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Res. 30954-2026 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 13/08/2026
OutcomeResultado
As to the requests of 4 September and 7 October 2024, the Chamber directed the parties to abide by judgment 2024036996; as to the remainder, it denied the amparo and stated that the alleged delay must be litigated in the administrative-litigation jurisdiction.Respecto de las gestiones del 4 de septiembre y 7 de octubre de 2024, la Sala dispuso estarse a lo resuelto en la sentencia 2024036996; en lo demás, declaró sin lugar el recurso y señaló que la mora alegada debe discutirse en la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) found that the amparo beneficiary had made several requests to INDER to open proceedings concerning payment for possession rights over a property in Rey Curré Indigenous Territory. As to the requests of 4 September and 7 October 2024, it directed that the parties abide by an earlier judgment. It denied the amparo as to the later requests, holding that delay in resolving administrative proceedings and compliance with their deadlines are ordinary legality issues for the administrative-litigation jurisdiction, except in circumstances recognized by the Chamber. It did not decide whether the beneficiary has possession rights, is entitled to compensation, or whether INDER must open administrative proceedings. INDER stated that the matter remained in process under the National Plan for the Recovery of Indigenous Territories.La Sala Constitucional tuvo por acreditado que la amparada presentó varias gestiones ante el INDER para que se abriera un procedimiento sobre el pago de derechos de posesión de un inmueble en el territorio indígena de Rey Curré. Respecto de las solicitudes del 4 de septiembre y 7 de octubre de 2024, dispuso estarse a lo resuelto en una sentencia anterior. En cuanto a las gestiones posteriores, declaró sin lugar el recurso: consideró que la mora en resolver procedimientos administrativos y el cumplimiento de sus plazos son asuntos de legalidad ordinaria que deben discutirse en la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, salvo las excepciones reconocidas por la Sala. No resolvió si la amparada tiene derechos de posesión, si corresponde indemnizarla ni si el INDER debe abrir un procedimiento administrativo. El INDER indicó que la gestión seguía en trámite dentro del Plan Nacional de Recuperación de Territorios Indígenas.
Key excerptExtracto clave
Accordingly, this Court had already ruled on the delay concerning the requests of 4 September and 7 October 2024, dismissing the amparo for the reasons stated. Therefore, as to those particular requests, the beneficiary must abide by what was decided in judgment No. 2024036996 at 9:30 a.m. on 13 December 2024. V.- Although in this case the respondent alleges that, after 4 September and 7 October 2024, the beneficiary made new requests to the same effect and claims that the respondent authority has still not acted as requested, the explanation in the cited precedent must be reiterated: the alleged delay in this case does not fall within the exceptions established by this Chamber concerning prompt and effective justice (Article 41 of the Political Constitution). For that reason, the amparo is inadmissible in this constitutional forum and must be debated before the administrative-litigation jurisdiction.Así las cosas, véase que este Tribunal ya se había pronunciado sobre la mora atinente a las gestiones de 4 de septiembre y 7 de octubre de 2024, desestimando el recurso según los razonamientos expuestos. Ergo, en relación con estas gestiones en particular deberá la amparada estarse a lo resuelto en la sentencia nro. 2024036996 de las 9:30 horas de 13 de diciembre de 2024. V.- Ahora, si bien en el sub iudice el accionado alega que, luego del 4 de septiembre y 7 de octubre de 2024, la tutelada formuló nuevas gestiones en el mismo sentido y acusa que la autoridad accionada tampoco ha procedido según lo solicitado, cabe reiterar lo explicado en el precedente citado ut supra, en cuanto a que la mora acusada en la especie no se encuentra dentro de los supuestos de excepción establecidos por esta Cámara en lo atinente a una justicia pronta y cumplida (artículo 41 de la Constitución Política), razón por la cual el recurso resulta inadmisible en esta sede constitucional, y deberá ser objeto de discusión ante la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"En suma, la nueva jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa es un cauce idóneo, por sus nuevas características de simplicidad, celeridad y prontitud para el amparo y protección efectiva de las situaciones jurídicas sustanciales de los administrados en las que se requiera recabar prueba o definir algunas cuestiones de legalidad ordinaria."
"In sum, the new administrative-litigation jurisdiction is a suitable avenue, given its features of simplicity, speed, and promptness, for effectively protecting the substantive legal positions of individuals where evidence must be gathered or ordinary legality issues determined."
Considerando VI
"En suma, la nueva jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa es un cauce idóneo, por sus nuevas características de simplicidad, celeridad y prontitud para el amparo y protección efectiva de las situaciones jurídicas sustanciales de los administrados en las que se requiera recabar prueba o definir algunas cuestiones de legalidad ordinaria."
Considerando VI
"En todo lo demás, se declara sin lugar el recurso."
"In all other respects, the amparo is denied."
Por tanto
"En todo lo demás, se declara sin lugar el recurso."
Por tanto
Full documentDocumento completo
Document Review CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at 9:30 a.m. on 13 August 2026.
Amparo proceeding filed in case no. 26-015288-0007-CO by Nombre03, identity card CED03, on behalf of Nombre02, identity card CED04, against the RURAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE (INDER).
