Summary dismissal of unconstitutionality action for failure to formally raise the claim in the underlying proceedingRechazo de plano de acción de inconstitucionalidad por ausencia de invocación formal en el asunto base

*160067820007CO* Res. No. 2016007812 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fourteen hours thirty minutes on the eighth of June of two thousand sixteen.

Action of unconstitutionality brought by LUIS ALONSO GUTIÉRREZ HERRERA, of legal age, attorney, notary public, identity card No. 2-433-967, resident of Alajuela, against articles 7, subsections c) and d), and 126, subsection d), all of the Código Notarial.

Resultando:

1.- By brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at 12:20 hrs. on May 27, 2016, the petitioner requests that the unconstitutionality of articles 7, subsections c) and d), and 126, subsection d), all of the Código Notarial, be declared. He indicates that the base matter, in which such regulations must be applied, is the disciplinary proceeding being processed against him before the Juzgado Notarial, in case file number 16-000323-627-NO. As to the merits, the petitioner considers that the regulation given by the legislator, regarding prohibitions, in the cited subsection c) of article 7 of the Código Notarial, is disproportionate and lacks support in the Law of the Constitution, because it starts from the partiality of the notary public in their conduct. He affirms that this incurs a contradiction (antinomy) with respect to what is regulated in article 35 of that same legal body. He maintains that there exists an insurmountable defect in legislative technique for violating the principles of legality and proportionality of norms. He claims, to that effect, that article 7, subsection c), of the Código Notarial establishes that the notary public is prohibited from authorizing acts or contracts "in which the notary has an interest." He affirms that the notary public will always hold an interest, given that, as a public official, in every act celebrated in their presence, they safeguard the interest in legality, legitimacy, and regularity of the parties' actions, that is, they are the guarantor of the public interest. He maintains that, furthermore, they have a financial interest, since they receive fees. He argues that, consequently, the simple mention that the notary possesses an "interest" in the act or contract is not sufficient to establish that a condition exists which vitiates their objectivity and impartiality. He adds that the reference to the term "interest," used by the legislator, is incomplete and empty, as to be able to fulfill the objective of restricting the personal freedom of the notary public. He claims that, instead, the norm should have referred to the existence of a "conflicting interest," but it did not do so. He considers that this implies an inadequate use of legislative technique to curtail personal freedoms of the notary public and the parties and, furthermore, infringes the principle of equality before the law and equivalence of forms to achieve regulations for similar situations based on proportional constitutional legal reasoning. He indicates that article 7, subsection d), of the Código Notarial includes a constitutional defect, by granting registrars the power to declare nullities in public instruments that have not been alleged by the parties. He claims that this inverts the principle of party autonomy (autonomía de la voluntad) in contractual matters and misapplies the guarantee of administrative legality derived from the principle of the same name of constitutional origin. He points out that the cited article establishes that the notary public is prohibited from authorizing acts or contracts contrary to law, ineffective ones, or those which require prior authorization for execution, while this has not been issued, "or any other action or requirement that prevents their registration in the public registries (registros públicos)." He affirms that, with this, the legislator granted a power of review and declaration of the legality of acts and contracts that is reserved to the ordinary jurisdiction and not to administrative officials. He states that with such normative provisions, the faculty of the notary public to participate as an advisor in acts or contracts in which persons related to them by affinity or consanguinity participate is sanctioned with an absolute prohibition, solely under the use of the indeterminate concept of the notary's "interest," which – in his opinion – is insufficient to be able to restrict both their freedom in the liberal exercise of a regulated public function, and the freedom of contract of the parties in persons of their trust. He adds that from articles 1 and 6 of the Código Notarial it is clearly inferred that the notary public is not a party to the acts and contracts celebrated in their presence and their function is merely that of an advisor, who acts at the request of the parties appearing before them, by virtue of the principle of party autonomy. He argues that, therefore, the insurmountable impediment provided for in the challenged regulations is not justified. He complains that there also exists an excess of legislative power, given that there is a clear disproportion between means and ends, regarding the challenged articles and their adjustment to the normative system defined in the Código Notarial itself. He claims that the objective of article 7, subsections c) and d), as well as of article 126, subsection d), all of the Código Notarial, is to guarantee what is provided in article 35 of that same normative body; however, he considers that the mechanism used by the legislator is invasive of freedom of contract and equality and infringes the constitutional principles of equality before the law and party autonomy. He affirms that the cited article 35 contemplates impartiality and objectivity as a duty in the exercise of the notarial profession. He considers that the excess in the exercise of the legislative function is found when the legislator, to protect such impartiality – an aspect that is exclusively a matter of personal assessment in relation to the position the notary finds themselves in – establishes a prohibition on what is grounds for recusal (excusa) in the conduct of the notary public. He claims that, by incurring an error in classifying the conduct of the cited article 7, a consequence is imposed in article 126, subsection d), which is tainted with unconstitutionality, by exceeding the constitutional principles of equality and legality. He maintains that the legislator regulated the conduct of judges in cases of impediments (impedimentos), recusals (excusas), and challenges (recusaciones), in the sense that the cause for impediment is relative when kinship exists and does not generate a nullity if the opposing party allows (habilita) the official to hear the matter. He points out, to that effect, that article 49, subsections 2) and 6), of the Código Procesal Civil provides that even when there exists some type of interest for the judge's relatives, if the blood relatives acquire a right in the outcome of the proceeding, there is an impediment, but if the opposing party allows the official, this impediment shall not weigh in the handling of the case, as long as a substitute judge does not intervene. He considers that a similar solution should be given in the case of the notary public, in the sense that if both parties agree that the impediment does not vitiate the impartiality and advisory role of the notary in the drafting of the contract about which will already exists, then, there exists neither nullity nor a need for the official to be automatically disqualified by operation of law (inhibido de pleno derecho) from hearing the case, since, under such hypothesis, there exists a recusal (excusa) rather than an impediment, which the parties must assess and resolve whether it in any way affects the legal case or contract that, in itself, they have already agreed to enter into. He maintains that the alleged unconstitutionality exists insofar as the legislator, in the enactment of both procedural norms, treated unequally one public official (notary) versus another (judge), with the aggravating factor that the former does not decide nor become involved in a conflict. He affirms that there also exists a relative legislative omission to regulate the cause for allowing the notary, as a result of an incorrect understanding of the notary's function and its confusion with the functions of the attorney. He claims that unlike an attorney, who defends their client, the notary public works authorizing notarial deeds independently and under a fee schedule (arancel), maintaining the impartiality of their actions, because they maintain detachment (ajenidad) in their conduct and in the relationships that the parties who come before them to request their advice establish. He indicates that, in accordance with the doctrine extracted from articles 35 and 36 of the Código Notarial, provided that the notary is obligated to ensure the impartiality and objectivity of their participation, they are able to review, ex officio (oficiosamente) and prior to the execution of contracts between the parties, the existence of any aspect that constitutes a recusal for them and compels their abstention from participating in the advisory role requested of them. He affirms that, in principle, the notarial function is not discretionary and the notary acts as a public servant and it is not possible for them to refuse to provide the service except under extreme conditions. He concludes that, then, since it is the notary public who determines whether partiality exists or not in their conduct, what was regulated by the legislator in article 7, subsections c) and d), and the consequence given in article 126, subsection d), all of the Código Notarial, is the product of an erroneous conception of the notarial function and the exercise of an abuse of the right given to the legislator to enact norms that develop the conduct of citizens in diverse situations. He requests that, consequently, this action of unconstitutionality be admitted.

