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Res. 26909-2026 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 17/07/2026
OutcomeResultado
The amparo application was denied because no environmental injury of constitutional significance was established through this summary proceeding; legality disputes must be brought in ordinary proceedings, and the cited precedent warns that the works must not begin without the corresponding authorizations.Se declaró sin lugar el amparo porque no se acreditó una lesión ambiental de relevancia constitucional en esta vía sumaria; las discrepancias de legalidad deben plantearse en la vía ordinaria, y el antecedente citado advierte que las obras no deben comenzar sin las autorizaciones correspondientes.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) denied the amparo application against the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano concerning works to enable a road beside Montezuma Park and the tree cutting alleged by the applicant. It found no evidence of an environmental injury of constitutional significance that could be established through the summary amparo proceeding: the Área de Conservación Tempisque-SINAC reported that the park does not qualify as forest, a protected wild area, or a water-protection area, and SETENA granted environmental viability to the project in 2021. Disputes about the project's legal basis, regulatory plans, and permits must be raised through the ordinary legality proceedings. The judgment warns the Concejo that it must obtain the corresponding authorizations before beginning the works, as stated in the cited precedent. Justice Rueda dissented on citizen participation; Justice Salazar filed a note.La Sala Constitucional declaró sin lugar el amparo contra el Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano por las obras para habilitar una calle junto al Parque de Montezuma y la corta de árboles alegada por el recurrente. Consideró que no había elementos para acreditar una lesión ambiental de relevancia constitucional en la vía sumaria: el Área de Conservación Tempisque-SINAC indicó que el parque no califica como bosque, área silvestre protegida ni zona de protección hídrica, y SETENA otorgó viabilidad ambiental al proyecto en 2021. Las discrepancias sobre el sustento del proyecto, los planes reguladores y los permisos deben plantearse en la vía ordinaria de legalidad. La sentencia advierte al Concejo que debe contar con las autorizaciones correspondientes antes de iniciar las obras, conforme al antecedente citado. El Magistrado Rueda salvó el voto en cuanto a participación ciudadana; el Magistrado Salazar puso nota.
Key excerptExtracto clave
Furthermore, regarding the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the record contains no evidence establishing an injury of constitutional significance that can be addressed through the summary amparo proceeding. As stated in judgment 2021000176 at 9:15 a.m. on 8 January 2021, the Montezuma Park area was found not to qualify as forest, a protected wild area, or a water-protection area. It is also established that, by Resolution No. 0631-2021-SETENA of 22 April 2021, the Secretaría Técnica Ambiental issued the corresponding environmental viability.Además, respecto al derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, no constan elementos en autos que permitan acreditar una lesión de relevancia constitucional residenciable en la vía sumaria del amparo. Así, como se indicó en sentencia 2021000176 de las 9:15 horas del 8 de enero de 2021, se descartó que el área del parque de Montezuma califique como bosque, área silvestre protegida o de protección hídrica. Además, se verifica que mediante resolución nro. 0631-2021-SETENA del 22 de abril de 2021, la Secretaría Técnica Ambiental emitió la viabilidad ambiental respectiva.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"En este sentido, la parte dispositiva de ese fallo estableció lo siguiente: “Se declara con lugar el recurso. Se ordena a Cynthia María Rodríguez Quesada, en su condición de Intendente del Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano de Puntarenas, o a quien en su lugar ocupe el cargo, que gire las órdenes pertinentes y lleve a cabo todas las actuaciones requeridas dentro del ámbito de sus competencias para que en el plazo de seis meses, contado a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia, se solucione el problema de paso al centro de Montezuma, de modo que se garantice el libre paso de vehículos de emergencia.”"
"In this regard, the operative part of that judgment provided: “The application is granted. Cynthia María Rodríguez Quesada, in her capacity as Intendant of the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano de Puntarenas, or whoever holds that office, is ordered to issue the appropriate instructions and take all actions required within her powers so that, within six months from notification of this judgment, the access problem to central Montezuma is resolved, ensuring the free passage of emergency vehicles.”"
Considerando III, antecedente de relevancia
"En este sentido, la parte dispositiva de ese fallo estableció lo siguiente: “Se declara con lugar el recurso. Se ordena a Cynthia María Rodríguez Quesada, en su condición de Intendente del Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano de Puntarenas, o a quien en su lugar ocupe el cargo, que gire las órdenes pertinentes y lleve a cabo todas las actuaciones requeridas dentro del ámbito de sus competencias para que en el plazo de seis meses, contado a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia, se solucione el problema de paso al centro de Montezuma, de modo que se garantice el libre paso de vehículos de emergencia.”"
Considerando III, antecedente de relevancia
"Así las cosas, respecto a este extremo, procede la desestimatoria de este recurso."
"Accordingly, the application must be denied as to this claim."
Considerando III, antecedente de relevancia
"Así las cosas, respecto a este extremo, procede la desestimatoria de este recurso."
Considerando III, antecedente de relevancia
Full documentDocumento completo
Document Review CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at 9:25 a.m. on 17 July 2026.
Amparo proceeding in file number 26-017874-0007-CO, filed by [Nombre 001], identity card [Valor 001], against the CONCEJO MUNICIPAL DE DISTRITO DE CÓBANO (Cóbano District Municipal Council).
Background:
“Turning to the substance of the facts alleged by the amparo applicant, this representation states that, although tree-cutting work has indeed been carried out in the project area, those actions were not arbitrary or without technical and legal support. Rather, they are activities expressly included in the project called ‘Habilitation Calle Pública Contiguo al Parque de Montezuma,’ which underwent the environmental impact assessment procedure established by the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente. The project was processed before the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental (SETENA) under administrative file D1-0625-2020, culminating in Resolution No. 0631-2021-SETENA, issued at 1:33 p.m. on 22 April 2021, which analyzed Technical Report DEA-0172-2021-SETENA concerning the project’s Initial Environmental Assessment. In that resolution, the competent environmental authority expressly ruled: ‘Approve the D1 Environmental Assessment Document, Affidavit of Environmental Commitments, submitted for environmental assessment by the project developer.’ The resolution also states that, in accordance with Articles 17, 18, and 19 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, the project satisfactorily completed the environmental assessment procedure established by Costa Rican law.
“This is especially important because, pursuant to Articles 83 et seq. of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, SETENA is the specialized technical body to which the legislature has assigned exclusive jurisdiction to assess the environmental impacts of projects, works, or activities subject to environmental assessment and to determine their environmental viability. Consequently, the work currently being carried out does not result from discretionary decisions by the Municipality or actions outside the legal framework, but from compliance with an administrative act issued by the competent environmental authority. That act enjoys a presumption of legitimacy, enforceability, and validity unless annulled by the competent judicial or administrative authority.
“It should also be noted that the principle of legality, enshrined in Article 11 of the Political Constitution and developed in the Ley General de la Administración Pública, requires every public Administration to act within the powers conferred on it by the legal system. Accordingly, once environmental viability has been obtained and the conditions imposed by SETENA have been met, the Municipality is also required to carry out the project in accordance with the authorizations granted and the environmental mitigation, control, and monitoring measures established in the administrative resolution. Likewise, the principles of legitimate expectations and legal certainty preclude disregarding the legal effects of an environmental authorization validly issued by the competent authority, unless it is revoked, annulled, or suspended through the procedures established by law.
“The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has repeatedly recognized that environmental impact assessment is an essential preventive instrument for ensuring effective protection of the fundamental right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment provided for in Article 50 of the Political Constitution. In that regard, in Voto n.° 1220-2002, the Chamber emphasized that conducting an environmental impact study is an indispensable preventive mechanism for assessing, on a technical and scientific basis, a project’s possible effects before it is carried out. Likewise, in Voto n.° 2063-2007, the Chamber developed the principle of objectification of environmental protection, indicating that administrative decisions on environmental matters must be based on scientific and technical criteria, which are for the specialized Administration to apply. In this case, the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental (SETENA) is to conduct the technical assessment of the environmental viability of projects submitted to it.
“In line with that case law, the Chamber has held that constitutional jurisdiction does not exercise control by replacing the specialized body’s technical judgment, but by verifying that its actions are duly reasoned, consistent with standards of reasonableness and legality, and neither arbitrary nor harmful to fundamental rights. In this case, the amparo applicant provides no suitable technical evidence showing that the authorized work is being carried out contrary to the environmental viability granted, nor does he establish that the Municipality has failed to comply with the environmental obligations imposed by SETENA. On the contrary, the administrative action is proceeding under the legally established procedure and pursuant to a final administrative resolution issued by the competent environmental body.
“Accordingly, it cannot validly be asserted that the Municipality has acted arbitrarily or unlawfully in a way that infringes the constitutional right to a healthy environment, since the challenged actions form part of a project previously subjected to the environmental assessment procedure established by the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente and authorized by the competent technical authority.
“The project Habilitación Calle Pública Contiguo al Parque de Montezuma is included in the Plan Regulador Integral Cabuya Montezuma and was authorized in the Índice de Fragilidad Ambiental (IFA), with approval of the Plan Regulador Cabuya Montezuma by the Board of Directors of the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, at session No. 5927, Article 5, subsection 11, held on 18 April 2016; with approval by the Urban Planning Department of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, communicated by letter C- UCTOOT-35-05-2016 dated 31 May 2016; and with approval by the Cóbano District Municipal Council at extraordinary session number 03-2016, Article I, subsection a, of 9 June 2016. It was published in the digital supplement to La Gaceta No. 184 on Wednesday, 14 September 2016.
“Finally, it is important to refer to and submit as evidence the agreements issued by the Cóbano District Municipal Council concerning this matter. In that regard, see the agreement from ordinary session number 009-20, Article VIII, subsection c, of 30 June 2020, which states: By letter INT-2020-151, the Intendancy requests authorization to ask SINAC to cut 8 trees located in the area where the street to be opened along the northwest side of Montezuma Park is to pass, as contemplated in the Montezuma regulatory plan. In this regard, it should be noted that the motion was approved by 5 votes in favor, authorizing the Intendancy to process before MINAE-SINAC the cutting of trees such as: · Orgullo de la India (Lagerstroemia punctata), small tree. Ornamental use. Roble sabana (Tabebuia rosea), very small tree. Timber use · Guácimo (Guazuma ulmifolia), small tree. Used for firewood. Madroño (Calycophyllum candidissimun), small tree. Ornamental use · Coco (Cocos nucifera). Small palm. Food use · Jicaro (Crescentia cujete), shrub. Craft use. Roble Sabana (Tabebuia rosea), very small tree. Timber use. Madero Negro (Gliricidia sepium), small tree. Used for green fences and posts.
“Likewise, see the agreement from ordinary session number 98-26, Article VIII, subsection b, of 17 March 2026, which refers to letter No. INGV-054-2027, issued by Mr. Frankling Obregon Zamora, head of ROAD MANAGEMENT, requesting authorization to cut trees in Montezuma. It should be noted that, by 5 votes in favor from the councilors present, the request by Eng. Obregón Zamora was approved. Pursuant to the ‘Ley General de Caminos Públicos,’ Law 5060, Article 2 bis, he requests the cutting of four trees located on the public street adjacent to Montezuma Park, within the public right-of-way. In addition, the head of the road engineering department was authorized to notify SINAC of this Council’s approval, in its capacity as the competent public body with authority to remove obstacles located in the right-of-way in the public interest of improving the district road network.
