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Res. 11155-2007 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 01/08/2007
OutcomeResultado
The Chamber annuls as unconstitutional the 2003 Management Plan for Gandoca-Manzanillo due to the Conservation Area Director's manifest lack of authority, but rejects the challenge to Decree 29019-MINAE.La Sala anula por inconstitucional el Plan de Manejo de Aplicación en el Refugio Gandoca-Manzanillo de 2003, por incompetencia manifiesta del Director del Área de Conservación, pero rechaza el cuestionamiento al Decreto 29019-MINAE.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber annuls the 2003 Management Plan Regulation for the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge as unconstitutional. The majority holds that the Director of the La Amistad Caribe Conservation Area lacked substantive authority to issue the plan; under the Biodiversity Law, that function belongs to the Regional Council (first instance) and the National Council of Conservation Areas (final approval), not the director. By issuing the plan, the official committed a manifest lack of competence that violates the principle prohibiting arbitrariness (Article 11 of the Constitution). The challenge to Decree 29019-MINAE, which had tacitly reduced the refuge by excluding urban zones, is rejected, because a later decree eliminated the exclusion, restoring the original boundaries without violating the principle of non-reduction. The court declines to address the other grievances (lack of environmental impact assessment, use permits and land-use changes, participation of private parties in administrative functions), deeming them matters of mere legality to be resolved in ordinary courts.La Sala Constitucional anula el Reglamento Plan de Manejo de Aplicación en el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo de 2003, por considerarlo inconstitucional. La mayoría concluye que el Director del Área de Conservación La Amistad Caribe carecía de competencia material para dictar dicho plan; conforme a la Ley de Biodiversidad, esa función corresponde al Consejo Regional (primera instancia) y al Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (definitiva), no al director. Al emitir el plan, el funcionario incurrió en una incompetencia manifiesta que vulnera el principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad (artículo 11 constitucional). En cambio, se rechaza el cuestionamiento sobre el Decreto 29019-MINAE, que había reducido tácitamente el refugio al excluir zonas urbanas, pues la pérdida de vigencia del artículo 6 del Decreto 16614-MAG mediante decreto posterior mantiene la extensión original del área protegida, sin violar el principio de irreductibilidad. La sentencia omite pronunciarse sobre los demás agravios (falta de evaluación de impacto ambiental, permisos de uso y cambios de suelo, participación de particulares en funciones administrativas), por considerarlos cuestiones de mera legalidad que deben ventilarse en la vía ordinaria.
Key excerptExtracto clave
In the present constitutional challenge it has been demonstrated that the person who issued the questioned Regulation was the Director of the La Amistad Caribe Conservation Area, Eng. Edwin Cyrus Cyrus, thereby violating the constitutional principle prohibiting arbitrariness (Article 11 of the Political Constitution), since he incurred in a manifest material lack of competence by enacting a component of the Management Plan for the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, given that, for the reasons indicated, such competence corresponds to the Regional Council, in the first instance, and, definitively, to the National Council of Conservation Areas.En la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad ha quedado demostrado que, quien dictó el Reglamento cuestionado fue el Director del Área de Conservación La Amistad Caribe, Ing. Edwin Cyrus Cyrus, con lo cual, se quebrantó el principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad constitucional (artículo 11 de la Constitución Política), toda vez que, incurrió en una incompetencia material manifiesta al dictar un componente del Plan de Manejo del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo, siendo que, en tal caso, por lo anteriormente señalado, tal competencia le corresponde al Consejo Regional, en primera instancia, y, en definitiva, al Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"Al Director del Área de Conservación no le corresponde dictar los planes de manejo o los componentes de éste, pues, a lo sumo, le compete proponerle al Consejo Regional políticas o lineamientos."
"The Director of the Conservation Area is not competent to issue management plans or their components, since at most he may propose policies or guidelines to the Regional Council."
Considerando VI
"Al Director del Área de Conservación no le corresponde dictar los planes de manejo o los componentes de éste, pues, a lo sumo, le compete proponerle al Consejo Regional políticas o lineamientos."
Considerando VI
"El quebranto de los límites señalados al dictarse un reglamento produce, irremisiblemente, una actuación arbitraria prohibida, carente de validez y eficacia, tanto a la luz del Derecho de la Constitución como del ordenamiento jurídico infraconstitucional."
"The breach of the indicated limits when issuing a regulation inevitably produces a prohibited arbitrary action, devoid of validity and effectiveness, both under Constitutional Law and under the sub-constitutional legal order."
Considerando V
"El quebranto de los límites señalados al dictarse un reglamento produce, irremisiblemente, una actuación arbitraria prohibida, carente de validez y eficacia, tanto a la luz del Derecho de la Constitución como del ordenamiento jurídico infraconstitucional."
Considerando V
"La Ley de Biodiversidad creó el Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (SINAC), siendo que el artículo 22, párrafo 1°, le impone dentro de sus fines primordiales “planificar” los procesos dirigidos a lograr la sostenibilidad en el manejo de los recursos naturales."
"The Biodiversity Law created the National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC); Article 22, paragraph 1, imposes upon it the primary goal of “planning” the processes aimed at achieving sustainability in natural resource management."
Considerando VI
"La Ley de Biodiversidad creó el Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (SINAC), siendo que el artículo 22, párrafo 1°, le impone dentro de sus fines primordiales “planificar” los procesos dirigidos a lograr la sostenibilidad en el manejo de los recursos naturales."
Considerando VI
Full documentDocumento completo
SENTENCE WITH DISSENTING VOTE Relevance Indicators Relevant sentence Related Sentences Sentence with protected data, in accordance with current regulations Content of Interest:
Type of content: Majority vote Branch of Law: 2. PRINCIPLES WITH JURISPRUDENCE Topic: Prohibition of arbitrariness Subtopics:
NOT APPLICABLE.
Principle of prohibition of arbitrariness and exercise of regulatory power. The principle of prohibition of arbitrariness entails the ban on arbitrariness, that is, on any distinction lacking a sufficient and just reason. The principle of prohibition of arbitrariness is not contained within the principle of equality before the law; arbitrariness is synonymous with manifest injustice, and injustice is not limited to discrimination. Arbitrary action is that which is contrary to justice, reason, or the laws, which obeys the mere whim or will of the public agent. The prohibition of arbitrariness condemns the lack of objective legal basis or foundation for an administrative conduct and, consequently, the violation of the material order of principles and values inherent to the Rule of Law. In essence, the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness has operated as a powerful corrective against abusive and discriminatory actions by public administrations when exercising discretionary powers (abuse or excess of discretion). Regarding the application of the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness within the scope of regulatory power, it must be noted that, since this power is naturally discretionary, the prohibitive principle of arbitrariness plays a role of the highest order. Sentence 11155-07 ... See more Content of Interest:
Type of content: Majority vote Branch of Law: 3. MATTERS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY CONTROL Topic: ENVIRONMENT Subtopics:
NOT APPLICABLE.
11155-07. THE MANAGEMENT PLAN OF THE GANDOCA MANZANILLO WILDLIFE REFUGE IS ANNULLED. Regulation called Management Plan for application in the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge (Plan de manejo de aplicación en el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo) of May 21, 2003, published in La Gaceta No. 114 of June 16, 2003, and Decree No. 29019-MINAE, called Regulation for the participatory management of natural resources in the Gandoca Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge, Gandoca sector (Reglamento para el manejo participativo de los recursos naturales en el Refugio de Vida Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo, sector Gandoca) of September 19, 2000, published in La Gaceta No. 208 of October 31, 2000.
* 050069790007CO * * 050069790007CO * Vote No. 11155-2007 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fourteen forty-nine on August 1, two thousand seven.
Action of unconstitutionality filed by ROBERTO MOLINA UGALDE, of legal age, married, bearer of identity card No. 5-195-151, in his capacity as General Secretary of the Trade Union Association of Workers of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Asociación Sindical de Trabajadores del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía), against the Regulation called Management Plan for application in the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge (Plan de manejo de aplicación en el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo) of May 21, 2003, published in La Gaceta No. 114 of June 16, 2003, and Decree No. 29019-MINAE, called Regulation for the participatory management of natural resources in the Gandoca Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge, Gandoca sector (Reglamento para el manejo participativo de los recursos naturales en el Refugio de Vida Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo, sector Gandoca) of September 19, 2000, published in La Gaceta No. 208 of October 31, 2000. Also intervening in the action are THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE OF THE REPUBLIC (PROCURADURIA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA) and CARLOS MANUEL RODRÍGUEZ ECHANDI, MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY (MINISTRO DE AMBIENTE Y ENERGÍA).
Whereas:
1220-02, annulled the previous amendment, since the cited Decree exempted, a priori, certain activities or works that presented specific characteristics from the EIA. It added that, in accordance with Article 21, subsection e), of Decree No. 25705-MINAE, productive or infrastructure development in Wildlife Refuges required the submission of an EIA. Likewise, said study was required for activities carried out on private property lands within protected wilderness areas, the maritime-terrestrial zone, the restricted-use area for tourism suitability, areas with forest land-use capacity, and where a land-use change (cambio de uso de la tierra) was intended (Article 22). It noted that Article 82 of the Wildlife Conservation Law subjects the “(…) development activities or projects and exploitation of natural resources (…)” within National Wildlife Refuges, whether mixed or private property, to “(…) criteria of strict sustainability in the protection of natural resources and shall be analyzed through the submission of an impact assessment of the action to be developed, following the technical-scientific methodology applied in this regard (…)”.
By reason of the foregoing, it stated that, in the absence of an express rule, and even with Article 19, subsection d), of Decree 25705-MINAE in force, an EIA could only be required for the Management Plan of the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge as of its publication date through an extensive, pro natura interpretation. In coastal National Wildlife Refuges that encompass the maritime-terrestrial zone, the Management Plan substitutes the Regulatory Plan in the coastal sector and entails a zoning of uses that are potentially impactful to the environment. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it stated that the interpretation is controversial because it goes against the exhaustive list of acts then subject to environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA), as it is a procedural requirement, and because it would have retroactive effect. The Constitutional Court, in Vote No. 10421-03, highlighted “(…) the obligation to have an environmental impact study to carry out activities or projects that by their nature may alter or contaminate the environment (…)”.