2.- By resolution of 9:40 hrs. on May 30, 2016, the petitioner was warned that, within a period of three days, counted from the day following the notification of that resolution and under warning of being denied the processing of the action in case of non-compliance, they had to provide a literal certification of the brief in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the norm in the matter cited as the base (case file No. 16-000323-627-NO) and accredit the procedural status in which said matter is found. The foregoing in accordance with articles 75, 79, and 80 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

3.- By brief received in this Chamber at 15:59 hrs. on June 3, 2016, Laura Patricia Charpentier Soto, in her capacity as special judicial attorney-in-fact of the petitioner, indicates that she presents documentation in compliance with the warning issued by resolution of 9:40 hrs. on May 30, 2016.

4.- Article 9 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional authorizes the Chamber to reject, summarily (de plano) or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition submitted for its consideration that proves to be manifestly improper (improcedente), or when it considers that there exist sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it involves the simple reiteration or reproduction of a prior, equal, or similar petition that was rejected.

Drafted by Magistrate Jinesta Lobo; and,

Considerando:

I.- CONCERNING THE FORMAL PREREQUISITES (PRESUPUESTOS FORMALES) OF ADMISSIBILITY AND STANDING (LEGITIMACIÓN) FOR THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the action of unconstitutionality is a procedure with certain formalities, which, if not met, make it impossible for this Chamber to rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes the prerequisites of admissibility for actions of unconstitutionality and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in a judicial venue – including hábeas corpus or amparo remedies – or in an administrative one – in the procedure for exhaustion of the administrative remedy (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) –, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked, as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered harmed in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action – where the base matter is not required –, in the following cases: a) when by the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury; b) when it involves the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos), or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los Habitantes. Regarding the requirement of a matter pending resolution, established in the first paragraph of article 75 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, this Chamber has explained that, in such a case, the action of unconstitutionality is constituted or configured as:

"(...) a proceeding of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a matter pending resolution is required - whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure for exhausting the administrative remedy - in order to access the constitutional venue, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered harmed in the main matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative repercussion on that process pending resolution, because it manifests on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in that matter (...) ." (Judgment No. 4190-95 of 11:33 hrs. of July 28, 1995; emphasis not from the original).

Likewise, in judgment No. 1319-1997 of 14:51 hrs. of March 4, 1997, the following was considered:

"(…) Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes, as one of the prerequisites for filing an action of unconstitutionality, the existence of a matter pending resolution, as it constitutes the connection point that must exist between the process in which the norm reputed unconstitutional is applied and the object of the constitutional proceeding, and the basis that legitimizes the petitioner's claim as the last procedural remedy, in the exercise of the right to constitutional jurisdiction. The rigor in standing (legitimación) to access the constitutional jurisdiction, rather than constituting an obstacle to prevent the control of the constitutionality of laws, constitutes the channel for the right of access to justice, derived from the existence of a 'prior matter' that has motivated that discordance or contradiction between the law and the Constitution, in order to maintain the -special- jurisdictional function, and not to distort the purity of the system of relations among the constitutional powers of the State, of which the Chamber is a part, because as a member thereof, it is not entirely free and unlimited in its actions. For this reason, the action of unconstitutionality requires its existence - of the prior matter - as a reasonable means to protect the defense of the right or interest considered harmed. However, the reasonableness of the action of unconstitutionality as a means of defense for the petitioner should not be analyzed only within the context of the prior matter, but immersed in the constitutional legal framework governing the actions of this Chamber. It is not, then, a particular consideration of the unconstitutionality of a normative provision, to file an action without requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution, but rather, it is necessary to demonstrate that it constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed. (…)” Based on the cited precedents and the jurisprudential line of this Chamber, it is deduced that the action proceeding is, principally, of an incidental nature, and therefore, a matter pending resolution in the administrative venue – in the administrative challenge proceeding against the final act – or judicial venue is required for the action to prosper. Thus, only in exceptional cases established by law, will the existence of that requirement not be necessary.

II.- CONCERNING THE STANDING AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. As indicated, article 75, first paragraph, in fine, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional presupposes, for purposes of admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality via the incidental route, the existence of a main matter pending resolution, whether before the courts – including hábeas corpus or amparo –, or in the procedure for exhausting the administrative remedy, in which that unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed. Such requirements do not translate into a merely formal matter, because simple compliance therewith is not sufficient; it is further required that the norm challenged through this route have a direct impact on the matter serving as the base, such that what is resolved in the action serves as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest harmed within the prior matter. A contrario sensu, if there is no direct connection between the object of discussion in the base matter and what is challenged in the action, it is not possible for this Chamber to rule in that regard. It is for the foregoing that, in accordance with articles 75 and 79 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, petitioners must accredit and provide a literal certification of the brief in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the norms in the base matter, in order to verify their impact on such matter. In the case at hand, the petitioner expressly cites, for purposes of supporting the standing he holds to bring this action of unconstitutionality, the disciplinary proceeding being processed before the Juzgado Notarial of the Primer Circuito Judicial de San José in case file No. 16-000323-0627-NO; however, following a warning made by this Court – for the purpose of having him provide a literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the norm in said base matter was invoked –, the petitioner's special judicial attorney-in-fact provided, solely, a copy of the response (contestación) submitted by the petitioner in the referenced disciplinary proceeding, and from the reading of that brief, it is verified that the unconstitutionality of articles 7, subsections c) and d), and 126, subsection d), all of the Código Notarial, was not invoked therein in a formal and explicit manner. Although this Chamber has indicated that an extensive grounding is not required in the invocation of unconstitutionality of the norm, the truth is that it is necessary that in the base matter, the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action be expressly argued, and the constitutional norms considered infringed be indicated (see, for example, recently, judgment No. 2014000851 of 14:30 hours of January 22, 2014), aspects which are not accredited in the case under study. Therefore, this action is inadmissible and its summary rejection (rechazo de plano) proceeds, as is hereby ordered.

Por tanto:

The action is summarily rejected (se rechaza de plano).

Ernesto Jinesta L. President Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V.

Paul Rueda L.

Nancy Hernández L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jose Paulino Hernández G.

Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador -- *MLENTSITXOI61* Telephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712.

Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6 Res. Nº 2016007812 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fourteen hours thirty minutes on the eighth of June of two thousand sixteen.

Action of unconstitutionality brought by LUIS ALONSO GUTIÉRREZ HERRERA, adult, attorney, notary public, identity card No. 2-433-967, resident of Alajuela, against articles 7, subsections c) and d), and 126, subsection d), all of the Notarial Code.