“II. CONCLUSION “Based on the established facts and the applicable legal framework, this representation reaches the following conclusions:
“It has been demonstrated that the amparo applicant’s assertion concerning an alleged donation of the land to the people of Montezuma has no legal basis, because the property in dispute is located within the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, which is public-domain property belonging to the State and is inalienable, not subject to acquisitive prescription, and exempt from seizure, pursuant to Articles 1, 5, and 7 of Law No. 6043, Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre. Accordingly, no private individual could hold an ownership right capable of being transferred by donation. The fact that the land was historically used as a community park does not change its legal nature or create acquired rights over public-domain property. That factual situation is therefore insufficient to displace the special legal regime protecting property within the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone.
“On the other hand, the tree-cutting work challenged by the amparo applicant is neither arbitrary nor without legal support, but forms part of the implementation of the project called ‘Habilitación Calle Pública Contiguo al Parque de Montezuma,’ previously subjected to the environmental assessment procedure provided for in Articles 17, 18, and 19 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente. However, this representation clarifies that the trees have not yet been cut.
“The project has environmental viability granted by the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental (SETENA) through Resolution No. 0631-2021-SETENA, issued in file D1-0625-2020. This administrative act was issued by the competent environmental authority and enjoys a presumption of legitimacy, enforceability, and validity, as it has not been suspended or annulled by a competent authority. The Cóbano District Municipal Council has acted in strict compliance with the principle of legality enshrined in Article 11 of the Political Constitution, limiting itself to carrying out a project authorized by the competent technical authority and observing the environmental conditions imposed during the environmental assessment procedure, with no objective evidence that those obligations were breached.
“The amparo applicant provides no suitable technical evidence to establish that the municipal actions are being carried out contrary to the environmental viability granted, nor does he demonstrate arbitrary, unreasonable, or unlawful conduct that would constitute a current or imminent violation of the fundamental right enshrined in Article 50 of the Political Constitution.
“It should be noted that the foregoing establishes that the opening of the Public Street Adjacent to Montezuma Park is duly included in the Plan Regulador Integral Cabuya-Montezuma, has the necessary environmental viability, and was approved by the competent authorities, including the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo (ICT), the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo (INVU), and the Cóbano District Municipal Council. Its publication in the official gazette La Gaceta gives it full force and legal basis for opening the aforementioned public road.
“From the foregoing and the documentary evidence submitted, it follows that the actions relating to cutting trees in the area adjacent to Montezuma Park were considered, analyzed, and approved by the Cóbano District Municipal Council through agreements adopted at ordinary sessions in 2020 and 2026. Those agreements show that the authorizations granted responded to the public interest in improving road infrastructure and were issued within the legal powers of the Municipal Council, in coordination with the competent authorities, particularly SINAC, to obtain the corresponding environmental authorizations. Accordingly, there is no evidence of arbitrary conduct or conduct lacking legal support, but rather of an administrative procedure backed by formal agreements and applicable law. These matters should therefore be considered when deciding this amparo application.
“In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Cóbano District Municipal Council acted within the powers conferred on it by the legal system, based on a current environmental authorization issued by the competent authority. Accordingly, the violation of fundamental rights alleged by the amparo applicant is not established.”
“2. REGARDING THE RESPONSE BY THE CÓBANO CMDC:
“2.1. The President of the Cóbano CMDC, who was asked to respond (but not the Intendant, who was not asked), argues that the property rights concerning the land where Montezuma Park is currently located are valid. I am not in a position to challenge that, as I am not trained in law, but the foregoing is noted. In any event, nowhere in its response does it deny my assertion that no public street has ever existed in that park. I reiterate that there has never been any street in that entire area, and that the ‘path’ now visible is an artificial feature resulting from the earthworks and tree cutting suddenly carried out from 12 through 19 March 2026. They claim that the street is included in an approved regulatory plan, but omit to say that claims, complaints, and administrative and even judicial proceedings have been brought against that plan and the alleged ‘street’ by organizations and natural and legal persons.
“2.2. Nowhere in its response does the Cóbano CMDC deny—or even address—that it violated the fundamental rights I specified in my amparo pleading. At most, it naively and indolently claims that it acted in accordance with ‘the law,’ and that this is per se its ‘reason why the violation of the fundamental rights alleged by the amparo applicant is not established’ (p. 6). This ignores or evades the fact that legally lawful conduct can become constitutionally unlawful by violating fundamental rights recognized in national, supranational, and international sources of our Constitutional Law, as has indeed occurred in this case.
“2.3. In responding to my allegations, the Cóbano CMDC acknowledges that ‘... tree-cutting work has indeed been carried out in the project area’ (p. 2), but:
“A) In its ‘conclusion’ it then states categorically, inconsistently, and revealingly: ‘... the tree-cutting work challenged by the amparo applicant is neither arbitrary nor without legal support, but forms part of the implementation of the project called “Habilitación Calle Pública Contiguo al Parque de Montezuma,” previously subjected to the environmental assessment procedure ... HOWEVER, THIS REPRESENTATION CLARIFIES THAT THE TREES HAVE NOT YET BEEN CUT’ (p. 5; capitalization and boldface added). In other words, especially since all tree felling requires authorization from the competent authority (see, e.g., Articles 17 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente and 27, 33, and 34 of the Ley Forestal), if the trees that have not yet been cut are those ‘authorized’ for felling, then other trees have been cut, as the Cóbano CMDC itself acknowledges, and those trees would have been cut without specific authorization. Among them are precisely the trees I identify in my application. Put simply: the destructive work described in the response as ‘authorized’ does not match the work carried out, as alleged in my complaint.
“B) The Cóbano CMDC relies on a council agreement to process authorization to cut ‘8 trees’ (Agreement No. 9 at Ordinary Session No. 009-20, Article VIII, subsection c, of 30 June 2020) and a purported ‘authorization’ from the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación/MINAE (Tempisque Area, Cóbano Subregion), requested on 6 July 2020 and obtained the following day, 16 July (Resolution 026-20 at 3:00 p.m. on 16 July 2020). BUT:
“B.1. First, this authorization does not correspond to that agreement or, in any event, to the work carried out. For example, the 2020 SINAC resolution concerned ‘nine trees,’ while the Cóbano CMDC now alleges authorization for ‘eight trees.’ The descriptions of the trees do not match exactly in the agreement, resolution, and work carried out either (see the resolution’s ‘Therefore ... First,’ p. 2; to make matters worse, the SINAC file—which is not even paginated—refers to ‘10’ trees!). And while the agreement and resolution state that the trees to be cut are located on the ‘northwest side of the park,’ several of the trees cut were not there, but far inside the park.
“B.2. Second, even if it were the same ‘authorization,’ it would have expired. According to item Six of that authorization, ‘The term of this permit is non-extendable unless an extension is requested before its expiration and the requirements and procedures set out in the Ley General de la Administración Pública are met. It expires two months after the date of notification.’ No extension appears in the record. In other words, if it was issued for a two-month term almost six years ago, by the time it was used this past May it had expired entirely.
“B.3. In the end, neither the alleged ‘street,’ nor the tree felling at its supposed location, much less the felling inside the park, has any environmental viability.
“2.4. The Cóbano CMDC states: ‘... the project was processed before the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental (SETENA) under administrative file D1-0625-2020, culminating in Resolution No. 0631-2021-SETENA, issued at 1:33 p.m. on 22 April 2021, which analyzed Technical Report DEA-0172-2021-SETENA concerning the project’s Initial Environmental Assessment.’ “2.4.1. Contrary to the Cóbano CMDC’s understanding, I, the amparo applicant, am not asking this constitutional forum to review the legality of that SETENA resolution. Now, in light of its response and the attached SETENA resolution, I point out that the form was processed stating: ‘Technical Report DEA-0172-2021-SETENA for the project HABILITACION CALLE PUBLICA CONTIGUO AL PARQUE DE MONTEZUMA. File number D1-0625-2020-SETENA’ (in fact, the project is not ‘adjacent to’ but ‘within’ the original park). However, as requested by the Cóbano CMDC, the form was to open a public street shown on the site plan as existing.
The term ‘opening’ a street is used when there is already a physical track, gravel road, footpath, or easement on the land, but for some reason it is not suitable for safe public traffic or is not legally recognized by the municipality. The aim is to improve, widen, repair, or formalize a road already there. (Without making this matter a dispute over mere legality, I submit that such uses are also sources of law, pursuant to Articles 1, 4, and 14 of the Civil Code and Article 7 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública.) Building a street that does not exist—opening a road—means designing and constructing a road from scratch over previously undeveloped land, with the aim of changing the topography and land use to create entirely new road infrastructure connecting two points. In the end, however, in the D1 form’s Field Inspection section, the SETENA resolution acknowledges: ‘Having reviewed the information contained in administrative file D1-0625-2020-SETENA and analyzed the project location according to a report issued by the Geography Area, thereby complying with Executive Decree N° 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC and its amendments, the Environmental Assessment Department determined not to conduct a field inspection’ (emphasis and boldface added).
“2.4.2. In summary: A) A form for construction of a public street should have been processed, since no such street has ever physically existed in Montezuma Park. B) If SETENA had conducted the corresponding field inspection, it would have found that no such ‘street’ physically existed on the land. C) Moreover, if the Cóbano CMDC claims to have complied with the site plan, photographic record, and environmental measures, those photographs would show that the street did not physically exist and that the place was entirely part of Montezuma Park. Unfortunately, the Cóbano CMDC has not submitted that evidence, which would contradict its claim.
“3. FOR A BETTER RESOLUTION:
“3.1. I ask this Constitutional Chamber to consider requesting from the Cóbano CMDC, for informational, indicative, and/or evidentiary purposes as appropriate:
“A) First, clarify whether there is a council agreement declaring the affected land to be a municipal public street, a corresponding entry in the Cantonal Road Register of the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (MOPT), and inclusion in the relevant municipal road inventory. Also clarify whether, on that basis, it could officially receive public funds for construction and request an Environmental Assessment from SETENA to open and consequently build a new public street, as should have been done; and, in each such case, provide an authenticated copy of the relevant supporting documents.
“B) Identify and demonstrate the project’s physical design, as required by the Ley de Construcciones, the Ley General de Caminos, Law No. 9329, and the Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre. There should be a site plan respecting the legal minimum width of 14 meters so that the distance from the edge of the road boundary to the existing play area can be determined, as well as the roadway design, stormwater drainage systems, location, construction period, and compensation, mitigation, prevention, restoration, and recovery measures. None of this has ever been publicly known, nor has the CMDC even hinted at it now on this decisive occasion.
