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Res. 10973-2006 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 26/07/2006
OutcomeResultado
The constitutionality challenge was dismissed, upholding the constitutionality of sport hunting and the seasonal decree, while ordering MINAE to improve future decrees with license limits and monitoring.La acción de inconstitucionalidad se declara sin lugar, confirmando la constitucionalidad de la caza deportiva y del decreto de vedas, y ordenando al MINAE mejorar los futuros decretos con límites y monitoreo.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber dismissed a constitutional challenge against articles 28-34 of the Wildlife Conservation Law (No. 7317), articles 16-18 of its Regulation, and Executive Decree 31737-MINAE (2004 hunting seasons). The petitioners argued that sport hunting and the annual hunting decree—issued without specific per-species scientific studies—violated the right to a healthy environment (Art. 50 of the Constitution) and the precautionary principle. The Chamber held that sport hunting, as a regulated and supervised use of wildlife, is compatible with the principle of sustainable development. Regarding the decree, it found sufficient technical-scientific support (biologists’ experience, sightings, historical data) even though exact population counts were lacking. The Chamber ruled that concrete effects on specific species must be challenged case-by-case through amparo proceedings, not abstractly in constitutional review. Additionally, it ordered MINAE to include maximum license limits per zone, species, and bag limits in future decrees, along with centralized monitoring.La Sala Constitucional rechazó una acción de inconstitucionalidad contra los artículos 28 a 34 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre (N.º 7317), los artículos 16 a 18 de su Reglamento y el Decreto Ejecutivo N.º 31737-MINAE (vedas de caza 2004). Los accionantes alegaban que la caza deportiva y el decreto anual de vedas, emitido sin estudios científicos específicos por especie, violaban el derecho a un ambiente sano (art. 50 constitucional) y el principio precautorio. La Sala determinó que la caza deportiva, como aprovechamiento regulado y fiscalizado de la fauna, es compatible con el principio de desarrollo sostenible. Respecto al decreto impugnado, consideró que contaba con un respaldo técnico-científico suficiente (experiencia de biólogos, avistamientos, datos históricos), aunque no fueran censos poblacionales exactos por especie. La Sala estableció que los efectos concretos del decreto sobre especies específicas deben analizarse caso por caso mediante el recurso de amparo, y no en abstracto en una acción de inconstitucionalidad. Como complemento, ordenó al MINAE que los futuros decretos de vedas establezcan límites máximos de licencias por zona, especie y número de piezas, así como un control y monitoreo centralizado.
Key excerptExtracto clave
Now, the fact that the existence of sport hunting is not in itself unconstitutional does not mean that its specific regulation is not... Decree 31737-MINAE... regulates in detail hunting and fishing... for the year 2004. Here we face a problem of verifying the effects the challenged decree may be having... given its generic nature, it prevents determining the effects on each species... it is enough that the challenged decree has a technical-scientific basis that earns this Chamber's faith to pass the constitutionality test. It does not have to be the best scientific study, only one that respects 'technical and scientific rules of uniform meaning and exact application'... it would be virtually impossible 'in the abstract' to determine the effects that the decree may have on each affected species... which is why the legal system has another solution for this type of case: the concrete analysis of its effects through the amparo remedy... In this context, for this Chamber the challenged decree is not per se unconstitutional, since it has technical-scientific support that, although probably can and should be better, does not allow establishing in the abstract its impact on one or several specific species—effects that can indeed be ascertained through a concrete analysis of each supposedly affected species, if the case arises, via amparo. Finally, this Chamber holds that future decrees of this kind must establish specific limits on the maximum number of licenses to be granted per zone, per species, and the number of pieces permitted, as well as establish centralized control and monitoring thereof, to avoid excesses that could result in a violation of Article 50 of our Constitution.Ahora bien, el hecho de que la existencia de la caza deportiva por sí misma no sea inconstitucional, no quiere decir que su regulación específica no lo sea... el decreto 31737-MINAE... regula en detalle la caza y pesca... para el año 2004. Aquí nos topamos con un problema de comprobación de los efectos que el decreto impugnado pueda estar produciendo... dado que su naturaleza genérica, impide determinar los efectos que en cada especie produce... basta con que el decreto impugnado tenga una base técnico científica que le merezca fe a esta Sala, para superar el test de constitucionalidad. No tiene que ser el mejor estudio científico, sólo aquél que respete las 'reglas técnicas y científicas de sentido unívoco y aplicación exacta'... sería virtualmente imposible 'en abstracto' determinar los efectos que la aplicación del decreto pueda tener en cada especie... por lo cual el sistema legal tiene otra solución para este tipo de casos y es el análisis concreto de sus efectos, mediante el recurso de amparo... Dentro de ese contexto, para esta Sala no resulta per sé inconstitucional el decreto impugnado, pues tiene un respaldo técnico-científico que, aunque probablemente puede y debe ser mejor, no se puede establecer en abstracto su afectación sobre una o varias especies determinadas, efectos que sí se pueden lograr mediante el análisis concreto de cada especie supuestamente afectada, si se diera el caso, por medio del recurso de amparo. Finalmente estima esta Sala que los decretos futuros de esta especie deben establecer límites determinados sobre el número de licencias máximas a otorgar por zona, por especie y el número de piezas permitidas, así como establecer un control y monitoreo centralizado de las mismas, para evitar excesos que pudieran resultar en una violación al artículo 50 de nuestra Constitución.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"De esta forma la cacería deportiva constituye una forma legal de aprovechamiento de la fauna silvestre, sometida a regulación, control y fiscalización del Estado, independientemente de su compatibilidad ética."
"In this way, sport hunting constitutes a legal form of wildlife use, subject to state regulation, control, and supervision, regardless of its ethical compatibility."
Considerando V
"De esta forma la cacería deportiva constituye una forma legal de aprovechamiento de la fauna silvestre, sometida a regulación, control y fiscalización del Estado, independientemente de su compatibilidad ética."
Considerando V
"Así las cosas, basta con que el decreto impugnado tenga una base técnico científica que le merezca fe a esta Sala, para superar el test de constitucionalidad. No tiene que ser el mejor estudio científico, sólo aquél que respete las 'reglas técnicas y científicas de sentido unívoco y aplicación exacta'."
"Thus, it suffices that the challenged decree has a technical-scientific basis that earns this Chamber's faith, in order to pass the constitutionality test. It need not be the best scientific study, only one that respects 'technical and scientific rules of uniform meaning and exact application'."
Considerando VI
"Así las cosas, basta con que el decreto impugnado tenga una base técnico científica que le merezca fe a esta Sala, para superar el test de constitucionalidad. No tiene que ser el mejor estudio científico, sólo aquél que respete las 'reglas técnicas y científicas de sentido unívoco y aplicación exacta'."
Considerando VI
"Finalmente estima esta Sala que los decretos futuros de esta especie deben establecer límites determinados sobre el número de licencias máximas a otorgar por zona, por especie y el número de piezas permitidas, así como establecer un control y monitoreo centralizado de las mismas."
"Finally, this Chamber holds that future decrees of this kind must establish specific limits on the maximum number of licenses to be granted per zone, per species, and the number of pieces permitted, as well as establish centralized control and monitoring thereof."
Considerando VII
"Finalmente estima esta Sala que los decretos futuros de esta especie deben establecer límites determinados sobre el número de licencias máximas a otorgar por zona, por especie y el número de piezas permitidas, así como establecer un control y monitoreo centralizado de las mismas."
Considerando VII
Full documentDocumento completo
*040075730007CO* *040075730007CO* Res. Nº 2006-010973 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at eighteen hours and five minutes of July twenty-sixth, two thousand six.
