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Res. 92514-2025 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 10/07/2025
OutcomeResultado
The Chamber admitted the challenge for consideration, recognized standing based on diffuse environmental interests, and clarified that it had neither decided the merits nor suspended the regulation’s validity and general application.La Sala admitió la acción para su trámite, reconoció legitimación por intereses difusos ambientales y aclaró que todavía no resolvió el fondo ni suspendió la vigencia y aplicación general del reglamento impugnado.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber admits for consideration a challenge to Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, and 10 of Executive Decree No. 44974-S, the Regulation for the Regionalized Management of Ordinary and Organic Solid Waste in Costa Rica. The petitioner alleges that these provisions violate the rights to life and a healthy environment, international agreements, municipal autonomy, and environmental principles including prevention, precaution, progressivity, a safe climate, and science-based protection. The Chamber recognizes the petitioner’s standing based on the defense of diffuse environmental interests and grants the Attorney General’s Office and several public authorities fifteen days to respond. The order does not yet decide whether the regulation is constitutional. It explains that admitting the challenge does not suspend the regulation’s validity or general application; it only prevents a final decision in certain judicial cases or administrative-exhaustion proceedings in which application of the challenged provisions is at issue.La Sala Constitucional admite para trámite una acción dirigida contra los artículos 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9 y 10 del Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 44974-S, Reglamento para la Gestión Regionalizada de Residuos Sólidos Ordinarios y Orgánicos en Costa Rica. La impugnación sostiene que esas disposiciones vulneran los derechos a la vida y a un ambiente sano, convenios internacionales, la autonomía municipal y diversos principios ambientales, entre ellos prevención, precaución, progresividad, clima seguro y tutela científica. La Sala reconoce legitimación al accionante por la defensa de intereses difusos ambientales y concede audiencia por quince días a la Procuraduría General de la República y a varias autoridades públicas. La resolución no determina todavía si el reglamento es constitucional. Aclara que la admisión de la acción no suspende su vigencia ni su aplicación general; únicamente impide dictar resolución final en ciertos procesos judiciales o procedimientos de agotamiento de la vía administrativa donde se discuta la aplicación de las normas cuestionadas.
Key excerptExtracto clave
This action is admitted because it satisfies the requirements established in Articles 73 through 79 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law. The petitioner’s standing derives from the existence of diffuse interests concerning environmental protection. The first, and perhaps most important, rule is that filing an action of unconstitutionality does not suspend the general effectiveness and applicability of the provisions. The second is that only acts applying the challenged provisions are suspended when undertaken by judicial authorities in proceedings before them or by administrative authorities in procedures intended to exhaust administrative remedies, but their validity and general application are not suspended. The fourth rule is that, in principle, the filing has no suspensive effect in direct actions, as in this case, brought in defense of diffuse interests (see Constitutional Court Judgment No. 537-91).Esta acción se admite por reunir los requisitos a que se refiere la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional en sus artículos 73 a 79. La legitimación del accionante proviene de la existencia de intereses difusos, por protección al ambiente. La primera, y quizás la más importante, es que la interposición de una acción de inconstitucionalidad no suspende la eficacia y aplicabilidad en general de las normas. La segunda, es que solo se suspenden los actos de aplicación de las normas impugnadas por las autoridades judiciales en los procesos incoados ante ellas, o por las administrativas, en los procedimientos tendientes a agotar la vía administrativa, pero no su vigencia y aplicación en general. La cuarta es que –en principio-, en los casos de acción directa, como ocurre en esta acción, que se acude en defensa de intereses difusos, no opera el efecto suspensivo de la interposición (véase voto n.° 537-91 del Tribunal Constitucional).
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"Se da curso a la acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por [Nombre01 001], para que se declaren inconstitucionales los numerales 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9 y 10 del REGLAMENTO PARA LA GESTIÓN REGIONALIZADA DE RESIDUOS SÓLIDOS ORDINARIOS Y ORGÁNICOS EN COSTA RICA, DECRETO EJECUTIVO, nro. 44974-S, publicado en el Alcance nro. 52 a la Gaceta nro. 75 de 28 de abril de 2025, por violentar los artículos 21 y 50 constitucionales, la Convención de la Diversidad Biológica y el Acuerdo de París, así como los principios ambientales de progresividad, preventivo, el de clima seguro, y de tutela científica."
"The action of unconstitutionality filed by [Name01 001] is admitted for consideration, seeking a declaration that Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, and 10 of the Regulation for the Regionalized Management of Ordinary and Organic Solid Waste in Costa Rica, Executive Decree No. 44974-S, published in Supplement No. 52 to Gazette No. 75 of April 28, 2025, are unconstitutional for violating Articles 21 and 50 of the Constitution, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Paris Agreement, and the environmental principles of progressivity, prevention, a safe climate, and science-based protection."
Admisión
"Se da curso a la acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por [Nombre01 001], para que se declaren inconstitucionales los numerales 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9 y 10 del REGLAMENTO PARA LA GESTIÓN REGIONALIZADA DE RESIDUOS SÓLIDOS ORDINARIOS Y ORGÁNICOS EN COSTA RICA, DECRETO EJECUTIVO, nro. 44974-S, publicado en el Alcance nro. 52 a la Gaceta nro. 75 de 28 de abril de 2025, por violentar los artículos 21 y 50 constitucionales, la Convención de la Diversidad Biológica y el Acuerdo de París, así como los principios ambientales de progresividad, preventivo, el de clima seguro, y de tutela científica."
Admisión
"La tercera regla, es que la Sala puede graduar los alcances del efecto suspensivo de la acción."
"The third rule is that the Chamber may calibrate the scope of the action’s suspensive effect."
Efectos jurídicos de la interposición
"La tercera regla, es que la Sala puede graduar los alcances del efecto suspensivo de la acción."
Efectos jurídicos de la interposición
"Donde no existe contención en relación con la aplicación de la norma, no procede la suspensión de su eficacia y aplicabilidad."
"Where there is no dispute concerning application of the provision, suspension of its effectiveness and applicability does not apply."
Efectos jurídicos de la interposición
"Donde no existe contención en relación con la aplicación de la norma, no procede la suspensión de su eficacia y aplicabilidad."
Efectos jurídicos de la interposición
"En otras palabras, en todos aquellos asuntos donde no existe un procedimiento de agotamiento de vía administrativa, en los términos arriba indicados, la norma debe continuarse aplicando, independientemente de si beneficia -acto administrativo favorable- o perjudica al justiciable -acto desfavorable no impugnado-."
"In other words, in every matter where there is no procedure for exhaustion of administrative remedies under the terms stated above, the provision must continue to be applied, regardless of whether it benefits the affected person—a favorable administrative act—or harms that person—an unfavorable act that has not been challenged."
Efectos jurídicos de la interposición
"En otras palabras, en todos aquellos asuntos donde no existe un procedimiento de agotamiento de vía administrativa, en los términos arriba indicados, la norma debe continuarse aplicando, independientemente de si beneficia -acto administrativo favorable- o perjudica al justiciable -acto desfavorable no impugnado-."
Efectos jurídicos de la interposición
Full documentDocumento completo
*250172170007CO* CASE FILE:
PROCEEDING:
ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY PETITIONER:
[Name01 001] CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine thirty-seven a.m. on July tenth, two thousand twenty-five.
The constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) filed by [Nombre01 001] is admitted for consideration, seeking a declaration that provisions 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, and 10 of the REGLAMENTO PARA LA GESTIÓN REGIONALIZADA DE RESIDUOS SÓLIDOS ORDINARIOS Y ORGÁNICOS EN COSTA RICA, DECRETO EJECUTIVO, No. 44974-S, published in Supplement No. 52 to La Gaceta No. 75 of April 28, 2025, are unconstitutional because they violate Articles 21 and 50 of the Constitution, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Paris Agreement, as well as the environmental principles of progressivity, prevention, a safe climate, and scientific protection. The Procuraduría General de la República, the Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, the Secretario General de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, the Ministra de la Presidencia, and the Ministra de Salud are granted fifteen days to submit their views. The provisions are challenged on the grounds of an alleged violation of Articles 21 and 50 of the Constitution and failure to comply with several ratified international agreements, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Paris Agreement.
Also at issue are environmental principles such as progressivity, prevention, a safe climate, and scientific protection. Grounds for Unconstitutionality: 1—Violation of the principle of scientific protection in broad terms, pursuant to the provisions of rules 4, 9, and 10; failure to incorporate the climate variable in provisions 4, 9, and 10; and deregulation of Nombre02’s powers in provisions 9 and 10. He states that, for the first time in Costa Rica, the regulation essentially seeks to govern the management and/or movement of ordinary and organic solid waste between cantons until it reaches sites where those materials will be treated. As evidence, he points to the title of the Regulation itself and the Fourth Recital of the challenged provision, which expressly states: “...the provisions established in this Executive Decree seek to promote the creation and improvement of the public and private infrastructure necessary for the separate collection, transportation, receipt, storage, recovery, treatment, and proper final disposal of solid waste, including the promotion of regional solutions....” Provision 2 of the Regulation similarly states: “Article 2: Scope of Application.
The Poder Ejecutivo, through the Ministerio de Salud and within the scope of its powers, shall coordinate with municipalities and authorized ordinary solid-waste management companies in Costa Rica regarding the planning, collection, treatment, recovery, and final disposal of ordinary solid waste under a regional model....” Nevertheless, despite the momentous importance of the regulatory provision issued by the Presidente de la República and the head minister of the authority responsible for waste, the climate variable has not to date been incorporated, without any technical, scientific, or legal justification, into an activity that plainly has adverse effects on the atmosphere, health, and the planet. In his view, the foregoing violates the preventive principle through omission because it is evident that, if studies exist—as they indeed do—indicating that adverse consequences will result from climate change, there is no justification for excluding the climate variable from the provision at issue.
Regarding the aforementioned lack of “technical reports guaranteeing the sustainability of the activity,” he contends that this should be regarded as a deficiency in the regulatory provision because, from the standpoint of the daily, weekly, or annual volume of waste entering all treatment sites, there is currently no dossier containing those metrics in conjunction with other anthropogenic and natural factors that might have yielded data establishing that the Regulation itself constituted a genuine and robust comprehensive environmental and climate solution for each municipality or group of municipalities. Accordingly, because it lacks scientific support, it may be asserted that the challenged provision was drafted in violation of the principles of scientific protection and prevention. He asks that the administrative record for this challenged regulation be reviewed so that it may be seen that climate change in connection with waste was never weighed in the equation, and that this error supports an initial finding that there is a defect of constitutional magnitude.
The various international agreements signed by our country call for measures to reduce the factors that cause an unsafe climate. He believes that each State should instead help reduce adverse environmental impacts so that it may focus on striving for climate resilience, and that among the actions we are required to take is, at a minimum, obtaining reliable emissions data in order to make vital decisions for drafting the best regulations. Along the same lines, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held in the case of LA OROYA V. PERU on November 27, 2023: “34. With regard to the obligations, two issues must be highlighted: the obligation of prevention and the obligation of protection—better known as the precautionary principle. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights identifies the difference between them as follows: whereas in the former there is scientific certainty regarding the environmental consequences that would arise (in response to which sub-obligations such as regulation, oversight, environmental impact assessments (estudios de impacto ambiental), etc., apply), the latter obligation applies when there is no scientific certainty regarding the environmental consequences; however, this does not relieve the State of its duty to take measures to address potential environmental harm.” It is a fact that, based on public research such as the studies he cites, before issuing the Regulation it was necessary to begin with a nationwide general study prepared by the Oficina de Cambio Climático del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía together with the Ministerio de Planificación and the Ministerio de Salud.
