Ombudsman's standing to challenge insurer sanctionsLegitimación de la Defensoría para impugnar sanciones a aseguradoras

FILE N° 12-005870-0007-CO FILE N° 12-005870-0007-CO File: 12-005870-0007-CO Res. Nº 2013000990 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fourteen hours thirty minutes on the twenty-third of January of two thousand thirteen.

Action of unconstitutionality brought by the DEFENDER OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE REPUBLIC, OFELIA TAITELBAUM YOSELEWICH, of legal age, married, holder of a Master's degree in Administration, identity card number 1-367-763, resident of Escazú, in her capacity as Defender of the Inhabitants of the Republic, against Articles 37 subparagraphs a) and b); 39 subparagraph a) in relation to 36 subparagraph 1), 38 subparagraphs 1) and 25, all of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law number 8653.

Whereas:

1.- By a brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber on the seventh of May of two thousand twelve, the petitioner requests that the unconstitutionality of Articles 37 subparagraphs a) and b); 39 subparagraph a) in relation to 36 subparagraph 1), 38 subparagraphs 1) and Article 25, all of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law number 8653, be declared. She alleges that her standing derives from Article 75, third paragraph, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law and from Articles 1 and 13 of the Law of the Defender of the Inhabitants of the Republic, which authorizes the Institution to bring actions of unconstitutionality in defense of the inhabitants of the Republic, a mandate that must be understood systematically as the defense of constitutionality and the obligation of public authorities to act in accordance with justice and morality and within the framework of the Constitution. Regarding the claim itself, it is noted that for many years the insurance market in our country operated linked to the figure of a state monopoly; however, starting in two thousand eight, the opening of that activity was chosen, temporarily excluding universal and compulsory insurance such as that for vehicles and occupational hazards.- It is indicated that as a result of that opening, a legal regulation was established and a body was created to regulate and supervise the market, as well as the conduct of the operators, in order to protect the interests and rights of consumers.- The petitioner adds that it is precisely in this surveillance and sanctioning work that there is an injury to the Political Constitution because the challenged articles establish unequal treatment for the different insurance and reinsurance entities, since it is not taken into account that for some of them the sanctions that may be established could be ruinous, whereby they would have to leave the market, thus affecting consumers and the general population.- Likewise, she points out that those same norms, besides affecting some operators unequally with respect to others, produce an injury to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality because the sanctions could become excessive for one of the operators by very significantly affecting its operational capacity, with which we are facing norms whose legal effects are exaggerated since the correction could be achieved with a type of sanction more adjusted to justice and proportion.- Finally, it is pointed out that there is also an injury to the fundamental right of the consumer enshrined in Article 46 of the Constitution in the sense that by disproportionately affecting the financial capacity of insurance entities due to the established sanctions, the ability of such operators to cover and meet their obligations towards consumers is put at risk, jeopardizing their health and economic stability, all by affecting the capacity to indemnify the insured damages. Likewise, it could occur that the economic cost of the sanctions is transferred to consumers, thereby threatening their health and economic interests.- For all of the above, she requests that the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms be declared.

2.- By resolution of twelve hours forty minutes on the twelfth of June of two thousand twelve, the action was admitted and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and the General Superintendency of Insurance were granted a hearing.- 3.- Magda Inés Rojas Chaves, of legal age, married, resident of Heredia, with identity card number 4-110-097, in her capacity as Deputy Attorney General of the Republic, answers the hearing granted and states firstly that the action is inadmissible because, as this advisory body has held, the power attributed in Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law is directly related to its material competence, which means that the Defender's Office may appear in protection of fundamental rights and in general the rights and interests of the country's inhabitants. However, it is pointed out, this action is exercised in defense of the insurance and reinsurance entities of the country, with particular emphasis on the damages of the challenged regulations for the National Insurance Institute. Having said the above, the Attorney General's Office affirms that although the action is brought because the amount of the sanctions could be transferred to the consumer, the truth is that the claim is limited to the provisions referring to insurance and reinsurance activities, thereby ignoring that the law regulating the insurance market serves to regulate the activity of insurance intermediation and the provision of insurance services, activities that are also susceptible to affecting consumers. For this reason, it is affirmed, it is not explainable why the action of the Defender's Office is limited to the provisions regarding insurers and reinsurers and express mention is made of the National Insurance Institute, nor is it explained that precisely the challenged provisions seek the stability and solvency of the participating entities and to protect the rights of the insured. Therefore, if the unconstitutionality of the norm were declared, the country's insured would find themselves in a situation where companies can adopt the risks they deem convenient, disrespect the legislation, and eventually the rights that the law recognizes to the insured without the possibility of sanction, so it must be concluded that the Defender's Office has exercised an action in protection of the insurers and reinsurers which, if successful, would harm the public order present in the insurance market regime and the rights of the country's inhabitants.- On the other hand, regarding the merits of the matter, it is pointed out that indeed after years of monopoly in insurance matters, the law came to conceive a competitive but regulated insurance market, within which the National Insurance Institute must operate as one more participant. Specifically, it is pointed out that there is no injury to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality because the challenged norms incorporate legal effects that are legitimate insofar as they obey the need to regulate the activity of insurers within the constitutional framework, and they are also suitable because there is a clear means-to-end relationship since the specific conducts whose lack can be sanctioned have a direct relationship with the purposes of the Law established in Article 2 and the general objectives related to the establishment of a market of this type, such as transparency, the management of clear rules, and appropriate treatment of the consumer. The same applies to proportionality in the strict sense given that for the application of sanctions, the graduation parameters of the Securities Market Regulatory Law are mandatory, which include the seriousness of the infraction, the threat or the damage caused, the indications of intentionality, the capacity to pay, the duration of the conduct, and the recidivism of the offender.- If to this is added that the norm provides a margin in relation to the amount of the infraction, it can be concluded that proportionality in the strict sense is clearly respected by verifying a balanced relationship established between the benefits to the general interest and the sanctioning measure. On the other hand, it is pointed out, in relation to the violation of the principle of legal equality, contrary to what is argued in the action, the law employs two objective criteria: the covered subject (insurers and reinsurers) as well as the amount of the equity to establish a percentage of the latter as a sanction.- The Attorney General's Office opines that if a specific sum in colones is established as a fine, an inequality could be incurred because the meaning and effects of that fixed fine could harm some of the entities. With the chosen system, the monetary expression is not a product of the legislator but is given by the amount of the equity, that is, if a company must pay a larger fine in a given case, it is because its equity is larger.- Finally, regarding the violation of consumer rights derived from Article 46 of the Constitution, the Attorney General's Office points out that the Law whose articles are challenged contains precisely as one of its most important objectives the protection of the consumer. In particular, Articles 4, 5, and 6, which have strict rules for the defense of the condition of the insurance consumer, so that, it is argued, the faculties and powers of bodies such as the Superintendency of Insurance must correspond to such objectives, and also with such purposes, the law contains strict rules that interested companies must respect.- It is pointed out that such objectives could not be fulfilled if companies do not comply with their obligations, and that non-compliance would indeed constitute an impact on consumer rights.- Thus, respect for the norms, the non-assumption of undue risks, and respect for the insured are imposed more vigorously when facing the State insurer.- In conclusion, it is affirmed that the action should be rejected or declared without merit as there is no injury to the alleged constitutional rights.- 4.- By a brief dated the sixteenth of July of two thousand twelve, Javier Cascante Elizondo, of legal age, married once, identity card number 1-726-627, holder of a Master's degree in Economics, resident of San José, in his capacity as General Superintendent of Insurance, appears in this process and answers the hearing granted in the following terms: he points out that in a system of opening in the insurance market, it is necessary that especially insurance companies have clear guidelines established in the legal system for the performance of their activity so as to guarantee citizens that their activity is compliant with legality and good technique.- In accordance with the above, it is logical that within the system a mechanism exists to establish consequences for actions deemed harmful to citizens, and, of course, the administration must be empowered to apply such sanctions, especially in this case which includes a duality of legal interests to protect, namely: public financial order and also the constitutional rights of all consumers. In particular, the sanctions established in the Law are challenged, first because it is said that they infringe the right to equality, but it concerns ten economic agents that would be the subjects of the regulation and -mainly- the manner of applying the sanctions takes into account applicable assumptions considering the legal nature and also the specific characteristics of each one.- Particularly, the position of the state insurer is very different from the others, so the system of sanctions, contrary to what is affirmed, allows the sanctions to produce a similar effect on all participants who commit the infractions.- In relation to the alleged injury to reasonableness and proportionality, the Superintendent of Insurance points out that on this point it is affirmed that there could be an impact on the Public Treasury, but his statement is not supported by any type of evidence, and he does not even present a single argument to validate his claims.- In any case, it is affirmed, when applying sanctions, criteria of proportionality and reasonableness must be respected since their application must follow the guidelines of Article 164 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law, which mandate paying attention to the damage and the conditions of the subject as well as the effects on consumers.- A comparative table is also added showing that the sanctions authorized by the different Costa Rican laws related to these issues are similar and perhaps even harsher in areas such as pensions and securities.- He also adds that -as can be deduced from the table he provides- it is daring and imprecise to indicate that our country has the most severe fines or sanctions in the region, because the types of sanctions are very different and the parameters used are diverse, so it is not possible to make comparisons.- Finally, regarding the possible impact on consumer rights due to the possible transfer of sanction costs, it should be noted that we are in an open price-setting regime, so it is the insurance entities that, after prior notice to the Superintendency, could raise their rates if their studies and costs so suggest.- That can happen with or without sanctions, so the Defender's Office's argument about the transfer of sanction costs via price ignores the fact that in an open system, consumers are capable of evaluating and comparing a variable as important as price, so that the companies themselves, in an open system, are the first interested in avoiding an increase in their prices, as this would mean a reduction in what constitutes their main activity, namely the sale of insurance.- For all of the above, it is requested that the action be declared without merit.- 5- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law were published in numbers 56, 57, and 58 of the Judicial Bulletin, on the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first of March of two thousand twelve.- 6.- By a brief dated the thirteenth of August of two thousand twelve, Juan Ignacio Quirós Arroyo, of legal age, married, retired mathematics teacher, resident of Moravia, identity card number 2-227-536, appeared in this process as a coadjuvant and states his interest in the outcome of this process. To this end, he indicates first that the Defender of the Inhabitants is not legitimized to bring the action, since the case falls within the ambit of Private Law because it concerns the business of private insurance. He states his disagreement with the fact that the Defender's Office seeks to defend the insurers -especially the National Insurance Institute-, thereby attempting to eliminate provisions that would benefit not only the INS, but also the other private insurers, to the detriment of insurance consumers. He considers that it is not valid to affirm that if an insurer is sanctioned with a fine on its equity, this will necessarily lead to a danger for its pool of insured persons, because from an accounting standpoint, the assets of the insurer are one thing and its liabilities are another.- He adds that a company's liabilities reflect the obligations contracted by that company with third parties and indicates that in insurance matters, a distinction can be made between technical liabilities and non-technical liabilities. In turn, technical liabilities can be divided into nominate and innominate; thus, the most important liabilities of an insurance company are the technical liabilities, that is, the debts to the insured and the technical commitments (technical provisions). For this reason, he considers that the liability is not affected by a sanction to the insurer on its equity, since these are resources that are its exclusive property. Thus, these equity funds would be those affected by an eventual sanction. He continues pointing out that the argument that a fine on any insurer will affect insurance consumers with an increase in premiums is unacceptable. For an increase in premiums or an increase in deductibles and other items to occur, a catastrophic event must happen, not contemplated in the technical provisions, not in the insurers' equity due to poor administration of their operational risk, their minimum solvency capital, and their market conduct, among other relevant facts. He considers that the suspension or total elimination of the fines from the sanctioning regime of that insurance law would indeed be catastrophic for consumers and users of insurance, since insurers would have carte blanche to carry out market conducts that would indeed affect the insured population, and would remain in clear impunity, to the detriment of the insured. In the petitioner's judgment, furthermore, the absence of the principle of reasonableness and proportionality is not true either, since the law itself indicates the graduality of the sanctions.

