Constitutionality of Article 81(l) of the Labor CodeConstitucionalidad del artículo 81 inciso l) del Código de Trabajo

Res: 2000-06590 **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at fifteen hours and twenty-nine minutes on the twenty-sixth of July of two thousand.- Action of unconstitutionality brought by Nombre232568, of legal age, married, regional supervisor of the Ministry of Health, identity card number CED57161, resident of Paraíso de Cartago, against Article 81, subsection l) of the Labor Code.

**Whereas:** **1.-** By written submission received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at nine hours and twenty-seven minutes on the seventh of July of the current year, the petitioner requests that the unconstitutionality of Article 81, subsection l) of the Labor Code be declared, considering that it violates the principle of legality. He indicates that he was dismissed from his position as Regional Supervisor of the Ministry of Health, for being deemed to have committed a serious breach (falta grave) of the contractual obligations, in accordance with that provision, as it was considered that he had been untruthful in a report related to the operation of a restaurant located in the city of Cartago. He asserts that subsection l) of Article 81 of the Labor Code is indeterminate because there is no parameter whatsoever to determine which conduct constitutes a serious breach (falta grave). The principle of criminal legality obliges the legislator to formulate defined and precise laws; that is, the Labor Code can only fulfill its purpose when the act is configured and its effects are described with precision and determination. He argues that this involves an administrative-labor penal type that is totally open, abstract, and imprecise; which is proscribed by the best constitutional doctrine, even in the administrative sphere, as it is a source of arbitrariness and injustice by not establishing limits for the adjudicator. There are no parameters of reasonableness or proportionality that must be observed. The norm punishes, with the maximum penalty, which is dismissal without employer liability (despido sin responsabilidad patronal), a generic and indeterminate cause, not subject to parameters of any kind.

**2.-** Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject, on purely procedural grounds or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition submitted for its consideration that proves to be manifestly inadmissible, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is the mere reiteration or reproduction of a previous, rejected, identical or similar petition.

Drafted by Magistrate **Solano Carrera**; and, **Considering:** **I.-** The petitioner alleges that subsection l) of Article 81 of the Labor Code infringes upon the principle of legality because it does not clearly and determinatively describe the conduct sanctioned with dismissal without employer liability (despido sin responsabilidad patronal). In this regard, this Chamber has already issued rulings on repeated occasions. Thus, in judgment 04545 at fifteen hours and thirty-nine minutes of the current year, it stated:

*"The constitutionality of subsection L) of Article 81 of the Labor Code has already been analyzed by this Chamber. In judgment No. 6960-94, at 14:42 hrs. on November 29, 1994, upon judicial consultation from the Superior Labor Court of Cartago, the Chamber considered that:* *" Article 81 of the Labor Code cannot be considered either strictly numerus clausus or apertus, since its intention is to determine some typically considered serious conducts, but in fulfillment of the general principle governing labor matters of 'Primacy of reality', and taking into account the diversity of factors and circumstances that may intervene in an employment relationship, it establishes the possibility of dismissing without employer liability a worker who engages in acts or omissions considered serious (subsection L), since it is not possible that only eleven subsections (specific situations) constitute just cause for dismissal, when the worker-employer or inter-labor relationship is much more extensive due to its dynamism. Moreover, not even with the help of notable imagination or experience could the legislator foresee every possible situation.* **II.** Certainly, when the Code in subsection l) of Article 81 finally refers to 'any other serious breach (falta grave)' committed by the worker, it does not, and cannot, leave the determination of content for the specific situation attributed such condition entirely to the unrestricted discretion of the employer. Therefore, even if the employer may understand that a certain conduct or action constitutes a serious breach (falta grave), it will be the judge, if their intervention is required, who fills the apparent void offered by a formula as broad as the one discussed. In other words, it will be the judge in whose jurisdiction the specific case lies who, with criteria of proportionality and reasonableness, fills the content of the subsection in question, determining the appropriateness of the applied sanction for the 'serious breach (falta grave)'. To consider, as the consulting judges do, that constitutional content could be harmed by subjectively applying the norm at hand, is to ignore the fundamental task and mission of judges, who in every case must interpret and apply secondary legal order, with constitutional criteria or parameters.* **III.** Moreover, the subsection L) in question does not establish conditions that undermine the freedom or dignity of the human being, nor does it violate the guarantees that the Constitution establishes in its Article 56, regarding which the jurisprudence of this Chamber has established:* *'Although Article 56 of the Political Constitution establishes the obligation for the State to promote that everyone obtains employment, it does not derive from this that the State must be the employer, but rather that its governmental, economic, social policies, etcetera, must tend to promote the development of occupations for the inhabitants of the country'.* *(Judgment No. 1609-91, at 15:30 hours on August 20, 1991).* *In conclusion, neither the content, nor the principle inspiring the consulted subsection, conflicts with the Political Constitution and the consultation must be resolved thus."* *In a subsequent resolution, Judgment No. 563-97 at 14:39 hrs. on January 29, 1997, the Chamber reiterated its criterion regarding the conformity of subsection L) of Article 81 of the Labor Code, as follows:* 563-97 of 14:39 hrs. of January 29, 1997, the Chamber reiterated its criterion regarding the conformity of subsection L) of Article 81 of the Labor Code, as follows:

*"Considering* *I. OF THE GROUNDS FOR CHALLENGING ARTICLE 81, SUBSECTION L OF THE LABOR CODE. The plaintiff challenges Article 81, subsection L of the Labor Code, alleging that it does not taxatively determine the grounds that may motivate a dismissal without employer liability (despido sin responsabilidad patronal), since it leaves the employer with the discretion to legislate and establish new grounds for dismissal and aggravate existing ones, in violation of the principles of separation of powers, specificity (tipicidad), and legislative power, established in constitutional Articles 9, 11, 39, 41 and 43, 105, 121 subsection 1, 123 to 129; in addition to considering it contrary to the principle of equality -Article 33 of the Political Constitution-, by allowing the employer to make a distinction among workers, since in the same workplace there may be contracts in which the same conduct is qualified in a diverse manner, so that, in some cases it may be considered a minor offense and in others a serious offense; and of Articles 191 and 192 of the Fundamental Charter, in reference to the public sector, since it follows from such norms that there cannot be an open criminal type of dismissal, as it is contrary to labor stability in the Public Administration, so that the grounds for dismissal must be taxative and equal for all servants.* *II. OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CRIMINAL OR SANCTIONING SPECIFICITY (TIPICIDAD). Article 81, subsection L. of the Labor Code provides:* *"The following are just causes that empower the employer to terminate the employment contract:* *...* *l) When the worker incurs any other serious breach of the obligations imposed upon him by the contract."* *By being provided in the transcribed form, the principle of specificity (tipicidad) is not violated, since the norm is neither omitted nor obscure in determining the grounds for justified dismissal. It is understood that all work performed by employees -public official or employee of a private company- is different depending on the position or post held, even if it involves the same workplace; so that the responsibilities to which each is subject will depend on the assigned task. In this way, legal consequences do derive from the employment contract, which must be taken as a source of law, insofar as rights and obligations for the worker derive from it, in his particular condition, since it specifies the task and function for which he is hired, and which the employee accepts. By virtue of the foregoing, it is clear that both the rights and obligations imposed on workers are not subjective in nature, but objective; they are not imposed by the person themselves, but by the function performed or post held.* *III. Previously, this Chamber defined the scope of application of disciplinary power or disciplinary authority (potestad disciplinaria) in the public sector; thus, in judgment number 1264-95, of March seven, nineteen ninety-five, it was indicated:* *"IV. SPHERE OF APPLICATION OF DISCIPLINARY POWER. The application of the disciplinary regime is limited to the activities of the individual in their capacity as public agent or official, to compel and ensure, preventively and repressively, compliance with the legal duties of the employment, function, or post. The misconduct generating this responsibility are many and varied, such as, for example, negligence, apathy, carelessness, absenteeism, incorrectness with superiors, equals or subordinates and with the public, irregular social conduct, lack of probity, abandonment of post, etc., which according to their seriousness are classified as minor, serious, or very serious. The duties of officials derive, like their rights, from the law and the nature of the post or function they perform, that is, they have an objective character. The duties of officials are of two kinds, the general ones, which concern every official by the mere fact of being one, and the special ones, imposed in relation to the specific administrative function performed. Thus, for example, obedience is a duty for every public official, but the duty of obedience of a professor is not the same as the duty of a police officer. Some general duties are: obedience, which consists of respect and obedience to hierarchically superior authorities; and the provision of service, which consists of the official's duty to perform the tasks proper to their post, which is given by the nature of the function, for the best public service, performance or productivity in services, with officials being obliged to faithfully fulfill the function or post, completing the regulatory working day, and must collaborate loyally with their superiors and co-workers, for the improvement of services and achievement of the purposes of the administrative unit to which they are assigned. The provision of service must be personal, by virtue of the official presumption in favor of the assigned official's competence. Also constituting general duties are the duty of reserve, which lies in the obligation to proceed with due discretion in the performance of the post, keeping opportune silence in cases where the nature of the function so requires -in the public sector, breach of secrecy can generate severe disciplinary sanctions, and even of a criminal nature, as is the case in the diplomatic disciplinary field and the Judicial Branch, in the revelation of secrets that affect State security, or the interests of the parties, causing serious harm-; and the duty of decorum requires that the public office be attended by its holder with due respect and correctness, both professionally and socially, by reason of the institution they represent. The duty to dedicate oneself entirely and with all zeal and decorum to the assigned post prohibits the official from exercising other posts or functions, since it would make the good service of both impossible. On occasions the nature of the employment excludes the exercise of certain professions, thus a judge cannot hold management or advisory positions in private companies. The public official may not act in the service of third parties in matters in which they are intervening by reason of their post, nor in those that are being processed or pending resolution in the office where they work, nor may they be a lawyer, legal representative or expert for a third party in any kind of litigation against the State. Incurring any of these incompatibilities shall be classified as a serious or very serious offense, and it is also necessary to sanction the absences or non-attendances, delays, carelessness, informalities or negligences originating from the exercise of compatible activities."* *As observed, from the condition of public official, general obligations derive for all those who hold this condition, but from the employment contract, special obligations are generated, in relation to the specific administrative function performed. For this reason, it is not contrary to the principle of specificity (tipicidad), regulated in constitutional Article 39, to subject, in a general manner, the determination of what constitutes a serious offense to the labor contract, in relation to the responsibility assigned to each employee.* *IV. It must also be pointed out that it is illusory and outside of all normative logic to pretend that the law specify in detail each one of the labor obligations derived from each and every one of the labor relations of all the country's employees, motivated by the specific task that each one performs in their work, as a ground for dismissal without employer liability (despido sin responsabilidad laboral). And in this sense, it must be kept in mind that, although in disciplinary sanctioning authority (potestad sancionatoria disciplinaria) the principle of specificity (tipicidad) must be respected, it is not applied with the same rigor as in criminal matters:* *"It can be affirmed that the principle of specificity (tipicidad) constitutes a fundamental principle in disciplinary responsibility, but not in the same way as in the criminal-legal field, since the principles 'nullum crimen sine lege', 'nullum poena sine lege' do not have the rigidity and requirement that characterizes them in substantive criminal law, because the sanctioning activity of a criminal nature and that of a disciplinary nature correspond to different legal fields, and the parameters of discretion that are proper to the exercise of administrative disciplinary authority (potestad disciplinaria administrativa) are broader than those of the State's criminal sanctioning authority. Thus, in criminal law, in relation to crimes, every penalty must be established in the law with respect to the incriminated act, excluding, by its generality, any possibility of reference to so-called indeterminate legal concepts, or open or indeterminate clauses; if the conduct is not fully defined, there is no penalty. In disciplinary law, by reason of the purpose it pursues, which is the protection of the general social order, and the matter it regulates -discipline-, the determination of the disciplinary infraction is less demanding than the criminal sanction, since it includes acts that can be qualified as a violation of the official's duties, which in some legislations are not specified, and in others, they are. So that, the exercise of this power is discretionary, hence it is appropriate to apply sanctions for any breach of functional duties, without the need for them to be specifically detailed as a sanctionable act, therefore, the enumeration of punishable acts made via regulation does not have a limitative character. Motivated by the variety of causes that may generate its application, by the frequent imprecision of its precepts and by the sphere of application, it is not always organic nor clear in literal expression, reason for which sanctions may be discretionally applied for offenses not concretely foreseen, but which are understood to be included in the text, provided they result from the verification of the disciplinary offense, through a procedure created for that purpose. The disciplinary offense or infraction has been defined as a violation of the functioning of any duty proper to their condition, even when it has not been specially defined although it has been foreseen. The determining acts of disciplinary offenses are innumerable, since they depend on the nature of the behaviors or conducts of the 'subordinate' subjects, behaviors or conducts in truth unlimited in number given their variety; for this reason, the existence of three elements of the disciplinary offense is deduced: 1.- a material element: which is an act or an omission; 2.- a moral element: which is the imputation of the act to a free will; and 3.- a formal element: which is the disturbance to the functioning of the service or immediate or possible affection of its efficacy." (Judgment number 5594-94, of fifteen hours forty-five minutes of September twenty-seven, nineteen ninety-four.)* *V. OF THE OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS. By virtue of the foregoing reasons, it is fitting to conclude that the challenged norm is also not injurious to the principle of separation of powers, since it does not entail any "legislative delegation," the only thing it authorizes is that the employer, in consideration of the terms of the contract, of the function to be performed, may, having as a parameter the offenses expressly indicated in the Labor Code, take into consideration "any other serious breach of the obligations imposed upon him by the contract," without thereby conferring upon the employer the capacity to determine in an arbitrary and unconstitutional manner the grounds for dismissal without employer liability (despido sin responsabilidad patronal), as the plaintiff alleges. And much less is it violative of the principle of equality, since it is understood that labor responsibilities and obligations will always be different, precisely by virtue of the post or employment held; that is, not all employees or officials of the same workplace are in the same situation of equality, but only those who hold the same position or post."* Based on the foregoing, there being no reasons to vary the criterion held by this Court, it is appropriate to reject the filed action on the merits.- **Therefore:** The action is rejected on the merits.

