← Environmental Law Center← Centro de Derecho Ambiental
Res. 09960-2016 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 15/07/2016
OutcomeResultado
The Constitutional Court rules that the bill for the Minamata Convention on Mercury contains no essential procedural defects or unconstitutional provisions.La Sala Constitucional dictamina que el proyecto de ley del Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio no contiene vicios esenciales de procedimiento ni disposiciones inconstitucionales.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Court responds to the mandatory legislative consultation on the bill for the 'Minamata Convention on Mercury' (legislative file No. 19,426). The court analyzes the legislative procedure and the treaty's content. Regarding the procedure, the Court concludes that there were no substantial procedural flaws to invalidate it, even though the Committee issued its report before receiving all non-mandatory consultation responses and reconsidered a matter that had already been discussed in the same session. The consultations were discretionary and did not prejudice any rights. On the merits, the convention is found to be consistent with the Constitution, particularly Articles 21 and 50, as it aims to protect human health and the environment from mercury emissions. The Court considers that the obligations assumed do not entail extraordinary financial burdens and respect domestic law. The opinion evacuates the consultation, stating that the bill contains no essential procedural flaws or unconstitutional provisions.La Sala Constitucional evacúa la consulta legislativa preceptiva sobre el proyecto de ley 'Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio' (expediente N° 19.426). El tribunal analiza el procedimiento legislativo seguido y el contenido del convenio. En cuanto al trámite, la Sala concluye que no se produjeron vicios sustanciales que lo invaliden, pese a que la Comisión dictaminó el proyecto antes de recibir todos los informes de consultas no obligatorias y volvió sobre un asunto ya conocido en la misma sesión. Las consultas eran discrecionales y no perjudicaron derechos. Sobre el fondo, el convenio se considera conforme con la Constitución Política, particularmente con los artículos 21 y 50, al buscar proteger la salud humana y el medio ambiente de las emisiones de mercurio. La Sala estima que las obligaciones asumidas no implican cargas financieras extraordinarias y respetan el ordenamiento interno. El dictamen evacúa la consulta en el sentido de que el proyecto no contiene vicios esenciales de procedimiento ni disposiciones inconstitucionales.
Key excerptExtracto clave
In accordance with Article 98 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, this Constitutional Court reviewed the legislative procedure for processing the bill called 'Minamata Convention on Mercury,' finding that no substantial or significant defect has occurred that could invalidate it due to a breach of essential principles such as democratic participation, political representation, respect for minorities, or publicity and transparency. (...) By virtue of the foregoing, the consultation is evacuated in the sense that the bill in question contains no essential procedural defects or invalidating provisions. (...) The consultation is evacuated in the sense that the bill 'Minamata Convention on Mercury,' legislative file No. 19,426, contains no essential procedural defects or unconstitutional provisions.De conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 98, de la Ley que rige esta Jurisdicción, este Tribunal Constitucional revisó el procedimiento legislativo para la tramitación del proyecto de ley denominado “Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio”, advirtiéndose que no se ha producido algún vicio sustancial o de trascendencia, capaz de invalidarlo por quebranto a principios esenciales, tales como el democrático, de participación, de representación política, respeto de las minorías o de publicidad y transparencia. (...) En mérito de lo expuesto, se evacua la consulta en el sentido de que, el proyecto de ley en cuestión, no contiene vicios esenciales de procedimiento o disposiciones que lo invaliden. (...) Se evacua la consulta en el sentido que el proyecto de ley “Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio”, expediente legislativo N° 19.426, no contiene vicios esenciales de procedimiento, ni disposiciones inconstitucionales.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"Lo anterior, lejos de contravenir la Carta Constitucional, por el contrario, es acorde con ésta, en particular, con lo dispuesto en los artículos 21 y 50, de la Constitución Política, entre otros."
"Far from contravening the Constitution, the foregoing is consistent with it, particularly with the provisions of Articles 21 and 50 of the Constitution, among others."
Considerando VI
"Lo anterior, lejos de contravenir la Carta Constitucional, por el contrario, es acorde con ésta, en particular, con lo dispuesto en los artículos 21 y 50, de la Constitución Política, entre otros."
Considerando VI
"El Poder Ejecutivo podrá convocar a la Asamblea Legislativa a sesiones extraordinarias. En estas no se conocerá de materias distintas a las expresadas en el decreto de convocatoria, excepto que se trate del nombramiento de funcionarios que corresponda hacer a la Asamblea, o de las reformas legales que fueren indispensables al resolver los asuntos sometidos a su conocimiento."
"The Executive Power may convene the Legislative Assembly to extraordinary sessions. In these, no matters other than those expressed in the convocation decree shall be heard, except for the appointment of officials that the Assembly must make, or legal reforms that are essential to resolve the matters submitted to its consideration."
Considerando IV
"El Poder Ejecutivo podrá convocar a la Asamblea Legislativa a sesiones extraordinarias. En estas no se conocerá de materias distintas a las expresadas en el decreto de convocatoria, excepto que se trate del nombramiento de funcionarios que corresponda hacer a la Asamblea, o de las reformas legales que fueren indispensables al resolver los asuntos sometidos a su conocimiento."
Considerando IV
Full documentDocumento completo
*160077430007CO* Res. No. 2016009960 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine hours twenty minutes on the fifteenth of July, two thousand sixteen.
Mandatory legislative consultation of constitutionality submitted by the Directorate of the Legislative Assembly, regarding the bill "Minamata Convention on Mercury", legislative file No. 19.426.
Whereas:
1.- The consultation, submitted in compliance with the provisions of subsection a) of Article 96 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, was received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 17:26 hours on June 15, 2016, with a certified copy of the legislative file. The Presidency of the Chamber acknowledged receipt of the consultation by resolution at 07:42 hours on the following June 16. Consequently, the term to evacuate it expires on July 15 of the current year.
2.- In the proceeding, the formalities established by law were observed.
Drafted by Judge Salazar Alvarado; and,
Considering:
I.- Preliminarily.- The first step, in order to evacuate the consultation, is to verify the proceedings followed in this case, in accordance with what is indicated in Article 98 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, by providing that the consultation must be made after the bill is approved in the first debate and before final approval, and that, when evacuating it, the Chamber will rule on any aspects or reasons it deems relevant from a constitutional point of view, but binding only with respect to the proceedings. For the above purposes and due to the importance of the matter in question, a chronological summary of the bill will be made in the following considering.
II.- The processing of the file in the Legislative Assembly.- The bill "Minamata Convention on Mercury", processed in legislative file No. 19.426, has followed this chronological order:
III.- PURPOSE AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CONSULTATION. This mandatory consultation of constitutionality is submitted by the Directorate of the Legislative Assembly in compliance with the provisions of Article 10, subsection b) of the Political Constitution, and Article 96, subsection a) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, regarding the bill "Minamata Convention on Mercury", processed in legislative file No. 19.426, as it concerns the legislative approval of an international treaty. Given that the cited bill was approved in the first debate in Plenary Session No. 25 of June 9, 2016, its hearing is appropriate, in accordance with the provisions of Article 98, paragraph 1, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.
IV.- ON THE LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE IN THE SPECIFIC CASE. In accordance with the provisions of Article 98 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, this Constitutional Court reviewed the legislative procedure for processing the bill called "Minamata Convention on Mercury", noting that no substantial or significant defect has occurred capable of invalidating it due to a breach of essential principles, such as the democratic principle, participation, political representation, respect for minorities, or publicity and transparency. In this regard, as evident from the certified copy of legislative file No. 19.426, the "Minamata Convention on Mercury" was signed by the Costa Rican State in the city of Kumamoto, Japan, on October 10, 2013 (folios 2 and 56). Also, in the electronic file of the legislative consultation, a document was forwarded to this Chamber by Mr. Óscar Omar Monge Castro, Head of the Department of Treaties, Limits, and Borders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, stating that Mr. Álvaro Cedeño Molinari, Ambassador of Costa Rica to Japan, was the one who, in the name and on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica, signed said convention, an act for which the then President of the Republic, Mrs. Laura Chinchilla Miranda, with the countersignature of the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Mrs. Gioconda Ubeda Rivera, conferred Full Powers upon him. Although from a reading of Article 140, subsection 10) of the Political Constitution, it appears that the signing of international treaties is an attribution of the Executive Branch, understood as the collegiate body composed of the President and the Minister of the Branch, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties itself, approved by Law No. 7615 of July 24, 1996, provides in its Article 7, regarding this topic:
"ARTICLE 7.- Full powers. 1.- For the adoption or authentication of the text of a treaty, or for expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty, a person is considered as representing a State: a) If he produces appropriate full powers…".
Thus, said official was authorized to proceed with the signing of the Convention in question, on behalf of the Costa Rican State, by virtue of the provisions of the cited article, since he possessed the necessary and sufficient powers to do so. Furthermore, the foregoing is reinforced by the endorsement given to the Convention by the President of the Republic through the various stages of the legislative procedure. Indeed, the bill was presented before the legislative stream by the Executive Branch, in exercise of its power of initiative, provided for in Article 140, subsection 5) of the Political Constitution (folios 1-77 of the copy of the legislative file). Also, it is accredited that, through Executive Decree No. 38.950-MP of April 7, 2015 (folios 78 to 80 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.111-MP of July 30, 2015 (folios 206 to 212 of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.337-MP of November 30, 2015 (folios 269 to 277 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.364-MP of December 3, 2015 (folios 278 to 280 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.580-MP of March 28, 2016 (folios 281 and 282 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.583-MP of April 12, 2016 (folios 283 to 287 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.584-MP of April 14, 2016 (folios 288 to 290 of the copy of the legislative file); and Executive Decree No. 39.621-MP of April 18, 2016 (folios 291 to 294 of the copy of the legislative file), the Executive Branch called or extended the call to extraordinary sessions so that the Legislative Assembly would hear, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, or else withdrew it from the hearing of Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Body. Thus, no defect is observed regarding the signing of the Convention. It was also accredited that the bill was published in Supplement No. 28 of Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 82 of April 29, 2015 (folios 82 and 83 of the legislative file, as well as the address of the Website of the National Printing Office, in pdf format, http://www.imprentanacional.go.cr/pub/2015/04/29/ALCA28_29_04_2015.pdf). The text of the bill was referred to the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade, where, in Ordinary Session No. 4 of July 9, 2015, that Permanent Special Committee approved it by a unanimous vote of all eight deputies present, without any modification being made.
However, even though this Chamber finds no irregularity whatsoever in the processing of the bill in question that implies nullity for being contrary to the Political Constitution or to the legislative procedure regulated in the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, which is a parameter of constitutionality, it is necessary to make some clarifications. During the extraordinary sessions period of the Legislative Assembly, the initiative in the formation of laws is held exclusively by the Executive Branch, in accordance with the provisions of Article 118 of the Constitution, which empowers the Executive Branch to call the Legislative Assembly to meet in extraordinary session, a point reiterated in Article 140, subsection 14) of the Fundamental Norm. The call to extraordinary sessions empowers the Legislative Assembly to restore, in periods of forced inactivity, the capacity – which it would otherwise lack – to exercise its own competencies and, specifically, to exercise legislative power; however, its competencies are significantly limited, since it depends on the will of the Executive Branch (in a similar sense, Judgment No. 5582-1998, of 13:36 hours on July 31, 1998). In the call to Extraordinary Sessions, the powers of the Executive Branch as co-legislator become apparent, particularly regarding governmental initiative or initiative external to the legislative body. It is clear that this power to call extraordinary sessions is an indispensable means for the Executive Branch to influence parliamentary tasks, since in this period, the Legislative Assembly is prohibited from meeting by full right and can only do so under the call of the Executive Branch. In this sense, the constitutional norm provides:
"Article 118.- The Executive Branch may call the Legislative Assembly to extraordinary sessions. In these, matters other than those expressed in the call decree shall not be heard, except for the appointment of officials that the Assembly is responsible for making, or legal reforms that are indispensable in resolving the matters submitted for its hearing".
According to this norm, the Legislative Assembly cannot hear matters that have not been included in the Call Decree. This is without prejudice to the competencies related to the appointments of officials that the Legislative Branch is responsible for making, or bills on legal reforms that are indispensable for resolving matters submitted for the hearing of the legislative body, as the cited article rightly indicates. This Chamber has already had occasion to examine and rule on the scope of the powers entrusted to the constitutional bodies during the extraordinary sessions period. Thus, in Judgment No. 6939-1996, of 9:24 hours on December 20, 1996, it considered:
"VI. ON THE EXTRAORDINARY SESSIONS PERIOD. In this vein, it should be noted that the extraordinary sessions period of the Legislative Assembly is understood as the provision for it to meet outside the normally established timeframes. It is Article 118 of the Constitution that regulates its call, corresponding to the Executive Branch, so that in these, matters other than those expressed in the call decree shall not be heard, with the exception of the appointment of officials that the Legislative Assembly is responsible for making, or legal reforms that are indispensable in resolving the matters submitted for its hearing. It is a power of discretionary exercise. Regarding the foregoing, it should be clarified that with the extraordinary sessions period, the Legislative Assembly only loses legislative initiative, but not the other functions entrusted to it, among which precisely two stand out: legislating and exercising political control. By virtue of the provisions of Article 118 of the Constitution, it is intended that only the matters included in the Executive Branch's call decree be heard and voted on in the Plenary, so the Legislative Assembly can continue functioning normally in all its other functions, and can even reject a bill from the Executive Branch, send it to committee, delay it, modify it, and include matters not suggested by the Executive Branch, which is part of the dynamics of Parliament. However, it cannot totally modify or substitute a proposal with that of any deputy, since its exercise is conditioned by the call decree. (…)".
Thus, for the validity of the approval procedure for bills processed during the extraordinary sessions period, the Executive Branch must have undoubtedly called the Legislative Assembly for that purpose. Indeed, the call fixes the matters upon which the Legislative Assembly can validly exercise its attributions, so consequently, all those not expressed in the Call Decree are excluded. This implies, certainly, a partial and temporary subjection of the Legislative Assembly to the will of the Executive Branch, manifested in the Call Decree. It should not be overlooked that the call to extraordinary sessions constitutes a typically political act; and, therefore, its exercise is discretionary. In this sense, governmental function, as an activity of political direction, is normally discretionary and has no greater limits than those provided in the Political Constitution. So, one of the ways in which the Executive Branch participates in legislative activity is through the call to extraordinary sessions, by means of defining, by virtue of prior planning and programming, the priority and urgent bills for the smooth running of the Government. Indeed, during extraordinary sessions, the Parliament's agenda is optionally defined, based on reasons of political direction, and is externalized through the respective executive decree. As a political decision, it enjoys a sphere of discretion to safeguard its need for adaptation to the country's requirements. In this vein, given that it must adapt to national demands, it is, then, a flexible decision; and, necessarily, mutable. Therefore, the Executive Branch can, at its discretion, extend the call decree to extraordinary sessions, or else withdraw the called projects. To do this, it can rely on the need for the Legislative Assembly to hear and discuss the projects that the Executive Branch considers priorities in attending to collective interests for proper and sound government management. It would be absurd and contrary to the designed system for the Executive Branch to somehow remain subject to one or more call decrees, since great flexibility must prevail in this matter, in attention to the needs and collective requirements that serve as its foundation and that are in constant mutation. This position was previously held by this Constitutional Court in Judgment No. 6939-1996, of 9:24 hours on December 20, 1996, an occasion on which it stated:
"IV. ON LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE. Regarding the first point, it should be noted that legislative initiative is the introductory or initiating phase of the legislative procedure, or in other words, it is the faculty to submit a bill on a specific matter to a Parliament, with the consequent obligation of the Legislative Assembly to deliberate on it, except in the case where, when the initiative proceeds from the Executive Branch, it withdraws it during the extraordinary sessions period. Technically, the initiative does not form part of the legislative power, although it does constitute an essential operation within the legislative procedure; it is an act of impetus and not an act of legislative decision, while legislative competence resides exclusively in the Legislative Assembly -Articles 105 and 121 subsection 1) of the Political Constitution-. For its part, governmental initiative refers to the faculty given to the Executive Branch by virtue of the provisions of Article 140 subsection 5) of the Political Constitution, to promote bills, a faculty that can be exercised throughout the legislature, and exclusively during extraordinary session periods -Article 123 ibidem-. However, the fact that legislative initiative corresponds exclusively to the Executive Branch for a specific session period of the Legislative Assembly does not mean that the preparation and drafting of the projects to be discussed must also be prepared exclusively by the Executive Branch; it can call Parliament to discuss any project already being processed in the Assembly and that has been drafted directly by the deputies. In this sense, it should be emphasized that what matters is that, through the call decree, it is the Executive Branch that defines which matters are of its interest, so that they are processed and voted on in the Plenary. Also, it is important to note that the doctrine is unanimous that during this exceptional period, the Executive Branch, just as it freely disposes of the faculty to propose (not draft) the bills to be processed, likewise has the faculty to withdraw those it considers appropriate, without this implying a violation of any constitutional provision or legislative procedure, provided the same has not been definitively approved as a Law of the Republic.