7.- In a brief dated the fourteenth of August of two thousand twelve, Nancy Arias Mora, of legal age, lawyer, divorced, identity card number 1-710-839, in her capacity as General Judicial Attorney-in-Fact of the National Insurance Institute, also appears as a coadjuvant in this action of unconstitutionality. She points out that her standing as a coadjuvant arises from an investigation that the Insurance Supervisor is currently conducting against her represented party, under file N° PA-0004-2011. In that procedure, the norms now challenged would eventually be applied, for which the impact would be direct in relation to this action. She affirms that the vice of constitutionality that said articles present lies in the high level of the economic sanctions, which constitute a risk for the insurance market operators, as they could eventually be forced to pay a sum of up to 5% of their equity, which would undoubtedly cause a serious, public, and notorious financial problem for any of the companies. She indicates that in the specific case of the National Insurance Institute, this risk is doubled because it is a company constituted as an autonomous institution, which handles public funds in part of its activity, so that if a fine is imposed on the company's equity - the equity of all Costa Ricans because it is a company with a State guarantee -, the impact would be not only on its equity directly but also on the profits it transfers to the Costa Rican State and on the benefits that all Costa Ricans receive from state institutions. The application of such strong economic sanctions generates a very high risk for the insurance market operators, which can even become a risk of bankruptcy for the companies, since a fine linked to equity could easily generate that situation, which evidently violates the freedom of commerce constitutionally guaranteed in Costa Rica. She adds that the imposition of such high sanctions violates the freedom of commerce because they entail the eventual closure of the business. Likewise, she considers the provisions of Article 50 of the Constitution injured, since it corresponds to the State to organize and stimulate production, not to establish limits or limitations that impede its exercise. She also considers the principle of equality injured because the I.N.S. is the only competitor that has a subsidiary company that provides auxiliary insurance services, so the distinction among the possible recipients of this sanction would be even more burdensome, since only the I.N.S. could receive it. Furthermore, the challenged fines are aimed at harming almost exclusively the INS, and this is neither reasonable nor proportionate.

8.- The hearing provided for in Articles 10 and 85 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by numeral 9 ibidem, considering this resolution sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Court.

9.- The prescriptions of law have been complied with in the proceedings. Authored by Judge Mora Mora; and,

Considering:

I.- On the admissibility of the action. In this process, both the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and the General Superintendency of Insurance have raised doubts regarding the admissibility of this action of unconstitutionality brought by the Defender of the Inhabitants.- They argue, in summary, that although the power recognized by Article 75, third paragraph, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law to that state body is undeniable, the truth is that - as it has been understood and interpreted - the Defender's Office must act within the scope of its powers, which does not occur in this case because the claim is formulated very precisely for the alleged infringement of the constitutional rights of a few specific economic agents whose conduct is regulated by the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, number 8653, and to whom the sanctioning regime that the Defender challenges is exclusively applicable.- It is alleged by both parties that there is actually no link between this issue and the rights and interests of the country's inhabitants, so the action of the Defender's Office instead becomes an action for the protection of the individual right and interest of practically a single entity, which is the National Insurance Institute.- II.- Upon analyzing such statements and studying the arguments that support them, this Court concludes that indeed this action of unconstitutionality must be rejected outright, as it is outside the sphere of competence that - in matters of filing actions of unconstitutionality - has been attributed to the Defender of the Inhabitants. For this conclusion, it must be considered first that, as the Attorney General's Office points out in its report, the broad power of the Defender's Office enshrined in Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law is delimited by what constitutes its subject-matter competence, that is, those issues that the legislator charged it with addressing according to its own organic law understood systematically with the rest of the legal system.- This Chamber has also understood it this way, indicating in this regard in judgment number 2000-07730 of fourteen hours forty-seven minutes on the thirtieth of August of two thousand:

"In this line of thought, as indicated by Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law: 'The prior pending case shall not be necessary when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or when it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those that concern the community as a whole. Neither shall the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Attorney General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, and the Defender of the Inhabitants need it.' This norm, from the point of view of its content, not only empowers the Defender of the Inhabitants to directly bring the action of unconstitutionality, but, also, does not establish any limitation for doing so. It is clear: the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Attorney General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, and the Defender of the Inhabitants do not need a prior matter to bring the action (first postulate). However, it is understood that this is not the case because the exercise of the action, in each of these cases, presupposes that the body in question is developing within the exercise of the powers that are its own, and only to that extent, each of them would have the necessary standing to bring an action." In that same judgment, progress was made towards defining those powers of the Defender's Office 'that are its own', and after extensive considerations, it was concluded that "the Defender of the Inhabitants was precisely created to protect the rights and interests of the inhabitants, as well as to ensure that the functioning of the public sector conforms to morality, justice, the Political Constitution, and other norms of the legal system," to then emphasize that: "In summary, it can be concluded a) that the legal system has granted the Defender of the Inhabitants a very broad sphere of powers, which is not exclusive of other constitutional or legal powers on the matter; b) that it is responsible for supervising the correct functioning of the Administration, to help ensure its adherence to the Principle of Legality, as well as to protect the rights and interests of the inhabitants, and, to this extent, the law provides it with all the necessary mechanisms to perform that task...' In this way, the possibility of filing unconstitutionality actions (acciones de inconstitucionalidad) by the Ombudsman's Office (Defensoría), directly and before this Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), operates not only when the object of the action falls within the scenarios covered in Article 73 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, but also when its purpose is the defense of the inhabitants' constitutionally ranked rights and interests. III.- However, in the specific case, it is this latter requirement that is absent, since the action is filed against a specific part of the sanctions regime expressed in Articles 37 subsections a) and b); 39 subsection a) in relation to 36 subsection 1), 38 subsections 1) and 25, of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros number 8653, where sanctions are established for a very specific group of legal subjects, namely, the economic agents called insurance companies (aseguradoras) and reinsurance companies (reaseguradoras). Thus, and according to the report of the Superintendencia de Seguros, the action is filed to defend an alleged violation of the constitutional rights of approximately ten legal entities that are the ones –as of this date– registered before said Superintendency to carry out insurance and reinsurance activities. On this specific point, it is pertinent to bring up what was stated by the Chamber in the cited ruling 2000-07730:

"VI.- (...). Regarding standing (legitimación) to bring actions before the Courts of Justice, Article 13 of the Law allows it to initiate all those judicial actions or remedies against the Public Administration, in those cases where, in its judgment, the Courts may, by the nature of the issue, provide a suitable solution to the merits of the matter, either because in practice there is no one with the proper legal capacity (personería), funds, or time to be qualified or willing to initiate the action themselves, or because the interested party belongs to that group of people or sectors of people that, as already mentioned, due to whatever circumstances (ignorance, economic or cultural marginalization, etc.), are in fact in a situation of disadvantage vis-à-vis the Public Administration.

From the foregoing, it is understood that although there is no legal impediment for the Ombudsman's Office to file actions on behalf of individuals or small or specific groups (and not for the defense of all the country's inhabitants in general), such actions by the Ombudsman (Defensor) should be presented to this Venue together with a necessary and sufficient justification in the terms described above; that is, it should be fully demonstrated that –for any valid and reasonable circumstance– the beneficiaries of the Ombudsman's Office's action are in conditions of disadvantage for the self-defense of their constitutional rights. For this Court, to understand it otherwise would be to allow the Ombudsman's Office to appear in defense of some people, yes, but not others, that is, to act in an unequal and selective manner, without providing the necessary and sufficient explanation that validates such conduct from the viewpoint of the principle of equality.- When we apply the foregoing ideas to this case, we find that no explanation or justification is provided as to why the Ombudsperson (Defensora de los Habitantes) appears in defense of what she herself describes as a group of active legal entities whose patrimonial data are as follows: Instituto Nacional de Seguros: 454,663,997,770 million colones; MAPFRE Costa Rica: 3,231,290,396 million colones; ASSA Compañía de Seguros: 5,807,763,765 million colones, data that suggest –in principle– a broad possibility to exercise, on their own, the defense of their constitutional rights.- IV.- A second aspect that has been mentioned by the Ombudsman's Office as a basis for appearing as a petitioner (accionante) in this unconstitutionality proceeding relates to the alleged harm that consumers will receive in their constitutional rights as a result of the application of pecuniary penalties to the insurance and reinsurance entities. It is stated that a sanction could eventually be excessive and, in such a case, there could –in turn– be the possibility that the company might choose to pass that cost of the fine on to consumers through an increase in the price of its services, or else –it is indicated– it could happen that, faced with a sanction of suspension of activities (or an excessively high fine), the company decides to withdraw from the market, leaving consumers unprotected regarding their legal relationships with that company.- First of all, it is observed that the entire construction of the Ombudsman's Office's standing on this point is based on situations that do not derive directly and necessarily from the texts under discussion, since those norms provide a graduated system of sanctions, in addition to rules to be taken into account in establishing the amount of the sanction, which include assessing the possible effect that the sanction might produce on the market, so that the sanction that could produce the eventual violation of consumer rights is not something necessary but only possible and highly eventual. Added to the above is that, as the Superintendente de Seguros rightly indicates, the Ombudsman's Office provides no evidence or argument whatsoever that points to concluding that this harm from the passing on of costs will unfailingly occur, but rather it is –again– only a probability; and, furthermore, it is also not demonstrated that the exit of a market participant signifies, in and of itself and automatically, harm to the insurance market. On the contrary, regarding this argument, it is pertinent to point out, as stated by the Procuraduría, that the insurance market is currently open and regulated, which means, in relation to the cost and price structure, that the participants themselves –companies and consumers– will make their own calculations and determine the price of services, so that it will be the consumers and companies who finally decide which turns out to be the best option as it suits them.- This open condition means that it is the consumer themselves who has sufficient power to dissuade companies from passing on costs and thus avoid the harm that they would supposedly suffer if a company decides to arbitrarily increase the price of its services without considering the other market factors. In this manner, the Ombudsman's Office should have alleged and demonstrated why this market mechanism established by law would not be sufficient for the protection of the consumer collective and in what way the latter would necessarily be affected by a specific sanction that has been imposed on an insurance or reinsurance company. All of this is far from having been demonstrated in this case, so there is no basis whatsoever to understand that through this proceeding, the Ombudsman's Office will effectively manage to protect such rights and interests of the consumer collective.- Finally, add to the above the fact that –as the parties have pointed out– this action has been filed to achieve the annulment and disappearance from the legal system of the norms related to a part of the sanctioning system applicable to insurance and reinsurance companies, so that if the claim were to succeed, such a gap would indeed necessarily and negatively affect the sphere of consumer rights and interests, insofar as the insurance and reinsurance companies would be free to omit a long series of conducts that the legislator himself has considered fundamental for the proper functioning of the insurance market.- Leaving compliance with such conducts to the discretion and convenience of the service-providing companies without possibilities of coercion would indeed necessarily produce an effect on consumers, which is why the Ombudsman's Office's action must be rejected outright (rechazarse de plano), insofar as, if it were to succeed, the very people it claims to defend would instead be harmed.- V.- Conclusion.- From the foregoing, it is possible to conclude that this unconstitutionality action filed by the Defensoría de los Habitantes against Articles 37 subsections a) and b); 39 subsection a) in relation to 36 subsection 1), 38 subsections 1) and 25, all of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, must be rejected outright because this body has acted –in this particular case– outside the scope of its powers as they have been delimited by the law and the jurisprudence of this Chamber, since no justification whatsoever is presented for acting directly on behalf of the insurance and reinsurance companies, nor has it been demonstrated that the discussed norms will produce, necessarily and by themselves, harm to the consumer collective, whereas the declaration that is requested will indeed negatively impact the aforementioned group of people.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza de plano la acción planteada.- Gilbert Armijo S. Presidente a.i Luis Paulino Mora M. Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V. Paul Rueda L.

Teresita Rodríguez A. Jose Paulino Hernández G.