To date, however, this was not done, thus revealing a major technical deficiency of constitutional magnitude, because a regulatory provision was issued without it being clear whether it was the best one from a technical and scientific standpoint. The administrative record of Executive Decree No. 44974-S contains no such climate dossier of studies or research, and this demonstrates the lack of supporting grounds that leads us to understand that the assertions regarding rules 4, 9, and 10 of the Regulation are true, since everything was done merely as a matter of administrative discretion, with a major conceptual void concerning the implications of climate change, to such an extreme that safeguards along those lines were not even mentioned. Having clarified this first point, he states that he will explain the climate variable as it relates to the Regulation. In the rule established in Executive Decree No. 44974-S, the Poder Ejecutivo made no provision whatsoever for climate-related matters; he therefore requests that this be considered for a moment from that perspective and that an approach requiring application of the principle of progressivity now be adopted.
By doing so, it will become apparent that, had a sound rule been issued that did take the climate variable into account, it might even have been possible to introduce into our State a hierarchy of measures for mitigating significant residual environmental and climate impacts (those that cannot be avoided), thereby ensuring that the net loss to biodiversity, the legally protected interest of climate, or health was as close to zero as possible. Because this was omitted, however, we as a State will continue to aim far below what the planet requires and what international climate instruments provide. He further notes that it must be clearly understood—and that this compounds the country’s adverse circumstances—that Nombre02 currently does not quantify environmental climate vectors in our State. This is an indisputable reality because no specific protocols or guidelines exist, and what is not quantified cannot be assessed, much less serve as the basis for efficient mitigation, protection, and prevention measures, which would be the appropriate course.
In other words, what is now evident is that the Poder Ejecutivo issued regulations that appear progressive, but they were never conceived or supported with basic scientific rigor, and all of this amounts to improvisation and regression in a very serious field in which climate-related matters are being addressed negligently and blindly. It must be clear, as stated, that even now the Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental itself has no protocols or procedures for assessing climate effects in activities, works, and projects. If that office states that it is working to have the relevant materials ready by the end of this year, 2025, then still less do the municipalities or the Ministerio de Salud know how to account for the foregoing effects on the climate; nevertheless, this Regulation was irresponsibly issued regarding a matter closely connected to all atmospheric issues. At least Nombre02 has now stated that by the end of this year, 2025, it will have an initial draft concerning how to measure the climate variable; but if that is the status there, it is evident that the Ministerio de Salud is even further behind.
Taken together, this leads us to reaffirm and confirm that the Regulation was drafted without making appropriate provision for climate change, which supports the argument that the principle of objective substantiation was violated. To directly connect the foregoing statements with the Regulation, he notes that rule 9 provides that a technical justification will be issued and, at the end of that article, further states that municipal corporations must issue decisions based on specialized technical environmental grounds. He indicates that the foregoing contains an inconsistency of constitutional magnitude that must not be overlooked, since it clearly violates the principles of prevention and scientific protection. Administrative acts affecting the environment cannot be adopted unless they are technically assessed; to think otherwise is to improvise with people’s lives, the climate, biodiversity, and ecosystems.
He therefore reaffirms that challenged provision 9 was issued despite the impossibility of verifying environmental and climate impacts, which must not be permitted; consequently, it must be declared unconstitutional because the Executive requires municipalities to issue environmental justifications but, strangely, does not require them first to approach Nombre02 so that the specialized office may analyze all necessary factors in the case, among which climate considerations should not be absent. He thus highlights the extremely poor drafting approach followed in the Regulation. He asserts that the starting point should always be zero net loss and a net gain in biodiversity and public health, but the Regulation requires municipal decisions to be made without requiring prior environmental studies approved by Nombre02 and without making appropriate provision for climate change. It is clear that the municipalities and the Ministerio de Salud may work in coordination with Nombre02 to develop the best environmental criteria, but neither the municipalities nor the Ministerio de Salud should evaluate and, in turn, approve enabling acts of an environmental nature, as rule 9 states when it provides: “Article 9: Exceptional Cases.
In accordance with the provisions of sections 8, 9, and 10 of Ley 8839, in cases where it is determined that, due to geographic characteristics and environmental feasibility, it is more practicable, from the standpoint of travel and route conditions, to dispose of waste at an environmental park located in another region, while respecting the distances established in Article 9 of these regulations and the municipal integrated waste-management plan (plan municipal de gestión integral de residuos), a technical justification supporting that decision shall be required. At a minimum, the justification must contain: 1. A technical and economic analysis comparing the available alternatives and demonstrating that the proposed option is the most feasible in terms of operating costs and efficiency. 2. Potential impacts and mitigation measures (medidas de mitigación) to minimize adverse effects in the region of origin and the destination region. 3.
A projection of the volumes of waste to be transported, taking into account current and future generation in the region of origin. 4. Reduction and recovery actions (acciones de reducción y valorización) implemented before final disposal (disposición final), detailing their impact on minimizing the waste transported. 5. Capacity of the receiving site. 6. A logistics and transportation plan, including routes, frequencies, and monitoring mechanisms to ensure traceability and minimize the impact of transportation. 7. Intermunicipal agreements or contracts with private operators, if applicable. The Ministry of Health shall provide technical support and oversight in implementing these actions, ensuring that sites for the separation, treatment, recovery, and final disposal of waste comply with Decreto Ejecutivo N° 44421-S Reglamento de parques ambientales para la separación, tratamiento, aprovechamiento y disposición final de residuos sólidos, dated 4 de marzo del 2024.” Following the foregoing, the question is asked: why do these measures—which are strictly a protocol or a basic environmental-impact-assessment guide—not state among their requirements that every municipal decision must undergo SETENA review?
This shows that the regulations repeatedly express and emphasize the goal of minimizing the environmental impact of waste. However, the existence of a major deficiency and uncertainty warrants a declaration that, at a minimum, the requirements of section 9 must be interpreted as lacking an express reference to the need to consult SETENA, which should even create a specific protocol or mechanism governing this type of municipal criterion for the scenario contemplated in regulatory section 9. Something similar is noted in regulatory section 10, which states: “… Exceptional situations (situaciones de excepción): If transportation to another region is required because the infrastructure is under development or maintenance, or because another region has more advanced or efficient approved technologies, the following information must be submitted for the corresponding review to the Regional Health Stewardship Directorate (Dirección Regional de Rectoría de la Salud) for the canton concerned….” The question is asked: why is it stated that certain requirements must be reviewed, yet no requirement to submit SETENA’s opinion is included?
In light of this further deficiency, another unconstitutionality by omission (inconstitucionalidad por omisión) is evident, because the matter must first be submitted to Nombre02, after which whatever the municipalities determine to be appropriate could be forwarded to the Regional Health Stewardship Directorate. For all the reasons stated, it is considered that these are unconstitutional omissions by the Executive Branch, because municipal corporations are not required to submit an application—which could take the form of a specific opinion in an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) conducted by the municipalities—concerning the most appropriate course of action in exceptional cases, thereby allowing for an informed and lucid decision supported by science and technical expertise regarding the environmental and climatic aspects that would unquestionably be involved in the various phases of integrated solid-waste management (gestión integrada de residuos sólidos).
All the foregoing is essential to assessing and minimizing the ecological footprint (huella ecológica) that we impose on the climate and the atmosphere. The decision to transport waste to other regions does not lie with the companies that treat it; rather, it is expressly and exclusively a municipal determination, made in accordance with municipal interests and territorial and administrative autonomy. The municipal obligation to request that exceptional environmental opinion arises from the provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity (Convención de la Diversidad Biológica) itself, which states, insofar as relevant: “ARTICLE 14. Impact assessment and minimizing adverse impacts. 1.-Each Contracting Party, as far as possible and as appropriate: a) Shall establish appropriate procedures requiring environmental impact assessment of its proposed projects that are likely to have significant adverse effects on biological diversity, with a view to avoiding or minimizing such effects and, where appropriate, shall allow public participation in such procedures. b) Shall establish appropriate arrangements to ensure that the environmental consequences of its programs and policies that are likely to have significant adverse effects on biological diversity are duly taken into account….” It is abundantly clear that, by virtue of a treaty obligation, the challenged regulatory provision establishing rules for solid-waste programs and policies must be interpreted as having been required to state that every municipality, or region composed of municipalities, had to obtain opinions approved by Nombre02 before exceptional measures for transporting waste could be authorized.
Nor can it be disregarded that these challenged Regulations constitute a macro-policy and a comprehensive solid-waste-management program that will affect biological diversity. But the environmental aspect cannot disregard the climate variable (variable climática), which is not even weighed by Nombre02 yet; this must be kept in mind because it may be addressed in the judgment so that decisions in these waste-regionalization processes are comprehensive. In other words, the request is that municipalities be required to undergo Nombre02 review before adopting an opinion and that such opinion must take climate change into account. Regarding the effects of failing to consider the climate variable in decisions such as those discussed, the Seventh State of the Region Report: Report Synopsis: Challenges and Opportunities of Climate-Change Adaptation, Volume III (Séptimo informe estado de la región: sinopsis del informe: retos y oportunidades de la adaptación al cambio climático, volumen III) states: “According to the available scientific evidence, deficient environmental management and climate events in the CARD region have historically caused significant impacts that will worsen with climate change.
In view of this, and as has already been recognized in international agreements since Paris 2015, responsibilities for addressing climate change across the planet are shared but differentiated. Public policies must be adapted to the circumstances of each territory and to its human-development conditions. In CARD, a low contribution to global emissions (which does not eliminate the urgency of reducing them) coexists with high exposure to the potential effects of the phenomenon, as it is one of the global high-impact ‘hot spots’—both actual and foreseeable. This exposure compounds social, economic, and institutional human-development problems, deficient land-use planning (ordenamiento territorial), poverty, exclusion, and other factors, demonstrating the urgent regional need to prioritize adaptation…” (page 1209). For that reason, it is insisted that sections 9 and 10 violate principles such as precaution, reasonableness, and proportionality, as well as the principle of progressivity (principio de progresividad).
It is more than evident that those municipal decisions must be approved by SETENA, since they entail the implementation of environmental policies, as stated in section 14(b) of the Convention on Biological Diversity. It is again asserted that an interpretive judgment (sentencia interpretativa) is required, providing that municipalities and the Ministry of Health shall be obligated, through the necessary protocols, to consult Nombre02 regarding the exceptional cases contemplated in the challenged sections 9 and 10. In line with that request, Nombre02 should be ordered to create the pertinent protocols or guidelines so that the provisions of sections 9 and 10 are environmentally and climatically feasible. It is requested that, in considering the arguments presented, account be taken of the statement in section 1 of the challenged Regulations concerning environmental matters and their intended objective: “Article 1: Objective.
