State advertising and indirect censorship in political satire programPauta publicitaria estatal y censura indirecta en programa de sátira política

V.ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS OF THIS APPEAL. According to the foregoing statement of proven facts, it is documented that, although the company that produces and broadcasts the program El Chinamo was able to continue doing so, including the section El Chinaoke—which caused the controversy with the respondent institutions—and it is asserted that the advertising placement (pauta publicitaria) with the channel was maintained, albeit redistributed, the truth is that the press releases from both institutions leave no hint of doubt that they adopted decisions linked to said advertising placement and the broadcast of the "El Chinaoke" section. In the case of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and its brand Kölbi, the autonomous entity reported that: "Kölbi brand values do not align with content presented on the television program El Chinamo. Kölbi, a commercial brand of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), clarifies and communicates to the public: 0 The content presented by [Name 006] [Value 003] on the program El Chinamo, specifically in the El Chinaoke section, does not align with our brand values. 0 Given its Costa Rican origin, Kölbi distances itself from situations in which violence is implicitly or explicitly promoted or exposed, discrimination, apology for crime, or parody of victims' suffering. 0 On the contrary, the advertising and commercial efforts of the brand focus on promoting values such as peace, family unity, respect, innovation, and solidarity, with a positive impact characteristic of the national idiosyncrasy. This is confirmed by Kölbi's journey in the market for over fifteen years. 0 The contracting of the advertising spaces on the program in question, as well as the mentions of Kölbi, were intended to associate the brand with family entertainment typical of the end and beginning of the year season; never with situations alluding to pain, stigmatization, or mockery. 0 'As a leading brand, we are governed by solid principles that guide our actions and decisions. We do not support acts contrary to those values, especially those contrary to the social and environmental responsibility we promote,' stated Leda Acevedo, ICE's Telecommunications Manager. 0 For the reasons stated, Kölbi has decided to disassociate itself from the program El Chinamo and will analyze the permanence of its advertising placement on [Name 006] [Value 003]." (emphasis added). Meanwhile, in the case of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, the official press release was expressed in the following terms, as pertinent: "In this context, the President of the Bank's National Board of Directors, Jorge Eduardo Sánchez, has emphasized that our brand—which is the property of our clients and the working people [Name 002]—cannot be exposed to being associated with inappropriate images or those that might even foster behaviors foreign to the morality and public order to which we are bound.

In the particular case of the public debate generated precisely by some content aired in the 'El Chinaoke' section of the program 'El Chinamo,' broadcast by [Name 006] [Value 003], we deeply regret as Banco Popular that some sectors of the citizenry might feel offended or uncomfortable by said images, and we have adopted the pertinent actions to guarantee that our participations are always fostered within spaces that have the values of healthy entertainment as a permanent priority.

In this way, and given that this season of the program 'El Chinamo' will extend until next Monday, December 23, we will only maintain the sponsorship of the 'El Aguinaldazo' section, which brings joy to the family by awarding a lucky viewer 1 million colones daily." (emphasis added). That is to say, in the case of both entities, there was an express decision, officially communicated, to impose consequences linked to the payment for advertising spaces, due to the content of a section of the television program. After the issuance of the two press releases cited above, several parodies of the same style as those already described were broadcast; however, due to the dates on which the press releases were made public, as well as those on which these amparo appeals (recursos de amparo) were filed, there is no interest in covering the subsequent programs. Having established the foregoing considerations, it is now necessary to determine whether, as the appellants here allege, the questioned decisions contravene freedom of expression.

VI.- ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ITS FUNCTION IN A REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM. In various pronouncements, this body of constitutional justice has established the nexus between freedom of expression and the principles upon which our political and legal system is built. In Judgment No. 1997-01750 of 3:00 p.m. on March 21, 1997, it was explained as follows:

"X- In this regard, among the main precepts that recognize and guarantee freedom of expression and information and that configure what could be called the general regime of that constitutionally protected freedom, the following exist:

"Article 28 (Political Constitution):

'No one may be disturbed or persecuted for the expression of their opinions or for any act that does not violate the law...' "Article 29 (Political Constitution):

'Everyone may communicate their thoughts verbally or in writing, and publish them without prior censorship; but they shall be responsible for the abuses they commit in the exercise of this right, in the cases and in the manner established by law.' "Article 13 (American Convention): Freedom of Thought and Expression:

'1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, or in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice.

'2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law and be necessary to ensure:

'a) respect for the rights or reputations of others; or 'b) the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals.

'3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.

'4. Public entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 2.

'5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitements to violence or any other similar illegal action against any person or group of persons on any grounds, including those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin, shall be prohibited by law.' "Article 19 (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights):

'1. No one shall be subjected to interference regarding their opinions.

'2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

'3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

'a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; 'b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.' XI- From the content of the foregoing provisions, it is evident that freedom of expression and information has, as a prior and indispensable condition, freedom of thought or ideology, and that it essentially comprises the right of every person to freely seek, receive, and express thoughts, ideas, opinions, value judgments, beliefs, facts, data, etc., in relation to all types of matters (including political and electoral matters), using any lawful means at their disposal and for the most varied purposes (commercial, recreational, political, electoral, etc.). From the cited precepts, it is also evident that within the framework of its constitutionally guaranteed regime, the fundamental right of free expression and information is configured as a right of freedom. This implies, basically, that its exercise does not require express recognition by public authorities as to who its legitimate holders are, but rather that it is expected of them—or better said, generally required—that they refrain from influencing or imposing any type of obstacle on said exercise. This condition of the right to free expression and information has been especially pondered at the level of its protection within the Inter-American Human Rights System, a situation reflected above all in the breadth of content and the degree of exceptionality of the limitations with which it is recognized and guaranteed in the American Convention on Human Rights. From the essential content of freedom of expression and information also arises the existence of its two concurrent dimensions, highlighted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, on the compulsory membership of journalists. In this regard, the Court indicated that this freedom manifests itself both in the individual dimension, of the person who expresses or expresses themselves, and in a collective dimension, of all those who receive the content of that expression. These two dimensions are so interwoven that when the former is restricted, it is not only the fundamental right of its individual holder that is being limited, but also that of all those who have been prevented from receiving their ideas and information. Given this very close link between both dimensions (individual and collective), freedom of expression and information implies the right to use any lawful means to disseminate thought or information and to make it reach any number of recipients, a situation that reveals that the expression and dissemination of thought or information are indivisible, such that a restriction of those means or of the possibilities of dissemination means, simultaneously and to the same extent, a limitation of the right of free expression and information.

XII- From the foregoing, it follows that freedom of expression and information has a basic character, being a necessary prerequisite for the remaining fundamental rights, which is why it has been pointed out as a determining factor for the legitimacy of the functioning of the democratic system, by allowing people, without any distinction, to think in the way they best decide and to freely express their opinions at all times. Contributing to this basic character is the fact that the essential content of freedom of expression and information does not require special demands regarding the content, the forms, or the means used by the message being expressed, or the levels of dissemination it reaches, a situation that favors that, through it, manifestations of its exercise as varied as artistic creation or electoral propaganda itself are recognized and guaranteed." That is to say, based on the Constitution itself, as well as the norms of the regional and universal human rights protection systems, a vigorous protection of freedom of expression is evident, from a dual perspective: dogmatic—that is, in consideration of its character as a fundamental right—and organic or institutional—as an element immanent to democracy. In the same vein, Judgment No. 2006-05977 of 3:16 p.m. on May 3, 2006, developed this syncretism between freedom of expression and democracy:

"VIII.- Freedom of expression as an indispensable requirement of democracy. Freedom of expression is undoubtedly one of the conditions—though not the only one—for democracy to function. This freedom is what allows for the creation of public opinion, essential for giving content to several principles of the constitutional State, such as, for example, the right to information, the right of petition, or rights regarding political participation; the existence of a free and consolidated public opinion is also a condition for the functioning of representative democracy. The possibility for all persons to participate in public discussions constitutes the necessary prerequisite for building a social dynamic of exchanging knowledge, ideas, and information, which allows for the generation of consensus and decision-making among the components of the various social groups, but which also constitutes a channel for the expression of dissensus, which in a democracy are as necessary as agreements. For its part, the exchange of opinions and information that originates from public discussion contributes to forming personal opinion, both of which shape public opinion, which ultimately manifests itself through the channels of representative democracy. As the Spanish Constitutional Court itself has indicated, other rights that the Constitution enshrines would be emptied of real content, representative institutions reduced to hollow forms, and the principle of democratic legitimacy—which is the basis of our entire legal-political order—absolutely falsified (Judgment 6/1981), if there did not exist liberties capable of permitting that exchange, which... presupposes the right of citizens to have extensive and adequate information regarding the facts, allowing them to form their convictions and participate in the discussion relating to public affairs (Judgment 159/1986).

IX-. Content of freedom of expression. It could be said that freedom of information has several facets, as recognized by national doctrine (of which the first three are related to what is discussed here): a) freedom of the press in a broad sense, covering any type of publication, b) freedom of information through non-written means, c) the right of rectification or reply. Freedom of the press generically encompasses all types of printed materials, printing, editing, circulation of newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, and publications of all kinds. By its nature, it is the natural vehicle for the freedom of expression of citizens. It translates into the right for individuals to seek and disseminate information and ideas to an indeterminate number of people about facts that, by their nature, are of general interest because they are considered newsworthy. By its nature, it is subject to the same limitations as freedom of expression. Its functions in a democracy are: to inform (facts, newsworthy events), to integrate opinion (stimulating social integration), and to control political power, insofar as it is a permanent guardian of the honesty and correct handling of public affairs. Given its symbiotic link with democratic ideology, countless international instruments and practically all the Constitutions of the free world, since the French Declaration of 1789 (art. 11), have recognized it. Our Political Constitution, for its part, protects it through various norms:

'Everyone may communicate their thoughts verbally or in writing and publish them without prior censorship; but they shall be responsible for the abuses they commit in the exercise of this right, under the conditions and in the manner established by law' (Article 29) 'No one may be disturbed or persecuted for the expression of their opinions or for any act that does not violate the law.

Private actions that do not harm morality or public order or that do not harm a third party are beyond the reach of the law.

However, no political propaganda may be carried out in any form by clergy or laypersons invoking religious motives or using religious beliefs as a means' (Article 28).

Other constitutional norms related to this right are:

'The freedom of petition, individually or collectively, before any public official or official entity, and the right to obtain a prompt resolution are guaranteed' (Article 27).

'Free access to administrative departments for purposes of information on matters of public interest is guaranteed.

State secrets are exempted' (Article 30).

Freedom of expression has, as a consequence, the prohibition of all forms of censorship, in a dual sense: interlocutors cannot be censored, on the one hand; and, in general, the possible contents of the discussion cannot be censored beforehand either: in principle, in a democracy, all topics are debatable. The non-censorability of subjects has a practically universal character, as established by our Constitution; no one can be deprived of the freedom to speak and express themselves as they see fit; the non-censorability of content, while it does not occur in a prior manner, does encounter some limitations; however, these must be such that the freedom continues to have meaning or is not emptied of its content; basically, like all freedom, it must be exercised with responsibility, ultimately to pursue legitimate aims within the system." It is also relevant to bring up Resolution No. 2022025167 of 1:30 p.m. on October 21, 2022, insofar as it broadly develops the implications of freedom of expression, which has multiple manifestations:

"IV.- ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. Freedom of expression is one of the pillars upon which the Rule of Law is founded and comprises both the fundamental and universal guarantee to manifest one's own thoughts or opinions, and to know those of others. In other words, it refers to the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas, whether orally or in writing. This is why it is said that freedom of expression is characterized by being a right with a double dimension: an individual dimension, consisting of the right of each person to seek information and express their own thoughts, ideas, and information; and a collective or social dimension, consisting of the right of society to seek and receive any information, to know the thoughts, ideas, and information of others, and to be well-informed. Regarding this double dimension of the freedom under study, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter I/A Court HR), in the case of Herrera Ulloa vs. the State of [Name 002] (judgment of July 2, 2004), held the following:

'(…) 109. In this regard, the Court has indicated that the first dimension of freedom of expression "is not exhausted in the theoretical recognition of the right to speak or write, but also inseparably comprises the right to use any appropriate medium to disseminate thought and to make it reach the greatest number of recipients." In this sense, the expression and dissemination of thoughts and ideas are indivisible, so that a restriction on the possibilities of dissemination represents directly, and to the same extent, a limit on the right to express oneself freely.

110. With respect to the second dimension of the right to freedom of expression, that is, the social dimension, it is necessary to point out that freedom of expression is a means for the exchange of ideas and information among people; it comprises their right to try to communicate their points of view to others, but it also implies the right of all to know opinions, accounts, and news expressed by third parties. For the ordinary citizen, knowledge of another's opinion or of the information available to others is as important as the right to disseminate their own.

111. This Tribunal has affirmed that both dimensions are of equal importance and must be fully guaranteed simultaneously to give total effectiveness to the right to freedom of expression in the terms provided by Article 13 of the Convention (…).' For its part, the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American Legal Framework on the Right to Freedom of Expression, December 2009), referred to this right in the following terms:

'(...) it is one of the individual rights that most clearly reflects the virtue that accompanies—and characterizes—human beings: the unique and precious virtue of thinking about the world from our own perspective and of communicating with others to build, through a deliberative process, not only the model of life that each person has the right to adopt, but the model of society in which we want to live. All the creative potential in art, science, technology, politics, in short, all our individual and collective creative capacity, depends fundamentally on the respect and promotion of the right to freedom of expression in all its dimensions. It is, then, an individual right without which the first and most important of our freedoms would be denied: the right to think for oneself and to share our thinking with others (...)

Likewise, international soft law instruments have safeguarded this freedom. Thus, the Declaration of Chapultepec (adopted by the hemispheric conference on freedom of expression held in Mexico City on March 11, 1994), in its first principle, states that:

'1. There are no free people or societies without freedom of expression and of the press. The exercise of this is not a concession of the authorities; it is an inalienable right of the people.' For its part, the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression (approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in October 2000, at its 108th regular session), provides the following:

'1. Freedom of expression, in all its forms and manifestations, is a fundamental and inalienable right, inherent to all persons. It is, moreover, an indispensable requirement for the very existence of a democratic society.' In another context, within the European legal order, the European Convention on Human Rights stands out, which in its article 10 specifies the universal ownership of this right, in the following terms:

'Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.' Similarly, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in its article 11, states the following:

'Article 11 Freedom of expression and information 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.

2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected.' (…)

For its part, the I/A Court HR, in the case of Moya Chacón et al. vs. Costa Rica (judgment of May 23, 2022), indicated the following:

'(…) b.3 Permitted restrictions on freedom of expression and the application of subsequent liability in cases affecting honor and dignity in matters of public interest 71. The Tribunal recalls that, in general, the right to freedom of expression cannot be subject to prior censorship but, in any case, to subsequent liability in very exceptional cases and under the fulfillment of a series of strict requirements. Thus, Article 13.2 of the American Convention establishes that subsequent liability for the exercise of freedom of expression must meet the following concurrent requirements: (i) be previously established by law, in a formal and material sense; (ii) respond to an objective permitted by the American Convention; and (iii) be necessary in a democratic society (for which they must meet the requirements of suitability, necessity, and proportionality).

72. Regarding strict legality, the Court has established that restrictions must be previously fixed by law as a means to ensure that they are not left to the discretion of public power. For this, the classification of the conduct must be clear and precise, even more so if it involves convictions in the criminal and not the civil order. Regarding the permitted or legitimate aims, these are indicated in the referred Article 13.2 and are (a) respect for the rights or reputations of others, or (b) the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals. Likewise, restrictions on freedom of expression must be suitable, that is, effectively conducive to achieving the legitimately permitted purpose. As regards the analysis of necessity, the Tribunal has held that, for a restriction on free expression to be compatible with the American Convention, it must be necessary in a democratic society, understanding 'necessary' as the existence of a compelling social need that justifies the restriction. In this sense, the Court must examine the existing alternatives to achieve the legitimate aim pursued and specify the greater or lesser harmfulness of those alternatives. Finally, in relation to the proportionality of the measure, the Court has understood that the restrictions imposed on the right to freedom of expression must be proportional to the interest that justifies them and closely adjust to the achievement of that objective, interfering as little as possible in the effective enjoyment of the right. In that sense, it is not sufficient that it has a legitimate purpose, but the measure in question must respect proportionality when affecting freedom of expression. In other words, 'in this last step of the analysis, it is considered whether the restriction is strictly proportional, so that the sacrifice inherent therein is not exaggerated or excessive compared to the advantages obtained through such limitation.'" The Court recalls that these restrictions are exceptional in nature and must not limit, beyond what is strictly necessary, the full exercise of freedom of expression nor become a direct or indirect mechanism of prior censorship.

73. In this regard, the Court has established that such subsequent liability may be imposed insofar as the right to honor and reputation may have been affected. Thus, Article 11 of the Convention establishes, in effect, that everyone has the right to have their honor protected and their dignity recognized. The Court has indicated that the right to honor "recognizes that every person has the right to respect for it, prohibits all unlawful attacks on honor or reputation, and imposes on States the duty to provide legal protection against such attacks." In general terms, this Court has indicated that "the right to honor relates to one's own esteem and self-worth, while reputation refers to the opinion others have of a person." In this sense, this Court has held that "both freedom of expression and the right to honor, rights both protected by the Convention, are of the utmost importance, which is why it is necessary to guarantee both rights, so that they coexist harmoniously." The exercise of each fundamental right must be done with respect for and safeguarding of other fundamental rights. Therefore, the Court has noted that "the resolution of the conflict that arises between both rights requires a balancing of the two, for which purpose each case must be examined, according to its characteristics and circumstances, in order to assess the existence and intensity of the elements on which that judgment is based." 74. The Court recalls in this respect that, to determine the conventionality of a restriction on freedom of expression when it collides with the right to honor, it is of vital importance to analyze whether the statements made are of public interest, given that in these cases the judge must evaluate with special caution the need to limit freedom of expression. In its jurisprudence, the Court has considered of public interest those opinions or information on matters in which society has a legitimate interest in being informed, in knowing what affects the functioning of the State, or affects general rights or interests, or carries important consequences. Determining the foregoing has consequences in the analysis of the conventionality of the restriction on the right to freedom of expression, given that expressions relating to matters of public interest—such as, for example, those concerning a person's suitability for holding public office or acts performed by public officials in the performance of their duties—enjoy greater protection, in such a way as to foster democratic debate.

75. Thus, the Court has indicated that, in a democratic society, those persons who influence matters of public interest are more exposed to public scrutiny and criticism. This different threshold of protection is explained because their activities leave the domain of the private sphere to enter the sphere of public debate and, therefore, they have voluntarily exposed themselves to this more demanding scrutiny. This does not mean, in any way, that the honor of persons participating in matters of public interest should not be legally protected, but rather that it must be protected in a manner consistent with the principles of democratic pluralism.

76. On the other hand, in relation to the necessary character and the rigorous proportionality analysis that must govern between the limitation on the right to freedom of expression and the protection of the right to honor, the goal shall be to seek that intervention which, being the most suitable for restoring damaged reputation, also contains a minimal degree of impact on the sphere of freedom of expression. In this respect, within the framework of freedom of information, the Court considers that there is a duty of the journalist to reasonably verify, though not necessarily exhaustively, the facts they disseminate. However, this does not imply a strict requirement of truthfulness, at least with regard to matters of public interest, recognizing as an exoneration that the publication is made in good faith or justifiably and always in accordance with minimum standards of ethics and professionalism in the search for truth. Likewise, the Court warns that, for investigative journalism to exist in a democratic society, it is necessary to leave journalists "room for error," given that without this margin of error there can be no independent journalism nor, therefore, the possibility of the necessary democratic scrutiny that emanates from it.

77. Additionally, the Court also considers that no one shall be subjected to subsequent liability for the dissemination of information related to a public matter that is based on material accessible to the public or that comes from official sources.

78. Finally, it should also be emphasized that, should it be deemed appropriate to grant reparation to the person aggrieved in their honor, the purpose of this reparation must not be to punish the issuer of the information, but to restore the affected person. In this respect, States must exercise the utmost caution when imposing reparations, so as not to dissuade the press from participating in the discussion of matters of legitimate public interest (…).” (…)

VI.- CONCERNING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (AND OF THE PRESS) AS GUARANTORS OF THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM. Freedom of expression and, concomitantly, the exercise of freedom of the press, become fundamental pillars upon which a democratic society is built. The intrinsic relationship that exists between such freedoms and democracy is practically unquestionable; hence, the latter is arbitrarily weakened and eroded when said freedoms cannot be fully exercised nor are they respected and guaranteed in legal systems.

The Inter-American Democratic Charter (approved by the Member States of the OAS during an extraordinary session of the General Assembly held on September 11, 2001, in Lima, Peru), on this matter, provides in its Article 4 that: "Transparency in government activities, probity, responsibility of governments in public management, respect for social rights, and freedom of expression and of the press are essential components of the exercise of democracy." Furthermore, it is worth recalling that the previously issued Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression establishes in its first principle that freedom of expression is "(…) an indispensable requirement for the very existence of a democratic society." Freedom of the press (or what some call a free press), as a manifestation of freedom of expression, constitutes an essential element for scrutinizing—without reprisals—the actions of third parties, whether private individuals or public officials, mainly those who occupy high office or aspire to it, thus consequently enabling accountability, combating corruption, transparency in the management of public funds, among many other aspects that are fundamental for maintaining a democratic system in force. Part of that duty lies in investigating persons in power, mainly the government, formulating difficult questions and thereby attempting to reveal to the citizenry what is really happening, as a means, in turn, for them to make correct decisions, mainly when voting and also later, when in the exercise of power. As the so-called Civil Liberties Union for Europe (a non-governmental organization that promotes civil liberties for all persons in the European Union) has stated, "(…) A free press helps at every step of this process. It provides information to voters before they vote; it fosters dialogue and debate to enrich the understanding of this information; and then it informs the citizenry about the work of the government and whether they are actually fulfilling their promises. In a democracy, the citizenry delegates decision-making power to its elected officials, and the press is a way of controlling them (…)." In essence, it is feasible to affirm, then, that freedom of the press is fundamental in democratic systems, because it allows citizens to form opinions and criteria regarding the reality in which they live. For this reason, independent media are unfortunately precisely one of the main targets of anti-democratic political systems or, at least, of those that seek to become so and are heading in that direction.

(…)

For its part, the Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American Legal Framework on the Right to Freedom of Expression, December 2009), stated the following:

"(…) the IACHR and the Inter-American Court have stressed in their jurisprudence that the importance of freedom of expression within the catalog of human rights also derives from its structural relationship with democracy. This relationship, which has been described by the organs of the Inter-American human rights system as 'close,' 'indissoluble,' 'essential,' and 'fundamental,' among others, explains much of the interpretive developments that have been given to freedom of expression by the IACHR and the Inter-American Court in their various decisions on the subject. The link between freedom of expression and democracy is so important that, as the IACHR has explained, the very objective of Article 13 of the American Convention is to strengthen the functioning of pluralistic and deliberative democratic systems through the protection and promotion of the free circulation of information, ideas, and expressions of all kinds (…) if the exercise of the right to freedom of expression tends not only to the personal fulfillment of the person expressing themselves, but also to the consolidation of truly democratic societies, the State has the obligation to generate the conditions so that public debate not only satisfies the legitimate needs of all as consumers of certain information (entertainment, for example), but as citizens. That is, there must be sufficient conditions for a public, plural, and open deliberation to take place on matters that concern us all as citizens of a given State (…)." (The highlighting is not part of the original).

Also, said Rapporteurship stated the following:

"(…) in a democratic society, the press has the right to freely inform and criticize the government, and the people have the right to be informed about different views of what is happening in the community (…)." Along the same lines of thought, the European Court of Human Rights, in the case Lingens v. Austria (judgment of July 8, 1986), stressed that "(…) freedom of the press offers the public one of the best means for discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders. More generally, freedom of political debate is at the very heart of the concept of a democratic society (…)." Likewise, the Colombian Constitutional Court has referred to the subject under consideration on several occasions. Thus, in Judgment No. T-256/13 of April 30, 2013, it held that: "(…) the right to freedom of expression is a principle of the exercise of democracy because it is within the framework of a democratic state that citizen participation acquires special relevance, and in furtherance of it, the freedom to express different opinions and to manifest minority thoughts without fear of being repressed by state powers is guaranteed (…)" and explained that:

"(…) Therefore, the pronouncements of the Inter-American Commission and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have stressed that freedom of expression fulfills a triple function in the democratic system: a) it ensures the individual right of every person to think for themselves and to share with others their personal thought and opinion, b) it has a close, indissoluble, essential, fundamental, and structural relationship with democracy, and to that extent, the very objective of Article 13 of the American Convention is to strengthen the functioning of democratic, pluralistic, and deliberative systems, through the protection and promotion of the free circulation of ideas and opinions, and c) finally, it is a key tool for the exercise of other fundamental rights, given that 'it is an essential mechanism for the exercise of the right to participation, to religious freedom, to education, to ethnic or cultural identity, and, of course, to equality understood not only as the right to non-discrimination, but as the right to the enjoyment of certain basic social rights (…)." Similarly, this constitutional body added that:

"(…) This Corporation from very early in its jurisprudence recognized the value of this right within the framework of a democracy with the following words: 'Although the freedom to express and disseminate one's own thought and opinions is a right of every person, it is not only an individual right, but also a guarantee of a fundamental political institution: 'free public opinion.' Free public opinion is indissolubly linked to political pluralism, which is a fundamental value and a requirement for the functioning of the democratic state. Without free public communication, other rights enshrined in the Constitution would be emptied of real content, representative and participatory institutional mechanisms reduced to empty forms, and the principle of democratic legitimacy absolutely falsified (…)." (The highlighting is not part of the original).

In Judgment No. T-543 of 2017 of August 25, 2017, the Colombian Constitutional Court indicated that freedom of expression fulfills the following functions in a democratic society: "(…) (i) allows seeking truth and developing knowledge; (ii) makes possible the principle of self-government; (iii) promotes personal autonomy; (iv) prevents abuses of power; and (v) is a 'safety valve' that stimulates the peaceful confrontation of state or social decisions that are not shared (…)." For its part, in Judgment No. C-135/21 of May 13, 2021, said Court mentioned that some of the contributions of the fundamental right to freedom of expression to democratic functioning are the following: "(…) i) allows seeking truth and developing knowledge; ii) creates a space for healthy dialogue and protest for the citizenry, which consolidates pluralistic and deliberative societies; iii) allows establishing mechanisms of control and accountability over the rulers; iv) promotes citizen self-government; and v) contributes to better popular elections (…)." Also, in Judgment No. T-145/19 of April 2, 2019, the Colombian Court held that freedom of expression "(…) is a pillar of the Social Rule of Law and a fundamental principle of democratic regimes, where human dignity is respected and the participation of the citizenry and all sectors is valued, which makes it possible to consolidate pluralistic and deliberative societies (…)." Likewise, on this last occasion, said body noted that "(…) The main foundation of the legal protection of freedom of expression finds support in human dignity, in the autonomy of the person and in its instrumental character for the exercise of multiple rights, and in the diverse functions it fulfills in democratic systems (…)." It can, then, be emphasized from the cited decisions the structural link—as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights describes it—between democracy and freedom of expression, because only a regime in which the people, its inhabitants, are recognized as a plural voice, with the capacity to dissent, to express opinions, and to criticize aspects of the reality in which they live, but, especially, activities originating in the public sphere, can be described as a substantively democratic regime.

VII.- ON POLITICAL SATIRE AS ONE OF THE FORMS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. The case under consideration offers the particularity, within the general framework of freedom of expression and its multiple manifestations, of referring to a section, within a television program, intended to perform musical parodies about social and political problems which, as stipulated in the proven facts of this decision, were three, up to the moment when the defendant institutions decided to communicate changes in the payment of advertising for the program: care in the public health system, consequences of citizen insecurity, and cost of living. We are, then, facing a specific form of the exercise of freedom of expression, related to political satire, to humor with social criticism. To fully understand this aspect, it is necessary to recall that freedom of expression is indispensable for the development and fulfillment of individuals. Thanks to the free exchange of information and opinions, people better understand the world in which they live, because the free circulation of ideas allows seeking truth, deepening knowledge, and participating in decision-making processes. For this reason, without freedom of expression, one cannot speak of democracy, as was especially highlighted in the previous recital. Not only because of the effect it has on the formation of opinion, but also because it constitutes a way for people to make known to the authorities what they think, and for those authorities to be able to respond to their concerns. It is necessary for stability, pluralism, and tolerance in society. In a country like ours, where freedom of thought and expression exists, its inhabitants have the right to criticize public power, through different forms, making use of the great plasticity inherent in freedom of expression, including satire. Expressions of openly satirical and humorous vocation allow for exaggerations, distortions, and ironic representations. They are linked to laughter and criticism. In the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy, the term satire appears as: "1.f. Composition in verse or prose whose object is to censure or ridicule someone or something. 2.f. Sharp, spicy, and caustic discourse or saying, aimed at censuring or ridiculing." It is a notion that encompasses very varied aspects: irony, irreverence, disrespect, insolence, exaggeration, mockery. It can be embodied in writings, speeches, images, caricatures, parodies, pastiches. For its part, the word humor, in the second meaning of the recently cited dictionary, means: "Joviality, wit," and humorism is defined as a "way of presenting reality." Making people laugh, then, is the primary intention of satire. Now, it should not be forgotten that behind all the current novel types of making and transmitting humor and satire, one is facing a form of expression with origins in antiquity: Aristophanes in the 5th century B.C. satirized the social and political life of the time; Lucilius, in the 1st century B.C. created Latin satire, understood as a poetic genre intended to point out social vices and ridiculous things. Later, Molière, in the 17th century, used that resource to criticize courtly customs, doctors, and the bourgeoisie. With all the different nuances specified, it certainly constitutes a form of freedom of expression. From the point of view of individuals, in the exercise of their freedom, of the principle of autonomy of the will recognized in our Costa Rican constitution by Article 28, it covers not only inoffensive ideas but also those that may displease public institutions, groups of people, or individuals, an effect that often goes hand in hand with satire, especially if it is an instrument of denunciation and social criticism. Humor is inspired by reality but tends toward exaggeration, toward caricature, often to propose reflection, generate surprise or stupor, as well as to make painful truths more bearable, or even to serve as an antidote for anger. The greater or lesser tolerance for satire in a society is proportional to the greater or lesser level of commitment of that society to a truly democratic system. The European Court of Human Rights paid particular attention to interference with the right of artists—and of any person, in general—to express themselves through satire, understanding it as a form of artistic expression and social commentary that seeks to provoke and agitate. In the case Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria, of January 27, 2007, it stated:

"26. The Court recalls that freedom of expression, enshrined in paragraph 1 of Article 10, constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, a primary condition for the progress and development of each person. Subject to paragraph 2, it covers not only 'information' or 'ideas' that are favorably received or considered inoffensive or indifferent, but also those that offend, shock, or disturb the State or a group of inhabitants. This is required by pluralism, tolerance, and the spirit of openness, without which one cannot speak of a 'democratic society.' Those who create, interpret, disseminate, or exhibit a work of art contribute to the exchange of ideas and opinions indispensable in a democratic society. Hence, the State's obligation not to unduly hinder freedom of expression. Evidently, artists and those who promote their works do not escape the eventual limitations implied by the second paragraph of Article 10. Whoever exercises their freedom of expression assumes, in effect, according to the very terms of the paragraph, 'duties and responsibilities,' which will depend on the situation and procedure employed (Müller and Others v. Switzerland, May 24, 1988, §§ 33-34, Series A no. 133, and the references cited). (…)

33. (…) The Court considers that the model of representation constitutes a caricature of the persons alluded to using satirical elements. It is recalled that satire is a form of artistic expression and social commentary that, through the exaggeration and distortion of reality that characterizes it, naturally seeks to provoke and agitate. Therefore, any interference with the right of an artist to express themselves by this means must be examined with particular attention." (the highlighting is our own) In the same vein, the Court of Appeals of Versailles, in 1991 (January 31, 1991, D. 1991, IR), specified that the humorous genre allows for exaggerations, distortions, and ironic presentations, regarding which everyone is free to assess whether or not they are in good taste. This, to the extent that a high degree of subjectivity prevails here, of plural and different perceptions of the topic addressed and of one's own sensitivity regarding what may or may not be humorous.

On the diversity inherent in freedom of expression and the possibility of restricting some of its manifestations, in Decision No. 2006-05977 of 15:16 hours on May 3, 2006, this Court indicated:

"X.-. The limits on freedom of expression and freedom of the press. To determine which expressions can be limited and to what extent, it is important to take into account that not all expressions can have the same value nor enjoy, consequently, the same constitutional protection. Thus, for example, even international jurisprudence, cf. the Spanish Constitutional Court, has indicated that insults or formally injurious and unnecessary value judgments for the expression of an idea, thought, or opinion lack constitutional protection. On another level are opinions, that is, personal value judgments that are not formally injurious and unnecessary for what is intended to be expressed, although they contain what is known as 'disturbing or hurtful opinions'; these opinions would be constitutionally protected by freedom of expression and could even have as their content irony, satire, and mockery. On another step would be information, meaning by that the truthful narration of facts, which would be protected as a general rule, unless it violates other fundamental rights or constitutionally protected legal interests (for example, honor, privacy, the order and tranquility of the nation, the rights of children and adolescents). On another level would be news, meaning by that the truthful narration of facts that have public relevance, either because of the facts in themselves, or because of the persons involved in them; news contributes in a prominent way to the creation of free public opinion. On the last level would be found falsehoods, rumors, or insidious statements that hide behind a neutral narration of facts and that, in reality, completely lack veracity. On the subject of veracity, the Commission on Human Rights has indicated (Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, adopted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights at its 108th regular session in October 2000) that any prior conditioning on aspects such as veracity, timeliness, or impartiality of the information is considered prior censorship, but in the opinion of this Court, it must be understood that this refers to the possibility of using such arguments as justification for prior censorship of the information, not to impede the right to effective judicial protection against insults or damages that they may have received in their person, property, or moral interests, as established by Article 41 of our Constitution when stating:

'Resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the insults or damages they may have received in their person, property, or moral interests. Justice must be done to them promptly, completely, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws.' (the underline is added) The previous decision is complemented by what this Chamber also provided in ruling No. 2019008752 of 9:30 a.m. on May 17, 2019:

"I.- Preliminary considerations: on freedom of expression. Having seen the allegations of the appellant, she is reminded that the purpose of the amparo appeal is to provide timely protection against infringements or threats to fundamental rights and freedoms, not to serve as an instrument to censor opinions, however offensive, shocking, or annoying they may be to some sectors of the population (see in this sense ruling No. 2015007498 of 11:30 a.m. on May 22, 2015). Thus, the simple fact that an external manifestation, an artistic work, or a literary work, for example, is in bad taste or violates the sensitivity, particular morals, or personal ethical values of some individuals, in and of itself, is not a matter directly related to an eventual violation of some fundamental right. On the contrary, the Chamber has been emphatic in declaring that any restriction—censorship or 'subsequent liability'—to freedom of expression, the right to public information, and artistic creation, is subject to 'strict scrutiny,' since to accept its admissibility it would not be enough to prove that the restriction is useful for safeguarding other fundamental rights, but it is indispensable to demonstrate that the safeguard or restriction is necessary to protect those rights and that, moreover, that safeguard and the degree of impact on those rights is of greater significance than the very safeguard of freedom of expression (see, by way of example, the ruling of this Chamber No. 2012-005178 of 11:30 a.m. on April 20, 2012).

(…)

Likewise, the jurisprudence established in the case New York Times v. Sullivan of 1964 is recognized, in which it is noted that the protection the Constitution offers to freedom of expression does not depend on the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs expressed, and recognizes that a certain degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of that freedom, based on which the government and the courts must allow a debate that is 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' to develop, which may include caustic, vehement expressions, and sometimes severe, unpleasant attacks toward the government and public officials. Erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate, and they must be protected to give freedom of expression breathing room to survive. The rules must prevent a public official from being able to sue a media outlet or a private individual for damages caused by a false defamation relating to their official conduct, unless it is proven with convincing clarity that the expression was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not.

This caveat is essential in light of the State's obligation to protect the reputation and honor of individuals, and even more so, within its duty to ensure that the misuse or diversion of this freedom is not used to violate equally essential purposes of the democratic system, among which is the system of fundamental rights. The interdependence between fundamental rights and their systemic value is recognized in doctrine; in that sense, protecting one freedom to the detriment of others due to a lack of a hermeneutical vision has a negative effect on the entire system of freedom (see judgment 2771-03 of this Chamber)'". (The highlighting and underlining are not from the original)." (emphasis supplied) Similarly, in ruling Nº 2009-12680 of 10:59 a.m. on August 14, 2009, this Constitutional Court recognized the indispensable protection of satirical expressions, given their role as a component of social pluralism:

"For its part, the Spanish Constitutional Court has affirmed that 'ideological freedom is inextricably linked to political pluralism, which, as an essential value of our legal system advocated by the Constitution, requires the greatest breadth in the exercise of that freedom and, naturally, not only insofar as it coincides with the Constitution and the rest of the legal system, but also insofar as it may be opposed to the values and goods they enshrine, always excluding violence to impose one's own criteria, but allowing the free exposition of the same in the terms demanded by an advanced democracy. Hence the indispensable restrictive interpretation of limitations on ideological freedom and the right to express it, without which that freedom would be entirely ineffective' (judgment 20/1990, of February 15, legal basis 5°, in the Boletín Oficial del Estado of 3/1/1990). On this point, the jurisprudence of this Chamber 'has indicated that insults or value judgments that are formally injurious and unnecessary for the expression of an idea, thought, or opinion lack constitutional protection. On another level are opinions, that is, personal value judgments that are not formally injurious and unnecessary for what one seeks to express, even if they contain what is known as "disturbing or hurtful opinions"; these opinions would be constitutionally protected by freedom of expression and could even include irony, satire, and mockery as their content' (see judgment number 2006-05977 of 3:16 p.m. on May 3, 2006). In this regard, it is pertinent to note that mockery, humor, and the caricaturization of characters are part of daily life. Both the ordinary citizen and the public figure (politician, judge, athlete, artist) are accustomed to jokes and the ridiculing of certain acts and customs. Therefore, as long as satirical humor does not entail injury to the honor of individuals or to the essential content of the rights to privacy or image, it can and must be freely expressed, as it constitutes the exercise of the constitutional right to freedom of expression and, furthermore, a natural element of the human right to the free development of personality. This is the legitimate exercise of the so-called animus jocandi, accurately defined as that festive intention, to play or joke, which prevents a declaration of will from being taken seriously, does not give rise to an obligation, and is not punishable by mere verbal expression (see Cabanellas, Guillermo "Repertorio Jurídico", p. 166 no. 7107). However, when this is not the case and abuses occur, at the level of mere legality, the legislature has defined, in the Código Penal, the crimes of slander, libel, and defamation (Articles 145 to 147) and, in the Código Civil, the theory of abuse of right (Article 22), which is why any person who feels harmed can subsequently claim to be compensated. In the specific case, from reading the bulletin in question, visible on folios 60 and 60v of the judicial file, it is noted that, with a humorous and ironic sense, the petitioner raised a series of requests, understood as requests made to the Reyes Magos (Three Wise Men) on the occasion of celebrating their day, for which purpose he incorporated a caricature of the same. Among such requests, he requested lighting for the covered courts, reinstatement of teachers, not paying for the use of the courts, construction of the back wall on the fronton court, using the football pitch in December, using electronic devices in the club's ranches, having a fiscal appointed by the club's members, that the Asociación Española de Beneficencia get up to date with maintenance fees, that there be a savings of one million dollars to build a convention center, etc. Even the appellant pointed out as the phrase of the month, attributed to Ceferino Casero, President of the Club's Junta Directiva, the following: 'there are some people who are accompanying me, but anonymously.' All these comments constitute merely jocular and ironic manifestations, which do not harm any right nor result in an abusive exercise of the right to express oneself. By virtue of the foregoing, the Chamber concludes that the sanction imposed on the petitioner for the mere fact of having published the said bulletin and made ironic statements harms the constitutional rights to freedom of expression and free development of personality. For this reason alone, the amparo action is admissible." (emphasis ours. See, in the same vein, rulings 2009-014384 of 3:55 p.m. on September 16, 2009, and Nº 2015019641 of 9:05 a.m. on December 18, 2015) Finally, it is worth highlighting ruling N° 2018008396 of 12:40 p.m. on May 25, 2018, in which it was considered that plurality of content is consubstantial to freedom of expression and repressing it implies its denial:

"Thus, there is sufficient evidence of existing censorship and the distancing between the Administration and the protected party. In this regard, although the respondent party stated that it was a complete reorganization of the resource, the fact is that it failed to attach evidentiary elements that would allow the Chamber to reach the same conclusion. The evidence it provided referred to the reassigned functions (which fell within the profile of a journalist) and to the certificate of the petitioner's salary.

The Chamber reiterates that, in matters of constitutional control, once clear indicia of censorship are established ab initio, a burden of proof falls upon the opposing party that must lead to the conclusion that the actions were not of such a nature, especially when the respondent is in a better position to provide evidence to the case (dynamic burden of proof), since the Administration has access to information resources and public funds to rule out any discrimination or violation of a fundamental right; despite which, in the sub examine case, the respondent fails to discredit the grievance of the appellants with reliable evidence. Thus, taking into consideration the provisions of the aforementioned subsections b) and c) of numeral 4 of the Ley Orgánica del SINART, which expressly obligate that public entity to respect political, religious, social, and cultural pluralism as well as to allow the free expression of opinions, it is clear that in this instance, a form of veiled censorship has occurred through the relocation of a journalist to a position that limits or eliminates his influence on the transmitted content, all after or on account of the aforementioned statements made in the exercise of his journalistic work.

The foregoing is even more relevant because, through veiled censorship, a kind of surreptitious intimidation or bullying is exerted upon the rest of the journalistic staff of the public entity SINART. In this way, their freedom of the press is threatened by the possibility of being victims of reprisals derived from exercising journalism freely, when opinions are formulated that the management of the medium, according to the government of the day, does not share; an environment that fosters the scourge of self-censorship to the detriment of journalists, because their job stability could compel them to avoid reprisals. This also affects the final recipient of journalism services, the public, whose capacity to form a well-founded personal opinion by listening to a diversity of informative content and points of view is thereby diminished." From the recently cited precedents of this Court, as well as from the conceptual elements and examples outlined, it is extracted that the musical parodies that gave rise to the actions challenged in this proceeding enjoy special protection within the framework of safeguarding freedom of expression, as they are manifestations of thought aimed—by resorting to humor—at presenting social criticism and at public authorities, regardless of whether their content aligns with a uniform or generalized sensitivity for visualizing those specific social problems addressed. It remains to examine the consequences imposed upon these forms of exercising freedom of expression from the public sphere.

VIII.- REGARDING THE PUBLIC ADVERTISING GUIDELINE AND ITS IMPACT ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. This Constitutional Chamber has already referred on various occasions to the use of public resources to contract, withdraw, or redirect advertising to certain media outlets. For example, in judgment No. 2015-01782 of 11:36 a.m. on February 6, 2015, the following considerations were made:

"VIII.- The core point of this proceeding is to determine whether the notes sent by the respondent to public institutions last July constitute an illegitimate limitation on freedom of expression and thought. Consequently, the starting point of the analysis must be freedom of expression, its limits, and direct or indirect censorship.

Without the intention of exhausting the topic, nor reiterating what was already stated in the recital on constitutional jurisprudence, the protection enjoyed by freedom of expression in our context must be emphasized. Without prejudice to other instruments that protect it, it is noted that the Constitución Política guarantees freedom of expression and thought in Articles 28 and 29, while the Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos does so in Article 13:

'ARTICLE 28.- No one may be disturbed or persecuted for the expression of their opinions or for any act that does not infringe the law.

Private actions that do not harm public morals or order, or that do not harm a third party, are outside the scope of the law.

However, political propaganda may not be carried out in any form by clergy or laypeople invoking religious reasons or using religious beliefs as a means.

ARTICLE 29.- Everyone may communicate their thoughts by word or in writing, and publish them without prior censorship; but they shall be responsible for the abuses they commit in the exercise of this right, in the cases and in the manner established by law.' 'Article 13. Freedom of Thought and Expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, or in printed or artistic form, or through any other medium of one's choice.

2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent liability, which must be expressly established by law and be necessary to ensure:

• a)respect for the rights or reputations of others, or b) the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals.

3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means intended to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions. (… )' Freedom of expression is a fundamental pillar of the democratic State, since it allows for the circulation of ideas and information—even those opposing the government of the day—, the formation of public opinion, the oversight and denunciation of government actions, among others.

Now, for the purposes of resolving the sub examine case, it is first necessary to transcribe the statements of both parties that have caused the conflict. According to the recordings provided by the respondent party, the segment questioned as slanderous states the following:

'Ciudadano costarricense. ¿Confía y cree usted en un diputado que se dice le representa en el máximo Poder de la República, que fue estudiante de derecho con notas sobresalientes en una universidad, a punto de graduarse, en tiempo récord, sin tener bachillerato de secundaria y que es un requisito indispensable para poder llevar esa carrera? ¿Un diputado que en la sección voto 2010, en el periódico La Nación, dice ser abogado graduado de la Universidad [Nombre 002], constituyendo esto un delito de falsedad ideológica? ¿un diputado denunciado por la Fiscalía por presunta estafa, al estar involucrado en la falsificación de firmas para contratos para la campaña 2010, donde cobraron más de ₡220 millones y los contratados declararon que nunca cobraron un cinco y que en su mayoría falsificaron las firmas? ¿Un diputado donde en un audio solicita a Hugo Navas copia de uno de esos contratos falsos para amedrentar a Rita Chaves y demás diputados del PASE, diciéndoles que Hugo sabe todo y que puede acabar con todos, con el partido y todo? ¿Un diputado que el OIJ investiga junto a los diputados de su fracción por aparentes nombramientos falsos en la Asamblea Legislativa, donde nunca se presentaron a trabajar, pero su salario era cobrado, constituyendo esto una estafa de más de ₡200 millones al Estado costarricense, o sea, a todos nosotros? ¿Un diputado que en un audio planea robarse de la deuda política del proceso electoral 2010 ₡356 millones con facturas de gastos inexistentes? A un diputado así, no se le puede creer. No es digno de sentarse en una curul. No a la impunidad. Señor Fiscal General de la República actúe, queremos respuestas. Este es un mensaje de los ciudadanos indignados con el PASE.' It is observed then that the segment criticizes the suitability of a person to hold the office of diputado, denounces alleged illegal acts, and urges the Fiscal General to act. All these topics are of public interest and, as such, fall within the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression.

Indeed, when dealing with public officials, particularly those of high rank, the threshold of freedom of expression and the duty of tolerance to criticism increase. This is so because a fundamental element of the democratic system, which distinguishes it from dictatorships, consists of the broad freedom enjoyed by both the general citizenry and the press in particular, to express their criticisms and question the suitability (technical or moral) of public officials without fear of censorship or reprisals, which evidently does not prevent the affected person from resorting to the right of reply or other ordinary judicial avenues in defense of their image and good name. In the specific case of public officials, they are more exposed to public scrutiny, since the exercise of their functions transcends the private sphere and, due to its impact on the development and political events of a country, enters the public sphere, meaning it has consequences of interest to the general citizenry. Likewise, citizen control over the Public Administration and the duty of accountability of public officials (Article 11 of the Constitución Política) can only occur in a democratic system with broad freedom of expression and information. That is the relevance of the social dimension of the right to information, intimately linked to that of expression. In that sense, precisely, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights expressed itself in the Tristán Donoso case:

'115. Finally, regarding the right to honor, the Court recalls that expressions concerning the suitability of a person for holding a public office or acts performed by public officials in the performance of their duties enjoy greater protection, in such a way as to foster democratic debate. The Court has indicated that in a democratic society, public officials are more exposed to public scrutiny and criticism. This different threshold of protection is explained because they have voluntarily exposed themselves to more demanding scrutiny. Their activities leave the domain of the private sphere to enter the sphere of public debate. This threshold is not based on the quality of the subject, but on the public interest of the activities they carry out (… )

122. As already indicated, international law establishes that the threshold for protecting the honor of a public official must allow the broadest citizen control over the exercise of their functions (supra para. 115). This differential protection of honor is explained because the public official voluntarily exposes themselves to society's scrutiny, which entails a greater risk of suffering harm to their honor, as well as the possibility, associated with their position, of having greater social influence and ease of access to the media to give explanations or respond regarding facts that involve them.' Similarly, in the Ricardo Canese case, the Court stated:

'97. Democratic control, by society through public opinion, fosters the transparency of state activities and promotes the responsibility of officials for their public management, which is why there must be a greater margin of tolerance for statements and assessments made in the course of political debates or on matters of public interest.

98. The Court has established that it is logical and appropriate that expressions concerning public officials or other persons exercising functions of a public nature should enjoy, under the terms of Article 13.2 of the Convention, a margin of openness to broad debate regarding matters of public interest, which is essential for the functioning of a truly democratic system (… )' Along the same lines of thought, the European Court of Human Rights held that 'freedom of the press provides the public one of the best means of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders. More generally, freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society' (case 'Lingens vs. Austria', judgment of July 8, 1986, Series A No. 103, para. 42).

Returning to the normative analysis, the fact that both legal texts, the Constitución Política and the Convención Americana, established the system of limits, or rather, of subsequent control of freedom of expression, stands out. Thus, on the one hand, censorship was proscribed, and on the other, the regime of subsequent liability was instituted, since the exercise of freedom of expression does not exempt one from assuming the consequences derived from its misuse, for example, when crimes of slander, libel, and defamation are committed. Thus, the middle ground between the right to freedom of expression and the protection of honor is achieved through the system of subsequent liability, without direct or indirect mechanisms of censorship being appropriate in any matter. In the Tristán Donoso case, the Inter-American Court stated:

'110. However, freedom of expression is not an absolute right. Article 13.2 of the Convention, which prohibits prior censorship, also provides for the possibility of imposing subsequent liability for the abusive exercise of this right. These restrictions are exceptional in nature and should not limit, beyond what is strictly necessary, the full exercise of freedom of expression and become a direct or indirect mechanism of prior censorship.

111. For its part, Article 11 of the Convention establishes that everyone has the right to have their honor respected and their dignity recognized. This implies limits to interference by individuals and the State. Therefore, it is legitimate for anyone who considers their honor affected to resort to the judicial remedies that the State provides for its protection.' (The emphasis is not from the original).

In the sub iudice case, the foregoing translates into the possibility for the respondent to file the judicial actions they deem pertinent, in order to determine the eventual harm to their honor and the possible liability of those who have exceeded the limits of freedom of expression. Another alternative that finds support in the legal system is the use of rectification or reply, when a person is affected by inaccurate or offensive information issued to their detriment (Article 14 of the Convención Americana and Article 66 and following of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

However, as mentioned, censorship, direct or indirect, has no place in our context. It is appropriate to delve into this topic in order to resolve the case under review. The third paragraph of Article 13 of the Convención Americana sheds light on this matter:

'3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means intended to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.' In this sense, censorship can be direct—for example, the direct prohibition of a certain publication—or indirect (also called soft censorship, subtle censorship, veiled censorship)—for example, the use of various means to intimidate and thereby prevent a publication. The Convention provides a non-exhaustive list of cases of censorship by indirect means (controls over paper, frequencies, etc.) and concludes with the general rule, which would be '… or by any other means intended to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.' It is worth mentioning the Ivcher Bronstein case as an example, in which the Inter-American Court considered that a resolution to nullify the legal effect of Mr. Ivcher Bronstein's nationality certificate—among other facts—constituted an indirect means of restricting his freedom of expression. Also, within comparative law, the ruling 'Editorial Río Negro contra Provincia de Neuquén' (9/5/07) is of interest, in which the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (Argentina) ruled, because the Executive Branch of the Province of Neuquén temporarily deprived that media outlet of official advertising without demonstrating the reasonableness of such measure, and also spoke out against the indirect violation of freedom of the press through economic means: 'The first option for a State is to give or not give advertising, and that decision remains within the scope of state discretion. If it decides to give it, it must do so fulfilling two constitutional criteria: 1) it cannot manipulate advertising, giving it to and withdrawing it from some media based on discriminatory criteria; 2) it cannot use advertising as an indirect way of affecting freedom of expression. Therefore, it has at its disposal many distribution criteria, but whichever one it uses, they must always maintain a minimum general guideline to avoid denaturalizations.' Now, in the specific case, the respondent sent a missive to several public institutions, using paper with the letterhead and seal of the Asamblea Legislativa, in which he stated:

'(… ) 4.- In my particular case, in clear right to protect my personal, professional, and moral integrity, I will base the complaint against the producer of that radio space and jointly and severally against its sponsors, since it is enough for you to punctually monitor at 8 p.m. the frequency 800 AM and listen, within the same sponsor lineup to which this institution belongs as a sponsor of the program in question, alongside the spot you pay for with public money, another spot recorded with the voice of Mr. [Nombre 001] himself in which he asks citizens if they believe a diputado who is a liar, investigated as a forger and swindler, aspiring to graduate as a lawyer irregularly, reported by the TSE for trying to embezzle millions in sums of money through the use of false documents and more unfounded accusations, taking advantage of the radio producer under the protection of his sponsors, to recklessly pressure the Señor Fiscal General to act against the undersigned, thus preventing impunity, as if the Head of the Ministerio Público were deliberately covering up a series of crimes committed by this servant.

5.- Out of the consideration you deserve, I respectfully warn you of this matter and urge you to assess, as a responsible precautionary measure, the possibility of taking off the air the institutional advertising you pay for on this radio program, while we resolve in the courts the complaint we are about to file, with the purpose of not judicially tarnishing or harming the healthy image that Costa Ricans have of this noble institution, which must be protected and should not be involved in such deplorable matters alien to your honorable work, whereby my lawyers would immediately dismiss, at the request of the undersigned, the potential joint and several lawsuit extended against this public entity. (… )' (Excerpt from the note addressed to Correos [Nombre 002]., provided by the appellant; the emphasis is not from the original).

The exhortation sent to public institutions so that they would withdraw advertising from the petitioner's radio program falls within the cases of indirect censorship of freedom of expression for several reasons.

First, advertising provides the main financial support that allows the transmission of radio programs and, ultimately, the economic support of the people who work on said program. It is evident that if the program's economic income is limited, it is also harmed or—even—eliminated, all to the detriment of both freedom of expression and freedom of information. The described situation is even more serious when it comes to small media, such as local newspapers or small radio stations, whose financial stability can come to depend heavily on state advertising. In the Tristán Donoso case, the Inter-American Court ruled regarding economic threats to freedom of expression:

'129. Finally, although the criminal penalty of fine-days does not appear excessive, the criminal conviction imposed as a form of subsequent liability established in this case is unnecessary. Additionally, the facts under the Court's review show that the fear of civil sanction, given the ex-Procurador's claim for an extremely high civil compensation, can be clearly as or more intimidating and inhibiting for the exercise of freedom of expression than a criminal sanction, as it has the potential to compromise the personal and family life of anyone who denounces a public official, with the evident and disvaluable result of self-censorship, both for the affected party and for other potential critics of a public servant's performance.' Secondly, a diputado of the Republic is not just any citizen, but rather holds particular political power due to his influence in the approval of bills, regarding which there are a multitude of both private and public interests. Ergo, a recommendation or withdrawal of advertising from a radio program, issued by an official in a particular position of political power and having as its leitmotiv his disagreement with the criticisms against him disseminated by a certain media outlet, constitutes a veiled form of intimidation that not only affects the radio program directly alluded to, but also sends an intimidating message to the rest of the media, fostering a hostile environment for the freedoms of expression and information essential in a democratic system. In the sub iudice case, such threat even came to have concrete effects, insofar as, according to the evidence provided by the plaintiff, the advertising schedule of the ICAA, programmed for the period from October 15 to November 15, 2014, was suspended while the respondent's official communication was being answered.

If the other entities to which the respondent addressed his communication had acted in the same manner, that would have resulted in a serious impact on the financial stability of the aforementioned radio program, all of this having as its genesis a public official's disagreement with the criticisms aired on it.

The foregoing does not imply that the alleged violation of the respondent's honor and of those who could eventually be responsible for it is of little importance. Quite the contrary, what is claimed by the respondent is so relevant that the legal system has established appropriate and reasonable procedural avenues both to defend the honor of the affected person (for example, through a criminal proceeding) and to ensure the accuracy of the disseminated information (right of rectification and reply).

Now then, the clarifying notes sent by the defendant last October to the public institutions do not affect this Chamber's reasoning. On the one hand, they are actions that occurred after the notification of the course of these proceedings – the notes were delivered to said institutions on October 7 and 8, 2014, while the notification occurred on October 6, 2014. On the other hand, the Chamber observes that, although it was clarified through such notes that the "... previous letter sent regarding this matter did not necessarily seek to impose on you the obligation to withdraw your advertising from that program...", a warning to the institutions was also indicated, motivated again by the criticisms made of the respondent:

"5.- I do not omit to respectfully point out your duty of care, understood as exercising greater control over the resources that, in terms of propaganda, advertising, or information, you have available to place in media outlets, maintaining at least a minimum monitoring that allows you to know, as in the case of the CD I am providing you [which contains an edition of the program 'Rompiendo El Silencio'], the nature of the statements made in the spaces where you place advertising." (Excerpt from the note addressed to the National Institute of Learning, provided by the respondent).

Finally, it must be noted that public officials can indeed express themselves on matters of public interest. However, they are guarantors of fundamental rights, so the expressions they utter must avoid becoming a form of direct or indirect censorship. Again, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is cited:

"139. In a democratic society, it is not only legitimate but sometimes constitutes a duty of state authorities to pronounce on matters of public interest. However, in doing so, they are subject to certain limitations in that they must verify in a reasonable manner, although not necessarily exhaustively, the facts on which they base their opinions, and they should do so with even greater diligence than that employed by private individuals, due to their high office, the broad scope, and eventual effects that their expressions may have on certain sectors of the population, and to prevent citizens and other interested persons from receiving a manipulated version of certain facts. Furthermore, they must bear in mind that as public officials, they have a position as guarantor of the fundamental rights of individuals and, therefore, their statements cannot disregard these rights nor constitute forms of direct or indirect interference or harmful pressure on the rights of those who seek to contribute to public deliberation through the expression and dissemination of their thought. This duty of special care is particularly accentuated in situations of greater social conflict, public order disturbances, or social or political polarization, precisely because of the set of risks they may entail for certain persons or groups at a given time." (Case of Ríos et al.)

In conclusion, the Chamber considers that the respondent has every right to defend his honor and reputation through the legal mechanisms provided for by the Constitution and the law, among them, the right of rectification and reply and the complaint for the crimes of slander, libel, and defamation regulated in the Penal Code. In that sense, sending a note to the program's sponsors indicating that they consider withdrawing their sponsorship due to its negative content against his image constituted indirect censorship – in the terms indicated in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court cited above – of the radio program "Rompiendo El Silencio." In the assessment made, specific weight is given to the fact that the respondent holds a position of political power due to his position as Deputy of the Republic, and that his missive indeed caused a negative effect beyond a simple complaint, as it has been proven in the case file that it produced effects on one of the sponsors, which temporarily suspended advertising (ICAA). Consequently, this claim is declared with merit.

IX.- Regarding the public institutions that were recipients of the respondent's communications, most of them merely took note of the matter or rejected having competence or interference in it, as stated in the proven facts. However, it was also possible to observe that in the case of the ICAA, the missive caused the practical effect of temporarily suspending sponsorship of the claimant's radio program. Indeed, it is recorded in official communication number PRE-CI-557-2014 of November 19, 2014:

"Receive a cordial greeting, following instructions from the Executive Presidency Msc. Yamileth Astorga Espeleta, I inform you that the corresponding advertising placement from October 15 to November 15, 2014, was pending the response made by the Board of Directors of AYA, regarding the note from Mr. Oscar López Arias, which is contained in case file No. 14-15222007-CO of the Constitutional Chamber, where all the documents of your interest are found.

However, I am pleased to inform you, as you are aware, that the advertising placement with your program was restarted from November 1 to December 15, 2014 (...)" Thus, although the Board of Directors ultimately decided to reject competence and responsibility in the matter, the suspension of the advertising placement had a negative impact on the activity of the protected party, who ordinarily should have received said placements, which did not occur due to the letters addressed by the respondent to the ICAA. In reality, the ICAA, not even as a precautionary measure, should have suspended the advertising placement as a result of the defendant's missive. The Chamber cannot fail to warn that indirect censorship via financing can be devastating when it affects small media outlets or the programs disseminated on them. Thus, this Chamber verifies the materialization of a harm that affected the protected party due to broadcasting the controversial segment on his radio program, which is detrimental to his freedoms of expression and information. To that extent, the appeal is declared with merit against the ICAA solely for compensatory purposes, since the advertising placement was restarted." (emphasis added) Likewise, in judgment No. 2016-015220 of 4:00 p.m. on October 18, 2016, the problem was addressed based on the following considerations:

"VIII.- Now then, it is of utmost importance for the specific case to indicate that advertising provides fundamental financial support in the current operational scheme of mass media outlets, as it allows the publication or dissemination of their content and, ultimately, the economic livelihood of the people working in said outlet. It is evident that if the economic income of a media outlet (in this case print) is limited, it is also harmed or – even – eliminated, all to the detriment of both freedom of expression and freedom of information. The described situation is even more serious when dealing with small media outlets, such as local newspapers or small radio stations, whose financial stability can depend largely on state advertising. In the Tristán Donoso case, the Inter-American Court ruled regarding economic threats to freedom of expression:

'129. Finally, although the criminal penalty of day-fines does not appear excessive, the criminal conviction imposed as a form of subsequent liability established in the present case is unnecessary. Additionally, the facts under the Court's examination show that the fear of civil sanction, given the former Attorney General's claim for extremely high civil reparations, can be clearly as or more intimidating and inhibiting for the exercise of freedom of expression than a criminal sanction, as it has the potential to compromise the personal and family life of those who denounce a public official, with the evident and harmful result of self-censorship, both for the affected party and for other potential critics of a public servant's actions.' A clarification must, however, be made to adapt what has been said to the particularities of this case. The Manager of the respondent Bank states that it would be incorrect for the Chamber to dictate the manner in which a vital aspect of the commercial business operated by the Bank, namely advertising, should be conducted, and on this point he is correct. The Chamber understands that the legal status of the Banco Nacional [Name 002] must be taken into account within the state administrative framework, as it is an institution with constitutionally recognized autonomy and which has been tasked with carrying out an unquestionably commercial activity and, moreover, in a competitive regime with private entities. In this dynamic, the commercial advertising that state enterprises may carry out responds and must clearly respond to technical and objective decisions and assessments, and the interference of an organ for the protection of Fundamental Rights like this Chamber is not appropriate in such aspects. That is not where the constitutional and Human Rights conflict analyzed here originates, as demonstrated by the general position expressed in the 2012 report of the Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights titled 'Principles on the Regulation of Official Advertising and Freedom of Expression.' In said document, the need for the different state institutions to have technically and objectively designed plans for their communication purposes is well established, and this is repeated in the legislative investigation file, where the Deputies and the claimant himself affirm that the particular condition of public enterprises must be taken into account, and technical and objective decisions on advertising must be respected. In this regard, the claimant himself precisely states that:

'the criterion for distributing advertising placement must be market criteria, must be media plans designed by professionals in the field, and the necessary money must be invested to fulfill that media plan, so that what the state enterprise competing in the market wishes to communicate is efficiently communicated.' (pp. 18-36 of Legislative File 20066) The problem in this case arises rather when public enterprises deviate from that channel to manage their advertising placement according to purposes unrelated to objective and technical reasons, and incompatible with the constitutional framework of fundamental rights. It is at that point where this Chamber's participation becomes fully justified, and this is what is sought to be confirmed or dismissed through this amparo appeal.

IX- The specific case. - The protected party states that the respondent has used his influence and functions as General Manager of Banco Nacional [Name 002] to try to pressure the Newspaper La Nación to modify publications and reports made; he affirms that this pressure materialized in the gradual reduction of the advertising placement and in its virtual reduction to zero in recent months. From the proven facts and the consideration on the analysis of evidence, the Chamber has demonstrated both the reality of the reduction of the Banco Nacional's advertising placement to the Newspaper La Nación, starting from the publication made at the end of February, and particularly during the months of June and July, and the reasons that motivated it. In this latter sense, as indicated supra, the statements of the respondent official himself, issued before the various bodies inquiring about his actions, are sufficiently clear. In all of them, the official expressed the existence of a disagreement with the way in which the media outlet reported during the months of February, March, April, and May 2016 on topics concerning the defendant banking entity in relation to the case of the company LATCO; actions of the bank's Board of Directors, as well as the participation of BNCR in the BICSA case. According to what the claimant narrates and the respondent Manager confirms, the dissatisfaction reached its peak with this last case, understanding that the newspaper was setting aside the Bank's responses and omitting important information, all of which could result (as it did) in heavy economic expenses for the Bank to maintain minimum levels of confidence in its situation. It is because of this case and its alleged serious consequences for the Bank that the respondent Manager arranged to publish, on May 13, 2016, a paid space in two other national print media outlets, in order to respond to the cited publications of La Nación and make known what, in his opinion, was the real situation regarding the BICSA case. With the latter, the situation got worse, adding to the conflict bitter editorials from the media outlet and responses from the Bank in the same tone. It is at this point that the Manager decided to 'have a conversation' with the representatives of the media outlet, as a result of which he ordered, concomitantly and in the meantime, a pause he called an 'impasse' in the advertising placement with the newspaper La Nación; that pause concludes (according to his own words) after he is attended to by the Director of the media outlet. These narrated events are consistently repeated both in the claimant's brief and in all the versions provided by the respondent himself before the Bank's Board of Directors, before the Legislative Commission that investigated the case, and before the Chamber in the report rendered, and above all, they are clearly evident in the audio provided by the claimant. Having said the foregoing, the assessment of such facts, against the constitutional framework of freedom of expression and the right to information, by this Court cannot be positive for the respondent. It is constitutionally reprehensible for the General Manager of a public Bank, that is, a public official, to have issued an order to withdraw an advertising placement from a specific print newspaper, without a valid objective and technical basis, but rather due to his disagreement with the way in which the news and reports issued regarding the activities and situation of the banking entity he represents were prepared. The Court understands that the foregoing constitutes indirect censorship, a clear form of attempting to influence the informative content of the media outlet, and furthermore sends an intimidating message to the rest of the media that fosters an environment hostile to the freedoms of expression and information that are essential in a democratic system. The foregoing, insofar as it comes from a public servant, is totally inadmissible in light of the necessary respect for and adherence to what a Deputy appropriately defined as the 'democratic logic,' to whose realization institutions must contribute, including of course public enterprises. (p. 383 of Legislative File 20,066). It imposes the broadest possible realization of freedom of expression and the right to information, without this meaning the renunciation of employing the legally established means to combat news or opinions that may unjustly affect the work of institutions.

X.- Indeed, if in the respondent's judgment, the media outlet should have given him due right of reply at the times he requested to meet with the company's representatives due to the relevance of what was published, he could and can file the judicial actions he deems pertinent, in order to determine the eventual impact on his honor, or harm to the banking entity he represents, and the possible liability of those who may have exceeded the limits of freedom of expression. In addition, he had the option, recognized in the legal system, of resorting to the rectification or reply procedure, in favor of persons who are affected by inaccurate or offensive information issued to their detriment (articles 14 of the American Convention and 66 et seq. of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law). However, the respondent opted first for the publication of clarifying notes in paid spaces in other print media outlets and did not do so with the Newspaper La Nación. By doing so, he set aside the formal mechanism of rectification and reply before the Newspaper La Nación, or some other press outlet of Grupo Nación, and he did so in an absolutely deliberate manner, as he expresses before the Commission that '... (...) one of you was talking about why I didn't go through the judicial route. Am I going to file an appeal before the Constitutional Chamber to tell them to give me a right of reply? We would still be in the admissibility process.' (p. 383 Legislative File 20,066). These are unfortunate considerations, not only because they do not correspond to the true reality of the rectification and reply procedure – which, contrary to what he affirms, has a very expeditious admissibility process – but also because they also attempt to justify the use of de facto avenues or pressure tactics above legal avenues, to achieve a modification in the content of the newspaper's reports. On this topic, it must be emphasized, as mentioned, that such attempts at direct or indirect censorship are not acceptable in our environment, nor in the constitutional rule of law.

XI.- Conclusion.- Thus, this Chamber confirms an act of indirect censorship carried out by a state servant, with the aim of limiting the freedom of information that the protected media outlet must enjoy, by means of a decrease in advertising placement, without technical or objective reasons and rather with the clear intention of influencing the informative content of the press outlet in relation to its reports concerning Banco Nacional [Name 002] and its subsidiaries.

In this case, what the doctrine has clearly called indirect censorship is confirmed, a form of illegitimate harassment of a media outlet by a public entity, which not only harms freedom of expression as stated above, but also the right of citizens to have mechanisms of truthful information in a democracy. It is a perverse and undemocratic way of using State power to direct opinion, according to a system of 'reward or punishment,' toward those who exercise freedom of the press and free expression guaranteed constitutionally and conventionally. On this subject, the Human Rights Commission and the most authoritative doctrine have been emphatic in pointing out that 'the right of expression cannot be restricted either by indirect ways or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment and devices used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means intended to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.' The mechanisms of direct or 'indirect' censorship are clearly prohibited by Article 13.3 of the American Convention and were the subject of attention by different organs of the inter-American system. Interpreting the cited Article 13.3, the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter, "IACHR"), establishes in its principle 5 that '[p]rior censorship, direct or indirect interference in or pressure exerted upon any expression, opinion or information transmitted through any means of oral, written, artistic, visual or electronic communication must be prohibited by law. Restrictions on the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as the arbitrary imposition of information and the creation of obstacles to the free flow of information, violate the right to freedom of expression.' And in its principle 13, it indicates that 'the use of state power and public treasury resources; the granting of customs preferences; the arbitrary and discriminatory allocation of official advertising and official credits; the granting of radio and television frequencies, among others, with the purpose of pressuring and punishing, or rewarding and privileging social communicators and media outlets based on their informational lines, are an attack on freedom of expression and must be expressly prohibited by law.' For its part, the Inter-American Court has indicated that 'any act of public authority that implies a restriction on the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas, to a greater extent or by means other than those authorized by the same Convention, are illegitimate.

It is widely recognized in the doctrine that indirect censorship is normally hidden behind apparently legitimate actions that, however, are carried out with the purpose of conditioning the exercise of individuals' freedom of expression. When this happens, a violation of Article 13.3 of the Convention is established. As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter, the "Inter-American Court" or "Court") has held, it constitutes a violation of freedom of expression.' (I/A Court H.R., Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985, Series A No. 5, para. 55.)

These restriction mechanisms were also the subject of analysis by the Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression of the IACHR, which in its 2003 Annual Report drew attention to these 'obscure obstructions, silently imposed [that] do not give rise to investigations nor deserve widespread condemnation.' The issue was also addressed by this office in its 2008 and 2009 Reports.

The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court, for its part, has condemned on various occasions the adoption of state measures that constitute indirect means of restricting freedom of expression. Thus, for example, it has condemned the requirement of compulsory membership in a professional association for journalists, the arbitrary use of the State's regulatory powers when this has been used to initiate intimidating actions against the directors of a media outlet, or to revoke the nationality of the director of a media outlet as a consequence of the editorial line of the programs it transmits (Case of Ivcher Bronstein vs. Peru).

The rapporteurs for freedom of expression of the UN, the OAS, and the OSCE have also addressed the topic of indirect restrictions on freedom of expression by authorities. For example, in their 2002 Joint Declaration, they affirmed that 'governments and public bodies should never abuse their custody of public finances to try to influence the content of press media reporting; the placement of advertising must be based on market reasons.' The arbitrary use of official advertising was one of the first mechanisms of indirect censorship addressed by the inter-American system. Indeed, the Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression in its 2003 Annual Report dedicated a special chapter to studying the phenomenon and concluded that 'indirect obstruction through state advertising acts as a strong deterrent to freedom of expression' (IACHR Annual Report OEA/Ser. L/V/II.118. Doc 70, December 2003). As indicated at that time by the Special Rapporteurship:

'this topic deserves special attention in the Americas, where the concentration of media outlets has historically fostered the abuse of power by rulers in the arbitrary distribution of official advertising, like other mechanisms of indirect censorship, it operates on different types of needs that media outlets have in order to function and interests that can affect them. It is a form of pressure that acts as a reward or punishment intended to condition the editorial line of a media outlet according to the will of the person exerting the pressure. As stated, indirect censorship mechanisms tend to hide behind the apparent legitimate exercise of state powers, many of which are exercised by officials in a discretionary manner. In the case of the distribution of official advertising, a case of indirect censorship is established when it is carried out with discriminatory purposes according to the editorial position of the media outlet included or excluded in that distribution and with the object of conditioning its editorial position or informational line.

To determine whether or not there was a violation of freedom of expression due to the exercise of those powers, it is necessary to analyze the context. That is precisely what has been demonstrated in this amparo, that the withdrawal of advertising during the first semester of 2016, but particularly in the months following the publications at the end of February, occurred in a context of confrontation with the media outlet, where it is proven that the strategy did not obey objective criteria, but rather was given, in the Manager's own words, with the aim of 'motivating' the newspaper to change its editorial line and news focus, instead of using existing legal mechanisms, such as the right of rectification and reply if it was deemed to be inaccurate or offensive information.

In the cases Baruch Ivcher Bronstein Vs. Peru. Judgment of February 6, 2001. Series C No. 74, para. 154. In a similar sense, cf. I/A Court H.R., 'Case of Perozo et al. Vs. Venezuela'. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Series C No. 195, the Inter-American Court has held that '[w]hen evaluating a supposed restriction or limitation on freedom of expression, the Court must not subject itself only to the study of the act in question, but must also examine said act in light of the facts of the case in their entirety, including the circumstances and context in which they occurred.' Following the same reasoning, it held that 'the enunciation of restrictive means in Article 13.3 is not exhaustive nor does it preclude considering "any other means" or indirect ways derived from new technologies (...). For a violation of Article 13.3 of the Convention to be established, it is necessary that the way or means effectively restricts, even if indirectly, the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions' (OC-5/85 and Case of Ríos et al. vs. Venezuela). For its part, the Rapporteurship for freedom of expression has been denouncing that this type of indirect censorship occurs frequently, and this is due to the absence of legal norms regulating the distribution of advertising placement and reducing the discretion of public officials. In the same sense, it was pointed out by the Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina in the case Editorial Río Negro S.A. v. Province of Neuquén, in which the court indicated that the Province of Neuquén had violated the freedom of expression of a newspaper by eliminating the official advertising it had contracted there as a consequence of critical coverage. The Supreme Court indicated that the Province of Neuquén should establish an adequate legal framework that limits the discretion of public officials and prevents such types of arbitrary actions.

Likewise, the Supreme Court of Chile resolved a claim filed by Revista Punto Final against the distribution of official advertising carried out by some ministries. There, the court considered that the Chilean legal order grants officials 'a broad margin of discretion' and recommended that the investment of state advertising be made 'under transparent and non-discriminatory criteria' (case 9148/09). There have also been cases in countries like the United States (El Día Vs. Rossello, the Federal Court of Appeals for the First Circuit), in which it was established that the withdrawal of official advertising by the administration of the Governor of Puerto Rico, Pedro Rossello, from the newspaper El Día, as a consequence of criticisms the newspaper had made of the governor, constituted a clear violation of the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. In that sense, the Court of Appeals understood that 'using government funds to punish the political speech of members of the press and to seek to coerce [media outlets into issuing] expressions favorable to the government is contrary to the First Amendment.' Furthermore, the Court understood that "clearly established law prohibits the government from conditioning the revocation of benefits [in this case, state advertising] on a basis that infringes constitutionally protected interests (Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Puerto Rico, case El Día vs. Rossello, decision of January 25, 1999, 165 F.3d 106, p. 110).

It is clear from the foregoing and from the reports of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression that the State has the right to establish and modify its advertising guidelines, but it must do so through objective and transparent criteria, established in a planned manner that ensures that the power of the State or its funds are not used to discriminate, manipulate, or directly or indirectly censor freedom of expression and freedom of the press guaranteed by the Convention and the Constitution. For the reasons stated, the appeal against Banco Nacional [Name 002] is granted, with the effects that will be stated in the operative part." (emphasis added) Also, in decision No. 2018013315 of 9:20 a.m. on August 17, 2018, the Chamber made it clear that the arbitrary allocation of public resources through the purchase of advertising, as a means to restrict freedom of expression, contravenes both the Constitution and International Human Rights Law:

"The Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as an instrument for interpreting Article 13 of the American Convention, in its Principle 13 establishes: 'The use of the power of the State and the resources of the public treasury; the granting of customs privileges; the arbitrary and discriminatory allocation of official advertising and official credits; the granting of radio and television frequencies, among others, with the aim of pressuring and punishing or rewarding and privileging social communicators and media outlets based on their information lines, violates freedom of expression and must be expressly prohibited by law. Social communication media have the right to carry out their work independently. Direct or indirect pressures aimed at silencing the informative work of social communicators are incompatible with freedom of expression.' The Declaration of Chapultepec, adopted by the Hemispheric Conference on Freedom of Expression held in Mexico City on March 11, 1994, is also relevant as a doctrinal source, as it constitutes a manifestation of will and support from numerous leaders in defense of the right to freedom of expression, which endows it with strong legitimacy. Its Principle 6 provides: 'The media and journalists should not be subject to discrimination or favors because of what they write or say.' In other spheres, the European Court of Human Rights has held that the insufficient precision of laws and the establishment of unacceptably discretionary powers constitute violations of freedom of expression. Thus, when legislation is unclear or leaves decisions to the discretion of public officials, a legal framework contrary to freedom of expression exists. Similarly, in the Ricardo Canese case, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights indicated:

'97. Democratic control, by society through public opinion, fosters transparency in state activities and promotes the accountability of officials for their public management. Therefore, there must be a greater margin of tolerance for affirmations and appraisals expressed during political debates or on matters of public interest.

98. The Court has established that it is logical and appropriate that expressions concerning public officials or other persons who perform functions of a public nature should enjoy, under the terms of Article 13.2 of the Convention, a margin of openness to broad debate regarding matters of public interest, which is essential for the functioning of a truly democratic system. (…)' No type of censorship, direct or indirect, has a place in our system, as stated in the third paragraph of Article 13 of the American Convention:

'3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means aimed at impeding the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.' (the highlighting is not from the original) In this sense, censorship can be direct – for example, the direct prohibition of a certain publication – or indirect (also called soft censorship, subtle, veiled censorship) – for example, the use of various means to intimidate and thereby prevent a publication, or the unjustified impediment to access to information of public interest. Likewise, Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights contemplates a non-exhaustive list of cases of censorship through indirect means (controls on newsprint, frequencies, etc.) and expressly leaves the possibilities open, when it states: '…or by any other means aimed at impeding the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.' The same conclusion is reached in judgment No. 2020016167 of 9:20 a.m. on August 28, 2020, which differentiates a case where objective reasons existed for canceling the subscription to several print media outlets – and it was therefore not decreed that an infringement of freedom of expression had occurred – from another in which the actions were based on disagreement with the supposed positions of a media outlet, in which case a violation of the freedom under discussion was concluded:

"IV.- ON THE SPECIFIC CASE. In the sub examine, the petitioner claims that the Ministry of Labor and Social Security violates fundamental rights, given that the subscription to Diario Extra was canceled. In this regard, the report rendered under oath by the Minister of Labor and Social Security indicated, regarding the cancellation by the MTSS of the subscription held with Diario Extra, that: '(…) that decision was due to the fact that, as a result of the National Health Emergency facing the country, which has caused economic impact not only nationally but worldwide, the Executive Branch managed, days ago, a cut in public spending. Given that this budget cut obliged us, as an Institution, to release costs in some specific line items, taking care, of course, not to affect the service that we, as a Ministry, provide to the citizenry. It being then, that by virtue of this budget cut that we carried out, the decision was adopted to eliminate the subscription that the Institution held with some national circulation newspapers, such as: Diario Extra, La Nación, El Financiero, and La República. Because the amount for the payment of the invoked subscriptions was charged to the same line item from which paper and cardboard supplies were purchased, and this represented almost 50% of the budget for these purposes. And given that, as a result of the pandemic caused by the COVID-19 virus, we must have paper towels available for the hand-washing sinks we have installed for the hand washing of employees and users of this Ministry; the purchase of the aforementioned supplies was prioritized, with the consequence of eliminating the mentioned subscriptions' (the bold is not from the original).

Thus, the Court verifies that, on July 14, 2020, an official from the MTSS sent official letter DGAF-OF-383-2020 to the legal representative of Sociedad Periodística Extra Limitada, in which he stated: 'In the most attentive manner and in the context of procurement 2019CD-000045-0007000001; under the on-demand modality for the acquisition of copies of the newspaper La Extra, it is reported that, in response to superior instructions and in compliance with the new directives issued by the Government of the Republic [Name 002], which urges mandatory budget cuts in order to focus on the COVID-19 pandemic, we find it necessary to formally request the indefinite cancellation of delivery of said newspaper starting July 16, 2020.' In the same vein, official letters DGAD-OF-376-2020 addressed to the legal representative of Properiodicos Limitada and DGAD-OF-382-2020 sent to the legal representative of Grupo Nación GN S.A. are observed, by which the cancellation of the subscription held by the MTSS with the newspapers La República, as well as La Nación and El Financiero, was reported, respectively.

Thus, contrary to what was alleged by the respondent, this Court considers that the action of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security does not violate fundamental rights. It should be noted that, in the sub iudice, the MTSS canceled the subscription not only of Diario Extra, but of other media outlets such as La República, La Nación, and El Financiero. Furthermore, it is not verified that such a decision was arbitrary, but rather that it was due to a budget cut resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. In this regard, it is worth reiterating that the report rendered under oath by the Minister of Labor and Social Security stated that '(…) the amount for the payment of the invoked subscriptions was charged to the same line item from which paper and cardboard supplies were purchased, and this represented almost 50% of the budget for these purposes. And given that, as a result of the pandemic caused by the COVID-19 virus, we must have paper towels available for the hand-washing sinks we have installed for the hand washing of employees and users of this Ministry; the purchase of the aforementioned supplies was prioritized, with the consequence of eliminating the mentioned subscriptions.' Ergo, given the conditions caused by the referred pandemic, said institution prioritized the purchase of paper towels, which led to dispensing with the referred subscriptions. Consequently, as no violation of fundamental rights has been verified, the appropriate course is to dismiss the appeal regarding this point.

V.- Furthermore, regarding the claim made by the appellant concerning the actions of the ICAA, the Court observes that on June 29, 2020, the 'MINUTA GG-2020-02784' was issued, relating to a meeting held between ICAA officials and representatives of the SITRAA union, a document that lacks signatures and in which it is stated: 'Objective: Various SITRAA issues Place: Virtual Date: 06-29-20 Start Time: 11:00 am End Time: 12:40 pm (…) 1. Campaign to reinforce AyA work, action, SITRAA- AyA. operational crews, slogan hygiene heroes. Mario Rodríguez explains the proposal, SITRAA has carried out a communication campaign to improve AyA's image. They do not agree with the campaign and expenses that AyA has planned. Slogan: “Héroes de la Higiene”, they want to start a campaign with this slogan and carry it out with the support of operational workers throughout the country. Yamileth Astorga asks Mario what the objective of the AyA Advertising Procurement is, he apparently is not clear on it, therefore she gives him a detailed explanation, the objective is the connectivity of homes to the AyA sewerage networks. She clarifies that the campaign is not to improve AyA's image, but to encourage the population to connect to the sewerage networks. She calls for not feeding (no alimentar) the newspapers Diario Extra and CRHoy, since their objective is privatization. Mario comments that they do not give information to the press, rather he indicates that the press asks them for clarifications on things they are unaware of. He clarifies that SITRAA takes to the press the things for which they do not receive a response from the Administration. Maritza Alvarado makes comments about the campaign, indicates that SITRAA's proposal seems good to her, it can be done with their own resources, recommends that there be unity to improve AyA's image, points out some tasks that have been developed from the Institutional Communication Directorate. The internal base must be reinforced before projecting ourselves externally. Marianela from SITRAA comments that it would be good if Mrs. Yamileth carefully reads the press releases that appear in the press, so that she realizes that SITRAA is not harming the image, but rather defends the institutionality of AyA, due to its importance in water resource management. Yamileth indicates that the media only publish things that weaken AyA's image, requests to form an alliance with the unions to improve the Institution's image (…)' (the emphasis is added).

In this regard, the Executive President of the ICAA indicates in the report rendered under oath before this Constitutional Court that: 'In accordance with the formality established at the institutional level, a draft minute of the meeting was drawn up, with number GG-2020-02784, which is associated with the official letter number, this draft does not bear any signature or rubric of the participants and it is clarified at this point that, although the officials on the list contained in the draft minute were summoned, Ms. Annette Henchoz Castro and Mr. Alejando Calderón Acuña did not attend the meeting that had been called virtually, however; it was held in person. The draft minute was drawn up by official Andrey Vila Abarca, who records in the format customary for these meetings, the agenda and a succinct reference to the topics addressed. The minute was subsequently communicated and shared via email by the SDI with Memorandum GG-2020-02784, signed by official Andrey Vila Abarca of the General Management, who is responsible for following up on the issues and agreements of the meetings with the different unions constituted within the AYA. From the document called “minute” it is clearly evident that at no time did the undersigned state the fact being appealed, so it is clear that the appellant takes a phrase from a minute out of context, from a meeting held between Senior Management and the SITRAA Union, where an internal motivational campaign for AyA staff is analyzed, especially aimed at workers who are on the front line of pandemic response. In that context and with the aim of joining efforts, I made a call to the union groups so that if there are situations that worry them internally within the institution, they present their complaints to Senior Management so that they can be addressed, before going to the media. That is what I specifically referred to when I indicated “do not feed the media” as the minute cites. I reiterate, that neither from the minute nor from any other document does it ever appear that I “ordered not to speak with Diario Extra”, I do not know on what basis the appellant makes this reckless interpretation regarding freedom of expression. In fact, all press inquiries made by Diario Extra have been attended to in a timely manner; from May to date, 9 requests for information submitted by email have been received and responded to. Diario Extra and Extra TV 42 have published at least 183 notes related to the institution this year' (the bold is added).

The Chamber also observes that, on July 21, 2020, the executive president of the ICAA addressed official letter PRE-2020-01101 to the general manager of Diario Extra, in which she stated: 'In exercise of the right of reply enshrined in Articles 29 of the Political Constitution and 14 of the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as Article 66 onwards of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction, in my capacity as Executive President of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, I request the due space to rectify the note published by Diario Extra on July 21, 2020, titled “Presidenta AyA ordena no hablar con DIARIO EXTRA”. I appreciate the publication of the following text: AyA has never ordered not to speak with Diario Extra With respect to the note published in Diario Extra on July 21, 2020, titled “Presidenta AyA ordena no hablar con Diario Extra”, as Executive President of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (AyA) I classify as absolutely false that any official has been “ordered” not to speak with Diario Extra. The journalist takes a phrase from a minute out of context, from a meeting held between Senior Management and the SITRAA Union, where an internal motivational campaign for AyA staff is analyzed, especially aimed at workers who are on the front line of pandemic response. In that context and with the aim of joining efforts, I make a call to the union groups so that if there are situations that worry them internally within the institution, they present their complaints to Senior Management so that they can be addressed, before going to the media. That is what is specifically referred to with “do not feed the media...” as the minute cites. Neither from the minute nor from anywhere else does it ever appear that I “ordered not to speak with Diario Extra”, I do not know on what basis the journalist makes this reckless interpretation regarding freedom of expression. In fact, all press inquiries made by Diario Extra have been attended to in a timely manner; from May to date, 9 requests for information submitted by email have been received and responded to. Diario Extra and Extra TV 42 have published at least 183 notes related to the institution this year. At AyA we respect the right to information and freedom of expression, we would never agree to harming those rights. This year we have sent two rights of reply to Diario Extra, one regarding a publication from January 15 that was never published, and another that was published in the June 27 edition. We are aware of the vital role the press plays for our democracy. We are clear on how important it is for the country to strengthen the media, as a nation we cannot allow the interruption of the operations of a media outlet, that would be contrary to the public interest of being informed, especially in the midst of a pandemic, which demands truthful and timely information daily. We have trusted and continue to trust Grupo Extra to carry out our information and accountability campaigns to the population and we will continue to do so to the extent possible. We could never allow ourselves to be accused of dealing any blow to freedom of expression' (the highlighting is added). (…)

Thus, in the sub iudice, the Chamber considers that a violation of constitutional relevance has occurred. It should be noted that although the aforementioned minute lacks signatures, it is no less true that the executive president of the ICAA did not deny its content, but rather limited herself to alleging that the phrase 'She calls for not feeding the newspapers Diario Extra and CRHoy, since their objective is privatization' was taken out of context, since what she intended to express was 'a call to the union groups so that if there are situations that worry them internally within the institution, they present their complaints to Senior Management so that they can be addressed, before going to the media. That is what is specifically referred to with “do not feed the media.”' On this point, the Court considers that in the sub examine there is sufficient evidence that the executive president of the ICAA said the phrase transcribed above, which, clearly, constitutes an impact on the constitutional rights to freedom of thought and expression, freedom of the press, and equality, all of this in relation to the constitutional principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency in public management, by virtue of being a type of veiled censorship, given that the practical result of such a call is to prevent the affected media outlets from having access to public information.

Indeed, contrary to what was held by the appealed authority, the phrase in question exhorted officials of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados to refrain from sending information of public relevance to certain media outlets. In the first place, such action implies a serious threat to the freedom of thought and expression of such public servants, given that the initiative comes from, no more and no less, the institution's own executive president, whence the 'call not to feed the media' takes on particular gravity due to the hierarchical rank of the person who expressed it. In the second place, freedom of the press and the right to equality are violated, since it encourages that two specific media outlets, CR-Hoy and Diario Extra, not receive information from ICAA officials, while in a completely unjustified manner, it places the affected parties in a clear situation of disadvantage compared to the rest of the media. In addition, the described situation harms the general population, given that 'the call not to feed the media' prevents the public from accessing information concerning the provision of essential public services, which is unacceptable in a society governed by the principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency in public management.

By virtue of the foregoing, the appropriate course is to grant the appeal, in the terms set forth in the operative part of this judgment." Additionally, through judgment No. 2022025167 of 1:30 p.m. on October 21, 2022, the Chamber recognized the relevance of restricting indirect censorship originating from public power, as a central problem in the defense of freedom of expression, in the following terms:

"VII.- ON THE PROHIBITION OF IMPOSING RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS) THROUGH INDIRECT MEANS. Freedom of expression and, consequently, freedom of the press, are not considered unrestricted and absolute rights, but rather - as analyzed supra - they are subject to certain limits or subsequent controls. In this regard, Article 29 of our Political Charter establishes that individuals shall be responsible for the abuses they commit in the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and, for its part, Article 13.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights provides that the referred right is subject to subsequent liabilities, which must be expressly established by law and be necessary to ensure respect for the rights or reputation of others or to protect national security, public order, public health, or public morals.

However, equally, these limitations, this Constitutional Court has said, are exceptional in nature and cannot restrict such rights beyond what is strictly necessary, emptying them of content and thus becoming a direct or indirect mechanism of censorship, which has no place in our system. These freedoms, consequently, cannot be subject to illegitimate direct restrictions (such as, for example, prior censorship, the murder of journalists by virtue of the exercise of their functions, etc.) nor to restrictions of an indirect nature (also called soft censorship, subtle, veiled censorship). These latter measures -of an indirect nature- are characterized by being less evident, but which equally have the purpose of arbitrarily reducing or restraining freedom of expression. They could be considered more subtle ways in which public authorities or individuals seek to finally and effectively restrict freedom of expression. Authors García Ramírez and Gonza define them very accurately as those '(…) actions or omissions that bring about the inhibition of the subject, as a consequence of intimidation, the obstruction of channels of expression, or the “planting” of obstacles that prevent or severely limit the exercise of that freedom (…)' (García Ramírez (Sergio) and Gonza (Alejandra). La libertad de expresión de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. México, Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal, first edition, 2007, p. 42). For its part, the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression explains that '(…) These measures (…) have not been strictly designed to restrict freedom of expression. Indeed, these per se do not constitute a violation of this right. However, their effects generate an adverse impact on the free circulation of ideas that is often little investigated and, therefore, more difficult to discover (…)' (Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, 2004).

As examples of this type of indirect restrictions or veiled censorship, one can cite, among many others, the use of various means to intimidate and, in this way, prevent a publication, controls on newsprint for newspapers or radio frequencies, the restriction of freedom of movement, the granting or suppression of state advertising, limitations on the economic income of media outlets, the imposition of high and unjustified tax burdens. Regarding this type of indirect restrictions, the cited authors García Ramírez and Gonza explain that these can occur when '(…) a right different from freedom of expression itself is violated, in a way that the latter is affected - for example, in one case, the deprivation of the subject's nationality -, improper or excessive investigations are carried out, access to certain means regularly used by the right holder is prohibited, freedom of movement is restricted, the effects of a contract are disregarded, or the holders of certain assets are prevented from disposing of them (…)' (García Ramírez (Sergio) and Gonza (Alejandra). La libertad de expresión en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. México, Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal, first edition, 2007, p. 42). For his part, Justice Rueda Leal, in the additional reasons set forth in Judgment No. 15220-2016 of 4:00 p.m. on October 18, 2016, also made reference to some modalities of this type of indirect or veiled censorship, listing the following: '(…) a) The denial of access to institutions and public information as retaliation for critical coverage, forcing the media outlet to resort to jurisdictional instances. In this way, even if an entity is eventually forced to deliver certain information if its public nature is demonstrated, it is no less true that the Administration “gains” time, thus achieving disclosure in a more favorable political “timing”. b) The inequitable allocation of radio and television frequencies. c) The obstruction of access to elementary resources for the production of a media outlet (such as paper or telephone service) via the setting of arbitrary requirements or unreasonable tax impositions. d) The threat of initiating judicial proceedings, conditioned on the disclosure or not of critical reports (…)'.

In terms of these restrictions of a properly indirect nature, Article 13.3 of the American Convention on Human Rights expressly states the following:

'3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means aimed at impeding the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.' (The highlighting is not part of the original).

The Declaration of Chapultepec (adopted by the hemispheric conference on freedom of expression held in Mexico, D.F. on March 11, 1994), establishes that there must be no law or act of power that restrains freedom of expression or freedom of the press, whatever the means of communication. Likewise, in its list of principles, it mentions the following:

'4. The murder, terrorism, kidnapping, pressure, intimidation, unjust imprisonment of journalists, the material destruction of media outlets, violence of any kind, and the impunity of aggressors, severely restrain freedom of expression and the press. These acts must be investigated promptly and severely sanctioned.' '5. Prior censorship, restrictions on the circulation of media or the dissemination of their messages, the arbitrary imposition of information, the creation of obstacles to the free flow of information, and limitations on the free exercise and mobilization of journalists, directly oppose freedom of the press.' '6. The media and journalists should not be subject to discrimination or favors because of what they write or say.' Tariff and exchange-rate policies, licenses for the import of paper or journalistic equipment, the granting of radio and television frequencies, and the awarding or withdrawal of state advertising must not be used to reward or punish media outlets or journalists." "10. No media outlet or journalist should be sanctioned for disseminating the truth or formulating criticisms or complaints against public authorities." (The highlighting is not part of the original.)

Likewise, the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression (approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in October 2000, at its 108th regular session), provides, on this same subject, the following:

"5. Prior censorship, interference, or direct or indirect pressure upon any expression, opinion, or information disseminated through any oral, written, artistic, visual, or electronic medium must be prohibited by law. Restrictions on the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as the arbitrary imposition of information and the creation of obstacles to the free flow of information, violate the right to freedom of expression." "9. The murder, kidnapping, intimidation of, and threats against social communicators, as well as the material destruction of media outlets, violates the fundamental rights of individuals and severely restricts freedom of expression. It is the duty of States to prevent and investigate these acts, to punish their perpetrators, and to ensure adequate reparation for the victims." "13. The use of the power of the State and public treasury resources; the granting of tariff preferences; the arbitrary and discriminatory allocation of official advertising and official loans; the granting of radio and television frequencies, among others, with the aim of pressuring and punishing or rewarding and privileging social communicators and media outlets based on their editorial lines, violates freedom of expression and must be expressly prohibited by law. Social media outlets have the right to carry out their work independently. Direct or indirect pressures aimed at silencing the journalistic work of social communicators are incompatible with freedom of expression." (The highlighting is not part of the original.)

As can be observed with crystal clarity, multiple forms exist through which media can be manipulated indirectly. Indeed, the American Convention on Human Rights is clear in indicating that the examples cited in clause 13.3 are not exhaustive, pointing out that these types of indirect restrictions can also be configured "by any other means aimed at impeding the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions." Now, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ruled on different occasions regarding subtle censorship or properly indirect restrictions, forcefully condemning them. Thus, in the Judgment of Ivcher Bronstein vs. Peru (judgment of February 6, 2001), the Inter-American Court heard a case brought by Baruch Ivcher Bronstein, a naturalized citizen of Peru and majority shareholder of the company that then operated Channel 2 of that country's television. Ivcher Bronstein, in that capacity, exercised editorial control over the programs, particularly one called Contrapunto (through which several journalistic reports were disseminated regarding torture, an alleged murder, and cases of corruption committed by the Intelligence Services of the Peruvian Government) and it was demonstrated that, as a result of the foregoing, he was subjected to several intimidating acts that concluded with the issuance of a decree revoking his Peruvian citizenship. On that occasion, the Inter-American Court held that the resolution that legally nullified the nationality granted to Ivcher Bronstein constituted precisely an indirect means to restrict his freedom of expression, as well as that of the journalists who worked on that program. On that occasion, the Inter-American Court offered the following arguments of interest:

"(...) 158. It has likewise been demonstrated that, as a consequence of the editorial line adopted by Channel 2, Mr. Ivcher was subjected to intimidating actions of various kinds. For example, after the broadcast of one of the reports mentioned in the previous paragraph, the Joint Command of the Armed Forces issued an official communiqué denouncing Mr. Ivcher for carrying out a defamatory campaign aimed at discrediting the Armed Forces (supra para. 76.k). Furthermore, the same day that the Army issued said communiqué, the Executive Branch of Peru issued a supreme decree regulating the Nationality Law, establishing the possibility of canceling the nationality of naturalized Peruvians (supra para. 76.l).

159. It has also been proven that days after Channel 2 announced the presentation of a report on illegal recordings of telephone conversations held by opposition candidates, the Director General of the National Police reported that the file in which Mr. Ivcher's nationality title was processed had not been located, and that it had not been proven that he had renounced his Israeli nationality, which is why, through a "directorial resolution," it was ordered that the aforementioned nationality title be nullified.

160. As a consequence of the foregoing, on August 1, 1997, Judge Percy Escobar ordered the suspension of Mr. Ivcher's rights as majority shareholder and President of the Company and the revocation of his appointment as Director thereof, the judicial convening of an Extraordinary General Shareholders' Meeting to elect a new Board of Directors, and the prohibition of the transfer of his shares. Furthermore, he granted provisional administration of the Company to the minority shareholders, until a new Board of Directors was appointed, thus removing Mr. Ivcher Bronstein from the control of Channel 2.

161. The Court has verified that, after the Company's minority shareholders assumed its administration, journalists who worked on the Contrapunto program were prohibited from entering Channel 2 and the editorial line of said program was modified (supra para. 76.v).

162. In the context of the events indicated, this Court observes that the resolution that legally nullified Mr. Ivcher's nationality title constituted an indirect means to restrict his freedom of expression, as well as that of the journalists who worked and investigated for the Contrapunto program on Channel 2 of Peruvian television.

163. By separating Mr. Ivcher from the control of Channel 2, and excluding the journalists from the Contrapunto program, the State not only restricted their right to circulate news, ideas, and opinions, but also affected the right of all Peruvians to receive information, thus limiting their freedom to exercise political options and develop fully in a democratic society.

164. In light of all the foregoing, the Court concludes that the State violated the right to freedom of expression enshrined in Articles 13.1 and 13.3 of the Convention, to the detriment of Baruch Ivcher Bronstein (...)." (The highlighting is not part of the original.)

Another clear example of this type of indirect restriction is recorded in the case of Ricardo Canese vs. Paraguay (judgment of August 31, 2004). Mr. Ricardo Canese, who was a presidential candidate during the electoral contest for Paraguay's 1993 elections, linked Juan Carlos Wasmosy (also a candidate) to illicit acts allegedly committed by the latter while serving as president of a consortium, which, in turn, were published in two Paraguayan newspapers. This resulted in Canese (who worked in a media outlet) being criminally prosecuted for the commission of the crimes of defamation and slander, being convicted in the first instance in 1994 and in the second instance in 1997; at which time, he was also sentenced to two months in prison and a fine. Furthermore, as a consequence of this process, Canese was subjected to a permanent restriction on leaving the country (and was also, concurrently, dismissed from the media outlet where he worked). These judgments were subsequently annulled in December 2002 by the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay. The Inter-American Court made reference to the importance of guaranteeing freedom of expression during an electoral campaign and, after analyzing the case under study, held that the criminal sanction to which Canese was subjected was considered an indirect method of restricting said right. Expressly, on that occasion, the following was indicated:

"(...) 3) The importance of freedom of thought and expression within the framework of an electoral campaign.

88. The Court considers it important to emphasize that, within the framework of an electoral campaign, freedom of thought and expression in its two dimensions constitutes a fundamental bastion for debate during the electoral process, because it becomes an essential tool for forming the public opinion of the electorate, strengthens the political contest between the different candidates and parties participating in the elections, and becomes an authentic instrument for analyzing the political platforms proposed by the different candidates, which allows for greater transparency and oversight of future authorities and their administration. (...)

90. The Tribunal considers it indispensable to protect and guarantee the exercise of freedom of expression in the political debate that precedes the elections of state authorities who will govern a State. The formation of the collective will through the exercise of individual suffrage is nourished by the different options presented by political parties through the candidates who represent them. Democratic debate implies allowing the free circulation of ideas and information regarding the candidates and their political parties by media outlets, by the candidates themselves, and by any person who wishes to express their opinion or provide information. It is essential that everyone be able to question and inquire about the capacity and suitability of the candidates, as well as dissent and confront their proposals, ideas, and opinions so that the electorate can form their criteria for voting. In this sense, the exercise of political rights and freedom of thought and expression are intimately linked and strengthen one another. In this regard, the European Court has established that:

Free elections and freedom of expression, particularly freedom of political debate, together form the foundation of any democratic system (Cf. Judgment of the case Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, of March 2, 1987, Series A no. 113, p. 22, para. 47, and judgment of the case Lingens v. Austria of July 8, 1986, Series A no. 103, p. 26, paras. 41-42). The two rights are interrelated and reinforce each other: for example, as the Court has indicated in the past, freedom of expression is one of the "conditions" necessary to "ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the election of the legislative body" (see the aforementioned judgment in the case Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, p. 24, para. 54). For this reason[,] it is particularly important that opinions and information of all kinds can flow freely in the period preceding elections.

91. The Court observes that, in his statements, the alleged victim made reference to the fact that the company CONEMPA, whose president was Mr. Juan Carlos Wasmosy, then a presidential candidate, "passed" "dividends" to former dictator Stroessner. It has been demonstrated, and it is also a public fact, that said consortium was one of the two companies responsible for executing the construction works of the Itaipú hydroelectric plant, one of the largest hydroelectric dams in the world and the main public work of Paraguay.

92. The Court considers that there is no doubt that the statements made by Mr. Canese in relation to the company CONEMPA concern matters of public interest, since, in the context of the time when he made them, said company was responsible for the construction of the aforementioned hydroelectric plant. As emerges from the body of evidence in this case (supra para. 69.4), the National Congress itself, through its Bicameral Commission for the Investigation of Illicit Acts, undertook the investigation into corruption at Itaipú, in which Mr. Juan Carlos Wasmosy and the aforementioned company were implicated.

93. The Court observes that the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay, when issuing the decision by which it annulled the convictions handed down in 1994 and 1997 (supra para. 69.49), indicated that the statements made by Mr. Canese within the political framework of an electoral campaign for the Presidency of the Republic, "necessarily constitute, in a Democratic Society aimed at a participatory and pluralistic construction of Power, a question of public interest." 94. In the present case, when making the statements for which he was sued and convicted, Mr. Canese was exercising his right to freedom of thought and expression within the framework of an electoral contest, in relation to a public figure such as a presidential candidate, on matters of public interest, by questioning the capacity and suitability of a candidate to assume the Presidency of the Republic. During the electoral campaign, Mr. Canese was interviewed about Mr. Wasmosy's candidacy by journalists from two national newspapers, in his capacity as a presidential candidate. By publishing Mr. Canese's statements, the newspapers "ABC Color" and "Noticias" played an essential role as vehicles for the exercise of the social dimension of freedom of thought and expression, as they collected and transmitted to the electorate the opinion of one of the presidential candidates regarding another, which contributes to the electorate having greater information and different criteria prior to decision-making.

• 4)Restrictions permitted to freedom of thought and expression in a democratic society (...)

98. The Tribunal has established that it is logical and appropriate that expressions concerning public officials or other persons who exercise functions of a public nature should enjoy, under the terms of Article 13.2 of the Convention, a margin of openness to broad debate regarding matters of public interest, which is essential for the functioning of a truly democratic system. This same criterion applies regarding opinions or statements of public interest that are expressed in relation to a person who is running as a candidate for the Presidency of the Republic, who voluntarily subjects themselves to public scrutiny, as well as regarding matters of public interest in which society has a legitimate interest in staying informed, in knowing what affects the functioning of the State, affects general interests or rights, or entails important consequences. As has been established, there is no doubt that the statements made by Mr. Canese in relation to the company CONEMPA concern matters of public interest (supra para. 92).

99. In this sense, the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay, when issuing on December 11, 2002 (supra para. 69.49) the decision by which it annulled the convictions handed down in 1994 and 1997 and acquitted the alleged victim of guilt and penalty, referred to the nature and relevance of his statements, pointing out, inter alia, that [t]he affirmations of Engineer Canese, -within the political framework of an electoral campaign for the highest magistracy-, necessarily constitute, in a Democratic Society aimed at a participatory and pluralistic construction of Power, a question of public interest. Nothing is more important and public than the discussion and subsequent popular election of the First Magistrate of the Republic.

100. The foregoing considerations do not mean, in any way, that the honor of public officials or public persons should not be legally protected, but rather that it should be protected in a manner consistent with the principles of democratic pluralism. Likewise, the protection of the reputation of private individuals who are involved in activities of public interest must also be carried out in accordance with the principles of democratic pluralism. (...)

103. Thus, in the case of public officials, persons who exercise functions of a public nature, and politicians, a different threshold of protection must be applied, which is not based on the quality of the subject, but on the nature of public interest that the activities or actions of a specific person entail. Those persons who influence questions of public interest have voluntarily exposed themselves to a more demanding public scrutiny and, consequently, in that sphere they are subjected to a greater risk of suffering criticism, since their activities leave the domain of the private sphere to enter the sphere of public debate. In this sense, within the framework of public debate, the margin of acceptance and tolerance of criticism by the State itself, by public officials, by politicians, and even by private individuals who carry out activities subject to public scrutiny must be much greater than that of private individuals. In this scenario are the directors of the company CONEMPA, a consortium which was entrusted with the execution of a large part of the construction works of the Itaipú hydroelectric plant.

104. Based on the foregoing considerations, it is for the Tribunal to determine whether, in this case, the application of subsequent criminal liability regarding the allegedly abusive exercise of the right to freedom of thought and expression through statements related to matters of public interest, can be considered to meet the requirement of necessity in a democratic society. In this regard, it is necessary to recall that Criminal Law is the most restrictive and severe means of establishing liability for an illicit act.

105. The Tribunal considers that, in the proceedings brought against Mr. Canese, the judicial bodies should have taken into consideration that he made his statements in the context of an electoral campaign for the Presidency of the Republic and regarding matters of public interest, a circumstance in which opinions and criticism are issued in a more open, intense, and dynamic manner in accordance with the principles of democratic pluralism. In the present case, the judge should have weighed respect for the rights or reputation of others against the value in a democratic society of open debate on topics of public interest or concern.

106. The criminal process, the consequent conviction imposed on Mr. Canese for more than eight years, and the restriction on leaving the country applied for eight years and almost four months, facts on which this case is based, constituted an unnecessary and excessive sanction for the statements made by the alleged victim within the framework of the electoral campaign, regarding another candidate for the Presidency of the Republic and on matters of public interest; they also limited open debate on topics of public interest or concern and restricted the exercise of Mr. Canese's freedom of thought and expression to express his opinions during the rest of the electoral campaign. According to the circumstances of this case, there was no imperative social interest that justified the penal sanction, as it disproportionately limited the alleged victim's freedom of thought and expression without taking into consideration that his statements referred to questions of public interest. The foregoing constituted an excessive restriction or limitation in a democratic society on the right to freedom of thought and expression of Mr. Ricardo Canese, incompatible with Article 13 of the American Convention.

107. Furthermore, the Tribunal considers that, in this case, the criminal process, the consequent conviction imposed on Mr. Canese for more than eight years, and the restrictions on leaving the country for eight years and almost four months constituted indirect means of restricting Mr. Canese's freedom of thought and expression. In this regard, after being criminally convicted, Mr. Canese was dismissed from the media outlet where he worked and for a period did not publish his articles in any other newspaper.

108. In light of all the foregoing, the Court considers that the State violated the right to freedom of thought and expression enshrined in Article 13 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1.1 of said treaty, to the detriment of Mr. Ricardo Canese, given that the restrictions on the exercise of this right imposed on him for approximately eight years exceeded the framework contained in said Article (...)." (The highlighting is not part of the original.)

Likewise, the case of Granier and others (Radio Caracas Televisión) vs. Venezuela (judgment of June 22, 2015) is of great and utmost interest. In this matter, the Inter-American Court held the existence of a conflictive and tense environment in Venezuela to be proven, resulting from the suffered coup d'état, which, in turn, originated political polarization (radicalization of the positions of the involved sectors) and contributed to the government accusing private media outlets, among them RCTV (Radio Caracas Televisión), of being enemies of the government, coup-mongers, and fascists. The Court also found it proven that the State of Venezuela sought a way to silence said media outlet (given that it expressed ideas different from the government's policies while maintaining a critical line towards the Presidency of Hugo Chávez), through the non-renewal, in 2007, of the concession for the use of the radio spectrum (which it had held since its founding in 1953), which evidently curtailed its ability, indirectly or subtly, to continue operating and to continue disseminating dissenting information, in clear violation of freedom of expression. In this judgment, significantly, the Inter-American Court held that said decision was preceded by various public statements issued by both the President of the Republic and other officials, who generated an intimidating environment. Notedly, it was indicated that then-President Chávez made, among others, the following statements:

"(...) 75. (...) a) the statement of President Chávez on June 9, 2002, on his Program "Aló Presidente," in which he affirmed: "television stations and radios, the stations, even though they are private, only make use of a concession, the State is the owner [...], and the State gives permission to a group of businesspersons who so request it to operate, to launch the image through that pipeline, but the State reserves the permission. It is as if someone wanted to use a water pipeline to supply water to a town that belongs to the State, and the State gives them permission. [...] Suppose that [...] we give them permission to use the water pipeline [and] they begin to poison the water. [...] [One must] immediately not only take away the permission, put them in jail. They are poisoning the people, that happens, it is exactly the same case [and] the same logic, the same explanation with a television channel";

• b)the statement of President Chávez on January 12, 2003, on his program "Aló Presidente," in which he expressed: "The same happens with these owners of television channels and the owners of radio stations; they too have a State concession, but the signal does not belong to them. The signal belongs to the State. I want to make that very clear, I want to make it very clear because if the owners of these television stations and radio stations continue in their irrational determination to destabilize our country, to try to give rise to subversion, because it is subversion, undoubtedly, [...] it is subversion in this fascist case and it is encouraged by the media outlets, by these gentlemen I have mentioned and others I will not mention. I announce it in advance to Venezuela. I have ordered a review of all the legal procedure through which these gentlemen were given the concession. We are reviewing it and if they do not regain normalcy in the use of the concession, if they continue using the concession to try to break the country, or overthrow the government, then I would be obliged to revoke the concession that has been given to them to operate the television channels"; c) the statement of President Chávez on November 9, 2003, on his program "Aló Presidente," through which he stated: "I will not allow you to do it again, [...] you: Globovisión, Televén, Venevisión and RCTV tomorrow or the day after [Minister] Jesse Chacón, I gave you an order, you must have a team of analysts and observers 24 hours a day watching all channels simultaneously and we must be clear, I am clear about it, where the line is that they must not cross, and they must know it, it is the line of the law indeed. The moment they cross the line of the law they will be closed without fail to assure peace for Venezuela, to assure tranquility for Venezuela," and d) on May 9, 2004, President Chávez declared on his program "Aló Presidente": "[h]ere, those who violate the right to information, the right to freedom of expression, are the owners of the private media outlets, there are some exceptions, but above all the large television channels Venevisión, Globovisión, RCTV [...] the owners of these media outlets are committed to coup-mongering, terrorism, and destabilization, and I could say at this point I have no doubt, that the owners of these media outlets we can well declare them enemies of the people of Venezuela (...)

80. (...) a) the statement of President Chávez on December 28, 2006, on the occasion of his year-end greeting to the Armed Forces, in which he expressed: "There is a gentleman out there, one of those representatives of the oligarchy, who wanted to be president of the oligarchy, and whom those Adeco-Copeyano governments later gave concessions to have a television channel and he now goes around saying that concession is eternal, his television concession runs out in March, it runs out in March, so he better start packing his bags and seeing what he's going to do as of March, there will be no new concession for that coup-mongering television channel that was called Radio Caracas Televisión, the concession is ending, the measure is already drafted, so start getting ready, turning off the equipment then, no media outlet that is at the service of coup-mongering, against the people, against the nation, against national independence, against the dignity of the Republic will be tolerated here, Venezuela must be respected, I announce it before the date arrives so, so they don't go on with their little story that no, they get 20 more years, 20 more years I give you notice chirulí, 20 more years if you're good, it's over for you, it's over for you (...)

• d)on January 8, 2007, at the act of appointing a new ministerial cabinet, President Chávez pronounced once again with respect to RCTV's concession by stating that: "Nothing and no one shall prevent the decision not to renew the concession to that television channel, which everyone knows which it is, from being carried out. Nothing and no one will be able to prevent it (...)." Likewise, on this occasion and, in accordance with the following terms, the Court explained how, in this particular case, a violation of Article 13.3 of the American Convention on Human Rights occurred:

"(...) 148. In this regard, the Court has previously indicated that media outlets are true instruments of freedom of expression, which serve to materialize this right and play an essential role as vehicles for the exercise of the social dimension of this freedom in a democratic society, which is why it is essential that they gather the most diverse information and opinions. Indeed, this Tribunal agrees with the Commission that media outlets are, generally, associations of persons who have gathered to exercise their freedom of expression on a sustained basis, which is why it is unusual today for a media outlet not to be in the name of a legal entity, since the production and distribution of informational goods require an organizational and financial structure that meets the demands of informational demand.

Similarly, just as labor unions are instruments for exercising workers' right of association and political parties are vehicles for exercising citizens' political rights, the media are mechanisms that serve the exercise of the right to freedom of expression of those who use them as a means of disseminating their ideas or information. (...)

151. Consequently, the Inter-American Court considers that restrictions on freedom of expression are frequently materialized through state or private actions that affect not only the legal entity that constitutes a media outlet, but also the plurality of natural persons, such as its shareholders or the journalists who work there, who carry out acts of communication through it and whose rights may also be violated (...)

152. In this regard, it should be noted that today an important part of journalism is exercised through legal entities, and it is reiterated that it is fundamental that journalists who work in these media outlets enjoy the protection and independence necessary to fully perform their duties, since it is they who keep society informed, an indispensable requirement for it to enjoy full freedom. Especially, bearing in mind that their activity is the primary manifestation of freedom of expression of thought and is specifically guaranteed by the American Convention (...)

1.3. Indirect restrictions - scope of Article 13.3 of the Convention 161. In the present case, it has been argued that this would be a possible indirect restriction on the right to freedom of expression, which is why the Court highlights that Article 13.3 of the Convention expressly refers to such a situation by stating that "[t]he right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions." This Court considers that the scope of Article 13.3 of the Convention must be the result of a joint reading with Article 13.1 of the Convention, in the sense that a broad interpretation of this norm allows considering that it specifically protects the communication, dissemination, and circulation of ideas and opinions, so that the use of "indirect methods or means" to restrict them is prohibited.

