Rejection of unconstitutionality claim for lack of admissible underlying case in individual inmate interest defenseRechazo de acción de inconstitucionalidad por falta de asunto base admisible en defensa de interés individual de recluso

*160100880007CO* Res. No. 2016011332 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at ten hours forty minutes on August tenth, two thousand sixteen.

Action of unconstitutionality brought by ELADIO TACSAN RUÍZ, identity card No. 0501490049, against Article 2 of the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult Person.

Whereas:

1.- By document received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 11 hrs. on August 1, 2016, the petitioner requests that the unconstitutionality of Article 2 of the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult Person be declared, regarding the age established in that normative body for considering a person as an older adult. He indicates, to that effect, that the challenged rule establishes that an older adult person is defined as “[a]ll persons sixty-five years of age or older.” He alleges that the setting of such an age contravenes the age established by the World Health Organization and the United Nations Organization to define persons of the third age. He affirms that, according to the World Health Organization, persons 60 to 74 years of age are considered of advanced age, those 75 to 90 years are old or elderly, those over 90 years are called great old or great long-lived, and every individual over 60 years of age shall be called, indistinctly, a person of the third age. He maintains that the United Nations considers an elderly person to be everyone over 65 years of age for developed countries and over 60 years for developing countries, as is the case of Costa Rica. He refers to the 49th Directing Council and 61st Session of the Regional Committee, of the Pan American Health Organization and the World Health Organization, held in Washington D.C. (USA), from September 28 to October 2, 2009. He also refers to the United Nations Principles for Older Persons, approved by resolution A/RES/46/91 of the United Nations General Assembly of December 16, 1991. He requests that, consequently, this action of unconstitutionality be accepted, so that the age provided in Law No. 7935 is modified and the age of the older adult person is established at 60 years.

2.- In order to substantiate the standing he holds to bring this action of unconstitutionality, the plaintiff alleges that he filed an amparo appeal against the National Institute of Criminology, in which reference is made to the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult Person. He points out that, furthermore, the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes that a prior case pending resolution shall not be necessary when “it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those that concern the community as a whole,” which is fulfilled in this case, given that it concerns a broad sector of the population.

3.- Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject on procedural grounds or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition brought to its attention that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a simple reiteration or reproduction of a prior, identical or similar petition that was rejected.

Magistrate Jinesta Lobo writes; and,

Considering:

I.- ON THE FORMAL PREREQUISITES FOR ADMISSIBILITY AND STANDING OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the action of unconstitutionality is a procedure with certain formalities, which, if not met, make it impossible for this Chamber to rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the prerequisites for admissibility for actions of unconstitutionality and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in a judicial venue –including habeas corpus or amparo appeals– or in an administrative venue –in the procedure for exhausting this avenue–, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged rule is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the principal matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action –the base matter is not required–, in the following cases: a) when by the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury; b) it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Procurador General of the Republic, the Contralor General of the Republic, the Fiscal General of the Republic, and the Defensor de los Habitantes. Regarding the requirement of a matter pending resolution, established in the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law that governs this Jurisdiction, this Chamber has explained that, in such case, the action of unconstitutionality is constituted or configured as:

“(...) a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, by which it is meant that the existence of a matter pending resolution is required -whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative avenue- in order to access the constitutional avenue, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the principal matter, so that what is decided by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative repercussion on said process pending resolution, since it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter (...).” (Judgment No. 4190-95 of 11:33 hrs. of July 28, 1995; the highlighted text does not correspond to the original).

Likewise, in judgment No. 1319-1997 of 14:51 hrs. of March 4, 1997, the following was considered:

“(…) Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes as one of the prerequisites for filing the action of unconstitutionality, the existence of a matter pending resolution, as it constitutes the point of connection that must exist between the process in which the rule reputed unconstitutional is applied and the object of the constitutional process, and the basis that legitimizes the petitioner's claim as a last procedural remedy, in the exercise of the right to constitutional jurisdiction. The rigor in standing to access constitutional jurisdiction, more than constituting an obstacle to impede the control of the constitutionality of laws, constitutes the channel for the right of access to justice, derived from the existence of a 'prior matter' that has motivated that discordance or contradiction between the law and the Constitution, to maintain the jurisdictional function -special-, and not distort the purity of the system of relations among the constitutional powers of the State, of which the Chamber is a part, because as a member of those, it is not entirely free and unlimited in its actions. For this reason, the action of unconstitutionality requires its existence -of the prior matter- as a reasonable means to protect the defense of the right or interest considered injured. However, the reasonableness of the action of unconstitutionality as a means of defense for the petitioner must not be analyzed only within the context of the prior matter, but immersed in the constitutional legal framework that governs the actions of this Chamber. It is not, then, a matter of a particular consideration of the unconstitutionality of a normative provision, to file an action without requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution, rather, it is necessary to demonstrate that it constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right or interest deemed injured. (…)” Based on the cited precedents and the jurisprudential line of this Chamber, it is inferred that the action process is, principally, of an incidental nature, therefore a matter pending resolution in the administrative venue –in the administrative procedure for challenging the final act– or judicial venue is required for the action to succeed. Thus, only in exceptional cases that the law establishes will the existence of that requirement not be necessary.

II.- ON THE STANDING AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE PRESENT ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. As indicated, Article 75, first paragraph, in fine, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction presupposes, for purposes of the admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality via the incidental path, the existence of a principal matter pending resolution, whether before the courts –including habeas corpus or amparo–, or in the procedure for exhausting the administrative avenue, in which that unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. Consistent with the foregoing, this Chamber has repeatedly indicated that when the base matter on which the presentation of an action of unconstitutionality rests is an amparo or habeas corpus appeal, for such action to be admissible, these appeals must themselves be admissible. Regarding this point, in judgment No. 2004-94 of 15:15 hrs. of April 27, 1994, this Court indicated the following:

“(...) Additionally, the Chamber cannot fail to note the specific situation raised in the appeal, specifically with regard to the possibility granted by Article 75, first paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, to file an action of unconstitutionality on the basis of an amparo or habeas corpus appeal pending before it, and it must be indicated that for these cases it is absolutely necessary that these be admissible; that is, that it effectively involves a matter in which not only fundamental rights of persons are at stake, but also that for its resolution, the norms whose unconstitutionality is sought must be applied; a manifestly improper amparo or habeas corpus does not constitute a reasonable means to protect any right or interest, and therefore a declaration of unconstitutionality cannot be sought within it, since this would imply recognizing, by such avenue, the existence in our legal system of a popular action as a prerequisite of standing for access to the control of constitutionality of norms, a situation that has been repeatedly rejected, both in specialized doctrine, and in the Jurisprudence of this Chamber itself.” (Criterion reaffirmed -among others- in judgments Nos. 2005-94, 416-96, 749-96, 857-96, 2511-96 and 5268-96).

In the present case, the petitioner alleges, to substantiate the standing he holds to bring this action of unconstitutionality, that he filed “an Amparo Appeal against the National Institute of Criminology, where reference is made to the Older Adult Law.” The petitioner does not provide the expedition number assigned to said amparo; however, through the Costa Rican Judicial Office Management System, it was possible to determine that such amparo corresponds to No. 16-009870-0007-CO, as well as that it was rejected on procedural grounds, by judgment No. 2016-010913 of 09:05 hrs. of July 29, 2016, based on the following order of considerations:

“(…) With respect to the allegations and claims of the appellant, that this Chamber order the National Institute of Criminology to approve the recommendation of the Disciplinary Council of the Center where he is imprisoned to be transferred from Area C to D, the appellant must be advised that in reiterated jurisprudence this Chamber has determined that everything concerning the transfer or placement of persons deprived of liberty in the various penal centers is the exclusive competence of the administrative authorities in charge of the execution of the sentence. This Chamber could not substitute for the penitentiary administration in its functions and determine –without greater elements of judgment– the correct or most convenient placement of the person under the protection of the appeal. (…) Therefore, if the appellant considers that it is appropriate to approve the requested relocation, for meeting the requirements demanded for such purpose, he may raise it –if he so wishes– before the Sentence Execution Judge who handles the matters of the penitentiary center where he is located (…)” Therefore, as the cited amparo was declared inadmissible, for the reasons already stated, it is not demonstrated that there currently exists, as the base of this action, a prior matter that can be considered a reasonable or suitable means for the defense of the rights and interests alleged as infringed, in the terms of the cited Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.