“C) Describe and provide evidence of the notifications to MOPT and the Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, as well as the corresponding permit from the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo for the alleged street, as required by Costa Rican law, given that it would be located in the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone.
“D) Clearly state the right-of-way in which the ‘eight trees’ located in the area where the alleged ‘street’ is supposed to pass are to be cut, whether they are protected trees, their respective ages and sizes, and whether the corresponding permits have been obtained.
“3.2. I also ask that SINAC be ordered to provide a certified copy of the file concerning the 2020 tree-felling request that led to Resolution 026-20 at 3:00 p.m. on 16 July 2020.
“3.3. Additional evidence. I attach photographs showing A) the affected land as it was before the work began on the 12th, B) its current state after the 19th, both dates in March just past, and C) the machinery at work in Montezuma Park, felling trees—which are not so ‘small’—and moving earth on completely undeveloped land, with no existing street. Topographic plans: one from 1994 in the name of the Junta Eclesiástica de Montezuma, showing a play area and a court on the land and no street along its northwest side, and stating that the total donated area is 3657.65 m2. A topographic plan in the name of the Cóbano District Municipal Council, dated 2018, shows a public street 11 meters wide along the northwest side of the Montezuma Park area. The street does not exist; the plan also shows an Area A, reducing the Montezuma Park area to 1698m2. In view of the foregoing, I reiterate my request that my amparo application be granted.”
Justice Hess Herrera drafted the opinion; and, Reasons:
I.Object of the application. The amparo applicant claims that, on 12 March 2026, the Cóbano District Municipal Council cut century-old trees of several species that were planted in the public park in Montezuma and carried out earthworks across the land to build a street and other works such as parking spaces, as shown on the cadastral map. He clarifies that the land in question was donated by a Costa Rican citizen and designated as a park area in 1984; it is also located in the maritime-terrestrial zone, and no such public street has ever existed there since the donation. He argues that there is a children’s play area, as well as benches and tables, and a drinking-water fountain. He says that birds, armadillos, raccoons, squirrels, and all kinds of monkeys normally passed through and lived in the trees that were cut; their trunks were removed from the site and their roots covered with earth to eliminate any evidence. He maintains that the area formed a section of a biological corridor, which has since been cut off. He considers that, because the play area will be very close to the street and future parking spaces, they will pose a great danger; vehicle noise pollution and toxic gases will also result.
II.Facts found. The following facts are considered duly established and relevant to the decision in this matter:
III.Relevant Precedent. In judgment no. 2021000176, at 9:15 a.m. on 8 January 2021, the Court ruled:
“V.—The specific case. The amparo applicant alleges that the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano intends to build a new street crossing Montezuma’s playground.
As a preliminary matter, it must be noted that the materials in the record show that the parties state that the project for this new street stems from compliance with what the Chamber ordered in judgment no. 2020-8437, at 9:20 a.m. on 8 May 2020 (case file no. 20-3867-007-CO). However, it must be made clear that, in that judgment, this Court ordered a solution to the passage problem in central Montezuma to ensure the free passage of emergency vehicles; it did not prescribe a specific means by which the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano had to resolve the problem. In this regard, the operative part of that ruling provided as follows: ‘The amparo application is granted. Cynthia María Rodríguez Quesada, in her capacity as Intendant of the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano de Puntarenas, or whoever holds that office in her place, is ordered to issue the relevant orders and carry out all actions required within her sphere of authority so that, within six months from notification of this judgment, the passage problem in central Montezuma is resolved, ensuring the free passage of emergency vehicles. In the interim, she shall adopt the necessary temporary traffic measures to ensure, within a maximum of three days from notification of this ruling, the passage of emergency vehicles along the street leading to the center of the community. (…)’ (emphasis added).
The amparo applicant now alleges that the project for this new street in Montezuma Park will entail cutting trees and reducing the area available for community recreation. She claims that the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano has never involved the public in decision-making on the matter.
However, regarding a similar grievance, in judgment no. 2017-1163, at 9:40 a.m. on 27 January 2017, this Chamber stated the following:
‘V.—Citizen participation in the specific case (drafted by Justice Salazar Alvarado). The amparo applicants also allege that the respondents have not ensured citizen participation in the process of extracting water from the Sardinal aquifer, nor provided them with information about the agreements and conventions signed. On this point, as Justice Jinesta Lobo has stated on other occasions, the majority of the Chamber considers that direct citizen participation in public affairs or the management of public matters is an evident constitutional principle (Article 9 of the Constitution) that must be implemented through the constitutional and subconstitutional legal order. As a general principle of Constitutional Law, citizen participation extends to the political or governmental sphere and the purely administrative sphere in making fundamental decisions. In the political or governmental sphere, the subject is addressed through instruments such as the regulation of popular elections, legislative referenda, and popular initiatives in lawmaking.
In the strictly administrative sphere, the principle of participation by members of the public must be developed gradually and according to the subject matter and sector, because not every fundamental administrative decision must necessarily be preceded by citizen participation; otherwise, administrative management, which must be fluid and dynamic pursuant to the constitutional principles of effectiveness and efficiency, would be slowed down. Our Political Constitution neither states nor specifies mechanisms for members of the public to participate in the adoption of fundamental administrative decisions; that is, it does not address this matter. The subconstitutional legal order, essentially through statutes, will determine the sectors and matters requiring greater participation (e.g., the drafting of regulations, environmental matters, consumer protection, urban planning, regulation and setting of rates for services of general interest, and municipal popular consultations such as open town meetings and referenda).
There will be situations in which the ordinary legislature has established such participation as a true, complete, and perfect right, fully enforceable in certain circumstances and subject to certain requirements and conditions that must be assessed. In those cases, determining whether or not that right established by statute has been violated is a question of legality to be litigated before the ordinary or general jurisdiction, not this constitutional jurisdiction. In short, what the Constitution in force and the international human rights instruments contemplate is a principle of participation which, for obvious reasons, does not attain the mandatory and enforceable character of a fundamental or human right. It is not possible to derive from the fundamental text and human rights instruments a supposed right to participation that applies unconditionally to the adoption of any or every fundamental administrative decision and would justify granting every amparo application whenever a violation is alleged.
The ordinary legislature gradually establishes and develops that right to participation in certain matters and sectors of the subconstitutional legal order; therefore, I reiterate, it is not for the constitutional jurisdiction, as this is a matter of ordinary legality, to determine when a statutorily established right has been infringed. In light of the foregoing, from a constitutional or conventional perspective, it is not possible to speak of a perfect right to participation; reference must instead be made to the constitutional principle of citizen participation in making fundamental decisions, whether political or administrative.’ (emphasis added).
Accordingly, as to this issue, the amparo application must be denied.
VI.The person whose rights are protected also alleges that the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano based the street project through Montezuma Park on the Cabuya Montezuma Comprehensive Regulatory Plan; however, that plan lacks environmental viability. She claims that the project is also based on resolution no. 327-2010-SETENA; however, that resolution concerns another regulatory plan, specifically the Montezuma Cabuya Tourist Center Regulatory Plan, which has a different zoning scheme from the Cabuya Montezuma Comprehensive Regulatory Plan. She also alleges that the resolution did not approve opening a new street inside the playground.
However, if there is any disagreement regarding the basis for the project to build a street through Montezuma Park, it must be raised through the ordinary legality route, where, in full proceedings, it can be determined whether the project was included in either of the two regulatory plans mentioned, under what specific technical and legal conditions, and whether it complies with the provisions applicable to the area where it is located. In this regard, ‘it should be recalled that amparo proceedings are eminently summary in nature—that is, brief and straightforward—and their procedure is incompatible with slow and complex evidentiary proceedings or with the need first to examine, on a declaratory basis, whether the subconstitutional rights that the parties cite as part of the factual allegations in the amparo application or the report required by law, as applicable, actually exist. Consequently, this route is not suited to conducting extensive environmental investigations, since those would require opening the proceedings for evidence’ (judgment no. 2017-3417, at 9:05 a.m. on 3 March 2017).
In addition, as regards the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the record contains no evidence of a violation of constitutional significance that could be addressed through summary amparo proceedings. In this regard, according to the report submitted by the Director of the Tempisque Conservation Area of the National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC), Montezuma Park does not qualify as forest, a protected wild area, or a water-protection area. It is also established that, by letter no. INT-2020-156, received on 6 July 2020, the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano requested authorization from the Tempisque Conservation Area-SINAC to cut eight trees located in the community park in order to open the street that will cross that area. Subsequently, by resolution no. 26-2020, at 3:00 p.m. on 16 July 2020 (notified to the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano on 24 July 2020), the Cóbano Subregional Office of the Tempisque Conservation Area of SINAC, following an on-site inspection conducted on 9 July 2020, authorized that council to fell the trees.
It is also inferred that the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano is processing the corresponding permit with SETENA for the works to open the aforementioned street; however, processing has been delayed by a payment problem, and for that reason the project has not begun while awaiting resolution of that issue and SETENA’s corresponding determination. Consistent with this, the record shows that, on 22 July 2020, the amparo applicant was notified of the agreement adopted by the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano at regular session no. 11-20 of 14 July 2020, in response to a request submitted to the municipal district council opposing the opening of the aforementioned street. The agreement stated: ‘The administration is responsibly taking the necessary steps to open the street. Among other procedures, the request for authorization to cut the trees has already been sent; on the other hand, steps are being taken to comply with what the National Technical Secretariat has requested.
Once approval is obtained from both institutions, this Municipal Council must proceed to bring the street into existence (…) It is important to emphasize and reiterate that no tree will be cut without authorization and approval from the corresponding institutions.’ Likewise, in an agreement adopted at regular session no. 14-20 of 4 August 2020 (notified on 6 August 2020), the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano reiterated to the applicant that work to open the aforementioned street ‘will begin once both authorization to cut trees from the National System of Conservation Areas and the street’s environmental viability from SETENA have been obtained, of which the amparo applicant is fully aware, as she was notified of this together with the agreement responding to the request not to open the Montezuma street.’ Moreover, it should be noted that the amparo applicant does not allege having filed any request with SETENA asserting the project’s alleged lack of environmental viability.
Accordingly, the amparo application must be denied as to this issue, while the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano is advised that, before beginning work on the street in Montezuma Park, it must have received the corresponding authorizations.
VII.On the other hand, the person whose rights are protected alleges that the project to build the new street through Montezuma Park lacks approval from the Concejo Municipal de Puntarenas and the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, contrary to Article 15 of the Road Administration Law.
However, it must be stated that determining compliance with requirements established in subconstitutional legislation is not within this Chamber’s remit. In this regard, this Constitutional Court does not oversee the legality of the actions or resolutions of the challenged authority. Accordingly, any disagreement on this matter must be raised by the amparo applicant, if she so chooses, through the ordinary legality route, where she must also raise the purely legality-based objections she asserts concerning administrative resolution no. 26-2020, by which the Cóbano Subregional Office of the Tempisque Conservation Area authorized the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano to fell the trees in Montezuma public park.
In view of the foregoing, the amparo application must be declared denied with respect to this grievance.
