Unconstitutionality of the six-month time limit to challenge CCSS decisionsInconstitucionalidad del plazo de seis meses para impugnar resoluciones de la CCSS

** 080151520007CO * Res. No. 2009003082 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at twelve hours and thirty-three minutes on the twenty-fourth of February, two thousand nine.

Consultation on constitutionality (consulta judicial) filed by the Labor Judge of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, MSc. Karol Baltodano Aguilar, regarding the constitutionality of article 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, No. 17 of October 22, 1943, and its amendments.- Whereas (Resultando):

1.- By resolution of 10:26 hrs. on October 28, 2008, issued in case file number 05-000561-0163-AC of the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, which is an ordinary proceeding by AMEL DE AMERICA INTERNACIONAL SRL against the COSTA RICAN SOCIAL SECURITY FUND, MSc. Karol Baltodano Aguilar, judge of that office, formulates a consultation on constitutionality (consulta judicial) regarding the constitutionality of article 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, No. 17 of October 22, 1943, and its amendments. The provision is questioned insofar as it establishes that “The period to challenge before the courts the final resolutions (resoluciones firmes) issued by the Fund shall be six months,” according to the amendment made by article 85 of Law #793 of February 16, 2000. The consulting judge's doubt originates from the fact that, by judgment number 5545 of 15:03 hrs. on October 11, 1995, the Constitutional Chamber declared the unconstitutionality of that provision in its previous text, which stated that “…In any of the circumstances provided for in this article, unless the limitation period (término de prescripción) is shorter, no interested party may dispute before the labor courts any resolutions of the Fund that have been final for more than one year”; the amended provision establishes an even shorter period—6 months—for the judicial challenge of the Fund's resolutions, which, in her opinion, repeats the prior situation of denial of access to justice. The Judge, in accordance with the prescriptions of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, suspended the proceeding and summoned the parties to appear before the Chamber (pages 1 to 3).- 2.- By resolution of 13:30 hrs. on December 2, 2008, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic is given a hearing (page 6).- 3.- The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, represented by the Deputy Attorney General, Lic. Farid Beirute Brenes, answers the hearing and states, in pertinent part, that:

“II.- CONSULTED PROVISION AND ITS REASON:

Consultation is made regarding the constitutionality of article 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, -Number 17 of October 22, 1943, and its amendments- which, in pertinent part, reads:

“The period to challenge before the courts the final resolutions (resoluciones firmes) issued by the Fund shall be six months.” (As amended by article 85 of Law No. 7983 of February 16, 2000) The Consulting Judge states that, when answering the labor claim, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, by means of a written submission filed with the cited Labor Court on October 18, 2006, raised the objection of the statute of limitations (excepción de prescripción) based on the provisions of article 55 in question; a circumstance which gives rise to her doubt, given that the former legal text, which stated “…In any of the circumstances provided for in this article, unless the limitation period (término de prescripción) is shorter, no interested party may dispute before the labor courts any resolutions of the Fund that have been final for more than one year.”, was declared unconstitutional.

Thus, she transcribes judgment number 5545 of 15:03 hours on October 11, 1995, as follows:

“The Chamber considers that the establishment of obstacles by the legislator that impede the possibility of challenging certain acts because that right was not exercised within the period established by law, indeed obeys reasons of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), as it intended to set a limit for the exercise of that right. However, within the legal system of the Social State of Law, it must be permitted that everyone has the opportunity to appear before the courts of justice demanding the protection of an injured or disputed right, and that judges attend to their petitions as provided by law. In the matter addressed, the primary purpose of the constituent was to maintain social insurance to strengthen social security, which is the public system of coverage for social, individual, and economic needs developed from the historical action of social welfare, and which has become one of the hallmarks of the Social or Welfare State (see in this regard resolution No. 846-92 of 13:30 hours on March 27, 1992). Therefore, by preventing the administered party from disputing before the courts of justice the resolutions of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund regarding the application of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime in a jurisdictional venue, the principle of social security that the constituent established in the creation of social insurance, and within it, the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime, is infringed.

THEREFORE:

The consultation is answered in the sense that the part of article 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund that states, “In any of the circumstances provided for in this article, unless the limitation period (término de prescripción) is shorter, no interested party may dispute before the labor courts any resolutions of the Fund that have been final for more than one year.” is unconstitutional. This judgment is declaratory and its effect is retroactive to the effective date of the provision consulted. Let this judgment be published in full in the Judicial Bulletin and summarized in the Gazette. Notify the consulting party.” She further indicates that, despite that constitutional resolution being issued in 1995, subsequently, through a partial amendment to the cited Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (per article 85 of Law Number 7983 of February 16, 2000), a new period was imposed on the administered party to challenge the administrative resolutions issued by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund before the Courts of Justice, with the aggravating factor that it is now six months. Hence, she perceives that the current legal text repeats the previous hypothesis, restricting the right of access to jurisdictional justice, to the natural judge, and to material res judicata. She argues that the period indicated in the current text of the mentioned article 55 forever precludes the possibility of resorting to the jurisdictional route.

In such terms, she requests that an opinion be issued regarding the constitutionality of the new period available to the administered party for resorting to the Courts of Justice, as provided in the paragraph of article 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, Number 17 of October 22, 1943, and its amendments.

III.- ANALYSIS OF THE CONSULTED PROVISION AND ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY:

This Advisory Body considers that the current paragraph of article 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, which states, “The period to challenge before the courts the final resolutions (resoluciones firmes) issued by the Fund shall be six months.”, does not contravene the Law of the Constitution.

Said legal provision literally establishes:

“Article 55.- Disputes arising from the application of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime and those promoted by the application of laws and regulations by the Inspection Service or against it, shall be substantiated and resolved by the corresponding office, and against what this Service decides, an appeal shall be admissible before the corresponding Division Management, provided it is filed before the office that issued the resolution, within three business days following the respective notification.

The ruling must be issued within twenty business days following the date on which the appeal was filed.

Other disputes arising on the occasion of the application of this law or its regulations shall be substantiated and resolved by the respective Division Management. Against what this decides, an appeal shall be admissible before the Board of Directors, which must be filed before the same Division Management that issued the challenged resolution, within three business days following notification. The ruling of the Board of Directors must be issued within twenty days following the date on which the appeal was filed.

Each Division Manager shall hear matters pertaining to their competence, according to the subject matter involved. If any Manager considers that a case does not correspond to them, they shall refer it ex officio, without further procedure, to the respective Division. The period to challenge before the courts the final resolutions (resoluciones firmes) issued by the Fund shall be six months.” (Thus amended by article 85 of Law No. 7983 of February 16, 2000) (The text highlighted in bold is not from the original) In the first place, it is pertinent to observe what this Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has indicated, regarding the distinction between the terms provided in articles 61 and 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, as this is important for understanding the opinion of this Advisory Body in relation to the crux of the consultation formulated by the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José. Thus, as relevant, it stated:

"Article 61 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund and 23 of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regulation, in relevant part, state: 'The right to claim the granting of disability pensions prescribes in two years, and for death pensions, in ten years...' Article 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, which is a related and complementary provision to the preceding ones, in relevant part, states: '... In any of the circumstances provided for in this article, unless the limitation period (término de prescripción) is shorter, no interested party may dispute before the Labor Courts any resolutions of the Fund that have been final for more than one year.' The cited articles 61 and 23 clearly contemplate matters regarding the limitation period (prescripción) for exercising the right to a pension, in this specific case for disability. For its part, article 55 establishes clear hypotheses of expiration (caducidad), while also contemplating that no interested party may dispute before the Labor Courts any resolutions of the Fund that have been final for more than one year. Now, the specific application of these articles must be clear, in such a way that, as long as no pension has been applied for, the terms established in the cited articles 61 and 23 apply, meaning that the limitation period (período de prescripción) contemplated in those articles is for claiming the granting of a pension; but once that right has been exercised, the cited article 55 immediately comes into force and as a complementary article, which establishes the expiration period (término de caducidad) of one year that operates due to the inactivity of the interested party, when, dissatisfied with unfavorable and final resolutions (resoluciones firmes) of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, they do not go to dispute them before the Labor Courts in a timely manner." (The highlighted text is not from the original) (See judgment of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 8 of 15:30 hours on January 5, 1994.)

In accordance with the cited provisions, it can be noted from the above transcription that, within the legal system under study, there are two transcendental moments for the administered party, either to enforce or claim the right to obtain a disability pension, in which case it prescribes in two years, or due to the death of the direct beneficiary, which prescribes in ten years; and the moment through which the former can exercise the right to challenge a final resolution (resolución firme) of the Fund that is unfavorable to their own interests. The first is the one clearly set forth in the mentioned article 61, and needless to say, it is the limitation period (plazo de la prescripción); and the second, that is, the one contained in the mentioned article 55, which is the expiration period (término de la caducidad).

It can also be explained from the foregoing, that both provisions are not only clear in establishing the purpose each pursues within the legal system, but also that the categorical periods stipulated in those provisions are based on reasons of legal certainty (seguridad y certeza jurídica), just as this honorable Constitutional Court has emphasized, by stating "… that the establishment of obstacles by the legislator that impede the possibility of challenging certain acts because that right was not exercised within the period established by law, indeed obeys reasons of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), as it intended to set a limit for the exercise of that right." (Judgment Number 1995-05545, of 15:03 hours on October 11, 1995).

It is well known that legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) constitutes a general principle of Law, without which a Social State of Law could guarantee the certainty that the legal situation of its citizens will not be modified except by regular, duly predetermined procedures; that is, it represents the guarantee of the objective application of the law, insofar as individuals know at every moment what to expect legally; or rather, what their rights and obligations are. Likewise, the majority of legal doctrine indicates that, from a subjective point of view, certainty is equivalent to the moral assurance an individual has regarding their property, insofar as it will be respected; which requires certain conditions, such as the judicial organization, the police force, the laws, so that, from an objective point of view, legal certainty is equivalent to the existence of a just and effective social order whose compliance is ensured by public coercion. Therefore, Vicenc Aguado i Cudolà rightly maintains that both the limitation period (prescripción) and expiration (caducidad) "…are in reality mechanisms designed to guarantee that the general interest is satisfied within a specific time, avoiding situations of legal uncertainty for citizens." ("Prescripción y caducidad en el ejercicio de potestades administrativas", Ediciones Jurídicas y Sociales, S.A. Madrid, 1999, p.19) Hence the importance of the existence of the institution of expiration (caducidad) in our national legislation, which both doctrine and jurisprudence are consistent in defining as that presupposition of an exceptional nature, authorized by law, applicable when the period for the exercise of a right or challenge of a specific act or proceeding elapses, generally attributable to the inertia or abandonment of the holder due to their inactivity. To that extent, the courts order, ex officio or at the request of an interested party, the archiving of actions or claims for rights, because the corresponding period has been amply exceeded, thereby extinguishing a specific right or action. Thus, and regarding the topic of Social Security in general, authoritative doctrine has indicated that expiration (caducidad) can be defined as:

"…that institution by which, due to the lack of activity by the holder of a right during a specific period of time, and by the passage of that time, said right is extinguished; expiration (caducidad) applies exclusively to the benefits of the Social Security system, hence the need to delimit this character beforehand (on this matter, the doctrine of the Supreme Court can be cited, where benefits are classified as Social Security benefits, for the purpose of applying expiration rules, those that were the responsibility of the Social Welfare Regime of the Assistance-Pharmaceutical Physicians and Insuring Entities for Workplace Accidents, and which were integrated into the Social Security System, STS of June 16, 2005, rec.3862/2004), which builds upon previous doctrine). Expiration (caducidad) is defined in opposition to and in relation with the institution of extinctive limitation (prescripción extintiva); both have an identical consequence: the extinction of an action or right…" (Cardenal Carro (MIGUEL), Palomar Olmeda (ALBERTO), Sempere Navarro (ANTONIO V.), Hierro Hierro (FRANCISCO JAVIER) “Diccionario de Seguridad Social”, Editorial Aranzadi S.A. Camino de Galar, 15 31190 Cizur Menor (Navarra) 2006, p. 115) In distinguishing the institution of expiration (caducidad) from that of limitation (prescripción), this Advisory Body observes that indeed there is a point of convergence between the two, which is to put an end to the legal uncertainty that may arise in various actions or rights that are not claimed or applied for in a timely manner by the holders, a situation of inertia or abandonment being presumed on their part due to their inactivity in exercising the corresponding right. Despite this, notable differences are observed, which are worth summarizing as follows:

-Expiration (caducidad) is linked to the exercise of so-called potestative rights or legal powers, whose purpose is to promote a change in the legal situation, protecting the general interest.

