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Res. 04789-2012 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 18/04/2012
OutcomeResultado
The Constitutional Chamber summarily dismisses the action because it does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right in the underlying case, as the challenged regulation (IDA regulation) is not applicable in the underlying criminal proceeding.La Sala Constitucional rechaza de plano la acción por no constituir un medio razonable para amparar el derecho en el asunto base, ya que la normativa impugnada (reglamento del IDA) no es aplicable en el proceso penal subyacente.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber summarily dismisses an unconstitutionality action filed against articles 101 and 102 of the IDA's Regulation for the Selection and Assignment of Land Applicants. The action was brought in the context of a criminal proceeding for fraud by simulation, where the petitioner's clients acted as private prosecutors. The Chamber finds the action inadmissible because it does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the allegedly violated right. Its decision is based on the fact that the challenged regulation has no direct impact on the underlying matter (a criminal case), since the criminal judge does not need to apply that regulation to decide the case. The Chamber notes that the proper procedural moment to challenge the constitutionality of those norms was during the exhaustion of administrative remedies or through administrative litigation, not within a criminal proceeding. The incidental nature of the unconstitutionality action and the requirement of direct connection between the challenged norm and the underlying case are reaffirmed.La Sala Constitucional rechaza de plano una acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta contra los artículos 101 y 102 del Reglamento para la Selección y Asignación de Solicitantes de Tierras del IDA. La acción se promovió en el contexto de un proceso penal por fraude de simulación, donde los representados del accionante figuraban como querellantes. La Sala determina que la acción es inadmisible porque no constituye un medio razonable para amparar el derecho que se considera lesionado. Fundamenta su decisión en que la normativa impugnada no tiene incidencia directa sobre el asunto base (un proceso penal), ya que el juez penal no debe aplicar dicho reglamento para resolver la causa. La Sala señala que el momento procesal adecuado para cuestionar la constitucionalidad de esas normas era en la fase de agotamiento de la vía administrativa o en la vía contencioso-administrativa, no dentro de un proceso penal. Se reitera la naturaleza incidental de la acción de inconstitucionalidad y la necesidad de conexidad directa entre la norma impugnada y el asunto base.
Key excerptExtracto clave
II.- INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION FOR NOT CONSTITUTING A REASONABLE MEANS TO PROTECT THE RIGHT IN THE UNDERLYING CASE. On repeated occasions, this Chamber has held that the action process is primarily of an incidental nature, requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution—whether before the courts or in the administrative exhaustion procedure—within which the unconstitutionality of the norm has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured. These requirements are not a merely formal matter, for mere formal compliance is not enough; it is also required that the norm challenged through this avenue have a direct impact on the matter serving as the basis, such that the decision in the action has a direct effect on the underlying matter, as a reasonable means to protect the right. […] In the present case, the action is inadmissible since it does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured. To support his standing, the petitioner states that criminal proceeding No. (…) for the crime of fraud by simulation is pending before the Criminal Court of the First Judicial Circuit of (…), in which the persons represented in the action appear as private prosecutors. It is therefore clear that the action is not a reasonable means, for there is no connection between the nullity of the norms sought and the judicial proceeding in question, given that the latter is discussing a potential crime, not the administrative procedure, and thus the judge, in deciding the case, does not need to apply the challenged norm.II.