162. In this regard, the Court points out that this subsection seeks to exemplify more subtle forms of restriction on the right to freedom of expression by state authorities or private individuals. Indeed, this Court has had the opportunity to declare in previous cases the indirect restriction produced, for example, through a decision that "rendered legally ineffective the nationality title" of the majority shareholder of a television channel or through "the criminal proceedings, the consequent conviction imposed [...] for more than eight years and the restrictions on leaving the country for eight years" against a presidential candidate.

163 On the other hand, the enumeration of restrictive means in Article 13.3 is not exhaustive nor does it prevent considering "any other means" or indirect methods derived from new technologies. In this sense, Article 13 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression indicates other examples of indirect means or methods (...)

Likewise, the expert witness García Belaunde during the public hearing referred to other possible forms of indirect restriction related to: i) "advertising, [since] States are important advertising agents and [...] giving a lot of publicity or withdrawing it can be important and, in a given case, there can be a kind of asphyxiation for media that basically live off advertising," or ii) "taxation [when there are] cases [in which] companies [...] have been burdened with taxes" in order to generate inconvenience or send messages to the media outlet.

164. Furthermore, the Court recalls that for a violation of Article 13.3 of the Convention to be configured, it is necessary that the method or means effectively restrict, indirectly, the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions. Moreover, the Court reiterates that Article 13.3 of the Convention imposes obligations of guarantee on the State, even in the sphere of relations between private individuals, since it not only covers indirect governmental restrictions but also private controls that produce the same result. In this regard, the Court highlights that indirect restriction can generate a dissuasive, intimidating, and inhibiting effect on all those who exercise the right to freedom of expression, which, in turn, prevents public debate on issues of interest to society. (...)

170. (...) This Court considers that, given that the radio-electric space is a scarce good, with a determined number of frequencies, this limits the number of media that can access them, so it is necessary to ensure that in that number of media, a diversity of informative or opinion viewpoints or positions is represented. The Court highlights that pluralism of ideas in the media cannot be measured by the quantity of media outlets, but by whether the ideas and information transmitted are effectively diverse and addressed from divergent positions without a single vision or position existing. The foregoing must be taken into account in the processes of granting or renewing broadcasting concessions or licenses. In this sense, the Court considers that the limits or restrictions derived from the regulations related to broadcasting must take into account the guarantee of media pluralism given its importance for the functioning of a democratic society (...)

3. Alleged indirect restriction on freedom of expression established in Article 13.3 of the American Convention (...)

193. Now, to carry out an analysis of the recount of statements reviewed above, it is imperative to perform a joint reading of the statements and remarks, since in isolation they could not autonomously constitute facts constitutive of a violation of the American Convention. This is because the fact that several officials made statements in the same vein during the same period demonstrates that they were not isolated statements. Taking the foregoing into account, the Court will proceed to assess what was set out therein in order to determine if there were reasons or motives for which said decision was reached other than the declared purpose, since, as it already pointed out, taking into account the motive or purpose is relevant for the legal analysis of a case, especially if one seeks to determine whether arbitrary action or a deviation of power (supra para. 189) was configured. In the first place, the Court highlights that since 2002 it had been warned that television channels that did not modify their editorial line would not have their concession renewed (supra para. 75) and that these types of statements increased as the expiration date of the concessions approached (supra paras. 76 to 78). Starting in 2006, in several of said statements that were prior to Communication No. 0424 and Resolution No. 002, it was announced that the decision not to renew the concession to RCTV had already been made and would not be reevaluated or modified (supra para. 79 to 86). Likewise, it is worth highlighting that there were not only statements by state officials in various media outlets, but also publications in national newspapers and even the dissemination of a book in order to announce and justify the decision not to renew RCTV's concession. Therefore, the Court can conclude, firstly, that the decision was made well in advance of the termination of the concession period and that the order was given to CONATEL and the Ministry of Telecommunications from the executive branch.

194. Regarding the true reasons that would have motivated the decision, in the statements and publications made by different members of the Venezuelan government, these are: i) the non-modification of the editorial line by RCTV after the 2002 coup d'état despite the warnings made since that year, and ii) the alleged irregular actions in which RCTV would have incurred and that would have resulted in sanctions. Regarding the first reason given, the Court considers it imperative to state that it is not possible to impose a restriction on the right to freedom of expression based on the political disagreement that a certain editorial line may generate for a government. As was previously pointed out, the right to freedom of expression must be guaranteed not only with respect to the dissemination of information or ideas that are received favorably or considered inoffensive or indifferent, but especially with regard to those that are disagreeable to the State or any sector of the population (supra para. 140). In relation to the alleged irregular actions in which RCTV would have incurred and that would have resulted in sanctions, the Court highlights that it is contradictory that statements and accusations were made about the alleged sanctions and that Communication No. 0424 expressly indicated that these were not the justification for the decision. In particular, the Court highlights that despite the seriousness of the facts related to the coup d'état, it was not proven before this Court that proceedings aimed at sanctioning said irregular actions had been adopted domestically, so it is not possible to use what happened during the coup as an argument to ground the decision, when such actions were not sanctioned at the time.

195. At this point, the Court considers it necessary to reiterate the precedent established in another case related to this same media outlet, according to which in a democratic society it is not only legitimate, but sometimes constitutes a duty of state authorities, to pronounce on matters of public interest. However, in doing so they are subject to certain limitations in that they must verify in a reasonable manner, though not necessarily exhaustively, the facts on which they base their opinions, and they should do so with even greater diligence than that employed by private individuals, due to their high office, the broad scope, and eventual effects that their expressions can have on certain sectors of the population, and to prevent citizens and other interested persons from receiving a manipulated version of certain facts. Furthermore, they must bear in mind that as public officials they hold a position of guarantor of the fundamental rights of persons and, therefore, their statements cannot disregard these rights nor constitute forms of direct or indirect interference or harmful pressure on the rights of those who seek to contribute to public deliberation through the expression and dissemination of their thought. This duty of special care is particularly accentuated in situations of greater social conflict, alterations of public order, or social or political polarization, precisely because of the set of risks they may entail for certain persons or groups at a given moment.

196. Likewise, the Court denotes that of the statements provided in the present contentious case, only one would have mentioned the purpose declared in Communication No. 0424 and Resolution No. 002, that is, the protection of plurality of media, while the majority of the remaining statements coincide in invoking the other reasons. The foregoing allows the Court to conclude, secondly, that the declared purpose was not the real one and that it was only given with the objective of giving an appearance of legality to the decisions.

4. Conclusion on the right to freedom of expression.

197. The Court thus concludes, as it has done in other cases, that the facts of the present case implied a deviation of power, since a permitted faculty of the State was used with the objective of editorially aligning the media outlet with the government. The above assertion derives from the two main conclusions which this Court can reach from the foregoing, namely, that the decision had been made in advance and that it was based on the annoyance generated by RCTV's editorial line, added to the context of the "deterioration in the protection of freedom of expression" that was proven in the present case (supra para. 61).

198. Furthermore, this Court considers it necessary to highlight that the deviation of power declared here had an impact on the exercise of freedom of expression, not only on the workers and directors of RCTV, but also on the social dimension of said right (supra para. 136), that is, on the citizenry that was deprived of having access to the editorial line that RCTV represented. Indeed, the real purpose sought to silence critical voices against the government, which constitute, together with pluralism, tolerance, and a spirit of openness, the demands inherent in a democratic debate that, precisely, the right to freedom of expression seeks to protect.

199. It is therefore proven that in the present case an indirect restriction on the exercise of the right to freedom of expression was configured, produced by the use of means aimed at impeding the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions, when the State decided to reserve a portion of the spectrum for itself and, therefore, impede participation in the administrative procedures for the awarding of titles or the renewal of the concession to a media outlet that expressed critical voices against the government, for which reason the Court declares the violation of Article 13.1 and 13.3 in relation to Article 1.1 of the American Convention to the detriment of Marcel Granier, Peter Bottome, Jaime Nestares, Inés Bacalao, Eladio Lárez, Eduardo Sapene, Daniela Bergami, Miguel Ángel Rodríguez, Soraya Castellano, María Arriaga and Larissa Patiño. (...)". (The highlighting is not part of the original)." Furthermore, in judgment No. 23107-2022 of 09:30 hrs. on October 4, 2022, special emphasis was placed on the State's duty to harmonize its actions with the defense of freedom of expression:

"(...) VI.- Specific Case. In the sub lite case, the appellant alleges as a first grievance that, in her condition as a journalist, she directs the analysis, opinion, and self-criticism program called "Hablando Claro," which has been broadcast since February 1, 2007, on Radio Columbia and considers that in that condition the respondent authorities violated her fundamental rights, specifically, the rights to free expression and freedom of the press, given that between July 8 and 9 last year, she received calls from five public officials, who hold hierarchical positions within the Government of the Republic or in the communication offices of ministries and decentralized institutions, who told her, in their capacity as confidential journalistic sources, that they were alarmed by a communication that the then Minister of Communication, Patricia Navarro Molina, sent them via WhatsApp to all the Ministers and Executive Presidents of the Government. She claims that, according to what her sources told her, in the referenced communication, the Minister instructed all high-ranking officials to urgently suspend all state advertising to the media outlets "Amelia Rueda, La Nación, CRHoy and [Valor 003]". Likewise, that said communication urged them "urgently not to participate in interviews on Hablando Claro and Amelia Rueda".

In this regard, from the report rendered by the respondent authorities - which is accepted as having been given under oath with the consequences, including criminal ones, provided for in Article 44 of the Law governing this Jurisdiction - and the evidence provided for the resolution of the matter, this Chamber could not find it proven that the order or directive challenged by the appellant was issued. Although it may be considered that, on this particular point, the reports received are succinct or laconic, the truth is that they clearly state that an order or indication in that sense was not issued. The Chamber appreciates that such reports focus on the competencies and powers of the Ministry of Communication and on procedural aspects of the filing of this remedy, but by denying the existence of the order, directive, or indication referred to by the petitioner, in this particular case there is no possibility whatsoever of finding its existence proven, and thus it is appropriate to dismiss the remedy inasmuch as this extreme.

VII.- However, due to the transcendence of the issue and the seriousness that could entail issuing any order from public power in the terms claimed in this process, it is necessary to remind the authorities of the Ministry of Communication and the Ministry of the Presidency that, as expressed in the fifth considering clause of this judgment, freedom of expression and information entails a double dimension, which is reflected not only in the possibility for journalists to report on issues of relevance for public opinion, but also the right of the country's inhabitants to learn of such information, for which reason public bodies and entities have the duty to adopt corresponding measures so that the inhabitants of the Republic can be informed about the actions and events that occur or develop in the national territory and that are of interest to the community. Especially since the issues and decisions that are considered and handled by the central government and every institution, body, and administrative entity have transcendence and relevance for the proper functioning of the country and the exercise of the rights recognized for the population in general and for their members within their own spheres of action, therefore, all these issues must be treated with absolute publicity and transparency, without any possibility of preventing the citizenry, public opinion, and any means of mass communication, from having knowledge of them. Ergo, practices that hinder access to information, such as preventing reporting on certain events or decisions, refusing to grant interviews to various media outlets, not inviting them to be part of conferences or press briefings, limiting their advertising, impeding access to necessary inputs for dissemination, among other variables related to direct or indirect censorship, cannot and must not be endorsed by a Constitutional Court, for the elementary reason that its access and timely delivery must be done through an easy, expeditious, and uncomplicated process, which guarantees the population, and in general public opinion, the right to information and freedom of expression.

Having said the foregoing, it is reiterated to the respondent authorities that "the government and the courts must allow a debate that is 'uninhibited, robust, and open,' which may include caustic, vehement expressions and sometimes severe, unpleasant attacks towards the government and public officials" (Cf. judgment No. 2006-5977 of 3:16 p.m. on May 3, 2006). In other words, the respondents must bear in mind that, in the exercise of public offices such as those they hold, and in the current era, where due to technological advancement there is greater ease of coverage and access to news events, it is normal that some of the discussions generated in the heat of the press may prove unfortunate and unpleasant for them; however, in a democratic country like Costa Rica, this exercise of freedom of expression and freedom of the press is what characterizes us as a Social State of Law and a free people. For these reasons, in order to guarantee the freedom of the press and free expression that both journalists or mass media outlets and the population in general possess, the respondent authorities must ensure that any directive, order, act, or instruction issued from the central government always adheres to the protection of these freedoms and any fundamental right enjoyed in a democratic country like ours (...)" (the highlighting is added) In the same direction as the jurisprudential line of this Chamber, outlined above, the report of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of March 7, 2011, "Principles on the Regulation of Official Advertising and Freedom of Expression" highlights in paragraph 10 that: "The arbitrary distribution of official advertising, like other mechanisms of indirect censorship, operates on different types of needs that media outlets have to function and interests that may affect them. It is a form of pressure that acts as a reward or punishment intended to condition the editorial line of a media outlet according to the will of the one exerting the pressure." In turn, it proposes as lines of action to restrict arbitrariness in this matter - and thereby prevent it from acting as a mechanism of indirect limitation of freedom of expression - clear and precise legal regulation of the issue, the association of official advertising with legitimate purposes of public utility, transparent and objective procedures for allocating state advertising spending, access to public information related to this topic, control of advertising allocation, and informative pluralism.

IX.- CONCLUSIONS. From the conjunction of the various normative, conceptual, and jurisprudential elements outlined throughout this judgment, it remains to examine the specific actions challenged and which, in the Chamber's opinion, were clearly established in respective press releases. In the case of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (Kölbi), it was stated, textually:

| "Valores de la marca kölbi no concuerdan con contenidos expuestos en programa televisivo El Chinamo." (Kölbi brand values do not align with contents displayed on the television program El Chinamo.) | Kölbi, a commercial brand of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), clarifies and communicates to the public: | | 0 Los contenidos expuestos por [Nombre 006] [Valor 003] en el programa El Chinamo, puntualmente en la sección El Chinaoke no concuerdan con los valores de nuestra marca. (0 The contents displayed by [Nombre 006] [Valor 003] on the program El Chinamo, specifically in the El Chinaoke section, do not align with our brand values.) | | | 0 Dado su origen costarricense, Kölbi se aleja de situaciones en las que se promueva o exponga violencia de forma implícita o explícita, discriminación, apología de la delincuencia o parodia del sufrimiento de víctimas. (0 Given its Costa Rican origin, Kölbi distances itself from situations in which violence is implicitly or explicitly promoted or exposed, discrimination, apology for crime, or parody of the suffering of victims.) | | | 0 Por el contrario, los esfuerzos publicitarios y comerciales de la marca se enfocan en incentivar valores como la paz, la unión familiar, el respeto, la innovación y la solidaridad, con impacto positivo y propio de la idiosincrasia nacional. Así consta en el recorrido de Kölbi por más de quince años en el mercado. (0 On the contrary, the brand's advertising and commercial efforts focus on encouraging values such as peace, family unity, respect, innovation, and solidarity, with a positive impact characteristic of the national idiosyncrasy. This is evidenced by Kölbi's trajectory of over fifteen years in the market.) | | | 0 La contratación de los espacios publicitarios en el programa en cuestión, así como de las menciones a kölbi tuvieron el objetivo de asociar la marca con entretenimiento familiar propio de la época de fin e inicio de año; nunca a situaciones alusivas al dolor, la estigmatización o el escarnio. (0 The contracting of advertising space on the program in question, as well as mentions of kölbi, had the objective of associating the brand with family entertainment characteristic of the end and beginning of the year season; never with situations alluding to pain, stigmatization, or mockery.) | | | 0 "Como marca líder, nos regimos por principios sólidos que guían nuestras acciones y decisiones. No apoyamos actos opuestos a esos valores, especialmente aquellos contrarios a la responsabilidad social y ambiental que promovemos", manifestó Leda Acevedo, gerente de Telecomunicaciones del ICE. (0 "As a leading brand, we are governed by solid principles that guide our actions and decisions. We do not support acts contrary to those values, especially those contrary to the social and environmental responsibility we promote," stated Leda Acevedo, Telecommunications Manager of ICE.) | | | 0 Por lo expuesto, kölbi ha decidido desligarse del programa El Chinamo y analizará la permanencia de su pauta en [Nombre 006] [Valor 003] (0 For the reasons stated, kölbi has decided to disassociate itself from the program El Chinamo and will analyze the permanence of its advertising placement in [Nombre 006] [Valor 003]) | | The connection made in the press release between the content of the parodies subject to the remedy and the contracting of advertising space is undeniable. Since the party responsible for the Kölbi brand is a public institution, as is the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, it is contrary to freedom of expression to "punish" a specific content, which dealt, as already indicated, with matters of public relevance, which, furthermore, had no relation whatsoever with the institute or the brand responsible for mobile telephony. It is, by all lights, a mechanism of indirect censorship prohibited by the Constitution (articles 28 and 29), the American Convention on Human Rights (article 13), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 19), which imposes the granting of the amparo with regard to this autonomous entity.

Regarding the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, the press release states:

| "Reafirmamos nuestro compromiso con el sano entretenimiento en estas fiestas." (We reaffirm our commitment to healthy entertainment during these holidays.) | San José, December 20, 2024. At Banco Popular, we have as a constant priority and a central value of our brand to promote actions that strengthen the well-being of the citizenry, especially at times such as the Christmas and New Year's holidays, where family and healthy entertainment should take center stage. | | Con el fin de contribuir al desarrollo de una sociedad más unida y positiva, mantenemos una presencia constante en decenas de medios de comunicación de todo el país, promocionando servicios que mejoran la vida de nuestros clientes y apoyando contenidos en dichos medios que fomenten la alegría de toda la familia, la reflexión y el respeto por la diversidad. (With the aim of contributing to the development of a more united and positive society, we maintain a constant presence in dozens of media outlets throughout the country, promoting services that improve the lives of our clients and supporting content in said media that encourages joy for the whole family, reflection, and respect for diversity.) | | | En este contexto, el presidente de la Junta Directiva Nacional del Banco, Jorge Eduardo Sánchez, ha enfatizado que nuestra marca – que es propiedad de nuestros clientes y de las personas trabajadoras [Nombre 002] – no puede verse expuesta a ser relacionada con imágenes inapropiadas o que incluso pudiesen fomentar conductas ajenas a la moral y el orden público al cual nos debemos. (In this context, the president of the National Board of Directors of the Bank, Jorge Eduardo Sánchez, has emphasized that our brand – which is the property of our clients and the working people [Nombre 002] – cannot be exposed to being associated with inappropriate images or those that could even promote conduct contrary to morality and public order to which we are bound.) | | | En el caso particular del debate público generado precisamente a partir de algunos contenidos emitidos en la sección "El Chinaoke" del programa "El Chinamo", que se transmite por parte de [Nombre 006] [Valor 003], lamentamos profundamente como Banco Popular que algunos sectores de la ciudadanía pudiesen sentirse ofendidos o incómodos por dichas imágenes y hemos adoptado las acciones pertinentes para garantizar que nuestras participaciones se propicien siempre dentro de espacios que tienen como prioridad permanente los valores del sano entretenimiento. (In the particular case of the public debate generated precisely from some contents broadcast in the "El Chinaoke" section of the program "El Chinamo," which is broadcast by [Nombre 006] [Valor 003], we deeply regret as Banco Popular that some sectors of the citizenry might feel offended or uncomfortable by said images, and we have adopted the pertinent actions to guarantee that our participations are always fostered within spaces that have healthy entertainment values as a permanent priority.) | | | De esta forma, y siendo que esta temporada del programa "El Chinamo" se extenderá hasta el próximo lunes 23 de diciembre, mantendremos únicamente el patrocinio de la sección "El Aguinaldazo" que lleva alegría a la familia premiando diariamente con 1 millón de colones a algún afortunado televidente. (In this way, and since this season of the program "El Chinamo" extends until next Monday, December 23, we will maintain only the sponsorship of the "El Aguinaldazo" section, which brings joy to the family by awarding 1 million colones daily to some lucky viewer.) | | | Agradecemos y le asignamos la mayor relevancia a la opinión de nuestros clientes en este tipo de materias, y reiteramos que en el Banco Popular trabajamos sin pausa para contribuir al bienestar social, fomentando el respeto, la inclusión y el disfrute responsable para toda la ciudadanía." (We are grateful for and assign the highest importance to the opinion of our clients in this type of matter, and we reiterate that at Banco Popular we work tirelessly to contribute to social well-being, promoting respect, inclusion, and responsible enjoyment for all citizens.") | | In the same terms as explained for the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, this second press release makes it patently clear that the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal reconsidered its sponsorship of the program due to its content, as a negative consequence of its disagreement with it. Similarly, in the case of the bank, none of the videos alluded in any way to the performance of that entity or to its activity. This, for parity of reasons, since the bank is also a public law entity (article 2 of Law No. 4351), implies the granting of the remedy against it, for having adopted a decision that entails indirect censorship, prohibited by the Political Constitution (articles 28 and 29), the American Convention on Human Rights (article 13), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 19). (...)" ...

See more Content of Interest:

Type of content: Majority Vote Branch of Law: 6. LEY DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL ANOTADA CON JURISPRUDENCIA Topic: 033- Active Legitimation Subtopics:

NOT APPLICABLE.

ARTICLE 33 OF THE LEY DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL "(…) I.- ON ACTIVE LEGITIMATION. The plaintiffs file the remedies accumulated here in diverse ways. The first, [Nombre 001], in favor of [Nombre 002]. and the second, [Nombre 003], on their own behalf and that of the viewers of the program.

The foregoing requires some clarifications on active legitimation. The most relevant of these is to recall that Article 33 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regulates a broad vicarious active legitimation: "Any person may file the amparo remedy," which has been peacefully recognized in the doctrine and praxis of our constitutional jurisdiction:

"it is necessary to indicate that, in the amparo remedy, the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional in its numeral 33 establishes a vicarious legitimation by indicating that 'any person may file the amparo remedy in favor of a third party'." Thus, the claimants do have standing to file this proceeding." (Judgment No. 2003-7149 of 13:21 hours on July 17, 2003) In this way, one may act on behalf of someone else, without the need for a formal professional or family link between the claimant and the party protected. Moreover, nothing prevents that open standing from being directed at the defense of the rights of a natural person or a legal entity (Cf. Judgments No. 2008-12043 of 10:11 hours on August 1, 2008, No. 2020-18221 of 9:15 hours on September 25, 2020). With the exception of the dissenting vote of Judge Rueda Leal set forth below, the majority of this Court has agreed to the defense of the fundamental rights of legal persons.

Finally, it should be noted that claimant [Name 003] seeks the defense of freedom of expression from the standpoint of a dual dimension: active—the freedom to express oneself—and passive—the freedom to receive and know the opinions of others—and it is in that capacity that active standing is understood to operate with respect to his appeal. (…)" VCG10/2025 ... See more Content of Interest:

Type of content: Majority Vote Branch of Law: 6. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION ANNOTATED WITH CASE LAW Topic: 034- Passive standing. Joinder of parties Subtopics:

NOT APPLICABLE.

ARTICLE 34 OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION "(…) II.- ON PASSIVE STANDING. Likewise, passive standing in this proceeding requires a series of clarifications. First, although one of the claimants requests that the amparo be directed against several authorities, there is only evidence in the record related to the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal; therefore, the appeal is limited to them.

Likewise, due to the particularities of the activity carried out by both the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, it is necessary to specify their condition as passive parties.

The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad was created as an autonomous institution by Decree-Law No. 449 of April 8, 1949. Through Law No. 8622 approving the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, the General Telecommunications Law (No. 8642), and the Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector (No. 8660), the opening of the telecommunications market was carried out. Article 4 of the last-cited law (No. 8660) established that it complements the Law creating the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, No. 449, of April 8, 1949, and its amendments. Furthermore, in section 5 of the same law, a listing of ICE's companies was made, determining that any other companies it constitutes or acquires, in both cases, with a participation of no less than fifty-one percent (51%) of the share capital, are also companies of the institute. Within this category of the Institute's business activities is the Kölbi brand, dedicated to mobile telephony.

Although this gives the Institute a different scope of action, it is worth recalling the first provisions of the General Law of Public Administration:

"Article 1.- The Public Administration shall be constituted by the State and other public entities, each with legal personality and capacity under public and private law.

Article 2.- 1. The rules of this law that regulate the activity of the State shall also apply to other public entities, in the absence of a special rule for them.

2. The rules that regulate other public entities shall not apply to the State, unless the nature of the situation requires otherwise.

Article 3.- 1. Public law shall regulate the organization and activity of public entities, unless there is an express rule to the contrary.

2. Private law shall regulate the activity of entities that, due to their overall regime and the requirements of their line of business, may be considered common industrial or commercial enterprises." According to the norms just cited, although the business activity—common industrial or commercial—of some public entities is regulated by private law, this does not extend to their basic structures—that is, what allows them to be considered public law entities—nor to the oversight powers over public resources or resources of public interest that concern them.

In this latter sense, articles 1 of the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets and 8 of the Organic Law of the Contraloría General de la República bind the various entities and bodies that make up the public sector to their mandates. This Court has so understood, among others, in Resolution No. 2017-11808 of 9:05 hours on July 28, 2017:

"We must not lose sight of the fact that the public enterprise today finds itself at a crossroads when it carries out its activity in a free competition regime, in a market segment where both public and private enterprises participate. On the one hand, if it is treated as a public body or entity and, therefore, subject to a series of controls and requirements, its chances of survival in the market are very slim. On the other hand, if it is freed from all control, serious abuses could occur in the use of public funds. Hence the need for a fair balance between the needs it requires to compete on equal terms with other economic agents and the necessary controls over the use of public funds, starting from an elementary principle: where public funds go, control must follow, both that exercised by the internal audit, the Contraloría General de la República, and the Comisión Permanente Especial para el Control del Ingreso y del Gasto Público of the Asamblea Legislativa, among others. However, this must be in accordance with the reality the public enterprise faces, that is, controls that do not constitute an obstacle or a hindrance so that the public enterprise is not placed at a disadvantage in a competitive market (see Judgment 2016-000779 of sixteen hours and thirty minutes on January nineteenth, two thousand sixteen). Taking the foregoing as a frame of reference, there is no doubt that it is fundamental that the public enterprise be guaranteed that certain strategic information will not fall into the hands of the competition, since otherwise, its disappearance would be a matter of time. This entails that any request for information concerning financial, banking, industrial, or commercial activity must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad—public enterprise-public entity—openly competes in the telecommunications market with other enterprises, public and private, and, consequently, must develop a commercial strategy to promote its services, which it provides under the Kölbi brand." To the foregoing considerations, two additional factors are added: that in this case, the communication modifying the advertising schedule was issued by the manager of Telecommunications of the institute, and that the issue involves the use of the company's resources; therefore, there are sufficient elements to consider the Institute as having passive standing in this appeal.

The Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, for its part, is an entity with very particular characteristics, since its founding Law, No. 4351, declares that "The Bank is owned by the workers in equal parts, and the right to co-ownership shall be subject to having held a mandatory savings account for one continuous year or in alternating periods. The mandatory savers shall participate in the profits and, through their social organizations, in the appointment of its directors." (Article 1), thereby conferring a corporate character upon it; which, however, does not relieve it of its condition as a public law entity (Article 2), nor from the oversight of its resources by the Contraloría General de la República. It is taken into account, as with the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, that the communication regarding the modification of its advertising schedule, the object of this appeal, was issued by the president of the bank's Junta Directiva Nacional. (…)" VCG10/2025 ... See more Content of Interest:

Type of content: Majority Vote Branch of Law: 1. POLITICAL CONSTITUTION WITH CASE LAW Topic: 029- Freedom of expression Subtopics:

NOT APPLICABLE.

ARTICLE 29 OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION "(…) VI.- ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ITS FUNCTION IN A REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC REGIME. In various pronouncements, this constitutional justice body has established the link between freedom of expression and the principles upon which our political and legal system is built. In Judgment No. 1997-01750 of 15:00 hours on March 21, 1997, it was explained as follows:

"X- In this regard, among the main precepts that recognize and guarantee freedom of expression and information, and that configure what could be called the general regime of that constitutionally protected freedom, are:

"Article 28 (Political Constitution):

"No one may be disturbed or persecuted for the expression of their opinions or for any act that does not violate the law…".

"Article 29 (Political Constitution):

"Everyone may communicate their thoughts orally or in writing, and publish them without prior censorship; but they shall be responsible for the abuses they commit in the exercise of this right, in the cases and in the manner established by law".

"Article 13 (American Convention): Freedom of Thought and Expression:

"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, whether orally, in writing, or in printed or artistic form, or through any other medium of one's choice.

"2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent liability, which must be expressly established by law and be necessary to ensure:

"a) Respect for the rights or reputations of others, or "b) The protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals.

"3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment and apparatus used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means intended to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.

"4. Public entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 2.

"5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitements to violence or any other similar illegal action against any person or group of persons, on any grounds, including those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin, shall be prohibited by law." "Article 19 (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights):

"1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with their privacy, family, home, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on their honour and reputation.

"2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks." "3. The exercise of the right provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

"a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; "b) For the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals." XI- From the content of the foregoing provisions, it follows that freedom of expression and information has freedom of thought or ideology as a prior and indispensable condition, and essentially comprises the right of every person to freely seek, receive, and express thoughts, ideas, opinions, value judgments, beliefs, facts, data, etc., in relation to all kinds of matters (including political and electoral ones), using any lawful means at their disposal and for the most varied purposes (commercial, recreational, political, electoral, etc.). It also follows from the cited precepts that, within the framework of its constitutionally guaranteed regime, the fundamental right to free expression and information is configured as a liberty right. This implies, basically, that its exercise does not require an express recognition by public authorities regarding who its legitimate holders are, but rather that they are expected—or rather, it is generally demanded of them—to refrain from influencing or imposing any kind of obstacle to said exercise. This condition of the right to free expression and information has been especially weighed at the level of its protection in the Inter-American Human Rights System, a situation reflected above all in the breadth of content and the degree of exceptionality of the limitations with which it is recognized and guaranteed in the American Convention on Human Rights. From the essential content of freedom of expression and information also arises the existence of its two concurrent dimensions, highlighted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its advisory opinion OC-5/85 on the compulsory licensing of journalists. In this regard, the Court indicated that this freedom manifests itself both in the individual dimension, of the one who expresses or expresses themselves, and in another collective one, of all those who receive the content of that expression. These two dimensions are so intertwined that when the former is restricted, it is not only the fundamental right of its individual holder that is being limited, but also that of all those who have been prevented from receiving their ideas and information. Given this very close link between both dimensions (individual and collective), freedom of expression and information implies the right to use any lawful means to disseminate thought or information and to convey it to any number of recipients, a situation that reveals that the expression and dissemination of thought or information are indivisible, so that a restriction of those means or of the possibilities of dissemination simultaneously means, and to the same extent, a limitation of the right to free expression and information.

XII- From the foregoing, it follows that freedom of expression and information has a basic character, being a necessary prerequisite for the remaining fundamental rights, which is why it has been identified as a determining factor for the legitimacy of the functioning of the democratic system, by allowing people at all times, without any distinction, to think as they best decide and freely express their opinions. Contributing to this basic character is the fact that the essential content of freedom of expression and information does not require special demands in relation to the content, forms, or means used by the message being expressed or the levels of dissemination it achieves, a situation that favors the recognition and guarantee through it of manifestations of its exercise as varied as artistic creation or electoral propaganda itself." That is, based on the Constitution itself, as well as on the norms of the regional and universal human rights protection systems, there is evidence of a vigorous protection of freedom of expression, from a dual perspective: dogmatic—that is, in consideration of its character as a fundamental right—and organic or institutional—as an element inherent to democracy. In the same vein, Judgment No. 2006-05977 of 15:16 hours on May 3, 2006, developed this syncretism between freedom of expression and democracy:

"VIII.- Freedom of expression as an indispensable requirement of democracy. Freedom of expression is undoubtedly one of the conditions—although not the only one—for democracy to function. This freedom is what allows the creation of public opinion, essential to give content to various principles of the constitutional State, such as, for example, the right to information, the right of petition, or rights regarding political participation; the existence of a free and consolidated public opinion is also a condition for the functioning of representative democracy. The possibility for all persons to participate in public discussions constitutes the necessary prerequisite for the construction of a social dynamic of exchange of knowledge, ideas, and information, which allows the generation of consensus and decision-making among the components of the various social groups, but which also constitutes a channel for the expression of dissent, which in a democracy is as necessary as agreements. In turn, the exchange of opinions and information that originates from public discussion contributes to forming personal opinion; both make up public opinion, which ends up manifesting itself through the channels of representative democracy. As the Spanish Constitutional Court itself has pointed out, other rights enshrined in the Constitution would be emptied of real content, representative institutions reduced to hollow forms, and the principle of democratic legitimacy... which is the basis of our entire legal-political order (Judgment 6/1981) would be absolutely falsified, if there were no freedoms capable of allowing that exchange, which… presupposes the right of citizens to have broad and adequate information regarding facts, allowing them to form their convictions and participate in the discussion concerning public affairs (Judgment 159/1986).

IX-. Content of freedom of expression. Freedom of information could be said to have several facets, as recognized by national doctrine (of which the first three are related to what is discussed here): a) freedom of the press in a broad sense, which covers any type of publication, b) freedom of information through non-written means, c) the right of rectification or reply. Freedom of the press generically encompasses all types of printed matter, printing, publishing, circulation of newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, and publications of all kinds. It is by its nature the natural vehicle for the freedom of expression of citizens. It translates into the right for individuals to seek and disseminate information and ideas to an indeterminate number of people about events that, by their nature, are of general interest because they are considered newsworthy. By its nature, it is subject to the same limitations as freedom of expression. Its functions in a democracy are: to inform (facts, newsworthy events), to integrate opinion (stimulating social integration), and to control political power, as it is a permanent guardian of the honesty and correct management of public affairs. Given its symbiotic link with democratic ideology, an endless number of international instruments and practically all the Constitutions of the free world, since the French Declaration of 1789 (art. 11), have recognized it. Our Political Constitution, for its part, protects it through various norms:

"Everyone may communicate their thoughts orally or in writing and publish them without prior censorship; but they shall be responsible for the abuses they commit in the exercise of this right, under the conditions and in the manner established by law" (Article 29) "No one may be disturbed or persecuted for the expression of their opinions nor for any act that does not violate the law.

Private actions that do not harm public morals or order or that do not harm a third party are beyond the reach of the law.

However, no political propaganda may be carried out in any form by clergy or laypersons invoking religious motives or using religious beliefs as a means" (Article 28).

Other constitutional norms related to this right are:

"The freedom of petition, individually or collectively, before any public official or official entity, and the right to obtain a prompt resolution, is guaranteed. (Article 27).

"Free access to administrative departments for purposes of information on matters of public interest is guaranteed.

State secrets are inviolable" (Article 30).

Freedom of expression has as a consequence the prohibition of all forms of censorship, in a dual sense: one cannot censor the interlocutors, on the one hand; and one cannot, in general, censor in advance the possible contents of the discussion either: in principle, in a democracy, all topics are debatable. The non-censorability of subjects has a practically universal character, as established by our Constitution; no one can be deprived of the freedom to speak and express themselves as they see fit. The non-censorability of content, although it does not occur in advance, does find some limitations; however, these must be such that the freedom continues to have meaning or is not emptied of its content. Basically, like all freedom, it must be exercised responsibly, in short, to pursue legitimate ends within the system." It is also relevant to bring up Resolution No. 2022025167 of 13:30 hours on October 21, 2022, insofar as it broadly develops the implications of freedom of expression, which has multiple manifestations:

"IV.- ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. Freedom of expression is one of the pillars upon which the Rule of Law is founded and comprises both the fundamental and universal guarantee to express one's own thoughts or opinions and to know those of others. In other terms, it refers to the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas, whether orally or in writing. That is why it is said that freedom of expression is characterized by being a right with a dual dimension: an individual dimension, consisting of the right of each person to seek information and express their own thoughts, ideas, and information; and a collective or social dimension, consisting of the right of society to seek and receive any information, to know the thoughts, ideas, and information of others, and to be well informed. On this dual dimension of the freedom under study, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter I/A Court H.R.), in the case Herrera Ulloa vs. the State of [Name 002] (Judgment of July 2, 2004), held the following:

"(…) 109. In this regard, the Court has indicated that the first dimension of freedom of expression "is not exhausted in the theoretical recognition of the right to speak or write, but also inseparably comprises the right to use any appropriate means to disseminate thought and have it reach the greatest number of recipients." In this sense, the expression and dissemination of thoughts and ideas are indivisible, such that a restriction on the possibilities of dissemination represents directly, and to the same extent, a limit on the right to express oneself freely.

110. With respect to the second dimension of the right to freedom of expression, that is, the social one, it is necessary to point out that freedom of expression is a means for the exchange of ideas and information among people; it comprises their right to try to communicate their points of view to others, but it also implies the right of everyone to know opinions, accounts, and news offered by third parties. For the common citizen, knowing the opinion of others or the information available to others is as important as the right to disseminate one's own.

111. This Tribunal has affirmed that both dimensions possess equal importance and must be fully guaranteed simultaneously to give total effect to the right to freedom of expression under the terms provided for by Article 13 of the Convention (…)".

For its part, the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American Legal Framework on the Right to Freedom of Expression, December 2009), referred to this right in the following terms:

"(…) it is one of the individual rights that most clearly reflects the virtue that accompanies—and characterizes—human beings: the unique and precious virtue of thinking about the world from our own perspective and communicating with others to build, through a deliberative process, not only the life model that each one has the right to adopt, but the model of society in which we want to live. All the creative potential in art, in science, in technology, in politics—in short, all our individual and collective creative capacity depends, fundamentally, on respect for and promotion of the right to freedom of expression in all its dimensions. It is, then, an individual right without which the first and most important of our freedoms would be denied: the right to think for oneself and to share our thoughts with others (…)

Likewise, international soft law instruments have safeguarded this freedom. Thus, the Declaration of Chapultepec (adopted by the hemispheric conference on freedom of expression held in Mexico City on March 11, 1994), in its first principle states that:

"1. There are no free people or societies without freedom of expression and of the press. The exercise of this is not a concession of the authorities; it is an inalienable right of the people." For its part, the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression (approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in October 2000, at the 108th regular session), provides the following:

"1. Freedom of expression, in all its forms and manifestations, is a fundamental and inalienable right, inherent to all persons. It is, moreover, an indispensable requirement for the very existence of a democratic society." In another context, within the European legal order, the European Convention on Human Rights stands out, which in its article 10 specifies the universal entitlement to this right, in the following terms:

"Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary." Likewise, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in its Article 11, cites the following:

"Article 11 Freedom of expression and information 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.

2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected." (…)

For its part, the I/A Court H.R., in the case Moya Chacón et al. vs. Costa Rica (Judgment of May 23, 2022), indicated the following:

"(…) b.3 Permitted restrictions on freedom of expression and the application of subsequent liability in cases affecting honor and dignity in matters of public interest 71. The Tribunal recalls that, generally, the right to freedom of expression cannot be subject to prior censorship but, in any case, to subsequent liabilities in very exceptional cases and subject to a series of strict requirements.

Thus, Article 13.2 of the American Convention establishes that subsequent liabilities for the exercise of freedom of expression must concurrently meet the following requirements: (i) be previously established by law, in both a formal and material sense; (ii) respond to an objective permitted by the American Convention; and (iii) be necessary in a democratic society (for which they must meet the requirements of suitability, necessity, and proportionality).

72. Regarding strict legality, the Court has established that restrictions must be previously fixed by law as a means of ensuring that they are not left to the discretion of public authorities. For this, the definition of the conduct must be clear and precise, even more so if it involves criminal convictions rather than civil ones. Regarding the permitted or legitimate aims, they are indicated in the aforementioned Article 13.2 and are (a) respect for the rights or reputation of others, or (b) the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals. Likewise, restrictions on freedom of expression must be suitable, that is, effectively conducive to achieving the legitimately permitted purpose. With respect to the analysis of necessity, the Court has held that, for a restriction on free expression to be compatible with the American Convention, it must be necessary in a democratic society, understanding "necessary" as the existence of a compelling social need that justifies the restriction. In this sense, the Court must examine the existing alternatives to achieve the legitimate aim pursued and determine the greater or lesser harmfulness of those alternatives. Finally, in relation to the proportionality of the measure, the Court has understood that the restrictions imposed on the right to freedom of expression must be proportional to the interest that justifies them and must closely adjust to the achievement of that objective, interfering as little as possible in the effective enjoyment of the right. In that sense, it is not sufficient for it to have a legitimate purpose; rather, the measure in question must respect proportionality at the time it affects freedom of expression. In other words, "in this last step of the analysis, it is considered whether the restriction is strictly proportional, such that the sacrifice inherent in it is not exaggerated or excessive compared to the advantages obtained through such limitation." The Court recalls that these restrictions are exceptional in nature and must not limit, beyond what is strictly necessary, the full exercise of freedom of expression or become a direct or indirect mechanism of prior censorship.

73. In this sense, the Court has established that such subsequent liabilities can be imposed insofar as the right to honor and reputation could have been affected. Thus, Article 11 of the Convention establishes, in effect, that every person has the right to the protection of their honor and to the recognition of their dignity. The Court has indicated that the right to honor "recognizes that every person has the right to respect for it, prohibits any illegal attack against honor or reputation, and imposes on States the duty to provide the protection of the law against such attacks." In general terms, this Court has indicated that "the right to honor relates to one's own esteem and worth, while reputation refers to the opinion that others have of a person." In this sense, this Court has held that "both freedom of expression and the right to honor, both rights protected by the Convention, are of utmost importance; therefore, it is necessary to guarantee both rights so that they coexist harmoniously." The exercise of each fundamental right must be done with respect for and safeguarding of other fundamental rights. Therefore, the Court has indicated that "the resolution of the conflict that arises between these two rights requires a balancing between them, for which each case must be examined, according to its characteristics and circumstances, in order to assess the existence and intensity of the elements on which such a judgment is based." 74. The Court recalls in this regard that, to determine the conventionality of a restriction on freedom of expression when it collides with the right to honor, it is vitally important to analyze whether the statements made are of public interest, given that in these cases the judge must evaluate with special caution the need to limit freedom of expression. In its jurisprudence, the Court has considered those opinions or information on matters in which society has a legitimate interest in staying informed, in knowing what affects the functioning of the State, or affects general rights or interests or entails important consequences for it, to be of public interest. Determining the foregoing has consequences in the analysis of the conventionality of the restriction on the right to freedom of expression, given that expressions concerning matters of public interest—such as, for example, those concerning the suitability of a person for holding public office or the acts performed by public officials in the performance of their duties—enjoy greater protection, so as to foster democratic debate.

75. Thus, the Court has indicated that, in a democratic society, those persons who influence matters of public interest are more exposed to public scrutiny and criticism. This different threshold of protection is explained because their activities leave the domain of the private sphere to enter the sphere of public debate and, therefore, they have voluntarily exposed themselves to this more demanding scrutiny. This does not mean, in any way, that the honor of persons participating in matters of public interest should not be legally protected, but rather that it must be protected in a manner consistent with the principles of democratic pluralism.

76. On the other hand, in relation to the necessary character and the rigorous proportionality analysis that must govern the limitation on the right to freedom of expression and the protection of the right to honor, one must seek that intervention which, being the most suitable for restoring damaged reputation, also contains a minimal degree of impact on the sphere of freedom of expression. In this regard, within the framework of freedom of information, the Court considers that there is a duty for journalists to verify, in a reasonable, though not necessarily exhaustive, manner, the facts they disseminate. However, this does not mean a strict requirement of truthfulness, at least with respect to matters of public interest, recognizing as a defense that the publication is made in good faith or justifiably and always in accordance with minimum standards of ethics and professionalism in the search for truth. Likewise, the Court warns that, for investigative journalism to exist in a democratic society, it is necessary to leave journalists "room for error," given that without this margin of error, independent journalism cannot exist, nor therefore can the necessary democratic scrutiny that emanates from it.

77. Additionally, the Court also considers that no one may be subjected to subsequent liabilities for the dissemination of information related to a public matter that is based on material that is accessible to the public or that comes from official sources.

78. Finally, it must also be emphasized that, if it is deemed appropriate to grant reparation to an aggrieved person in their honor, the purpose of this reparation should not be to punish the issuer of the information, but to restore the affected person. In this regard, States must exercise maximum caution when imposing reparations, so as not to dissuade the press from participating in the discussion of matters of legitimate public interest (...)”.

(...)

VI.REGARDING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (AND OF THE PRESS) AS GUARANTORS OF THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM. Freedom of expression and, concomitantly, the exercise of freedom of the press, become fundamental pillars upon which a democratic society is built. The intrinsic relationship that exists between such freedoms and democracy is practically unquestionable; hence, the latter is arbitrarily weakened and eroded when said freedoms cannot be fully exercised nor are respected and guaranteed in legal systems.

The Inter-American Democratic Charter (approved by the Member States of the OAS during a special session of the General Assembly held on September 11, 2001, in Lima, Peru), on this matter, provides in its Article 4 that: "Transparency in government activities, probity, responsibility of governments in public management, respect for social rights, and freedom of expression and of the press are essential components of the exercise of democracy." Furthermore, it must be remembered that the previously adopted Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression establishes in its first principle that freedom of expression is "(...) an indispensable requirement for the very existence of a democratic society." Freedom of the press (or what some call a free press), as a manifestation of freedom of expression, constitutes an essential element for monitoring—without reprisals—the actions of third parties, whether of a private nature or public officials, mainly those who hold high office or aspire to it, thus allowing, consequently, accountability, the fight against corruption, transparency in the management of public funds, among many other aspects that are fundamental for maintaining a democratic system alive. Part of that duty lies in investigating people in power, mainly the government, asking the difficult questions and thus attempting to reveal to the citizenry what is really happening, as a means, in turn, for them to make the correct decisions, mainly at the time of voting and, also later, when one is in the exercise of power. As has been stated by the so-called Civil Liberties Union for Europe (a non-governmental organization that promotes civil liberties for all people in the European Union): "(...) A free press helps at every step of this process. It provides information to voters before they vote; it fosters dialogue and debate to enrich the understanding of this information; and then it informs the citizenry about the work of the government and whether they are truly carrying out their promises. In a democracy, the citizenry delegates decision-making power to their elected officials, and the press is a way of controlling them (...)”.

In essence, it is feasible to affirm, then, that freedom of the press is fundamental in democratic systems, as it allows citizens to form opinions and criteria in relation to the reality in which they live. For this reason, unfortunately, independent media are precisely one of the main targets of anti-democratic political systems, or at least of those that aim to project themselves and are moving towards that.

(...)

Meanwhile, the Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American Legal Framework on the Right to Freedom of Expression, December 2009), stated the following:

"(...) the IACHR and the Inter-American Court have underscored in their jurisprudence that the importance of freedom of expression within the catalog of human rights also derives from its structural relationship with democracy. This relationship, which has been described by the organs of the inter-American human rights system as 'close,' 'indissoluble,' 'essential,' and 'fundamental,' among others, explains much of the interpretive developments that have been granted to freedom of expression by the IACHR and the Inter-American Court in their various decisions on the matter. So important is the link between freedom of expression and democracy that, as the IACHR has explained, the very purpose of Article 13 of the American Convention is to strengthen the functioning of pluralist and deliberative democratic systems through the protection and promotion of the free circulation of information, ideas, and expressions of all kinds (...) if the exercise of the right to freedom of expression not only tends toward the personal fulfillment of the person expressing themselves, but also toward the consolidation of truly democratic societies, the State has the obligation to create the conditions so that public debate not only satisfies the legitimate needs of everyone as consumers of certain information (entertainment, for example), but also as citizens. That is to say, sufficient conditions must exist so that a public, plural, and open deliberation can take place on the issues that concern us all as citizens of a given State (...)”. (The emphasis does not form part of the original).

This Rapporteurship also stated the following:

"(...) in a democratic society, the press has the right to inform freely and criticize the government, and the people have the right to be informed about different visions of what is happening in the community (...)".

Along the same line of thought, the European Court of Human Rights, in the case of Lingens v. Austria (judgment of July 8, 1986), emphasized that "(...) freedom of the press provides the public opinion with one of the best means for knowing and judging the ideas and attitudes of political leaders. More generally, freedom of political controversy lies at the very heart of the concept of a democratic society (...)”.

Furthermore, the Colombian Constitutional Court has referred to the subject under study on several occasions. Thus, in Judgment No. T-256/13 of April 30, 2013, it held that: "(...) the right to freedom of expression is a principle of the exercise of democracy because it is within the framework of a democratic state where citizen participation acquires special relevance, and in the development thereof, the freedom to express different opinions and to manifest minority thoughts without fear of being repressed by state powers is guaranteed (…)" and explained that:

"(...) For this reason, the pronouncements of the Inter-American Commission and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have highlighted that freedom of expression fulfills a triple function in the democratic system: a) it ensures the individual right of every person to think for themselves and to share their personal thoughts and opinions with others, b) it has a close, indissoluble, essential, fundamental, and structural relationship with democracy, and to that extent, the very purpose of Article 13 of the American Convention is to strengthen the functioning of democratic, pluralist, and deliberative systems, through the protection and promotion of the free circulation of ideas and opinions, and c) finally, it is a key tool for the exercise of other fundamental rights, given that 'it is an essential mechanism for the exercise of the right to participation, religious freedom, education, ethnic or cultural identity, and, of course, equality, understood not only as the right to non-discrimination, but as the right to the enjoyment of certain basic social rights (…)'”.

Similarly, this constitutional body added that:

"(...) This Corporation, very early in its jurisprudence, recognized the value of this right within the framework of a democracy with the following words: 'Although the freedom to express and disseminate one's own thoughts and opinions is a right of every person, it is not only an individual right, but also a guarantee of a fundamental political institution: \"free public opinion\". Free public opinion is indissolubly linked to political pluralism, which is a fundamental value and a requirement for the functioning of the democratic state. Without free public communication, other rights enshrined in the Constitution would be emptied of real content, representative and participatory institutions would be reduced to hollow forms, and the principle of democratic legitimacy would be absolutely falsified (…)'”. (The emphasis does not form part of the original).

In Judgment No. T-543 of 2017 of August 25, 2017, the Colombian Constitutional Court indicated that freedom of expression fulfills the following functions in a democratic society: "(...) (i) allows the search for truth and the development of knowledge; (ii) makes the principle of self-government possible; (iii) promotes personal autonomy; (iv) prevents abuses of power; and (v) is an 'escape valve' that stimulates the peaceful confrontation of state or social decisions that are not shared (…)”. For its part, in Judgment No. C-135/21 of May 13, 2021, said Court mentioned that some of the contributions of the fundamental right to freedom of expression to democratic functioning are the following: "(...) i) allows the search for truth and the development of knowledge; ii) creates a space for healthy dialogue and protest for the citizenry, which consolidates pluralist and deliberative societies; iii) allows the establishment of control and accountability mechanisms over rulers; iv) promotes citizen self-government; and v) contributes to better popular elections (…)”.

Also, in Judgment No. T-145/19 of April 2, 2019, the Colombian Court held that freedom of expression "(...) is a pillar of the Social State of Law and a fundamental principle of democratic regimes, where human dignity is respected and the participation of the citizenry and all sectors is valued, which allows for the consolidation of pluralist and deliberative societies (…)”. Also, on this last occasion, said body indicated that "(...) The main foundation of the legal protection of freedom of expression is based on human dignity, on the autonomy of the person and on its instrumental character for the exercise of multiple rights, and on the different functions it fulfills in democratic systems (…)”.

It can, then, be emphasized from the cited decisions the structural link—as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights qualifies it—between democracy and freedom of expression, since only a regime in which the people, its inhabitants, are recognized as a plural voice, with the capacity to dissent, to opine, and to criticize aspects of the reality in which they live, but especially, activities originating in the public sphere, can be qualified as a substantively democratic regime. (…)” VCG10/2025 ... See more Content of Interest:

Content Type: Dissenting Vote Branch of Law: 6. LEY DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL ANNOTATED WITH JURISPRUDENCE Topic: 033- Active standing Subtopics:

NOT APPLICABLE.

Res. 20250021235 PARTIAL DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE RUEDA LEAL.

Concerning the remedy filed in case file no. 24-035822-0007-CO in favor of [Name 002] S. A., I believe it should have been summarily dismissed, since the petitioner files the amparo in favor of a legal entity.

In this sense, in my dissenting vote to judgment no. 2019002355 of 9:30 a.m. on February 12, 2019, I held:

“in Advisory Opinion 22-16 of February 26, 2016, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights indicated that although some States recognize the right of petition to legal entities under special conditions, such as unions, political parties, or representatives of indigenous peoples, Afro-descendant communities, or specific groups, the fact is that 'Article 1.2 of the American Convention only enshrines rights in favor of natural persons, meaning that legal entities are not holders of the rights enshrined in said treaty'. On the other hand, in the same advisory opinion, the Inter-American Court held that, in certain specific contexts, natural persons may exercise their rights through legal entities (for example, through a media outlet, as occurred in the case of Granier et al. v. Venezuela); however, for this to be protectable before the inter-American system, 'the exercise of the right through a legal entity must involve an essential and direct relationship between the natural person who requires protection from the inter-American system and the legal entity through which the violation occurred, since a simple link between both persons is not sufficient to conclude that the rights of natural persons, and not of the legal entities, are truly being protected. Indeed, it must be proven beyond the simple participation of the natural person in the proprietary activities of the legal entity, so that such participation is substantially related to the rights alleged to have been violated.' (emphasis added) (OC. 22/16)”.

In my opinion, the reading of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional compels the same ratio of the conventional hermeneutics cited above regarding every fundamental right. Thus, in a constitutional process filed in favor of a legal entity, its admission for study requires an essential and direct relationship between the legal entity that claims to be affected by some violation of the constitutional order and the natural person who, due to such injury, sees some fundamental right diminished, in a reflected but direct manner. Now, for these purposes, the mere reference to a connection or link between the legal entity and the natural person is insufficient to be able to conclude that, precisely, through the constitutional process, the protection of the fundamental rights of the latter is being sought, not merely those of the former. The aforementioned requirement thus becomes a sine qua non prerequisite for the admissibility of constitutional review by this jurisdiction. Based on the foregoing, I deduce that this must be the guideline with which the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional is to be interpreted, so that in the sub iudice the application of jurisdictional constitutional review is inadmissible, given that, based on the evidence in the case file, the essential link between the protected legal entity and some specific natural person, in relation to the allegedly aggrieved right, has not been demonstrated.

Paul Rueda L.

VCG10/2025 ... See more Content of Interest:

Content Type: Separate Note Branch of Law: 4. ASUNTOS DE GARANTÍA Topic: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PRESS Subtopics:

MEDIA OUTLETS.

Res. No. 2025021235 Note of Judge Cruz Castro. Public Law Entities that carry out business activities may also incur in violations of freedom of expression.— In this amparo remedy resolved with merit due to the finding of indirect censorship of freedom of expression, I consider it relevant to record this note to highlight that public law entities, such as the ICE and Banco Popular, although they carry out business or private law activities, are also susceptible to being appealed as liable subjects in the violation of the right to freedom of expression. Even if the amparo remedy had been filed against private law subjects, these are also susceptible to being liable subjects in the violation of freedom of expression, since this fundamental guarantee is more important than freedom of commerce. Thus, the legal nature of the infringing entity does not negate the possibility that it may be appealed in an amparo remedy for violating freedom of expression and freedom of the press.

Freedom of expression is a fundamental right and, at the same time, a pillar of democracy. Its restriction or suppression based on unfounded or arbitrary decisions of state authority is not justified. As a fundamental right, it allows each person to seek information and express their own thoughts, ideas, and information; and in a collective or social dimension, it is the right of society to seek and receive any information, to know the thoughts, ideas, and information of others, and to be well informed. As a pillar of democracy, it allows the creation of public opinion, essential for giving content to several principles of the constitutional rule of law. The public authority must promote criticism and objection to its own decisions. The supposed uniformity of opinion based on an arbitrary political decision is inadmissible in a democratic society. Uniformity in opinions, the absence of criticism, or single thought is the atmosphere of a dictatorial government, contrary to a democracy that defines our Constitución Política.

This Chamber has made it clear that the arbitrary allocation of public resources through the purchase of advertising, as a means to restrict freedom of expression, contravenes both the Constitution and International Human Rights Law. My criterion goes beyond those limits, not only the arbitrary allocation of public resources, but also the arbitrary allocation of private resources. The arbitrary and conditioned distribution of advertising can be a mechanism of indirect censorship, as it is a repression that acts as a reward or punishment intended to condition freedom of expression, according to the will of the payer, whether a public subject or a private subject. This indirect censorship has many faces; it can be disguised or easily hidden; however, if an arbitrary restriction of freedom of thought and artistic creativity is demonstrated, a private entity can be held responsible, because reality is not defined by commercial interests, but by freedom of thought.

Although I agree with everything indicated in this vote, I add, however, that private law subjects could also incur in violations of freedom of expression by imposing direct or indirect censorship in the allocation of advertising, whose content, most of the time, does not even respond to the principle of truthfulness.

Fernando Cruz C. Judge VCG10/2025 ... See more Content of Interest:

Content Type: Separate Note Branch of Law: 4. ASUNTOS DE GARANTÍA Topic: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PRESS Subtopics:

MEDIA OUTLETS.

Res. No. 2025021235 DIFFERENT REASONS OF JUDGE GARRO VARGAS Content A. Admissibility of the accumulated remedy....................................1 B. Arguments...............................................................2 C. Proven facts............................................................3 D. Considerations..........................................................6 1. Normative and jurisprudential framework...................................6 2. Subjects appealed.......................................................9 3. Noteworthy factual aspects...............................................11 4. Core of the issue.......................................................15 I respectfully consider that the amparo remedy must be granted, but for reasons different from those indicated by the majority of this Court. First, I must refer to a procedural aspect, then to the arguments, the normative framework, the particularities of the subjects appealed, and, finally, the core of the issue.

A. Admissibility of the accumulated remedy The accumulated amparo remedy was filed on behalf of the petitioner "and of the people who watch the program that is the subject of this remedy." I believe that this amparo should have been admitted only in favor of the petitioner, since the indeterminacy of the subjects who make up the television audience is such that a basic procedural prerequisite for the litigation to be joined regarding them is not met: knowing exactly who they are. It is true that the Chamber has admitted amparos in favor of somewhat indeterminate groups of people, but always under the condition that there is a real possibility of specifying who is involved: a group of students from a school, some residents of a street, persons deprived of liberty from a specific area of a penitentiary center, etc. This condition is not met here, as it is not a determinable group of people.

On this, the majority says:

"Finally, it should be noted that the petitioner [Name 003] seeks the defense of freedom of expression from the point of view of a double dimension: the active one—the freedom to express oneself—and the passive one—the freedom to receive and know the opinions of others—and it is in that capacity that the active standing regarding his remedy is understood to operate." I consider that such an argument does not remedy the radical indeterminacy of the subjects that make up the television audience, and only relates to the dimensions of freedom of expression, which is clearly another issue.

That argument is only applicable to the appellant, who is the person we can certainly protect such freedom for in its passive dimension.

B. Arguments The appellant states that, for the 2024 edition, "El Chinaoke" developed three music videos related to matters of public interest that generated direct criticism of the Government. In that regard, they detailed that the first video, called "En el EBAIS," refers to the collapse of patient care at the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, CCSS) with a message about the increase in waiting lists afflicting Costa Ricans. Additionally, the institution's financial situation is mentioned, as well as the corruption cases and raids generated by the "Barrenador" case. In the second music video, titled "¿Será que hoy me van a asaltar?", the lyrics address the insecurity situation facing the country with a significant increase in the homicide rate, mostly related to organized crime and drug trafficking. It likewise alludes to the President of the Republic, as well as collateral deaths. In the third video, called "No tengo plata," reference is made to the high cost of living in the country, as well as the unfulfilled promises by the Government regarding price reductions. They allege that on December 19, 2024, the commercial brand Kölbi, owned by ICE, announced it would withdraw its advertising placement (pauta publicitaria) from the program "El Chinamo," stating that the content of "El Chinaoke" does not align with our brand's values. Subsequently, on December 20, 2024, the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (BPDC) announced in a statement that it would only maintain sponsorship of the "El Aguinaldazo" section on "El Chinamo," and would withdraw the rest of its advertising. This was under the argument that it had to avoid any association with content contrary to public morality and public order (moral y el orden público). They accuse the respondents' decision to withdraw the advertising placement (pauta publicitaria) from "El Chinamo" of constituting a violation of freedom of expression and press, protected by Articles 28 and 29 of the Constitution, as well as by Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights (CADH).

C. Proven Facts Although the judgment contains the list of proven facts, it is important to reiterate that, for the 2024 edition, in the "El Chinaoke" section broadcast within the program called "El Chinamo," transmitted on [Name 002] S. A. ([Name 006] or [Value 003]), several music videos were presented; however, only three are the subject of this proceeding: "En el EBAIS," "¿Será que hoy me van a asaltar?" and "No tengo plata," transmitted on December 12, 15, and 18, respectively. Likewise, it is inferred that on December 17, 2024, the BPDC requested the advertising agency that had placed its advertising placement (pauta) on the program "El Chinamo" to modify the brand's presences on the program, which resulted in the elimination of the introduction and exit screens for the four program segments when calls to participants were made, and that only the screens used when the winner of the "El Aguinaldazo" section was drawn be used. For its part, the commercial brand Kölbi, owned by ICE, issued a press release on December 19, 2024, in the following terms:

"The kölbi brand values do not align with content presented on the television program El Chinamo. Kölbi, a commercial brand of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), clarifies and communicates to the public: 0 The content presented by [Name 006] [Value 003] on the program El Chinamo, specifically in the El Chinaoke section, does not align with our brand's values. 0 Given its Costa Rican origin, Kölbi distances itself from situations in which violence is implicitly or explicitly promoted or exposed, discrimination, apology for crime, or parody of victims' suffering. 0 On the contrary, the brand's advertising and commercial efforts focus on promoting values such as peace, family unity, respect, innovation, and solidarity, with a positive impact characteristic of the national idiosyncrasy. This is evidenced in Kölbi's journey over more than fifteen years in the market. 0 The contracting of advertising spaces on the program in question, as well as the mentions of kölbi, were aimed at associating the brand with family entertainment typical of the end-of-year and beginning-of-year season; never with situations alluding to pain, stigmatization, or mockery. 0 'As a leading brand, we are governed by solid principles that guide our actions and decisions. We do not support acts contrary to those values, especially those contrary to the social and environmental responsibility we promote,' stated Leda Acevedo, ICE's Telecommunications Manager. 0 For the reasons stated, kölbi has decided to disassociate itself from the program El Chinamo and will analyze the permanence of its advertising placement (pauta) on [Name 006] [Value 003]." Immediately thereafter, on December 20, 2024, the BPDC published the following statement:

"We reaffirm our commitment to wholesome entertainment this holiday season. San José, December 20, 2024. At Banco Popular, we have as a constant priority and a core value of our brand to promote actions that strengthen the well-being of citizens, especially at times like the Christmas and New Year's holidays, where family and wholesome entertainment should take center stage.

With the aim of contributing to the development of a more united and positive society, we maintain a constant presence in dozens of media outlets throughout the country, promoting services that improve the lives of our clients and supporting content in said media that fosters family joy, reflection, and respect for diversity.

In this context, the president of the Bank's National Board of Directors, Jorge Eduardo Sánchez, has emphasized that our brand – which is the property of our clients and working people [Name 002] – cannot be exposed to being associated with inappropriate images or those that could even promote conduct contrary to public morality and public order (moral y el orden público) to which we are bound.

In the particular case of the public debate generated precisely from certain content broadcast in the 'El Chinaoke' section of the program 'El Chinamo,' which is transmitted by [Name 006] [Value 003], we deeply regret as Banco Popular that some sectors of the citizenry may have felt offended or uncomfortable by said images, and we have adopted the pertinent actions to guarantee that our participations are always promoted within spaces that have the values of wholesome entertainment as a permanent priority.

Thus, and given that this season of the program 'El Chinamo' will run until next Monday, December 23, we will maintain only the sponsorship of the 'El Aguinaldazo' section, which brings joy to the family by awarding 1 million colones daily to a lucky viewer.

We thank and assign the utmost relevance to our clients' opinion on such matters, and we reiterate that at Banco Popular we work tirelessly to contribute to social well-being, promoting respect, inclusion, and responsible enjoyment for all citizens." The record shows that the Kölbi brand did not withdraw its advertising placement (pauta publicitaria) from the media outlet, but rather redistributed it. Furthermore, [Name 006] continued to broadcast the "El Chinaoke" segments in their entirety within its programming, and they are currently available as public links on the Internet, accessible to anyone.

D. Considerations 1. Regulatory and Jurisprudential Framework In this regard, I transcribe here what I stated in the dissenting reasons to judgment 2022-25167 (Parque Viva):

"Regulatory and Jurisprudential Framework There are two norms that must be taken into consideration. On the one hand, Article 29 of the Political Constitution, which establishes:

Article 29. Everyone may communicate their thoughts by word or in writing, and publish them without prior censorship; but they shall be responsible for the abuses they commit in the exercise of this right, in the cases and in the manner established by law.

On the other hand, as relevant, Article 13 of the CADH, which states:

Article 13. Freedom of Thought and Expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, or in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice.

2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent liability, which shall be expressly established by law and be necessary to ensure: a) respect for the rights or reputations of others; or b) the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals.

3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means aimed at impeding the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.

4. Public entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 2.

5. (…) (The emphasis is not from the original).

The Constitutional Chamber has robust jurisprudence emphasizing that respect for freedom of expression is one of the indispensable conditions for the Rule of Law and the exercise of democratic life. Among many other judgments, the following can be partially transcribed:

'VIII.- Freedom of expression as an indispensable requirement for democracy. Freedom of expression is undoubtedly one of the conditions – although not the only one – for democracy to function. This freedom is what allows for the creation of public opinion, essential for giving content to various principles of the constitutional State, such as, for example, the right to information, the right of petition, or rights regarding political participation; the existence of a free and consolidated public opinion is also a condition for the functioning of representative democracy. The possibility for all persons to participate in public discussions constitutes the necessary prerequisite for the construction of a social dynamic of exchanging knowledge, ideas, and information, which allows the generation of consensus and decision-making among the components of the various social groups, but which also constitutes a channel for the expression of dissent, which in a democracy is as necessary as agreements. For its part, the exchange of opinions and information originating from public discussion contributes to forming personal opinion; both shape public opinion, which ultimately manifests itself through the channels of representative democracy' (judgment 2006-5977; the emphasis is not from the original; these considerations have been reiterated many times by the Chamber, for example, in judgments 2015-1782, 2018-8396, 2019-8263, and 2020-16167).

This judgment continues with a passage particularly relevant to the analysis that will be immediately undertaken:

'Freedom of expression has as a consequence the prohibition of all forms of censorship, in a double sense: one cannot censor the interlocutors, on the one hand; and one cannot, in general, censor in advance the possible contents of the discussion: in principle, in a democracy, all topics are debatable. The non-censorability of subjects has a practically universal character, as our Constitution establishes, no one can be deprived of the freedom to speak and express themselves as they see fit; the non-censorability of contents, while not occurring in advance, finds some limitations; however, these must be such that the freedom still has meaning or is not emptied of its content, basically, like any freedom, it must be exercised with responsibility, in short, to pursue legitimate ends within the system' (ibid.; the emphasis is not from the original).

That is, censorship is spoken of – understood as the act of reproving – as an act contrary to freedom of expression. In other words, it is affirmed that the consequence of that freedom is the prohibition of all kinds of censorship. Therefore, there is not only prior censorship, expressly prohibited by Articles 29 of the Constitution and 13 of the CADH, but subsequent censorship can also occur, which has the purpose of inhibiting certain informative or opinion content. It is also said that protection against censorship covers not only the subjects (who communicates) but also the content (what is communicated).

Furthermore, although it does not emerge from those jurisprudential lines, I believe that other criteria could be incorporated to complete a typology of censorship. Thus, by its appearance, it can be veiled or manifest; by the means used to exercise it, it can be direct or indirect (for example, as provided in Article 13.3 of the CADH); by its effects, it can be absolute (if the reprobation goes concomitantly with suppression) or relative.

Finally, in a synthetic manner, it has stated:

'The Chamber recalls that the defense of freedom of expression is vital for the functioning of a democratic regime' (judgment 2017-014977; the emphasis is not from the original).

Naturally, I fully agree with that jurisprudence, and I have concurred in many other subsequent judgments that strengthen that line (see judgments 2021-15417, 2022-4244, 2022-5915, 2022-9856, 2022-23107, among others).

2. Respondents The BPDC is a non-state public entity, that is, it does not belong to the State but to the workers. This is established by its Organic Law:

Article 1.- The Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal is created, which shall be governed by this law and its regulations. The Bank is owned by the workers in equal parts, and the right to co-ownership shall be subject to their having had a mandatory savings account for one continuous year or in alternating periods… Article 2.- The Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal is a non-state Public Law institution, with legal personality and its own patrimony, with full administrative and functional autonomy. Its operation shall be governed by the norms of Public Law.

As can be observed, the base is corporate and is not owned by the State. This is relevant, as the majority refers to judgment 2016-015220 of 4:00 p.m. on October 18, 2016, in which a similar matter brought against Banco Nacional [Name 002] was analyzed. Nevertheless, I believe that the BPDC and Banco Nacional should not be treated as equals. The cited resolution itself explains that the nature of Banco Nacional [Name 002] is that of a state institution with constitutionally recognized autonomy, which has been tasked with carrying out a commercial activity, in competition with private entities. In contrast, as established by the norm just transcribed, the BPDC is 'a non-state Public Law institution, with legal personality and its own patrimony, with full administrative and functional autonomy.' For its part, Kölbi is a commercial brand, which operates within the framework of Law No. 8660 and Law No. 8642. And they explain it well in their report:

'In this context, derived from its internal organization, the Telecommunications Management is responsible for managing the telecommunications business and the KÖLBI brand; all technical and commercial management is executed by said Management.' But that brand cannot be legally identified with ICE. Therefore, I respectfully consider that what is affirmed by the majority is inaccurate:

'Since the party responsible for the Kölbi brand is a public institution, such as the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, it is contrary to freedom of expression to "punish" specific content, which dealt, as already indicated, with matters of public relevance.' Here, the party responsible for Kölbi is not properly ICE as an autonomous institution, but rather those who exercise the Telecommunications Management insofar as they are the head of the commercial brand.

Both the BPDC and the Kölbi brand carry out business activities. In that line of thought, it is necessary to bring up the stipulations of the General Law of Public Administration, which states the following:

Article 3.- 1. Public law shall regulate the organization and activity of public entities, except where expressly provided otherwise. 2. Private law shall regulate the activity of entities that, by their overall regime and the requirements of their business operations, can be considered as common industrial or commercial enterprises. (The emphasis is not from the original).

Consequently, judgment 2016-015220 is not exactly applicable to the specific case, as the respondents here have an eminently commercial business operation and, at least in the case of the BPDC, it is not a state institution. This means they have a broad margin of action to determine their advertising policy. Furthermore, the BPDC's representative is correct in saying:

"The appellant confuses, or at least does not precisely distinguish, the factual aspects attributed to ICE (Kölbi) and to the BPDC, he likens and confuses them, in order to try to apply legal syllogisms from other cases analyzed by the Chamber that, in the specific case, are not applicable to our represented party." And this not only with respect to the distinct legal nature of Banco Nacional compared to the respondents here, but also because in the precedent the situation was quite different: it involved journalistic conduct that presumably harmed that bank's image.

3. Noteworthy Factual Aspects On the other hand, from a careful examination of the report provided by ICE, it was determined that said institution, through its Kölbi brand, has no direct contract with [Name 006], nor any contract related to the "El Chinaoke" segment, nor with the content presented in that section of the program. Furthermore, it is corroborated that as part of the commercial strategy (estrategia comercial) of the Kölbi brand, it was decided to relocate the advertising placement (pauta publicitaria) from the "Misión Chinamo" section as a measure aligned with the brand's values, seeking to have the advertising presented in other programs of the same [Value 003] that better fit the image Kölbi wishes to project. In that regard, the report emphasized the following:

"The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad through its KÖLBI brand does not have a direct contract with [Name 002] ([Name 005], as it is through an active bidding process with advertising agencies, which are responsible for contracting advertising placements (pautas) in media outlets; it is thus that said agencies contracted a placement (pauta) in the program 'El Chinamo,' specifically in the section called 'Misión Chinamo.' In this section, throughout the program, the brand exposure takes place, which was carefully analyzed and linked to its commercial strategic plan and has been done for years from the standpoint of technological innovation. It is important to note that, under no circumstances, was a contract established related to the 'Chinaoke' segment or the content presented in that section of the program (…) In the year 2024, during the course of the aforementioned program or section, the commercial strategy (estrategia comercial) of the KÖLBI brand was analyzed, determining that the type of content was moving away from the brand's values. In that context, and as part of the commercial strategy (estrategia comercial) of the 'KÖLBI' brand, it was decided to relocate the advertising placement (pauta publicitaria) from the 'Misión Chinamo' section. This relocation was a measure aligned with the brand's values, seeking to have the advertising presented in other programs of the same [Value 003] that better fit the image that 'KÖLBI' wishes to project (…) The advertising placement (pauta publicitaria) WAS NOT WITHDRAWN FROM THE MEDIA, but was distributed to optimize advertising impact and was aligned with the interests of the telecommunications business strategic plan and the KÖLBI brand, in mutual agreement with the advertising agency and the television station itself. [Name 006] continued to broadcast the 'Chinaoke' segments in their entirety within its programming, and they are currently available as public links on the Internet, accessible to anyone (…) The relocation of the advertising placement (pauta publicitaria) responds to objective and transparent criteria, which are aligned with the commercial strategy (estrategia comercial) defined by the 'KÖLBI' brand. These criteria seek to optimize the reach and effectiveness of advertising campaigns, ensuring that the relocation is carried out in accordance with the interests and commercial objectives established by the brand, in a clear and consistent manner, as it is the duty of the contracted advertising agencies to ensure adherence to the guidelines of both the brand book and its values and personality, contractually agreed upon between the advertising company and ICE (…) In this sense, the measure does not imply the elimination of the advertising placement (pauta publicitaria), but rather its relocation in other spaces of the media outlet, thus guaranteeing the brand's media presence." In a similar vein, the president of the National Board of Directors and the general manager with powers of unlimited general attorney-in-fact of the BPDC indicated that the banking entity purchased an advertising placement (pauta publicitaria) for the television program "El Chinamo," and on October 8, 2024, the Corporate Marketing Directorate approved the participation in the program "El Chinamo," with the "El Aguinaldazo" section. They added that on December 17, 2024, the advertising agency was requested to make a modification to the brand's presences in the program, with the priority objective of avoiding any type of consumer saturation; this, because the initial package purchased included fourteen daily presences, but from a technical analysis, a quantity of up to twenty-two brand presences per program was detected. As relevant, the core content extracted from the report is as follows:

"It is true that Banco Popular purchased an advertising placement (pauta publicitaria) for the television program 'El Chinamo.' On September 26, 2024, [Name 006] [Value 003] began marketing the program to Banco Popular, giving priority to clients who had a presence in the same space in 2023; as was the case with our Institution, thus, the initial offer presented to the Bank by the media outlet proposed a considerable discount on the rate price that other brands would eventually have to pay if they contracted similar presences (…) on October 8, 2024, the Corporate Marketing Directorate approved the participation in the program 'El Chinamo,' with the 'El Aguinaldazo' section (…) Banco Popular on October 8, 2024, approved the participation and placement (pauta) in the program 'El Chinamo,' with the 'El Aguinaldazo' section. As part of a habitual practice of monitoring results within institutional marketing processes, on Friday, December 13, 2024, the Advertising Agency was requested to review the preliminary results of 'El Chinamo,' whose 2024 season began on Wednesday, December 11, 2024. From the technical analysis described, a quantity of up to 22 brand presences per program was detected, which differed from those initially contracted; the increase in presences was due to a bonus granted unilaterally by the Channel, resulting in greater exposure than expected (overexposure), given that the initial package included 14 daily presences. Based on said analysis, on December 17, 2024, the Advertising Agency was requested to make a modification to the brand's presences in this program, with the priority objective of avoiding any type of saturation towards the consumer. This resulted in the elimination of the introduction and exit screens for the four program segments when calls to participants were made, so that only the screens used when the winner of the 'El Aguinaldazo' section was drawn would be used; the foregoing was implemented as of December 18, 2024, when the presences in 'El Chinamo' were reduced from 22 to 12 (…) It is important to note that throughout the entire season of the program 'El Chinamo' - which concluded on December 23 - our participation in the 'El Aguinaldazo' segment remained unchanged, redistributing, as already explained, brand presences via screens for advertising spots in different programs of the same channel, with the objective of benefiting the Institution and expanding the brand's reach." In view of the above, it is clear that the respondent parties did not withdraw the advertising placements (pautas publicitarias) from the program called "El Chinamo." As argued, the variations in brand exposure were due, in Kölbi's case, to criteria aligned with the commercial strategy (estrategia comercial) defined by the brand, while in the BPDC's case, to a modification in the brand presences in this program with the priority objective of avoiding any type of consumer saturation. Furthermore, the reduction of advertising placements (pautas publicitarias) in the program called "El Chinamo" did not cause an impossibility to broadcast the program. Indeed, both brands remained until the end of the program in the "El Chinaoke" and "El Aguinaldazo" sections, respectively.

4. Core of the Issue But why, even though we are dealing with a commercial brand of a state institution and a non-state public law subject of a corporate base, which have a broad margin of action and were not directly alluded to by the content of the videos, can it be affirmed that they incurred in a violation of freedom of expression? Why can it be said that such a violation is configured if, as a consequence of the foregoing, it is evident that they have no obligation whatsoever to place advertising (pautar) with anyone, nor a duty, in itself, to maintain said placement (pauta) or its characteristics?

As I stated at the time:

"Article 13.3 of the CADH indicates that the violation of freedom of expression by indirect means occurs when these are 'aimed at impeding the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.' Furthermore, according to the jurisprudence of both the IACHR Court and the Constitutional Chamber, the acts must fall upon the subject who communicates (individual or legal entity)" (Dissenting reasons to judgment 2022-25167).

Here, the conduct of the respondent parties did not impede, either totally or partially, the circulation of ideas and opinions. But I consider that a type of censorship was configured. In this regard, it is appropriate to bring up what I also stated on that occasion and transcribe again:

"'Freedom of expression has as a consequence the prohibition of all forms of censorship, in a double sense: one cannot censor the interlocutors, on the one hand; and one cannot, in general, censor in advance the possible contents of the discussion: in principle, in a democracy, all topics are debatable. The non-censorability of subjects has a practically universal character, as our Constitution establishes, no one can be deprived of the freedom to speak and express themselves as they see fit; the non-censorability of contents, while not occurring in advance, finds some limitations; however, these must be such that the freedom still has meaning or is not emptied of its content, basically, like any freedom, it must be exercised with responsibility, in short, to pursue legitimate ends within the system' (judgment 2006-5977; the emphasis is not from the original).

That is, censorship is spoken of – understood as the act of reproving – as an act contrary to freedom of expression. In other words, it is affirmed that the consequence of that freedom is the prohibition of all kinds of censorship. Therefore, there is not only prior censorship, expressly prohibited by Articles 29 of the Constitution and 13 of the CADH, but subsequent censorship can also occur, which has the purpose of inhibiting certain informative or opinion content. It is also said that protection against censorship covers not only the subjects (who communicates) but also the content (what is communicated).

Furthermore, although it does not emerge from those jurisprudential lines, I believe that other criteria could be incorporated to complete a typology of censorship.

Thus, by its appearance, it can be veiled or manifest; by the means used to exercise it, it can be direct or indirect (for example, as provided in Article 13.3 of the ACHR); by its effects, it can be absolute (if the condemnation is concomitant with suppression) or relative” (ibid.; emphasis not in original).

And then I added:

“This means that any expression involving censorship, even if its effects are only relative and not absolute, since it did not prevent the subsequent dissemination of the condemned ideas, constitutes a direct injury to freedom of expression” (ibid.).

I must acknowledge that Kölbi presented a better-articulated argument to justify the relocation of the advertising placement when it stated:

“In 2024, during the aforementioned program or segment, the KÖLBI brand commercial strategy was analyzed, determining that the type of content was moving away from the brand's values. In that context, and as part of the 'KÖLBI' brand commercial strategy, the decision was made to relocate the advertising placement from the 'Misión Chinamo' segment. This relocation was a measure aligned with the brand's values, seeking for the advertising to be presented in other programs of the same [Value 003] that better fit the image that 'KÖLBI' wishes to project.” And also:

“That reputation is associated with the family's social mobility, with the most intrinsic Tico Pura Vida -Costa Rican- being; KÖLBI focuses on well-being, on the continuous improvement of society, it has no interference -from a commercial perspective- in public policy, much less in the discussion of the major social issues that we carry as a society.” However, it is glaringly obvious that the request to reduce and relocate the advertising placements in the program “El Chinamo” reflected a reaction by the Kölbi brand and the BPDC to the three videos. As the majority points out, the content of these does not refer in any way to the commercial lines of business of Kölbi and the BPDC but rather to government authorities. And I consider that the respondents do not manage to fully disprove that they used the faculties inherent to their respective commercial lines of business as a mechanism of political influence. Furthermore, they did not provide sufficient elements of conviction to determine what the link is between their own commercial activities and the direct harm the content of the videos caused to their line of business or corporate identity. Therefore, in this specific case, considering the context and the other elements mentioned herein, the reaction to content clearly contrary to the government appears to have taken on the appearance of subsequent, veiled, direct, relative censorship, since they fail to discredit the use of prerogatives specific to their commercial line of business with pernicious effects for freedom of expression.

Therefore, I concur with granting the appeal, but for different reasons.

Anamari Garro Vargas Judge VCG09/2025 ... See more CO* Res. No. 2025021235 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at thirteen thirty hours on July eighth, two thousand twenty-five.

Consolidated amparo appeals (case files numbers 24-035822-007 and 24-035833-0007-CO), filed by [Name 001], identification number [Value 001], on behalf of [Name 002] and [Name 003], identification number [Value 002], on their own behalf and on behalf of the people who watch the program that is the object of this appeal, against the INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD and the BANCO POPULAR Y DE DESARROLLO COMUNAL.

WHEREAS:

1.- By a brief received on December 21, 2024, [Name 001] filed an amparo appeal, in the following terms: for nearly twenty-four years, [Name 006] has broadcast a program called "El Chinamo," which is transmitted on national television. They indicate that, over the years, El Chinamo has featured a segment called "El Chinaoke," used for parody, satire, and comedy, as valid forms of expression and criticism of political figures, the current government, public institutions, or situations of general interest. To do this, melodies from pre-existing songs are used, with the original lyrics altered to introduce political criticism content. They state that El Chinamo, like many other television programs, relies on advertising placement from public and private companies. They state that, for the 2024 edition, three music videos concerning matters of public interest were developed in the El Chinaoke segment, which involved direct criticism of the Government. In the first video, called "En el EBAIS," reference is made to the collapse of patient care at the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, with a message regarding the increase in waiting lists afflicting Costa Ricans. The video also alludes to the institution's financial situation, as well as corruption cases and raids resulting from the "Barrenador" case. In the second music video called "¿Será que hoy me van a asaltar?", the lyrics refer to the insecurity situation the country faces, with a significant increase in the homicide rate mostly related to organized crime and drug trafficking. They add that the video alludes to the President of the Republic, as well as collateral deaths from organized crime. In the third video called "No tengo plata," allusion is made to the high cost of living in the country, and to the promises unfulfilled by the Government regarding price reductions. They allege that the commercial brand Kölbi, owned by the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, announced on December 19, 2024, that it would withdraw its advertising placement in the program El Chinamo, arguing that the content of El Chinaoke "does not match our brand's values." The institution also reported that: "Given its Costa Rican origin, Kölbi distances itself from situations where violence is promoted or exposed implicitly or explicitly, discrimination, advocacy of crime, or parody of victims' suffering. On the contrary, the brand's advertising and commercial efforts focus on encouraging values such as peace, family unity, respect, innovation, and solidarity, with a positive impact inherent to the national idiosyncrasy. This is evidenced in Kölbi's journey in the market for over fifteen years." Subsequently, on December 20, 2024, the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal announced in a statement that it would only maintain its sponsorship of the "El Aguinaldazo" segment on El Chinamo and would withdraw the rest of its advertising. This was based on the argument that it had to avoid any association with content contrary to morality and public order. They argue that the respondents' decision to withdraw the advertising placement from El Chinamo constitutes a violation of freedom of expression and press, protected by Articles 28 and 29 of the Constitution, as well as by numeral 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and therefore request that the appeal be granted, with its consequences.

2.- By a resolution at 11:26 a.m. on January 6, 2025, the process was given course.

3.- Leda María Acevedo Zúñiga, Telecommunications Manager with powers of a generalissima attorney-in-fact without sum limit for the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, reports under oath. She indicates that this institute, regarding the telecommunications sector, operates in a competitive market under the legal framework established by Ley 8660 and Ley 8642. "In this context, derived from its internal organization, the Telecommunications Management has the responsibility of managing the telecommunications business and the KÖLBI brand; all technical and commercial management is executed by this Management. Defining, organizing, directing, and optimizing the use of all its resources, including those allocated to advertising, is inherent to its competence. This optimization is crucial to ensure that all strategic decisions, whether in terms of advertising placements or any other related action, are aligned with the values, objectives, and purposes of the brand 'KÖLBI.' The fundamental objective is that all communication and marketing actions are implemented consistently with the brand's commercial strategic plan, to ensure it is exposed in the most appropriate manner before consumers. This commercial plan has been classified as confidential by the ICE's Board of Directors, with the purpose of protecting the strategic information that underpins the institution's competitiveness and ensures the success of its business model. In this way, the ICE protects the key information that drives its growth and presence in a highly competitive market, which, as is known, it shares with other transnational giants, eminently private in nature. Regarding the specific case First: As a starting point in the analysis of this matter, it is noted that the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, through its KÖLBI brand, does not have a direct contract with [Name 002] ([Name 005]), since it is through an active bidding process with advertising agencies, which are responsible for contracting placements in media outlets, that is how said agencies contracted a placement in the program 'El Chinamo,' specifically in the segment called 'Misión Chinamo.' In this segment, throughout the program, the brand exposure is carried out, which was carefully analyzed and linked to the brand's commercial strategic plan and has been done for years from the innovation of technology. It is important to point out that, under no circumstance, was a contract established related to the 'Chinaoke' segment nor to the content displayed in that section of the program. In summary, KÖLBI hires the expert service of an advertising agency, which is the one that places commercial and market placement -not of an institutional nature- in the different communication and brand exposure channels for the effects of placing and selling telecommunications services available to the public, just as other telecommunications operators with which it competes for the market do. Second: In 2024, during the aforementioned program or segment, the KÖLBI brand commercial strategy was analyzed, determining that the type of content was moving away from the brand's values. In that context, and as part of the 'KÖLBI' brand commercial strategy, the decision was made to relocate the advertising placement from the 'Misión Chinamo' segment. This relocation was a measure aligned with the brand's values, seeking for the advertising to be presented in other programs of the same [Value 003] that better fit the image that 'KÖLBI' wishes to project. In this way, the advertising strategy was aligned with the principles of sustainability and technological innovation, which are key to the brand's identity and vision, ensuring that advertising campaigns are in tune with its long-term values and objectives. KÖLBI is associated with technology, innovation, the future, fluidity, communication, the internet, social networks, and in general everything that the world of telecommunications-infocommunications involves. Likewise, that brand is, to some degree, accompanied by the ICE's reputation for building major infrastructure works, public services, universal access, the country's development through bringing and providing electricity and telecommunications throughout the entire country for 75 years. That reputation is associated with the family's social mobility, with the most intrinsic Tico Pura Vida -Costa Rican- being; KÖLBI focuses on well-being, on the continuous improvement of society, it has no interference -from a commercial perspective- in public policy, much less in the discussion of the major social issues that we carry as a society. Third: The advertising placement WAS NOT WITHDRAWN FROM THE MEDIA; rather, it was distributed to optimize the advertising impact and was aligned with the interests of the strategic plan for the telecommunications business and the KÖLBI brand, in mutual agreement with the advertising agency and the television station itself. Fourth: [Name 006] continued to broadcast the 'Chinaoke' segments in their entirety within its programming, and they are currently available as public links on the Internet, accessible to anyone. This fact demonstrates that, at no time, did the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad exercise censorship or limit the transmission of the content produced by the media outlet, as it has no interest, interference, or power to do so, because, as reiterated, there is no contractual relationship. In this way, it is confirmed that access to and dissemination of the program were not restricted in any way, guaranteeing the free circulation of information and the broadcast programming. Fifth: The relocation of the advertising placement responds to objective and transparent criteria, which are aligned with the commercial strategy defined by the 'KÖLBI' brand. These criteria seek to optimize the reach and effectiveness of the advertising campaigns, ensuring that the relocation is carried out in accordance with the commercial interests and objectives established by the brand, clearly and consistently, as it is the duty of the contracted advertising agencies to ensure adherence to both the brand book guidelines and its values and personality, as contractually agreed between the advertising company and the ICE. As shown below in the following excerpt from the contract: [CHAPTER II. PARTICULAR CONDITIONS. 14. WARRANTY VALIDITY FOR THE GOOD OR SERVICE. 14.3. The provision of the service must also be identified with the principles of logistics and good administration of the contract. 22. CONTRACT EXECUTION CONDITIONS. 22.10. It shall be the direct responsibility of the agency (agencies) to supervise and control the final quality of the materials that the ICE approves, whether these are printed, audiovisual, BTL tactics, or of any other type, as well as to supervise that the information contained in each material is correct, the drafting, formats, correctness, style, readability, review of the information according to advertising legislation, and adherence to both the brand book guidelines and its values and personality. The ICE will not assume any cost associated with quality control failures in the production and execution processes. 22.24. The ownership of the ICE's registered trademarks belongs exclusively to the ICE, therefore the agency (agencies) must provide the corresponding safeguarding of said intellectual property in the preparation and execution of all services contemplated during the validity of this contract and after its termination. The agency (agencies) shall be responsible before the ICE for any improper use, lack of care, damages, and losses caused to the ICE's trademarks or the works used under the protection of this contract. 24. QUALITY CONTROL SYSTEM. 24.4. The agency (agencies) must guarantee that the service provided complies with the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and market reality, logically and objectively, ensuring at all times its continuity and strict compliance with what has been agreed upon]. Therefore, under no circumstance can the decision to relocate the advertising placement be interpreted as an act of censorship against a third party's freedom of the press or expression, as the appellant suggests. It is evident that this decision responds exclusively to contractual and strategic matters defined between the involved parties. Furthermore, it should be noted that the appellant does not possess sufficient information or knowledge about the commercial strategy plan under which the relocation decision was made. In this sense, the measure does not imply the elimination of the advertising placement, but rather its relocation in other spaces of the media outlet, thus guaranteeing the brand's media presence. This strategic approach allows the advertising to continue aligning with the company's values, principles, and commercial objectives, ensuring its positioning in a competitive environment, and associated with the environments, segments, contexts, and sentiments that are of commercial interest to KÖLBI. Consequently, any interpretation attempting to link this commercial decision with a violation of fundamental rights is unfounded, as the exercise of freedom of expression or press has not been prevented or restricted. Rather, it is a legitimate management of the brand's advertising resources, seeking to optimize its impact and coherence with its business vision and social responsibility. In accordance with the provisions of Ley N.º 8660 Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector, the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, as an actor in an open market, is subject to the dynamics of private law regarding the usual practices of the telecommunications industry, of which commercial management, and therefore advertising, forms a part. This grants it the freedom to choose whom to associate with, provided it does not engage in unfair practices or those contrary to applicable regulations. By virtue of this administrative, technical, and financial autonomy, the ICE is empowered to make commercial decisions, such as contracting or withdrawing advertising, based on its strategic objectives and business values. These decisions, therefore, cannot be considered violations of constitutional rights, such as freedom of expression or the press. Likewise, the KÖLBI operation must be governed by business criteria that maximize both its economic sustainability and its institutional reputation. This implies that the advertising associations it undertakes must be congruent with the organization's values and must not include content that could directly or indirectly affect its public image or consumer relations. In this context, it is essential that its strategic decisions align with its commercial plan, which is designed to guarantee efficiency, competitiveness, and coherence with its corporate objectives. It should be noted that Article 35 of Ley N.º 8660 establishes that KÖLBI's commercial strategy plan is protected under the principle of confidentiality. This means that information related to advertising placement decisions and their relocation is not publicly available, thus protecting the institution's commercial interests and strategic viability. "(Article 35- Handling of Confidential Information)": "(…The information that the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) and its companies obtain from their users and clients shall be confidential and may only be used and shared between the ICE and its companies, for business purposes. Its disclosure to third parties is restricted, except when requested by a legally competent authority that justifies its need and through the respective means. Information related to the activities of the ICE and its companies, classified by them as industrial, commercial, or economic secret, is confidential when, for strategic, commercial, and competitive reasons, its disclosure to third parties is not convenient. For these purposes, the following shall be considered: a) The confidentiality of the information shall be declared by the Board of Directors as the highest decision-making body and must contain the corresponding technical and legal basis, as well as the period during which the information shall have said character. b) The confidentiality of the information may only be applied to those activities or services developed under free competition schemes. It does not include administrative procedures and activities, nor the financial statements and their annexes comprising income, custody, investment, expenditure, and their evaluation, as well as the balance sheet, the income statement, and, in general, the rest of the accounting information and that of its subsidiaries which is of a public nature, in the segments of its activity that remain under monopoly. c) Public entities that, by constitutional or legal provision, perform functions of control, supervision, vigilance, or oversight of the Public Treasury shall have access to the information declared confidential by the ICE and its companies, as well as jurisdictional bodies. Such entities and bodies must safeguard the confidentiality and integrity of the information from those third parties not expressly authorized by law.)" The budget allocated to the advertising placement will be used in other spaces within the same media outlet, selected in accordance with KÖLBI's commercial objectives. This strategic approach ensures that our communication is consistent with our brand identity and effectively contributes to generating value for our clients and society in general. As a responsible entity, we assume the duty to associate our brand exclusively with spaces that reflect values compatible with our own, such as respect, closeness, family, and social responsibility. In this sense, the ICE has not violated any constitutional right; on the contrary, it reaffirms its commitment to freedom of expression and to projecting messages aligned with the fundamental values of our institution. The relocation of the advertising placement should not be interpreted as censorship or as a political or editorial stance, but as a strategic decision aimed at strengthening our brand and its connection with Costa Ricans, in addition to the interest in positioning the brand and thus selling KÖLBI products, which ultimately generate the income for the business operation, including paying for the placement (The ICE budget has no State allocation; it all comes from revenue from electricity and telecommunications sales). Likewise, we reiterate that our advertising placement remains active in other spaces of [Name 006] and in various media outlets, which reinforces our commitment to a comprehensive, responsible communication strategy aligned with the interests and expectations of our clients and audiences. These decisions obey business criteria that prioritize coherence, sustainability, and positive impact on the community. It is worth saying that it should not be interpreted that KÖLBI has an obligation to place advertising in specific media." She requests that the appeal be dismissed.

4.- Harold Cordero Villalobos, general manager of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, reports under oath the following: "By this means, I clarify to the Constitutional Chamber that I have not issued any administrative act against the appellant, nor have I formed any omission that could determine the alleged violation of the fundamental rights claimed. However, in accordance with the provisions of Article 34 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional and following the indications of the Constitutional Chamber, it is necessary to direct the amparo appeals to the official who may have, through their action or omission, violated a fundamental right of the appellant. Therefore, it is appropriate for the Constitutional Chamber to take into account the report and evidence presented by the following collaborator, who, by virtue of the organizational structure approved by the ICE's Board of Directors, is competent to address the facts alleged in this case with the detail and specificity it merits: Mrs. LEDA MARÍA DE LOS ANGELES ACEVEDO ZÚÑIGA, holder of identification number N°1-0630-0198, who is the Telecommunications Manager of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad." He requests that the appeal be dismissed.

5.- Jorge Eduardo Sánchez Sibaja, president of the National Board of Directors, and Gina Melissa Carvajal Vega, general manager with powers of a generalissima attorney-in-fact without sum limit, both of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, report under oath the following: "REGARDING THE FACTS REGARDING FACT ONE, TWO, AND THREE: They are rejected as they are not known to us, given that they are facts alien to our represented party. REGARDING FACT FOUR: It is partially accepted. It is true that the Banco Popular purchased an advertising placement for the television program 'El Chinamo.' On September 26, 2024, [Name 006] [Value 003] began the commercialization of the program with the Banco Popular, giving priority to clients who had a presence in the same space in 2023; as was the case of our Institution, thus, the initial offer presented to the Bank by the media outlet proposed a considerable discount on the rate price that other brands would eventually have to disburse if contracting similar presences. On October 3, 2024, the Advertising Agency contracted for this purpose was asked to match the previous year's advertising package and to include, as a bonus (meaning, without any additional cost to the proposed package), a total of 12 spots. Taking into consideration the initial offer and the improvement made to it, as well as various technical criteria specific to the matter such as reach, frequency, price per spot, prices per rating point, affinity of the target market with the institution's client profile within the media buying strategy, among others, on October 8, 2024, the Corporate Marketing Direction approved participation in the program 'El Chinamo,' with the 'El Aguinaldazo' segment. REGARDING FACT FIVE AND SIX: They are rejected as they are not known to us, given that they refer to situations alien to our represented party. REGARDING FACT SEVEN: It is rejected as False. As indicated in the response to FACT FOUR, the Banco Popular on October 8, 2024, approved participation and placement in the program 'El Chinamo,' with the 'El Aguinaldazo' segment. As part of a standard practice of results follow-up within institutional marketing processes, on Friday, December 13, 2024, the Advertising Agency was asked to review the preliminary results of 'El Chinamo,' whose 2024 season began on Wednesday, December 11, 2024. From the described technical analysis, a quantity of up to 22 brand presences per program was detected, which differed from those initially contracted; the increase in presences was due to a bonus unilaterally granted by the Channel, which resulted in greater exposure than expected (overexposure), given that the initial package included 14 daily presences. Based on this analysis, on December 17, 2024, the Advertising Agency was asked to make a modification to the brand's presences in this program, with the priority objective of avoiding any type of saturation towards the consumer. This resulted in the elimination of the presentation and exit screens for the four program segments when calls were being made to participants, so that only the screens were used when the winner of the 'El Aguinaldazo' segment was announced. The above was implemented starting December 18, 2024, when presences on 'El Chinamo' were reduced from 22 to 12. What is stated in the preceding paragraph did not imply any type of restriction, withdrawal of placement, or affectation to the media outlet, since it was coordinated directly with the channel and the Advertising Agency so that the equivalent investment amount represented by the screens that would be removed was redistributed in commercials to be aired in different programs on the same Channel, taking advantage of its year-end programming grid, which in turn would allow us to offer our clients and the general public a holiday message through our institutional jingle and reach other audiences at other times. It is important to indicate that throughout the entire season of the program 'El Chinamo' - which concluded on December 23rd - our participation in the 'El Aguinaldazo' segment was maintained without any variation, redistributing, as already explained, brand presences through screens for advertising spots in different programs on the same channel, with the objective of benefiting the Institution and expanding the brand's reach. As can be seen, esteemed Judges, the redistribution and optimization of the Bank's placement in 'El Chinamo' is based solely and exclusively on technical criteria and was executed prior to the public incident that occurred regarding the contents of the 'El Chinaoke' segment, which apparently and as stated by the appellant, caused the Kölbi brand, owned by the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, to withdraw its placement from the program 'El Chinamo' due to the contents of the 'El Chinaoke' segment." Now, the press release issued by the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (BPDC) must be understood as a response to the various communications and comments from clients, individuals, and sectors linked to the BPDC, expressing high degrees of disagreement and concern over content broadcast within the program “El Chinamo,” aired by [Name 006] [Value 003], at a time when our Institution had significant advertising participation; the massive comments coincided in noting that certain images and words used within parody sections, particularly those addressing issues related to citizen security, could be considered harsh, uncomfortable for certain audiences, or inappropriate for a space intended for family enjoyment. This was done to avoid affecting our name and the good reputation achieved with great effort over decades, and it is for this reason that said press release was issued. However, we must be emphatic that Banco Popular maintained its advertising placement in El Chinamo with the segment “El Aguinaldazo” until the program concluded, and that the difference in advertising presences, in the interest of not causing consumer saturation, was redistributed into commercials aired in different programs on the same Channel, such that this cannot be considered censorship or any act against the freedoms of the press and expression, as the petitioner erroneously argues. The foregoing convincingly demonstrates that our Institution in no way violated any right to freedom of the press or expression, since there is no evidence of censorship of the advertising space initially agreed upon with [Name 006] [Value 003], and the sponsorship of the “El Aguinaldazo” segment was maintained until the referenced program concluded its season. Furthermore, we must clarify that Banco Popular has no relationship whatsoever with, nor was it a specific sponsor of, the space called “El Chinaoke,” over which we have no interference or prior knowledge of its contents and which cannot be conditioned from our position as an advertiser. REGARDING THE EIGHTH FACT: It is rejected because it is not within our knowledge, as it refers to situations unrelated to our represented party. REGARDING THE MERITS OF THIS MATTER Honorable Magistrates, in light of what has been detailed in each of the points that have been answered, it is demonstrated that the Bank has not violated the fundamental rights to free expression and freedom of the press of [Name 002]. The BPDC omits referring to the totality of the arguments and assertions made by the petitioner in their Amparo brief, because this Institution is knowledgeable of and respectful of all the scopes of the rights related to information, freedom of expression, and freedom of the press, as well as the inconvenient nature of practices that may directly or indirectly constitute prior censorship of different social manifestations. The petitioner confuses, or at least does not precisely distinguish, the factual aspects attributed to ICE (Kölbi) and to the BPDC, likening and confusing them to try to apply legal syllogisms from other cases analyzed by the Chamber that, in this specific case, are not applicable to our represented party. For the Bank, it is clear that our advertising placement was not in any of the Channel's news or information services. As has been stated, the Bank was contacted in September 2024 by [Name 006] [Value 003] to place advertising in the program “El Chinamo,” after which the institutional decision was made to participate in the “El Aguinaldazo” section. This advertising investment allowed the Institution to reward current or potential clients with one million colones in each of the 12 programs, reinforcing its positioning and consideration, to support the promotion of the use of the Bank's debit and credit cards in the highest consumption season of the year and to involve our clients, not only in the best conditions offered by our Entity, but also in the promotion of electric vehicles that one can participate in through purchases made. Now, as part of a standard practice of results monitoring within institutional marketing processes, on Friday, December 13, 2024, the Advertising Agency was asked to review the preliminary results of “El Chinamo,” whose 2024 season began on Wednesday, December 11, 2024. From the technical analysis described, a quantity of up to 22 brand presences per program was detected, which differed from those initially contracted. The increase in presences was due to a bonus granted unilaterally by the Channel, which resulted in greater exposure than expected (overexposure), given that the initial package included 14 daily presences. Based on said analysis, on December 17, 2024, the Advertising Agency was asked to make a modification to the brand's presences in this program, with the primary objective of avoiding any type of saturation towards the consumer. This resulted in the elimination of the introduction and exit screens of the program's four segments when calls to participants were made, so that the screens were only used when the winner of the “El Aguinaldazo” section was announced. The foregoing was executed starting on December 18, 2024, when the presences in “El Chinamo” were reduced from 22 to 12. What was stated in the preceding paragraph did not imply any type of restriction, withdrawal of advertising placement, or impact on the media outlet, much less any violation of the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of the press of [Name 002] as the petitioner claims, but rather was in response to a contractual negotiation, since it was coordinated directly with the channel and the Advertising Agency so that the amount equivalent to the investment represented by the screens that were to be removed was redistributed into commercials to be aired in different programs on the same Channel, which is how it was carried out, and said placements or advertising presences were transmitted through advertising spots in different programs on the same channel. Regarding the press release issued by the BPDC, it is reiterated that this was done due to the various communications and comments from clients, individuals, and sectors linked to the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (BPDC), expressing high degrees of disagreement and concern over content broadcast within the program “El Chinamo,” aired by [Name 006] [Value 003], at a time when our Institution had significant advertising participation; the massive comments coincided in noting that certain images and words used within parody sections, particularly those addressing issues related to citizen security, could be considered harsh, uncomfortable for certain audiences, or inappropriate for a space intended for family enjoyment. Thus, to avoid affecting our name and the good reputation achieved with great effort over decades, it is for this reason that said press release was issued. It must be emphasized that Banco Popular maintained its advertising placement in El Chinamo with the segment “El Aguinaldazo” until the program concluded, and that the difference in advertising presences, in the interest of not causing consumer saturation, was redistributed into commercials aired in different programs on the same Channel. With the foregoing, it is demonstrated that our Institution in no way violated any right to freedom of the press or expression, since there is no evidence of censorship of the advertising space initially agreed upon with [Name 006] [Value 003], and the sponsorship of the “El Aguinaldazo” segment was maintained until the referenced program concluded its season. Furthermore, we must clarify that Banco Popular has no relationship whatsoever with, nor was it a specific sponsor of, the space called “El Chinaoke,” over which we have no interference or prior knowledge of its contents and which cannot be conditioned from our position as an advertiser. We reiterate that it is on record that our advertising break was not in any news or journalistic segment, so no right to freedom of the press or expression was ever affected. However, our regulations on “reputational risk” do require us to protect our brand and our clientele, given that we are a public company in competition. The Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal is a non-state public entity, meaning it does not belong to the State but to the workers, as established in articles 1 and 2 of its Organic Law: “Article 1.- The Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal is hereby created, which shall be governed by this law and its regulations. The Bank is owned by the workers in equal parts, and the right to co-ownership will be subject to them having held a mandatory savings account for one continuous year or in alternate periods… Article 2.- The Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal is a non-state Public Law institution, with legal personality and its own patrimony, with full administrative and functional autonomy. Its operation shall be governed by the norms of Public Law…”. In this capacity, there is clarity on the transcendence of freedom of expression and freedom of the press in a Social State of Law, such as the Costa Rican one. Likewise, it is conscious of and vigilant regarding the duty of probity and transparency that must govern the activity of a non-state public entity, such as the Bank, in the handling of public funds. Likewise, we deeply respect the right that any citizen has to complain or speak out regarding public officials, in whatever space they see fit. It is important to be clear that even in the program El Chinamo, even in the CHINAOKE section, no attacks or comments were made against the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal that could in any way motivate a reaction from our institution. This is a differentiating factor with respect to the background information pointed out by the petitioner himself, where he presents the case of a state bank that withdrew advertising placements from a newspaper due to alleged publications by that written medium against the cited bank. In the present case, the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal was not attacked, but most importantly, our represented party did not take any action that in any way caused harm to [Name 002], with whom it contracted for advertising, respecting the agreed terms, maintaining its advertising placement in the program El Chinamo until its conclusion, and even placing advertising in different programming spaces with said television company. The press release mentioned in the seventh fact of the appeal highlights the concern of a series of clients regarding what was expressed in a section of the program El Chinamo. It is precisely the respect we have for our co-owner clients of our Institution, as well as respect for their freedom of expression, that led us to request an assessment of what happened from the General Management. However, it is clarified that all actions by Banco Popular have clear technical support, were agreed upon with the channel, and the decision was never made to remove the brand presence of Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal from the channel (including from the program El Chinamo), which is falsely stated in the seventh fact of the appeal. The Petitioner’s conclusion that this constitutes a violation of the freedoms of expression and the press is not only untrue based on what has been stated, but also starts from a false premise, which is that the BPDC withdrew its advertising placement against [Name 002]. In summary, under no consideration could it be indicated that the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal has acted arbitrarily or capriciously against the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of the press against [Name 002], given that it maintained its advertising placement in the “El Aguinaldazo” section of “El Chinamo” and all actions adopted in this regard were duly coordinated with the Advertising Agency and accepted by the television company itself, which executed them.” They request that the process be dismissed.

6.- By resolution No. 2025000820 at 09:20 hours on January 10, 2025, it was ordered to accumulate case file No. 24-035833-0007-CO, filed by [Name 003], identity card [Value 002], against the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, to this process -No. 24-035822-0007-CO-, in order to be resolved herein, due to the connection of the facts. In the filing brief, dated December 21, 2024, and in the brief of January 7, 2025, the petitioner indicates that as a Costa Rican, respectful of his constitutional duties and obligations and the laws of the country, he formally files an amparo appeal for removing the advertising placement in the program chinaoque of [Value 003], because the freedom of expression of Costa Ricans is being curtailed with prior censorship of the program of [Value 003], not allowing Costa Ricans to see the program on that channel, transgressing Article 28 of the Constitution and Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights.

7.- In the proceedings followed, the legal prescriptions have been observed.

Drafted by Magistrate Hess Herrera; and,

Considering:

I.- ON ACTIVE LEGITIMATION. The plaintiffs formulate the appeals accumulated here in different ways. The first, [Name 001], on behalf of [Name 002]. and the second, [Name 003], on his own behalf and that of the program's viewers.

The foregoing requires some clarifications on active legitimation. The most relevant of these is to recall that Article 33 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law regulates a broad vicarious active legitimation: “Any person may file the amparo appeal,” which has been peacefully recognized in the doctrine and practice of our constitutional jurisdiction:

“it is necessary to indicate that, in the amparo appeal, the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law in its numeral 33 establishes vicarious legitimation by indicating that ‘any person may file the amparo appeal on behalf of a third party.’ Thus, the petitioners do have legitimation to file the present process.” (Judgment No. 2003-7149 at 13:21 hours on July 17, 2003) Thus, one can act on behalf of someone else, without the need for a formal professional or family bond between the plaintiff and the protected party. On the other hand, nothing prevents this open legitimation from being directed at the defense of the rights of a natural person or a legal person (Cf. Judgments No. 2008-12043 at 10:11 hours on August 1, 2008, No. 2020-18221 at 9:15 hours on September 25, 2020). With the exception of the dissenting minority vote of Magistrate Rueda Leal set forth below, the majority of this Tribunal has agreed to the defense of the fundamental rights of legal persons.

Finally, it should be noted that petitioner [Name 003] demands the defense of freedom of expression from a dual perspective: active - the freedom to express oneself - and passive - the freedom to receive and know the opinions of others - and it is in this condition that it is understood the active legitimation operates with respect to his appeal.

II.- ON PASSIVE LEGITIMATION. Likewise, the passive legitimation in this process requires a series of clarifications. First, although one of the petitioners requests that the amparo be directed against several authorities, there is only evidence in the case records related to the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, so the appeal is constrained to them.

Furthermore, due to the particularities of the activity carried out by both the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, it is necessary to specify their status as passive legitimized parties.

The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad was created as an autonomous institution by Decree Law No. 449 of April 8, 1949. Through Law No. 8622 approving the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, the General Telecommunications Law (No. 8642), and the Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector (No. 8660), the opening of the telecommunications market was carried out. Article 4 of the last cited law (No. 8660) established that it complements the Law creating the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, No. 449, of April 8, 1949 and its reforms. Additionally, in numeral 5 of the same law, a recount of ICE's companies was made, determining that the institute also includes other companies it constitutes or acquires, in both cases, with a participation of not less than fifty-one percent (51%) of the share capital. Within this category of business activities of the Institute is the Kölbi brand, dedicated to mobile telephony.

Although this gives the Institute a different scope of action, it is worth recalling the first provisions of the General Law of Public Administration:

“Article 1.- The Public Administration shall be constituted by the State and the other public entities, each with legal personality and capacity under public and private law.

Article 2.- 1. The rules of this law that regulate the activity of the State shall also apply to other public entities, in the absence of a special rule for them. 2. The rules that regulate other public entities shall not apply to the State, unless the nature of the situation requires otherwise.

Article 3.- 1. Public law shall regulate the organization and activity of public entities, unless an express rule states otherwise. 2. Private law shall regulate the activity of entities that, due to their overall regime and the requirements of their line of business, can be considered common industrial or mercantile companies.” In accordance with the recently cited norms, although the business activity - common industrial or mercantile - of some public entities is regulated by private law, this does not extend to their base structures - that is, what allows them to be considered public law entities - nor to the powers of oversight of public resources or of public interest that concern them.

In this latter sense, Articles 1 of the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets and 8 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic bind the various entities and bodies that make up the public sector to their mandates. This Tribunal has understood it this way, among others, in resolution No. 2017-11808 at 9:05 hours on July 28, 2017:

“One must not lose sight of the fact that the public company is today at a crossroads when it carries out its activity in a free competition regime, in a market segment where both public and private companies participate. On one hand, if it is treated as a public body or entity and, therefore, subject to a series of controls and requirements, its possibilities of survival in the market are very scarce. On the other hand, if it is freed from all control, serious abuses could occur with the use of public funds. Hence the need for a fair balance between the needs it requires to compete on equal terms with other economic agents and the necessary controls over the use of public funds, based on an elementary principle: where public funds go, control must go, both that exercised by internal audit, the Comptroller General of the Republic, and the Special Permanent Commission for the Control of Income and Public Expenditure of the Legislative Assembly, among others. However, this must be in accordance with the reality faced by the public company, that is, controls that do not constitute an obstacle or a hindrance so that the public company is not left at a disadvantage in a competitive market (see Judgment 2016-000779 at sixteen hours thirty minutes on January nineteen, two thousand sixteen). Adopting the foregoing as a frame of reference, there is no doubt that it is essential that the public company be guaranteed that certain strategic information will not fall into the hands of the competition, because otherwise, its disappearance would be a matter of time. This entails that any request for information related to financial, banking, industrial, or commercial activity must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad –a public company-public entity– competes openly in the telecommunications market with other companies, public and private, and, consequently, must develop a commercial strategy to promote its services, which it provides under the Kölbi brand.” To the foregoing considerations, two additional factors are added: that in this case, the press release regarding the modification of the advertising placement was issued by the institute's Telecommunications manager, and that the issue involves the use of the company's resources, so there are sufficient elements to consider the Institute as passively legitimized in the present appeal.

The Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, for its part, is a figure with very particular characteristics, since its Law of creation, No. 4351, declares that “The Bank is owned by the workers in equal parts, and the right to co-ownership will be subject to them having held a mandatory savings account for one continuous year or in alternate periods. The mandatory savers will participate in the profits and through their social organizations in the appointment of its directors.” (article 1), thereby conferring upon it a corporate nature; which, however, does not relieve it of its condition as a public law entity (article 2), nor from the oversight of its resources by the Comptroller General of the Republic. It is taken into account, as with the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, that the press release on the modification of its advertising placement, the object of this appeal, was issued by the president of the bank's National Board of Directors.

III.- OBJECT OF THE APPEAL.- The petitioners allege that, for nearly 24 years, [Name 006] has broadcast a program called "El Chinamo," which is transmitted on national television. They note that, over the years, El Chinamo has had a section called "El Chinaoke," which is used for parody, satire, and comedy, as valid forms of expression and criticism of political figures, the current government, public institutions, or situations of general interest. For this purpose, they use the melodies of pre-existing songs, altering the original lyrics to introduce content of political criticism. They affirm that El Chinamo, like many other television programs, relies on advertising placement from public and private companies. They affirm that, for the 2024 edition, El Chinaoke developed three music videos related to issues of public interest, which generated direct criticism of the Government. In the first video called "En el EBAIS" (At the EBAIS), reference is made to the collapse in patient care at the CCSS, with a message regarding the increase in waiting lists afflicting Costa Ricans. The video also alludes to the institution's financial situation, as well as the corruption cases and raids generated by the “Barrenador” case. In the second music video called “¿Será que hoy me van a asaltar?” (Will I be assaulted today?), the lyrics refer to the insecurity situation the country faces, with a significant increase in the homicide rate mostly related to organized crime and drug trafficking. They add that the video alludes to the President of the Republic, as well as to collateral deaths. In the third video called "No tengo plata" (I Have No Money), allusion is made to the high cost of living in the country, as well as to the unfulfilled promises by the Government regarding price reductions. They allege that the commercial brand Kölbi, owned by ICE, announced on December 19, 2024, that it would withdraw its advertising placement from the program El Chinamo, arguing that the contents of El Chinaoke "do not align with our brand values." Subsequently, on December 20, 2024, the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal announced in a press release that it would only maintain sponsorship of the "El Aguinaldazo" section in El Chinamo, and would withdraw the rest of its advertising. The foregoing, under the argument that it must avoid any association with content contrary to morality and public order. They argue that the respondents' decision to withdraw advertising placement from El Chinamo constitutes a violation of the freedom of expression and press, protected by Articles 28 and 29 of the Constitution, as well as by numeral 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and therefore request that the appeal be granted, with its consequences.

