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Res. 16199-2026 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 07/05/2026
OutcomeResultado
The amparo is dismissed because the municipality had already intervened before being notified of the appeal, ruling out any violation of fundamental rights.Se declara sin lugar el amparo porque la municipalidad ya había intervenido antes de ser notificada del recurso, descartando lesión a derechos fundamentales.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber hears an amparo action against the Municipality of La Unión for failing to remove banana suckers from an adjacent municipal area, which the petitioner claimed posed an imminent danger to her home and physical integrity. The Chamber confirms that the municipality had already carried out cutting and removal of the vegetation before being notified of the amparo, and timely communicated the actions taken. It finds no violation of fundamental rights, as the maintenance work was performed according to institutional planning and the technical criteria used are matters of ordinary legality beyond its constitutional jurisdiction. The appeal is dismissed, emphasizing that reviewing the adequacy of the cleanup is a matter for the administrative courts, not the Constitutional Chamber.La Sala Constitucional conoce un recurso de amparo contra la Municipalidad de La Unión por la omisión en eliminar vástagos de banano en un área municipal colindante, que según la recurrente representaban un peligro inminente para su vivienda e integridad física. La Sala constata que la municipalidad ya había realizado intervenciones de corte y eliminación de vegetación antes de ser notificada del amparo, comunicando oportunamente las actuaciones. Concluye que no existe lesión a los derechos fundamentales, pues las labores de mantenimiento se ejecutaron conforme a la planificación institucional y los criterios técnicos empleados son cuestiones de legalidad ordinaria que exceden la competencia constitucional. Se declara sin lugar el recurso, enfatizando que la verificación de la suficiencia de las labores de limpieza corresponde a la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, no a la Sala.
Key excerptExtracto clave
Given this context, the Chamber finds that the appeal must be dismissed. As can be seen from the review of the file, the authorities were notified of this amparo on April 8 and 9, 2026, so the municipal actions to address the complaint—completed on January 9, 2026—took place before the local government was aware of this amparo. Accordingly, the alleged violation of the petitioner's fundamental rights is ruled out. [...] Finally, the petitioner is reminded that this Court is not responsible for verifying whether the municipality should have cleared more vegetation at the site, or whether, from an environmental technical standpoint, the handling of the complaint was insufficient and should have been addressed differently. The review of the cleanup work, as well as the technical criteria used to determine which areas and trees or weeds should be removed, are matters of ordinary legality that cannot be addressed in this constitutional venue.Ante este panorama, estima la Sala que se debe declarar sin lugar el recurso. Como puede apreciarse del estudio del expediente, las autoridades accionadas fueron notificadas sobre la interposición del presente amparo en fechas 8 y 9 de abril de 2026, de manera que las actuaciones municipales para atender la denuncia incoada por la parte recurrente, las cuales se concretaron el pasado 9 de enero de 2026, se dieron con anterioridad a que el gobierno local accionado tuviera conocimiento de este amparo. En ese sentido, se descarta la aducida lesión a los derechos fundamentales de la amparada. [...] Finalmente, debe recordársele a la tutelada que no le corresponde a este Tribunal verificar si la municipalidad recurrida debía proceder con la limpieza de más vegetación en el sitio denunciado, o si, desde el punto de vista técnico ambiental, la atención de la denuncia fue insuficiente y se debió haber abordado de manera distinta. La revisión de las labores de limpieza, así como los criterios técnicos que se hayan empleado para determinar cuáles eran los sectores y árboles o maleza que debía ser eliminada, son cuestiones de evidente legalidad ordinaria que no podrían ventilarse en esta sede constitucional.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"no le corresponde a este Tribunal verificar si la municipalidad recurrida debía proceder con la limpieza de más vegetación en el sitio denunciado, o si, desde el punto de vista técnico ambiental, la atención de la denuncia fue insuficiente y se debió haber abordado de manera distinta."
"it is not for this Court to verify whether the municipality should have cleared more vegetation at the reported site, or whether, from an environmental technical standpoint, the handling of the complaint was insufficient and should have been addressed differently."
Considerando III
"no le corresponde a este Tribunal verificar si la municipalidad recurrida debía proceder con la limpieza de más vegetación en el sitio denunciado, o si, desde el punto de vista técnico ambiental, la atención de la denuncia fue insuficiente y se debió haber abordado de manera distinta."
Considerando III
"La revisión de las labores de limpieza, así como los criterios técnicos que se hayan empleado para determinar cuáles eran los sectores y árboles o maleza que debía ser eliminada, son cuestiones de evidente legalidad ordinaria que no podrían ventilarse en esta sede constitucional."
