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Res. 00336-2016 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 13/01/2016
OutcomeResultado
The Constitutional Chamber flatly rejected the action for failing to meet the requirement of a pending matter that constitutes a reasonable means to protect the violated right.La Sala Constitucional rechazó de plano la acción por no cumplir con el requisito de un asunto pendiente de resolver que constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho lesionado.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber flatly rejected an unconstitutionality action brought against Article 210 of the Education Code, Articles 3(b) and 13(i) of the Fundamental Education Law, and Section 1 of the Descriptive Manual of Teaching Specialties. The plaintiff, attorney Yashín Castrillo Fernández, argued that these provisions violated the principle of religious neutrality and the rights to free development of personality, equality, and human dignity. He had previously asked the Vice Minister of Education to annul the norms and cited that request as the underlying matter. The Chamber held that a mere administrative request, without a concrete situation or an exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies procedure, does not satisfy the requirement of a “pending matter” under Article 75(1) of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law. Consequently, the action did not constitute a reasonable means to protect the alleged right and was flatly rejected. The ruling underscores that unconstitutionality proceedings in Costa Rica are incidental, not popular actions, and must be anchored in a real case or controversy.La Sala Constitucional rechazó de plano una acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta contra el artículo 210 del Código de Educación, los artículos 3 inciso b) y 13 inciso i) de la Ley Fundamental de Educación, y el apartado 1 del Manual Descriptivo de Especialidades Docentes, normas que el accionante consideraba contrarias al principio de neutralidad religiosa y a los derechos de libre desarrollo de la personalidad, igualdad y dignidad humana. El accionante, abogado Yashín Castrillo Fernández, había solicitado a la Vice Ministra Académica del MEP anular esas disposiciones, y citó esa gestión como asunto base. La Sala determinó que dicha solicitud administrativa no constituía un asunto pendiente de resolver en los términos del artículo 75 párrafo primero de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, ya que no existía una situación concreta ni un procedimiento administrativo en fase de agotamiento de la vía. Por tanto, la acción no era un medio razonable para amparar el derecho invocado, lo que condujo a su rechazo de plano sin examen de fondo. La decisión reafirma la naturaleza incidental de la acción de inconstitucionalidad y excluye las acciones populares en el sistema costarricense.
Key excerptExtracto clave
The Court considers that not any petition or request can serve as the basis for an action, but only those in which a concrete right or situation is discussed that is susceptible to the application of the challenged norm, since otherwise it would imply admitting a popular action, which is not admissible in our legal system. By virtue of the foregoing, the matter cited by the plaintiff cannot be considered a base matter for this action, because there is no concrete situation to resolve, nor is it an administrative proceeding, much less one that is in the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies phase. Consequently, the action is inadmissible as it does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right allegedly violated.El Tribunal aprecia que no cualquier gestión o solicitud, puede ser asunto base de una acción, sino, solo aquellas en los que se discuta un derecho o situación concreta que sea susceptible de aplicación de la norma que se cuestiona, pues lo contrario implicaría admitir una acción popular, lo que no es admisible en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico. En virtud de lo expuesto, el asunto que el actor cita, no puede ser considerado como asunto base para esta acción, por cuanto no existe una situación concreta que resolver, ni se trata de un procedimiento administrativo y, mucho menos, que se encuentre en fase de agotamiento de la vía administrativa. En consecuencia, la acción resulta inadmisible al no constituir un medio razonable para amparar el derecho que se considera lesionado.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"El Tribunal aprecia que no cualquier gestión o solicitud, puede ser asunto base de una acción, sino, solo aquellas en los que se discuta un derecho o situación concreta que sea susceptible de aplicación de la norma que se cuestiona, pues lo contrario implicaría admitir una acción popular, lo que no es admisible en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico."
"The Court considers that not any petition or request can serve as the basis for an action, but only those in which a concrete right or situation is discussed that is susceptible to the application of the challenged norm, since otherwise it would imply admitting a popular action, which is not admissible in our legal system."
Considerando II
"El Tribunal aprecia que no cualquier gestión o solicitud, puede ser asunto base de una acción, sino, solo aquellas en los que se discuta un derecho o situación concreta que sea susceptible de aplicación de la norma que se cuestiona, pues lo contrario implicaría admitir una acción popular, lo que no es admisible en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico."