Background:
FIRST: Regarding Ms. Nombre02’s status as a non-Indigenous older adult. It is true that the amparo applicant states that Ms. Nombre02 is an older adult and does not belong to an Indigenous people. This Administration respects that status and the special protection that the legal system recognizes for older adults. Nevertheless, it must be stated that the mere assertion that she does not belong to an Indigenous people does not, by itself, establish that an ordinary administrative proceeding should be opened immediately or that an indemnifiable possessory right exists. Those matters require technical, social, legal, territorial, and documentary assessment within the corresponding stages of Plan RTI.
SECOND: Regarding the alleged good-faith acquisition of a property in 1976. We reject that this Administration may consider it established, solely on the basis of the amparo applicant’s statements, that Ms. Nombre02 acquired a property in good faith in 1976. Determining good faith, whether there was actual occupation, the duration of possession, the validity or scope of an unregistered private document, and whether indemnification may be warranted are matters that require technical and legal analysis through the applicable channels. Therefore, those matters cannot be considered proven in constitutional proceedings, nor can an ordinary administrative proceeding be ordered to open automatically without first having the minimum technical information required.
THIRD: Regarding the property’s location within the Rey Curré Indigenous Territory. We reject that the information provided by the amparo applicant establishes definitively that the property described is within the Rey Curré Indigenous Territory. In letter INDER-GG-DRT-FT-IRT-OFI-0923-2024, which was sent to the amparo applicant, this Administration stated that it did not have a cadastral survey, sketch, coordinates, or sufficient technical information to locate the property precisely. Accordingly, before any determination on the possible opening of an ordinary administrative proceeding, technical, territorial, registry, and topographic checks must be carried out.
FOURTH: Regarding the claim that when she acquired the property there was no Indigenous reserve or Indigenous people at the site. We reject that this Administration may confirm that point in the terms stated by the amparo applicant. Historical determination of the creation, delimitation, modification, and validity of an Indigenous territory, as well as assessment of whether there was an Indigenous population at a particular time, requires technical, legal, and historical analysis. Those matters exceed the summary nature of an amparo proceeding and cannot be resolved solely on the basis of a party’s assertions.
FIFTH: Regarding the claim that INDER ‘removed’ a neighboring property holder and that Ms. Nombre02 therefore fears eviction. We reject that INDER issued any administrative action ordering Ms. Nombre02 to be evicted or abruptly removed from the property she says she occupies. The institutional procedure under Plan RTI does not operate as the amparo applicant describes. Any action relating to occupations within Indigenous territories must respect due process, the right to a defense, the corresponding notice, and the opportunity to submit evidence. Therefore, there is no threat of any kind attributable to INDER that would justify granting this amparo application.
SIXTH: Regarding the allegations of harm to the protected person’s health, stress, anxiety, insomnia, and worry. This Administration understands and respects the personal situation described by the amparo applicant concerning Ms. Nombre02’s status as an older adult. Nevertheless, we reject that any arbitrary, illegitimate, or omissive action by INDER directly violated her fundamental rights. To the contrary, additional steps have been taken to seek interinstitutional support for the protected person. In that regard, by letter INDER-GG-DRT-FT-IRT-OFI-0348-2026 dated 26 March 2026, the case was referred to the National Council for Older Adults and the Joint Social Assistance Institute so that they could assess her socioeconomic circumstances, health, family support network, access to a pension, and the possible activation of social protection measures. That letter was sent to both institutions on 27 March 2026. IMAS acknowledged receipt that same day, and CONAPAM responded on 12 May 2026, indicating that the case would be referred to the corresponding care networks in Osa and Buenos Aires for assessment.
SEVENTH: Regarding the claim that INDER has refused to open the administrative proceeding. We categorically reject that INDER has arbitrarily or definitively refused to process the request submitted by the amparo applicant. This Administration has stated that the possible opening of an ordinary administrative proceeding first requires preliminary technical activities, such as a census, territorial verification, topographic survey, registry analysis, identification of the occupation, coordination with the corresponding Indigenous Integral Development Association, and preparation of a preliminary case file. Consequently, there is no institutional refusal, but rather compliance with the applicable technical and administrative procedure.
EIGHTH: Regarding the requests submitted on 4 September 2024 and 7 October 2024. It is true that the amparo applicant submitted requests related to opening an administrative proceeding on 4 September 2024 and 7 October 2024. Those requests were addressed by letter INDER-GG-DRTFT-IRT-OFI-0923-2024, served by email on 7 November 2024, which stated that minimum technical information was needed to locate the property and determine whether the corresponding actions were warranted. Likewise, those requests had already been considered by the Constitutional Chamber in case no. 24-029619-0007-CO, which that Honorable Chamber decided, finding it established that this Administration had provided a formal response.
NINTH: Regarding the requests submitted on 28 January 2025, 5 February 2025, and 2 September 2025. It is true that the amparo applicant submitted various administrative requests on 28 January 2025, 5 February 2025, and 2 September 2025, addressed both to this Unit and to the Executive Presidency of the Rural Development Institute. In them, he substantially reiterated the same arguments previously presented, relating to the request for the urgent opening of an ordinary administrative proceeding for Ms. Nombre02, citing her status as an older adult, her alleged good-faith possession, and the need for prompt institutional attention. In response to those requests, this Administration issued letter INDER-GG-DRT-FTIRT-OFI-0615-2026 dated 25 May 2026, providing a consolidated formal response to the above-mentioned filings and expressly reiterating that this Administration has not rejected Ms. Nombre02’s request and that it is currently being processed as part of the activities carried out under the National Plan for the Recovery of Indigenous Territories (Plan RTI).
