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Res. 14306-2025 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 14/05/2025
OutcomeResultado
The Constitutional Chamber summarily dismisses the unconstitutionality action for lack of standing of the petitioning organizations.La Sala Constitucional rechaza de plano la acción de inconstitucionalidad por falta de legitimación activa de las organizaciones accionantes.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber summarily dismisses an unconstitutionality action filed by several human rights organizations against Executive Decree No. 43810-MGP, which amended the Refugee Regulations. The Chamber analyzes the petitioners' standing and concludes that neither of the invoked grounds—diffuse interests or corporate interests—is satisfied. Regarding diffuse interests, the Chamber notes that immigration law is not per se a matter of diffuse interest under its case law and that the challenged provisions are susceptible to individual application to identifiable persons, who have already sought habeas corpus relief. On corporate interests, the petitioners' generic assertions fail to demonstrate that their members are in fact refugees or asylum seekers, and broadly worded human rights purposes do not confer unconditional standing. The action is also dismissed as to one organization whose legal representation was not properly accredited. Three justices write separately on the point of diffuse interests but concur in the dismissal.La Sala Constitucional rechaza de plano una acción de inconstitucionalidad presentada por varias organizaciones defensoras de derechos humanos contra el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 43810-MGP, que reformó el Reglamento de Personas Refugiadas. La Sala analiza la legitimación de los accionantes y concluye que no se configura ninguno de los supuestos invocados: intereses difusos ni intereses corporativos. Respecto a los intereses difusos, señala que la normativa migratoria no constituye per se materia de interés difuso según su jurisprudencia y que las disposiciones impugnadas son susceptibles de aplicación individual en perjuicio de personas identificables, quienes han acudido al hábeas corpus. En cuanto a los intereses corporativos, las afirmaciones genéricas de los accionantes no acreditan que sus asociados sean efectivamente personas refugiadas o solicitantes de refugio, y los fines estatutarios amplios de protección de derechos humanos no otorgan una legitimación incondicional. La Sala también rechaza la acción respecto de una asociación cuya representación legal no fue debidamente acreditada. Tres magistrados emiten razones diferentes en el punto de intereses difusos, pero coinciden en el rechazo.
Key excerptExtracto clave
VI.- IN CONCLUSION. As a corollary to the above, the action under study must be summarily dismissed, and it is so ordered. VII.- SEPARATE REASONS OF JUSTICES CRUZ CASTRO, RUEDA LEAL AND FERNÁNDEZ ARGÜELLO regarding diffuse interests, drafted by the second named. As we have stated in other cases, we consider that one attribute of a diffuse interest is precisely that its impact is general—that is, it affects an entire population or broad sectors thereof—within a context where it is not necessary that the harmed subjects know one another (they may even lack any legal nexus or relationship among themselves), but what is required is the existence of a single situation of harm or danger to a constitutional interest that equally and without any individualization encompasses and binds together an entire society in the abstract. Its defense is aimed at satisfying a need of society as such; therefore, it transcends that of an individual human being, whether considered individually or collectively. (…) Now, this does not mean that in every situation invoked one may allege the existence of a diffuse interest, even if it may be the object of a particular situation. Let us remember that for an interest to be considered “diffuse,” it must not only affect a community but also be diffused, spread throughout that community. If it does not produce such an effect, it cannot be considered a diffuse interest. In the petitioners’ case, as the Majority indicates, the challenged regulation does not produce a socially diffused impact but rather a specific one. Thus, what is glimpsed in this case is a situation that, while it may be shared by a certain group of persons, does not have such a magnitude as to be considered a diffuse interest. For this reason, we concur with the Majority in dismissing this action.VI.- EN CONCLUSIÓN. Como corolario de lo anterior, procede rechazar de plano la acción en estudio, como así se dispone. VII.- RAZONES DIFERENTES DE LOS MAGISTRADOS CRUZ CASTRO, RUEDA LEAL Y FERNÁNDEZ ARGÜELLO, en lo que respecta a intereses difusos, con redacción del segundo. Tal como lo hemos expresado en otros casos, estimamos que una cualidad del interés difuso consiste precisamente, en que su afectación es general -esto es, incide en toda una población o en amplios sectores de ella- dentro de un contexto, donde no se precisa que los sujetos perjudicados se conozcan entre sí (incluso podrían carecer de nexo o relaciones jurídicas entre ellos), pero sí se requiere de la presencia de una misma situación de daño o peligro a un bien constitucional que, por igual y sin necesidad de individualización alguna, comprende y aglomera a toda una sociedad en abstracto. Su defensa tiene como finalidad satisfacer una necesidad de la sociedad como tal, por ello, es trascendente a la de un ser humano individual o colectivamente considerado. (...) Ahora bien, ello no quiere decir, en modo alguno, que en toda situación invocada se pueda alegar la existencia de un interés difuso, aunque este pueda ser objeto de una situación particular. Recordemos que para que un interés sea considerado “difuso”, no solo debe afectar una colectividad, sino también debe difuminarse, difundirse en esa colectividad. Si no produce tal efecto, no puede ser considerado un interés difuso. En el caso de los accionantes, tal como refiere la Mayoría, la normativa impugnada no produce una afectación socialmente difuminada, sino determinada. De modo que, en este caso, lo que se vislumbra es una situación que, si bien puede ser compartida por algún grupo de personas, ese efecto no es de tal magnitud como para considerarlo un interés difuso. Por el motivo expuesto coincidimos con la Mayoría en desestimar esta acción.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"Prima facie, no se está ante un caso que intereses difusos, así reconocido en la jurisprudencia de esta Sala. De hecho, este Tribunal ha resuelto que la materia migratoria no constituye, per se, materia en donde exista un interés difuso (Voto N° 2020-001339)."
"Prima facie, this is not a case of diffuse interests, as recognized in the case law of this Chamber. In fact, this Court has held that immigration matters do not per se constitute an area where a diffuse interest exists (Decision No. 2020-001339)."
Considerando V.- A
"Prima facie, no se está ante un caso que intereses difusos, así reconocido en la jurisprudencia de esta Sala. De hecho, este Tribunal ha resuelto que la materia migratoria no constituye, per se, materia en donde exista un interés difuso (Voto N° 2020-001339)."
Considerando V.- A
"Se verifica, además, que se está en presencia de normas susceptibles de concretizarse en casos de aplicación individual en cabeza de personas específicas y que inciden directamente en la esfera jurídica de personas singulares y plenamente identificables, quienes están habilitadas para plantear la correspondiente reclamación administrativa o judicial."
"It is further verified that the norms at issue are susceptible to being materialized in cases of individual application to specific persons and that they directly affect the legal sphere of singular and fully identifiable individuals, who are entitled to bring the corresponding administrative or judicial claim."
Considerando V.- A
"Se verifica, además, que se está en presencia de normas susceptibles de concretizarse en casos de aplicación individual en cabeza de personas específicas y que inciden directamente en la esfera jurídica de personas singulares y plenamente identificables, quienes están habilitadas para plantear la correspondiente reclamación administrativa o judicial."