Resultando:

1.- By brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at 12:20 hrs. on May 27, 2016, the petitioner requests that the unconstitutionality of articles 7, subsections c) and d), and 126, subsection d), all of the Notarial Code be declared. He indicates that the base matter, in which such regulations must be applied, is the disciplinary process being processed against him before the Notarial Court, in case file number 16-000323-627-NO. Regarding the merits, the petitioner considers that the regulation given by the legislator, regarding prohibitions, in the cited subsection c) of article 7 of the Notarial Code, is disproportionate and lacks support in Constitutional Law, because it assumes the partiality of the notary public in their conduct. He states that this incurs an antinomy with respect to what is regulated in ordinal 35 of that same legal body. He maintains that there is an insurmountable defect in legislative technique for violating the principles of legality and proportionality of norms. He alleges, to that effect, that ordinal 7, subsection c), of the Notarial Code establishes that the notary public is prohibited from authorizing acts or contracts "in which the notary has an interest." He states that the notary public will always have an interest, since, as a public official, in each proceeding that is celebrated in their presence, they safeguard the interest in the legality, legitimacy, and regularity of the parties' actions, that is, they are the guarantor of the public interest.

He further maintains that he has an economic interest, given that he receives fees. He argues that, consequently, the mere mention that the notary has an "interest" (interés) in the act or contract is not sufficient to establish that a condition exists that vitiates his objectivity and impartiality. He adds that the reference to the term "interest" (interés), used by the legislator, is incomplete and empty, such that it cannot fulfill the objective of restricting the personal freedom of the notary public. He alleges that, instead, the rule should have referred to the existence of a "conflicting interest" (interés contrapuesto), but it did not do so. He considers that this represents an inappropriate use of legislative technique to curtail the personal freedoms of the notary public and of the parties and, additionally, violates the principle of equality before the law and equivalence of forms for achieving regulations of similar situations based on proportional constitutional legal reasoning. He indicates that Article 7, subsection d), of the Notarial Code (Código Notarial) includes a constitutional defect, by granting registrars the power to declare nullities in public instruments that have not been alleged by the parties. He alleges that this inverts the principle of autonomy of will in contractual matters and disapplies the guarantee of administrative legality derived from the principle of the same name of constitutional origin. He points out that the cited provision establishes that the notary public is prohibited from authorizing acts or contracts contrary to law, ineffective ones, or those that require prior authorization for execution, as long as such authorization has not been issued, "or any other action or requirement that prevents their registration in the public registries." He affirms that, with this, the legislator granted a power of review and declaration of the legality of acts and contracts that is reserved to the ordinary jurisdiction and not to administrative officials. He states that these normative provisions penalize, with absolute prohibition, the notary public's faculty to participate as an advisor within acts or contracts involving persons related to him by affinity or consanguinity, solely based on the use of the indeterminate concept of the notary's "interest" (interés), which –in his judgment– is insufficient to restrict both his freedom in the liberal exercise of a regulated public function and the parties' freedom to contract with persons of their trust. He adds that from Articles 1 and 6 of the Notarial Code, it is clearly inferred that the notary public is not a party to the acts and contracts executed in his presence and his function is merely that of an advisor, who acts at the request of the parties appearing before him, by virtue of the principle of autonomy of will. He argues that, due to the foregoing, the insurmountable impediment provided for in the challenged regulations is not justified. He also claims that there is an excess of legislative power, since there is a clear disproportion between means and ends, regarding the challenged articles and their adjustment to the normative system defined in the Notarial Code itself. He alleges that the objective of Article 7, subsections c) and d), as well as Article 126, subsection d), all of the Notarial Code, is to guarantee what is provided in Article 35 of that same normative body; however, he considers that the mechanism used by the legislator is invasive of freedom of contract and equality and violates the constitutional principles of equality before the law and autonomy of will. He affirms that the cited Article 35 contemplates impartiality and objectivity as a duty in the exercise of the public notarial function. He considers that the excess in the exercise of the legislative function occurs when the legislator, to safeguard such impartiality –an aspect that is exclusively a matter of personal assessment in relation to the position in which the notary finds himself–, establishes a prohibition on what is a ground for excuse in the notary public's action. He alleges that, by incurring an error in classifying the conduct of said Article 7, a consequence is imposed in Article 126, subsection d), which is vitiated by unconstitutionality, by exceeding the constitutional principles of equality and legality. He maintains that the legislator regulated the action of judges in the hypothesis of impediments, excuses, and recusals, in the sense that the cause of impediment is relative when a kinship exists and does not generate a nullity if the counterparty empowers the official to hear the matter. He points out, to that effect, that Article 49, subsections 2) and 6), of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) provides that even when there is some type of interest for relatives of the judge, if the consanguineous parties acquire a right from the outcome of the proceeding, there is an impediment, but if the opposing party empowers the official, this impediment shall not weigh on the hearing of the case, as long as a substitute judge does not intervene. He deems that a similar solution should be given in the case of the notary public, in the sense that if both parties agree that the impediment does not vitiate the notary's impartiality and advice in drafting the contract regarding which will already exists, then, there is neither nullity nor a need for the official to be, as a matter of law, disqualified from hearing the case, since, under such hypothesis, there is an excuse rather than an impediment, which the parties must assess and decide if it in any way affects the case or legal contract that they, in any event, have already agreed to execute. He maintains that the alleged unconstitutionality exists insofar as the legislator, in enacting both procedural norms, treated one public official (notary) unequally compared to another (judge), with the aggravating factor that the former does not resolve nor become involved in a conflict. He affirms that there is also a relative legislative omission to regulate the cause for empowering the notary, as a product of an incorrect understanding of the notary's function and its confusion with the functions of an attorney. He alleges that unlike an attorney, who defends his client, the notary public works by authorizing public deeds independently and under a fee schedule, maintaining the impartiality of his action, as he maintains detachment in his conduct and in the relationships proposed by the parties who come before him requesting his advice. He indicates that, in accordance with the doctrine extracted from Articles 35 and 36 of the Notarial Code, provided that the notary is obliged to ensure the impartiality and objectivity of his participation, he is able to review, ex officio and prior to the execution of contracts between the parties, the existence of any aspect that constitutes an excuse for him and compels his abstention from participating in the advice requested of him. He affirms that, in principle, the notarial function is not discretionary and the notary acts as a public servant and cannot refuse to provide the service except in extreme conditions. He concludes that, therefore, it being the notary public who determines whether there is partiality or not in his conduct, what the legislator regulated in Article 7, subsections c) and d), and the consequence given in Article 126, subsection d), all of the Notarial Code, is the product of an erroneous conception of the notarial function and an exercise of abuse of the right granted to the legislator to enact norms that develop the conduct of citizens in various situations. He requests that, consequently, this action of unconstitutionality be granted.