Regarding permits, land-use changes (cambios de uso), and functional innovations, it explained that the plaintiff's allegations concern the following points of interest: a) National Wildlife Refuges fall within the concept of equivalent reserves and are not governed by the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law, but by environmental legislation, i.e., the Wildlife Law, Forestry Law, Organic Environmental Law, and International Treaties, etc.; b) the forests and forest lands located in the inalienable areas of the maritime-terrestrial zone, among them the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, are integral assets of the State's Natural Heritage, subject to the Forestry Law. (A large part of the aforementioned Refuge is comprised of wetlands declared a RAMSAR site and mangroves); c) permits for the use of public domain are precarious in nature, for mobile infrastructure, and must conform to Articles 18 of the Forestry Law, 11, Transitory Provision I, paragraph 1, of its Regulations, and 39 of the Biodiversity Law; provisions that cannot vary or override the Management Plan of the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, a regulation, or an administrative resolution.
The activities offered to visitors must be consistent with the protected area, with minimal infrastructure and harmonious with the conservation objectives. The challenged Regulation authorizes different activities that endanger the integrity of the flora, fauna, wetlands, ecosystems, and disturb the environmental balance. The Refuge in question operates as mixed, because alongside state property there is private property (eighty-five percent), which has a different regime than that outside this area; d) the publication of the Regulation to the Management Plan zones the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge into 15 zones (9 terrestrial and 6 marine-coastal), divided into subzones and classifying them as recommended use, recommended use with conditions, and not permitted. According to the zoning, construction, remodeling, or expansion of different types of buildings is permitted: commercial, state, hotel, fishing, agriculture, etc.; e) the Zonal Committee, supported by Decree No. 25595-MINAE and the Regulation being challenged, is granting land-use changes (cambios de uso del suelo) and making decisions that seriously affect the environment.
The Report of the Federated College of Engineers and Architects No. JLS-0788-1-04 of October 13, 2004, determined non-compliance with construction requirements in the Manzanillo zone; f) the challenged Regulation permits the land-use change (cambio de uso del suelo) prohibited by the Forestry Law. Since its publication, permits authorizing it have been granted, which have led to the felling of trees. It also permits urbanization of fifteen percent of the terrestrial area of the Refuge and the coastal plain of greatest ecological wealth, between Cocles, Manzanillo, and part of Punta Mona, with high population density, without protecting the flora and fauna. The Regulation to this Management Plan signifies the destruction of the last coastal forests in the maritime-terrestrial zone of the Refuge. The Office of the Ombudsman, in Report No. 07520-2004-DHR of August 12, 2004, upon a complaint by a Conservationist Association, verified the destruction of temporary wetlands in the Refuge, rich in flora and fauna, and recommended that MINAE revoke a land-use change authorization, rule on the environmental damages caused, and initiate a procedure to evaluate the performance of MINAE officials who assessed, endorsed, or approved the Management Plan.
On the other hand, and regarding the Coastal State Natural Heritage, it pointed out that, in accordance with Article 73 of Law No. 6043, national parks and equivalent reserves are excluded from its application, and are governed by their respective legislation. It indicated that, according to Opinion No. C-174-87, the term "equivalent reserves" encompasses all state-protected wilderness areas, subject to management plans that ensure adequate protection, conservation, and rational use of natural resources for sustainable development. It explained that the legislator intended to institute mutually exclusive regimes between the ordinary maritime-terrestrial zone of Law No. 6043 and the categories that make up the State Natural Heritage. The foregoing, in view of the dissimilar purposes to be achieved with the designation of state wilderness areas and the criteria required for their administration.
Currently, protected wilderness areas of the State Natural Heritage, in addition to national wildlife refuges, include national parks, biological reserves, forest reserves, protective zones, natural monuments, and wetlands. Also, the forests and forest lands of the maritime-terrestrial zone comprise the State Natural Heritage regulated by the Forestry Law. Likewise, the wetlands of the Gandoca-Manzanillo Refuge are part of the list of wetlands of international importance. It indicated that mangroves are currently public domain protected areas, integral parts of the State Natural Heritage since that classification, and are under the administration of MINAE, through the National System of Protected Areas and their respective regional Conservation Areas. Under such arguments, it stated that, in sum, the State Natural Heritage is composed of protected wilderness areas, forests, and lands of forestry suitability described in Article 13 of the Forestry Law, which hold public domain status by immediate designation of the legislator.
Regarding use permits (permisos de uso), it explained that their object is focused on those activities in which, without requiring fixed constructions or works, special circumstances of intensity or profitability concur, implying an occupation with removable installations, which generate a situation for the permit holder of little solidity, precarious and revocable for reasons of public opportunity or convenience, without liability for the Administration, short-term, and which may be subject to the payment of a fee, according to Article 154 of the General Public Administration Law. For its part, it mentioned that, unlike use permits, a concession is defined as that title by which the granting Administration enables a private party (individual or legal entity) to carry out, for their own benefit and that of the community, a privative or exclusive use of a parcel of public domain. The foregoing, for developments that involve the execution of permanent works or buildings of a certain magnitude.
Likewise, the latter entails a more intense use and greater stability than an authorization (use permit) allows, conferring upon the holder a new right, of an administrative real nature, for the use and enjoyment of the asset, under the conditions stipulated by law and in the granting act and the respective contract. However, it argued that the definition of use permit contained in the Regulations to the Forestry Law, Article 2, is incomplete and inadequate, when providing the following: “(…) Use permit: Authorizations for the use of parts of state-owned lands, for purposes that do not entail forest exploitation (…)”. It added that there is a series of rules that allude to use permits in the State's natural heritage. In this way, it pointed out that the Forestry Law prohibits the felling or exploitation of forests in state wilderness areas and only authorizes research, training, and ecotourism activities within the State Natural Heritage “(…) once approved by the Ministry of Environment and Energy, which will define, when appropriate, the conducting of environmental impact assessments, as established by the regulations to this law” (Articles 1 in fine and 18).
The original wording of Transitory Provision I of the Forestry Law (1996) provided that: "Permits, concessions, and contracts protected under the repealed legislation shall remain in force until their expiration." Likewise, the rule that reformed the previous precept (Law No. 7761 of April 24, 1998) maintained that text and added a second paragraph, which reads: “(…) However, in the maritime-terrestrial zone and mangroves, the State Forestry Administration shall extend the permits, concessions, and contracts protected under prior legislation, provided that by virtue thereof investments in infrastructure have been made and they comply with the environmental requirements for such effect (…)”. For its part, it noted that Decree No. 29342-MINAE of February 6, 2001, restricts the renewal of existing use permits in mangrove areas to those related to salt and shrimp production, under a Management Plan and compliance with specific requirements.
It added that the Regulations to the Forestry Law, Article 11, paragraph 4, provides that: “(…) Use permits granted under Law 4465 and its amendments shall remain in force until their expiration (…)”. Paragraph 1 of this same article conditions the use permits of the State Natural Heritage to “(…) those projects that do not require forest exploitation and do not affect ecosystems, wildlife, wetlands, and systems, except for activities expressly permitted by Law 6084 on National Parks and Law 7317 on Wildlife. Additional exceptions shall only be permitted in the public interest and subject to an environmental impact study and compliance with its recommendations (…)”. In its paragraph 2, it limited the research and ecotourism activities contemplated in numeral 18 of the Law, when it involved lodging within areas of the State Natural Heritage, to “(…) rustic structures, in accordance with the surroundings, oriented mainly to lodging for researchers and secondarily tourists (…)”.
Finally, the Biodiversity Law, in its numeral 39, authorizes, within state-protected wilderness areas, concessions and non-essential services, which “(…) in no case may include the authorization of access to biodiversity elements for third parties, nor the construction of private buildings (…)”. Regarding the unconstitutionality defects of the Regulation to the Wildlife Conservation Law, it explained, in the first instance, that in state-owned national wildlife refuges, the areas declared as such belong entirely to the State, and in Mixed Property ones, part belongs to the State and others are private property. By virtue of the foregoing, the administration of the former corresponds exclusively to SINAC, through the regional Conservation Area, and in Mixed Property ones, the administration is shared between this state body and the private owners. It stated that the state lands (of mixed property) that form part of the National Wildlife Refuges are public domain, integral parts of the State Natural Heritage, and their use is conditioned by the Forestry Law, Article 18, in concordance with Article 39 of the Biodiversity Law.
The administration by MINAE in that sector is exclusive. By virtue of the foregoing, it argued that the so-called "shared administration" consists of private parties administering the lands belonging to them, with the legal limitations and controls that the regime entails. However, it alleged that the Regulation to the Wildlife Conservation Law opposes these norms and, especially, Article 18 of the Forestry Law, for the following reasons: a) Article 81 authorizes different uses in Mixed Property Refuges: tourist developments of all types, extraction of quarry materials, and other activities, without distinguishing between state public domain and private spaces; b) numeral 83 allows use permits in the restricted zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone and in mixed property refuges; c) Article 82 even authorizes "memoranda of understanding" as a legal figure for use; d) precept 89 details, as activities typical of use permits, agricultural and livestock uses, housing for tourism on a commercial and recreational scale, industrial, mining, or extractive use, commercial use (restaurants, shops, and others), tourist projects, etc.; e) numeral 84 and following establish the requirements for use permits; f) Articles 91 and 94 empower the indiscriminate renewal of use permits, without considering the exceptional granting of Transitory Provision I of the Forestry Law.