-- Código verificador -- 8-10!4:"%#+ Regarding the claim properly speaking, it is noted that for many years the insurance market in our country operated under a state monopoly; however, starting in two thousand eight, the decision was made to open up that activity, excluding for the time being universal and mandatory insurance such as vehicle insurance and occupational hazard insurance (riesgos laborales). It is indicated that as a result of this opening, the decision was made to establish legal regulation and create a body responsible for regulating and overseeing the market, as well as the conduct of operators, in order to protect the interests and rights of consumers. The plaintiff adds that it is precisely in this oversight and sanctioning function where a violation of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) exists, because the challenged articles establish unequal treatment for different insurance and reinsurance entities, insofar as it is not taken into account that for some of them, the sanctions that may be imposed could be ruinous, thereby forcing them to leave the market, thus affecting consumers and residents in general. Similarly, it notes that these same norms, in addition to affecting some operators unequally compared to others, cause a violation of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality because the sanctions could become excessive for one of the operators, as their operational capacity would be very significantly affected, meaning we are faced with norms whose legal effects are exaggerated, since the correction could be achieved with a type of sanction more aligned with justice and proportion. Finally, it is noted that there is also a violation of the fundamental right of the consumer enshrined in Constitutional Article 46 (artículo 46 Constitucional) in the sense that, by disproportionately affecting the financial capacity of the insurance entities due to the established sanctions, the ability of such operators to cover and meet their obligations towards consumers is put at risk, endangering their health and economic stability, all to the detriment of the ability to indemnify the insured damages. Likewise, the economic cost of the sanctions could be transferred to consumers, thereby threatening their health and economic interests. For all these reasons, it requests that the challenged norms be declared unconstitutional.

2.- By resolution of twelve hours forty minutes on June twelfth, two thousand twelve, the action was admitted, and a hearing was granted to the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) and the General Superintendency of Insurance (Superintendencia General de Seguros).

3.- Magda Inés Rojas Chaves, of legal age, married, resident of Heredia, with identity card number 4-110-097, in her capacity as Deputy Attorney General (Procuradora General Adjunta) of the Republic, responds to the hearing granted and notes, in the first place, that the action is inadmissible because, as this advisory body has held, the power attributed to it in Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) is directly related to its material competence, which means that the Ombudsman's Office (Defensoría) may appear in protection of fundamental rights and, in general, the rights and interests of the country's inhabitants. However, it is pointed out, this action is exercised in defense of the insurance and reinsurance entities of the country, with particular emphasis on the harm caused by the challenged regulations to the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros). Having said the above, the Attorney General affirms that although the action is brought because the amount of the sanctions could be transferred to the consumer, the truth is that the claim is limited to the provisions referring to the activities of insurance and reinsurance, thereby overlooking the fact that the law regulating the insurance market serves to regulate the activity of insurance intermediation and the provision of insurance services, activities that are also susceptible to affecting consumers. For this reason, it is stated, it is not explainable why the Ombudsman's Office's action is limited to the provisions concerning insurers and reinsurers and mention is made ability to pay, the duration of the conduct, and the recidivism of the offender. If to this is added that the norm provides a margin in relation to the amount of the infraction, it can be concluded that proportionality in the strict sense is clearly respected, as a balanced relationship is established between the benefits to the general interest and the sanctioning measure. On the other hand, it is noted, in relation to the violation of the principle of legal equality, contrary to what is maintained in the action, the law employs two objective criteria, the covered subject (insurers and reinsurers) as well as the amount of the equity to establish a percentage of the latter as a sanction. The Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría) opines that if a specific sum in colones were established as a fine, an inequality could be incurred because the meaning and effects of that fixed fine could harm some of the entities.

With the chosen system, the monetary expression is not a product of the legislator but is given by the amount of the equity (patrimonio), meaning that if a company must pay a higher fine in a given case, it is because its equity (patrimonio) is larger.- Finally, regarding the infringement of consumer rights derived from Article 46 of the Constitution, the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría) points out that the Law whose articles are challenged contains, precisely as one of its most important objectives, consumer protection. In particular, Articles 4, 5, and 6, which contain strict rules for the defense of the insurance consumer's condition, so that, as is maintained, the powers and authorities of bodies such as the Superintendencia de Seguros must correspond to such objectives, and also with such purposes the law contains strict rules that the interested companies must respect.- It is noted that such objectives could not be fulfilled if companies do not comply with their obligations, and such non-compliance would indeed constitute an impact on consumers' rights.- Thus, the respect for the rules, the non-assumption of undue risks, and the respect for the insured are imposed more vigorously when dealing with the State insurer.- In conclusion, it is affirmed that the action must be dismissed or declared without merit because there is no injury whatsoever to the alleged constitutional rights.- 4.- Through a written submission dated July sixteenth, two thousand twelve, Javier Cascante Elizondo, of legal age, married once, identity card number 1-726-627, Master in Economics, resident of San José, in his capacity as General Superintendent of Insurance (Superintendente General de Seguros), appears in this proceeding and responds to the hearing granted in the following terms: he points out that in an open insurance market system, it is necessary especially for insurance companies to have clear guidelines set forth in the legal system for carrying out their activity, so as to guarantee to citizens that their activity adheres to legality and good practice.- In accordance with the above, it is logical that within the system there exists a mechanism to establish consequences for actions deemed harmful to citizens, and, of course, the administration must be empowered to apply such sanctions, especially in this case which includes a duality of legal interests to be protected, namely: public financial order and also the constitutional rights of all consumers. In particular, the sanctions established in the Law are challenged, first because it is said that they infringe the right to equality, but it involves ten economic agents that would be the subjects of the regulations and -principally- the way of applying the sanctions takes into account applicable assumptions considering the legal nature and also the individual characteristics of each one.- Particularly, the position of the state insurer is very different from the others, so that the system of sanctions, contrary to what is affirmed, allows the sanctions to produce a similar effect on all participants who commit infractions. Regarding the alleged injury to reasonableness (razonabilidad) and proportionality, the Superintendente de Seguros points out that on this point it is affirmed that there may be an impact on the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), but this statement is not supported by any type of proof, nor does it even present a single argument that would allow its affirmations to be considered valid.- In any case, it is affirmed, when applying sanctions, criteria of proportionality and reasonableness must be respected, as their application must follow the guidelines of Article 164 of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, which mandate paying attention to the damage and the conditions of the subject, as well as the effects on consumers.- A comparative table is also added showing that the sanctions authorized by the various Costa Rican laws related to these topics are similar and even perhaps stricter in matters such as pensions and securities.- It also adds that -as can be deduced from the table it provides- it is venturesome and imprecise to state that our country has the most severe fines or sanctions in the region, the foregoing because the types of sanctions are very different and the parameters used are diverse, so that it is not possible to make comparisons.- Finally, regarding the possible impact on consumer rights due to the potential pass-through of sanction costs, it must be noted that we are in an open price-setting regime, so that it is the insurance entities themselves that, after prior notice to the Superintendencia, could raise their rates if their studies and costs so suggest.- This can occur with or without sanctions, so that the Ombudsman's Office's (Defensoría) argument about the pass-through of sanction costs via price fails to consider that in an open system, consumers are capable of valuing and comparing a variable as important as price, so that the companies themselves, in an open system, are the first ones interested in avoiding an increase in their prices, as this would mean a reduction in what constitutes their main activity, namely the sale of insurance.- For all the foregoing, it is requested that the action be declared without merit.- 5- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional were published in numbers 56, 57, and 58 of the Boletín Judicial, on the days nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first of March, two thousand twelve.- 6.- Through a written submission dated August thirteenth, two thousand twelve, Juan Ignacio Quirós Arroyo appeared in this proceeding as coadjuvant, of legal age, married, retired mathematics teacher, resident of Moravia, identity card number 2-227-536, and manifests his interest in the outcome of this proceeding, and to this end he points out first that the Defensoría de los Habitantes is not legitimized to file the action, as the case falls within the scope of Private Law because it deals with the private insurance business. He expresses his disagreement with the fact that the Defensoría seeks to defend insurance companies -especially the Instituto Nacional de Seguros-, thereby attempting to eliminate provisions that would benefit not only the INS, but also the other private insurance companies, to the detriment of insurance consumers. He considers it is not valid to affirm that if an insurer is sanctioned with a fine on its equity (patrimonio), this will necessarily lead to a danger for its mass of insureds, because in accounting terms, the assets of the insurer are one thing and its liabilities are another.- He adds that a company's liabilities reflect the obligations contracted by that company with third parties and indicates that in insurance matters one can distinguish between technical liabilities and non-technical liabilities. In turn, technical liabilities can be divided into named and unnamed; thus, the most important liabilities of an insurance company are the technical liabilities, that is, the debts to the insureds and the technical commitments (technical provisions). Therefore, he considers that the liability is not affected by a sanction on the insurer's equity (patrimonio), since these are resources that are its exclusive property. Thus, these equity (patrimonio) funds would be the ones affected by an eventual sanction. He continues by pointing out that the argument that a fine on any insurer will affect insurance consumers with an increase in premiums is not acceptable.

For an increase in premiums or an increase in deductibles (franquicias) and other cost-sharing amounts (deducibles) to occur, there must be a catastrophic event, not contemplated in the technical provisions, not in the equity of the insurers due to poor management of their operational risk, of their minimum solvency capital, and of their market conduct, among other relevant facts. It considers that the suspension or total elimination of the fines under the sanctioning regime of that insurance law would indeed be catastrophic for consumers and insurance users, as insurers would have carte blanche to carry out market conduct that would indeed affect the insured population, and would remain in clear impunity, to the detriment of the insured. In the petitioner's judgment, furthermore, the absence of the principle of reasonableness and proportionality is also not true, since the law itself provides for the gradualism of sanctions.

7.- In a filing dated August fourteenth, two thousand twelve, Nancy Arias Mora, of legal age, attorney, divorced, identity card number 1-710-839, in her capacity as General Judicial Attorney-in-Fact of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, also appears to coadjuvate in this unconstitutionality action. She points out that her standing as a coadjuvant derives from an investigation that is currently being conducted against her principal by the Insurance Supervisor (Supervisor de Seguros), under case file number N° PA-0004-2011. In that proceeding, the norms now being challenged would eventually be applied, so the impact would be direct in relation to this action. She affirms that the constitutional defect presented by said articles lies in the exorbitance of the economic sanctions, which constitute a risk for insurance market operators, as they may eventually be forced to pay a sum of up to 5% of their equity, which would undoubtedly cause a serious, public, and notorious financial problem for any of the companies. She indicates that in the specific case of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, that risk is doubled because it is a company constituted as an autonomous institution, which manages public funds in part of its activity, so that if a fine is imposed on the company's equity—the equity of all Costa Ricans because it is a company guaranteed by the State—the impact would be not only on its equity directly but also on the profits it transfers to the Costa Rican State and on the benefits that all Costa Ricans receive from state institutions. The application of such strong economic sanctions generates a very high risk for insurance market operators, which can even become a bankruptcy risk for the companies, since a fine tied to equity could easily generate that situation, which evidently undermines the freedom of commerce constitutionally guaranteed in Costa Rica. She adds that the imposition of such high sanctions violates freedom of commerce as they entail the eventual closure of the business. Likewise, she deems the provisions of constitutional Article 50 to be harmed, since it is the State's duty to organize and stimulate production, not to establish limits or limitations that impede its exercise. She also deems the principle of equality harmed because the I.N.S. is the only competitor that has a subsidiary company providing auxiliary insurance services, making the distinction among the possible recipients of this sanction even more burdensome, since only the I.N.S. could receive it. Moreover, the challenged fines are aimed at harming, almost exclusively, the INS, and that is neither reasonable nor proportionate.

8.- The hearing provided for in Articles 10 and 85 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by numeral 9 thereof, considering this resolution to be sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Court.

9.- In the proceedings, the prescriptions of law have been complied with. Justice Mora Mora writes, and;

Considering:

I.- Regarding the admissibility of the action. In this process, both the Procuraduría General de la República and the Superintendencia General de Seguros have raised doubts regarding the admissibility of this unconstitutionality action filed by the Defensoría de los Habitantes.- They maintain in summary that, although the faculty recognized by Article 75, third paragraph of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional to that state organ is undeniable, the truth is that—as it has been understood and interpreted—the Defensoría's action must be within the scope of its competencies, a thing that does not occur in this case because the claim is raised in a very precise manner for the alleged infringement of the constitutional rights of a few and specific economic agents whose conduct is regulated by the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, number 8653, and to whom the sanctioning regime challenged by the Defensora is exclusively applicable.- It is alleged by both parties that there is in reality no link between this issue and the rights and interests of the country's inhabitants, so the Defensoría's action derives rather into an action for the protection of the individual right and interest of practically a single entity, which is the Instituto Nacional de Seguros.- II.- When analyzing such affirmations and studying the arguments that support them, this Court concludes that indeed this unconstitutionality action must be summarily dismissed, as it falls outside the scope of competency that, in matters of filing unconstitutionality actions, has been attributed to the Defensoría de los Habitantes.