- Limitation (prescripción), on the other hand, protects the particular interest of the passive subject of a right or action against untimely claims, when they could no longer be expected or the precise evidence for the defense has been lost.

-Expiration (caducidad) is not susceptible to interruption or suspension, meaning that the period for challenging an act or exercising a right runs inevitably. Not so in limitation (prescripción), which can be interrupted through specific administrative or legal actions, as the case may be; the legal term for the exercise of the corresponding right or claim thereby being immediately extended (ipso facto). In the first figure, it is not necessary for one of the parties to the proceeding to plead it, as it can be raised ex officio. In the second, it is only declarable at the request of a party.

-Regarding what properly concerns the right that is lost in one and the other institution due to the passage of time, our Constitutional Court, through judgment Number 2000-00878 of 16:12 hours on January 26, 2000, has aptly pointed out that limitation (prescripción) is “a legal institution by virtue of which, through the inactivity and negligence of the interested party within a period defined in law, the enjoyment of a right is lost, as defined by doctrine, by indicating that 'in limitation (prescripción), the right is born with an indefinite duration and is only lost when there is negligence in using it' (Roberto Ruggiero, in his book Instituciones de Derecho Civil, translated from the fourth Italian edition by Ramón Serrano Sureño and José Santacruz Teijeiro, Editorial Reus, S.A, Madrid, Spain, 1929). So that, limitation (prescripción) extinguishes the action or claim, but not the right itself, unlike expiration (caducidad), an institution similar to limitation (prescripción) insofar as time also operates in it as an extinguishing cause, but we repeat, of the right itself, such that the acquisition of the right is prevented by the useless passage of the legal term, or what is the same, 'the claim for whose exercise a term is prefixed, is born originally with this time limitation, so that it cannot be asserted once it has elapsed' (Roberto Ruggiero, Op. Cit.). In these same terms, it has been understood by constitutional jurisprudence, by referring it to the omission or inertia of the beneficiary, who has allowed a specific period to elapse without exercising their right and, based on that, loses it, or at least loses the immediate benefit it would have meant for them, but without necessarily implying that this right disappears entirely, which in some way constitutes a waiver of rights on the part of the beneficiary (judgment number 05969-93, of fifteen hours twenty-one minutes on November sixteenth, nineteen ninety-three). And it is precisely within this conception, that this Court has pointed out that:

'IV. It is true that the institution of limitation (prescripción) is not unconstitutional in its essence, since it helps to integrate a basic principle of the legal system, which is that of legal certainty (seguridad juridica)' (judgment number 05969-93, supra cited).” To that extent, the Court of Constitutional Law has clearly explained that the establishment of such periods as the one concerning us in this study constitutes an organizing element of social relations, because “if the possibility of initiating action to pursue a right were left open, without respecting the fulfillment of periods and terms due to the passage of time, relations between persons would become insecure, indefinite, and everyone could claim 'sine die' for their rights, regardless of what happened in the past. There would be a major alteration in control for the obligors themselves, because they could never consider an obligation discharged, such as granting rights not requested or simply not used by the beneficiary, which would have repercussions on other areas of activity of persons, such as the cost of operations (commercial, industrial, etc.) and services in the market.” (Judgment No. 2000-00878, cited) Furthermore, the cited doctrine has indicated that, “in limitation (prescripción), the axis of reflections is the subjective element; in effect, the potential holder of a right does not request the initiation of the procedure for the recognition of a right to a Social Security benefit. Therefore, limitation (prescripción) finds its foundation in the need to put an end to situations of uncertainty in the exercise of rights, and in the presumption of abandonment of the same by the holder, a direct consequence of their inactivity. In expiration (caducidad), the subjective element plays a secondary role, and what is relevant is the objective element of the absence of exercise of the right to the corresponding monthly payment. In this case, the foundation of expiration (caducidad) lies in the attempt to safeguard a general and social interest, of a public nature, directly connected with the promotion of spaces of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), apart from considerations of a subjective order. Secondly, and compared to limitation (prescripción), which must be pleaded at the request of a party (STA of October 5, 1994 ® 1994,7750), the automatic character of expiration (caducidad) must be highlighted, which means that it must be appreciated ex officio. Indeed, it is a matter of procedural public order, which operates ex lege, without the need to be pleaded by a party (STS of May 4, 1984, ® 1984, 2956).” (see, Cardenal Carro (MIGUEL), Palomar Olmeda (ALBERTO), Sempere Navarro (ANTONIO V.), Hierro Hierro (FRANCISCO JAVIER) Ibid, p. 117) From the analysis conducted thus far, this Advisory Body concludes with full propriety that the period stipulated in article 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund does not in any way infringe the right of access to jurisdictional justice, to the natural judge, and to material res judicata. Quite the contrary, such an institution is based on reasons of legal certainty (seguridad y certeza jurídica) and the safeguarding of the general interest over the defined right. In any case, it is also valid to highlight, in the words of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, that as long as the right to the various hypotheses provided in article 61 of the cited Law is not exercised, for example, the limitation periods (términos de prescripción) established therein apply; but once that right is exercised, the provisions of the aforementioned article apply immediately and as a complementary article, that is, the period of six months for the interested party to be able to challenge before the Courts of Justice those final resolutions (resoluciones firmes) of the Fund that are supposedly not in accordance with their interests; or, alternatively, the administered party may challenge, within the same period, the resolutions arising from the application of laws and regulations by the Inspection Service or against it. (Judgment Number 08 of 15:30 hours on January 5, 1994) In this way, this Advisory Body considers that the expiration period (plazo de caducidad) established in the provision in question is not in itself unconstitutional, being rather sufficient for the administered party or interested party to be able to assert their right or action before the courts of justice for the purpose of challenging the final resolutions (resoluciones firmes) issued by the Fund. Without this implying the violation of the principle of Social Security protected by article 73 of the Constitution, or the Conventions of the International Labor Organization, Numbers 102 (relating to the Minimum Standard of Social Security, - ratified in our legal system by Law Number 4737, of March 29, 1971) and Convention 130 (relating to medical care and benefits, - ratified by Law Number 4737, of March 29, 1971), or any other international instrument.

Finally, it is worth noting that, although by provision of article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction and the doctrine informing it, the jurisprudence and precedents of the constitutional jurisdiction are binding erga omnes, they certainly are not so for this honorable Chamber. However, and by virtue of the reasoning set forth throughout this analysis, it is our opinion that, contrary to what was established in constitutional judgment number 1995-5545 of fifteen hours and three minutes on October eleventh, nineteen ninety-five, the expiration period (plazo de caducidad) stipulated in the provision consulted by the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit does not contravene the Law of the Constitution.

IV.- CONCLUSION:

Based on articles 73 of the Political Constitution, 61 and 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, as well as the abundant jurisprudence emanating from the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, and pertinent doctrine, it is the opinion of this Advisory Body that the period stipulated in the mentioned article 55, which states, “The period to challenge before the courts the final resolutions (resoluciones firmes) issued by the Fund shall be six months.” (As amended by article 85 of Law No. 7983 of February 16, 2000)”, is not contrary to the Law of the Constitution.

4.- The legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.- Drafted by Magistrate Armijo Sancho; and, Considering (Considerando):

I.- This consultation has been formulated in accordance with article 101 and following of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction and meets the admissibility requirements set forth in the Law.- II.- As described in the background, the doubt regarding the constitutionality of article 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund lies in the fact that, despite there being a prior declaration of unconstitutionality of the previous text of that provision, annulled by judgment number 5545 of 15:03 hrs. on October 11, 1995, which established a one-year period to challenge the Fund's resolutions, the current text, according to the legislative reform carried out in the year 2000, established a period of six months for that purpose.- III.- Although respectable, the Chamber does not share the opinion of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, in favor of the constitutionality of the consulted provision, literally set forth in the "Whereas" second, based on arguments of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) and its consideration regarding the application assumptions of the terms provided in articles 61 and 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Fund and the two transcendental moments for the administered party, that is, to enforce or claim the right to obtain a disability pension, in which case it prescribes in two years, or due to the death of the direct beneficiary, which prescribes in ten, and the moment in which the right to challenge a final resolution (resolución firme) of the Fund unfavorable to one's own interests can be exercised, distinguishing between a limitation period (término de prescripción), in the first case, and an expiration period (término de caducidad), in the second. The reform made to article 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund entails the same vice of constitutionality declared in judgment number 5545 of 15:03 hrs. on October 11, 1995, which constitutes binding jurisprudence, in accordance with article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which provides that “The jurisprudence and precedents of the constitutional jurisdiction are binding erga omnes, except for itself.” “Omnes” includes, of course, the legislator, who, by reforming Article 55, contrary to what was ordered in a binding judgment of this Chamber and aggravating the constitutional defect declared by the Chamber in 1995, also violated the Constitution.- IV.- Because, in effect, that one-year term provided in the text previously annulled by the Chamber, as being contrary to the principle of social security (see judgment 5545-95, Considerando II), is reduced by half by the provision under consultation, which only further undermines, in an even more serious manner, the fundamental rights of access to justice and social security; furthermore, that one-year period for judicially challenging the administrative resolutions of the Caja is considerably shorter than that provided for the acts of other administrations (see Arts. 39 and 40 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), whereby, should that period be maintained, an evident inequality would be enshrined, to the detriment of those who are subject to unfavorable acts by the Caja and, taking into consideration the nature of the resolutions of that institution, relating to the performance of its social missions and linked to social rights and benefits that the Constitution classifies as inalienable (Art. 74), the indicated limitation constitutes an affront to the Law of the Constitution. For this reason, the Chamber reiterates what was expressed in judgment number 5545 of 15:03 hrs. of October 11, 1995, in which it considered that:

“the matter under consultation refers to the fact that Article 55 of the Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social number 17 of October 22, 1943, reformed by law No.6914 of November 28, 1983, does not permit the administered parties to appear before the courts to have justice done, since upon the expiry of the term contained therein, the possibility of access to the jurisdictional avenue is permanently foreclosed. In this regard, the Procuraduría General de la República noted that the expiration period (plazo de caducidad) established therein is not unconstitutional, as it is founded on the values of certainty and legal certainty. The Chamber considers that the establishment of obstacles by the legislator that impede the possibility of challenging certain acts because that right was not exercised within the period established by law, does indeed obey reasons of legal certainty, as the intention was to set a limit for the exercise of that right. However, within the legal system of the Social State of Law (Estado Social de Derecho), everyone must be permitted the opportunity to appear before the courts of justice demanding the protection of an injured or disputed right, and the judges must attend to their petitions as provided by law. In the matter at hand, the primary purpose of the constituent was to maintain the social insurances to strengthen social security, which is the public system of coverage for social, individual, and economic needs developed from the historic action of social welfare, and which has become one of the hallmarks of the social state or welfare state (see in this regard resolution No.846-92 of 13:30 hours of March 27, 1992). So that, by preventing the administered party from discussing before the courts of justice the resolutions of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social by the application of the Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte in the jurisdictional venue, the principle of social security that the constituent established in the creation of social insurance and within it the Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte regime is infringed”.- V.- As the annulment of the period currently provided for challenging the final administrative resolutions of the Caja leads to a legal vacuum, regarding the questioned statute of limitations (término de prescripción) and, thereby, to a situation of legal uncertainty, it is necessary to apply what is provided in the second paragraph of Article 91 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional for this type of situation, which provides that:

The constitutional annulment judgment may graduate and dimension in space, time, or matter, its retroactive effect, and shall dictate the necessary rules to prevent this from producing serious disruptions of social security, justice, or peace.