Precept 91 confuses two mutually exclusive planning instruments for the coastal zone: the regulatory plans under the purview of Law No. 6043 and the Management Plans inherent to National Wildlife Refuges. For its part, Article 94 alludes to different categories of use on a land area. Under this understanding, it considered that it is appropriate for the Constitutional Chamber to weigh the unconstitutionality of these norms, for connectedness, insofar as they distort the nature of use permits, due to the type of works and activities they authorize, are environmentally unprotective, and do not discriminate, in Mixed Property Refuges, the uses permitted in the public domain area and private property area, conflicting with the Forestry Law (Articles 18 and Transitory Provision I) and numeral 39 of the Biodiversity Law. On the other hand, and regarding the use permits (permisos de uso) and changes of use (cambios de uso) in the Management Plan of the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, it specifically pointed out the following apparent constitutional conflicts:
29019-MINAE, called the Regulation for participatory management of natural resources in the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, was specifically repealed through Article 8 of Executive Decree No. 23069-MIRENEM, whereby Article 6 of Executive Decree No. 16614-MAG came back into force. Consequently, it considered that the reduction of the area of the Refuge in question caused environmental damage to the existing biodiversity, since it violated Article 38 of the Organic Environmental Law, which establishes that the surface area of such areas can only be reduced by law, after conducting the technical studies that justify the measure. By virtue of the foregoing, it noted that, indeed, by Executive Decree No. 25595-MINAE of October 11, 1996, the Advisory Committee of the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge was created; the latter, which carries out its functions with the joint participation of the civil society of the area, who contributed to the zoning of the Management Plan, in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 of the Organic Environmental Law.
It argued that any participation and function of the Committee has contributed effectively to the advancement of the procedure for the publication of the Decree, which clarifies and confirms both the Management Plan and its Regulation, thereby complying with the provisions of subsection 18) of Article 140 of the Political Constitution. It stated that, although there is a regulation for the different activities that can be carried out within the Refuge, the truth is that the Local Committee is the one that recommends to the Administration, based on a technical inspection report carried out by MINAE officials, whether or not it is advisable to grant the permit, with the Administration being the one that issues, through an administrative resolution, the authorization or approval thereof. By virtue of the foregoing, it indicated that said Committee simply recommends approving or not a permit, while the Administration is the one that, through an administrative act (administrative resolution), approves or revokes it as the case may be.
It explained, then, that the Committee is simply a guide for administrative actions. Likewise, it pointed out that, nevertheless, the administrative resolution does not imply construction permits, so the individual must carry out the pertinent procedures before the corresponding bodies, for example, before SETENA. Although there are areas with wetland characteristics, many do not necessarily imply, technically, being a wetland, since these must be declared in this category via executive decree. It added that the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, especially as Waterfowl Habitat (RAMSAR), has determined and classified the wetlands in the national territory, pointing out, in turn, the urgent need for such areas to have a Management Plan for their planning. It explained that the activities carried out in those areas with wetland characteristics are controlled by the Administration of MINAE, which may impose limitations on the use of resources within the zone, so ecosystems may not be damaged.
The foregoing is so because, otherwise, an environmental impact assessment would be required. It noted that the legal nature of the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge is of a mixed type; that is, it is comprised of State property and private property, in such a way that the former has the power and the duty to ensure the conservation and protection of natural resources through a healthy environment and sustainable development. However, it argued that legally established private owners have the right to exercise their attributes of ownership and transfer their properties, since there is no regulation prohibiting it, so they have the enjoyment, use, and transformation of the property, except for what the law prohibits. It stated that the recommendations given by the Ombudsman's Office (Defensoría de los Habitantes) have been complied with by both the Director of the La Amistad Caribe Conservation Area and by this Ministry, with the objective of ensuring the conservation and protection of natural resources.
Likewise, it noted that, in accordance with official communication No. ACLAC-AL-15-2005 of January 13, 2005, it was clarified before SETENA that the Management Plan includes a participatory analysis of technical criteria put forward by different institutions, which evaluated its preparation and execution, together with the application of the Environmental Management Plan. It considered that the Management Plan is simply a territorial and environmental planning tool that establishes minimum and maximum impact parameters for those activities that humans intend to carry out. In that sense, it argued that no regulatory plan in the country includes environmental impact assessments, since, as a framework planning tool, it does not require that requirement. The latter requirement, which specific activities that individuals intend to develop must indeed have, such as construction of hotels, housing, forest harvesting (aprovechamientos forestales) and, in some cases, even research.
By virtue of such considerations, it affirmed that the preparation and execution of the Management Plan did not violate current environmental legal regulations, nor does it require an environmental impact assessment (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental) for its validity and effectiveness. Regarding the provisions of Article 73 of Law No. 6043, it argued that it is necessary to consider the content and legal effect entailed by what is contemplated in said article, given that the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) itself has reiterated this in several pronouncements and directives. Thus, in Opinion No. C-174-87, it ruled as relevant, the following: "(....) Although technically the expression ‘equivalent reserves’ has been given more restricted connotations, in our legal system, and specifically in the Law on the Maritime Terrestrial Zone, it has been used to allude to all protected wild areas, together with the national parks that make up the forest heritage of the State: biological reserves, protective zones, forest reserves, and national wildlife refuges, which are of an inalienable and unseizable nature, are subject to specific public management plans that guarantee the adequate protection, conservation, and rational use of resources, for sustained development.
(…)" It indicated that, in strict adherence to the legislation and the guidelines set forth by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, the Forest Administration and MINAE have carried out, executed, managed, and controlled the actions and activities performed within the maritime terrestrial zone comprised in the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, whether they be use permits (permisos de uso), tree cutting permits (permisos de corta de árboles), plan approvals (visado de planos), construction, etc. The foregoing, since these latter actions and activities are governed by the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) and other related laws. The application of the Management Plan contributes to the control and protection of natural resources through sustainable development, where both the visitor and those who live in the area have environmental and legal technical parameters to act within the Refuge.
However, it noted that, beforehand, a series of procedures must be carried out, including the presentation of documents by the interested party, the performance of technical inspections by MINAE officials, the assessment and recommendation by the Advisory Committee, appointed and empowered by the Executive Decree to execute the Management Plan within the Refuge, and the final act through an administrative resolution that supports the legality and approval to carry out the activity. Likewise, it pointed out that, in cases where some type of irregularity has been aired in the zone, whether inside or outside the area of the maritime terrestrial zone comprised in the Refuge, the Forest Administration has ensured and sought to carry out the pertinent procedures before the Environmental Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo) or the corresponding prosecutor's office, through a complaint that sanctions the environmental damage caused and the violation of environmental legislation.
It added that it is the National Council of Conservation Areas (Consejo Nacional de las Áreas de Conservación) which is responsible for granting concessions or contracts to authorize the provision of non-essential services. However, it explained that non-essential activities, be they circulation of roads and trails, marches on foot, picnics, camping, snorkeling, as well as excessive influx, noises, movements, and organic and inorganic waste, are regulated, controlled, and supervised by the officials of each zone, in this case, that of Manzanillo. It indicated that, even though excessive influx, movement, or noise that may occur at certain times of the year cannot be eliminated, at least they can be controlled, since, in high season, patrolling by MINAE officials, support from the COVINERAS, guides, and members of the public force is reinforced. The foregoing, in the conservation of flora and fauna, as well as in the circulation of traffic and the entry of visitors to the Manzanillo area.
It affirmed that any type of non-essential activity must comply with the established legal guidelines and the respective technical assessment for its approval. Under such a set of considerations, it requested that the unconstitutionality action be rejected with respect to the Regulation of the Management Plan applied to the Refuge, since, in its opinion, the actions taken by the Ministry and its respective Conservation Area have been in accordance with the law.
Drafted by Magistrate Jinesta Lobo; and,
Considering:
According to Article 75, paragraph 2, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the prior pending case will not be necessary when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the defense of diffuse interests that concern the community as a whole. On this matter, this Constitutional Court, in Ruling No. 8239-01 of 16:07 hrs. on August 14, 2001, referred to diffuse interests in the following terms:
"(…) According to the first of the cases provided for by paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the questioned norm must not be susceptible to concrete application, which would later allow the challenge of the application act and its consequent use as a base matter. (...) Secondly, the possibility to appeal in defense of diffuse interests is provided for (...) Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our law – as this Chamber has already stated – merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that against them, determined persons, or personalized groups are identified or easily identifiable, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate interests that concern a community as a whole. It deals, then, with individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive an injury, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, so it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them.
That is, diffuse interests share a dual nature, since they are at once collective – because they are common to a generality – and individual, for which reason they can be claimed in such a character. (...) In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of persons not formally organized, but united based on a certain social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a certain personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. (…)" In the present case, the plaintiff claims standing via abstract constitutionality control and invokes the protection of diffuse interests, since he appeals in defense of the environment. Such circumstances constitute, in favor of the petitioner, sufficient direct standing for the filing of this unconstitutionality action.
The petitioner questions the constitutionality of the Regulation called Management Plan for application in the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge of May 21, 2003, and of Decree No. 29019-MINAE, Regulation for participatory management of natural resources in the Gandoca Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge, Gandoca sector, of September 19, 2000, considering that they present, concretely, the following defects of unconstitutionality: a) Violation of the principle of lifetime tenure (irreductibilidad) enshrined in constitutional numeral 50, 3 of the Convention for the Protection of the Flora, Fauna, and Natural Scenic Beauties of the American Countries, and 38 of the Organic Environmental Law, since numeral 8 of Executive Decree No. 29019-MINAE repealed Decree No. 23069-MIRENEM, which, in turn, had expanded the area comprised within the Refuge, including, for such purposes, the urban zone of Manzanillo; b) breach of numerals 130, 140, subsections 3) and 18) of the Political Constitution, given that the Regulation Management Plan for application in the Gandoca-Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge, Gandoca sector, in addition to being configured as a regulation of a general nature issued, incorrectly, by the Director of the La Amistad Caribe Conservation Area and not by the Minister and President of the Republic, was enacted without following the procedures that the General Public Administration Law stipulates for this purpose in its numerals 25, 27, subsection 1), 28, subsection b), 121, 128, 129, 240, subsection 1), and 241, for the approval and publication of this type of norms; c) violation of the principle enshrined in precept 50 of the Political Constitution, for the following reasons: c.1.) the Management Plan for Application in the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge omitted, prior to its approval, to undergo an environmental impact assessment.