2.- By a ruling issued at 9:40 a.m. on May 30, 2016, the petitioner was warned that, within three days, counted from the day following the notification of that ruling and under warning of denying the processing of the action in case of non-compliance, he had to provide a literal certification of the filing in which he invoked the unconstitutionality of the rule in the matter cited as the basis (case file No. 16-000323-627-NO) and certify the procedural status of that matter. The foregoing in accordance with Articles 75, 79, and 80 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

3.- Through a filing received in this Chamber (Sala) at 3:59 p.m. on June 3, 2016, Laura Patricia Charpentier Soto, in her capacity as special judicial representative of the petitioner, indicated that she was submitting documentation in compliance with the warning issued by the ruling of 9:40 a.m. on May 30, 2016.

4.- Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject, outright or on the merits, at any time, including from its submission, any filing brought before it that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it deems that sufficient elements of judgment exist to reject it, or that it involves the simple reiteration or reproduction of a previous identical or similar filing that was rejected.

Drafted by Magistrate Jinesta Lobo; and,

Considering:

I.- ON THE FORMAL PREREQUISITES FOR ADMISSIBILITY AND STANDING OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. This Chamber has repeatedly noted that the action of unconstitutionality is a procedure with specific formalities, which, if not met, make it impossible for this Chamber to rule on the merits. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the prerequisites for admissibility for actions of unconstitutionality and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in a judicial venue –including habeas corpus or amparo appeals– or in an administrative one –in the procedure for exhausting this route–, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged rule is invoked, as a reasonable means to protect the right considered harmed in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action –the underlying matter is not required–, in the following cases: a) when due to the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct harm; b) it involves the defense of diffuse interests, or those concerning the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Attorney General (Procurador General de la República), the Comptroller General (Contralor General de la República), the Prosecutor General (Fiscal General de la República), and the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes). Regarding the requirement of a matter pending resolution, established in the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, this Chamber has explained that, in such a case, the action of unconstitutionality is constituted or configured as:

"(...) a proceeding of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a matter pending resolution is required –whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route– to access the constitutional route, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered harmed in the main matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on said pending proceeding, since it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter (...)." (Judgment No. 4190-95 of 11:33 a.m. on July 28, 1995; the emphasis is not original).

Likewise, in judgment No. 1319-1997 of 2:51 p.m. on March 4, 1997, the following was considered:

"(...) Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes as one of the prerequisites for filing an action of unconstitutionality, the existence of a matter pending resolution, as it constitutes the point of connection that must exist between the proceeding in which the norm deemed unconstitutional is applied and the object of the constitutional proceeding, and the basis that legitimizes the petitioner's claim as a last procedural remedy, in the exercise of the right to constitutional jurisdiction. The rigor in standing to access constitutional jurisdiction, more than constituting an obstacle to prevent constitutional review of laws, constitutes the channel for the right of access to justice, derived from the existence of a 'prior matter' that has motivated that discordance or contradiction between the law and the Constitution, to maintain the jurisdictional function –special–, and not distort the purity of the system of relations of the constitutional powers of the State, of which this Chamber is a part, because as a member of those, it is not entirely free and unlimited in its actions. For this reason, the action of unconstitutionality requires its existence –of the prior matter– as a reasonable means to protect the defense of the right or interest considered harmed. However, the reasonableness of the action of unconstitutionality as a means of defense for the petitioner must not be analyzed solely within the context of the prior matter, but immersed in the constitutional legal framework governing the actions of this Chamber. It is not, then, a matter of a particular consideration of the unconstitutionality of a normative provision, so as to file an action without requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution; rather, it is necessary to demonstrate that it constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right or interest deemed harmed. (...)"

Based on the cited precedents and the jurisprudential line of this Chamber, it is inferred that the action proceeding is, principally, of an incidental nature, such that a matter pending resolution is required –in the administrative route, within the administrative procedure challenging the final act, or judicial route– for the action to proceed. Thus, only in exceptional cases established by law will the existence of that requirement not be necessary.

II.- ON THE STANDING AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE PRESENT ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. As indicated, Article 75, first paragraph, in fine, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction presupposes, for the purposes of admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality via the incidental route, the existence of a main matter pending resolution, whether before the courts –including habeas corpus or amparo–, or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route, in which such unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed. Such requirements do not translate into a merely formal matter, since mere compliance therewith is not enough; it is further required that the norm challenged through this route have a direct impact on the matter serving as the basis, such that what is resolved in the action serves as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest harmed within the prior matter. A contrario sensu, if there is no direct connection between the object of discussion in the underlying matter and what is challenged in the action, it is not possible for this Chamber to rule on it. It is for the foregoing reason that, in accordance with Articles 75 and 79 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, petitioners must certify and provide a literal certification of the filing in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the norms in the underlying matter, in order to verify its impact on such matter. In the present case, the petitioner expressly cites, for the purpose of substantiating the standing he holds to bring this action of unconstitutionality, the disciplinary proceeding being processed before the Notarial Court (Juzgado Notarial) of the First Judicial Circuit of San José under case file No. 16-000323-0627-NO; however, following a warning issued to him by this Tribunal –to the effect that he provide a literal certification of the filing in which the unconstitutionality of the norm was invoked in said underlying matter–, the special judicial representative of the petitioner submitted only a copy of the response filed by the petitioner in the referred disciplinary proceeding, and from a reading of that filing, it is verified that the unconstitutionality of Articles 7, subsections c) and d), and 126, subsection d), all of the Notarial Code, was not invoked therein in a formal and explicit manner. Although this Chamber has indicated that an extensive legal argument is not required when invoking the unconstitutionality of a norm, the fact is that it is indeed necessary that the underlying matter expressly argue the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action and indicate the constitutional norms that are considered infringed (see, for example, recently, judgment No.

2014000851 at 2:30 p.m. on January 22, 2014), aspects that are not proven in the case under study. Therefore, this action is inadmissible and its outright rejection is appropriate, as is hereby ordered.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza de plano la acción.

Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador -- *MLENTSITXOI61* Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Supreme Court of Justice Building, San José, Catedral District, González Lahmann Neighborhood, streets 19 and 21, avenues 8 and 6 "…Although this Chamber has indicated that an extensive legal argument is not required when alleging the unconstitutionality of a norm, it is indeed necessary that, in the underlying case, the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action be expressly argued and the constitutional provisions considered to be infringed be indicated (see, for example, recently, judgment No. 2014000851 of 14:30 hours on January 22, 2014), aspects that are not substantiated in the case under study…" Res.

Nº 2016007812 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fourteen hours and thirty minutes on June eighth, two thousand sixteen.

An unconstitutionality action filed by **LUIS ALONSO GUTIÉRREZ HERRERA**, of legal age, attorney, notary public, identity card No. 2-433-967, resident of Alajuela, against articles 7, subsections c) and d), and 126, subsection d), all of the Notarial Code.