For this conclusion, it must first be considered that, as indicated by the Procuraduría in its report, the broad authority of the Defensoría (Ombudsman's Office) established in Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional is limited by what constitutes the subject matter of its competence, that is, those matters that the legislator charged it with attending to according to its own organic law interpreted systematically with the rest of the legal system. This Chamber has also understood it this way, having stated on the matter in judgment number 2000-07730 of fourteen hours forty-seven minutes of August thirtieth, two thousand:

³In this order of ideas, as Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional indicates: "A prior pending case shall not be necessary when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or when it concerns the defense of diffuse interests, or those that pertain to the community as a whole. Nor shall the Contralor General de la República, the Procurador General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República and the Defensor de los Habitantes need one." This provision, from the point of view of its content, not only enables the Defensoría de los Habitantes (Ombudsman's Office) to directly file an unconstitutionality action (acción de inconstitucionalidad), but also establishes no limitation to do so. It is clear: the Contralor General de la República, the Procurador General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República and the Defensor de los Habitantes do not need a prior matter to file the action (first postulate). Without concluded that ³ however, it is understood that this is not so by virtue of the fact that the exercise of the action, in each of these cases, presupposes that the relevant body is operating in the exercise of the powers that are its own, and only to that extent would each of them have the necessary standing (legitimación) to file an action.´ In that same judgment, progress was made toward fixing those competencies of the Defensoría "that are its own" and after extensive considerations, it was "the Defensoría de los Habitantes was precisely created to protect the rights and interests of the inhabitants, as well as to monitor that the functioning of the public sector adheres to morality, justice, the Constitución Política and other norms of the legal system," to later emphasize that: "In summary, it can be concluded a) that the legal system has granted the Defensor de los Habitantes an extremely broad sphere of competencies, which is not exclusive of other constitutional or legal competencies on the matter; b) that it is responsible for supervising the correct functioning of the Administration, to help ensure its adherence to the Principle of Legality, as well as to protect the rights and interests of the inhabitants and, to this extent, the law provides it with all the necessary mechanisms to perform that task«´. Thus, the possibility for the Defensoría to file unconstitutionality actions, directly and before this Sala Constitucional, operates not only when the object of the action is included within the assumptions set forth in Article 73 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, but also when its purpose is the defense of the rights and interests of constitutional rank of the inhabitants.- III.- However, in the specific case, it is this latter requirement that is absent because the action is filed against a specific part of the sanctions regime sanctions expressed in Articles 37 subsections a) and b); 39 subsection a) in relation to 36 subsection 1), 38 subsections 1) and 25, of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros number 8653, which establishes sanctions for a very specific group of legal subjects, namely, the economic agents called insurers (aseguradoras) and reinsurers (reaseguradoras). Thus, and according to the report of the Superintendencia de Seguros, the action is brought to defend an alleged violation of the constitutional rights of approximately ten legal persons that are those who —as of this date— are registered before that Superintendencia to carry out insurance and reinsurance activities. On this specific point, it is pertinent to bring up what was stated by this Chamber in the cited judgment 2000-07730:

³VI.- (...). Regarding standing (legitimación) to bring actions before the Courts of Justice, Article 13 of the Law allows it to initiate all those judicial actions or remedies against the Public Administration, in those cases where, in its judgment, the Courts can, by the nature of the issue, provide a suitable solution to the substance of the matter, either because in practice there is no one with the proper legal capacity (personería), funds or time to be qualified or willing to initiate the action themselves, or because the interested party belongs to that group of persons or sectors of persons who, as already mentioned, due to whatever circumstances (ignorance, economic or cultural marginalization, etc.), find themselves in a de facto situation of disadvantage vis-à-vis the Public Administration.

From the foregoing, it is understood that although there is no legal impediment preventing the Ombudsman's Office from bringing actions on behalf of persons or small or specific groups (and not for the defense of all the inhabitants of the country in general), such actions by the Ombudsman should be presented to this Court together with a necessary and sufficient justification in the aforementioned terms; that is, it should be fully demonstrated that —for any valid and reasonable circumstance— the beneficiaries of the Ombudsman's Office's action are in a disadvantaged condition for defending their own constitutional rights. For this Tribunal, to understand it otherwise would be to allow the Ombudsman's Office to appear in defense of some persons, yes, but not of others; that is, to act in an unequal and selective manner, without providing the necessary and sufficient explanation that validates such conduct from the standpoint of the principle of equality.— When we apply the foregoing ideas to this case, we find that no explanation or justification is provided as to why the Ombudsman appears in defense of what she herself describes as a group of active legal entities that possess the following financial data: Instituto Nacional de Seguros: 454,663,997,770 million colones; MAPFRE Costa Rica: 3,231,290,396 million colones; ASSA Compañía de Seguros: 5,807,763,765 million colones, data which suggest —in principle— a broad capacity to exercise on their own behalf the defense of their constitutional rights.— IV.— A second aspect that has been mentioned by the Ombudsman's Office as a basis for appearing as a claimant in this unconstitutionality proceeding relates to the alleged harm that consumers will suffer to their constitutional rights as a result of the application of monetary penalties to insurance and reinsurance entities. It is asserted that a sanction could eventually be excessive and, in such a case, there could exist —in turn— the possibility that the company might choose to pass that cost of the fine on to consumers through an increase in the price of its services, or else —it is noted— it could happen that, faced with a sanction of suspension of activities (or an excessively high fine), the company might decide to withdraw from the market, leaving consumers unprotected regarding their legal relationships with that company.— First, it is observed that the entire construction of the Ombudsman's Office's standing on this point is based on situations that do not derive directly and necessarily from the texts under discussion, as those norms provide a graduated system of sanctions, as well as rules to be taken into account in establishing the amount of the sanction, which include assessing even the possible effect that the sanction may produce on the market; therefore, the sanction that could produce the eventual injury to consumer rights is not something necessary, but only possible and very remote. Added to the foregoing is the fact that, as the Insurance Superintendent rightly indicates, the Ombudsman's Office provides no evidence and no argument whatsoever that points to the conclusion that such harm from the pass-through of costs will inevitably occur, but rather it is —again— only a probability; moreover, it is also not demonstrated that the departure of a market participant signifies, in and of itself and automatically, harm to the insurance market. On the contrary, regarding this argument, it is relevant to point out, as noted by the Attorney General's Office, that the insurance market is currently open and regulated, which means, in relation to the structure of costs and prices, that the participating companies and consumers themselves will make their own calculations and determine the price of services, such that it will be the consumers and companies who ultimately decide which option is best according to their convenience.— This open condition means that it is the consumer himself who has sufficient power to dissuade companies from passing on costs and thus to avoid the harm that would supposedly be inflicted upon them if a company decides to increase the price of its services arbitrarily and without consideration of the other market factors. Thus, the Ombudsman's Office should have alleged and demonstrated why this market mechanism established by law would not be sufficient for the protection of the group of consumers and in what way the latter would necessarily be affected by a specific sanction imposed on an insurance or reinsurance company.

All of this is far from having been demonstrated in this case, and therefore there is no basis whatsoever for understanding that through this proceeding the Ombudsman’s Office will actually protect such rights and interests of the collective body of consumers.- Finally, add to the foregoing the fact that —as the parties have pointed out— this action has been filed to achieve the nullity and disappearance of the legal framework, of the rules related to a part of the sanctioning system applicable to insurance and reinsurance companies, such that if the claim were to succeed, such a vacuum would necessarily and negatively impact the sphere of rights and interests of consumers, insofar as insurance and reinsurance companies would be free to omit a long series of conduct that the legislator itself has considered fundamental for the proper functioning of the insurance market.- Leaving compliance with such conduct to the discretion and convenience of the service-providing companies without the possibility of coercion would necessarily result in an impact on consumers, which is why the Ombudsman’s Office’s petition must be rejected outright, since if it were instead to succeed, the very persons it claims to defend would be harmed.- V.- Conclusion.- From the foregoing, it can be concluded that this action of unconstitutionality filed by the Ombudsman’s Office against Articles 37, subsections a) and b); 39, subsection a) in relation to 36, subsection 1), 38, subsections 1) and 25, all of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, must be rejected outright because this body has acted —in this particular case— outside the scope of its powers as they have been delimited by law and the case law of this Chamber, insofar as no justification whatsoever has been presented for acting directly on behalf of insurance and reinsurance companies, nor has it been demonstrated that the rules under discussion will necessarily and by themselves cause harm to the collective body of consumers, whereas the declaration sought will negatively impact the aforementioned group of persons.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza de plano la acción planteada.- Gilbert Armijo S.

<o:p></o:p> Presidente a.i Luis Paulino Mora M. Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V. Paul Rueda L.

Teresita Rodríguez A. Jose Paulino Hernández G.

-- Código verificador -- 8-10!4:"%#+ SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at fourteen hours thirty minutes on January twenty-third, two thousand thirteen.

Action of unconstitutionality (Acción de inconstitucionalidad) brought by DEFENSORA DE LOS HABITANTES DE LA REPUBLICA, OFELIA TAITELBAUM YOSELEWICH, of legal age, married, Master in Administration, identification card number 1-367-763, resident of Escazú, in her capacity as Defensora de los Habitantes de la República, against articles 37 subsections a) and b); 39 subsection a) in relation to 36 subsection 1), 38 subsections 1) and 25, all of the Regulatory Law of the Insurance Market (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros) number 8653.

Resultando:

1.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber (Sala) on May seventh, two thousand twelve, the petitioner requests that the unconstitutionality of articles 37 subsections a) and b); 39 subsection a) in relation to 36 subsection 1), 38 subsections 1) and article 25, all of the Regulatory Law of the Insurance Market number 8653, be declared. She claims that her standing (legitimación) derives from article 75, third paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) and from articles 1 and 13 of the Law of the Defensoría de los Habitantes de la República, which authorizes the Institution to bring actions of unconstitutionality in defense of the inhabitants of the Republic, a mandate that must be understood systematically as the defense of constitutionality and of the obligation of public authorities to act in accordance with justice and morality and within the framework of the Constitution.

Regarding the claim proper, it is pointed out that for many years the insurance market in our country operated under a state monopoly; however, starting in two thousand eight, the decision was made to open that activity, temporarily excluding universal and compulsory insurance such as vehicle insurance and workers' compensation (riesgos laborales). It is indicated that as a result of that opening, the decision was made to establish legal regulation and create a body responsible for regulating and overseeing the market, as well as the conduct of operators, in order to protect the interests and rights of consumers. The plaintiff adds that it is precisely in this oversight and sanctioning function where a violation of the Political Constitution exists, because the challenged articles establish unequal treatment for the different insurance and reinsurance entities, given that it is not taken into account that for some of them, the sanctions that may be established could be ruinous, which would force them to leave the market, thus affecting consumers and residents in general. Likewise, she points out that those same norms, in addition to affecting some operators unequally compared to others, cause a violation of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality because the sanctions could become excessive for one of the operators, very significantly affecting its operational capacity, meaning we are facing norms whose legal effects are exaggerated since the correction could be achieved with a type of sanction more adjusted to justice and proportion. Finally, it is pointed out that there is also a violation of the fundamental right of the consumer, enshrined in Article 46 of the Constitution, in the sense that by disproportionately affecting the financial capacity of insurance entities due to the established sanctions, the capacity of such operators to cover and meet their obligations towards consumers is put at risk, endangering their health and economic stability, all by affecting the capacity to indemnify insured damages. Likewise, it could happen that the economic cost of the sanctions is transferred to consumers, thereby threatening their health and economic interests. For all these reasons, she requests that the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms be declared.

2.- By resolution at twelve hours forty minutes on June twelfth, two thousand twelve, the action was admitted and a hearing was granted to the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) and the General Superintendency of Insurance (Superintendencia General de Seguros).