Considerando II
"En consecuencia, la acción resulta inadmisible al no constituir un medio razonable para amparar el derecho que se considera lesionado."
"Consequently, the action is inadmissible as it does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right allegedly violated."
Considerando II
"En consecuencia, la acción resulta inadmisible al no constituir un medio razonable para amparar el derecho que se considera lesionado."
Considerando II
Full documentDocumento completo
*150166480007CO* *150166480007CO* CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine hours forty-five minutes of the thirteenth of January of two thousand sixteen.
Action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) filed by YASHíN CASTRILLO FERNáNDEZ, identity card No. 1-612-575, attorney; against Article 210 of the Education Code; Articles 3, subsection b), and 13, subsection i), of the Fundamental Law of Education and the Manual Descriptivo de Especialidades Docentes, code No. 072000, section 1.
RESULTANDO:
Drafted by Magistrate Jinesta Lobo; and,
CONSIDERANDO:
This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the action of unconstitutionality is a procedure with certain formalities, which, if not met, make it impossible for this Chamber to rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the requirements of admissibility (presupuestos de admisibilidad) for actions of unconstitutionality and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution (asunto pendiente de resolver), whether in a judicial venue –including habeas corpus or amparo remedies– or in an administrative one –in the procedure for exhausting this avenue–, in which the unconstitutionality of the questioned norm is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right considered injured in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action –the base matter is not required– in the following circumstances: a) when, due to the nature of the matter, no individual and direct injury exists; b) when it involves the defense of diffuse interests, or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contralor General de la República), the Prosecutor General of the Republic (Fiscal General de la República) and the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes).
Regarding the requirement of a matter pending resolution, established in the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law that governs this Jurisdiction, this Chamber has explained that, in such a case, the action of unconstitutionality is constituted or configured as:
“(…) a proceeding of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a matter pending resolution is required –whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative avenue– in order to access the constitutional avenue, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, so that the decision of the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on that proceeding pending resolution, since it expresses an opinion on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in that matter (…)”. (Judgment No. 4190-95 of 11:33 hrs. of July 28, 1995; the highlighting does not correspond to the original).
Likewise, in judgment No. 1319-1997 of 14:51 hrs. of March 4, 1997, the following was considered:
“(…) Article 75 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes as one of the requirements for filing the action of unconstitutionality, the existence of a matter pending resolution, as it constitutes the connection point that must exist between the proceeding in which the norm deemed unconstitutional is applied and the object of the constitutional proceeding, and the basis that legitimizes the claimant's petition as the last procedural remedy, in the exercise of the right to constitutional jurisdiction. The rigor in standing to access constitutional jurisdiction, rather than constituting an obstacle to prevent the control of constitutionality of laws, constitutes the channel of the right of access to justice, derived from the existence of a "prior matter" that motivated that discordance or contradiction between the law and the Constitution, to maintain the jurisdictional function –special–, and not to distort the purity of the system of relations of the constitutional powers of the State, of which the Chamber is a part, because, as a member of those, it is not entirely free and unlimited in its actions.
For this reason, the action of unconstitutionality requires its existence –the prior matter– as a reasonable means to protect the defense of the right or interest that is considered injured. However, the reasonableness of the action of unconstitutionality as a means of defense for the claimant should not be analyzed only within the context of the prior matter, but immersed in the constitutional legal framework that governs the actions of this Chamber. It is not, then, a particular consideration of the unconstitutionality of a normative provision, to file an action without requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution, but rather, it is necessary to demonstrate that it constitutes a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest that is deemed injured. (…)”
II.INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION FOR NOT BEING A REASONABLE MEANS.- As highlighted supra, Article 75, first paragraph, in fine, of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction requires, for the purposes of admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality through the incidental avenue, such as the present one, a matter pending resolution (asunto pendiente de resolver), in which the invoked unconstitutionality is a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. In the present case, the claimant cites as the base matter (asunto base) the petition addressed to the Vice Minister of Academic Affairs of the Ministry of Public Education, received on October 26, 2015, in which he appears “before your Authority to request that the challenged norms be annulled and left without effect.” The Court considers that not just any petition or request can serve as a base matter for an action, but only those in which a specific right or situation is discussed that is susceptible to the application of the questioned norm, since the contrary would imply admitting a popular action, which is not admissible in our legal system.