Considerando V.- A
"En definitiva, en el sub lite no se evidencia una efectiva defensa de intereses corporativos. De hecho, admitir esta acción en los términos en que se ha sido formulada, supondría reconocer tácitamente la existencia de una acción popular, la cual, como lo ha indicado la Sala Constitucional en su reiterada jurisprudencia (ver Sentencia N° 2016-000787 de las 9:05 hrs. del 20 de enero de 2016), no se adecua al marco de las competencias procesales que al efecto tiene este Tribunal Constitucional, en sus funciones de intérprete último y guardián de la Constitución."
"In sum, the present case does not show an effective defense of corporate interests. In fact, admitting this action as formulated would tacitly recognize the existence of a popular action, which, as the Constitutional Chamber has consistently held in its case law (see Judgment No. 2016-000787 of 9:05 a.m. on January 20, 2016), does not fit within the framework of the procedural powers vested in this Constitutional Court in its role as ultimate interpreter and guardian of the Constitution."
Considerando V.- B
"En definitiva, en el sub lite no se evidencia una efectiva defensa de intereses corporativos. De hecho, admitir esta acción en los términos en que se ha sido formulada, supondría reconocer tácitamente la existencia de una acción popular, la cual, como lo ha indicado la Sala Constitucional en su reiterada jurisprudencia (ver Sentencia N° 2016-000787 de las 9:05 hrs. del 20 de enero de 2016), no se adecua al marco de las competencias procesales que al efecto tiene este Tribunal Constitucional, en sus funciones de intérprete último y guardián de la Constitución."
Considerando V.- B
Full documentDocumento completo
Constitutional Chamber Date of Resolution: 09:30 on May 14, 2025 Case File: 23-018267-0007-CO Type of Matter: Unconstitutionality Action Judgment with Separate Note Judgment with protected data, in accordance with current regulations 1 *CO* Res. No. 2025-014306 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine-thirty on the fourteenth of May, two thousand twenty-five.
Unconstitutionality action filed by [Name 001], foreigner migratory identity document No. [Value 001], who claims to be the coordinator of the [...], with legal entity identification number No. [Value 002], [Name 002], with foreigner migratory identity document No. [Value 003], in his capacity as legal representative of the [...], with legal entity identification number No. [Value 004], [Name 003], with foreigner migratory identity document No. [Value 005], in his capacity as Vice President and legal representative of the [...], with legal entity identification number No. [Value 006], [Name 004], bearer of passport No. [Value 007], in his capacity as country director and legal representative of [Name 005], with legal entity identification number No. [Value 008], [Name 006], bearer of identity card number [Value 009], in her capacity as national director and legal representative of the [Name 007], with legal entity identification number No. [Value 010], and [Name 008], bearer of passport No. [Value 011], in her capacity as director and legal representative of the [Name 009], with legal entity identification number No. 3-[Value 012]; against Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, of Executive Decree No. 43810-MGP, insofar as they reform, in order, Articles 14, 54, 58, 59, 121, and 140, of the Refugee Persons Regulation (Executive Decree No. 36831-G), as well as Article 7, of Executive Decree No. 43810-MGP, which derogates Articles 15, 16, 18, and 139, of the Refugee Persons Regulation (Executive Decree No. 36831-G), and Article 8, of Executive Decree No. 43810-MGP, which includes a sole Transitory provision to the Refugee Persons Regulation (Executive Decree No. 36831-G).
Whereas:
The application of the concept requires an individual assessment of whether the refugee will be readmitted to the “first country of asylum,” will be granted legal stay there, and will be accorded standards of treatment consistent with the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol and with international human rights standards, including, but not limited to, protection against refoulement. A case could arise where, for example, even though an individual had previously enjoyed protection in another country, that person has valid reasons to fear that their physical safety or freedom is in danger in that country. Similarly, it could be that a refugee is unable to obtain effective protection or enjoy the full and durable enjoyment of their rights in the first country of asylum, for example, if they are forced to live without an appropriate legal status. In such cases, refugees may legitimately feel compelled to seek protection elsewhere.
They argue that, for this reason, the refusal to allow access to the procedure or their transfer to a third country with the standards expressly set forth in the rule in question is incompatible with the obligations of States to provide international protection to refugees and asylum seekers. They note that this Constitutional Chamber has generated case law on the matter when, through Ruling No. 010073-2023, it analyzed the habeas corpus appeal filed by a migrant person whose asylum application was not admitted because they had passed through a third country and who was detained for expulsion at the Juan Santamaría International Airport. In this ruling, this Court expressed its concern because the application of Article 121 of the Refugee Regulations allows an asylum application to be denied without taking into consideration the reasons why the person left their country of origin and without also weighing the reasons why they did not seek asylum in the transit countries.
This Court deemed it improper that, in applying this article, the situations of special vulnerability that protected the petitioner were set aside, especially the aggressions suffered based on her gender in one of the transit countries, and recalled that although the principle of singular inderogability of regulations is one of the fundamental pillars of a rule-of-law state such as Costa Rica’s, “human rights are the measure of legitimacy of the actions of public power...” The foregoing, moreover, in relation to the case law emanating from this Court, in which it grants constitutional rank to international instruments, or, to the extent that they grant greater guarantees, confers upon them a rank superior to the Constitution. In turn, in this same ruling, regarding the concept of a third country, it established: “the rule applied does not take into account cases such as the present one, limiting the possibility of hearing them; furthermore, it delegates to the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería the qualification of a State as reliable and respectful of human rights, as well as the assessment of its political and social situation, without offering parameters for this, concomitantly punishing the person for not having previously requested refuge.” This Court stated that the resolutions that declared the asylum application inadmissible lacked due reasoning, inasmuch as they did not detail the reasons why the transit country of the petitioner could be considered safe, whether it would admit her, and whether in that country she would be given the possibility of submitting her asylum application with minimum guarantees; instead, the application of Article 121 occurred mechanically, setting aside the principles “pro homine” and “pro libertate.” It notes that the concept of a safe third country is not foreign to the framework of international protection and is based on the joint approach among states to various migratory situations; however, its application entails a series of elements, such as interstate coordination and review of the conditions in the first country of asylum, which, in the application of the challenged executive decree, are not being contemplated by the country, thus causing the rule in question not to comply with constitutional or conventional principles.
Furthermore, they claim that admissibility criteria imply a collective analysis. The regulation challenged here allows asylum applications to be declared inadmissible, thus preventing them from being evaluated by the competent authorities and from an individualized analysis of the applications being carried out. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has highlighted that, in order to give useful effect to the right to seek and receive asylum, States must: “design and make operational fair and efficient procedures aimed at determining whether the applicant meets the criteria to exercise said right and apply for refugee status, taking into account that the definitions contain subjective and objective elements (supra paras. 75, 76, and 80) that can only be ascertained through individualized procedures and that, in turn, allow for a proper examination of the asylum application and prevent refoulement contrary to international law.” (Advisory Opinion OC-21/14 of August 19, 2014, para. 244).
