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Res. 29158-2026 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 30/07/2026
OutcomeResultado
The majority summarily rejected the amparo because the certificate’s validity and the effects of revoking the agreement had to be disputed through the appropriate legality procedure; two justices dissented and proposed admitting it to require progressive measures for access to water.La mayoría rechazó de plano el amparo porque la validez de la constancia de agua y los efectos de la revocación del convenio debían discutirse en la vía de legalidad correspondiente; dos magistrados salvaron el voto y propusieron admitirlo para ordenar medidas progresivas de acceso al agua.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) majority summarily rejected the amparo application as inadmissible. The Sonafluca ASADA challenged AyA’s and the Municipality of San Carlos’s refusal to recognize a water availability certificate issued after the delegation agreement was revoked. The majority considered that deciding whether the certificate was valid, and whether the administrative-litigation proceedings suspended the revocation’s effects, raised issues of ordinary legality for that proceeding rather than amparo; it indicated that the person concerned could apply to AyA or pursue the appropriate legality procedure. Justices Cruz Castro and Rueda Leal dissented, arguing that access to drinking water is a fundamental right and that technical limitations do not release the State from adopting reasonable, progressive measures to secure it. The majority did not adopt that proposed result.La mayoría de la Sala Constitucional rechazó de plano por inadmisible el amparo de la ASADA Sonafluca, que cuestionaba que AyA y la Municipalidad de San Carlos desconocieran una constancia de disponibilidad de agua emitida después de la revocación del convenio de delegación. Consideró que determinar si esa constancia era válida y si el proceso contencioso-administrativo suspendía los efectos de la revocación planteaba cuestiones de mera legalidad que debían resolverse en esa vía, no en amparo; indicó que la persona interesada podía acudir al AyA o a la vía de legalidad correspondiente. Los magistrados Cruz Castro y Rueda Leal salvaron el voto: sostuvieron que el acceso al agua potable es un derecho fundamental y que las limitaciones técnicas no eximen al Estado de adoptar medidas razonables y progresivas para garantizarlo. La mayoría no acogió esa propuesta.
Key excerptExtracto clave
Based on the allegations, this Court considers that determining whether the service availability certificate issued by the applicant is valid, despite having been issued after the ICAA revoked the delegation agreement, is a dispute of ordinary legality. Nor is it for this jurisdiction to decide whether merely filing the administrative-litigation proceedings has the effect of suspending the revocation of the agreement, so as to recognize the validity of acts issued by that ASADA after 14 May 2026; that determination must be made in those same proceedings, not here as the applicant seeks. Accordingly, the protected person should apply to the ICAA or pursue the appropriate legality procedure to dispute the matter. As regards this jurisdiction, the amparo must be rejected as inadmissible.A partir de lo alegado, este Tribunal considera que, determinar si la constancia de disponibilidad de servicios emitida por la recurrente tiene validez, a pesar de haber sido expedida luego de ser revocado el convenio de delegación por parte del ICAA, constituye una discusión de mera legalidad. Tampoco le compete a esta jurisdicción señalar si la mera presentación del proceso contencioso tiene como efecto suspender o no los efectos de revocación del convenio en cuestión, a fin de reconocerle validez a los actos emitidos por esa ASADA, luego del 14 de mayo de 2026, pues tal determinación debe ser adoptada en ese mismo proceso y no en este como pretende la recurrente. En ese sentido, lo pertinente es que acuda el tutelado ante el ICAA o a la vía de legalidad que corresponda a discutir lo aquí pretendido. En lo que respecta a esta jurisdicción, el amparo debe ser rechazado por inadmisible.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"El agua no es un servicio cualquiera, es un derecho humano esencial, por ello, la autoridad accionada no puede desentenderse de su deber de garantizarlo, escudándose en limitaciones técnicas sin ofrecer soluciones efectivas."
"Water is not an ordinary service; it is an essential human right. The authority challenged therefore cannot evade its duty to guarantee it by relying on technical limitations without offering effective solutions."
