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Res. 18414-2025 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 17/06/2025
OutcomeResultado
The Constitutional Chamber corrects the error generated by resolution 202401620 and reinstates the costs order against the State instead of SETENA in amparo judgment 2023026912.La Sala Constitucional corrige el error generado por la resolución 202401620 y restablece la condena en costas al Estado en lugar de a SETENA, en la sentencia de amparo 2023026912.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber addresses a motion to correct a material error in judgment 2023026912, which granted amparo against SETENA for failure to respond. The petitioner first requested that the costs be imposed on SETENA, arguing it has its own legal personality; the Chamber agreed via resolution 202401620. Subsequently, the same petitioner noted that SETENA lacks legal personality, and the costs should fall on the State. Based on Article 12 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, the Chamber corrects resolution 202401620, reinstating the original order against the State. The ruling reaffirms the order to SETENA to expressly resolve the petitioner's request within ten working days, under warning of disobedience.La Sala Constitucional conoce de una gestión de corrección de error material en la sentencia 2023026912, que declaró con lugar un recurso de amparo contra SETENA por omisión de respuesta. El recurrente inicialmente solicitó corregir el por tanto para condenar en costas a SETENA, alegando personalidad jurídica propia, y la Sala accedió mediante resolución 202401620. Posteriormente, el mismo recurrente advierte que SETENA carece de personalidad jurídica, por lo que la condena debe recaer en el Estado. La Sala, con fundamento en el artículo 12 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, rectifica la resolución 202401620 y deja sin efecto la condena a SETENA, restableciendo la condena original al Estado. La resolución reitera la orden a SETENA de resolver expresamente la gestión del recurrente en diez días hábiles, bajo apercibimiento de desobediencia.
Key excerptExtracto clave
Therefore, seeing that the petitioner misled this Chamber, based on the power granted to this Chamber by Article 12 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, the error generated by resolution No. 202401620 of 9:50 a.m. on June 11, 2025, is corrected, so that the operative part of judgment No. 2023026912 of 9:15 a.m. on October 20, 2023, reads correctly, again, as follows: '... The State is ordered to pay the costs, damages, and losses caused by the facts underlying this declaration, which shall be liquidated in the administrative contentious execution of judgment. Notify.'Por consiguiente, visto que el recurrente indujo a error a esta Sala, con fundamento en la facultad que el artículo 12 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional le otorga a esta Sala, se corrige el error generado por la resolución N° 202401620 de las 09:50 horas del 11 de junio de 2025, a fin de que la parte dispositiva de la sentencia Nº 2023026912 de las 09:15 horas del 20 de octubre de 2023, se lea correctamente, de nuevo, lo siguiente, a saber: “... Se condena al Estado al pago de las costas, daños y perjuicios causados con los hechos que sirven de base a esta declaratoria, los que se liquidarán en ejecución de sentencia de lo contencioso administrativo. Notifíquese”.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"visto que el recurrente indujo a error a esta Sala, con fundamento en la facultad que el artículo 12 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional le otorga a esta Sala, se corrige el error generado por la resolución N° 202401620"
"Given that the petitioner misled this Chamber, based on the power granted by Article 12 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, the error generated by resolution No. 202401620 is corrected"
Considerando II
"visto que el recurrente indujo a error a esta Sala, con fundamento en la facultad que el artículo 12 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional le otorga a esta Sala, se corrige el error generado por la resolución N° 202401620"
Considerando II
"Se condena al Estado al pago de las costas, daños y perjuicios causados con los hechos que sirven de base a esta declaratoria"
"The State is ordered to pay the costs, damages, and losses caused by the facts underlying this declaration"
Por tanto
"Se condena al Estado al pago de las costas, daños y perjuicios causados con los hechos que sirven de base a esta declaratoria"
Por tanto
Full documentDocumento completo
Type of matter: Amparo action (Recurso de amparo) Judgment with protected data, in accordance with current regulations SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at nine hours thirty minutes on June seventeenth, two thousand twenty-five.
Amparo action (Recurso de amparo) processed in expediente number 23-023678-0007-CO, filed by Nombre01, identity card CED07, against the SECRETARÍA TÉCNICA NACIONAL AMBIENTAL (SETENA).
Whereas:
Drafted by Magistrate Garro Vargas; and, Considering (Considerando):
I.Article 12 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes that the judgments issued by the Court may be clarified or supplemented (aclaradas o adicionadas), at the request of a party, if requested within three days, and on its own motion at any time, even in enforcement proceedings, to the extent necessary to give full compliance with the content of the ruling.