Luis Fernando Solano C. Presidente, a.i.

Nombre43949 . Nombre44110 .

Carlos M. Arguedas R. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Susana Castro A.

In other words, it will be the judge in whose jurisdiction the specific case lies who, with criteria of proportionality and reasonableness, will give content to the sub-section in question, determining the appropriateness of the applied sanction for the "serious misconduct (falta grave)". To consider, as the consulting judges do, that the constitutional content could be harmed by subjectively applying the rule at hand, is to disregard the fundamental task and mission of judges, who in all cases must interpret and apply secondary legal order with constitutional criteria or parameters.</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-left:60pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">III.</span><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-style:italic"> Furthermore, the sub-section L) in question does not establish conditions that undermine the freedom or dignity of the human being, nor does it violate the guarantees that the Constitution establishes in its Article 56, regarding which the jurisprudence of this Chamber has established:</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-left:60pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-style:italic">"While Article 56 of the Political Constitution establishes the obligation for the State to promote that everyone achieves employment, it does not follow from this that the State must be the employer, but rather that its governmental, economic, social policies, etcetera, should tend to promote the development of occupations for the inhabitants of the country through them".</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-left:60pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-style:italic">(Judgment No. 1609-91, of 3:30 p.m. on August 20, 1991).</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-left:60pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-style:italic">In conclusion, neither the content nor the principle inspiring the consulted sub-section collide with the Political Constitution, and thus the consultation must be resolved."</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-style:italic">In a subsequent ruling, Judgment No. 563-97 of 2:39 p.m. on January 29, 1997, the Chamber reiterated its criterion regarding the conformity of sub-section L) of Article 81 of the Labor Code, as follows:</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-left:60pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:center; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-style:italic">"Considering</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-left:60pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-style:italic">I. OF THE GROUNDS FOR CHALLENGING ARTICLE 81, SUB-SECTION L, OF THE LABOR CODE. The plaintiff challenges Article 81, sub-section L of the Labor Code, alleging that it does not exhaustively determine the causes that may justify a dismissal without employer liability (despido sin responsabilidad patronal), since it leaves to the employer's discretion the power to legislate and establish new causes for dismissal and aggravate existing ones, in violation of the principles of separation of powers, specificity (tipicidad), and legislative power, established in constitutional Articles 9, 11, 39, 41 and 43, 105, 121 sub-section 1, 123 to 129; besides considering it contrary to the principle of equality -Article 33 of the Political Constitution-, by allowing the employer to make a distinction between workers, since in the same workplace there may be contracts in which the same conduct is classified in a different manner, so that, in some cases it may be considered a minor offense (falta leve) and in others as serious misconduct (falta grave); and of Articles 191 and 192 of the Fundamental Charter, in reference to the public sector, since from such rules it follows that there cannot be an open-ended criminal type of dismissal, as it is contrary to job stability in the Public Administration, such that the causes for dismissal must be exhaustive and equal for all servants. </span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-left:60pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-style:italic">II. OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CRIMINAL OR SANCTIONING SPECIFICITY. Article 81, sub-section L. of the Labor Code provides:</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-left:60pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-style:italic">"The following are just causes that empower the employer to terminate the employment contract:</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-left:60pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'">...</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-left:60pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-style:italic">l) When the worker commits any other serious misconduct against the obligations imposed by the contract."</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-left:60pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-style:italic">By being provided in the transcribed form, the principle of specificity is not violated, given that the rule is neither omissive nor unclear in determining the causes for justified dismissal. It is understood that all work performed by employees -civil servant or employee of a private company- is different depending on the position or post held, even within the same workplace; so the responsibilities to which each is subject will depend on the assigned task. In this way, legal consequences do derive from the employment contract, which must be taken as a source of law, insofar as rights and obligations for the worker derive from it, in their particular condition, since it specifies the task and function for which they are hired, and which the employee accepts. By virtue of the foregoing, it is clear that both the rights and obligations imposed on workers are not subjective in nature, but objective; they are not imposed by the person themselves, but by the function performed or the post held. </span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-left:60pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-style:italic">III. Previously, this Chamber defined the scope of application of disciplinary power (poder disciplinario) in the public sector; thus, in judgment number 1264-95, of March seventh, nineteen ninety-five, it was indicated:</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-left:60pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-style:italic">"</span><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'">IV. SPHERE OF APPLICATION OF DISCIPLINARY POWER. The application of the disciplinary regime is limited to the activities of the individual in their capacity as a public agent or official, to compel and ensure, preventively and repressively, compliance with the legal duties of the employment, function, or post. The misconduct (faltas) generating this responsibility are many and varied, such as, for example, sloth, apathy, carelessness, absence, impropriety with superiors, equals or subordinates and with the public, irregular social conduct, lack of probity, abandonment of post, etc., which according to their severity are classified as minor (leves), serious (graves) or very serious (muy graves). The duties of officials derive, like their rights, from the law and the nature of the post or function they perform, that is, they have an objective character. The duties of officials are of two kinds, general ones, which concern every official by the mere fact of being one, and special ones, imposed in relation to the specific administrative function performed. Thus, for example, obedience is a duty for every public official, but the duty of obedience of a professor is not the same as the duty of a police officer. Some general duties are: that of obedience, which consists of respect and obedience to superior hierarchical authorities; and the provision of service, which consists of the official's duty to carry out the services inherent to their post, which is given by the nature of the function, for the better public service, performance or productivity in the services, the officials being obliged to faithfully fulfill the function or post, completing the regulatory work day, and must loyally collaborate with their bosses and coworkers, for the improvement of services and achievement of the aims of the administrative unit to which they are assigned. The provision of service must be personal, by virtue of the official presumption in favor of the assigned official's competence. Also constituting general duties are the duty of confidentiality (deber de reserva), which consists of the