Partial Annulment of Decree 28174 for Undermining Archaeological Heritage ProtectionAnulación parcial del Decreto 28174 por desprotección del patrimonio arqueológico

Executive Decree 28174-MP-C-MINAE-MEIC Case File: 99-007926-0007-CO Resolution: 2002-05245 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at sixteen hours and twenty minutes on the twenty-ninth of May of two thousand two.- Action of unconstitutionality brought by Sandra Piszk Feinzilber, in her capacity as Defender of the Inhabitants of the Republic, and Gabriel Macaya Trejos, in his capacity as Rector of the University of Costa Rica, against Executive Decree number 28174-mp-minae-MEIC, of the twelfth of October of nineteen ninety-nine, published in Supplement number 78-A to La Gaceta number 202, of the nineteenth of October of nineteen ninety-nine, as well as particularly against Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 15, 16, and 17 of the same Regulation. Also intervening in the proceedings were Melania Ortiz Volio, in her capacity as General Director of the National Museum of Costa Rica, Rolando Sáenz Ulloa and Ana Lucía Espinoza Blanco, general judicial representatives of Ecodesarrollo Papagayo Sociedad Anónima; Magdalena León Coto, identity card number CED38233, Virginia Novoa, card number CED38234, Javier Artavia, number CED38235, Mario Hernández Villalobos, card CED38236, Olman Solís Alpizar, CED38237, Oscar Enrique Delgado Murillo, CED38238; Alejandro Coto Alvarado, in his capacity as judicial and extrajudicial representative of the Costa Rican Association of Housing Builders (Asociación Costarricense de ConstrucTores de Vivienda); Marco Vinicio Ruíz, President of the Chamber of Industries of Costa Rica (Cámara de Industrias de Costa Rica); Javier Esquivel Font, judicial and extrajudicial representative of the Chamber of Consultants in Architecture and Engineering (Cámara de Consultores en Arquitectura e Ingeniería); Rafael Esquivel Yglesias, President of the Costa Rican Chamber of Construction (Cámara Costarricense de la Construcción); Nombre29270, identity card number CED38239, Ana C. Arias Quirós, Telf5033; Elena Troyo Arias, Telf5034; Leidy Bonilla Vargas, Telf5035; Virginia Novoa Espinoza, 6-150-507; Maureen Sánchez Pereira, 1-570-963; Lesbia Acuña Marín, 1-428-926; Andrés Anchio Fuentes, 1-527-011; Carlos Aguilar Piedra, 3-06-214; Floria Arrea Sierman, 1-521-118; Adrián Badilla Cambronero, Telf5036; Minor Castro Méndez, 6-246-070; Juan Guerrero Miranda, 2-281-1395; Ana Cristina Hernández, 1-551-993; Magdalena León Coto, 4-116-279; Mauricio Murillo Herrera, 1-978-812; Cleria Ruiz Torres, 2-498-802, Wilson Valerio Lobo, 1-447-201; Anayancy Herrera Villalobos, 4-140-167; Martín Calvo Mora, Ana Arias Quirós and Elena Troyo Vargas, representatives of the National Museum, the University of Costa Rica, and the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports on the National Archaeological Commission; and RomáN Solís Zelaya representing the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic.

Whereas:

1.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber on the twenty-ninth of October of two thousand, the Defender of the Inhabitants of the Republic requests that the unconstitutionality of Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 16, and 17 of Executive Decree number 28174-mp-minae-MEIC, of the twelfth of October of nineteen ninety-nine, published in Supplement number 78-A to La Gaceta number 202, of the nineteenth of October of nineteen ninety-nine, be declared. She alleges that through the issuance of the challenged Decree, the Executive Branch repealed subsection c) of Article 14 of Executive Decree number 19106-C of the twelfth of June of nineteen eighty-nine, as well as the final paragraph of subsection a.2. of Article 19 of Executive Decree number 25705-MINAE, of the eighth of October of nineteen ninety-six, and Article 12 of the Manual of Technical Instruments for the Environmental Impact Assessment Process (Manual de Instrumentos Técnicos de Proceso de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental), approved by resolution number 588-97 of the twenty-eighth of August of nineteen ninety-seven of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (SETENA). Likewise, she affirms that it eliminated the requirement for archaeological evaluations and studies in the processing of the Environmental Impact Study. She considers that the Decree in question makes an inadequate reading of Article 3 of the Law on the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense, insofar as the reduction of bureaucratic procedures cannot lead to the State completely withdrawing from fulfilling its oversight powers. Deregulation is a valid concept and favorable to new administration techniques insofar as it seeks to accelerate internal procedures, but the harmonious development between the different assets protected by the legal system must necessarily be weighed. She believes that the cited Decree lacks a cost-benefit evaluation that incorporates into its considerations the economic impact that the lack of protection of archaeological resources and the cultural impact that this represents would have for the country and the national community. Through the issuance of the challenged Regulation, all previously established requirements for conducting archaeological retrospectives studies are expressly eliminated, establishing that the property owner's permission is required to carry out an evaluation or rescue of the assets found, or known about, and once the owner's permission is obtained, the Museum is granted a period of 15 days to establish the importance of the findings and present a rescue proposal; once the period has expired without having complied with what is indicated, it provides that the project developer may continue developing its ordinary activities. The prior permits, which had to be issued by the National Museum before the start of works, are eliminated, and said requirement is only retained for works carried out on archaeological sites previously declared through the procedure established by Law number 7555. She considers that, through the Decree, protection is restricted for those sites where there are works of man and nature, as well as archaeological places of significant value for the evolution or progress of a people, from a historical, aesthetic, ethnological, anthropological, or environmental point of view. She alleges that before the issuance of the challenged Decree, subsection a.2. of Article 19 of Executive Decree number 26228-MINAE was applied, which established that to determine the environmental feasibility of a project, it was necessary to previously present, in a preliminary evaluation form, whether it involved a geographical space included in the registry of archaeological sites defined by the National Museum. She considers it necessary to clarify that including a specific area in the aforementioned registries did not necessarily imply its declaration as an archaeological site, under the terms of Law 7555. It was basic and prior information intended to establish whether, within the geographical space where the project would be developed, there existed "possible areas of archaeological interest." This requirement is expressly eliminated by the new Decree, thus leaving the National Museum and SETENA without mechanisms to effectively protect the national archaeological heritage. She questions the creation of a new concept, that of "unimportant archaeological sites," which are those that present insufficient archaeological evidence, are highly altered, or whose characteristics do not allow obtaining information from them. Nor is it specified which body will determine the importance or lack thereof of the finding, which would facilitate a lack of protection. The provision states that archaeological rescue is only appropriate in important archaeological sites that "deserve to be registered, analyzed, or excavated," leaving the Nation's cultural and archaeological resource without real and effective protection, to the extent that subsequent control would come into force once the archaeological heritage is affected, when due to the use of machinery and equipment the archaeological record sites are exposed, they have evidently already been damaged, altered, and the pieces dismembered, and if even so the works are not suspended because what is appropriate is simply the communication of the finding, the final situation when the qualified and technical authorities on the matter intervene will be evidently harmful and irreversible. All resources in the preventive stage remain within the volitional sphere of the property owner, without any public instance being able to intervene, unless the declaration of an archaeological site is made. She points out here that the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports has not declared a single archaeological site under the terms indicated by Law 7555, despite the fact that said Law has been in force for four years. The Law on National Archaeological Heritage does not distinguish between sites of archaeological interest and sites without interest, given that every finding incorporates in itself great historical value, even in those cases where it is finally decided not to extract the pieces found. Furthermore, Article 36 of the cited Law declares the investigation, protection, conservation, restoration, and recovery of the archaeological heritage of Costa Rica to be of public interest. The Government of Costa Rica signed the Convention on the Defense of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations, also known as the Convention of San Salvador, which establishes in Article 8 the obligation of the Costa Rican State to proceed with the identification, registration, protection, conservation, and surveillance of its cultural heritage, for which it must create the necessary legislative and regulatory provisions to effectively protect said heritage, as well as guarantee the conservation of archaeological places and objects. Also ratified, through Law 4711, was the Recommendation on the Conservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works, which provides that States are obliged to conserve or save cultural property through preventive and corrective measures, which must seek to avoid the affectation of archaeological heritage endangered by public or private works that may deteriorate or destroy it. She believes that since the consultation of the Direction of the National Museum, the School of Anthropology and Sociology of the University of Costa Rica, ICOMOS, a consultative body of UNESCO, or any other technical body was omitted for the approval of the challenged Decree, this omission delegitimizes any technical criterion that may have been intended to be incorporated into it. She requests that the unconstitutionality of the cited Executive Decree be declared and that the State obligation to ensure the effective protection and preservation of the archaeological heritage through the implementation of preventive measures and timely intervention be reiterated, as well as to adapt the current regulations to the Conventions on the matter, which have been signed and ratified by Costa Rica.

2.- By resolution of fifteen hours and thirty-five minutes on the eleventh of November of two thousand (folio 266), this Chamber warned the Office of the Defender of the Inhabitants to indicate which articles of the challenged Decree it considered unconstitutional and to specify in each case the violation that occurred, with the respective regulatory citations.

3.- By brief presented on the twenty-third of November of two thousand (folio 268), the Defender of the Inhabitants of the Republic, in compliance with the warning given, states that the Decree is remiss, since it only contemplates expropriation, without establishing intermediate measures that enable the State to intervene without needing to declare the archaeological interest of the site. She alleges that the Costa Rican State signed the "Convention on the Defense of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations," ratified on September 5, 1979, in which it is declared: "That it is essential to adopt, both nationally and internationally, measures of the greatest effectiveness conducive to the adequate protection, defense, and recovery of cultural property." She considers that the Decree, by eliminating all prior controls, repealing the mechanisms established for the effective protection of archaeological property, incurs non-compliance with the cited Convention. She indicates that in the second whereas clause of the cited Decree, economic criteria are adduced to justify the repeal of the norms and manuals that contemplated the prior archaeology study and state intervention. In relation to whereas clauses 5 and 6, referring to Article 3 of the Law on the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense, she considers that regulations and controls aimed at the preservation of historical and archaeological heritage cannot be eliminated. In relation to the 7th whereas clause of the challenged Decree, which interprets Article 25 of the International Treaty for the Recommendation on the Conservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works, she considers that it borders on a simplistic analysis, since it attempts to delegate state control to the obligation of individuals to communicate archaeological findings, when that instrument promotes the protection of archaeological heritage insofar as it may be threatened by public and private works resulting from development, so dispensing with prior and necessary control would nullify the right of present and future generations to know about their origin and past. Regarding the 8th whereas clause, she indicates that to date there is not a single declaration of a site of archaeological interest, and furthermore, the declaration of zones only attests to the possibility that archaeological findings may occur, without it implying, in itself, special protection by the State. With respect to the norms considered unconstitutional, Article 1 establishes as the only requirements and procedures for conducting archaeological studies those established therein, thus ignoring the provisions of higher-ranking norms than the cited Executive Decree, which broadly establish not only requirements for conducting archaeological studies but also the obligation to carry out and adopt the necessary measures for this type of research. In relation to Article 2, which provides some definitions, she considers that those of "Important archaeological sites," those presenting cultural features, architectural structures feasible for analysis, or cultural stratigraphy, or that provide data on the following ancient groups: Paleoindian (10,000 to 6,000 BC), Archaic (6,000 to 3,000 BC), Early Formative (3,000 to 1,500 BC), or Protohistoric (1450 to 1550 AD). It also defines "Unimportant archaeological sites" as those sites that do not present the above characteristics, have insufficient archaeological evidence, are highly altered, or whose characteristics do not allow obtaining information from them. She considers that such definitions use an erroneous periodization, disrespecting the basic principles of prevention and scientific rigor, and ignoring the constitutional mandate to conserve and develop historical heritage. The foregoing opposes what is established in Law 4711. She considers that establishing by Decree the existence of sites without archaeological interest, without a prior in situ assessment carried out by a technical body, empties the content of Article 89 of the Political Constitution, to the detriment of the precautionary principle. Regarding the stage of archaeological rescue (Article 3 of the Decree), which restricts its application to cases where important cultural features are discovered, she indicates that Article 23 of the Recommendation on the Conservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works states that measures aimed at conserving or saving cultural property must be carried out sufficiently in advance of the public or private works to be developed in a given area, and that all new construction must be subject to preliminary excavations, of a mandatory nature, with the possibility of postponing construction to allow time for taking measures aimed at the conservation and safeguarding of said property, as also provided by Article 13 of Law 6703. In reference to Article 4 of the Decree, which provides procedures requiring the authorization of the landowner to conduct excavations, it infringes on the right enshrined in Article 89 of the Constitution, by leaving in the hands of the individual the power to allow studies or excavations to be carried out, grossly contravening Law 4711 in Article 24 subsection b), and is also contrary to the principle of prevention and that of legal certainty, necessary for the effective protection of the archaeological resource and property. She also considers that this provision violates Articles 1 and 8 of the Convention on the Defense of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations. With respect to findings by third parties, regulated in Article 5, she maintains that it establishes the figure of positive silence when, after the 15-day period for the inspection and preparation of the proposal for rescue work by the National Museum has expired without said inspection having been carried out or the rescue proposal drawn up, the project developer may continue the construction of the initiated work, which is considered unconstitutional to the extent that, by means of a Decree, it is intended to modify a legal norm such as the General Law of Public Administration, thus violating Article 129 of the Political Constitution. Regarding Article 6, referring to findings by project developers when carrying out earthworks (movimientos de tierra), which will not require authorization from the National Museum or an archaeological study, except in cases where the land is located on an archaeological site, she considers that it nullifies the right contained in Article 89 of the Political Constitution, directly infringing Articles 7 and 8 of Law 4711, which develop the precautionary principle in matters of archaeological heritage. She considers that in subsection c) of that article, what was previously indicated regarding positive silence can be applied, given that in this case the possibility of implicit affirmative resolution is erroneously admitted, thus allowing the irrational and irreparable affectation of the archaeological resource. Regarding voluntary archaeological studies, provided in Article 9 of the Decree, she considers that these cannot be voluntary, since the power to carry them out is left in the hands of the individual. As for Article 16, which repeals subsection c) of Article 9 of Executive Decree 19016, and the repeals provided in Article 17, referring to the Regulations of Procedures of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat and the Manual of Technical Instruments for the Environmental Impact Review Process, she considers that the property protected by Articles 50 and 89 of the Political Constitution, referring to the conservation and protection of historical, archaeological, and cultural heritage, are left unprotected. She alleges that the challenged Decree creates a legal vacuum that will have enormous repercussions on the social and cultural rights of Costa Ricans and the international community.

4.- By resolution of fourteen hours and thirty minutes on the twenty-sixth of November of two thousand (folio 288), the action was admitted, granting an audience to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Commerce, the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, and the Ministry of Environment and Energy.

5.- The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic submitted its report, visible on folios 291 to 311. It points out that the archaeological heritage comprises a set of riches, an object of study and aesthetic contemplation, essential for the adequate development of the human personality, thus fulfilling a purpose of general utility, which is to preserve the pre-Columbian cultural heritage for current and future generations. It states that the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 15; the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Article 13; and the Charter of the Organization of American States, Article 46, establish the duty of States to protect the archaeological property existing within their territories, and therefore, in the Costa Rican case, the Political Constitution develops those provisions in Article 89. It indicates that in this regard, Costa Rica has signed a series of international conventions, such as the Recommendation on the Conservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works; the Convention for the Protection of Cultural and Natural Heritage; the Convention on the Defense of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations; the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, etc. It alleges that the archaeological heritage is in the public domain, to which constitutional standing is recognized, thus enjoying privileged self-protection by the Administration, which has not only the right but also the obligation to prevent or cause to cease any harmful or damaging act. In Costa Rica, except for private property acquired previously, of an exceptional nature and requiring necessary verification by the individual, since the enactment of Law number 7 of October sixth, nineteen thirty-eight, all archaeological objects existing in the soil of Costa Rica prior to the Spanish conquest, as well as monuments of the same kind that may be found, were declared property of the State. Regarding this action, it considers that with respect to Articles 1 and 6 of the challenged Decree, they are contrary to the Political Constitution and the International Conventions signed for its conservation. It considers that reality has shown that the lack of proper regulatory controls to protect public domain property has caused significant damage to them; furthermore, in the case of cultural or natural heritage, its protection is required in a preventive form. Regarding Article 2, it believes it establishes concepts with an inapplicable periodization on archaeological sites with or without importance, elaborated without scientific rigor and without a prior in situ study by the technical body. They recommend that this Chamber, using the powers conferred by Article 377 of the Civil Procedure Code, seek the technical opinion of the School of Anthropology and Sociology of the University of Costa Rica, so that an archaeology professional reports on the correct periodization. With respect to provision 3 of the Decree, it excludes unimportant sites from the archaeological rescue, without previously assessing that condition, leaving such resources unprotected (cf. Articles 2, subsection f) and 5, subsection a)), since in those cases the rescue would be delegated to private parties, when that competence must remain with the National Museum, without prejudice to the collaboration they may provide. Another objection against provision 2, subsections a) and b), arises from understanding that archaeological sites would only be those declared as such by executive decree, Law number 7555. It considers that the precept is applicable to Architectural Historical Heritage, given its specific particularity and material evidence generally easily verifiable, but obviously not to the Archaeological Heritage, which entered the public domain by Law number 7, an attribute reiterated in Law number 6703, thus complying with General Principles 3 and 13 of the Agreement approved through Law number 4711. It considers that provisions 2, 3, and 5, subsection b) of Decree number 28174 also contravene the constitutional order. Regarding Article 4, it questions that it leaves the conduct of excavations or archaeological studies in the hands of private parties, limited to the project areas, without including their surrounding framework. There is a similar provision in Law 6703, which establishes that the National Archaeological Commission may authorize excavations with the landowner's authorization, and with the obligation to supervise the excavation directly and adequately, and to adopt the corresponding measures to prevent damage to the property in question. In accordance with the transcribed legal norm, it understands that the owner's authorization must be reserved for cases in which the National Archaeology Commission, for reasons of scientific or academic interest, authorizes excavations to be carried out by a third party of recognized competence in the matter, and not the owner of the property where the archaeological investigation will be carried out, as happens in the hypothesis raised in Article 15 ibidem. However, it believes that authorization cannot be required when conducting the preventive archaeological evaluations that every project developer must necessarily contract, to comply with provisions such as those repealed by provisions 16, subsection c) and 17 of Decree number 28174. It considers adequate the provision of the Decree that requires the owner's authorization for rescue work, but making it clear that, if the owner's refusal arises, and in order not to nullify the State's powers over archaeological property, the National Museum may issue and communicate to the reluctant owner an order to permit and not obstruct the rescue work. In reference to provision 5 of the Decree, which enshrines the figure of positive silence, since once the periods of fifteen days for the inspection and evaluation of the site, as well as for the preparation of the proposal for the rescue work by the National Museum, when applicable, have expired without the respective actions having been carried out, the project developer may continue the construction of the initiated work, it does not believe there is a violation of provision 129 of the Political Constitution, since Law 6703, of a special nature, contains in its Article 13 the period of fifteen days for the National Museum to define how it will organize the rescue work. However, it cannot be permitted that once the periods have expired, the project developer continues developing its ordinary activities to the detriment of the archaeological property. It considers that the solution to the above is contemplated by the Decree itself in its 7th Whereas Clause, when it cites Principle 25 of the Agreement approved by Law number 4711, so once the periods have expired without the Museum carrying out the inspection and evaluation of the site or designing the proposal for the rescue work, the project developer will have the right to demand, through the corresponding legal channel, compensation for the damages it proves were caused during the time used in excess by the National Museum to carry out those activities. The commented periods are exclusively for carrying out the indicated activities (inspection, evaluation, rescue proposal), but not for rescuing the archaeological property, and therefore it considers Article 5, subsection c), and by connection, also provision 6, subsection c), of Decree number 28174 unconstitutional. With respect to the questions regarding Article 9, the possibility that authorized persons registered with the National Archaeological Commission may be hired to prepare archaeological studies is not questioned, which in any case has its basis in Law number 7472, Article 8; the problem lies in eliminating preventive control and reserving it for cases where earthworks (movimientos de tierra) are carried out on a site located in an archaeological site according to the procedures of Law number 7555, and when at the project developer's volition the archaeological studies are contracted (Article 9 ibidem). The power of guardianship of public power over its heritage cannot depend on private will, as it makes it uncertain. Another additional question arises when the Decree (Article 9, paragraph 2) allows the project developer to voluntarily hire any person duly authorized and registered with the National Archaeological Commission to supervise the earthworks (movimientos de tierra), because that supervisory power must belong exclusively to the National Museum.

It considers that Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 16, and 17 of the Regulations on Procedures for Archaeological Studies are contrary to Articles 7, 89, and 121, subsection 14) of the Political Constitution and to the cited international instruments, and it thus requests that this Chamber declare them so.

6.- Elizabeth Odio Benito, in her capacity as Minister of Environment and Energy, responds on folio 312 to the hearing granted, stating that she adheres to what was indicated by the Procuraduría General de la República.

7.- By means of a brief filed on January third, two thousand (folios 355 to 424), Samuel Guzowski Rose, Minister of Economy, Industry, and Commerce, states that the purpose of the challenged Decree is to regulate the procedures applicable to the process of obtaining and authorizing archaeological studies, with a view to the construction of civil works, of a public or private nature, and does not intend to exhaust in itself all the protection, regulations, and responsibility that pertains to the State in matters of preservation and development of goods of archaeological importance. He indicates that prior controls are maintained in the Decree; they are simply made consistent with current legislation. On the other hand, the International Conventions signed by Costa Rica do not obligate in all cases to carry out prior controls; they establish diverse controls in accordance with the different actions entrusted to the state body in charge of safeguarding archaeological heritage, hence he considers that the Decree does not leave archaeological heritage unprotected. It was issued in strict adherence to the fundamental guarantees of sustainable development, the right to individual property, and freedom of enterprise; developing the principles included in the international treaties signed on this matter by our country, as well as those that the Constitutional Chamber's own jurisprudence has declared. He alleges that the Political Constitution, in Articles 50 and 89, regulates natural heritage and cultural heritage independently. With respect to Law number 4711, he indicates that this regulation obligates the protection of historical heritage at the moment of being discovered: through two types of actions, the first is preventive when the existence of sites of archaeological importance is known with certainty, in which case qualified work must be performed before carrying out any type of civil work (exception regime), and the second is conservation and salvage, which proceeds when upon finding vestiges of probable archaeological importance, these are qualified and consequently rational measures are adopted for their protection (normal regime). It also obligates the evaluation of objects for the purposes of cataloging and determining their importance, that is, to determine the relative importance of cultural goods, to protect or save cultural goods placed in danger, knowing their existence, the danger that threatens them, and coordinating actions with those involved. It also establishes the obligation to publish or make available by some other means the results of studies of scientific or historical interest that have been conducted in relation to works intended to save cultural goods, especially when all or a large part of the immovable cultural goods have been destroyed. He considers that these obligations are specifically fulfilled in the Decree. The obligation contained in Article 20 of the Convention finds fulfillment in Recital 3 of the Decree, as well as in Articles 4, 5, 7, and 15. Article 25 of the Convention is congruent with the obligation established in Recital 7 and Articles 5 and 6 of the Decree. He also considers that the obligation contained in Article 23 of the Convention is regulated in Recital 11 and Articles 3, 5, 6, and 9 of the Decree. Regarding this point, he considers that it is understood that the obligation to halt progress to allow time for the adoption of conservation or salvage measures for cultural goods exists and is logical insofar as it concerns places of importance from an archaeological or cultural point of view in which there are important monuments, such as cities, towns, places, or neighborhoods of historical value, which should be protected by the legislation of all countries, so it is not an absolute imposition or applicable to other cases beyond those stated, in which the importance of cultural rescue is evident. Article 25 of the Convention is fulfilled by Article 8 of the challenged Decree, and in which it indicates that it is not possible to impose illegitimate limitations on property rights. With respect to Law number 5980 Approving the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, this provides a differentiated notion between cultural heritage and natural heritage. Article 3 is respected by what is established in Recital 11, while Article 5 is safeguarded by the first and second Recitals and by Article 15 of the challenged Decree. Regarding Law number 6360, Convention on the Defense of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations, he considers that the challenged Decree adopts the guidelines of the cited convention. Article 8 of the Convention is respected with the regulation established in Articles 5, 6, 7, 10, and 11. With respect to Law number 7526 Approving the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Articles 11 and 3 of the challenged Decree are in accordance with what is established in Articles 5 and 7 of that Convention. Regarding the National Archaeological Heritage Law, it establishes two possession regimes for archaeological goods, one public and one private. The only obligations imposed on private possessors were to present the inventory of their collections to the Public Registry of National Archaeological Heritage, with the exclusive purpose of their identification and registration, and to agree to lend the goods in custody to the Museum to disseminate the culture of the different ethnic groups that inhabited our country in the past. He considers that the challenged Decree is in conformity in all its articles with Law number 6703; it is also consistent with constitutional regulations, by establishing protection measures for national archaeological heritage, both prior to the execution of civil works when they are sites declared by executive decree as being of archaeological interest, in which case permission for earthworks (movimientos de tierra) must be requested from the National Museum and its approval must be obtained, and likewise, excavations and preliminary studies must be conducted prior to the execution of works. When civil works have already begun and archaeological vestiges are found, it orders the State's action so that the same is timely and compliant with Articles 11, 45, 46, 89 of the Constitution and 11, 113, 114 of the General Law of Public Administration, as well as Laws numbers 6703 and 7555. He deems that the challenged Decree allows greater protection than Law 6703. He indicates that the definitions established in the Historical-Architectural Heritage Law of Costa Rica are in accord with those established in the challenged Decree. He indicates that both the Civil Code and the Water Law establish the obligation to report the finding of goods that, by legal provision or by their nature, are susceptible to being moved by themselves or by an action of nature, including human action. With respect to the arguments made by the Defensoría de los Habitantes, that the Proposed Environmental Study Forms (Formularios de Estudio Ambiental Propuesto, FEAP) included an archaeological impact study, he indicates that these forms are an ecological instrument administered by the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental (SETENA), attached to the Ministry of Environment and Energy. The inclusion of the mentioned obligation finds no legal or rational support since first, it is based on speculation as to whether or not there are potential areas of archaeological, historical, or cultural interest; second, it obligates the private individual through a manual of an environmental nature, whose rank is inferior to a regulation, to comply with obligations in the cultural area. Although social heritage is composed of natural and cultural goods, this does not mean that identical norms are applicable to the treatment of one subject and the other. Due to the Museum's inactivity, private individuals were forced to comply with arbitrary requirements or restrictions that were not in accordance with the Law; an "AP" was required in areas where there was an express record of the presence of archaeological sites, defined by the National Museum. He considers that the obligation to declare the existence within possible areas of archaeological interest, or of historical and cultural heritage, according to data provided by the Museum within an ecological analysis instrument, is disproportionate and irrational. If the duty of the National Museum is to carry out preventive studies and the planning of conservation and rescue actions, the private individual cannot be forced to substitute for the Museum's inertia. He also indicates that the Fundación Anastasio Alfaro was constituted as the entity charged by the Museum to carry out archaeological impact study work, constituting a monopoly whose non-conformity with the Legal System had already been warned of. With respect to the arguments of the Defensoría to the effect that the decree eliminates prior controls for earthworks (movimientos de tierra) in the execution of civil works, he considers that neither the Constitution nor the international treaties signed by Costa Rica require permits or prior authorizations in all cases where the development of public or private civil works is encountered. The Defensoría shows a total lack of knowledge of the current normative texts. Under no logic can it be concluded that the regulation repeals the law, because if the challenged decree is analyzed properly, its sole objective is the "Regulation of Procedures for Archaeological Studies" in the execution of works, and therefore, it does not contain norms specifically directed at developing each of the powers that the laws grant to the Museum, to the Municipalities, and to any citizen to act in protection of the historical and cultural heritage of the Republic. He alleges that private property has a social function, but under pretext of such, the owner cannot be deprived of the fundamental core of real property. From the decree, it is clear that the request for authorization to enter private land is for the purposes of excavation or earth-moving work under archaeological control techniques, which imply preventing the owner from the normal use he/she was making of the property; being that this is a limitation, for it not to be compensable and therefore, to require the owner's submission, it must originate in a Law approved through a reinforced legislative procedure. With respect to the plaintiff's argument that a positive silence is established, he considers that in the challenged Decree, the deadlines granted to the Museum or the National Archaeological Commission (CAN) are to initiate the administrative procedure for the evaluation and recovery of found goods, not to conclude it. With respect to the Defensoría's argument to the effect that the challenged decree leaves the execution of studies or excavations by the National Museum to the discretion of the property owner, he states that the Decree limits itself to complying with what is established in Article 12 of Law number 6703, so the reproach should be directed at the Law and, in any case, for those properties declared sites of archaeological interest or when the private individual finds objects of archaeological importance, the Museum does not need authorization, as this only operates in the remaining cases. Regarding what the Procuraduría considers an erroneous historical classification of archaeological sites, he considers that this is not a constitutionality problem. As for the argument that every find embodies in itself great historical value, he states that this is not true; objects in themselves do not have historical value, but only insofar as they are part of the environment that integrates, interprets, or complements them. Regarding the argument that the accreditation of natural or legal persons, public or private, to perform auxiliary services to the public function is contrary to the Constitution, he indicates that despite the non-existence of a norm of legal or infra-legal character that so enabled it, the Decree does correct this deviation of power, by highlighting the administrative power –already existing by legal mandate– to open a process for the accreditation of suitable persons to carry out the auxiliary management of the public service entrusted to the National Museum. He alleges that the Procuraduría General de la República errs in affirming that the public domain status of archaeological heritage justifies the transgression of all types of rights, when the property right is limited to the surface of the territory, and the State is the owner of the minerals and resources found in the subsoil. He requests that this action be declared without merit.

8.- By written brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber on December seventeenth, two thousand, Gabriel Macaya Trejos, in his capacity as Rector of the University of Costa Rica (folios 1 to 29), requests that the unconstitutionality of Executive Decree number 28174-MP-C-MINAE-MEIC be declared, an action to which file number 99-009452-007-CO was assigned. He alleges that it is undeniable that in a globalized environment, with foreign investments and economic opening, demands may arise that the country's institutional design is not prepared to respond to with the necessary speed, so the simplification of procedures and deregulation may be necessary, but it is also equally true that bureaucratic obstruction can be the product of a limitation of institutional resources that prevent prompt and complete service, so that in these cases, extreme deregulation can cause greater harm than it intends to remedy. He considers that the elimination of archaeological evaluation procedures does not favor the conservation of the cultural vestiges of our past and the knowledge of pre-Columbian societies. As for the legal standing to bring this action, it is based on the protection of diffuse interests as provided in Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. With respect to the merits, he considers that the Decree is contrary to the Paris Convention, which establishes a preventive and corrective duty on the part of the State to safeguard cultural goods, of which archaeological heritage forms a part. With the enactment of environmental provisions, preventive archaeological studies were included within environmental impact assessments (evaluaciones de impacto ambiental, EIAs), which has represented progress in the protection of archaeological heritage, as it allowed studies to be carried out when the project design was still in phases as early as feasibility studies. Prior archaeological studies, regardless of whether a site declaration exists, conform to the protection of historical heritage, since the Convention includes as cultural goods the vestiges of the past that are neither recognized nor registered. He points out that the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage is contrary to what is provided in Article 6 of the challenged Decree, insofar as prior authorization from the National Museum or an archaeological study is not required to perform earthworks (movimientos de tierra). The Convention on the Defense of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations (Convention of San Salvador), provided in numeral 8 that each State is responsible for the identification, registration, protection, conservation, and surveillance of its cultural heritage, so Article 6 of the Decree disregards that mandate. In accordance with the terms of the Convention of San Salvador, the exploration, excavation, investigation, and conservation of archaeological places and objects must be carried out by scientific institutions that perform them in collaboration with the national body in charge of archaeological heritage, while Article 15 of the questioned Decree disregards the requirement of a scientific institution to develop these tasks, indicating that a "university degree in archaeology and a minimum experience of two assistance jobs in archaeological evaluations" is sufficient to obtain accreditation as a person authorized by the National Archaeological Commission for such purposes. He points out that the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property contains active obligations for the Costa Rican State, ignored by the Decree. For its issuance, the Executive Branch did not consult the pertinent institutions (National Museum, National Archaeological Commission, University of Costa Rica, ICOMOS), as established by subsection a) of the aforementioned Article 5, so he considers that this procedural defect is another element to take into account for the declaration of unconstitutionality of said Decree. It is his opinion that the Regulation in general clearly reflects the absence of the advice of specialists in archaeology, so if it remains as it is, it will lead those guided by it into serious errors that will lead to the destruction of our National Archaeological Heritage. Article 20 of the "Recommendation on the Conservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works" provides the obligation to entrust the protection of historical heritage to appropriate official entities, which in the case of Costa Rica would be the National Museum, the University of Costa Rica, the Center for Conservation and Investigation of Cultural Heritage of the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, and the National Archaeological Commission. On the other hand, he considers that although it is true that with the enactment of Law number 6703 a step forward was taken in the investigation and conservation of archaeological evidence, these could only be done once the site had been discovered and many times altered by heavy machinery during the removal of earth in the first phases of construction of public or private works, so what proceeded was to carry out archaeological rescue, which corresponds to the planning, execution, analysis, and publication of the results of an archaeological investigation conducted in those cases when, for different reasons, archaeological evidence is detected, which is susceptible to being altered imminently by the execution of a public or private work or activity, or by natural action. As a direct consequence of the new Decree, more than 30 years of progress in the area of protection are lost, because the project planner is not required to perform these studies, in addition to eliminating the historical and legal power of the National Museum to carry out archaeological rescue. In recital number 8, reference is made to the fact that in Costa Rica only four zones have been declared of archaeological interest, so the text reflects a lack of knowledge about what Costa Rican archaeology is. Article l0 of the recitals says that the only reference to archaeological sites in national legislation is the one established in Law number 7555, but he does not understand how the fact that national legislation does not use the concept of the archaeological site as it should, must be taken to the detriment of the content that this concept has in archaeology, which is conceived as a humanized physical space where archaeological evidence left by indigenous societies prior to or contemporary with the establishment of Hispanic culture is found. The archaeological investigations carried out in the country have allowed the registration of nearly 3500 sites, which can be verified in various bibliographies. In archaeology, by its nature, every site is important, for being of a non-renewable nature, so the damage done to it is irreversible. The type of study required will vary according to its contextual characteristics; objects or other types of archaeological remains are not valuable by themselves, but because of the archaeological context that allows the inference of ancient history. The Decree in question contains an erroneous definition of the concepts of the evaluation stage, since in archaeology the concept of "most basic characteristics" is not used; rather, archaeological investigation is a scientific, logical, and systematic process that poses problems and seeks solutions about past cultures. It has various and diverse components and work stages: formulation of the problem and research design; inspection; diagnosis (evaluation); excavation (programmed or rescue); analysis and processing of the evidence and information collected; conservation and dissemination of knowledge. This process is not taken up again at any point in the decree; the investigation is presented in a fragmented manner, such as protecting what has been declared and "excavating or rescuing" findings, and not as a knowledge process. Subsection f) of the same Article 2 presents an illogical definition of rescue within the archaeological investigation process, since it is not possible to carry out an archaeological rescue task without executing scientifically controlled excavation. The definition of excavation is erroneous from an archaeological point of view, as it repeats the same conceptual errors as in the case of subsection f), but also describes the mechanical action of "removing earth, rocks, or other elements...", as if archaeology consisted of the mere procedure of exposing elements of archaeological evidence. Subsection h) of the same Article 2 is absolutely limited, because conservation, in the professional work of Archaeological Heritage, cannot be limited to the protection of specific zones in archaeological sites, since conservation obligates performing those protection works as required by the type of good being conserved. The other point, subsection i), refers to a periodization in "sites where cultural features or architectural structures cannot be defined but that provide data on ancient groups: Paleo-Indians (10,000 to 6,000 B.C.), Archaic (6,000-3,000 B.C.), Early Formative (3,000 to 1,500 B.C.) or Protohistoric (1,450 to 1,550 A.D.)," a periodization that he considers absolutely incomplete, as it leaves out what is known as pre-paleoindian, which comprises 30,000 or 40,000 to 10,000 B.C.; and it leaves out the period from 1,500 B.C. to 1,450 A.D. He points out that in the first case there are between 20,000 and 30,000 years of ancient history, and in the second case there are 2,950 years that are omitted. He states that subsection j) -archaeological site without importance- of Article 2 advances criteria on archaeological sites without the specialists giving their opinion, which he considers serious, because a site could perfectly be found that according to subsection j) is not important and, archaeologically, could be of the greatest relevance, such as for example a very altered site that contains remains that are very difficult to find, and which therefore has enormous significance for the archaeology of the country and of America. Subsection j) cannot classify, in the way it does, what an archaeological site without importance is; only an archaeologist can indicate that after having carried out an investigation; for the same reasons, Article 3 cannot be accepted from the viewpoint of the theoretical corpus of the archaeological discipline. Article 6 allows earthworks (movimientos de tierra) without authorization from the National Museum or an archaeological study, except in those cases in which the land is located in an archaeological site according to the procedures of Law number 7555, which is unacceptable, as it does not take into account that an archaeological site exists and is important even if the procedures of the cited Law have not yet been carried out. Subsection b) of Article 6 subjects all archaeological work to "archaeological rescue tasks," forgetting that there may be findings that, by their nature, require investigation, conservation, and preservation. Article 10 authorizes the performance of "inspections" without permission from the C.A.N. and without the need for a final report, which he considers serious, because from an archaeological point of view, it is always necessary to apply field methods that require the removal of matrix; if not, the inspection is incapable of being able to assure one thing or another. Regarding Article 15, which refers to the registry of persons authorized by the C.A.N. to carry out archaeological studies, training in archaeology must be required, in accordance with the academic guidelines of the University of Costa Rica. Based on these reasonings, he requests that the unconstitutionality of the challenged Decree be declared.

9.- By resolution of the thirteen hours and thirty minutes of January seventh, two thousand, this Chamber resolved to consolidate the action processed under file number 99-009452-007-CO with number 99-007926-007-CO.

10.- By resolution of the fourteen hours and twenty-five minutes of February seventh, two thousand, this Chamber warned the petitioner Macaya Trejos to clarify which are the articles he challenges and the reasons for unconstitutionality of each one of them.

11.- By written brief filed at sixteen hours and twelve minutes on February eleventh, two thousand (folios 539 to 556), Gabriel Macaya Trejos, Rector of the University of Costa Rica, in response to the Chamber's warning, states that the admonition is procedurally incorrect, as the action has been admitted and consolidated, in addition to the fact that the Chamber already knows with precision the articles being challenged and the reasons for unconstitutionality of each one of those norms. Nevertheless, he proceeds to indicate, in accordance with the admonition, the articles of Decree number 28174 that are challenged, which are the following: 1, 6, 9, for being contrary to the State's duty to conserve archaeological heritage, established in Article 89 of the Political Constitution and in the Paris Convention (Article 8). That same violation is observed in subsections a) and b) of Article 2 of the Regulations, when a distinction is made between an archaeological site without a declaration pursuant to Law number 7555 and sites with heritage value declared by executive decree, notions that are equally contrary to the Paris Convention, in addition to the Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (Article 4), and the Convention of San Salvador. He further considers that the division into two regimes - declared or undeclared archaeological sites (subsections a) and b) of Article 2 of the challenged Decree) violates the concept of cultural goods contemplated by the Convention of San Salvador. Article 15 of the Decree, by indicating that a university degree in archaeology and a minimum experience of two assistance jobs in archaeological evaluations is sufficient to obtain accreditation as a person authorized by the National Archaeological Commission, is insufficient. For the drafting of the Decree, the Executive Branch did not consult the pertinent institutions (National Museum, National Archaeological Commission, University of Costa Rica, ICOMOS), as established by subsection a) of Article 5 of the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property. Article 10 authorizes inspections to be carried out without permission from the C.A.N. and without the need for a final report, which leaves archaeological heritage unprotected. He requests to ratify, or failing that, to process the present action and to declare the unconstitutionality of Executive Decree number 28174-MP-C-MINAE-MEIC.

12.- By resolution of the nine hours and fifty-three minutes of March second, two thousand (folio 569), the Chamber deemed the action expanded, to include Articles 3, 10, and 15 of the challenged Decree, and a hearing was granted to the Procuraduría General de la República, the Ministry of Economy, Industry, and Commerce, the Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sports, and the Ministry of Environment and Energy.

13.- The Procuraduría General de la República rendered its report (folio 946) and states that the defense of the historical-artistic heritage for collective enjoyment carries with it the right of participation in the goods that comprise it, such that they transcend the subjective public rights typical of the individualistic conception of the liberal Rule-of-Law State, as limitations on its action. The right to participate in the cultural life of the community and in the benefits that result are also established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 27.1, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 15.1 a). A similar commitment is ordered by the American Convention on Human Rights.

The Convention known as Malta 92, in Article 5.3, requires that environmental impact assessments (evaluaciones de impacto ambiental) take into account archaeological sites and their context, and the European Union issued a Directive including Cultural Heritage as one of the aspects to be considered in the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) of public and private works. The elimination of unnecessary procedures in administrative proceedings is commendable, but not those that result in a lack of protection for the natural environment or cultural assets. Regarding the plaintiff's allegations that the repeals ordered by the challenged Decree (Article 16, subsection c) and Article 17) are contrary to Article 89 of the Constitution, which imposes a duty of conservation that implicitly carries the constitutional principle of effective and preventive protection, a safeguard that the norms repealed by the challenged Decree in Article 16, subsection c) and Article 17 sought to provide. A posteriori measures, when the damage to or disappearance of the asset has already occurred, are insufficient and ineffective, due to the irreparable or difficult-to-replace effects, when not impossible, that the conduct entails, which is why the selection of preventive administrative techniques in the regulation of the Nation's historical and artistic heritage is necessary to comply with the provisions of the Constitution. The challenged Decree fails to comply with the constitutional mandate of the State not to promote situations that result in deterioration. This duty corresponds to the public domain character, which is set forth in Article 121, subsection 14 of the Constitution. It considers that the disappearance of the mandatory nature of the archaeological study in environmental impact assessments (evaluaciones de impacto ambiental), prior to the execution of public and private works, which materialized in the issuance of a letter of authorization to the developer by the National Museum (Museo Nacional), after consulting data and the site, represents a step backward by changing a preventive measure for a corrective one and ignores Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) precedent number 2706-95 on the compatibility of tourism development with archaeological resources. It questions the periodization contained in the Decree (Article 2, subsection i, paragraph 2), which it considers incomplete, because it excludes the pre-Paleoindian period and the period from 1500 B.C. to 1450 A.D., a stage in which our indigenous people reached civilization and from which the most sites are found. It considers that the hearing within the procedure for drafting general administrative provisions, in cases where it is required, constitutes a substantial formality, causing the nullity of the procedure and the regulatory act, because through it, the will of the Administration can be influenced, and a modification of the final act can be produced, and on the legal level, this procedure is provided for decentralized entities and those representative of general or corporate interests. It indicates that Article 88 of the Constitution provides for consultation with the University of Costa Rica (Universidad de Costa Rica) on legislative projects related to matters under its competence, but that an interpretation of granting a hearing to that University on all legislative projects related to the disciplines it teaches would be unreasonable and not consistent with the meaning of that text. It states that the lapsus incurred in the brief contesting the action of the Ombudsman's Office (Defensoría de los Habitantes), folio 7, final paragraph, is corrected, regarding the repeal of the norm establishing the authorization of the National Archaeological Commission (Comisión Arqueológica Nacional) to carry out archaeological excavations, a text that remains in force. In the event that Decree 28174 is declared inapplicable, either by restoring the validity of the repealed norms or by granting a reasonable period to the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo) to issue a new Regulation, incorporating the omitted technical criteria of the competent state bodies.

14.- By a brief filed on March twenty-fourth, two thousand (folio 985), Rodolfo Méndez Mata, Acting Minister of Environment and Energy, Enrique Granados Moreno, Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports, and Samuel Guzowski Rose, Minister of Economy, Industry and Commerce and Foreign Trade, state that this Chamber must correct the transfer granted in this action, since the Decree is not challenged in its entirety. They state that the challenged Regulation corrects the conceptual error of considering that the environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental) is the only instrument to effectively investigate, protect, and conserve the archaeological heritage and eliminates the administrative practice by virtue of which, unjustly, the work of investigation, protection, and rescue had been restricted solely to activities subject to oversight by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental). The SETENA Procedures Regulation had illegitimately introduced in subsection a.2 of Article 19, an archaeological impact study as part of the Environmental Impact Assessment (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental), without any legal or technical basis. The National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental) does not exercise control over all projects, activities, and works developed in the national territory, so the assigned control was partial and neglected the duty to do so comprehensively. Decree 28174 establishes a protection system that complements Law number 6703 and adheres to all applicable regulations on the matter, maintains prior controls according to the regulatory block, and that international treaties do not require in all cases to carry out, but do oblige the State to take various actions for its protection and expand the possibilities of voluntary control by the administered parties, regardless of whether they are subject to the Secretariat's control or not, always under the supervision of the National Archaeological Commission (Comisión Arqueológica Nacional) and the National Museum (Museo Nacional). Regarding the standing that the University of Costa Rica (Universidad de Costa Rica) claims to have, they do not object to the principle created by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) on the matter of its competence based on vote 305-90, for the purposes of admitting the participation of said higher education entity; however, they do not admit that this standing derives from the existence of real or imminent damage to the environment, given that the archaeological heritage is not part of the natural environment. They allege that the Decree conforms to the international norms cited by the plaintiff. Contrasting the challenged Decree and Law number 4711, it is clear that it is not true that the State's preventive and corrective duty regarding archaeological heritage is excluded from the decree, since precisely, in attention to that preventive duty, the investigative work of the National Museum (Museo Nacional) is promoted for the declaration of sites of archaeological importance, for which a reinforced protection regime is established. They consider that the broadest protection of the archaeological heritage is that declared by Article 2, subsection i) of the Decree, since the norm establishes that regardless of the period, all sites (movable or immovable) that present cultural, structural, architectural features susceptible to analysis or a cultural stratigraphy are a mandatory object of study and rescue. The voluntary procedures established for the entire national territory and for all types of works - and not only for those overseen by SETENA - reinforce the preventive principle in the potential and real protection of the assets that make up the archaeological heritage. Furthermore, the implementation of the accreditation of professionals of recognized competence to carry out research, exploration, excavation, and rescue work on the archaeological heritage (Article 15 of the Decree, developing Law number 6703), strengthens the preventive and corrective work of the State. The system previously implemented by the National Museum (Museo Nacional) was alien to the criteria of reasonableness and opportunity, based on the following aspects, since it obligated the administered party to carry out and finance investigative work, which by law is conferred upon the State through the National Museum (Museo Nacional), it tolerated that the National Museum (Museo Nacional) neglected its legal obligation in the protection, research, and preservation of the archaeological heritage. The criteria used by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental) are exclusively environmentalist and do not protect the archaeological heritage efficiently or preferentially; it is well known that the SETENA regulation only requires an environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental) for certain activities, usually large and of significant environmental importance. As is evident from the very letter of Article 19 of Decree 25705-MINAE, it is clear that medium and small agricultural activities, industrial ones located in and zoned by regulatory plans, as well as those that are smaller than the dimensions stated therein, are not subject to the control of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental) and consequently, if there are vestiges of the presence of earlier cultures there, there would be no preventive protection. They consider it important to clarify that the Convention approved by Law 5980, when it recommends widely consulting the normative provisions on archaeological heritage, does not oblige the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo) to consult in particular with any state University or deconcentrated entity or specific private association on all the regulations it is to adopt, but rather recommends that such consultation be carried out in accordance with the procedures established by internal law. Regarding the owner's authorization to carry out excavations on their property, the duty to avoid damage to property and the tasks of the National Archaeological Commission (Comisión Arqueológica Nacional) to supervise the excavation directly and adequately and to adopt the corresponding measures to avoid damage to the property in question. With respect to the obligation to suspend work in the event of the discovery of archaeological objects; of the duty of the National Museum (Museo Nacional) to define and organize tasks within a deadline, they indicate that Article 13 orders that if, when carrying out excavations, to execute public or private works, archaeological objects are discovered, by the owner themselves or by third parties, the work must be suspended immediately and the objects placed at the disposal of the Directorate of the National Museum (Museo Nacional), which will have a period of fifteen days to define how the archaeological rescue work will be organized. Regarding those authorized to carry out excavation work to discover or explore archaeological heritage, they allege that Article 15 resolves the doubt about the conformity of the challenged Decree with the Law that supports it. With respect to the alleged lack of consultation with the relevant institutions, they consider that the plaintiff did not verify properly before making this statement, since as documented, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the Ministry of the Presidency, and the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Commerce were consulted and signed the Decree. With respect to the exposition of archaeological concepts and epochs, these are not aspects of constitutionality that must be resolved by the Chamber. They request that the unconstitutionality action be declared without merit in all its extremes.

15.- By means of a brief filed on April twenty-seventh, two thousand (folio 1099), the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República) states that to complement certain points analyzed when responding to the hearing on the unconstitutionality action filed by the University of Costa Rica (Universidad de Costa Rica) and in what may be of interest when resolving the merits, he states that to the citations made about the parallelism of protection between natural and cultural heritage in Comparative Law, some examples of modern Constitutions in Latin American countries are added in which reference is made to that same parallelism. He also indicates that ECLAC (CEPAL), in the Preparatory Meetings for Eco 92 in Rio de Janeiro, emphasized “not relating the sustainability of development solely to natural capital but within the scope of a dynamic equilibrium among all forms of capital and heritage: human, physical, financial, institutional, and cultural,” and the UNESCO Convention of November 23, 1972, emphasized that “the degradation or destruction of an asset of the cultural and natural heritage constitutes a dire impoverishment for all the peoples of the world.” He further points out that the Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, approved on March 8, 1993, adopted a concept of environment that encompasses abiotic and biotic natural resources, assets that make up the cultural heritage, and the landscape. The European Community Directive of June 27, 1985, on environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental), he continues indicating, in the notion of environment includes natural elements, the landscape, material assets, and the cultural heritage (Article 3). He cites some authors in which some matters of interest related to this action can be consulted.

16.- By a brief filed on December twenty-second, nineteen ninety-nine, Melania Ortiz Volio, in her capacity as General Director of the National Museum of Costa Rica (Museo Nacional de Costa Rica), states that she requests to be considered an active coadjuvant in this action.

17.- By means of a brief filed on January twenty-eighth, two thousand, Rolando Sáenz Ulloa, legal representative of Ecodesarrollo Papagayo S.A., requests to be considered a passive coadjuvant in this action.

18.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), concerning the resolution that considered the action filed to be expanded, were published in numbers 057, 058, and 059 of the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial), of March 21, 22, and 23, two thousand. (Folio 945) 19.- By means of a brief filed on March first, two thousand (folio 575), Magdalena León Coto, Virginia Novoa, Javier Artavia, Mario Hernández Villalobos, and Olman Solís Alpízar request to be considered active coadjuvants in this unconstitutionality action.

20.- By means of a brief filed at fourteen hours and forty-five minutes on March twentieth, two thousand (folio 570 to 588), Oscar Enrique Delgado Murillo, in his personal capacity and as director of the Marriot Los Sueños Resort & Golf Club Project developed by Marina Herradura S.A., requests to be considered a passive coadjuvant.

21.- Through a memorial filed at fourteen hours and forty-four minutes on March twentieth, two thousand (folios 761 to 777), Alejandro Coto Alvarado, judicial and extrajudicial representative of the Costa Rican Association of Housing Builders (Asociación Costarricense de Constructores de Vivienda), requests to be considered a passive coadjuvant in this unconstitutionality action.

22.- By resolution at nine hours and forty minutes on April seventh, two thousand (folio 1016), Oscar Enrique Delgado Murillo was warned to prove, through the pertinent legal documents, his standing to judicially represent the coadjuvant company, and Alejandro Coto Alvarado to demonstrate his condition as representative of the Costa Rican Association of Housing Builders (Asociación Costarricense de Constructores de Vivienda).

23.- By a brief received on April twelfth, two thousand (folio 1018), Marco Vinicio Ruiz, in his capacity as President with judicial and extrajudicial representation powers of the Chamber of Industries of Costa Rica (Cámara de Industrias de Costa Rica), requests to be considered a passive coadjuvant in this unconstitutionality action.

24.- Through a brief received on April twelfth, two thousand (folio 1024), Javier Esquivel Font, judicial and extrajudicial representative of the Association Chamber of Architecture and Engineering Consultants (Asociación Cámara de Consultores en Arquitectura e Ingeniería), requests to be considered a passive coadjuvant in this action.

25.- According to a brief received on April twelfth, two thousand (folio 1031 to 1036), Rafael Esquivel Yglesias, in his capacity as Vice President with judicial and extrajudicial representation powers of the Costa Rican Chamber of Construction (Cámara Costarricense de la Construcción), requests to be considered a passive coadjuvant in this action.

26.- By a brief received on April thirteenth, two thousand (folio 1063), Oscar Enrique Delgado Murillo states, in response to the Chamber's warning, clarifying that he submitted the coadjuvancy in a personal capacity and requests that it be admitted as such.

27.- Through a brief received on April twenty-fourth, two thousand (folio 1069), Alejandro Coto Alvarado provides a notarial certification of the legal capacity of the Costa Rican Association of Housing Builders (Asociación Costarricense de Constructores de Vivienda).

28.- By a brief received on April twenty-fifth, two thousand (folio 1071 to 1076), [Name29270], Ana C. Arias Quirós, Elena Troyo Arias, Leidy Bonilla Vargas, Virginia Novoa Espinoza, Maureen Sánchez Pereira, Lesbia Acuña Marín, Andrés Anchio Fuentes, Carlos Aguilar Piedra, Floria Arrea Sierman Adrián Badilla Cambronero, Minor Castro Méndez, Juan Guerrero Miranda, Ana Cristina Hernández, Magdalena León Coto, Mauricio Murillo Herrera, Cleria Ruiz Torres, Wilson Valerio Lobo, and Anayancy Herrera Villalobos state that they request to be considered active coadjuvants in this action.

29.- By a brief filed on May eleventh, two thousand (folio 1126), [Name29270], Ana C. Arias Quirós, and Elena Troyo Vargas, representatives of the National Museum (Museo Nacional), the University of Costa Rica (Universidad de Costa Rica), and the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports before the National Archaeological Commission (Comisión Arqueológica Nacional), request to be considered active coadjuvants in this proceeding.

30.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) were published in numbers 005, 006, and 007 of the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial), of January 7, 10, and 11, two thousand. (Folio 426) 31.- Through a brief presented to the Secretariat of the Chamber on August thirty-first, two thousand one (folio 1263), the Secretary of the National Archaeological Commission (Comisión Arqueológica Nacional) provides a copy of opinion number C-201-2001, according to which the rescue of the archaeological heritage is the exclusive attribution of the National Museum (Museo Nacional), in accordance with Law 6703, Article 13, in relation to the Paris Convention (Law 4711). The aforementioned opinion also mentions that distinctions should not be made between sudden rescue and planned rescue, as both are inalienable competences of the State.

32.- On February twenty-eighth, two thousand two, this Chamber held an oral and public hearing, with the participation of representatives from the Ombudsman's Office of the Republic (Defensoría de los Habitantes de la República), the University of Costa Rica (Universidad de Costa Rica), the National Museum (Museo Nacional), the Ministry of Foreign Trade (Ministerio de Comercio Exterior), Ecodesarrollos Papagayo S.A., and the Attorney General's Office of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República). The Ombudsman of the Republic (Defensor de los Habitantes de la República) spoke about the invalidity of the entirety of the challenged Decree, including its “considering” clauses (considerandos), for eliminating the protection mechanisms for the archaeological heritage contained in Law 6703, Decree 19016-C, and various international treaties. He cited constitutional jurisprudence supporting his position. The Rector of the University of Costa Rica (Universidad de Costa Rica) alleged that the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo) should have consulted this project with the specialized authorities on the matter, as ordered by Article 10 of Law 4711; he defined archaeology as a science that studies objects based on coordinates of time and space, for which all findings are important, and not only those that the Decree arbitrarily determined, without following technical criteria and leaving out important phases of Costa Rican ethnic history. The representative of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (Ministerio de Comercio Exterior) alleged that, as a premise for the analysis of this case, principles characteristic of Environmental Law and the protection that the state must provide regarding the environment should not be followed; he considers that Law 4711 authorizes the use of methods such as those established in the challenged Decree; he affirms that objective and non-arbitrary criteria were used for the determination of archaeological sites of importance; he alleges that what is established in Articles 5 and 6 of the Decree does not constitute a positive silence (silencio positivo), but merely a form of protection for property owners, to prevent state inertia from making the exercise of the property right illusory and stopping national development; he argues that there was no error in the establishment of historical periods contained in Article 2, since paragraph 1 of subsection j) allows a broadly protective interpretation. The Director of the National Museum (Museo Nacional) stated that the Decree violates the precautionary principle that should inform matters related to the protection of the environment and the archaeological heritage; she points out that since the regulation came into effect, the number of requests for archaeological studies has decreased considerably, while complaints of damage have increased. The representative of Ecodesarrollos Papagayo S.A. alleges that the rules contained in the challenged decree allow for rational protection of the archaeological heritage, without preventing the real estate and tourism development of the country. The Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República) and two other representatives of that body allege that the decree in question leaves the vast majority of existing archaeological sites in the country unprotected, since currently only 3 cantons have been declared of architectural-archaeological interest, in accordance with Law 7555, while the records of the National Museum (Museo Nacional) are much more abundant; they cite opinion C-201-01, in which the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría) determined that the rescue of archaeological assets by private individuals is unconstitutional.