III.- ON THE ALLEGED EXISTENCE OF COLLECTIVE INTERESTS. To which it is added that it cannot be considered that we are in the presence of a case of diffuse interests. When hearing a case analogous to the present one, in which the defense of the interests of older adult persons was also alleged, this Court, by judgment No. 2013-014672 of 14:30 hrs. of November 6, 2013, decided the following:

“I.- OBJECT OF THE ACTION. The plaintiff challenged the omission of the legislator to regulate a special dismissal process that protects the older adult, in application of the provisions of Article 51 of the Political Constitution. In her view, Article 71 of the Political Constitution is unconstitutional, as it does not include, under its scope of protection, older adults.

II.- ON THE FORMAL PREREQUISITES FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY AND STANDING OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. The action of unconstitutionality is a process established for the purpose of guaranteeing the supremacy of the Political Constitution, against norms or other provisions of a general nature. In light of this and, by express will of the legislator, it is of a highly technical degree, so for its admissibility certain requirements must be strictly met, contrary to what occurs with habeas corpus and amparo appeals, in which informality is the rule. Thus, the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction stipulates that to file an action of unconstitutionality it is necessary that there exists a matter pending resolution before the courts, including a habeas corpus or amparo appeal, or in the procedure for exhausting the administrative avenue, in which the unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. On the other hand, the second paragraph of the same article provides, by way of exception, that a prior case pending resolution shall not be necessary when by the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole.

III.- In the present matter [the plaintiff] appeared, according to her view, in defense of a diffuse interest, such as the well-being and protection of older adult persons. This Constitutional Court does not consider that such types of interests mediate in the present case. In accordance with what was explained in the preceding considering ground, the action of unconstitutionality has an eminently incidental nature, so the standing to file it derives, as a general rule, from the existence of a base matter, in which the unconstitutionality of a norm has been invoked, as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. Thus, the hypotheses of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction – referring to the existence of collective or diffuse interests – are the exception. As such, they are only applicable when the circumstances of the case - which must be examined in particular - determine the impossibility (or, at least, a manifest improbability) that a base judicial process or administrative procedure could ever be brought. In this sense, in judgment No. 2008-006803 of 17:46 hrs. of April 23, 2008, this Court explained:

“(…) The jurisprudence of this court is pacific and long-standing to the effect that popular actions are not permitted in our system, insofar as, if admitted, they would lead to diametrically denying the incidental character that the action possesses in the design of our current system of constitutional justice. Indeed, Article 75 of the Law that governs this jurisdiction establishes that, as a rule, the admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality is conditioned on the existence of a prior matter pending resolution, in which the inapplicability of the challenged norm or norms has been invoked, so that the lawsuit serves as a reasonable means for the protection of the right or interest deemed injured. In attention to that incidental nature, it is important to underline that the hypotheses of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of this jurisdiction do not constitute alternatives, but exceptions to the aforementioned general rule that requires the existence of a prior matter pending resolution as the basis of the action. As such, they are only applicable when the circumstances of the case –which must be examined individually– determine the impossibility (or, at least, a manifest improbability) that a base process, judicial or administrative, brought by reason or on occasion of an individual and direct injury caused by the application of the challenged provisions could ever be brought (…)” (the emphasis does not belong to the original) (reiterated criterion, among others, in judgments Nos. 2008 – 015448 of 14:54 hrs. of October 15, 2008, 2010 – 011346 of 14:59 hrs. of June 29, 2010, 2011 – 1633 of 14:47 hrs. of February 9, 2011 and, 2013 – 001420 of 14:30 hrs. of January 30, 2013).

In the present case, more than being before a diffuse interest, we are before an individual interest that can be protected within the framework of an administrative procedure or jurisdictional process, in which the dismissal of an older adult is discussed, for supposedly being discriminatory, on the grounds that it was based on reasons of age. From this procedure or process, the action of unconstitutionality could perfectly be filed. This being the case, the plaintiff cannot be considered as having standing to formulate the present action of unconstitutionality.” Considerations that are applicable to the case under study, for, in the instant case, more than being in the presence of a diffuse interest, what is intended, at its core, is to challenge the specific placement of the petitioner within the penitentiary system (as confirmed by reading amparo No. 16-009870-0007-CO), clearly in protection of his individual interest. Placement within the penitentiary system that can be elucidated within the framework of an administrative procedure or a jurisdictional process, which may become the base matter for a possible action of unconstitutionality. Finally, it must be noted that this Chamber has specified –in various votes– that, through the expression "interests that concern the community as a whole," contained in the cited Article 75, second paragraph, the “legislator intended to refer to the standing held by a corporate entity, when it acts through its representatives in defense of the rights and interests of the persons that make up its associative base and provided that it concerns the challenge of norms or provisions that affect that core of rights or interests that constitutes the reason for being and the binding factor of the group” (judgment No. 2014-20446 of 09:30 hrs. of December 17, 2014). Which is also not fulfilled in the case under study. Therefore, definitively, none of the cases of direct standing provided for in the second paragraph of the referenced Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction is configured.

IV.- IN CONCLUSION. By virtue of what has been stated, it is proper to reject this action on procedural grounds, as is hereby ordered.

Therefore:

The action is rejected on procedural grounds.

Ernesto Jinesta L. President Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V.

Paul Rueda L.

Nancy Hernández L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jose Paulino Hernández G.

Document Signed Digitally -- Verification code -- *RGQDT2QWYXA61* FILE No. 16-010088-0007-CO Telephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional.

Building Supreme Court of Justice, San José, Catedral District, González Lahmann Neighborhood, 19th and 21st Streets, 8th and 6th Avenues Res. No. 2016011332 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at ten hours and forty minutes on August tenth, two thousand sixteen.

Unconstitutionality action brought by ELADIO TACSAN RUÍZ, identity card No. 0501490049, against Article 2 of the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult.

Whereas:

1.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 11:00 a.m. on August 1, 2016, the petitioner requests that the unconstitutionality of Article 2 of the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult be declared, with respect to the age established in said normative body for considering a person to be an older adult. He indicates, to that effect, that the challenged norm defines an older adult as “[a]ny person sixty-five years of age or older.” He alleges that the setting of such an age contravenes the age established by the World Health Organization and the United Nations for defining elderly persons. He states that, according to the World Health Organization, persons from 60 to 74 years of age are considered to be of advanced age, from 75 to 90 years are old or elderly, those over 90 years are called the very old or the very long-lived, and any individual over 60 years of age shall be called, interchangeably, an elderly person. He maintains that the United Nations considers an elderly person to be any person over 65 years of age for developed countries and 60 years for developing countries, as is the case of Costa Rica. He refers to the 49th Directing Council and 61st Session of the Regional Committee, of the Pan American Health Organization and the World Health Organization, held in Washington D.C. (USA), from September 28 to October 2, 2009. He also refers to the United Nations Principles for Older Persons, approved by resolution A/RES/46/91 of the United Nations General Assembly of December 16, 1991. He requests that, consequently, the present unconstitutionality action be granted, so that the age provided for in Law No. 7935 be modified and the age of the older adult be established at 60 years.