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has referred to collective expulsions, which are expressly prohibited by Article 22.9 of the Convention; these may be understood as: “any measure of expulsion of a foreign person that is not based on individual criteria, but on group considerations, even if the group in question is not numerous. Likewise, it emphasized that collective expulsions, besides violating the right of residence and transit, have the potential to violate many other rights, among them, life, security, freedom, as well as the principle of non-refoulement and the right to seek and receive asylum; since they imply the expulsion of persons without carrying out an individualized study of their migratory situation, regardless of whether they suffer persecution or threats to any of their rights.” The Inter-American Court stated: “the 'collective' nature of an expulsion implies a decision that does not develop an objective analysis of the individual circumstances of each foreigner, and therefore falls into arbitrariness.” (Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. vs. Dominican Republic.
Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of October 24, 2012, p. 49). Faced with the automatic application of the presumptions contained in Executive Decree No. 43810-MGP, this Constitutional Chamber has pointed out that: “the regulatory reform entails an immediate consequence consisting of the archiving of the asylum application, without the issuance of a reasoned act that analyzes the particular situation of the person and allows them to exercise their right of defense against such a penalty” (Ruling No. 05106-2023). The petitioners affirm that the rule subject to constitutional review allows the automatic and collective denial of asylum applications, as it allows asylum applications submitted outside the thirty-day period and those of persons who have passed through a third country to be rejected, without carrying out an exhaustive assessment of the merits of each case to determine whether the person should be recognized as a refugee or not, preventing an individualized analysis thereof, thus incurring in collective expulsions.
They also claim that the rule subject to constitutional review prevents “sur place” refugees from submitting their asylum applications in Costa Rica. “Sur place” refugees are persons who were not considered refugees when they left their country of origin, but who subsequently acquired that status due to two possible reasons: i) the circumstances of their country changed during their absence; and/or ii) as a result of their own conduct. Therefore, persons who entered Costa Rica and who, after thirty days, meet the conditions to be considered refugees will not be able to request asylum. Regarding “sur place” refugees, it is highlighted that the IACHR urged Costa Rica to take said concept into consideration, for the particular approach to the cases of Nicaraguan persons with a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Nicaragua, reaffirming the validity and relevance of said practice within the framework of the right to seek and receive asylum established in the American Convention on Human Rights; in this sense, it pointed out: “to guarantee the recognition of refugee status for Nicaraguan persons with a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Nicaragua, including so-called sur place refugees, through fair, agile, and efficient procedures that guarantee their right to seek asylum and their right to non-refoulement in accordance with Articles 22.7 and 22.8 of the American Convention.” (Forced Migration of Nicaraguan Persons to Costa Rica, OAS/Ser.L/V/II.
Doc. 150, September 8, 2019, para. 227). Along the same lines, UNHCR pronounced itself in the technical opinion issued in Ruling No. 2023-0041 of February 2, 2023, which was submitted to the Constitutional Chamber at the request of said jurisdictional body, when analyzing the difficulties a “sur place” refugee will have in accessing the asylum procedure, with the limitations imposed by the rule subject to constitutionality review; in this regard, it stated: “Likewise, the possibility of submitting an application for recognition of refugee status at any time after arriving in the country is essential to facilitate the person seeking asylum as a sur place refugee. This may be necessary, for example, when the circumstances in a person's country of origin changed during their absence or as a result of their own conduct, thus creating a need for international protection.” With the example of “sur place” refugees, it becomes evident that the regulation challenged here is unconstitutional and disrespectful of the pillars governing the asylum application process, as well as that the imposed thirty-calendar-day deadline lacks any technical or logical basis.
They add that the principle of non-refoulement constitutes a fundamental pillar of the right to seek and receive asylum and has therefore been enshrined as a norm of ius cogens. This, moreover, is regulated in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which establishes: “No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” In our Political Constitution, this is protected in the aforementioned Article 31, which contemplates the right to seek and receive asylum. At the regional level, the American Convention on Human Rights contemplates its protection in Article 22.8, which establishes: “In no case may an alien be expelled or returned to another country, whether or not it is his country of origin, if his right to life or personal freedom is at risk of being violated because of his race, nationality, religion, social status, or political opinions.” It is thus that the States Parties to the Convention have the obligation not to expel or return any person to territories where their life or freedom would be threatened.
This protection is applicable to all persons who are refugees under the terms of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and who do not fall within the scope of exclusion. The Inter-American Court has repeatedly indicated the obligation of States Parties to carry out an individualized analysis of the case, to verify and evaluate the plausibility of the risk in the event of refoulement; in this regard, it specifies that: “When examining the principle of non-refoulement in the face of possible risks to the rights to life or liberty of a person, this Court has already clarified that the risk 'must be real, that is, a foreseeable consequence. In this sense, the State must carry out an individualized examination in order to verify and evaluate the circumstances alleged by the person that reveal that they may suffer an impairment to their life or freedom in the country to which they are intended to be returned, that is, to their country of origin or, if returned to a third country, that this person runs the risk of subsequently being sent to the place where they suffer such risk.
If their narrative is credible, convincing, or coherent such that there may be a probable risk situation for them, the principle of non-refoulement must govern'.” Along the same lines, the Inter-American Court, in Advisory Opinion OC-25/18, indicated that the principle of non-refoulement requires action on the part of the State, particularly because it requires that the State analyze individually whether the person is in danger in the event of refoulement. This implies: “an interview with the person and a prior or preliminary assessment in order to determine whether there are sufficient reasons to believe that there is a risk of irreparable harm to their rights.” Given the declaratory nature of refugee status determination, the protection afforded by the principle of non-refoulement applies to all refugees whether or not they have yet been recognized as such by the authorities. The principle of non-refoulement constitutes a fundamental pillar in the procedure for determining refugee status, precisely because the rights that could eventually be violated should a person be returned to their country of origin or others, are very difficult or impossible to repair.
By virtue of the foregoing, they consider that the regulation challenged through this unconstitutionality action substantially violates the principle of non-refoulement, given that no individualized analysis is carried out of the reasons why the persons require international protection; it merely limits itself to declaring inadmissibility solely on formal grounds, leaving these persons at a potential risk of deportation, completely disregarding the fate they could face if returned. The foregoing is absolutely contrary to the Political Constitution of Costa Rica, to the American Convention on Human Rights, to the interpretations made by the Inter-American Court, to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, and to the principle of non-refoulement, which, although regulated in the aforementioned instruments, has also been considered by the international community as a principle of ius cogens.
They also question matters regarding “manifestly unfounded or abusive applications.” The competence to determine refugee status in Costa Rica is defined by law, in the Ley General de Migración y Extranjería, which defines the responsibilities of (a) the Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio and (b) the Unidad de Refugio, as an organ of the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería. Article 13, subsection 26, of the Ley General de Migración y Extranjería establishes that among the functions of the Directorate General is to: “Submit applications for said status to the Comisión de Visas Restringidas y de Refugio.” For its part, Article 49 of said regulatory body determines that: “The Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio shall be composed of the Minister of Labor and Social Security or their representative, the Minister of Public Security or their representative, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship or their representative.