The foregoing, since the cited refuge is not governed by what the Law on the Maritime Terrestrial Zone establishes, but by the rest of the environmental legislation; c.2.) the cited management plan allows new permits or land-use changes (cambios de uso de suelo) within the zone that seriously affect the environment; c.3.) the plan under study authorizes the development on the site of a series of activities that disturb the environmental balance.
In this unconstitutionality action, the complete text of the Regulation called Management Plan for application in the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge of May 21, 2003, published in La Gaceta No. 114 of June 16, 2003, and Article 8 of Decree No. 29019-MINAE, called Regulation for participatory management of natural resources in the Gandoca Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge, Gandoca sector of September 19, 2000, published in La Gaceta No. 208 of October 31, 2000, are challenged.
29019 OF SEPTEMBER 19, 2000. REGULATION FOR PARTICIPATORY MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE WILDLIFE REFUGE, GANDOCA MANZANILLO, GANDOCA SECTOR. In the first place, the plaintiff accuses that numeral 8 of Executive Decree No. 29019-MINAE infringes the environmental principle of lifetime tenure enshrined in constitutional numeral 50, 3 of the Convention for the Protection of the Flora, Fauna, and Natural Scenic Beauties of the American Countries, and 38 of the Organic Environmental Law, given that it repeals Executive Decree No. 23069-MIRENEM, which, in turn, had expanded the area comprised within the Refuge, including, for such purposes, the urban zone of Manzanillo. On this matter, it is worth noting that, in a case raised in similar terms, this Constitutional Court, in Ruling No. 5975-06 of 15:14 hrs. on May 3, 2006, ruled, as relevant, the following:
"(…) VII.- On the increase and reduction of protected wild areas. In the brief filing the unconstitutionality action, the plaintiff challenges – and points it out as a ground for unconstitutionality – the repeal of Decree 23069-MIRENEM by Decree 29019-MINAE because it tacitly reduced the extension of the Gandoca-Manzanillo Wildlife Refuge, given that the latter had expanded the limits of the Refuge. Analyzing the enacted decrees related to the Gandoca-Manzanillo Refuge, one observes how the Executive Branch has issued several in an effort to regulate its situation. In order to clarify the current situation, it is convenient to recount those related to the object of this action. We have, in the first place, DE-16614-MAG of October 29, 1985, which creates the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge (REGAMA). The legal basis of the decree is concretely in Article 2 of Law No. 4465, but especially in Article 18 of Law No. 6919, Wildlife Conservation Law, now repealed, but which at that time provided: ‘Article 18.- National wildlife refuges are those that the Executive Branch declares as such, for the protection and research of wild flora and fauna, especially those in danger of extinction.
The Executive Branch is authorized to establish, within forest reserves and on private lands, areas under the classification of national wildlife refuges, which, for purposes of wildlife conservation, will fall under the administration of the Wildlife Department of the General Forestry Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. (…)’" "The Article 6 of Decree 16614-MAG expressly excluded from that refuge the urban zone of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo. Subsequently, DE-23069-MIRENEM of April 5, 1994, was issued; Article 16 of that Decree repealed Art. 6 of DE-16614. The immediate consequence thereof is that the urban areas of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo became part of the Gandoca-Manzanillo Refuge. Later, Decree DE-29019-MINAE of October 31, 2000, was enacted, which, through Article 8, repealed Decree 23069-MIRENEM; with this, Article 6 of DE-16614 tacitly regained validity.
At that moment, a tacit reduction of the territory of the reserve occurs by again excluding the urban areas of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo, which left things in the situation in which Decree No. 16614-MAG would have placed them.
However, subsequently the Executive Branch issued DE-32753-MINAE of May 16, 2005, which expressly repealed Article 6 of DE-16614; once again, the urban zones of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo became part of the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo), a situation that continues to this day.
Regarding the increase and/or decrease of the territorial boundaries of the forest patrimony (patrimonio forestal), this Court, in judgment No. 1999-5399 of 4:39 p.m. on October 26, 1993, in which the Chamber stated:
"…if the Executive Branch is empowered to establish the boundaries of its forest patrimony, it shall do so through the regulatory pathway and not the legal one, with the due indemnification of the properties over which the forest patrimony is extended, since by virtue of Article 9 of the Constitution and the theory of the separation of Powers, the Legislative Assembly is the only constitutional body empowered to issue laws. Therefore, when dealing with a public domain asset (bien demanial), it is illogical to think that the State is limited or unable to act in safeguarding the flora and fauna of our lands.
II.In this line of thought, since this action is directed against an executive decree that expanded the boundaries of a national park—Isla del Coco—extending them to a distance of fifteen kilometers out to sea, measured from the low-tide line of the coast, it is important to determine that it did so in the full exercise of its powers, both legal and constitutional, as it concerns a public domain asset. (…)
V.In relation to the alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of the Flora, Fauna, and Natural Scenic Beauties of the Countries of America—approved by Law No. 3763 of October first, nineteen sixty-six—in relation to Article 7 of the Constitution, which, where relevant, reads as follows:
'The Contracting Governments agree that the boundaries of national parks shall not be altered, nor any part thereof alienated, except by action of the competent legislative authority. The resources existing therein shall not be exploited for commercial purposes.
The Contracting Governments agree to prohibit the hunting, killing, and capture of specimens of fauna and the destruction and collection of specimens of flora in national parks, except when done by the park authorities or by order or under their supervision, or for duly authorized scientific investigations.' These norms must be interpreted in a restrictive sense, such that the requirement to establish the boundaries of national parks through a law applies only when it is to their detriment, that is, when their extent is to be reduced, and not when the boundaries of the protective zones of the State's forest patrimony are to be extended. This article must be read in conjunction with Article 40 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), which states:
'The area of forest reserves (reservas forestales), protective zones (zonas protectoras), national parks, wildlife refuges, biological reserves of the forest patrimony, may only be reduced by a law of the Republic, following the corresponding technical studies that justify this measure.' And this is so by virtue of the fact that the legally protected interest is the 'forest resource' (recurso forestal), a term that 'means the protection and preservation of the integrity of the natural environment' (resolution of the Constitutional Chamber number 2233-93, at nine thirty-six a.m. on May twenty-eighth) that exists in the zone declared a national park, and which is recognized by international legislation, by the special laws enacted for that purpose, and by the texts of the political charters. In this sense, Article 69 of the Political Constitution speaks of 'rational exploitation of the land,' constituting a fundamental principle its protection (…).” (the bold is not from the original) It is evident, then, that the Executive Branch cannot reduce the territorial boundaries of a wilderness area (área silvestre), but it can extend them.
Hence, the Decrees whose repeal or entry into force produced as an immediate consequence the increase of the territory of a specific protected area are constitutional. (…) although Decree DE-29019-MINAE of October 31, 2000, repealed Decree 23069-MIRENEM, and in doing so excluded the urban areas of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo from the REGAMA (thereby producing a tacit reduction of the territory of the REGAMA), subsequently the Executive Branch issued DE-32753-MINAE of May 16, 2005, which repealed Article 6 of Decree 16614-MAG. In doing so, the territory of the reserve returned to its original situation. This is not only constitutional but also in accordance with the jurisprudence of this Court on the matter. By virtue of the foregoing, and in accordance with Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), the appropriate course is to reject the action. (…) (The highlighted text is not part of the original).
Consequently, it must be taken into consideration, as previously noted, that Article 6 of Decree No. 16614-MAG of July 1, 1985, which created the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, expressly excluded from said refuge the urban zone of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo, by providing the following: “The areas that, according to the studies conducted by the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism (INVU), are comprised within the urban zones of Gandoca, Manzanillo, and Puerto Viejo, shall not be subject to the regulations of this Decree.” Subsequently, this latter decree was repealed through provision 16 of Decree No. 23069-MIRENEM of March 21, 1994, which declared restricted access to the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, whereupon the urban areas of Gandoca-Manzanillo became part of the Refuge under study. Later, the questioned Decree No. 29019-MINAE of September 19, 2000, was issued, which, through Article 8, repealed the previous Decree, that is, Decree No. 23069-MIRENEM, and, consequently, Article 6 of Decree No. 16614-MAG regained effect and the territory of the cited reserve was reduced again.
Notwithstanding the above, through Article 2 of Executive Decree No. 32753-MINAE of May 16, 2005, currently in effect, the repeal of Article 6 of Decree No. 16614-MAG was ordered. Hence, the aforementioned urban zones once again became part of the refuge under study. Under this order of considerations, and since there is no reason whatsoever to vary the criterion expressed in the partially transcribed Vote, nor any reasons of public interest that justify reconsidering the matter, this Court does not find that, in this instance, Decree No. 29019-MINAE violates the principle of lifetime tenure (irreductibilidad) as alleged.
V.PRINCIPLE OF THE PROHIBITION OF ARBITRARINESS (PRINCIPIO DE INTERDICCIÓN DE LA ARBITRARIEDAD) AND EXERCISE OF THE REGULATORY POWER (POTESTAD REGLAMENTARIA). The principle of the prohibition of arbitrariness was conceived by the German jurist Leibholz in 1928 as a criterion for weighing the respect for the principle of equality by the legislator. According to this formulation, the principle of the prohibition of arbitrariness entails the prohibition of arbitrariness, that is, of any differentiation lacking a sufficient and just reason. The principle was taken up by Spanish doctrine, specifically by García de Enterría in the late 1950s (1959), with a broader meaning—not limited to the principle of equality—than that proposed by Leibholz. Subsequently, the principle with this broader meaning was adopted by the Spanish Constitution of 1978 in its Article 9.3, on the proposal of Senator Lorenzo Martín-Retortillo, who justified his initiative on the need to have the principle of the prohibition of arbitrariness as another technique or mechanism for controlling or supervising public powers inherent to the Rule of Law (Estado de Derecho).