The legislative initiative is a typically political act, which, by its very nature, is revocable for entirely discretionary reasons, which is why, at its whim and will, the Executive Branch may modify the "agenda," that is, the matters it submits for discussion by the deputies, either expanding the convocation by including new matters, or removing from the list projects already convened (…)." From what this Chamber stated in the partially transcribed judgment, it is inferred that the reservation established in Article 118 of the Political Constitution implies that the Legislative Assembly may only legislate on the bills included in the Decree of Convocation; and, in turn, the Executive has been reserved the determination of the importance and advisability of the projects included in said decree, a possibility that is flexible and attends to the priorities and interests of the Government. Even this Chamber has endorsed the possibility that, by executive decree, all projects submitted to the knowledge of the Legislative Assembly may be de-convoked, since it would be a contradiction, which would violate the principle of reasonableness, for the Executive not to be able to de-convoke what has been included in the respective decree. On this matter, this Court, in Judgment No. 057-98, at 15:36 hours, on January 7, 1998, resolved the following:
"(…) In accordance with the provisions of Articles 116 and 118 of the Political Constitution, the Legislative Assembly shall meet each year on the first day of May, even if it has not been convened, and its ordinary sessions shall last six months, divided into two periods, from the first of May to the thirty-first of July and from the first of September to the thirty-first of November. The Executive Branch, for its part, may convene the Legislative Assembly for extraordinary sessions, in which no matters other than those expressed in the decree of convocation shall be considered, except in the case of the appointment of officials that correspond to the Assembly, or the legal reforms that are indispensable when resolving the matters submitted to its knowledge. It is clear that in the case under study, the withdrawal of bills by the Executive does not imply that the closure of extraordinary sessions must occur, because nothing prevents another convocation from taking place again, since it is within the period constitutionally provided for that purpose (…)." The political direction of the Government requires the specification of decisions, by determining what the objectives to be achieved are. Hence, if the Decree of Convocation to extraordinary sessions constitutes a political act and, consequently, a discretionary one of the Executive Branch, it can be concluded that the body has broad powers to add or withdraw bills in response to national interests and reasons of opportunity and convenience. In the case of the bill under consultation, it was included in the Executive Decrees of convocation —or expansion of convocation— of the Legislative Assembly to extraordinary sessions. Thus, the Legislative Assembly was in a position to deliberate on the bill in question. For its part, the Executive Branch made discretionary use of the convocations and de-convocations to extraordinary sessions to consider the bill in question. What was thus done by the Executive Branch is within the constitutionally granted powers, without the exercise of such power violating any constitutional principle, in particular, those of reasonableness, proportionality, publicity, and legal certainty. This is so because, precisely, the power of the Executive Branch consists of the possibility of indicating which bills can be considered during the period of extraordinary sessions. The Political Constitution allows the Executive Branch to convene the Legislative Assembly or not to do so, and, in the former case, it is for the deliberation of the projects that that Branch of the Republic proposes. Thus, it may, in accordance with its governmental priorities, not convene the Assembly, suspend the sessions, or modify, in response to its interests, the terms of the convocation. It is evident that the Government's priorities may change over time, and if these are modified, the projects for whose consideration and deliberation it convenes the Legislative Assembly may also vary. Any rigidity in this matter may affect the satisfaction of general interests and the need to regulate certain aspects of national life. For this reason, the Executive Branch is not limited in de-convoking bills during extraordinary sessions and, furthermore, enjoys relative discretion in the management of the parliamentary agenda. In the case under examination, the bill under consultation was included in the decrees of convocation or expansion to extraordinary sessions and was agendized on the order of the day of the Special Permanent Commission on International Relations and Foreign Trade. On the other hand, before the de-convocations of bills by the Executive Branch, in the exercise of the powers granted constitutionally, including the bill of interest here, the expected and logical consequence is the modification of the planned order of the day and that the Deputies would proceed to consider only those projects that were kept by the Government in its Decree of Convocation. Furthermore, the exercise of this power of the Executive does not form part, strictly speaking, of the legislative procedures, but rather refers to a long-standing practice of that Branch, which affects the processing of other procedures. In any case, the bill remained on the legislative agenda during the periods in which it convened the legislative body for its consideration during the period of extraordinary sessions, whereby the possibilities of participation, representation, opposition, and deliberation of the Deputies were not affected, nor were the principles of publicity and legal certainty, aspects safeguarded by the legislative procedure (see in this same sense Judgment No. 2006-06732, at 14:47 hours, on May 17, 2006). Thus, in the case of the processing of file No. 19,426, the bill "Minamata Convention on Mercury," during the period of extraordinary sessions, the Special Permanent Commission on International Relations and Foreign Trade only considered it when the Executive Branch, by means of the respective Executive Decree, convened or expanded the convocation to said extraordinary sessions and included, within the decree, the consideration of this bill. On the other hand, it ceased its consideration when the Executive Branch, also by means of a decree, withdrew it from the consideration of the extraordinary sessions of the Legislative Assembly. Therefore, as regards this point, the legislative procedure does not present constitutionality defects.
Another point of the legislative procedure that it is opportune to briefly examine is the one relating to the consultations that, at the time, the Special Permanent Commission on International Relations and Foreign Trade made to several public institutions, as well as to private legal entities. Indeed, in Ordinary Session No. 2, on June 18, 2015, the aforementioned Commission approved a motion for the bill to be consulted to the Supreme Court of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the Ministry of Health, and the Cement Companies of the country. Similarly, in Ordinary Session No. 4, on July 9, 2015, that Commission approved another motion for the bill to be consulted to the Ministry of Finance. However, in that same session, an order motion was approved so that the Commission would agree to return in the order of the day to the consideration of file No. 19,426, "Minamata Convention on Mercury," whereby the President of the Commission submitted said bill for discussion on the merits, which was approved unanimously by the eight deputies present, without the deadline granted —according to the agreed extensions— to render some of the requested reports having yet expired. However, this does not constitute any irregularity that could be considered serious in the processing of the bill. Note that the consultations made were not mandatory but rather a discretionary decision of the respective Legislative Commission. Their purpose is to gather the opinion of certain public or private sectors that, eventually, could have some interest —in a broad sense— in the bill, which, at the time, the respective Legislative Commission considered opportune, but of which the legislative body could, even, dispense tacitly or expressly. In any case, the reports from those consultations could well be received during the processing of the bill in the plenary, without the fact that they were not ultimately rendered being able, in any way, to invalidate the legislative procedure. Thus, it is irrelevant whether the consultations in question were not responded to —as in this case in which only the opinions of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Ministry of Environment and Energy with respect to the bill are on record— or whether they were responded to after the deadline granted for that purpose had expired, or whether, finally, the respective Legislative Commission issued a committee report on the bill without the deadline granted for the public institutions or private legal entities to pronounce on the matter having expired or, even, when said deadline had not even begun to run, as happened with the consultation to the Ministry of Finance, because in the same session in which it was requested, the legislative Commission issued a committee report on the bill, since none of that constitutes a defect in the legislative process capable of invalidating it.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is necessary to make an additional assessment regarding the possibility of the deputies to vary the order of the day and return to consider a bill that had already been considered, according to the order of the day of that session, and that, therefore, it concerns a phase of the legislative process already precluded. Such happened with the bill under study, since in Ordinary Session No. 4, on July 9, 2015, the Special Permanent Commission on International Relations and Foreign Trade approved an order motion so that the Commission would agree to return in the order of the day to the consideration of file No. 19,426, "Minamata Convention on Mercury," which had already been discussed in that same session and whose consideration had been concluded, moving on to the consideration of other matters. Thus, the President of the Commission submitted said bill for discussion on the merits, which was approved —unanimously— by the eight deputies present. Although, initially, the advisor of the Department of Technical Services of the Legislative Assembly, Mr. Gustavo Sibaja Rojas, when consulted by the President of the Special Permanent Commission on International Relations and Foreign Trade, expressed orally, in Ordinary Session No. 4, on July 9, 2015, that he saw no problem whatsoever in going back in the order of the day and considering again a bill that had already been considered in that same session, provided that, as in this case, all the deputies agreed and so decided (folio 179 of the certified copy of the legislative file); later, when rendering the written opinion requested by the President of the Commission (folios 190 to 195), that same Department changed its opinion and considered that the practice of reverting matters in the same session to reconsider them is contrary to the democratic principles, legal certainty, publicity, transparency, preclusion of acts, and reasonableness, and therefore it deemed that practice contrary to the Political Constitution. Having analyzed the matter, this Chamber considers that neither opinion is valid, since everything depends on the circumstances in which said alteration of the order of the day occurs. This means that each specific case must be assessed, in order to determine whether, indeed, harm is caused to the cited constitutional principles and, in the affirmative, to essential steps of the legislative procedure, as a consequence. From the examination of the circumstances in which the return to the consideration of file No. 19,426 occurred, in Ordinary Session No. 4, on July 9, 2015, of the Special Permanent Commission on International Relations and Foreign Trade, this Constitutional Court considers that no harm whatsoever was caused to the cited constitutional principles; and, therefore, no essential violation of the legislative procedure for the approval of the Convention occurred either. The legislative environment surrounding the bill in Commission, as well as the opinion of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, was absolutely favorable to the bill, without any institution or private legal entity having expressed any objection regarding it. And although it is true, according to the order of the day of Ordinary Session No. 4, on July 9, 2015, that the bill in question had already been considered, it is also true that said consideration had not ended but had been suspended to consider the rest of the agenda, in order to allow time for Mr. Rigoberto Blanco Sáenz, Director of the Directorate of Health Services Development of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, who had been summoned for a hearing in that session to speak about the Convention, to appear. Thus, that point of the agenda of the Commission had not yet precluded, and, therefore, the Commission could well, through an order motion, return to the matter and vote on it, as was indeed done. Not only did all the deputies agree to immediately issue a committee report on that bill, given how urgent the approval of the Convention is for the country, but there is no element indicating that there was anyone with a contrary interest who may have been surprised in their interests by the approval of that bill in Commission. There is no harm to the interests and rights of the deputies or the citizenry with the actions of the Commission, so there is no reason to consider that, in this case, an essential step in the legislative procedure surrounding the bill of file No. 19,426 was violated by the fact that the Commission, unanimously, agreed to return to that bill and give it the unanimous favorable committee report. Additionally, no infringement is observed of the rights and powers of the legislators, since the bill was considered by the Legislative Plenary as corresponded, because it is an International Convention; and, therefore, it could not be delegated to a Legislative Commission with Plenary Powers, according to the provisions of Article 124, paragraph 3, of the Political Constitution, in relation to Article 121, section 4), ibid. On the other hand, the bill under consultation was convened, in its time, by the Executive Branch, to be considered in extraordinary sessions, as previously related, respecting the provision in Article 118 of the Political Constitution, and it had, for its approval in the first debate, the unanimous vote of the forty deputies present, as recorded in the Minutes of Plenary Session No. 25, held on June 9, 2016 (folios 414 to 429 of the copy of the legislative file). Consequently, this Constitutional Court notes that in the process of approving the bill called "Minamata Convention on Mercury," no substantial or significant defect has occurred to invalidate it, due to the breach of essential principles, such as the democratic, of participation, of political representation, respect for minorities, or of publicity and transparency.
V.— Observations regarding the substance of the bill. Before making some observations regarding the substance of the bill under consultation, it must be borne in mind that, according to the provisions of Article 101 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, the advisory opinion of this Chamber will only be binding when it establishes the existence of unconstitutional procedures in the bill under consultation. Furthermore, regarding the content of the various articles, reference will be made to the most relevant aspects of the Convention, without making an analysis of each and every one of the articles, since, in principle, they are considered in conformity with the Law of the Constitution.
VI.— ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TREATY UNDER CONSULTATION. On October 10, 2013, in original and in authentic texts in Arabic, Chinese, Spanish, French, English, and Russian, the Convention under study was signed in the city of Kumamoto, Japan, with the purpose —as stated in the explanatory memorandum and in the text of the Agreement itself— of “protecting human health and the environment from emissions and releases of mercury and mercury compounds” (Article 1 of the Convention under consultation). The foregoing, far from contravening the Constitutional Charter, is, on the contrary, consistent with it, in particular, with the provisions of Articles 21 and 50 of the Political Constitution, among others. Likewise, having analyzed the content of the articles comprising the Convention under consultation, this Constitutional Court considers that, in general terms, substantially, it is in conformity with the precepts, values, and fundamental principles of the Law of the Constitution.
VII.— DESCRIPTION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION. The provisions contained in the Convention under study —which comprise a total of thirty-five articles, plus five annexes (A, B, C, D, and E)— are those proper and common that make up conventions of this nature. Thus, as detailed in legal report No. AL-DEST-IJU-175-2015, prepared by the Department of Studies, References, and Technical Services of the Legislative Assembly, in relation to the bill processed in file No. 19,426, Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention are general provisions establishing the general objective of the Convention and the definitions of the terms used in it. In Articles 3 through 7, the commitments of the signatory States are established for the total elimination of new primary sources of mercury extraction starting from 2020, the moratorium on existing ones for a determined period, and the prohibition of the use of certain products used in the manufacture of mercury compounds, defined in the respective Annexes of the Convention, as well as of certain industrial processes that cause the emission or release of mercury, articles whose trade is prohibited. In accordance with the technique proper to International Law, these absolute or fixed-term prohibitions contemplate exceptions and a special procedure for an interested Party to accede to or request temporary exemptions with respect to those prohibitions. Obligations of means, not of results, are also contemplated, which imply the commitment of the Parties to carry out actions, without specifying a limit or a specific result. As part of these obligations of means, is found the duty to prepare various national action plans to progressively reduce or mitigate the human factors that are sources of emissions or releases of mercury, as well as to provide international cooperation, raise public awareness, and exchange scientific, technical, or relevant information. Other minor obligations consist of providing national reports or reference to obligations contemplated in other international instruments, such as the Basel Convention on the disposal of hazardous wastes (Article 11.3.a). It is important to highlight that, from the study of the articles, it is inferred that the Convention does not impose any financial obligation on the Parties beyond the provision to national institutions of resources for the effective compliance with the obligations assumed and, on the contrary, provides for the possibility of States accessing the resources of the United Nations Environment Trust Fund for developing countries (Article 13 of the Convention). Furthermore, technology transfer is provided for (Article 14 of the Convention), and, in addition to the Conference of the Parties, an Implementation and Compliance Committee of fifteen member countries is created, which is responsible for applying and verifying compliance with obligations, and a Secretariat in charge of bureaucratic functions or those assigned by the Convention to the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme (Articles 15, 23, and 24 of the Convention). The Convention closes with the usual treaty law regulations relating to amendments, entry into force, deposit, authentic texts, and annexes (Articles 26 to 35, and Annexes A, B, C, D, and E of the Convention), all of which present no constitutionality problem. Regarding the obligations that the State acquires with the signing of the Convention, the only provision related to the financial issue is Article 13, but this only imposes on the Parties the obligation to provide their own national bodies, to the extent of their possibilities, with the necessary resources for the implementation of the Convention, which is already implicit from the moment those commitments are acquired. On the other hand, the contribution of funds for the Mechanism created in the Convention is only an invitation, not an obligation (Article 13, section 12, of the Convention), and the possibility of accessing international cooperation funds for developing countries is opened. Thus, this Chamber considers that the commitments assumed by the country in this Convention fall within the scope of ordinary budgetary provision, since those commitments are actions that already appear within the ordinary course of national institutional structure. Regarding the obligations of means, not of results, which imply the commitment of the Parties to carry out actions, without specifying a limit or a specific result, they only have the value of guidelines or political orientation or, if preferred, programmatic, but they do not impose any responsibility on the State and cannot provide grounds for an international claim against the Government. Such is the case with the obligations contained in Articles 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 of the Convention. By contrast, in Articles 3 to 8 of the Convention, a series of substantive obligations are imposed on the Parties. These obligations or commitments acquired by the State refer to primary mining extraction, the use of products with mercury compounds, industrial processes, artisanal gold mining, and the issue of emissions. In this matter, the State's obligations range from prohibiting the authorization of new sources of primary mercury extraction to the preparation of a national plan aimed at the decrease or reduction of the presence of mercury. Within these obligations imposed in the Convention is that of making an inventory of the country's situation regarding the issue of mercury in each of the areas covered by that international instrument. All these obligations, which are typical of conventions of this nature and which constitute a regulatory technique widely used in international law and to which States may voluntarily submit, not only present no contradiction with the Law of the Constitution, but rather, are entirely consistent with the precepts of Articles 21 and 50 of the Political Constitution. Furthermore, from the analysis of the commitments acquired by the Costa Rican State with the signing and legislative approval of the Convention, it is inferred that the actions to be taken in this matter are already included in the ordinary powers of the national institutions related to the subject, so it does not imply the provision of additional resources or powers. In short, all the obligations imposed in the Convention, such as the total elimination of the extraction of new sources of mercury, the moratorium on existing ones within a determined period, the prohibition of the use of compounds of mercury, as well as their gradual elimination, are acquired by the State but with total respect for the domestic legal order and national interests, which is typical of this type of international convention. The Convention also contemplates temporary exemption clauses from compliance with the obligations relating to the manufacture, use, or utilization of industrial processes involving mercury, as well as amendment mechanisms and adoption of the convention and its annexes, in harmony with the domestic legislation of the countries, which are typical and normal regulations in International Law. Likewise, regarding the ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession to the Convention (Article 30), the impossibility of formulating reservations to the Convention (Article 32), and the conditions and deadlines for its denunciation (Article 33), these are also common provisions of treaty law, the voluntary submission to which by the State presents no conflict of constitutionality. In relation to Annex E of the Convention, which deals with the arbitration and conciliation procedure, this Chamber finds no constitutionality objection either, since it is a provision that is typical in this matter in International Law and to which States may voluntarily submit, as is the case of our country upon signing the Convention. Finally, given that this Convention does not imply, in any way, the attribution or transfer of State powers to a community legal order (Article 121, section 4, of the Political Constitution), for its approval in the first and second debates, the absolute majority of votes of the deputies present in the parliamentary session suffices, in accordance with the provisions of Article 119 of the Political Charter. On the other hand, the consideration of this Convention cannot be delegated to a Legislative Commission with Plenary Powers, in accordance with the provisions of Article 124, third paragraph, of the Constitution. These requirements were satisfied upon approving this Convention in the first debate, in Ordinary Plenary Session No. 25, on June 9, 2016, by the unanimous vote of the forty deputies present.
VIII.— Conclusion. By virtue of the foregoing, the consultation is answered in the sense that the bill in question does not contain essential procedural defects or provisions that invalidate it.
Therefore:
The consultation is answered in the sense that the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury,” legislative file No. 19,426, does not contain essential procedural defects, nor unconstitutional provisions.- Fernando Cruz C. Presiding Judge a.i.
Nancy Hernández L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G.
Aracelly Pacheco S.
Enrique Ulate C.
Jose Paulino Hernández G.
Document Digitally Signed -- Verification Code -- *V3DOYCL2IXQ61* FILE No. 16-007743-0007-CO Telephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional.
Building Supreme Court of Justice, San José, Catedral District, González Lahmann Neighborhood, 19th and 21st Streets, 8th and 6th Avenues **Exp: 16-007743-0007-CO** **Res. No. 2016009960** **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at nine hours twenty minutes on the fifteenth of July two thousand sixteen.
Mandatory pre-legislative constitutionality consultation filed by the Board of Directors of the Legislative Assembly, regarding the bill "Minamata Convention on Mercury", legislative file No. 19.426.
**Whereas:** **1.-** The consultation, filed in compliance with the provisions of subsection a), of Article 96, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (*Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional*), was received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 17:26 hours, on June 15, 2016, with a certified copy of the legislative file. The Presidency of the Chamber accepted the consultation by resolution at 07:42 hours, on the following June 16. Consequently, the term to render the decision expires on July 15 of the current year.
