fundamentales como es la regulación, versus la nacionalización. En contra de ello el Estado, a través de la Procuraduría General de la República y el Ministerio de Transportes, así como los coadyuvantes pasivos, ofrecen razones generales y conceptos indeterminados carentes de algún respaldo para justificar la decisión. Se habla de la existencia de “un claro interés público inmerso” en la actividad o de “decisión estatal dada la relevancia de la actividad...”, pero nada se concreta en demostraciones y argumentos plausibles, más allá de tales declaraciones.

23. De hecho, el eje fundamental de la defensa de la norma discurre por vía de las consideraciones dadas por la Sala cuando conoció una consulta legislativa referente al proyecto que se convirtió en la ley que ahora se impugna (sentencia número 2011-04778 de las 14:30 del 13 de abril de 2011) en donde se elaboró sobre esta cuestión y se afirmó que la nacionalización de toda manifestación de la actividad de transporte remunerado de personas por vías terrestres no lesionaba la libertad de comercio.- Sin embargo, la lectura de dicha sentencia, permite ver que la Sala omitió cualquier consideración respecto a la razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de dicha nacionalización y, por otra parte, zanja la cuestión de la lesión a la libertad de comercio con un razonamiento simplemente erróneo:

“...Con esta reforma el legislador busca, de una vez por todas, abstraer de la esfera privada la prestación del servicio de transporte de personas que en su totalidad ha sido declarado servicio público por el legislador y hace que sean otras las reglas del juego y principios jurídicos a aplicar: Los particulares se convierten en colaboradores de la Administración Pública en la prestación de ese servicio que, por sus características y la evidente existencia de un interés público, debe ser en principio, asumido por el Estado sin que estén de por medio principios y derechos que rigen las relaciones privadas, como lo son el principio de autonomía de la voluntad o la libertad de comercio. En consecuencia, el Tribunal estima que el proyecto de ley consultado no lesiona los artículos 28, 45. 46 y 56 de la Constitución Política”. (sentencia número 2011-4778 citada) (el destacado no es del original) Puede verse nítidamente el error fundamental del razonamiento, cuando se señala que la autonomía de la voluntad y la libertad de comercio “rigen las relaciones privadas” sin que puedan oponerse válidamente a la voluntad estatal, si ella toma para sí una actividad.- Es la negación, no solo de la línea contundente en contrario que ha sostenido este Tribunal, sino también la desvalorización del concepto de derecho fundamental y libertad recogido en la Constitución Política justamente como límite al poder estatal según se explicó.- 24. De tal modo, no existe en este expediente nada que amerite ser calificado como argumento suficiente para justificar y hacer aceptable la radical decisión de privar a las personas de su libertad de empresa y comercio en materia de transporte remunerado de personas en la modalidad del porteo de personas.- Nada apunta a entender esa “esencialidad para el mantenimiento del Estado de Derecho” de la que nos habla la sentencia 2011-4778 o el “relevante interés público inmerso” que citan la Procuraduría y el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes.- No se alega, ni menos se prueba, la necesidad de proteger principios o valores constitucionales, como la concreción de principio de solidaridad, reglas de mejor reparto de riqueza, entre otras.

Podría incluso -con abandono del papel de juez imparcial que cumple la Sala- buscarse un soporte en la defensa de poblaciones vulnerables, concreción de principios de solidaridad, reglas de mejor reparto de riqueza, entre otras, pero nada de ello se ha alegado y en los hechos resulta evidentemente forzado.- 25. Más aún, en algunos extractos de la exposición de motivos del proyecto de Ley descubren razones que acentúan la insuficiencia de motivos válidos. Se lee en el expediente legislativo:

“…durante varias semanas del presente año se llevó a cabo un arduo proceso de negociación en el cual el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes y sus autoridades, junto con la Cámara Nacional de Transporte de Autobús, la Federación Nacional de Taxis y la Cámara de Porteadores como representante del sector, mantuvieron una sesión permanente de discusión, buscando una formulación de consenso para solucionar la situación de los señores y señoras porteadoras”.

