Rejection of unconstitutionality action against procedural costs rulesRechazo de acción de inconstitucionalidad contra normas de costas procesales

**Review of the Document** **Exp: 26-012399-0007-CO** **Res. No. 2026016816** **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at nine hours twenty minutes on the thirteenth of May, two thousand twenty-six.

Action of unconstitutionality brought by [Name 001], of legal age, married, attorney, resident of Heredia, identity card [Value 001], against articles 69.2, 73.1, and 73.2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 150.3, 119.2, and 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, and 267 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

**Whereas:** 1.- By brief received in this Chamber on April 10, 2026, the plaintiff files an action of unconstitutionality and specifies that the following norms are challenged:

“a) Article 69.2 of the Civil Procedure Code prevents reviewing, in cassation, the failure to rule on costs, if the party requested them and they were not considered in the judgment; Article 73.1 of the Civil Procedure Code establishes the phrase that every losing party must be ordered to pay costs, even ex officio, and 73.2 of the same procedural body, which does not contemplate the exemption for litigating plausibly not at the discretion of the Judge's interpretation, but rather the existence of certainty of the facts attributed in the complaint:

"69.2 Grounds. The cassation appeal may be based on procedural and substantive reasons. [...]

The failure to rule on costs, incidents without direct influence on the merits of the matter, or when an addendum to the judgment has not been requested to fill the omission shall not be grounds for appeal." "73.1 Order to pay costs. In every resolution that puts an end to the proceeding, ex officio, the losing party shall be ordered to pay costs. Costs shall be considered to include attorney's fees, compensation for the time invested by the party in attending procedural acts where their presence was necessary, and other indispensable expenses of the proceeding." "73.2 Exemption. Exemption may be granted, totally or partially, in a reasoned manner, when:

1. The claim or counterclaim includes exaggerated amounts.

2. The judgment admits important defenses invoked by the losing party, which substantially modify what was sought.

3. There is significant reciprocal loss on claims, defenses, or exceptions.

4. The party has adjusted its conduct to good faith, loyalty, probity, and the rational use of the procedural system.

If there is no order to pay costs, each party shall pay those it has incurred, and both parties shall pay those that are common." Although there is no express norm for the First Chamber of Cassation to impose costs, they derive from this same legal precept, by defining that any resolution that puts an end to the proceeding shall result in an order to pay costs, without limiting this order to an extraordinary appeal, which does not end the proceeding, but rather reviews a resolution that did put an end to the proceeding.

• b)Articles 119 subsection 2), 150.3, and 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, in the same vein, establish phrases that impose costs for the mere fact of having been defeated. The cassation appeal seeks the review of a final judgment, so costs should not be interpreted as a sanction for agreeing to have a Superior review the judgment, on the presumption of defects therein, but rather it should be verified whether there is bad faith in filing the appeal, as a punitive premise, and not as a punishment without discussion. In the same way, Article 193 is considered an outright punishment, without the corresponding substantiation of whether one litigated in good faith and plausibly. And granting the Judge's ex officio initiative to impose costs would contain an action by the judge, substituting the conduct of the party that does not request it:

"ARTICLE 119.- 2) It shall also contain the corresponding ruling regarding costs, even ex officio." "ARTICLE 150. 3) The judgment that declares the cassation appeal without merit shall order the losing party to pay the personal and procedural costs caused by the appeal; unless, due to the nature of the issues debated in the appeal, there has been, in the judgment of the First Chamber or the Court of Cassation, sufficient reason to appeal." "ARTICLE 193.- In judgments and orders with the character of a judgment, the losing party shall be ordered to pay personal and procedural costs, a ruling that must be made ex officio." c) Article 267 of the Criminal Procedure Code sets the order to pay costs for the losing party, without making a distinction as to what should be understood as the "losing party"—whether it refers to the accused, or to the complainants, and also to the civil parties. And as a consequence of the foregoing, no reference is made either to the procedural moment at which the party should be considered defeated, whether it is only when a final judgment has been issued at trial, thereby excluding the preliminary hearing, which is only a preparatory stage. The norm was left gravely to the discretion of the judge:

"ARTICLE 267.- Setting of costs. Costs shall be borne by the losing party, but the court may exempt it, totally or partially, when there is plausible reason to litigate. When multiple parties are ordered to pay costs, the court shall set the proportional part corresponding to each, without prejudice to the joint and several liability established by law." Regarding the merits, the plaintiff states—as "FIRST CONSIDERATIONS"—that:

“1. The Political Constitution guarantees citizens the right to resort to the Courts of Justice, seeking to resolve their conflicts and also to report inappropriate situations or abuse of power in the public function, through the premise derived from the public official's duty to be accountable. These norms are Articles 11, 41, and 49 of the Magna Carta.

"ARTICLE 11.- Public officials are merely depository of authority. They are obligated to fulfill the duties the law imposes on them and cannot arrogate powers not granted therein. They must swear an oath to observe and comply with this Constitution and the laws. The action to demand criminal liability for their acts is public. The Public Administration in a broad sense shall be subject to a procedure of results evaluation and accountability, with the consequent personal liability for officials in the fulfillment of their duties. The law shall indicate the means so that this results control and accountability operates as a system covering all public institutions." "ARTICLE 41.- By resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received to their person, property, or moral interests. They must be given prompt, complete justice, without denial, and in strict accordance with the laws." "ARTICLE 49.- The contentious-administrative jurisdiction is established as an attribution of the Judicial Branch, with the purpose of guaranteeing the legality of the administrative function of the State, its institutions, and any other public law entity.

Abuse of power shall be grounds for challenging administrative acts.

The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of those administered." 2. Likewise, by rulings of the Constitutional Chamber, and from international treaties and conventions, the principle of access to justice has been established in favor of citizens, which is enshrined in Article 41 of the Magna Carta:

"It has been said that the Judicial Branch is the primary recipient and obligor of this legal norm, as it is the primary fundamental guarantor of the exercise of the right of access to justice." Ruling 21039-2010 Constitutional Chamber.

3. In a democratic system, it should be established that the imposition of pecuniary sanctions by way of costs is the exception and not the rule, which must be contained in the legal system in the manner in which it must be applied by the Courts of Justice, in all matters. And 4. There is a general conception in judicial matters that the administration of justice service evolves towards gratuity, and towards fostering confidence in resorting to it, to denounce public officials." Then, he adds—as "GROUNDS AND FOUNDATIONS OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY"—the following:

“I. CIVIL MATTER:

1. It is established as a general rule that the judicial authority, even ex officio, imposes the order to pay costs on the losing party in a judicial proceeding, whether in civil or contentious-administrative matters. And only as an exception, the exemption from paying costs, but conditioned on several assumptions regulated by these procedural norms, including, in the case of cassation appeals in civil matters, that if the appeal is not upheld, the payment of costs is imposed on the appellant.

2. All citizens who resort to the law, to bring a judicial action, in search of justice, carry from the beginning of the proceeding a sword of Damocles, in case their case does not succeed, because as a general rule they are punished with an order to pay costs, despite having sufficient merit to litigate, but that remains subject to the interpretation of the judicial authority, because the norms empower them to impose costs as a rule. Which has been happening in judicial practice.

3. The circumstances for winning a lawsuit or a civil action for damages, in criminal matters, depends entirely on the decision of the Judicial Authority, who interprets the evidence together with the facts in accordance with the law, so any error not only prevents the person from obtaining justice, but also condemns them to pay costs to the opposing party, for the mere fact that the Judge decides so. That is to say, the jurisdictional body is granted the power to impose costs as a general rule, with it being sufficient to provide an explanation as a basis, even if it is not convincing. Even the lack of substantiation for why it does not decide on costs is not a ground for civil cassation, according to the current civil procedure code. If the general rule were to exempt from costs, and the exception to impose them, it would obligate the Judge to perform greater intellectual work to justify the order to pay costs.

4. Access to justice is impaired by the threat of having costs imposed because one did not manage to convince the Judge, and for whatever reason, their action is declared without merit, which in itself implies a sufficient sanction for the losing party, namely not resolving the conflict, not repairing their damages and moral interests, as established in Article 41 of the Magna Carta. From that point, as occurs with the criteria of opportunity in criminal matters, that there is no criminal prosecution when the damage suffered by the perpetrator of the crime exceeds any future and eventual penalty to be imposed.

"The accused has suffered, as a consequence of the act, serious physical or moral damages that make the application of a penalty disproportionate, or when the conditions under which the court is authorized to dispense with the penalty are met." Article 22 subsection c of the Criminal Procedure Code.

5. It is understood that costs are a type of compensation for the party who was called into a judicial proceeding, but under the assumption of an abuse of right, not because there being reason, upon being defeated, they are immediately ordered to pay costs. Therefore, the judicial function must be to determine whether there was reason and motive to litigate and not under the condition of having been defeated. Because upon verifying that there was reason to bring the action, there can be no sanction in the payment of orders to pay costs, solely because in the eyes of the judicial authority, there was insufficient evidence to reach total conviction.

6. Applying an order to pay costs for being defeated violates the principle of good faith, because ex officio, solely for being defeated, it is automatically inferred that the losing party acted in bad faith and in abuse of right, which is why they deserve the sanction of paying costs, when the facts on which their action was based, despite being true, in the opinion of the judicial authority do not convince it to declare the claim with merit, or to uphold the complaint. The general rule is that all who resort to the Courts, resorting to the legal system, act in good faith, and it must be proven that it was not so, in order to order payment of costs. Therefore, the general rule is to exempt from costs and, except for proof to the contrary, exceptionally to order payment of costs.

7. The nature of the order to pay costs must be for the abuse of right, as indicated by Article 22 of the Civil Code:

"ARTICLE 22.- The law does not protect the abuse of right or its antisocial exercise. Any act or omission in a contract, which by the intention of its author, by its object, or by the circumstances in which it is performed, manifestly exceeds the normal limits of the exercise of a right, causing damage to a third party or to the counterparty, shall give rise to the corresponding compensation and the adoption of judicial or administrative measures to prevent the persistence of the abuse." Therefore, it is understood that the order to pay costs has the purpose of preventing future similar actions based on the abuse of right, which harms the person who is sued or denounced, but this does not imply that the law must assume a priori that, solely for having been defeated, the person is considered abusive in the exercise of the constitutional right to access justice, when the cause is illegitimate or illegal, because the reasons for which the action is not declared with merit are multiple despite having had the reason to bring suit.

8. The questioned norms prevent judges from providing a convincing response as to why they consider that they should order payment of costs, beyond simply applying the refrain "for having been defeated" used in judgments, and in cassation, by judicial function, they have the duty to provide a clear, broad response, and under the rules of sound criticism, provide the criterion as to why costs must be imposed, and to allow, on appeal or cassation, the debate of that criterion so that the party has the opportunity to prove that there was always plausibility to litigate. But that is prevented if the norms challenged as unconstitutional grant the judicial authority the right to impose, merely for considering the party from whom the payment of those costs is demanded as defeated. That phrase in itself is an obstacle to knowing the criterion of whether or not there was an abuse of right by the losing party, according to the analysis that must be demanded of the judge.

9. Article 41 of the Constitution does not establish the imposition of costs on anyone who exercises the right to resort to the laws in search of justice for reparation of damage to their patrimony or injury to their interests. It does not contain, authorize, or permit a procedural sanction because they exercised that constitutional right, since the use of the right to seek the solution to an individual or collective problem is interpreted. The constitutional legislator did not foresee that the State could, through procedural regulatory bodies, punish the exercise of that constitutional right. Article 7 of the Constitution elevates international conventions and treaties to a hierarchical level, so the questioned procedural norms harm that hierarchical constitutional principle of subordination to conventionality control, where the Pact of San José, in its Articles 8 and 25, refers to the right to be heard by a Judge, and to have an effective recourse against acts that violate one's rights, even if they come from State agents. In this convention, there is no provision that, in the legal system, the citizen, in pursuit of justice, is imposed the payment of costs for being defeated.

10. Both plaintiff and defendant, in whatever matter, proceed on equal terms to propose their thesis and antithesis, so that an impartial arbitrator indicates whether or not judicial protection is appropriate. If at the constitutional level it is not provided that anyone who seeks justice will be ordered to pay costs for the exercise of that right, procedural laws, as norms subordinate to substantive law and the Constitution, cannot violate that fundamental right and constitutional principle.

II. SCOPE OF THE PUBLIC FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL AND CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

11. In the scope of the public function, in criminal matters, there are complaints against public officials, and in contentious-administrative matters, ordinary lawsuits and civil treasury claims against public officials and against the State or the centralized Public Administration, the order to pay costs is fixed outright, solely because the administered party, as plaintiff, has been defeated, as a general rule, which is considered an interference with the principle and right of access to justice, and to its effective protection, because it discourages citizens in their right to request accountability, to demand responsibility from public servants, and the right to oversight of the public treasury, through complaints against public officials for their misconduct in the exercise of their functions, if the same Courts in the criminal or contentious-administrative jurisdiction, upon declaring the action without merit, proceed to order payment of costs, for the exercise of a right that the Magna Carta itself empowers. Demanding payment of those costs, by virtue of accountability, ensures the imbalance of forces of the citizen against state power, through which, within the social contract, the questioned norms place the State and the Public Administration in general above its citizens, when the latter are the holders of sovereignty and of the res publica. The questioned norms promote discouragement so that citizens present claims or complaints against public officials, knowing that not only could their action be dismissed or provisionally dismissed, or result in acquittal, in the criminal jurisdiction, but their situation is aggravated when they are ordered to pay in favor of those public officials, who, by their positions, should accept being subject to the claims of the population, and not that they become unjustly enriched just because a favorable judgment was not reached, according to the judicial criterion.

If the original legislator, when enshrining the contentious-administrative jurisdiction in Article 49, intended to guarantee the legality of the Public Administration, to challenge abuses of power, and to protect the subjective rights and legitimate interests of those administered, it did not consider that the exercise of that right would be subject to an order to pay costs, when by jurisdictional criterion, it is considered that their claim had no merit from the legal point of view, but that, except in cases of abuse of right and manifest bad faith, in any case, the State and the public administration in general must assume the expenses of the judicial proceeding to promote the exercise of a constitutional right by the sovereign against state power.

12. Article 2 of the Magna Carta refers to the concept of sovereignty, which resides in The Nation, which in relation to Article 11 of the Constitution, which establishes that public officials are merely depositories of authority, reinforces the idea that it is the citizen who holds title to the res publica, and the Public Administration is a kind of regent, and not its owner, so it would be a contradiction that the sovereign—the people—demands accountability and the claim of responsibility, and upon resorting to the legal system and the Courts of Justice, they are frightened away from exercising that right, because payment of costs is imposed if they fail to prove their right.

“This Court has so understood, emphasizing that certain assets are proper to and solely of the Nation, a sociological and philosophical concept, which does not involve specific or individual persons, but rather a collective that contains the inhabitants of a country, its history, and its future. Therefore, this Chamber has understood, the State—in this case the Municipality—comes to be a kind of fiduciary of these assets, that is, a mere administrator of public assets that clearly does not entail a right of owners in favor of the State or municipalities that results in the exclusion of citizens. It is along these lines that this Court mentioned that there are assets and activities that ‘are “proper to the Nation”’; they are designated, certainly, also as ‘domain of the State,’ but the Constituent’s phrasing entails that certain assets are entrusted to it because the Nation lacks legal personification. The State comes to be a kind of fiduciary of the Nation, a formula coherent with the historical claims that justify the constitutionally declared public domain status we examine. Public officials cannot dispose at will of authorizations relating to services and assets proper to the Nation that time would render allegedly unchallengeable; there is an essential public order: The law is not simply an aggregate of subjective rights; it is also formed by an order of coexistence—objective—reasonable and democratic, an expression of the values of the Social State of Law (Articles 74 and 50 of the Constitution). Order divorced from the rights of persons is dictatorial; the protection of subjective rights without subjection to an objective sense of justice is the reign of the strongest. Both extremes are alien to the Constitution, vigilant of both the essential principles of justice and fundamental subjective rights: Authorities and Liberties must find, in all state tasks, not to mention jurisdictional ones, their difficult and always unstable balance (see judgment number 5386-93).” Ruling 048272015 of 9:40 on April 10, 2015, Constitutional Chamber.

13. Most seriously, in contentious-administrative matters, as determined by Article 49 of the Constitution, the ordinary citizen confronts the Public Administration, which from the outset possesses the resources to face any action against it, through the intervention of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic as the State's attorney, who has the right to demand copies of the complaint and the evidence, for which the deadline to respond is suspended until they are delivered, despite the fact that, in the 21st century, it can access them through the online case management system, like the rest of the defendants, as provided in Article 33 of the Constitution, that everyone is equal before the Law; furthermore, it can request an additional third of the time granted to respond, and every public agency must collaborate with the Attorney General's Office, to send all documentation it requests, exempt from payment of fiscal stamps, without forgetting that public officials or the State have at their disposal revenues from the public treasury to face those claims. The same occurs with every centralized or decentralized public institution, including municipal corporations. In contrast, the citizen must disburse from their own private funds the hiring of attorneys, payment for all paperwork, stamps, transfers, copies, bringing witnesses, etc., so that in the end, the Contentious-Administrative Court, through interpretations of the evidence and the facts, with the application of the law, declares the claim without merit, and automatically imposes the payment of costs on the citizen, for the mere fact of being defeated, upon losing their claim, granting the right to the Public Administration, or the public servant, to collect those costs from the citizen, by provision of procedural law, when both servants and the Public Administration work through a national budget, derived from the taxes paid by that same plaintiff. It is evident that their action to defend the interests of the Public Administration is already budgeted for the public entity, whether it be the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, or decentralized or autonomous entities, because even these entities collect taxes and, therefore, have a legal department to face those judicial actions. This imposition of costs contradicts the coexistence with the citizen's right to demand accountability from public officials, if in the exercise of that right, they already know that the taxpayer, the sovereign, will be sanctioned to pay procedural and personal expenses in favor of the public servant and the Public Administration, which frightens and restrains the exercise of that constitutional right.

14. The subordination of the public function to conventionality control, regulated by Article 7 of the Magna Carta, grounds the constitutional challenge to the norms of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, regarding the imposition of costs, when there exist norms such as Articles 8 and 25 of the Pact of San José, as well as Articles 1, 3, 4, 7, and 8 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which establish the promotion of democracy in the countries of the region as the basis of political organization, but which essentially rests on the defense of the human rights of the inhabitants of each nation, accepting and protecting the international instruments that protect them against state power. Therefore, there must exist the means to denounce any violation of those rights before the Inter-American system, as well as the probity of the public function, the State's responsibility in public management, and the subordination of public servants to the Constitution, which in no way would be consonant with the limitations on the citizen against state power, if they see not only their action or complaint fail but are also affected by the payment of costs, generating a warning to any citizen who seeks to exercise that same right, making their financial situation burdensome with the order to pay costs, because the Judge, who is part of the State, was not convinced.

15. Unfortunately, we have the Judge, in criminal matters and in contentious-administrative matters, as Judge and Party. The crime of malfeasance or breach of duties against public officials also includes judicial officials, so by being reviewed or judged by judicial officials themselves, they violate impartiality and objectivity, no matter how much one tries to excuse that this is not the case. A Judge who departs from the application of the law is excused under the premise that intent must necessarily be proven, and not that it is an error of judgment, but that because of that error, the citizen lost their claim, and on appeal that error was maintained, and when it is considered that an unlawful act was committed, the repressive apparatus, in the hands of the Public Prosecutor's Office, dismisses or provisionally dismisses, and where it is warned that although Article 71 of the CPP empowers the filing of a private criminal complaint, because it opposes the prosecutor's criterion, the Judge at the intermediate stage orders payment of costs, considering that the private complaint is not appropriate for those crimes. The same applies when, in contentious-administrative matters, public officials are judged, including judicial officials, and it is required to prove intent or gross negligence, as exceptional terms compared to the common terms of the private or particular sector, to thereby prevent a conviction against the State. But this leads to a harsh order to pay costs just for not having convinced the Contentious-Administrative Court. And 16. Violation of the Principle of Equality before the Law. Any criminal or contentious-administrative action against a judicial servant or against the Public Administration entails a power imbalance, when the accused as a member of the State, in its capacity as active Public Administration, or the administrative entity, faces these actions with greater resources than the offended party, or plaintiff. In the criminal jurisdiction, the offended party has the right to file a private criminal complaint and to bring the civil action for damages against the accused officials, so the situation may arise that the Public Prosecutor's Office does not accuse, but rather requests dismissal or a provisional dismissal, leaving the offended party alone, who must constitute themselves as private complainant, and civil party, because they consider that there is merit to judge the public official. However, as has been the practice at the intermediate stage, the Judge rejects the private complaint and the civil action, because they adhere to what was requested by the Public Prosecutor's Office, because they grant more veracity to what was requested by the prosecutorial entity, and therefore, they order the private complainant and civil party to pay costs. There is a difference between having the monopoly of public prosecution by law, and the Public Prosecutor's Office being absolutely correct, as it has been a notorious fact that not every prosecutorial accusation achieves a conviction at trial, such as the cases against the former Minister of Environment of the Oscar Arias administration, who was acquitted, or that of the former mayor of San José, Johnny Araya, where at trial the Public Prosecutor's Office itself acknowledged the shortcomings of its accusation.

But in these cases, the judicial authority does not order the prosecution to pay costs for losing with its criminal accusation, but it does order the private prosecutor (querellante) to pay, under the same premise that the judicial authority considers that the accusatory document cannot be admitted, or because it contained errors. Equality is breached when the Public Prosecutor's Office is free from paying costs when its accusation is not admitted and the Criminal Court does not impose payment of such costs upon it, but it does impose them on the private prosecutor, because the latter is an ordinary citizen and not a member of the Public Administration, to which the Public Prosecutor's Office belongs.

The message is that the citizen must submit to whatever the Public Prosecutor's Office decides, and may only appear as a private prosecutor or civil party (actor civil) if there is a criminal accusation by the prosecution, but not when the prosecuting entity requests dismissal or dismissal (sobreseimiento), subjecting the victim to the prosecution's criterion, because in practice, the Criminal Judge defers to what the prosecution requests, and not the injured party. However, the Code of Criminal Procedure does not contain a legal precept that prevents the victim from appearing as a private prosecutor or civil party if the prosecution has chosen not to accuse. The rules challenged here are applied as a punishment for whoever continues as a private prosecutor or civil party, to deter them from continuing with the proceeding in the future if the prosecution decides not to do so.

Regarding the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria), the victim seeks reparation for the damage caused by the accused, due to his conduct as a public official, and therefore, the legislator allowed a civil lawsuit to be filed within the criminal proceeding, meaning that, in the intermediate stage (etapa intermedia), the victim's right has not reached its end, because at that stage their right has not been resolved by a judgment with the effect of res judicata (cosa juzgada material); rather, the victim has the ability to bring their right before the civil or administrative litigation court, since their action depended on the continuation of the criminal action, due to the principle of procedural accessory. If the judicial authority considers that there is no crime, this does not imply that there is no civil liability, but according to the interpretation of the criminal procedural law, only at TRIAL (DEBATE) can a Court review civil liability, and not in the criminal intermediate stage. And this is logical because only through an adversarial proceeding, immediacy, and legality can the merit of the injured parties' right be determined. Therefore, to order the injured parties, as civil parties, to pay costs in the criminal intermediate stage would be to advance a criterion against the victim's right, without a Judge having admitted evidence, heard the parties, and carried out the adversarial proceeding, immediacy, and issued a judgment on the merits, because the resolution at that stage is accessory; that is, the civil action is maintained as long as the criminal action is underway, without this implying, in and of itself, that the injured parties lack merit regarding civil compensation. This is what Article 40 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states:

"Article 40- Accessory nature. In the criminal procedure, the civil action for damages may only be pursued while the criminal prosecution is pending. If the accused is provisionally dismissed or the procedure is suspended, in accordance with the provisions of the law, the pursuit of the civil action shall be suspended until the criminal prosecution continues, and the right to file the lawsuit before the competent courts shall be preserved.

The Criminal Court must rule on the merits of the duly pursued civil action for damages, even when a judgment of acquittal or definitive dismissal has been issued in the trial phase." The challenged rule 267 of the same Code of Criminal Procedure is completely generic, and therefore violates the principles of legal certainty and legal security (seguridad y certeza jurídica) by stating:

"Setting Costs. Costs shall be borne by the losing party, but the court may exempt it, totally or partially, when there is plausible reason for litigating. When several parties are ordered to pay costs, the court shall set the proportional share corresponding to each one, without prejudice to the joint and several liability established by law." This rule is framed within a criminal proceeding, in which, under the principle of due process, the accused could be ordered to pay costs to the injured parties appearing as private prosecutors or civil parties, once they are convicted of the crimes in a judgment by a Trial Court, and from that arises the rule with the spirit of recognizing the victims, in addition to compensation for civil liability, the expenses encompassed by costs.

In contrast, since the Intermediate Stage is merely a preparatory phase for Trial, if the accusation of the Public Prosecutor's Office, or of the victim through their Private Prosecution (Querella), does not succeed to proceed to the Trial stage, the Prosecution is not ordered to pay costs for seeing its intention to bring the accusation to trial fail, but if it is interpreted that the private prosecutor must be ordered to pay because their private prosecution did not succeed in reaching trial, and what is more serious, is ordering the civil plaintiffs to pay costs, who have not yet succeeded in having a Trial Court hear their claims, so that by a judgment on the merits the legitimacy of their rights can be determined, but it is interpreted with an open rule that empowers the court to order them to pay costs.

The Criminal Courts of the intermediate stage have applied this Article 267 in the intermediate stage, both to punish the private prosecutor and the civil party, it being unjust that, by the principle of equality, the Public Prosecutor's Office, if its accusation is rejected, is not ordered to pay costs, but the injustice is more evident in the case of the civil action, in which a judgment with the effect of res judicata has not yet been issued, and this rule is applied at the free discretion of the Judge, who equates the refusal to proceed to the trial stage with having been "defeated" when their right has not yet been analyzed in a due process, but rather because the criminal action could not continue, which per se does not imply that the victim does not have the right to claim civil liability in another venue, thus violating Article 41 of the Constitution, which warns that access and effective protection is achieved when, resorting to the laws, a final judgment is reached through due process.

It has been the practice of the Criminal Courts, as the body of the intermediate stage, to order both the private prosecutor and the civil party to pay costs, because the criminal action has been dismissed or dismissed (sobreseído), based on this rule. Leaving the exemption to the discretionary criterion of the judge, according to the same legal rule, by establishing the word "may", when it should be clearer that in the intermediate stage, costs cannot be imposed, because the victim's right has not yet been resolved through a due process by a Trial Court, with due process, and the principles of contradiction, legality, immediacy, effective protection, the right to hear the victim, to propose and admit evidence, etc., as provided in Article 39 of the Constitution, which enshrines due process in criminal matters, where no one may be sanctioned without the demonstration of being guilty thereof, and prior exercise of their defense:

"ARTICLE 39.- No one shall be made to suffer a penalty except for a crime, quasi-crime, or misdemeanor, sanctioned by prior law and by virtue of a final judgment issued by competent authority, prior opportunity given to the accused person to exercise their defense and through the necessary demonstration of guilt." In the intermediate stage there is no trial, there is no admission of evidence, and the order to pay costs is a burdensome sanction, without the Judge having the inputs that would only occur in a Trial, to have the authority to impose costs on the accused, and equally, on the injured parties as private prosecutors and civil parties.

The application of this rule in the way it is drafted does not provide legal certainty so that the victim knows with certainty at which procedural moment a procedural party must be deemed defeated in order to impose costs, when according to Article 41 of the Constitution, defeated implies that there must be a prior TRIAL where it is possible to prove not only the innocence or guilt of the accused, but also whether the private prosecutor or the civil party bases their right in a plausible manner and in good faith. Because it is in the corresponding proceeding, with due contradiction and admission of evidence, that the Trial Court can define the merit of the right of all parties to subsequently base the imposition of the cost order, as an exception to the rule, as has already been justified in preceding lines, and not as a general rule in contentious-administrative proceedings.

This rule, without a specification, allows the Judge of the Intermediate Stage to impose costs, only because they consider that rejecting the private prosecution is equivalent to deeming the claim of the injured parties defeated, similarly to the civil action, because it is accessory, the same concept must be sheltered to impose costs separately, for the private prosecution and for the civil action. This also violates the constitutional principle of equality, because while the other procedural codes have as a premise for imposing costs the existence of a resolution on the merits, in criminal matters, costs are set because the criminal action was not elevated to trial, when at that stage no evidence is admitted, nor can matters that only correspond to the trial stage be known.

Article 318, fifth paragraph of the Code of Criminal Procedure:

"The court shall prevent that, in the hearing, questions that are proper to the oral trial are discussed." In addition to the above, Article 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes:

"Rule of interpretation. Legal provisions that restrict personal liberty or limit the exercise of a power or right conferred upon the subjects of the proceeding must be interpreted restrictively. In this matter, extensive interpretation and analogy are prohibited as long as they do not favor the liberty of the accused or the exercise of a power conferred upon those who intervene in the proceeding." A Guarantee Judge, in a democratic state, during the intermediate stage, is limited to hearing matters proper to a Trial, according to the legal framework to which they are subject, because an express legal rule exists; therefore, they could not have the authority to determine the guilt of the accused, and under that same reasoning, they also cannot deem the private prosecutor or the civil party DEFEATED, if there was no trial nor a judgment that determined, with prior due process, that the injured parties have no right whatsoever to establish the liability of the accused, or the party against whom the private prosecution is directed, which would allow the application of numeral 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as if a criminal judgment had been issued that determined, after the adversarial proceeding, the criminal claim of the private prosecution and the civil claim, when in the latter case the injured parties retain their right to sue in the ordinary jurisdiction.

"V.- OF THE FUNCTION OF THE JUDGE IN THE PREPARATORY PHASE IN THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING. The procedure designed in the new criminal procedural legislation (Code of Criminal Procedure) entails an absolute separation of the judge of the procedure in relation to the judge in charge of the trial; the latter will arrive at the trial without any knowledge of the case to be resolved, so that the evidence received in the oral hearing is that which is effectively and solely taken into account to resolve the matter. It is assumed that the trial judge has little knowledge of what occurred in the preceding stages, which is why the oral hearing acquires greater importance and complexity, requiring the introduction of alternative solutions that reduce the number of cases reaching trial, which substantially strengthens the real force of the principle of orality and immediacy. In the intermediate procedure, all issues incidental to the case that are not related to the holding of the oral and public trial must be resolved. With this, the aim is to give full objectivity and impartiality to the judge, so that they are not committed to a specific thesis at the time of resolving the case, which translates into greater independence of the official in charge of the trial and decision of the criminal case. Thus, the investigation will be in charge of the Public Prosecutor's Office, under judicial control in the acts that require it (Article 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). The function of the judge in the preparatory investigation stage is to guarantee the rights of the parties and compliance with formalities ordered in protection of fundamental rights, as is the case with the entry and search of a dwelling (Article 238 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). In this way, the judge rescues their independence from the investigated fact, which allows them to fulfill their role as a faithful guarantor of the rights of the parties—of all parties to the criminal proceeding. Thus, in the new criminal procedural legislation, a great change occurs in the conformation of the procedural system itself, since, from an inquisitorial system, it moves to an accusatorial one." Voto 03930-2008 of 14:43 on March 12, 2008, Constitutional Chamber)" The petitioner requests that “the unconstitutionality be declared with retroaction from the effective date of the same, due to the existence of defects that conflict with the Constitution, due to the existence of the phrase "defeated" that the challenged rules contain as a general rule, as well as the indeterminate nature of Article 267 of the CPP, which injures constitutional norms 1, 2, 7, 9, 11, 33, 39, 41, 154 of the Political Constitution.” They also request that the challenged rules be modified as proposed by them.

2.- For the purpose of substantiating their legal standing (legitimación), the petitioner states the following:

“Based on the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law number 7135, the present action does not refer solely to the protection of an individual interest in a particular case, but extends to an effect on the community that uses the service of the justice administration system, in the various matters in which the precepts of the challenged procedural codes are applied, and therefore, it extends to the entire community, when not only the petitioner is affected, and this action of unconstitutionality must be admitted for study, without the requirement of a pending case.

'That concept of "diffuse interests" aims to develop a form of legal standing, which in recent times has constituted one of the traditional principles of standing and which has been gaining ground, especially in the field of administrative law, as a final, novel but necessary, broadening so that this oversight is increasingly more effective and efficient. Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and even more difficult to identify, cannot be in our Law - as this Chamber has already stated - the merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that in relation to them, determined persons, or personalized groups, are identified or easily identifiable, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate interests or those that concern a community as a whole. It concerns, then, individual interests, but, at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive a benefit or a detriment, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, for which it is rightly said that these are equal interests of the groups of people who find themselves in certain situations and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, since they are at once collective - because they are common to a generality - and individual, for which they can be claimed in such capacity. And precisely this is what occurs in the present case, in which the petitioner evidently has an individual interest insofar as they are being affected by the contamination to which their community is subjected, but there is also a collective interest, since the harm is also produced to the collectivity as a whole. So, in matters of the Right to the Environment, standing corresponds to the human being as such, because the harm to that fundamental right is suffered by both the community and the individual in particular. Thus, in matters of diffuse interests, any member of the affected community, as the petitioners are, has standing to resort to the amparo proceeding seeking the protection of their fundamental rights.' voto 04423-1993 of September 7, 1993, Constitutional Chamber.