2.- In order to substantiate the standing (legitimación) he holds to bring this acción de inconstitucionalidad, the petitioner (actor) claims that he filed a recurso de amparo against the Instituto Nacional de Criminología, in which the Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor is mentioned. He points out that, in addition, the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes that a prior pending case will not be necessary when "it involves the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos), or those that concern the community as a whole," which is fulfilled in this case, given that it concerns a broad sector of the population.

3.- Article 9 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional empowers the Chamber (Sala) to reject, outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its submission, any petition presented for its consideration that proves to be manifestly inadmissible, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is merely a reiteration or reproduction of an earlier, similar, or equal petition that was rejected.

Drafted by Magistrate Jinesta Lobo; and,

Considerando:

I.- ON THE FORMAL PREREQUISITES FOR ADMISSIBILITY AND STANDING (LEGITIMACIÓN) OF THE ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the acción de inconstitucionalidad is a procedure with specific formalities, which, if not met, prevent this Chamber from ruling on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes the prerequisites for the admissibility of acciones de inconstitucionalidad and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in a judicial venue –including recurso de habeas corpus or recurso de amparo– or in the administrative venue –in the procedure for exhausting this channel–, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action –the base matter is not required–, in the following cases: a) when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury; b) it involves the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos), or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los Habitantes. Regarding the requirement of a matter pending resolution, established in the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, this Chamber has explained that, in such a case, the acción de inconstitucionalidad is constituted or configured as:

" (...) a proceeding of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a matter pending resolution is required -whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure for exhausting the administrative channel- to be able to access the constitutional channel, but in such a way that, the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, so that the ruling of the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on that process pending resolution, since it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter (...)". (Judgment No. 4190-95 of 11:33 hrs. of July 28, 1995; the emphasis does not correspond to the original).

Likewise, in judgment No. 1319-1997 of 14:51 hrs. of March 4, 1997, the following was considered:

"(...) Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes as one of the prerequisites for filing an acción de inconstitucionalidad, the existence of a matter pending resolution, as this constitutes the connection point that must exist between the proceeding where the norm deemed unconstitutional is applied, the object of the constitutional proceeding, and the basis that legitimizes the petitioner's claim as a last procedural remedy, in the exercise of the right to constitutional jurisdiction. The rigor in the standing (legitimación) to access constitutional jurisdiction, rather than constituting an obstacle to prevent the control of the constitutionality of laws, constitutes the channel for the right of access to justice, derived from the existence of a "prior matter" that has motivated that discordance or contradiction between the law and the Constitution, to maintain the jurisdictional function -special-, and not distort the purity of the system of relations among the constitutional powers of the State, of which the Chamber is a part, because as an integral part of those, it is not entirely free and unlimited in its actions. For this reason, the acción de inconstitucionalidad requires its existence -the prior matter- as a reasonable means to protect the defense of the right or interest considered injured. However, the reasonableness of the acción de inconstitucionalidad as a means of defense for the petitioner must not be analyzed only within the context of the prior matter, but immersed in the constitutional legal framework that governs the actions of this Chamber. It is not, then, a matter of a particular consideration of the unconstitutionality of a normative provision, to file an action without requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution, but rather, it is necessary to demonstrate that it constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right or interest estimated as injured. (...)"

Based on the cited precedents and this Chamber's jurisprudential line, it is inferred that the action proceeding is, principally, of an incidental nature, therefore a matter pending resolution in the administrative channel –in the administrative challenge procedure against the final act– or judicial channel is required for the action to prosper. Thus, only in exceptional cases established by law will the existence of this requirement not be necessary.

II.- ON THE STANDING (LEGITIMACIÓN) AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE PRESENT ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. As indicated, Article 75, first paragraph, in fine, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional presupposes, for the admissibility of an acción de inconstitucionalidad through the incidental channel, the existence of a main matter pending resolution, either before the tribunals –including habeas corpus or recurso de amparo–, or in the procedure for exhausting the administrative channel, in which that unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. Consistent with the above, this Chamber has repeatedly indicated that when the base matter supporting the submission of an acción de inconstitucionalidad is a recurso de amparo or habeas corpus, for the former to be admissible, these remedies must, in turn, be admissible. Regarding this point, in judgment No. 2004-94 of 15:15 hrs. of April 27, 1994, this Court indicated the following:

"(...) Furthermore, the Chamber cannot fail to note the specific situation raised in the appeal, specifically regarding the possibility granted by Article 75, first paragraph of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, to file an acción de inconstitucionalidad based on a recurso de amparo or habeas corpus pending before it, and it should be noted that for these cases it is absolutely necessary that these are admissible; that is, that it must effectively be a matter in which not only the fundamental rights of persons are at stake, but also that the norms whose unconstitutionality is sought must be applied for its resolution; a manifestly inadmissible recurso de amparo or habeas corpus does not constitute a reasonable means of protecting any right or interest, and therefore a declaration of unconstitutionality cannot be sought within it, as this would imply recognizing, through that channel, the existence in our legal system of a popular action as a prerequisite for standing (legitimación) to access the control of constitutionality of norms, a situation that has been repeatedly rejected, both in specialized doctrine and by this Chamber's own Case Law." (Criterion reaffirmed -among others- in judgments Nos. 2005-94, 416-96, 749-96, 857-96, 2511-96 and 5268-96).

In the present case, the petitioner claims, to substantiate the standing (legitimación) he holds to bring this acción de inconstitucionalidad, that he filed "a Recurso de Amparo against the Instituto Nacional de Criminología, where allusion is made to the Ley del Adulto Mayor". The petitioner does not provide the case file number (número de expediente) assigned to said amparo; however, through the Sistema Costarricense de Gestión de Despachos Judiciales it was possible to determine that such amparo corresponds to No. 16-009870-0007-CO, and that it was rejected outright, through judgment No. 2016-010913 of 09:05 hrs. of July 29, 2016, based on the following order of considerations:

"(...) Regarding the petitioner's allegations and claims, that this Chamber order the Instituto Nacional de Criminología to approve the recommendation of the Consejo Disciplinario of the Center where he is incarcerated to be transferred from area C to D, it must be indicated to the petitioner that in repeated case law this Chamber has determined that everything concerning the transfer or location of persons deprived of liberty in different penitentiary centers is the exclusive competence of the administrative authorities in charge of the execution of the sentence. This Chamber could not substitute the penitentiary administration in its functions and determine –without greater elements of judgment– the correct or most convenient location of the protected party. (...) Therefore, if the petitioner considers that approving the requested relocation proceeds, for meeting the requirements demanded for that purpose, he may raise it -if he deems it appropriate- before the Juez de Ejecución de la Pena who handles the matters of the penitentiary center where he is located (...)"

Therefore, since the cited amparo was declared inadmissible for the reasons already stated, it is not proven that there currently exists, as a basis for this action, a prior matter that can be considered a reasonable or suitable means for the defense of the rights and interests alleged as infringed, in the terms of the cited Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

III.- ON THE ALLEGED EXISTENCE OF COLLECTIVE INTERESTS. To which it is added that it cannot be considered that we are in the presence of a case of diffuse interests (intereses difusos). Upon hearing a case analogous to the present one, in which the defense of the interests of older adults was also alleged, this Court, by judgment No. 2013-014672 of 14:30 hrs. of November 6, 2013, resolved the following:

"I.- OBJECT OF THE ACTION. The petitioner questioned the legislator's omission to regulate a special dismissal process to protect the older adult, in application of the provisions of Article 51 of the Constitución Política. In her opinion, Article 71 of the Constitución Política is unconstitutional, as it does not include, under its scope of protection, older adults.