II.Consequently, given that the petitioner induced this Court into error, based on the power that Article 12 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional grants to this Court, the error generated by resolution No. 202401620 of 09:50 hours on June 11, 2025, is corrected, so that the dispositive portion of judgment No. 2023026912 of 09:15 hours on October 20, 2023, correctly reads, again, as follows, to wit: “The action (recurso) is GRANTED (CON LUGAR). It is ordered to Eng. Ulises Álvarez Acosta, in his capacity as national environmental secretary, or to whomever occupies his position, that within the non-extendable term of TEN BUSINESS DAYS, counted from the notification of this resolution, he adopt the necessary provisions so that the Secretaría Nacional Ambiental expressly resolves the request filed by the petitioner through official letter No. AEL-0042-2023. Eng. Ulises Álvarez Acosta, in his capacity as national environmental secretary, or whomever occupies the position, is warned that failure to obey said order will constitute the crime of disobedience (desobediencia) and that, in accordance with Article 71 of the Law of this jurisdiction, a penalty of imprisonment from three months to two years, or a fine from twenty to sixty days, will be imposed on anyone who receives an order that must be fulfilled or enforced, issued in an amparo action (recurso de amparo) and does not fulfill it or does not enforce it, provided the crime is not more severely penalized.
The State is ordered to pay the costs (costas), damages, and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused by the facts that serve as the basis for this declaration, which will be liquidated in the enforcement of judgment of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction (ejecución de sentencia de lo contencioso administrativo). Notify”.
Therefore (Por tanto):
The error generated in what was ordered in resolution No. 202401620 of 09:50 hours on June 11, 2025, regarding the dispositive portion of judgment No. 2023026912 of 09:15 hours on October 20, 2023, is corrected. Consequently, in the operative part (por tanto) of judgment No. 2023026912 of 09:15 hours on October 20, 2023, the following shall be correctly read: “ The action (recurso) is GRANTED (CON LUGAR). It is ordered to Eng. Ulises Álvarez Acosta, in his capacity as national environmental secretary, or to whomever occupies his position, that within the non-extendable term of TEN BUSINESS DAYS, counted from the notification of this resolution, he adopt the necessary provisions so that the Secretaría Nacional Ambiental expressly resolves the request filed by the petitioner through official letter No. AEL-0042-2023. Eng. Ulises Álvarez Acosta, in his capacity as national environmental secretary, or whomever occupies the position, is warned that failure to obey said order will constitute the crime of disobedience (desobediencia) and that, in accordance with Article 71 of the Law of this jurisdiction, a penalty of imprisonment from three months to two years, or a fine from twenty to sixty days, will be imposed on anyone who receives an order that must be fulfilled or enforced, issued in an amparo action (recurso de amparo) and does not fulfill it or does not enforce it, provided the crime is not more severely penalized.
The State is ordered to pay the costs (costas), damages, and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused by the facts that serve as the basis for this declaration, which will be liquidated in the enforcement of judgment of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction (ejecución de sentencia de lo contencioso administrativo). Notify”.
Fernando Castillo V.
President Fernando Cruz C.
Paul Rueda L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G.
Anamari Garro V.
Ingrid Hess H.
PROCEEDING: RECURSO DE AMPARO RESOLUTION No. 2024001620 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at ten hours thirty minutes on January twenty-third, two thousand twenty-four.
Amparo action (Recurso de amparo) filed by [Nombre02 001], identity card number [CED01], on behalf of [Nombre02 002], with identity document [CED02], [Nombre02 003], identity document, [CED03], [Nombre02 004], identity document, [CED04], [Nombre02 005], identity document number [CED05], [Nombre02 001], identity document number [Valor 006], [Nombre02 006], identity document number [Valor 007], [Nombre 007], identity document number [Valor 008], and [Nombre02 008], identity document number [CED06]; against the UNIVERSIDAD DE LAS CIENCIAS MÉDICAS UCIMED.