Action of unconstitutionality brought by Nombre01, of legal age, married once, attorney, bearer of identity card CED01, Ombudsman of the Republic, and Nombre02, with a single surname due to his Canadian nationality, of legal age, married once, businessman, residence card number 125-140350-000777, resident of La Garita de Alajuela, in his capacity as President of the Fundación Restauración de la Naturaleza, holder of legal entity number 3-006-171553, against Executive Decree # 31737 MINAE, articles 28 through 34 of the Wildlife Conservation Law and 16 through 18 of its Regulation, Executive Decree # 26435-MINAE. Also participating in the proceedings were Allan René Flores Moya, Acting Minister of Environment and Energy, and Farid Beirute Brenes representing the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic. Intervening as coadjuvants are Ruth Solano Vásquez, identity card CED02, President of the Asociación de Justicia para la Naturaleza, legal entity number 3-002-110034-32, Luis Diego Marín Schumacher, identity card CED03, President of APREFLOFAS, Asociación Preservacionista de Flora y Fauna Silvestre, legal entity number 3-002-071676-32, Ignacio Escorriola Giovannini, identity card CED04, Legal Counsel of Vida, Asociación de Voluntariado, Investigación y Desarrollo Ambiental, legal entity CED05, Randall Arauz Vargas, identity card CED06, President of Pretoma, Asociación Programa Restauración de Tortugas Marinas, legal entity CED07, María Elena Founier, identity card CED08, President of the Asociación Conservacionista Yisky, Noemí Canet Moya, identity card CED09, President of the College of Biologists; Luis Diego Acuña Delcore, identity card CED10.
Whereas:
Drafted by Magistrate Mora Mora; and,
Considering:
I.On admissibility: The Ombudsman's Office (Defensoría de los Habitantes) is directly legitimized to file this action of unconstitutionality by express provision of the third paragraph of article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.
For its part, the standing of the petitioner Nombre02 is active and direct, insofar as the state duty to protect the environment safeguards a collective interest whose defense exempts the petitioner from the prior matter required by the first paragraph of Article 75 of the aforementioned law, in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph thereof, as this Constitutional Chamber has interpreted in abundant case law when analyzing Article 50 of our Constitución Política.
II.Object of the challenge. This action seeks to determine whether Articles 28 to 35 of the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre and 16 to 18 of its regulation, Decreto number 26435-MINAE, as well as Decreto number 31737-MINAE, are unconstitutional for being contrary to the provisions of Articles 50 and 89 of the Constitution, and the provisions of international treaties on the matter, signed, approved, and ratified by the Costa Rican state.
The petitioners' arguments revolve around two aspects:
It is clear from the filing brief that both arguments primarily refer to sport hunting, although the regulations against which it was filed regulate, in addition to the latter, the exercise of scientific hunting and subsistence hunting. In this sense, the action is considered filed regarding sport hunting only. It is also worth clarifying that of the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, only the articles regulating matters related to hunting were challenged, not those related to continental and island fishing, whose regulation is contained in Articles 61 to 69 of the aforementioned law.
III.On the merits. The challenged articles of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre regulate matters related to the exercise of sport, scientific, and subsistence hunting. It literally states:
“ARTICULO 28.- For the purpose of regulating the exercise of hunting, it is classified into:
For their part, numerals 16 to 18 of the regulation to the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, Decreto number 26435-MINAE, indicate the basic guidelines that the executive branch must follow in establishing the closed seasons which it annually sets by decree. In this regard, it regulates matters concerning authorized hunting methods and, specifically, matters related to the type of weapons that may be used. These provisions are complemented each year by what is established in the respective closed season decree. Thus, the regulatory framework governing the exercise of big game and small game hunting (caza mayor y menor) consists of the provisions of the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, Articles 28 to 35, the regulation to the law in its Articles 16 to 18, which, in addition to hunting, regulates continental and island fishing, and the corresponding closed season decree. These latter two norms, the regulation and the annual closed season decree, constitute the development that, in the exercise of its regulatory power, the executive branch makes of what is stipulated in the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre regarding the exercise of hunting and, as applicable, continental and island fishing.
IV.On the constitutionality of sport hunting. Costa Rican legislation uses a concept of conservation of our natural resources based on their rational use, given their renewable nature. From this point of view, the State's obligation is to ensure the adoption of legislation and actions aimed at securing the protection and conservation of fauna and flora with a concept of balance. Precisely, the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre and its regulation aim to regulate and rationally maintain the use of wildlife without its degradation. Within this context, the Executive Branch has the obligation to establish the closed seasons and types of weapons that may be used in the hunting and fishing regulated by the law (Article 34), and its Regulation establishes the obligation to issue an annual decree with the respective regulations (Article 16), prohibiting the hunting or fishing of endangered species with the exception of sustainably conducted reproduction. In this sense, the challenged executive decree 31737-MINAE has its legal basis in Articles 6, 12, 14, and 18 of the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre.
V.The argument that sport hunting of wild species in and of itself endangers the environment and the ecological balance protected in Article 50 of the Constitution is not shared by this Chamber. This is in view of the fact that the entire regulatory scheme is based on the idea that the use and exploitation (aprovechamiento) that human beings can make of wildlife, seen as a natural resource, must be in such a way that it does not endanger the survival of species through rational use and exploitation. This is a perspective founded on the principle of sustainable development, which has constitutional support and backing in the international regulations signed by our country. Likewise, the concept of sustainable development has been developed by constitutional case law since ruling 3705-93. In this way, sport hunting constitutes a legal form of exploitation of wild fauna, subject to State regulation, control, and oversight, regardless of its ethical compatibility.
In addition to the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, the Convention for the Protection of the Flora, Fauna and Natural Scenic Beauties of the Countries of America (CITES) establishes the legal framework for the hunting activity, including sport hunting, to be exercised in a sustainable manner. To claim that the defense of Article 50 of our Constitution includes respect for life in all its forms, without exception, would imply the non-application of the principle of sustainable development. The consequences would be such that animal breeding activities for human consumption, and scientific and subsistence hunting and fishing—not just sport hunting—could not be carried out. Therefore, as the Procuraduría rightly points out in its response, Article 9.1 of the Ley de Biodiversidad must be understood in relation to the aims of conservation and sustainable use of national resources. In the specific case, this implies the State's duty to protect all existing species of flora and fauna from irrational use, understood as that which could endanger the existence of the different species.
In this sense, as long as the concept regulated by the Law conforms to the principle of rational use of natural resources, that is, sustainable development that allows for their renewal, the legislation meets the requirements of Article 50 of the Constitution and the international treaties signed by our country.
VI.However, the fact that the existence of sport hunting in itself is not unconstitutional does not mean that its specific regulation is not; that is, that Decreto 31737-MINAE, issued pursuant to the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, which regulates in detail hunting and continental/island fishing for the year 2004, respects the stated principles, which brings us to the second point of challenge in this action. Here we encounter a problem of verifying the effects that the challenged decree may be producing on the flora and fauna, given that its generic nature prevents determining the effects it produces on each species. This is precisely the central point of the plaintiffs' argument. They indicate that in the absence of specific scientific studies for each species, the authorization of sport hunting is, in itself, a violation of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment and the precautionary principle, and that, therefore, until such technical studies exist, the authorization contained in the decree to issue sport hunting licenses must be prohibited.
In support of this thesis, they cite the precedent of this Chamber set in the case of the closed season for green turtle hunting, indicating that for the decree to be constitutional, it must indicate which species can be hunted or fished, and with which weapons and methods, only based on solid technical-scientific support for each species that guarantees respect for the environment. The Procuraduría indicates that the questioned decree must withstand the constitutional test, in this case, respect for the precautionary principle, and that although there is a strictly technical-scientific field that the constitutional judge cannot evaluate, it is within their purview to verify whether the requirement as such is met, and whether it reasonably satisfies what in technical matters are called “univocal and exactly applicable technical and scientific rules” protected in Article 158.4 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública.
What this implies is that, although the Chamber does not have the technical-scientific elements to determine whether environmental protection is met for each species, in general, the decree has some technical-scientific backing that gives it a constitutional appearance, even though its particular effects cannot be broadly deduced from it given that it affects an undetermined number of species. Undoubtedly, the issue is complicated because even if the decree withstands this analysis, it is not known for certain whether it actually produces harmful effects on one or several specific species, which, as is known, due to the chain of effects, would always result in an impact on the environment in general, thereby bringing us back to the first argument raised regarding whether it is possible at all to hunt animals without affecting the environment. As can be seen, the crux of the matter lies in understanding that the balance sought by both our Constitution and our legislation is not, and cannot be, perfect, but only reasonable, that is, a rational exploitation of natural resources that allows for their renewable use.