The objective of these Regulations is to establish a management framework for the integrated management of ordinary solid waste (gestión integral de residuos sólidos ordinarios) in Costa Rica, based on cantonal systems and intermunicipal cooperation, in order to optimize the use of resources and minimize environmental impact….” But how can environmental impacts be minimized without having SETENA “assess” exceptional cases such as those contemplated in sections 9 and 10? All of this has remained uncertain to date because of the extremely poor drafting of the Regulations, which were prepared without considering the technical and scientific criteria involved. If environmental impact assessments must always be predictive, then the opinions to be adopted by municipalities pursuant to sections 9 and 10 should likewise include the corresponding predictive analysis, even establishing mitigation, prevention, or compensation measures (medidas de mitigación, prevención o compensación).
Continuing with this section, it is noted that regulatory section 4 provides: “Article 4: Regionalization. In compliance with Article 2(i) of Ley 8839, the Ministry of Health establishes that the integrated management of ordinary solid waste must be assessed and planned by region, in accordance with the boundaries established by the Ministry of National Planning and Economic Policy (Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica, MIDEPLAN), as specified in Decreto Ejecutivo N° 37735, Reglamento general para el Sistema Nacional de Planificación, dated 06 de mayo del 2013. Municipalities and other entities responsible for waste management must organize themselves within these regions, ensuring the optimization of resources, the reduction of operating costs, and the minimization of environmental impacts. Each region shall autonomously manage its ordinary solid waste, reducing its dependence on other regions and promoting the implementation of circular-economy models (modelos de economía circular).
Likewise, technologies adapted to local needs must be used to ensure efficient and sustainable management aligned with the principles of environmental protection and public health. Each region shall autonomously manage its ordinary solid waste, reducing its dependence on other regions and promoting the implementation of circular-economy models. Likewise, technologies adapted to local needs must be used to ensure efficient and sustainable management aligned with the principles of environmental protection and public health.” In light of the foregoing, it is proposed that, as a matter of drafting and sound legal and environmental technique, the final paragraph of section 4 should establish that each municipality or group of municipalities must consult Nombre02 so that the best environmental and climate-related decisions can be made regarding the regionalization of waste management. Under the same understanding, it is also considered and proposed to this Chamber that sections 9 and 10, which establish the need for municipalities to adopt exceptional determinations, should expressly include a provision stating the obligation to consult SETENA. It is considered that the cited proposals would satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and the ratified treaty framework.
It notes that this Constitutional Chamber has previously ruled on several occasions regarding the threats posed by the effects of climate change to the human rights to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, health, drinking water, among others, as well as regarding the binding obligations assumed by Costa Rica through international environmental human rights instruments, including the obligations to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate the effects caused by them (judgment no. 2012-9206 of 04 de julio de 2012). But it asks: how can GHG emissions be stabilized without weighing and assessing municipal decisions? It states that the answer is clear: compliance with constitutional provisions 21 and 50 would be possible only if these local or regional entities were required to obtain an opinion from Nombre02. To illustrate the approach followed by the Chamber, it cites the following: “...
The principle of environmental protection is not a recommendation or statement of intent made by the Constitution; rather, it is an immediately enforceable right, and government agencies are therefore obligated to ensure compliance with the legal provisions intended to protect the environment...” (judgment no. 1999-132). Regarding in dubio pro natura and the precautionary principle (principio precautorio), it cites: “The in dubio pro natura principle, therefore, does not depend on the existence of a risk of serious or irreversible harm—as the precautionary principle does—but instead entails a ‘general rule of conduct governing the relationship of the State—and society in general—with the environment, applicable to all areas of decision-making in which there is a risk of environmental harm, and requiring us to refrain from choosing conduct that may harm the environment when other options exist (Nombre03 and Lucero, 2018)’” (Constitutional decision no. 2024-13229).
Prior consultation with Nombre02 by municipalities would be grounded in Article 14 of the aforementioned Convention on Biological Diversity and also in other international instruments, such as the Paris Agreement. Remaining within planetary boundaries is a matter of long-term survival; recognizing the legally binding nature of respect for the planetary boundaries that keep the Earth within the “safe operating space” is a matter of short-term justice, and this proceeding is therefore brought in an effort to introduce environmental soundness into the challenged provision. It recalls that, worldwide, we have entered a stage in which, instead of speaking of global warming, the terminology has already changed and it is said that we have entered an era of global boiling; we must therefore move forward, and civil society asks you, as administrators of climate justice, to observe what is happening throughout the world, where we have exceeded six of the nine planetary boundaries.
It requests that the previously cited report, Pressure on Public Finances in a Context of Climate Variability and Change: Challenges for Improving Present Conditions and Reducing Future Impacts (DFOE-AE-OS-00001-2017), be reviewed in order to appreciate the magnitude of the climate-related effects of poor national planning in Costa Rica. It states that, in the recent judgment in U”wa Indigenous People and Its Members v. Colombia, dated 04 de julio de 2024, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights considered the following regarding this matter: “States must take the ‘triple planetary crisis’ into account when fulfilling their obligations to respect and guarantee the right to a healthy environment. The triple planetary crisis describes the interconnection and combined effects of three global threats: environmental pollution, biodiversity loss, and the climate crisis arising from the extraction and use of fossil fuels and methane emissions.
In this regard, the United Nations Environment Assembly of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has stated that this combined crisis poses a critical threat to life on Earth, requiring urgent and coordinated global action to combat its effects. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) also underscores the existential nature of this threat, emphasizing that the devastating consequences of these interrelated crises affect the health of the planet and all its forms of life. Accordingly, the Court notes that the triple planetary crisis is a complex and multifaceted challenge requiring an integrated and urgent response to ensure the sustainability of the planet and the well-being of its inhabitants.” It also notes that (since 04/07/1994, under Law no. 7414) Costa Rica has been a State Party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), whose principles (Article 3) include the following: the Parties shall protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities; the Parties shall take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent, or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.
In addition, the UNFCCC establishes among State obligations (Article 4.f) the obligation to take climate-change considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in their relevant social, economic, and environmental policies and actions, and to employ appropriate methods with a view to minimizing adverse effects on the economy, public health, and the quality of the environment resulting from projects or measures undertaken by the Parties to mitigate or adapt to climate change. It further states that the protection of the climate rights of future generations has been addressed since July 2023 in the Maastricht Principles on the Human Rights of Future Generations, which stated the following: “17. Violations of the obligation to respect. Violations of the obligations to respect the human rights of future generations include, among others:
In order for the appropriate determination regarding jurisdiction to have been made correctly, it considers that this should have been done through a legislative amendment removing from Nombre02 its powers regarding solid-waste management, the preparation of guidelines, etc.; however, because this was done at the regulatory level, this is a situation requiring a ruling from this Chamber, at least an interpretive one, unless it declares the provisions unconstitutional and removes all the challenged provisions from our legal system. Second: The regulations were never subjected to SETENA’s review, nor did they obtain an environmental permit, despite containing provisions that establish regulations and conditions governing land-use planning by regionalizing integrated solid-waste management. It notes that, given the Nombre01 of the Regulations, it is evident that they establish land-use planning rules and duties to evaluate land-use planning by region; consequently, they should have been submitted to SETENA for approval of a strategic environmental assessment (evaluación ambiental estratégica, EAE), thereby obtaining an environmental permit at the national or regional level.
Because this was not done, there is a constitutional-level deficiency that violates Article 50 of the Constitution. It observes that when Section 4 of the Regulations states: “… Regionalization. In compliance with Article 2(i) of Ley 8839, the Ministry of Health establishes that the integrated management of ordinary solid waste must be evaluated and planned by region, in accordance with the boundaries established by the Ministry of National Planning and Economic Policy (MIDEPLAN),” it expressly links everything to land-use rules. Accordingly, this is clearly now a provision with land-use planning implications, and the second ground of the action is based on that fact. It argues that interpretations in environmental matters must always be guided by the environmental public interest, as established in Article 11(3) of the Biodiversity Law, and by the precautionary principle (principio precautorio).
It therefore requests a ruling that its argument is correct and that, based on Sections 4 and 10—or the Regulations as a whole—they should have been submitted to Nombre02 before being given validity, force, and effect, in order to reduce the risks, harm, and adverse environmental impact of the provisions. Because this did not occur, the Regulations must now be declared unconstitutional. Indeed, the current SETENA provision contained in the Manual of Technical Instruments for the Environmental Impact Assessment Process (EIA Manual), Part III.14, states: “Article 1—Introduction of the environmental variable into Regulatory Plans or other land-use planning. In all land-use planning undertaken in the country, including public or private cantonal or local regulatory plans that contemplate the development of activities, works, or projects that could affect the environment, the environmental variable must be incorporated in accordance with the Procedure for Introducing the Environmental Variable into Regulatory Plans or Other Land-Use Planning established in Anexo 1 of this decree….” Although the Regulations are not a cantonal regulatory plan, it is evident that they are rules under which the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Health adopted or planned measures dividing and organizing the country into regions and even, in Section 10, established maximum travel distances for trucks carrying waste, which entail land uses.
Section 10 even established maximum radii for locating transfer stations when waste had to be transported more than 80 km. Consequently, in its view, the Regulations constitute rules that imposed regulations and organized geographic space; they therefore should have been subjected to Nombre02’s review before being approved and published. Because this was not done, Sections 4 and 10, as well as the Regulations as a whole, must be declared entirely unconstitutional. Strategic environmental assessments also expressly apply to all regulations requiring land-use planning, and these Regulations are a clear example, as indicated by Section 4 in connection with Section 10. The argument is based on the holdings of this Constitutional Chamber in decisions no. 2002-01220, in expediente 01-002886-0007-CO of February 6, 2002; no. 2005-02529, in expediente 03-009943- 0007- CO of March 9, 2005; and no. 2005-097765, in expediente 05-03589-0007- CO of July 27, 2005, which establish the need to incorporate the environmental variable into land-use planning.
Consideration is also requested of Chapter VI of Ley 7554 (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente) and the General Regulations on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedures in Costa Rica (Decreto Ejecutivo nro. 31849- MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC), which include a special section on introducing the environmental-impact variable, or environmental variable, into Regulatory Plans and other forms of land-use planning (all of which would be connected to Article 50 of the Constitution).
Third: Without supporting studies or reasonable grounds, the challenged provisions exclude the collection and transportation of special-handling or hazardous waste. Section 2 of these Regulations states: “Article 2: Scope of Application. The Executive Branch, acting through the Ministry of Health and within the scope of its powers, shall coordinate with the municipalities and ordinary solid-waste management companies authorized in Costa Rica regarding the planning, collection, treatment, recovery, and final disposal of ordinary solid waste under a regional model. Special-handling or hazardous waste, governed by Ley N°8839 of June 24, 2010, ‘Ley para la Gestión Integral de Residuos,’ and by the Reglamento General a la Ley para la Gestión Integral de Residuos, N° 37567-S-MINAETH dated March 19, 2013, is excluded.” As previously explained, it argues that the challenged rules govern the management and movement of solid waste, but that Section 2, without grounds supported by technical and scientific studies, excluded from their application the collection, transportation, and final disposal of a particularly hazardous or special type of waste.