- INADMISIBILIDAD DE LA ACCIÓN POR NO CONSTITUIR UN MEDIO RAZONABLE PARA AMPARAR EL DERECHO EN EL ASUNTO BASE. En reiteradas ocasiones, esta Sala ha considerado que el proceso de acción es principalmente de carácter incidental, por lo que se requiere que exista un asunto pendiente de resolver en vía administrativa o judicial, dentro del cual se haya invocado la inconstitucionalidad de la norma como medio razonable para amparar el derecho que se considera lesionado. Tales requisitos no se traducen en una cuestión meramente formal, pues no basta con el simple cumplimiento formal de los mismos, se requiere además, que la norma impugnada a través de ésta vía tenga una incidencia directa sobre el asunto que sirve como base, de tal suerte, que lo resuelto en la acción tenga una incidencia directa en el asunto base, como medio razonable para amparar el derecho. […] Ahora bien, en el caso particular, la presente acción resulta inadmisible, toda vez, que no constituye un medio razonable para amparar el derecho que se considera lesionado. En ese sentido, a efecto de fundamentar su legitimación para actuar, el accionante señala que ante el Juzgado Penal del I Circuito Judicial de (…) se tramita el proceso penal número (…) por el delito de fraude de simulación, en el cual los representados en la acción figuran como querellantes. Resulta claro entonces que la acción no es medio razonable, pues no hay incidencia entre la nulidad de las normas pretendidas y el proceso judicial en cuestión, toda vez que en éste se está discutiendo un eventual delito, no el procedimiento administrativo, por lo que el juez para resolver la causa no debe aplicar la normativa impugnada.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"Así las cosas, la exigencia de un asunto previo pendiente de resolver, no constituye un requisito meramente formal, toda vez, que no basta con la sola existencia de un asunto base, ni con la simple invocación de la inconstitucionalidad, pues se requiere además, que la acción sea un medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado."
"Thus, the requirement of a prior matter pending resolution is not a merely formal requirement, since the mere existence of an underlying case and the simple invocation of unconstitutionality are not enough; it is also required that the action be a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured."
Considerando I
"Así las cosas, la exigencia de un asunto previo pendiente de resolver, no constituye un requisito meramente formal, toda vez, que no basta con la sola existencia de un asunto base, ni con la simple invocación de la inconstitucionalidad, pues se requiere además, que la acción sea un medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado."
Considerando I
"Resulta claro entonces que la acción no es medio razonable, pues no hay incidencia entre la nulidad de las normas pretendidas y el proceso judicial en cuestión, toda vez que en éste se está discutiendo un eventual delito, no el procedimiento administrativo, por lo que el juez para resolver la causa no debe aplicar la normativa impugnada."
"It is therefore clear that the action is not a reasonable means, for there is no connection between the nullity of the norms sought and the judicial proceeding in question, given that the latter is discussing a potential crime, not the administrative procedure, and thus the judge, in deciding the case, does not need to apply the challenged norm."
Considerando II
"Resulta claro entonces que la acción no es medio razonable, pues no hay incidencia entre la nulidad de las normas pretendidas y el proceso judicial en cuestión, toda vez que en éste se está discutiendo un eventual delito, no el procedimiento administrativo, por lo que el juez para resolver la causa no debe aplicar la normativa impugnada."
Considerando II
"En primer término, se trata de un proceso de naturaleza incidental, y no de una acción directa o popular, con lo que se quiere decir que se requiere de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver -sea ante los tribunales de justicia o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa- para poder acceder a la vía constitucional, pero de tal manera que, la acción constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho considerado lesionado en el asunto principal."
"First, it is a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, meaning that it requires the existence of a matter pending resolution—whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust administrative remedies—in order to access the constitutional avenue, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter."
Considerando I
"En primer término, se trata de un proceso de naturaleza incidental, y no de una acción directa o popular, con lo que se quiere decir que se requiere de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver -sea ante los tribunales de justicia o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa- para poder acceder a la vía constitucional, pero de tal manera que, la acción constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho considerado lesionado en el asunto principal."
Considerando I
Full documentDocumento completo
CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fourteen hours thirty minutes on the eighteenth of April of two thousand twelve. Unconstitutionality action brought by J.A.B.V., identity card number (…), in his capacity as representative of H.V.S., identity card 0-0000-0000 and R.C.C., identity card 0-0000-0000, against articles 101 and 102 of the Reglamento para la Selección y Asignación de Solicitantes de Tierras, approved by agreement taken in article 3 of the extraordinary session 003-2008 of the Junta Directiva of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, held on 22 January 2008.