IV.- PROVEN FACTS. Of importance for the decision of this matter, the following facts are deemed as duly demonstrated:

• a)[Name 002] transmits, on national television, the program called "El Chinamo," which has a section called "El Chinaoke," used for parody, satire, and comedy, based on melodies of pre-existing songs, whose original lyrics are altered to introduce content of political criticism (undisputed fact); b) For the 2024 edition, several music videos were presented in the “El Chinaoke” section; however, only three are the object of this process: The first, called "En el EBAIS" (At the EBAIS), transmitted on December 12, refers to the collapse in patient care at the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, with a message regarding the increase in waiting lists afflicting Costa Ricans, the institution's financial situation, and the investigation known as the “Barrenador” case. The second music video, “¿Será que hoy me van a asaltar?” (Will I be assaulted today?), refers to national security, organized crime, and drug trafficking, and was transmitted on December 15. A third video, from December 18, called "No tengo plata" (I Have No Money), alludes to the cost of living in the country (undisputed fact); c) The Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal requested on December 17, 2024, that the advertising agency that placed its advertising placement in the program El Chinamo make a modification to the brand's presences in the program. This resulted in the elimination of the introduction and exit screens of the program's four segments when calls to participants were made, so that the screens were only used when the winner of the “El Aguinaldazo” section was announced. (report rendered by the respondent authority).
• d)The commercial brand Kölbi, owned by the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, issued a press release on December 19, 2024, in the following terms: “Kölbi brand values do not align with content presented on television program El Chinamo. Kölbi, a commercial brand of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), clarifies and communicates to the public: 0 The content presented by [Name 006] [Value 003] on the program El Chinamo, specifically in the El Chinaoke section, does not align with our brand values. 0 Given its Costa Rican origin, Kölbi distances itself from situations in which violence is promoted or exposed implicitly or explicitly, discrimination, advocacy of crime, or parody of victims' suffering. 0 On the contrary, the brand's advertising and commercial efforts are focused on promoting values such as peace, family unity, respect, innovation, and solidarity, with a positive impact and characteristic of the national idiosyncrasy. This is evidenced in Kölbi's journey for over fifteen years in the market. 0 The contracting of advertising spaces on the program in question, as well as mentions of Kölbi, had the objective of associating the brand with family entertainment typical of the end and beginning of the year season; never with situations alluding to pain, stigmatization, or mockery. 0 “As a leading brand, we are governed by solid principles that guide our actions and decisions. We do not support acts opposed to those values, especially those contrary to the social and environmental responsibility we promote,” stated Leda Acevedo, Telecommunications Manager of ICE. 0 Based on the foregoing, Kölbi has decided to disassociate itself from the program El Chinamo and will analyze the permanence of its advertising placement with [Name 006] [Value 003]” (public and well-known fact); e) Subsequently, on December 20, 2024, the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal published the following press release: “We reaffirm our commitment to healthy entertainment this holiday season. San José, December 20, 2024.

At Banco Popular, we have as a constant priority and a core value of our brand the promotion of actions that strengthen the well-being of the citizenry, especially at times such as the Christmas and New Year holidays, where family and wholesome entertainment must occupy a central place.

In order to contribute to the development of a more united and positive society, we maintain a constant presence in dozens of media outlets throughout the country, promoting services that improve the lives of our clients and supporting content in said media that fosters joy for the entire family, reflection, and respect for diversity.

In this context, the president of the Bank's National Board of Directors, Jorge Eduardo Sánchez, has emphasized that our brand—which is owned by our clients and the working people [Nombre 002]—cannot be exposed to being associated with inappropriate images or those that could even foster behaviors alien to the morals and public order to which we are bound.

In the particular case of the public debate generated precisely by some content broadcast in the "El Chinaoke" segment of the "El Chinamo" program, which is transmitted by [Nombre 006] [Valor 003], we deeply regret as Banco Popular that some sectors of the citizenry may have felt offended or uncomfortable by such images, and we have adopted the pertinent actions to guarantee that our participation is always fostered within spaces whose permanent priority is the values of wholesome entertainment.

Thus, and given that this season of the "El Chinamo" program will extend until next Monday, December 23, we will maintain only the sponsorship of the "El Aguinaldazo" segment, which brings joy to the family by daily rewarding some fortunate viewer with 1 million colones.

We thank and assign the greatest importance to the opinion of our clients on these types of matters, and we reiterate that at Banco Popular we work without pause to contribute to social well-being, fostering respect, inclusion, and responsible enjoyment for the entire citizenry." (a matter of public and general knowledge); f) The Kölbi brand did not withdraw its advertising schedule from the media outlet, but rather redistributed it (report rendered by the appealed authority); g) [Nombre 006] continued to broadcast in their entirety the "Chinaoke" segments within its programming, and they are currently available as public links on the Internet, accessible to any person (a matter of public and general knowledge).

V.ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS OF THIS APPEAL. In accordance with the foregoing recitation of proven facts, it is evident that, although the company that produces and transmits the program El Chinamo was able to continue doing so, including the segment El Chinaoke—which caused the controversy with the appellant institutions—and although it is stated that the advertising schedule with the channel was maintained, albeit redistributed, the truth is that the press releases of both institutions leave no hint of doubt that they adopted decisions linked to said schedule and the transmission of the "El Chinaoke" segment. In the case of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad) and its Kölbi brand, the autonomous entity reported that: "Kölbi brand values do not align with content aired on the television program El Chinamo. Kölbi, a commercial brand of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE), clarifies and communicates to the public: 0 The content aired by [Nombre 006] [Valor 003] on the program El Chinamo, specifically in the El Chinaoke segment, does not align with our brand values. 0 Given its Costa Rican origin, Kölbi distances itself from situations in which violence is implicitly or explicitly promoted or exposed, discrimination, apology for crime, or parody of victims' suffering. 0 On the contrary, the brand's advertising and commercial efforts focus on encouraging values such as peace, family unity, respect, innovation, and solidarity, with a positive impact characteristic of the national idiosyncrasy. This is evident in Kölbi's journey over more than fifteen years in the market. 0 The contracting of advertising spaces on the program in question, as well as mentions of Kölbi, had the objective of associating the brand with family entertainment typical of the end- and beginning-of-year season; never with situations alluding to pain, stigmatization, or mockery. 0 'As a leading brand, we are governed by solid principles that guide our actions and decisions. We do not support acts contrary to those values, especially those contrary to the social and environmental responsibility we promote,' stated Leda Acevedo, ICE Telecommunications Manager. 0 For the reasons stated, Kölbi has decided to dissociate itself from the program El Chinamo and will analyze the permanence of its advertising schedule with [Nombre 006] [Valor 003]." (emphasis added). Meanwhile, in the case of Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, the official press release was expressed in the following terms, as pertinent: "In this context, the president of the Bank's National Board of Directors, Jorge Eduardo Sánchez, has emphasized that our brand—which is owned by our clients and the working people [Nombre 002]—cannot be exposed to being associated with inappropriate images or those that could even foster behaviors alien to the morals and public order to which we are bound.

In the particular case of the public debate generated precisely by some content broadcast in the 'El Chinaoke' segment of the 'El Chinamo' program, which is transmitted by [Nombre 006] [Valor 003], we deeply regret as Banco Popular that some sectors of the citizenry may have felt offended or uncomfortable by such images, and we have adopted the pertinent actions to guarantee that our participation is always fostered within spaces whose permanent priority is the values of wholesome entertainment.

Thus, and given that this season of the 'El Chinamo' program will extend until next Monday, December 23, we will maintain only the sponsorship of the 'El Aguinaldazo' segment, which brings joy to the family by daily rewarding some fortunate viewer with 1 million colones." (emphasis in original). That is to say, in the case of both entities, there was an express decision, officially communicated, to impose consequences linked to the payment for advertising spaces, due to the content of a segment of the television program. After the issuance of the two press releases cited above, several parodies in the same style as those already described were broadcast; however, due to the dates on which the press releases were made public, as well as those on which these amparo appeals were filed, it is not relevant to cover the subsequent programs. Having established the foregoing considerations, it is now necessary to determine whether, as the appellants here allege, the contested decisions contravene freedom of expression.

VI.- ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ITS FUNCTION IN A REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC REGIME. In various pronouncements, this body of constitutional justice has established the nexus between freedom of expression and the principles upon which our political and legal system is built. In judgment No. 1997-01750 of 3:00 p.m. on March 21, 1997, it was explained as follows:

"X- In this regard, among the principal precepts that recognize and guarantee freedom of expression and information, and that configure what could be called the general regime of that constitutionally protected freedom, are:

"Article 28 (Constitución Política):

"No one may be disturbed or persecuted for the expression of their opinions or for any act that does not violate the law…" "Article 29 (Constitución Política):

"All persons may communicate their thoughts orally or in writing, and publish them without prior censorship; but they shall be responsible for any abuses they commit in the exercise of this right, in the cases and in the manner established by law." "Article 13 (Convención Americana): Freedom of Thought and Expression:

"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice.

"2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent liability, which shall be expressly established by law and be necessary to ensure:

"a) Respect for the rights or reputations of others; or "b) The protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals.

"3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.

"4. Public entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 2.

"5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitements to violence or any other similar illegal action against any person or group of persons on any grounds, including those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin, shall be prohibited by law." "Article 19 (Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos):

"1. No one shall be molested on account of his opinions.

"2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

"3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

"a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; "b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals." XI- From the content of the foregoing provisions, it follows that freedom of expression and information has as a prior and indispensable condition freedom of thought or ideology, and that it essentially comprises the right of every person to freely seek, receive, and express thoughts, ideas, opinions, value judgments, beliefs, facts, data, etc., in relation to all types of matters (including political and electoral), using any lawful means at their disposal and for the most varied purposes (commercial, recreational, political, electoral, etc.). From the cited precepts, it also follows that within the framework of its constitutionally guaranteed regime, the fundamental right to free expression and information is configured as a right of liberty. This implies, basically, that its exercise does not require express recognition from the public authorities as to who its legitimate holders are, but rather that they are expected—or rather, generally required—to refrain from interfering with or imposing any type of obstacle to said exercise. This condition of the right to free expression and information has been especially weighed at the level of its protection in the Inter-American System of Human Rights, a situation reflected above all in the breadth of its content and the degree of exceptionality of the limitations with which it is recognized and guaranteed in the Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. From the essential content of freedom of expression and information also results the existence of its two concurrent dimensions, as highlighted by the Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos in its advisory opinion OC-5/85, on the compulsory licensing of journalists. In this regard, the Court indicated that this freedom manifests itself both in the individual dimension, of the person who expresses or expresses themselves, and in a collective dimension, of all those who receive the content of that expression. These two dimensions are interwoven in such a way that when the former is restricted, it is not only the fundamental right of its individual holder that is being limited, but also that of all those who have been prevented from receiving their ideas and information. Given this very close link between both dimensions (individual and collective), freedom of expression and information implies the right to use any lawful means to disseminate thought or information and to reach any number of recipients, a situation that reveals that the expression and dissemination of thought or information are indivisible, so that a restriction of those means or of the possibilities of dissemination means, at the same time and to the same extent, a limitation of the right to free expression and information.

XII- From the foregoing, it follows that freedom of expression and information has a basic character, being a necessary precondition for the remaining fundamental rights, which is why it has been identified as a determining factor for the legitimacy of the functioning of the democratic system, by allowing people at all times, without any distinction, to think in whatever way they best decide and freely express their opinions. Contributing to this basic character is the fact that the essential content of freedom of expression and information does not require special demands in relation to the content, forms, or means employed by the message being expressed, or the levels of dissemination it achieves, a situation that favors the recognition and guarantee, through its medium, of manifestations of its exercise as varied as artistic creation or electoral propaganda itself." That is to say, starting from the Constitution itself, as well as from the norms of the regional and universal systems for the protection of human rights, one finds vigorous protection of freedom of expression, from a dual perspective: dogmatic—that is, in consideration of its character as a fundamental right—and organic or institutional—as an element immanent to democracy. In the same vein, judgment No. 2006-05977 of 3:16 p.m. on May 3, 2006, developed this syncretism between freedom of expression and democracy:

"VIII.- Freedom of expression as an indispensable requirement of democracy. Freedom of expression is without a doubt one of the conditions—though not the only one—for democracy to function. This freedom is what allows the creation of public opinion, essential for giving content to several principles of the constitutional State, such as, for example, the right to information, the right of petition, or rights regarding political participation; the existence of a free and consolidated public opinion is also a condition for the functioning of representative democracy. The possibility for all persons to participate in public discussions constitutes the necessary presupposition for the construction of a social dynamic of exchange of knowledge, ideas, and information, which allows for the generation of consensus and decision-making among the components of the various social groups, but which also constitutes a channel for the expression of dissent, which in a democracy is as necessary as agreements. For its part, the exchange of opinions and information that originates from public discussion contributes to forming personal opinion; both make up public opinion, which ends up manifesting itself through the channels of representative democracy. As the Spanish Constitutional Court itself has pointed out, other rights consecrated by the Constitution would be emptied of real content, representative institutions reduced to hollow forms, and the principle of democratic legitimacy... which is the basis of our entire legal-political order, would be absolutely falsified (Judgment 6/1981), if there did not exist freedoms capable of permitting that exchange, which… presupposes the right of citizens to have broad and adequate information regarding the facts, allowing them to form their convictions and participate in the discussion relating to public affairs (Judgment 159/1986).

IX-. Content of freedom of expression. Freedom of information could be said to have several facets, as national doctrine has recognized (of which the first three are related to what is discussed here): a) freedom of the press in a broad sense, covering any type of publication; b) freedom of information through non-written media; c) the right of rectification or reply. Freedom of the press generically encompasses all types of printed matter, printing, publishing, circulation of newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, and publications of all kinds. By its nature, it is the natural vehicle for the freedom of expression of citizens. It translates into the right for individuals to seek and disseminate information and ideas to an undetermined number of persons about facts that, by their nature, are of interest to the general public because they are considered newsworthy. By its nature, it is subject to the same limitations as freedom of expression. Its functions within a democracy are: to inform (newsworthy events, happenings), to integrate public opinion (stimulating social integration), and to control political power, insofar as it is a permanent guardian of the honesty and correct handling of public affairs. Given its symbiotic link with democratic ideology, an endless number of international instruments and practically all the Constitutions of the free world, since the French Declaration of 1789 (Art. 11), have recognized it. Our Constitución Política, for its part, protects it through various norms:

"All persons may communicate their thoughts orally or in writing and publish them without prior censorship; but they shall be responsible for any abuses they commit in the exercise of this right, under the conditions and in the manner established by law" (Article 29) "No one may be disturbed or persecuted for the expression of their opinions or for any act that does not violate the law.

Private actions that do not harm morals or public order or that do not prejudice a third party are beyond the reach of the law.

However, political propaganda in any form by clergy or laypersons invoking religious motives or making use of religious beliefs as a means shall not be permitted" (Article 28).

Other constitutional norms related to this right are:

"The freedom of petition, individually or collectively, before any public official or official entity, and the right to obtain a prompt resolution, is guaranteed." (Article 27).

"Free access to administrative departments for purposes of information on matters of public interest is guaranteed.

State secrets are exempt" (Article 30).

Freedom of expression has as a consequence the prohibition of all forms of censorship, in a dual sense: on one hand, one cannot censor the interlocutors; and on the other, one cannot, in general, censor in advance the possible contents of the discussion: in principle, in a democracy, all topics are debatable. The non-censorability of subjects has a practically universal character, as established by our Constitution: no one may be deprived of the freedom to speak and express themselves as they see fit. The non-censorability of contents, while not occurring in advance, encounters some limitations; however, these must be such that the freedom continues to make sense or is not emptied of its content; basically, like any freedom, it must be exercised responsibly, ultimately to pursue legitimate ends within the system." It is also relevant to cite resolution No. 2022025167 of 1:30 p.m. on October 21, 2022, insofar as it broadly develops the implications of freedom of expression, which has multiple manifestations:

"IV.- ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. Freedom of expression is one of the pillars upon which the Rule of Law is founded and comprises both the fundamental and universal guarantee of expressing one's own thoughts or opinions and of knowing those of others. In other terms, it refers to the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas, whether orally or in writing. For this reason, it is said that freedom of expression is characterized as a right with a dual dimension: an individual dimension, consisting of the right of each person to seek information and express their own thoughts, ideas, and information; and a collective or social dimension, consisting of the right of society to procure and receive any information, to know the thoughts, ideas, and information of others, and to be well-informed. Regarding this dual dimension of the freedom under study, the Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (hereinafter Corte IDH), in the case Herrera Ulloa vs. the State [Nombre 002] (judgment of July 2, 2004), held the following:

"(…) 109. In this regard, the Court has indicated that the first dimension of freedom of expression 'does not exhaust itself in the theoretical recognition of the right to speak or write, but also inseparably comprises the right to use any appropriate medium to disseminate thought and to reach the greatest number of recipients.' In this sense, the expression and dissemination of thoughts and ideas are indivisible, so that a restriction on the possibilities of dissemination directly represents, and to the same extent, a limit on the right to freely express oneself.

110. With respect to the second dimension of the right to freedom of expression, that is, the social dimension, it must be pointed out that freedom of expression is a means for the exchange of ideas and information among people; it comprises their right to try to communicate their points of view to others, but also implies the right of everyone to know opinions, accounts, and news conveyed by third parties. For the ordinary citizen, knowing the opinion of others or the information available to them is as important as the right to disseminate one's own.

111. This Tribunal has affirmed that both dimensions are of equal importance and must be fully guaranteed simultaneously to give total effectiveness to the right to freedom of expression in the terms provided for by Article 13 of the Convention (…)" For its part, the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American Legal Framework on the Right to Freedom of Expression, December 2009), referred to this right in the following terms:

"(…) it is one of the individual rights that most clearly reflects the virtue that accompanies—and characterizes—human beings: the unique and precious virtue of thinking about the world from our own perspective and communicating with others to build, through a deliberative process, not only the model of life that each person has the right to adopt but also the model of society in which we wish to live. All the creative potential in art, in science, in technology, in politics—in short, all our individual and collective creative capacity—fundamentally depends on the right to freedom of expression being respected and promoted in all its dimensions. It is therefore an individual right without which the first and most important of our freedoms would be denied: the right to think on our own and to share our thoughts with others (…)

Likewise, international soft law instruments have safeguarded this freedom. Thus, the Declaración de Chapultepec (adopted by the hemispheric conference on freedom of expression held in México, D.F., on March 11, 1994), in its first principle, states:

"1. There are no free people or societies without freedom of expression and the press. The exercise of this is not a concession of the authorities; it is an inalienable right of the people." For its part, the Declaración de Principios sobre Libertad de Expresión (approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in October 2000, at its 108th regular session), provides the following:

"1. Freedom of expression, in all its forms and manifestations, is a fundamental and inalienable right, inherent to all persons. It is, moreover, an indispensable requirement for the very existence of a democratic society." In another context, within the European legal order, the Convención Europea sobre Derechos Humanos stands out, which in its article 10 specifies the universal entitlement to this right, in the following terms:

"Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television, or cinema enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions, or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity, or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary." Similarly, the Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea, in its Article 11, states the following:

"Article 11 Freedom of expression and information 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.

2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected." (…)

For its part, the Corte IDH, in the case Moya Chacón and others vs. Costa Rica (judgment of May 23, 2022), indicated the following:

"(…) b.3 Permitted restrictions on freedom of expression and the application of subsequent liability in cases affecting honor and dignity in matters of public interest 71. The Tribunal recalls that, generally, the right to freedom of expression cannot be subject to prior censorship but, in any case, to subsequent liability in very exceptional cases and subject to compliance with a series of strict requirements. Thus, Article 13.2 of the Convención Americana establishes that subsequent liabilities for the exercise of freedom of expression must comply with the following concurrent requirements: (i) be previously established by law, in a formal and material sense; (ii) respond to an objective permitted by the Convención Americana; and (iii) be necessary in a democratic society (for which they must satisfy the requirements of suitability, necessity, and proportionality).

72. Regarding strict legality, the Court has established that restrictions must be previously established by law as a means to ensure that they are not left to the discretion of public power. For this, the definition of the conduct must be clear and precise, even more so if criminal convictions are involved rather than civil ones. Regarding the permitted or legitimate aims, they are indicated in the aforementioned Article 13.2 and are (a) the respect for the rights or reputations of others, or (b) the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals. Likewise, restrictions on freedom of expression must be suitable, that is, effectively conducive to achieving the legitimately permitted purpose. With respect to the analysis of necessity, the Tribunal has held that, for a restriction on free expression to be compatible with the Convención Americana, it must be necessary in a democratic society, understanding 'necessary' as the existence of an imperative social need that justifies the restriction. In this sense, the Court must examine the existing alternatives to achieve the legitimate aim pursued and determine the greater or lesser harmfulness thereof.

Finally, in relation to the proportionality of the measure, the Court has understood that restrictions imposed on the right to freedom of expression must be proportional to the interest that justifies them and must closely conform to the achievement of that objective, interfering to the least extent possible in the effective enjoyment of the right. In that sense, it is not enough for it to have a legitimate purpose; rather, the measure in question must respect proportionality when affecting freedom of expression. In other words, “in this final step of the analysis, it is considered whether the restriction is strictly proportional, such that the sacrifice inherent to it is not exaggerated or disproportionate compared to the advantages obtained through such limitation.” The Court recalls that these restrictions are exceptional in nature and must not limit, beyond what is strictly necessary, the full exercise of freedom of expression or become a direct or indirect mechanism of prior censorship.

73. In this sense, the Court has established that such subsequent liabilities (responsabilidades ulteriores) may be imposed insofar as the right to honor and reputation may have been affected. Thus, Article 11 of the Convention establishes, in effect, that everyone has the right to have their honor protected and their dignity recognized. The Court has indicated that the right to honor “recognizes that every person has the right to respect for it, prohibits any unlawful attack on honor or reputation, and imposes on States the duty to provide legal protection against such attacks.” In general terms, this Court has indicated that “the right to honor relates to one’s own esteem and worth, whereas reputation refers to the opinion others have of a person.” In this sense, this Court has held that “both freedom of expression and the right to honor, both rights protected by the Convention, are of utmost importance, and it is therefore necessary to guarantee both rights so that they coexist harmoniously.” The exercise of each fundamental right must be carried out with respect for and safeguarding of other fundamental rights. Thus, the Court has indicated that “the resolution of the conflict that arises between both rights requires a balancing between them, for which each case must be examined, according to its characteristics and circumstances, in order to assess the existence and intensity of the elements upon which such judgment is based.” 74. The Court recalls in this regard that, to determine the conventionality of a restriction on freedom of expression when it collides with the right to honor, it is of vital importance to analyze whether the statements made are of public interest, since in these cases the adjudicator must evaluate with special caution the need to limit freedom of expression. In its jurisprudence, the Court has considered as a matter of public interest those opinions or information on matters in which society has a legitimate interest in staying informed, in knowing what affects the functioning of the State, or affects general rights or interests or carries important consequences. Determining the above has consequences in the analysis of the conventionality of the restriction on the right to freedom of expression, since expressions concerning matters of public interest—such as, for example, those concerning a person’s suitability for holding public office or acts carried out by public officials in the performance of their duties—enjoy greater protection, so as to foster democratic debate.

75. Thus, the Court has indicated that, in a democratic society, those persons who influence matters of public interest are more exposed to public scrutiny and criticism. This different threshold of protection is explained because their activities leave the domain of the private sphere to enter the sphere of public debate and, therefore, they have voluntarily exposed themselves to this more demanding scrutiny. This does not mean, in any way, that the honor of persons involved in matters of public interest should not be legally protected, but rather that it must be protected in a manner consistent with the principles of democratic pluralism.

76. On the other hand, in relation to the necessary character and the rigorous proportionality analysis that must govern the limitation on the right to freedom of expression and the protection of the right to honor, that intervention must be sought which, being the most suitable for restoring the damaged reputation, also contains a minimal degree of affectation in the sphere of freedom of expression. In this regard, within the framework of freedom of information, the Court considers that there is a duty of the journalist to verify in a reasonable manner, although not necessarily exhaustively, the facts they disseminate. However, this does not mean a strict requirement of truthfulness, at least regarding matters of public interest, recognizing as a defense that the publication was made in good faith or justifiably and always in accordance with minimum ethical and professional standards in the search for truth. Likewise, the Court warns that, for investigative journalism to exist in a democratic society, it is necessary to leave journalists “room for error,” since without that margin of error there can be no independent journalism nor, therefore, the possibility of the necessary democratic scrutiny that emanates from it.

77. Additionally, the Court also considers that no one may be subjected to subsequent liabilities (responsabilidades ulteriores) for the dissemination of information related to a public matter that is based on material that is accessible to the public or that comes from official sources.

78. Finally, the need must also be highlighted that, if it is deemed appropriate to award reparation to the person aggrieved in their honor, the purpose of this should not be to punish the emitter of the information, but to restore the affected person. In this regard, States must exercise the utmost caution when imposing reparations, so as not to dissuade the press from participating in the discussion of matters of legitimate public interest (…).” (…)

VI.- REGARDING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (AND OF THE PRESS) AS GUARANTORS OF THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM. Freedom of expression and, concomitantly, the exercise of freedom of the press, become fundamental pillars upon which a democratic society is built. The intrinsic relationship that exists between such freedoms and democracy is practically unquestionable; hence, the latter is weakened and arbitrarily eroded when such freedoms cannot be fully exercised nor are they respected and guaranteed in legal systems.

The Inter-American Democratic Charter (approved by the Member States of the OAS during a special session of the General Assembly held on September 11, 2001, in Lima, Peru), on this matter, provides in its Article 4 that: “Transparency in government activities, probity, responsibility in public management, respect for social rights, and freedom of expression and of the press are essential components of the exercise of democracy.” Furthermore, it must be recalled that the previously issued Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression establishes in its first principle that freedom of expression is “(…) an indispensable requirement for the very existence of a democratic society.” Freedom of the press (or what some call a free press), as a manifestation of freedom of expression, constitutes an essential element for scrutinizing—without repression—the actions of third parties, whether of a private nature or public officials, mainly those who hold high office or aspire to it, thus consequently allowing accountability, combating corruption, transparency in the management of public funds, among many other aspects that are fundamental for maintaining a democratic system in force. Part of that duty lies in investigating persons in power, mainly the government, formulating difficult questions and thus trying to reveal to the citizenry what is really happening, as a means, in turn, for them to make correct decisions, mainly when voting and also subsequently, when in the exercise of power. As the so-called European Civil Liberties Union (a non-governmental organization that promotes civil liberties for all persons in the European Union) has stated, “(…) A free press helps at every step of this process. It provides information to voters before they vote; it fosters dialogue and debate to enrich the understanding of this information; and then it informs the citizenry about the work of the government and whether they are really carrying out their promises. In a democracy, the citizenry delegates decision-making power to their elected officials, and the press is a way of controlling them (…).” In essence, it is feasible to affirm, then, that freedom of the press is fundamental in democratic systems, as it allows citizens to form opinions and criteria in relation to the reality in which they live. For this reason, independent media are unfortunately precisely one of the main objectives of anti-democratic political systems, or at least of those that want to shape themselves and are heading towards that.

(…)

For its part, the Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American Legal Framework on the Right to Freedom of Expression, December 2009), stated the following:

“(…) the IACHR and the Inter-American Court have underscored in their jurisprudence that the importance of freedom of expression within the catalog of human rights also derives from its structural relationship with democracy. This relationship, which has been described by the organs of the Inter-American Human Rights System as ‘close,’ ‘indissoluble,’ ‘essential,’ and ‘fundamental,’ among others, explains a large part of the interpretative developments that have been granted to freedom of expression by the IACHR and the Inter-American Court in their various decisions on the matter. So important is the link between freedom of expression and democracy that, as the IACHR has explained, the very objective of Article 13 of the American Convention is to strengthen the functioning of pluralistic and deliberative democratic systems by protecting and promoting the free circulation of information, ideas, and expressions of all kinds (…) if the exercise of the right to freedom of expression not only tends toward the personal fulfillment of the person expressing themselves, but toward the consolidation of truly democratic societies, the State has the obligation to generate the conditions so that public debate not only satisfies the legitimate needs of all as consumers of certain information (entertainment, for example), but as citizens. That is, there must be sufficient conditions for a public, plural, and open deliberation to take place on the matters that concern us all as citizens of a given State (…).” (The highlight is not part of the original).

Also, said Rapporteurship expressed the following:

“(…) in a democratic society, the press has the right to freely report and criticize the government, and the people have the right to be informed about different visions of what is happening in the community (…).” In the same line of thought, the European Court of Human Rights, in the case of Lingens vs. Austria (judgment of July 8, 1986), highlighted that “(…) freedom of the press provides the public one of the best means of discovering and judging the ideas and attitudes of political leaders. More generally, freedom of political controversy belongs to the very heart of the concept of a democratic society (…).” Likewise, the Colombian Constitutional Court has referred to the subject under study on several occasions. Thus, in Judgment No. T-256/13 of April 30, 2013, it held that: “(…) the right to freedom of expression is a principle of the exercise of democracy because it is within the framework of a democratic state where citizen participation acquires special relevance, and in its development, the freedom to express different opinions and manifest minority thoughts is guaranteed without fear of being repressed by state powers (…)” and explained that:

“(…) For this reason, the pronouncements of the Inter-American Commission and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have highlighted that freedom of expression fulfills a triple function in the democratic system: a) it ensures the individual right of every person to think for themselves and to share with others their personal thought and opinion, b) it has a close, indissoluble, essential, fundamental, and structural relationship with democracy, and to that extent, the very objective of Article 13 of the American Convention is to strengthen the functioning of democratic, pluralistic, and deliberative systems, through the protection and promotion of the free circulation of ideas and opinions, and c) finally, it is a key tool for the exercise of other fundamental rights, since ‘it is an essential mechanism for the exercise of the right to participation, to religious freedom, to education, to ethnic or cultural identity and, of course, to equality understood not only as the right to non-discrimination, but as the right to the enjoyment of certain basic social rights (…).’” Equally, this constitutional body added that:

“(…) This Corporation from very early in its jurisprudence recognized the value of this right within the framework of a democracy with the following words: ‘Although the freedom to express and disseminate one’s own thought and opinions is a right of every person, it is not only an individual right, but also a guarantee of a fundamental political institution: “free public opinion.” Free public opinion is indissolubly linked to political pluralism, which is a fundamental value and a functional requirement of the democratic state. Without free public communication, other rights enshrined in the Constitution would be emptied of real content, representative and participatory institutions reduced to hollow forms, and the principle of democratic legitimacy absolutely falsified (…).’” (The highlight is not part of the original).

In Judgment No. T-543 of 2017 of August 25, 2017, the Colombian Constitutional Court stated that freedom of expression fulfills the following functions in a democratic society: “(…) (i) it allows seeking the truth and developing knowledge; (ii) it makes the principle of self-government possible; (iii) it promotes personal autonomy; (iv) it prevents abuses of power; and (v) it is a ‘safety valve’ that stimulates peaceful confrontation of state or social decisions that are not shared (…).” For its part, in Judgment No. C-135/21 of May 13, 2021, said Court mentioned that some of the contributions of the fundamental right to freedom of expression to democratic functioning are the following: “(…) i) it allows seeking the truth and developing knowledge; ii) it creates a space for healthy dialogue and protest for the citizenry, which consolidates pluralistic and deliberative societies; iii) it allows establishing control and accountability mechanisms before the rulers; iv) it promotes citizen self-government; and v) it contributes to better popular elections (…).” Also, in Judgment No. T-145/19 of April 2, 2019, the Colombian Court held that freedom of expression “(…) is a pillar of the Social State of Law and a fundamental principle of democratic regimes, where human dignity is respected and the participation of the citizenry and all sectors is valued, which allows consolidating pluralistic and deliberative societies (…).” Likewise, on this last occasion, said body stated that “(…) The main foundation of the legal protection of freedom of expression finds support in human dignity, in the autonomy of the person and in its instrumental character for the exercise of multiple rights, and in the different functions it fulfills in democratic systems (…).” It can, then, be emphasized from the cited decisions the structural link—as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights describes it—between democracy and freedom of expression, because only a regime in which the people, its inhabitants, are recognized as a plural voice, with the capacity to dissent, to opine, and to criticize aspects of the reality in which they live, but especially about activities originating in the public sphere, can be described as a substantively democratic regime.

VII.- ON POLITICAL SATIRE AS ONE OF THE FORMS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. The case under study offers the particularity, within the general framework of freedom of expression and its multiple manifestations, of referring to a section within a television program aimed at performing musical parodies about social and political problems which, as stipulated in the proven facts of this resolution, were three, until the moment the sued institutions decided to communicate changes in the payment of advertising for the program: care in the public health system, consequences of citizen insecurity, and cost of living. We are, then, faced with a specific form of the exercise of freedom of expression, connected to political satire, to humor with social criticism. To fully understand this aspect, it is necessary to remember that freedom of expression is indispensable for the development and fulfillment of individuals. Thanks to the free exchange of information and opinions, people better understand the world in which they live, because the free circulation of ideas allows seeking the truth, deepening knowledge, and participating in decision-making processes. For this reason, without freedom of expression, one cannot speak of democracy, as was especially highlighted in the preceding recital (considerando). Not only because of the effect it has on the formation of opinion; but also because it constitutes a way for people to let the authorities know what they think and for such authorities to respond to their concerns. It is necessary for stability, pluralism, and tolerance in society. In a country like ours, where there is freedom of thought and expression, its inhabitants have the right to criticize public power, through different forms, making use of the great plasticity inherent in freedom of expression, including satire. Expressions of openly satirical and humorous vocation allow for exaggerations, deformations, and ironic representations. They are linked to laughter and criticism. In the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy, the term satire appears as: “1.f. Composition in verse or prose whose object is to censure or ridicule someone or something. 2.f. Sharp, biting, and caustic speech or saying, aimed at censuring or ridiculing.” It is a notion that encompasses very varied aspects: irony, irreverence, disrespect, insolence, exaggeration, mockery. It can be expressed in writings, speeches, images, caricatures, parodies, pastiches. For its part, the word humor, in the second meaning of the recently cited dictionary means: “Joviality, wit” and humorism is defined as a “way of presenting reality.” Making people laugh, then, is the primary intention of satire. That said, one must not forget that behind all the current novel types of making and transmitting humor and satire, we are dealing with a form of expression with origins in antiquity: Aristophanes in the 5th century B.C. satirized the social and political life of the time; Lucilius, in the 1st century B.C., created Latin satire, understood as a poetic genre destined to point out social vices and ridiculousness. Subsequently, Molière, in the 17th century, used that resource to criticize courtesan customs, doctors, and the bourgeoisie. With all the different specific nuances pointed out, it certainly constitutes a form of freedom of expression. From the point of view of individuals, in the exercise of their freedom, of the principle of autonomy of will recognized in our Costa Rican Constitution by Article 28, it covers not only harmless ideas, but also those that may displease public institutions, groups of people, or individuals, an effect that often goes hand in hand with satire, especially if it is an instrument of denunciation and social criticism. Humor is inspired by reality but tends toward exaggeration, toward caricaturization, often to propose reflection, to generate surprise or astonishment, as well as to make painful truths more bearable, or even to serve as an antidote to anger. The greater or lesser tolerance for satire in a society is proportional to the greater or lesser level of commitment of that society to a truly democratic system. The European Court of Human Rights devoted particular attention to interference with the right of artists—and of any person, in general—to express themselves through satire, understanding it as a form of artistic expression and social commentary that seeks to provoke and agitate. In the case of Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria, of January 27, 2007, it stated:

“26. The Court recalls that freedom of expression, enshrined in paragraph 1 of Article 10, constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, a primary condition for the progress and development of each person. Subject to paragraph 2, it covers not only ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favorably received or considered inoffensive or indifferent, but also those that offend, shock, or disturb the State or a group of inhabitants. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness, without which there is no ‘democratic society.’ Those who create, interpret, disseminate, or exhibit a work of art contribute to the exchange of ideas and opinions indispensable in a democratic society. Hence the obligation of the State not to unduly impede freedom of expression. Evidently, artists and those who promote their works do not escape the potential limitations implied by the second paragraph of Article 10. Whoever exercises their freedom of expression assumes, in effect, according to the very terms of the paragraph, ‘duties and responsibilities,’ which will depend on the situation and procedure used (Müller and others v. Switzerland, May 24, 1988, §§ 33-34, Series A no. 133, and the references cited). (…)

33. (…) The Court considers that the model of representation constitutes a caricature of the persons alluded to using satirical elements. It is recalled that satire is a form of artistic expression and social commentary that, through the exaggeration and distortion of reality that characterizes it, naturally seeks to provoke and agitate. For this reason, any interference with an artist’s right to express themselves through that medium must be examined with particular attention.” (the highlighting is ours) In the same sense, the Court of Appeals of Versailles, in 1991 (January 31, 1991, D. 1991, IR), specified that the humorous genre allows exaggerations, deformations, and ironic presentations, regarding which each person is free to appreciate whether or not they are in good taste. This, to the extent that a high degree of subjectivity holds sway here, of plural and different perceptions of the topic addressed and of one’s own sensitivity about what may or may not be humorous.

Regarding the inherent diversity of freedom of expression and the possibility of restricting some of its manifestations, in decision No. 2006-05977 of 3:16 p.m. on May 3, 2006, this Court stated:

“X.-. The limits to freedom of expression and freedom of the press. To determine which expressions can be limited and to what extent, it is important to take into account that not all expressions can have the same value nor enjoy, consequently, the same constitutional protection. Thus, for example, even international jurisprudence, vgr. the Spanish Constitutional Court, has indicated that insults or formally injurious value judgments that are unnecessary for the expression of an idea, thought, or opinion lack constitutional protection. On another step are opinions, that is, personal value judgments that are not formally injurious and unnecessary for what one wants to express, even if they contain what is known as ‘disturbing or offensive opinions’; these opinions would indeed be constitutionally protected by freedom of expression and could even include irony, satire, and mockery as content. On another step would be information, understood as the truthful narration of facts, which would be protected as a general rule, unless it violates other fundamental rights or constitutionally protected goods (for example, honor, privacy, public order and tranquility of the nation, the rights of children and adolescents). On another level would be the news, understood as the truthful narration of facts that have public relevance, either because of the facts themselves or because of the persons involved in them; news contributes outstandingly to the creation of free public opinion. On the last step would be falsehoods, rumors, or insidiousness hidden behind a neutral narration of facts and which in reality completely lack truthfulness. On the topic of truthfulness, the Human Rights Commission has indicated (Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, adopted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights at its 108th regular session in October 2000) that any prior conditioning is considered prior censorship on aspects such as truthfulness, timeliness, or impartiality of the information, but in the opinion of this Court, it must be understood as referring to the possibility of using such arguments as justifications for prior censorship of information, not to prevent the right to effective judicial protection against injuries or damages received in one’s person, property, or moral interests, as established by Article 41 of our Constitution when stating:

‘Resorting to the laws, all must find redress for injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. Justice must be done promptly, fully, without denial, and in strict accordance with the laws.’ (the underline is added) The previous resolution is complemented by the provisions, also by this Chamber, in judgment No. 2019008752 of 9:30 a.m. on May 17, 2019:

“I.- Preliminary considerations: on freedom of expression. In view of the appellant’s allegations, it is reminded that the purpose of the remedy of amparo (recurso de amparo) is to provide timely protection against infringements or threats to fundamental rights and freedoms, not to serve as an instrument to censure opinions, however offensive, shocking, or annoying they may be to some sectors of the population (see in that sense judgment No. 2015007498 of 11:30 a.m. on May 22, 2015). Thus, the simple fact that an external manifestation, an artistic work, or a literary work, for example, is in bad taste or violates the sensibility, particular morals, or personal ethical values of some individuals, in itself, is not a question that relates directly to a potential violation of some fundamental right. On the contrary, the Chamber has been emphatic in declaring that any restriction—censorship or ‘subsequent liability’ (responsabilidad ulterior)—on freedom of expression, the right to public information, and artistic creation, is subject to ‘strict scrutiny,’ since to accept its admissibility it would not be enough to prove that said restriction is useful for safeguarding other fundamental rights, but it is indispensable to demonstrate that the safeguard or restriction is necessary to protect those rights and that, moreover, said safeguard and the degree of affectation to those rights is of greater magnitude than the safeguarding of freedom of expression itself (see, by way of example, the judgment of this Chamber No. 2012-005178 of 11:30 a.m. on April 20, 2012).

(…)

It likewise recognizes the jurisprudence established in the case New York Times vs.

Sullivan from 1964, which states that the protection the Constitution offers to freedom of expression does not depend on the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs expressed, and recognizes that a certain degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of that freedom, from which the government and the courts must permit a debate that is ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ to develop, which may include caustic, vehement, and sometimes severe, unpleasant attacks on the government and public officials. Erroneous statements are inevitable in a free debate and must be protected to allow freedom of expression air to breathe and survive. The rules must prevent a public official from suing a media outlet or a private individual for damages caused by false defamation relating to their official conduct, unless it is proven with clear convincing evidence that the expression was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. This caveat is essential given the State's obligation to protect the reputation and honor of individuals and, furthermore, within its obligation to ensure that the misuse or diversion of this freedom is not used to violate equally essential purposes of the democratic system, among which the system of fundamental rights is included. The interdependence between fundamental rights and their systemic value is recognized in doctrine; in that sense, the protection of one freedom to the detriment of others due to a lack of a hermeneutical vision has a negative effect on the entire system of freedom (see ruling 2771-03 of this Chamber)’”. (The highlighting and underlining are not from the original)." (emphasis supplied) Likewise, in pronouncement No. 2009-12680 of 10:59 a.m. on August 14, 2009, this Constitutional Court recognized the indispensable protection of satirical expressions, in their capacity as a component of social pluralism:

“For its part, the Spanish Constitutional Court has affirmed that ‘ideological freedom is indissolubly linked to political pluralism which, as an essential value of our legal system upheld by the Constitution, requires the maximum breadth in its exercise and, naturally, not only in what coincides with the Constitution and the rest of the legal system, but also in what is opposed to the values and goods they enshrine, always excluding violence to impose one's own criteria, but allowing their free exposition in the terms demanded by an advanced democracy. Hence the indispensable restrictive interpretation of the limitations on ideological freedom and the right to express it, without which the former would lack all effectiveness’ (ruling 20/1990, of February 15, ground 5°, in the Official State Gazette of 3/1/1990). On this point, the jurisprudence of the Chamber ‘has indicated that insults or formally injurious value judgments that are unnecessary for the expression of an idea, thought, or opinion lack constitutional protection. On another level are opinions, that is, personal value judgments that are not formally injurious and unnecessary for what is intended to be expressed, even if they contain what is known as "disturbing or wounding opinions"; these opinions would be constitutionally protected by freedom of expression and could have as their content even irony, satire, and mockery’ (see ruling number 2006-05977 of 3:16 p.m. on May 3, 2006). In this regard, it is worth noting that mockery, humor, and the caricaturization of characters are part of daily life. Both the ordinary citizen and the public figure (politician, judge, athlete, artist) are accustomed to jokes and the ridiculing of certain acts and customs. Therefore, as long as satirical humor does not entail harm to the honor of individuals or to the essential content of the rights to privacy or image, it can and must be freely expressed, as it constitutes the exercise of the constitutional right to freedom of expression and, furthermore, a natural element of the human right to the free development of personality. This is the legitimate exercise of the so-called animus jocandi, rightly defined as that festive intention, to play, to joke, which prevents the declaration of will from being taken seriously, which does not give rise to an obligation nor is it punishable merely by its verbal expression (vid. Cabanellas, Guillermo “Repertorio Jurídico”, p. 166 no. 7107). However, when this is not the case and abuses occur, at the level of mere legality, the legislator has criminalized, in the Penal Code, the crimes of injury, slander, and defamation (articles 145 to 147) and, in the Civil Code, the theory of abuse of right (article 22), which is why any person who feels harmed can subsequently claim to be compensated. In the specific case, from reading the bulletin in question, visible at folios 60 and 60v of the judicial file, it is noted that with a humorous and ironic sense, the claimant raised a series of petitions, understood as requests made to the Three Wise Men on the occasion of celebrating their day, for which purpose he incorporated a caricature of them. Among such requests, he asked for lighting for the covered courts, reinstatement of teachers, not paying for the use of the courts, construction of the rebound wall on the fronton court, using the soccer field in December, using electronic devices in the club's ranchos, having an auditor appointed by the club members, that the Asociación Española de Beneficencia catch up with maintenance fees, that there be savings of one million dollars to build a convention center, etc. Even the petitioner included as the phrase of the month, attributed to Ceferino Casero, President of the Club's Board of Directors, the following: “there are some people who are accompanying me, but anonymously.” All of these comments constitute merely jocular and ironic statements, which do not harm any right nor result in an abusive exercise of the right to express oneself. By virtue of the foregoing, the Chamber concludes that the sanction imposed on the petitioner for the mere fact of having published the aforementioned bulletin and expressed ironic statements harms the constitutional rights to freedom of expression and the free development of personality. For this reason alone, the constitutional complaint (amparo) is appropriate.” (the emphasis is our own. See in the same sense rulings 2009-014384 of 3:55 p.m. on September 16, 2009 and No. 2015019641 of 9:05 a.m. on December 18, 2015) Finally, it is worth highlighting pronouncement No. 2018008396 of 12:40 p.m. on May 25, 2018, in which it was considered that the plurality of content is consubstantial to freedom of expression and repressing it implies its denial:

“Thus, there are sufficient indications of the existing censorship and the distancing between the Administration and the petitioner. In this regard, although the respondent party affirmed that it was a complete reorganization of the resource, the fact is that it omitted to attach evidentiary elements that would allow the Chamber to reach the same conclusion. The evidence it adduced referred to the reassigned functions (which fell within the profile of a journalist) and to the certificate of the petitioner's salary.

The Chamber reiterates that, in matters of constitutionality control, once clear indications of censorship are established ab initio, the counterparty bears a burden of proof that must lead to the conclusion that the actions were not of such a nature, especially when the respondent is in a better position to provide evidence to the case (dynamic burden of proof), given that the Administration has volumes of information and public resources to rule out any discrimination or violation of a fundamental right; despite which, in the sub examine, the respondent fails to discredit with reliable evidence the grievance of the petitioners. In this way, taking into consideration the provisions in the aforementioned subsections b) and c) of numeral 4 of the Organic Law of SINART, which expressly oblige that public enterprise to respect political, religious, social, and cultural pluralism as well as to permit the free expression of opinions, it is clear that in the specific case a form of veiled censorship has occurred through the relocation of a journalist to a position that limits or eliminates his influence on the transmitted content, all of this after or motivated by the aforementioned statements in the exercise of his journalistic work.

The foregoing is even more relevant, since through veiled censorship a kind of surreptitious intimidation or intimidation is exercised against the rest of the journalistic staff of the public enterprise SINART. In this way, their press freedom is threatened by the possibility of being victims of reprisals derived from the exercise of journalism in freedom, when they formulate opinions not shared by the media's management according to the current government; an environment that fosters the scourge of self-censorship to the detriment of journalists, because their job stability could compel them to avoid reprisals. This also affects the final recipient of journalism services, the public, who in this way sees their capacity to form their own reasoned criteria diminished by failing to be exposed to a diversity of informative content and points of view.” From the recently cited precedents of this Court, as well as from the conceptual elements and exemplification outlined, it is extracted that the musical parodies that originated the actions challenged in this proceeding enjoy special protection within the framework of safeguarding freedom of expression, as they are expressions of thought aimed—using humor—at exposing social criticism and targeting public entities, regardless of whether their content aligns with a uniform or generalized sensibility for visualizing those specific social problems addressed. It would remain to examine the consequences that, from the public sphere, were imposed on those forms of embodying freedom of expression.

VIII.- ON THE PUBLIC ADVERTISING SCHEDULE AND ITS IMPACT ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. This Constitutional Chamber has already referred on different occasions to the use of public resources to contract, withdraw, or redirect advertising to certain media outlets. For example, in ruling No. 2015-01782 of 11:36 a.m. on February 6, 2015, the following considerations were made:

“VIII.- The core point of this proceeding is to determine whether the notes sent by the respondent to public institutions last July constitute an illegitimate limitation on freedom of expression and thought. Consequently, the starting point of the analysis must be freedom of expression, its limits, and direct or indirect censorship.

Without the intention of exhausting the topic, nor reiterating what was already said in the whereas clause on constitutional jurisprudence, the protection that freedom of expression enjoys in our environment must be emphasized. Without prejudice to other instruments that protect it, it is noted that the Political Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and thought in articles 28 and 29, while the American Convention on Human Rights does so in article 13:

“ARTICLE 28.- No one may be disturbed or persecuted for the expression of their opinions nor for any act that does not violate the law.

Private actions that do not harm public morals or order, or that do not harm a third party, are outside the scope of the law.

However, political propaganda may not be made in any form by clerics or laypersons invoking religious motives or using, as a means, religious beliefs.

ARTICLE 29.- Everyone may communicate their thoughts by word or in writing, and publish them without prior censorship; but they shall be responsible for the abuses they commit in the exercise of this right, in the cases and manner established by law.” “Article 13. Freedom of Thought and Expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, whether orally, in writing, or in printed or artistic form, or by any other procedure of their choice.

2. The exercise of the right provided for in the preceding paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but to subsequent liabilities, which must be expressly established by law and be necessary to ensure:

• a)respect for the rights or reputation of others, or b) the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals.

3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment and apparatus used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means aimed at impeding the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions. (…)” Freedom of expression is a fundamental pillar of the democratic State, as it allows the circulation of ideas and information – even those opposing the current government – the formation of public opinion, the oversight and denunciation of government actions, among others.

Now, for the purposes of resolving the sub examine, it first behooves us to transcribe the statements of both parties that have given rise to the conflict. According to the recordings provided by the respondent party, the advertising spot questioned as injurious indicates the following:

“Costa Rican citizen. Do you trust and believe in a deputy who claims to represent you in the highest Power of the Republic, who was a law student with outstanding grades at a university, about to graduate, in record time, without having a high school diploma and that is an indispensable requirement to take that degree program? A deputy who, in the 2010 vote section of La Nación newspaper, claims to be a lawyer graduated from the University [Name 002], this constituting a crime of ideological falsehood? A Deputy reported by the Prosecutor's Office for alleged fraud, being involved in the falsification of signatures for contracts for the 2010 campaign, where they collected over ȼ 220 million and the contractors declared they never received a penny and that they mostly forged the signatures? A deputy where in an audio recording he requests Hugo Navas for a copy of one of those false contracts to intimidate Rita Chaves and other PASE deputies, telling them that Hugo knows everything and that he can finish them all, the party and everything? A deputy whom the OIJ is investigating along with other deputies of his faction for apparent false appointments in the Legislative Assembly, where they never showed up for work, but their salary was collected, this constituting a fraud of over ȼ 200 million to the Costa Rican State, that is, to all of us? A deputy who in an audio recording plans to steal ȼ 356 million from the political debt of the 2010 electoral process with invoices for non-existent expenses? Such a deputy cannot be believed. He is not worthy of sitting in a congressional seat. No to impunity. Mr. Attorney General of the Republic act, we want answers. This is a message from the citizens outraged with PASE.” It is observed then that the spot criticizes a person's suitability to hold the office of deputy, denounces alleged illicit acts, and urges the Attorney General to act. All these topics are of public interest and, as such, fall within the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression.

Indeed, in the case of public officials, particularly those of high rank, the threshold of freedom of expression and the duty of tolerance towards criticism increase. This is so because a fundamental element of the democratic system, which distinguishes it from dictatorships, consists of the broad freedom enjoyed by both citizens in general and the press in particular, regarding the expression of their criticisms and the questioning of the suitability (technical or moral) of public officials without fear of censorship or reprisals, which evidently does not prevent the person who feels affected from resorting to the right of rectification or other ordinary judicial avenues in defense of their image and good name. In the specific case of public officials, they are more exposed to public scrutiny, since the exercise of their functions transcends the private sphere and, due to its impact on the development and political events of a country, is incorporated into the public sphere, that is, it has consequences of interest to citizens in general. Likewise, citizen control over the Public Administration and the duty of accountability of public officials (article 11 of the Political Constitution) can only occur in a democratic system with broad freedom of expression and information. That is the relevance of the social dimension of the right to information, intimately linked to that of expression. In this sense, precisely, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights stated in the Tristán Donoso case:

“115. Finally, with respect to the right to honor, the Court recalls that expressions concerning the suitability of a person for the performance of a public office or acts carried out by public officials in the performance of their duties enjoy greater protection, so as to foster democratic debate. The Court has indicated that in a democratic society public officials are more exposed to public scrutiny and criticism. This different threshold of protection is explained because they have voluntarily exposed themselves to more demanding scrutiny. Their activities leave the domain of the private sphere to enter the sphere of public debate. This threshold is not based on the quality of the individual, but on the public interest of the activities they carry out (…)

122. As already indicated, international law establishes that the threshold of protection for the honor of a public official must allow the widest possible citizen control over the exercise of their functions (supra para. 115). This differentiated protection of honor is explained because the public official voluntarily exposes themselves to society's scrutiny, which leads them to a greater risk of suffering harm to their honor, as well as due to the possibility, associated with their condition, of having greater social influence and ease of access to the media to give explanations or respond about events that involve them.” Similarly, in the Ricardo Canese case, the Court indicated:

“97. Democratic control, by society through public opinion, fosters transparency in State activities and promotes the accountability of officials for their public management, which is why there must be a greater margin of tolerance for statements and assessments made in the course of political debates or on matters of public interest.

98. The Court has established that it is logical and appropriate that expressions concerning public officials or other persons exercising functions of a public nature must enjoy, under the terms of Article 13.2 of the Convention, a margin of openness to broad debate regarding matters of public interest, which is essential for the functioning of a truly democratic system (…)” In the same line of thought, the European Court of Human Rights held that "freedom of the press affords the public one of the best means of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders. More generally, freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society" (case "Lingens vs. Austria", judgment of July 8, 1986, Series A No. 103, para. 42).

Returning to the normative analysis, the fact that both legal texts, the Political Constitution and the American Convention, established the system of limits, or rather, of subsequent control of freedom of expression stands out. In this way, on the one hand, censorship was proscribed, and, on the other, the regime of subsequent liability was instituted, since the exercise of freedom of expression does not exempt one from assuming the consequences derived from its misuse, for example, when the crimes of injury (injurias), slander (calumnias), and defamation (difamación) are committed. Thus, the middle ground between the right to freedom of expression and the protection of honor is provided through the system of subsequent liability, without direct or indirect mechanisms of censorship being appropriate in any matter. In the Tristán Donoso case, the Inter-American Court stated:

“110. However, freedom of expression is not an absolute right. Article 13.2 of the Convention, which prohibits prior censorship, also provides for the possibility of demanding subsequent liabilities for the abusive exercise of this right. These restrictions are exceptional in nature and must not limit, beyond what is strictly necessary, the full exercise of freedom of expression and become a direct or indirect mechanism of prior censorship.

111. For its part, Article 11 of the Convention establishes that everyone has the right to respect for their honor and recognition of their dignity. This implies limits to the interference of private individuals and the State. Therefore, it is legitimate for anyone who considers their honor affected to resort to the judicial means that the State provides for its protection.” (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

In the sub iudice, the foregoing translates into the possibility that the respondent has to file the judicial actions he deems pertinent, in order to determine the potential harm to his honor and the possible liability of those who have exceeded the limits of freedom of expression. Another alternative that finds acceptance in the legal system is the use of rectification or reply, when a person is affected by inaccurate or offensive information issued to their detriment (articles 14 of the American Convention and 66 and following of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction).

However, as mentioned, censorship, direct or indirect, finds no place in our environment. It is worth delving deeper into this topic in order to provide a solution to the case under examination. The third paragraph of Article 13 of the American Convention provides guidance in this regard:

“3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment and apparatus used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means aimed at impeding the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.” In this sense, censorship can be direct – for example, the direct prohibition of a certain publication – or indirect (also called soft censorship, subtle, veiled censorship) – for example, the use of various means to intimidate and thereby prevent a publication. The Convention provides a non-exhaustive list of cases of censorship through indirect means (controls on paper, frequencies, etc.) and concludes with the general rule, which would be “… or by any other means aimed at impeding the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.” It is worth mentioning the Ivcher Bronstein case as an example, in which the Inter-American Court considered that a resolution to nullify the legal effect of Mr. Ivcher Bronstein's nationality title – among other acts – constituted an indirect means of restricting his freedom of expression. Also, within comparative law, the ruling "Editorial Río Negro v. Provincia de Neuquén" (5/09/07) is of interest, in which the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (Argentina) ruled, after the Executive Branch of the Province of Neuquén temporarily deprived that media outlet of official advertising without demonstrating the reasonableness of such measure, and also ruled against the indirect violation of press freedom through economic means: "The first option for a State is to give or not give advertising, and that decision remains within the scope of State discretion. If it decides to give it, it must do so complying with two constitutional criteria: 1) it cannot manipulate advertising, giving it and withdrawing it from some media based on discriminatory criteria; 2) it cannot use advertising as an indirect way of affecting freedom of expression. Therefore, it has at its disposal many distributive criteria, but whatever it uses must always maintain a minimum general guideline to prevent denaturalization." Now, in the specific case, the respondent sent a missive to several public institutions, using paper with the letterhead and seal of the Legislative Assembly, in which he stated:

“(…) 4.- In my particular case, in clear right to protect my personal, professional, and moral integrity, I will base the complaint against the producer of this radio program and jointly against its sponsors, as it suffices that you accurately monitor at 8 pm the 800 AM frequency and listen, within the same list of sponsors to which this institution belongs as a sponsor of the program in question, alongside the spot you pay for with public money, another spot recorded with the voice of Mr. [Name 001] himself in which he asks citizens if they believe a lying Deputy, investigated for being a forger and swindler, an aspiring law graduate in an irregular manner, reported by the TSE for attempting to embezzle millions in sums of money through the use of false documents and more unfounded accusations, the radio producer taking advantage under the shelter of his sponsors, to recklessly pressure the Attorney General to act against the undersigned, thus preventing impunity, as if the Head of the Public Prosecutor's Office were deliberately covering up a series of crimes committed by this public servant.

5.- Due to the consideration you deserve, I respectfully warn you of this matter and urge you to consider as a responsible precautionary measure, the possibility of taking the institutional advertising you pay for in this radio program off the air, while we resolve in the courts the complaint we are about to file, with the purpose of not tarnishing judicially nor harming the healthy image that Costa Ricans have of this noble institution, which must be protected and should not see itself involved in such deplorable matters alien to your honorable work, with which my lawyers would immediately dismiss, at the request of the undersigned, the potential joint extended lawsuit against this public entity. (…)” (Extract from the note addressed to Correos [Name 002], provided by the petitioner; the highlighting does not correspond to the original).

The exhortation sent to the public institutions so that they would withdraw advertising from the petitioner's radio program falls within the cases of indirect censorship of freedom of expression for several reasons.

Firstly, advertising provides the main financial support that allows the transmission of radio programs and, ultimately, the economic sustenance of the people who work on said program. It is evident that if the program's economic income is limited, it may also be harmed or – even – eliminated, all to the detriment of both freedom of expression and that of information. The situation described is even more serious when it involves small media outlets, such as local newspapers or small radio stations, whose financial stability may depend largely on State advertising. In the Tristán Donoso case, the Inter-American Court ruled regarding economic threats to freedom of expression:

“129. Finally, although the criminal penalty of a daily fine does not appear excessive, the criminal conviction imposed as a form of subsequent liability established in the present case is unnecessary. Additionally, the facts under the Court's examination show that the fear of civil sanction, given the former Attorney General's claim for an extremely high civil compensation, may be clearly as or more intimidating and inhibiting for the exercise of freedom of expression than a criminal sanction, as it has the potential to compromise the personal and family life of anyone who denounces a public official, with the evident and undesirable result of self-censorship, both for the affected person and for other potential critics of the performance of a public servant.” Secondly, a deputy of the Republic is not just any citizen, but rather holds particular political power due to their influence in the approval of bills, regarding which there are many interests, both private and public.

Therefore, a recommendation or withdrawal of advertising from a radio program, issued by an official in a particular position of political power and having as its leitmotiv his disagreement with the criticisms against him disseminated by a specific media outlet, constitutes a veiled form of intimidation that not only affects the radio program directly alluded to, but also sends an intimidating message to the rest of the media, fostering an environment hostile to the freedoms of expression and information essential in a democratic system. In the case sub iudice, such threat even came to have concrete effects, to the extent that, according to the evidence provided by the plaintiff, the ICAA advertising placement, scheduled for the period from October 15 to November 15, 2014, was suspended while the responding official’s communication was being answered. If the other entities to which the responding official addressed his communication had acted in the same manner, that would have resulted in a serious impact on the financial stability of the aforementioned radio program, all of which had as its genesis the dissatisfaction of a public official with the criticisms disseminated therein.

The foregoing does not imply that the alleged violation of the honor of the responding official and of those who could eventually be responsible for it is of little importance. Quite the contrary, what is claimed by the responding official is so relevant that the legal system has established appropriate and reasonable procedural avenues both to defend the honor of the affected person (for example, through criminal proceedings) and to ensure the accuracy of the disseminated information (right of rectification and reply).

Now then, the clarifying notes sent by the defendant in October of last year to the public institutions do not affect this Chamber's reasoning. On the one hand, they are actions that occurred after notification of the course of these proceedings was given – the notes were delivered to those institutions on October 7 and 8, 2014; whereas notification occurred on October 6, 2014. On the other hand, the Chamber observes that, although it was clarified through such notes that the "… previous letter sent on this matter did not necessarily seek to impose upon you the obligation to have to withdraw your advertising from that program…", a warning to the institutions was also indicated, motivated once again by the criticisms made of the responding official:

"5.- I do not fail to respectfully point out your duty of care, understood as exercising greater control over the resources that, in terms of propaganda, advertising, or information, you have available to place in media outlets, maintaining at least minimal monitoring that allows you to know, as in the case of the CD I am providing you [which contains an edited segment of the program 'Rompiendo El Silencio'], the quality of the statements made in the spaces where you place advertising." (Excerpt from the note sent to the Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje, provided by the responding official).

Finally, it must be noted that public officials may express themselves on matters of public interest. However, they are guarantors of fundamental rights, such that the expressions they utter must avoid becoming a form of direct or indirect censorship. Again, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is cited:

"139. In a democratic society, it is not only legitimate but sometimes constitutes a duty of State authorities to pronounce on matters of public interest. However, in doing so they are subject to certain limitations in that they must verify in a reasonable manner, although not necessarily exhaustively, the facts on which they base their opinions, and they should do so with even greater diligence than that employed by private individuals, by reason of their high office, the broad reach, and eventual effects their expressions may have on certain sectors of the population, and to prevent citizens and other interested persons from receiving a manipulated version of certain facts. Furthermore, they must bear in mind that, as public officials, they hold a position as guarantor of the fundamental rights of individuals and, therefore, their statements cannot disregard these rights nor constitute forms of direct or indirect interference or harmful pressure on the rights of those who seek to contribute to public deliberation through the expression and dissemination of their thoughts. This duty of special care is particularly accentuated in situations of greater social conflict, alterations of public order, or social or political polarization, precisely because of the set of risks they can entail for certain persons or groups at a given time." (Caso Ríos y otros) In conclusion, the Chamber finds that the responding official has every right to defend his honor and reputation through the legal mechanisms provided for in the Constitution and the law, among them, the right of rectification and reply and the criminal complaint for the crimes of slander, libel, and defamation regulated in the Penal Code. In that sense, the sending of a note to the sponsors of the program indicating that they consider withdrawing their sponsorship due to its negative content against his image, constituted indirect censorship – in the terms set forth in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court cited supra – of the radio program "Rompiendo El Silencio". In the assessment made, specific weight is given to the fact that the responding official holds a position of political power due to his position as Deputy of the Republic, and that his missive effectively caused a negative effect beyond a simple complaint, as it was accredited in the record that it produced effects on one of the sponsors, who temporarily suspended advertising (ICAA). Consequently, this claim is granted.

IX.- Regarding the public institutions that were recipients of the responding official's communications, most of them merely took note of the matter or declined having competence or involvement in it, as was recorded in the proven facts. However, it could also be observed that in the case of the ICAA, the missive caused the practical effect of temporarily suspending sponsorship of the plaintiff's radio program. Indeed, it is recorded in communication number PRE-CI-557-2014 of November 19, 2014:

"Receive a cordial greeting, following instructions from the Executive Presidency, Msc. Yamileth Astorga Espeleta, I inform you that the corresponding advertising placement from October 15 to November 15, 2014, was pending the response to be made by the Board of Directors of AYA to the note from Mr. Oscar López Arias, which is contained in file No. 14-15222007-CO of the Constitutional Chamber, where all documents of your interest are contained.

However, I take the liberty of informing you, as you are aware, that advertising placement with your program restarted from November 1 to December 15, 2014 (… )" Thus, although the Board of Directors ultimately opted to decline competence and responsibility in the matter, the suspension of the advertising placement had a negative impact on the activity of the protected party, who ordinarily should have received said placements, which did not occur due to the letters sent by the responding official to the ICAA. In reality, the ICAA should not have suspended the advertising placement, not even as a precautionary measure, as a result of the defendant's missive. The Chamber cannot fail to warn that indirect censorship through financing can be devastating when it affects small media outlets or the programs broadcast on them. Thus, this Chamber verifies the materialization of harm that affected the protected party for having broadcast on his radio program the segment under dispute, which is to the detriment of his freedoms of expression and information. To that extent, the appeal against the ICAA is granted solely for indemnification purposes, given that the advertising placement was restarted." (emphasis added) Likewise, in judgment No. 2016-015220 of 4:00 p.m. on October 18, 2016, the problem was addressed, based on the following considerations:

"VIII.- Now then, it is of utmost importance for the specific case to indicate that advertising provides fundamental financial support in the current operating scheme of mass media, as it allows for the publication or dissemination of their content and, ultimately, the economic sustenance of the people who work in that medium. It is evident that if the economic income of a media outlet (in this case, print) is limited, it is also harmed or—even—eliminated, all to the detriment of both freedom of expression and freedom of information. The situation described is even more serious when dealing with small media outlets, such as local newspapers or small radio stations, whose financial stability can largely depend on State advertising. In the Tristán Donoso case, the Inter-American Court ruled regarding economic threats to freedom of expression:

"129. Finally, although the criminal penalty of fine-days does not appear excessive, the criminal conviction imposed as a form of subsequent liability established in the present case is unnecessary. Additionally, the facts under the Court's examination show that the fear of civil sanction, given the former Attorney General's claim for extremely high civil damages, can be in all respects as or more intimidating and inhibiting for the exercise of freedom of expression than a criminal sanction, as it has the potential to compromise the personal and family life of the person who denounces a public official, with the evident and harmful result of self-censorship, both for the affected person and for other potential critics of a public servant's conduct." A clarification must, however, be made to adapt what was said to the particularities of this case. The Manager of the respondent Bank states that it would be incorrect for the Chamber to go so far as to indicate the manner in which a vital aspect of the commercial business operated by the Bank, that is, advertising, should be conducted, and on this point he is correct. The Chamber understands that the legal condition of Banco Nacional [Name 002] must be taken into account within the State administrative framework, as it is an institution with constitutionally recognized autonomy and which has been tasked with carrying out an unquestionably commercial activity and, furthermore, in a competitive regime with private entities. In that dynamic, the commercial advertising that State enterprises may carry out responds, and must respond, clearly to technical and objective decisions and assessments, and the interference of an organ for the protection of Fundamental Rights like this Chamber is not appropriate in such aspects. That is not where the constitutional and Human Rights conflict analyzed here originates, as demonstrated by the general position expressed in the 2012 report of the Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights titled "Principles on the Regulation of Official Advertising and Freedom of Expression". In said document, the need for the various State institutions to have technically and objectively designed plans for their communication purposes is well-established, and this is repeated in the legislative investigation file, where the Deputies and the plaintiff himself affirm that the particular condition of public enterprises must be considered, and the technical and objective decisions regarding advertising must be respected. In this regard, the plaintiff himself precisely states that:

"the criterion for distributing advertising placement should be market criteria, they should be media plans designed by professionals in the field, and the money that is needed to fulfill that media plan should be invested, so that what the State enterprise competing in the market wishes to communicate is efficiently communicated." (pp. 18-36 of Legislative File 20066) The problem in this case arises, rather, when public enterprises deviate from that channel to manage their advertising placement according to purposes alien to objective and technical reasons, and incompatible with the constitutional framework of fundamental rights. It is at that point where this Chamber's participation acquires full justification, and that is what is sought to be confirmed or discarded through this amparo appeal.

IX- The specific case. - The protected party states that the responding official has used his influences and functions as General Manager of Banco Nacional [Name 002] to attempt to pressure Diario La Nación to modify publications and reports made; he affirms that this pressure materialized in the gradual reduction of advertising placement and its virtual reduction to zero in recent months. From the proven facts and the considerando regarding analysis of evidence, the Chamber holds as demonstrated both the reality of the reduction of advertising placement from Banco Nacional to Periódico La Nación, starting from the publication made at the end of February, and particularly during the months of June and July, as well as the reasons that motivated it. In this latter sense, as indicated supra, the statements of the responding official himself, issued before the various bodies inquiring about his conduct, are sufficiently clear. In all of them, the official expressed the existence of disagreement with the manner in which the media outlet reported during the months of February, March, April, and May 2016 on topics concerning the respondent banking entity in relation to the case of the company LATCO; actions of the Bank's Board of Directors, as well as the participation of BNCR in the BICSA case. As narrated by the plaintiff and confirmed by the responding Manager, dissatisfaction reached its peak with this last case, as it was understood that the newspaper was disregarding the Bank's responses and omitting important information, all of which could result (as it did) in heavy economic expenditures for the Bank to maintain minimum levels of confidence in its situation. It is because of that case and its supposed serious consequences for the Bank that the responding Manager decided to publish, on May 13, 2016, a paid advertisement in two other national print media outlets, in order to respond to the cited publications of La Nación and to make known what, in his opinion, was the real situation regarding the BICSA case. With this last action, the situation worsened, adding to the conflict bitter editorials from the media outlet and responses from the Bank in the same tone. It is at this point that the Manager decided to "have a conversation" with the representatives of the media outlet, as a result of which he ordered, concomitantly and in the meantime, a pause he called an "impasse" in advertising placement with the newspaper La Nación; that pause concludes (according to his own words) after he is attended to by the Director of the media outlet. These narrated facts are repeated consistently both in the plaintiff's brief and in all the versions provided by the responding official himself before the Bank's Board of Directors, before the Legislative Commission that investigated the case, and before the Chamber in the report rendered, and, above all, it is clearly recorded in the audio provided by the plaintiff. That said, the assessment of such facts, against the constitutional framework of freedom of expression and the right to information, by this Court cannot be positive for the responding official. It is constitutionally reprehensible that the General Manager of a public Bank, that is, a public official, issued an order to withdraw advertising placement from a particular written newspaper, without a valid objective and technical basis, but rather by reason of his disagreement with the manner in which news and reports were being produced regarding the activities and situation of the banking entity he represents. The Court understands that the foregoing constitutes indirect censorship, a clear form of attempting to influence the informational content of the media outlet, and furthermore sends an intimidating message to the rest of the media that fosters an environment hostile to the freedoms of expression and information essential in a democratic system. The foregoing, as it emanates from a public servant, is totally inadmissible given the necessary respect for and adherence to what a Deputy appropriately defined as "democratic logic," to the realization of which all bodies must contribute, including, of course, public enterprises (p. 383 of Legislative File 20.066). It imposes the broadest possible realization of freedom of expression and the right to information, without this signifying a renunciation of using the legally established means to combat news or opinions that may unjustly affect the work of institutions.

X.- Indeed, if, in the judgment of the responding official, the media outlet should have given him the due right of reply at the times he requested to meet with the company's representatives due to the relevance of what was published, he could, and can, file the judicial actions he deems pertinent, so that the eventual impact on his honor, or damage to the banking entity he represents, and the possible liability of those who have exceeded the limits of freedom of expression can be determined. Furthermore, he had the option, provided for in the legal system, of resorting to the rectification or reply process, in favor of persons who are affected by inaccurate or offensive information issued to their detriment (Article 14 of the American Convention and Article 66 et seq. of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). However, the responding official first opted for the publication of clarifying notes in paid advertisement spaces in other written media outlets and did not do so with Diario La Nación. In doing so, he set aside the formal mechanism of rectification and reply before Diario La Nación, or some other media outlet of Grupo Nación, and he did so in an absolutely deliberate manner, as he expressed before the Commission that "… (…) some of you were discussing why I didn't resort to the judicial route. Am I going to file a motion with the Constitutional Chamber to tell them to give me a right of reply? We would still be in the admission process." (p. 383 Legislative File 20.066). These are unfortunate considerations, not only because they do not correspond to the true reality of the rectification and reply process—which, contrary to what he affirms, has a very expeditious admission process—but also because they furthermore seek to justify the undertaking of de facto avenues or acts of pressure over the avenues of law, to achieve a modification in the content of the newspaper's reports. On this topic, it is important to emphasize, as was mentioned, that such attempts at censorship, direct or indirect, have no place in our environment, nor in the constitutional state of law.

XI.- Conclusion. Thus, this Chamber verifies an act of indirect censorship carried out by a State servant, with the aim of limiting the freedom of information that the protected media outlet should enjoy, through a reduction in advertising placement, without technical or objective reasons and rather with the clear intention of influencing the informational content of the press outlet regarding its reports concerning Banco Nacional [Name 002] and its subsidiaries.

In the case, what legal doctrine has clearly termed indirect censorship is verified, a form of illegitimate harassment of a media outlet by a public entity, which not only harms freedom of expression as stated above, but also the right of citizens to have truthful information mechanisms in a democracy. It is a perverse and anti-democratic way of using State power to direct opinion, according to a "reward or punishment" system, for those who exercise freedom of the press and free expression guaranteed constitutionally and conventionally. On this topic, the Human Rights Commission and the most authoritative legal doctrine have been emphatic in stating that "the right of expression cannot be restricted by indirect ways or means either, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment and devices used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means aimed at impeding the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions." The mechanisms of direct or "indirect" censorship are clearly prohibited by Article 13.3 of the American Convention and were the subject of attention by various organs of the inter-American system. Interpreting the cited Article 13.3, the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter, "IACHR"), establishes in its Principle 5 that "[p]rior censorship, interference, or direct or indirect pressure upon any expression, opinion, or information disseminated through any oral, written, artistic, visual, or electronic medium of communication must be prohibited by law. Restrictions on the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as the arbitrary imposition of information and the creation of obstacles to the free flow of information, violate the right to freedom of expression." And in its Principle 13, it indicates that "the use of State power and public treasury resources; the granting of tariff benefits; the arbitrary and discriminatory allocation of official advertising and official credit; the granting of radio and television frequencies, among others, with the objective of pressuring and punishing, or rewarding and privileging social communicators and media outlets based on their informational lines, are attacks against freedom of expression and must be expressly prohibited by law." For its part, the Inter-American Court has stated that "any act of public power that implies a restriction on the right to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas, to a greater extent or by means other than those authorized by the same Convention, is illegitimate.

It is widely recognized in legal doctrine that indirect censorship is normally hidden behind apparently legitimate actions that, however, are undertaken with the purpose of conditioning the exercise of individuals' freedom of expression. When that happens, a violation of Article 13.3 of the Convention occurs. As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter, the "Inter-American Court" or "Court") has held, it violates freedom of expression." (IACtHR. The Mandatory Membership of Journalists (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985, Series A No. 5, para. 55.)

These mechanisms of restriction were also the subject of analysis by the Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression of the IACHR, which in its 2003 Annual Report drew attention to these "obscure obstructions, silently imposed [that] do not give rise to investigations nor merit widespread condemnation." The issue was also addressed by this office in its 2008 and 2009 Reports.

The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court, for its part, has condemned on various occasions the adoption of State measures that constitute indirect means of restricting freedom of expression. Thus, for example, it has condemned the requirement of mandatory membership of journalists, the arbitrary use of State regulatory powers when these have been used to initiate intimidating actions against the board of a media outlet, or to revoke the nationality of a media outlet's director as a consequence of the editorial line of the programs it broadcasts (Caso Ivcher Bronstein vs Perú).

The freedom of expression rapporteurs of the UN, the OAS, and the OSCE have also addressed the topic of indirect restrictions on freedom of expression by authorities. For example, in their 2002 Joint Declaration they affirmed that, "governments and public bodies should never abuse their custody of public finances to try to influence the content of media information; advertising placement should be based on market reasons." The arbitrary use of official advertising was one of the first indirect censorship mechanisms addressed by the inter-American system. Indeed, the Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression, in its 2003 Annual Report, dedicated a special chapter to studying the phenomenon and concluded that "indirect obstruction through State advertising acts as a strong deterrent to freedom of expression" (IACHR Annual Report OEA/Ser. L/VI.118. Doc 70, December 2003). As the Special Rapporteurship indicated at that time:

"This topic deserves special attention in the Americas, where media concentration has historically fostered the abuse of power by rulers in the arbitrary distribution of official advertising, like other indirect censorship mechanisms, operates on different types of needs that media outlets have to function and interests that can affect them. It is a form of pressure that acts as a reward or punishment with the purpose of conditioning a media outlet's editorial line according to the will of the party exerting the pressure. As stated, indirect censorship mechanisms usually hide behind the apparent legitimate exercise of State powers, many of which are exercised by officials in a discretionary manner. In the case of the distribution of official advertising, a case of indirect censorship is configured when it is carried out with discriminatory purposes according to the editorial position of the media outlet included or excluded in that distribution and with the aim of conditioning its editorial position or informational line.

To determine when a violation of freedom of expression has occurred due to the exercise of those powers, it is necessary to analyze the context. That is precisely what has been demonstrated in this amparo appeal: that the withdrawal of advertising during the first half of 2016, but particularly in the months following the publications at the end of February, occurred in a context of confrontation with the media outlet, where it is proven that the strategy did not follow objective criteria, but rather occurred, in the words of the manager himself, with the aim of 'motivating' the newspaper to change its editorial line and news focus, instead of using the existing legal mechanisms, such as the right of rectification and reply, if it was believed that the information was inaccurate or offensive.

In the cases Baruch Ivcher Bronstein Vs. Perú. Judgment of February 6, 2001. Series C No. 74, para. 154. In a similar sense, cf. IACtHR, "Caso Perozo y otros Vs. Venezuela". Judgment of January 28, 2009. Series C No. 195, the Inter-American Court has held that "[w]hen assessing an alleged restriction or limitation on freedom of expression, the Court must not subject itself solely to the study of the act in question, but must equally examine said act in light of the facts of the case as a whole, including the circumstances and context in which they occurred." Following the same reasoning, it held that "the enumeration of restrictive means made in Article 13.3 is not exhaustive nor prevents consideration of 'any other means' or indirect avenues derived from new technologies (… ). For a violation of Article 13.3 of the Convention to be configured, it is necessary that the avenue or means effectively restricts, even if indirectly, the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions" (OC-5/85 and caso Ríos y otros contra Venezuela). For its part, the Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression has been denouncing that this type of indirect censorship occurs frequently and is due to the absence of legal norms regulating the distribution of advertising placement and reducing the discretion of public officials. In the same sense, it was pointed out by the Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina in the case Editorial Río Negro S.A. v. Provincia de Neuquén, in which the court indicated that the Province of Neuquén had violated the freedom of expression of a newspaper by eliminating the official advertising it had contracted there as a consequence of critical coverage. The Supreme Court indicated that the Province of Neuquén should establish an adequate legal framework that limits the discretion of public officials and prevents such arbitrariness.

Likewise, the Supreme Court of Chile resolved a claim presented by Revista Punto Final against the distribution of official advertising carried out by some ministries. There, the court considered that the Chilean legal order grants officials "a wide margin of discretion" and recommended that State advertising investment be made "under transparent and non-discriminatory criteria" (case 9148/09). Cases have also occurred in countries such as the United States (El Día Vs.

Rossello, the Federal Court of Appeals for the First Circuit), in which it was established that the withdrawal of official advertising by the administration of the governor of Puerto Rico, Pedro Rossello, from the newspaper El Día, as a consequence of criticism the newspaper had made of the governor, constituted a clear violation of the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. In that regard, the Court of Appeals held that “using government funds to punish the political speech of members of the press and to seek to coerce [the media into issuing] expressions favorable to the government is contrary to the First Amendment.” Furthermore, the Court held that “the clearly established right prohibits the government from conditioning the revocation of benefits [in this case, state advertising] on a basis that infringes constitutionally protected interests (Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Puerto Rico, El Día vs. Rossello case, decision of January 25, 1999, 165 F.3d 106, p. 110).

It is clear from the foregoing and from the reports of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression that the State has the right to establish and modify its advertising allocation, but that it must do so through objective and transparent criteria, established in a planned manner that ensures that the power of the State or its funds are not used to discriminate, manipulate, or directly or indirectly censor freedom of expression and freedom of the press guaranteed conventionally and constitutionally. For the reasons stated, the appeal is granted against Banco Nacional [Name 002], with the effects that will be stated in the operative part.” (emphasis supplied) Also in decision Nº 2018013315 at 9:20 a.m. on August 17, 2018, the Chamber made clear that the arbitrary allocation of public resources through the purchase of advertising, as a means to restrict freedom of expression, contravenes both the Constitution and International Human Rights Law:

“The Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as an instrument for interpreting article 13 of the American Convention, establishes in its Principle 13: “The use of the power of the State and the resources of the public treasury; the granting of customs preferences; the arbitrary and discriminatory allocation of official advertising and official credits; the granting of radio and television frequencies, among others, with the objective of pressuring and punishing or rewarding and privileging social communicators and the media based on their informational lines, violates freedom of expression and must be expressly prohibited by law. The social media have the right to carry out their work independently. Direct or indirect pressures aimed at silencing the informational work of social communicators are incompatible with freedom of expression.” Also relevant, as a doctrinal source, is the Declaration of Chapultepec adopted by the Hemispheric Conference on Freedom of Expression held in Mexico City on March 11, 1994, which constitutes a manifestation of will and support from numerous leaders in defense of the right to freedom of expression, which endows it with strong legitimacy. Its Principle 6 provides: “the media and journalists should not be subject to discrimination or favors based on what they write or say.” In other areas, the European Court of Human Rights has held that the insufficient precision of laws and the establishment of unacceptably discretionary powers constitute violations of freedom of expression. Thus, when the regulations are not clear or leave decisions to the discretion of public officials, a legal framework contrary to freedom of expression exists. Likewise, in the Ricardo Canese case, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights indicated:

“97. Democratic control, by society through public opinion, fosters transparency of state activities and promotes the accountability of officials regarding their public management, which is why there must be a greater margin of tolerance for statements and assessments made in the course of political debates or on matters of public interest.

98. The Court has established that it is logical and appropriate that expressions concerning public officials or other persons exercising functions of a public nature should enjoy, under the terms of Article 13.2 of the Convention, a margin of openness to broad debate regarding matters of public interest, which is essential for the functioning of a truly democratic system.(…)” No type of censorship, direct or indirect, finds a place in our system, as expressed in subsection three of Article 13 of the American Convention:

“3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means aimed at impeding the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.” (the highlighting is not from the original) In this sense, censorship can be direct –for example, the direct prohibition of a certain publication– or indirect (also called soft censorship, subtle censorship, veiled censorship) –for example, the use of various means to intimidate and thereby prevent a publication, or the unjustified impediment to access to information of public interest–. Likewise, Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights contemplates a non-exhaustive list of cases of censorship by indirect means (controls over paper, frequencies, etc.) and expressly leaves the possibilities open, when it states: “…or by any other means aimed at impeding the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.” The same conclusion is reached in judgment Nº 2020016167 at 9:20 a.m. on August 28, 2020, where a case in which objective reasons existed for canceling the subscription to various written media—and it was not decreed, therefore, that a violation of freedom of expression had been incurred—is differentiated from another in which the actions were based on a disagreement with the alleged positions of a media outlet, in which case a breach of freedom was concluded in the comment:

“IV.- ON THE SPECIFIC CASE. In the sub examine, the amparo petitioner claims that the Ministry of Labor and Social Security violates fundamental rights, given that the subscription to Diario Extra was canceled. In this regard, in the report rendered under oath by the Minister of Labor and Social Security, it was indicated, regarding the cancellation by the MTSS of the subscription held with Diario Extra, that: “(…) that decision was due to the fact that as a result of the State of Sanitary Emergency facing the country, which has caused us economic impact not only nationally but also globally, the Executive Branch managed, days ago, cuts in public spending. Given that this budget cut forced us, as an Institution, to free up costs in some specific budget items, taking care, of course, not to affect the service that we as a Ministry provide to the citizenry. It being then, that by virtue of that budget cut we implemented, the decision was adopted to eliminate the subscription that the Institution maintained with some national circulation newspapers, such as: Diario Extra, La Nación, El Financiero and La República. Since the amount for the payment of the invoked subscriptions was charged from the same budget item used to purchase paper and cardboard supplies and this represented almost 50% of the budget for those purposes. And given that as a result of the pandemic produced by the COVID 19 virus, we must have paper towels available for the sinks we have installed for hand washing by employees and users of this Ministry; it was that the purchase of cited supplies was prioritized, with the consequence of eliminating the mentioned subscriptions” (the bold is not from the original).

Thus, the Court verifies that, on July 14, 2020, an official of the MTSS sent official letter DGAF-OF-383-2020 to the legal representative of Sociedad Periodística Extra Limitada, in which he stated: “In the most courteous manner and within the framework of contract 2019CD-000045-0007000001; under the on-demand modality for the acquisition of copies of the newspaper La Extra, this is to inform that in response to superior instructions and in compliance with the new directives issued by the Government of the Republic [Name 002], which urges mandatory budget cuts in order to focus on addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, we find it necessary to formally request the indefinite cancellation of delivery of said newspaper as of July 16, 2020.” In the same vein, official letters DGAD-OF-376-2020 addressed to the legal representative of Properiodicos Limitada and DGAD-OF-382-2020 sent to the legal representative of Grupo Nación GN S.A. are observed, through which notice was given of the cancellation of the subscription that the MTSS maintained with the newspapers La República, as well as La Nación and El Financiero, respectively.

Thus, contrary to what was alleged by the respondent, this Court considers that the action of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security does not violate fundamental rights. Note that, in the sub iudice, the MTSS canceled the subscription not only of Diario Extra, but of other media outlets such as La República, La Nación and El Financiero. Furthermore, it is not verified that such a decision was arbitrary, but rather that it was due to a budget cut derived from the covid-19 pandemic. In this regard, it is worth reiterating that in the report rendered under oath by the Minister of Labor and Social Security, it was recorded that “(…) the amount for the payment of the invoked subscriptions was charged from the same budget item used to purchase paper and cardboard supplies and this represented almost 50% of the budget for those purposes. And given that as a result of the pandemic produced by the COVID 19 virus, we must have paper towels available for the sinks we have installed for hand washing by employees and users of this Ministry; it was that the purchase of cited supplies was prioritized, with the consequence of eliminating the mentioned subscriptions.” Ergo, given the conditions caused by the referred pandemic, that institution prioritized the purchase of paper towels, which led to the foregoing of the referred subscriptions. Consequently, given that a violation of fundamental rights has not been verified, it is appropriate to dismiss the appeal regarding that point.

V.- On the other hand, regarding the claim made by the appellant concerning the actions of the ICAA, the Court observes that on June 29, 2020, “MINUTA GG-2020-02784” was issued, relating to a meeting held between officials of the ICAA and representatives of the SITRAA union, a document that lacks signatures and in which it is recorded: “Objective: Various SITRAA Topics Place: Virtual Date: 29-06-20 Start time: 11:00 am End time: 12:40 pm (…) 1. AyA work reinforcement campaign, action, SITRAA- AyA. operational crews, slogan hygiene heroes. Mario Rodríguez explains the proposal, from SITRAA a communication campaign has been carried out to improve the image of AyA. They do not agree with the campaign and expenses that AyA has planned. Slogan: “Hygiene Heroes”, they want to start a campaign with this slogan and carry it out with the support of operational workers throughout the country. Yamileth Astorga asks Mario what the objective of AyA’s Advertising Contracting is, apparently he is not clear about it, therefore she gives him a detailed explanation, the objective is the connection of homes to the AyA sewerage networks. She clarifies that the campaign is not to improve the image of AyA, but to encourage the population to connect to the sewerage networks. She makes a call not to feed Diarios Extra and CRHoy, since the objective of these is privatization. Mario comments that they do not give information to the press, rather he indicates that the press asks them for clarifications on things they do not know. He clarifies that SITRAA takes to the press the things for which they do not receive a response from the Administration. Maritza Alvarado makes comments about the campaign, indicates that SITRAA’s proposal seems good to her and can be done with own resources, recommends that there be unity to improve the image of AyA, points out some tasks that have been developed from the Institutional Communication Directorate. The internal base must be reinforced before projecting to the external. Marianela from SITRAA comments that it would be good if Mrs. Yamileth carefully reads the press releases that appear in the press, so that she realizes that SITRAA is not damaging the image, but rather defends the institutionality of AyA, for its importance in the management of water resources. Yamileth indicates that the media only publish things that weaken the image of AyA, requests to form an alliance with the unions to improve the image of the Institution (…)” (the emphasis was supplied).

In this regard, the Executive President of the ICAA indicates in the report rendered under oath before this Constitutional Court that: “In accordance with the formality established at the institutional level, a draft minute of the meeting was drawn up, with number GG-2020-02784, which is associated with the official letter number, said draft does not bear any signature or rubric of the participants and it is clarified in this act that, despite the fact that the officials listed in the draft minute were convened, Ms. Annette Henchoz Castro and Mr. Alejando Calderón Acuña did not attend the meeting that had been convened virtually, however; it took place in person. The draft minute was drawn up by the official Andrey Vila Abarca, who records in the format customarily used for these meetings, the agenda and a brief reference to the topics addressed. The minute was subsequently communicated and shared via email by the SDI with Memorandum GG-2020-02784, signed by the official Andrey Vila Abarca of the General Management, who is responsible for following up on the topics and agreements of the meetings with the different unions formed in AYA. From the document called “minute” it is clearly evident that at no time did the undersigned express the fact being appealed, so it is clear that the appellant takes a phrase from a minute out of context, from a meeting held between the Senior Administration and the SITRAA Union, where an internal motivational campaign for AyA personnel is analyzed, especially, aimed at workers who are on the front line of pandemic response. In that context and in the spirit of joining efforts, I made a call to the union groups so that if there are situations that concern them internally within the institution, they present their complaints to the Senior Administration to be addressed, before going to the media. That is what I referred to specifically when I indicated “not to feed the media” as the minute cites. I reiterate that neither from the minute nor from any other document does it ever appear that “an order was given not to speak with Diario Extra”, I do not know on what basis the appellant makes this reckless interpretation regarding freedom of expression. In fact, all press inquiries made by Diario Extra have been attended to in a timely manner; from May to date, 9 requests for information submitted by mail have been received and answered. Diario Extra and Extra TV 42, during this year have published at least 183 notes related to the institution” (the bold was supplied).

The Chamber also observes that, on July 21, 2020, the Executive President of the ICAA addressed official letter PRE-2020-01101 to the general manager of Diario Extra, in which she stated: “In exercise of the right of reply enshrined in Articles 29 of the Political Constitution and 14 of the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as 66 et seq. of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, in my capacity as Executive President of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, I request the due space to rectify the note published by Diario Extra on July 21, 2020, titled “Presidenta AyA ordena no hablar con DIARIO EXTRA”. I appreciate the publication of the following text: AyA has never ordered not to speak with Diario Extra Regarding the note published in Diario Extra on July 21, 2020, titled “Presidenta AyA ordena no hablar con Diario Extra”, as Executive President of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (AyA), I qualify as absolutely false that any official has been “ordered” not to speak with Diario Extra. The journalist takes out of context a phrase from a minute, from a meeting held between the Senior Administration and the SITRAA Union, where an internal motivational campaign for AyA personnel is analyzed, especially, aimed at workers who are on the front line of pandemic response. In that context and in the spirit of joining efforts, I make a call to the union groups so that if there are situations that concern them internally within the institution, they present their complaints to the Senior Administration to be addressed, before going to the media. That is what “not to feed the media...” refers to specifically, as the minute cites. Neither from the minute nor from any part does it ever appear that an “order was given not to speak with Diario Extra”, I do not know on what basis the journalist makes this reckless interpretation regarding freedom of expression. In fact, all press inquiries made by Diario Extra have been attended to in a timely manner; from May to date, 9 requests for information submitted by mail have been received and answered. Diario Extra and Extra TV 42, during this year have published at least 183 notes related to the institution. At AyA we are respectful of the right to information and freedom of expression, we would never agree to violate those rights. During this year we have sent two rights of reply to Diario Extra, one regarding a publication from January 15 that was never published, and another that was published in the June 27 edition. We are aware of the vital role the press plays for our democracy. We are clear about how important it is for the country to strengthen the media, since as a nation we cannot allow the interruption of a media outlet’s operations, that would be contrary to the public interest of being informed, especially in the midst of a pandemic, which demands truthful and timely information daily. We have trusted and continue to trust Grupo Extra to carry out our informational and accountability campaigns to the population, and we will continue to do so to the best of our ability. We could never allow ourselves to be accused of dealing any blow to freedom of expression” (the highlighting was supplied). (…)

Thus, in the sub iudice, the Chamber considers that a violation of constitutional relevance has occurred. Note that although the alluded minute lacks signatures, it is no less true that the Executive President of the ICAA did not deny its content, but limited herself to alleging that the phrase “Hace un llamado a no alimentar a los Diarios Extra y CRHoy, ya que el objetivo de éstos es la privatización” was taken out of context, given that what she intended to express was “a call to the union groups so that if there are situations that concern them internally within the institution, they present their complaints to the Senior Administration to be addressed, before going to the media. That is what “not to feed the media” refers to specifically.” On this point, the Court considers that in the sub examine there are sufficient indications that the Executive President of the ICAA said the phrase transcribed above, which, clearly, constitutes an impact on the constitutional rights to freedom of thought and expression, freedom of the press, and equality, all of this in relation to the constitutional principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency in public management, by virtue of the fact that it constitutes a kind of veiled censorship, given that the practical result of such a call is to prevent the affected media from having access to public information.

Indeed, contrary to what was held by the appealed authority, with the phrase in question, officials of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados were exhorted to refrain from sending information of public relevance to certain media outlets. First, such action implies a serious threat to the freedom of thought and expression of those servants, given that the initiative comes, no more and no less, from the very Executive President of the institution in question, from which the “call not to feed media” takes on particular gravity due to the hierarchical rank of the person who expressed it. Second, the freedom of the press and the right to equality are violated, since it incites that two specific media outlets, CR-Hoy and Diario Extra, not receive information from ICAA officials, while in an absolutely unjustified manner placing the affected parties in a clear situation of disadvantage compared to the rest of the media. In addition, the described situation harms the population in general, since the “call not to feed media” prevents the public from accessing information concerning the provision of essential public services, which is unacceptable in a society governed by the principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency in public management.

By virtue of the foregoing, it is appropriate to grant the appeal, in the terms set forth in the operative part of this judgment.” Additionally, through judgment Nº 2022025167 at 1:30 p.m. on October 21, 2022, the Chamber recognized the relevance of restricting indirect censorship originating from public power, as a central problem in the defense of freedom of expression, in the following terms:

“VII.- ON THE PROHIBITION OF IMPOSING RESTRICTIONS BY INDIRECT MEANS ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS). Freedom of expression and, therefore, freedom of the press, are not considered unrestricted and absolute rights, but rather—as analyzed supra—they are subject to certain limits or subsequent controls. In this regard, Article 29 of our Political Charter provides that persons shall be responsible for the abuses they commit in the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and, for its part, Article 13.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights provides that the referred right is subject to subsequent liabilities, which must be expressly established by law and be necessary to ensure respect for the rights or reputation of others or to protect national security, public order, public health, or public morals.

However, equally, these limitations, this Constitutional Court has said, are exceptional in nature and cannot restrict such rights beyond what is strictly necessary, emptying them of content and thus becoming a direct or indirect mechanism of censorship, which has no place in our system. These freedoms, consequently, cannot be subject to illegitimate direct restrictions (such as, for example, prior censorship, the murder of journalists by virtue of the exercise of their functions, etc.) nor to restrictions of an indirect nature (also called soft censorship, subtle censorship, veiled censorship). These latter measures—of an indirect nature—are characterized by being less evident, but which equally have the purpose of arbitrarily reducing or curtailing freedom of expression. They could be considered more subtle forms in which public authorities or private individuals seek to finally and effectively restrict freedom of expression. Authors García Ramírez and Gonza define them very accurately as those “(…) actions or omissions that bring about the inhibition of the subject, as a consequence of intimidation, the obstruction of channels of expression or the “planting” of obstacles that prevent or severely limit the exercise of that freedom (…)” (García Ramírez (Sergio) and Gonza (Alejandra). La libertad de expresión de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Mexico, Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal, first edition, 2007, p. 42). For its part, the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression explains that “(…) These measures (…) have not been designed strictly to restrict freedom of expression. Indeed, these per se do not configure a violation of this right. Notwithstanding this, their effects generate an adverse impact on the free circulation of ideas that is often little investigated and, therefore, more difficult to discover (…)” (Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, 2004).

As examples of this type of indirect restrictions or veiled censorship, one can cite, among many others, the use of various means to intimidate and, in this way, prevent a publication, controls over newsprint for newspapers or radio frequencies, the restriction of freedom of circulation, the granting or withdrawal of state advertising, limitations on the economic income of media outlets, the imposition of high and unjustified tax burdens. Regarding this type of indirect restrictions, the cited authors García Ramírez and Gonza explain that these can occur when “(…) a right different from freedom of expression itself is violated, in such a way that the latter is affected—for example, in one case, the deprivation of the subject's nationality—, undue or excessive investigations are carried out, access to certain means regularly used by the right holder is prohibited, freedom of circulation is restricted, the effects of a contract are disregarded, or the holders of certain assets are prevented from disposing of them (…)” (García Ramírez (Sergio) and Gonza (Alejandra). La libertad de expresión en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Mexico, Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal, first edition, 2007, p. 42). For his part, Magistrate Rueda Leal, in the additional reasons set forth in Judgment No. 15220-2016 at 4:00 p.m. on October 18, 2016, also referred to some modalities of this type of indirect or veiled censorship, listing the following: “(…) a) The denial of access to institutions and public information as retaliation for critical coverage, which forces the media to resort to jurisdictional instances. In this way, although an entity is ultimately compelled to deliver certain information if its public nature is demonstrated, it is no less true that the Administration “gains” time, thus achieving dissemination at a politically more favorable “timing.” b) The inequitable allocation of radio and television frequencies. c) The obstruction of access to elementary resources for the production of a medium (such as paper or telephone service) via the setting of arbitrary requirements or unreasonable tax impositions. d) The threat of initiating judicial proceedings, conditioned on whether or not critical reports are disseminated (…)”.

In terms of these restrictions of a properly indirect nature, Article 13.3 of the American Convention on Human Rights expressly states the following:

“3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means aimed at impeding the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.” (The highlighting is not part of the original).

The Declaration of Chapultepec (adopted by the Hemispheric Conference on Freedom of Expression held in Mexico, D.F. on March 11, 1994), provides that there should be no law or act of power that curtails freedom of expression or the press, whatever the means of communication. Likewise, in the list of principles, it mentions the following:

“4. The murder, terrorism, kidnapping, pressure, intimidation, unjust imprisonment of journalists, the material destruction of media outlets, violence of any kind and the impunity of aggressors, severely curtail freedom of expression and press. These acts must be investigated promptly and severely punished.” “5.

"Prior censorship, restrictions on the circulation of media or the dissemination of their messages, the arbitrary imposition of information, the creation of obstacles to the free flow of information, and limitations on the free exercise and mobilization of journalists directly oppose freedom of the press." "6. Media and journalists must not be subject to discrimination or favors based on what they write or say." "7. Tariff and exchange-rate policies, licenses for importing paper or journalistic equipment, the granting of radio and television frequencies, and the concession or suppression of state advertising must not be applied to reward or punish media outlets or journalists." "10. No media outlet or journalist must be sanctioned for disseminating the truth or formulating criticisms or complaints against the public authorities." (The emphasized text is not part of the original).

Likewise, the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression (approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in October 2000, at its 108th regular session), provides, on this same subject, the following:

"5. Prior censorship, interference, or direct or indirect pressure on any expression, opinion, or information disseminated through any oral, written, artistic, visual, or electronic medium must be prohibited by law. Restrictions on the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as the arbitrary imposition of information and the creation of obstacles to the free flow of information, violate the right to freedom of expression." "9. The assassination, kidnapping, intimidation of, or threats to social communicators, as well as the material destruction of media outlets, violate the fundamental rights of persons and severely curtail freedom of expression. It is the duty of States to prevent and investigate these acts, punish their perpetrators, and ensure adequate reparation for the victims." "13. The use of State power and public treasury resources; the concession of tariff prebends; the arbitrary and discriminatory allocation of official advertising and official credits; the granting of radio and television frequencies, among others, with the aim of pressuring and punishing or rewarding and privileging social communicators and media outlets based on their editorial lines, is an attack against freedom of expression and must be expressly prohibited by law. Social media have the right to perform their work independently. Direct or indirect pressures aimed at silencing the journalistic work of social communicators are incompatible with freedom of expression." (The emphasized text is not part of the original).

As can be observed with absolute clarity, there are multiple ways in which the media can be manipulated indirectly. Indeed, the American Convention on Human Rights is clear in indicating that the examples cited in section 13.3 are not exhaustive, by noting that these types of indirect restrictions can also take shape "by any other means aimed at impeding the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions." Now, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ruled on various occasions regarding veiled censorship or strictly indirect restrictions, condemning them forcefully. Thus, in the Judgment of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru (judgment of February 6, 2001), the Inter-American Court heard a case brought by Baruch Ivcher Bronstein, a naturalized citizen of Peru and majority shareholder of the company that then operated channel 2 of that country's television. Ivcher Bronstein, in that capacity, exercised editorial control over the programs, particularly one called Contrapunto (through which various journalistic reports were disseminated about torture, an alleged murder, and cases of corruption committed by the Peruvian Government Intelligence Services), and it was demonstrated that, by virtue of the foregoing, he was subjected to various acts of intimidation that concluded with the issuance of a decree that revoked his Peruvian citizenship. On that occasion, the Inter-American Court held that the resolution that nullified the nationality granted to Ivcher Bronstein constituted precisely an indirect means to restrict his freedom of expression, as well as that of the journalists who worked on that program. In that instance, the Inter-American Court offered the following arguments of interest:

"(…) 158. It has likewise been demonstrated that, as a consequence of the editorial line adopted by Channel 2, Mr. Ivcher was the object of various types of intimidation. For example, after the broadcast of one of the reports mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Joint Command of the Armed Forces issued an official communiqué accusing Mr. Ivcher of carrying out a defamatory campaign aimed at discrediting the Armed Forces (supra para. 76.k). Furthermore, on the same day that the Army issued said communiqué, the Executive Branch of Peru issued a Supreme Decree regulating the Nationality Law, establishing the possibility of canceling the nationality of naturalized Peruvians (supra para. 76.l).

159. It has also been proven that days after Channel 2 announced the presentation of a report on illegal recordings of telephone conversations held by opposition candidates, the Director General of the National Police reported that the file in which Mr. Ivcher's nationality title was processed had not been located, and that it had not been accredited that he had renounced his Israeli nationality, which is why, by means of a "directorial resolution," it was ordered that the mentioned nationality title be rendered without effect.

160. As a consequence of the foregoing, on August 1, 1997, Judge Percy Escobar ordered the suspension of the exercise of Mr. Ivcher's rights as majority shareholder and President of the Company and the revocation of his appointment as Director thereof, the judicial convening of an Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders to elect a new Board of Directors, and the prohibition of the transfer of his shares. Moreover, he granted the provisional administration of the Company to the minority shareholders, until a new Board of Directors was appointed, thereby removing Mr. Ivcher Bronstein from the control of Channel 2.

161. The Court has verified that, after the minority shareholders of the Company assumed its administration, the journalists who worked on the program Contrapunto were prohibited from entering Channel 2 and the editorial line of said program was modified (supra para. 76.v).

162. In the context of the aforementioned facts, this Court observes that the resolution that rendered Mr. Ivcher's nationality title without legal effect constituted an indirect means to restrict his freedom of expression, as well as that of the journalists who worked on and investigated for the program Contrapunto on Peruvian television's Channel 2.

163. By separating Mr. Ivcher from control of Channel 2, and excluding the journalists from the program Contrapunto, the State not only restricted their right to circulate news, ideas, and opinions, but also affected the right of all Peruvians to receive information, thus limiting their freedom to exercise political options and develop fully in a democratic society.

164. For all the foregoing, the Court concludes that the State violated the right to freedom of expression enshrined in Articles 13.1 and 13.3 of the Convention, to the detriment of Baruch Ivcher Bronstein (…)”. (The emphasized text is not part of the original).

Another clear example of this type of indirect restrictions is recorded in the case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay (judgment of August 31, 2004). Mr. Ricardo Canese, who was a presidential candidate during the electoral contest for the 1993 elections in Paraguay, linked Juan Carlos Wasmosy (also a candidate) to illicit actions allegedly committed by the latter when he served as president of a consortium, which, in turn, were published in two Paraguayan newspapers. This led to Canese (who worked for a media outlet) being criminally prosecuted for the crimes of defamation and slander, being convicted at first instance in 1994 and at second instance in 1997; at which time he was also sentenced to two months in prison and a fine. Furthermore, as a consequence of this proceeding, Canese was subjected to a permanent restriction on leaving the country (and, also, parallelly, was dismissed from the media outlet where he worked). These judgments were subsequently annulled in December 2002 by the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay. The Inter-American Court referred to the importance of guaranteeing freedom of expression during an electoral campaign and, after analyzing the case under study, held that the criminal penalty to which Canese was subjected was considered an indirect method of restricting said right. Expressly, on that occasion, the following was indicated:

"(…) 3) The importance of freedom of thought and expression in the framework of an electoral campaign.

88. The Court considers it important to highlight that, in the framework of an electoral campaign, freedom of thought and expression in its two dimensions constitutes a fundamental bastion for debate during the electoral process, because it becomes an essential tool for shaping the public opinion of the electorate, strengthens the political contest among the different candidates and parties participating in the elections, and becomes an authentic instrument for analyzing the political platforms proposed by the different candidates, which allows for greater transparency and oversight of future authorities and their administration. (…)

90. The Tribunal considers it essential to protect and guarantee the exercise of freedom of expression in the political debate that precedes the elections of the state authorities that will govern a State. The formation of the collective will through the exercise of individual suffrage is nourished by the different options presented by political parties through the candidates who represent them. Democratic debate implies that the free circulation of ideas and information regarding the candidates and their political parties must be permitted by the media, by the candidates themselves, and by any person who wishes to express their opinion or provide information. It is essential that everyone be able to question and inquire about the capacity and suitability of the candidates, as well as to dissent and confront their proposals, ideas, and opinions so that voters can form their criteria for voting. In this sense, the exercise of political rights and the freedom of thought and expression are intimately linked and strengthen each other. In this regard, the European Court has established that:

Free elections and freedom of expression, particularly the freedom of political debate, together form the foundation of any democratic system (Cf. Judgment of Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, of March 2, 1987, Series A no. 113, p.22, para. 47, and judgment of Lingens v. Austria, of July 8, 1986, Series A no. 103, p. 26, paras. 41-42). The two rights are interrelated and reinforce one another: for example, as the Court has indicated in the past, freedom of expression is one of the “conditions” necessary to “ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the election of the legislative body” (see the aforementioned judgment of Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, p. 24, para. 54). For this reason[,] it is particularly important that all kinds of opinions and information can circulate freely in the period preceding elections.

91. The Court observes that, in his statements, the alleged victim referred to the fact that the company CONEMPA, whose president was Mr. Juan Carlos Wasmosy, then a presidential candidate, "passed" "dividends" to the former dictator Stroessner. It has been demonstrated, as well as it being a public fact, that said consortium was one of the two companies in charge of executing the construction works of the Itaipú hydroelectric plant, one of the largest hydroelectric dams in the world and the main public works project of Paraguay.

92. The Court considers there is no doubt that the statements made by Mr. Canese regarding the company CONEMPA relate to matters of public interest, because in the context of the time when he made them, said company was in charge of the construction of the aforementioned hydroelectric plant. As flows from the body of evidence in this case (supra para. 69.4), the National Congress itself, through its Bicameral Commission for the Investigation of Illicit Acts, was in charge of the investigation into corruption at Itaipú, in which Mr. Juan Carlos Wasmosy and the aforementioned company were involved.

93. The Court observes that the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay, when issuing the decision by which it annulled the convictions handed down in 1994 and 1997 (supra para. 69.49), indicated that the statements Mr. Canese made in the political framework of an electoral campaign for the Presidency of the Republic, "necessarily entail, in a Democratic Society aimed at a participatory and pluralistic construction of Power, a matter of public interest." 94. In this case, by issuing the statements for which he was sued and convicted, Mr. Canese was exercising his right to freedom of thought and expression within the framework of an electoral contest, in relation to a public figure such as a presidential candidate, regarding matters of public interest, by questioning the capacity and suitability of a candidate to assume the Presidency of the Republic. During the electoral campaign, Mr. Canese was interviewed about Mr. Wasmosy's candidacy by journalists from two national newspapers, in his capacity as a presidential candidate. By publishing Mr. Canese's statements, the newspapers "ABC Color" and "Noticias" played an essential role as vehicles for the exercise of the social dimension of freedom of thought and expression, as they collected and transmitted to the voters the opinion of one presidential candidate regarding another of them, which contributes to the electorate having more information and different criteria prior to decision-making.

• 4)Permitted restrictions on freedom of thought and expression in a democratic society (…)

98. The Tribunal has established that it is logical and appropriate that expressions concerning public officials or other persons exercising functions of a public nature should enjoy, under Article 13.2 of the Convention, a margin of openness to broad debate regarding matters of public interest, which is essential for the functioning of a truly democratic system. This same criterion applies to opinions or statements of public interest that are made in relation to a person running as a candidate for the Presidency of the Republic, who voluntarily submits to public scrutiny, as well as to matters of public interest in which society has a legitimate interest in staying informed, in knowing what affects the functioning of the State, affects general interests or rights, or entails important consequences for it. As has been established, there is no doubt that the statements made by Mr. Canese regarding the company CONEMPA relate to matters of public interest (supra para. 92).

99. In this sense, the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay, when issuing on December 11, 2002 (supra para. 69.49) the decision by which it annulled the convictions handed down in 1994 and 1997 and acquitted the alleged victim of guilt and penalty, referred to the character and relevance of his statements, noting, inter alia, that [t]he affirmations of Eng. Canese, -in the political framework of an electoral campaign for the highest office-, necessarily entail, in a Democratic Society aimed at a participatory and pluralistic construction of Power, a matter of public interest. Nothing is more important and public than the discussion and subsequent popular election of the Chief Magistrate of the Republic.

100. The foregoing considerations do not mean, in any way, that the honor of public officials or public figures should not be legally protected, but rather that it must be protected in a manner consistent with the principles of democratic pluralism. Likewise, the protection of the reputation of private individuals who are involved in activities of public interest must also be carried out in accordance with the principles of democratic pluralism. (…)

103. Thus, in the case of public officials, persons exercising functions of a public nature, and politicians, a different threshold of protection must be applied, one which is not based on the status of the subject, but on the character of public interest that the activities or actions of a specific person entail. Those persons who influence matters of public interest have voluntarily exposed themselves to more demanding public scrutiny and, consequently, in that sphere they are subjected to a greater risk of receiving criticism, since their activities move from the private sphere into the sphere of public debate. In this sense, within the framework of public debate, the margin of acceptance and tolerance of criticism by the State itself, by public officials, by politicians, and even by private individuals who develop activities subject to public scrutiny, must be much greater than that of private individuals. This applies to the directors of the company CONEMPA, the consortium charged with executing a large part of the construction works of the Itaipú hydroelectric plant.

104. Based on the foregoing considerations, it falls to the Tribunal to determine whether, in this case, the application of subsequent criminal liability regarding the allegedly abusive exercise of the right to freedom of thought and expression through statements related to matters of public interest can be considered to meet the requirement of necessity in a democratic society. In this regard, it is necessary to recall that Criminal Law is the most restrictive and severe means for establishing liability regarding illicit conduct.

105. The Tribunal considers that in the proceeding brought against Mr. Canese, the judicial bodies should have taken into consideration that he made his statements in the context of an electoral campaign for the Presidency of the Republic and regarding matters of public interest, a circumstance in which opinions and criticisms are emitted in a more open, intense, and dynamic manner consistent with the principles of democratic pluralism. In this case, the judge should have weighed respect for the rights or reputation of others against the value that, in a democratic society, open debate on topics of public interest or concern holds.

106. The criminal proceeding, the consequent conviction imposed on Mr. Canese for over eight years, and the restriction on leaving the country applied for eight years and almost four months—facts that sustain this case—constituted an unnecessary and excessive sanction for the statements the alleged victim made within the framework of the electoral campaign, regarding another candidate for the Presidency of the Republic and on matters of public interest; they also limited open debate on topics of public interest or concern and restricted the exercise of Mr. Canese's freedom of thought and expression to voice his opinions during the remainder of the electoral campaign. According to the circumstances of this case, there was no imperative social interest that justified the criminal sanction, as it disproportionately limited the alleged victim's freedom of thought and expression without taking into consideration that his statements referred to matters of public interest. The foregoing constituted an excessive restriction or limitation in a democratic society on the right to freedom of thought and expression of Mr. Ricardo Canese, incompatible with Article 13 of the American Convention.

107. Likewise, the Tribunal considers that, in this case, the criminal proceeding, the consequent conviction imposed on Mr. Canese for over eight years, and the restrictions on leaving the country for eight years and almost four months constituted indirect means of restricting Mr. Canese's freedom of thought and expression. In this regard, after being criminally convicted, Mr. Canese was dismissed from the media outlet where he worked and, for a period, did not publish his articles in any other newspaper.

108. For all the foregoing, the Court considers that the State violated the right to freedom of thought and expression enshrined in Article 13 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1.1 of said treaty, to the detriment of Mr. Ricardo Canese, given that the restrictions on the exercise of this right imposed on him for approximately eight years exceeded the framework contained in said article (…)”. (The emphasized text is not part of the original).