VIII.Dissenting opinion of Justice Rueda concerning citizen participation. As I stated in judgment no. 2017-1163, at 9:40 a.m. on 27 January 2017, unlike the majority, I consider that Article 9 of the Political Constitution not only sets forth a constitutional principle, but that citizen participation must be regarded as a fundamental right, with all the guarantees and protections that entails. In keeping with this position, I stated the following in that judgment:
‘A.—The constitutional significance of the right to citizen participation and its advancement through this Chamber’s case law. In judgment number 2013-017305, at 11:32 a.m. on 20 December 2013, this Court had the opportunity to analyze an amparo application in which citizen participation was advanced as a fundamental right. On that occasion, it explained the following: “The right to citizen participation in decision-making has become one of the fundamental pillars on which the democratic system rests. In our country, the constitutional legislature incorporated this right into Article 9 of the Political Constitution by providing that the Government of the Republic shall be popular, representative, participatory, alternative, and accountable. This mandate of the Fundamental Law guided subsequent constitutional and subconstitutional legal development. Thus, a series of mechanisms has been established to ensure that the right to participatory government can be effectively applied and does not remain merely on paper, such as referenda for the approval or repeal of laws and partial constitutional amendments, or popular initiatives in lawmaking (see, among others, judgment number 2005-05649, at 2:39 p.m. on 11 May 2005).
The right to participatory government, elevated to constitutional rank through the amendment enacted by Law N° 8364 of 1 July 2003, published in La Gaceta N° 146 of 31 July 2003, not only recognizes political oversight at the highest level of law, but also revalues the citizen’s role in decision-making processes. By the will of the constituent legislature, which this Chamber must not and cannot disregard, the right to participatory government stands as a fundamental pillar of our democratic system—a point the dissenting vote incorrectly disregards by downgrading citizen participation from a right to a general principle, clearly contrary to this Chamber’s case-law line, as demonstrated below—which is consistent with a political system based on tolerance, pluralism, and respect for freedom. This right to participatory government, also called the right to citizen participation, is protected by several international human rights instruments.
Thus, Article 21 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that ‘everyone has the right to take part in the government of their country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.’ Consistent with this, Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights expressly recognizes the right of citizens ‘(…) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives.’ Similarly, Article 5 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter states: ‘Representative democracy is strengthened and deepened by the permanent, ethical, and responsible participation of citizens within a framework of legality consistent with the respective constitutional order.’ More emphatically, Article 6 of that Charter provides: ‘Citizen participation in decisions relating to their own development is a right and a responsibility. It is also a necessary condition for the full and effective exercise of democracy.
Promoting and encouraging various forms of participation strengthens democracy.’ This conventional and constitutional recognition of the aforementioned right represents a fundamental aspect of this century’s democratic model, in which citizen oversight, transparency, and accountability stand out as factors inherent in the republican system, thereby lending far greater legitimacy to political decision-making, a key aspect of genuine governability. One of the mechanisms devised to fulfill the provisions of Article 9 of the Constitution is the public hearing, a means through which interested persons may assert their rights, actively participate in matters of national or local significance, and bring to the Administration’s attention any irregularities or disagreements concerning a proposed project. Accordingly, the public hearing is an instrument typical of a mature democracy, through which active citizen participation in public decision-making is encouraged.
Given its significance, the hearing must be conducted in a manner that ensures the greatest participation possible by those who may be affected; therefore, any action or omission that prevents this constitutes an open violation of the participants’ fundamental rights (see, among others, judgment number 2009-018223). As to the participatory nature of the public hearing, the Political Constitution itself requires it, since the amendment to Article 9 of the Fundamental Law, in force since 31 July 2003, established that the Government of the Republic must be participatory, among other things, which means that the government in office gives effect to what has been established through popular deliberation. In other words, in today’s democracy, citizens enjoy, by constitutional mandate, not only the right to vote as a means of exercising their right to participatory government, but also numerous instruments of various kinds to contribute to political decision-making, enabling them to exert direct influence on major public decisions.
This fundamental right to citizen participation requires that the people be able to express themselves equally through both majority and minority viewpoints. Thus, both national mechanisms, such as referenda or plebiscites, and local ones are important. Participants in a public hearing must be given every reasonable facility to be informed and to make themselves heard, since a hearing must not become an obstacle or a means of preventing the timely resolution of a given request (…)” Accordingly, we consider it necessary to include this note to reiterate the constitutional significance of Article 9 of the Political Constitution, not only as a general principle but as a clear and legitimate fundamental right, as we have done on previous occasions.’ In the present case, the amparo applicant alleges that proper citizen participation was not provided concerning the opening of a new street in Montezuma Park and its environmental implications (for example, tree cutting).
The challenged authorities of the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano state that the street project was included in the regulatory plan presented to the public at the public hearing held on 22 June 2012; nevertheless, they have not submitted suitable evidence to establish this fact. The respondent corporation is advised that, under the doctrine of the dynamic burden of proof, the party best positioned to add evidence to the proceedings is under a correspondingly greater obligation to do so (see judgments nos. 2018008396, at 12:40 p.m. on 25 May 2018; 2017015028, at 9:15 a.m. on 22 September 2017; and 2013014504, at 9:05 a.m. on 1 November 2013). In this case, that burden rests on the respondent, because it is responsible for safeguarding the right of the canton’s residents to participate in processing the aforementioned regulatory plan. It is therefore obligated to possess and submit evidence showing respect for participatory government, protected by Article 9 of the Political Constitution and Article 5 of the Municipal Code. In light of the foregoing, I consider it appropriate to grant the amparo application for violation of the fundamental right to citizen participation. (…)
Therefore:
The amparo application is denied. Favio José López Chacón and Ana Silvia Lobo Prada, respectively Intendant and Vice-Intendant, both of the Concejo Municipal del Distrito de Cóbano, shall take note of the warning stated at the end of Whereas VI of this judgment. Justice Rueda Leal dissents and would grant the amparo application for violation of the fundamental right to citizen participation.” In addition, judgment no. 2025025664, at 9:20 a.m. on 14 August 2026, stated:
“V.—The specific case: In this matter, the amparo applicant claims: 1) that, on 17 January 2025, a sign was placed adjacent to Montezuma Park stating that a project to open a public street would be carried out; however, she complains that the location makes no logical sense and that carrying it out would destroy the only park with forest density; moreover, the challenged authority must conduct an environmental assessment and share the information with the affected population so they can determine whether destroying an environmentally significant area is necessary; and 2) she argues that the company she represents holds a concession over land on which a large sum has been invested in building a hotel; however, the land is in sandy soils and the excavation for the street would destabilize the land on which the hotel is being built.
The Chamber has established that, at Article VIII, item c, of regular session no. 9-20 of 30 June 2020, the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano agreed to authorize the Intendancy to process with MINAE-SINAC the cutting of eight trees located ‘around the park in the community of Montezuma, exactly where the street designed and approved in the Cabuya-Montezuma regulatory plan runs and which would be opened in order to relieve congestion in the center of the community.’ Subsequently, by letter INT-2020-156, received on 6 July 2020, the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano requested authorization from the Tempisque Conservation Area-SINAC to cut eight trees located in the community park in the community park, in order to open the street that will pass through that area. Likewise, by resolution no. 26-2020, at 3:00 p.m. on 16 July 2020 (notified to the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano on 24 July 2020), the Cóbano Subregional Office of the Tempisque Conservation Area of SINAC, following an on-site inspection conducted on 9 July 2020, authorized that municipal district council to fell the trees requested in letter INT-2020-156.
Similarly, by letter no. INT-2020-316 of 18 September 2020, the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano requested that SINAC extend the validity period of the permit to cut the trees located in Montezuma Park because the process for SETENA’s authorization had been halted due to problems paying the D1 form fee. According to the Tempisque Conservation Area-SINAC, the area covered by Montezuma Park does not qualify as forest, nor is it a protected wild area or water-protection area.
The Chamber has also established that, by resolution no. 0631-2021-SETENA of 22 April 2021, the Environmental Technical Secretariat ruled on the request submitted by the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano for ‘Opening of a Public Street Adjacent to Montezuma Park.’ The document provided as follows: ‘FIRST: Approve the D1 Environmental Assessment Document, Sworn Declaration of Environmental Commitments, submitted for environmental assessment by the project developer. SECOND: Inform the interested party that, in accordance with Articles 17, 18, and 19 of the Organic Law of the Environment, the environmental assessment procedure for the project “Opening of a Public Street Adjacent to Montezuma Park,” administrative case file D1- 0625-2020-SETENA, has been completed, as described below. THIRD: In accordance with Decree N° 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, the validity of this environmental viability approval shall be FIVE YEARS for commencement of the works.
If the works do not commence within the established period, the provisions of the legislation in force shall be applied. FOURTH: Mr. FAVIO JOSE LOPEZ CHACON, identification document number 05-0351-0926, in his capacity as legal representative of CONCEJO MUNICIPAL DE DISTRITO DE COBANO, legal entity identification number 3-007-078297, case file number D1-0625-2020-SETENA, is ordered as follows: (…) FIFTH: Based on the environmental characteristics of the AP and its interaction with the activities the project will carry out, environmental-responsibility reports shall be submitted every SIX MONTHS during the construction phase, along with a consolidated final report. This is in accordance with Plenary Agreement CP-036-2011-SETENA of 28 February 2011. Environmental reports must be submitted within a maximum of 10 days after the end of the period they cover. The period for the first environmental-supervision report begins when activities commence.
To prepare these reports, using the format established by this Secretariat, the environmental supervisor shall be responsible for making the necessary number of visits, depending on the characteristics of the project. Based on these reports and the monitoring program, SETENA may adjust the amount of the guarantee and order the interested party to take measures to fulfill its commitment to comply with all mandatory requirements, so that the project, work, or activity remains within a controlled environmental-impact range. The responsible party and the owner shall support SETENA’s work during inspections it conducts. It is recalled that the granting of Environmental Viability is one step in the Environmental Impact Assessment process and that, once it has been granted, the environmental-management stage begins; this stage is to be carried out by this Secretariat through the Environmental Audit and Monitoring Department (ASA), in accordance with Plenary Commission Agreement No. 015-2014 of 26 August 2014.
SIXTH: Comply with Resolution N° 1834-2016-SETENA, “Signage for Projects with Environmental Viability,” of 29 September 2016. SEVENTH: The developer is advised that, if noncompliance with the environmental obligations undertaken is verified pursuant to Article 14 of Executive Decree 31849, or if falsification or manipulation of the information submitted is established, given that the instrument submitted is a Sworn Declaration, this Secretariat may proceed as provided in Article 15 of that same Decree, rendering ineffective the Environmental Viability (License) granted by this document. The corresponding documentation must be submitted, without prejudice to the authority to file the corresponding criminal complaints for any offense committed or to apply any of the sanctions listed in Article 99 of the Organic Law of the Environment. EIGHTH: Recall the recommendations/preventive measures arising from the supplementary technical studies and from what is described in the THIRD WHEREAS section above.