WHEREAS:
CONSIDERING:
The unconstitutionality action is a process with certain formalities, which must be satisfied so that the Chamber can validly hear the merits of the challenge. In that sense, article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes the prerequisites for the admissibility of the unconstitutionality action. First, the existence of a prior matter pending resolution is required, either in judicial proceedings, or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative channel, in which unconstitutionality has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. In the second and third paragraphs, the law establishes exceptionally, prerequisites that do not require the prior matter, when by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse or collective interests, or when it is filed directly by the Contralor General de la República, the Procurador General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los Habitantes. Now, regarding the requirement of a matter pending resolution, this Chamber, through judgment number 04190-95, of eleven hours thirty-three minutes on the twenty-eighth of July of nineteen ninety-five, stated the following:
" ('In the first place, it is a procedure of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, meaning that the existence of a matter pending resolution -whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative channel- is required to access the constitutional avenue, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Tribunal positively or negatively impacts said pending resolution process, since it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in that matter; and it is only by exception that the legislation allows direct access to this avenue - prerequisites of the second and third paragraphs of article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional-' ) Thus, the requirement of a prior matter pending resolution does not constitute a merely formal requirement, since the mere existence of an underlying matter is not sufficient, nor is the simple invocation of unconstitutionality, as it is also required that the action be a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured.
This means that the challenged regulations must be applicable in the underlying matter. (See in the same sense judgments numbers 01668-90, 04085-93, 00798-94, 03615-94, 00409-I-95, 00851-95, 04190-95, 00791-96). Likewise, there are other formalities that must be fulfilled, namely, the explicit determination of the challenged regulations, duly substantiated, with a specific citation of the constitutional norms and principles considered infringed, authentication by a lawyer of the brief in which the action is filed, accreditation of the conditions of standing (powers and certifications), as well as the literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the norms was invoked in the underlying matter, all requirements that in case of not being fulfilled by the petitioners, can be addressed by a prevention order from the Presidency of the Chamber.
On repeated occasions, this Chamber has considered that the action process is mainly of an incidental nature, which requires the existence of a matter pending resolution in administrative or judicial proceedings, within which the unconstitutionality of the norm has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured. Such requirements do not translate into a merely formal matter, since the simple formal fulfillment of the same is not enough; it is also required that the norm challenged through this avenue has a direct impact on the matter serving as the basis, such that what is resolved in the action has a direct impact on the underlying matter, as a reasonable means to protect the right. A contrario sensu, if there is no direct connection between the object of discussion in the underlying matter and what is challenged in the action, or if the result of the action does not affect the result of the prior matter, it is not possible for this Chamber to rule on the matter.
Now, in this particular case, the present action is inadmissible, since it does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured. In that sense, in order to substantiate his standing to act, the petitioner states that criminal process number (…) is being processed before the Criminal Court of the First Judicial Circuit of (…) for the crime of fraud by simulation, in which the parties represented in the action appear as complainants. It is clear then that the action is not a reasonable means, since there is no connection between the nullity of the intended norms and the judicial process in question, since in the latter an eventual crime is being discussed, not the administrative procedure, so the judge to resolve the case does not need to apply the challenged regulations. In this context, the procedural moment to have raised the unconstitutionality action was during the exhaustion phase of the administrative channel in the respective procedure, or if it had been challenged in the administrative litigation channel.
Furthermore, the petitioner practically challenges the procedure of the specific case, which he could have objected to in the contentious-administrative channel. In other words, even though the criminal process is directed against the officials related to the land procedures being claimed, the truth is that the application of the regulations questioned here would not affect, nor would it directly impact, the resolution of the underlying matter. As a consequence of the above and given the pointed-out lack of connection, the present action does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured, which necessarily causes its inadmissibility.
By virtue of the foregoing, the outright rejection of the action is required.
THEREFORE:
The action is rejected outright.