Voto salvado
"El agua no es un servicio cualquiera, es un derecho humano esencial, por ello, la autoridad accionada no puede desentenderse de su deber de garantizarlo, escudándose en limitaciones técnicas sin ofrecer soluciones efectivas."
Voto salvado
"Por estas razones, estimamos que el recurso debió admitirse, al menos para ordenar la adopción de medidas concretas y progresivas que garantice, en un plazo razonable, el acceso efectivo al agua potable de la parte amparada."
"For these reasons, we consider that the application should have been admitted, at least to order concrete and progressive measures that would guarantee the protected party effective access to drinking water within a reasonable period."
Voto salvado
"Por estas razones, estimamos que el recurso debió admitirse, al menos para ordenar la adopción de medidas concretas y progresivas que garantice, en un plazo razonable, el acceso efectivo al agua potable de la parte amparada."
Voto salvado
Full documentDocumento completo
Document Review CASE FILE No. 26-025088-0007-CO PROCEEDING: AMPARO PROCEEDING RULING No. 2026029158 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at 9:25 a.m. on 30 July 2026.
Amparo proceeding filed by Nombre01, holder of identity card CED01, in her capacity as president of the ASOCIACIÓN ADMINISTRADORA DE ACUEDUCTO RURAL DE SONAFLUCA DE LA FORTUNA DE SAN CARLOS, on behalf of Nombre02, holder of identity card CED02; against the INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ACUEDUCTOS Y ALCANTARILLADOS and the MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN CARLOS.
Background:
On the basis of this communication, and despite the existence of a judicial proceeding in which the legality of the actions taken by the respondent Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados is being disputed, it decided to inform third parties that the ASADA had lost its legitimacy and that, therefore, they should no longer deal with it. The Municipalidad de San Carlos relied on that communication to deny every permit that in some way required the ASADA’s involvement, as in the case of Mr. Nombre02, whose approval was denied because he had a water-availability statement from ASADA SONAFLUCA. She states that the decision adopted by the AYA and its communication to the other respondent, the Municipalidad de San Carlos, caused the latter to deny Mr. Nombre02 the relevant municipal permits to obtain drinking-water service through the ASADA Sonafluca; in other words, access to drinking water—a human and fundamental right of every resident of the Republic—was violated by an AYA directive, even though the AYA is theoretically responsible for guaranteeing access to this vital resource.
She states that the applicant does not have access to the application submitted by Mr. Nombre02 to the Municipalidad de San Carlos or to the ruling by which that municipal corporation decided the matter, because the ASADA Sonafluca is not a party to that administrative proceeding and, consequently, has no access to the relevant case file. Nevertheless, this representative knows that Mr. Nombre02’s application was denied as a result of the communication sent by the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados in official letter No. SG-GSD-2026-00678, instructing the Municipalidad de San Carlos not to recognize as valid documents issued by the ASADA Sonafluca after 14 May 2026.
As set out in the factual background, the dispute between the AyA and the ASADA Sonafluca concerning the validity of the termination of the delegation agreement is before the administrative-litigation jurisdiction. That is, judicial proceedings are currently underway to determine whether the administrative actions taken by the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados comply with the legal system. However, before that dispute was resolved by the ordinary judge responsible for administrative legality, the AyA decided to inform the Municipalidad de San Carlos that the ASADA Sonafluca lacked authority to issue statements of water availability and other certifications related to public-service provision, expressly asking that those documents no longer be recognized by the various municipal departments. That action had an immediate legal effect extending beyond the institutional dispute between the AyA and the ASADA. As a result of that communication, the Municipalidad de San Carlos denied Mr. Nombre02’s application to obtain drinking-water service, materially depriving him of the possibility of obtaining the resource essential to meeting his basic needs. In other words, the dispute ceased to be exclusively administrative and became a concrete impairment of a fundamental right.