obligation to proceed with due discretion in the performance of the post, keeping opportune silence in cases where the nature of the function requires it - in the public sector, breach of secrecy can generate severe disciplinary sanctions, and even criminal ones, as is the case in the diplomatic disciplinary field and the Judicial Branch, in the revelation of secrets that affect State security, or the interests of the parties, causing serious damages-; and the duty of decorum (deber del decoro) demands that public office be attended by its holder with due respect and correctness, both professionally and socially, by reason of the institution they represent. The duty to dedicate oneself entirely and with all zeal and decorum to the assigned post prohibits the official from exercising other posts or functions, as it would make good service in both impossible. On occasions, the nature of the employment excludes the exercise of certain professions, thus a judge cannot hold management or advisory positions for private companies. The public official may not act in the service of third parties in matters in which they are intervening by reason of their post, nor in those that are being processed or pending resolution in the office where they work, nor may they be an attorney, legal representative (procurador) or expert for a third party in any kind of litigation against the State. Incurring in any of these incompatibilities shall be classified as serious or very serious misconduct, and absences or non-attendances, delays, carelessness, informalities or negligence originating from the exercise of compatible activities must also be sanctioned.</span><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-style:italic">"</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-left:60pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-style:italic">As can be seen, from the condition of public official, general obligations derive for all who hold this condition, but from the employment contract, special obligations are generated, in relation to the specific administrative function performed. Therefore, it is not contrary to the principle of specificity, regulated in constitutional Article 39, to subject the determination of what constitutes serious misconduct to the employment contract in a general manner, in relation to the responsibility assigned to each employee.</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-left:60pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-style:italic">IV. It must also be noted that it is illusory and outside all normative logic to seek that the law specify in detail each and every one of the labor obligations derived from each and every one of the labor relations of all the country's employees, motivated by the specific task that each one performs in their work, as a cause for dismissal without labor liability. And in this sense, it must be kept in mind that, although in the disciplinary sanctioning power the principle of specificity must be respected, it is not applied with the same rigor as in criminal matters:</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-left:60pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-style:italic">"It can be affirmed that the principle of specificity constitutes a fundamental principle in disciplinary responsibility, but not in the same form as in the criminal-legal field, since the principles 'nullum crimen sine lege', 'nullum poena sine lege' do not have the rigidity and requirement that characterizes them in substantive criminal law, because the sanctioning activity of a criminal nature and that of a disciplinary nature correspond to different legal fields, and the parameters of discretion that are typical of the exercise of administrative disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria administrativa) are broader than those of the State's criminal sanctioning power. Thus, in criminal law, in relation to crimes, all penalties must be established in the law with respect to the incriminated act, excluding, by their generality, any possibility of reference to so-called indeterminate legal concepts, or open or indeterminate clauses; if the conduct is not fully defined, there is no penalty. In disciplinary law, by reason of the purpose it pursues, which is the protection of the general social order, and the matter it regulates - discipline - the determination of the disciplinary infraction is less demanding than the criminal sanction, since it encompasses facts that can be classified as violations of the official's duties, which in some legislations are not specified, and, in others, they are. So, the exercise of this power is discretionary, hence it is appropriate to apply sanctions for any misconduct against functional duties, without the need for them to be detailed concretely as a punishable fact, for which reason the enumeration of punishable acts made via regulation does not have a limiting character. Motivated by the variety of causes that can generate its application, the frequent imprecision of its precepts, and the sphere of application, it is not always organic or clear in literal expression, for which reason misconduct not concretely foreseen can be sanctioned discretionally, but which are understood to be included in the text, provided they result from the verification of the disciplinary misconduct, through a procedure created for this purpose. Disciplinary misconduct or infraction has been defined by saying it is a violation of the functioning of any duty proper to one's condition, even when it has not been specially defined but is foreseen. The determining facts of disciplinary misconduct are innumerable, as they depend on the nature of the behaviors or conduct of the 'subordinated' subjects, behaviors or conduct truly unlimited in number given their variety; therefore the existence of three elements of disciplinary misconduct is deduced: 1.- a material element: which is an act or an omission; 2.- a moral element: which is the imputation of the act to a free will; and 3.- a formal element: which is the disturbance to the functioning of the service or the immediate or possible affection of its efficacy." (Judgment number 5594-94, of three forty-five p.m. on September twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-four.)</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-left:60pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-style:italic">V. OF THE OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS. By virtue of the foregoing reasons, it is fitting to conclude that the challenged rule is also not injurious to the principle of separation of powers, as it does not entail any 'legislative delegation'; the only thing it authorizes is that the employer, in consideration of the terms of the contract, of the function to be performed, may, taking as a parameter the misconduct expressly indicated in the Labor Code, take into consideration 'any other serious misconduct against the obligations imposed by the contract', without this conferring upon the employer the capacity to arbitrarily and unconstitutionally determine the causes for dismissal without employer liability, as the plaintiff alleges. And much less does it violate the principle of equality, since it is understood that labor responsibilities and obligations will always be different, precisely by virtue of the post or employment held; that is, not all employees or officials of the same workplace are in the same situation of equality, but only those who hold the same post or position."</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'">Based on the foregoing, there being no grounds to vary the criterion held by this Tribunal, the action filed must be rejected on its merits.-</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:center; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; font-weight:bold">Therefore:</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'">The action is rejected on its merits.</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:center; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'">Luis Fernando Solano C.</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:center; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'">Presidente, a.i.</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:center; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'">Nombre43949</span><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'">. Nombre44110</span><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'">.</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'">Carlos M. Arguedas R. Ana Virginia Calzada M.</span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:10pt; margin-bottom:10pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:'Roman 12cpi'">Adrián Vargas B. Susana Castro A.</span></p></div></body></html>"