NINTH: Remind the developer that, pursuant to Article 11 of Executive Decree N° 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC—Scope of the EIA procedure before SETENA—compliance with the EIA procedure does not exempt the developer from completing procedures before other Administrative authorities, in accordance with their powers and the regulations in force, or from fulfilling obligations or responsibilities arising from its activities. TENTH: An ordinary motion for revocation may be filed against this resolution before SETENA, and an appeal before the Minister of Environment and Energy, within three business days counted from the business day following notification, in accordance with Articles 342 et seq. of the General Law of Public Administration N° 6227 and Article 87 of the Organic Law of the Environment N° 7554. ELEVENTH: All documents submitted to SETENA must clearly state the case file number, resolution number, and full name of the project.
An email address must also be provided for receipt of notifications from this Secretariat. TWELFTH: The complete case file, as well as the documents SETENA has issued during the Assessment process, shall be available to the developer at the web address.’ Thus, it was because of the aforementioned environmental viability approval that, on 15 January 2025, the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano placed a sign near Montezuma Park, which reads: ‘PROJECT: OPENING OF A PUBLIC STREET ADJACENT TO MONTEZUMA PARK DEVELOPER: CONCEJO MUNICIPAL DE DISTRITO DE CÓBANO PROJECT AREA 704 m CASE FILE NUMBER D1-0625-2020-SETENA ENVIRONMENTAL VIABILITY RESOLUTION N° 0631-2021-SETENA 22 APRIL 2021.’ Accordingly, this part of the amparo application must be denied. In this regard, the applicant maintains that the environmental viability approval was improper because it concerns another regulatory plan. However, as already held in the aforementioned judgment no. 2021000176, at 9:15 a.m. on 8 January 2021, any disagreement regarding the basis for the project to build a street through Montezuma Park must be raised through the ordinary legality route, where it can be determined whether the project was included in either of the two regulatory plans mentioned, under what specific technical and legal conditions, and whether it complies with the provisions applicable to the area where it is located.
Furthermore, as regards the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the record contains no evidence of a violation of constitutional significance that could be addressed through summary amparo proceedings. Thus, as stated in judgment 2021000176, at 9:15 a.m. on 8 January 2021, Montezuma Park was found not to qualify as forest, a protected wild area, or a water-protection area. It is also established that, by resolution no. 0631-2021-SETENA of 22 April 2021, the Environmental Technical Secretariat issued the corresponding environmental viability approval.
Finally, it should be noted that the amparo applicant does not allege having filed any request with SETENA asserting the project’s alleged lack of environmental viability for the street in Montezuma Park.
VI.On the other hand, the applicant claims that the company she represents holds a concession over land on which a large sum has been invested in building a hotel; however, the land is in sandy soils, and the excavation for construction of the street would destabilize the land on which the hotel is being built.
In this regard, first, there is no indication that the protected party filed any complaint with the respondent authority about this situation. Moreover, the report submitted under the responsibilities and formalities that entails states: “It is incorrect to say that the applicant pays fees. Under Ley 6043 on the Maritime Terrestrial Zone and its Regulations, it is understood that payment of the concession fee is due once this District Municipal Council has approved the application, for the concession to be granted by the Costa Rican Tourism Institute. As of today, the concession application process for Las Brisas de las Delicias de Cóbano S. A., expediente 3963-2020, has been halted because the company has not adjusted the survey plan submitted with its application. Likewise, if it has remained on the parcel for which the concession was requested since before the Comprehensive Cabuya Montezuma Regulatory Plan took effect, as published in La Gaceta 184 on Wednesday, 14 September 2016, and if it paid any taxes before that date, the company’s legal representative must appear before this District Municipal Council to complete the corresponding procedure.
“The applicant has interests of her own in the land for which her company requested a concession, because she has not adjusted the required setbacks for the buildings to conform to the survey plan submitted with the concession application and the Comprehensive Cabuya Montezuma Regulatory Plan. This is not an environmental issue, since the project challenged here has the corresponding environmental viability and studies, as shown by the evidence attached here. It is not true that her company is left defenseless, since it can adjust the buildings in accordance with Ley 9242, which regulates existing buildings in the Restricted Zone of the Maritime Terrestrial Zone. The applicant herself has not initiated that procedure because she does not wish to adjust the setbacks on the parcel for which the concession was requested.” Accordingly, at this preliminary stage, the Chamber has no evidence that would allow it to verify any violation of the fundamental rights of the protected company. Consequently, this part of the amparo application is denied. (…)
Therefore:
The application is denied. Justice Rueda Leal appends a note.”
In view of the applicant’s claims, the application must be denied.
As follows from the precedents quoted above, any disagreement with the grounds supporting the Montezuma park road project must be raised through the ordinary legality procedure, where it can be determined whether the project was included in either of the two regulatory plans mentioned, under what specific technical and legal conditions, and whether it complies with the provisions applicable to the area where it is located.
Moreover, as to the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the case file contains no evidence establishing a constitutionally significant injury that may be addressed through the summary amparo proceeding. Thus, as stated in judgment 2021000176, at 9:15 a.m. on 8 January 2021, it was determined that the Montezuma park area does not qualify as a forest, a protected wild area, or a water-protection area. It is also established that, by resolution no. 0631-2021-SETENA of 22 April 2021, the Environmental Technical Secretariat issued the corresponding environmental viability.
In environmental matters, it is also my view that, where the Public Administration has already intervened, the matter falls within the administrative-litigation jurisdiction. However, I do consider the merits when other rights of persons affected by a source of pollution are at stake, including health, quality of life, and the right to enjoy a healthy environment free from pollution (Article 50 of the Political Constitution). That is the case here: the applicant alleges that on 12 March 2026, the Cóbano District Municipal Council cut down century-old trees of several species that had been planted in Montezuma public park. The applicant states that birds, armadillos, raccoons, squirrels, and all kinds of monkeys normally passed through and lived in the cut trees, whose trunks were removed from the site and whose roots were covered with soil to eliminate any evidence, to the detriment of a healthy and ecologically balanced environment and a dignified quality of life.
The parties are advised that any paper documents, as well as objects or evidence contained on an electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic, or new-technology device, must be collected from the court office within a maximum period of 30 business days from notification of this judgment. Any material not collected within that period will be destroyed, as provided in the “Regulations on Electronic Case Files before the Judiciary,” approved by the Full Court in Article XXVI of session no. 27-11 of 22 August 2011, published in Judicial Bulletin no. 19 of 26 January 2012, and in the Judicial Council’s resolution approved in Article LXXXI of session no. 43-12 held on 3 May 2012.
Therefore:
The application is denied. Justice Salazar Alvarado appends a note.
Fernando Castillo V.
President Fernando Cruz C.
Paul Rueda L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G.
Anamari Garro V.
Ingrid Hess H.
EXPEDIENTE N° 26-017874-0007-CO Telephone: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2220-4607 / 2220-4844. Email address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Sabana Sur, Calle Morenos, 100 mts. south of the Perpetual Help Church).
Revisión del Documento SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas veinticinco minutos del diecisiete de julio de dos mil veintiseis .
Recurso de amparo que se tramita en expediente número 26-017874-0007-CO, interpuesto por [Nombre 001], cédula de identidad [Valor 001], contra el CONCEJO MUNICIPAL DE DISTRITO DE CÓBANO.
Resultando:
Redacta la Magistrada Hess Herrera; y,
Considerando:
I.Objeto del recurso. El recurrente reclama que, el 12 de marzo de 2026, el Concejo Municipal del Distrito de Cóbano cortó árboles centenarios de varias especies que estaban plantados en el parque público de Montezuma e hizo movimientos de tierras a través del terreno para la construcción de una calle y otras obras como parqueos, según se indica en el plano de catastro. Aclara que el terreno en cuestión fue donado por un ciudadano costarricense y habilitado como área de parque desde 1984; además, se encuentra en área de zona marítima terrestre y desde la donación nunca ha existido semejante calle pública. Arguye que existe un área de juegos para niños, también bancas y mesas; además, una fuente de agua potable. Alude que en los árboles cortados, cuyos troncos fueron desaparecidos del lugar y sus raíces cubiertas con tierra para eliminar cualquier evidencia, normalmente pasaban y habitaban aves, armadillos, mapaches, ardillas y monos de todas clases. Sostiene que se trataba de un tramo constitutivo de corredor biológico, desde entonces truncado. Considera que, al quedar el área de juegos muy cerca de la calle y los futuros parqueos, ocasionarán un gran peligro; además, se producirá contaminación sónica y gases tóxicos de los vehículos.
II.Hechos probados. De importancia para la decisión de este asunto, se estiman como debidamente demostrados los siguientes hechos:
III.Antecedente de relevancia. En sentencia nro. 2021000176 de las 9:15 horas del 8 de enero de 2021 se resolvió:
“V.- Sobre el caso concreto. La recurrente aduce que el Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano pretende construir una calle nueva atravesando el parque infantil de Montezuma.
En un primer orden de ideas, es menester indicar que, de los elementos que constan en autos, se aprecia que las partes procesales indican que el proyecto de esa nueva calle obedece al cumplimiento de lo ordenado por la Sala en la sentencia n.° 2020-8437 de las 9:20 horas del 8 de mayo de 2020 (expediente n.° 20-3867-007-CO). Sin embargo, es preciso dejar en claro que en tal sentencia, este tribunal ordenó la solución al problema de paso que se presenta en el centro de Montezuma, de modo que se garantice el libre paso de vehículos de emergencia, mas no se impuso una forma específica en que el Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano debía solventar la problemática. En este sentido, la parte dispositiva de ese fallo estableció lo siguiente: “Se declara con lugar el recurso. Se ordena a Cynthia María Rodríguez Quesada, en su condición de Intendente del Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano de Puntarenas, o a quien en su lugar ocupe el cargo, que gire las órdenes pertinentes y lleve a cabo todas las actuaciones requeridas dentro del ámbito de sus competencias para que en el plazo de seis meses, contado a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia, se solucione el problema de paso al centro de Montezuma, de modo que se garantice el libre paso de vehículos de emergencia.
En el ínterin, deberá adoptar las medidas viales temporales necesarias para asegurar, en el plazo máximo de tres días contado a partir de la notificación de este pronunciamiento, el tránsito de los vehículos de emergencia por la calle que da acceso al centro de la comunidad. (…)” (énfasis agregado).
Ahora bien, la recurrente aduce que el proyecto de esa nueva calle en el parque de Montezuma implicará la corta de árboles y la disminución del área de esparcimiento comunal. Acusa que el Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano en ningún momento ha participado a la población en la toma de decisiones al respecto.