There will always be, as a result of human intervention, an unbalancing effect on nature, whose effects must not be such that they endanger its sustainability. That being the case, it is enough for the challenged decree to have a technical-scientific basis that is credible to this Chamber to pass the constitutional test. It does not have to be the best scientific study, only one that respects “univocal and exactly applicable technical and scientific rules.” From a scientific point of view, this may be heresy, but not from a legal point of view, which has other rules of the game. It remains a concern for this Chamber that this is the case; nevertheless, it would be virtually impossible “in the abstract” to determine the effects that the application of the decree may have on each species affected by it. Therefore, the legal system has another solution for this type of case: the concrete analysis of its effects through the recurso de amparo, which is precisely meant to measure the concrete application that general regulations may have in a specific situation that results in an infringement of a fundamental right.
This does not mean, as the Procuraduría rightly warns, that the decree is not required to have technical-scientific backing. And it is here where there is a contrast between what the MINAE considers technical-scientific backing and what the appellants consider as such. The heart of the matter is that MINAE bases the drafting of the decree on the experience of its biologists with more than twenty years of experience, on particular investigations or those of national and foreign institutions, the historical behavior of the species involved, among others (as noted in official communication DM-1780-2003 of September 5, 2003, on folio 120), and the petitioners consider that for this technical-scientific study to be valid, it must be a specific study of each species. Thus, the Chamber is put in the position of choosing between two systems used, both scientific, to determine not which is better—which is not within the scope of the action, which is limited, as the Procuraduría recognizes, to determining whether respect for the precautionary principle is met, i.e., whether it has some scientifically reasonable basis that guarantees environmental protection.
We already know that nothing perfect can be expected in this matter, which is based rather on the concept of sustainable development and not on avoiding any impact on it. Within this context, for this Chamber, the challenged decree is not per se unconstitutional, as it has technical-scientific backing. Although this backing probably can and should be better, its impact on one or several specific species cannot be established in the abstract; effects that can indeed be determined through the concrete analysis of each allegedly affected species, should the case arise, via the recurso de amparo. One could say that the impossibility of knowing in the abstract whether the environmental balance is guaranteed is, in itself, proof of the violation of the precautionary principle, and this would be true, as occurred in the precedent of the sea turtle case 1250-03, were it not for the fact that the State has also provided evidence that the prohibition per se of sport hunting in general, and of certain species in particular regulated in the questioned decree, could, in turn, bring about adverse effects on the environment if not controlled, as mentioned by the Minister of Environment and Energy in their briefs on folios 157 and 205.
Evidence has even been provided of the overpopulation of several species that produce harmful effects on crops or other species, which need to be controlled through sport hunting and other methods to avoid the use of techniques that indiscriminately affect the environment, such as mass poisonings that would affect other species, including those outside the decree. In such a way that the very annulment of the challenged regulation could signify, in turn, a violation of the State's duty to guarantee a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. Thus, inevitably, the concrete effects of the challenged decree must be assessed against each specific case and with an analysis of the technical-scientific studies submitted as evidence, and not in the abstract as intended in this action.
VII-. Finally, this Chamber considers that future decrees of this kind must establish specific limits on the maximum number of licenses to be granted per zone, per species, and the number of specimens allowed, as well as establish centralized control and monitoring of the same, to avoid excesses that could result in a violation of Article 50 of our Constitution.
Por tanto:
The action is declared without merit. The Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía (MINAE) must comply with the obligation indicated in the last considerando of this judgment. Notify.
Ana Virginia Calzada M. Presidenta a.i Luis Paulino Mora M. Adrián Vargas B.
Gilbert Armijo S. Fernando Cruz C.
Horacio González Q. Jorge Araya G.
In that regard, they consider applicable the precedent of this Chamber handed down in judgment 1250-03, regarding the arbitrary and unsupervised permit for the activity of hunting sea turtles, which was granted by this Chamber.
Thus, and despite the fact that the population of the African White Rhinoceros was less than two thousand specimens and was in Appendix I of CITES when its hunting was permitted, it now numbers around fifteen thousand specimens, precisely because its conservation for harvesting as hunting trophies, which can be exported without problems to the country of origin of the hunter, is profitable. Thus, and regardless of the relative abundance or scarcity of the animal species whose hunting is permitted in the country—which, it is repeated, none of them has reduced populations and even less are in danger of extinction—and regardless of whether or not exact population censuses have been conducted to determine their number—a thing that it reiterates is impossible to do here or anywhere—what could be done to dismantle the entire Costa Rican System of Conservation Areas is to prohibit the sustainable use of biodiversity.
Drafted by Magistrate Mora Mora; and,
Considering:
I.On admissibility: The Defensoría de los Habitantes is directly legitimized to file this unconstitutionality action by express provision of the third paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. For his part, the standing (legitimación) of the claimant Nombre02 is active and direct insofar as the state duty of environmental protection safeguards a collective interest whose defense exempts the claimant from the prior issue required by the first paragraph of Article 75 of the cited law, in accordance with what is established in the second paragraph ibidem, as this Constitutional Chamber has interpreted in abundant jurisprudence when analyzing Article 50 of our Political Constitution.
II.Object of the challenge. This action aims to determine whether Articles 28 to 35 of the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre and 16 to 18 of its regulations, decreto número 26435-MINAE, as well as decreto número 31737-MINAE, are unconstitutional for being contrary to the provisions of Articles 50 and 89 of the Constitution, and what is established in international treaties on the matter, signed, approved, and ratified by the Costa Rican state.
The claimants' arguments revolve around two aspects:
It is clear from the action filing brief that both arguments refer mainly to sport hunting, although the regulations against which it was filed also regulate, in addition to the latter, the practice of scientific and subsistence hunting; in that sense, the action is deemed filed regarding sport hunting only. Likewise, it is necessary to clarify that of the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, only the articles regulating matters related to hunting were challenged, not those related to continental and insular fishing, whose regulation is contained in Articles 61 to 69 of the cited law.
III.On the merits. The challenged articles of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre regulate matters related to the practice of sport, scientific, and subsistence hunting. It textually establishes:
“ARTICLE 28.- With the objective of regulating the practice of hunting, it is classified into:
For their part, numerals 16 to 18 of the regulations to the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, decree number 26435-MINAE, indicate the basic guidelines that the executive branch must follow in establishing the closed seasons that it annually establishes by decree. In this regard, it regulates matters related to authorized hunting methods and, specifically, matters related to the type of weapons that may be used. These provisions are complemented each year by what the respective closed season decree establishes. In this way, the regulatory framework governing matters related to the practice of big and small game hunting consists of what is established in the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, Articles 28 to 35, the regulations to the law in its Articles 16 to 18, which in addition to hunting, regulates matters related to continental and insular fishing, and the corresponding closed season decree. These last two norms, the regulation and the annual closed season decree, constitute the development that, in exercise of its regulatory power, the executive branch makes of what the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre provides regarding the practice of hunting and, where applicable, continental and insular fishing.
IV.On the constitutionality of sport hunting. Costa Rican legislation uses a concept of conservation of our natural resources based on their rational use, given their renewable nature. From this point of view, the State's obligation is to ensure the adoption of legislation and actions aimed at ensuring the protection and conservation of fauna and flora with a concept of balance. Precisely, the purpose of the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre and its regulations is to regulate and maintain in a rational manner the use of wildlife without its detriment occurring. Within this context, the Executive Branch has the obligation to establish the closed seasons and types of weapons that may be used in hunting and fishing regulated by the law (Article 34), and its Regulations establish the obligation to issue an annual decree with the respective regulations (Article 16), prohibiting the hunting or fishing of species in danger of extinction with the exception of sustainably carried out reproduction. In that sense, the challenged executive decree 31737-MINAE has its legal basis in Articles 6, 12, 14, and 18 of the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre.