Res: 2000-06590 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las quince horas con veintinueve minutos del veintiséis de julio del dos mil.- Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por Nombre232568 , mayor, casado, supervisor regional del Ministerio de Salud, cédula de identidad número CED57161, vecino de Paraíso de Cartago contra el artículo 81 inciso l) del Código de Trabajo.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las nueve horas veintisiete minutos del siete de julio del año en curso, el accionante solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del artículo 81 inciso l) del Código de Trabajo por considerar que vulnera el principio de legalidad. Señala que fue despedido de su puesto de Supervisor Regional del Ministerio de Salud, por considerar que incurrió en una falta grave a las obligaciones del contrato, de conformidad con lo que dispone dicha norma, al estimarse que había faltado a la verdad en un informe relacionado con el funcionamiento de un restaurante situado en la ciudad de Cartago. Afirma que el inciso l) del artículo 81 del Código de Trabajo es indeterminado pues no existe parámetro alguno para determinar qué conducta constituye falta grave. El principio de legalidad criminal obliga al legislador a formular leyes definidas y precisas, esto es, el Código de Trabajo sólo puede cumplir su cometido cuando el hecho esté configurado y sus efectos sean descritos con precisión y determinación. Aduce que se está en presencia de un tipo penal administrativo laboral totalmente abierto, abstracto e impreciso; lo cual está proscrito por la mejor doctrina constitucionalista, incluso en el ámbito administrativo, pues es fuente de arbitrariedades e injusticia por no establecer límites al juzgador. No hay parámetros de razonabilidad o proporcionalidad que deban observarse. La norma castiga con la pena máxima, cual es el despido sin responsabilidad patronal, una causal genérica e indeterminada, no sujeta a parámetros de ninguna índole.