Likewise, the case of Granier et al. (Radio Caracas Televisión) v. Venezuela (judgment of June 22, 2015) is of the utmost and greatest interest. In this matter, the Inter-American Court held as proven the existence of a conflictive and tense environment in Venezuela, a product of the coup d'état suffered, which, in turn, caused political polarization (radicalization of the positions of the involved sectors) and contributed to the government accusing private media outlets, among them RCTV (Radio Caracas Televisión), of being enemies of the government, coup-plotters, and fascists. The Court also held as demonstrated that the State of Venezuela sought a way to silence said media outlet (given that it expressed ideas different from government policies, maintaining a critical line against the Presidency of Hugo Chávez), through the non-renewal, in 2007, of the concession for the use of the radioelectric spectrum (which it had held since its founding in 1953), which, evidently, indirectly or covertly curtailed its possibility of continuing to operate and continue disseminating dissident information, in clear violation of freedom of expression. In this judgment, in a relevant manner, the Inter-American Court held that said decision was preceded by various public declarations issued by both the President of the Republic and other officials, who generated an environment of intimidation. Particularly, it was indicated that then-President Chávez made, among others, the following statements:

"(…) 75. (…) a) President Chávez's declaration of June 9, 2002, on his program “Aló Presidente,” in which he stated: “the television and radio stations, the broadcasting stations, even when they are private, only make use of a concession, the State is the owner [...], and the State gives permission to a group of businessmen who request it so they can operate, so they can launch the image through that pipeline, but the State reserves the permission. It is as if someone wanted to use a State-owned water pipeline to supply water to a town, and the State gives them permission. [...] Suppose you [...] we give them permission to use the water pipeline [and] they begin to poison the water. […] [We must] immediately not only withdraw the permit, but put them in jail. They are poisoning the people, that happens, it is exactly the same case [and] the same logic, the same explanation with a television channel”; b) President Chávez's declaration of January 12, 2003, on his program “Aló Presidente,” in which he expressed: “The same happens with these owners of television channels and the owners of radio stations; they also have a concession from the State, but the signal does not belong to them. The signal belongs to the State. I want to make that very clear, I want to make it very clear because if the owners of these television and radio stations continue in their irrational determination to destabilize our country, to try to give a foothold to subversion, because it is subversion, without a doubt, […] it is, in this case, fascist subversion and it is encouraged by the media, by these gentlemen I have mentioned and others I am not going to name. So I announce it to Venezuela. I have ordered a review of the entire legal procedure through which these gentlemen were given the concession. We are reviewing it, and if they do not return to normal in the use of the concession, if they continue using the concession to try to break the country, or overthrow the government, then I would be obligated to revoke the concession that has been given to them to operate the television channels”; c) President Chávez's declaration of November 9, 2003, on his program “Aló Presidente,” through which he stated: “I will not allow you to do it again, […] you: Globovisión, Televén, Venevisión and RCTV, tomorrow or the day after, [Minister] Jesse Chacón, I gave you an order, you must have a team of analysts and observers 24 hours a day watching all the channels simultaneously and we must be clear, I am clear, what the line is that they must not cross, and they must know it, it is the line of the law. The moment they cross the line of the law, they will be closed inevitably to assure peace for Venezuela, to assure tranquility for Venezuela," and d) On May 9, 2004, President Chávez declared on his program “Aló Presidente”: [h]ere, those who violate the right to information, the right to freedom of expression, are the owners of the private media, there are some exceptions, but above all the large television channels Venevisión, Globovisión, RCTV […] the owners of these media outlets are committed to coup-mongering, terrorism, and destabilization, and I could say at this point I have no doubt, that we can well declare the owners of those media outlets enemies of the people of Venezuela (…)

80. (… ) a) President Chávez's declaration of December 28, 2006, on the occasion of his year-end greeting to the Armed Forces, in which he expressed: “There is a gentleman out there, one of those representatives of the oligarchy, who wanted to be president of the oligarchy, and whom those Adeco-Copeyano governments later gave concessions to have a television channel, and he is now going around saying that this concession is eternal; his television concession runs out in March, it runs out in March, so he better get his bags ready and start figuring out what he's going to do as of March. There will be no new concession for that coup-mongering television channel called Radio Caracas Televisión; the concession is over, the measure has already been drafted, so get ready, turn off the equipment, because no media outlet at the service of coup-mongering, against the people, against the nation, against national independence, against the dignity of the Republic, will be tolerated here. Venezuela must be respected. I announce it before the date arrives so they do not keep up their little story of 'no, that it is 20 more years, 20 more years.' I am warning you, chirulí, 20 more years if you are good. It's over for you, it's over for you (…)

• d)On January 8, 2007, at the swearing-in ceremony of a new ministerial cabinet, President Chávez once again spoke regarding RCTV's concession, indicating: “Nothing and no one will prevent the decision not to renew the concession to that television channel, which everyone knows which one it is, from being carried out. Nothing and no one can stop it (…).” Likewise, on this occasion and in the following terms, the Court explained how, in this particular case, a violation of Article 13.3 of the American Convention on Human Rights occurred:

"(…) 148. In this regard, the Court has previously stated that media outlets are true instruments of freedom of expression, which serve to materialize this right and play an essential role as vehicles for the exercise of the social dimension of this freedom in a democratic society, which is why it is essential that they gather the most diverse information and opinions. In effect, this Tribunal agrees with the Commission that media outlets are, generally, associations of individuals who have come together to exercise their freedom of expression on a sustained basis, which is why it is unusual today for a media outlet not to be in the name of a legal entity, given that the production and distribution of information goods requires an organizational and financial structure that responds to the demands of the information market.

Similarly, just as unions constitute instruments for the exercise of workers' right of association and political parties are vehicles for the exercise of citizens' political rights, media outlets are mechanisms that serve the exercise of the right to freedom of expression of those who use them as a means of disseminating their ideas or information. (…)

151. Consequently, the Inter-American Court considers that restrictions on freedom of expression frequently materialize through State or private actions that affect not only the legal entity that constitutes a media outlet, but also the plurality of natural persons, such as its shareholders or the journalists who work there, who carry out acts of communication through it and whose rights may also be violated (…)

152. In this regard, it should be noted that today a significant part of journalism is exercised through legal entities, and it is reiterated that it is fundamental that the journalists who work in these media outlets enjoy the protection and independence necessary to perform their functions fully, since they are the ones who keep society informed, an indispensable requirement for it to enjoy full freedom. Especially, taking into account that their activity is the primary manifestation of freedom of expression of thought and is specifically guaranteed by the American Convention (…)

1.3. Indirect restrictions - scope of Article 13.3 of the Convention 161. In the present case, it has been argued that there might be a possible indirect restriction on the right to freedom of expression, which is why the Court emphasizes that Article 13.3 of the Convention makes express reference to such a situation by stating that "[t]he right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions." This Tribunal considers that the scope of Article 13.3 of the Convention must be the result of a joint reading with Article 13.1 of the Convention, in the sense that a broad interpretation of this norm allows it to be considered that it specifically protects the communication, dissemination, and circulation of ideas and opinions, so that the use of "indirect methods or means" to restrict them is prohibited.

162. In this regard, the Court indicates that what this subsection seeks is to exemplify more subtle forms of restriction on the right to freedom of expression by State authorities or private parties. Indeed, this Tribunal has had the opportunity to declare in previous cases the indirect restriction produced, for example, through a decision that "rendered legally ineffective the nationality title" of the majority shareholder of a television channel or through "the criminal proceedings, the consequent conviction imposed […] for more than eight years, and the restrictions on leaving the country for eight years" against a presidential candidate.

163. On the other hand, the listing of restrictive means provided in Article 13.3 is not exhaustive nor does it prevent considering "any other means" or indirect methods derived from new technologies. In this sense, Article 13 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression indicates other examples of indirect methods or means (…)

Likewise, expert witness García Belaunde during the public hearing referred to other possible forms of indirect restriction related to: i) "advertising, [since] States are important advertising agents and […] giving a lot of advertising or withdrawing it can be important and, given the case, there can be a kind of asphyxiation for media outlets that basically live off advertising," or ii) "taxation [when there are] cases [in] which [the] companies […] have been burdened with taxes" with the aim of causing annoyance or sending messages to the media outlet.

164. Furthermore, the Court recalls that for a violation of Article 13.3 of the Convention to be configured, it is necessary that the method or means effectively restrict, in an indirect form, the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions. Moreover, the Court reiterates that Article 13.3 of the Convention imposes obligations of guarantee on the State, even in the sphere of relations between private parties, since it not only covers indirect governmental restrictions, but also private controls that produce the same result. In this regard, the Court highlights that the indirect restriction can generate a dissuasive, intimidating, and inhibiting effect on all those who exercise the right to freedom of expression, which, in turn, prevents public debate on issues of interest to society. (…)

170. (…) This Tribunal considers that, given that the radioelectric spectrum (espacio radioeléctrico) is a scarce good, with a determined number of frequencies, this limits the number of media outlets that can access them, which is why it is necessary to ensure that a diversity of informative or opinion perspectives or positions is represented within that number of media outlets. The Court highlights that pluralism of ideas in the media cannot be measured by the quantity of media outlets, but rather by the fact that the ideas and information transmitted are effectively diverse and are addressed from divergent positions without a single vision or position existing. The foregoing must be taken into account in the processes of granting and renewal of broadcasting (radiodifusión) concessions or licenses. In this sense, the Tribunal considers that the limits or restrictions derived from regulations related to broadcasting must take into account the guarantee of media pluralism given its importance for the functioning of a democratic society (…)

3. Alleged indirect restriction on freedom of expression established in Article 13.3 of the American Convention (…)

193. Now then, to carry out an analysis of the recount of statements outlined above, it is imperative to perform a joint reading of the statements and indications, since in isolation they could not autonomously constitute facts constitutive of a violation of the American Convention. This is because the fact that several officials made statements in the same vein during the same period demonstrates that they were not isolated statements. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Court will proceed to make an assessment of what was expressed therein in order to determine if there were reasons or motives for which said decision was reached other than the declared purpose, since, as it already pointed out, taking the motive or purpose into account is relevant for the legal analysis of a case, especially if it seeks to determine if an arbitrary action or a deviation of power (desviación de poder) was configured (supra para. 189). In the first place, the Court highlights that since 2002 it had been warned that television channels that did not modify their editorial line would not have their concession renewed (supra para. 75) and that this type of statement increased when the concession expiration date approached (supra paras. 76 to 78). Starting in 2006, in several of said statements that were prior to Communication No. 0424 and Resolution No. 002, it was announced that the decision not to renew the concession to RCTV had already been made and would not be re-evaluated or modified (supra paras. 79 to 86). Likewise, it is worth emphasizing that these were not only statements by State officials in various media outlets, but also publications in national newspapers and even the dissemination of a book with the aim of announcing and justifying the decision not to renew RCTV's concession. Therefore, the Tribunal can conclude, in the first place, that the decision was made well in advance of the end of the concession term and that the order was given to CONATEL and the Ministry for Telecommunications from the executive branch.

194. Regarding the true reasons that would have motivated the decision, in the statements and publications made by different members of the Venezuelan government, these are: i) the non-modification of the editorial line by RCTV after the 2002 coup d'état despite the warnings made since that year, and ii) the alleged irregular actions in which RCTV would have incurred and that would have brought it sanctions. Regarding the first reason put forward, the Court considers it imperative to state that it is not possible to restrict the right to freedom of expression based on the political disagreement that a certain editorial line may generate for a government. As was pointed out previously, the right to freedom of expression must be guaranteed not only regarding the dissemination of information or ideas that are received favorably or considered inoffensive or indifferent, but especially regarding those that are disagreeable to the State or any sector of the population (supra para. 140). In relation to the alleged irregular actions in which RCTV would have incurred and that would have brought it sanctions, the Tribunal highlights that it is contradictory that indications and accusations about the alleged sanctions were made and that in communication No. 0424 it was expressly indicated that these were not the justification for the decision. Especially, the Court highlights that despite the seriousness of the events related to the coup d'état, it was not proven before this Tribunal that at the internal level procedures aimed at sanctioning said irregular actions had been adopted, so it is not possible that what happened during the coup was used as an argument to ground the decision, when said actions were not sanctioned at the time.

195. At this point, the Tribunal considers it necessary to reiterate the precedent established in another case related to this same media outlet, according to which in a democratic society it is not only legitimate, but sometimes constitutes a duty of State authorities, to pronounce on matters of public interest. However, in doing so they are subject to certain limitations in that they must verify in a reasonable manner, although not necessarily exhaustive, the facts on which they base their opinions, and they should do so with even greater diligence than that employed by private parties, due to their high office, the broad scope and eventual effects that their expressions can have on certain sectors of the population, and to prevent citizens and other interested persons from receiving a manipulated version of determined facts. Furthermore, they must bear in mind that as public officials they have a position of guarantor of the fundamental rights of persons and, therefore, their statements cannot disregard these nor constitute forms of direct or indirect interference or harmful pressure on the rights of those who seek to contribute to public deliberation through the expression and dissemination of their thought. This duty of special care is particularly accentuated in situations of greater social conflict, alterations of public order, or social or political polarization, precisely because of the set of risks they may entail for determined persons or groups at a given moment.

196. Likewise, the Tribunal notes that of the statements provided in the present contentious case, only one would have mentioned the purpose declared in Communication No. 0424 and Resolution No. 002, that is, the protection of media plurality, while the majority of the remaining statements coincide in invoking the other statements. The foregoing allows the Court to conclude, in the second place, that the declared purpose was not the real one and that it was only given with the objective of giving an appearance of legality to the decisions.

4. Conclusion on the right to freedom of expression.

197. The Court concludes then, as it has done in other cases, that the facts of the present case implied a deviation of power (desviación de poder), since a permitted faculty of the State was used with the objective of editorially aligning the media outlet with the government. The foregoing affirmation is derived from the two main conclusions that this Tribunal can reach from what has been described above, namely, that the decision had been made beforehand and that it was based on the annoyance generated by RCTV's editorial line, added to the context of the "deterioration of the protection of freedom of expression" that was proven in the present case (supra para. 61).

198. Likewise, this Tribunal considers it necessary to highlight that the deviation of power (desviación de poder) declared here had an impact on the exercise of freedom of expression, not only on the workers and directors of RCTV, but also on the social dimension of said right (supra para. 136), that is, on the citizenry that was deprived of having access to the editorial line that RCTV represented. Indeed, the real purpose sought to silence voices critical of the government, which, together with pluralism, tolerance, and the spirit of openness, constitute the demands inherent to a democratic debate that, precisely, the right to freedom of expression seeks to protect.

199. It is proven, consequently, that in the present case an indirect restriction on the exercise of the right to freedom of expression was configured, produced by the use of means aimed at impeding the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions, when the State decided that it would reserve the portion of the spectrum and, therefore, prevent participation in the administrative procedures for the awarding of titles or the renewal of the concession to a media outlet that expressed critical voices against the government, reason for which the Tribunal declares the violation of Article 13.1 and 13.3 in relation to Article 1.1 of the American Convention to the detriment of Marcel Granier, Peter Bottome, Jaime Nestares, Inés Bacalao, Eladio Lárez, Eduardo Sapene, Daniela Bergami, Miguel Ángel Rodríguez, Soraya Castellano, María Arriaga, and Larissa Patiño. (…)." (The emphasis is not part of the original)." In addition, in ruling No. 23107-2022 of 09:30 hrs. on October 4, 2022, special emphasis was placed on the State's duty to harmonize its actions with the defense of freedom of expression:

"(…) VI.- Specific Case. In the sub lite, the appellant alleges as the first grievance, that in her condition as a journalist, she directs the analysis, opinion, and self-criticism program called "Hablando Claro," which has been broadcast since February 1, 2007, on Radio Columbia, and she considers that in that condition the respondent authorities harmed her fundamental rights, specifically, the rights to free expression and press freedom, given that between July 8 and 9 last, she received calls from five public officials, who work in hierarchical positions within the Government of the Republic or in the communication offices of ministries and decentralized institutions, who told her, in their condition as confidential journalistic sources, that they were alarmed by a communication that the then Minister of Communication, Patricia Navarro Molina, sent them via WhatsApp, to all the Ministers and Executive Presidents of the Government. She argues that, according to what her sources related to her, in the referred communication, the Minister instructed all the senior officials to suspend, on an urgent basis, all types of state advertising to the media outlets "Amelia Rueda, La Nación, CRHoy and [Valor 003]". Likewise, that in that communication they were urged "on an urgent basis not to participate in interviews on Hablando Claro and Amelia Rueda." In this regard, from the report rendered by the respondent authorities, -which is taken as given under oath with the consequences, including criminal ones, provided for in Article 44 of the Law that governs this Jurisdiction- and the evidence provided for the resolution of the matter, this Chamber could not find it proven that the order or directive questioned by the appellant was issued. Although it may be considered that, on this particular point, the reports received are succinct or laconic, the truth is that they do expressly state that an order or indication in that sense was not issued. The Chamber notes that such reports focus on the competencies and powers of the Ministry of Communication and on procedural aspects of the filing of this recourse, but by denying the existence of the order, directive, or indication referred to by the amparo petitioner (amparada), in this specific case, there is no possibility whatsoever of considering its existence proven, and thus it is appropriate to dismiss the recourse on this point.

VII.- However, due to the transcendence of the issue and the seriousness that issuing any order from the public authorities in the terms claimed in this process could imply, it is necessary to remind the authorities of the Ministry of Communication and the Ministry of the Presidency, that as expressed in the fifth considering clause of this ruling, freedom of expression and information entails a double dimension, which is reflected not only in the possibility for journalists to inform about issues of relevance to public opinion, but also the right that the inhabitants of the country have to learn about said information, for which the public bodies and entities are under the duty to adopt the corresponding measures so that the inhabitants of the Republic can be informed about the actions and events that occur or develop in the national territory and that are of interest to the community. Especially since the topics and decisions taken and addressed by the central government and every institution, body, and administrative entity have a transcendence and relevance for the proper functioning of the country and the exercise of the rights recognized to the population in general and to its members within their own spheres of action, for which, all these topics must be treated with absolute publicity and transparency, without any possibility of preventing the citizenry, public opinion, and any mass media outlet from having knowledge of them. Ergo, practices that hinder access to information, such as preventing reporting on certain events or decisions, refusing to give interviews to various media outlets, not inviting them to be part of conferences or press rounds, limiting advertising, impeding access to inputs necessary for dissemination, among other variables related to direct or indirect censorship, cannot and should not be endorsed by a Constitutional Tribunal, for the elementary reason that their access and timely delivery must be done through an easy, expeditious, and uncomplicated process, which guarantees the population and, in general public opinion, the right to information and freedom of expression.

Having said the above, the respondent authorities are reiterated that "the government and the courts must allow an 'uninhibited, robust, and open' debate to develop, which may include caustic, vehement, and sometimes severely unpleasant attacks towards the government and public officials" (Cf. ruling No. 2006-5977 of 15:16 hours on May 3, 2006). In other words, the respondents must keep in mind that, in the exercise of public offices such as those they hold, and in the current era, where due to technological advancement there is greater ease of coverage and access to newsworthy events, it is normal that some of the discussions generated in the heat of the press may turn out to be unfortunate and unpleasant for them; however, in a democratic country like Costa Rica, that exercise of freedom of expression and press freedom is what characterizes us as a Social State of Law (Estado Social de Derecho) and a free people. For these reasons, in order to guarantee the press freedom and free expression that both journalists or mass media outlets, as well as the population in general, have, the respondent authorities must ensure that any directive, order, act, or instruction issued from the central government always adheres to the protection of these freedoms and any fundamental right enjoyed in a democratic country like ours (…)" (the emphasis is added) In the same direction as the jurisprudential line of this Chamber, outlined above, the report of the Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of March 7, 2011, "Principles on the Regulation of Official Advertising and Freedom of Expression" highlights in its paragraph 10 that: "The arbitrary distribution of official advertising, like other indirect censorship mechanisms, operates on distinct types of needs that media outlets have to function and interests that can affect them. It is a form of pressure that acts as a reward or punishment aimed at conditioning the editorial line of a media outlet according to the will of the one applying the pressure.". In turn, it proposes as lines of action to restrict arbitrariness in this matter -and with it, prevent it from acting as a mechanism of indirect limitation on freedom of expression- the clear and precise legal regulation of the topic, the association of official advertising with legitimate purposes of public utility, transparent and objective procedures for the allocation of state advertising placement (pauta estatal), access to public information linked to this topic, control of advertising allocation, and informative pluralism.

IX.- CONCLUSIONS. From the conjunction of the diverse normative, conceptual, and jurisprudential elements outlined throughout this ruling, it remains to examine the specific contested actions that, in the judgment of the Chamber, were clearly established in respective press releases. In the case of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (Kölbi), it was expressed, textually:

"Values of the kölbi brand do not align with content presented on the television program El Chinamo. Kölbi, a commercial brand of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) clarifies and communicates to the public:

0 The content presented by [Name 006] [Value 003] on the program El Chinamo, specifically in the El Chinaoke section, does not align with our brand values.

0 Given its Costa Rican origin, Kölbi distances itself from situations in which violence is implicitly or explicitly promoted or exposed, discrimination, apology for crime, or parody of victims' suffering.

0 On the contrary, the brand's advertising and commercial efforts focus on encouraging values such as peace, family unity, respect, innovation, and solidarity, with a positive impact and characteristic of the national idiosyncrasy. This is evidenced in Kölbi's journey over more than fifteen years in the market.

0 The contracting of advertising spaces on the program in question, as well as mentions of kölbi, had the objective of associating the brand with family entertainment typical of the end and beginning of the year season; never with situations alluding to pain, stigmatization, or mockery.

0 "As a leading brand, we are governed by solid principles that guide our actions and decisions. We do not support acts contrary to those values, especially those contrary to the social and environmental responsibility that we promote," stated Leda Acevedo, ICE's Telecommunications manager.

0 In light of the above, kölbi has decided to disassociate itself from the program El Chinamo and will analyze the permanence of its ad placement (pauta) on [Name 006] [Value 003]" The connection made in the press release between the content of the parodies subject to the recourse and the contracting of advertising spaces is undeniable. Since the entity responsible for the Kölbi brand is a public institution, as the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is, it is contrary to freedom of expression to "punish" specific content, which dealt, as already indicated, with matters of public relevance, which, in addition, had no relation to either the institute or the brand responsible for mobile telephony. It is, clearly, an indirect censorship mechanism prohibited by the Constitution (Articles 28 and 29), the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 13), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 19), which mandates the granting of the amparo recourse in what concerns this autonomous entity.

Regarding the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, the press release states:

"We reaffirm our commitment to healthy entertainment during these festivities. San José, December 20, 2024. At Banco Popular, we have as a constant priority and a core value of our brand to promote actions that strengthen the well-being of the citizenry, especially at times such as the Christmas and New Year's festivities, where family and healthy entertainment must occupy a central place.

In order to contribute to the development of a more united and positive society, we maintain a constant presence in dozens of media outlets throughout the country, promoting services that improve the lives of our clients and supporting content in said media that fosters the joy of the whole family, reflection, and respect for diversity.

In this context, the president of the National Board of Directors of the Bank, Jorge Eduardo Sánchez, has emphasized that our brand – which is the property of our clients and of the working people [Name 002] – cannot be exposed to being related to inappropriate images or those that could even foster behaviors alien to the morality and public order to which we are bound.

In the particular case of the public debate generated precisely from some content broadcast in the "El Chinaoke" section of the program "El Chinamo," transmitted by [Name 006] [Value 003], we deeply regret as Banco Popular that some sectors of the citizenry could feel offended or uncomfortable by said images and we have adopted the pertinent actions to guarantee that our participations are always promoted within spaces that have healthy entertainment values as a permanent priority.

In this way, and given that this season of the program "El Chinamo" will extend until next Monday, December 23, we will only maintain the sponsorship of the "El Aguinaldazo" section, which brings joy to the family by daily rewarding some fortunate viewer with 1 million colones.

We thank and assign the greatest relevance to the opinion of our clients in this type of matter, and we reiterate that at Banco Popular we work tirelessly to contribute to social well-being, promoting respect, inclusion, and responsible enjoyment for all the citizenry.".

In the same terms as explained for the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, this second press release clearly shows that the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal reconsidered the sponsorship of the program due to its content, as a negative consequence for its disagreement with it. Likewise, in the case of the bank, none of the videos alluded in any way to the performance of that entity or its activity. This, by parity of reasons, since the bank is equally a public law entity (article 2 of Law No. 4351), implies the granting of the recourse against it, having adopted a decision that entails indirect censorship, prohibited by the Political Constitution (Articles 28 and 29), the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 13), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 19).

THEREFORE (POR TANTO):

The recourse is granted. Leda María Acevedo Zúñiga, Telecommunications manager of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, Jorge Eduardo Sánchez Sibaja, president of the National Board of Directors, and Gina Melissa Carvajal Vega, general manager, the latter two of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, or whoever holds those positions in their stead, are ordered to abstain from incurring in the future in acts equal or similar to those that gave rise to the granting of this recourse. The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal are condemned to pay the costs, damages, and losses caused by the facts that serve as the basis for this declaration, which will be liquidated in the execution of the judgment of the administrative contentious jurisdiction. Judge Cruz Castro records a note. Judge Rueda Leal partially dissents only in relation to file No. 24-035822-0007-CO, which is flatly rejected for admissibility reasons. Judge Garro Vargas records different reasons.

Fernando Castillo V. President Fernando Cruz C.

Paul Rueda L.

Luis Fdo.

**Partial Dissenting Vote of Judge Rueda Leal.** Concerning the appeal filed in case file no. 24-035822-0007-CO on behalf of [Name 002] S. A., I consider that it should have been summarily dismissed, since the petitioner files the amparo on behalf of a legal entity.

In that regard, in my dissenting vote to ruling no. 2019002355 of 9:30 a.m. on February 12, 2019, I held:

“in Advisory Opinion 22-16 of February 26, 2016, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights indicated that although some States recognize the right of petition for legal entities with special conditions, such as unions, political parties, or representatives of indigenous peoples, Afro-descendant communities, or specific groups, the fact is that ‘Article 1.2 of the American Convention only enshrines rights in favor of natural persons, so legal entities are not holders of the rights enshrined in said treaty.’ On the other hand, in the same advisory opinion, the Inter-American Court provided that, in certain particular contexts, natural persons may exercise their rights through legal entities (for example, through a media outlet, as occurred in the Granier et al. v. Venezuela case); however, for this to be subject to protection before the inter-American system, ‘the exercise of the right through a legal entity must involve an essential and direct relationship between the natural person requiring protection from the inter-American system and the legal entity through which the violation occurred, since a simple link between both persons is not sufficient to conclude that the rights of natural persons are indeed being protected and not those of the legal entities. In effect, it must be proven beyond the simple participation of the natural person in the ordinary activities of the legal entity, such that said participation relates substantially to the rights alleged to have been violated.’ (emphasis added) (OC. 22/16)”.

In my opinion, a reading of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law compels the same reasoning as the conventional hermeneutics cited above with respect to every fundamental right. Thus, in a constitutional process filed on behalf of a legal entity, its admission for study requires an essential and direct relationship between the legal entity that claims to be affected by some violation of the constitutional order and the natural person who, due to such injury, sees some fundamental right diminished, indirectly but directly. Now, for such purposes, a mere reference to a connection or link between the legal entity and the natural person is insufficient to infer that, precisely, through the constitutional process, the safeguarding of the fundamental rights of the latter is being sought, not merely those of the former. The aforementioned requirement thus becomes a *sine qua non* prerequisite for the admissibility of constitutional review by this jurisdiction. Based on the foregoing, I conclude that this must be the guideline by which the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law should be interpreted, such that in the *sub iudice* case, the application of jurisdictional constitutional review becomes inadmissible, given that, based on the evidence in the record, the essential link between the legal entity protected and any specific natural person, in relation to the alleged aggrieved right, has not been demonstrated.

Paul Rueda L.

Res. No. 2025021235 **Note of Judge Cruz Castro. Public Law Entities that perform business activities can also incur in violations of freedom of expression.-** In this amparo appeal resolved favorably upon verifying indirect censorship of freedom of expression, I consider it relevant to record this note to highlight that public law entities, such as the ICE and the Banco Popular, although they carry out business or private law activities, can also be subjected to appeals as passive subjects in the violation of the right to freedom of expression. Even if the amparo appeal had been filed against subjects of private law, these can also be passive subjects in the violation of freedom of expression, since this fundamental guarantee is more important than the freedom of commerce. Thus, the legal nature of the transgressor entity does not vitiate the possibility that it may be challenged in an amparo appeal for violating freedom of expression and freedom of the press.

Freedom of expression is a fundamental right and simultaneously a pillar of democracy. Its restriction or suppression based on unfounded or arbitrary decisions by state authority is not justified. As a fundamental right, it allows each person to seek information and express their own thoughts, ideas, and information; and in a collective or social dimension, it is the right of society to seek and receive any information, to know the thoughts, ideas, and information of others, and to be well-informed. As a pillar of democracy, it allows the creation of public opinion, essential for giving content to various principles of the constitutional rule of law. Public authority must promote criticism and objection to its own decisions. The supposed uniformity of opinion based on an arbitrary political decision is inadmissible in a democratic society. Uniformity of opinions, the absence of criticism, or single thought is the atmosphere of a dictatorial government, contrary to a democracy as defined by our Political Constitution.

This Chamber has made it clear that the arbitrary allocation of public resources through the purchase of advertising, as a means to restrict freedom of expression, contravenes both the Constitution and International Human Rights Law. My opinion goes beyond those limits, encompassing not only the arbitrary allocation of public resources, but also the arbitrary allocation of private resources. The arbitrary and conditioned distribution of advertising can be a mechanism of indirect censorship, as it is a repression that acts as a reward or punishment aimed at conditioning freedom of expression, according to the will of the payer, whether a public or private subject. This indirect censorship has many faces, it can be disguised or easily hidden; however, if an arbitrary restriction on freedom of thought and artistic creativity is demonstrated, a private entity can be held responsible, because reality is not defined by commercial interests, but by freedom of thought.

While I agree with everything stated in this vote, I add that private law subjects could also incur in violations of freedom of expression by imposing direct or indirect censorship in the allocation of advertising, the content of which, in most cases, does not even comply with the principle of truthfulness.

Fernando Cruz C. Judge Res. No. 2025021235 **DIFFERENT REASONS OF JUDGE GARRO VARGAS** **Content** A. Admissibility of the consolidated appeal.............................1 B. Allegations.......................................................2 C. Proven facts....................................................3 D. Considerations....................................................6 1. Normative and jurisprudential framework.............................6 2. Subjects appealed.............................................9 3. Notable factual aspects.................................11 4. Core of the issue...........................................15 Respectfully, I consider that the amparo appeal must be granted, but for reasons different from those stated by the majority of this Court. Firstly, I must refer to a procedural aspect, then to the allegations, the normative framework, the particularities of the subjects appealed, and, finally, the core of the issue.

A. Admissibility of the consolidated appeal The consolidated amparo appeal was filed on behalf of the appellant “and the people who watch the program subject to this appeal.” I believe this amparo should have been admitted only on behalf of the appellant, since the indeterminacy of the subjects who are part of the television audience is such that a basic procedural prerequisite for joinder is not met with respect to them: knowing exactly who they are. It is true that the Chamber has admitted amparos on behalf of somewhat indeterminate groups of people, but always under the condition that there is a real possibility of specifying who they are: a group of students from a school, some neighbors on a street, persons deprived of liberty in a specific area of a penitentiary center, etc. Here, such a condition is not met, as it is not a determinable group of people.

Regarding this, the majority says:

“Finally, it should be noted that the appellant [Name 003] seeks the defense of freedom of expression from a double dimension: active - the freedom to express oneself - and passive - the freedom to receive and know the opinions of others - and it is in this capacity that the active legal standing is understood to operate with respect to his appeal”.

I consider that such an argument does not remedy the radical indeterminacy of the subjects that make up the television audience, and only relates to the dimensions of freedom of expression, which is clearly a different matter. That argument is only applicable to the appellant, who is the one we can certainly protect regarding that freedom in its passive dimension.

B. Allegations The appellant states that, for the 2024 edition, “El Chinaoke” developed three music videos related to public interest issues that generated direct criticism of the Government. In this regard, they detailed that the first video, called “En el EBAIS” (At the EBAIS), refers to the collapse in patient care at the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, CCSS) with a message about the increase in waiting lists that afflicts Costa Ricans. In addition, it mentions the institution's financial situation, as well as cases of corruption and raids generated by the “Barrenador” case. In the second music video, titled “¿Será que hoy me van a asaltar?” (Will I be assaulted today?), the lyrics deal with the insecurity situation facing the country with a significant increase in the homicide rate, mostly related to organized crime and drug trafficking. It also alludes to the President of the Republic, as well as collateral deaths. The third video, called “No tengo plata” (I have no money), refers to the high cost of living in the country, as well as the unfulfilled promises by the Government regarding price reductions. They allege that on December 19, 2024, the commercial brand Kölbi, owned by ICE, announced it would withdraw its advertising placement in the program “El Chinamo,” stating that the content of “El Chinaoke” does not align with our brand values. Subsequently, on December 20, 2024, the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (BPDC) announced in a statement that it would only maintain sponsorship of the “El Aguinaldazo” section in “El Chinamo,” and would withdraw the rest of its advertising, under the argument that it must avoid any association with content contrary to morality and public order. They accuse that the decision of the respondents to withdraw advertising placement from “El Chinamo” constitutes a violation of freedom of expression and press, protected by Articles 28 and 29 of the Constitution, as well as by Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights (CADH).

C. Proven facts Although the list of proven facts is found in the judgment, it is important to reiterate that, for the 2024 edition, in the “El Chinaoke” section broadcast within the program called “El Chinamo,” transmitted on [Name 002] S. A. ([Name 006] or [Value 003]), several music videos were presented; however, only three are the subject of this process: “En el EBAIS,” “¿Será que hoy me van a asaltar?” and “No tengo plata,” transmitted on December 12, 15, and 18, respectively. Furthermore, it is inferred that on December 17, 2024, the BPDC asked the advertising agency that had placed its placement in the program “El Chinamo” to make a modification to the brand presences in the program, which led to the removal of the presentation and exit screens of the four program segments when calls to participants were made, and to use only the screens when the winner of the “El Aguinaldazo” section was announced. For its part, the commercial brand Kölbi, owned by ICE, issued a press release on December 19, 2024, in the following terms:

“Kölbi brand values do not align with content exposed on the television program El Chinamo. Kölbi, a commercial brand of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) clarifies and communicates to the public: 0 The content exposed by [Name 006] [Value 003] on the program El Chinamo, specifically in the El Chinaoke section, does not align with our brand values. 0 Given its Costa Rican origin, Kölbi distances itself from situations in which violence is promoted or exposed implicitly or explicitly, discrimination, apology for crime, or parody of the suffering of victims. 0 On the contrary, the brand's advertising and commercial efforts focus on promoting values such as peace, family unity, respect, innovation, and solidarity, with a positive impact characteristic of the national idiosyncrasy. This is evident in Kölbi's trajectory over more than fifteen years in the market. 0 The contracting of advertising spaces on the program in question, as well as mentions of Kölbi, had the objective of associating the brand with family entertainment typical of the end and beginning of the year season; never with situations alluding to pain, stigmatization, or mockery. 0 'As a leading brand, we are governed by solid principles that guide our actions and decisions. We do not support acts opposed to those values, especially those contrary to the social and environmental responsibility we promote,' stated Leda Acevedo, ICE Telecommunications Manager. 0 For the reasons stated, Kölbi has decided to dissociate itself from the program El Chinamo and will analyze the permanence of its placement on [Name 006] [Value 003]”.

Immediately after, that is, on December 20, 2024, the BPDC published the following statement:

“We reaffirm our commitment to healthy entertainment during these holidays. San José, December 20, 2024. At Banco Popular, our constant priority and a central value of our brand is to promote actions that strengthen the well-being of citizens, especially at times such as the Christmas and New Year holidays, where family and healthy entertainment should occupy a central place.

With the aim of contributing to the development of a more united and positive society, we maintain a constant presence in dozens of media outlets across the country, promoting services that improve the lives of our clients and supporting content in said media that fosters joy for the whole family, reflection, and respect for diversity.

In this context, the president of the Banco's National Board of Directors, Jorge Eduardo Sánchez, has emphasized that our brand – which is the property of our clients and [Name 002] workers – cannot be exposed to being associated with inappropriate images or those that could even promote conduct alien to the morality and public order to which we are bound.

In the specific case of the public debate generated precisely from some content broadcast in the 'El Chinaoke' section of the program 'El Chinamo', which is transmitted by [Name 006] [Value 003], we deeply regret as Banco Popular that some sectors of the citizenry might feel offended or uncomfortable by said images, and we have taken the pertinent actions to guarantee that our participations are always fostered within spaces that have the values of healthy entertainment as a permanent priority.

In this way, and given that this season of the program 'El Chinamo' will extend until next Monday, December 23, we will only maintain the sponsorship of the 'El Aguinaldazo' section, which brings joy to the family by daily rewarding a lucky viewer with 1 million colones.

We thank and assign the utmost relevance to the opinion of our clients in this type of matter, and we reiterate that at Banco Popular we work tirelessly to contribute to social well-being, promoting respect, inclusion, and responsible enjoyment for all citizens.” It is on record that the Kölbi brand did not withdraw advertising placement from the media outlet, but redistributed it. Furthermore, [Name 006] continued to broadcast the “El Chinaoke” segments in their entirety within its programming, and they are currently available as public links on the Internet, accessible to any person.

D. Considerations 1. Normative and jurisprudential framework In this respect, I transcribe here what I stated in the different reasons to judgment 2022-25167 (Parque Viva):

“Normative and jurisprudential framework There are two norms that must be taken into consideration. On one hand, Article 29 of the Political Constitution establishes:

Article 29. Everyone may communicate their thoughts orally or in writing, and publish them without prior censorship (previa censura); but they shall be liable for the abuses they commit in the exercise of this right, in the cases and in the manner established by law.

On the other hand, as relevant, Article 13 of the CADH states:

Article 13. Freedom of Thought and Expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, or in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice.

2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship (censura previa) but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law and be necessary to ensure: a) respect for the rights or reputations of others; or b) the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals.

3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.

4. Public entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship (censura previa) for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 2.

5. (...) (Emphasis not in original).

The Constitutional Chamber has robust jurisprudence emphasizing that respect for freedom of expression is one of the indispensable conditions of the Rule of Law and the exercise of democratic life. Among many other rulings, the following can be partially transcribed:

“VIII.- Freedom of expression as an indispensable requirement of democracy. Freedom of expression is undoubtedly one of the conditions - although not the only one - for democracy to function. This freedom is what allows the creation of public opinion, essential for giving content to various principles of the constitutional State, such as, for example, the right to information, the right of petition, or rights regarding political participation; the existence of a free and consolidated public opinion is also a condition for the functioning of representative democracy. The possibility for all persons to participate in public discussions constitutes the necessary prerequisite for the construction of a social dynamic of exchange of knowledge, ideas, and information, which allows for the generation of consensus and decision-making among the components of the various social groups, but which also constitutes a channel for the expression of dissent, which in a democracy is as necessary as agreements. For its part, the exchange of opinions and information that originates from public discussion contributes to forming personal opinion; both shape public opinion, which ultimately manifests itself through the channels of representative democracy” (ruling 2006-5977; emphasis not in original; these considerations have been frequently reiterated by the Chamber, for example, in rulings 2015-1782, 2018-8396, 2019-8263, and 2020-16167).

This ruling continues with a passage particularly relevant for the analysis to be carried out immediately:

“Freedom of expression has as a consequence the prohibition of all forms of censorship (censura), in a double sense: persons cannot be censored, on one hand; and in general, the possible contents of the discussion cannot be censored in advance either: in principle, in a democracy, all topics are debatable. The non-censorability of subjects has a practically universal character, as our Constitution establishes, no one can be deprived of the freedom to speak and express themselves as they see fit; the non-censorability of contents, although it does not occur in advance, finds some limitations; however, these must be such that freedom continues to have meaning or is not emptied of its content, basically, like all freedom, it must be exercised responsibly, ultimately to pursue legitimate ends within the system” (ibid.; emphasis not in original).

That is, it speaks of censorship (censura) – understood as the act of disapproving – as an act contrary to freedom of expression. In other words, it is affirmed that the consequence of that freedom is the prohibition of all kinds of censorship (censura). Therefore, there is not only prior censorship (censura previa), expressly prohibited by Articles 29 of the Constitution and 13 of the CADH, but also subsequent censorship, which has the purpose of inhibiting certain informational or opinion content. It is also said that protection against censorship applies not only to subjects (who communicates) but also to content (what is communicated).

Furthermore, although it does not emerge from those jurisprudential lines, I believe other criteria could be incorporated to complete a typology of censorship. Thus, by its appearance, it can be veiled or overt; by the means to exercise it, it can be direct or indirect (for example, as provided in Article 13.3 of the CADH); by its effects, it can be absolute (if the disapproval goes concomitantly with suppression) or relative.

Finally, synthetically, it has stated:

“The Chamber recalls that the defense of freedom of expression is vital for the functioning of a democratic regime” (ruling 2017-014977; emphasis not in original).

Naturally, I fully agree with that jurisprudence, and I have concurred in many other subsequent rulings that strengthen that line (see rulings 2021-15417, 2022-4244, 2022-5915, 2022-9856, 2022-23107, among others).

2. Subjects appealed The BPDC is a non-state public entity, meaning it does not belong to the State but to the workers. This is established by its Organic Law:

Article 1.- The Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal is hereby created, which shall be governed by this law and its regulations. The Bank is owned by the workers in equal parts, and the right to co-ownership shall be subject to their having had a mandatory savings account for one continuous year or in alternate periods… Article 2.- The Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal is an institution of non-state Public Law, with legal personality and its own assets, with full administrative and functional autonomy. Its operation shall be governed by the norms of Public Law.

As can be observed, its basis is corporate and it is not owned by the State. This is relevant, as the majority refers to ruling 2016-015220 of 4:00 p.m. on October 18, 2016, in which a similar matter filed against Banco Nacional [Name 002] was analyzed. However, I believe that treating BPDC and Banco Nacional under equal conditions is not appropriate. The mentioned resolution itself explains that the nature of Banco Nacional [Name 002] is that of a state institution with constitutionally recognized autonomy, which has been entrusted with carrying out a commercial activity, in a competitive regime with private entities. In contrast, as established by the norm just transcribed, the BPDC is “an institution of non-state Public Law, with legal personality and its own assets, with full administrative and functional autonomy.” For its part, Kölbi is a commercial brand, which operates within the framework of Law No. 8660 and Law No. 8642. And as they well explain in their report:

“In this context, derived from its internal organization, the Telecommunications Management has the responsibility of managing the telecommunications business and the KÖLBI brand; all technical and commercial management is executed by that Management.” But that brand cannot be legally identified with the ICE. Therefore, I respectfully consider that the statement by the majority is inaccurate:

“Given that the entity responsible for the Kölbi brand is a public institution, as is the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, it is contrary to freedom of expression to ‘punish’ specific content, which dealt, as already indicated, with issues of public relevance.” Here, the entity responsible for Kölbi is not properly the ICE as an autonomous institution, but rather those who head the Telecommunications Management insofar as they are the head of the commercial brand.

Both the BPDC and the Kölbi brand carry out business activities. In this line of thought, it is necessary to bring up what is stipulated in the General Law of Public Administration, which states the following:

Article 3.- 1. Public law shall regulate the organization and activity of public entities, unless otherwise expressly provided. 2. Private law shall regulate the activity of entities that, by their overall regime and the requirements of their line of business, can be considered as common industrial or commercial enterprises. (Emphasis not in original).

Consequently, ruling 2016-015220 does not apply exactly to the specific case, as the respondents here have an eminently commercial line of business and, at least in the case of the BPDC, it is not a state institution. This means they have a wide margin of action to determine their advertising policy. Furthermore, the representative of the BPDC is correct when he states:

“The appellant confuses, or at least does not distinguish precisely, the factual aspects attributed to the ICE (Kölbi) and to the BPDC; he likens and confuses them, attempting to apply legal syllogisms from other cases analyzed by the Chamber that, in the present matter, are not applicable to our represented party.” And this applies not only with respect to the different legal nature of Banco Nacional compared to the respondents here, but also because in the precedent the situation was very different: it involved journalistic conduct that presumably harmed the image of that bank.

3. Notable factual aspects On the other hand, through a careful examination of the report submitted by the ICE, it was determined that said institution, through its Kölbi brand, does not have a direct contract with [Name 006], nor a contract related to the “El Chinaoke” segment, nor with the content displayed in that section of the program. Furthermore, it is corroborated that, as part of the commercial strategy of the Kölbi brand, it was decided to relocate the advertising placement from the “Misión Chinamo” section as a measure aligned with the brand's values, seeking to present the advertising in other programs of the same [Value 003] that better fit the image Kölbi wishes to project. In this regard, the report emphasized the following:

“The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, through its KÖLBI brand, does not have a direct contract with [Name 002] ([Name 005]), since it is through an active bidding process with advertising agencies, which are responsible for contracting placements in media outlets; it is thus how said agencies contracted a placement in the program 'El Chinamo', specifically in the section called 'Misión Chinamo'.” In this section, throughout the program, the brand's exposure is carried out, which was carefully analyzed and linked to its commercial strategic plan and has been done for years through technological innovation. It is important to note that, under no circumstances, was a contract established related to the "Chinaoke" segment or the content exhibited in that section of the program (…) In 2024, during the aforementioned program or section, the commercial strategy of the KÖLBI brand was analyzed, determining that the type of content was straying from the brand's values. In that context, and as part of the commercial strategy of the "KÖLBI" brand, it was decided to relocate the advertising placement (pauta publicitaria) of the "Misión Chinamo" section. This relocation was a measure aligned with the brand's values, seeking for the advertising to be presented in other programs on the same [Valor 003], which better fit the image that "KÖLBI" wishes to project (…) The advertising placement WAS NOT WITHDRAWN FROM THE MEDIA, but rather distributed to optimize advertising impact and aligned with the interests of the telecommunications business strategic plan and the KÖLBI brand, and by mutual agreement with the advertising agency and the television station itself. [Nombre 006] continued to broadcast the "Chinaoke" segments in their entirety within its programming, and they are currently available as public links on the Internet, accessible to anyone (…) The relocation of the advertising placement responds to objective and transparent criteria, which are aligned with the commercial strategy defined by the "KÖLBI" brand. These criteria seek to optimize the reach and effectiveness of advertising campaigns, ensuring that the relocation is carried out in accordance with the commercial interests and objectives established by the brand, in a clear and consistent manner, as it is the duty of the contracted advertising agencies to ensure adherence to the guidelines of both the brand book and its values ​​and personality, contractually agreed upon between the advertising company and ICE (…) In this sense, the measure does not imply the elimination of the advertising placement, but rather its relocation in other media spaces, thus guaranteeing the media presence of the brand.” Similarly, the president of the National Board of Directors and the general manager, with powers as a general unlimited attorney-in-fact of BPDC, indicated that the banking entity purchased an advertising placement for the television program “El Chinamo,” and on October 8, 2024, the Corporate Marketing Directorate approved participation in the program “El Chinamo,” with the section “El Aguinaldazo.” They added that on December 17, 2024, the advertising agency was asked to make a modification to the brand's presences in the program with the primary objective of avoiding any type of saturation towards the consumer; this, because the initial package purchased included fourteen daily presences, but a technical analysis detected up to twenty-two brand presences per program. As relevant, the report extracts, in substance, the following:

“It is true that Banco Popular purchased an advertising placement for the television program “El Chinamo.” On September 26, 2024, [Nombre 006] [Valor 003] began the commercialization of the program with Banco Popular, giving priority to clients who had a presence in the same space in 2023; as was the case with our Institution, thus, the initial offer presented to the Bank by the media outlet proposed a considerable discount on the rate price that other brands would eventually have to pay if they contracted similar presences (…) on October 8, 2024, the Corporate Marketing Directorate approved participation in the program “El Chinamo,” with the section “El Aguinaldazo” (…) Banco Popular on October 8, 2024, approved the participation and placement in the program “El Chinamo,” with the section “El Aguinaldazo.” As part of a standard practice of results monitoring within institutional marketing processes, on Friday, December 13, 2024, the Advertising Agency was asked to review the preliminary results of “El Chinamo,” whose 2024 season began on Wednesday, December 11, 2024. From the technical analysis described, a number of up to 22 brand presences per program was detected, which differed from those initially contracted; the increase in presences was due to a bonus unilaterally granted by the Channel and which resulted in greater exposure than expected (overexposure), given that the initial package included 14 daily presences. Based on this analysis, on December 17, 2024, the Advertising Agency was asked to make a modification to the brand's presences in this program, with the primary objective of avoiding any type of saturation towards the consumer. This led to the elimination of the presentation and exit screens of the four program segments when calls were made to participants, so that only the screens would be used when the winner of the “El Aguinaldazo” section was announced. The foregoing was executed as of December 18, 2024, when the presences in “El Chinamo” were reduced from 22 to 12” (…) It is important to indicate that throughout the entire season of the program “El Chinamo” - which concluded on December 23 - our participation in the “El Aguinaldazo” segment was maintained without any variation, redistributing, as already explained, brand presences through screens for advertising spots in different programs on the same channel with the objective of benefiting the Institution and expanding brand reach.” In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the appellees did not withdraw the advertising placements from the program called “El Chinamo.” As they argued, the variations in brand exposure were due, in the case of Kölbi, to criteria aligned with the commercial strategy defined by the brand, while in the case of BPDC, to a modification in the brand's presences in this program with the primary objective of avoiding any type of saturation towards the consumer. Furthermore, the reduction of advertising placements in the program called “El Chinamo” did not make it impossible to broadcast the program. Both brands even remained until the end of the program in the sections “El Chinaoke” and “El Aguinaldazo,” respectively.

4. Core of the issue But why, despite the fact that we are dealing with a commercial brand, of a state institution and a non-state public law entity with a corporate basis, which have a broad margin of action and were not directly alluded to by the content of the videos, can it be affirmed that they incurred an injury to freedom of expression? Why can it be said that such an injury is configured if, as a consequence of the foregoing, it is evident that they have no obligation whatsoever to place advertising with anyone nor any duty, in itself, to maintain said placement or its characteristics?

As I said at the time:

“Article 13.3 of the ACHR states that injury to freedom of expression through indirect means occurs when these are ‘aimed at impeding the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.’ Furthermore, according to the jurisprudence of both the IACHR Court and the Constitutional Chamber, the acts must fall upon the subject who communicates (natural or legal person)” (Reasons differing from judgment 2022-25167).

Here, the conduct of the appellees did not impede, either totally or partially, the circulation of ideas and opinions. But I consider that a type of censorship was configured. In that sense, it is timely to bring up what I also said on that occasion and transcribe again:

““Freedom of expression has as a consequence the prohibition of all forms of censorship, in a double sense: one cannot censor the interlocutors, on the one hand; and one cannot, in general, also censor in advance the possible contents of the discussion: in principle, in a democracy, all topics are discussable. The non-censorability of subjects has a practically universal character, as established by our Constitution, no one can be deprived of the freedom to speak and express themselves as they see fit; the non-censorability of content, although it does not occur in advance, finds some limitations; however, these must be such that freedom continues to make sense or is not emptied of its content, basically, like all freedom, it must be exercised with responsibility, in short, to pursue legitimate ends within the system” (judgment 2006-5977; emphasis not in original).

That is, censorship is spoken of – understood as the act of reproving – as an act contrary to freedom of expression. Stated differently, it is affirmed that the consequence of that freedom is the prohibition of all kinds of censorship. Then, there is not only prior censorship, expressly prohibited by Articles 29 of the Constitution and 13 of the ACHR, but subsequent censorship can also occur, which has the purpose of inhibiting certain informative or opinion content. It is also said that the protection against censorship covers not only the subjects (who communicates) but also the content (what is communicated).

Furthermore, although it does not follow from those jurisprudential lines, I believe that other criteria could be incorporated to complete a typology of censorship. Thus, by its appearance, it can be veiled or manifest; by the means to exercise it, it can be direct or indirect (for example, as provided in Article 13.3 of the ACHR); by its effects, it can be absolute (if the reprobation goes concomitantly with suppression) or relative” (ibid.; emphasis not in original).

And then I added:

“This means that any manifestation that constitutes censorship, even if by its effects it is only relative and not absolute, since with it the subsequent dissemination of the reproved ideas was not impeded, constitutes a direct injury to freedom of expression” (ibid.).

I must acknowledge that Kölbi made a better-articulated argument to justify the relocation of the placement when it stated:

“In 2024, during the aforementioned program or section, the commercial strategy of the KÖLBI brand was analyzed, determining that the type of content was straying from the brand's values. In that context, and as part of the commercial strategy of the "KÖLBI" brand, it was decided to relocate the advertising placement of the "Misión Chinamo" section. This relocation was a measure aligned with the brand's values, seeking for the advertising to be presented in other programs on the same [Valor 003], which better fit the image that "KÖLBI" wishes to project.” And also:

“That reputation is associated with the social mobility of the family, of the most intrinsic Pura Vida Tico -Costa Rican- being; KÖLBI focuses on well-being, on the continuous improvement of society, it does not have interference -from a commercial perspective- in public policy and even less so in the discussion of the major social topics that we as a society carry.” However, it is clear that the request to reduce and relocate the advertising placements in the program “El Chinamo” reflected a reaction by the Kölbi brand and BPDC to the three videos. As the majority points out, the content of these makes no reference to the commercial lines of business of Kölbi and BPDC but to government authorities. And I consider that the appellees do not fully manage to disprove that they used the powers inherent to their respective commercial lines of business as a mechanism of political influence. Furthermore, they did not provide sufficient elements of conviction to determine what the link is between their own commercial activities and the direct harm caused by the content of the videos to their line of business or their corporate identity. Therefore, in the specific case, in light of the context and other elements mentioned herein, the reaction to content clearly contrary to the government seems rather to have taken on the appearance of subsequent, veiled, direct, relative censorship, since they cannot discredit the use of the prerogatives inherent to their commercial line of business with pernicious effects for freedom of expression.

Therefore, I concur with the granting of the appeal (recurso), but for different reasons.

Anamari Garro Vargas Magistrate Telephones: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2220-4607 / 2220-4844. Email address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Sabana Sur, Calle Morenos, 100 mts. South of the Perpetuo Socorro Church).

Observations of CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER (SALA CONSTITUCIONAL) voted by ballot Classification prepared by the JUDICIAL BRANCH's CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER. Reproduction and/or distribution in onerous form is prohibited.

Is a faithful copy of the original - Taken from the Nexus.PJ on: 05-08-2026 11:13:59.

Sala Constitucional Clase de asunto: Recurso de amparo Analizado por: SALA CONSTITUCIONAL Sentencia con Voto Salvado Sentencia con nota separada Indicadores de Relevancia Sentencia relevante Sentencia con datos protegidos, de conformidad con la normativa vigente Contenido de Interés:

Temas Estrategicos: Derechos Humanos Tipo de contenido: Voto de mayoría Rama del Derecho: 4. ASUNTOS DE GARANTÍA Tema: LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN Y PRENSA Subtemas:

MEDIOS DE COMUNICACION.

021235-25. LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN Y PRENSA. SE CUESTIONA LA ELIMINACIÓN DE PAUTA PUBLICITARIA DE ENTIDADES ESTATALES DE PROGRAMA DE TELEVISIÓN. SE DECLARA CON LUGAR EL RECURSO. SE ORDENA AL INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD Y AL BANCO POPULAR Y DE DESARROLLO COMUNAL, QUE SE ABSTENGAN DE INCURRIR EN EL FUTURO EN ACTOS IGUALES O SIMILARES A LOS QUE DIERON BASE PARA LA ESTIMATORIA DE ESTE RECURSO. TEMAS: SÁTIRA POLÍTICA. LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN CONCEPTO. PAUTA PÚBLICA. VCG10/2025 “(…) V. ANÁLISIS DE LOS HECHOS DE ESTE RECURSO. De acuerdo con la anterior relación de hechos probados, consta que, si bien la empresa que produce y transmite el programa El Chinamo pudo continuar haciéndolo, incluyendo la sección El Chinaoke -que causó la controversia con las instituciones recurridas-; así como que se afirma que la pauta publicitaria con el canal se mantuvo, aunque redistribuida, lo cierto es que los comunicados de prensa de ambas instituciones no dejan asomo de duda en que adoptaron decisiones vinculadas con dicha pauta y la transmisión de la sección “El Chinaoke”. En el caso del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad y su marca Kölbi, el ente autónomo informó que: “Valores de la marca kölbi no concuerdan con contenidos expuestos en programa televisivo El Chinamo. Kölbi, marca comercial del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) aclara y comunica a la opinión pública: 0 Los contenidos expuestos por [Nombre 006] [Valor 003] en el programa El Chinamo, puntualmente en la sección El Chinaoke no concuerdan con los valores de nuestra marca. 0 Dado su origen costarricense, Kölbi se aleja de situaciones en las que se promueva o exponga violencia de forma implícita o explícita, discriminación, apología de la delincuencia o parodia del sufrimiento de víctimas. 0 Por el contrario, los esfuerzos publicitarios y comerciales de la marca se enfocan en incentivar valores como la paz, la unión familiar, el respeto, la innovación y la solidaridad, con impacto positivo y propio de la idiosincrasia nacional. Así consta en el recorrido de Kölbi por más de quince años en el mercado. 0 La contratación de los espacios publicitarios en el programa en cuestión, así como de las menciones a kölbi tuvieron el objetivo de asociar la marca con entretenimiento familiar propio de la época de fin e inicio de año; nunca a situaciones alusivas al dolor, la estigmatización o el escarnio. 0 “Como marca líder, nos regimos por principios sólidos que guían nuestras acciones y decisiones. No apoyamos actos opuestos a esos valores, especialmente aquellos contrarios a la responsabilidad social y ambiental que promovemos”, manifestó Leda Acevedo, gerente de Telecomunicaciones del ICE. 0 Por lo expuesto, kölbi ha decidido desligarse del programa El Chinamo y analizará la permanencia de su pauta en [Nombre 006] [Valor 003]”. (el énfasis es agregado). Mientras que en el caso del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, el comunicado oficial se expresó en los términos que siguen, en lo pertinente: “En este contexto, el presidente de la Junta Directiva Nacional del Banco, Jorge Eduardo Sánchez, ha enfatizado que nuestra marca – que es propiedad de nuestros clientes y de las personas trabajadoras [Nombre 002] – no puede verse expuesta a ser relacionada con imágenes inapropiadas o que incluso pudiesen fomentar conductas ajenas a la moral y el orden público al cual nos debemos.

En el caso particular del debate público generado precisamente a partir de algunos contenidos emitidos en la sección “El Chinaoke” del programa “El Chinamo”, que se transmite por parte de [Nombre 006] [Valor 003], lamentamos profundamente como Banco Popular que algunos sectores de la ciudadanía pudiesen sentirse ofendidos o incómodos por dichas imágenes y hemos adoptado las acciones pertinentes para garantizar que nuestras participaciones se propicien siempre dentro de espacios que tienen como prioridad permanente los valores del sano entretenimiento.

De esta forma, y siendo que esta temporada del programa “El Chinamo” se extenderá hasta el próximo lunes 23 de diciembre, mantendremos únicamente el patrocinio de la sección “El Aguinaldazo” que lleva alegría a la familia premiando diariamente con 1 millón de colones a algún afortunado televidente.” (el destacado es propio). Es decir, que en el caso de ambas entidades existió una decisión expresa, comunicada oficialmente de imponer consecuencias vinculadas con el pago de espacios publicitarios, debido al contenido de una sección del programa televisivo. Con posterioridad a la emisión de los dos comunicados de prensa supra citados, se transmitieron varias parodias del mismo estilo de las que ya se reseñaron; sin embargo, en razón de las fechas en que se hicieron públicos los comunicados, así como de aquellas en que se interpusieron estos recursos de amparo, carece de interés abarcar los subsiguientes programas. Establecidas las anteriores consideraciones, corresponde ahora determinar si, como lo alegan los aquí recurrentes, las decisiones cuestionadas contravienen la libertad de expresión.

VI.- SOBRE LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN Y SU FUNCIÓN EN UN RÉGIMEN REPUBLICANO Y DEMOCRÁTICO. En distintos pronunciamientos, este órgano de justicia constitucional ha establecido el nexo entre la libertad de expresión y los principios sobre los cuales está construido nuestro sistema político y jurídico. En la sentencia No. 1997-01750 de las 15:00 horas del 21 de marzo de 1997 se explicó de la siguiente forma:

“X- Al respecto, dentro de los principales preceptos que reconocen y garantizan la libertad de expresión e información y que configuran lo que podría denominarse el régimen general de esa libertad constitucionalmente protegido, se tienen:

“Artículo 28 (Constitución Política):

“Nadie puede ser inquietado ni perseguido por la manifestación de sus opiniones ni por acto alguno que no infrinja la ley…”.

“Artículo 29 (Constitución Política):

“Todos pueden comunicar sus pensamientos de palabra o por escrito, y publicarlos sin previa censura; pero serán responsables de los abusos que cometan en el ejercicio de este derecho, en los casos y del modo que la ley establezca”.

“Artículo 13 (Convención Americana): Libertad de Pensamiento y de Expresión:

“1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión. Este derecho comprende la libertad de buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas de toda índole, sin consideración de fronteras, ya sea oralmente, por escrito o en forma impresa o artística, o por cualquier otro procedimiento de su elección.

“2. El ejercicio del derecho previsto en el inciso precedente no puede e star sujeto a previa censura sino a responsabilidades ulteriores, las que deben estar expresamente fijadas por la ley y ser necesarias para asegurar:

“a) El respeto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás, o “b) La protección de la seguridad nacional, el orden público o la salud o la moral públicas.

“3. No se puede restringir el derecho de expresión por vías o medios indirectos, tales como el abuso de controles oficiales o particulares de papel para periódicos, de frecuencias radioeléctricas o de enseres y aparatos usados en la difusión de información o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la cir culación de las ideas y opiniones.

“4. Los espectáculos públicos pueden ser sometidos por ley a censura previa con el exclusivo objeto de regular el acceso a ellos para la protección moral de la infancia y la adolescencia, sin perjuicio de lo establecido en el inciso 2.

“5. Estará prohibida por ley toda propaganda en favor de la guerra y toda apología del odio nacional, racial o religioso que constituyan incitaciones a la violencia o cualquier otra acción ilegal similar contra cualquier persona o grupo de personas, por ningún motivo, inclusive los de raza, color, religión, idioma u origen nacional.” “Artículo 19 (Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos):

“1. Nadie podrá ser molestado a causa de sus opiniones.

“2. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de expresión; este derecho comprende la libertad de buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas de toda índole, sin consideración de fronteras, ya sea oralmente, por escrito o en forma impresa o artística, o por cualquier otro procedimiento de su elección.

“3. El ejercicio del derecho previsto en el párrafo 2 de este artículo entraña deberes y responsabilidades especiales. Por consiguiente, puede estar sujeto a ciertas restricciones que deberán, sin embargo, estar expresamente fijadas por la ley y ser necesarias para:

“a) Asegurar el respecto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás; “b) La protección de la seguridad nacional, el orden público o la salud o la moral públicos.” XI- Del contenido de las anteriores disposiciones se desprende que la liber tad de expresión e información tiene como condición previa e indispensable a la libertad de pensamiento o ideológica y que comprende esencialmente el derecho de toda persona de buscar, recibir y expresar libremente pensamientos, ideas, opiniones, juicios de valor, creencias, hechos, datos, etc., en relación con todo tipo de materias (incluidas la política y la electoral), utilizando cualquier medio lícito a su disposición y con los más variados propósitos (comerciales, recreativos, políticos, electorales, etc). De los citados preceptos también se desprende que en el marco de su régimen constitucionalmente garantizado, el derecho fundamental de libre expresión e información se encuentra configurado como un derecho de libertad. Esto implica, básicamente, que para su ejercicio no se requiere de un reconocimiento expreso de los poderes públicos acerca de quienes son sus legítimos titulares, sino más bien que de ellos se espera -o mejor dicho se exige con carácter general- que se abstengan de incidir o de imponer algún tipo de obstáculo a dicho ejercicio. Esta condición del derecho a la libre expresión e información ha sido especialmente ponderada a nivel de su protección en el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, situación que se refleja sobre todo en la amplitud del contenido y el grado de excepcionalidad de las limitaciones con que se reconoce y garantiza en la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Del contenido esencial de la libertad de expresión e información resulta asimismo la existencia de sus dos dimensiones concurrentes, puesta de manifiesto por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, en su opinión consultiva OC-5/85, sobre la colegiación obligatoria de los periodistas. Al respecto, la Corte señaló que esa libertad se manifiesta tanto en la dimensión individual, de quien expresa o se expresa, como en otra colectiva, de todos los que reciben el contenido de esa expresión. Estas dos dimensiones están imbricadas de tal modo que cuando se restringe la primera, no es sólo el derecho fundamental de su titular individual el que está siendo limitado, sino también el de todos aquellos a quienes se ha impedido recibir sus ideas e informaciones. Dada esa vinculación tan estrecha entre ambas dimensiones (individual y colectiva), la libertad de expresión e información implica el derecho a utilizar cualquier medio lícito para difundir el pensamiento o la información y hacerlo llegar a cualquier número de destinatarios, situación que revela que la expresión y difusión del pensamiento o de la información son indivisibles, por lo que una restricción de esos medios o de las posibilidades de divulgación significa, al mismo tiempo y en la misma medida, una limitación del derecho de libre expresión e información.

XII- De lo anterior, resulta que la libertad de expresión e información tiene un carácter básico al ser presupuesto necesario para los restantes derechos fundamentales, razón por la cual se le ha señalado como factor determinante para la legitimidad del funcionamiento del sistema democrático, al permitir que en todo momento las personas, sin distinción alguna, piensen de la manera que mejor decidan y expresen libremente sus opiniones. A dicho carácter básico contribuye el hecho de que el contenido esencial de la libertad de expresión e información no precisa de especiales exigencias en relación con el contenido, las formas o los medios que empleé el mensaje que se expresa o los niveles de difusión que alcance, situación esta que favorece que por su medio se reconozcan y garanticen manifestaciones de su ejercicio tan variadas como la creación artística o la misma propaganda electoral.” Es decir, a partir de la Constitución misma, así como de las normas de los sistemas regional y universal de protección de los derechos humanos, se da cuenta de una vigorosa protección de la libertad de expresión, desde una doble vertiente: dogmática -esto es, en consideración a su carácter de derecho fundamental- y orgánica o institucional -como elemento inmanente a la democracia-. En igual tesitura, la sentencia No. 2006-05977 de las 15:16 horas del 3 de mayo del 2006 desarrolló este sincretismo entre libertad de expresión y democracia:

“VIII.- La libertad de expresión como requisito indispensable de la democracia. La libertad de expresión sin duda alguna es una de las condiciones -aunque no la única-, para que funcione la democracia. Esta libertad es la que permite la creación de la opinión pública, esencial para darle contenido a varios principios del Estado constitucional, como lo son por ejemplo el derecho a la información, el derecho de petición o los derechos en materia de participación política; la existencia de una opinión pública libre y consolidada también es una condición para el funcionamiento de la democracia representativa. La posibilidad de que todas las personas participen en las discusiones públicas constituye el presupuesto necesario para la construcción de una dinámica social de intercambio de conocimientos ideas e información, que permita la generación de consensos y la toma de decisiones entre los componentes de los diversos grupos sociales, pero que también constituya un cauce para la expresión de los disensos, que en la democracia son tan necesarios como los acuerdos. Por su parte, el intercambio de opiniones e informaciones que se origina con la discusión pública contribuye a formar la opinión personal, ambas conforman la opinión pública, que acaba manifestándose por medio de los canales de la democracia representativa. Como lo ha señalado el propio Tribunal Constitucional español, quedarían vaciados de contenido real otros derechos que la Constitución consagra, reducidas a formas huecas las instituciones representativas y absolutamente falseado el principio de legitimidad democrática... que es la base de toda nuestra ordenación jurídico-política (Sentencia 6/1981), si no existieran unas libertades capaces de permitir ese intercambio, que… presupone el derecho de los ciudadanos a contar con una amplia y adecuada información respecto de los hechos, que les permita formar sus convicciones y participar en la discusión relativa a los asuntos públicos (Sentencia 159/1986).

IX-. Contenido de la libertad de expresión. La libertad de información podría decirse que tiene varias facetas, según lo ha reconocido la doctrina nacional (de las cuales las tres primeras se relacionan con lo que aquí se discute): a) la libertad de imprenta en sentido amplio, que cubre cualquier tipo de publicación, b) la libertad de información por medios no escritos, c) el derecho de rectificación o respuesta. La libertad de prensa engloba de manera genérica todos los tipos de impresos, impresión, edición, circulación de periódicos, folletos, revistas y publicaciones de toda clase. Es por su naturaleza vehículo natural de la libertad de expresión de los ciudadanos. Se traduce en el derecho para los administrados de buscar y difundir las informaciones y las ideas a un número indeterminado de personas sobre hechos que por su naturaleza son de interés de la generalidad por considerarse noticiosos. Por su naturaleza, está sujeta a las mismas limitaciones que la libertad de expresión. Tiene como funciones en la democracia: informar (hechos, acontecimientos noticiosos), integrar la opinión (estimulando la integración social) y controlar el poder político, en cuanto es permanente guardián de la honestidad y correcto manejo de los asuntos públicos. Dado su vínculo simbiótico con la ideología democrática, un sin fin de instrumentos internacionales y prácticamente todas las Constituciones del mundo libre, desde la Declaración Francesa de 1789 (art.11) la han reconocido. Nuestra Constitución Política por su parte, la tutela por medio de diversas normas:

“Todos pueden comunicar sus pensamientos de palabra o por escrito y publicarlos sin previa censura; pero serán responsables de los abusos que cometan en el ejercicio de este derecho, en las condiciones y modos que establezca la ley” (artículo 29) “Nadie puede ser inquietado ni perseguido por la manifestación de sus opiniones ni por acto alguno que no infrinja la ley.

Las acciones privadas que no dañen la moral o el orden público o que no perjudiquen a tercero, están fuera de la acción de la ley.

No se podrá, sin embargo, hacer en forma alguna propaganda política por clérigos o seglares invocando motivos de religión o valiéndose, como medio, de creencias religiosas” (artículo 28).

Otras normas constitucionales relacionadas con este derecho son:

“Se garantiza la libertad de petición, en forma individual o colectiva, ante cualquier funcionario público o entidad oficial, y el derecho a obtener pronta resolución. (artículo 27).

“Se garantiza el libre acceso a los departamentos administrativos con propósitos de información sobre asuntos de interés público.

Quedan a salvo los secretos de Estado” (artículo 30).

La libertad de expresión tiene como consecuencia la prohibición de toda forma de censura, en un doble sentido: no se puede censurar a los interlocutores, por una parte; y no se puede, en general, tampoco censurar en forma previa los contenidos posibles de la discusión: en principio, en una democracia, todos los temas son discutibles. La no censurabilidad de los sujetos tienen un carácter prácticamente universal, como lo establece nuestra Constitución, nadie puede ser privado de la libertad de hablar y expresarse como mejor le parezca; la no censurabilidad de los contenidos, si bien no se da en forma previa, encuentra algunas limitaciones, sin embargo, éstas deben ser tales que la libertad siga teniendo sentido o no sea vaciada de su contenido, básicamente, como toda libertad, debe ejercerse con responsabilidad, en fin para perseguir fines legítimos dentro del sistema.” También es relevante traer a colación la resolución No. 2022025167 de las 13:30 horas de 21 de octubre de 2022, en el tanto desarrolla con amplitud las implicaciones de la libertad de expresión, que tiene múltiples manifestaciones:

“IV.- SOBRE LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN. La libertad de expresión es uno de los pilares sobre los cuales está fundado el Estado de Derecho y comprende, tanto la garantía fundamental y universal de manifestar los pensamientos o las opiniones propias, como conocer los de otros. En otros términos, refiere a la libertad de buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas, ya sea oralmente o por escrito. Por esto se dice que la libertad de expresión se caracteriza por ser un derecho con una doble dimensión: una dimensión individual, consistente en el derecho de cada persona a buscar información y expresar los propios pensamientos, ideas e informaciones; y una dimensión colectiva o social, consistente en el derecho de la sociedad a procurar y recibir cualquier información, a conocer los pensamientos, ideas e informaciones ajenos y a estar bien informada. Sobre esta doble dimensión de la libertad bajo estudio, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (en adelante Corte IDH), en el caso Herrera Ulloa vs. el Estado [Nombre 002] (sentencia de 2 de julio de 2004), sostuvo lo siguiente:

“(…) 109. Al respecto, la Corte ha indicado que la primera dimensión de la libertad de expresión “no se agota en el reconocimiento teórico del derecho a hablar o escribir, sino que comprende además, inseparablemente, el derecho a utilizar cualquier medio apropiado para difundir el pensamiento y hacerlo llegar al mayor número de destinatarios”. En este sentido, la expresión y la difusión de pensamientos e ideas son indivisibles, de modo que una restricción de las posibilidades de divulgación representa directamente, y en la misma medida, un límite al derecho de expresarse libremente.

110. Con respecto a la segunda dimensión del derecho a la libertad de expresión esto es, la social, es menester señalar que la libertad de expresión es un medio para el intercambio de ideas e informaciones entre las personas; comprende su derecho a tratar de comunicar a otras sus puntos de vista, pero implica también el derecho de todos a conocer opiniones, relatos y noticias vertidas por terceros. Para el ciudadano común tiene tanta importancia el conocimiento de la opinión ajena o de la información de que disponen otros como el derecho a difundir la propia.

111. Este Tribunal ha afirmado que ambas dimensiones poseen igual importancia y deben ser garantizadas plenamente en forma simultánea para dar efectividad total al derecho a la libertad de expresión en los términos previstos por el artículo 13 de la Convención (…)”.

Por su parte, la Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Marco jurídico interamericano sobre el derecho a la libertad de expresión, diciembre 2009), se refirió a este derecho conforme los siguientes términos:

“(…) se trata de uno de los derechos individuales que de manera más clara refleja la virtud que acompaña -y caracteriza- a los seres humanos: la virtud única y preciosa de pensar al mundo desde nuestra propia perspectiva y de comunicarnos con los otros para construir a través de un proceso deliberativo, no solo el modelo de vida que cada uno tiene derecho a adoptar, sino el modelo de sociedad en el cual queremos vivir. Todo el potencial creativo en el arte, en la ciencia, en la tecnología, en la política, en fin, toda nuestra capacidad creadora individual y colectiva, depende, fundamentalmente, de que se respete y promueva el derecho a la libertad de expresión en todas sus dimensiones. Se trata entonces de un derecho individual sin el cual se estaría negando la primera y más importante de nuestras libertades: el derecho a pensar por cuenta propia y a compartir con otros nuestro pensamiento (…)

Asimismo, instrumentos internacionales de soft law han resguardado esta libertad. Así, la Declaración de Chapultepec (adoptada por la conferencia hemisférica sobre libertad de expresión celebrada en México, D.F. el 11 de marzo de 1994), en su primer principio refiere que:

“1. No hay personas ni sociedades libres sin libertad de expresión y de prensa. El ejercicio de ésta no es una concesión de las autoridades; es un derecho inalienable del pueblo”.

Por su parte, la Declaración de Principios sobre Libertad de Expresión (aprobada por la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en octubre de 2000, en el 108 período ordinario), dispone lo siguiente:

“1. La libertad de expresión, en todas sus formas y manifestaciones, es un derecho fundamental e inalienable, inherente a todas las personas. Es, además, un requisito indispensable para la existencia misma de una sociedad democrática”.

En otro contexto, dentro del ordenamiento jurídico europeo, se destaca la Convención Europea sobre Derechos Humanos, que en su ordinal 10 precisa la titularidad universal de este derecho, conforme los siguientes términos:

“Libertad de expresión 1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de expresión. Este derecho comprende la libertad de opinión y la libertad de recibir o de comunicar informaciones o ideas sin que pueda haber injerencia de autoridades públicas y sin consideración de fronteras. El presente artículo no impide que los Estados sometan a las empresas de radiodifusión, de cinematografía o de televisión a un régimen de autorización previa.

2. El ejercicio de estas libertades, que entrañan deberes y responsabilidades, podrá ser sometido a ciertas formalidades, condiciones, restricciones o sanciones, previstas por la ley, que constituyan medidas necesarias, en una sociedad democrática, para la seguridad nacional, la integridad territorial o la seguridad pública, la defensa del orden y la prevención del delito, la protección de la salud o de la moral, la protección de la reputación o de los derechos ajenos, para impedir la divulgación de informaciones confidenciales o para garantizar la autoridad y la imparcialidad del poder judicial”.

Igualmente, la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea, en su ordinal 11, cita lo siguiente:

“Artículo 11 Libertad de expresión y de información 1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de expresión. Este derecho comprende la libertad de opinión y la libertad de recibir o de comunicar informaciones o ideas sin que pueda haber injerencia de autoridades públicas y sin consideración de fronteras.

2. Se respetan la libertad de los medios de comunicación y su pluralismo”.

(…)

Por su parte, la Corte IDH en el caso Moya Chacón y otros vs. Costa Rica (sentencia de 23 de mayo de 2022), indicó lo siguiente:

“(…) b.3 Restricciones permitidas a la libertad de expresión y la aplicación de responsabilidades ulteriores en casos que haya afectación de la honra y de la dignidad en asuntos de interés público 71. El Tribunal recuerda que, con carácter general, el derecho a la libertad de expresión no puede estar sujeto a censura previa sino, en todo caso, a responsabilidades ulteriores en casos muy excepcionales y bajo el cumplimiento de una serie de estrictos requisitos. Así, el artículo 13.2 de la Convención Americana establece que las responsabilidades ulteriores por el ejercicio de la libertad de expresión, deben cumplir con los siguientes requisitos de forma concurrente: (i) estar previamente fijadas por ley, en sentido formal y material; (ii) responder a un objetivo permitido por la Convención Americana y (iii) ser necesarias en una sociedad democrática (para lo cual deben cumplir con los requisitos de idoneidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad).

72. Respecto a la estricta legalidad, la Corte ha establecido que las restricciones deben estar previamente fijadas en la ley como medio para asegurar que las mismas no queden al arbitrio del poder público. Para esto, la tipificación de la conducta debe ser clara y precisa, más aún si se trata de condenas del orden penal y no del orden civil. Sobre los fines permitidos o legítimos, los mismos están indicados en el referido artículo 13.2 y son (a) el respeto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás, o (b) la protección de la seguridad nacional, el orden público o la salud o la moral públicas. Asimismo, las restricciones a la libertad de expresión deben ser idóneas, esto es, efectivamente conducentes para alcanzar la finalidad legítimamente permitida. En lo que respecta al análisis de necesidad, el Tribunal ha sostenido que, para que una restricción a la libre expresión sea compatible con la Convención Americana, aquella debe ser necesaria en una sociedad democrática, entendiendo por “necesaria” la existencia de una necesidad social imperiosa que justifique la restricción. En este sentido, la Corte deberá examinar las alternativas existentes para alcanzar el fin legítimo perseguido y precisar la mayor o menor lesividad de aquéllas. Finalmente, en relación con la proporcionalidad de la medida, la Corte ha entendido que las restricciones impuestas sobre el derecho a la libertad de expresión deben ser proporcionales al interés que las justifican y ajustarse estrechamente al logro de ese objetivo, interfiriendo en la menor medida posible en el efectivo goce del derecho. En ese sentido, no es suficiente que tenga una finalidad legítima, sino que la medida en cuestión debe respetar la proporcionalidad al momento de afectar la libertad de expresión. En otras palabras, “en este último paso del análisis se considera si la restricción resulta estrictamente proporcional, de tal forma que el sacrificio inherente a aquella no resulte exagerado o desmedido frente a las ventajas que se obtienen mediante tal limitación”. El Tribunal recuerda que estas restricciones tienen carácter excepcional y no deben limitar, más allá de lo estrictamente necesario, el pleno ejercicio de la libertad de expresión y convertirse en un mecanismo directo o indirecto de censura previa.

73. En este sentido, la Corte ha establecido que se pueden imponer tales responsabilidades ulteriores en tanto se pudiera haber afectado el derecho a la honra y la reputación. Así, el artículo 11 de la Convención establece, en efecto, que toda persona tiene derecho a la protección de su honra y al reconocimiento de su dignidad. La Corte ha señalado que el derecho a la honra “reconoce que toda persona tiene derecho al respeto de esta, prohíbe todo ataque ilegal contra la honra o reputación e impone a los Estados el deber de brindar la protección de la ley contra tales ataques”. En términos generales, este Tribunal ha indicado que “el derecho a la honra se relaciona con la estima y valía propia, mientras que la reputación se refiere a la opinión que otros tienen de una persona”. En este sentido, este Tribunal ha sostenido que, “tanto la libertad de expresión como el derecho a la honra, derechos ambos protegidos por la Convención, revisten suma importancia, por lo cual es necesario garantizar ambos derechos, de forma que coexistan de manera armoniosa”. El ejercicio de cada derecho fundamental tiene que hacerse con respeto y salvaguarda de los demás derechos fundamentales. Por ende, la Corte ha señalado que “la solución del conflicto que se presenta entre ambos derechos requiere de una ponderación entre los mismos, para lo cual deberá examinarse cada caso, conforme a sus características y circunstancias, a fin de apreciar la existencia e intensidad de los elementos en que se sustenta dicho juicio”.

74. El Tribunal recuerda a este respecto que, para determinar la convencionalidad de una restricción a la libertad de expresión cuando este colisione con el derecho a la honra, es de vital importancia analizar si las declaraciones efectuadas poseen interés público, toda vez que en estos casos el juzgador debe evaluar con especial cautela la necesidad de limitar la libertad de expresión. En su jurisprudencia, la Corte ha considerado de interés público aquellas opiniones o informaciones sobre asuntos en los cuales la sociedad tiene un legítimo interés de mantenerse informada, de conocer lo que incide sobre el funcionamiento del Estado, o afecta derechos o intereses generales o le acarrea consecuencias importantes. Determinar lo anterior tiene consecuencias en el análisis de la convencionalidad de la restricción al derecho a la libertad de expresión, toda vez que las expresiones que versan sobre cuestiones de interés público -como, por ejemplo, las concernientes a la idoneidad de una persona para el desempeño de un cargo público o a los actos realizados por funcionarios públicos en el desempeño de sus labores- gozan de mayor protección, de manera tal que se propicie el debate democrático.

75. Así, la Corte ha señalado que, en una sociedad democrática, aquellas personas que influyen en cuestiones de interés público están más expuestas al escrutinio y la crítica del público. Este diferente umbral de protección se explica porque sus actividades salen del dominio de la esfera privada para insertarse en la esfera del debate público y, por tanto, se han expuesto voluntariamente a este escrutinio más exigente. Esto no significa, de modo alguno, que el honor de las personas participantes en asuntos de interés público no deba ser jurídicamente protegido, sino que éste debe serlo de manera acorde con los principios del pluralismo democrático.

76. Por otro lado, en relación con el carácter necesario y el riguroso análisis de proporcionalidad que debe regir entre la limitación al derecho a la libertad de expresión y la protección del derecho a la honra, se deberá buscar aquella intervención que, siendo la más idónea para restablecer la reputación dañada, contenga, además, un grado mínimo de afectación en el ámbito de la libertad de expresión. A este respecto, en el marco de la libertad de información, el Tribunal considera que existe un deber del periodista de constatar en forma razonable, aunque no necesariamente exhaustiva, los hechos que divulga. Ahora bien, esto no significa una exigencia estricta de veracidad, por lo menos en lo que hace referencia a cuestiones de interés público, reconociendo como descargo el que la publicación se haga de buena fe o justificadamente y siempre de conformidad con unos estándares mínimos de ética y profesionalidad en la búsqueda de la verdad. Asimismo, el Tribunal advierte que, para que exista el periodismo de investigación en una sociedad democrática, es necesario dejar a los periodistas “espacio para el error”, toda vez que sin ese margen de error no puede existir un periodismo independiente ni la posibilidad, por tanto, del necesario escrutinio democrático que dimana de este.

77. Adicionalmente, la Corte también considera que nadie podrá ser sometido a responsabilidades ulteriores por la difusión de información relacionada con un asunto público y que tenga como base material que es accesible al público o que proviene de fuentes oficiales.

78. Por último, también se debe destacar la necesidad de que, en caso de estimarse adecuado otorgar una reparación a la persona agraviada en su honra, la finalidad de esta no debe ser la de castigar al emisor de la información, sino la de restaurar a la persona afectada. A este respecto, los Estados deben ejercer la máxima cautela al imponer reparaciones, de tal manera que no disuadan a la prensa de participar en la discusión de asuntos de legítimo interés público (…)”.

(…)

VI.- TOCANTE A LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN (Y DE PRENSA) COMO GARANTES DEL SISTEMA DEMOCRÁTICO. La libertad de expresión y, concomitantemente, el ejercicio de la libertad de prensa, devienen en pilares fundamentales sobre los que se erige una sociedad democrática. Resulta prácticamente incuestionable la intrínseca relación que existe entre tales libertades y la democracia; de ahí que, esta última se debilita y erosiona arbitrariamente cuando dichas libertades no se pueden ejercer plenamente ni, tampoco, se respetan y garantizan en los ordenamientos jurídicos.

La Carta Democrática Interamericana (aprobada por los Estados Miembros de la OEA durante una sesión extraordinaria de la Asamblea General que se llevó a cabo el 11 de septiembre de 2001 en Lima, Perú), sobre este particular, dispone en su artículo 4 que: “Son componentes fundamentales del ejercicio de la democracia la transparencia de las actividades gubernamentales, la probidad, la responsabilidad de los gobiernos en la gestión pública, el respeto por los derechos sociales y la libertad de expresión y de prensa”. Además, hay que recordar que la ya dictada Declaración de Principios sobre Libertad de Expresión establece en su primer principio que la libertad de expresión es “(…) un requisito indispensable para la existencia misma de una sociedad democrática”.

La libertad de prensa (o lo que algunos denominan una prensa libre), como manifestación de la libertad de expresión, constituye un elemento esencial para fiscalizar -sin represiones-, las actuaciones de los terceros, sean de índole privada o funcionarios públicos, principalmente de los que ocupan altos cargos o aspiran a este, permitiendo así, consecuentemente, la rendición de cuentas, combatir la corrupción, la transparencia en el manejo de fondos públicos, entre otros muchos aspectos que resultan fundamentales para mantener vigente un sistema democrático. Parte de ese deber, reside en el investigar a las personas en el poder, principalmente al gobierno, formulando los cuestionamientos difíciles e intentar así revelarle a la ciudadanía lo que realmente está sucediendo, como medio, a su vez, para que tomen las decisiones correctas, principalmente, a la hora de votar y, también posteriormente, cuando se está en ejercicio del poder. Tal y como lo ha manifestado la llamada Unión por las Libertades Civiles de Europa (organización no gubernamental que promueve las libertades civiles para todas las personas en la Unión Europea) “(…) Una prensa libre ayuda en cada paso de este proceso. Proporciona información a los votantes antes de votar; fomenta el diálogo y el debate para enriquecer la comprensión de esta información; y luego informa a la ciudadanía sobre la labor del gobierno y si realmente están llevando a cabo sus promesas. En democracia, la ciudadanía delega el poder de decisión en sus cargos electos, y la prensa es una forma de controlarlos (…)”. En esencia, es factible afirmar, entonces, que la libertad de prensa resulta fundamental en los sistemas democráticos, pues permite a los ciudadanos formarse opiniones y criterios en relación con la realidad en que viven. Por este motivo, lamentablemente los medios de comunicación independientes son precisamente uno de los objetivos principales de los sistemas políticos antidemocráticos o, al menos, de aquellos que quieren perfilarse y van encaminados hacia ello.

(…)

Por su parte, la Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Marco jurídico interamericano sobre el derecho a la libertad de expresión, diciembre 2009), señaló lo siguiente:

“(…) la CIDH y la Corte Interamericana han subrayado en su jurisprudencia que la importancia de la libertad de expresión dentro del catálogo de los derechos humanos se deriva también de su relación estructural con la democracia. Esta relación, que ha sido calificada por los órganos del sistema interamericano de derechos humanos como “estrecha”, “indisoluble”, “esencial” y “fundamental”, entre otras, explica gran parte de los desarrollos interpretativos que se han otorgado a la libertad de expresión por parte de la CIDH y la Corte Interamericana en sus distintas decisiones sobre el particular. Es tan importante el vínculo entre la libertad de expresión y la democracia que, según ha explicado la CIDH, el objetivo mismo del artículo 13 de la Convención Americana es el de fortalecer el funcionamiento de sistemas democráticos pluralistas y deliberativos mediante la protección y el fomento de la libre circulación de información, ideas y expresiones de toda índole (…) si el ejercicio del derecho a la libertad de expresión no solo tiende a la realización personal de quien se expresa, sino a la consolidación de sociedades verdaderamente democráticas, el Estado tiene la obligación de generar las condiciones para que el debate público no solo satisfaga las legítimas necesidades de todos como consumidores de determinada información (de entretenimiento, por ejemplo), sino como ciudadanos. Es decir, tienen que existir condiciones suficientes para que pueda producirse una deliberación pública, plural y abierta, sobre los asuntos que nos conciernen a todos en tanto ciudadanos de un determinado Estado (…)”. (El destacado no forma parte del original).

También, dicha Relatoría expuso lo siguiente:

“(…) en una sociedad democrática, la prensa tiene derecho a informar libremente y criticar al gobierno, y el pueblo tiene derecho a ser informado sobre distintas visiones de lo que ocurre en la comunidad (…)”.

En la misma línea de pensamiento, la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos, en el caso Lingens vs. Austria (sentencia de 8 de julio de 1986), resaltó que "(…) la libertad de prensa proporciona a la opinión pública uno de los mejores medios para conocer y juzgar las ideas y actitudes de los dirigentes políticos. En términos más generales, la libertad de las controversias políticas pertenece al corazón mismo del concepto de sociedad democrática (…)”.

Asimismo, la Corte Constitucional Colombiana, ha hecho referencia al tema bajo estudio en varias oportunidades. Así, en la Sentencia No. T-256/13 30 de abril de 2013, sostuvo que: “(…) el derecho a la libertad de expresión, es un principio del ejercicio de la democracia pues es en el marco de un estado democrático donde la participación de la ciudadanía adquiere especial relevancia, y en desarrollo de ella, se garantiza la libertad de expresar las distintas opiniones y de manifestar los pensamientos minoritarios sin miedo a ser reprimido por poderes estatales (…)” y explicó que:

“(…) Por ello, los pronunciamientos de la Comisión Interamericana y la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos han resaltado que la libertad de expresión cumple una triple función en el sistema democrático: a) asegura el derecho individual de toda persona a pensar por cuenta propia y a compartir con otros el pensamiento y la opinión personal, b) tiene una relación estrecha, indisoluble, esencial, fundamental y estructural con la democracia, y en esa medida, el objetivo mismo del artículo 13 de la Convención Americana es el de fortalecer el funcionamiento de sistemas democráticos, pluralistas y deliberativos, mediante la protección y fomento de la libre circulación de ideas y opiniones, y c) finalmente, es una herramienta clave para el ejercicio de los demás derechos fundamentales, toda vez que “se trata de un mecanismo esencial para el ejercicio del derecho a la participación, a la libertad religiosa, a la educación, a la identidad étnica o cultural y, por supuesto, a la igualdad no sólo entendida como el derecho a la no discriminación, sino como el derecho al goce de ciertos derechos sociales básicos (…)”.

Igualmente, este órgano constitucional agregó que:

“(…) Esta Corporación desde muy temprano en su jurisprudencia reconoció el valor de este derecho en el marco de una democracia con las siguientes palabras: “Aunque la libertad de expresar y difundir el propio pensamiento y opiniones es un derecho de toda persona, no es sólo un derecho individual, sino también garantía de una institución política fundamental: "la opinión pública libre". Una opinión pública libre está indisolublemente ligada con el pluralismo político, que es un valor fundamental y un requisito de funcionamiento del estado democrático. Sin una comunicación pública libre quedarían vaciados de contenido real otros derechos que la Constitución consagra, reducidos a formas hueras las institucionales representativas y participativas y absolutamente falseado el principio de la legitimidad democrática (…)”. (El destacado no forma parte del original).

En la Sentencia No. T-543 de 2017 de 25 de agosto de 2017, la Corte Constitucional Colombiana señaló que la libertad de expresión cumple las siguientes funciones en una sociedad democrática: “(…) (i) permite buscar la verdad y desarrollar el conocimiento; (ii) hace posible el principio de autogobierno; (iii) promueve la autonomía personal; (iv) previene abusos de poder; y (v) es una “válvula de escape” que estimula la confrontación pacífica de las decisiones estatales o sociales que no se compartan (…)”. Por su parte, en la Sentencia No. C-135/21 de 13 de mayo de 2021, dicha Corte mencionó que algunos de los aportes del derecho fundamental a la libertad de expresión al funcionamiento democrático, son los siguientes: “(…) i) permite buscar la verdad y desarrollar el conocimiento; ii) crea un espacio de sano diálogo y protesta para la ciudadanía, que consolida sociedades pluralistas y deliberativas; iii) permite establecer mecanismos de control y rendición de cuentas ante los gobernantes; iv) promueve el autogobierno ciudadano; y v) contribuye a mejores elecciones populares (…)”.

También, en la Sentencia No. T-145/19 de 2 de abril de 2019, la Corte Colombiana sostuvo que la libertad de expresión “(…) es un pilar del Estado Social de Derecho y un principio fundamental de los regímenes democráticos, donde se respeta la dignidad humana y se valora la participación de la ciudadanía y de todos los sectores, lo que permite consolidar sociedades pluralistas y deliberativas (…)”. Asimismo, en esta última ocasión, dicho órgano señaló que “(…) El fundamento principal del amparo jurídico de la libertad de expresión encuentra sustento en la dignidad humana, en la autonomía de la persona y en su carácter instrumental para el ejercicio de múltiples derechos, y en las distintas funciones que cumple en los sistemas democráticos (…)”.

Puede, entonces, enfatizarse de las decisiones citadas el vínculo estructural -como lo califica la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos- entre democracia y libertad de expresión, pues solamente un régimen en el que se reconoce al pueblo, a sus habitantes, como una voz plural, con capacidad de disentir, de opinar y de criticar sobre aspectos de la realidad en que viven, pero, especialmente, sobre las actividades originadas en la esfera pública, puede calificarse de régimen sustantivamente democrático.

VII.- SOBRE LA SÁTIRA POLÍTICA COMO UNA DE LAS FORMAS DE LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN. El caso en estudio ofrece la particularidad, en el marco general de la libertad de expresión y sus múltiples manifestaciones, de referirse a una sección, dentro de un programa televisivo, destinada a realizar parodias musicales sobre problemas sociales y políticos que, como se estipuló en los hechos probados de esta resolución, fueron tres, hasta el momento en que las instituciones accionadas decidieron comunicar cambios en el pago de publicidad para el programa: atención en el sistema público de salud, consecuencias de la inseguridad ciudadana y costo de la vida. Se está, entonces, frente a una forma específica del ejercicio de la libertad de expresión, conexa a la sátira política, al humor con crítica social. Para entender plenamente este aspecto es necesario recordar que la libertad de expresión es indispensable para el desarrollo y realización de los individuos. Gracias al libre intercambio de informaciones y opiniones las personas entienden mejor el mundo en el que viven, pues la libre circulación de ideas permite buscar la verdad, profundizar los conocimientos, participar en los procesos de toma de decisiones. Por esto, sin libertad de expresión, no puede hablarse de democracia, como se puso de especial relieve en el anterior considerando. No solo por el efecto que tiene en la formación de opinión; sino, además, porque constituye una vía para que las personas hagan saber a las autoridades lo que piensan y tales autoridades puedan responder a sus preocupaciones. Es necesaria para la estabilidad, el pluralismo y la tolerancia en la sociedad. En un país como el nuestro, donde existe la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión, sus habitantes tienen el derecho de criticar al poder público, a través de distintas formas, echando mano de la gran plasticidad propia de la libertad de expresión, incluida la sátira. Las expresiones de vocación abiertamente satírica y humorística permiten exageraciones, deformaciones y representaciones irónicas. Se vinculan con la risa y la crítica. En el Diccionario de la Real Academia Española el término sátira aparece como: “1.f. Composición en verso o prosa cuyo objeto es censurar o ridiculizar a alguien o algo. 2.f. Discurso o dicho agudo, picante y mordaz, dirigido a censurar o ridiculizar.”. Es una noción que abarca aspectos muy variados: ironía, irreverencia, irrespeto, insolencia, exageración, burla. Puede plasmarse en escritos, discursos, imágenes, caricaturas, parodias, pastiches. Por su parte, la palabra humor, en la segunda acepción del recién citado diccionario significa: “Jovialidad, agudeza” y el humorismo lo define como un “modo de presentar la realidad”. Hacer reír, entonces, es la intención primaria de la sátira. Ahora bien, no debe olvidarse que detrás de todos los tipos novedosos actuales de hacer y transmitir el humor y la sátira, se está ante una forma de expresión con orígenes en la antigüedad: Aristófanes en el siglo V a.C. satirizó la vida social y política de la época; Lucilio, en el siglo I a.C. creó la sátira latina, entendida como género poético destinado a señalar los vicios y ridículos sociales. Posteriormente, Molière, en el siglo XVII, empleó ese recurso para criticar las costumbres cortesanas, a los médicos y a los burgueses. Con todos los distintos matices puntualizados, ciertamente constituye una forma de la libertad de expresión. Desde el punto de vista de los particulares, en ejercicio de su libertad, del principio de autonomía de la voluntad que les reconoce en nuestra constitución costarricense el artículo 28, cubre no solamente las ideas inofensivas, sino también aquellas que puedan disgustar a las instituciones públicas, a grupos de personas o a individuos, efecto que muchas veces va aparejado con la sátira, sobre todo si es instrumento de denuncia y crítica social. El humor se inspira en la realidad, pero tiende a la exageración, a la caricaturización, muchas veces para proponer una reflexión, generar sorpresa o estupor, así como para hacer más llevaderas verdades dolorosas, o aun, para fungir como antídoto de la ira. La mayor o menor tolerancia a la sátira en una sociedad es proporcional al mayor o menor nivel de compromiso de esa sociedad con un sistema verdaderamente democrático. La Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos dedicó una atención particular a la injerencia en el derecho de los artistas -y de cualquier persona, en general- a expresarse a través de la sátira, entendiéndola como una forma de expresión artística y comentario social que busca provocar y agitar. En el caso Vereinigung Bildender Künstler c/Austria, del 27 de enero de 2007, señaló:

“26. La Corte recuerda que la libertad de expresión, consagrada en el parágrafo 1 del artículo 10, constituye uno de los fundamentos esenciales de una sociedad democrática, una condición primordial para el progreso y desarrollo de cada persona. Con la reserva del parágrafo 2, ella cubre no solo las “informaciones” o “ideas” recibidas con agrado o consideradas inofensivas o indiferentes, sino también aquellas que hieren, chocan o inquietan al Estado o a un grupo de habitantes. Así lo exigen el pluralismo, la tolerancia y el espíritu de apertura, sin el cual no se puede hablar de una “sociedad democrática”. Quienes crean, interpretan, difunden o exponen una obra de arte, contribuyen al intercambio de ideas y opiniones indispensable en una sociedad democrática. De ahí la obligación del Estado de no impedir indebidamente la libertad de expresión. Evidentemente, los artistas y quienes promueven sus obras no escapan a las eventuales limitaciones que implica el parágrafo segundo del artículo 10. Quien ejerce su libertad de expresión asume, en efecto, según los propios términos del parágrafo, “deberes y responsabilidades”, las cuales dependerán de la situación y procedimiento empleado (Müller y otros c. Suiza, 24 de mayo 1988, §§ 33-34, serie A no. 133, y las referencias citadas). (…)

33. (…) La Corte considera que el modelo de representación constituye una caricatura de las personas aludidas a partir de elementos satíricos. Se recuerda que la sátira es una forma de expresión artística y comentario social que, a través de la exageración y la deformación de la realidad que la caracteriza, busca naturalmente provocar y agitar. Por esto, debe examinarse con particular atención toda injerencia en el derecho de un artista a expresarse por ese medio.” (lo destacado es propio) En el mismo sentido, la Corte de Apelaciones de Versalles, en 1991 (31 de enero de 1991, D. 1991, IR), precisó que el género humorístico permite exageraciones, deformaciones y presentaciones irónicas, respecto de las cuales cada uno es libre de apreciar si son o no de buen gusto. Esto, en la medida en la que campea aquí un alto grado de subjetividad, de percepciones plurales y distintas del tema que se aborde y de la propia sensibilidad sobre lo que puede o no ser humorístico.

Sobre la diversidad propia de la libertad de expresión y la posibilidad de restringir algunas de sus manifestaciones, en la decisión No. 2006-05977 de las 15:16 horas dieciséis del 3 de mayo del 2006 indicó esta Tribunal:

“X.-. Los límites a la libertad de expresión y libertad de prensa. Para determinar cuáles expresiones se pueden limitar y en qué medida, es importante tomar en cuenta que no todas las expresiones pueden tener el mismo valor ni gozar, en consecuencia, de la misma protección constitucional. Así por ejemplo, incluso la jurisprudencia internacional, vgr. el Tribunal Constitucional español, ha señalado que carecen de protección constitucional, los insultos o los juicios de valor formalmente injuriosos e innecesarios para la expresión de una idea, pensamiento u opinión. En otro peldaño se encuentran las opiniones, es decir, los juicios de valor personales que no sean formalmente injuriosos e innecesarios para lo que se quiere expresar, aunque contengan lo que se conoce como "opiniones inquietantes o hirientes"; estas opiniones sí estarían protegidas constitucionalmente por la libertad de expresión y podría tener como contenido incluso la ironía, la sátira y la burla. En otro escalón estaría la información, entendiendo por tal la narración veraz de hechos, que estaría protegida como regla general, a menos que vulnere otros derechos fundamentales o bienes constitucionalmente protegidos (por ejemplo, el honor, la intimidad, el orden y tranquilidad de la nación, los derechos de los niños y adolescentes). En otro nivel estaría la noticia, entendiendo por tal la narración veraz de hechos que tienen relevancia pública, ya sea por los hechos en sí mismos, o por las personas que intervienen en ellos; las noticias contribuyen de manera destacada a la creación de la opinión pública libre. En el último escalón se encontrarían las falsedades, los rumores o insidias que se esconden detrás de una narración neutral de hechos y que en realidad carecen por completo de veracidad. Sobre el tema de la veracidad, la Comisión de Derechos Humanos ha señalado (Declaración de Principios sobre Libertad de Expresión, adoptada por la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en su 108 periodo ordinario de sesiones en octubre de 2000) que se considera censura previa cualquier condicionamiento previo, a aspectos tales como veracidad, oportunidad o imparcialidad de la información, pero a criterio de este Tribunal, debe entenderse que está referido a la posibilidad de utilizar dichos argumentos como justificantes de una censura previa de la información, no para impedir el derecho a una tutela judicial efectiva frente a las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales, como lo establece el artículo 41 de nuestra Constitución al señalar:

“Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales. Debe hacérseles justicia pronta, cumplida, sin denegación y en estricta conformidad con las leyes.” (el subrayado es agregado) La anterior resolución, se complementa con lo dispuesto, también por esta Sala, en la sentencia No. 2019008752 de las 9:30 horas del 17 de mayo de 2019:

“I.- Consideraciones preliminares: sobre la libertad de expresión. Vistas las alegaciones de la recurrente, se le recuerda que la finalidad del recurso de amparo es brindar tutela oportuna contra infracciones o amenazas a los derechos y libertades fundamentales, no servir como un instrumento para censurar opiniones, por ofensivas, chocantes o molestas que éstas puedan resultarles a algunos sectores de la población (véase en ese sentido la sentencia N° 2015007498 de las 11:30 hrs. de 22 de mayo de 2015). De esta forma, el simple hecho de que una manifestación externa, una obra artística o un trabajo literario, por ejemplo, sean de mal gusto o violenten la sensibilidad, la moral particular o los valores éticos personales de algunos individuos, en sí mismo, no es una cuestión que se relacione directamente con una eventual vulneración de algún derecho fundamental. Por el contrario, la Sala ha sido enfática al declarar que cualquier restricción —censura o “responsabilidad ulterior”— a la libertad de expresión, al derecho a la información pública y a la creación artística, está sujeta a un “escrutinio estricto”, ya que para aceptar su procedencia no bastaría con probar que esa restricción es útil para salvaguardar otros derechos fundamentales, sino que resulta indispensable demostrar que la salvaguarda o restricción son necesarias para proteger esos derechos y que, además, esa salvaguarda y el grado de afectación a esos derechos, es de mayor entidad que la propia salvaguarda de la libertad de expresión (véase, a manera de ejemplo, la sentencia de esta Sala N° 2012-005178 de las 11:30 horas del 20 de abril de 2012).

(…)

De igual forma reconoce la jurisprudencia sentada en el caso New York Times vs. Sullivan de 1964 en la que se señala que la protección que la Constitución ofrece a la libertad de expresión no depende de la verdad, popularidad o utilidad social de las ideas y creencias manifestadas, y reconoce que un cierto grado de abuso es inseparable del uso adecuado de esa libertad, a partir de la cual el gobierno y los tribunales deben permitir que se desarrolle un debate ‘desinhibido, robusto y abierto’, lo que puede incluir expresiones cáusticas, vehementes y a veces ataques severos desagradables hacia el gobierno y los funcionarios públicos. Los enunciados erróneos son inevitables en un debate libre, y deben ser protegidos para dejar a la libertad de expresión aire para que pueda respirar y sobrevivir. Las normas deben impedir que un funcionario público pueda demandar a un medio de comunicación o a un particular por daños causados por una difamación falsa relativa a su comportamiento oficial, a menos que se pruebe con claridad convincente que la expresión se hizo con malicia real, es decir, con conocimiento de que era falsa o con indiferente desconsideración de si era o no falsa. Esta salvedad que se hace es indispensable frente a la obligación del Estado de proteger la reputación y honra de las personas y más aún, dentro de la obligación que tiene de velar porque el mal uso o desvío de esta libertad no se utilice para violar fines igualmente esenciales del sistema democrático, entre los que se incluye el sistema de derechos fundamentales. Es reconocida en doctrina la interdependencia que existe entre los derechos fundamentales y su valor sistémico, en ese sentido, la protección de una libertad en demérito de otras por falta de una visión hermenéutica tiene un efecto negativo sobre todo el sistema de libertad (ver sentencia 2771-03 de esta Sala)’”. (El resaltado y subrayado no es del original).” (el énfasis es suplido) Igualmente, en el pronunciamiento Nº 2009-12680 de las 10:59 horas del 14 de agosto del 2009, reconoció este Tribunal Constitucional la indispensable protección de expresiones de índole satírica, en su condición de componente del pluralismo social:

“Por su parte, el Tribunal Constitucional Español ha afirmado que “la libertad ideológica indisolublemente unida al pluralismo político que, como valor esencial de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico propugna la Constitución, exige la máxima amplitud en el ejercicio de aquélla y, naturalmente, no sólo en lo coincidente con la Constitución y con el resto del ordenamiento jurídico, sino también en lo que resulte contrapuesto a los valores y bienes que ellos consagran, excluida siempre la violencia para imponer los propios criterios, pero permitiendo la libre exposición de los mismos en los términos que impone una democracia avanzada. De ahí la indispensable interpretación restrictiva de las limitaciones a la libertad ideológica y del derecho a expresarla, sin el cual carecería aquélla de toda efectividad" (sentencia 20/1990, del 15 de febrero, fundamento 5°, en Boletín Oficial del Estado del 1/3/1990). Sobre el punto, la jurisprudencia de la Sala “ha señalado que carecen de protección constitucional, los insultos o los juicios de valor formalmente injuriosos e innecesarios para la expresión de una idea, pensamiento u opinión. En otro peldaño se encuentran las opiniones, es decir, los juicios de valor personales que no sean formalmente injuriosos e innecesarios para lo que se quiere expresar, aunque contengan lo que se conoce como "opiniones inquietantes o hirientes"; estas opiniones sí estarían protegidas constitucionalmente por la libertad de expresión y podrían tener como contenido incluso la ironía, la sátira y la burla” (ver sentencia número 2006-05977 de las 15:16 horas del 3 de mayo de 2006). Al respecto, conviene advertir que la burla, el humor y la caricaturización de personajes forman parte de la vida diaria. Tanto el ciudadano común como el hombre público (político, juez, deportista, artista) están acostumbrados a las bromas y la ridiculización de ciertos actos y costumbres. Por tanto, mientras el humor satírico no traiga aparejada lesiones al honor de las personas o al contenido esencial de los derechos a la intimidad o la imagen, este puede y debe manifestarse libremente, por tratarse del ejercicio del derecho constitucional a la libertad de expresión y, además, de un elemento natural del derecho humano al libre desarrollo de la personalidad. Se trata del legítimo ejercicio del denominado animus jocandi, definido con acierto como aquella intención festiva, de jugar de bromear que impide tomar en serio la declaración de voluntad, que no produce el nacimiento de una obligación ni es punible por la simple manifestación verbal (vid. Cabanellas, Guillermo “Repertorio Jurídico”, pág. 166 n° 7107). Ahora bien, cuando ese no es el caso y se producen abusos, en el nivel de la mera legalidad, el legislador ha tipificado, en el Código Penal, los delitos de injurias, calumnias y difamación (artículos 145 a 147) y en el Código Civil, la teoría del abuso del derecho (artículo 22), razón por la cual cualquier persona que se sienta lesiona puede reclamar a posteriori que se le resarza. En la especie, de la lectura del boletín de marras, visible a folios 60 y 60v del expediente judicial, se advierte que con un sentido humorístico e irónico, el accionante planteó una serie de peticiones, entendidas como solicitudes hechas a los Reyes Magos con motivo de celebrarse su día, para cuyo efecto incorporó una caricatura de los mismos. Entre tales solicitudes, requirió la iluminación para las canchas techadas, reintegro de profesores, no pagar por el uso de las canchas, construcción de la pared de rebote en la cancha de frontón, utilizar la cancha de fútbol en diciembre, usar aparatos electrónicos en los ranchos del club, tener un fiscal nombrado por los socios del club, que la Asociación Española de Beneficencia se pusiera al día con las cuotas de mantenimiento, que hubiera un ahorro de un millón de dólares para construir un centro de convenciones, etc.. Incluso, el recurrente señaló como frase del mes, atribuida a Ceferino Casero, Presidente de la Junta Directiva del Club, lo siguiente: “hay algunas personas que me están acompañando, pero anónimamente”. Todos estos comentarios constituyen meras manifestaciones jocosas e irónicas, que no lesionan derecho alguno ni resultan en un ejercicio abusivo del derecho a expresarse. En virtud de lo expuesto, la Sala concluye que la sanción impuesta al amparado por el mero hecho de haber publicado el referido boletín y expuesto manifestaciones irónicas, lesiona los derechos constitucionales a la libertad de expresión y el libre desarrollo de la personalidad. Solo por este motivo deviene procedente el amparo.” (el destacado el propio. Ver en igual sentido las sentencias 2009-014384 de las 15:55 horas del 16 de setiembre de 2009 y Nº 2015019641 de las 9:05 horas del 18 de diciembre de 2015) Finalmente, merece destacarse el pronunciamiento N° 2018008396 de las 12:40 horas del 25 de mayo de 2018, en el cual se consideró que la pluralidad de contenidos es consustancial a la libertad de expresión y reprimirla implica su desconocimiento:

“Así, existen suficientes indicios sobre la censura existente y el distanciamiento entre la Administración y el tutelado. Al respecto, si bien la parte accionada afirmó que se trataba de una reorganización completa del recurso", lo cierto es que omitió adjuntar elementos probatorios que permitieran a la Sala llegar a la misma conclusión. La prueba que allegó se refería a las funciones reasignadas (que se encontraban dentro del perfil de un periodista) y a la constancia del salario del amparado.

La Sala reitera que, en materia de control de constitucionalidad, una vez que ab initio se establecen indicios claros de censura, recae en la contraparte una carga probatoria que debe llevar a concluir que las acciones no eran de tal naturaleza, máxime cuando la recurrida se encuentra en mejores posibilidades de aportar prueba a la causa (carga dinámica de la prueba), toda vez que la Administración dispone de caudales de información y recursos públicos para descartar alguna discriminación o violación a un derecho fundamental; pese a lo cual, en el sub examine, la recurrida no logra desacreditar con prueba fehaciente el agravio de los recurrentes. De esta manera, tomando en consideración lo dispuesto en los ya citados incisos b) y c) del numeral 4 de la Ley Orgánica del SINART, que de forma expresa obligan a esa empresa pública a respetar el pluralismo político, religioso, social y cultural así como a permitir la libre expresión de las opiniones , resulta claro que en la especie se ha dado una forma de censura velada a través de la reubicación de un periodista en un puesto que viene a limitar o eliminar su influencia en el contenido transmitido, todo ello luego o con motivo de las referidas manifestaciones en el ejercicio de su quehacer periodístico.

Lo anterior resulta aún más relevante, puesto que por la vía de la censura velada se ejerce una especie de intimidación o amedrentamiento subrepticio al resto del personal periodístico de la empresa pública SINART. De este modo, la libertad de prensa de aquel se ve amenazada ante la posibilidad de ser víctima de represalias derivadas del ejercicio del periodismo en libertad, cuando se formulen opiniones que no comparta la dirección del medio según el gobierno de tumo; ambiente que propicia el flagelo de la autocensura en detrimento de los periodistas, merced a que su estabilidad laboral podría compelerles a evitar represalias. Ello viene a afectar igualmente al destinatario final de los servicios de periodismo, el público, quien por esa vía ve menguada su capacidad de formarse criterio propio de manera fundada a través del estar a la escucha de una diversidad de contenidos informativo y puntos de vista.” De los antecedentes recién citados de este Tribunal, así como de los elementos conceptuales y de ejemplificación reseñados, se extrae que las parodias musicales que originaron las actuaciones que se impugnan en este proceso, gozan de una especial protección en el esquema de tutela de la libertad de expresión, pues son manifestaciones de pensamiento dirigidas -echando mano del humor- a exponer una crítica social y a instancias públicas, con independencia de si su contenido es afín a una sensibilidad uniforme o generalizada para visualizar esos problemas sociales concretos abordados. Restaría por examinar, las consecuencias que, desde la esfera pública, se impusieron a esas formas de plasmar la libertad de expresión.

VIII.- SOBRE LA PAUTA PÚBLICA Y SU IMPACTO SOBRE LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN. Esta Sala Constitucional se ha referido ya en distintas ocasiones a la utilización de recursos públicos para contratar, retirar o reorientar publicidad a determinados medios de comunicación. Por ejemplo, en la sentencia No. 2015-01782 de las 11:36 horas del 6 de febrero de 2015 se efectuaron las siguientes consideraciones:

“VIII.- El punto medular de este proceso es determinar si las notas enviadas por el recurrido a las instituciones públicas en julio pasado constituyen una limitación ilegítima a la libertad de expresión y pensamiento. Consecuentemente, el punto de partida del análisis debe ser la libertad de expresión, sus límites y la censura directa o indirecta.

Sin la intención de agotar el tema, ni reiterar lo que ya fue dicho en el considerando sobre jurisprudencia constitucional, debe enfatizarse la protección que goza la libertad de expresión en nuestro medio. Sin perjuicio de otros instrumentos que la tutelan, se señala que la Constitución Política garantiza la libertad de expresión y pensamiento en los artículos 28 y 29, mientras que la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos lo hace en el artículo 13:

“ARTÍCULO 28.- Nadie puede ser inquietado ni perseguido por la manifestación de sus opiniones ni por acto alguno que no infrinja la ley.

Las acciones privadas que no dañen la moral o el orden públicos, o que no perjudiquen a tercero, están fuera de la acción de la ley.

No se podrá, sin embargo, hacer en forma alguna propaganda política por clérigos o seglares invocando motivos de religión o valiéndose, como medio, de creencias religiosas.

ARTÍCULO 29.- Todos pueden comunicar sus pensamientos de palabra o por escrito, y publicarlos sin previa censura; pero serán responsables de los abusos que cometan en el ejercicio de este derecho, en los casos y del modo que la ley establezca.” “Artículo 13. Libertad de Pensamiento y de Expresión 1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión. Este derecho comprende la libertad de buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas de toda índole, sin consideración de fronteras, ya sea oralmente, por escrito o en forma impresa o artística, o por cualquier otro procedimiento de su elección.

2. El ejercicio del derecho previsto en el inciso precedente no puede estar sujeto a previa censura sino a responsabilidades ulteriores, las que deben estar expresamente fijadas por la ley y ser necesarias para asegurar:

• a)el respeto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás, o b) la protección de la seguridad nacional, el orden público o la salud o la moral públicas.

3. No se puede restringir el derecho de expresión por vías o medios indirectos, tales como el abuso de controles oficiales o particulares de papel para periódicos, de frecuencias radioeléctricas, o de enseres y aparatos usados en la difusión de información o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones. (… )” La libertad de expresión es un pilar fundamental del Estado democrático, ya que permite la circulación de ideas e información – aun aquellas de oposición al gobierno de turno-, la formación de la opinión pública, la fiscalización y denuncia de las acciones del gobierno, entre otras.

Ahora bien, a los efectos de resolver el sub examine, primeramente procede transcribir las manifestaciones de ambas partes que han suscitado el conflicto. Según las grabaciones aportadas por la parte recurrida, la cuña cuestionada como injuriosa indica lo siguiente:

“Ciudadano costarricense. ¿Confía y cree usted en un diputado que se dice le representa en el máximo Poder de la República, que fue estudiante de derecho con notas sobresalientes en una universidad, a punto de graduarse, en tiempo récord, sin tener bachillerato de secundaria y que es un requisito indispensable para poder llevar esa carrera? ¿Un diputado que en la sección voto 2010, en el periódico La Nación, dice ser abogado graduado de la Universidad [Nombre 002], constituyendo esto un delito de falsedad ideológica? ¿un diputado denunciado por la Fiscalía por presunta estafa, al estar involucrado en la falsificación de firmas para contratos para la campaña 2010, donde cobraron más de ? 220 millones y los contratados declararon que nunca cobraron un cinco y que en su mayoría falsificaron las firmas? ¿Un diputado donde en un audio solicita a Hugo Navas copia de uno de esos contratos falsos para amedrentar a Rita Chaves y demás diputados del PASE, diciéndoles que Hugo sabe todo y que puede acabar con todos, con el partido y todo? ¿Un diputado que el OIJ investiga junto a los diputados de su fracción por aparentes nombramientos falsos en la Asamblea Legislativa, donde nunca se presentaron a trabajar, pero su salario era cobrado, constituyendo esto una estafa de más de ? 200 millones al Estado costarricense, o sea, a todos nosotros? ¿Un diputado que en un audio planea robarse de la deuda política del proceso electoral 2010 ? 356 millones con facturas de gastos inexistentes? A un diputado así, no se le puede creer. No es digno de sentarse en una curul. No a la impunidad. Señor Fiscal General de la República actúe, queremos respuestas. Este es un mensaje de los ciudadanos indignados con el PASE.” Se observa entonces que en la cuña se critica la idoneidad de una persona para ejercer el cargo de diputado, se denuncian supuestos hechos ilícitos y se incita al Fiscal General a actuar. Todos esos temas son de interés público y, como tales, se circunscriben dentro del ejercicio legítimo de la libertad de expresión.