33.- In the proceedings held, the legal requirements have been observed.

Drafted by Magistrate Vargas Benavides; and, Considering (Considerando):

I.- The rules of standing in unconstitutionality actions. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) regulates the prerequisites that determine the admissibility of unconstitutionality actions, requiring a pending matter to be resolved at the administrative or judicial venue in which the unconstitutionality is invoked, a requirement that is not necessary in the exceptional cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when by the nature of the norm there is no individual or direct injury; when it is based on the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole, or when it is filed by the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contralor General de la República), the Attorney General of the Republic (Fiscal General de la República), or the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes), in these latter cases, within their respective spheres of competence. From the foregoing, the first rule is the need to have a prior matter, even allowing possibilities to resort to the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) directly. To do so, the norm in question must not be susceptible to concrete application, which would later allow the challenge of the application act and its consequent use as the base matter. The text in question provides that it proceeds when "by the nature of the matter, there is no individual or direct injury," that is, when by that same nature, the injury is collective (antonym of individual) and indirect. This would be the case of acts that injure the interests of certain groups or corporations as such, and not strictly those of their members directly. Secondly, the possibility of resorting in defense of "diffuse interests" is provided for; this concept, whose content has been gradually delineated by the Chamber, could be summarized in the terms used in judgment number 3750-93 of this court, at fifteen hours on July thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three:

"… Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and even more difficult to identify, cannot be in our law - as this Chamber has already stated - merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership becomes confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that determined individuals, or personalized groups, are identified or easily identifiable in relation to them, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate interests that concern a community as a whole. It is therefore a matter of individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive harm, current or potential, more or less equal for all, so it is rightly said that it is a matter of equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, as they are at once collective - for being common to a generality - and individual, for which they can be claimed in such character." In synthesis, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united around a certain social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a certain personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is diffused, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. In these cases, clearly, the challenge that a member of one of these sectors could make under paragraph 2 of Article 75 must necessarily refer to provisions that affect them as such. This Chamber has enumerated various rights to which it has given the qualifier "diffuse," such as the environment, cultural heritage, the defense of the territorial integrity of the country, and the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), among others. In this regard, two clarifications must be made: on one hand, the referred assets transcend the sphere traditionally recognized for diffuse interests, since they refer in principle to aspects that affect the national community and not particular groups thereof; environmental damage does not only affect the neighbors of a region or the consumers of a product, but injures or puts at serious risk the natural heritage of the entire country and even of Humanity; similarly, the defense of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) is an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just of any one group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration made by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) is no more than a simple description typical of its obligation – as a jurisdictional body – to limit itself to hearing the cases submitted to it, without it being understood in any way that only those that the Chamber has expressly recognized as such can be considered diffuse rights; the foregoing would imply an undesirable overturn in the scope of the Rule of Law, and its correlative "State of rights," which – as in the case of the Costa Rican model – starts from the premise that what must be express are the limits to freedoms, since these underlie the human condition itself and therefore do not require official recognition. Finally, when paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) speaks of interests "that concern the community as a whole," it refers to the legal assets explained in the preceding lines, that is, those whose ownership rests with the very holders of sovereignty, in each of the inhabitants of the Republic. It is therefore not the case that any person can resort to the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in protection of any interests (popular action), but rather that every individual can act in defense of those assets that affect the entire national community, without it being valid in this field either to attempt any exhaustive enumeration.

II.- The standing of the plaintiffs in this case. From what was said in the previous paragraph, it is clear that the action filed by the Ombudswoman of the Republic (Defensora de los Habitantes de la República) must be admitted insofar as direct standing for its filing is recognized, taking into account that she comes in defense of the rights recognized in Articles 50 and 89 of the Political Constitution. For his part, the Rector of the University of Costa Rica (Universidad de Costa Rica) considers that his standing derives from the protection of diffuse interests, a situation in which the same Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) allows the challenge directly. From the foregoing, the Rector of the University has standing, not in his functional capacity, but as a citizen who comes to safeguard the defense of interests that concern the national community, of marked general interest, such as the historical-archaeological heritage of the Republic. The protection of historical-cultural values, whether because they are considered necessary elements for the free development of the personality, as indispensable elements for the knowledge of the historical origins of our societies, or from a merely spiritual enjoyment point of view, is a matter of national interest.

Archaeological goods, as a subspecies of historical-cultural values, insofar as they become a means of knowing the history of man, his origins and his background, enjoy the same privileged protection through the possibility that any person, based on the authorization conferred in that regard by Article 75, paragraph 2 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which is why the action filed by the Rector of the University of Costa Rica is admissible, insofar as it becomes a means of protecting that type of interests.

III.- Other aspects of admissibility. Being clear that the petitioners have sufficient standing to bring this claim, it remains to be noted that the challenged action is one of those provided for in Article 73, subsection a) of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, as it concerns a general act of a normative nature (Regulatory Decree), a matter whose constitutionality may be reviewed through this channel. Furthermore, the parties filed their initial briefs in accordance with the requirements stipulated in Articles 78 and 79 of the procedural Law, as well as the preventive orders issued by this Chamber. In conclusion, the present action is admissible, and therefore the object and merits of the same must be addressed immediately.

IV.- Regarding the coadjuvancies. Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes that within the fifteen days following the first publication of the notice referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81, parties who have pending matters as of the date the action was filed, or those who have a legitimate interest in the definition of the object in dispute, may appear to coadyuvate with either of the two positions under discussion; in the case of unconstitutionality actions, the coadyuvant essentially comes to defend the petitioner's annulment claim or to support the validity of the challenged act. In this case, this Chamber, by resolution at fourteen hours and forty-five minutes on February twenty-first, two thousand (folio 557), admitted as active coadyuvants the Directora General of the Museo Nacional de Costa Rica and Rolando Sáenz Ulloa and Ana Lucía Espinoza Blanco, in their capacity as Apoderados Generales Judiciales of Ecodesarrollo Papagayo Sociedad Anónima, and by resolution at fifteen hours and fifty minutes on May ninth, two thousand (folios 1105 and 1106), accepted as coadyuvants in this action Magdalena León Coto, Virginia Novoa, Javier Artavia, Mario Hernández Villalobos, Olman Solís Alpízar, the Asociación Costarricense de Constructores de Vivienda, the Cámara de Industrias de Costa Rica, the Asociación Cámara de Consultores en Arquitectura e Ingeniería, and the Cámara Costarricense de la Construcción, and therefore no ruling is necessary in that regard. As for the brief visible at folio 580, in which Oscar Enrique Delgado Murillo requests to be considered as a coadyuvant, that same resolution determined not to admit his request for not having demonstrated his legitimate interest. The coadyuvancy request filed by Nombre29270 and others, appearing at folio 1071, was rejected, and the coadyuvancy petition of Ana Patricia Rojas Hernández and another was rejected as untimely. Regarding the coadyuvancy request presented by Nombre29270, in his capacity as representative of the Museo Nacional on the Comisión Arqueológica Nacional, Ana C. Arias Quirós, as representative of the University of Costa Rica before that Commission, and Elena Troyo Vargas, as representative of the Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes on that same Commission, visible at folios 1126 to 1161, it is rejected as untimely, taking into consideration that the first of the edicts referred to in Article 81 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional had been published on March twenty-first, two thousand.

V.- Object of the challenge. The petitioners challenge as unconstitutional Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 15, 16 and 17 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 28174-mp-minae-MEIC, of October twelfth, nineteen ninety-nine, published in La Gaceta number 202, Alcance 78 of October nineteenth, nineteen ninety-nine, considering them contrary to the norms contained in Articles 50, 89 and 121 subsection 14) of the Constitución Política, as well as the Convention on the Defense of the Archaeological, Historical and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the American Declaration of the Rights of Man, the Charter of the Organization of American States, the Recommendation on the Conservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works, the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the Convention on the Defense of the Archaeological, Historical and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations, and the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.

On the merits.

VI.- Archaeological goods in the constitutional system. Article 89 of the Constitución Política establishes that among the cultural purposes of the Republic are:

"… protect natural beauty, conserve and develop the historical and artistic heritage of the Nation, and support private initiative for scientific and artistic progress." The protection of historical heritage is thus framed within the broader scope of the State's duty to preserve the common culture that turns its people into a Nation. The Diccionario de la Real Academia Española de la Lengua, as relevant, defines culture as:

"… the set of ways of life and customs, knowledge and degree of artistic, scientific or industrial development, in a period or social group" (Twenty-Second Edition. Volume I. 2001) The archaeological heritage is a species of the broader genus constituted by cultural heritage, a clarification that has important practical implications insofar as the State's role in promoting and guaranteeing archaeological goods must always be part of a comprehensive policy for the protection and promotion of autochthonous cultural production. For the rights derived from the constitutional norm in question to be effectively realized, public authorities are required not only to create the necessary normative framework but also to act concretely, through suitable protective mechanisms based on the inescapable premise that a Nation that despises its historical heritage, destroying it or failing to prevent its loss or deterioration by all lawful means, is destined to fail as a society, for it is precisely the vision of the past that allows us to understand the present and plan for the future. The archaeological heritage—in the Costa Rican case—has been commonly defined as the set of immovable and movable goods, products of indigenous cultures prior to or contemporary with the establishment of Hispanic culture in the national territory, as well as human remains, flora, and fauna related to these cultures, constituting one of the principal means to achieve a precise knowledge of the historical origins of our societies, insofar as it allows understanding the germ of our current forms of thought and cultural expression, in addition to providing highly useful data for other fields of knowledge, such as ecology, pharmacotherapy, zoology, etc. On the intrinsic importance of the archaeological heritage within the social system, this Chamber ruled in the following terms:

"Archaeology and History are two intimately linked sciences, having as one of their objectives clarifying and reconstructing the events of the past. Historical reconstruction is based fundamentally on the interpretation of written documents, whereas Archaeology bases its studies on data obtained through material objects left by human action in now-vanished societies, by means of their relationship with each other, the form of the find, and their connection with the environment. Every preserved object, every vestige of life and activity of man in past societies, represents a testimony that makes total or partial knowledge possible, as the case may be, of those testimonies, and, therefore, of ways of life already nonexistent and unknown in the present, but whose knowledge is of singular importance, as they form part of the cultural identity of the society in which one lives; of course, to the extent that they are an important testimony for the reconstruction and knowledge of the events of the past." (Judgment number 729-96 of nine hours fifteen minutes on February ninth, nineteen ninety-six) It is not that knowledge of the past holds particular interest for reasons of mere historiographical curiosity, but rather that its study allows approaching a global understanding of current social and cultural phenomena. The protection of archaeological goods must therefore be understood as a form of safeguarding culture in general, as a good that transcends the ownership of any individual, constituting a value of national importance, whose recognition and effective defense forms part of the set of interests guaranteed in Articles 50 and 74 of the Constitución Política.

VII.- The archaeological heritage in International Law. Costa Rica, as a subject of International Law, has signed and ratified various instruments aimed at protecting the archaeological heritage. Thus, we may cite the following: A) The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (Hague Convention), of May fourteenth, nineteen fifty-four, and its Regulations, which recognize the importance of the archaeological heritage, obligating States involved in a war conflict to respect that of those they occupy, placing their cultural property in safe keeping, far from the conflict zone. B) The Recommendation defining the international principles to be applied to archaeological excavations, of December fifth, nineteen fifty-six, obligates States Parties to subject archaeological excavations carried out in their territories to strict surveillance and prior authorization from a competent authority (principle 5). C) The International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites, which recognizes the inseparability of the monument and the history it attests to, in addition to the prohibition of relocating the monument except for its conservation (Article 7); the obligation to protect those sites (14), and the need to preserve the identity of the monument, avoiding essentially altering its appearance or nature (15). D) The Convention on the Defense of the Archaeological, Historical and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations (Convention of San Salvador), approved through Ley number 6360 of September fifth, nineteen seventy-nine, which includes within cultural property archaeological material belonging to American cultures prior to contact with European culture (Article 2); recognizes the State's ownership over such objects (6); provides that each State undertakes to promote the exploration, excavation, investigation, and conservation of places and objects by specialized bodies in association with public institutions charged with protecting the archaeological heritage (8). E) The Recommendation on the Conservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works, signed on November twenty-second, nineteen sixty-eight, approved by Ley number 4711, of January sixth, nineteen seventy-one, within its recitals (considerandos) establishes that contemporary civilization and its future evolution rests upon the tradition of peoples and the creative forces of humanity, as well as their social and economic development, and that cultural property is the product and testimony of the different traditions and spiritual achievements of the past, and thus constitutes the fundamental element of the personality of peoples, for which reason it determines the need to extend the protection of cultural heritage to the entire territory of the State, and not only to sites formally declared as such (Article 3); the measures must be both preventive and corrective (7) against any type of work, public or private, capable of deteriorating them (8); it further provides that detailed studies should be carried out with sufficient advance notice to determine the measures to be adopted in situ, as well as the magnitude of the necessary rescue work (22). F) The Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, signed on November twenty-first, nineteen seventy-two, approved by Ley number 5980 of November sixteenth, nineteen seventy-six, orders States Parties to identify, protect, conserve, rehabilitate, and transmit to future generations the cultural heritage (Article 4). G) The Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, signed on September nineteenth, nineteen seventy, approved by Ley number 7526 of July tenth, nineteen ninety-five, which includes within the concept of cultural heritage those of ethnological, archaeological, and natural value (Article 5).

It is unnecessary to clarify that all the instruments cited in the preceding paragraph constitute sources of Law in Costa Rica, capable of being applied directly by this Sala Constitucional for the resolution of the present matter, as dictated by Article 48 of the Constitution. In the case of those approved by the Asamblea Legislativa, by express provision of Article 7 of the Constitución Política. Regarding those that do not enjoy that status, because they constitute at least sources of interpretation for the approved instruments. Nor does this Chamber recognize the existence of mere recommendations in matters of human rights, for if States decide to self-limit, recognizing the existence of certain human rights, even when they appear denominated with the name of "recommendations." The foregoing leads to the understanding that the Recommendation defining the international principles to be applied to archaeological excavations, the International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites, and the Recommendation on the Conservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works, are—in the terms stated above—acts vested with full normativity in the Costa Rican constitutional order, and cannot be considered mere enumerations of objectives and goals to be achieved.

VIII.- The legal regulation of the archaeological heritage. In addition to the constitutional norms protecting the archaeological heritage and the commitments assumed in that same vein by Costa Rica before the international community, various internal norms have been issued concerning the matter that is the object of this action. A) Ley number 7 of October sixth, nineteen thirty-eight, grants archaeological goods the status of public-domain property (Article 1), in addition to ordering the immediate communication of the discovery of objects to public authorities, which must take the necessary measures for their protection (Article 17). B) Ley 6793, of December twenty-eighth, nineteen eighty-one, Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, which, in addition to reiterating the provisions of Ley number 7, creates the Comisión Arqueológica Nacional, a body vested with the power to authorize excavations by previously registered scientists and to supervise them (Articles 12 and 15); it confers upon the Museo Nacional the competence to define the manner in which goods are to be rescued in the event of discovery by a third party (Article 13). C) The Código de Minería, Ley number 6797, of October fourth, nineteen eighty-two, whose Article 102 subsection h) mandates the performance of environmental impact studies (estudios de impacto ambiental) regarding the effects on the nation's archaeological and cultural wealth for the conduct of mining activities. D) Ley number 7555, of October fourth, nineteen seventy-five, Ley de Patrimonio Histórico-Arquitectónico de Costa Rica, which defines an archaeological site as one containing objects important from a historical, aesthetic, ethnological, anthropological, or environmental point of view (Article 6); Article 7, for its part, establishes the procedure for incorporating a property into the historical-architectural heritage by Decree, which implies the prohibition on demolishing the property.

IX.- The importance of archaeological goods. Archaeological goods, understood as those objects that allow the researcher to access historical knowledge, possess an intrinsic importance, as they constitute an ideal instrument that is difficult to replace for acquiring that knowledge, in which the environment surrounding them also acquires special relevance. For the effective protection of archaeological goods, the State must actively participate in all procedures aimed at their detection, rescue (when applicable), study, registration, and conservation. Only in this way will the duties arising from the constitutional mandate be fully satisfied, as well as those assumed through the signing of the cited international instruments and the enactment of the mentioned laws. Despite that marked importance, the protection of archaeological goods has been affected by the confluence of various factors, such as collecting, the commerce of objects, and their indiscriminate destruction due in part to the construction of buildings in areas where archaeological sites exist. This confluence of interests, by reason of the State's constitutional obligation to ensure the protection of the archaeological heritage, makes necessary the establishment of legislative and administrative mechanisms aimed at guaranteeing the protection of the archaeological legacy, in the face of the need for economic development. This prevalence was already recognized by the Corte Plena when, exercising functions of constitutional comptroller, it held:

"It is obvious that archaeological goods also have appreciable monetary value, whether because of the material they are made of (gold, for example), or because of their fine craftsmanship and beauty, even if made of clay or stone. Some of those objects may be of scant physical value or of little artistic significance; but even so, they are valuable for their origin and as elements of study to investigate the culture of peoples of other eras, their beliefs and customs, or the nature of the environment in which they lived, depending on the traces or representations that may be found there. For all that, archaeological objects from the aboriginal races that populated the continent in the pre-Columbian era, or prior to or contemporaneous with the establishment of Hispanic culture, are valuable; and because of that value, many acquire those pieces, some for spiritual enjoyment or scientific interest and others perhaps to profit from them. But over the individual interest that each may have in the possession or ownership of those objects, the public interest predominates, both because of the historical value of such goods and because, within the culture of peoples, lies the study of what the human groups that inhabited the same territory did, a study that is facilitated by making it possible, right here, for the greatest number of people to have access to those sources of knowledge; and nothing is more consistent with that public interest than archaeological goods remaining in national territory, in the possession of museums and under the ownership of the State or its institutions, as part of the historical heritage that the Carta Política calls 'of the Nation,' in Article 89. It must therefore be emphasized that what is most important is not the material value of the referred objects, but their historical and cultural value, and that the economic doctrine on productive assets and freedom of enterprise could in no way be applicable to those objects." (Resolution at thirteen hours on May twelfth, nineteen eighty-nine) It is therefore clear that the relevance of archaeological goods is not exhausted in venal aspects. Quite the contrary, their greatest importance lies in the data they can offer for an adequate understanding of the origins of national identity, in addition to the vast information they offer for other no less important fields of scientific knowledge. It is thus that even goods of few aesthetic qualities, of daily use, or even in poor condition may be of great importance for archaeological knowledge. On the other hand, the protection of the archaeological heritage is also a matter of global relevance. The Preliminary Report on the Legal Means for the Protection and Conservation of the Historical and Artistic Heritage of the American Countries of the Organization of American States established in this regard:

"There is no exclusively local interest in the states protecting and conserving the objectified testimonies of the art and culture of past eras found in their respective territories; that interest is shared by the entire international community, which justifiably considers that those constitute a cultural heritage belonging to all humanity and, therefore, deserve to be the object of its concern and its protection.

In this way, the protection and conservation of cultural heritage currently transcends the scope of national jurisdictions to be complemented, legally through international instruments, and materially through the solidarity-based cooperation of the countries forming the international community to make effective such a duty of protection and conservation" The preservation of a people's archaeological heritage is not seen, then, as a matter of purely local interest, but rather as a significant contribution to the preservation of world culture.

X.- The archaeological heritage as a public-domain good. It is evident that archaeological goods, in accordance with the terms of the cited norms, form part of the public heritage, the so-called public-domain goods (bienes dominiales), whose ownership belongs to the Nation, insofar as they are allocated to fulfilling a purpose of general interest. The use and tenure of public-domain goods is always part of a special regime, characterized by the fact that such objects must be used only in a manner that does not contradict their purpose, in some cases only by the Administration; in others also by private individuals, but strictly adhering to the limitations that their public character entails. This Chamber has defined public-domain goods in the following terms:

"…The public domain is composed of goods that manifest, by express will of the legislator, a special destiny of serving the community, the public interest. They are the so-called public-domain goods (bienes dominicales), property goods, public things or public goods, which do not belong individually to private parties and which are destined for a public use and subject to a special regime, outside of commerce among men. That is, affected by their own nature and vocation. Consequently, those goods belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, are affected by the service they provide and which invariably is essential by virtue of an express norm. Characteristic notes of these goods are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, unattachable, cannot be mortgaged nor be subject to encumbrance in the terms of Civil Law, and administrative action substitutes for interdicts to recover ownership. As they are outside of commerce, these goods cannot be the object of possession, although a right to use can be acquired, though not a right to property. The permit for use is a unilateral legal act issued by the Administration, in the exercise of its functions, and what is placed in the hands of the private individual is the beneficial ownership of the good, with the State always reserving the direct ownership over the thing…" (Judgment number 2306-91 of fourteen hours forty-five minutes on November sixth, nineteen ninety-one) Previously, the Corte Plena, exercising constitutional control, determined:

"Well then, if before the Law of 1938 there was no proper legislation on the archaeological heritage, it is very reasonable that the legislator addressed it in that Law and in that of 1981, to avoid what had occurred under the previous regime. XIX.- Those two laws recognize the individual property of archaeological goods that were in private hands; but at the same time they provided that, thereafter, goods that were the object of discovery would belong to the State. No acquired right was injured, as the private property existing up until then was maintained… No special norm in the Constitution is needed for specific prohibitions to be established in ordinary laws, if they have support in Article 28, as are those that exclude discovery as a legitimate title to acquire private ownership of archaeological goods… XX.- Article 89 reflects the public interest that the Constitution protects in Article 28, second paragraph, for it states there that 'Among the cultural purposes of the Republic are:...to conserve and develop the historical and artistic heritage of the Nation.' Thereby, the existence of a heritage different from that of economic goods was recognized, and at the same time the duty to procure its conservation was established. The cultural and historical public order allows interpreting that rule broadly, and relying on it to reaffirm the State ownership of archaeological goods discovered in the future, as provided by the Law of 1938. Those goods, then and now, constitute 'a common heritage that past generations bequeathed to posterity'… XXI.- From all of the above it follows: a) That the property regime instituted in Article 1 of the Law of 1938 is legitimate, as it has support in Articles 28 and 89 and is not contrary to Article 45 of the Carta Política itself; and b) That, consequently, Articles 3, 5, 7, 9 and 17 of Ley Nº 6703 of 1981 cannot be contrary to the Constitution either, insofar as they are applicable to archaeological objects discovered after Ley Nº 7 of 1938, because those goods belong to the State, in accordance with Article 1 of that Law of 1938, which is not unconstitutional." (Resolution at thirteen hours on May twelfth, nineteen eighty-nine) XI.- The preventive principle in archaeological matters. The importance of archaeological goods and their character as public-domain goods creates a series of obligations on the State aimed at their effective protection, a common element of so-called third-generation rights. In matters of such relevance and delicate protection, it cannot be conceived that administrative authorities intervene once the damage has been caused, because the damage may be irreversible and of very great proportions. In the case of archaeological goods, there is a single possibility: their effective protection or their irremediable loss. To dimension the moment and the actions that the State must undertake for the protection of the archaeological heritage, some considerations of importance must be made, which were outlined in the preceding considerations. Archaeological goods, considered individually, while it is true they may constitute key elements for understanding the country's historical-cultural past, their relevance may be diminished if they are not considered integrally with respect to the context in which they were found. Archaeological investigation cannot therefore be limited to the study of objects that have been totally or partially destroyed, or to goods removed from their context without the prior conduct of exhaustive field analyses aimed at their understanding within the environment where they were discovered, since in such cases a task that by constitutional imperative (Articles 50, 74 and 89) should be conceived as one of scientific rigor, could become little more than a simple task of collecting and artistic contemplation, in contravention of the fundamental order.

XII.- Regarding the challenged regulations: the simplification of procedures. Through the present action, the constitutionality is questioned of Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 15, 16 and 17 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 28174-mp-minae-MEIC, of October twelfth, nineteen ninety-nine, which regulates, to the exclusion of any other source, the procedures for the study, rescue, and preservation of archaeological goods. The Decree under review evidently emphasizes the simplification of procedures in the case of construction of public or private works, with respect to the requirements established in the legal system for the purpose of protecting the archaeological heritage.

While the deregulation of certain activities burdened with excessive requirements is not invalid per se and may even be desirable, this Chamber starts from the premise that any procedures necessary for the protection of assets of constitutional relevance cannot be validly eliminated without an adequate substitution by others that fulfill the same protective function. Based on that reasoning, we shall proceed to analyze each of the provisions challenged in this action.

XIII.- Tacit repeals. Article 1 provides that:

"Article 1—Of the requirements. The only requirements and procedures for conducting archaeological studies are those established in this decree and therefore, all regulations, manuals, directives, circulars, and other documents that do not conform to the guidelines and provisions of this decree are repealed." In order to fully understand the modification that this provision produced in the legal system, it is first necessary to clarify—an obvious rule—that the only provisions that could be affected by this Decree would be earlier ones of equal or lower rank (article 11 of the Constitution) that oppose it, so any discordance between the text of this Regulation and that of a higher-ranking act is merely a problem of illegality of the Decree, given that it is incapable of modifying in any way the text of the formal Law. If, on the contrary, any provision of the Decree opposes norms or principles that form part of the parameter of constitutionality, then those same provisions will be sanctionable through this channel. For this reason, the text of the other questioned provisions must be analyzed to determine whether the repeal contained in this article effectively constitutes a weakening of the control that the State exercises over the Nation's archaeological heritage.

XIV.- Definitions contained in the Decree and their implications. For its part, article 2 contains a series of definitions to be used for the interpretation of the remaining articles of the Regulation:

"Article 2—Definitions.

• a)Archaeological sites (without a declaration pursuant to Law N° 7555): An archaeological site is understood to be the locality in which, through archaeological studies, the presence of pre-Columbian remains is demonstrated, the importance of which varies according to the characteristics of the remains and the value conferred upon them, based on grounded knowledge about the cultures that populated the zone.
• b)Sites with heritage value declared via executive decree and pursuant to Law N° 7555: Those are archaeological sites that have been defined and incorporated into the historical heritage via executive decree and according to the procedures established in the Law of Historical-Architectural Heritage, Law N° 7555 of October 20, 1995.
• c)Archaeological studies: refers to scientifically valid research, aimed at discovering or exploring the archaeological heritage of a specific zone or site.
• d)Inspection stage: consists of the reconnaissance of a determined terrain with the purpose of verifying the existence of pre-Columbian cultural remains.
• e)Evaluation stage: consists of performing a diagnosis of the detected archaeological resources, using a scientifically valid methodology. Said diagnosis shall determine whether the most basic characteristics of the detected remains have archaeological importance; if so, measures permitting the rescue of the heritage assets must be recommended.
• f)Rescue: It is the immediate action of preserving the remains detected in the evaluation to prevent the destruction of cultural features, architectonic structures, or sites of archaeological importance, prior to the excavation.
• g)Excavation: consists of the action of removing earth, rocks, or other elements with the purpose of evaluating or rescuing cultural features, architectonic structures, or sites of archaeological importance.
• h)Conservation: refers to the protection of specific zones in archaeological sites pursuant to the procedure described in article 8 of this regulation.
• i)Archaeological sites of importance:

- Are sites that present cultural features, architectonic structures feasible for analysis, and/or a cultural stratigraphy; - Sites where cultural features or architectonic structures cannot be defined but that provide data on the following ancient groups: Paleo-Indians (10,000 to 6,000 B.C.), Archaics (6,000 to 3,000 B.C.), from the Early Formative (3,000 to 1,500 B.C.) or Proto-historics (1450 to 1550 A.D.).

• j)Archaeological sites without importance: Those sites that do not present the previous characteristics; or that present insufficient archaeological evidence; or that are very altered or that due to their characteristics do not allow obtaining information from them." Article 2 defines archaeological sites as the locality in which, through archaeological studies, the presence of pre-Columbian remains is demonstrated, the importance of which varies according to the characteristics of the remains and the value conferred upon them, based on grounded knowledge about the cultures that populated the zone. Notwithstanding this definition, which in principle could be considered broad, that same article defines archaeological sites of importance as those that present cultural features, architectonic structures feasible for analysis, or a general stratigraphy, where cultural features or architectonic structures can be defined that provide data on the following ancient groups: Paleo-Indians (10,000 to 6,000 B.C.), Archaics (6,000 to 3,000 B.C.), from the Early Formative (3,000 to 1,500 B.C.) or Proto-historics (1450 to 1550 A.D.). As a first approximation, it is pertinent to point out two relevant ideas. First, it is not determined in said article nor in the rest of the Decree, which is the authority responsible for determining if an archaeological site is of importance for presenting cultural features or architectonic structures feasible for analysis, so based on the provisions of Law 6703 of December twenty-eighth, nineteen hundred and eighty-one (articles 4 and 15), as well as the need to prevent future conflicts of competencies, or worse yet, a total absence of them that could imply a renunciation of the State's own competencies in this matter, this Chamber must clarify that whenever this matter is discussed in the project, it must be interpreted in the sense that the National Museum and the National Archaeological Commission (Comisión Arqueológica Nacional) are the State bodies that must establish whether one is dealing with deposits “of importance,” based on strictly scientific criteria. On the other hand, it is extremely serious that the historical classification made to determine when an archaeological site is of importance disregards the periods between the years 1,500 B.C. to 1450 A.D. and any eventual findings older than 10,000 years B.C., that is, it does not consider archaeological elements from a period of almost three thousand years and another of indeterminate length as being of importance. This exclusion is clearly unconstitutional, by reason that both article 89 of the Political Constitution and the instruments that obligate the Costa Rican State to protect archaeological assets do so without those norms establishing a gradation by reason of their period of origin; it not being possible, from this perspective, to discriminate a priori in a whimsical and unscientific manner, as the Decree in question does. The aspects pointed out so far are not merely technical problems of archaeological definition, but have profound repercussions from the standpoint of the protection of historical assets, since the declaration of importance of an archaeological site determines relevant consequences with respect to its rescue and discovery. Thus, article 3 of the Decree provides:

"Article 3—Cases in which archaeological rescue is applicable. The archaeological rescue stage shall only be applicable in those cases where cultural features, architectonic structures, or archaeological sites of importance defined in the previous article are discovered, which merit being recorded, analyzed, or excavated.

All heritage assets found during the archaeological studies must be delivered to the National Museum, which shall handle the respective storage and registration procedures at no cost to the interested party." It is clear, from the provisions transcribed above, that the possibility is opened of finding archaeological assets that, besides not presenting cultural features, architectonic structures feasible for analysis, or a cultural stratigraphy, belong to the era spanning the years 1,500 B.C. to 1420 A.D. or earlier than 10,000 B.C., for which they would be considered as assets without importance and therefore their rescue would not be warranted. The same can be said in the case of discoveries, since an archaeological asset such as the one just mentioned would also not require any rescue. Finally, the state of conservation of the assets does not necessarily imply their lack of importance from the archaeological point of view, so understanding them a priori as lacking importance—with the effects that said condition entails—results in the lack of protection of diverse types of objects whose apparent insignificance (shell middens (concheros), altered sites, etc.) prevents the State from giving them effective protection, in contravention of its constitutional and international duties. The inadmissible exclusion of a considerable historical period of our history as an objective determining element of its importance from an archaeological point of view, as well as the consequences this brings in the regulation of rescues and discoveries in such cases, constitute violations of constitutional articles 50, 74, and 89, as well as the conventional norms cited previously.

XV.- Permit to conduct excavations. (Written by Judge Sancho) The plaintiffs question the validity of the provision contained in article 4 of the Executive Decree, which requires the owner's authorization to proceed with conducting archaeological excavations. The cited article provides:

"Article 4—Owner's permit to excavate. To be able to execute excavations, whether for evaluation or rescue, the authorization of the owner or owners of the land to be excavated must be obtained. The excavations must be limited solely to the project area." The previous provision largely reproduces what article 12 of Law number 6703 of December twenty-eighth, nineteen hundred and eighty-one regulates, when it states:

"Article 12.- The National Archaeological Commission may authorize excavations with the authorization of the landowner, and with the obligation to supervise the excavation directly and adequately, and to adopt the corresponding measures to avoid damage to the property in question." (The underlining is not from the original).

The legal mechanism of obtaining prior permission from the property owner that the challenged provision develops, in summary, provides that on sites, whether of archaeological interest or not, where prior studies exist or in the case of discoveries that merit evaluation or rescue actions, all State actions to preserve the archaeological heritage are appropriate and legitimate. The issue raised in this considerando concerns the coincidence of the appearance of archaeological remains of importance on private property and the concern of how to ensure that the State's heritage is protected, rescued, and conserved. In the criteria of the majority of the Chamber, when the provisions speak of the need to obtain the owner's permits to conduct archaeological excavations, it points to the respect that must exist for the right of property in the dimension established in article 45 of the Political Constitution. In accordance with the terms of this judgment, especially in considerandos VIII, IX, and X, in practice there exist two property rights of a diverse nature, which may eventually come into conflict: on the one hand, the archaeological heritage which is a public domain asset, as established in this judgment, and which is, moreover, a privileged right, due to the characteristic features that inform it; on the other hand, the right to property, whether public or private, but which is distinct from the assets that make up the public domain and which is a right of the most deeply rooted tradition, as it was qualified as a "natural right" in the Fundamental Interim Social Pact of Costa Rica of December 1, 1821 and about which it is said to be one of the cornerstones of the political and social formation of the country's democratic regime. Facing the hypothetical conflict of interests that might arise, it must be decided which of the two rights prevails over the other, and in the criteria of the majority of the Chamber, what must exist is a perfect balance that favors each of the two, but to the extent that it protects both in their just dimension. Regarding the right of property, during the constituent process of nineteen hundred and forty-nine, it was said:

"It should be noted, firstly, that article 29 of the 1871 Constitution, in a certain way already introduced the concept of the social function of property, by virtue of the reform introduced in the year '43, when speaking that Congress could, by two-thirds of the totality of its members, impose limitations of social interest on private property. It was admitted that limitations could be imposed on property for reasons of social interest, and by doing so, it was implicitly also established that in Costa Rica, property had constitutionally lost, from that moment, the absolute, closed character it had in previous eras, when economic liberalism and Manchesterian individualism were at their peak… private property cannot be considered as something that interests only its owner, ignoring the consequences that the disorderly or arbitrary exercise of the respective right may produce in society; this right is recognized and guaranteed, because its existence is known to be useful and convenient for the development of the national economy, but it is guaranteed within the logical limitations imposed upon it by the fact of its social function; it cannot therefore be an absolute and inviolable concept… The idea that property is or has a social function is an idea imposed by the needs of the modern world in the economy of free countries, which must be adjusted not only for the benefit of the owners, but for that of all society, for that of the other factors of production, for that of the groups that buy the products in the market, for the benefit, finally, of all the elements whose concurrence makes it possible for the profits derived from private property to be produced." (Principal ideas expressed by Deputy Rodrigo Facio. Acts of the Constituent Assembly. Volume II, pages 465 et seq.)

With all the foregoing established, in the Chamber's judgment, the State has available to it, in order to adequately protect the archaeological heritage, the application of all necessary legal mechanisms to dictate precautionary measures of an administrative nature and to manage, in the judicial venue, with the speed the case warrants, the application of the necessary measures to protect that heritage and to compel the reluctant owner to agree to allow the excavation works to be carried out, when the circumstances so warrant. In other words, it cannot be unconstitutional that the authorization of the landowner must be requested, since theirs is a right of constitutional rank and the maxim that "property is inviolable" admits no other interpretation than that which derives from its literal content, especially if one notes that the exceptions to such a principle can only be those that are already contained, expressly, in the same constitutional article 45; but everything understood, of course, in function of the interpretation given to it by the National Constituent Assembly of nineteen hundred and forty-nine, according to the terms of the intervention of Deputy Facio Brenes. On the other hand, to affirm that to protect the archaeological heritage, the State may disregard the right of property, which would thus be subordinated to the former, is not a conclusion that can be reached by the mere confrontation of both rights. In summary: the Political Constitution, by definition, has a structure such that the rights and guarantees are aligned in a harmonious manner, and it is not possible to affirm the prevalence of one over the others. When a conflict of interests exists, "by resorting to the laws, everyone shall find reparation," states constitutional article 41, and prompt and full justice must be done. This means that the fundamental text itself has foreseen the way in which disputes between persons must be resolved and it is, in the judgment of the majority of the Chamber, the sense that must be given to the provisions under examination (article 4 of Executive Decree 28174-MP-MINAE-MEIC and article 12 of Law 6703 of December 28, 1981). That is, those provisions are not unconstitutional; in case of the refusal of the landowner, justified or not, to facilitate evaluation or rescue excavations of the archaeological heritage, the State may immobilize the property in question, dictating precautionary measures without thereby incurring a violation of the property right, subject to it having to, immediately, resort to the courts of justice to request the corresponding authorizations, all without prejudice to exercising, if it deems it convenient, the right to expropriate the land partially or totally. For all the reasons stated, by majority, this aspect of the action declares that the provisions involved are not unconstitutional.

XVI.- Of discoveries by third parties. Section 5 establishes the need to communicate discoveries that are located to the National Museum, an entity which is given a period of 15 calendar days (días naturales) to conduct the necessary studies and determine if they are of importance, and 15 additional days to prepare a proposal in case it is determined that the assets found require rescue. It similarly determines the possibility of continuing with the works if, within the mentioned periods, the Museum has not performed the corresponding actions.

"Article 5—Discoveries by third parties. When through third parties the National Museum is notified of the discovery of monuments, ruins, inscriptions, or objects of archaeological interest on public or private lands, the procedure shall be as follows:

• a)The National Museum, within the following 15 calendar days counted from said notification, must conduct an archaeological inspection and, where appropriate, an evaluation of the site. If the remains found are of archaeological importance, the National Museum shall have a maximum period of 15 additional calendar days to prepare a proposal for the archaeological rescue work.
• b)The rescue may be performed by persons duly accredited before the National Archaeological Commission (CAN), under the supervision of the National Museum and shall be limited to the project areas defined by the archaeological evaluation.
• c)If, upon expiration of the periods established in subsection a) of this article, the corresponding actions have not been performed, the project developer may continue carrying out their ordinary activities." The text of this article is in part a reproduction of the provisions of section 13 of the aforementioned Law number 6703, regarding the duty of third parties to report discoveries of archaeological objects to the National Museum, and the period of 15 days that said institution has to conduct the corresponding studies. Both provisions are distinguished, however, in that the challenged one clearly defines that it is a period counted in calendar days; likewise, in the fact that upon expiration of the term, the discoverer of the objects may continue with the respective works. This last aspect is clearly unconstitutional, as it subjects the protection of the archaeological heritage to the diligence of the Administration, specifically to compliance with the short periods (in calendar days) provided for by the provision in question. This Chamber has already established in a consistent line of jurisprudence that, regarding the protection of essential interests for the Nation, such as the environment (and we could say the same about archaeological heritage), positive silence does not operate due to the Administration's omission in fulfilling its duties, without prejudice to the liability it may incur for the damages its delay causes to the administered parties. (See in that sense judgments numbers 6332-94, of eighteen hours and twelve minutes of October twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred and ninety-four, and 1895-00, of fifteen hours and forty-six minutes of February twenty-ninth, two thousand.) The same arguments must be used to annul the provisions contained in subsection d) of article 11 and in subsection d) of article 12 of the challenged Regulation, as they establish a positive silence in favor of project developers who have conducted a voluntary archaeological study and have submitted its results for approval by the National Archaeological Commission. This last provision, although it has not been challenged in this action, due to connectedness must be annulled.

XVII.- Procedure in case of execution of public or private works. Section 6 of the challenged Decree establishes that earthworks (movimientos de tierra) do not require authorization from the National Museum nor an archaeological study, except in those cases where the land is located in an archaeological site according to the procedures of Law number 7555. The text of the referred article is the following:

"Article 6—Discoveries by project developers. Earthworks do not require authorization from the National Museum nor an archaeological study, except in those cases where the land is located in an archaeological site according to the procedures of Law N° 7555.

If, during the works being carried out for the execution of public or private projects, archaeological objects are discovered, the procedure shall be the following:

• a)The person responsible for the project must notify the fact, immediately, to the National Museum and make the objects found available to it. The project developer must only halt the works for the execution of the project in that area or those areas where archaeological objects have been found.
• b)The National Museum, within the following 15 calendar days counted from said notification, must conduct an archaeological inspection and, where appropriate, an evaluation of the site. If the remains found are of archaeological importance, the National Museum shall have a maximum period of 15 additional calendar days to prepare a proposal for the archaeological rescue work.
• c)If, upon expiration of the periods established in subsections a) and b) of this article, the corresponding actions have not been performed, the project developer may continue carrying out their ordinary activities.
• d)The rescue shall be limited solely to the project areas defined in the archaeological evaluation, which must be previously approved by the CAN." Article 6, paragraph 1, establishes that prior authorization from the National Museum is required for carrying out earthworks only on lands located in an archaeological site declared as such according to the procedures established in Law number 7555. In this regard, the first thing that must be clarified is that the referred Law has as its object "…the preservation of the historical-architectural heritage of Costa Rica" (article 1), providing that the Executive Branch may, by way of Decree, effect the respective declaration, after conducting the studies that determine the presence of a site of importance according to the terms of the Law (article 7). It is evident that the concept of archaeological heritage goes far beyond the architectural legacy, since, as was previously stated, it constitutes a broad concept that encompasses a vast plurality of movable and immovable assets, remains of persons, animals, and plants, capable of yielding information about our ancestors. Due to the foregoing, limiting the obtaining of archaeological permits to earthworks carried out in places declared as of historical-architectural interest (Law 7.555) implies the lack of protection of the archaeological heritage located in all those zones of the country that have not been the object of a formal declaration, in accordance with the cited Law. Thus, the subjection of the National Museum's permits to the prior existence of the referred declaration by the Executive Branch implies its effective lack of protection, in clear contravention of what article 89 of the Political Constitution orders. This defect is not remedied by the fact that article 9 of the challenged Decree establishes that any public or private project developer, prior to the execution of their works, may conduct a voluntary archaeological study on the land, since compliance with protective functions that correspond to the State cannot be left to the discretion of private parties. Therefore, this Chamber must declare the invalidity of the phrase “according to the procedures of Law N° 7555” contained in the first paragraph of article 6 of the Decree that is the object of this action.

XVIII.- On voluntary procedures. Articles 9 and 10 of the project provide for the archaeological studies that the owner, voluntarily, may conduct on their property before carrying out civil works. The mentioned sections state:

"Article 9—Procedures for voluntary archaeological studies. Any public or private project developer who, prior to the execution of their works, wishes to conduct an archaeological study of the land on which the work will be carried out and which has not been significantly altered previously, may contract any person duly authorized and registered before the CAN to conduct all or any of the stages of an archaeological study. They may contract the studies to determine the existence of cultural evidence in the area to be altered or the potential damage to the archaeological heritage for the purpose of implementing preventive measures that avoid or reduce said damage.

Likewise and voluntarily, the interested party may contract any person duly authorized and registered before the CAN for the supervision of the earthworks." "Article 10.—Archaeological inspection. To determine if there is cultural evidence in the project area, the project developer, public or private, may contract any person authorized and registered with the CAN to conduct archaeological studies to perform the inspections.

Since it is not an excavation, the inspection shall not require the submission of a proposal before the CAN nor the sending of a final report." In this regard, this Chamber must clarify that it is not unconstitutional to allow private parties to conduct archaeological studies on their properties before building. The contrary would be true if the possibilities of studying the archaeological impact of a work depended exclusively on the will of private parties, that is, if there were no mechanisms through which the State could intervene directly in fulfillment of its constitutional duties in relation to the historical heritage. For the same reasons, it is not unconstitutional for such analyses to be carried out by professionals registered and authorized by the National Archaeological Commission. What is contrary to the Political Constitution is what subsections d) of article 11, and d) of article 12 determine, since in both cases forms of positive silence are established in favor of the owners, to the detriment of the reinforced protection that the State is obligated to give to the archaeological heritage, as was established in Considerando XVI of this judgment.

XIX.- Registry of persons authorized to conduct archaeological studies. Article 15 of the challenged regulation contains the following text:

"Article 15.—Registry of persons authorized by the CAN to conduct archaeological studies. Natural or legal persons, national or foreign, who possess a university degree in archaeology and a minimum experience of two assistance works in archaeological evaluations, may register in the Registry of persons authorized by the CAN to conduct archaeological studies.

Said persons may perform all the work involved in the inspection, evaluation, and rescue phases, including laboratory analyses, which they may carry out in public or private laboratories.

The National Archaeological Commission (CAN) must create a Registry of persons who meet the requirements established in the first paragraph of this article, based on the registration applications submitted." The CAN must make available to project designers the Registry of persons accredited to carry out archaeological studies.

The CAN must provide to accredited persons, at the time of conducting an evaluation, the available bibliography, the final reports of previously conducted evaluations, the archaeological sites database, and other studies, for which purpose the Museum must provide the CAN with the corresponding information." Following the line of argument contained in the preceding point, there does not appear to be any defect of unconstitutionality in the fact that duly accredited professionals may carry out archaeological studies, duly supervised by the State, through the National Museum. In the case of rescue work, which implies the removal of objects from the site where they are found and their transfer into the hands of the Administration for the purpose of protecting them, that activity, although it may not only be carried out by the State, through the authorities of the National Museum, but also by duly accredited professionals, the truth is that in this case the oversight exercised by the Administration must be heightened, in order to prevent the said goods from being removed from the public domain.

XX.- Repeal of subsection c) of Article 14 of Decree 19016-C. Article 16, subsection c) of the challenged regulation repeals—as relevant—the text of subsection c) of Article 14 of Executive Decree 19016-C, Regulation of the National Archaeological Commission.

"Article 16.— Amendments. Amend the Regulation of the National Archaeological Commission, Executive Decree No. 19106-C of June 12, 1989:

(…)

• c)Repeal subsection c) of Article 14 of the cited regulation." The repealed text is as follows:

"Article 14.— The functions of the National Archaeological Commission shall be:

(…)

• c)To authorize archaeological excavations. To do so, the interested party must request the respective form from the CAN and send it to the CAN with complete information. The CAN shall evaluate the request, and shall issue its decision within a maximum of two months from the submission. The decision shall be communicated in writing to the interested party, and a copy thereof shall be sent to the Department of Anthropology and History of the National Museum, attaching the background of the matter.

(…)" This Chamber considers that the repeal of the norm in question does not constitute a defect of unconstitutionality. The foregoing is because although said provision is eliminated, the procedure contained therein is not, as it is provided for in Articles 5° and 6° of the challenged Decree, with the sole difference that the timeframes were reduced as a means of alleviating the procedural burden on the project designer, and recalling that in this very judgment the Chamber has already deemed invalid the norms that establish a positive silence in favor of the project designer in this matter. For the stated reasons, the referred to subsection c) of Article 16 of the Decree under study is not unconstitutional.

XXI.- Exclusion of archaeological studies from environmental assessment (evaluación ambiental) procedures. Article 17 of the challenged Regulation provides the following in this regard:

"Article 17.— Repeals.

• a)Repeal the final paragraph of subsection a.2. of Article 19 of the Regulation of Procedures of the National Technical Secretariat for the Environment (SETENA), Executive Decree No. 25705-MINAE of October 8, 1996 and its amendments, which reads as follows: “Areas where there is an express record of the presence of archaeological sites, defined by the National Museum, preferably on published and disseminated maps, at a scale no greater than 1:50,000 and registered with SETENA.” b) Repeal from the Manual of Technical Instruments for the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, EIA) Process, SETENA Resolution No. 588-97 of August 28, 1997, published in “La Gaceta” 215 of November 7, 1997 on its page 21, the informational requirement of the Preliminary Environmental Assessment Form (Formulario de Evaluación Ambiental Preliminar, FEAP) requested by SETENA regarding the “existence within the project's impact area of possible areas of archaeological interest or historical and cultural heritage (patrimonio histórico y cultural), according to data provided by the National Museum”, for which purpose they must provide the Museum's note.” Likewise, repeal the inclusion of the requirement related to archaeological evaluations and studies in the procedure of the Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA)." With the foregoing provisions, the archaeological component was eliminated from the two main environmental assessment mechanisms detailed in the Organic Law of the Environment, which are the Preliminary Environmental Assessment Form (FEAP) and the Environmental Impact Study (EsIA). Taking into account that the aforementioned requirements are not replaced in the cited Decree by any other suitable ones to guarantee preventively the integrity of the archaeological heritage, this Chamber considers that said repeals become unconstitutional. As stated above, archaeological heritage forms part of the broader concept of the environment, precisely because it is the cultural (human) component of the environment. Complete protection of the environment, which therefore respects, in an integral manner, what is ordered by Article 50 of the Constitution, must contemplate the protection of archaeological goods, of the historical legacy through which human beings have adapted to and modified their surroundings throughout the centuries.

XXII.- Conclusion. By reason of the arguments contained in the preceding paragraphs, this Chamber considers that the present action must be partially granted, understanding that of Executive Decree number 28174-mp-minae-MEIC, of the twelfth of October of nineteen ninety-nine, published in Supplement number 78-A to La Gaceta number 202, of the nineteenth of October of nineteen ninety-nine, the following are unconstitutional: from paragraph 2ª of subsection i) of Article 2°, the word "siguientes", as well as the text after the word "antiguos"; subsection c) of Article 5; from paragraph 1° of Article 6 the phrase “según los procedimientos de la Ley 7555”; subsection d) of Article 11; subsection d) of Article 12; as well as Article 17, whereby the requirements established in the final paragraph of subsection a.2. of Article 19 of Executive Decree number 25075-MINAE, and in the Manual of Technical Instruments for the Environmental Impact Assessment Process, SETENA Resolution number 588-97 of the twenty-eighth of August of nineteen ninety-seven, shall regain their validity. The previously cited norms are unconstitutional for violation of Articles 7°, 50, 74 and 89 of the Political Constitution, as well as the international instruments in force in Costa Rica, referred to in Considerando VII of this judgment. In all other respects, the action shall be dismissed, as is hereby done.

Justices Arguedas, Vargas and Armijo issue a dissenting opinion and additionally declare unconstitutional Article 4 of Decree 28174-MP-MINAE-MEIC and, by connection, in accordance with Article 89 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, annul the expression “con autorización del propietario del terreno”, from Article 12 of the Law on National Archaeological Heritage, number 6703 of the twenty-eighth of December of nineteen eighty-six.

Por tanto:

The action is partially granted. The following are annulled as unconstitutional, from Executive Decree number 28174-mp-minae-MEIC, of the twelfth of October of nineteen ninety-nine: from paragraph 2ª of subsection i) of Article 2°, the word "siguientes", as well as the text after the word "antiguos"; subsection c) of Article 5; from paragraph 1° of Article 6 the phrase “según los procedimientos de la Ley 7555”; subsection d) of Article 11; subsection d) of Article 12; as well as Article 17, whereby the requirements established in the final paragraph of subsection a.2. of Article 19 of Executive Decree number 25075-MINAE, and in the Manual of Technical Instruments for the Environmental Impact Assessment Process, SETENA Resolution number 588-97 of the twenty-eighth of August of nineteen ninety-seven, regain their validity. This judgment is declaratory and retroactive to the date of issuance of the challenged Decree, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. In all other respects, the action is dismissed. Record in the Official Gazette "La Gaceta" and publish in full in the Judicial Bulletin. Communicate to the Legislative and Executive Branches. Notify.- Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Eduardo Sancho G.

Carlos M. Arguedas R. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

MCP/oc/13céd.- With respect to Article 4 of the Decree, which provides that procedures require the authorization of the landowner to carry out excavations, it infringes the right enshrined in Article 89 of the Constitution by leaving in the hands of a private individual the power to allow studies or excavations to be conducted, grossly contravening Article 24(b) of Law 4711, and it is also contrary to the principle of prevention and the principle of legal certainty, necessary for the effective protection of the archaeological resource and assets. It further considers that this provision violates Articles 1 and 8 of the Convention on the Defense of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations. With respect to findings by third parties, regulated in Article 5, it argues that this article establishes the concept of positive silence (silencio positivo) whereby, once the 15-day period for the inspection and preparation of the proposal for rescue work by the Museo Nacional has expired without said inspection having been carried out or the rescue proposal prepared, the project developer (proyectista) may continue construction of the work begun, which is considered unconstitutional insofar as it attempts, by way of a Decree, to modify a legal-rank norm such as the Ley General de Administración Pública, thus violating Article 129 of the Political Constitution. Regarding Article 6, concerning findings by project developers when carrying out earthworks (movimientos de tierra), which will not require authorization from the Museo Nacional nor an archaeological study, except in those cases where the land is located on an archaeological site (sitio arqueológico), it considers that this renders nugatory the right contained in Article 89 of the Political Constitution, directly infringing Articles 7 and 8 of Law 4711, which develop the precautionary principle regarding archaeological heritage. It considers that subsection c) of that article allows the application of what was previously noted regarding positive silence, given that in this case, the possibility of an implicit affirmative resolution is erroneously admitted, thus allowing the irrational and irreparable damage to the archaeological resource. Regarding voluntary archaeological studies, provided for in Article 9 of the Decree, it considers that these cannot be voluntary, as the power to conduct them is left in the hands of a private individual. As for Article 16, which repeals subsection c) of Article 9 of Executive Decree 19016, and the repeals provided in Article 17, referring to the Reglamento de Procedimientos de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental and the Manual de Instrumentos Técnicos del Proceso de Revisión de Impacto Ambiental, it considers that the assets protected by Articles 50 and 89 of the Political Constitution, concerning the conservation and protection of historical, archaeological, and cultural heritage, are left unprotected. It alleges that the challenged Decree creates a legal vacuum that will have enormous repercussions on the social and cultural rights of Costa Ricans and the international community.

**4.-** By a resolution issued at fourteen hours and thirty minutes on November twenty-sixth, two thousand (folio 288), the action was admitted, granting a hearing to the Procuraduría General de la República, the Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Comercio, the Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes, and the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía.