2.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar rechazada.

Redacta el Magistrado Solano Carrera; y,

Considerando:

I.- El accionante alega que el inciso l) del artículo 81 del Código de Trabajo infringe el principio de legalidad dado que no describe en forma clara y determinada la conducta que se sanciona con el despido sin responsabilidad patronal. Al respecto, esta Sala ya ha emitido pronunciamiento en reiteradas oportunidades. Así en la sentencia 04545 de las quince horas treinta y nueve minutos del año en curso señaló:

"La constitucionalidad del inciso L) del artículo 81 del Código de Trabajo ya ha sido analizada por esta Sala. En la sentencia No. 6960-94, de las 14:42 hrs. del 29 de noviembre de 1994, ante la consulta judicial por el Tribunal Superior de Trabajo de Cartago la Sala consideró que:

" el artículo 81 del Código de Trabajo no puede ser considerado ni numerus clausus ni apertus estrictamente, toda vez que la intención del mismo es determinar algunas conductas típicamente consideradas graves, pero que en cumplimiento mismo del principio general que rige la materia laboral de "Primacía de la realidad", y tomando en cuenta la diversidad de factores y circunstancias que puedan intervenir en una relación laboral, establece la posibilidad de despedir sin responsabilidad patronal al trabajador que incurra en actos u omisiones considerados graves (inciso L), ya que no es posible que únicamente once incisos (situaciones concretas) constituyan causa justa para el despido, cuando la relación obrero -patronal o interlaboral es mucho más extensa por su dinamismo. Por otra parte, ni con ayuda de una notable imaginación o experiencia podría el legislador prever toda situación posible.

II.Ciertamente, cuando el Código finalmente remite en el inciso l) del artículo 81 a "cualquier otra falta grave" en que incurra el trabajador, no deja ni puede dejar totalmente al arbitrio irrestricto del patrono la fijación de contenidos para la situación concreta a que se atribuya tal condición. Por eso, aun cuando el patrono pueda entender que una determinada conducta o actuación constituye falta grave, será el juez, si se requiere su intervención, el que llene de contenido el aparente vacío que ofrece una fórmula tan amplia como la que se comenta. En otras palabras, será el juez en cuya jurisdicción radique el caso concreto, quien con criterios de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad, llene de contenido el inciso en cuestión, determinando la procedencia de la aplicada sanción por la "falta grave". Considerar, como lo hacen los señores jueces consultantes, que se podría lesionar el contenido constitucional al aplicar subjetivamente la norma que nos ocupa, es desconocer la tarea y misión fundamental de los jueces, que en todo caso deben interpretar y aplicar el ordenamiento jurídico secundario, con criterios o parámetros constitucionales.

III.Por otra parte, el inciso L) en cuestión no establece condiciones que menoscaben la libertad ni la dignidad del ser humano, ni viola las garantías que la Constitución establece en su artículo 56, sobre el cual la jurisprudencia de esta Sala ha establecido:

"Si bien el artículo 56 de la Constitución Política establece la obligación para el Estado de promover que todos logren ocupación, de ello no se deriva que el Estado debe ser el empleador, sino que sus políticas de gobierno, económicas, sociales, etcétera, deban tender a que con ellas se promueva el desarrollo de ocupaciones para los habitantes del país".

(Sentencia N. 1609-91, de las 15:30 horas del 20 de agosto, 1991).

En conclusión, ni el contenido, ni el principio en que se inspira el inciso consultado, rozan con la Constitución Política y así debe evacuarse la consulta." En resolución posterior, la Sentencia No. 563-97 de las 14:39 hrs. del 29 de enero de 1997, la Sala reiteró su criterio, en cuanto a la conformidad del inciso L) del artículo 81 del Código de Trabajo, así:

"Considerando

I.DE LOS MOTIVOS DE IMPUGNACIÓN DEL ARTÍCULO 81 INCISO L DEL CÓDIGO DE TRABAJO. Impugna la accionante el artículo 81 inciso L del Código de Trabajo, al alegar que no determina en forma taxativa las causales que pueden motivar un despido sin responsabilidad patronal, ya que deja al arbitrio del patrono la potestad de legislar y establecer nuevas causales de despido y agravar las existentes, en violación de los principios de separación de poderes, de tipicidad, y potestad legislativa, establecidos en los artículos 9, 11, 39, 41 y 43, 105, 121 inciso 1, 123 a 129 constitucionales; además de estimar que resulta contrario al principio de igualdad -artículo 33 de la Constitución Política-, al permitirle al patrono poder hacer una distinción entre trabajadores, pues en un mismo lugar de trabajo pueden existir contratos en que la misma conducra es calificada en forma diversa, de manera que, en algunos casos podrá tenerse como falta leve y en otros como falta grave; y de los artículos 191 y 192 de la Carta Fundamental, en referencia al sector público, pues de tales normas se deriva que no puede haber un tipo penal de despido abierto, ya que resulta contrario a la estabilidad laboral en la Administración Pública, de modo que las causales de despido deben ser taxativas e iguales para todos los servidores.