The Regulations to this Law shall establish provisions regarding its functioning and organization. The Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio shall be responsible for determining the granting of restricted visas and refugee status for persons who so request before the Directorate General.” Article 118 of said regulation establishes, with even greater clarity, that it shall be the competence of the Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio to resolve the approval or denial of refugee status, by means of a reasoned resolution. Meanwhile, Article 264 determines the creation of the Unidad de Refugio as a technical and administrative support body for said Commission. However, Article 5 of Executive Decree No. 43810-MGP grants the Unidad de Refugio the power to determine when an application is “manifestly unfounded or clearly abusive or fraudulent in nature.” According to Article 6 of the same decree, the Unidad de Refugio has the power to summarily reject asylum applications that are unfounded, improper, or abusive.
As reported by the Unidad de Refugio, regarding decisions declared inadmissible for having been filed outside the thirty days based on Article 1 of Executive Decree No. 43810-MGP, that is, those declared improper for having been filed outside the thirty days required by the rule, no appeals are available: “inasmuch as Article 199 of the Ley General de Migración y Extranjería and Article 14 of the Reglamento de Personas Refugiadas, Executive Decree number 36831-G (...) on which the inadmissibility is based, clearly state that the immediate archiving of the administrative file shall be ordered, and it is not indicated that there is an opportunity to appeal the resolution.” Therefore, they consider that the process of rejecting asylum applications carried out by the Unidad de Refugio not only limits effective access to the procedure for determining refugee status—inasmuch as it does not allow a substantive analysis of the asylum application nor does it allow applicants to be heard during the procedure—but also constitutes a breach of other minimum due process guarantees that must be present in all procedures for determining refugee status.
Specifically, the power to summarily reject asylum applications and the impossibility of filing appeals against these decisions disregard the following guarantees developed in the Inter-American Human Rights System for refugee status determination processes: a) access to an impartial and trained authority for identifying international protection needs, and b) the right to appeal the decision that does not recognize refugee status. The case law of the Inter-American Court recognizes that the right to seek asylum includes the right of every person to have effective access to the procedure to be recognized as a refugee. In turn, effective access to the procedure implies that the “competent authority” carries out a correct examination of the grounds for the application, that is, determines whether or not the person has a well-founded fear of persecution, and that the procedure concludes with a reasoned decision on whether or not the person qualifies to be recognized as a refugee.
Regarding manifestly unfounded cases, in the Pacheco Tineo case, the Inter-American Court indicated: “States may establish 'accelerated procedures' to resolve applications that are 'manifestly unfounded and abusive' for which there is no need for international protection. However, given the serious consequences that an erroneous determination may have for the applicant, even in these procedures, the minimum guarantees of a hearing, determination of that unfounded or abusive nature of the application by the competent authority, and the possibility of reviewing the negative decision before an expulsion must be respected.” (Case of the Pacheco Tineo Family vs. Plurinational State of Bolivia. Judgment of November 25, 2013, p. 59; emphasis not in the original).
Despite the clarity of the Ley General de Migración y Extranjería regarding legal competences, and the content of the right to seek asylum, as developed by the Inter-American Court, Articles 5 and 6 of the challenged Executive Decree modify the procedure for determining refugee status in a manner contrary to law and attribute competence to the Unidad de Refugio to make decisions on manifestly unfounded asylum applications, which includes aspects of inadmissibility of applications. This content of Articles 5 and 6 contradicts a higher-ranking norm, since the Ley General de Migración y Extranjería defines the Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio as the sole “competent authority” to determine refugee status and, according to the case law of the Inter-American Court, that competence includes determining which applications are considered manifestly unfounded. This decree becomes an ultra vires act insofar as it exceeds the limit of the law regarding which body is responsible for ruling on asylum applications.
Likewise, Articles 5 and 6 of the challenged Executive Decree, by departing from the legal process for determining refugee status and the competence of the Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio, violate the rules of due process and the constitutional principles of legality and—by analogy—that of the natural judge, recognized in the case law of the Constitutional Chamber. Regarding the principle of the natural judge, derived from Article 35 of the Political Constitution, they cite Ruling No. 2004-12629 of this Chamber. In summary, Articles 5 and 6 of Executive Decree 43810-MGP grant a new competence to the Unidad de Refugio in contravention of the Ley General de Migración y Extranjería, thus allowing an entity that is not legally competent to decide on the admissibility of asylum applications, affecting the due process guarantees of asylum seekers to a natural judge and for their asylum applications to be examined by an impartial and trained authority for the identification of international protection needs.
Articles 5 and 6 of Executive Decree No. 43810-MGP grant a technical and administrative support entity, attached to the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, the power to decide on the recognition of a person as a refugee. A power that, according to the law, corresponds exclusively to the Comisión de Visas Restringidas y de Refugio. This power, granted to the Unidad de Refugio, causes asylum seekers whose applications are declared inadmissible not to have access to an impartial and trained authority for identifying international protection needs. Regarding the absence of challenge mechanisms, they allege that the challenged rule does not establish the possibility of filing appeals against the decision of the Unidad de Refugio, thereby disregarding the right of every person to appeal final decisions adopted within a migratory process. In particular, if the decision is unfavorable and is adopted by an administrative authority, the Inter-American Court has indicated that the right to appeal the decision before a judge or tribunal is a “fundamental requirement to guarantee adequate control and scrutiny of the acts of the administration that affect fundamental rights.” (Case of Vélez Loor vs. Panama.
Judgment of November 23, 2010, p. 42). Likewise, the Inter-American Court has indicated that, by virtue of the right to appeal an administrative decision, asylum seekers also have the right to: i. be provided information on how to appeal the decision; ii. have a reasonable period to file the appeal; and iii. have the appeals filed have suspensive effects and allow the applicant to remain in the country until the final decision in the case is adopted. Faced with the suspensive effects of appeals, the IACHR has explained that these are fundamental for the right to appeal a decision to be effective, as this is how it can be guaranteed that a person can access effective judicial protection. The IACHR has considered that, in many cases, when the deportation of a person is carried out before issuing a final decision in their case, “the lack of economic resources or legal assistance represents, for migrants, insurmountable obstacles in their access to justice.” (Human Rights of Migrants, Refugees, Stateless Persons, Victims of Human Trafficking, and Internally Displaced Persons: Norms and Standards of the Inter-American Human Rights System, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, September 3, 2015, para. 323).
In the specific case, the impossibility of filing appeals against the inadmissibility resolutions of the Unidad de Refugio prevents the decisions of this entity from being reviewed and prevents the affected persons from accessing effective judicial protection. These decisions affect the possibility of a person being recognized as a refugee and cause persons in need of international protection to potentially be deported or expelled for lacking a regular migratory status.
Consequently, it is observed that the decisions of the Unidad de Refugio denying the admission of an asylum application affect the human rights of asylum seekers, not only the right to receive and seek asylum, but also expose them to the risk of being returned to countries where their life and personal integrity are in danger. They consider that, consequently, Articles 1, 5, and 6 of Executive Decree No. 43810-MGP constitute a violation of due process guarantees in the procedures for determining refugee status. They insist that the Unidad de Refugio is not a competent, impartial, and trained authority to issue final decisions, and the impossibility of appealing its resolutions disregards the right of persons to appeal administrative decisions, preventing persons affected by the decisions of that body from accessing effective international protection and exposing them to being deported or expelled despite the risk they are in.