**Whereas:** **1.-** Through a brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at 12:20 hrs. on May 27, 2016, the plaintiff requests that the unconstitutionality of articles 7, subsections c) and d), and 126, subsection d), all of the Notarial Code, be declared. He indicates that the base matter, in which such regulations must be applied, is the disciplinary proceeding being processed against him before the Notarial Court, in case file number 16-000323-627-NO. On the merits, the plaintiff considers that the regulation provided by the legislator, regarding prohibitions, in the cited subsection c) of article 7 of the Notarial Code, is disproportionate and lacks support in Constitutional Law, since it presumes partiality on the part of the notary public in their actions. He affirms that this creates an antinomy with respect to what is regulated in section 35 of that same legal body. He maintains that there is an irreparable defect in legislative technique, as it violates the principles of legality and proportionality of norms. He alleges, to this effect, that section 7, subsection c), of the Notarial Code establishes that the notary public is prohibited from authorizing acts or contracts "in which the notary has an interest." He affirms that the notary public will always have an interest, since, as a public official, in every act celebrated in their presence, they safeguard the interest in the legality, legitimacy, and regularity of the parties' actions, that is, they are the guarantor of the public interest. He maintains that, in addition, they have an economic interest, given that they receive fees. He argues that, consequently, the simple mention that the notary has an "interest" in the act or contract is not sufficient to establish that there is a condition that vitiates their objectivity and impartiality. He adds that the reference to the term "interest," used by the legislator, is incomplete and empty, such that it cannot fulfill the objective of restricting the personal freedom of the notary public. He alleges that, instead, the norm should have referred to the existence of a "conflicting interest," but it did not do so. He considers that this represents an inadequate use of legislative technique to curtail the personal freedoms of the notary public and the parties, and, in addition, the principle of equality before the law and equivalence of forms for achieving regulation of similar situations based on proportional constitutional legal reasoning is infringed. He indicates that section 7, subsection d), of the Notarial Code contains a constitutional defect, by conferring upon registrars the power to declare nullities in public instruments that have not been alleged by the parties. He alleges that this inverts the principle of autonomy of will in contractual matters and disapplies the guarantee of administrative legality derived from the principle of the same name of constitutional origin. He points out that the cited numeral establishes that the notary public is prohibited from authorizing acts or contracts contrary to law, ineffective ones, or those that require prior authorization for their execution, so long as this has not been granted, "or any other proceeding or requirement that prevents their registration in the public registries." He affirms that, with this, the legislator granted a power of review and declaration of the legality of acts and contracts that is reserved for the ordinary jurisdiction and not for administrative officials. He states that with such normative provisions, the notary public's authority to participate as an advisor in acts or contracts involving persons related to them by affinity or consanguinity is sanctioned with an absolute prohibition, solely based on the use of the indeterminate concept of the notary's "interest," which—in his opinion—is insufficient to be able to restrict both their freedom in the liberal exercise of a regulated public function and the freedom of contract of the parties in persons of their trust. He adds that from articles 1 and 6 of the Notarial Code it is clearly inferred that the notary public is not a party to the acts and contracts celebrated in their presence, and their function is merely that of an advisor, who acts at the request of the parties appearing before them, by virtue of the principle of autonomy of will. He argues that, therefore, the insurmountable impediment provided for in the questioned regulations is not justified. He claims that there is also an excess of legislative power, since there is a clear disproportion between means and ends, regarding the challenged articles and their adjustment to the normative system defined in the Notarial Code itself. He alleges that the objective of article 7, subsections c) and d), as well as numeral 126, subsection d), all of the Notarial Code, is to guarantee the provisions of section 35 of that same normative body; however, he considers that the mechanism used by the legislator is invasive of the freedom of contract and equality, and infringes the constitutional principles of equality before the law and autonomy of will. He affirms that the cited article 35 contemplates impartiality and objectivity as duties in the exercise of public notarial practice. He considers that the excess in the exercise of the legislative function is found where the legislator, to protect such impartiality—an aspect that is exclusively a matter of personal assessment in relation to the position in which the notary finds themselves—establishes a prohibition on what constitutes grounds for excuse in the notary public's actions. He alleges that, by making an error in classifying the conduct of the cited article 7, a consequence is imposed in numeral 126, subsection d), which is vitiated by unconstitutionality, as it exceeds the constitutional principles of equality and legality. He maintains that the legislator regulated the actions of judges in the hypothesis of impediments, excuses, and recusals, in the sense that the cause for impediment is relative when there is kinship and does not generate a nullity if the counterparty enables the official to hear the matter. He points out, to this effect, that article 49, subsections 2) and 6), of the Civil Procedure Code provides that even if there is some type of interest for the judge's relatives, if the consanguineous parties acquire a right in the outcome of the proceeding, there is an impediment, but if the opposing party enables the official, this impediment will not weigh upon the handling of the case, so long as a substitute judge does not intervene. He considers that a similar solution should be applied in the case of the notary public, in the sense that if both parties agree that the impediment does not vitiate the notary's impartiality and advisory role in the preparation of the contract regarding which there is already intent, then there is neither nullity nor need for the official to be, by operation of law, barred from hearing the case, since, under such hypothesis, there is an excuse rather than an impediment, which must be assessed by the parties, who must decide if it in any way affects the case or legal contract that they have, in any case, already agreed to celebrate. He maintains that the alleged unconstitutionality exists to the extent that the legislator, in the enactment of both procedural norms, treated a public official (notary) unequally compared to another (judge), with the aggravating factor that the former does not resolve or become involved in a conflict. He affirms that there is also a relative legislative omission in regulating the cause for enabling the notary, as a result of an incorrect understanding of the notary's function and its confusion with the functions of an attorney. He alleges that unlike an attorney, who defends their client, the notary public works authorizing public deeds independently and under a fee schedule, maintaining the impartiality of their actions, given that they maintain detachment in their conduct and in the relationships proposed by the parties who come before them to request their advisory services. He indicates that, in accordance with the doctrine extracted from articles 35 and 36 of the Notarial Code, whenever the notary is obliged to ensure the impartiality and objectivity of their participation, they are in a position to review, on their own initiative and prior to the execution of contracts between the parties, the existence of any aspect that constitutes an excuse for them and obliges their abstention from participating in the advisory service requested of them. He affirms that, in principle, the notarial function is not discretionary, and the notary acts as a public servant and it is not possible for them to refuse to provide the service except under extreme conditions. He concludes that, therefore, it being the notary public who determines whether there is partiality or not in their conduct, what the legislator regulated in numeral 7, subsections c) and d), and the consequence given in numeral 126, subsection d), all of the Notarial Code, is the product of an erroneous conception of the notarial function and the exercise of an abuse of the right given to the legislator to enact norms that develop the conduct of citizens in various situations. He requests that, consequently, this unconstitutionality action be granted.

**2.-** By resolution at 9:40 hrs. on May 30, 2016, the plaintiff was mandated, within a period of three days, counted from the day following notification of that resolution and under warning of denying processing to the action in case of non-compliance, to provide a literal certification of the brief in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the norm in the matter cited as the base (case file No. 16-000323-627-NO) and to certify the procedural status of said matter. The above in conformity with articles 75, 79, and 80 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.

**3.-** Through a brief received in this Chamber at 15:59 hrs. on June 3, 2016, Laura Patricia Charpentier Soto, in her capacity as special judicial representative of the plaintiff, indicates that she submits documentation in compliance with the mandate issued by resolution at 9:40 hrs. on May 30, 2016.