II.- ON THE FORMAL PREREQUISITES FOR ADMISSIBILITY AND STANDING (LEGITIMACIÓN) OF THE ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. The acción de inconstitucionalidad is a proceeding established for the purpose of guaranteeing the supremacy of the Constitución Política, in the face of norms or other provisions of a general nature. In light of this and, by the express will of the legislator, it is of a highly technical nature, so for its admissibility certain requirements must be strictly met, contrary to what occurs with the remedies of habeas corpus and recurso de amparo, where informality is the rule. Thus, the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional stipulates that to file an acción de inconstitucionalidad, it is necessary that there be a matter pending resolution before the courts, including a recurso de habeas corpus or recurso de amparo, or else, in the procedure for exhausting the administrative channel, in which the unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. On the other hand, the second paragraph of the same article provides, by way of exception, that a prior case pending resolution will not be necessary when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it involves the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or those that concern the community as a whole.

III.- In the present matter [the petitioner] appeared, according to her criterion, in defense of a diffuse interest (interés difuso), such as the well-being and protection of older adults. This Constitutional Court does not consider that this type of interest mediates in the present case. In accordance with what was explained in the previous considerando, the acción de inconstitucionalidad has an eminently incidental nature, so the standing (legitimación) to file it derives, as a general rule, from the existence of a base matter, in which the unconstitutionality of a norm has been invoked, as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. Thus, the hypotheses of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional – referring to the existence of collective or diffuse interests (intereses difusos) – are the exception. As such, they are only applicable when the circumstances of the case - which must be examined in particular - determine the impossibility (or, at least, a manifest improbability) that a base judicial process or administrative procedure could ever be raised. In this sense, in judgment No. 2008-006803 of 17:46 hrs. of April 23, 2008, this Court explained:

"(...) The jurisprudence of this court is unanimous and long-standing in the sense that popular actions are not permitted in our system, to the extent that, if admitted, they would lead to diametrically denying the incidental nature that the action possesses in the design of our current constitutional justice system. Indeed, Article 75 of the Law governing this jurisdiction establishes that, as a rule, the admissibility of an acción de inconstitucionalidad is conditioned on the existence of a prior matter pending resolution, in which the non-application of the challenged norm or norms has been invoked, so that the lawsuit serves as a reasonable means for the protection of the right or interest estimated as injured. In light of that incidental nature, it is important to underline that the hypotheses in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of this jurisdiction do not constitute alternatives, but rather exceptions to the aforementioned general rule that requires the existence of a prior matter pending resolution as the foundation of the action. As such, they are only applicable when the circumstances of the case –which must be examined individually– determine the impossibility (or, at least, a manifest improbability) that a base process, judicial or administrative, could ever be raised, initiated on the grounds of or occasioned by an individual and direct injury caused by the application of the challenged provisions (...)" (the emphasis does not belong to the original) (criterion reiterated, among others, in judgments Nos. 2008 – 015448 of 14:54 hrs. of October 15, 2008, 2010 – 011346 of 14:59 hrs. of June 29, 2010, 2011 – 1633 of 14:47 hrs. of February 9, 2011 and, 2013 – 001420 of 14:30 hrs. of January 30, 2013).

In the present case, more than being before a diffuse interest, we are before an individual interest that can be protected within the framework of an administrative procedure or jurisdictional process, in which the dismissal of an older adult is discussed, for being supposedly discriminatory, as it was carried out due to age reasons. Based on this procedure or process, an acción de inconstitucionalidad could perfectly well be filed. This being the case, the promoter cannot be considered to have standing (legitimación) to formulate the present acción de inconstitucionalidad." Considerations that are applicable to the case under study, as, in the specific matter, more than being in the presence of a diffuse interest, what is ultimately sought is to question the specific location of the petitioner within the penitentiary system (as confirmed by reading the amparo No. 16-009870-0007-CO), clearly in protection of his individual interest. A location within the penitentiary system that can be elucidated within the framework of an administrative procedure or a jurisdictional process, which can constitute the base matter for a potential acción de inconstitucionalidad. Finally, it should be noted that this Chamber has specified –in various votes– that, through the expression "interests that concern the community as a whole", contained in the cited article 75, second paragraph, the "legislator meant to refer to the standing (legitimación) held by a corporate entity, when it acts through its representatives in defense of the rights and interests of the persons who constitute its associative base and provided that it involves the challenge of norms or provisions that affect that nucleus of rights or interests that constitutes the reason for being and the unifying factor of the group" (judgment No. 2014-20446 of 09:30 hrs. of December 17, 2014). Which is also not fulfilled in the case under study. Therefore, definitively, none of the cases of direct standing (legitimación directa) provided for in the second paragraph of the referenced numeral 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional is configured.

IV.- IN CONCLUSION. By virtue of the foregoing, it is appropriate to reject this action outright, as so ordered.

</sub></span><span lang=EN style='mso-fareast-font-family:\r\n\"Times New Roman\";mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> </div> <p align=center style='text-align:center'><b>_{<span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN'>Therefore:</span>}</b><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p>_{<span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</span>}<span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span>_{<span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN'>The action is rejected outright.&nbsp; </span>}<span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <div> <p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN style='mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> </div> <p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'><span lang=EN style='mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN'>&nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p> <div style='margin-left:-5.65pt'>

</div> <p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'><span lang=EN style='mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'><span lang=EN style='mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal>_{<span lang=EN style='font-size:8.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN'>Digitally Signed Document</span>}<span lang=EN style='mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language: EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal>_{<span lang=EN style='font-size:8.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN'>-- Verification code --</span>}<span lang=EN style='mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language: EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal>_{<span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"WASP 39 L"; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN'>*RGQDT2QWYXA61*</span>}<span lang=EN style='mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language: EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal>_{<span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN'>&nbsp;RGQDT2QWYXA61 </span>}<span lang=EN style='mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal align=right style='text-align:right'><b>_{<span lang=EN style='font-size:8.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language: EN'>FILE N° 16-010088-0007-CO </span>}</b><span lang=EN style='mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN style='mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <div style='border:none;border-top:solid #010101 1.0pt;mso-border-top-alt:solid #010101 .25pt; padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 0cm'> <div style='margin-top:1.0pt'> <p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'>_{<span lang=EN style='font-size:8.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language: EN'>Telephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional.</span>}<span lang=EN style='mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> Building Supreme Court of Justice, San José, Catedral District, González Lahmann Neighborhood, streets 19 and 21, avenues 8 and 6 "… in this case, rather than being in the presence of a diffuse interest, what is ultimately sought is to challenge the specific placement of the petitioner within the prison system (as confirmed by reading amparo No. 16-009870-0007-CO), clearly in protection of his individual interest. Placement within the prison system that can be resolved within the framework of an administrative procedure or a judicial proceeding, which can serve as the underlying matter for a potential acción de inconstitucionalidad (constitutional challenge). Finally, it should be noted that this Chamber has specified –in various rulings– that, through the expression "interests that concern the community as a whole" The text in the cited section 75, second paragraph, states that the “legislator intended to refer to the standing held by a corporate entity, when it acts through its representatives in defense of the rights and interests of the persons who make up its membership base, and provided that it involves the challenging of norms or provisions that affect that core of rights or interests that constitutes the reason for being and the binding factor of the group” (judgment No.

2014-20446 of 09:30 hrs. on December 17, 2014). Which is also not satisfied in the case under study. Therefore, in definitive, none of the grounds for direct legal standing provided for in the second paragraph of the aforementioned numeral 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional are configured…” *160100880007CO* **Exp: 16-010088-0007-CO** **Res. Nº 2016011332** **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at ten hours forty minutes on August ten, two thousand sixteen.** An action of unconstitutionality brought by **ELADIO TACSAN RUÍZ**, identity card No. 0501490049, against Article 2 of the Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor.