In its view, it was and remains essential for the collection and transportation of this type of special waste to be assessed comprehensively together with the collection and transportation of ordinary solid waste, since that would be an appropriate way to undertake the necessary waste management. Although special waste should not be collected in the same trucks or at the same time as ordinary waste, the provision contains no technical justification for failing to make appropriate arrangements for hazardous waste, because such waste likewise causes serious pollution problems involving greenhouse gases (gases de efecto invernadero, GEI), the atmosphere, and the legally protected interest of the climate, as well as the right to health and to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment; it therefore reveals an unconstitutional defect. Mandatory waste management—whether involving ordinary solid, organic, or special waste—required joint but differentiated regulation.
The absence of such regulation disrupts the logic of a comprehensive waste-regulation process and violates Article 50 of the Constitution. Based on the foregoing, it requests that Section 2 be declared entirely unconstitutional for violating the principle of scientific protection (principio de tutela científica). Along the same lines, it requests a declaration that Section 1 is constitutionally defective insofar as it states that the purpose of the Regulations is solely to govern the management of ordinary solid waste, because the use of that word excluded the regulation of special or hazardous waste in Costa Rica without a technical and scientific study. The same defect would consequently be present in the Nombre01 of the Regulations, since it states that only ordinary solid and organic waste will be regulated.
Fourth: Failure to assess climate effects in environmental assessments (diagnósticos ambientales) concerning the management of solid waste of any kind. Section 5(d) of the Regulations states: “Article 5: Assessment of ordinary-waste management needs by region. Every five years, the Directorate of Radiological Protection and Environmental Health (DPRSA) of the Ministry of Health, in coordination with the Ministry of Housing and Human Settlements, the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the Institute for Municipal Development and Advisory Services, the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses, and the State Universities, shall prepare an assessment to identify critical areas in each region with respect to ordinary-waste management, considering the following matters: … d. Environmental and Public-Health Indicators. • Areas in which high rates of improper ordinary solid-waste management have been identified. • Complaints concerning the burning of ordinary waste. • Complaints concerning the creation of landfills or dumps. • Protected areas and aquifer-recharge zones in which the construction of waste infrastructure must be avoided….
This assessment will make it possible to identify, for each region, the need to implement activities for the treatment, recovery, and final disposal of ordinary waste….” The foregoing reveals an omission constituting a deficiency of constitutional and international-law status, because there is no valid reason not to include among the environmental and public-health indicators an indicator relating to a safe climate, GEI, and carbon sequestration (fijación de carbono), all of which relate to Articles 21 and 50 of the Constitution and to Articles 4.2 and 7.2.2. of the Paris Agreement, which establish that each State must take measures to mitigate climate change, since adaptation is a global challenge affecting all persons, States, and businesses. This likewise violates the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, whose principles in Article 3 include the parties’ obligation to protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations.
That international instrument also states that precautionary measures must be taken to anticipate, prevent, or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Article 4(f) of that Convention sets forth the State’s duty, to the extent feasible, to take climate-change considerations into account in its social, economic, and environmental policies and measures and to employ appropriate methods. Here, there is no justification for the climate’s omission, given that, as stated, an assessment must be prepared. This is therefore an omission that should be corrected by adding another subparagraph to Section 5(d). To demonstrate further the necessity of what it argues, it notes that Section 5 states that the “assessment will make it possible to identify, for each region, the need to implement activities for the treatment, recovery, and final disposal of ordinary waste.” Accordingly, omitting the climate-related component is nonsensical and would violate proportionality and reasonableness as basic principles of environmental law.
The questions arising from that deficiency would be: How could activities for the treatment, recovery, and final disposal of waste be identified for each region if there is no item incorporating the climate-related component so that timely measures can be taken to measure, reduce, or eliminate the atmospheric effects of GEI?
Why is express reference made to several environmental factors, while the legally protected interest of climate (bien jurídico clima) is left out? The question is: if, from the standpoint of international conventions, climate obligations are established for policies, activities, works, or projects, why was the climate variable omitted from something as important as an environmental assessment (diagnóstico ambiental) of sites where solid waste is not managed in a timely manner? How will critical areas be identified by region without quantifying or considering climate-related factors? In truth, this reflects how the climate variable is overlooked throughout the regulations, as previously stated. Accordingly, he requests a finding of unconstitutionality and incompatibility with international conventions by omission, and a declaration that the Executive Branch must include the climate variable among the assessment indicators.
Fifth: Violation of the principle of objectification (principio de objetivación) with respect to regulated areas, radii, and distances in kilometers. He warns that several of the challenged provisions contain legal and climate-related inconsistencies that are unsupported by technical criteria and were adopted solely as a matter of administrative discretion, which is extremely dangerous because, among other things, the environmental and climate-related effects of those decisions are unknown. Provision 10 states: “Article 10: Transportation of ordinary solid waste (Residuos sólidos ordinarios), distances, and exceptional cases. The transportation of ordinary solid waste must simultaneously satisfy two fundamental conditions: 1. Ordinary solid-waste management must take place within the corresponding region, in accordance with the boundaries established by the Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica (MIDEPLAN), pursuant to Article 4 of these regulations, except for cases subject to Article 8 of these regulations. 2.
When ordinary solid waste must be transported outside the municipal territory where it is generated for treatment or final disposal, the distance to the Environmental Parks (Parques Ambientales) must not exceed 80 kilometers from the farthest point of generation. Whenever this distance is exceeded, the use of Transfer Stations (Estaciones de Transferencia) shall be mandatory to optimize transportation, ensuring efficient operation within the same region…”. Provision 10, paragraph 2, establishes a situation that was left entirely within the realm of subjective administrative judgment, because there is no scientific or technical explanation or justification for why 80 kilometers was considered a sufficiently efficient maximum distance for transporting ordinary solid waste outside the municipal territory where it is generated for treatment or final disposal at the industrial park. The “recitals” (considerandos) of the Regulations make no mention of any studies on the subject.
The maximum distance of 80 kms could create serious environmental, social, economic, and institutional problems for municipalities and regulated parties, because: 1- If the environmental park or transfer station is 89 km away, what would happen? Would transportation only a few additional kilometers be illegal? 2- Would municipalities have to find land on which to build a transfer station so as to reduce the distance to kilometer 79 and thereby comply with the regulatory provision? 3- What happens if the current regulatory plan (plan regulador) within the canton does not authorize land use (uso del suelo) for a transfer station or a sanitary landfill (relleno sanitario) less than 80 kms from the initial collection stage? 4- Was the maximum distance in kilometers established by considering the greenhouse gases (gases de efecto invernadero, GEI) generated by solid waste and the burning of fuel by hauling trucks, or did that distance also take into account carbon sequestration (fijación de carbono) from the waste?
In other words, what environmental and climate-related parameters were weighed in determining the maximum distance? 5- What preexisting provision having the force of law justified those 80 kms? 6- At the end of paragraph 10, a maximum period of only one year is established for having transfer stations and, potentially, cantonal or inter-cantonal sanitary landfills in place; therefore, when could the procurement procedures (licitaciones) be conducted so that applications for environmental licenses (licencias ambientales) may be prepared and the land expropriated and acquired? 7- Will one year be sufficient for all the necessary enabling acts (actos habilitadores) to be completed? 8- What becomes of the contracts that municipalities have signed with companies that transport waste to various parts of the country if there are no nearby transfer stations within 80 kms? 9- Will it be necessary to institute harmfulness proceedings (procesos de lesividad) to invalidate the contracts currently being performed by companies hired by municipalities that travel beyond 80 kms?
As can be seen, many questions arise concerning the distances and the period granted by a provision that was never analyzed using scientific parameters or based on separate technical studies for each canton; this nationwide generalization violates rational logic and the principles of reasonableness and proportionality (principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad). He considers that the Ministerio de Salud and the Presidencia have very irresponsibly jeopardized even waste collection and municipal finances, and he requests a declaration to that effect. He further states that, regarding the principle of objectification, constitutional decisions numbers 2005-14293, 2006-17126 and 2009-2009 may be consulted, in which the following paragraph has repeatedly been cited: “Regarding the objectification of environmental protection (objetivación de la tutela ambiental): as this Court stated in judgment number 14293-2005, issued at two fifty-two p.m. on October nineteenth, two thousand five, this is a principle that must under no circumstances be confused with the preceding principle [referring to the precautionary principle (principio precautorio)], since, as a consequence of Articles 16 and 160 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, it entails the need to support decision-making in this field with technical studies, with respect both to individual acts and to provisions of general application—whether statutory or regulatory—from which arises the requirement of ‘adherence to science and technology’ (vinculación a la ciencia y a la técnica), thereby constraining the Administration’s discretion in this area.
Accordingly, in light of the results of those technical studies—such as environmental impact studies (estudios de impacto ambiental)—if there is objective technical evidence indicating the likelihood of manifest harm to the environment, natural resources, or human health, the proposed project, work, or activity must be rejected; and where there is ‘reasonable doubt,’ decisions must be made in favor of the environment under the pro-nature principle (principio pro-natura), which may entail adopting both compensatory and precautionary measures in order to provide adequate environmental protection.” The drafters of the Regulations have jeopardized the right to health, quality of life, and even the right to a healthy environment by issuing a provision with serious deficiencies such as those identified, plainly violating the right to pursue sustainable development (desarrollo sostenible), under which environmental, social, economic, and institutional considerations must operate organically and in balance.
The mere fact of generalizing something that is not amenable to generalization, such as distances, without weighing binding provisions in regulatory plans and the various land uses on a case-by-case basis, demonstrates the absurdity of the provision; however, the Executive Branch disregarded the specific circumstances of each canton, thereby permeating the Regulations with unconstitutionality. If, because of these Regulations, municipalities were unable to obtain sites for environmental parks or transfer stations within the perimeters prescribed by provision 10, the solid-waste problem would become a national emergency, because the straitjacket that has been imposed prevents municipalities from acting swiftly. The drafters of the provision proceeded from an idealized situation in which the cantons were uniform; they never properly assessed land-use plans (planes de ordenamiento territorial), whether transfer stations would be ready at suitable locations, or even whether sanitary landfills or environmental parks would be available.
Because this was not done, the challenged provision creates inconsistencies that unquestionably establish a violation of the principle of objectification, resulting in nationwide chaos. The dangers posed by untreated GEI during the collection stage could become more severe under this provision. In responding to this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad), the Executive Branch may claim that it instead seeks to bring order to solid-waste management; however, by adopting a provision lacking supporting technical grounds, it took a dreadful step forward. Indeed, an express statute providing for a degree of flexibility should have been enacted, but never a rigid regulation. It should be noted that the adopted provisions instead jeopardize even municipal finances and require amendments to many existing regulatory plans so that each canton must provide suitable locations for sanitary landfills or transfer stations.