Sin embargo, sobre un agravio similar, en sentencia n.° 2017-1163 de las 9:40 horas del 27 de enero de 2017, esta Sala indicó lo siguiente:
“V.- Sobre la participación ciudadana en el caso concreto (redacción del Magistrado Salazar Alvarado). Además, los amparados acusan que los recurridos no han garantizado la participación ciudadana en el proceso de extracción de agua del manto acuífero de Sardinal, ni tampoco se les ha brindado información sobre los acuerdos y convenios firmados. En relación con este punto, como en otras ocasiones lo ha manifestado el Magistrado Jinesta Lobo, la mayoría de la Sala considera que la participación ciudadana directa en los asuntos públicos o el manejo de la cosa pública, es un evidente principio constitucional (artículo 9° de la Constitución) que debe ser actuado por el ordenamiento jurídico constitucional e infraconstitucional. La participación ciudadana, como principio general del Derecho Constitucional, se proyecta en el terreno político o de gobierno y el meramente administrativo, para la toma de decisiones fundamentales.
En la dimensión política o de gobierno, el tema se desarrolla a través de instrumentos como la regulación de los procesos de elección popular, el referéndum legislativo y la iniciativa popular en la formación de la ley. En el plano estrictamente administrativo, el principio de participación de los administrados debe ser desarrollado de manera paulatina y según la materia y sector, por cuanto, no toda decisión administrativa fundamental, debe estar, necesariamente, precedida, de participación ciudadana, puesto que de ser así se ralentizaría la gestión administrativa que debe ser, por aplicación de los principios constitucionales de eficacia y eficiencia, fluida y dinámica. Nuestra Constitución política, no enuncia ni señala los mecanismos de participación de los administrados en la adopción de las decisiones administrativas fundamentales, esto es, no se ocupa de tal extremo. El ordenamiento infraconstitucional, esencialmente, legal será el que vaya determinando aquellos sectores y materias donde debe haber una mayor participación (v. gr. en materia de elaboración de reglamentos, ambiental, de protección del consumidor, de planificación urbana, regulación y fijación de tarifas en servicios de interés general, realización de consultas populares a nivel municipal como cabildos abiertos y referendos, etc.).
Habrá situaciones en las que el legislador ordinario ha configurado tal participación como un verdadero, acabado y perfecto derecho, plenamente exigible, en determinadas circunstancias y bajo ciertos presupuestos y condiciones que habrá que verificar. En tales casos, determinar si se ha quebrantado o no tal derecho de configuración legislativa es una cuestión de legalidad que se debe discutir ante la jurisdicción ordinaria o común y no en esta jurisdicción constitucional. En definitiva, lo que contemplan la Constitución vigente y los instrumentos internacionales en materia de derechos humanos, es un principio de participación, que por razones obvias no alcanza el carácter preceptivo y exigible de un derecho fundamental o humano. No resulta posible extraer del texto fundamental y de los instrumentos de Derechos Humanos un supuesto derecho a la participación que rija de manera incondicional para la adopción de cualquier o toda decisión administrativa fundamental que justifique acoger todo amparo siempre que se alegue que se violó el mismo.
Es el legislador ordinario el que paulatinamente, va configurando y desarrollando tal derecho de participación en ciertas materias y en determinados sectores del ordenamiento jurídico infraconstitucional, por lo que, reitero, no le corresponde a la jurisdicción constitucional, por ser una cuestión de legalidad ordinaria, establecer cuándo se ha infringido un derecho de configuración legal. En razón de lo expuesto, no resulta posible hablar, desde una perspectiva constitucional o convencional, de un derecho perfecto a la participación, debiendo, en su lugar, hacerse referencia al principio constitucional de la participación ciudadana en la toma de decisiones fundamentales, sean políticas o administrativas.” (énfasis agregado).
Así las cosas, respecto a este extremo, procede la desestimatoria de este recurso.
VI.La tutelada también alega que el Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano sustentó el proyecto de la calle que pasará por el parque de Montezuma en el Plan Regulador Integral Cabuya Montezuma; sin embargo, tal plan carece de viabilidad ambiental. Reclama que el proyecto también se sustenta en la resolución n.° 327-2010- SETENA; empero esta corresponde a otro plan regulador, específicamente al Plan Regulador Centro Turístico Montezuma Cabuya, que tiene una diferente zonificación al Plan Regulador Integral Cabuya Montezuma. Además, acusa que en esa resolución no se aprobó la apertura de una calle nueva dentro del parque infantil.
Empero, en caso de existir alguna disconformidad respecto al sustento que justifica el proyecto de la calle por el parque de Montezuma, deberá ser alegada en la vía ordinaria de legalidad, donde, en vía plenaria, se podrá determinar si se incluyó o no en alguno de los dos planes reguladores indicados, bajo qué condiciones técnicas y legales específicas y si cumple con las disposiciones correspondientes a la zona donde se ubica. En este sentido, “recuérdese que el proceso de amparo es de carácter eminentemente sumario —es decir, breve y sencillo— y su tramitación no es compatible con la práctica de diligencias probatorias lentas y complejas, o con la necesidad de entrar previamente a examinar —con carácter declarativo— si los derechos de rango infra constitucional que las partes citan como parte del elenco fáctico del recurso de amparo o del informe de ley, según sea el caso, existen en realidad. De allí que esta vía no sea apta para hacer amplias investigaciones en materia ambiental, puesto que éstas harían necesario abrir el proceso a pruebas” (sentencia n.° 2017-3417 de las 9:05 horas del 3 de marzo de 2017).
Aunado a lo anterior, respecto al derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, no constan elementos en autos que permitan acreditar una lesión de relevancia constitucional residenciable en la vía sumaria del amparo. En esta línea, según el informe rendido por el Director del Área de Conservación Tempisque del Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (SINAC), se descarta que el área del parque de Montezuma califique como bosque, área silvestre protegida o de protección hídrica. Además, se verifica que, mediante oficio n.º INT-2020-156, recibido el 6 de julio de 2020, el Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano solicitó al Área de Conservación Tempisque-SINAC la autorización para la corta de ocho árboles ubicados en el parque de la comunidad a efectos de habilitar la calle que atravesará ese sector. Luego, mediante resolución n.° 26-2020 de las 15:00 horas del 16 de julio de 2020 (notificada al Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano el 24 de julio de 2020), la Oficina Subregional de Cóbano del Área de Conservación Tempisque del SINAC, posterior a la inspección in situ efectuada el 9 de julio de 2020, autorizó a tal concejo la tala de los árboles.
Asimismo, se colige que el Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano está tramitando el permiso correspondiente ante el SETENA para las obras de habilitación de la calle aludida; sin embargo, los trámites se han visto retrasados por un problema de pago, debido a lo cual el proyecto no se ha iniciado en espera de la resolución de este inconveniente y el respectivo pronunciamiento de la SETENA. En consonancia con ello, se aprecia en autos que, el 22 de julio de 2020, a la recurrente se le notificó el acuerdo tomado por el Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano en la sesión ordinaria n.° 11-20 del 14 de julio de 2020, donde, en respuesta a una gestión planteada ante el concejo municipal de distrito contra la apertura de la referida calle, se indicó lo siguiente: “De una manera responsable desde la administración se están llevando las gestiones necesarias para la apertura de la calle, entre otros tramites (sic.) ya ha sido enviada la solicitud de autorización para la corta de los árboles, por otro lado se está (sic.) llevando a cabo la (sic.) gestiones para dar cumplimiento a lo solicitado por la Secretaría Técnica Nacional, por lo que una vez se obtenga visto bueno por parte de estas dos instituciones este Concejo Municipal deberá dar marcha a la materialización de la calle (…)Es importante destacar y reiterar que no se realizara (sic.) la corta de ningún árbol sin contar con las autorizaciones y visto bueno por parte de las instituciones correspondientes”.
Asimismo, en acuerdo adoptado en la sesión ordinaria n.° 14-20 del 4 de agosto de 2020 (notificado el 6 de agosto de 2020), el Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano reiteró a la accionante que las obras para la habilitación de la aludida calle “serán puestas en marcha cuando se obtenga tanto la autorización de corta por parte del Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, y la viabilidad de la calle por parte de SETENA, de lo cual la recurrente tiene pleno conocimiento siendo que le fue notificado junto con el acuerdo de respuesta a la solicitud de no apertura de la calle de Montezuma”. Además, no sobra indicar que la parte recurrente no alega haber interpuesto gestión alguna ante la SETENA acusando la presunta inviabilidad ambiental del proyecto de la calle en el parque de Montezuma.
Así las cosas, se impone la desestimatoria de este recurso en lo concerniente a este extremo, no sin antes advertir al Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano que, antes de comenzar la ejecución de las obras de la calle en el Parque de Montezuma, deberá haber recibido las autorizaciones correspondientes.
VII.Por otro lado, la amparada acusa que el proyecto de construcción de la nueva calle que pasará por el parque de Montezuma no cuenta con la aprobación del Concejo Municipal de Puntarenas, ni la del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, lo que contraviene el artículo 15 de la Ley de Administración Vial.
No obstante, es menester indicar que no es resorte de esta Sala determinar el cumplimiento de requisitos dispuestos en la normativa infraconstitucional. En esta línea, este Tribunal Constitucional no es un contralor de la legalidad de las actuaciones o resoluciones de la autoridad recurrida. Así las cosas, cualquier inconformidad al respecto, deberá alegarla la recurrente, si a bien lo tiene, ante la vía de legalidad ordinaria, donde también deberá plantear las disconformidades de mera legalidad que esgrime respecto a la resolución administrativa n.° 26-2020, mediante la que la Oficina Subregional de Cóbano del Área de Conservación Tempisque autorizó al Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano para talar los árboles del parque público de Montezuma.
En mérito de las consideraciones expuestas, se impone declarar sin lugar el recurso en lo que a este agravio atañe.
VIII.Voto salvado del Magistrado Rueda en relación con la participación ciudadana. Tal como lo consigné en la sentencia n.° 2017-1163 de las 9:40 horas del 27 de enero de 2017, a diferencia de la mayoría, estimo que el ordinal 9 de la Constitución Política no solo recoge un principio de rango constitucional, sino que la participación ciudadana debe ser considerada como un derecho fundamental, con todas las garantías y protección que ello implica. Conforme esta línea, en la aludida sentencia indiqué lo siguiente:
“A.- Sobre la relevancia constitucional del derecho a la participación ciudadana y su impulso mediante la jurisprudencia de esta Sala. En la sentencia número 2013-017305 de las 11:32 horas del 20 de diciembre de 2013, este Tribunal tuvo la oportunidad de analizar un recurso de amparo en el que se potenciaba la participación ciudadana como derecho fundamental. En esa oportunidad, se explicó lo siguiente: “El derecho a la participación ciudadana en la toma de decisiones se ha convertido en uno de los pilares fundamentales sobre los que descansa el sistema democrático. En nuestro país, el legislador constitucional recogió este derecho en el artículo 9 de la Constitución Política al disponer que el Gobierno de la República sea popular, representativo, participativo, alternativo y responsable. Este mandato de la Ley Fundamental ha orientado un posterior desarrollo normativo constitucional e infraconstitucional.