Consequently, the principle of the prohibition of arbitrariness is not contained within the principle of equality before the law, because the breach of the latter is certainly one instance of arbitrariness, but not the only one. Arbitrariness is synonymous with manifest injustice, and injustice is not limited to discrimination. An arbitrary action is one contrary to justice, reason, or the laws, which obeys the mere whim or will of the public agent. The prohibition of arbitrariness condemns the lack of objective legal basis or foundation for an administrative conduct and, consequently, the violation of the material order of principles and values characteristic of the Rule of Law. In essence, the principle of the prohibition of arbitrariness has operated as a powerful corrective against abusive and discriminatory actions by public administrations when exercising discretionary powers (potestades discrecionales) (abuse or excess of discretion).
Regarding the application of the principle of the prohibition of arbitrariness in the scope of the regulatory power, it must be noted that since the latter is naturally discretionary, the prohibitive principle of arbitrariness plays a primary role. First, it must be pointed out that, except for matters that are reserved to regulation—internal organization and statutory or service relationships—and in which autonomous or independent regulations (from the law) are admissible, a primary limit of the regulatory power is its subjection to the law it seeks to develop or execute, an extreme that obviously connects with constitutional principles such as legality (principio de legalidad), reservation of law (reserva de ley), and normative hierarchy. The regulatory power is, except in the indicated cases, the expression of an option or alternative predetermined by the ordinary legislator in the exercise of their freedom of configuration, from which the body competent to exercise the regulatory power cannot deviate.
Among the formal limits of the regulatory power is also competence, according to which only the bodies expressly authorized by the legal system can exercise it, which denotes the essentially subordinate character, materially and formally, of any regulation. Breaching these limits when issuing a regulation inexorably produces a prohibited arbitrary action, devoid of validity and effectiveness, both in light of the Law of the Constitution and the infra-constitutional legal system. To further elaborate, regarding the referenced principle, this Constitutional Court, in Vote No. 14421-04 of 11:00 a.m. on December 17, 2004, drafted by the Presiding Judge, stated the following:
“(…) The regulation of the constitutive elements of an administrative act—whether of a substantial, objective nature (motive, content, and purpose), subjective nature (competence, standing, and investiture), or formal nature (procedure and statement of reasons)—has the purpose of rationalizing the administrative function or conduct and, above all, endowing it with logic and reasonableness, preventing public administrations from surprising those under their administration with contradictory, absurd, disproportionate, or irrational acts. A matter of prime importance in every administrative act is proportionality stricto sensu between the means employed by the respective public administration and the ends it seeks to achieve, as well as the suitability or necessity of its content, and, of course, when it is afflictive or imposes a burden, the weighing of its intervention or minimum impact. Precisely for this reason, the principle of the prohibition of arbitrariness has emerged in contemporary Constitutional Law as one of the guiding principles of the administrative function, according to which administrative conduct must be sufficiently coherent and reasonably supported by the legal framework, so that it is self-sufficient and self-explanatory.
In our constitutional legal system, this principle arises from the first part of Article 11 of the Political Constitution, which prescribes: 'Public officials are simply depositaries of authority. They are obliged to fulfill the duties that the law imposes upon them and cannot arrogate powers not granted to them therein (…)'. It is worth noting, moreover, that arbitrariness should not be confused with administrative discretion, that is, with the possibility that every public entity or body has to choose among several options or solutions (content), all equally just, when facing a specific need (motive) and using indeterminate legal concepts to address a problem (motive), concepts which suppose a margin of positive and negative appreciation and a halo of uncertainty, but which, ultimately, admit only one just solution (…)”.
ON THE COMPETENCE TO ISSUE THE MANAGEMENT PLANS (PLANES DE MANEJO). The Court understands that the denominated “Regulation for the Implementation Management Plan in the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge” (Reglamento Plan de Manejo de Aplicación en el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo), dated May 21, 2003, published in La Gaceta No. 114 of June 16, 2003, is a zoning Regulation for the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, where permitted, conditional, and non-permitted uses are regulated, which constitutes a clear partial component of a comprehensive or total Management Plan (Plan de Manejo). The Biodiversity Law (Ley de Biodiversidad) created the National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC), and Article 22, paragraph 1, imposes upon it among its primary purposes the “planning” of processes aimed at achieving sustainability in the management of natural resources.
Paragraph 2 of that provision stipulates that the system's components shall exercise their functions and powers “as a single instance.” Notwithstanding the above, Articles 23 and subsequent provisions of the same legal body delineate the powers of each of the organisms that make up the system. Thus, the National Council of Conservation Areas (Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación), under Article 25, subsection 5, is responsible for approving the plans of the conservation areas (áreas de conservación). Furthermore, Article 30, subsection 5, establishes as a power of the Regional Councils of the Conservation Areas (Consejos Regionales de las Áreas de Conservación) the approval of the specific plans for the Conservation Area. The Director of the Conservation Area, according to the provisions of the Biodiversity Law, has no assigned planning or programming functions. On the contrary, the latter's powers are of an administrative, operational, or executive nature, so much so that Article 31 states that they are responsible for “… implementing national policies and executing the directives of the Regional Council (…)”.
Additionally, Article 28, paragraph 1, prescribes that the territorial units called Conservation Areas, which are under the administrative responsibility of a Director, are under the general supervision of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE) through the National Council of Conservation Areas. Likewise, paragraph 2 establishes that Conservation Areas have the duty to execute “… the policies, strategies, and programs approved by the National Council of Conservation Areas (…)”. Under this reasoning, the Director of the Conservation Area is not the one to issue management plans or components thereof, since, at most, their role is to propose policies or guidelines to the Regional Council (Article 30, subsection 5). The need for approval of management plans by the National Council and the Regional Council is clearly ratified by Article 40, paragraph 1, which states, where relevant, the following: “(…) The concessions and contracts authorized in the preceding article must be based on the strategies and plans approved in the first instance by the Regional Council and definitively by the National Council of Conservation Areas, in accordance with the established laws and policies (…)”.
In the present action of unconstitutionality, it has been demonstrated that the person who issued the questioned Regulation was the Director of the La Amistad Caribe Conservation Area (Área de Conservación La Amistad Caribe, ACOSA), Eng. Edwin Cyrus Cyrus, thereby breaching the constitutional principle of the prohibition of arbitrariness (Article 11 of the Political Constitution), since he incurred in manifest material incompetence by issuing a component of the Management Plan for the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, given that, in such a case, as previously indicated, this competence belongs to the Regional Council in the first instance, and, definitively, to the National Council of Conservation Areas.
Due to the manner in which the present action of unconstitutionality is resolved, this Court refrains from ruling on the rest of the grievances formulated by the petitioner. In any case, it must be taken into consideration that such points are of mere legality (mera legalidad), so they must be heard and resolved in the ordinary jurisdiction.
As a corollary of the foregoing, it is necessary to partially grant the action of unconstitutionality filed, solely against the so-called Implementation Management Plan in the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge of May 21, 2003. Judges Solano and Vargas issue a dissenting vote and dismiss the action in all its aspects.-
Therefore:
The action is partially granted. Consequently, the Regulation for the Implementation Management Plan in the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge of May 21, 2003, published in La Gaceta No. 114 of June 16, 2003, is annulled as unconstitutional. This judgment has declaratory and retroactive effects to the effective date of the annulled act, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith and legal relationships or situations that may have been consolidated by statute of limitations, expiration, or by virtue of a final judgment having the authority of material res judicata. It shall be published in full in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) and summarized in the Official Gazette La Gaceta. Judges Solano and Vargas issue a dissenting vote and dismiss the action in all its aspects.- Luis Fernando Solano C. President Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.
Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.
Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.
EJL/*- Dissenting vote of Judges Solano and Vargas, drafted by the latter.
The undersigned Judges issue a dissenting vote and dismiss the action in all its aspects for the reasons set forth below. Firstly, we concur with the majority vote insofar as it states that Decree 29019 of September 19, 2000, is not contrary to the Law of the Constitution, given that the Chamber had already ruled on that aspect in judgment 5975-06 of three fourteen p.m. on May third, two thousand six, which is applicable in the present action of unconstitutionality. However, we dissent from the majority of the Chamber in indicating that the “Implementation Management Plan in the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge” is unconstitutional, because in reality, the allegations regarding said regulation are points of legality that we consider should not be evaluated in this venue. Indeed, the majority's argument is that the Director of the Conservation Area was not competent to issue said management plan, since that responsibility belongs to the Regional Council in the first instance; nevertheless, we do not consider that it should be in this venue where the competent authority is determined, nor do we believe that this constitutes a defect of unconstitutionality, as these are points that must be elucidated through the corresponding ordinary channel.
Under the principle of the prohibition of arbitrariness recognized in Article 11 of the Political Constitution, any situation or provision could be framed; therefore, it is necessary for this allegation to be accompanied by a violation of another constitutional principle or value, which does not occur in this specific case. For the foregoing reasons, we consider that in this action of unconstitutionality there is no violation whatsoever of the Law of the Constitution, and for that reason the action must be dismissed in all its aspects.
Luis Fernando Solano C. Adrián Vargas B.
Classification prepared by the SALA CONSTITUCIONAL of the Judicial Branch. Its reproduction and/or distribution for profit is prohibited.
It is a faithful copy of the original - Taken from Nexus.PJ on: 07-05-2026 06:41:32.
Control constitucional: Sentencia estimatoria Sentencia con Voto Salvado Indicadores de Relevancia Sentencia relevante Sentencias Relacionadas Sentencia con datos protegidos, de conformidad con la normativa vigente Contenido de Interés:
Tipo de contenido: Voto de mayoría Rama del Derecho: 2. PRINCIPIOS CON JURISPRUDENCIA Tema: Interdicción de la arbitrariedad Subtemas:
NO APLICA.
Principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad y ejercicio de la potestad reglamentaria. El principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad supone la prohibición de la arbitrariedad, esto es, de toda diferencia carente de una razón suficiente y justa. El principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad no está contenido en el de igualdad ante la ley, arbitrariedad es sinónimo de injusticia ostensible y la injusticia no se limita a la discriminación. La actuación arbitraria es la contraria a la justicia, a la razón o las leyes, que obedece al mero capricho o voluntad del agente público. La prohibición de la arbitrariedad lo que condena es la falta de sustento o fundamento jurídico objetivo de una conducta administrativa y, por consiguiente, la infracción del orden material de los principios y valores propios del Estado de Derecho. En esencia, el principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad ha venido operando como un poderoso correctivo frente a las actuaciones abusivas y discriminatorias de las administraciones públicas cuando ejercen potestades discrecionales (abuso o exceso de discrecionalidad).
En lo que se refiere a la aplicación del principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad en el ámbito de la potestad reglamentaria, debe indicarse que al ser ésta, naturalmente, discrecional, el principio prohibitivo de la arbitrariedad cumple un papel de primer orden. Sentencia 11155-07 ... Ver más Contenido de Interés:
Tipo de contenido: Voto de mayoría Rama del Derecho: 3. ASUNTOS DE CONTROL DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD Tema: AMBIENTE Subtemas:
NO APLICA.
11155-07. SE ANULA PLAN DE MANEJO DEL REFUGIO DE VIDA SILVESTRE GANDOCA MANZANILLO. Reglamento denominado Plan de manejo de aplicación en el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo del 21 de mayo del 2003, publicado en La Gaceta No. 114 del 16 de junio del 2003 y el Decreto No. 29019-MINAE, denominado Reglamento para el manejo participativo de los recursos naturales en el Refugio de Vida Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo, sector Gandoca del 19 de septiembre del 2000, publicado en la Gaceta No. 208 del 31 de octubre del 2000.
* 050069790007CO * * 050069790007CO * Voto No. 11155-2007 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce y cuarenta y nueve horas de 1° de agosto de dos mil siete.
Acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por ROBERTO MOLINA UGALDE, mayor de edad, casado, portador de la cédula de identidad No. 5-195- 151, en su condición de Secretario General de la Asociación Sindical de Trabajadores del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, contra el Reglamento denominado Plan de manejo de aplicación en el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo del 21 de mayo del 2003, publicado en La Gaceta No. 114 del 16 de junio del 2003 y el Decreto No. 29019-MINAE, denominado Reglamento para el manejo participativo de los recursos naturales en el Refugio de Vida Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo, sector Gandoca del 19 de septiembre del 2000, publicado en la Gaceta No. 208 del 31 de octubre del 2000. Intervienen también en la acción, LA PROCURADURIA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA y CARLOS MANUEL RODRÍGUEZ ECHANDI, MINISTRO DE AMBIENTE Y ENERGÍA.
Resultando:
Redacta el Magistrado Jinesta Lobo; y,
Considerando:
A tenor del artículo 75, párrafo 2°, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, no será necesario el caso previo pendiente de resolución cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa, o se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto. Sobre el particular, este Tribunal Constitucional, en el Voto No. 8239-01 de las 16:07 hrs. del 14 de agosto del 2001, se refirió a los intereses difusos en los siguientes términos:
"(…) De acuerdo con el primero de los supuestos previstos por el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, la norma cuestionada no debe ser susceptible de aplicación concreta, que permita luego la impugnación del acto aplicativo y su consecuente empleo como asunto base. (...) En segundo lugar, se prevé la posibilidad de acudir en defensa de intereses difusos (...) Los intereses difusos, aunque de difícil definición y más difícil identificación, no pueden ser en nuestra ley - como ya lo ha dicho esta Sala- los intereses meramente colectivos; ni tan difusos que su titularidad se confunda con la de la comunidad nacional como un todo, ni tan concretos que frente a ellos resulten identificados o fácilmente identificables personas determinadas, o grupos personalizados, cuya legitimación derivaría, no de los intereses difusos, sino de los corporativos que atañen a una comunidad en su conjunto.
Se trata entonces de intereses individuales, pero a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y, por ende reciben un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos igual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que se trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos que se encuentran en determinadas circunstancias y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas. Es decir, los intereses difusos participan de una doble naturaleza, ya que son a la vez colectivos -por ser comunes a una generalidad- e individuales, por lo que pueden ser reclamados en tal carácter. (...) En síntesis, los intereses difusos son aquellos cuya titularidad pertenece a grupos de personas no organizadas formalmente, pero unidas a partir de una determinada necesidad social, una característica física, su origen étnico, una determinada orientación personal o ideológica, el consumo de un cierto producto, etc. (…)" En el presente asunto, el accionante aduce su legitimación por vía del control de constitucionalidad abstracto e invoca la tutela de intereses difusos, toda vez que, acude en defensa del ambiente. Tales circunstancias configuran a favor del gestionante una legitimación directa suficiente para la interposición de la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad.
El gestionante cuestiona la constitucionalidad del Reglamento denominado Plan de manejo de aplicación en el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo del 21 de mayo del 2003 y del Decreto No. 29019-MINAE, Reglamento para el manejo participativo de los recursos naturales en el Refugio de Vida Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo, sector Gandoca, del 19 de septiembre del 2000, por estimar que presentan, concretamente, los siguientes vicios de inconstitucionalidad: a) Violación al principio de irreductibilidad consagrado en los numerales 50 constitucional, 3° de la Convención para la Protección de la Flora, de la Fauna y de las Bellezas Escénicas Naturales de los Países de América y 38 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, por cuanto, el numeral 8° del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29019-MINAE derogó el Decreto No. 23069-MIRENEM, el cual, a su vez, había ampliado el área comprendida dentro del Refugio, incluyendo, para tales efectos, la zona urbana de Manzanillo; b) quebranto a los numerales 130, 140, incisos 3) y 18) de la Constitución Política, dado que, el Reglamento Plan de manejo de aplicación en el Refugio de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo, sector Gandoca, además de configurarse como una normativa de carácter general dictada, incorrectamente, por el Director del Área de Conservación La Amistad Caribe y no por el Ministro y Presidente de la República, fue promulgada sin que se siguieran los procedimientos que pauta al efecto la Ley General de Administración Pública en sus numerales 25, 27, inciso 1°), 28, inciso b), 121, 128, 129, 240, inciso 1°) y 241, para la aprobación y publicación de este tipo de normas; c) vulneración al principio consagrado en el precepto 50 de la Constitución Política, por las siguientes razones: c.1.) el Plan de Manejo de Aplicación en el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca- Manzanillo omitió, de previo a su aprobación, someterse a un estudio de impacto ambiental.
Lo anterior, toda vez que, el citado refugio no se encuentra regido por lo que establece la Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, sino por el resto de la legislación ambiental; c.2.) el citado plan de manejo, permite nuevos permisos o cambios de uso de suelo dentro de la zona que afectan, gravemente, el ambiente; c.3.) el plan bajo estudio autoriza el desarrollo en el sitio de una serie de actividades que perturban el equilibrio del ambiente.
En la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad se cuestionan el texto completo del Reglamento denominado Plan de manejo de aplicación en el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca- Manzanillo de 21 de mayo del 2003, publicado en La Gaceta No. 114 de 16 de junio del 2003 y el artículo 8° del Decreto No. 29019-MINAE, denominado Reglamento para el manejo participativo de los recursos naturales en el Refugio de Vida Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo, sector Gandoca de 19 de septiembre del 2000, publicado en la Gaceta No. 208 del 31 de octubre del 2000.
29019 DE 19 DE SEPTIEMBRE DEL 2000. REGLAMENTO MANEJO PARTICIPATIVO DE RECURSOS NATURALES EN EL REFUGIO DE VIDA SILVESTRE, GANDOCA MANZANILLO, SECTOR GANDOCA. En primer término, acusa el accionante que el numeral 8° del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29019-MINAE infringe el principio ambiental de irreductibilidad consagrado en los numerales 50 constitucional, 3° de la Convención para la Protección de la Flora, de la Fauna y de las Bellezas Escénicas Naturales de los Países de América y 38 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, dado que, éste deroga el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 23069-MIRENEM, el cual, a su vez, había ampliado el área comprendida dentro del Refugio, incluyendo, para tales efectos, la zona urbana de Manzanillo. Sobre el particular, cabe apuntar que, en un asunto planteado en similares términos, este Tribunal Constitucional, en el Voto No. 5975-06 de las 15:14 hrs. del 3 de mayo del 2006, dispuso, en lo conducente, lo siguiente:
“(…) VII.- Sobre el aumento y reducción de las áreas silvestres protegidas. En el memorial de interposición de la acción de inconstitucionalidad, el accionante impugna –y lo señala como motivo de inconstitucionalidad-, la derogatoria del Decreto 23069-MIRENEM por el Decreto 29019-MINAE pues tácitamente redujo la extensión del Refugio de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo, dado que éste último había ampliado los límites del Refugio. Analizando los decretos promulgados relacionados con el Refugio Gandoca-Manzanillo, se observa como el Poder Ejecutivo ha emitido varios en procura de regular la situación del mismo. Con el objeto de aclarar la situación actual, es conveniente hacer un recuento de los relacionados con el objeto de esta acción. Tenemos en primer término el DE-16614-MAG de 29 de octubre de 1985, que crea el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo (REGAMA). El fundamento legal del decreto está concretamente en el artículo 2 de la Ley N° 4465, pero especialmente en el artículo 18 de la Ley N° 6919, Ley de Conservación de la Fauna Silvestre, ya derogada, pero que en aquel momento disponía: “Artículo 18.- Son refugios nacionales de fauna silvestre los que el Poder Ejecutivo declare como tales, para la protección y la investigación de la flora y la fauna silvestre, en especial de aquella en vías de extinción.