3.- Magda Inés Rojas Chaves, of legal age, married, resident of Heredia, with identity card number 4-110-097, in her capacity as Deputy Attorney General (Procuradora General Adjunta) of the Republic, responds to the granted hearing and first points out that the action is inadmissible because, as this advisory body has held, the power attributed in Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) is directly related to its material competence, meaning that the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría) can act in protection of fundamental rights and in general the rights and interests of the country's inhabitants. However, it is noted that this action is brought in defense of the country's insurance and reinsurance entities, with particular emphasis on the harms of the challenged regulations to the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros). Having said the above, the Attorney General affirms that although the action is brought because the amount of the sanctions could be transferred to the consumer, the truth is that the claim is limited to the provisions referring to insurance and reinsurance activities, thereby leaving aside the fact that the law regulating the insurance market serves to regulate the activity of insurance intermediation and the provision of insurance services, activities that are also capable of affecting consumers. Therefore, it is affirmed, it is not explainable why the action of the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría) is limited to the provisions for insurers and reinsurers and mention is made capacity to pay, the duration of the conduct, and the recidivism of the offender. If to this is added that the norm allows a margin in relation to the amount of the infraction, it can be concluded that proportionality in the strict sense is clearly respected, as a balanced relationship is verified between the benefits to the general interest and the sanctioning measure. Furthermore, it is pointed out, regarding the violation of the principle of legal equality, contrary to what is maintained in the action, the law employs two objective criteria: the covered subject (insurers and reinsurers) as well as the amount of equity to establish a percentage of the latter as a sanction. The Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría) opines that if a fixed sum in colones is established as a fine, inequality could be incurred because the significance and effects of that fixed fine could harm some of the entities.

With the chosen system, the monetary expression is not a product of the legislator but is given by the amount of the equity, meaning that if a company must pay a higher fine in a specific case, it is because its equity is larger.- Finally, regarding the infringement of consumer rights derived from Article 46 of the Constitution, the Attorney General's Office points out that the Law whose articles are challenged contains, precisely, as one of its most important objectives, consumer protection. In particular, articles 4, 5, and 6, which contain strict rules for the defense of the insurance consumer's condition, so that, it is argued, the faculties and powers of bodies such as the Superintendencia de Seguros must correspond to such objectives, and also with such purposes, the law contains strict rules that the interested companies must respect.- It is noted that such objectives could not be fulfilled if companies do not comply with their obligations, and that non-compliance would indeed constitute an infringement of consumer rights.- Thus, the respect for regulations, the non-assumption of undue risks, and the respect for the insured are imposed more energetically when dealing with the State insurer.- In conclusion, it is affirmed that the action must be dismissed or declared without merit for not existing any injury to the constitutional rights alleged.- 4.- By brief dated the sixteenth of July of two thousand twelve, Javier Cascante Elizondo, of legal age, married once, identity card number 1-726-627, Master in Economics, resident of San José, in his capacity as Superintendente General de Seguros, appears in this proceeding and responds to the granted hearing in the following terms: he points out that in an open insurance market system, it is necessary that especially the insurance companies have clear guidelines established in the legal system for carrying out their activity, so that citizens are guaranteed that their activity adheres to legality and sound technique.- In accordance with the foregoing, it is logical that within the system there exists a mechanism to establish consequences for actions deemed harmful to citizens and, of course, the administration must be empowered to apply such sanctions, especially in this case where a duality of protected legal interests is involved, namely: financial public order and also the constitutional rights of all consumers.- In particular, the challenge is against the sanctions established in the Law, firstly because it is said that they violate the right to equality, but there are ten economic agents that would be the subjects of the regulation and -mainly- the way of applying the sanctions takes into account applicable scenarios considering the legal nature and also the specific characteristics of each one.- Particularly, the position of the state insurer is very different from the others, so that the sanction system, contrary to what is affirmed, allows the sanctions to produce a similar effect on all participants who commit infractions.- In relation to the alleged injury to reasonableness and proportionality, the Superintendente de Seguros points out that on this point it is affirmed that there could be an impact on the Public Treasury, but his statement is not supported by any type of evidence and he does not even present a single argument that would allow his claims to be considered valid.- In any case, it is affirmed, when applying sanctions, criteria of proportionality and reasonableness must be respected, as their application must follow the guidelines of Article 164 of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, which mandate paying attention to the damage and the conditions of the subject, as well as to the effects on consumers.- A comparative table is also added demonstrating that the sanctions authorized by different Costa Rican laws related to these matters are similar and perhaps even harsher in areas such as pensions and securities.- He also adds that -as can be deduced from the table he provides- it is reckless and inaccurate to state that our country has the most severe fines or sanctions in the region, because the types of sanctions are very different and the parameters used are diverse, so it is not possible to make comparisons.- Finally, regarding the possible impact on consumer rights from the potential pass-through of sanction costs, it must be noted that we are in an open price-setting regime, so that it is the insurance entities that, upon prior notification to the Superintendency, could raise their rates if their studies and costs so suggest.- This can happen with or without sanctions, so that the argument of the Defensoría about the pass-through of sanction costs via pricing fails to take into account that in an open system, consumers are capable of evaluating and comparing a variable as important as price, so that the companies themselves, in an open system, are the primary ones interested in avoiding price increases, as this would mean a decrease in what constitutes their main activity, namely the sale of insurance.- For all the above, it is requested that the action be declared without merit.- 5- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional were published in numbers 56, 57, and 58 of the Boletín Judicial, on the days of the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first of March of two thousand twelve.- 6.- By brief dated the thirteenth of August of two thousand twelve, Juan Ignacio Quirós Arroyo, of legal age, married, a retired mathematics professor, resident of Moravia, identity card number 2-227-536, appeared in this proceeding as a coadjuvant and expresses his interest in the outcome of this process, and for this purpose, he points out firstly that the Defensoría de los Habitantes is not legitimately authorized to bring the action, as the case falls within the scope of Private Law because it deals with the private insurance business. He expresses his disagreement with the fact that the Defensoría seeks to defend insurers -especially the Instituto Nacional de Seguros-, thereby seeking to eliminate provisions that would benefit not only the INS, but also other private insurers, to the detriment of insurance consumers. He considers it is not valid to affirm that if an insurer is sanctioned with a fine based on its equity, this will necessarily lead to a danger for its mass of insured persons, because in accounting terms, the assets of the insurer are one thing and its liabilities another.- He adds that a company's liabilities reflect the obligations contracted by that company to third parties and indicates that in insurance matters, a distinction can be made between technical and non-technical liabilities. In turn, technical liabilities can be divided into named and unnamed; thus, the most important liabilities of an insurance company are the technical liabilities, that is, the debts to the insured and the technical commitments (technical provisions). Therefore, he considers that the liabilities are not affected by a sanction on the insurer's equity, since these are resources that are its exclusive property.

For an increase in premiums or an increase in deductibles (franquicias) or deductibles (deducibles) and others to occur, a catastrophic event must take place, not contemplated in the technical provisions, nor in the equity of the insurers due to poor management of their operational risk, their minimum solvency capital, and their market conduct, among other relevant facts. It considers that the suspension or total elimination of the fines from the sanctioning regime of that insurance law would indeed be catastrophic for consumers and insurance users, since insurers would have carte blanche to carry out market conduct that would indeed affect the insured population, and they would remain in clear impunity, to the detriment of the policyholders. In the petitioner's judgment, moreover, the absence of the principle of reasonableness and proportionality is also untrue, because the law itself indicates the graduality of the sanctions.

7.- In a brief of August fourteenth, two thousand twelve, Nancy Arias Mora, of legal age, attorney, divorced, identity card number 1-710-839, in her capacity as General Judicial Attorney-in-Fact of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, also appears to coadjuvate in this acción de inconstitucionalidad. She indicates that her standing as a coadjuvant proceeds from an investigation that the Supervisor of Insurance is currently conducting on her principal, under expediente N° PA-0004-2011. In that procedure, the norms now challenged would eventually be applied, so the impact would be direct in relation to this action. She affirms that the constitutional defect presented by said articles lies in the excessive nature of the economic sanctions, which constitute a risk for operators of the insurance market, as they may eventually be obliged to pay a sum of up to 5% of their equity, which would undoubtedly cause a serious, public, and notorious financial problem for any of the companies. She indicates that in the specific case of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, this risk is doubled because it is a company constituted as an autonomous institution, which manages public funds in part of its activity, so if a fine is imposed on the company's equity -the equity of all Costa Ricans because it is a company with the State's guarantee-, the impact would be not only on its equity directly but also on the profits it transfers to the Costa Rican State and on the benefits that all Costa Ricans receive from state institutions. The application of such strong economic sanctions generates a very high risk for the operators of the insurance market, which can even become a bankruptcy risk for the companies, since a fine associated with equity could easily generate that situation, which evidently undermines the freedom of commerce constitutionally guaranteed in Costa Rica. She adds that the imposition of such high sanctions violates the freedom of commerce because they entail the eventual closure of the business. Likewise, she considers Article 50 constitutional to be injured, since it is the State's duty to organize and stimulate production, not to establish limits or limitations that prevent its exercise. She also considers the principle of equality to be injured as well, because the I.N.S. is the only competitor that has a subsidiary company that provides auxiliary insurance services, so the distinction among the possible recipients of this sanction would be even more burdensome, since only the I.N.S. could receive it. Moreover, the challenged fines are aimed at prejudicing, almost exclusively, the INS, and that is neither reasonable nor proportionate.

8.- The hearing provided for in articles 10 and 85 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by numeral 9 ibidem, deeming this resolution sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Court.

9.- In the proceedings, the prescriptions of law have been fulfilled. Drafter: Magistrate Mora Mora, and,

Considering:

I.- On the admissibility of the acción. In this process, both the Procuraduría General de la República and the Superintendencia General de Seguros have raised doubts regarding the admissibility of this acción de inconstitucionalidad filed by the Defensoría de los Habitantes.- They maintain, in summary, that although the faculty recognized to that state organ by Article 75, third paragraph of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional is undeniable, the truth is that -as has been understood and interpreted- the Defensoría's action must be within the scope of its competencies, something that does not occur in this case because the claim is raised very precisely for the alleged infringement of the constitutional rights of a few specific economic agents whose conduct is regulated by the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, number 8653, and to whom the sanctioning regime that the Defensora discusses applies exclusively.- It is alleged by both parties that there is in reality no link between this issue and the rights and interests of the country's inhabitants, so the Defensoría's action rather results in an action for the protection of the individual right and interest of practically a single entity, namely the Instituto Nacional de Seguros.- II.- Upon analyzing such assertions and studying the arguments that support them, this Tribunal concludes that indeed this acción de inconstitucionalidad must be rejected outright, as it is outside the jurisdictional scope that in the matter of filing acciones de inconstitucionalidad- has been attributed to the Defensoría de los Habitantes.