Así, se ha establecido una serie de mecanismos que buscan que el derecho al gobierno participativo pueda ser aplicado en forma efectiva, y no quede únicamente en el papel, tales como el referéndum para la aprobación o derogación de leyes y reformas parciales a la Constitución, o la iniciativa popular en la formación de leyes (véase, entre otras, la sentencia número 2005-05649 de las 14:39 horas del 11 de mayo del 2005). El derecho al gobierno participativo, elevado a rango constitucional mediante la reforma propiciada por Ley N° 8364 de 01 de julio de 2003, publicada en La Gaceta N° 146 de 31 de julio de 2003, no solo significa un reconocimiento del más alto rango normativo a la función del control político, sino que, además, constituye una revalorización del papel del ciudadano en los procesos de toma de decisión. Por voluntad del legislador constituyente, que esta Sala no debe ni puede desconocer, el derecho al gobierno participativo se erige como pilar fundamental de nuestro régimen democrático -cuestión erróneamente desconocida por el voto de minoría, que le baja la categoría a la participación ciudadana de derecho a principio general, en clara contraposición a la línea jurisprudencial de esta Sala como más adelante se demuestra-, lo que resulta conteste con un sistema político basado en la tolerancia, el pluralismo y el respeto a la libertad.
Este derecho al gobierno participativo, también denominado derecho a la participación ciudadana, se encuentre cobijado en varios instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos. De este modo, el artículo 21 de la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos de 1948 dispone que "toda persona tiene derecho a participar en el gobierno de su país, directamente o por medio de representantes libremente escogidos". Concordante con lo anterior, el numeral 25 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos reconoce expresamente el derecho de los ciudadanos: “(…) de participar en la dirección de los asuntos públicos, directamente o por medio de representantes libremente elegidos”. En igual sentido, la Carta Democrática Interamericana señala en su artículo 5° que: “La democracia representativa se refuerza y profundiza con la participación permanente, ética y responsable de la ciudadanía en un marco de legalidad conforme al respectivo orden constitucional”.
De manera más vehemente, el numeral 6 de dicha Carta estatuye que: “La participación de la ciudadanía en las decisiones relativas a su propio desarrollo es un derecho y una responsabilidad. Es también una condición necesaria para el pleno y efectivo ejercicio de la democracia. Promover y fomentar diversas formas de participación fortalece la democracia”. Este reconocimiento convencional y constitucional al mencionado derecho representa un aspecto fundamental del modelo democrático de este siglo, en el que el control ciudadano, la transparencia y la rendición de cuentas destacan como factores inherentes al sistema republicano, lo que a su vez dota la toma de decisiones políticas de mucha mayor legitimidad, aspecto clave cuando de verdadera gobernabilidad se trata. Precisamente, uno de los mecanismos ideados para cumplir lo dispuesto en el artículo 9 constitucional es la audiencia pública, que constituye en un medio a través del cual las personas interesadas pueden hacer valer sus derechos, participando activamente en temas de relevancia nacional o local, y poniendo en conocimiento de la Administración todas aquellas anomalías o disconformidades en relación con el proyecto que se pretenda desarrollar.
Así las cosas, la audiencia pública es un instrumento típico de una democracia madura, mediante el cual se fomente la participación activa del ciudadano en la toma de decisiones públicas. Por su significado, la audiencia debe efectuarse de tal forma que garantice la mayor participación de las personas que puedan verse afectadas, de ahí que cualquier acción u omisión que evite lo anterior, implica una abierta vulneración a los derechos fundamentales de los participantes (véase, entre otras, la sentencia número 2009-018223). En cuanto al carácter participativo de la audiencia pública, la propia Constitución Política obliga a ello, pues con la reforma vigente desde el 31 de julio de 2003 al numeral 9 de la Ley Fundamental quedó estatuido que el Gobierno de la República tiene que ser, entre otros aspectos, participativo, lo que implica que el gobierno de turno es un articulador de lo establecido por deliberación popular.
En otras palabras, en la democracia actual, los ciudadanos gozan, por mandato constitucional, ya no solo del derecho al voto para ejercer su derecho al gobierno participativo, sino de cantidad de instrumentos de diversa naturaleza para coadyuvar en la toma de decisiones políticas, lo que propicia que puedan ejercer influencia directa en las grandes decisiones públicas. Este derecho fundamental de participación ciudadana establece que el pueblo debe estar habilitado para manifestarse por igual en puntos de vista tanto mayoritarios como minoritarios. Así, serán importantes tanto los mecanismos de participación nacionales como el referéndum o plebiscito, como los locales. Durante la audiencia pública se les deben otorgar a los participantes todas las facilidades para que se encuentren informados y puedan hacerse escuchar, todo dentro de lo razonable, pues tampoco puede convertirse la audiencia en un obstáculo o un recurso para impedir que se dé oportuna resolución a determinada gestión (…)”.
Así las cosas, estimamos necesario consignar esta nota con el fin de reiterar la relevancia constitucional del numeral 9 de la Constitución Política, no solo como principio general sino como un claro y legítimo derecho fundamental, como lo hemos hecho en anteriores ocasiones.” Ahora bien, en el sub lite, la recurrente acusa que no se dio la debida participación ciudadana en relación con la habilitación de una nueva calle en el parque de Montezuma y las implicaciones ambientales que ello conlleva (verbigracia, la corta de árboles). Por su parte, las autoridades recurridas del Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano aducen que el proyecto de esa calle estaba incluido en el plan regulador expuesto a la ciudadanía en la audiencia pública celebrada el 22 de junio de 2012; pese a ello, lo cierto es que no aportan los elementos probatorios idóneos a los efectos de comprobar este hecho. Advierta la corporación accionada que, de acuerdo con la doctrina de la carga dinámica de la prueba, aquella parte que esté en mejores condiciones de agregar prueba al proceso se encuentra aun más obligada a hacerlo (ver sentencias n.os 2018008396 de las 12:40 horas del 25 de mayo de 2018, 2017015028 de las 9:15 horas del 22 de setiembre de 2017 y 2013014504 de las 9:05 horas del 1º de noviembre de 2013).
En la especie, tal carga recae en la recurrida, puesto que ella es responsable de resguardar el derecho a la participación de los habitantes del cantón en la tramitación del referido plan regulador, en virtud de lo cual recae sobre ella la obligación de contar y aportar los medios probatorios que acrediten el respeto al gobierno participativo, cobijado en los artículos 9 de la Constitución Política y 5 del Código Municipal. En mérito de lo expuesto, estimo procedente la estimatoria de este recurso por la lesión al derecho fundamental a la participación ciudadana. (…)
Por tanto:
Se declara sin lugar el recurso. Tomen nota Favio José López Chacón y Ana Silvia Lobo Prada, por su orden Intendente y Viceintendente, ambos del Concejo Municipal del Distrito de Cóbano de la advertencia indicada en el considerando VI in fine de esta sentencia. El Magistrado Rueda Leal salva el voto y declara con lugar el recurso por la vulneración al derecho fundamental a la participación ciudadana”.
Además, en sentencia nro. 2025025664 de las 9:20 horas del 14 de agosto de 2026, se indicó:
“V.- Sobre el caso concreto: En el sub iudice, la recurrente reclama: 1) que, el 17 de enero de 2025, un rótulo fue colocado contiguo al parque Montezuma, en el que se indicó la ejecución de un proyecto para la habilitación de calle pública; empero, reclamara que esa obra no tiene un sentido lógico por su ubicación y realizarla implica la destrucción del único parque donde existe densidad boscosa; además, la autoridad accionada debe realizar una evaluación ambiental y la información debe ser compartida con la población afectada, para así determinar la necesidad de destruir una zona ambiental; y, 2) arguye que la sociedad que representa es concesionaria de un terreno, donde se ha invertido una gran suma para la construcción de un hotel; empero, está ubicada en suelos arenosos y, la excavación a realizarse para la construcción de la calle implica la desestabilización para el terreno en el que se está construyendo el hotel.
Al respecto, la Sala tiene por acreditado que, en el artículo VIII, inciso c, de la sesión ordinaria nro. 9-20 del 30 de junio de 2020, el Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano acordó autorizar a la Intendencia a tramitar ante el MINAE-SINAC la corta de ocho árboles ubicados “en los alrededores del parque de la comunidad de Montezuma exactamente por donde pasa la calle diseñada y aprobada en el plan regulador Cabuya- Montezuma y que se habilitara (sic.) con el finde descongestionar el centro de la comunidad”. Posteriormente, mediante oficio INT-2020-156, recibido el 6 de julio de 2020, el Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano solicitó al Área de Conservación Tempisque-SINAC la autorización para la corta de ocho árboles ubicados en el parque de la comunidad en el parque de la comunidad, a efectos de habilitar la calle que pasará por ese sector. Asimismo, en resolución n.° 26-2020 de las 15:00 horas del 16 de julio de 2020 (notificado al Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano el 24 de julio de 2020), la Oficina Subregional de Cóbano del Área de Conservación Tempisque del SINAC, posterior a la inspección in situ efectuada el 9 de julio de 2020, autorizó a tal concejo municipal de distrito para talar los árboles que había solicitado mediante oficio INT-2020-156.
De igual forma, mediante oficio n.° INT-2020-316 del 18 de setiembre de 2020, el Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano solicitó al SINAC la ampliación del plazo de vigencia del permiso para la corta de los árboles ubicados en el Parque de Montezuma debido a que el trámite para la autorización por parte de SETENA se encontraba paralizado, ya que se habían presentado problemas con el pago del formulario D1. Según el Área de Conservación Tempisque-SINAC, el área cubierta por el parque de Montezuma no califica como bosque, ni es un área silvestre protegida o de protección hídrica.
Por su parte, la Sala tiene por demostrado que, mediante resolución nro. 0631-2021-SETENA del 22 de abril de 2021, la Secretaría Técnica Ambiental resolvió la solicitud del Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano para la “Habilitación Calle Pública Contiguo al Parque de Montezuma”. En tal documento se dispuso: “PRIMERO: Aprobar el Documento de Evaluación Ambiental D1 Declaración Jurada de Compromisos Ambientales sometido a evaluación ambiental por el proyectista. SEGUNDO: Comunicar al interesado que, de conformidad con los artículos 17,18 y 19 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, se ha cumplido con el procedimiento de evaluación ambiental del proyecto "Habilitación Calle Pública Contiguo al Parque de Montezuma", con expediente administrativo D1- 0625-2020-SETENA, según se describe a continuación. TERCERO: De acuerdo al Decreto N° 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, la vigencia de esta viabilidad será por un período de CINCO AÑOS para el inicio de las obras.
En caso de no iniciarse las obras en el tiempo establecido, se procederá a aplicar lo establecido en la legislación vigente. CUARTO: Se le ordena al señor FAVIO JOSE LOPEZ CHACON documento de identificación número 05-0351-0926 en calidad de representante legal de la sociedad CONCEJO MUNICIPAL DE DISTRITO DE COBANO con cédula jurídica 3-007-078297, expediente número D1-0625-2020-SETENA: (…) QUINTO: Con base en las características ambientales del AP y su interacción con las actividades que realizará el proyecto, se establece una periodicidad de presentación de informes regenciales para periodos de cada SEIS MESES durante la fase constructiva y un informe final consolidado. Lo anterior de conformidad con lo establecido en el Acuerdo de Plenaria CP-036-2011-SETENA del 28 de febrero del 2011. Los Informes ambientales deberán ser presentados en un plazo máximo de 10 días posteriores a la finalización del periodo que cubren.