V.The argument that the sport hunting of wild species in itself endangers the environment and the ecological balance safeguarded in Article 50 of the Constitution is not shared by this Chamber, in view of the fact that the entire regulatory scheme is based on the idea that the use and exploitation that human beings can make of wildlife, seen as a natural resource, must be such that it cannot endanger the survival of species through their rational use and exploitation. It is a perspective grounded in the principle of sustainable development, which has constitutional support and backing in the international regulations signed by our country. Likewise, the concept of sustainable development has been developed by constitutional jurisprudence since judgment 3705-93. In this way, sport hunting constitutes a legal form of use of wild fauna, subject to State regulation, control, and oversight, regardless of its ethical compatibility.
In addition to the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere (CITES) establishes the legal framework for hunting activity, including sport hunting, to be exercised sustainably. To claim that the defense of Article 50 of our Constitution includes respect for life in all its forms, without exception, would imply the non-application of the principle of sustainable development, with consequences such that animal breeding activities for human consumption and scientific and subsistence hunting and fishing, not just sport hunting, could not be carried out. Therefore, as the Attorney General's Office rightly points out in its response, Article 9.1 of the Biodiversity Law (Ley de Biodiversidad) must be understood in relation to the purposes of conservation and sustainable use of national resources, which in the specific case implies the State's duty to protect all existing species of flora and fauna from irrational use, understood as that which could endanger the existence of the different species.
In that sense, as long as the concept that the Law regulates complies with the principle of rational use of natural resources, that is, a sustainable development that allows their renewal, the legislation meets the requirements of Article 50 of the Constitution and the international treaties signed by our country.
VI.Now, the fact that the existence of sport hunting in itself is not unconstitutional does not mean that its specific regulation is not, that is, that decreto 31737-MINAE, issued pursuant to the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, which regulates in detail continental and insular hunting and fishing for the year 2004, is respectful of the indicated principles, which brings us to the second point of challenge of this action. Here we encounter a problem of verifying the effects that the challenged decree may be producing on flora and fauna, given that its generic nature prevents determining the effects it produces on each species. This is precisely the central point of the claimants' argument, who indicate that in the absence of specific scientific studies for each species, the authorization of sport hunting in itself is a violation of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment and of the precautionary principle, and that therefore, until such technical studies exist, the authorization contained in the decree to issue sport hunting licenses must be prohibited.
In support of this thesis, they cite the precedent of this Chamber issued in the case of the closed season on green turtle hunting, indicating that for the decree to be constitutional, it must indicate which species may be hunted or fished, and with what weapons and methods, only based on solid technical-scientific backing for each species that guarantees respect for the environment. The Attorney General's Office indicates that the questioned decree must withstand the constitutional test, in this case respect for the precautionary principle, and that although there is a strictly technical-scientific scope that the constitutional judge cannot evaluate, it is their responsibility to verify whether the requirement as such is met, and whether this reasonably satisfies what in technical matters are called “univocal scientific and technical rules of exact application” safeguarded in Article 158.4 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública.
What this implies is that although the Chamber does not have the technical-scientific elements to determine whether environmental protection is met for each species, in general the decree has some technical-scientific backing that gives it a constitutional character, even if its particular effects cannot be roughly inferred from it given that it affects an indeterminate number of species. Undoubtedly, the issue is complicated because even if the decree withstands that analysis, it is not known for certain whether it actually produces harmful effects on one or several specific species which, as is known, due to the chain of its effects would always result in an impact on the environment in general, which brings us back to the first argument raised about whether it is possible at all to hunt animals without affecting the environment. As can be seen, the crux of the matter is understanding that the balance sought by both our Constitution and our legislation is not and cannot be perfect, but only reasonable, that is, a rational use of natural resources that allows their renewable use.
There will always be a disequilibrating effect on nature as a result of human intervention, the effects of which must not be such that they endanger its sustainability. Thus, it is sufficient that the challenged decree has a technical-scientific basis that deserves this Chamber's faith to pass the constitutionality test. It does not have to be the best scientific study, only one that respects the “univocal scientific and technical rules of exact application,” which from a scientific point of view may be a heresy, but not from the legal point of view, which has other rules of the game. It remains a concern for this Chamber that this is so; nonetheless, it would be virtually impossible “in abstracto” to determine the effects that the application of the decree could have on each species affected by it, for which reason the legal system has another solution for this type of case, which is the concrete analysis of its effects, through the amparo appeal, which is precisely for measuring the concrete application that general regulations may have in a specific situation that results in an impact on a fundamental right.
This does not mean, as the Attorney General's Office rightly warns, that the decree is not required to have technical-scientific backing, and it is here where a contradiction arises between what MINAE considers technical-scientific backing and what the appellants consider as such. The heart of the matter is that MINAE bases the preparation of the decree on the experience of its biologists with more than twenty years of experience, on particular investigations or those of national and foreign institutions, the historical behavior of the species involved, among others, (as indicated in official communication DM-1780-2003 of September five, two thousand three on folio 120), and the claimants consider that this technical-scientific study, to be valid, must be a specific study of each species. Thus, the Chamber is made to choose between two systems used, both scientific, to determine not which is the best, which is not within the scope of the action, which is limited, as the Attorney General's Office recognizes, to determining whether respect for the precautionary principle is met, that is, whether it has some scientifically reasonable basis that guarantees environmental protection, since we already know that nothing perfect can be expected in this matter, which is based rather on the concept of sustainable development and not on any impact on it.
Within that context, for this Chamber, the challenged decree is not per se unconstitutional, as it has technical-scientific backing that, although it probably can and should be better, its impact on one or several specific species cannot be established in abstracto, effects that can indeed be achieved through the concrete analysis of each supposedly affected species, if the case arises, by means of the amparo appeal. It could be said that the impossibility of knowing in abstracto whether the environmental balance is guaranteed is in itself proof of the violation of the precautionary principle, and this would be true, as resulted in the precedent of the sea turtle case 1250-03, were it not for the fact that the State has also provided evidence that the per se prohibition of sport hunting in general, and of certain species in particular regulated in the questioned decree, could in turn bring adverse effects on the environment if not controlled, as mentioned by the Minister of Environment and Energy in his briefs on folios 157 and 205.
Even evidence has been provided of the overpopulation of several species that produce harmful effects on crops or on other species, which need to be controlled through sport hunting and other methods to avoid the use of techniques that indiscriminately affect the environment, such as mass poisonings that would affect other species, even those not covered by the decree, such that the very annulment of the challenged regulations could in turn mean a violation of the state's duty to guarantee a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. Thus, inevitably, the concrete effects of the challenged decree must be assessed against each specific case and with analysis of the technical-scientific studies submitted as evidence, and not in abstracto as intended in this action.
VII-. Finally, this Chamber considers that future decrees of this kind must establish specific limits on the maximum number of licenses to be granted per zone, per species, and the number of allowed specimens, as well as establish centralized control and monitoring of the same, to avoid excesses that could result in a violation of Article 50 of our Constitution.
Therefore:
The action is declared without merit. The Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía (MINAE) must comply with the obligation indicated in the last considering clause of this judgment. Notify.
</p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center"><span style="font-family:Arial">Acting President</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> Luis Paulino Mora M.</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">Adrián Vargas B.</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> Gilbert Armijo S.</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">Fernando Cruz C.</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> Horacio González Q.</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">Jorge Araya G. </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt"><span> </span></p> answers the hearing granted on page 41, stating that the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre (Wildlife Conservation Law) number 7317 aims to regulate and rationally manage the use of wildlife, without detriment to it, in accordance with the challenged legal regulations, and that article 34 of the Ley de Conservación a la Vida Silvestre (Wildlife Conservation Law) gives the Executive Branch the power to establish closed seasons and types of weapons that may be used in the hunting and fishing regulated by law.