For this conclusion, it must first be considered that, as the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría) points out in its report, the broad authority of the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría) established in Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) is limited by what constitutes the subject matter of its competence, that is, those matters that the legislator tasked it with attending to according to its own organic law, understood systematically with the rest of the legal system. This has also been understood by this Chamber, which stated on the matter in judgment number 2000-07730 of fourteen hours forty-seven minutes of August thirtieth, two thousand:

"In this vein, as indicated by Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional): "A prior pending case shall not be necessary when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it involves the defense of diffuse interests, or those that pertain to the community as a whole. Neither shall the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contralor General de la República), the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), the Prosecutor General of the Republic (Fiscal General de la República), and the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes) require one." This norm, from the perspective of its content, not only empowers the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría de los Habitantes) to directly file the unconstitutionality action, but also does not establish any limitation for doing so. It is clear: the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Attorney General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, and the Ombudsman do not need a prior matter to file the action (first postulate). However, it is understood that this is not the case by virtue of the fact that the exercise of the action, in each of these cases, presupposes that the organ in question is operating within the exercise of the competencies that are its own and only to that extent would each of them have the necessary standing to present an action." In that same judgment, progress was made toward defining those competencies of the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría) "that are its own" and after extensive considerations, it was "the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría de los Habitantes) was precisely created to protect the rights and interests of the inhabitants, as well as to monitor that the functioning of the public sector conforms to morality, justice, the Political Constitution, and other norms of the legal system," to later emphasize that: "In summary, it can be concluded a) that the legal system has granted the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes) an extremely broad sphere of competencies, which is not exclusive of other constitutional or legal competencies on the matter; b) that it is his competence to supervise the correct functioning of the Administration, to contribute to ensuring its adherence to the Principle of Legality, as well as to protect the rights and interests of the inhabitants and, to this extent, the law provides him with all the necessary mechanisms to perform that task." In such a way, the possibility of filing unconstitutionality actions by the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría), directly and before this Constitutional Chamber, operates not only when the object of the action is comprised within the assumptions set forth in Article 73 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), but also when its purpose is the defense of the rights and interests of constitutional rank of the inhabitants.- III.- However, in the specific case, it is this last requirement that is absent because the action is filed against a specific part of the sanctions regime expressed in Articles 37 subsections a) and b); 39 subsection a) in relation to 36 subsection 1), 38 subsections 1) and 25, of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros) number 8653, which establishes sanctions for a very specific group of legal subjects, namely, the economic agents called insurers (aseguradoras) and reinsurers (reaseguradoras). Thus, and according to the report of the Office of the Superintendent of Insurance (Superintendencia de Seguros), the action is brought to defend an alleged injury to the constitutional rights of approximately ten legal persons who are the ones that—to date—are registered before said Superintendency to carry out insurance (aseguramiento) and reinsurance (reaseguramiento) activities. On this specific point, it is pertinent to bring up what was stated by the Chamber in the cited judgment 2000-07730:

"VI.- (...). Regarding standing to sue before the Courts of Justice, Article 13 of the Law allows him to initiate all such legal actions or remedies against the Public Administration, in those cases in which, in his judgment, the Courts may, due to the nature of the issue, provide a suitable solution to the merits of the matter, whether because in practice no one with the proper legal personality, funds, or time exists to have standing or be willing to initiate the action themselves, or because the interested party belongs to that group of persons or sectors of persons that, as already mentioned, due to whatever circumstances (ignorance, economic or cultural marginalization, etc.), find themselves in a de facto situation of disadvantage vis-à-vis the Public Administration." From what has been said, it is understood that although there is no legal impediment for the Ombudsman's Office to file actions on behalf of specific or small groups of persons (and not for the defense of all the country's inhabitants in general), such actions by the Ombudsman should be presented to this Court together with a necessary and sufficient justification in the aforementioned terms; that is, it should be fully demonstrated that —for any valid and reasonable circumstance— the beneficiaries of the Ombudsman's Office's action find themselves in conditions of disadvantage for the defense of their own constitutional rights. For this Court, to understand it otherwise would be to allow the Ombudsman's Office to appear in defense of some persons, yes, but not of others; that is, to act in an unequal and selective manner, without providing the necessary and sufficient explanation that validates such conduct from the standpoint of the principle of equality.- When we apply the previous ideas to this case, we find that no explanation and justification is provided for why the Ombudsperson appears in defense of what she herself describes as a group of active legal entities that have the following asset data: Instituto Nacional de Seguros: 454,663,997,770 million colones; MAPFRE Costa Rica: 3,231,290,396 million colones; ASSA Compañía de Seguros: 5,807,763,765 million colones, data that suggests —in principle— a broad possibility to exercise on their own the defense of their constitutional rights.- IV.- A second aspect that has been mentioned by the Ombudsman's Office as support for appearing as a plaintiff in this unconstitutionality proceeding is related to the supposed harm that consumers will receive in their constitutional rights as a result of the application of pecuniary penalties to insurance and reinsurance entities. It is stated that a sanction could eventually be excessive and in such a case there could, in turn, exist the possibility that the company may choose to pass on that fine cost to consumers through an increase in the price of its services, or —it is indicated— it could happen that faced with a sanction of suspension of activities (or an excessively high fine), the company decides to withdraw from the market, leaving consumers unprotected regarding their legal relations with that company.- Firstly, it is observed that the entire construction of the Ombudsman's Office's standing on this point is based on situations that do not derive directly and necessarily from the texts under discussion, since such norms provide a graduated system of sanctions, in addition to rules to be taken into account in establishing the amount of the sanction that include evaluating even the possible impact that the sanction may produce on the market, so that the sanction that could produce the eventual injury to consumer rights is not something necessary but only possible and very eventual. Adding to the above, as the Superintendente de Seguros correctly indicates, the Ombudsman's Office provides no proof and no argument that aims to conclude that this harm from cost pass-through will inevitably occur, but rather it is —again— only a probability, and furthermore, it is also not demonstrated that the exit of a market participant signifies, in and of itself and automatically, harm to the insurance market. On the contrary, in relation to this argument, it is relevant to point out, as noted by the Procuraduría, that the insurance market is currently open and regulated, which means, in relation to the structure of costs and prices, that it will be the participating companies and consumers themselves who make their own calculations and determine the price of services, so that it will be the consumers and companies who ultimately decide which turns out to be the best option as it suits them.- Such an open condition means that it is the consumer himself who has sufficient power to dissuade companies from passing on costs and to thus avoid the harm that would supposedly befall them if a company decides to increase the price of its services arbitrarily and without consideration of the rest of the market factors. In this way, the Ombudsman's Office should have alleged and demonstrated why this market mechanism established by law, would not be sufficient for the protection of the group of consumers and in what way the latter would necessarily be affected by a specific sanction that has been imposed on an insurance or reinsurance company.

All of this is far from having been demonstrated in this case, and therefore there is no basis whatsoever to understand that with this proceeding the Defensoría will effectively manage to protect such rights and interests of the collective body of consumers.- Finally, add to the foregoing the fact that —as the parties have pointed out— this action has been brought to achieve the nullity and disappearance of the legal framework, of the rules related to a part of the sanctioning system applicable to insurance and reinsurance companies, so that if the claim were to succeed, such a void would necessarily and negatively affect the sphere of rights and interests of consumers, insofar as insurance and reinsurance companies would be free to omit a long series of conducts that the legislator itself has considered fundamental for the proper functioning of the insurance market.- Leaving compliance with such conducts to the discretion and convenience of the service-providing companies without the possibility of coercion would necessarily produce an impact on consumers, for which reason the Defensoría's claim must be rejected outright, given that, if it were to succeed, the persons it claims to defend would instead be harmed.- V.- Conclusion.- From the foregoing, it must be concluded that this acción de inconstitucionalidad filed by the Defensoría de los Habitantes against Articles 37, subsections a) and b); 39, subsection a) in relation to 36, subsection 1), 38, subsections 1) and 25, all of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, must be rejected outright because this body has acted —in this particular case— outside the scope of its powers as defined by law and the case law of this Chamber, given that no justification whatsoever is presented for acting directly in favor of the insurance and reinsurance companies, nor has it been demonstrated that the contested rules will necessarily and in and of themselves produce harm to the collective body of consumers, whereas the declaration sought would negatively impact the aforementioned group of persons.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza de plano la acción planteada.- Gilbert Armijo S.

Presidente a.i Luis Paulino Mora M. Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V. Paul Rueda L.

Teresita Rodríguez A. Jose Paulino Hernández G.

-- Código verificador -- 8-10!4:"%#+

SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce horas treinta minutos del veintitres de enero de dos mil trece.

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por DEFENSORA DE LOS HABITANTES DE LA REPUBLICA, OFELIA TAITELBAUM YOSELEWICH, mayor, casada, máster en Administración, cédula de identidad número 1- 367-763, vecina de Escazú, en su calidad de Defensora de los Habitantes de la República, en contra de los artículos 37 incisos a) y b); 39 inciso a) en relación con el 36 inciso 1), 38 incisos 1) y 25, todos Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros número 8653.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala el siete de mayo de dos mil doce la accionante solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 37 incisos a) y b); 39 inciso a) en relación con el 36 inciso 1), 38 incisos 1) y artículo 25, todos de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros número 8653. Alega que su legimitación deriva del artículo 75 párrafo tercero de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y de los artículos 1 y 13 de la Ley de la Defensoría de los Habitantes de la República, que autoriza a la Institución a plantear acciones de inconstitucionalidad en defensa de los habitantes de la República, mandato que debe entenderse de manera sistemática como la defensa de la constitucionalidad y de la obligación de las autoridades públicas de actuar con apego a la justicia y la moral y dentro del marco de la Constitución. En cuanto al reclamo propiamente dicho se señala que durante muchos años el mercado de seguros en nuestro país, funcionó ligado a la figura de un monopolio estatal, sin embargo a partir del dos mil ocho se optó por la apertura de esa actividad, excluyendo de momento los seguros universales y obligatorios como el de vehículos y el de riesgos laborales.- Se indica que a raíz de esa apertura se optó por establecer una regulación legal y crear un órgano encargado de regular y vigilar el mercado, así como la conducta de los operadores ello con el fin de proteger los intereses y derechos de los consumidores.- Agrega la accionante que precisamente en esa labor de vigilancia y sanción es donde existe una lesión a la Constitución Política porque los artículos impugnados establecen un tratamiento desigual para las diferentes entidades aseguradoras y reaseguradoras, ello por cuanto no se toma en cuenta que para algunas de ellas las sanciones que puedan llegar a establecerse pueden ser ruinosas, con lo cual tendrían que salir del mercado afectando de ese modo a los consumidores y pobladores en general.- De igual forma, señala que esas mismas normas, además de afectar de manera desigual a unos operadores respecto de otros, producen una lesión a los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad pues las sanciones podrían llegar a ser excesivas para uno de los operadores por afectarse de forma muy importante su capacidad de operación con lo cual, estamos frente a normas cuyos efectos jurídicos son exagerados pues la corrección podría lograrse con un tipo de sanción más ajustada a la justicia y proporción.- Finalmente se señala que también existe una lesión al derecho fundamental del consumidor recogido en el artículo 46 Constitucional en el sentido de que al afectarse desmedidamente la capacidad financiera de las entidades aseguradoras en razón de las sanciones establecidas, se pone en riesgo la capacidad de tales operadoras de cubrir y atender sus obligaciones frente a los consumidores, poniendo en riesgo su salud y estabilidad económica, todo al afectar la capacidad de indeminizar los daños asegurados. Igualmente, podría ocurrir que se traslade el costo económico de las sanciones a los consumidores con lo que se amenaza su salud e intereses económicos.- Por todo ello solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas.