**2.-** The formalities established by law were observed in the proceeding.
Drafted by the Magistrate **Salazar Alvarado**; and, **Considering:** **I.- Preliminarily.-** The first matter to address, for the purposes of rendering the decision on the consultation, is to verify the procedures followed in this case, in accordance with what is set forth in Article 98 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, which provides that the consultation must be made after the bill has been approved in the first debate and before final approval, and that, in rendering its decision, the Chamber shall rule on any aspects or grounds it deems relevant from a constitutional standpoint, but its decision is binding only with respect to the procedures.
For the foregoing purposes and due to the importance of the matter at hand, the following recital (considerando) will provide a chronological summary of the bill.
II.- Processing of the legislative file (expediente) in the Legislative Assembly.- The bill "Minamata Convention on Mercury", processed under legislative file (expediente legislativo) No. 19.426, has followed this chronological order:
III.- PURPOSE AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CONSULTATION. This mandatory constitutionality consultation (consulta preceptiva de constitucionalidad) is filed by the Directorate of the Legislative Assembly in compliance with the provisions of Article 10, subsection b), of the Political Constitution, and Article 96, subsection a), of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), in relation to the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, processed under legislative file No. 19.426, as it involves the legislative approval of an international treaty. Given that the cited bill was approved in the first debate during Plenary Session No. 25, of June 9, 2016, its review is appropriate, in accordance with the provisions of Article 98, paragraph 1, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law.
IV.- ON THE LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE IN THE SPECIFIC CASE. In accordance with the provisions of Article 98 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, this Constitutional Court reviewed the legislative procedure for the processing of the bill titled “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, observing that no substantial or material defect has occurred capable of invalidating it due to a breach of essential principles, such as those of democracy, participation, political representation, respect for minorities, or publicity and transparency. In this regard, as is evident from the certified copy of legislative file No. 19.426, the “Minamata Convention on Mercury” was signed by the Costa Rican State in the city of Kumamoto, Japan, on October 10, 2013 (folios 2 and 56). Likewise, the electronic file of the legislative consultation contains a document sent to this Chamber by Mr. Óscar Omar Monge Castro, Head of the Department of Treaties, Limits, and Borders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, which states that Mr. Álvaro Cedeño Molinari, Ambassador of Costa Rica in Japan, was the one who, on behalf and in representation of the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica, signed said convention, an act for which the then President of the Republic, Ms. Laura Chinchilla Miranda, with the countersignature of the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Ms. Gioconda Ubeda Rivera, conferred Full Powers upon him. Although a reading of Article 140, subsection 10), of the Political Constitution shows that the signing of international treaties is a power of the Executive Branch, understood as the collegiate body composed of the President and the Minister of the relevant branch, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties itself, approved by Law No. 7615, of July 24, 1996, in its Article 7, provides, regarding this matter:
“ARTICLE 7.- Full powers. 1.- For the adoption or authentication of the text of a treaty, or for expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty, a person is considered as representing a State: a) If he produces appropriate full powers…”.
Thus, said official was authorized to proceed with the signing of the Convention in question, on behalf of the Costa Rican State, by virtue of the provisions of the cited article, given that he possessed the necessary and sufficient powers to do so. Furthermore, the foregoing is reinforced by the endorsement the President of the Republic gives to the Convention throughout the various stages of the legislative procedure.
Indeed, the bill was submitted to the legislative process by the Executive Branch, in exercise of its power of initiative, provided for in Article 140, subsection 5), of the Political Constitution (folios 1-77 of the copy of the legislative file). Likewise, it is certified that, by means of Executive Decree No. 38.950-MP, of April 7, 2015 (folios 78 to 80 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.111-MP, of July 30, 2015 (folios 206 to 212 of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.337-MP, of November 30, 2015 (folios 269 to 277 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.364-MP, of December 3, 2015 (folios 278 to 280 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.580-MP, of March 28, 2016 (folios 281 and 282 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.583-MP, of April 12, 2016 (folios 283 to 287 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.584-MP, of April 14, 2016 (folios 288 to 290 of the copy of the legislative file); and Executive Decree No. 39.621-MP, of April 18, 2016 (folios 291 to 294 of the copy of the legislative file), the Executive Branch convened or expanded the call to extraordinary sessions, so that the Legislative Assembly would take cognizance of, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, or else, withdrew it from the cognizance of Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Body. Thus, no defect is observed in relation to the signing of the Convention. It was also certified that the bill was published in Supplement (Alcance) No. 28, of the Official Gazette La Gaceta, No. 82, of April 29, 2015 (folios 82 and 83 of the legislative file, as well as the website address of the National Printing Office (Imprenta Nacional), in the format called pdf, http://www.imprentanacional.go.cr/pub/2015/04/29/ALCA28_29_04_2015.pdf). The text of the bill was referred to the Special Permanent Commission on International Relations and Foreign Trade, where, in Ordinary Session No. 4, of July 9, 2015, that Special Permanent Commission approved it by unanimous vote of the totality of the eight deputies present, without any modification being made to it.
However, even though this Chamber finds no irregularity in the processing of the bill in question that implies nullity for being contrary to the Political Constitution or to the legislative procedure regulated in the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly, which is a parameter of constitutionality, it is necessary to make some clarifications. During the period of extraordinary sessions of the Legislative Assembly, the initiative in the formation of laws is held exclusively by the Executive Branch, in accordance with the provisions of Article 118 of the Constitution, which empowers the Executive Branch to convene the Legislative Assembly to meet in extraordinary session, a point reiterated in Article 140, subsection 14), of the Fundamental Norm. The call to extraordinary sessions empowers the Legislative Assembly to re-establish, in periods of forced inactivity, the capacity—which it would not otherwise have—to exercise its own competencies and, specifically, to exercise the legislative power; however, its competencies are significantly limited, since it depends on the will of the Executive Branch (in a similar sense, Judgment No. 5582-1998, of 13:36 hours, of July 31, 1998). In the call to Extraordinary Sessions, the powers of the Executive Branch as co-legislator are made evident, particularly with regard to governmental or external initiative to the legislative body. It is clear that this power to call extraordinary sessions is an indispensable means for the Executive Branch to influence parliamentary tasks, since in this period, the Legislative Assembly is barred from meeting as of right and may only do so under the call of the Executive. In this sense, the constitutional norm provides:
***“Article 118.-*** The Executive Branch may convene the Legislative Assembly to extraordinary sessions. In these, no matters other than those expressed in the decree of convocation shall be taken cognizance of, except in the case of the appointment of officials that corresponds to the Assembly to make, or of the legal reforms that were indispensable when resolving the matters submitted to its cognizance." According to this norm, the Legislative Assembly cannot take cognizance of matters that have not been included in the Decree of Convocation. This is without prejudice to the competencies related to the appointment of officials that corresponds to the Legislative Branch to make, or bills for legal reforms that are indispensable to resolve the matters submitted to the cognizance of the legislative body, as the cited article rightly points out. This Chamber has already had occasion to examine and rule with respect to the scope of the powers entrusted to the constitutional bodies during the period of extraordinary sessions. Thus, in Judgment No. 6939-1996, of 9:24 hours, of December 20, 1996, it considered:
"***VI. THE PERIOD OF EXTRAORDINARY SESSIONS.*** In this order of ideas, it should be noted that the period of extraordinary sessions of the Legislative Assembly is understood as the provision for it to meet outside the periods established on a normal basis. It is Article 118 of the Constitution that regulates its convocation, corresponding to the Executive Branch, so that in them, no matters other than those expressed in the decree of convocation shall be taken cognizance of, with the exception of the appointment of officials that corresponds to the Legislative Assembly to make, or of the legal reforms that were indispensable when resolving the matters submitted to its cognizance. It is a power of discretionary exercise. In relation to the foregoing, it is necessary to clarify that with the period of extraordinary sessions, the Legislative Assembly only loses the legislative initiative, but not the other functions entrusted to it, among which two stand out: that of legislating and that of exercising political control. By virtue of the provisions of Article 118 of the Constitution, the intent is that in the Plenary, only the matters included in the decree of convocation of the Executive Branch be taken cognizance of and voted on, meaning that the Legislative Assembly can continue to function normally in all its other functions, and it may even reject a bill from the Executive, send it to committee, delay it, modify it, and include matters not suggested by the Executive Branch, which is characteristic of the dynamics of Parliament. However, it cannot completely modify or substitute a proposal with one from a deputy, since its exercise is conditioned by the decree of convocation. (...)” Thus, for the validity of the procedure for approving bills processed during the period of extraordinary sessions, the Executive Branch must have convened the Legislative Assembly in an unmistakable manner for that purpose. Indeed, the convocation sets the matters on which the Legislative Assembly can validly deploy its powers; therefore, consequently, all those not expressed in the Decree of Convocation are excluded. This implies, certainly, a partial and temporary subjection of the Legislative Assembly to the will of the Executive Branch, manifested in the Decree of Convocation. It must not be lost sight of that the call to extraordinary sessions constitutes a typically political act; and, therefore, its exercise is discretionary. In this sense, the governmental function, as an activity of political direction, is normally discretionary and has no greater limits than those provided in the Political Constitution. Thus, one of the ways in which the Executive participates in legislative activity is through the call to extraordinary sessions, by means of defining, in virtue of prior planning and programming, the legislative bills that are a priority and urgent for the good progress of the Government. Indeed, during extraordinary sessions, the Parliament's agenda is defined facultatively, attending to reasons of political direction, and is externalized through the respective executive decree. Because it is a political decision, it enjoys a sphere of discretion to safeguard its need to adapt to the country's requirements. In that order of ideas, given that it must adapt to national demands, it is, then, a flexible decision; and, necessarily, mutable. Therefore, the Executive Branch may, discretionally, expand the decree of convocation to extraordinary sessions, or else, withdraw the bills convened. To do this, it can base itself on the need for the Legislative Assembly to take cognizance of and discuss the bills that the Executive Branch considers a priority in view of the collective interests for a correct and sound management of government. It would be absurd and contrary to the conceived system for the Executive Branch, in some way, to remain subject to one or several decrees of convocation, since in this matter great flexibility must prevail, in view of the needs and requirements of a collective nature that serve as its foundation and that are in constant mutation. This position was previously held by this Constitutional Court in Judgment No. 6939-1996, of 9:24 hours, of December 20, 1996, at which time it stated:
"***IV. THE LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE.*** With respect to the first point, it should be noted that the legislative initiative is the introductory or initiating phase of the legislative procedure, or put another way, it is the faculty to submit to a Parliament a bill on a specific matter, with the consequent obligation of the Legislative Assembly to deliberate on it, except in the case that, when the initiative originates from the Executive Branch, the latter withdraws it during the period of extraordinary sessions. Technically, the initiative does not form part of the legislative power, although it does constitute an essential operation within the legislative procedure; it is an act of impulse and not an act of legislative decision, insofar as the legislative competence resides exclusively in the Legislative Assembly - Articles 105 and 121 subsection 1) of the Political Constitution -. For its part, the governmental initiative refers to the faculty given to the Executive Branch by virtue of the provisions of Article 140 subsection 5) of the Political Constitution, to promote bills, a faculty it can exercise during the entire legislative term, and exclusively in the periods of extraordinary sessions - Article 123 ibidem -. However, the fact that the legislative initiative corresponds exclusively to the Executive Branch for a specific period of sessions of the Legislative Assembly does not mean that the preparation and drafting of the bills to be discussed must also be prepared exclusively by the Executive Branch; it may convene Parliament to discuss some bill already in process in the Assembly that has been prepared directly by the deputies. In this sense, it must be emphasized that what matters is that, by means of the decree of convocation, it is the Executive Branch that defines which matters are of its interest, for them to be processed and voted on in the Plenary. Likewise, it is important to note that the doctrine is unanimous in that during this exceptional period, the Executive Branch, just as it freely disposes of the faculty to propose (not prepare) the bills to be processed, has the faculty to withdraw those it considers appropriate, without this implying a violation of any legislative provision or procedure, provided that the same has not been definitively approved as a Law of the Republic. The legislative initiative is a typically political act, which by its own nature, is revocable for wholly discretionary reasons, which is why, at its pleasure and will, the Executive Branch can modify the 'agenda', that is, the matters it submits for discussion to the deputies, either by expanding the convocation to include new matters, or by eliminating from the list bills already convened (...)” From what has been said by this Chamber in the partially transcribed judgment, it is inferred that the reservation provided in Article 118 of the Political Constitution implies that the Legislative Assembly may only legislate on the bills included in the Decree of Convocation; and, in turn, the determination of the importance and advisability of the bills included in said decree has been reserved to the Executive, a possibility that is flexible and attends to the priorities and interests of the Government. This Chamber has even endorsed the possibility of de-convening, via executive decree, all bills submitted to the cognizance of the Legislative Assembly, since it would be counterintuitive and against the principle of reasonableness for the Executive not to be able to de-convene what has been included in the respective decree. On the matter, this Court, in Judgment No. 057-98, of 15:36 hours, of January 7, 1998, resolved the following:
"(…) In accordance with what Articles 116 and 118 of the Political Constitution establish, the Legislative Assembly shall meet each year on the first day of May, even if not convened, and its ordinary sessions shall last six months, divided into two periods, from the first of May to the thirty-first of July and from the first of September to the thirtieth of November. The Executive Branch, for its part, may convene the Legislative Assembly to extraordinary sessions, in which no matters other than those expressed in the decree of convocation shall be taken cognizance of, except for the appointment of officials that corresponds to the Assembly to make, or the legal reforms that were indispensable when resolving the matters submitted to its cognizance. It is clear that in the case under study, the withdrawal of bills by the Executive does not imply that the closing of extraordinary sessions must occur, insofar as nothing prevents another convocation from occurring, since it is within the period constitutionally provided for this purpose (…)" The political direction of the Government requires the concretization of decisions by determining which are the objectives to be achieved. Hence, if the Decree of Convocation to extraordinary sessions constitutes a political act and, consequently, a discretionary one of the Executive Branch, it can be concluded that the body has broad faculties to add or withdraw bills in view of national interests and reasons of opportunity and advisability. In the case of the bill under consultation, it was included in the Executive Decrees of convocation—or expansion of convocation—of the Legislative Assembly to extraordinary sessions. Thus, the Legislative Assembly had the possibility of deliberating on the bill in question. For its part, the Executive Branch made discretionary management of the convocations and de-convocations to extraordinary sessions to take cognizance of the bill in question. What was thus acted upon by the Executive Branch is within the constitutionally granted competencies, without the exercise of such faculty violating any constitutional principle, in particular, those of reasonableness, proportionality, publicity, and legal certainty. This is so precisely because the faculty of the Executive Branch consists of the possibility of indicating which bills can be taken cognizance of during the period of extraordinary sessions. The Political Constitution allows the Executive Branch to convene the Legislative Assembly or not, and, in the first case, it is for the deliberation of the bills that that Branch of the Republic proposes. Thus, it may, in accordance with its governmental priorities, not convene the Assembly, suspend the sessions, or modify, in view of its interests, the terms of the convocation. It is evident that the Government's priorities can change over time, and if these are modified, the bills for whose cognizance and deliberation it convenes the Legislative Assembly can also change. Any rigidity in this matter can affect the satisfaction of general interests and the need to regulate certain aspects of national life. For this reason, the Executive Branch is not limited in de-convening bills during extraordinary sessions and, furthermore, enjoys relative discretion in the management of the parliamentary agenda. In the case under examination, the bill under consultation was included in the decrees of convocation or expansion to extraordinary sessions and was on the agenda of the Special Permanent Commission on International Relations and Foreign Trade. On the other hand, in the face of the de-convocations of bills by the Executive Branch, in exercise of the constitutionally granted faculties, including the bill of interest here, the expected and logical consequence is the modification of the planned agenda and that the Deputies would proceed to take cognizance of only those bills that were maintained by the Government in its Decree of Convocation. Furthermore, the exercise of this faculty of the Executive does not properly form part of the legislative procedures, but rather refers to an established practice of that Branch that affects the processing of other procedures. In any event, the bill remained on the legislative agenda during the periods when it convened the legislative body for its cognizance during the period of extraordinary sessions, by which the possibilities of participation, representation, opposition, and deliberation of the Deputies were not affected, nor were the principles of publicity and legal certainty, aspects safeguarded by the legislative procedure (see in this same sense Judgment No. 2006-06732, of 14:47 hours, of May 17, 2006). Thus, in the case of the processing of file No. 19.426, the bill for the “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, during the period of extraordinary sessions, the Special Permanent Commission on International Relations and Foreign Trade only took cognizance of it when the Executive Branch, by means of the respective Executive Decree, convened or expanded the call to said extraordinary sessions and included, within the decree, the cognizance of this bill. On the other hand, it ceased its cognizance when the Executive Branch, also by means of a decree, withdrew it from the cognizance of the extraordinary sessions of the Legislative Assembly. By which, with regard to this point, the legislative procedure presents no defects of constitutionality.
Another point of the legislative procedure on which it is opportune to conduct a brief examination is that relating to the consultations that, at the time, the Special Permanent Commission on International Relations and Foreign Trade made to various public institutions, as well as to private law subjects. Indeed, in Ordinary Session No. 2, of June 18, 2015, the cited Commission approved a motion for the bill to be consulted to the Supreme Court of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the Ministry of Health, and the country's cement companies. Similarly, in Ordinary Session No. 4, of July 9, 2015, that Commission approved another motion for the bill to be consulted to the Ministry of Finance. However, in that same session, a procedural motion (moción de orden) was approved so that the Commission would agree to return on the agenda to the cognizance of file No. 19.426, “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, for which reason the President of the Commission submitted said bill for discussion on the merits, which was unanimously approved by the eight deputies present, without the deadline granted—in accordance with the agreed extensions—for rendering some of the requested reports having yet expired. However, this does not constitute any irregularity that could be considered serious in the processing of the bill. Note that the consultations made are not mandatory, but rather a discretionary decision of the respective Legislative Commission. Their purpose is to gather the criteria of certain public or private sectors that, eventually, might have some interest—in a broad sense—in the bill, which, at the time, the respective Legislative Commission considered opportune, but which the legislative body could, even, dispense with, tacitly or expressly. In any event, the reports from those consultations could well be received during the processing of the bill in the plenary, without the fact that, definitively, they are not completed being able, in any way, to invalidate the legislative procedure. In such a way, it is irrelevant if the consultations in question were not answered—as in this case where only the criteria of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Ministry of Environment and Energy regarding the bill are on record—or if they were answered after the deadline granted for that purpose, or if, finally, the respective Legislative Commission issued its opinion on the bill without the deadline granted for the public institutions or private law subjects to pronounce on the matter having expired, or even, as happened with the consultation to the Ministry of Finance, said deadline had not even begun to run, since in the same session in which it was requested, the legislative Commission issued its opinion on the bill, given that none of this constitutes a defect in the legislative process capable of invalidating it.