The cited letter also reiterated that this Administration had previously responded to the requests in letters INDER-GG-DRT-FT-IRT-OFI-0923-2024 and INDER-GG-DRT-FT-IRT-OFI-1058-2025, and that the request had already been considered by the Constitutional Chamber in case no. 24-029619-0007-CO. It further reiterated that the prioritization of occupations to be addressed under Plan RTI is carried out in coordination with the Indigenous Integral Development Associations, in their capacity as local governments and representatives of the respective Indigenous territories, in accordance with the applicable regulatory framework and the corresponding territorial coordination and planning processes. Consequently, it is not true that there has been abandonment, an absolute refusal, deliberate neglect, or unlawful omission attributable to the Rural Development Institute, since the requests identified by the amparo applicant were formally addressed by the above-mentioned letter, and the case is currently being processed under the framework for implementing Plan RTI.
TENTH: Regarding the request submitted to the Executive Presidency on 6 October 2025. It is true that on 6 October 2025—and not 4 October 2025, as the amparo applicant states—Lic. Nombre03 submitted a filing to the Executive Presidency requesting an order to open the ordinary administrative proceeding urgently. That filing was referred to the Land Information and Registration Unit on the 16th of the same month. In response, this Unit issued letter INDER-GG-DRT-FT-IRT-OFI-1058-2025 dated 20 October 2025, signed by Engineer Pablo César Zamora Alfaro, which provided a formal response to the amparo applicant’s arguments. That letter clarified that INDER has not refused to initiate an administrative proceeding; rather, the request was duly registered and must be processed according to the applicable order of priority under Plan RTI.
ELEVENTH: Regarding the claim that INDER ‘decides whenever it wants’ or ignores requests. We reject that claim as stated. It is not true that this Administration ignored the requests submitted by the amparo applicant. The requests were received, processed, analyzed, and answered within the scope of the institution’s powers. What the amparo applicant characterizes as inaction is, in fact, compliance with a complex technical, territorial, and legal procedure that cannot be omitted or arbitrarily expedited without affecting the collective rights of the Indigenous community involved.
TWELFTH: Regarding the prioritization of occupations within the Rey Curré Indigenous Territory. It must be stated that Plan RTI carries out actions in the country’s twenty-four Indigenous territories, and therefore occupations must be addressed in accordance with institutional planning, operational availability, and territorial prioritization criteria. The order of priority for occupations to be addressed within each Indigenous territory is determined by the Indigenous Integral Development Associations, in their capacity as local governments and legal representatives of the Indigenous communities. This is based on Articles 4.1, 4.2, 6, 7.1, and 32 of ILO Convention 169, ratified by Law No. 7316, Article 22 of the Community Development Law No. 3859, Article 5 of the Regulations to the Indigenous Law No. 6172, and Article 1 of Executive Decree No. 13568-C-G. Consequently, INDER cannot unilaterally alter the territorial priorities defined in coordination with the corresponding Indigenous Integral Development Association, as doing so would disregard the Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.
THIRTEENTH: Regarding coordination and follow-up carried out with the Rey Curré Indigenous Integral Development Association. It is true that, based on the steps taken by this Administration to assess the situation raised by Ms. Nombre02, various follow-ups and coordination efforts were carried out with the Rey Curré Indigenous Integral Development Association, aimed at assessing whether the case could be prioritized within Plan RTI’s territorial response processes. In that regard, by letter INDER-GG-DRT-FT-IRT-OFI-0225-2026 dated 2 March 2026, the Coordinator of Land Information and Registration formally wrote to the Board of Directors of the Association for the Integral Development of the Rey Curré Indigenous Territory, requesting that, for humanitarian reasons and in light of Ms. Nombre05 Figueroa’s vulnerability as an older adult, it consider granting exceptional treatment and including her case on the priority list for this Territory.
Follow-ups with the Integral Development Association were conducted on 13 and 26 March 2026, reiterating Ms. Nombre02’s vulnerable circumstances and Plan RTI’s institutional willingness to coordinate priority attention for the case within the applicable legal, operational, and territorial possibilities. Likewise, on 9 April 2026, the Rey Curré Indigenous Integral Development Association requested additional information relating to the property in question, specifically the possessor’s name, location, area, and survey, in order to assess the corresponding level of priority technically. In response, by letter INDER-GG-DRT-FT-IRT-OFI-0511-2026 dated 29 April 2026, this Administration sent the Integral Development Association all information available in Plan RTI’s records concerning Ms. Nombre02’s case. Subsequently, on 15 May 2026, personnel from this Unit communicated directly via WhatsApp with the President of the Rey Curré Indigenous Integral Development Association, José Rigoberto Leiva, who is president of the ADI.
He stated that the Association was willing to prioritize Ms. Nombre02’s case and coordinate a visit to the property to complete the corresponding assessment. Written confirmation of that conversation was made that same day by email to the Integral Development Association, which acknowledged receipt. Finally, on 25 May 2026, with the approval of the relevant supervisor, the information was forwarded to the head of the topographic survey crew, who was asked to consider including a visit to the property in the next field trip scheduled for the territory. This shows that Ms. Nombre02’s case is currently being processed and that this Administration has taken concrete, ongoing, and coordinated action to advance its response to the request submitted by the amparo applicant. It also establishes that the case is currently being processed, that active coordination with the Rey Curré ADI is underway, and that interinstitutional steps have been taken to seek social support for Ms.