Likewise, that article 16 of the Reglamento a la Ley de la Conservación a la Vida Silvestre (Regulation to the Wildlife Conservation Law) establishes that an annual Decreto Ejecutivo (Executive Decree) must be issued with the respective regulations, prohibiting the hunting or fishing of species not included in the lists of minor and major game species. It is precisely in accordance with that regulation that Decreto Ejecutivo 31737 MINAE is supported, which grants the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre (General Directorate of Wildlife) the power to plan, develop, and control continental or insular, aquatic, and terrestrial wildlife throughout the national territory, establishing procedures and requirements for its conservation, and also prohibiting the hunting, fishing, and extraction of continental or insular flora and fauna of endangered species, with the exception of sustainably conducted reproduction.
It explains that the species included in Decreto Ejecutivo 31737-MINAE respond to a cultural pattern that has been maintained through time, and that despite the practice of hunting, populations are maintained in forest areas, being subject to hunting due to their reproductive potential. It states that although direct population censuses have not been conducted for most of these species, MINAE technicians have been able to determine the good condition of the populations through indirect methods such as sightings and hunter reports, whose sustainable use is permitted; nor is an exact count needed to conclude that some species, such as piches, collajera pigeons, purple pigeons, and some migratory species like the blue-winged teal (cerceta aliazul), white-winged dove (paloma ala blanca), and rice pigeon (paloma arrocera), constitute large populations, sometimes damaging crops like blackberry, sorghum, corn, and rice, precisely due to their high biotic potential (potencial biótico) that allows them to reproduce very quickly, producing multiple litters per year.
It explains that controlled hunting when population peaks occur avoids much more harmful practices such as mass poisonings, which in turn often cause irreversible damage to other species, such as foxes, weasels, and birds of prey that die by the thousands from eating the poisoned meat. It is considered that the available habitat for the species authorized for hunting is assured, in a good proportion, by the National System of Conservation Areas declared by MINAE, as they occupy more than twenty-five percent of the national territory. To carry out a correct study, the only thing that can be obtained are population indices to assist in decision-making for wild species management, as not even developed countries have absolute population studies. Currently, two hundred thirty-nine species of mammals have been described in the country, of which twelve species are subject to controlled hunting, representing five percent of the total, which does not endanger the environment and ecological balance.
Regarding birds, eight hundred forty species have been described, of which seventeen are subject to hunting, representing two percent of the total species in the country. One of the greatest threats and causes of greatest damage to wildlife species is illegal and furtive hunting by inhabitants surrounding these protected areas, as the number of authorized pieces and reproduction seasons are not respected, they hunt all types of animals, male or female, and use unauthorized methods. The species whose harvest has been permitted over the last thirty-five years or more through Closed Season Tables (Cuadros de Veda), which are adjusted when deemed necessary according to reproduction periods, have maintained their populations in relation to the available habitat, as occurs with pigeons, local and migratory ducks that have increased exponentially due to changes in agriculture, from the sowing of products such as sorghum, corn, rice, beans, etc. It emphasizes that in drafting the decrees, research conducted by experts at a private level and with national and foreign institutions was used.
Likewise, the experience of officials in the biology field was used. It considers that a possible declaration of unconstitutionality of the mentioned articles would cause an excessive increase in illegal hunting, which would have a negative effect on wildlife species populations. In some countries, total bans have been declared, an action that has caused havoc in the natural populations of wild animals. It concludes by indicating that the implications of a declaration of unconstitutionality of articles 28 to 34 of the Law and 16 to 18 of the Reglamento de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre (Regulation to the Wildlife Conservation Law) would bring inconvenient consequences, placing the country at the forefront of their conservation and management, as has unfortunately occurred in countries like India, Kenya, and Venezuela, which, with similar regulations, managed to tie the hands of Wildlife biologists, who could not stop the drastic decline of their wild animal populations.
Therefore, if these articles are eliminated from the legal system, there would be a lack of adequate control over the practice of hunting and a census of those who practice it, as well as the obtaining of results of scientific interest. Another important point to consider is the existence of people who, due to their difficult economic situation, generally residents of areas far from the urban core of our country, use wild animal hunting as a means of obtaining cheap protein, and through these regulations, they have been able to be detected and appropriately regulated. Regarding article 11 of the Ley de la Biodiversidad (Biodiversity Law), there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the practice of sport hunting has caused damage to the wildlife species populations subject to this activity. It affirms that resolution 9.24 of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora does not harm the pro natura principle, given that the animals whose controlled hunting is permitted do not threaten the conservation and survival of the species, especially since said regulation is only applicable to species that are subject to international trade.
The Sala Constitucional (Constitutional Chamber) has understood the environment as a potential for development to be used appropriately, requiring integrated action in its natural, sociocultural, technological, and political relations; otherwise, its productivity would degrade for the present and the future and would put the heritage of future generations at risk. It requests that the filed action of unconstitutionality be declared without merit.
Drafted by Magistrate Mora Mora; and,
Considering:
I.On admissibility: The Defensoría de los Habitantes is directly legitimized to file this action of unconstitutionality by express provision of the third paragraph of article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. For its part, the standing of the plaintiff Nombre02 is active and direct, insofar as the State's duty to protect the environment safeguards a collective interest whose defense exempts the plaintiff from the prior matter required by the first paragraph of article 75 of the cited law, in accordance with the second paragraph of the same, as this Sala Constitucional has interpreted in abundant jurisprudence when analyzing article 50 of our Constitución Política.
II.Object of the challenge. This action aims to determine whether articles 28 to 35 of the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre and 16 to 18 of its regulation, decree number 26435-MINAE, as well as decree number 31737-MINAE, are unconstitutional for being contrary to the provisions of articles 50 and 89 of the Constitution, and what is established by international treaties on the matter, signed, approved, and ratified by the Costa Rican state.
The arguments of the plaintiffs revolve around two aspects:
Likewise, that this violates the provisions of the Convention for the Conservation of Biodiversity and Protection of Priority Wilderness Areas in Central America, Law No. 7433, and the principle contained in Article 9.1 of the Biodiversity Law (LB) No. 7788 of April 30, 1998.
It is clear from the filing brief of the action that both arguments refer, mainly, to sport hunting (cacería deportiva), although the regulations against which it was filed regulate, in addition to the latter, the exercise of scientific hunting (cacería científica) and subsistence hunting (cacería de subsistencia); in that sense, the action is deemed filed as to sport hunting only. Likewise, it should be clarified that of the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre), only the articles regulating matters related to hunting were challenged, not those related to continental and insular fishing, whose regulation is contained in Articles 61 to 69 of the cited law.
III.On the merits. The challenged articles of the Wildlife Conservation Law regulate matters related to the exercise of hunting, sport, scientific, and subsistence. They textually establish:
"ARTICLE 28.- With the objective of regulating the exercise of hunting, this is classified into:
For their part, numerals 16 to 18 of the regulations to the Wildlife Conservation Law, Decree No. 26435-MINAE, indicate the basic guidelines that the executive branch must follow in establishing the closed seasons that it annually establishes by decree. In this sense, it regulates matters related to authorized hunting methods and, specifically, matters related to the type of weapons that may be used. These provisions come to be complemented each year by what the respective closed season decree establishes. In this manner, the regulatory framework that regulates matters related to the exercise of big game (caza mayor) and small game (caza menor) hunting is constituted by what the Wildlife Conservation Law establishes, Articles 28 to 35, the regulations to the law in its Articles 16 to 18, which in addition to hunting, regulates matters related to continental and insular fishing, and the corresponding closed season decree. These last two norms, the regulations and the annual closed season decree, come to be the development that, in exercise of its normative power, the executive branch makes of what the Wildlife Conservation Law provides on the exercise of hunting and, as applicable, continental and insular fishing.