Efectivamente, tratándose de funcionarios públicos, en particular aquellos de alta jerarquía, el umbral de la libertad de expresión y el deber de tolerancia a la crítica aumentan. Esto es así porque un elemento fundamental del sistema democrático, que lo distingue de las dictaduras, consiste en la amplia libertad de que gozan tanto la ciudadanía en general como la prensa en particular, con respecto de exteriorizar sus críticas y cuestionar la idoneidad (técnica o moral) de los funcionarios públicos sin temor a censura ni represalias, lo que evidentemente no obsta que la persona que se sienta afectada, acuda al derecho de rectificación o a otras vías judiciales ordinarias en defensa de su imagen y buen nombre. En el caso concreto de los funcionarios públicos, se encuentran más expuestos al escrutinio público, toda vez que el ejercicio de sus funciones trasciende el ámbito privado y, por su impacto en el desarrollo y acontecer político de un país, se incorpora a la esfera pública, esto es tiene consecuencias de interés para la ciudadanía en general. Asimismo, el control ciudadano sobre la Administración Pública y el deber de rendición de cuentas de los funcionarios públicos (artículo 11 de la Constitución Política), solo pueden darse en un sistema democrático de amplia libertad de expresión e información. Esa es la relevancia de la dimensión social del derecho de información, íntimamente ligado al de expresión. En tal sentido, precisamente, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos se expresó en el caso Tristán Donoso:

“115. Por último, respecto del derecho a la honra, la Corte recuerda que las expresiones concernientes a la idoneidad de una persona para el desempeño de un cargo público o a los actos realizados por funcionarios públicos en el desempeño de sus labores gozan de mayor protección, de manera tal que se propicie el debate democrático. La Corte ha señalado que en una sociedad democrática los funcionarios públicos están más expuestos al escrutinio y la crítica del público. Este diferente umbral de protección se explica porque se han expuesto voluntariamente a un escrutinio más exigente. Sus actividades salen del dominio de la esfera privada para insertarse en la esfera del debate público. Este umbral no se asienta en la calidad del sujeto, sino en el interés público de las actividades que realiza (… )

122. Como ya se ha indicado, el derecho internacional establece que el umbral de protección al honor de un funcionario público debe permitir el más amplio control ciudadano sobre el ejercicio de sus funciones (supra párr. 115). Esta protección al honor de manera diferenciada se explica porque el funcionario público se expone voluntariamente al escrutinio de la sociedad, lo que lo lleva a un mayor riesgo de sufrir afectaciones a su honor, así como también por la posibilidad, asociada a su condición, de tener una mayor influencia social y facilidad de acceso a los medios de comunicación para dar explicaciones o responder sobre hechos que los involucren.” De igual forma, en el caso Ricardo Canese, la Corte indicó:

“97. El control democrático, por parte de la sociedad a través de la opinión pública, fomenta la transparencia de las actividades estatales y promueve la responsabilidad de los funcionarios sobre su gestión pública, razón por la cual debe existir un mayor margen de tolerancia frente a afirmaciones y apreciaciones vertidas en el curso de los debates políticos o sobre cuestiones de interés público.

98. El Tribunal ha establecido que es lógico y apropiado que las expresiones concernientes a funcionarios públicos o a otras personas que ejercen funciones de una naturaleza pública deben gozar, en los términos del artículo 13.2 de la Convención, de un margen de apertura a un debate amplio respecto de asuntos de interés público, el cual es esencial para el funcionamiento de un sistema verdaderamente democrático (… )” En la misma línea de pensamiento, la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos sostuvo que "la libertad de prensa proporciona a la opinión pública uno de los mejores medios para conocer y juzgar las ideas y actitudes de los dirigentes políticos. En términos más generales, la libertad de las controversias políticas pertenece al corazón mismo del concepto de sociedad democrática" (caso "Lingens vs. Austria", sentencia del 8 de julio de 1986, serie A N° 103, párr. 42).

Retomando el análisis normativo, resalta el hecho de que ambos textos jurídicos, la Constitución Política y la Convención Americana, estatuyeron el sistema de límites, o bien, de control ulterior de la libertad de expresión. De este modo, por un lado, se proscribió la censura, y, por el otro, se instauró el régimen de responsabilidad ulterior, toda vez que el ejercicio de la libertad de expresión no exime de asumir las consecuencias derivadas de su mal uso, verbigracia cuando se cometen delitos de injurias, calumnias y difamación. Así, el punto medio entre el derecho a la libertad de expresión y la protección del honor se da mediante el sistema de responsabilidad ulterior, sin que en ningún asunto los mecanismos directos o indirectos de censura sean procedentes. En el caso Tristán Donoso , la Corte Interamericana manifestó:

“110. Sin embargo, la libertad de expresión no es un derecho absoluto. El artículo 13.2 de la Convención, que prohíbe la censura previa, también prevé la posibilidad de exigir responsabilidades ulteriores por el ejercicio abusivo de este derecho. Estas restricciones tienen carácter excepcional y no deben limitar, más allá de lo estrictamente necesario, el pleno ejercicio de la libertad de expresión y convertirse en un mecanismo directo o indirecto de censura previa.

111. Por su parte, el artículo 11 de la Convención establece que toda persona tiene derecho al respeto de su honra y al reconocimiento de su dignidad. Esto implica límites a las injerencias de los particulares y del Estado. Por ello, es legítimo que quien se considere afectado en su honor recurra a los medios judiciales que el Estado disponga para su protección.” (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

En el sub iudice, lo anterior se traduce en la posibilidad que tiene el recurrido de presentar las acciones judiciales que considere pertinentes, con el fin de que se determine la eventual afectación de su honor y la posible responsabilidad de aquellos que hayan excedido los límites de la libertad de expresión. Otra alternativa que encuentra acogida en el ordenamiento jurídico es el uso de la rectificación o respuesta, cuando una persona se vea afectada por información inexacta o agraviante emitida en su perjuicio (artículos 14 de la Convención Americana y 66 y siguientes de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

Sin embargo, tal y como se mencionó, la censura, directa o indirecta, no encuentra cabida en nuestro medio. Conviene profundizar en este tema a fin de dar solución al caso examinado. El inciso tercero del artículo 13 de la Convención Americana brinda luces al respecto:

“3. No se puede restringir el derecho de expresión por vías o medios indirectos, tales como el abuso de controles oficiales o particulares de papel para periódicos, de frecuencias radioeléctricas, o de enseres y aparatos usados en la difusión de información o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones.” En este sentido, la censura puede ser directa – por ejemplo, la prohibición directa de cierta publicación- o indirecta (también denominada soft censorship, censura sutil, velada)– por ejemplo, la utilización de diversos medios para intimidar y de ese modo evitar una publicación-. La Convención prevé una lista no taxativa de casos de censura por medios indirectos (controles de papel, de frecuencias, etc.) y concluye con la regla general, que sería “… o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones.” Valga mencionar el caso Ivcher Bronstein a manera de ejemplo, en el cual la Corte Interamericana estimó que una resolución para dejar sin efecto legal el título de nacionalidad del señor Ivcher Bronstein – entre otros hechos- constituía un medio indirecto de restringir su libertad de expresión. También, dentro del derecho comparado, resulta de interés el fallo "Editorial Río Negro contra Provincia de Neuquén" (5/09/07), en el que la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (Argentina) dipuso, a raíz de que el Poder Ejecutivo de la Provincia del Neuquén privó temporalmente de publicidad oficial a dicho medio sin demostrar la razonabilidad de tal medida, y además se pronunció en contra de la violación indirecta de la libertad de prensa por medios económicos: "La primera opción para un Estado es dar o no publicidad, y esa decisión permanece dentro del ámbito de la discrecionalidad estatal. Si decide darla, debe hacerlo cumpliendo dos criterios constitucionales: 1) no puede manipular la publicidad, dándola y retirándola a algunos medios en base a criterios discriminatorios; 2) no puede utilizar la publicidad como un modo indirecto de afectar la libertad de expresión. Por ello, tiene a su disposición muchos criterios distributivos, pero cualquiera sea el que utilice deben mantener siempre una pauta mínima general para evitar desnaturalizaciones." Ahora bien, en la especie, el recurrido dirigió una misiva a varias instituciones públicas, usando papel con el membrete y el sello de la Asamblea Legislativa, en la cual manifestaba:

“ (… ) 4.- En mi caso particular, en claro derecho de tutelar mi integridad personal, profesional y moral, fundamentaré la querella contra el productor de ese especio radial y solidariamente contra sus patrocinadores, pues basta con que ustedes monitoreen puntualmente a las 8 pm la frecuencia 800 AM y escuchen, dentro de la misma parrilla de patrocinadores a la que esta institución pertenece como auspiciador del programa en cuestión, junto a la cuña que ustedes pagan con dinero público, otra cuña grabada con la voz del propio señor [Nombre 001] en la que le pregunta a los ciudadanos si le creen a un Diputado mentiroso, investigado por falsificador y estafador, aspirante a graduarse de abogado en forma irregular, denunciado por el TSE por querer sustraer millonarias sumas de dinero mediante el uso de documentos falsos y más señalamientos infundados, aprovechando el productor radial al amparo de sus patrocinadores, para presionar de forma temeraria al Señor Fiscal General a que actúe contra el suscrito, evitando así la impunidad, como si el Jefe del Ministerio Público estuviese encubriendo deliberadamente una serie de delitos cometidos por este servidor.

5.- Por la consideración que se merecen, respetuosamente les prevengo de este asunto y les insto a valorar como una responsable medida cautelar, la posibilidad de sacar del aire la publicidad institucional que pagan en este programa radial, mientras resolvemos en los tribunales la querella que estamos por incoar, con el propósito de no empañar judicialmente ni perjudicar la sana imagen que los costarricenses tienen de esta noble institución, la cual debe ser protegida y no debería verse inmiscuida en asuntos tan deplorables y ajenos al honroso quehacer de ustedes, con lo que mis abogados desestimarían de inmediato a petición del suscrito, la eventual demanda solidaria extensiva contra esta entidad pública. (… )” (Extracto de la nota dirigida a Correos [Nombre 002]., aportada por el recurrente; lo destacado no corresponde al original).

La excitativa enviada a las instituciones públicas con el fin de que ellas retiraran la publicidad del programa de radio del amparado, se enmarca dentro de los casos de censura indirecta a la libertad de expresión por varias razones.

Primeramente, la publicidad provee el principal soporte financiero que permite la transmisión de los programas radiales y, a la postre, el sustento económico de las personas que trabajan en dicho programa. Es evidente que si se limita el ingreso económico del programa, también se llega a perjudicarlo o – inclusive- eliminarlo, todo en detrimento tanto de la libertad de expresión como de la de información. La situación descrita resulta incluso más grave cuando se trata medios de comunicación pequeños, como periódicos locales o pequeñas estaciones de radio, cuya estabilidad financiera puede llegar a depender en gran medida de la publicidad estatal. En el caso Tristán Donoso, la Corte Interamericana se pronunció en cuanto a las amenazas económicas a la libertad de expresión:

“129. Finalmente, si bien la sanción penal de días-multa no aparece como excesiva, la condena penal impuesta como forma de responsabilidad ulterior establecida en el presente caso es innecesaria. Adicionalmente, los hechos bajo el examen del Tribunal evidencian que el temor a la sanción civil, ante la pretensión del ex Procurador de una reparación civil sumamente elevada, puede ser a todas luces tan o más intimidante e inhibidor para el ejercicio de la libertad de expresión que una sanción penal, en tanto tiene la potencialidad de comprometer la vida personal y familiar de quien denuncia a un funcionario público, con el resultado evidente y disvalioso de autocensura, tanto para el afectado como para otros potenciales críticos de la actuación de un servidor público”.

En segundo lugar, un diputado de la República no es un ciudadano cualquiera, sino que ostenta un poder político particular debido a su incidencia en la aprobación de proyectos de ley, respecto de los cuales existe cantidad de intereses tanto privados como públicos. Ergo, una recomendación o retiro de publicidad de un programa radial, emitido por un funcionario en una particular posición de poder político y teniendo como leitmotiv su disconformidad con las críticas contra él difundidas por determinado medio de comunicación, constituye una forma velada de intimidación que no solo afecta al programa radial directamente aludido, sino que además envía un mensaje intimidante al resto de medios fomentando un ambiente hostil a las libertades de expresión e información esenciales en un sistema democrático. En el sub iudice, tal amenaza incluso pasó a tener efectos concretos, en la medida que, según la prueba aportada por el accionante, la pauta publicitaria del ICAA, programada para el periodo del 15 de octubre al 15 de noviembre de 2014, fue suspendida mientras se respondía el oficio del recurrido. Si las demás entidades a las que el recurrido dirigió su oficio, hubieran actuado de igual manera, eso hubiera derivado en una grave afectación a la estabilidad financiera del citado programa radial, todo ello teniendo como génesis la inconformidad de un funcionario público con las críticas difundidas en el mismo.

Lo anterior no implica que sea de poca importancia la alegada violación al honor del recurrido y de quienes podrían ser eventualmente responsables por ello. Todo lo contrario, lo reclamado por el recurrido es tan relevante que el ordenamiento jurídico ha establecido vías procesales apropiadas y razonables tanto para defender el honor de la persona afectada (por ejemplo a través de un proceso penal), como para velar por la exactitud de la información divulgada (derecho de rectificación y respuesta).

Ahora bien, las notas aclaratorias enviadas por el accionado en octubre pasado a las instituciones públicas, no afectan el razonamiento de esta Sala. Por un lado, son actuaciones ocurridas con posterioridad a la notificación del curso de este proceso – las notas fueron entregadas a dichas instituciones los días 7 y 8 de octubre de 2014; mientras que la notificación acaeció el 6 de octubre de 2014-. Por el otro, la Sala observa que, si bien se aclaró mediante tales notas que la “ … anterior carta enviada al respecto de este asunto, no buscaba imponerles necesariamente la obligación de tener que retirar su publicidad de ese programa… ” , también se indicó un apercibimiento a las instituciones motivado nuevamente en las críticas hechas al recurrido:

“5.- No omito señalarles respetuosamente su deber de cuidado, entendido en ejercer un mayor control de los recursos que en materia de propaganda, publicidad o información ustedes disponen pautar en medios de comunicación, manteniendo al menos un monitoreo mínimo que les permita conocer como en el caso del CD que les aporto [el cual contiene una edición del programa “Rompiendo El Silencio” ], la calidad de manifestaciones proferidas en los espacios en los que ustedes pautan.” (Extracto de la nota dirigida al Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje, aportada por el recurrido).

Por último, debe acotarse que los funcionarios públicos sí pueden manifestarse en torno a temas de interés público. Sin embargo, ellos son garantes de los derechos fundamentales, de manera que las expresiones que pronuncien deben evitar tornarse en una forma de censura directa o indirecta. Nuevamente, se cita a la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos:

“139. En una sociedad democrática no sólo es legítimo, sino que en ocasiones constituye un deber de las autoridades estatales, pronunciarse sobre cuestiones de interés público. Sin embargo, al hacerlo están sometidos a ciertas limitaciones en cuanto deben constatar en forma razonable, aunque no necesariamente exhaustiva, los hechos en los que fundamentan sus opiniones, y deberían hacerlo con una diligencia aún mayor a la empleada por los particulares, en razón de su alta investidura, del amplio alcance y eventuales efectos que sus expresiones pueden tener en ciertos sectores de la población, y para evitar que los ciudadanos y otras personas interesadas reciban una versión manipulada de determinados hechos. Además, deben tener en cuenta que en tanto funcionarios públicos tienen una posición de garante de los derechos fundamentales de las personas y, por tanto, sus declaraciones no pueden desconocer éstos ni constituir formas de injerencia directa o indirecta o presión lesiva en los derechos de quienes pretenden contribuir a la deliberación pública mediante la expresión y difusión de su pensamiento. Este deber de especial cuidado se ve particularmente acentuado en situaciones de mayor conflictividad social, alteraciones del orden público o polarización social o política, precisamente por el conjunto de riesgos que pueden implicar para determinadas personas o grupos en un momento dado.” (Caso Ríos y otros) En conclusión, la Sala estima el recurrido tiene todo el derecho a defender su honor y reputación por medio de los mecanismos legales que prevé la Constitución y la ley, entre ellos, el derecho de rectificación y respuesta y la querella por los delitos de injurias calumnias y difamación regulada en el Código Penal. En ese sentido, el envío de una nota a los patrocinadores del programa indicando que consideren retirar su patrocinio por el contenido negativo del mismo contra su imagen, constituyó una censura indirecta – en los términos señalados en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana supra citada-, al programa radial “Rompiendo El Silencio” . En la valoración que se hace tiene un peso específico el hecho de que el recurrido ostenta una posición de poder político por su cargo de Diputado de la República, y que efectivamente su misiva causó un efecto negativo más allá de un simple reclamo, al haberse acreditado en autos que produjo efectos sobre uno de los patrocinadores, quien suspendió temporalmente la publicidad (ICAA). Consecuentemente, se declara con lugar dicho extremo.

IX.- En cuanto a las instituciones públicas destinatarias de los oficios del recurrido, la mayoría de ellas únicamente tomó nota del asunto o rechazó tener competencia o injerencia en el mismo, según se hizo constar en los hechos probados. No obstante, también se pudo observar que en el caso del ICAA, la misiva provocó el efecto práctico de suspender temporalmente el patrocino al programa radial del accionante. En efecto, se consigna en el oficio número PRE-CI-557-2014 de 19 de noviembre de 2014:

“Reciba un cordial saludo, atendiendo instrucciones de la Presidencia Ejecutiva Msc. Yamileth Astorga Espeleta, le indico que la pauta correspondiente del 15 de octubre al 15 de noviembre de 2014, estaba pendiente de la respuesta que realizara la Junta Directiva de AYA, ante la nota del señor Oscar López Arias, la cual consta en el expediente Nº 14-15222007-CO de la Sala Constitucional, en donde constas todos los documentos de su interés.

No obstante, me permito informarle como es de su conocimiento que la pauta con su programa se reinició del 1 de noviembre al 15 de diciembre de 2014 (… )” Así las cosas, si bien la Junta Directiva optó finalmente por rechazar competencia y responsabilidad en el asunto, la suspensión de la pausa publicitaria tuvo incidencia negativa en la actividad del amparado, quien ordinariamente debió haber recibido dichas pautas, lo que no ocurrió debido a las cartas dirigidas por el recurrido al ICAA. En realidad, el ICAA, ni tan siquiera como medida cautelar, debió haber suspendido la pauta publicitaria como consecuencia de la misiva del accionado. La Sala no deja de advertir que la censura indirecta por vía del financiamiento puede resultar devastadora cuando afecta a medios de comunicación pequeños o a los programas en ellos divulgados. Así las cosas, esta Sala constata la materialización de un perjuicio que afectó al amparado por el hecho de transmitir en su programa radial la cuña objeto de disputa, lo que va en detrimento de sus libertades de expresión y de información. En ese tanto, se declara con lugar el recurso en contra del ICAA solo para efectos indemnizatorios, toda vez que la pauta publicitaria se reinició.” (el énfasis es agregado) Asimismo, en la sentencia Nº 2016-015220 de las 16:00 horas del 18 de octubre de 2016 se abordó el problema, a partir de las siguientes consideraciones:

“VIII.- Ahora bien, es de suma importancia para el caso concreto indicar que la publicidad provee un soporte financiero fundamental en el actual esquema de funcionamiento de los medios de comunicación colectiva, pues permite la publicación o difusión de su contenido y a la postre, el sustento económico de las personas que trabajan en dicho medio. Es evidente que si se limita el ingreso económico de un medio de comunicación (en este caso escrito), también se llega a perjudicarlo o – inclusive- eliminarlo, todo en detrimento tanto de la libertad de expresión como de la de información. La situación descrita resulta incluso más grave cuando se trata medios de comunicación pequeños, como periódicos locales o pequeñas estaciones de radio, cuya estabilidad financiera puede llegar a depender en gran medida de la publicidad estatal. En el caso Tristán Donoso, la Corte Interamericana se pronunció en cuanto a las amenazas económicas a la libertad de expresión:

“129. Finalmente, si bien la sanción penal de días-multa no aparece como excesiva, la condena penal impuesta como forma de responsabilidad ulterior establecida en el presente caso es innecesaria. Adicionalmente, los hechos bajo el examen del Tribunal evidencian que el temor a la sanción civil, ante la pretensión del ex Procurador de una reparación civil sumamente elevada, puede ser a todas luces tan o más intimidante e inhibidor para el ejercicio de la libertad de expresión que una sanción penal, en tanto tiene la potencialidad de comprometer la vida personal y familiar de quien denuncia a un funcionario público, con el resultado evidente y disvalioso de autocensura, tanto para el afectado como para otros potenciales críticos de la actuación de un servidor público”.

Debe, sin embargo, hacerse una precisión para adaptar lo dicho a las particularidades de este caso. El Gerente del Banco recurrido expone que resultaría incorrecto que la Sala venga a señalar la manera en que debe conducirse un aspecto vital para el negocio comercial que opera el Banco, cual es la publicidad, y en este punto le asiste la razón. La Sala entiende que debe tomarse en cuenta la condición jurídica del Banco Nacional [Nombre 002], dentro del entramado administrativo estatal, pues se trata de una institución con autonomía constitucionalmente reconocida y a la cual se ha encargado de llevar a cabo una actividad incuestionablemente comercial y, además de ello, en régimen de competencia con entidades privadas. En esa dinámica, la publicidad comercial que puedan realizar las empresas estatales responde y debe responder claramente a decisiones y valoraciones técnicas y objetivas y sobre tales aspectos no cabe la injerencia de un órgano de protección de Derechos Fundamentales como esta Sala.- No es allí donde se origina el conflicto constitucional y de Derechos Humanos que aquí se analiza, como lo demuestra la posición general expresada en el informe del año 2012 de Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos titulado “Principios sobre la regulación de la publicidad oficial y libertad de expresión”. En dicho documento se deja bien establecida la necesidad de que las distintas instituciones estatales cuenten con planes técnica y objetivamente diseñados para sus finalidades de comunicación y ello se repite en expediente legislativo de la investigación, donde las Diputadas y Diputados y el propio recurrente dejan afirmado que la particular condición de las empresas públicas debe tenerse en cuenta y respetarse las decisiones técnicas y objetivas sobre publicidad. Al respecto, de manera precisa señala el propio recurrente que:

“el criterio para distribuir la pauta publicitaria debe ser criterios de mercado, deben ser planes de medios diseñados por profesionales en la materia y se debe invertir el dinero que haga falta para cumplir ese plan de medios, de manera que lo que la empresa estatal que compite en el mercado quiere comunicar, sea eficientemente comunicado.” (p. 18-36 del Expediente Legislativo 20066) El problema en este caso surge más bien cuando las empresas públicas se separan de ese cauce para gestionar su pauta publicitaria de acuerdo con finalidades ajenas a razones objetivas y técnicas, e incompatibles con el marco constitucional de derechos fundamentales. - Es en ese punto donde la participación de esta Sala adquiere plena justificación y ello es lo que se busca confirmar o descartar a través de este recurso de amparo.

IX- El caso concreto. - El amparado manifiesta que el recurrido ha hecho uso de sus influencias y funciones como Gerente General del Banco Nacional [Nombre 002] para intentar presionar al Diario La Nación a modificar publicaciones y reportajes efectuados; afirma que esa presión se concretó en la reducción paulatina de la pauta publicitaria y en su virtual reducción a cero en los últimos meses. De los hechos probados y del considerando sobre análisis de prueba, la Sala tiene por demostradas, tanto la realidad de la reducción de la pauta del Banco Nacional al Periódico la Nación, a partir de la publicación hecha a finales de febrero, y en particular durante los meses de junio y julio, como las razones que motivaron la misma.- En este último sentido, según se indicó supra, son suficientemente claras las declaraciones del propio funcionario recurrido, emitidas ante los diversos órganos que inquieren sobre su actuación.- En todas ellas el funcionario expresó la existencia de una disconformidad con la forma en que el medio de comunicación reportó durante los meses de febrero, marzo, abril y mayo de 2016, sobre temas referentes a la entidad bancaria accionada en relación con el caso de la empresa LATCO; actuaciones de la Junta Directiva del banco, así como la participación del BNCR, en el caso BICSA. Según narra el recurrente y confirma el Gerente recurrido, la insatisfacción alcanzó su cima con este último caso, al entenderse que el periódico estaba dejando de lado las respuestas del Banco y omitiendo información importante, todo lo cual podría redundar (como efecto ocurrió) en fuertes erogaciones económicas del Banco para mantener niveles mínimos de confianza en su situación. Es por dicho caso y sus supuestas graves consecuencias para el Banco, que el Gerente recurrido dispuso publicar, el 13 de mayo de 2016, un campo pagado en otros dos medios escritos nacionales, a fin de responder a las citadas publicaciones de La Nación y dar a conocer lo que en su criterio era la situación real en torno al caso BICSA. Con esto último la situación derivó para peor, sumando al conflicto, enconados editoriales del medio de comunicación y respuestas del Banco en el mismo tono. Es en este punto que el Gerente decidió “ tener una conversación” con los personeros del medio de comunicación, a raíz de lo cual, dispuso, concomitantemente y mientras tanto, una pausa que denominó "impasse" en la pauta publicitaria al periódico la Nación; esa pausa concluye, (según sus propias palabras) luego de que es atendido por el Director del medio de comunicación. Estos hechos narrados se repiten con consistencia tanto en el escrito del recurrente como en todas las versiones que brindó el propio recurrido ante la Junta Directiva del Banco, ante la Comisión Legislativa que investigó el caso y ante la Sala en el informe rendido y sobre todo consta claramente en el audio aportado por el recurrente.- Dicho lo anterior, la valoración de tales hechos, frente al marco constitucional de la libertad de expresión y el derecho a la información, por parte de este Tribunal no puede ser positiva para el recurrido. Resulta constitucionalmente reprochable que el Gerente General de un Banco púbico, es decir, un funcionario público, haya emitido una orden de retiro de una pauta publicitaria a un determinado diario escrito, sin un fundamento objetivo y técnico válido, sino en razón de su disconformidad, con la forma en que se elaboraban las noticias y reportajes emitidos respecto de las actividades y situación de la entidad bancaria que representa. El Tribunal entiende que lo anterior constituye una censura indirecta, una forma clara de intentar influir en los contenidos informativos del medio de comunicación, y además envía un mensaje intimidante al resto de medios que fomenta un ambiente hostíl a las libertades de expresión e información esenciales en un sistema democrático. Lo anterior, en tanto proviene de un servidor público, resulta totalmente inadmisible frente al necesario respeto y apego a lo que una Diputada apropiadamente definió como “ la lógica democrática” a cuya realización deben contribuir las instancias, incluyendo por supuesto las empresas públicas.- (p. 383 del Expendiente Legislativo 20.066) Ella impone la plasmación más amplia posible de la libertad de expresión y el derecho a la información, sin que esto signifique la renuncia a emplear los medios jurídicamente establecidos para combatir las noticias u opiniones que puedan afectar injustamente la labor de las instituciones.

X.- En efecto, si a juicio del recurrido , el medio de comunicación debía darle el debido derecho de respuesta en los momentos en que solicitó reunirse con los representantes de la empresa en razón de la relevancia de lo publicado, podía y puede presentar las acciones judiciales que considere pertinentes, con el fin de que se determine la eventual afectación de su honor, o de perjuicio a la entidad bancaria que representa y la posible responsabilidad de aquellos que hayan excedido los límites de la libertad de expresión. Además, tenía la opción recogida en el ordenamiento jurídico de acudir al proceso de rectificación o respuesta, en favor de las personas que se vean afectadas por informaciones inexactas o agraviantes emitidas en su perjuicio (artículos 14 de la Convención Americana y 66 y siguientes de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). No obstante, el recurrido optó primero por la publicación de notas aclaratorias en campos pagados a otros medios de comunicación escrito y no lo hizo así con el Diario La Nación. Con ello dejó de lado el mecanismo formal de rectificación y respuesta ante el Diario La Nación, o algún otro medio de prensa del Grupo Nación, y lo hizo de manera absolutamente deliberada, según lo expresa ante la Comisión que “… (… ) alguno de Ustedes, conversaba de que porqué no acudía a la vía judicial. ¿Voy a ir a poner un recurso a la Sala Cuarta para decirles que me den un derecho de respuesta? Estuviéramos en el proceso de admisión todavía.” (p. 383 Expediente Legislativo 20.066). Se trata de desafortunadas consideraciones, no solo porque no responden a la verdadera realidad del proceso de rectificación y respuesta, -el cual contrario a lo que afirma, tiene un proceso de admisión muy expedito-, sino porque con ellas se pretende además justificar la realización de vías de hecho o actos de presión por encima de las vías del derecho, para lograr una modificación en contenido de los reportajes del periódico.- Sobre este tema, cabe recalcar, tal y como se mencionó, que tales intentos de censura, directa o indirecta, no encuentran cabida en nuestro medio, ni en el estado constitucional de derecho.

XI.- Conclusión.-Así las cosas, esta Sala comprueba un acto de censura indirecta ejecutado por un servidor estatal, con el fin de limitar la libertad de información que debe disfrutar el medio de comunicación amparado, mediante una disminución de la pauta publicitaria, sin razones técnicas u objetivas y más bien con la clara intención de incidir en el contenido informativo del medio de prensa en relación con sus reportajes referentes al Banco Nacional [Nombre 002] y sus subsidiarias.

En el caso se comprueba lo que claramente la doctrina ha denominado censura indirecta, una forma de acoso ilegítimo de un medio de comunicación de parte de un ente público, que no sólo lesiona la libertad de expresión según se dijo líneas atrás, sino el derecho de los ciudadanos de contar con mecanismos de información veraz en la democracia. Es una forma perversa y antidemocrática de utilizar el poder del Estado para dirigir la opinión, según un sistema de “premio o castigo”, a quienes ejercen la libertad de prensa y libre expresión garantizada constitucional y convencionalmente. Sobre este tema la Comisión de Derechos Humanos y la doctrina más autorizada han sido enfáticas en señalar que “no se puede restringir el derecho de expresión tampoco por vías o medios indirectos, tales como el abuso de controles oficiales o particulares de papel para periódicos, de frecuencias radioeléctricas, o de enseres y aparatos usados en la difusión de información o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones”.

Los mecanismos de censura directa o “ indirecta” están claramente prohibidos por el artículo 13.3 de la Convención Americana fueron objeto de atención por parte de distintos órganos del sistema interamericano. Interpretando el artículo 13.3 citado, la Declaración de Principios sobre Libertad de Expresión aprobada por la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (en adelante, “CIDH” ), establece en su principio 5 que “ [l]a censura previa, interferencia o presión directa o indirecta sobre cualquier expresión, opinión o información difundida a través de cualquier medio de comunicación oral, escrito, artístico, visual o electrónico, debe estar prohibida por la ley. Las restricciones en la circulación libre de ideas y opiniones, como así también la imposición arbitraria de información y la creación de obstáculos al libre flujo informativo, violan el derecho a la libertad de expresión”. Y en su principio 13 indica que “ la utilización del poder del Estado y los recursos de la hacienda pública; la concesión de prebendas arancelarias; la asignación arbitraria y discriminatoria de publicidad oficial y créditos oficiales; el otorgamiento de frecuencias de radio y televisión, entre otros, con el objetivo de presionar y castigar, o premiar y privilegiar a los comunicadores sociales y a los medios de comunicación en función de sus líneas informativas, atentan contra la libertad de expresión y deben estar expresamente prohibidos por la ley” .

Por su parte la Corte Interamericana ha señalado que “todo acto del poder público que implique una restricción al derecho de buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas, en mayor medida o por medios distintos de los autorizados por la misma Convención, son ilegítimos.

Es reconocido ampliamente en la doctrina, que la censura indirecta normalmente se oculta detrás de acciones aparentemente legítimas que, sin embargo, son adelantadas con el propósito de condicionar el ejercicio de la libertad de expresión de los individuos. Cuando eso sucede, se configura una violación del artículo 13.3 de la Convención. Como lo ha sostenido la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (en adelante, la “Corte Interamericana” o “ Corte” ), resulta violatorio de la libertad de expresión”. (Corte I.D.H. La Colegiación obligatoria de periodistas (Arts. 13 y 29 Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos). Opinión Consultiva OC-5/85 del 13 de noviembre de 1985, Serie A No. 5, párr. 55.)

Estos mecanismos de restricción fueron también objeto de análisis por parte de la Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión de la CIDH, que en su Informe Anual 2003 llamó la atención sobre estas “obstrucciones oscuras, impuestas silenciosamente [que] no dan lugar a investigaciones ni merecen una censura generalizada” . La cuestión también fue abordada por esta oficina en sus Informes de 2008 y 2009.

La jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana por su parte, ha condenado en distintas ocasiones la adopción de medidas estatales que constituyen medios indirectos de restricción de la libertad de expresión. Así, por ejemplo, ha condenado la exigencia de la colegiatura obligatoria de periodistas, el uso arbitrario de las facultades de regulación del Estado cuando éste ha sido utilizado para iniciar acciones intimidatorias contra las directivas de un medio de comunicación, o para revocar la nacionalidad del director de un medio como consecuencia de la línea editorial de los programas que transmite (Caso Ivcher Bronstein vs Perú).

Los relatores para la libertad de expresión de la ONU, la OEA y la OSCE también han abordado el tema de las restricciones indirectas a la libertad de expresión por parte de las autoridades. Por ejemplo, en su Declaración Conjunta de 2002 afirmaron que, “los gobiernos y los órganos públicos nunca deben abusar de su custodia de las finanzas públicas para tratar de influir en el contenido de la información de los medios de prensa; el anuncio de publicidad debe basarse en razones de mercado” .

El uso arbitrario de la publicidad oficial fue uno de los primeros mecanismos de censura indirecta abordados por el sistema interamericano. En efecto, la Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión en su Informe Anual 2003 dedicó un capítulo especial a estudiar el fenómeno y concluyó que “la obstrucción indirecta a través de la publicidad estatal actúa como un fuerte disuasivo de la libertad de expresión” (CIDH Informe Anual OEA/Ser. L/VI.118. Doc 70, diciembre 2003). Según indicó en ese momento la Relatoría Especial:

“este tema merece especial atención en las Américas, donde la concentración de los medios de comunicación ha fomentado, históricamente, el abuso de poder por parte de los gobernantes en la distribución arbitraria de publicidad oficial, como otros mecanismos de censura indirecta, opera sobre distintos tipos de necesidades que los medios de comunicación tienen para funcionar e intereses que pueden afectarlos. Es una forma de presión que actúa como premio o castigo que tiene por objeto condicionar la línea editorial de un medio según la voluntad de quien ejerce la presión. Según se dijo, los mecanismos de censura indirecta suelen esconderse detrás del aparente ejercicio legítimo de facultades estatales, muchas de las cuales se ejercen por los funcionarios en forma discrecional. En el caso de la distribución de la publicidad oficial, se configura un caso de censura indirecta cuando la misma es realizada con fines discriminatorios de acuerdo a la posición editorial del medio incluido o excluido en ese reparto y con el objeto de condicionar su posición editorial o línea informativa.

Para determinar cuando hubo o no violación a la libertad de expresión con motivo del ejercicio de esas facultades, es necesario analizar el contexto. Eso es precisamente lo que ha quedado demostrado en este amparo, que el retiro de la publicidad durante el primer semestre del año 2016, pero en particular de los meses posteriores a las publicaciones de finales de febrero, se dio en un contexto de confrontación con el medio, donde se logra comprobar que la estrategia no obedeció a criterios objetivos, sino que se dio, en palabras del propio gerente, con el fin de “ motivar” al diario a cambiar su línea editorial y enfoque noticioso, en vez de utilizar los mecanismos legales, existentes como el derecho de rectificación y respuesta si se estimaba que se trataba de informaciones inexactas o agraviantes.

En los casos Baruch Ivcher Bronstein Vs. Perú. Sentencia de 6 de febrero de 2001. Serie C No. 74, párr. 154. En sentido similar, conf. Corte I.D.H, “Caso Perozo y otros Vs. Venezuela”. Sentencia de 28 de enero de 2009. Serie C No. 195, la Corte Interamericana, ha sostenido que “[al] evaluar una supuesta restricción o limitación a la libertad de expresión, el Tribunal no debe sujetarse únicamente al estudio del acto en cuestión, sino que debe igualmente examinar dicho acto a la luz de los hechos del caso en su totalidad, incluyendo las circunstancias y el contexto en los que éstos se presentaron”. Siguiendo el mismo razonamiento, sostuvo que “la enunciación de medios restrictivos que hace el artículo 13.3 no es taxativa ni impide considerar 'cualesquiera otros medios' o vías indirectas derivados de nuevas tecnologías (… ). Para que se configure una violación al artículo 13.3 de la Convención es necesario que la vía o el medio restrinjan efectivamente, aunque sea en forma indirecta, la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones”(OC-5/85 y caso Ríos y otros contra Venezuela). por su parte, la Relatoría para la libertad de expresión ha venido denunciando que este tipo de censuras indirectas se dan con frecuencia y ello se debe a la ausencia de normas legales que regulen la distribución de la pauta publicitaria y reduzcan la discrecionalidad de los funcionarios públicos. En el mismo sentido, fue señalada por la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Argentina en el caso Editorial Río Negro S.A. c. Provincia de Neuquén, en el cual el tribunal indicó que la Provincia de Neuquén había violado la libertad de expresión de un diario al eliminar la publicidad oficial que allí tenía contratada como consecuencia de una cobertura crítica. La Corte Suprema señaló que la Provincia de Neuquén debería establecer un marco legal adecuado que limite la discrecionalidad de los funcionarios públicos e impida ese tipo de arbitrariedades.

Asimismo, la Corte Suprema de Chile resolvió un reclamo presentado por la Revista Punto Final contra la distribución de publicidad oficial realizada por algunos ministerios. Allí, el tribunal consideró que el orden jurídico chileno otorga a los funcionarios “un amplio margen de discrecionalidad” y recomendó que la inversión de publicidad estatal se haga “bajo criterios transparentes y no discriminatorios”( caso 9148/09). También se han dado casos en países como Estados Unidos (El Día Vs. Rossello, la Corte Federal de Apelaciones del Primer Circuito), en el que se estableció que el retiro de publicidad oficial por parte de la administración del gobernador de Puerto Rico, Pedro Rossello al diario El Día, como consecuencia de críticas que el periódico había hecho al gobernador, constituía una clara violación del derecho a la libertad de expresión garantizado por la Primera Enmienda a la Constitución de los Estados Unidos. En ese sentido, la Corte de Apelaciones entendió que “usar fondos del gobierno para castigar el discurso político de miembros de la prensa y buscar coaccionar [a los medios de comunicación para que emitan] expresiones favorables al gobierno es contrario a la Primera Enmienda”. Además, la Corte entendió que “el derecho claramente establecido prohíbe al gobierno condicionar la revocación de beneficios [en este caso, la publicidad del Estado] sobre una base que infringe intereses constitucionalmente protegidos (Corte de Apelaciones del Primer Circuito, Puerto Rico, caso El Día vs. Rossello, decisión del 25 de enero de 1999, 165 F.3d 106, pág. 110).

Queda claro de lo expuesto y de los informes de la Relatoría de Libertad de Expresión que el Estado tiene derecho a establecer y modificar su pauta publicitaria, pero que debe hacerlo por medio de criterios objetivos y transparentes, establecidos en forma planificada que aseguren que no se utiliza el poder del Estado o sus fondos, para discriminar, manipular o censurar directa o indirectamente la libertad de expresión y de prensa garantizados convencional y constitucionalmente. Por las razones expuestas, se declara con lugar el recurso en contra del Banco Nacional [Nombre 002], con los efectos que se dirán en la parte dispositiva.” (el destacado es suplido) También en la decisión Nº 2018013315 de las 9:20 horas del 17 de agosto de 2018 la Sala dejó claro que la asignación arbitraria de recursos públicos a través de compra de publicidad, como medio para restringir la libertad de expresión, contraviene tanto la Constitución como el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos:

“La Declaración de Principios sobre la Libertad de Expresión, aprobada por la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos como instrumento para interpretar el numeral 13 de la Convención Americana, en su Principio 13 establece “La utilización del poder del Estado y los recursos de la hacienda pública; la concesión de prebendas arancelarias; la asignación arbitraria y discriminatoria de publicidad oficial y créditos oficiales; el otorgamiento de frecuencias de radio y televisión, entre otros, con el objetivo de presionar y castigar o premiar y privilegiar a los comunicadores sociales y a los medios de comunicación en función de sus líneas informativas, atenta contra la libertad de expresión y deben estar expresamente prohibidos por la ley. Los medios de comunicación social tienen derecho a realizar su labor en forma independiente. Presiones directas o indirectas dirigidas a silenciar la labor informativa de los comunicadores sociales son incompatibles con la libertad de expresión. ” También deviene relevante, como fuente doctrinaria, la Declaración de Chapultepec adoptada por la Conferencia Hemisférica sobre Libertad de Expresión celebrada en México D.F. el 11 de marzo de 1994, que constituye una manifestación de voluntad y apoyo de numerosos dirigentes en defensa del derecho a la libertad de expresión, lo que la reviste de una fuerte legitimación. Su Principio 6 dispone “los medios de comunicación y los periodistas no deben ser objeto de discriminaciones o favores en razón de lo que escriban o digan”. En otros ámbitos, la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos ha sostenido que la insuficiente precisión de las leyes y el establecimiento de facultades inaceptablemente discrecionales, constituyen violaciones a la libertad de expresión. Así, cuando la normativa no es clara o deja las decisiones a la discreción de funcionarios públicos, se da un marco legal contrario a la libertad de expresión. De igual forma, en el caso Ricardo Canese, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos indicó:

“97. El control democrático, por parte de la sociedad a través de la opinión pública, fomenta la transparencia de las actividades estatales y promueve la responsabilidad de los funcionarios sobre su gestión pública, razón por la cual debe existir un mayor margen de tolerancia frente a afirmaciones y apreciaciones vertidas en el curso de los debates políticos o sobre cuestiones de interés público.

98. El Tribunal ha establecido que es lógico y apropiado que las expresiones concernientes a funcionarios públicos o a otras personas que ejercen funciones de una naturaleza pública deben gozar, en los términos del artículo 13.2 de la Convención, de un margen de apertura a un debate amplio respecto de asuntos de interés público, el cual es esencial para el funcionamiento de un sistema verdaderamente democrático.(…)” Ningún tipo de censura, directa o indirecta, encuentra cabida en nuestro medio, así lo expresa el inciso tercero del ordinal 13 de la Convención Americana:

“3. No se puede restringir el derecho de expresión por vías o medios indirectos, tales como el abuso de controles oficiales o particulares de papel para periódicos, de frecuencias radioeléctricas, o de enseres y aparatos usados en la difusión de información o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones.” (el resaltado no es del original) En este sentido, la censura puede ser directa –verbigracia, la prohibición directa de cierta publicación- o indirecta (también denominada soft censorship, censura sutil, velada) –por ejemplo, la utilización de diversos medios para intimidar y de ese modo evitar una publicación, o el impedimento injustificado al acceso a información de interés público–. Asimismo, el artículo 13 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos contempla una lista no taxativa de casos de censura por medios indirectos (controles de papel, de frecuencias, etc.) y de modo expreso deja abierta las posibilidades, cuando estatuye: “…o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones.” A igual conclusión se llega en la sentencia Nº 2020016167 de las 9:20 horas del 28 de agosto de 2020, donde se diferencia un caso en el que mediaron razones objetivas para cancelar la suscripción a varios medios de comunicación escrita -y no se decretó, por ende, que se hubiera incurrido en infracción de la libertad de expresión- de otro en el cual las actuaciones tuvieron sustento en un desacuerdo con las supuestas posiciones de un medio de comunicación, en cuyo caso se concluyó en un quebranto de la libertad en comentario:

“IV.- SOBRE EL CASO CONCRETO. En el sub examine, el amparado reclama que el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social vulnera los derechos fundamentales, dado que se canceló la suscripción del Diario Extra. Al respecto, en el informe rendido bajo juramento por la Ministra de Trabajo y Seguridad Social se indicó, respecto a la cancelación por parte del MTSS de la suscripción mantenida con el Diario Extra, que: “(…) esa decisión obedeció a que producto del Estado de Emergencia Sanitaria que enfrenta el país, que nos ha causado afectación económica no solo a nivel nacional sino también mundial, el Poder Ejecutivo gestionó días atrás, recorte en el gasto público. Siendo que ese recorte presupuestario, nos obligó cómo Institución a liberar costos en algunas partidas específicas, cuidando desde luego, no afectar el servicio que como Cartera brindamos a la ciudadanía. Siendo entonces, que en virtud de ese recorte presupuestario que realizamos, fue que se adoptó la decisión de eliminar la suscripción que la Institución mantenía con algunos diarios de circulación nacional, tales como: Diario Extra, La Nación, El Financiero y La República. Pues el monto para el pago de las suscripciones invocadas, se acreditaba desde la misma partida con la que se compraban suministros de papel y cartón y ello representaba casi el 50% del presupuesto para esos efectos. Y siendo que a raíz de la pandemia producida por el virus COVID 19, debemos tener disponibles toallas de papel para los lavatorios que tenemos instalados para el lavado de manos de personas funcionarias y usuarias de este Ministerio; fue que se prioriza la compra de suministros citados, con la consecuencia de eliminar las suscripciones mencionadas” (la negrita no es del original).

Así, el Tribunal verifica que, el 14 de julio de 2020, un funcionario del MTSS remitió el oficio DGAF-OF-383-2020 a la representante legal de la Sociedad Periodística Extra Limitada, en el que manifestó: “De la manera más atenta y en marco de la contratación 2019CD-000045-0007000001; bajo la modalidad según demanda para la adquisición ejemplares del periódico La Extra, se informa que en atención a instrucciones superiores y en cumplimiento de las nuevas directrices emitidas por el Gobierno de la República [Nombre 002], que insta hacer recortes presupuestarios mandatorios a efecto de orientarse a la atención de la pandemia COVID-19 nos vemos en la necesidad de solicitar formalmente, la cancelación indefinida de entrega de dicho periódico a partir del día 16 de julio de 2020”. En igual sentido, se observan los oficios DGAD-OF-376-2020 dirigido al representante legal de Properiodicos Limitada y DGAD-OF-382-2020 remitido al representante legal de Grupo Nación GN S.A., mediante los cuales se informó sobre la cancelación de la suscripción que mantenía el MTSS con los periódicos La República, así como La Nación y El Financiero, respectivamente.

De este modo, contrario a lo alegado por el tutelado, este Tribunal estima que la actuación del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social no conculca los derechos fundamentales. Nótese que, en el sub iudice, el MTSS canceló la suscripción no solo del Diario Extra, sino de otros medios de comunicación como La República, La Nación y El Financiero. Además, no se verifica que tal decisión haya sido arbitraria, sino que la misma obedece a un recorte presupuestario derivado de la pandemia de la covid-19. Al respecto, cabe reiterar que en el informe rendido bajo juramento por la ministra de Trabajo y Seguridad Social se consignó que “(…) el monto para el pago de las suscripciones invocadas, se acreditaba desde la misma partida con la que se compraban suministros de papel y cartón y ello representaba casi el 50% del presupuesto para esos efectos. Y siendo que a raíz de la pandemia producida por el virus COVID 19, debemos tener disponibles toallas de papel para los lavatorios que tenemos instalados para el lavado de manos de personas funcionarias y usuarias de este Ministerio; fue que se prioriza la compra de suministros citados, con la consecuencia de eliminar las suscripciones mencionadas”. Ergo, dadas las condiciones provocadas por la referida pandemia, tal institución priorizó la compra de toallas de papel, lo que conllevó que se prescindiera de las suscripciones referidas. Por consiguiente, al no haberse verificado la vulneración a los derechos fundamentales, lo procedente es declarar sin lugar el recurso en cuanto a tal extremo.

V.- Por otra parte, en cuanto al reclamo formulado por el recurrente respecto al accionar del ICAA, el Tribunal observa que el 29 de junio de 2020 se emitió la “MINUTA GG-2020-02784”, relativa a una reunión efectuada entre funcionarios del ICAA y representantes del sindicato SITRAA, documento que carece de firmas y en el que se consigna: “Objetivo: Temas variaos SITRAA Lugar: Virtual Fecha:29-06-20 Hora de inicio: 11:00am Hora final: 12:40pm (…) 1. Campaña de refuerzo labor de AyA, acción, SITRAA- AyA. cuadrillas operativas, lema héroes de la higiene. Mario Rodríguez explica la propuesta, desde SITRAA se ha realizado una campaña de comunicación para levantar la imagen del AyA. No están de acuerdo con la campaña y gastos que tiene programado el AyA. Lema: “Héroes de la Higiene”, quieren iniciar con una campaña con este lema y realizarlo con apoyo de los trabajadores operativos en todo el país. Yamileth Astorga le consulta a Mario cuál es el objetivo de la Contratación de Publicidad del AyA, al parecer no lo tiene claro, por ende ella le realiza una explicación detallada, el objetivo es la conectividad de las viviendas a las redes de alcantarillado de AyA. Aclara que la campaña no es para levantar la imagen de AyA, sino para estimular a la población a que se conecte a las redes de alcantarillado. Hace un llamado a no alimentar a los Diarios Extra y CRHoy, ya que el objetivo de éstos es la privatización. Mario comenta que ellos no dan información a la prensa, más bien indica que la prensa les solicita a ellos aclaraciones de cosas que ellos no conocen. Aclara que SITRAA lleva a la prensa las cosas que no reciben respuesta por parte de la Administración. Maritza Alvarado realiza comentarios sobre la campaña, indica que la propuesta de SITRAA le parece bien se puede hacer con recursos propios, recomienda que exista unidad para levantar la imagen de AyA, señala algunas labores que se han desarrollado desde la Dirección de Comunicación Institucional. Se debe reforzar la base interna antes de proyectarnos a lo externo. Marianela de SITRAA comenta que sería bueno que doña Yamileth lea detenidamente los comunicados que salen en prensa, para que se de (sic) cuenta que el SITRAA no está perjudicando la imagen, sino mas (sic) bien defienden la institucionalidad del AyA, por su importancia en la gestión del recurso hídrico. Yamileth indica que los medios solo publican cosas que debilitan la imagen de AyA, solicita hacer una alianza con los sindicatos para levantar la imagen de la Institución (…)” (el énfasis fue suplido).

Al respecto, la Presidenta Ejecutiva del ICAA indica en el informe rendido bajo juramento ante este Tribunal Constitucional que: “En atención a la formalidad establecida a nivel institucional, se levantó un borrador de minuta de la reunión, con número GG-2020-02784, el cual está asociado al número de oficio, dicho borrador no lleva ninguna firma o rúbrica de los participantes y se aclara en este acto, que a pesar de que estaban convocados los funcionarios de la lista contenida en el borrador de la minuta, los señores Annette Henchoz Castro y Alejando Calderón Acuña, no se presentaron a la reunión que había sido convocada de manera virtual, sin embargo; se realizó de forma presencial. El borrador de minuta fue levantado por el funcionario Andrey Vila Abarca, quien consigna en el formato que se acostumbra a estas reuniones, la agenda y una sucinta referencia de los temas abordados. La minuta posteriormente fue comunicada y compartida vía correo electrónico por el SDI con el Memorando GG-2020-02784, suscrito por el funcionario Andrey Vila Abarca de la Gerencia General, quien tiene bajo su responsabilidad dar seguimiento a los temas y acuerdos de las reuniones con los diferentes sindicatos constituidos en el AYA. Del documento denominado “minuta” se desprende claramente que en ningún momento la suscrita manifestó el hecho que se recurre, por lo que es claro que el recurrente descontextualiza una frase de una minuta, de una reunión sostenida entre la Administración Superior y el Sindicato SITRAA, donde se analiza una campaña motivacional interna al personal del AyA, especialmente, dirigida a los trabajadores que están en primera línea de atención de la pandemia. En ese contexto y en el ánimo de unir esfuerzos hice un llamado a las agrupaciones sindicales para que si hay situaciones que les preocupen a lo interno de la institución presenten sus denuncias a la Administración Superior para que sean atendidas, antes de acudir a los medios de comunicación. A eso me referí puntualmente cuando indiqué “no alimentar los medios” como lo cita la minuta. Reitero, que ni de la minuta ni de ningún otro documento se desprende jamás que se haya “ordenado no hablar con Diario Extra”, ignoro en qué se basa el recurrente para realizar esa temeraria interpretación a la libertad de expresión. De hecho, todas las consultas de prensa realizadas por Diario Extra han sido atendidas en tiempo y forma; de mayo a la fecha, se han recibido y dado respuesta a 9 solicitudes de información planteadas por correo. Diario Extra y Extra TV 42, durante este año han publicado al menos 183 notas relacionadas a la institución” (la negrita fue suplida).

La Sala también observa que, el 21 de julio de 2020, la presidenta ejecutiva del ICAA dirigió el oficio PRE-2020-01101 a la gerente general de Diario Extra, en el que manifestó: “En ejercicio del derecho de respuesta consagrado en los artículos 29 de la Constitución Política y 14 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, así como el 66 en adelante de la Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional, en mi calidad de Presidenta Ejecutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, solicito el debido espacio para rectificar la nota publicada por Diario Extra el día 21 de julio del 2020 titulada “Presidenta AyA ordena no hablar con DIARIO EXTRA”. Agradezco la publicación del siguiente texto: AyA jamás ha ordenado no hablar con Diario Extra Con respecto a la nota publicada en Diario Extra el 21 de julio del 2020, titulada “Presidenta AyA ordena no hablar con Diario Extra”, como Presidenta Ejecutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (AyA) califico de absolutamente falso que se haya “ordenado” a algún funcionario o funcionaria no hablar con el Diario Extra. El periodista descontextualiza una frase de una minuta, de una reunión sostenida entre la Administración Superior y el Sindicato SITRAA, donde se analiza una campaña motivacional interna al personal del AyA, especialmente, dirigida a los trabajadores que están en primera línea de atención de la pandemia. En ese contexto y en el ánimo de unir esfuerzos hago un llamado a las agrupaciones sindicales para que si hay situaciones que les preocupen a lo interno de la institución presenten sus denuncias a la Administración Superior para que sean atendidas, antes de acudir a los medios de comunicación. A eso se refiere puntualmente con “no alimentar los medios...” como lo cita la minuta. Ni de la minuta ni de ninguna parte se desprende jamás que se haya “ordenado no hablar con Diario Extra”, ignoro en qué se basa el periodista para realizar esa temeraria interpretación a la libertad de expresión. De hecho, todas las consultas de prensa realizadas por Diario Extra han sido atendidas en tiempo y forma; de mayo a la fecha, se han recibido y dado respuesta a 9 solicitudes de información planteadas por correo. Diario Extra y Extra TV 42, durante este año han publicado al menos 183 notas relacionadas a la institución. En el AyA somos respetuosos del derecho a la información y la libertad de expresión, nunca estaríamos de acuerdo en lesionar esos derechos. Durante este año a Diario Extra hemos enviado dos derechos de respuesta, uno con respecto a una publicación del día 15 de enero que jamás se publicó, y otro que si fue publicado en la edición del 27 de junio. Somos conscientes del papel vital que juega la prensa para nuestra democracia. Estamos claros de lo importante que es para el país el fortalecimiento de los medios de comunicación, ya que como nación no nos podemos permitir la interrupción de las operaciones de un medio de comunicación, eso sería contrario al interés público de estar informados, máxime en medio de una pandemia, que exige información veraz y oportuna a diario. Hemos confiado y confiamos en el Grupo Extra para realizar nuestras campañas informativas y de rendición de cuentas a la población y seguiremos en la medida de nuestras posibilidades haciéndolo. Jamás podríamos permitir que se nos acuse de asestarle golpe alguno a la libertad de expresión” (el resaltado fue suplido). (…)

De este modo, en el sub iudice, la Sala estima que se ha producido una lesión de relevancia constitucional. Nótese que si bien la minuta aludida carece de firmas, no menos cierto es que la presidenta ejecutiva del ICAA no desmintió su contenido, sino que se limitó a alegar que se descontextualizó la frase “Hace un llamado a no alimentar a los Diarios Extra y CRHoy, ya que el objetivo de éstos es la privatización”, toda vez que lo que pretendió externar fue “un llamado a las agrupaciones sindicales para que si hay situaciones que les preocupen a lo interno de la institución presenten sus denuncias a la Administración Superior para que sean atendidas, antes de acudir a los medios de comunicación. A eso se refiere puntualmente con “no alimentar los medios”. En cuanto al punto, el Tribunal estima que en el sub examine existen indicios suficientes de que la presidenta ejecutiva del ICAA dijo la frase antes transcrita, lo cual, a todas luces, constituye una afectación a los derechos constitucionales a la libertad de pensamiento y expresión, de prensa y a la igualdad, todo esto en relación con los principios constitucionales democrático, de rendición de cuentas y de transparencia en la gestión pública, en virtud de que se trata de una especie de censura velada, dado que el resultado práctico de tal llamado es evitar que los medios de comunicación perjudicados tuviesen acceso a información pública.

En efecto, contrario a lo sostenido por la autoridad recurrida, con la frase en cuestión se exhortó a funcionarios del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, a que se abstuvieren de remitir información de relevancia pública a ciertos medios de comunicación. En primer término, tal actuación implica una seria amenaza a la libertad de pensamiento y expresión de tales servidores, dado que la iniciativa proviene, ni más ni menos, de la propia presidenta ejecutiva de la institución en mención, a partir de lo cual el “llamado a no alimentar a medios” reviste una particular gravedad merced al rango jerárquico de quien lo externó. En segundo término, se vulnera la libertad de prensa y el derecho a la igualdad, toda vez que se incita a que dos medios de comunicación en particular, CR-Hoy y Diario Extra, no reciban información por parte de los funcionarios del ICAA, al tiempo que de manera absolutamente injustificada coloca a los afectados en una clara situación de desventaja frente al resto de medios. En adición, la situación expuesta lesiona a la población en general, dado que “el llamado a no alimentar a medios” le impide al público acceder a información concerniente a la prestación de servicios públicos esenciales, lo cual es inaceptable en una sociedad que se rige por los principios democrático, de rendición de cuentas, y de transparencia en la gestión pública.

En virtud de lo expuesto, lo procedente es declarar con lugar el recurso, en los términos consignados en la parte dispositiva de esta sentencia.” Adicionalmente, a través de la sentencia Nº 2022025167 de las 13:30 horas de 21 de octubre de 2022 reconoció la Sala la relevancia de restringir la censura indirecta proveniente desde el poder público, como problema central de la defensa de la libertad de expresión, en los siguientes términos:

“VII.- SOBRE LA PROHIBICIÓN DE IMPONER RESTRICCIONES POR VÍAS INDIRECTAS A LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN (Y A LA LIBERTAD DE PRENSA). La libertad de expresión y, por ende, la libertad de prensa, no son considerados derechos irrestrictos y absolutos, sino que -tal y como se analizó supra -, se encuentran sujetos a ciertos límites o controles ulteriores. Al respecto, el ordinal 29 de nuestra Carta Política estatuye que las personas serán responsables de los abusos que cometan en el ejercicio del derecho a la libertad de expresión y, por su parte, el artículo 13.2 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos dispone que el referido derecho está sujeto a responsabilidades ulteriores, las que deben estar expresamente fijadas por la ley y ser necesarias para asegurar el respeto a los derechos o la reputación de los demás o proteger la seguridad nacional, el orden público, la salud o la moral pública.

Sin embargo, igualmente, estas limitaciones, ha dicho este Tribunal Constitucional, gozan de carácter excepcional y no pueden restringir tales derechos más allá de lo estrictamente necesario, vaciándolos de contenido y convirtiéndose así en un mecanismo directo o indirecto de censura, el cual no tiene cabida en nuestro medio. Estas libertades, en consecuencia, no pueden ser objeto de restricciones ilegítimas directas (como sería, por ejemplo, la censura previa, el asesinato de periodistas en virtud del ejercicio de sus funciones, etc.) ni, tampoco, de restricciones de índole indirecto (también llamada soft censorship, censura sutil, velada). Estas últimas medidas -de índole indirecto-, se caracterizan por ser menos evidentes, pero que igualmente tienen como propósito reducir o coartar arbitrariamente la libertad de expresión. Se podrían considerar formas más sutiles en que las autoridades públicas o particulares buscan restringir final y efectivamente la libertad de expresión. Los autores García Ramírez y Gonza las definen muy acertadamente como aquellas “(…) acciones u omisiones que traen consigo la inhibición del sujeto, como consecuencia de la intimidación, la obstrucción de canales de expresión o la “siembra” de obstáculos que impiden o limitan severamente el ejercicio de aquella libertad (…)” (García Ramírez (Sergio) y Gonza (Alejandra). La libertad de expresión de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. México, Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal, primera edición, 2007, p. 42). Por su parte, la Relatoría para la Libertad de Expresión explica que “(…) Estas medidas (…) no han sido diseñadas estrictamente para restringir la libertad de expresión. En efecto, éstas per se no configuran una violación de este derecho. No obstante ello, sus efectos generan un impacto adverso en la libre circulación de ideas que con frecuencia es poco investigado y, por ende, más difícil de descubrir (…)” (Informe Anual de la Relatoría para la Libertad de Expresión, 2004).

Como ejemplos de este tipo de restricciones indirectas o censura velada se puede citar, entre otros muchos, el uso de diversos medios para intimidar y, de este modo, evitar una publicación, los controles de papel para periódicos o de frecuencias radioeléctricas, la restricción a la libertad de circulación, la concesión o supresión de publicidad estatal, las limitaciones de ingresos económicos a medios de comunicación, la imposición de altas e injustificadas cargas tributarias. Sobre este tipo de restricciones indirectas, los citados autores García Ramírez y Gonza explican que estas puede ocurrir cuando“(…) se vulnera un derecho diferente de la libertad de expresión misma, en forma que ésta resulta afectada -por ejemplo, en un caso, la privación de la nacionalidad del sujeto-, se practican investigaciones indebidas o excesivas, se prohíbe el acceso a determinados medios de los que regularmente se ha valido el titular del derecho, se restringe la libertad de circulación, se desconocen los efectos de un contrato o se impide a los titulares de ciertos bienes la disposición de éstos (…)” (García Ramírez (Sergio) y Gonza (7200Alejandra). La libertad de expresión en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. México, Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal, primera edición, 2007, p. 42). Por su parte, el Magistrado Rueda Leal, en las razones adicionales consignadas en la Sentencia No. 15220-2016 de las 16:00 hrs. de 18 de octubre de 2016, hizo también referencia a algunas modalidades de este tipo de censura indirecta o velada, enumerando las siguientes: “(…) a) La negativa de acceso a las instituciones y a la información pública como represalia por una cobertura crítica, lo que obliga al medio a acudir a instancias jurisdiccionales. De esta forma, aunque finalmente se obligue a una entidad a entregar determinada información si se demuestra su carácter público, no menos cierto es que la Administración “gana” tiempo, logrando así una divulgación en un “timing” político más favorable. b) La asignación inequitativa de frecuencias de radio y televisión. c) La obstaculización del acceso a recursos elementales para la producción de un medio (como el papel o el servicio telefónico) vía fijación de requerimientos arbitrarios o imposiciones tributarias irrazonables. d) La amenaza de entablar procesos judiciales, condicionada a la divulgación o no de reportajes críticos (…)”.

En cuanto a estas restricciones de índole propiamente indirecto, el artículo 13.3 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, señala expresamente lo siguiente:

“3. No se puede restringir el derecho de expresión por vías o medios indirectos, tales como el abuso de controles oficiales o particulares de papel para periódicos, de frecuencias radioeléctricas, o de enseres y aparatos usados en la difusión de información o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones”. (El destacado no forma parte del original).

La Declaración de Chapultepec (adoptada por la conferencia hemisférica sobre libertad de expresión celebrada en México, D.F. el 11 de marzo de 1994), estatuye que no debe existir ninguna ley o acto de poder que coarte la libertad de expresión o de prensa, cualquiera sea el medio de comunicación. Asimismo, en el elenco de principios menciona lo siguiente:

“4. El asesinato, el terrorismo, el secuestro, las presiones, la intimidación, la prisión injusta de los periodistas, la destrucción material de los medios de comunicación, la violencia de cualquier tipo y la impunidad de los agresores, coartan severamente la libertad de expresión y de prensa. Estos actos deben ser investigados con prontitud y sancionados con severidad”.

“5. La censura previa, las restricciones a la circulación de los medios o a la divulgación de sus mensajes, la imposición arbitraria de información, la creación de obstáculos al libre flujo informativo y las limitaciones al libre ejercicio y movilización de los periodistas, se oponen directamente a la libertad de prensa”.

“6. Los medios de comunicación y los periodistas no deben ser objeto de discriminaciones o favores en razón de lo que escriban o digan.” “7. Las políticas arancelarias y cambiarias, las licencias para la importación de papel o equipo periodístico, el otorgamiento de frecuencias de radio y televisión y la concesión o supresión de publicidad estatal, no deben aplicarse para premiar o castigar a medios o periodistas”.

“10. Ningún medio de comunicación o periodista debe ser sancionado por difundir la verdad o formular críticas o denuncias contra el poder público”. (El destacado no forma parte del original).

Igualmente, la Declaración de Principios sobre Libertad de Expresión (aprobada por la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en octubre de 2000, en el 108 período ordinario), dispone, sobre este mismo tema, lo siguiente:

“5. La censura previa, interferencia o presión directa o indirecta sobre cualquier expresión, opinión o información difundida a través de cualquier medio de comunicación oral, escrito, artístico, visual o electrónico, debe estar prohibida por la ley. Las restricciones en la circulación libre de ideas y opiniones, como así también la imposición arbitraria de información y la creación de obstáculos al libre flujo informativo, violan el derecho a la libertad de expresión”.

“9. El asesinato, secuestro, intimidación, amenaza a los comunicadores sociales, así como la destrucción material de los medios de comunicación, viola los derechos fundamentales de las personas y coarta severamente la libertad de expresión. Es deber de los Estados prevenir e investigar estos hechos, sancionar a sus autores y asegurar a las víctimas una reparación adecuada”.

“13. La utilización del poder del Estado y los recursos de la hacienda pública; la concesión de prebendas arancelarias; la asignación arbitraria y discriminatoria de publicidad oficial y créditos oficiales; el otorgamiento de frecuencias de radio y televisión, entre otros, con el objetivo de presionar y castigar o premiar y privilegiar a los comunicadores sociales y a los medios de comunicación en función de sus líneas informativas, atenta contra la libertad de expresión y deben estar expresamente prohibidos por la ley. Los medios de comunicación social tienen derecho a realizar su labor en forma independiente. Presiones directas o indirectas dirigidas a silenciar la labor informativa de los comunicadores sociales son incompatibles con la libertad de expresión”. (El destacado no forma parte del original).

Como se puede observar con meridiana claridad, existen múltiples formas en que se puede manipular a los medios de forma indirecta. Incluso, la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos es clara al indicar que los ejemplos citados en el ordinal 13.3 no son taxativos, al señalar que este tipo de restricciones indirectas se pueden configurar también “por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones”.

Ahora, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos se ha pronunciado en distintas ocasiones respecto a la censura velada o restricciones propiamente indirectas, condenándolas contundentemente. Así, en la Sentencia Ivcher Bronstein vs. Perú (sentencia de 6 de febrero de 2001), la Corte IDH conoció un caso planteado por Baruch Ivcher Bronstein, ciudadano naturalizado del Perú y accionista mayoritario de la empresa que operaba entonces el canal 2 de la televisión de ese país. Ivcher Bronstein, en esa condición, ejercía control editorial sobre los programas, particularmente, uno llamado Contrapunto (mediante el cual se difundieron varios informes periodísticos sobre torturas, un supuesto asesinato y casos de corrupción cometidos por los Servicios de Inteligencia del Gobierno Peruano) y se demostró que, en virtud de lo anterior, este fue sometido a varios actos intimidatorios que concluyeron con la emisión de un decreto que revocó su ciudadanía peruana. En tal oportunidad, la Corte IDH dispuso que la resolución que dejó sin efecto legal la nacionalidad otorgada a Ivcher Bronstein constituyó precisamente un medio indirecto para restringir su libertad de expresión, así como la de los periodistas que laboraban en dicho programa. En tal ocasión, la Corte IDH vertió los siguientes argumentos de interés:

“(…) 158. De igual manera se ha demostrado que, como consecuencia de la línea editorial asumida por el Canal 2, el señor Ivcher fue objeto de acciones intimidatorias de diverso tipo. Por ejemplo, luego de la emisión de uno de los reportajes mencionados en el párrafo anterior, el Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas emitió un comunicado oficial en el que denunciaba al señor Ivcher por llevar a cabo una campaña difamatoria tendiente a desprestigiar a las Fuerzas Armadas (supra párr. 76.k). Además, el mismo día en que el Ejército emitió dicho comunicado, el Poder Ejecutivo del Perú expidió un decreto supremo que reglamentó la Ley de Nacionalidad, estableciendo la posibilidad de cancelar ésta a los peruanos naturalizados (supra párr. 76.l).

159. Ha sido probado también que días después de que el Canal 2 anunciara la presentación de un reportaje sobre grabaciones ilegales de conversaciones telefónicas sostenidas por candidatos de la oposición, el Director General de la Policía Nacional informó que no se había localizado el expediente en el que se tramitó el título de nacionalidad del señor Ivcher, y que no se había acreditado que éste hubiera renunciado a su nacionalidad israelí, razón por la cual, mediante una “resolución directoral”, se dispuso dejar sin efecto el mencionado título de nacionalidad.

160. Como consecuencia de lo anterior, el 1 de agosto de 1997 el Juez Percy Escobar ordenó que se suspendiera el ejercicio de los derechos del señor Ivcher como accionista mayoritario y Presidente de la Compañía y se revocara su nombramiento como Director de la misma, se convocara judicialmente a una Junta General Extraordinaria de Accionistas para elegir un nuevo Directorio y se prohibiera la transferencia de las acciones de aquél. Además, otorgó la administración provisional de la Empresa a los accionistas minoritarios, hasta que se nombrase un nuevo Directorio, retirando así al señor Ivcher Bronstein del control del Canal 2.

161. La Corte ha constatado que, después de que los accionistas minoritarios de la Compañía asumieron la administración de ésta, se prohibió el ingreso al Canal 2 de periodistas que laboraban en el programa Contrapunto y se modificó la línea informativa de dicho programa (supra párr. 76.v).

162. En el contexto de los hechos señalados, esta Corte observa que la resolución que dejó sin efecto legal el título de nacionalidad del señor Ivcher constituyó un medio indirecto para restringir su libertad de expresión, así como la de los periodistas que laboraban e investigaban para el programa Contrapunto del Canal 2 de la televisión peruana.

163. Al separar al señor Ivcher del control del Canal 2, y excluir a los periodistas del programa Contrapunto, el Estado no sólo restringió el derecho de éstos a circular noticias, ideas y opiniones, sino que afectó también el derecho de todos los peruanos a recibir información, limitando así su libertad para ejercer opciones políticas y desarrollarse plenamente en una sociedad democrática.

164. Por todo lo expuesto, la Corte concluye que el Estado violó el derecho a la libertad de expresión consagrado en el artículo 13.1 y 13.3 de la Convención, en perjuicio de Baruch Ivcher Bronstein (…)”. (El destacado no forma parte del original).

Otro claro ejemplo de este tipo de restricciones indirectas se consigna en el caso Ricardo Canese vs. Paraguay (sentencia de 31 de agosto de 2004). El señor Ricardo Canese, quien era candidato presidencial durante la contienda electoral para las elecciones del Paraguay del año 1993, relacionó a Juan Carlos Wasmosy (también candidato), con acciones ilícitas presuntamente cometidas por este último cuando ejercía como presidente de un consorcio, las cuales, a su vez, fueron publicadas en dos diarios paraguayos. Esto originó que Canese (quien trabajaba en un medio de comunicación), fuera procesado penalmente por la comisión de los delitos de difamación e injuria, siendo condenado en primera instancia en 1994 y en segunda instancia en 1997; oportunidad en la cual, a su vez, se le impuso dos meses de prisión y una multa. Además, como consecuencia de este proceso, Canese fue sometido a una restricción permanente para salir del país (y, también, paralelamente, fue despedido del medio donde laboraba). Estas sentencias, posteriormente, fueron anuladas en diciembre de 2002 por la Sala Penal de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Paraguay. La Corte IDH, hizo referencia a la importancia de garantizar la libertad de expresión durante una campaña electoral y, luego de analizar el caso bajo estudio, sostuvo que la sanción penal a la cual fue sometida Canese era considerada como un método indirecto de restricción a dicho derecho. Expresamente, en dicha ocasión, se indicó lo siguiente:

“(…) 3) La importancia de la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión en el m arco de una campaña electoral.

88. La Corte considera importante resaltar que, en el marco de una campaña electoral, la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión en sus dos dimensiones constituye un bastión fundamental para el debate durante el proceso electoral, debido a que se transforma en una herramienta esencial para la formación de la opinión pública de los electores, fortalece la contienda política entre los distintos candidatos y partidos que participan en los comicios y se transforma en un auténtico instrumento de análisis de las plataformas políticas planteadas por los distintos candidatos, lo cual permite una mayor transparencia y fiscalización de las futuras autoridades y de su gestión. (…)

90. El Tribunal considera indispensable que se proteja y garantice el ejercicio de la libertad de expresión en el debate político que precede a las elecciones de las autoridades estatales que gobernarán un Estado. La formación de la voluntad colectiva mediante el ejercicio del sufragio individual se nutre de las diferentes opciones que presentan los partidos políticos a través de los candidatos que los representan. El debate democrático implica que se permita la circulaci ón libre de ideas e información respecto de los candidatos y sus partidos políticos po r parte de los medios de comunicación, de los propios candidatos y de cualquier persona que desee expresar su opinión o brindar información. Es preciso que todos puedan cuestionar e indagar sobre la capacidad e idoneidad de los candidatos, así como disentir y confrontar sus propuestas, ideas y opiniones de manera que los electores puedan formar su criterio para votar. En este sentido, el ejercicio de los derechos políticos y la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión se e ncuentran íntimamente ligados y se fortalecen entre sí. Al respecto, la Corte Europea ha establecido que:

Las elecciones libres y la libertad de expresión, particularmente la libertad de debate político, forman juntas el cimiento de cualquier sistema democrático (Cfr. Sentencia del caso Math ieu-Mohin y Clerfayt c. Belgica, de 2 de marzo de 1987, Serie A no. 113, p.22, párr. 47, y sentencia del caso Lingens c. Austria de 8 de julio 1986, Serie A no. 103, p. 26, párrs. 41-42). Los dos derechos están interrelacionados y se refuerzan el uno al otro: por ejemplo, como ha indicado la Corte en el pasado, la libertad de expresión es una de las “condiciones” necesarias para “asegurar la libre expresión de opinión del pueblo en la elección del cuerpo legislativo” (ver la sentencia mencionada más arriba del caso Mathieu-Mohin y Clerfayt, p. 24, párr. 54). Por esta razón[,] es particularmente importante que las opiniones y la información de toda clase puedan circular libremente en el período que antecede a las elecciones.

91. La Corte observa que, en sus declaraciones, la presunta víctima hizo referencia a que la empresa CONEMPA, cuyo presidente era el señor Juan Carlos Wasmosy, en ese entonces candidato presidencial, le “pasaba” “dividendos” al exdictador Stroessner. Ha quedado demostrado, así como también es un hecho público, que dicho consorcio era una de las dos empresas encargadas de ejecutar las obras de construcción de la central hidroeléctrica de Itaipú, una de las mayores represas hidroeléctricas del mundo y la principal obra pública del Pa raguay.

92. La Corte estima que no queda duda de que las declaraciones que hiciera el señ or Canese en relación con la empresa CONEMPA atañen a asuntos de interés público, pues en el contexto de la época en que las rindió dicha empresa se encargaba de la c onstrucción de la mencionada central hidroeléctrica. Conforme fluye del acervo probatorio del presente caso (supra párr. 69.4), el propio Congreso Nacional, a través de su Comisión Bicameral de Investigación de Ilícitos, se encargó de la investigación sobre corrupción en Itaipú, en la cual se involucraba al señor Juan Carlos Wasmosy y a la referida empresa.

93. La Corte observa que la Sala Penal de la Corte Suprema de Justicia del Paraguay, al emitir la decisión por la cual anuló las sentencias condenatorias dictadas en 1994 y 1997 (supra párr. 69.49), indicó que las declaraciones que el señor Canese rindió en el marco polít ico de una campaña electoral a la Presidencia de la República, “necesariamente importan en una Sociedad Democrática, encaminada a una construcción participativa y pluralista del Poder, una cuestión de interés público”.

94. En el presente caso, al emitir las declaraciones por las que fue querellado y condenado, el señor Canese estaba ejercitando su derecho a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión en el marco de una contienda electoral, en relación con una figura pública como es un candidato presidencial, sobre asuntos de interés público, al cuestionar la capacidad e idoneidad de un candidato para asumir la Presidencia de la República. Durante la campaña electoral, el señor Canese fue entrevistado sobre la candidatura del señor Wasmosy por periodistas de dos diarios nacionales, en su cará cter de candidato presidencial. Al publicar las declaraciones del señor Canese, los diarios “ABC Color” y “Noticias” jugaron un papel esencial como vehículos para el ejercicio de la dimensión social de la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión, pues recogieron y transmitieron a los electores la opinión de uno de los candidatos presidenciales respecto de otro de ellos, lo cual contribuye a que el electorado cuente con mayor información y diferentes criterios previ o a la toma de decisiones.

• 4)Las restricciones permitidas a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión en una sociedad democrática (…)

98. El Tribunal ha establecido que es lógico y apropiado que las expresiones concernientes a funcionarios públicos o a otras personas que ejercen funciones de una naturaleza pública deben gozar, en los términos del artículo 13.2 de la Convención, de un margen de apertura a un debate amplio respecto de asuntos de interés público, el cual es esencial para e l funcionamiento de un sistema verdaderamente democrático. Este mismo criterio se aplica respecto de las opiniones o declaraciones de interés público que se viertan en relación con una persona que se postula como candidato a la Presidencia de la República, la cual se somete voluntariamente al escrutinio público, así como respecto de asuntos de interés público en los cuales la sociedad tiene un legítimo interés de mantenerse informada, de conocer lo que incide sobre el funcionamiento del Estado, afecta intereses o derechos generales, o le acarrea consecuencias importantes. Como ha quedado establecido, no hay duda de que las declaraciones que hiciera el señor Canese en relación con la empresa CONEMPA atañen a asuntos de interés público (supra párr. 92).

99. En este sentido, la Sala Penal de la Corte Suprema de Justicia del Paraguay, al emitir el 11 de diciembre de 2002 (supra párr. 69.49) la decisión por la cual anuló las sentencias condenatorias dictadas en 1994 y 1997 y absolvió a la presunta víctima de culpa y pena, se refirió al carácter y relevancia de las declaraciones de ésta, al señalar, inter alia, que [l]as afirmaciones del Ing. Canese, -en el marco político de una campaña electoral a la primera magistratura-, necesariamente importan en una Sociedad Democrática, encaminada a una construcción participativa y pluralista del Poder, una cuestión de interés público. Nada más importante y público que la discusión y posterior elección popular del Primer Magistrado de la República.

100. Las anteriores consideraciones no significan, de modo alguno, que el honor de los funcionarios públicos o de las personas públicas no deba ser jurídicamente protegido, sino que éste debe serlo de manera acorde con los principios del pluralismo democrático. Asimismo, la protección de la reputación de particulares que se encuentran inmiscuidos en actividades de interés público también se deberá realizar de conformidad con los principios del pluralismo democrático. (…)

103. Es así que tratándose de funcionarios públicos, de personas que ejercen funciones de una naturaleza pública y de políticos, se debe aplicar un umbral diferente de protección, el cual no se asienta en la calidad del sujeto, sino en el carácter de interé s público que conllevan las actividades o actuaciones de una persona determinada. Aquellas personas que influyen en cuestiones de interés público se han expuesto voluntariamente a un escrutinio público má s exigente y, consecuentemente, en ese ámbito se ven sometidos a un mayor riesgo de sufrir críticas, ya que sus actividades salen del dominio de la esfera privada para insertarse en la esfera del debate público. En este sentido, en el marco del debate público, el margen de aceptación y tolerancia a las críticas por parte del propio Estado, de los funcionarios públicos, de los políticos e inclusive de los particulares que desarrollan actividades sometidas al escrutinio pú blico debe ser mucho mayor que el de los particulares. En esta hipótesis se encuentran los directivos de la empresa CONEMPA, consorcio al cual le fue encargada la ejecución de gran parte de las obras de construcción de la central hidroeléctrica de Itaipú 104. Con base en las anteriores consideraciones, corresponde al Tribunal determinar si, en est e caso, la aplicación de responsabilidades penales ulteriores respecto del supuesto ejercicio abusivo del derecho a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión a través de declaraciones relativas a asuntos de interés público, puede considerarse que cumple con el requisito de necesariedad en una sociedad democrática. Al respecto, es preciso recordar que el Derecho Penal es el medio más restrictivo y severo para establecer responsabilidades respecto de una conducta ilícita.

105. El Tribunal estima que en el proceso seguido contra el señor Canese los órganos judiciales debieron tomar en consideración que aquel rindió sus declaraciones en el contexto de una campaña electoral a la Presidencia de la República y respecto de asuntos de interés público, circunstancia en la cual las opiniones y críticas se emiten de una manera más abierta, intensa y dinámica acorde con los principios del pluralismo democrático. En el presente caso, el juzgador debí a ponderar el respeto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás con el valor que tiene en una sociedad democrática el debate abierto sobre temas de interés o preocupación pública.

106. El proceso penal, la consecuente condena impuesta al señor Canese durante más de ocho años y la restricción para salir del país aplicada durante ocho años y casi cuatro meses, hechos que sustentan el presente caso, constituyeron una sanción innecesaria y excesiva por las declaraciones que emitió la presunta víctima en el marco de la campaña electoral, respecto de otr o candidato a la Presidencia de la República y sobre asuntos de interés público; así como también limitaron el debate abierto sobre temas de interés o preocupación pública y restringieron el ejercicio de la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión del señor Canese de emitir sus opiniones durante el resto de la campaña electoral. De acuerdo con las circunstancias del presente caso, no existía un interés social imperativo que justificara la sanción penal, pues se limitó desproporcionadamente la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión de la presunta v íctima sin tomar en consideración que sus declaraciones se referían a cuestiones de interés público. Lo anterior constituyó una restricción o limitación excesiva en una sociedad democrática al derecho a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión del señor Ricardo Canese, incompatible con el artículo 13 de la Convención Americana.

107. Asimismo, el Tribunal considera que, en este caso, el proceso penal, la consecuente condena impuesta al señor Canese durante más de ocho años y las restricciones para salir del país durante ocho años y casi cuatro meses constituyeron medios indirectos de restricción a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresió n del señor Canese. Al respecto, después de ser condenado penalmente, el señor Canes e fue despedido del medio de comunicación en el cual trabajaba y durante un período no publicó sus artículos en ningún otro diario.

108. Por todo lo expuesto, la Corte considera que el Estado violó el derecho a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión consagrado en el artículo 13 de la Convención Americana, en relación con el artículo 1.1 de dicho tratado, en perjuicio del señor Ricardo Canese, dado que las restricciones al ejercicio de este derecho impuestas a éste durante aproximadamente ocho años excedieron el marco contenido en dicho artículo (…)”. (El destacado no forma parte del original).

Igualmente, de sumo y gran interés resulta el caso Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) vs. Venezuela (sentencia de 22 de junio de 2015). En este asunto, la Corte IDH tuvo por probada la existencia de un ambiente conflictivo y de tensión en Venezuela, producto del golpe de Estado sufrido, el cual, a su vez, originó una polarización política (radicalización de las posturas de los sectores involucrados) y coadyuvó a que el gobierno acusara a los medios de comunicación privados, entre ellos a RCTV (Radio Caracas Televisión), de ser enemigos del gobierno, golpistas y fascistas. La Corte tuvo por demostrado también que el Estado de Venezuela buscó la forma de silenciar a dicho medio de comunicación (habida cuenta que expresaba ideas diferentes a las políticas de gobierno manteniendo una línea crítica a la Presidencia de Hugo Chávez), a través de la no renovación, en el año 2007, de la concesión de uso del espectro radioeléctrico (la cual poseía desde su fundación en el año 1953), lo cual, evidentemente, coartó a este, de forma indirecta o velada, la posibilidad de continuar funcionando y continuar difundiendo información disidente, en clara violación a la libertad de expresión. En esta sentencia, de forma relevante, la Corte IDH sostuvo que dicha decisión fue precedida por diversas declaraciones públicas emitidas, tanto por el Presidente de la República como por otros funcionarios, quienes generaron un ambiente de intimidación. Particularmente, se indicó que el entonces Presidente Chávez, realizó, entre otras, las siguientes manifestaciones:

“(…) 75. (…) a) la declaración del Presidente Chávez de 9 de junio de 2002 en su Programa “Aló Presidente”, en la que afirmó: “las televisoras y las radios, las emisoras, aún cuando sean privadas sólo hacen uso de una concesión, el Estado es el dueño [...], y el Estado le da permiso a un grupo de empresarios que así lo piden para que operen, para que lancen la imagen por esa tubería, pero el Estado se reserva el permiso. Es como si alguien quisiera utilizar una tubería de aguas para surtir agua a un pueblo que sea del Estado, y el Estado le da el permiso. [...] Suponte tú que […] le demos el permiso para que use la tubería de agua [y] comience a envenenar el agua. […] [Hay que] inmediatamente no sólo quitarle el permiso, meterlo preso. Está envenenando a la gente, eso pasa, igualito es el caso [y] la misma lógica, la misma explicación con un canal de televisión”; b) la declaración del Presidente Chávez de 12 de enero de 2003 en su programa “Aló Presidente”, en la que expresó: “Igual pasa con estos dueños de canales de televisión y los dueños de las emisoras de radio; ellos también tienen una concesión del Estado, pero no les pertenece la señal. La señal le pertenece al Estado. Eso quiero dejarlo bien claro, quiero dejarlo bien claro porque si los dueños de estas televisoras y emisoras de radio continúan en su empeño irracional por desestabilizar nuestro país, por tratar de darle pie a la subversión, porque es subversión, sin duda, […] es subversión en este caso fascista y es alentada por los medios de comunicación, por estos señores que he mencionado y otros más que no voy a mencionar. Así lo adelanto a Venezuela. He ordenado revisar todo el procedimiento jurídico a través de los cuales se les dio la concesión a estos señores. La estamos revisando y si ellos no recuperan la normalidad en la utilización de la concesión, si ellos siguen utilizando la concesión para tratar de quebrar el país, o derrocar el gobierno, pues yo estaría en la obligación de revocarles la concesión que se les ha dado para que operen los canales de televisión”; c) la declaración del Presidente Chávez de 9 de noviembre de 2003 en su programa “ Aló Presidente”, a través de la cual manifestó: “no voy a permitir que ustedes lo hagan de nuevo, […] ustedes: Globovisión, Televén, Venevisión y RCTV mañana o pasado mañana [Ministro] Jesse Chacón, le di una orden, usted debe tener un equipo de analistas y de observadores 24 horas al día mirando todos los canales simultáneamente y debemos tener claro, yo lo tengo claro, cual es la raya de la cual ellos no deben pasarse, y ellos deben saber, es la raya de la ley pues. En el momento en que pasen la raya de la ley serán cerrados indefectiblemente para asegurarle la paz a Venezuela, para asegurarle a Venezuela la tranquilidad”, y d) el 9 de mayo de 2004, el Presidente Chávez declaró en su programa “Aló Presidente”: [a]quí los que violan el derecho a la información, el derecho a la libertad de expresión, son los dueños de los medios de comunicación privados, son alguna s excepciones, pero sobre todo los grandes canales de televisión Venevisión, Globovisión, RCTV […] los dueños de estos medios de comunicación están comprometidos con el golpismo, el terrorismo y la desestabilización, y yo pudiera decir a estas alturas no me queda ninguna duda, que los dueños de esos medios de comunicación nosotros bien podemos declararlos enemigos del pueblo de Venezuela (…)

80. (… ) a) la declaración del Presidente Chávez de 28 de diciembre de 2006, por ocasión de su saludo de fin de año a las Fuerzas Armadas, en la cual expresó: “Hay un señor por ahí de esos representantes de la oligarquía, que quería ser presidente de la oligarquía, y que luego esos Gobiernos adecos-copeyanos le dieron concesiones para tener un canal de televisión y él ahora anda diciendo que esa concesión es eterna, se le acaba en marzo la concesión de televisión, se le acaba en marzo, así que mejor que vaya preparando sus maletas y vaya viendo a ver qué va a hacer a partir de marzo, no habrá nueva concesión para ese canal golpista de televisión que se llamó Radio Caracas Televisión, se acaba la concesión, ya está redactada la medida, así que vayan preparándose, apagando los equipos pues, no se va tolerar aquí ningún medio de comunicación que esté al servicio del golpismo, contra el pueblo, contra la nación, contra la independencia nacional, contra la dignidad de la República, Venezuela se respeta, lo anuncio antes que llegue la fecha para, para que no sigan ellos con su cuentito de que no que son 20 años más, 20 años más yo te aviso chirulí, 20 años más si es bueno, se te acabo, se te acabo (…)

• d)el 8 de enero de 2007, en el acto de nombramiento de un nuevo gabinete ministerial, el Presi dente Chávez se pronunció una vez más con respecto a la concesión de RCTV al indicar que: “Nada ni nadie impedirá que se cumpla la decisión de no renovarle la concesión a ese canal de televisión, que todos saben cuál es. Nada ni nadie podrá evitarlo (…)”.

Asimismo, en esta oportunidad y, conforme los siguientes términos, la Corte explicó cómo, en este caso en particular, se dio una violación al artículo 13.3 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos:

“(…) 148. Al respecto, la Corte ha señalado anteriormente que los medios de comunicación son verdaderos instrumentos de la libertad de expresión, que sirven para materializar este derecho y que juegan un papel esencial como vehículos para el ejercicio de la dimensión social de esta libertad en una sociedad democrática, razón por la cual es indispensable que recojan las más diversas informaciones y opiniones. En efecto, este Tribunal coincide con la Comisión respecto a que los medios de comunicación son, generalmente, asociaciones de personas que se han reunido para ejercer de manera sostenida su libertad de expresión, por lo que es inusual en la actualidad que un medio de comunicación no esté a nombre de una persona jurídica, toda vez que la producción y distribución del bien informativo requieren de una estructura organizativa y financiera que responda a las exigencias de la demanda informativa. De manera semejante, así como los sindicatos constituyen instrumentos para el ejercicio del derecho de asociación de los trabajadores y los partidos políticos son vehículos para el ejercicio de los derechos políticos de los ciudadanos, los medios de comunicación son mecanismos que sirven al ejercicio del derecho a la libertad de expresión de quienes los utilizan como medio de difusión de sus ideas o informaciones. (…)

151. En consecuencia, la Corte Interamericana considera que las restricciones a la libertad de expresión frecuentemente se materializan a través de acciones estatales o de particulares que afectan, no solo a la persona jurídica que constituye un medio de comunicación, sino también a la pluralidad de personas naturales, tales como sus accionistas o los periodistas que allí trabajan, que realizan actos de comunicación a través de la misma y cuyos derechos también pueden verse vulnerados (…)

152. Al respecto, debe advertirse que hoy en día una parte importante del periodismo se ejerce a través de personas jurídicas y se reitera que es fundamental que los periodistas que laboran en estos medios de comunicación gocen de la protección y de la independencia necesarias para realizar sus funciones a cabalidad, ya que son ellos los que mantienen informada a la sociedad, requisito indispensable para que ésta goce de una plena libertad. En especial, teniendo en cuenta que su actividad es la manifestación primaria de la libertad de expresión del pensamiento y se encuentra garantizada específicamente por la Convención Americana (…)

1.3. Restricciones indirectas - alcances del artículo 13.3 de la Convención 161. En el presente caso se ha argumentado que se estaría frente a una posible restricción indirecta al derecho a la libertad de expresión, razón por la cual la Corte resalta que el artículo 13.3 de la Convención hace referencia expresa a tal situación al señalar que “[n]o se puede restringir el derecho de expresión por vías o medios indirectos, tales como el abuso de controles oficiales o particulares de papel para periódicos, de frecuencias radioeléctricas, o de enseres y aparatos usados en la difusión de información o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones”. Este Tribunal considera que el alcance del artículo 13.3 de la Convención debe ser el resultado de una lectura conjunta con el artículo 13.1 de la Convención, en el sentido que una interpretación amplia de esta norma permite considerar que protege en forma específica la comunicación, difusión y circulación de ideas y opiniones, de modo que queda prohibido el empleo de “vías o medios indirectos” para restringirlas.

162. Al respecto, la Corte señala que lo que busca este inciso es ejemplificar formas más sutiles de restricción al derecho a la libertad de expresión por parte de autoridades estatales o particulares. En efecto, este Tribunal ha tenido la oportunidad de declarar en casos anteriores la restricción indirecta producida, por ejemplo, mediante una decisión que dejó “sin efecto legal el título de nacionalidad” del accionista mayoritario de un canal de televisión o por “el proceso penal, la consecuente condena impuesta […] durante más de ocho años y las restricciones para salir del país durante ocho años” en contra de un candidato presidencial.

163 Por otra parte, la enunciación de medios restrictivos que hace el artículo 13.3 no es taxativa ni impide considerar “cualesquiera otros medios” o vías indirectas derivados de nuevas tecnologías. En este sentido, el artículo 13 de la Declaración de Principios sobre la Libertad de Expresión indica otros ejemplos de medios o vías indirectas (…)

Igualmente, el perito García Belaunde durante la audiencia pública hizo referencia a otras posibles formas de restricción indirecta relacionadas con: i) “la publicidad, [ya que] los Estados son importantes agentes de publicidad y […] dar mucha publicidad o quitarla puede ser importante y, dado el caso, puede haber una especie de asfixia para los medios que básicamente viven de la publicidad”, o ii) “la tributación [cuando se dan] casos [en] que [las] empresas […] han sido cargadas tributariamente” con el fin de generar molestias o enviar mensajes al medio de comunicación.

164. Asimismo, la Corte recuerda que para que se configure una violación al artículo 13.3 de la Convención es necesario que la vía o el medio restrinjan efectivamente, en forma indirecta, la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones. Además, la Corte reitera que el artículo 13.3 de la Convención impone al Estado obligaciones de garantía, aún en el ámbito de las relaciones entre particulares, pues no sólo abarca restricciones gubernamentales indirectas, sino también controles particulares que produzcan el mismo resultado. Al respecto, la Corte resalta que la restricción indirecta puede llegar a generar un efecto disuasivo, atemorizador e inhibidor sobre todos los que ejercen el derecho a la libertad de expresión, lo que, a su vez, impide el debate público sobre temas de interés de la sociedad. (…)

170. (…) Este Tribunal estima que, dado que el espacio radioeléctrico es un bien escaso, con un número determinado de frecuencias, esto limita el número de medios que pueden acceder a ellas, por lo que es necesario asegurar que en ese número de medios se halle representada una diversidad de visiones o posturas informativas o de opinión. La Corte resalta que el pluralismo de ideas en los medios no se puede medir a partir de la cantidad de medios de comunicación, sino de que las ideas y la información transmitidas sean efectivamente diversas y estén abordadas desde posturas divergentes sin que exista una única visión o postura. Lo anterior debe tenerse en cuenta en los procesos de otorgamiento, renovación de concesiones o licencias de radiodifusión. En este sentido, el Tribunal considera que los límites o restricciones que se deriven de la normatividad relacionada con la radiodifusión deben tener en cuenta la garantía del pluralismo de medios dada su importancia para el funcionamiento de una sociedad democrática (…)

3. Alegada restricción indirecta a la libertad de expresión establecida en el artículo 13.3 de la Convención Americana (…)

193. Ahora bien, para efectuar un análisis del recuento de declaraciones reseñado anteriormente es imperioso realizar una lectura conjunta de las declaraciones y señalamientos, por cuanto de manera aislada no podrían configurar autónomamente hechos constitutivos de una vulneración a la Convención Americana. Esto debido a que el hecho de que varios funcionarios hayan realizado declaraciones en el mismo sentido durante un mismo lapso, demuestra que no fueron declaraciones aisladas. Teniendo en cuenta lo anterior, la Corte procederá a efectuar una valoración de lo allí expuesto con el fin de determinar si existieron razones o motivos por los cuales se arribó a dicha decisión distintos a la finalidad declarada, por cuanto, como ya lo señaló, tener en cuenta el motivo o propósito es relevante para el análisis jurídico de un caso, en especial si se busca determinar si se configuró una actuación arbitraria o una desviación de poder (supra párr. 189). En primer lugar, la Corte resalta que desde el año 2002 se venía advirtiendo que a los canales de televisión que no modificaran su línea editorial no se les renovaría su concesión (supra párr. 75) y que este tipo de declaraciones se acrecentaron cuando se acercó la fecha del vencimiento de las concesiones (supra párrs. 76 a 78). A partir de 2006, en varias de dichas declaraciones que fueron anteriores a la Comunicación Nº 0424 y la Resolución Nº 002 se anunció que la decisión de no renovar la concesión a RCTV ya se encontraba tomada y no sería revaluada o modificada (supra párr. 79 a 86). Asimismo, vale la pena resaltar que no solamente fueron declaraciones de funcionarios estatales en diversos medios de comunicación, sino que además se hicieron publicaciones en diarios nacionales y hasta la divulgación de un libro con el fin de anunciar y justificar la decisión de no renovar la concesión de RCTV. Por lo anterior, el Tribunal puede concluir, en primer lugar, que la decisión fue tomada con bastante anterioridad a la finalización del término de la concesión y que la orden fue dada a CONATEL y al Ministerio para la Telecomunicación desde el ejecutivo.

194. Respecto a las verdaderas razones que habrían motivado la decisión, en las declaraciones y las publicaciones hechas por distintos miembros del gobierno venezolano estas son: i) la no modificación de la línea editorial por parte de RCTV después del golpe de estado de 2002 a pesar de las advertencias realizadas desde ese año, y ii) las alegadas actuaciones irregulares en las que habría incurrido RCTV y que le habrían acarreado sanciones. Sobre la primera razón esgrimida, la Corte considera imperioso manifestar que no es posible realizar una restricción al derecho a la libertad de expresión con base en la discrepancia política que pueda generar una determinada línea editorial a un gobierno. Como fue señalado anteriormente, el derecho a la libertad de expresión no sólo debe garantizarse en lo que respecta a la difusión de información o ideas que son recibidas favorablemente o consideradas como inofensivas o indiferentes, sino especialmente en lo que toca a las que resultan ingratas para el Estado o cualquier sector de la población (supra párr. 140). Con relación a las alegadas actuaciones irregulares en las que habría incurrido RCTV y que le habrían acarreado sanciones, el Tribunal resalta que resulta contradictorio que se hicieran señalamientos y acusaciones sobre las alegadas sanciones y que en la comunicación Nº 0424 se indicara expresamente que estas no eran la justificación de la decisión. En especial, la Corte resalta que a pesar de la gravedad de los hechos relacionados con el golpe de Estado no se probó ante este Tribunal que a nivel interno se hubieran adoptado procedimientos tendientes a sancionar dichas actuaciones irregulares, de forma que no es posible que se utilizara como argumento para fundamentar la decisión lo sucedido durante el golpe, cuando dichas actuaciones no fueron sancionadas en su momento.

195. En este punto, el Tribunal considera necesario reiterar el precedente establecido en otro caso relacionado con este mismo medio de comunicación, según el cual en una sociedad democrática no sólo es legítimo, sino que en ocasiones constituye un deber de las autoridades estatales, pronunciarse sobre cuestiones de interés público. Sin embargo, al hacerlo están sometidos a ciertas limitaciones en cuanto deben constatar en forma razonable, aunque no necesariamente exhaustiva, los hechos en los que fundamentan sus opiniones, y deberían hacerlo con una diligencia aún mayor a la empleada por los particulares, en razón de su alta investidura, del amplio alcance y eventuales efectos que sus expresiones pueden tener en ciertos sectores de la población, y para evitar que los ciudadanos y otras personas interesadas reciban una versión manipulada de determinados hechos. Además, deben tener en cuenta que en tanto funcionarios públicos tienen una posición de garante de los derechos fundamentales de las personas y, por tanto, sus declaraciones no pueden desconocer éstos ni constituir formas de injerencia directa o indirecta o presión lesiva en los derechos de quienes pretenden contribuir a la deliberación pública mediante la expresión y difusión de su pensamiento. Este deber de especial cuidado se ve particularmente acentuado en situaciones de mayor conflictividad social, alteraciones del orden público o polarización social o política, precisamente por el conjunto de riesgos que pueden implicar para determinadas personas o grupos en un momento dado.

196. Asimismo, el Tribunal denota que de las declaraciones aportadas en el presente caso contencioso sólo una habría hecho mención a la finalidad declarada en la Comunicación Nº 0424 y la Resolución Nº 002, es decir, la protección a la pluralidad de medios, mientras que en su mayoría las restantes declaraciones coinciden en invocar las otras declaraciones. Lo anterior, le permite concluir a la Corte, en segundo lugar, que la finalidad declarada no era la real y que sólo se dio con el objetivo de dar una apariencia de legalidad a las decisiones.

4. Conclusión sobre el derecho a la libertad de expresión.

197. La Corte concluye entonces, como lo ha hecho en otros casos, que los hechos del presente caso implicaron una desviación de poder, ya que se hizo uso de una facultad permitida del Estado con el objetivo de alinear editorialmente al medio de comunicación con el gobierno. La anterior afirmación se deriva a partir de las dos conclusiones principales a las cuales puede arribar este Tribunal a partir de lo descrito anteriormente, a saber, que la decisión se encontraba tomada con anterioridad y que se fundaba en las molestias generadas por la línea editorial de RCTV, sumado al contexto sobre el “deterioro a la protección a la libertad de expresión” que fue probado en el presente caso (supra párr. 61).

198. Asimismo, este Tribunal considera necesario resaltar que la desviación de poder aquí declarada tuvo un impacto en el ejercicio de la libertad de expresión, no sólo en los trabajadores y directivos de RCTV, sino además en la dimensión social de dicho derecho (supra párr. 136), es decir, en la ciudadanía que se vio privada de tener acceso a la línea editorial que RCTV representaba. En efecto, la finalidad real buscaba acallar voces críticas al gobierno, las cuales se constituyen junto con el pluralismo, la tolerancia y el espíritu de apertura, en las demandas propias de un debate democrático que, justamente, el derecho a la libertad de expresión busca proteger.

199. Se encuentra probado, en consecuencia, que en el presente caso se configuró una restricción indirecta al ejercicio del derecho a la libertad de expresión producida por la utilización de medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y circulación de la ideas y opiniones, al decidir el Estado que se reservaría la porción del espectro y, por tanto, impedir la participación en los procedimientos administrativos para la adjudicación de los títulos o la renovación de la concesión a un medio que expresaba voces críticas contra el gobierno, razón por la cual el Tribunal declara la vulneración del artículo 13.1 y 13.3 en relación con el artículo 1.1 de la Convención Americana en perjuicio Marcel Granier, Peter Bottome, Jaime Nestares, Inés Bacalao, Eladio Lárez, Eduardo Sapene, Daniela Bergami, Miguel Ángel Rodríguez, Soraya Castellano, María Arriaga y Larissa Patiño. (…)”. (El destacado no forma parte del original).” Además, en la sentencia No. 23107-2022 de las 09:30 hrs. de 4 de octubre de 2022, se hizo especial énfasis en el deber del Estado de armonizar sus actuaciones con la defensa de la libertad de expresión:

“(…) VI.- Caso concreto. En el sub lite, la recurrente alega como primer agravio, que en su condición de periodista, ejerce la dirección del programa de análisis, opinión y autocrítica llamado "Hablando Claro", que se transmite desde el 1° de febrero de 2007, por Radio Columbia y considera que en esa condición las autoridades recurridas lesionaron sus derechos fundamentales, específicamente, los derechos a la libre expresión y libertad de prensa, dado que entre el 8 y el 9 de julio pasado, recibió llamadas de cinco personas funcionarias públicas, que se desempeñan en puestos de jerarquía dentro del Gobierno de la República o en las oficinas de comunicación de ministerios e instituciones descentralizadas, quienes le manifestaron, en condición de fuentes periodísticas confidenciales, que se encontraban alarmadas por un comunicado que la entonces Ministra de Comunicación, Patricia Navarro Molina, les remitió por WhatsApp, a todos los Ministros y Presidentes Ejecutivos del Gobierno. Aduce que, según le relataron sus fuentes, en la referida comunicación, la Ministra instruía a todos los jerarcas a suspender, con carácter de urgencia, todo tipo de publicidad estatal a los medios "Amelia Rueda, La Nación, CRHoy y [Valor 003]". Asimismo, que en ese comunicado se les instaba "con carácter de urgencia a no participar en entrevistas en Hablando Claro y Amelia Rueda".

Al respecto, del informe rendido por las autoridades recurridas, -que se tiene por dado bajo fe de juramento con las consecuencias, incluso penales, previstas en el artículo 44 de la Ley que rige esta Jurisdicción- y la prueba aportada para la resolución del asunto, esta Sala no pudo tener por demostrado que se haya girado la orden o directriz que cuestiona la recurrente. Si bien, puede considerarse que, sobre este punto en particular, los informes recibidos resultan escuetos o lacónicos, lo cierto es que sí expresan claramente que no se giró una orden o indicación en ese sentido. La Sala aprecia que tales informes se enfocan en las competencias y potestades del Ministerio de Comunicación y en aspectos procesales de la presentación de este recurso, pero al negar la existencia de la orden, directriz o indicación referida por la amparada, en este caso en particular se carece de toda posibilidad de tener por demostrada su existencia, siendo así que lo procedente es declarar sin lugar el recurso en cuanto a este extremo.

VII.- Sin embargo, por la trascendencia del tema y la gravedad que podría implicar girar desde el poder público alguna orden en los términos reclamados en este proceso, resulta menester recordar a las autoridades del Ministerio de Comunicación y del Ministerio de la Presidencia, que tal y como se expresó en el quinto considerando de esta sentencia, la libertad de expresión e información conlleva una doble dimensión, que se refleja no sólo en la posibilidad de los periodistas de informar sobre los temas de relevancia para la opinión pública, sino también el derecho que tienen los habitantes del país de enterarse de dicha información, por lo que los órganos y entes públicos se encuentran en el deber de adoptar las medidas correspondientes para que pueda informarse a los y las habitantes de la República sobre las acciones y acontecimientos que se producen o desarrollan en el territorio nacional y que son de interés para la colectividad. Máxime que los temas y decisiones que se toman y tratan desde el gobierno central y toda institución, órgano y ente administrativo, tienen una trascendencia y relevancia para el buen funcionamiento del país y el ejercicio de los derechos reconocidos a la población en general y a sus integrantes dentro de sus propios ámbitos de actuación, por lo que, todos estos temas deben ser tratados con absoluta publicidad y transparencia, sin posibilidad alguna de impedirle a la ciudadanía, a la opinión pública y a cualesquier medio de comunicación colectiva, tener conocimiento de estos. Ergo, las prácticas que obstaculizan el acceso a la información, como lo es el impedir informar sobre determinados eventos o decisiones, rehusarse a brindar entrevistas a diversos medios de comunicación, no invitarlos a formar parte de conferencias o ruedas de prensa, limitarles la publicidad, impedir el acceso a insumos necesarios para la divulgación, entre otras variables relacionadas con la censura directa o indirecta, no pueden ni deben ser avaladas por un Tribunal Constitucional, por la elemental razón de que su acceso y entrega oportuna tiene que hacerse a través de un proceso fácil, expedito y sin complicaciones, que garantice a la población y, en general a la opinión pública, el derecho a la información y a la libertad de expresión.

Dicho lo anterior, se les reitera a las autoridades recurridas que “el gobierno y los tribunales deben permitir que se desarrolle un debate "desinhibido, robusto y abierto", lo que puede incluir expresiones cáusticas, vehementes y a veces ataques severos desagradables hacia el gobierno y los funcionarios públicos” (Cfr. sentencia No. 2006-5977 de las 15:16 horas de 3 de mayo de 2006). En otras palabras, deben tener presente los recurridos que, en el ejercicio de cargos públicos como los que ostentan, y en la era actual, en donde por el avance tecnológico se tiene mayor facilidad de cobertura y acceso a hechos noticiosos, es normal que alguna de las discusiones que se generen al calor de la prensa, pueden resultarles infortunadas y desagradables; no obstante, en un país democrático como Costa Rica, ese ejercicio de la libertad de expresión y la libertad de prensa es lo que nos caracteriza como un Estado Social de Derecho y un pueblo libre. Por tales razones, en aras de garantizar la libertad de prensa y de libre expresión que tienen tanto los periodistas o medios de comunicación colectiva, como la población de manera general, es que las autoridades recurridas deben velar porque cualquier directriz, orden, acto o instrucción que se gire desde el gobierno central se apegue siempre a la protección de estas libertades y de cualquier derecho fundamental de los que se goza en un país democrático como el nuestro (…)” (el destacado es añadido) En la misma dirección de la línea jurisprudencial de esta Sala, supra reseñada, el informe de la Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos del 7 de marzo de 2011, “Principios sobre regulación de la publicidad oficial y la libertad de expresión” destaca en su párrafo 10 que: “La distribución arbitraria de publicidad oficial, como otros mecanismos de censura indirecta, opera sobre distintos tipos de necesidades que los medios de comunicación tienen para funcionar e intereses que pueden afectarlos. Es una forma de presión que actúa como premio o castigo que tiene por objeto condicionar la línea editorial de un medio según la voluntad de quien ejerce la presión.”. A su vez, propone como líneas de acción para restringir la arbitrariedad en esta materia -y con ello, impedir que funja como mecanismo de limitación indirecta de la libertad de expresión- la regulación legal clara y precisa del tema, la asociación de la publicidad oficial con propósitos legítimos de utilidad pública, procedimientos transparentes y objetivos de asignación de la pauta estatal, acceso a la información pública vinculada con este tema, control de la asignación publicitaria y pluralismo informativo.

IX.- CONCLUSIONES. De la conjunción de los diversos elementos normativos, conceptuales y jurisprudenciales reseñados a lo largo de esta sentencia, resta examinar las actuaciones concretas impugnadas y que, a juicio de la Sala, quedaron claramente asentadas en sendos comunicados de prensa. En el caso del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (Kölbi), se expresó, textualmente:

“Valores de la marca kölbi no concuerdan con contenidos expuestos en programa televisivo El Chinamo. Kölbi, marca comercial del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) aclara y comunica a la opinión pública:

0 Los contenidos expuestos por [Nombre 006] [Valor 003] en el programa El Chinamo, puntualmente en la sección El Chinaoke no concuerdan con los valores de nuestra marca.

0 Dado su origen costarricense, Kölbi se aleja de situaciones en las que se promueva o exponga violencia de forma implícita o explícita, discriminación, apología de la delincuencia o parodia del sufrimiento de víctimas.

0 Por el contrario, los esfuerzos publicitarios y comerciales de la marca se enfocan en incentivar valores como la paz, la unión familiar, el respeto, la innovación y la solidaridad, con impacto positivo y propio de la idiosincrasia nacional. Así consta en el recorrido de Kölbi por más de quince años en el mercado.

0 La contratación de los espacios publicitarios en el programa en cuestión, así como de las menciones a kölbi tuvieron el objetivo de asociar la marca con entretenimiento familiar propio de la época de fin e inicio de año; nunca a situaciones alusivas al dolor, la estigmatización o el escarnio.

0 “Como marca líder, nos regimos por principios sólidos que guían nuestras acciones y decisiones. No apoyamos actos opuestos a esos valores, especialmente aquellos contrarios a la responsabilidad social y ambiental que promovemos”, manifestó Leda Acevedo, gerente de Telecomunicaciones del ICE.

0 Por lo expuesto, kölbi ha decidido desligarse del programa El Chinamo y analizará la permanencia de su pauta en [Nombre 006] [Valor 003]” La relación que se efectúa en el comunicado entre el contenido de las parodias objeto del recurso y la contratación de espacios publicitarios es innegable. Al ser el responsable de la marca Kölbi una institución pública, como lo es el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, es contrario a la libertad de expresión “castigar” un contenido concreto, que versaba, como ya se indicó, sobre temas de relevancia pública, que, además, no tenían ninguna relación ni con el instituto ni con la marca encargada de la telefonía móvil. Es, a todas luces, un mecanismo de censura indirecta prohibido por la Constitución (artículos 28 y 29), la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (artículo 13) y el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (artículo 19), que impone la estimatoria del amparo en lo que concierne a este ente autónomo.

En cuanto al Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal el comunicado dice:

“Reafirmamos nuestro compromiso con el sano entretenimiento en estas fiestas. San José, 20 de diciembre de 2024. En el Banco Popular tenemos como una prioridad constante y un valor central de nuestra marca el promover acciones que fortalezcan el bienestar de la ciudadanía, especialmente en momentos como lo son las fiestas de Navidad y Fin de Año, donde la familia y el sano entretenimiento deben ocupar un lugar central.

Con el fin de contribuir al desarrollo de una sociedad más unida y positiva, mantenemos una presencia constante en decenas de medios de comunicación de todo el país, promocionando servicios que mejoran la vida de nuestros clientes y apoyando contenidos en dichos medios que fomenten la alegría de toda la familia, la reflexión y el respeto por la diversidad.

En este contexto, el presidente de la Junta Directiva Nacional del Banco, Jorge Eduardo Sánchez, ha enfatizado que nuestra marca – que es propiedad de nuestros clientes y de las personas trabajadoras [Nombre 002] – no puede verse expuesta a ser relacionada con imágenes inapropiadas o que incluso pudiesen fomentar conductas ajenas a la moral y el orden público al cual nos debemos.

En el caso particular del debate público generado precisamente a partir de algunos contenidos emitidos en la sección “El Chinaoke” del programa “El Chinamo”, que se transmite por parte de [Nombre 006] [Valor 003], lamentamos profundamente como Banco Popular que algunos sectores de la ciudadanía pudiesen sentirse ofendidos o incómodos por dichas imágenes y hemos adoptado las acciones pertinentes para garantizar que nuestras participaciones se propicien siempre dentro de espacios que tienen como prioridad permanente los valores del sano entretenimiento.

De esta forma, y siendo que esta temporada del programa “El Chinamo” se extenderá hasta el próximo lunes 23 de diciembre, mantendremos únicamente el patrocinio de la sección “El Aguinaldazo” que lleva alegría a la familia premiando diariamente con 1 millón de colones a algún afortunado televidente.

Agradecemos y le asignamos la mayor relevancia a la opinión de nuestros clientes en este tipo de materias, y reiteramos que en el Banco Popular trabajamos sin pausa para contribuir al bienestar social, fomentando el respeto, la inclusión y el disfrute responsable para toda la ciudadanía.”.

En los mismos términos que se ha explicado para el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, este segundo comunicado deja ver de forma palmaria que el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal replanteó el patrocinio al programa debido a sus contenidos, como consecuencia negativa por su desacuerdo con él. Igualmente, en el caso del banco, ninguno de los videos aludía de ninguna manera al desempeño de ese ente o a su actividad. Esto, por paridad de razones, al ser igualmente el banco un ente de derecho público (artículo 2 de la Ley No. 4351), implica la estimatoria del recurso en su contra, al haber adoptado una decisión que apareja censura indirecta, prohibida por la Constitución Política (artículos 28 y 29), la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (artículo 13) y el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (artículo 19). (…)” ... Ver más Contenido de Interés:

Tipo de contenido: Voto de mayoría Rama del Derecho: 6. LEY DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL ANOTADA CON JURISPRUDENCIA Tema: 033- Legitimación activa Subtemas:

NO APLICA.

ARTÍCULO 33 DE LA LEY DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL “(…) I.- SOBRE LA LEGITIMACIÓN ACTIVA. Los actores formulan los recursos aquí acumulados de forma diversa. El primero, [Nombre 001], a favor de [Nombre 002]. y el segundo, [Nombre 003], a nombre propio y de los televidentes del programa.