However, there is a criminal proceeding in process, in which numeral 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was applied, and of which a certified copy by the office is attached, file 21-000004-1218-PE, where costs are imposed, despite the fact that it was corroborated that the facts of the private prosecution did exist in reality, and that, as the case was not elevated to trial, it was improper to order the civil parties to pay costs, who by law had their right safeguarded to bring an action in the administrative litigation court, as is currently under file 23-0007663-1027CA, for which reason ordering costs was an anticipated action that the civil plaintiffs had no right to bring an action, when their right has not yet been resolved on the merits by a judgment with the status of res judicata, vitiating the resolution that imposes costs in an anticipated manner, because the criminal proceeding did not prosper, by not reaching the stage of oral and public trial.” 3.- By resolution of 15:07 hours on April 17, 2026, the petitioner was warned that: “a) regarding the proceeding processed in file no. 21-000004-1218-PE, clarify in whose favor the action is filed and, if filed in favor of a third person, a suitable document must be provided accrediting the granting of sufficient powers to the petitioner to formulate this constitutional review process in favor of that person; b) clarify if the copies provided together with the filing brief (pertaining to a brief dated March 9, 2026) correspond to the brief invoking unconstitutionality in the main matter and c) specify and accredit the procedural status of file no. 21-000004-1218-PE.” 4.- Through a brief associated with this file on April 23, 2026, the petitioner replied that, in order to “fulfill the warning contained in the resolution of 15:07 on April 17 of the current year, which I do in the same order requested:

“a) Regarding the present action, with respect to file No. 21-000004-1218-PE, it is filed for the benefit of the undersigned, who acts within the criminal file, in their capacity as victim appearing as private prosecutor and civil party, and therefore, a procedural mandate is not necessary.

• b)The copy attached to the present action corresponds to the brief of 03/09/2026, which contains the invocation of unconstitutionality in the main matter, as the rules of the CPP take precedence over Article 41 of the Constitution.
• c)It is specified that the procedural status of file No. 21-000004-1218-PE is awaiting resolution of an incident of absolute procedural defects, filed by the co-civil party and the undersigned, due to the serious omission of the Judge, in not summoning the parties to a hearing to hear the recusal, as had been ordered by the Criminal Court of Goicoechea, so that a new Criminal Judge subsequently elucidates, among other things, the issue of the legitimacy of imposing costs based on precepts 266 and 267 of the CPP. To accredit the foregoing, the resolution of the Criminal Court of Goicoechea, at 11:00 hours on February 10, 2026, and the incident hearing of the Criminal Court, at 14:22 on March 11, 2026, are attached, as well as the screenshot inserted below, from the online management system, which accredits the status of the electronic file in which, after the deadline granted to the other parties has expired, the Judge is awaited to resolve the incident on the merits, so that the omitted preliminary hearing is granted. In addition to the foregoing, to inform that there is an appeal still pending, once the incident of absolute procedural defects is resolved.” 5.- Article 9 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its submission, any petition brought to its knowledge that proves to be manifestly inadmissible, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is the mere reiteration or reproduction of a previous equal or similar rejected petition.

Drafted by Judge Castillo Víquez; and,

Considering:

I.- OF THE REQUIREMENTS AND FORMALITIES OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the action of unconstitutionality is a process with certain formalities that must necessarily be fulfilled for this Court to validly rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law regulates legal standing to file actions of unconstitutionality and provides for different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in a judicial venue –including habeas corpus or amparo proceedings– or in an administrative venue –in the procedure for exhausting this avenue–, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action –the base matter is not required–, in the following cases: a) when, due to the nature of the matter, no individual and direct harm exists; b) it involves the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Attorney General of the Republic, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, and the Ombudsman.

Likewise, in judgment no. 04190-95 of 11:33 hours on July 28, 1995, this Court specified that the action of unconstitutionality is:

“(…) a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, meaning that the existence of a matter pending resolution is required -whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative avenue- to be able to access the constitutional avenue, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered harmed in the main matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on said pending proceeding, because it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter; and only by exception does the legislation allow direct access to this avenue - cases of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law …”.

Finally, there are other formalities that must be fulfilled, namely, the filing brief must be authenticated and contain an explicit determination of the challenged norms, duly substantiated, with specific citation of the components of the constitutional block that are considered infringed (Article 78 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law). In addition, the conditions of legal standing must be accredited (powers of attorney and certifications), the payment of the Bar Association stamp must be made, and a literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms was invoked in the base matter must be provided (Article 79 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law).

II.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION BY DIRECT AVENUE: OF THE ALLEGED DEFENSE OF DIFFUSE INTERESTS. It must be pointed out –in the first place– that this Chamber has explained that:

“(…) given the formalism legally provided for constitutional review processes (...) the argumentative burden in the processing of an action of unconstitutionality falls on the petitioner, who must explain, without circumlocution, the contradiction existing between an infra-constitutional norm and the constitutional block, as well as the legal standing that assists them” (voto no. 2020-000319 of 12:15 hours on January 8, 2020; the emphasis does not correspond to the original).

In the case at hand (sub lite), the petitioner alleges that the action is brought in defense of diffuse interests, since the present action “extends to an effect on the community that uses the service of the justice administration system, in the various matters in which the precepts of the challenged codes are applied, and therefore, it extends to the entire community”. In this way, the defense of a collective so generic and imprecise is alleged that it simply confuses itself with the national community as a whole, which is inadmissible. This Chamber has specified –as reflected in the very precedent cited by the petitioner– that:

“(…) Diffuse interests, although difficult to define…, cannot be in our Law - as this Chamber has already stated - the merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that in relation to them, determined persons, or personalized groups, are identified or easily identifiable, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate interests or those that concern a community as a whole.” (voto no. 3705-93 of 15:00 hours on July 30, 1993; the emphasis does not correspond to the original).

In which case, when hearing a case analogous to the present one, this Chamber resolved that:

“(…) Although the petitioner maintains that the accused omission violates the safety of all “citizen-pedestrians” and “citizen-drivers”, the truth is that it cannot be considered that this concerns a group or category that meets the particularities described in the partially transcribed precedents and, on the contrary, this concerns a presumed collective so extensive, imprecise, and diffuse that it simply identifies itself with the national community as a whole. It must be reiterated, therefore, what was resolved by this Chamber in the sense that a diffuse interest must not be so diluted that it is confused with the national community, that is, “it cannot become so broad and generic that it is confused with that recognized to all members of society to watch over constitutional legality” (see judgment No. 0360-99, cited above). Indeed, if the possibility of the petitioner to file an action of unconstitutionality in this matter were admitted, under the conditions intended by them, it would mean –ultimately– recognizing the existence of a popular action, which, as the Constitutional Chamber has indicated in its reiterated jurisprudence (see judgment No. 2016-000787 of 9:05 a.m. on January 20, 2016), does not fit the framework of the procedural powers that this Constitutional Court has for this purpose, in its functions as the ultimate interpreter and guardian of the Constitution.” (voto no. 2016-005589 of 9:05 hours on April 27, 2016) Considerations fully applicable to the case at hand.

To which is added that this Court, by majority, has considered that when a norm is susceptible to individual application, the defense of diffuse interests cannot be invoked to admit the action. On this point, in voto no. 2022-011649 of 9:20 hours on May 25, 2022, this Chamber resolved that:

“III.- ON DIRECT STANDING. The petitioner, in turn, claims to have direct standing, because they state that the challenged norm not only harms the fundamental rights of an individual nature of their represented party, but also violates broad collective and diffuse rights, due to the effects it produces. However, this Chamber, by majority, has considered that when the norm being challenged is susceptible to individual application, the defense of diffuse interests cannot be invoked to admit the action. Thus, in voto no. 2021-002185 of 12:51 hours on February 3, 2021, this Constitutional Court stated the following:

“(…) II.- On diffuse interests and the legal standing of the petitioners in the case under study. The petitioners state that their standing comes from the defense of diffuse interests regarding the protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. In this regard, it should be noted that, as already mentioned, the cases of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law constitute exceptions to the rule contained in the first paragraph of the same article, which must be carefully analyzed in each specific case. The diffuse interest has been understood as that interest related to a right or legal situation of a special and particular nature, which can be shared by other persons, with all interested parties forming a specific group or category. Thus, the violation of that right can affect everyone in general or each one in particular, hence any member of the community can file the action to protect the right considered harmed.

Regarding this matter, the reiterated jurisprudence of the Chamber indicates that:

"It has been pointed out that this is a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of the collective interest just defined in the preceding considerando, but which cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right recognized to all members of society to ensure constitutional legality, since the latter —as has been repeatedly stated— is excluded from the current system of constitutional review. It is, therefore, an interest distributed in each of the administered persons, mediate if you will, and diluted, but no less verifiable for that reason, for the defense, in this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. It is the special characteristics of these rights in themselves and not the particular situation of the subjects who may hold them, that is the key to distinguishing and determining the presence of the so-called diffuse interests as has been stated in different rulings such as 03705-93 at fifteen hours on July thirtieth for the right to the environment, number 05753-93 at fourteen forty-five hours on November ninth of that same year for the defense of historical heritage, and number 00980-91 at thirteen thirty hours on May twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-one for electoral matters." –ver ruling number 360-90– From this definition, it is possible to estimate that the diffuse interest is made up of an eminently subjective element, relating to its belonging or ownership of the interest, and another objective element, related to the incidence of the good on society, which distinguishes it from other legal situations. In relation to the first—the subjective one—it is clear that it is diluted in a non-individualized human group, which co-participates in the enjoyment of the legal good that is the object of the interest, but whose conformation does not result from a set of identifiable subjects, encompassing and with relatively clear contours, as does occur in the collective interest. And from the objective perspective, it must be clarified that not every "diffuse" interest acquires the legal category of "diffuse interest," but only those imbued with a profound social relevance, whose assessment results from the circumstances of each case –ver, among others, rulings numbers 2006-15960 and 2014-4904–. In this sense, just as it has been said that such interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality—which would entail the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional)—neither can it be so concrete that it allows an individual claim, since in such case, the standing would derive from that claim –ver, among others, rulings numbers 2008-13442, 2009-300 and 2009-9201–. Thus, examples of such interests are the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, the defense of historical heritage, electoral matters, the defense of the right to health, and the oversight of public funds. Therefore, in the case under study, where the plaintiffs refer to their standing regarding the defense of diffuse interests in matters of protection of a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, what is appropriate is to rule as indicated in the following considerandos.

(…)

In the action now being heard, the same plaintiffs challenge the same norms of articles 50 and 51 of the Regulation in question, as well as article 52 of the same instrument, and although, beyond the sustainability of wildlife breeding farms (zoocriaderos), this action focuses on issues of ex situ conservation and environmental education—which was also pointed out in that previous action—the truth is that this Chamber's definition of standing itself, as established in the cited ruling, is fully applicable in this new action. Note that, certainly, as the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) clearly indicates and the Minister of Environment and Energy (Ministro de Ambiente y Energía) emphatically states, the regulations being challenged are indeed totally susceptible to individual application and directly affect the legal sphere of singular and identifiable persons, who carry out a specific activity, subject to the regulation set forth in the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre) and its regulation. Thus, it is clear that contrary to the alleged defense of diffuse interests, what is at stake is some degree of disagreement with the subjection to which they must submit for the regulation of the activity they carry out or intend to carry out; see that as well referred by the report of the Minister of Environment and Energy, the plaintiffs are directly related as founders, managers, or employees of various companies related to the exhibition of wildlife or its tourism promotion. Thus, it is unfeasible to adduce alleged conservation and environmental education problems, in order to use the figure of diffuse interests and thereby promote a direct action of unconstitutionality, bypassing the strict admissibility requirements set forth in the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, as indicated in considerandos II and III of this decision.

Under this understanding, and taking into consideration the identity of the plaintiffs and the challenged regulations, it is clear that the precedent of ruling 2018-18563 is fully applicable to this action now being heard, from which it must necessarily be concluded that just as on that previous occasion, the plaintiffs lack standing to file this process, and therefore it is improper to hear and rule on the issues raised. Accordingly, the appropriate course is to dismiss this action" (the underlining does not correspond to the original).

In a similar sense, in ruling No. 2021-011994 at 16:30 hours on May 26, 2021, this Chamber held that:

"(…) It is reiterated that the diffuse interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality (which would entail the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction); but neither can it be so concrete that it allows an individual claim, since, in such case, the standing would derive from that claim (…)" (see in this same sense, among others, Rulings (Votos) No. 2021-025373 at 9:20 hours on November 10, 2021 and No. 2022-007466 at 9:45 hours on March 30, 2022).

In the present case, it is clear that we are in the presence of norms susceptible to being materialized in cases of individual application vested in specific persons and that directly affect the legal sphere of singular and fully identifiable persons, who are empowered to file the corresponding judicial claim. Consequently, and in accordance with the aforementioned jurisprudential antecedents, it cannot be considered that, in the sub lite matter, the referred assumption of direct standing, for the defense of diffuse interests, is configured.

III.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION INCIDENTALLY. The present action is also inadmissible incidentally, for the following reasons:

A.- Article 75, first paragraph, in fine, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction requires, for purposes of the admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality through the incidental avenue—like the present one—the existence of a pending main matter to be resolved, either before the courts—including habeas corpus or amparo—or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative avenue, in which such unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed. It should be reiterated that this Chamber has pointed out—in multiple rulings—that:

"(...) Such requirements do not translate into a merely formal issue, since the simple fulfillment of the same is not enough, but it is also required that the norm challenged through this avenue has a direct incidence on the matter serving as the basis, in such a way that what is resolved in the action serves as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest harmed within the prior matter. A contrario sensu, if there is no direct connection between the object of discussion of the base matter and what is challenged in the action, it is not possible for this Chamber to rule in this regard. It is for this reason that, in accordance with articles 75 and 79 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, the plaintiffs must accredit and provide a literal certification of the written submission in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the norms in the base matter, in order to verify their incidence on such matter." (ruling No. 2019-016243 at 9:20 hours on August 28, 2019, among others; the highlighting does not correspond to the original).

Regarding the requirements that the cited written submission of invocation must meet, this Chamber has indicated that:

"(…) although, in the invocation of the unconstitutionality of the norm, an extensive substantiation is not required, the truth is that it is indeed necessary that in the base matter the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action is expressly invoked... and the constitutional norms considered infringed are indicated…". (Ruling No. 2014-000851 at 14:30 hrs. on January 22, 2014)." (ruling No. 2017-007744 at 9:15 hours on May 24, 2017).

By ruling No. 2022-5564 at 9:00 hours on March 9, 2022, this Tribunal specified the following:

"(…) In this case and in relation to the content of article 17 referring to seizure (comiso), after analyzing the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the norm was invoked, it proves insufficient. The possible constitutional articles harmed are mentioned, but the reasons are not indicated. Above all, the arguments referred to constitutional article 45 are lacking, which is, precisely, the right alleged as harmed in the brief filing the action. Finally, regarding article 20 referred to, it is not mentioned in the invocation brief, so its challenge, lacking the minimum legal basis, is inadmissible." Finally, this Tribunal has also resolved that the invocation of unconstitutionality must be made in the base matter prior to the filing of the action (see, for example, rulings No. 2016-009868 at 9:20 hours on July 13, 2016 and No. 2016-011291 at 10:40 hours on August 10, 2016).

B.- In the sub lite matter, the plaintiff mentions—for the purpose of supporting his standing—the existence of a criminal proceeding processed in case file (expediente) No. 21-000004-1218-PE. Likewise, in response to the warning (prevención) issued by this Chamber, by resolution at 15:07 hours on April 17, 2026, the plaintiff answered the following: "b) The copy that was attached to the present action, corresponds to the written submission of 03/09/2026, in which the invocation of unconstitutionality in the main matter is recorded, for the norms of the CPP being placed above constitutional article 41." Now, upon reviewing the referred written submission invoking unconstitutionality, it is verified—in the first place—that the unconstitutionality of articles 69.2, 73.1, and 73.2 of the Civil Procedural Code (Código Procesal Civil) and 150.3, 119.2, and 193 of the Contentious Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) was not invoked. In fact, no allusion whatsoever is made to such provisions. Regarding article 267 of the Criminal Procedural Code (Código Procesal Penal), this is the mention that was made:

"From the dismissal ruling (sentencia de sobreseimiento), there have been flagrant violations of the rights of the victims, who were condemned to unjustly pay costs, due to the intervention of a capricious criterion of the acting criminal judge, who at that moment, violated all the substantive and procedural norms that prevented him from directly sanctioning the victims, with the payment of costs, when it was evident that there was total plausibility in having presented their actions, and the Judge, centered the condemnation, on the fact that the victims, should have abstained from filing a private complaint (querella) and civil action because the prosecution had requested the dismissal, a criterion that is neither legal nor in accordance with the rules of sound criticism, but only subjective, harming the rights of citizens who report the irregular actions of judicial officials. From the foregoing, the Judge who represented the Criminal Tribunal, echoed those violations, when hearing the appeals against that illegal and illegitimate first-instance ruling, as well as unconstitutional, because article 41 of the Magna Carta, is above the application and interpretation of norms 266 and 267 of the CPP, in which the Third Chamber itself has established that costs cannot be instrumentalized in such a way that their purpose translates into discouraging citizens from filing complaints and actions against public officials. Which evidently happened in the present case, because each fact that was the subject of the complaint, had its evidentiary basis, which was not shared by the prosecution, did not imply that it possessed the absolute truth, much less that it was the basis for condemning in costs.

"Fixing of costs The costs shall be the responsibility of the losing party, but the tribunal may exempt it, totally or partially, when there was a plausible reason to litigate." Neither of the two first and second instance resolutions, made the analysis if each fact complained of, had happened in reality, which made the complaint and civil action plausible, as opposed to, it having been a false or slanderous complaint, without any evidence supporting that the accused… had acted in violation of the law, to the detriment of the rights of the vehicle owner and the driver, in accordance with the Traffic Law." Then it is added:

"(…) Therefore, the actions of Judge… and Judge…, were unconstitutional, not only for applying the norms without considering the due exoneration – if they did not wish to elevate the two accused to trial by complaint – as well as disregarding the right of citizens to access justice through the legal system, duly supported by evidence…".

From which it follows that, in such written submission, no formal, express, and adequate invocation of unconstitutionality of such article was made, but rather—in reality—what was challenged was its interpretation and application in the specific case, which is improper. Thus, for example, in ruling No. 2014-000851 at 14:30 hours on January 22, 2014, this Chamber resolved that:

"(…) although, in the invocation of the unconstitutionality of the norm, an extensive substantiation is not required, the truth is that it is indeed necessary that in the base matter the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action is expressly invoked—not of the acts of application—and the constitutional norms considered infringed are indicated…" (the highlighting does not correspond to the original).

On its part, in ruling No. 2020-000811 at 9:30 hours on January 15, 2020, this Tribunal resolved that:

"IV.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE PRESENT ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. In the sub judice matter, after reviewing the video and audio recording provided by the plaintiffs themselves, corresponding to the hearing held on December 13, 2019, it is verified that therein an adequate invocation of unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the present action was not made. On the contrary, in such hearing what is alleged by the technical defense of the plaintiffs is that the accused facts are not typical, according to an adequate interpretation and application of article 263 bis of the Criminal Code, in light of the jurisprudence of this Chamber, particularly, ruling No. 2019-15221. Even, in the fragment of the recording corresponding to the supposed invocation, it is verified that what the technical defense of the plaintiffs alleged was the following:

"(…) right away, Madam Judge, I also lodge the unconstitutionality of the article of the Criminal Code that establishes the crime of obstruction of roadways as a reasonable means to protect the right of my represented parties. In that sense, then, an action of unconstitutionality would also eventually be filed against that article of the Criminal Code for an abuse or an abusive application of the terms of that article of the Criminal Code that goes against what the Constitutional Chamber has said regarding, for example, what happens if there were alternate routes. At that place where the blockade was carried out, the evidence of the Public Force itself and the statements of the police officers say there were alternate routes. Therefore, the Constitutional Chamber has said that in those cases it must be tolerated because there must be a balance between the exercise of freedom of expression and freedom of transit…" (the highlighting does not correspond to the original) From the reading of the extract, it is verified, with all clarity, that what was really not alleged or challenged was the unconstitutionality of any specific normative content of article 263 bis of the Criminal Code, but rather that its application was challenged—in a generic manner—for that particular case. Therefore, it cannot be estimated that such invocation meets the minimum conditions required by this Chamber, in attention to the provisions of the aforementioned articles 75 and 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. As already indicated, in the base matter what is carried out is a general challenge to the way in which the norm in question must be interpreted and applied and the unconstitutionality of any concrete normative element of said legal provision was not properly alleged, for being estimated as incompatible with some component of the constitutional block. As a consequence, it cannot be estimated that the alleged invocation allows adequately establishing the incidental nature of this action. All the more so since this Chamber has resolved, in a reiterated manner, that "the improper application of the law or its erroneous interpretation in the specific case" is not a matter proper to be heard through the action of unconstitutionality (ruling No. 5966-94 at 15:54 hrs. on October 11, 1994)." Considerations fully applicable to the sub lite matter.

IV.- IN CONCLUSION. As a corollary to the foregoing, it is appropriate to reject the action outright, as is hereby ordered.

V.- DIFFERING REASONS OF MAGISTRATES CRUZ CASTRO AND RUEDA LEAL, WITH RESPECT TO DIFFUSE INTERESTS. As we have expressed in other cases, we estimate that a quality of diffuse interest consists precisely, in that its affectation is general—that is, it affects an entire population or broad sectors of it—within a context, where it is not necessary for the harmed subjects to know each other (they could even lack a nexus or legal relationships among them), but the presence of the same situation of harm or danger to a constitutional good is required, which, equally and without any need for individualization, encompasses and agglomerates an entire society in the abstract. Its defense aims to satisfy a need of society as such, therefore, it transcends that of an individual human being, whether considered individually or collectively. In ruling No. 2019-17397 at 12:54 hours on September 11, 2019, this Tribunal reiterated the following:

"(…) Secondly, the possibility of appearing in defense of 'diffuse interests' is foreseen; this concept, whose content has been gradually delineated by the Chamber, could be summarized in the terms employed in ruling number 3750-93 of this tribunal, at fifteen hours on July thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three) '… Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our law—as this Chamber has already said—merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that, in relation to them, specific persons, or personalized groups, are identified or easily identifiable, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones that pertain to a community as a whole. We are dealing then with individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous sets of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive harm, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, for which reason it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the sets that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests participate in a dual nature, since they are at once collective—for being common to a generality—and individual, and therefore may be claimed in such character.' In synthesis, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united based on a determined social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a determined personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is diluted, dissolved (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. In these cases, of course, the challenge that a member of one of these sectors could carry out, protected under paragraph 2 of article 75, must necessarily refer to provisions that affect them as such. This Chamber has enumerated various rights to which it has given the qualifier of 'diffuse,' such as the environment, cultural heritage, the defense of the territorial integrity of the country, and the proper management of public expenditure, among others. In this regard, two precisions must be made: on the one hand, the referred goods transcend the sphere traditionally recognized to diffuse interests, since they refer in principle to aspects that affect the national collectivity and not particular groups thereof; an environmental damage does not just affect the neighbors of a region or the consumers of a product, but rather harms or puts at serious risk the natural heritage of the entire country and even of Humanity; in the same way, the defense of the proper management made of the public funds authorized in the National Budget is an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just of any one group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration that the Constitutional Chamber has made does not go beyond a simple description proper to its obligation—as a jurisdictional organ—to limit itself to hearing the cases that are submitted to it, without it being in any way understood that only those rights that the Chamber has expressly already recognized as such can be considered diffuse rights; the foregoing would imply giving an undesirable turn in the scope of the Rule of Law, and of its correlative 'State of rights,' which—as in the case of the Costa Rican model—starts from the premise that what must be express are the limits to freedoms, since these underlie the human condition itself and therefore do not require official recognition. Finally, when paragraph 2 of article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction speaks of interests 'that pertain to the collectivity as a whole,' it refers to the legal goods explained in the previous lines, that is, those whose ownership rests in the same holders of sovereignty, in each one of the inhabitants of the Republic.

It is not, therefore, a matter of any person being able to appear before the Constitutional Chamber in protection of any interests whatsoever (popular action), but of every individual being able to act in defense of those goods that affect the entire national collectivity, without it being valid in this field either to attempt any attempt at exhaustive enumeration" (see ruling No. 2007-01145)." In consonance with what has been stated and sustained by this Tribunal in its jurisprudence, we are dealing then with individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous sets of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive harm, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, for which reason it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the sets that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. It is for this reason, precisely, that, from ruling No. 2021-2185 at 12:51 hours on February 3, 2021, we consider, unlike the Majority of this Tribunal, that some of these interests can be embodied in a particular concrete case, without for that reason losing their condition as diffuse interests, as occurs with the protection of the environment, whose impact affects a person and everyone in general; and such affectation can be individualized in a particular situation, such as, for example, the construction of a factory in a specific neighboring sector, without the respective environmental studies, whose negative effects affect the planet's ozone layer. Undoubtedly, the result of a claim or process that a neighbor could file against that factory, will not only affect their own interests, but also those of the rest of the collectivity. Therefore, it constitutes a diffuse interest; and, nevertheless, it is also the object of a particular individualized situation. Now then, this does not mean, in any way, that in every invoked situation the existence of a diffuse interest can be alleged, even though it could be the object of a particular situation. Let us remember that for an interest to be considered "diffuse," it must not only affect a collectivity, but it must also be diluted, diffused within that collectivity. If it does not produce such an effect, it cannot be considered a diffuse interest. In the case of the plaintiff, as the Majority states, the challenged regulation does not produce a socially diluted affectation, but a determined one. Hence, in this case, what is foreseen is a situation that, although it may be shared by some group of people, that effect is not of such magnitude as to consider it a diffuse interest. For the stated reason, we concur with the Majority in dismissing this action.

VI.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE. The parties are warned that should they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 working days counted from the notification of this ruling. Otherwise, all material that is not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, as provided in the "Regulation on the Electronic Case File before the Judicial Branch" (Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial), approved by the Full Court (Corte Plena) in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

Por tanto:

The action is rejected outright. Magistrates Cruz Castro and Rueda Leal give differing reasons regarding standing for diffuse interests.

Fernando Castillo V.

President Fernando Cruz C.

Paul Rueda L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

Anamari Garro V.

Ingrid Hess H.

Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador --  Nº 2026016816 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine hours and twenty minutes on the thirteenth of May of two thousand twenty-six.

An action of unconstitutionality brought by [Name 001], of legal age, married, attorney, resident of Heredia, identity card [Value 001], against articles 69.2, 73.1 and 73.2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 150.3, 119.2 and 193 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, and 267 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

**Whereas:** **1.-** By filing received in this Chamber on April 10, 2026, the plaintiff brings an action of unconstitutionality and specifies that the following norms are challenged:

“a) Article 69.2 of the Civil Procedure Code prevents the failure to rule on costs from being heard in cassation (casación), if the party requested them and they were not considered in the judgment; article 73.1 of the Civil Procedure Code establishes the phrase that *every defeated party must be ordered to pay costs, even ex officio*, and 73.2 of the same procedural body, which does not contemplate the exemption for litigating in a plausible manner not at the discretion of the Judge's interpretation, but rather the existence of certainty of the facts attributed in the claim:

"**69.2 Grounds.** The cassation appeal (recurso de casación) may be based on procedural and substantive reasons. [...]

The failure to rule on costs, incidents without direct influence on the merits of the case, or when a supplementation of the judgment (adición del fallo) has not been requested to fill the omission, shall not be grounds for appeal." "**73.1 Award of costs.** In every resolution that puts an end to the process, ex officio, *the defeated party shall be ordered to pay costs*. Costs shall be considered attorney's fees, compensation for the time invested by the party in attending procedural acts where their presence was necessary, and other indispensable expenses of the process." "**73.2 Exemption.** A total or partial exemption may be granted, in a reasoned manner, when:

**1.** The claim or counterclaim includes exaggerated claims.

**2.** The ruling admits significant defenses invoked by the defeated party, which substantially modify what was sought.

**3.** There is significant mutual defeat on claims, defenses, or exceptions.

**4.** The party has adjusted their conduct to good faith, loyalty, probity, and the rational use of the procedural system.

If there is no award of costs, each party shall pay those they have incurred and both parties shall pay those that are common." Although there is no express norm for the First Cassation Chamber (Sala Primera de Casación) to impose costs, they derive from this same legal precept, by defining that every resolution that puts an end to the process shall be condemned to costs, without limiting this condemnation to an extraordinary appeal, which does not put an end to the process, but rather reviews a resolution that did put an end to the process.

• b)Articles 119 subsection 2), 150.3 and 193 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, in the same sense, establish phrases that impose costs for the sole fact of having been defeated. The cassation appeal seeks the review of a final judgment, for which costs should not be interpreted as a sanction for accessing a review of the judgment by a Superior, on the presumption of defects therein, but rather it should be verified whether there is bad faith in filing the appeal, as a punitive premise, and not as a punishment without discussion. In the same way, 193 is considered an outright punishment, without the corresponding substantiation of whether one litigated in good faith and in a plausible manner. And granting the ex officio initiative to the Judge to impose costs would contain an action by the adjudicator, substituting the conduct of the party that does not request it:

"**ARTICLE 119.-** **2)** It shall also contain the corresponding pronouncement regarding costs, even ex officio." "ARTICLE **150. 3)** The judgment that declares the cassation appeal without merit shall order *the defeated party* to pay the personal and procedural costs caused by the appeal; unless, due to the nature of the issues debated in the appeal, there has been, in the judgment of the First Chamber or the Cassation Tribunal (Tribunal de Casación), sufficient reason to appeal.

"</span></p></div><div style="margin:12.25pt 3.75pt 12.25pt 49.6pt; background-color:#ffffff"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:0.05pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-0.05pt; text-align:justify; line-height:115%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">"</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">ARTICLE 193.-</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub"> In judgments and orders having the character of a judgment, </span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">the losing party</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub"> shall be ordered to pay personal and procedural costs, a ruling that must be made on its own motion"</span></p></div><div style="margin:12.25pt 3.75pt 12.25pt 49.6pt; background-color:#ffffff"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:0.05pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-0.05pt; text-align:justify; line-height:115%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">c) Article 267 of the Criminal Procedure Code establishes the award of costs against the losing party, without distinguishing what should be understood as "losing party" whether it refers to the accused, or to the complainants, and also to the civil plaintiffs. And as a consequence of the above, no reference is made either as to at what procedural stage the party should be deemed the losing party, whether only when a judgment on the merits has been rendered at trial, therefore excluding the preliminary hearing, which is only a preparatory stage. The provision was seriously left to the discretion of the judge:</span></p></div><div style="margin:12.25pt 3.75pt 12.25pt 49.6pt; background-color:#ffffff"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:0.05pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-0.05pt; text-align:justify; line-height:115%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">"ARTICLE 267.- Fixing of costs The costs </span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">shall be borne by the losing party</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">, but the court may exempt it, in whole or in part, when there is plausible reason to litigate. When there are several persons ordered to pay costs, the court shall fix the proportional part corresponding to each one, without prejudice to the joint and several liability established by law.</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">”</span></p></div><p style="margin:12.25pt 3.75pt 12.25pt 1pt; text-indent:34.45pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">Regarding the merits, the petitioner states </span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">–</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">as </span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">“</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub">FIRST CONSIDERATIONS</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">”</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub"> </span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">–</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub"> that:</span></p><div style="margin:12.25pt 3.75pt 12.25pt 49.6pt; background-color:#ffffff"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:0.05pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-0.05pt; text-align:justify; line-height:110%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">“</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">1. The Political Constitution guarantees citizens the right to resort to the Courts of Justice, to seek resolution of their conflicts and also to</span></p></div><div style="margin:12.25pt 3.75pt 12.25pt 49.6pt; background-color:#ffffff"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:0.05pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-0.05pt; text-align:justify; line-height:110%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">report inappropriate situations or abuse of power by public officials, through the premise derived from the public official's duty to render accounts. These rules are Articles 11, 41 and 49 of the Magna Carta.</span></p></div><div style="margin:12.25pt 3.75pt 12.25pt 49.6pt; background-color:#ffffff"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:0.05pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-0.05pt; text-align:justify; line-height:110%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">"ARTICLE 11.- Public officials are mere trustees of authority. They are obligated to fulfill the duties imposed upon them by law and cannot arrogate to themselves powers not granted therein. They must take an oath to observe and comply with this Constitution and the laws. The action to hold them criminally liable for their acts is public. The Public Administration, in a broad sense, shall be subject to a procedure of results evaluation and accountability, with the consequent personal liability for officials in the performance of their duties. The law shall indicate the means for this control of results and accountability to operate as a system covering all public institutions."</span></p></div><div style="margin:12.25pt 3.75pt 12.25pt 49.6pt; background-color:#ffffff"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:0.05pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-0.05pt; text-align:justify; line-height:110%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">"ARTICLE 41.- By resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received to their person, property, or moral interests. Justice must be administered to them promptly, completely, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws."</span></p></div><div style="margin:12.25pt 3.75pt 12.25pt 49.6pt; background-color:#ffffff"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:0.05pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-0.05pt; text-align:justify; line-height:110%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">"ARTICLE 49.- The contentious-administrative jurisdiction is established as a function of the Judicial Branch, with the purpose of guaranteeing the legality of the administrative function of the State, its institutions, and every other public law entity.</span></p></div><div style="margin:12.25pt 3.75pt 12.25pt 49.6pt; background-color:#ffffff"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:0.05pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-0.05pt; text-align:justify; line-height:110%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">Abuse of power shall be grounds for the challenge of administrative acts.</span></p></div><div style="margin:12.25pt 3.75pt 12.25pt 49.6pt; background-color:#ffffff"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:0.05pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-0.05pt; text-align:justify; line-height:110%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of those subject to administration."</span></p></div><div style="margin:12.25pt 3.75pt 12.25pt 49.6pt; background-color:#ffffff"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:0.05pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-0.05pt; text-align:justify; line-height:110%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">2. Likewise, through rulings of the Constitutional Chamber, and international treaties and conventions, the principle of access to justice in favor of citizens has been established, which is enshrined in Article 41 of the Magna Carta:</span></p></div><div style="margin:12.25pt 3.75pt 12.25pt 49.6pt; background-color:#ffffff"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:0.05pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-0.05pt; text-align:justify; line-height:110%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">"It has been said that the Judicial Branch is the first recipient and obligor under this legal rule, as it is the primary fundamental guarantor of the exercise of the right of access to justice" Voto 21039-2010 Constitutional Chamber.</span></p></div><div style="margin:12.25pt 3.75pt 12.25pt 49.6pt; background-color:#ffffff"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:0.05pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-0.05pt; text-align:justify; line-height:110%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">3. In a democratic system, it should be established that the imposition of pecuniary sanctions by way of costs is the exception and not the rule, which the legal system must contain in the manner in which it is to be applied by the Courts of Justice, in all matters. And</span></p></div><div style="margin:12.25pt 3.75pt 12.25pt 49.6pt; background-color:#ffffff"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:0.05pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-0.05pt; text-align:justify; line-height:110%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">4. There is a general understanding in judicial matters that the service of the administration of justice is evolving towards being free of charge, and towards fostering confidence in resorting to it, to report public officials.</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">”</span></p></div><p style="margin:12.25pt 3.75pt 12.25pt 1pt; text-indent:34.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">Then, he adds </span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">–</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">as </span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">“</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub">REASONS AND GROUNDS OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">”</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub"> </span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">–</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub"> the following: </span></p><div style="margin:12.25pt 3.75pt 12.25pt 49.6pt; background-color:#ffffff"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:0.05pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-0.05pt; text-align:justify; line-height:110%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">“</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">I.</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub"> </span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub">CIVIL MATTER</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">:</span></p></div><div style="margin:12.25pt 3.75pt 12.25pt 49.6pt; background-color:#ffffff"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:0.05pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-0.05pt; text-align:justify; line-height:110%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">1.