Nombre02. Consequently, this representative considers that the claim of failure to respond has become moot, or, alternatively, that the amparo application should be denied because there is no current violation attributable to the Rural Development Institute.”
Justice Rueda Leal drafts the decision; and, Reasons:
Since INDER’s executive director failed to submit the report within the period set by this Court in the order commencing this matter, the application is decided pursuant to Article 45 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, taking into consideration the evidence in the record.
The applicant states that his client is an older adult who has exercised peaceful, notorious, and uninterrupted possession of a property that she acquired in good faith before the Rey Curré reserve was declared Indigenous land. He mentions that, in 2003, CONAI issued opinion no. C-395-2003, which stated that, pursuant to Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, INDER must relocate owners and possessors of properties located within Indigenous territories. He challenges the fact that, despite the foregoing, INDER has neither coordinated the relevant matters with CONAI nor done anything to address the protected person’s situation. In that regard, he states that on multiple occasions he has asked INDER to open the corresponding administrative proceeding to determine whether the protected person has the right to dispose of her property; however, this has not been done. He says these requests were submitted on 4 September and 7 October 2024, as well as on 28 January, 5 February, 2, 4 September, and 4 October, all in 2025. He asks that the respondent authority be ordered to open and conclude the corresponding administrative proceeding.
The following facts relevant to deciding this matter are deemed duly established, either because they have been proven or because the respondent authority failed to address them, as provided in the initial order:
In this matter, the applicant states that his client is an older adult who has exercised peaceful, notorious, and uninterrupted possession of a property that she acquired in good faith before the Rey Curré reserve was declared Indigenous land. He mentions that, in 2003, CONAI issued opinion no. C-395-2003, which stated that, pursuant to Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, INDER must relocate owners and possessors of properties located within Indigenous territories. He challenges the fact that, despite the foregoing, INDER has neither coordinated the relevant matters with CONAI nor done anything to address the protected person’s situation. In that regard, he states that on multiple occasions he has asked INDER to open the corresponding administrative proceeding to determine whether the protected person has the right to dispose of her property; however, this has not been done. He says these requests were submitted on 4 September and 7 October 2024, as well as on 28 January, 5 February, 2, 4 September, and 4 October, all in 2025. He asks that the respondent authority be ordered to open and conclude the corresponding administrative proceeding.
The record establishes that the protected person submitted requests to INDER seeking the opening of an administrative proceeding for “payment of possession rights” in respect of a property on the following dates: 4 September and 7 October 2024; 28 January, 5 February, 2 September, 4 September, and 4 October, all in 2025. The respondent authority was served with the order commencing this proceeding on 22 May 2026. By letter no. INDER-GG-DRT-FT-IRT-OFI-0615-2026 of 25 May 2026, communicated to the applicant, the respondent authority stated: “First, by letter INDER-GG-DRT-FT-IRT-OFI-0923-2024, notified by email on 07 November 2024, this administrative unit responded to the requests submitted on 04 September 2024 and 07 October 2024 concerning the opening of an administrative proceeding and the request for compensation for Ms. Nombre02’s possession rights. Subsequently, by letter INDER-GG-DRT-FT-IRT-OFI-1058- 2025 dated 20 October 2025, the renewed request submitted to INDER’s Executive Presidency concerning the situation raised by your client was addressed again.
Additionally, it is important to state that the request submitted by your client was already considered by the Constitutional Chamber in expediente No. 24-029619-0007-CO, brought against the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER), in which the Constitutional Chamber issued a decision, finding it established that this Administration had responded to the requests made at that time. In that regard, it is clarified that this Administration has not rejected the request submitted by your client and it is currently being processed as part of the activities carried out under the National Plan for the Recovery of Indigenous Territories (Plan RTI). In this regard, it is important to state that the Plan RTI carries out its activities in the country’s twenty-four Indigenous territories, developing various technical, social, legal, and administrative stages to address occupations within Indigenous territories.
These activities include preparing preliminary case files, censuses, topographic surveys, registry analyses and, eventually, opening ordinary administrative proceedings when appropriate under institutional planning and verification of technical and legal requirements. It should also be stated that prioritization of the occupations to be addressed under the Plan RTI is carried out in coordination with the Indigenous Comprehensive Development Associations (ADI), in their capacity as local governments and representatives of the respective Indigenous territories, in accordance with the applicable regulatory framework and the coordination and planning processes undertaken to implement the Plan RTI. Accordingly, this Administration is currently coordinating and working with the relevant Comprehensive Development Association to assess and include the occupation in question in the service and planning processes being carried out in the respective Indigenous territory, in accordance with the work schedule, operational availability, and applicable prioritization criteria.