By virtue of the foregoing, the matter cited by the plaintiff cannot be considered a base matter for this action, given that there is no specific situation to resolve, nor does it constitute an administrative procedure and, much less, one that is in the stage of exhausting the administrative avenue. Consequently, the action is inadmissible as it does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured. From the foregoing, the Chamber considers that the admissibility requirements of Article 75, paragraph 1, of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction are not met and, therefore, the outright rejection (rechazo de plano) of the action is in order.
POR TANTO:
The action is rejected outright (se rechaza de plano).
Ernesto Jinesta L.
Fernando Cruz C.
Fernando Castillo V.
Nancy Hernández L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jose Paulino Hernández G.
Yerma Campos C.
*L8C8NF47IQCA61* of July 28, 1995; the highlighted portion does not correspond to the original). </sub></span> Likewise, in judgment No. 1319-1997 of 2:51 p.m. on March 4, 1997, the following was considered:
“(…) Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes as one of the prerequisites for filing an unconstitutionality action, the existence of a pending matter to be resolved, as it constitutes the connecting point that must exist between the proceeding in which the rule alleged to be unconstitutional is applied, the object of the constitutional process, and the basis that legitimizes the plaintiff’s claim as a last procedural remedy, in the exercise of the right to constitutional jurisdiction. The rigor in the standing to access constitutional jurisdiction, rather than constituting an obstacle to prevent the review of the constitutionality of laws, constitutes the channel for the right of access to justice, derived from the existence of a ‘prior matter’ that has given rise to that discrepancy or contradiction between the law and the Constitution, in order to maintain the —special— jurisdictional function, and not distort the purity of the system of relations among the constitutional powers of the State, of which this Chamber is a part, because as a member of those, it is not entirely free and unlimited in its actions.
For this reason, the unconstitutionality action requires its existence —of the prior matter— as a reasonable means to protect the defense of the right or interest considered injured. However, the reasonableness of the unconstitutionality action as a means of defense for the plaintiff should not be analyzed solely within the context of the prior matter, but rather immersed in the constitutional legal framework governing this Chamber’s proceedings. It is not, then, a matter of a particular consideration of the unconstitutionality of a normative provision, to file an action without requiring the existence of a pending matter to be resolved; rather, it is necessary to demonstrate that it constitutes a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest deemed injured. (…)”
II.INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION FOR NOT BEING A REASONABLE MEANS.- As highlighted *supra*, Article 75, first paragraph, *in fine*, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional requires, for purposes of the admissibility of an unconstitutionality action through the incidental channel, like the present one, a pending matter to be resolved, in which the unconstitutionality invoked is a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. In the present case, the plaintiff cites as the underlying matter the request addressed to the Vice Minister of Academics of the Ministry of Public Education, received on October 26, 2015, in which he “appears before your Authority to request that the challenged rules be annulled and rendered without effect.” The Tribunal notes that not just any proceeding or request can serve as the underlying matter for an action, but only those in which a specific right or situation is discussed that is susceptible to the application of the rule being challenged, since the opposite would imply admitting a popular action, which is not admissible in our legal system.
By virtue of the foregoing, the matter that the plaintiff cites cannot be considered an underlying matter for this action, because there is no specific situation to resolve, nor is it an administrative procedure, much less one that is in the phase of exhausting administrative remedies. Consequently, the action is inadmissible as it does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured. From the above, the Chamber considers that the admissibility prerequisites of Article 75, paragraph 1, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional are not met and, therefore, the outright rejection of the action is in order.
POR TANTO:
The action is rejected outright.
| |  Ernesto Jinesta L.
Presidente | | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| |  Fernando Cruz C. | |  Fernando Castillo V. | |  Nancy Hernández L. | |  Luis Fdo.