It is established as a general rule (regla general) that the judicial authority, even on its own motion, shall impose the award of costs on the losing party (parte vencida) in a judicial proceeding, whether in civil or administrative litigation matters. And only as an exception, the exemption from the payment of costs, but conditioned upon several assumptions regulated by these procedural rules, including in the case of the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) in civil matters, that, if the appeal is not granted, the payment of costs is imposed on the appellant.

2. All citizens who resort to the law, to bring a judicial action, in search of justice, carry from the beginning of the proceeding a sword of Damocles, in the event that their case does not succeed, because as a general rule they are punished with an award of the payment of costs, despite having sufficient merit to litigate, but that is left to the interpretation of the judge, because the rules empower them to impose costs as a rule. This has been occurring in judicial practice.

3. The circumstances for winning a lawsuit or a civil compensatory action, in criminal matters, depend entirely on the decision of the Judicial Authority, who interprets the evidence together with the facts in accordance with the law, so that any error not only prevents the person from obtaining justice, but also condemns them to pay costs to the opposing party, by the mere fact that the Judge so decides. That is, the power is granted to the jurisdictional body to impose costs as a general rule, it being sufficient to provide an explanation as a basis, even if it is not convincing. Even the lack of reasoning as to why it does not decide on costs is not grounds for civil cassation, according to the current civil procedural code. If the general rule were to exempt from costs, and the exception to impose them, it would oblige the Judge to carry out a greater intellectual effort to base the award of costs.

4. Access to justice is undermined by the threat of costs being imposed because the petitioner failed to convince the Judge, and for whatever reason, their action is declared without merit, which already entails a sufficient sanction for the losing party, such as not resolving the conflict, not repairing their damages and moral interests, as established by Article 41 of the Magna Carta. From that perspective, as happens with the criteria of opportunity in criminal matters, where there is no criminal prosecution when the harm suffered by the perpetrator of the crime exceeds any future and eventual penalty to be imposed.

"The accused has suffered, as a consequence of the act, serious physical or moral damages that make the application of a penalty disproportionate, or when the conditions under which the court is authorized to dispense with the penalty are met." Article 22 subsection c of the Código Procesal Penal.

5. It is understood that costs are a kind of compensation for the party called into a judicial proceeding, but under the assumption of an abuse of right, not because, having reason, upon being defeated, one is immediately condemned to the payment of costs. Therefore, the judicial function must be to determine whether there was reason and motive to litigate and not under the condition of having been defeated. Because upon verifying that there was reason to formulate the action, there can be no sanction in the payment of awards, only because in the eyes of the judge, there was insufficient evidence to reach total conviction.

6. Applying an award of costs for being defeated violates the principle of good faith, because on its own motion, only for being defeated, it is automatically inferred that the losing party acted in bad faith and in abuse of right, therefore deserving the sanction of the payment of costs, when the facts upon which their action was based, despite being true, in the judge's consideration do not convince them to declare the lawsuit well-founded, or to uphold the complaint. The general rule is that all who come before the Courts, resorting to the legal system (ordenamiento jurídico), act in good faith, and it must be proven that it was not so, in order to award costs. Therefore, the general rule is to exempt from costs and, except for proof to the contrary, exceptionally award costs.

7. The nature of the award of costs must be due to the abuse of right, as indicated by Article 22 of the Código Civil:

"ARTÍCULO 22.- The law does not protect the abuse of right or the antisocial exercise thereof. Any act or omission in a contract, which by the intention of its author, by its object, or by the circumstances in which it is carried out, manifestly exceeds the normal limits of the exercise of a right, with damage to a third party or to the counterparty, shall give rise to the corresponding indemnification and to the adoption of judicial or administrative measures that prevent the persistence of the abuse." Therefore, it is understood that the award of costs has the purpose of preventing future similar actions based on the abuse of right, which harms the person who is sued or denounced, but this does not imply that the law must assume a priori that, for the sole fact of having been defeated, one is considered abusive in the exercise of the constitutional right to access justice, when the cause is illegitimate or illegal, because the reasons for not declaring the action well-founded are multiple despite having had reason to bring the action.

8.

The challenged norms prevent judges from providing a convincing response as to why they consider that they must impose costs, beyond simply applying the refrain "for having been unsuccessful" that is used in judgments, and in cassation, by judicial function, they have the duty to provide a clear, comprehensive response under the rules of sound criticism, to provide the criterion of why costs must be imposed, and to allow that criterion to be debated on appeal or cassation, so that the party has the opportunity to prove that there was always plausibility for litigating. But this is prevented if the norms challenged as unconstitutional grant the judge the right to impose, merely by having deemed unsuccessful the party from whom payment of those costs is demanded. That phrase in itself is an obstacle to knowing the criterion of whether or not there was an abuse of right by the unsuccessful party, according to the analysis that must be required of the adjudicator.

9. Article 41 of the Constitution does not establish the imposition of costs on whoever exercises the right to resort to the laws in search of justice to remedy damage to their property or injury to their interests. It does not contain, authorize, or permit a procedural sanction because they exercised that constitutional right, since the use of the right to seek the solution to an individual or collective problem is being interpreted. The constitutional legislator did not foresee that the State could, through procedural regulatory bodies, punish the exercise of that constitutional right. Article 7 of the Constitution elevates international agreements and treaties to a hierarchical level, so the challenged procedural norms violate that constitutional hierarchical principle of subordination to conventionality control, where the Pact of San José, in its articles 8 and 25, refers to the right to be heard by a Judge, and to have an effective remedy against acts that violate their rights, even if they come from agents of the State. In this agreement, it does not exist that, in the legal system, payment of costs is imposed on a citizen, in search of justice, for being unsuccessful.

10. Both plaintiff and defendant, regardless of the subject matter, go on equal terms to propose their thesis and antithesis, so that an impartial arbitrator indicates whether or not judicial protection proceeds. If at the constitutional level it is not provided that whoever resorts in search of justice will be condemned to pay costs for the exercise of that right, procedural laws, as norms subordinate to substantive law and the Constitution, cannot breach that fundamental right and constitutional principle.

II. SCOPE OF PUBLIC FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION MATTERS

11. In the scope of public function, there exist, in criminal matters, complaints against public officials, and in administrative litigation (contenciosa administrativa) matters, ordinary and civil treasury lawsuits against public officials and against the State or the centralized Public Administration, the condemnation of costs is established outright, merely because the administered party, as plaintiff, has been unsuccessful, as a general rule, which is considered an interference in the principle and right of access to justice, and to the effective protection thereof, because it discourages citizens in their right to demand accountability, to demand responsibility from public servants, and the right to oversight of the public treasury, through complaints against public officials for their misconduct in the exercise of their duties, if the same Courts in criminal jurisdiction or administrative litigation (contenciosa administrativa), upon dismissing the action, proceed to condemn in costs, for the exercise of a right that the Magna Carta itself empowers. Demanding payment of those costs, by virtue of accountability, ensures the imbalance of power of the citizen against state power, whereby, within the social contract, the challenged norms place the State and the Public Administration in general, above its citizens, when the latter are the holders of sovereignty and of the public thing. The challenged norms promote discouragement for citizens to file lawsuits or complaints against public officials, knowing that not only could their action be dismissed or dismissed, or acquitted, in criminal jurisdiction, but their situation is aggravated when they are ordered to pay in favor of those public officials, who, by their positions, should accept being subject to the claims of the population, and not be unjustly enriched just because a favorable judgment was not reached, according to the judicial criterion.

If the original legislator, when enshrining administrative litigation (contencioso administrativo) jurisdiction in Article 49, intended to guarantee the legality of the Public Administration, to challenge abuses of power, and to protect the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered parties, it did not consider that the exercise of that right would be subject to a condemnation of costs, when at the jurisdictional criterion, it considers that their lawsuit had no merit from a legal point of view, but that except in cases of abuse of right and manifest bad faith, in any case, the State and the public administration in general, must assume the costs of the judicial process to promote the exercise of a constitutional right by the sovereign against state power.

12.

Article 2 of the Magna Carta refers to the concept of sovereignty, which resides in the Nation, which in relation to constitutional Article 11, which establishes that public officials are mere depositaries of authority, reinforces the idea that the citizen is the holder of the public matter, and the Public Administration, a kind of regent, and not its owner, so it would be a contradiction for the sovereign —the people— to demand accountability and seek liability, and when resorting to the legal system and the Courts of Justice, to be frightened from exercising that right, because the payment of legal costs is imposed if they fail to prove their right.

“Thus, this Court has understood it, emphasizing that certain assets are proper to and solely of the Nation, a sociological and philosophical concept, which does not pertain to specific or individual persons, **but to a collective that contains the inhabitants of a country, its history and its future**. Therefore, as this Chamber has understood it, the State —in this case the Municipality— becomes a sort of fiduciary of these assets, that is, a mere administrator of public assets which clearly does not entail a right of ownership in favor of the State or the municipalities that results in the exclusion of citizens. It is along these lines that this Court mentioned that there are assets and activities that ‘are “proper to the Nation”’; they are certainly also designated as ‘domain of the State’, but the Constituent’s phrasing implies that certain assets are entrusted to it because the Nation lacks juridical personality. The State becomes a sort of fiduciary of the Nation, a coherent formula with the historical vindications that justify the constitutionally declared public domain that we examine. Public officials cannot arbitrarily grant authorizations relating to services and assets proper to the Nation that time would purportedly render unassailable; there is an essential public order: Law is not simply an aggregate of subjective rights; it is also formed by an —objective— order of reasonable and democratic coexistence, an expression of the values of the Social State of Law (Articles 74 and 50 of the Constitution). An Order detached from the rights of individuals is dictatorial; the protection of subjective rights without subjection to an objective sense of justice is the reign of the strongest. Both extremes are alien to the Constitution, vigilant over both the essential principles of justice and fundamental subjective rights: Authorities and Liberties must find, in all state tasks, not to mention jurisdictional ones, their difficult and always unstable equilibrium” (see ruling number 5386-93).” Voto 048272015 of 9:40 on April 10, 2015, Sala Constitucional.

13. The most serious aspect in contentious-administrative matters, as determined by constitutional Article 49, is that the ordinary citizen confronts the Public Administration, which from the outset possesses the resources to face any action against it, through the intervention of the Procuraduría General de la República as the State’s attorney, who has the right to demand copies of the complaint and the evidence, for which the period to respond is suspended until they are delivered, even though in the 21st century, it can access them through the online management system, like the rest of the defendants, as provided by Article 33 of the Constitution, regarding that all are equal before the Law; furthermore, it can request an additional third of the period granted to respond, and every public office must collaborate with the Procuraduría, to send all documentation it requests, exempt from the payment of fiscal stamps, not to mention that public officials or the State have at their disposal income from the public treasury to confront those lawsuits, the same occurring with every centralized or decentralized public institution, including municipal corporations. In contrast, the citizen must disburse from their own private funds the hiring of lawyers, payment for all paperwork, stamps, transfers, copies, bringing witnesses, etc., so that in the end the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, through interpretations of the evidence and the facts, with application of the law, declares the lawsuit without merit, and automatically imposes the payment of legal costs on the citizen, for the mere fact of being the losing party upon losing their lawsuit, granting the right to the Public Administration, or to the public servant, to collect those costs from the citizen, by provision of procedural law, when both servants and the Public Administration work through a national budget, derived from the taxes paid by that same plaintiff.

It is evident that their actions to defend the interests of the Public Administration are already budgeted for the public entity, whether it be the Procuraduría General de la República, or decentralized or autonomous entities, because even these collect taxes and, therefore, have a legal department to face those judicial actions. This imposition of costs contradicts the coexistence with the right of the citizen to demand accountability from public officials, if in the exercise of that right, they already know that the taxpayer, the sovereign, will be sanctioned by paying procedural and personal costs in favor of the public servant and the Public Administration, which frightens and deters the exercise of that constitutional right.

14. The subordination of the public function to the control of conventionality, regulated by article 7 of the Magna Carta, grounds the constitutional challenge of the rules of the criminal procedural code and the administrative contentious procedural code, regarding the imposition of costs, when there exist norms such as 8 and 25 of the Pact of San José, as well as articles 1, 3, 4, 7 and 8 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which establish the promotion of democracy in the countries of the region, as the basis of political organization, but which fundamentally rests on the defense of the human rights of the inhabitants of each nation, accepting and protecting the international instruments that shield them against state power; therefore, there must be a way to denounce any violation of those rights before the inter-American system, as well as the probity of the public function, the state's responsibility in public management, and the subordination of public servants to the Constitution, which in no way would be consistent with the limitations on the citizen, before state power, if they see not only losing their action or complaint but also being affected by the payment of costs, generating a warning to any citizen seeking to exercise the same right, making their financial situation burdensome with the condemnation to pay costs, because the Judge, who is part of the State, was not convinced.

15. Unfortunately, we have the Judge, in criminal matters, and in administrative contentious matters, as Judge and Party. The crime of prevarication or breach of duties against public officials also includes judicial officials, so that, upon being reviewed or judged by judicial officials themselves, they harm impartiality and objectivity, no matter how much one seeks to excuse that this is not the case. A Judge, who deviates from the application of the law, is excused under the premise that intent must necessarily be proven, and not merely an error of judgment, but because of that error, the citizen lost their lawsuit, and on appeal that error was upheld, and upon considering that an illicit act was committed, the repressive apparatus, in the hands of the Fiscalía, dismisses or dismisses the case, and where it is noted that although Article 71 of the CPP empowers filing a criminal complaint (querella), because the prosecutorial criterion is challenged, the Judge of the intermediate stage condemns in costs, considering that the criminal complaint does not proceed for those crimes. The same occurs in the administrative contentious arena, where public officials are judged, among them, judicial officials, and proving intent or gross negligence is required, as exceptional terms distinct from the common parlance of the private or particular sector, in order to thereby prevent a condemnation against the State. But this entails a harsh condemnation in costs for simply not having convinced the Administrative Contentious Tribunal. And 16. Violation of the Principle of Equality before the Law. Any criminal or administrative contentious action against a judicial servant, or against the Public Administration, entails an imbalance of power, when the accused, as a member of the State, in their capacity as active Public Administration, or the administrative entity, faces these actions with greater resources than the offended party, or plaintiff. In the criminal jurisdiction, the offended party has the right to file a criminal complaint (querellar) and bring the civil compensatory action (acción civil resarcitoria) against the accused officials, which may lead to the situation where the Fiscalía does not indict, but instead requests dismissal or a stay of proceedings, leaving the offended party alone, who must constitute themselves as a criminal complainant (querellante), and civil plaintiff, because they consider that there is merit to judge the public official. However, as has been the practice in the intermediate stage, the Judge rejects the criminal complaint and the civil action, because they adhere to what the Fiscalía requested, as they grant more veracity to what the prosecutorial entity requested, and therefore, they condemn the criminal complainant and civil plaintiff in costs. There is a difference between having the monopoly of public action by law, and the Fiscalía being absolutely correct, as it has become a notorious fact that not every prosecutorial indictment results in a conviction at trial, such as the cases against the former minister of the environment under the Oscar Arias administration, who was acquitted, or that of the former mayor of San José, Johnny Araya, where at trial the Fiscalía itself acknowledged the shortcomings of its indictment. But in these cases, the judicial authority does not condemn the Fiscalía to pay the costs for losing with its criminal indictment, yet it does condemn the criminal complainant, under the same premise that the judicial authority considers that the accusatory piece cannot be admitted, or because it contained errors.

Equality is breached when the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) is exempt from paying costs when its accusation is not admitted and the Criminal Court does not impose their payment upon it, but does impose them on the private prosecutor (querellante), because that individual is an ordinary citizen and not a member of the Public Administration, to which the Public Prosecutor's Office belongs.

The message is that the citizen must submit to what the Public Prosecutor's Office decides, and may only become a private prosecutor or civil party (actor civil) if there is a prosecutorial accusation, but not when the prosecuting body requests dismissal (desestimación) or stay of proceedings (sobreseimiento), thus subjecting the victim to the prosecutor's criteria, because in practice, the Criminal Judge leans towards what the prosecution requests, not the injured party. However, the Code of Criminal Procedure does not have a legal precept that prevents the victim from becoming a private prosecutor or civil party if the prosecution has opted not to accuse. The rules challenged here are applied as a punishment for those who continue as a private prosecutor or civil party, to deter them from subsequently continuing with the process if the prosecution decides not to do so.

Regarding the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria), the victim seeks reparation for the harm caused by the accused through their conduct as a public official, and therefore, the legislator allowed them to file a civil lawsuit within the criminal process, meaning that, at the intermediate stage (etapa intermedia), the victim's right is not finalized, since at that stage their right has not been resolved by a judgment having the force of res judicata (cosa juzgada material). Rather, the victim may exercise their right to pursue the matter in the civil or administrative litigation (contencioso administrativo) court, since their action depended on the continuation of the criminal action, due to the principle of procedural accessoriness (accesoriedad procesal). If the judicial authority considers that there is no crime, it does not imply that there is no civil liability, but by interpretation of the criminal procedure law, only at TRIAL (DEBATE) can a Court review civil liability, and not at the criminal intermediate stage. And this is logical because only through an adversarial process (contradictorio), immediacy (inmediación), and legality, can one ascertain the merit of the injured parties' claim. Therefore, ordering injured parties to pay costs at the criminal intermediate stage, as civil parties, would be to advance a criterion against the victim's right, without a Judge having examined evidence, heard the parties, conducted the adversarial process and immediacy, and issued a judgment on the merits. This is because the ruling at that stage is accessory, meaning the civil action is maintained while the criminal action is pending, which does not in itself imply that the injured parties are wrong regarding civil compensation. Thus reads Article 40 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:

"Article 40- Accessory nature. In the criminal procedure, the civil action for damages may only be exercised while the criminal prosecution is pending.

If the accused has been provisionally dismissed or the proceeding suspended, in accordance with the provisions of the law, the exercise of the civil action shall be suspended until the criminal prosecution continues and the right to file the claim before the competent courts shall be preserved.

The Criminal Trial Court must rule on the merits of the validly exercised civil action for damages, even if an acquittal or definitive dismissal has been issued during the trial phase." The challenged provision 267 of the same criminal procedural code is completely generic, and therefore violative of the principles of legal certainty and security by stating:

"Determination of court costs. Court costs shall be borne by the losing party, but the court may exempt it, totally or partially, when there is plausible reason to litigate. When several are ordered to pay costs, the tribunal shall determine the proportional share corresponding to each, without prejudice to the joint and several liability established by law." This provision is framed within a criminal process, in which, under the principle of due process, the accused could be made to pay costs to the victims constituted as private prosecutors or civil parties, until he is convicted of the crimes in a judgment by a Trial Court, and from there the provision derives with that spirit of recognizing the victims, in addition to the compensation for civil liability, the expenses encompassed in court costs.

In contrast, since the Intermediate Stage is solely a preparatory phase for Trial, if the accusation of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, or of the victim through their Private Criminal Complaint, does not succeed in moving to the Trial stage, the Public Prosecutor's Office is not ordered to pay costs for seeing its intention to bring the accusation to trial fail. However, it is interpreted that the private prosecutor must be ordered to pay because his complaint did not succeed in reaching trial, and what is more serious, it orders civil plaintiffs to pay costs, who have not yet succeeded in having a Trial Court hear their claims, so that a decision on the merits may determine the legitimacy of their rights, but it is interpreted with an open-ended provision, which empowers ordering them to pay costs.

The Criminal Courts of the intermediate stage have applied this Article 267 in the intermediate stage, both to punish the private prosecutor and the civil party, it being unjust that, under the principle of equality, the Public Prosecutor's Office, if its accusation is denied, is not ordered to pay costs. But it is more evident the injustice in the case of the civil action, in which a judgment having the authority of res judicata material has not yet been rendered, and this provision is applied at the free discretion of the Judge, who likens the refusal to proceed to the trial stage to them having been "defeated," when their right has not yet been examined in a due process, but rather because the criminal action could not continue, which per se does not imply that the victim has no right to claim civil liability in another venue, thus violating Article 41 of the Constitution, which warns that access and effective protection are achieved when, by resorting to the laws, a definitive judgment is reached through due process.

It has been the practice of the Criminal Courts, as the body of the intermediate stage, to order both the private prosecutor and the civil party to pay costs, because the criminal action has been dismissed or the accused has been discharged, based on this provision.

Leaving the exemption to the judge's discretionary criteria, according to the same legal norm, by establishing the word "may," when it should be clearer that in the intermediate stage, costs cannot be imposed, because the victim's right has not yet been resolved through due process by a Trial Court, with the mediation of due process, and the principles of adversarial proceedings, legality, immediacy, effective protection, the right to hear the victim, to propose and evacuate evidence, etc., as provided in Article 39 of the Magna Carta, which enshrines due process in criminal matters, where no one can be sanctioned without proof of being guilty thereof, and prior exercise of their defense:

"ARTICLE 39.- No one shall be made to suffer a penalty except for a crime, quasi-crime, or misdemeanor, sanctioned by prior law and by virtue of a final judgment issued by a competent authority, after the accused has been given the prior opportunity to exercise their defense and through the necessary demonstration of guilt." In the intermediate stage there is no trial, there is no evacuation of evidence, and the award of costs is a burdensome sanction, without the Judge having the inputs that would only occur in a Debate, to have the authority to impose costs on the accused, and likewise, on the offended parties as complainants and civil plaintiffs.

The application of this norm in the form in which it is drafted does not provide legal certainty for the victim to know with certainty at which procedural moment a procedural party should be deemed unsuccessful in order to impose costs, when, according to Article 41 of the Constitution, unsuccessful implies that there must be a prior DEBATE where it is possible to prove not only the innocence or guilt of the accused, but also whether the complainant or the civil plaintiff bases their right in a plausible and good faith manner. Because it is in the corresponding process, with due adversarial proceedings and evacuation of evidence, that the Trial Court can define the right of all parties to subsequently ground the imposition of the award of costs, as an exception to the rule, as has already been justified in previous lines, and not as a general rule in administrative contentious proceedings.

This norm, without a specification, allows the Judge of the Intermediate Stage to impose costs, only because they consider that denying the complaint is equivalent to deeming the claim of the offended parties unsuccessful, just as with the civil action, because it is accessory, the same concept must be applied to impose costs separately, for the complaint and for the civil action. This also violates the constitutional principle of equality, because while other procedural bodies have as a premise for imposing costs the existence of a resolution on the merits, in criminal matters, costs are fixed because the criminal action was not elevated to trial, when at that stage evidence is not evacuated, nor can matters be heard that only correspond to the trial stage.

Article 318, fifth paragraph of the Código Procesal Penal:

"The court will prevent that, in the hearing, matters that are proper to the oral trial are discussed." In addition to the above, Article 2 of the Código Procesal Penal establishes:

"Rule of interpretation. Legal provisions that restrict personal freedom or limit the exercise of a power or right conferred to the subjects of the process must be interpreted restrictively. In this matter, extensive interpretation and analogy are prohibited as long as they do not favor the freedom of the accused or the exercise of a faculty conferred to those who intervene in the procedure." A Judge of Guarantees, in a democratic state, during the intermediate stage, if they are limited to hearing matters proper to a Trial, according to the legal framework to which they are subject, due to the existence of an express legal norm, then they could not have the authority to determine the guilt of the accused, and under that same line of reasoning, they also cannot deem the complainant or the civil plaintiff UNSUCCESSFUL, if there was no trial nor a judgment that determined, with prior due process, that no right whatsoever of the offended parties exists to establish the responsibility of the accused, or the defendant, which would allow the application of numeral 267 of the Código Procesal Penal, as if a criminal judgment had been rendered that heard, after adversarial proceedings, the criminal claim of the complaint and the civil claim, when in the latter case the offended parties retain their right to sue in the ordinary jurisdiction.

“V.- THE JUDGE'S FUNCTION IN THE PREPARATORY PHASE IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS. The procedure designed in the new criminal procedural legislation (Código Procesal Penal) entails an absolute separation of the judge of the procedure in relation to the person in charge of the trial, the latter will arrive at the debate without any knowledge of the case that they must resolve, so that the evidence received in the oral hearing is the only evidence effectively taken into account to resolve the matter. It is assumed that the trial judge has little knowledge of what occurred in the preceding stages, which is why the oral hearing acquires greater importance and complexity, which requires the introduction of alternative solutions that reduce the number of matters that reach debate, which substantially strengthens the real validity of the principle of orality and immediacy. In the intermediate procedure, all matters that are incidental to the case and are not related to the holding of the oral and public debate must be resolved.

With this, the aim is to provide full objectivity and impartiality to the judge, so that the judge is not committed to a specific thesis when resolving the case, which translates into greater independence of the official in charge of the debate and decision of the criminal case. In this way, the investigation (instrucción) will be in charge of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), under jurisdictional control in those acts that so require (Article 62 of the Criminal Procedure Code). The judge's function in the preparatory investigation stage is to guarantee the rights of the parties and compliance with formalities ordered for the protection of fundamental rights, as is the case of home searches (allanamiento de morada) (Article 238 of the Criminal Procedure Code). In this way, the judge rescues his independence from the investigated fact, which allows him to fulfill his role as a faithful guarantor of the rights of the parties — of all the parties in the criminal process. Thus, in the new criminal procedural legislation, a great change occurs in the very conformation of the procedural system, since it moves from an inquisitorial system to an accusatorial one." Voto 03930-2008 of 14:43 of March 12, 2008, Constitutional Chamber) &nbsp; The petitioner requests that "the unconstitutionality be declared with retroactive effect (retroacción) from their entry into force, due to existing defects (vicios) that clash with the Magna Carta, because of the existence of the phrase 'expired' (vencido) that the challenged norms contain as a general rule, as well as the undefined nature of 267 of the CPP, which injures constitutional norms 1, 2, 7, 9, 11, 33, 39, 41, 154 of the Political Constitution." He also asks that the challenged norms be modified as he proposes. 2.- In order to substantiate his standing (legitimación), the petitioner indicates the following:

"Based on the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law number 7135, this action does not concern only the particular matter regarding the protection of an individual interest, but extends to an affectation of the community that uses the service of the justice administration system, in the various matters in which the precepts of the challenged procedural bodies are applied, therefore it extends to the entire community, when not only the petitioner is affected, and this action of unconstitutionality must be admitted for study, without the requirement of a pending case.

'That concept of 'diffuse interests' (intereses difusos) aims to develop a form of standing, which in recent times has constituted one of the traditional principles of standing and has been making its way, especially in the field of administrative law, as a final, novel but necessary broadening, so that such oversight becomes increasingly more effective and efficient. Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and even more difficult to identify, cannot be in our Law — as this Chamber has already stated — merely collective interests; neither so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that identified or easily identifiable specific persons, or personalized groups, are distinguished from them, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones or those concerning a community as a whole. It deals, then, with individual interests, but, at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive a benefit or a prejudice, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, which is why it is rightly said that these are equal interests of the groups of people who find themselves in certain situations and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, since they are at once collective — because they are common to a generality — and individual, for which they can be claimed in that capacity. And precisely that is what happens in the present case, in which the petitioner evidently has an individual interest insofar as he is being affected by the contamination afflicting his community, but also a collective interest exists, since the injury also occurs to the collectivity as a whole. Thus, when it comes to the Right to the Environment, standing corresponds to the human being as such, since the injury to that fundamental right is suffered both by the community and by the individual in particular. So, in the case of diffuse interests, any member of the affected community, such as the petitioners, is legitimized to resort to the amparo recourse in pursuit of the protection of his fundamental rights.' voto 04423-1993 of September 7, 1993 Constitutional Chamber.

However, there is a criminal process in progress, in which numeral 267 of the Criminal Procedure Code was applied, and of which a certified copy by the office is attached, file 21-000004-1218-PE, where costs are imposed, even though it was corroborated that the facts of the complaint did exist in reality, and that since the case was not elevated to trial, it was inappropriate to condemn the civil plaintiffs to costs, who by law were safeguarded the right to act in the administrative contentious route, as is currently under file 23-0007663-1027CA, therefore, condemning in costs was an anticipated action that the civil claimants had no right to act, when their right has not yet been resolved on the merits by a judgment having the status of res judicata (cosa juzgada material), vitiating the resolution that imposes costs in an anticipated manner, because the criminal process did not prosper, not reaching the oral and public trial stage." 3.- By resolution of 15:07 hours of April 17, 2026, the petitioner was warned to: "a) regarding the process being processed under file no. 21-000004-1218- PE, clarify on behalf of whom the action is filed and, if filed on behalf of a third person, a suitable document must be provided accrediting the granting of sufficient powers to the petitioner to formulate this constitutional control process on behalf of that person; b) clarify if the copies provided along with the filing brief (pertaining to a brief dated March 9, 2026) correspond to the brief invoking unconstitutionality in the main matter and c) specify and accredit the procedural state of file no.

21- 000004-1218-PE.

4.- By a brief associated with this case file on April 23, 2026, the claimant responded that, to "fulfill the prevention order contained in the resolution of 3:07 p.m. on April 17 of the current year, which I do in the same order requested:

"a) Regarding the present action (acción), with respect to case file No. 21-000004-1218-PE, it is filed for the benefit of the undersigned, who acts within the criminal case file, in his capacity as victim constituted as private prosecutor (querellante) and civil party, so no procedural mandate is necessary.

• b)The copy that was attached to the present action (acción) corresponds to the brief of 03/09/2026, which contains an invocation of unconstitutionality in the main matter, because the rules of the CPP take precedence over Article 41 of the Constitution.
• c)It is specified that the procedural status of case file No. 21-000004-1218-PE is awaiting resolution of an incident of absolute procedural defects (incidente de defectos procesales absolutos), filed by the co-civil party and the undersigned, due to the serious omission of the Judge, in not summoning the parties to a hearing to consider a recusal (recusación), as was ordered by the Criminal Court of Goicoechea, so that a new Criminal Judge subsequently elucidates, among other things, the issue of the legitimacy of the imposition of costs based on precepts 266 and 267 of the CPP. To prove the foregoing, the resolution of the Criminal Court of Goicoechea, from 11:00 a.m. on February 10, 2026, and the incident hearing of the Criminal Court, from 2:22 p.m. on March 11, 2026, are attached, as well as the screenshot inserted below of the online management system, which proves the status of the electronic case file in which there is a wait, after the deadline granted to the other parties expired, for the Judge to proceed to resolve the incident on the merits (fondo), so that the omitted preliminary hearing (audiencia preliminar) is granted. In addition to the foregoing, to inform that there is an appeal (recurso de apelación) still pending, once the incident of absolute procedural defects (incidente de defectos absolutos procesales) is resolved." 5.- Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits (por el fondo), at any time, even from its presentation, any petition brought to its attention that turns out to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is the simple reiteration or reproduction of a previous equal or similar rejected petition.

Drafted by Magistrate Castillo Víquez; and,

Considering:

I.- OF THE REQUIREMENTS AND FORMALITIES OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY (ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD). This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) is a process with certain formalities, which must necessarily be fulfilled so that this Court can validly rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) regulates the standing (legitimación) to file actions of unconstitutionality (acciones de inconstitucionalidad) and provides for different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in a judicial venue –including habeas corpus or amparo appeals– or in the administrative venue –in the procedure for exhausting this route–, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked, as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest that is considered harmed in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate direct action (acción directa) –the base matter is not required–, in the following cases: a) when due to the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct harm; b) it involves the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action (acción) is brought by the Attorney General of the Republic, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, and the Ombudsman.