She emphasizes that Mr. Nombre02 is not a party to the administrative-litigation proceeding currently involving the AyA and the ASADA Sonafluca. Nor did he participate in the summary administrative proceeding that ended with termination of the delegation agreement. He is a third party wholly unrelated to that legal dispute. Nevertheless, he directly bore the consequences of an institutional conflict whose resolution falls exclusively to the courts. The Public Administration may have disputes concerning the legality of its own acts; it may even litigate the validity of administrative agreements or the authority of different public-service operators. What is constitutionally impermissible is to transfer the consequences of that conflict to residents by restricting effective access to a fundamental human right whose protection is precisely the responsibility of the respondent institutions.
The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has consistently held that access to drinking water is a preferred right that must prevail over administrative obstacles, jurisdictional disputes, or controversies between public entities, especially when such situations directly affect service users. In this case, neither the AyA nor the Municipalidad de San Carlos assessed the impact their decisions would have on the administrator’s effective exercise of the right to water. The administrative action was limited to implementing the consequences of an institutional dispute, without considering that this would prevent a citizen from accessing the public drinking-water supply service. That omission is incompatible with the essential content of Articles 21 and 50 of the Constitution.
Public institutions must not only act within the law; they must act in a manner compatible with fundamental rights. When an administrative interpretation allows several possible alternatives, the principle of constitutional supremacy requires choosing the one that best protects human rights and least affects those subject to administration. The opposite occurred in this case. The interpretation adopted by the respondent authorities was the most burdensome for the exercise of the right to drinking water, since it immediately resulted in a citizen being denied access to the service, without a final judicial ruling having definitively determined the legal situation of the ASADA Sonafluca. Accordingly, the joint action of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados and the Municipalidad de San Carlos directly violated Articles 21 and 50 of the Constitution by placing the effects of an administrative dispute ahead of the effective exercise of a human right whose protection is among the most important mandates of Costa Rica’s constitutional order.
She asks that the Municipalidad de San Carlos be ordered to send this Honorable Chamber a complete copy of the administrative case file concerning the application submitted by Mr. Nombre02, including the application, the ruling issued on it, the factual and legal grounds for the decision, and all documentation supporting the resolution of that matter, as this constitutes essential evidence for deciding this amparo proceeding. For the factual and legal reasons set out, she asks this Constitutional Chamber: 1- To grant this amparo proceeding, as the violation of the fundamental human right of access to drinking water, recognized in Articles 21 and 50 of the Constitution and in the international instruments forming part of the constitutional block, has been established. 2- To declare that the actions taken by the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados and the Municipalidad de San Carlos, as described in this application, violate the fundamental right of access to drinking water by preventing those subject to administration from effectively accessing that service as a consequence of an administrative dispute whose legality is currently before the administrative-litigation jurisdiction. 3- To order the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados and the Municipalidad de San Carlos to immediately cease the actions that gave rise to this constitutional violation and to refrain in the future from carrying out acts or omissions that have the effect of preventing, obstructing, or restricting residents of the community of Sonafluca from accessing drinking water on the basis of official letter No. SG-GSD-2026-00678 or any other administrative action arising from the pending judicial dispute. 4- If the respondents oppose the application, to order the respondent authorities jointly and severally to pay the costs, damages, and losses caused by the alleged violation of the fundamental rights herein reported, to be assessed at the judgment enforcement stage, in accordance with the provisions of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.
Drafted by Justice Castillo Víquez; and, Reasons:
As representative of the ASADA SONAFLUCA, the applicant considers it arbitrary for the respondents to refuse to recognize acts it issued as administrator of the drinking-water service from 14 May 2026 onward, such as the validity of the statement of service availability it issued to the amparo beneficiary on 25 May 2026, valid for 12 months, because she has brought administrative-litigation proceedings against the ICAA concerning revocation of the delegation agreement.