IV.On the constitutionality of sport hunting. Costa Rican legislation uses a concept of conservation of our natural resources based on their rational use, given their renewable nature. From this point of view, the State's obligation is to ensure the adoption of legislation and actions aimed at ensuring the protection and conservation of fauna and flora with a concept of balance. Precisely, the Wildlife Conservation Law and its regulations aim to regulate and maintain the use of wildlife in a rational manner without causing detriment to it. Within this context, the Executive Branch has the obligation to establish the closed seasons and types of weapons that may be used in the hunting and fishing regulated by the law (Article 34), and its Regulations establish the obligation to issue an annual decree with the respective regulations (Article 16), prohibiting the hunting or fishing of endangered species with the exception of sustainably conducted reproduction. In that sense, the challenged Executive Decree 31737-MINAE has its legal basis in Articles 6, 12, 14, and 18 of the Wildlife Conservation Law.
V.The argument that sport hunting of wild species in itself endangers the environment and the ecological balance protected in Article 50 of the Constitution is not shared by this Chamber, in view that the entire normative scheme is based on the use and utilization (aprovechamiento) that human beings can make of wildlife, viewed as a natural resource, in such a way that it cannot endanger the survival of species through its rational use and exploitation. This is a perspective founded on the principle of sustainable development that has constitutional support and backing in the international regulations signed by our country. Likewise, the concept of sustainable development has been developed by constitutional jurisprudence since ruling 3705-93. In this way, sport hunting constitutes a legal form of utilization of wild fauna, subject to State regulation, control, and oversight, independently of its ethical compatibility.
In addition to the Wildlife Conservation Law, the Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the Western Hemisphere (CITES) establishes the legal framework so that the activity of hunting, including sport hunting, is exercised in a sustainable manner. Attempting to claim that the defense of Article 50 of our Constitution includes respect for life in all its forms, without exception, would imply the disapplication of the principle of sustainable development, with consequences such that animal husbandry activities for human consumption and scientific and subsistence hunting and fishing could not be carried out, not just sport hunting, so that as the Attorney General's Office rightly points out in its response, Article 9.1 of the Biodiversity Law must be understood in relation to the goals of conservation and sustainable use of national resources, which in the specific case implies the State's duty to protect all existing species of flora and fauna from irrational use, understood as that which could endanger the existence of the different species.
In that sense, as long as the concept that the Law regulates conforms to the principle of rational use of natural resources, that is, of a sustainable development that allows their renewal, the legislation satisfies the requirements of Article 50 of the Constitution and the international treaties signed by our country.
VI.Now then, the fact that the existence of sport hunting by itself is not unconstitutional does not mean that its specific regulation is not; that is, that Decree 31737-MINAE, issued in accordance with the Wildlife Conservation Law, which regulates in detail hunting and continental and insular fishing for the year 2004, is respectful of the indicated principles, which brings us to the second point of challenge in this action. Here we encounter a problem of verifying the effects that the challenged decree may be producing on flora and fauna, given that its generic nature prevents determining the effects it produces on each species. This is precisely the central point of the plaintiffs' argument, who indicate that in the absence of specific scientific studies for each species, the authorization of sport hunting in itself results in a violation of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment and of the precautionary principle (principio precautorio), and that therefore, until such technical studies exist, the authorization contained in the decree to issue sport hunting licenses must be prohibited.
In support of that thesis, they cite the precedent of this Chamber issued in the case of the closed season on green turtle hunting, indicating that for the decree to be constitutional, it must indicate which species may be hunted or fished, and with what weapons and methods, only based on solid technical-scientific backing for each species that guarantees respect for the environment. The Attorney General's Office indicates that the questioned decree must withstand the constitutional test, in this case respect for the precautionary principle, and that although there exists a strictly technical-scientific scope that the constitutional judge cannot enter to evaluate, it is indeed his or her responsibility to verify whether the requirement, as such, is met, and whether it reasonably satisfies what in technical matters are called "technical and scientific rules of unambiguous meaning and exact application" protected in Article 158.4 of the General Law of Public Administration.
What this implies is that although the Chamber does not have the technical-scientific elements to determine if environmental protection is fulfilled for each species, in general the decree has some technical-scientific backing that gives it a constitutional nuance, even if its particular effects cannot be deduced *grosso modo* from it given that it affects an indeterminate number of species. Undoubtedly, the topic is complicated because even if the decree withstands that analysis, it is not known for certain whether it actually produces harmful effects on one or several specific species which, as is known, due to the chain of its effects would always result in an impact on the environment in general, with which we return to the first argument raised regarding whether it is at all possible to hunt animals without affecting the environment. As can be seen, the heart of the matter is in understanding that the balance that both our Constitution and our legislation seek is not and cannot be perfect, but only reasonable, that is, a rational utilization of natural resources that permits their renewable use.
There will always be, as a product of human intervention, an unbalancing effect on nature, the effects of which must not be such that they endanger its sustainability. Thus, the matter stands; it is enough that the challenged decree has a technical-scientific basis that deserves faith from this Chamber to overcome the constitutionality test. It does not have to be the best scientific study, only one that respects the "technical and scientific rules of unambiguous meaning and exact application," which from a scientific point of view may be a heresy, but not from the legal point of view which has other rules of the game. This being so does not cease to be a concern for this Chamber; however, it would be virtually impossible to determine "in the abstract" the effects that the application of the decree may have on each species affected by it, for which reason the legal system has another solution for this type of case, which is the concrete analysis of its effects, through the recurso de amparo, which is precisely for measuring the concrete application that the general regulation may have in a specific situation that results in an impact on a fundamental right.
That does not mean, as the Attorney General's Office rightly warns, that the decree is not obligated to have technical-scientific backing, and it is here where a contrast occurs between what the MINAE considers technical-scientific backing and what the appellants consider as such. The center of the matter is that the MINAE bases the elaboration of the decree on the experience of its biologists with more than twenty years of experience, on particular investigations or those of national and foreign institutions, the historical behavior of the involved species, among others (as indicated in official letter DM-1780-2003 of September 5, 2003 on folio 120), and the petitioners consider that said technical-scientific study, to be valid, must be a specific study of each species. Thus, the matter before the Chamber is to choose between two systems used, both scientific, to determine, not which is better, which is not within the scope of the action, which is limited, as the Attorney General's Office recognizes, to determining if respect for the precautionary principle is complied with, that is, if it has some scientifically reasonable basis that guarantees environmental protection, since we already know that nothing perfect can be intended in this matter, which is based rather on the concept of sustainable development and not on any impact upon it.
Within that context, for this Chamber, the challenged decree is not unconstitutional *per se*, since it has technical-scientific backing that, although it probably can and should be better, its impact on one or several specific species cannot be established in the abstract, effects that can indeed be achieved through the concrete analysis of each supposedly affected species, should the case arise, by means of the recurso de amparo. It could be said that the impossibility of knowing in the abstract whether the environmental balance is guaranteed is in itself proof of the violation of the precautionary principle, and that would be true, as resulted in the precedent of the case of the marine turtles 1250-03, were it not because the State has also provided evidence that the *per se* prohibition of sport hunting in general and of certain species in particular regulated in the questioned decree can, in turn, bring adverse effects on the environment if not controlled, as mentioned by the Minister of Environment and Energy in his briefs on folios 157 and 205.
Even evidence has been provided of the overpopulation of various species that produce harmful effects on crops or on other species, which need to be controlled through sport hunting and other methods to avoid the use of techniques that indiscriminately affect the environment, such as mass poisonings that would affect other species, including those outside the decree, in such a way that the very annulment of the challenged regulation could signify, in turn, a violation of the State's duty to guarantee a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. Thus, things stand; inevitably, the concrete effects of the challenged decree must be assessed against each specific case and with an analysis of the technical-scientific studies that are submitted as evidence, and not in the abstract as is intended in this action.
VII.Finally, this Chamber considers that future decrees of this kind must establish specific limits on the number of maximum licenses to be granted per zone, per species, and the number of pieces allowed, as well as establish centralized control and monitoring of the same, to avoid excesses that could result in a violation of Article 50 of our Constitution.
Por tanto:
The action is declared without merit. The Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE) must comply with the obligation indicated in the last considerando of this judgment. Let it be notified.
Presidenta a.i Luis Paulino Mora M. Adrián Vargas B.
Gilbert Armijo S. Fernando Cruz C.
Horacio González Q. Jorge Araya G.