The Unidad de Refugio has assumed competences, outside the law, that violate the constitutional guarantees of due process and the constitutional principles of legality and natural judge, by assuming the competence to resolve the merits of asylum applications and, in turn, limiting the right to appeal any decision of the Public Administration, which are explicitly recognized in Article 8.2.h) of the American Convention on Human Rights and also in the case law of the Inter-American Court. They further allege an infringement of the constitutional principles of legality, legislative reservation, and normative hierarchy. According to the case law of the Constitutional Chamber, regulatory power that does not comply with the principles of legality, legislative reservation, and normative hierarchy must be considered prohibited arbitrary action. They cite Ruling No. 6669-2022. According to the Constitutional Chamber, regulatory power is subject to the principle of legality established in numeral 11 of the Constitution and Article 11 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; therefore, the actions and conduct carried out by the Public Administration must conform to and be authorized by the Law, expressly or, at least, in an implicitly reasonable manner.
It is a power that cannot invade the sphere of legal reserve, exclusive to the Legislative Branch, given that the imposition of restrictions on fundamental rights is reserved to the law. In repeated case law, the Constitutional Chamber has pointed out that the regulation and limitation of human rights must be done through a law, in that “the principle of legal reserve not only guarantees freedom vis-à-vis the rest of the citizens, but also constitutes a guarantee of control against public power” (Ruling No. 1668-2010). They indicate that the Constitutional Chamber has recently analyzed the applicability of Executive Decree No. 43810-MGP, in Ruling No. 010073-2023, in which it stated: “All of this without setting aside that we are dealing with a regulatory norm that establishes restrictions on the human right to seek asylum, in frontal disrespect of the principle of legislative reserve in the regulation of fundamental rights, another pivot of the Constitutional and Democratic Rule of Law.” In a similar sense, this Court has pronounced itself in Rulings No. 01635-1990, No. 002243-1993, No. 012230-2019, and No. 01158-2021; in turn, it is also important to clarify that, regarding this decree, it pronounced itself along the same lines in Ruling No. 005583-2023.
Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights determines that restrictions on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized therein may only be limited in accordance with a law. The Inter-American Court has so determined in its Advisory Opinion No. 6, in which it is specifically observed that the word “law” is the “legal norm of a general nature, conforming to the common good, emanating from the constitutionally provided for and democratically elected legislative organs, and elaborated according to the procedure established by the Constitutions of the States Parties for the formation of laws.” Observing comparative case law, in Chile, faced with a limitation on the right to seek and receive asylum through an admissibility interview to the procedure that was not contemplated in the law, but rather by a hierarchically lower instrument, the Courts of Appeals of that country established that said interview created an admissibility stage to the procedure not contemplated in the law, to determine whether the person deserves to be recognized as a refugee or not and, therefore, said reforms were unconstitutional (Courts of Appeals of Iquique, Chile, in rulings Protección 117-2019, Protección 144-2019, Protección 145-2019, Protección 146-2019 and Protección 450-2019).
Articles 1, 5 and 6 of Executive Decree No. 43810-MGP introduce limitations on the right to request and receive asylum. A human right recognized in Article 31 of the Political Constitution and by international instruments ratified by Costa Rica. Therefore, being a human right, the regulation of the exercise of the right to request and receive asylum should have been carried out through a formal law, emanating from the Legislative Branch, according to the procedure established in the Constitution. Based on the foregoing, it can be concluded that neither the President of the Republic nor the Ministry of the Interior and Police had the legal authority to limit the right to request and receive asylum by means of a decree. The regulation of this right is a matter of legal reserve (reserva de ley), meaning that its regulation should have been done through a law. Consequently, Articles 1, 5 and 6 of Executive Decree No. 43810-MGP represent an arbitrary action prohibited by the Executive Branch, since they do not conform to the principles of legality and legal reserve.
They also question the impossibility of leaving the country within the framework of the asylum application procedure and tacit abandonment of the asylum application. Article 4 of Executive Decree No. 43810-MGP establishes the impossibility of leaving the country for refugee applicants, under penalty of archiving their refugee applications, thus limiting the right to freedom of movement and equality in relation to persons recognized as refugees, against the country's obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, as well as the constitutional principles of legality, legal reserve, and normative hierarchy. Article 4 of the decree challenged herein establishes the reform of Article 59 of the Refugee Persons Regulations (Reglamento de Personas Refugiadas). They accuse that the limitations in the norm subject to constitutional review are a violation of the freedom of movement (libertad ambulatoria) of asylum seekers, for three essential reasons: (i) the right of movement is an essential right for the free development of the person seeking asylum, (ii) limits on the right to movement are a matter of legal reserve, and (iii) the archiving of the asylum application is the product of a modality of tacit waiver.
The norm subject to constitutional analysis absolutely prevents the exercise and enjoyment of the right to leave the national territory for asylum seekers, as it specifically states that: "(...) Under no circumstances will the travel of refugee applicants outside the national territory be authorized." These limits on freedom of movement are unnecessary, disproportionate, and unjustified. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte IDH) recognizes the right of movement and, through its jurisprudence, has indicated the legal mechanisms for a limit to said right to intervene with respect for human rights. In the Case of Fleury et al. vs. Haiti, the Inter-American Court stated that: "(...) the right of movement and residence, recognized in Article 22.1 of the Convention, is an indispensable condition for the free development of the person, which includes: a) the right of those who are lawfully within a State to move freely within it and choose their place of residence, and b) their right to enter, remain in, and leave the territory of the State without illegal interference..." Executive Decree No. 43810-MGP grants the Administration the power to assume that any departure from the country implies the real non-existence of the need for international protection, but instead of providing greater protection and procedural guarantee, what it does is restrict freedoms protected both at the constitutional and international levels.
This generalized motivation is arbitrary and has no basis. It is also contrary to due process (debido proceso), because it does not even make a prior individualized analysis of each application. It denies it de facto. On this particular matter, the Inter-American Court has also pointed out that measures restricting freedom of movement must have a justification for their adoption. It states that: "(...) to determine the necessity and proportionality of the restriction on freedom of movement, it is necessary to establish whether the decision ordering said measure complied with minimal reasoning justifying its adoption. When analyzing the imposition of such measures, judicial authorities must base their decisions on objective elements that may indicate that the procedural dangers sought to be prevented can effectively materialize." (Cuadernillos de Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos No. 26, p. 113).
It is so discordant to apply this migratory sanction that "(...) regarding the restriction on leaving the country, the Court has indicated that said restriction can become a substitute for the prison sentence" (Case of Ricardo Canese vs. Paraguay, paragraph 162). Consequently, the administrative migratory sanction is a clear violation of the right to personal liberty and the freedom of movement of asylum seekers. They add that the Constitutional Chamber has already granted several habeas corpus petitions of asylum seekers, as the norm clearly violates the restriction on movement. The Chamber states that: "Regarding the particular case of the protected person, it is observed that there was an arbitrary limitation on his right to movement by the respondent authority, since he was denied the possibility of leaving the country due to his status as a refugee applicant, therefore this Tribunal considers that the application of Article 59 of the Refugee Persons Regulations violates the rights of the protected person, since the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees grants those who hold such status the most favorable treatment possible and in no case less favorable than that generally accorded to foreigners in the same circumstances.