(…)

“Con esta iniciativa se pretende de manera muy categórica, establecer dentro del marco regulatorio de la Ley reguladora del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos en la modalidad taxi, N.º 7969, un servicio que hoy día es una realidad y que esta tutelado de manera equivocada al estar amparado solamente ante la palabra “personas” en el Código de Comercio, con el fin de crear una legislación que garantice mejores condiciones y costos más bajos para el usuario, buscando el beneficio y el bienestar de las grandes mayorías…” (…)

“No se trata de una concesión porque no nace de un producto de una licitación pública, sino que nace de un permiso y obedece fundamentalmente que es una necesidad específica y puntual.” “Lo anterior por cuanto en el momento en que se elimine la palabra “personas”, hay quienes efectivamente desarrollan esa actividad en el marco de legalidad del artículo 323 del Código de Comercio, por lo que con base en el referido artículo 34 de nuestra Constitución deben respetarse los derechos adquiridos por estas personas.” “Además se incorporan tres transitorios con el objeto de que el Ministerio de Obras y Transportes asuma la responsabilidad de tutelar el servicio de porteo de personas tanto en modalidad automóvil como en modalidad microbús a través del Consejo de Transporte Público, que es el instrumento que el legislador ha creado para regular esta materia.” “Es importante tener presente, que se trata de una situación transitoria para todo aquel interesado o interesada que logre demostrar y cumplir los requisitos ante el Consejo de Transporte Público y pueda acreditarse en el período posterior de dos meses, pues aquellos y aquellas que no cumplan con los mismos no podrán operar porque estarían actuando ilegalmente, pues ya no operarían bajo el marco del porteo ni de transportes.” “Igualmente se pretende darle un marco regulatorio de seguridad a todos aquellos usuarios para poder tutelar la responsabilidad de aquellas empresas o personas que brindan este servicio, que hoy día están tutelados solo bajo el Código de Comercio a través de la Defensoría del Consumidor. Aquellos que incumplan la nueva normativa establecida serán sujetos del debido proceso y podrían perder el permiso o código que les permite desarrollar esa actividad, tal y como opera en el servicio de taxis formal.” 26.- Resulta claro que la exclusión plena y completa del ejercicio de una libertad fundamental como la libertad de comercio y empresa, se ha decidido con la finalidad de ordenar la situación particular de un grupo de personas fácilmente determinable que venía ejerciendo la actividad del porteo, labor con la que se decide acabar, paradójicamente, para “mejores condiciones y costos más bajos para el usuario, buscando el beneficio y el bienestar de las grandes mayorías” y resolver los problemas que han surgido por la ineficiencia y falta de capacidad del Estado para ordenar y vigilar y principalmente proteger, la adecuada prestación del servicio público de taxi. El Estado confiesa claramente su incapacidad de fiscalizar el servicio ilegal de transporte público de taxi y decide a cambio, secuestrar una libertad fundamental de comercio y contratación . Desde mi perspectiva, estos objetivos no son válidos, ni cumplen con el test de razonabilidad constitucional.

27. Así expuestas las cosas, resulta indefendible que las vicisitudes en la contratación de un servicio de transporte en automóvil acordado directamente entre personas adultas y capaces jurídicamente de velar por sus intereses y defender sus derechos, impongan una intervención del Estado de la forma más despectiva posible hacia la libertad general y de comercio en particular.

Conclusiones.

28. Del elenco fáctico queda demostrado que el legislador sí innovó el ordenamiento jurídico con la emisión de la Ley 8955, pues no solo proclamó su titularidad sobre cualquier forma de transporte remunerado de personas por la vía terrestre, sino que eliminó el porteo de personas del listado de contratos regulados por el Código de Comercio.