*040075730007CO* *040075730007CO* Res. Nº 2006-010973 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las dieciocho horas y cinco minutos del veintiséis de julio del dos mil seis.
Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por Nombre01, mayor, casado una vez, abogado, portador de la cédula de identidad CED01, Defensor de los Habitantes de la República y Nombre02, con único apellido en razón de su nacionalidad canadiense, mayor, casado una vez, empresario, cédula de residencia número uno dos cinco- uno cuatro cero tres cinco cero- cero cero cero siete siete siete, vecino de la Garita de Alajuela, en su calidad de Presidente de la Fundación Restauración de la Naturaleza, titular de la persona jurídica número tres- cero cero seis- ciento setenta y un mil quinientos cincuenta y tres, contra el Decreto Ejecutivo # 31737 MINAE, los artículos 28 al 34 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre y 16 al 18 de su Reglamento, Decreto Ejecutivo # 26435-MINAE. Intervinieron también en el proceso Allan René Flores Moya, Ministro del Ambiente y Energía a.i y Farid Beirute Brenes en representación de la Procuraduría General de la República.
Como coadyuvantes intervienen Ruth Solano Vásquez, cédula de identidad CED02, Presidenta de la Asociación de Justicia para la Naturaleza, cédula jurídica número tres-cero cero dos-uno uno cero cero cero tres cuatro-treinta y dos, Luis Diego Marín Schumacher, cédula de identidad CED03, Presidente de APREFLOFAS, Asociación Preservacionista de Flora y Fauna Silvestre, cédula jurídica tres cero cero dos-cero siete uno seis siete seis-treinta y dos, Ignacio Escorriola Giovannini, cédula de identidad CED04, Fiscal de Vida, Asociación de Voluntariado, Investigación y Desarrollo Ambiental, cédula jurídica CED05, Randall Arauz Vargas, cédula de identidad CED06, Presidente de Pretoma, Asociación Programa Restauración de Tortugas Marinas, cédula jurídica CED07, María Elena Founier, cédula de identidad CED08, Presidenta de la Asociación Conservacionista Yisky, Noemí Canet Moya, cédula de identidad CED09, Presidenta del Colegio de Biólogos; Luis Diego Acuña Delcore, cédula de identidad CED10. .
Resultando:
Redacta el Magistrado Mora Mora; y,
Considerando:
I.Sobre la admisibilidad: La Defensoría de los Habitantes está directamente legitimada para interponer esta acción de inconstitucionalidad por disposición expresa del párrafo tercero del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Por su parte, la legitimación del accionante Nombre02, es activa y directa en el tanto el deber estatal de protección del ambiente tutela un interés colectivo cuya defensa exime al accionante del asunto previo exigido por el párrafo primero del artículo 75 de la citada ley, de conformidad con lo que establece el párrafo segundo ibídem, tal y como lo ha interpretado esta Sala Constitucional en abundante jurisprudencia al analizar el artículo 50 de nuestra Constitución Política.
II.Objeto de la impugnación. Esta acción tiene por objeto determinar si los artículos 28 a 35 de la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre y 16 a 18 de su reglamento, decreto número 26435-MINAE, así como el decreto número 31737- MINAE, son inconstitucionales por ser contrarios a lo que disponen los artículos 50 y 89 de la Constitución, y lo que establecen los tratados internacionales sobre la materia, suscritos aprobados y ratificados por el estado costarricense.
Los argumentos de los accionantes giran en torno a dos aspectos:
Queda claro del escrito de interposición de la acción que ambos argumentos se refieren, principalmente, a la cacería deportiva, aunque la normativa contra la cual fue interpuesta regula, además de esta última, el ejercicio de la cacería científica y la de subsistencia, en ese sentido se tiene por interpuesta la acción en cuanto a la cacería deportiva únicamente. Asimismo cabe aclarar que de la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre sólo fue impugnado el articulado que regula lo relacionado con la caza, no así lo relacionado con la pesca continental e insular, cuya regulación está contenida en los artículos 61 a 69 de la citada ley.
III.Sobre el fondo. Los artículos de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre impugnados, regulan lo relacionado con el ejercicio de la caza, deportiva, científica y de subsistencia. Establece textualmente:
“ARTICULO 28.- Con el objetivo de regular el ejercicio de la caza, esta se clasifica en:
Por su parte, los numerales 16 al 18 del reglamento a la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, decreto número 26435-MINAE, señalan los lineamientos básicos que debe seguir el poder ejecutivo en el establecimiento de la vedas que anualmente establece por medio de decreto. En este sentido, regula lo relativo a los métodos de caza autorizados y, específicamente, lo relacionado con el tipo de armas que pueden ser utilizadas. Estas disposiciones vienen a ser complementadas cada año con lo que establece el respectivo decreto de vedas. De esta manera, el marco normativo que regula lo relativo al ejercicio de la caza mayor y menor, está constituido por lo que establece la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, artículos 28 a 35, el reglamento a la ley en sus artículos 16 a 18, que además de la caza, regula lo relativo a la pesca continental e insular, y el correspondiente decreto de vedas. Estas últimas dos normas, el reglamento y el decreto anual de vedas, vienen a ser el desarrollo que, en ejercicio de su potestad normativa, el poder ejecutivo hace de lo que dispone la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre sobre el ejercicio de la caza y, en su caso, de la pesca continental e insular.
IV.Sobre la constitucionalidad de la caza deportiva. La legislación costarricense utiliza un concepto de conservación de nuestros recursos naturales basado en el uso racional de los mismos, dada su naturaleza renovable. Desde este punto de vista la obligación del Estado es velar por la adopción de legislación y acciones tendentes a asegurar la protección y conservación de la fauna y la flora con un concepto de equilibrio. Precisamente la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre y su reglamento tiene como objeto regular y mantener en forma racional el uso de la vida silvestre sin que se de un detrimento de ésta. Dentro de este contexto el Poder Ejecutivo tiene la obligación de establecer las vedas y tipos de armas que se podrán utilizar en la caza y pesca que regula la ley (artículo 34) y su Reglamento establece la obligación de emitir un decreto anual con las regulaciones respectivas (artículo 16) prohibiéndose la caza o la pesca de las especies en vías de extinción con excepción de la reproducción efectuada sosteniblemente. En ese sentido el decreto ejecutivo 31737- MINAE impugnado, tiene su sustento jurídico en los artículos 6, 12, 14 y 18 de la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre.
V.El argumento de que la cacería deportiva de especies silvestres por sí mismo pone en peligro el ambiente y el equilibrio ecológico tutelado en el artículo 50 de la Constitución, no es compartido por esta Sala, en vista de que todo el esquema normativo se basa en que el uso y aprovechamiento que el ser humano puede hacer de la vida silvestre, vista como recurso natural, de tal forma que no puede poner en peligro la superviviencia de las especies con su uso y explotación racional. Se trata de una perspectiva fundamentada en el principio de desarrollo sostenible que tiene sustento constitucional y respaldo en la normativa internacional suscrita por nuestro país. Asimismo el concepto de desarrollo sostenible ha sido desarrollado por la jurisprudencia constitucional a partir de la sentencia 3705-93. De esta forma la cacería deportiva constituye una forma legal de aprovechamiento de la fauna silvestre, sometida a regulación, control y fiscalización del Estado, independientemente de su compatibilidad ética.
Además de la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, la Convención para la Protección de la Flora, Fauna y Bellezas Escénicas Naturales de los Países de América (CITES), establece el marco jurídico para que la actividad de la caza, incluida la deportiva, se ejerza en forma sostenible. Pretender que la defensa del artículo 50 de nuestra Constitución incluye el respeto a la vida en todas sus formas, sin excepción, implicaría la desaplicación del principio de desarrollo sostenible, con consecuencias tales que no podrían realizarse actividades de crianza de animales pare el consumo humano y de la caza y pesca científica y de subsistencia, no sólo la deportiva, por lo que como bien lo apunta la Procuraduría en su respuesta, el artículo 9.1 de la Ley de Biodiversidad hay que entenderlo en relación con los fines de conservación y uso sostenible de los recursos nacionales, lo que en el caso concreto implica, el deber del Estado de proteger a todas las especies de flora y fauna existentes del uso irracional entendido como aquél que pueda poner en peligro la existencia de las distintas especies.