**5.-** The Procuraduría General de la República submitted its report, visible at folios 291 to 311. It notes that the archaeological heritage comprises a set of riches, objects of study and aesthetic contemplation, essential for the adequate development of the human personality, and therefore fulfills a purpose of general utility, which is to preserve the pre-Columbian cultural heritage for present and future generations. It states that Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Article 13 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and Article 46 of the Charter of the Organization of American States establish the duty of States to protect the archaeological assets existing in their territories, and therefore, in the Costa Rican case, the Political Constitution develops these provisions in Article 89. It indicates that, in this sense, Costa Rica has signed a series of international conventions, such as the Recommendation on the Conservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works; the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage; the Convention on the Defense of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations; the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, etc. It argues that the archaeological heritage is public domain, which is granted constitutional standing, and therefore enjoys privileged protection through self-tutelage by the Administration, which has not only the right but also the obligation to prevent or cease any injurious or damaging act. In Costa Rica, except for previously acquired private property, which is exceptional and requires proof by the private individual, since the enactment of Law Number 7 of October sixth, nineteen thirty-eight, all archaeological objects existing in the soil of Costa Rica predating the Spanish conquest were declared property of the State, as were monuments of the same kind that might be found. Regarding this action, it considers that Articles 1 and 6 of the challenged Decree are contrary to the Political Constitution and the international conventions signed for its conservation. It considers that reality has shown that the lack of proper regulatory controls to protect public domain assets has caused significant harm to them; furthermore, dealing with cultural or natural heritage, its protection is required in a preventive manner. On Article 2, it believes it establishes concepts with an inapplicable periodization regarding archaeological sites (sitios arqueológicos) with or without importance, developed without scientific rigor and without a prior on-site study by the technical body. It recommends that this Chamber, using the powers conferred by Article 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seek the technical opinion of the Escuela de Antropología y Sociología of the Universidad de Costa Rica, so that a professional in archaeology may report on the correct periodization. With respect to provision 3 of the Decree, it excludes non-important sites from archaeological rescue, without previously assessing that condition, leaving such resources unprotected (cf. Articles 2(f) and 5(a)), since in those cases the rescue would be delegated to private individuals, when that competence must remain with the Museo Nacional, without prejudice to the collaboration they may provide. Another objection to provision 2(a) and (b) arises from the understanding that archaeological sites would only be those declared as such by executive decree under Law Number 7555. It considers that this precept is applicable to the Architectural Historical Heritage, given its specific particularity and generally easily verifiable material evidence, but obviously not to the Archaeological Heritage, which entered the public domain through Law Number 7, an attribute reiterated in Law Number 6703, thus fulfilling General Principles 3 and 13 of the Convention approved by Law Number 4711. It considers that provisions 2, 3, and 5(b) of Decree Number 28174 also contravene the constitutional order. Regarding Article 4, it questions that it leaves the execution of excavations or archaeological studies in the hands of private individuals, limiting them to the project areas, without including their surrounding context. A similar provision exists in Law 6703, establishing that the Comisión Arqueológica Nacional may authorize excavations with the landowner's authorization, and with the obligation to supervise the excavation directly and adequately, and to adopt the corresponding measures to avoid damage to the property in question. According to the transcribed legal norm, it understands that the landowner's authorization must be reserved for cases in which the Comisión Arqueológica Nacional, for reasons of scientific or academic interest, authorizes excavations by a third party of recognized competence in the field, and not the owner of the property where the archaeological investigation will be carried out, as occurs in the hypothesis raised in Article 15 ibidem. However, it considers that the authorization cannot be required when the preventive archaeological evaluations are carried out that every project developer must necessarily contract to comply with provisions such as those repealed by provisions 16(c) and 17 of Decree Number 28174. It considers the Decree's provision requiring the landowner's authorization for rescue work appropriate, but with the understanding that, if the owner refuses, and in order not to render the State's powers over archaeological assets nugatory, the Museo Nacional may issue and communicate to the reluctant owner an order to permit and not obstruct the rescue work. In reference to provision 5 of the Decree, which establishes the concept of positive silence, since upon expiration of the fifteen-day periods for inspection and evaluation of the site, as well as for the preparation of the proposal for rescue work by the Museo Nacional, when applicable, without the respective actions having been carried out, the project developer may continue the construction of the work begun, it does not consider that there is a violation of provision 129 of the Political Constitution, because Law 6703, being a special law, contains in its Article 13 the fifteen-day period for the Museo Nacional to define how it will organize the rescue work. However, it cannot be permitted that, upon expiration of the deadlines, the project developer continues developing its ordinary activities to the detriment of the archaeological assets. It considers that the solution to the above is contemplated by the same Decree in its Recital (Considerando) 7, when it cites Principle 25 of the Convention approved by Law Number 4711, so that upon expiration of the deadlines without the Museo Nacional carrying out the inspection and evaluation of the site or designing the proposal for rescue work, the project developer will have the right to demand, through the corresponding channel, compensation for the damages it proves were caused during the time used in excess by the Museo Nacional to carry out those activities. The discussed deadlines are exclusively for carrying out the indicated activities (inspection, evaluation, rescue proposal), but not for rescuing the archaeological assets, and therefore it considers Article 5(c), and by connection, also provision 6(c) of Decree Number 28174, unconstitutional. With respect to the challenges to Article 9, the possibility of authorized persons registered with the Comisión Arqueológica Nacional being hired to prepare archaeological studies is not questioned, which in any case has its basis in Article 8 of Law Number 7472; the problem lies in eliminating preventive control and reserving it for cases where there are earthworks located in an archaeological site according to the procedures of Law Number 7555, and when, at the will of the project developer, archaeological studies are contracted (Article 9 ibidem). The power of protection by the public authority over its heritage cannot depend on private will, as this makes it uncertain. Another additional challenge arises when the Decree (Article 9, paragraph 2) allows the project developer to voluntarily hire any person duly authorized and registered before the Comisión Arqueológica Nacional to supervise earthworks, because this supervisory power must belong exclusively to the Museo Nacional. It considers that Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 16, and 17 of the Reglamento de Trámites para los Estudios Arqueológicos are contrary to Articles 7, 89, and 121(14) of the Political Constitution and to the cited international instruments, and it requests that this Chamber declare them so.

**6.-** Elizabeth Odio Benito, in her capacity as Ministra de Ambiente y Energía, responds at folio 312 to the granted hearing, stating that she adheres to the arguments presented by the Procuraduría General de la República.

**7.-** Through a brief filed on January third, two thousand (folios 355 to 424), Samuel Guzowski Rose, Ministro de Economía, Industria y Comercio, states that the purpose of the challenged Decree is to regulate the procedures applicable to the process of obtaining and authorizing archaeological studies for the construction of civil works, whether public or private in nature, and does not intend to exhaust in itself all the protection, regulations, and responsibility pertaining to the State regarding the preservation and development of assets of archaeological importance. He indicates that prior controls are maintained in the Decree, they are simply made consistent with current legislation. On the other hand, the international conventions signed by Costa Rica do not require prior controls in all cases; they establish various controls in accordance with the different actions entrusted to the state agency responsible for protecting the archaeological heritage, hence he considers that the Decree does not leave the archaeological heritage unprotected. It was issued in strict adherence to the fundamental guarantees of sustainable development, the right to individual property, and freedom of enterprise; developing the principles included in the international treaties signed by our country on this matter, as well as those declared by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber itself. He alleges that the Political Constitution, in Articles 50 and 89, regulates natural heritage and cultural heritage independently. Regarding Law Number 4711, he indicates that this regulation obligates the protection of historical heritage at the moment of its discovery through two types of actions: the first is preventive, when the existence of sites of archaeological importance is known with certainty, here to carry out qualified work before undertaking any type of civil work (exceptional regime), and the second is conservation and salvage, which proceeds when, upon finding vestiges of probable archaeological importance, these are qualified and consequently rational measures are adopted for their protection (normal regime). It also requires the assessment of objects for the purposes of cataloging and determining their importance, that is, determining the relative importance of cultural assets, protecting or saving cultural assets in danger, knowing their existence, the danger that threatens them, and coordinating actions with those involved. It also establishes the obligation to publish or make available by some other means the results of studies of scientific or historical interest that have been carried out in relation to works aimed at saving cultural assets, especially when all or a large part of the immovable cultural assets have been destroyed. He considers that these obligations are specifically fulfilled in the Decree. The obligation contained in Article 20 of the Convention is fulfilled in Recital 3 of the Decree, as well as in Articles 4, 5, 7, and 15. Article 25 of the Convention is consistent with the obligation established in Recital 7 and Articles 5 and 6 of the Decree. He also considers that the obligation contained in Article 23 of the Convention is regulated in Recital 11 and Articles 3, 5, 6, and 9 of the Decree. On this point, he considers it is understood that the obligation to stop progress to allow time for the adoption of conservation or salvage measures for cultural assets exists and is logical to the extent that it concerns places of importance from an archaeological or cultural point of view in which there are important monuments, such as cities, towns, places, or neighborhoods of historical value, which should be protected by the legislation of all countries, so it is not an absolute imposition or applicable to other cases beyond those stated, in which the importance of cultural rescue is evident. Article 25 of the Convention is fulfilled by Article 8 of the challenged Decree, which indicates that it is not possible to impose illegitimate limitations on property rights. With respect to Law Number 5980 Approving the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, it provides a differentiated notion between cultural and natural heritage. Article 3 is respected by what is established in Recital 11, while Article 5 is safeguarded by Recitals one and two and by Article 15 of the challenged Decree. Regarding Law Number 6360, Convention on the Defense of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations, he considers that the challenged Decree adopts the guidelines of the cited convention. Article 8 of the Convention is respected by the regulation established in Articles 5, 6, 7, 10, and 11. With respect to Law Number 7526 Approving the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Articles 11 and 3 of the challenged Decree are consistent with what is established in Articles 5 and 7 of that Convention. Regarding the Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, it establishes two regimes of possession of archaeological assets: one public and one private. The only obligations imposed on private possessors were to submit an inventory of their collections to the Registro Público del Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, for the exclusive purpose of their identification and registration, and to agree to lend the assets in custody to the Museo Nacional to disseminate the culture of the different ethnic groups that inhabited our country in the past. He considers that the challenged Decree is compliant in all its articles with Law Number 6703; it is also consistent with the constitutional norms by establishing measures for the protection of the national archaeological heritage, both prior to the execution of civil works when they are sites declared by executive decree as being of archaeological interest, in which case permission for earthworks must be requested from the Museo Nacional and its approval obtained, and excavations and preliminary studies must also be carried out prior to the execution of works. When civil works have already begun and archaeological vestiges are found, it orders the State's intervention so that it is timely and compliant with Articles 11, 45, 46, 89 of the Constitution and 11, 113, 114 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, as well as Laws Number 6703 and 7555. He considers that the challenged Decree allows for greater protection than Law 6703. He indicates that the definitions established in the Ley de Patrimonio Histórico–Arquitectónico de Costa Rica are consistent with those established in the challenged Decree. He indicates that both the Civil Code and the Water Law establish the obligation to report the discovery of assets that, by legal provision or by their nature, are capable of being moved by themselves or by an action of nature, including human action. Regarding the allegations made by the Defensoría de los Habitantes, that the Formularios de Estudio Ambiental Propuesto (FEAP) included an archaeological impact study, he indicates that these forms are an ecological instrument administered by the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, attached to the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía. The inclusion of the mentioned obligation has no legal or rational basis since, first, it is based on speculation as to whether or not there are possible areas of archaeological, historical, or cultural interest; second, private individuals are obligated, through an environmental manual whose rank is lower than a regulation, to comply with obligations in the cultural sphere. Although the social heritage is composed of natural and cultural assets, identical rules are not applicable to the treatment of both subjects. Due to the inaction of the Museo Nacional, private individuals were forced to comply with arbitrary requirements or restrictions that were not in accordance with the law; an "AP" was required in areas where there was express registration of the presence of archaeological sites, as defined by the Museo Nacional. He considers the obligation to declare the existence within possible areas of archaeological interest, or of historical and cultural heritage, according to the data provided by the Museo Nacional within an ecological analysis instrument, to be disproportionate and irrational. If the duty of the Museo Nacional is to carry out preventive studies and plan conservation and rescue actions, the private individual cannot be forced to substitute for its inertia. He also indicates that the Fundación Anastasio Alfaro was established as the entity commissioned by the Museo Nacional to exercise the tasks of archaeological impact study, constituting a monopoly whose non-conformity with the legal system had already been noted. Regarding the allegations of the Defensoría that the decree eliminates prior controls for earthworks in the execution of civil works, he considers that neither the Constitution nor the international treaties signed by Costa Rica require permits or prior authorizations in all cases where the development of public or private civil works is encountered. The Defensoría demonstrates a total ignorance of the current regulatory texts. Under no logic can it be concluded that the regulations repeal the law, because if the challenged decree is analyzed appropriately, its sole objective is the "Reglamentación de Trámites Para Estudios Arqueológicos" in the execution of works, and therefore there are no rules specifically aimed at developing each of the powers that the laws grant to the Museo Nacional, the Municipalities, and any citizen to act in protection of the historical and cultural heritage of the Republic. He argues that private property has a social function, but under the pretext of this, the owner cannot be deprived of the fundamental core of real estate property. It is clear from the decree that the request for authorization to enter private land is for the purposes of excavation or earthworks under archaeological control techniques, which imply preventing the owner from the normal use they had been making of the property; since this is a limitation, for it not to be compensable and therefore, to demand the owner's submission, it requires an origin in a Law approved through a reinforced procedure. With respect to the plaintiff's allegation that a positive silence is established, he considers that in the challenged Decree, the deadlines granted to the Museo Nacional or the CAN are to initiate the administrative procedure of assessment and recovery of the found assets, not to conclude it. With respect to the Defensoría's argument that the challenged Decree leaves the execution of studies or excavations by the Museo Nacional at the discretion of the property owner, he states that the Decree merely complies with what is established in Article 12 of Law Number 6703, so the criticism must be directed at the Law, and in any case, on those properties declared sites of archaeological interest or when the private individual finds objects of archaeological importance, the Museo Nacional does not need authorization, as this only operates in the remaining cases. Regarding what the Procuraduría considers an erroneous historical classification of archaeological sites, he considers that this is not a constitutional problem. As for the argument that every discovery inherently incorporates great historical value, he states that this is not true; objects in themselves do not have historical value, but only to the extent that they form part of the environment that integrates, interprets, or complements them. Regarding the accreditation of natural or legal persons, public or private, to perform auxiliary services to the public function being contrary to the Constitution, he indicates that despite the absence of a legal or infralegal norm that so enabled it, the Decree does correct this deviation of power by highlighting the administrative power—already existing by legal mandate—to open an accreditation process for suitable persons to carry out auxiliary management of the public service entrusted to the Museo Nacional. He alleges that the Procuraduría General de la República falls into the error of affirming that the public domain status of the archaeological heritage justifies the violation of all types of rights, when the right of property is limited to the surface of the territory and the State is the owner of the minerals and resources found in the subsoil. He requests that the present action be dismissed.

**8.-** Through a brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber on December seventeenth, two thousand, Gabriel Macaya Trejos, in his capacity as Rector of the Universidad de Costa Rica (folios 1 to 29), requests that the unconstitutionality of Executive Decree Number 28174-MP-C-MINAE-MEIC be declared, an action assigned expediente number 99-009452-007-CO. He alleges that it is undeniable that in a globalized environment, with foreign investments and economic openness, demands may arise that the country's institutional design is not prepared to respond to with the necessary speed, so simplification of procedures and deregulation may be necessary, but it is equally true that bureaucratic obstruction can be the product of a limitation of institutional resources that prevent prompt and efficient service, such that in these cases, drastic deregulation can cause greater harm than it aims to remedy. He considers that the elimination of archaeological evaluation procedures does not favor the conservation of the cultural vestiges of our past and the knowledge of pre-Columbian societies. As for the standing to file this action, it is based on the protection of diffuse interests as provided in Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Regarding the merits, he considers that the Decree is contrary to the Paris Convention, which establishes a preventive and corrective duty on the part of the State to safeguard cultural assets, of which the archaeological heritage forms part. With the enactment of environmental provisions, preventive archaeological studies were included within environmental impact assessments (evaluaciones de impacto ambiental), which has represented progress in the protection of the archaeological heritage, as it allowed studies to be carried out when the project design was still in its earliest phases, such as feasibility studies. Prior archaeological studies, regardless of whether there is an archaeological site declaration, conform to the protection of historical heritage, since the Convention includes as cultural assets the unrecognized and unregistered vestiges of the past. He notes that the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage is contrary to what is provided in Article 6 of the challenged Decree, in that prior authorization from the Museo Nacional or an archaeological study is not required to conduct earthworks. The Convention on the Defense of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations (Convention of San Salvador) provided in provision 8 that each State is responsible for the identification, registration, protection, conservation, and vigilance of its cultural heritage, such that Article 6 of the Decree disregards that mandate. In accordance with the terms of the Convention of San Salvador, the exploration, excavation, investigation, and conservation of archaeological places and objects must be carried out by scientific institutions that do so in collaboration with the national agency responsible for the archaeological heritage, while Article 15 of the questioned Decree disregards the requirement of a scientific institution to develop these tasks, by indicating that a “university degree in archaeology and a minimum experience of two assisting assignments in archaeological evaluations” is sufficient to obtain accreditation as a person authorized by the Comisión Arqueológica Nacional for such purposes.

It points out that the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property contains active obligations for the Costa Rican State, which were disregarded by the Decree. For its issuance, the Executive Branch did not consult the pertinent institutions (National Museum, National Archaeological Commission, University of Costa Rica, ICOMOS), as established in subsection a) of the aforementioned Article 5, for which reason it considers that this defect in the procedure is another element to be taken into account for the declaration of unconstitutionality of said Decree. It is of the opinion that the Regulations generally reflect clearly the absence of advice from archaeology specialists, so that if it is maintained as such, it will lead those who follow it into serious errors that will result in the destruction of our National Archaeological Heritage. Article 20 of the "Recommendation on the Conservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works" stipulates the obligation to entrust the protection of historical heritage to appropriate official entities, which in the case of Costa Rica would be the National Museum, the University of Costa Rica, the Center for Conservation and Research of the Cultural Heritage of the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, and the National Archaeological Commission. On the other hand, it considers that, while it is true that the enactment of Law number 6703 represented a step forward in the investigation and conservation of archaeological evidence, this could only be done once the site had been discovered and was often already altered by heavy machinery during earthworks (remoción de tierra) in the initial phases of construction of public or private works, so that what was appropriate was to carry out an archaeological rescue (rescate arqueológico), which corresponds to the planning, execution, analysis, and publication of the results of an archaeological investigation carried out in those cases when, for different reasons, archaeological evidence is detected and is susceptible to imminent alteration due to the execution of a public or private work or activity, or by natural action. As a direct consequence of the new Decree, it represents a regression of more than 30 years in terms of protection, because the developer is not required to conduct these studies, in addition to eliminating the historic and legal authority of the National Museum to carry out the archaeological rescue (rescate arqueológico). In recital (considerando) number 8, reference is made to the fact that in Costa Rica only four zones have been declared of archaeological interest, so the text reflects a lack of knowledge about what Costa Rican archaeology is. Article 10 of the recitals (considerandos) says that the only reference to archaeological sites in national legislation is that established in Law number 7555, but it does not understand how the fact that the concept of an archaeological site is not used as it should be in national legislation must be taken to the detriment of the content this concept has in archaeology, which is conceived as a humanized physical space where archaeological evidence left by indigenous societies prior to or contemporary with the establishment of Hispanic culture is found. The archaeological investigations carried out in the country have allowed for the registration of nearly 3,500 sites, which can be verified in various bibliographies. In archaeology, by its nature, every site is important, because it is non-renewable, so that any damage done to it is irreversible. The type of study required will vary according to its contextual characteristics; objects or other types of archaeological remains are not valuable by themselves, but rather for the archaeological context that allows for the inference of ancient history. The Decree in question contains an erroneous definition of the concepts of the evaluation stage, since archaeology does not use the concept of "most basic characteristics", but rather that archaeological investigation is a scientific, logical, and systematic process that poses problems and seeks solutions about past cultures. It has several and diverse components and work stages: problem formulation and research design; survey (inspección); diagnosis (evaluation); excavation (programmed or rescue); analysis and processing of the evidence and information collected; conservation; and the dissemination of knowledge. This process is not taken up at any point in the decree; the investigation is presented in a fragmented manner, proposed as protecting what has been declared and "excavating or rescuing" the findings, and not as a process of knowledge. Subsection f) of the same Article 2 presents an illogical definition of rescue within the archaeological investigation process, since it is not possible to carry out an archaeological rescue (rescate arqueológico) work without executing a scientifically controlled excavation. The definition of excavation is erroneous from the archaeological point of view, as it repeats the same conceptual errors as in the case of subsection f), but also describes the mechanical action of "removing earth, rocks, or other elements...", as if archaeology consisted of the mere procedure of uncovering elements of archaeological evidence. Subsection h) of the same Article 2 is absolutely limited, since conservation, in the professional work of Archaeological Heritage, cannot be limited to the protection of specific zones in archaeological sites, because conservation requires carrying out those protection and consolidation works required by the type of property being conserved. The other point of subsection i) refers to a periodization into "sites where cultural features or architectural structures cannot be defined but which provide data on ancient groups: Paleoindians (10,000 to 6,000 B.C.), Archaics (6,000-3,000 B.C.), Early Formative (3,000 to 1,500 B.C.), or Protohistoric (1,450 to 1,550 A.D.)," a periodization it considers absolutely incomplete, since it leaves out what is known as pre-Paleoindian, which spans from 30,000 or 40,000 to 10,000 B.C.; and leaves out the period from 1,500 B.C. to 1,450 A.D. It points out that in the first case, there are between 20,000 and 30,000 years of ancient history, and in the second case, there are 2,950 years that are omitted. It states that subsection j) -unimportant archaeological site- of Article 2 advances a judgment on archaeological sites without specialists giving their opinion, which it considers serious, because it is perfectly possible to find a site that, according to subsection j), is not important and, archaeologically, may be of the greatest relevance, such as a very altered site containing remains that are very difficult to find, and which therefore has enormous significance for the archaeology of the country and the Americas. Subsection j) cannot qualify, in the way it does, what an unimportant archaeological site is; that can only be indicated by an archaeologist after having conducted an investigation; for the same reasons, Article 3 cannot be accepted from the point of view of the theoretical corpus of the archaeological discipline. Article 6 permits earthworks (movimientos de tierra) without authorization from the National Museum or an archaeological study, except in those cases where the land is located in an archaeological site according to the procedures of Law number 7555, which is unacceptable, since it does not take into account that an archaeological site exists and is important even if the procedures of the cited Law have not yet been carried out. Subsection b) of Article 6 subordinates all archaeological work to "archaeological rescue (rescate arqueológico) tasks," forgetting that there may be findings that, by their nature, require investigation, conservation, and preservation. Article 10 authorizes carrying out "surveys (inspecciones)" without permission from the C.A.N. and without needing a final report, which it considers serious, because from the archaeological point of view, it is always necessary to apply field methods that require the removal of the matrix; otherwise, the survey (inspección) is incapable of being able to ascertain one thing or another. Regarding Article 15, which refers to the registry of persons authorized by the C.A.N. to carry out archaeological studies, training in archaeology must be required, in accordance with the academic guidelines of the University of Costa Rica. Based on these reasonings, it requests that the unconstitutionality of the challenged Decree be declared.

**9.-** By resolution at one thirty p.m. on January seventh, two thousand, this Chamber resolved to consolidate the action processed under expediente number 99-009452-007-CO with number 99-007926-007-CO.

**10.-** By resolution at two twenty-five p.m. on February seventh, two thousand, this Chamber warned the petitioner Macaya Trejos to clarify which articles he challenges and the reasons for unconstitutionality for each one of them.

**11.-** By a brief filed at four twelve p.m. on February eleventh, two thousand (folios 539 to 556), Gabriel Macaya Trejos, President of the University of Costa Rica, in response to what was warned by the Chamber, states that the admonishment is procedurally incorrect, since the action has been admitted and consolidated, in addition to the fact that the Chamber already knows with precision the articles being challenged and the reasons for unconstitutionality for each of those norms. Nevertheless, he proceeds to indicate, in accordance with what was warned, that the articles of Decree number 28174 being challenged are the following: 1, 6, 9, for being contrary to the State's duty to conserve the archaeological heritage, established in Article 89 of the Political Constitution and in the Paris Convention (Article 8). That same violation is observed in subsections a) and b) of Article 2 of the Regulations, when a difference is made between an archaeological site without a declaration pursuant to Law number 7555 and sites with heritage value declared by means of an executive decree, notions that are equally contrary to the Paris Convention, in addition to the Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (Article 4), and the San Salvador Convention. It also considers that the division into two regimes -declared or undeclared archaeological sites (Article 2, subsections a) and b) of the challenged Decree) violates the concept of cultural property contemplated in the San Salvador Convention. Article 15 of the Decree, by indicating that a university degree in archaeology and a minimum experience of two works of assistance in archaeological evaluations is sufficient to obtain accreditation as a person authorized by the National Archaeological Commission, is insufficient. For the drafting of the Decree, the Executive Branch did not consult the pertinent institutions (National Museum, National Archaeological Commission, University of Costa Rica, ICOMOS), as established by subsection a) of Article 5 of the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property. Article 10 authorizes carrying out surveys (inspecciones) without permission from the C.A.N. and without needing a final report, which fails to protect the archaeological heritage. It requests that the present action be ratified, or failing that, be processed, and that the unconstitutionality of Executive Decree number 28174-MP-C-MINAE-MEIC be declared.

**12.-** By resolution at nine fifty-three a.m. on March second, two thousand (folio 569), the Chamber deemed the action expanded, to include Articles 3, 10, and 15 of the challenged Decree, and granted a hearing to the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República), the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Commerce, the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, and the Ministry of Environment and Energy.

**13.-** The Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) submitted its report (folio 946) and states that the defense of the historical-artistic heritage for collective enjoyment inherently includes the right to participate in the goods that comprise it, such that they transcend the subjective public rights typical of the individualistic conception of the liberal State governed by the rule of law, as limitations on its action. The right to participate in the cultural life of the community and in the resulting benefits are also established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 27.1, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 15, 1 a). A similar commitment is mandated by the American Convention on Human Rights. The Convention known as Malta 92, in Article 5.3, requires that environmental impact assessments (evaluaciones de impacto ambiental) take into account archaeological sites and their context, and the European Union issued a Directive including Cultural Heritage as one of the aspects to be considered in the Environmental Impact Assessment of public and private works. The elimination of unnecessary formalities in administrative procedures is commendable, but not those that result in a lack of protection for the natural environment or cultural property. Regarding the plaintiff's arguments that the repeals ordered by the challenged Decree (Articles 16 subsection c) and 17) are contrary to Article 89 of the Constitution, which imposes a duty of conservation that implicitly carries the constitutional principle of effective and preventive protection, a protection sought by the norms repealed by the challenged Decree in Articles 16 subsection c) and 17. A posteriori measures, when the damage to or disappearance of the property has occurred, are insufficient and ineffective, due to the irreparable effects or those that are difficult to restore, if not impossible, that the conducts entail, which is why the choice of preventive administrative techniques in the regulation of the Nation's historical and artistic heritage is necessary to comply with the provisions of the Constitution. The challenged Decree breaches the constitutional mandate incumbent upon the State not to promote situations that result in deterioration. This duty corresponds to the character of public domain, which is found in Article 121, subsection 14 of the Constitution. It considers that the disappearance of the mandatory archaeological study in environmental impact assessments (evaluaciones de impacto ambiental), before the execution of public and private works, which was materialized in the issuance of a permit letter to the developer by the National Museum, following prior consultation of data and the site, implies a regression by changing a preventive measure for a corrective one and ignores the precedent of this Constitutional Chamber, number 2706-95, regarding the reconciliation of tourism development with the archaeological resource. It questions the periodization contained in the Decree (Article 2, subsection i, paragraph 2), which it considers incomplete, because it excludes the pre-Paleoindian period and the period from 1,500 B.C. to 1,450 A.D., a stage in which our indigenous peoples achieved civilization and from which the most sites are found. It considers that the hearing within the procedure for drafting administrative provisions of a general nature, in cases where it is required, constitutes a substantial formality, causing the nullity of the procedure and the regulatory act, because through it, one can influence the will of the Administration and produce a modification of the final act, and on the legal level, this procedure is provided for decentralized entities and those representative of general or corporate interests. It indicates that Article 88 of the Constitution provides for consultation with the University of Costa Rica on bills relating to matters under its purview, but that the interpretation of granting a hearing to that University on all bills related to the disciplines it teaches would be unreasonable and does not conform to the meaning of that text. It states that the lapsus incurred in the brief responding to the action of the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría de los Habitantes), folio 7, final paragraph, regarding the repeal of the norm establishing the authorization of the National Archaeological Commission to carry out archaeological excavations, is corrected; this text remains in force. Should Decree 28174 be declared inapplicable, either by restoring the validity of the repealed norms or by granting a reasonable period to the Executive Branch to issue a new Regulation, incorporating the omitted technical criteria of the competent state bodies.

**14.-** By a brief filed on March twenty-fourth, two thousand (folio 985), Rodolfo Méndez Mata, Acting Minister of Environment and Energy, Enrique Granados Moreno, Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports, and Samuel Guzowski Rose, Minister of Economy, Industry and Commerce and Foreign Trade, state that this Chamber must correct the referral granted in this action, insofar as the Decree is not challenged in its entirety. They state that the challenged Regulations correct the conceptual error of considering the environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental) as the sole instrument for investigating, protecting, and effectively conserving the archaeological heritage, and eliminate the administrative practice by virtue of which the work of investigation, protection, and rescue had been unjustly restricted solely to activities subject to the oversight of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat. The Procedures Regulation of SETENA had illegitimately introduced in subsection a. 2 of Article 19 an archaeological impact study as part of the Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental), without any legal or technical basis. The National Environmental Technical Secretariat does not exercise control over all projects, activities, and works carried out in the national territory, so the assigned control was partial and neglected the duty to do so comprehensively. Decree 28174 establishes a protection system that complements Law number 6703 and adheres to all applicable regulations on the matter, maintains prior controls in accordance with the regulatory framework, and points out that international treaties do not mandate this in all cases, but do obligate the State to carry out various actions for its protection and to broaden the possibilities for voluntary control by the administered parties, regardless of whether they are subject to the Secretariat's control or not, always under the supervision of the National Archaeological Commission and the National Museum. Regarding the standing (legitimación) that the University of Costa Rica claims to have, they do not object to the principle created by the Constitutional Chamber in matters of its competence based on ruling 305-90, for the purpose of admitting the participation of said higher education entity; however, they do not admit that this standing (legitimación) arises from the existence of real or imminent damage to the environment, given that the archaeological heritage is not part of the natural environment. They claim that the Decree conforms to the international norms cited by the plaintiff. Contrasting the challenged Decree and Law number 4711, it is clear that it is not true that the preventive and corrective duty of the State regarding archaeological heritage is excluded from the decree, since precisely, in response to that preventive duty, the investigative work of the National Museum for the declaration of sites of archaeological importance is promoted, for which a reinforced protection regime is established. They consider that the broadest protection of the archaeological heritage is that declared in Article 2, subsection i) of the Decree, since the norm establishes that regardless of the period, all sites (movable or immovable) that present cultural, structural, or architectural features amenable to analysis, or a cultural stratigraphy, are a mandatory subject of study and rescue. The voluntary procedures established for the entire national territory and for all types of works—and not only for those overseen by SETENA—reinforce the preventive principle in the potential and real protection of the assets that make up the archaeological heritage. In addition, the implementation of the accreditation of professionals of recognized competence to carry out investigation, exploration, excavation, and rescue work on the archaeological heritage (Article 15 of the Decree, developing Law number 6703) strengthens the preventive and corrective work incumbent upon the State. The system previously implemented by the National Museum was alien to the criteria of reasonableness and timeliness, based on the following aspects: it obligated the administered party to carry out and finance investigatory work, which by law is conferred upon the State through the National Museum; it tolerated the National Museum neglecting its legal obligation in the protection, investigation, and preservation of the archaeological heritage. The criteria used by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat are exclusively environmental and do not protect the archaeological heritage efficiently or preferentially; it is well known that the SETENA regulation only requires that an environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental) be carried out for certain activities, usually large ones with significant environmental importance. As is evident from the very text of Article 19 of Decree 25705-MINAE, it is clear that medium and small agricultural activities, industrial activities located in regulatory plans and zoned as such, as well as those smaller than the dimensions set forth therein, are not subject to the control of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat, and consequently, if vestiges of the presence of earlier cultures exist there, there would be no preventive protection. They consider it important to clarify that the Convention approved by Law 5980, while recommending broad consultation of regulatory provisions on archaeological heritage, does not obligate the Executive Branch to consult specifically with any particular state University or deconcentrated entity or specific private association on all regulations it may adopt, but rather recommends that such consultation be carried out in accordance with the procedures established by internal law. Regarding the owner's authorization to carry out excavations on their property, the duty to avoid damage to the property, and the tasks incumbent upon the National Archaeological Commission to supervise the excavation directly and adequately and to adopt the corresponding measures to avoid damage to the property in question. With respect to the obligation to suspend work in the event of discovery of archaeological objects; the duty of the National Museum to define and organize work within a timeframe, they indicate that Article 13 orders that if, when carrying out excavations to execute public or private works, archaeological objects are discovered, by the owner themself or by third parties, the work must be suspended immediately and the objects placed at the disposal of the Directorate of the National Museum, which will have a period of fifteen days to define the manner in which the archaeological rescue (rescate arqueológico) work will be organized. Regarding those authorized to carry out excavation work to discover or explore archaeological heritage, they claim that Article 15 resolves the doubt about the conformity of the challenged Decree with the Law that supports it. Regarding the alleged lack of consultation with the pertinent institutions, they consider that the plaintiff did not ascertain this well before making this statement, since, as documented, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the Ministry of the Presidency, and the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Commerce were consulted and signed the Decree. With respect to the exposition of archaeological concepts and eras, these are not aspects of constitutionality to be resolved by the Chamber. They request that the action of unconstitutionality be declared without merit in all its respects.

**15.-** By means of a brief filed on April twenty-seventh, two thousand (folio 1099), the Attorney General (Procurador General de la República) states that, in complement to certain points analyzed when responding to the hearing on the action of unconstitutionality filed by the University of Costa Rica and in whatever may be of interest when resolving the merits, he states that to the citations made regarding the parallelism of protection between natural and cultural heritage in Comparative Law, some examples of modern Constitutions in Latin American countries are added, in which reference is made to that same parallelism. He also indicates that ECLAC, in the Preparatory Meetings for the Rio de Janeiro Eco 92, emphasized "not relating the sustainability of development only to natural capital but within the scope of a dynamic balance between all forms of capital and heritage: human, physical, financial, institutional, and cultural," and the UNESCO Convention of November 23, 1972, emphasized that "the degradation or destruction of an item of the cultural and natural heritage constitutes a disastrous impoverishment of all the peoples of the world." He further points out that the Council of Europe Convention on civil liability for damage resulting from activities dangerous to the environment, approved on March 8, 1993, adopted a concept of the environment that encompasses abiotic and biotic natural resources, the assets that constitute the cultural heritage, and the landscape. The European Community Directive of June 27, 1985, on environmental impact assessment, he continues to indicate, in its notion of the environment, includes natural elements, the landscape, material goods, and cultural heritage (Article 3). He cites some authors in whom certain matters of interest related to this action may be consulted.

**16.-** By a brief filed on December twenty-second, nineteen ninety-nine, Melania Ortiz Volio, in her capacity as General Director of the National Museum of Costa Rica, states that she requests to be considered an active coadjuvant in the present action.

**17.-** By means of a brief filed on January twenty-eighth, two thousand, Rolando Sáenz Ulloa, legal representative of Ecodesarrollo Papagayo S.A., requests to be considered a passive coadjuvant in the present action.

**18.-** The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction, concerning the resolution that deemed the filed action expanded, were published in numbers 057, 058, and 059 of the Judicial Bulletin, on the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd of March, two thousand.

(Folio 945) **19.-** By means of a brief filed on March first, two thousand (folio 575), Magdalena León Coto, Virginia Novoa, Javier Artavia, Mario Hernández Villalobos, and Olman Solís Alpízar request that they be admitted as active coadjuvants in this action of unconstitutionality.

**20.-** By means of a brief filed at two forty-five p.m. on March twentieth, two thousand (folios 570 to 588), Oscar Enrique Delgado Murillo, in his personal capacity and as director of the Hotel Marriott Los Sueños Resort & Golf Club Project developed by Marina Herradura S.A., requests that he be admitted as a passive coadjuvant.

**21.-** By means of a memorial filed at two forty-four p.m. on March twentieth, two thousand (folios 761 to 777), Alejandro Coto Alvarado, judicial and extrajudicial representative of the Costa Rican Association of Housing Builders (Asociación Costarricense de Constructores de Vivienda), requests that he be admitted as a passive coadjuvant in this action of unconstitutionality.

**22.-** By resolution of nine forty a.m. on April seventh, two thousand (folio 1016), Oscar Enrique Delgado Murillo was warned to prove, by means of the pertinent legal documents, his standing to legally represent the coadjuvant company, and Alejandro Coto Alvarado was warned to prove his status as representative of the Costa Rican Association of Housing Builders (Asociación Costarricense de Constructores de Vivienda).

**23.-** By a brief received on April twelfth, two thousand (folio 1018), Marco Vinicio Ruiz, in his capacity as President with powers of judicial and extrajudicial representation of the Chamber of Industries of Costa Rica (Cámara de Industrias de Costa Rica), requests that he be admitted as a passive coadjuvant in this action of unconstitutionality.

**24.-** By means of a brief received on April twelfth, two thousand (folio 1024), Javier Esquivel Font, judicial and extrajudicial representative of the Chamber Association of Architecture and Engineering Consultants (Asociación Cámara de Consultores en Arquitectura e Ingeniería), requests that he be admitted as a passive coadjuvant in this action.

**25.-** According to a brief received on April twelfth, two thousand (folios 1031 to 1036), Rafael Esquivel Yglesias, in his capacity as Vice President with powers of judicial and extrajudicial representation of the Costa Rican Chamber of Construction (Cámara Costarricense de la Construcción), requests that he be admitted as a passive coadjuvant in this action.

**26.-** By a brief received on April thirteenth, two thousand (folio 1063), Oscar Enrique Delgado Murillo states, in response to the warning issued by the Chamber, that he clarifies that he filed the coadjuvancy in a personal capacity and requests that it be admitted as such.

**27.-** By means of a brief received on April twenty-fourth, two thousand (folio 1069), Alejandro Coto Alvarado provides a notarial certification of the legal existence of the Costa Rican Association of Housing Builders (Asociación Costarricense de Constructores de Vivienda).

**28.-** By a brief received on April twenty-fifth, two thousand (folios 1071 to 1076), Nombre29270, Ana C. Arias Quirós, Elena Troyo Arias, Leidy Bonilla Vargas, Virginia Novoa Espinoza, Maureen Sánchez Pereira, Lesbia Acuña Marín, Andrés Anchio Fuentes, Carlos Aguilar Piedra, Floria Arrea Sierman, Adrián Badilla Cambronero, Minor Castro Méndez, Juan Guerrero Miranda, Ana Cristina Hernández, Magdalena León Coto, Mauricio Murillo Herrera, Cleria Ruiz Torres, Wilson Valerio Lobo, and Anayancy Herrera Villalobos state that they request to be admitted as active coadjuvants in this action.

**29.-** By a brief filed on May eleventh, two thousand (folio 1126), Nombre29270, Ana C. Arias Quirós, and Elena Troyo Vargas, representatives of the National Museum (Museo Nacional), the University of Costa Rica (Universidad de Costa Rica), and the Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sports (Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes) before the National Archaeological Commission (Comisión Arqueológica Nacional), request that they be admitted as active coadjuvants in this proceeding.

**30.-** The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) were published in numbers 005, 006, and 007 of the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial), on January 7, 10, and 11, two thousand. (Folio 426) **31.-** By means of a brief filed with the Secretariat of the Chamber on August thirty-first, two thousand one (folio 1263), the Secretary of the National Archaeological Commission (Comisión Arqueológica Nacional) provides a copy of opinion number C-201-2001, according to which the rescue of the archaeological heritage is the exclusive authority of the National Museum (Museo Nacional), in accordance with Law 6703, Article 13, in relation to the Paris Convention (Law 4711). The referenced opinion also mentions that no distinctions should be made between sudden rescue and planned rescue, as both are non-waivable competencies of the State.

**32.-** On February twenty-eighth, two thousand two, this Chamber held an oral and public hearing, with the participation of representatives from the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría de los Habitantes de la República), the University of Costa Rica (Universidad de Costa Rica), the National Museum (Museo Nacional), the Ministry of Foreign Trade (Ministerio de Comercio Exterior), Ecodesarrollos Papagayo S.A., and the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República). The Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes de la República) spoke about the invalidity of the entire challenged Decree, including its "whereas clauses" (considerandos), for eliminating the protection mechanisms for the archaeological heritage contained in Law 6703, Decree 19016-C, and various international treaties. He cited constitutional jurisprudence that supports his position. The Rector of the University of Costa Rica (Universidad de Costa Rica) argued that the Executive Branch should have consulted this project with the specialized authorities in the matter, as ordered by Article 10 of Law 4711; he defined archaeology as a science that studies objects based on time and space coordinates, therefore all finds are important, and not only those that the Decree arbitrarily determined, without following technical criteria and leaving out important phases of Costa Rican ethnic history. The representative of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (Ministerio de Comercio Exterior) argued that, as a premise for the analysis of this case, principles specific to Environmental Law and the protection the State must provide regarding the environment should not be followed; he considers that Law 4711 authorizes the use of methods such as those established in the challenged Decree; he affirms that objective and non-arbitrary criteria were used for determining the archaeological sites of importance; he argues that what is established in Articles 5 and 6 of the Decree is not positive silence, but merely a form of protection for property owners, to prevent State inertia from making the exercise of property rights illusory and stopping national development; he argues that there was no error whatsoever in the establishment of historical periods contained in Article 2, since paragraph 1 of subsection j) allows for a broadly protective interpretation. The Director of the National Museum (Museo Nacional) stated that the Decree violates the precautionary principle that must inform matters related to the protection of the environment and the archaeological heritage; she points out that since the entry into force of the regulation, the number of requests for archaeological studies has decreased considerably, while complaints for damages have increased. The representative of Ecodesarrollos Papagayo S.A. argues that the rules contained in the challenged decree allow for a rational protection of the archaeological heritage, without thereby impeding the country's real estate and tourism development. The Attorney General (Procurador General de la República) and two other representatives of that body argue that the decree in question leaves unprotected the vast majority of the archaeological sites existing in the country, since currently only 3 cantons have been declared of architectural-archaeological interest, in accordance with Law 7555, while the records of the National Museum are much more abundant; they cite opinion C-201-01, in which the Attorney General's Office determined that the rescue of archaeological goods by private individuals is unconstitutional.

**33.-** In the proceedings followed, the legal prescriptions have been observed.

Drafted by Magistrate **Vargas Benavides**; and, **Considering:** **I.- The standing rules in actions of unconstitutionality.** Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) regulates the requirements that determine the admissibility of actions of unconstitutionality, requiring a matter pending resolution in an administrative or judicial venue in which the unconstitutionality is invoked, a requirement that is not necessary in the exceptional cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when by the nature of the rule there is no individual or direct harm; when it is based on the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole, or when it is filed by the Attorney General (Procurador General de la República), the Comptroller General (Contralor General de la República), the Prosecutor General (Fiscal General de la República), or the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes), in these latter cases, within their respective spheres of competency. Based on the foregoing, it follows that the first rule is the need to have a prior matter, even allowing the possibility of going directly to the Constitutional Chamber. To do so, the challenged rule must not be susceptible to concrete application, which would later allow the challenge of the enforcement act and its consequent use as a base matter. The text in question provides that it is appropriate when "because of the nature of the matter, there is no individual or direct harm," that is, when by that same nature, the harm is collective (antonym of individual) and indirect. This would be the case of acts that harm the interests of certain groups or corporations as such, and not strictly those of their members directly. Secondly, the possibility of seeking protection in defense of "diffuse interests" is foreseen; this concept, whose content has been gradually delineated by the Chamber, could be summarized in the terms used in this court's judgment number 3750-93, of three p.m. on July thirtieth, nineteen hundred ninety-three:

"… Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our law -as this Chamber has already stated- merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership merges with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that identified or easily identifiable specific persons, or personalized groups, can be pinpointed in relation to them, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate interests that concern a community as a whole. It is therefore a matter of individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive an actual or potential harm, more or less equal for all, which is why it is correctly said that these are equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, as they are at once collective—for being common to a generality—and individual, for which reason they can be claimed in such a capacity." In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united based on a specific social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a specific personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is diffused, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. In these cases, of course, the challenge that a member of one of these sectors could make, protected by paragraph 2 of Article 75, must necessarily refer to provisions that affect him as such. This Chamber has listed various rights to which it has given the qualifier of "diffuse," such as the environment, cultural heritage, defense of the country's territorial integrity, and the Public Treasury, among others. In this regard, two clarifications must be made: on the one hand, the referenced goods transcend the sphere traditionally recognized for diffuse interests, since they refer in principle to aspects that affect the national community and not particular groups of it; environmental harm does not just affect neighbors of a region or consumers of a product, but harms or gravely endangers the natural heritage of the entire country and even of Humanity; similarly, the defense of the Public Treasury is an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just of any group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration that the Constitutional Chamber has made is no more than a simple description proper to its obligation—as a jurisdictional organ—to limit itself to hearing the cases submitted to it, without it being understood in any way that only those rights that the Chamber has expressly recognized as such can be considered diffuse rights; the foregoing would imply an undesirable overturning of the scope of the Rule of Law, and its correlative "State of rights," which—as in the case of the Costa Rican model—starts from the premise that what must be express are the limits to freedoms, since these underlie the human condition itself and therefore do not require official recognition. Finally, when paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) speaks of interests "that concern the community as a whole," it refers to the legal goods explained in the preceding lines, that is, those whose ownership rests in the very holders of sovereignty, in each one of the inhabitants of the Republic. It is not, therefore, a matter of any person being able to go to the Constitutional Chamber in protection of any interests whatsoever (popular action), but rather that every individual can act in defense of those goods that affect the entire national community, without it being valid in this field either to attempt any kind of exhaustive enumeration.

**II.- The standing of the plaintiffs in this case.** Based on what was stated in the preceding paragraph, it is clear that the action filed by the Ombudsperson (Defensora de los Habitantes de la República) must be admitted insofar as she is recognized as having direct standing for its filing, taking into account that she acts in defense of the rights recognized in Articles 50 and 89 of the Political Constitution. For his part, the Rector of the University of Costa Rica (Universidad de Costa Rica) considers that his standing derives from the protection of diffuse interests, a situation in which the same Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) allows the challenge directly. Based on the foregoing, the Rector of the University has standing, not in his functional capacity, but as a citizen who seeks to safeguard the defense of interests that concern the national community, of marked general interest, such as the historical-archaeological heritage of the Republic. The protection of historical-cultural values, whether considered as necessary elements for the free development of personality, as indispensable elements for understanding the historical origins of our societies, or from a purely spiritual enjoyment point of view, is a matter of national interest. Archaeological goods, as a sub-species of historical-cultural values, insofar as they become a means of knowing the history of man, his origins, and his background, enjoy the same privileged protection through the possibility that any person, based on the authorization conferred in this regard by Article 75, paragraph 2, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), which is why the action filed by the Rector of the University of Costa Rica is admissible, insofar as it becomes a means of protecting that type of interest.

**III.- Other aspects of admissibility.** It being clear that the plaintiffs have sufficient standing to file this claim, it remains to indicate that the challenged action is one of those provided for in Article 73, subsection a), of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), as it is a general act of a normative nature (Regulatory Decree), a matter whose constitutionality can be reviewed in this venue. Furthermore, the parties submitted their filing briefs in compliance with the requirements stipulated in numerals 78 and 79 of the Law of Rite, as well as the warnings issued by this Chamber. In conclusion, this action is admissible, and therefore we must immediately proceed to discuss its object and substance.

**IV.- Regarding the coadjuvancies.** Article 83 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes that within fifteen days following the first publication of the notice referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81, the parties who appear with pending matters as of the date of filing the action, or those who have a legitimate interest in the definition of the object in dispute, may appear to coadjuvate with either of the two positions under discussion. In the case of actions of unconstitutionality, basically, the coadjuvant appears to defend the annulment claim of the plaintiff or to support the validity of the challenged act. In this case, this Chamber, by resolution of two forty-five p.m. on February twenty-first, two thousand (folio 557), admitted as active coadjuvants the Director General of the National Museum of Costa Rica (Museo Nacional de Costa Rica) and Rolando Sáenz Ulloa and Ana Lucía Espinoza Blanco, in their capacity as General Judicial Attorneys of Ecodesarrollo Papagayo Sociedad Anónima, and by resolution of three fifty p.m. on May ninth, two thousand (folios 1105 and 1106), admitted as coadjuvants in this action Magdalena León Coto, Virginia Novoa, Javier Artavia, Mario Hernández Villalobos, Olman Solís Alpízar, the Costa Rican Association of Housing Builders (Asociación Costarricense de Constructores de Vivienda), the Chamber of Industries of Costa Rica (Cámara de Industrias de Costa Rica), the Chamber Association of Architecture and Engineering Consultants (Asociación Cámara de Consultores en Arquitectura e Ingeniería), and the Costa Rican Chamber of Construction (Cámara Costarricense de la Construcción), so there is no need to rule on this matter. Regarding the brief visible on folio 580, in which Oscar Enrique Delgado Murillo requests to be admitted as a coadjuvant, that same resolution determined not to admit his request for not having demonstrated his legitimate interest. The coadjuvancy request submitted by Nombre29270 and others, recorded on folio 1071, was rejected, and the coadjuvancy action of Ana Patricia Rojas Hernández and another was rejected as untimely. Regarding the coadjuvancy request submitted by Nombre29270, in his capacity as representative of the National Museum (Museo Nacional) on the National Archaeological Commission (Comisión Arqueológica Nacional), Ana C. Arias Quirós, as representative of the University of Costa Rica (Universidad de Costa Rica) before that Commission, and Elena Troyo Vargas, as representative of the Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sports (Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes) on that same Commission, visible on folios 1126 to 1161, it is rejected as untimely, taking into consideration that the first of the edicts mentioned in Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) had been published on March twenty-first, two thousand.

**V.- Object of the challenge.** The plaintiffs challenge as unconstitutional Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 15, 16, and 17 of Executive Decree number 28174-MP-MINAE-MEIC, of October twelfth, nineteen hundred ninety-nine, published in La Gaceta number 202, Supplement 78, of October nineteenth, nineteen hundred ninety-nine, considering them contrary to the norms contained in Articles 50, 89, and 121, subsection 14), of the Political Constitution, as well as the Convention on the Defense of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the American Declaration of the Rights of Man, the Charter of the Organization of American States, the Recommendation on the Conservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works, the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the Convention on the Defense of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations, and the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.

**On the merits.** **VI.- Archaeological goods in the constitutional system.** Article 89 of the Political Constitution establishes that among the cultural aims of the Republic are:

"… to protect natural beauties, to conserve and develop the historical and artistic heritage of the Nation, and to support private initiative for scientific and artistic progress." The protection of the historical heritage is thus framed within the broader scope of the State's duty to preserve the common culture that turns its people into a Nation. The Dictionary of the Spanish Language (Diccionario de la Real Academia Española de la Lengua), where relevant, defines culture as:

"… the set of ways of life and customs, knowledge, and degree of artistic, scientific, or industrial development, in a period or social group" (Twenty-second Edition. Volume I. 2001) The archaeological heritage is a species of the broader genus constituted by cultural heritage, a clarification that has important practical implications insofar as the role of the State in promoting and guaranteeing archaeological goods must always be part of a comprehensive policy for the protection and promotion of autochthonous cultural production. For the rights derived from the constitutional norm in question to be effectively realized, it is required on the part of public authorities not only to create the necessary normative framework but also to act in a concrete manner, through suitable protection mechanisms that start from the inescapable premise that a Nation that disdains its historical heritage, destroying it or avoiding by all licit means its loss or deterioration, is destined to fail as a society, for it is precisely the vision of the past that allows one to understand the present and plan for the future. The archaeological heritage—in the Costa Rican case—has been commonly defined as the set of immovable and movable goods, products of indigenous cultures prior to or contemporary with the establishment of the Hispanic culture in the national territory, as well as human remains, flora, and fauna related to these cultures, constituting one of the principal means to achieve the exact knowledge of the historical origins of our societies, insofar as it allows one to understand the germ of our current forms of thought and cultural expression, in addition to providing highly useful data for other fields of knowledge, such as ecology, pharmacotherapy, zoology, etc. Regarding the intrinsic importance of the archaeological heritage within the social system, this Chamber has pronounced in the following terms:

"Archaeology and History are two intimately linked sciences, having as one of their objectives to clarify and reconstruct the events of the past. Historical reconstruction is based, fundamentally, on the interpretation of written documents, while Archaeology bases its studies on data obtained through the material objects left by the action of man in already vanished societies, through their relationship with each other, the form of the find, and their connection with the environment. Every preserved object, every vestige of life and activity of man from past societies, represents a testimony that makes possible the total or partial knowledge, as the case may be, of those testimonies, and, therefore, of ways of life already non-existent and unknown in the present, but whose knowledge is of singular importance, as they form part of the cultural identity of the society in which one lives; of course, to the extent that they are an important testimony for the reconstruction and knowledge of the events of the past." (Judgment number 729-96 of nine-fifteen a.m. on February ninth, nineteen hundred ninety-six) It is not that knowledge of the past holds a particular interest for reasons of mere historiographical curiosity, but rather that its study allows one to approach a global understanding of current social and cultural phenomena. The protection of archaeological goods must then be understood as a form of safeguarding culture in general, as a good that transcends the ownership of any individual, becoming a value of national importance, whose recognition and effective defense form part of the set of interests guaranteed in Articles 50 and 74 of the Political Constitution.

**VII.- The archaeological heritage in International Law.** Costa Rica, as a subject of International Law, has signed and ratified various instruments aimed at protecting the archaeological heritage. Thus, we can cite the following: **A)** The *Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (Hague Convention)*, of May fourteenth, nineteen hundred fifty-four, and its Regulations, which recognize the importance of the archaeological heritage, obligating States involved in a warlike conflict to respect that of those they occupy, placing their cultural goods in safe keeping, far from the conflict zone.

**B)** The *Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to Archaeological Excavations*, of December fifth, nineteen fifty-six, obligates States Parties to subject archaeological excavations carried out in their territories to strict supervision and prior authorization by the competent authority (principle 5). **C)** The *International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites*, which recognizes the inseparability of the monument and the history it testifies to, in addition to the prohibition of moving the monument except for its conservation (article 7); the obligation to protect those sites (14), and the need to preserve the identity of the monument, avoiding essentially altering its appearance or nature (15). **D)** The *Convention on the Defense of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations (Convention of San Salvador)*, approved by Law number 6360 of September fifth, nineteen seventy-nine, which includes within cultural property archaeological material belonging to cultures prior to the American cultures prior to contact with European culture (article 2); recognizes the State's ownership over such objects (6); provides that each State undertakes to promote the exploration, excavation, research, and conservation of places and objects by specialized bodies in partnership with the public institutions responsible for safeguarding the archaeological heritage (8). **E)** The *Recommendation concerning the Preservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works*, signed on November twenty-second, nineteen sixty-eight, approved by Law number 4711 of January sixth, nineteen seventy-one, establishes in its whereas clauses that contemporary civilization and its future evolution rest upon the tradition of peoples and the creative forces of humanity, as well as upon their social and economic development, and that cultural property is the product and testimony of the different traditions and spiritual achievements of the past, thus constituting the fundamental element of the personality of peoples, for which reason it determines the need to extend the protection of cultural heritage to the entire territory of the State, and not only to sites formally declared as such (article 3); the measures must be both preventive and corrective (7) against any type of work, public or private, capable of deteriorating them (8); it further provides that detailed studies must be carried out with sufficient advance notice to determine the measures to be adopted *in situ*, as well as the magnitude of the necessary salvage work (22). **F)** The *Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage*, signed on November twenty-first, nineteen seventy-two, approved by Law number 5980 of November sixteenth, nineteen seventy-six, orders States Parties to identify, protect, conserve, rehabilitate, and transmit cultural heritage to future generations (article 4). **G)** The *Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property*, signed on September nineteenth, nineteen seventy, approved by Law number 7526 of July tenth, nineteen ninety-five, which includes within the concept of cultural heritage those of ethnological, archaeological, and natural value (article 5).

It is unnecessary to clarify that all the instruments cited in the preceding paragraph constitute sources of Law in Costa Rica, susceptible to being applied directly by this Constitutional Chamber for the resolution of this matter, as dictated by Article 48 of the Constitution. In the case of those approved by the Legislative Assembly, by express provision of Article 7 of the Political Constitution. As for those that do not enjoy such status, because they constitute at least sources of interpretation of the approved instruments. Nor does this Chamber recognize the existence of mere recommendations in matters of human rights, even if the States decide to self-limit, recognizing the existence of certain human rights, even when they appear denominated with the name of "recommendations". The foregoing leads to the understanding that the *Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to Archaeological Excavations*, the *International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites*, and the *Recommendation concerning the Preservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works*, are—in the aforementioned terms—acts provided with full normativity in the Costa Rican constitutional order, without them being able to be considered simple enumerations of objectives and goals to be achieved.