In light of the allegations, this Court considers that determining whether the statement of service availability issued by the applicant is valid despite being issued after the ICAA revoked the delegation agreement is a matter of ordinary legality. Nor is it within the remit of this jurisdiction to determine whether the mere filing of administrative-litigation proceedings has the effect of suspending the effects of revocation of the agreement in question, so as to recognize the validity of acts issued by that ASADA after 14 May 2026. That determination must be made in those same proceedings, and not here as the applicant seeks. Accordingly, the protected party should pursue the matter before the ICAA or through the appropriate legality proceedings. As far as this jurisdiction is concerned, the amparo must be rejected as inadmissible.
We dissent from the majority’s position. In this case, the respondent’s refusal to provide an essential service is upheld on the basis of technical considerations concerning the insufficiency of the infrastructure or water capacity; however, there is no adequate weighing of the fact that access to drinking water is a fundamental right, indispensable to life, health, and human dignity.
Article 21 of the Constitution protects human life, and this Court has recognized that access to water for human consumption is a material prerequisite for that right. Article 50 of the Constitution also imposes on the State the duty to ensure the well-being of all residents, which necessarily includes effective, sufficient, and continuous access to drinking water. In the international sphere, instruments such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—interpreted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in its General Comment No. 15—recognize the human right to water and require States to take positive measures for its full realization. The State is subject to a heightened obligation in a social and democratic state governed by the rule of law; for this reason, the supply of water is a priority obligation of the public authorities.
From this perspective, invoking technical limitations cannot serve as an absolute justification for disregarding a basic need for subsistence. Whoever administers the water supply cannot merely note the system’s insufficiency; there is a legal duty to plan, anticipate, and carry out the actions necessary to progressively guarantee access to the water service, especially for human consumption.
The majority’s approach normalizes a structural omission: it accepts that a lack of infrastructure exempts the State from its obligation, when that very deficiency demonstrates a failure to fulfill its duty to plan ahead. This does not mean requiring the impossible, but rather requiring the adoption of reasonable, alternative, or progressive measures so that people are not left unprotected.
Water is not an ordinary service; it is an essential human right. Therefore, the respondent authority cannot shirk its duty to guarantee it by sheltering behind technical limitations without offering effective solutions.
For these reasons, we consider that the amparo should have been admitted, at least to order the adoption of concrete and progressive measures that ensure the amparo beneficiary effective access to drinking water within a reasonable time. Water is an asset and a fundamental right whose effective exercise must be ensured; this is an unavoidable duty.
The parties are advised that if they submitted any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained on any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic, or new-technology device, these must be collected from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days from notification of this judgment. Otherwise, any such material not collected within that period will be destroyed, as provided in the “Regulations on the Electronic Case File before the Judiciary,” approved by the Full Court at Session No. 27-11 of 22 August 2011, Article XXVI, and published in Judicial Bulletin number 19 of 26 January 2012, as well as in the resolution approved by the Superior Council of the Judiciary at Session No. 43-12 held on 3 May 2012, Article LXXXI.
Therefore:
The amparo proceeding is summarily rejected. Justices Cruz Castro and Rueda Leal dissent.
Fernando Castillo V.
President Fernando Cruz C.
Paul Rueda L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G.
Anamari Garro V.
Ingrid Hess H.
CASE FILE No. 26-025088-0007-CO Telephone: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2220-4607 / 2220-4844. Email address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Dirección01).
Revisión del Documento EXPEDIENTE N° 26-025088-0007-CO PROCESO: RECURSO DE AMPARO RESOLUCIÓN Nº 2026029158 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas veinticinco minutos del treinta de julio de dos mil veintiseis .
Recurso de amparo interpuesto por Nombre01, con cédula de identidad CED01, en su condición de presidenta de la ASOCIACIÓN ADMINISTRADORA DE ACUEDUCTO RURAL DE SONAFLUCA DE LA FORTUNA DE SAN CARLOS, a favor de Nombre02, cédula CED02; contra el INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ACUEDUCTOS Y ALCANTARILLADOS Y LA MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN CARLOS.