Lo anterior obliga a realizar algunas precisiones sobre la legitimación activa. La más relevante de ellas es recordar que el artículo 33 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regula una legitimación activa vicaria amplia: “Cualquier persona podrá interponer el recurso de amparo”, lo cual se ha reconocido pacíficamente en la doctrina y praxis de nuestra jurisdicción constitucional:

“es preciso indicar que, en el recurso de amparo, la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional en su numeral 33 establece una legitimación vicaria al indicar que "cualquier persona podrá interponer el recurso de amparo a favor de un tercero". Así las cosas, los recurrentes si tienen legitimación para interponer el presente proceso.” (sentencia No. 2003-7149 de las 13:21 horas del 17 de julio de 2003) De esta forma, se puede actuar a favor de alguien más, sin necesidad de que exista un vínculo formal profesional o familiar entre parte actora y parte amparada. Por otra parte, nada impide que esa legitimación abierta se dirija a la defensa de los derechos de una persona física o de una persona jurídica (Cfr. las sentencias No. 2008-12043 de las 10:11 horas del 1º de agosto de 2008, No. 2020-18221 de las 9:15 horas del 25 de setiembre de 2020). Con la salvedad del voto minoritario del magistrado Rueda Leal plasmado infra, la mayoría de este Tribunal ha acordado la defensa de los derechos fundamentales de personas morales.

Finalmente, cabe hacer notar que el recurrente [Nombre 003] demanda la defensa de la libertad de expresión desde el punto de vista de una doble dimensión: activa -la libertad de expresarse- y pasiva -la libertad de recibir y conocer las opiniones de otros- y es en esa condición que se entiende opera la legitimación activa respecto de su recurso. (…)” VCG10/2025 ... Ver más Contenido de Interés:

Tipo de contenido: Voto de mayoría Rama del Derecho: 6. LEY DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL ANOTADA CON JURISPRUDENCIA Tema: 034- Legitimación pasiva. Litis consorcios Subtemas:

NO APLICA.

ARTÍCULO 34 DE LA LEY DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL “(…) II.- SOBRE LA LEGITIMACIÓN PASIVA. Igualmente, la legitimación pasiva en este proceso requiere de una serie de puntualizaciones. Primero, aunque uno de los recurrentes solicita dirigir el amparo contra varias autoridades, solamente consta prueba en los autos relacionada con el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad y con el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, por lo que el recurso se constriñe a ellas.

Asimismo, debido a las particularidades de la actividad que desarrollan tanto el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad como el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal corresponde precisar su condición de legitimados pasivos.

El Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad fue creado como institución autónoma mediante el Decreto Ley No. 449 del 8 de abril de 1949. Por medio de la Ley No. 8622 de aprobación del Tratado de Libre Comercio República Dominicana-Centroamérica-Estados Unidos, la Ley General de Telecomunicaciones (No. 8642) y la Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones (No. 8660) se procedió a la apertura del mercado de telecomunicaciones. En el artículo 4 de la última ley citada (No. 8660) se estableció que con ella se complementa la Ley de creación del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, No. 449, de 8 de abril de 1949 y sus reformas. Además, en el numeral 5 de la misma ley, se efectuó un recuento de las empresas del ICE, determinando que también son empresas del instituto las demás que constituya o adquiera, en ambos casos, con una participación no menor que el cincuenta y uno por ciento (51%) del capital accionario. Dentro de este rubro de actividades empresariales del Instituto se encuentra la marca Kölbi, dedicada a telefonía móvil.

Si bien esto le da un margen de acción distinto al Instituto, cabe recordar las primeras disposiciones de la Ley General de la Administración Pública:

“Artículo 1º.- La Administración Pública estará constituida por el Estado y los demás entes públicos, cada uno con personalidad jurídica y capacidad de derecho público y privado.

Artículo 2º.- 1. Las reglas de esta ley que regulan la actividad del Estado se aplicarán también a los otros entes públicos, en ausencia de norma especial para éstos.

2. Las reglas que regulan a los otros entes públicos no se aplicarán al Estado, salvo que la naturaleza de la situación requiera lo contrario.

Artículo 3º.- 1. El derecho público regulará la organización y actividad de los entes públicos, salvo norma expresa en contrario.

2. El derecho privado regulará la actividad de los entes que por su régimen de conjunto y los requerimientos de su giro puedan estimarse como empresas industriales o mercantiles comunes.” De acuerdo con las normas recién citadas, si bien la actividad empresarial -industrial o mercantil común- de algunos entes públicos está regulada por el derecho privado, esto no alcanza sus estructuras de base -es decir, lo que permite considerarlos entes de derecho público- ni las potestades de fiscalización de los recursos públicos o de interés público que les conciernen.

En este último sentido, los artículos 1º de la Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos y 8 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República atan a sus mandatos a las distintas entidades y órganos que integran el sector público. Así lo ha entendido este Tribunal, entre otras, en la resolución No. 2017-11808 de las 9:05 horas del 28 de julio de 2017:

“No hay que perder de vista, que la empresa pública se encuentra hoy en día en una encrucijada cuando ejerce su actividad en un régimen de libre competencia, en un segmento del mercado donde participan tanto empresas públicas como empresas privadas. Por un lado, si se le trata como un órgano o ente público y, por ende, sujeto a una serie de controles y requerimiento, sus posibilidades de supervivencia en el mercado son muy escasas. Por el otro, si le libera de todo control, se podrían presentar graves abusos con la utilización de los fondos públicos. De ahí la necesidad de que haya un justo equilibrio entre las necesidades que requiere para competir en igualdad de condiciones con los otros agentes económicos y los necesarios controles sobre la utilización de los fondos públicos, partiendo de un principio elemental: ahí donde van los fondos públicos debe ir el control, tanto el que ejerce la auditoría interna, la Contraloría General de la República y la Comisión Permanente Especial para el Control del Ingreso y del Gasto Público de la Asamblea Legislativa, entre otros. Empero, este tiene que ser acorde con la realidad que enfrenta la empresa pública, es decir, controles que no constituyan un obstáculo o una rémora para que la empresa pública no quede en desventaja en un mercado competitivo (ver Sentencia 2016-000779 de las dieciséis horas y treinta minutos de diecinueve de enero de dos mil dieciséis). Adoptando como marco de referencia lo anterior, no cabe duda que es fundamental que a la empresa pública se le garantice que cierta información estratégica no caerá en manos de la competencia, pues de lo contrario, su desaparición sería una cuestión de tiempo. Esto conlleva que cualquier solicitud de información atinente a la actividad financiera, bancaria, industrial o comercial debe de ser analizada en cada caso concreto. El Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad –empresa pública-ente público-, compite abiertamente en el mercado de las telecomunicaciones con otras empresas, públicas y privadas, y, por consiguiente, debe de desarrollar una estrategia comercial para promocionar sus servicios, los que presta bajo la marca Kölbi.” A las anteriores consideraciones se suman dos factores adicionales: que en este caso el comunicado de modificación de pauta publicitaria lo emitió la gerente de Telecomunicaciones del instituto y que el tema implica el uso de los recursos de la empresa, por lo que hay elementos suficientes para tener por legitimado pasivamente al Instituto en el presente recurso.

El Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, por su parte, es una figura con características muy particulares, pues su Ley de creación, No. 4351 declara que “El Banco es propiedad de los trabajadores por partes iguales y el derecho a la copropiedad estará sujeto a que hayan tenido una cuenta de ahorro obligatorio durante un año continuo o en períodos alternos. Los ahorrantes obligatorios participarán de las utilidades y por medio de sus organizaciones sociales en la designación de sus directores.” (artículo 1), con lo que le confiere un carácter corporativo, el cual; no obstante, no le releva de su condición de ente de derecho público (artículo 2), ni de la fiscalización de sus recursos por parte de la Contraloría General de la República. Se toma en cuenta, al igual que respecto del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, que el comunicado sobre la modificación de su pauta publicitaria, objeto de este recurso, fue emitido por el presidente de la Junta Directiva Nacional del banco. (…)” VCG10/2025 ... Ver más Contenido de Interés:

Tipo de contenido: Voto de mayoría Rama del Derecho: 1. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA CON JURISPRUDENCIA Tema: 029- Libertad de expresión Subtemas:

NO APLICA.

ARTÍCULO 29 DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA “(…) VI.- SOBRE LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN Y SU FUNCIÓN EN UN RÉGIMEN REPUBLICANO Y DEMOCRÁTICO. En distintos pronunciamientos, este órgano de justicia constitucional ha establecido el nexo entre la libertad de expresión y los principios sobre los cuales está construido nuestro sistema político y jurídico. En la sentencia No. 1997-01750 de las 15:00 horas del 21 de marzo de 1997 se explicó de la siguiente forma:

“X- Al respecto, dentro de los principales preceptos que reconocen y garantizan la libertad de expresión e información y que configuran lo que podría denominarse el régimen general de esa libertad constitucionalmente protegido, se tienen:

“Artículo 28 (Constitución Política):

“Nadie puede ser inquietado ni perseguido por la manifestación de sus opiniones ni por acto alguno que no infrinja la ley…”.

“Artículo 29 (Constitución Política):

“Todos pueden comunicar sus pensamientos de palabra o por escrito, y publicarlos sin previa censura; pero serán responsables de los abusos que cometan en el ejercicio de este derecho, en los casos y del modo que la ley establezca”.

“Artículo 13 (Convención Americana): Libertad de Pensamiento y de Expresión:

“1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión. Este derecho comprende la libertad de buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas de toda índole, sin consideración de fronteras, ya sea oralmente, por escrito o en forma impresa o artística, o por cualquier otro procedimiento de su elección.

“2. El ejercicio del derecho previsto en el inciso precedente no puede e star sujeto a previa censura sino a responsabilidades ulteriores, las que deben estar expresamente fijadas por la ley y ser necesarias para asegurar:

“a) El respeto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás, o “b) La protección de la seguridad nacional, el orden público o la salud o la moral públicas.

“3. No se puede restringir el derecho de expresión por vías o medios indirectos, tales como el abuso de controles oficiales o particulares de papel para periódicos, de frecuencias radioeléctricas o de enseres y aparatos usados en la difusión de información o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la cir culación de las ideas y opiniones.

“4. Los espectáculos públicos pueden ser sometidos por ley a censura previa con el exclusivo objeto de regular el acceso a ellos para la protección moral de la infancia y la adolescencia, sin perjuicio de lo establecido en el inciso 2.

“5. Estará prohibida por ley toda propaganda en favor de la guerra y toda apología del odio nacional, racial o religioso que constituyan incitaciones a la violencia o cualquier otra acción ilegal similar contra cualquier persona o grupo de personas, por ningún motivo, inclusive los de raza, color, religión, idioma u origen nacional.” “Artículo 19 (Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos):

“1. Nadie podrá ser molestado a causa de sus opiniones.

“2. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de expresión; este derecho comprende la libertad de buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas de toda índole, sin consideración de fronteras, ya sea oralmente, por escrito o en forma impresa o artística, o por cualquier otro procedimiento de su elección.

“3. El ejercicio del derecho previsto en el párrafo 2 de este artículo entraña deberes y responsabilidades especiales. Por consiguiente, puede estar sujeto a ciertas restricciones que deberán, sin embargo, estar expresamente fijadas por la ley y ser necesarias para:

“a) Asegurar el respecto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás; “b) La protección de la seguridad nacional, el orden público o la salud o la moral públicos.” XI- Del contenido de las anteriores disposiciones se desprende que la liber tad de expresión e información tiene como condición previa e indispensable a la libertad de pensamiento o ideológica y que comprende esencialmente el derecho de toda persona de buscar, recibir y expresar libremente pensamientos, ideas, opiniones, juicios de valor, creencias, hechos, datos, etc., en relación con todo tipo de materias (incluidas la política y la electoral), utilizando cualquier medio lícito a su disposición y con los más variados propósitos (comerciales, recreativos, políticos, electorales, etc). De los citados preceptos también se desprende que en el marco de su régimen constitucionalmente garantizado, el derecho fundamental de libre expresión e información se encuentra configurado como un derecho de libertad. Esto implica, básicamente, que para su ejercicio no se requiere de un reconocimiento expreso de los poderes públicos acerca de quienes son sus legítimos titulares, sino más bien que de ellos se espera -o mejor dicho se exige con carácter general- que se abstengan de incidir o de imponer algún tipo de obstáculo a dicho ejercicio. Esta condición del derecho a la libre expresión e información ha sido especialmente ponderada a nivel de su protección en el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, situación que se refleja sobre todo en la amplitud del contenido y el grado de excepcionalidad de las limitaciones con que se reconoce y garantiza en la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Del contenido esencial de la libertad de expresión e información resulta asimismo la existencia de sus dos dimensiones concurrentes, puesta de manifiesto por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, en su opinión consultiva OC-5/85, sobre la colegiación obligatoria de los periodistas. Al respecto, la Corte señaló que esa libertad se manifiesta tanto en la dimensión individual, de quien expresa o se expresa, como en otra colectiva, de todos los que reciben el contenido de esa expresión. Estas dos dimensiones están imbricadas de tal modo que cuando se restringe la primera, no es sólo el derecho fundamental de su titular individual el que está siendo limitado, sino también el de todos aquellos a quienes se ha impedido recibir sus ideas e informaciones. Dada esa vinculación tan estrecha entre ambas dimensiones (individual y colectiva), la libertad de expresión e información implica el derecho a utilizar cualquier medio lícito para difundir el pensamiento o la información y hacerlo llegar a cualquier número de destinatarios, situación que revela que la expresión y difusión del pensamiento o de la información son indivisibles, por lo que una restricción de esos medios o de las posibilidades de divulgación significa, al mismo tiempo y en la misma medida, una limitación del derecho de libre expresión e información.

XII- De lo anterior, resulta que la libertad de expresión e información tiene un carácter básico al ser presupuesto necesario para los restantes derechos fundamentales, razón por la cual se le ha señalado como factor determinante para la legitimidad del funcionamiento del sistema democrático, al permitir que en todo momento las personas, sin distinción alguna, piensen de la manera que mejor decidan y expresen libremente sus opiniones. A dicho carácter básico contribuye el hecho de que el contenido esencial de la libertad de expresión e información no precisa de especiales exigencias en relación con el contenido, las formas o los medios que empleé el mensaje que se expresa o los niveles de difusión que alcance, situación esta que favorece que por su medio se reconozcan y garanticen manifestaciones de su ejercicio tan variadas como la creación artística o la misma propaganda electoral.” Es decir, a partir de la Constitución misma, así como de las normas de los sistemas regional y universal de protección de los derechos humanos, se da cuenta de una vigorosa protección de la libertad de expresión, desde una doble vertiente: dogmática -esto es, en consideración a su carácter de derecho fundamental- y orgánica o institucional -como elemento inmanente a la democracia-. En igual tesitura, la sentencia No. 2006-05977 de las 15:16 horas del 3 de mayo del 2006 desarrolló este sincretismo entre libertad de expresión y democracia:

“VIII.- La libertad de expresión como requisito indispensable de la democracia. La libertad de expresión sin duda alguna es una de las condiciones -aunque no la única-, para que funcione la democracia. Esta libertad es la que permite la creación de la opinión pública, esencial para darle contenido a varios principios del Estado constitucional, como lo son por ejemplo el derecho a la información, el derecho de petición o los derechos en materia de participación política; la existencia de una opinión pública libre y consolidada también es una condición para el funcionamiento de la democracia representativa. La posibilidad de que todas las personas participen en las discusiones públicas constituye el presupuesto necesario para la construcción de una dinámica social de intercambio de conocimientos ideas e información, que permita la generación de consensos y la toma de decisiones entre los componentes de los diversos grupos sociales, pero que también constituya un cauce para la expresión de los disensos, que en la democracia son tan necesarios como los acuerdos. Por su parte, el intercambio de opiniones e informaciones que se origina con la discusión pública contribuye a formar la opinión personal, ambas conforman la opinión pública, que acaba manifestándose por medio de los canales de la democracia representativa. Como lo ha señalado el propio Tribunal Constitucional español, quedarían vaciados de contenido real otros derechos que la Constitución consagra, reducidas a formas huecas las instituciones representativas y absolutamente falseado el principio de legitimidad democrática... que es la base de toda nuestra ordenación jurídico-política (Sentencia 6/1981), si no existieran unas libertades capaces de permitir ese intercambio, que… presupone el derecho de los ciudadanos a contar con una amplia y adecuada información respecto de los hechos, que les permita formar sus convicciones y participar en la discusión relativa a los asuntos públicos (Sentencia 159/1986).

IX-. Contenido de la libertad de expresión. La libertad de información podría decirse que tiene varias facetas, según lo ha reconocido la doctrina nacional (de las cuales las tres primeras se relacionan con lo que aquí se discute): a) la libertad de imprenta en sentido amplio, que cubre cualquier tipo de publicación, b) la libertad de información por medios no escritos, c) el derecho de rectificación o respuesta. La libertad de prensa engloba de manera genérica todos los tipos de impresos, impresión, edición, circulación de periódicos, folletos, revistas y publicaciones de toda clase. Es por su naturaleza vehículo natural de la libertad de expresión de los ciudadanos. Se traduce en el derecho para los administrados de buscar y difundir las informaciones y las ideas a un número indeterminado de personas sobre hechos que por su naturaleza son de interés de la generalidad por considerarse noticiosos. Por su naturaleza, está sujeta a las mismas limitaciones que la libertad de expresión. Tiene como funciones en la democracia: informar (hechos, acontecimientos noticiosos), integrar la opinión (estimulando la integración social) y controlar el poder político, en cuanto es permanente guardián de la honestidad y correcto manejo de los asuntos públicos. Dado su vínculo simbiótico con la ideología democrática, un sin fin de instrumentos internacionales y prácticamente todas las Constituciones del mundo libre, desde la Declaración Francesa de 1789 (art.11) la han reconocido. Nuestra Constitución Política por su parte, la tutela por medio de diversas normas:

“Todos pueden comunicar sus pensamientos de palabra o por escrito y publicarlos sin previa censura; pero serán responsables de los abusos que cometan en el ejercicio de este derecho, en las condiciones y modos que establezca la ley” (artículo 29) “Nadie puede ser inquietado ni perseguido por la manifestación de sus opiniones ni por acto alguno que no infrinja la ley.

Las acciones privadas que no dañen la moral o el orden público o que no perjudiquen a tercero, están fuera de la acción de la ley.

No se podrá, sin embargo, hacer en forma alguna propaganda política por clérigos o seglares invocando motivos de religión o valiéndose, como medio, de creencias religiosas” (artículo 28).

Otras normas constitucionales relacionadas con este derecho son:

“Se garantiza la libertad de petición, en forma individual o colectiva, ante cualquier funcionario público o entidad oficial, y el derecho a obtener pronta resolución. (artículo 27).

“Se garantiza el libre acceso a los departamentos administrativos con propósitos de información sobre asuntos de interés público.

Quedan a salvo los secretos de Estado” (artículo 30).

La libertad de expresión tiene como consecuencia la prohibición de toda forma de censura, en un doble sentido: no se puede censurar a los interlocutores, por una parte; y no se puede, en general, tampoco censurar en forma previa los contenidos posibles de la discusión: en principio, en una democracia, todos los temas son discutibles. La no censurabilidad de los sujetos tienen un carácter prácticamente universal, como lo establece nuestra Constitución, nadie puede ser privado de la libertad de hablar y expresarse como mejor le parezca; la no censurabilidad de los contenidos, si bien no se da en forma previa, encuentra algunas limitaciones, sin embargo, éstas deben ser tales que la libertad siga teniendo sentido o no sea vaciada de su contenido, básicamente, como toda libertad, debe ejercerse con responsabilidad, en fin para perseguir fines legítimos dentro del sistema.” También es relevante traer a colación la resolución No. 2022025167 de las 13:30 horas de 21 de octubre de 2022, en el tanto desarrolla con amplitud las implicaciones de la libertad de expresión, que tiene múltiples manifestaciones:

“IV.- SOBRE LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN. La libertad de expresión es uno de los pilares sobre los cuales está fundado el Estado de Derecho y comprende, tanto la garantía fundamental y universal de manifestar los pensamientos o las opiniones propias, como conocer los de otros. En otros términos, refiere a la libertad de buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas, ya sea oralmente o por escrito. Por esto se dice que la libertad de expresión se caracteriza por ser un derecho con una doble dimensión: una dimensión individual, consistente en el derecho de cada persona a buscar información y expresar los propios pensamientos, ideas e informaciones; y una dimensión colectiva o social, consistente en el derecho de la sociedad a procurar y recibir cualquier información, a conocer los pensamientos, ideas e informaciones ajenos y a estar bien informada. Sobre esta doble dimensión de la libertad bajo estudio, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (en adelante Corte IDH), en el caso Herrera Ulloa vs. el Estado [Nombre 002] (sentencia de 2 de julio de 2004), sostuvo lo siguiente:

“(…) 109. Al respecto, la Corte ha indicado que la primera dimensión de la libertad de expresión “no se agota en el reconocimiento teórico del derecho a hablar o escribir, sino que comprende además, inseparablemente, el derecho a utilizar cualquier medio apropiado para difundir el pensamiento y hacerlo llegar al mayor número de destinatarios”. En este sentido, la expresión y la difusión de pensamientos e ideas son indivisibles, de modo que una restricción de las posibilidades de divulgación representa directamente, y en la misma medida, un límite al derecho de expresarse libremente.

110. Con respecto a la segunda dimensión del derecho a la libertad de expresión esto es, la social, es menester señalar que la libertad de expresión es un medio para el intercambio de ideas e informaciones entre las personas; comprende su derecho a tratar de comunicar a otras sus puntos de vista, pero implica también el derecho de todos a conocer opiniones, relatos y noticias vertidas por terceros. Para el ciudadano común tiene tanta importancia el conocimiento de la opinión ajena o de la información de que disponen otros como el derecho a difundir la propia.

111. Este Tribunal ha afirmado que ambas dimensiones poseen igual importancia y deben ser garantizadas plenamente en forma simultánea para dar efectividad total al derecho a la libertad de expresión en los términos previstos por el artículo 13 de la Convención (…)”.

Por su parte, la Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Marco jurídico interamericano sobre el derecho a la libertad de expresión, diciembre 2009), se refirió a este derecho conforme los siguientes términos:

“(…) se trata de uno de los derechos individuales que de manera más clara refleja la virtud que acompaña -y caracteriza- a los seres humanos: la virtud única y preciosa de pensar al mundo desde nuestra propia perspectiva y de comunicarnos con los otros para construir a través de un proceso deliberativo, no solo el modelo de vida que cada uno tiene derecho a adoptar, sino el modelo de sociedad en el cual queremos vivir. Todo el potencial creativo en el arte, en la ciencia, en la tecnología, en la política, en fin, toda nuestra capacidad creadora individual y colectiva, depende, fundamentalmente, de que se respete y promueva el derecho a la libertad de expresión en todas sus dimensiones. Se trata entonces de un derecho individual sin el cual se estaría negando la primera y más importante de nuestras libertades: el derecho a pensar por cuenta propia y a compartir con otros nuestro pensamiento (…)

Asimismo, instrumentos internacionales de soft law han resguardado esta libertad. Así, la Declaración de Chapultepec (adoptada por la conferencia hemisférica sobre libertad de expresión celebrada en México, D.F. el 11 de marzo de 1994), en su primer principio refiere que:

“1. No hay personas ni sociedades libres sin libertad de expresión y de prensa. El ejercicio de ésta no es una concesión de las autoridades; es un derecho inalienable del pueblo”.

Por su parte, la Declaración de Principios sobre Libertad de Expresión (aprobada por la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en octubre de 2000, en el 108 período ordinario), dispone lo siguiente:

“1. La libertad de expresión, en todas sus formas y manifestaciones, es un derecho fundamental e inalienable, inherente a todas las personas. Es, además, un requisito indispensable para la existencia misma de una sociedad democrática”.

En otro contexto, dentro del ordenamiento jurídico europeo, se destaca la Convención Europea sobre Derechos Humanos, que en su ordinal 10 precisa la titularidad universal de este derecho, conforme los siguientes términos:

“Libertad de expresión 1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de expresión. Este derecho comprende la libertad de opinión y la libertad de recibir o de comunicar informaciones o ideas sin que pueda haber injerencia de autoridades públicas y sin consideración de fronteras. El presente artículo no impide que los Estados sometan a las empresas de radiodifusión, de cinematografía o de televisión a un régimen de autorización previa.

2. El ejercicio de estas libertades, que entrañan deberes y responsabilidades, podrá ser sometido a ciertas formalidades, condiciones, restricciones o sanciones, previstas por la ley, que constituyan medidas necesarias, en una sociedad democrática, para la seguridad nacional, la integridad territorial o la seguridad pública, la defensa del orden y la prevención del delito, la protección de la salud o de la moral, la protección de la reputación o de los derechos ajenos, para impedir la divulgación de informaciones confidenciales o para garantizar la autoridad y la imparcialidad del poder judicial”.

Igualmente, la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea, en su ordinal 11, cita lo siguiente:

“Artículo 11 Libertad de expresión y de información 1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de expresión. Este derecho comprende la libertad de opinión y la libertad de recibir o de comunicar informaciones o ideas sin que pueda haber injerencia de autoridades públicas y sin consideración de fronteras.

2. Se respetan la libertad de los medios de comunicación y su pluralismo”.

(…)

Por su parte, la Corte IDH en el caso Moya Chacón y otros vs. Costa Rica (sentencia de 23 de mayo de 2022), indicó lo siguiente:

“(…) b.3 Restricciones permitidas a la libertad de expresión y la aplicación de responsabilidades ulteriores en casos que haya afectación de la honra y de la dignidad en asuntos de interés público 71. El Tribunal recuerda que, con carácter general, el derecho a la libertad de expresión no puede estar sujeto a censura previa sino, en todo caso, a responsabilidades ulteriores en casos muy excepcionales y bajo el cumplimiento de una serie de estrictos requisitos. Así, el artículo 13.2 de la Convención Americana establece que las responsabilidades ulteriores por el ejercicio de la libertad de expresión, deben cumplir con los siguientes requisitos de forma concurrente: (i) estar previamente fijadas por ley, en sentido formal y material; (ii) responder a un objetivo permitido por la Convención Americana y (iii) ser necesarias en una sociedad democrática (para lo cual deben cumplir con los requisitos de idoneidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad).

72. Respecto a la estricta legalidad, la Corte ha establecido que las restricciones deben estar previamente fijadas en la ley como medio para asegurar que las mismas no queden al arbitrio del poder público. Para esto, la tipificación de la conducta debe ser clara y precisa, más aún si se trata de condenas del orden penal y no del orden civil. Sobre los fines permitidos o legítimos, los mismos están indicados en el referido artículo 13.2 y son (a) el respeto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás, o (b) la protección de la seguridad nacional, el orden público o la salud o la moral públicas. Asimismo, las restricciones a la libertad de expresión deben ser idóneas, esto es, efectivamente conducentes para alcanzar la finalidad legítimamente permitida. En lo que respecta al análisis de necesidad, el Tribunal ha sostenido que, para que una restricción a la libre expresión sea compatible con la Convención Americana, aquella debe ser necesaria en una sociedad democrática, entendiendo por “necesaria” la existencia de una necesidad social imperiosa que justifique la restricción. En este sentido, la Corte deberá examinar las alternativas existentes para alcanzar el fin legítimo perseguido y precisar la mayor o menor lesividad de aquéllas. Finalmente, en relación con la proporcionalidad de la medida, la Corte ha entendido que las restricciones impuestas sobre el derecho a la libertad de expresión deben ser proporcionales al interés que las justifican y ajustarse estrechamente al logro de ese objetivo, interfiriendo en la menor medida posible en el efectivo goce del derecho. En ese sentido, no es suficiente que tenga una finalidad legítima, sino que la medida en cuestión debe respetar la proporcionalidad al momento de afectar la libertad de expresión. En otras palabras, “en este último paso del análisis se considera si la restricción resulta estrictamente proporcional, de tal forma que el sacrificio inherente a aquella no resulte exagerado o desmedido frente a las ventajas que se obtienen mediante tal limitación”. El Tribunal recuerda que estas restricciones tienen carácter excepcional y no deben limitar, más allá de lo estrictamente necesario, el pleno ejercicio de la libertad de expresión y convertirse en un mecanismo directo o indirecto de censura previa.

73. En este sentido, la Corte ha establecido que se pueden imponer tales responsabilidades ulteriores en tanto se pudiera haber afectado el derecho a la honra y la reputación. Así, el artículo 11 de la Convención establece, en efecto, que toda persona tiene derecho a la protección de su honra y al reconocimiento de su dignidad. La Corte ha señalado que el derecho a la honra “reconoce que toda persona tiene derecho al respeto de esta, prohíbe todo ataque ilegal contra la honra o reputación e impone a los Estados el deber de brindar la protección de la ley contra tales ataques”. En términos generales, este Tribunal ha indicado que “el derecho a la honra se relaciona con la estima y valía propia, mientras que la reputación se refiere a la opinión que otros tienen de una persona”. En este sentido, este Tribunal ha sostenido que, “tanto la libertad de expresión como el derecho a la honra, derechos ambos protegidos por la Convención, revisten suma importancia, por lo cual es necesario garantizar ambos derechos, de forma que coexistan de manera armoniosa”. El ejercicio de cada derecho fundamental tiene que hacerse con respeto y salvaguarda de los demás derechos fundamentales. Por ende, la Corte ha señalado que “la solución del conflicto que se presenta entre ambos derechos requiere de una ponderación entre los mismos, para lo cual deberá examinarse cada caso, conforme a sus características y circunstancias, a fin de apreciar la existencia e intensidad de los elementos en que se sustenta dicho juicio”.

74. El Tribunal recuerda a este respecto que, para determinar la convencionalidad de una restricción a la libertad de expresión cuando este colisione con el derecho a la honra, es de vital importancia analizar si las declaraciones efectuadas poseen interés público, toda vez que en estos casos el juzgador debe evaluar con especial cautela la necesidad de limitar la libertad de expresión. En su jurisprudencia, la Corte ha considerado de interés público aquellas opiniones o informaciones sobre asuntos en los cuales la sociedad tiene un legítimo interés de mantenerse informada, de conocer lo que incide sobre el funcionamiento del Estado, o afecta derechos o intereses generales o le acarrea consecuencias importantes. Determinar lo anterior tiene consecuencias en el análisis de la convencionalidad de la restricción al derecho a la libertad de expresión, toda vez que las expresiones que versan sobre cuestiones de interés público -como, por ejemplo, las concernientes a la idoneidad de una persona para el desempeño de un cargo público o a los actos realizados por funcionarios públicos en el desempeño de sus labores- gozan de mayor protección, de manera tal que se propicie el debate democrático.

75. Así, la Corte ha señalado que, en una sociedad democrática, aquellas personas que influyen en cuestiones de interés público están más expuestas al escrutinio y la crítica del público. Este diferente umbral de protección se explica porque sus actividades salen del dominio de la esfera privada para insertarse en la esfera del debate público y, por tanto, se han expuesto voluntariamente a este escrutinio más exigente. Esto no significa, de modo alguno, que el honor de las personas participantes en asuntos de interés público no deba ser jurídicamente protegido, sino que éste debe serlo de manera acorde con los principios del pluralismo democrático.

76. Por otro lado, en relación con el carácter necesario y el riguroso análisis de proporcionalidad que debe regir entre la limitación al derecho a la libertad de expresión y la protección del derecho a la honra, se deberá buscar aquella intervención que, siendo la más idónea para restablecer la reputación dañada, contenga, además, un grado mínimo de afectación en el ámbito de la libertad de expresión. A este respecto, en el marco de la libertad de información, el Tribunal considera que existe un deber del periodista de constatar en forma razonable, aunque no necesariamente exhaustiva, los hechos que divulga. Ahora bien, esto no significa una exigencia estricta de veracidad, por lo menos en lo que hace referencia a cuestiones de interés público, reconociendo como descargo el que la publicación se haga de buena fe o justificadamente y siempre de conformidad con unos estándares mínimos de ética y profesionalidad en la búsqueda de la verdad. Asimismo, el Tribunal advierte que, para que exista el periodismo de investigación en una sociedad democrática, es necesario dejar a los periodistas “espacio para el error”, toda vez que sin ese margen de error no puede existir un periodismo independiente ni la posibilidad, por tanto, del necesario escrutinio democrático que dimana de este.

77. Adicionalmente, la Corte también considera que nadie podrá ser sometido a responsabilidades ulteriores por la difusión de información relacionada con un asunto público y que tenga como base material que es accesible al público o que proviene de fuentes oficiales.

78. Por último, también se debe destacar la necesidad de que, en caso de estimarse adecuado otorgar una reparación a la persona agraviada en su honra, la finalidad de esta no debe ser la de castigar al emisor de la información, sino la de restaurar a la persona afectada. A este respecto, los Estados deben ejercer la máxima cautela al imponer reparaciones, de tal manera que no disuadan a la prensa de participar en la discusión de asuntos de legítimo interés público (…)”.

(…)

VI.- TOCANTE A LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN (Y DE PRENSA) COMO GARANTES DEL SISTEMA DEMOCRÁTICO. La libertad de expresión y, concomitantemente, el ejercicio de la libertad de prensa, devienen en pilares fundamentales sobre los que se erige una sociedad democrática. Resulta prácticamente incuestionable la intrínseca relación que existe entre tales libertades y la democracia; de ahí que, esta última se debilita y erosiona arbitrariamente cuando dichas libertades no se pueden ejercer plenamente ni, tampoco, se respetan y garantizan en los ordenamientos jurídicos.

La Carta Democrática Interamericana (aprobada por los Estados Miembros de la OEA durante una sesión extraordinaria de la Asamblea General que se llevó a cabo el 11 de septiembre de 2001 en Lima, Perú), sobre este particular, dispone en su artículo 4 que: “Son componentes fundamentales del ejercicio de la democracia la transparencia de las actividades gubernamentales, la probidad, la responsabilidad de los gobiernos en la gestión pública, el respeto por los derechos sociales y la libertad de expresión y de prensa”. Además, hay que recordar que la ya dictada Declaración de Principios sobre Libertad de Expresión establece en su primer principio que la libertad de expresión es “(…) un requisito indispensable para la existencia misma de una sociedad democrática”.

La libertad de prensa (o lo que algunos denominan una prensa libre), como manifestación de la libertad de expresión, constituye un elemento esencial para fiscalizar -sin represiones-, las actuaciones de los terceros, sean de índole privada o funcionarios públicos, principalmente de los que ocupan altos cargos o aspiran a este, permitiendo así, consecuentemente, la rendición de cuentas, combatir la corrupción, la transparencia en el manejo de fondos públicos, entre otros muchos aspectos que resultan fundamentales para mantener vigente un sistema democrático. Parte de ese deber, reside en el investigar a las personas en el poder, principalmente al gobierno, formulando los cuestionamientos difíciles e intentar así revelarle a la ciudadanía lo que realmente está sucediendo, como medio, a su vez, para que tomen las decisiones correctas, principalmente, a la hora de votar y, también posteriormente, cuando se está en ejercicio del poder. Tal y como lo ha manifestado la llamada Unión por las Libertades Civiles de Europa (organización no gubernamental que promueve las libertades civiles para todas las personas en la Unión Europea) “(…) Una prensa libre ayuda en cada paso de este proceso. Proporciona información a los votantes antes de votar; fomenta el diálogo y el debate para enriquecer la comprensión de esta información; y luego informa a la ciudadanía sobre la labor del gobierno y si realmente están llevando a cabo sus promesas. En democracia, la ciudadanía delega el poder de decisión en sus cargos electos, y la prensa es una forma de controlarlos (…)”. En esencia, es factible afirmar, entonces, que la libertad de prensa resulta fundamental en los sistemas democráticos, pues permite a los ciudadanos formarse opiniones y criterios en relación con la realidad en que viven. Por este motivo, lamentablemente los medios de comunicación independientes son precisamente uno de los objetivos principales de los sistemas políticos antidemocráticos o, al menos, de aquellos que quieren perfilarse y van encaminados hacia ello.

(…)

Por su parte, la Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Marco jurídico interamericano sobre el derecho a la libertad de expresión, diciembre 2009), señaló lo siguiente:

“(…) la CIDH y la Corte Interamericana han subrayado en su jurisprudencia que la importancia de la libertad de expresión dentro del catálogo de los derechos humanos se deriva también de su relación estructural con la democracia. Esta relación, que ha sido calificada por los órganos del sistema interamericano de derechos humanos como “estrecha”, “indisoluble”, “esencial” y “fundamental”, entre otras, explica gran parte de los desarrollos interpretativos que se han otorgado a la libertad de expresión por parte de la CIDH y la Corte Interamericana en sus distintas decisiones sobre el particular. Es tan importante el vínculo entre la libertad de expresión y la democracia que, según ha explicado la CIDH, el objetivo mismo del artículo 13 de la Convención Americana es el de fortalecer el funcionamiento de sistemas democráticos pluralistas y deliberativos mediante la protección y el fomento de la libre circulación de información, ideas y expresiones de toda índole (…) si el ejercicio del derecho a la libertad de expresión no solo tiende a la realización personal de quien se expresa, sino a la consolidación de sociedades verdaderamente democráticas, el Estado tiene la obligación de generar las condiciones para que el debate público no solo satisfaga las legítimas necesidades de todos como consumidores de determinada información (de entretenimiento, por ejemplo), sino como ciudadanos. Es decir, tienen que existir condiciones suficientes para que pueda producirse una deliberación pública, plural y abierta, sobre los asuntos que nos conciernen a todos en tanto ciudadanos de un determinado Estado (…)”. (El destacado no forma parte del original).

También, dicha Relatoría expuso lo siguiente:

“(…) en una sociedad democrática, la prensa tiene derecho a informar libremente y criticar al gobierno, y el pueblo tiene derecho a ser informado sobre distintas visiones de lo que ocurre en la comunidad (…)”.

En la misma línea de pensamiento, la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos, en el caso Lingens vs. Austria (sentencia de 8 de julio de 1986), resaltó que "(…) la libertad de prensa proporciona a la opinión pública uno de los mejores medios para conocer y juzgar las ideas y actitudes de los dirigentes políticos. En términos más generales, la libertad de las controversias políticas pertenece al corazón mismo del concepto de sociedad democrática (…)”.

Asimismo, la Corte Constitucional Colombiana, ha hecho referencia al tema bajo estudio en varias oportunidades. Así, en la Sentencia No. T-256/13 30 de abril de 2013, sostuvo que: “(…) el derecho a la libertad de expresión, es un principio del ejercicio de la democracia pues es en el marco de un estado democrático donde la participación de la ciudadanía adquiere especial relevancia, y en desarrollo de ella, se garantiza la libertad de expresar las distintas opiniones y de manifestar los pensamientos minoritarios sin miedo a ser reprimido por poderes estatales (…)” y explicó que:

“(…) Por ello, los pronunciamientos de la Comisión Interamericana y la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos han resaltado que la libertad de expresión cumple una triple función en el sistema democrático: a) asegura el derecho individual de toda persona a pensar por cuenta propia y a compartir con otros el pensamiento y la opinión personal, b) tiene una relación estrecha, indisoluble, esencial, fundamental y estructural con la democracia, y en esa medida, el objetivo mismo del artículo 13 de la Convención Americana es el de fortalecer el funcionamiento de sistemas democráticos, pluralistas y deliberativos, mediante la protección y fomento de la libre circulación de ideas y opiniones, y c) finalmente, es una herramienta clave para el ejercicio de los demás derechos fundamentales, toda vez que “se trata de un mecanismo esencial para el ejercicio del derecho a la participación, a la libertad religiosa, a la educación, a la identidad étnica o cultural y, por supuesto, a la igualdad no sólo entendida como el derecho a la no discriminación, sino como el derecho al goce de ciertos derechos sociales básicos (…)”.

Igualmente, este órgano constitucional agregó que:

“(…) Esta Corporación desde muy temprano en su jurisprudencia reconoció el valor de este derecho en el marco de una democracia con las siguientes palabras: “Aunque la libertad de expresar y difundir el propio pensamiento y opiniones es un derecho de toda persona, no es sólo un derecho individual, sino también garantía de una institución política fundamental: "la opinión pública libre". Una opinión pública libre está indisolublemente ligada con el pluralismo político, que es un valor fundamental y un requisito de funcionamiento del estado democrático. Sin una comunicación pública libre quedarían vaciados de contenido real otros derechos que la Constitución consagra, reducidos a formas hueras las institucionales representativas y participativas y absolutamente falseado el principio de la legitimidad democrática (…)”. (El destacado no forma parte del original).

En la Sentencia No. T-543 de 2017 de 25 de agosto de 2017, la Corte Constitucional Colombiana señaló que la libertad de expresión cumple las siguientes funciones en una sociedad democrática: “(…) (i) permite buscar la verdad y desarrollar el conocimiento; (ii) hace posible el principio de autogobierno; (iii) promueve la autonomía personal; (iv) previene abusos de poder; y (v) es una “válvula de escape” que estimula la confrontación pacífica de las decisiones estatales o sociales que no se compartan (…)”. Por su parte, en la Sentencia No. C-135/21 de 13 de mayo de 2021, dicha Corte mencionó que algunos de los aportes del derecho fundamental a la libertad de expresión al funcionamiento democrático, son los siguientes: “(…) i) permite buscar la verdad y desarrollar el conocimiento; ii) crea un espacio de sano diálogo y protesta para la ciudadanía, que consolida sociedades pluralistas y deliberativas; iii) permite establecer mecanismos de control y rendición de cuentas ante los gobernantes; iv) promueve el autogobierno ciudadano; y v) contribuye a mejores elecciones populares (…)”.

También, en la Sentencia No. T-145/19 de 2 de abril de 2019, la Corte Colombiana sostuvo que la libertad de expresión “(…) es un pilar del Estado Social de Derecho y un principio fundamental de los regímenes democráticos, donde se respeta la dignidad humana y se valora la participación de la ciudadanía y de todos los sectores, lo que permite consolidar sociedades pluralistas y deliberativas (…)”. Asimismo, en esta última ocasión, dicho órgano señaló que “(…) El fundamento principal del amparo jurídico de la libertad de expresión encuentra sustento en la dignidad humana, en la autonomía de la persona y en su carácter instrumental para el ejercicio de múltiples derechos, y en las distintas funciones que cumple en los sistemas democráticos (…)”.

Puede, entonces, enfatizarse de las decisiones citadas el vínculo estructural -como lo califica la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos- entre democracia y libertad de expresión, pues solamente un régimen en el que se reconoce al pueblo, a sus habitantes, como una voz plural, con capacidad de disentir, de opinar y de criticar sobre aspectos de la realidad en que viven, pero, especialmente, sobre las actividades originadas en la esfera pública, puede calificarse de régimen sustantivamente democrático. (…)” VCG10/2025 ... Ver más Contenido de Interés:

Tipo de contenido: Voto salvado Rama del Derecho: 6. LEY DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL ANOTADA CON JURISPRUDENCIA Tema: 033- Legitimación activa Subtemas:

NO APLICA.

Res. 20250021235 VOTO SALVADO PARCIAL DEL MAGISTRADO RUEDA LEAL.

Concerniente al recurso interpuesto en el expediente nro. 24-035822-0007-CO a favor de [Nombre 002] S. A., considero que se debió rechazar de plano, por cuanto la parte accionante formula el amparo a favor de una persona jurídica.

En tal sentido, en mi voto salvado a la sentencia nro. 2019002355 de las 9:30 horas de 12 de febrero de 2019 sostuve:

“en la Opinión Consultiva 22-16 del 26 de febrero de 2016, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos indicó que si bien algunos Estados reconocen el derecho de petición a personas jurídicas con condiciones especiales, como lo son los sindicatos, partidos políticos o representantes de pueblos indígenas, comunidades afrodescendientes o grupos específicos, lo cierto es que “El artículo 1.2 de la Convención Americana sólo consagra derechos a favor de personas físicas, por lo que las personas jurídicas no son titulares de los derechos consagrados en dicho tratado”. Por otro lado, en la misma opinión consultiva, la Corte Interamericana dispuso que, en ciertos contextos particulares, las personas físicas pueden llegar a ejercer sus derechos a través de personas jurídicas (verbigracia, a través de un medio de comunicación, como acaeció en el caso Granier y otros contra Venezuela); empero, a efectos de que ello sea tutelable ante el sistema interamericano, “el ejercicio del derecho a través de una persona jurídica debe involucrar una relación esencial y directa entre la persona natural que requiere protección por parte del sistema interamericano y la persona jurídica a través de la cual se produjo la violación, por cuanto no es suficiente con un simple vínculo entre ambas personas para concluir que efectivamente se están protegiendo los derechos de personas físicas y no de las personas jurídicas. En efecto, se debe probar más allá de la simple participación de la persona natural en las actividades propias de la persona jurídica, de forma que dicha participación se relacione de manera sustancial con los derechos alegados como vulnerados.” (énfasis agregado) (OC. 22/16)”.

En mi criterio, la lectura de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional obliga a la misma ratio de la hermenéutica convencional supracitada respecto a todo derecho fundamental. Así, en un proceso de constitucionalidad formulado a favor de una persona jurídica, su admisión para estudio exige una relación esencial y directa entre la persona jurídica que aduce verse afectada por alguna vulneración al orden constitucional y la persona natural que por tal lesión viene a ver menoscabado, de forma refleja pero directa, algún derecho fundamental. Ahora, para tales efectos es insuficiente la mera referencia a una conexión o vínculo entre la persona jurídica y la natural para poder colegir que, precisamente, por medio del proceso de constitucionalidad se esté procurando el resguardo de los derechos fundamentales de la última, no meramente los de la primera. El requerimiento antedicho deviene entonces un presupuesto sine qua non para la procedencia del control de constitucionalidad por parte de esta jurisdicción. A partir de lo expuesto, colijo que esta debe ser la pauta con que se debe interpretar la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, de manera que en el sub iudice deviene improcedente la aplicación del control jurisdiccional de constitucionalidad, toda vez que, con base en la prueba que consta en autos, no se ha demostrado el vínculo esencial entre la persona jurídica amparada y alguna natural, de modo específico, en relación con el presunto derecho agraviado.

Paul Rueda L.

VCG10/2025 ... Ver más Contenido de Interés:

Tipo de contenido: Nota separada Rama del Derecho: 4. ASUNTOS DE GARANTÍA Tema: LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN Y PRENSA Subtemas:

MEDIOS DE COMUNICACION.

Res. Nº 2025021235 Nota del Magistrado Cruz Castro. Entidades de Derecho Público que desempeñan actividades empresariales también pueden incurrir en violaciones a la libertad de expresión.- En este recurso de amparo resuelto con lugar por violación constatarse la censura indirecta a la libertad de expresión, considero relevante consignar esta nota para resaltar que las entidades de derecho público, como lo son el ICE y el Banco Popular, aunque desarrollan actividades empresariales o de derecho privado, también son susceptibles de ser recurridos como sujetos pasivos en la violación del derecho a la libertad de expresión. Incluso aunque el recurso de amparo se hubiera interpuesto en contra de sujetos de derecho privado, también estos son susceptibles de ser sujetos pasivos en la violación a la libertad de expresión, puesto que esta garantía fundamental es más importante que la libertad de comercio. De forma tal que, la naturaleza jurídica del ente transgresor no enerva la posibilidad que pueda ser recurrido en un recurso de amparo por violentar la libertad de expresión y libertad de prensa.

La libertad de expresión es un derecho fundamental y a la vez un pilar de la democracia. No se justifica su restricción o supresión en función de decisiones infundadas o arbitrarias de la autoridad estatal. Como derecho fundamental le permite a cada persona buscar información y expresar los propios pensamientos, ideas e informaciones; y en una dimensión colectiva o social, es el derecho de la sociedad a procurar y recibir cualquier información, a conocer los pensamientos, ideas e informaciones ajenos y a estar bien informada. Como pilar de la democracia, permite la creación de la opinión pública, esencial para darle contenido a varios principios del Estado constitucional de derecho. La autoridad pública debe promover la crítica y la objeción a sus propias decisiones. La supuesta uniformidad de opinión en función de una decisión política arbitraria, es inadmisible en una sociedad democrática. La uniformidad en las opiniones, la ausencia de crítica o el pensamiento único, es la atmósfera de un gobierno dictatorial, contrario a una democracia que define nuestra Constitución Política.

Esta Sala ha dejado claro que la asignación arbitraria de recursos públicos a través de compra de publicidad, como medio para restringir la libertad de expresión, contraviene tanto la Constitución como el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos. Mi criterio supera esos límites, no sólo la asignación arbitraria de recursos públicos, sino también la asignación arbitraria de recursos privados. La distribución arbitraria y condicionada de la publicidad, puede ser un mecanismo de censura indirecta, pues es una represión que actúa como premio o castigo que tiene por objeto condicionar la libertad de expresión, según la voluntad de quien paga, sea este un sujeto público o un sujeto privado. Esta censura indirecta tiene muchos rostros, se puede disimular o se puede ocultar, fácilmente, empero, si se demuestra una restricción arbitraria de la libertad de pensamiento y de la creatividad artística, puede ser responsable un ente privado, porque la realidad no la definen los intereses comerciales, sino la libertad de pensamiento.

Si bien coincido con todo lo indicado en este voto, empero, agrego, que los sujetos de derecho privado también podrían incurrir en violaciones a la libertad de expresión, por imponer la censura directa o indirecta en la asignación de publicidad, cuyo contenido, en la mayor parte de las veces, ni siquiera responde al principio de veracidad.

Fernando Cruz C. Magistrado VCG10/2025 ... Ver más Contenido de Interés:

Tipo de contenido: Nota separada Rama del Derecho: 4. ASUNTOS DE GARANTÍA Tema: LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN Y PRENSA Subtemas:

MEDIOS DE COMUNICACION.

Res. Nº 2025021235 RAZONES DIFERENTES DE LA MAGISTRADA GARRO VARGAS Contenido A. Admisibilidad del recurso acumulado.............................1 B. Alegatos.......................................................2 C. Hechos probados................................................3 D. Consideraciones................................................6 1. Marco normativo y jurisprudencial.............................6 2. Sujetos recurridos.............................................9 3. Aspectos fácticos destacables.................................11 4. Núcleo la cuestión...........................................15 Respetuosamente considero que el recurso de amparo debe ser declarado con lugar, pero por razones diferentes a las señaladas por la mayoría de este Tribunal. En primer término, debo referirme a un aspecto procesal, luego a los alegatos, al marco normativo, a las particularidades de los sujetos recurridos y, finalmente, al núcleo de la cuestión.

A. Admisibilidad del recurso acumulado El recurso de amparo acumulado fue interpuesto a favor del recurrente “y de las personas que ven el programa objeto de este recurso”. Estimo que ese amparo debió ser admitido sólo a favor del recurrente, pues es tal la indeterminación de los sujetos que son parte de la teleaudiencia, que no se cumple con un presupuesto procesal básico para que se trabe la litis respecto de ellos: saber exactamente quiénes son. Es cierto que la Sala ha admitido amparos a favor de grupos de personas un tanto indeterminadas, pero siempre bajo la condición de que existe una posibilidad real de precisar de quiénes se trata: un grupo de estudiantes de una escuela, unos vecinos de una calle, personas privadas de libertad de un ámbito de un centro penitenciario, etc. Aquí no se cumple con tal condición, pues no es un grupo de personas determinable.

Sobre esto la mayoría dice:

“Finalmente, cabe hacer notar que el recurrente [Nombre 003] demanda la defensa de la libertad de expresión desde el punto de vista de una doble dimensión: activa -la libertad de expresarse- y pasiva -la libertad de recibir y conocer las opiniones de otros- y es en esa condición que se entiende opera la legitimación activa respecto de su recurso”.

Considero que tal argumento no subsana la indeterminación radical de los sujetos que componen la teleaudiencia, y solo hace relación a las dimensiones de la libertad expresión, que claramente se trata de otro tema. Ese argumento es solo aplicable al recurrente, que es a quien podemos ciertamente protegerle tal libertad en su dimensión pasiva.

B. Alegatos La parte recurrente manifiesta que, para la edición del año 2024, “El Chinaoke” desarrolló tres videos musicales relativos a temas de interés público que generaron una crítica directa hacía el Gobierno. En ese sentido, detallaron que el primer video denominado “En el EBAIS” se refiere al colapso en la atención de pacientes en la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS) con un mensaje sobre el aumento en las listas de espera que aqueja a los costarricenses. Además, se menciona la situación financiera de la institución, así como los casos de corrupción y allanamientos generados por el caso Barrenador. En el segundo video musical, titulado “¿Será que hoy me van a asaltar?”, la letra versa sobre la situación de inseguridad que enfrenta el país con un aumento significativo en la tasa de homicidios relacionados mayoritariamente con delincuencia organizada y el tráfico de drogas. Igualmente, se alude al presidente de la República, así como a las muertes colaterales. En el tercer video, llamado “No tengo plata”, se hace relación al alto costo de vida en el país, así como a las promesas incumplidas por el Gobierno con respecto a la reducción en los precios. Aducen que el 19 de diciembre de 2024 la marca comercial Kölbi, propiedad del ICE, anunció que retiraría su pauta publicitaria en el programa “El Chinamo”, afirmando que los contenidos de “El Chinaoke” no concuerdan con los valores de nuestra marca. Posteriormente, el 20 de diciembre de 2024, el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (BPDC) dio a conocer en un comunicado que únicamente mantendría el patrocinio de la sección “El Aguinaldazo” en “El Chinamo”, y retiraría el resto de su publicidad. Esto bajo el argumento de que debía evitar cualquier asociación con contenidos contrarios a la moral y el orden público. Acusan que la decisión de los recurridos de retirar la pauta publicitaria de “El Chinamo” constituye una vulneración a la libertad de expresión y prensa, protegidos por los artículos 28 y 29 constitucionales, así como por el artículo 13 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (CADH).

C. Hechos probados Aunque en la sentencia se encuentra el elenco de los hechos probados, es importante reiterar que, para la edición del año 2024, en la sección “El Chinaoke” emitida dentro del programa denominado “El Chinamo”, trasmitido en [Nombre 002] S. A. ([Nombre 006] o [Valor 003]), se presentaron varios videos musicales; no obstante, únicamente tres son objeto de este proceso: “En el EBAIS”, “¿Será que hoy me van a asaltar?” y “No tengo plata”, transmitidos el 12, 15 y 18 de diciembre, respectivamente. Asimismo, se colige que el 17 de diciembre de 2024 el BPDC solicitó a la agencia de publicidad que había colocado su pauta en el programa “El Chinamo” que realizara una modificación en las presencias de la marca en el programa, lo cual derivó en la eliminación de las pantallas de presentación y salida de los cuatro segmentos del programa cuando se realizaban las llamadas a los participantes, y que se usaran solamente las pantallas cuando se sacaba a la persona ganadora de la sección “El Aguinaldazo”. Por su parte, la marca comercial Kölbi, propiedad del ICE, emitió el 19 de diciembre de 2024 un comunicado de prensa, en los siguientes términos:

“Valores de la marca kölbi no concuerdan con contenidos expuestos en programa televisivo El Chinamo. Kölbi, marca comercial del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) aclara y comunica a la opinión pública: 0 Los contenidos expuestos por [Nombre 006] [Valor 003] en el programa El Chinamo, puntualmente en la sección El Chinaoke no concuerdan con los valores de nuestra marca. 0 Dado su origen costarricense, Kölbi se aleja de situaciones en las que se promueva o exponga violencia de forma implícita o explícita, discriminación, apología de la delincuencia o parodia del sufrimiento de víctimas. 0 Por el contrario, los esfuerzos publicitarios y comerciales de la marca se enfocan en incentivar valores como la paz, la unión familiar, el respeto, la innovación y la solidaridad, con impacto positivo y propio de la idiosincrasia nacional. Así consta en el recorrido de Kölbi por más de quince años en el mercado. 0 La contratación de los espacios publicitarios en el programa en cuestión, así como de las menciones a kölbi tuvieron el objetivo de asociar la marca con entretenimiento familiar propio de la época de fin e inicio de año; nunca a situaciones alusivas al dolor, la estigmatización o el escarnio. 0 “Como marca líder, nos regimos por principios sólidos que guían nuestras acciones y decisiones. No apoyamos actos opuestos a esos valores, especialmente aquellos contrarios a la responsabilidad social y ambiental que promovemos”, manifestó Leda Acevedo, gerente de Telecomunicaciones del ICE. 0 Por lo expuesto, kölbi ha decidido desligarse del programa El Chinamo y analizará la permanencia de su pauta en [Nombre 006] [Valor 003]”.

Acto seguido, sea el 20 de diciembre de 2024, el BPDC publicó el siguiente comunicado:

“Reafirmamos nuestro compromiso con el sano entretenimiento en estas fiestas. San José, 20 de diciembre de 2024. En el Banco Popular tenemos como una prioridad constante y un valor central de nuestra marca el promover acciones que fortalezcan el bienestar de la ciudadanía, especialmente en momentos como lo son las fiestas de Navidad y Fin de Año, donde la familia y el sano entretenimiento deben ocupar un lugar central.

Con el fin de contribuir al desarrollo de una sociedad más unida y positiva, mantenemos una presencia constante en decenas de medios de comunicación de todo el país, promocionando servicios que mejoran la vida de nuestros clientes y apoyando contenidos en dichos medios que fomenten la alegría de toda la familia, la reflexión y el respeto por la diversidad.

En este contexto, el presidente de la Junta Directiva Nacional del Banco, Jorge Eduardo Sánchez, ha enfatizado que nuestra marca –que es propiedad de nuestros clientes y de las personas trabajadoras [Nombre 002]– no puede verse expuesta a ser relacionada con imágenes inapropiadas o que incluso pudiesen fomentar conductas ajenas a la moral y el orden público al cual nos debemos.

En el caso particular del debate público generado precisamente a partir de algunos contenidos emitidos en la sección “El Chinaoke” del programa “El Chinamo”, que se transmite por parte de [Nombre 006] [Valor 003], lamentamos profundamente como Banco Popular que algunos sectores de la ciudadanía pudiesen sentirse ofendidos o incómodos por dichas imágenes y hemos adoptado las acciones pertinentes para garantizar que nuestras participaciones se propicien siempre dentro de espacios que tienen como prioridad permanente los valores del sano entretenimiento.

De esta forma, y siendo que esta temporada del programa “El Chinamo” se extenderá hasta el próximo lunes 23 de diciembre, mantendremos únicamente el patrocinio de la sección “El Aguinaldazo” que lleva alegría a la familia premiando diariamente con 1 millón de colones a algún afortunado televidente.

Agradecemos y le asignamos la mayor relevancia a la opinión de nuestros clientes en este tipo de materias, y reiteramos que en el Banco Popular trabajamos sin pausa para contribuir al bienestar social, fomentando el respeto, la inclusión y el disfrute responsable para toda la ciudadanía”.

Consta que la marca Kölbi no retiró la pauta publicitaria del medio de comunicación, sino que la redistribuyó. Además, [Nombre 006] continuó transmitiendo en su totalidad los segmentos de “El Chinaoke” dentro de su programación y actualmente se encuentran disponibles como enlaces públicos en Internet, accesibles para cualquier persona.

D. Consideraciones 1. Marco normativo y jurisprudencial Al respecto, transcribo acá lo que dije en las razones diferentes a la sentencia 2022-25167 (Parque Viva):

“Marco normativo y jurisprudencial Hay dos normas que han de tomarse en consideración. Por un lado, el artículo 29 de la Constitución Política que establece:

Artículo 29. Todos pueden comunicar sus pensamientos de palabra o por escrito, y publicarlos sin previa censura; pero serán responsables de los abusos que cometan en el ejercicio de este derecho, en los casos y del modo que la ley establezca.

Por otro, en lo conducente, el artículo 13 de la CADH que señala:

Artículo 13. Libertad de Pensamiento y de Expresión 1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión. Este derecho comprende la libertad de buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas de toda índole, sin consideración de fronteras, ya sea oralmente, por escrito o en forma impresa o artística, o por cualquier otro procedimiento de su elección.

2. El ejercicio del derecho previsto en el inciso precedente no puede estar sujeto a previa censura sino a responsabilidades ulteriores, las que deben estar expresamente fijadas por la ley y ser necesarias para asegurar: a) el respeto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás, o b) la protección de la seguridad nacional, el orden público o la salud o la moral públicas.

3. No se puede restringir el derecho de expresión por vías o medios indirectos, tales como el abuso de controles oficiales o particulares de papel para periódicos, de frecuencias radioeléctricas, o de enseres y aparatos usados en la difusión de información o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones.

4. Los espectáculos públicos pueden ser sometidos por la ley a censura previa, con el exclusivo objeto de regular el acceso a ellos para la protección moral de la infancia y la adolescencia, sin perjuicio de lo establecido en el inciso 2.

5. (…) (El destacado no es del original).

La Sala Constitucional tiene una robusta jurisprudencia que subraya que el respeto a la libertad de expresión es una de las condiciones indispensables del Estado de Derecho y del ejercicio de la vida democrática. Entre muchas otras sentencias se puede transcribir parcialmente la siguiente:

“VIII.- La libertad de expresión como requisito indispensable de la democracia. La libertad de expresión sin duda alguna es una de las condiciones -aunque no la única-, para que funcione la democracia. Esta libertad es la que permite la creación de la opinión pública, esencial para darle contenido a varios principios del Estado constitucional, como lo son por ejemplo el derecho a la información, el derecho de petición o los derechos en materia de participación política; la existencia de una opinión pública libre y consolidada también es una condición para el funcionamiento de la democracia representativa. La posibilidad de que todas las personas participen en las discusiones públicas constituye el presupuesto necesario para la construcción de una dinámica social de intercambio de conocimientos ideas e información, que permita la generación de consensos y la toma de decisiones entre los componentes de los diversos grupos sociales, pero que también constituya un cauce para la expresión de los disensos, que en la democracia son tan necesarios como los acuerdos. Por su parte, el intercambio de opiniones e informaciones que se origina con la discusión pública contribuye a formar la opinión personal, ambas conforman la opinión pública, que acaba manifestándose por medio de los canales de la democracia representativa” (sentencia 2006-5977; el destacado no es del original; esas consideraciones han sido muchas veces reiteradas por la Sala, por ejemplo, en las sentencias 2015-1782, 2018-8396, 2019-8263 y 2020-16167).

Esta sentencia continúa con un pasaje particularmente relevante para el análisis que de inmediato se va a hacer:

“La libertad de expresión tiene como consecuencia la prohibición de toda forma de censura, en un doble sentido: no se puede censurar a los interlocutores, por una parte; y no se puede, en general, tampoco censurar en forma previa los contenidos posibles de la discusión: en principio, en una democracia, todos los temas son discutibles. La no censurabilidad de los sujetos tienen un carácter prácticamente universal, como lo establece nuestra Constitución, nadie puede ser privado de la libertad de hablar y expresarse como mejor le parezca; la no censurabilidad de los contenidos, si bien no se da en forma previa, encuentra algunas limitaciones, sin embargo, éstas deben ser tales que la libertad siga teniendo sentido o no sea vaciada de su contenido, básicamente, como toda libertad, debe ejercerse con responsabilidad, en fin para perseguir fines legítimos dentro del sistema” (ibid.; el destacado no es del original).

Es decir, se habla de la censura –entendida como el acto de reprobar– como un acto contrario a la libertad de expresión. Dicho de otro modo, se afirma que la consecuencia de esa libertad es la prohibición de toda clase de censura. Luego, no existe solo la censura previa, prohibida expresamente por los artículos 29 de la Constitución y 13 de la CADH, sino que puede darse una censura posterior, que tiene el propósito de inhibir cierto contenido informativo o de opinión. También se dice que la protección contra la censura alcanza no solo a los sujetos (quien comunica) sino al contenido (lo que se comunica).

Además, aunque no se desprende de esas líneas jurisprudenciales, estimo que se podrían incorporar otros criterios para completar una tipología de censura. Así, por su apariencia, puede ser velada o manifiesta; por los medios para ejercerla, puede ser directa o indirecta (por ejemplo, según lo previsto en el artículo 13.3 de la CADH); por sus efectos, puede ser absoluta (si la reprobación va de manera concomitante con la supresión) o relativa.

Finalmente, de manera sintética, ha dicho:

“La Sala recuerda que la defensa de la libertad de expresión es vital para el funcionamiento de un régimen democrático” (sentencia 2017-014977; el destacado no es del original).

Naturalmente, coincido plenamente con esa jurisprudencia, y he concurrido en muchas otras sentencias posteriores que fortalecen esa línea (vid. sentencias 2021-15417, 2022-4244, 2022-5915, 2022-9856, 2022-23107, entre otras).

2. Sujetos recurridos El BPDC es una entidad pública no estatal, es decir, que no le pertenece al Estado sino a los trabajadores. Así lo establece su Ley Orgánica:

Artículo 1º.- Créase el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, el que se regirá por la presente ley y su reglamento. El Banco es propiedad de los trabajadores por partes iguales y el derecho a la copropiedad estará sujeta a que hayan tenido una cuenta de ahorro obligatorio durante un año continuo o en períodos alternos… Artículo 2°. - El Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal es una institución de Derecho Público no estatal, con personería jurídica y patrimonio propio, con plena autonomía administrativa y funcional. Su funcionamiento se regirá por las normas del Derecho Público.

Como se puede observar, la base es corporativa y no es propiedad del Estado. Esto es relevante, pues la mayoría hace referencia a la sentencia 2016-015220 de las 16:00 horas del 18 de octubre de 2016 en la que se analizó un asunto similar interpuesto contra el Banco Nacional [Nombre 002]. No obstante, estimo que no cabe tratar en igualdad de condiciones al BPDC y al Banco Nacional. La propia resolución mencionada explica que la naturaleza del Banco Nacional [Nombre 002] es la de una institución estatal con autonomía constitucionalmente reconocida, a la cual se ha encargado llevar a cabo una actividad comercial, en régimen de competencia con entidades privadas. En cambio, como lo establece la norma recién transcrita, el BPDC es “una institución de Derecho Público no estatal, con personería jurídica y patrimonio propio, con plena autonomía administrativa y funcional”.

Por su parte, Kölbi es una marca comercial, que funciona en el marco de Ley Nº 8660 y la Ley Nº 8642. Y bien lo explican en su informe:

“En este contexto, derivado de su organización interna, la Gerencia de Telecomunicaciones tiene la responsabilidad de gestionar el negocio de telecomunicaciones y la marca KÖLBI, toda la gestión técnica y comercial es ejecutada por esa Gerencia”.

Pero esa marca no se puede identificar jurídicamente con el ICE. Por eso, respetuosamente considero que es inexacto lo afirmado por la mayoría:

“Al ser el responsable de la marca Kölbi una institución pública, como lo es el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, es contrario a la libertad de expresión “castigar” un contenido concreto, que versaba, como ya se indicó, sobre temas de relevancia pública”.

Aquí el responsable de Kölbi no es propiamente el ICE como institución autónoma, sino quienes ejercen la gerencia de Telecomunicaciones en tanto son la cabeza de la marca comercial.

Tanto el BPDC como la marca Kölbi, desarrollan actividades empresariales. En esa línea de ideas es menester traer a colación lo estipulado en la Ley General de la Administración Pública, que dice lo siguiente:

Artículo 3º.- 1. El derecho público regulará la organización y actividad de los entes públicos, salvo norma expresa en contrario.

2. El derecho privado regulará la actividad de los entes que por su régimen de conjunto y los requerimientos de su giro puedan estimarse como empresas industriales o mercantiles comunes. (El destacado no es del original).

Consecuente, la sentencia 2016-015220 no aplica exactamente al caso concreto, pues los aquí recurridos tienen un giro eminentemente comercial y, al menos en el caso del BPDC, no es una institución estatal. Eso significa que tienen un amplio margen de acción para determinar su política publicitaria. Además, lleva razón el representante del BPDC cuando dice:

“Confunde el recurrente, o al menos no distingue con precisión, los aspectos fácticos que atribuye al ICE (Kölbi) y al BPDC, los asemeja y confunde, para tratar de aplicar silogismos jurídicos de otros casos analizados por la Sala que, en la especie, para nuestro representado no resultan aplicables”.

Y esto no solo respecto de la distinta naturaleza jurídica del Banco Nacional respecto de los aquí recurridos, sino porque en el precedente la situación era otra muy distinta: se trataba de conductas periodísticas que presumiblemente lesionaban la imagen de ese banco.

3. Aspectos fácticos destacables Por otra parte, del atento examen del informe rendido por el ICE se logró determinar que dicha institución, mediante su marca Kölbi, no tiene un contrato directo con [Nombre 006], ni tampoco un contrato relacionado con el segmento “El Chinaoke”, ni con el contenido expuesto en dicha sección del programa. Además, se corrobora que como parte de la estrategia comercial de la marca Kölbi se decidió reubicar la pauta publicitaria de la sección “Misión Chinamo” como una medida alineada con los valores de la marca, buscando que la publicidad se presentara en otros programas del mismo [Valor 003], que se ajustaran mejor a la imagen que Kölbi desea proyectar. En ese sentido, en el informe se subrayó lo siguiente:

“El Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad mediante su marca KÖLBI no tiene un contrato directo con la [Nombre 002] ([Nombre 005], ya que es a través de un proceso de licitación activa con agencias de publicidad, las cuales se encargan de contratar las pautas en medios de comunicación, es así como dichas agencias contrataron una pauta en el programa "El Chinamo", específicamente en la sección denominada "Misión Chinamo". En esta sección, a lo largo del programa, se lleva a cabo la exposición de la marca, la cual fue cuidadosamente analizada y vinculada con el plan estratégico comercial de la misma y se hace desde años atrás desde la innovación de la tecnología. Es importante señalar que, en ninguna circunstancia, se estableció un contrato relacionado con el segmento "Chinaoke" ni con el contenido expuesto en dicha sección del programa (…) En el año 2024 en el transcurso del programa aludido o sección, se analizó la estrategia comercial de marca KÖLBI, determinándose que se alejaba el tipo de contenido de los valores de la marca. En ese contexto, y como parte de la estrategia comercial de la marca "KÖLBI ", se decidió reubicar la pauta publicitaria de la sección "Misión Chinamo". Esta reubicación fue una medida alineada con los valores de la marca, buscando que la publicidad se presentara en otros programas del mismo [Valor 003], que se ajustaran mejor a la imagen que "KÖLBI" desea proyectar (…) La pauta publicitaria NO FUE RETIRADA DEL MEDIO, si no que se distribuyó para optimizar el impacto publicitario y se alineó con los intereses del plan estratégico del negocio de telecomunicaciones y la marca KÖLBI y en común acuerdo con la agencia de publicidad y la misma televisora. [Nombre 006] continuó transmitiendo en su totalidad los segmentos de "Chinaoke" dentro de su programación, y actualmente se encuentran disponibles como enlaces públicos en Internet, accesibles para cualquier persona (…) La reubicación de la pauta publicitaria responde a criterios objetivos y transparentes, los cuales están alineados con la estrategia comercial definida por la marca "KÖLBI". Dichos criterios buscan optimizar el alcance y la efectividad de las campañas publicitarias, asegurando que la reubicación se realice de acuerdo con los intereses y objetivos comerciales establecidos por la marca, de forma clara y consistente pues es deber de las agencias publicitarias contratadas, velar por el apego a los lineamientos tanto del libro de marca, como de valores y personalidad de esta, pactado contractualmente entre la empresa de publicidad y el ICE (…) En este sentido, la medida no implica la eliminación de la pauta publicitaria, sino su reubicación en otros espacios del medio, garantizando así la presencia mediática de la marca”.

En similar sentido, el presidente de la Junta Directiva Nacional y la gerente general con facultades de apoderada generalísima sin límite de suma del BPDC indicaron el ente bancario compró una pauta publicitaria para el programa televisivo “El Chinamo”, y el 08 de octubre de 2024 se aprobó por parte la Dirección Corporativa de Mercadeo la participación en el programa “El Chinamo”, con la sección “El Aguinaldazo”. Agregaron que el 17 de diciembre de 2024 se solicitó a la agencia de publicidad realizar una modificación en las presencias de la marca en el programa con el objetivo prioritario de evitar cualquier tipo de saturación hacia el consumidor; esto, por cuanto el paquete inicial adquirido incluía catorce presencias diarias, pero de un análisis técnico se detectó una cantidad de hasta veintidós presencias de la marca por programa. En lo conducente, del informe se extrae, en lo medular, lo siguiente:

“Es cierto que el Banco Popular compró una pauta publicitaria para el programa televisivo “El Chinamo”. El 26 de setiembre del 2024, [Nombre 006] [Valor 003] inició la comercialización del programa con el Banco Popular, dando prioridad a los clientes que tuvieron presencia en el mismo espacio en el año 2023; como fue el caso de nuestra Institución, de esta forma, la oferta inicial presentada al Banco por parte del medio proponía un descuento considerable del precio tarifario que eventualmente tendrían que desembolsar otras marcas en caso de contratar presencias similares (…) el 08 de octubre de 2024 se aprobó por parte la Dirección Corporativa de Mercadeo la participación en el programa “El Chinamo”, con la sección “El Aguinaldazo” (…) el Banco Popular el 08 de octubre de 2024 aprobó la participación y pauta en el programa “El Chinamo”, con la sección “El Aguinaldazo”. Como parte de una práctica habitual de seguimiento de resultados dentro de los procesos de mercadeo institucionales, el viernes 13 de diciembre de 2024 se solicitó a la Agencia de Publicidad revisar los resultados preliminares de “El Chinamo”, cuya temporada 2024 inició el miércoles 11 de diciembre 2024. Del análisis técnico descrito se detectó una cantidad de hasta 22 presencias de la marca por programa, que difería de las inicialmente contratadas, el aumento de presencias se debió a una bonificación que otorgó unilateralmente el Canal y que resultó en una exposición mayor a la esperada (sobrexposición), dado que el paquete inicial incluía 14 presencias diarias. Con base en dicho análisis, el 17 de diciembre de 2024 se solicitó a la Agencia de Publicidad, realizar una modificación en las presencias de la marca en este programa, con el objetivo prioritario de evitar cualquier tipo de saturación hacia el consumidor. Esto derivó en la eliminación de las pantallas de presentación y salida de los cuatro segmentos del programa cuando se realizaban las llamadas a los participantes, para que se usaran solamente las pantallas cuando se sacaba a la persona ganador o ganadora de la sección “El Aguinaldazo”, lo anterior se ejecutó a partir del pasado 18 de diciembre de 2024, cuando las presencias en “El Chinamo” se disminuyeron de 22 a 12” (…) Es importante indicar que a lo largo de toda la temporada del programa “El Chinamo” - que concluyó el pasado 23 de diciembre - se mantuvo sin variación alguna nuestra participación en el segmento de “El Aguinaldazo”, redistribuyendo, como ya se explicó, presencias de marca a través de pantallas por spots publicitarios en distintos programas del mismo canal con el objetivo de beneficiar a la Institución y ampliar el alcance de marca”.

Visto lo anterior, resulta claro que las partes recurridas no retiraron del programa denominado “El Chinamo” las pautas publicitarias. Según lo argumentaron, las variaciones en la exposición de las marcas obedecieron, en el caso de Kölbi, a criterios que están alineados con la estrategia comercial definida por la marca, mientras que en el caso del BPDC a una modificación en las presencias de la marca en este programa con el objetivo prioritario de evitar cualquier tipo de saturación hacia el consumidor. Además, la reducción de las pautas publicitarias en el programa denominado “El Chinamo” no causó una imposibilidad para emitir el programa. Incluso ambas marcas se mantuvieron hasta el final del programa en las secciones “El Chinaoke” y el “El Aguinaldazo”, respectivamente.

4. Núcleo la cuestión Pero ¿por qué, pese a que estamos ante una marca comercial, de una institución estatal y a un sujeto de derecho público no estatal de base corporativa, que tienen amplio margen de acción y que no fueron aludidos directamente por el contenido de los videos, se puede afirmar que incurrieron en una lesión a la libertad de expresión? ¿Por qué se puede decir que tal lesión se configura si, como consecuencia de lo anterior, es evidente que no tienen obligación alguna de pautar con nadie ni deber, en sí mismo, de mantener dicha pauta ni las características de esta?

Como dije en su momento:

“El artículo 13.3 de la CADH señala que la lesión a la libertad de expresión por medios indirectos se da cuanto estos están “encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones”. Además, por jurisprudencia, tanto de la Corte IDH como de la Sala Constitucional, los actos deben recaer sobre el sujeto que comunica (personal física o jurídica” (Razones diferentes a la sentencia 2022-25167).

Aquí la conducta de las partes recurridas no impidió ni total ni parcialmente la circulación de ideas y opiniones. Pero considero que se configuró un tipo de censura. En ese sentido, es oportuno traer a colación lo que también dije en esa oportunidad y transcribo de nuevo:

““La libertad de expresión tiene como consecuencia la prohibición de toda forma de censura, en un doble sentido: no se puede censurar a los interlocutores, por una parte; y no se puede, en general, tampoco censurar en forma previa los contenidos posibles de la discusión: en principio, en una democracia, todos los temas son discutibles. La no censurabilidad de los sujetos tienen un carácter prácticamente universal, como lo establece nuestra Constitución, nadie puede ser privado de la libertad de hablar y expresarse como mejor le parezca; la no censurabilidad de los contenidos, si bien no se da en forma previa, encuentra algunas limitaciones, sin embargo, éstas deben ser tales que la libertad siga teniendo sentido o no sea vaciada de su contenido, básicamente, como toda libertad, debe ejercerse con responsabilidad, en fin para perseguir fines legítimos dentro del sistema” (sentencia 2006-5977.; el destacado no es del original).

Es decir, se habla de la censura –entendida como el acto de reprobar– como un acto contrario a la libertad de expresión. Dicho de otro modo, se afirma que la consecuencia de esa libertad es la prohibición de toda clase de censura. Luego, no existe solo la censura previa, prohibida expresamente por los artículos 29 de la Constitución y 13 de la CADH, sino que puede darse una censura posterior, que tiene el propósito de inhibir cierto contenido informativo o de opinión. También se dice que la protección contra la censura alcanza no solo a los sujetos (quien comunica) sino al contenido (lo que se comunica).

Además, aunque no se desprende de esas líneas jurisprudenciales, estimo que se podrían incorporar otros criterios para completar una tipología de censura. Así, por su apariencia, puede ser velada o manifiesta; por los medios para ejercerla, puede ser directa o indirecta (por ejemplo, según lo previsto en el artículo 13.3 de la CADH); por sus efectos, puede ser absoluta (si la reprobación va de manera concomitante con la supresión) o relativa” (ibid..; el destacado no es del original).

Y luego añadí:

“Esto quiere decir que toda manifestación que suponga una censura, aunque por sus efectos sea solo relativa y no absoluta, pues con ella no se impidió la difusión posterior de las ideas reprobadas, constituye una lesión directa a la libertad de expresión” (ibid.).

He de reconocer que Kölbi hizo una argumentación mejor articulada para justificar la reubicación de la pauta cuando dijo:

“En el año 2024 en el transcurso del programa aludido o sección, se analizó la estrategia comercial de marca KÖLBI, determinándose que se alejaba el tipo de contenido de los valores de la marca. En ese contexto, y como parte de la estrategia comercial de la marca "KÖLBI ", se decidió reubicar la pauta publicitaria de la sección "Misión Chinamo". Esta reubicación fue una medida alineada con los valores de la marca, buscando que la publicidad se presentara en otros programas del mismo [Valor 003], que se ajustaran mejor a la imagen que "KÖLBI" desea proyectar”.

Y también:

“Esa reputación está asociada a la movilidad social de la familia, del ser más intrínseco Tico Pura Vida -costarricense-; KÖLBI se enfoca en el bien vivir, en la mejora continua de la sociedad, no tiene injerencia -desde la perspectiva comercial- en la política pública y menos aún en la discusión de los grandes temas sociales que como sociedad arrastramos”.

No obstante, es palmario que la solicitud de disminuir y reubicar las pautas publicitarias en el programa “El Chinamo” reflejó una reacción de la marca Kölbi y el BPDC ante los tres videos. Como apunta la mayoría, el contenido de estos no hace relación alguna a los giros comerciales de Kölbi y el BPDC sino a las autoridades de gobierno. Y considero que los recurridos no logran desvirtuar plenamente que usaron las facultades propias de sus respectivos giros comerciales como un mecanismo de influencia política. Además, no aportaron suficientes elementos de convicción que permitan determinar cuál es el vínculo entre sus propias actividades comerciales y el perjuicio directo que causó el contenido de los videos para su giro o su identidad empresarial. Entonces, en el caso concreto, en atención al contexto y demás elementos aquí mencionados, la reacción ante un contenido claramente contrario al gobierno, más parece haber adquirido visos de censura posterior, velada, directa, relativa, pues no logran desacreditar el uso de las prerrogativas propias de su giro comercial con efectos perniciosos para la libertad de expresión.

Por tanto, concuerdo con la estimatoria del recurso, pero por razones diferentes.

Anamari Garro Vargas Magistrada VCG09/2025 ... Ver más CO* Res. Nº 2025021235 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las trece treinta horas del ocho de julio de dos mil veinticinco.

Recursos de amparo acumulados (expedientes números 24-035822-007 y 24-035833-0007-CO), interpuestos por [Nombre 001], cédula de identidad [Valor 001], a favor de [Nombre 002]. y [Nombre 003], cédula de identidad [Valor 002], a favor suyo y de las personas que ven el programa objeto de este recurso, contra el INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD y el BANCO POPULAR Y DE DESARROLLO COMUNAL.

RESULTANDO:

1.-Mediante escrito recibido el 21 de diciembre de 2024, [Nombre 001] interpuso recurso de amparo, en los siguientes términos: desde hace cerca de veinticuatro años, [Nombre 006] ha emitido un programa denominado "El Chinamo", el cual se transmite por televisión nacional. Señala que, a lo largo de los años, el Chinamo ha contado con una sección denominada "El Chinaoke", que se utiliza para la parodia, la sátira y la comedia, como formas válidas de expresión y crítica de figuras políticas, el gobierno de turno, instituciones públicas o situaciones de interés general. Para ello, se recurre a las melodías de canciones preexistentes, a las que se les altera la letra original para introducir contenido de crítica política. Afirma que El Chinamo, al igual que muchos otros programas televisivos, se apoya en pauta publicitaria de empresas públicas y privadas Afirma que, para la edición del año 2024, en la sección El Chinaoke se desarrolló tres videos musicales relativos a temas de interés público, que implicaban una crítica directa hacia el Gobierno. En el primer video, denominado "En el EBAIS", se hace referencia al colapso en la atención de pacientes en la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, con un mensaje referente al aumento en las listas de espera que aqueja a los costarricenses. En el video también se hace alusión a la situación financiera de la institución, así como a los casos de corrupción y allanamientos generados por el caso Barrenador. En el segundo video musical denominado “¿Será que hoy me van a asaltar?”, la letra hace referencia a la situación de inseguridad que enfrenta el país, con un aumento significativo en la tasa de homicidios relacionados mayoritariamente con delincuencia organizada y el tráfico de drogas. Agrega que en el video se hace alusión al Presidente de la República, así como a las muertes colaterales del crimen organizado. En el tercer video llamado "No tengo plata", se hace alusión al alto costo de vida en el país, así como a las promesas incumplidas por el Gobierno con respecto a la reducción en los precios. Alega que la marca comercial Kölbi, propiedad del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad anunció el 19 de diciembre de 2024 que retiraría su pauta publicitaria en el programa El Chinamo, argumentando que los contenidos del Chinaoke "no concuerdan con los valores de nuestra marca". La institución informó, además, que: "Dado su origen costarricense, Kölbi se aleja de situaciones en las que se promueva o exponga violencia de forma implícita o explícita, discriminación, apología de la delincuencia o parodia del sufrimiento de víctimas. Por el contrario, los esfuerzos publicitarios y comerciales de la marca se enfocan en incentivar valores como la paz, la unión familiar, el respeto, la innovación y la solidaridad, con impacto positivo y propio de la idiosincrasia nacional. Así consta en el recorrido de Kölbi por más de quince años en el mercado”. Posteriormente, el 20 de diciembre de 2024, el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal anunció en un comunicado que únicamente mantendría el patrocinio de la sección "El Aguinaldazo" en El Chinamo, y retiraría el resto de su publicidad. Lo anterior, con el argumento que debía evitar cualquier asociación con contenidos contrarios a la moral y el orden público. Aduce que la decisión de los recurridos de retirar la pauta publicitaria del Chinamo, constituye una vulneración a la libertad de expresión y prensa, protegidos por los artículos 28 y 29 constitucionales, así como por el numeral 13 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, por lo que pide que se acoja el recurso, con sus consecuencias.

2.-Por resolución de las 11:26 horas del 6 de enero de 2025, se le dio curso al proceso.

3- Informa bajo juramento Leda María Acevedo Zúñiga, gerente de Telecomunicaciones con facultades de apoderada generalísima sin límite de suma del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad. Señala que ese instituto, en lo que respecta al sector telecomunicaciones opera en un mercado competitivo bajo el marco legal establecido por la Ley Nº 8660 y la Ley Nº 8642. “En este contexto, derivado de su organización interna, la Gerencia de Telecomunicaciones tiene la responsabilidad de gestionar el negocio de telecomunicaciones y la marca KÖLBI, toda la gestión técnica y comercial es ejecutada por esa Gerencia. El definir, organizar, dirigir y optimizar el uso de todos sus recursos, incluidos los destinados a la publicidad, le es inherente a su competencia, esta optimización es crucial para asegurar que todas las decisiones estratégicas, ya sea en términos de pautas publicitarias o cualquier otra acción relacionada, estén alineadas con los valores, objetivos y propósitos de la marca "KÖLBI”. El objetivo fundamental es que todas las acciones de comunicación y marketing se implementen de manera coherente con el plan estratégico comercial de la marca, para garantizar que se exponga de la forma más adecuada ante los consumidores. Este plan comercial ha sido clasificado como confidencial por el Consejo Directivo del ICE, con el propósito de proteger la información estratégica que sustenta la competitividad de la institución y asegura el éxito de su modelo de negocio. De esta forma, el ICE protege la información clave que impulsa su crecimiento y presencia en un mercado altamente competitivo, que como es sabido comparte con otros gigantes transnacionales eminentemente de naturaleza privada. Sobre el caso en concreto Primero: Como punto de partida en el análisis del presente asunto, se advierte que el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad mediante su marca KÖLBI no tiene un contrato directo con la [Nombre 002] ([Nombre 005], ya que es a través de un proceso de licitación activa con agencias de publicidad, las cuales se encargan de contratar las pautas en medios de comunicación, es así como dichas agencias contrataron una pauta en el programa "El Chinamo", específicamente en la sección denominada "Misión Chinamo". En esta sección, a lo largo del programa, se lleva a cabo la exposición de la marca, la cual fue cuidadosamente analizada y vinculada con el plan estratégico comercial de la misma y se hace desde años atrás desde la innovación de la tecnología. Es importante señalar que, en ninguna circunstancia, se estableció un contrato relacionado con el segmento "Chinaoke" ni con el contenido expuesto en dicha sección del programa. En suma, KÖLBI contrata el servicio experto de una agencia de publicidad, la cual es la que coloca pauta comercial y de mercado -no de naturaleza institucional- en los distintos canales de comunicación y de exposición de marca para los efectos propios de colocación y venta de servicios de telecomunicaciones disponibles al público, al igual que lo hacen los demás operadores de telecomunicaciones con los que se disputa el mercado. Segundo: En el año 2024 en el transcurso del programa aludido o sección, se analizó la estrategia comercial de marca KÖLBI, determinándose que se alejaba el tipo de contenido de los valores de la marca. En ese contexto, y como parte de la estrategia comercial de la marca "KÖLBI ", se decidió reubicar la pauta publicitaria de la sección "Misión Chinamo". Esta reubicación fue una medida alineada con los valores de la marca, buscando que la publicidad se presentara en otros programas del mismo [Valor 003], que se ajustaran mejor a la imagen que "KÖLBI" desea proyectar. De este modo, la estrategia publicitaria se alineó con los principios de sostenibilidad e innovación tecnológica, que son clave para la identidad y visión de la marca, garantizando que las campañas publicitarias estén en sintonía con sus valores y objetivos a largo plazo. KÖLBI está asociado a tecnología, innovación, futuro, fluidez, comunicación, internet, redes sociales y en general todo lo que implica el mundo de las telecomunicaciones-infocomunicaciones tiene inmerso, de la misma manera, esa marca, en algún grado la acompaña la reputación del ICE en construcción de grandes obras de infraestructura, servicios públicos, acceso universal, desarrollo del país mediante el acercamiento y dotación de electricidad y telecomunicaciones a lo largo de todo el país durante 75 años. Esa reputación está asociada a la movilidad social de la familia, del ser más intrínseco Tico Pura Vida - costarricense-; KÖLBI se enfoca en el bien vivir, en la mejora continua de la sociedad, no tiene injerencia -desde la perspectiva comercial- en la política pública y menos aún en la discusión de los grandes temas sociales que como sociedad arrastramos. Tercero: La pauta publicitaria NO FUE RETIRADA DEL MEDIO, si no que se distribuyó para optimizar el impacto publicitario y se alineó con los intereses del plan estratégico del negocio de telecomunicaciones y la marca KÖLBI y en común acuerdo con la agencia de publicidad y la misma televisora. Cuarto: [Nombre 006] continuó transmitiendo en su totalidad los segmentos de "Chinaoke" dentro de su programación, y actualmente se encuentran disponibles como enlaces públicos en Internet, accesibles para cualquier persona. Este hecho evidencia que, en ningún momento, el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad ejerció censura ni limitó la transmisión del contenido producido por el medio pues no tiene interés, injerencia ni la potestad para hacerlo, por que como se reiteró no existe una relación contractual. De esta manera, se confirma que el acceso y la difusión del programa no fueron restringidos de ninguna forma, garantizando la libre circulación de la información y la programación emitida. Quinto: La reubicación de la pauta publicitaria responde a criterios objetivos y transparentes, los cuales están alineados con la estrategia comercial definida por la marca "KÖLBI". Dichos criterios buscan optimizar el alcance y la efectividad de las campañas publicitarias, asegurando que la reubicación se realice de acuerdo con los intereses y objetivos comerciales establecidos por la marca, de forma clara y consistente pues es deber de las agencias publicitarias contratadas, velar por el apego a los lineamientos tanto del libro de marca, como de valores y personalidad de esta, pactado contractualmente entre la empresa de publicidad y el ICE. Tal como se muestra a continuación del siguiente extracto del contrato: [CAPITULO II. CONDICIONES PARTICULARES. 14. VIGENCIA DE LA GARANTÍA DEL BIEN O SERVICIO. 14.3. También la prestación del servicio debe estar identificada con los principios de logística y buena administración del contrato. 22. CONDICIONES DE LA EJECUCIÓN DEL CONTRATO. 22.10. Será responsabilidad directa de la (s) agencia (s) supervisar y controlar la calidad final de los materiales que el ICE apruebe, sean estos impresos, audiovisuales, tácticas de BTL o de cualquier otro tipo, así como, supervisar que la información contenida en cada material sea correcta, la redacción, formatos, corrección, estilo, legibilidad, revisión de la información según la legislación publicitaria y apego a los lineamientos tanto del libro de marca, como de valores y personalidad de la misma. El ICE, no asumirá ningún costo asociado a faltas de control de calidad en los procesos de producción y ejecución. 22.24. La titularidad de las marcas registradas del ICE pertenece exclusivamente al ICE, por lo que la agencia (s) deberá brindar el resguardo correspondiente de dicha propiedad intelectual en la elaboración y la ejecución de todos los servicios contemplados durante la vigencia de esta contratación y posterior a la terminación del mismo. La (s) agencia (s) será responsable ante el ICE por cualquier uso indebido, falta de cuidado, daños y perjuicios causados a las marcas del ICE o las obras utilizadas al amparo de la presente contratación. 24. SISTEMA DE CONTROL DE CALIDAD. 24.4. La (s) agencia (s) deberá garantizar que el servicio brindado cumpla con los principios de razonabilidad, proporcionalidad y realidad del mercado, de forma lógica y objetiva, asegurando en todo momento la continuidad del mismo y el estricto cumplimiento de lo convenido]. Por lo tanto, en ninguna circunstancia puede interpretarse la decisión de reubicación de la pauta publicitaria como un acto de censura a la libertad de prensa o de expresión de un tercero, como lo sugiere el recurrente. Es evidente que esta decisión responde exclusivamente a temas contractuales y estratégicos definidos entre las partes involucradas. Además, se debe destacar que el recurrente no posee información suficiente ni conocimiento sobre el plan de estrategia comercial bajo el cual se tomó la decisión de reubicación. En este sentido, la medida no implica la eliminación de la pauta publicitaria, sino su reubicación en otros espacios del medio, garantizando así la presencia mediática de la marca. Este enfoque estratégico permite que la publicidad continúe alineándose con los valores, principios y objetivos comerciales de la empresa, asegurando además su posicionamiento en un entorno competitivo, y asociada a los ambientes, segmentos, contexto y sentimientos que son de interés comercial de KÖLBI. En consecuencia, cualquier interpretación que pretenda ligar esta decisión comercial con una vulneración de derechos fundamentales carece de fundamento, pues no se ha impedido ni restringido el ejercicio de la libertad de expresión o prensa. Más bien, se trata de una gestión legítima de los recursos publicitarios de la marca, que busca optimizar su impacto y coherencia con su visión empresarial y responsabilidad social. De acuerdo con lo establecido en la Ley N. º 8660 Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones, el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, como actor en un mercado abierto, está sujeto a las dinámicas del derecho privado respecto a las prácticas usuales de la industria de las telecomunicaciones, de la cual forma parte la gestión comercial y por ende la publicidad. Esto le otorga la libertad de elegir con quién asociarse, siempre y cuando no incurra en prácticas desleales o contrarias a la normativa aplicable. En virtud de esta autonomía administrativa, técnica y financiera, el ICE está facultado para tomar decisiones comerciales, como la contratación o el retiro de publicidad, fundamentadas en sus objetivos estratégicos y valores empresariales. Estas decisiones, por tanto, no pueden considerarse violaciones de derechos constitucionales, como la libertad de expresión o de prensa. Asimismo, la operación KÖLBI debe regirse por criterios empresariales que maximicen tanto su sostenibilidad económica como su reputación institucional. Esto implica que las asociaciones publicitarias que realice deben ser congruentes con los valores de la organización y no deben incluir contenidos que puedan afectar, directa o indirectamente, su imagen pública o las relaciones con los consumidores. En este contexto, es esencial que sus decisiones estratégicas se alineen con su plan comercial, el cual está diseñado para garantizar eficiencia, competitividad y coherencia con sus objetivos corporativos. Cabe señalar que el artículo 35 de la Ley N. º 8660 establece que el plan de estrategia comercial de KÖLBI se encuentra protegido bajo el principio de confidencialidad. Esto significa que la información relacionada con las decisiones de pauta publicitaria y su reubicación no está disponible públicamente, protegiendo así los intereses comerciales y la viabilidad estratégica de la institución. “(Artículo 35- Manejo de información confidencial)”: “(…La información que el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) y sus empresas obtengan de sus usuarios y clientes será de carácter confidencial y solo podrá ser utilizada y compartida entre el ICE y sus empresas, para los fines del negocio. Su conocimiento, por parte de terceros, queda restringido, salvo cuando así lo solicite una autoridad legalmente competente que justifique su necesidad y por los medios respectivos. Es confidencial la información relacionada con las actividades del ICE y sus empresas, calificada por estas como secreto industrial, comercial o económico, cuando, por motivos estratégicos, comerciales y de competencia, no resulte conveniente su divulgación a terceros. Para tales efectos, se deberá considerar lo siguiente: a) La confidencialidad de la información será declarada por el Consejo Directivo como órgano máximo de decisión y deberá contener el fundamento técnico y legal correspondiente, así como el plazo durante el cual la información tendrá dicho carácter. b) La confidencialidad de la información solamente podrá aplicarse en aquellas actividades o servicios que se desarrollen bajo esquemas de libre competencia. No incluye procedimientos y actividades administrativas, ni los estados financieros y sus anexos que comprenden los ingresos, la custodia, la inversión, el gasto y su evaluación, así como el balance de situación, el estado de resultados y, en general, el resto de información contable y de sus subsidiarias que es de carácter público, en los segmentos de su actividad que se mantengan en monopolio. c) Tendrán acceso a la información declarada confidencial por el ICE y sus empresas, las entidades públicas que, por disposición constitucional o legal, realicen funciones de control, supervisión, vigilancia o fiscalización de la Hacienda Pública, así como también los órganos jurisdiccionales. Tales entidades y órganos deberán resguardar la confidencialidad e integridad de la información frente a aquellos terceros no autorizados expresamente por ley)”. El presupuesto asignado a la pauta publicitaria será utilizado en otros espacios dentro del mismo medio, seleccionados de acuerdo con los objetivos comerciales de KÖLBI. Este enfoque estratégico garantiza que nuestra comunicación sea coherente con la identidad de nuestra marca y que contribuya efectivamente a la generación de valor para nuestros clientes y para la sociedad en general. Como entidad responsable, asumimos el deber de asociar nuestra marca exclusivamente con espacios que reflejen valores compatibles con los nuestros, tales como el respeto, la cercanía, la familia, y la responsabilidad social. En este sentido, el ICE no ha vulnerado ningún derecho constitucional; por el contrario, reafirma su compromiso con la libertad de expresión y con la proyección de mensajes alineados con los valores fundamentales de nuestra institución. La reubicación de la pauta publicitaria no debe interpretarse como censura ni como una postura política o editorial, sino como una decisión estratégica orientada a fortalecer nuestra marca y su conexión con los costarricenses, amén del interés por posicionar la marca y así vender los productos KÖLBI que en última instancia son los que generan los ingresos para la operación del negocio, incluyendo pagar la pauta (El presupuesto del ICE no tiene ninguna asignación Estatal, deviene todo de los ingresos por las ventas de electricidad y telecomunicaciones). Asimismo, reiteramos que nuestra pauta publicitaria permanece activa en otros espacios de [Nombre 006] y en diversos medios de comunicación, lo que refuerza nuestro compromiso con una estrategia comunicacional integral, responsable y alineada con los intereses y expectativas de nuestros clientes y audiencias. Estas decisiones obedecen a criterios empresariales que priorizan la coherencia, la sostenibilidad y el impacto positivo en la comunidad. Valga decir que no debe interpretarse que KÖLBI tenga obligación de pautar en medios determinados”. Solicita se declare sin lugar el recurso.

4.- Informa bajo juramento Harold Cordero Villalobos, gerente general del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, lo transcrito a continuación: “Por este medio aclaro a la Sala Constitucional que no he emitido acto administrativo alguno en contra del recurrente ni he configurado conducta omisa que pueda determinar la supuesta violación de los derechos fundamentales alegados. Ahora bien, de acuerdo con lo establecido en el artículo 34 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional y siguiendo las indicaciones de la Sala Constitucional, resulta necesario dirigir los recursos de amparo al funcionario que haya podido, mediante su acción u omisión, vulnerar algún derecho fundamental del recurrente. Por lo tanto, corresponde a la Sala Constitucional tomar en cuenta el informe y las pruebas presentadas por la siguiente colaboradora, quien en virtud de la estructura organizacional aprobada por el Consejo Directivo del ICE, es competente para abordar los hechos alegados en este caso con el detalle y especificidad que amerita: La señora LEDA MARÍA DE LOS ANGELES ACEVEDO ZÚÑIGA, portadora de la cédula de identidad N°1-0630-0198, quien es Gerente de Telecomunicaciones del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad”. Solicita se declare sin lugar el recurso.

5.- Informan bajo juramento Jorge Eduardo Sánchez Sibaja, presidente de la Junta Directiva Nacional y Gina Melissa Carvajal Vega, gerente general con facultades de apoderada generalísima sin límite de suma, ambos del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal lo siguiente: “EN CUANTO A LOS HECHOS EN CUANTO AL HECHO PRIMERO, SEGUNDO Y TERCERO: Se rechazan por cuanto no nos constan, toda vez que se trata de hechos ajenos a nuestro representado. EN CUANTO AL HECHO CUARTO: Se acepta parcialmente. Es cierto que el Banco Popular compró una pauta publicitaria para el programa televisivo “El Chinamo”. El 26 de setiembre del 2024, [Nombre 006] [Valor 003] inició la comercialización del programa con el Banco Popular, dando prioridad a los clientes que tuvieron presencia en el mismo espacio en el año 2023; como fue el caso de nuestra Institución, de esta forma, la oferta inicial presentada al Banco por parte del medio proponía un descuento considerable del precio tarifario que eventualmente tendrían que desembolsar otras marcas en caso de contratar presencias similares. El 03 de octubre de 2024 se solicitó a la Agencia de Publicidad contratada al efecto igualar el paquete publicitario del año anterior e incluir de forma bonificada (es decir, sin que significara algún costo adicional al paquete propuesto), un total de 12 spots. Tomando en consideración la oferta inicial y la mejora realizada a la misma, así como diversos criterios técnicos propios de la materia como son el alcance, frecuencia, precio por spot, precios por punto de rating, afinidad del mercado meta con el perfil de cliente de la institución dentro de la estrategia de compra de medios, entre otros, el 08 de octubre de 2024 se aprobó por parte la Dirección Corporativa de Mercadeo la participación en el programa “El Chinamo”, con la sección “El Aguinaldazo”. EN CUANTO AL HECHO QUINTO Y SEXTO: Se rechazan por cuanto no nos constan, toda vez que refieren a situaciones ajenas a nuestro representado. EN CUANTO AL HECHO SÉTIMO: Se rechaza por Falso. Como se indicó en la contestación del HECHO CUARTO, el Banco Popular el 08 de octubre de 2024 aprobó la participación y pauta en el programa “El Chinamo”, con la sección “El Aguinaldazo”. Como parte de una práctica habitual de seguimiento de resultados dentro de los procesos de mercadeo institucionales, el viernes 13 de diciembre de 2024 se solicitó a la Agencia de Publicidad revisar los resultados preliminares de “El Chinamo”, cuya temporada 2024 inició el miércoles 11 de diciembre 2024. Del análisis técnico descrito se detectó una cantidad de hasta 22 presencias de la marca por programa, que difería de las inicialmente contratadas, el aumento de presencias se debió a una bonificación que otorgó unilateralmente el Canal y que resultó en una exposición mayor a la esperada (sobrexposición), dado que el paquete inicial incluía 14 presencias diarias. Con base en dicho análisis, el 17 de diciembre de 2024 se solicitó a la Agencia de Publicidad, realizar una modificación en las presencias de la marca en este programa, con el objetivo prioritario de evitar cualquier tipo de saturación hacia el consumidor. Esto derivó en la eliminación de las pantallas de presentación y salida de los cuatro segmentos del programa cuando se realizaban las llamadas a los participantes, para que se usaran solamente las pantallas cuando se sacaba a la persona ganador o ganadora de la sección “El Aguinaldazo”, lo anterior se ejecutó a partir del pasado 18 de diciembre de 2024, cuando las presencias en “El Chinamo” se disminuyeron de 22 a 12. Lo expuesto en el párrafo precedente no implicó ningún tipo de restricción, retiro de pauta o afectación al medio de comunicación, ya que se coordinó directamente con el canal y la Agencia de Publicidad para que el monto equivalente a la inversión que representaban las pantallas que serían retiradas fuese redistribuido en comerciales a ser emitidos en diferentes programas del mismo Canal, aprovechando su parrilla de fin de año, lo cual a su vez, permitiría ofrecer a nuestros clientes y al público en general un mensaje navideño a través de nuestro jingle institucional y alcanzar otras audiencias en otros horarios. Es importante indicar que a lo largo de toda la temporada del programa “El Chinamo” - que concluyó el pasado 23 de diciembre - se mantuvo sin variación alguna nuestra participación en el segmento de “El Aguinaldazo”, redistribuyendo, como ya se explicó, presencias de marca a través de pantallas por spots publicitarios en distintos programas del mismo canal con el objetivo de beneficiar a la Institución y ampliar el alcance de marca. Como se puede apreciar señores Magistrados, la redistribución y optimización de la pauta del Banco en “El Chinamo” se sustenta única y exclusivamente en criterios técnicos y se ejecutó de forma previa al incidente público ocurrido con respecto a contenidos de la sección del “El Chinaoke”, que originaron en apariencia y conforme lo señala el recurrente, que la marca Kölbi propiedad del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, retirara su pauta del programa “El Chinamo” por los contenidos de la sección “El Chinaoke”. Ahora bien, el comunicado de prensa que realizó el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (BPDC), debemos manifestar que este obedeció a las diversas comunicaciones y comentarios por parte de clientes, personas y sectores vinculados al BPDC, manifestando altos grados de inconformidad y preocupación por contenidos difundidos dentro del programa “El Chinamo”, que emitió [Nombre 006] [Valor 003], siendo que a esa fecha existía una importante participación publicitaria de nuestra Institución; los comentarios masivos coincidieron en señalar que ciertas imágenes y palabras utilizadas dentro de secciones de parodia, particularmente en aquellas donde se había abordado temas vinculados a seguridad ciudadana, podrían resultar fuertes, incómodas para determinados públicos o no ser apropiadas para un espacio destinado al disfrute familiar, lo anterior para no afectar nuestro nombre y la buena reputación alcanzada con gran esfuerzo durante décadas, y es por ello que se emitió dicho comunicado. No obstante, debemos ser enfáticos en que el Banco Popular mantuvo su pauta publicitaria en el Chinamo con el segmento “El Aguinaldazo” hasta que el programa concluyó, y que la diferencia de presencias publicitarias en aras de no causar saturación al consumidor se redistribuyó en comerciales emitidos en diferentes programas del mismo Canal, de modo tal que no puede tenerse ello como una censura o acto alguno en contra de las libertades de prensa y expresión, según lo argumenta de manera equivocada el recurrente. Con lo anterior se logra demostrar fehacientemente que nuestra Institución en modo alguno violentó ningún derecho de libertad de prensa ni de expresión, toda vez que no consta una censura al espacio publicitario que un inicio se pactó por [Nombre 006] [Valor 003], y el patrocinio del segmento “El Aguinaldazo” se mantuvo hasta que el referido programa concluyera su temporada, además debemos aclarar que el Banco Popular no tiene relación alguna o fue patrocinador específico del espacio denominado “El Chinaoke”, respecto del cual no tenemos ninguna injerencia o conocimiento previo de sus contenidos y que no se puede condicionar desde nuestra posición como anunciante. EN CUANTO AL HECHO OCTAVO: Se rechaza por cuanto no nos consta, en tanto refiere a situaciones ajenas a nuestro representado. EN CUANTO AL FONDO DE ESTE ASUNTO Honorables Magistrados, a la luz de lo detallado en cada uno de los puntos que se han contestado, se logra demostrar que el Banco no ha violentado los derechos fundamentales a la libre expresión y libertad de prensa de [Nombre 002]. El BPDC omite referirse a la totalidad de argumentos y aseveraciones expuestos por el recurrente en su escrito de Amparo, debido a que esta Institución es conocedora y respetuosa de todos los alcances de los derechos relativos a la información, libertad de expresión y libertad de prensa, así como de lo inconveniente de las prácticas que puedan constituir directa o indirectamente una censura previa a las distintas manifestaciones sociales. Confunde el recurrente, o al menos no distingue con precisión, los aspectos fácticos que atribuye al ICE (Kölbi) y al BPDC, los asemeja y confunde, para tratar de aplicar silogismos jurídicos de otros casos analizados por la Sala que, en la especie, para nuestro representado no resultan aplicables. Para el Banco resulta claro que nuestra pauta publicitaria no estaba en ninguno de los servicios informativos o noticieros del Canal. Como se ha expuesto, el Banco en setiembre de 2024 fue contactado por [Nombre 006] [Valor 003] para pautar en el programa “El Chinamo” siendo que posteriormente se tomó la decisión institucional de participar en la sección “El Aguinaldazo”. Dicha inversión publicitaria permitió a la Institución premiar a los clientes actuales o potenciales con un millón de colones en cada uno de los 12 programas, reforzando su posicionamiento y consideración, para apoyar la promoción de uso de tarjetas de débito y crédito del Banco en la temporada de mayor consumo del año y hacer partícipes a nuestros clientes, no solo de las mejores condiciones que ofrece nuestra Entidad, sino también de la promoción de vehículos eléctricos que se logra participar por las compras realizadas. Ahora bien, y como parte de una práctica habitual de seguimiento de resultados dentro de los procesos de mercadeo institucionales, el viernes 13 de diciembre de 2024 se solicitó a la Agencia de Publicidad revisar los resultados preliminares de “El Chinamo”, cuya temporada 2024 inició el miércoles 11 de diciembre 2024. Del análisis técnico descrito se detectó una cantidad de hasta 22 presencias de la marca por programa, las cuales diferían de las inicialmente contratadas, el aumento de presencias se debió a una bonificación que otorgó unilateralmente el Canal y que resultó en una exposición mayor a la esperada (sobrexposición), dado que el paquete inicial incluía 14 presencias diarias. Con base en dicho análisis, el 17 de diciembre de 2024 se solicitó a la Agencia de Publicidad, realizar una modificación en las presencias de la marca en este programa, con el objetivo prioritario de evitar cualquier tipo de saturación hacia el consumidor. Esto derivó en la eliminación de las pantallas de presentación y salida de los cuatro segmentos del programa cuando se realizaban las llamadas a los participantes, para que se usaran solamente las pantallas cuando se sacaba a la persona ganadora de la sección “El Aguinaldazo”. Lo anterior se ejecutó a partir del pasado 18 de diciembre de 2024, cuando las presencias en “El Chinamo” se disminuyeron de 22 a 12. Lo expuesto en el párrafo precedente no implicó ningún tipo de restricción, retiro de pauta o afectación al medio de comunicación, ni mucho menos violación alguna a los derechos de libertad de expresión y libertad de prensa de [Nombre 002] como lo hace ver el recurrente, sino que obedece a una negociación contractual, toda vez que se coordinó directamente con el canal y la Agencia de Publicidad para que el monto equivalente a la inversión que representaban las pantallas que serían retiradas fuese redistribuido en comerciales a ser emitidos en diferentes programas del mismo Canal, siendo que así se realizó, y dichas pautas o presencias publicitarias se transmitieron por spots publicitarios en distintos programas del mismo canal. En relación al comunicado de prensa que se hizo por parte del BPDC, se reitera que este se realizó por las diversas comunicaciones y comentarios por parte de clientes, personas y sectores vinculadas al Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (BPDC), manifestando altos grados de inconformidad y preocupación por contenidos difundidos dentro del programa “El Chinamo”, que emitió [Nombre 006] [Valor 003], siendo que a esa fecha existía una importante participación publicitaria de nuestra Institución; los comentarios masivos coincidieron en señalar que ciertas imágenes y palabras utilizadas dentro de secciones de parodia, particularmente en aquellas donde se había abordado temas vinculados a seguridad ciudadana, podrían resultar fuertes, incómodas para determinados públicos o no ser apropiadas para un espacio destinado al disfrute familiar. Así, para no afectar nuestro nombre y la buena reputación alcanzada con gran esfuerzo durante décadas, es por ello que se emitió dicho comunicado. Debe recalcarse que el Banco Popular mantuvo su pauta publicitaria en el Chinamo con el segmento “El Aguinaldazo” hasta que el programa concluyó, y que la diferenciade presencias publicitarias en aras de no causar saturación al consumidor se redistribuyó en comerciales emitidos en diferentes programas del mismo Canal. Con lo anterior se logra demostrar que nuestra Institución en modo alguno violentó ningún derecho de libertad de prensa ni de expresión, toda vez que no consta una censura al espacio publicitario que en un inicio se pactó con [Nombre 006] [Valor 003], y el patrocinio del segmento “El Aguinaldazo” se mantuvo hasta que el referido programa concluyera su temporada. Además, debemos aclarar que el Banco Popular no tiene relación alguna ni fue patrocinador específico del espacio denominado “El Chinaoke”, respecto del cual no tenemos ninguna injerencia o conocimiento previo de sus contenidos y que no se puede condicionar desde nuestra posición como anunciante. Reiteramos que consta que nuestra pausa publicitaria no estuvo en ningún segmento informativo o periodístico, por lo que nunca se afectó ningún derecho de libertad de prensa o de expresión, pero sí nos obliga nuestra normativa en materia de “riesgo reputacional” a proteger nuestra marca y nuestra clientela en razón de que somos una empresa pública en competencia. El Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal es una entidad pública no estatal, es decir, no le pertenece al Estado sino a los trabajadores, conforme lo establecen los artículos 1 y 2 de su Ley Orgánica: “Artículo 1º.- Créase el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, el que se regirá por la presente ley y su reglamento. El Banco es propiedad de los trabajadores por partes iguales y el derecho a la copropiedad estará sujeta a que hayan tenido una cuenta de ahorro obligatorio durante un año continuo o en períodos alternos… Artículo 2°. - El Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal es una institución de Derecho Público no estatal, con personería jurídica y patrimonio propio, con plena autonomía administrativa y funcional. Su funcionamiento se regirá por las normas del Derecho Público…”. En esa condición, se tiene claridad de la transcendencia de la libertad de expresión y la libertad de prensa en un Estado Social de Derecho, como es el costarricense. Asimismo, es consciente y vigilante del deber de probidad y transparencia que debe regir la actividad de una entidad pública no estatal, como lo es el Banco, en el manejo de fondos públicos. Asimismo, respetamos profundamente el derecho que cualquier ciudadano tiene de quejarse o manifestarse respecto de los funcionarios públicos, en el espacio que lo tengan a bien. Es importante tener claro que incluso, en el programa El Chinamo, incluso en la sección del CHINAOKE, no se realizaron ataques o comentario alguno en contra del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, que pudiera de forma alguna motivar una reacción de nuestra institución. Esto resulta un factor diferenciador respecto a los antecedentes señalados por el propio recurrente, donde expone el caso de un banco estatal que retiró pautas publicitarias de un periódico ante supuestas publicaciones de este medio escrito en contra del citado banco. En el presente caso no se atacó al Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, pero lo más importante, nuestro representado no tomó ninguna acción que de forma alguna provocara un daño a [Nombre 002], con quien contrató por publicidad, respetando los términos pactados, manteniendo su pauta en el programa El Chinamo hasta su finalización, y pautando incluso en distintos espacios de programación con dicha empresa televisora. El comunicado de prensa que se menciona en el hecho sétimo del recurso pone de manifiesto la preocupación de una serie de clientes respecto de lo manifestado en una sección del programa El Chinamo. Es precisamente el respeto que tenemos por nuestros clientes copropietarios de nuestra Institución, así como por el respeto a su libertad de expresión, que se pidió una valoración de lo sucedido a la Gerencia General. No obstante, queda aclarado que todas las actuaciones del Banco Popular cuentan con un claro sustento técnico, fueron consensuadas con el canal y nunca se tomó la decisión de retirar del canal (incluso del programa El Chinamo) la presencia de marca del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, lo cual se indica falsamente en el hecho sétimo del recurso. La conclusión del Recurrente de que se está ante una violación de las libertades de expresión y de prensa no solo no es cierta por lo antes dicho, sino que parte de una premisa falsa cual es que el BPDC retiró la pauta publicitaria en contra de [Nombre 002]. En síntesis, tenemos que bajo ninguna consideración se podría indicar que el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal ha actuado de forma arbitraria o antojadiza en contra de los derechos de libertad de expresión y libertad de prensa en contra de [Nombre 002], dado que mantuvo su pauta en la sección de “El Aguinaldazo” de “El Chinamo” y todas las acciones adoptadas al respecto fueron debidamente coordinadas con la Agencia de Publicidad y aceptadas por la propia empresa televisiva que las ejecutó”. Solicitan se declare sin lugar el proceso.

6.- Por resolución Nº 2025000820 de las 09:20 horas del 10 de enero de 2025, se ordenó acumular el expediente N°24-035833-0007-CO, interpuesto por [Nombre 003], cédula de identidad [Valor 002], contra el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad y el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, a este proceso -N°24-035822-0007-CO-, a fin de que se resuelva en este, debido a que existe conexidad de los hechos. En el escrito de interposición, del 21 de diciembre de 2024, y en memorial del 7 de enero de 2025, el recurrente indica que como costarricense, respetuoso de sus deberes y obligaciones constitucionales y de las leyes del país, presenta formal recurso de amparo por quitar la pauta publicitaria en el programa chinaoque de [Valor 003], porque se está coartando la libertad de expresión de los costarricenses con censura previa al programa de [Valor 003], no permitiendo ver el programa de ese canal, los costarricenses, transgrediendo el artículo 28 constitucional y el artículo 13 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos.

7.- En los procedimientos seguidos se han observado las prescripciones legales.

Redacta la Magistrada Hess Herrera; y,

Considerando:

I.- SOBRE LA LEGITIMACIÓN ACTIVA. Los actores formulan los recursos aquí acumulados de forma diversa. El primero, [Nombre 001], a favor de [Nombre 002]. y el segundo, [Nombre 003], a nombre propio y de los televidentes del programa.