Notwithstanding what has been said, it is necessary to make an additional assessment regarding the possibility of the deputies to vary the agenda and return to take cognizance of a bill that had already been taken cognizance of, according to the agenda of that session, and that, therefore, represents a phase of the legislative process already precluded. Such happened with the bill under study, since in Ordinary Session No. 4, of July 9, 2015, the Special Permanent Commission on International Relations and Foreign Trade approved a procedural motion for the Commission to agree to return on the agenda to the cognizance of file No. 19.426, “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, which had already been discussed in that same session and whose cognizance had been concluded, moving on to the cognizance of other matters. Thus, the President of the Commission submitted said bill for discussion on the merits, which was approved—unanimously—by the eight deputies present. While, initially, the advisor from the Department of Technical Services of the Legislative Assembly, Mr. Gustavo Sibaja Rojas, upon consultation by the President of the Special Permanent Commission on International Relations and Foreign Trade, expressed verbally, in Ordinary Session No. 4, of July 9, 2015, that he saw no problem in returning to the agenda and taking cognizance again of a bill that had already been taken cognizance of in that same session, provided that, as in this case, all the deputies were in agreement and so decided (folio 179 of the certified copy of the legislative file); later, upon rendering the written opinion requested by the President of the Commission (folios 190 to 195), that same Department changed its criteria and considered that the practice of bringing matters back in the same session to take cognizance of them again is contrary to the democratic, legal certainty, publicity, transparency, preclusion of acts, and reasonableness principles, for which reason it deems that practice contrary to the Political Constitution. Having analyzed the matter, this Chamber deems that neither one nor the other criterion is valid, since everything depends on the circumstances in which said alteration of the agenda occurs. This means that each specific case must be assessed, in order to determine whether, effectively, injury to the cited constitutional principles occurs or not, and, if affirmative, to essential processes of the legislative procedure, as a consequence.
From the examination of the circumstances in which the review of file No. 19.426 was revisited, in Ordinary Session No. 4, of July 9, 2015, of the Permanent Special Commission of International Relations and Foreign Trade, this Constitutional Court considers that no injury was caused to the cited constitutional principles; and, therefore, nor was there an essential violation of the legislative procedure for approval of the Convention. The legislative environment surrounding the bill in Commission, as well as the opinion of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, was absolutely favorable to the bill, without any institution or private legal entity having expressed any objection in this regard. And while it is true, according to the agenda of Ordinary Session No. 4, of July 9, 2015, the bill in question had already been discussed, it is also true that this discussion had not concluded, but had been suspended to address the rest of the agenda, in order to allow time for Mr. Rigoberto Blanco Sáenz, Director of the Health Services Development Directorate of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, who had been summoned for a hearing in that session to address the Convention, to appear. Thus, that point on the Commission's agenda had not yet been precluded and, therefore, the Commission could, through a motion of order, revisit the matter and vote on it, as was effectively done. Not only all the deputies agreed to issue an immediate report on that bill, given how urgent the approval of the Convention is for the country, but there is no element indicating that there was anyone with a contrary interest who was caught by surprise by the approval of that bill in Commission. There is no injury to the interests and rights of the deputies or of the citizenry with the Commission's proceeding, so there is no reason to consider that, in this case, a violation of an essential procedure occurred in the legislative procedure regarding the bill of file No. 19.426 due to the fact that the Commission, unanimously, agreed to revisit that bill and issue a unanimous affirmative report. Additionally, no infringement of the rights and powers of legislators is observed, since the bill was heard by the Legislative Plenary as appropriate, as it concerns an International Convention; and, therefore, it could not be delegated to a Legislative Commission with Full Powers, as established by Article 124, paragraph 3, of the Constitución Política, in relation to 121, subsection 4), ibid. On the other hand, the bill under consultation was convened, in due course, by the Poder Ejecutivo, to be heard in extraordinary sessions, as previously recounted, respecting the provisions of Article 118, of the Constitución Política, and it secured, for its approval in the first debate, the unanimous vote of the forty deputies present, as recorded in the Minutes of Plenary Session No. 25, held on June 9, 2016 (folios 414 to 429 of the copy of the legislative file). Consequently, this Constitutional Court notes that in the approval process of the bill entitled <i>"Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio"</i> (Minamata Convention on Mercury), <i>no</i> substantive or significant defect has occurred to invalidate it, due to a breach of essential principles, such as the democratic principle, the principle of participation, of political representation, respect for minorities, or of publicity and transparency.
V.- Observations regarding the substance of the bill. Prior to making some observations regarding the substance of the bill under consultation, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 101, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the opinion of this Chamber will only be binding in that it establishes the existence of unconstitutional procedures in the bill consulted. Furthermore, regarding the content of the various articles, reference will be made to the most relevant aspects of the Convention, without performing an analysis of each and every article, since, in principle, they are considered consistent with the Derecho de la Constitución.
VI.- ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TREATY UNDER CONSULTATION. On October 10, 2013, in the original and in authentic texts in Arabic, Chinese, Spanish, French, English, and Russian, the Convention under study was signed in the city of Kumamoto, Japan, with the purpose—as stated in the explanatory memorandum and in the text of the Agreement itself—of "<i>protecting human health and the environment from emissions and releases of mercury and mercury compounds</i>" (Article 1, of the Convention under consultation). The foregoing, far from contravening the Carta Constitucional, is, on the contrary, consistent with it, in particular, with the provisions of Articles 21 and 50, of the Constitución Política, among others. Likewise, after analyzing the content of the articles that make up the Convention under consultation, this Constitutional Court considers that, in general terms, it is substantially consistent with the precepts, values, and fundamental principles of the Derecho de la Constitución.
VII.- DESCRIPTION OF THE CONVENTION'S REGULATIONS. The rules contained in the Convention under study —which comprise a total of thirty-five articles, plus five annexes (A, B, C, D, and E)— are the typical and common ones that make up conventions of this nature. Thus, as detailed in the legal report No. AL-DEST-IJU-175-2015, prepared by the Department of Studies, References, and Technical Services of the Asamblea Legislativa, in relation to the bill processed in file No. 19.426, Articles 1 and 2, of the Convention, are general provisions establishing the general objective of the Convention and the definitions of the terms used therein. In Articles 3 to 7, the commitments of the signatory States are established for the total elimination of new primary sources of mercury extraction starting in 2020, the moratorium of existing ones for a specific period, and the prohibition of the use of certain products used in the manufacture of mercury compounds, defined in the respective Annexes of the Convention, as well as of certain industrial processes that cause the emission or release of mercury, articles whose trade is prohibited. In accordance with the technique of Derecho Internacional, these absolute or time-limited prohibitions contemplate exceptions and a special procedure so that an interested Party may avail itself of or request temporary exemptions with respect to those prohibitions. Obligations of means, not of results, are also contemplated, which involve the commitment of the Parties to carry out actions, without specifying a limit or a specific result. As part of these obligations of means, there is the duty to develop various national action plans to reduce or mitigate human factors that are a source of mercury emissions or releases, as well as providing international cooperation, raising awareness among the population, and exchanging scientific, technical, or relevant information. Other minor obligations consist of providing national reports or the referral to obligations contemplated in other international instruments, such as the Basel Convention, on the disposal of hazardous waste (Article 11.3.a). It is important to highlight that, from the study of the articles, it is inferred that the Convention does not impose any financial obligation on the Parties beyond the provision to national institutions of resources for the effective fulfillment of the obligations assumed and, on the contrary, provides for the possibility of States accessing the resources of the United Nations Environment Fund Trust Fund for developing countries (Article 13, of the Convention). Technological transfer is also provided for (Article 14, of the Convention) and, in addition to the Conference of the Parties, an Implementation and Compliance Committee of fifteen member countries is created, which is responsible for applying and verifying compliance with the obligations, and a Secretariat in charge of the bureaucratic functions or those assigned by the Convention to the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme (Articles 15, 23, and 24, of the Convention). The Convention closes with the usual treaty law regulations relating to amendments, entry into force, deposit, authentic texts, and annexes (Articles 26 to 35, and Annexes A, B, C, D, and E, of the Convention), all of which present no problem of constitutionality. Regarding the obligations that the State acquires by signing the Convention, the only rule related to the financial issue is Article 13, but this only obliges the Parties to provide their own national agencies, within their means, with the resources necessary for the implementation of the Convention, which is already implicit from the moment those commitments are acquired. On the other hand, the contribution of funds to the Mechanism created in the Convention is only an invitation, not an obligation (Article 13, paragraph 12, of the Convention), and the possibility of accessing international cooperation funds for developing countries is opened. Thus, this Chamber considers that the commitments assumed by the country in this Convention fall within the ordinary budgetary planning, as those commitments are actions that are already part of the normal scope of national institutions. As for the obligations of means, not of results, which imply the commitment of the Parties to carry out actions, without specifying a limit or a specific result, they only have the value of a directive or political guidance or, if preferred, a programmatic nature, but do not impose any responsibility on the State and cannot give rise to an international claim against the Government. Such is the case of the obligations contained in Articles 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20, of the Convention. On the contrary, in Articles 3 to 8, of the Convention, a series of substantive obligations is imposed on the Parties. These obligations or commitments acquired by the State refer to primary extraction in mines, the use of products with mercury compounds, industrial processes, artisanal gold extraction, and the issue of emissions. In this matter, the State's obligations range from the prohibition of authorizing new primary sources of mercury extraction to the implementation of a national plan aimed at decreasing or reducing the presence of mercury. Among these obligations imposed in the Convention is the requirement to inventory the country's situation regarding the mercury issue in each of the areas contemplated by that international instrument. All these obligations, which are typical of conventions of this nature and which constitute a regulatory technique widely used in international law and to which States may voluntarily submit, not only do not present any contradiction with the Derecho de la Constitución, but rather, are entirely consistent with the provisions of Articles 21 and 50, of the Constitución Política. Furthermore, from the analysis of the commitments acquired by the Costa Rican State with the signing and legislative approval of the Convention, it is inferred that the actions to be taken in this matter are already included in the ordinary powers of national institutions related to the issue, so it does not imply the provision of additional resources or powers. In short, all the obligations imposed in the Convention, such as the total elimination of the extraction of new mercury sources, the moratorium of existing ones within a specific period, the prohibition of the use of mercury compounds, as well as their gradual elimination, are acquired by the State but with total respect for the domestic legal system and national interests, which is typical of this type of international convention. The Convention also contemplates temporary exemption clauses from compliance with the obligations relating to the manufacture, use, or utilization of industrial processes involving mercury, as well as mechanisms for amendment and adoption of the convention and its annexes, in line with the domestic legislation of countries, which are typical and normal regulations in Derecho Internacional. Likewise, regarding the ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession to the Convention (Article 30), the impossibility of formulating reservations to the Convention (Article 32), and the conditions and deadlines for its denunciation (Article 33), these are also common provisions of treaty law, whose voluntary submission by the State presents no conflict of constitutionality. In relation to Annex E, of the Convention, which deals with the arbitration and conciliation procedure, this Chamber also finds no objection of constitutionality, as it concerns regulations that are typical in this matter in International Law and to which States can voluntarily submit themselves, as is the case of our country upon signing the Convention. Finally, given that this Convention does not imply, in any way, the attribution or transfer of State competences to a community legal system (Article 121, subsection 4), of the Constitución Política), for its approval in the first and second debates, the absolute majority of votes of the deputies present in the parliamentary session is sufficient, in accordance with the provisions of Article 119, of the Carta Política. On the other hand, the hearing of this Convention cannot be delegated to a Comisión Legislativa Plena, in accordance with the provisions of Article 124, third paragraph, of the Constitution. These requirements were satisfied when this Convention was approved in the first debate, in Ordinary Plenary Session No. 25, of June 9, 2016, by the unanimous vote of the forty deputies present.
VIII.- Conclusion. By virtue of the foregoing, the consultation is answered in the sense that the bill in question contains no essential procedural defects or provisions that invalidate it.
Por tanto:
The consultation is answered in the sense that the bill "Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio", legislative file No. 19.426, contains no essential procedural defects or unconstitutional provisions.-
| Fernando Cruz C. | ||
| President a.i. | ||
| Nancy Hernández L. | ||
| Jorge Araya G. | ||
| Enrique Ulate C. |
Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador -- *V3DOYCL2IXQ61* Building Supreme Court of Justice, San José, Catedral District, González Lahmann Neighborhood, streets 19 and 21, avenues 8 and 6
| "...the Executive Branch may, at its discretion, expand the decree convening extraordinary sessions, or withdraw the projects convened. To do so, it can rely on the need for the Legislative Assembly to consider and discuss projects that the Executive Branch deems priorities in light of collective interests for proper and sound governance. It would be absurd and contrary to the designed system if the Executive Branch were, in any way, bound by one or several convening decrees, since great flexibility must prevail in this matter, given the constantly changing collective needs and requirements that support it..." | **Decision 9960-16** |
|---|---|
| "the reservation established in Article 118 of the Political Constitution implies that the Legislative Assembly may only legislate on the bills included in the Convening Decree; and, in turn, the determination of the importance and expediency of the projects included in said decree has been reserved to the Executive, a possibility that is flexible and responds to the Government's priorities and interests. This Chamber has even endorsed the possibility of unconvening, by executive decree, all projects submitted to the Legislative Assembly, since it would be a contradiction, offending the principle of reasonableness, if the Executive could not unconvene what has been included in the respective decree." | **Decision 9960-16** |
“…\(^{14}\) The provisions contained in the Convention under study—which comprise a total of thirty-five articles, plus five annexes (A, B, C, D, and E)—are the typical and common features of conventions of this nature. Thus, as detailed in legal report N° AL-DEST-IJU-175-2015, prepared by the Department of Studies, References, and Technical Services of the Legislative Assembly, in relation to the bill being processed under expediente N° 19.426, Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention are general provisions that establish the overall objective of the Convention and the definitions of the terms used therein. Articles 3 through 7 establish the commitments of the signatory States for the total elimination of new primary mercury mining sources starting in 2020, a moratorium on existing ones for a set period, and the prohibition of the use of certain products used in the manufacture of mercury compounds, defined in the respective Annexes of the Convention, as well as certain industrial processes that cause the emission or release of mercury, articles whose trade is prohibited. In accordance with the typical technique of International Law, these absolute or time-limited prohibitions contemplate exceptions and a special procedure allowing an interested Party to avail itself of or request temporary exemptions regarding those prohibitions. Obligations of means, not of results, are also contemplated, which involve the commitment of the Parties to carry out actions, without specifying a limit or a specific result. As part of these obligations of means, there is the duty to prepare various national action plans to progressively reduce or mitigate human factors that are sources of mercury emissions or releases, as well as providing international cooperation, raising public awareness, and exchanging scientific, technical, or relevant information. Other minor obligations consist of submitting national reports or referring to obligations contemplated in other international instruments, such as the Basel Convention, on the disposal of hazardous wastes (Article 11.3.a). It is important to highlight that from the study of the articles, it is inferred that the Convention does not impose any financial obligation on the Parties beyond providing national institutions with resources for the effective fulfillment of the assumed obligations and, on the contrary, provides for the possibility for States to access resources from the United Nations Environment Fund for developing countries (Article 13 of the Convention). Likewise, technology transfer is foreseen (Article 14 of the Convention), and in addition to the Conference of the Parties, a fifteen-member-country Implementation and Compliance Committee is created, which is responsible for applying and verifying compliance with the obligations, and a Secretariat in charge of bureaucratic functions or those assigned by the Convention to the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme (Articles 15, 23, and 24 of the Convention)." The Convention closes with the usual treaty-law provisions regarding amendments, entry into force, deposit, authentic texts, and annexes (Articles 26 through 35, and Annexes A, B, C, D, and E, of the Convention), none of which presents any constitutional issue. With respect to the obligations the State assumes upon signing the Convention, the only provision related to financial matters is Article 13, but this merely requires the Parties to provide their own national bodies, to the extent possible, with the resources necessary for implementing the Convention, which is already implicit from the moment those commitments are undertaken. Furthermore, contributing funds to the Mechanism created in the Convention is merely an invitation, not an obligation (Article 13, paragraph 12, of the Convention), and the possibility of accessing international cooperation funds for developing countries is opened. Accordingly, this Chamber considers that the commitments assumed by the country in this Convention fall within the scope of ordinary budget planning, since those commitments are actions already within the ordinary operations of the national institutional framework. As for obligations of means, not of results, which entail the Parties' commitment to carry out actions without specifying a limit or a specific result, they hold only the value of a guideline, political orientation, or, if one wishes, a programmatic nature, but they impose no liability on the State and cannot serve as the basis for an international claim against the Government. Such is the case with the obligations contained in Articles 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 of the Convention. In contrast, Articles 3 through 8 of the Convention impose a series of substantive obligations on the Parties. These obligations or commitments undertaken by the State relate to primary mining (extracción primaria en minas), the use of products containing mercury compounds, industrial processes, artisanal gold mining (extracción artesanal de oro), and the issue of emissions. In this area, the State's obligations range from prohibiting the authorization of new sources of primary mercury mining to carrying out a national plan aimed at reducing or decreasing the presence of mercury. Among these obligations imposed by the Convention is that of preparing an inventory of the country's situation regarding mercury in each of the areas covered by this international instrument. All these obligations, which are characteristic of conventions of this nature and constitute a normative technique widely used in international law, to which States may voluntarily submit, not only present no contradiction with Constitutional Law but, rather, are entirely consistent with the provisions of Articles 21 and 50 of the Political Constitution. Moreover, from the analysis of the commitments the Costa Rican State assumes by signing and obtaining legislative approval of the Convention, it is inferred that the actions to be taken in this matter are already included in the ordinary competencies of the national institutions related to the issue, and therefore do not entail the allocation of additional resources or competencies. In short, all the obligations imposed by the Convention, such as the total elimination of extraction from new sources of mercury, the phase-out (moratoria) of existing ones within a set timeframe, the prohibition of the use of mercury compounds, and their gradual elimination, are assumed by the State with full respect for the domestic legal order and national interests, which is characteristic of this type of international convention. The Convention also provides for temporary exemption clauses from compliance with obligations relating to the manufacture, use, or utilization of industrial processes involving mercury, as well as mechanisms for amending and adopting the convention and its annexes, consistent with the domestic legislation of the countries, which are typical and normal regulations in International Law. Likewise, with respect to ratification, acceptance, approval of, or accession to the Convention (Article 30), the impossibility of formulating reservations to the Convention (Article 32), and the conditions and deadlines for its denunciation (Article 33), these are also common provisions of treaty law, the State's voluntary submission to which presents no conflict with constitutionality. Regarding Annex E of the Convention, which addresses the arbitration and conciliation procedure, this Chamber likewise finds no objection on constitutional grounds, as it is a provision that is typical in this area of International Law and to which States may voluntarily submit, as is the case with our country upon signing the Convention. Finally, given that this Convention does not, in any way, entail the attribution or transfer of State competencies to a community legal order (Article 121, paragraph 4, of the Political Constitution), its approval in the first and second debates requires only the absolute majority of votes of the deputies present at the parliamentary session, in accordance with the provisions of Article 119 of the Political Charter. Furthermore, consideration of this Convention cannot be delegated to a Full Legislative Commission, in accordance with Article 124, third paragraph, of the Constitution. These requirements were satisfied when this Convention was approved in the first debate, at Ordinary Plenary Session No. 25, of 9 June 2016, by a unanimous vote of the forty deputies present…" **Having reviewed:** 1.- The consultation, which is submitted in compliance with the provisions of subsection a) of Article 96 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, was received by the Secretariat of the Chamber at 5:26 p.m. on June 15, 2016, with a certified copy of the legislative file. The Presidency of the Chamber accepted the consultation by resolution at 7:42 a.m. on the following June 16. Consequently, the deadline to resolve it expires on July 15 of the current year.