En ese sentido, mientras que el concepto que la Ley regula sea conforme al principio de uso racional de los recursos naturales, es decir de un desarrollo sostenible que permita su renovación, la legislación cumple con las exigencias del artículo 50 de la Constitución y los tratados internacionales suscritos por nuestro país.
VI.Ahora bien, el hecho de que la existencia de la caza deportiva por sí misma no sea inconstitucional, no quiere decir que su regulación específica no lo sea, es decir, que el decreto 31737-MINAE, dictado conforme a la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, que regula en detalle la caza y pesca continental e insular para el año 2004, sea respetuosa de los principios señalados, lo cual nos lleva al segundo punto de impugnación de esta acción. Aquí nos topamos con un problema de comprobación de los efectos que el decreto impugnado pueda estar produciendo en la flora y fauna, dado que su naturaleza genérica, impide determinar los efectos que en cada especie produce. Este es precisamente el punto central del argumento de los actores que señalan que al no existir estudios científicos específicos para cada especie, la autorización de caza deportiva en sí misma resulta violatoria del derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado y del principio precautorio, y que por lo tanto, hasta tanto no existan tales estudios técnicos, la autorización contenida en el decreto para emitir licencias de caza deportiva debe ser prohibida.
En apoyo a esa tesis, citan el antecedente de esta Sala dictado en el caso de la veda a la caza de la tortuga verde, indicando que el decreto para ser constitucional debe indicar cuales especies se pueden cazar o pescar, y con qué armas y métodos, sólo a partir de un sólido respaldo técnico científico para cada especie que garantice el respeto al ambiente. La Procuraduría indica que el decreto cuestionado debe resistir el test constitucional en este caso el respeto al principio precautorio, y que aunque existe un ámbito estrictamente técnico científico que el juez constitucional no puede entrar a valorar, sí le corresponde constatar si el requisito en cuanto a tal, se cumple, y si éste razonablemente satisface lo que en materia técnica se llaman “reglas técnicas y científicas de sentido unívoco y aplicación exacta” tutelado en el artículo 158.4 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública.
Lo que esto implica es que si bien la Sala no tiene los elementos técnico-científicos para determinar si en cada especie se cumple con la protección del ambiente, en general el decreto - tiene algún respaldo técnico científico que le de un matiz constitucional, aún y cuando sus efectos particulares no se puedan desprender grosso modo del mismo dado que afecta a un número indeterminado de especies. Sin duda que el tema es complicado porque aunque el decreto resista ese análisis, no se sabe si a ciencia cierta en realidad produce efectos nocivos en una o varias especies determinadas que, como se sabe, debido a la cadena de sus efectos resultaría siempre en una afectación del ambiente en general, con lo cual volvemos a caer en el primer argumento planteado sobre si es posible del todo cazar animales sin afectar el ambiente. Como puede verse el quid del asunto está en entender que el equilibrio que pretenden tanto nuestra Constitución como nuestra legislación no es ni puede ser perfecto, sino únicamente razonable es decir de un aprovechamiento racional de los recursos naturales que permita su uso renovable.
Siempre habrá producto de la intervención del ser humano un efecto desequilibrante en la naturaleza, cuyos efectos no deben ser tales que pongan en peligro su sostenibilidad. Así las cosas, basta con que el decreto impugnado tenga una base técnico científica que le merezca fe a esta Sala, para superar el test de constitucionalidad. No tiene que ser el mejor estudio científico, sólo aquél que respete las “reglas técnicas y científicas de sentido unívoco y aplicación exacta”, lo cual desde el punto de vista científico puede resultar una herejía, pero no desde el punto de vista legal que tiene otras reglas del juego. No deja de ser una preocupación para esta Sala que ello sea así, no obstante sería virtualmente imposible “en abstracto” determinar los efectos que la aplicación del decreto pueda tener en cada especie afectada por el mismo, por lo cual el sistema legal tiene otra solución para este tipo de casos y es el análisis concreto de sus efectos, mediante el recurso de amparo que es precisamente para medir la aplicación concreta que la normativa general pueda tener en una situación concreta que derive en una afectación de un derecho fundamental.
Eso no quiere decir, como bien lo advierte la Procuraduría que el decreto no esté obligado a tener un respaldo técnico científico, y es aquí donde se da una contraposición en entre lo que el Minae considera un respaldo técnico-científico y lo que los recurrentes consideran como tal. El centro del asunto está en que el Minae basa la elaboración del decreto en la experiencia de sus biólogos de más de veinte años de experiencia, de investigaciones particulares o de instituciones nacionales y extranjeros, el comportamiento histórico de las especies involucradazas, entre otros,(como seseñala en el oficio DM-1780-2003 del cinco de setiembre del 2003 a folio 120), y los accionantes estiman que ese estudio técnico científico para ser válido debe ser un estudio específico de cada especie. Así las cosas, se pone a la Sala a escoger entre dos sistemas utilizados, ambos científicos, para determinar, no cuál es el mejor, lo cual no está dentro de los alcances de la acción, que se limita como lo reconoce la Procuraduría, a determinar si se cumple con el respeto al principio precautorio es decir, si el mismo tiene alguna base científicamente razonable que garantice la protección al medio ambiente, pues ya sabemos que no puede pretenderse nada perfecto en esta materia que se basa más bien en el concepto de desarrollo sostenible y no en toda afectación del mismo.
Dentro de ese contexto, para esta Sala no resulta per sé inconstitucional el decreto impugnado, pues tiene un respaldo técnico-científico que, aunque probablemente puede y debe ser mejor, no se puede establecer en abstracto su afectación sobre una o varias especies determinadas, efectos que sí se pueden lograr mediante el análisis concreto de cada especie supuestamente afectada, si se diera el caso, por medio del recurso de amparo. Podría decirse que la imposibilidad de saber en abstracto si el equilibrio ambiental está garantizado es por sí mismo la prueba de la violación al principio precautorio, y ello sería cierto, como resultó en el antecedente del caso de las tortugas marinas 1250-03, si no fuera porque el Estado también ha aportado prueba de que la prohibición per sé de la caza deportiva en general y de ciertas especies en particular reguladas en el decreto cuestionado, pueden traer a su vez efectos adversos sobre el ambiente de no ser controladas, como lo menciona el Ministro de Ambiente y Energía en sus escritos de folios 157 y 205.
Incluso se ha aportado prueba de la sobrepoblación de varias especies que producen efectos nocivos sobre cultivos o sobre otras especies, que requieren ser controlados por medio de la caza deportiva y otros métodos para evitar el uso de técnicas que afectan indiscriminadamente el ambiente, como son los envenenamientos masivos que afectarían otras especies, incluso las que están fuera del decreto, de tal forma que la propia anulación de la normativa impugnada podría significar, a su vez, una violación al deber del estado de garantizar un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado. Así las cosas inevitablemente los efectos concretos del decreto impugnado, deberán de valorarse frente a cada caso específico y con análisis de los estudios técnico-científicos que como prueba sean sometidos y no en abstracto como se pretende en esta acción.
VII-. Finalmente estima esta Sala que los decretos futuros de esta especie deben establecer límites determinados sobre el número de licencias máximas a otorgar por zona, por especie y el número de piezas permitidas, así como establecer un control y monitoreo centralizado de las mismas, para evitar excesos que pudieran resultar en una violación al artículo 50 de nuestra Constitución.
Por tanto:
Se declara sin lugar la acción. Debe el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía (MINAE) cumplir con la obligación señalada en el último considerando de esta sentencia. Notifíquese.
Ana Virginia Calzada M.
Presidenta a.i Luis Paulino Mora M. Adrián Vargas B.
Gilbert Armijo S. Fernando Cruz C.
Horacio González Q. Jorge Araya G.
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