**Whereas:** **1.-** By written brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 11:00 hrs. on August 1, 2016, the petitioner requests that the unconstitutionality of Article 2 of the Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor be declared, regarding the age established in that normative body for considering a person as an older adult. He indicates, to that effect, that the challenged norm establishes that an older adult (persona adulta mayor) is defined as “[a]ny person sixty-five years of age or older”. He alleges that setting such an age contravenes the age established by the World Health Organization and the United Nations for defining elderly persons. He affirms that, according to the World Health Organization, persons from 60 to 74 years of age are considered of advanced age, from 75 to 90 years are old or elderly, those who exceed 90 years are called great old or great long-lived, and every individual over 60 years of age shall be called, indistinctly, an elderly person (persona de la tercera edad). He maintains that the United Nations considers as elderly any person over 65 years of age for developed countries and 60 years for developing countries, as is the case of Costa Rica.

Refers to the 49th Directing Council and 61st Session of the Regional Committee, of the Pan American Health Organization and the World Health Organization, held in Washington D.C. (USA), from September 28 to October 2, 2009. Refers, also, to the United Nations Principles for Older Persons, approved by resolution A/RES/46/91 of the General Assembly of the United Nations of December 16, 1991. Requests that, consequently, this action of unconstitutionality be admitted, so that the age provided for in Law No. 7935 be modified and the age of the older adult be established at 60 years.

**2.-** In order to substantiate the standing he holds to bring this action of unconstitutionality, the plaintiff alleges that he filed an amparo appeal against the National Institute of Criminology (Instituto Nacional de Criminología), in which reference is made to the Integral Law for the Older Adult (Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor). He points out that, furthermore, the second paragraph of article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes that a prior case pending resolution is not necessary when "*it concerns the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos), or those that concern the community as a whole*", which is fulfilled in this case, given that it concerns a broad sector of the population.

**3.-** Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition brought to its attention that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a mere reiteration or reproduction of a previous equal or similar petition already rejected.

Drafted by Magistrate **Jinesta Lobo**; and, **Considering:** **I.- ON THE FORMAL REQUIREMENTS OF ADMISSIBILITY AND STANDING FOR THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.** This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the action of unconstitutionality is a procedure with certain formalities, which, if not met, make it impossible for this Chamber to rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes the requirements of admissibility for actions of unconstitutionality and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in a judicial venue – including habeas corpus or amparo appeals – or in the administrative venue – in the procedure for exhausting this route – in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right considered injured in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action – the underlying matter is not required – in the following cases: a) when by the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury; b) it concerns the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos), or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contralor General de la República), the Prosecutor General of the Republic (Fiscal General de la República) and the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes). Regarding the requirement of a matter pending resolution, established in the first paragraph of article 75 of the Law that governs this Jurisdiction, this Chamber has explained that, in such a case, the action of unconstitutionality is constituted or configured as:

"(...) *a proceeding of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a matter pending resolution is required -whether before the courts or in the procedure for exhausting the administrative route- to be able to access the constitutional route, but in such a way that **the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on said pending process**, since it manifests on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter* (...)" . (Judgment No. 4190-95 of 11:33 hrs. of July 28, 1995; the emphasis does not correspond to the original).

Likewise, in judgment No. 1319-1997 of 14:51 hrs. of March 4, 1997, the following was considered:

"(…) *Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes as one of the requirements for filing an action of unconstitutionality, the existence of a matter pending resolution, as it constitutes the connecting point that must exist between the proceeding in which the norm deemed unconstitutional is applied with the object of the constitutional process and the basis that legitimizes the plaintiff's claim as a last procedural remedy, in the exercise of the right to constitutional jurisdiction. The rigor in standing to access constitutional jurisdiction, more than constituting an obstacle to prevent the control of the constitutionality of laws, constitutes the channel of the right of access to justice, derived from the existence of a 'prior matter' that has motivated that discordance or contradiction between the law and the Constitution, to maintain the jurisdictional function -special-, and not distort the purity of the system of relations of the constitutional powers of the State, of which the Chamber is a part, because as a member of those, it is not entirely free and unlimited in its actions. For this reason, the action of unconstitutionality needs its existence -of the prior matter- as a reasonable means to protect the defense of the right or interest that is considered injured. However, the reasonableness of the action of unconstitutionality as a means of defense for the plaintiff should not be analyzed only within the context of the prior matter, but immersed in the constitutional legal framework that governs the actions of this Chamber. It is not, then, a particular consideration of the unconstitutionality of a normative provision to file an action without requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution, but rather, it is necessary to demonstrate that it constitutes a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest that is deemed injured.* (…)" Based on the cited precedents and the jurisprudential line of this Chamber, it is inferred that the action proceeding is, principally, of an incidental nature, which is why a matter pending resolution in the administrative venue – in the administrative procedure of challenge against the final act – or judicial venue is required for the action to proceed. Thus, only in exceptional cases established by law, will the existence of that requirement not be necessary.

**II.- ON STANDING AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE PRESENT ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.** As indicated, article 75, first paragraph, *in fine*, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) presupposes, for purposes of the admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality via the incidental route, the existence of a main matter pending resolution, whether before the courts – including habeas corpus or amparo – or in the procedure for exhausting the administrative route, in which that unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. In accordance with the foregoing, this Chamber has repeatedly indicated that when the underlying matter on which the filing of an action of unconstitutionality is based is an amparo or habeas corpus appeal, for the former to be admissible, these appeals must, in turn, be admissible. Regarding this point, in judgment No. 2004-94 of 15:15 hrs. of April 27, 1994, this Court indicated the following:

"(...) *Furthermore, the Chamber cannot fail to note the concrete situation raised in the appeal, specifically regarding the possibility granted by article 75, first paragraph of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), to file an action of unconstitutionality based on an amparo or habeas corpus appeal pending before it, and it must be indicated that for these cases it is absolutely necessary that these be admissible; that is, that it effectively concerns a matter in which not only fundamental rights of persons are at stake, but also that for its resolution the norms whose unconstitutionality is sought must be applied; a manifestly improper amparo or habeas corpus does not constitute a reasonable means of protecting any right or interest, and therefore a declaration of unconstitutionality cannot be sought within it, as this would imply recognizing, by this means, the existence in our legal system of a popular action as a requirement of standing for access to the control of constitutionality of norms, a situation that has been repeatedly rejected, both in specialized doctrine, and in the Jurisprudence of this Chamber itself.*" (Criterion reaffirmed -among others- in judgments Nos. 2005-94, 416-96, 749-96, 857-96, 2511-96 and 5268-96).