Esa actuación, por su radicalidad, no puede menos que imponer al Estado una amplia y convincente labor de justificación frente a los reclamos que, como en este caso lleguen a plantear las personas que se consideran afectadas en sus derechos fundamentales a la libertad y en particular a la libertad de comercio y empresa, pues como se explicó supra, no basta que el estado decida declarar una actividad comercial como de “interés público” para que ésta sea válida desde una perspectiva constitucional. Con ese argumento, se puede vaciar el contenido completo de los derechos económicos de nuestra Constitución Política, por ejemplo, para despojar servicios tradicionalmente ejercidos en competencia como la educación o la salud.- Desde mi perspectiva, los interesados en la defensa de la norma no han querido o no han podido aportar razones concretas y aceptables desde un punto de vista constitucional, para sustentar una medida tan radical como la nacionalización de esa actividad, la cual no está por demás repetirlo, involucra mayoritariamente personas en pleno uso de sus capacidades y libertades, negociando prestaciones y precios sobre una actividad omnipresente en nuestra sociedad como lo es el traslado de personas de un punto a otro. Por todo lo dicho estimo que es procedente declarar con lugar la acción y anular la norma impugnada con sus consecuencias.

XIII.- Voto salvado del Magistrado Salazar Alvarado: Con el respeto debido, disiento del criterio de la mayoría del pleno de este Tribunal Constitucional, que rechazó la demanda de constitucionalidad, la que acojo en minoría, por las razones que de seguido me permito exponer.

Como primer punto en la exposición de mi criterio, es necesario resaltar el reconocimiento de la Constitución Política como norma jurídica dotada de fuerza normativa, lo que importa su supremacía en el marco formal, ubicándola en la cúspide del ordenamiento jurídico, como fuente suprema de las fuentes del derecho, con potestad de organizar el Estado, de definir el régimen político y brindando una serie de garantías a favor de todas las personas. Así, la Carta Fundamental, que rige desde 1949, cuenta con una serie de normas, valores y principios que corresponden a limitaciones al ejercicio del poder y con ello, tratar de garantizar la libertad de las personas, lo cual, tal como señalaré en líneas posteriores, considero vulneradas con la normativa impugnada en el presente proceso de inconstitucionalidad.

En este marco, se establece la necesidad de analizar, por parte de este Tribunal Constitucional, la validez de una norma, es decir, dilucidar si el contenido de la Ley N° 8955 del 26 de setiembre de 2011 “Reforma al Código de Comercio -Ley N° 3284 del 30 de abril de 1964- y de la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi -Ley N° 7969 del 22 de diciembre de 1999- encuentra regularidad con nuestra Constitución Política, que es la norma fundante del ordenamiento jurídico costarricense y de la cual deriva la validez de todas las normas que lo conforman.

Dicho lo anterior, la Constitución Política de nuestro país, a partir de sus artículos 1, 9, 11, 28, 50 y 74, define el sistema de gobierno como un Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho, lo que implica, como lo ha señalado esta Sala -v.g. Sentencia N° 13323-06, de las 17:26 horas del 6 de setiembre de 2006-, la existencia de relaciones recíprocas entre diversas instancias públicas de orden constitucional y legal, incluyendo a los miembros de la sociedad civil, lo que impone, al Estado, la obligación de garantizar que las personas se desenvuelvan del modo más favorable a su dignidad, libertad y el respeto y efectividad de sus derechos fundamentales.

Esto vuelve exigibles una serie de valores y principios, dentro de los que resaltan el principio de legalidad, el principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad y el principio de respeto de las libertades y derechos fundamentales, todos en condiciones de igualdad. En el caso concreto, y desde esta Jurisdicción Constitucional, considero que la plena efectividad de tales principios se debe analizar desde dos ópticas, la primera, en torno a los intereses del consumidor o de la libertad de las personas como consumidoras del servicio de transporte; y, una segunda, referente a la libertad de comercio.

El principio de respeto de la libertad, inteligible a partir del contenido del artículo 28, de la Constitución Política, establece que toda persona posee una esfera individual en la cual puede, por medio de su voluntad, elegir sus opciones de vida y tomar las decisiones que mejor favorezcan a su desarrollo integral. Si bien, esto comporta la obligación que su actuar no contravenga el ordenamiento jurídico, así como las normas morales y las buenas costumbres, lo cierto es que la ley no debe invadir la esfera intangible de la libertad.