Salazar A. | |  Jose Paulino Hernández G. | |  Yerma Campos C. | *L8C8NF47IQCA61* Telephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6 "...The Court finds that not just any administrative step (gestión) or request may serve as the basis for an action, but only those in which a specific right or situation is discussed that is susceptible to the application of the challenged norm, since the contrary would imply admitting a popular action (acción popular), which is not admissible in our legal system." In light of the foregoing, the matter cited by the petitioner cannot be considered as a base matter for this action, since there is no concrete situation to be resolved, nor is it an administrative procedure, much less one that is in the phase of exhausting administrative remedies…”
CONSIDERANDO:
This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the unconstitutionality action is a procedure with certain formalities, which, if not met, prevent this Chamber from ruling on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes the admissibility requirements for unconstitutionality actions and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in a judicial venue—including hábeas corpus or amparo remedies—or in an administrative venue—in the procedure for exhausting this route—, in which the unconstitutionality of the questioned norm is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right considered injured in the principal matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate direct action—a base matter is not required—in the following cases: a) when by the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury; b) it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those that pertain to the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los Habitantes.
Regarding the requirement of a matter pending resolution, established in the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, this Chamber has explained that, in such a case, the unconstitutionality action is constituted or configured as:
“(...) a proceeding of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, meaning that the existence of a matter pending resolution is required —whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust administrative remedies— to be able to access the constitutional route, but in such a way that, the action constitutes a reasonable means of protecting the right considered injured in the principal matter, so that what is decided by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on said proceeding pending resolution, since it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter (...).” (Judgment No. 4190-95 of 11:33 hrs. on July 28, 1995; the emphasis does not correspond to the original).
Likewise, in judgment No. 1319-1997 of 14:51 hrs. on March 4, 1997, the following was considered:
"(...) Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law establishes as one of the requirements for filing an unconstitutionality action, the existence of a matter pending resolution, as it constitutes the connection point that must exist between the proceeding in which the norm deemed unconstitutional is applied and the object of the constitutional proceeding, and the basis that legitimizes the petitioner's claim as a last procedural remedy in the exercise of the right to constitutional jurisdiction. The rigor in the standing to access constitutional jurisdiction, rather than constituting an obstacle to preventing the control of the constitutionality of laws, constitutes the channel for the right of access to justice, derived from the existence of a 'prior matter' that has motivated that discrepancy or contradiction between the law and the Constitution, to maintain the jurisdictional function—special—, and not to distort the purity of the system of relations of the constitutional powers of the State, of which the Chamber is a part, because as an integral part of those, it is not entirely free and unlimited in its actions. For this reason, the unconstitutionality action requires its existence—of the prior matter—as a reasonable means of protecting the defense of the right or interest considered injured. However, the reasonableness of the unconstitutionality action as a means of defense for the petitioner should not be analyzed only within the context of the prior matter, but immersed in the constitutional legal framework that governs the actions of this Chamber. It is not, then, a question of a particular consideration of the unconstitutionality of a normative provision to file an action without requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution, but rather, it is necessary to demonstrate that it constitutes a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest estimated to be injured. (...)"
II.INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION FOR NOT BEING A REASONABLE MEANS.- As highlighted *supra*, Article 75, first paragraph, *in fine*, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law requires, for the purposes of the admissibility of an unconstitutionality action via the incidental route, such as the present one, a matter pending resolution, in which the invoked unconstitutionality is a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. In the present case, the petitioner cites as a base matter the filing addressed to the Vice Minister of Academic Affairs of the Ministry of Public Education, received on October 26, 2015, in which it is presented “before your Authority to request that the contested norms be annulled and rendered without effect”. The Court appreciates that not just any filing or request can be a base matter for an action, but only those in which a specific right or situation is discussed that is susceptible to the application of the norm being questioned, since the contrary would imply admitting a popular action, which is not admissible in our legal system.
In light of the foregoing, the matter cited by the petitioner cannot be considered as a base matter for this action, since there is no concrete situation to resolve, nor is it an administrative procedure, much less one that is in the phase of exhausting administrative remedies. Consequently, the action is inadmissible as it does not constitute a reasonable means of protecting the right considered injured. Based on the foregoing, the Chamber considers that the admissibility requirements of Article 75, paragraph 1, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law are not met, and, therefore, what proceeds is the outright rejection of the action.
POR TANTO:
The action is rejected outright.
| Ernesto Jinesta L. President | ||
| Fernando Cruz C. | Fernando Castillo V. |
| Nancy Hernández L. | | Luis Fdo.