In the present case, the plaintiff alleges, for the purpose of substantiating the standing he holds to bring this action of unconstitutionality, that he filed "*an Amparo Appeal against the National Institute of Criminology (Instituto Nacional de Criminología), where reference is made to the Law of the Older Adult (Ley del Adulto Mayor)*". The plaintiff does not provide the case file number assigned to said amparo; however, by means of the Costa Rican Judicial Offices Management System (Sistema Costarricense de Gestión de Despachos Judiciales) it was possible to determine that such amparo corresponds to No. 16-009870-0007-CO, as well as that it was rejected outright, by judgment No. 2016-010913 of 09:05 hrs. of July 29, 2016, based on the following order of considerations:

"(…) *Regarding the allegations and claims of the appellant, that this Chamber order the National Institute of Criminology (Instituto Nacional de Criminología) to approve the recommendation of the Disciplinary Council of the Center where he is incarcerated to be transferred from Area C to D, it must be pointed out to the appellant that in repeated jurisprudence this Chamber has determined that everything concerning the transfer or placement of persons deprived of liberty in the different prison centers is the exclusive competence of the administrative authorities in charge of the execution of the sentence. This Chamber could not substitute the prison administration in its functions and determine – without greater elements of judgment – the correct or most convenient placement of the protected party.* (…) *Therefore, if the appellant considers that it is appropriate to approve the requested relocation, for meeting the required requisites for that purpose, he may raise it - if he so wishes - before the Judge of Execution of the Sentence (Juez de Ejecución de la Pena) who hears the matters of the prison center where he is located* (…)" Therefore, having declared the cited amparo inadmissible, for the reasons already stated, it is not accredited that there currently exists, as a basis for this action, a prior matter that can be deemed a reasonable or suitable means for the defense of the rights and interests alleged as infringed, in the terms of the cited article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

**III.- ON THE ALLEGED EXISTENCE OF COLLECTIVE INTERESTS (INTERESES COLECTIVOS).** To which it is added that it cannot be considered that there is a case of diffuse interests (intereses difusos). When hearing a case analogous to the present one, in which the defense of the interests of older adults was also alleged, this Court, by judgment No. 2013-014672 of 14:30 hrs. of November 6, 2013, resolved the following:

"**I.- OBJECT OF THE ACTION.** The plaintiff questioned the legislator's omission to regulate a special dismissal procedure that protects the older adult, in application of the provisions of article 51 of the Political Constitution. In her view, article 71 of the Political Constitution is unconstitutional, as it does not include, under its scope of protection, older adults.

**II.- ON THE FORMAL REQUIREMENTS OF ADMISSIBILITY AND STANDING FOR THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.** The action of unconstitutionality is a proceeding established with the purpose of guaranteeing the supremacy of the Political Constitution, against norms or other provisions of a general nature. As a result of this and, by the express will of the legislator, it is of a high technical degree, so for its admissibility certain requirements must be strictly met, contrary to what occurs with habeas corpus and amparo appeals, in which informality is the rule. Thus, the first paragraph of article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) stipulates that to file an action of unconstitutionality it is necessary that there be a matter pending resolution before the courts, including a habeas corpus or amparo appeal, or, alternatively, in the procedure for exhausting the administrative route, in which the unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered injured. On the other hand, the second paragraph of the same article provides, by way of exception, that the prior case pending resolution shall not be necessary when by the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or those that concern the community as a whole.

**III.-** In the present matter [the plaintiff] appeared, according to her view, in defense of a diffuse interest (interés difuso), such as the well-being and protection of older adults. This Constitutional Court does not consider that such interests are present in this case. In accordance with what was explained in the preceding considering, the action of unconstitutionality has an eminently incidental nature, so the standing to file it derives, **as a general rule**,* from the existence of an underlying matter, in which the unconstitutionality of a norm has been invoked, as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered injured. Thus, the hypotheses of the second paragraph of article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) – referring to the existence of collective interests (intereses colectivos) or diffuse interests (intereses difusos) – are the exception. As such, they are only applicable when the circumstances of the case - which must be examined individually - determine the impossibility (or, at least, a manifest improbability) that a base judicial process or administrative procedure could be raised. In this sense, in judgment No. 2008-006803 of 17:46 hrs. of April 23, 2008, this Court explained:

"(…) The jurisprudence of this court is settled and long-standing in the sense that popular actions are not permitted in our system, insofar as, if admitted, they would lead to diametrically denying the incidental nature that the action possesses in the design of our current constitutional justice system. Indeed, article 75 of the Law governing this jurisdiction establishes that, as a rule, the admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality is conditioned on the existence of a prior matter pending resolution, in which the inapplicability of the challenged norm or norms has been invoked, so that the lawsuit serves as a reasonable means for the protection of the right or interest deemed injured. **In view of that incidental nature, it is important to emphasize that the hypotheses of the second paragraph of article 75 of the Law of this jurisdiction do not constitute alternatives, but rather exceptions to the aforementioned general rule that requires the existence of a prior matter pending resolution as the basis of the action. As such, they are only applicable when the circumstances of the case – which must be examined individually – determine the impossibility (or, at least, a manifest improbability) that a base process, judicial or administrative, could arise, brought on the grounds or on the occasion of an individual and direct injury caused by the application of the challenged provisions** (…)" (the emphasis does not belong to the original) (criterion reiterated, among others, in judgments Nos. 2008 – 015448 of 14:54 hrs. of October 15, 2008, 2010 – 011346 of 14:59 hrs. of June 29, 2010, 2011 – 1633 of 14:47 hrs. of February 9, 2011 and, 2013 – 001420 of 14:30 hrs. of January 30, 2013).

In the present case, rather than being faced with a diffuse interest (interés difuso), we are faced with an individual interest that can be protected within the framework of an administrative procedure or jurisdictional process, in which the dismissal of an older adult is discussed, for being supposedly discriminatory, being carried out on the grounds of age. Based on this procedure or process, the action of unconstitutionality could perfectly well be filed. Thus, the petitioner cannot be considered to have standing to formulate this action of unconstitutionality.

" Considerations that are applicable to the case under study, because, in the specific case, rather than being in the presence of a diffuse interest (interés difuso), what is sought, fundamentally, is to question the specific placement of the plaintiff within the penitentiary system (as confirmed by reading amparo No. 16-009870-0007-CO), clearly in safeguard of his individual interest. Placement within the penitentiary system that can be elucidated within the framework of an administrative procedure or a jurisdictional process, which can constitute the underlying matter for an eventual action of unconstitutionality. Finally, it must be noted that this Chamber has specified – in various decisions – that, through the expression "*interests that concern the community as a whole*" , contained in the cited article 75, second paragraph, the "*legislator intended to refer to the standing held by a corporate entity, when it acts through its representatives in defense of the rights and interests of the persons that make up its associative base and provided that it concerns the questioning of norms or provisions that affect that core of rights or interests that constitutes the raison d'être and the binding factor of the group* " (judgment No. 2014-20446 of 09:30 hrs. of December 17, 2014). Which is also not fulfilled in the case under study. Therefore, definitively, none of the cases of direct standing provided for in the second paragraph of the referenced numeral 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) are configured.

**IV.- IN CONCLUSION.** By virtue of the foregoing, it is appropriate to reject this action outright, as is hereby ordered.

Therefore:

The action is flatly dismissed.

Digitally Signed Document -- Verification Code -- *RGQDT2QWYXA61* **EXPEDIENTE N° 16-010088-0007-CO** Telephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6

*160100880007CO* Res. Nº 2016011332 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las diez horas cuarenta minutos del diez de agosto de dos mil dieciseis .

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por ELADIO TACSAN RUÍZ, cédula de identidad No. 0501490049, contra el artículo 2 de la Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 11 hrs. del 01 de agosto de 2016, el accionante solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del artículo 2 de la Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor, en cuanto a la edad establecida en dicho cuerpo normativo, para considerar a una persona como adulto mayor. Indica, al efecto, que la norma cuestionada establece que se define como persona adulta mayor a “[t]oda persona de sesenta y cinco años o más ”. Alega que la fijación de tal edad contraviene la edad establecida por la Organización Mundial de la Salud y la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para definir a las personas de la tercera edad. Afirma que, según la Organización Mundial de la Salud, las personas de 60 a 74 años de edad son consideradas de edad avanzada, de 75 a 90 años son viejas o ancianas, las que sobrepasan los 90 años son denominadas grandes viejos o grandes longevos y a todo individuo mayor de 60 años se le llamará, de forma indistinta, persona de la tercera edad. Sostiene que las Naciones Unidas considera anciano a toda persona mayor de 65 años de edad para países desarrollados y de 60 años para los países en desarrollo, tal y como es el caso de Costa Rica. Remite al 49.o Consejo Directivo y 61.a Sesión del Comité Regional, de la Organización Panamericana de la Salud y de la Organización Mundial de la Salud, realizados en Washington D.C. (EUA), del 28 de setiembre al 2 de octubre de 2009. Remite, también, a los Principios de las Naciones Unidas a favor de las Personas de Edad, aprobados por resolución A/RES/46/91 de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas del 16 de diciembre de 1991. Solicita que, en consecuencia, se acoja la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, a fin que se modifique la edad prevista en la Ley No. 7935 y se establezca la edad de la persona adulta mayor en 60 años.