**VIII.- The legal regulation of archaeological heritage.** In addition to the constitutional norms that protect archaeological heritage and the commitments assumed in that same sense by Costa Rica before the international community, various internal norms have been issued regarding the matter subject to this action. **A)** Law number 7 of October sixth, nineteen thirty-eight grants archaeological property the condition of public domain property (article 1), in addition to ordering the immediate communication of the discovery of objects to public authorities, which must take the necessary measures for their protection (article 17). **B)** Law 6793, of December twenty-eighth, nineteen eighty-one, *National Archaeological Heritage Law*, which, in addition to reiterating the provisions of Law number 7, creates the National Archaeological Commission, a body to which it grants the authority to authorize excavations by previously registered scientists and supervise them (articles 12 and 15); confers upon the Museo Nacional the competence to define the manner in which property will be rescued in the event of discovery by a third party (article 13). **C)** The Mining Code, Law number 6797, of October fourth, nineteen eighty-two, whose article 102 subsection h) mandates the performance of environmental impact assessment (evaluaciones de impacto ambiental, EIA) referred to the effects on the country's archaeological and cultural wealth for conducting mining activities. **D)** Law number 7555, of October fourth, nineteen seventy-five, *Historical-Architectural Heritage Law of Costa Rica*, which defines the archaeological site as that which contains objects important from a historical, aesthetic, ethnological, anthropological, or environmental point of view (article 6); numeral 7, for its part, establishes the procedure for the incorporation of a property into the historical-architectural heritage by Decree, which implies the impediment of demolishing the immovable property.

**IX.- The importance of archaeological property.** Archaeological property, understood as those objects that allow the researcher to access historical knowledge, possess an intrinsic importance, for constituting an ideal instrument, difficult to replace, for acquiring that knowledge, in which the environment surrounding them also acquires special relevance. For the effective protection of archaeological property, the State must actively participate in all procedures aimed at their detection, rescue (when appropriate), study, registration, and conservation. Only in this way will the duties arising from the constitutional mandate, as well as those assumed through the signing of the cited international instruments and the promulgation of the mentioned laws, be fully complied with. Notwithstanding this marked importance, the protection of archaeological property has been affected by the confluence of various factors, such as collecting, the trade of objects, and their indiscriminate destruction due in part to the construction of buildings in areas where archaeological sites exist. This confluence of interests, by reason of the State's constitutional obligation to ensure the protection of archaeological heritage, makes necessary the establishment of legislative and administrative mechanisms aimed at guaranteeing the protection of the archaeological legacy, in the face of the need for economic development. This prevalence was already recognized by the Full Court when, exercising functions of controller of constitutionality, it held:

"*It is obvious that archaeological property also has appreciable monetary value, whether for the material of which they are made (gold, for example), or for their fine craftsmanship and beauty, even if they are made of clay or stone. Some of these objects may be of scarce physical value or little artistic significance; but even so, they are valuable for their origin and as elements of study for investigating the culture of peoples from other eras, their beliefs and customs, or the nature of the environment in which they lived, according to the traces or representations that may be found there. For all of this, the archaeological objects from the aboriginal races that populated the continent in the pre-Columbian era or prior to or contemporary with the establishment of Hispanic culture are valuable; and it is for this value that many acquire these pieces, some for spiritual enjoyment or scientific interest and others perhaps to profit from them. But over the individual interest that each may have in the possession or ownership of these objects, the public interest prevails, both for the historical value of such property, and because, within the culture of peoples, is the study of what the human groups that inhabited the same territory did, a study that is facilitated by making it possible that, right here, the greatest number of people have access to these sources of knowledge; and nothing is more consistent with that public interest than for the archaeological property to remain on national territory, in the possession of museums and under the ownership of the State or its institutions, as part of the historical heritage that the Political Charter denominates "of the Nation", in article 89. It must then be emphasized that the most important thing is not the material value of the referred objects, but the historical and cultural value, and that in no way could the economic doctrine on productive goods and freedom of enterprise be applicable to those objects*." (Resolution of thirteen hours on May twelfth, nineteen eighty-nine) It is then clear that the relevance of archaeological property is not exhausted in venal aspects. Quite to the contrary, their greatest importance lies in the data they can offer to adequately understand the origins of national identity, in addition to the vast information they offer for other no less important fields of scientific knowledge. It is thus that even property of few aesthetic qualities, of daily use, or even in a poor state of conservation can be of great importance for archaeological knowledge. On the other hand, the protection of archaeological heritage is also a matter of global relevance. The Preliminary Report on the Legal Means for the Protection and Conservation of the Historical and Artistic Heritage of the American Countries of the Organization of American States established in this regard:

"There is no exclusively local interest in the states to protect and conserve the objectified testimonies of the art and culture of past eras that are found in their respective territories; that interest is shared by the entire international community, which justifiably considers that those constitute a cultural heritage that belongs to all humanity and, therefore, deserve to be the object of its concern and protection.

In this way, the protection and conservation of cultural heritage currently transcends the scope of national jurisdictions to be complemented, legally through international instruments, and materially through the solidary cooperation of the countries that form the international community to make effective such duty of protection and conservation" The preservation of a people's archaeological heritage is not seen, then, as a matter of mere local interest, but as a significant contribution to the preservation of world culture.

**X.- Archaeological heritage as public domain property.** It is evident that archaeological property, in accordance with the terms of the cited norms, forms part of the public heritage, of the so-called public domain property, the title to which belongs to the Nation, insofar as they are assigned to fulfill a purpose of general interest. The use and possession of public domain property always forms part of a special regime, characterized by the fact that such objects must be employed only in a way that does not contradict their purpose, in some cases only by the Administration; in others also by private individuals, but strictly adhering to the limitations that their public character implies. This Chamber has defined public domain property in the following terms:

"…The public domain is integrated by goods that manifest, by the express will of the legislator, a special destiny of serving the community, the public interest. These are the so-called demesnial goods, domanial goods, public goods or things, or public property, which do not belong individually to private persons and which are destined for a public use and subject to a special regime, outside the commerce of men. That is, affected by their own nature and vocation. Consequently, these goods belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, they are affected to the service they provide and which is invariably essential by virtue of an express norm. Notorious characteristics of these goods are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, unseizable, cannot be mortgaged nor be susceptible to encumbrance in the terms of Civil Law, and the administrative action substitutes the interdicts to recover dominion. As they are outside commerce, these goods cannot be the object of possession, although a right to use can be acquired, although not a right to ownership. The use permit is a unilateral legal act issued by the Administration, in the use of its functions, and what is placed in the hands of the private individual is the useful domain of the good, with the State always reserving the direct dominion over the thing..." (Judgment number 2306-91 of fourteen hours forty-five minutes on November sixth, nineteen ninety-one) Previously, the Full Court, exercising control of constitutionality, determined:

"*Well then, if before the Law of 1938 legislation was not duly made on archaeological heritage, it is very right that the legislator dealt with it in that Law and in that of 1981, to avoid what had occurred under the previous regime. XIX.- These two laws recognize the individual ownership of archaeological property that was in private hands; but at the same time provided that, henceforth, property that was the object of discovery would belong to the State. No acquired right was injured, since private property existing until then was maintained... No special norm in the Constitution is needed, so that concrete prohibitions can be established in ordinary laws, if they have support in article 28, as are those that exclude discovery as a legitimate title to acquire private dominion over archaeological property... XX.- In article 89, the public interest is reflected that the Constitution protects in number 28, second paragraph, since it says there that "Among the cultural aims of the Republic are:... to conserve and develop the historical and artistic heritage of the Nation". With this, the existence of a heritage different from that of goods of an economic character was recognized, and at the same time the duty to procure its conservation was established. Cultural and historical public order allows interpreting that rule broadly, and basing oneself on it to reaffirm the state ownership of archaeological property that would be discovered in the future, as provided by the Law of 1938. Those goods, before and now, constitute 'a common heritage that past generations bequeathed to posterity'... XXI.- From all of the foregoing, it follows: a) That the ownership regime instituted in article 1 of the Law of 1938 is legitimate, since it has support in articles 28 and 89 and is not in contraposition to article 45 of the Political Charter itself; and b) That, consequently, articles 3, 5, 7, 9, and 17 of Law No. 6703 of 1981 cannot be contrary to the Constitution either, insofar as they are applicable to archaeological objects found after Law No. 7 of 1938, since those goods belong to the State, in accordance with article 1 of that Law of 1938, which is not unconstitutional*." (Resolution of thirteen hours on May twelfth, nineteen eighty-nine) **XI.- The preventive principle in archaeological matters.** The importance of archaeological property and its character as public domain property creates a series of obligations on the part of the State directed to their effective protection, a common element of the so-called third-generation rights. In matters of such relevance and delicate protection, it cannot be conceived that administrative authorities intervene once the damage has been caused, since the damages may be irreversible and of very large proportions. In the case of archaeological property, there is a single possibility: their effective protection or their irremediable loss. In order to dimension the moment and the actions that the State must undertake for the protection of archaeological heritage, some important considerations that were outlined in the preceding considerations must be made. Archaeological property, individually considered, while it is true that they can constitute key elements for the understanding of the historical–cultural past of the country, their relevance may be diminished if they are not considered integrally with respect to the context in which they were found. Archaeological investigation cannot then be limited to the study of objects that have been totally or partially destroyed, or to property removed from their context without the prior completion of exhaustive field analyses aimed at understanding them within the environment where they were found, since in such cases a task that by constitutional imperative (articles 50, 74 and 89) should be conceived as one of scientific rigor, could become little more than a simple task of collecting and artistic contemplation, in contravention of the fundamental order.

**XII.- On the contested regulations: the simplification of procedures.** Through this action, the constitutionality is questioned of articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 15, 16 and 17 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 28174-MP-MINAE-MEIC, of October twelfth, nineteen ninety-nine, which regulates, to the exclusion of any other source, the procedures for the study, rescue, and preservation of archaeological property. The Decree under study evidently emphasizes the simplification of procedures in the case of construction of public or private works, with respect to the requirements established in the legal system for the purpose of protecting archaeological heritage. Although the deregulation of certain activities burdened with excessive requirements is not invalid *per se* and can even be desirable, this Chamber starts from the premise that any procedures necessary for the protection of property of constitutional relevance cannot be validly eliminated without adequate substitution by others that fulfill the same protective function. On that basis of reasoning, we shall proceed to analyze each of the provisions contested in this action.

**XIII.- Implied repeals.** Article 1 provides that:

"Article 1—Of the requirements. The only requirements and procedures for carrying out archaeological studies are those established in this decree and, therefore, all regulations, manuals, directives, circulars, and other documents that do not conform to the guidelines and provisions of this decree are hereby repealed." In order to fully understand the modification that this norm produced in the legal order, it is necessary first to clarify—an obvious rule—that the only provisions that could be affected by this Decree would be those prior ones of equal or lower rank (Article 11 of the Constitution) that oppose it, so any discordance between the text of this Reglamento and that of a higher-ranking act is nothing more than a problem of illegality of the Decree, given that it is incapable of modifying in any way the text of the formal Law. If, on the contrary, any provision of the Decree opposes norms or principles that form part of the parameter of constitutionality, then those same ones will be sanctionable in this venue. For this reason, the text of the other contested provisions must be analyzed to determine if the repeal contained in this article effectively constitutes a weakening of the control that the State exercises over the Nation's archaeological heritage.

**XIV.- Definitions contained in the Decree and their implications.** For its part, article 2 contains a series of definitions to be used for the interpretation of the remaining articles of the Reglamento:

"Article 2—Definitions.

• a)Archaeological sites (without a declaration in accordance with Law No. 7555): An archaeological site is understood as the locality where, through archaeological studies, the presence of pre-Columbian remains is demonstrated, the importance of which varies according to the characteristics of the remains and the value conferred upon them, according to the substantiated knowledge about the cultures that populated the area.
• b)Sites with heritage value declared by executive decree and in accordance with Law No. 7555: These are those archaeological sites that have been defined and incorporated into the historical heritage by executive decree and according to the procedures established in the Historical-Architectural Heritage Law, Law No. 7555 of October 20, 1995.
• c)Archaeological studies: refers to scientifically valid research, destined to discover or explore the archaeological heritage of a specific area or site.
• d)Inspection stage: consists of the reconnaissance of a specific terrain for the purpose of verifying the existence of pre-Columbian cultural remains.
• e)Evaluation stage: consists of carrying out a diagnosis of the detected archaeological resources, using a scientifically valid methodology.

This diagnosis shall determine whether the most basic characteristics of the detected remains have archaeological importance; if so, measures must be recommended to enable the rescue of the heritage assets.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>f) Rescue: This is the immediate action of preserving the remains detected in the evaluation to prevent the destruction of cultural features, architectural structures, or sites of archaeological importance, prior to excavation.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>g) Excavation: this consists of the action of removing earth, rocks, or other elements in order to evaluate or rescue cultural features, architectural structures, or sites of archaeological importance.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>h) Conservation: this refers to the protection of specific zones at archaeological sites in accordance with the procedure described in Article 8 of these regulations.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>i) Archaeological sites of importance:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-left:74.7pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-18pt\"><span>&lt;![if !supportLists]&gt;</span><span style=\"font-family:Symbol\"></span><span style=\"font-size:7pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:7pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:7pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:7pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:7pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:7pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:7pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:7pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:7pt\"> </span><span>&lt;![endif]&gt;These are sites that present cultural features, architectural structures amenable to analysis, and/or a cultural stratigraphy;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-left:74.7pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-18pt\"><span>&lt;![if !supportLists]&gt;</span><span style=\"font-family:Symbol\"></span><span style=\"font-size:7pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:7pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:7pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:7pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:7pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:7pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:7pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:7pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:7pt\"> </span><span>&lt;![endif]&gt;Sites where cultural features or architectural structures cannot be defined but that provide data on the following ancient groups: Paleoindians (10,000 to 6,000 B.C.), Archaic (6,000 to 3,000 B.C.), Early Formative (3,000 to 1,500 B.C.), or Protohistoric (1450 to 1550 A.D.).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>j) Archaeological sites without importance: Those sites that do not present the foregoing characteristics; or that present insufficient archaeological evidence; or that are highly altered, or that due to their characteristics do not permit information to be obtained from them.\"</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Article 2 defines archaeological sites as the locality in which, through archaeological studies, the presence of pre-Columbian remains is demonstrated, the importance of which varies according to the characteristics of the remains and the value conferred upon them, based on substantiated knowledge of the cultures that populated the area. Notwithstanding this definition, which in principle could be considered broad, that same article defines as archaeological sites of importance those that present cultural features, architectural structures amenable to analysis, or a general stratigraphy, where cultural features or architectural structures can be defined that provide data on the following ancient groups: Paleoindians (10,000 to 6,000 B.C.), Archaic (6,000 to 3,000 B.C.), Early Formative (3,000 to 1,500 B.C.), or Protohistoric (1450 to 1550 A.D.). As a first approximation, two relevant ideas must be noted. First, neither that article nor the rest of the Decree determines which authority is responsible for determining whether an archaeological site is of importance because it presents cultural features or architectural structures amenable to analysis; therefore, based on the provisions of Ley 6703 of December twenty-eighth, nineteen eighty-one (Articles 4 and 15), as well as the need to prevent future conflicts of jurisdiction, or worse, a complete absence thereof that could imply a renunciation of the State’s own powers in this matter, this Chamber must clarify that whenever this matter is addressed in the project, it must be interpreted to mean that the Museo Nacional and the Comisión Arqueológica Nacional are the State bodies that shall establish whether one is dealing with deposits “of importance,” based on strictly scientific criteria. On the other hand, it is extremely serious that the historical classification made to determine when an archaeological site is of importance disregards the periods between the years 1,500 B.C. to 1450 A.D. and the possible finds of antiquity greater than 10,000 years B.C.; that is, it does not consider of importance the archaeological elements encompassed in a period of almost three thousand years and in one of indeterminate breadth. This exclusion is patently unconstitutional, because both Article 89 of the Constitución Política and the instruments that obligate the Costa Rican State to protect archaeological assets do not establish a gradation based on their period of origin, and from this perspective, they cannot be discriminated against </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">a priori</span><span> in a capricious and unscientific manner, as the Decree in question does. The aspects noted thus far are not merely technical problems of archaeological definition; rather, they have profound repercussions from the standpoint of the protection of historical assets, since the declaration of importance of an archaeological site determines significant consequences regarding its rescue and discovery. Thus, Article 3 of the Decree provides:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>\"Article 3—Cases in which archaeological rescue is appropriate. The archaeological rescue stage shall only be appropriate in those cases in which cultural features, architectural structures, or archaeological sites of importance defined in the preceding article are discovered, which merit being recorded, analyzed, or excavated.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>All heritage assets found in archaeological studies must be delivered to the Museo Nacional, which shall handle the respective storage and registration procedures at no cost to the interested party.\"</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>It is clear, from the norms transcribed above, that the possibility is opened of finding archaeological assets that, in addition to not presenting cultural features, architectural structures amenable to analysis, or a cultural stratigraphy, belong to the era spanning from 1,500 B.C. to 1420 A.D. or earlier than 10,000 B.C., and would therefore be considered assets without importance and thus would not merit rescue. The same can be said in the case of discoveries, since an archaeological asset like the one previously described would likewise not require any rescue. Finally, the state of conservation of assets does not necessarily imply their low importance from an archaeological standpoint; therefore, considering them </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">a priori</span><span> as lacking importance—with the effects that such a condition entails—results in the lack of protection of various types of objects whose apparent insignificance (shell middens, altered sites, etc.) prevents the State from giving them effective protection, in contravention of its constitutional and international duties. The impermissible exclusion of a considerable historical period of our history as an objective element determining its importance from an archaeological standpoint, as well as the consequences this entails in the regulation of rescues and discoveries in such cases, constitute violations of Articles 50, 74, and 89 of the Constitution, as well as the international norms cited previously.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">XV.- Permit to carry out excavations.</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">(Drafted by Judge Sancho) </span><span>The plaintiffs challenge the validity of the norm contained in Article 4 of the Executive Decree, which requires the owner’s authorization to proceed with archaeological excavations. The cited article provides:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>\"Article 4—Owner’s permit to excavate. In order to carry out excavations, whether for evaluation or rescue, the authorization of the owner(s) of the land to be excavated must be obtained. Excavations shall be limited solely to the project area.\"</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>The foregoing provision reproduces, to a large extent, what is regulated by Article 12 of Law number 6703 of December twenty-eighth, nineteen eighty-one, stating:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>\"Article 12.- The Comisión Arqueológica Nacional may authorize excavations </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">with the authorization of the landowner</span><span>, and with the obligation to supervise the excavation directly and adequately, and to adopt the corresponding measures to avoid damage to the property in question.\" (The underlining does not appear in the original).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>The legal mechanism of obtaining the prior permit of the property owner developed by the regulations under challenge, in short, provides that at sites, whether of archaeological interest or not, where prior studies exist or where there are discoveries that merit evaluation or rescue actions, all State actions to preserve the archaeological heritage are appropriate and legitimate. The issue raised in this recital concerns the coincidence of the appearance of archaeological features of importance on private property and the concern for how to ensure that the State’s heritage is protected, rescued, and conserved. In the opinion of the majority of the Chamber, when the norms speak of the need to obtain the owner’s permits to carry out archaeological excavations, they refer to the respect that must exist for the right of property in the dimension established in Article 45 of the Constitución Política. In accordance with the terms of this judgment, especially in recitals VIII, IX, and X, in practice there exist two rights of property of a diverse nature, which may potentially come into conflict: on the one hand, the archaeological heritage, which is a public domain asset, as established in this judgment, and which is, moreover, a privileged right, due to the characteristic features that inform it; on the other hand, the right to property, whether public or private, but which is distinct from the assets that make up the public domain and which is a right of the most ancient lineage, such that it was classified as a \"natural right\" in the Pacto Social Fundamental Interino de Costa Rica of December 1, 1821, and of which it is said to be one of the cornerstones of the political and social formation of the country’s democratic regime. Faced with the hypothetical conflict of interests that could arise, it must be resolved which of the two rights prevails over the other, and in the opinion of the majority of the Chamber, what must exist is a perfect balance that favors each of the two, but to the extent that it protects both in their proper dimension. Regarding the right of property, during the Constituent Assembly of nineteen forty-nine, it was said:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>\"It should be noted, in the first place, that Article 29 of the Constitution of 1871, in a certain way, already introduced the concept of the social function of property, by virtue of the reform introduced to it in the year 1943, when it stated that Congress could, by a two-thirds vote of the totality of its members, impose limitations of social interest on private property. It was admitted that property may be subject to limitations for reasons of social interest, and in doing so, it was implicitly also established that in Costa Rica, property had constitutionally lost, from that moment on, the absolute, closed character it had in earlier times, when economic liberalism and Manchesterian individualism were at their peak… private property cannot be considered as something that interests only its holder, ignoring the consequences that the disorderly or arbitrary exercise of the respective right may produce in society; this right is recognized and guaranteed because its existence is known to be useful and convenient for the development of the national economy, but it is guaranteed within the logical limitations imposed by the fact of its social function; it therefore cannot be an absolute and inviolable concept… The idea that property is or has a social function is an idea imposed by the needs of the modern world in the economy of free countries, which must be adjusted not only for the benefit of the owners, but for that of all society, for the other factors of production, for the groups that buy products in the market, for the benefit, in short, of all the elements whose concurrence makes it possible for the profits derived from private property to be produced.\" (Principal ideas expressed by Deputy Rodrigo Facio. Actas de la Constituyente. Volume II, pages 465 and following)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Given all the foregoing, in the Chamber’s judgment, the State has available to it, in order to adequately protect the archaeological heritage, all the necessary legal mechanisms to issue precautionary measures of an administrative nature and to manage, in the judicial venue, with the speed the case merits, the application of the measures necessary to protect that heritage and to compel the reluctant owner to consent to the excavation work being carried out, when circumstances so warrant. In other words, requiring the landowner’s authorization cannot be unconstitutional, since his is a right of constitutional rank, and the maxim that “property is inviolable” admits no other interpretation than that derived from its literal content, especially if one considers that the exceptions to such a principle can only be those that are already expressly contained in Article 45 of the Constitution itself; but all this is understood, of course, in light of the interpretation given to it by the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente of nineteen forty-nine, according to the terms of Deputy Facio Brenes’s intervention. On the other hand, to affirm that in order to protect the archaeological heritage, the State may disregard the right of property, which would thus be subordinated to the former, is not a conclusion that can be reached by merely confronting both rights. In summary: the Constitución Política, by definition, has a structure in which rights and guarantees are aligned harmoniously, and it is not possible to affirm the prevalence of one over the others. When a conflict of interests exists, “by resorting to the laws, all must find redress,” provides Article 41 of the Constitution, and prompt and complete justice must be done. This means that the fundamental text itself has provided for the manner in which controversies between persons are to be resolved, and this is, in the opinion of the majority of the Chamber, the meaning that should be given to the norms under examination (Article 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo 28174-MP-MINAE-MEIC and Article 12 of Ley 6703 of 28 December 1981). That is, those norms are not unconstitutional; in the event of a landowner’s refusal, justified or not, to facilitate evaluation or rescue excavations</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> of the archaeological heritage, the State may immobilize the property in question, issuing precautionary measures without thereby incurring a violation of the right of property, subject to the requirement that it must immediately resort to the courts of justice to request the corresponding authorizations, all without prejudice to exercising, if it deems it appropriate, the right to partially or totally expropriate the land. For all the reasons stated, by majority, this aspect of the action declares that the norms involved are not unconstitutional.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">XVI.- Discoveries by third parties. </span><span>Section 5 establishes the need to notify the Museo Nacional of discoveries that are located, an entity which is given a period of 15 calendar days to carry out the necessary studies and determine whether they are of importance, and an additional 15 days to prepare a proposal if it determines that the discovered assets require rescue. It likewise establishes the possibility of continuing with the works if, within the mentioned periods, the Museum has not carried out the corresponding actions.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>\"Article 5—Discoveries by third parties. When the Museo Nacional is notified through third parties of the discovery of monuments, ruins, inscriptions, or objects of archaeological interest on public or private lands, the procedure shall be as follows:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>a) The Museo Nacional, within the following 15 calendar days counted from said notification, shall carry out an archaeological inspection and, when appropriate, an evaluation of the site. If the remains found are of archaeological importance, the Museo Nacional shall have a maximum additional period of 15 calendar days to prepare a proposal for the archaeological rescue work.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>b) The rescue may be carried out by persons duly accredited before the Comisión Arqueológica Nacional (CAN), under the supervision of the Museo Nacional, and shall be limited to the project areas defined by the archaeological evaluation.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>c) If, upon expiration of the periods established in subsection a) of this article, the corresponding actions have not been carried out, the project developer may continue developing their ordinary activities.\"</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>The text of this article is partly a reproduction of that provided in Section 13 of the aforementioned Law number 6703, regarding the duty of third parties to report to the Museo Nacional on the discovery of archaeological objects, and the 15-day period that institution has to carry out the corresponding studies. Both norms are distinguished, however, in that the challenged one clearly defines that it is a period counted in calendar days; likewise, in the fact that upon expiration of the term, the discoverer of the objects may continue with the respective works. This last aspect is clearly unconstitutional, since it subordinates the protection of the archaeological heritage to the diligence of the Administration, specifically to compliance with the short periods (in calendar days) provided for by the norm in question. This Chamber has already established in a consistent line of jurisprudence that as regards the protection of essential interests for the Nation, such as the environment (and we could say the same of the archaeological heritage), positive silence does not operate due to the Administration’s omission in fulfilling its duties, without prejudice to the liability it may incur for the damages its delay causes to the administered parties. (See in this regard judgments numbers 6332-94, of </span><span style=\"letter-spacing:-0.1pt\">eighteen hours and twelve minutes of October twenty-sixth, nineteen ninety-four, and 1895-00, of fifteen hours and forty-six minutes of February twenty-ninth, two thousand.) The same arguments must be used to annul the norms contained in subsection d) of Article 11 and subsection d) of Article 12 of the challenged Regulations, for establishing a positive silence in favor of project developers who have carried out a voluntary archaeological study and have submitted their results for approval by the Comisión Arqueológica Nacional. This latter provision, even though it was not challenged in the present action, must be annulled due to its connection.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">XVII.- Procedure in the event of the execution of public or private works. </span><span>Section 6 of the challenged Decree establishes that earthworks (movimientos de tierra) do not require authorization from the Museo Nacional or an archaeological study, except in those cases where the land is located within an archaeological site according to the procedures of Law number 7555. The text of the referenced article is as follows:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>\"Article 6—Discoveries by project developers. Earthworks (movimientos de tierra) do not require authorization from the Museo Nacional or an archaeological study, except in those cases where the land is located within an archaeological site according to the procedures of Ley Nº 7555.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>If, during the works carried out for the execution of public or private projects, archaeological objects are discovered, the procedure shall be as follows:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>a) The project manager must immediately notify the Museo Nacional of the fact and make the found objects available to it. The project developer must only halt the works for the execution of the project in that area or those areas where archaeological objects were found.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>b) The Museo Nacional, within the following 15 calendar days counted from said notification, shall carry out an archaeological inspection and, when appropriate, an evaluation of the site. If the remains found are of archaeological importance, the Museo Nacional shall have a maximum additional period of 15 calendar days to prepare a proposal for the archaeological rescue work.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:20.7pt\"><span>c) If, upon expiration of the periods established in subsections a) and b) of this article, the corresponding actions have not been carried out, the project developer may continue developing their ordinary activities.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>d) The rescue shall be limited solely to the project areas defined in the archaeological evaluation, which must be previously approved by the CAN.\"</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Article 6, paragraph 1 establishes that </span><span style=\"background-color:#ffff00\">prior</span><span> authorization from the Museo Nacional is required for carrying out earthworks (movimientos de tierra) only on lands located within an archaeological site declared as such according to the procedures established in Law number 7555. In this regard, the first thing that must be clarified is that the purpose of the referenced Law is \"…</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">the preservation of the historical-architectural heritage of Costa Rica</span><span>\" (Article 1), providing that the Executive Branch may, by way of Decree, make the respective declaration, after studies have been carried out that determine the presence of a site of importance under the terms of the Law (Article 7). It is evident that the concept of archaeological heritage goes far beyond the architectural legacy, since, as stated previously, it constitutes a broad concept encompassing a vast plurality of movable and immovable property, as well as remains of persons, animals, and plants, capable of yielding information about our ancestors. For this reason, limiting the obtaining of archaeological permits to earthworks (movimientos de tierra) carried out in places declared as of historical-architectural interest (Ley 7.555) implies the lack of protection for the archaeological heritage located in all those areas of the country that have not been the subject of a formal declaration, in accordance with the cited Law. Thus, the subordination of the Museo Nacional’s permits to the prior existence of that declaration by the Executive Branch implies its effective lack of protection, in clear contravention of what Article 89 of the Constitución Política orders. This defect is not cured by the fact that Article 9 of the challenged Decree establishes that any public or private project developer, prior to carrying out their works, may conduct a voluntary archaeological study on the land, since the fulfillment of protection functions that correspond to the State cannot be left to the discretion of private parties. Therefore, this Chamber must declare the invalidity of the phrase “according to the procedures of Ley N° 7555” contained in the first paragraph of Article 6 of the Decree that is the subject of this action.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">XVIII.- On voluntary procedures.</span><span> Articles 9 and 10 of the project provide for the archaeological studies that the owner may voluntarily carry out on their property before undertaking a civil work. The mentioned sections read as follows:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>\"Article 9— Procedures for voluntary archaeological studies. Any public or private project developer who, prior to carrying out their works, wishes to conduct an archaeological study of the land on which the work will be carried out and which has not been highly altered previously, may contract any person duly authorized and registered before the CAN to carry out all or any of the stages of an archaeological study. They may contract studies to determine the existence of cultural evidence in the area to be altered or the potential damage to the archaeological heritage for the purpose of implementing preventive measures that avoid or reduce such damages.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Likewise, and on a voluntary basis, the interested party may contract any person duly authorized and registered before the CAN for the supervision of earthworks (movimientos de tierras).\"</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>\"Article 10.—Archaeological inspection. To determine if cultural evidence exists in the project area, the public or private project developer may contract any person authorized and registered with the CAN to carry out archaeological studies to perform the inspections.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Since it is not an excavation, the inspection shall not require the submission of a proposal to the CAN nor the submission of a final report.\"</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>In this regard, this Chamber must clarify that it is not unconstitutional to allow private parties to carry out archaeological studies on their properties before building. The opposite would be true if the possibilities for studying the archaeological impact of a work depended exclusively on the will of private parties, that is, if there were no mechanisms through which the State could directly intervene in fulfillment of its constitutional duties regarding the historical heritage. For the same reasons, it is also not unconstitutional for such analyses to be carried out by professionals registered and authorized by the Comisión Arqueológica Nacional. What is contrary to the Constitución Política is what subsections d) of Article 11 and d) of Article 12 determine, since in both cases forms of positive silence are established in favor of the owners, to the detriment of the reinforced protection that the State is obligated to give to the archaeological heritage, as was established in “recital XVI” of this judgment.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">XIX.- Registry of persons authorized to carry out archaeological studies.</span><span> Article 15 of the challenged regulations contains the following text:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>\"Article 15.—Registry of persons authorized by the CAN to carry out archaeological studies.

Natural or legal persons, national or foreign, who hold a university degree in archaeology and have a minimum of two experiences assisting in archaeological evaluations (evaluaciones arqueológicas), may be accredited in the Registry of persons authorized by the CAN to carry out archaeological studies (estudios arqueológicos).

Said persons may carry out all the tasks involved in the inspection, evaluation, and rescue phases, including laboratory analyses that they may perform in public or private laboratories.

The National Archaeological Commission (Comisión Arqueológica Nacional, CAN) must maintain a Registry of persons who meet the requirements established in the first paragraph of this article, based on the registration applications submitted. The CAN must make the Registry of accredited persons for carrying out archaeological studies available to project proponents.

The CAN must provide accredited persons, at the time an evaluation is conducted, with the available bibliography, the final reports of previously conducted evaluations, the database of archaeological sites, and other studies, for which the Museum must provide the corresponding information to the CAN." There does not seem to exist—following the line of argument contained in the preceding point—any defect of unconstitutionality in the fact that duly accredited professionals may carry out archaeological studies, duly supervised by the State, through the National Museum. In the case of rescue work, which involves the removal of objects from the site where they are found and their transfer to the custody of the Administration for the purpose of protecting them, this activity, although it can indeed be carried out not only by the State, through the authorities of the National Museum, but also by duly accredited professionals, the truth is that in this case the oversight exercised by the Administration must be accentuated, in order to prevent the said assets from being removed from the public domain.

**XX.- Repeal of subsection c) of article 14 of Decree 19016-C.** Article 16, subsection c), of the challenged regulation repeals—as applicable—the text of subsection c) of article 14 of Executive Decree 19016-C, Regulation of the National Archaeological Commission.

"Article 16.— Reforms. The Regulation of the National Archaeological Commission, Executive Decree No. 19106-C of June 12, 1989, is amended:

(…)

• c)Subsection c) of article 14 of the cited regulation is repealed." The repealed text is as follows:

"Article 14.- The functions of the National Archaeological Commission shall be:

(…)

• c)Authorize archaeological excavations. To this end, the interested party must request the respective form from the CAN and forward it with the complete information. The CAN will evaluate the request and issue its decision within a maximum of two months from submission. The decision will be communicated in writing to the interested party, and a copy will be sent to the Department of Anthropology and History of the National Museum, attaching the background information on the matter.

(…)" This Chamber considers that the repeal of the rule in question does not constitute a defect of unconstitutionality. The foregoing, because even though said provision is eliminated, the procedure contained therein is not, as it is foreseen in Articles 5 and 6 of the challenged Decree, with the only difference being that the time periods were reduced as a way to alleviate the burden of procedures weighing on the project proponent, and recalling that in this same ruling, the Chamber has already considered invalid the rules that establish a positive silence in favor of the project proponent in this matter. For the stated reasons, the referred subsection c) of article 16 of the Decree under study is not unconstitutional.

**XXI.- Exclusion of archaeological studies from environmental assessment procedures.** Article 17 of the challenged Regulation provides the following in this regard:

"Article 17.— Repeals.

• a)The final paragraph of subsection a.2. of article 19 of the Regulation of Procedures of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (SETENA), Executive Decree No. 25705-MINAE of October 8, 1996, and its amendments, which reads as follows, is repealed: “Areas where there is an express record of the presence of archaeological sites, defined by the National Museum, preferably in published and disseminated maps, at a scale no greater than 1:50,000 and registered with SETENA.” b) From the Manual of Technical Instruments for the Environmental Impact Assessment Process, SETENA Resolution No. 588-97 of August 28, 1997, published in “La Gaceta” 215 of November 7, 1997, on its page 21, the informational requirement of the Preliminary Environmental Assessment Form (Formulario de Evaluación Ambiental Preliminar, FEAP) requested by SETENA regarding the “existence within the project’s impact area of possible areas of archaeological interest or of historical and cultural heritage, according to the data provided by the National Museum”, for which they must provide the Museum’s note, is repealed. Likewise, the inclusion of the requirement related to archaeological assessments and studies in the process of the Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA) is repealed." With the preceding provisions, the archaeological component was eliminated from the two main environmental assessment mechanisms detailed in the Organic Law of the Environment, which are the Preliminary Environmental Assessment Form (FEAP) and the Environmental Impact Study (EsiA). Taking into account that the aforementioned requirements are not substituted in the cited Decree by any other suitable ones to guarantee, in a preventive manner, the integrity of the archaeological heritage, the Chamber considers that said repeals become unconstitutional. As stated above, archaeological heritage forms part of the broader concept of environment, precisely because it is the cultural (human) component of the environment. A complete protection of the environment, which therefore respects, in its entirety, what is ordered by Article 50 of the Constitution, must contemplate the protection of archaeological assets, of the historical legacy through which human beings have adapted to and modified their surroundings over the centuries.

**XXII.- Conclusion.** By reason of the arguments contained in the preceding paragraphs, this Chamber considers that the present action must be declared partially with merit, understanding that from Executive Decree number 28174-MP-MINAE-MEIC, of October twelve, nineteen ninety-nine, published in Supplement number 78-A to La Gaceta number 202, of October nineteen, nineteen ninety-nine, the following are unconstitutional: from the 2nd paragraph of subsection i) of article 2, the word "following", as well as the text after the word "ancient"; subsection c) of article 5; from the 1st paragraph of article 6, the phrase “according to the procedures of Ley 7555”; subsection d) of article 11; subsection d) of article 12; as well as article 17, whereby the requirements established in the final paragraph of subsection a.2. of article 19 of Executive Decree number 25075-MINAE, and in the Manual of Technical Instruments for the Environmental Impact Assessment Process, SETENA Resolution number 588-97 of August twenty-eight, nineteen ninety-seven, regain their validity. The previously cited rules are unconstitutional for violation of Articles 7, 50, 74, and 89 of the Political Constitution, as well as the international instruments in force in Costa Rica, referred to in Considerando VII of this ruling. In all other respects, the action is dismissed, as is hereby done.

Justices Arguedas, Vargas, and Armijo dissent and additionally declare unconstitutional Article 4 of Decree 28174-MP-MINAE-MEIC and, by connection, in accordance with Article 89 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the expression “with authorization of the landowner” is annulled from Article 12 of the National Archaeological Heritage Law, number 6703 of December twenty-eight, nineteen eighty-six.

**Por tanto:** The action is partially granted. The following are annulled for unconstitutionality, from Executive Decree number 28174-MP-MINAE-MEIC, of October twelve, nineteen ninety-nine: from the 2nd paragraph of subsection i) of article 2, the word "following", as well as the text after the word "ancient"; subsection c) of article 5; from the 1st paragraph of article 6, the phrase “according to the procedures of Ley 7555”; subsection d) of article 11; subsection d) of article 12; as well as article 17, whereby the requirements established in the final paragraph of subsection a.2. of article 19 of Executive Decree number 25075-MINAE, and in the Manual of Technical Instruments for the Environmental Impact Assessment Process, SETENA Resolution number 588-97 of August twenty-eight, nineteen ninety-seven, regain their validity. This ruling is declaratory and retroactive to the date of issuance of the challenged Decree, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. In all other respects, the action is dismissed. Noted in the Official Gazette "La Gaceta" and published in full in the Judicial Bulletin. Communicated to the Legislative and Executive Branches. Notified.- Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Eduardo Sancho G.

Carlos M. Arguedas R. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

MCP/oc/13céd.- This requirement is expressly eliminated by the new Decree, thus leaving the Museo Nacional and SETENA without mechanisms to effectively protect the national archaeological heritage. It questions the creation of a new concept, that of <span style=\"font-style:italic\">"unimportant archaeological sites (sitios arqueológicos sin importancia)"</span><span>, which are those that present insufficient archaeological evidence, that are heavily altered, or that due to their characteristics do not allow information to be obtained from them. Nor is it specified which body will determine the importance or not of the find, which would facilitate a lack of protection. Numeral</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> provides that archaeological rescue (rescate arqueológico) only proceeds at important archaeological sites (sitios arqueológicos de importancia), which "</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">merit being recorded, analyzed, or excavated"</span><span>, leaving the Nation's cultural and archaeological resource without real and effective protection, to the extent that a subsequent control would come into force once the archaeological heritage has been affected, when through the use of machinery and equipment the archaeological record sites are exposed, they have evidently already been damaged, altered, the pieces have been dismembered, and if even so the works are not suspended because what proceeds is simply the communication of the find, the final situation when the qualified and technical authorities intervene in the matter will be evidently harmful and irreversible. All resources at the preventive stage remain within the volitional sphere of the property owner, without any public authority being able to intervene, unless it carries out the declaration of an archaeological site (sitio arqueológico). It points out in this regard that the Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes has not declared a single archaeological site in the terms set forth in Ley 7555, despite the fact that said Law has been in force for four years. The Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico does not distinguish between sites of archaeological interest and sites without interest, given that every find incorporates in itself great historical value, even in those cases where it is ultimately decided not to extract the pieces found. Furthermore, Article 36 of the cited Law declares the investigation, protection, conservation, restoration, and recovery of the archaeological heritage of Costa Rica to be of public interest. The Government of Costa Rica signed the Convention on the Defense of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations (Convención sobre Defensa del Patrimonio Arqueológico, Histórico y Artístico de las Naciones Americanas), also known as the Convention of San Salvador, which establishes in Article 8 the obligation of the Costa Rican State to proceed with the identification, recording, protection, conservation, and vigilance of its cultural heritage, for which it must create the necessary legislative and regulatory provisions to effectively protect said heritage, as well as guarantee the conservation of archaeological places and objects. Also ratified, through Ley 4711, was the Recommendation on the Conservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works, which provides that States are obliged to conserve or save cultural property, through preventive and corrective measures, which must seek to avoid the affectation of the archaeological heritage endangered by public or private works that could deteriorate or destroy them. It considers that since the approval of the challenged Decree omitted consulting the Dirección del Museo Nacional, the Escuela de Antropología y Sociología of the Universidad de Costa Rica, ICOMOS, a consultative body of UNESCO, or any other technical body, this omission delegitimizes any technical criterion that may have been intended to be incorporated into it. It requests that the unconstitutionality of the cited Decreto Ejecutivo be declared and the state obligation to seek the effective protection and preservation of the archaeological heritage through the implementation of preventive measures and timely intervention be reiterated, as well as to adapt the current regulations to the Conventions on the matter, which have been signed and ratified by Costa Rica.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">2.- </span><span>By resolution at fifteen thirty-five hours on November eleventh, two thousand (folio 266), this Chamber warned the Defensoría de los Habitantes to indicate which articles of the challenged Decree it considered unconstitutional and to specify in each case the violation that occurred, with the respective legal citations.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:28.35pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">3.- </span><span>By brief filed on November twenty-third, two thousand (folio 268), the Defensora de los Habitantes de la República, in compliance with the warning given, states that the Decree is negligent (omiso), since it only contemplates expropriation, without establishing intermediate measures that would enable the State to intervene without needing to declare the archaeological interest of the site. It alleges that the Costa Rican State signed the "Convention on the Defense of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations", ratified on September 5, 1979, in which it is declared: </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">"That it is essential to adopt, both nationally and internationally, the most effective measures conducive to the adequate protection, defense, and recovery of cultural property".</span><span> It considers that the Decree, by eliminating all prior controls, derogating the mechanisms established for the effective protection of archaeological property, incurs a breach of the cited Convention. It indicates that in the second whereas clause (considerando segundo) of the cited Decree, economic criteria are adduced to justify the derogation of the norms and manuals that contemplated the prior archaeology study and state intervention. In relation to whereas clauses (considerandos) 5 and 6, referring to Article 3 of the Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, it considers that regulations and controls tending to the preservation of the historical and archaeological heritage cannot be eliminated. In relation to the 7th whereas clause (considerando 7°) of the challenged Decree, which interprets Article 25 of the International Treaty for the Recommendation on the Conservation of Cultural Property Endangered by the Execution of Public or Private Works, it considers that it borders on a simplistic analysis, since it intends to delegate state control to the obligation of private individuals to communicate archaeological finds, when that instrument promotes the protection of the archaeological heritage to the extent that it may be threatened by public and private works resulting from development, so dispensing with prior and necessary control would render nugatory the right of present and future generations to know about their origin and past. Regarding the 8th whereas clause (considerando 8°), it indicates that there is not, to date, a single declaration of an archaeological interest site (sitio de interés arqueológico), and furthermore, the declaration of zones merely certifies the possibility of archaeological finds occurring, without this in itself implying special protection by the State. Regarding the norms considered unconstitutional, Article 1 establishes as the only requirements and procedures for carrying out archaeological studies those established therein, thus ignoring provisions in norms of higher rank than the cited Decreto Ejecutivo, which broadly establish not only requirements for carrying out archaeological studies, but also the obligation to perform and adopt the necessary measures for this type of research. In relation to Article 2, which provides some definitions, it considers that those of "Important archaeological sites (Sitios arqueológicos de importancia)", those that present cultural features, architectural structures feasible for analysis, or a cultural stratigraphy, or that provide data on the following ancient groups: Paleo-Indians (10,000 to 6,000 B.C.), Archaic (6,000 to 3,000 B.C.), Early Formative (3,000 to 1,500 B.C.), or Protohistoric (1450 to 1550 A.D.). It also defines "Unimportant archaeological sites (Sitios arqueológicos sin importancia)" as those sites that do not present the above characteristics, have insufficient archaeological evidence, are highly altered, or by their characteristics do not allow information to be obtained from them. It considers that such definitions use an erroneous periodization, disrespecting the basic principles of prevention, scientific rigor, and ignoring the constitutional mandate to conserve and develop the historical heritage. The foregoing opposes provisions in Ley 4711. It considers that establishing by Decree the existence of sites without archaeological interest, without a prior on-site assessment by a technical body, empties the content of Article 89 of the Constitución Política, to the detriment of the precautionary principle. Regarding the archaeological rescue (rescate arqueológico) stage (Article 3 of the Decree), which restricts its application to cases in which important cultural features are discovered, it indicates that Article 23 of the Recommendation on the Conservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works provides that measures aimed at conserving or saving cultural property must be carried out sufficiently in advance of public or private works to be developed in a given area, and that all new construction must be subject to mandatory preliminary excavations, with construction being able to be postponed to allow time for measures aimed at the conservation and safeguarding of said property, as also provided by Article 13 of Ley 6703. In reference to Article 4 of the Decree, which provides procedures requiring authorization from the landowner to conduct excavations, it infringes the right enshrined in Article 89 of the Constitution, by leaving in the hands of the private individual the power to allow studies or excavations to be carried out, grossly contravening Ley 4711 in Article 24 subsection b), and is also contrary to the principle of prevention and that of legal certainty, necessary for the effective protection of the archaeological resource and property. It further considers that this numeral violates Articles 1 and 8 of the Convention on the Defense of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations. With respect to finds by third parties, regulated in Article 5°, it maintains that this establishes the figure of positive silence (silencio positivo) when, after the expiration of the 15-day period for the inspection and preparation of the proposal for rescue works (labores de rescate) by the Museo Nacional without said inspection having been carried out or the rescue proposal prepared, the project planner (proyectista) may continue the construction of the initiated work, which is considered unconstitutional to the extent that, by way of a Decree, it intends to modify a norm of legal rank such as the Ley General de Administración Pública, thus violating Article 129 of the Constitución Política. Regarding Article 6, referring to finds by project planners (proyectistas) when carrying out earthworks (movimientos de tierra), which will not require authorization from the Museo Nacional or an archaeological study, except in those cases where the land is located on an archaeological site (sitio arqueológico), it considers that it renders nugatory the right contained in Article 89 of the Constitución Política, directly infringing Articles 7 and 8 of Ley 4711, which develop the precautionary principle regarding archaeological heritage. It considers that in subsection c) of that article, what was previously stated regarding positive silence can be applied, given that in this case the possibility of implicit affirmative resolution is erroneously admitted, thus allowing the irrational and irreparable affectation of the archaeological resource. Regarding voluntary archaeological studies, provided for in Article 9 of the Decree, it considers that these cannot be voluntary, since the power to carry them out is left in the hands of the private individual. As for Article 16, which derogates subsection c) of Article 9 of Decreto Ejecutivo 19016, and the derogations provided in Article 17, referring to the Reglamento de Procedimientos de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental and the Manual de Instrumentos Técnicos del Proceso de Revisión de Impacto Ambiental, it considers that the property protected by Articles 50 and 89 of the Constitución Política, referring to the conservation and protection of the historical, archaeological, and cultural heritage, is left unprotected. It alleges that the challenged Decree generates a legal vacuum that will have enormous repercussions on the social and cultural rights of Costa Ricans and the international community.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:35.4pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">4.- </span><span>By resolution at fourteen thirty hours on November twenty-sixth, two thousand (folio 288), the action was admitted, granting a hearing to the Procuraduría General de la República, the Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Comercio, the Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes, and the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:35.45pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">5.- </span><span>The Procuraduría General de la República submitted its report visible at folios 291 to 311. It points out that the archaeological heritage comprises a set of riches, object of study and aesthetic contemplation, essential for the adequate development of the human personality, for which it serves a purpose of general utility, which is to preserve for present and future generations the pre-Columbian cultural heritage. It states that the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 15; the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Article 13; and the Charter of the Organization of American States, Article 46, establish the duty of States to protect the archaeological property existing in their territories, so in the Costa Rican case, the Constitución Política develops these provisions in Article 89. It indicates that in this sense, Costa Rica has signed a series of international agreements, such as the Recommendation on the Conservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works; the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage; the Convention on the Defense of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations; the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, etc. It alleges that the archaeological heritage is of public domain, to which constitutional foundation is recognized, so it enjoys privileged self-protective protection by the Administration, which has not only the right but also the obligation to prevent or cease any harmful or prejudicial act. In Costa Rica, except for private property acquired previously, of an exceptional nature and requiring necessary proof by the private individual, since the enactment of Law number 7 of October 6, nineteen thirty-eight, all archaeological objects existing in the soil of Costa Rica prior to the Spanish conquest, as well as monuments of the same kind that might be found, were declared property of the State. Regarding this action, it considers that with respect to Articles 1 and 6 of the challenged Decree, they are contrary to the Constitución Política and the International Conventions signed for its conservation. It considers that reality has demonstrated that the lack of due regulatory controls to protect public domain property has caused significant damage to them; moreover, in the case of cultural or natural heritage, its protection is required in a preventive manner. Regarding Article 2, it considers that it establishes concepts with an inapplicable periodization regarding archaeological sites with importance or without it, prepared without scientific rigor and without a prior on-site study by the technical body. They recommend to this Chamber that, using the powers conferred by Article 377 of the Código Procesal Civil, it obtain the technical opinion of the Escuela de Antropología y Sociología of the Universidad de Costa Rica, so that a professional in archaeology may report on the correct periodization. With respect to numeral 3 of the Decree, it excludes unimportant sites from archaeological rescue (rescate arqueológico), without previously assessing that condition, thus leaving such resources unprotected (cf. Articles 2, subsection f) and 5, subsection a), since in those cases the rescue would be delegated to private individuals, when that competence should continue to belong to the Museo Nacional, without prejudice to the collaboration they may provide. Another objection to numeral 2, subsections a) and b), arises from the understanding that archaeological sites (sitios arqueológicos) would be only those declared as such by executive decree, Law number 7555. It considers that the precept is applicable to the Historical-Architectural Heritage, given its specific particularity and material evidence that is generally easily verifiable, but obviously not to the Archaeological one, which entered the public domain through Law number 7, an attribute reiterated in Law number 6703, thus complying with General Principles 3 and 13 of the Convention approved through Ley number 4711. It considers that numerals 2, 3, and 5, subsection b) of Decree number 28174 also contravene the constitutional order. Regarding Article 4, it questions leaving the execution of excavations or archaeological studies in the hands of private individuals, limiting them to the project areas, without including their surrounding context. A similar provision exists in Ley 6703, which establishes that the Comisión Arqueológica Nacional may authorize excavations with the authorization of the landowner, and with the obligation to supervise the excavation directly and adequately, and to adopt the corresponding measures to avoid damage to the property in question. In accordance with the transcribed legal norm, it understands that the owner's authorization should be reserved for cases in which the Comisión Nacional de Arqueología, for reasons of scientific or academic interest, authorizes excavations by a third party of recognized competence in the matter, and not the owner of the property where the archaeological research will be carried out, as occurs in the hypothesis raised in Article 15 ibidem. However, it considers that authorization cannot be required when carrying out the preventive archaeological evaluations (evaluaciones arqueológicas preventivas) that every project planner (proyectista) must necessarily contract, to comply with provisions such as those derogated by numerals 16, subsection c) and 17 of Decree number 28174. It considers the provision of the Decree that requires the owner's authorization for rescue works appropriate, but with the clear understanding that, if the owner's refusal arises, and in order not to render nugatory the State's powers over archaeological property, the Museo Nacional may issue and communicate to the reluctant owner an order to permit and not obstruct the rescue works. In reference to numeral 5 of the Decree, which enshrines the figure of positive silence, since after the expiration of the fifteen-day periods for the inspection and evaluation of the site, as well as for the preparation of the proposal for rescue works by the Museo Nacional, when applicable, without the respective actions having been carried out, the project planner (proyectista) may continue the construction of the initiated work, it does not believe there is a violation of numeral 129 of the Constitución Política, because Ley 6703, of a special nature, contains in its Article 13 the fifteen-day period for the Museo Nacional to define how it will organize the rescue works. However, it cannot be permitted that, once the periods have expired, the project planner continues developing its ordinary activities to the detriment of the archaeological property. It considers that the solution to the foregoing is contemplated by the same Decree in its Whereas Clause 7 (Considerando 7º), when it cites Principle 25 of the Convention approved by Ley number 4711, so that once the periods have expired without the Museo having carried out the inspection and evaluation of the site or designed the proposal for the rescue works, the project planner (proyectista) will have the right to demand, through the corresponding legal channels, compensation for the damages it proves were caused to it during the time used in excess by the Museo Nacional to perform those activities. The commented periods are exclusively for carrying out the indicated activities (inspection, evaluation, rescue proposal), but not for rescuing the archaeological property, so it considers Article 5, subsection c), unconstitutional, and by connection, also numeral 6, subsection c), of Decree number 28174. With respect to the challenges to Article 9, the possibility of persons authorized and registered with the Comisión Arqueológica Nacional being contracted to prepare archaeological studies is not questioned, which in any case has its basis in Law number 7472, Article 8. The problem lies in eliminating preventive control and reserving it for cases where there are earthworks (movimientos de tierras) located on an archaeological site (sitio arqueológico) according to the procedures of Law number 7555, and when, at the will of the project planner (proyectista), archaeological studies are contracted (Article 9 ibidem). The power of the public authorities to protect their heritage cannot depend on private will, as this makes it uncertain. Another additional challenge arises when the Decree (Article 9, paragraph 2) allows the project planner to voluntarily contract any person duly authorized and registered with the Comisión Arqueológica Nacional to supervise earthworks (movimientos de tierras), because that supervisory power must belong exclusively to the Museo Nacional. It considers that Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 16, and 17 of the Reglamento de Trámites para los Estudios Arqueológicos are contrary to Articles 7, 89, and 121, subsection 14) of the Constitución Política and to the cited international instruments and thus requests this Chamber to declare them so.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:35.45pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">6.- </span><span>Elizabeth Odio Benito, in her capacity as Ministra de Ambiente y Energía, responds at folio 312 to the granted hearing, stating that she adheres to the statements made by the Procuraduría General de la República.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:35.45pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">7.- </span><span>By means of a brief filed on January 3, two thousand (folios 355 to 424), Samuel Guzowski Rose, Ministro de Economía, Industria y Comercio, states that the purpose of the challenged Decree is to regulate the procedures applicable to the process of obtaining and authorizing archaeological studies, with a view to the construction of civil works, of a public or private nature, and does not intend to exhaust in itself all the protection, regulations, and responsibility that concerns the State in matters of preservation and development of property of archaeological importance. It indicates that prior controls are maintained in the Decree; they are simply made consistent with current legislation. On the other hand, the International Conventions signed by Costa Rica do not oblige in all cases to carry out prior controls; they establish various controls in consideration of the different actions entrusted to the state agency responsible for the protection of the archaeological heritage, hence it considers that the Decree does not leave the archaeological heritage unprotected. It was issued in strict adherence to the fundamental guarantees of sustainable development, the right to individual property, and the freedom of enterprise; developing the principles included in the international treaties signed on this matter by our country, as well as those that the jurisprudence of the Sala Constitucional itself has declared. It alleges that the Constitución Política, in Articles 50 and 89, regulates the natural heritage and the cultural heritage independently. With respect to Law number 4711, it indicates that this regulation obliges the protection of the historical heritage upon discovery: through two types of actions, the first is preventive when the existence of important archaeological sites (sitios de importancia arqueológica) is known with certainty, where qualified work must be carried out before undertaking any type of civil work (exception regime), and the second is conservation and salvage (conservación y salvamento), which proceeds when vestiges of probable archaeological importance are found, these are qualified, and consequently, rational measures for their protection are adopted (normal regime). It also obliges the assessment of objects for the purpose of cataloging and determining their importance, that is, determining the relative importance of cultural property, protecting, or saving cultural property placed at risk, knowing its existence, the danger that threatens it, and coordinating actions with those involved. It also establishes the obligation to publish or make available by some other means the results of studies of scientific or historical interest that have been carried out in relation to work aimed at saving cultural property, especially when all or a large part of the immovable cultural property has been destroyed. It considers that these obligations are specifically fulfilled in the Decree. The obligation contained in Article 20 of the Convention finds fulfillment in Whereas Clause 3 (Considerando 3°) of the Decree, as well as in Articles 4, 5, 7, 15. Article 25 of the Convention is consistent with the obligation established in Whereas Clause 7 (Considerando 7) and Articles 5 and 6 of the Decree. It likewise considers that the obligation contained in Article 23 of the Convention is regulated in Whereas Clause 11 (Considerando 11) and Articles 3, 5, 6, 9 of the Decree. On this point, it considers that it is understood that the obligation to stop progress to allow time for the adoption of conservation or salvage measures (medidas de conservación o salvamento) for cultural property exists and is logical to the extent that it concerns places of importance from the archaeological or cultural point of view in which there are important monuments, such as cities, towns, places, or neighborhoods of historical value, which should be protected by the legislation of all countries, so it is not an absolute imposition or applicable to other cases beyond those stated, in which the importance of cultural rescue is evident. Article 25 of the Convention is complied with by Article 8 of the challenged Decree, in which it states that it is not possible to impose illegitimate limitations on the right to property. With respect to Law number 5980 Approving the<span>&#xa0;</span> Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, this provides a differentiated notion between cultural heritage and natural heritage. Article 3 is respected by the provisions of Whereas Clause 11 (Considerando 11), while Article 5 is safeguarded by the first and second Whereas Clauses (Considerandos primero y segundo) and by Article 15 of the challenged Decree. Regarding Law number 6360, Convention on Defense of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations, it considers that the challenged decree adopts the guidelines of the cited convention. Article 8 of the Convention is respected by the regulation established in Articles 5, 6, 7, 10, and 11. With respect to Law number 7526 Approving the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Articles 11 and 3 of the challenged Decree are consistent with the provisions of Articles 5 and 7 of that Convention. Regarding the Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, this establishes two regimes of possession of archaeological property: one public and one private. The only obligations imposed on private possessors were to present the inventory of their collections to the Registro Público del Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, for the exclusive purpose of their identification and registration, and to agree to lend the property in custody to the Museo to disseminate the culture of the different ethnic groups that inhabited our country in the past. It considers that the challenged Decree is compliant in all its articles with Law number 6703; it is also consistent with constitutional regulations, by establishing measures for the protection of the national archaeological heritage, both prior to the execution of civil works when they are sites declared by executive decree as being of archaeological interest, in which case the earthworks (movimientos de tierra) permit must be requested from the Museo Nacional and its approval obtained, likewise preliminary excavations and studies must be carried out prior to the execution of works. When civil works have already begun and archaeological vestiges are found, ordering the State's action so that it is timely and compliant with Articles 11, 45, 46, 89 of the Constitution and 11, 113, 114 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, as well as Laws numbers 6703 and 7555. It considers that the challenged Decree admits greater protection than Ley 6703.</span> It states that the definitions established in the Historical-Architectural Heritage Law of Costa Rica are consistent with those established in the challenged Decree. It indicates that both the Civil Code and the Water Law establish the obligation to report the discovery of goods that, by legal provision or by their nature, are susceptible to being moved by themselves or by an action of nature, including human action. Regarding the arguments made by the Ombudsman's Office, that the Proposed Environmental Study Forms (FEAP) included an archaeological impact study, it indicates that these forms are an ecological instrument administered by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (SETENA), attached to the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE). The inclusion of the aforementioned obligation finds no legal or rational basis since, first, it is based on speculation as to whether or not there are possible areas of archaeological, historical, or cultural interest; second, it obligates the individual, through a manual of an environmental nature, whose rank is inferior to a regulation, to comply with obligations related to cultural matters. Although the social patrimony consists of natural and cultural assets, identical rules are not applicable to the treatment of one and the other. Due to the Museum's inactivity, individuals were forced to comply with arbitrary requirements or restrictions that were not in accordance with the Law; an "AP" was required in areas where there was an express record of the presence of archaeological sites, defined by the National Museum. It considers the obligation to declare the existence within possible areas of archaeological interest, or of historical and cultural heritage, according to data provided by the Museum within an ecological analysis instrument, to be disproportionate and irrational. If the duty of the National Museum is to carry out preventive studies and the planning of conservation and rescue actions, the individual cannot be forced to substitute for that entity's inertia. It further indicates that the Anastasio Alfaro Foundation was constituted as the entity designated by the Museum to carry out the tasks of archaeological impact study, establishing a monopoly whose non-conformity with the Legal System had already been warned about. Regarding the Ombudsman's Office's arguments to the effect that the decree eliminates prior controls for earthworks (movimientos de tierras) in the execution of civil works, it considers that neither the Constitution nor the international treaties signed by Costa Rica require permits or prior authorizations in all cases involving the development of public or private civil works. The Ombudsman's Office demonstrates a total lack of knowledge of the current regulatory texts. Under no logic can it be concluded that the regulation repeals the law, since if the challenged decree is properly analyzed, its sole objective is the "Regulation of Procedures for Archaeological Studies" in the execution of works, and therefore there are no rules specifically aimed at developing each of the powers that the laws grant to the Museum, the Municipalities, and any citizen to act in protection of the historical and cultural heritage of the Republic. It alleges that private property has a social function, but under the pretext thereof, the owner cannot be deprived of the fundamental core of real estate property. It is clear from the decree that the request for authorization to enter private land is for the purpose of excavating or performing earthworks (movimientos de tierra) under archaeological control techniques, which implies preventing the owner from the normal use they had been making of the property; since this constitutes a limitation, for it not to be compensable and, therefore, to demand the owner's submission, it must originate from a Law approved through reinforced procedure. Regarding the plaintiff's argument that a positive silence is established, it considers that in the challenged Decree, the deadlines granted to the Museum or the National Archaeological Commission (CAN) are for initiating the administrative procedure for the assessment and recovery of the found goods, not for concluding it. Regarding the Ombudsman's Office's argument that the challenged decree leaves the performance of studies or excavations by the National Museum at the discretion of the property owner, it states that the Decree merely complies with the provisions of Article 12 of Law Number 6703, so the reproach must be directed at the Law and, in any case, on those properties declared sites of archaeological interest or when the individual finds objects of archaeological importance, the Museum does not need authorization, since this only applies in the remaining cases. Regarding what the Attorney General's Office considers an erroneous historical classification of archaeological sites, it believes that this is not a problem of constitutionality. As for the argument that every finding in itself incorporates great historical value, it states that this is not true; objects in themselves do not have historical value, but only to the extent that they form part of the environment that integrates, interprets, or complements them. Regarding the argument that the accreditation of individuals or public or private legal entities to provide auxiliary services to the public function is contrary to the Constitution, it indicates that despite the non-existence of a legal or infralegal norm that authorized it, the Decree does correct this deviation of power, by highlighting the administrative power – already existing by legal mandate – to open an accreditation process for suitable persons to carry out the auxiliary management of the public service entrusted to the National Museum. It alleges that the Attorney General's Office of the Republic errs in affirming that the public domain status of archaeological heritage justifies the transgression of all types of rights, when the right of property is circumscribed to the surface of the territory and the State is the owner of the minerals and resources found in the subsoil. It requests that this action be declared without merit.