Lo anterior obliga a realizar algunas precisiones sobre la legitimación activa. La más relevante de ellas es recordar que el artículo 33 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regula una legitimación activa vicaria amplia: “Cualquier persona podrá interponer el recurso de amparo”, lo cual se ha reconocido pacíficamente en la doctrina y praxis de nuestra jurisdicción constitucional:

“es preciso indicar que, en el recurso de amparo, la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional en su numeral 33 establece una legitimación vicaria al indicar que "cualquier persona podrá interponer el recurso de amparo a favor de un tercero". Así las cosas, los recurrentes si tienen legitimación para interponer el presente proceso.” (sentencia No. 2003-7149 de las 13:21 horas del 17 de julio de 2003) De esta forma, se puede actuar a favor de alguien más, sin necesidad de que exista un vínculo formal profesional o familiar entre parte actora y parte amparada. Por otra parte, nada impide que esa legitimación abierta se dirija a la defensa de los derechos de una persona física o de una persona jurídica (Cfr. las sentencias No. 2008-12043 de las 10:11 horas del 1º de agosto de 2008, No. 2020-18221 de las 9:15 horas del 25 de setiembre de 2020). Con la salvedad del voto minoritario del magistrado Rueda Leal plasmado infra, la mayoría de este Tribunal ha acordado la defensa de los derechos fundamentales de personas morales.

Finalmente, cabe hacer notar que el recurrente [Nombre 003] demanda la defensa de la libertad de expresión desde el punto de vista de una doble dimensión: activa -la libertad de expresarse- y pasiva -la libertad de recibir y conocer las opiniones de otros- y es en esa condición que se entiende opera la legitimación activa respecto de su recurso.

II.- SOBRE LA LEGITIMACIÓN PASIVA. Igualmente, la legitimación pasiva en este proceso requiere de una serie de puntualizaciones. Primero, aunque uno de los recurrentes solicita dirigir el amparo contra varias autoridades, solamente consta prueba en los autos relacionada con el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad y con el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, por lo que el recurso se constriñe a ellas.

Asimismo, debido a las particularidades de la actividad que desarrollan tanto el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad como el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal corresponde precisar su condición de legitimados pasivos.

El Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad fue creado como institución autónoma mediante el Decreto Ley No. 449 del 8 de abril de 1949. Por medio de la Ley No. 8622 de aprobación del Tratado de Libre Comercio República Dominicana-Centroamérica-Estados Unidos, la Ley General de Telecomunicaciones (No. 8642) y la Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones (No. 8660) se procedió a la apertura del mercado de telecomunicaciones. En el artículo 4 de la última ley citada (No. 8660) se estableció que con ella se complementa la Ley de creación del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, No. 449, de 8 de abril de 1949 y sus reformas. Además, en el numeral 5 de la misma ley, se efectuó un recuento de las empresas del ICE, determinando que también son empresas del instituto las demás que constituya o adquiera, en ambos casos, con una participación no menor que el cincuenta y uno por ciento (51%) del capital accionario. Dentro de este rubro de actividades empresariales del Instituto se encuentra la marca Kölbi, dedicada a telefonía móvil.

Si bien esto le da un margen de acción distinto al Instituto, cabe recordar las primeras disposiciones de la Ley General de la Administración Pública:

“Artículo 1º.- La Administración Pública estará constituida por el Estado y los demás entes públicos, cada uno con personalidad jurídica y capacidad de derecho público y privado.

Artículo 2º.- 1. Las reglas de esta ley que regulan la actividad del Estado se aplicarán también a los otros entes públicos, en ausencia de norma especial para éstos.

2. Las reglas que regulan a los otros entes públicos no se aplicarán al Estado, salvo que la naturaleza de la situación requiera lo contrario.

Artículo 3º.- 1. El derecho público regulará la organización y actividad de los entes públicos, salvo norma expresa en contrario.

2. El derecho privado regulará la actividad de los entes que por su régimen de conjunto y los requerimientos de su giro puedan estimarse como empresas industriales o mercantiles comunes.” De acuerdo con las normas recién citadas, si bien la actividad empresarial -industrial o mercantil común- de algunos entes públicos está regulada por el derecho privado, esto no alcanza sus estructuras de base -es decir, lo que permite considerarlos entes de derecho público- ni las potestades de fiscalización de los recursos públicos o de interés público que les conciernen.

En este último sentido, los artículos 1º de la Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos y 8 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República atan a sus mandatos a las distintas entidades y órganos que integran el sector público. Así lo ha entendido este Tribunal, entre otras, en la resolución No. 2017-11808 de las 9:05 horas del 28 de julio de 2017:

“No hay que perder de vista, que la empresa pública se encuentra hoy en día en una encrucijada cuando ejerce su actividad en un régimen de libre competencia, en un segmento del mercado donde participan tanto empresas públicas como empresas privadas. Por un lado, si se le trata como un órgano o ente público y, por ende, sujeto a una serie de controles y requerimiento, sus posibilidades de supervivencia en el mercado son muy escasas. Por el otro, si le libera de todo control, se podrían presentar graves abusos con la utilización de los fondos públicos. De ahí la necesidad de que haya un justo equilibrio entre las necesidades que requiere para competir en igualdad de condiciones con los otros agentes económicos y los necesarios controles sobre la utilización de los fondos públicos, partiendo de un principio elemental: ahí donde van los fondos públicos debe ir el control, tanto el que ejerce la auditoría interna, la Contraloría General de la República y la Comisión Permanente Especial para el Control del Ingreso y del Gasto Público de la Asamblea Legislativa, entre otros. Empero, este tiene que ser acorde con la realidad que enfrenta la empresa pública, es decir, controles que no constituyan un obstáculo o una rémora para que la empresa pública no quede en desventaja en un mercado competitivo (ver Sentencia 2016-000779 de las dieciséis horas y treinta minutos de diecinueve de enero de dos mil dieciséis). Adoptando como marco de referencia lo anterior, no cabe duda que es fundamental que a la empresa pública se le garantice que cierta información estratégica no caerá en manos de la competencia, pues de lo contrario, su desaparición sería una cuestión de tiempo. Esto conlleva que cualquier solicitud de información atinente a la actividad financiera, bancaria, industrial o comercial debe de ser analizada en cada caso concreto. El Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad –empresa pública-ente público-, compite abiertamente en el mercado de las telecomunicaciones con otras empresas, públicas y privadas, y, por consiguiente, debe de desarrollar una estrategia comercial para promocionar sus servicios, los que presta bajo la marca Kölbi.” A las anteriores consideraciones se suman dos factores adicionales: que en este caso el comunicado de modificación de pauta publicitaria lo emitió la gerente de Telecomunicaciones del instituto y que el tema implica el uso de los recursos de la empresa, por lo que hay elementos suficientes para tener por legitimado pasivamente al Instituto en el presente recurso.

El Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, por su parte, es una figura con características muy particulares, pues su Ley de creación, No. 4351 declara que “El Banco es propiedad de los trabajadores por partes iguales y el derecho a la copropiedad estará sujeto a que hayan tenido una cuenta de ahorro obligatorio durante un año continuo o en períodos alternos. Los ahorrantes obligatorios participarán de las utilidades y por medio de sus organizaciones sociales en la designación de sus directores.” (artículo 1), con lo que le confiere un carácter corporativo, el cual; no obstante, no le releva de su condición de ente de derecho público (artículo 2), ni de la fiscalización de sus recursos por parte de la Contraloría General de la República. Se toma en cuenta, al igual que respecto del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, que el comunicado sobre la modificación de su pauta publicitaria, objeto de este recurso, fue emitido por el presidente de la Junta Directiva Nacional del banco.

III.- OBJETO DEL RECURSO.- Los recurrentes alegan que, desde hace cerca de 24 años, [Nombre 006] ha emitido un programa denominado "El Chinamo", el cual se transmite por televisión nacional. Señalan que, a lo largo de los años, el Chinamo ha contado con una sección denominada "El Chinaoke", que se utiliza para la parodia, la sátira y la comedia, como formas válidas de expresión y crítica de figuras políticas, el gobierno de turno, instituciones públicas o situaciones de interés general. Para ello, se recurre a las melodías de canciones preexistentes, a las que se les altera la letra original para introducir contenido de crítica política. Afirman que el Chinamo, al igual que muchos otros programas televisivos, se apoya en pauta publicitaria de empresas públicas y privadas Afirman que, para la edición del año 2024, el Chinaoke desarrolló tres videos musicales relativos a temas de interés público, y que generaron una crítica directa había el Gobierno. En el primer video denominado "En el EBAIS", se hace referencia al colapso en la atención de pacientes en la CCSS, con un mensaje referente al aumento en las listas de espera que aqueja a los costarricenses. En el video también se hace alusión a la situación financiera de la institución, así como a los casos de corrupción y allanamientos generados por el caso Barrenador. En el segundo video musical denominado ¿Será que hoy me van a asaltar?, la letra hace referencia a la situación de inseguridad que enfrenta el país, con un aumento significativo en la tasa de homicidios relacionados mayoritariamente con delincuencia organizada y el tráfico de drogas. Agregan que en el video se hace alusión al presidente de la República, así como a las muertes colaterales. En el tercer video llamado "No tengo plata", se hace alusión al alto costo de vida en el país, así como a las promesas incumplidas por el Gobierno con respecto a la reducción en los precios. Alegan que la marca comercial Kölbi, propiedad del ICE anunció el 19 de diciembre de 2024 que retiraría su pauta publicitaria en el programa el Chinamo, argumentando que los contenidos del Chinaoke "no concuerdan con los valores de nuestra marca". Posteriormente, el 20 de diciembre de 2024, el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal anunció en un comunicado que únicamente mantendría el patrocinio de la sección "El Aguinaldazo" en el Chinamo, y retiraría el resto de su publicidad. Lo anterior, bajo el argumento que debía evitar cualquier asociación con contenidos contrarios a la moral y el orden público. Aducen que la decisión de los recurridos de retirar la pauta publicitaria del Chinamo, constituye una vulneración a la libertad de expresión y prensa, protegidos por los artículos 28 y 29 constitucionales, así como por el numeral 13 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, por lo que piden que se acoja el recurso, con sus consecuencias IV.- HECHOS PROBADOS. De importancia para la decisión de este asunto, se estiman como debidamente demostrados los siguientes hechos:

• a)[Nombre 002]. transmite, por televisión nacional, el programa denominado "El Chinamo", el cual cuenta con una sección denominada "El Chinaoke", que se utiliza para la parodia, la sátira y la comedia, a partir de melodías de canciones preexistentes, a las que se les altera la letra original para introducir contenido de crítica política (hecho incontrovertido); b) Para la edición del año 2024, en la sección “El Chinaoke” se presentaron varios videos musicales; no obstante, son objeto de este proceso únicamente tres: El primero, denominado "En el EBAIS", transmitido el 12 de diciembre hace referencia al colapso en la atención de pacientes en la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, con un mensaje referente al aumento en las listas de espera que aqueja a los costarricenses, la situación financiera de la institución y la investigación conocida como caso Barrenador. El segundo video musical, “¿Será que hoy me van a asaltar?”, se refiere a seguridad nacional, delincuencia organizada y tráfico de drogas, fue transmitido el 15 de diciembre. Un tercer video, del 18 de diciembre, llamado "No tengo plata", alude al costo de vida en el país (hecho incontrovertido); c) El Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal solicitó el 17 de diciembre de 2024 a la agencia de publicidad que colocó su pauta en el programa El Chinamo, realizar una modificación en las presencias de la marca en el programa. Esto derivó en la eliminación de las pantallas de presentación y salida de los cuatro segmentos del programa cuando se realizaban las llamadas a los participantes, para que se usaran solamente las pantallas cuando se sacaba a la persona ganadora de la sección “El Aguinaldazo”. (informe rendido por la autoridad recurrida).
• d)La marca comercial Kölbi, propiedad del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, emitió el 19 de diciembre de 2024 un comunicado de prensa, en los siguientes términos: “Valores de la marca kölbi no concuerdan con contenidos expuestos en programa televisivo El Chinamo. Kölbi, marca comercial del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) aclara y comunica a la opinión pública: 0 Los contenidos expuestos por [Nombre 006] [Valor 003] en el programa El Chinamo, puntualmente en la sección El Chinaoke no concuerdan con los valores de nuestra marca. 0 Dado su origen costarricense, Kölbi se aleja de situaciones en las que se promueva o exponga violencia de forma implícita o explícita, discriminación, apología de la delincuencia o parodia del sufrimiento de víctimas. 0 Por el contrario, los esfuerzos publicitarios y comerciales de la marca se enfocan en incentivar valores como la paz, la unión familiar, el respeto, la innovación y la solidaridad, con impacto positivo y propio de la idiosincrasia nacional. Así consta en el recorrido de Kölbi por más de quince años en el mercado. 0 La contratación de los espacios publicitarios en el programa en cuestión, así como de las menciones a kölbi tuvieron el objetivo de asociar la marca con entretenimiento familiar propio de la época de fin e inicio de año; nunca a situaciones alusivas al dolor, la estigmatización o el escarnio. 0 “Como marca líder, nos regimos por principios sólidos que guían nuestras acciones y decisiones. No apoyamos actos opuestos a esos valores, especialmente aquellos contrarios a la responsabilidad social y ambiental que promovemos”, manifestó Leda Acevedo, gerente de Telecomunicaciones del ICE. 0 Por lo expuesto, kölbi ha decidido desligarse del programa El Chinamo y analizará la permanencia de su pauta en [Nombre 006] [Valor 003]” (hecho público y notorio); e) Posteriormente, el 20 de diciembre de 2024, el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal publicó el siguiente comunicado: “Reafirmamos nuestro compromiso con el sano entretenimiento en estas fiestas. San José, 20 de diciembre de 2024. En el Banco Popular tenemos como una prioridad constante y un valor central de nuestra marca el promover acciones que fortalezcan el bienestar de la ciudadanía, especialmente en momentos como lo son las fiestas de Navidad y Fin de Año, donde la familia y el sano entretenimiento deben ocupar un lugar central.

Con el fin de contribuir al desarrollo de una sociedad más unida y positiva, mantenemos una presencia constante en decenas de medios de comunicación de todo el país, promocionando servicios que mejoran la vida de nuestros clientes y apoyando contenidos en dichos medios que fomenten la alegría de toda la familia, la reflexión y el respeto por la diversidad.

En este contexto, el presidente de la Junta Directiva Nacional del Banco, Jorge Eduardo Sánchez, ha enfatizado que nuestra marca – que es propiedad de nuestros clientes y de las personas trabajadoras [Nombre 002] – no puede verse expuesta a ser relacionada con imágenes inapropiadas o que incluso pudiesen fomentar conductas ajenas a la moral y el orden público al cual nos debemos.

En el caso particular del debate público generado precisamente a partir de algunos contenidos emitidos en la sección “El Chinaoke” del programa “El Chinamo”, que se transmite por parte de [Nombre 006] [Valor 003], lamentamos profundamente como Banco Popular que algunos sectores de la ciudadanía pudiesen sentirse ofendidos o incómodos por dichas imágenes y hemos adoptado las acciones pertinentes para garantizar que nuestras participaciones se propicien siempre dentro de espacios que tienen como prioridad permanente los valores del sano entretenimiento.

De esta forma, y siendo que esta temporada del programa “El Chinamo” se extenderá hasta el próximo lunes 23 de diciembre, mantendremos únicamente el patrocinio de la sección “El Aguinaldazo” que lleva alegría a la familia premiando diariamente con 1 millón de colones a algún afortunado televidente.

Agradecemos y le asignamos la mayor relevancia a la opinión de nuestros clientes en este tipo de materias, y reiteramos que en el Banco Popular trabajamos sin pausa para contribuir al bienestar social, fomentando el respeto, la inclusión y el disfrute responsable para toda la ciudadanía.” (hecho público y notorio); f) La marca Kölbi no retiró la pauta publicitaria del medio de comunicación, sino que la redistribuyó (informe rendido por la autoridad recurrida); g) [Nombre 006] continuó transmitiendo en su totalidad los segmentos de "Chinaoke" dentro de su programación y actualmente se encuentran disponibles como enlaces públicos en Internet, accesibles para cualquier persona (hecho público y notorio).

V.ANÁLISIS DE LOS HECHOS DE ESTE RECURSO. De acuerdo con la anterior relación de hechos probados, consta que, si bien la empresa que produce y transmite el programa El Chinamo pudo continuar haciéndolo, incluyendo la sección El Chinaoke -que causó la controversia con las instituciones recurridas-; así como que se afirma que la pauta publicitaria con el canal se mantuvo, aunque redistribuida, lo cierto es que los comunicados de prensa de ambas instituciones no dejan asomo de duda en que adoptaron decisiones vinculadas con dicha pauta y la transmisión de la sección “El Chinaoke”. En el caso del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad y su marca Kölbi, el ente autónomo informó que: “Valores de la marca kölbi no concuerdan con contenidos expuestos en programa televisivo El Chinamo. Kölbi, marca comercial del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) aclara y comunica a la opinión pública: 0 Los contenidos expuestos por [Nombre 006] [Valor 003] en el programa El Chinamo, puntualmente en la sección El Chinaoke no concuerdan con los valores de nuestra marca. 0 Dado su origen costarricense, Kölbi se aleja de situaciones en las que se promueva o exponga violencia de forma implícita o explícita, discriminación, apología de la delincuencia o parodia del sufrimiento de víctimas. 0 Por el contrario, los esfuerzos publicitarios y comerciales de la marca se enfocan en incentivar valores como la paz, la unión familiar, el respeto, la innovación y la solidaridad, con impacto positivo y propio de la idiosincrasia nacional. Así consta en el recorrido de Kölbi por más de quince años en el mercado. 0 La contratación de los espacios publicitarios en el programa en cuestión, así como de las menciones a kölbi tuvieron el objetivo de asociar la marca con entretenimiento familiar propio de la época de fin e inicio de año; nunca a situaciones alusivas al dolor, la estigmatización o el escarnio. 0 “Como marca líder, nos regimos por principios sólidos que guían nuestras acciones y decisiones. No apoyamos actos opuestos a esos valores, especialmente aquellos contrarios a la responsabilidad social y ambiental que promovemos”, manifestó Leda Acevedo, gerente de Telecomunicaciones del ICE. 0 Por lo expuesto, kölbi ha decidido desligarse del programa El Chinamo y analizará la permanencia de su pauta en [Nombre 006] [Valor 003]”. (el énfasis es agregado). Mientras que en el caso del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, el comunicado oficial se expresó en los términos que siguen, en lo pertinente: “En este contexto, el presidente de la Junta Directiva Nacional del Banco, Jorge Eduardo Sánchez, ha enfatizado que nuestra marca – que es propiedad de nuestros clientes y de las personas trabajadoras [Nombre 002] – no puede verse expuesta a ser relacionada con imágenes inapropiadas o que incluso pudiesen fomentar conductas ajenas a la moral y el orden público al cual nos debemos.

En el caso particular del debate público generado precisamente a partir de algunos contenidos emitidos en la sección “El Chinaoke” del programa “El Chinamo”, que se transmite por parte de [Nombre 006] [Valor 003], lamentamos profundamente como Banco Popular que algunos sectores de la ciudadanía pudiesen sentirse ofendidos o incómodos por dichas imágenes y hemos adoptado las acciones pertinentes para garantizar que nuestras participaciones se propicien siempre dentro de espacios que tienen como prioridad permanente los valores del sano entretenimiento.

De esta forma, y siendo que esta temporada del programa “El Chinamo” se extenderá hasta el próximo lunes 23 de diciembre, mantendremos únicamente el patrocinio de la sección “El Aguinaldazo” que lleva alegría a la familia premiando diariamente con 1 millón de colones a algún afortunado televidente.” (el destacado es propio). Es decir, que en el caso de ambas entidades existió una decisión expresa, comunicada oficialmente de imponer consecuencias vinculadas con el pago de espacios publicitarios, debido al contenido de una sección del programa televisivo. Con posterioridad a la emisión de los dos comunicados de prensa supra citados, se transmitieron varias parodias del mismo estilo de las que ya se reseñaron; sin embargo, en razón de las fechas en que se hicieron públicos los comunicados, así como de aquellas en que se interpusieron estos recursos de amparo, carece de interés abarcar los subsiguientes programas. Establecidas las anteriores consideraciones, corresponde ahora determinar si, como lo alegan los aquí recurrentes, las decisiones cuestionadas contravienen la libertad de expresión.

VI.- SOBRE LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN Y SU FUNCIÓN EN UN RÉGIMEN REPUBLICANO Y DEMOCRÁTICO. En distintos pronunciamientos, este órgano de justicia constitucional ha establecido el nexo entre la libertad de expresión y los principios sobre los cuales está construido nuestro sistema político y jurídico. En la sentencia No. 1997-01750 de las 15:00 horas del 21 de marzo de 1997 se explicó de la siguiente forma:

“X- Al respecto, dentro de los principales preceptos que reconocen y garantizan la libertad de expresión e información y que configuran lo que podría denominarse el régimen general de esa libertad constitucionalmente protegido, se tienen:

“Artículo 28 (Constitución Política):

“Nadie puede ser inquietado ni perseguido por la manifestación de sus opiniones ni por acto alguno que no infrinja la ley…”.

“Artículo 29 (Constitución Política):

“Todos pueden comunicar sus pensamientos de palabra o por escrito, y publicarlos sin previa censura; pero serán responsables de los abusos que cometan en el ejercicio de este derecho, en los casos y del modo que la ley establezca”.

“Artículo 13 (Convención Americana): Libertad de Pensamiento y de Expresión:

“1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión. Este derecho comprende la libertad de buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas de toda índole, sin consideración de fronteras, ya sea oralmente, por escrito o en forma impresa o artística, o por cualquier otro procedimiento de su elección.

“2. El ejercicio del derecho previsto en el inciso precedente no puede e star sujeto a previa censura sino a responsabilidades ulteriores, las que deben estar expresamente fijadas por la ley y ser necesarias para asegurar:

“a) El respeto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás, o “b) La protección de la seguridad nacional, el orden público o la salud o la moral públicas.

“3. No se puede restringir el derecho de expresión por vías o medios indirectos, tales como el abuso de controles oficiales o particulares de papel para periódicos, de frecuencias radioeléctricas o de enseres y aparatos usados en la difusión de información o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la cir culación de las ideas y opiniones.

“4. Los espectáculos públicos pueden ser sometidos por ley a censura previa con el exclusivo objeto de regular el acceso a ellos para la protección moral de la infancia y la adolescencia, sin perjuicio de lo establecido en el inciso 2.

“5. Estará prohibida por ley toda propaganda en favor de la guerra y toda apología del odio nacional, racial o religioso que constituyan incitaciones a la violencia o cualquier otra acción ilegal similar contra cualquier persona o grupo de personas, por ningún motivo, inclusive los de raza, color, religión, idioma u origen nacional.” “Artículo 19 (Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos):

“1. Nadie podrá ser molestado a causa de sus opiniones.

“2. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de expresión; este derecho comprende la libertad de buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas de toda índole, sin consideración de fronteras, ya sea oralmente, por escrito o en forma impresa o artística, o por cualquier otro procedimiento de su elección.

“3. El ejercicio del derecho previsto en el párrafo 2 de este artículo entraña deberes y responsabilidades especiales. Por consiguiente, puede estar sujeto a ciertas restricciones que deberán, sin embargo, estar expresamente fijadas por la ley y ser necesarias para:

“a) Asegurar el respecto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás; “b) La protección de la seguridad nacional, el orden público o la salud o la moral públicos.” XI- Del contenido de las anteriores disposiciones se desprende que la liber tad de expresión e información tiene como condición previa e indispensable a la libertad de pensamiento o ideológica y que comprende esencialmente el derecho de toda persona de buscar, recibir y expresar libremente pensamientos, ideas, opiniones, juicios de valor, creencias, hechos, datos, etc., en relación con todo tipo de materias (incluidas la política y la electoral), utilizando cualquier medio lícito a su disposición y con los más variados propósitos (comerciales, recreativos, políticos, electorales, etc). De los citados preceptos también se desprende que en el marco de su régimen constitucionalmente garantizado, el derecho fundamental de libre expresión e información se encuentra configurado como un derecho de libertad. Esto implica, básicamente, que para su ejercicio no se requiere de un reconocimiento expreso de los poderes públicos acerca de quienes son sus legítimos titulares, sino más bien que de ellos se espera -o mejor dicho se exige con carácter general- que se abstengan de incidir o de imponer algún tipo de obstáculo a dicho ejercicio. Esta condición del derecho a la libre expresión e información ha sido especialmente ponderada a nivel de su protección en el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, situación que se refleja sobre todo en la amplitud del contenido y el grado de excepcionalidad de las limitaciones con que se reconoce y garantiza en la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Del contenido esencial de la libertad de expresión e información resulta asimismo la existencia de sus dos dimensiones concurrentes, puesta de manifiesto por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, en su opinión consultiva OC-5/85, sobre la colegiación obligatoria de los periodistas. Al respecto, la Corte señaló que esa libertad se manifiesta tanto en la dimensión individual, de quien expresa o se expresa, como en otra colectiva, de todos los que reciben el contenido de esa expresión. Estas dos dimensiones están imbricadas de tal modo que cuando se restringe la primera, no es sólo el derecho fundamental de su titular individual el que está siendo limitado, sino también el de todos aquellos a quienes se ha impedido recibir sus ideas e informaciones. Dada esa vinculación tan estrecha entre ambas dimensiones (individual y colectiva), la libertad de expresión e información implica el derecho a utilizar cualquier medio lícito para difundir el pensamiento o la información y hacerlo llegar a cualquier número de destinatarios, situación que revela que la expresión y difusión del pensamiento o de la información son indivisibles, por lo que una restricción de esos medios o de las posibilidades de divulgación significa, al mismo tiempo y en la misma medida, una limitación del derecho de libre expresión e información.

XII- De lo anterior, resulta que la libertad de expresión e información tiene un carácter básico al ser presupuesto necesario para los restantes derechos fundamentales, razón por la cual se le ha señalado como factor determinante para la legitimidad del funcionamiento del sistema democrático, al permitir que en todo momento las personas, sin distinción alguna, piensen de la manera que mejor decidan y expresen libremente sus opiniones. A dicho carácter básico contribuye el hecho de que el contenido esencial de la libertad de expresión e información no precisa de especiales exigencias en relación con el contenido, las formas o los medios que empleé el mensaje que se expresa o los niveles de difusión que alcance, situación esta que favorece que por su medio se reconozcan y garanticen manifestaciones de su ejercicio tan variadas como la creación artística o la misma propaganda electoral.” Es decir, a partir de la Constitución misma, así como de las normas de los sistemas regional y universal de protección de los derechos humanos, se da cuenta de una vigorosa protección de la libertad de expresión, desde una doble vertiente: dogmática -esto es, en consideración a su carácter de derecho fundamental- y orgánica o institucional -como elemento inmanente a la democracia-. En igual tesitura, la sentencia No. 2006-05977 de las 15:16 horas del 3 de mayo del 2006 desarrolló este sincretismo entre libertad de expresión y democracia:

“VIII.- La libertad de expresión como requisito indispensable de la democracia. La libertad de expresión sin duda alguna es una de las condiciones -aunque no la única-, para que funcione la democracia. Esta libertad es la que permite la creación de la opinión pública, esencial para darle contenido a varios principios del Estado constitucional, como lo son por ejemplo el derecho a la información, el derecho de petición o los derechos en materia de participación política; la existencia de una opinión pública libre y consolidada también es una condición para el funcionamiento de la democracia representativa. La posibilidad de que todas las personas participen en las discusiones públicas constituye el presupuesto necesario para la construcción de una dinámica social de intercambio de conocimientos ideas e información, que permita la generación de consensos y la toma de decisiones entre los componentes de los diversos grupos sociales, pero que también constituya un cauce para la expresión de los disensos, que en la democracia son tan necesarios como los acuerdos. Por su parte, el intercambio de opiniones e informaciones que se origina con la discusión pública contribuye a formar la opinión personal, ambas conforman la opinión pública, que acaba manifestándose por medio de los canales de la democracia representativa. Como lo ha señalado el propio Tribunal Constitucional español, quedarían vaciados de contenido real otros derechos que la Constitución consagra, reducidas a formas huecas las instituciones representativas y absolutamente falseado el principio de legitimidad democrática... que es la base de toda nuestra ordenación jurídico-política (Sentencia 6/1981), si no existieran unas libertades capaces de permitir ese intercambio, que… presupone el derecho de los ciudadanos a contar con una amplia y adecuada información respecto de los hechos, que les permita formar sus convicciones y participar en la discusión relativa a los asuntos públicos (Sentencia 159/1986).

IX-. Contenido de la libertad de expresión. La libertad de información podría decirse que tiene varias facetas, según lo ha reconocido la doctrina nacional (de las cuales las tres primeras se relacionan con lo que aquí se discute): a) la libertad de imprenta en sentido amplio, que cubre cualquier tipo de publicación, b) la libertad de información por medios no escritos, c) el derecho de rectificación o respuesta. La libertad de prensa engloba de manera genérica todos los tipos de impresos, impresión, edición, circulación de periódicos, folletos, revistas y publicaciones de toda clase. Es por su naturaleza vehículo natural de la libertad de expresión de los ciudadanos. Se traduce en el derecho para los administrados de buscar y difundir las informaciones y las ideas a un número indeterminado de personas sobre hechos que por su naturaleza son de interés de la generalidad por considerarse noticiosos. Por su naturaleza, está sujeta a las mismas limitaciones que la libertad de expresión. Tiene como funciones en la democracia: informar (hechos, acontecimientos noticiosos), integrar la opinión (estimulando la integración social) y controlar el poder político, en cuanto es permanente guardián de la honestidad y correcto manejo de los asuntos públicos. Dado su vínculo simbiótico con la ideología democrática, un sin fin de instrumentos internacionales y prácticamente todas las Constituciones del mundo libre, desde la Declaración Francesa de 1789 (art.11) la han reconocido. Nuestra Constitución Política por su parte, la tutela por medio de diversas normas:

“Todos pueden comunicar sus pensamientos de palabra o por escrito y publicarlos sin previa censura; pero serán responsables de los abusos que cometan en el ejercicio de este derecho, en las condiciones y modos que establezca la ley” (artículo 29) “Nadie puede ser inquietado ni perseguido por la manifestación de sus opiniones ni por acto alguno que no infrinja la ley.

Las acciones privadas que no dañen la moral o el orden público o que no perjudiquen a tercero, están fuera de la acción de la ley.

No se podrá, sin embargo, hacer en forma alguna propaganda política por clérigos o seglares invocando motivos de religión o valiéndose, como medio, de creencias religiosas” (artículo 28).

Otras normas constitucionales relacionadas con este derecho son:

“Se garantiza la libertad de petición, en forma individual o colectiva, ante cualquier funcionario público o entidad oficial, y el derecho a obtener pronta resolución. (artículo 27).

“Se garantiza el libre acceso a los departamentos administrativos con propósitos de información sobre asuntos de interés público.

Quedan a salvo los secretos de Estado” (artículo 30).

La libertad de expresión tiene como consecuencia la prohibición de toda forma de censura, en un doble sentido: no se puede censurar a los interlocutores, por una parte; y no se puede, en general, tampoco censurar en forma previa los contenidos posibles de la discusión: en principio, en una democracia, todos los temas son discutibles. La no censurabilidad de los sujetos tienen un carácter prácticamente universal, como lo establece nuestra Constitución, nadie puede ser privado de la libertad de hablar y expresarse como mejor le parezca; la no censurabilidad de los contenidos, si bien no se da en forma previa, encuentra algunas limitaciones, sin embargo, éstas deben ser tales que la libertad siga teniendo sentido o no sea vaciada de su contenido, básicamente, como toda libertad, debe ejercerse con responsabilidad, en fin para perseguir fines legítimos dentro del sistema.” También es relevante traer a colación la resolución No. 2022025167 de las 13:30 horas de 21 de octubre de 2022, en el tanto desarrolla con amplitud las implicaciones de la libertad de expresión, que tiene múltiples manifestaciones:

“IV.- SOBRE LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN. La libertad de expresión es uno de los pilares sobre los cuales está fundado el Estado de Derecho y comprende, tanto la garantía fundamental y universal de manifestar los pensamientos o las opiniones propias, como conocer los de otros. En otros términos, refiere a la libertad de buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas, ya sea oralmente o por escrito. Por esto se dice que la libertad de expresión se caracteriza por ser un derecho con una doble dimensión: una dimensión individual, consistente en el derecho de cada persona a buscar información y expresar los propios pensamientos, ideas e informaciones; y una dimensión colectiva o social, consistente en el derecho de la sociedad a procurar y recibir cualquier información, a conocer los pensamientos, ideas e informaciones ajenos y a estar bien informada. Sobre esta doble dimensión de la libertad bajo estudio, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (en adelante Corte IDH), en el caso Herrera Ulloa vs. el Estado [Nombre 002] (sentencia de 2 de julio de 2004), sostuvo lo siguiente:

“(…) 109. Al respecto, la Corte ha indicado que la primera dimensión de la libertad de expresión “no se agota en el reconocimiento teórico del derecho a hablar o escribir, sino que comprende además, inseparablemente, el derecho a utilizar cualquier medio apropiado para difundir el pensamiento y hacerlo llegar al mayor número de destinatarios”. En este sentido, la expresión y la difusión de pensamientos e ideas son indivisibles, de modo que una restricción de las posibilidades de divulgación representa directamente, y en la misma medida, un límite al derecho de expresarse libremente.

110. Con respecto a la segunda dimensión del derecho a la libertad de expresión esto es, la social, es menester señalar que la libertad de expresión es un medio para el intercambio de ideas e informaciones entre las personas; comprende su derecho a tratar de comunicar a otras sus puntos de vista, pero implica también el derecho de todos a conocer opiniones, relatos y noticias vertidas por terceros. Para el ciudadano común tiene tanta importancia el conocimiento de la opinión ajena o de la información de que disponen otros como el derecho a difundir la propia.

111. Este Tribunal ha afirmado que ambas dimensiones poseen igual importancia y deben ser garantizadas plenamente en forma simultánea para dar efectividad total al derecho a la libertad de expresión en los términos previstos por el artículo 13 de la Convención (…)”.

Por su parte, la Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Marco jurídico interamericano sobre el derecho a la libertad de expresión, diciembre 2009), se refirió a este derecho conforme los siguientes términos:

“(…) se trata de uno de los derechos individuales que de manera más clara refleja la virtud que acompaña -y caracteriza- a los seres humanos: la virtud única y preciosa de pensar al mundo desde nuestra propia perspectiva y de comunicarnos con los otros para construir a través de un proceso deliberativo, no solo el modelo de vida que cada uno tiene derecho a adoptar, sino el modelo de sociedad en el cual queremos vivir. Todo el potencial creativo en el arte, en la ciencia, en la tecnología, en la política, en fin, toda nuestra capacidad creadora individual y colectiva, depende, fundamentalmente, de que se respete y promueva el derecho a la libertad de expresión en todas sus dimensiones. Se trata entonces de un derecho individual sin el cual se estaría negando la primera y más importante de nuestras libertades: el derecho a pensar por cuenta propia y a compartir con otros nuestro pensamiento (…)

Asimismo, instrumentos internacionales de soft law han resguardado esta libertad. Así, la Declaración de Chapultepec (adoptada por la conferencia hemisférica sobre libertad de expresión celebrada en México, D.F. el 11 de marzo de 1994), en su primer principio refiere que:

“1. No hay personas ni sociedades libres sin libertad de expresión y de prensa. El ejercicio de ésta no es una concesión de las autoridades; es un derecho inalienable del pueblo”.

Por su parte, la Declaración de Principios sobre Libertad de Expresión (aprobada por la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en octubre de 2000, en el 108 período ordinario), dispone lo siguiente:

“1. La libertad de expresión, en todas sus formas y manifestaciones, es un derecho fundamental e inalienable, inherente a todas las personas. Es, además, un requisito indispensable para la existencia misma de una sociedad democrática”.

En otro contexto, dentro del ordenamiento jurídico europeo, se destaca la Convención Europea sobre Derechos Humanos, que en su ordinal 10 precisa la titularidad universal de este derecho, conforme los siguientes términos:

“Libertad de expresión 1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de expresión. Este derecho comprende la libertad de opinión y la libertad de recibir o de comunicar informaciones o ideas sin que pueda haber injerencia de autoridades públicas y sin consideración de fronteras. El presente artículo no impide que los Estados sometan a las empresas de radiodifusión, de cinematografía o de televisión a un régimen de autorización previa.

2. El ejercicio de estas libertades, que entrañan deberes y responsabilidades, podrá ser sometido a ciertas formalidades, condiciones, restricciones o sanciones, previstas por la ley, que constituyan medidas necesarias, en una sociedad democrática, para la seguridad nacional, la integridad territorial o la seguridad pública, la defensa del orden y la prevención del delito, la protección de la salud o de la moral, la protección de la reputación o de los derechos ajenos, para impedir la divulgación de informaciones confidenciales o para garantizar la autoridad y la imparcialidad del poder judicial”.

Igualmente, la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea, en su ordinal 11, cita lo siguiente:

“Artículo 11 Libertad de expresión y de información 1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de expresión. Este derecho comprende la libertad de opinión y la libertad de recibir o de comunicar informaciones o ideas sin que pueda haber injerencia de autoridades públicas y sin consideración de fronteras.

2. Se respetan la libertad de los medios de comunicación y su pluralismo”.

(…)

Por su parte, la Corte IDH en el caso Moya Chacón y otros vs. Costa Rica (sentencia de 23 de mayo de 2022), indicó lo siguiente:

“(…) b.3 Restricciones permitidas a la libertad de expresión y la aplicación de responsabilidades ulteriores en casos que haya afectación de la honra y de la dignidad en asuntos de interés público 71. El Tribunal recuerda que, con carácter general, el derecho a la libertad de expresión no puede estar sujeto a censura previa sino, en todo caso, a responsabilidades ulteriores en casos muy excepcionales y bajo el cumplimiento de una serie de estrictos requisitos. Así, el artículo 13.2 de la Convención Americana establece que las responsabilidades ulteriores por el ejercicio de la libertad de expresión, deben cumplir con los siguientes requisitos de forma concurrente: (i) estar previamente fijadas por ley, en sentido formal y material; (ii) responder a un objetivo permitido por la Convención Americana y (iii) ser necesarias en una sociedad democrática (para lo cual deben cumplir con los requisitos de idoneidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad).

72. Respecto a la estricta legalidad, la Corte ha establecido que las restricciones deben estar previamente fijadas en la ley como medio para asegurar que las mismas no queden al arbitrio del poder público. Para esto, la tipificación de la conducta debe ser clara y precisa, más aún si se trata de condenas del orden penal y no del orden civil. Sobre los fines permitidos o legítimos, los mismos están indicados en el referido artículo 13.2 y son (a) el respeto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás, o (b) la protección de la seguridad nacional, el orden público o la salud o la moral públicas. Asimismo, las restricciones a la libertad de expresión deben ser idóneas, esto es, efectivamente conducentes para alcanzar la finalidad legítimamente permitida. En lo que respecta al análisis de necesidad, el Tribunal ha sostenido que, para que una restricción a la libre expresión sea compatible con la Convención Americana, aquella debe ser necesaria en una sociedad democrática, entendiendo por “necesaria” la existencia de una necesidad social imperiosa que justifique la restricción. En este sentido, la Corte deberá examinar las alternativas existentes para alcanzar el fin legítimo perseguido y precisar la mayor o menor lesividad de aquéllas. Finalmente, en relación con la proporcionalidad de la medida, la Corte ha entendido que las restricciones impuestas sobre el derecho a la libertad de expresión deben ser proporcionales al interés que las justifican y ajustarse estrechamente al logro de ese objetivo, interfiriendo en la menor medida posible en el efectivo goce del derecho. En ese sentido, no es suficiente que tenga una finalidad legítima, sino que la medida en cuestión debe respetar la proporcionalidad al momento de afectar la libertad de expresión. En otras palabras, “en este último paso del análisis se considera si la restricción resulta estrictamente proporcional, de tal forma que el sacrificio inherente a aquella no resulte exagerado o desmedido frente a las ventajas que se obtienen mediante tal limitación”. El Tribunal recuerda que estas restricciones tienen carácter excepcional y no deben limitar, más allá de lo estrictamente necesario, el pleno ejercicio de la libertad de expresión y convertirse en un mecanismo directo o indirecto de censura previa.

73. En este sentido, la Corte ha establecido que se pueden imponer tales responsabilidades ulteriores en tanto se pudiera haber afectado el derecho a la honra y la reputación. Así, el artículo 11 de la Convención establece, en efecto, que toda persona tiene derecho a la protección de su honra y al reconocimiento de su dignidad. La Corte ha señalado que el derecho a la honra “reconoce que toda persona tiene derecho al respeto de esta, prohíbe todo ataque ilegal contra la honra o reputación e impone a los Estados el deber de brindar la protección de la ley contra tales ataques”. En términos generales, este Tribunal ha indicado que “el derecho a la honra se relaciona con la estima y valía propia, mientras que la reputación se refiere a la opinión que otros tienen de una persona”. En este sentido, este Tribunal ha sostenido que, “tanto la libertad de expresión como el derecho a la honra, derechos ambos protegidos por la Convención, revisten suma importancia, por lo cual es necesario garantizar ambos derechos, de forma que coexistan de manera armoniosa”. El ejercicio de cada derecho fundamental tiene que hacerse con respeto y salvaguarda de los demás derechos fundamentales. Por ende, la Corte ha señalado que “la solución del conflicto que se presenta entre ambos derechos requiere de una ponderación entre los mismos, para lo cual deberá examinarse cada caso, conforme a sus características y circunstancias, a fin de apreciar la existencia e intensidad de los elementos en que se sustenta dicho juicio”.

74. El Tribunal recuerda a este respecto que, para determinar la convencionalidad de una restricción a la libertad de expresión cuando este colisione con el derecho a la honra, es de vital importancia analizar si las declaraciones efectuadas poseen interés público, toda vez que en estos casos el juzgador debe evaluar con especial cautela la necesidad de limitar la libertad de expresión. En su jurisprudencia, la Corte ha considerado de interés público aquellas opiniones o informaciones sobre asuntos en los cuales la sociedad tiene un legítimo interés de mantenerse informada, de conocer lo que incide sobre el funcionamiento del Estado, o afecta derechos o intereses generales o le acarrea consecuencias importantes. Determinar lo anterior tiene consecuencias en el análisis de la convencionalidad de la restricción al derecho a la libertad de expresión, toda vez que las expresiones que versan sobre cuestiones de interés público -como, por ejemplo, las concernientes a la idoneidad de una persona para el desempeño de un cargo público o a los actos realizados por funcionarios públicos en el desempeño de sus labores- gozan de mayor protección, de manera tal que se propicie el debate democrático.

75. Así, la Corte ha señalado que, en una sociedad democrática, aquellas personas que influyen en cuestiones de interés público están más expuestas al escrutinio y la crítica del público. Este diferente umbral de protección se explica porque sus actividades salen del dominio de la esfera privada para insertarse en la esfera del debate público y, por tanto, se han expuesto voluntariamente a este escrutinio más exigente. Esto no significa, de modo alguno, que el honor de las personas participantes en asuntos de interés público no deba ser jurídicamente protegido, sino que éste debe serlo de manera acorde con los principios del pluralismo democrático.

76. Por otro lado, en relación con el carácter necesario y el riguroso análisis de proporcionalidad que debe regir entre la limitación al derecho a la libertad de expresión y la protección del derecho a la honra, se deberá buscar aquella intervención que, siendo la más idónea para restablecer la reputación dañada, contenga, además, un grado mínimo de afectación en el ámbito de la libertad de expresión. A este respecto, en el marco de la libertad de información, el Tribunal considera que existe un deber del periodista de constatar en forma razonable, aunque no necesariamente exhaustiva, los hechos que divulga. Ahora bien, esto no significa una exigencia estricta de veracidad, por lo menos en lo que hace referencia a cuestiones de interés público, reconociendo como descargo el que la publicación se haga de buena fe o justificadamente y siempre de conformidad con unos estándares mínimos de ética y profesionalidad en la búsqueda de la verdad. Asimismo, el Tribunal advierte que, para que exista el periodismo de investigación en una sociedad democrática, es necesario dejar a los periodistas “espacio para el error”, toda vez que sin ese margen de error no puede existir un periodismo independiente ni la posibilidad, por tanto, del necesario escrutinio democrático que dimana de este.

77. Adicionalmente, la Corte también considera que nadie podrá ser sometido a responsabilidades ulteriores por la difusión de información relacionada con un asunto público y que tenga como base material que es accesible al público o que proviene de fuentes oficiales.

78. Por último, también se debe destacar la necesidad de que, en caso de estimarse adecuado otorgar una reparación a la persona agraviada en su honra, la finalidad de esta no debe ser la de castigar al emisor de la información, sino la de restaurar a la persona afectada. A este respecto, los Estados deben ejercer la máxima cautela al imponer reparaciones, de tal manera que no disuadan a la prensa de participar en la discusión de asuntos de legítimo interés público (…)”.

(…)

VI.- TOCANTE A LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN (Y DE PRENSA) COMO GARANTES DEL SISTEMA DEMOCRÁTICO. La libertad de expresión y, concomitantemente, el ejercicio de la libertad de prensa, devienen en pilares fundamentales sobre los que se erige una sociedad democrática. Resulta prácticamente incuestionable la intrínseca relación que existe entre tales libertades y la democracia; de ahí que, esta última se debilita y erosiona arbitrariamente cuando dichas libertades no se pueden ejercer plenamente ni, tampoco, se respetan y garantizan en los ordenamientos jurídicos.

La Carta Democrática Interamericana (aprobada por los Estados Miembros de la OEA durante una sesión extraordinaria de la Asamblea General que se llevó a cabo el 11 de septiembre de 2001 en Lima, Perú), sobre este particular, dispone en su artículo 4 que: “Son componentes fundamentales del ejercicio de la democracia la transparencia de las actividades gubernamentales, la probidad, la responsabilidad de los gobiernos en la gestión pública, el respeto por los derechos sociales y la libertad de expresión y de prensa”. Además, hay que recordar que la ya dictada Declaración de Principios sobre Libertad de Expresión establece en su primer principio que la libertad de expresión es “(…) un requisito indispensable para la existencia misma de una sociedad democrática”.

La libertad de prensa (o lo que algunos denominan una prensa libre), como manifestación de la libertad de expresión, constituye un elemento esencial para fiscalizar -sin represiones-, las actuaciones de los terceros, sean de índole privada o funcionarios públicos, principalmente de los que ocupan altos cargos o aspiran a este, permitiendo así, consecuentemente, la rendición de cuentas, combatir la corrupción, la transparencia en el manejo de fondos públicos, entre otros muchos aspectos que resultan fundamentales para mantener vigente un sistema democrático. Parte de ese deber, reside en el investigar a las personas en el poder, principalmente al gobierno, formulando los cuestionamientos difíciles e intentar así revelarle a la ciudadanía lo que realmente está sucediendo, como medio, a su vez, para que tomen las decisiones correctas, principalmente, a la hora de votar y, también posteriormente, cuando se está en ejercicio del poder. Tal y como lo ha manifestado la llamada Unión por las Libertades Civiles de Europa (organización no gubernamental que promueve las libertades civiles para todas las personas en la Unión Europea) “(…) Una prensa libre ayuda en cada paso de este proceso. Proporciona información a los votantes antes de votar; fomenta el diálogo y el debate para enriquecer la comprensión de esta información; y luego informa a la ciudadanía sobre la labor del gobierno y si realmente están llevando a cabo sus promesas. En democracia, la ciudadanía delega el poder de decisión en sus cargos electos, y la prensa es una forma de controlarlos (…)”. En esencia, es factible afirmar, entonces, que la libertad de prensa resulta fundamental en los sistemas democráticos, pues permite a los ciudadanos formarse opiniones y criterios en relación con la realidad en que viven. Por este motivo, lamentablemente los medios de comunicación independientes son precisamente uno de los objetivos principales de los sistemas políticos antidemocráticos o, al menos, de aquellos que quieren perfilarse y van encaminados hacia ello.

(…)

Por su parte, la Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Marco jurídico interamericano sobre el derecho a la libertad de expresión, diciembre 2009), señaló lo siguiente:

“(…) la CIDH y la Corte Interamericana han subrayado en su jurisprudencia que la importancia de la libertad de expresión dentro del catálogo de los derechos humanos se deriva también de su relación estructural con la democracia. Esta relación, que ha sido calificada por los órganos del sistema interamericano de derechos humanos como “estrecha”, “indisoluble”, “esencial” y “fundamental”, entre otras, explica gran parte de los desarrollos interpretativos que se han otorgado a la libertad de expresión por parte de la CIDH y la Corte Interamericana en sus distintas decisiones sobre el particular. Es tan importante el vínculo entre la libertad de expresión y la democracia que, según ha explicado la CIDH, el objetivo mismo del artículo 13 de la Convención Americana es el de fortalecer el funcionamiento de sistemas democráticos pluralistas y deliberativos mediante la protección y el fomento de la libre circulación de información, ideas y expresiones de toda índole (…) si el ejercicio del derecho a la libertad de expresión no solo tiende a la realización personal de quien se expresa, sino a la consolidación de sociedades verdaderamente democráticas, el Estado tiene la obligación de generar las condiciones para que el debate público no solo satisfaga las legítimas necesidades de todos como consumidores de determinada información (de entretenimiento, por ejemplo), sino como ciudadanos. Es decir, tienen que existir condiciones suficientes para que pueda producirse una deliberación pública, plural y abierta, sobre los asuntos que nos conciernen a todos en tanto ciudadanos de un determinado Estado (…)”. (El destacado no forma parte del original).

También, dicha Relatoría expuso lo siguiente:

“(…) en una sociedad democrática, la prensa tiene derecho a informar libremente y criticar al gobierno, y el pueblo tiene derecho a ser informado sobre distintas visiones de lo que ocurre en la comunidad (…)”.

En la misma línea de pensamiento, la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos, en el caso Lingens vs. Austria (sentencia de 8 de julio de 1986), resaltó que "(…) la libertad de prensa proporciona a la opinión pública uno de los mejores medios para conocer y juzgar las ideas y actitudes de los dirigentes políticos. En términos más generales, la libertad de las controversias políticas pertenece al corazón mismo del concepto de sociedad democrática (…)”.

Asimismo, la Corte Constitucional Colombiana, ha hecho referencia al tema bajo estudio en varias oportunidades. Así, en la Sentencia No. T-256/13 30 de abril de 2013, sostuvo que: “(…) el derecho a la libertad de expresión, es un principio del ejercicio de la democracia pues es en el marco de un estado democrático donde la participación de la ciudadanía adquiere especial relevancia, y en desarrollo de ella, se garantiza la libertad de expresar las distintas opiniones y de manifestar los pensamientos minoritarios sin miedo a ser reprimido por poderes estatales (…)” y explicó que:

“(…) Por ello, los pronunciamientos de la Comisión Interamericana y la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos han resaltado que la libertad de expresión cumple una triple función en el sistema democrático: a) asegura el derecho individual de toda persona a pensar por cuenta propia y a compartir con otros el pensamiento y la opinión personal, b) tiene una relación estrecha, indisoluble, esencial, fundamental y estructural con la democracia, y en esa medida, el objetivo mismo del artículo 13 de la Convención Americana es el de fortalecer el funcionamiento de sistemas democráticos, pluralistas y deliberativos, mediante la protección y fomento de la libre circulación de ideas y opiniones, y c) finalmente, es una herramienta clave para el ejercicio de los demás derechos fundamentales, toda vez que “se trata de un mecanismo esencial para el ejercicio del derecho a la participación, a la libertad religiosa, a la educación, a la identidad étnica o cultural y, por supuesto, a la igualdad no sólo entendida como el derecho a la no discriminación, sino como el derecho al goce de ciertos derechos sociales básicos (…)”.

Igualmente, este órgano constitucional agregó que:

“(…) Esta Corporación desde muy temprano en su jurisprudencia reconoció el valor de este derecho en el marco de una democracia con las siguientes palabras: “Aunque la libertad de expresar y difundir el propio pensamiento y opiniones es un derecho de toda persona, no es sólo un derecho individual, sino también garantía de una institución política fundamental: "la opinión pública libre". Una opinión pública libre está indisolublemente ligada con el pluralismo político, que es un valor fundamental y un requisito de funcionamiento del estado democrático. Sin una comunicación pública libre quedarían vaciados de contenido real otros derechos que la Constitución consagra, reducidos a formas hueras las institucionales representativas y participativas y absolutamente falseado el principio de la legitimidad democrática (…)”. (El destacado no forma parte del original).

En la Sentencia No. T-543 de 2017 de 25 de agosto de 2017, la Corte Constitucional Colombiana señaló que la libertad de expresión cumple las siguientes funciones en una sociedad democrática: “(…) (i) permite buscar la verdad y desarrollar el conocimiento; (ii) hace posible el principio de autogobierno; (iii) promueve la autonomía personal; (iv) previene abusos de poder; y (v) es una “válvula de escape” que estimula la confrontación pacífica de las decisiones estatales o sociales que no se compartan (…)”. Por su parte, en la Sentencia No. C-135/21 de 13 de mayo de 2021, dicha Corte mencionó que algunos de los aportes del derecho fundamental a la libertad de expresión al funcionamiento democrático, son los siguientes: “(…) i) permite buscar la verdad y desarrollar el conocimiento; ii) crea un espacio de sano diálogo y protesta para la ciudadanía, que consolida sociedades pluralistas y deliberativas; iii) permite establecer mecanismos de control y rendición de cuentas ante los gobernantes; iv) promueve el autogobierno ciudadano; y v) contribuye a mejores elecciones populares (…)”.

También, en la Sentencia No. T-145/19 de 2 de abril de 2019, la Corte Colombiana sostuvo que la libertad de expresión “(…) es un pilar del Estado Social de Derecho y un principio fundamental de los regímenes democráticos, donde se respeta la dignidad humana y se valora la participación de la ciudadanía y de todos los sectores, lo que permite consolidar sociedades pluralistas y deliberativas (…)”. Asimismo, en esta última ocasión, dicho órgano señaló que “(…) El fundamento principal del amparo jurídico de la libertad de expresión encuentra sustento en la dignidad humana, en la autonomía de la persona y en su carácter instrumental para el ejercicio de múltiples derechos, y en las distintas funciones que cumple en los sistemas democráticos (…)”.

Puede, entonces, enfatizarse de las decisiones citadas el vínculo estructural -como lo califica la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos- entre democracia y libertad de expresión, pues solamente un régimen en el que se reconoce al pueblo, a sus habitantes, como una voz plural, con capacidad de disentir, de opinar y de criticar sobre aspectos de la realidad en que viven, pero, especialmente, sobre las actividades originadas en la esfera pública, puede calificarse de régimen sustantivamente democrático.

VII.- SOBRE LA SÁTIRA POLÍTICA COMO UNA DE LAS FORMAS DE LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN. El caso en estudio ofrece la particularidad, en el marco general de la libertad de expresión y sus múltiples manifestaciones, de referirse a una sección, dentro de un programa televisivo, destinada a realizar parodias musicales sobre problemas sociales y políticos que, como se estipuló en los hechos probados de esta resolución, fueron tres, hasta el momento en que las instituciones accionadas decidieron comunicar cambios en el pago de publicidad para el programa: atención en el sistema público de salud, consecuencias de la inseguridad ciudadana y costo de la vida. Se está, entonces, frente a una forma específica del ejercicio de la libertad de expresión, conexa a la sátira política, al humor con crítica social. Para entender plenamente este aspecto es necesario recordar que la libertad de expresión es indispensable para el desarrollo y realización de los individuos. Gracias al libre intercambio de informaciones y opiniones las personas entienden mejor el mundo en el que viven, pues la libre circulación de ideas permite buscar la verdad, profundizar los conocimientos, participar en los procesos de toma de decisiones. Por esto, sin libertad de expresión, no puede hablarse de democracia, como se puso de especial relieve en el anterior considerando. No solo por el efecto que tiene en la formación de opinión; sino, además, porque constituye una vía para que las personas hagan saber a las autoridades lo que piensan y tales autoridades puedan responder a sus preocupaciones. Es necesaria para la estabilidad, el pluralismo y la tolerancia en la sociedad. En un país como el nuestro, donde existe la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión, sus habitantes tienen el derecho de criticar al poder público, a través de distintas formas, echando mano de la gran plasticidad propia de la libertad de expresión, incluida la sátira. Las expresiones de vocación abiertamente satírica y humorística permiten exageraciones, deformaciones y representaciones irónicas. Se vinculan con la risa y la crítica. En el Diccionario de la Real Academia Española el término sátira aparece como: “1.f. Composición en verso o prosa cuyo objeto es censurar o ridiculizar a alguien o algo. 2.f. Discurso o dicho agudo, picante y mordaz, dirigido a censurar o ridiculizar.”. Es una noción que abarca aspectos muy variados: ironía, irreverencia, irrespeto, insolencia, exageración, burla. Puede plasmarse en escritos, discursos, imágenes, caricaturas, parodias, pastiches. Por su parte, la palabra humor, en la segunda acepción del recién citado diccionario significa: “Jovialidad, agudeza” y el humorismo lo define como un “modo de presentar la realidad”. Hacer reír, entonces, es la intención primaria de la sátira. Ahora bien, no debe olvidarse que detrás de todos los tipos novedosos actuales de hacer y transmitir el humor y la sátira, se está ante una forma de expresión con orígenes en la antigüedad: Aristófanes en el siglo V a.C. satirizó la vida social y política de la época; Lucilio, en el siglo I a.C. creó la sátira latina, entendida como género poético destinado a señalar los vicios y ridículos sociales. Posteriormente, Molière, en el siglo XVII, empleó ese recurso para criticar las costumbres cortesanas, a los médicos y a los burgueses. Con todos los distintos matices puntualizados, ciertamente constituye una forma de la libertad de expresión. Desde el punto de vista de los particulares, en ejercicio de su libertad, del principio de autonomía de la voluntad que les reconoce en nuestra constitución costarricense el artículo 28, cubre no solamente las ideas inofensivas, sino también aquellas que puedan disgustar a las instituciones públicas, a grupos de personas o a individuos, efecto que muchas veces va aparejado con la sátira, sobre todo si es instrumento de denuncia y crítica social. El humor se inspira en la realidad, pero tiende a la exageración, a la caricaturización, muchas veces para proponer una reflexión, generar sorpresa o estupor, así como para hacer más llevaderas verdades dolorosas, o aun, para fungir como antídoto de la ira. La mayor o menor tolerancia a la sátira en una sociedad es proporcional al mayor o menor nivel de compromiso de esa sociedad con un sistema verdaderamente democrático. La Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos dedicó una atención particular a la injerencia en el derecho de los artistas -y de cualquier persona, en general- a expresarse a través de la sátira, entendiéndola como una forma de expresión artística y comentario social que busca provocar y agitar. En el caso Vereinigung Bildender Künstler c/Austria, del 27 de enero de 2007, señaló:

“26. La Corte recuerda que la libertad de expresión, consagrada en el parágrafo 1 del artículo 10, constituye uno de los fundamentos esenciales de una sociedad democrática, una condición primordial para el progreso y desarrollo de cada persona. Con la reserva del parágrafo 2, ella cubre no solo las “informaciones” o “ideas” recibidas con agrado o consideradas inofensivas o indiferentes, sino también aquellas que hieren, chocan o inquietan al Estado o a un grupo de habitantes. Así lo exigen el pluralismo, la tolerancia y el espíritu de apertura, sin el cual no se puede hablar de una “sociedad democrática”. Quienes crean, interpretan, difunden o exponen una obra de arte, contribuyen al intercambio de ideas y opiniones indispensable en una sociedad democrática. De ahí la obligación del Estado de no impedir indebidamente la libertad de expresión. Evidentemente, los artistas y quienes promueven sus obras no escapan a las eventuales limitaciones que implica el parágrafo segundo del artículo 10. Quien ejerce su libertad de expresión asume, en efecto, según los propios términos del parágrafo, “deberes y responsabilidades”, las cuales dependerán de la situación y procedimiento empleado (Müller y otros c. Suiza, 24 de mayo 1988, §§ 33-34, serie A no. 133, y las referencias citadas). (…)

33. (…) La Corte considera que el modelo de representación constituye una caricatura de las personas aludidas a partir de elementos satíricos. Se recuerda que la sátira es una forma de expresión artística y comentario social que, a través de la exageración y la deformación de la realidad que la caracteriza, busca naturalmente provocar y agitar. Por esto, debe examinarse con particular atención toda injerencia en el derecho de un artista a expresarse por ese medio.” (lo destacado es propio) En el mismo sentido, la Corte de Apelaciones de Versalles, en 1991 (31 de enero de 1991, D. 1991, IR), precisó que el género humorístico permite exageraciones, deformaciones y presentaciones irónicas, respecto de las cuales cada uno es libre de apreciar si son o no de buen gusto. Esto, en la medida en la que campea aquí un alto grado de subjetividad, de percepciones plurales y distintas del tema que se aborde y de la propia sensibilidad sobre lo que puede o no ser humorístico.

Sobre la diversidad propia de la libertad de expresión y la posibilidad de restringir algunas de sus manifestaciones, en la decisión No. 2006-05977 de las 15:16 horas dieciséis del 3 de mayo del 2006 indicó esta Tribunal:

“X.-. Los límites a la libertad de expresión y libertad de prensa. Para determinar cuáles expresiones se pueden limitar y en qué medida, es importante tomar en cuenta que no todas las expresiones pueden tener el mismo valor ni gozar, en consecuencia, de la misma protección constitucional. Así por ejemplo, incluso la jurisprudencia internacional, vgr. el Tribunal Constitucional español, ha señalado que carecen de protección constitucional, los insultos o los juicios de valor formalmente injuriosos e innecesarios para la expresión de una idea, pensamiento u opinión. En otro peldaño se encuentran las opiniones, es decir, los juicios de valor personales que no sean formalmente injuriosos e innecesarios para lo que se quiere expresar, aunque contengan lo que se conoce como "opiniones inquietantes o hirientes"; estas opiniones sí estarían protegidas constitucionalmente por la libertad de expresión y podría tener como contenido incluso la ironía, la sátira y la burla. En otro escalón estaría la información, entendiendo por tal la narración veraz de hechos, que estaría protegida como regla general, a menos que vulnere otros derechos fundamentales o bienes constitucionalmente protegidos (por ejemplo, el honor, la intimidad, el orden y tranquilidad de la nación, los derechos de los niños y adolescentes). En otro nivel estaría la noticia, entendiendo por tal la narración veraz de hechos que tienen relevancia pública, ya sea por los hechos en sí mismos, o por las personas que intervienen en ellos; las noticias contribuyen de manera destacada a la creación de la opinión pública libre. En el último escalón se encontrarían las falsedades, los rumores o insidias que se esconden detrás de una narración neutral de hechos y que en realidad carecen por completo de veracidad. Sobre el tema de la veracidad, la Comisión de Derechos Humanos ha señalado (Declaración de Principios sobre Libertad de Expresión, adoptada por la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en su 108 periodo ordinario de sesiones en octubre de 2000) que se considera censura previa cualquier condicionamiento previo, a aspectos tales como veracidad, oportunidad o imparcialidad de la información, pero a criterio de este Tribunal, debe entenderse que está referido a la posibilidad de utilizar dichos argumentos como justificantes de una censura previa de la información, no para impedir el derecho a una tutela judicial efectiva frente a las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales, como lo establece el artículo 41 de nuestra Constitución al señalar:

“Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales. Debe hacérseles justicia pronta, cumplida, sin denegación y en estricta conformidad con las leyes.” (el subrayado es agregado) La anterior resolución, se complementa con lo dispuesto, también por esta Sala, en la sentencia No. 2019008752 de las 9:30 horas del 17 de mayo de 2019:

“I.- Consideraciones preliminares: sobre la libertad de expresión. Vistas las alegaciones de la recurrente, se le recuerda que la finalidad del recurso de amparo es brindar tutela oportuna contra infracciones o amenazas a los derechos y libertades fundamentales, no servir como un instrumento para censurar opiniones, por ofensivas, chocantes o molestas que éstas puedan resultarles a algunos sectores de la población (véase en ese sentido la sentencia N° 2015007498 de las 11:30 hrs. de 22 de mayo de 2015). De esta forma, el simple hecho de que una manifestación externa, una obra artística o un trabajo literario, por ejemplo, sean de mal gusto o violenten la sensibilidad, la moral particular o los valores éticos personales de algunos individuos, en sí mismo, no es una cuestión que se relacione directamente con una eventual vulneración de algún derecho fundamental. Por el contrario, la Sala ha sido enfática al declarar que cualquier restricción —censura o “responsabilidad ulterior”— a la libertad de expresión, al derecho a la información pública y a la creación artística, está sujeta a un “escrutinio estricto”, ya que para aceptar su procedencia no bastaría con probar que esa restricción es útil para salvaguardar otros derechos fundamentales, sino que resulta indispensable demostrar que la salvaguarda o restricción son necesarias para proteger esos derechos y que, además, esa salvaguarda y el grado de afectación a esos derechos, es de mayor entidad que la propia salvaguarda de la libertad de expresión (véase, a manera de ejemplo, la sentencia de esta Sala N° 2012-005178 de las 11:30 horas del 20 de abril de 2012).

(…)

De igual forma reconoce la jurisprudencia sentada en el caso New York Times vs. Sullivan de 1964 en la que se señala que la protección que la Constitución ofrece a la libertad de expresión no depende de la verdad, popularidad o utilidad social de las ideas y creencias manifestadas, y reconoce que un cierto grado de abuso es inseparable del uso adecuado de esa libertad, a partir de la cual el gobierno y los tribunales deben permitir que se desarrolle un debate ‘desinhibido, robusto y abierto’, lo que puede incluir expresiones cáusticas, vehementes y a veces ataques severos desagradables hacia el gobierno y los funcionarios públicos. Los enunciados erróneos son inevitables en un debate libre, y deben ser protegidos para dejar a la libertad de expresión aire para que pueda respirar y sobrevivir. Las normas deben impedir que un funcionario público pueda demandar a un medio de comunicación o a un particular por daños causados por una difamación falsa relativa a su comportamiento oficial, a menos que se pruebe con claridad convincente que la expresión se hizo con malicia real, es decir, con conocimiento de que era falsa o con indiferente desconsideración de si era o no falsa. Esta salvedad que se hace es indispensable frente a la obligación del Estado de proteger la reputación y honra de las personas y más aún, dentro de la obligación que tiene de velar porque el mal uso o desvío de esta libertad no se utilice para violar fines igualmente esenciales del sistema democrático, entre los que se incluye el sistema de derechos fundamentales. Es reconocida en doctrina la interdependencia que existe entre los derechos fundamentales y su valor sistémico, en ese sentido, la protección de una libertad en demérito de otras por falta de una visión hermenéutica tiene un efecto negativo sobre todo el sistema de libertad (ver sentencia 2771-03 de esta Sala)’”. (El resaltado y subrayado no es del original).” (el énfasis es suplido) Igualmente, en el pronunciamiento Nº 2009-12680 de las 10:59 horas del 14 de agosto del 2009, reconoció este Tribunal Constitucional la indispensable protección de expresiones de índole satírica, en su condición de componente del pluralismo social:

“Por su parte, el Tribunal Constitucional Español ha afirmado que “la libertad ideológica indisolublemente unida al pluralismo político que, como valor esencial de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico propugna la Constitución, exige la máxima amplitud en el ejercicio de aquélla y, naturalmente, no sólo en lo coincidente con la Constitución y con el resto del ordenamiento jurídico, sino también en lo que resulte contrapuesto a los valores y bienes que ellos consagran, excluida siempre la violencia para imponer los propios criterios, pero permitiendo la libre exposición de los mismos en los términos que impone una democracia avanzada. De ahí la indispensable interpretación restrictiva de las limitaciones a la libertad ideológica y del derecho a expresarla, sin el cual carecería aquélla de toda efectividad" (sentencia 20/1990, del 15 de febrero, fundamento 5°, en Boletín Oficial del Estado del 1/3/1990). Sobre el punto, la jurisprudencia de la Sala “ha señalado que carecen de protección constitucional, los insultos o los juicios de valor formalmente injuriosos e innecesarios para la expresión de una idea, pensamiento u opinión. En otro peldaño se encuentran las opiniones, es decir, los juicios de valor personales que no sean formalmente injuriosos e innecesarios para lo que se quiere expresar, aunque contengan lo que se conoce como "opiniones inquietantes o hirientes"; estas opiniones sí estarían protegidas constitucionalmente por la libertad de expresión y podrían tener como contenido incluso la ironía, la sátira y la burla” (ver sentencia número 2006-05977 de las 15:16 horas del 3 de mayo de 2006). Al respecto, conviene advertir que la burla, el humor y la caricaturización de personajes forman parte de la vida diaria. Tanto el ciudadano común como el hombre público (político, juez, deportista, artista) están acostumbrados a las bromas y la ridiculización de ciertos actos y costumbres. Por tanto, mientras el humor satírico no traiga aparejada lesiones al honor de las personas o al contenido esencial de los derechos a la intimidad o la imagen, este puede y debe manifestarse libremente, por tratarse del ejercicio del derecho constitucional a la libertad de expresión y, además, de un elemento natural del derecho humano al libre desarrollo de la personalidad. Se trata del legítimo ejercicio del denominado animus jocandi, definido con acierto como aquella intención festiva, de jugar de bromear que impide tomar en serio la declaración de voluntad, que no produce el nacimiento de una obligación ni es punible por la simple manifestación verbal (vid. Cabanellas, Guillermo “Repertorio Jurídico”, pág. 166 n° 7107). Ahora bien, cuando ese no es el caso y se producen abusos, en el nivel de la mera legalidad, el legislador ha tipificado, en el Código Penal, los delitos de injurias, calumnias y difamación (artículos 145 a 147) y en el Código Civil, la teoría del abuso del derecho (artículo 22), razón por la cual cualquier persona que se sienta lesiona puede reclamar a posteriori que se le resarza. En la especie, de la lectura del boletín de marras, visible a folios 60 y 60v del expediente judicial, se advierte que con un sentido humorístico e irónico, el accionante planteó una serie de peticiones, entendidas como solicitudes hechas a los Reyes Magos con motivo de celebrarse su día, para cuyo efecto incorporó una caricatura de los mismos. Entre tales solicitudes, requirió la iluminación para las canchas techadas, reintegro de profesores, no pagar por el uso de las canchas, construcción de la pared de rebote en la cancha de frontón, utilizar la cancha de fútbol en diciembre, usar aparatos electrónicos en los ranchos del club, tener un fiscal nombrado por los socios del club, que la Asociación Española de Beneficencia se pusiera al día con las cuotas de mantenimiento, que hubiera un ahorro de un millón de dólares para construir un centro de convenciones, etc.. Incluso, el recurrente señaló como frase del mes, atribuida a Ceferino Casero, Presidente de la Junta Directiva del Club, lo siguiente: “hay algunas personas que me están acompañando, pero anónimamente”. Todos estos comentarios constituyen meras manifestaciones jocosas e irónicas, que no lesionan derecho alguno ni resultan en un ejercicio abusivo del derecho a expresarse. En virtud de lo expuesto, la Sala concluye que la sanción impuesta al amparado por el mero hecho de haber publicado el referido boletín y expuesto manifestaciones irónicas, lesiona los derechos constitucionales a la libertad de expresión y el libre desarrollo de la personalidad. Solo por este motivo deviene procedente el amparo.” (el destacado el propio. Ver en igual sentido las sentencias 2009-014384 de las 15:55 horas del 16 de setiembre de 2009 y Nº 2015019641 de las 9:05 horas del 18 de diciembre de 2015) Finalmente, merece destacarse el pronunciamiento N° 2018008396 de las 12:40 horas del 25 de mayo de 2018, en el cual se consideró que la pluralidad de contenidos es consustancial a la libertad de expresión y reprimirla implica su desconocimiento:

“Así, existen suficientes indicios sobre la censura existente y el distanciamiento entre la Administración y el tutelado. Al respecto, si bien la parte accionada afirmó que se trataba de una reorganización completa del recurso", lo cierto es que omitió adjuntar elementos probatorios que permitieran a la Sala llegar a la misma conclusión. La prueba que allegó se refería a las funciones reasignadas (que se encontraban dentro del perfil de un periodista) y a la constancia del salario del amparado.

La Sala reitera que, en materia de control de constitucionalidad, una vez que ab initio se establecen indicios claros de censura, recae en la contraparte una carga probatoria que debe llevar a concluir que las acciones no eran de tal naturaleza, máxime cuando la recurrida se encuentra en mejores posibilidades de aportar prueba a la causa (carga dinámica de la prueba), toda vez que la Administración dispone de caudales de información y recursos públicos para descartar alguna discriminación o violación a un derecho fundamental; pese a lo cual, en el sub examine, la recurrida no logra desacreditar con prueba fehaciente el agravio de los recurrentes. De esta manera, tomando en consideración lo dispuesto en los ya citados incisos b) y c) del numeral 4 de la Ley Orgánica del SINART, que de forma expresa obligan a esa empresa pública a respetar el pluralismo político, religioso, social y cultural así como a permitir la libre expresión de las opiniones , resulta claro que en la especie se ha dado una forma de censura velada a través de la reubicación de un periodista en un puesto que viene a limitar o eliminar su influencia en el contenido transmitido, todo ello luego o con motivo de las referidas manifestaciones en el ejercicio de su quehacer periodístico.

Lo anterior resulta aún más relevante, puesto que por la vía de la censura velada se ejerce una especie de intimidación o amedrentamiento subrepticio al resto del personal periodístico de la empresa pública SINART. De este modo, la libertad de prensa de aquel se ve amenazada ante la posibilidad de ser víctima de represalias derivadas del ejercicio del periodismo en libertad, cuando se formulen opiniones que no comparta la dirección del medio según el gobierno de tumo; ambiente que propicia el flagelo de la autocensura en detrimento de los periodistas, merced a que su estabilidad laboral podría compelerles a evitar represalias. Ello viene a afectar igualmente al destinatario final de los servicios de periodismo, el público, quien por esa vía ve menguada su capacidad de formarse criterio propio de manera fundada a través del estar a la escucha de una diversidad de contenidos informativo y puntos de vista.” De los antecedentes recién citados de este Tribunal, así como de los elementos conceptuales y de ejemplificación reseñados, se extrae que las parodias musicales que originaron las actuaciones que se impugnan en este proceso, gozan de una especial protección en el esquema de tutela de la libertad de expresión, pues son manifestaciones de pensamiento dirigidas -echando mano del humor- a exponer una crítica social y a instancias públicas, con independencia de si su contenido es afín a una sensibilidad uniforme o generalizada para visualizar esos problemas sociales concretos abordados. Restaría por examinar, las consecuencias que, desde la esfera pública, se impusieron a esas formas de plasmar la libertad de expresión.

VIII.- SOBRE LA PAUTA PÚBLICA Y SU IMPACTO SOBRE LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN. Esta Sala Constitucional se ha referido ya en distintas ocasiones a la utilización de recursos públicos para contratar, retirar o reorientar publicidad a determinados medios de comunicación. Por ejemplo, en la sentencia No. 2015-01782 de las 11:36 horas del 6 de febrero de 2015 se efectuaron las siguientes consideraciones:

“VIII.- El punto medular de este proceso es determinar si las notas enviadas por el recurrido a las instituciones públicas en julio pasado constituyen una limitación ilegítima a la libertad de expresión y pensamiento. Consecuentemente, el punto de partida del análisis debe ser la libertad de expresión, sus límites y la censura directa o indirecta.

Sin la intención de agotar el tema, ni reiterar lo que ya fue dicho en el considerando sobre jurisprudencia constitucional, debe enfatizarse la protección que goza la libertad de expresión en nuestro medio. Sin perjuicio de otros instrumentos que la tutelan, se señala que la Constitución Política garantiza la libertad de expresión y pensamiento en los artículos 28 y 29, mientras que la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos lo hace en el artículo 13:

“ARTÍCULO 28.- Nadie puede ser inquietado ni perseguido por la manifestación de sus opiniones ni por acto alguno que no infrinja la ley.

Las acciones privadas que no dañen la moral o el orden públicos, o que no perjudiquen a tercero, están fuera de la acción de la ley.

No se podrá, sin embargo, hacer en forma alguna propaganda política por clérigos o seglares invocando motivos de religión o valiéndose, como medio, de creencias religiosas.

ARTÍCULO 29.- Todos pueden comunicar sus pensamientos de palabra o por escrito, y publicarlos sin previa censura; pero serán responsables de los abusos que cometan en el ejercicio de este derecho, en los casos y del modo que la ley establezca.” “Artículo 13. Libertad de Pensamiento y de Expresión 1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión. Este derecho comprende la libertad de buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas de toda índole, sin consideración de fronteras, ya sea oralmente, por escrito o en forma impresa o artística, o por cualquier otro procedimiento de su elección.

2. El ejercicio del derecho previsto en el inciso precedente no puede estar sujeto a previa censura sino a responsabilidades ulteriores, las que deben estar expresamente fijadas por la ley y ser necesarias para asegurar:

• a)el respeto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás, o b) la protección de la seguridad nacional, el orden público o la salud o la moral públicas.

3. No se puede restringir el derecho de expresión por vías o medios indirectos, tales como el abuso de controles oficiales o particulares de papel para periódicos, de frecuencias radioeléctricas, o de enseres y aparatos usados en la difusión de información o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones. (… )” La libertad de expresión es un pilar fundamental del Estado democrático, ya que permite la circulación de ideas e información – aun aquellas de oposición al gobierno de turno-, la formación de la opinión pública, la fiscalización y denuncia de las acciones del gobierno, entre otras.

Ahora bien, a los efectos de resolver el sub examine, primeramente procede transcribir las manifestaciones de ambas partes que han suscitado el conflicto. Según las grabaciones aportadas por la parte recurrida, la cuña cuestionada como injuriosa indica lo siguiente:

“Ciudadano costarricense. ¿Confía y cree usted en un diputado que se dice le representa en el máximo Poder de la República, que fue estudiante de derecho con notas sobresalientes en una universidad, a punto de graduarse, en tiempo récord, sin tener bachillerato de secundaria y que es un requisito indispensable para poder llevar esa carrera? ¿Un diputado que en la sección voto 2010, en el periódico La Nación, dice ser abogado graduado de la Universidad [Nombre 002], constituyendo esto un delito de falsedad ideológica? ¿un diputado denunciado por la Fiscalía por presunta estafa, al estar involucrado en la falsificación de firmas para contratos para la campaña 2010, donde cobraron más de ȼ 220 millones y los contratados declararon que nunca cobraron un cinco y que en su mayoría falsificaron las firmas? ¿Un diputado donde en un audio solicita a Hugo Navas copia de uno de esos contratos falsos para amedrentar a Rita Chaves y demás diputados del PASE, diciéndoles que Hugo sabe todo y que puede acabar con todos, con el partido y todo? ¿Un diputado que el OIJ investiga junto a los diputados de su fracción por aparentes nombramientos falsos en la Asamblea Legislativa, donde nunca se presentaron a trabajar, pero su salario era cobrado, constituyendo esto una estafa de más de ȼ 200 millones al Estado costarricense, o sea, a todos nosotros? ¿Un diputado que en un audio planea robarse de la deuda política del proceso electoral 2010 ȼ 356 millones con facturas de gastos inexistentes? A un diputado así, no se le puede creer. No es digno de sentarse en una curul. No a la impunidad. Señor Fiscal General de la República actúe, queremos respuestas. Este es un mensaje de los ciudadanos indignados con el PASE.” Se observa entonces que en la cuña se critica la idoneidad de una persona para ejercer el cargo de diputado, se denuncian supuestos hechos ilícitos y se incita al Fiscal General a actuar. Todos esos temas son de interés público y, como tales, se circunscriben dentro del ejercicio legítimo de la libertad de expresión.

Efectivamente, tratándose de funcionarios públicos, en particular aquellos de alta jerarquía, el umbral de la libertad de expresión y el deber de tolerancia a la crítica aumentan. Esto es así porque un elemento fundamental del sistema democrático, que lo distingue de las dictaduras, consiste en la amplia libertad de que gozan tanto la ciudadanía en general como la prensa en particular, con respecto de exteriorizar sus críticas y cuestionar la idoneidad (técnica o moral) de los funcionarios públicos sin temor a censura ni represalias, lo que evidentemente no obsta que la persona que se sienta afectada, acuda al derecho de rectificación o a otras vías judiciales ordinarias en defensa de su imagen y buen nombre. En el caso concreto de los funcionarios públicos, se encuentran más expuestos al escrutinio público, toda vez que el ejercicio de sus funciones trasciende el ámbito privado y, por su impacto en el desarrollo y acontecer político de un país, se incorpora a la esfera pública, esto es tiene consecuencias de interés para la ciudadanía en general. Asimismo, el control ciudadano sobre la Administración Pública y el deber de rendición de cuentas de los funcionarios públicos (artículo 11 de la Constitución Política), solo pueden darse en un sistema democrático de amplia libertad de expresión e información. Esa es la relevancia de la dimensión social del derecho de información, íntimamente ligado al de expresión. En tal sentido, precisamente, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos se expresó en el caso Tristán Donoso:

“115. Por último, respecto del derecho a la honra, la Corte recuerda que las expresiones concernientes a la idoneidad de una persona para el desempeño de un cargo público o a los actos realizados por funcionarios públicos en el desempeño de sus labores gozan de mayor protección, de manera tal que se propicie el debate democrático. La Corte ha señalado que en una sociedad democrática los funcionarios públicos están más expuestos al escrutinio y la crítica del público. Este diferente umbral de protección se explica porque se han expuesto voluntariamente a un escrutinio más exigente. Sus actividades salen del dominio de la esfera privada para insertarse en la esfera del debate público. Este umbral no se asienta en la calidad del sujeto, sino en el interés público de las actividades que realiza (… )

122. Como ya se ha indicado, el derecho internacional establece que el umbral de protección al honor de un funcionario público debe permitir el más amplio control ciudadano sobre el ejercicio de sus funciones (supra párr. 115). Esta protección al honor de manera diferenciada se explica porque el funcionario público se expone voluntariamente al escrutinio de la sociedad, lo que lo lleva a un mayor riesgo de sufrir afectaciones a su honor, así como también por la posibilidad, asociada a su condición, de tener una mayor influencia social y facilidad de acceso a los medios de comunicación para dar explicaciones o responder sobre hechos que los involucren.” De igual forma, en el caso Ricardo Canese, la Corte indicó:

“97. El control democrático, por parte de la sociedad a través de la opinión pública, fomenta la transparencia de las actividades estatales y promueve la responsabilidad de los funcionarios sobre su gestión pública, razón por la cual debe existir un mayor margen de tolerancia frente a afirmaciones y apreciaciones vertidas en el curso de los debates políticos o sobre cuestiones de interés público.

98. El Tribunal ha establecido que es lógico y apropiado que las expresiones concernientes a funcionarios públicos o a otras personas que ejercen funciones de una naturaleza pública deben gozar, en los términos del artículo 13.2 de la Convención, de un margen de apertura a un debate amplio respecto de asuntos de interés público, el cual es esencial para el funcionamiento de un sistema verdaderamente democrático (… )” En la misma línea de pensamiento, la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos sostuvo que "la libertad de prensa proporciona a la opinión pública uno de los mejores medios para conocer y juzgar las ideas y actitudes de los dirigentes políticos. En términos más generales, la libertad de las controversias políticas pertenece al corazón mismo del concepto de sociedad democrática" (caso "Lingens vs. Austria", sentencia del 8 de julio de 1986, serie A N° 103, párr. 42).

Retomando el análisis normativo, resalta el hecho de que ambos textos jurídicos, la Constitución Política y la Convención Americana, estatuyeron el sistema de límites, o bien, de control ulterior de la libertad de expresión. De este modo, por un lado, se proscribió la censura, y, por el otro, se instauró el régimen de responsabilidad ulterior, toda vez que el ejercicio de la libertad de expresión no exime de asumir las consecuencias derivadas de su mal uso, verbigracia cuando se cometen delitos de injurias, calumnias y difamación. Así, el punto medio entre el derecho a la libertad de expresión y la protección del honor se da mediante el sistema de responsabilidad ulterior, sin que en ningún asunto los mecanismos directos o indirectos de censura sean procedentes. En el caso Tristán Donoso , la Corte Interamericana manifestó:

“110. Sin embargo, la libertad de expresión no es un derecho absoluto. El artículo 13.2 de la Convención, que prohíbe la censura previa, también prevé la posibilidad de exigir responsabilidades ulteriores por el ejercicio abusivo de este derecho. Estas restricciones tienen carácter excepcional y no deben limitar, más allá de lo estrictamente necesario, el pleno ejercicio de la libertad de expresión y convertirse en un mecanismo directo o indirecto de censura previa.

111. Por su parte, el artículo 11 de la Convención establece que toda persona tiene derecho al respeto de su honra y al reconocimiento de su dignidad. Esto implica límites a las injerencias de los particulares y del Estado. Por ello, es legítimo que quien se considere afectado en su honor recurra a los medios judiciales que el Estado disponga para su protección.” (Lo destacado no corresponde al original).

En el sub iudice, lo anterior se traduce en la posibilidad que tiene el recurrido de presentar las acciones judiciales que considere pertinentes, con el fin de que se determine la eventual afectación de su honor y la posible responsabilidad de aquellos que hayan excedido los límites de la libertad de expresión. Otra alternativa que encuentra acogida en el ordenamiento jurídico es el uso de la rectificación o respuesta, cuando una persona se vea afectada por información inexacta o agraviante emitida en su perjuicio (artículos 14 de la Convención Americana y 66 y siguientes de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

Sin embargo, tal y como se mencionó, la censura, directa o indirecta, no encuentra cabida en nuestro medio. Conviene profundizar en este tema a fin de dar solución al caso examinado. El inciso tercero del artículo 13 de la Convención Americana brinda luces al respecto:

“3. No se puede restringir el derecho de expresión por vías o medios indirectos, tales como el abuso de controles oficiales o particulares de papel para periódicos, de frecuencias radioeléctricas, o de enseres y aparatos usados en la difusión de información o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones.” En este sentido, la censura puede ser directa – por ejemplo, la prohibición directa de cierta publicación- o indirecta (también denominada soft censorship, censura sutil, velada)– por ejemplo, la utilización de diversos medios para intimidar y de ese modo evitar una publicación-. La Convención prevé una lista no taxativa de casos de censura por medios indirectos (controles de papel, de frecuencias, etc.) y concluye con la regla general, que sería “… o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones.” Valga mencionar el caso Ivcher Bronstein a manera de ejemplo, en el cual la Corte Interamericana estimó que una resolución para dejar sin efecto legal el título de nacionalidad del señor Ivcher Bronstein – entre otros hechos- constituía un medio indirecto de restringir su libertad de expresión. También, dentro del derecho comparado, resulta de interés el fallo "Editorial Río Negro contra Provincia de Neuquén" (5/09/07), en el que la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (Argentina) dipuso, a raíz de que el Poder Ejecutivo de la Provincia del Neuquén privó temporalmente de publicidad oficial a dicho medio sin demostrar la razonabilidad de tal medida, y además se pronunció en contra de la violación indirecta de la libertad de prensa por medios económicos: "La primera opción para un Estado es dar o no publicidad, y esa decisión permanece dentro del ámbito de la discrecionalidad estatal. Si decide darla, debe hacerlo cumpliendo dos criterios constitucionales: 1) no puede manipular la publicidad, dándola y retirándola a algunos medios en base a criterios discriminatorios; 2) no puede utilizar la publicidad como un modo indirecto de afectar la libertad de expresión. Por ello, tiene a su disposición muchos criterios distributivos, pero cualquiera sea el que utilice deben mantener siempre una pauta mínima general para evitar desnaturalizaciones." Ahora bien, en la especie, el recurrido dirigió una misiva a varias instituciones públicas, usando papel con el membrete y el sello de la Asamblea Legislativa, en la cual manifestaba:

“ (… ) 4.- En mi caso particular, en claro derecho de tutelar mi integridad personal, profesional y moral, fundamentaré la querella contra el productor de ese especio radial y solidariamente contra sus patrocinadores, pues basta con que ustedes monitoreen puntualmente a las 8 pm la frecuencia 800 AM y escuchen, dentro de la misma parrilla de patrocinadores a la que esta institución pertenece como auspiciador del programa en cuestión, junto a la cuña que ustedes pagan con dinero público, otra cuña grabada con la voz del propio señor [Nombre 001] en la que le pregunta a los ciudadanos si le creen a un Diputado mentiroso, investigado por falsificador y estafador, aspirante a graduarse de abogado en forma irregular, denunciado por el TSE por querer sustraer millonarias sumas de dinero mediante el uso de documentos falsos y más señalamientos infundados, aprovechando el productor radial al amparo de sus patrocinadores, para presionar de forma temeraria al Señor Fiscal General a que actúe contra el suscrito, evitando así la impunidad, como si el Jefe del Ministerio Público estuviese encubriendo deliberadamente una serie de delitos cometidos por este servidor.

5.- Por la consideración que se merecen, respetuosamente les prevengo de este asunto y les insto a valorar como una responsable medida cautelar, la posibilidad de sacar del aire la publicidad institucional que pagan en este programa radial, mientras resolvemos en los tribunales la querella que estamos por incoar, con el propósito de no empañar judicialmente ni perjudicar la sana imagen que los costarricenses tienen de esta noble institución, la cual debe ser protegida y no debería verse inmiscuida en asuntos tan deplorables y ajenos al honroso quehacer de ustedes, con lo que mis abogados desestimarían de inmediato a petición del suscrito, la eventual demanda solidaria extensiva contra esta entidad pública. (… )” (Extracto de la nota dirigida a Correos [Nombre 002]., aportada por el recurrente; lo destacado no corresponde al original).

La excitativa enviada a las instituciones públicas con el fin de que ellas retiraran la publicidad del programa de radio del amparado, se enmarca dentro de los casos de censura indirecta a la libertad de expresión por varias razones.

Primeramente, la publicidad provee el principal soporte financiero que permite la transmisión de los programas radiales y, a la postre, el sustento económico de las personas que trabajan en dicho programa. Es evidente que si se limita el ingreso económico del programa, también se llega a perjudicarlo o – inclusive- eliminarlo, todo en detrimento tanto de la libertad de expresión como de la de información. La situación descrita resulta incluso más grave cuando se trata medios de comunicación pequeños, como periódicos locales o pequeñas estaciones de radio, cuya estabilidad financiera puede llegar a depender en gran medida de la publicidad estatal. En el caso Tristán Donoso, la Corte Interamericana se pronunció en cuanto a las amenazas económicas a la libertad de expresión:

“129. Finalmente, si bien la sanción penal de días-multa no aparece como excesiva, la condena penal impuesta como forma de responsabilidad ulterior establecida en el presente caso es innecesaria. Adicionalmente, los hechos bajo el examen del Tribunal evidencian que el temor a la sanción civil, ante la pretensión del ex Procurador de una reparación civil sumamente elevada, puede ser a todas luces tan o más intimidante e inhibidor para el ejercicio de la libertad de expresión que una sanción penal, en tanto tiene la potencialidad de comprometer la vida personal y familiar de quien denuncia a un funcionario público, con el resultado evidente y disvalioso de autocensura, tanto para el afectado como para otros potenciales críticos de la actuación de un servidor público”.

En segundo lugar, un diputado de la República no es un ciudadano cualquiera, sino que ostenta un poder político particular debido a su incidencia en la aprobación de proyectos de ley, respecto de los cuales existe cantidad de intereses tanto privados como públicos. Ergo, una recomendación o retiro de publicidad de un programa radial, emitido por un funcionario en una particular posición de poder político y teniendo como leitmotiv su disconformidad con las críticas contra él difundidas por determinado medio de comunicación, constituye una forma velada de intimidación que no solo afecta al programa radial directamente aludido, sino que además envía un mensaje intimidante al resto de medios fomentando un ambiente hostil a las libertades de expresión e información esenciales en un sistema democrático. En el sub iudice, tal amenaza incluso pasó a tener efectos concretos, en la medida que, según la prueba aportada por el accionante, la pauta publicitaria del ICAA, programada para el periodo del 15 de octubre al 15 de noviembre de 2014, fue suspendida mientras se respondía el oficio del recurrido. Si las demás entidades a las que el recurrido dirigió su oficio, hubieran actuado de igual manera, eso hubiera derivado en una grave afectación a la estabilidad financiera del citado programa radial, todo ello teniendo como génesis la inconformidad de un funcionario público con las críticas difundidas en el mismo.

Lo anterior no implica que sea de poca importancia la alegada violación al honor del recurrido y de quienes podrían ser eventualmente responsables por ello. Todo lo contrario, lo reclamado por el recurrido es tan relevante que el ordenamiento jurídico ha establecido vías procesales apropiadas y razonables tanto para defender el honor de la persona afectada (por ejemplo a través de un proceso penal), como para velar por la exactitud de la información divulgada (derecho de rectificación y respuesta).

Ahora bien, las notas aclaratorias enviadas por el accionado en octubre pasado a las instituciones públicas, no afectan el razonamiento de esta Sala. Por un lado, son actuaciones ocurridas con posterioridad a la notificación del curso de este proceso – las notas fueron entregadas a dichas instituciones los días 7 y 8 de octubre de 2014; mientras que la notificación acaeció el 6 de octubre de 2014-. Por el otro, la Sala observa que, si bien se aclaró mediante tales notas que la “ … anterior carta enviada al respecto de este asunto, no buscaba imponerles necesariamente la obligación de tener que retirar su publicidad de ese programa… ” , también se indicó un apercibimiento a las instituciones motivado nuevamente en las críticas hechas al recurrido:

“5.- No omito señalarles respetuosamente su deber de cuidado, entendido en ejercer un mayor control de los recursos que en materia de propaganda, publicidad o información ustedes disponen pautar en medios de comunicación, manteniendo al menos un monitoreo mínimo que les permita conocer como en el caso del CD que les aporto [el cual contiene una edición del programa “Rompiendo El Silencio” ], la calidad de manifestaciones proferidas en los espacios en los que ustedes pautan.” (Extracto de la nota dirigida al Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje, aportada por el recurrido).

Por último, debe acotarse que los funcionarios públicos sí pueden manifestarse en torno a temas de interés público. Sin embargo, ellos son garantes de los derechos fundamentales, de manera que las expresiones que pronuncien deben evitar tornarse en una forma de censura directa o indirecta. Nuevamente, se cita a la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos:

“139. En una sociedad democrática no sólo es legítimo, sino que en ocasiones constituye un deber de las autoridades estatales, pronunciarse sobre cuestiones de interés público. Sin embargo, al hacerlo están sometidos a ciertas limitaciones en cuanto deben constatar en forma razonable, aunque no necesariamente exhaustiva, los hechos en los que fundamentan sus opiniones, y deberían hacerlo con una diligencia aún mayor a la empleada por los particulares, en razón de su alta investidura, del amplio alcance y eventuales efectos que sus expresiones pueden tener en ciertos sectores de la población, y para evitar que los ciudadanos y otras personas interesadas reciban una versión manipulada de determinados hechos. Además, deben tener en cuenta que en tanto funcionarios públicos tienen una posición de garante de los derechos fundamentales de las personas y, por tanto, sus declaraciones no pueden desconocer éstos ni constituir formas de injerencia directa o indirecta o presión lesiva en los derechos de quienes pretenden contribuir a la deliberación pública mediante la expresión y difusión de su pensamiento. Este deber de especial cuidado se ve particularmente acentuado en situaciones de mayor conflictividad social, alteraciones del orden público o polarización social o política, precisamente por el conjunto de riesgos que pueden implicar para determinadas personas o grupos en un momento dado.” (Caso Ríos y otros) En conclusión, la Sala estima el recurrido tiene todo el derecho a defender su honor y reputación por medio de los mecanismos legales que prevé la Constitución y la ley, entre ellos, el derecho de rectificación y respuesta y la querella por los delitos de injurias calumnias y difamación regulada en el Código Penal. En ese sentido, el envío de una nota a los patrocinadores del programa indicando que consideren retirar su patrocinio por el contenido negativo del mismo contra su imagen, constituyó una censura indirecta – en los términos señalados en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana supra citada-, al programa radial “Rompiendo El Silencio” . En la valoración que se hace tiene un peso específico el hecho de que el recurrido ostenta una posición de poder político por su cargo de Diputado de la República, y que efectivamente su misiva causó un efecto negativo más allá de un simple reclamo, al haberse acreditado en autos que produjo efectos sobre uno de los patrocinadores, quien suspendió temporalmente la publicidad (ICAA). Consecuentemente, se declara con lugar dicho extremo.

IX.- En cuanto a las instituciones públicas destinatarias de los oficios del recurrido, la mayoría de ellas únicamente tomó nota del asunto o rechazó tener competencia o injerencia en el mismo, según se hizo constar en los hechos probados. No obstante, también se pudo observar que en el caso del ICAA, la misiva provocó el efecto práctico de suspender temporalmente el patrocino al programa radial del accionante. En efecto, se consigna en el oficio número PRE-CI-557-2014 de 19 de noviembre de 2014:

“Reciba un cordial saludo, atendiendo instrucciones de la Presidencia Ejecutiva Msc. Yamileth Astorga Espeleta, le indico que la pauta correspondiente del 15 de octubre al 15 de noviembre de 2014, estaba pendiente de la respuesta que realizara la Junta Directiva de AYA, ante la nota del señor Oscar López Arias, la cual consta en el expediente Nº 14-15222007-CO de la Sala Constitucional, en donde constas todos los documentos de su interés.

No obstante, me permito informarle como es de su conocimiento que la pauta con su programa se reinició del 1 de noviembre al 15 de diciembre de 2014 (… )” Así las cosas, si bien la Junta Directiva optó finalmente por rechazar competencia y responsabilidad en el asunto, la suspensión de la pausa publicitaria tuvo incidencia negativa en la actividad del amparado, quien ordinariamente debió haber recibido dichas pautas, lo que no ocurrió debido a las cartas dirigidas por el recurrido al ICAA. En realidad, el ICAA, ni tan siquiera como medida cautelar, debió haber suspendido la pauta publicitaria como consecuencia de la misiva del accionado. La Sala no deja de advertir que la censura indirecta por vía del financiamiento puede resultar devastadora cuando afecta a medios de comunicación pequeños o a los programas en ellos divulgados. Así las cosas, esta Sala constata la materialización de un perjuicio que afectó al amparado por el hecho de transmitir en su programa radial la cuña objeto de disputa, lo que va en detrimento de sus libertades de expresión y de información. En ese tanto, se declara con lugar el recurso en contra del ICAA solo para efectos indemnizatorios, toda vez que la pauta publicitaria se reinició.” (el énfasis es agregado) Asimismo, en la sentencia Nº 2016-015220 de las 16:00 horas del 18 de octubre de 2016 se abordó el problema, a partir de las siguientes consideraciones:

“VIII.- Ahora bien, es de suma importancia para el caso concreto indicar que la publicidad provee un soporte financiero fundamental en el actual esquema de funcionamiento de los medios de comunicación colectiva, pues permite la publicación o difusión de su contenido y a la postre, el sustento económico de las personas que trabajan en dicho medio. Es evidente que si se limita el ingreso económico de un medio de comunicación (en este caso escrito), también se llega a perjudicarlo o – inclusive- eliminarlo, todo en detrimento tanto de la libertad de expresión como de la de información. La situación descrita resulta incluso más grave cuando se trata medios de comunicación pequeños, como periódicos locales o pequeñas estaciones de radio, cuya estabilidad financiera puede llegar a depender en gran medida de la publicidad estatal. En el caso Tristán Donoso, la Corte Interamericana se pronunció en cuanto a las amenazas económicas a la libertad de expresión:

“129. Finalmente, si bien la sanción penal de días-multa no aparece como excesiva, la condena penal impuesta como forma de responsabilidad ulterior establecida en el presente caso es innecesaria. Adicionalmente, los hechos bajo el examen del Tribunal evidencian que el temor a la sanción civil, ante la pretensión del ex Procurador de una reparación civil sumamente elevada, puede ser a todas luces tan o más intimidante e inhibidor para el ejercicio de la libertad de expresión que una sanción penal, en tanto tiene la potencialidad de comprometer la vida personal y familiar de quien denuncia a un funcionario público, con el resultado evidente y disvalioso de autocensura, tanto para el afectado como para otros potenciales críticos de la actuación de un servidor público”.

Debe, sin embargo, hacerse una precisión para adaptar lo dicho a las particularidades de este caso. El Gerente del Banco recurrido expone que resultaría incorrecto que la Sala venga a señalar la manera en que debe conducirse un aspecto vital para el negocio comercial que opera el Banco, cual es la publicidad, y en este punto le asiste la razón. La Sala entiende que debe tomarse en cuenta la condición jurídica del Banco Nacional [Nombre 002], dentro del entramado administrativo estatal, pues se trata de una institución con autonomía constitucionalmente reconocida y a la cual se ha encargado de llevar a cabo una actividad incuestionablemente comercial y, además de ello, en régimen de competencia con entidades privadas. En esa dinámica, la publicidad comercial que puedan realizar las empresas estatales responde y debe responder claramente a decisiones y valoraciones técnicas y objetivas y sobre tales aspectos no cabe la injerencia de un órgano de protección de Derechos Fundamentales como esta Sala.- No es allí donde se origina el conflicto constitucional y de Derechos Humanos que aquí se analiza, como lo demuestra la posición general expresada en el informe del año 2012 de Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos titulado “Principios sobre la regulación de la publicidad oficial y libertad de expresión”. En dicho documento se deja bien establecida la necesidad de que las distintas instituciones estatales cuenten con planes técnica y objetivamente diseñados para sus finalidades de comunicación y ello se repite en expediente legislativo de la investigación, donde las Diputadas y Diputados y el propio recurrente dejan afirmado que la particular condición de las empresas públicas debe tenerse en cuenta y respetarse las decisiones técnicas y objetivas sobre publicidad. Al respecto, de manera precisa señala el propio recurrente que:

“el criterio para distribuir la pauta publicitaria debe ser criterios de mercado, deben ser planes de medios diseñados por profesionales en la materia y se debe invertir el dinero que haga falta para cumplir ese plan de medios, de manera que lo que la empresa estatal que compite en el mercado quiere comunicar, sea eficientemente comunicado.” (p. 18-36 del Expediente Legislativo 20066) El problema en este caso surge más bien cuando las empresas públicas se separan de ese cauce para gestionar su pauta publicitaria de acuerdo con finalidades ajenas a razones objetivas y técnicas, e incompatibles con el marco constitucional de derechos fundamentales. - Es en ese punto donde la participación de esta Sala adquiere plena justificación y ello es lo que se busca confirmar o descartar a través de este recurso de amparo.

IX- El caso concreto. - El amparado manifiesta que el recurrido ha hecho uso de sus influencias y funciones como Gerente General del Banco Nacional [Nombre 002] para intentar presionar al Diario La Nación a modificar publicaciones y reportajes efectuados; afirma que esa presión se concretó en la reducción paulatina de la pauta publicitaria y en su virtual reducción a cero en los últimos meses. De los hechos probados y del considerando sobre análisis de prueba, la Sala tiene por demostradas, tanto la realidad de la reducción de la pauta del Banco Nacional al Periódico la Nación, a partir de la publicación hecha a finales de febrero, y en particular durante los meses de junio y julio, como las razones que motivaron la misma.- En este último sentido, según se indicó supra, son suficientemente claras las declaraciones del propio funcionario recurrido, emitidas ante los diversos órganos que inquieren sobre su actuación.- En todas ellas el funcionario expresó la existencia de una disconformidad con la forma en que el medio de comunicación reportó durante los meses de febrero, marzo, abril y mayo de 2016, sobre temas referentes a la entidad bancaria accionada en relación con el caso de la empresa LATCO; actuaciones de la Junta Directiva del banco, así como la participación del BNCR, en el caso BICSA. Según narra el recurrente y confirma el Gerente recurrido, la insatisfacción alcanzó su cima con este último caso, al entenderse que el periódico estaba dejando de lado las respuestas del Banco y omitiendo información importante, todo lo cual podría redundar (como efecto ocurrió) en fuertes erogaciones económicas del Banco para mantener niveles mínimos de confianza en su situación. Es por dicho caso y sus supuestas graves consecuencias para el Banco, que el Gerente recurrido dispuso publicar, el 13 de mayo de 2016, un campo pagado en otros dos medios escritos nacionales, a fin de responder a las citadas publicaciones de La Nación y dar a conocer lo que en su criterio era la situación real en torno al caso BICSA. Con esto último la situación derivó para peor, sumando al conflicto, enconados editoriales del medio de comunicación y respuestas del Banco en el mismo tono. Es en este punto que el Gerente decidió “ tener una conversación” con los personeros del medio de comunicación, a raíz de lo cual, dispuso, concomitantemente y mientras tanto, una pausa que denominó "impasse" en la pauta publicitaria al periódico la Nación; esa pausa concluye, (según sus propias palabras) luego de que es atendido por el Director del medio de comunicación. Estos hechos narrados se repiten con consistencia tanto en el escrito del recurrente como en todas las versiones que brindó el propio recurrido ante la Junta Directiva del Banco, ante la Comisión Legislativa que investigó el caso y ante la Sala en el informe rendido y sobre todo consta claramente en el audio aportado por el recurrente.- Dicho lo anterior, la valoración de tales hechos, frente al marco constitucional de la libertad de expresión y el derecho a la información, por parte de este Tribunal no puede ser positiva para el recurrido. Resulta constitucionalmente reprochable que el Gerente General de un Banco púbico, es decir, un funcionario público, haya emitido una orden de retiro de una pauta publicitaria a un determinado diario escrito, sin un fundamento objetivo y técnico válido, sino en razón de su disconformidad, con la forma en que se elaboraban las noticias y reportajes emitidos respecto de las actividades y situación de la entidad bancaria que representa. El Tribunal entiende que lo anterior constituye una censura indirecta, una forma clara de intentar influir en los contenidos informativos del medio de comunicación, y además envía un mensaje intimidante al resto de medios que fomenta un ambiente hostíl a las libertades de expresión e información esenciales en un sistema democrático. Lo anterior, en tanto proviene de un servidor público, resulta totalmente inadmisible frente al necesario respeto y apego a lo que una Diputada apropiadamente definió como “ la lógica democrática” a cuya realización deben contribuir las instancias, incluyendo por supuesto las empresas públicas.- (p. 383 del Expendiente Legislativo 20.066) Ella impone la plasmación más amplia posible de la libertad de expresión y el derecho a la información, sin que esto signifique la renuncia a emplear los medios jurídicamente establecidos para combatir las noticias u opiniones que puedan afectar injustamente la labor de las instituciones.

X.- En efecto, si a juicio del recurrido , el medio de comunicación debía darle el debido derecho de respuesta en los momentos en que solicitó reunirse con los representantes de la empresa en razón de la relevancia de lo publicado, podía y puede presentar las acciones judiciales que considere pertinentes, con el fin de que se determine la eventual afectación de su honor, o de perjuicio a la entidad bancaria que representa y la posible responsabilidad de aquellos que hayan excedido los límites de la libertad de expresión. Además, tenía la opción recogida en el ordenamiento jurídico de acudir al proceso de rectificación o respuesta, en favor de las personas que se vean afectadas por informaciones inexactas o agraviantes emitidas en su perjuicio (artículos 14 de la Convención Americana y 66 y siguientes de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). No obstante, el recurrido optó primero por la publicación de notas aclaratorias en campos pagados a otros medios de comunicación escrito y no lo hizo así con el Diario La Nación. Con ello dejó de lado el mecanismo formal de rectificación y respuesta ante el Diario La Nación, o algún otro medio de prensa del Grupo Nación, y lo hizo de manera absolutamente deliberada, según lo expresa ante la Comisión que “… (… ) alguno de Ustedes, conversaba de que porqué no acudía a la vía judicial. ¿Voy a ir a poner un recurso a la Sala Cuarta para decirles que me den un derecho de respuesta? Estuviéramos en el proceso de admisión todavía.” (p. 383 Expediente Legislativo 20.066). Se trata de desafortunadas consideraciones, no solo porque no responden a la verdadera realidad del proceso de rectificación y respuesta, -el cual contrario a lo que afirma, tiene un proceso de admisión muy expedito-, sino porque con ellas se pretende además justificar la realización de vías de hecho o actos de presión por encima de las vías del derecho, para lograr una modificación en contenido de los reportajes del periódico.- Sobre este tema, cabe recalcar, tal y como se mencionó, que tales intentos de censura, directa o indirecta, no encuentran cabida en nuestro medio, ni en el estado constitucional de derecho.

XI.- Conclusión.-Así las cosas, esta Sala comprueba un acto de censura indirecta ejecutado por un servidor estatal, con el fin de limitar la libertad de información que debe disfrutar el medio de comunicación amparado, mediante una disminución de la pauta publicitaria, sin razones técnicas u objetivas y más bien con la clara intención de incidir en el contenido informativo del medio de prensa en relación con sus reportajes referentes al Banco Nacional [Nombre 002] y sus subsidiarias.

En el caso se comprueba lo que claramente la doctrina ha denominado censura indirecta, una forma de acoso ilegítimo de un medio de comunicación de parte de un ente público, que no sólo lesiona la libertad de expresión según se dijo líneas atrás, sino el derecho de los ciudadanos de contar con mecanismos de información veraz en la democracia. Es una forma perversa y antidemocrática de utilizar el poder del Estado para dirigir la opinión, según un sistema de “premio o castigo”, a quienes ejercen la libertad de prensa y libre expresión garantizada constitucional y convencionalmente. Sobre este tema la Comisión de Derechos Humanos y la doctrina más autorizada han sido enfáticas en señalar que “no se puede restringir el derecho de expresión tampoco por vías o medios indirectos, tales como el abuso de controles oficiales o particulares de papel para periódicos, de frecuencias radioeléctricas, o de enseres y aparatos usados en la difusión de información o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones”.

Los mecanismos de censura directa o “ indirecta” están claramente prohibidos por el artículo 13.3 de la Convención Americana fueron objeto de atención por parte de distintos órganos del sistema interamericano. Interpretando el artículo 13.3 citado, la Declaración de Principios sobre Libertad de Expresión aprobada por la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (en adelante, “CIDH” ), establece en su principio 5 que “ [l]a censura previa, interferencia o presión directa o indirecta sobre cualquier expresión, opinión o información difundida a través de cualquier medio de comunicación oral, escrito, artístico, visual o electrónico, debe estar prohibida por la ley. Las restricciones en la circulación libre de ideas y opiniones, como así también la imposición arbitraria de información y la creación de obstáculos al libre flujo informativo, violan el derecho a la libertad de expresión”. Y en su principio 13 indica que “ la utilización del poder del Estado y los recursos de la hacienda pública; la concesión de prebendas arancelarias; la asignación arbitraria y discriminatoria de publicidad oficial y créditos oficiales; el otorgamiento de frecuencias de radio y televisión, entre otros, con el objetivo de presionar y castigar, o premiar y privilegiar a los comunicadores sociales y a los medios de comunicación en función de sus líneas informativas, atentan contra la libertad de expresión y deben estar expresamente prohibidos por la ley” .

Por su parte la Corte Interamericana ha señalado que “todo acto del poder público que implique una restricción al derecho de buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas, en mayor medida o por medios distintos de los autorizados por la misma Convención, son ilegítimos.

Es reconocido ampliamente en la doctrina, que la censura indirecta normalmente se oculta detrás de acciones aparentemente legítimas que, sin embargo, son adelantadas con el propósito de condicionar el ejercicio de la libertad de expresión de los individuos. Cuando eso sucede, se configura una violación del artículo 13.3 de la Convención. Como lo ha sostenido la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (en adelante, la “Corte Interamericana” o “ Corte” ), resulta violatorio de la libertad de expresión”. (Corte I.D.H. La Colegiación obligatoria de periodistas (Arts. 13 y 29 Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos). Opinión Consultiva OC-5/85 del 13 de noviembre de 1985, Serie A No. 5, párr. 55.)

Estos mecanismos de restricción fueron también objeto de análisis por parte de la Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión de la CIDH, que en su Informe Anual 2003 llamó la atención sobre estas “obstrucciones oscuras, impuestas silenciosamente [que] no dan lugar a investigaciones ni merecen una censura generalizada” . La cuestión también fue abordada por esta oficina en sus Informes de 2008 y 2009.

La jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana por su parte, ha condenado en distintas ocasiones la adopción de medidas estatales que constituyen medios indirectos de restricción de la libertad de expresión. Así, por ejemplo, ha condenado la exigencia de la colegiatura obligatoria de periodistas, el uso arbitrario de las facultades de regulación del Estado cuando éste ha sido utilizado para iniciar acciones intimidatorias contra las directivas de un medio de comunicación, o para revocar la nacionalidad del director de un medio como consecuencia de la línea editorial de los programas que transmite (Caso Ivcher Bronstein vs Perú).

Los relatores para la libertad de expresión de la ONU, la OEA y la OSCE también han abordado el tema de las restricciones indirectas a la libertad de expresión por parte de las autoridades. Por ejemplo, en su Declaración Conjunta de 2002 afirmaron que, “los gobiernos y los órganos públicos nunca deben abusar de su custodia de las finanzas públicas para tratar de influir en el contenido de la información de los medios de prensa; el anuncio de publicidad debe basarse en razones de mercado” .

El uso arbitrario de la publicidad oficial fue uno de los primeros mecanismos de censura indirecta abordados por el sistema interamericano. En efecto, la Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión en su Informe Anual 2003 dedicó un capítulo especial a estudiar el fenómeno y concluyó que “la obstrucción indirecta a través de la publicidad estatal actúa como un fuerte disuasivo de la libertad de expresión” (CIDH Informe Anual OEA/Ser. L/VI.118. Doc 70, diciembre 2003). Según indicó en ese momento la Relatoría Especial:

“este tema merece especial atención en las Américas, donde la concentración de los medios de comunicación ha fomentado, históricamente, el abuso de poder por parte de los gobernantes en la distribución arbitraria de publicidad oficial, como otros mecanismos de censura indirecta, opera sobre distintos tipos de necesidades que los medios de comunicación tienen para funcionar e intereses que pueden afectarlos. Es una forma de presión que actúa como premio o castigo que tiene por objeto condicionar la línea editorial de un medio según la voluntad de quien ejerce la presión. Según se dijo, los mecanismos de censura indirecta suelen esconderse detrás del aparente ejercicio legítimo de facultades estatales, muchas de las cuales se ejercen por los funcionarios en forma discrecional. En el caso de la distribución de la publicidad oficial, se configura un caso de censura indirecta cuando la misma es realizada con fines discriminatorios de acuerdo a la posición editorial del medio incluido o excluido en ese reparto y con el objeto de condicionar su posición editorial o línea informativa.

Para determinar cuando hubo o no violación a la libertad de expresión con motivo del ejercicio de esas facultades, es necesario analizar el contexto. Eso es precisamente lo que ha quedado demostrado en este amparo, que el retiro de la publicidad durante el primer semestre del año 2016, pero en particular de los meses posteriores a las publicaciones de finales de febrero, se dio en un contexto de confrontación con el medio, donde se logra comprobar que la estrategia no obedeció a criterios objetivos, sino que se dio, en palabras del propio gerente, con el fin de “ motivar” al diario a cambiar su línea editorial y enfoque noticioso, en vez de utilizar los mecanismos legales, existentes como el derecho de rectificación y respuesta si se estimaba que se trataba de informaciones inexactas o agraviantes.

En los casos Baruch Ivcher Bronstein Vs. Perú. Sentencia de 6 de febrero de 2001. Serie C No. 74, párr. 154. En sentido similar, conf. Corte I.D.H, “Caso Perozo y otros Vs. Venezuela”. Sentencia de 28 de enero de 2009. Serie C No. 195, la Corte Interamericana, ha sostenido que “[al] evaluar una supuesta restricción o limitación a la libertad de expresión, el Tribunal no debe sujetarse únicamente al estudio del acto en cuestión, sino que debe igualmente examinar dicho acto a la luz de los hechos del caso en su totalidad, incluyendo las circunstancias y el contexto en los que éstos se presentaron”. Siguiendo el mismo razonamiento, sostuvo que “la enunciación de medios restrictivos que hace el artículo 13.3 no es taxativa ni impide considerar 'cualesquiera otros medios' o vías indirectas derivados de nuevas tecnologías (… ). Para que se configure una violación al artículo 13.3 de la Convención es necesario que la vía o el medio restrinjan efectivamente, aunque sea en forma indirecta, la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones”(OC-5/85 y caso Ríos y otros contra Venezuela). por su parte, la Relatoría para la libertad de expresión ha venido denunciando que este tipo de censuras indirectas se dan con frecuencia y ello se debe a la ausencia de normas legales que regulen la distribución de la pauta publicitaria y reduzcan la discrecionalidad de los funcionarios públicos. En el mismo sentido, fue señalada por la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Argentina en el caso Editorial Río Negro S.A. c. Provincia de Neuquén, en el cual el tribunal indicó que la Provincia de Neuquén había violado la libertad de expresión de un diario al eliminar la publicidad oficial que allí tenía contratada como consecuencia de una cobertura crítica. La Corte Suprema señaló que la Provincia de Neuquén debería establecer un marco legal adecuado que limite la discrecionalidad de los funcionarios públicos e impida ese tipo de arbitrariedades.