2.- Por resolución de las doce horas cuarenta minutos del doce de junio de dos mil doce, se le dio curso a la acción y se confirió audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la República y a la Superintendencia General de Seguros.- 3.- Magda Inés Rojas Chaves, mayor, casada, vecina de Heredia, con cédula de identidad número 4-110-097, en su calidad de Procuradora General Adjunta de la República, contesta la audiencia conferida y señala en primer término que la acción resulta inadmisible en razón de que, como lo ha sostenido ese órgano asesor, la facultad que se atribuye en el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional está directamente relacionado con su competencia material, lo que significa que la Defensoría puede acudir en tutela de los derechos fundamentales y en general los derechos e intereses de los habitantes del país. Sin embargo, se apunta, esta acción se ejerce en defensa de las entidades aseguradoras y reaseguradores del país, con particular énfasis en los perjuicios de la normativa impugnada para el Instituto Nacional de Seguros. Dicho lo anterior, afirma la Procuradora que aunque la acción se ejerce porque el monto de las sanciones podrían trasladarse al consumidor, lo cierto es que el reclamo se limita a las disposiciones referidas a las actividades de aseguramiento y reaseguramiento, con lo que se deja de lado que la ley que regula el mercado de seguros sirve para regular la actividad de la intermediación de seguros y la provisión de servicios de seguros, actividades que son susceptibles también de afectar a los consumidores. Por ello se afirma, no resulta explicable porque la acción de la Defensoría se limita a las disposiciones de las aseguradoras y reaseguradoras y se hace mención precisamente las disposiciones impugnadas lo que buscan es la estabilidad y solvencia de las entidades participantes y proteger los derechos de los asegurados. Por ello, de declararse la inconstitucionalidad de la norma los asegurados del país se encontrarían ante una situación en que las empresas pueden adoptar los riesgos que crean convenientes, irrespetar la legislación y eventualmente los derechos que la ley reconoce a los asegurados sin que haya posibilidad de sanción, por lo que es de concluir que la Defensoría ha ejercido una acción en protección de las aseguradoras y reaseguradoras la cual, de prosperar, lesionaría el orden público presente en el régimen del mercado de seguros y los derechos de los habitantes del país.- Por otra parte, en cuanto al fondo del asunto se señala que efectivamente luego de años de monopolio en materia de seguros la ley vino a concebir un mercado de seguros competitivo pero regulado, dentro del que el Instituto Nacional de Seguros deberá operar como un participante más. Concretamente se señala que no existe lesión a los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad porque las normas impugnadas recogen efectos jurídicos que son legítimos en tanto obedecen a la necesidad de regular la actividad de las aseguradoras dentro del marco constitucional y además son idóneos porque existe una clara relación de medio a fin pues las conductas específicas cuya falta puede ser sancionada, tienen una relación directa con los fines de la Ley establecidos en el artículo 2 y los objetivos generales relacionadas con el establecimiento de un mercado de este tipo como lo son la transparencia y el manejo de reglas claras y trato apropiado al consumidor. Igual sucede con la proporcionalidad en sentido estricto dado que para la aplicación de las sanciones son obligatorios los parámetros de graduación de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores que incluyen la gravedad de la infracción, la amenaza o el daño causado, los indicios de intencionalidad, la capacidad de pago, la duración de la conducta y la reincidencia del infractor.- Si a ello se suma que la norma da un margen en relación con el monto de la infracción, se puede concluir que se respeta claramente la proporcionalidad en sentido estricto al constatarse una relación equilibrada que se establece entre los beneficios al interés general y la medida la sancionatoria. Por otra parte, se señala, en relación con la violación al principio de igualdad jurídica, contrario a lo que se sostiene en la acción, la ley emplea dos criterios objetivos, el sujeto cubierto (aseguradoras y reaseguradoras) así como el monto del patrimonio para establecer un porcentaje de éste último como sanción.- Opina la Procuraduría que si se establece como multa una suma determinada en colones, se puede incurrir en una desigualdad porque el significado y efectos de esa multa fija podrían perjudicar a algunas de las entidades. Con el sistema elegido la expresión dineraria no es producto del legislador sino que viene dada por el monto del patrimonio, es decir que si una empresa debe pagar más multa en un caso determinado es porque su patrimonio es más abultado.- Finalmente, en cuanto a la infracción a los derechos del consumidor derivados del artículo 46 Constitucional señala la Procuraduría que la Ley cuyos artículos se impugnan, contiene precisamente como unos de sus objetivos más importantes la protección del consumidor. En particular, los artículos 4, 5 6, que tienen reglas estrictas para la defensa de la condición del consumidor de seguros, de modo que, según se sostiene, a tales objetivos deben corresponder las facultades y potestades de órganos como la Superintendencia de Seguros y también con tales finalidades la ley contiene reglas estrictas que las empresas interesadas deben respetar.- Se señala que tales objetivos no podrían cumplirse si las empresas no cumplen con sus obligaciones y ese incumplimiento sí constituiría una afectación a los derechos de los consumidores.- Así, el respeto a las normas, la no asunción de riesgos indebido y el respeto de los asegurados se imponen más enérgicamente cuando se está frente a la aseguradora del Estado.- En conclusión, se afirma que la acción debe inadmitirse o bien declararse sin lugar por no existir lesión alguna de los derechos constitucionales alegados.- 4.- Mediante escrito del dieciséis de julio de dos mil doce, Javier Cascante Elizondo, mayor, casado una vez, cédula de identidad número 1-726-627, Máster en Economía, vecino de San José, en su condición de Superintendente General de Seguros, se apersona en este proceso y contesta la audiencia conferida en los siguientes términos: señala que en un sistema de apertura en el mercado de seguros es necesario que especialmente las empresas aseguradoras tengan lineamientos claros fijados en el ordenamiento jurídico, para la realización de su actividad de modo que se garantice a los ciudadanos que su actividad sea apegada la legalidad y una buena técnica.- Acorde con lo anterior, resulta lógico que dentro del sistema exista un mecanismo para establecer consecuencias para las actuaciones que se estimen lesivas para los ciudadanos y, por supuesto, se debe facultar a la administración para aplicar tales sanciones, más en este caso donde se incluye una dualidad de bienes jurídicos a proteger, a saber: el orden público financiero y además los derechos constitucionales de todos los consumidores. En particular, se reclama contra las sanciones fijadas en la Ley, primero porque se dice que infringen el derecho de igualdad pero se trata de diez agentes económicos que serían los sujetos de la normativa y -principalmente- la forma de aplicar las sanciones toma en cuenta supuestos aplicables atendiendo a la naturaleza jurídica y además las características propias de cada uno.- Particularmente la posición de la aseguradora estatal es muy diferente de las demás, de manera que el sistema de sanciones al contrario de lo que se afirma, permite que las sanciones produzcan un efecto parecido en todos los participantes que cometan las faltas.- En relación con la supuesta lesión a la razonabilidad y la proporcionalidad, señala el Superintendente de Seguros que en este punto se afirma que puede haber una afectación de la Hacienda Pública pero no se sustenta su dicho con prueba de ningún tipo y ni siquiera expone un solo alegato que permita tener como válidas sus afirmaciones.- En todo caso, se afirma, al aplicar las sanciones deben respetarse criterios de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad pues su aplicación debe seguir las guías del artículo 164 de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores que ordenan prestar atención al daño y las condiciones del sujeto así como a los efectos sobre los consumidores.- Se agrega además un cuadro comparativo donde se demuestra que las sanciones autorizadas por las distintas leyes costarricenses relacionadas con estos temas son similares e incluso quizás más duras en materias como pensiones y valores.- Agrega igualmente que -según se desprende de la tabla que aporta- es aventurado e impreciso señalar que nuestro país tiene las multas o sanciones más graves de la región lo anterior porque los tipos de sanción son muy diferentes y los parámetros que se emplean son diversos de modo que no es posible hacer comparaciones.- Finalmente, en cuanto a la posible afectación de los derechos de los consumidores por el posible traslado de costos de las sanciones debe señalarse que estamos en régimen abierto de fijación de precios de modo que son las entidades aseguradoras las que, previo informe a la Superintendencia, podrían subir sus tarifas si sus estudios y costos así lo sugieren.- Eso puede ocurrir con o sin sanciones, de modo que el argumento de la Defensoría sobre el traslado de costos de las sanciones vía precio, deja de tomar en cuenta que en un sistema abierto los consumidores son capaces de valorar y comparar una variable tan importante como el precio de modo que las propias empresas, en un sistema abierto, son las primeras interesadas en evitar el aumento de sus precios, pues ello significaría una merma en lo que constituye su actividad principal, a saber la venta de seguros.- Por todo lo anterior se solicita que la acción se declare sin lugar.- 5- Los edictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional fueron publicados en los números 56, 57 y 58 del Boletín Judicial, de los días diecinueve, veinte y veintiuno de marzo de dos mil doce.- 6.- Por escrito del trece de agosto de dos mil doce, se apersonó en este proceso como coadyuvante Juan Ignacio Quirós Arroyo, mayor, casado profesor de matemática pensionado, vecino de Moravia, cédula de identidad número 2-227-536 y manifiesta su interés en el resultado de este proceso y para ello señala en primer término que la Defensoría de los Habitantes no se encuentra legitimada para presentar la acción, pues el caso entra dentro del ámbito del Derecho Privado por tratarse del negocio de los seguros privados. Señala su inconformidad con el hecho de que la Defensoría busque defender a las aseguradoras -especialmente al Instituto Nacional de Seguros-, con lo cual procura eliminar disposiciones que beneficiarían no sólo al INS, sino también a las demás aseguradoras privadas, en detrimento de los consumidores de seguros. Estima que no es válido afirmar que si una aseguradora es sancionada con una multa sobre su patrimonio, ello conllevará necesariamente a un peligro para su masa de asegurados pues contablemente, una cosa son los activos de la aseguradora y otro cosa sus pasivos.- Agrega que el pasivo de una empresa refleja las obligaciones contraídas por esa empresa con terceros e indica que en materia de seguros se puede distinguir, entre los pasivos técnicos y los no técnicos. A su vez, los pasivos técnicos se pueden dividir en nominados e innominados, así los pasivos más importantes de una compañía de seguros son los pasivos técnicos, es decir, las deudas con los asegurados y los compromisos técnicos (provisiones técnicas). Por ello, considera que el pasivo no se ve afectado por una sanción a la aseguradora sobre su patrimonio, por cuanto son recursos que son de su propiedad exclusiva. Así, estos fondos del patrimonio serían los afectados por una eventual sanción. Continúa señalando, que no es de recibo el argumento de que una multa a cualquier aseguradora va a afectar a los consumidores de seguros con un aumento en las primas. Para que se produzca un aumento en las primas o un aumento en las franquicias o en los deducibles y otros, tiene que darse un evento catastrófico, no contemplado en las provisiones técnicas, no en el patrimonio de las aseguradoras por la mala administración de su riesgo operativo, de su capital mínimo de solvencia y de su conducta de mercado, entre otros hechos relevantes. Considera que la suspensión o eliminación total de las multas del régimen sancionatorio de esa ley de seguros, si sería catastrófico para los consumidores y usuarios del seguro, pues las aseguradoras tendrían carta blanca, para llevar a cabo conductas de mercado que sí afectarían a la población asegurada, y permanecerían en clara impunidad, en perjuicio de los asegurados. A juicio del gestionante además, no es cierta tampoco la ausencia del principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, por cuanto la misma ley señala la gradualidad de las sanciones.

7.- En escrito del catorce de agosto de dos mil doce Nancy Arias Mora, mayor, abogada, divorciada, cédula de identidad número 1-710-839, en su condición de Apoderada General Judicial del Instituto Nacional de Seguros, se apersona también a coadyuvar en esta acción de inconstitucionalidad. Señala que su legitimación como coayuvante procede de una investigación que es está realizando en este momento a su representada por parte del Supervisor de Seguros, bajo el expediente N° PA-0004-2011. En ese procedimiento se aplicarían eventualmente las normas que ahora se impugnan, por lo que la afectación sería directa en relación con esta acción. Afirma que el vicio de constitucionalidad que presentan dichos artículos radica en lo elevado de las sanciones económicas, las cuales constituyen un riesgo para los operadores del mercado de seguros, al verse eventualmente obligados a cancelar una suma de hasta el 5% de su patrimonio, lo que sin duda causaría un problema financiero serio, público y notorio para cualquiera de las empresas. Indica que en el caso concreto del Instituto Nacional de Seguros, ese riesgo se duplica porque se trata de una empresa constituida como institución autónoma, que maneja fondos públicos en parte de su actividad, por lo que si se le impone una multa sobre el patrimonio de la empresa -patrimonio de todos los costarricenses porque es una empresa con garantía del Estado-, la afectación sería no sólo sobre su patrimonio directamente sino también sobre las utilidades que traslada al Estado costarricense y sobre los beneficios que perciben todos los costarricenses de las instituciones estatales. La aplicación de sanciones económicas tan fuertes genera un riesgo muy elevado para los operadores del mercado de seguros, lo cual puede convertirse incluso en un riesgo de quiebra para las empresas, pues una multa asociada al patrimonio, fácilmente podría generar esa situación, lo cual evidentemente atenta contra la libertad de comercio garantizada constitucionalmente en Costa Rica. Agrega que la imposición de sanciones tan altas, violenta la libertad de comercio pues conllevan el eventual cierre del negocio. De igual forma, estima lesionado lo dispuesto en el artículo 50 constitucional, ya que corresponde al Estado organizar y estimular la producción, no establecer límites o limitaciones que impida su ejercicio. Asimismo estima lesionado también el principio de igualdad por cuanto el I.N.S., es el único competidor que tiene una empresa subsidiaria que brinda servicios auxiliares de seguros, por lo que, resultaría aún más gravosa la distinción entre los posibles receptores de esta sanción, ya que sólo el I.N.S. podría recibirla. Además que las multas impugnadas están dirigidas a perjudicar de manera casi exclusiva al INS, y ello no es razonable ni proporcionado.

8.- Se prescinde de la vista señalada en los artículos 10 y 85 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, con base en la potestad que otorga a la Sala el numeral 9 ibídem, al estimar suficientemente fundada esta resolución en principios y normas evidentes, así como en la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal.