**8.-** By a document received at the Secretariat of the Chamber on December 17, two thousand, Gabriel Macaya Trejos, in his capacity as Rector of the University of Costa Rica (folios 1 to 29), requests that the unconstitutionality of Executive Decree Number 28174-MP-C-MINAE-MEIC be declared, an action assigned file number 99-009452-007-CO. He alleges that it is undeniable that in a globalized environment, with foreign investments and economic opening, demands may arise that the country's institutional design is not prepared to respond to with the necessary speed, so simplification of procedures and deregulation may be necessary, but it is also equally true that bureaucratic entanglement may result from a limitation of institutional resources that prevents prompt and diligent service, so in these cases, extreme deregulation can cause greater evils than those it seeks to remedy. He considers that the elimination of archaeological evaluation procedures does not favor the conservation of cultural vestiges of our past and the knowledge of pre-Columbian societies. As for the standing to file this action, it is based on the protection of diffuse interests as provided in Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. As for the merits, he considers that the Decree is contrary to the Paris Convention, which establishes a preventive and corrective duty on the part of the State to safeguard cultural assets, of which archaeological heritage forms a part. With the enactment of environmental provisions, preventive archaeological studies were included within environmental impact studies, which has represented progress in the protection of archaeological heritage, as it allowed studies to be carried out when the project design was still in phases as early as feasibility studies. Prior archaeological studies, regardless of whether there is a declaration of an archaeological site, conform to the protection of historical heritage, since the Convention includes as cultural assets the vestiges of the past that are neither recognized nor registered. He points out that the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage is contrary to the provisions of Article 6 of the challenged Decree, insofar as it does not require prior authorization from the National Museum or an archaeological study to carry out earthworks (movimientos de tierra). The Convention on the Defense of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations (Convention of San Salvador) provided in numeral 8 that each State is responsible for the identification, registration, protection, conservation, and surveillance of its cultural heritage, so Article 6 of the Decree disregards that mandate. In accordance with the terms of the Convention of San Salvador, the exploration, excavation, investigation, and conservation of archaeological places and objects must be carried out by scientific institutions in collaboration with the national agency responsible for archaeological heritage, while Article 15 of the questioned Decree disregards the requirement of a scientific institution to carry out these tasks, indicating that a "university degree in archaeology and a minimum experience of two assistance works in archaeological evaluations" is sufficient to obtain accreditation as a person authorized by the National Archaeological Commission (CAN) for such purposes. He points out that the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property contains active obligations for the Costa Rican State, which are ignored by the Decree. For its issuance, the Executive Branch did not consult the pertinent institutions (National Museum, National Archaeological Commission, University of Costa Rica, ICOMOS), as established in subsection a) of article 5 cited above, for which he considers this procedural defect to be another element to be taken into account for the declaration of unconstitutionality of said Decree. He is of the opinion that the Regulation in general clearly reflects the absence of advice from specialists in archaeology, so if it remains as it is, it will lead those guided by it into serious errors that will result in the destruction of our National Archaeological Heritage. Article 20 of the "Recommendation on the Conservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works" establishes the obligation to entrust the protection of historical heritage to appropriate official entities, which in the case of Costa Rica would be the National Museum, the University of Costa Rica, the Center for Conservation and Research of Cultural Heritage of the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, and the National Archaeological Commission (CAN). On the other hand, he considers that although it is true that with the enactment of Law Number 6703 a step forward was taken in the investigation and conservation of archaeological evidence, these could only be carried out once the site had been discovered and often altered by heavy machinery during earth removal in the early phases of construction of public or private works, so what proceeded was to carry out archaeological rescue, which corresponds to the planning, execution, analysis, and publication of the results of archaeological research conducted in those cases when, for various reasons, archaeological evidence is detected, which is susceptible to being imminently altered by the execution of a public or private work or activity, or by natural action. As a direct consequence of the new Decree, there is a setback of more than 30 years in terms of protection, because the project designer is not required to conduct these studies, in addition to eliminating the historical and legal power of the National Museum to carry out archaeological rescue. In considerando number 8, reference is made to the fact that in Costa Rica only four zones have been declared of archaeological interest, so the text reflects a lack of knowledge about what Costa Rican archaeology is. Article 10 of the considerandos says that the only reference to archaeological sites in national legislation is that established in Law Number 7555, but he does not understand how the fact that national legislation does not use the concept of an archaeological site as it should be used must detract from the content that this concept has in archaeology, which is conceived as a humanized physical space where archaeological evidence is found left by indigenous societies prior to or contemporary with the establishment of Hispanic culture. The archaeological investigations carried out in the country have allowed the registration of nearly 3500 sites, which can be verified in various bibliographies. In archaeology, by its nature, every site is important, as it is non-renewable, so any damage done to it is irreversible. The type of study required will vary according to its contextual characteristics; objects or other types of archaeological remains are not valuable on their own, but for the archaeological context that allows the inference of ancient history. The Decree in question contains an erroneous definition of the concepts of the evaluation stage, since in archaeology the concept of "most basic characteristics" is not used; rather, archaeological research is a scientific, logical, and systematic process that poses problems and seeks solutions about past cultures. It has several and diverse components and stages of work: formulation of the problem and research design; inspection; diagnosis (evaluation); excavation (programmed or rescue); analysis and processing of the collected evidence and information; conservation and dissemination of knowledge. This process is not taken up at any point in the decree; research is proposed in a fragmented manner, proposed as protecting what is declared and "excavating or rescuing" findings and not as a knowledge process. Subsection f) of the same Article 2 presents an illogical definition of rescue within the archaeological research process, since it is not possible to carry out archaeological rescue work without executing scientifically controlled excavation. The definition of excavation is erroneous from an archaeological point of view, as it repeats the same conceptual errors as in the case of subsection f), but also describes the mechanical action of "removing earth, rocks, or other elements...", as if archaeology consisted of the mere procedure of uncovering elements of archaeological evidence. Subsection h) of the same Article 2 is absolutely limited, since conservation, in the professional work of Archaeological Heritage, cannot be limited to the protection of specific zones at archaeological sites, as conservation requires carrying out those protection and consolidation works required by the type of asset being conserved. The other point of subsection i) refers to a periodization in "sites where cultural features or architectural structures cannot be defined but that provide data on ancient groups: Paleoindians (10,000 to 6,000 B.C., Archaic (6000-3000 B.C.), Early Formative (3,000 to 1,500 B.C.) or Protohistoric (1,450 to 1550 A.D.), a periodization he considers absolutely incomplete, as it leaves unconsidered what is known as pre-Paleoindian, which encompasses from 30,000 or 40,000 to 10,000 B.C.; and leaves unconsidered the period from 1,500 B.C. to 1,450 A.D. He points out that in the first case, there are between 20,000 years to 30,000 years of ancient history, and in the second case, there are 2,950 years that are omitted. He states that subsection j) - archaeological site without importance - of Article 2 advances a judgment on archaeological sites without specialists giving their opinion, which he considers serious, because it is perfectly possible to find a site that according to subsection j) is not important and, archaeologically, may be of the greatest relevance, such as, for example, a very disturbed site containing remains that are very difficult to find, and which therefore has enormous significance for the archaeology of the country and of America. Subsection j) cannot qualify, as it does, what an archaeological site without importance is; that can only be indicated by an archaeologist after having conducted an investigation; for the same reasons, Article 3 cannot be accepted from the point of view of the theoretical corpus of the archaeological discipline. Article 6 permits earth movements without authorization from the National Museum or archaeological study, except in those cases where the land is located on an archaeological site according to the procedures of Law Number 7555, which is unacceptable, as it does not take into account that an archaeological site exists and is important even if the procedures of the cited Law have not yet been carried out. Subsection b) of Article 6 subjects all archaeological work to "archaeological rescue work," forgetting that there may be findings that, by their nature, require investigation, conservation, and preservation. Article 10 authorizes the performance of "inspections" without permission from the C.A.N. and without the need for a final report, which he considers serious, because from an archaeological point of view, it is always necessary to apply field methods that require the removal of the matrix; if not, the inspection is incapable of ensuring one thing or another. As for Article 15, which refers to the registry of persons authorized by C.A.N. to carry out archaeological studies, academic training in archaeology must be required, in accordance with the academic guidelines of the University of Costa Rica. Based on these reasonings, he requests that the unconstitutionality of the challenged Decree be declared.

**9.-** By a resolution at thirteen hours thirty minutes on January 7, two thousand, this Chamber resolved to consolidate the action processed under file number 99-009452-007-CO with number 99-007926-007-CO.

**10.-** By a resolution at fourteen hours twenty-five minutes on February 7, two thousand, this Chamber warned the plaintiff Macaya Trejos to clarify which articles he questions and the reasons for the unconstitutionality of each one.

**11.-** By a document filed at sixteen hours twelve minutes on February 11, two thousand (folios 539 to 556), Gabriel Macaya Trejos, Rector of the University of Costa Rica, in response to the warning from the Chamber, states that the warning is procedurally incorrect, since the action has been admitted and consolidated, and the Chamber already knows with precision the articles being challenged and the reasons for the unconstitutionality of each one. Nevertheless, he proceeds to indicate, as warned, that the articles of Decree Number 28174 being questioned are the following: 1, 6, 9, for being contrary to the State's duty to conserve archaeological heritage, established in Article 89 of the Political Constitution and in the Paris Convention (Article 8). That same violation is observed in subsections a) and b) of Article 2 of the Regulation, when a difference is made between an archaeological site without a declaration pursuant to Law Number 7555 and sites with declared heritage value by executive decree, notions that are equally contrary to the Paris Convention, in addition to the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (Article 4), and the Convention of San Salvador. He also considers that the division into two regimes - declared or undeclared archaeological sites (Article 2 subsections a) and b) of the challenged Decree) violates the concept of cultural assets contemplated by the Convention of San Salvador. Article 15 of the Decree, by indicating that a university degree in archaeology and a minimum of two assistance works in archaeological evaluations is sufficient to obtain accreditation as a person authorized by the National Archaeological Commission, is insufficient. For the drafting of the Decree, the Executive Branch did not consult the pertinent institutions (National Museum, National Archaeological Commission, University of Costa Rica, ICOMOS), as established in subsection a) of Article 5 of the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property. Article 10 authorizes inspections without permission from the C.A.N. and without the need for a final report, which leaves the archaeological heritage unprotected. He asks to ratify, or failing that, to process this action and declare the unconstitutionality of Executive Decree Number 28174-MP-C-MINAE-MEIC.

**12.-** By a resolution at nine hours fifty-three minutes on March 2, two thousand (folio 569), the Chamber deemed the action expanded to include Articles 3, 10, and 15 of the challenged Decree, and a hearing was granted to the Attorney General's Office of the Republic, the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Commerce, the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, and the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE).

**13.-** The Attorney General's Office of the Republic rendered its report (folio 946) and states that the defense of the historical-artistic heritage for collective enjoyment carries with it the right to participate in the assets that comprise it, in such a way that they transcend the subjective public rights typical of the individualistic conception of the liberal Rule of Law, as limiters of its action. The right to participate in the cultural life of the community and in the benefits that result is also established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 27.1, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 15.1 a). A similar commitment is mandated by the American Convention on Human Rights. The Convention known as Malta 92, in Article 5.3, requires that environmental impact studies take into account archaeological sites and their context, and the European Union issued a Directive that includes Cultural Heritage as one of the aspects to consider in the Environmental Impact Assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) of public and private works. The liberation of unnecessary procedures in administrative processes is commendable, but not those that result in a lack of protection for the natural environment or cultural assets. Regarding the plaintiff's arguments that the derogations ordered by the challenged Decree (Articles 16 subsection c) and 17) are contrary to Article 89 of the Constitution, which imposes a duty of conservation that carries with it the constitutional principle of effective and preventive protection, a protection that the norms repealed by the challenged Decree in Articles 16 subsection c) and 17 sought to provide. A posteriori measures, when the damage or disappearance of the asset has already occurred, are insufficient and ineffective, due to the irreparable effects or those that are difficult to replace, when not impossible, that the behaviors imply, which is why the choice of administrative prevention techniques in the regulation of the historical and artistic heritage of the Nation is necessary to comply with the provisions of the Constitution. The challenged Decree fails to comply with the constitutional mandate on the part of the State not to propitiate situations that result in deterioration. Corresponding to this duty is the public domain character, which is found in Article 121, subsection 14 of the Constitution. It considers that the disappearance of the mandatory nature of the archaeological study in environmental impact assessments, before the execution of public and private works, which was concretized in the issuance of an authorization letter to the project designer by the National Museum, after consulting data and the location, represents a step backward by changing a preventive measure for a corrective one and ignores the precedent of Constitutional Chamber number 2706-95 regarding the compatibilization of tourism development with the archaeological resource. It questions the periodization contained in the Decree (Article 2 subsection i, paragraph 2), which it considers incomplete because it excludes the pre-Paleoindian period and the period from 1,500 B.C. to 1,450 A.D., a stage in which our indigenous people achieved civilization and from which the most sites are found. It considers that the hearing within the procedure for drafting general administrative provisions, in cases where it is required, constitutes a substantial formality, causing nullity of the procedure and the regulatory act, because through it one can influence the will of the Administration and produce a modification of the final act, and on the legal level, this procedure is provided for decentralized entities and those representing interests of a general or corporate nature. It indicates that Article 88 of the Constitution provides for consultation with the University of Costa Rica on draft laws related to matters under its competence, but that interpreting this text to confer a hearing to that University on all draft laws related to the disciplines it teaches would be unreasonable and contrary to its meaning. It states that the lapsus incurred in the response brief to the Ombudsman's Office's action, folio 7, final paragraph, is corrected regarding the derogation of the rule establishing the authorization of the National Archaeological Commission (CAN) to carry out archaeological excavations, a text which remains in force. In the event that Decree 28174 is declared inapplicable, either by restoring the validity of the repealed rules or by granting a prudent period to the Executive Branch to issue a new Regulation, incorporating the omitted technical criteria from the competent state bodies.

**14.-** By a document filed on March 24, two thousand (folio 985), Rodolfo Méndez Mata, Acting Minister of Environment and Energy, Enrique Granados Moreno, Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports, and Samuel Guzowski Rose, Minister of Economy, Industry and Commerce and Foreign Trade, state that this Chamber must correct the transfer granted in this action, as the Decree is not challenged in its entirety. They state that the challenged Regulation corrects the conceptual error of considering the environmental impact study (estudio de impacto ambiental) as the only instrument to effectively investigate, protect, and conserve archaeological heritage and eliminates the administrative practice by virtue of which the work of investigation, protection, and rescue had been unjustly restricted only to activities subject to the supervision of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (SETENA). The Regulation of Procedures of SETENA had illegitimately introduced in subsection a.2 of Article 19 an archaeological impact study as part of the Environmental Impact Study, without any legal or technical basis. The National Environmental Technical Secretariat (SETENA) does not exercise control over all projects, activities, and works carried out in the national territory, so the assigned control was partial and neglected the duty to do so comprehensively. Decree 28174 establishes a protection system that complements Law Number 6703 and adheres to all applicable regulations on the matter, maintains prior controls in accordance with the regulatory framework, and that international treaties do not require studies to be carried out in all cases, but do oblige the State to carry out various actions for their protection and to expand the possibilities of voluntary control by citizens, regardless of whether or not they are subject to the control of the Secretariat, always under the supervision of the National Archaeological Commission (CAN) and the National Museum.

With respect to the standing (legitimación) claimed by the University of Costa Rica (Universidad de Costa Rica), they do not object to the principle created by the Constitutional Chamber in the matter of its competence based on vote 305-90, for purposes of admitting the participation of said higher education entity; however, they do not admit that this standing arises from the existence of real or imminent damage to the environment, given that the archaeological heritage (patrimonio arqueológico) is not part of the natural environment. They argue that the Decree conforms to the international norms cited by the plaintiff. Contrasting the challenged Decree and Law Number 4711, it is clear that it is not true that the State's preventive and corrective duty regarding archaeological heritage is excluded from the decree, since precisely, in response to that preventive duty, the research work of the National Museum (Museo Nacional) is promoted for the declaration of sites of archaeological importance, for which a reinforced protection regime is established. They consider that the broadest protection of the archaeological heritage is that declared by Article 2, subsection i) of the Decree, since the norm establishes that regardless of the period, all sites (movable or immovable) that present cultural, structural, architectural features susceptible to analysis or a cultural stratigraphy, are mandatory objects of study and rescue. The voluntary procedures established for the entire national territory and for all types of works —and not only for those supervised by SETENA— reinforce the preventive principle in the potential and real protection of the assets comprising the archaeological heritage. Furthermore, the implementation of the accreditation of professionals of recognized competence to carry out research, exploration, excavation, and rescue work of the archaeological heritage (Article 15 of the Decree, developing Law Number 6703) strengthens the preventive and corrective work under the State's responsibility. The system previously implemented by the National Museum was alien to the criteria of reasonableness and opportunity, based on the following aspects, since it obligated the administered party to carry out and finance investigative work that, by law, is conferred upon the State through the National Museum; it tolerated the National Museum neglecting its legal obligation in the protection, investigation, and preservation of the archaeological heritage. The criteria used by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental) are exclusively environmentalist and do not efficiently or preferentially protect the archaeological heritage; it is well known that SETENA's regulations only require that an environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental) be carried out for certain activities, usually large ones and of significant environmental importance. As is evident from the very wording of Article 19 of Decree 25705-MINAE, it is clear that medium and small agricultural activities, industrial activities located in regulatory plans and zoned, as well as those that are smaller than the dimensions set out therein, are not subject to the control of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat and consequently, if vestiges of earlier cultures exist there, there would be no preventive protection. They consider it important to specify that the Convention approved by Law 5980, when it recommends broadly consulting the normative provisions on archaeological heritage, does not obligate the Executive Branch to consult in particular with any State University or decentralized entity or specific private association on all regulations it will adopt, but rather recommends that such consultation be carried out in accordance with the procedures established by internal law. Regarding the owner's authorization to carry out excavations on their property, the duty to avoid damage to property and the tasks under the responsibility of the National Archaeological Commission (Comisión Arqueológica Nacional), to supervise the excavation directly and adequately and to adopt the corresponding measures to avoid damage to the property in question. With respect to the obligation to suspend work in the event of discovery of archaeological objects; the duty of the National Museum to define and organize work within a timeframe, they indicate that Article 13 orders that if, when carrying out excavations to execute public or private works, archaeological objects are discovered by the owner themselves or by third parties, the work must be suspended immediately and the objects made available to the Directorate of the National Museum, which will have a period of fifteen days to define the manner in which the archaeological rescue (rescate arqueológico) work will be organized. Regarding those authorized to carry out excavation work to discover or explore archaeological heritage, they argue that Article 15 resolves the doubt about the conformity of the challenged Decree with the Law that supports it. With respect to the alleged lack of consultation with the pertinent institutions, they consider that the plaintiff did not fully verify this before making this claim, since as is documented, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the Ministry of the Presidency, and the Ministry of Economy, Industry, and Commerce were consulted and signed the Decree. Regarding the exposition of archaeological concepts and periods, these are not aspects of constitutionality that must be resolved by the Chamber. They request that the unconstitutionality action be declared without merit in all its extremes.

**15.-** By means of a brief filed on April twenty-seventh, two thousand (folio 1099), the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República) states that in complement to certain points analyzed when responding to the hearing on the unconstitutionality action filed by the University of Costa Rica and in what may be of interest when resolving the merits, he states that to the citations made about the parallelism of protection between natural and cultural heritage in Comparative Law, some examples of modern Constitutions in Latin American countries are added in which reference is made to that same parallelism. He also indicates that ECLAC, in the Preparatory Meetings for the Rio de Janeiro Eco 92, emphasized “not relating the sustainability of development solely to natural capital but rather within the scope of a dynamic equilibrium among all forms of capital and heritage: human, physical, financial, institutional, and cultural,” and the UNESCO Convention of November 23, 1972, emphasized that “the degradation or destruction of an asset of cultural and natural heritage constitutes a dire impoverishment for all the peoples of the world.” He further points out that the Council of Europe Convention on civil liability for damage resulting from activities dangerous to the environment, approved on March 8, 1993, adopted a concept of environment that encompasses abiotic and biotic natural resources, assets comprising the cultural heritage, and the landscape. The European Community Directive of June 27, 1985, on environmental impact assessment, he continues to indicate, in the notion of environment includes natural elements, the landscape, material assets, and cultural heritage (Article 3). He cites some authors in whom some matters of interest related to this action may be consulted.

**16.-** By brief filed on December twenty-second, nineteen ninety-nine, Melania Ortiz Volio, in her capacity as Director General of the National Museum of Costa Rica (Museo Nacional de Costa Rica), states that she requests to be considered an active coadjuvant in this action.

**17.-** By means of a brief filed on January twenty-eighth, two thousand, Rolando Sáenz Ulloa, legal representative of Ecodesarrollo Papagayo S.A., requests to be considered a passive coadjuvant in this action.

**18.-** The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, concerning the resolution that had expanded the filed action, were published in numbers 057, 058, and 059 of the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial), on the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd of March, two thousand. (Folio 945) **19.-** By means of a brief filed on March first, two thousand (folio 575), Magdalena León Coto, Virginia Novoa, Javier Artavia, Mario Hernández Villalobos, and Olman Solís Alpízar request to be considered active coadjuvants in this unconstitutionality action.

**20.-** By means of a brief filed at fourteen hours and forty-five minutes on March twentieth, two thousand (folios 570 to 588), Oscar Enrique Delgado Murillo, in his personal capacity and as director of the Hotel Marriot Los Sueños Resort Golf Club Project developed by Marina Herradura S.A., requests to be considered a passive coadjuvant.

**21.-** By means of a memorial filed at fourteen hours and forty-four minutes on March twentieth, two thousand (folios 761 to 777), Alejandro Coto Alvarado, judicial and extrajudicial representative of the Costa Rican Association of Housing Builders (Asociación Costarricense de Constructores de Vivienda), requests to be considered a passive coadjuvant in this unconstitutionality action.

**22.-** By resolution at nine hours and forty minutes on April seventh, two thousand (folio 1016), Oscar Enrique Delgado Murillo was prevented from accrediting, through the pertinent legal documents, his standing to judicially represent the coadjuvant company, and Alejandro Coto Alvarado was prevented from demonstrating his status as representative of the Costa Rican Association of Housing Builders.

**23.-** By brief received on April twelfth, two thousand (folio 1018), Marco Vinicio Ruiz, in his capacity as President with judicial and extrajudicial representation powers of the Chamber of Industries of Costa Rica (Cámara de Industrias de Costa Rica), requests to be considered a passive coadjuvant in this unconstitutionality action.

**24.-** By means of a brief received on April twelfth, two thousand (folio 1024), Javier Esquivel Font, judicial and extrajudicial representative of the Association Chamber of Consultants in Architecture and Engineering (Asociación Cámara de Consultores en Arquitectura e Ingeniería), requests to be considered a passive coadjuvant in this action.

**25.-** According to a brief received on April twelfth, two thousand (folios 1031 to 1036), Rafael Esquivel Yglesias, in his capacity as Vice President with judicial and extrajudicial representation powers of the Costa Rican Chamber of Construction (Cámara Costarricense de la Construcción), requests to be considered a passive coadjuvant in this action.

**26.-** By brief received on April thirteenth, two thousand (folio 1063), Oscar Enrique Delgado Murillo states, in response to what was prevented by the Chamber, that he clarifies that he filed the coadjuvancy in a personal capacity and requests that it be admitted as such.

**27.-** By means of a brief received on April twenty-fourth, two thousand (folio 1069), Alejandro Coto Alvarado provides a notarial certification of the legal status of the Costa Rican Association of Housing Builders.

**28.-** By brief received on April twenty-fifth, two thousand (folios 1071 to 1076), Nombre29270, Ana C. Arias Quirós, Elena Troyo Arias, Leidy Bonilla Vargas, Virginia Novoa Espinoza, Maureen Sánchez Pereira, Lesbia Acuña Marín, Andrés Anchio Fuentes, Carlos Aguilar Piedra, Floria Arrea Sierman, Adrián Badilla Cambronero, Minor Castro Méndez, Juan Guerrero Miranda, Ana Cristina Hernández, Magdalena León Coto, Mauricio Murillo Herrera, Cleria Ruiz Torres, Wilson Valerio Lobo, and Anayancy Herrera Villalobos state that they request to be considered active coadjuvants in this action.

**29.-** By brief filed on May eleventh, two thousand (folio 1126), Nombre29270, Ana C. Arias Quirós, and Elena Troyo Vargas, representatives of the National Museum, the University of Costa Rica, and the Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sports before the National Archaeological Commission, request to be considered active coadjuvants in this proceeding.

**30.-** The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were published in numbers 005, 006, and 007 of the Judicial Bulletin, on the 7th, 10th, and 11th of January, two thousand. (Folio 426) **31.-** By means of a brief filed with the Secretariat of the Chamber on August thirty-first, two thousand one (folio 1263), the Secretary of the National Archaeological Commission provides a copy of opinion number C-201-2001, according to which the rescue of archaeological heritage is the exclusive attribution of the National Museum, in accordance with Law 6703, Article 13, in relation to the Paris Convention (Law 4711). The aforementioned opinion also mentions that no distinction should be made between sudden rescue and planned rescue, as both are inalienable competences of the State.

**32.-** On February twenty-eighth, two thousand two, this Chamber held an oral and public hearing, with the participation of representatives from the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría de los Habitantes de la República), the University of Costa Rica, the National Museum, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Ecodesarrollos Papagayo S.A., and the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República). The Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes de la República) spoke about the invalidity of the entirety of the challenged Decree, including its “whereas clauses” (considerandos), for eliminating the protection mechanisms for archaeological heritage contained in Law 6703, Decree 19016-C, and various international treaties. He cited constitutional jurisprudence that supports his position. The Rector of the University of Costa Rica argued that the Executive Branch should have consulted this project with the specialized authorities on the matter, as ordered by Article 10 of Law 4711; he defined archaeology as a science that studies objects based on coordinates of time and space, for which reason all findings are important, and not only those that the Decree arbitrarily determined, without following technical criteria and leaving out important phases of Costa Rican ethnic history. The representative of the Ministry of Foreign Trade argued that, as a premise for the analysis of this case, principles that are characteristic of Environmental Law and the protection that the state must provide regarding the environment should not be followed; he considers that Law 4711 authorizes the use of methods such as those established in the challenged Decree; he affirms that objective and non-arbitrary criteria were used for determining the archaeological sites of importance; he argues that what is established in Articles 5 and 6 of the Decree does not constitute positive silence, but rather only a form of protection for owners, to prevent state inertia from rendering the exercise of property rights illusory and stopping national development; he adduces that there was no error whatsoever in the establishment of historical periods contained in Article 2, since paragraph 1 of subsection j) allows for a broadly protective interpretation. The Director of the National Museum stated that the Decree violates the precautionary principle that should inform matters related to the protection of the environment and archaeological heritage; she points out that since the regulation came into force, the number of applications for archaeological studies has decreased considerably, while complaints for damages have increased. The representative of Ecodesarrollos Papagayo S.A. argues that the rules contained in the challenged decree allow for rational protection of the archaeological heritage, without this preventing the real estate and tourism development of the country. The Attorney General of the Republic and two other representatives of said body argue that the decree in question leaves the vast majority of existing archaeological sites in the country unprotected, since currently only 3 cantons have been declared of architectural-archaeological interest, in accordance with Law 7555, while the records of the National Museum are much more abundant; they cite opinion C-201-01, in which the Attorney General's Office determined that the rescue of archaeological assets by private individuals is unconstitutional.

**33.-** In the proceedings followed, the legal prescriptions have been observed.

Judge **Vargas Benavides** writes; and, **Considering:** **I.- The rules on standing in unconstitutionality actions.** Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction regulates the prerequisites that determine the admissibility of unconstitutionality actions, requiring a pending matter to be resolved in administrative or judicial proceedings in which the unconstitutionality is invoked, a requirement that is not necessary in the exceptional cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when, by the nature of the norm, there is no individual or direct harm; when it is based on the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the collectivity as a whole, or when it is filed by the Attorney General of the Republic, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Attorney General of the Republic, or the Ombudsman, in these latter cases, within their respective spheres of competence. Based on the foregoing, it follows that the first rule is the need to have a prior matter, even allowing possibilities to appear before the Constitutional Chamber directly. To do so, the challenged norm must not be susceptible to concrete application, which would later allow the challenge of the applicative act and its consequent use as a base matter. The text in question provides that it is applicable when "by the nature of the matter, there is no individual or direct harm," that is, when, by that same nature, the harm is collective (antonym of individual) and indirect. This would be the case of acts that harm the interests of certain groups or corporations as such, and not properly those of their members directly. In the second place, the possibility of appearing in defense of "diffuse interests" is foreseen; this concept, whose content has been progressively delineated by the Chamber, could be summarized in the terms used in the judgment of this tribunal number 3750-93, at fifteen hours on July thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three:

“... Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our law - as this Chamber has already stated - merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that in relation to them, determined or easily identifiable persons, or personalized groups, are identified, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones that concern a community as a whole. It is, therefore, a matter of individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive harm, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, for which reason it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a double nature, since they are at once collective —for being common to a generality— and individual, for which reason they can be claimed in such character.” In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united based on a certain social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a certain personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is blurred, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. In these cases, of course, the challenge that a member of one of these sectors could make, covered by paragraph 2 of Article 75, must necessarily refer to provisions that affect them as such. This Chamber has enumerated various rights to which it has given the qualifier of “diffuse,” such as the environment, cultural heritage, the defense of the country's territorial integrity, and the Public Treasury, among others. In this regard, two clarifications must be made: on the one hand, the referred assets transcend the sphere traditionally recognized for diffuse interests, since they refer in principle to aspects that affect the national collectivity and not particular groups thereof; an environmental damage does not only affect the neighbors of a region or the consumers of a product, but rather harms or seriously endangers the natural heritage of the entire country and even of Humanity; in the same way, the defense of the Public Treasury is an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just of any group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration made by the Constitutional Chamber is nothing more than a simple description proper to its obligation —as a jurisdictional body— to limit itself to hearing the cases submitted to it, without it being possible in any way to come to understand that only those rights that the Chamber has expressly recognized as such can be considered diffuse rights; the foregoing would imply an undesirable overturning in the scope of the Rule of Law, and of its correlative “State of Rights,” which —as in the case of the Costa Rican model— starts from the premise that what must be express are the limits on liberties, since these underlie the human condition itself and therefore do not require official recognition. Finally, when paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction speaks of interests “that concern the collectivity as a whole,” it refers to the legal assets explained in the previous lines, that is, those whose ownership rests in the very holders of sovereignty, in each one of the inhabitants of the Republic. It is not, therefore, a matter of any person being able to appear before the Constitutional Chamber to protect any interests (popular action), but rather that any individual can act in defense of those assets that affect the entire national collectivity, without it being valid in this field either to attempt any effort at a taxative enumeration.

**II.- The standing of the plaintiffs in this case.** Based on what was stated in the previous paragraph, it is clear that the action filed by the Ombudsman must be admitted insofar as she is recognized as having direct standing to file it, taking into account that she appears in defense of the rights recognized in Articles 50 and 89 of the Political Constitution. For her part, the Rector of the University of Costa Rica considers that her standing derives from the protection of diffuse interests, a situation in which Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction itself allows the challenge directly. Based on the foregoing, the Rector of the University has standing, not in her functional capacity, but as a citizen who appears to protect the defense of interests that concern the national collectivity, of marked general interest, such as the historical-archaeological heritage of the Republic. The protection of historical-cultural values, whether by being considered as necessary elements for the free development of the personality, as indispensable elements for knowledge of the historical origins of our societies, or from a merely spiritual enjoyment point of view, is a matter of national interest. Archaeological assets, as a sub-species of historical-cultural values, insofar as they become a means of knowing the history of man, his origins, and his antecedents, enjoy the same privileged protection through the possibility that any person, based on the authorization conferred in this regard by Article 75, paragraph 2 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, for which reason the action filed by the Rector of the University of Costa Rica is admissible, insofar as it becomes a means of protecting that type of interests.

**III.- Other aspects of admissibility.** It being clear that the plaintiffs have sufficient standing to promote this claim, it remains to indicate that the challenged action is one of those provided for in Article 73, subsection a) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, as it concerns a general act of a normative nature (Regulatory Decree), a matter whose constitutionality it is appropriate to review in this venue. Furthermore, the parties filed their initial briefs in compliance with the requirements stipulated in numerals 78 and 79 of the Law of rites, as well as the warnings issued by this Chamber. In conclusion, this action is admissible, so it must proceed immediately to discuss the object and merits thereof.

**IV.- Regarding the coadjuvancies.** Article 83 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes that within the fifteen days following the first publication of the notice referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81, the parties that appear with matters pending on the date the action was filed, or those who have a legitimate interest in the definition of the object in dispute, may appear to coadjuvate with either of the two positions under discussion, in the case of unconstitutionality actions, basically the coadjuvant appears to defend the annulment claim of the plaintiff or to support the validity of the challenged act. In this case, this Chamber, by resolution at fourteen hours and forty-five minutes on February twenty-first, two thousand (folio 557), admitted as active coadjuvants the Director General of the National Museum of Costa Rica and Rolando Sáenz Ulloa and Ana Lucía Espinoza Blanco, in their capacity as General Judicial Attorneys of Ecodesarrollo Papagayo Sociedad Anónima, and by resolution at fifteen hours and fifty minutes on May ninth, two thousand (folios 1105 and 1106), accepted as coadjuvants in this action Magdalena León Coto, Virginia Novoa, Javier Artavia, Mario Hernández Villalobos, Olman Solís Alpízar, the Costa Rican Association of Housing Builders, the Chamber of Industries of Costa Rica, the Association Chamber of Consultants in Architecture and Engineering, and the Costa Rican Chamber of Construction, so there is no need to rule on this matter. As for the brief visible on folio 580, in which Oscar Enrique Delgado Murillo requests to be considered a coadjuvant, in that same resolution it was determined not to admit his request for not having demonstrated his legitimate interest.

The request for joinder (coadyuvancia) presented by Nombre29270 and others, found at folio 1071, was rejected, and the joinder petition of Ana Patricia Rojas Hernández and another was rejected as untimely (extemporánea). Regarding the request for joinder (coadyuvancia) presented by Nombre29270, in his capacity as representative of the Museo Nacional on the Comisión Arqueológica Nacional, Ana C. Arias Quirós, as representative of the Universidad de Costa Rica before that Commission, and Elena Troyo Vargas, as representative of the Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes on that same Commission, visible at folios 1126 to 1161, it is rejected as untimely (extemporánea), taking into consideration that the first of the edicts referred to in Article 81 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional had been published on March twenty-first, two thousand.

**V.- Subject matter of the challenge.** The plaintiffs challenge as unconstitutional Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 15, 16, and 17 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 28174-MP-MINAE-MEIC, of October twelfth, nineteen ninety-nine, published in La Gaceta number 202, Alcance 78 of October nineteenth, nineteen ninety-nine, considering them contrary to the rules contained in Articles 50, 89, and 121 subsection 14) of the Constitución Política, as well as the Convención sobre Defensa del Patrimonio Arqueológico, Histórico y Artístico de las Naciones Americanas, the Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos Sociales y Culturales, the Declaración Americana de Derechos del Hombre, the Carta de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, the Recomendación sobre la Conservación de los Bienes Culturales que la Ejecución de Obras Públicas o Privadas puedan poner en peligro, the Convención para la Protección del Patrimonio Cultural y Natural, the Convención sobre Defensa del Patrimonio Arqueológico, Histórico y Artístico de las Naciones Americanas, and the Convención sobre las medidas que deben adoptarse para prohibir e impedir la importación, la exportación y transferencia de propiedad ilícitas de bienes culturales.

**On the merits.** **VI.- Archaeological property in the constitutional system.** Article 89 of the Constitución Política establishes that among the cultural purposes of the Republic are:

"… to protect natural beauty spots, conserve and develop the historical and artistic heritage (patrimonio histórico y artístico) of the Nation, and support private initiative for scientific and artistic progress." The protection of the historical heritage (patrimonio histórico) is thus framed within the broader scope of the State's duty to preserve the common culture that turns its people into a Nation. The Diccionario de la Real Academia Española de la Lengua, as relevant, defines culture as:

"… the set of ways of life and customs, knowledge, and degree of artistic, scientific, or industrial development, in an era or social group" (Twenty-Second Edition. Volume I. 2001) The archaeological heritage (patrimonio arqueológico) is a species of the broader genus constituted by cultural heritage (patrimonio cultural), a clarification that has important practical implications insofar as the State's role in the promotion and guarantee of archaeological property must always be part of a comprehensive policy for the protection and promotion of native cultural production. For the rights derived from the constitutional rule in question to be effectively verified, public authorities are required not only to create the necessary regulatory framework but also to act in a concrete manner, through suitable protection mechanisms that start from the inescapable premise that a Nation that despises its historical inheritance, destroying it or avoiding its loss or deterioration by all lawful means, is destined to fail as a society, since it is precisely the vision of the past that allows one to understand the present and plan for the future. The archaeological heritage (patrimonio arqueológico) –in the Costa Rican case– has commonly been defined as the set of immovable and movable property, a product of indigenous cultures prior to or contemporary with the establishment of Hispanic culture in the national territory, as well as human remains, flora, and fauna related to these cultures, constituting one of the principal means for making effective the exact knowledge of the historical origins of our societies, insofar as it allows for an understanding of the germ of our current forms of thought and cultural expression, in addition to providing highly useful data for other fields of knowledge, such as ecology, pharmacotherapy, zoology, etc. On the intrinsic importance of the archaeological heritage (patrimonio arqueológico) within the social system, this Chamber ruled in the following terms:

"Archaeology and History are two intimately linked sciences, having as one of their objectives to clarify and reconstruct the events of the past. Historical reconstruction is based, fundamentally, on the interpretation of written documents, while Archaeology bases its studies on data obtained through material objects left by human action in societies that have already disappeared, through their relationship with each other, the form of the find, and their connection with the environment. Every preserved object, every vestige of life and activity of humans from past societies, represents testimony that makes possible the total or partial knowledge, as the case may be, of that testimony, and, therefore, of ways of life already nonexistent and unknown in the present, but whose knowledge is of singular importance, as they form part of the cultural identity of the society in which one lives; of course, to the extent that they are important testimony for the reconstruction and knowledge of past events." (Judgment number 729-96 of nine hours fifteen minutes of February ninth, nineteen ninety-six) It is not that knowledge of the past is particularly interesting for reasons of mere historiographical curiosity, but rather that its study allows one to approach a global understanding of current social and cultural phenomena. The protection of archaeological property must therefore be understood as a form of safeguarding culture in general, as an asset (bien) that transcends the ownership of any individual, constituting a value of national importance, whose recognition and effective defense form part of the set of interests guaranteed in Articles 50 and 74 of the Constitución Política.

**VII.- The archaeological heritage in International Law.** Costa Rica, as a subject of International Law, has signed and ratified various instruments intended to protect the archaeological heritage (patrimonio arqueológico). Thus, we can cite the following: **A)** The *Convención sobre la protección de los bienes culturales en caso de conflicto armado* *(Convención de La Haya)*, of May fourteenth, nineteen fifty-four, and its Regulations, which recognize the importance of the archaeological heritage (patrimonio arqueológico), obliging States involved in a war conflict to respect that of those they occupy, placing their cultural goods under good protection, far from the conflict zone. **B)** The *Recomendación que define los principios internacionales que deberán aplicarse a las excavaciones arqueológicas*, of December fifth, nineteen fifty-six, obliges the States Parties to subject the archaeological excavations carried out in their territories to strict supervision and prior authorization from the competent authority (principle 5). **C)** The *Carta Internacional sobre la conservación y la restauración de los monumentos y de los sitios*, which recognizes the inseparability of the monument and the history it attests to, in addition to the prohibition of moving the monument unless for its conservation (Article 7); the obligation to protect those sites (14), and the need to preserve the identity of the monument, avoiding essentially altering its appearance or nature (15). **D)** The *Convención sobre defensa del patrimonio arqueológico, histórico y artístico de las Naciones Americanas (Convención de San Salvador)*, approved by Ley número 6360 of September fifth, nineteen seventy-nine, which includes within cultural property the archaeological material belonging to American cultures prior to contact with European culture (Article 2); recognizes the State's dominion over such objects (6); provides that each State undertakes to promote the exploration, excavation, investigation, and conservation of places and objects by specialized bodies in association with the public institutions responsible for protecting the archaeological heritage (patrimonio arqueológico) (8). **E)** The *Recomendación sobre la conservación de los bienes culturales que la ejecución de obras públicas o privadas pone en peligro*, subscribed on November twenty-second, nineteen sixty-eight, approved by Ley número 4711, of January sixth, nineteen seventy-one, within its preamble (considerandos) establishes that contemporary civilization and its future evolution rest on the tradition of peoples and the creative forces of humanity, as well as on their social and economic development, and that cultural property is the product and testimony of the different traditions and spiritual achievements of the past, and thus constitutes the fundamental element of the personality of peoples, therefore determining the need to extend the protection of cultural heritage (patrimonio cultural) to the entire territory of the State, and not only to sites formally declared as such (Article 3); the measures must be both preventive and corrective (7) against any type of work, public or private, capable of deteriorating them (8); it also provides that detailed studies must be carried out sufficiently in advance to determine the measures to be adopted *in situ*, as well as the magnitude of the necessary salvage work (22). **F)** The *Convención para la protección del patrimonio mundial, cultural y natural*, subscribed on November twenty-first, nineteen seventy-two, approved by Ley número 5980 of November sixteenth, nineteen seventy-six, orders the States Parties to identify, protect, conserve, rehabilitate, and transmit to future generations the cultural heritage (patrimonio cultural) (Article 4). **G)** The *Convención sobre las medidas que deben adoptarse para prohibir e impedir la importación, la exportación y la transferencia de propiedad ilícitas de bienes culturales*, signed on September nineteenth, nineteen seventy, approved by Ley número 7526 of July tenth, nineteen ninety-five, which includes within the concept of cultural heritage (patrimonio cultural) those of ethnological, archaeological, and natural value (Article 5).

It goes without saying that all the instruments cited in the previous paragraph constitute sources of Law in Costa Rica, susceptible to being applied directly by this Constitutional Chamber for the resolution of this matter, as dictated by Article 48 of the Constitution. In the case of those approved by the Asamblea Legislativa, by express provision of Article 7 of the Constitución Política. As for those that do not enjoy that condition, because they constitute at least sources of interpretation of the approved instruments. Nor does this Chamber recognize the existence of simple recommendations in matters of human rights, since if States decide to self-limit, recognizing the existence of certain human rights, even when they appear denominated with the name of "recommendations." The foregoing leads to the understanding that the *Recomendación que define los principios internacionales que deberán aplicarse a las excavaciones arqueológicas*, the *Carta Internacional sobre la conservación y la restauración de los monumentos y de los sitios*, and the *Recomendación sobre la conservación de los bienes culturales que la ejecución de obras públicas o privadas pone en peligro*, are –in the terms stated above– acts endowed with full normative force in the Costa Rican constitutional order, and cannot be considered simple enumerations of objectives and goals to be achieved.

**VIII.- The legal regulation of the archaeological heritage.** In addition to the constitutional norms that protect the archaeological heritage (patrimonio arqueológico) and the commitments assumed in that same sense by Costa Rica before the international community, various internal rules have been issued concerning the subject matter of this action. **A)** Ley número 7 of October sixth, nineteen thirty-eight, grants archaeological property the status of public domain property (dominiales) (Article 1), in addition to ordering the immediate communication of the finding of objects to public authorities, which must take the necessary measures for their protection (Article 17). **B)** Ley 6793, of December twenty-eighth, nineteen eighty-one, *Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico*, which in addition to reiterating the provisions of Ley número 7, creates the Comisión Arqueológica Nacional, a body to which it grants the authority to authorize excavations by previously registered scientists and supervise them (Articles 12 and 15); it confers upon the Museo Nacional the competence to define the manner in which property (bienes) will be rescued in the event of a find by a third party (Article 13). **C)** The Código de Minería, Ley número 6797, of October fourth, nineteen eighty-two, whose Article 102 subsection h) requires the completion of environmental impact studies (estudios de impacto ambiental) regarding the effects on the archaeological and cultural wealth of the country for conducting mining activities. **D)** Ley número 7555, of October fourth, nineteen seventy-five, *Ley de Patrimonio Histórico-Arquitectónico de Costa Rica*, which defines the archaeological site (sitio arqueológico) as that which contains objects important from a historical, aesthetic, ethnological, anthropological, or environmental point of view (Article 6); section 7, for its part, establishes the procedure for incorporating a property (bien) into the historical-architectural heritage (patrimonio histórico-arquitectónico) by Decree, which implies the inability to demolish the immovable property.

**IX.- The importance of archaeological property.** Archaeological property (bienes arqueológicos), understood as those objects that allow the researcher to access historical knowledge, possesses intrinsic importance, as it constitutes a suitable and difficult-to-replace instrument for acquiring that knowledge, in which the environment surrounding it also acquires special relevance. For the effective protection of archaeological property (bienes arqueológicos), the State must actively participate in all procedures aimed at its detection, rescue (when applicable), study, registration, and conservation. Only in this way will full compliance be given to the duties arising from the constitutional mandate, as well as those assumed through the signing of the cited international instruments and the promulgation of the mentioned laws. Despite this marked importance, the protection of archaeological property (bienes arqueológicos) has been affected by the confluence of various factors, such as collecting, the trade of objects, and their indiscriminate destruction due in part to the construction of buildings in areas where archaeological sites (sitios arqueológicos) exist. This confluence of interests, by reason of the State's constitutional obligation to ensure the protection of the archaeological heritage (patrimonio arqueológico), makes necessary the establishment of legislative and administrative mechanisms aimed at guaranteeing the protection of the archaeological legacy, in the face of the need for economic development. This prevalence was already recognized by the Corte Plena when, exercising functions of constitutional controller, it held:

*“It is obvious that archaeological property also has appreciable value in money, whether due to the material from which it is made (gold, for example), or for its fine craftsmanship and beauty, even if made of clay or stone. Some of these objects may be of little physical value or of little artistic significance; but even so they are valuable for their origin and as elements of study for investigating the culture of peoples from other eras, their beliefs and customs, or the nature of the environment in which they lived, according to the traces or representations that may be found there. For all of that, the archaeological objects originating from the aboriginal races that populated the continent in the pre-Columbian era or prior to or contemporary with the establishment of Hispanic culture are valuable; and it is for that value that many acquire these pieces, some for spiritual enjoyment or scientific interest and others perhaps to profit from them. But over the individual interest that each person may have in the possession or ownership of those objects, the public interest prevails, both because of the historical value of such property (bienes), and because, within the culture of peoples, is the study of what was done by the human groups that inhabited the same territory, a study that is facilitated by making it possible, right here, for the greatest number of people to have access to those sources of knowledge; and nothing is more consistent with that public interest than for the archaeological property (bienes arqueológicos) to remain in national territory, in the power of museums and under the ownership of the State or its institutions, as part of the historical heritage (patrimonio histórico) that the Carta Política denominates 'of the Nation', in Article 89. It must then be underlined that the most important thing is not the material value of the referred objects, but the historical and cultural value, and that in no way could the economic doctrine on productive goods (bienes productivos) and freedom of enterprise be applicable to those objects.”* (Resolution of thirteen hours of May twelfth, nineteen eighty-nine) It is thus clear that the relevance of archaeological property (bienes arqueológicos) is not exhausted in venal aspects. Quite the contrary, its greatest importance lies in the data they can offer to adequately understand the origins of national identity, in addition to the vast information they offer for other no less important fields of scientific knowledge. It is in this way that even property (bienes) of few aesthetic qualities, for everyday use, or even in a poor state of conservation can be of great importance for archaeological knowledge. Moreover, the protection of the archaeological heritage (patrimonio arqueológico) is also a matter of worldwide relevance. The Informe Preliminar Sobre los Medios Jurídicos para la Protección y Conservación del Patrimonio Histórico y Artístico de los Países Americanos of the Organización de Estados Americanos established in this sense:

"There is not an exclusively local interest in the States to protect and conserve the objectified testimonies of art and culture from past eras found in their respective territories; that interest is shared by the entire international community, which justifiably considers that those constitute a cultural heritage (patrimonio cultural) that belongs to all humanity and, therefore, deserves to be the object of its concern and its protection.

In this way, the protection and conservation of the cultural heritage (patrimonio cultural) currently transcends the scope of national jurisdictions to be complemented, legally through international instruments, and materially through the solidary cooperation of the countries that form the international community to make effective such a duty of protection and conservation" The preservation of a people's archaeological heritage (patrimonio arqueológico) is not seen, then, as a matter of mere local interest, but as a significant contribution to the preservation of world culture.