2.- A efecto de fundamentar la legitimación que ostenta para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, el actor alega que presentó un recurso de amparo contra el Instituto Nacional de Criminología, en el que se hace alusión a la Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor. Señala que, además, el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece que no será necesario caso previo pendiente de resolución cuando “se trata de la defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto”, lo que se cumple en este caso, dado que atañe a un amplio sector de la población.

3.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar rechazada.

Redacta el Magistrado Jinesta Lobo; y,

Considerando:

I.- SOBRE LOS PRESUPUESTOS FORMALES DE ADMISIBILIDAD Y LEGITIMACIÓN DE LA ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. Esta Sala ha señalado, de forma reiterada, que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es un procedimiento con determinadas formalidades, que, si no se reúnen, imposibilitan que esta Sala se pronuncie sobre el fondo del asunto. En el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional se establecen los presupuestos de admisibilidad para las acciones de inconstitucionalidad y se regulan situaciones distintas. En el párrafo primero se exige la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sea en sede judicial –incluyendo los recursos de hábeas corpus o de amparo- o en la administrativa –en el procedimiento de agotamiento de esta vía-, en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho que se considera lesionado en el asunto principal. En los párrafos segundo y tercero se regula la acción directa –no se requiere del asunto base-, en los siguientes supuestos: a) cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa; b) se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto; y c) cuando la acción sea promovida por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes. En cuanto a la exigencia del asunto pendiente de resolver, establecida en el párrafo primero del artículo 75 la Ley que rige esta Jurisdicción, esta Sala ha explicado que, en tal supuesto, la acción de inconstitucionalidad se constituye o configura como:

“(...) un proceso de naturaleza incidental, y no de una acción directa o popular, con lo que se quiere decir que se requiere de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver -sea ante los tribunales de justicia o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa- para poder acceder a la vía constitucional, pero de tal manera que, la acción constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho considerado lesionado en el asunto principal, de manera que lo resuelto por el Tribunal Constitucional repercuta positiva o negativamente en dicho proceso pendiente de resolver, por cuanto se manifiesta sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas que deberán ser aplicadas en dicho asunto (...)” . (Sentencia No. 4190-95 de las 11:33 hrs. de 28 de julio de 1995; lo destacado no corresponde al original).

Asimismo, en la sentencia No. 1319-1997 de las 14:51 hrs. de 4 de marzo de 1997, se consideró lo siguiente:

“(…) El artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece como uno de los presupuestos para interponer la acción de inconstitucionalidad, la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, por constituir el punto de conexión que ha de existir entre el proceso en que se aplica la norma que se reputa inconstitucional con el objeto del proceso constitucional y el fundamento que legitima la pretensión del accionante como último remedio procesal, en el ejercicio del derecho a la jurisdicción constitucional. El rigor en la legitimación para acceder a la jurisdicción constitucional, más que constituir un obstáculo para impedir el control de la constitucionalidad de las leyes, constituye el cauce del derecho de acceso a la justicia, derivado de la existencia de un "asunto previo" que haya motivado aquella discordancia o contradicción entre la ley y la Constitución, para mantener la función jurisdiccional -especial-, y no distorsionar la pureza del sistema de relación de los poderes constitucionales del Estado, del que es parte la Sala, porque como integrante de aquellos, no es enteramente libre e ilimitada en sus acciones. Por esta causa, es que la acción de inconstitucionalidad necesita de su existencia -del asunto previo- como medio razonable para amparar la defensa del derecho o interés que se considera lesionado. Empero, la razonabilidad de la acción de inconstitucionalidad como medio de defensa del accionante no debe analizarse solo dentro del contexto del asunto previo, sino inmersa en el marco jurídico constitucional que rige las actuaciones de esta Sala. No se trata, entonces, de una consideración particular de la inconstitucionalidad de una disposición normativa, para interponer una acción sin requerir la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sino, que es necesario que se demuestre que constituye un medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se estima lesionado. (…)” Con fundamento en los precedentes citados y la línea jurisprudencial de esta Sala, se colige que el proceso de acción es, principalmente, de naturaleza incidental, por lo que se requiere de un asunto pendiente de resolver en vía administrativa –en el procedimiento administrativo de impugnación contra el acto final- o judicial, para que prospere la acción. De esta manera, solo en casos excepcionales que la ley establece, no será necesaria la existencia de ese requisito.

II.- SOBRE LA LEGITIMACIÓN Y LA ADMISIBILIDAD DE LA PRESENTE ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. Según se indicó, el artículo 75, párrafo primero, in fine, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional presupone, para efectos de la admisibilidad de una acción de inconstitucionalidad por la vía incidental, la existencia de un asunto principal pendiente de resolver, ya sea ante los tribunales –inclusive de hábeas corpus o de amparo-, o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa, en que se invoque esa inconstitucionalidad como medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considere lesionado. En consonancia con lo anterior, esta Sala ha señalado, de forma reiterada, que cuando el asunto base en que se apoya la presentación de una acción de inconstitucionalidad sea un recurso de amparo o de hábeas corpus, para que aquella sea procedente, estos recursos deben ser, a su vez, admisibles. Respecto a este punto, en sentencia No. 2004-94 de las 15:15 hrs. del 27 de abril de 1994, este Tribunal indicó lo siguiente:

“(...) Por otra parte, la Sala no puede dejar de advertir la situación concreta planteada en el recurso, específicamente en lo que se refiere a la posibilidad que otorga el artículo 75 párrafo primero de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, de interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad sobre la base de un recurso de amparo o de hábeas corpus pendiente ante ella, debiendo indicarse que para estos casos es absolutamente necesario que éstos sean admisibles; es decir, que efectivamente se trate de un asunto en el que estén de por medio no sólo derechos fundamentales de las personas, sino también que para su resolución hayan de aplicarse las normas cuya inconstitucionalidad se pretende; un amparo o hábeas corpus manifiestamente improcedente no constituye medio razonable de amparar ningún derecho o interés, y por ello no puede pretenderse dentro de aquél una declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad, pues ello implicaría reconocer, por esa vía, la existencia en nuestro ordenamiento de una acción popular como presupuesto de legitimación para el acceso al control de constitucionalidad de las normas, situación que en reiteradas oportunidades se ha sido rechazado, tanto en la doctrina especializada, como la propia Jurisprudencia de esta Sala.” (Criterio reafirmado -entre otras- en sentencias Nos. 2005-94, 416-96, 749-96, 857-96, 2511-96 y 5268-96).