9.- En los procedimientos se han cumplido las prescripciones de ley. Redacta el Magistrado Mora Mora y,

Considerando:

I.- Sobre la admisibilidad de la acción. En este proceso, tanto la Procuraduría General de la República como la Superintendencia General de Seguros han planteado dudas en relación con la admisibilidad de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad planteada por la Defensoría de los Habitantes.- Sostienen en resumen que si bien es innegable la facultad reconocida por el artículo 75 párrafo tercero de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional a ese órgano estatal, lo cierto es que -tal y como lo se ha entendido e interpretado- la actuación de la Defensoría debe serlo dentro del ámbito de sus competencias, cosa que no ocurre en este caso porque el reclamo se plantea de forma muy precisa por la supuesta infracción de los derechos constitucionales de unos pocos y específicos agentes económicos cuya conducta se encuentra regulada por la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, número 8653 y a los cuales les resulta aplicable exclusivamente el régimen sancionatorio que discute la Defensora.- Se alega por ambas partes que no hay en realidad ningún ligamen entre este tema y los derechos e intereses de los habitantes del país por lo que la acción de la Defensoría deriva más bien en una acción para la protección del derecho e interés individual de prácticamente un solo ente, cual es el Instituto Nacional de Seguros.- II.- Al analizar tales afirmaciones y estudiar los argumentos que las sustentan, este Tribunal concluye que efectivamente esta acción de inconstitucionalidad debe rechazarse de plano, al resultar ajena al ámbito competencial que ±en materia de interposición de acciones de inconstitucionalidad- le ha sido atribuido a la Defensoría de los Habitantes. Para esta conclusión debe considerarse primeramente que tal y como lo señala la Procuraduría en su informe, la amplia facultad de la Defensoría recogida en el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional viene acotada por lo que constituye la materia de su competencia, es decir aquellos temas que el legislador le encargó de atender según su propia ley orgánica entendida de forma sistemática con el resto del ordenamiento jurídico.- Así lo ha comprendido también esta Sala quien señaló al respecto en la sentencia número 2000-07730 de las catorce horas cuarenta y siete minutos del treinta de agosto del dos mil:

³En este orden de ideas, según lo indica artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional: "No será necesario el caso previo pendiente de resolución cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos, o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. Tampoco la necesitarán el Contralor General de la República, el Procurador General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes". Esta norma, desde el punto de vista de su contenido, no solo habilita a la Defensoría de los Habitantes para interponer de manera directa la acción de inconstitucionalidad, sino que, además, no establece ninguna limitación para hacerlo. Ella es clara: el Contralor General de la República, el Procurador General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes no necesitan de un asunto previo para interponer la acción (primer postulado). Sin concluyó que ³ embargo, se entiende que ello no es así en virtud de que el ejercicio de la acción, en cada uno de estos casos, presupone que el órgano del que se trate esté desenvolviéndose en el ejercicio de las competencias que le son propias y sólo en esa medida, cada uno de ellos dispondría de la legitimación necesaria para presentar una acción.´ En esa misma sentencia, se avanzó hacia la fijación de esas competencias de la Defensoría ³que le son propias´y luego de amplias consideraciones se «la Defensoría de los Habitantes justamente fue creada para proteger los derechos e intereses de los habitantes, así como para vigilar que el funcionamiento del sector público se ajuste a la moral, la justicia, la Constitución Política y demás normas del ordenamiento jurídico´, para luego acentuar que: ³En síntesis, cabe concluir a) que el ordenamiento jurídico le ha otorgado al Defensor de los Habitantes una esfera de competencias sumamente amplia, que no es excluyente de otras competencias constitucionales o legales sobre la materia; b) que le compete supervisar el correcto funcionamiento de la Administración, para contribuir a asegurar su apego al Principio de Legalidad, así como proteger los derechos e intereses de los habitantes y, en esta medida, la ley le brinda todos los mecanismos necesarios para desempeñar esa tarea«´. De tal modo, la posibilidad de planteamiento de acciones de inconstitucionalidad por parte de la Defensoría, de manera directa y ante esta Sala Constitucional opera no solo cuando el objeto de la acción esté comprendido dentro de los supuestos recogidos en el artículo 73 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, sino además cuando tenga como finalidad la defensa de los derechos e intereses de rango constitucional de los habitantes.- III.- Sin embargo, en el caso concreto es éste último requisito el que está ausente pues la acción se presenta en contra de una parte específica del régimen de sanciones expresado en los artículos 37 incisos a) y b); 39 inciso a) en relación con el 36 inciso 1), 38 incisos 1) y 25, de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros número 8653 en donde se establecen sanciones para un grupo muy específico de sujetos jurídicos, a saber, los agentes económicos denominados aseguradoras y reaseguradoras. Así, y de acuerdo con el informe de la Superintendencia de Seguros, la acción se plantea para defender una supuesta lesión de los derechos constitucionales de aproximadamente diez personas jurídicas que son las que ±a la fecha- están inscritas ante dicha Superintendencia para realizar actividades de aseguramiento y reaseguramiento. En este punto concreto, interesa traer a colación lo señalado por la Sala en la citada sentencia 2000-07730:

³VI.- («). En cuanto a la legitimación para accionar ante los Tribunales de Justicia, el artículo 13 de la Ley le permite iniciar todas aquellas acciones o recursos judiciales contra la Administración Pública, en aquellos casos en que a su juicio los Tribunales puedan, por la índole del tema, brindar una solución idónea al fondo de la cuestión, sea porque en la práctica no existe nadie con la debida personería, fondos o tiempo como para estar legitimado o dispuesto a iniciar él mismo la acción, o porque el interesado pertenece a aquel grupo personas o sectores de personas que, como ya se ha mencionado, por las circunstancias que sean (ignorancia, marginación económica o cultural, etc.), se encuentran de hecho en una situación desventaja frente a la Administración Pública.

De lo dicho se comprende que si bien no existe ningún impedimento legal para que la Defensoría pueda plantear acciones a favor de personas o grupos pequeños o concretos (y no para la defensa de todos los habitantes del país en general) tales actuaciones del Defensor deberían presentarse a esta Sede junto con N° 12-005870-0007-CO una necesaria y suficiente justificación en los términos antedichos es decir, debería demostrarse cabalmente que ±por cualquiera circunstancia válida y razonable- los beneficiados por la acción de la Defensoria se encuentran en condiciones de desventaja para la propia defensa de sus derechos constitucionales. Para este Tribunal, entenderlo de otro modo sería permitir que la Defensoría se apersone en defensa de algunas personas sí, pero de otras no, es decir, que actúe de manera desigual y selectiva, sin brindar la necesaria y suficiente explicación que valide tal conducta desde el punto de vista del principio de igualdad.- Cuando aplicamos las ideas anteriores a este caso nos encontramos que no se aporta ninguna explicación y justificación de porqué la Defensora de los Habitantes se apersona en defensa de lo que ella misma describe como un conjunto de personas jurídicas activas que cuenta con los siguientes datos patrimoniales: Instituto Nacional de Seguros: 454.663.997.770 millones de colones; MAPFRE Costa Rica: 3.231.290.396 millones de colones; ASSA Compañía de Seguros: 5.807.763.765 millones de colones, datos que hacen pensar -en principio- en una amplia posibilidad para ejercer por su cuenta la defensa de sus derechos constitucionales.- IV.- Un segundo aspecto que ha sido mencionado por la Defensoría como sustento para presentarse como accionante en este proceso de inconstitucionalidad se relaciona con la supuesta afectación que los consumidores van recibir en sus derechos constitucionales a raíz de la aplicación de las penas pecuniarias a las entidades aseguradoras y reaseguradoras. Se afirma que una sanción podría resultar eventualmente excesiva y en tal caso podría existir -a su vez- la posibilidad de que la empresa optara por trasladar ese costo de la multa a los consumidores a través de un aumento del precio de sus servicios, o bien -se indica- podría acontecer que ante una sanción de suspensión de actividades (o una multa demasiado alta) la empresa decida retirarse el mercado dejando a los N° 12-005870-0007-CO consumidores desprotegidos respecto de sus relaciones jurídicas con esa empresa.-En primer lugar se observa que toda la construcción de la legitimación de la Defensoría en este punto, se funda en situaciones que no se derivan de forma directa y necesaria de los textos discutidos, pues tales normas proveen un sistema graduado de sanciones, además de unas reglas a tomar en cuenta en el establecimiento del monto de la sanción que incluyen valorar incluso incluso la posible afectación que la sanción produzca en el mercado, de manera que la sanción que pueda producir la eventual lesión de los derechos del consumidor no es algo necesario sino solo posible y muy eventual. Se suma a lo anterior que, como bien lo indica el Superintendente de Seguros, la Defensoría no aporta prueba y argumento alguno que apunte a concluir que ese perjuicio por traslado de costos, se va a producir indefectiblemente sino que es -de nuevo- solo una probabilidad y además tampoco se demuestra que la salida de un participante del mercado signifique, de por sí y automáticamente, un perjuicio para el mercado de los seguros. Por el contrario, en relación con este argumento interesa apuntar, tal y como se señala por la Procuraduría que el mercado de seguros es actualmente abierto y regulado lo cual significa en relación con la estructura de costos y precios, que serán los propios participantes empresas y consumidores los que realicen sus propios cálculos y determinen el precio de los servicios, de manera que serán los consumidores y empresas las que decidan finalmente cuál resulta ser la mejor opción según les convenga.- Tal condición abierta hace que sea el propio consumidor quien tenga poder suficiente para disuadir a las empresas de trasladar los costos y para evitar así el perjuicio que supuestamente se les produciría si una empresa decide aumentar el precio de sus servicios de forma arbitraria y sin consideración del resto de factores del mercado. De este modo, debió la Defensoría alegar y demostrar por qué este mecanismo de mercado fijado por ley, N° 12-005870-0007-CO no sería suficiente para la protección del conjunto de los consumidores y de qué forma éstos últimos resultarían necesariamente afectados por una concreta sanción que haya sido impuesta a una empresa aseguradora o reaseguradora. Todo esto está lejos de haber sido demostrado en este caso, por lo que no existe base alguna para entender que con este proceso la Defensoría efectivamente logrará proteger tales derechos e intereses del conjunto de los consumidores.-Finalmente, agréguese a lo anterior el hecho de que ±tal y como lo han hecho ver las partes-, esta acción se ha planteado para lograr la nulidad y desaparición del ordenamiento, de las normas relacionadas con una parte del sistema sancionatorio aplicable a las empresas aseguradoras y reaseguradoras, de manera que de prosperar el reclamo, tal vacío sí incidiría necesaria y negativamente en la esfera de derechos e intereses de los consumidores en el tanto las empresas aseguradoras y reaseguradoras quedarían libres de omitir una larga serie de conductas que el propio legislador ha considerado como fundamentales para el buen funcionamiento del mercado de seguros.- Dejar el cumplimiento de tales conductas al arbitrio y conveniencia de las empresas prestadoras del servicio sin posibilidades de coacción, sí produciría necesariamente en una afectación de los consumidores, razón por la que el planteamiento de la Defensoría debe rechazarse de plano en el tanto en que, de prosperar más bien las personas a las que señala defender saldrían perjudicadas.- V.- Conclusión.- De lo dicho cabe concluir que esta acción de inconstitucionalidad planteada por la Defensoría de los Habitantes en contra de los artículos 37 incisos a) y b); 39 inciso a) en relación con el 36 inciso 1), 38 incisos 1) y 25, todos de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, debe rechazarse de plano porque este órgano ha actuado ±en este caso particular- fuera del ámbito de sus competencias según han sido delimitadas por la ley y la jurisprudencia de esta Sala, ello en tanto que no se presenta justificación alguna para actuar directamente N° 12-005870-0007-CO a favor de las empresas aseguradoras y reaseguradoras y tampoco se ha demostrado que las normas discutidas producirán, necesariamente y por sí mismas, un perjuicio al conjunto de consumidores, mientras que la declaratoria que se pide, si incidirá negativamente en el citado conjunto de personas.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza de plano la acción planteada.- Gilbert Armijo S.

Presidente a.i Luis Paulino Mora M. Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V. Paul Rueda L.

Teresita Rodríguez A. Jose Paulino Hernández G.

-- Código verificador -- 8-10!4:"%#+ N° 12-005870-0007-CO