Likewise, in judgment No. 04190-95 of 11:33 a.m. on July 28, 1995, this Court specified that the action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) is:

"(...) a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action (acción directa o popular), which means that the existence of a matter pending resolution –whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route– is required to be able to access the constitutional route, but in such a way that the action (acción) constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered harmed in the main matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative repercussion on that pending process, since it manifests on the constitutionality of the rules that must be applied in that matter; and only by exception does the legislation allow direct access to this route –assumptions of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) …".

Finally, there are other formalities that must be fulfilled, namely, the written submission must be authenticated and contain an explicit determination of the challenged regulations, duly substantiated, with specific citation of the components of the block of constitutionality (bloque de constitucionalidad) that are considered infringed (Article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). It must also prove the conditions of standing (legitimación) (powers of attorney and certifications), proceed with the payment of the Costa Rican Bar Association stamp, and provide a literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the norms challenged in the base matter was invoked (Article 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

II.- REGARDING THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION (ACCIÓN) VIA THE DIRECT ROUTE: OF THE ALLEGED DEFENSE OF DIFFUSE INTERESTS (INTERESES DIFUSOS).

It should be noted – first of all – that this Chamber has explained that:

"(…) given the formalism legally provided for in constitutional review proceedings (…) the argumentative burden in the processing of an acción de inconstitucionalidad falls on the claimant, who must explain, without ambiguity, the contradiction between an infra-constitutional norm and the constitutional block, as well as the standing that assists them" (vote no. 2020-000319 of 12:15 p.m. on January 8, 2020; the emphasis is not from the original).

In the case at hand (sub lite), the claimant alleges that the action is brought in defense of diffuse interests, since the present action "extends to an affectation of the community that uses the justice administration system service, in the various matters in which the precepts of the questioned bodies are applied, therefore it extends to the entire community." In this way, the defense of a collective so generic and imprecise is alleged that it is simply confused with the national community as a whole, which is improper. This Chamber has specified – as reflected in the very precedent cited by the claimant – that:

"(…) Diffuse interests, although difficult to define…, cannot be in our Law – as this Chamber has already said – merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that, in relation to them, specific persons, or personalized groups, are identified or easily identifiable, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones or those that pertain to a community as a whole." (vote no. 3705-93 of 3:00 p.m. on July 30, 1993; the emphasis is not from the original).

In which case, when hearing a case analogous to the present one, this Chamber resolved that:

"(…) Although the claimant maintains that the accused omission threatens the safety of all 'citizen-pedestrians' and 'citizen-drivers,' the truth is that it cannot be considered that this is a group or category that meets the particularities described in the partially transcribed precedents and, on the contrary, it is in the presence of a presumed collective so broad, imprecise, and blurred that it is simply identified with the national community as a whole. It must be reiterated, for this reason, what was resolved by this Chamber to the effect that the diffuse interest must not be so diluted that it is confused with the national collectivity, that is, 'it cannot become so broad and generic that it is confused with that recognized to all members of society to ensure constitutional legality' (see judgment No. 0360-99, supra cited). Indeed, if the possibility of the actor to file an acción de inconstitucionalidad in this matter were admitted, under the conditions sought by the latter, it would ultimately mean – recognizing the existence of an acción popular, which, as the Constitutional Chamber has indicated in its reiterated jurisprudence (see judgment No. 2016-000787 of 9:05 a.m. on January 20, 2016), does not conform to the framework of procedural competences that this Constitutional Court has for that purpose, in its functions as ultimate interpreter and guardian of the Constitution." (vote no. 2016-005589 of 9:05 a.m. on April 27, 2016).

Considerations fully applicable to the case at hand.

To which it is added that this Court, by majority, has considered that when a norm is susceptible to individual application, it is not appropriate to invoke diffuse interests to admit the action. On this point, in vote no. 2022-011649 of 9:20 a.m. on May 25, 2022, this Chamber resolved that:

"III.- ON DIRECT STANDING. The claimant, in turn, claims to have direct standing, because he states that the challenged norm not only injures the individual fundamental rights of his represented party, but also violates numerous collective and diffuse rights, due to the effects it produces. However, this Chamber, by majority, has considered that when the challenged norm is susceptible to individual application, it is not appropriate to invoke the defense of diffuse interests to admit the action. Thus, in vote no. 2021-002185 of 12:51 p.m. on February 3, 2021, this Constitutional Court indicated the following:

"(…) II.- On diffuse interests and the standing of the claimants in the case under study. The claimants indicate that their standing comes from the defense of diffuse interests regarding the protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. In this regard, it should be noted that, as already mentioned, the cases in the second paragraph of article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional constitute exceptions to the rule contained in the first paragraph of the same article, which must be carefully analyzed in each specific case. The diffuse interest has been understood as that interest related to a right or legal situation of a special and particular nature, which may be shared by other persons, with all the interested parties forming a specific group or category. Thus, the violation of that right can affect everyone in general or each one in particular, hence any member of the collectivity can file the action to protect the right deemed injured.

Regarding this matter, the reiterated jurisprudence of the Chamber indicates that:

"It has been pointed out that this is a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of the collective interest just defined in the preceding recital, but which cannot become so broad and generic that it is confused with the right recognized to all members of society to ensure constitutional legality, since this latter right -as has been repeatedly stated- is excluded from the current constitutional review system. It is, therefore, an interest distributed among each of the administered persons, mediate if you will, and diluted, but no less verifiable for that reason, for the defense, before this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. The special characteristics of these rights themselves, and not the particular situation of the subjects who may hold them in relation to them, are the key to distinguishing and determining the presence of so-called diffuse interests, as has been stated in various resolutions such as 03705-93 at fifteen hundred hours on July thirtieth for the right to the environment, number 05753-93 at fourteen forty-five hours on November ninth of that same year for the defense of historical heritage, and number 00980-91 at thirteen thirty hours on May twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-one for electoral matters." –see judgment number 360-90- From this definition, it is possible to consider that the diffuse interest is made up of an eminently subjective element, relating to its belonging or ownership of the interest, and another objective element, related to the incidence of the good in society, which distinguishes it from other legal situations. In relation to the first -the subjective one-, it is clear that it is diffused within a non-individualized human group, which co-participates in the enjoyment of the legal good that is the object of the interest, but whose conformation does not result from an identifiable, encompassable group of subjects with relatively clear contours, as does occur in the collective interest. And from the objective perspective, it must be clarified that not every "diffused" interest acquires the legal category of "diffuse interest," but only those imbued with profound social relevance, whose assessment results from the circumstances of each case –see, among others, judgments number 2006-15960 and 2014-4904-. In this sense, just as it has been said that this interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality -which would imply the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional)-, neither can it be so concrete that it permits an individual claim, for in such a case, standing would derive from that claim –see, among others, judgments number 2008-13442, 2009-300 and 2009-9201-. Thus, examples of such interests are the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, the defense of historical heritage, electoral matters, the defense of the right to health, and the oversight of public funds. Therefore, in the case under study, where the plaintiffs base their standing on the defense of diffuse interests in the matter of protection of a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the appropriate course is to rule as indicated in the following recitals.

(…)

In the action now being heard, the same plaintiffs challenge the same provisions of Articles 50 and 51 of the Regulation in question, as well as Article 52 of the same instrument, and although, beyond the sustainability of captive breeding facilities (zoocriaderos), this action focuses on issues of ex situ conservation and environmental education -which was also pointed out in that action-, the truth is that this Chamber's own definition of standing, as set forth in the cited judgment, is fully applicable in this new action. Note that, certainly, as clearly indicated by the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) and emphatically stated by the Minister of Environment and Energy, the regulations being challenged are indeed totally susceptible to individual application and to directly affecting the legal sphere of singular and identifiable persons, who carry out a specific activity, subject to the regulation set forth in the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre) and its regulation. Thus, it is clear that, contrary to the alleged defense of diffuse interests, what is at stake is some degree of disagreement with the subjection to which they must submit for the regulation of the activity they carry out or intend to carry out; see that, as the report of the Minister of Environment and Energy well states, the plaintiffs are directly related as founders, managers, or employees of various companies related to the exhibition of wildlife or its tourism promotion.

Thus, it is unfeasible to adduce alleged problems of conservation and environmental education in order to use the concept of diffuse interests and thereby promote a direct action of unconstitutionality, bypassing the strict admissibility requirements set forth in the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, as indicated in considerandos II and III of this resolution.

Under this understanding, and taking into consideration the identity of the plaintiffs and the challenged regulations, it is clear that the precedent of judgment 2018-18563 is fully applicable to the action now before us, from which it must necessarily be concluded that, as on that previous occasion, the plaintiffs lack standing (legitimación) to bring this proceeding. Consequently, it is improper to hear and rule on the aspects raised. Thus, the appropriate course is to dismiss this action" (the underlining does not correspond to the original).

In a similar vein, in judgment No. 2021-011994 of 4:30 p.m. on May 26, 2021, this Chamber held that:

"(…) It is reiterated that the diffuse interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality (which would imply the tacit establishment of an actio popularis not contemplated by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional); but neither can it be so concrete that it permits an individual claim, for, in such a case, standing (legitimación) would derive from that claim (…)" (see in this same regard, among others, Votes No. 2021-025373 of 9:20 a.m. on November 10, 2021 and No. 2022-007466 of 9:45 a.m. on March 30, 2022).

In the instant case, it is clear that we are in the presence of norms susceptible to being materialized in cases of individual application affecting specific persons, which directly impact the legal sphere of singular and fully identifiable individuals, who are empowered to bring the corresponding judicial claim. Consequently, and in accordance with the aforementioned jurisprudential precedents, it cannot be considered that, in the sub lite, the referenced situation of direct standing (legitimación directa) for the defense of diffuse interests is configured.

III.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION VIA THE INCIDENTAL ROUTE. The present action is also inadmissible via the incidental route, for the following reasons:

A.- Article 75, first paragraph, in fine, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional requires, for the admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality via the incidental route –like the present one–, the existence of a principal matter pending resolution, whether before the courts –including habeas corpus or amparo courts–, or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route, in which that unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. It bears reiterating that this Chamber has indicated –in multiple votes– that:

"(...) Such requirements do not translate into a merely formal question, since mere compliance with them is not sufficient; rather, it is also required that the norm challenged through this route have a direct impact on the matter serving as the basis, such that what is resolved in the action serves as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest injured in the prior matter. A contrario sensu, if there is no direct connection between the object of discussion in the base matter and what is challenged in the action, it is not possible for this Chamber to rule on the matter. It is for this reason that, in accordance with Articles 75 and 79 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, plaintiffs must demonstrate and provide a literal certification of the written submission in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the norms in the base matter, in order to verify its impact on such matter." (vote no. 2019-016243 of 9:20 a.m. on August 28, 2019, among others; the highlighting does not correspond to the original).

Regarding the requirements that the cited written invocation must meet, this Chamber has indicated that:

"(…) although an extensive foundational argument is not required when invoking the unconstitutionality of the norm, the truth is that it is necessary for the base matter to expressly invoke the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action... and to indicate the constitutional norms considered infringed…". (Judgment No. 2014-000851 of 2:30 p.m. on January 22, 2014)." (judgment no. 2017-007744 of 9:15 a.m. on May 24, 2017).

By judgment no. 2022-5564 of 9:00 a.m. on March 9, 2022, this Court specified the following:

"(…) In this case and in relation to the content of Article 17 referring to confiscation (comiso), upon analyzing the memorial in which the unconstitutionality of the norm was invoked, it proves insufficient. The possible constitutional articles infringed are mentioned, but the reasons are not indicated. Above all, the arguments referring to constitutional article 45 are notably absent, which is precisely the right alleged as injured in the written submission filing the action.

Finally, as for the aforementioned article 20, it is not mentioned in the pleading of invocation, and therefore its challenge, lacking the minimum legal basis, is inadmissible.” Finally, this Court has also resolved that the invocation of unconstitutionality must be made in the base matter prior to the filing of the action (see, for example, rulings no. 2016-009868 of 9:20 a.m. on July 13, 2016, and no. 2016-011291 of 10:40 a.m. on August 10, 2016).

B.- In the sub lite, the petitioner mentions – to support his standing – the existence of a criminal proceeding being processed in case file no. 21-000004-1218-PE. Likewise, in response to the prevention made by this Chamber, by means of a resolution at 3:07 p.m. on April 17, 2026, the petitioner answered the following: “b) The copy attached to this action corresponds to the brief dated 03/09/2026, which records the invocation of unconstitutionality in the main matter, because the regulations of the CPP take precedence over Article 41 of the Constitution.” Now, upon reviewing the aforementioned brief invoking unconstitutionality, it is verified – in the first place – that the unconstitutionality of Articles 69.2, 73.1, and 73.2 of the Civil Procedure Code and 150.3, 119.2, and 193 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code was not invoked. In fact, no allusion whatsoever is made to such provisions. Regarding Article 267 of the Criminal Procedure Code, this is the mention that was made:

“Since the dismissal judgment, there have been flagrant violations of the rights of the victims, who were unjustly ordered to pay costs, due to the intervention of a capricious criterion of the acting criminal judge, who at that time, violated all substantive and procedural rules that prevented him from directly sanctioning the victims with the payment of costs, when it was evident that there was total reasonableness in having filed their petitions, and the Judge focused the condemnation on the fact that the victims should have refrained from filing a criminal complaint and civil action because the Prosecutor's Office had requested dismissal, a criterion that is neither legal nor in accordance with the rules of sound judgment, but only subjective, which harms the rights of citizens who report the irregular actions of judicial officials. Based on the foregoing, the Judge who represented the Criminal Court echoed those violations, upon hearing the appeals against that illegal and illegitimate first-instance judgment, as well as unconstitutional, because Article 41 of the Magna Carta is above the application and interpretation of rules 266 and 267 of the CPP, in which the Third Chamber itself has established that costs cannot be instrumentalized in such a way that their purpose translates into discouraging citizens from filing complaints and actions against public officials. Which evidently happened in this case, because each fact that was the subject of the criminal complaint had its evidentiary basis, which was not shared by the Prosecutor's Office, did not imply that it held the absolute truth and even less that it was the basis for ordering the payment of costs.

“Fixing of costs Costs shall be borne by the losing party, but the court may exempt it, totally or partially, when there is a plausible reason for litigating.” Neither of the two first and second instance resolutions made the analysis of whether each fact alleged in the complaint had actually occurred, which would make the complaint and the civil action plausible, as opposed to having been a false or slanderous accusation, without any evidence to support that the accused… had acted in violation of the law, to the detriment of the rights of the vehicle owner and the driver, pursuant to the Traffic Law.” It then adds:

“(…) Therefore, the action of the Judge… and of the Judge…, were unconstitutional, not only for applying the rules without considering the appropriate exemption – if they did not wish to take the two accused to trial via a complaint – as well as for disregarding the right of citizens to access justice through the legal system, duly supported by evidence…”.

From which it follows that, in such brief, no formal, express, and adequate invocation of unconstitutionality of that article was made, but rather – in reality – what was questioned was its interpretation and application in the specific case, which is improper. Thus, for example, in ruling no.

2014-000851 at 2:30 p.m. on January 22, 2014, this Chamber resolved that:

"(…) although a lengthy substantiation is not required when challenging the unconstitutionality of a norm, it is indeed necessary that in the underlying matter the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action—not of the implementing acts—be expressly invoked, and that the constitutional norms considered to have been infringed be indicated…" (emphasis not in original).

For its part, in ruling no. 2020-000811 at 9:30 a.m. on January 15, 2020, this Court resolved that:

"IV.- OF THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE PRESENT ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. In the sub judice, after reviewing the video and audio recording provided by the claimants themselves, corresponding to the hearing held on December 13, 2019, it is verified that an adequate invocation of the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in this action was not made during the same. On the contrary, in that hearing what the claimants' technical defense alleged is that the imputed acts are not typical, according to an adequate interpretation and application of article 263 bis of the Criminal Code, in light of the jurisprudence of this Chamber, particularly, sentence No. 2019-15221. Indeed, in the recording fragment that corresponds to the supposed invocation, it is verified that what the claimants' technical defense alleged was the following:

"(…) right away, Your Honor, I also raise the unconstitutionality of the Criminal Code article that establishes the crime of obstruction of roads as a reasonable means to protect my clients' rights. In that sense, an action of unconstitutionality would eventually also be filed against that article of the Criminal Code for an abuse or an abusive application of the terms of that article of the Criminal Code, which goes against what the Constitutional Chamber has said regarding, for example, what happens if there were alternative routes. In that place where the blockade was staged, the Public Force's own evidence and the police officers' statements establish that there were alternative routes. Therefore, the Constitutional Chamber has said that in those cases it must be tolerated because a balance must exist there between the exercise of freedom of expression and freedom of transit…" (emphasis not in original) From the reading of the excerpt, it is verified with complete clarity that what was actually not alleged or challenged was the unconstitutionality of any specific normative content of article 263 bis of the Criminal Code. Rather, its application to that particular case was questioned in a generic manner. Therefore, such invocation cannot be deemed to meet the minimum conditions required by this Chamber, pursuant to the provisions of the aforementioned articles 75 and 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. As already indicated, in the underlying matter a general questioning is made regarding the way in which the norm in question should be interpreted and applied, and the unconstitutionality of any specific normative element of said legal provision was not properly alleged as being incompatible with any component of the constitutional block. As a consequence, it cannot be deemed that the alleged invocation allows for the incidental nature of this action to be adequately established. Especially since this Chamber has repeatedly resolved that "the improper application of the law or its erroneous interpretation in the specific case" is not a matter proper for consideration through the action of unconstitutionality (sentence No. 5966-94 at 3:54 p.m. on October 11, 1994)." Considerations fully applicable to the sub lite.

IV.- IN CONCLUSION. As a corollary of the foregoing, it is appropriate to outright reject the action, as is hereby ordered.

V.- DIFFERENT REASONS OF JUSTICES CRUZ CASTRO AND RUEDA LEAL, REGARDING DIFFUSE INTERESTS. As we have expressed in other cases, we consider that a quality of the diffuse interest consists precisely in that its affectation is general—that is, it impacts an entire population or broad sectors thereof—within a context where it is not required that the affected subjects know each other (they could even lack any legal nexus or relationship among themselves), but it does require the presence of the same situation of harm or danger to a constitutional right that, equally and without any need for individualization, comprises and encompasses an entire society in the abstract. Its defense aims to satisfy a need of society as such; therefore, it transcends that of an individual or collectively considered human being. In sentence no.

2019-17397 of 12:54 p.m. on September 11, 2019, this Court reiterated the following:

"(...) Secondly, the possibility of coming forward in defense of 'diffuse interests' (intereses difusos) is provided for; this concept, whose content has been gradually delineated by the Chamber, could be summarized in the terms used in judgment number 3750-93 of this court, of three o'clock in the afternoon of July thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three) '...Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and even more difficult to identify, cannot be, in our law -as this Chamber has already stated- merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that determined persons, or personalized groups, are identified or easily identifiable against them, whose legal standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from the corporate interests that concern a community as a whole. It is, then, a matter of individual interests, but, at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, suffer an actual or potential harm, more or less equal for all, which is why it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, since they are simultaneously collective—because they are common to a generality—and individual, for which reason they can be claimed in such capacity'."

In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united based on a certain social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a certain personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is blurred, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. In these cases, of course, the challenge that a member of one of these sectors could make under paragraph 2 of article 75 must necessarily refer to provisions that affect them as such. This Chamber has listed various rights to which it has given the qualification of "diffuse," such as the environment, cultural heritage, the defense of the country's territorial integrity, and the proper management of public spending, among others. In this regard, two clarifications must be made: on the one hand, the aforementioned assets transcend the sphere traditionally recognized for diffuse interests, since they refer in principle to aspects that affect the national community and not particular groups thereof; an environmental harm does not only affect the neighbors of a region or the consumers of a product, but injures or puts at serious risk the natural heritage of the entire country and even of Humanity; in the same way, the defense of the proper management of the public funds authorized in the Budget of the Republic is an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just of any group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration made by the Constitutional Chamber is no more than a simple description inherent to its obligation—as a jurisdictional body—to limit itself to hearing the cases submitted to it, without it being understood in any way that only those rights that the Chamber has already expressly recognized as such can be considered diffuse rights; the foregoing would imply an undesirable overturning in the scope of the Rule of Law, and its correlative "State of rights," which—as in the case of the Costa Rican model—starts from the premise that what must be express are the limits to freedoms, since these underlie the human condition itself and therefore do not require official recognition. Finally, when paragraph 2 of article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional speaks of interests "that concern the community as a whole," it refers to the legal assets explained in the previous lines, that is, those whose ownership rests in the very holders of sovereignty, in each one of the inhabitants of the Republic.

It is not, therefore, a matter of any person being able to come before the Constitutional Chamber in protection of any interests whatsoever (popular action), but rather that every individual can act in defense of those assets that affect the entire national community, nor is it valid in this field to essay any attempt at an exhaustive enumeration" (see judgment No. 2007-01145)." In accordance with what has been stated and sustained by this Court in its jurisprudence, it is, then, a matter of individual interests, but, at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, suffer an actual or potential harm, more or less equal for all, which is why it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is precisely why, based on judgment no. 2021-2185 of 12:51 p.m. on February 3, 2021, we consider, unlike the Majority of this Court, that some of these interests can be reflected in a specific, concrete case, without thereby losing their condition as a diffuse interest, as occurs with the protection of the environment, whose impact affects one person and everyone in general; and such impact can be individualized in a particular situation, such as, for example, the construction of a factory in a specific neighboring sector, without the respective environmental studies, whose negative effects impact the planet's ozone layer. Undoubtedly, the result of a claim or process that a neighbor may bring against that factory will not only affect their own interests, but also those of the rest of the community. Therefore, it constitutes a diffuse interest; and, nevertheless, it is also the object of an individualized particular situation. Now, this does not mean, in any way, that the existence of a diffuse interest can be alleged in every invoked situation, even though it may be the object of a particular situation. Let us remember that for an interest to be considered "diffuse," it must not only affect a community, but must also be blurred, disseminated throughout that community. If it produces no such effect, it cannot be considered a diffuse interest. In the case of the petitioner, as the Majority states, the challenged regulation does not produce a socially diffused impact, but rather a determined one. So that, in this case, what is discerned is a situation that, although it may be shared by some group of people, that effect is not of such magnitude as to be considered a diffuse interest. For the reason stated, we agree with the Majority in dismissing this action.

**VI.- DOCUMENTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FILE**.

The parties are warned that if they have submitted any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be retrieved from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment.

Otherwise, any material not removed within this period shall be destroyed, as provided in the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", approved by the Full Court in session N° 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judiciary, in session N° 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

Por tanto:

It is flatly dismissed. The magistrates Cruz Castro and Rueda Leal provide different reasons regarding standing for diffuse interests (legitimación por intereses difusos).

**Motion for the Inclusion, Referral, and Joinder of Actions in the Administrative Proceeding initiated in File No. ________** **I. Grounds for the Request** 1. **Common Background and Scope of the Emergency Declared by Executive Decree No. 36452-MP.** As discussed in the application, this project falls within the scope of Executive Decree No. 36452-MP, which declared a State of Emergency due to the flooding and landslides caused by the indirect influence of Hurricane Otto. However, in this context, it must be considered that the emergencies declared are not identical to the project presented now. The initial declaration was supplanted by Executive Decree No. 40495-MP to address the problems caused by Tropical Storm Nate and later reinforced by Executive Decree No. 36292-MP, known as the "Permanent Original Decree," which remains in force and declares Costa Rica a "permanently potential emergency area" for all terms and legal purposes.

A state of emergency exists because Executive Decree No. 36292-MP establishes a condition of permanent risk for the entire national territory, and in this sense, there is an overlap of "emergencies" that have been occurring in the area, each one aggravating the pre-existing physical conditions and necessitating the projects presented in this application.

The following is the forest cover (cobertura boscosa) located on the San Roque farm, property of the Cartago Institute of Agricultural Education (Instituto de Cartago de Educación Agrícola, ICAA), an entity attached to the National Council of Rectors (Consejo Nacional de Rectores, CONARE), located in the Santa Rosa district, Turrialba canton, Cartago province, for which a forest certification was requested for inclusion in the program of Payment for Environmental Services (Pago de Servicios Ambientales, PSA), operated through the Cartago Conservation Area (Área de Conservación Cartago, ACOSA) and administered by the National Forestry Financing Fund (Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal, FONAFIFO). The property corresponds to the farm located three kilometers southeast of the center of Santa Rosa, Turrialba, Cartago, registered in the Property Registry of the Cartago Registry under real property folio number 132475-000, with a total area of 155 hectares, 2,800.32 square meters, according to cadastral plan number C-0782050-2008, natural boundary. The certification was carried out based on field verification, taking into account land-use change (cambio de uso del suelo), current use, and forest cover (cobertura boscosa) conditions, determined as follows:

In order to meet the requirements established in the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) No. 7575, the Forestry Law Regulations (Reglamento a la Ley Forestal), Executive Decree No. 25721-MINAE, and the provisions for the payment program, specifically regarding the participation of forest ecosystems in the PSA, the following conditions must be maintained: conservation of forest cover (cobertura boscosa), prohibition of land-use change (cambio de uso del suelo), maintenance of the spring (naciente), protection of the water easement (servidumbre) areas, and respect for the areas of lifetime tenure (irreductibilidad). These conditions are binding for the program and their compliance is verified by the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, SINAC). The methodology used for the delimitation and measurement of the forest area under the PSAH (Pago de Servicios Ambientales para la Protección de Bosque) modality was based on the guidelines of the National Geographical Institute (Instituto Geográfico Nacional, IGN) and the regulations of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, SETENA).

The verification of compliance was carried out for the forest located in the northwestern sector of the property, as indicated in Anexo 1, where the forest cover (cobertura boscosa) polygon is defined. This polygon occupies an area of 55 hectares, 8,900.45 square meters, according to the data presented below:

The certification process was reviewed in accordance with the criteria established in the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), its Regulations, and Executive Decree No. 25721-MINAE, as well as the provisions of the National Council of Rectors (CONARE) regarding the participation of its attached institutions in conservation programs. It is noted that the Cartago Institute of Agricultural Education (ICAA) has complied with the requirements of the Cartago Conservation Area (ACOSA) and the National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC) for the purposes of the PSA. This is verified in expediente number 132475-2008-SETENA.

Salazar A.</p></td><td style="padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore"> </span></p></td><td style="padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><img 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style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub">Jorge Araya G.</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><img 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p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub">Ingrid Hess H.</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub">Digitally Signed Document</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub">-- Verification code --</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'WASP 39 L'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub"></span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:spaces">&nbsp;</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">ATCR2VN3ZZC61 </span></p><div style="-aw-headerfooter-type:footer-primary; clear:both"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:5.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">EXPEDIENTE N</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:5.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">°</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:5.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub"> </span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:5.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">26-012399-0007-CO</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:5.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:1pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:1pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; border-top:0.75pt solid #000000; background-color:#ffffff; -aw-border-top:0pt single"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub">Telephones: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482).

Res. Nº 2026016816 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at nine hours twenty minutes on May thirteenth, two thousand twenty-six.

An unconstitutionality action filed by [Name 001], of legal age, married, attorney, resident of Heredia, identity card number [Value 001], against articles 69.2, 73.1, and 73.2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 150.3, 119.2, and 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, and 267 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Resultando:

1.- By document received by this Chamber on April 10, 2026, the petitioner files an unconstitutionality action and specifies that the following norms are challenged:

"a) Article 69.2 of the Civil Procedure Code prevents review in cassation of the failure to rule on costs, if the party requested them and they were not considered in the judgment; Article 73.1 of the Civil Procedure Code establishes the phrase that *every losing party must be ordered to pay costs (costas), even ex officio*, and 73.2 of the same procedural body does not contemplate the exemption for litigating plausibly at the judge's discretion, but rather the existence of certainty of the facts alleged in the complaint:

"**69.2 Grounds.** The cassation appeal may be based on procedural and substantive reasons. [...]

Failure to rule on costs shall not be grounds for appeal, nor shall incidents without direct influence on the merits of the matter, or when clarification (adición) of the ruling has not been requested to fill the omission." "**73.1 Order to pay costs (Condenatoria en costas).** In every ruling that concludes the proceeding, ex officio, *the losing party shall be ordered to pay costs (costas)*. Costs shall be considered as attorney's fees, compensation for the time invested by the party in attending procedural acts where their presence was necessary, and other indispensable expenses of the proceeding." "**73.2 Exemption.** Exemption, total or partial, may be granted, with reasoning, when:

**1.** The complaint or counterclaim includes exaggerated claims.

**2.** The ruling admits important defenses invoked by the losing party, which substantially modify what was sought.

**3.** There is a significant mutual defeat on claims, defenses, or exceptions.

**4.** The party has adjusted their conduct to good faith, loyalty, probity, and the rational use of the procedural system.

If there is no order to pay costs, each party shall pay those it has incurred and both parties shall pay the common ones." Although there is no express norm for the First Cassation Chamber to impose costs, these are derived from this same legal precept, by defining that every ruling that concludes the proceeding will order costs, without limiting this order to an extraordinary appeal, which does not conclude the proceeding, but rather reviews a ruling that did conclude the proceeding.

• b)Articles 119 subsection 2), 150.3, and 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, in the same sense, establish phrases that impose costs for the mere fact of having been defeated. The cassation appeal seeks the review of a final judgment, so costs should not be interpreted as a sanction for seeking a review of the judgment by a Superior Court on the presumption of defects therein, but rather it should be verified whether there is bad faith in filing the appeal as a sanctioning premise, and not as a punishment without discussion. In the same way, Article 193 is considered an outright punishment, without the corresponding substantiation of whether the case was litigated in good faith and plausibly. And granting the judge ex officio initiative to impose costs would contain an action by the judge, substituting the conduct of the party that does not request it:

"**ARTICLE 119.-** **2)** It shall also contain the corresponding pronouncement regarding costs (costas), even ex officio." "**ARTICLE 150.-** 3) The judgment declaring the appeal in cassation (recurso de casación) without merit shall order the losing party (parte vencida) to pay the personal and procedural costs (costas personales y procesales) caused by the appeal; except when, due to the nature of the issues debated in the appeal, there was, in the opinion of the Sala Primera or the Tribunal de Casación, sufficient reason to appeal." "ARTICLE 193.- In judgments and orders having the character of a judgment, the losing party (vencido) shall be ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs, a ruling that must be made ex officio" c) Article 267 of the Código Procesal Penal establishes the award of costs against the losing party, without distinction as to what should be understood as "losing party" whether it is the accused, or refers to the private prosecutors, and also to the civil claimants. And as a consequence of the foregoing, no reference is made either as to at what procedural moment a party should be deemed the losing party, if it is only when a final judgment has been rendered in the trial, thereby excluding the preliminary hearing (audiencia preliminar), which is only a preparatory stage. The norm was left gravely to the discretion of the judge:

"ARTICLE 267.- Determination of costs The costs shall be borne by the losing party, but the court may exempt it, totally or partially, when there is plausible reason to litigate. When there are several parties ordered to pay costs, the court shall determine the proportional share corresponding to each, without prejudice to the solidarity established by law." Regarding the merits, the claimant sets forth – as "FIRST CONSIDERATIONS (PRIMERAS CONSIDERACIONES)" – that:

"1. The Constitución Política guarantees citizens the right to resort to the Courts of Justice, seeking to resolve their conflicts and also to report inappropriate situations or abuse of power (desvío de poder) by public officials, through the premise derived from the public official's duty to render accounts. These norms are Articles 11, 41, and 49 of the Magna Carta.

"ARTICLE 11.- Public officials are mere depositaries of authority. They are obliged to fulfill the duties that the law imposes on them and cannot arrogate powers not granted therein. They must take an oath to observe and comply with this Constitution and the laws. The action to demand criminal liability for their acts is public. The Public Administration, in a broad sense, shall be subject to a procedure of results evaluation and accountability, with the consequent personal liability for the officials in the fulfillment of their duties. The law shall indicate the means for this control of results and accountability to operate as a system covering all public institutions." "ARTICLE 41.- Resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they may have received in their person, property, or moral interests. They must be afforded prompt, complete justice, without denial and in strict conformity with the laws." "ARTICLE 49.- The contentious-administrative jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa) is established as an attribution of the Judicial Branch, with the purpose of guaranteeing the legality of the administrative function of the State, its institutions, and any other public law entity. Abuse of power shall be grounds for challenging administrative acts. The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and the legitimate interests (intereses legítimos) of the governed." "2. Likewise, through rulings of the Sala Constitucional, and international treaties and conventions, the principle of access to justice in favor of citizens has been established, which is enshrined in Article 41 of the Magna Carta: "It has been said that the Judicial Branch is the primary addressee and obligor under this legal norm, as it is the primary fundamental guarantor of the exercise of the right of access to justice" ruling 21039-2010 Sala Constitucional.

"3. In a democratic system, it should be established that the imposition of pecuniary sanctions in the form of costs is the exception and not the rule, which the legal system must contain in the manner in which it is to be applied by the Courts of Justice, in all matters. And 4.