En el presente caso, el accionante alega, para efectos de fundamentar la legitimación que ostenta para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, que presentó “un Recurso de Amparo contra el Instituto Nacional de Criminología, donde se hace alusión a la Ley del Adulto Mayor”. El accionante no aporta el número de expediente asignado a dicho amparo; sin embargo, por medio del Sistema Costarricense de Gestión de Despachos Judiciales se pudo determinar que tal amparo corresponde al No. 16-009870-0007-CO, así como que este se rechazó de plano, mediante sentencia No. 2016-010913 de las 09:05 hrs. del 29 de julio de 2016, con sustento en el siguiente orden de consideraciones:

“(…) Con respecto a los alegatos y pretensiones del recurrente, de que esta Sala ordene al Instituto Nacional de Criminología aprobar la recomendación del Consejo Disciplinario del Centro en que se encuentra recluido para ser trasladado del ámbito C al D, debe indicarse al recurrente que en reiterada jurisprudencia esta Sala ha determinado que todo lo concerniente al traslado o ubicación de privados de libertad en los distintos centros penales, es competencia exclusiva de las autoridades administrativas encargadas de la ejecución de la pena. No podría esta Sala sustituir a la administración penitenciaria en sus funciones y determinar –sin mayores elementos de juicio- la correcta o más conveniente ubicación del amparado. (…) Por ende, si el recurrente estima que procede aprobar la reubicación solicitada, por cumplir con los requisitos exigidos al efecto, podrá plantearlo -sí a bien lo tiene- ante el Juez de Ejecución de la Pena que conozca de los asuntos del centro penitenciario en que se encuentra ubicado (…)” Por ende, al haberse declarado inadmisible el citado amparo, por las razones ya expuestas, no se acredita que exista, actualmente y como base de esta acción, un asunto previo que pueda estimarse como medio razonable o idóneo para la defensa de los derechos e intereses que se alegan como infringidos, en los términos del citado artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

III.- SOBRE LA ALEGADA EXISTENCIA DE INTERESES COLECTIVOS. A lo que se agrega que no puede estimarse que se esté en presencia de un supuesto de intereses difusos. Al conocer de un caso análogo al presente, en el que se alegaba, también, la defensa de los intereses de las personas adultas mayores, este Tribunal, por sentencia No. 2013-014672 de las 14:30 hrs. del 06 de noviembre de 2013, resolvió lo siguiente:

“I.- OBJETO DE LA ACCIÓN. La accionante cuestionó la omisión del legislador de regular un proceso especial de despido que proteja al adulto mayor, en aplicación de lo dispuesto por el artículo 51 de la Constitución Política. En su criterio el artículo 71 de la Constitución Política es inconstitucional, pues no incluye, bajo su ámbito de protección, a los adultos y adultas mayores.

II.- SOBRE LOS PRESUPUESTOS FORMALES DE ADMISIBILIDAD Y LEGITIMACIÓN DE LA ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. La acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso instaurado con el propósito de garantizar la supremacía de la Constitución Política, frente a normas u otras disposiciones de carácter general. En función de esto y, por voluntad admisibilidad se deben cumplir de manera estricta, ciertos requisitos, contrario a lo que ocurre a los recursos de hábeas corpus y de amparo, en los cuales la informalidad es la regla. Así, el párrafo primero del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional estipula que para interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad es necesario que exista un asunto pendiente de resolver ante los tribunales, inclusive un recurso de hábeas corpus o de amparo, o bien, en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa, en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se considere lesionado. De otra parte, el segundo párrafo del mismo ordinal dispone, a modo de excepción, que no será necesario el caso previo pendiente de resolución cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto.

III.- En el presente asunto [la accionante] se apersonó, según su criterio, en defensa de un interés difuso, como lo es el bienestar y la protección de las personas adultas mayores. Este Tribunal Constitucional no considera que en el presente caso medien ese tipo de intereses. De acuerdo con lo explicado en el considerando anterior, la acción de inconstitucionalidad tiene una naturaleza eminentemente incidental, por lo que la legitimación para interponerla deriva, por regla general, de la existencia de un asunto base, en el cual se haya invocado la inconstitucionalidad de una norma, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado. Así, las hipótesis del párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional – referente a la existencia de intereses colectivos o difusos – son la excepción. Como tales, solamente resultan aplicables cuando las circunstancias del caso - mismas que deben ser examinadas en particular - determinen la imposibilidad (o, al menos, una manifiesta improbabilidad) de que pueda llegar a plantearse un proceso judicial o procedimiento administrativo base. En este sentido, en la sentencia No. 2008-006803 de las 17:46 hrs. de 23 de abril de 2008, este Tribunal explicó:

“(…) La jurisprudencia de este tribunal es pacífica y de larga data en el sentido de que las acciones populares no están permitidas en nuestro medio, en la medida en que, de admitirse, conducirían a negar diametralmente el carácter incidental que posee la acción en el diseño de nuestro sistema de justicia constitucional vigente. En efecto, el artículo 75 de la Ley que rige esta jurisdicción establece que, como regla, la admisibilidad de una acción de inconstitucionalidad está condicionada a la existencia de un asunto previo pendiente de resolver, en el que se haya invocado la inaplicabilidad de la norma o normas impugnadas, de modo que la demanda sirva como un medio razonable para la tutela del derecho o interés que se estima lesionado. En atención a esa naturaleza incidental, es importante subrayar que las hipótesis del párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de esta jurisdicción no constituyen alternativas, sino excepciones a la mencionada regla general que exige la existencia de un asunto previo pendiente de resolver como fundamento de la acción. Como tales, solo resultan aplicables cuando las circunstancias del caso –que deben ser examinadas individualmente- determinan la imposibilidad (o, al menos, una manifiesta improbabilidad) de que pueda llegar a plantearse un proceso base, judicial o administrativo, entablado con motivo o con ocasión de una lesión individual y directa causada por la aplicación de las disposiciones impugnadas (…)” (el énfasis no pertenece al original) (criterio reiterado, entre otras, en las sentencias Nos. 2008 – 015448 de las 14:54 hrs. de 15 de octubre de 2008, 2010 – 011346 de las 14:59 hrs. de 29 de junio de 2010, 2011 – 1633 de las 14:47 hrs. de 9 de febrero de 2011 y, 2013 – 001420 de las 14:30 hrs. de 30 de enero de 2013).

En el presente caso, más que encontrarnos ante un interés difuso, estamos ante un interés individual que puede ser tutelado en el marco de un procedimiento administrativo o proceso jurisdiccional, en los cuales se discuta el despido de una adulta o adulto mayor, por ser supuestamente discriminatorio, al efectuarse por razones de edad. A partir de este procedimiento o proceso, perfectamente podría interponerse la acción de inconstitucionalidad. Así las cosas, no puede tenerse a la promovente por legitimada para formular la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad.” Consideraciones que son aplicables al caso en estudio, pues, en la especie, más que estarse en presencia de un interés difuso, lo que se pretende, en el fondo, es cuestionar la concreta ubicación del accionante dentro del sistema penitenciario (según se confirma con la lectura del amparo No. 16-009870-0007-CO), en resguardo, claramente, de su interés individual. Ubicación dentro del sistema penitenciario que puede ser dilucidado en el marco de un procedimiento administrativo o de un proceso jurisdiccional, que puede constituirse en asunto base de una eventual acción de inconstitucionalidad. Finalmente, debe señalarse que esta Sala ha precisado –en diversos votos- que, a través de la expresión "intereses que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto ", contenida en el citado ordinal 75, párrafo segundo, el “legislador quiso referirse a la legitimación que ostenta una entidad corporativa, cuando actúa por intermedio de sus representantes en defensa de los derechos e intereses de las personas que conforman su base asociativa y siempre y cuando se trate del cuestionamiento de normas o disposiciones que incidan en aquel núcleo de derechos o intereses que constituye la razón de ser y el factor aglutinante de la agrupación ” (sentencia No. 2014-20446 de las 09:30 hrs. del 17 de diciembre de 2014). Lo que tampoco se cumple en el caso en estudio. Por lo que, en definitiva, no se configura alguno de los supuestos de legitimación directa previstos en el párrafo segundo del referido numeral 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

IV.- EN CONCLUSIÓN. En virtud de lo expuesto, procede rechazar de plano esta acción, como así se dispone.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza de plano la acción.

Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V.

Paul Rueda L.

Nancy Hernández L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jose Paulino Hernández G.

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