"The review of the cleanup work, as well as the technical criteria used to determine which areas and trees or weeds should be removed, are matters of ordinary legality that cannot be addressed in this constitutional venue."
Considerando III
"La revisión de las labores de limpieza, así como los criterios técnicos que se hayan empleado para determinar cuáles eran los sectores y árboles o maleza que debía ser eliminada, son cuestiones de evidente legalidad ordinaria que no podrían ventilarse en esta sede constitucional."
Considerando III
Full documentDocumento completo
Document Review CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine thirty hours on May seventh, two thousand twenty-six.
Amparo action processed under case file number 26-009469-0007-CO, filed by Nombre01, identification card number CED01, against the MUNICIPALITY OF LA UNIÓN.
WHEREAS:
| Table 1 | Historical record of the response given to Mrs. Nombre01's procedure, as part of the requested process. Extracted from the municipal system. |
|---|
This action is supported by photographic evidence incorporated into the administrative file, in which the intervention carried out by the Municipality at the site can be observed.
| Table 2 | Photograph incorporated into the file as evidence of the work carried out. |
|---|
Subsequently, in response to an appeal procedure filed by the petitioner, the Administration provided a response on January 12, 2026, stating: "In response to your communication, we inform you that the indicated case is under the responsibility of Mr. Leonardo Aguilar, the official in charge of attending to and following up on this type of request, who can provide you with the corresponding information and address your inquiries directly. For these purposes, you are requested to coordinate an appointment in advance with said official, in order to review in detail what has been done, the scope of what was requested, and the interventions carried out, as well as those that may eventually apply in accordance with municipal competencies. We remain attentive to facilitate the respective coordination." Finally, on February 26, 2026, the cutting of the palm tree located in front of the petitioner's home was carried out, thus completing the pending interventions, which was also duly communicated via email, attaching the respective photographic evidence that is in the file.
On this last occasion, it was reported: "Today we proceed with the pending elimination of the palm tree located in front of the petitioner's home. The suckers had been eliminated on 09/01/2026. Please be informed that the requested interventions are carried out according to a priority work schedule that we manage jointly with the company in charge of maintaining the ornamentation of public roads. Attached you will find the following files: IMG-20260109-WA0083.jpg IMG-20260109-WA0078.jpg IMG-20260109-WA0080.jpg IMG-20260226-WA0071.jpg IMG-20260226-WA0079.jpg". For all of the above, it is not correct to affirm that the Municipality has incurred an omission in addressing the case, given that the actions were executed, communicated in a timely manner to the user, and duly recorded in the institutional system, with complete traceability of the procedure existing. The "finalized" status recorded in the system corresponds to the administrative closure of the process in relation to the initially attended procedure, without prejudice to there being complementary actions that were executed later, in accordance with the operational programming of the service, until completing the totality of the requested interventions.
On the other hand, it is necessary to specify that the plant elements referred to by the petitioner correspond to suckers (rebrotes or hijuelos) (vástagos) of banana plants, which do not constitute urban trees in the strict sense, nor do they present the structural characteristics that would allow them to be equated to trees in terms of risk. Consequently, there is no technical evidence to conclude that said elements represented an imminent danger condition for the integrity of people or the infrastructure. In this regard, as seen in Table 2, these are plant structures of a herbaceous nature, without lignification or structural development characteristic of large trees, whose intervention is performed using basic manual tools, without requiring the use of specialized equipment such as chainsaws or other implements typical of felling tasks. This condition reinforces that these are not elements that, due to their physical characteristics, represent a risk comparable to that of a very tall tree or one with potential for structural failure.
Additionally, while the petitioner associates the presence of wildlife with said plant elements, there is no evidence to establish a direct causal relationship between both factors. It should be considered that behind the petitioner's property there is a municipal area destined for a park, which, as is usual, has its own vegetative cover (cobertura vegetal) typical of these types of spaces, which can naturally foster the presence of biodiversity in the environment. Likewise, the sector where the property is located, namely, the Iztarú Urbanization, is surrounded to the north and west by areas with vegetative cover, including coffee plantations and other green areas, which constitutes an environmental setting that favors the presence of fauna, without this being specifically attributable to the indicated suckers (vástagos). Moreover, according to the photographic evidence (see Table 2), as well as the review of the site's location, no direct physical proximity is observed that allows for reasonably inferring a mechanism for fauna to access the petitioner's property.
In parallel, it is important to indicate that the designated municipal area receives monthly maintenance through clearing (chapia) work throughout the year, so it is not correct to affirm that there is a lack of attention to said space. Likewise, it must be clarified that there is no specific municipal tax associated with the cutting or pruning of trees, nor an individualized obligation to provide the service upon specific demand, these tasks being part of the general public space maintenance services, which are provided regularly according to institutional planning. They request that the Chamber declare the appeal unfounded.