Under this train of thought, the provisions of the aforementioned article limit the ambulatory rights of the person seeking refugee status” (Voto N° 5583-2023). In summary, this measure is an absolute prohibition on freedom of movement that affects all asylum seekers and reaches other persons who are being illegitimately persecuted in their countries of origin, and who will not be able to enjoy the protection of the State of Costa Rica due to the illegitimate restriction on freedom of movement. It is, moreover, discriminatory, because it is strictly aimed at the population that seeks asylum. There does not exist in the country an absolute prohibition, like this one, that affects other migratory categories of foreign persons. They add that limits on the right to movement are a matter of legal reserve. The freedom of movement of asylum seekers has been restricted by Executive Decree No. 43810-MGP.
The Inter-American Court and the Organization of American States point out, in relation to legitimate restrictions on freedom of movement, that: "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his own country. This shall not be conditioned on any specific purpose or period of time during which the person decides to remain abroad. Likewise, the freedom to determine the State of destination is part of this guarantee. Every migrant who is lawfully within the territory of a Member State shall have, within that territory, the right to free movement and to choose his or her place of residence. All persons also have the right to remain in their country of origin. The exercise of the aforementioned rights may not be restricted except by law, to the extent indispensable in a democratic society to prevent criminal offenses or protect national security, public safety or order, public morals or health, or the rights and freedoms of others." (Inter-American Principles on the Human Rights of All Migrants, Refugees, Stateless Persons, and Victims of Human Trafficking, p. 20).
In the same sense, in Costa Rica, the regime of fundamental rights and freedoms is a matter of legal reserve and cannot be restricted through an executive decree. They cite Voto N° 3173-1993 of the Constitutional Chamber. In summary, a restriction of this type cannot be imposed by decree. They indicate that the Constitutional Chamber has already granted several habeas corpus petitions of asylum seekers, as it considered that the decree is a legal instrument that is neither suitable nor legitimate for those purposes. They cite again Voto N° 2023-5583. They add that the archiving of the asylum application constitutes a modality of tacit waiver, without an administrative act with motive, content, and purpose. The presidential decree indicates that, if the person applying for refugee status leaves the national territory, it implies the tacit abandonment and the archiving of the administrative file corresponding to the application for recognition of refugee status.
The basis for the analysis of an asylum application is enshrined in Article 22.7 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The Inter-American Court has indicated that: "the right to seek and receive asylum under refugee status, recognized in Articles 22.7 of the American Convention and XXVII of the American Declaration, read in conjunction with other provisions of the Convention and in light of special treaties, imposes on the State certain specific duties: i) duty not to return (non refoulement) and its extraterritorial application; ii) duty to allow the asylum application and not to reject at the border; iii) duty not to penalize or sanction for irregular entry or presence and not to detain; iv) duty to provide effective access to a fair and efficient procedure for determining refugee status; v) duty to ensure minimum guarantees of due process in fair and efficient procedures for determining refugee status or condition; vi) duty to adapt procedures to the specific needs of children and adolescents; vii) duty to grant international protection if the refugee definition is satisfied and to ensure the maintenance and continuity of refugee status; viii) duty to restrictively interpret exclusion clauses; and ix) duty to provide access to rights on an equal basis under refugee status" (Advisory Opinion OC-25/18).
However, notwithstanding the foregoing, Executive Decree No. 43810-MGP entails an immediate consequence consisting of the archiving of the asylum application. The foregoing, without there being an administrative act that motivates the decision and that this is subsequent to a particular analysis of each case, taking into account the individual situation of the person and, furthermore, allowing the right to defense, if necessary. On the contrary, it would force a new refugee application with consequences for the fundamental rights of the person seeking asylum. They affirm that this Chamber has already granted several habeas corpus petitions of asylum seekers, as it considered that there was an abuse of right: "The archiving of the application, resulting from a modality of tacit waiver by the applicant, disregards and undermines international regulations, constituting an invasive and punitive mandate, which deprives the regular migrant of their ambulatory rights, under the application of an illegitimate presumption of abuse of right" (Voto N° 005583-2023).
They conclude that, for all the foregoing, the norm subject to constitutional review not only threatens to violate the right to freedom of movement through an illegitimate legal instrument, but also the right to seek and receive asylum of persons seeking international protection in the country and of other persons who are being illegitimately persecuted in their countries of origin, who will not be able to enjoy international protection in Costa Rica. They also accuse restrictions on the right to work. Articles 2 and 3 of Executive Decree No. 43810-MGP, which reform -respectively- Articles 54 and 58 of the Refugee Persons Regulations, establish the denial of recognition of refugee status due to unauthorized work activities. Which, in their opinion, is contrary to the declaratory nature of asylum, the right to equality and non-discrimination and the non-retroactivity of the law, as well as the constitutional principles of legality, legal reserve, and normative hierarchy.
Additionally, the resolutions of the refugee unit issued based on this regulation do not admit any appeal against them, in violation of the guarantees of due process. For its part, Article 8 of Executive Decree No. 43810-MGP introduces a single transitional provision (transitorio único) to the Refugee Persons Regulations, which establishes: "Refugee applicants who already have a work permit prior to the reform established in this executive decree must demonstrate in each renewal of said permit their respective insurance coverage before the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social), uninterruptedly, in accordance with Article 7 subsection 7) of the General Migration and Foreigners Law No. 8764 (Ley General de Migración y Extranjería N° 8764). If they do not demonstrate their insurance coverage, they will be given an identification card that identifies them as refugee applicants, but which will not include an authorization to work.
Work permits that have been granted prior to this reform will subsist until the Administration issues a final ruling on the refugee application." They consider that the limitations provided for in the challenged regulation are a severe violation of the freedom to work of asylum seekers, such as: (i) the right of the individual to work from the recognition of human dignity as an essential part thereof and as the State's guarantee of the right to free choice of work, (ii) in relation to the principle of equality before the law and non-discrimination in light of the declaratory nature of the recognition of refugee status, and (iii) given the imposition of new requirements for the renewal of the provisional work permit card for asylum seekers who had made their application before the entry into force of the decree subject to constitutional review. Regarding the accused violation of the right of the individual to work from the recognition of human dignity as an essential part thereof and the free choice of work, they point out that Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment." For its part, the Constitutional Chamber has stated that the right to work is a fundamental right of the individual's social rights, provided for in Article 56 of the Constitution, which states that "work is a right of the individual" and "in said proposition it is implicit that it is a right of all" (Voto N° 13544-2007).
Furthermore, such norm must be of a protective nature, with the constitutional purpose of guaranteeing working persons the right to a dignified existence. They accuse that the norm subject to constitutional review makes modifications that limit the right to work of asylum seekers, solely because of their status as applicants, which implies that it is also to the detriment of human dignity. In the first place, Executive Decree No. 43810-MGP states that asylum seekers can only process the provisional work permit if they intend to work for a legal or natural person, thereby restricting the right of asylum seekers to self-employment. In this regard, the International Labor Organization defines work as "...the set of human activities, paid or unpaid, that produce goods or services in an economy, or that satisfy the needs of a community or provide the means of support necessary for individuals." The preceding definition includes the set of human activities and at no time does it indicate that work is exclusively for persons under a dependent relationship modality.