El Estado de Derecho, mediante la división de poderes y el control jurisdiccional de estos, impone la plena vigencia del principio de legalidad, sometiendo a la Administración al Derecho, siendo que la interdicción de la arbitrariedad brinda un marco de seguridad jurídica a las personas, lo que garantiza su libertad personal. De tal forma, las libertades fundamentales corresponden a una de las bases más sólidas del Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho. En el sub-examine, considero que lo dispuesto en la Ley N° 8955 “Reforma al Código de Comercio -Ley N° 3284- y de la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la modalidad Taxi -Ley N° 7969- entra en una fuerte colisión con la prerrogativa en cita, pues tiene una incidencia directa en la libertad de las personas de elegir y de contratar, como consumidores y como usuarios de los servicios de transporte, la modalidad del servicio que le sea de mayor conveniencia, lo que resulta una intromisión grosera en las condiciones particulares de cada individuo. La demanda de bienes y servicios, en este caso del servicio de transporte, tiene como fin la satisfacción de los intereses de cada persona, por lo que, de previo a externar el consentimiento para la adquisición de estos, los individuos deberían contar con los elementos de juicio necesarios que permitan expresarlo con toda la libertad -v.g. Sentencia N° 4463-96, de las 9:45 horas del 30 de agosto de 1996- y de acuerdo con sus necesidades, donde encuentra un alto valor la multiplicidad de operadores.

Asimismo, esta Sala ha señalado -ver en ese sentido, entre otras, las Sentencias N° 0490-94 de las 16:15 horas del 25 de enero de 1994, N° 6116-96 de las 15:21 horas de 12 de noviembre de 1996 y N° 6497-96 de las 11:42 horas de 2 de diciembre de 1996- que dentro de los elementos de juicio para la selección de una oferta de servicio, deben incluirse, en una mezcla armónica, varios principios constitucionales que contemplan la preocupación estatal a favor de los más amplios sectores de la población cuando sus individuos actúan como consumidores, la reafirmación de la libertad individual al facilitar a los particulares la libre disposición del patrimonio con el concurso del mayor conocimiento posible del bien o del servicio a adquirir, el ordenamiento y la sistematización de las relaciones recíprocas entre los interesados, la homologación de las prácticas comerciales internacionales al sistema interno y la mayor protección de las personas de cara a los medios de subsistencia.

La literalidad de la citada Sentencia N° 6497-96, en la que se reitera la posición del Tribunal dispuesta en las otras sentencias igualmente mencionadas y que se mantiene a nuestros días, indica:

"...es notorio que el consumidor se encuentra en el extremo de la cadena formada por la producción, distribución y comercialización de los bienes de consumo que requiere adquirir para su satisfacción personal, y su participación en ese proceso, no responde a razones técnicas ni profesionales, sino en la celebración constante de contratos a título personal. Por ello la relación en esa secuencia comercial es de inferioridad y requiere de una especial protección frente a los proveedores de los bienes y servicios, a los efectos de que previo a externar su consentimiento contractual cuente con todos los elementos de juicio necesarios, que le permitan expresarlo con toda libertad y ello implica el conocimiento cabal de los bienes y servicios ofrecidos. Van incluidos por lo expresado, en una mezcla armónica, varios principios constitucionales, como la preocupación estatal a favor de los más amplios sectores de la población cuando actúan como consumidores, la reafirmación de la libertad individual al facilitar a los particulares la libre disposición del patrimonio con el concurso del mayor posible conocimiento del bien o servicio a adquirir, la protección de la salud cuando esté involucrada, el ordenamiento y la sistemación de las relaciones recíprocas entre los interesados, la homologación de las prácticas comerciales internacionales al sistema interno y en fin, la mayor protección del funcionamiento del habitante en los medios de subsistencia".

Además, los derechos de los consumidores también encuentran sustento en normas de Derecho Internacional. En este marco, destaca lo dispuesto por las Directrices de las Naciones Unidas para la Protección del Consumidor, las cuales señalan que las políticas de los gobiernos deben tratar, en la medida de lo posible, que los consumidores obtengan el máximo beneficio de sus recursos económicos y, además, deben tratar de establecer procedimientos adecuados de distribución, prácticas comerciales leales, comercialización informativa y protección efectiva contra las prácticas que puedan perjudicar los intereses económicos de los consumidores y la posibilidad de elegir en el mercado. Además, señala la necesidad de implementar todos los esfuerzos necesarios para garantizar que todos los interesados en participar en la provisión de bienes y servicios cumplan con las leyes y normas obligatorias vigentes. Lo dicho, se traduce en la necesidad de restringir prácticas comerciales restrictivas o de tipo abusivo que puedan perjudicar a los consumidores.