Consequently, in order to dictate a rule to prevent the annulment ordered in this judgment from producing serious disruptions to security, it is established that the maximum period for commencing the judicial proceeding against the resolutions of the Caja Costarricense de Seguridad Social will be the same as that provided by the legal system as the statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción) for the claim of the respective substantive right.- Therefore (Por tanto):

The consultation is resolved in the sense that the part of Article 55 of the Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social that provides that “The period to challenge before the courts the final resolutions issued by the Caja shall be six months” is unconstitutional. In exercise of the powers granted to the Chamber in Article 91 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, it is ordered that the maximum period for commencing the judicial proceeding against the resolutions of the Caja Costarricense de Seguridad Social will be the same as that provided by the legal system as the statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción) for the claim of the respective substantive right. This judgment is declaratory and its effect is retroactive to the effective date of the provision under consultation. Let this judgment be published in its entirety in the Boletín Judicial and summarized in the Gaceta. Notify the consultant, the Asamblea Legislativa, and the Executive President of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.- Adrián Vargas B.

Presidente a.i.

Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Rosa María Abdelnour G.

Horacio González Q. Jorge Araya G.

(The highlighted text is not part of the original text) (See judgment of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 8 of 15:30 hours on January 5, 1994.)

In accordance with the cited regulations, it can be noted from what has been transcribed that, within the legal system under study, there are two transcendental moments for the administered party, whether to assert or claim the right to obtain a disability pension, in which case it prescribes in two years, or upon the death of the direct beneficiary, which prescribes in ten years; and the moment through which that party can exercise the right to challenge a final resolution (resolución firme) of the Caja that is unfavorable to their own interests. The first is clearly provided for in the aforementioned Article 61, and it goes without saying that this is the statute of limitations (prescripción) period; and the second, that is, the content of the aforementioned Article 55, which is the term for expiration (caducidad).

It can also be explained from the foregoing that both norms are not only clear in establishing the purpose each of them pursues within the legal system, but also that the categorical time limits stipulated in those regulations are based on reasons of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), as that honorable Constitutional Court has emphasized, stating "... that the establishment of obstacles by the legislator that prevent the possibility of challenging certain acts because that right was not exercised within the period established by law, indeed obeys reasons of legal certainty, as it was intended to set a limit for the exercise of that right." (Judgment Number 1995-05545, of 15:03 hours on October 11, 1995).

It is well known that legal certainty constitutes a general principle of Law, without which a Social State of Law could not guarantee the certainty that the legal situation of its citizens will not be modified except through regular, duly predetermined procedures; that is, it represents the guarantee of the objective application of the law, insofar as individuals know at every moment what to expect legally; or rather, what their rights and obligations are. Likewise, the majority of doctrine indicates that from a subjective point of view, certainty is equivalent to the moral assurance that the individual has regarding their assets, in that they will be respected; which requires certain conditions, such as judicial organization, the police force, and laws, so that from an objective point of view, legal certainty is equivalent to the existence of a just and effective social order whose compliance is ensured by public coercion. Therefore, with good reason, Vicenc Aguado i Cudolà maintains that both the statute of limitations (prescripción) and expiration (caducidad) "... are in reality mechanisms designed to guarantee that the general interest is satisfied within a determined time, avoiding situations of legal uncertainty for citizens." ("Prescripción y caducidad en el ejercicio de potestades administrativas", Ediciones Jurídicas y Sociales, S.A. Madrid, 1999, p.19) Hence the importance of the existence of the institution of expiration (caducidad) in our national legislation, which both doctrine and jurisprudence agree in defining as that procedural prerequisite of an exceptional nature, authorized by law, applicable upon the expiry of the period for the exercise of a right or the challenge of a specific act or proceeding, generally attributable to the inertia or abandonment of the titleholder themselves due to their inactivity. To that extent, courts order, on their own motion or at the request of an interested party, the dismissal of actions or claims of rights, because the corresponding period has elapsed broadly, thereby extinguishing a specific right or action. Thus, and regarding the subject of Social Security in general, authoritative doctrine has indicated that expiration (caducidad) can be defined as:

"...that institution by which, due to a lack of activity by the subject holding a right during a determined period of time, and through the passage of the same, said right is extinguished; expiration (caducidad) applies exclusively to the benefits of the Social Security system, hence this character must be delineated previously (on this matter, it is worth citing the doctrine of the Supreme Court in which benefits from the Social Security system are classified, for the purpose of applying expiration rules, as those that were under the purview of the Medical Assistance-Pharmaceutical and Workplace Accident Insurer Entities' Provident Scheme, and which were integrated into the Social Security System, STS of June 16, 2005, rec. 3862/2004), which reflects the earlier doctrine). Expiration (caducidad) is defined in opposition to and in relation to the institution of extinctive statute of limitations (prescripción extintiva); both have an identical consequence: the extinction of an action or right..." (Cardenal Carro (MIGUEL), Palomar Olmeda (ALBERTO), Sempere Navarro (ANTONIO V.), Hierro Hierro (FRANCISCO JAVIER) "Diccionario de Seguridad Social", Editorial Aranzadi S.A. Camino de Galar, 15 31190 Cizur Menor (Navarra) 2006, p. 115) When this Advisory Body distinguishes the institution of expiration (caducidad) from that of statute of limitations (prescripción), it observes that indeed there is a point of convergence between the two, which is to put an end to the legal uncertainty that may arise in various actions or rights that are not claimed or requested in a timely manner by their titleholders, with an inertia or abandonment being presumed on their part due to their inactivity in exercising them accordingly. Despite this, notable differences are observed that are worth outlining as follows:

- Expiration (caducidad) is linked to the exercise of so-called potestative rights or legal powers, whose purpose is to promote a change in the legal situation, protecting the general interest.

- The statute of limitations (prescripción), on the other hand, protects the private interest of the passive subject of a right or action against untimely claims, when they were no longer to be expected or the precise evidence for defense has been lost.

- Expiration (caducidad) is not subject to interruption or suspension, meaning the period for challenging an act or exercising a right runs inevitably. This is not the case for the statute of limitations (prescripción), which can be interrupted by certain administrative or legal actions, as the case may be; thereby extending, ipso facto, the legal term for exercising the corresponding right or claim. In the first instance, it is not necessary for one of the parties to the proceeding to plead it, as it can be ruled on its own motion. In the second, it can only be declared at the request of a party.

- Regarding strictly the right that is lost in one and the other institution due to the passage of time, our Constitutional Court, through judgment Number 2000-00878 of 16:12 hours on January 26, 2000, has aptly indicated that the statute of limitations (prescripción) is "a legal institution by virtue of which, through the inactivity and negligence of the interested party within a period defined by law, the enjoyment of a right is lost, as defined by doctrine, when it indicates that 'in the statute of limitations, the right is born with indefinite duration and is only lost when there is negligence in using it' (Roberto Ruggiero, in his book Instituciones de Derecho Civil, translated from the fourth Italian edition by Ramón Serrano Sureño and José Santacruz Teijeiro, Editorial Reus, S.A, Madrid, Spain, 1929). So that, the statute of limitations extinguishes the action or claim, but not the right itself, unlike expiration (caducidad), an institution similar to the statute of limitations insofar as time also operates as an extinctive cause, but we repeat, of the right, so that the acquisition of the right is prevented by the useless passage of the legal term, or what is the same, 'the claim for whose exercise a term is prefixed, is born originally with this time limitation, so that it cannot be asserted once it has elapsed' (Roberto Ruggiero, Op. Cit.). In these same terms it has been understood by constitutional jurisprudence, when referring it to the omission or inertia of the beneficiary, who has allowed a certain period to elapse without exercising their right and based on that, loses it, or at least loses the immediate benefit that it would have meant for them, but without necessarily implying that this right disappears completely, which in some way constitutes a waiver of rights by the beneficiary (judgment number 05969-93, of fifteen hours twenty-one minutes on November sixteenth, nineteen ninety-three). And it is precisely within this conception, that this Court has indicated that:

"IV. It is true that the institution of the statute of limitations (prescripción) is not unconstitutional in its essence, since it helps to integrate a basic principle of the legal system, which is that of legal certainty (seguridad juridica)" (judgment number 05969-93, cited above)." To that extent, the Court of Constitutional Law has clearly explained that the establishment of such time limits as the one concerning us in this study constitutes an ordering element of social relations, because "if the possibility of bringing action in pursuit of a right were left open, without respecting the fulfillment of time limits and terms due to the passage of time, relationships between people would become insecure, indefinite, and each person could claim 'sine die' for their rights, regardless of what happened in the past. A major alteration in control for the obligors themselves would occur, because they could never consider an obligation discharged, such as that of granting unrequested rights or rights simply not used by the beneficiary, which would have repercussions on other areas of people's activity, such as the cost of operations (commercial, industrial, etc.) and services in the market." (Judgment No. 2000-00878, cited) Furthermore, the cited doctrine has indicated that, "in the statute of limitations (prescripción), the focus of reflection is the subjective element; indeed, the eventual holder of a right does not request the initiation of the procedure for recognition of a right to a Social Security benefit. Therefore, the statute of limitations finds its basis in the need to put an end to situations of uncertainty in the exercise of rights, and in the presumption of abandonment of the same by the holder, a direct consequence of their inactivity. In expiration (caducidad), the subjective element plays a secondary role, and what is relevant is the objective element of the absence of exercise of the right to the corresponding monthly payment. In this case, the basis of expiration lies in the attempt to safeguard a general and social interest, of a public nature, directly connected to the promotion of spaces of legal certainty, regardless of subjective considerations. Secondly, and in contrast to the statute of limitations, which must be pleaded at the instance of a party (STA of October 5, 1994, reg. 1994, 7750), the automatic nature of expiration (caducidad) must be highlighted, meaning it must be applied on its own motion. Indeed, it is a matter of procedural public order, which operates ex lege, without needing to be pleaded by a party (STS of May 4, 1984, reg. 1984, 2956)." (see, Cardenal Carro (MIGUEL), Palomar Olmeda (ALBERTO), Sempere Navarro (ANTONIO V.), Hierro Hierro (FRANCISCO JAVIER) Ibid, p. 117) From what has been analyzed up to this point, this Advisory Body concludes with full propriety that the time limit stipulated in Article 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social) does not in any way infringe upon the right of access to jurisdictional justice, the natural judge, and substantive res judicata. Quite the contrary, such an institution is based on reasons of legal certainty and the safeguarding of the general interest over the defined right. In any case, it is also worth highlighting, in the words of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, that as long as the right to the various hypotheses provided for in Article 61 of the cited Law is not exercised, for example, the statute of limitations (prescripción) terms established therein apply; but once that right is exercised, the provision in the aforementioned numeral immediately applies as a complementary article, that is, the six-month period for the interested party to challenge before the Courts of Justice those final resolutions of the Caja that they assume are not in accordance with their interests; or, the administered party may challenge within the same period the resolutions arising from the application of laws and regulations by the Inspection Service or against it. (Judgment Number 08 of 15:30 hours on January 5, 1994) In this way, this Advisory Body considers that the expiration (caducidad) period established in the norm in question is not, in itself, unconstitutional, being rather sufficient for the administered party or interested party to assert their right or action before the courts of justice for the purpose of challenging the final resolutions issued by the Caja. Without this implying the violation of the principle of Social Security protected by Article 73 of the Constitution, or the Conventions of the International Labour Organization, Numbers 102 (the latter relating to the Minimum Standard of Social Security, ratified in our legal system by Law Number 4737, of March 29, 1971) and Convention 130 (relating to medical care and benefits, ratified by Law Number 4737, of March 29, 1971), or any other international instrument.