Whereas:
It culminates with the evaluation of the same by the tutor, within the framework of the topics, criteria, and evaluation instruments defined and approved by the Academic Council of the Academic Unit. Its authorization and follow-up shall be the responsibility of the Deanship or Directorate of the respective Academic Unit.” Likewise, UCIMED’s contract with each student, in its ninth article, states that the internship may be carried out in a public or private hospital and that the cost is borne by the student, as transcribed: “The economic cost of the clinical placements shall be covered by the UCIMED student, the latter being the sole person responsible for attending to the information provided by the Deanship or Career Directorate regarding the cost and designation of the clinical placement, both in public and private establishments, as applicable. Furthermore, the student must fulfill the academic and administrative requirements to join the clinical placement at the designated health establishment.” She affirms that private hospitals have not restricted clinical placements for UCIMED students; on the contrary, there is evidence that the La Católica hospital, where several students from other health sciences universities in the country are currently completing and have completed their internships, has expressed interest in providing those clinical placements to UCIMED students so they can complete their internship (clinical practice).
The response from the Dean of Medicine, Pablo Vargas Villarreal, issued on 12/21/2023 in official communication DM-428-23, by express delegation from the Rector, the highest authority of UCIMED, is not based on or supported by legal, much less technical, criteria to deny the completion of the internship in a private hospital. In this argument, Dean Pablo Vargas Villarreal takes out of context the phrase “as applicable,” since clearly article 9 of the contract, when referring to that phrase, associates it with the type of establishment, be it “Public or Private,” because the contracts were signed for medical students, not for other programs. In this context, a clear attempt by the Dean is observed to distort what the signed contract states, given that one should not expect individuals to make interpretations beyond the literal meaning that the contract contains, because if that were the case, it would generate serious legal defects.
The dean's argument is detrimental to the most affected party, in this case the students. In his response, the Dean attempts to evade the fact that the phrase “as applicable” stated in article 9 of the contract clearly refers to whether the internship is public or private; that is, it was not a mass contract for all students of all specialties simultaneously, because it should not be presumed that the contract merits a separate clarification, as the Dean now attempts to make it appear. She therefore deems it important to point out that the Costa Rican Political Constitution, in its article 79, establishes that “Freedom of education is guaranteed. However, every private educational center shall be under the inspection of the State.” This as a guarantee for the correct execution and fulfillment of fundamental rights such as education, which is clearly transgressed against UCIMED medical program students who wish to complete their internship in a private health center by this evasion of the university authorities.
As can be observed, from the analysis of two formal documents, namely the Contract and the “Reglamento de Trabajos Finales De Graduación En El Grado De Licenciatura (Tfg),” it is stated that the internship may be carried out in private centers; however, in the verbal and written responses of the university authorities, there is an attempt to resort to a denial that has no properly formal and well-founded legal or technical basis, despite there being an openness on the part of private hospitals to receive UCIMED students. Furthermore, preventing the medical program students from completing their internship in private hospitals affects their right to continuous education and delays their possibilities of obtaining honest and duly paid work that allows them to be independent, prevents their dignity from being undermined, and allows them to stop depending economically on their parents, because they are no longer minors; however, because the medical program is quite demanding in terms of schedules and academic load, it is not possible to access a job without completing the internship, which requires a full daily workload and is the final requirement for graduation.
Education is one of the rights with the greatest development internationally and of greatest importance to the United Nations; it is posited as the basic principle of development. In addition to being included as one of the Millennium Goals, the right to education is protected by various United Nations bodies, especially UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), since now, more than ever, international documents, their reasons, scope, and interpretations shall be valid and applicable law at all levels; these changes imply, above all, a substantive improvement in the way our legal system resolves matters. She requests that the University of Medical Sciences be ordered not to limit the fundamental right to education of the medical program students who submitted a request to the Rector with a signed letter, and that they be allowed to continue and not delay the educational process; therefore, to authorize the students to carry out the “Internship” (university practice), the last phase of the training process according to the medical curriculum, in a private hospital health center, since there is sufficient and competent evidence that in the current contract between the parties, specifically in the ninth article, there is viability for medical program students to be authorized to complete the internship in private centers, such as CIMA hospital, Clínica Bíblica hospital, and La Católica hospital, among others, and also as indicated in the “Reglamento de Trabajos Finales De Graduación En El Grado De Licenciatura (Tfg).” That the University desist from maintaining the internship solely within the C.C.S.S. and enable this practice in private health centers as is proper, since it is considered a decision based solely on a stereotype linked exclusively to the unsupported preconception that private centers do not meet conditions, when it has been demonstrated that the C.C.S.S. itself contracts private health center services to expand its installed capacity.