Ana Virginia Calzada M. President Luis Paulino Mora M. Fernando Cruz C.
Fernando Castillo V. Rosa María Abdelnour G.
Enrique Ulate C. Jose Paulino Hernández G.
It indicates that Article 102 of the Regulations omits substantial steps that provide support for the procedural provisions, with the consequent violation of due process and the defenselessness of those affected, because despite indicating in subsection a) that the process of admonition (amonestación) of Article 68 of the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización) will be fulfilled, the text allows one to determine that such admonition (amonestación) is given prior to what will be a report on the non-compliance intended to be attributed to the signatories, that is, one is admonished first, at the discretion of the official in charge of the Subregional Office (Oficina Subregional) of the place, and then an investigation is conducted, which violates the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública) regarding the order of precedence of reports, in addition to the jurisprudence of this Court regarding the notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the procedure in accordance with the principles of intimation and imputation that give rise to due process, which are impossible to fulfill if the charges being brought have not been established through a preliminary investigation, by means of a timely, express, precise, clear, and detailed account of the facts attributed and their legal consequences.
It considers that the challenged regulation generates a procedure that lacks a detailed description, in a precise and clear form, of the fact or facts attributed, with a clear legal classification, the legal bases of the accusation, and the specific punitive claim. It maintains that despite Article 102 indicating that the admonition (amonestación) is established by Article 68 of the Land Law (Ley de Tierras), said norm indicates the stipulations that will be recorded in the contract, and at the same time, in its subsection 4), provides that the Institute must, in accordance with the procedure established in the Chapter on Land Tribunals, extinguish the award (adjudicación) for the reasons indicated by law, noting that with the exception of the case of unjustified abandonment of the parcel or the family, an admonition (amonestación) that has not been addressed by the awardee (adjudicatario) must precede.
It maintains that in the framework manual of the institutional procedure of the IDA, prepared in 2007, reference is made to an Agrarian Report (Informe Agrario), also called a Technical Report (Informe Técnico), and it is indicated as the central input of a legal process, noting that the officials responsible for issuing the report must provide all necessary evidence to support their affirmations and observations, and it is also provided that the IDA Subregional Office (Oficina Subregional) where a property is located in which suspected non-compliance with the conditions imposed on land tenure (tenencia de la tierra), dictated by regulation, is detected, has the duty to render a detailed report of the non-compliance attributed to the awardee (adjudicatario) and forward it to the Regional Directorate (Dirección Regional). It considers that said manual refers to what it calls “the legal process,” without mentioning it as an administrative procedure (procedimiento administrativo), in addition to the fact that the Agrarian Report (Informe Agrario) or Technical Report (Informe Técnico) is never made known to the affected party, which is contrary to due process, such that the affected party or allegedly non-compliant awardee (adjudicatario) is subjected to a legal process conducted by the Legal Advisory (Asesoría Legal), without ever learning the grounds for the accusation against them or the evidence existing in the report, making their defense impossible.
It explains that the IDA has maintained that it issues autonomous regulations in the exercise of a right derived from the provisions of Article 267 subsection h) of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and Decrees 8979-P and 9469-P, which exclude it from the application of Book II of the aforementioned Law; however, it believes that such power does not exist, because Article 19 of that same Law, which forms part of Book I, prohibits it, in addition to the fact that the property right acquired by the awardee (adjudicatario) is a constitutional right and therefore its protection and defense is reserved to the law, and issuing autonomous regulations in this matter is prohibited. It reiterates that the norm which the IDA intends to invoke to arrogate the power to generate its own regulations to act upon fundamental rights did not exclude the IDA from the application of Book II of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de Administración Pública) regarding administrative procedure (procedimiento administrativo), because regardless of whether the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización) is mentioned in the cited decrees, the latter does not contain an administrative procedure (procedimiento administrativo) regulated by law, and the mention made by Article 68 of Law N° 2825 of the procedure stipulated in the chapter on Land Tribunals is merely a rhetorical statement without real content, because neither a procedure nor Land Tribunals were established within that law nor separately by other laws.