There is a general conception in judicial matters that the service of the administration of justice is evolving toward gratuity and to fostering confidence in resorting to it, to report public officials.” Then, it adds – as “**MOTIVOS Y FUNDAMENTOS DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD**” – the following:

“*I.* ***CIVIL MATTER***:

1. It is established as a **general rule**, that the judicial authority, even acting sua sponte, imposes the award of costs on the **losing party** in a judicial proceeding, whether in civil or contentious-administrative matters. And only as an exception, the exemption from paying costs, but conditioned on several assumptions regulated by these procedural norms, including in the case of the cassation appeal in civil matters, that, if the appeal is not granted, the payment of costs is imposed on the appellant.

2. All citizens who resort to the law, to file a judicial action, in search of justice, carry from the beginning of the proceeding a sword of Damocles, in case their case does not succeed, because as a general rule they are punished with an award to pay costs, despite having sufficient merit to litigate, but that is left to the interpretation of the judge, because the norms empower them, to impose costs as a rule. Which has been happening in judicial practice.

3. The circumstances for winning a lawsuit or a tort action for civil damages, in criminal matters, depend completely on the decision of the Judicial Authority, which interprets the evidence together with the facts in accordance with the law, so any error not only prevents the person from obtaining justice, but also condemns them to pay costs to the opposing party, for the mere fact that the Judge so decides. That is to say, that the power is granted to the jurisdictional body to impose costs as a general rule, it being sufficient to provide an explanation as a basis, even if it is not convincing. Even the lack of a basis for why it does not decide on costs, is not grounds for civil cassation, according to the current civil procedural code. If the general rule were to exempt from costs, and the exception to impose them, it would force the Judge to perform a greater intellectual effort to ground the award of costs.

4. Access to justice is broken before the threat of being imposed costs because one did not manage to convince the Judge, and for whatever reason, their action is declared without merit, which already implies a sufficient penalty for the losing party, such as not resolving the conflict, not repairing their damages and moral interests, as established in article 41 of the Magna Carta. From that point, as happens with the criteria of opportunity in criminal matters, where there is no criminal prosecution, when the damage suffered by the perpetrator of the crime exceeds any future and eventual penalty to be imposed.

"The accused has suffered, as a consequence of the act, serious physical or moral damages that render the application of a penalty disproportionate, or when the prerequisites under which the court is authorized to dispense with the penalty are met." Article 22, subsection c of the Criminal Procedural Code.

5. It is understood that costs are a kind of compensation for whoever was called to a judicial proceeding, but under the assumption of an abuse of right, not because having reason, upon being defeated, they are immediately condemned to pay costs. Therefore, the judicial function must be to determine whether there was reason and motive to litigate and not under the condition of having been defeated. Because upon verifying that there was reason to formulate the action, there can be no penalty in the payment of awards, only because in the eyes of the judge, there was not sufficient evidence to reach total conviction.

6. Applying an award of costs for being defeated violates the principle of good faith, because sua sponte, only for being defeated, it is automatically inferred that the losing party acted in bad faith and in abuse of the right, so they deserve the penalty of paying costs, when the facts on which their action was based, despite being true, in the consideration of the judge do not convince them to declare the lawsuit granted, or to uphold the complaint. The general rule is that all those who resort to the Courts, resorting to the legal system, act in good faith, and it must be proven that it was not so, in order to award costs. Therefore, the general rule is to exempt from costs and, except for proof to the contrary, exceptionally award costs.

7. The nature of the award of costs must be for abuse of right, as indicated in article 22 of the Civil Code:

"ARTICLE 22.- The law does not protect the abuse of right or the anti-social exercise thereof.

Every act or omission in a contract which, by the intention of its author, by its purpose, or by the circumstances in which it is performed, manifestly exceeds the normal limits of the exercise of a right, causing damage to a third party or to the counterparty, shall give rise to the corresponding indemnification (indemnización) and to the adoption of judicial or administrative measures that prevent the persistence in the abuse." It is therefore understood that the award of costs (condena en costas) is intended to prevent future similar actions based on abuse of right, which harms the person who is sued or reported, but this does not imply that the law must assume a priori that, merely for having been defeated, one is considered abusive in the exercise of the constitutional right of access to justice, when the cause is illegitimate or illegal, because the reasons why the action is not upheld are multiple, despite having had reason to take action.

8. The challenged norms prevent judicial officers from providing a convincing response as to why they consider that costs must be awarded, beyond simply applying the refrain "for having been defeated" used in judgments, and in cassation (casación), by their judicial function, they have the duty to provide a clear, comprehensive response under the rules of sound criticism, giving the criterion of why costs must be imposed, and allowing that criterion to be debated on appeal (apelación) or cassation, so that the party has the opportunity to prove that there was always plausibility to litigate. But this is prevented if the norms challenged as unconstitutional grant the judicial officer the right to impose costs solely for having deemed defeated the party from whom payment of those costs is demanded. That phrase in itself is an obstacle to knowing the criterion of whether there was or was not abuse of right by the defeated party, according to the analysis that must be required of the adjudicator.

9. Article 41 of the Constitution does not establish the imposition of costs on whoever exercises the right to have recourse to the laws in search of justice for the reparation of damage to their property or injury to their interests. It does not contain, authorize, or permit a procedural sanction because that constitutional right was exercised, since the use of the right is interpreted as seeking the solution to an individual or collective problem. The constitutional legislator did not foresee that the State could, through procedural normative bodies, punish the exercise of that constitutional right. Article 7 of the Constitution elevates international conventions and treaties to a hierarchical level, so the challenged procedural norms violate that constitutional hierarchical principle of subordination to conventionality control (control de convencionalidad), where the Pact of San José (Pacto de San José), in its Articles 8 and 25, refers to the right to be heard by a judge and to have an effective remedy against acts that violate one's rights, even if they come from agents of the State. Under this convention, there is no provision that, in the legal system, a citizen seeking justice be imposed the payment of costs (costas) for being defeated.

10. Both plaintiff and defendant, regardless of the subject matter, proceed on equal terms to propose their thesis and antithesis, so that an impartial arbitrator indicates whether or not judicial protection is appropriate. If at the constitutional level it is not provided that whoever seeks justice shall be condemned to pay costs for exercising that right, procedural laws as norms subordinate to substantive law and to the Constitution cannot breach that fundamental right and constitutional principle.

II. SCOPE OF PUBLIC FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION MATTERS

11. In the sphere of public function, there exist, in criminal matters, complaints (denuncias) against public officials, and in administrative litigation matters, ordinary and civil treasury lawsuits against public officials and against the State or the centralized Public Administration, the award of costs is fixed outright, as a general rule, merely because the administered party, as plaintiff, has been defeated. This is considered an interference in the principle and right of access to justice and its effective protection, because it discourages citizens in their right to demand accountability, to demand responsibility from public servants, and the right to oversee the public treasury, through complaints against public officials for their misconduct in the exercise of their duties. This occurs if the same Courts in criminal or administrative litigation jurisdiction, upon declaring the action without merit, proceed to award costs for exercising a right that the Magna Carta itself empowers. Demanding payment of those costs, by virtue of demanding accountability, ensures the imbalance of forces of the citizen against state power, whereby, within the social contract, the challenged norms place the State and the Public Administration in general above its citizens, when the latter are the holders of sovereignty and of the republic.

The challenged norms discourage citizens from filing lawsuits or complaints against public officials, knowing that not only could their action be dismissed, stayed, or result in acquittal in the criminal jurisdiction, but their situation is aggravated when they are ordered to pay those public officials, who, by virtue of their positions, should accept being subject to the claims of the population, and not be unjustly enriched simply because a favorable judgment was not reached, according to judicial criteria.

If the original legislator, upon enshrining the contentious-administrative jurisdiction in Article 49, sought to guarantee the legality of the Public Administration, challenge abuses of power, and protect the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the governed, it did not consider that the exercise of that right would be subject to an award of costs, when at the jurisdictional discretion, it considers that their claim was not legally well-founded, but that except in cases of abuse of right and manifest bad faith, in any case, the State and the public administration in general, must bear the costs of the judicial process to promote the exercise of a constitutional right by the sovereign against state power.

12. Article 2 of the Magna Carta refers to the concept of sovereignty, which resides in The Nation, which in relation to Article 11 of the Constitution, establishing that public officials are mere depositaries of authority, reinforces the idea that the citizen is the holder of the res publica, and the Public Administration, a kind of regent, and not its owner, so it would be a contradiction that the sovereign — the people — demands accountability and a claim for responsibility, and when resorting to the legal system and the Courts of Justice, is intimidated from exercising that right, because an order to pay costs is imposed if they fail to prove their right.

"This Tribunal has understood it thus, having emphasized that certain assets are proper to and solely of the Nation, a sociological and philosophical concept, which does not entail specific or individual persons, but rather a collective that contains the inhabitants of a country, its history and its future. Therefore, this Chamber has understood it, the State —in this case the Municipality— becomes a sort of fiduciary of these assets, that is, a mere administrator of public assets that clearly does not entail a property right in favor of the State or the municipalities resulting in the exclusion of citizens. It is along these lines that this Tribunal mentioned that there are assets and activities that 'are "proper to the Nation"'; they are, certainly, also designated as 'domain of the State', but the Constituent's phrasing entails that certain assets are entrusted to the former because the Nation lacks legal personality. The State becomes a kind of fiduciary of the Nation, a formula coherent with the historical reclamations that justify the constitutionally declared public domain we examine. Public officials cannot arbitrarily grant authorizations relating to services and assets proper to the Nation that time would allegedly render unassailable; there is an essential public order: Law is not simply an aggregate of subjective rights; it is also comprised of an objective, reasonable, and democratic order of coexistence, an expression of the values of the Social State of Law (Articles 74 and 50 of the Constitution). An Order detached from the rights of persons is dictatorial; the protection of subjective rights without subjection to an objective sense of justice is the reign of the strongest. Both extremes are alien to the Constitution, which is vigilant of both the essential principles of justice and fundamental subjective rights: Authorities and Liberties must find in all state tasks, let alone jurisdictional ones, their difficult and always unstable balance" (see judgment number 5386-93)." Voto 048272015 of 9:40 on April 10, 2015, Constitutional Chamber.

13.

What is most serious in contentious-administrative matters, as determined by Article 49 of the Constitution, is that the ordinary citizen faces the Public Administration, which from the outset possesses the resources to confront any action against it, through the intervention of the Procuraduría General de la República as the State's attorney, who has the right to demand copies of the complaint and the evidence, for which the deadline to respond is suspended until they are delivered, despite the fact that in the 21st century, they can access them through the online management system, like the rest of the defendants, as provided in Article 33 of the Constitution, regarding everyone being equal before the Law; furthermore, they can request an additional third of the granted deadline to respond, and every public agency must collaborate with the Procuraduría, to send all requested documentation, exempt from the payment of fiscal stamps, without forgetting that public officials or the State have at their disposal public treasury revenues to face those claims, the same occurs with every centralized or decentralized public institution, including municipal corporations, whereas the citizen must disburse from their own private funds, the hiring of lawyers, payment of all paperwork, stamps, transfers, copies, bringing witnesses, etc., so that in the end the Contentious Administrative Tribunal, through interpretations of the evidence and the facts, with application of the law, declares the claim without merit, and automatically imposes the payment of costs on the citizen, by the mere fact of being defeated, losing their claim, granting the right to the Public Administration, or the public servant, to collect those costs from the citizen, by provision of procedural law, when both the servants and the Public Administration work through a national budget, derived from the taxes paid by that same plaintiff. It is evident that their actions to defend the interests of the Public Administration are already budgeted for the public entity, whether it be the Procuraduría General de la República, or decentralized or autonomous entities, because even these collect taxes and, therefore, possess a legal department to face those judicial actions. This imposition of costs contradicts the coexistence with the citizen's right to demand accountability from public officials, if in the exercise of that right, they already know that the taxpayer, the sovereign, will be sanctioned to pay procedural and personal expenses in favor of the public servant and the Public Administration, which intimidates and restrains the exercise of that constitutional right.

The subordination of the public function to conventionality control, regulated by Article 7 of the Magna Carta, grounds the constitutional challenge to the regulations of the criminal procedural code and the contentious-administrative procedural code, regarding the imposition of costs, when norms such as 8 and 25 of the Pact of San José exist, as well as Articles 1, 3, 4, 7, and 8 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which establish the promotion of democracy in the countries of the region, as the basis of political organization, but which essentially rests on the defense of the human rights of the inhabitants of each nation, accepting and protecting the international instruments that protect them against state power, therefore there must be a way to denounce any violation of those rights before the inter-American system, as well as the probity of the public function, state responsibility in public management, and the subordination of public servants to the Constitution, which in no way would be consonant with the limitations of the citizen before state power, if they see not only their action or complaint lost but also affected by the payment of costs, generating a warning to any citizen seeking to exercise the same right, turning their financial situation burdensome with the condemnation to pay costs, because the Judge, who is part of the State, was not convinced.

Unfortunately, we have the Judge, in criminal matters, and in contentious-administrative matters, as Judge and Party. The crime of prevarication or breach of duties against public officials also includes judicial officials, thus, when reviewed or judged by the judicial officials themselves, they harm impartiality and objectivity no matter how much they try to excuse that this is not the case. A Judge who departs from the application of the law is excused under the premise that intent (dolo) must necessarily be proven, and not that it is an error of judgment, but because of that error, the citizen lost their claim, and on appeal that error was upheld, and when it is considered that an illicit act was committed, the repressive apparatus, in the hands of the Prosecutor's Office (Fiscalía), dismisses or stays the proceedings, and where it is noted that although Article 71 of the CPP empowers the filing of a private criminal action (querella), because the prosecutorial criterion is opposed, the Judge of the intermediate stage condemns in costs, considering that the private criminal action does not proceed for these crimes. The same when in contentious-administrative matters, public officials are judged, among them, judicial officials, and it is required to prove intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave), as exceptional terms compared to common parlance in the private or particular sector, to thereby prevent a conviction against the State. But this leads to a harsh condemnation in costs merely for not having convinced the Contentious Administrative Tribunal. And Violation of the Principle of Equality before the Law.

Any criminal or administrative contentious action against a judicial officer, or against the Public Administration (Administración Pública), entails a power imbalance, when the defendant as a member of the State, in its capacity as active Public Administration (Administración Pública), or the administrative entity, faces these actions with greater resources than the aggrieved party, or plaintiff. In the criminal jurisdiction, the aggrieved party has the right to file a criminal complaint (querellar) and bring a civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) against the accused officials, so a situation may arise where the prosecutorial office (fiscalía) does not press charges, but instead requests dismissal (desestimación) or stay of proceedings (sobreseimiento), leaving the aggrieved party alone, who must constitute themselves as a private prosecutor (querellante), and civil plaintiff (actor civil), because they consider that there is merit to judge the public official. However, as has been the practice in the intermediate stage (etapa intermedia), the Judge rejects the criminal complaint and the civil action, because they adhere to what is requested by the Prosecutorial Office (Fiscalía), because they grant more veracity to what is requested by the prosecutorial body, and therefore, they condemn the private prosecutor and civil plaintiff to pay legal costs (costas). There is a difference between having the monopoly of public action by law, and another, that the prosecutorial office is absolutely right, as it has already been a notorious fact that not every prosecutorial accusation achieves a conviction at trial, as were the cases against the former environment minister of the Oscar Arias administration, who was acquitted, or that of the former mayor of San José, Johnny Araya, where even at trial the prosecutorial office itself acknowledged the shortcomings of its accusation. But in these cases, the judicial authority does not condemn the prosecutorial office to pay the legal costs for losing with its criminal accusation, but it does condemn the private prosecutor, given the same premise that the judicial officer considers that the accusatory piece cannot be admitted, or because it contained errors. Equality is breached when the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público) is free from paying legal costs when its accusation is not admitted and the Criminal Court does not impose the payment thereof on it, but it does on the private prosecutor, because it is an ordinary citizen, and not a member of the Public Administration (Administración Pública), like the one to which the Public Ministry belongs.

The message is that the citizen must abide by what the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público) decides, only constituting themselves as a private prosecutor or civil plaintiff if there is a prosecutorial accusation, not when the prosecutorial body requests dismissal or a stay of proceedings, subjecting the victim to the prosecutorial criterion, because in practice, the Criminal Judge leans toward what the prosecutorial office requests, and not the aggrieved party. However, the criminal procedural code does not have a legal precept that prevents the victim from constituting themselves as a private prosecutor or civil plaintiff if the prosecutorial office has opted not to press charges. The norms questioned here are applied as a punishment for whoever continues as a private prosecutor or civil plaintiff, so that they refrain henceforth from continuing with the process if the prosecutorial office decides not to do so.

Regarding the civil action for damages, the victim seeks reparation for the damage caused by the accused, for their conduct as a public official, and therefore, the legislator allowed them to file a civil lawsuit within the criminal process, so, in the intermediate stage, it does not imply the end of the victim's right, since in that stage their right has not been resolved by a judgment that has become res judicata (cosa juzgada material), but rather the victim has the exercise of taking their right to the civil or administrative contentious venue, since their action depended on the continuation of the criminal action, due to the principle of procedural accessoriness (accesoriedad procesal). If the judicial authority considers that there is no crime, it does not imply that there is no civil liability, but by interpretation of the criminal procedural law, only at TRIAL, can a Court review civil liability, and not in the criminal intermediate stage. And this is logical because only through an adversarial proceeding, immediacy (inmediación), and legality, can the right or lack thereof of the aggrieved parties be known. Therefore, condemning the aggrieved parties, as civil plaintiffs, to pay legal costs in the criminal intermediate stage would be to advance a criterion against the victim's right, without a Judge having evacuated evidence, heard the parties, and carried out the adversarial proceeding, the immediacy, and rendered a judgment on the merits, because the resolution at that stage is accessory, that is, the civil action is maintained as long as the criminal action is pending, without implying in itself that the aggrieved parties are not right regarding civil compensation. Thus reads Article 40 of the Código Procesal Penal:

"Article 40- Accessory character. In the criminal procedure, the civil action for damages may only be exercised while the criminal prosecution is pending." If the accused has been provisionally dismissed or the proceeding suspended, in accordance with the provisions of the law, the exercise of the civil action shall be suspended until the criminal prosecution continues and the right to file the claim before the competent courts shall be preserved.

The Criminal Trial Court must rule on the merits of the validly exercised civil action for damages, even if an acquittal or definitive dismissal has been issued during the trial phase." The challenged provision 267 of the same criminal procedural code is completely generic, and therefore violative of the principles of legal certainty and security by stating:

"Determination of court costs. Court costs shall be borne by the losing party, but the court may exempt it, totally or partially, when there is plausible reason to litigate. When several are ordered to pay costs, the tribunal shall determine the proportional share corresponding to each, without prejudice to the joint and several liability established by law." This provision is framed within a criminal process, in which, under the principle of due process, the accused could be made to pay costs to the victims constituted as private prosecutors or civil parties, until he is convicted of the crimes in a judgment by a Trial Court, and from there the provision derives with that spirit of recognizing the victims, in addition to the compensation for civil liability, the expenses encompassed in court costs.

In contrast, since the Intermediate Stage is solely a preparatory phase for Trial, if the accusation of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, or of the victim through their Private Criminal Complaint, does not succeed in moving to the Trial stage, the Public Prosecutor's Office is not ordered to pay costs for seeing its intention to bring the accusation to trial fail. However, it is interpreted that the private prosecutor must be ordered to pay because his complaint did not succeed in reaching trial, and what is more serious, it orders civil plaintiffs to pay costs, who have not yet succeeded in having a Trial Court hear their claims, so that a decision on the merits may determine the legitimacy of their rights, but it is interpreted with an open-ended provision, which empowers ordering them to pay costs.

The Criminal Courts of the intermediate stage have applied this Article 267 in the intermediate stage, both to punish the private prosecutor and the civil party, it being unjust that, under the principle of equality, the Public Prosecutor's Office, if its accusation is denied, is not ordered to pay costs. But it is more evident the injustice in the case of the civil action, in which a judgment having the authority of res judicata material has not yet been rendered, and this provision is applied at the free discretion of the Judge, who likens the refusal to proceed to the trial stage to them having been "defeated," when their right has not yet been examined in a due process, but rather because the criminal action could not continue, which per se does not imply that the victim has no right to claim civil liability in another venue, thus violating Article 41 of the Constitution, which warns that access and effective protection are achieved when, by resorting to the laws, a definitive judgment is reached through due process.

It has been the practice of the Criminal Courts, as the body of the intermediate stage, to order both the private prosecutor and the civil party to pay costs, because the criminal action has been dismissed or the accused has been discharged, based on this provision.

Leaving the exemption to the judge's discretionary criteria, according to the same legal norm, by establishing the word "may," when it should be clearer that in the intermediate stage, costs cannot be imposed, because the victim's right has not yet been resolved through due process by a Trial Court, with the mediation of due process, and the principles of adversarial proceedings, legality, immediacy, effective protection, the right to hear the victim, to propose and evacuate evidence, etc., as provided in Article 39 of the Magna Carta, which enshrines due process in criminal matters, where no one can be sanctioned without proof of being guilty thereof, and prior exercise of their defense:

"ARTICLE 39.- No one shall be made to suffer a penalty except for a crime, quasi-crime, or misdemeanor, sanctioned by prior law and by virtue of a final judgment issued by a competent authority, after the accused has been given the prior opportunity to exercise their defense and through the necessary demonstration of guilt." In the intermediate stage there is no trial, there is no evacuation of evidence, and the award of costs is a burdensome sanction, without the Judge having the inputs that would only occur in a Debate, to have the authority to impose costs on the accused, and likewise, on the offended parties as complainants and civil plaintiffs.

The application of this norm in the form in which it is drafted does not provide legal certainty for the victim to know with certainty at which procedural moment a procedural party should be deemed unsuccessful in order to impose costs, when, according to Article 41 of the Constitution, unsuccessful implies that there must be a prior DEBATE where it is possible to prove not only the innocence or guilt of the accused, but also whether the complainant or the civil plaintiff bases their right in a plausible and good faith manner. Because it is in the corresponding process, with due adversarial proceedings and evacuation of evidence, that the Trial Court can define the right of all parties to subsequently ground the imposition of the award of costs, as an exception to the rule, as has already been justified in previous lines, and not as a general rule in administrative contentious proceedings.

This norm, without a specification, allows the Judge of the Intermediate Stage to impose costs, only because they consider that denying the complaint is equivalent to deeming the claim of the offended parties unsuccessful, just as with the civil action, because it is accessory, the same concept must be applied to impose costs separately, for the complaint and for the civil action. This also violates the constitutional principle of equality, because while other procedural bodies have as a premise for imposing costs the existence of a resolution on the merits, in criminal matters, costs are fixed because the criminal action was not elevated to trial, when at that stage evidence is not evacuated, nor can matters be heard that only correspond to the trial stage.

Article 318, fifth paragraph of the Código Procesal Penal:

"The court will prevent that, in the hearing, matters that are proper to the oral trial are discussed." In addition to the above, Article 2 of the Código Procesal Penal establishes:

"Rule of interpretation. Legal provisions that restrict personal freedom or limit the exercise of a power or right conferred to the subjects of the process must be interpreted restrictively. In this matter, extensive interpretation and analogy are prohibited as long as they do not favor the freedom of the accused or the exercise of a faculty conferred to those who intervene in the procedure." A Judge of Guarantees, in a democratic state, during the intermediate stage, if they are limited to hearing matters proper to a Trial, according to the legal framework to which they are subject, due to the existence of an express legal norm, then they could not have the authority to determine the guilt of the accused, and under that same line of reasoning, they also cannot deem the complainant or the civil plaintiff UNSUCCESSFUL, if there was no trial nor a judgment that determined, with prior due process, that no right whatsoever of the offended parties exists to establish the responsibility of the accused, or the defendant, which would allow the application of numeral 267 of the Código Procesal Penal, as if a criminal judgment had been rendered that heard, after adversarial proceedings, the criminal claim of the complaint and the civil claim, when in the latter case the offended parties retain their right to sue in the ordinary jurisdiction.

“V.- THE JUDGE'S FUNCTION IN THE PREPARATORY PHASE IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS. The procedure designed in the new criminal procedural legislation (Código Procesal Penal) entails an absolute separation of the judge of the procedure in relation to the person in charge of the trial, the latter will arrive at the debate without any knowledge of the case that they must resolve, so that the evidence received in the oral hearing is the only evidence effectively taken into account to resolve the matter. It is assumed that the trial judge has little knowledge of what occurred in the preceding stages, which is why the oral hearing acquires greater importance and complexity, which requires the introduction of alternative solutions that reduce the number of matters that reach debate, which substantially strengthens the real validity of the principle of orality and immediacy. In the intermediate procedure, all matters that are incidental to the case and are not related to the holding of the oral and public debate must be resolved.

With this, the aim is to provide full objectivity and impartiality to the judge, so that the judge is not committed to a specific thesis when resolving the case, which translates into greater independence of the official in charge of the debate and decision of the criminal case. In this way, the investigation (instrucción) will be in charge of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), under jurisdictional control in those acts that so require (Article 62 of the Criminal Procedure Code). The judge's function in the preparatory investigation stage is to guarantee the rights of the parties and compliance with formalities ordered for the protection of fundamental rights, as is the case of home searches (allanamiento de morada) (Article 238 of the Criminal Procedure Code). In this way, the judge rescues his independence from the investigated fact, which allows him to fulfill his role as a faithful guarantor of the rights of the parties — of all the parties in the criminal process. Thus, in the new criminal procedural legislation, a great change occurs in the very conformation of the procedural system, since it moves from an inquisitorial system to an accusatorial one." Voto 03930-2008 of 14:43 of March 12, 2008, Constitutional Chamber) &nbsp; The petitioner requests that "the unconstitutionality be declared with retroactive effect (retroacción) from their entry into force, due to existing defects (vicios) that clash with the Magna Carta, because of the existence of the phrase 'expired' (vencido) that the challenged norms contain as a general rule, as well as the undefined nature of 267 of the CPP, which injures constitutional norms 1, 2, 7, 9, 11, 33, 39, 41, 154 of the Political Constitution." He also asks that the challenged norms be modified as he proposes. 2.- In order to substantiate his standing (legitimación), the petitioner indicates the following:

"Based on the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law number 7135, this action does not concern only the particular matter regarding the protection of an individual interest, but extends to an affectation of the community that uses the service of the justice administration system, in the various matters in which the precepts of the challenged procedural bodies are applied, therefore it extends to the entire community, when not only the petitioner is affected, and this action of unconstitutionality must be admitted for study, without the requirement of a pending case.

'That concept of 'diffuse interests' (intereses difusos) aims to develop a form of standing, which in recent times has constituted one of the traditional principles of standing and has been making its way, especially in the field of administrative law, as a final, novel but necessary broadening, so that such oversight becomes increasingly more effective and efficient. Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and even more difficult to identify, cannot be in our Law — as this Chamber has already stated — merely collective interests; neither so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that identified or easily identifiable specific persons, or personalized groups, are distinguished from them, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones or those concerning a community as a whole. It deals, then, with individual interests, but, at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive a benefit or a prejudice, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, which is why it is rightly said that these are equal interests of the groups of people who find themselves in certain situations and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, since they are at once collective — because they are common to a generality — and individual, for which they can be claimed in that capacity. And precisely that is what happens in the present case, in which the petitioner evidently has an individual interest insofar as he is being affected by the contamination afflicting his community, but also a collective interest exists, since the injury also occurs to the collectivity as a whole. Thus, when it comes to the Right to the Environment, standing corresponds to the human being as such, since the injury to that fundamental right is suffered both by the community and by the individual in particular. So, in the case of diffuse interests, any member of the affected community, such as the petitioners, is legitimized to resort to the amparo recourse in pursuit of the protection of his fundamental rights.' voto 04423-1993 of September 7, 1993 Constitutional Chamber.

However, there is a criminal process in progress, in which numeral 267 of the Criminal Procedure Code was applied, and of which a certified copy by the office is attached, file 21-000004-1218-PE, where costs are imposed, even though it was corroborated that the facts of the complaint did exist in reality, and that since the case was not elevated to trial, it was inappropriate to condemn the civil plaintiffs to costs, who by law were safeguarded the right to act in the administrative contentious route, as is currently under file 23-0007663-1027CA, therefore, condemning in costs was an anticipated action that the civil claimants had no right to act, when their right has not yet been resolved on the merits by a judgment having the status of res judicata (cosa juzgada material), vitiating the resolution that imposes costs in an anticipated manner, because the criminal process did not prosper, not reaching the oral and public trial stage." 3.- By resolution of 15:07 hours of April 17, 2026, the petitioner was warned to: "a) regarding the process being processed under file no. 21-000004-1218- PE, clarify on behalf of whom the action is filed and, if filed on behalf of a third person, a suitable document must be provided accrediting the granting of sufficient powers to the petitioner to formulate this constitutional control process on behalf of that person; b) clarify if the copies provided along with the filing brief (pertaining to a brief dated March 9, 2026) correspond to the brief invoking unconstitutionality in the main matter and c) specify and accredit the procedural state of file no.

21- 000004-1218-PE.

4.- By a brief associated with this case file on April 23, 2026, the claimant responded that, to "fulfill the prevention order contained in the resolution of 3:07 p.m. on April 17 of the current year, which I do in the same order requested:

"a) Regarding the present action (acción), with respect to case file No. 21-000004-1218-PE, it is filed for the benefit of the undersigned, who acts within the criminal case file, in his capacity as victim constituted as private prosecutor (querellante) and civil party, so no procedural mandate is necessary.

• b)The copy that was attached to the present action (acción) corresponds to the brief of 03/09/2026, which contains an invocation of unconstitutionality in the main matter, because the rules of the CPP take precedence over Article 41 of the Constitution.
• c)It is specified that the procedural status of case file No. 21-000004-1218-PE is awaiting resolution of an incident of absolute procedural defects (incidente de defectos procesales absolutos), filed by the co-civil party and the undersigned, due to the serious omission of the Judge, in not summoning the parties to a hearing to consider a recusal (recusación), as was ordered by the Criminal Court of Goicoechea, so that a new Criminal Judge subsequently elucidates, among other things, the issue of the legitimacy of the imposition of costs based on precepts 266 and 267 of the CPP. To prove the foregoing, the resolution of the Criminal Court of Goicoechea, from 11:00 a.m. on February 10, 2026, and the incident hearing of the Criminal Court, from 2:22 p.m. on March 11, 2026, are attached, as well as the screenshot inserted below of the online management system, which proves the status of the electronic case file in which there is a wait, after the deadline granted to the other parties expired, for the Judge to proceed to resolve the incident on the merits (fondo), so that the omitted preliminary hearing (audiencia preliminar) is granted. In addition to the foregoing, to inform that there is an appeal (recurso de apelación) still pending, once the incident of absolute procedural defects (incidente de defectos absolutos procesales) is resolved." 5.- Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits (por el fondo), at any time, even from its presentation, any petition brought to its attention that turns out to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is the simple reiteration or reproduction of a previous equal or similar rejected petition.

Drafted by Magistrate Castillo Víquez; and,

Considering:

I.- OF THE REQUIREMENTS AND FORMALITIES OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY (ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD). This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) is a process with certain formalities, which must necessarily be fulfilled so that this Court can validly rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) regulates the standing (legitimación) to file actions of unconstitutionality (acciones de inconstitucionalidad) and provides for different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in a judicial venue –including habeas corpus or amparo appeals– or in the administrative venue –in the procedure for exhausting this route–, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked, as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest that is considered harmed in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate direct action (acción directa) –the base matter is not required–, in the following cases: a) when due to the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct harm; b) it involves the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action (acción) is brought by the Attorney General of the Republic, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, and the Ombudsman.

Likewise, in judgment No. 04190-95 of 11:33 a.m. on July 28, 1995, this Court specified that the action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) is:

"(...) a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action (acción directa o popular), which means that the existence of a matter pending resolution –whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route– is required to be able to access the constitutional route, but in such a way that the action (acción) constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered harmed in the main matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative repercussion on that pending process, since it manifests on the constitutionality of the rules that must be applied in that matter; and only by exception does the legislation allow direct access to this route –assumptions of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) …".

Finally, there are other formalities that must be fulfilled, namely, the written submission must be authenticated and contain an explicit determination of the challenged regulations, duly substantiated, with specific citation of the components of the block of constitutionality (bloque de constitucionalidad) that are considered infringed (Article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). It must also prove the conditions of standing (legitimación) (powers of attorney and certifications), proceed with the payment of the Costa Rican Bar Association stamp, and provide a literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the norms challenged in the base matter was invoked (Article 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

II.- REGARDING THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION (ACCIÓN) VIA THE DIRECT ROUTE: OF THE ALLEGED DEFENSE OF DIFFUSE INTERESTS (INTERESES DIFUSOS).

It should be noted – first of all – that this Chamber has explained that:

"(…) given the formalism legally provided for in constitutional review proceedings (…) the argumentative burden in the processing of an acción de inconstitucionalidad falls on the claimant, who must explain, without ambiguity, the contradiction between an infra-constitutional norm and the constitutional block, as well as the standing that assists them" (vote no. 2020-000319 of 12:15 p.m. on January 8, 2020; the emphasis is not from the original).

In the case at hand (sub lite), the claimant alleges that the action is brought in defense of diffuse interests, since the present action "extends to an affectation of the community that uses the justice administration system service, in the various matters in which the precepts of the questioned bodies are applied, therefore it extends to the entire community." In this way, the defense of a collective so generic and imprecise is alleged that it is simply confused with the national community as a whole, which is improper. This Chamber has specified – as reflected in the very precedent cited by the claimant – that:

"(…) Diffuse interests, although difficult to define…, cannot be in our Law – as this Chamber has already said – merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that, in relation to them, specific persons, or personalized groups, are identified or easily identifiable, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones or those that pertain to a community as a whole." (vote no. 3705-93 of 3:00 p.m. on July 30, 1993; the emphasis is not from the original).