2.- The formalities established by law were observed in the procedure.
Drafted by Magistrate **Salazar Alvarado**; and, **Considering:** **I.- Preliminary.-** The first step, for the purpose of resolving the consultation, is to verify the procedures followed in this case, in accordance with Article 98 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which provides that the consultation must be made after the bill has been approved in first debate and before final approval, and that, when resolving it, the Chamber shall rule on any aspects or grounds it deems relevant from a constitutional standpoint, but its decision shall be binding only with regard to procedures.
For the foregoing purposes and due to the importance of the matter at hand, the following recital (considerando) will provide a chronological summary of the bill.
II.- The processing of the file (expediente) in the Legislative Assembly.- The bill "Minamata Convention on Mercury" ("Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio"), processed under legislative file (expediente legislativo) No. 19.426, has followed the chronological order below:
III.- PURPOSE AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CONSULTATION (CONSULTA). This mandatory constitutional consultation (consulta preceptiva de constitucionalidad) is formulated by the Board of Directors of the Legislative Assembly in compliance with the provisions of Article 10, subsection b), of the Political Constitution, and Article 96, subsection a), of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), in relation to the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, processed in legislative file No. 19.426, as it concerns the legislative approval of an international treaty. Given that the cited bill was approved in the first debate in Plenary Session No. 25, of June 9, 2016, its consideration is appropriate, in accordance with the provisions of Article 98, paragraph 1, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.
IV.- ON THE LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE IN THIS SPECIFIC CASE. In accordance with the provisions of Article 98 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, this Constitutional Tribunal reviewed the legislative procedure for the processing of the bill titled “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, noting that no substantial or significant defect (vicio sustancial) has occurred, capable of invalidating it for a breach of essential principles, such as the democratic principle, the principle of participation, political representation, respect for minorities, or publicity and transparency. In this regard, as can be deduced from the certified copy of legislative file No. 19.426, the “Minamata Convention on Mercury” was signed by the Costa Rican State in the city of Kumamoto, Japan, on October 10, 2013 (folios 2 and 56). Likewise, in the electronic file of the legislative consultation, there is a document sent to this Chamber by Mr. Óscar Omar Monge Castro, Head of the Department of Treaties, Limits, and Borders, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, which states that Mr. Álvaro Cedeño Molinari, Ambassador of Costa Rica to Japan, was the one who, in the name and on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica, signed (suscribió) said convention, an act for which the then President of the Republic, Mrs. Laura Chinchilla Miranda, with the countersignature (refrendo) of the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Mrs. Gioconda Ubeda Rivera, conferred upon him Full Powers (Plenos Poderes). Although from a reading of Article 140, subsection 10), of the Political Constitution, it can be deduced that the signing of international treaties is an attribution of the Executive Branch, understood as the collegiate body composed of the President and the Minister of the relevant Branch, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties itself, approved by Ley N° 7615, of July 24, 1996, in its Article 7, provides, regarding this matter:
“ARTICLE 7.- Full powers. 1.- For the adoption or authentication of the text of a treaty, or to express the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty, a person is considered to represent a State: (a) If he produces appropriate full powers…”.
Thus, said official was empowered (legitimado) to proceed with the signing of the Convention in question, on behalf of the Costa Rican State, by virtue of the provisions of the cited article, since he had the necessary and sufficient powers for it. Furthermore, the foregoing is reinforced by the endorsement (aval) given to the Convention by the President of the Republic through the various stages of the legislative procedure.
Indeed, the bill was presented to the legislative stream by the Executive Branch, in exercise of its power of initiative, provided for in Article 140, subsection 5), of the Political Constitution (folios 1-77 of the copy of the legislative file). Likewise, it is certified that, through Executive Decree No. 38.950-MP, of April 7, 2015 (folios 78 to 80 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.111-MP, of July 30, 2015 (folios 206 to 212 of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.337-MP, of November 30, 2015 (folios 269 to 277 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.364-MP, of December 3, 2015 (folios 278 to 280 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.580-MP, of March 28, 2016 (folios 281 and 282 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.583-MP, of April 12, 2016 (folios 283 to 287 of the copy of the legislative file); Executive Decree No. 39.584-MP, of April 14, 2016 (folios 288 to 290 of the copy of the legislative file); and Executive Decree No. 39.621-MP, of April 18, 2016 (folios 291 to 294 of the copy of the legislative file), the Executive Branch convened or expanded the call to extraordinary sessions, so that the Legislative Assembly would take cognizance of, among others, legislative file No. 19.426, or, withdrew it from the cognizance of the Extraordinary Sessions of the Legislative Body. Thus, no defect is observed in relation to the signing of the Agreement. It was also certified that the bill was published in Alcance No. 28, of the Official Gazette La Gaceta, No. 82, of April 29, 2015 (folios 82 and 83 of the legislative file, as well as the address of the Website of the Imprenta Nacional, in the format called pdf, http://www.imprentanacional.go.cr/pub/2015/04/29/ALCA28_29_04_2015.pdf). The text of the bill was referred to the Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior, where, in Ordinary Session No. 4, of July 9, 2015, that Comisión Permanente Especial approved it by unanimous vote of all eight deputies present, without any modification being made to it.
However, even though this Chamber does not find, in the processing of the bill in question, any irregularity that would imply nullity for being contrary to the Political Constitution or to the legislative procedure regulated in the Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, which is a parameter of constitutionality, it is necessary to make some clarifications. During the period of extraordinary sessions of the Legislative Assembly, the initiative in the formation of laws is held exclusively by the Executive Branch, in accordance with the provisions of Article 118, Constitutional, which empowers the Executive Branch to convene the Legislative Assembly to meet in extraordinary form, which is reiterated in Article 140, subsection 14), of the Fundamental Norm. The call to extraordinary sessions empowers the Legislative Assembly to restore, in periods of forced inactivity, the capacity—which otherwise it would not have—to exercise its own competencies and, specifically, to exercise its legislative power; however, its competencies are significantly limited, since it depends on the will of the Executive Branch (in a similar sense, Judgment No. 5582-1998, at 13:36, of July 31, 1998). In the call to Extraordinary Sessions, the powers of the Executive Branch as co-legislator are made evident, particularly concerning gubernative initiative or initiative external to the legislative body. It is clear that this power to call extraordinary sessions is an indispensable means for the Executive Branch to influence parliamentary tasks, since in this period, the Legislative Assembly is barred from meeting as of right and can only do so under the call of the Executive. In this sense, the constitutional norm provides:
"Article 118.- The Executive Branch may convene the Legislative Assembly to extraordinary sessions. In these, no matters other than those expressed in the decree of convocation shall be heard, except in the case of the appointment of officials that the Assembly is responsible for making, or of the legal reforms that are indispensable when resolving the matters submitted for its cognizance." According to this norm, the Legislative Assembly cannot hear matters that have not been included in the Decree of Convocation. This is without prejudice to the competencies related to the appointment of officials that the Legislative Branch is responsible for making, or bills on legal reforms that are indispensable to resolve the matters submitted to the cognizance of the legislative body, as the cited article rightly points out. This Chamber has already had occasion to examine and rule regarding the scope of the powers entrusted to the constitutional bodies during the period of extraordinary sessions. Thus, in Judgment No. 6939-1996, at 9:24, of December 20, 1996, it considered:
"VI. OF THE PERIOD OF EXTRAORDINARY SESSIONS. In this vein, it is worth noting that the period of extraordinary sessions of the Legislative Assembly is understood as the provision it has to meet outside the normally established periods. It is Article 118 of the constitution that regulates its convocation, corresponding to the Executive Branch, so that in them, no matters other than those expressed in the decree of convocation shall be heard, with the exception of the appointment of officials that the Legislative Assembly is responsible for making, or of legal reforms that are indispensable when resolving the matters submitted for its cognizance. It is a power of discretionary exercise. In relation to the foregoing, it is worth clarifying that with the period of extraordinary sessions, the Legislative Assembly only loses the legislative initiative, but not the other functions entrusted to it, among which two stand out precisely: that of legislating and that of exercising political control. By virtue of the provisions of Article 118 of the constitution, it is intended that in the Plenary, only the matters included in the decree of convocation of the Executive Branch be heard and voted on, so the Legislative Assembly can continue to function normally in all its other functions, and may even reject a bill from the Executive, send it to committee, delay it, modify it, and include matters not suggested by the Executive Branch, which is typical of the dynamics of Parliament. However, it cannot totally modify or substitute a proposal with one from a deputy, since its exercise is conditioned by the decree of convocation. (…)" Thus, for the validity of the approval procedure for bills processed during the period of extraordinary sessions, it is essential that the Executive Branch has unequivocally convened the Legislative Assembly for that purpose. In effect, the convocation fixes the matters upon which the Legislative Assembly can validly deploy its attributions, so that, consequently, all those not expressed in the Decree of Convocation are excluded. This implies, certainly, a partial and temporary subjection of the Legislative Assembly to the will of the Executive Branch, manifested in the Decree of Convocation. One must not lose sight of the fact that the call to extraordinary sessions constitutes a typically political act; and, therefore, its exercise is discretionary. In this sense, governmental function, as an activity of political direction, is normally discretionary and has no greater limits than those established in the Political Constitution. Thus, one of the ways in which the Executive participates in legislative activity is through the convocation to extraordinary sessions, by means of the definition, by virtue of prior planning and programming, of the priority and urgent bills for the smooth running of the Government. In effect, during the extraordinary sessions, the Parliament's agenda is defined, facultatively, attending to reasons of political direction, and is externalized through the respective executive decree. As it is a political decision, it enjoys a sphere of discretion to safeguard its need for adaptation to the country's requirements. In that vein, given that it must adapt to national demands, it is, then, a flexible decision; and, necessarily, mutable. Therefore, the Executive Branch may, discretionally, expand the decree of convocation to extraordinary sessions, or withdraw the convened bills. For this, it may base itself on the need for the Legislative Assembly to hear and discuss the bills that the Executive Branch considers a priority in light of the collective interests for a correct and sound government management. It would be absurd and contrary to the devised system for the Executive Branch to become, in any way, subject to one or several decrees of convocation, because in this matter great flexibility must prevail, in light of the needs and requirements of a collective nature that serve as its foundation and are in constant mutation. This position was previously upheld by this Constitutional Court in Judgment No. 6939-1996, at 9:24, of December 20, 1996, an occasion on which it stated:
"IV. OF THE LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE. Regarding the first point, it should be noted that the legislative initiative is the introductory or initiating phase of the legislative procedure, or put another way, it is the faculty to submit to a Parliament a bill on a specific matter, with the consequent obligation of the Legislative Assembly to deliberate on it, except in the case where, when the initiative comes from the Executive Branch, the latter withdraws it during the period of extraordinary sessions. Technically, the initiative does not form part of the legislative power, although it does constitute an essential operation within the legislative procedure; it is an act of impetus and not an act of legislative decision, insofar as the legislative competence resides exclusively in the Legislative Assembly —Articles 105 and 121 subsection 1) of the Political Constitution—. For its part, the gubernative initiative refers to the faculty granted to the Executive Branch by virtue of the provisions of Article 140 subsection 5) of the Political Constitution, to promote bills, a faculty it can exercise during the entire legislative term, and exclusively during the periods of extraordinary sessions —Article 123 ibid—. However, the fact that the legislative initiative corresponds exclusively to the Executive Branch for a specific period of sessions of the Legislative Assembly does not mean that the preparation and drafting of the bills to be discussed must also be prepared exclusively by the Executive Branch; it can convene Parliament to discuss a bill already pending in the Assembly that has been drafted directly by the deputies. In this sense, it should be emphasized that what matters is that, through the decree of convocation, it is the Executive Branch that defines which matters are of its interest, to be processed and voted on in the Plenary. Likewise, it is important to point out that the doctrine is unanimous that during this exceptional period, the Executive Branch, just as it freely disposes of the faculty to propose (not draft) the bills to be processed, also has the faculty to withdraw those it deems appropriate, without this implying a violation of any legislative provision or procedure, provided that the bill has not been definitively approved as a Law of the Republic. The legislative initiative is a typically political act, which by its very nature is revocable for entirely discretionary reasons, which is why, at its pleasure and will, the Executive Branch can modify the 'agenda,' that is, the matters it submits for discussion by the deputies, whether by expanding the convocation to include new matters, or by removing from the list bills already convened (…)" From what this Chamber stated in the partially transcribed judgment, it is inferred that the reservation provided for in Article 118 of the Political Constitution implies that the Legislative Assembly can only legislate on the bills included in the Decree of Convocation; and, in turn, the determination of the importance and advisability of the bills included in said decree has been reserved to the Executive, a possibility that is flexible and attends to the Government's priorities and interests. Indeed, this Chamber has endorsed the possibility that, by means of an executive decree, all the bills submitted to the cognizance of the Legislative Assembly be de-convened, because it would be a contradiction, which would violate the principle of reasonableness, if the Executive could not de-convene what had been included in the respective decree. On this matter, this Tribunal, in Judgment No. 057-98, at 15:36, of January 7, 1998, resolved the following:
"(…) In accordance with the provisions of Articles 116 and 118 of the Political Constitution, the Legislative Assembly shall meet each year on the first day of May, even if it has not been convened, and its ordinary sessions shall last six months, divided into two periods, from the first of May to the thirty-first of July and from the first of September to the thirtieth of November. The Executive Branch, for its part, may convene the Legislative Assembly to extraordinary sessions, in which no matters other than those expressed in the decree of convocation shall be heard, except in the case of the appointment of officials that the Assembly is responsible for making, or of the legal reforms that are indispensable when resolving the matters submitted for its cognizance. It is clear that in the case under study, the withdrawal of the bills by the Executive does not imply that the closure of extraordinary sessions must occur, since nothing prevents another convocation from being made, given that we are within the constitutionally provided period for this (…)" The political direction of the Government requires the concretion of decisions, by determining which objectives are to be achieved. Hence, if the Decree of Convocation to extraordinary sessions constitutes a political act and, consequently, is discretionary for the Executive Branch, it can be concluded that the body has ample faculties to add or withdraw bills in light of national interests and reasons of opportunity and convenience. In the case of the bill consulted, it was included in the Executive Decrees of convocation—or expansion of convocation—of the Legislative Assembly to extraordinary sessions. Thus, the Legislative Assembly was in a position to deliberate on the bill in question. For its part, the Executive Branch made discretionary use of convocations and de-convocations to extraordinary sessions to hear the bill in question. The actions thus taken by the Executive Branch fall within the constitutionally granted competencies, and the exercise of this faculty does not violate any constitutional principle, in particular, those of reasonableness, proportionality, publicity, and legal certainty. This is so precisely because the faculty of the Executive Branch consists of the possibility of indicating which bills can be heard during the period of extraordinary sessions. The Political Constitution allows the Executive Branch to convene the Legislative Assembly or not to do so, and, in the first case, it is for the deliberation of the bills that that Branch of the Republic proposes. Thus, it can, in accordance with its governmental priorities, not convene the Assembly, suspend the sessions, or modify, in light of its interests, the terms of the convocation. It is evident that the Government's priorities can change over time, and if these are modified, the bills for whose cognizance and deliberation it convenes the Legislative Assembly can also vary. Any rigidity in this matter can affect the satisfaction of general interests and the need to regulate certain aspects of national life. For this reason, the Executive Branch is not limited in de-convening bills during extraordinary sessions and, furthermore, enjoys relative discretion in managing the parliamentary agenda. In the case under examination, the bill consulted was included in the decrees of convocation or expansion to extraordinary sessions and was agendized on the order of the day of the Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior. Moreover, in light of the de-convocations of bills by the Executive Branch, in exercise of its constitutionally granted faculties, including the bill of interest here, the expected and logical consequence is the modification of the planned order of the day and that the Deputies would only hear those bills that were maintained by the Government in its Decree of Convocation. Furthermore, the exercise of this faculty by the Executive does not form part, properly, of the legislative procedures, but rather refers to a longstanding practice of that Branch, which affects the processing of other procedures. In any case, the bill remained on the legislative agenda during the periods when it convened the legislative body for its cognizance during the period of extraordinary sessions, such that the possibilities for participation, representation, opposition, and deliberation of the Deputies were not affected, nor were the principles of publicity and legal certainty, aspects safeguarded by the legislative procedure (see in this same sense Judgment No. 2006-06732, at 14:47, of May 17, 2006). Thus, in the case of the processing of file No. 19.426, bill "Minamata Convention on Mercury," during the period of extraordinary sessions, the Comisión Especial Permanente de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior only heard it when the Executive Branch, through the respective Executive Decree, convened or expanded the convocation to said extraordinary sessions and included, within the decree, the cognizance of this bill. On the other hand, it ceased its cognizance when the Executive Branch, also through decree, withdrew it from the cognizance of the extraordinary sessions of the Legislative Assembly. Consequently, regarding this point, the legislative procedure does not present defects of constitutionality.