It indicates that the challenged regulation attempts to assume powers that neither the Constitution nor the laws grant, by creating a legal procedure in which the IDA's Regional Legal Directorates are transformed into special tribunals that allow for incurring undue dispossession of awardees (adjudicatarios), under the protection of arbitrary and even chrematistic criteria of that Institute. It requests that the filed action be granted.
WHEREAS:
The unconstitutionality action is a process with certain formalities, which must be satisfied so that the Chamber (Sala) can validly hear the merits of the challenge. In that sense, Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes the prerequisites for the admissibility of the unconstitutionality action. In the first term, the existence of a prior matter pending resolution is required, either in judicial proceedings, or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative channel, in which unconstitutionality has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered to be harmed. In the second and third paragraphs, the law establishes, exceptionally, prerequisites under which the prior matter is not required, when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it involves the defense of diffuse or collective interests, or when it is filed directly by the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Attorney General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, and the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes). Now, regarding the requirement of a matter pending resolution, this Chamber (Sala), through ruling number 04190-95, at eleven thirty-three hours on July twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-five, stated the following:
³ (“) In the first term, it is a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a matter pending resolution is required —whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative channel— in order to access the constitutional channel, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered harmed in the principal matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative repercussion on said process pending resolution, since it manifests on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter; and only by exception does the legislation permit direct access to this channel —prerequisites of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law—’ (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) Thus, things being as they are, the requirement of a prior matter pending resolution does not constitute a merely formal requirement, since the mere existence of a base matter is not enough, nor is the simple invocation of unconstitutionality, because it is also required that the action be a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed.
This means that the challenged regulation must be applicable in the base matter. (See in the same sense rulings numbers 01668-90, 04085-93, 00798-94, 03615-94, 00409-I-95, 00851-95, 04190-95, 00791-96). Likewise, there are other formalities that must be fulfilled, namely, the explicit determination of the challenged regulation, duly substantiated, with specific citation of the constitutional norms and principles considered to be infringed, authentication of the brief filing the action by an attorney, the accreditation of the conditions of standing (powers and certifications), as well as the literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the norms was invoked in the base matter, all requirements that, in the event of not being fulfilled by the plaintiffs (accionantes), may be warned by the Presidency of the Chamber (Sala).
On repeated occasions, this Chamber (Sala) has considered that the action process is principally of an incidental nature, for which it is required that there be a matter pending resolution in the administrative or judicial sphere, within which the unconstitutionality of the norm has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right considered to be harmed. Such requirements do not translate into a merely formal issue, since the simple formal fulfillment of them is not enough; it is also required that the norm challenged through this channel have a direct impact on the matter serving as the base, in such a way that what is resolved in the action has a direct impact on the base matter, as a reasonable means to protect the right. A contrario sensu, if there is no direct connection between the object of discussion in the base matter and what is challenged in the action, or if the result of the action does not impact the result of the prior matter, it is impossible for this Chamber (Sala) to rule on it.
Now, in the specific case, the present action is inadmissible, since it does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right considered harmed. In that sense, in order to substantiate his standing to act, the plaintiff (accionante) indicates that criminal process number (…) for the crime of simulation fraud is being processed before the Criminal Court of the I Judicial Circuit of (…), in which those represented in the action appear as complainants. It is clear then that the action is not a reasonable means, because there is no impact between the nullity of the norms sought and the judicial process in question, since an eventual crime is being discussed in the latter, not the administrative procedure (procedimiento administrativo), so the judge, in order to resolve the case, does not have to apply the challenged regulation. Thus, things being as they are, the procedural moment to have filed the unconstitutionality action was in the phase of exhausting the administrative channel in the respective procedure, or if it had been challenged in the contentious-administrative channel.