Drafted by Magistrate Salazar Alvarado; and,
WHEREAS:
Before analyzing the merits of the matter, it must be clarified that, as of Ruling No. 2008-02545 at 8:55 a.m. on February 22, 2008, this Chamber has referred to the administrative contentious jurisdiction –with some exceptions– those matters in which it is discussed whether the administration has complied or not with the deadlines set by the General Law of Public Administration (articles 261 and 325) or by sectoral laws to resolve by final act an administrative procedure –initiated ex officio or at the request of a party– or to hear the pertinent administrative appeals. Precisely, in the sub lite case, an exception scenario is presented, as we are faced with a complaint related to the apparent danger to life and integrity posed by the fall of vegetation located adjacent to the petitioner's property, which has not been resolved within a reasonable time. Bearing in mind the fundamental rights invoked (life and integrity), this Chamber assesses the possible delays in resolving complaints of this type. Having clarified the point, we proceed to resolve the specific situation raised in this amparo action.
The petitioner indicates that on October 17, 2024, several suckers (vástagos) fell onto the wall of her property, generating a risk to the infrastructure and the people living in the home. She affirms that, on that same date, a request was made to the Municipality of La Unión, via email: ...01, to proceed with addressing the situation; however, only the suckers (vástagos) that had already fallen were removed, omitting to cut or eliminate the other existing suckers (vástagos), which continued to represent an imminent danger.
Of importance for the decision in this matter, the following facts are deemed duly demonstrated, either because they have been accredited or because the respondent has omitted to refer to them as provided in the initial order:
In the sub examine case, the petitioner alleges that on October 17, 2024, several suckers (vástagos) fell onto the wall of her property, generating a risk to the infrastructure and the people living in the home. She affirms that, on that same date, a request was made to the Municipality of La Unión, via email: ...01, to proceed with addressing the situation; however, only the suckers (vástagos) that had already fallen were removed, omitting to cut or eliminate the other existing suckers (vástagos), which continued to represent an imminent danger. In this regard, the Chamber considers it proven that there is a procedure filed by Mrs. Nombre01, whose procedure number No. 2026-00008, was filed on January 4, 2026. The Municipality proceeded to intervene at the site, carrying out the cutting of additional suckers (vástagos) in the areas nearest to the boundary with the petitioner's property. On January 9, 2026, the elimination of the suckers (vástagos) from banana plants located in the area indicated by the petitioner was carried out, which was duly communicated via email on the same date.
These are plant structures of a herbaceous nature, without lignification or structural development characteristic of large trees, whose intervention is performed using basic manual tools, without requiring the use of specialized equipment such as chainsaws or other implements typical of felling tasks. Behind the petitioner's property there is a municipal area destined for a park, which, as is usual, has its own vegetative cover (cobertura vegetal) typical of these types of spaces, which can naturally foster the presence of biodiversity in the environment. Given this scenario, the Chamber believes that the appeal must be declared unfounded. As can be seen from the study of the file, the respondent authorities were notified of the filing of this amparo action on April 8 and 9, 2026, meaning that the municipal actions to address the complaint lodged by the petitioner, which were carried out on January 9, 2026, occurred before the respondent local government became aware of this amparo action.
In that sense, the alleged violation of the fundamental rights of the amparo petitioner is dismissed. Observe also that the interested party was notified of the attention given to her complaint, as well as the maintenance and pruning work that was able to be carried out at the site. Finally, the petitioner must be reminded that it is not for this Court to verify whether the respondent municipality should have proceeded with clearing more vegetation at the reported site, or if, from a technical environmental standpoint, the attention given to the complaint was insufficient and should have been addressed differently. The review of the clearing work, as well as the technical criteria that may have been used to determine which sectors and trees or weeds (maleza) had to be eliminated, are matters of evident ordinary legality that cannot be heard in this constitutional venue. For all of the above, the Chamber does not consider that there are sufficient indications to believe that any violation of the fundamental rights of the promoting party has occurred, which is why the dismissal of the amparo action proceeds.
I have supported the thesis of this Court that, when a citizen alleges a violation of the right to swift and fulfilled justice in the administrative venue, those who must hear the legal controversy are the Contentious-Administrative Courts and not this Chamber. Now, with the recent enactment of Law No. 9097, Law Regulating the Right of Petition, it has been established that this right is susceptible to judicial protection through the amparo action established by Article 32 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, in relation to Article 27 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica, in those cases where the petitioner considers that the material actions of the Administration, its administrative acts, or its response are affecting their fundamental rights. In my view, the recently enacted regulation does not imply that this Court must modify its jurisprudential line, as, based on numeral 7 of its Law, it is exclusively responsible for defining its own competence.