Another point of the legislative procedure on which it is appropriate to make a brief examination is that related to the consultations that, at the time, the Comisión Especial Permanente de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior made to several public institutions, as well as to subjects of private law. Indeed, in Ordinary Session No. 2, of June 18, 2015, the cited Commission approved a motion for the bill to be consulted with the Corte Suprema de Justicia, the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, the Ministerio de Salud, and the country's cement companies. Similarly, in Ordinary Session No. 4, of July 9, 2015, that Commission approved another motion to consult the bill with the Ministerio de Hacienda. However, in that same session, a procedural motion was approved for the Commission to agree to return on the order of the day to the cognizance of file No. 19.426, "Minamata Convention on Mercury," so the President of the Commission submitted said bill for discussion on the merits, and it was unanimously approved by the eight deputies present, without the deadline granted—according to the agreed extensions—for submitting some of the requested reports having yet expired. However, this does not constitute any irregularity that can be considered serious in the processing of the bill. Note that the consultations made are not mandatory, but rather a matter of discretionary decision by the respective Legislative Commission. Their purpose is to gather the criteria of certain public or private sectors that could, eventually, have some interest—in a broad sense—in the bill, which, at the time, the respective Legislative Commission considered opportune, but which the legislative body could even, tacitly or expressly, dispense with. In any case, the reports from these consultations could well be received during the processing of the bill in the plenary, without the fact that they are not ultimately submitted being able, in any way, to invalidate the legislative procedure. Thus, it is irrelevant whether the consultations in question were not responded to—as in this case, where only the criteria of the Corte Suprema de Justicia and the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía regarding the bill are recorded—or if they were responded to after the deadline granted for that purpose had expired, or if, finally, the respective Legislative Commission issued its report on the bill without the deadline granted for the public institutions or subjects of private law to pronounce on the matter having expired, or, even if said deadline had not even begun to run, as happened with the consultation to the Ministerio de Hacienda, since in the same session in which it was requested, the Legislative Commission issued its report on the bill, given that none of this constitutes a defect in the legislative process capable of invalidating it.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, an additional assessment is necessary regarding the possibility of the deputies altering the order of the day and returning to hear a bill that had already been heard, according to the order of the day of that session, and that, therefore, involves a phase of the legislative process already precluded. Such occurred with the bill under study, since in Ordinary Session No. 4, of July 9, 2015, the Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior approved a procedural motion for the Commission to agree to return on the order of the day to the cognizance of file No. 19.426, "Minamata Convention on Mercury," which had already been discussed in that same session and whose hearing had been concluded, moving on to the hearing of other matters. Thus, the President of the Commission submitted said bill for discussion on the merits, which was approved—unanimously—by the eight deputies present. Although, initially, the advisor of the Departamento de Servicios Técnicos of the Legislative Assembly, Mr. Gustavo Sibaja Rojas, in response to a query from the President of the Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior, verbally expressed, in Ordinary Session No. 4, of July 9, 2015, that he saw no problem whatsoever in returning to the order of the day and hearing again a bill that had already been heard in that same session, provided that, as in this case, all the deputies present were in agreement and so decided (folio 179 of the certified copy of the legislative file); later, when submitting the written opinion requested by the President of the Commission (folios 190 to 195), that same Department changed its criterion and considered that the practice of retracting matters in the same session to hear them again is contrary to the democratic principle, legal certainty, publicity, transparency, preclusion of acts, and reasonableness, and thus it deems that practice contrary to the Political Constitution. Having analyzed the matter, this Chamber considers that neither one criterion nor the other is valid, since everything depends on the circumstances in which said alteration of the order of the day occurs. This means that each specific case must be assessed, in order to determine whether, indeed, an injury to the cited constitutional principles is or is not produced, and, in the affirmative case, to essential steps of the legislative procedure, as a consequence.
From the examination of the circumstances under which the matter of file No. 19.426 was revisited, in Ordinary Session No. 4 of July 9, 2015, of the Permanent Special Committee on International Relations and Foreign Trade, this Constitutional Court considers that no injury to the cited constitutional principles occurred; and, therefore, no essential violation of the legislative procedure for the approval of the Agreement took place. The legislative environment surrounding the bill in Committee, as well as the opinion of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, was absolutely favorable to the bill, without any institution or private legal subject having raised any objection whatsoever. And while it is true, according to the agenda of Ordinary Session No. 4 of July 9, 2015, that the bill in question had already been discussed, it is also true that such discussion had not concluded but had been suspended to address the rest of the agenda, in order to allow time for Mr. Rigoberto Blanco Sáenz, Director of the Directorate of Health Services Development of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, to appear; he had been summoned to a hearing in that session to comment on the Agreement. Thus, that point on the Committee's agenda had not yet concluded and, therefore, the Committee could well, through a motion of order, revisit the matter and vote on it, as indeed occurred. Not only were all the deputies in agreement to issue an immediate report on that bill, given how pressing the approval of the Agreement is for the country, but there is also no element indicating that anyone with a contrary interest was taken by surprise regarding their interests by the approval of that bill in Committee. There is no injury to the interests and rights of the deputies or the citizenry through the Committee's procedure; therefore, there is no reason to consider that, in this case, a violation of an essential step in the legislative procedure occurred regarding the bill in file No. 19.426 by virtue of the Committee having unanimously agreed to revisit that bill and issue it a unanimous affirmative report. Additionally, no infringement of the legislators' rights and powers is observed, since the bill was considered by the Legislative Plenary as was appropriate, given that it is an International Agreement; and, therefore, it could not be delegated to a Legislative Committee with Full Powers, pursuant to Article 124, paragraph 3, of the Political Constitution, in relation to Article 121, subsection 4), ibid. Furthermore, the bill under consultation was duly convoked by the Executive Branch to be considered in extraordinary sessions, as previously recounted, respecting the provisions of Article 118 of the Political Constitution, and for its approval in the first debate, it received the unanimous vote of the forty deputies present, as recorded in the Minutes of Plenary Session No. 25, held on June 9, 2016 (folios 414 to 429 of the copy of the legislative file). Consequently, this Constitutional Court finds that in the approval process for the bill titled *"Minamata Convention on Mercury"*, no substantial or significant defect has occurred that would invalidate it for violation of essential principles, such as the democratic principle, participation, political representation, respect for minorities, or publicity and transparency.
V.- Observations regarding the substance of the bill. Before making some observations regarding the substance of the bill under consultation, it must be borne in mind that, according to the provisions of Article 101 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the opinion of this Chamber shall only be binding to the extent it establishes the existence of unconstitutional procedures in the consulted bill. Furthermore, regarding the content of the various articles, reference will be made to the most relevant aspects of the Convention, without conducting an analysis of each and every article, since, in principle, they are considered consistent with Constitutional Law.
VI.- ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TREATY UNDER CONSULTATION. On October 10, 2013, in original form and in authentic texts in Arabic, Chinese, Spanish, French, English, and Russian, the Convention under study was signed in the city of Kumamoto, Japan, with the objective—as stated in the statement of purposes and in the text of the Agreement itself—of "*protecting human health and the environment from anthropogenic emissions and releases of mercury and mercury compounds*" (Article 1 of the consulted Convention). The foregoing, far from contravening the Constitutional Charter, is, on the contrary, consistent with it, particularly with the provisions of Articles 21 and 50 of the Political Constitution, among others. Likewise, having analyzed the content of the articles that make up the consulted Convention, this Constitutional Court considers that, in general terms, it is substantially consistent with the precepts, values, and fundamental principles of Constitutional Law.
VII.- DESCRIPTION OF THE CONVENTION'S REGULATIONS. The rules contained in the Convention under study—comprising a total of thirty-five articles, plus five annexes (A, B, C, D, and E)—are typical and common to those comprising conventions of this nature. Thus, as detailed in legal report No. AL-DEST-IJU-175-2015, prepared by the Department of Studies, References, and Technical Services of the Legislative Assembly, regarding the bill processed in file No. 19.426, Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention are general provisions establishing the overall objective of the Convention and the definitions of the terms used therein. In Articles 3 through 7, the commitments of the signatory States are established for the total elimination of new primary sources of mercury extraction after 2020, the moratorium on existing ones for a determined period, and the prohibition of the use of certain products used in the manufacture of mercury compounds, defined in the respective Annexes of the Convention, as well as certain industrial processes that cause the emission or release of mercury, articles whose trade is prohibited. In accordance with the typical technique of International Law, these absolute or time-limited prohibitions include exceptions and a special procedure for an interested Party to avail itself of or request temporary exemptions regarding those prohibitions. Also contemplated are obligations of means, not of results, which imply the commitment of the Parties to carry out actions, without specifying a limit or a specific result. As part of these obligations of means, there is the duty to develop various national action plans to progressively reduce or mitigate the human factors that are sources of mercury emissions or releases, as well as to provide international cooperation, raise public awareness, and exchange scientific, technical, or relevant information. Other minor obligations consist of providing national reports or referring to obligations contemplated in other international instruments, such as the Basel Convention on the control of hazardous waste disposal (Article 11.3.a). It is important to highlight that, from the study of the articles, it is inferred that the Convention does not impose any financial obligation on the Parties beyond providing national institutions with resources for the effective fulfillment of the assumed obligations; on the contrary, it provides for the possibility of States accessing resources from the United Nations Environment Programme Trust Fund for developing countries (Article 13 of the Convention). Likewise, technological transfer is provided for (Article 14 of the Convention), and in addition to the Conference of the Parties, an Implementation and Compliance Committee of fifteen member countries is created, which is responsible for applying and verifying compliance with the obligations, and a Secretariat is established to handle bureaucratic functions or those assigned by the Convention to the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme (Articles 15, 23, and 24 of the Convention). The Convention concludes with the usual treaty law regulations concerning amendments, entry into force, depository, authentic texts, and annexes (Articles 26 to 35, and Annexes A, B, C, D, and E of the Convention), none of which presents any constitutional problem. Regarding the obligations that the State acquires upon signing the Convention, the only rule related to the financial topic is Article 13, but this only imposes on the Parties the obligation to provide their own national agencies, to the extent of their capabilities, with the resources necessary for the implementation of the Convention, which is already implicit from the moment these commitments are undertaken. Furthermore, the contribution of funds to the Mechanism created in the Convention is only an invitation, not an obligation (Article 13, section 12, of the Convention), and it opens up the possibility of accessing international cooperation funds for developing countries. In such a way, this Chamber considers that the commitments assumed by the country in this Convention fall within the ordinary budget planning, since those commitments are actions that already form part of the normal operations of the national institutional framework. Regarding the obligations of means, not of results, which imply the commitment of the Parties to carry out actions, without specifying a limit or a specific result, they only have value as a directive or political orientation, or, if one wishes, programmatic, but do not impose any responsibility on the State and cannot serve as the basis for an international claim against the Government. Such is the case with the obligations contained in Articles 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 of the Convention. On the contrary, in Articles 3 to 8 of the Convention, a series of substantive obligations is imposed on the Parties. These obligations or commitments acquired by the State refer to primary mining extraction, the use of products with mercury compounds, industrial processes, artisanal and small-scale gold extraction, and the topic of emissions. In this matter, the State's obligations range from the prohibition of authorizing new primary sources of mercury extraction to the implementation of a national plan aimed at the decrease or reduction of mercury presence. Among the obligations imposed in the Convention is that of conducting an inventory of the country's situation regarding the topic of mercury in each of the areas covered by that international instrument. All these obligations, which are characteristic of conventions of this nature and constitute a widely used regulatory technique in international law to which States may voluntarily submit, not only do not present any contradiction with Constitutional Law, but rather are entirely consistent with the provisions of Articles 21 and 50 of the Political Constitution. Moreover, from the analysis of the commitments acquired by the Costa Rican State through the signing and legislative approval of the Convention, it is inferred that the actions to be taken in this matter are already included within the ordinary competencies of the national institutions related to the topic, and therefore, it does not imply the provision of additional resources or competencies. In short, all the obligations imposed in the Convention, such as the total elimination of extraction from new mercury sources, the moratorium on existing ones within a determined period, the prohibition of the use of mercury compounds, as well as their gradual elimination, are acquired by the State with full respect for the domestic legal order and national interests, which is typical of this type of international convention. The Convention also includes temporary exemption clauses for compliance with obligations related to the manufacture, use, or utilization of industrial processes involving mercury, as well as mechanisms for amending and adopting the convention and its annexes, in accordance with the countries' domestic legislation, which are typical and normal regulations in International Law. Likewise, regarding the ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession to the Convention (Article 30), the impossibility of formulating reservations to the Convention (Article 32), and the conditions and deadlines for its denunciation (Article 33), these are also common provisions of treaty law, the State's voluntary submission to which presents no constitutional conflict. In relation to Annex E of the Convention, which deals with the arbitration and conciliation procedure, this Chamber also finds no constitutional objection, since it concerns regulations that are typical in this matter in International Law and to which States can voluntarily submit, as is the case with our country upon signing the Convention. Finally, given that this Convention in no way implies the attribution or transfer of State competencies to a community legal order (Article 121, subsection 4) of the Political Constitution), for its approval in the first and second debate, an absolute majority vote of the deputies present in the parliamentary session is sufficient, in accordance with the provisions of Article 119 of the Political Charter. Furthermore, the consideration of this Convention cannot be delegated to a Legislative Committee with Full Powers, in accordance with the provisions of the third paragraph of Article 124 of the Constitution. These requirements were satisfied when this Convention was approved in the first debate, in Ordinary Plenary Session No. 25 of June 9, 2016, by a unanimous vote of the forty deputies present.
VIII.- Conclusion. Based on the foregoing, the consultation is resolved in the sense that the bill in question contains no essential procedural defects or provisions that would invalidate it.
Therefore:
The consultation is resolved in the sense that the bill “Minamata Convention on Mercury”, legislative file No. 19.426, contains no essential procedural defects or unconstitutional provisions.-
| Fernando Cruz C. | ||
| President a.i | ||
| Nancy Hernández L. | Luis Fdo. Salazar A. | |
| Jorge Araya G. | Aracelly Pacheco S. | |
| Enrique Ulate C. | Jose Paulino Hernández G. |
Digitally Signed Document -- Verification code -- *V3DOYCL2IXQ61* Building Supreme Court of Justice, San José, Catedral District, González Lahmann Neighborhood, streets 19 and 21, avenues 8 and 6
*160077430007CO* Res. Nº 2016009960 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas veinte minutos del quince de julio de dos mil dieciseis .
Consulta legislativa preceptiva de constitucionalidad formulada por el Directorio de la Asamblea Legislativa, sobre el proyecto de Ley "Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio", expediente legislativo N° 19.426.
Resultando:
1.- La consulta, que se formula en cumplimiento de lo que establece el inciso a), del artículo 96, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, fue recibida en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 17:26 horas, del 15 de junio de 2016, con una copia certificada del expediente legislativo. La Presidencia de la Sala tuvo por presentada la consulta mediante resolución de las 07:42 horas, del 16 de junio siguiente. En consecuencia, el término para evacuarla vence el día 15 de julio del año en curso.
2.- En el procedimiento se cumplió con las formalidades establecidas en la ley.
Redacta el Magistrado Salazar Alvarado; y,
Considerando:
I.- De previo.- Lo primero que procede, a los efectos de evacuar la consulta, es verificar los trámites seguidos en este caso, en concordancia con lo que señala el artículo 98, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, al disponer que la consulta deberá hacerse después de aprobado el proyecto en primer debate y antes de la aprobación definitiva y que, al evacuarla, la Sala dictaminará sobre cualesquiera aspectos o motivos que estime relevantes desde el punto de vista constitucional, pero vinculante sólo en lo que se refiere a los trámites. Para los efectos anteriores y por la importancia del asunto de que se trata, en el siguiente considerando se hará una síntesis cronológica del proyecto de ley.
II.- La tramitación del expediente en la Asamblea Legislativa.- El proyecto de Ley "Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio", que se tramita en el a) El proyecto, que es de iniciativa del Poder Ejecutivo, fue presentado a la Secretaría del Directorio de la Asamblea Legislativa, a las 15:00 horas, del 1 de diciembre de 2014 (folios 1 y siguientes la copia certificada del expediente legislativo).
III.- OBJETO Y ADMISIBILIDAD DE LA CONSULTA. Esta consulta preceptiva de constitucionalidad, se formula por el Directorio de la Asamblea Legislativa en cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en el artículo 10, inciso b), de la Constitución Política, y 96, inciso a), de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en relación con el proyecto de ley “Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio”, que se tramita en expediente legislativo N° 19.426, por tratarse de la aprobación legislativa de un tratado internacional. Dado que el citado proyecto de ley fue aprobado en primer debate en la Sesión Plenaria N° 25, del 9 de junio de 2016, procede su conocimiento, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 98, párrafo 1°, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.
IV.- SOBRE EL PROCEDIMIENTO LEGISLATIVO EN EL CASO CONCRETO. De conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 98, de la Ley que rige esta Jurisdicción, este Tribunal Constitucional revisó el procedimiento legislativo para la tramitación del proyecto de ley denominado “Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio”, advirtiéndose que no se ha producido algún vicio sustancial o de trascendencia, capaz de invalidarlo por quebranto a principios esenciales, tales como el democrático, de participación, de representación política, respeto de las minorías o de publicidad y transparencia. Al respecto, según se desprende de la copia certificada del expediente legislativo N° 19.426, el “Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio” fue firmado por el Estado costarricense, en la ciudad de Kumamoto, Japón, el día 10 de octubre de 2013 (folios 2 y 56). Asimismo, obra en el expediente electrónico de la consulta legislativa, documento remitido a esta Sala por el señor Óscar Omar Monge Castro, Jefe del Departamento de Tratados, Límites y Fronteras, del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, en el que consta que el señor Álvaro Cedeño Molinari, Embajador de Costa Rica en Japón, fue quien, a nombre y en representación del Gobierno de la República de Costa Rica, suscribió dicho convenio, acto para el cual, la entonces Presidenta de la República, señora Laura Chinchilla Miranda, con el refrendo de la Ministra a.i. de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, señora Gioconda Ubeda Rivera, le confirió Plenos Poderes. Si bien, de la lectura del artículo 140, inciso 10), de la Constitución Política, se desprende que la firma de los tratados internacionales es una atribución del Poder Ejecutivo, entendido como el órgano colegiado compuesto por el Presidente y el Ministro del Ramo, la propia Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados, aprobada mediante Ley N° 7615, de 24 de julio de 1996, en su artículo 7°, dispone, en relación con este tema:
“ARTÍCULO 7.- Plenos poderes. 1.- Para la adopción o la autenticación del texto de un tratado, o para manifestar el consentimiento del Estado en obligarse por un tratado, se considerará que una persona representa a un Estado: a) Si se presentan los adecuados plenos poderes…”.