Ultimately, those most affected are those of us in civil society, both in this generation and in future generations. It is clear that, when the provision was issued, its direct and indirect collateral effects on society were never measured; constitutional decision number 2005-1174 encapsulates the essence of the argument made here as follows: “Any harm caused to the environment is always difficult or impossible to remedy, and the approval of an environmental impact study requires complete certainty that natural resources will be affected only minimally, as Article 50 of the Carta Política mandates by its own force...”. Environmental impact assessments (evaluaciones de impacto ambiental, EIA) are conspicuously absent in the exceptional cases under provisions 9 and 10; moreover, minimal impact cannot be verified for that same reason. By issuing provision 10. 2, the respondents deprived the relevant requirements of substance and exposed us to clear and manifest risks; instead of shedding light on the problem of solid-waste management, the challenged provision leaves many issues unresolved that place society and the planet at risk.
That provision cannot be remedied because of its inherent rigidity. He further considers that it jeopardizes the legally protected interest of climate because no predictive assessment was made of what might occur once the provision began to be applied; therefore, the constitutional challenge should be granted and point 10.2 should also be declared unconstitutional insofar as it rigidly establishes a maximum distance in kilometers. If the principle of objectification applies to legislative activity, he considers that it must also apply to this regulatory provision and requests a declaration to that effect. He states that this issue concerning the lack of studies relating to regulatory provision 10 cannot be overlooked when it provides: “Transfer Stations: must be strategically located within the territory of the municipality generating the waste or, failing that, within the territories of municipalities participating in an intermunicipal agreement (convenio intermunicipal), while observing a radius of influence of up to 45 kilometers…”.
He requests that everything stated above in this third section be considered when evaluating that 45 kms radius, because that range has no scientific or technical justification and is therefore unconstitutional. He notes that there is a regulatory obligation that supposedly may not be exceeded, but where did the justification for that area come from?
The truth is that no one knows, and for that reason it is unconstitutional. The question is also asked: Why was a radius of 15 kms or 65 kms not considered? The truth is that everything was left to the imagination and discretion of the Poder Ejecutivo, and that must not be permitted, since it may cause environmental, social, and climate-related problems affecting people’s health, ecosystems, and even future generations. The initiative of the Poder Ejecutivo was clearly improvised and rushed, admits of no remedy whatsoever, and must be so declared. Those radii in the aforementioned provision are even imposed over provisions in territorial planning plans (planes de ordenamiento territorial), since it appears that acceptance of this rigidity is mandated without just cause by the Poder Ejecutivo. Sixth: Unconstitutionality arising from the establishment of mandatory regulations for municipalities by means of a regulation.
Regulatory provision 10 clearly states that the requirements are unalterable, and that article, which consists of two subsections, provides: “The transportation of ordinary solid waste must simultaneously satisfy two fundamental conditions.” The words “must satisfy” are mandatory and rigid and allow no flexibility or discretion. The petitioner considers that this imposition even violates the constitutionally protected territorial and administrative autonomy of municipalities and that, accordingly, the words “must satisfy” violate constitutional provision 169 and constitutional provision 170. The Código Municipal, which constitutes the special law (norma especial), establishes that there will be regional or national powers in which municipalities “may” participate together with the Administración Pública; however, the word “may,” contained in provision 3, does not mean that every municipality must do and obey whatever the Poder Ejecutivo orders it to do.
The petitioner notes that the provision states: “Article 3. - The territorial jurisdiction of a municipality is its respective canton, whose principal city is the seat of the municipal government. The government and administration of cantonal interests and services shall be entrusted to the municipal government. A municipality may exercise municipal powers and invest public funds jointly with other municipalities and institutions of the Administración Pública for the fulfillment of local, regional, or national purposes, or for the construction of public works of common benefit, in accordance with the agreements they execute for that purpose.” The challenged provision has regulatory rank and, therefore, the duty established in the cited regulatory provision 10 contravenes constitutional articles 169 and 170 and the Código Municipal, because no statute establishes the obligation imposed by the Ejecutivo.
In other words, through a regulatory provision, the Poder Ejecutivo arbitrarily prescribed matters falling entirely within municipal authority; indeed, not even the Ley de Gestión Integral de Residuos Sólidos establishes the duty being imposed and now challenged. The word “must” must be declared unconstitutional on every occasion on which it appears in provisions 4 and 10, as must the obligations imposed on municipalities, as explained with reference to provision 9. In light of all the foregoing, the petitioner considers that the Poder Ejecutivo exceeded its regulatory authority (potestad reglamentaria) in provisions 4, 9, and 10, because it is compelling municipalities to make decisions in violation of their territorial and administrative municipal autonomy (autonomía municipal territorial y administrativa). Provision 4 states: “Regionalization. In compliance with article 2 subsection i) of Ley 8839, the Ministerio de Salud establishes that the integrated management of ordinary solid waste (gestión integral de los residuos sólidos ordinarios) must be evaluated and planned by region…
Municipalities and other entities responsible for waste management must organize themselves within these regions, ensuring the optimization of resources and the reduction of operating costs. Each region shall autonomously manage its ordinary solid waste….” As can be seen, the regulatory provision states that, pursuant to article 2 subsection i) of the Ley de Gestión Integral de Residuos Sólidos, a municipal duty exists. This is untrue, because the wording in that body of law sets forth an objective of the law, providing that integrated waste management will be promoted, and “to promote” is very different from “must.” The word “must” entails a mandatory order, whereas the second word, “promote,” means to encourage or pursue an objective. The petitioner therefore considers that the regulation contains unconstitutional provisions that encroach upon municipal powers and autonomy. For the reasons stated, the petitioner considers that the purported “duty” allegedly derived from provision 2 subsection i) of Ley 8839 must be declared unconstitutional, because that claim is false.
Furthermore, the words “shall organize themselves within those regions,” or the obligation to manage waste autonomously, must be deemed unconstitutional because an express statute requiring what the Poder Ejecutivo now seeks to mandate through a mere regulation is lacking. The petitioner also notes that, by providing in provision 4 of the Reglamento that municipalities must autonomously manage their ordinary solid waste, it also violates their constitutionally protected territorial and administrative municipal autonomy. Regulatory provision 9 states: “Article 9: Exceptional cases. In accordance with provisions 8, 9, and 10 of Ley 8839, in cases where it is determined that, due to geographical characteristics and environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental), it is more practicable from the standpoint of transportation and route conditions to dispose of waste at an environmental park (parque ambiental) located in another region, while complying with the distances established in article 9 of this regulation and the municipal integrated waste-management plan (plan municipal de gestión integral de residuos), a technical justification supporting that decision shall be required.
At a minimum, the justification must contain: 1. A technical and economic analysis comparing the available alternatives and demonstrating that the proposed option is the most feasible in terms of operating costs and efficiency. 2. Potential impacts and mitigation measures (medidas de mitigación) to minimize adverse effects in the areas of origin and destination. 3. A projection of the volumes of waste to be transported, considering current and future generation in the region of origin. 4. Reduction and recovery measures (valorización) implemented before final disposal, detailing their impact on minimizing the waste transported. 5. Capacity of the receiving site. 6. A logistics and transportation plan, including routes, frequencies, and monitoring mechanisms to ensure traceability and minimize the impact of transportation. 7. Intermunicipal agreements or contracts with private operators, if applicable.
The Ministerio de Salud shall provide technical support and supervision in implementing these measures, ensuring that waste-separation, treatment, recovery, and final-disposal sites comply with decreto ejecutivo N° 44421-S Reglamento de parques ambientales para la separación, tratamiento, aprovechamiento y disposición final de residuos sólidos dated 4 de marzo del 2024.” In provision 9 of the challenged regulation, the Poder Ejecutivo unconstitutionally created an obligation requiring municipalities to justify a decision by means of an enabling environmental act (acto habilitador ambiental). Throughout provision 9, it is evident that Presidencia and the Ministerio de Salud arrogated to themselves, or claimed, powers belonging to Nombre02 without having authority to do so; moreover, they compel municipalities to conduct their own environmental assessments in order to collect and transport waste.
In the petitioner’s view, this could not be done by regulation because it entails two constitutional defects: the first is encroaching upon SETENA’s authority by creating an environmental guide without any criteria, as previously explained; furthermore, there is no authority to do so. The second is compelling municipalities to justify environmental criteria despite lacking the expertise, experience, or authority to conduct an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA), and it is therefore unconstitutional. Provision 10 of the regulation provides: “Article 10: Transportation of ordinary solid waste, distances, and exceptional cases. The transportation of ordinary solid waste must simultaneously satisfy two fundamental conditions: 1. The management of ordinary solid waste must take place within the corresponding region, in accordance with the boundaries established by the Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica (MIDEPLAN), pursuant to article 4 of this regulation, except in cases governed by article 8 of this regulation. 2.
When ordinary solid waste must be transported outside the municipal territory where it is generated for treatment or final disposal, the distance to the Parques Ambientales must not exceed 80 kilómetros from the most distant generation point. In cases where this distance is exceeded, the use of transfer stations (Estaciones de Transferencia) shall be mandatory to optimize transportation and ensure efficient operation within the same region. The transfer stations must be strategically located within the territory of the generating municipality or, alternatively, within the territories of municipalities that are parties to an intermunicipal agreement, while observing a radius of influence of up to 45 kilómetros. These facilities must have the infrastructure necessary to ensure efficient logistical operation and protection of the environment and public health, pursuant to chapter XI ‘De las estaciones de transferencia’ of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 36093-S, Reglamento sobre el Manejo de Residuos Sólidos Ordinarios, published on 16 de agosto de 2010.
Strategies must also be implemented to prevent traffic congestion and optimize transportation flows. Exceptional circumstances: If transportation to another region is required because infrastructure is under development or maintenance, or because another region has more advanced or efficient approved technologies, the following information must be submitted for review to the Dirección Regional de Rectoría de la Salud corresponding to the canton: a. A detailed technical report explaining the reasons for the exception and specifying whether it is due to: .Infrastructure development in the original region. .Maintenance work requiring operations to cease at treatment or final-disposal sites. .An exceptional circumstance (for example, natural disasters, health emergencies, or maintenance). .The availability of advanced technologies in another region. b. A comparative analysis of the technological capacities of the regions involved when more advanced or efficient technologies exist. c. The proposed destination for treatment, recovery, or final disposal. d. Evidence that the receiving site complies with national regulations. e. A plan that includes: .Strategies for managing ordinary solid waste during the exception period. .A detailed schedule of transportation activities. .Mechanisms for minimizing environmental and public-health impacts.
These exceptions shall have a maximum term of 1 year from the entry into force of this regulation, during which each region must work on developing its infrastructure.” In the foregoing, the petitioner notes inconsistencies and violations of municipal autonomy. For example, the provision begins by stating: “1. The management of ordinary solid waste must take place within the corresponding region.” Why is the term MUST used? What is the technical basis for imposing this requirement? Why is an obligation imposed on municipalities when it has no support in a statutory or constitutional provision?