Therefore, it is reiterated that the request submitted by your client is currently being processed and will be addressed in accordance with the corresponding technical and administrative procedures within the framework of implementing the Plan RTI.” In this regard, it is relevant to point out that this Chamber had already decided a similar claim brought by the protected person. In that connection, in judgment no. 2024036996 at 9:30 a.m. on 13 December 2024, this Chamber ruled:
“I.- SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION. The older adult bringing the application states that on 4 September 2024 she submitted a request to the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, seeking the opening of an ordinary administrative proceeding for payment of the possession rights she has over a property located in the Rey Curré Indigenous territory, but received no response, even though she renewed her request on 7 October of that same year. She maintains that this omission violates her fundamental rights.
The following facts relevant to deciding this amparo application are deemed established:
In this matter, the older adult bringing the application states that on 4 September 2024 she submitted a request to the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, seeking the opening of an ordinary administrative proceeding for payment of the possession rights she has over a property located in the Rey Curré Indigenous territory, but received no response, even though she renewed her request on 7 October of that same year. She maintains that this omission violates her fundamental rights.
As to the alleged harm, it should be stated that Nombre01’s case does not fall within the exceptions established for this purpose, and therefore it is not for the Chamber to rule on it. In that regard, it is clarified that although, beginning with decision number 2008-02545 at 8:55 a.m. on 22 February 2008, this Chamber has referred to the administrative-litigation jurisdiction—with some exceptions—matters concerning whether a public authority has complied with the periods established by the General Law of Public Administration (Articles 261 and 325) or sector-specific laws governing special administrative proceedings, either to issue a final decision in an administrative proceeding—initiated on the authority’s own motion or at a party’s request—or to consider the applicable administrative remedies, in the present case the request is not directly related to the protected person’s status as an older adult, since what is sought is payment for possession rights. Accordingly, the Chamber finds no harm as alleged. On this basis, the application must be denied, as is hereby ordered.
Finally, the dispute over the truthfulness of the information provided is outside the scope of this specialized procedure. The applicant party may, if it so wishes, resort to the avenues for legal review to file any complaints or reports it deems appropriate.” Accordingly, note that this Court had already ruled on the alleged delay concerning the requests of 4 September and 7 October 2024, denying the application for the reasons stated. Therefore, as to those requests in particular, the protected person must abide by what was decided in judgment no. 2024036996 at 9:30 a.m. on 13 December 2024.
V.Although in this matter the respondent alleges that, after 4 September and 7 October 2024, the protected person submitted further requests to the same effect and asserts that the respondent authority likewise has not acted as requested, it bears repeating what was explained in the precedent cited above: the alleged delay in this case is not among the exceptions established by this Chamber regarding prompt and fulfilled justice (Article 41 of the Political Constitution). For that reason, the application is inadmissible in this constitutional forum and must be addressed before the administrative-litigation jurisdiction, for the following reasons.
AN EXPEDITIOUS AND EFFECTIVE MECHANISM FOR THE PROTECTION OF SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL SITUATIONS OF THE ADMINISTERED. Since its establishment, the Constitutional Chamber has applied broad admissibility criteria in view of the absence of expeditious and swift procedural avenues for protecting substantive legal situations grounded in the subconstitutional legal order or legality framework, which are indirectly connected to fundamental rights and Constitutional Law. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that, by virtue of its supremacy, superlegality, and direct and immediate effect, the Constitution provides an indirect basis for any conceivable substantive legal situation of individuals. Nevertheless, upon better consideration and following the enactment of the Code of Administrative Litigation Procedure (Law No. 8508 of 24 April 2006) and its entry into force on 1 January 2008, it has become clear that litigants now have access to a plenary and universal administrative-litigation jurisdiction that is highly expeditious and swift because of the various procedural mechanisms that legislation incorporates into the legal order.
These include shortened periods for carrying out the various procedural acts; broad standing; interim measures; an open-ended range of claims that may be brought; oral proceedings—and their subsidiary principles of concentration, immediacy, and expedition; a single level of jurisdiction, with a right of appeal in expressly specified circumstances; settlement within the proceeding; unified proceedings; proceedings given preferential treatment or “amparo de legalidad”; proceedings on the merits; new enforcement measures (coercive fines, substitute or commissarial enforcement, attachment of fiscal-domain property and some public-domain property); the broad powers of the enforcement judges; the extension and adaptation of the effects of case law to third parties; and flexibility in cassation appeals. All these new procedural mechanisms are expressly intended to achieve procedural economy, expedition, promptness, and effective or fulfilled protection of the substantive legal situations of the administered, while safeguarding basic fundamental rights such as due process, the right to a defense, and the right to present opposing arguments.
In sum, owing to its new features of simplicity, expedition, and promptness, the new administrative-litigation jurisdiction is a suitable avenue for the effective protection of substantive legal situations of the administered where evidence must be gathered or ordinary legality issues must be decided.
A CLEAR QUESTION OF ORDINARY LEGALITY. It is clear that determining whether the public administration has complied with the periods established by the General Law of Public Administration (Articles 261 and 325) or sector-specific laws governing special administrative proceedings, either to issue a final decision in an administrative proceeding—initiated on the authority’s own motion or at a party’s request—or to consider the applicable administrative remedies, is plainly a question of ordinary legality that may henceforth be raised and decided before the administrative-litigation jurisdiction, applying principles that inform constitutional jurisdiction, such as substitute standing, the possibility of a personal defense—that is, appearing without legal counsel—and exemption from costs for the applicant. Consequently, the application must be summarily dismissed, and the applicant party should be advised that, if it so wishes, it may turn to the administrative-litigation jurisdiction.