Nor does it make a distinction between the salaried or self-employed modality. Within the same line of thought, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in the report incorporated within file No. 23-000049-0007-CO and which is recorded in Resolution No. 2023-003439, processed by this Chamber, has indicated: "(H) Restrictions on the right to work (...) 64. International law recognizes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain their living by work freely chosen or accepted. This right does not include a guarantee of employment or an absolute and unconditional right to obtain a job, but rather the right to access and participate in the labor market on equal terms, for example, by enjoying the right to seek paid work or start a business to produce or sell goods or services. (...) 66. On the other hand, UNHCR emphasizes that international human rights law complements the guarantees provided for in the 1951 Refugee Convention and even establishes more favorable standards in relation to some rights.
In this sense, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights establishes that States Parties must take progressive measures so that all persons within their jurisdiction, both nationals and foreigners (including refugees and asylum seekers), have the opportunity to gain their living by work freely chosen or accepted" (the underlining does not correspond to the original). Therefore, this norm is limiting the right to free choice of work of all asylum seekers in the country, since they cannot freely choose to perform some self-employed activity to produce goods or services and provide themselves, with this, sustenance for themselves and their families. In the second place, the challenged decree paved the way for the procedure for granting work permits to refugee applicants, which establishes a series of requirements that make it impossible for a refugee applicant to obtain them, causing that no refugee applicant can finally present them completely in order to thus work in the country.
In the third place, the challenged decree empowers the Administration to archive a person's asylum application for performing work without a work permit. The foregoing leads to the archiving of the asylum application, without there being an administrative act with motive, content, and proportional purpose, which analyzes the particular situation of the person and allows them to exercise their right of defense against such sanction, which is contrary to the principle of legality in light of the analysis of the administrative act and constitutes a violation of the right to seek and receive asylum, as previously stated. Furthermore, the indicated articles do not establish the means to challenge the resolution that denies the work permit, thereby generating a clear violation of the minimum procedural guarantees. Finally, the challenged norm also contains a violation of the principle of gratuity that governs the matter of refugee status, since, in order to obtain the provisional work permit, the person must pay sixty dollars, according to the norm subject to constitutional review.
Article 117 of the General Migration and Foreigners Law recognizes that: "The procedure to determine refugee status shall be carried out at no cost to the person." They accuse a violation of the principle of equality before the law and non-discrimination in light of the declaratory nature of the recognition of refugee status. Persons duly recognized as refugees are granted a migratory identity document for foreigners under the special unrestricted category (categoría especial libre condición), which allows them to work in any labor area, both as employees and self-employed, this being established in Article 56 of the same Refugee Persons Regulations. The declaratory nature of the recognition of refugee status is a cornerstone within international regulations on refugee matters. In this regard, the Inter-American Court reaffirmed, in the analysis of the Pacheco Tineo vs. Bolivia case, that "the recognition of a person's refugee status does not have a constitutive character, but rather a declaratory one, therefore it is incumbent upon the States to guarantee a duty of special precaution in the verification of such condition and in the measures it adopts, through adequate procedures and in accordance with due process." From the foregoing, it is concluded that ignoring the declaratory nature of refugee status generated by the differentiated treatment made by Executive Decree No. 43810-MGP, between an asylum seeker and a recognized refugee -who share a common social origin-, is an evident violation of the constitutional principle of equality.
Likewise, not granting an unrestricted work permit to asylum seekers represents a distinction and exclusion of persons who should be treated as equals. They also claim the imposition of new requirements for the renewal of the provisional work permit card for asylum seekers who had made their application before the entry into force of the decree subject to constitutional review, in light of the principle of non-retroactivity of the law. Although the Constitutional Chamber has said that the timing of the application of the law is not a matter of constitutionality, in this case, what is challenged is that the single transitional provision introduced by Article 8 of Executive Decree No. 43810-MGP disregards what is ordered by Article 34 of the Political Constitution, and prevents the application of the decree from being determined based on what is stipulated by said constitutional norm. They add that the acquired right consists of a legal situation that is consolidated and, therefore, the Administration must adapt its functioning to safeguard that conduct, that is, its administrative actions must not be unrestricted.
Acquired property rights, as well as consolidated legal situations, possess the highest level of protection that our legal system can grant. The acquired right occurs when a good or a right enters the patrimonial sphere of a subject, for its part, the consolidated legal situation constitutes a definition of a state of affairs, it is no longer an incorporation, but merely the demarcation. In both cases, the legal system protects the person who has obtained the right or legal situation in question, in order to ensure legal certainty and equity. In the challenged single transitional provision, the Administration has established that, for the renewal of the work permit, the applicant must previously be registered with the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, contrary to the previous norm, which results in an impairment of the legal certainty of persons who were already asylum seekers before the entry into force of the norm subject to constitutional review.
Consequently, the applicants who formalized their refugee application prior to the entry into force of the reform of the Refugee Persons Regulations were clear that the Costa Rican State would provide them with a provisional work permit, since it is a right that is linked to the refugee application and does not depend on any other criterion or requirement, therefore, now, limiting the issuance of the work permit to demonstrating insurance coverage before the Costa Rican Social Security Fund violates the principle of non-retroactivity protected in the Political Constitution and the acquired rights of refugee applicants. Hence, it is not only unconstitutional but also unconventional in light of the international regulations governing the matter. They allege that the existence of such extensive requirements to apply for the work permit, in practical terms, prevents the exercise of the right to work.
Based on Article 54 of the Refugee Persons Regulations, on February 14, 2023, Resolution DJUR-0204-12-2022-AMB, issued by the Ministry of the Interior and Police and the General Directorate of Migration and Foreigners, which established the Procedure for granting work permits to refugee applicants, was published in La Gaceta No. 27 and is currently applied. Said resolution, in its Article 6, defines that the granting of the work permit is subject to a series of requirements, which are: "Article 6.—The granting of the work permit shall be subject to the fulfillment of the following requirements: 1. - Persons who intend to work for a legal person: a. Duly authenticated job offer indicating the duties, schedule, salary to be earned, signed by the legal representative of the company. b. The company must be up to date with its obligations before the CCSS. c. Certification of financial statements issued by an authorized Public Accountant, of the balance sheet and the income statement of the company. d. Certification from the corresponding insurance entity, indicating that the company is up to date in the payment of the occupational hazards policy or original proof of payment showing it is up to date. e. That the legal person is duly incorporated, which shall be verified by the Refugee Unit through the National Registry. f. In the event that the company is registered before the General Directorate of Taxation, it must be up to date in the payment of taxes. 2.
Persons who intend to work for a natural person: a. Duly authenticated job offer... indicating the duties, schedule, salary to be earned, signed by the employing person. b. Certified copy or, failing that, original and copy to be compared by a public official, of the valid identity document of the employing person. c. Verification of the economic solvency of the authorized public (sic) or salary certificate. d. The person must be up to date with their obligations before the CCSS. e. Certification from the corresponding insurance entity, indicating that the employer is up to date in the payment of the occupational hazards policy or proof of payment up to date. d. In the event that the person is registered before the General Directorate of Taxation, they must be up to date in the payment of national taxes." With the foregoing, it is evident that requirements are demanded which, in addition to being unequal (compared to those of a refugee), are extensive and disproportionate.