Finally, it is not superfluous to indicate that, although by provision of Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction and the doctrine that informs it, the jurisprudence and precedents of the constitutional jurisdiction are binding erga omnes, it certainly is not binding for that honorable Chamber. However, and by virtue of the reasoning set forth throughout this analysis, it is our criterion that, contrary to what was held in constitutional judgment number 1995-5545 of fifteen hours and three minutes on October eleventh, nineteen ninety-five, the expiration (caducidad) period stipulated in the norm consulted by the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit does not contravene the Law of the Constitution.

IV.- CONCLUSION:

Based on Articles 73 of the Political Constitution, 61 and 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, as well as the abundant jurisprudence emanating from the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, and pertinent doctrine, it is the criterion of this Advisory Body that the time limit stipulated in the aforementioned Article 55, which states, "The period to challenge before the courts the final resolutions (resoluciones firmes) issued by the Caja shall be six months." (As amended by Article 85 of Law No. 7983 of February 16, 2000)", is not contrary to the Law of the Constitution.

4.- In the proceedings, the legal requirements have been observed.- Drafted by Magistrate Armijo Sancho; and,

Considering:

I.- This consultation has been formulated in accordance with Article 101 and following of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction and meets the admissibility requirements provided in the Law.- II.- As described in the background, the doubt about the constitutionality of Article 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund lies in the fact that, despite a previous declaration of unconstitutionality of the former text of that norm, annulled by judgment number 5545 of 15:03 hrs. on October 11, 1995, which established a one-year period to challenge resolutions of the Caja, the current text, according to the legislative reform carried out in 2000, established a six-month period for this purpose.- III.- Although respectable, the Chamber does not share the opinion of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic, in favor of the constitutionality of the consulted norm, literally set forth in the second "Resultando", based on arguments of legal certainty and its consideration of the supposed cases for the application of the terms provided in Articles 61 and 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Caja and the two transcendental moments for the administered party, whether to assert or claim the right to obtain a disability pension, in which case it prescribes in two years, or upon the death of the direct beneficiary, which prescribes in ten, and the moment in which the right can be exercised to challenge a final resolution of the Caja unfavorable to their own interests, distinguishing between a statute of limitations (prescripción) term, in the first case, and an expiration (caducidad) term, in the second. The reform carried out in Article 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund entails the same vice of constitutionality declared in judgment number 5545 of 15:03 hrs. on October 11, 1995, which constitutes binding jurisprudence, in accordance with Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which provides that "The jurisprudence and precedents of the constitutional jurisdiction are binding erga omnes, except for itself." "Omnes" includes, of course, the legislator, who by amending Article 55, contrary to what was ordered in a binding judgment of this Chamber and aggravating the vice of constitutionality declared by the Chamber in 1995, also violated the Constitution.- IV.- Because, in effect, that one-year term provided in the text previously annulled by the Chamber, for being contrary to the principle of social security (see judgment 5545-95, Considering II), is reduced by half by the consulted norm, which only undermines in an even more serious manner the fundamental rights of access to justice and social security; furthermore, that one-year period to judicially challenge the administrative resolutions of the Caja is considerably shorter than the period provided for the acts of other administrations (see Articles 39 and 40 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code), with which, if that period were maintained, an evident inequality would be enshrined, to the detriment of those who are the object of unfavorable acts by the Caja and, taking into consideration the nature of the resolutions of that institution, relating to the performance of its social tasks and linked to social rights and benefits that the Constitution classifies as inalienable (Article 74), the indicated limitation constitutes an affront to the Law of the Constitution. For this reason, the Chamber reiterates what was expressed in judgment number 5545 of 15:03 hrs. on October 11, 1995, insofar as it considered that:

"the subject matter consulted refers to the fact that Article 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund number 17 of October 22, 1943, amended by Law No. 6914 of November 28, 1983, does not allow the administered parties to go to the courts to obtain justice, because upon the expiration of the period contained therein, the possibility of access to the jurisdictional route is forever precluded. In this regard, the Attorney General's Office of the Republic indicated that the expiration (caducidad) period established therein is not unconstitutional, as it is based on the values of certainty and legal certainty. The Chamber considers that the establishment of obstacles by the legislator that prevent the possibility of challenging certain acts because that right was not exercised within the period established by law, indeed obeys reasons of legal certainty, as it was intended to set a limit for the exercise of that right. However, within the legal system of the Social State of Law, it must be allowed that everyone has the opportunity to go before the courts of justice demanding the protection of a right that has been injured or is in dispute, and that judges attend to their petitions as provided by law.

In the matter at hand, the primary purpose of the constituent was to maintain social insurance to strengthen social security, which is the public system of coverage for social, individual, and economic needs developed from the historical action of social welfare, and which has become one of the hallmarks of the social State or welfare State (see in this regard resolution No. 846-92 of 13:30 hours on March 27, 1992). Thus, by preventing the administered party from discussing before the courts of justice the resolutions of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social concerning the application of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime at the jurisdictional level, the principle of social security that the constituent established in the creation of social insurance, and within it the Disability, Old Age, and Death regime, is infringed."- **V.-** Since the annulment of the period currently provided for challenging final administrative resolutions of the Caja leads to a legal vacuum regarding the statute of limitations in question and, consequently, to a situation of legal uncertainty, it is necessary to apply the provision of the second paragraph of Article 91 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional for this type of situation, which provides that:

*The constitutional annulment judgment may graduate and dimension in space, time, or matter its retroactive effect, and shall dictate the rules necessary to prevent it from producing serious dislocations of social security, justice, or peace.* Consequently, in order to dictate a rule to prevent the annulment ordered in this judgment from causing serious dislocations to security, it is established that the maximum period to initiate the judicial process against the resolutions of the Caja Costarricense de Seguridad Social shall be the same as the statute of limitations period provided by the legal system for claiming the respective substantive right.- **Por tanto:** The consultation is resolved in the sense that the part of Article 55 of the Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social that provides "*The period to challenge before the courts the final resolutions issued by the Caja shall be six months*" is unconstitutional. In exercise of the powers granted to the Chamber in Article 91 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, it is ordered that the maximum period to initiate the judicial process against the resolutions of the Caja Costarricense de Seguridad Social shall be the same as the statute of limitations period provided by the legal system for claiming the respective substantive right. This judgment is declaratory and its effect is retroactive to the effective date of the norm consulted. This judgment shall be published in its entirety in the Boletín Judicial and summarized in the La Gaceta. Notify the consulting party, the Asamblea Legislativa, and the Executive President of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.- **Adrián Vargas B.** **Presidente a.i.** **Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.** **Fernando Cruz C. Rosa María Abdelnour G.** **Horacio González Q. Jorge Araya G.** The ruling of the Board of Directors must be issued within the twenty days following the day on which the appeal was filed.

Each Division Manager shall hear matters pertaining to their competence, according to the subject matter involved. If any believes a case does not correspond to them, they shall refer it ex officio without further procedure to the respective Division. **The period for challenging before the courts the final resolutions issued by the Caja shall be six months."** (Thus amended by Article 85 of Law No. 7983 of February 16, 2000) (The text highlighted in bold is not from the original text) First, it is pertinent to observe what that Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has indicated regarding the distinction between the terms provided for in Articles 61 and 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social), as it is important for understanding the opinion of this Advisory Body in relation to the crux of the inquiry made by the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José. Thus, in relevant part, it stated:

"Article 61 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund and 23 of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regulations (Reglamento de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte), in what is pertinent, state: 'The right to claim the granting of disability pensions prescribes (prescribe) in two years, and for death pensions in ten years...' Article 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, which is a related and complementary norm to the foregoing, in what is pertinent, indicates: '... In any of the circumstances provided for in this article, unless the statute of limitations (término de prescripción) period were shorter, no interested party may discuss before the Labor Courts the resolutions of the Caja that have been final for more than one year.' **Cited Articles 61 and 23 clearly contemplate the matter of the statute of limitations (prescripción) for exercising the right to a pension, in this specific case for disability. For its part, Article 55 establishes clear hypotheses of expiry (caducidad), by contemplating in turn that no interested party may discuss before the Labor Courts the resolutions of the Caja that have been final for more than one year.** Now, the specific application of these articles must be clear, in such a way that, as long as no pension has been requested, the terms established in cited Articles 61 and 23 govern, **that is, the statute of limitations (prescripción) period contemplated in said articles is for claiming the granting of a pension; but once that right has been exercised, cited Article 55 immediately comes into effect, and as a complementary article, which establishes the one-year expiry (caducidad) period that operates due to the inactivity of the interested party,** when, disagreeing with unfavorable and final resolutions of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, he or she does not proceed to discuss them before the Labor Courts in a timely manner." (The highlighted text is not from the original text) (See judgment of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 8 of 3:30 p.m. on January 5, 1994.)

In accordance with the cited regulations, it can be noted from the transcribed text that within the legal system under study, there are two transcendental moments for the administered party, either to assert or claim the right to obtain a disability pension, in which case it prescribes (prescribe) in two years, or due to the death of the direct beneficiary, which prescribes in ten years; and the moment through which that party can exercise the right to challenge a final resolution of the Caja that is unfavorable to their own interests. The first is clearly set forth in the aforementioned Article 61, and it goes without saying that this is the statute of limitations (prescripción) period; and the second, that is, the content of the aforementioned Article 55, which is the expiry (caducidad) period.

It can also be explained from the foregoing that both norms are not only clear in establishing the purpose each pursues within the legal system, but also that the categorical periods stipulated in those regulations are based on reasons of legal certainty and security (seguridad y certeza jurídica), as that honorable Constitutional Court has emphasized, stating "... that the establishment of obstacles by the legislator that prevent the possibility of challenging certain acts because that right was not exercised within the period established by law, indeed responds to reasons of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), since it was intended to set a limit for the exercise of that right." (Judgment Number 1995-05545, of 3:03 p.m. on October 11, 1995).