The parties are advised that, if they submitted any paper documents or objects or evidence contained on any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic, or new-technology device, they must collect them from the court office within a maximum period of 30 working days from service of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not collected within that period will be destroyed, as provided in the “Regulation on Electronic Case Files before the Judiciary,” approved by the Full Court at session No. 27-11 of 22 August 2011, Article XXVI, and published in Boletín Judicial number 19 of 26 January 2012, as well as in the resolution approved by the Superior Council of the Judiciary at session No. 43-12 held on 3 May 2012, Article LXXXI.
Therefore:
As to the alleged delay concerning the requests of 4 September and 7 October 2024, the protected person shall abide by what was decided in judgment no. 2024036996 at 9:30 a.m. on 13 December 2024. In all other respects, the application is denied.
Fernando Castillo V.
President Fernando Cruz C.
Paul Rueda L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G.
Anamari Garro V.
Ingrid Hess H.
EXPEDIENTE N° 26-015288-0007-CO Telephone: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2220-4607 / 2220-4844. Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Dirección01).
Revisión del Documento SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas treinta minutos del trece de agosto de dos mil veintiseis .
Recurso de amparo que se tramita en el expediente nro. 26-015288-0007-CO, interpuesto por Nombre03, cédula de identidad CED03, a favor de Nombre02, cédula de identidad CED04, contra el INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL (INDER).
Resultando:
Redacta el Magistrado Rueda Leal; y,
Considerando:
En vista de que el director ejecutivo del INDER omitió rendir el informe dentro del plazo fijado por este Tribunal en la resolución de curso del sub lite, se procede a resolver el recurso de acuerdo con el artículo 45 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y tomando en consideración los elementos probatorios que constan en los autos.
El accionante expone que su representada es una adulta mayor que ha ejercicio una posesión pacífica, notoria e ininterrumpida de una propiedad que adquirió de buena fe antes de la declaratoria de las tierras indígenas de la reserva Rey Curré. Menciona que, en el 2003, la CONAI emitió el dictamen nro. C-395-2003 en el cual dispuso que, conforme al artículo 5 de la ley Indígena, el INDER debe reubicar a los propietarios y poseedores de propiedades que se encuentre dentro territorios indígenas. Cuestiona que, a pesar de lo anterior, el INDER no ha coordinado lo pertinente con la CONAI ni ha hecho algo por atender la situación de la tutelada. En tal sentido, señala que en múltiples ocasiones le ha solicitado al INDER la apertura del respectivo procedimiento administrativo para que se defina si la amparada tiene derecho a disponer de su finca; empero, esto no se ha efectuado. Comenta que tales gestiones fueron planteadas el 4 de septiembre y el 7 de octubre de 2024; así como el 28 de enero, 5 de febrero, 2, de septiembre, 4 de septiembre, y 4 de octubre, todos de 2025. Solicita que se le ordene a la autoridad accionada la apertura y conclusión del procedimiento administrativo correspondiente.
De importancia para la decisión de este asunto, se estiman como debidamente demostrados los siguientes hechos, sea porque así han sido acreditados o bien porque la autoridad recurrida haya omitido referirse a ellos, según lo prevenido en el auto inicial:
En el sub lite, el accionante expone que su representada es una adulta mayor que ha ejercicio una posesión pacífica, notoria e ininterrumpida de una propiedad que adquirió de buena fe antes de la declaratoria de las tierras indígenas de la reserva Rey Curré. Menciona que, en el 2003, la CONAI emitió el dictamen nro. C-395-2003 en el cual dispuso que, conforme al artículo 5 de la ley Indígena, el INDER debe reubicar a los propietarios y poseedores de propiedades que se encuentre dentro territorios indígenas. Cuestiona que, a pesar de lo anterior, el INDER no ha coordinado lo pertinente con la CONAI ni ha hecho algo por atender la situación de la tutelada. En tal sentido, señala que en múltiples ocasiones le ha solicitado al INDER la apertura del respectivo procedimiento administrativo para que se defina si la amparada tiene derecho a disponer de su finca; empero, esto no se ha efectuado. Comenta que tales gestiones fueron planteadas el 4 de septiembre y el 7 de octubre de 2024; así como el 28 de enero, 5 de febrero, 2, de septiembre, 4 de septiembre, y 4 de octubre, todos de 2025. Solicita que se le ordene a la autoridad accionada la apertura y conclusión del procedimiento administrativo correspondiente.
Del estudio de los autos se tiene por demostrado que, la tutelada planteó gestiones ante el INDER para solicitar la apertura de un procedimiento administrativo para el “pago de derechos de posesión” de un inmueble en las siguientes fechas: 4 de septiembre y 7 de octubre de 2024; 28 de enero, 5 de febrero, 2 de septiembre, 4 de septiembre, y 4 de octubre, todos de 2025. La autoridad accionada fue notificada de la resolución de curso de este proceso el 22 de mayo de 2026. Mediante el oficio nro. INDER-GG-DRT-FT-IRT-OFI-0615-2026 de 25 de mayo de 2026, comunicado al accionante, la autoridad recurrida indicó: “Primeramente, mediante oficio INDER-GG-DRT-FT-IRT-OFI-0923-2024, notificado vía correo electrónico el día 07 de noviembre de 2024, esta unidad administrativa brindó respuesta a las solicitudes presentadas los días 04 de septiembre de 2024 y 07 de octubre de 2024, relacionadas con la apertura de procedimiento administrativo y sobre la solicitud de indemnización que realiza sobre los derechos de posesión de la señora Nombre02.