**X.- The archaeological heritage as a public domain asset.** It is evident that archaeological property (bienes arqueológicos), in accordance with the terms of the cited norms, forms part of the public heritage, of the so-called public domain property (bienes dominiales), whose ownership lies with the Nation, insofar as they are assigned to fulfill a purpose of general interest. The use and tenure of public domain property (bienes dominiales) always forms part of a special regime, characterized by the fact that such objects must be used only in a way that does not contradict their purpose, in some cases only by the Administration; in others also by private individuals, but strictly adhering to the limitations that their public character implies. This Chamber has defined public domain property (bienes de dominio público) in the following terms:

"…Public domain is made up of property that manifests, by the express will of the legislator, a special destiny to serve the community, the public interest. They are the so-called public domain property (bienes dominicales, bienes dominiales), public goods or things (bienes o cosas públicas), or public property (bienes públicos), which do not belong individually to private parties and are destined for public use and subject to a special regime, outside the commerce of men. That is, affected by their own nature and vocation. Consequently, those property belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, are affected by the service they provide, and that invariably is essential by virtue of an express rule. Characteristic notes of these property are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, unseizable, cannot be mortgaged or be susceptible to encumbrance in the terms of Civil Law, and administrative action substitutes for interdicts to recover dominion. As they are outside of commerce, these property cannot be the object of possession, although a right to use (aprovechamiento) can be acquired, though not a right to ownership. The use permit (permiso de uso) is a unilateral legal act issued by the Administration, in the exercise of its functions, and what is placed in the hands of the private individual is the useful domain of the property (bien), with the State always reserving the direct dominion over the thing…" (Judgment number 2306-91 of fourteen hours and forty-five minutes of November sixth, nineteen ninety-one) Previously, the Corte Plena, exercising constitutional control, determined:

*“Well then, if before the 1938 Law the archaeological heritage (patrimonio arqueológico) was not properly legislated, it is very much in order that the legislator dealt with it in that Law and in the one from 1981, to avoid what had occurred under the previous regime. XIX.- Those two laws recognize individual ownership of archaeological property (bienes arqueológicos) that were in private hands; but at the same time they provided that, henceforth, property that were the object of a find would belong to the State. No acquired right was harmed, since the previously existing private property was maintained… No special rule in the Constitution is necessary so that concrete prohibitions can be established in ordinary laws, if supported by Article 28, such as those that exclude finds as a legitimate title to acquire private dominion of archaeological property (bienes arqueológicos)… XX.- Article 89 reflects the public interest that the Constitution protects in section 28, second paragraph, since it states there that 'Among the cultural purposes of the Republic are:...to conserve and develop the historical and artistic heritage (patrimonio histórico y artístico) of the Nation.' With this, the existence of a heritage (patrimonio) different from that of economic property (bienes de carácter económico) was recognized, and at the same time the duty to seek its conservation was established. Cultural and historical public order allows for interpreting that rule broadly, and relying on it to reaffirm the state ownership of archaeological property (bienes arqueológicos) discovered in the future, as provided by the 1938 Law. Those property, before and now, constitute 'a common heritage (patrimonio común) that past generations bequeathed to posterity'… XXI.- From all the foregoing, it follows: a) That the property regime instituted in Article 1 of the 1938 Law is legitimate, since it has support in Articles 28 and 89 and does not contradict Article 45 of the Carta Política itself; and b) That, consequently, Articles 3, 5, 7, 9, and 17 of Ley Nº 6703 of 1981 cannot be contrary to the Constitution either, insofar as they are applicable to archaeological objects found after Ley Nº 7 of 1938, since those property belong to the State, in accordance with Article 1 of that 1938 Law, which is not unconstitutional.”* (Resolution of thirteen hours of May twelfth, nineteen eighty-nine) **XI.- The preventive principle in archaeological matters.** The importance of archaeological property (bienes arqueológicos) and their character as public domain property (bienes dominiales) creates for the State a series of obligations aimed at their effective protection, a common element of so-called third-generation rights. In matters of such relevance and delicate protection, it cannot be conceived that administrative authorities intervene once the damage has been caused, since the damages can be irreversible and of very large proportions. In the case of archaeological property (bienes arqueológicos), there is a single possibility: their effective protection or their irremediable loss. In order to dimension the moment and the actions that the State must undertake for the protection of the archaeological heritage (patrimonio arqueológico), some important considerations must be made, which were outlined in the preceding considerations. Archaeological property (bienes arqueológicos), individually considered, although it is true that they can constitute key elements for understanding the historical-cultural past of the country, their relevance can be diminished if they are not considered comprehensively with respect to the context in which they were found.

Archaeological research, therefore, cannot be limited to the study of objects that have been totally or partially destroyed, or to goods removed from their context without the prior performance of exhaustive field analyses aimed at understanding them within the environment where they were found, since in such cases a task that by constitutional mandate (articles 50, 74 and 89) should be conceived as one of scientific rigor, could become little more than a simple task of collecting and artistic contemplation, in contravention of the fundamental order.

**XII.- Regarding the challenged regulations: the simplification of procedures**. Through this action, the constitutionality of articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 15, 16 and 17 of Executive Decree number 28174-MP-MINAE-MEIC, of October twelve, nineteen ninety-nine, is challenged, which regulates, to the exclusion of any other source, the procedures for the study, rescue, and preservation of archaeological goods. The Decree under study evidently emphasizes the simplification of procedures in the case of construction of public or private works, with respect to the requirements established in the legal system for the purpose of protecting the archaeological heritage. Although the deregulation of certain activities burdened with excessive requirements is not invalid *per se* and may even be desirable, this Chamber starts from the premise that any procedures necessary for the protection of goods of constitutional relevance cannot be validly eliminated without an adequate substitution by others that fulfill the same protective function. Based on that reasoning, each of the provisions challenged in this action will be analyzed.

**XIII.- Tacit derogations.** Article 1 provides that:

"Article 1—Of the requirements. The only requirements and procedures for carrying out archaeological studies are those established in this decree and, therefore, all regulations, manuals, directives, circulars, and other documents that do not conform to the guidelines and provisions of this decree are hereby repealed." In order to fully understand the modification that this rule produced in the legal system, it is necessary first to clarify—an obvious rule—that the only provisions that could be affected by this Decree would be prior ones of equal or lower rank (constitutional article 11) that oppose it, meaning that any discrepancy between the text of this Regulation and that of a higher-ranking act is nothing more than a problem of illegality of the Decree, given that it is incapable of modifying in any way the text of the formal Law. If, on the contrary, any provision of the Decree opposes norms or principles that form part of the constitutionality parameter, then those shall indeed be sanctionable through this avenue. For this reason, the text of the other questioned provisions must be analyzed to determine whether the repeal contained in this article effectively constitutes a weakening of the control that the State exercises over the Nation's archaeological heritage.

**XIV.- Definitions contained in the Decree and their implications.** For its part, article 2 contains a series of definitions to be used for the interpretation of the remaining articles of the Regulation:

"Article 2—Definitions.

• a)Archaeological sites (without declaration pursuant to Law Nº 7555): An archaeological site is understood to be the locality where, through archaeological studies, the presence of pre-Columbian remains is demonstrated, whose importance varies according to the characteristics of the remains and the value conferred upon them, according to the substantiated knowledge about the cultures that populated the zone.
• b)Sites with heritage value declared by executive decree and pursuant to Law Nº 7555: These are those archaeological sites that have been defined and incorporated into the historical heritage by executive decree and according to the procedures established in the Historical Architectural Heritage Law, Law Nº 7555 of October 20, 1995.
• c)Archaeological studies: refers to scientifically valid research, aimed at discovering or exploring the archaeological heritage of a specific zone or site.
• d)Inspection stage: consists of the reconnaissance of a specific terrain for the purpose of verifying the existence of pre-Columbian cultural remains.
• e)Evaluation stage: consists of carrying out a diagnosis of the detected archaeological resources, using a scientifically valid methodology. Said diagnosis shall determine if the most basic characteristics of the detected remains have archaeological importance; if so, measures that permit the rescue of the heritage goods must be recommended.
• f)Rescue: It is the immediate action of preserving the remains detected in the evaluation to prevent the destruction of cultural features, architectural structures, or sites of archaeological importance, prior to excavation.
• g)Excavation: consists of the action of removing earth, rocks, or other elements for the purpose of evaluating or rescuing cultural features, architectural structures, or sites of archaeological importance.
• h)Conservation: refers to the protection of specific zones in archaeological sites according to the procedure described in article 8 of this regulation.
• i)Archaeological sites of importance:

* They are sites that present cultural features, architectural structures susceptible to analysis, and/or a cultural stratigraphy; * Sites where cultural features or architectural structures cannot be defined but that provide data on the following ancient groups: Paleoindians (10,000 to 6,000 B.C.), Archaic (6,000 to 3,000 B.C.), Early Formative (3,000 to 1,500 B.C.) or Protohistoric (1450 to 1550 A.D.).

• j)Archaeological sites without importance: Those sites that do not present the previous characteristics; or that present insufficient archaeological evidence; or that are highly altered or that due to their characteristics do not permit obtaining information from them." Article 2 defines archaeological sites as the locality where, through archaeological studies, the presence of pre-Columbian remains is demonstrated, whose importance varies according to the characteristics of the remains and the value conferred upon them, according to the substantiated knowledge about the cultures that populated the zone. Notwithstanding this definition, which in principle could be considered broad, that same article defines archaeological sites of importance as those that present cultural features, architectural structures susceptible to analysis, or a cultural stratigraphy, where cultural features or architectural structures can be defined that provide data on the following ancient groups: Paleoindians (10,000 to 6,000 B.C.), Archaic (6,000 to 3,000 B.C.), Early Formative (3,000 to 1,500 B.C.) or Protohistoric (1450 to 1550 A.D.). As a first approximation, two relevant ideas must be pointed out. First, neither in said article nor in the rest of the Decree is it determined which authority is responsible for determining whether an archaeological site is of importance because it presents cultural features or architectural structures susceptible to analysis, such that based on the provisions of Law 6703 of December twenty-eight, nineteen eighty-one (articles 4 and 15), as well as the need to prevent future conflicts of competence, or worse, a total absence thereof that could imply a renunciation of the State's own competences in this matter, this Chamber must clarify that whenever this matter is discussed in the project, it must be interpreted in the sense that the National Museum (Museo Nacional) and the National Archaeological Commission (Comisión Arqueológica Nacional) are the State organs that must establish whether one is dealing with deposits “of importance,” based on strictly scientific criteria. Furthermore, it is extremely serious that the historical classification carried out to determine when an archaeological site is of importance disregards the periods between the years 1,500 B.C. to 1450 A.D. and the eventual finds of antiquity greater than 10,000 years B.C., that is, it does not consider archaeological elements comprised in a period of almost three thousand years and in one of indeterminate breadth to be of importance. This exclusion is clearly unconstitutional, because both article 89 of the Political Constitution and the instruments that oblige the Costa Rican State to protect archaeological goods do not establish a gradation based on their period of origin, and from this perspective, discrimination *a priori* in a whimsical and unscientific manner, as the Decree in question does, is not possible. The aspects pointed out so far are not merely technical problems of archaeological definition, but rather have profound repercussions from the point of view of the protection of historical goods, since the declaration of importance of an archaeological site determines relevant consequences with respect to its rescue and discovery. Thus, article 3 of the Decree provides:

"Article 3—Cases in which archaeological rescue is appropriate. The archaeological rescue stage shall only be appropriate in those cases where cultural features, architectural structures, or archaeological sites of importance defined in the previous article are discovered, which merit being recorded, analyzed, or excavated.

All heritage goods found in the archaeological studies must be delivered to the National Museum (Museo Nacional), which shall handle the respective storage and registration procedures at no cost to the interested party." It is clear, from the rules transcribed above, that the possibility opens up of finding archaeological goods that, in addition to not presenting cultural features, architectural structures susceptible to analysis, or a cultural stratigraphy, belong to the era spanning the years 1,500 B.C. to 1420 A.D. or prior to 10,000 B.C., such that they would be considered goods without importance and therefore their rescue would not be warranted. The same can be said in the case of discoveries, since an archaeological good like the one previously mentioned would also not require any rescue. Finally, the state of conservation (estado de conservación) of the goods does not necessarily imply their lack of importance from the archaeological point of view, so understanding them *a priori* as lacking importance—with the effects that such a condition entails—results in the lack of protection of diverse types of objects whose apparent insignificance (shell middens (concheros), altered sites, etc.) prevents the State from giving them effective protection, in contravention of its constitutional and international duties. The inadmissible exclusion of a considerable historical period of our history as an objective element determining its importance from an archaeological point of view, as well as the consequences this entails in the regulation of rescues and discoveries in such cases, constitute violations of constitutional articles 50, 74, and 89, as well as the conventional norms cited previously.

**XV.- Permit to carry out excavations.** **(Drafted by Magistrate Sancho)** The plaintiffs challenge the validity of the rule contained in article 4 of the Executive Decree, which requires the property owner's authorization to proceed with archaeological excavations. The cited article provides:

"Article 4—Owner's permit to excavate. In order to carry out excavations, whether for evaluation or rescue, the authorization of the owner(s) of the land to be excavated must be obtained. The excavations must be limited solely to the project area." The previous provision reproduces, to a large extent, what article 12 of Law number 6703 of December twenty-eight, nineteen eighty-one regulates, by stating:

"Article 12.- The National Archaeological Commission (Comisión Arqueológica Nacional) may authorize excavations with the authorization of the landowner, and with the obligation to supervise the excavation directly and adequately, and to adopt the corresponding measures to prevent damage to the property in question." (The underlining is not from the original).

The legal mechanism of obtaining the prior permit from the owner of the property that the challenged regulation develops, in summary, provides that in sites, whether of archaeological interest or not, where there are prior studies or where discoveries merit evaluation or rescue actions, all State actions to preserve the archaeological heritage are appropriate and legitimate. The issue raised in this considerando has to do with the coincidence of the appearance of archaeological features of importance on private property and the concern of how to ensure that the State's heritage is protected, rescued, and conserved. In the opinion of the majority of the Chamber, when the rules speak of the need to have the property owner's permits to carry out archaeological excavations, they point to the respect that must exist for the right of property in the dimension established in article 45 of the Political Constitution. In accordance with the terms of this judgment, especially in considerandos VIII, IX, and X, in practice there are two property rights of a diverse nature, which may eventually come into conflict: on one hand, the archaeological heritage, which is a public domain good, as established in this judgment, and which is, moreover, a privileged right, due to the characteristic features that inform it; on the other hand, the right to property, whether public or private, but which is distinct from the goods that make up the public domain and which is a right of the most ancient lineage, such that it was qualified as a "natural right" in the Interim Fundamental Social Pact of Costa Rica of December 1, 1821, and of which it is said to be one of the cornerstones of the political and social formation of the country's democratic regime. Faced with the hypothetical conflict of interests that could arise, it must be resolved which of the two rights prevails over the other, and in the opinion of the majority of the Chamber, what must exist is a perfect balance that favors each of the two, but to the extent that it protects both in their just dimension. Regarding the right of property, in the constituent process of nineteen forty-nine, it was said:

"It should be noted, in the first place, that article 29 of the 1871 Constitution, in a certain way, already introduced the concept of the social function of property, by virtue of the reform introduced to it in the year '43, by stating that Congress could, through two-thirds of the totality of its members, impose limitations of social interest on private property. It was admitted that limitations can be imposed on property for reasons of social interest, and by doing so, it was implicitly established also that in Costa Rica, property had constitutionally lost, from that moment on, the absolute, closed character it had in previous eras, when economic liberalism and Manchesterian individualism were at their peak… private property cannot be considered as something that interests only its owner, ignoring the consequences that the disorderly or arbitrary exercise of the respective right may produce in society; this right is recognized and guaranteed because its existence is known to be useful and convenient for the development of the national economy, but it is guaranteed within the logical limitations imposed by the fact of its social function; that it cannot therefore be an absolute and inviolable concept… The idea that property is or has a social function is an idea imposed by the needs of the modern world in the economy of free countries, which must be adjusted not only for the benefit of the owners, but for that of all society, for that of the other factors of production, for that of the groups that buy products in the market, for the benefit, in short, of all the elements whose concurrence makes it possible for the profits derived from private property to be produced." (Main ideas expressed by Deputy Rodrigo Facio. Acts of the Constituent Assembly. Volume II, pages 465 et seq.)

Having established all the foregoing, in the judgment of the Chamber, the State has available to it, in order to adequately protect the archaeological heritage, the application of all necessary legal mechanisms to issue precautionary measures of an administrative nature and to manage, in the jurisdictional venue, with the speed the case warrants, the application of the necessary measures to protect that heritage and to compel the reluctant owner to agree to have the excavation works carried out, when circumstances warrant it. In other words, the requirement to request authorization from the landowner cannot be unconstitutional, since their right is one of constitutional rank and the maxim that "property is inviolable" admits no other interpretation than that derived from its literal content, especially considering that the exceptions to such a principle can only be those already expressly contained in constitutional article 45 itself; but everything understood, of course, in light of the interpretation given to it by the National Constituent Assembly of nineteen forty-nine, according to the terms of Deputy Facio Brenes's intervention. On the other hand, asserting that to protect the archaeological heritage, the State can disregard the right of property, which would thus be subordinated to the former, is not a conclusion that can be reached by merely comparing both rights. In summary: the Political Constitution, by definition, has a structure in which rights and guarantees are aligned harmoniously and it is not possible to affirm the prevalence of one over the others. When there is a conflict of interests, "resorting to the laws, all must find reparation," provides constitutional article 41, and prompt and complete justice must be done. This means that the same fundamental text has foreseen the way to proceed to dissolve disputes between persons and it is, in the judgment of the majority of the Chamber, the meaning that must be given to the norms being examined (article 4 of Executive Decree 28174-MP-MINAE-MEIC and article 12 of Law 6703 of December 28, 1981). That is, those norms are not unconstitutional; in the case of the landowner's refusal, justified or not, to facilitate the evaluation or rescue excavations of the archaeological heritage, the State may immobilize the property in question, issuing precautionary measures without thereby incurring a violation of the property right, subject to the reservation that it must, immediately, resort to the courts of justice to request the corresponding authorizations, all without prejudice to exercising, if it deems it convenient, the right to expropriate the land partially or totally. By reason of all that has been said, by majority, this point of the action declares that the norms involved are not unconstitutional.

**XVI.- Of discoveries by third parties.** Article 5 establishes the need to notify the National Museum (Museo Nacional) of any discoveries that are located, an organ that is given a period of 15 calendar days (días naturales) to carry out the necessary studies and determine if they are of importance, and an additional 15 days to prepare a proposal if it determines that the discovered goods require rescue. It also determines the possibility of continuing with the works if, within the mentioned periods, the Museum has not carried out the corresponding actions.

"Article 5—Discoveries by third parties. When third parties notify the National Museum (Museo Nacional) of the discovery of monuments, ruins, inscriptions, objects of archaeological interest on public or private lands, the procedure shall be as follows:

• a)The National Museum (Museo Nacional), within the following 15 calendar days counted from said notification, must carry out an archaeological inspection and, when appropriate, an evaluation of the site. If the remains found are of archaeological importance, the National Museum (Museo Nacional) shall have a maximum additional period of 15 calendar days to prepare a proposal for the archaeological rescue work.
• b)The rescue may be carried out by persons duly accredited before the National Archaeological Commission (Comisión Arqueológica Nacional, CAN), under the supervision of the National Museum (Museo Nacional), and shall be limited to the project areas defined by the archaeological evaluation.
• c)If, upon expiration of the periods established in subsection a) of this article, the corresponding actions have not been carried out, the project developer may continue carrying out their ordinary activities." The text of this article partly reproduces the provisions of article 13 of the aforementioned Law number 6703, regarding the duty of third parties to report discoveries of archaeological objects to the National Museum (Museo Nacional), and the period of 15 days that said institution has to carry out the corresponding studies. Both norms are distinguished, however, in that the challenged one clearly defines that it is a period counted in calendar days (días naturales); likewise, in the fact that upon expiration of the term, the discoverer of the objects may continue with the respective works. This last aspect is clearly unconstitutional, because it subordinates the protection of the archaeological heritage to the diligence of the Administration, specifically to compliance with the short periods (in calendar days) provided for by the norm in question. This Chamber has already established in a consistent line of jurisprudence that regarding the protection of essential interests for the Nation, such as the environment (and we could say the same of the archaeological heritage), positive silence does not operate due to the Administration's omission in fulfilling its duties, without prejudice to the liability it may incur for the damages its delay causes to the administered parties. (See in this sense judgments numbers 6332-94, of eighteen hours twelve minutes on October twenty-six, nineteen ninety-four, and 1895-00, of fifteen hours forty-six minutes on February twenty-nine, two thousand) The same arguments must be used to annul the norms contained in subsection d) of article 11 and in subsection d) of article 12 of the challenged Regulation, for establishing a positive silence in favor of project developers who have carried out a voluntary archaeological study and have submitted their results for the approval of the National Archaeological Commission (Comisión Arqueológica Nacional). This last provision, although not challenged in this action, must be annulled due to its connection.

**XVII.- Procedure in case of execution of public or private works.** Article 6 of the challenged Decree establishes that earthworks (movimientos de tierra) do not require authorization from the National Museum (Museo Nacional) or an archaeological study, except in those cases where the land is located on an archaeological site according to the procedures of Law number 7555. The text of the referred article is as follows:

"Article 6—Discoveries by project developers. Earthworks (movimientos de tierra) do not require authorization from the National Museum (Museo Nacional) or an archaeological study, except in those cases where the land is located on an archaeological site according to the procedures of Law Nº 7555.

If, during the work carried out for the execution of public or private works, archaeological objects are discovered, the procedure shall be as follows:

• a)The project manager must immediately notify the National Museum (Museo Nacional) of the fact and make the found objects available to it. The project developer must only halt the work for the execution of the works in that or those areas where archaeological objects have been found.
• b)The National Museum (Museo Nacional), within the following 15 calendar days counted from said notification, must carry out an archaeological inspection and, when appropriate, an evaluation of the site.

If the remains found are of archaeological importance, the Museo Nacional shall have a maximum additional period of 15 calendar days to prepare a proposal for the archaeological rescue (rescate arqueológico) work.

• c)If, upon expiration of the deadlines established in subsections a) and b) of this article, the corresponding actions have not been carried out, the project developer (proyectista) may continue developing its ordinary activities.
• d)The rescue shall be limited solely to the project areas defined in the archaeological assessment, which must be previously approved by the CAN." Article 6, first paragraph, establishes that prior authorization from the Museo Nacional is required for the performance of earthworks (movimientos de tierra) only on lands located on an archaeological site declared as such according to the procedures established in Ley 7555. In this regard, the first thing that must be clarified is that the purpose of the aforementioned Law is "…the preservation of the historical-architectural heritage of Costa Rica" (Article 1), providing that the Executive Branch may, by way of Decree, issue the respective declaration, after the studies that determine the presence of a site of importance under the terms of the Law have been conducted (Article 7). It is evident that the concept of archaeological heritage goes far beyond the architectural legacy, since, as stated above, it constitutes a broad concept that encompasses a vast plurality of movable and immovable property, remains of people, animals, and plants, capable of providing information about our ancestors. For this reason, limiting the procurement of archaeological permits to earthworks carried out in places declared as being of historical-architectural interest (Ley 7.555) implies a lack of protection for the archaeological heritage located in all those areas of the country that have not been the subject of a formal declaration, in accordance with the cited Law. Thus, subjecting the Museo Nacional’s permits to the prior existence of the aforementioned declaration by the Executive Branch implies its effective lack of protection, in clear contravention of what is ordered by Article 89 of the Political Constitution. This defect is also not cured by the fact that Article 9 of the challenged Decree establishes that any public or private project developer, prior to performing its works, may conduct a voluntary archaeological study of the land, since the fulfillment of protective functions that correspond to the State cannot be left to the discretion of private parties. For the foregoing reasons, this Chamber must declare the invalidity of the phrase “según los procedimientos de la Ley N° 7555” contained in the first paragraph of Article 6 of the Decree that is the subject of this action.

XVIII.- On voluntary procedures. Articles 9 and 10 of the draft regulation provide for the archaeological studies that the property owner, on a voluntary basis, may carry out on their property before performing civil works. The aforementioned articles state:

"Article 9.— Voluntary archaeological study procedures. Any public or private project developer who, prior to carrying out its works, wishes to conduct an archaeological study of the land on which the work will be carried out and which has not been significantly altered previously, may contract any person duly authorized and registered with the CAN for the performance of all or any of the stages of an archaeological study. They may contract the studies to determine the existence of cultural evidence in the area to be altered or the potential damage to the archaeological heritage for the purpose of implementing preventive measures to avoid or reduce such damages.

Likewise, and on a voluntary basis, the interested party may contract any person duly authorized and registered with the CAN for the supervision of earthworks." "Article 10.—Archaeological inspection. To determine if there is cultural evidence in the project area, the project developer, public or private, may contract any person authorized and registered with the CAN to perform archaeological studies for the performance of inspections.

As it is not an excavation, the inspection shall not require the submission of a proposal to the CAN or the sending of a final report." In this regard, this Chamber must clarify that allowing private parties to conduct archaeological studies on their properties before building is not unconstitutional. It would be contrary if the possibilities of studying the archaeological impact of a work depended exclusively on the will of private parties, that is, if there were no mechanisms through which the State could intervene directly in fulfillment of its constitutional duties regarding historical heritage. For the same reasons, it is also not unconstitutional for such analyses to be carried out by professionals registered and authorized by the Comisión Arqueológica Nacional (CAN). What is contrary to the Political Constitution is what is determined by subsections d) of Article 11, and d) of Article 12, since in both cases forms of positive silence in favor of the property owners are established, to the detriment of the reinforced protection that the State is obliged to give to the archaeological heritage, as was established in “considerando XVI” of this ruling.

XIX.- Registry of persons authorized to conduct archaeological studies. Article 15 of the challenged regulation contains the following text:

"Article 15.—Registry of persons authorized by the CAN to conduct archaeological studies. Natural or legal persons, national or foreign, who hold a university degree in archaeology and a minimum experience of two assistance works in archaeological assessments, may be accredited in the Registry of persons authorized by the CAN to conduct archaeological studies.

Said persons may perform all the work involved in the inspection, assessment, and rescue phases, including laboratory analyses that may be performed in public or private laboratories.

The Comisión Arqueológica Nacional (CAN) must create a Registry of persons who meet the requirements established in the first paragraph of this article, based on the registration applications submitted. The CAN must make available to project developers the Registry of persons accredited to conduct archaeological studies.

The CAN must provide accredited persons, at the time of conducting an assessment, the available bibliography, the final reports of previously conducted assessments, the database of archaeological sites, and other studies, for which purpose the Museo must provide the CAN with the corresponding information." Following the line of argument contained in the previous point, there seems to be no defect of unconstitutionality in the fact that duly accredited professionals may conduct archaeological studies, duly supervised by the State, through the Museo Nacional. In the case of the rescue work, which involves the removal of objects from the site where they are found and their transfer into the hands of the Administration for their protection, this activity, although it can be carried out not only by the State, through the authorities of the Museo Nacional, but also by duly accredited professionals, the truth is that in this case the oversight that the Administration exercises must be accentuated, in order to prevent said goods from being removed from the public domain.

XX.- Repeal of subsection c) of Article 14 of Decreto 19016-C. Subsection c) of Article 16 of the challenged regulation repeals—as relevant—the text of subsection c) of Article 14 of Decreto Ejecutivo 19016-C, Reglamento de la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional.

"Article 16.— Reforms. Amends the Reglamento de la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional, Decreto Ejecutivo Nº 19106-C of June 12, 1989:

(…)

• c)Repeals subsection c) of Article 14 of the cited regulation." The repealed text is as follows:

"Article 14.- The functions of the Comisión Arqueológica Nacional shall be:

(…)

• c)To authorize archaeological excavations. To this end, the interested party must request the respective form from the CAN and send it to the CAN with the complete information. The CAN shall evaluate the application, and issue its decision within a maximum of two months from its submission. The decision shall be communicated in writing to the interested party, and a copy thereof shall be sent to the Department of Anthropology and History of the Museo Nacional, attaching the background file of the matter.

(…)" This Chamber considers that the repeal of the rule in question does not constitute a defect of unconstitutionality. The foregoing is because, although said provision is eliminated, the procedure contained therein is not, as it is provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the challenged Decree, with the sole difference that the deadlines were reduced as a way to attenuate the procedural burden on the project developer, and recalling that in this very ruling, the Chamber has already considered invalid the rules that establish a positive silence in favor of the project developer in this matter. For the reasons stated, the aforementioned subsection c) of Article 16 of the Decree under study is not unconstitutional.

XXI.- Exclusion of archaeological studies from the environmental assessment procedures. Article 17 of the challenged Regulation provides the following in this regard:

"Article 17.— Repeals.

• a)Repeals the final paragraph of subsection a.2. of Article 19 of the Reglamento de Procedimientos de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional del Ambiente (SETENA), Decreto Ejecutivo Nº 25705-MINAE of October 8, 1996, and its amendments, which reads as follows: “Áreas donde exista un registro expreso de la presencia de sitios arqueológicos, definidas por el Museo Nacional, preferiblemente en mapas publicados y divulgados, a una escala no mayor de 1:50.000 y registrados ante la SETENA.” b) Repeals, from the Manual de Instrumentos Técnicos del Proceso de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, SETENA Resolution Nº 588-97 of August 28, 1997, published in “La Gaceta” 215 of November 7, 1997, on its page 21, the informational requirement of the Formulario de Evaluación Ambiental Preliminar (FEAP) requested by SETENA regarding the “existencia dentro del área de impacto del proyecto de posibles áreas de interés arqueológico o de patrimonio histórico y cultural, de acuerdo a los datos suministrados por el Museo Nacional”, for which they must provide the note from the Museo”. Likewise, repeals the inclusion of the requirement related to archaeological assessments and studies in the Estudio de impacto ambiental (EsiA) procedure." With the foregoing provisions, the archaeological component was eliminated from the two main environmental assessment mechanisms detailed in the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, which are the Formulario de Evaluación Ambiental Preliminar (FEAP) and the Estudio de Impacto Ambiental (EsiA). Taking into account that the aforementioned requirements are not replaced in the cited Decree by any other suitable means to preventively guarantee the integrity of the archaeological heritage, the Chamber considers that said repeals become unconstitutional. As stated above, archaeological heritage forms part of the broader concept of environment, precisely because it is the cultural (human) component of the environment. Complete protection of the environment, which therefore entirely respects what is ordered by Article 50 of the Constitution, must contemplate the safeguarding of archaeological goods, the historical legacy through which human beings have adapted to and modified their environment over the centuries.

XXII.- Conclusion. By reason of the arguments contained in the preceding paragraphs, this Chamber considers that this action must be partially granted, understanding that from Decreto Ejecutivo number 28174-MP-MINAE-MEIC, of October twelfth, nineteen ninety-nine, published in Alcance number 78-A to La Gaceta number 202, of October nineteenth, nineteen ninety-nine, the following are unconstitutional: from the 2nd paragraph of subsection i) of Article 2°, the word "siguientes", as well as the text after the word "antiguos"; subsection c) of Article 5; from the 1st paragraph of Article 6 the phrase “según los procedimientos de la Ley 7555”; subsection d) of Article 11; subsection d) of Article 12; as well as Article 17, wherefore the requirements established in the final paragraph of subsection a.2. of Article 19 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 25075-MINAE, and in the Manual de Instrumentos Técnicos del Proceso de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, SETENA Resolution number 588-97 of August twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-seven, shall regain their effect. The standards cited above are unconstitutional due to violation of Articles 7, 50, 74, and 89 of the Political Constitution, as well as the international instruments valid in Costa Rica, referred to in considerando VII of this ruling. In all other respects, the action is declared without merit, as is hereby done.

Magistrates Arguedas, Vargas, and Armijo issue a dissenting opinion and also declare Article 4 of Decreto 28174-MP-MINAE-MEIC unconstitutional, and by connection, in accordance with Article 89 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the expression “con autorización del propietario del terreno”, from Article 12 of the Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, number 6703 of December twenty-eighth, nineteen eighty-six, is annulled.

Por tanto:

The action is partially granted. The following are annulled as unconstitutional, from Decreto Ejecutivo number 28174-MP-MINAE-MEIC, of October twelfth, nineteen ninety-nine: from the 2nd paragraph of subsection i) of Article 2°, the word "siguientes", as well as the text after the word "antiguos"; subsection c) of Article 5; from the 1st paragraph of Article 6 the phrase “según los procedimientos de la Ley 7555”; subsection d) of Article 11; subsection d) of Article 12; as well as Article 17, wherefore the requirements established in the final paragraph of subsection a.2. of Article 19 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 25075-MINAE, and in the Manual de Instrumentos Técnicos del Proceso de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, SETENA Resolution number 588-97 of August twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-seven, regain their effect. This ruling is declaratory and retroactive to the date of issuance of the challenged Decree, without prejudice to good-faith acquired rights. In all other respects, the action is denied. Let it be published in the Diario Oficial "La Gaceta" and published in its entirety in the Boletín Judicial. Communicate to the Legislative and Executive Branches. Notify.- Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Eduardo Sancho G.

Carlos M. Arguedas R. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

MCP/oc/13céd.-

Decreto Ejecutivo 28174-MP-C-MINAE-MEIC Res: 2002-05245 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las dieciséis horas con veinte minutos del veintinueve de mayo del dos mil dos.- Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por Sandra Piszk Feinzilber, en su condición de Defensora de los Habitantes de la República y Gabriel Macaya Trejos, en su calidad de Rector de la Universidad de Costa Rica, contra el Decreto Ejecutivo número 28174-mp-minae-MEIC, de doce de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, publicado en el Alcance número 78-A a La Gaceta número 202, de diecinueve de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, así como en particular contra los artículos 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 15, 16 y 17 del mismo Reglamento. Intervinieron también en el proceso Melania Ortiz Volio, en su condición de Directora General del Museo Nacional de Costa Rica, Rolando Sáenz Ulloa y Ana Lucía Espinoza Blanco, apoderados generales judiciales de Ecodesarrollo Papagayo Sociedad Anónima; Magdalena León Coto, cédula de identidad número CED38233, Virginia Novoa, cédula número CED38234, Javier Artavia, número CED38235, Mario Hernández Villalobos, cédula CED38236, Olman Solís Alpizar, CED38237, Oscar Enrique Delgado Murillo, CED38238; Alejandro Coto Alvarado, en su condición de representante judicial y extrajudicial de la Asociación Costarricense de ConstrucTores de Vivienda; Marco Vinicio Ruíz, Presidente de la Cámara de Industrias de Costa Rica; Javier Esquivel Font, representante judicial y extrajudicial de la Cámara de Consultores en Arquitectura e Ingeniería; Rafael Esquivel Yglesias, Presidente de la Cámara Costarricense de la Construcción; Nombre29270, cédula de identidad número CED38239, Ana C. Arias Quirós, Telf5033; Elena Troyo Arias, Telf5034; Leidy Bonilla Vargas, Telf5035; Virginia Novoa Espinoza, 6-150-507; Maureen Sánchez Pereira, 1-570-963; Lesbia Acuña Marín, 1-428-926; Andrés Anchio Fuentes, 1-527-011; Carlos Aguilar Piedra, 3-06-214; Floria Arrea Sierman, 1-521-118; Adrián Badilla Cambronero, Telf5036; Minor Castro Méndez, 6-246-070; Juan Guerrero Miranda, 2-281-1395; Ana Cristina Hernández, 1-551-993; Magdalena León Coto, 4-116-279; Mauricio Murillo Herrera, 1-978-812; Cleria Ruiz Torres, 2-498-802, Wilson Valerio Lobo, 1-447-201; Anayancy Herrera Villalobos, 4-140-167; Martín Calvo Mora, Ana Arias Quirós y Elena Troyo Vargas representantes del Museo Nacional, la Universidad de Costa Rica y el Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes en la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional; y RomáN Solís Zelaya en representación de la Procuraduría General de la República.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala el veintinueve de octubre de dos mil, la Defensora de los Habitantes de la República solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 16 y 17 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 28174-mp-minae-MEIC, de doce de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, publicado en el Alcance número 78-A a La Gaceta número 202, de diecinueve de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve. Alega que mediante la emisión del Decreto impugnado, el Poder Ejecutivo derogó el inciso c) del artículo 14 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 19106-C de doce de junio de mil novecientos ochenta y nueve, así como el párrafo final del inciso a.2. del artículo 19 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 25705-MINAE, de ocho de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y seis, y el artículo 12 del Manual de Instrumentos Técnicos de Proceso de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, aprobado por resolución número 588-97 de veintiocho de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y siete de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental. Asimismo, afirma que eliminó el requisito de las evaluaciones y estudios arqueológicos, en el trámite del Estudio de Impacto Ambiental. Considera que el Decreto de mérito realiza una lectura inadecuada del artículo 3 de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, en la medida en que la reducción de trámites burocráticos no puede llevar a sacar por completo al Estado del cumplimiento de sus potestades fiscalizadoras. La desregulación es un concepto válido y favorable a las nuevas técnicas de administración en la medida en que procura acelerar los procedimientos internos, pero debe ponderarse necesariamente el desarrollo armonioso entre los distintos bienes tutelados por el ordenamiento. Estima que el citado Decreto adolece de una evaluación de costo beneficio que incorpore en sus consideraciones el impacto económico que tendría para el país y el colectivo nacional la desprotección de los recursos arqueológicos y el impacto cultural que ello representa. Mediante la emisión del Reglamento impugnado se eliminan expresamente todos los requisitos establecidos con anterioridad para llevar a cabo los estudios de retrospección arqueológica, estableciendo que se requiere del permiso del propietario para poder realizar evaluación o rescate de los bienes hallados, o que se conozcan, y una vez obtenido el permiso del propietario, al Museo se le otorga un plazo de 15 días para establecer la importancia de los hallazgos y presentar una propuesta de rescate, vencido el plazo sin que se haya cumplido con lo indicado, dispone que el proyectista podrá continuar desarrollando sus actividades ordinarias. Se eliminan los permisos previos al inicio de las obras que debían ser extendidos por parte del Museo Nacional y solamente se conserva dicho requisito para las obras que se realicen en sitios arqueológicos previamente declarados mediante el procedimiento dispuesto por la Ley número 7555. Considera que por vía del Decreto se restringe la protección para aquellos sitios en que existen obras del hombre y la naturaleza, así como los lugares arqueológicos de valor significativo para la evolución o el progreso de un pueblo, desde el punto de vista histórico, estético, etnológico, antropológico o ambiental. Alega que antes de la emisión del Decreto impugnado, se aplicaba el inciso a.2. del artículo 19 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 26228-MINAE, el cual establecía que para la determinación de la viabilidad ambiental de un proyecto, era necesario presentar previamente en un formulario de evaluación preliminar, si se trataba de un espacio geográfico incluido en el registro de sitios arqueológicos definidos por el Museo Nacional. Considera que es necesario aclarar que incluir determinada área en los registros aludidos no necesariamente tenía implícita su declaratoria de sitio arqueológico, en los términos de la Ley 7555. Se trataba de una información básica y previa que pretendía establecer si existía dentro del espacio geográfico en que se desarrollaría el proyecto, "posibles áreas de interés arqueológico". Este requisito es eliminado expresamente por el nuevo Decreto, dejando así al Museo Nacional y a la SETENA sin mecanismos para proteger efectivamente el patrimonio arqueológico nacional. Cuestiona la creación de un nuevo concepto, el de "sitios arqueológicos sin importancia", que son aquellos que presentan evidencia arqueológica insuficiente, que estén muy alterados, o que por sus características no permiten obtener información a partir de ellos. Tampoco se consigna qué organismo determinará la importancia o no del hallazgo, lo cual facilitaría la desprotección. En el numeral se dispone que solamente procede el rescate arqueológico en los sitios arqueológicos de importancia, que "merezcan ser registrados, analizados o excavados", dejando sin protección real y efectiva al recurso cultural y arqueológico de la Nación, en la medida en que un control posterior, entraría en vigencia una vez afectado el patrimonio arqueológico, cuando por el uso de maquinaria y equipo se exponen los sitios de registro arqueológico evidentemente ya se han dañado los mismos, se han alterado, se han desmembrado las piezas y si aún así no se suspenden las obras por cuanto lo que procede es simplemente la comunicación del hallazgo, la situación final para cuando intervengan las autoridades calificadas y técnicas en el tema será evidentemente dañosa e irreversible. Todos los recursos en la etapa preventiva, quedan en la esfera volitiva del propietario del inmueble, sin que allí pueda intervenir ninguna instancia pública, a menos que realice la declaratoria de sitio arqueológico. Hace ver en este punto que el Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes no ha declarado ni un solo sitio arqueológico en los términos en que lo señala la Ley 7555, a pesar de que dicha Ley tiene cuatro años de vigencia. La Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, no distingue entre sitios de interés arqueológico y sitios sin interés, dado que todo hallazgo incorpora en sí mismo un gran valor histórico, aún en aquellos casos, en que finalmente se decida no extraer las piezas encontradas. Además, el artículo 36 de la citada Ley declara de interés público la investigación, protección, conservación, restauración y recuperación del patrimonio arqueológico de Costa Rica. El Gobierno de Costa Rica suscribió la Convención sobre Defensa del Patrimonio Arqueológico, Histórico y Artístico de las Naciones Americanas, también conocida como la Convención de San Salvador, la cual establece en el artículo 8, la obligación del Estado costarricense, de proceder a la identificación, registro, protección, conservación y vigilancia de su patrimonio cultural, para lo cual debe crear las disposiciones legislativas y reglamentarias necesarias para proteger eficazmente dicho patrimonio, así como garantizar la conservación de lugares y objetos arqueológicos. También fue ratificada, mediante Ley 4711, la Recomendación sobre la Conservación de los Bienes Culturales que la Ejecución de Obras Públicas o Privadas pueda poner en peligro, la cual dispone que los Estados están obligados a conservar o salvar los bienes culturales, por medio de medidas preventivas y correctivas, que deben buscar evitar la afectación del patrimonio arqueológico puesto en peligro por obras públicas o privadas que puedan deteriorarlos o destruirlos. Estima que ya como para la aprobación del Decreto impugnado se omitió consultar a la Dirección del Museo Nacional, a la Escuela de Antropología y Sociología de la Universidad de Costa Rica, a ICOMOS, órgano consultor de la UNESCO, ni a ningún otro órgano técnico, esta omisión deslegitima cualquier criterio técnico que se haya pretendido incorporar al mismo. Solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del citado Decreto Ejecutivo y se reitere la obligación estatal de procurar la protección efectiva y la preservación del patrimonio arqueológico mediante la puesta en práctica de medidas preventivas y de oportuna intervención, así como adecuar la normativa vigente a las Convenciones sobre la materia, que han sido suscritas y ratificadas por Costa Rica.

2.- Por resolución de las quince horas y treinta y cinco minutos del once de noviembre de dos mil (folio 266), esta Sala previno a la Defensoría de los Habitantes que indicara cuáles artículos del Decreto impugnado consideraba inconstitucionales y especificara en cada caso la violación ocurrida, con las citas normativas respectivas.

3.- Por escrito presentado el veintitrés de noviembre de dos mil (folio 268), la Defensora de los Habitantes de la República, en cumplimiento a la prevención conferida, manifiesta que el Decreto es omiso, ya que únicamente contempla la expropiación, sin establecer medidas intermedias, que posibiliten al Estado intervenir sin necesidad de declarar el interés arqueológico del sitio. Alega que el Estado costarricense suscribió la "Convención sobre Defensa del Patrimonio Arqueológico, Histórico y Artístico de las Naciones Americanas", ratificada el 5 de setiembre de 1979, en la cual se declara: "Que es imprescindible adoptar, tanto en el ámbito nacional como en el internacional, medidas de la mayor eficacia conducentes a la adecuada protección, defensa y recuperación de los bienes culturales". Considera que el Decreto, al eliminar todos los controles previos, derogando los mecanismos establecidos para la efectiva protección de los bienes arqueológicos, incurre en incumplimiento de la citada Convención. Indica que en el considerando segundo, del citado Decreto, se aducen criterios económicos para justificar la derogatoria de las normas y manuales que contemplaban el estudio previo de arqueología y la intervención estatal. En relación con los considerandos 5 y 6, referidos al artículo 3 de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, considera que no se pueden eliminar regulaciones y controles que tienden a la preservación del patrimonio histórico y arqueológico. En relación con el considerando 7° del Decreto impugnado, que interpreta el artículo 25 del Tratado Internacional para la Recomendación sobre la Conservación de los Bienes Culturales que la Ejecución de Obras Públicas o Privadas pueda poner en Peligro, considera que raya en un análisis simplista, ya que pretende delegar el control estatal en la obligación de los particulares de comunicar los hallazgos arqueológicos, cuando ese instrumento promueve la protección del patrimonio arqueológico en la medida en que pueda ser amenazado por los trabajos públicos y privados que resultan del desarrollo, por lo que prescindir del control previo y necesario haría nugatorio el derecho de las presentes y futuras generaciones a conocer sobre su origen y pasado. Sobre el considerando 8°, indica que no hay a la fecha una sola declaratoria de sitio de interés arqueológico y además la declaratoria de zonas solamente acredita la posibilidad de que se den hallazgos arqueológicos, sin que implique por sí misma, una protección especial por parte del Estado. Respecto de las normas consideradas inconstitucionales, el artículo 1° establece como únicos requisitos y trámites para la realización de los estudios arqueológicos los establecidos en el mismo, obviándose así lo dispuesto en normas de rango superior al citado Decreto Ejecutivo, las cuales establecen ampliamente no solo requisitos para la realización de estudios arqueológicos, sino además la obligación de hacer y adoptar las medidas necesarias para este tipo de investigaciones. En relación con el artículo 2 que da algunas definiciones, considera que las de "Sitios arqueológicos de importancia", aquellos que presentan rasgos culturales, estructuras arquitectónicas factibles de análisis o una estratigrafía cultural o que aportan datos sobre los siguientes grupos antiguos: Paleoindios (10.000 a 6.000 a.C.), Arcaicos (6.000 a 3.000 a.C.), del Formativo Temprano (3.000 a 1.500 a.C.) ó Protohistóricos (1450 a 1550 d.C.). Además define los "Sitios arqueológicos sin importancia" como aquellos sitios que no presentan las características anteriores, tienen evidencia arqueológica insuficiente, están muy alterados o por sus características no permiten obtener información a partir de ellos. Considera que tales definiciones, utilizan una periodización errónea, irrespetando los principios básicos de prevención, rigurosidad científica e ignorando el mandato constitucional de conservar y desarrollar el patrimonio histórico. Lo anterior se opone a lo establecido en la Ley 4711. Considera que establecer mediante Decreto la existencia de sitios sin interés arqueológico, sin que de previo medie una valoración in sito, realizada por órgano técnico, vacía el contenido del artículo 89 de la Constitución Política, en detrimento del principio precautorio. En cuanto a la etapa de rescate arqueológico, (artículo 3 del Decreto) que restringe su aplicación a casos en que se descubran rasgos culturales de importancia, indica que el artículo 23 de la Recomendación sobre la Conservación de los Bienes Culturales que la Ejecución de Obras Públicas o Privadas pueda poner en Peligro, las medidas encaminadas a conservar o salvar los bienes culturales deben realizarse con la suficiente anticipación a las obras públicas o privadas que vayan a desarrollarse en una determinada zona, y que toda nueva construcción debe estar sujeta a excavaciones preliminares, de carácter obligatorio, pudiendo aplazarse la construcción para dar tiempo a la toma de medidas destinadas a la conservación y salvaguarda de dichos bienes, como también lo dispone el artículo 13 de la Ley 6703. En referencia al artículo 4 del Decreto que dispone trámites que se debe contar con la autorización del propietario del terreno para realizar excavaciones, infringe el derecho consagrado en el artículo 89 constitucional, al dejar manos del particular la potestad de que puedan realizarse estudios o excavaciones, contraviniendo de manera grosera, la Ley 4711 en el artículo 24 inciso b), y es además contrario al principio de prevención y al de seguridad jurídica, necesarios para la tutela efectiva del recurso y bienes arqueológicos. Considera además que ese numeral violenta los artículos 1 y 8 de la Convención sobre Defensa del Patrimonio Arqueológico, Histórico y Artístico de las Naciones Americanas. Con respecto a los hallazgos por parte de terceros, regulados en el artículo 5°, sostiene que éste establece la figura del silencio positivo cuando vencido el plazo de 15 días para la inspección y elaboración de la propuesta de las labores de rescate por parte del Museo Nacional sin que dicha inspección se haya realizado o bien se elabore la propuesta de rescate, el proyectista podrá continuar la construcción de la obra iniciada, el que es considerado inconstitucional en la medida en que por vía de Decreto se pretende modificar una norma de rango legal como lo es la Ley General de Administración Pública, violentando así el artículo 129 de la Constitución Política. Sobre el artículo 6, referente a los hallazgos por parte de los proyectistas cuando realizan movimientos de tierra, los cuales no requerirán de autorización por parte del Museo Nacional ni estudio arqueológico, salvo en aquellos casos en que el terreno esté ubicado en un sitio arqueológico, considera que hace nugatorio el derecho contenido en el artículo 89 de la Constitución Política, infringe directamente los artículos 7 y 8 de la Ley 4711, que desarrollan el principio precautorio en materia de patrimonio arqueológico. Considera que en el inciso c) de ese artículo, se puede aplicar lo señalado anteriormente respecto al silencio positivo, dado que en este caso se admite erróneamente la posibilidad de la resolución afirmativa implícita, permitiendo así la afectación irracional e irreparable del recurso arqueológico. Respecto de los estudios arqueológicos voluntarios, dispuesto en el artículo 9 del Decreto, considera que éstos no pueden ser voluntarios, ya que se deja en manos del particular la potestad de realizarlos. En cuanto al artículo 16, que deroga el inciso c) del artículo 9 del Decreto Ejecutivo 19016, y de las derogaciones dispuestas en el artículo 17, referentes al Reglamento de Procedimientos de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental y Manual de Instrumentos Técnicos del Proceso de Revisión de Impacto Ambiental, considera que se desprotegen los bienes tutelados por los artículos 50 y 89 de la Constitución Política, referentes a la conservación y protección del patrimonio histórico, arqueológico y cultural. Alega que el Decreto impugnado genera un vacío jurídico que tendrá repercusiones enormes en los derechos sociales y culturales de los costarricenses y de la comunidad internacional.

4.- Por resolución de las catorce horas y treinta minutos del veintiséis de noviembre de dos mil (folio 288), se dio curso a la acción, confiriendo audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la República, al Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Comercio, al Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes y al Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía.

5.- La Procuraduría General de la República rindió su informe visible a folios 291 a 311. Señala que el patrimonio arqueológico integra un conjunto de riquezas, objeto de estudio y contemplación estética, imprescindible para el adecuado desarrollo de la personalidad del ser humano, por lo que cumple un fin de utilidad general, cual es preservar para las generaciones actuales y futuras el acervo cultural precolombino. Manifiesta que el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos Sociales y Culturales, artículo 15; la Declaración Americana de Derechos y Deberes del Hombre, artículo 13 y la Carta de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, artículo 46, establecen el deber de los Estados de tutelar los bienes arqueológicos existentes en sus territorios, por lo que en el caso costarricense la Constitución Política desarrolla esos dispositivos en el artículo 89. Indica que en este sentido Costa Rica ha suscrito una serie de convenios internacionales, tales como la Recomendación sobre la Conservación de los Bienes Culturales que la Ejecución de Obras Públicas o Privadas puedan poner en peligro; la Convención para la Protección del Patrimonio Cultural y Natural; la Convención sobre Defensa del Patrimonio Arqueológico, Histórico y Artístico de las Naciones Americanas; la Convención sobre las medidas que deben adoptarse para prohibir e impedir la importación, la exportación y transferencia de propiedad ilícitas de bienes culturales, etc. Alega que el patrimonio arqueológico es de dominio público, al cual se le reconoce asiento constitucional, por lo que goza de una protección privilegiada de autotutela por parte de la Administración, que tiene no sólo el derecho, sino también la obligación de impedir o hacer cesar todo acto lesivo o perjudicial. En Costa Rica, salvo la propiedad privada adquirida con anterioridad, de carácter excepcional y necesaria comprobación por el particular, desde la promulgación de la Ley número 7 de seis de octubre de mil novecientos treinta y ocho, fueron declarados propiedad del Estado todos los objetos arqueológicos existentes en el suelo de Costa Rica anteriores a la conquista española, así como los monumentos del mismo género que pudieran encontrarse. En cuanto a esta acción, considera que con respecto a los artículos 1º y 6º del Decreto impugnado, resultan contrarios a la Constitución Política y a los Convenios Internacionales suscritos para su conservación. Considera que la realidad ha demostrado que la falta de los debidos controles normativos para tutelar los bienes demaniales ha provocado un significativo perjuicio de los mismos, además, tratándose del patrimonio cultural o natural, se exige su protección en forma preventiva. Sobre el artículo 2, estima que establece conceptos con una periodización inaplicable sobre sitios arqueológicos con importancia o sin ella, elaborados sin rigurosidad científica y sin previo estudio in situ por el órgano técnico. Recomiendan a esta Sala que en uso de las facultades conferidas por el artículo 377 del Código Procesal Civil, recabe el criterio técnico de la Escuela de Antropología y Sociología de la Universidad de Costa Rica, para que un (a) profesional en arqueología informe sobre la periodización correcta. Con respecto al numeral 3º del Decreto, excluye del rescate arqueológico los sitios no importantes, sin valorar previamente esa condición, desprotegiendo tales recursos (cfr. artículos 2, inciso f) y 5, inciso a), pues en esos casos el rescate sería delegado a particulares, cuando esa competencia debe seguir siendo del Museo Nacional, sin perjuicio de la colaboración que puedan brindar aquéllos. Otro reparo contra el numeral 2, incisos a) y b), surge por entender que sitios arqueológicos serían solamente aquellos declarados como tales mediante decreto ejecutivo, Ley número 7555. Considera que el precepto es aplicable al Patrimonio Histórico Arquitectónico, dada su particularidad específica y evidencia material por lo general fácilmente constatable, pero obviamente no al Arqueológico, el cual ingresó al dominio público por Ley número 7, atributo reiterado en la Ley número 6703, cumpliéndose así con los Principios Generales 3 y 13 del Convenio aprobado mediante Ley número 4711. Considera que los numerales 2, 3 y 5, inciso b) del Decreto número 28174 también contrarían el ordenamiento constitucional. Sobre el artículo 4º, cuestiona que deje en manos de particulares la realización de excavaciones o estudios arqueológicos, limitándose a las áreas del proyecto, sin incluir su marco circundante. Existe una disposición similar en la Ley 6703, que establece que la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional podrá autorizar excavaciones con autorización del propietario del terreno, y con la obligación de supervisar la excavación en forma directa y adecuada, y de adoptar las medidas correspondientes para evitar daños a la propiedad de que se trate. De acuerdo con la norma legal transcrita, entiende que la autorización del propietario debe reservarse a los casos en que la Comisión Nacional de Arqueología, por razones de interés científico o académico, autoriza excavaciones a cargo de un tercero de reconocida competencia en la materia, y no dueño del inmueble donde se realizará la investigación arqueológica, como sucede en la hipótesis planteada en el artículo 15 ibídem. Sin embargo, estima que la autorización no puede exigirse cuando se realizan las evaluaciones arqueológicas preventivas que todo proyectista debe necesariamente contratar, para cumplir disposiciones como las derogadas por los numerales 16, inciso c) y 17 del Decreto número 28174. Considera adecuada la disposición del Decreto que exige la autorización del propietario para las labores de rescate, pero teniendo claro que, si surge la negativa del dueño, y a fin de no hacer nugatorias las potestades del Estado sobre los bienes arqueológicos, el Museo Nacional podrá dictar y comunicar al propietario renuente orden de permitir y no obstruir las labores de rescate. En referencia al numeral 5º del Decreto, que consagra la figura del silencio positivo, pues vencidos los plazos de quince días para la inspección y evaluación del sitio, así como para la elaboración de la propuesta de las labores de rescate por parte del Museo Nacional, cuando así corresponda, sin que se hayan realizado las acciones respectivas, el proyectista podrá continuar la construcción de la obra iniciada, no estima que haya violación al numeral 129 de la Constitución Política, por cuanto la Ley 6703, de carácter especial, contiene en su artículo 13 el plazo de quince días para que el Museo Nacional defina cómo organizará las labores de rescate. No obstante, no puede permitirse que vencidos los plazos, el proyectista continúe desarrollando sus actividades ordinarias en demérito de los bienes arqueológicos. Considera que la solución a lo anterior la contempla el mismo Decreto en su Considerando 7º, cuando cita el Principio 25 del Convenio aprobado por Ley número 4711, por lo que vencidos los plazos sin que el Museo realice la inspección y evaluación del sitio o diseñe la propuesta de las labores de rescate, el proyectista tendrá derecho a exigir, en la vía correspondiente, la indemnización de los daños que demuestre le fueron ocasionados durante el tiempo utilizado en exceso por el Museo Nacional para realizar esas actividades. Los plazos comentados son exclusivamente para realizar las actividades indicadas (inspección, evaluación, propuesta de rescate), pero no para rescatar los bienes arqueológicos, por lo que estima inconstitucional el artículo 5º, inciso c), y por conexión, también el numeral 6º, inciso c), del Decreto número 28174. Con respecto a los cuestionamientos al artículo 9, no se cuestiona la posibilidad de que personas autorizadas y registradas en la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional sean contratadas para elaborar estudios arqueológicos, lo cual en todo caso tiene fundamento en la Ley número 7472, artículo 8, el problema radica en elimina el control preventivo y lo reserva a los casos donde hayan movimientos de tierras ubicadas en un sitio arqueológico según los procedimientos de la Ley número 7555, y cuando por la voluntad del proyectista se contraten los estudios arqueológicos (artículo 9º ibídem). La potestad de tutela del poder público sobre su patrimonio no puede depender del arbitrio particular, pues la torna incierta. Otro cuestionamiento adicional se presenta cuando el Decreto (artículo 9, párrafo 2°) permite al proyectista contratar voluntariamente a cualquier persona debidamente autorizada y registrada ante la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional para supervisar los movimientos de tierras, porque esa potestad de supervisión debe pertenecer exclusivamente al Museo Nacional. Estima que los artículos 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 16 y 17 del Reglamento de Trámites para los Estudios Arqueológicos son contrarios a los artículos 7, 89 y 121, inciso 14) de la Constitución Política y a los instrumentos internacionales citados y así solicita a esta Sala sean declarados.