And given that there are no grounds for the foregoing, it is considered that there is an unconstitutional infringement (inconstitucionalidad) arising from the violation of municipal autonomy, in addition to the principle of scientific protection (principio de tutela científica), discussed above. The same applies to the imposition of a maximum distance of 80 kms, since there are no criteria justifying the violation of territorial and administrative autonomy and because this was done through a regulation when it was required to be enacted by law. The same reasoning may be applied to the 45-km radii, since there is no technical justification for them, and this also violates territorial and administrative autonomy in the management of municipalities’ own interests. Finally, this section could not be concluded without mentioning, with respect to this constitutional violation of municipal powers and authority, that Article 3 of Law No. 10096 provides as follows: “ARTICLE 3—Scope of application.
This law is a matter of public policy (orden público). It shall apply in all official regions of the country established by the Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica, hereinafter Mideplan. It shall be binding on the entire public sector, both centralized and decentralized, including public enterprises, except those operating under a competitive regime, which this law authorizes to assist in fulfilling its objectives. Institutions possessing constitutionally guaranteed autonomy may participate within the framework of their constitutional autonomy. The Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS) and the state universities may participate within the framework of their constitutional autonomy. Municipalities shall be authorized to participate actively in regional development whenever they deem it appropriate, within the scope and exercise of the municipal autonomy vested in them.” This provision, which by reason of its connection is linked to constitutional Articles 169 and 170, provides that, by virtue of their constitutionally enshrined autonomy, municipalities have the power to participate, or not, in regional development processes.
The challenged decree flagrantly infringes that exclusive power of the municipalities, and for that reason it is considered that this action, together with the other points already addressed, should be granted and declared well-founded. The petitioner requests a declaration that provisions 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9 and 10 are constitutionally defective and incompatible with international conventions (inconvencionalidad); that the challenged provisions be found to constitute an abuse of the Executive Branch’s regulatory authority (potestad reglamentaria); and that they also violate several principles of environmental law, including the prevention principle (principio preventivo), the precautionary principle (principio precautorio), the safe-climate principle (principio de clima seguro), the principle of scientific protection, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, as well as the non-regression principle (principio de no regresión) and the progressivity principle (principio de progresividad).
The petitioner asks that the constitutional effects of a declaration of unconstitutionality (declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad) be weighed and that, if it is considered feasible, upon balancing the violation of municipal autonomy (sixth point) and the failure to subject the regulation to a strategic environmental assessment (evaluación ambiental estratégica) (second point), the entire regulation be declared null and void. In any event, the petitioner asks that consideration be given to the first point, which requests at least an interpretive judgment (sentencia interpretativa), and to the third, fourth, and fifth points, which allege that there were no technical grounds for excluding hazardous waste and that radii and distances in kilometers lacking any supporting basis were established without studies. The petitioner likewise requests that the Court address the encroachment upon the authority of Nombre02 and the mandatory need to take action to ensure a safe climate.
The petitioner adds the provisions of Advisory Opinion OC-32/25 of May 29, 2025, issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and entitled Climate Emergency and Human Rights, so that they may be considered in these proceedings. This action is admitted because it meets the requirements set forth in Articles 73 through 79 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. The petitioner has standing (legitimación) based on the existence of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) concerning environmental protection. Notice of the filing of the action shall be published three consecutive times in the Boletín Judicial. Legal effects of filing the action: The purpose of the publication provided for in Article 81 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional is to notify the courts and the bodies that exhaust administrative remedies (agotan la vía administrativa) that the constitutional challenge (demanda de inconstitucionalidad) has been filed, so that no final decision may be issued, until the Chamber has ruled on the matter, in any proceedings or procedures in which the application of the law, decree, provision, agreement, or resolution is at issue.
Several rules follow from this statutory provision. The first, and perhaps most important, is that filing an action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) does not suspend the general effectiveness and applicability of the provisions. The second is that only acts applying the challenged provisions are suspended—by judicial authorities in proceedings brought before them or by administrative authorities in procedures intended to exhaust administrative remedies—but not the general validity and application of those provisions. The third rule is that the Chamber may determine the extent of the action’s suspensive effect (efecto suspensivo). The fourth is that, in principle, in cases involving a direct action (acción directa), as in this action brought in defense of diffuse interests, filing does not have a suspensive effect (see judgment No. 537-91 of the Constitutional Court).
In other words, at the administrative level, suspension of the application of the challenged provisions operates only in cases involving a procedure for the exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de vía administrativa), which presupposes that an interested party has filed an appeal to a higher authority (recurso de alzada) or a motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición) against the final act. Where there is no dispute regarding the application of the provision, suspension of its effectiveness and applicability is not warranted. In other words, in all matters in which there is no procedure for exhausting administrative remedies under the terms set forth above, the provision must continue to be applied, regardless of whether it benefits the litigant—a favorable administrative act—or harms the litigant—an unfavorable act that has not been challenged. Within fifteen days after the first publication of the aforementioned notice, persons appearing as parties in matters pending on the date this action was filed, in which the application of the challenged provisions is at issue, or persons having a legitimate interest (interés legítimo), may enter an appearance to support the action’s admissibility or inadmissibility or, where appropriate, to expand upon the grounds of unconstitutionality relating to the matter in which they have an interest.
It is further stated that, pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional and as the Chamber has repeatedly held (decisions 0536-91, 0537-91, 0554-91 and 0881-91), this publication does not suspend the general validity of the provision, but only its application in the cases and under the conditions specified. The response to the hearing granted in this decision shall be submitted only once, using only one of the following methods: physical documents submitted directly to the Chamber’s Clerk’s Office; the fax system; electronic documents submitted through the GESTIÓN EN LÍNEA System; or the email address ...01, which is used exclusively for receiving reports. In every case, the response and all other documents shall expressly indicate the case number to which they pertain. Responses submitted electronically shall bear the signature of the responsible person signing them, either by digitizing the physical document bearing that person’s signature or by means of a digital signature, in accordance with the provisions of the Ley de Certificados, Firmas Digitales y Documentos Electrónicos, Nº 8454, in order to establish the authenticity of the filing. Electronically generated or digitized documents submitted through the Gestión en Línea System or the specified email address shall not exceed 3 Megabytes. Let notice be given.
*250172170007CO* ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD [Nombre01 001] SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas treinta y siete minutos del diez de julio de dos mil veinticinco.
Se da curso a la acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por [Nombre01 001], para que se declaren inconstitucionales los numerales 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9 y 10 del REGLAMENTO PARA LA GESTIÓN REGIONALIZADA DE RESIDUOS SÓLIDOS ORDINARIOS Y ORGÁNICOS EN COSTA RICA, DECRETO EJECUTIVO, nro. 44974-S, publicado en el Alcance nro. 52 a la Gaceta nro. 75 de 28 de abril de 2025, por violentar los artículos 21 y 50 constitucionales, la Convención de la Diversidad Biológica y el Acuerdo de París, así como los principios ambientales de progresividad, preventivo, el de clima seguro, y de tutela científica. Se confiere audiencia por quince días a la Procuraduría General de la República, al ministro de Ambiente y Energía, al secretario general de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, a la ministra de la Presidencia y a la ministra de Salud. Las normas se impugnan en cuanto se alega violación a los numerales 21 y 50 constitucionales y la inobservancia de varios convenios internacionales ratificados, como la Convención de la Diversidad Biológica y el Acuerdo de París.
Además, y los principios ambientales, tales como el de progresividad, preventivo, clima seguro y de tutela científica. Motivos de Inconstitucionalidad: 1- Violación al principio de tutela científica en términos amplios, conforme a lo establecido en las normas 4, 9 y 10, desvinculación de la variable climática en los numerales 4, 9 y 10; y desregularización de las competencias de Nombre02 en los ordinales 9 y 10. Señala que el reglamento busca, por primera vez en Costa Rica, normar en esencia la gestión y/o el tráfico de residuos sólidos ordinarios y orgánicos entre cantones, hasta llegar a sitios donde se tratarán esos materiales y como prueba de ello, denota el propio título del Reglamento y el Considerando Cuarto de la norma cuestionada, que señala de forma expresa: "… las disposiciones establecidas en el presente Decreto Ejecutivo buscan promover la creación y el mejoramiento de infraestructura pública y privada necesaria para la recolección selectiva, el transporte, el acopio, el almacenamiento, la valorización, el tratamiento y la disposición final adecuada de residuos sólidos, incluyendo el fomento de soluciones regionales…".
El numeral 2 del Reglamento, en la misma línea se señala: "Artículo 2: Ámbito de Aplicación. El Poder Ejecutivo a través del Ministerio de Salud, dentro del ámbito de sus competencias, coordinará con las municipalidades y empresas de gestión de residuos sólidos ordinarios autorizadas en Costa Rica, la planificación, recolección, tratamiento, aprovechamiento y disposición final de residuos sólidos ordinarios en un modelo regional…". Pero, a pesar de lo monumentalmente trascendente de la disposición reglamentaria, emitida por el presidente de la República y la ministra del ente rector en residuos, se tiene que, sin razón técnica, ni científica, o jurídica, a la fecha no se incorporó la variable climática en una actividad, que a todas luces genera efectos negativos a la atmósfera, a la salud y al planeta. En su criterio, lo anterior violenta el principio preventivo por omisión, porque es manifiesto que, si existen estudios, como en verdad los hay, que señalan que vendrán consecuencias negativas por efectos del cambio climático, no se justifica el haber dejado la variable climática fuera en la norma en cuestión.
Cuando se habla en lo anterior de falta de "informes técnicos que garanticen la sostenibilidad de la actividad", aduce que debe ponderarse ello como falencia en la norma reglamentaria, porque desde la perspectiva del volumen de ingresos de residuos diarios o semanales o anuales a todos los sitios de tratamiento, no existe a la fecha un dosier con la métrica de estos, conjugados con otros factores antrópicos y naturales, que pudieran haber arrojado datos que determinaran que el Reglamento en sí fuera una verdadera y sólida solución integral ambiental/climática para cada municipalidad, o grupo de municipalidades y, en ese sentido, al estar carentes de un respaldo científico, se puede afirmar, que la norma cuestionada se elaboró en violación al principio de tutela científica y al de prevención. Pide que por favor valoren el expediente administrativo de este reglamento cuestionado para que vean que nunca se sopesó el cambio climático vinculado a los residuos en la ecuación y ese error lleva a afirmar de entrada que existe un vicio de rango constitucional.
Los diferentes convenios internacionales suscritos por nuestro país instan a tomar medidas para reducir los factores que provocan un clima no seguro. Estima que cada Estado más bien debe colaborar a disminuir los impactos negativos ambientales, para con ello enfocarse en luchar por una resiliencia climática y entre las acciones que estamos obligados a hacer, es al menos contar con datos certeros de las emisiones, para poder tomar decisiones vitales para elaborar las mejores regulaciones. Y en la misma línea la Corte IDH ha dispuesto en el caso LA OROYA VS. PERÚ el 27 noviembre de 2023: "34. En cuanto a las obligaciones hay dos cuestiones que deben destacarse: la obligación de prevención y la obligación de protección -mejor conocido como principio precautorio. La Corte IDH identifica que la diferencia entre ambas es que mientras que en la primera existe una certeza científica sobre cuáles serían las consecuencias ambientales (frente a las que operan las sub-obligaciones como regular, fiscalizar, estudios de impacto ambiental, etc.); en el caso de la segunda obligación, opera cuando no exista certeza científica sobre las consecuencias ambientales, pero ello no exime que el Estado tome medidas para hacer frente a los posibles daños ambientales".