De modo, que dicho funcionario se encontraba legitimado para proceder a la firma del Convenio en cuestión, en representación del Estado costarricense, en virtud de lo dispuesto en el citado artículo, toda vez que contaba con los poderes necesarios y suficientes para ello. Además, lo anterior se refuerza con el aval que le da el Presidente de la República al Convenio a través de las diversas etapas del procedimiento legislativo. Efectivamente, el proyecto de ley fue presentado ante la corriente legislativa, por parte del Poder Ejecutivo, en ejercicio de su poder de iniciativa, previsto en el artículo 140, inciso 5), de la Constitución Política (folios 1-77 de la copia del expediente legislativo). Asimismo, se acredita que, mediante Decreto Ejecutivo N° 38.950-MP, del 7 de abril de 2015 (folios 78 a 80 de la copia del expediente legislativo); Decreto Ejecutivo N° 39.111-MP, del 30 de julio de 2015 (folios 206 a 212 del 2015 (folios 269 a 277 de la copia del expediente legislativo); Decreto Ejecutivo N° 39.364-MP, del 3 de diciembre de 2015 (folios 278 a 280 de la copia del expediente legislativo); Decreto Ejecutivo N° 39.580-MP, del 28 de marzo de 2016 (folios 281 y 282 de la copia del expediente legislativo); Decreto Ejecutivo N° 39.583-MP, del 12 de abril de 2016 (folios 283 a 287 de la copia del expediente legislativo); Decreto Ejecutivo N° 39.584-MP, del 14 de abril de 2016 (folios 288 a 290 de la copia del expediente legislativo); y Decreto Ejecutivo N° 39.621-MP, del 18 de abril de 2016 (folios 291 a 294 de la copia del expediente legislativo), el Poder Ejecutivo convocó o amplió la convocatoria a sesiones extraordinarias, a fin de que la Asamblea Legislativa conociera, entre otros, el expediente legislativo N° 19.426, o bien, lo retiró del conocimiento de Sesiones Extraordinarias del Órgano Legislativo. De modo, que no se observa ningún vicio en relación con la suscripción del Convenio. También, se acreditó que el proyecto de ley fue publicado en el Alcance N° 28, del Diario Oficial La Gaceta, N° 82, de 29 de abril de 2015 (folios 82 y 83 del Nacional, en el formato denominado pdf, http://www.imprentanacional.go.cr/pub/2015/04/29/ALCA28_29_04_2015.pdf). El texto del proyecto fue remitido ante la Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior, donde, en Sesión Ordinaria N° 4, del 9 de julio de 2015, esa Comisión Permanente Especial, lo aprobó por votación unánime la totalidad de los ocho diputados presentes, sin que se le hiciera modificación alguna.
Sin embargo, aún cuando esta Sala no encuentra, en la tramitación del proyecto de ley en cuestión, irregularidad alguna que implique nulidad por ser contraria a la Constitución Política o al procedimiento legislativo regulado en el Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, que es parámetro de constitucionalidad, es preciso hacer algunas aclaraciones. Durante el período de sesiones extraordinarias de la Asamblea Legislativa, la iniciativa en la formación de las leyes la ostenta, exclusivamente, el Poder Ejecutivo, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 118, Constitucional, el cual faculta al Poder Ejecutivo para convocar a la Asamblea Legislativa a sesionar en forma extraordinaria, lo cual es reiterado en el artículo 140, inciso 14), de la Norma Fundamental. La convocatoria a sesiones extraordinarias, faculta a la Asamblea Legislativa para restablecer, en los períodos de forzada inactividad, la capacidad -que de otro modo no tendría- para ejercer sus propias competencias y, en concreto, para ejercitar la potestad legislativa; no obstante, sus competencias están sensiblemente limitadas, ya que depende de la voluntad del Poder Ejecutivo (en sentido similar, Sentencia Nº 5582-1998, de las 13:36 horas, del 31 de julio de 1998). En la convocatoria a Sesiones Extraordinarias, se hacen patentes las potestades del Poder Ejecutivo como colegislador, particularmente, en lo tocante a la iniciativa gubernativa o externa al órgano legislativo. Es claro, que ese poder de convocatoria a sesiones extraordinarias, es un medio indispensable, del Poder Ejecutivo, para incidir en las tareas parlamentarias, pues en este período, la Asamblea Legislativa tiene vedado reunirse de pleno derecho y sólo lo puede hacer, bajo la convocatoria del Ejecutivo. En este sentido, la norma constitucional dispone:
"Artículo 118.- El Poder Ejecutivo podrá convocar a la Asamblea Legislativa a sesiones extraordinarias. En estas no se conocerá de materias distintas a las expresadas en el decreto de convocatoria, excepto que se trate del nombramiento de funcionarios que corresponda hacer a la Asamblea, o de las reformas legales que fueren indispensables al resolver los asuntos sometidos a su conocimiento".
Según esta norma, la Asamblea Legislativa no puede conocer asuntos que no hayan sido incluidos en el Decreto de Convocatoria. Esto, sin perjuicio de las competencias relacionadas con los nombramientos de funcionarios que corresponda hacer al Poder Legislativo, o proyectos de ley sobre reformas legales que sean indispensables para resolver los asuntos sometidos al conocimiento del órgano legislativo, como bien señala el citado artículo. Esta Sala ya ha tenido ocasión de examinar y pronunciarse con respecto a los alcances de las potestades encomendadas a los órganos constitucionales durante el período de sesiones extraordinarias, Así, en Sentencia N° 6939-1996, de las 9:24 horas, del 20 de diciembre de 1996, consideró:
"VI. DEL PERÍODO DE SESIONES EXTRAORDINARIAS. En este orden de ideas, cabe señalar que por período de sesiones extraordinarias de la Asamblea Legislativa, se entiende la previsión que tiene la misma para reunirse fuera de los plazos establecidos con carácter normal. Es el artículo 118 constitucional, el que regula su convocatoria, correspondiendo al Poder Ejecutivo, de manera que en ellas, no se conocerá de materia distintas a las expresadas en el decreto de convocatoria, con excepción de lo que se trate de nombramientos de funcionarios que corresponda hacer a la Asamblea Legislativa, o de reformas legales que fueren indispensables al resolver los asuntos sometidos a su conocimiento. Se trata de una potestad de ejercicio discrecional. En relación con lo anterior, cabe aclarar que con el período de sesiones extraordinarias, la Asamblea Legislativa únicamente pierde la iniciativa legislativa, pero no las demás funciones a ella encomendadas, entre las que destacan precisamente dos: la de legislar y la de ejercer el control político. En virtud de lo dispuesto en el artículo 118 constitucional, se pretende que en Plenario se conozcan y voten exclusivamente los asuntos incluidos en el decreto de convocatoria del Poder Ejecutivo, por lo que la Asamblea Legislativa puede seguir funcionando normalmente en todas sus demás funciones, e inclusive puede rechazar un proyecto de ley del Ejecutivo, enviarlo a comisión, demorarlo, modificarlo, e incluirle asuntos no sugeridos por el Poder Ejecutivo, lo cual es propio de la dinámica del Parlamento. Sin embargo, no puede modificar o sustituir totalmente una propuesta, por la de algún diputado, pues su ejercicio está condicionado por el decreto de convocatoria. (…)".
Así, para la validez del procedimiento de aprobación de los proyectos de ley que se tramitan durante el período de las sesiones extraordinarias, es preciso que el Poder Ejecutivo haya convocado de manera indubitable a la Asamblea Legislativa con ese objeto. En efecto, la convocatoria fija las materias sobre las cuales la Asamblea Legislativa puede desplegar válidamente sus atribuciones, por lo que, en consecuencia, quedan excluidas todas aquellas que no se expresan en el Decreto de Convocatoria. Esto implica, ciertamente, una sujeción parcial y temporal, de la Asamblea Legislativa, a la voluntad del Poder Ejecutivo, manifestada en el Decreto de Convocatoria. No debe perderse de vista, que la convocatoria a sesiones extraordinarias constituye un acto típicamente político; y, por ende, su ejercicio es discrecional. En este sentido, la función gubernamental, como una actividad de dirección política es, normalmente, discrecional, y no tiene mayores límites que los dispuestos en la Constitución Política. De manera, que una de las formas en que el Ejecutivo participa en la actividad legislativa, es a través de la convocatoria a sesiones extraordinarias, por medio de la definición, en virtud de una planificación y programación previas, de los proyectos de ley prioritarios y urgentes para la buena marcha del Gobierno. En efecto, durante las sesiones extraordinarias, la agenda del Parlamento se define, facultativamente, atendiendo razones de dirección política, y se exterioriza a través del respectivo decreto ejecutivo. Por tratarse de una decisión política, goza de una esfera de discrecionalidad para salvaguardar su necesidad de adaptación a los requerimientos del país. En ese orden de ideas, dado que debe de adaptarse a las exigencias nacionales, se trata, entonces, de una decisión flexible; y, necesariamente, mutable. Por lo tanto, el Poder Ejecutivo puede, discrecionalmente, ampliar el decreto de convocatoria a sesiones extraordinarias, o bien, retirar los proyectos convocados. Para ello, puede basarse en la necesidad de que la Asamblea Legislativa conozca y discuta sobre los proyectos que el Poder Ejecutivo considere prioritarios en atención a los intereses colectivos para una correcta y sana gestión de gobierno. Resultaría absurdo y contrario al sistema ideado, que el Poder Ejecutivo, de alguna manera, quede sujeto a uno o varios decretos de convocatoria, pues en esta materia debe imperar una gran flexibilidad, en atención a las necesidades y a los requerimientos de carácter colectivo que le sirven de sustento y que están en constante mutación. Esta posición ya fue sostenida anteriormente por esta Tribunal Constitucional en Sentencia Nº 6939-1996, de las 9:24 horas, del 20 de diciembre de 1996, oportunidad en la que dijo:
"IV. DE LA INICIATIVA LEGISLATIVA. Respecto del primer punto, cabe señalar que la iniciativa legislativa es la fase introductoria o iniciadora del procedimiento legislativo, o dicho de otro modo, es la facultad de someter a un Parlamento un proyecto de ley sobre una cuestión determinada, con la consiguiente obligación de la Asamblea Legislativa de deliberar sobre él, salvo el caso de que, cuando la iniciativa proceda del Poder Ejecutivo, éste lo retire durante el período de sesiones extraordinarias. Técnicamente, la iniciativa no integra la potestad legislativa, aunque sí constituye una operación esencial dentro del procedimiento legislativo; se trata de un acto de impulso y no de un acto de decisión legislativa, en tanto la competencia legislativa reside exclusivamente en la Asamblea Legislativa -artículos 105 y 121 inciso 1) de la Constitución Política-. Por su parte, la iniciativa gubernativa se refiere a la facultad que se da al Poder Ejecutivo en virtud de lo dispuesto en el artículo 140 inciso 5) de la Constitución Política, para promover proyectos de ley, facultad que puede ejercer durante toda la legislatura, y con exclusividad en los períodos de sesiones extraordinarios -artículo 123 ibídem-. Sin embargo, el que corresponda al Poder Ejecutivo la iniciativa legislativa en exclusiva para un período determinado de sesiones de la Asamblea Legislativa, no quiere decir que la preparación y elaboración de los proyectos a discutir deban ser elaborados también en exclusiva por el Poder Ejecutivo, el mismo puede convocar al Parlamento para que discuta de algún proyecto que ya está en trámite en la Asamblea y que haya sido elaborado directamente por los diputados. En este sentido, cabe recalcar, que lo que interesa es que, mediante el decreto de convocatoria, sea el Poder Ejecutivo quien defina qué asuntos son de su interés, para que se tramiten y voten en el Plenario. Asimismo, es importante señalar que la doctrina es unánime en cuanto durante este período excepcional, el Poder Ejecutivo, así como dispone libremente de la facultad de proponer (no elaborar) los proyectos de ley que se tramitarán, así tiene la facultad para retirar los que considere, sin que ello implique violación a disposición o procedimiento legislativo alguno, siempre y cuando el mismo no haya sido definitivamente aprobado como Ley de la República. La iniciativa legislativa es un acto típicamente político, que por su propia naturaleza, es revocable por razones enteramente discrecionales, motivo por el cual, a su antojo y voluntad, el Poder Ejecutivo puede modificar la "agenda", es decir, los asuntos que somete a discusión de los diputados, sea ampliando la convocatoria incluyendo nuevos asuntos, o eliminando de la lista proyectos ya convocados (…)".
De lo dicho por esta Sala en la sentencia parcialmente transcrita, se colige que la reserva dispuesta en el artículo 118, de la Constitución Política, implica que la Asamblea Legislativa sólo puede legislar sobre los proyectos de ley incluidos en el Decreto de Convocatoria; y, a su vez, se ha reservado al Ejecutivo la determinación de la importancia y conveniencia de los proyectos que se incluyen en dicho decreto, posibilidad que es flexible y atiende a las prioridades e intereses del Gobierno. Incluso, esta Sala ha avalado la posibilidad que mediante decreto ejecutivo se desconvoquen todos los proyectos sometidos a conocimiento de la Asamblea Legislativa, pues sería un contrasentido, que atentaría contra el principio de razonabilidad, que el Ejecutivo no pudiera desconvocar lo que haya sido incluido en el respectivo decreto. Sobre el particular, este Tribunal, en Sentencia N° 057-98, de las 15:36 horas, del 7 de enero de 1998, resolvió lo siguiente:
"(…) De conformidad con lo que establecen los artículos 116 y 118 de la Constitución Política, la Asamblea Legislativa se reunirá cada año el día primero de mayo, aún cuando no haya sido convocada y sus sesiones ordinarias durarán seis meses, divididas en dos períodos, del primero de mayo al treinta y uno de julio y del primero de setiembre al treinta de noviembre. El Poder Ejecutivo, por su parte, podrá convocar a la Asamblea Legislativa a sesiones extraordinarias, en las que no se conocerá de materias distintas a las expresadas en el decreto de convocatoria, excepto que se trate del nombramiento de funcionarios que corresponda hacer a la Asamblea, o de las reformas legales que fueren indispensables al resolver los asuntos sometidos a su conocimiento. Es claro que en el caso bajo estudio, el retiro de los proyectos de ley por parte del Ejecutivo no implica que deba producirse el cierre de sesiones extraordinarias, por cuanto, nada impide que se vuelva a producir otra convocatoria, por encontrarse dentro del período constitucionalmente dispuesto para ello (…)".
La dirección política del Gobierno, precisa de la concreción de las decisiones, al determinar cuáles son los objetivos por lograr. De allí, que si el Decreto de Convocatoria a las sesiones extraordinarias, constituye un acto político y, en consecuencia, discrecional del Poder Ejecutivo, se puede concluir que el órgano dispone de amplias facultades para agregar o retirar proyectos de ley en atención a los intereses nacionales y a las razones de oportunidad y conveniencia. En el caso del proyecto de ley consultado, éste estaba incluido en los Decretos Ejecutivos de convocatoria -o ampliación de convocatoria- de la Asamblea Legislativa a sesiones extraordinarias. De modo, que la Asamblea Legislativa estaba en la posibilidad de deliberar sobre el proyecto de ley en cuestión. Por su parte, el Poder Ejecutivo hizo un manejo discrecional de las convocatorias y desconvocatorias a sesiones extraordinarias para conocer el proyecto de ley en cuestión. Lo así actuado por el Poder Ejecutivo, está dentro de las competencias constitucionalmente otorgadas, sin que con el ejercicio de tal facultad se viole algún principio constitucional, en particular, los de razonabilidad, proporcionalidad, publicidad y seguridad jurídica. Esto es así porque, precisamente, la facultad del Poder Ejecutivo consiste en la posibilidad de indicar qué proyectos de ley se pueden conocer durante el período de sesiones extraordinarias. La Constitución Política permite, al Poder Ejecutivo, convocar a la Asamblea Legislativa o no hacerlo, y, en el primero de los casos, es para la deliberación de los proyectos que ese Poder de la República proponga. De modo que puede, de conformidad con sus prioridades gubernamentales, no convocar a la Asamblea, suspender las sesiones o modificar, en atención a sus intereses, los términos de la convocatoria. Resulta evidente que las prioridades del Gobierno pueden mutar con el transcurso del tiempo y si estas se modifican, también pueden variar los proyectos para cuyo conocimiento y deliberación convoca a la Asamblea Legislativa. Cualquier rigidez en esta materia puede afectar la satisfacción de los intereses generales y la necesidad de regular determinados aspectos de la vida nacional. Por esta razón, el Poder Ejecutivo no está limitado para desconvocar proyectos de ley durante las sesiones extraordinarias y, además, goza de discrecionalidad relativa en el manejo de la agenda parlamentaria. En el caso bajo examen, el proyecto de ley consultado estaba incluido en los decretos de convocatoria o ampliación a sesiones extraordinarias y se encontraba agendado en el orden del día de la Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior. Por otra parte, ante las desconvocatorias de proyectos de ley por parte del Poder Ejecutivo, en ejercicio de las facultades otorgadas constitucionalmente, incluido el proyecto que aquí interesa, la consecuencia esperable y lógica es la modificación el orden del día previsto y que los Diputados entraran a conocer, únicamente, aquellos proyectos que sí se mantenían por el Gobierno en su Decreto de Convocatoria. Además, el ejercicio de esta facultad del Ejecutivo, no forma parte, propiamente, de los procedimientos legislativos, sino que se refiere a una práctica inveterada de ese Poder, que afecta el trámite de otros procedimientos. De cualquier modo, el proyecto de ley permaneció en la agenda legislativa, durante los períodos en que convocó al órgano legislativo para su conocimiento durante el período de sesiones extraordinarias, con lo cual no se vieran afectadas las posibilidades de participación, representación, oposición y deliberación de los Diputados, como tampoco los principios de publicidad y seguridad jurídica, aspectos resguardados por el procedimiento legislativo (ver en este mismo sentido la Sentencia N° 2006-06732, de las 14:47 horas, del 17de mayo de 2006). Así, en el caso de la tramitación del expediente N° 19.426, proyecto de ley “Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio”, durante el período de sesiones extraordinarias, la Comisión Especial Permanente de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior, sólo lo conoció cuando el Poder Ejecutivo, por medio del respectivo Decreto Ejecutivo, convocó o amplió la convocatoria a dichas sesiones extraordinarias e incluyó, dentro del decreto, el conocimiento de este proyecto de ley. Por otra parte, cesó en su conocimiento, cuando el Poder Ejecutivo, también por medio de decreto, lo retiró del conocimiento de las sesiones extraordinarias de la Asamblea Legislativa. Con lo cual, en lo que respecta a este punto, el procedimiento legislativo no presenta vicios de constitucionalidad.