6.- Elizabeth Odio Benito, en su condición de Ministra de Ambiente y Energía contesta a folio 312 la audiencia concedida, manifestando que se adhiere a lo indicado por la Procuraduría General de la República.

7.- Por medio de escrito presentado el tres de enero de dos mil (folios 355 al 424), Samuel Guzowski Rose, Ministro de Economía, Industria y Comercio, manifiesta que el objeto del Decreto impugnado es reglamentar los trámites aplicables al procedimiento de obtención y autorización de estudios arqueológicos, con miras a la construcción de obras civiles, de naturaleza pública o privada, y no pretende agotar en sí mismo toda la protección, normativa y responsabilidad que atañe al Estado en materia de preservación y desarrollo de bienes de importancia arqueológica. Indica que los controles previos se mantienen en el Decreto, simplemente se hacen consecuentes con la legislación vigente. Por otra parte, los Convenios Internacionales suscritos por Costa Rica no obligan en todos los casos a realizar controles previos, establecen diversos controles en atención a las distintas actuaciones que se encomiendan al organismo estatal encargado de la tutela del patrimonio arqueológico, de ahí que considere que el Decreto no desprotege el patrimonio arqueológico. Fue dictado en estricto apego a las garantías fundamentales del desarrollo sostenible, el derecho de propiedad individual y la libertad de empresa; desarrollando los principios incluidos en los tratados internacionales suscritos en esa materia por nuestro país, así como aquellos que ha declarado la propia jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional. Alega que la Constitución Política, en los artículos 50 y 89 regula en forma independiente el patrimonio natural y el cultural. Con respecto a la Ley número 4711, indica que esta normativa obliga a proteger el patrimonio histórico al momento de ser descubierto: mediante dos tipos de acciones, la primera es preventiva cuando se conoce con certeza la existencia de sitios de importancia arqueológica, aquí a realizar labores calificadas antes de realizar cualquier tipo de obra civil (régimen de excepción) y la segunda que es de conservación y salvamento, que procede cuando al encontrar vestigios de probable importancia arqueológica, estos son calificados y consecuentemente se adoptan las medidas racionales para su protección (régimen normal). Obliga además a valorar los objetos a efectos de catalogar y determinar su importancia, es decir a determinar la importancia relativa de los bienes culturales, a proteger o salvar bienes culturales puestos en peligro, conociendo su existencia, el peligro que los amenaza y coordinando acciones con los involucrados. Establece también la obligación de publicar o poner a disposición por algún otro medio, los resultados de los estudios de interés científico o histórico que se hayan realizado en relación con trabajos destinados a salvar bienes culturales, en especial cuando todos o gran parte de los bienes culturales inmuebles hayan sido destruidos. Considera que estas obligaciones se encuentran específicamente cumplidas en el Decreto. La obligación contenida en el artículo 20 de la Convención encuentra cumplimiento en el Considerando 3° del Decreto, así como en los artículos 4, 5, 7, 15. El artículo 25 de la Convención es congruente con la obligación establecida en el Considerando 7 y los artículos 5 y 6 del Decreto. Considera asimismo que la obligación contenido en el artículo 23 de la Convención se encuentra regulada en el Considerando 11 y los artículos 3, 5, 6 9 del Decreto. En cuanto a este punto considera que es entendida que la obligación de detener el avance para dar tiempo a la adopción de medidas de conservación o salvamento de bienes culturales, existe y es lógica en la medida en que se trata de lugares de importancia desde el punto de vista arqueológico o cultural en las cuales haya monumentos importantes, tales como ciudades, pueblos, lugares o barrios de valor histórico, que deberían estar protegidos por la legislación de todos los países, por lo que no es una imposición absoluta o aplicable a otros casos más allá de los enunciados, en los que es patente la importancia del rescate cultural. El artículo 25 de la Convención es cumplido por el artículo 8 del Decreto impugnado y en el cual señala que no es posible imponer limitaciones ilegítimas al derecho de propiedad. Con respecto a la Ley número 5980 de Aprobación del Convenio Sobre la Protección del Patrimonio Mundial, Cultural y Natural, este proporciona una noción diferenciada entre el patrimonio cultural y el natural. El artículo 3 es respetado por lo establecido en el Considerando 11, mientras que el artículo 5 se encuentra resguardado por los Considerandos primero y segundo y por el artículo 15 del Decreto impugnado. Sobre la Ley número 6360, Convención Sobre Defensa del Patrimonio Arqueológico, Histórico y Artístico de las Naciones Americanas, considera que el decreto impugnado, adopta los lineamientos del convenio citado. El artículo 8 del Convenio es respetado con la regulación establecida en los artículos 5, 6, 7, 10 y 11. Con respecto a la Ley número 7526 de Aprobación de la Convención sobre las Medidas que deben adoptarse para prohibir e Impedir la Importación, la Exportación y la Transferencia de Propiedad Ilícitas de Bienes Culturales, los artículos 11 y 3 del Decreto impugnado son acordes con lo establecido en los artículos 5 y 7 de esa Convención. Respecto de la Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, esta establece dos regímenes de posesión de los bienes arqueológicos, uno público y uno privado. Las únicas obligaciones impuesta a los poseedores privados fueron presentar el inventario de sus colecciones al Registro Público del Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, con el propósito exclusivo de su identificación e inscripción, acceder a prestar los bienes en custodia al Museo para difundir la cultura de los diferentes grupos étnicos que habitaron nuestro país en el pasado. Considera que el Decreto impugnado es conforme en todo su articulado con la Ley número 6703; igualmente es consecuente con la normativa constitucional, al establecer medidas de protección del patrimonio nacional arqueológico, tanto de previo a la realización de obras civiles cuando son sitios declarados por decreto ejecutivo como de interés arqueológico, en cuyo caso se debe solicitar el permiso de movimiento de tierras al Museo Nacional y contar con su aprobación, asimismo se deben realizar las excavaciones y estudios preliminares previos a la ejecución de obras. Cuando las obras civiles ya han iniciado y se encuentran vestigios arqueológicos, ordenando la actuación del Estado para que la misma resulte oportuna y acatante de los artículos 11, 45,46, 89 de la Constitución y 11, 113, 114 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, así como de las Leyes números 6703 y 7555. Estima que el Decreto impugnado admite una mayor protección que la Ley 6703. Indica que la las definiciones establecidas en la Ley de Patrimonio Histórico–Arquitectónico de Costa Rica son acordes con las establecidas en el Decreto impugnado. Indica que tanto el Código Civil como la Ley de Aguas establece la obligación de denunciar el hallazgo de bienes que, por disposición legal o por su naturaleza, sean susceptibles de trasladarse por sí mismos o por una acción de la naturaleza, incluida la acción humana. Con respecto a los alegatos realizados por la Defensoría de los Habitantes, de que en los Formularios de Estudio Ambiental Propuesto (FEAP) se incluía un estudio de impacto arqueológico, indica que estos formularios son un instrumento de orden ecológico y administrado por Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, adscrita al Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía. La inclusión de la obligación en mención no halla sustento legal ni racional ya que primero, se basa en la especulación de si existen o no posibles áreas de interés arqueológico, histórico o cultural; segundo, se obliga al particular mediante un manual de índole ambiental, cuyo rango es inferior a un reglamento, a cumplir con obligaciones de la materia cultural. Si bien el patrimonio social se compone de bienes naturales y culturales, no por ello son aplicables normas idénticas al tratamiento de uno y otro tema. Por inactividad del Museo, se obligaba a los particulares a cumplir con requisitos o restricciones antojadizas que no se encontraban apegadas a la Ley, se exigía un “AP” en áreas donde existiera un registro expreso de la presencia de sitios arqueológicos, definidas por el Museo Nacional. Considera que es desproporcionada e irracional la obligación de declarar la existencia dentro de posibles áreas de interés arqueológico, o de patrimonio histórico y cultural, de acuerdo con los datos suministrados por el Museo dentro de un instrumento de análisis ecológico. Si el deber del Museo Nacional es realizar estudios preventivos y la planificación de acciones de conservación y rescate, no se puede obligar al particular a sustituir la inercia de aquel. Indica además que se constituyó la Fundación Anastasio Alfaro, como ente encargado por el Museo para ejercer las labores de estudio de impacto arqueológico, constituyendo un monopolio cuya disconformidad con el Ordenamiento Jurídico ya se había advertido. Con respecto a los alegatos de la Defensoría en el sentido de que el decreto elimina los controles previos para los movimientos de tierras en la ejecución de obras civiles, considera que ni la Constitución ni los tratados internacionales suscritos por Costa Rica, exigen permisos ni autorizaciones previas, en todos los casos en que se encuentre el desarrollo de obras civiles públicas o privadas. La Defensoría evidencia un desconocimiento total de los textos normativos vigentes. Bajo ninguna lógica puede llegarse a concluir que el reglamento deroga a la ley, ya que si se analiza de forma adecuada el decreto impugnado, lo único que es su objetivo es la "Reglamentación de Trámites Para Estudios Arqueológicos” en ejecución de obras, y por ello no se encuentran normas específicamente dirigidas a desarrollar cada una de las facultades que las leyes otorgan al Museo, a las Municipalidades y a cualquier ciudadano para actuar en tutela del patrimonio histórico y cultural de la República. Alega que la propiedad privada tiene una función social, pero so pretexto de tal, no puede privarse al propietario del núcleo fundamental de la propiedad inmobiliaria. Del decreto queda claro que la solicitud de autorización para ingresar en el fundo privado es para efectos de excavar o labores de movimiento de tierra bajo técnicas de control arqueológico, que implican impedir al propietario el uso normal que venía haciendo del inmueble; siendo que esto es una limitación, la misma para no ser indemnizable y por ende, para exigir el sometimiento del propietario, requiere que tenga origen en la Ley aprobada mediante trámite reforzado. Con respecto al alegato de la actora de que se establece un silencio positivo, considera que en el Decreto impugnado, los plazos que se otorgan al Museo o a la CAN son para iniciar el procedimiento administrativo de valoración y recuperación de los bienes hallados, no para concluirlo. Con respecto al argumento de la Defensoría en el sentido de que el decreto impugnado deja al arbitrio del propietario del inmueble la realización de estudios o excavaciones por parte del Museo Nacional, manifiesta que el Decreto se limita a cumplir con lo establecido en el artículo 12 de la Ley número 6703, por lo que el reproche debe dirigirse a la Ley y en todo caso, en aquellos inmuebles declarados sitios de interés arqueológico o cuando el particular encuentra objetos de importancia arqueológica, el Museo no necesita autorización, ya que esta solo opera en los restantes casos. Sobre lo que la Procuraduría considera una errónea clasificación histórica de los sitios arqueológicos, considera que no se trata de un problema de constitucionalidad. En cuanto al argumento de que todo hallazgo incorpora en sí mismo un gran valor histórico, manifiesta que esto no es cierto, los objetos en sí mismos no tienen un valor histórico, sino solo en la medida en que forman parte del entorno que los integra, interpreta o complementa. En cuanto que la acreditación de personas físicas o jurídicas públicas o privadas para realizar servicios de auxilio a la función pública, es contraria a la Constitución, indica que a pesar de la inexistencia de una norma de carácter legal o infralegal que así lo habilitara. El Decreto sí corrige esta desviación de poder, al destacar la facultad administrativa –ya existente por mandato legal- de abrir un proceso de acreditación de personas idóneas para la realización de la gestión auxiliar del servicio público encomendado al Museo Nacional. Alega que la Procuraduría General de la República cae en el error de afirmar que la demanialidad del patrimonio arqueológico justifica la trasgresión de todo tipo de derechos, cuando el derecho de propiedad se circunscribe a la superficialidad del territorio y el Estado es propietario de los minerales y recursos que se encuentren en el subsuelo. Solicita que se declare sin lugar la presente acción.

8.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala el diecisiete de diciembre de dos mil, Gabriel Macaya Trejos, en su condición de Rector de la Universidad de Costa Rica (folios 1 al 29) solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del Decreto Ejecutivo número 28174-MP-C-MINAE-MEIC, acción a la que se le asignó el número de expediente 99-009452-007-CO. Alega que es innegable que en un entorno globalizado, de inversiones extranjeras y apertura de la economía, pueden provocarse demandas que el diseño institucional del país no está preparado para responder con la celeridad necesaria, por lo que puede resultar necesaria la simplificación de trámites y la desregulación, pero que también es igualmente cierto que el entrabamiento burocrático puede ser producto de una limitación de recursos institucionales que impiden un servicio pronto y cumplido, de manera que en estos casos, la desregulación a ultranza puede causar mayores males que los que pretende remediar. Considera que la eliminación de los trámites de evaluación arqueológica no favorece la conservación de los vestigios culturales de nuestro pasado y el conocimiento de las sociedad precolombinas. En cuanto a la legitimación para interponer esta acción, se fundamenta en la protección de intereses difusos según lo dispuesto en el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. En cuanto al fondo, considera que el Decreto es contrario a la Convención de París, la cual establece un deber preventivo y correctivo por parte del Estado de salvaguardar los bienes culturales, de los cuales el patrimonio arqueológico forma parte. Con la promulgación de las disposiciones ambientales, se incluyó dentro de los estudios de impacto ambiental los estudios arqueológicos preventivos, lo cual ha representado un avance en la protección del patrimonio arqueológico, por permitía realizar estudios cuando el diseño del proyecto se hallaba aún en fases tan tempranas como estudios de factibilidad. Los estudios arqueológicos previos, independientemente de que exista declaratoria de sitio arqueológico, se ajustan a la protección del patrimonio histórico, puesto que la Convención incluye como bienes culturales los vestigios del pasado no reconocidos ni registrados. Señala que la Convención sobre la Protección del Patrimonio Mundial, Cultural y Natural, es contraria a lo dispuesto en el artículo 6 del Decreto impugnado, por cuanto no se exige la autorización previa del Museo Nacional ni estudio arqueológico para realizar movimientos de tierra. La Convención sobre Defensa del Patrimonio Arqueológico, Histórico y Artístico de las Naciones Americanas (Convención de San Salvador), dispuso en el numeral 8 que cada Estado es responsable de la identificación, registro, protección, conservación y vigilancia de su patrimonio cultural, de manera que el artículo 6 del Decreto, desconoce ese mandato. En concordancia con los términos de la Convención de San Salvador, la exploración, excavación, investigación y conservación de lugares y objetos arqueológicos debe ser llevada a cabo por instituciones científicas que las realicen en colaboración con el organismo nacional encargado del patrimonio arqueológico, mientras que el artículo 15 del Decreto cuestionado desconoce el requisito de institución científica para desarrollar esas tareas, al indicar que es suficiente un “grado universitario de arqueología y una experiencia mínima de dos trabajos de asistencia en evaluaciones arqueológicas”, para obtener la acreditación como persona autorizada por la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional para tales efectos. Señala que la Convención sobre las medidas que deben adoptarse para prohibir e impedir la importación, la exportación, y la transferencia de propiedad ilícitas de bienes culturales, contiene obligaciones activas para el Estado Costarricense, obviados por el Decreto. Para su emisión, el Poder Ejecutivo no consultó a las instituciones pertinentes (Museo Nacional, Comisión Arqueológica Nacional, Universidad de Costa Rica, ICOMOS), tal y como lo establece el inciso a) del artículo 5 supracitado, de donde considera que este vicio en el procedimiento es otro elemento a tomar en cuenta para la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de dicho Decreto. Es del criterio que el Reglamento en general refleja claramente la ausencia de los consejos de especialistas en arqueología, por lo que si se mantiene así, arrastrará a los que se guíen por él a graves errores que conllevarán a la destrucción de nuestro Patrimonio Arqueológico Nacional. El artículo 20 de la “Recomendación sobre la Conservación de los Bienes Culturales que la Ejecución de Obras Públicas o Privadas pueda poner en Peligro”, dispone la obligación de encomendar la protección del patrimonio histórico a entidades oficiales adecuadas, las que en el caso de Costa Rica serían el Museo Nacional, la Universidad de Costa Rica, el Centro de Conservación e Investigación del Patrimonio Cultural del Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes y la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional. Por otra parte, considera que si bien es cierto con la promulgación de la Ley número 6703 se dio un paso adelante en la investigación y conservación de la evidencia arqueológica, estas solo se podían hacer un vez que el sitio había sido descubierto y muchas veces alterado por la maquinaria pesada durante la remoción de tierra en las primeras fases de construcción de obras públicas o privadas, de forma que lo que procedía era realizar el rescate arqueológico, que corresponde a la planificación, ejecución, análisis y publicación de los resultados de una investigación arqueológica practicada en aquellos casos cuando por distinta índole sea detectada la evidencia arqueológica, la cual es susceptible de ser alterada en forma inminente por la ejecución de obra o actividad pública o privada, o por acción natural. Como consecuencia directa del nuevo Decreto se retrocede más de 30 años en materia de protección, porque no se le exige al proyectista la necesidad de hacer estos estudios, además de eliminar la potestad histórica y legal del Museo Nacional de realizar el rescate arqueológico. En el considerando número 8, se hace referencia a que en Costa Rica únicamente cuatro zonas han sido declaradas de interés arqueológico, por lo que el texto refleja un desconocimiento sobre lo que es la arqueología de Costa Rica. El artículo l0 de los considerandos dice que la única referencia de sitios arqueológicos en la legislación nacional es la establecida en la Ley número 7555, pero no comprende como el hecho de que en la legislación nacional no se utilice el concepto de sitio arqueológico como se debe, tenga que tomarse en desmedro del contenido que este concepto tiene en arqueología, el que es concebido como un espacio físico humanizado donde se encuentra evidencia arqueológica dejada por las sociedades indígenas anteriores o contemporáneas al establecimiento de la cultura hispánica. Las investigaciones arqueológicas realizadas en el país han permitido registrar cerca de 3500 sitios, lo que puede ser verificado en bibliografía diversa. En arqueología, por su naturaleza, todo sitio es importante, por ser de carácter no renovable, de manera que el daño que se le haga es irreversible. El tipo de estudio que requiera variará de acuerdo a sus características contextuales; los objetos u otros tipos de restos arqueológicos no son valiosos por sí solos, sino por el contexto arqueológico que permite la inferencia de la historia antigua. El Decreto en cuestión contiene una errónea definición de los conceptos de etapa de evaluación, ya que en arqueología no se utiliza el concepto de “características más básicas”, sino que la investigación arqueológica es un proceso científico, lógico y sistemático que plantea problemas y busca soluciones acerca de las culturas pasadas. Posee varios y diversos componentes y etapas de trabajo: formulación del problema y diseño de la investigación; inspección; diagnóstico (evaluación); excavación (programada o de rescate); análisis y procesamiento de la evidencia e información recopilada; conservación y la divulgación del conocimiento. Este proceso no es retomado en ningún punto del decreto, la investigación se plantea en forma fraccionada, se plantea como el proteger lo declarado y “excavar o rescatar” los hallazgos y no como un proceso de conocimiento. El inciso f),' del mismo artículo 2 presenta una definición de rescate ilógica dentro del proceso de investigación arqueológica, ya que no es posible realizar una labor de rescate arqueológico sin ejecutar la excavación científicamente controlada. La definición de excavación es errónea desde el punto de vista arqueológico, ya que repite los mismos errores conceptuales que en el caso del inciso f), pero además describe la acción mecánica de “remover la tierra, las rocas u otros elementos…“, como si la arqueología consistiera en el mero procedimiento de dejar al descubierto elementos de evidencia arqueológica. El inciso h) del mismo artículo 2 es absolutamente limitado, pues la conservación, en el trabajo profesional del Patrimonio Arqueológico, no puede limitarse a la protección de zonas específicas en sitios arqueológicos, ya que la conservación obliga realizar aquellas obras de protección y consolidación que requiera el tipo de bien que se conserva. El otro punto del inciso i), hace referencia a una periodización en “sitios en donde no se pueden definir rasgos culturales o estructuras arquitectónicas pero que aportan datos sobre los grupos antiguos: Paleoindios (10.000 a 6.000 a.C., Arcaicos (6000-3000 a.C.), del Formativo Temprano (3.000 a 1.500 a.C.) ó Protohistóricos (1.450 a 1550 d.C.), periodización que considera absolutamente incompleta, ya que deja sin contemplar lo que se conoce como pre-paleoindio que comprende de 30.000 ó 40.000 a 10.000 a.C.; y deja sin contemplar el período de 1.500 a.C. a 1.450 d.C. Señala que en el primer caso hay entre 20.000 años a 30.000 años de historia antigua, y en el segundo caso hay 2.950 años que se omiten. Manifiesta que el inciso j) -sitio arqueológico sin importancia- del artículo 2 adelanta criterio sobre los sitios arqueológicos sin que los especialistas den su opinión, lo que considera grave, porque perfectamente se puede encontrar un sitio que según el inciso j) no es importante y, arqueológicamente, puede ser de la mayor relevancia, como por ejemplo un sitio muy alterado que contenga restos muy difíciles de encontrar, y que por lo tanto tiene una enorme significación para la arqueología del país y de América. El inciso j) no puede calificar, de la manera que lo hace, lo que es un sitio arqueológico sin importancia, eso sólo lo puede señalar un arqueólogo después de haber realizado una investigación; por las mismas razones el artículo 3 no puede ser aceptado desde el punto de vista del corpus teórico de la disciplina arqueológica. El artículo 6 permite los movimientos de tierra sin autorización del Museo Nacional ni estudio arqueológico, salvo en aquellos casos en que el terreno se encuentra ubicado en un sitio arqueológico según procedimientos de la Ley número 7555, lo cual es inaceptable, pues no toma en cuenta que un sitio arqueológico existe y es importante aunque todavía no se hayan realizado los procedimientos de la citada Ley. El inciso b) del artículo 6 supedita todos los trabajos arqueológicos a “labores de rescate arqueológico”, olvidando que puede haber hallazgos que, por su naturaleza, requieran de investigación, conservación y preservación. El artículo 10 autoriza a realizar “inspecciones” sin permiso de la C.A.N. y sin necesidad de un informe final, lo que considera grave, porque desde el punto de vista arqueológico, es necesario siempre aplicar métodos de campo que requieren de la remoción de matriz, si no la inspección es incapaz de poder asegura una u otras cosa. En cuanto al artículo 15, que se refiere al registro de personas autorizadas por C.A.N. para realizar estudios arqueológicos, debe solicitarse la formación en arqueología, de acuerdo a los lineamientos académicos de la Universidad de Costa Rica. Con fundamento en estos razonamientos solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del Decreto impugnado.

9.- Por resolución de las trece horas con treinta minutos del siete de enero de dos mil, esta Sala resolvió acumular la acción que se tramita bajo el expediente número 99-009452-007-CO a la número 99-007926-007-CO.

10.- Por resolución de las catorce horas y veinticinco minutos del siete de febrero de dos mil, esta Sala previno al accionante Macaya Trejos aclarar cuáles son los artículos que cuestiona y las razones de inconstitucionalidad de cada una de ellas.

11.- Por escrito presentado a las dieciséis horas doce minutos del once de febrero de dos mil (folios 539 al 556), Gabriel Macaya Trejos, Rector de la Universidad de Costa Rica, en respuesta a lo prevenido por la Sala, manifiesta que el apercibimiento es procesalmente incorrecto, ya que la acción ha sido admitida y acumulada, además de que la Sala ya conoce con precisión los artículos que se impugnan y las razones de inconstitucionalidad de cada una de esas normas. No obstante, procede a señalar conforme a lo apercibido, los artículos que se cuestionan del Decreto número 28174 son los siguientes: 1, 6, 9, por ser contrarios al deber de conservar el patrimonio arqueológico por parte del Estado, establecido en el artículo 89 de la Constitución Política y en la Convención de París (artículo 8) Esa misma violación se observa en los incisos a) y b) del artículo 2 del Reglamento, cuando se hace una diferencia entre sitio arqueológico sin declaratoria conforme a la Ley número 7555 y sitios con valor patrimonial declarados mediante decreto ejecutivo, nociones que son igualmente contrarias a la Convención de París, además de la Convención sobre la protección del patrimonio mundial, cultural y natural (artículo 4), la Convención de San Salvador. Considera además que la división en dos regímenes -sitios arqueológicos declarados o no declarados (artículo 2 incisos a) y b del Decreto impugnado) es violatoria del concepto de bienes culturales que contempla la Convención de San Salvador. El artículo 15 del Decreto, al indicar que es suficiente un grado universitario de arqueología y una experiencia mínima de dos trabajos de asistencia en evaluaciones arqueológicas, para obtener la acreditación como persona autorizada por la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional, es insuficiente. Para la redacción del Decreto, el Poder Ejecutivo no consultó a las instituciones pertinentes (Museo Nacional, Comisión Arqueológica Nacional, Universidad de Costa Rica, ICOMOS), tal y como lo establece el inciso a) del artículo 5 de la Convención sobre las medidas que deben adoptarse para prohibir e impedir la importación, la exportación, y la transferencia de propiedad ilícitas de bienes culturales. El artículo 10 autoriza a realizar inspecciones sin permiso de la C.A.N. y sin necesidad de un informe final, lo cual desprotege el patrimonio arqueológico. Solicita ratificar, o en su defecto darle trámite a la presente acción y se declare la inconstitucionalidad del Decreto Ejecutivo número 28174-MP-C-MINAE-MEIC.

12.- Por resolución de las nueve horas y cincuenta y tres minutos de dos de marzo de dos mil (folio 569), la Sala tuvo por ampliada la acción, para incluir los artículos 3, 10 y 15 del Decreto impugnado y se confirió audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la República, al Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Comercio, al Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes y al Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía.

13.- La Procuraduría General de la República rindió su informe (folio 946) y manifiesta que la defensa del patrimonio histórico-artístico para el disfrute colectivo lleva inmerso el derecho de participación en los bienes que lo integran, de forma tal que trascienden los derechos públicos subjetivos propios de la concepción individualista del Estado liberal de Derecho, como limitantes de su acción. El derecho a participar en la vida cultural de la comunidad y en los beneficios que resulten también lo establecen la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos, artículo 27,1 y el Pacto Internacional de los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, artículo 15,1 a). Un compromiso similar es ordenado por la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. El Convenio denominado Malta 92, en el artículo 5.3, exige que los estudios de impacto ambiental tengan en cuenta los yacimientos arqueológicos y su contexto y la Unión Europea emitió una Directiva en la que incluye el Patrimonio Cultural como uno de los aspectos que hay que tener en cuenta en la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental de las obras públicas y privadas. La liberación de trámites innecesarios en los procedimientos administrativos es plausible, pero no de los que redunden en una desprotección del ambiente natural o de los bienes culturales. Con respecto a los alegatos de la actora en el sentido de que las derogatorias dispuestas por el Decreto impugnado(artículos 16 inciso c) y 17) son contrarias al artículo 89 de la Constitución, que impone un deber de conservación que lleva implícito el principio constitucional de protección eficaz y preventiva, tutela que procuraban las normas derogadas por el Decreto impugnado en los artículos 16 inciso c) y 17. Las medidas a posteriori, cuando el daño o desaparición del bien se ha producido son insuficientes e ineficaces, por los efectos irreparables o de difícil reposición, cuando no imposibles, que las conductas implican, razón por la cual la escogencia de técnicas administrativas de prevención en la regulación del patrimonio histórico y artístico de la Nación resultan necesarias para cumplir con lo dispuesto en la Constitución. El Decreto impugnado incumple el mandato constitucional a cargo del Estado de no propiciar situaciones que redunden en deterioro. A ese deber se corresponde el carácter de dominio público, cuyo está en el artículo 121, inciso 14 de la Constitución. Considera que la desaparición de la obligatoriedad del estudio arqueológico en las evaluaciones de impacto ambiental, antes de la ejecución de obras públicas y privadas, que se concretaba en la expedición de una carta-autorización al proyectista por parte del Museo Nacional, previa consulta de datos y del lugar, implica un retroceso al cambiar una medida preventiva por una correctiva e ignora el precedente de la Sala Constitucional número 2706-95 sobre la compatibilización del desarrollo turístico con el recurso arqueológico. Cuestiona la periodización contenida en el Decreto (artículo 2 inciso i, párrafo 2°), la que considera incompleta, porque excluye el período pre-paleoindio y el período de 1.500 a.C. a 1.450 d.C., etapa en la cual nuestros indígenas alcanzaron la civilización y de la que más sitios se hallan. Considera que la audiencia dentro del procedimiento de elaboración de disposiciones administrativas de carácter general, en los casos en que es requerida, constituye una formalidad sustancial, causante de nulidad del procedimiento y del acto reglamentario, porque a través de la misma se puede influir en la voluntad de la Administración y producir una modificación del acto final y en el plano legal, ese trámite se prevé para las entidades descentralizadas y representativas de intereses de carácter general o corporativo. Indica que el artículo 88 constitucional prevé la consulta a la Universidad de Costa Rica en los proyectos de Ley relativos a las materias bajo su competencia, pero que sería irrazonable y no se ajusta al sentido de ese texto la interpretación de conferir audiencia a esa Universidad en todos los proyectos de Ley que se relacionen con las disciplinas que imparte. Manifiesta que se corrige el lapsus en que se incurrió en el escrito de contestación a la acción de la Defensoría de los Habitantes, folio 7, párrafo final, en lo relativo a la derogatoria de la norma que establece la autorización de la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional para realizar excavaciones arqueológicas, texto que continúa en vigor. En caso de que llegue a declararse inaplicable el Decreto 28174, ya sea restableciendo la vigencia de las normas derogadas o confiriéndole un plazo prudencial al Poder Ejecutivo para que dicte un nuevo Reglamento, con incorporación de los criterios técnicos omitidos de los órganos estatales competentes.

14.- Por escrito presentado el veinticuatro de marzo de dos mil (folio 985), Rodolfo Méndez Mata, Ministro a.i. de Ambiente y Energía, Enrique Granados Moreno, Ministro de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes, y Samuel Guzowski Rose, Ministro de Economía, Industria y Comercio y Comercio Exterior, manifiestan que esta Sala debe corregir el traslado conferido en esta acción, por cuanto el Decreto no se encuentra impugnado en su totalidad. Manifiestan que el Reglamento impugnado corrige el error conceptual de considerar que el estudio de impacto ambiental es el único instrumento para investigar, proteger y conservar eficazmente el patrimonio arqueológico y elimina la práctica administrativa en virtud de la cual, injustamente se había restringido la labor de investigación, protección y rescate únicamente para las actividades sujetas a fiscalización de Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental. El Reglamento de Procedimientos de la SETENA, de forma ilegítima había introducido en el inciso a. 2 del artículo 19, un estudio de impacto arqueológico como parte del Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, sin ningún asidero legal ni técnico. La Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental no ejerce un control sobre todos los proyectos, actividades y obras desarrolladas en el territorio nacional, por lo que el control asignado era parcial y dejaba de lado el deber de hacerlo integralmente. El Decreto 28174 establece un sistema de protección que complementa la Ley número 6703 y se apega a toda la normativa aplicable en la materia, mantiene los controles previos conforme al bloque normativo, y que los tratados internacionales no obligan en todos los casos a realizar, pero sí obligan al Estado a realizar diversas acciones para su protección y ampliar las posibilidades de control voluntario a cargo de los administrados, independientemente de si están sometidos o no al control de la Secretaría, siempre bajo la supervisión de la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional y del Museo Nacional. Con respecto a la legitimación que alega tener la Universidad de Costa Rica, no objetan el principio creado por la Sala Constitucional en la materia de su competencia a partir del voto 305-90, para efectos de admitir la participación de dicha entidad de educación superior, sin embargo, no admiten que esta legitimación sea a partir de la existencia de un daño real o inminente al ambiente, dado que el patrimonio arqueológico no es parte del ambiente natural. Alegan que el Decreto se ajusta a las normas internacionales citadas por la accionante. Contrastando el Decreto impugnado y la Ley número 4711, se tiene que no es cierto que el deber preventivo y correctivo del Estado en materia de patrimonio arqueológico se excluya del decreto, ya que justamente, en atención a ese deber preventivo, se promueve la labor de investigación del Museo Nacional para la declaratoria de los sitios de importancia arqueológica, para los cuales se establece un régimen de protección reforzada. Consideran que la más amplia protección del patrimonio arqueológico es la que declara el artículo 2 inciso i) del Decreto, ya que la norma establece que sin importar el período, todos los sitios (muebles o inmuebles) que presenten rasgos culturales, estructurales, arquitectónicos factibles de análisis o una estratigrama cultural, son objeto obligatorio de estudio y rescate. Los procedimientos voluntarios establecidos para todo el territorio nacional y en todo tipo de obras -y no únicamente para las fiscalizadas por SETENA-, refuerzan el principio preventivo en la tutela potencial y real de los bienes integrantes del patrimonio arqueológico. Además, la puesta en práctica de la acreditación de profesionales de reconocida competencia para realizar trabajos de investigación, exploración, excavación y rescate del patrimonio arqueológico (artículo 15 del Decreto, desarrollando la Ley número 6703), fortalece la labor preventiva y correctiva a cargo del Estado. El sistema anteriormente implementado por el Museo Nacional era ajeno a los criterios de razonabilidad y oportunidad, con base en los siguientes aspectos, ya que obligaba al administrado a realizar y financiar una labor investigativa, que por ley es conferida al Estado por medio del Museo Nacional, toleraba que el Museo Nacional desatendiera su obligación legal en la protección, investigación y preservación del patrimonio arqueológico. Los criterios usados por Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental son exclusivamente ambientalistas y no protegen en forma eficiente ni preferente al patrimonio arqueológico; es de sobra conocido que el reglamento de la SETENA únicamente obliga que se realice un estudio de impacto ambiental para determinadas actividades, usualmente grandes y de significativa importancia ambiental. Como se desprende de la misma letra del artículo 19 del Decreto 25705-MINAE, es claro que las actividades agrícolas medianas y pequeñas, las industriales ubicadas en planes reguladores y zonificadas, así como las que sean menores a las dimensiones ahí expuestas, no están sujetas al control de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental y consecuentemente, si ahí existen vestigios de presencia de culturas anteriores, no existiría protección preventiva. Consideran importante puntualizar que el Convenio aprobado por Ley 5980, cuando recomienda consultar ampliamente las disposiciones normativas en materia de patrimonio arqueológico, no obliga al Poder Ejecutivo a consultar en particular con alguna Universidad estatal o entidad desconcentrada o asociación privada específica todos los reglamentos que vaya a adoptar, sino que recomienda que dicha consulta sea realizada de acuerdo con los procedimientos establecidos por la ley interna. En cuanto a la autorización del propietario para realizar excavaciones en su inmueble, el deber de evitar daños a la propiedad y las labores a cargo de la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional, de supervisar la excavación en forma directa y adecuada y de adoptar las medidas correspondientes para evitar daños a la propiedad de que se trate. Con respecto a la obligación de suspender los trabajos en caso descubrimiento de objetos arqueológicos; del deber del Museo Nacional de definir y organizar labores en un plazo, indican que el artículo 13 ordena que si al practicar excavaciones, para ejecutar obras públicas o privadas, fueren descubiertos objetos arqueológicos, por el propio dueño o por terceros, los trabajos deberán ser suspendidos de inmediato y los objetos puestos a disposición de la Dirección del Museo Nacional, el que tendrá un plazo de quince días para definir la forma en que se organizarán las labores de rescate arqueológico. Sobre los autorizados para realizar trabajos de excavación para descubrir o explorar patrimonio arqueológico, alegan que el artículo 15 resuelve la duda sobre la conformidad del Decreto impugnado con la Ley que lo sustenta. Con respecto a la alegada falta de consulta a las instituciones pertinentes, consideran que el accionante no se cercioró bien antes de realizar esta afirmación, ya que como consta documentalmente, el Ministerio de Cultura, el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, el Ministerio de la Presidencia y el Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Comercio, fueron consultados y firmaron el Decreto. Con respecto a la exposición de conceptos y épocas arqueológicos, éstos no son aspectos de constitucionalidad que deban ser resueltos por la Sala. Solicitan que se declare sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad en todos sus extremos.

15.- Por medio de escrito presentado el veintisiete de abril de dos mil (folio 1099), el Procurador General de la República manifiesta que en complemento a ciertos puntos analizados al contestar la audiencia sobre la acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por la Universidad de Costa Rica y en lo que pueda ser de interés al resolver el fondo, manifiesta que a las citas hechas acerca del paralelismo de protección entre del patrimonio natural y cultural en el Derecho Comparado, se agregan algunos ejemplos de Constituciones modernas en los países del entorno latinoamericano en las que se hace referencia a ese mismo paralelismo. Indica asimismo que la CEPAL en las Jornadas Preparatorias para la Eco 92 de Río de Janeiro hizo énfasis en “no relacionar la sustentabilidad del desarrollo solamente con el capital natural sino en el ámbito de un equilibrio dinámico entre todas las formas de capital y patrimonio: humano, físico, financiero, institucional y cultural” y la Convención de la UNESCO, del 23 de noviembre de 1972 hizo énfasis en que “la degradación o la destrucción de un bien del patrimonio cultural y natural constituye un empobrecimiento funesto de todos los pueblos del mundo”. Hace ver además que el Convenio del Consejo de Europa sobre responsabilidad civil por daños derivados de actividades peligrosas en el medio ambiente, aprobado el 8 de marzo de 1993, adoptó un concepto de medio ambiente que abarca los recursos naturales abióticos y bióticos, los bienes que componen el patrimonio cultural y el paisaje. La Directiva de la Comunidad Europea de 27 de junio de 1985, de evaluación de impacto ambiental, continua indicando, en la noción de medio ambiente comprende los elementos naturales, el paisaje, los bienes materiales y el patrimonio cultural (artículo 3). Cita algunos autores en los que pueden ser consultados algunos asuntos de interés relacionados con esta acción.

16.- Por escrito presentado el veintidós de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, Melania Ortiz Volio, en su condición de Directora General del Museo Nacional de Costa Rica manifiesta que solicita se le tenga como coadyuvante activa en la presente acción.

17.- Por medio de escrito presentado el veintiocho de enero de dos mil, Rolando Sáenz Ulloa, apoderado de Ecodesarrollo Papagayo S.A., solicita que se le tenga como coadyuvante pasivo en la presente acción.

18.- Los edictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, referentes a la resolución que tuvo por ampliada la acción interpuesta, fueron publicados en los números 057, 058 y 059 del Boletín Judicial, de los días 21, 22 y 23 de marzo de dos mil. (Folio 945) 19.- Por medio de escrito presentado el primero de marzo de dos mil (folio 575), Magdalena León Coto, Virginia Novoa, Javier Artavia, Mario Hernández Villalobos y Olman Solís Alpízar, solicitan que se les tenga como coadyuvantes activos en esta acción de inconstitucionalidad.

20.- Por medio de escrito presentado a las catorce horas y cuarenta y cinco minutos del veinte de marzo de dos mil (folio 570 al 588), Oscar Enrique Delgado Murillo, en su condición personal y como director del Proyecto Hotel Marriot Los Sueños Resort  Golf Club desarrollado por Marina Herradura S.A., solicita que se le tenga como coadyuvante pasivo.

21.- Mediante memorial presentado a las catorce horas y cuarenta y cuatro minutos del veinte de marzo de dos mil (folios 761 al 777), Alejandro Coto Alvarado, representante judicial y extrajudicial de la Asociación Costarricense de Constructores de Vivienda, solicita que se le tenga como coadyuvante pasivo en esta acción de inconstitucionalidad.

22.- Por resolución de las nueve horas y cuarenta minutos del siete de abril de dos mil (folio 1016) se previno a Oscar Enrique Delgado Murillo acreditar mediante los documentos legales pertinentes su legitimación para respresentar judicialmente a la sociedad coadyuvante y a Alejandro Coto Alvarado que demostrara su condición de representante de la Asociación Costarricense de Constructores de Vivienda.

23.- Por escrito recibido el doce de abril de dos mil (folio 1018), Marco Vinicio Ruiz, en su condición de Presidente con facultades de representación judicial y extrajudicial de la Cámara de Industrias de Costa Rica solicita que se le tenga como coadyuvante pasivo en esta acción de inconstitucionalidad.

24.- Mediante escrito recibido el doce de abril de dos mil (folio 1024), Javier Esquivel Font, representante judicial y extrajudicial de la Asociación Cámara de Consultores en Arquitectura e Ingeniería, solicita que se le tenga como coadyuvante pasivo en esta acción.

25.- De acuerdo con escrito recibido el doce de abril de dos mil (folio 1031 al 1036), Rafael Esquivel Yglesias, en su condición de Vicepresidente con facultades de representación judicial y extrajudicial de la Cámara Costarricense de la Construcción, solicita que se le tenga como coadyuvante pasivo en esta acción.

26.- Por escrito recibido el trece de abril de dos mil (folio 1063), Oscar Enrique Delgado Murillo manifiesta en atención a lo prevenido por la Sala, aclara que la coadyuvancia la presentó a título personal y así solicita que sea admitida.

27.- Mediante escrito recibido el veinticuatro de abril de dos mil (folio 1069), Alejandro Coto Alvarado aporta certificación notarial de personería de la Asociación Costarricense de Constructores de Vivienda.

28.- Por escrito recibido el veinticinco de abril de dos mil (folio 1071 al 1076), Nombre29270, Ana C. Arias Quirós, Elena Troyo Arias, Leidy Bonilla Vargas, Virginia Novoa Espinoza, Maureen Sánchez Pereira, Lesbia Acuña Marín, Andrés Anchio Fuentes, Carlos Aguilar Piedra, Floria Arrea Sierman Adrián Badilla Cambronero, Minor Castro Méndez, Juan Guerrero Miranda, Ana Cristina Hernández, Magdalena León Coto, Mauricio Murillo Herrera, Cleria Ruiz Torres, Wilson Valerio Lobo y Anayancy Herrera Villalobos, manifiestan que solicitan se les tenga como coadyuvantes activos en esta acción.

29.- Por escrito presentado el once de mayo de dos mil (folio 1126), Nombre29270, Ana C. Arias Quirós y Elena Troyo Vargas, representantes del Museo Nacional, la Universidad de Costa Rica y el Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes ante la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional, solicitan que se les tenga como coadyuvantes activos en el presente proceso.

30.- Los edictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional fueron publicados en los números 005, 006 y 007 del Boletín Judicial, de los días 7, 10 y 11 de enero de dos mil. (Folio 426) 31.- Mediante escrito presentado a la Secretaría de la Sala el treinta y uno de agosto de dos mil uno (folio 1263), la Secretaria de la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional aporta copia del dictamen número C-201-2001, según el cual el rescate del patrimonio arqueológico es atribución exclusiva del Museo Nacional, de conformidad con la Ley 6703, artículo 13, en relación con la Convención de París (Ley 4711) Menciona asimismo el referido dictamen que no deben ser hechos distingos entre el rescate súbito y el planificado, ya que ambos son competencias irrenunciables del Estado.

32.- En fecha veintiocho de febrero de dos mil dos, esta Sala efectuó vista oral y pública, con la participación de representantes de la Defensoría de los Habitantes de la República, la Universidad de Costa Rica, el Museo Nacional, el Ministerio de Comercio Exterior, Ecodesarrollos Papagayo S.A. y la Procuraduría General de la República. El Defensor de los Habitantes de la República expuso acerca de la invalidez de la totalidad del Decreto impugnado, incluyendo sus “considerandos”, por eliminar los mecanismos de protección del patrimonio arqueológico contenidos en la Ley 6703, el Decreto 19016-C y diversos tratados internacionales. Citó jurisprudencia constitucional que respalda su posición. El Rector de la Universidad de Costa Rica alegó que el Poder Ejecutivo debió consultar este proyecto a las autoridades especializadas en la materia, como ordena el artículo 10 de la Ley 4711; definió la arqueología como una ciencia que estudia los objetos a partir de coordenadas de tiempo y espacio, por lo cual todos los hallazgos son importantes, y no solamente los que de forma arbitraria determinó el Decreto, sin seguir criterios técnicos y dejando por fuera importantes fases de la historia étnica costarricense. El representante del Ministerio de Comercio Exterior alegó que, como premisa para el análisis de este caso, no deben ser seguidos principios que son propios del Derecho Ambiental, y de la protección que el estado debe prestar respecto del medio ambiente; considera que la Ley 4711 autoriza el empleo de métodos como los establecidos en el Decreto impugnado; afirma que fueron empleados criterios objetivos y no arbitrarios para la determinación de los sitios arqueológicos de importancia; alega que no se trata de silencio positivo lo establecido en los artículos 5° y 6° del Decreto, sino tan solo de una forma de protección a los propietarios, para evitar que la inercia estatal haga ilusorio el ejercicio del derecho de propiedad y detenga el desarrollo nacional; aduce que no existió error alguno en el establecimiento de períodos históricos contenida en el artículo 2°, ya que el párrafo 1° del inciso j) permite una interpretación ampliamente protectora. La Directora del Museo Nacional expuso que el Decreto violenta el principio precautorio que debe informar las materias relacionadas a la protección del medio ambiente y el patrimonio arqueológico; señala que desde la entrada en vigencia del reglamento, la cantidad de solicitudes de estudios arqueológicos ha disminuido considerablemente, mientras que las denuncias por daños se han incrementado. El representante de Ecodesarrollos Papagayo S.A. alega que las reglas contenidas en el decreto impugnado permiten una protección racional del patrimonio arqueológico, sin que ello impida el desarrollo inmobiliario y turístico del país. El Procurador General de la República y otros dos representantes de dicho órgano alegan que el decreto en cuestión desprotege la gran mayoría de los sitios arqueológicos existentes en el país, pues en la actualidad solo 3 cantones han sido declarados de interés arquitectónico-arqueológico, de conformidad con la Ley 7555, mientras que los registros del Museo Nacional son mucho más abundantes; citan el dictamen C-201-01, en el cual la Procuraduría determinó que el rescate de bienes arqueológicos por particulares es inconstitucional.

33.- En los procedimientos seguidos han sido observadas las prescripciones legales.

Redacta el magistrado Vargas Benavides; y,

Considerando:

I.- Las reglas de legitimación en las acciones de inconstitucionalidad. El artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regula los presupuestos que determinan la admisibilidad de las acciones de inconstitucionalidad, exigiendo un asunto pendiente de resolver en sede administrativa o judicial en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad, requisito que no es necesario en los casos de excepción previstos en el párrafo segundo y tercero de ese artículo, es decir, que por la naturaleza de la norma no haya lesión individual o directa; que se fundamente en la defensa de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto, o que sea presentada por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República o el Defensor de los Habitantes, en estos últimos casos, dentro de sus respectivas esferas competenciales. A partir de lo antes dicho, se tiene que como primera regla la necesidad de contar con un asunto previo, permitiéndose incluso posibilidades de acudir a la Sala Constitucional en forma directa. Para hacerlo, la norma cuestionada no debe ser susceptible de aplicación concreta, que permita luego la impugnación del acto aplicativo y su consecuente empleo como asunto base. Dispone el texto en cuestión que procede cuando "por la naturaleza del asunto, no exista lesión individual ni directa", es decir, cuando por esa misma naturaleza, la lesión sea colectiva (antónimo de individual) e indirecta. Sería el caso de actos que lesionen los intereses de determinados grupos o corporaciones en cuanto tales, y no propiamente de sus miembros en forma directa. En segundo lugar, se prevé la posibilidad de acudir en defensa de "intereses difusos"; este concepto, cuyo contenido ha ido siendo delineado paulatinamente por parte de la Sala, podría ser resumido en los términos empleados en la sentencia de este tribunal número 3750-93, de las quince horas del treinta de julio de mil novecientos noventa y tres:

"… Los intereses difusos, aunque de difícil definición y más difícil identificación, no pueden ser en nuestra ley -como ya lo ha dicho esta Sala- los intereses meramente colectivos; ni tan difusos que su titularidad se confunda con la de la comunidad nacional como un todo, ni tan concretos que frente a ellos resulten identificados o fácilmente indentificables personas determinadas, o grupos personalizados, cuya legitimación derivaría, no de los intereses difusos, sino de los corporativos que atañen a una comunidad en su conjunto. Se trata entonces de intereses individuales, pero a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y, por ende reciben un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos igual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que se trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos que se encuentran en determinadas circunstancias y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas. Es decir, los intereses difusos participan de una doble naturaleza, ya que son a la vez colectivos -por ser comunes a una generalidad- e individuales, por lo que pueden ser reclamados en tal carácter" En síntesis, los intereses difusos son aquellos cuya titularidad pertenece a grupos de personas no organizadas formalmente, pero unidas a partir de una determinada necesidad social, una característica física, su origen étnico, una determinada orientación personal o ideológica, el consumo de un cierto producto, etc. El interés, en estos casos, se encuentra difuminado, diluido (difuso) entre una pluralidad no identificada de sujetos. En estos casos, claro, la impugnación que el miembro de uno de estos sectores podría efectuar amparado en el párrafo 2° del artículo 75, deberá estar referida necesariamente a disposiciones que lo afecten en cuanto tal. Esta Sala ha enumerado diversos derechos a los que les ha dado el calificativo de "difusos", tales como el medio ambiente, el patrimonio cultural, la defensa de la integridad territorial del país y de a Hacienda Pública, entre otros. Al respecto deben ser efectuadas dos precisiones: por un lado, los referidos bienes trascienden la esfera tradicionalmente reconocida a los intereses difusos, ya que se refieren en principio a aspectos que afectan a la colectividad nacional y no a grupos particulares de ésta; un daño ambiental no afecta apenas a los vecinos de una región o a los consumidores de un producto, sino que lesiona o pone en grave riesgo el patrimonio natural de todo el país e incluso de la Humanidad; del mismo modo, la defensa de la Hacienda Pública es un interés de todos los habitantes de Costa Rica, no tan solo de un grupo cualquiera de ellos. Por otra parte, la enumeración que ha hecho la Sala Constitucional no pasa de una simple descripción propia de su obligación –como órgano jurisdiccional- de limitarse a conocer de los casos que le sean sometidos, sin que pueda de ninguna manera llegar a entenderse que solo pueden ser considerados derechos difusos aquellos que la Sala expresamente haya reconocido como tales; lo anterior implicaría dar un vuelco indeseable en los alcances del Estado de Derecho, y de su correlativo "Estado de derechos", que –como en el caso del modelo costarricense- parte de la premisa de que lo que debe ser expreso son los límites a las libertades, ya que éstas subyacen a la misma condición humana y no requieren por ende de reconocimiento oficial. Finalmente, cuando el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional habla de intereses "que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto", se refiere a los bienes jurídicos explicados en las líneas anteriores, es decir, aquellos cuya titularidad reposa en los mismos detentores de la soberanía, en cada uno de los habitantes de la República. No se trata por ende de que cualquier persona pueda acudir a la Sala Constitucional en tutela de cualesquiera intereses (acción popular), sino que todo individuo puede actuar en defensa de aquellos bienes que afectan a toda la colectividad nacional, sin que tampoco en este campo sea válido ensayar cualquier intento de enumeración taxativa.

II.- La legitimación de los accionantes en este caso. A partir de lo dicho en el párrafo anterior, es claro que la acción interpuesta por la Defensora de los Habitantes de la República debe admitirse en el tanto se le reconoce legitimación directa para su interposición, teniendo en cuenta que acude en defensa de los derechos reconocidos en los artículos 50 y 89 de la Constitución Política. Por su parte, el Rector de la Universidad de Costa Rica considera que su legitimación deriva de la protección de intereses difusos, situación en la cual el mismo artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional permite la impugnación en forma directa. A partir de lo dicho, se encuentra legitimado el Rector de la Universidad, no en su condición funcional, sino como ciudadano que acude a tutelar la defensa de intereses que atañen a la colectividad nacional, de marcado interés general, como lo es la el patrimonio histórico-arqueológico de la República. La tutela de valores histórico culturales, ya sea por ser considerados como elementos necesarios para el libre desarrollo de la personalidad, como elementos indispensables para el conocimiento de los orígenes históricos de nuestras sociedades, o desde un punto de vista meramente de goce espiritual, es un asunto de interés nacional. Los bienes arqueológicos, como subespecie de los valores histórico culturales, en el tanto se convierten en un medio de conocer la historia del hombre, sus orígenes y sus antecedentes, gozan de la misma protección privilegiada mediante la posibilidad de que cualquier persona, basada en la autorización que al respecto confiere el artículo 75 párrafo 2° de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, razón por la cual es admisible la acción interpuesta por el Rector de la Universidad de Costa Rica, en el tanto se convierte en un medio de protección de ese tipo de intereses.

III.- Otros aspectos de admisibilidad. Estando claro que los actores cuentan con legitimación suficiente para promover esta demanda, resta indicar que la actuación impugnada es una de las previstas en el artículo 73 inciso a) de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, por tratarse de un acto general de orden normativo (Decreto reglamentario), materia cuya constitucionalidad procede revisar en esta vía. Además, las partes presentaron sus escritos de interposición en atención a los requisitos estipulados en los numerales 78 y 79 de la Ley de rito, así como las prevenciones efectuadas por esta Sala. En conclusión, la presente acción es admisible, por lo que debe entrarse de inmediato a discutir el objeto y el fondo de las misma.

IV.- Acerca de las coadyuvancias. El artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece que en los quince días posteriores a la primera publicación del aviso a que alude el párrafo segundo del artículo 81, las partes que figuren con asuntos pendientes a la fecha de interposición de la acción, o aquellos que cuenten con un interés legítimo en la definición del objeto en disputa, podrán apersonarse para coadyuvar con cualquiera de las dos posiciones objeto de la discusión, en el caso de las acciones de inconstitucionalidad, básicamente el coadyuvante acude a defender la pretensión anulatoria del actor o a respaldar la validez del acto impugnado. En este caso, esta Sala, por resolución de las catorce horas y cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintiuno de febrero de dos mil (folio 557), admitió como coadyuvantes activos a la Directora General del Museo Nacional de Costa Rica y a Rolando Sáenz Ulloa y Ana Lucía Espinoza Blanco, en su condición de Apoderados Generales Judiciales de Ecodesarrollo Papagayo Sociedad Anónima y por resolución de las quince horas y cincuenta minutos del nueve de mayo de dos mil (folios 1105 y 1106), acogió como coadyuvantes en esta acción a Magdalena León Coto, Virginia Novoa, Javier Artavia, Mario Hernández Villalobos, Olman Solís Alpízar, a la Asociación Costarricense de Constructores de Vivienda, a la Cámara de Industrias de Costa Rica, a la Asociación Cámara de Consultores en Arquitectura e Ingeniería y a la Cámara Costarricense de la Construcción, por lo que no cabe pronunciarse al respecto. En cuanto al escrito visible a folio 580, en el que Oscar Enrique Delgado Murillo solicita se le tenga como coadyuvante, en esa misma resolución se determinó no admitir su solicitud por no haber demostrado su legítimo interés. Se rechazó la solicitud de coadyuvancia presentada por Nombre29270 y otros que consta a folios 1071 y se rechazó por extemporánea la gestión de coadyuvancia de Ana Patricia Rojas Hernández y otro. En cuanto a la solicitud de coadyuvancia presentada por Nombre29270, en su carácter de representante del Museo Nacional en la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional, Ana C. Arias Quirós, como representante de la Universidad de Costa Rica ante esa Comisión y Elena Troyo Vargas, como representante del Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes en esa misma Comisión, visible a folios 1126 al 1161, se rechaza por extemporánea, tomando en consideración que el primero de los edictos de que habla el artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional había sido publicado el veintiuno de marzo de dos mil.

V.- Objeto de la impugnación. Los actores impugnan por inconstitucionales los artículos 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 15, 16 y 17 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 28174-mp-minae-MEIC, de doce de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, publicado en La Gaceta número 202, Alcance 78 del diecinueve de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, por considerarlos contrarios a las normas contenidas en los artículos 50, 89 y 121 inciso 14) de la Constitución Política, así como de la Convención sobre Defensa del Patrimonio Arqueológico, Histórico y Artístico de las Naciones Americanas, al Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos Sociales y Culturales, a la Declaración Americana de Derechos del Hombre, a la Carta de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, a la Recomendación sobre la Conservación de los Bienes Culturales que la Ejecución de Obras Públicas o Privadas puedan poner en peligro, a la Convención para la Protección del Patrimonio Cultural y Natural, a la Convención sobre Defensa del Patrimonio Arqueológico, Histórico y Artístico de las Naciones Americanas, y a la Convención sobre las medidas que deben adoptarse para prohibir e impedir la importación, la exportación y transferencia de propiedad ilícitas de bienes culturales.

Sobre el fondo.