In which case, when hearing a case analogous to the present one, this Chamber resolved that:

"(…) Although the claimant maintains that the accused omission threatens the safety of all 'citizen-pedestrians' and 'citizen-drivers,' the truth is that it cannot be considered that this is a group or category that meets the particularities described in the partially transcribed precedents and, on the contrary, it is in the presence of a presumed collective so broad, imprecise, and blurred that it is simply identified with the national community as a whole. It must be reiterated, for this reason, what was resolved by this Chamber to the effect that the diffuse interest must not be so diluted that it is confused with the national collectivity, that is, 'it cannot become so broad and generic that it is confused with that recognized to all members of society to ensure constitutional legality' (see judgment No. 0360-99, supra cited). Indeed, if the possibility of the actor to file an acción de inconstitucionalidad in this matter were admitted, under the conditions sought by the latter, it would ultimately mean – recognizing the existence of an acción popular, which, as the Constitutional Chamber has indicated in its reiterated jurisprudence (see judgment No. 2016-000787 of 9:05 a.m. on January 20, 2016), does not conform to the framework of procedural competences that this Constitutional Court has for that purpose, in its functions as ultimate interpreter and guardian of the Constitution." (vote no. 2016-005589 of 9:05 a.m. on April 27, 2016).

Considerations fully applicable to the case at hand.

To which it is added that this Court, by majority, has considered that when a norm is susceptible to individual application, it is not appropriate to invoke diffuse interests to admit the action. On this point, in vote no. 2022-011649 of 9:20 a.m. on May 25, 2022, this Chamber resolved that:

"III.- ON DIRECT STANDING. The claimant, in turn, claims to have direct standing, because he states that the challenged norm not only injures the individual fundamental rights of his represented party, but also violates numerous collective and diffuse rights, due to the effects it produces. However, this Chamber, by majority, has considered that when the challenged norm is susceptible to individual application, it is not appropriate to invoke the defense of diffuse interests to admit the action. Thus, in vote no. 2021-002185 of 12:51 p.m. on February 3, 2021, this Constitutional Court indicated the following:

"(…) II.- On diffuse interests and the standing of the claimants in the case under study. The claimants indicate that their standing comes from the defense of diffuse interests regarding the protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. In this regard, it should be noted that, as already mentioned, the cases in the second paragraph of article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional constitute exceptions to the rule contained in the first paragraph of the same article, which must be carefully analyzed in each specific case. The diffuse interest has been understood as that interest related to a right or legal situation of a special and particular nature, which may be shared by other persons, with all the interested parties forming a specific group or category. Thus, the violation of that right can affect everyone in general or each one in particular, hence any member of the collectivity can file the action to protect the right deemed injured.

Regarding this matter, the reiterated jurisprudence of the Chamber indicates that:

"It has been pointed out that this is a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of the collective interest just defined in the preceding recital, but which cannot become so broad and generic that it is confused with the right recognized to all members of society to ensure constitutional legality, since this latter right -as has been repeatedly stated- is excluded from the current constitutional review system. It is, therefore, an interest distributed among each of the administered persons, mediate if you will, and diluted, but no less verifiable for that reason, for the defense, before this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. The special characteristics of these rights themselves, and not the particular situation of the subjects who may hold them in relation to them, are the key to distinguishing and determining the presence of so-called diffuse interests, as has been stated in various resolutions such as 03705-93 at fifteen hundred hours on July thirtieth for the right to the environment, number 05753-93 at fourteen forty-five hours on November ninth of that same year for the defense of historical heritage, and number 00980-91 at thirteen thirty hours on May twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-one for electoral matters." –see judgment number 360-90- From this definition, it is possible to consider that the diffuse interest is made up of an eminently subjective element, relating to its belonging or ownership of the interest, and another objective element, related to the incidence of the good in society, which distinguishes it from other legal situations. In relation to the first -the subjective one-, it is clear that it is diffused within a non-individualized human group, which co-participates in the enjoyment of the legal good that is the object of the interest, but whose conformation does not result from an identifiable, encompassable group of subjects with relatively clear contours, as does occur in the collective interest. And from the objective perspective, it must be clarified that not every "diffused" interest acquires the legal category of "diffuse interest," but only those imbued with profound social relevance, whose assessment results from the circumstances of each case –see, among others, judgments number 2006-15960 and 2014-4904-. In this sense, just as it has been said that this interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality -which would imply the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional)-, neither can it be so concrete that it permits an individual claim, for in such a case, standing would derive from that claim –see, among others, judgments number 2008-13442, 2009-300 and 2009-9201-. Thus, examples of such interests are the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, the defense of historical heritage, electoral matters, the defense of the right to health, and the oversight of public funds. Therefore, in the case under study, where the plaintiffs base their standing on the defense of diffuse interests in the matter of protection of a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the appropriate course is to rule as indicated in the following recitals.

(…)

In the action now being heard, the same plaintiffs challenge the same provisions of Articles 50 and 51 of the Regulation in question, as well as Article 52 of the same instrument, and although, beyond the sustainability of captive breeding facilities (zoocriaderos), this action focuses on issues of ex situ conservation and environmental education -which was also pointed out in that action-, the truth is that this Chamber's own definition of standing, as set forth in the cited judgment, is fully applicable in this new action. Note that, certainly, as clearly indicated by the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) and emphatically stated by the Minister of Environment and Energy, the regulations being challenged are indeed totally susceptible to individual application and to directly affecting the legal sphere of singular and identifiable persons, who carry out a specific activity, subject to the regulation set forth in the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre) and its regulation. Thus, it is clear that, contrary to the alleged defense of diffuse interests, what is at stake is some degree of disagreement with the subjection to which they must submit for the regulation of the activity they carry out or intend to carry out; see that, as the report of the Minister of Environment and Energy well states, the plaintiffs are directly related as founders, managers, or employees of various companies related to the exhibition of wildlife or its tourism promotion.

Thus, it is unfeasible to adduce alleged problems of conservation and environmental education in order to use the concept of diffuse interests and thereby promote a direct action of unconstitutionality, bypassing the strict admissibility requirements set forth in the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, as indicated in considerandos II and III of this resolution.

Under this understanding, and taking into consideration the identity of the plaintiffs and the challenged regulations, it is clear that the precedent of judgment 2018-18563 is fully applicable to the action now before us, from which it must necessarily be concluded that, as on that previous occasion, the plaintiffs lack standing (legitimación) to bring this proceeding. Consequently, it is improper to hear and rule on the aspects raised. Thus, the appropriate course is to dismiss this action" (the underlining does not correspond to the original).

In a similar vein, in judgment No. 2021-011994 of 4:30 p.m. on May 26, 2021, this Chamber held that:

"(…) It is reiterated that the diffuse interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality (which would imply the tacit establishment of an actio popularis not contemplated by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional); but neither can it be so concrete that it permits an individual claim, for, in such a case, standing (legitimación) would derive from that claim (…)" (see in this same regard, among others, Votes No. 2021-025373 of 9:20 a.m. on November 10, 2021 and No. 2022-007466 of 9:45 a.m. on March 30, 2022).

In the instant case, it is clear that we are in the presence of norms susceptible to being materialized in cases of individual application affecting specific persons, which directly impact the legal sphere of singular and fully identifiable individuals, who are empowered to bring the corresponding judicial claim. Consequently, and in accordance with the aforementioned jurisprudential precedents, it cannot be considered that, in the sub lite, the referenced situation of direct standing (legitimación directa) for the defense of diffuse interests is configured.

III.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION VIA THE INCIDENTAL ROUTE. The present action is also inadmissible via the incidental route, for the following reasons:

A.- Article 75, first paragraph, in fine, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional requires, for the admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality via the incidental route –like the present one–, the existence of a principal matter pending resolution, whether before the courts –including habeas corpus or amparo courts–, or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route, in which that unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured. It bears reiterating that this Chamber has indicated –in multiple votes– that:

"(...) Such requirements do not translate into a merely formal question, since mere compliance with them is not sufficient; rather, it is also required that the norm challenged through this route have a direct impact on the matter serving as the basis, such that what is resolved in the action serves as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest injured in the prior matter. A contrario sensu, if there is no direct connection between the object of discussion in the base matter and what is challenged in the action, it is not possible for this Chamber to rule on the matter. It is for this reason that, in accordance with Articles 75 and 79 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction, plaintiffs must demonstrate and provide a literal certification of the written submission in which they invoked the unconstitutionality of the norms in the base matter, in order to verify its impact on such matter." (vote no. 2019-016243 of 9:20 a.m. on August 28, 2019, among others; the highlighting does not correspond to the original).

Regarding the requirements that the cited written invocation must meet, this Chamber has indicated that:

"(…) although an extensive foundational argument is not required when invoking the unconstitutionality of the norm, the truth is that it is necessary for the base matter to expressly invoke the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action... and to indicate the constitutional norms considered infringed…". (Judgment No. 2014-000851 of 2:30 p.m. on January 22, 2014)." (judgment no. 2017-007744 of 9:15 a.m. on May 24, 2017).

By judgment no. 2022-5564 of 9:00 a.m. on March 9, 2022, this Court specified the following:

"(…) In this case and in relation to the content of Article 17 referring to confiscation (comiso), upon analyzing the memorial in which the unconstitutionality of the norm was invoked, it proves insufficient. The possible constitutional articles infringed are mentioned, but the reasons are not indicated. Above all, the arguments referring to constitutional article 45 are notably absent, which is precisely the right alleged as injured in the written submission filing the action.

Finally, as for the aforementioned article 20, it is not mentioned in the pleading of invocation, and therefore its challenge, lacking the minimum legal basis, is inadmissible.” Finally, this Court has also resolved that the invocation of unconstitutionality must be made in the base matter prior to the filing of the action (see, for example, rulings no. 2016-009868 of 9:20 a.m. on July 13, 2016, and no. 2016-011291 of 10:40 a.m. on August 10, 2016).

B.- In the sub lite, the petitioner mentions – to support his standing – the existence of a criminal proceeding being processed in case file no. 21-000004-1218-PE. Likewise, in response to the prevention made by this Chamber, by means of a resolution at 3:07 p.m. on April 17, 2026, the petitioner answered the following: “b) The copy attached to this action corresponds to the brief dated 03/09/2026, which records the invocation of unconstitutionality in the main matter, because the regulations of the CPP take precedence over Article 41 of the Constitution.” Now, upon reviewing the aforementioned brief invoking unconstitutionality, it is verified – in the first place – that the unconstitutionality of Articles 69.2, 73.1, and 73.2 of the Civil Procedure Code and 150.3, 119.2, and 193 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code was not invoked. In fact, no allusion whatsoever is made to such provisions. Regarding Article 267 of the Criminal Procedure Code, this is the mention that was made:

“Since the dismissal judgment, there have been flagrant violations of the rights of the victims, who were unjustly ordered to pay costs, due to the intervention of a capricious criterion of the acting criminal judge, who at that time, violated all substantive and procedural rules that prevented him from directly sanctioning the victims with the payment of costs, when it was evident that there was total reasonableness in having filed their petitions, and the Judge focused the condemnation on the fact that the victims should have refrained from filing a criminal complaint and civil action because the Prosecutor's Office had requested dismissal, a criterion that is neither legal nor in accordance with the rules of sound judgment, but only subjective, which harms the rights of citizens who report the irregular actions of judicial officials. Based on the foregoing, the Judge who represented the Criminal Court echoed those violations, upon hearing the appeals against that illegal and illegitimate first-instance judgment, as well as unconstitutional, because Article 41 of the Magna Carta is above the application and interpretation of rules 266 and 267 of the CPP, in which the Third Chamber itself has established that costs cannot be instrumentalized in such a way that their purpose translates into discouraging citizens from filing complaints and actions against public officials. Which evidently happened in this case, because each fact that was the subject of the criminal complaint had its evidentiary basis, which was not shared by the Prosecutor's Office, did not imply that it held the absolute truth and even less that it was the basis for ordering the payment of costs.

“Fixing of costs Costs shall be borne by the losing party, but the court may exempt it, totally or partially, when there is a plausible reason for litigating.” Neither of the two first and second instance resolutions made the analysis of whether each fact alleged in the complaint had actually occurred, which would make the complaint and the civil action plausible, as opposed to having been a false or slanderous accusation, without any evidence to support that the accused… had acted in violation of the law, to the detriment of the rights of the vehicle owner and the driver, pursuant to the Traffic Law.” It then adds:

“(…) Therefore, the action of the Judge… and of the Judge…, were unconstitutional, not only for applying the rules without considering the appropriate exemption – if they did not wish to take the two accused to trial via a complaint – as well as for disregarding the right of citizens to access justice through the legal system, duly supported by evidence…”.

From which it follows that, in such brief, no formal, express, and adequate invocation of unconstitutionality of that article was made, but rather – in reality – what was questioned was its interpretation and application in the specific case, which is improper. Thus, for example, in ruling no.

2014-000851 at 2:30 p.m. on January 22, 2014, this Chamber resolved that:

"(…) although a lengthy substantiation is not required when challenging the unconstitutionality of a norm, it is indeed necessary that in the underlying matter the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in the action—not of the implementing acts—be expressly invoked, and that the constitutional norms considered to have been infringed be indicated…" (emphasis not in original).

For its part, in ruling no. 2020-000811 at 9:30 a.m. on January 15, 2020, this Court resolved that:

"IV.- OF THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE PRESENT ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. In the sub judice, after reviewing the video and audio recording provided by the claimants themselves, corresponding to the hearing held on December 13, 2019, it is verified that an adequate invocation of the unconstitutionality of the norm challenged in this action was not made during the same. On the contrary, in that hearing what the claimants' technical defense alleged is that the imputed acts are not typical, according to an adequate interpretation and application of article 263 bis of the Criminal Code, in light of the jurisprudence of this Chamber, particularly, sentence No. 2019-15221. Indeed, in the recording fragment that corresponds to the supposed invocation, it is verified that what the claimants' technical defense alleged was the following:

"(…) right away, Your Honor, I also raise the unconstitutionality of the Criminal Code article that establishes the crime of obstruction of roads as a reasonable means to protect my clients' rights. In that sense, an action of unconstitutionality would eventually also be filed against that article of the Criminal Code for an abuse or an abusive application of the terms of that article of the Criminal Code, which goes against what the Constitutional Chamber has said regarding, for example, what happens if there were alternative routes. In that place where the blockade was staged, the Public Force's own evidence and the police officers' statements establish that there were alternative routes. Therefore, the Constitutional Chamber has said that in those cases it must be tolerated because a balance must exist there between the exercise of freedom of expression and freedom of transit…" (emphasis not in original) From the reading of the excerpt, it is verified with complete clarity that what was actually not alleged or challenged was the unconstitutionality of any specific normative content of article 263 bis of the Criminal Code. Rather, its application to that particular case was questioned in a generic manner. Therefore, such invocation cannot be deemed to meet the minimum conditions required by this Chamber, pursuant to the provisions of the aforementioned articles 75 and 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. As already indicated, in the underlying matter a general questioning is made regarding the way in which the norm in question should be interpreted and applied, and the unconstitutionality of any specific normative element of said legal provision was not properly alleged as being incompatible with any component of the constitutional block. As a consequence, it cannot be deemed that the alleged invocation allows for the incidental nature of this action to be adequately established. Especially since this Chamber has repeatedly resolved that "the improper application of the law or its erroneous interpretation in the specific case" is not a matter proper for consideration through the action of unconstitutionality (sentence No. 5966-94 at 3:54 p.m. on October 11, 1994)." Considerations fully applicable to the sub lite.

IV.- IN CONCLUSION. As a corollary of the foregoing, it is appropriate to outright reject the action, as is hereby ordered.

V.- DIFFERENT REASONS OF JUSTICES CRUZ CASTRO AND RUEDA LEAL, REGARDING DIFFUSE INTERESTS. As we have expressed in other cases, we consider that a quality of the diffuse interest consists precisely in that its affectation is general—that is, it impacts an entire population or broad sectors thereof—within a context where it is not required that the affected subjects know each other (they could even lack any legal nexus or relationship among themselves), but it does require the presence of the same situation of harm or danger to a constitutional right that, equally and without any need for individualization, comprises and encompasses an entire society in the abstract. Its defense aims to satisfy a need of society as such; therefore, it transcends that of an individual or collectively considered human being. In sentence no.

2019-17397 of 12:54 p.m. on September 11, 2019, this Tribunal reiterated the following:

"(…) Secondly, the possibility of seeking recourse in defense of 'diffuse interests' (intereses difusos) is provided for; this concept, whose content has been gradually delineated by this Chamber, could be summarized in the terms used in judgment no. 3750-93 of this tribunal, of three o'clock in the afternoon on July thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three) '… Diffuse interests (intereses difusos), although difficult to define and even more difficult to identify, cannot be under our law—as this Chamber has already stated—merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that, in relation to them, specific, determined, or easily identifiable persons or personalized groups are identified, whose legal standing (legitimación) would derive, not from diffuse interests (intereses difusos), but from corporate ones that concern a community as a whole. It involves, then, individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, suffer an actual or potential harm, more or less the same for everyone, so that it is rightly said that these are equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, simultaneously, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests (intereses difusos) partake of a dual nature, since they are at once collective—for being common to a generality—and individual, for which reason they can be claimed in such capacity'." In summary, diffuse interests (intereses difusos) are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united by a specific social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a particular personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is blurred, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. In these cases, of course, the challenge (impugnación) that a member of one of these sectors could bring, relying on paragraph 2 of Article 75, must necessarily refer to provisions that affect him or her as such. This Chamber has enumerated various rights which it has classified as "diffuse," such as the environment, cultural heritage, the defense of the country's territorial integrity, and the proper management of public spending, among others. In this regard, two clarifications must be made: on one hand, the aforementioned goods transcend the sphere traditionally recognized for diffuse interests (intereses difusos), since they refer in principle to aspects that affect the national community and not particular groups within it; an environmental harm does not affect merely the residents of a region or the consumers of a product, but injures or gravely endangers the natural heritage of the entire country and even of Humanity; likewise, the defense of the proper management of public funds authorized in the National Budget is an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just any group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration that the Constitutional Chamber has made is nothing more than a simple description proper to its obligation—as a jurisdictional body—to limit itself to hearing the cases submitted to it, without it being possible in any way to understand that only those rights which the Chamber has already expressly recognized as such can be considered diffuse rights (derechos difusos); the foregoing would imply an undesirable overturning of the scope of the Rule of Law (Estado de Derecho), and of its correlative "State of rights," which—as in the case of the Costa Rican model—starts from the premise that what must be express are the limits on freedoms, since these underlie the human condition itself and therefore do not require official recognition. Finally, when paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) speaks of interests "that concern the community as a whole," it refers to the legal goods (bienes jurídicos) explained in the preceding lines, that is, those whose ownership lies with the very holders of sovereignty, in each of the inhabitants of the Republic.

It is not, therefore, that any person can come to the Constitutional Chamber in protection of any interests whatsoever (popular action), but rather that every individual can act in defense of those goods that affect the entire national community, without it being valid in this field either to attempt any exhaustive enumeration" (see judgment No. 2007- 01145)." In accordance with the foregoing and as sustained by this Tribunal in its jurisprudence, it involves, then, individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, suffer an actual or potential harm, more or less the same for everyone, so that it is rightly said that these are equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, simultaneously, of each one of them. It is for this reason, precisely, that, starting with judgment no. 2021-2185 of 12:51 p.m. on February 3, 2021, we consider, unlike the Majority of this Tribunal, that some of these interests can be embodied in a specific, particular case, without thereby losing their condition as a diffuse interest (interés difuso), as occurs with environmental protection, whose impact affects one person and everyone in general; and such impact can be individualized in a particular situation, such as, for example, the construction of a factory in a specific neighboring sector, without the respective environmental studies, whose negative effects impact the planet's ozone layer. Undoubtedly, the result of a claim or proceeding that a neighbor may bring against that factory will not only affect their own interests, but also those of the rest of the community. Therefore, it constitutes a diffuse interest (interés difuso); and, nevertheless, it is also the object of a particular, individualized situation. Now, this does not mean, in any way, that in every situation invoked, the existence of a diffuse interest (interés difuso) can be alleged, even though it may be the object of a particular situation. Let us remember that for an interest to be considered "diffuse," it must not only affect a community, but must also be blurred, diffused within that community. If it does not produce such an effect, it cannot be considered a diffuse interest (interés difuso). In the case of the petitioner, as the Majority states, the challenged regulations do not produce a socially diffused impact, but a determined one. So, in this case, what is glimpsed is a situation that, while it may be shared by some group of people, its effect is not of such magnitude as to consider it a diffuse interest (interés difuso). For the stated reason, we agree with the Majority in dismissing this action.

VI.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE CASE FILE (EXPEDIENTE).

The parties are warned that if they have submitted any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be retrieved from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment.

Otherwise, all material not removed within this period shall be destroyed, in accordance with the provisions of the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", approved by the Corte Plena in session N° 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session N° 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

Por tanto:

The action is rejected outright. Magistrates Cruz Castro and Rueda Leal give different reasons regarding standing (legitimación) for diffuse interests.

**Motion for the Inclusion, Referral, and Joinder of Actions in the Administrative Proceeding initiated in File No. ________** **I. Grounds for the Request** 1. **Common Background and Scope of the Emergency Declared by Executive Decree No. 36452-MP.** As discussed in the application, this project falls within the scope of Executive Decree No. 36452-MP, which declared a State of Emergency due to the flooding and landslides caused by the indirect influence of Hurricane Otto. However, in this context, it must be considered that the emergencies declared are not identical to the project presented now. The initial declaration was supplanted by Executive Decree No. 40495-MP to address the problems caused by Tropical Storm Nate and later reinforced by Executive Decree No. 36292-MP, known as the "Permanent Original Decree," which remains in force and declares Costa Rica a "permanently potential emergency area" for all terms and legal purposes.

A state of emergency exists because Executive Decree No. 36292-MP establishes a condition of permanent risk for the entire national territory, and in this sense, there is an overlap of "emergencies" that have been occurring in the area, each one aggravating the pre-existing physical conditions and necessitating the projects presented in this application.

The following is the forest cover (cobertura boscosa) located on the San Roque farm, property of the Cartago Institute of Agricultural Education (Instituto de Cartago de Educación Agrícola, ICAA), an entity attached to the National Council of Rectors (Consejo Nacional de Rectores, CONARE), located in the Santa Rosa district, Turrialba canton, Cartago province, for which a forest certification was requested for inclusion in the program of Payment for Environmental Services (Pago de Servicios Ambientales, PSA), operated through the Cartago Conservation Area (Área de Conservación Cartago, ACOSA) and administered by the National Forestry Financing Fund (Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal, FONAFIFO). The property corresponds to the farm located three kilometers southeast of the center of Santa Rosa, Turrialba, Cartago, registered in the Property Registry of the Cartago Registry under real property folio number 132475-000, with a total area of 155 hectares, 2,800.32 square meters, according to cadastral plan number C-0782050-2008, natural boundary. The certification was carried out based on field verification, taking into account land-use change (cambio de uso del suelo), current use, and forest cover (cobertura boscosa) conditions, determined as follows:

In order to meet the requirements established in the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) No. 7575, the Forestry Law Regulations (Reglamento a la Ley Forestal), Executive Decree No. 25721-MINAE, and the provisions for the payment program, specifically regarding the participation of forest ecosystems in the PSA, the following conditions must be maintained: conservation of forest cover (cobertura boscosa), prohibition of land-use change (cambio de uso del suelo), maintenance of the spring (naciente), protection of the water easement (servidumbre) areas, and respect for the areas of lifetime tenure (irreductibilidad). These conditions are binding for the program and their compliance is verified by the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, SINAC). The methodology used for the delimitation and measurement of the forest area under the PSAH (Pago de Servicios Ambientales para la Protección de Bosque) modality was based on the guidelines of the National Geographical Institute (Instituto Geográfico Nacional, IGN) and the regulations of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, SETENA).

The verification of compliance was carried out for the forest located in the northwestern sector of the property, as indicated in Anexo 1, where the forest cover (cobertura boscosa) polygon is defined. This polygon occupies an area of 55 hectares, 8,900.45 square meters, according to the data presented below:

The certification process was reviewed in accordance with the criteria established in the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), its Regulations, and Executive Decree No. 25721-MINAE, as well as the provisions of the National Council of Rectors (CONARE) regarding the participation of its attached institutions in conservation programs. It is noted that the Cartago Institute of Agricultural Education (ICAA) has complied with the requirements of the Cartago Conservation Area (ACOSA) and the National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC) for the purposes of the PSA. This is verified in expediente number 132475-2008-SETENA.

Salazar A.</span></p></td><td style="padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore"> </span></p></td><td style="padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><img 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style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub">Jorge Araya G.</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><img 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p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub">Ingrid Hess H.</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub">Digitally Signed Document</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub">-- Verification code --</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'WASP 39 L'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub"></span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:spaces">&nbsp;</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">ATCR2VN3ZZC61 </span></p><div style="-aw-headerfooter-type:footer-primary; clear:both"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:5.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">EXPEDIENTE N</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:5.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">°</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:5.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub"> </span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:5.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">26-012399-0007-CO</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:5.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:1pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:1pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; border-top:0.75pt solid #000000; background-color:#ffffff; -aw-border-top:0pt single"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub">Telephones: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482).

Revisión del Documento  Res. Nº 2026016816 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas veinte minutos del trece de mayo de dos mil veintiseis .

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por [Nombre 001], mayor, casado, abogado, vecino de Heredia, cédula de identidad [Valor 001], contra los artículos 69.2, 73.1 y 73.2 del Código Procesal Civil, 150.3, 119.2 y 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo y 267 del Código Procesal Penal.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en esta Sala el 10 de abril de 2026, el accionante interpone acción de inconstitucionalidad y especifica que se impugnan las siguientes normas:

“a) El artículo 69.2 del Código Procesal Civil, impide conocer en casación, de la falta de pronunciamiento de las costas, si la parte la solicitó y no fue considerada en sentencia; el artículo 73.1 del Código Procesal Civil, establece la frase que a todo vencido se le debe condenar en costas, aun de oficio, y 73.2 del mismo cuerpo procesal, que no contempla la eximente por litigar en forma plausible no a discreción de interpretación del Juez, sino la existencia de certeza de los hechos atribuidos en la demanda:

"69.2 Causales. El recurso de casación podrá fundarse en razones procesales y de fondo. [...]

No será motivo para recurrir la falta de pronunciamiento sobre costas, incidentes sin influencia directa en el fondo del asunto, o cuando no se hubiera pedido adición de/ fallo para llenar la omisión." "73.1 Condenatoria en costas. En toda resolución que le ponga fin al proceso, de oficio, se condenará al vencido al pago de costas. Se considerarán costas los honorarios de abogado, la indemnización de/ tiempo invertido por la parte en asistir a los actos del procedimiento en que fuera necesaria su presencia y los demás gastos indispensables del proceso." "73.2 Exención. Se podrá eximir, total o parcialmente, de forma razonada, cuando:

1. La demanda o contrademanda comprenda pretensiones exageradas.

2. El fallo admita defensas de importancia invocadas por el vencido, que modifiquen sustancialmente lo pretendido.

3. Haya vencimiento recíproco trascendente sobre pretensiones, defensas o excepciones.

4. La parte haya ajustado su conducta a la buena fe, la lealtad, la probidad y al uso racional del sistema procesal.

Si no hubiera condenatoria en costas, cada parte pagará las que hubiera causado y ambas partes las que fueran comunes." Aunque no existe una norma expresa para que la Sala Primera de Casación, imponga costas, las mismas se derivan de este mismo precepto legal, al definir que toda resolución que ponga fin al proceso se condenara a costas, sin que limite esta condena a un recurso extraordinario, que no pone fin al proceso, sino que revisa una resolución que si puso fin al proceso.

• b)Los artículos 119 inciso 2), 150.3 y 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, en el mismo sentido establecen frases que imponen costas por el solo hecho de haber sido vencido. El recurso de casación, busca la revisión de una sentencia final, por lo que las costas no se deberían interpretar como una sanción por acceder a que un Superior revise la sentencia, por presumir vicios en la misma, sino que debería verificarse si existe mala fe en interponer el recurso, como premisa sancionatoria, y no como un castigo sin discusión. De la misma forma el 193, se considera un castigo a ultranza, sin la correspondiente fundamentación de si se litigó de buena fe y en forma plausible. Y otorgar la iniciativa oficiosa del Juez, para imponer costas, contendría una acción al juzgador, sustituyendo la conducta de la parte, que no lo solicite:

"ARTÍCULO 119.- 2) Contendrá también el pronunciamiento correspondiente respecto de las costas, aun de oficio." "ARTICULO 150. 3) La sentencia que declare sin lugar el recurso de casación, condenará a la parte vencida al pago de las costas personales y procesales causadas por el recurso; salvo que, por la naturaleza de las cuestiones debatidas en el recurso, haya habido, a juicio de la Sala Primera o del Tribunal de Casación, motivo suficiente para recurrir. " "ARTÍCULO 193.- En las sentencias y los autos con carácter de sentencia, se condenará al vencido al pago de las costas personales y procesales, pronunciamiento que deberá hacerse de oficio" c) El artículo 267 del Código Procesal Penal, fija la condena en costas a la parte vencida, sin hacer distinción a lo que se debe entender como "parte vencida" si es al imputado, o hace referencia a los querellantes, y también a los actores civiles. Y como consecuencia de lo anterior, tampoco se hace referencia en qué momento procesal se debe tener como vencida a la parte, si es únicamente cuando se ha dictado sentencia de fondo en el debate, por ende, excluyendo a la audiencia preliminar, que solo es una etapa preparatoria. La norma fue dejada gravemente a discreción del juzgador:

"ARTICULO 267.- Fijación de las costas Las costas estarán a cargo de la parte vencida, pero el tribunal podrá eximirla, total o parcialmente, cuando haya razón plausible para litigar. Cuando sean varios los condenados al pago de costas, el tribunal fijará la parte proporcional que corresponda a cada uno, sin perjuicio de la solidaridad que establezca la ley.” En cuanto al fondo, el accionante expone –como “PRIMERAS CONSIDERACIONES” – que:

“1. La Constitución Política garantiza a los ciudadanos el derecho de acudir a los Tribunales de Justicia, en busca de solucionar sus conflictos y además para denunciar situaciones inapropiadas o desvío de poder de la función pública, mediante la premisa que se deriva del deber del funcionario público a rendir de cuentas. Estas normas son los artículos 11, 41 y 49 de la Carta Magna.

"ARTÍCULO 11.-Los funcionarios públicos son simples depositarios de la autoridad. Están obligados a cumplir los deberes que la ley les impone y no pueden arrogarse facultades no concedidas en ella. Deben prestarjuramento de observar y cumplir esta Constitución y las leyes. La acción para exigirles la responsabilidad penal por sus actos es pública. La Administración Pública en sentido amplio, estará sometida a un procedimiento de evaluación de resultados y rendición de cuentas, con la consecuente responsabilidad personal para los funcionarios en el cumplimiento de sus deberes. La ley señalará los medios para que este control de resultados y rendición de cuentas opere como un sistema que cubra todas las instituciones públicas." "ARTÍCULO 41.- Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales. Debe hacérseles justicia pronta, cumplida, sin denegación y en estricta conformidad con las leyes." "ARTÍCULO 49.- Establécese la jurisdicción contencioso - administrativa como atribución del Poder Judicial, con el objeto de garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa del Estado, de sus instituciones y de toda otra entidad de derecho público.

La desviación de poder será motivo de impugnación de los actos administrativos.

La ley protegerá, al menos, los derechos subjetivos y los intereses legítimos de los administrados." 2. Asimismo, por votos de la Sala Constitucional, y de los tratados y convenios internacionales, se ha establecido el principio de acceso a la justicia a favor de los ciudadanos, el cual está consagrado en el artículo 41 de la Carta Magna:

"Se ha dicho que el Poder Judicial es el primer destinatario y obligado por esta norma legal, pues es el primer garante fundamental del ejercicio del derecho de acceso a la justicia" voto 21039-2010 Sala Constitucional.

3. En un sistema democrático, se debería establecer que la imposición de sanciones pecuniarias por concepto de costas, es la excepción y no la regla, que debe contener del ordenamiento jurídico en el modo como deba aplicarse por parte de los Tribunales de Justicia, en todas las materias. Y 4. Existe la concepción general en materia judicial que el servicio de la administración de justicia evoluciona a la gratuidad, y a fomentar a la confianza en acudir a ella, para denunciar a los funcionarios públicos.” Luego, añade –como “MOTIVOS Y FUNDAMENTOS DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD” – lo siguiente:

“I. MATERIAL CIVIL:

1. Se establece como regla general, que la autoridad judicial, aun de oficio, imponga la condena de costas a la parte vencida de un proceso judicial, sea en materia civil o contencioso administrativo. Y solo como una excepción, la eximente del pago a costas, pero condicionada a varios supuestos reglados por estas normas procesales, incluyendo en el caso del recurso de casación en materia civil, que, si no es acogido el recurso, se impone el pago de las costas al recurrente.

2. Todos los ciudadanos que acuden a la ley, para entablar una acción judicial, en busca de justicia, llevan desde el inicio del proceso una espada de Damocles, en caso que su caso no salga victorioso, porque por regla general se ve castigado con una condena al pago de costas, a pesar de tener suficiente mérito para litigar, pero ello queda a interpretación del judicial, porque las normas les faculta, imponer las costas como regla. Lo cual ha venido sucediendo en la práctica judicial.