Es un hecho que, partiendo de las investigaciones públicas como los que cita, era necesario que, previo a emitir el Reglamento, se debía partir de un estudio general nacional, proveniente de la Oficina de Cambio Climático del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, en conjunto con el Ministerio de Planificación y el Ministerio de Salud, pero a la fecha, ello no se hizo y se nota por tanto una gran falencia técnica de rango constitucional, pues se emitió una norma reglamentaria, sin tener claro si la misma era la mejor, técnica y científicamente hablando. En el expediente administrativo del decreto ejecutivo, nro. 44974-S, ese dosier climático de estudios o investigaciones que señala no existe y eso demuestra la falta de fundamentos que nos lleva a comprender, que lo expuesto sobre las normas 4, 9 y 10 del reglamento es cierto, pues todo se hizo por mera discrecionalidad administrativa, con un gran vacío del factor conceptual de las implicaciones del cambio climático, al grado extremo que hubo una negación de citar salvaguardas en esa línea.
Teniendo claro ese primer punto expuesto, denota que detallará lo de la variable climática vinculada al Reglamento. En la norma prevista en el decreto ejecutivo nro. 44974-S, el Poder Ejecutivo no previó nada sobre la parte climática, por lo que solicita se piense un momento en esa línea y se aplique ahora un pensamiento que imponga el criterio de progresividad. Haciendo lo anterior, se verá que la realidad es que si se hubiese emitido una buena norma que sí considera la variable climática incluso se podría haber llegado a introducir en nuestro Estado una jerarquización de las medidas de mitigación de impactos ambientales climáticos residuales significativos (aquellos que no se pueden evitar) para así asegurar una pérdida neta lo más cercana a cero, a la biodiversidad, al bien jurídico clima, o la salud. Pero como ello faltó, seguiremos apuntando como Estado, muy debajo de lo necesitado por el planeta y lo previsto en los instrumentos internacionales climáticos.
Por otra parte, apunta que debe tenerse bien claro (y que suma a los factores negativos patrios) que a la fecha en nuestro Estado no se cuantifican los vectores climáticos ambientales por parte de Nombre02 y esto es una realidad inobjetable, por no existir protocolos o guías específicas y, lo que no se cuantifica, no se puede valorar y menos respecto a ello se pueden tomar medidas de mitigación, protección y prevención eficientes, que sería lo oportuno. Es decir, lo visible ahora es que el Poder Ejecutivo emitió una normativa que en apariencia es de avanzada, pero la misma nunca fue pensada y respaldada con rigurosidad científica básica y todo ello significa improvisación y una regresión en una materia muy seria, donde se está actuando negligentemente y a ciegas en todo lo climático. Debe quedar claro, como se dijo, que a la fecha incluso, ni la propia Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental, tiene protocolos y procedimientos para valorar los efectos climáticos en las actividades, obras y proyectos y si desde esa oficina señalan que se está trabajando en tener lo pertinente a finales de este año 2025, entonces se tiene que menos las municipalidades, ni el Ministerio de Salud saben el cómo contabilizar los efectos al clima en lo anterior y, no obstante; se emitió irresponsablemente este Reglamento sobre una materia que está altamente vinculada a todo lo atmosférico.
Ahora, al menos, la Nombre02 ha señalado que para finales de este año 2025 tendrá un primer borrador sobre cómo mesurar la variable climática, pero si ello ocurre ahí, es manifiesto que el ministerio de Salud va aún más atrás y esto en conjunto nos lleva a reafirmar y ratificar que el Reglamento se elaboró sin prever lo oportuno sobre cambio climático, lo cual apoya la tesis de la violación al principio de objetivación. Para vincular directamente lo que se viene diciendo con el Reglamento, advierte que la norma 9 señala que se emitirá una justificación técnica y también al final de ese artículo se dice, que se deben de dictar actos bajo presupuestos técnicos ambientales especializados, por parte de las corporaciones municipales. Indica que, en lo anterior existe una inconsistencia de rango constitucional que no debe pasar desapercibida, pues es una clara violación al principio preventivo y al de tutela científica, puesto que no pueden adoptarse actos administrativos, con efectos en el ambiente, si los mismos no se valoran técnicamente y pensar lo contrario, es improvisar con la vida de las personas, el clima, con la biodiversidad y los ecosistemas.
Por ello reafirma que el ordinal 9 cuestionado se emitió con la imposibilitad de verificar los impactos climáticos ambientales y ello no debe ser permitido y, por esto debe declararse la inconstitucionalidad, porque el Ejecutivo obliga a las municipalidades a que deban emitir justificaciones ambientales, pero extrañamente no se les obliga a ir a Nombre02 previamente para que así se analicen por parte de la oficina especializada, todos los factores necesarios del caso, donde lo climático no debería faltar. Y con ello advierte la pésima técnica seguida en el Reglamento. Afirma que siempre se debería partir de una pérdida neta de cero y una ganancia neta de la biodiversidad y la salud pública, pero con lo previsto en el Reglamento se obliga a tomar decisiones municipales sin exigirse los estudios previos ambientales aprobados por Nombre02 y sin prever lo oportuno sobre el cambio climático. Está claro que las municipalidades y el ministerio de Salud, pueden trabajar coordinadamente con Nombre02 en la elaboración de los mejores criterios ambientales, pero no deben ser ni las municipalidades, ni el ministerio de Salud, quienes evalúen y a su vez aprueben los actos habilitadores de naturaleza ambiental, tal y como lo dice la norma 9 cuando dispone: "Artículo 9: Casos de excepción.
Con apego a lo dispuesto por los numerales 8, 9, 10 de la Ley 8839, en los casos en que se determine que, debido a características geográficas y de viabilidad ambiental, sea más factible desde el punto de vista de traslados y condiciones de rutas, dispensar los residuos en un parque ambiental ubicado en otra región, respetando las distancias establecidas en el artículo 9 del presente reglamento y el plan municipal de gestión integral de residuos, será necesaria una justificación técnica que respalde esta decisión. Como mínimo, la justificación debe contener: 1. Análisis técnico y económico que compare las alternativas disponibles, demostrando que la opción propuesta es la más viable en términos de costos operativos y eficiencia. 2. Impactos potenciales y las medidas de mitigación para minimizar efectos negativos en la zona de origen y de destino. 3. Proyección de volúmenes de residuos a trasladar, considerando la generación actual y futura en la región de origen. 4.
Acciones de reducción y valorización implementadas antes de la disposición final, detallando su impacto en la minimización de residuos transportados. 5. Capacidad del sitio receptor. 6. Plan logístico y de transporte, incluyendo rutas, frecuencias y mecanismos de monitoreo para asegurar la trazabilidad y minimizar el impacto del traslado. 7. Acuerdos intermunicipales o contratos con operadores privados, si aplican. El Ministerio de Salud brindará apoyo técnico y supervisión en la implementación de estas acciones, garantizando que los sitios de separación, tratamiento, aprovechamiento y disposición final de residuos cumplan con el decreto ejecutivo N° 44421-S Reglamento de parques ambientales para la separación, tratamiento, aprovechamiento y disposición final de residuos sólidos de fecha 4 de marzo del 2024.". Luego de lo anterior, se pregunta ¿por qué en esas medidas, que son netamente un protocolo, o una guía básica valoración de impacto ambiental, no se dice entre los requisitos, que se debe pasar cualquier decisión municipal por el tamiz de SETENA?
Denota que se externa y exalta el buscar minimizar el impacto ambiental de residuos insistentemente. Pero como advierte que existe una falencia y duda grande que amerita declarar que se debe al menos interpretar que dentro de los requisitos de la norma 9, se echa de menos la referencia expresa de la necesidad de consultar a SETENA, quien debería incluso crear un protocolo o un mecanismo específico que norme este tipo de criterios municipales para la hipótesis prevista en la norma 9 Reglamentaria. Advierte algo similar en el numeral 10 reglamentario cuando se expone: "… Situaciones de excepción: En caso de requerir trasladarse a otra región debido a que las infraestructuras se encuentren en desarrollo, mantenimiento o cuando otra región cuente con tecnologías más avanzadas o eficientes aprobadas, se debe presentar ante la Dirección Regional de Rectoría de la Salud donde se ubique el cantón para su respectiva revisión la siguiente información…".
Se pregunta, ¿por qué se dice que se requiere una revisión, de ciertos requisitos, pero no se incluye que debe aportarse el criterio de SETENA? Y es que, ante esa otra falencia, denota otra inconstitucionalidad por omisión, puesto que primero se debe ir a Nombre02 y luego se podría trasladar lo pertinente que dispongan las municipalidades, a la dirección Regional de Rectoría de Salud. Por todo lo señalado, considera que se está ante inconstitucionalidades por omisión de parte del Poder Ejecutivo, al no obligar a las corporaciones municipales a presentar una gestión que podría ser un criterio específico, en una EIA a cargo de las municipalidades, sobre lo más oportuno ante los casos de excepción, para que así, se pueda tener un acto con discernimiento y lucidez, con respaldo de la ciencia y la técnica en esa parte ambiental y la climática que definitivamente estaría envuelta en las diferentes fases de la gestión integrada de residuos sólidos.
Todo lo anterior, es fundamental, evaluar y minimizar la huella ecológica que le generamos al clima y a la atmósfera. La decisión de trasladar residuos a otras regiones no es de resorte de las empresas que dan tratamiento, sino que, expresamente ello es un criterio netamente municipal, de acuerdo con sus intereses y autonomía territorial y administrativa. La obligación municipal de pedir ese criterio ambiental excepcional, nace por lo dispuesto en la propia Convención de la Diversidad Biológica que dispone en lo que nos interesa: "ARTÍCULO 14. Evaluación del impacto y reducción al mínimo del impacto adverso. 1.-Cada Parte Contratante, en la medida de lo posible y según proceda: a) Establecerá procedimientos apropiados por los que se exija la evaluación del impacto ambiental de sus proyectos propuestos que puedan tener efectos adversos importantes para la diversidad biológica con miras a evitar o reducir al mínimo esos efectos y, cuando proceda, permitirá la participación del público en esos procedimientos. b) Establecerá arreglos apropiados para asegurarse de que se tengan debidamente en cuenta las consecuencias ambientales de sus programas y políticas que puedan tener efectos adversos importantes para la diversidad biológica…".
Es más que claro que, por una obligación convencional, se debe interpretar que la norma reglamentaria cuestionada, que establece regulaciones sobre programas y políticas de residuos sólidos, debió haber señalado, que era obligatorio, que cada municipalidad, o región compuesta de municipalidades, debía contar con criterios aprobados por Nombre02 antes de autorizarse las medidas excepcionales en el traslado de residuos. Y no se puede desconocer que este Reglamento cuestionado es una macro política y todo un programa en la gestión de residuos sólidos que tendrá efectos en la diversidad biológica. Pero la parte ambiental, no puede dejar de lado la variable climática, que aún ni siquiera se pondera en Nombre02 y esto hay que tenerlo presente, pues pueden señalarlo en sentencia, para que las decisiones en estos procesos de regionalización de los residuos sean integrales. Es decir, se les pide que se obligue a las municipalidades a tener que pasar por el tamiz de Nombre02 de previo a adoptar un criterio y que este debe considerar el cambio climático.