VI.- Los bienes arqueológicos en el sistema constitucional. El artículo 89 de la Constitución Política establece que entre los fines culturales de la República están:

"… proteger las bellezas naturales, conservar y desarrollar el patrimonio histórico y artístico de la Nación y apoyar la iniciativa privada para el progreso científico y artístico." La protección del patrimonio histórico se enmarca entonces dentro del rango más amplio del deber que tiene el Estado de preservar la cultura común que convierte a su pueblo en una Nación. El Diccionario de la Real Academia Española de la Lengua, en lo conducente, define a la cultura como:

"… el conjunto de modos de vida y costumbres, conocimientos y grado de desarrollo artístico, científico o industrial, en una época o grupo social" (Vigésima Segunda Edición. Tomo I. 2001) El patrimonio arqueológico es una especie del género más amplio constituido por el patrimonio cultural, precisión que tiene importantes implicaciones prácticas en el tanto el papel del Estado en la promoción y garantía de los bienes arqueológicos debe ser siempre parte de una política integral de protección y fomento de la producción cultural autóctona. Para que los derechos derivados de la norma constitucional en cuestión sean efectivamente verificados, se requiere de parte de las autoridades públicas no solo crear el marco normativo necesario, sino además actuar de manera concreta, mediante mecanismos idóneos de tutela que partan de la premisa ineludible de que una Nación que desprecia su herencia histórica, destruyéndola o evitando por todos los medios lícitos su pérdida o deterioro, se encuentra destinada a fracasar como sociedad, pues es precisamente la visión del pasado la que permite entender el presente y programar el futuro. El patrimonio arqueológico –en el caso costarricense- ha sido definido comúnmente como el conjunto de bienes inmuebles y muebles, producto de las culturas indígenas anteriores o contemporáneas al establecimiento de la cultura hispánica en el territorio nacional, así como los restos humanos, flora y fauna, relacionados con estas culturas, constituyendo uno de los principales medios para hacer efectivo el conocimiento exacto de los orígenes históricos de nuestras sociedades, en el tanto permite comprender el germen de nuestras actuales formas de pensamiento y expresión cultural, además de aportar datos de gran utilidad para otros campos del conocimiento, tales como la ecología, la farmacoterapia, la zoología, etc. Sobre la importancia intrínseca del patrimonio arqueológico dentro del sistema social, esta Sala se pronunció en los términos siguientes:

"Arqueología e Historia son dos ciencias vinculadas íntimamente, teniendo como uno de sus objetivos aclarar y reconstruir los acontecimientos del pasado. La reconstrucción histórica se basa, fundamentalmente en la interpretación de documentos escritos, mientras que la Arqueología basa sus estudios en los datos que obtiene a través de los objetos materiales dejados por la acción del hombre en las sociedades ya desaparecidas, por medio de su relación entre ellos, de la forma del hallazgo y de su conexión con el ambiente. Todo objeto conservado, todo vestigio de vida y actividad del hombre de las sociedades del pasado, representa un testimonio que hace posible el conocimiento total o parcial, según sea el caso, de esos testimonios, y, por ende, de formas de vida ya inexistentes y desconocidas en el presente, pero cuyo conocimiento es de singular importancia, pues forman parte de la identidad cultural de la sociedad en que se vive; desde luego, en la medida en que sean un testimonio importante para la reconstrucción y conocimiento de los hechos del pasado". (Sentencia número 729-96 de las nueve horas quince minutos del nueve de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y seis) No es que el conocimiento del pasado revista un particular interés por razones de mera curiosidad historiográfica, sino que su estudio permite aproximarse a una comprensión global de los fenómenos sociales y culturales actuales. La tutela de los bienes arqueológicos debe entonces ser comprendida como una forma de amparo de la cultura en general, como bien que trasciende la titularidad de cualquier individuo, constituyéndose en un valor de importancia nacional, cuyo reconocimiento y efectiva defensa forma parte del conjunto de intereses garantizados en los artículos 50 y 74 de la Constitución Política.

VII.- El patrimonio arqueológico en el Derecho Internacional. Costa Rica, como sujeto de Derecho Internacional, ha suscrito y ratificado diversos instrumentos destinados a proteger el patrimonio arqueológico. Así, podemos citar los siguientes: A) La Convención sobre la protección de los bienes culturales en caso de conflicto armado (Convención de La Haya), de catorce de mayo de mil novecientos cincuenta y cuatro, y su Reglamento, los cuales reconocen la importancia del patrimonio arqueológico, obligando a los Estados envueltos en un conflicto bélico a respetar el de aquellos que ocupen, poniendo sus bienes culturales a buen resguardo, lejos de la zona de conflicto. B) La Recomendación que define los principios internacionales que deberán aplicarse a las excavaciones arqueológicas, de cinco de diciembre de mil novecientos cincuenta y seis, obliga a los Estados Partes a someter la excavaciones arqueológicas que en sus territorios sean llevadas a cabo a una estricta vigilancia y previa autorización de autoridad competente (principio 5). C) La Carta Internacional sobre la conservación y la restauración de los monumentos y de los sitios, que reconoce la inseparabilidad del monumento y la historia que atestigua, además de la prohibición del traslado del monumento a no ser para su conservación (artículo 7); la obligación de proteger esos sitios (14), y la necesidad de preservar la identidad del monumento, evitando alterar esencialmente su apariencia o naturaleza (15). D) La Convención sobre defensa del patrimonio arqueológico, histórico y artístico de las Naciones Americanas (Convención de San Salvador), aprobada mediante Ley número 6360 de cinco de setiembre de mil novecientos setenta y nueve, que incluye dentro de los bienes culturales al material arqueológico perteneciente a culturas anteriores a las culturas americanas anteriores a los contactos con la cultura europea (artículo 2); reconoce el dominio del Estado sobre tales objetos (6); dispone que cada Estado se compromete a promover la exploración, excavación, investigación y conservación de lugares y objetos por parte de organismos especializados en asocio con las instituciones públicas encargadas de tutelar el patrimonio arqueológico (8). E) La Recomendación sobre la conservación de los bienes culturales que la ejecución de obras públicas o privadas pone en peligro, suscrita el veintidós de noviembre de mil novecientos sesenta y ocho, aprobada mediante Ley número 4711, de seis de enero de mil novecientos setenta y uno, dentro de sus considerandos establece que la civilización contemporánea y su evolución futura reposa sobre la tradición de los pueblos y las fuerzas creadoras de la humanidad, así como sobre su desarrollo social y económico y que los bienes culturales son producto y testimonio de las diferentes tradiciones y realizaciones espirituales de lo pasado, y constituye así el elemento fundamental de las personalidad de los pueblos, por lo que determina la necesidad de llevar la protección del patrimonio cultural a todo el territorio del Estado, y no solo a los sitios formalmente declarados como tales (artículo 3); las medidas deben ser tanto preventivas como correctivas (7) contra cualquier tipo de obra, pública o privada, capaz de deteriorarlos (8); dispone además que deberán ser realizados, con suficiente anticipación, estudios detenidos para determinar las medidas que deban ser adoptadas in situ, así como la magnitud de los trabajos de salvación necesarios (22). F) La Convención para la protección del patrimonio mundial, cultural y natural, suscrita el veintiuno de noviembre de mil novecientos setenta y dos, aprobada por Ley número 5980 de dieciséis de noviembre de mil novecientos setenta y seis, ordena a los Estados Partes identificar, proteger, conservar, rehabilitar y transmitir a las futuras generaciones, el patrimonio cultural (artículo 4). G) La Convención sobre las medidas que deben adoptarse para prohibir e impedir la importación, la exportación y la transferencia de propiedad ilícitas de bienes culturales, firmada el diecinueve de setiembre de mil novecientos setenta, aprobada por Ley número 7526 de diez de julio de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, que incluye dentro del concepto de patrimonio cultural a aquellos de valor etnológico, arqueológico y natural (artículo 5).

Huelga aclarar que todos los instrumentos citados en el párrafo anterior constituyen fuente de Derecho en Costa Rica, susceptibles de ser aplicados directamente por esta Sala Constitucional para la resolución del presente asunto, según dicta el artículo 48 constitucional. En el caso de los aprobados por la Asamblea Legislativa, por disposición expresa del artículo 7 de la Constitución Política. En cuanto a los que no gozan de dicha condición, porque constituyen al menos fuentes de interpretación de los instrumentos aprobados. Tampoco reconoce esta Sala la existencia de simples recomendaciones en materia de derechos humanos, pues si los Estados deciden autolimitarse, reconociendo la existencia de determinados derechos humanos, aun cuando aparezcan denominadas con el nombre de “recomendaciones”. Lo anterior lleva a entender que la Recomendación que define los principios internacionales que deberán aplicarse a las excavaciones arqueológicas, la Carta Internacional sobre la conservación y la restauración de los monumentos y de los sitios y la Recomendación sobre la conservación de los bienes culturales que la ejecución de obras públicas o privadas pone en peligro, son –en los términos antes dichos- actos provistos de plena normatividad en el ordenamiento constitucional costarricense, sin que se les pueda considerar simples enumeraciones de objetivos y metas a alcanzar.

VIII.- La regulación legal del patrimonio arqueológico. Además de las normas constitucionales que protegen el patrimonio arqueológico y de los compromisos asumidos en ese mismo sentido por Costa Rica ante la comunidad internacional, han sido emitidas diversas normas internas referentes a la materia objeto de esta acción. A) La Ley número 7 de seis de octubre de mil novecientos treinta y ocho da a los bienes arqueológicos la condición de dominiales (artículo 1), además de ordenar la inmediata comunicación del hallazgo de objetos a las autoridades públicas, las cuales deberán tomar las medidas necesarias para su protección (artículo 17). B) La Ley 6793, de veintiocho de diciembre de mil novecientos ochenta y uno, Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, que además de reiterar las disposiciones de la Ley número 7, crean la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional, órgano al cual le dan potestad de autorizar excavaciones por parte de científicos previamente registrados y supervisarlas (artículos 12 y 15); confiere al Museo Nacional la competencia para definir la forma en que se rescatarán los bienes en caso de hallazgo por parte de tercero (artículo 13). C) El Código de Minería, Ley número 6797, de cuatro de octubre de mil novecientos ochenta y dos, cuyo artículo 102 inciso h) obliga la realización de estudios de impacto ambiental referentes a los efectos sobre la riqueza arqueológica y cultural del país para la realización de actividades mineras. D) La Ley número 7555, de cuatro de octubre de mil novecientos setenta y cinco, Ley de Patrimonio Histórico-Arquitectónico de Costa Rica, que define el sitio arqueológico como aquel que contiene objetos importantes desde un punto de vista histórico, estético, etnológico, antropológico o ambiental (artículo 6°); el numeral 7°, por su parte, establece el procedimiento para la incorporación de un bien al patrimonio histórico-arquitectónico mediante Decreto, que implica el impedimento de demoler el inmueble.

IX.- La importancia de los bienes arqueológicos. Los bienes arqueológicos, entendidos como aquellos objetos que permiten al investigador acceder al conocimiento histórico, poseen una importancia intrínseca, por constituir un instrumento idóneo y difícilmente reemplazable para adquirir ese conocimiento, en el que el medio que los circunda adquiere también especial relevancia. Para la efectiva tutela de los bienes arqueológicos, el Estado debe participar activamente en todos los procedimientos tendientes a su detección, rescate (cuando proceda), estudio, registro y conservación. Solo de esa forma será dado cabal cumplimiento a los deberes provenientes del mandato constitucional, así como de los asumidos mediante la suscripción de los instrumentos internacionales citados y de la promulgación de las leyes mencionadas. No obstante esa marcada importancia, la tutela de los bienes arqueológicos se ha visto afectada por la confluencia de diversos factores, tales como el coleccionismo, el comercio de objetos y su destrucción indiscriminada debido en parte a la realización de edificaciones en zonas donde existen sitios arqueológicos. Esta confluencia de intereses, en razón de la obligación constitucional del Estado de velar por la protección del patrimonio arqueológico, hace necesario el establecimiento de mecanismos legislativos y administrativos tendientes garantizar la protección del legado arqueológico, ante la necesidad del desarrollo económico. Esta prevalencia ya fue reconocida por la Corte Plena cuando, ejerciendo funciones de contralor de constitucionalidad, sostuvo:

“Es obvio que los bienes arqueológicos también tienen valor apreciable en dinero, ya sea por el material de que están hechos (el oro, por ejemplo), o por su fina artesanía y su belleza, aunque sean de barro o de piedra. Algunos de esos objetos pueden ser de escaso valor físico o de poca significación artística; pero aun así son valiosos por su origen y como elementos de estudio para investigar la cultura de los pueblos de otras épocas, de sus creencias y costumbres, o de la naturaleza del medio en que vivieron, según sean las huellas o representaciones que allí logren encontrarse. Por todo eso valen los objetos arqueológicos provenientes de las razas aborígenes que poblaron el continente en la época precolombina o anterior o contemporánea al establecimiento de la cultura hispánica; y por ese valor es que muchos adquieren esas piezas, algunos para goce espiritual o interés científico y otros acaso para lucrar con ellos. Pero sobre el interés individual que cada uno pueda tener en la posesión o propiedad de esos objetos, predomina el interés público, tanto por el valor histórico de tales bienes, como porque, dentro de la cultura de los pueblos, está el estudio de lo que hicieron los grupos humanos que habitaron el mismo territorio, estudio que se facilita haciendo posible que, aquí mismo, el mayor número de personas tenga acceso a esas fuentes de conocimiento; y nada más consecuente con ese interés público, que los bienes arqueológicos permanezcan en territorio nacional, en poder de museos y bajo la pertenencia del Estado o de sus instituciones, como parte del patrimonio histórico que la Carta Política denomina “de la Nación”, en el artículo 89. Debe entonces subrayarse que lo más importante no es el valor material de los referidos objetos, sino el valor histórico y cultural, y que de ningún modo podría ser aplicable a esos objetos la doctrina económica sobre los bienes productivos y la libertad de empresa”. (Resolución de las trece horas del doce de mayo de mil novecientos ochenta y nueve) Queda entonces claro que la relevancia de los bienes arqueológicos no se agota en aspectos venales. Muy por el contrario, su mayor importancia está en los datos que pueden ofrecer para conocer adecuadamente los orígenes de la identidad nacional, además de la basta información que ofrecen para otros no menos importantes campos del conocimiento científico. Es así como incluso bienes de pocas cualidades estéticas, de uso cotidiano,o aún en mal estado de conservación pueden ser de gran importancia para el conocimiento arqueológico. Por otra parte, la protección del patrimonio arqueológico es también un asunto de relevancia mundial. El Informe Preliminar Sobre los Medios Jurídicos para la Protección y Conservación del Patrimonio Histórico y Artístico de los Países Americanos de la Organización de Estados Americanos estableció en este sentido:

"No existe un interés exclusivamente local en los estados de proteger y conservar los testimonios objetivados del arte y la cultura de épocas pretéritas que se encuentran en sus respectivos territorios; ese interés es compartido por toda la comunidad internacional, que justificadamente considera que aquellos constituyen un patrimonio cultural que pertenece a la humanidad entera y, por ende, merecen ser objeto de su preocupación y su protección.

De esta manera, la protección y conservación del patrimonio cultural trasciende actualmente del ámbito de las jurisdicciones nacionales para complementarse, jurídicamente por medio de instrumentos internacionales, y materialmente a través de la cooperación solidaria de los países que forman la comunidad internacional para hacer efectivo tal deber de protección y conservación" La preservación del patrimonio arqueológico de un pueblo no es visto, entonces, como un asunto de mero interés local, mas como un aporte significativo a la preservación de la cultura mundial.

X.- El patrimonio arqueológico como bien de dominio público. Es evidente que los bienes arqueológicos, de conformidad con los términos de las normas citadas, forman parte del patrimonio público, de los llamados bienes dominiales, cuya titularidad es la Nación, en el tanto se encuentran afectos a cumplir una finalidad de interés general. El uso y tenencia de los bienes dominicales forma parte siempre de un régimen especial, caracterizado por el hecho de que tales objetos deben ser empleados tan solo en forma tal que no contradigan su finalidad, en algunas casos solamente por parte de la Administración; en otros también por parte de particulares, pero ciñéndose estrictamente a las limitaciones que su carácter público implica. Esta Sala ha definido los bienes de dominio público en los siguientes términos:

"…El dominio público se encuentra integrado por bienes que manifiestan, por voluntad expresa del legislador, un destino especial de servir a la comunidad, al interés público.- Son los llamados bienes dominicales, bienes dominiales, bienes o cosas públicas o bienes públicos, que no pertenecen individualmente a los particulares y que están destinados a un uso público y sometidos a un régimen especial, fuera del comercio de los hombres.- Es decir, afectados por su propia naturaleza y vocación.- En consecuencia, esos bienes pertenecen al Estado en el sentido más amplio del concepto, están afectados al servicio que prestan y que invariablemente es esencial en virtud de norma expresa.- Notas características de estos bienes, es que son inalienables, imprescriptibles, inembargables, no pueden hipotecarse ni ser susceptibles de gravamen en los términos del Derecho Civil y la acción administrativa sustituye a los interdictos para recuperar el dominio.- Como están fuera del comercio, estos bienes no pueden ser objeto de posesión, aunque se puede adquirir un derecho al aprovechamiento, aunque no un derecho a la propiedad.- El permiso de uso es un acto jurídico unilateral que lo dicta la Administración, en el uso de sus funciones y lo que se pone en manos del particular, es el dominio útil del bien, reservándose siempre el Estado, el dominio directo sobre la cosa…" (Sentencia número 2306-91 de las catorce horas con cuarenta y cinco minutos del seis de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y uno) Con anterioridad, la Corte Plena, ejerciendo control de constitucionalidad, determinó:

“Pues bien, si antes de la Ley de 1938 no se legisló debidamente sobre el patrimonio arqueológico, muy puesto en razón está que el legislador se ocupara de ello en esa Ley y en la de 1981, para evitar lo que había ocurrido bajo el régimen anterior. XIX.- Esas dos leyes reconocen la propiedad individual de los bienes arqueológicos que estuvieran en mano privada; pero a la vez dispusieron que, en lo sucesivo, los bienes que fueran objeto de hallazgo pertenecerían al Estado. No se lesionó ningún derecho adquirido, pues se mantuvo la propiedad particular hasta entonces existente… No hace falta norma especial en la Constitución, para que puedan establecerse prohibiciones concretas en las leyes ordinarias, si tuvieren apoyo en el artículo 28, como son las que excluyen el hallazgo como título legítimo para adquirir el dominio privado de los bienes arqueológicos… XX.- En el artículo 89 se refleja el interés público que la Constitución protege en el número 28 párrafo segundo, pues allí se dice que “Entre los fines culturales de la República están:...conservar y desarrollar el patrimonio histórico y artístico de la Nación”. Con ello se reconoció la existencia de un patrimonio diferente al de los bienes de carácter económico, y a la vez quedó establecido el deber de procurar su conservación. El orden público cultural e histórico permite interpretar esa regla con amplitud, y basarse en ella para reafirmar la propiedad estatal de los bienes arqueológicos que se descubrieran en lo futuro, como lo dispuso la Ley de 1938. Esos bienes, antes y ahora, constituyen “un patrimonio común que las generaciones pasadas legaron a las posteriores”… XXI.- De todo lo anterior se desprende: a) Que es legítimo el régimen de propiedad instituido en el artículo 1º de la Ley de 1938, pues tiene respaldo en los artículos 28 y 89 y no se contrapone el artículo 45 de la propia Carta Política; y b) Que, en consecuencia, tampoco pueden ser contrarios a la Constitución los artículos 3º, 5º, 7º, 9º y 17 de la Ley Nº 6703 de 1981, en cuanto son aplicables a los objetos arqueológicos hallados con posterioridad a la Ley Nº 7 de 1938, pues esos bienes pertenecen al Estado, de acuerdo con el artículo 1º de esa Ley de 1938, que no es inconstitucional.” (Resolución de las trece horas de doce de mayo de mil novecientos ochenta y nueve) XI.- El principio preventivo en materia arqueológica. La importancia de los bienes arqueológicos y su carácter de bienes dominiales crea a cargo del Estado una serie de obligaciones dirigidas a su efectiva tutela, elemento común de los derechos de la llamada tercera generación. En temas de tanta relevancia y delicada protección, no puede concebirse que las autoridades administrativas intervengan una vez que el daño ha sido causado, por cuanto los daños pueden resultar irreversibles y de muy grandes proporciones. En el caso de los bienes arqueológicos existe una única posibilidad, su protección efectiva o su pérdida irremediable. A efecto de dimensionar el momento y las acciones que el Estado debe emprender para la protección del patrimonio arqueológico, deben realizarse algunas consideraciones de importancia que quedaron dibujadas en las consideraciones anteriores. Los bienes arqueológicos, individualmente considerados, si bien es cierto pueden constituir elementos claves para la comprensión del pasado histórico–cultural del país, su relevancia puede resultar disminuida si no son considerados integralmente respecto del contexto en el cual fueron encontrados. La investigación arqueológica no puede limitarse entonces al estudio de objetos que han sido destruidos total o parcialmente, o bien a bienes sacados de su contexto sin la previa realización de exhaustivos análisis de campo que visen su comprensión dentro del ambiente donde fueron hallados, ya que en tales casos una labor que por imperativo constitucional (artículos 50, 74 y 89) debería ser concebida como de rigurosidad científica, se podría convertir en poco más que una simple labor de coleccionismo y contemplación artística, en contravención del orden fundamental.

XII.- Sobre la normativa impugnada: la simplificación de trámites. A través de la presente acción, es cuestionada la constitucionalidad de los artículos 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 15, 16 y 17 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 28174-mp-minae-MEIC, de doce de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, que regula, con exclusión de cualquier otra fuente, los procedimientos de estudio, rescate y preservación de los bienes arqueológicos. El Decreto en estudio evidentemente enfatiza la simplificación de trámites en caso de construcción de obras públicas o privadas, respecto de los requisitos establecidos en el ordenamiento con la finalidad de proteger el patrimonio arqueológico. Si bien la desregulación de ciertas actividades cargadas de requisitos excesivos no es inválida per se y puede resultar hasta deseable, parte esta Sala de la premisa de que cualesquiera trámites necesarios para la protección de bienes de relevancia constitucional, no pueden ser válidamente eliminados sin una adecuada sustitución por otros que cumplan la misma función protectora. Con esa base de raciocinio, se entrará a analizar cada una de las disposiciones impugnadas en esta acción.

XIII.- Derogatorias tácitas. El artículo 1° dispone que:

"Artículo 1º—De los requisitos. Los únicos requisitos y trámites para la realización de los estudios arqueológicos son los establecidos en el presente decreto y por lo tanto, se derogan todos los reglamentos, manuales, directrices, circulares y demás documentos que no se ajusten a los lineamientos y disposiciones del presente decreto." Para poder comprender a cabalidad la modificación que esta norma produjo en el ordenamiento jurídico, resulta preciso en primer término aclarar –regla obvia- que las únicas disposiciones que podrían ser afectadas por este Decreto serían las anteriores de rango igual o inferior (artículo 11 constitucional) que se le opongan, por lo que cualquier discordancia entre el texto de este Reglamento y el de un acto de rango superior no es más que un problema de ilegalidad del Decreto, dado que el mismo es incapaz de modificar en forma alguna el texto de la Ley formal. Si, por el contrario, alguna disposición del Decreto se opone a normas o principios que formen parte del parámetro de constitucionalidad, entonces las mismas sí serán sancionables en esta vía. Debe por esa razón ser analizado el texto de los otros dispositivos cuestionados, para determinar si la derogatoria contenida en este artículo constituye efectivamente un debilitamiento del control que el Estado ejerce sobre el patrimonio arqueológico de la Nación.

XIV.- Definiciones contenidas en el Decreto y sus implicaciones. Por su parte, el artículo 2° contiene una serie de definiciones a ser usadas para la interpretación del restante articulado del Reglamento:

"Artículo 2º—Definiciones.

a)Sitios arqueológicos (sin declaratoria conforme a la ley Nº 7555): Se entiende por sitio arqueológico la localidad en que mediante estudios arqueológicos, se demuestre la presencia de restos precolombinos, cuya importancia varía de acuerdo con las características de los restos y del valor que se confiera a éstos, según el conocimiento fundamentado sobre las culturas que poblaron la zona.

• b)Sitios con valor patrimonial declarados mediante decreto ejecutivo y conforme a la ley Nº 7555: Son aquellos sitios arqueológicos que hayan sido definidos e incorporados al patrimonio histórico mediante decreto ejecutivo y según los procedimientos establecidos en la Ley de Patrimonio Histórico Arquitectónico, ley Nº 7555 del 20 de octubre de 1995.
• c)Estudios arqueológicos: se refiere a la investigación científicamente válida, destinada a descubrir o explorar el patrimonio arqueológico de una zona o sitio específico.
• d)Etapa de inspección: consiste en el reconocimiento de un terreno determinado con el fin de verificar la existencia de restos culturales precolombinos.
• e)Etapa de evaluación: consiste en realizar un diagnóstico de los recursos arqueológicos detectados, utilizando una metodología científicamente válida. Dicho diagnóstico determinará si las características más básicas de los restos detectados tienen importancia arqueológica, de ser así deberán recomendarse las medidas que permitan el rescate de los bienes patrimoniales.
• f)Rescate: Es la acción inmediata de preservar los restos detectados en la evaluación para evitar la destrucción de rasgos culturales, estructuras arquitectónicas o sitios de importancia arqueológica, previa a la excavación.
• g)Excavación: consiste en la acción de remover la tierra, las rocas u otros elementos con el fin de evaluar o rescatar los rasgos culturales, estructuras arquitectónicas o sitios de importancia arqueológica.
• h)Conservación: se refiere a la protección de zonas específicas en sitios arqueológicos conforme al procedimiento descrito en el artículo 8 del presente reglamento.
• i)Sitios arqueológicos de importancia:

<![if !supportLists]> <![endif]>Son sitios que presentan rasgos culturales, estructuras arquitectónicas factibles de análisis, y/ó una estratigrafía cultural; <![if !supportLists]> <![endif]>Sitios en donde no se pueden definir rasgos culturales o estructuras arquitectónicas pero que aportan datos sobre los siguientes grupos antiguos: Paleoindios (10.000 a 6.000 a.C.), Arcaicos (6.000 a 3.000 a.C.), del Formativo Temprano (3.000 a 1.500 a.C.) ó Protohistóricos (1450 a 1550 d.C.).

• j)Sitios arqueológicos sin importancia: Aquellos sitios que no presentan las características anteriores; ó que presentan evidencia arqueológica insuficiente; o que están muy alterados ó que por sus características no permiten obtener información a partir de ellos." El artículo 2 define los sitios arqueológicos como la localidad en que mediante estudios arqueológicos, se demuestre la presencia de restos precolombinos, cuya importancia varía de acuerdo con las características de los restos y del valor que se confiera a éstos, según el conocimiento fundamentado sobre las culturas que poblaron la zona. No obstante esta definición, que en principio podría considerarse amplia, ese mismo artículo define como sitios arqeológicos de importancia aquellos que presentan rasgos culturales, estructuras arquitectónicas factibles de análisis, o una estratigrafía general, en donde se pueden definir rasgos culturales o estructuras arquitectónicas que aportan datos sobre los siguientes grupos antiguos: Paleoindios (10.000 a 6.000 a.C.), Arcaicos (6.000 a 3.000 a.C.), del Formativo Temprano (3.000 a 1.500 a.C.) o Protohistóricos (1450 a 1550 d.C.). Como primera aproximación corresponde señalar dos ideas relevantes. Primero, no se determina en dicho artículo ni en el resto del Decreto, cuál es la autoridad encargada de determinar si un sitio arqueológico es de importancia por presentar rasgos culturales o estructuras arquitectónicas factibles de análisis, por lo que a partir de lo dispuesto en la Ley 6703 de veintiocho de diciembre de mil novecientos ochenta y uno (artículos 4° y 15), así como de la necesidad de impedir que en el futuro surjan conflictos de competencias, o peor aún, una ausencia total de ellas que podría implicar una renuncia a las competencias propias del Estado en esta materia, debe esta Sala aclarar que siempre que se hable de esta materia en el proyecto, el miso debe interpretarse en el sentido de que son el Museo Nacional y la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional, los órganos del Estado que deberán establecer si se está ante yacimientos “de importancia”, a partir de criterios estrictamente científicos. Por otra parte, resulta de suma gravedad el hecho de que la clasificación histórica realizada para determinar cuándo un sitio arqueológico es de importancia prescinde de los períodos comprendidos entre los años 1.500 a.C. al 1450 d.C. y los eventuales hallazgos de antigüedad mayor a los 10.000 años a.C, es decir, que no considera de importancia los elementos arqueológico comprendidos en un período de casi tres mil años y en uno de amplitud indeterminada. Esta exclusión a todas luces es inconstitucional, en razón de que tanto el artículo 89 de la Constitución Política como los instrumentos que obligan al Estado costarricense a proteger los bienes arqueológicos, sin que dichas normas establezcan una gradación en razón de su época de origen, no pudiendo, desde esta perspectiva, discriminarse a priori en forma antojadiza y acientífica, como lo hace el Decreto en cuestión. Los aspectos hasta aquí señalados no son meramente técnicos problemas de definición arqueológica, sino que tienen profundas repercusiones desde un punto de vista de la protección de los bienes históricos, ya que la declaratoria de importancia de un sitio arqueológico determina relevantes consecuencias con respecto a su rescate y hallazgo. Así, dispone el artículo 3° del Decreto:

"Artículo 3º—Casos en que procede el rescate arqueológico. La etapa de rescate arqueológico únicamente procederá en aquellos casos en que se descubran rasgos culturales, estructuras arquitectónicas o sitios arqueológicos de importancia definidos en el artículo anterior, que merezcan ser registrados, analizados, o excavados.

Todos los bienes patrimoniales hallados en los estudios arqueológicos, deberán ser entregados al Museo Nacional, el cual se encargará de los trámites respectivos de almacenaje y registro y sin costo alguno para el interesado." Es claro, a partir de las normas antes transcritas, que se abre la posibilidad de encontrar bienes arqueológicos que, además de no presentar rasgos culturales, estructuras arquitectónicas factibles de análisis o una estratigrafía cultural, pertenecen a la época que abarca de los años 1.500 a.C. al 1420 d.C. o anteriores al 10.000 a.C., por lo que serían considerados como bienes sin importancia y por lo tanto no se ameritaría su rescate. Lo mismo cabe decir en el caso de los hallazgos, ya que un bien arqueológico como el antes señalado tampoco requeriría rescate alguno. Finalmente, el estado de conservación de los bienes no necesariamente supone su poca importancia desde el punto de vista arqueológico, por lo que entenderlos a priori como carentes de importancia –con los efectos que dicha condición conlleva- resulta en la desprotección de diversos tipos de objetos cuya aparente insignificancia (concheros, sitios alterados, etc.) impide que el Estado les dé una efectiva protección, en contravención a sus deberes constitucionales e internacionales. La inadmisible exclusión de un período histórico considerable de nuestra historia como elemento objetivo determinador de su importancia desde un punto de vista arqueológico, así como las consecuencias que ello apareja en la regulación de los rescates y hallazgos en tales casos, importan violaciones a los artículos 50, 74 y 89 constitucionales, así como las normas convencionales citadas con anterioridad.

XV.- Permiso para realizar excavaciones. (Redacta el Magistrado Sancho) Cuestionan los accionantes la validez de la norma contenida en el artículo 4° del Decreto Ejecutivo, que exige la autorización del propietario para proceder a realizar excavaciones de carácter arqueológico. Dispone el citado artículo:

"Artículo 4º—Permiso del propietario para excavar. Para poder ejecutar excavaciones, sean de evaluación o de rescate, deberá contarse con la autorización del o los propietarios del terreno que se va a excavar. Las excavaciones deberán limitarse únicamente al área del proyecto." La anterior disposición reproduce, en buena medida, lo que regula el artículo 12 de la Ley número 6703 de veintiocho de diciembre de mil novecientos ochenta y uno, al expresar:

"Artículo 12.- La Comisión Arqueológica Nacional podrá autorizar excavaciones con autorización del propietario del terreno, y con la obligación de supervisar la excavación en forma directa y adecuada, y de adoptar las medidas correspondientes para evitar daños a la propiedad de que se trate." (El subrayado no es del original).

El mecanismo jurídico de obtener el permiso previo del propietario del inmueble que desarrolla la normativa que se cuestiona, en síntesis, prevé que en los sitios, ya sean de interés arqueológico o no, en los que existan estudios previos o que se trate de hallazgos que merezcan acciones de evaluación o de rescate, son procedentes y legítimas todas las acciones del Estado para preservar el patrimonio arqueológico. El tema que se plantea en este considerando tiene que ver con la coincidencia de la aparición de rasgos arqueológicos de importancia en propiedad privada y la preocupación de cómo asegurar que el patrimonio del Estado se proteja, se rescate y se conserve. En criterio de la mayoría de la Sala, cuando las normas hablan de la necesidad de contar con los permisos del propietario para realizar excavaciones arqueológicas, se apunta al respeto que debe existir del derecho de propiedad en la dimensión que se establece en el artículo 45 de la Constitución Política. De conformidad con los términos de esta sentencia, especialmente en los considerandos VIII, IX y X, en la práctica existen dos derechos de propiedad de naturaleza diversa, que pueden eventualmente entrar en conflicto: por un lado el patrimonio arqueológico que es un bien de dominio público, como se deja sentado en esta sentencia, y que es, además, un derecho privilegiado, por los rasgos característicos que lo informan; por otro lado, el derecho a la propiedad, sea pública o privada, pero que es distinto de los bienes que integran el dominio público y que es un derecho de la más rancia solera, como que fue calificado de "derecho natural" en el Pacto Social Fundamental Interino de Costa Rica del 1° de diciembre de 1821 y del que se dice es una de las piedras angulares de la formación política y social del régimen democrático del país. Frente al hipotético conflicto de intereses que pudiera surgir, debe resolverse cuál de los dos derechos prevalece sobre el otro y en el criterio de la mayoría de la Sala, lo que debe existir es un perfecto equilibrio que favorezca a cada uno de los dos, pero en la medida que los proteja a ambos en su justa dimensión. Del derecho de propiedad, en el proceso constituyente de mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve, se dijo:

"De advertir es, en primer lugar, que el artículo 29 de la Constitución de 1871, en cierta forma introducía ya el concepto de función social de la propiedad, en virtud de la reforma que se le introdujo en el año 43, al hablar de que el Congreso podría mediante los dos tercios de la totalidad de sus miembros, imponerle a la propiedad privada las limitaciones de interés social. Se admitió que a la propiedad se le pueden imponer limitaciones por causas de interés social, y al hacerlo, implícitamente quedó establecido también que en Costa Rica la propiedad había perdido constitucionalmente, desde ese momento, el carácter absoluto, cerrado, que tuvo en épocas anteriores, cuando el liberalismo económico y el individualismo manchesteriano estaban en su apogeo… la propiedad privada no puede considerarse como algo que interese sólo a su titular, desconociendo las consecuencias que en la sociedad pueda producir el desordenado o arbitrario ejercicio del respectivo derecho; éste se reconoce y se garantiza, porque se sabe útil y conveniente su existencia para el desarrollo de la economía nacional, pero se garantiza dentro de las limitaciones lógicas que le impone el hecho de su función social; que no puede ser por tanto un concepto absoluto e inviolable… La idea de que la propiedad es o tiene una función social, es una idea impuesta por las necesidades del mundo moderno en la economía de los países libres, la cual debe ajustarse no sólo para beneficio de los propietarios, sino para el de toda la sociedad, para el de los otros factores de la producción, para el de los grupos que compran los productos en el mercado, para beneficio, en fin, de todos los elementos cuya concurrencia hace lo posible que se produzcan las ganancias que se derivan de la propiedad privada." (Principales ideas expuestas por el diputado Rodrigo Facio. Actas de la Constituyente. Tomo II, páginas 465 y siguientes) Sentado todo lo anterior, a juicio de la Sala, están disponibles para el Estado, en función de proteger adecuadamente el patrimonio arqueológico, aplicar todos los mecanismos jurídicos necesarios para dictar medidas cautelares de carácter administrativo y para gestionar, en sede jurisdiccional, con la rapidez que el caso amerite, la aplicación de las medidas necesarias para proteger ese patrimonio y para compeler al propietario remiso a acceder a que se realicen las obras de excavación, cuando las circunstancias lo ameriten. En otras palabras, no puede ser inconstitucional el que se deba pedir la autorización al propietario del terreno, puesto que el suyo, es un derecho de rango constitucional y la máxima de que "la propiedad es inviolable", no admite otra interpretación como no sea la que se deriva de su contenido literal, sobre todo si se repara en que las excepciones a tal principio solo pueden ser las que ya están contenidas, expresamente, en el mismo artículo 45 constitucional; pero entendido todo, desde luego, en función de la interpretación que le dio la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente de mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve, según los términos de la intervención del Diputado Facio Brenes. Por otro lado, afirmar que para proteger el patrimonio arqueológico, el Estado pueda desconocer el derecho de propiedad, que quedaría de tal forma, subordinado a aquél, no es una conclusión a la que pueda arribarse con la sola confrontación de ambos derechos. En resumen: la Constitución Política, por definición, tiene una estructura tal en la que se alinean de manera armónica los derechos y garantías y no es posible afirmar la prevalencia de uno sobre los demás. Cuando existe un conflicto de intereses, "ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación", dispone el artículo 41 constitucional y debe hacerse justicia pronta y cumplida. Esto significa que el mismo texto fundamental ha previsto la forma como se debe proceder para disolver las controversias entre las personas y es, a juicio de la mayoría de la Sala, el sentido que debe darse a las normas que se examinan (artículo 4 del Decreto Ejecutivo 28174-MP-MINAE-MEIC y artículo 12 de la Ley 6703 de 28 de diciembre de 1981). Es decir, que esas normas no son inconstitucionales; en caso de la negativa del propietario del terreno, justificada o no, para facilitar las excavaciones de evaluación o rescate del patrimonio arqueológico, el Estado puede inmovilizar la propiedad de que se trate, dictando medidas cautelares sin que por ello incurra en violación del derecho de propiedad, a reserva de que deba, de inmediato, acudir a los tribunales de justicia para pedir las autorizaciones correspondientes y todo sin perjuicio de ejercer, si lo estima conveniente, el derecho de expropiar parcial o totalmente el terreno. En razón de todo lo dicho, por mayoría, este extremo de la acción declara que las normas involucradas no son inconstitucionales.

XVI.- De los hallazgos por parte de terceros. El ordinal 5° establece la necesidad de comunicar al Museo Nacional los hallazgos que sean localizados, órgano al que se le da un plazo de 15 días naturales para efectuar los estudios necesarios y determinar si son de importancia, y 15 días adicionales para elaborar una propuesta en caso de determinar que los bienes hallados requieren ser rescatados. Determina igualmente la posibilidad de continuar con las obras si dentro de los plazos mencionados, el Museo no ha realizado las acciones correspondientes.

"Artículo 5º—Hallazgos por parte de terceros. Cuando a través de terceras personas se notifique al Museo Nacional del descubrimiento de monumentos, ruinas, inscripciones, objetos de interés arqueológico en terrenos públicos o privados, el procedimiento será el siguiente:

• a)El Museo Nacional, dentro de los siguientes 15 días naturales contados a partir de dicha notificación, deberá realizar una inspección arqueológica y cuando corresponda una evaluación del sitio. Si los restos encontrados son de importancia arqueológica, el Museo Nacional contará con un plazo máximo de 15 días naturales adicionales para elaborar una propuesta de las labores de rescate arqueológico.
• b)El rescate podrá ser realizado por las personas debidamente acreditadas ante la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional (CAN), bajo la supervisión del Museo Nacional y se limitará a las áreas del proyecto definidas por la evaluación arqueológica.
• c)Si vencidos los plazos establecidos en el inciso a) del presente artículo, no se han realizado las acciones correspondientes, el proyectista podrá continuar desarrollando sus actividades ordinarias." El texto de este artículo es en parte reproducción de los dispuesto en el ordinal 13 de la Ley número 6703 ya citada, en lo referente al deber de los terceros de reportar al Museo Nacional acerca de los hallazgos de objetos arqueológicos, y al plazo de 15 días con que cuenta dicha institución para efectuar los estudios correspondientes. Ambas normas se distinguen, sin embargo, en que la impugnada define con claridad que se trata de un plazo contado en días naturales; asimismo, en el hecho de que vencido el término, el descubridor de los objetos podrá continuar con las obras respectivas. Este último aspecto resulta claramente inconstitucional, pues supedita la protección del patrimonio arqueológico a la diligencia de la Administración, específicamente al cumplimiento de los cortos plazos (en días naturales) previstos por la norma en cuestión. Esta Sala ya ha establecido en una consistente línea jurisprudencial que en cuanto a la protección de intereses esenciales para la Nación, tales como el medio ambiente (y podríamos decir lo mismo del patrimonio arqueológico) no opera el silencio positivo por la omisión de la Administración en el cumplimiento de sus deberes, sin perjuicio de la responsabilidad a la que se pueda hacer acreedor por los daños que su atraso ocasione a los administrados. (Ver en ese sentido las sentencias números 6332-94, de las dieciocho horas con doce minutos del veintiséis de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, y 1895-00, de las quince horas con cuarenta y seis minutos del veintinueve de febrero de dos mil) Iguales argumentos deberán ser empleados para anular las normas contenidas en el inciso d) del artículo 11 y en el inciso d) del artículo 12 del Reglamento impugnado, por establecer un silencio positivo a favor de los proyectistas que hayan realizado un estudio arqueológico voluntario, y hayan sometido sus resultados a la aprobación de la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional. Esta última disposición, aunque no haya sido impugnada en la presente acción, por conexidad deberá ser anulada.

XVII.- Procedimiento en caso de ejecución de obras públicas o privadas. El numeral 6° del Decreto impugnado establece que los movimientos de tierra no requieren autorización del Museo Nacional ni estudio arqueológico, salvo en aquellos casos en que el terreno se encuentra ubicado en un sitio arqueológico según los procedimientos de la Ley número 7555. El texto del referido artículo es el siguiente:

"Artículo 6º—Hallazgos por parte de proyectistas. Los movimientos de tierra no requieren autorización del Museo Nacional ni estudio arqueológico, salvo en aquellos casos en que el terreno se encuentra ubicado en un sitio arqueológico según los procedimientos de la ley Nº 7555.

Si en los trabajos que se realizan para la ejecución de obras públicas o privadas se descubren objetos arqueológicos, el procedimiento será el siguiente:

• a)El responsable del proyecto deberá notificar el hecho, en forma inmediata al Museo Nacional y poner a disposición de éste los objetos encontrados. El proyectista únicamente deberá paralizar los trabajos para la realización de las obras en aquella o aquellas áreas en donde se hayan encontrado objetos arqueológicos.
• b)El Museo Nacional, dentro de los siguientes 15 días naturales contados a partir de dicha notificación, deberá realizar una inspección arqueológica y cuando corresponda una evaluación del sitio. Si los restos encontrados son de importancia arqueológica, el Museo Nacional contará con un plazo máximo de 15 días naturales adicionales para elaborar una propuesta de las labores de rescate arqueológico.
• c)Si vencidos los plazos establecidos en los incisos a) y b) del presente artículo, no se han realizado las acciones correspondientes, el proyectista podrá continuar desarrollando sus actividades ordinarias.
• d)El rescate se limitará únicamente a las áreas del proyecto definidas en la evaluación arqueológica, la cual debe ser previamente aprobada por la CAN." El artículo 6° párrafo 1° establece que se requiere de autorización previa del Museo Nacional para la realización de movimientos de tierra únicamente en los terrenos que se encuentren ubicados en un sitio arqueológico declarado como tal según los procedimientos establecidos en la Ley número 7555. Al respecto, lo primero que debe ser aclarado es que la referida Ley tiene como objeto "…la preservación del patrimonio histórico-arquitectónico de Costa Rica" (artículo 1°), disponiendo que el Poder Ejecutivo podrá, por vía de Decreto, efectuar la respectiva declaratoria, luego de efectuados los estudios que determinen la presencia de un sitio de importancia según los términos de la Ley (artículo 7°). Resulta evidente que el concepto de patrimonio arqueológico va mucho más allá del legado arquitectónico, pues como fue dicho atrás, constituye un concepto amplio que abarca una vasta pluralidad de bienes muebles e inmuebles, restos de personas, animales y plantas, capaces de arrojar información acerca de nuestros ancestros. En razón de lo anterior, limitar la obtención de permisos arqueológicos a los movimientos de tierra realizados en lugares declarados como de interés histórico-arquitectónico (Ley 7.555) implica la desprotección del patrimonio arqueológico ubicado en todas aquellas zonas del país que no hayan sido objeto de una declaración formal, de conformidad con la citada Ley. Así, la supeditación de los permisos del Museo Nacional a la existencia previa de la referida declaratoria del Poder Ejecutivo implica su efectiva desprotección, en clara contravención de lo que ordena el artículo 89 de la Constitución Política. Este vicio tampoco se salva con el hecho de que el artículo 9° del Decreto impugnado establezca que cualquier proyectista público o privado, previo a la realización de sus obras, podrá realizar un estudio arqueológico voluntario en el terreno, ya que no puede dejarse a discreción de los particulares el cumplimiento de funciones de protección que corresponden al Estado. Por lo anterior, debe esta Sala declarar la invalidez de la frase “según los procedimientos de la Ley N° 7555” contenido en el primer párrafo del artículo 6° del Decreto objeto de esta acción.

XVIII.- Sobre los trámites voluntarios. Los artículos 9° y 10 del proyecto prevén los estudios arqueológicos que el propietario, en forma voluntaria, puede realizar en su finca antes de efectuar una obra civil. Rezan los mencionados numerales:

"Artículo 9º— Trámites de estudios arqueológicos voluntarios. Cualquier proyectista público o privado, que previo a la realización de sus obras, desee realizar un estudio arqueológico del terreno en que va a realizar la obra y que no haya sido muy alterado anteriormente, podrá contratar a cualquier persona debidamente autorizada y registrada ante la CAN para la realización de todas o cualquiera de las etapas de un estudio arqueológico. Podrá contratar los estudios para determinar la existencia de evidencia cultural en el área por alterar o el potencial daño al patrimonio arqueológico con el propósito de implementar las medidas preventivas que eviten o reduzcan dichos daños.

Igualmente y de forma voluntaria, el interesado podrá contratar cualquier persona debidamente autorizada y registrada ante la CAN para la supervisión de los movimientos de tierras." "Artículo 10.—Inspección arqueológica. Para determinar si existe evidencia cultural en el área del proyecto, el proyectista, público o privado, podrá contratar para la realización de las inspecciones, a cualquier persona autorizada y registrada en la CAN para realizar estudios arqueológicos.

Como no se trata de excavación, la inspección no requerirá presentación de una propuesta ante la CAN ni de la remisión de un informe final." Al respecto, debe esta Sala aclarar que no es inconstitucional permitir a los particulares la realización de estudios arqueológicos en sus propiedades antes de construir. Contrario sería si las posibilidades de estudio del impacto arqueológico de una obra dependieran exclusivamente de la voluntad de los particulares, es decir, si no existieran mecanismos a través de los cuales el Estado puede intervenir directamente en cumplimiento de sus deberes constitucionales en relación con el patrimonio histórico. Por las mismas razones, tampoco resulta inconstitucional que tales análisis sean llevados a cabo por parte de profesionales registrados y autorizados por la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional. Lo que sí resulta contrario a la Constitución Política es lo que determinan los incisos d) del artículo 11, y d) del artículo 12, pues en ambos casos se establecen formas de silencio positivo a favor de los propietarios, en perjuicio de la reforzada protección que el Estado está obligado a dar al patrimonio arqueológico, como fuera establecido en el “considerando XVI” de esta sentencia.

XIX.- Registro de personas autorizadas para efectuar estudios arqueológicos. Contiene el artículo 15 del reglamento impugnado el siguiente texto:

"Artículo 15.—Registro de personas autorizadas por la CAN para realizar estudios arqueológicos. Las personas físicas o jurídicas, nacionales o extranjeras, que posean un grado universitario en arqueología y una experiencia mínima de dos trabajos de asistencia en evaluaciones arqueológicas, podrán acreditarse en el Registro de personas autorizadas por la CAN para realizar estudios arqueológicos.

Dichas personas podrán realizar todas las labores que implican las fases de inspección, evaluación y rescate, incluyendo los análisis de laboratorio que podrán realizar en laboratorios públicos o privados.

La Comisión Arqueológica Nacional (CAN) deberá realizar un Registro de las personas que cumplan con los requisitos establecidos en el primer párrafo del presente artículo, a partir de las solicitudes de registro presentadas. La CAN deberá poner a disposición de los proyectistas el Registro de personas acreditadas para realizar estudios arqueológicos.

La CAN deberá brindar a las personas acreditadas, en el momento de la realización de una evaluación, la bibliografía disponible, los informes finales de las evaluaciones realizadas anteriormente, la base de datos de sitios arqueológicos y demás estudios, para lo cual el Museo deberá proporcionar a la CAN la información correspondiente." No parece existir –siguiendo la línea argumentativa contenida en el punto anterior- ningún vicio de inconstitucionalidad en el hecho de que profesionales debidamente acreditados puedan llevar a cabo estudios arqueológicos, debidamente supervisados por el Estado, a través del Museo Nacional. En el caso de la labor de rescate, que implica la salida de los objetos del sitio donde se encuentran y su traslado a manos de la Administración a efecto de protegerlos, dicha actividad, si bien no solamente puede ser llevada a cabo por parte del Estado, a través de las autoridades del Museo Nacional, sino también por parte de profesionales debidamente acreditados, lo cierto es que en este caso la fiscalización que la Administración realice debe ser acentuada, en aras de evitar que los referidos bienes sean sustraídos del dominio público.

XX.- Derogación del inciso c) del artículo 14 del Decreto 19016-C. El artículo 16 inciso c) del reglamento impugnado deroga –en lo conducente- el texto del inciso c) del artículo 14 del decreto Ejecutivo 19016-C, Reglamento de la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional.

"Artículo 16.— Reformas. Modifíquese el Reglamento de la Comisión Arqueológica Nacional, decreto ejecutivo Nº 19106-C del 12 de junio de 1989:

(…)

• c)Deróguese el inciso c) del artículo 14 del citado reglamento." El texto derogado es el siguiente:

"Artículo 14.- Serán funciones de la comisión Arqueológica Nacional:

(…)

• c)Autorizar excavaciones arqueológicas. Para ello, el interesado deberá solicitar el respectivo formulario a la CAN y remitirlo a esta con la información completa. La CAN evaluará la solicitud, y emitirá su decisión en un máximo de dos meses a partir de la presentación. La decisión será comunicada por escrito al interesado, y de la misma se enviará copia al Departamento de Antropología e Historia del Museo Nacional, adjuntándose el antecedente del asunto.

(…)" Estima esta Sala que la derogación de la norma en cuestión no constituye un vicio de inconstitucionalidad. Lo anterior por cuanto si bien se elimina dicha disposición, no así el trámite en ella contenido, el cual está previsto en los artículos 5° y 6° del Decreto impugnado, con la única diferencia de que los plazos se redujeron como modo de atenuar la carga de trámites que pesa sobre el proyectista, y recordando que en esta misma sentencia ya la Sala consideró inválidas las normas que establecen un silencio positivo a favor del proyectista en esta materia. Por las razones dichas, el referido inciso c) del artículo 16 del Decreto en estudio no es inconstitucional.

XXI.- Exclusión de los estudios arqueológicos de los trámites de evaluación ambiental. El artículo 17 del Reglamento impugnado dispone al respecto lo siguiente:

"Artículo 17.— Derogatorias.

• a)Deróguese el párrafo final del inciso a.2. del artículo 19 del Reglamento de Procedimientos de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional del Ambiente (SETENA), decreto ejecutivo Nº 25705-MINAE del 8 de octubre de 1996 y sus reformas que dice así: “Áreas donde exista un registro expreso de la presencia de sitios arqueológicos, definidas por el Museo Nacional, preferiblemente en mapas publicados y divulgados, a una escala no mayor de 1:50.000 y registrados ante la SETENA.” b) Deróguese del Manual de Instrumentos Técnicos del Proceso de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, resolución de la SETENA Nº 588-97 del 28 de agosto de 1997, publicado en “La Gaceta” 215 del 7 de noviembre de 1997 en su página 21, el requisito informativo del Formulario de Evaluación Ambiental Preliminar (FEAP) solicitado por SETENA sobre la “existencia dentro del área de impacto del proyecto de posibles áreas de interés arqueológico o de patrimonio histórico y cultural, de acuerdo a los datos suministrados por el Museo Nacional”, para lo cual deben aportar la nota del Museo”. Asimismo deróguese la inclusión del requisito relacionado con las evaluaciones y estudios arqueológicos en el trámite del Estudio de impacto ambiental EsIA." Con las anteriores disposiciones, se eliminó el componente arqueológico de los dos principales mecanismos de evaluación ambiental detallados en la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, como son el Formulario de Evaluación Ambiental Preliminar (FEAP) y el Estudio de Impacto Ambiental (EsiA). Tomando en cuenta que los requisitos antes mencionados no son sustituidos en el Decreto de cita por cualesquiera otros idóneos para garantizar en forma preventiva la integridad del patrimonio arqueológico, estima la Sala que dichas derogatorias devienen inconstitucionales. Como fuera dicho atrás, el patrimonio arqueológico forma parte del concepto más amplio de ambiente, precisamente porque es el componente cultural (humano) del ambiente. Una protección completa al ambiente, que respete por ende, en forma íntegra lo ordenado por el artículo 50 constitucional, debe contemplar la tutela de los bienes arqueológicos, del legado histórico a través del cual el ser humano se ha adaptado y ha modificado su entorno a lo largo de los siglos.

XXII.- Conclusión. En razón de los argumentos contenidos en los párrafos que preceden, considera esta Sala que la presente acción debe ser declarada parcialmente con lugar, por entender que del Decreto Ejecutivo número 28174-mp-minae-MEIC, de doce de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, publicado en el Alcance número 78-A a La Gaceta número 202, de diecinueve de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, son inconstitucionales, del párrafo 2ª del inciso i) del artículo 2°, la palabra "siguientes", así como el texto posterior a la palabra "antiguos"; el inciso c) del artículo 5; del párrafo 1° del artículo 6 la frase “según los procedimientos de la Ley 7555”; el inciso d) del artículo 11; el inciso d) del artículo 12; así como el artículo 17, por lo que recobrarán su vigencia los requisitos establecidos en el párrafo final del inciso a.2. del artículo 19 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 25075-MINAE, y en el Manual de Instrumentos Técnicos del Proceso de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, resolución de la SETENA número 588-97 de veintiocho de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y siete. Las normas anteriormente citadas son inconstitucionales por violación a los artículos 7°, 50, 74 y 89 de la Constitución Política, así como a los instrumentos internacionales vigentes en Costa Rica, referidos en el considerando VII de esta sentencia. En lo demás, se declarará sin lugar la acción, como en efecto se hace.

Salvan el voto los magistrados Arguedas, Vargas y Armijo y declaran inconstitucional, además el artículo 4 del Decreto 28174-MP-MINAE-MEIC y por conexidad, del conformidad con el artículo 89 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, se anula la expresión “con autorización del propietario del terreno”, del artículo 12 de la Ley de Patrimonio Nacional Arqueológico, número 6703 de veintiocho de diciembre de mil novecientos ochenta y seis.

Por tanto:

Se declara parcialmente con lugar la acción. Se anulan por inconstitucionales, del Decreto Ejecutivo número 28174-mp-minae-MEIC, de doce de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, del párrafo 2ª del inciso i) del artículo 2°, la palabra "siguientes", así como el texto posterior a la palabra "antiguos"; el inciso c) del artículo 5; del párrafo 1° del artículo 6 la frase “según los procedimientos de la Ley 7555”; el inciso d) del artículo 11; el inciso d) del artículo 12; así como el artículo 17, por lo que recobran su vigencia los requisitos establecidos en el párrafo final del inciso a.2. del artículo 19 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 25075-MINAE, y en el Manual de Instrumentos Técnicos del Proceso de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, resolución de la SETENA número 588-97 de veintiocho de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y siete. Esta sentencia es declarativa y retroactiva a la fecha de emisión del Decreto que se impugna, sin perjuicio de derechos adquiridos de buena fe. En lo demás, se declara sin lugar la acción. Reséñese en el Diario Oficial "La Gaceta" y publíquese íntegramente en el Boletín Judicial. Comuníquese a los Poderes Legislativo y Ejecutivo. Notifíquese.- Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Eduardo Sancho G.

Carlos M. Arguedas R. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

MCP/oc/13céd.-