Furthermore, the plaintiff (accionante) practically challenges the procedure of the specific case, which could have been objected to in the contentious channel. In other words, even though the criminal process is directed against the officials related to the land procedures being claimed, the fact is that the application of the regulation questioned here would not affect, nor directly impact, the resolution of the base matter. As a consequence of the foregoing and given the noted lack of connection, the present action is not a reasonable means to protect the right considered harmed, which necessarily causes its inadmissibility.
By virtue of the foregoing, the outright rejection of the action is warranted.
THEREFORE:
The action is rejected outright.
CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fourteen hours thirty minutes on April eighteenth, two thousand twelve. Action of unconstitutionality brought by J.A.B.V., identity card number (…), in his capacity as representative of H.V.S., identity card 0-0000-0000 and R.C.C., identity card 0-0000-0000, against Articles 101 and 102 of the Regulations for the Selection and Assignment of Land Applicants (Reglamento para la Selección y Asignación de Solicitantes de Tierras), approved by agreement taken in Article 3 of extraordinary session 003-2008 of the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of the Institute of Agrarian Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario), held on January 22, 2008.
WHEREAS:
CONSIDERING:
The action of unconstitutionality is a process with certain formalities, which must be satisfied in order for the Chamber to validly hear the merits of the challenge. In that sense, Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the prerequisites for the admissibility of the action of unconstitutionality. First, it requires the existence of a prior matter pending resolution, whether in a judicial venue, or in the procedure for exhausting the administrative venue, in which unconstitutionality has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest that is considered injured. In the second and third paragraphs, the law establishes, on an exceptional basis, prerequisites in which the prior matter is not required, when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it involves the defense of diffuse or collective interests, or when it is formulated directly by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contralor General de la República), the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), the Prosecutor General of the Republic (Fiscal General de la República), and the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes).
Now, regarding the requirement of a pending matter to be resolved, this Chamber, through judgment number 04190-95, of eleven hours thirty-three minutes of July twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-five, indicated the following:
³ (")In the first place, it is a proceeding of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a pending matter to be resolved is required —whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative avenue (vía administrativa)— in order to access the constitutional avenue (vía constitucional), but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the principal matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Tribunal has a positive or negative repercussion on said pending proceeding to be resolved, inasmuch as it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter; and it is only by exception that legislation permits direct access to this avenue —assumptions of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional)—.
Thus, the requirement of a previous pending matter to be resolved does not constitute a merely formal requirement, since the sole existence of a base matter is not sufficient, nor is the simple invocation of unconstitutionality, because it is also required that the action be a reasonable means to protect the right or interest that is considered injured. This means that the norm challenged must be applicable in the base matter. (See in the same sense judgments numbers 01668-90, 04085-93, 00798-94, 03615-94, 00409-I-95, 00851-95, 04190-95, 00791-96). Likewise, there are other formalities that must be fulfilled, namely, the explicit determination of the challenged norms, duly substantiated, with specific citation of the constitutional norms and principles that are considered infringed, the authentication by a lawyer of the writ in which the action is filed, the accreditation of the conditions of legal standing (legitimación) (powers of attorney and certifications), as well as the literal certification of the writ in which the unconstitutionality of the norms was invoked in the base matter, all of which requirements, in case of not being fulfilled by the claimants (accionantes), may be warned by the Presidency (la Presidencia) of the Chamber (la Sala).
On repeated occasions, this Chamber has considered that the action proceeding is principally of an incidental nature, for which reason it is required that there exist a pending matter to be resolved in the administrative or judicial avenue (vía), within which the unconstitutionality of the norm has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured. Such requirements do not translate into a merely formal question, because the simple formal fulfillment of the same is not enough; it is also required that the norm challenged through this avenue (vía) has a direct incidence on the matter serving as a base, in such a manner that what is resolved in the action has a direct incidence on the base matter, as a reasonable means to protect the right. A contrario sensu, if there does not exist a direct connection (conexidad) between the object of discussion in the base matter and that challenged in the action, or if the result of the action does not affect the result of the previous matter, it is not possible for this Chamber to rule on the matter.