Asimismo, la Corte Suprema de Chile resolvió un reclamo presentado por la Revista Punto Final contra la distribución de publicidad oficial realizada por algunos ministerios. Allí, el tribunal consideró que el orden jurídico chileno otorga a los funcionarios “un amplio margen de discrecionalidad” y recomendó que la inversión de publicidad estatal se haga “bajo criterios transparentes y no discriminatorios”( caso 9148/09). También se han dado casos en países como Estados Unidos (El Día Vs. Rossello, la Corte Federal de Apelaciones del Primer Circuito), en el que se estableció que el retiro de publicidad oficial por parte de la administración del gobernador de Puerto Rico, Pedro Rossello al diario El Día, como consecuencia de críticas que el periódico había hecho al gobernador, constituía una clara violación del derecho a la libertad de expresión garantizado por la Primera Enmienda a la Constitución de los Estados Unidos. En ese sentido, la Corte de Apelaciones entendió que “usar fondos del gobierno para castigar el discurso político de miembros de la prensa y buscar coaccionar [a los medios de comunicación para que emitan] expresiones favorables al gobierno es contrario a la Primera Enmienda”. Además, la Corte entendió que “el derecho claramente establecido prohíbe al gobierno condicionar la revocación de beneficios [en este caso, la publicidad del Estado] sobre una base que infringe intereses constitucionalmente protegidos (Corte de Apelaciones del Primer Circuito, Puerto Rico, caso El Día vs. Rossello, decisión del 25 de enero de 1999, 165 F.3d 106, pág. 110).

Queda claro de lo expuesto y de los informes de la Relatoría de Libertad de Expresión que el Estado tiene derecho a establecer y modificar su pauta publicitaria, pero que debe hacerlo por medio de criterios objetivos y transparentes, establecidos en forma planificada que aseguren que no se utiliza el poder del Estado o sus fondos, para discriminar, manipular o censurar directa o indirectamente la libertad de expresión y de prensa garantizados convencional y constitucionalmente. Por las razones expuestas, se declara con lugar el recurso en contra del Banco Nacional [Nombre 002], con los efectos que se dirán en la parte dispositiva.” (el destacado es suplido) También en la decisión Nº 2018013315 de las 9:20 horas del 17 de agosto de 2018 la Sala dejó claro que la asignación arbitraria de recursos públicos a través de compra de publicidad, como medio para restringir la libertad de expresión, contraviene tanto la Constitución como el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos:

“La Declaración de Principios sobre la Libertad de Expresión, aprobada por la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos como instrumento para interpretar el numeral 13 de la Convención Americana, en su Principio 13 establece “La utilización del poder del Estado y los recursos de la hacienda pública; la concesión de prebendas arancelarias; la asignación arbitraria y discriminatoria de publicidad oficial y créditos oficiales; el otorgamiento de frecuencias de radio y televisión, entre otros, con el objetivo de presionar y castigar o premiar y privilegiar a los comunicadores sociales y a los medios de comunicación en función de sus líneas informativas, atenta contra la libertad de expresión y deben estar expresamente prohibidos por la ley. Los medios de comunicación social tienen derecho a realizar su labor en forma independiente. Presiones directas o indirectas dirigidas a silenciar la labor informativa de los comunicadores sociales son incompatibles con la libertad de expresión. ” También deviene relevante, como fuente doctrinaria, la Declaración de Chapultepec adoptada por la Conferencia Hemisférica sobre Libertad de Expresión celebrada en México D.F. el 11 de marzo de 1994, que constituye una manifestación de voluntad y apoyo de numerosos dirigentes en defensa del derecho a la libertad de expresión, lo que la reviste de una fuerte legitimación. Su Principio 6 dispone “los medios de comunicación y los periodistas no deben ser objeto de discriminaciones o favores en razón de lo que escriban o digan”. En otros ámbitos, la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos ha sostenido que la insuficiente precisión de las leyes y el establecimiento de facultades inaceptablemente discrecionales, constituyen violaciones a la libertad de expresión. Así, cuando la normativa no es clara o deja las decisiones a la discreción de funcionarios públicos, se da un marco legal contrario a la libertad de expresión. De igual forma, en el caso Ricardo Canese, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos indicó:

“97. El control democrático, por parte de la sociedad a través de la opinión pública, fomenta la transparencia de las actividades estatales y promueve la responsabilidad de los funcionarios sobre su gestión pública, razón por la cual debe existir un mayor margen de tolerancia frente a afirmaciones y apreciaciones vertidas en el curso de los debates políticos o sobre cuestiones de interés público.

98. El Tribunal ha establecido que es lógico y apropiado que las expresiones concernientes a funcionarios públicos o a otras personas que ejercen funciones de una naturaleza pública deben gozar, en los términos del artículo 13.2 de la Convención, de un margen de apertura a un debate amplio respecto de asuntos de interés público, el cual es esencial para el funcionamiento de un sistema verdaderamente democrático.(…)” Ningún tipo de censura, directa o indirecta, encuentra cabida en nuestro medio, así lo expresa el inciso tercero del ordinal 13 de la Convención Americana:

“3. No se puede restringir el derecho de expresión por vías o medios indirectos, tales como el abuso de controles oficiales o particulares de papel para periódicos, de frecuencias radioeléctricas, o de enseres y aparatos usados en la difusión de información o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones.” (el resaltado no es del original) En este sentido, la censura puede ser directa –verbigracia, la prohibición directa de cierta publicación- o indirecta (también denominada soft censorship, censura sutil, velada) –por ejemplo, la utilización de diversos medios para intimidar y de ese modo evitar una publicación, o el impedimento injustificado al acceso a información de interés público–. Asimismo, el artículo 13 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos contempla una lista no taxativa de casos de censura por medios indirectos (controles de papel, de frecuencias, etc.) y de modo expreso deja abierta las posibilidades, cuando estatuye: “…o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones.” A igual conclusión se llega en la sentencia Nº 2020016167 de las 9:20 horas del 28 de agosto de 2020, donde se diferencia un caso en el que mediaron razones objetivas para cancelar la suscripción a varios medios de comunicación escrita -y no se decretó, por ende, que se hubiera incurrido en infracción de la libertad de expresión- de otro en el cual las actuaciones tuvieron sustento en un desacuerdo con las supuestas posiciones de un medio de comunicación, en cuyo caso se concluyó en un quebranto de la libertad en comentario:

“IV.- SOBRE EL CASO CONCRETO. En el sub examine, el amparado reclama que el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social vulnera los derechos fundamentales, dado que se canceló la suscripción del Diario Extra. Al respecto, en el informe rendido bajo juramento por la Ministra de Trabajo y Seguridad Social se indicó, respecto a la cancelación por parte del MTSS de la suscripción mantenida con el Diario Extra, que: “(…) esa decisión obedeció a que producto del Estado de Emergencia Sanitaria que enfrenta el país, que nos ha causado afectación económica no solo a nivel nacional sino también mundial, el Poder Ejecutivo gestionó días atrás, recorte en el gasto público. Siendo que ese recorte presupuestario, nos obligó cómo Institución a liberar costos en algunas partidas específicas, cuidando desde luego, no afectar el servicio que como Cartera brindamos a la ciudadanía. Siendo entonces, que en virtud de ese recorte presupuestario que realizamos, fue que se adoptó la decisión de eliminar la suscripción que la Institución mantenía con algunos diarios de circulación nacional, tales como: Diario Extra, La Nación, El Financiero y La República. Pues el monto para el pago de las suscripciones invocadas, se acreditaba desde la misma partida con la que se compraban suministros de papel y cartón y ello representaba casi el 50% del presupuesto para esos efectos. Y siendo que a raíz de la pandemia producida por el virus COVID 19, debemos tener disponibles toallas de papel para los lavatorios que tenemos instalados para el lavado de manos de personas funcionarias y usuarias de este Ministerio; fue que se prioriza la compra de suministros citados, con la consecuencia de eliminar las suscripciones mencionadas” (la negrita no es del original).

Así, el Tribunal verifica que, el 14 de julio de 2020, un funcionario del MTSS remitió el oficio DGAF-OF-383-2020 a la representante legal de la Sociedad Periodística Extra Limitada, en el que manifestó: “De la manera más atenta y en marco de la contratación 2019CD-000045-0007000001; bajo la modalidad según demanda para la adquisición ejemplares del periódico La Extra, se informa que en atención a instrucciones superiores y en cumplimiento de las nuevas directrices emitidas por el Gobierno de la República [Nombre 002], que insta hacer recortes presupuestarios mandatorios a efecto de orientarse a la atención de la pandemia COVID-19 nos vemos en la necesidad de solicitar formalmente, la cancelación indefinida de entrega de dicho periódico a partir del día 16 de julio de 2020”. En igual sentido, se observan los oficios DGAD-OF-376-2020 dirigido al representante legal de Properiodicos Limitada y DGAD-OF-382-2020 remitido al representante legal de Grupo Nación GN S.A., mediante los cuales se informó sobre la cancelación de la suscripción que mantenía el MTSS con los periódicos La República, así como La Nación y El Financiero, respectivamente.

De este modo, contrario a lo alegado por el tutelado, este Tribunal estima que la actuación del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social no conculca los derechos fundamentales. Nótese que, en el sub iudice, el MTSS canceló la suscripción no solo del Diario Extra, sino de otros medios de comunicación como La República, La Nación y El Financiero. Además, no se verifica que tal decisión haya sido arbitraria, sino que la misma obedece a un recorte presupuestario derivado de la pandemia de la covid-19. Al respecto, cabe reiterar que en el informe rendido bajo juramento por la ministra de Trabajo y Seguridad Social se consignó que “(…) el monto para el pago de las suscripciones invocadas, se acreditaba desde la misma partida con la que se compraban suministros de papel y cartón y ello representaba casi el 50% del presupuesto para esos efectos. Y siendo que a raíz de la pandemia producida por el virus COVID 19, debemos tener disponibles toallas de papel para los lavatorios que tenemos instalados para el lavado de manos de personas funcionarias y usuarias de este Ministerio; fue que se prioriza la compra de suministros citados, con la consecuencia de eliminar las suscripciones mencionadas”. Ergo, dadas las condiciones provocadas por la referida pandemia, tal institución priorizó la compra de toallas de papel, lo que conllevó que se prescindiera de las suscripciones referidas. Por consiguiente, al no haberse verificado la vulneración a los derechos fundamentales, lo procedente es declarar sin lugar el recurso en cuanto a tal extremo.

V.- Por otra parte, en cuanto al reclamo formulado por el recurrente respecto al accionar del ICAA, el Tribunal observa que el 29 de junio de 2020 se emitió la “MINUTA GG-2020-02784”, relativa a una reunión efectuada entre funcionarios del ICAA y representantes del sindicato SITRAA, documento que carece de firmas y en el que se consigna: “Objetivo: Temas variaos SITRAA Lugar: Virtual Fecha:29-06-20 Hora de inicio: 11:00am Hora final: 12:40pm (…) 1. Campaña de refuerzo labor de AyA, acción, SITRAA- AyA. cuadrillas operativas, lema héroes de la higiene. Mario Rodríguez explica la propuesta, desde SITRAA se ha realizado una campaña de comunicación para levantar la imagen del AyA. No están de acuerdo con la campaña y gastos que tiene programado el AyA. Lema: “Héroes de la Higiene”, quieren iniciar con una campaña con este lema y realizarlo con apoyo de los trabajadores operativos en todo el país. Yamileth Astorga le consulta a Mario cuál es el objetivo de la Contratación de Publicidad del AyA, al parecer no lo tiene claro, por ende ella le realiza una explicación detallada, el objetivo es la conectividad de las viviendas a las redes de alcantarillado de AyA. Aclara que la campaña no es para levantar la imagen de AyA, sino para estimular a la población a que se conecte a las redes de alcantarillado. Hace un llamado a no alimentar a los Diarios Extra y CRHoy, ya que el objetivo de éstos es la privatización. Mario comenta que ellos no dan información a la prensa, más bien indica que la prensa les solicita a ellos aclaraciones de cosas que ellos no conocen. Aclara que SITRAA lleva a la prensa las cosas que no reciben respuesta por parte de la Administración. Maritza Alvarado realiza comentarios sobre la campaña, indica que la propuesta de SITRAA le parece bien se puede hacer con recursos propios, recomienda que exista unidad para levantar la imagen de AyA, señala algunas labores que se han desarrollado desde la Dirección de Comunicación Institucional. Se debe reforzar la base interna antes de proyectarnos a lo externo. Marianela de SITRAA comenta que sería bueno que doña Yamileth lea detenidamente los comunicados que salen en prensa, para que se de (sic) cuenta que el SITRAA no está perjudicando la imagen, sino mas (sic) bien defienden la institucionalidad del AyA, por su importancia en la gestión del recurso hídrico. Yamileth indica que los medios solo publican cosas que debilitan la imagen de AyA, solicita hacer una alianza con los sindicatos para levantar la imagen de la Institución (…)” (el énfasis fue suplido).

Al respecto, la Presidenta Ejecutiva del ICAA indica en el informe rendido bajo juramento ante este Tribunal Constitucional que: “En atención a la formalidad establecida a nivel institucional, se levantó un borrador de minuta de la reunión, con número GG-2020-02784, el cual está asociado al número de oficio, dicho borrador no lleva ninguna firma o rúbrica de los participantes y se aclara en este acto, que a pesar de que estaban convocados los funcionarios de la lista contenida en el borrador de la minuta, los señores Annette Henchoz Castro y Alejando Calderón Acuña, no se presentaron a la reunión que había sido convocada de manera virtual, sin embargo; se realizó de forma presencial. El borrador de minuta fue levantado por el funcionario Andrey Vila Abarca, quien consigna en el formato que se acostumbra a estas reuniones, la agenda y una sucinta referencia de los temas abordados. La minuta posteriormente fue comunicada y compartida vía correo electrónico por el SDI con el Memorando GG-2020-02784, suscrito por el funcionario Andrey Vila Abarca de la Gerencia General, quien tiene bajo su responsabilidad dar seguimiento a los temas y acuerdos de las reuniones con los diferentes sindicatos constituidos en el AYA. Del documento denominado “minuta” se desprende claramente que en ningún momento la suscrita manifestó el hecho que se recurre, por lo que es claro que el recurrente descontextualiza una frase de una minuta, de una reunión sostenida entre la Administración Superior y el Sindicato SITRAA, donde se analiza una campaña motivacional interna al personal del AyA, especialmente, dirigida a los trabajadores que están en primera línea de atención de la pandemia. En ese contexto y en el ánimo de unir esfuerzos hice un llamado a las agrupaciones sindicales para que si hay situaciones que les preocupen a lo interno de la institución presenten sus denuncias a la Administración Superior para que sean atendidas, antes de acudir a los medios de comunicación. A eso me referí puntualmente cuando indiqué “no alimentar los medios” como lo cita la minuta. Reitero, que ni de la minuta ni de ningún otro documento se desprende jamás que se haya “ordenado no hablar con Diario Extra”, ignoro en qué se basa el recurrente para realizar esa temeraria interpretación a la libertad de expresión. De hecho, todas las consultas de prensa realizadas por Diario Extra han sido atendidas en tiempo y forma; de mayo a la fecha, se han recibido y dado respuesta a 9 solicitudes de información planteadas por correo. Diario Extra y Extra TV 42, durante este año han publicado al menos 183 notas relacionadas a la institución” (la negrita fue suplida).

La Sala también observa que, el 21 de julio de 2020, la presidenta ejecutiva del ICAA dirigió el oficio PRE-2020-01101 a la gerente general de Diario Extra, en el que manifestó: “En ejercicio del derecho de respuesta consagrado en los artículos 29 de la Constitución Política y 14 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, así como el 66 en adelante de la Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional, en mi calidad de Presidenta Ejecutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, solicito el debido espacio para rectificar la nota publicada por Diario Extra el día 21 de julio del 2020 titulada “Presidenta AyA ordena no hablar con DIARIO EXTRA”. Agradezco la publicación del siguiente texto: AyA jamás ha ordenado no hablar con Diario Extra Con respecto a la nota publicada en Diario Extra el 21 de julio del 2020, titulada “Presidenta AyA ordena no hablar con Diario Extra”, como Presidenta Ejecutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (AyA) califico de absolutamente falso que se haya “ordenado” a algún funcionario o funcionaria no hablar con el Diario Extra. El periodista descontextualiza una frase de una minuta, de una reunión sostenida entre la Administración Superior y el Sindicato SITRAA, donde se analiza una campaña motivacional interna al personal del AyA, especialmente, dirigida a los trabajadores que están en primera línea de atención de la pandemia. En ese contexto y en el ánimo de unir esfuerzos hago un llamado a las agrupaciones sindicales para que si hay situaciones que les preocupen a lo interno de la institución presenten sus denuncias a la Administración Superior para que sean atendidas, antes de acudir a los medios de comunicación. A eso se refiere puntualmente con “no alimentar los medios...” como lo cita la minuta. Ni de la minuta ni de ninguna parte se desprende jamás que se haya “ordenado no hablar con Diario Extra”, ignoro en qué se basa el periodista para realizar esa temeraria interpretación a la libertad de expresión. De hecho, todas las consultas de prensa realizadas por Diario Extra han sido atendidas en tiempo y forma; de mayo a la fecha, se han recibido y dado respuesta a 9 solicitudes de información planteadas por correo. Diario Extra y Extra TV 42, durante este año han publicado al menos 183 notas relacionadas a la institución. En el AyA somos respetuosos del derecho a la información y la libertad de expresión, nunca estaríamos de acuerdo en lesionar esos derechos. Durante este año a Diario Extra hemos enviado dos derechos de respuesta, uno con respecto a una publicación del día 15 de enero que jamás se publicó, y otro que si fue publicado en la edición del 27 de junio. Somos conscientes del papel vital que juega la prensa para nuestra democracia. Estamos claros de lo importante que es para el país el fortalecimiento de los medios de comunicación, ya que como nación no nos podemos permitir la interrupción de las operaciones de un medio de comunicación, eso sería contrario al interés público de estar informados, máxime en medio de una pandemia, que exige información veraz y oportuna a diario. Hemos confiado y confiamos en el Grupo Extra para realizar nuestras campañas informativas y de rendición de cuentas a la población y seguiremos en la medida de nuestras posibilidades haciéndolo. Jamás podríamos permitir que se nos acuse de asestarle golpe alguno a la libertad de expresión” (el resaltado fue suplido). (…)

De este modo, en el sub iudice, la Sala estima que se ha producido una lesión de relevancia constitucional. Nótese que si bien la minuta aludida carece de firmas, no menos cierto es que la presidenta ejecutiva del ICAA no desmintió su contenido, sino que se limitó a alegar que se descontextualizó la frase “Hace un llamado a no alimentar a los Diarios Extra y CRHoy, ya que el objetivo de éstos es la privatización”, toda vez que lo que pretendió externar fue “un llamado a las agrupaciones sindicales para que si hay situaciones que les preocupen a lo interno de la institución presenten sus denuncias a la Administración Superior para que sean atendidas, antes de acudir a los medios de comunicación. A eso se refiere puntualmente con “no alimentar los medios”. En cuanto al punto, el Tribunal estima que en el sub examine existen indicios suficientes de que la presidenta ejecutiva del ICAA dijo la frase antes transcrita, lo cual, a todas luces, constituye una afectación a los derechos constitucionales a la libertad de pensamiento y expresión, de prensa y a la igualdad, todo esto en relación con los principios constitucionales democrático, de rendición de cuentas y de transparencia en la gestión pública, en virtud de que se trata de una especie de censura velada, dado que el resultado práctico de tal llamado es evitar que los medios de comunicación perjudicados tuviesen acceso a información pública.

En efecto, contrario a lo sostenido por la autoridad recurrida, con la frase en cuestión se exhortó a funcionarios del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, a que se abstuvieren de remitir información de relevancia pública a ciertos medios de comunicación. En primer término, tal actuación implica una seria amenaza a la libertad de pensamiento y expresión de tales servidores, dado que la iniciativa proviene, ni más ni menos, de la propia presidenta ejecutiva de la institución en mención, a partir de lo cual el “llamado a no alimentar a medios” reviste una particular gravedad merced al rango jerárquico de quien lo externó. En segundo término, se vulnera la libertad de prensa y el derecho a la igualdad, toda vez que se incita a que dos medios de comunicación en particular, CR-Hoy y Diario Extra, no reciban información por parte de los funcionarios del ICAA, al tiempo que de manera absolutamente injustificada coloca a los afectados en una clara situación de desventaja frente al resto de medios. En adición, la situación expuesta lesiona a la población en general, dado que “el llamado a no alimentar a medios” le impide al público acceder a información concerniente a la prestación de servicios públicos esenciales, lo cual es inaceptable en una sociedad que se rige por los principios democrático, de rendición de cuentas, y de transparencia en la gestión pública.

En virtud de lo expuesto, lo procedente es declarar con lugar el recurso, en los términos consignados en la parte dispositiva de esta sentencia.” Adicionalmente, a través de la sentencia Nº 2022025167 de las 13:30 horas de 21 de octubre de 2022 reconoció la Sala la relevancia de restringir la censura indirecta proveniente desde el poder público, como problema central de la defensa de la libertad de expresión, en los siguientes términos:

“VII.- SOBRE LA PROHIBICIÓN DE IMPONER RESTRICCIONES POR VÍAS INDIRECTAS A LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN (Y A LA LIBERTAD DE PRENSA). La libertad de expresión y, por ende, la libertad de prensa, no son considerados derechos irrestrictos y absolutos, sino que -tal y como se analizó supra -, se encuentran sujetos a ciertos límites o controles ulteriores. Al respecto, el ordinal 29 de nuestra Carta Política estatuye que las personas serán responsables de los abusos que cometan en el ejercicio del derecho a la libertad de expresión y, por su parte, el artículo 13.2 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos dispone que el referido derecho está sujeto a responsabilidades ulteriores, las que deben estar expresamente fijadas por la ley y ser necesarias para asegurar el respeto a los derechos o la reputación de los demás o proteger la seguridad nacional, el orden público, la salud o la moral pública.

Sin embargo, igualmente, estas limitaciones, ha dicho este Tribunal Constitucional, gozan de carácter excepcional y no pueden restringir tales derechos más allá de lo estrictamente necesario, vaciándolos de contenido y convirtiéndose así en un mecanismo directo o indirecto de censura, el cual no tiene cabida en nuestro medio. Estas libertades, en consecuencia, no pueden ser objeto de restricciones ilegítimas directas (como sería, por ejemplo, la censura previa, el asesinato de periodistas en virtud del ejercicio de sus funciones, etc.) ni, tampoco, de restricciones de índole indirecto (también llamada soft censorship, censura sutil, velada). Estas últimas medidas -de índole indirecto-, se caracterizan por ser menos evidentes, pero que igualmente tienen como propósito reducir o coartar arbitrariamente la libertad de expresión. Se podrían considerar formas más sutiles en que las autoridades públicas o particulares buscan restringir final y efectivamente la libertad de expresión. Los autores García Ramírez y Gonza las definen muy acertadamente como aquellas “(…) acciones u omisiones que traen consigo la inhibición del sujeto, como consecuencia de la intimidación, la obstrucción de canales de expresión o la “siembra” de obstáculos que impiden o limitan severamente el ejercicio de aquella libertad (…)” (García Ramírez (Sergio) y Gonza (Alejandra). La libertad de expresión de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. México, Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal, primera edición, 2007, p. 42). Por su parte, la Relatoría para la Libertad de Expresión explica que “(…) Estas medidas (…) no han sido diseñadas estrictamente para restringir la libertad de expresión. En efecto, éstas per se no configuran una violación de este derecho. No obstante ello, sus efectos generan un impacto adverso en la libre circulación de ideas que con frecuencia es poco investigado y, por ende, más difícil de descubrir (…)” (Informe Anual de la Relatoría para la Libertad de Expresión, 2004).

Como ejemplos de este tipo de restricciones indirectas o censura velada se puede citar, entre otros muchos, el uso de diversos medios para intimidar y, de este modo, evitar una publicación, los controles de papel para periódicos o de frecuencias radioeléctricas, la restricción a la libertad de circulación, la concesión o supresión de publicidad estatal, las limitaciones de ingresos económicos a medios de comunicación, la imposición de altas e injustificadas cargas tributarias. Sobre este tipo de restricciones indirectas, los citados autores García Ramírez y Gonza explican que estas puede ocurrir cuando“(…) se vulnera un derecho diferente de la libertad de expresión misma, en forma que ésta resulta afectada -por ejemplo, en un caso, la privación de la nacionalidad del sujeto-, se practican investigaciones indebidas o excesivas, se prohíbe el acceso a determinados medios de los que regularmente se ha valido el titular del derecho, se restringe la libertad de circulación, se desconocen los efectos de un contrato o se impide a los titulares de ciertos bienes la disposición de éstos (…)” (García Ramírez (Sergio) y Gonza (7200Alejandra). La libertad de expresión en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. México, Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal, primera edición, 2007, p. 42). Por su parte, el Magistrado Rueda Leal, en las razones adicionales consignadas en la Sentencia No. 15220-2016 de las 16:00 hrs. de 18 de octubre de 2016, hizo también referencia a algunas modalidades de este tipo de censura indirecta o velada, enumerando las siguientes: “(…) a) La negativa de acceso a las instituciones y a la información pública como represalia por una cobertura crítica, lo que obliga al medio a acudir a instancias jurisdiccionales. De esta forma, aunque finalmente se obligue a una entidad a entregar determinada información si se demuestra su carácter público, no menos cierto es que la Administración “gana” tiempo, logrando así una divulgación en un “timing” político más favorable. b) La asignación inequitativa de frecuencias de radio y televisión. c) La obstaculización del acceso a recursos elementales para la producción de un medio (como el papel o el servicio telefónico) vía fijación de requerimientos arbitrarios o imposiciones tributarias irrazonables. d) La amenaza de entablar procesos judiciales, condicionada a la divulgación o no de reportajes críticos (…)”.

En cuanto a estas restricciones de índole propiamente indirecto, el artículo 13.3 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, señala expresamente lo siguiente:

“3. No se puede restringir el derecho de expresión por vías o medios indirectos, tales como el abuso de controles oficiales o particulares de papel para periódicos, de frecuencias radioeléctricas, o de enseres y aparatos usados en la difusión de información o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones”. (El destacado no forma parte del original).

La Declaración de Chapultepec (adoptada por la conferencia hemisférica sobre libertad de expresión celebrada en México, D.F. el 11 de marzo de 1994), estatuye que no debe existir ninguna ley o acto de poder que coarte la libertad de expresión o de prensa, cualquiera sea el medio de comunicación. Asimismo, en el elenco de principios menciona lo siguiente:

“4. El asesinato, el terrorismo, el secuestro, las presiones, la intimidación, la prisión injusta de los periodistas, la destrucción material de los medios de comunicación, la violencia de cualquier tipo y la impunidad de los agresores, coartan severamente la libertad de expresión y de prensa. Estos actos deben ser investigados con prontitud y sancionados con severidad”.

“5. La censura previa, las restricciones a la circulación de los medios o a la divulgación de sus mensajes, la imposición arbitraria de información, la creación de obstáculos al libre flujo informativo y las limitaciones al libre ejercicio y movilización de los periodistas, se oponen directamente a la libertad de prensa”.

“6. Los medios de comunicación y los periodistas no deben ser objeto de discriminaciones o favores en razón de lo que escriban o digan.” “7. Las políticas arancelarias y cambiarias, las licencias para la importación de papel o equipo periodístico, el otorgamiento de frecuencias de radio y televisión y la concesión o supresión de publicidad estatal, no deben aplicarse para premiar o castigar a medios o periodistas”.

“10. Ningún medio de comunicación o periodista debe ser sancionado por difundir la verdad o formular críticas o denuncias contra el poder público”. (El destacado no forma parte del original).

Igualmente, la Declaración de Principios sobre Libertad de Expresión (aprobada por la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en octubre de 2000, en el 108 período ordinario), dispone, sobre este mismo tema, lo siguiente:

“5. La censura previa, interferencia o presión directa o indirecta sobre cualquier expresión, opinión o información difundida a través de cualquier medio de comunicación oral, escrito, artístico, visual o electrónico, debe estar prohibida por la ley. Las restricciones en la circulación libre de ideas y opiniones, como así también la imposición arbitraria de información y la creación de obstáculos al libre flujo informativo, violan el derecho a la libertad de expresión”.

“9. El asesinato, secuestro, intimidación, amenaza a los comunicadores sociales, así como la destrucción material de los medios de comunicación, viola los derechos fundamentales de las personas y coarta severamente la libertad de expresión. Es deber de los Estados prevenir e investigar estos hechos, sancionar a sus autores y asegurar a las víctimas una reparación adecuada”.

“13. La utilización del poder del Estado y los recursos de la hacienda pública; la concesión de prebendas arancelarias; la asignación arbitraria y discriminatoria de publicidad oficial y créditos oficiales; el otorgamiento de frecuencias de radio y televisión, entre otros, con el objetivo de presionar y castigar o premiar y privilegiar a los comunicadores sociales y a los medios de comunicación en función de sus líneas informativas, atenta contra la libertad de expresión y deben estar expresamente prohibidos por la ley. Los medios de comunicación social tienen derecho a realizar su labor en forma independiente. Presiones directas o indirectas dirigidas a silenciar la labor informativa de los comunicadores sociales son incompatibles con la libertad de expresión”. (El destacado no forma parte del original).

Como se puede observar con meridiana claridad, existen múltiples formas en que se puede manipular a los medios de forma indirecta. Incluso, la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos es clara al indicar que los ejemplos citados en el ordinal 13.3 no son taxativos, al señalar que este tipo de restricciones indirectas se pueden configurar también “por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones”.

Ahora, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos se ha pronunciado en distintas ocasiones respecto a la censura velada o restricciones propiamente indirectas, condenándolas contundentemente. Así, en la Sentencia Ivcher Bronstein vs. Perú (sentencia de 6 de febrero de 2001), la Corte IDH conoció un caso planteado por Baruch Ivcher Bronstein, ciudadano naturalizado del Perú y accionista mayoritario de la empresa que operaba entonces el canal 2 de la televisión de ese país. Ivcher Bronstein, en esa condición, ejercía control editorial sobre los programas, particularmente, uno llamado Contrapunto (mediante el cual se difundieron varios informes periodísticos sobre torturas, un supuesto asesinato y casos de corrupción cometidos por los Servicios de Inteligencia del Gobierno Peruano) y se demostró que, en virtud de lo anterior, este fue sometido a varios actos intimidatorios que concluyeron con la emisión de un decreto que revocó su ciudadanía peruana. En tal oportunidad, la Corte IDH dispuso que la resolución que dejó sin efecto legal la nacionalidad otorgada a Ivcher Bronstein constituyó precisamente un medio indirecto para restringir su libertad de expresión, así como la de los periodistas que laboraban en dicho programa. En tal ocasión, la Corte IDH vertió los siguientes argumentos de interés:

“(…) 158. De igual manera se ha demostrado que, como consecuencia de la línea editorial asumida por el Canal 2, el señor Ivcher fue objeto de acciones intimidatorias de diverso tipo. Por ejemplo, luego de la emisión de uno de los reportajes mencionados en el párrafo anterior, el Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas emitió un comunicado oficial en el que denunciaba al señor Ivcher por llevar a cabo una campaña difamatoria tendiente a desprestigiar a las Fuerzas Armadas (supra párr. 76.k). Además, el mismo día en que el Ejército emitió dicho comunicado, el Poder Ejecutivo del Perú expidió un decreto supremo que reglamentó la Ley de Nacionalidad, estableciendo la posibilidad de cancelar ésta a los peruanos naturalizados (supra párr. 76.l).

159. Ha sido probado también que días después de que el Canal 2 anunciara la presentación de un reportaje sobre grabaciones ilegales de conversaciones telefónicas sostenidas por candidatos de la oposición, el Director General de la Policía Nacional informó que no se había localizado el expediente en el que se tramitó el título de nacionalidad del señor Ivcher, y que no se había acreditado que éste hubiera renunciado a su nacionalidad israelí, razón por la cual, mediante una “resolución directoral”, se dispuso dejar sin efecto el mencionado título de nacionalidad.

160. Como consecuencia de lo anterior, el 1 de agosto de 1997 el Juez Percy Escobar ordenó que se suspendiera el ejercicio de los derechos del señor Ivcher como accionista mayoritario y Presidente de la Compañía y se revocara su nombramiento como Director de la misma, se convocara judicialmente a una Junta General Extraordinaria de Accionistas para elegir un nuevo Directorio y se prohibiera la transferencia de las acciones de aquél. Además, otorgó la administración provisional de la Empresa a los accionistas minoritarios, hasta que se nombrase un nuevo Directorio, retirando así al señor Ivcher Bronstein del control del Canal 2.

161. La Corte ha constatado que, después de que los accionistas minoritarios de la Compañía asumieron la administración de ésta, se prohibió el ingreso al Canal 2 de periodistas que laboraban en el programa Contrapunto y se modificó la línea informativa de dicho programa (supra párr. 76.v).

162. En el contexto de los hechos señalados, esta Corte observa que la resolución que dejó sin efecto legal el título de nacionalidad del señor Ivcher constituyó un medio indirecto para restringir su libertad de expresión, así como la de los periodistas que laboraban e investigaban para el programa Contrapunto del Canal 2 de la televisión peruana.

163. Al separar al señor Ivcher del control del Canal 2, y excluir a los periodistas del programa Contrapunto, el Estado no sólo restringió el derecho de éstos a circular noticias, ideas y opiniones, sino que afectó también el derecho de todos los peruanos a recibir información, limitando así su libertad para ejercer opciones políticas y desarrollarse plenamente en una sociedad democrática.

164. Por todo lo expuesto, la Corte concluye que el Estado violó el derecho a la libertad de expresión consagrado en el artículo 13.1 y 13.3 de la Convención, en perjuicio de Baruch Ivcher Bronstein (…)”. (El destacado no forma parte del original).

Otro claro ejemplo de este tipo de restricciones indirectas se consigna en el caso Ricardo Canese vs. Paraguay (sentencia de 31 de agosto de 2004). El señor Ricardo Canese, quien era candidato presidencial durante la contienda electoral para las elecciones del Paraguay del año 1993, relacionó a Juan Carlos Wasmosy (también candidato), con acciones ilícitas presuntamente cometidas por este último cuando ejercía como presidente de un consorcio, las cuales, a su vez, fueron publicadas en dos diarios paraguayos. Esto originó que Canese (quien trabajaba en un medio de comunicación), fuera procesado penalmente por la comisión de los delitos de difamación e injuria, siendo condenado en primera instancia en 1994 y en segunda instancia en 1997; oportunidad en la cual, a su vez, se le impuso dos meses de prisión y una multa. Además, como consecuencia de este proceso, Canese fue sometido a una restricción permanente para salir del país (y, también, paralelamente, fue despedido del medio donde laboraba). Estas sentencias, posteriormente, fueron anuladas en diciembre de 2002 por la Sala Penal de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Paraguay. La Corte IDH, hizo referencia a la importancia de garantizar la libertad de expresión durante una campaña electoral y, luego de analizar el caso bajo estudio, sostuvo que la sanción penal a la cual fue sometida Canese era considerada como un método indirecto de restricción a dicho derecho. Expresamente, en dicha ocasión, se indicó lo siguiente:

“(…) 3) La importancia de la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión en el m arco de una campaña electoral.

88. La Corte considera importante resaltar que, en el marco de una campaña electoral, la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión en sus dos dimensiones constituye un bastión fundamental para el debate durante el proceso electoral, debido a que se transforma en una herramienta esencial para la formación de la opinión pública de los electores, fortalece la contienda política entre los distintos candidatos y partidos que participan en los comicios y se transforma en un auténtico instrumento de análisis de las plataformas políticas planteadas por los distintos candidatos, lo cual permite una mayor transparencia y fiscalización de las futuras autoridades y de su gestión. (…)

90. El Tribunal considera indispensable que se proteja y garantice el ejercicio de la libertad de expresión en el debate político que precede a las elecciones de las autoridades estatales que gobernarán un Estado. La formación de la voluntad colectiva mediante el ejercicio del sufragio individual se nutre de las diferentes opciones que presentan los partidos políticos a través de los candidatos que los representan. El debate democrático implica que se permita la circulaci ón libre de ideas e información respecto de los candidatos y sus partidos políticos po r parte de los medios de comunicación, de los propios candidatos y de cualquier persona que desee expresar su opinión o brindar información. Es preciso que todos puedan cuestionar e indagar sobre la capacidad e idoneidad de los candidatos, así como disentir y confrontar sus propuestas, ideas y opiniones de manera que los electores puedan formar su criterio para votar. En este sentido, el ejercicio de los derechos políticos y la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión se e ncuentran íntimamente ligados y se fortalecen entre sí. Al respecto, la Corte Europea ha establecido que:

Las elecciones libres y la libertad de expresión, particularmente la libertad de debate político, forman juntas el cimiento de cualquier sistema democrático (Cfr. Sentencia del caso Math ieu-Mohin y Clerfayt c. Belgica, de 2 de marzo de 1987, Serie A no. 113, p.22, párr. 47, y sentencia del caso Lingens c. Austria de 8 de julio 1986, Serie A no. 103, p. 26, párrs. 41-42). Los dos derechos están interrelacionados y se refuerzan el uno al otro: por ejemplo, como ha indicado la Corte en el pasado, la libertad de expresión es una de las “condiciones” necesarias para “asegurar la libre expresión de opinión del pueblo en la elección del cuerpo legislativo” (ver la sentencia mencionada más arriba del caso Mathieu-Mohin y Clerfayt, p. 24, párr. 54). Por esta razón[,] es particularmente importante que las opiniones y la información de toda clase puedan circular libremente en el período que antecede a las elecciones.

91. La Corte observa que, en sus declaraciones, la presunta víctima hizo referencia a que la empresa CONEMPA, cuyo presidente era el señor Juan Carlos Wasmosy, en ese entonces candidato presidencial, le “pasaba” “dividendos” al exdictador Stroessner. Ha quedado demostrado, así como también es un hecho público, que dicho consorcio era una de las dos empresas encargadas de ejecutar las obras de construcción de la central hidroeléctrica de Itaipú, una de las mayores represas hidroeléctricas del mundo y la principal obra pública del Pa raguay.

92. La Corte estima que no queda duda de que las declaraciones que hiciera el señ or Canese en relación con la empresa CONEMPA atañen a asuntos de interés público, pues en el contexto de la época en que las rindió dicha empresa se encargaba de la c onstrucción de la mencionada central hidroeléctrica. Conforme fluye del acervo probatorio del presente caso (supra párr. 69.4), el propio Congreso Nacional, a través de su Comisión Bicameral de Investigación de Ilícitos, se encargó de la investigación sobre corrupción en Itaipú, en la cual se involucraba al señor Juan Carlos Wasmosy y a la referida empresa.

93. La Corte observa que la Sala Penal de la Corte Suprema de Justicia del Paraguay, al emitir la decisión por la cual anuló las sentencias condenatorias dictadas en 1994 y 1997 (supra párr. 69.49), indicó que las declaraciones que el señor Canese rindió en el marco polít ico de una campaña electoral a la Presidencia de la República, “necesariamente importan en una Sociedad Democrática, encaminada a una construcción participativa y pluralista del Poder, una cuestión de interés público”.

94. En el presente caso, al emitir las declaraciones por las que fue querellado y condenado, el señor Canese estaba ejercitando su derecho a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión en el marco de una contienda electoral, en relación con una figura pública como es un candidato presidencial, sobre asuntos de interés público, al cuestionar la capacidad e idoneidad de un candidato para asumir la Presidencia de la República. Durante la campaña electoral, el señor Canese fue entrevistado sobre la candidatura del señor Wasmosy por periodistas de dos diarios nacionales, en su cará cter de candidato presidencial. Al publicar las declaraciones del señor Canese, los diarios “ABC Color” y “Noticias” jugaron un papel esencial como vehículos para el ejercicio de la dimensión social de la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión, pues recogieron y transmitieron a los electores la opinión de uno de los candidatos presidenciales respecto de otro de ellos, lo cual contribuye a que el electorado cuente con mayor información y diferentes criterios previ o a la toma de decisiones.

• 4)Las restricciones permitidas a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión en una sociedad democrática (…)

98. El Tribunal ha establecido que es lógico y apropiado que las expresiones concernientes a funcionarios públicos o a otras personas que ejercen funciones de una naturaleza pública deben gozar, en los términos del artículo 13.2 de la Convención, de un margen de apertura a un debate amplio respecto de asuntos de interés público, el cual es esencial para e l funcionamiento de un sistema verdaderamente democrático. Este mismo criterio se aplica respecto de las opiniones o declaraciones de interés público que se viertan en relación con una persona que se postula como candidato a la Presidencia de la República, la cual se somete voluntariamente al escrutinio público, así como respecto de asuntos de interés público en los cuales la sociedad tiene un legítimo interés de mantenerse informada, de conocer lo que incide sobre el funcionamiento del Estado, afecta intereses o derechos generales, o le acarrea consecuencias importantes. Como ha quedado establecido, no hay duda de que las declaraciones que hiciera el señor Canese en relación con la empresa CONEMPA atañen a asuntos de interés público (supra párr. 92).

99. En este sentido, la Sala Penal de la Corte Suprema de Justicia del Paraguay, al emitir el 11 de diciembre de 2002 (supra párr. 69.49) la decisión por la cual anuló las sentencias condenatorias dictadas en 1994 y 1997 y absolvió a la presunta víctima de culpa y pena, se refirió al carácter y relevancia de las declaraciones de ésta, al señalar, inter alia, que [l]as afirmaciones del Ing. Canese, -en el marco político de una campaña electoral a la primera magistratura-, necesariamente importan en una Sociedad Democrática, encaminada a una construcción participativa y pluralista del Poder, una cuestión de interés público. Nada más importante y público que la discusión y posterior elección popular del Primer Magistrado de la República.

100. Las anteriores consideraciones no significan, de modo alguno, que el honor de los funcionarios públicos o de las personas públicas no deba ser jurídicamente protegido, sino que éste debe serlo de manera acorde con los principios del pluralismo democrático. Asimismo, la protección de la reputación de particulares que se encuentran inmiscuidos en actividades de interés público también se deberá realizar de conformidad con los principios del pluralismo democrático. (…)

103. Es así que tratándose de funcionarios públicos, de personas que ejercen funciones de una naturaleza pública y de políticos, se debe aplicar un umbral diferente de protección, el cual no se asienta en la calidad del sujeto, sino en el carácter de interé s público que conllevan las actividades o actuaciones de una persona determinada. Aquellas personas que influyen en cuestiones de interés público se han expuesto voluntariamente a un escrutinio público má s exigente y, consecuentemente, en ese ámbito se ven sometidos a un mayor riesgo de sufrir críticas, ya que sus actividades salen del dominio de la esfera privada para insertarse en la esfera del debate público. En este sentido, en el marco del debate público, el margen de aceptación y tolerancia a las críticas por parte del propio Estado, de los funcionarios públicos, de los políticos e inclusive de los particulares que desarrollan actividades sometidas al escrutinio pú blico debe ser mucho mayor que el de los particulares. En esta hipótesis se encuentran los directivos de la empresa CONEMPA, consorcio al cual le fue encargada la ejecución de gran parte de las obras de construcción de la central hidroeléctrica de Itaipú 104. Con base en las anteriores consideraciones, corresponde al Tribunal determinar si, en est e caso, la aplicación de responsabilidades penales ulteriores respecto del supuesto ejercicio abusivo del derecho a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión a través de declaraciones relativas a asuntos de interés público, puede considerarse que cumple con el requisito de necesariedad en una sociedad democrática. Al respecto, es preciso recordar que el Derecho Penal es el medio más restrictivo y severo para establecer responsabilidades respecto de una conducta ilícita.

105. El Tribunal estima que en el proceso seguido contra el señor Canese los órganos judiciales debieron tomar en consideración que aquel rindió sus declaraciones en el contexto de una campaña electoral a la Presidencia de la República y respecto de asuntos de interés público, circunstancia en la cual las opiniones y críticas se emiten de una manera más abierta, intensa y dinámica acorde con los principios del pluralismo democrático. En el presente caso, el juzgador debí a ponderar el respeto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás con el valor que tiene en una sociedad democrática el debate abierto sobre temas de interés o preocupación pública.

106. El proceso penal, la consecuente condena impuesta al señor Canese durante más de ocho años y la restricción para salir del país aplicada durante ocho años y casi cuatro meses, hechos que sustentan el presente caso, constituyeron una sanción innecesaria y excesiva por las declaraciones que emitió la presunta víctima en el marco de la campaña electoral, respecto de otr o candidato a la Presidencia de la República y sobre asuntos de interés público; así como también limitaron el debate abierto sobre temas de interés o preocupación pública y restringieron el ejercicio de la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión del señor Canese de emitir sus opiniones durante el resto de la campaña electoral. De acuerdo con las circunstancias del presente caso, no existía un interés social imperativo que justificara la sanción penal, pues se limitó desproporcionadamente la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión de la presunta v íctima sin tomar en consideración que sus declaraciones se referían a cuestiones de interés público. Lo anterior constituyó una restricción o limitación excesiva en una sociedad democrática al derecho a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión del señor Ricardo Canese, incompatible con el artículo 13 de la Convención Americana.

107. Asimismo, el Tribunal considera que, en este caso, el proceso penal, la consecuente condena impuesta al señor Canese durante más de ocho años y las restricciones para salir del país durante ocho años y casi cuatro meses constituyeron medios indirectos de restricción a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresió n del señor Canese. Al respecto, después de ser condenado penalmente, el señor Canes e fue despedido del medio de comunicación en el cual trabajaba y durante un período no publicó sus artículos en ningún otro diario.

108. Por todo lo expuesto, la Corte considera que el Estado violó el derecho a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión consagrado en el artículo 13 de la Convención Americana, en relación con el artículo 1.1 de dicho tratado, en perjuicio del señor Ricardo Canese, dado que las restricciones al ejercicio de este derecho impuestas a éste durante aproximadamente ocho años excedieron el marco contenido en dicho artículo (…)”. (El destacado no forma parte del original).

Igualmente, de sumo y gran interés resulta el caso Granier y otros (Radio Caracas Televisión) vs. Venezuela (sentencia de 22 de junio de 2015). En este asunto, la Corte IDH tuvo por probada la existencia de un ambiente conflictivo y de tensión en Venezuela, producto del golpe de Estado sufrido, el cual, a su vez, originó una polarización política (radicalización de las posturas de los sectores involucrados) y coadyuvó a que el gobierno acusara a los medios de comunicación privados, entre ellos a RCTV (Radio Caracas Televisión), de ser enemigos del gobierno, golpistas y fascistas. La Corte tuvo por demostrado también que el Estado de Venezuela buscó la forma de silenciar a dicho medio de comunicación (habida cuenta que expresaba ideas diferentes a las políticas de gobierno manteniendo una línea crítica a la Presidencia de Hugo Chávez), a través de la no renovación, en el año 2007, de la concesión de uso del espectro radioeléctrico (la cual poseía desde su fundación en el año 1953), lo cual, evidentemente, coartó a este, de forma indirecta o velada, la posibilidad de continuar funcionando y continuar difundiendo información disidente, en clara violación a la libertad de expresión. En esta sentencia, de forma relevante, la Corte IDH sostuvo que dicha decisión fue precedida por diversas declaraciones públicas emitidas, tanto por el Presidente de la República como por otros funcionarios, quienes generaron un ambiente de intimidación. Particularmente, se indicó que el entonces Presidente Chávez, realizó, entre otras, las siguientes manifestaciones:

“(…) 75. (…) a) la declaración del Presidente Chávez de 9 de junio de 2002 en su Programa “Aló Presidente”, en la que afirmó: “las televisoras y las radios, las emisoras, aún cuando sean privadas sólo hacen uso de una concesión, el Estado es el dueño [...], y el Estado le da permiso a un grupo de empresarios que así lo piden para que operen, para que lancen la imagen por esa tubería, pero el Estado se reserva el permiso. Es como si alguien quisiera utilizar una tubería de aguas para surtir agua a un pueblo que sea del Estado, y el Estado le da el permiso. [...] Suponte tú que […] le demos el permiso para que use la tubería de agua [y] comience a envenenar el agua. […] [Hay que] inmediatamente no sólo quitarle el permiso, meterlo preso. Está envenenando a la gente, eso pasa, igualito es el caso [y] la misma lógica, la misma explicación con un canal de televisión”; b) la declaración del Presidente Chávez de 12 de enero de 2003 en su programa “Aló Presidente”, en la que expresó: “Igual pasa con estos dueños de canales de televisión y los dueños de las emisoras de radio; ellos también tienen una concesión del Estado, pero no les pertenece la señal. La señal le pertenece al Estado. Eso quiero dejarlo bien claro, quiero dejarlo bien claro porque si los dueños de estas televisoras y emisoras de radio continúan en su empeño irracional por desestabilizar nuestro país, por tratar de darle pie a la subversión, porque es subversión, sin duda, […] es subversión en este caso fascista y es alentada por los medios de comunicación, por estos señores que he mencionado y otros más que no voy a mencionar. Así lo adelanto a Venezuela. He ordenado revisar todo el procedimiento jurídico a través de los cuales se les dio la concesión a estos señores. La estamos revisando y si ellos no recuperan la normalidad en la utilización de la concesión, si ellos siguen utilizando la concesión para tratar de quebrar el país, o derrocar el gobierno, pues yo estaría en la obligación de revocarles la concesión que se les ha dado para que operen los canales de televisión”; c) la declaración del Presidente Chávez de 9 de noviembre de 2003 en su programa “ Aló Presidente”, a través de la cual manifestó: “no voy a permitir que ustedes lo hagan de nuevo, […] ustedes: Globovisión, Televén, Venevisión y RCTV mañana o pasado mañana [Ministro] Jesse Chacón, le di una orden, usted debe tener un equipo de analistas y de observadores 24 horas al día mirando todos los canales simultáneamente y debemos tener claro, yo lo tengo claro, cual es la raya de la cual ellos no deben pasarse, y ellos deben saber, es la raya de la ley pues. En el momento en que pasen la raya de la ley serán cerrados indefectiblemente para asegurarle la paz a Venezuela, para asegurarle a Venezuela la tranquilidad”, y d) el 9 de mayo de 2004, el Presidente Chávez declaró en su programa “Aló Presidente”: [a]quí los que violan el derecho a la información, el derecho a la libertad de expresión, son los dueños de los medios de comunicación privados, son alguna s excepciones, pero sobre todo los grandes canales de televisión Venevisión, Globovisión, RCTV […] los dueños de estos medios de comunicación están comprometidos con el golpismo, el terrorismo y la desestabilización, y yo pudiera decir a estas alturas no me queda ninguna duda, que los dueños de esos medios de comunicación nosotros bien podemos declararlos enemigos del pueblo de Venezuela (…)

80. (… ) a) la declaración del Presidente Chávez de 28 de diciembre de 2006, por ocasión de su saludo de fin de año a las Fuerzas Armadas, en la cual expresó: “Hay un señor por ahí de esos representantes de la oligarquía, que quería ser presidente de la oligarquía, y que luego esos Gobiernos adecos-copeyanos le dieron concesiones para tener un canal de televisión y él ahora anda diciendo que esa concesión es eterna, se le acaba en marzo la concesión de televisión, se le acaba en marzo, así que mejor que vaya preparando sus maletas y vaya viendo a ver qué va a hacer a partir de marzo, no habrá nueva concesión para ese canal golpista de televisión que se llamó Radio Caracas Televisión, se acaba la concesión, ya está redactada la medida, así que vayan preparándose, apagando los equipos pues, no se va tolerar aquí ningún medio de comunicación que esté al servicio del golpismo, contra el pueblo, contra la nación, contra la independencia nacional, contra la dignidad de la República, Venezuela se respeta, lo anuncio antes que llegue la fecha para, para que no sigan ellos con su cuentito de que no que son 20 años más, 20 años más yo te aviso chirulí, 20 años más si es bueno, se te acabo, se te acabo (…)

• d)el 8 de enero de 2007, en el acto de nombramiento de un nuevo gabinete ministerial, el Presi dente Chávez se pronunció una vez más con respecto a la concesión de RCTV al indicar que: “Nada ni nadie impedirá que se cumpla la decisión de no renovarle la concesión a ese canal de televisión, que todos saben cuál es. Nada ni nadie podrá evitarlo (…)”.

Asimismo, en esta oportunidad y, conforme los siguientes términos, la Corte explicó cómo, en este caso en particular, se dio una violación al artículo 13.3 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos:

“(…) 148. Al respecto, la Corte ha señalado anteriormente que los medios de comunicación son verdaderos instrumentos de la libertad de expresión, que sirven para materializar este derecho y que juegan un papel esencial como vehículos para el ejercicio de la dimensión social de esta libertad en una sociedad democrática, razón por la cual es indispensable que recojan las más diversas informaciones y opiniones. En efecto, este Tribunal coincide con la Comisión respecto a que los medios de comunicación son, generalmente, asociaciones de personas que se han reunido para ejercer de manera sostenida su libertad de expresión, por lo que es inusual en la actualidad que un medio de comunicación no esté a nombre de una persona jurídica, toda vez que la producción y distribución del bien informativo requieren de una estructura organizativa y financiera que responda a las exigencias de la demanda informativa. De manera semejante, así como los sindicatos constituyen instrumentos para el ejercicio del derecho de asociación de los trabajadores y los partidos políticos son vehículos para el ejercicio de los derechos políticos de los ciudadanos, los medios de comunicación son mecanismos que sirven al ejercicio del derecho a la libertad de expresión de quienes los utilizan como medio de difusión de sus ideas o informaciones. (…)

151. En consecuencia, la Corte Interamericana considera que las restricciones a la libertad de expresión frecuentemente se materializan a través de acciones estatales o de particulares que afectan, no solo a la persona jurídica que constituye un medio de comunicación, sino también a la pluralidad de personas naturales, tales como sus accionistas o los periodistas que allí trabajan, que realizan actos de comunicación a través de la misma y cuyos derechos también pueden verse vulnerados (…)

152. Al respecto, debe advertirse que hoy en día una parte importante del periodismo se ejerce a través de personas jurídicas y se reitera que es fundamental que los periodistas que laboran en estos medios de comunicación gocen de la protección y de la independencia necesarias para realizar sus funciones a cabalidad, ya que son ellos los que mantienen informada a la sociedad, requisito indispensable para que ésta goce de una plena libertad. En especial, teniendo en cuenta que su actividad es la manifestación primaria de la libertad de expresión del pensamiento y se encuentra garantizada específicamente por la Convención Americana (…)

1.3. Restricciones indirectas - alcances del artículo 13.3 de la Convención 161. En el presente caso se ha argumentado que se estaría frente a una posible restricción indirecta al derecho a la libertad de expresión, razón por la cual la Corte resalta que el artículo 13.3 de la Convención hace referencia expresa a tal situación al señalar que “[n]o se puede restringir el derecho de expresión por vías o medios indirectos, tales como el abuso de controles oficiales o particulares de papel para periódicos, de frecuencias radioeléctricas, o de enseres y aparatos usados en la difusión de información o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones”. Este Tribunal considera que el alcance del artículo 13.3 de la Convención debe ser el resultado de una lectura conjunta con el artículo 13.1 de la Convención, en el sentido que una interpretación amplia de esta norma permite considerar que protege en forma específica la comunicación, difusión y circulación de ideas y opiniones, de modo que queda prohibido el empleo de “vías o medios indirectos” para restringirlas.

162. Al respecto, la Corte señala que lo que busca este inciso es ejemplificar formas más sutiles de restricción al derecho a la libertad de expresión por parte de autoridades estatales o particulares. En efecto, este Tribunal ha tenido la oportunidad de declarar en casos anteriores la restricción indirecta producida, por ejemplo, mediante una decisión que dejó “sin efecto legal el título de nacionalidad” del accionista mayoritario de un canal de televisión o por “el proceso penal, la consecuente condena impuesta […] durante más de ocho años y las restricciones para salir del país durante ocho años” en contra de un candidato presidencial.

163 Por otra parte, la enunciación de medios restrictivos que hace el artículo 13.3 no es taxativa ni impide considerar “cualesquiera otros medios” o vías indirectas derivados de nuevas tecnologías. En este sentido, el artículo 13 de la Declaración de Principios sobre la Libertad de Expresión indica otros ejemplos de medios o vías indirectas (…)

Igualmente, el perito García Belaunde durante la audiencia pública hizo referencia a otras posibles formas de restricción indirecta relacionadas con: i) “la publicidad, [ya que] los Estados son importantes agentes de publicidad y […] dar mucha publicidad o quitarla puede ser importante y, dado el caso, puede haber una especie de asfixia para los medios que básicamente viven de la publicidad”, o ii) “la tributación [cuando se dan] casos [en] que [las] empresas […] han sido cargadas tributariamente” con el fin de generar molestias o enviar mensajes al medio de comunicación.

164. Asimismo, la Corte recuerda que para que se configure una violación al artículo 13.3 de la Convención es necesario que la vía o el medio restrinjan efectivamente, en forma indirecta, la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones. Además, la Corte reitera que el artículo 13.3 de la Convención impone al Estado obligaciones de garantía, aún en el ámbito de las relaciones entre particulares, pues no sólo abarca restricciones gubernamentales indirectas, sino también controles particulares que produzcan el mismo resultado. Al respecto, la Corte resalta que la restricción indirecta puede llegar a generar un efecto disuasivo, atemorizador e inhibidor sobre todos los que ejercen el derecho a la libertad de expresión, lo que, a su vez, impide el debate público sobre temas de interés de la sociedad. (…)

170. (…) Este Tribunal estima que, dado que el espacio radioeléctrico es un bien escaso, con un número determinado de frecuencias, esto limita el número de medios que pueden acceder a ellas, por lo que es necesario asegurar que en ese número de medios se halle representada una diversidad de visiones o posturas informativas o de opinión. La Corte resalta que el pluralismo de ideas en los medios no se puede medir a partir de la cantidad de medios de comunicación, sino de que las ideas y la información transmitidas sean efectivamente diversas y estén abordadas desde posturas divergentes sin que exista una única visión o postura. Lo anterior debe tenerse en cuenta en los procesos de otorgamiento, renovación de concesiones o licencias de radiodifusión. En este sentido, el Tribunal considera que los límites o restricciones que se deriven de la normatividad relacionada con la radiodifusión deben tener en cuenta la garantía del pluralismo de medios dada su importancia para el funcionamiento de una sociedad democrática (…)

3. Alegada restricción indirecta a la libertad de expresión establecida en el artículo 13.3 de la Convención Americana (…)

193. Ahora bien, para efectuar un análisis del recuento de declaraciones reseñado anteriormente es imperioso realizar una lectura conjunta de las declaraciones y señalamientos, por cuanto de manera aislada no podrían configurar autónomamente hechos constitutivos de una vulneración a la Convención Americana. Esto debido a que el hecho de que varios funcionarios hayan realizado declaraciones en el mismo sentido durante un mismo lapso, demuestra que no fueron declaraciones aisladas. Teniendo en cuenta lo anterior, la Corte procederá a efectuar una valoración de lo allí expuesto con el fin de determinar si existieron razones o motivos por los cuales se arribó a dicha decisión distintos a la finalidad declarada, por cuanto, como ya lo señaló, tener en cuenta el motivo o propósito es relevante para el análisis jurídico de un caso, en especial si se busca determinar si se configuró una actuación arbitraria o una desviación de poder (supra párr. 189). En primer lugar, la Corte resalta que desde el año 2002 se venía advirtiendo que a los canales de televisión que no modificaran su línea editorial no se les renovaría su concesión (supra párr. 75) y que este tipo de declaraciones se acrecentaron cuando se acercó la fecha del vencimiento de las concesiones (supra párrs. 76 a 78). A partir de 2006, en varias de dichas declaraciones que fueron anteriores a la Comunicación Nº 0424 y la Resolución Nº 002 se anunció que la decisión de no renovar la concesión a RCTV ya se encontraba tomada y no sería revaluada o modificada (supra párr. 79 a 86). Asimismo, vale la pena resaltar que no solamente fueron declaraciones de funcionarios estatales en diversos medios de comunicación, sino que además se hicieron publicaciones en diarios nacionales y hasta la divulgación de un libro con el fin de anunciar y justificar la decisión de no renovar la concesión de RCTV. Por lo anterior, el Tribunal puede concluir, en primer lugar, que la decisión fue tomada con bastante anterioridad a la finalización del término de la concesión y que la orden fue dada a CONATEL y al Ministerio para la Telecomunicación desde el ejecutivo.

194. Respecto a las verdaderas razones que habrían motivado la decisión, en las declaraciones y las publicaciones hechas por distintos miembros del gobierno venezolano estas son: i) la no modificación de la línea editorial por parte de RCTV después del golpe de estado de 2002 a pesar de las advertencias realizadas desde ese año, y ii) las alegadas actuaciones irregulares en las que habría incurrido RCTV y que le habrían acarreado sanciones. Sobre la primera razón esgrimida, la Corte considera imperioso manifestar que no es posible realizar una restricción al derecho a la libertad de expresión con base en la discrepancia política que pueda generar una determinada línea editorial a un gobierno. Como fue señalado anteriormente, el derecho a la libertad de expresión no sólo debe garantizarse en lo que respecta a la difusión de información o ideas que son recibidas favorablemente o consideradas como inofensivas o indiferentes, sino especialmente en lo que toca a las que resultan ingratas para el Estado o cualquier sector de la población (supra párr. 140). Con relación a las alegadas actuaciones irregulares en las que habría incurrido RCTV y que le habrían acarreado sanciones, el Tribunal resalta que resulta contradictorio que se hicieran señalamientos y acusaciones sobre las alegadas sanciones y que en la comunicación Nº 0424 se indicara expresamente que estas no eran la justificación de la decisión. En especial, la Corte resalta que a pesar de la gravedad de los hechos relacionados con el golpe de Estado no se probó ante este Tribunal que a nivel interno se hubieran adoptado procedimientos tendientes a sancionar dichas actuaciones irregulares, de forma que no es posible que se utilizara como argumento para fundamentar la decisión lo sucedido durante el golpe, cuando dichas actuaciones no fueron sancionadas en su momento.

195. En este punto, el Tribunal considera necesario reiterar el precedente establecido en otro caso relacionado con este mismo medio de comunicación, según el cual en una sociedad democrática no sólo es legítimo, sino que en ocasiones constituye un deber de las autoridades estatales, pronunciarse sobre cuestiones de interés público. Sin embargo, al hacerlo están sometidos a ciertas limitaciones en cuanto deben constatar en forma razonable, aunque no necesariamente exhaustiva, los hechos en los que fundamentan sus opiniones, y deberían hacerlo con una diligencia aún mayor a la empleada por los particulares, en razón de su alta investidura, del amplio alcance y eventuales efectos que sus expresiones pueden tener en ciertos sectores de la población, y para evitar que los ciudadanos y otras personas interesadas reciban una versión manipulada de determinados hechos. Además, deben tener en cuenta que en tanto funcionarios públicos tienen una posición de garante de los derechos fundamentales de las personas y, por tanto, sus declaraciones no pueden desconocer éstos ni constituir formas de injerencia directa o indirecta o presión lesiva en los derechos de quienes pretenden contribuir a la deliberación pública mediante la expresión y difusión de su pensamiento. Este deber de especial cuidado se ve particularmente acentuado en situaciones de mayor conflictividad social, alteraciones del orden público o polarización social o política, precisamente por el conjunto de riesgos que pueden implicar para determinadas personas o grupos en un momento dado.

196. Asimismo, el Tribunal denota que de las declaraciones aportadas en el presente caso contencioso sólo una habría hecho mención a la finalidad declarada en la Comunicación Nº 0424 y la Resolución Nº 002, es decir, la protección a la pluralidad de medios, mientras que en su mayoría las restantes declaraciones coinciden en invocar las otras declaraciones. Lo anterior, le permite concluir a la Corte, en segundo lugar, que la finalidad declarada no era la real y que sólo se dio con el objetivo de dar una apariencia de legalidad a las decisiones.

4. Conclusión sobre el derecho a la libertad de expresión.

197. La Corte concluye entonces, como lo ha hecho en otros casos, que los hechos del presente caso implicaron una desviación de poder, ya que se hizo uso de una facultad permitida del Estado con el objetivo de alinear editorialmente al medio de comunicación con el gobierno. La anterior afirmación se deriva a partir de las dos conclusiones principales a las cuales puede arribar este Tribunal a partir de lo descrito anteriormente, a saber, que la decisión se encontraba tomada con anterioridad y que se fundaba en las molestias generadas por la línea editorial de RCTV, sumado al contexto sobre el “deterioro a la protección a la libertad de expresión” que fue probado en el presente caso (supra párr. 61).

198. Asimismo, este Tribunal considera necesario resaltar que la desviación de poder aquí declarada tuvo un impacto en el ejercicio de la libertad de expresión, no sólo en los trabajadores y directivos de RCTV, sino además en la dimensión social de dicho derecho (supra párr. 136), es decir, en la ciudadanía que se vio privada de tener acceso a la línea editorial que RCTV representaba. En efecto, la finalidad real buscaba acallar voces críticas al gobierno, las cuales se constituyen junto con el pluralismo, la tolerancia y el espíritu de apertura, en las demandas propias de un debate democrático que, justamente, el derecho a la libertad de expresión busca proteger.

199. Se encuentra probado, en consecuencia, que en el presente caso se configuró una restricción indirecta al ejercicio del derecho a la libertad de expresión producida por la utilización de medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y circulación de la ideas y opiniones, al decidir el Estado que se reservaría la porción del espectro y, por tanto, impedir la participación en los procedimientos administrativos para la adjudicación de los títulos o la renovación de la concesión a un medio que expresaba voces críticas contra el gobierno, razón por la cual el Tribunal declara la vulneración del artículo 13.1 y 13.3 en relación con el artículo 1.1 de la Convención Americana en perjuicio Marcel Granier, Peter Bottome, Jaime Nestares, Inés Bacalao, Eladio Lárez, Eduardo Sapene, Daniela Bergami, Miguel Ángel Rodríguez, Soraya Castellano, María Arriaga y Larissa Patiño. (…)”. (El destacado no forma parte del original).” Además, en la sentencia No. 23107-2022 de las 09:30 hrs. de 4 de octubre de 2022, se hizo especial énfasis en el deber del Estado de armonizar sus actuaciones con la defensa de la libertad de expresión:

“(…) VI.- Caso concreto. En el sub lite, la recurrente alega como primer agravio, que en su condición de periodista, ejerce la dirección del programa de análisis, opinión y autocrítica llamado "Hablando Claro", que se transmite desde el 1° de febrero de 2007, por Radio Columbia y considera que en esa condición las autoridades recurridas lesionaron sus derechos fundamentales, específicamente, los derechos a la libre expresión y libertad de prensa, dado que entre el 8 y el 9 de julio pasado, recibió llamadas de cinco personas funcionarias públicas, que se desempeñan en puestos de jerarquía dentro del Gobierno de la República o en las oficinas de comunicación de ministerios e instituciones descentralizadas, quienes le manifestaron, en condición de fuentes periodísticas confidenciales, que se encontraban alarmadas por un comunicado que la entonces Ministra de Comunicación, Patricia Navarro Molina, les remitió por WhatsApp, a todos los Ministros y Presidentes Ejecutivos del Gobierno. Aduce que, según le relataron sus fuentes, en la referida comunicación, la Ministra instruía a todos los jerarcas a suspender, con carácter de urgencia, todo tipo de publicidad estatal a los medios "Amelia Rueda, La Nación, CRHoy y [Valor 003]". Asimismo, que en ese comunicado se les instaba "con carácter de urgencia a no participar en entrevistas en Hablando Claro y Amelia Rueda".

Al respecto, del informe rendido por las autoridades recurridas, -que se tiene por dado bajo fe de juramento con las consecuencias, incluso penales, previstas en el artículo 44 de la Ley que rige esta Jurisdicción- y la prueba aportada para la resolución del asunto, esta Sala no pudo tener por demostrado que se haya girado la orden o directriz que cuestiona la recurrente. Si bien, puede considerarse que, sobre este punto en particular, los informes recibidos resultan escuetos o lacónicos, lo cierto es que sí expresan claramente que no se giró una orden o indicación en ese sentido. La Sala aprecia que tales informes se enfocan en las competencias y potestades del Ministerio de Comunicación y en aspectos procesales de la presentación de este recurso, pero al negar la existencia de la orden, directriz o indicación referida por la amparada, en este caso en particular se carece de toda posibilidad de tener por demostrada su existencia, siendo así que lo procedente es declarar sin lugar el recurso en cuanto a este extremo.

VII.- Sin embargo, por la trascendencia del tema y la gravedad que podría implicar girar desde el poder público alguna orden en los términos reclamados en este proceso, resulta menester recordar a las autoridades del Ministerio de Comunicación y del Ministerio de la Presidencia, que tal y como se expresó en el quinto considerando de esta sentencia, la libertad de expresión e información conlleva una doble dimensión, que se refleja no sólo en la posibilidad de los periodistas de informar sobre los temas de relevancia para la opinión pública, sino también el derecho que tienen los habitantes del país de enterarse de dicha información, por lo que los órganos y entes públicos se encuentran en el deber de adoptar las medidas correspondientes para que pueda informarse a los y las habitantes de la República sobre las acciones y acontecimientos que se producen o desarrollan en el territorio nacional y que son de interés para la colectividad. Máxime que los temas y decisiones que se toman y tratan desde el gobierno central y toda institución, órgano y ente administrativo, tienen una trascendencia y relevancia para el buen funcionamiento del país y el ejercicio de los derechos reconocidos a la población en general y a sus integrantes dentro de sus propios ámbitos de actuación, por lo que, todos estos temas deben ser tratados con absoluta publicidad y transparencia, sin posibilidad alguna de impedirle a la ciudadanía, a la opinión pública y a cualesquier medio de comunicación colectiva, tener conocimiento de estos. Ergo, las prácticas que obstaculizan el acceso a la información, como lo es el impedir informar sobre determinados eventos o decisiones, rehusarse a brindar entrevistas a diversos medios de comunicación, no invitarlos a formar parte de conferencias o ruedas de prensa, limitarles la publicidad, impedir el acceso a insumos necesarios para la divulgación, entre otras variables relacionadas con la censura directa o indirecta, no pueden ni deben ser avaladas por un Tribunal Constitucional, por la elemental razón de que su acceso y entrega oportuna tiene que hacerse a través de un proceso fácil, expedito y sin complicaciones, que garantice a la población y, en general a la opinión pública, el derecho a la información y a la libertad de expresión.

Dicho lo anterior, se les reitera a las autoridades recurridas que “el gobierno y los tribunales deben permitir que se desarrolle un debate "desinhibido, robusto y abierto", lo que puede incluir expresiones cáusticas, vehementes y a veces ataques severos desagradables hacia el gobierno y los funcionarios públicos” (Cfr. sentencia No. 2006-5977 de las 15:16 horas de 3 de mayo de 2006). En otras palabras, deben tener presente los recurridos que, en el ejercicio de cargos públicos como los que ostentan, y en la era actual, en donde por el avance tecnológico se tiene mayor facilidad de cobertura y acceso a hechos noticiosos, es normal que alguna de las discusiones que se generen al calor de la prensa, pueden resultarles infortunadas y desagradables; no obstante, en un país democrático como Costa Rica, ese ejercicio de la libertad de expresión y la libertad de prensa es lo que nos caracteriza como un Estado Social de Derecho y un pueblo libre. Por tales razones, en aras de garantizar la libertad de prensa y de libre expresión que tienen tanto los periodistas o medios de comunicación colectiva, como la población de manera general, es que las autoridades recurridas deben velar porque cualquier directriz, orden, acto o instrucción que se gire desde el gobierno central se apegue siempre a la protección de estas libertades y de cualquier derecho fundamental de los que se goza en un país democrático como el nuestro (…)” (el destacado es añadido) En la misma dirección de la línea jurisprudencial de esta Sala, supra reseñada, el informe de la Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos del 7 de marzo de 2011, “Principios sobre regulación de la publicidad oficial y la libertad de expresión” destaca en su párrafo 10 que: “La distribución arbitraria de publicidad oficial, como otros mecanismos de censura indirecta, opera sobre distintos tipos de necesidades que los medios de comunicación tienen para funcionar e intereses que pueden afectarlos. Es una forma de presión que actúa como premio o castigo que tiene por objeto condicionar la línea editorial de un medio según la voluntad de quien ejerce la presión.”. A su vez, propone como líneas de acción para restringir la arbitrariedad en esta materia -y con ello, impedir que funja como mecanismo de limitación indirecta de la libertad de expresión- la regulación legal clara y precisa del tema, la asociación de la publicidad oficial con propósitos legítimos de utilidad pública, procedimientos transparentes y objetivos de asignación de la pauta estatal, acceso a la información pública vinculada con este tema, control de la asignación publicitaria y pluralismo informativo.

IX.- CONCLUSIONES. De la conjunción de los diversos elementos normativos, conceptuales y jurisprudenciales reseñados a lo largo de esta sentencia, resta examinar las actuaciones concretas impugnadas y que, a juicio de la Sala, quedaron claramente asentadas en sendos comunicados de prensa. En el caso del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (Kölbi), se expresó, textualmente:

“Valores de la marca kölbi no concuerdan con contenidos expuestos en programa televisivo El Chinamo. Kölbi, marca comercial del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) aclara y comunica a la opinión pública:

0 Los contenidos expuestos por [Nombre 006] [Valor 003] en el programa El Chinamo, puntualmente en la sección El Chinaoke no concuerdan con los valores de nuestra marca.

0 Dado su origen costarricense, Kölbi se aleja de situaciones en las que se promueva o exponga violencia de forma implícita o explícita, discriminación, apología de la delincuencia o parodia del sufrimiento de víctimas.

0 Por el contrario, los esfuerzos publicitarios y comerciales de la marca se enfocan en incentivar valores como la paz, la unión familiar, el respeto, la innovación y la solidaridad, con impacto positivo y propio de la idiosincrasia nacional. Así consta en el recorrido de Kölbi por más de quince años en el mercado.

0 La contratación de los espacios publicitarios en el programa en cuestión, así como de las menciones a kölbi tuvieron el objetivo de asociar la marca con entretenimiento familiar propio de la época de fin e inicio de año; nunca a situaciones alusivas al dolor, la estigmatización o el escarnio.

0 “Como marca líder, nos regimos por principios sólidos que guían nuestras acciones y decisiones. No apoyamos actos opuestos a esos valores, especialmente aquellos contrarios a la responsabilidad social y ambiental que promovemos”, manifestó Leda Acevedo, gerente de Telecomunicaciones del ICE.

0 Por lo expuesto, kölbi ha decidido desligarse del programa El Chinamo y analizará la permanencia de su pauta en [Nombre 006] [Valor 003]” La relación que se efectúa en el comunicado entre el contenido de las parodias objeto del recurso y la contratación de espacios publicitarios es innegable. Al ser el responsable de la marca Kölbi una institución pública, como lo es el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, es contrario a la libertad de expresión “castigar” un contenido concreto, que versaba, como ya se indicó, sobre temas de relevancia pública, que, además, no tenían ninguna relación ni con el instituto ni con la marca encargada de la telefonía móvil. Es, a todas luces, un mecanismo de censura indirecta prohibido por la Constitución (artículos 28 y 29), la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (artículo 13) y el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (artículo 19), que impone la estimatoria del amparo en lo que concierne a este ente autónomo.

En cuanto al Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal el comunicado dice:

“Reafirmamos nuestro compromiso con el sano entretenimiento en estas fiestas. San José, 20 de diciembre de 2024. En el Banco Popular tenemos como una prioridad constante y un valor central de nuestra marca el promover acciones que fortalezcan el bienestar de la ciudadanía, especialmente en momentos como lo son las fiestas de Navidad y Fin de Año, donde la familia y el sano entretenimiento deben ocupar un lugar central.

Con el fin de contribuir al desarrollo de una sociedad más unida y positiva, mantenemos una presencia constante en decenas de medios de comunicación de todo el país, promocionando servicios que mejoran la vida de nuestros clientes y apoyando contenidos en dichos medios que fomenten la alegría de toda la familia, la reflexión y el respeto por la diversidad.

En este contexto, el presidente de la Junta Directiva Nacional del Banco, Jorge Eduardo Sánchez, ha enfatizado que nuestra marca – que es propiedad de nuestros clientes y de las personas trabajadoras [Nombre 002] – no puede verse expuesta a ser relacionada con imágenes inapropiadas o que incluso pudiesen fomentar conductas ajenas a la moral y el orden público al cual nos debemos.

En el caso particular del debate público generado precisamente a partir de algunos contenidos emitidos en la sección “El Chinaoke” del programa “El Chinamo”, que se transmite por parte de [Nombre 006] [Valor 003], lamentamos profundamente como Banco Popular que algunos sectores de la ciudadanía pudiesen sentirse ofendidos o incómodos por dichas imágenes y hemos adoptado las acciones pertinentes para garantizar que nuestras participaciones se propicien siempre dentro de espacios que tienen como prioridad permanente los valores del sano entretenimiento.

De esta forma, y siendo que esta temporada del programa “El Chinamo” se extenderá hasta el próximo lunes 23 de diciembre, mantendremos únicamente el patrocinio de la sección “El Aguinaldazo” que lleva alegría a la familia premiando diariamente con 1 millón de colones a algún afortunado televidente.

Agradecemos y le asignamos la mayor relevancia a la opinión de nuestros clientes en este tipo de materias, y reiteramos que en el Banco Popular trabajamos sin pausa para contribuir al bienestar social, fomentando el respeto, la inclusión y el disfrute responsable para toda la ciudadanía.”.

En los mismos términos que se ha explicado para el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, este segundo comunicado deja ver de forma palmaria que el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal replanteó el patrocinio al programa debido a sus contenidos, como consecuencia negativa por su desacuerdo con él. Igualmente, en el caso del banco, ninguno de los videos aludía de ninguna manera al desempeño de ese ente o a su actividad. Esto, por paridad de razones, al ser igualmente el banco un ente de derecho público (artículo 2 de la Ley No. 4351), implica la estimatoria del recurso en su contra, al haber adoptado una decisión que apareja censura indirecta, prohibida por la Constitución Política (artículos 28 y 29), la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (artículo 13) y el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (artículo 19).

POR TANTO:

Se declara con lugar el recurso. Se ordena a Leda María Acevedo Zúñiga, gerente de Telecomunicaciones del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, a Jorge Eduardo Sánchez Sibaja, presidente de la Junta Directiva Nacional y a Gina Melissa Carvajal Vega, gerente general, últimos dos del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, o a quienes en su lugar ejerzan esos cargos, que se abstengan de incurrir en el futuro en actos iguales o similares a los que dieron base para la estimatoria de este recurso. Se condena al Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad y al Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal al pago de las costas, daños y perjuicios causados con los hechos que sirven de fundamento a esta declaratoria, los que se liquidarán en ejecución de sentencia de lo contencioso administrativo. El magistrado Cruz Castro consigna nota. El magistrado Rueda Leal salva parcialmente el voto solo en relación con el expediente nro. 24-035822-0007-CO, que lo rechaza de plano por razones de admisibilidad. La magistrada Garro Vargas consigna razones diferentes.

Fernando Castillo V.

Fernando Cruz C.

Paul Rueda L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

Anamari Garro V.

Ingrid Hess H..

Res. 20250021235 VOTO SALVADO PARCIAL DEL MAGISTRADO RUEDA LEAL.

Concerniente al recurso interpuesto en el expediente nro. 24-035822-0007-CO a favor de [Nombre 002] S. A., considero que se debió rechazar de plano, por cuanto la parte accionante formula el amparo a favor de una persona jurídica.

En tal sentido, en mi voto salvado a la sentencia nro. 2019002355 de las 9:30 horas de 12 de febrero de 2019 sostuve:

“en la Opinión Consultiva 22-16 del 26 de febrero de 2016, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos indicó que si bien algunos Estados reconocen el derecho de petición a personas jurídicas con condiciones especiales, como lo son los sindicatos, partidos políticos o representantes de pueblos indígenas, comunidades afrodescendientes o grupos específicos, lo cierto es que “El artículo 1.2 de la Convención Americana sólo consagra derechos a favor de personas físicas, por lo que las personas jurídicas no son titulares de los derechos consagrados en dicho tratado”. Por otro lado, en la misma opinión consultiva, la Corte Interamericana dispuso que, en ciertos contextos particulares, las personas físicas pueden llegar a ejercer sus derechos a través de personas jurídicas (verbigracia, a través de un medio de comunicación, como acaeció en el caso Granier y otros contra Venezuela); empero, a efectos de que ello sea tutelable ante el sistema interamericano, “el ejercicio del derecho a través de una persona jurídica debe involucrar una relación esencial y directa entre la persona natural que requiere protección por parte del sistema interamericano y la persona jurídica a través de la cual se produjo la violación, por cuanto no es suficiente con un simple vínculo entre ambas personas para concluir que efectivamente se están protegiendo los derechos de personas físicas y no de las personas jurídicas. En efecto, se debe probar más allá de la simple participación de la persona natural en las actividades propias de la persona jurídica, de forma que dicha participación se relacione de manera sustancial con los derechos alegados como vulnerados.” (énfasis agregado) (OC. 22/16)”.

En mi criterio, la lectura de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional obliga a la misma ratio de la hermenéutica convencional supracitada respecto a todo derecho fundamental. Así, en un proceso de constitucionalidad formulado a favor de una persona jurídica, su admisión para estudio exige una relación esencial y directa entre la persona jurídica que aduce verse afectada por alguna vulneración al orden constitucional y la persona natural que por tal lesión viene a ver menoscabado, de forma refleja pero directa, algún derecho fundamental. Ahora, para tales efectos es insuficiente la mera referencia a una conexión o vínculo entre la persona jurídica y la natural para poder colegir que, precisamente, por medio del proceso de constitucionalidad se esté procurando el resguardo de los derechos fundamentales de la última, no meramente los de la primera. El requerimiento antedicho deviene entonces un presupuesto sine qua non para la procedencia del control de constitucionalidad por parte de esta jurisdicción. A partir de lo expuesto, colijo que esta debe ser la pauta con que se debe interpretar la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, de manera que en el sub iudice deviene improcedente la aplicación del control jurisdiccional de constitucionalidad, toda vez que, con base en la prueba que consta en autos, no se ha demostrado el vínculo esencial entre la persona jurídica amparada y alguna natural, de modo específico, en relación con el presunto derecho agraviado.

Paul Rueda L.

Res. Nº 2025021235 Nota del Magistrado Cruz Castro. Entidades de Derecho Público que desempeñan actividades empresariales también pueden incurrir en violaciones a la libertad de expresión.- En este recurso de amparo resuelto con lugar por violación constatarse la censura indirecta a la libertad de expresión, considero relevante consignar esta nota para resaltar que las entidades de derecho público, como lo son el ICE y el Banco Popular, aunque desarrollan actividades empresariales o de derecho privado, también son susceptibles de ser recurridos como sujetos pasivos en la violación del derecho a la libertad de expresión. Incluso aunque el recurso de amparo se hubiera interpuesto en contra de sujetos de derecho privado, también estos son susceptibles de ser sujetos pasivos en la violación a la libertad de expresión, puesto que esta garantía fundamental es más importante que la libertad de comercio. De forma tal que, la naturaleza jurídica del ente transgresor no enerva la posibilidad que pueda ser recurrido en un recurso de amparo por violentar la libertad de expresión y libertad de prensa.

La libertad de expresión es un derecho fundamental y a la vez un pilar de la democracia. No se justifica su restricción o supresión en función de decisiones infundadas o arbitrarias de la autoridad estatal. Como derecho fundamental le permite a cada persona buscar información y expresar los propios pensamientos, ideas e informaciones; y en una dimensión colectiva o social, es el derecho de la sociedad a procurar y recibir cualquier información, a conocer los pensamientos, ideas e informaciones ajenos y a estar bien informada. Como pilar de la democracia, permite la creación de la opinión pública, esencial para darle contenido a varios principios del Estado constitucional de derecho. La autoridad pública debe promover la crítica y la objeción a sus propias decisiones. La supuesta uniformidad de opinión en función de una decisión política arbitraria, es inadmisible en una sociedad democrática. La uniformidad en las opiniones, la ausencia de crítica o el pensamiento único, es la atmósfera de un gobierno dictatorial, contrario a una democracia que define nuestra Constitución Política.

Esta Sala ha dejado claro que la asignación arbitraria de recursos públicos a través de compra de publicidad, como medio para restringir la libertad de expresión, contraviene tanto la Constitución como el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos. Mi criterio supera esos límites, no sólo la asignación arbitraria de recursos públicos, sino también la asignación arbitraria de recursos privados. La distribución arbitraria y condicionada de la publicidad, puede ser un mecanismo de censura indirecta, pues es una represión que actúa como premio o castigo que tiene por objeto condicionar la libertad de expresión, según la voluntad de quien paga, sea este un sujeto público o un sujeto privado. Esta censura indirecta tiene muchos rostros, se puede disimular o se puede ocultar, fácilmente, empero, si se demuestra una restricción arbitraria de la libertad de pensamiento y de la creatividad artística, puede ser responsable un ente privado, porque la realidad no la definen los intereses comerciales, sino la libertad de pensamiento.

Si bien coincido con todo lo indicado en este voto, empero, agrego, que los sujetos de derecho privado también podrían incurrir en violaciones a la libertad de expresión, por imponer la censura directa o indirecta en la asignación de publicidad, cuyo contenido, en la mayor parte de las veces, ni siquiera responde al principio de veracidad.

Fernando Cruz C.

Res. Nº 2025021235 RAZONES DIFERENTES DE LA MAGISTRADA GARRO VARGAS Contenido A. Admisibilidad del recurso acumulado.............................1 B. Alegatos.......................................................2 C. Hechos probados................................................3 D. Consideraciones................................................6 1. Marco normativo y jurisprudencial.............................6 2. Sujetos recurridos.............................................9 3. Aspectos fácticos destacables.................................11 4. Núcleo la cuestión...........................................15 Respetuosamente considero que el recurso de amparo debe ser declarado con lugar, pero por razones diferentes a las señaladas por la mayoría de este Tribunal. En primer término, debo referirme a un aspecto procesal, luego a los alegatos, al marco normativo, a las particularidades de los sujetos recurridos y, finalmente, al núcleo de la cuestión.

A. Admisibilidad del recurso acumulado El recurso de amparo acumulado fue interpuesto a favor del recurrente “y de las personas que ven el programa objeto de este recurso”. Estimo que ese amparo debió ser admitido sólo a favor del recurrente, pues es tal la indeterminación de los sujetos que son parte de la teleaudiencia, que no se cumple con un presupuesto procesal básico para que se trabe la litis respecto de ellos: saber exactamente quiénes son. Es cierto que la Sala ha admitido amparos a favor de grupos de personas un tanto indeterminadas, pero siempre bajo la condición de que existe una posibilidad real de precisar de quiénes se trata: un grupo de estudiantes de una escuela, unos vecinos de una calle, personas privadas de libertad de un ámbito de un centro penitenciario, etc. Aquí no se cumple con tal condición, pues no es un grupo de personas determinable.

Sobre esto la mayoría dice:

“Finalmente, cabe hacer notar que el recurrente [Nombre 003] demanda la defensa de la libertad de expresión desde el punto de vista de una doble dimensión: activa -la libertad de expresarse- y pasiva -la libertad de recibir y conocer las opiniones de otros- y es en esa condición que se entiende opera la legitimación activa respecto de su recurso”.

Considero que tal argumento no subsana la indeterminación radical de los sujetos que componen la teleaudiencia, y solo hace relación a las dimensiones de la libertad expresión, que claramente se trata de otro tema. Ese argumento es solo aplicable al recurrente, que es a quien podemos ciertamente protegerle tal libertad en su dimensión pasiva.

B. Alegatos La parte recurrente manifiesta que, para la edición del año 2024, “El Chinaoke” desarrolló tres videos musicales relativos a temas de interés público que generaron una crítica directa hacía el Gobierno. En ese sentido, detallaron que el primer video denominado “En el EBAIS” se refiere al colapso en la atención de pacientes en la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS) con un mensaje sobre el aumento en las listas de espera que aqueja a los costarricenses. Además, se menciona la situación financiera de la institución, así como los casos de corrupción y allanamientos generados por el caso Barrenador. En el segundo video musical, titulado “¿Será que hoy me van a asaltar?”, la letra versa sobre la situación de inseguridad que enfrenta el país con un aumento significativo en la tasa de homicidios relacionados mayoritariamente con delincuencia organizada y el tráfico de drogas. Igualmente, se alude al presidente de la República, así como a las muertes colaterales. En el tercer video, llamado “No tengo plata”, se hace relación al alto costo de vida en el país, así como a las promesas incumplidas por el Gobierno con respecto a la reducción en los precios. Aducen que el 19 de diciembre de 2024 la marca comercial Kölbi, propiedad del ICE, anunció que retiraría su pauta publicitaria en el programa “El Chinamo”, afirmando que los contenidos de “El Chinaoke” no concuerdan con los valores de nuestra marca. Posteriormente, el 20 de diciembre de 2024, el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (BPDC) dio a conocer en un comunicado que únicamente mantendría el patrocinio de la sección “El Aguinaldazo” en “El Chinamo”, y retiraría el resto de su publicidad. Esto bajo el argumento de que debía evitar cualquier asociación con contenidos contrarios a la moral y el orden público. Acusan que la decisión de los recurridos de retirar la pauta publicitaria de “El Chinamo” constituye una vulneración a la libertad de expresión y prensa, protegidos por los artículos 28 y 29 constitucionales, así como por el artículo 13 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (CADH).

C. Hechos probados Aunque en la sentencia se encuentra el elenco de los hechos probados, es importante reiterar que, para la edición del año 2024, en la sección “El Chinaoke” emitida dentro del programa denominado “El Chinamo”, trasmitido en [Nombre 002] S. A. ([Nombre 006] o [Valor 003]), se presentaron varios videos musicales; no obstante, únicamente tres son objeto de este proceso: “En el EBAIS”, “¿Será que hoy me van a asaltar?” y “No tengo plata”, transmitidos el 12, 15 y 18 de diciembre, respectivamente. Asimismo, se colige que el 17 de diciembre de 2024 el BPDC solicitó a la agencia de publicidad que había colocado su pauta en el programa “El Chinamo” que realizara una modificación en las presencias de la marca en el programa, lo cual derivó en la eliminación de las pantallas de presentación y salida de los cuatro segmentos del programa cuando se realizaban las llamadas a los participantes, y que se usaran solamente las pantallas cuando se sacaba a la persona ganadora de la sección “El Aguinaldazo”. Por su parte, la marca comercial Kölbi, propiedad del ICE, emitió el 19 de diciembre de 2024 un comunicado de prensa, en los siguientes términos:

“Valores de la marca kölbi no concuerdan con contenidos expuestos en programa televisivo El Chinamo. Kölbi, marca comercial del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) aclara y comunica a la opinión pública: 0 Los contenidos expuestos por [Nombre 006] [Valor 003] en el programa El Chinamo, puntualmente en la sección El Chinaoke no concuerdan con los valores de nuestra marca. 0 Dado su origen costarricense, Kölbi se aleja de situaciones en las que se promueva o exponga violencia de forma implícita o explícita, discriminación, apología de la delincuencia o parodia del sufrimiento de víctimas. 0 Por el contrario, los esfuerzos publicitarios y comerciales de la marca se enfocan en incentivar valores como la paz, la unión familiar, el respeto, la innovación y la solidaridad, con impacto positivo y propio de la idiosincrasia nacional. Así consta en el recorrido de Kölbi por más de quince años en el mercado. 0 La contratación de los espacios publicitarios en el programa en cuestión, así como de las menciones a kölbi tuvieron el objetivo de asociar la marca con entretenimiento familiar propio de la época de fin e inicio de año; nunca a situaciones alusivas al dolor, la estigmatización o el escarnio. 0 “Como marca líder, nos regimos por principios sólidos que guían nuestras acciones y decisiones. No apoyamos actos opuestos a esos valores, especialmente aquellos contrarios a la responsabilidad social y ambiental que promovemos”, manifestó Leda Acevedo, gerente de Telecomunicaciones del ICE. 0 Por lo expuesto, kölbi ha decidido desligarse del programa El Chinamo y analizará la permanencia de su pauta en [Nombre 006] [Valor 003]”.

Acto seguido, sea el 20 de diciembre de 2024, el BPDC publicó el siguiente comunicado:

“Reafirmamos nuestro compromiso con el sano entretenimiento en estas fiestas. San José, 20 de diciembre de 2024. En el Banco Popular tenemos como una prioridad constante y un valor central de nuestra marca el promover acciones que fortalezcan el bienestar de la ciudadanía, especialmente en momentos como lo son las fiestas de Navidad y Fin de Año, donde la familia y el sano entretenimiento deben ocupar un lugar central.

Con el fin de contribuir al desarrollo de una sociedad más unida y positiva, mantenemos una presencia constante en decenas de medios de comunicación de todo el país, promocionando servicios que mejoran la vida de nuestros clientes y apoyando contenidos en dichos medios que fomenten la alegría de toda la familia, la reflexión y el respeto por la diversidad.

En este contexto, el presidente de la Junta Directiva Nacional del Banco, Jorge Eduardo Sánchez, ha enfatizado que nuestra marca –que es propiedad de nuestros clientes y de las personas trabajadoras [Nombre 002]– no puede verse expuesta a ser relacionada con imágenes inapropiadas o que incluso pudiesen fomentar conductas ajenas a la moral y el orden público al cual nos debemos.

En el caso particular del debate público generado precisamente a partir de algunos contenidos emitidos en la sección “El Chinaoke” del programa “El Chinamo”, que se transmite por parte de [Nombre 006] [Valor 003], lamentamos profundamente como Banco Popular que algunos sectores de la ciudadanía pudiesen sentirse ofendidos o incómodos por dichas imágenes y hemos adoptado las acciones pertinentes para garantizar que nuestras participaciones se propicien siempre dentro de espacios que tienen como prioridad permanente los valores del sano entretenimiento.

De esta forma, y siendo que esta temporada del programa “El Chinamo” se extenderá hasta el próximo lunes 23 de diciembre, mantendremos únicamente el patrocinio de la sección “El Aguinaldazo” que lleva alegría a la familia premiando diariamente con 1 millón de colones a algún afortunado televidente.

Agradecemos y le asignamos la mayor relevancia a la opinión de nuestros clientes en este tipo de materias, y reiteramos que en el Banco Popular trabajamos sin pausa para contribuir al bienestar social, fomentando el respeto, la inclusión y el disfrute responsable para toda la ciudadanía”.

Consta que la marca Kölbi no retiró la pauta publicitaria del medio de comunicación, sino que la redistribuyó. Además, [Nombre 006] continuó transmitiendo en su totalidad los segmentos de “El Chinaoke” dentro de su programación y actualmente se encuentran disponibles como enlaces públicos en Internet, accesibles para cualquier persona.

D. Consideraciones 1. Marco normativo y jurisprudencial Al respecto, transcribo acá lo que dije en las razones diferentes a la sentencia 2022-25167 (Parque Viva):

“Marco normativo y jurisprudencial Hay dos normas que han de tomarse en consideración. Por un lado, el artículo 29 de la Constitución Política que establece:

Artículo 29. Todos pueden comunicar sus pensamientos de palabra o por escrito, y publicarlos sin previa censura; pero serán responsables de los abusos que cometan en el ejercicio de este derecho, en los casos y del modo que la ley establezca.

Por otro, en lo conducente, el artículo 13 de la CADH que señala:

Artículo 13. Libertad de Pensamiento y de Expresión 1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión. Este derecho comprende la libertad de buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas de toda índole, sin consideración de fronteras, ya sea oralmente, por escrito o en forma impresa o artística, o por cualquier otro procedimiento de su elección.

2. El ejercicio del derecho previsto en el inciso precedente no puede estar sujeto a previa censura sino a responsabilidades ulteriores, las que deben estar expresamente fijadas por la ley y ser necesarias para asegurar: a) el respeto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás, o b) la protección de la seguridad nacional, el orden público o la salud o la moral públicas.

3. No se puede restringir el derecho de expresión por vías o medios indirectos, tales como el abuso de controles oficiales o particulares de papel para periódicos, de frecuencias radioeléctricas, o de enseres y aparatos usados en la difusión de información o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones.

4. Los espectáculos públicos pueden ser sometidos por la ley a censura previa, con el exclusivo objeto de regular el acceso a ellos para la protección moral de la infancia y la adolescencia, sin perjuicio de lo establecido en el inciso 2.

5. (…) (El destacado no es del original).

La Sala Constitucional tiene una robusta jurisprudencia que subraya que el respeto a la libertad de expresión es una de las condiciones indispensables del Estado de Derecho y del ejercicio de la vida democrática. Entre muchas otras sentencias se puede transcribir parcialmente la siguiente:

“VIII.- La libertad de expresión como requisito indispensable de la democracia. La libertad de expresión sin duda alguna es una de las condiciones -aunque no la única-, para que funcione la democracia. Esta libertad es la que permite la creación de la opinión pública, esencial para darle contenido a varios principios del Estado constitucional, como lo son por ejemplo el derecho a la información, el derecho de petición o los derechos en materia de participación política; la existencia de una opinión pública libre y consolidada también es una condición para el funcionamiento de la democracia representativa. La posibilidad de que todas las personas participen en las discusiones públicas constituye el presupuesto necesario para la construcción de una dinámica social de intercambio de conocimientos ideas e información, que permita la generación de consensos y la toma de decisiones entre los componentes de los diversos grupos sociales, pero que también constituya un cauce para la expresión de los disensos, que en la democracia son tan necesarios como los acuerdos. Por su parte, el intercambio de opiniones e informaciones que se origina con la discusión pública contribuye a formar la opinión personal, ambas conforman la opinión pública, que acaba manifestándose por medio de los canales de la democracia representativa” (sentencia 2006-5977; el destacado no es del original; esas consideraciones han sido muchas veces reiteradas por la Sala, por ejemplo, en las sentencias 2015-1782, 2018-8396, 2019-8263 y 2020-16167).

Esta sentencia continúa con un pasaje particularmente relevante para el análisis que de inmediato se va a hacer:

“La libertad de expresión tiene como consecuencia la prohibición de toda forma de censura, en un doble sentido: no se puede censurar a los interlocutores, por una parte; y no se puede, en general, tampoco censurar en forma previa los contenidos posibles de la discusión: en principio, en una democracia, todos los temas son discutibles. La no censurabilidad de los sujetos tienen un carácter prácticamente universal, como lo establece nuestra Constitución, nadie puede ser privado de la libertad de hablar y expresarse como mejor le parezca; la no censurabilidad de los contenidos, si bien no se da en forma previa, encuentra algunas limitaciones, sin embargo, éstas deben ser tales que la libertad siga teniendo sentido o no sea vaciada de su contenido, básicamente, como toda libertad, debe ejercerse con responsabilidad, en fin para perseguir fines legítimos dentro del sistema” (ibid.; el destacado no es del original).

Es decir, se habla de la censura –entendida como el acto de reprobar– como un acto contrario a la libertad de expresión. Dicho de otro modo, se afirma que la consecuencia de esa libertad es la prohibición de toda clase de censura. Luego, no existe solo la censura previa, prohibida expresamente por los artículos 29 de la Constitución y 13 de la CADH, sino que puede darse una censura posterior, que tiene el propósito de inhibir cierto contenido informativo o de opinión. También se dice que la protección contra la censura alcanza no solo a los sujetos (quien comunica) sino al contenido (lo que se comunica).

Además, aunque no se desprende de esas líneas jurisprudenciales, estimo que se podrían incorporar otros criterios para completar una tipología de censura. Así, por su apariencia, puede ser velada o manifiesta; por los medios para ejercerla, puede ser directa o indirecta (por ejemplo, según lo previsto en el artículo 13.3 de la CADH); por sus efectos, puede ser absoluta (si la reprobación va de manera concomitante con la supresión) o relativa.

Finalmente, de manera sintética, ha dicho:

“La Sala recuerda que la defensa de la libertad de expresión es vital para el funcionamiento de un régimen democrático” (sentencia 2017-014977; el destacado no es del original).

Naturalmente, coincido plenamente con esa jurisprudencia, y he concurrido en muchas otras sentencias posteriores que fortalecen esa línea (vid. sentencias 2021-15417, 2022-4244, 2022-5915, 2022-9856, 2022-23107, entre otras).

2. Sujetos recurridos El BPDC es una entidad pública no estatal, es decir, que no le pertenece al Estado sino a los trabajadores. Así lo establece su Ley Orgánica:

Artículo 1º.- Créase el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, el que se regirá por la presente ley y su reglamento. El Banco es propiedad de los trabajadores por partes iguales y el derecho a la copropiedad estará sujeta a que hayan tenido una cuenta de ahorro obligatorio durante un año continuo o en períodos alternos… Artículo 2°. - El Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal es una institución de Derecho Público no estatal, con personería jurídica y patrimonio propio, con plena autonomía administrativa y funcional. Su funcionamiento se regirá por las normas del Derecho Público.

Como se puede observar, la base es corporativa y no es propiedad del Estado. Esto es relevante, pues la mayoría hace referencia a la sentencia 2016-015220 de las 16:00 horas del 18 de octubre de 2016 en la que se analizó un asunto similar interpuesto contra el Banco Nacional [Nombre 002]. No obstante, estimo que no cabe tratar en igualdad de condiciones al BPDC y al Banco Nacional. La propia resolución mencionada explica que la naturaleza del Banco Nacional [Nombre 002] es la de una institución estatal con autonomía constitucionalmente reconocida, a la cual se ha encargado llevar a cabo una actividad comercial, en régimen de competencia con entidades privadas. En cambio, como lo establece la norma recién transcrita, el BPDC es “una institución de Derecho Público no estatal, con personería jurídica y patrimonio propio, con plena autonomía administrativa y funcional”.

Por su parte, Kölbi es una marca comercial, que funciona en el marco de Ley Nº 8660 y la Ley Nº 8642. Y bien lo explican en su informe:

“En este contexto, derivado de su organización interna, la Gerencia de Telecomunicaciones tiene la responsabilidad de gestionar el negocio de telecomunicaciones y la marca KÖLBI, toda la gestión técnica y comercial es ejecutada por esa Gerencia”.

Pero esa marca no se puede identificar jurídicamente con el ICE. Por eso, respetuosamente considero que es inexacto lo afirmado por la mayoría:

“Al ser el responsable de la marca Kölbi una institución pública, como lo es el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, es contrario a la libertad de expresión “castigar” un contenido concreto, que versaba, como ya se indicó, sobre temas de relevancia pública”.

Aquí el responsable de Kölbi no es propiamente el ICE como institución autónoma, sino quienes ejercen la gerencia de Telecomunicaciones en tanto son la cabeza de la marca comercial.

Tanto el BPDC como la marca Kölbi, desarrollan actividades empresariales. En esa línea de ideas es menester traer a colación lo estipulado en la Ley General de la Administración Pública, que dice lo siguiente:

Artículo 3º.- 1. El derecho público regulará la organización y actividad de los entes públicos, salvo norma expresa en contrario.

2. El derecho privado regulará la actividad de los entes que por su régimen de conjunto y los requerimientos de su giro puedan estimarse como empresas industriales o mercantiles comunes. (El destacado no es del original).

Consecuente, la sentencia 2016-015220 no aplica exactamente al caso concreto, pues los aquí recurridos tienen un giro eminentemente comercial y, al menos en el caso del BPDC, no es una institución estatal. Eso significa que tienen un amplio margen de acción para determinar su política publicitaria. Además, lleva razón el representante del BPDC cuando dice:

“Confunde el recurrente, o al menos no distingue con precisión, los aspectos fácticos que atribuye al ICE (Kölbi) y al BPDC, los asemeja y confunde, para tratar de aplicar silogismos jurídicos de otros casos analizados por la Sala que, en la especie, para nuestro representado no resultan aplicables”.

Y esto no solo respecto de la distinta naturaleza jurídica del Banco Nacional respecto de los aquí recurridos, sino porque en el precedente la situación era otra muy distinta: se trataba de conductas periodísticas que presumiblemente lesionaban la imagen de ese banco.

3. Aspectos fácticos destacables Por otra parte, del atento examen del informe rendido por el ICE se logró determinar que dicha institución, mediante su marca Kölbi, no tiene un contrato directo con [Nombre 006], ni tampoco un contrato relacionado con el segmento “El Chinaoke”, ni con el contenido expuesto en dicha sección del programa. Además, se corrobora que como parte de la estrategia comercial de la marca Kölbi se decidió reubicar la pauta publicitaria de la sección “Misión Chinamo” como una medida alineada con los valores de la marca, buscando que la publicidad se presentara en otros programas del mismo [Valor 003], que se ajustaran mejor a la imagen que Kölbi desea proyectar. En ese sentido, en el informe se subrayó lo siguiente:

“El Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad mediante su marca KÖLBI no tiene un contrato directo con la [Nombre 002] ([Nombre 005], ya que es a través de un proceso de licitación activa con agencias de publicidad, las cuales se encargan de contratar las pautas en medios de comunicación, es así como dichas agencias contrataron una pauta en el programa "El Chinamo", específicamente en la sección denominada "Misión Chinamo". En esta sección, a lo largo del programa, se lleva a cabo la exposición de la marca, la cual fue cuidadosamente analizada y vinculada con el plan estratégico comercial de la misma y se hace desde años atrás desde la innovación de la tecnología. Es importante señalar que, en ninguna circunstancia, se estableció un contrato relacionado con el segmento "Chinaoke" ni con el contenido expuesto en dicha sección del programa (…) En el año 2024 en el transcurso del programa aludido o sección, se analizó la estrategia comercial de marca KÖLBI, determinándose que se alejaba el tipo de contenido de los valores de la marca. En ese contexto, y como parte de la estrategia comercial de la marca "KÖLBI ", se decidió reubicar la pauta publicitaria de la sección "Misión Chinamo". Esta reubicación fue una medida alineada con los valores de la marca, buscando que la publicidad se presentara en otros programas del mismo [Valor 003], que se ajustaran mejor a la imagen que "KÖLBI" desea proyectar (…) La pauta publicitaria NO FUE RETIRADA DEL MEDIO, si no que se distribuyó para optimizar el impacto publicitario y se alineó con los intereses del plan estratégico del negocio de telecomunicaciones y la marca KÖLBI y en común acuerdo con la agencia de publicidad y la misma televisora. [Nombre 006] continuó transmitiendo en su totalidad los segmentos de "Chinaoke" dentro de su programación, y actualmente se encuentran disponibles como enlaces públicos en Internet, accesibles para cualquier persona (…) La reubicación de la pauta publicitaria responde a criterios objetivos y transparentes, los cuales están alineados con la estrategia comercial definida por la marca "KÖLBI". Dichos criterios buscan optimizar el alcance y la efectividad de las campañas publicitarias, asegurando que la reubicación se realice de acuerdo con los intereses y objetivos comerciales establecidos por la marca, de forma clara y consistente pues es deber de las agencias publicitarias contratadas, velar por el apego a los lineamientos tanto del libro de marca, como de valores y personalidad de esta, pactado contractualmente entre la empresa de publicidad y el ICE (…) En este sentido, la medida no implica la eliminación de la pauta publicitaria, sino su reubicación en otros espacios del medio, garantizando así la presencia mediática de la marca”.

En similar sentido, el presidente de la Junta Directiva Nacional y la gerente general con facultades de apoderada generalísima sin límite de suma del BPDC indicaron el ente bancario compró una pauta publicitaria para el programa televisivo “El Chinamo”, y el 08 de octubre de 2024 se aprobó por parte la Dirección Corporativa de Mercadeo la participación en el programa “El Chinamo”, con la sección “El Aguinaldazo”. Agregaron que el 17 de diciembre de 2024 se solicitó a la agencia de publicidad realizar una modificación en las presencias de la marca en el programa con el objetivo prioritario de evitar cualquier tipo de saturación hacia el consumidor; esto, por cuanto el paquete inicial adquirido incluía catorce presencias diarias, pero de un análisis técnico se detectó una cantidad de hasta veintidós presencias de la marca por programa. En lo conducente, del informe se extrae, en lo medular, lo siguiente:

“Es cierto que el Banco Popular compró una pauta publicitaria para el programa televisivo “El Chinamo”. El 26 de setiembre del 2024, [Nombre 006] [Valor 003] inició la comercialización del programa con el Banco Popular, dando prioridad a los clientes que tuvieron presencia en el mismo espacio en el año 2023; como fue el caso de nuestra Institución, de esta forma, la oferta inicial presentada al Banco por parte del medio proponía un descuento considerable del precio tarifario que eventualmente tendrían que desembolsar otras marcas en caso de contratar presencias similares (…) el 08 de octubre de 2024 se aprobó por parte la Dirección Corporativa de Mercadeo la participación en el programa “El Chinamo”, con la sección “El Aguinaldazo” (…) el Banco Popular el 08 de octubre de 2024 aprobó la participación y pauta en el programa “El Chinamo”, con la sección “El Aguinaldazo”. Como parte de una práctica habitual de seguimiento de resultados dentro de los procesos de mercadeo institucionales, el viernes 13 de diciembre de 2024 se solicitó a la Agencia de Publicidad revisar los resultados preliminares de “El Chinamo”, cuya temporada 2024 inició el miércoles 11 de diciembre 2024. Del análisis técnico descrito se detectó una cantidad de hasta 22 presencias de la marca por programa, que difería de las inicialmente contratadas, el aumento de presencias se debió a una bonificación que otorgó unilateralmente el Canal y que resultó en una exposición mayor a la esperada (sobrexposición), dado que el paquete inicial incluía 14 presencias diarias. Con base en dicho análisis, el 17 de diciembre de 2024 se solicitó a la Agencia de Publicidad, realizar una modificación en las presencias de la marca en este programa, con el objetivo prioritario de evitar cualquier tipo de saturación hacia el consumidor. Esto derivó en la eliminación de las pantallas de presentación y salida de los cuatro segmentos del programa cuando se realizaban las llamadas a los participantes, para que se usaran solamente las pantallas cuando se sacaba a la persona ganador o ganadora de la sección “El Aguinaldazo”, lo anterior se ejecutó a partir del pasado 18 de diciembre de 2024, cuando las presencias en “El Chinamo” se disminuyeron de 22 a 12” (…) Es importante indicar que a lo largo de toda la temporada del programa “El Chinamo” - que concluyó el pasado 23 de diciembre - se mantuvo sin variación alguna nuestra participación en el segmento de “El Aguinaldazo”, redistribuyendo, como ya se explicó, presencias de marca a través de pantallas por spots publicitarios en distintos programas del mismo canal con el objetivo de beneficiar a la Institución y ampliar el alcance de marca”.

Visto lo anterior, resulta claro que las partes recurridas no retiraron del programa denominado “El Chinamo” las pautas publicitarias. Según lo argumentaron, las variaciones en la exposición de las marcas obedecieron, en el caso de Kölbi, a criterios que están alineados con la estrategia comercial definida por la marca, mientras que en el caso del BPDC a una modificación en las presencias de la marca en este programa con el objetivo prioritario de evitar cualquier tipo de saturación hacia el consumidor. Además, la reducción de las pautas publicitarias en el programa denominado “El Chinamo” no causó una imposibilidad para emitir el programa. Incluso ambas marcas se mantuvieron hasta el final del programa en las secciones “El Chinaoke” y el “El Aguinaldazo”, respectivamente.

4. Núcleo la cuestión Pero ¿por qué, pese a que estamos ante una marca comercial, de una institución estatal y a un sujeto de derecho público no estatal de base corporativa, que tienen amplio margen de acción y que no fueron aludidos directamente por el contenido de los videos, se puede afirmar que incurrieron en una lesión a la libertad de expresión? ¿Por qué se puede decir que tal lesión se configura si, como consecuencia de lo anterior, es evidente que no tienen obligación alguna de pautar con nadie ni deber, en sí mismo, de mantener dicha pauta ni las características de esta?

Como dije en su momento:

“El artículo 13.3 de la CADH señala que la lesión a la libertad de expresión por medios indirectos se da cuanto estos están “encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones”. Además, por jurisprudencia, tanto de la Corte IDH como de la Sala Constitucional, los actos deben recaer sobre el sujeto que comunica (personal física o jurídica” (Razones diferentes a la sentencia 2022-25167).

Aquí la conducta de las partes recurridas no impidió ni total ni parcialmente la circulación de ideas y opiniones. Pero considero que se configuró un tipo de censura. En ese sentido, es oportuno traer a colación lo que también dije en esa oportunidad y transcribo de nuevo:

““La libertad de expresión tiene como consecuencia la prohibición de toda forma de censura, en un doble sentido: no se puede censurar a los interlocutores, por una parte; y no se puede, en general, tampoco censurar en forma previa los contenidos posibles de la discusión: en principio, en una democracia, todos los temas son discutibles. La no censurabilidad de los sujetos tienen un carácter prácticamente universal, como lo establece nuestra Constitución, nadie puede ser privado de la libertad de hablar y expresarse como mejor le parezca; la no censurabilidad de los contenidos, si bien no se da en forma previa, encuentra algunas limitaciones, sin embargo, éstas deben ser tales que la libertad siga teniendo sentido o no sea vaciada de su contenido, básicamente, como toda libertad, debe ejercerse con responsabilidad, en fin para perseguir fines legítimos dentro del sistema” (sentencia 2006-5977.; el destacado no es del original).

Es decir, se habla de la censura –entendida como el acto de reprobar– como un acto contrario a la libertad de expresión. Dicho de otro modo, se afirma que la consecuencia de esa libertad es la prohibición de toda clase de censura. Luego, no existe solo la censura previa, prohibida expresamente por los artículos 29 de la Constitución y 13 de la CADH, sino que puede darse una censura posterior, que tiene el propósito de inhibir cierto contenido informativo o de opinión. También se dice que la protección contra la censura alcanza no solo a los sujetos (quien comunica) sino al contenido (lo que se comunica).

Además, aunque no se desprende de esas líneas jurisprudenciales, estimo que se podrían incorporar otros criterios para completar una tipología de censura. Así, por su apariencia, puede ser velada o manifiesta; por los medios para ejercerla, puede ser directa o indirecta (por ejemplo, según lo previsto en el artículo 13.3 de la CADH); por sus efectos, puede ser absoluta (si la reprobación va de manera concomitante con la supresión) o relativa” (ibid..; el destacado no es del original).

Y luego añadí:

“Esto quiere decir que toda manifestación que suponga una censura, aunque por sus efectos sea solo relativa y no absoluta, pues con ella no se impidió la difusión posterior de las ideas reprobadas, constituye una lesión directa a la libertad de expresión” (ibid.).

He de reconocer que Kölbi hizo una argumentación mejor articulada para justificar la reubicación de la pauta cuando dijo:

“En el año 2024 en el transcurso del programa aludido o sección, se analizó la estrategia comercial de marca KÖLBI, determinándose que se alejaba el tipo de contenido de los valores de la marca. En ese contexto, y como parte de la estrategia comercial de la marca "KÖLBI ", se decidió reubicar la pauta publicitaria de la sección "Misión Chinamo". Esta reubicación fue una medida alineada con los valores de la marca, buscando que la publicidad se presentara en otros programas del mismo [Valor 003], que se ajustaran mejor a la imagen que "KÖLBI" desea proyectar”.

Y también:

“Esa reputación está asociada a la movilidad social de la familia, del ser más intrínseco Tico Pura Vida -costarricense-; KÖLBI se enfoca en el bien vivir, en la mejora continua de la sociedad, no tiene injerencia -desde la perspectiva comercial- en la política pública y menos aún en la discusión de los grandes temas sociales que como sociedad arrastramos”.

No obstante, es palmario que la solicitud de disminuir y reubicar las pautas publicitarias en el programa “El Chinamo” reflejó una reacción de la marca Kölbi y el BPDC ante los tres videos. Como apunta la mayoría, el contenido de estos no hace relación alguna a los giros comerciales de Kölbi y el BPDC sino a las autoridades de gobierno. Y considero que los recurridos no logran desvirtuar plenamente que usaron las facultades propias de sus respectivos giros comerciales como un mecanismo de influencia política. Además, no aportaron suficientes elementos de convicción que permitan determinar cuál es el vínculo entre sus propias actividades comerciales y el perjuicio directo que causó el contenido de los videos para su giro o su identidad empresarial. Entonces, en el caso concreto, en atención al contexto y demás elementos aquí mencionados, la reacción ante un contenido claramente contrario al gobierno, más parece haber adquirido visos de censura posterior, velada, directa, relativa, pues no logran desacreditar el uso de las prerrogativas propias de su giro comercial con efectos perniciosos para la libertad de expresión.

Por tanto, concuerdo con la estimatoria del recurso, pero por razones diferentes.

Anamari Garro Vargas Observaciones de SALA CONSTITUCIONAL votado con boleta Clasificación elaborada por SALA CONSTITUCIONALdel Poder Judicial. Prohibida su reproducción y/o distribución en forma onerosa.