Con lo expuesto, se pone de manifiesto la necesidad de satisfacción de los intereses de las personas al comprar un servicio, lo cual, además, se evidencia al tratar de precisar una definición de servicio público. Según la doctrina, el servicio público se puede conceptualizar, a partir de una característica polisémica intrínseca a este, como la prestación, administrativa o no, de un servicio con fines de satisfacer una necesidad pública, lo que justifica, por un lado, la intervención del Estado, pero también conlleva la posibilidad de participación de particulares. Así, la citada intervención estatal se debe limitar, únicamente, a establecer una serie de normas mínimas, de alcance general, que permitan la participación, en condiciones de igualdad, a todos los interesados en la venta del servicio de transporte, con la consecuente ampliación de opciones de servicio a favor de las personas.

Por otra parte, al inicio de este voto disidente, señalé la necesidad de analizar el caso concreto, además, desde la perspectiva de libertad de comercio. La norma cuestionada eliminó la palabra "persona" del artículo 323, del Código de Comercio, lo que importa la nacionalización del servicio de transporte de personas por parte del Estado, con la consecuencia de que esa actividad queda fuera del comercio de los hombres, por lo que cualquier interesado ajeno al Estado y sus agentes -definidos, para este caso en concreto, como aquellos que cuentan con concesión o permiso- en participar en el mercado de transportes, quedan con una posibilidad de intervención residual, pues, únicamente, podría hacerlo en el tema de mercaderías, artículos y dineros. Tal restricción, en criterio del suscrito, resulta contraria al Derecho de la Constitución.

Sobre la libertad de comercio, este Tribunal Constitucional, entre otras, en Sentencia N° 4936-12 de las 15:33 horas del 18 de abril de 2012, indicó:

“VIII.- Por su parte, la libertad de empresa o comercio, contenida en el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, radica en el derecho de cada ciudadano de escoger libremente la actividad económica que desea desarrollar. Sin embargo, éste no es un derecho ilimitado, pues el Estado puede limitar dicha actividad por razones de orden público, la moral y la tutela de los derechos de terceros. Una vez que una persona escoge la actividad económica que desea desarrollar, debe ajustarse a los requisitos y lineamientos que el ordenamiento jurídico exige para llevar a cabo la actividad”.

En este pronunciamiento y a partir del contenido del artículo 46, de la Carta Política, reconoce que la libertad de comercio corresponde a que cada ciudadano tiene el derecho a escoger, libremente, la actividad económica que desea desarrollar. No obstante, también reconoce que esta garantía no es irrestricta y que el Estado puede restringir dicha actividad, pero, a criterio propio, la limitación debe darse, únicamente, por razones de orden público, la moral y la tutela de derechos de terceros.

En otras palabras, la libertad de comercio puede ser objeto de reglamentación y de restricciones legales, pero deberán superar el juicio de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad, de tal forma que no se vuelva nugatorio el ejercicio del derecho fundamental. A partir de esta concepción, se ha definido que la ley no pude, ni debe, ser irracional y debe garantizar una proporcionalidad entre medios y fines, lo que, además, implica una adecuación de la norma con el contenido de la Constitución, con especial referencia a los derechos fundamentales.

En el caso concreto, considero que la restricción impuesta por la norma impugnada no alcanza tales criterios, sobre todo si se toman en consideración las coyunturas actuales por las que atraviesa el sector transporte, en las que se afectan, franca y directamente, los intereses de las personas por la falta de efectividad del servicio, con la relación entre la calidad y el precio que se debe cancelar por este y la falta de opciones o proveedores de un óptimo servicio.

Así, en tesis de principio, mi criterio se basa en el reconocimiento y en la salvaguarda del contenido mínimo de dos derechos fundamentales. El primero de ellos, la libertad, contenida en el artículo 28, de la Constitución Política, desde la posición de las personas como consumidores del servicio de transporte. El segundo, corresponde al derecho contenido en el artículo 46, de la Constitución Política, referente a la libertad de comercio. Esto, porque estimo que la restricción impuesta por la normativa impugnada se encuentra lejos de criterios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, siendo que la nacionalización del servicio de transporte automotor modalidad Taxi y Seetaxi, cercena la potestad de selección y de contratación a la que tienen derechos los usuarios, conforme a sus intereses, preferencias y necesidades de las personas.