Now, in the specific case, this action is inadmissible, since it does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured. In that sense, in order to substantiate his legal standing (legitimación) to act, the claimant (accionante) indicates that before the Criminal Court (Juzgado Penal) of the First Judicial Circuit (I Circuito Judicial) of (…) criminal proceeding number (…) is being processed for the crime of fraud by simulation, in which those represented in the action appear as complainants (querellantes). It is therefore clear that the action is not a reasonable means, since there is no incidence between the nullity of the norms sought and the judicial proceeding in question, given that an eventual crime is being discussed in that proceeding, not the administrative procedure, for which reason the judge, to resolve the cause, does not have to apply the challenged norms.
Thus, the procedural moment to have filed the action of unconstitutionality was in the phase of exhaustion of the administrative avenue (vía administrativa) in the respective procedure, or if it had been challenged in the contentious-administrative avenue (vía contencioso administrativa). Furthermore, the claimant (accionante) practically challenges the procedure of the specific case, which could have been objected to in the contentious avenue (vía contenciosa). In other words, even though the criminal proceeding is directed against the officials related to the land procedures being claimed, the truth is that the application of the norms questioned here would not affect nor directly impact the resolution of the base matter. As a consequence of the foregoing and given the lack of connection (inconexidad) noted, this action does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured, which necessarily causes its inadmissibility.
By virtue of the foregoing, the outright rejection of the action is imposed.
POR TANTO:
Se rechaza de plano la acción.
Ana Virginia Calzada M. Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Fernando Cruz C.
Fernando Castillo V. Rosa María Abdelnour G.
Enrique Ulate C. Jose Paulino Hernández G.
#/ SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce horas treinta minutos del dieciocho de abril de dos mil doce. Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por J.A.B.V., cédula de residencia número (…), en su condición de representante de H.V.S., cédula de identidad 0-0000-0000 y R.C.C., cédula de identidad 0-0000-0000, contra los artículos 101 y 102 del Reglamento para la Selección y Asignación de Solicitantes de Tierras, aprobado por acuerdo tomado en el artículo 3 de la sesión extraordinaria 003-2008 de la Junta Directiva del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, celebrada el 22 de enero del 2008.
RESULTANDO:
CONSIDERANDO:
La acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso con Determinadas formalidades, que deben ser satisfechas a efecto de que la Sala pueda válidamente conocer el fondo de la impugnación. En ese sentido, el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, establece los presupuestos de admisibilidad de la acción de inconstitucionalidad. En primer término, se exige la existencia de un asunto previo pendiente de resolver, sea en vía judicial, o bien, en el procedimiento para agotar de la vía administrativa, en que se haya invocado la inconstitucionalidad como medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado. En el párrafo segundo y tercero, la ley establece de manera excepcional, presupuestos en los que no se exige el asunto previo, cuando por la naturaleza del asunto, no exista una lesión individual y directa, o se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos o colectivos, o bien cuando es formulada en forma directa por el Contralor General de la República, el Procurador General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes. Ahora bien, en cuanto a la exigencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, esta Sala mediante sentencia número 04190-95, de las once horas treinta y tres minutos del veintiocho de julio de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, señaló lo siguiente:
³ («)En primer término, se trata de un proceso de naturaleza incidental, y no de una acción directa o popular, con lo que se quiere decir que se requiere de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver -sea ante los tribunales de justicia o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa- para poder acceder a la vía constitucional, pero de tal anera que, la acción constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho considerado lesionado en el asunto principal, de manera que lo resuelto por el Tribunal Constitucional repercuta positiva o negativamente en dicho proceso pendiente de resolver, por cuanto se manifiesta sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas que deberán ser aplicadas en dicho asunto; y únicamente por excepción es que la legislación permite el acceso directo a esta vía -presupuestos de los párrafos segundo y tercero del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional-´ Así las cosas, la exigencia de un asunto previo pendiente de resolver, no constituye un requisito meramente formal, toda vez, que no basta con la sola existencia de un asunto base, ni con la simple invocación de la inconstitucionalidad, pues se requiere además, que la acción sea un medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado.