Not to limit the possibility of choosing the internship in private health centers, given that currently this limitation constitutes unequal, discriminatory, and harmful treatment of the education rights of UCIMED medical program students in proportion to those of other private universities, such as UNIBE, Universidad Latina de Costa Rica, Universidad Hispanoamericana, Universidad Internacional de las Américas, among others, where medical students who wish to complete their medical internship in private hospitals can do so, so as not to limit their students and create disadvantages for them due to the delay caused by not having a placement in the CCSS. Also, to avoid discriminatory and unequal treatment in relation to programs within UCIMED itself that do have the possibility of completing their internships in private hospitals, as in the cases of the Pharmacy and Microbiology programs. Similarly, discriminatory treatment in relation to foreign students under agreements serviced by UCIMED.
That approval be granted to complete the internship in a private hospital that does have clinical placements available for medical students, so as not to delay their progress, since this does not imply a disbursement for the university, given that the economic cost is covered by the students, according to the contract. That it be taken into account that waiting to obtain a space in the C.C.S.S. to fulfill the academic requirement might well not guarantee immediate completion of the internship, since this delay could even come from a lack of installed capacity at the C.C.S.S., even if the clinical placement has been obtained through the IFOM; it would generate another delay in taking the ECOM exam, as has already occurred with students from previous semesters, and would even delay the start of working life or the opportunity to access the medical specialty of their choice, which could well be at UCIMED itself, which has already won its struggle to train medical specialists, something previously limited solely to the public sector.
Drafted by Magistrate Castillo Víquez; and,
Considering:
The appellant claims that the respondent university prevents the protected parties—final-year medical program students—from completing the internship in private health centers, and compels them to take an exam to compete for the few clinical placements offered by the C.C.S.S., which she deems even contrary to the contract signed with that university. She further considers that such a measure is unequal, since in other programs completing the internship in private medical centers is permitted, not only in those of the C.C.S.S.
In this regard, it is appropriate to indicate that this Tribunal, in judgment no. 2021-5444, at 9:15 a.m. on March 12, 2021, stated in a similar case the following:
“II.- SPECIFIC CASE. First, it must be noted that the purpose of the amparo appeal is to provide timely protection against violations or threats to fundamental rights and freedoms, not to serve as a generic instrument for channeling all types of petitions. Given the foregoing, it is not within the purview of the constitutional jurisdiction to establish—based on academic criteria and policies, internal regulations, and the terms of the contracts signed between private universities and their students—whether the methodologies used to determine which students enter the university rotating internship block are appropriate or not from an academic or technical standpoint. Said aspect is not directly related to a potential direct violation of the right to education, but rather to matters pertaining to ordinary legality. Therefore, the petitioner may, if she deems fit, resort to the respondent university itself, the National Council of Private Higher Education (Consejo Nacional de Educación Superior Privada, CONESUP), or the ordinary jurisdiction, in order to file there the actions she deems pertinent so that what is appropriate in law is resolved.
On the other hand, the appellant claims to be discriminated against because other classmates were authorized to enroll in the clinical placements of the university rotating internship. Regarding this claim, it must be noted that the principle of equality established in article 33 of the Political Constitution does not possess an absolute character, as it does not, strictly speaking, grant a right to be equated with any individual without distinction of circumstances, but rather to demand that the law not make differences between two or more persons who are in the same legal situation or in identical conditions, and equal treatment cannot be sought when conditions or circumstances are unequal, or when the situation denounced is illegal or irregular. In that sense, whoever invokes the violation of this principle must provide evidentiary elements to allow a full comparison of parameters and, in this way, ascertain whether or not inequality occurs.
However, in the specific case, the appellant alludes to inequality but does not present any specific element for comparison. Consequently, the claim is inadmissible in all its aspects.” As indicated in this precedent, this jurisdiction is not competent to review the contracts signed between the parties, nor to determine whether that university must permit or not permit the internship to be completed in private medical centers as, according to their claims, is permitted for other programs—which she admits are different—at that same university. Nor is it competent to establish whether or not a test must be taken to opt for a placement in the internship, as this is a discussion of mere legality. In that case, the petitioner must, if she deems fit, raise her claim before the respondent university itself, the National Council of Private Higher Education (CONESUP), or the ordinary jurisdiction, so that what is appropriate in law is resolved. As far as this Tribunal is concerned, the amparo is inadmissible.
The parties are warned that if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic, or new technology-produced device, these must be withdrawn from this office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, any material not withdrawn within this period shall be destroyed, as provided in the “Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial,” approved by the Full Court in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI, and published in Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judiciary, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.
Therefore:
The appeal is rejected outright.
Sentencia con datos protegidos, de conformidad con la normativa vigente SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas treinta minutos del diecisiete de junio de dos mil veinticinco .