Queda autorizado el Poder Ejecutivo para establecer, dentro de las reservas forestales y en terrenos particulares, áreas bajo la clasificación de refugios nacionales de fauna silvestre, las que, para efectos de conservación de la fauna silvestre, quedarán bajo la administración del Departamento de Vida Silvestre de la Dirección General Forestal del Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería.(…)” El artículo 6° del Decreto 16614-MAG excluyó expresamente de ese refugio la zona urbana de Gandoca, Manzanillo y Puerto Viejo. Posteriormente se emitió el DE-23069-MIRENEM de 5 de abril de 1994; el artículo 16 de ese Decreto derogó el art. 6 del DE-16614. La consecuencia inmediata de ello, es que las áreas urbanas de Gandoca, Manzanillo y Puerto Viejo pasaron a formar parte del Refugio Gandoca-Manzanillo. Más adelante se promulgó el Decreto DE-29019-MINAE de 31 de octubre del 2000, el cual, a través del artículo 8°, derogó el Decreto 23069-MIRENEM; con ello, tácitamente recobró vigencia el artículo 6 del DE-16614.
Se produce en ese momento una disminución tácita del territorio de la reserva al excluirse de nuevo las áreas urbanas de Gandoca, Manzanillo y Puerto Viejo, lo que dejaba las cosas en la situación en que lo habría dispuesto el Decreto N° 16614-MAG. Sin embargo, posteriormente el Poder Ejecutivo emitió el DE-32753-MINAE de 16 de mayo del 2005, el cual derogó expresamente el artículo 6 del DE-16614; nuevamente las zonas urbanas de Gandoca, Manzanillo y Puerto Viejo pasan a formar parte del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca- Manzanillo, situación que se mantiene a la fecha.
Sobre el aumento y/o disminución de los límites territoriales del patrimonio forestal, este Tribunal, en la sentencia N° 1999-5399 de las 16:39 horas del 26 de octubre de 1993, en la cual la Sala señaló:
“…si el Poder Ejecutivo está legitimado para señalar los límites de su patrimonio forestal lo será a través de la vía reglamentaria y no la legal, con la debida indemnización de las propiedades sobre las que se extienda el patrimonio forestal, ya que en virtud del artículo 9 constitucional y de la teoría de la separación de Poderes, la Asamblea Legislativa es el único órgano constitucional facultado para emitir leyes. Por ello cuando se trate de un bien demanial resulta ilógico pensar que el Estado esté limitado o imposibilitado en su actuación en resguardo de la flora y la fauna de nuestras tierras.
II.En este orden de ideas, puesto que esta acción se dirige contra un decreto ejecutivo que amplió los límites de un parque nacional -Isla del Coco- extendiéndose a una distancia de quince kilómetros sobre el mar, medida desde la línea de bajamar de la costa, es que es importante determinar que lo hace en el pleno ejercicio de sus facultades, tanto legales como constitucionales, por tratarse de un bien demanial. (…)
V.En relación con la alegada violación del artículo 3 del Convenio para la protección de la flora, de la fauna y de las bellezas escénicas naturales de los países de América - aprobado por Ley número 3763, de primero de octubre de mil novecientos sesenta y seis- en relación con el artículo 7 constitucional, que en lo que interesa dice así:
"Los Gobiernos Contratantes convienen en que los límites de los parques nacionales no serán alterados ni enajenada parte alguna de ellos sino por acción de la autoridad legislativa competente. Las riquezas existentes en ellos no se explotarán con fines comerciales.
Los Gobiernos Contratantes convienen en prohibir la caza, la matanza y la captura de especimenes de la fauna y la destrucción y recolección de ejemplares de la flora en los parques nacionales, excepto cuando se haga por las autoridades del parque o por orden o bajo vigilancia de las mismas o para investigaciones científicas debidamente autorizadas." Deben esas normas interpretarse en sentido restrictivo, de manera que, la exigencia de establecer los límites de los parques nacionales a través de una ley es únicamente cuando va en detrimento del mismo, es decir, cuando se quiera reducir su extensión, y no cuando se quieran extender los límites de las zonas protectoras del patrimonio forestal del Estado. Este artículo debe completarse con el artículo 40 de la Ley Forestal que dice:
"El área de las reservas forestales, zonas protectoras, parques nacionales, refugios de vida silvestre, reservas biológicas del patrimonio forestal, sólo podrá ser reducida por ley de la República, previos estudios técnicos correspondientes que justifiquen esta medida." Y esto es así en virtud de que el bien jurídico que se protege es el "recurso forestal", término que "significa la protección y preservación de la integridad del medio ambiente natural," (resolución de la Sala Constitucional número 2233-93, de las nueve horas treinta y seis minutos del veintiocho de mayo) que existe en la zona declarada como parque nacional, y que es reconocido tanto por la legislación internacional, por las leyes especiales dictadas al efecto, como por los textos de las cartas políticas. En este sentido, el artículo 69 de la Constitución Política es que habla de "explotación racional de la tierra", constituyéndose un principio fundamental su protección (…).” (la negrita no es de original) Es evidente entonces que el Poder Ejecutivo, no puede reducir los límites territoriales un área (sic) silvestre, pero sí puede extenderlos.
De ahí que los Decretos cuya derogación o puesta en vigencia hayan producido como consecuencia inmediata el aumento del territorio de una determinada área protegida, son constitucionales. (…) si bien el Decreto DE-29019-MINAE de 31 de octubre del 2000, derogó el Decreto 23069-MIRENEM, y al hacerlo excluyó de la REGAMA las áreas urbanas de Gandoca, Manzanillo y Puerto Viejo (con lo que se produjo una disminución tácita del territorio de la REGAMA), posteriormente el Poder Ejecutivo emitió el DE-32753- MINAE de 16 de mayo del 2005 que derogó el artículo 6° del Decreto 16614-MAG. Al hacerlo, el territorio de la reserva volvió a su situación original. Ello no solo es constitucional, sino acorde con la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal en esa materia. En virtud de lo expuesto, y de conformidad con el artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, lo procedente es rechazar la acción. (…) (El destacado no forma parte del original).
En consecuencia, debe tomarse en consideración, tal y como, anteriormente, se señaló, que el artículo 6° del Decreto No. 16614-MAG de 1° de julio de 1985, mediante el cual se creó el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca- Manzanillo, excluyó, expresamente, de dicho refugio la zona urbana de Gandoca Manzanillo y Puerto Viejo, al disponer, lo siguiente: “Las áreas que de acuerdo con los estudios realizados por el Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo estén comprendidos dentro de las zonas urbanas de Gandoca, Manzanillo y Puerto Viejo, no estarán sometidas a las regulaciones del presente Decreto”. Posteriormente, éste último decreto fue derogado a través del numeral 16 del Decreto No. 23069-MIRENEM de 21 de marzo de 1994, el cual, declaró acceso restringido al Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo, con lo cual, las áreas urbanas de Gandoca-Manzanillo pasaron a formar parte del Refugio bajo estudio.
Ulteriormente, se emitió el Decreto cuestionado, No. 29019-MINAE de 19 de septiembre del 2000, el cual, a través del artículo 8°, derogó el Decreto anterior, sea, el Decreto No. 23069-MIRENEM, por lo que, consecuentemente, recobró vigencia el artículo 6° del Decreto No. 16614-MAG y se redujo, nuevamente, el territorio de la reserva citada. No obstante lo anterior, mediante el artículo 2° del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 32753-MINAE de 16 de mayo del 2005, actualmente vigente, se dispuso la derogación del artículo 6° del Decreto No. 16614-MAG. De ahí que, las zonas urbanas supra indicadas, pasaron, nuevamente, a formar parte del refugio bajo estudio. Bajo tal orden de consideraciones, y, al no existir razón alguna para variar el criterio vertido en el Voto parcialmente transcrito, ni razones de interés público que justifiquen reconsiderar la cuestión, este Tribunal no estima que, en la especie, el Decreto No. 29019-MINAE vulnere el principio de irreductibilidad alegado.
El principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad fue concebido por el jurista alemán Leibholz en 1928 como un criterio para ponderar el respeto del principio de igualdad por el legislador. Según esta formulación, el principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad supone la prohibición de la arbitrariedad, esto es, de toda diferencia carente de una razón suficiente y justa. El principio es retomado por la doctrina española, concretamente, por García de Enterría a finales de la década de los cincuenta (1959) con un sentido más extenso –no circunscrito al principio de igualdad- al propuesto por Leibholz. Ulteriormente, el principio con ese sentido más amplio, fue acogido por la Constitución Española de 1978 en su artículo 9.3, a propuesta del senador Lorenzo Martín-Retortillo, quien justifico su iniciativa en la necesidad de tener el principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad como una técnica o mecanismo más de control o fiscalización de los poderes públicos inherente al Estado de Derecho.
Consecuentemente, el principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad no está contenido en el de igualdad ante la ley, por cuanto la ruptura de ésta, ciertamente, es un caso de arbitrariedad pero no el único. Arbitrariedad es sinónimo de injusticia ostensible y la injusticia no se limita a la discriminación. La actuación arbitraria es la contraria a la justicia, a la razón o las leyes, que obedece al mero capricho o voluntad del agente público. La prohibición de la arbitrariedad lo que condena es la falta de sustento o fundamento jurídico objetivo de una conducta administrativa y, por consiguiente, la infracción del orden material de los principios y valores propios del Estado de Derecho. En esencia, el principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad ha venido operando como un poderoso correctivo frente a las actuaciones abusivas y discriminatorias de las administraciones públicas cuando ejercen potestades discrecionales (abuso o exceso de discrecionalidad).