**4.-** Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to dismiss outright or on the merits, at any time, including from its submission, any motion brought before it that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is the simple reiteration or reproduction of a previous equal or similar rejected motion.

Drafted by Judge **Jinesta Lobo**; and, **Considering:** **I.- ON THE FORMAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSIBILITY AND STANDING OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTION.** This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the unconstitutionality action is a procedure with specific formalities, which, if not met, make it impossible for this Chamber to rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the admissibility requirements for unconstitutionality actions and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in a judicial venue—including habeas corpus or amparo appeals—or in the administrative venue—in the procedure for exhausting this route—, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right considered injured in the principal matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action—the base matter is not required—, in the following cases: a) when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury; b) it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Attorney General of the Republic, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, and the Ombudsman. Regarding the requirement of a matter pending resolution, established in the first paragraph of article 75 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, this Chamber has explained that, in such case, the unconstitutionality action is constituted or configured as:

"(...) *a proceeding of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a matter pending resolution is required—whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route—in order to access the constitutional route, but in such a way that, **the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the principal matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on said pending proceeding**, since it manifests on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter* (...)" (Judgment No. 4190-95 at 11:33 hrs. on July 28, 1995; the emphasis does not correspond to the original).

Likewise, in judgment No. 1319-1997 at 14:51 hrs. on March 4, 1997, the following was considered:

"(...) *Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes, as one of the prerequisites for filing the unconstitutionality action, the existence of a matter pending resolution, as it constitutes the connection point that must exist between the proceeding in which the norm deemed unconstitutional is applied, the object of the constitutional proceeding, and the foundation that legitimizes the plaintiff's claim as a last procedural remedy, in the exercise of the right to constitutional jurisdiction. The rigor in standing to access constitutional jurisdiction, more than constituting an obstacle to preventing the control of the constitutionality of laws, constitutes the channel for the right of access to justice, derived from the existence of a "prior matter" that has motivated that discordance or contradiction between the law and the Constitution, to maintain the jurisdictional function—special—, and not distort the purity of the system of relations among the constitutional powers of the State, of which the Chamber is part, because as a member of those, it is not entirely free and unlimited in its actions. For this reason, the unconstitutionality action requires its existence—of the prior matter—as a reasonable means to protect the defense of the right or interest that is considered injured. However, the reasonableness of the unconstitutionality action as a means of defense for the plaintiff must not be analyzed only within the context of the prior matter, but rather immersed in the constitutional legal framework that governs the actions of this Chamber. It is not, then, a matter of a particular consideration of the unconstitutionality of a normative provision, to file an action without requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution, but rather, it is necessary to demonstrate that it constitutes a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest that is deemed injured.* (...)”

Based on the cited precedents and the jurisprudential line of this Chamber, it is inferred that the action proceeding is, principally, of an incidental nature, and therefore a matter pending resolution in the administrative venue—in the administrative proceeding for challenging the final act—or judicial venue is required for the action to proceed. Thus, only in exceptional cases established by law will the existence of this requirement not be necessary.

**II.- ON THE STANDING AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THIS UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTION.** As indicated, article 75, first paragraph, *in fine*, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction presupposes, for purposes of the admissibility of an unconstitutionality action through the incidental route, the existence of a principal matter pending resolution, whether before the courts—including habeas corpus or amparo—, or in the procedure for exhausting the administrative route, in which that unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. Such requirements do not translate into a merely formal issue, as the simple fulfillment thereof is not sufficient; it is also required that the norm challenged through this route has a direct incidence on the matter serving as the base, such that what is resolved in the action serves as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest injured within the prior matter. *A contrario sensu*, if there is no direct connection between the object of discussion in the base matter and what is challenged in the action, it is not possible for this Chamber to rule on it. It is for this reason that, in accordance with articles 75 and 79 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, plaintiffs must certify and provide literal certification of the brief in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the norms in the base matter, in order to verify their incidence on such matter. In the present case, the plaintiff expressly cites, for purposes of substantiating the standing they hold to bring this unconstitutionality action, the disciplinary proceeding being processed before the Notarial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José in case file No. 16-000323-0627-NO; however, given the mandate imposed by this Tribunal—for them to provide literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the norm was invoked in said base matter—, the special judicial representative of the plaintiff provided only a copy of the response formulated by the plaintiff in the referred disciplinary proceeding, and from the reading of that brief, it is verified that the unconstitutionality of articles 7, subsections c) and d), and 126, subsection d), all of the Notarial Code, was not formally and explicitly invoked therein. Although this Chamber has indicated that an extensive substantiation is not required when invoking the unconstitutionality of a norm, the fact is that it is necessary that in the base matter, the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action is expressly argued, and the constitutional norms considered infringed are indicated (see, for example, recently, judgment No.

2014000851 at 2:30 p.m. on January 22, 2014), aspects that are not substantiated in the case under study. Therefore, the present action is inadmissible and its outright rejection proceeds, as is hereby ordered.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza de plano la acción.

Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador -- *MLENTSITXOI61*

*160067820007CO* Res. Nº 2016007812 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce horas treinta minutos del ocho de junio de dos mil dieciseis .