Recurso de amparo que se tramita en expediente número 23-023678-0007-CO, interpuesto por Nombre01, cédula de identidad CED07, contra la SECRETARÍA TÉCNICA NACIONAL AMBIENTAL (SETENA).
Resultando:
Redacta la Magistrada Garro Vargas; y,
Considerando:
I.El artículo 12 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece que las sentencias que dicte la Sala podrán ser aclaradas o adicionadas, a petición de parte, si se solicitare dentro del tercer día, y de oficio en cualquier tiempo, incluso en los procedimientos de ejecución, en la medida en que sea necesario para dar cabal cumplimiento al contenido del fallo.
II.Por consiguiente, visto que el recurrente indujo a error a esta Sala, con fundamento en la facultad que el artículo 12 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional le otorga a esta Sala, se corrige el error generado por la resolución N° 202401620 de las 09:50 horas del 11 de junio de 2025, a fin de que la parte dispositiva de la sentencia Nº 2023026912 de las 09:15 horas del 20 de octubre de 2023, se lea correctamente, de nuevo, lo siguiente, a saber: “Se declara CON LUGAR el recurso. Se ordena al Ing. Ulises Álvarez Acosta, en su condición de secretario nacional ambiental, o a quien ocupe su cargo, que en el término improrrogable de DIEZ DÍAS HÁBILES, contado a partir de la notificación de esta resolución, adopte las previsiones necesarias para que la Secretaría Nacional Ambiental resuelva expresamente la gestión planteada por el recurrente mediante el oficio N° AEL-0042-2023. Se le advierte al Ing. Ulises Álvarez Acosta, en su condición de secretario nacional ambiental, o a quien ocupe el cargo, que de no acatar la orden dicha, incurrirá en el delito de desobediencia y, que de conformidad con el artículo 71 de la Ley de esta jurisdicción, se le impondrá prisión de tres meses a dos años, o de veinte a sesenta días multa, a quien recibiere una orden que deba cumplir o hacer cumplir, dictada en un recurso de amparo y no la cumpliere o no la hiciere cumplir, siempre que el delito no esté más gravemente penado.
Se condena al Estado al pago de las costas, daños y perjuicios causados con los hechos que sirven de base a esta declaratoria, los que se liquidarán en ejecución de sentencia de lo contencioso administrativo. Notifíquese”.
Por tanto:
Se corrige el error generado en lo dispuesto en la resolución N° 202401620 de las 09:50 horas del 11 de junio de 2025, relativo a la parte dispositiva de la sentencia Nº 2023026912 de las 09:15 horas del 20 de octubre de 2023. En consecuencia, en el por tanto de la sentencia Nº 2023026912 de las 09:15 horas del 20 de octubre de 2023, deberá leerse, correctamente, lo siguiente: “ Se declara CON LUGAR el recurso. Se ordena al Ing. Ulises Álvarez Acosta, en su condición de secretario nacional ambiental, o a quien ocupe su cargo, que en el término improrrogable de DIEZ DÍAS HÁBILES, contado a partir de la notificación de esta resolución, adopte las previsiones necesarias para que la Secretaría Nacional Ambiental resuelva expresamente la gestión planteada por el recurrente mediante el oficio N° AEL-0042-2023. Se le advierte al Ing. Ulises Álvarez Acosta, en su condición de secretario nacional ambiental, o a quien ocupe el cargo, que de no acatar la orden dicha, incurrirá en el delito de desobediencia y, que de conformidad con el artículo 71 de la Ley de esta jurisdicción, se le impondrá prisión de tres meses a dos años, o de veinte a sesenta días multa, a quien recibiere una orden que deba cumplir o hacer cumplir, dictada en un recurso de amparo y no la cumpliere o no la hiciere cumplir, siempre que el delito no esté más gravemente penado.
Se condena al Estado al pago de las costas, daños y perjuicios causados con los hechos que sirven de base a esta declaratoria, los que se liquidarán en ejecución de sentencia de lo contencioso administrativo. Notifíquese”.
Fernando Castillo V.
Fernando Cruz C.
Paul Rueda L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G.
Anamari Garro V.
Ingrid Hess H.
PROCESO: RECURSO DE AMPARO RESOLUCIÓN Nº 2024001620 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las diez horas treinta minutos del veintitres de enero de dos mil veinticuatro .