Sobre los efectos de la no observación de la variable climática en las decisiones, como las comentadas, denota que en el Séptimo informe estado de la región: sinopsis del informe: retos y oportunidades de la adaptación al cambio climático, volumen III, se señala: "De acuerdo con la evidencia científica disponible, la gestión ambiental deficiente y los eventos climáticos en la región CARD han causado históricamente importantes impactos que se agravarán con el cambio climático. Ante ello, y como ha sido ya reconocido en los acuerdos internacionales desde París 2015, las responsabilidades para enfrentar el cambio climático en el planeta son compartidas pero diferenciadas. Las políticas públicas deben adaptarse a la realidad de cada territorio y a sus condiciones de desarrollo humano. En CARD coexiste una situación de bajo aporte a las emisiones mundiales (lo cual no exime de la urgencia de reducirlas) con una alta exposición a los posibles efectos del fenómeno, al ser uno de los "puntos calientes" de alto impacto global -real y predecible-.
Esta exposición se suma a los problemas sociales, económicos e institucionales del desarrollo humano, ordenamiento territorial deficientes, pobreza, exclusión y otros elementos, evidenciando la urgencia regional de priorizar la adaptación…" (página 1209). Por ello insiste en ver en las normas 9 y 10, la violación a principios tales como el precautorio, el de razonabilidad, o el de proporcionalidad, amén del criterio de progresividad. Y es más que evidente, que esas decisiones municipales deben ser aprobadas por SETENA, pues implican la materialización de políticas ambientales, como lo dice la Convención de la Diversidad Biológica en el numeral 14 inciso b. Insiste en considerar que se requiere una sentencia interpretativa mediante la cual se disponga que existirá la obligación municipal y del ministerio de Salud de consultarse a Nombre02 mediante los protocolos necesarios, los casos de excepción previstos en las normas 9 y 10 cuestionadas.
Y pide que en esa línea se ordene a Nombre02 a tener que crear los protocolos o guías del caso para que lo dispuesto en esas normas 9 y 10, sea viable ambiental y climáticamente. Solicita ponderar dentro de lo que viene exponiendo, que la norma 1 del reglamento cuestionado señala sobre lo ambiental y el objetivo perseguido: "Artículo 1: Objetivo. El presente reglamento tiene como objetivo establecer un marco de gestión para la gestión integral de residuos sólidos ordinarios en Costa Rica, en función a sistemas cantonales y la colaboración intermunicipal para optimizar el uso de recursos y minimizar el impacto ambiental…". Pero ¿Cómo minimizar los impactos ambientales, sin "valorar" los casos de excepción como los previstos en las normas 9 y 10 en SETENA? Todo ello ha quedado en la incertidumbre a la fecha, por la pésima redacción del Reglamento, que se hace sin considerar criterios técnicos y científicos envueltos.
Si las evaluaciones de impacto ambiental deben ser predictivas siempre, pues también los criterios que deben adoptar las municipalidades conforme a las normas 9 y 10 deberían tener lo correspondiente, donde incluso se establezcan medidas de mitigación, prevención o compensación. Para continuar en este aparte, denota que la norma 4 reglamentaria dispone: "Artículo 4: Regionalización. El Ministerio de Salud en cumplimiento al artículo 2 inciso i) de la Ley 8839, establece que gestión integral de los residuos sólidos ordinarios se debe evaluar y planificar por regiones, conforme a las delimitaciones establecidas por el Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica (MIDEPLAN), según lo indicado en el decreto ejecutivo N° 37735, Reglamento general para el Sistema Nacional de Planificación, de fecha 06 de mayo del 2013. Las municipalidades y demás entidades responsables de la gestión de residuos deben organizarse dentro de estas regiones, garantizando la optimización de recursos, la reducción de costos operativos y la minimización de impactos ambientales.
Cada región deberá gestionar de manera autónoma sus residuos sólidos ordinarios, reduciendo su dependencia de otras regiones y promoviendo la implementación de modelos de economía circular. Asimismo, se debe adoptar el uso de tecnologías adaptadas a las necesidades locales para garantizar una gestión eficiente, sostenible y alineada con los principios de protección ambiental y salud pública. Cada región deberá gestionar de manera autónoma sus residuos sólidos ordinarios, reduciendo su dependencia de otras regiones y promoviendo la implementación de modelos de economía circular. Asimismo, se debe adoptar el uso de tecnologías adaptadas a las necesidades locales para garantizar una gestión eficiente, sostenible y alineada con los principios de protección ambiental y salud pública.". En razón de lo anterior, propone que, en esta norma número 4 por un asunto de redacción y buena técnica jurídico/ambiental, en el párrafo final se deba establecer, que es necesario que cada municipalidad o grupo de ellas, tenga que hacer una consulta a Nombre02 para poder tomarse las mejores decisiones ambientales y climáticas en la regionalización del manejo de residuos.
Y también bajo el mismo entendimiento, considera y propone a esta Sala, que en la norma 9 y 10, que establecen la necesidad de tomar criterios excepcionales por parte de las municipalidades, se disponga que se debe hacer constar incluso un punto que señale la obligación de hacer una consulta a SETENA. Considera que con las sugerencias que cita, se cumpliría con lo exigido por la Constitución y el marco convencional ratificado. Denota que esta Sala Constitucional en el pasado se ha pronunciado en varias ocasiones, sobre las amenazas de los efectos del cambio climático sobre los derechos humanos a un ambiente sano y equilibrado, a la salud, al agua potable, entre otros; así como de las obligaciones vinculantes asumidas por Costa Rica a través de instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos ambientales, incluyendo las de estabilizar las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero y amortiguar los efectos producidos por estos (sentencia nro. 2012-9206 de 04 de julio de 2012).
Pero se pregunta ¿cómo estabilizar las emisiones de GEI, sino se acude a ponderaciones y evaluaciones de las decisiones municipales? Indica que la respuesta es evidente y es que solo si se obliga a estas entidades locales o regionales a obtener un criterio de Nombre02 se podría cumplir con lo previsto en las normas 21 y 50 constitucionales. Para que se aprecie la vertiente seguida por la Sala, cita lo siguiente: "… El principio de protección del medio ambiente no es una recomendación o una intención que da la Constitución, sino que, por lo contrario, es un derecho de aplicación inmediata, por lo que existe una obligación por parte de los organismos gubernamentales de vigilar porque se cumplan las disposiciones legales que tiendan a proteger el medio ambiente..." (sentencia nro. 1999-132). Sobre el in dubio pro natura y lo precautorio citan: "El principio in dubio pro natura, entonces, no depende de que haya peligro de daño grave o irreversible -como sucede con el principio precautorio, sino que implica una "regla general de comportamiento, para la relación del Estado -y la sociedad en general- con el medio ambiente, aplicable a todos los ámbitos de decisiones en que exista un riesgo de afectación al medio ambiente, y que nos obliga a evitar optar por aquellas conductas que puedan causar daño al medio ambiente, cuando existan otras opciones (Nombre03 y Lucero, 2018)" (voto Constitucional nro. 2024-13229).
La consulta previa a Nombre02 por parte de las municipalidades estaría fundamentada en la norma 14 de la Convención de la Diversidad Biológica antes citada y también en otros instrumentos internacionales como el Acuerdo de París. Mantenerse dentro de los límites del Planeta es una cuestión de supervivencia a largo plazo; reconocer la naturaleza jurídicamente vinculante del respeto por los límites planetarios que mantienen la Tierra dentro del "espacio operativo seguro" es una cuestión de justicia a corto plazo y por ello se acude a esta vía para tratar de poner cordura ambiental en la norma cuestionada. Recuerda que, a nivel mundial hemos comenzado una etapa donde en lugar de hablar de calentamiento global, ya se cambiaron las palabras y se expone que entramos a la ebullición global, por ello debemos avanzar y desde la sociedad civil, se les pide a ustedes como operadores de justicia climática, que observen lo que ocurre en todo el orbe donde hemos rebasado seis de los nueve límites planetarios.
Pide tener a la vista el Informe Presión sobre la Hacienda Pública en un contexto de variabilidad y cambio climático: desafíos para mejorar las condiciones presentes y reducir los impactos futuros (DFOE-AE-OS-00001-2017) que citó anteriormente, para que se dimensionen los efectos climáticos de una mala planificación nacional en Costa Rica. Indica que, en la reciente sentencia del Pueblo Indígena U"wa y sus Miembros vs. Colombia, del 04 de julio de 2024, la Corte IDH consideró respecto al tema lo siguiente: "Los Estados deben tomar en cuenta la "triple crisis planetaria" en el cumplimiento de sus obligaciones de respeto y garantía del derecho al medio ambiente sano. La triple crisis planetaria describe la interconexión y los efectos combinados de tres amenazas globales: la contaminación ambiental, la pérdida de biodiversidad, y la crisis climática derivada de la explotación y uso de combustibles fósiles y las emanaciones de metano.
Al respecto, la Asamblea de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Medio Ambiente del Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Medio Ambiente (PNUMA) ha señalado que esta crisis combinada representa un peligro crítico para la vida en la Tierra, requiriendo una acción urgente y coordinada a nivel global para combatir sus efectos. La Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático (CMNUCC) también resalta la naturaleza existencial de esta amenaza, enfatizando que las consecuencias devastadoras de estas crisis interrelacionadas afectan la salud del planeta y de todas sus formas de vida. Por lo anterior, la Corte advierte que la triple crisis planetaria es un desafío complejo y multifacético que requiere una respuesta integrada y urgente para garantizar la sostenibilidad del planeta y el bienestar de sus habitantes". Denota también que (desde el 04/07/1994, en ley nro. 7414) Costa Rica es un Estado Parte de la Convención Marco de Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático (CMNUCC) que incluye dentro de sus principios (artículo 3) los siguientes: las partes deberán proteger el sistema climático en beneficio de las generaciones presentes y futuras, sobre la base de la equidad y con responsabilidades comunes, pero diferenciadas; deberán las partes tomar medidas de precaución para prever, prevenir o reducir al mínimo las causas del cambio climático y mitigar sus efectos adversos.
Además, la CMNUCC establece dentro de las obligaciones estatales (artículo 4.f) la de tener en cuenta, en la medida de lo posible, las consideraciones relativas al cambio climático en sus políticas y medidas sociales, económicas y ambientales y emplear métodos apropiados, con miras a reducir al mínimo los efectos adversos en la economía, la salud pública y la calidad del medio ambiente, de los proyectos o medidas emprendidos por las Partes para mitigar el cambio climático o adaptarse a él. También refiere que la defensa de los derechos climáticos de las generaciones futuras ha quedado contemplada desde julio de 2023, en la Declaración de Principios de Maastricht, cuando se dijo lo siguiente: "17. Violaciones de la obligación de respetar. Las violaciones de las obligaciones de respetar los derechos humanos de las generaciones futuras incluyen, entre otras:
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