Además, limita la participación activa en el mercado de venta del servicio de transporte, conforme se señaló con anterioridad. Si bien es necesaria una intervención del Estado, esta debe de ser mínima, estableciendo un marco regulatorio que siente las reglas mínimas para que se permita, a todos los interesados, en la venta del servicio de transporte, para así participar en condiciones de igualdad; empero, sin los excesos que conlleva la nacionalización del servicio, pues más que los intereses del Estado, deben prevalecer los de las personas (usuarias del transporte).

Por tal motivo y en función del bien común y de los intereses de cada particular, la apertura del servicio resulta de mayor conveniencia para las personas; esto, sin perder de vista que el contenido de los servicios y de la relación entre prestatario y consumidor, comporta el derecho de los segundos a recibir las prestaciones previstas en términos de cantidad y calidad -aspectos previamente definidos- que pueden ser regulados por el Estado sin necesidad de la nacionalización del servicio, lo que, además, contempla la obligación de resarcimiento en los casos que se presentan daño por el mal funcionamiento del servicio.

Finalmente, la prestación del servicio de transporte no debe entenderse en el origen de este, en el que se podría justificar una severa intervención del Estado y su gestión directa por parte de la Administración, sino que debe entenderse -y definirse- a partir del destinatario de este, lo que justifica el desarrollo de lo que puede denominarse una especie de servicio público impropio de transporte, en salvaguarda de la iniciativa de todo interesado en gestionar el servicio, la cual, sin necesidad de la nacionalización del servicio, el Estado podría establecer reglas mínimas.

Por tanto:

Por mayoría, se declaran sin lugar las acciones acumuladas. El Magistrado Castillo Víquez da razones diferentes para fundar la desestimatoria, con excepción del agravio relativo a la infracción del principio de igualdad. El Magistrado Rueda Leal salva el voto y declara con lugar las acciones acumuladas, por la creación de un monopolio a favor del Estado mediante una ley que no contó con la aprobación de los dos tercios de la totalidad de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa, y por vulnerar los derechos fundamentales a la propiedad y la libertad de empresa, así como el principio general de libertad. Los Magistrados Hernández López y Salazar Alvarado salvan el voto parcialmente y declaran con lugar las acciones planteadas por violación de la libertad de empresa protegida en los artículos 28 y 46 de la Constitución Política. En consecuencia, anulan los artículos 1 y 2 de la Ley 8955 del 16 de junio de 2011, el primero, únicamente en cuanto eliminó la palabra "personas" del artículo 323 el Código de Comercio y el segundo, única y exclusivamente, en cuanto declaró como servicio público la actividad del porteo de personas del Código de Comercio.- Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.

Paul Rueda L. Nancy Hernández L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A. José Paulino Hernández G.

ECUBEROJ/402/FCC 1 El texto, incluida la reforma mediante Ley n.° 16 de 8 de junio de1927, indicaba lo siguiente:

“La República no reconoce títulos hereditarios o empleos venales, ni permite la fundación de mayorazgos. Son prohibidos además en la República los monopolios, los privilegios y cualquier otro acto, aunque fuere originado en ley, que menoscabe o amenace la libertad de comercio, agricultura e industria, salvo los que el Estado haya establecido hasta la fecha o lo que ésta establezca en el futuro para su subsistencia, para prevenir males sociales, para estímulo de ingenio, para la ejecución de obras o para el desarrollo de empresas de interés indiscutiblemente nacional que sin monopolio o privilegio o pudieren ejecutarse o llevarse a cabo, a juicio del Poder Legislativo, por una mayoría de los dos tercios de la totalidad de sus miembros, y salvo también los que las Municipalidades hayan establecido hasta ahora o las que establezcan en lo venidero para iguales fines con la debida autorización del Poder Legislativo, dada por la mayoría indicada”.