Therefore, except for those legal-constitutional controversies that have been recognized by this same Chamber as exception scenarios, which are appropriate to be heard in this jurisdiction through the constitutional amparo guarantee process, in all other cases, and for the reasons this Court has given (ruling No. 2008-02545 at 8:55 a.m. on February 22, 2008), the competent authorities are the Judges of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, all of which is in accordance with numeral 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights, the Law of the Constitution (values, principles, and norms), and the corresponding legal norms based on a logical, systemic, and teleological interpretation of the legal system.
This Chamber must warn the parties that, if they have provided any paper documents, as well as objects or evidence supported by any additional device, or by electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic means or those produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a period of thirty business days after receiving notification of this ruling, otherwise all of it will be destroyed in accordance with the provisions established in the “Regulation on Electronic Case Files before the Judiciary”, approved by the Full Court in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in Judicial Bulletin No. 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judiciary, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.
THEREFORE:
The appeal is declared unfounded. Magistrate Castillo Víquez records a note.- Fernando Castillo V. President Fernando Cruz C.
Paul Rueda L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G.
Anamari Garro V.
Ingrid Hess H.
*HJRTJF9YUJK61* CASE FILE No. 26-009469-0007-CO Telephones: Telf01/ ALA-4TA (Telf02). Fax: Telf03 / Telf04. Email: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Dirección01, Dirección02, 100 mts. south of the Perpetuo Socorro church).
Revisión del Documento SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas treinta minutos del siete de mayo de dos mil veintiseis .
Recurso de amparo que se tramita en expediente número 26-009469-0007-CO, interpuesto por Nombre01, cédula de identidad CED01, contra la MUNICIPALIDAD DE LA UNIÓN.
RESULTANDO:
Redacta el Magistrado Salazar Alvarado; y,
CONSIDERANDO:
Antes de analizar el fondo del asunto, debe aclararse que, a partir de la Sentencia N° 2008-02545 de las 08:55 horas del 22 de febrero de 2008, esta Sala ha remitido a la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa –con algunas excepciones– aquellos asuntos en los que se discute, si la administración ha cumplido o no los plazos pautados por la Ley General de la Administración Pública (artículos 261 y 325) o por leyes sectoriales para resolver por acto final un procedimiento administrativo –instruido de oficio o a instancia de parte– o conocer de los recursos administrativos procedentes. Precisamente, en el sub lite, se plantea un supuesto de excepción, pues se está frente a una denuncia, relacionada con el aparente peligro para la vida e integridad que implica la caída de vegetación que se encuentra colindante a la propiedad de la parte recurrente, la cual no ha sido resuelta dentro de un plazo razonable. Atendiendo a los derechos fundamentales que se invocan (vida e integridad), esta Sala valora las posibles dilaciones en la resolución de las denuncias de este tipo. Clarificado el punto, se entra a resolver la situación concreta planteada en este amparo.
La parte recurrente indica que el 17 de octubre de 2024, se produjo la caída de varios vástagos sobre el muro de su propiedad, generando un riesgo para la infraestructura y las personas que habitan en la vivienda. Afirma que, en esa misma fecha, se realizó solicitud a la Municipalidad de La Unión, mediante el correo electrónico: ...01, para que se procediera a atender la situación; empero, solamente se retiraron los vástagos que ya habían caído, omitiendo cortar o eliminar los demás vástagos existentes, los cuales continuaban representando un peligro inminente.
De importancia para la decisión de este asunto, se estiman como debidamente demostrados los siguientes hechos, sea porque así han sido acreditados o bien porque el recurrido haya omitido referirse a ellos según lo prevenido en el auto inicial:
En el sub examine, la parte recurrente aduce que el 17 de octubre de 2024, se produjo la caída de varios vástagos sobre el muro de su propiedad, generando un riesgo para la infraestructura y las personas que habitan en la vivienda. Afirma que, en esa misma fecha, se realizó solicitud a la Municipalidad de La Unión, mediante el correo electrónico: ...01, para que se procediera a atender la situación; empero, solamente se retiraron los vástagos que ya habían caído, omitiendo cortar o eliminar los demás vástagos existentes, los cuales continuaban representando un peligro inminente. Al respecto, la Sala tiene por demostrado que existe una gestión presentada por la señora Nombre01, cuyo número de gestión No. 2026-00008, fue ingresada el 4 de enero de 2026. La Municipalidad procedió a intervenir el sitio, realizando la corta de vástagos adicionales en las zonas más próximas a la colindancia con la propiedad de la recurrente.