En lo que se refiere a la aplicación del principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad en el ámbito de la potestad reglamentaria, debe indicarse que al ser ésta, naturalmente, discrecional, el principio prohibitivo de la arbitrariedad cumple un papel de primer orden. En primer término, debe señalarse que salvo las materias que son reserva de reglamento –organización interna y relación estatutaria o de servicio- y en las que resultan admisibles los reglamentos autónomos o independientes –de la ley-, un primer límite de la potestad reglamentaria lo constituye la sujeción a la ley que se pretende desarrollar o ejecutar, extremo que obviamente, tiene conexión con principios constitucionales como el de legalidad, reserva de ley y jerarquía normativa. El poder reglamentario es, salvo los casos señalados, expresión de una opción o alternativa predeterminada por el legislador ordinario en ejercicio de su libertad de configuración, de la cual no puede separarse el órgano competente para ejercer la potestad reglamentaria.
Entre los límites formales de la potestad reglamentaria se encuentra, también, la competencia, de acuerdo con el cual solo los órganos autorizados expresamente por el ordenamiento jurídico pueden ejercerla, lo que denota el carácter esencial de norma, material y formalmente, subordinada que tiene todo reglamento. El quebranto de los límites señalados al dictarse un reglamento produce, irremisiblemente, una actuación arbitraria prohibida, carente de validez y eficacia, tanto a la luz del Derecho de la Constitución como del ordenamiento jurídico infraconstitucional. A mayor abundamiento, sobre el principio de referencia, este Tribunal Constitucional, en el Voto No. 14421-04 de las 11:00 hrs. del 17 de diciembre del 2004, con redacción del Magistrado ponente, señaló lo siguiente:
“(…) La regulación de los elementos constitutivos de carácter sustancial objetivos (motivo, contenido y fin) o subjetivos (competencia, legitimación e investidura) y formales (procedimiento y motivación) del acto administrativo, tienen por objeto racionalizar la función o conducta administrativa y, sobre todo, dotarla de logicidad o razonabilidad, evitando que las administraciones públicas sorprendan a los administrados con actos contradictorios, absurdos, desproporcionados o irracionales. Un aspecto de primer orden en todo acto administrativo es la proporcionalidad en sentido estricto entre los medios empleados por la administración pública respectiva y los fines que se pretenden lograr con éste, así como la idoneidad o necesidad de su contenido y, desde luego, cuando resulta aflictivo o de gravamen, la ponderación de su intervención o impacto mínimo. Precisamente por lo anterior, ha surgido en el Derecho Constitucional contemporáneo, como uno de los principios rectores de la función administrativa el de la interdicción de la arbitrariedad, de acuerdo con el cual la conducta administrativa debe ser suficientemente coherente y razonablemente sustentada en el bloque de legalidad, de modo que se baste y explique por sí misma.
En nuestro ordenamiento jurídico constitucional tal principio dimana de lo establecido en la primera parte del artículo 11 de la Constitución Política al preceptuar que “Los funcionarios públicos son simples depositarios de la autoridad. Están obligados a cumplir los deberes que la ley les impone y no pueden arrogarse facultades no concedidas en ella (…)”. No sobra, por lo demás, advertir, que la arbitrariedad no debe ser confundida con la discrecionalidad administrativa, esto es, con la posibilidad que tiene todo ente u órgano público de escoger entre varias opciones o soluciones (contenido), todas igualmente justas, ante el planteamiento de una necesidad determinada (motivo) y el uso de conceptos jurídicos indeterminados para atender un problema (motivo) los cuales suponen un margen de apreciación positiva y negativa y un halo de incertidumbre, pero que, en último término, admiten una única solución justa (…)”.
SOBRE LA COMPETENCIA PARA EMITIR LOS PLANES DE MANEJO. El Tribunal entiende que el denominado “Reglamento Plan de Manejo de Aplicación en el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca- Manzanillo”, de fecha 21 de mayo del 2003, publicado en La Gaceta No. 114 de 16 de junio del 2003, es un Reglamento de zonificación del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo, donde se regulan los usos permitidos, condicionales y no permitidos, con lo cual, constituye un claro componente, de carácter parcial, de un Plan de Manejo integral o total. La Ley de Biodiversidad creó el Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (SINAC), siendo que el artículo 22, párrafo 1°, le impone dentro de sus fines primordiales “planificar” los procesos dirigidos a lograr la sostenibilidad en el manejo de los recursos naturales. El párrafo 2° de ese ordinal dispone que los componentes del sistema ejercerán sus funciones y competencias “como una sola instancia”.
No obstante lo anterior, los artículos 23 y siguientes de ese mismo cuerpo normativo, delimitan las competencias de cada uno de los organismos que integran el sistema. Así, al Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación en el artículo 25, inciso 5°, le corresponde aprobar los planes de las áreas de conservación. De otra parte, el artículo 30, inciso 5°, establece como atribución de los Consejos Regionales de las Áreas de Conservación, aprobar los planes específicos del Área de Conservación. El Director del Área de Conservación, a tenor de lo establecido en la Ley de Biodiversidad, no tiene asignadas funciones de planificación o programación. Por el contrario, las competencias de éste último son de carácter administrativo, operativo o ejecutivo, tanto que el artículo 31 indica que le corresponde “(…) implementar las políticas nacionales y ejecutar las directrices del Consejo Regional (…)”. Adicionalmente, el artículo 28, párrafo 1°, preceptúa que las unidades territoriales denominadas Áreas de Conservación que se encuentran bajo la responsabilidad de administración de un Director, se encuentran bajo la supervisión general del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía por medio del Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación.
Asimismo, el párrafo 2°, le establece a las Áreas de Conservación, el deber de ejecutar “(…) las políticas, las estrategias y los programas aprobados por el Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (…)”. Bajo dicha inteligencia, al Director del Área de Conservación no le corresponde dictar los planes de manejo o los componentes de éste, pues, a lo sumo, le compete proponerle al Consejo Regional políticas o lineamientos (artículo 30, inciso 5°). La necesidad de la aprobación de los planes de manejo por el Consejo Nacional y el Consejo Regional, queda claramente ratificada por el artículo 40, párrafo 1°, que indica, en lo conducente, lo siguiente: “(…) Las concesiones y los contratos autorizados en el artículo anterior deberán basarse en las estrategias y los planes aprobados en primera instancia por el Consejo Regional y en forma definitiva por el Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, conforme a las leyes y políticas establecidas (…)”.
En la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad ha quedado demostrado que, quien dictó el Reglamento cuestionado fue el Director del Área de Conservación La Amistad Caribe, Ing. Edwin Cyrus Cyrus, con lo cual, se quebrantó el principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad constitucional (artículo 11 de la Constitución Política), toda vez que, incurrió en una incompetencia material manifiesta al dictar un componente del Plan de Manejo del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo, siendo que, en tal caso, por lo anteriormente señalado, tal competencia le corresponde al Consejo Regional, en primera instancia, y, en definitiva, al Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación.
Por la forma en que se resuelve la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, este Tribunal omite pronunciarse sobre el resto de los agravios formulados por el accionante. En todo caso, debe tomarse en consideración, que tales extremos son de mera legalidad, por lo que los mismos deberán de ser conocidos y resueltos en la jurisdicción ordinaria.
Como corolario de lo expuesto, se impone declarar parcialmente con lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad planteada, únicamente, contra el denominado Plan de manejo de aplicación en el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo del 21 de mayo del 2003.Los Magistrados Solano y Vargas salvan el voto y declaran sin lugar la acción en todos sus extremos.-
Por tanto:
Se declara parcialmente con lugar la acción. En consecuencia, se anula por inconstitucional el Reglamento Plan de manejo de aplicación en el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo del 21 de mayo del 2003, publicado en La Gaceta No. 114 del 16 de junio del 2003. Esta sentencia tiene efectos declarativos y retroactivos a la fecha de vigencia del acto anulado, sin perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos de buena fe y las relaciones o situaciones jurídicas que se hubieran consolidado por prescripción, caducidad o en virtud de sentencia pasada en autoridad de cosa juzgada material. Publíquese íntegramente en el Boletín Judicial y reséñese en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta. Los Magistrados Solano y Vargas salvan el voto y declaran sin lugar la acción en todos sus extremos.- Luis Fernando Solano C.
Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.
Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.
Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.
EJL/*- Voto salvado de los Magistrados Solano y Vargas, con redacción del segundo.
Los suscritos Magistrados salvan el voto y declaran sin lugar la acción en todos sus extremos por los motivos que de seguido se exponen. En primer lugar, coincidimos con el voto de mayoría en cuanto señala que el Decreto 29019 del 19 de setiembre de 2000 no es contrario al Derecho de la Constitución, toda vez que la Sala ya se había pronunciado sobre tal aspecto en la sentencia 5975-06 de las quince horas catorce minutos del tres de mayo de dos mil seis, la cual resulta de aplicación en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad. Sin embargo, discrepamos de la mayoría de la Sala al indicar que el “Plan de Manejo de Aplicación en el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo” resulta inconstitucional, pues en realidad, los alegatos referidos a dicho reglamento son extremos de legalidad que consideramos no deben ser valorados en esta sede. En efecto, el argumento de la mayoría es que el Director del Área de Conservación no era el competente para dictar dicho plan de manejo, pues ello le corresponde al Consejo Regional en primera instancia, sin embargo, no consideramos que sea en esta sede donde deba determinarse cuál autoridad es la competente ni creemos que ello revista un vicio de inconstitucionalidad, pues resultan extremos que deben ser dilucidados en la vía ordinaria correspondiente.
Bajo el principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad reconocido en el artículo 11 de la Constitución Política podría enmarcarse cualquier situación o disposición, por ello es necesario que ese alegato se vea acompañado de una violación a otro principio o valor constitucional, lo cual no ocurre en el caso concreto. Por lo anterior, estimamos que en la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad no existe violación alguna al Derecho de la Constitución, y por tal razón la acción debe desestimarse en todos sus extremos.
Luis Fernando Solano C. Adrián Vargas B.
Clasificación elaborada por SALA CONSTITUCIONALdel Poder Judicial. Prohibida su reproducción y/o distribución en forma onerosa.
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