Asimismo, posteriormente mediante oficio INDER-GG-DRT-FT-IRT-OFI-1058- 2025 de fecha 20 de octubre de 2025, se atendió nuevamente la solicitud reiterada presentada ante la Presidencia Ejecutiva del INDER, relacionada con la situación expuesta por su representada. Adicionalmente, resulta importante indicar que, la gestión presentada por su representada ya fue objeto de conocimiento por parte de la Sala Constitucional mediante el expediente N.° 24-029619-0007-CO, interpuesto contra el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER), recurso respecto del cual la Sala Constitucional emitió resolución, teniéndose por acreditado que esta Administración brindó respuesta a las solicitudes planteadas en ese momento. En ese sentido, se aclara que, la gestión presentada por su representada no ha sido rechazada por esta Administración y actualmente se encuentra en trámite dentro de las actividades desarrolladas en el marco del Plan Nacional de Recuperación de Territorios Indígenas (Plan RTI).
Sobre el particular, resulta importante indicar que, el Plan RTI ejecuta sus actividades en los veinticuatro territorios indígenas del país, desarrollando distintas etapas técnicas, sociales, legales y administrativas para la atención de ocupaciones dentro de territorios indígenas. Dentro de dichas actividades se contempla la confección de expedientes preliminares, censos, levantamientos topográficos, análisis registrales y, eventualmente, la apertura de procedimientos administrativos ordinarios, cuando corresponda conforme a la planificación institucional y verificación de requisitos técnicos y legales. Asimismo, debe indicarse que, la priorización de las ocupaciones que serán atendidas dentro del Plan RTI se realiza en coordinación con las Asociaciones de Desarrollo Integral Indígena (ADI), en su condición de gobiernos locales y representantes de los respectivos territorios indígenas, conforme al marco normativo aplicable y a los procesos de articulación y planificación que se desarrollan para la ejecución del Plan RTI.
En razón de lo anterior, actualmente esta Administración se encuentra realizando coordinaciones y articulaciones con la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral correspondiente, a efectos de valorar e incluir la ocupación consultada dentro de los procesos de atención y planificación que se desarrollan en el territorio indígena respectivo, conforme al orden de trabajo, disponibilidad operativa y criterios de priorización aplicables. Por tanto, se reitera que, la solicitud presentada por su representada se encuentra actualmente en trámite y será atendida conforme a los procedimientos técnicos y administrativos correspondientes dentro del marco de ejecución del Plan RTI.”.
Sobre el particular, interesa resaltar que esta Sala ya había resuelto un reclamo análogo planteado por la amparada. En ese sentido, en la sentencia nro. 2024036996 de las 9:30 horas de 13 de diciembre de 2024, esta Cámara resolvió:
“I.- OBJETO DEL RECURSO. La persona adulta mayor que recurre acota que el 4 de setiembre de 2024, formuló una gestión ante el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, requiriendo la apertura del procedimiento ordinario administrativo para el pago de los derechos de posesión que tiene sobre una finca que se ubica en el territorio indígena de Rey Curré, pero no ha obtenido respuesta alguna, pese a que, el pasado 7 de octubre de este mismo año, reiteró su gestión. Afirma que esa omisión vulnera sus derechos fundamentales.
De relevancia para la decisión del presente amparo se tienen por demostrados los siguientes:
En la especie, la persona adulta mayor que recurre acota que el 4 de setiembre de 2024, formuló una gestión ante el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, requiriendo la apertura del procedimiento ordinario administrativo para el pago de los derechos de posesión que tiene sobre una finca que se ubica en el territorio indígena de Rey Curré, pero no ha obtenido respuesta alguna, pese a que, el pasado 7 de octubre de este mismo año, reiteró su gestión. Afirma que esa omisión vulnera sus derechos fundamentales.
Ahora, atinente al reclamo acusado, cabe indicar que el caso de Nombre01 no se encuentra dentro de las excepciones contempladas al efecto, por lo que no le compete a la Sala pronunciarse al respecto. En ese sentido, se aclara que, aunque a partir del voto número 2008-02545 de las 8:55 horas de 22 de febrero de 2008, esta Sala ha remitido a la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa — con algunas excepciones — aquellos asuntos en los que se discute si la autoridad pública ha cumplido o no los plazos pautados por la Ley General de la Administración Pública (artículos 261 y 325) o las leyes sectoriales para los procedimientos administrativos especiales, a fin de resolver por acto final un procedimiento administrativo — incoado de oficio o a instancia de parte— o conocer de los recursos administrativos procedentes; en el caso en estudio, lo cierto es que la gestión no se relaciona directamente con la condición de la amparada de adulta mayor, pues lo que se procura es el pago por derechos de posesión. Así las cosas, descarta la Sala que exista el agravio reclamado. Bajo esta inteligencia, se impone desestimar el recurso, como en efecto se dispone.