II.DE LA ALEGADA VIOLACIÓN AL PRINCIPIO DE TIPICIDAD PENAL O SANCIONATORIO. El artículo 81 inciso L. del Código de Trabajo dispone:

"Son causas justas que facultan al patrono para dar por terminado el contrato de trabajo:

...

• l)Cuando el trabajador incurra en cualquier otra falta grave a las obligaciones que le imponga el contrato." Al disponerse en la forma transcrita no se viola el principio de tipicidad, toda vez que la norma no resulta omisa ni oscura en la determinación de las causales de despido justificado. Se entiende que toda labor desempeñada por los empleados -funcionario público o empleado de una empresa privada- es distinta dependiendo del cargo o puesto que se desempeñe, no obstante que se trate de un mismo centro de trabajo; de modo que las responsabilidades a que está sujeto cada uno dependerán de la tarea asignada. De este modo, sí se derivan consecuencias jurídicas del contrato de trabajo, el cual debe ser tomado como fuente de derecho, en el tanto de él se derivan derechos y obligaciones para el trabajador, en su condición particular, ya que en el mismo se especifica la tarea y función por la que se contrata, y que el empleado acepta. En virtud de lo anterior, es que queda claro que, tanto los derechos como obligaciones que se imponen a los trabajadores no son de carácter subjetivo, sino objetivos; no se imponen por la persona en sí, sino por la función que se desempeña o puesto que se ostenta.

III.Con anterioridad, esta Sala definió el ámbito de aplicación del poder disciplinario o potestad disciplinaria en el sector público; así, en sentencia número 1264-95, del siete de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, se indicó:

"IV. ESFERA DE APLICACION DEL PODER DISCIPLINARIO. La aplicación del régimen disciplinario se limita a las actividades del individuo en su carácter de agente o funcionario público, para compelir y asegurar, preventiva y represivamente, el cumplimiento de los deberes jurídicos del empleo, de la función o del cargo. Las faltas generadoras de esta responsabilidad son muchas y variadas, como por ejemplo, la desidia, apatía, descuido, inasistencia, incorreción con superiores, iguales o subordinados y con el público, conducta social irregular, falta de probidad, abandono del cargo, etc., que según su gravedad se clasifican de leves, graves o muy graves. Los deberes de los funcionarios derivan, como sus derechos, de la ley y de la naturaleza del cargo o función que desempeñan, es decir, tienen carácter objetivo. Los deberes de los funcionarios son de dos clases, los generales, que atañen a todo funcionario por el sólo hecho de serlo, y los especiales, impuestos en relación con la función administrativa específica desempeñada. Así por ejemplo, la obediencia es un deber para todo funcionario público, pero el deber de obediencia de un catedrático no resulta igual del deber de un policía. Algunos deberes generales son: el de obediencia, que consiste en el respeto y obediencia a las autoridades superiores jerárquicas; y la prestación del servicio, que consiste en el deber del funcionario de la realización de las prestaciones propias de su cargo, que viene dado por la naturaleza de la función, para el mejor servicio público, rendimiento o productividad en los servicios, quedando los funcionarios obligados al fiel cumplimiento de la función o cargo, cumpliendo la jornada de trabajo reglamentario, debiendo colaborar lealmente con sus jefes y compañeros de trabajo, para el mejoramiento de los servicios y consecución de los fines de la unidad administrativa en que se halle destinado. La prestación del servicio debe ser personal, en virtud de la presunción oficial en favor de la competencia del funcionario asignado. También constituyen deberes generales el deber de reserva, que estriba en la obligación de proceder con la debida discreción en el desempeño del cargo, guardando el oportuno silencio en los casos en que la índole de la función lo exija -en el sector público el quebrantamiento del secreto puede generar severas sanciones disciplinarias, e inclusive de tipo penal, como es el caso del ámbito disciplinario diplomático y del Poder Judicial, en la revelación de los secretos que afectan la seguridad del Estado, o los intereses de las partes, causando graves daños-; y el deber del decoro exije que el oficio público sea atendido por su titular con el debido respeto y corrección, tanto en lo profesional como en lo social, en razón de la institución que representa. El deber de consagrarse por entero y con todo celo y decoro al cargo asignado, veda al funcionario el ejercicio de otros cargos o funciones, por cuanto imposibilitaría el buen servicio de ambos. En ocasiones la índole del empleo excluye el ejercicio de determinadas profesiones, así el juez no puede desempeñar cargos de dirección o asesoramiento a empresas particulares. El funcionario público no podrá actuar al servicio de terceros en asuntos en que esté interviniendo por razón de su cargo, ni de los que se hallen en tramitación o pendientes de resolución en la oficina en que labore, ni tampoco podrá ser abogado, procurador o perito de tercero en cualquier clase de litigio contra el Estado. El incurrir en alguna de estas incompatibilidades se calificará como falta grave o muy grave, debiéndose además sancionar las faltas o ausencias, retrasos, descuidos, informalidades o negligencias que se originen en el ejercicio de actividades compatibles." Como se observa, de la condición de funcionario público se derivan obligaciones generales para todos los que ostenten esta condición, pero del contrato de trabajo, se generan obligaciones especiales, en relación con la función administrativa específica desempeñada. Por ello, es que no resulta contrario al principio de tipicidad, regulado en el artículo 39 constitucional, el sujetar de manera general al contrato laboral la determinación de qué constituye falta grave, en relación con la responsabilidad asignada a cada empleado.