3. Las circunstancias para ganar una demanda o una acción civil resarcitoria, en lo penal, depende completamente de la decisión de la Autoridad Judicial, quien, interpreta las pruebas junto a los hechos conforme al derecho, por lo que cualquier yerro, no solo impide a la persona obtener justicia, sino que se le condena a pagar costas a la parte contraria, por el mero hecho de que así lo decida el Juzgador. Es decir, que se le otorga el poder al órgano jurisdiccional en imponer costas por regla general, siendo suficiente brindar una explicación como fundamento, aunque no sea convincente. Incluso la falta de fundamentación del por qué no decide sobre las costas, no es motivo de casación civil, según el actual código procesal civil. Si la regla general fuera eximir de las costas, y la excepción imponer las mismas, obligaría al Juez, a realizar una mayor labor intelectiva para fundar la condena en costas.

4. El acceso a la justicia se ve quebrantado ante la amenaza de que se le imponga costas porque no logró convencer al Juzgador, y por cualquier motivo que sea, se le declara sin lugar su acción, lo que desde ya implica una sanción suficiente para el vencido, como es no solucionar el conflicto, no reparar sus daños e intereses morales, como lo establece el artículo 41 de la Carta Magna. Desde ahí, como sucede con los criterios de oportunidad en materia penal, que no hay persecución penal, cuando el daño sufrido por el autor del delito supera cualquier futura y eventual pena a imponer.

"El imputado haya sufrido, como consecuencia del hecho, daños físicos o morales graves que tornen desproporcionada la aplicación de una pena, o cuando concurran los presupuestos bajo los cuales el tribunal está autorizado para prescindir de la pena." Artículo 22 inciso c del Código Procesal Penal.

5. Se comprende que las costas es una especie de compensación para quien fue llamado a un proceso judicial, pero bajo el supuesto de un abuso del derecho, no porque existiendo razón, al ser vencido, en forma inmediata se le condene al pago de las costas. Por ello, la función judicial debe ser determinar si había razón y motivo para litigar y no bajo condición de haber sido vencido. Porque al verificar que, si había razón para formular la acción, no puede haber sanción en pago de condenas, solo porque a los ojos del judicial, no había prueba suficiente para llegar a un total convencimiento.

6. Aplicar una condena en costas por ser vencido, quebranta el principio de la buena fe, porque de oficio, solo por ser vencido, se infiere en forma automática que el vencido, actuó de mala fe y en abuso del derecho, por lo que merece la sanción del pago de costas, cuando los hechos en que se basó su acción a pesar de ser ciertas, a consideración del judicial no lo convence para declarar con lugar la demanda, o estimar la denuncia. La regla general es que todos los que acuden a los Tribunales, acudiendo al ordenamiento jurídico, actúan de buena fe, y se debe probar que no fue así, para condenar en costas. Por ello, la regla general es eximir de las costas y salvo prueba en contrario excepcionalmente condenar en costas.

7. La naturaleza de la condena en costas, debe ser por el abuso del derecho, como lo señala el artículo 22 del Código Civil:

"ARTÍCULO 22.- La ley no ampara el abuso del derecho o el ejercicio antisocial de éste. Todo acto u omisión en un contrato, que por la intención de su autor, por su objeto o por las circunstancias en que se realice, sobrepase manifiestamente los límites normales del ejercicio de un derecho, con daño para tercero o para la contraparte, dará lugar a la correspondiente indemnización y a la adopción de las medidas judiciales o administrativas que impidan la persistencia en el abuso" Por ello se comprende, que la condena en costas, tienen la finalidad de evitar futuras acciones similares basadas en el abuso del derecho, que perjudica a la persona que es demandada o denunciada, pero no por ello implica que la ley debe asumir a priori que, por solo haber sido vencido, se le tenga como abusivo en el ejercicio del derecho constitucional a acceder a la justicia, cuando la causa es ilegitima o ilegal, porque las razones para que no se declare con lugar la acción, son múltiples a pesar de haber tenido la razón para accionar.

8. Las normas cuestionadas evitan que los judiciales, ejerzan una respuestas convincente del por qué consideran que deben condenar en costas, más allá de solo aplicar el estribillo "por haber sido vencidos" que se usan en las sentencias, y en casación, por la función judicial, tienen el deber de brindar una respuesta clara, amplia y bajo las reglas de la sana critica, brindar el criterio del por qué se debe imponer las costas, y que se permita en apelación o casación, debatir ese criterio para que la parte, tenga la oportunidad de probar que siempre hubo plausibilidad para litigar. Pero ello se impide, si las normas cuestionadas como inconstitucionales, otorgan al judicial el derecho a imponer, por solo tener por vencido a la parte a quien se le exige el pago de esas costas. Esa frase en sí misma, es un obstáculo para conocer el criterio de si hubo o no abuso del derecho del vencido, según el análisis que se le debe exigir al juzgador.

9. El artículo 41 constitucional no establece la imposición de costas a quien ejerza el derecho a ocurrir a las leyes en busca de justicia para el reparo al daño a su patrimonio o lesión a sus intereses. No contiene, autoriza o permite una sanción procesal porque ejerció ese derecho constitucional, ya que se interpreta el uso del derecho para buscar la solución a un problema individual o colectivo. El legislador constitucional no previó que el Estado pudiera a través de cuerpos normativos procesales, castigar el ejercicio de ese derecho constitucional. El artículo 7 constitucional, eleva a nivel jerárquico los convenios y tratados internacionales, por lo que las normas procesales cuestionadas, lesionan ese principio jerárquico constitucional de subordinación al control de convencionalidad, donde el pacto de San José, en sus artículos 8 y 25, hace referencia al derecho de ser escuchado por un Juez, y tener un recurso efectivo para contra actos que violenten sus derechos, incluso si provienen de agentes del Estado. En este convenio no existe que, en el ordenamiento jurídico, se imponga al ciudadano, en búsqueda de justicia, al pago de costas por ser vencido.

10. Tanto demandante como demandado, de la materia que sea, van en igualdad de condiciones a proponer su tesis y anti tesis, para que un árbitro imparcial, indique si procede o no la protección judicial. Si a nivel constitucional no se dispone que quien acuda en busca de justicia, se le condenara al pago de las costas por el ejercicio de ese derecho, las leyes procesales como normas subordinadas al derecho de fondo y a la Constitución, no puede quebrantar ese derecho fundamental y principio constitucional

II. AMBITO DE LA FUNCION PUBLICA EN MATERIA PENAL Y CONTENCIOSA ADMINISTRATIVA

11. En el ámbito de la función pública, existen en materia penal, las denuncias contra funcionarios públicos, y en materia contenciosa administrativa, demandas ordinarias y civiles de hacienda, contra funcionarios públicos y contra el Estado o la Administración Pública centralizada, la condena en costas se fija a ultranza, por solo que el administrado, como demandante, ha salido vencido, como regla general, lo que se considera una interferencia en el principio y derecho al acceso a la justicia, y a la tutela efectiva de la misma, porque desestimula a los ciudadanos, en su derecho de solicitar rendición de cuentas, exigir responsabilidad a los servidores públicos y el derecho a la vigilancia de la hacienda pública, a través de las denuncias a los funcionarios públicos por su mal actuar en el ejercicio de sus funciones, si los mismos Tribunales en la jurisdicción penal o contenciosa administrativa, al declarar sin lugar la acción, proceden a la condena en costas, por el ejercicio de un derecho que faculta la propia Carta Magna. Exigir el pago de esas costas, en virtud de la rendición de cuentas, asegura el desequilibrio de fuerzas del ciudadano ante el poder estatal, por el cual, dentro del contrato social, las normas cuestionadas, colocan al Estado y a la Administración Pública en general, por encima de sus ciudadanos, cuando éstos son los titulares de la soberanía y de la res pública. Las normas cuestionadas, promueve el desaliento para que los ciudadanos, presenten las demandas o denuncias contra los funcionarios públicos, a sabiendas que no solo su acción se podría ver desestimado o sobreseída, o absuelto, en la jurisdicción penal, sino que se ve agravado su situación, cuando se le impone el pago a favor de esos funcionarios públicos, quienes, por su cargos, deberían aceptar ser sujetos a los reclamos de la población, y no que se enriquezca injustamente solo porque no se llegó a una sentencia estimatoria, según el criterio judicial.

Si el legislador original, al consagrar la jurisdicción contencioso administrativo en el artículo 49, pretendía garantizar la legalidad de la Administración Pública, impugnar las desviaciones de poder, y proteger los derechos subjetivos e intereses legítimos de los administrados, no consideraba que el ejercicio de ese derecho, fuera sujeto de una condena en costas, cuando a criterio jurisdiccional, considera que su demanda no tenía razón desde el punto de vista jurídico, pero que salvo el caso de abuso del derecho y mala fe manifiesta, en todo caso, el Estado y la administración pública en general, debe asumir los gastos del proceso judicial para promover el ejercicio de un derecho constitucional por parte del soberano contra el poder estatal.

12. El artículo 2 de la Carta Magna, hace referencia al concepto de la soberanía, el cual reside en La Nación, que con relación al 11 constitucional, que establece que los funcionarios públicos son simples depositarios de la autoridad, afianzan la idea de que es el ciudadano el titular de la res pública, y la Administración Pública, una especie de regente, y no su propietario, por lo que sería una contradicción, que el soberano — pueblo — exige rendición de cuentas y el reclamo de responsabilidad, y al acudir al ordenamiento jurídico y a los Tribunales de Justicia, se vea atemorizado a evitar acudir al ejercicio de ese derecho, porque se impone el pago de costas sino lograr probar su derecho.

“Así lo ha entendido este Tribunal, que ha hecho énfasis en que ciertos bienes son propios y únicamente de la Nación, concepto sociológico y filosófico, que no sobrelleva a personas específicas ni individuales, sino a una colectiva que contiene a los habitantes de un país, su historia y su porvenir. Por ende, lo ha comprendido esta Sala, el Estado —en este caso la Municipalidad- viene a ser una suerte de fiduciario de estos bienes, es decir, un simple administrador de los bienes públicos que claramente no conlleva un derecho de propietarios a favor del Estado o las municipalidades que tenga como consecuencia la exclusión de los ciudadanos. Es en estas líneas que este Tribunal mencionó que hay bienes y actividades que "son "propios de la Nación"; se los designa, ciertamente, también como "dominio del Estado", pero el giro del Constituyente conlleva que a aquel son encomendados cienos bienes porque la Nación carece de personificación jurídica. El Estado viene a ser una sueñe de fiduciario de la Nación, fórmula coherente con las reivindicaciones que históricamente justifican la demanialidad constitucionalmente declarada que examinamos. Los funcionarios públicos no pueden disponer a su antojo autorizaciones relativas a servicios y bienes propios de la Nación que el tiempo tornaría alegadamente inatacables; hay un orden público esencial: El derecho no es simplemente un agregado de derechos subjetivos; también lo conforma un orden de convivencia -objetivo-, razonable y democrático, expresión de los valores del Estado Social de Derecho (artículos 74 y 50 de la Constitución). El Orden desvinculado de los derechos de las personas es dictatorial; la tutela de derechos subjetivos sin sujeción a un sentido objetivo de la justicia es el reino de los más fuertes. Ambos extremos son ajenos a la Constitución, vigilante tanto de los principios esenciales de la justicia como de los derechos subjetivos fundamentales: Autoridades y Libertades han de encontrar en todas las tareas estatales, no se diga en las jurisdiccionales, su difícil y siempre inestable equilibrio" (véase sentencia número 5386-93)." Voto 048272015 de las 9:40 del 10 de abril del 2015, Sala Constitucional.

13. Lo más grave que en materia contenciosa administrativa, según lo determina el artículo 49 constitucional, se enfrenta el ciudadano común, contra la Administración Pública, quien desde el inicio posee los recursos para enfrentar cualquier acción en su contra, por intervención de la Procuraduría General de la República como abogado del Estado, quien, tiene el derecho a exigir copias de la demanda y las pruebas, para lo cual se suspende el plazo para contestar hasta tanto no le sean entregadas, a pesar que en pleno siglo XXI, puede acceder a ellas, a través del sistema en gestión en línea, como el resto de demandados, según lo dispone el artículo 33 de la Constitución, sobre que todos son iguales ante la Ley; además, que puede solicitar un tercera parte adicional del plazo concedido para contestar, y toda dependencia pública debe colaborar con la Procuraduría, para enviar toda documentación que solicite, exentas de pago de especies fiscales, sin olvidar, que los funcionarios públicos o el Estado, tienen a su haber ingresos del erario público para hacer frente a esas demandas, de igual forma sucede, con toda institución pública centralizada o descentralizadas, incluyendo las corporaciones municipales, en cambio, el ciudadano, debe erogar de su propio peculio, la contratación de abogados, pago de toda papelería, timbres, traslados, copias, llevar a los testigos, etc., para que al final el Tribunal Contencioso, mediante interpretaciones de las pruebas y de los hechos, con aplicación del derecho, declara sin lugar la demanda, y automáticamente impone el pago de costas al ciudadano, por el solo hecho de salir vencido, al perder su demanda, concediendo el derecho a la Administración Pública, o al servidor público, a cobrar esas costas al ciudadano, por disposición de ley procesal, cuando tanto servidores como la Administración Pública, labora mediante un presupuesto nacional, derivado de los impuestos que paga ese mismo demandante. Es evidente que su actuar para defender los intereses de la Administración Pública, ya se encuentra presupuestado para la entidad pública, se trate de la Procuraduría General de la República, o entes descentralizados o autónomos, porque incluso éstos, recaudan impuestos y por ello, poseen un departamento legal para afrontar esas acciones judiciales. Esta imposición de costas contradice la coexistencia con el derecho del ciudadano a pedir la rendición de cuentas de los funcionarios públicos, si en el ejercicio de ese derecho, ya saben que se le va a sancionar al contribuyente, al soberano, a pagar gastos procesales y personales a favor del servidor público y a la Administración Pública, lo que atemoriza y frena a ejercer ese derecho constitucional.

14. La subordinación de la función pública al control de convencionalidad, regulado por el artículo 7 de la Carta Magna, funda el cuestionamiento constitucional de las normativas del código procesal Penal y del código procesal contencioso administrativo, en cuanto a la imposición de costas, cuando existen normas como el 8 y 25 del pacto de san José, al igual que los artículos 1, 3, 4, 7 y 8 de la Carta Democrática Interamericana, que establecen la promoción de la democracia en los países de la región, como base de la organización política, pero que en lo esencial se sienta en la base de la defensa de los derechos humanos de los habitantes de cada nación, aceptando y protegiendo los instrumentos internacionales que los proteja contra el poder estatal, por lo que debe existir la forma de denunciar toda violación a esos derechos ante el sistema inter americano, así como la probidad de la función pública, responsabilidad del estado en la gestión pública, y la subordinación de los servidores públicos a la Constitución, que en modo alguno tendría consonancia con las limitaciones del ciudadano, ante el poder estatal, si ven no solo perder su acción o denuncia sino afectados por el pago de costas, generando una advertencia a todo aquel ciudadano que busquen ejercer el mismo derecho, tornando en engorroso su situación financiera con la condena a pagar costas, porque el Juez, que es parte del Estado, no estuvo convencido.

15. Desafortunadamente, tenemos al Juez, en lo penal, y en lo contencioso administrativo, como Juez y Parte. El delito de prevaricato o incumplimiento de deberes contra funcionarios públicos, también incluye a los funcionarios judiciales, por lo que, al ser revisado o juzgado por los propios funcionarios judiciales, lesionan la imparcialidad y objetividad por más que se pretenda excusar que ello no sea así. Un Juez, que se aparte de la aplicación de la ley, es excusado bajo la premisa que se debe necesariamente probar el dolo, y no que se trate de un error de criterio, pero que por ese error, el ciudadano, perdió su demanda, y por apelación mantuvieron ese error, y al considerarse que se cometió un ilícito, el aparato represor, en manos de la Fiscalía, desestima o sobresee, y en donde se advierte que aunque el 71 del CPP, faculta interponer la querella, porque se adversa el criterio fiscal, el Juez de la etapa intermedia, condena en costas, al considerar que no procede la querella, por esos delitos. Lo mismo cuando en el contencioso administrativo, se juzga a funcionarios públicos, entre ellos, a funcionarios judiciales, y se exige probar un dolo o culpa grave, como términos excepcionales a los vocablos comunes del sector privado o particular, para impedir con ello una condena contra el Estado. Pero ello, conlleva a una dura condena en costas por solo no haber convencido al Tribunal Contencioso administrativo. Y 16. Violación al Principio de Igualdad ante la Ley. Cualquier acción penal o contenciosa administrativa, en contra de un servidor judicial, o contra la Administración Pública, conlleva un desequilibrio de poder, cuando el imputado como miembro del Estado, en su condición de Administración Pública activa, o la entidad administrativa, afronta estas acciones, con mayores recursos que la parte ofendida, o demandante. En la jurisdicción penal, la parte ofendida, tiene el derecho de querellar y presentar la acción civil resarcitoria en contra de los funcionarios imputados, por lo que puede presentarse la situación que la fiscalía, no acuse, sino que pide desestimación o sobreseimiento, dejando a solas a la parte ofendida, quien debe constituirse como querellante, y actor civil, porque considera que si existe mérito para juzgar al funcionario público. Sin embargo, como ha sido la práctica en la etapa intermedia, el Juez, rechaza la querella y la acción civil, porque se apegan a lo solicitado por la Fiscalía, porque le otorga más veracidad lo requerido por el ente fiscal, y por ello, condenan en costas al querellante y actor civil. Hay una diferencia entre tener el monopolio de la acción pública por ley, y otro, que la fiscalía tenga la razón absoluta, como ya ha sido un hecho notorio, que no toda acusación fiscal, logra una condena en juicio, como fueron los casos contra el ex ministerio del ambiente de la administración Oscar Arias, que salió absuelto, o el del ex alcalde de San José, Johnny Araya, que hasta en juicio la misma fiscalía reconoció las falencias de su acusación. Pero en estos casos, la autoridad judicial, no condena a la fiscalía a pagar las costas por perder con su acusación penal, pero al querellante, si, ante la misma premisa que el judicial considera que no se logra admitir la pieza acusatoria, o porque la misma contenían yerros. La igualdad se quebranta cuando, el Ministerio Público, esta libre de pagar costas, cuando su acusación no es admitida y el Tribunal Penal, no le impone el pago de las mismas, pero al querellante, si, porque se trata de un ciudadano común, y no de un miembro de la Administración Pública, como al que pertenece el Ministerio Público.

El mensaje es que el ciudadano, debe sujetarse a lo que decida el Ministerio Público, solo constituirse como querellante o actor civil, si existe acusación fiscal, no así cuando el ente fiscal pide desestimación o sobreseimiento, sujetando a la víctima al criterio fiscal, porque en la práctica, el Juez Penal, se inclina a lo que solicita la fiscalía, y no la parte ofendida. Sin embargo, el código procesal penal, no tiene un precepto legal que impida a la víctima, no constituirse en querellante o actor civil, si la fiscalía, ha optado por no acusar. Las normas que aquí se cuestionan se aplica como un castigo para quien continua como querellante o actor civil, para que se abstenga en lo sucesivo a continuar con el proceso si la fiscalía, decide no hacerlo.

En cuanto a la acción civil resarcitoria, la víctima, busca la reparación del daño ocasionado por el imputado, por su conducta como funcionario público, y por ende, el legislador, le permitió entablar una demanda civil dentro del proceso penal, por lo que, en la etapa intermedia, no implica el final del derecho de la víctima, ya que en esa etapa su derecho no ha sido resuelto por una sentencia pasado por cosa jugada material, sino que la víctima tiene el ejercicio de llevar su derecho a la sede civil o contenciosa administrativa, pues su acción dependía que continuara la acción penal, por el principio de accesoriedad procesal. Si la autoridad judicial, considera que no hay delito, no implica que no exista responsabilidad civil, pero por interpretación de la ley procesal penal, solo en DEBATE, un Tribunal, puede revisar la responsabilidad civil, y no en la etapa intermedia penal. Y esto es lógico porque solo a través de un contradictorio, inmediación y legalidad, es que se puede conocer la razón o no del derecho de los ofendidos. Por ello, condenar en costas en la etapa intermedia penal, a los ofendidos, como actores civiles, sería adelantar un criterio en contra del derecho de la víctima, sin que un Juez, haya evacuado pruebas, escuchado a las partes, y llevado a cabo el contradictorio, la inmediación, y dictar una sentencia de fondo, porque la resolución en esa etapa es accesoria, o sea, se mantiene la acción civil, mientras la acción penal esté en trámite, sin que implique por si mismo, que los ofendidos, no tienen razón en cuanto a la indemnización civil. Así reza el artículo 40 del Código Procesal Penal:

"Artículo 40- Carácter accesorio. En el procedimiento penal, la acción civil resarcitoria solo podrá ser ejercida mientras esté pendiente la persecución penal. Sobreseído provisionalmente el imputado o suspendido el procedimiento, de conformidad con las previsiones de ley, el ejercicio de la acción civil se suspenderá hasta que la persecución penal continúe y quedará a salvo el derecho de interponer la demanda ante los tribunales competentes.

El Tribunal Penal deberá pronunciarse sobre el fondo de la acción civil resarcitoria válidamente ejercida, aún y cuando se haya dictado sentencia absolutoria o de sobreseimiento definitivo en la fase de juicio." La norma cuestionada 267 del mismo cuerpo procesal penal, es completamente genérica, y por ello violatoria de los principios de seguridad y certeza jurídica al señalar:

"Fijación de las costas Las costas estarán a cargo de la parte vencida, pero el tribunal podrá eximirla, total o parcialmente, cuando haya razón plausible para litigan Cuando sean varios los condenados al pago de costas, el tribunal fijará la parte proporcional que corresponda a cada uno, sin perjuicio de la solidaridad que establezca la ley." Esta norma se encuentra enmarcada dentro de un proceso penal, en que, bajo el principio del debido proceso, el imputado podría pagar costas a los ofendidos constituidos como querellantes o actores civiles, hasta que se le condene a los delitos en sentencia por parte de un Tribunal de Juicio, y de ahí deviene la norma con ese espíritu de reconocer a las victimas además de la indemnización por responsabilidad civil, los gastos que encierra las costas.

En cambio, siendo la Etapa Intermedia, únicamente una fase de preparación a Juicio, si la acusación del Ministerio Público, o de la víctima a través de su Querella, no prosperan para seguir a la etapa de Juicio, a la Fiscalía no se le condena al pago de costas por ver fracasada su intención de llevar la acusación a debate, pero si se interpreta que al querellante, hay que condenarlo porque su querella, no prosperó para llegar a debate, y lo más grave, es condenar a costas a los demandantes civiles, que aún no consiguen que un Tribunal de Juicio, conozca sus pretensiones, para que por sentencia de fondo determinen la legitimidad de sus derechos, pero se interpreta con una norma abierta, que faculta a condenarlos en costas.

Los Tribunales Penales de la etapa intermedia, han aplicado este artículo 267 en la etapa intermedia, tanto para castigar al querellante como al actor civil, siendo injusto que, por el principio de igualdad, a la Fiscalía, si se le niega su acusación, no son condenadas a costas, pero más evidente la injusticia en el caso de la acción civil, en la que aún no ha recaído una sentencia pasada por cosa juzgada material, y se aplique esta norma a criterio libre del Juez, quien asemeja la negativa de continuar a la etapa de juico, como que han sido "vencidos" cuando su derecho aún no ha sido analizado en un debido proceso, sino porque no pudo continuar la acción penal, lo cual per se no implica que la victima no tenga derecho a reclamar la responsabilidad civil en otra sede, violentando así el artículo 41 constitucional, que advierte que el acceso y tutela efectiva se alcanza cuando ocurriendo a las leyes se llega a una sentencia definitiva mediante el debido proceso.

Ha sido práctica de los Juzgado Penales, como órgano de la etapa intermedia, condenar tanto al querellante como al actor civil, porque se ha desestimado o sobreseído la acción penal, con fundamento a esta norma. Dejando la exención a criterio discrecional del jugador, según la misma norma legal, al establecer el vocablo "podrá", cuando debería ser más claro que en la etapa intermedia, no se puede imponer costas, porque el derecho de la víctima, aún no ha sido resuelto mediante un debido proceso por parte de un Tribunal de Juicio, mediando el debido proceso, y los principios de contradicción, legalidad, inmediación, tutela efectiva, derecho de escuchar a la víctima, proponer y evacuar las pruebas, etc., como así lo dispone el artículo 39 de la Carta Magna, en que consagra el debido proceso en materia penal, donde nadie puede ser sancionado, sin la demostración de ser culpable de la misma, y previo ejercicio de su defensa:

"ARTÍCULO 39.-A nadie se hará sufrir pena sino por delito, cuasidelito o falta, sancionados por ley anterior y en virtud de sentencia firme dictada por autoridad competente, previa oportunidad concedida al indiciado para ejercitar su defensa y mediante la necesaria demostración de culpabilidad." En la etapa intermedia no hay juicio, no hay evacuación de pruebas, y la condena en costas, es una sanción gravosa, sin que el Juez, tenga los insumos que solo sucedería en un Debate, para tener la facultad para imponer costas a los imputados, de igual forma, a los ofendidos como querellantes y actores civiles.

La aplicación de esta norma en la forma como se encuentra redactada, no brinda seguridad jurídica para que la víctima, conozca con certeza en qué momento procesal se debe tener a un parte procesal por vencido a para imponer las costas, cuando al tenor del artículo 41 constitucional, vencido implica que debe existir un DEBATE previo donde se logre probar no solo la inocencia o culpabilidad del imputado, sino si el querellante o el actor civil, fundan su derecho, en forma plausible y de buena fe. Porque es en el proceso correspondiente, con la debida contradicción y evacuación de pruebas, que el Tribunal de Juicio, pueda definir la razón del derecho de todas las partes para posterior fundar la imposición de la condena en costas, como excepción a la regla, como ya se ha justificado en líneas anteriores, y no como regla general en procesos contenciosos administrativos.

Esta norma sin una especificación, permite que el Juez de la Etapa Intermedia, imponga costas, solo porque considera que negar la querella, es equivalente a tener por vencido la pretensión de los ofendidos, al igual que la acción civil, porque es accesoria, debe cobijarse el mismo concepto para imponer costas por separado, por la querella y por la acción civil. Lo cual también violenta el principio de igualdad constitucional, porque mientras los demás cuerpos procesales, tiene como premisa para imponer costas, la existencia de una resolución del fondo, en materia penal, se fijan costas porque la acción penal no se elevó a juicio, cuando en esa etapa no se evacuan pruebas, ni tampoco se puede conocer cuestiones que únicamente corresponden a la etapa de juicio.

Artículo 318 párrafo quinto del Código Procesal Penal:

"El tribunal evitará que, en la audiencia, se discutan cuestiones que son propias del juicio oral." Aunado a lo anterior, el artículo 2 del Código Procesal Penal, establece:

"Regla de interpretación Deberán interpretarse restrictivamente las disposiciones legales que coarten la libertad personal o limiten el ejercicio de un poder o derecho conferido a los sujetos del proceso. En esta materia, se prohíben la interpretación extensiva y la analogía mientras no favorezcan la libertad del imputado ni el ejercicio de una facultad conferida a quienes intervienen en el procedimiento." Un Juez de Garantías, en un estado democrático, durante la etapa de intermedio, si está limitado a conocer de las cuestiones propias de un Juicio, según el marco jurídico al que está sujeto, por existir una norma legal expresa, entonces, no podría tener la facultad para determinar la culpabilidad del imputado, y bajo esa misma tesitura, tampoco puede tener por VENCIDO al querellante o al actor civil, sino hubo juicio ni tampoco una sentencia que conociera con previo debido proceso, que no existe derecho alguno de los ofendidos para asentar la responsabilidad del acusado, o querellado, que permita la aplicación del numeral 267 del Código Procesal Penal, como si hubiera recaído sentencia penal que conociera luego de la contradicción, la pretensión penal de la querella y la pretensión civil, cuando en este último le queda a los ofendidos su derecho para demandar en la vía jurisdicción común.

“V.- DE LA FUNCIÓN DEL JUEZ EN LA FASE PREPARATORIA EN EL PROCESO PENAL. El procedimiento diseñado en la nueva legislación procesal penal (Código Procesal Penal) conlleva a una separación absoluta del juez del procedimiento en relación con el encargado del juicio, éste llegará al debate sin conocimiento alguno del caso que deberá resolver, a efecto de que la prueba que recibe en la audiencia oral sea la que efectiva y únicamente se tome en cuenta para resolver el asunto. Se supone que el juez del debate tiene poco conocimiento de lo ocurrido en las etapas precedentes, motivo por el cual la audiencia oral adquiere mayor importancias y complejidad, lo que requiere la introducción de soluciones alternativas que disminuyan el número de asuntos que llegan a debate, lo cual fortalece sustancialmente la vigencia real del principio de oralidad e inmediatez. En el procedimiento intermedio se deben resolver todas las cuestiones que de incidencia en el caso, no estén relacionadas con la celebración del debate oral y público. Con esto, se pretende dar plena objetividad e imparcialidad al juez, de manera que éste no se encuentre comprometido con una tesis concreta al momento de resolver el caso, lo cual se traduce en una mayor independencia del funcionario encargado del debate y decisión de la causa penal. De esta suerte, la instrucción estará a cargo del Ministerio Público, bajo el control jurisdiccional en los actos que así lo requieran (artículo 62 del Código Procesal Penal). La función del juez en la etapa de la instrucción preparatoria es de garantía de los derechos de las partes y de cumplimiento de formalidades ordenadas en protección de los derechos fundamentales, como es el caso del allanamiento de morada (artículo 238 del Código Procesal Penal). De esta forma, el juez rescata su independencia frente al hecho investigado, lo que le permite cumplir con su cometido de fiel garante de los derechos de las partes —de todas las partes del proceso penal. De esta forma, en la nueva legislación procesal penal se da un gran cambio en la conformación del sistema procesal en sí, ya que, de un sistema inquisitorio, se pasa a uno acusatorio." Voto 03930-2008 de las 14:43 del 12 de marzo del 2008, Sala Constitucional)” Solicita, el accionante, que se declare “la inconstitucionalidad con retroacción desde la vigencia de las mismas, por existir vicios que riñen con la Carta Magna, por la existencia de la frase "vencido" que las normas cuestionadas, contiene como una regla general, así como lo indeterminado del 267 del CPP, que lesiona las normas constitucionales 1, 2, 7, 9, 11, 33, 39, 41, 154 de la Constitución Política”. Pide, además, que se modifique las normas impugnadas conforme él lo propone 2.- A efectos de fundamentar su legitimación, el accionante señala lo siguiente:

“Con base al párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional número 7135, la presente acción no versa solamente en lo particular en relación a un tema de protección de un interés individual, sino que se extiende a una afectación a la comunidad que hace uso del servicio de sistema de la administración de justicia, en las diversas materias en la que se aplican los preceptos de los cuerpos procesales cuestionados, por lo que se extiende a toda la comunidad, cuando se afecta no solo al recurrente, y se debe admitir para su estudio la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, sin el requerimiento de un caso pendiente.

"Ese concepto de "intereses difusos" tiene por objeto desarrollar una forma de legitimación, que en los últimos tiempos ha constituido uno de los principios tradicionales de la legitimación y que se ha venido abriendo paso, especialmente en el ámbito del derecho administrativo, como último ensanchamiento, novedoso pero necesario, para que esa fiscalización sea cada vez más efectiva y eficaz. Los intereses difusos, aunque de difícil definición y más difícil identificación, no pueden ser en nuestra Ley -como ya lo ha dicho esta Sala- los intereses meramente colectivos; ni tan difusos que su titularidad se confunda con la de la comunidad nacional como un todo, ni tan concretos que frente a ellos resulten identificadas o fácilmente identificables personas determinadas, o grupos personalizados, cuya legitimación derivaría, no de los intereses difusos, sino de los corporativos o que atañen a una comunidad en su conjunto. Se trata, entonces, de intereses individuales, pero, a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y, por ende, reciben un beneficio o un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos igual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que se trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos de personas que se encuentran en determinadas situaciones y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas. Es decir, los intereses difusos participan de una doble naturaleza, ya que son a la vez colectivos -por ser comunes a una generalidad- e individuales, por lo que pueden ser reclamados en tal carácter. Y precisamente ello es lo que sucede en el presente caso, en el cual el recurrente, evidentemente, tiene un interés individual en el tanto está siendo afectado por la contaminación de que es objeto su comunidad, pero también existe un interés colectivo, ya que la lesión también se produce a la colectividad como un todo. De manera que, en tratándose del Derecho al Ambiente, la legitimación corresponde al ser humano como tal, pues la lesión a ese derecho fundamental la sufre tanto la comunidad como el individuo en particular. Así, en tratándose de intereses difusos, cualquier miembro de la comunidad afectada, como lo son los recurrentes, está legitimado para acudir a la vía de amparo en procura de la protección de sus derechos fundamentales. voto 04423-1993 del 07 de septiembre de 1993 Sala Constitucional.