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por LUIS ALONSO GUTIÉRREZ HERRERA , mayor, abogado, notario público, cédula de identidad No. 2-433-967, vecino de Alajuela, contra los artículos 7, incisos c) y d), y 126, inciso d), todos del Código Notarial.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 12:20 hrs. del 27 de mayo de 2016, el accionante solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 7, incisos c) y d), y 126, inciso d), todos del Código Notarial. Señala que el asunto base, en el que debe aplicarse tal normativa, es el proceso disciplinario que se tramita en su contra ante el Juzgado Notarial, en el expediente número 16-000323-627-NO. En cuanto al fondo, estima el accionante que la regulación dada por legislador, en materia de prohibiciones, en el citado inciso c) del artículo 7 del Código Notarial, es desproporcionada y carente de sustento en el Derecho de la Constitución, por cuanto, parte de la parcialidad del notario público en su proceder. Afirma que con esto se incurre en una antinomia con respecto a lo regulado en el ordinal 35 de ese mismo cuerpo legal. Sostiene que se está en presencia de un defecto en la técnica legislativa insalvable por atentar contra los principios de legalidad y de proporcionalidad de las normas. Alega, al efecto, que el ordinal 7, inciso c), del Código Notarial establece que se prohíbe al notario público autorizar actos o contratos “ en los cuales tengan interés el notario”. Afirma que el notario público siempre va a ostentar un interés, toda vez que, como funcionario público, en cada actuación que se celebra en su presencia, tutela el interés en la legalidad, legitimidad y regularidad de la actuación de las partes, es decir, es el garante del interés público. Sostiene que, además, le asiste un interés económico, dado que, percibe honorarios. Argumenta que, en consecuencia, la simple mención a que el notario posea “ interés” en el acto o contrato no basta para establecer que exista una condición que vicia su objetividad e imparcialidad. Agrega que la referencia al término “ interés”, utilizado por el legislador, es incompleta y vacía, como para poder cumplir el objetivo de restringir la libertad personal del notario público. Alega que, en su lugar, la norma debió referirse a la existencia de un “ interés contrapuesto”, pero no lo hizo así. Considera que esto supone un uso inadecuado de la técnica legislativa para cercenar libertades personales del notario público y de las partes y, además, se infringe el principio de igualdad ante la ley y equivalencia de las formas para lograr regulaciones de situaciones similares sobre la base de razonamientos jurídicos constitucionales proporcionales. Indica que el ordinal 7, inciso d), del Código Notarial incluye un vicio de constitucionalidad, al conferir a los registradores la potestad de declarar nulidades en instrumentos públicos que no han sido alegadas por las partes. Alega que esto invierte el principio de autonomía de la voluntad en materia contractual y desaplica la garantía de legalidad administrativa derivada del principio de igual nombre de origen constitucional. Señala que el citado numeral establece que se prohíbe al notario público autorizar actos o contratos contrarios a la ley, ineficaces o los que para ser ejecutados requieran autorización previa, mientras esta no se haya extendido, “ o cualquier otra actuación o requisito que impida inscribirlos en los registros públicos”. Afirma que, con esto, el legislador otorgó una potestad de revisión y declaración de la legalidad de los actos y contratos que está reservada a la jurisdicción ordinaria y no a funcionarios administrativos. Manifiesta que con tales disposiciones normativas se sanciona, con prohibición absoluta, la facultad del notario público de participar como asesor dentro de actos o contratos en que participen personas relacionadas con él por afinidad o consanguinidad, solo bajo la utilización del concepto indeterminado de “interés ” del notario, lo que –a su juicio- resulta insuficiente para poder restringir tanto su libertad en el ejercicio liberal de una función pública reglada, como la libertad de contratación de las partes en personas de su confianza. Añade que de los artículos 1 y 6 del Código Notarial se desprende, claramente, que el notario público no es parte de los actos y contratos que se celebran en su presencia y su función es, meramente, de asesor, quien actúa a petición de las partes que concurren en su presencia, en virtud del principio de autonomía de la voluntad. Argumenta que, por lo anterior, no se justifica el impedimento insalvable previsto en la normativa cuestionada. Reclama que, también, existe un exceso del poder legislativo, toda vez que, existe una clara desproporción entre medios y fines, en cuanto a los artículos impugnados y su ajuste al sistema normativo definido en el propio Código Notarial. Alega que el objetivo del artículo 7, incisos c) y d), así como del numeral 126, inciso d), todos del Código Notarial, es garantizar lo dispuesto en el ordinal 35 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo; sin embargo, considera que el mecanismo utilizado por el legislador resulta invasivo de la libertad de contratación y de la igualdad e infringe los principios constitucionales de igualdad ante la ley y de autonomía de la voluntad. Afirma que el citado artículo 35 contempla la imparcialidad y la objetividad como deber en el ejercicio del notariado público. Considera que el exceso en el ejercicio de la función legislativa se encuentra cuando el legislador, para tutelar tal imparcialidad –aspecto que, exclusivamente, es de valoración personal en relación con la posición en que se encuentre el notario-, establece una prohibición en lo que es motivo de excusa en la actuación del notario público. Alega que, al incurrirse en un error al clasificar la conducta del citado artículo 7, se impone una consecuencia en el numeral 126, inciso d), que resulta viciada de inconstitucionalidad, al excederse los principios constitucionales de igualdad y legalidad. Sostiene que el legislador reguló la actuación de los juzgadores en la hipótesis de impedimentos, excusas y recusaciones, en el sentido que la causa de impedimento es relativa cuando existe parentesco y no genera una nulidad si la contraparte habilita al funcionario para que conozca del asunto. Señala, al efecto, que el artículo 49, incisos 2) y 6), del Código Procesal Civil prevé que aún cuando exista algún tipo de interés para parientes del juzgador, si las partes consanguíneas adquieren un derecho en el resultado del proceso, hay un impedimento, pero si la parte contraria habilita al funcionario, este impedimento no pesará en la atención del caso, mientras no intervenga un juez sustituto. Estima que debe darse similar solución en el caso del notario público, en el sentido que si ambas partes están de acuerdo en que el impedimento no vicia la imparcialidad y asesoría del notario en la confección del contrato sobre el cual ya existe voluntad, entonces, no existe ni nulidad ni necesidad que el funcionario esté de pleno derecho inhibido de conocer del caso, ya que, bajo tal hipótesis, existe una excusa más que un impedimento, la cual deben valorar las partes y resolver si de alguna forma afecta el caso o contrato jurídico que, de por sí, ya han convenido celebrar. Sostiene que la inconstitucionalidad acusada existe en la medida que el legislador, en la promulgación de ambas normas procesales, trató de forma desigual a un funcionario público (notario) frente a otro (juez), con el agravante que el primero no resuelve ni se involucra en un conflicto. Afirma que también existe una omisión legislativa relativa para regular la causa de habilitación del notario, como producto de una incorrecta compresión de la función del notario y de su confusión con las funciones del abogado. Alega que a diferencia de un abogado, que defiende a su cliente, el notario público trabaja autorizando escrituras públicas de forma independiente y bajo un arancel, manteniendo la imparcialidad de su actuación, por cuanto, mantiene la ajenidad en su proceder y en las relaciones que se plantean las partes que acuden ante él a solicitar su asesoría. Indica que, de conformidad a la doctrina que se extrae de los artículos 35 y 36 del Código Notarial, siempre que el notario está obligado a velar por la imparcialidad y objetividad de su participación, está en posibilidad de revisar, oficiosamente y de previo a la celebración de contratos entre las partes, la existencia de algún aspecto que se constituya en excusa para él y obligue abstención de su parte para participar en la asesoría que le es requerida. Afirma que, en principio, la función notarial no es discrecional y el notario actúa como servidor público y no le es posible negarse a prestar el servicio sino en condiciones extremas. Concluye que, entonces, siendo el notario público quien determina si existe parcialidad o no en su proceder, lo regulado por el legislador en el numeral 7, incisos c) y d), y la consecuencia dada en el numeral 126, inciso d), todos del Código Notarial, es producto de una concepción errónea de la función notarial y ejercicio de un abuso del derecho dado al legislador de promulgar normas que desarrollen las conductas de los ciudadanos en diversas situaciones. Solicita que, en consecuencia, se acoja la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad.

2.- Por resolución de las 9:40 hrs. del 30 de mayo de 2016, se previno al accionante que, dentro del plazo de tres días, contado a partir del día siguiente a la notificación de esa resolución y bajo apercibimiento de denegarle el trámite a la acción en caso de incumplimiento, debía aportar certificación literal del escrito en el que invocó la inconstitucionalidad de la norma en el asunto que cita como base (expediente No. 16-000323-627-NO) y acreditar el estado procesal en que se encuentra dicho asunto. Lo anterior de conformidad con los artículos 75, 79 y 80 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

3.- Mediante escrito recibido en esta Sala a las 15:59 hrs. del 03 de junio de 2016, Laura Patricia Charpentier Soto, en su condición de apoderada especial judicial del accionante, indica que presenta documentación en cumplimiento de la prevención realizada por resolución de las 9:40 hrs. del 30 de mayo de 2016.