IV.Debe además señalarse que, resulta ilusorio y fuera de toda lógica normativa, el pretender que en la ley se especifique en detalle cada una de las obligaciones laborales derivadas de todas y cada una de las relaciones laborales de todos los empleados del país, que se motiven en la tarea específica que cada uno realiza en su trabajo, como causal de un despido sin responsabilidad laboral. Y en este sentido, debe tenerse presente que, aunque en la potestad sancionatoria disciplinaria debe respetarse el principio de tipicidad, éste no se aplica con el mismo rigor que en la materia penal:

"Puede afirmarse que el principio de tipicidad constituye un principio fundamental en la responsabilidad disciplinaria, pero no en la misma forma que en ámbito jurídico-penal, ya que los principios "nullum crimen sine lege", "nullum poena sine lege" no tienen la rigidez y exigencia que les caracteriza en el derecho penal sustantivo, por cuanto la actividad sancionatoria de índole penal y la de índole disciplinaria corresponden a campos jurídicos diferentes, y los parámetros de discrecionalidad que son propios del ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria administrativa son más amplios que los de la potestad sancionatoria penal del Estado. Así, en el derecho penal, en relación con los delitos, toda pena debe estar establecida en la ley con respecto al hecho incriminado, excluyendo, por su generalidad, toda posibilidad de referencia a los llamados conceptos jurídicos indeterminados, o las cláusulas abiertas o indeterminadas; si la conducta no está plenamente definido no hay pena. En el derecho disciplinario, en razón del fin que persigue, cual es la protección del orden social general, y de la materia que regula, -la disciplina-, la determinación de la infracción disciplinaria es menos exigente que la sanción penal, ya que comprende hechos que pueden ser calificados como violación de los deberes del funcionamiento, que en algunas legislaciones no están especificados, y, en otras, sí. De manera que, el ejercicio de este poder es discrecional, de allí que proceda aplicar sanciones por cualquier falta a los deberes funcionales, sin necesidad de que estén detalladas concretamente como hecho sancionatorio, por lo cual, la enumeración que de los hechos punibles se haga vía reglamentaria no tiene carácter limitativo. Motivado en la variedad de causas que pueden generar su aplicación, en la imprecisión frecuente de sus preceptos y en la esfera de aplicación, no siempre es orgánico ni claro en la expresión literal, razón por la cual puede sancionarse discrecionalmente las faltas no previstas concretamente, pero que se entienden incluidas en el texto, siempre y cuando resulten de la comprobación de la falta disciplinaria, mediante un procedimiento creado al efecto. La falta o infracción disciplinaria se ha definido diciendo que es una violación al funcionamiento de cualquier deber propio de su condición, aún cuando no haya sido especialmente definida aunque si prevista. Los hechos determinantes de las faltas disciplinarias son innumerables, pues dependen de la índole de los comportamientos o conductas de los sujetos "subordinados", comportamientos o conductas en verdad ilimitados en número dada su variedad; por ello se deduce la existencia de tres elementos de la falta disciplinaria: 1.- un elemento material: que es un acto o una omisión; 2.- un elemento moral: que es la imputación del acto a una voluntad libre; y 3.- un elemento formal: que es la perturbación al funcionamiento del servicio o afección inmediata o posible de su eficacia." (Sentencia número 5594-94, de las quince horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintisiete de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro.)

V.DE LAS OTRAS VIOLACIONES ALEGADAS. En virtud de las razones anteriores es que cabe concluir que la norma impugnada tampoco resulta lesiva del principio de sepación de poderes, pues no conlleva "delegación legislativa" alguna, lo único que autoriza es que el patrono, en consideración a los términos del contrato, de la función a desempeñar, pueda, teniendo como parámetro las faltas señaladas expresamente en el Código de Trabajo, tomar en consideración "cualquier otra falta grave a las obligaciones que le imponga el contrato", sin que en ello se confiera al patrono capacidad para determinar en forma arbitraria e inconstitucional las causales del despido sin responsabilidad patronal, como alega la accionante. Y mucho menos resulta violatoria del principio de igualdad, ya que se entiende que las responsabilidades y obligaciones laborales siempre serán distintas, precisamente en virtud del cargo o empleo que se desempeñe; es decir, no todos los empleados o funcionarios de un mismo centro de trabajo se encuentran en una misma situación de igualdad, sino sólamente aquellos que ostenten el mismo puesto o cargo."

Con base en lo anteriormente expuesto, no existiendo motivos para variar el criterio sostenido por este Tribunal, procede rechazar por el fondo la acción interpuesta.-

Por tanto:

Se rechaza por el fondo la acción.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Presidente, a.i.

Nombre43949 . Nombre44110 .

Carlos M. Arguedas R. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Susana Castro A.