Sin embargo, existe un proceso penal en trámite, en que se aplicó el numeral 267 del Código Procesal Penal, y del cual se adjunta copia certificada por el despacho, expediente 21-000004-1218-PE, donde se condena en costas, a pesar que se corroboró que los hechos de la querella, si existieron en la realidad, y que al no elevarse el caso a juicio, era improcedente condenar en costas a los actores civiles, quienes por ley les salvaguardaba el derecho a accionar en la vía contenciosa administrativa, como se encuentra actualmente bajo expediente 23-0007663-1027CA, por lo que condenar en costas, fue una acción anticipada de que los demandantes civiles no tenían derecho a accionar, cuando aun su derecho no ha sido resuelto por el fondo por una sentencia pasada en carácter de cosa juzgada material, viciando la resolución que impone a costas en forma anticipada, porque el proceso penal no prosperó, al no alcanzar la etapa de juicio oral y público.” 3.- Por resolución de las 15:07 horas del 17 de abril de 2026, se previno al accionante que: “a) respecto del proceso que se tramita en expediente nro. 21-000004-1218- PE, aclare a favor de quién se interpone la acción y, de interponerse a favor de una tercera persona, deberá aportarse documento idóneo que acredite el otorgamiento de poderes suficientes al accionante para formular este proceso de control de constitucionalidad a favor de esa persona; b) esclarezca si las copias aportadas junto con el escrito de interposición (atinentes a un escrito fechado 9 de marzo de 2026) corresponden al escrito de invocación de inconstitucionalidad en el asunto principal y c) especifique y acredite el estado procesal del expediente nro. 21- 000004-1218-PE.” 4.- Mediante escrito asociado a este expediente el 23 de abril de 2026, el accionante contestó que, para “cumplir prevención contenida en la resolución de las 15:07 del 17 de abril del año en curso, lo cual hago en el mismo orden solicitado:

“a) En cuanto a la presente acción, con respecto al expediente N° 21-000004- 1218-PE, el mismo es interpuesto en beneficio del suscrito, quien actúa dentro del expediente penal, en su condición de víctima constituido como querellante y actor civil, por lo que no es necesario mandato procesal.

• b)La copia que se adjuntó a la presente acción, corresponde al escrito del 09/03/2026, en que consta invocación de inconstitucionalidad en el asunto principal, por anteponerse las normativas del CPP al artículo 41 constitucional.
• c)Se especifica que el estado procesal del expediente N° 21-000004-1218-PE, se encuentra en espera de resolución de incidente de defectos procesales absolutos, presentada por la co-actora civil y el suscrito, ante grave omisión del señor Juez, en no convocar a las partes a audiencia para conocer de recusación, como así fuera ordenado por el Tribunal Penal de Goicoechea, para que un nuevo Juez Penal, dilucide posteriormente, entre otras cosas, el tema de la legitimación de la imposición de costas en base a los preceptos 266 y 267 del CPP. Para acreditar lo anterior, se adjunta resolución del Tribunal Penal de Goicoechea, de las 11 horas del 10 de febrero del 2026, y la audiencia de incidencia, del Juzgado Penal, de las 14.22 del 11 de marzo del 2026, así como captura de pantalla que a continuación se inserta, del sistema de gestión en línea, que acredita el estado del expediente electrónico en que se está a la espera luego de vencido el plazo otorgado a las demás partes, el Juez, proceda a resolver la incidencia por fondo, para que se otorgue la audiencia preliminar omitida. Amén de lo anterior, informar que hay un recurso de apelación aún pendiente, una vez que se resuelva la incidencia de defectos absolutos procesales.” 5.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar rechazada.

Redacta el Magistrado Castillo Víquez; y,

Considerando:

I.- DE LOS REQUISITOS Y FORMALIDADES DE LA ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. Esta Sala ha señalado, de forma reiterada, que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso con determinadas formalidades, que necesariamente deben cumplirse para que este Tribunal pueda pronunciarse válidamente sobre el fondo del asunto. El artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regula la legitimación para interponer acciones de inconstitucionalidad y prevé situaciones distintas. En el párrafo primero se exige la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sea en sede judicial –incluyendo los recursos de hábeas corpus o de amparo- o en la administrativa –en el procedimiento de agotamiento de esta vía-, en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado en el asunto principal. En los párrafos segundo y tercero se regula la acción directa –no se requiere del asunto base-, en los siguientes supuestos: a) cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa; b) se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto; y c) cuando la acción sea promovida por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes.

Asimismo, en sentencia nro. 04190-95 de las 11:33 horas del 28 de julio de 1995, este Tribunal precisó que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es:

“(…) un proceso de naturaleza incidental, y no de una acción directa o popular, con lo que se quiere decir que se requiere de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver -sea ante los tribunales de justicia o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa- para poder acceder a la vía constitucional, pero de tal manera que, la acción constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho considerado lesionado en el asunto principal, de manera que lo resuelto por el Tribunal Constitucional repercuta positiva o negativamente en dicho proceso pendiente de resolver, por cuanto se manifiesta sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas que deberán ser aplicadas en dicho asunto; y únicamente por excepción es que la legislación permite el acceso directo a esta vía -presupuestos de los párrafos segundo y tercero del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional …”.

Finalmente, existen otras formalidades que deben ser cumplidas, a saber, el escrito de interposición debe estar autenticado y contener una determinación explícita de la normativa impugnada, debidamente fundamentada, con cita concreta de los componentes del bloque de constitucionalidad que se consideren infringidos (artículo 78 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Debe, además, acreditarse las condiciones de legitimación (poderes y certificaciones), procederse al pago del timbre del Colegio de Abogados y aportarse certificación literal del escrito en el que se invocó la inconstitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas en el asunto base (artículo 79 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

II.- SOBRE LA INADMISIBILIDAD DE LA ACCIÓN POR LA VÍA DIRECTA: DE LA ALEGADA DEFENSA DE INTERESES DIFUSOS. Debe señalarse –en primer lugar– que esta Sala ha explicado que:

“(…) dado el formalismo dispuesto legalmente para los procesos de control de constitucionalidad (...) la carga argumentativa en el trámite de una acción de inconstitucionalidad recae en el accionante, quien debe explicar, sin ambages, la contradicción existente entre una normativa infraconstitucional y el bloque de constitucionalidad, así como la legitimación que le asiste” (voto nro. 2020-000319 de las 12:15 horas del 8 de enero de 2020; el destacado no corresponde al original).

En el sub lite, el accionante alega que se acciona en defensa de intereses difusos, pues, la presente acción “se extiende a una afectación a la comunidad que hace uso del servicio de sistema de la administración de justicia, en las diversas materias en la que se aplican los preceptos de los cuerpos cuestionados, por lo que se extiende a toda la comunidad”. De esta forma, se alega la defensa de un colectivo tan genérico e impreciso, que simplemente se confunde con la comunidad nacional como un todo, lo que resulta improcedente. Esta Sala ha precisado –tal y como se refleja en el propio precedente que cita el accionante– que:

“(…) Los intereses difusos, aunque de difícil definición…, no pueden ser en nuestra Ley -como ya lo ha dicho esta Sala- los intereses meramente colectivos; ni tan difusos que su titularidad se confunda con la de la comunidad nacional como un todo, ni tan concretos que frente a ellos resulten identificadas o fácilmente identificables personas determinadas, o grupos personalizados, cuya legitimación derivaría, no de los intereses difusos, sino de los corporativos o que atañen a una comunidad en su conjunto.” (voto nro. 3705-93 de las 15 horas del 30 de julio de 1993; el destacado no corresponde al original).

En cuyo caso, al conocer de un caso análogo al presente, esta Sala resolvió que:

“(…) Aunque el accionante sostenga que la omisión acusada atenta en contra de la seguridad de todos los “ciudadanos-peatones” y “ciudadanos-conductores”, lo cierto es que no puede estimarse que se esté ante un grupo o categoría que reúna las particularidades descritas en los precedentes parcialmente transcritos y, por el contrario, se está en presencia de un presunto colectivo tan dilatado, impreciso y difuminado que, simplemente, se identifica con la comunidad nacional como un todo. Debe reiterarse, por esto, lo resuelto por esta Sala en el sentido que el interés difuso no debe ser tan diluido que se confunda con la colectividad nacional, es decir, “no puede llegar a ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el reconocido a todos los miembros de la sociedad de velar por la legalidad constitucional” (ver sentencia No. 0360-99, supra citada). En efecto, de admitirse la posibilidad del actor de plantear una acción de inconstitucionalidad en esta materia, en las condiciones pretendidas por este, supondría –en definitiva- reconocer la existencia de una acción popular, la cual, como lo ha indicado la Sala Constitucional en su reiterada jurisprudencia (ver sentencia No. 2016-000787 de las 9:05 hrs. del 20 de enero de 2016), no se adecua al marco de las competencias procesales que al efecto tiene este Tribunal Constitucional, en sus funciones de intérprete último y guardián de la Constitución.” (voto nro. 2016-005589 de las 9:05 horas del 27 de abril de 2016) Consideraciones plenamente aplicables a la especie.

A lo que se añade que este Tribunal, por mayoría, ha estimado que cuando una norma es susceptible de aplicación individual, no cabe invocar los intereses difusos para admitir la acción. Sobre este punto, en el voto nro. 2022-011649 de las 9:20 horas del 25 de mayo de 2022, esta Sala resolvió que:

“III.- SOBRE LA LEGITIMACIÓN DIRECTA. El accionante, a su vez, dice ostentar legitimación directa, porque refiere que la norma impugnada no solo lesiona los derechos fundamentales de carácter individual de su representado, sino que vulnera sendos colectivos y difusos, por los efectos que produce. No obstante, esta Sala, por mayoría, ha estimado que cuando la norma que se impugna es susceptible de aplicación individual, no cabe invocar la defensa de intereses difusos para admitir la acción. Así, en el voto n° 2021-002185 de las 12:51 horas del 3 de febrero de 2021 este Tribunal Constitucional señaló lo siguiente:

“(…) II.- Sobre los intereses difusos y la legitimación de los accionantes en el caso bajo estudio. Las accionantes señalan que su legitimación proviene de la defensa de los intereses difusos respecto de la protección al derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado. Al respecto, cabe indicar que, como ya se mencionó, los supuestos del párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional constituyen excepciones a la regla contenida en el párrafo primero del mismo artículo, que deben ser analizados cuidadosamente en cada caso concreto. El interés difuso ha sido entendido como aquel interés relacionado con un derecho o situación jurídica de naturaleza especial y particular, que puede ser compartido por otras personas, formando todos los interesados un grupo o categoría determinada. Así, la vulneración de ese derecho puede afectar a todos en general o a cada uno en particular, de ahí que cualquier miembro de la colectividad puede interponer la acción para proteger el derecho que se estima lesionado. Sobre el particular, la reiterada jurisprudencia de la Sala indica que:

"Se ha señalado que se trata un tipo especial de interés, cuya manifestación es menos concreta e individualizable que la del colectivo recién definido en el considerando anterior, pero que no puede llegar a ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el reconocido a todos los miembros de la sociedad de velar por la legalidad constitucional, ya que éste último -como se ha dicho reiteradamente- está excluido del actual sistema de revisión constitucional. Se trata pues de un interés distribuido en cada uno de los administrados, mediato si se quiere, y diluido, pero no por ello menos constatable, para la defensa, en esta Sala, de ciertos derechos constitucionales de una singular relevancia para el adecuado y armónico desarrollo de la sociedad. Son las especiales características de éstos derechos por sí mismas y no la particular situación frente a ellos de los sujetos que puedan ostentarlos, la clave para la distinción y determinación de la presencia de los llamados intereses difusos tal y como se manifestado en distintas resoluciones como la 03705-93 de las quince horas del treinta de julio para el derecho al ambiente, la número 05753-93 de las catorce horas cuarenta y cinco del nueve de noviembre de ese mismo año para la defensa del patrimonio histórico y la número 00980-91 de las trece y treinta del veinticuatro de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y uno para la materia electoral." –ver sentencia número 360-90- De esta definición es posible estimar que el interés difuso está conformado por un elemento eminentemente subjetivo, relativo a su pertenencia o titularidad del interés, y otro objetivo, relacionado con la incidencia del bien en la sociedad, que lo distingue de otras situaciones jurídicas. En relación con el primero -el subjetivo-, es claro que la misma se encuentra difuminada en un grupo humano no individualizado, que coparticipa en el disfrute del bien jurídico objeto del interés, pero cuya conformación no resulta de un conjunto de sujetos identificable, abarcable y de contornos relativamente nítidos, como sí ocurre en el interés colectivo. Y desde la perspectiva objetiva, debe aclararse que no todo interés "difuminado" adquiere la categoría jurídica de "interés difuso", sino únicamente aquellos impregnados de una profunda relevancia social, cuya valoración resulta de las circunstancias de cada caso –ver, entre otras, sentencias números 2006-15960 y 2014-4904-. En este sentido, así como se ha dicho que ese interés no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional -lo que supondría la instauración tácita de una acción popular no contemplada por la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional-, tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de ese reclamo –ver, entre otras, sentencias números 2008-13442, 2009-300 y 2009-9201-. Así, ejemplos de tales intereses son el derecho a un ambiente sano y armonioso, la defensa del patrimonio histórico, la materia electoral, la defensa del derecho a la salud y la fiscalización de los fondos públicos. De tal forma, en el caso bajo estudio, donde las accionantes refieren su legitimación respecto de la defensa de intereses difusos en materia de protección a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, lo que corresponde es pronunciarse conforme se indica en los considerandos siguientes.

(…)

En la acción que ahora se conoce, los mismos accionantes cuestionan las mismas normas de los artículos 50 y 51 del Reglamento en cuestión, así como el artículo 52 del mismo instrumento, y si bien, más allá de la sostenibilidad de los zoocriaderos, en esta acción se centran sobre temas de conservación ex situ y educación ambiental -que también fue señalado en aquella acción-, lo cierto es que la misma definición de esta Sala sobre la legitimación, tal como se dispuso en la sentencia de cita, resulta de plena aplicación en esta nueva acción. Nótese que, ciertamente, tal como lo señala claramente la Procuraduría General de la República y de manera enfática lo refiere el Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, la normativa que se cuestiona sí es totalmente susceptible de aplicación individual y de incidir directamente en la esfera jurídica de personas singulares e identificables, que ejercen una determinada actividad, sujeta a la regulación señalada en la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre y su reglamento. De tal manera, es claro que contrario a la aducida defensa de intereses difusos, lo que se encuentra de por medio es algún grado de inconformidad con la sujeción a que deben someterse para la regulación de la actividad que ejercen o pretenden ejercer ; véase que como bien refiere el informe del Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, los accionantes se encuentran directamente relacionados como fundadores, gerentes o servidores de diversas empresas relacionadas con la exhibición de fauna silvestre o su promoción turística. Así, resulta inviable aducir presuntos problemas de conservación y de educación ambiental, para utilizar la figura de los intereses difusos y promover con ello una acción de inconstitucionalidad directa obviando los estrictos requisitos de admisibilidad señalados en la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, tal como se indicó en los considerandos II y III de esta resolución.

Bajo esta inteligencia, y tomando en consideración la identidad de accionantes y de la normativa cuestionada, es claro que el precedente de la sentencia 2018-18563 resulta plenamente aplicable a esta acción que ahora se conoce, de donde debe necesariamente concluirse que al igual que en aquella anterior ocasión, los accionantes carecen de legitimación para la interposición de este proceso, por lo que resulta improcedente conocer y pronunciarse sobre los aspectos planteados. De tal manera, lo procedente es declarar sin lugar esta acción” (el subrayado no corresponde al original).

En similar sentido, en la sentencia n° 2021-011994 de las 16:30 horas del 26 de mayo de 2021 esta Sala dispuso que:

“(…) Se reitera que el interés difuso no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional (lo que supondría la instauración tácita de acción popular no contemplada por la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional); pero tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues, en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de ese reclamo (…)” (véase en este mismo sentido, entre otros, los Votos N° 2021-025373 de las 9:20 horas del 10 de noviembre de 2021 y N° 2022-007466 de las 9:45 horas del 30 de marzo de 2022).

En la especie, es claro que se está en presencia de normas susceptibles de concretizarse en casos de aplicación individual en cabeza de personas específicas y que inciden directamente en la esfera jurídica de personas singulares y plenamente identificables, quienes están habilitadas para plantear la correspondiente reclamación judicial. En consecuencia, y conforme a los antecedentes jurisprudenciales precitados, no puede estimarse que, en el sub lite, se configure el referido supuesto de legitimación directa, por defensa de intereses difusos.

III.- SOBRE LA INADMISIBILIDAD DE LA ACCIÓN POR LA VÍA INCIDENTAL. La presente acción también resulta inadmisible por la vía incidental, por lo siguiente:

A.- El artículo 75, párrafo primero, in fine, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional exige, para efectos de la admisibilidad de una acción de inconstitucionalidad por la vía incidental –como la presente–, la existencia de un asunto principal pendiente de resolver, ya sea ante los tribunales –inclusive de hábeas corpus o de amparo–, o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa, en que se invoque esa inconstitucionalidad como medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considere lesionado. Cabe reiterar que esta Sala ha señalado –en múltiples votos– que:

“(...) Tales requisitos no se traducen en una cuestión meramente formal, pues no basta con el simple cumplimiento de los mismos, sino que se requiere, además, que la norma impugnada a través de esta vía tenga una incidencia directa sobre el asunto que sirve como base, de tal suerte, que lo resuelto en la acción sirva como un medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés lesionado dentro del asunto previo. A contrario sensu, si no existe una conexidad directa entre el objeto de discusión del asunto base y lo impugnado en la acción, no resulta posible que esta Sala se pronuncie al respecto. Es por lo anterior, que, de conformidad con los artículos 75 y 79 de la Ley que rige a esta Jurisdicción, los accionantes deben acreditar y aportar certificación literal del escrito en el que invocaron la inconstitucionalidad de las normas en el asunto base, a efecto de verificar su incidencia en tal asunto.” (voto nro. 2019-016243 de las 9:20 horas del 28 de agosto de 2019, entre otros; el destacado no corresponde al original).

En cuanto a los requisitos que debe cumplir el citado escrito de invocación, esta Sala ha indicado que:

“(…) si bien, en la invocatoria de inconstitucionalidad de la norma, no se exige una extensa fundamentación, lo cierto es, que sí resulta necesario que en el asunto base se invoque expresamente, la inconstitucionalidad de la norma impugnada en la acción... y se indiquen las normas constitucionales que se consideren infringidas…”. (Sentencia No. 2014-000851 de las 14:30 hrs. del 22 de enero de 2014).” (sentencia nro. 2017-007744 de las 9:15 horas del 24 de mayo de 2017).

Por sentencia nro. 2022-5564 de las 9:00 horas del 9 de marzo de 2022, este Tribunal precisó lo siguiente:

“(…) En este caso y relación con el contenido del artículo 17 referido al comiso, analizado el memorial en que se invocó la inconstitucionalidad de la norma, el mismo resulta insuficiente. Se mencionan los posibles artículos constitucionales lesionados, pero no se indican las razones. Sobre todo, se echa de menos los alegatos referidos al artículo 45 constitucional que es, precisamente, el derecho que se alega como lesionado en el escrito de interposición de la acción. Por último, en cuanto al artículo 20 referido, no es mencionado en el escrito de invocación, por lo que su cuestionamiento, carente del mínimo fundamento jurídico, es inadmisible.” Finalmente, este Tribunal también ha resuelto que la invocación de inconstitucionalidad debe efectuarse en el asunto base de previo a la interposición de la acción (véase, por ejemplo, votos nro. 2016-009868 de las 9:20 horas del 13 de julio de 2016 y nro. 2016-011291 de las 10:40 horas del 10 de agosto de 2016).

B.- En el sub lite, el accionante menciona –a efectos de sustentar su legitimación– la existencia de un proceso penal que se tramita en expediente nro. 21-000004-1218-PE. Asimismo, en respuesta a la prevención realizada por esta Sala, mediante resolución de las 15:07 horas del 17 de abril de 2026, el accionante contestó lo siguiente: “b) La copia que se adjuntó a la presente acción, corresponde al escrito del 09/03/2026, en que consta invocación de inconstitucionalidad en el asunto principal, por anteponerse las normativas del CPP al artículo 41 constitucional.” Ahora, al revisarse el referido escrito de invocación de inconstitucionalidad, se constata –en primer lugar– que no se invocó la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 69.2, 73.1 y 73.2 del Código Procesal Civil y 150.3, 119.2 y 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. De hecho, no se hace alusión alguna a tales disposiciones. En cuanto al artículo 267 del Código Procesal Penal, esta es la mención que se realizó:

“Desde la sentencia de sobreseimiento, han existido violaciones flagrantes a los derechos de los ofendidos, quienes fueron condenados a pagar injustamente costas, por haber intervenido un criterio caprichoso del juez penal actuante, quien en aquel momento, violentó todas las normas de fondo y procesales que le impedían sancionar directamente a los ofendidos, con pago de costas, cuando era evidente que existía total plausibilidad en haber presentado sus gestiones, y el Juez, centró la condena, en que los ofendidos, debían abstenerse de gestionar querella y acción civil porque la fiscalía había solicitado el sobreseimiento, criterio que no es legal ni conforme a las regulas de la sana crítica, sino únicamente subjetivo que lesionan los derechos de los ciudadanos que denuncian las actuaciones irregulares de los funcionarios judiciales. De lo anterior, el Juez que representó al Tribunal Penal, hizo eco de aquellas violaciones, al conocer de los recursos de apelaciones contra esa sentencia de primera instancia ilegal e ilegítima, así como también inconstitucional, porque el artículo 41 de la Carta Magna, está por encima de la aplicación e interpretación de las normas 266 y 267 del CPP, en la que misma Sala Tercera, ha establecido que las constas no pueden ser instrumentalizadas de tal forma que su finalidad se traduce en desestimular a que los ciudadanos presenten las denuncias y gestiones contra los funcionarios públicos. Lo cual sucedió evidentemente en la especie, porque cada hecho que fue querellado, tenía su fundamento probatorio, que no fue compartido por la fiscalía, no implicaba que ello, tuviera la verdad absoluta y menos que fuera la base para condenar en costas.

“Fijación de las costas Las costar estarán a cargo de la parte vencida, pero el tribunal podrá eximirla, total o parcialmente, cuando haya razón plausible para litigar”.

Ninguna de las dos resoluciones de primera y segunda instancia, hicieron el análisis si cada hecho querellado, había sucedido en la realidad, que hacía plausible la querella y la acción civil, a diferencia, de que hubiera sido una denuncia falta o calumniosa, sin prueba alguna que sostuviera que los imputados… habían actuado en violación de la ley, en perjuicio de los derechos de la propietaria del vehículo y del conductor, conforme a la Ley de Tránsito.” Luego se añade:

“(…) Por ello, la actuación del Juez… y del Juez…, fueron inconstitucionales, no solo por aplicar las normas sin considerar la debida eximente – si es que no deseaban elevar a juicio por querella a los dos imputados – así como inobservar el derecho de los ciudadanos de acceder a la justicia mediante el ordenamiento jurídico, debidamente sustentado por las pruebas…”.

De lo que se deriva que, en tal escrito, no se realizó formal, expresa y adecuada invocación de inconstitucionalidad de tal ordinal, sino que –en realidad– lo que se cuestionó fue su interpretación y aplicación en el caso concreto, lo que resulta improcedente. Así, por ejemplo, en voto nro. 2014-000851 de las 14:30 horas del 22 de enero de 2014, esta Sala resolvió que:

“(…) si bien, en la invocatoria de inconstitucionalidad de la norma, no se exige una extensa fundamentación, lo cierto es, que sí resulta necesario que en el asunto base se invoque expresamente, la inconstitucionalidad de la norma impugnada en la acción –no de los actos de aplicación- y se indiquen las normas constitucionales que se consideren infringidas…” (el destacado no corresponde al original).

Por su parte, en voto nro. 2020-000811 de las 9:30 horas del 15 de enero de 2020, este Tribunal resolvió que:

“IV.- DE LA INADMISIBILIDAD DE LA PRESENTE ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. En el sub judice, luego de revisar la grabación de video y audio aportada por los propios accionantes, correspondiente a la audiencia realizada el 13 de diciembre de 2019, se constata que en la mismo no se realizó una adecuada invocación de inconstitucionalidad de la norma impugnada en la presente acción. Por el contrario, en tal audiencia lo que se alega por parte de la defensa técnica de los accionantes es que los hechos imputados no son típicos, conforme a una adecuada interpretación y aplicación del artículo 263 bis del Código Penal, a la luz de la jurisprudencia de esta Sala, particularmente, de la sentencia No. 2019-15221. Incluso, en el fragmento de grabación que corresponde a la supuesta invocación, se constata que lo que alegó la defensa técnica de los accionantes fue lo siguiente:

“(…) de una vez señora Jueza dejo también planteada la inconstitucionalidad del artículo del Código Penal que establece el delito de obstrucción de vías como medio razonable para amparar el derecho de mis representados. En ese sentido pues eventualmente se estaría presentando también una acción de inconstitucionalidad contra ese artículo del Código Penal por un abuso o una aplicación abusiva de los términos de ese artículo del Código Penal que va a contrapelo de lo que ha dicho la Sala Constitucional a cuanto a por ejemplo qué pasa si habían vías alternas. En ese lugar donde se hizo el bloqueo establece la misma prueba de la Fuerza Pública y de las declaraciones de los policías dicen que habían vías alternas. Por lo tanto, la Sala Constitucional ha dicho que en esos casos debe tolerarse porque ahí debe haber un equilibrio entre el ejercicio de la libertad de expresión y la libertad de tránsito…” (el destacado no corresponde al original) De la lectura del extracto se constata, con toda claridad, que realmente no se alegó o impugnó la inconstitucionalidad de algún contenido normativo específico del artículo 263 bis del Código Penal, sino que se cuestionó -de forma genérica- su aplicación para ese caso en particular. Por lo que no puede estimarse que tal invocación cumpla las condiciones mínimas exigidas por esta Sala, en atención a lo dispuesto en los mencionados artículos 75 y 79 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Como ya se indicó, en el asunto base lo que se realiza es un cuestionamiento general sobre la forma en que debe interpretarse y aplicarse la norma en cuestión y no se alegó propiamente la inconstitucionalidad de algún elemento normativo concreto de dicha disposición legal, por estimarse como incompatible con algún componente del bloque de constitucionalidad. Como consecuencia, no puede estimarse que la alegada invocación permita establecer, adecuadamente, el carácter incidental de esta acción. Máxime que esta Sala ha resuelto, de forma reiterada, que “la aplicación indebida de la ley o su errónea interpretación en el caso concreto” no es materia propia de conocerse mediante la acción de inconstitucionalidad (sentencia No. 5966-94 de las 15:54 hrs. del 11 de octubre de 1994).” Consideraciones plenamente aplicables al sub lite.

IV.- EN CONCLUSIÓN. Como corolario de lo anterior, procede rechazar de plano la acción, como así se dispone.

V.- RAZONES DIFERENTES DE LOS MAGISTRADOS CRUZ CASTRO Y RUEDA LEAL, EN LO QUE RESPECTA A INTERESES DIFUSOS. Tal como lo hemos expresado en otros casos, estimamos que una cualidad del interés difuso consiste precisamente, en que su afectación es general -esto es, incide en toda una población o en amplios sectores de ella- dentro de un contexto, donde no se precisa que los sujetos perjudicados se conozcan entre sí (incluso podrían carecer de nexo o relaciones jurídicas entre ellos), pero sí se requiere de la presencia de una misma situación de daño o peligro a un bien constitucional que, por igual y sin necesidad de individualización alguna, comprende y aglomera a toda una sociedad en abstracto. Su defensa tiene como finalidad satisfacer una necesidad de la sociedad como tal, por ello, es trascendente a la de un ser humano individual o colectivamente considerado. En sentencia nro. 2019-17397 de las 12:54 horas del 11 de setiembre de 2019, este Tribunal reiteró lo siguiente:

“(…) En segundo lugar, se prevé la posibilidad de acudir en defensa de "intereses difusos"; este concepto, cuyo contenido ha ido siendo delineado paulatinamente por parte de la Sala, podría ser resumido en los términos empleados en la sentencia de este tribunal número 3750-93, de las quince horas del treinta de julio de mil novecientos noventa y tres) "… Los intereses difusos, aunque de difícil definición y más difícil identificación, no pueden ser en nuestra ley -como ya lo ha dicho esta Sala los intereses meramente colectivos; ni tan difusos que su titularidad se confunda con la de la comunidad nacional como un todo, ni tan concretos que frente a ellos resulten identificados o fácilmente identificables personas determinadas, o grupos personalizados, cuya legitimación derivaría, no de los intereses difusos, sino de los corporativos que atañen a una comunidad en su conjunto. Se trata entonces de intereses individuales, pero a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y, por ende reciben un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos igual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que se trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos que se encuentran en determinadas circunstancias y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas. Es decir, los intereses difusos participan de una doble naturaleza, ya que son a la vez colectivos -por ser comunes a una generalidad- e individuales, por lo que pueden ser reclamados en tal carácter".

En síntesis, los intereses difusos son aquellos cuya titularidad pertenece a grupos de personas no organizadas formalmente, pero unidas a partir de una determinada necesidad social, una característica física, su origen étnico, una determinada orientación personal o ideológica, el consumo de un cierto producto, etc. El interés, en estos casos, se encuentra difuminado, diluido (difuso) entre una pluralidad no identificada de sujetos. En estos casos, claro, la impugnación que el miembro de uno de estos sectores podría efectuar amparado en el párrafo 2° del artículo 75, deberá estar referida necesariamente a disposiciones que lo afecten en cuanto tal. Esta Sala ha enumerado diversos derechos a los que les ha dado el calificativo de "difusos", tales como el medio ambiente, el patrimonio cultural, la defensa de la integridad territorial del país y del buen manejo del gasto público, entre otros. Al respecto deben ser efectuadas dos precisiones: por un lado, los referidos bienes trascienden la esfera tradicionalmente reconocida a los intereses difusos, ya que se refieren en principio a aspectos que afectan a la colectividad nacional y no a grupos particulares de ésta; un daño ambiental no afecta apenas a los vecinos de una región o a los consumidores de un producto, sino que lesiona o pone en grave riesgo el patrimonio natural de todo el país e incluso de la Humanidad; del mismo modo, la defensa del buen manejo que se haga de los fondos públicos autorizados en el Presupuesto de la República es un interés de todos los habitantes de Costa Rica, no tan solo de un grupo cualquiera de ellos. Por otra parte, la enumeración que ha hecho la Sala Constitucional no pasa de una simple descripción propia de su obligación –como órgano jurisdiccional- de limitarse a conocer de los casos que le son sometidos, sin que pueda de ninguna manera llegar a entenderse que solo pueden ser considerados derechos difusos aquellos que la Sala expresamente ha ya reconocido como tales; lo anterior implicaría dar un vuelco indeseable en los alcances del Estado de Derecho, y de su correlativo "Estado de derechos", que –como en el caso del modelo costarricense- parte de la premisa de que lo que debe ser expreso son los límites a las libertades, ya que éstas subyacen a la misma condición humana y no requieren por ende de reconocimiento oficial. Finalmente, cuando el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional habla de intereses "que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto", se refiere a los bienes jurídicos explicados en las líneas anteriores, es decir, aquellos cuya titularidad reposa en los mismos detentadores de la soberanía, en cada uno de los habitantes de la República.

No se trata por ende de que cualquier persona pueda acudir a la Sala Constitucional en tutela de cualesquiera intereses (acción popular), sino que todo individuo puede actuar en defensa de aquellos bienes que afectan a toda la colectividad nacional, sin que tampoco en este campo sea válido ensayar cualquier intento de enumeración taxativa” (véase la sentencia No. 2007- 01145).” En consonancia con lo expuesto y sostenido por este Tribunal en su jurisprudencia, se trata entonces de intereses individuales, pero a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y, por ende, reciben un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos igual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que se trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos que se encuentran en determinadas circunstancias y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas. Es por ello, precisamente, que, a partir de la sentencia nro. 2021-2185 de las 12:51 horas del 3 de febrero de 2021, consideramos, a diferencia de la Mayoría de este Tribunal, que algunos de estos intereses pueden estar plasmados en un caso particular en concreto, sin perder por ello su condición de interés difuso, tal como ocurre con la protección al ambiente, cuyo impacto afecta a una persona y a todos en general; y puede ser individualizada tal afectación en una situación en particular, como por ejemplo, la construcción de una fábrica en un sector vecino determinado, sin los estudios ambientales respectivos, cuyos efectos negativos incidan en la capa de ozono del planeta. Indudablemente el resultado de un reclamo o proceso que pueda plantear un vecino contra esa fábrica, no solo incidirá en sus intereses propios, sino también en el resto de la colectividad. Por ello, constituye un interés difuso; y, sin embargo, también es objeto de una situación particular individualizada. Ahora bien, ello no quiere decir, en modo alguno, que en toda situación invocada se pueda alegar la existencia de un interés difuso, aunque este pueda ser objeto de una situación particular. Recordemos que para que un interés sea considerado “difuso”, no solo debe afectar una colectividad, sino también debe difuminarse, difundirse en esa colectividad. Si no produce tal efecto, no puede ser considerado un interés difuso. En el caso del accionante, tal como refiere la Mayoría, la normativa impugnada no produce una afectación socialmente difuminada, sino determinada. De modo que, en este caso, lo que se vislumbra es una situación que, si bien puede ser compartida por algún grupo de personas, ese efecto no es de tal magnitud como para considerarlo un interés difuso. Por el motivo expuesto coincidimos con la Mayoría en desestimar esta acción.

VI.- DOCUMENTACIÓN APORTADA AL EXPEDIENTE. Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza de plano la acción. Los magistrados Cruz Castro y Rueda Leal dan razones diferentes en cuanto a la legitimación por intereses difusos.

Fernando Castillo V.

Fernando Cruz C.

Paul Rueda L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

Anamari Garro V.

Ingrid Hess H.

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