4.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar rechazada.

Redacta el Magistrado Jinesta Lobo; y,

Considerando:

I.- SOBRE LOS PRESUPUESTOS FORMALES DE ADMISIBILIDAD Y LEGITIMACIÓN DE LA ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. Esta Sala ha señalado, de forma reiterada, que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es un procedimiento con determinadas formalidades, que, si no se reúnen, imposibilitan que esta Sala se pronuncie sobre el fondo del asunto. En el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional se establecen los presupuestos de admisibilidad para las acciones de inconstitucionalidad y se regulan situaciones distintas. En el párrafo primero se exige la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sea en sede judicial –incluyendo los recursos de hábeas corpus o de amparo- o en la administrativa –en el procedimiento de agotamiento de esta vía-, en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho que se considera lesionado en el asunto principal. En los párrafos segundo y tercero se regula la acción directa –no se requiere del asunto base-, en los siguientes supuestos: a) cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa; b) se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto; y c) cuando la acción sea promovida por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes. En cuanto a la exigencia del asunto pendiente de resolver, establecida en el párrafo primero del artículo 75 la Ley que rige esta Jurisdicción, esta Sala ha explicado que, en tal supuesto, la acción de inconstitucionalidad se constituye o configura como:

“(...) un proceso de naturaleza incidental, y no de una acción directa o popular, con lo que se quiere decir que se requiere de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver -sea ante los tribunales de justicia o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa- para poder acceder a la vía constitucional, pero de tal manera que, la acción constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho considerado lesionado en el asunto principal, de manera que lo resuelto por el Tribunal Constitucional repercuta positiva o negativamente en dicho proceso pendiente de resolver, por cuanto se manifiesta sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas que deberán ser aplicadas en dicho asunto (...)” . (Sentencia No. 4190-95 de las 11:33 hrs. de 28 de julio de 1995; lo destacado no corresponde al original).

Asimismo, en la sentencia No. 1319-1997 de las 14:51 hrs. de 4 de marzo de 1997, se consideró lo siguiente:

“(…) El artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece como uno de los presupuestos para interponer la acción de inconstitucionalidad, la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, por constituir el punto de conexión que ha de existir entre el proceso en que se aplica la norma que se reputa inconstitucional con el objeto del proceso constitucional y el fundamento que legitima la pretensión del accionante como último remedio procesal, en el ejercicio del derecho a la jurisdicción constitucional. El rigor en la legitimación para acceder a la jurisdicción constitucional, más que constituir un obstáculo para impedir el control de la constitucionalidad de las leyes, constituye el cauce del derecho de acceso a la justicia, derivado de la existencia de un "asunto previo" que haya motivado aquella discordancia o contradicción entre la ley y la Constitución, para mantener la función jurisdiccional -especial-, y no distorsionar la pureza del sistema de relación de los poderes constitucionales del Estado, del que es parte la Sala, porque como integrante de aquellos, no es enteramente libre e ilimitada en sus acciones. Por esta causa, es que la acción de inconstitucionalidad necesita de su existencia -del asunto previo- como medio razonable para amparar la defensa del derecho o interés que se considera lesionado. Empero, la razonabilidad de la acción de inconstitucionalidad como medio de defensa del accionante no debe analizarse solo dentro del contexto del asunto previo, sino inmersa en el marco jurídico constitucional que rige las actuaciones de esta Sala. No se trata, entonces, de una consideración particular de la inconstitucionalidad de una disposición normativa, para interponer una acción sin requerir la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sino, que es necesario que se demuestre que constituye un medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se estima lesionado. (…)” Con fundamento en los precedentes citados y la línea jurisprudencial de esta Sala, se colige que el proceso de acción es, principalmente, de naturaleza incidental, por lo que se requiere de un asunto pendiente de resolver en vía administrativa –en el procedimiento administrativo de impugnación contra el acto final- o judicial, para que prospere la acción. De esta manera, solo en casos excepcionales que la ley establece, no será necesaria la existencia de ese requisito.

II.- SOBRE LA LEGITIMACIÓN Y LA ADMISIBILIDAD DE LA PRESENTE ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. Según se indicó, el artículo 75, párrafo primero, in fine, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional presupone, para efectos de la admisibilidad de una acción de inconstitucionalidad por la vía incidental, la existencia de un asunto principal pendiente de resolver, ya sea ante los tribunales –inclusive de hábeas corpus o de amparo-, o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa, en que se invoque esa inconstitucionalidad como medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considere lesionado. Tales requisitos no se traducen en una cuestión meramente formal, pues no basta con el simple cumplimiento de los mismos, se requiere, además, que la norma impugnada a través de esta vía tenga una incidencia directa sobre el asunto que sirve como base, de tal suerte, que lo resuelto en la acción sirva como un medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés lesionado dentro del asunto previo. A contrario sensu , si no existe una conexidad directa entre el objeto de discusión del asunto base y lo impugnado en la acción, no resulta posible que esta Sala se pronuncie al respecto. Es por lo anterior, que, de conformidad con los artículos 75 y 79 de la Ley que rige a esta Jurisdicción, los accionantes deben acreditar y aportar certificación literal del escrito en el que invocaron la inconstitucionalidad de las normas en el asunto base, a efecto de verificar su incidencia en tal asunto. En la especie, el accionante cita, expresamente, para efectos de fundamentar la legitimación que ostenta para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, el proceso disciplinario que se tramita ante el Juzgado Notarial del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José en expediente No. 16-000323-0627-NO; sin embargo, ante prevención que le realizó este Tribunal –a efectos que aportara certificación literal del escrito en el que se invocó la inconstitucionalidad de la norma en dicho asunto base-, la apoderada especial judicial del accionante aportó, únicamente, copia de la contestación formulada por el accionante en el referido proceso disciplinario y de la lectura de ese escrito se constata que en el mismo no se invocó, de manera formal y explícita, la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 7, incisos c) y d), y 126, inciso d), todos del Código Notarial. Si bien esta Sala ha indicado que en la invocación de inconstitucionalidad de la norma no se exige una extensa fundamentación, lo cierto es que sí resulta necesario que en el asunto base se argumente, y se indiquen las normas constitucionales que se consideren infringidas (ver, por ejemplo, recientemente, sentencia No. 2014000851 de las 14:30 horas del 22 de enero de 2014), aspectos que no se acreditan en el caso en estudio. Por ende, la presente acción es inadmisible y procede su rechazo de plano, como así se dispone.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza de plano la acción.

Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V.

Paul Rueda L.

Nancy Hernández L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jose Paulino Hernández G.

Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador -- *MLENTSITXOI61* 2295-3712. Dirección electrónica: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6