It is well known that legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) constitutes a general principle of Law, without which a Social State of Law could guarantee the certainty that the legal situation of its citizens will not be modified except by regular, duly predetermined procedures; that is, it represents the guarantee of the objective application of the law, insofar as individuals know at every moment what to expect legally; or rather, what their rights and obligations are. Likewise, the majority of doctrine indicates that, from the subjective point of view, certainty is equivalent to the moral certainty that the individual has that their assets will be respected; which requires certain conditions, such as judicial organization, the police force, and laws, so that, from the objective point of view, legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) is equivalent to the existence of a just and effective social order whose compliance is ensured by public coercion. Therefore, with full reason, Vicenc Aguado i Cudolà maintains that both the statute of limitations (prescripción) and expiry (caducidad) "...actually come to be mechanisms intended to guarantee that the general interest is satisfied within a determined time, avoiding situations of legal uncertainty (inseguridad jurídica) for citizens." ("Prescripción y caducidad en el ejercicio de potestades administrativas", Ediciones Jurídicas y Sociales, S.A. Madrid, 1999, p.19) Hence the importance of the existence of the institution of expiry (caducidad) in our national legislation, which both doctrine and jurisprudence agree in defining as that prerequisite of an exceptional nature, authorized by law, applicable when the period for exercising a right or challenging a specific act or action lapses, generally attributable to the inertia or abandonment of the holder due to inactivity. To that extent, the courts order, ex officio or at the request of an interested party, the archiving of actions or claims of rights, because the corresponding period has amply run its course, thereby extinguishing a specific right or action. Thus, and regarding the topic of Social Security in general, authoritative doctrine has indicated that expiry (caducidad) can be defined as:

"... that institution by which, due to the lack of activity of the holder of a right during a determined period of time, and by the passing thereof, said right is extinguished; expiry (caducidad) applies exclusively to the benefits (prestaciones) of the Social Security system, hence its character must be delimited beforehand (on this matter, the doctrine of the Supreme Court should be cited, in which those benefits of Social Security are classified, for the purpose of applying the rules of expiry (caducidad), as those that were under the Welfare Regime of Assistance Doctors-Pharmaceutical and Worker's Compensation Insurance Entities (Régimen de Previsión de los Médicos de Asistencia- Farmacéutica y Entidades Aseguradoras de Accidentes de Trabajo), and that were integrated into the Social Security System, STS of June 16, 2005, rec.3862/2004), which compiles the earlier doctrine). Expiry (caducidad) is defined by opposition and in relation to the institution of extinctive statute of limitations (prescripción extintiva); both have identical consequences: the extinction of an action or right..." (Cardenal Carro (MIGUEL), Palomar Olmeda (ALBERTO), Sempere Navarro (ANTONIO V.), Hierro Hierro (FRANCISCO JAVIER) "Diccionario de Seguridad Social", Editorial Aranzadi S.A. Camino de Galar, 15 31190 Cizur Menor (Navarra) 2006, p. 115) When distinguishing the institution of expiry (caducidad) from that of the statute of limitations (prescripción), this Advisory Body observes that indeed a point of convergence exists between the two, which is that of putting an end to the legal uncertainty that may arise in various actions or rights that are not claimed or requested in due time by their holders, with inertia or abandonment being presumed on their part due to their inactivity in exercising what corresponds. Despite this, notable differences are observed that are worth outlining as follows:

-The expiry (caducidad) is linked to the exercise of so-called potestative rights or legal powers, whose purpose is to promote a change in legal situation, protecting the general interest.

-The statute of limitations (prescripción), on the other hand, protects the private interest of the passive subject of a right or action against untimely claims, when they were no longer to be expected or the precise evidence for the defense has been lost.

-The expiry (caducidad) is not susceptible to interruption or suspension, so the period for challenging an act or exercising a right runs inevitably. Not so with the statute of limitations (prescripción), which can be interrupted through certain administrative or legal actions, as the case may be; thereby extending, ipso facto, the legal term for the exercise of the corresponding right or claim. In the first figure, it is not necessary for one of the parties to the proceeding to allege it, as it can be obtained ex officio. In the second, it is only declarable at the request of a party.

-Regarding what properly concerns the right that is lost in one and the other institution due to the passage of time, our Constitutional Court, through judgment Number 2000-00878 of 4:12 p.m. on January 26, 2000, has appropriately indicated that the statute of limitations (prescripción) is "a legal institution by virtue of which, due to the inactivity and negligence of the interested party within a period defined by law, the enjoyment of a right is lost, as defined by doctrine, indicating that 'in the statute of limitations (prescripción), the right is born with indefinite duration and is only lost when there is negligence in using it' (Roberto Ruggiero, in his book Instituciones de Derecho Civil, translated from the fourth Italian edition by Ramón Serrano Sureño and José Santacruz Teijeiro, Editorial Reus, S.A, Madrid, Spain, 1929). So that, the statute of limitations (prescripción) extinguishes the action or claim, but not the right itself, unlike expiry (caducidad), an institution similar to the statute of limitations (prescripción) in that time also operates therein as an extinctive cause, but it is repeated, of the right, so that the acquisition of the right is prevented by the useless passage of the legal term, or what is the same, 'the claim for whose exercise a term is prefixed, is originally born with this time limitation, so that it cannot be enforced when it has elapsed' (Roberto Ruggiero, Op. Cit.). In these same terms it has been understood by constitutional jurisprudence, when referring to the omission or inertia of the beneficiary, who has allowed a certain period to pass without exercising their right and based on that, loses it, or at least loses the immediate benefit it would have meant for them, but without necessarily implying that this right completely disappears, which in some way constitutes a waiver of rights by the beneficiary (judgment number 05969-93, of three twenty-one p.m. on November sixteenth, nineteen ninety-three). And it is precisely within this conception that this Court has indicated that:

"**IV. It is true that the institution of the statute of limitations (prescripción) is not in its essence unconstitutional, since it helps to integrate a basic principle of the legal order, which is that of legal certainty (seguridad juridica)**" (judgment number 05969-93, cited above)." To that extent, the Court of Constitutional Law has clearly explained that the establishment of this class of periods, such as the one that concerns us in this study, constitutes an organizing element of social relations, since "if the possibility of acting in pursuit of a right were left open, without respecting the compliance with periods and terms due to the passage of time, relations between people would become insecure, indefinite, and each could claim 'sine die' for their rights, regardless of what happened in the past. There would be a major alteration in the control for the obligors themselves, because they could never consider an obligation discharged, such as the granting of rights unrequested or simply unused by the beneficiary, which would have repercussions on other areas of people's activity, such as the cost of operations (commercial, industrial, etc.) and services in the market." (Judgment No. 2000-00878, cited) Furthermore, the cited doctrine has indicated that, "in the statute of limitations (prescripción), the axis of reflections is the subjective element; indeed, the eventual holder of a right does not request the initiation of the procedure for the recognition of a right to a Social Security benefit (prestación). Therefore, the statute of limitations (prescripción) finds its basis in the need to put an end to situations of uncertainty in the exercise of rights, and in the presumption of abandonment of the same by the holder, a direct consequence of their inactivity. In expiry (caducidad), the subjective element plays a secondary role, and what is relevant is the objective element of the absence of exercise of the right to the corresponding monthly payment. In this case, the basis of expiry (caducidad) lies in the attempt to safeguard a general and social interest, of a public nature, directly connected with the promotion of spaces of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), regardless of subjective considerations. Secondly, and compared to the statute of limitations (prescripción), which must be alleged at the request of a party (STA of October 5, 1994, rec. 1994,7750), the automatic nature of expiry (caducidad) must be highlighted, which means it must be appreciated ex officio. Indeed, it is a matter of procedural public order, which operates ex lege, without the need to be alleged by a party (STS of May 4, 1984, rec. 1984, 2956)." (see, Cardenal Carro (MIGUEL), Palomar Olmeda (ALBERTO), Sempere Navarro (ANTONIO V.), Hierro Hierro (FRANCISCO JAVIER) Ibid, p. 117) From what has been analyzed so far, this Advisory Body concludes with full propriety that the period stipulated in Article 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund in no way infringes upon the right of access to jurisdictional justice, to the natural judge, or to the material force of res judicata (cosa juzgada material). Quite the contrary, said institution is based on reasons of legal certainty and security (seguridad y certeza jurídica) and the safeguarding of the general interest over the defined right. In any case, it is also worth highlighting, in the words of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, that as long as, for example, the right to the various hypotheses provided for in Article 61 of the cited Law is not exercised, the statute of limitations (prescripción) terms established therein govern; but once that right is exercised, the provisions of the aforementioned numeral immediately and as a complementary article come into effect, that is, the six-month period for the interested party to challenge before the Courts of Justice those final resolutions of the Caja that are supposedly not in accordance with their interests; or, the administered party may challenge, within the same period, the resolutions derived from the application of laws and regulations by the Inspection Service (Servicio de Inspección) or against it. (Judgment Number 08 of 3:30 p.m. on January 5, 1994) In this way, this Advisory Body considers that the expiry (caducidad) period established in the norm in question is not, in itself, unconstitutional, being rather sufficient for the administered party or interested party to be able to assert their right or action before the courts of justice for the purpose of challenging the final resolutions issued by the Caja. Without this implying the violation of the principle of Social Security protected by Article 73 of the Constitution, or the Conventions of the International Labour Organization, Numbers 102 (relating to the Minimum Standard of Social Security, ratified in our legal system by Law Number 4737, of March 29, 1971) and Convention 130 (relating to medical care and benefits, ratified by Law Number 4737, of March 29, 1971), or any other international instrument.

Finally, it is not superfluous to indicate that, although by provision of Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) and the doctrine informing it, the jurisprudence and precedents of the constitutional jurisdiction are binding erga omnes, they certainly are not binding on that honorable Chamber. However, and by virtue of the reasoning set forth throughout this analysis, it is our opinion that, contrary to what was provided in constitutional judgment number 1995-5545 of three minutes past three in the afternoon on October eleventh, nineteen ninety-five, the expiry (caducidad) period stipulated in the norm consulted by the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit does not contravene the Law of the Constitution.

**IV.- CONCLUSION:** Based on Articles 73 of the Political Constitution, 61 and 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, as well as the abundant jurisprudence emanating from the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, and pertinent doctrine, it is the opinion of this Advisory Body that the period stipulated in the aforementioned Article 55, which states, "The period for challenging before the courts the final resolutions issued by the Caja shall be six months." (Thus amended by Article 85 of Law No. 7983 of February 16, 2000)", is not contrary to the Law of the Constitution.

**4.-** The legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.- Drafted by Magistrate **Armijo Sancho**; and, **Considering:** **I.-** This inquiry has been formulated in accordance with Article 101 and following of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction and meets the admissibility requirements provided for in the Law.- **II.-** As described in the background, the doubt regarding the constitutionality of Article 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund lies in the fact that, despite the existence of a prior declaration of unconstitutionality of the previous text of that norm, annulled by judgment number 5545 of 3:03 p.m.

of October 11, 1995, which established a one-year period to challenge the resolutions of the Caja, the current text, according to the legislative reform carried out in the year 2000, provided a six-month period for that purpose.- **III.-** Although respectable, the Chamber does not share the opinion of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), in favor of the constitutionality of the consulted norm, literally set forth in the second “Resultando,” based on arguments of legal certainty and its consideration regarding the cases of application of the terms provided for in Articles 61 and 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Caja and the two transcendental moments for the administered party, that is, to assert or claim the right to obtain a disability pension, in which case it prescribes in two years, or due to death of the direct beneficiary, which prescribes in ten, and the moment in which the right to challenge a final resolution of the Caja unfavorable to one's own interests can be exercised, distinguishing between a statute of limitations (término de prescripción), in the first case, and a statute of repose (caducidad), in the second. The reform operated in Article 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) entails the same defect of constitutionality declared in judgment number 5545 of 15:03 hrs. of October 11, 1995, which constitutes binding jurisprudence, in accordance with Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), which provides that “*The jurisprudence and precedents of the constitutional jurisdiction are binding erga omnes, except for itself*.” “*Omnes*” includes, of course, the legislator, who, by amending Article 55, contrary to what was ordered in a binding judgment of this Chamber and aggravating the defect of constitutionality declared by the Chamber in 1995, also violated the Constitution.- **IV.-** Because, in effect, that one-year term provided for in the text previously annulled by the Chamber, for being contrary to the principle of social security (see judgment 5545-95, Considerando II), is reduced by half by the consulted norm, which only further undermines, in an even more serious manner, the fundamental rights of access to justice and social security; furthermore, that one-year period to judicially challenge the administrative resolutions of the Caja is considerably shorter than that provided for the acts of other administrations (see Arts. 39 and 40 of the Contentious Administrative Procedural Code, Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), with which, if that period were maintained, an evident inequality would be enshrined, to the detriment of those who are the object of unfavorable acts by the Caja and, taking into consideration the nature of the resolutions of that institution, related to the performance of its social missions and linked to social rights and benefits that the Constitution qualifies as inalienable (Art. 74), the indicated limitation constitutes an affront to the Law of the Constitution. For this reason, the Chamber reiterates what was expressed in judgment number 5545 of 15:03 hrs. of October 11, 1995, in which it considered that:

“the consulted matter refers to the fact that Article 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund number 17 of October 22, 1943, amended by Law No. 6914 of November 28, 1983, does not permit the administered parties to resort to the courts to obtain justice, since upon the expiration of the period contained therein, the possibility of access to the jurisdictional route is forever precluded. In this regard, the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) indicated that the statute of repose (plazo de caducidad) established therein is not unconstitutional, as it is based on the values of certainty and legal certainty. The Chamber considers that the establishment of obstacles by the legislator that prevent the possibility of challenging certain acts because that right was not exercised within the period established by law, indeed responds to reasons of legal certainty, as it sought to set a limit for the exercise of that right. However, within the legal system of the Social State of Law, it must be permitted that everyone has the opportunity to appear before the courts of justice demanding the protection of an injured or disputed right, and that the judges attend to their petitions as provided by law. In the matter at hand, the primary purpose of the constituent was to maintain social insurance to strengthen social security, which is the public system of coverage of social, individual, and economic needs developed from the historical action of social welfare, and which has become one of the hallmarks of the Social State or welfare state (see in this regard resolution No. 846-92 of 13:30 hours of March 27, 1992). Thus, by preventing the administered party from discussing before the courts of justice the resolutions of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund through the application of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime (Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte) in a jurisdictional venue, the principle of social security that the constituent provided in the creation of social insurance and within it the Disability, Old Age, and Death regime is infringed.” - **V.-** As the annulment of the period currently provided for challenging the final administrative resolutions of the Caja leads to a legal vacuum, regarding the questioned statute of limitations (término de prescripción) and, with it, to a situation of legal uncertainty, it is necessary to apply what is provided for in the second paragraph of Article 91 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction for this type of situation, which provides that:

*The constitutional annulment judgment may graduate and dimension in space, time, or matter, its retroactive effect, and shall issue the necessary rules to prevent this from producing serious dislocations of social security, justice, or peace.* Consequently, in order to issue a rule to prevent the annulment ordered in this judgment from producing serious dislocations to security, it is established that the maximum period to file the judicial process against the resolutions of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund shall be the same as that provided by the legal system as the statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción) for the claim of the respective substantive right.- **Por tanto:** The consultation is resolved in the sense that the part of Article 55 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund that provides that “*The period to challenge before the courts the final resolutions issued by the Caja shall be six months*” is unconstitutional. In exercise of the powers granted to the Chamber in Article 91 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, it is ordered that the maximum period to file the judicial process against the resolutions of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund shall be the same as that provided by the legal system as the statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción) for the claim of the respective substantive right. This judgment is declaratory and its effect is retroactive to the effective date of the consulted norm. Publish this judgment in full in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) and summarize it in the Gazette (Gaceta). Notify the consultant, the Legislative Assembly, and the Executive President of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund.- **Adrián Vargas B.** **Presidente a.i.** **Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.** **Fernando Cruz C. Rosa María Abdelnour G.** **Horacio González Q. Jorge Araya G.**

* 080151520007CO * usuario1 usuario1 3 3 2009-03-11T21:36:00Z 2009-04-15T20:41:00Z 1 5363 29502 Poder Judicial 245 69 34796 11.6568 Clean 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 * 080151520007CO * Res. Nº 2009003082 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las doce horas y treinta y tres minutos del veinticuatro de febrero del dos mil nueve.

Consulta judicial formulada por la Jueza de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, MSc. Karol Baltodano Aguilar, sobre la constitucionalidad del artículo 55 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, No. 17 de 22 de octubre de 1943 y sus reformas.-

Resultando:

1.- Por resolución de 10:26 hrs. de 28 de octubre de 2008, dictada en el expediente número 05-000561-0163-AC del Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, que es proceso ordinario de AMEL DE AMERICA INTERNACIONAL SRL contra la CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL, la MSc. Karol Baltodano Aguilar, jueza de ese despacho, formula consulta sobre la constitucionalidad del artículo 55 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, No. 17 de 22 de octubre de 1943 y sus reformas. La norma es cuestionada en cuanto dispone que “El plazo para impugnar ante los tribunales las resoluciones firmes que dicte la Caja será de seis meses”, según reforma operada por el artículo 85 de la Ley #793 de 16 de febrero de 2000. La duda de la consultante se origina en el hecho de que por sentencia número 5545 de 15:03 hrs. de 11 de octubre de 1995, la Sala Constitucional declaró la inconstitucionalidad de esa norma en su texto anterior, la cual disponía que “…En cualquiera de las circunstancias previstas en este artículo, salvo que el término de prescripción fuere menor, ningún interesado podrá discutir ante los tribunales de trabajo las resoluciones de la Caja que tengan más de un año de haber quedado firmes”; la norma reformada, dispone un plazo incluso menor -6 meses- para la impugnación judicial de las resoluciones de la Caja, con lo cual, considera que repite la situación anterior de denegación de acceso a la justicia. La Jueza, de conformidad con las prescripciones de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, suspendió el proceso y emplazó a las partes para ante la Sala (fs. 1 a 3).- 2.- Por resolución de 13:30 hrs. de 2 de diciembre de 2008 se da audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la República (f. 6).- 3.- La Procuraduría General de la República, representada por el Procurador General Adjunto, Lic. Farid Beirute Brenes, contesta la audiencia y manifiesta, en lo que interesa, que:

“II.- NORMATIVA CONSULTADA Y SU MOTIVO:

Se consulta sobre la constitucionalidad del artículo 55 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, -Número 17 de 22 de octubre de 1943 y sus reformas- que, en lo que interesa, dice:

“El plazo para impugnar ante los tribunales las resoluciones firmes que dicte la Caja será de de seis meses.” (Así reformado por el artículo 85 de la Ley N º 7983 del 16 de febrero del 2000) Manifiesta la Juzgadora consultante que al contestar la demanda laboral, la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, mediante escrito presentado al citado Juzgado de Trabajo el 18 de octubre del 2006, opuso la excepción de prescripción con sustento en lo dispuesto en el artículo 55 en cuestión; circunstancia ésta, por la que le surge la duda, toda vez que, el antiguo texto legal que establecía “…En cualquiera de las circunstancias previstas en este artículo, salvo que el término de prescripción fuere menor, ningún interesado podrá discutir ante los tribunales de trabajo las resoluciones de la Caja que tengan más de un año de haber quedado firmes .”, fue declarado inconstitucional.

Así, transcribe sentencia número 5545 de las 15:03 horas del 11 de octubre de 1995, de la siguiente forma:

“Considera la Sala que el establecimiento de obstáculos por parte del legislador que impiden la posibilidad de impugnar ciertos actos por no haberse ejercido ese derecho dentro del plazo que establece la ley, efectivamente obedece a razones de seguridad jurídica, pues se quiso poner un límite para el ejercicio de aquel derecho. Sin embargo, dentro del sistema jurídico del Estado Social de Derecho debe permitirse que todos tengan oportunidad de acudir ante los tribunales de justicia demandando el amparo de un derecho lesionado o discutido, y que los jueces atiendan sus gestiones conforme lo dispone la ley. En la materia tratada, el fin primordial del constituyente fue mantener los seguros sociales para fortalecer la seguridad social, que es el sistema público de cobertura de necesidades sociales, individuales y de naturaleza económica desarrollado a partir de la acción histórica de la previsión social, y que ha llegado a convertirse en una de las señas de identidad del Estado social o de bienestar social (ver al respecto la resolución No. 846-92 de las 13:30 horas del 27 de marzo de 1992). De manera que al impedirle al administrado discutir ante los tribunales de justicia las resoluciones de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social por la aplicación del Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte en sede jurisdiccional, se infringe el principio de seguridad social que el constituyente dispuso en la creación del seguro social y dentro de éste, el régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte.

POR TANTO:

Se evacua la consulta en el sentido de que es inconstitucional la parte del artículo 55 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social que dice “En cualquiera de las circunstancias previstas en este artículo, salvo que el término de prescripción fuere menor, ningún interesado podrá discutir ante los tribunales de trabajo las resoluciones de la Caja que tengan más de un año de haber quedado firmes.” Esta sentencia es declarativa y su efecto retroactivo a la fecha de vigencia de la norma consultada. Publíquese esta sentencia íntegramente en el Boletín Judicial y reséñese en la Gaceta. Notifíquese al consultante.” Indica además, que pese que esa resolución constitucional fue emitida en el año 1995, posteriormente, mediante reforma parcial a la citada Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social (según artículo 85 de la Ley Número 7983 del 16 de febrero del año 2000) se impuso un nuevo plazo al administrado para impugnar las resoluciones administrativas que dicte la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social ante los Tribunales de Justicia, con el agravante de que ahora es de seis meses. Por lo que aprecia, que el actual texto legal viene a repetir la anterior hipótesis, limitándose el derecho al acceso a la justicia jurisdiccional, al juez natural y a la cosa juzgada material. Argumenta, que el plazo señalado en el texto actual del mencionado artículo 55, precluye para siempre la posibilidad de recurrir a la vía jurisdiccional.

En tales términos, solicita que se emita criterio acerca de la constitucionalidad del nuevo plazo que tiene el administrado para recurrir ante los Tribunales de Justicia, conforme lo dispone el párrafo del artículo 55 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, Número 17 de 22 de octubre de 1943 y sus reformas.

III.- ANÁLISIS DE LA NORMATIVA CONSULTADA , Y SU CONSTITUCIONALIDAD:

Considera este Órgano Asesor que el párrafo vigente del artículo 55 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social que expresa, “ El plazo para impugnar ante los tribunales las resoluciones firmes que dicte la Caja será de seis meses .”, no contraviene el Derecho de la Constitución.

Dicha norma legal, establece, literalmente:

“ Artículo 55.- Las controversias suscitadas por la aplicación del Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte y las promovidas por la aplicación de las leyes y los reglamentos por parte del Servicio de Inspección o contra él, serán substanciadas y resueltas por el despacho correspondiente y contra lo que este Servicio decida, cabrá recurso de apelación ante la Gerencia de División correspondiente, siempre que se interponga ante la oficina que dictó la resolución, dentro de los tres días hábiles posteriores a la notificación respectiva.

El pronunciamiento deberá dictarse dentro de los veinte días hábiles siguientes a la fecha en que se promovió el recurso.

Las demás controversias que se promuevan con motivo de la aplicación de esta ley o sus reglamentos, serán substanciadas y resueltas por la Gerencia de División respectiva. Contra lo que esta decida, cabrá recurso de apelación ante la Junta Directiva , el cual deberá interponerse ante la misma Gerencia de División que dictó la resolución impugnada, dentro de los tres días hábiles siguientes a la notificación. El pronunciamiento de la Junta Directiva deberá dictarse dentro de los veinte días siguientes a aquél en que se planteó el recurso.