Resultando:
Redacta el Magistrado Castillo Víquez; y,
Considerando:
La recurrente como representante de la ASADA SONAFLUCA considera arbitrario que las recurridas desconozcan los actos que emitió como administradora del servicio de agua potable, a partir del 14 de mayo de 2026, tal como la validez de la constancia de disponibilidad de servicios que le emitió al amparado el 25 de mayo de 2026, por 12 meses, pues tiene planteado un proceso contencioso administrativo contra el ICAA por la revocatoria del convenio de delegación.
A partir de lo alegado, este Tribunal considera que, determinar si la constancia de disponibilidad de servicios emitida por la recurrente tiene validez, a pesar de haber sido expedida luego de ser revocado el convenio de delegación por parte del ICAA, constituye una discusión de mera legalidad. Tampoco le compete a esta jurisdicción señalar si la mera presentación del proceso contencioso tiene como efecto suspender o no los efectos de revocación del convenio en cuestión, a fin de reconocerle validez a los actos emitidos por esa ASADA, luego del 14 de mayo de 2026, pues tal determinación debe ser adoptada en ese mismo proceso y no en este como pretende la recurrente. En ese sentido, lo pertinente es que acuda el tutelado ante el ICAA o a la vía de legalidad que corresponda a discutir lo aquí pretendido. En lo que respecta a esta jurisdicción, el amparo debe ser rechazado por inadmisible.
Disentimos del criterio de mayoría. En el presente caso, se valida la negativa de la parte recurrida de brindar un servicio esencial, con base en consideraciones técnicas relativas a la insuficiencia de la infraestructura o capacudad hídrica; sin embargo, se omite ponderar adecuadamente que el acceso al agua potable constituye un derecho fundamental, indispensable para la vida, la salud y la dignidad humana.
El artículo 21 de la Constitución Política protege la vida humana, y este Tribunal ha reconocido que el acceso al agua para consumo humano es un presupuesto material de ese derecho. Asimismo, el artículo 50 constitucional impone al Estado el deber de garantizar el bienestar de todos los habitantes, lo cual incluye necesariamente el acceso efectivo, suficiente y continuo al agua potable. En el ámbito internacional, instrumentos como el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales –interpretado por el Comité DESC en su Observación General No. 15– reconocen el derecho humano al agua, obligando a los Estados a adoptar medidas positivas para su plena realización. Hay una obligación reforzada impuesta al Estado en un estado social y democrático de derecho, por esta razón el suministro de agua, es una obligación prioritaria de los poderes públicos.
Desde esta perspectiva, la invocación de limitaciones técnicas no puede erigirse en una justificación absoluta para desatender una necesidad básica de subsistencia. Quien administre el suministro de agua no puede limitarse a constatar la insuficiencia del sistema; tiene el deber jurídico de planificar, prever y ejecutar las acciones necesarias para garantizar progresivamente el acceso al servicio al agua, especialmente cuando se trata de consumo humano.
El enfoque mayoritario normaliza una omisión estructural: acepta que la falta de infraestructura exonera al Estado de su obligación, cuando precisamente esa carencia evidencia un incumplimiento de su deber de previsión. No se trata de obligar a lo imposible, sino de exigir que se adopten medidas razonables, alternativas o progresivas para no dejar en desprotección a las personas.
El agua no es un servicio cualquiera, es un derecho humano esencial, por ello, la autoridad accionada no puede desentenderse de su deber de garantizarlo, escudándose en limitaciones técnicas sin ofrecer soluciones efectivas.
Por estas razones, estimamos que el recurso debió admitirse, al menos para ordenar la adopción de medidas concretas y progresivas que garantice, en un plazo razonable, el acceso efectivo al agua potable de la parte amparada. El agua es un bien y un derecho fundamental cuya vigencia debe asegurarse efectivamente, es un deber ineludible.
Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI
Por tanto:
Se rechaza de plano el recurso. Los Magistrados Cruz Castro y Rueda Leal salvan el voto.
Fernando Castillo V.
Fernando Cruz C.
Paul Rueda L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G.
Anamari Garro V.
Ingrid Hess H.
EXPEDIENTE N° 26-025088-0007-CO
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