En el momento de iniciar actividades se inicia el periodo del primer informe de regencia ambiental. Para la elaboración de estos informes, de acuerdo al formato establecido por esta Secretaría, será responsabilidad del regente ambiental realizar el número de visitas necesarias, dependiendo de las características del proyecto. Con base en estos informes y al programa de monitoreo, la SETENA podrá ajustar el monto de garantía y dictar medidas al interesado su compromiso por cumplir con todas las de acatamiento obligatorio para mantener al proyecto, obra o actividad dentro de un margen de impacto ambiental controlado. El responsable y el propietario deberán brindar apoyo a las labores de la SETENA, en las inspecciones que esta efectúe. Recordar que el otorgamiento de la Viabilidad Ambiental es un paso dentro del proceso de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental y que luego de otorgada ésta, inicia la etapa de gestión ambiental que debe realizar esta Secretaría, por medio del Departamento de Auditoría y Seguimiento Ambiental (ASA), lo anterior de conformidad con el acuerdo de la Comisión Plenaria, No. 015-2014, del 26 de agosto de 2014.
SEXTO: Cumplir con lo establecido en la Resolución N° 1834-2016-SETENA, "Rotulación de Proyectos con Viabilidad Ambiental", del 29 de septiembre del 2016. SÉTIMO: Advertir al desarrollador que si se llegare a verificar el incumplimiento de las obligaciones ambientales adquiridas, de conformidad con el artículo 14 del Decreto Ejecutivo 31849, o de comprobarse falsedad o manipulación de la información aportada, por el carácter de Declaración Jurada que tiene el instrumento presentado, esta Secretaría podrá proceder conforme a lo señalado en el artículo 15 de ese mismo Decreto, dejando sin efecto la Viabilidad (Licencia) Ambiental otorgada mediante este documento, debiendo presentar la documentación correspondiente, independientemente de la facultad de presentar las denuncias penales correspondientes por cualquier delito cometido, o de aplicar cualesquiera de las sanciones de las enumeradas en el artículo 99 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente.
OCTAVO: Recordar recomendaciones/prevenciones, que se desprenden de los estudios técnicos complementarios y lo descrito en el CONSIDERANDO TERCERO anterior. NOVENO: Recordar al desarrollador que de acuerdo al Artículo 11 del Decreto Ejecutivo N° 31849- MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC-Alcance del trámite de EIA ante la SETENA, el cumplimiento del procedimiento de EIA, no lo exime del trámite a cumplir ante otras autoridades de la Administración, de conformidad con las competencias y normativa vigentes, ni de cumplir con sus obligaciones o responsabilidades que de su gestión deriven. DÉCIMO: Contra esta resolución cabe interponer dentro del plazo de tres días hábiles, contados a partir del día hábil siguiente a la notificación, los recursos ordinarios de revocatoria ante la SETENA, y el de apelación ante el Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, de conformidad con los artículos 342 y siguientes de la Ley General de Administración Pública N° 6227, y 87 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente N° 7554.
DÉCIMO PRIMERO: Toda documentación que sea presentada ante la SETENA deberá indicar claramente el número de expediente, el número de resolución y el nombre completo del proyecto. También se deberá indicar una dirección de correo electrónico, para recibir notificaciones de parte de esta Secretaría. DÉCIMO SEGUNDO: El expediente completo, así como los documentos que la SETENA ha emitido durante el proceso de Evaluación estarán a disposición del desarrollador en la dirección web”.
Así, debido a la viabilidad ambiental antedicha, fue que, el 15 de enero de 2025, el Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano colocó un letrero en las inmediaciones del parque de Montezuma, en el que se lee: “PROYECTO HABILITACIÓN CALLE PÚBLICA CONTIGUO AL PARQUE DE MONTEZUMA DESARROLLADOR: CONCEJO MUNICIPAL DE DISTRITO DE CÓBANO ÁREA DEL PROYECTO 704 m EXPEDIENTE NÚMETO D1-0625-2020-SETENA RESULUCIÓN DE VIABILIDAD AMBIENTAL N° 0631-2021-SETENA 22 DE ABRIL DEL 2021”.
Así las cosas, lo correspondientes es declarar sin lugar este extremo del recurso. En este sentido, la parte accionante sostiene que esa viabilidad otorgada es improcedente, pues corresponde a otro plan regulador. Empero, tal y como ya se dispuso en la supracitada sentencia nro. 2021000176 de las 9:15 horas del 8 de enero de 2021, en caso de existir alguna disconformidad respecto al sustento que justifica el proyecto de la calle por el parque de Montezuma, deberá ser alegada en la vía ordinaria de legalidad, donde se podrá determinar si se incluyó o no en alguno de los dos planes reguladores indicados, bajo qué condiciones técnicas y legales específicas y si cumple con las disposiciones correspondientes a la zona donde se ubica.
Además, respecto al derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, no constan elementos en autos que permitan acreditar una lesión de relevancia constitucional residenciable en la vía sumaria del amparo. Así, como se indicó en sentencia 2021000176 de las 9:15 horas del 8 de enero de 2021, se descartó que el área del parque de Montezuma califique como bosque, área silvestre protegida o de protección hídrica. Además, se verifica que mediante resolución nro. 0631-2021-SETENA del 22 de abril de 2021, la Secretaría Técnica Ambiental emitió la viabilidad ambiental respectiva.
Y, por último, no está de más señalar que la parte recurrente no alega haber interpuesto gestión alguna ante la Setena acusando la presunta inviabilidad ambiental del proyecto de la calle en el parque de Montezuma.
VI.Por otra parte, la accionante reclama que la sociedad que representa es concesionaria de un terreno, donde se ha invertido una gran suma para la construcción de un hotel; empero, está ubicada en suelos arenosos y, la excavación a realizarse para la construcción de la calle implica la desestabilización para el terreno en el que se está construyendo el hotel.
Al respecto, en primer lugar, no se verifica que la parte amparada haya formulada gestión alguna para denunciar tal situación ante la autoridad accionada. Además, del informe rendido, con las responsabilidades y solemnidades que ello conlleva, se desprende que: “No lleva en razón al indicar que paga derechos, siendo de conocimiento de conformidad a la Ley 6043 sobre Zona Marítimo Terrestre y su Reglamento que el pago del canon por concesión corresponde al momento de ser aprobado el trámite por este Concejo Municipal de Distrito para el respectivo otorgamiento por parte del Instituto Costarricense de Turismo y al día de hoy el proceso de solicitud de concesión se encuentra detenido por parte de sociedad Las Brisas de las Delicias de Cóbano S. A., expediente 3963-2020, siendo que no ha ajustado el plano presentado en el trámite, asimismo, si ha permanecido en la parcela solicitada en concesión de previo a entrada en vigencia del Plan Regulador Integral Cabuya Montezuma según publicación de la Gaceta 184 del día miércoles 14 de setiembre del año 2016, y de previo a esta fecha ha pagado algún impuestos, corresponde al representante legal de la sociedad apersonarse a este Concejo Municipal de Distrito a realizar el trámite correspondiente.
Existen intereses propios de la recurrente respecto al terreno solicitado en concesión por su representada porque no ha ajustado los retiros correspondientes de las construcciones de conformidad al plano aportado en la solicitud de concesión y el Plan Regulador Integral Cabuya Montezuma y no por un tema ambiental siendo que el proyecto que aquí recurre cuanta con la respectiva viabilidad ambiental y estudios correspondientes, como consta en la prueba que aquí se adjunta. No es cierto que su representada se coloca en estado de indefensión siendo que cuenta con la posibilidad de ajustar las construcciones de conformidad a la Ley 9242 para la regulación de las construcciones existentes en la Zona Restringida de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, que la misma recurrente no ha gestionado al no querer ajustar los retiros de la parcela solicitada en concesión”.
Así las cosas, a priori, la Sala no cuenta con elemento alguno que permita verificar conculcación alguna a los derechos fundamentales de la sociedad amparada. En consecuencia, se desestima este extremo del amparo. (…)
Por tanto:
Se declara sin lugar el recurso. El magistrado Rueda Leal consigna nota”.
Vistos los reclamos del accionante, lo correspondiente es declarar sin lugar el recurso.
Tal y como se desprende de los precedentes transcritos, en caso de existir alguna disconformidad respecto al sustento que justifica el proyecto de la calle por el parque de Montezuma, deberá ser alegada en la vía ordinaria de legalidad, donde se podrá determinar si se incluyó o no en alguno de los dos planes reguladores indicados, bajo qué condiciones técnicas y legales específicas y si cumple con las disposiciones correspondientes a la zona donde se ubica.
Además, respecto al derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, no constan elementos en autos que permitan acreditar una lesión de relevancia constitucional residenciable en la vía sumaria del amparo. Así, como se indicó en sentencia 2021000176 de las 9:15 horas del 8 de enero de 2021, se descartó que el área del parque de Montezuma califique como bosque, área silvestre protegida o de protección hídrica. Además, se verifica que mediante resolución nro. 0631-2021-SETENA del 22 de abril de 2021, la Secretaría Técnica Ambiental emitió la viabilidad ambiental respectiva.
En asuntos ambientales, es también criterio del suscrito, de que si ya ha habido intervención de la Administración Pública, considero que su conocimiento y resolución corresponde a la jurisdicción contenciosa administrativa. No obstante, sí entro a conocer el fondo del asunto cuando están de por medio otros derechos de las personas afectadas por el foco de contaminación, entre ellos, la salud, la calidad de vida y el derecho a gozar de un ambiente sano y libre de contaminación (artículo 50, de la Constitución Política), tal y como sucede en este caso, en el que la parte recurrente acusa que el 12 de marzo de 2026, el Concejo Municipal del Distrito de Cóbano cortó árboles centenarios de varias especies que estaban plantados en el parque público de Montezuma. Alude que en los árboles cortados, cuyos troncos fueron desaparecidos del lugar y sus raíces cubiertas con tierra para eliminar cualquier evidencia, normalmente pasaban y habitaban aves, armadillos, mapaches, ardillas y monos de todas clases, en detrimento de un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado y de un nivel digno de calidad de vida.
Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidos en algún dispositivo de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en el plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contado a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. Se advierte que será destruido todo aquel material no retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en el artículo XXVI de la sesión nro. 27-11 del 22 de agosto de 2011, publicado en el Boletín Judicial nro. 19 del 26 de enero de 2012, así como en el acuerdo de Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, aprobado en el artículo LXXXI de la sesión nro. 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo de 2012.
Por tanto:
Se declara sin lugar el recurso. El magistrado Salazar Alvarado pone nota.
Fernando Castillo V.
Fernando Cruz C.
Paul Rueda L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G.
Anamari Garro V.
Ingrid Hess H.
EXPEDIENTE N° 26-017874-0007-CO
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