</span></sub></p> </td> </tr> <tr style='mso-yfti-irow:3;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes'> <td width=194 valign=top style='width:145.5pt;border:solid #010101 1.0pt; border-top:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #010101 .25pt;mso-border-alt:solid #010101 .25pt; padding:5.25pt 5.25pt 5.25pt 5.25pt'> <p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'><img width=162 height=73 id="_x0000_i1030" src="file:///C:\Users\VGRANA~1\AppData\Local\Temp\HTM7B86_6.JPG" alt=graphic align=middle border=0></p> <p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'><sub><span style='font-size:10.0pt;color:#010101'>Jose Paulino Hernández G.</span></sub></p> </td> <td width=194 valign=top style='width:145.5pt;border-top:none;border-left: none;border-bottom:solid #010101 1.0pt;border-right:solid #010101 1.0pt; mso-border-top-alt:solid #010101 .25pt;mso-border-left-alt:solid #010101 .25pt; mso-border-alt:solid #010101 .25pt;padding:5.25pt 5.25pt 5.25pt 5.25pt'> <p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'><span style='font-size:10.0pt'> </span></p> </td> <td width=193 valign=top style='width:144.75pt;border-top:none;border-left: none;border-bottom:solid #010101 1.0pt;border-right:solid #010101 1.0pt; mso-border-top-alt:solid #010101 .25pt;mso-border-left-alt:solid #010101 .25pt; mso-border-alt:solid #010101 .25pt;padding:5.25pt 5.25pt 5.25pt 5.25pt'> <p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'><img width=162 height=73 id="_x0000_i1031" src="file:///C:\Users\VGRANA~1\AppData\Local\Temp\HTM7B86_7.JPG" alt=graphic align=middle border=0></p> <p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'><sub><span style='font-size:10.0pt;color:#010101'>Yerma Campos C.</span></sub></p> </td> </tr> </table> </div> <p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p> </o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p> </o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal><sub><span lang=EN style='font-size:8.0pt;color:#010101; mso-ansi-language:EN'>Digitally Signed Document</span></sub><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal><sub><span lang=EN style='font-size:8.0pt;color:#010101; mso-ansi-language:EN'>-- Verification code --</span></sub><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal><sub><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"WASP 39 L"; color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>*L8C8NF47IQCA61*</span></sub><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal><sub><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'> L8C8NF47IQCA61 </span></sub><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal align=right style='text-align:right'><b><sub><span lang=EN style='font-size:8.0pt;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>EXPEDIENTE N° </span></sub></b><b><sub><span lang=EN style='font-size:8.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN'>15-016648-0007-CO </span></sub></b><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p> </o:p></span></p> <div style='border:none;border-top:solid #010101 1.0pt;mso-border-top-alt:solid #010101 .75pt; padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 0cm'> <div style='margin-top:1.0pt'> <p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'><sub><span lang=EN style='font-size:8.0pt;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>Telephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700.
Fax: 2295-3712. Email address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Supreme Court of Justice Building, San José, Catedral District, González Lahmann neighborhood, streets 19 and 21, avenues 8 and 6</span></sub><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> </div> </div> </div> </body> </html>
*150166480007CO* *150166480007CO* SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del trece de enero de dos mil dieciseis .
Acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por YASHíN CASTRILLO FERNáNDEZ, cédula de identidad No. 1-612-575, abogado; contra el artículo 210 del Código de Educación; los artículos 3, inciso b), y 13, inciso i), de la Ley Fundamental de Educación y el Manual Descriptivo de Especialidades Docentes, código No. 072000, apartado 1 .
RESULTANDO:
Redacta el Magistrado Jinesta Lobo; y,
CONSIDERANDO:
Esta Sala ha señalado, de forma reiterada, que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es un procedimiento con determinadas formalidades, que, si no se reúnen, imposibilitan que esta Sala se pronuncie sobre el fondo del asunto. En el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional se establecen los presupuestos de admisibilidad para las acciones de inconstitucionalidad y se regulan situaciones distintas. En el párrafo primero se exige la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sea en sede judicial –incluyendo los recursos de hábeas corpus o de amparo- o en la administrativa –en el procedimiento de agotamiento de esta vía-, en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho que se considera lesionado en el asunto principal. En los párrafos segundo y tercero se regula la acción directa –no se requiere del asunto base-, en los siguientes supuestos: a) cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa; b) se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto; y c) cuando la acción sea promovida por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes.