Finalmente, la discusión que se formula con respecto a la veracidad de lo informado es ajena a esta vía especializada. Ocurra la parte actora, si a bien lo tiene, a las vías de legalidad, a formulas las quejas o denuncias que estime pertinentes.”.
Así las cosas, véase que este Tribunal ya se había pronunciado sobre la mora atinente a las gestiones de 4 de septiembre y 7 de octubre de 2024, desestimando el recurso según los razonamientos expuestos. Ergo, en relación con estas gestiones en particular deberá la amparada estarse a lo resuelto en la sentencia nro. 2024036996 de las 9:30 horas de 13 de diciembre de 2024.
V.Ahora, si bien en el sub iudice el accionado alega que, luego del 4 de septiembre y 7 de octubre de 2024, la tutelada formuló nuevas gestiones en el mismo sentido y acusa que la autoridad accionada tampoco ha procedido según lo solicitado, cabe reiterar lo explicado en el precedente citado ut supra, en cuanto a que la mora acusada en la especie no se encuentra dentro de los supuestos de excepción establecidos por esta Cámara en lo atinente a una justicia pronta y cumplida (artículo 41 de la Constitución Política), razón por la cual el recurso resulta inadmisible en esta sede constitucional, y deberá ser objeto de discusión ante la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, de conformidad con las siguientes consideraciones.
VI.NUEVA JUSTICIA ADMINISTRATIVA, MECANISMO CÉLERE Y CUMPLIDO PARA LA PROTECCIÓN DE SITUACIONES JURÍDICAS SUSTANCIALES DE LOS ADMINISTRADOS. La Sala Constitucional, de su fundación, ha utilizado criterios amplios de admisibilidad en vista de la ausencia de cauces procesales expeditos y céleres para la protección de las situaciones jurídicas sustanciales que tienen asidero en el ordenamiento jurídico infra-constitucional o parámetro de legalidad, que guardan conexión indirecta con los derechos fundamentales y el Derecho de la Constitución. Sobre el particular, no debe perderse de perspectiva que la Constitución por su supremacía, súper-legalidad y eficacia directa e inmediata da fundamento indirecto a cualquier situación jurídica sustancial imaginable de las personas. No obstante, bajo una mejor ponderación y ante la promulgación del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo (Ley No. 8508 de 24 de abril de 2006) y su entrada en vigencia a partir del 1° de enero de 2008, ha quedado patente que ahora los justiciables cuentan con una jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa plenaria y universal, sumamente expedita y célere por los diversos mecanismos procesales que incorpora al ordenamiento jurídico esa legislación, tales como el acortamiento de los plazos para realizar los diversos actos procesales, la amplitud de la legitimación, las medidas cautelares, el numerus apertus de las pretensiones deducibles, la oralidad –y sus subprincipios concentración, inmediación y celeridad-, la única instancia con recurso de apelación en situaciones expresamente tasadas, la conciliación intra-procesal, el proceso unificado, el proceso de trámite preferente o “amparo de legalidad”, los procesos de puro derecho, las nuevas medidas de ejecución (multas coercitivas, ejecución sustitutiva o comisarial, embargo de bienes del dominio fiscal y algunos del dominio público), los amplios poderes del cuerpo de jueces de ejecución, la extensión y adaptación de los efectos de la jurisprudencia a terceros y la flexibilidad del recurso de casación.
Todos esos institutos procesales novedosos tienen por fin y propósito manifiesto alcanzar la economía procesal, la celeridad, la prontitud y la protección efectiva o cumplida de las situaciones jurídicas sustanciales de los administrados, todo con garantía de derechos fundamentales básicos como el debido proceso, la defensa y el contradictorio. En suma, la nueva jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa es un cauce idóneo, por sus nuevas características de simplicidad, celeridad y prontitud para el amparo y protección efectiva de las situaciones jurídicas sustanciales de los administrados en las que se requiera recabar prueba o definir algunas cuestiones de legalidad ordinaria.
CUESTIÓN EVIDENTE DE LEGALIDAD ORDINARIA. Es evidente que determinar si la administración pública cumple o no los plazos pautados por la Ley General de la Administración Pública (artículos 261 y 325) o las leyes sectoriales para los procedimientos administrativos especiales, para resolver por acto final un procedimiento administrativo –incoado de oficio o a instancia de parte- o conocer de los recursos administrativos procedentes, es una evidente cuestión de legalidad ordinaria que, en adelante, puede ser discutida y resuelta ante la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa con la aplicación de los principios que nutren la jurisdicción constitucional, tales como los de la legitimación vicaria, la posibilidad de la defensa material –esto es de comparecer sin patrocinio letrado- y de gratuidad para la recurrente. Consecuentemente, se impone el rechazo de plano e indicarle a la parte gestionante que si a bien lo tiene puede acudir a la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa.
Se previene a las partes que, de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, éstos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N°27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N°43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.
Por tanto:
En cuanto a la mora acusada respecto de las gestiones de 4 de septiembre y 7 de octubre de 2024, estese a lo resuelto en la sentencia nro. 2024036996 de las 9:30 horas de 13 de diciembre de 2024. En todo lo demás, se declara sin lugar el recurso.
Fernando Castillo V.
Fernando Cruz C.
Paul Rueda L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G.
Anamari Garro V.
Ingrid Hess H.
EXPEDIENTE N° 26-015288-0007-CO
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