Esto quiere decir, que la normativa impugnada debe ser aplicable en el asunto base. (Ver en igual sentido las sentencias números 01668-90, 04085-93, 00798-94, 03615-94, 00409-I-95, 00851-95, 04190-95,00791-96). Asimismo, existen otras formalidades que deben ser cumplidas, a saber, la determinación explícita de la normativa impugnada, debidamente fundamentada, con cita concreta de las normas y principios constitucionales que se consideren infringidos, la autenticación por abogado del escrito en el que se plantea la acción, la acreditación de las condiciones de legitimación (poderes y certificaciones), así como la certificación literal del escrito en el que se invocó la inconstitucionalidad de las normas en el asunto base, requisitos todos que en caso de no ser cumplidos por los accionantes, pueden ser prevenidos por la Presidencia de la Sala.
En reiteradas ocasiones, esta Sala ha considerado que el proceso de acción es principalmente de carácter incidental, por lo que se requiere que exista un asunto pendiente de resolver en vía administrativa o judicial, dentro del cual se haya invocado la inconstitucionalidad de la norma como medio razonable para amparar el derecho que se considera lesionado. Tales requisitos no se traducen en una cuestión meramente formal, pues no basta con el simple cumplimiento formal de los mismos, se requiere además, que la norma impugnada a través de ésta vía tenga una incidencia directa sobre el asunto que sirve como base, de tal suerte, que lo resuelto en la acción tenga una incidencia directa en el asunto base, como medio razonable para amparar el derecho. A contrario sensu, sino existe una conexidad directa entre el objeto de discusión del asunto base y lo impugnado en la acción, o bien, si el resultado de la acción no incide sobre el resultado del asunto previo, no resulta posible que esta Sala se pronuncie al respecto.
Ahora bien, en el caso particular, la presente acción resulta inadmisible, toda vez, que no constituye un medio razonable para amparar el derecho que se considera lesionado. En ese sentido, a efecto de fundamentar su legitimación para actuar, el accionante señala que ante el Juzgado Penal del I Circuito Judicial de (…) se tramita el proceso penal número (…) por el delito de fraude de simulación, en el cual los representados en la acción figuran como querellantes. Resulta claro entonces que la acción no es medio razonable, pues no hay incidencia entre la nulidad de las normas pretendidas y el proceso judicial en cuestión, toda vez que en éste se está discutiendo un eventual delito, no el procedimiento administrativo, por lo que el juez para resolver la causa no debe aplicar la normativa impugnada. Así las cosas, el momento procesal para haber planteado la acción de inconstitucionalidad era en la fase de agotamiento de la vía administrativa en el procedimiento respectivo o bien si lo hubiera impugnado en la vía contencioso administrativa.
Además, el accionante impugna prácticamente el procedimiento del caso concreto, lo cual pudo haber objetado en la vía contenciosa. En otras palabras, aún cuando el proceso penal está dirigido en contra de los funcionarios relacionados con los procedimientos de tierras que se reclaman, lo cierto es, que la aplicación de la normativa aquí cuestionada, no afectaría, ni incidiría de manera directa en la resolución del asunto base. Como consecuencia de lo anterior y dada la inconexidad apuntada, la presente acción no resulta un medio razonable para amparar el derecho ue se considera lesionado, lo que necesariamente provoca su inadmisibilidad.
En virtud de lo expuesto, se impone rechazar de Plano la acción.
POR TANTO:
Se rechaza de plano la acción.
Ana Virginia Calzada M.
Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Fernando Cruz C.
Fernando Castillo V. Rosa María Abdelnour G.
Enrique Ulate C. Jose Paulino Hernández G.
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