Recurso de amparo interpuesto por [Nombre02 001], cédula de identidad número [CED01], a favor de [Nombre02 002], con documento de identidad [CED02], [Nombre02 003], documento de identidad, [CED03], [Nombre02 004], documento de identidad, [CED04], [Nombre02 005], documento de identidad número [CED05], [Nombre02 001], documento de identidad número [Valor 006], [Nombre02 006], documento de identidad número [Valor 007], [Nombre 007], documento de identidad número [Valor 008], y [Nombre02 008], documento de identidad número [CED06]; contra la UNIVERSIDAD DE LAS CIENCIAS MÉDICAS UCIMED.
Resultando:
Redacta el Magistrado Castillo Víquez; y,
Considerando:
La recurrente reclama que la universidad recurrida le impide a los amparados -estudiantes de la carrera de medicina de último año- realizar el internado en centros de salud privados, y los conmina a hacer un examen para ingresar a competir por los pocos campos clínicos que ofrece la C.C.S.S., lo que estima resulta incluso contrario al contrato suscrito con esa universidad. Considera, además, que tal medida resulta desigual, por cuanto en otras carreras sí es permitido realizar el internado en centros médicos privados, no solo en los de la C.C.S.S.
Al respecto procede indicar, que este Tribunal en sentencia nro. 2021-5444, de las 9:15 horas del 12 de marzo de 2021, señaló en un caso similar lo siguiente:
“II.- CASO CONCRETO. En primer lugar, se debe indicar que la finalidad del recurso de amparo es brindar tutela oportuna contra infracciones o amenazas a los derechos y libertades fundamentales, no la de servir como un instrumento genérico para canalizar peticiones de todo tipo. Dado lo anterior, a la jurisdicción constitucional no le compete establecer -con fundamento en los criterios y políticas académicas, las reglamentaciones internas y los términos de las contrataciones suscritas entre las universidades privadas y sus estudiantes-, si las metodologías empleadas para determinar cuáles estudiantes ingresan al bloque de internado rotativo universitario, son procedentes o no desde un punto de vista académico o técnico. Dicho aspecto no se relaciona directamente con una eventual vulneración directa del derecho a la educación, sino con extremos propios de la legalidad ordinaria. Por lo tanto, podrá la petente, si a bien lo tiene, acudir ante la propia universidad recurrida, el Consejo Nacional de Educación Superior Privada (CONESUP) o la jurisdicción común, a fin de plantear allí las gestiones que estime pertinentes para que se resuelva lo que en derecho proceda.Por otro lado, la recurrente acusa estar siendo discriminada, porque otros de sus compañeros, sí se les autorizó matricular los campos clínicos del internado rotatorio universitario.
En cuanto a este reclamo, debe de indicársele que el principio de igualdad que establece el artículo 33 de la Constitución Política no posee un carácter absoluto, pues, no concede, propiamente, un derecho a ser equiparado a cualquier individuo sin distinción de circunstancias, sino más bien a exigir que la ley no haga diferencias entre dos o más personas que se encuentran en una misma situación jurídica o en condiciones idénticas y no puede pretenderse un trato igual cuando las condiciones o circunstancias son desiguales, o bien, cuando la situación que se denuncia es ilegal o irregular. En ese sentido, quien invoca la violación de este principio, debe suministrar elementos probatorios, para poder hacer una confrontación plena de parámetros de comparación y de esta forma, cotejar si se produce o no la desigualdad. Sin embargo, en el caso concreto, la recurrente alude desigualdad pero no presenta ningún elemento concreto de comparación.
En consecuencia, el reclamo resulta inadmisible en todos sus extremos.” Tal como se indica en este precedente, no le compete a esta jurisdicción revisar los contratos suscritos entre las partes, ni determinar si esa universidad debe permitir o no realizar el internado en centros médicos privados como, según afirman, sí se les permite a otras carreras -que admite son diferentes- de esa misma universidad. Así como tampoco, establecer si debe realizarse o no una prueba para optar por un campo en el internado, pues se trata de una discusión de mera legalidad. En ese caso, deberá la petente, si a bien lo tiene, plantear su reclamo ante la propia universidad recurrida, el Consejo Nacional de Educación Superior Privada (CONESUP) o la jurisdicción común, para que se resuelva lo que en derecho proceda. En lo que respecta a este Tribunal, el amparo es inadmisible.
Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI
Por tanto:
Se rechaza de plano el recurso.
Fernando Castillo V.
Fernando Cruz C.
Paul Rueda L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G.
Anamari Garro V.
Ingrid Hess H.
Observaciones de SALA CONSTITUCIONAL Se adjunta la sentencia 24-001620 del expediente 24-000086-0007-CO
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