Cada Gerente de División conocerá de los asuntos atinentes a su competencia, según la materia de que se trate. Si alguno estima que un caso no le corresponde, lo remitirá de oficio sin más trámite a la División respectiva. El plazo para impugnar ante los tribunales las resoluciones firmes que dicte la Caja será de seis meses.” (Así reformado por el artículo 85 de la Ley No. 7983 del 16 de febrero del 2000) (Lo resaltado en negrilla no es del texto original) En primer lugar, es pertinente observar lo que ha señalado esa Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en torno a la distinción de los términos previstos en los artículos 61 y 55 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, ya que es importante para la comprensión del criterio de este Órgano Asesor en relación con el quid de la consulta formulada por el Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José. Así, en lo conducente, expresó:

" El artículo 61 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social y 23 del Reglamento de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte, en lo que interesan dicen. " El derecho para reclamar el otorgamiento de las pensiones de invalidez, prescribe en dos años, y para las de muerte en diez años..." El artículo 55 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, que es una norma conexa y complementaria de las anteriores, en lo que interesa, señala: "... En cualquiera de las circunstancias previstas en este artículo, salvo que el término de prescripción fuera menor, ningún interesado podrá discutir ante los Tribunales de Trabajo las resoluciones de la Caja que tengan más de un año de haber quedado firmes". Los artículos 61 y 23 citados, contemplan claramente lo referente a la prescripción para ejercer el derecho a una pensión, en este caso concreto por invalidez. Por su parte el artículo 55, establece hipótesis claras de caducidad, al contemplar a su vez que ningún interesado podrá discutir ante los Tribunales de Trabajo las resoluciones de la Caja que tengan más de un año de haber quedado firmes. Ahora bien, se debe tener clara la aplicación concreta de estos artículos, de manera tal que, mientras no se haya solicitado pensión alguna, rigen los términos establecidos en los artículos 61 y 23 citados, o sea, que el período de prescripción contemplado en dichos artículos, lo es para reclamar el otorgamiento de pensión; pero una vez ejercido ese derecho entra a regir inmediatamente y como artículo complementario, el 55 citado, el cual establece el término de caducidad de un año que opera por la inactividad del interesado, cuando, inconforme con resoluciones desfavorables y firmes de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, no acude a discutirlas ante los Tribunales de Trabajo en tiempo y forma. " (Lo resaltado no es del texto original) (Véase sentencia de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, No.8 de las 15:30 horas del 5 de enero de 1994.)

En consonancia con la citada normativa, puede notarse de lo transcrito , que dentro del ordenamiento jurídico en estudio, existen dos momentos trascendentales para el administrado, ya sea para hacer valer o reclamar el derecho a obtener una pensión por invalidez, en cuyo caso prescribe en dos años, o bien por muerte del beneficiario directo, que prescribe en diez años; y el momento a través del cual, aquél puede ejercer el derecho para impugnar una resolución firme de la Caja , que le es desfavorable a sus propios intereses. El primero, es el dispuesto claramente en el mencionado artículo 61, y que sobra decir es el plazo de la prescripción; y el segundo, o sea el contenido en el mencionado artículo 55, que es el término de la caducidad.

Puede explicarse también de lo anteriormente expuesto, que ambas normas no sólo son diáfanas al establecer la finalidad que cada una de ellas persigue dentro del ordenamiento jurídico, sino también que los plazos categóricos estipulados en esa normativa tienen su sustento en razones de seguridad y certeza jurídica, tal y como lo ha subrayado ese honorable Tribunal Constitucional, al expresar “… que el establecimiento de obstáculos por parte del legislador que impiden la posibilidad de impugnar ciertos actos por no haberse ejercido ese derecho dentro del plazo que establece la ley, efectivamente obedece a razones de seguridad jurídica, pues se quiso poner un límite para el ejercicio de aquel derecho.” (Sentencia Número 1995- 05545, de 15:03 horas del 11 de octubre del 1995).

Es bien sabido que la seguridad jurídica constituye un principio general del Derecho, sin el cual un Estado Social de Derecho podría garantizar la certeza de que la situación jurídica de sus ciudadanos no será modificada más que por procedimientos regulares, debidamente predeterminados; es decir, representa la garantía de la aplicación objetiva de la ley, en tanto los individuos saben en cada momento a qué atenerse jurídicamente; o bien, cuáles son sus derechos y obligaciones. Asimismo indica la mayoría de la doctrina, que desde el punto de vista subjetivo, la seguridad equivale a la certeza moral que tiene el individuo de sus bienes, en tanto le serán respetados; lo cual requiere de ciertas condiciones, tales como la organización judicial, el cuerpo de policía, las leyes, por lo que, desde el punto de vista objetivo, la seguridad jurídica equivale a la existencia de un orden social justo y eficaz cuyo cumplimiento está asegurado por la coacción pública. Por ello, con toda razón Vicenc Aguado i Cudolà sostiene que tanto la prescripción como la caducidad “…viene a ser en realidad mecanismos destinados a garantizar que el interés general se satisfaga en un tiempo determinado, evitando situaciones de inseguridad jurídica a los ciudadanos.” (“Prescripción y caducidad en el ejercicio de potestades administrativas”, Ediciones Jurídicas y Sociales, S.A. Madrid, 1999, p.19) De ahí la importancia de la existencia del instituto de la caducidad en nuestra legislación nacional, que tanto la doctrina como la jurisprudencia, son contestes en definirlo como aquel presupuesto de carácter excepcional, autorizado por ley, aplicable al sobrevenir el plazo para el ejercicio de un derecho o impugnación de un determinado acto o actuación, imputable generalmente por la inercia o abandono del propio titular por su inactividad. En esa medida, los tribunales ordenan de oficio o a gestión de parte interesada, el archivo de las acciones o reclamaciones de derechos, por haber corrido con holgura el plazo correspondiente, extinguiéndose de esa manera un determinado derecho o acción. Así, y en tratándose del tema de la Seguridad Social en general, la autorizada doctrina ha indicado, que la caducidad puede definirse como:

“…aquel instituto por el cual, a falta de actividad del sujeto titular de un derecho durante un determinado período de tiempo, y por el transcurso del mismo, dicho derecho se extingue; la caducidad se aplica exclusivamente a las prestaciones del sistema de Seguridad Social, de ahí que se haya de deslindar con carácter previo dicho carácter (sobre este particular cabe citar la doctrina del Tribunal Supremo en la que se califican como prestaciones de Seguridad Social, a efecto de aplicar las reglas de caducidad, las que estuvieron a cargo del Régimen de Previsión de los Médicos de Asistencia- Farmacéutica y Entidades Aseguradoras de Accidentes de Trabajo, y que se integraron en el Sistema de Seguridad Social, STS de 16 de junio de 2005, rec.3862/2004), que recoge la doctrina anterior). La caducidad se define por oposición y en relación con la institución de la prescripción extintiva; ambas tienen idéntica consecuencia: la extinción de una acción o derecho…” (Cardenal Carro (MIGUEL), Palomar Olmeda (ALBERTO), Sempere Navarro (ANTONIO V.), Hierro Hierro (FRANCISCO JAVIER) “Diccionario de Seguridad Social”, Editorial Aranzadi S.A. Camino de Galar , 15 31190 Cizur Menor (Navarra) 2006, p. 115) Al distinguir este Órgano Asesor el instituto de la caducidad con el de la prescripción, observa que efectivamente entre ambos existe un punto de convergencia, cual es el de poner término a la incertidumbre jurídica que puede suscitarse en diversas acciones o derechos que no son reclamados o solicitados en su oportunidad por los titulares, presumiéndose por parte de éstos, una inercia o abandono en virtud de su inactividad para ejercer en lo correspondiente. Pese a ello, se observan notables diferencias que valen reseñar de la siguiente forma:

-La caducidad se vincula con el ejercicio de los llamados derechos potestativos o poderes jurídicos, cuyo fin es promover un cambio de situación jurídica, protegiendo el interés general.

- La prescripción, en cambio, protege el interés particular del sujeto pasivo de un derecho o acción frente a reclamaciones intempestivas, cuando ya no cabía esperarlas o se ha perdido las pruebas precisas para la defensa.

-La caducidad no es susceptible de interrupción ni suspensión, por lo que el plazo para la impugnación de un acto o ejercicio de un derecho, corre inevitablemente. No así en la prescripción, la cual puede interrumpirse mediante determinadas actuaciones administrativas o jurídicas, según sea el caso; ampliándose, ipso facto, el término legal para el ejercicio del derecho o reclamo correspondiente. En la primera figura, no es necesario que la alegue una de las partes del procedimiento, ya que puede obtenerse de oficio. En la segunda, sólo es declarable a petición de parte.

-En lo que atañe propiamente al derecho que se pierde en uno y otro instituto por el transcurso del tiempo, nuestro Tribunal Constitucional mediante sentencia Número 2000- 00878 de las 16:12 horas del 26 de enero del 2000, ha señalado atinadamente que la prescripción es “ una institución jurídica en virtud de la cual, por la inactividad y negligencia del interesado en un plazo definido en la ley, se pierde el disfrute de un derecho, según lo define la doctrina, al señalar que " en la prescripción, el derecho nace con duración indefinida y sólo se pierde cuando haya negligencia en usarlo " (Roberto Ruggiero , en su libro Instituciones de Derecho Civil , traducido de la cuarta edición italiana por Ramón Serrano Sureño y José Santacruz Teijeiro , Editorial Reus , S.A , Madrid, España, 1929). De manera que, la prescripción extingue la acción o pretensión, no así el derecho en sí, a diferencia de la caducidad, institución semejante a la prescripción en tanto en ella también opera el tiempo como causa extintiva, pero se repite, del derecho, de modo que se impide la adquisición del derecho por el transcurso inútil del término legal, o lo que es lo mismo, " la pretensión a cuyo ejercicio se prefija un término, nace originariamente con esta limitación de tiempo, de modo que no puede ser hecha valer cuando haya transcurrido " (Roberto Ruggiero , Op . Cit .). En estos mismos términos ha sido entendida por la jurisprudencia constitucional, al referirla a la omisión o inercia del beneficiario, que ha dejado transcurrir un determinado plazo sin ejercer su derecho y en base a ello, lo pierde, o al menos pierde el beneficio inmediato que le habría significado, pero sin que implique necesariamente que ese derecho le desaparezca del todo, lo que de alguna manera configura una renuncia de derechos por parte del beneficiario (sentencia número 05969- 93, de las quince horas veintiún minutos del dieciséis de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y tres). Y es precisamente dentro de esta concepción, que este Tribunal ha señalado que:

" IV. Es cierto que el instituto de la prescripción no es en su esencia inconstitucional, puesto que ayuda a integrar un principio básico del ordenamiento, cual es el de la seguridad juridica " (sentencia número 05969-93, supra citada).” En esa medida, el Tribunal del Derecho de la Constitución ha explicado claramente que el establecimiento de esa clase de plazos como el que nos atañe en este estudio, constituye un elemento ordenador de las relaciones sociales, pues “ si se dejase abierta la posibilidad de accionar en procura de derecho, sin respetar el cumplimiento de plazos y términos por el transcurso del tiempo, las relaciones entre las personas se tornarían inseguras, indefinidas, y cada cual podría reclamar “sine die ” por sus derechos, no importando lo sucedido en el pasado. Se daría una alteración mayúscula en el control para los propios obligados, porque nunca podrían tener por descargada una obligación como la de otorgar derechos no pedidos o simplemente no utilizados por el beneficiario, que tendría repercusiones sobre otros ámbitos de la actividad de las personas, como el costo de las operaciones (comerciales, industriales, etc.) y de los servicios en el mercado.” (Sentencia No. 2000-00878, citada) A mayor abundamiento, la citada doctrina ha señalado que, “en la prescripción, el eje de las reflexiones es el elemento subjetivo; en efecto, el eventual titular de un derecho no solicita el inicio del procedimiento de reconocimiento de un derecho a prestación de Seguridad Social. Por tanto, la prescripción encuentra su fundamento en la necesidad de poner fin a situaciones de incertidumbre en el ejercicio de los derechos, y en la presunción de abandono de los mismos por el titular, consecuencia directa de su inactividad. En la caducidad el elemento subjetivo mantiene un papel secundario, y lo relevante es el elemento objetivo de la ausencia de ejercicio del derecho a la mensualidad correspondiente. En este caso, el fundamento de la caducidad se halla en el intento de salvaguarda de un interés general y social, de carácter público, conectado directamente con la promoción de espacios de seguridad jurídica, al margen de consideraciones de orden subjetivo. En segundo lugar, y frente a la prescripción, que se ha de alegar a instancia de parte, (STA de 5 de octubre de 1994 ® 1994,7750), se ha de destacar el carácter automático de la caducidad, lo que hace que se deba apreciar de oficio. En efecto, se trata de una cuestión de orden público procesal, que opera ex lege , sin necesidad de ser alegada de parte (STS de 4 de mayo de 1984, ® 1984, 2956). ” ( véase , Cardenal Carro (MIGUEL), Palomar Olmeda (ALBERTO), Sempere Navarro (ANTONIO V.), Hierro Hierro (FRANCISCO JAVIER) Ibid , p. 117) De lo analizado hasta aquí, este Órgano Asesor concluye con toda propiedad, que el plazo estipulado en el artículo 55 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social no viene en modo alguno a infringir el derecho al acceso a la justicia jurisdiccional, al juez natural y a la cosa juzgada material . Todo lo contrario, tal instituto tiene su sustento en razones de seguridad y certeza jurídica y del resguardo del interés general sobre el derecho definido. En todo caso, válido es también resaltar en palabras de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, que mientras no se ejercite, por ejemplo, el derecho a las diversas hipótesis previstas en el artículo 61 de la citada Ley, rigen los términos de prescripción que allí se establecen; pero una vez que se ejerza ese derecho, rige inmediatamente y como artículo complementario lo establecido en el numeral supracitado , es decir el plazo de seis meses para que el interesado pueda impugnar ante los Tribunales de Justicia, aquellas resoluciones firmes de la Caja que supone no son acordes con sus intereses; o bien, puede el administrado impugnar en el mismo plazo las resoluciones derivadas de la aplicación de las leyes y reglamentos por parte del Servicio de Inspección o contra él. (Sentencia Número 08 de las 15:30 horas del 05 de enero de 1994) De esa forma considera este Órgano Asesor que el plazo de caducidad establecido en la norma en cuestión no es en sí misma, inconstitucional, siendo más bien suficiente para que el administrado o interesado pueda hacer valer su derecho o acción ante los tribunales de justicia a los efectos de impugnar las resoluciones firmes que dicte la Caja. Sin que con ello, implique el quebrantamiento del principio a la Seguridad Social que tutela el artículo 73 constitucional, o bien los Convenios de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, Números 102, (relativo éste a la Norma Mínima de Seguridad Social,- ratificado en nuestro ordenamiento, por la Ley Número 4737, de 29 de marzo de 1971) y el Convenio 130 (relativo a la asistencia médica y prestaciones, -ratificado mediante Ley Número 4737, de 29 de marzo de 1971), o algún otro instrumento de carácter internacional.

Finalmente, no está demás indicar, que si bien por disposición del artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y doctrina que le informa, la jurisprudencia y los precedentes de la jurisdicción constitucional son vinculantes erga omnes , ciertamente no lo es para esa honorable Sala. Sin embargo, y en virtud del fundamento expuesto a través de este análisis, es nuestro criterio, que contrario a lo dispuesto en la sentencia constitucional número 1995-5545 de las quince horas con tres minutos del once de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, el plazo de caducidad estipulado en la norma consultada por el Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial, no contraviene el Derecho de la Constitución.

IV.- CONCLUSIÓN:

Con fundamento en los artículos 73 de la Constitución Política, 61 y 55 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, así como la abundante jurisprudencia emanada de la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, y doctrina atinente, es criterio de este Órgano Asesor, que el plazo estipulado en el mencionado artículo 55, que expresa, “ El plazo para impugnar ante los tribunales las resoluciones firmes que dicte la Caja será de seis meses.”(Así reformado por el artículo 85 de la Ley No.7983 de 16 de de febrero del año 2000)” , no es contrario al Derecho de la Constitución.

4.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales.- Redacta el Magistrado Armijo Sancho; y,

Considerando:

I.- La presente consulta ha sido formulada de conformidad con el artículo 101 y siguientes de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y cumple los requisitos de admisibilidad previstos en la Ley.- II.- Conforme se ha descrito en los antecedentes, la duda sobre la constitucionalidad del artículo 55 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social radica en que, a pesar de existir una previa declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad del texto anterior de esa norma, anulado por sentencia número 5545 de 15:03 hrs. de 11 de octubre de 1995, que establecía un plazo un año para impugnar las resoluciones de la Caja, el texto vigente, según la reforma legislativa realizada en el año 2000, dispuso un plazo de seis meses al efecto.- III.- Aunque respetable, la Sala no comparte la opinión de la Procuraduría General de la República, a favor de la constitucionalidad de la norma consultada, expuesta literalmente en el “Resultando” segundo, con fundamento en argumentos de seguridad jurídica y de su consideración sobre los supuestos de aplicación de los términos previstos en los artículos 61 y 55 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja y los dos momentos trascendentales para el administrado, sea para hacer valer o reclamar el derecho a obtener una pensión por invalidez, en cuyo caso prescribe en dos años, o por muerte del beneficiario directo, que prescribe en diez, y el momento en el cual se puede ejercer el derecho para impugnar una resolución firme de la Caja desfavorable a los propios intereses, distinguiendo entre un término de prescripción, en el primer caso y de caducidad, en el segundo. La reforma operada en el artículo 55 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social entraña el mismo vicio de constitucionalidad declarado en la sentencia número 5545 de 15:03 hrs. de 11 de octubre de 1995, que constituye jurisprudencia vinculante, de conformidad con el artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, el cual dispone que “La jurisprudencia y los precedentes de la jurisdicción constitucional son vinculantes erga omnes, salvo para sí misma”. “Omnes” incluye, por supuesto, al legislador, que al reformar el artículo 55, contra lo dispuesto en una sentencia vinculante de esta Sala y agravando el vicio de constitucionalidad declarado por la Sala en 1995 también violó la Constitución.- IV.- Porque, en efecto, aquél término de un año previsto en el texto anteriormente anulado por la Sala, por contrario al principio de seguridad social (v. sentencia 5545- 95, Considerando II), resulta reducido a la mitad por la norma consultada, que no hace sino menoscabar en forma aún más grave, los derechos fundamentales de acceso a la justicia y de seguridad social; además, ese plazo de un año para impugnar judicialmente las resoluciones administrativas de la Caja resulta considerablemente menor que el previsto para los actos de otras administraciones (v. arts. 39 y 40 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), con lo cual, de mantenerse ese plazo, se consagraría una evidente desigualdad, en perjuicio de quienes son objeto de actos desfavorables por parte de la Caja y, tomando en consideración la índole de las resoluciones de esa institución, relativas al desempeño de sus cometidos sociales y vinculadas a derechos y beneficios sociales que la Constitución califica de irrenunciables (art. 74), resulta una afrenta al Derecho de la Constitución la limitación señalada. Por esto, la Sala reitera lo expresado en la sentencia número 5545 de 15:03 hrs. de 11 de octubre de 1995, en cuanto consideró que:

“el tema consultado refiere a que el artículo 55 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social número 17 de 22 de octubre de 1943, reformado por ley No.6914 de 28 de noviembre de 1983, no permite a los administrados ocurrir a los tribunales para que se les haga justicia, pues al fenecer el plazo contenido en él, precluye para siempre la posibilidad de acceso a la vía jurisdiccional. Al respecto, la Procuraduría General de la República señaló que el plazo de caducidad ahí establecido no resulta inconstitucional, pues tiene su fundamento en los valores de certeza y seguridad jurídica. Considera la Sala que el establecimiento de obstáculos por parte del legislador que impiden la posibilidad de impugnar ciertos actos por no haberse ejercido ese derecho dentro del plazo que establece la ley, efectivamente obedece a razones de seguridad jurídica, pues se quiso poner un límite para el ejercicio de aquel derecho. Sin embargo, dentro del sistema jurídico del Estado Social de Derecho debe permitirse que todos tengan oportunidad de acudir ante los tribunales de justicia demandando el amparo de un derecho lesionado o discutido, y que los jueces atiendan sus gestiones conforme lo dispone la ley. En la materia tratada, el fin primordial del constituyente fue mantener los seguros sociales para fortalecer la seguridad social, que es el sistema público de cobertura de necesidades sociales, individuales y de naturaleza económica desarrollado a partir de la acción histórica de la previsión social, y que ha llegado a convertirse en una de las señas de identidad del Estado social o de bienestar social (ver al respecto la resolución No.846-92 de las 13:30 horas del 27 de marzo de 1992). De manera que al impedirle al administrado discutir ante los tribunales de justicia las resoluciones de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social por la aplicación del Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte en sede jurisdiccional, se infringe el principio de seguridad social que el constituyente dispuso en la creación del seguro social y dentro de éste el régimen de Invalidez Vejez y Muerte”.- V.- Como la anulación del plazo actualmente previsto para la impugnación de las resoluciones administrativas firmes de la Caja conduce a un vacío legal, en cuanto al término de prescripción cuestionado y, con ello, a una situación de incertidumbre jurídica, es necesario aplicar lo previsto en el párrafo segundo del artículo 91 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional para esta clase de situaciones, el cual dispone que:

La sentencia constitucional de anulación podrá graduar y dimensionar en el espacio, el tiempo o la materia, su efecto retroactivo, y dictará las reglas necesarias para evitar que éste produzca graves dislocaciones de la seguridad, la justicia o la paz sociales.

En consecuencia, a fin de dictar una regla para evitar que la anulación que se dispone en esta sentencia produzca graves dislocaciones a la seguridad, se establece que el plazo máximo para incoar el proceso judicial contra las resoluciones de la Caja Costarricense de Seguridad Social será el mismo que disponga el ordenamiento jurídico como plazo de prescripción para el reclamo del respectivo derecho de fondo.-

Por tanto:

Se evacua la consulta en el sentido de que es inconstitucional, del artículo 55 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, la parte que dispone que “El plazo para impugnar ante los tribunales las resoluciones firmes que dicte la Caja será de seis meses”. En ejercicio de las potestades otorgadas a la Sala en el artículo 91 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, se dispone que el plazo máximo para incoar el proceso judicial contra las resoluciones de la Caja Costarricense de Seguridad Social será el mismo que disponga el ordenamiento jurídico como plazo de prescripción para el reclamo del respectivo derecho de fondo. Esta sentencia es declarativa y su efecto es retroactivo a la fecha de vigencia de la norma consultada. Publíquese esta sentencia íntegramente en el Boletín Judicial y reséñese en la Gaceta. Notifíquese al consultante, a la Asamblea Legislativa y al Presidente Ejecutivo de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.- Adrián Vargas B.

Presidente a.i.

Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Rosa María Abdelnour G.

Horacio González Q. Jorge Araya G.