El día 9 de enero de 2026 se procedió con la eliminación de los vástagos de plantas de banano ubicados en el área señalada por la recurrente, lo cual fue debidamente comunicado mediante correo electrónico en la misma fecha. Se trata de estructuras vegetales de naturaleza herbácea, sin lignificación ni desarrollo estructural propio de árboles de gran porte, cuya intervención se realiza mediante herramientas manuales básicas, sin requerir el uso de equipo especializado como motosierras u otros implementos propios de labores de tala. Detrás de la propiedad de la recurrente existe un área municipal destinada a parque, la cual, como es usual, cuenta con cobertura vegetal propia de este tipo de espacios, lo que naturalmente puede propiciar la presencia de biodiversidad en el entorno. Ante este panorama, estima la Sala que se debe declarar sin lugar el recurso. Como puede apreciarse del estudio del expediente, las autoridades accionadas fueron notificadas sobre la interposición del presente amparo en fechas 8 y 9 de abril de 2026, de manera que las actuaciones municipales para atender la denuncia incoada por la parte recurrente, las cuales se concretaron el pasado 9 de enero de 2026, se dieron con anterioridad a que el gobierno local accionado tuviera conocimiento de este amparo.
En ese sentido, se descarta la aducida lesión a los derechos fundamentales de la amparada. Obsérvese además que a la interesada le fue notificada la atención de su denuncia, así como los trabajos de mantenimiento y poda que se lograron realizar en el sitio. Finalmente, debe recordársele a la tutelada que no le corresponde a este Tribunal verificar si la municipalidad recurrida debía proceder con la limpieza de más vegetación en el sitio denunciado, o si, desde el punto de vista técnico ambiental, la atención de la denuncia fue insuficiente y se debió haber abordado de manera distinta. La revisión de las labores de limpieza, así como los criterios técnicos que se hayan empleado para determinar cuáles eran los sectores y árboles o maleza que debía ser eliminada, son cuestiones de evidente legalidad ordinaria que no podrían ventilarse en esta sede constitucional. Por todo lo anterior, no considera la Sala que existan suficientes indicios para estimar que se ha producido alguna lesión a los derechos fundamentales de la parte promovente, motivo por el cual procede la desestimatoria del amparo.
He apoyado la tesis de este Tribunal, de que cuando el justiciable alega una vulneración al derecho a una justicia pronta y cumplida en sede administrativa, quienes deben conocer la controversia jurídica son los Tribunales de lo Contencioso-Administrativo y no esta Sala. Ahora bien, con la reciente promulgación de la Ley n.° 9097, Ley de Regulación del Derecho de Petición, se ha establecido que ese derecho es susceptible de tutela judicial por medio del recurso de amparo establecido por el artículo 32 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en relación con el artículo 27 de la Constitución Política de la República de Costa Rica, en aquellos casos en que el peticionario considere que las actuaciones materiales de la Administración, sus actos administrativos o su respuesta le estén afectando sus derechos fundamentales. A mi modo de ver, la normativa recién promulgada no implica que este Tribunal deba modificar su línea jurisprudencial, quien, con base en el numeral 7 de su Ley, le corresponde definir exclusivamente su propia competencia.
Por ende, salvo aquellas controversias jurídico-constitucionales que han sido reconocidas por esta misma Sala como supuestos de excepción, que sí proceden ser conocidas en esta jurisdicción a través del proceso constitucional de garantía del amparo, en los demás casos, y por las razones que ha dado este Tribunal (sentencia N° 2008-02545 de las 8:55 horas de 22 de febrero de 2008), los competentes son los Jueces de la jurisdicción de lo contencioso-administrativo, todo lo cual es conforme al numeral 25, de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, el Derecho de la Constitución (valores, principios y normas) y las normas legales correspondientes con base en una interpretación lógica, sistémica y teleológica del ordenamiento jurídico.
Debe prevenir esta Sala a las partes que, de haber aportado algún documentos en papel, así como objetos o pruebas respaldadas por medio de cualquier dispositivo adicional, o por medio de soporte electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo de treinta días hábiles después de recibida la notificación de esta sentencia, de lo contrario todo ello será destruido de conformidad con lo establecido en el “Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial”, aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N°27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en Boletín Judicial N°19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N°43-12 celebrada el 03 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.
POR TANTO:
Se declara sin lugar el recurso. El magistrado Castillo Víquez consigna nota.- Fernando Castillo V.
Fernando Cruz C.
Paul Rueda L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G.
Anamari Garro V.
Ingrid Hess H.
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