Otro punto del procedimiento legislativo sobre el que es oportuno hacer un breve examen, es el relativo a las consultas que, en su momento, hizo la Comisión Especial Permanente de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior a varias instituciones públicas, así como también a sujetos de derecho privado. Efectivamente, en Sesión Ordinaria N° 2, del 18 de junio de 2015, la citada Comisión aprobó moción para que el proyecto de ley fuera consultado a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, al Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, al Ministerio de Salud y a las Cementeras del país. De igual modo, en Sesión Ordinaria N° 4, del 9 de julio de 2015, esa Comisión aprobó otra moción para que se consultara el proyecto de ley al Ministerio de Hacienda. Sin embargo, en esa misma sesión, se aprobó una moción de orden para que la Comisión acordara volver en el orden del día al conocimiento del expediente N° 19.426, “Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio", por lo que la Presidenta de la Comisión sometió a discusión por el fondo dicho proyecto de ley, el cual fue aprobado unánimemente por los ocho diputados presentes, sin haberse vencido aún el plazo otorgado -conforme a las prórrogas acordadas- para rendir algunos de los informes solicitados. Sin embargo, esto no constituye ninguna irregularidad que pueda considerarse grave en la tramitación del proyecto. Nótese, que las consultas hechas no son obligatorias, sino de decisión discrecional de la respectiva Comisión Legislativa. Su fin es recabar el criterio de determinados sectores públicos o privados que, eventualmente, podrían tener algún interés -en sentido amplio- en el proyecto de ley, lo que, en su momento, la Comisión Legislativa respectiva consideró oportuno, pero de las que podría, incluso, prescindir el órgano legislativo, en forma tácita o expresa. De cualquier modo, los informes de esas consultas bien podrían recibirse durante la tramitación del proyecto en el plenario, sin que el hecho de que, en definitiva, no se evacuen, pueda, de algún modo, invalidar el procedimiento legislativo. De manera tal, que resulta irrelevante si las consultas en cuestión no fueron atendidas -como en este caso en que únicamente constan los criterios de la Corte Suprema de Justicia y del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía con respecto al proyecto de ley- o si lo fueron vencido el plazo otorgado al efecto o si, finalmente, la Comisión Legislativa respectiva dictaminó el proyecto sin que hubiese vencido el plazo concedido para que las instituciones públicas o los sujetos de derecho privado se pronunciaran al efecto o, incluso, no hubiese ni siquiera empezado a correr dicho plazo, como sucedió con la consulta al Ministerio de Hacienda, pues en la misma sesión en que se solicitó, la Comisión legislativa dictaminó el proyecto de ley, ya que nada de ello constituye un vicio en el trámite legislativo capaz de invalidarlo.
No obstante lo dicho, es necesario hacer una valoración adicional con respecto a la posibilidad de los diputados de variar el orden del día y volver a conocer sobre un proyecto de ley que ya había sido conocido, según el orden del día de esa sesión, y que, por lo tanto, se trata de una fase del trámite legislativo ya precluida. Tal sucedió con el proyecto de ley bajo estudio, ya que en Sesión Ordinaria N° 4, del 9 de julio de 2015, la Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior, aprobó una moción de orden para que la Comisión acuerde volver en el orden del día al conocimiento del expediente N° 19.426, “Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio", que ya había sido discutido en esa misma sesión y cuyo conocimiento se había dado por terminado, pasando al conocimiento de otros asuntos. Así, la Presidenta de la Comisión, sometió a discusión por el fondo dicho proyecto de ley, el cual fue aprobado -unánimemente- por los ocho diputados presentes. Si bien, en un primer momento, el asesor del Departamento de Servicios Técnicos de la Asamblea Legislativa, señor Gustavo Sibaja Rojas, ante consulta de la Presidenta de la Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior, expresó verbalmente, en Sesión Ordinaria N° 4, del 9 de julio de 2015, que no veía problema alguno en volver al orden del día y conocer de nuevo sobre un proyecto de ley sobre el que ya se hubiese conocido en esa misma sesión, siempre que, como en este caso, todos los señores y señoras diputados y diputadas estuvieran de acuerdo y así lo decidiesen (folio 179 de la copia certificada del Presidenta de la Comisión (folios 190 a 195), ese mismo Departamento cambió su criterio y consideró que la práctica de retrotraer asuntos en la misma sesión para volverlos a conocer es contrario a los principios democrático, seguridad jurídica, publicidad, transparencia, preclusión de los actos y razonabilidad, por lo que estima esa práctica contraria a la Constitución Política. Analizado el asunto, esta Sala estima que ni uno ni otro criterio son válidos, ya que todo depende de las circunstancias en que dicha alteración del orden del día se produce. Esto quiere decir que habrá que valorar cada caso en concreto, a fin de determinar si, efectivamente, se produce o no lesión a los citados principios constitucionales y, en caso afirmativo, a trámites esenciales del procedimiento legislativo, como consecuencia. Del examen de las circunstancias en que se dio la vuelta al conocimiento del expediente N° 19.426, en Sesión Ordinaria N° 4, del 9 de julio de 2015, de la Comisión Permanente Especial de Relaciones Internacionales y Comercio Exterior, considera este Tribunal Constitucional que no se produjo lesión alguna a los citados principios constitucionales; y, por ende, tampoco violación esencial al procedimiento legislativo de aprobación del Convenio. El ambiente legislativo que rodeaba al proyecto de ley en Comisión, así como el criterio del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, era absolutamente favorable al proyecto de ley, sin que ninguna institución o sujeto de derecho privado haya externado reparo alguno al respecto. Y si bien es cierto, según el orden del día de la Sesión Ordinaria N° 4, del 9 de julio de 2015, ya se había conocido sobre el proyecto de ley en cuestión, también lo es que dicho conocimiento no había terminado, sino que había sido suspendido para conocer el resto de la agenda, a fin de dar tiempo para que compareciera el señor Rigoberto Blanco Sáenz, Director de la Dirección de Desarrollo de Servicios de Salud de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, a quien se le había citado para audiencia en esa sesión para que se refiriera al Convenio. De manera, que no había precluido aún ese punto de la agenda de la Comisión y, por lo tanto, bien podía, a través de una moción de orden, volver la Comisión sobre el asunto y votarlo, como efectivamente se hizo. No solo todos los señores y señoras diputados y diputadas estuvieron de acuerdo en dictaminar de forma inmediata ese proyecto de ley, dado lo apremiante que resulta para el país la aprobación del Convenio, sino que no existe ningún elemento que indique que hubiese alguien con un interés contrario que se haya visto sorprendido en sus intereses por la aprobación de ese proyecto de ley en Comisión. No hay ninguna lesión a los intereses y derechos de los diputados ni de la ciudadanía con el proceder de la Comisión, por lo que no existe razón para considerar que, en este caso, se haya dado una violación a un trámite esencial en el procedimiento legislativo en torno al proyecto de ley del expediente N° 19.426 por el hecho de que la Comisión, por unanimidad, haya acordado volver sobre ese proyecto y darle el dictamen unánime afirmativo. Adicionalmente, no se observa infracción a los derechos y potestades de los legisladores, pues el proyecto de ley fue conocido por el Plenario Legislativo como correspondía, por tratarse de un Convenio Internacional; y, por lo tanto, no podía ser delegado en una Comisión Legislativa con Potestad Plena, según lo establece el artículo 124, párrafo 3, de la Constitución Política, en relación con el 121, inciso 4), ibídem. De otra parte, el proyecto de ley en consulta fue convocado, en su momento, por el Poder Ejecutivo, para ser conocido en sesiones extraordinarias, según se relató anteriormente, respetándose lo dispuesto en el artículo 118, de la Constitución Política, y contó, para su aprobación en primer debate, con el voto unánime de los cuarenta diputados y diputadas presentes, según consta en el Acta de la Sesión Plenaria N° 25, llevada a cabo el 9 de junio de 2016 (folios 414 a 429 de la copia del expediente legislativo). En consecuencia, este Tribunal Constitucional advierte que en el trámite de aprobación del proyecto de ley denominado “Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio” , no se ha producido algún vicio sustancial o de trascendencia que lo invalide, por quebranto a principios esenciales, tales como, el democrático, de participación, de representación política, respeto de las minorías o de publicidad y transparencia.
V.- Observaciones en cuanto al fondo del proyecto. De previo a realizar algunas observaciones en cuanto al fondo del proyecto de ley consultado, debe tenerse presente que, de acuerdo con lo establecido en el artículo 101, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, el dictamen de esta Sala sólo será vinculante en cuanto establezca la existencia de trámites inconstitucionales del proyecto consultado. Además, en cuanto al contenido de los diversos artículos, se hará referencia a los aspectos más relevantes del Convenio, sin hacer un análisis de todos y cada uno de los artículos, ya que, en principio, se consideran conformes con el Derecho de la Constitución.
VI.- SOBRE LA CONSTITUCIONALIDAD DEL TRATADO CONSULTADO. El día 10 de octubre de 2013, en original y en textos auténticos en idioma árabe, chino, español, francés, inglés y ruso, fue suscrito en la ciudad de Kumamoto, Japón, el Convenio bajo estudio, con la finalidad -según consta en la exposición de motivos y en el propio texto del Acuerdo-, de “proteger la salud humana y el medio ambiente de las emisiones y liberaciones de mercurio y compuestos de mercurio ” (artículo 1, del Convenio consultado). Lo anterior, lejos de contravenir la Carta Constitucional, por el contrario, es acorde con ésta, en particular, con lo dispuesto en los artículos 21 y 50, de la Constitución Política, entre otros. Asimismo, analizado el contenido del articulado que conforma el Convenio consultado, este Tribunal Constitucional estima que, en términos generales, sustancialmente, es conforme con los preceptos, valores y principios fundamentales del Derecho de la Constitución.
VII.- DESCRIPCIÓN DE LA NORMATIVA DEL CONVENIO. Las normas contenidas en el Convenio bajo estudio -que conforman un total de treinta y cinco artículos, más cinco anexos (A, B, C, D y E)- son las propias y comunes que integran los convenios de esta naturaleza. Así, tal y como se detalla en el informe jurídico N° AL-DEST-IJU-175-2015, elaborado por el Departamento de Estudios, Referencias y Servicio Técnicos de la Asamblea Legislativa, en relación con el proyecto de ley que se tramita en generales en las que se establecen el objetivo general del Convenio y las definiciones de los términos empleados en él. En los artículos del 3 al 7, se establecen los compromisos de los Estados signatarios para la eliminación total de nuevas fuentes primarias de extracción de mercurio a partir del 2020, la moratoria de las ya existentes por un plazo determinado y la prohibición del uso de determinados productos que se emplean en la fabricación de compuestos de mercurio, definidos en los respectivos Anexos del Convenio, así como de ciertos procesos industriales que causan la emisión o liberación de mercurio, artículos cuyo comercio se prohíbe. Conforme con la técnica propia del Derecho Internacional, estas prohibiciones absolutas o a plazo determinado, contemplan excepciones y un procedimiento especial para que una Parte interesada pueda acoger o solicitar exenciones temporales con respecto a esas prohibiciones. Se contemplan también obligaciones de medios, no de resultados, que implican el compromiso de las Partes a realizar acciones, sin que se precise un límite o un resultado específico. Como parte de estas obligaciones de medios, se encuentra el deber de elaborar distintos planes de acción nacional para ir reduciendo o mitigando los factores humanos que sean fuente de emisiones o liberación de mercurio, así como el brindar cooperación internacional, concientizar a la población e intercambiar información científica, técnica o relevante. Otras obligaciones menores consisten en brindar informes nacionales o la remisión a obligaciones contempladas en otros instrumentos internacionales, como el de Basilea, sobre disposición de desechos peligrosos (artículo 11.3.a). Es importante resaltar, que del estudio del articulado, se colige que el Convenio no impone ninguna obligación financiera a las Partes más allá de la dotación a las instituciones nacionales con recursos para el cumplimiento efectivo de las obligaciones asumidas y, por el contrario, prevé la posibilidad de los Estados de acceder a los recursos del Fondo Fiduciario para el medio ambiente de Naciones Unidas para países en desarrollo (artículo 13, del Convenio). Se prevé, asimismo, la transferencia tecnológica (artículo 14, del Convenio) y se crean, además de la Conferencia de las Partes, un Comité de Aplicación y Cumplimiento de quince países miembros, que es el encargado de aplicar y verificar el cumplimiento de las obligaciones, y una Secretaría a cargo de las funciones burocráticas o asignadas por el Convenio al Director Ejecutivo del Programa para el Medio Ambiente de Naciones Unidas (artículos 15, 23 y 24, del Convenio). Se cierra el Convenio con las usuales regulaciones del derecho de los tratados relativas a enmiendas, entrada en vigor, depósito, textos auténticos y anexos (artículos 26 a 35, y Anexos A, B, C, D y E, del Convenio), todo lo cual no presenta ningún problema de constitucionalidad. En torno a las obligaciones que con la suscripción del Convenio adquiere el Estado, la única norma que se relaciona con el tema financiero, es el artículo 13, pero este lo único que impone a las Partes es la obligación de dotar a sus propios organismos nacionales, en la medida de sus posibilidades, de los recursos necesarios para la implementación del Convenio, lo cual ya está implícito desde el momento en que se adquieren esos compromisos. Por otra parte, la contribución con fondos para el Mecanismo creado en el Convenio, es solo una invitación, no una obligación (artículo 13, inciso 12, del Convenio) y se abre la posibilidad de acceder a los fondos de la cooperación internacional para países en desarrollo. De manera tal, que esta Sala estima que los compromisos asumidos por el país en este Convenio se enmarcan dentro de la previsión presupuestaria habitual, ya que esos compromisos son acciones que ya figuran dentro del giro ordinario de la institucionalidad nacional. En cuanto a las obligaciones de medios, no de resultados, que implican el compromiso de las Partes a realizar acciones, sin que se precise un límite o un resultado específico, únicamente tienen valor de directriz o de orientación política o, si se quiere, programático, pero no imponen ninguna responsabilidad al Estado y no pueden dar base a una reclamación internacional contra el Gobierno. Tal es el caso de las obligaciones que contienen los artículos 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19 y 20, del Convenio. Por el contrario, en los artículos 3 a 8, del Convenio, se impone a las Partes una serie de obligaciones sustantivas. Estas obligaciones o compromisos adquiridos por el Estado están referidos a la extracción primaria en minas, al uso de productos con compuestos de mercurio, a los procesos industriales, a la extracción artesanal de oro y al tema de las emisiones. En esta materia, las obligaciones del Estado van desde la prohibición de autorizar nuevas fuentes de extracción primaria de mercurio hasta la realización de un plan nacional tendente a la disminución o reducción de la presencia del mercurio. Dentro de estas obligaciones impuestas en el Convenio, está la de hacer un inventario de la situación del país en torno al tema del mercurio en cada uno de las áreas que contempla ese instrumento internacional. Todas estas obligaciones, que son propias de convenios de esta naturaleza y que constituyen una técnica normativa de amplia utilización en el derecho internacional y a las que voluntariamente pueden someterse los Estados, no solo no presentan ninguna contradicción con el Derecho de la Constitución, sino que, más bien, son acordes en todo con lo preceptuado en los artículos 21 y 50, de la Constitución Política. Además, del análisis de los compromisos que adquiere el Estado costarricense con la firma y aprobación legislativa del Convenio, se colige que las acciones a tomar en esta materia ya están incluidas en las competencias ordinarias de las instituciones nacionales relacionadas con el tema, por lo que no implica la dotación de recursos o competencias adicionales. En fin, todas las obligaciones impuestas en el Convenio, como la eliminación total de la extracción de nuevas fuentes de mercurio, la moratoria de las ya existentes dentro de un plazo determinado, la prohibición del uso de compuestos de mercurio, así como su paulatina eliminación, las adquiere el Estado pero con total respeto del ordenamiento interno y de los intereses nacionales, lo cual es propio de este tipo de convenios internacionales. El Convenio también contempla cláusulas temporales de excepción del cumplimiento de las obligaciones relativas a la fabricación, uso o utilización de procesos industriales que involucren mercurio, así como mecanismos de enmiendo y adopción del convenio y sus anexos, en consonancia con las legislaciones internas de los países, lo cual son regulaciones típicas y normales en el Derecho Internacional. Asimismo, en cuanto a la ratificación, aceptación, aprobación o adhesión al Convenio (artículo 30), a la imposibilidad de formular reservas al Convenio (artículo 32) y las condiciones y plazos de su denuncia (artículo 33), se trata también de disposiciones comunes del derecho de los tratados, cuyo sometimiento voluntario por parte del Estado no presenta ningún conflicto de constitucionalidad. En relación con el Anexo E, del Convenio, que trata sobre el procedimiento de arbitraje y conciliación, tampoco encuentra esta Sala reparo alguno de constitucionalidad, ya que se trata de normativa que es típica en esta materia en el Derecho Internacional y a la que voluntariamente se pueden someter los Estados, como lo es el caso de nuestro país al suscribir el Convenio. Por último, dado que este Convenio no implica, de modo alguno, la atribución o transferencia de competencias del Estado a un ordenamiento jurídico comunitario (artículo 121, inciso 4), de la Constitución Política), para su aprobación en primer y segundo debate, basta la mayoría absoluta de votos de los diputados y diputadas presentes en la sesión parlamentaria, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 119, de la Carta Política. Por otra parte, el conocimiento de este Convenio no puede ser delegado en una Comisión Legislativa Plena, de conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 124, párrafo tercero, Constitucional. Estos requisitos fueron satisfechos al aprobarse este Convenio en primer debate, en Sesión Plenaria Ordinaria N° 25, del 9 de junio de 2016, por votación unánime de los cuarenta diputados y diputadas presentes.
VIII.- Conclusión. En mérito de lo cuestión, no contiene vicios esenciales de procedimiento o disposiciones que lo invaliden.
Por tanto:
Se evacua la consulta en el sentido que el proyecto de ley “Convenio de Minamata sobre el Mercurio”, procedimiento, ni disposiciones inconstitucionales.- Fernando Cruz C.
a.i Nancy Hernández L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G.
Aracelly Pacheco S.
Enrique Ulate C.
Jose Paulino Hernández G.
Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador -- *V3DOYCL2IXQ61* Dirección electrónica: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6
Document not found. Documento no encontrado.