En cuanto a la exigencia del asunto pendiente de resolver, establecida en el párrafo primero del artículo 75 la Ley que rige esta Jurisdicción, esta Sala ha explicado que, en tal supuesto, la acción de inconstitucionalidad se constituye o configura como:
“(...) un proceso de naturaleza incidental, y no de una acción directa o popular, con lo que se quiere decir que se requiere de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver -sea ante los tribunales de justicia o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa- para poder acceder a la vía constitucional, pero de tal manera que, la acción constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho considerado lesionado en el asunto principal, de manera que lo resuelto por el Tribunal Constitucional repercuta positiva o negativamente en dicho proceso pendiente de resolver, por cuanto se manifiesta sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas que deberán ser aplicadas en dicho asunto (...) ”. (Sentencia No. 4190-95 de las 11:33 hrs. de 28 de julio de 1995; lo destacado no corresponde al original).
Asimismo, en la sentencia No. 1319-1997 de las 14:51 hrs. de 4 de marzo de 1997, se consideró lo siguiente:
“(…) El artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece como uno de los presupuestos para interponer la acción de inconstitucionalidad, la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, por constituir el punto de conexión que ha de existir entre el proceso en que se aplica la norma que se reputa inconstitucional con el objeto del proceso constitucional y el fundamento que legitima la pretensión del accionante como último remedio procesal, en el ejercicio del derecho a la jurisdicción constitucional. El rigor en la legitimación para acceder a la jurisdicción constitucional, más que constituir un obstáculo para impedir el control de la constitucionalidad de las leyes, constituye el cauce del derecho de acceso a la justicia, derivado de la existencia de un "asunto previo" que haya motivado aquella discordancia o contradicción entre la ley y la Constitución, para mantener la función jurisdiccional -especial-, y no distorsionar la pureza del sistema de relación de los poderes constitucionales del Estado, del que es parte la Sala, porque como integrante de aquellos, no es enteramente libre e ilimitada en sus acciones.
Por esta causa, es que la acción de inconstitucionalidad necesita de su existencia -del asunto previo- como medio razonable para amparar la defensa del derecho o interés que se considera lesionado. Empero, la razonabilidad de la acción de inconstitucionalidad como medio de defensa del accionante no debe analizarse solo dentro del contexto del asunto previo, sino inmersa en el marco jurídico constitucional que rige las actuaciones de esta Sala. No se trata, entonces, de una consideración particular de la inconstitucionalidad de una disposición normativa, para interponer una acción sin requerir la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sino, que es necesario que se demuestre que constituye un medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se estima lesionado. (…)”
II.INADMISIBILIDAD DE LA ACCIóN POR NO SER MEDIO RAZONABLE.- Como se destacó supra , el artículo 75, párrafo primero, in fine , de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional exige, para efectos de la admisibilidad de una acción de inconstitucionalidad por la vía incidental, como la presente, un asunto pendiente de resolver, en que la inconstitucionalidad invocada sea medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considere lesionado. En el presente caso, el accionante cita como asunto base la gestión dirigida a la Vice Ministra de Académica del Ministerio de Educación Pública, recibida el 26 de octubre de 2015, en la que se presenta “ante su Autoridad a solicitar se anule y deje sin efecto ” las normas impugnadas. El Tribunal aprecia que no cualquier gestión o solicitud, puede ser asunto base de una acción, sino, solo aquellas en los que se discuta un derecho o situación concreta que sea susceptible de aplicación de la norma que se cuestiona, pues lo contrario implicaría admitir una acción popular, lo que no es admisible en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico.
En virtud de lo expuesto, el asunto que el actor cita, no puede ser considerado como asunto base para esta acción, por cuanto no existe una situación concreta que resolver, ni se trata de un procedimiento administrativo y, mucho menos, que se encuentre en fase de agotamiento de la vía administrativa. En consecuencia, la acción resulta inadmisible al no constituir un medio razonable para amparar el derecho que se considera lesionado. De lo anterior la Sala estima que no se cumplen los presupuestos de admisibilidad del artículo 75, párrafo 1°, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y, por ende, lo que procede es el rechazo de plano de la acción .
POR TANTO:
Se rechaza de plano la acción.
Ernesto Jinesta L.
Fernando Cruz C.
Fernando Castillo V.
Nancy Hernández L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jose Paulino Hernández G.
Yerma Campos C.
*L8C8NF47IQCA61* 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Dirección electrónica: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6
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