Instead of simplifying and allowing the prompt integration of the person seeking asylum in the country, it extends the procedure and the requirements, which undeniably undermines the reinforcement of the principle of legal certainty of the Costa Rican democratic system and, specifically, prevents the exercise of the right to work, because if the person applying for refugee status does not meet any of the requirements, they will not have state authorization to work. The Inter-American Court analyzes the right to work as a fundamental right, defines it as a human right of a social nature -by virtue of which, all persons must have access to it- and, furthermore, adds that: "It is a fundamental right of the utmost importance for building a life project, since through work one obtains the means and resources to acquire movable and immovable property, indispensable for life in society. It implies, then, a consideration and a bond between a natural or moral person -or juridical, as it is known in some foreign legislations- who pays for the provision of a service by another person -generally natural, although it could also be moral-, although it must be taken into consideration that labor evolution has led to phenomena such as self-employment or entrepreneurship, where the bilateral link referenced above is not necessarily present, since by virtue thereof a product or service can be offered that does not fall into traditional labor relations." Consequently, the long list of requirements to be able to access the work permit and exercise such human right in a dignified manner is improper. As a direct injury to the human right, it prevents refugee applicants from obtaining the necessary resources for their existence and survival.
As an administrative procedure, it is contrary to the pertinence of the process. They claim, finally, that the lack of recourse against the decision denying the permit is a violation of due process. The norm submitted to constitutional review provides that the application for a work permit will be evaluated by the Refuge Unit, in view of the powers conferred by the Law or the General Directorate, but does not indicate any possibility of a challenge stage against a decision that may deny the work permit application. They cite Votes No. 15-90 and No. 5469-95 of this Chamber. They indicate that there is an undeniable link between due process and the right of defense, as part of the minimum guarantees. Thus, given the necessary adherence to due process that the Administration must respect, it is opportune to analyze what openly constitutes a serious violation of the right of defense of applicants, since the right to appeal is not provided for.
From the foregoing, it is concluded that this measure leaves unprotected, fails to enforce the exercise of the right, and does not ensure a channel for the defense of the rights of refugee applicants who require a work permit to perform a function as basic as it is necessary for human and societal survival, which is to work. The plaintiffs request that, as a precautionary measure, the application of the challenged norms be suspended, in order to provisionally protect and guarantee the fundamental rights of migrant persons seeking international protection in the country, thus preventing the production of greater damage or harm against the group. The appropriateness of this precautionary measure is in absolute harmony with previous pronouncements of this Chamber in which requests of this nature have been granted, in accordance with Votes No. 2015-15725 and No. 15-10720. In addition to the principles of procedural good faith, fumus boni iuris, periculum in mora, and the balancing of the interests at stake.
The request for the precautionary measure has the appearance of a good right under the assumption that what is requested is within reason and lacks recklessness, and furthermore, that the violations of the minimum guarantees that a contracting state of the Refugee Convention must grant to migrant persons seeking asylum could cause serious and irreparable damage to the fundamental rights of the group. Finally, the requested precautionary measure does not affect the public interest. In this sense, the suspension of the application of the challenged norms constitutes a core aspect, given that these are procedural norms whose implementation entails serious, irreversible, and irreparable damage, impacting fundamental human rights such as the life and physical integrity of migrant persons seeking international protection in the country. Moreover, these are norms of procedural application by the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, so the suspension of the challenged norm, and not only of its definitive implementing acts, is appropriate.
Likewise, regarding the merits, they request that the unconstitutionality action be granted and, therefore, articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 43810-MGP be annulled as unconstitutional, a decree that reformed or repealed articles 14, 54, 58, 59, 121, 140, 15, 16, 18, and 139 of the Reglamento de Personas Refugiadas (Decreto Ejecutivo N° 36831-G of September 28, 2011) and added a unique transitional provision to it.
Drafted by Justice Salazar Alvarado; and,
Considering:
The plaintiffs challenge articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 43810-MGP, inasmuch as they reform -in order- articles 14, 54, 58, 59, 121, and 140 of the Reglamento de Personas Refugiadas, as well as article 7 of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 43810-MGP, which repeals articles 15, 16, 18, and 139 of the Reglamento de Personas Refugiadas, and article 8 of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 43810-MGP, which adds a unique transitional provision to the Reglamento de Personas Refugiadas.
This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the unconstitutionality action is a process with certain formalities, which must necessarily be met for this Court to validly rule on the merits of the matter. Specifically concerning the issue of standing to access this constitutional review process, article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional provides for different scenarios. The first paragraph regulates the unconstitutionality action via the incidental route, which requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in the judicial sphere - including hábeas corpus or amparo appeals - or in the administrative sphere - in the procedure for exhausting this route -, in which the unconstitutionality of the questioned norm is invoked as a reasonable means of safeguarding the right or interest that is considered harmed in the main matter.
In the second and third paragraphs, direct action—where no underlying matter is required—is regulated in the following cases: a) when, by the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm; b) when it concerns the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Attorney General of the Republic, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Chief Prosecutor of the Republic, and the Ombudsperson.
Now, in Judgment No. 1995-04190 of 11:33 a.m. on July 28, 1995, this Court highlighted that the acción de inconstitucionalidad is:
“(…) a proceeding of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a matter pending resolution—whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative channel—is required in order to be able to access the constitutional channel, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered harmed in the principal matter, so that what is decided by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative repercussion on said proceeding pending resolution, insofar as it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter; and it is only by exception that the legislation permits direct access to this channel—the conditions set out in the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional …”.
In Voto No. 1998-6366 of 4:27 p.m. on September 2, 1998, this Chamber reiterated that:
“(…) The acción de inconstitucionalidad is, in essence, incidental. That is, its filing must be analyzed, first of all, from the point of view of a principal matter, with respect to which it is an instrument for the effective respect of the rights or interests claimed therein. One of the core aspects of that initial study is that of the legal standing (legitimación) with which one acts. The grounding in a principal matter is the first of the conditions addressed in Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the basic norm on the subject. The remaining hypotheses must be understood restrictively, not with the intent of curtailing the right to effective judicial protection, but of respecting the logic of the constitutional justice system insofar as it relates to constitutionality review, since the legislator's construction of a relatively formal scheme for initiating the acción de inconstitucionalidad would be worthless if, in practice, all form were set aside and matters were admitted as if it were a system governed by the so-called popular action.
In this way, the cases of the second paragraph of the cited Article 75, which exempt the plaintiff from any connection to a principal matter, can be classified as special and exceptional.” In accordance with the foregoing, this Chamber has indicated that “the acción proceeding is, mainly, of an incidental nature, and therefore a matter pending resolution in the administrative channel—in the administrative appeal procedure against the final act—or judicial channel is required for the action to prosper. Thus, only in exceptional cases established by law will the existence of this requirement not be necessary” (Judgment No. 2018-018560 of 9:20 a.m. on November 7, 2018). It has also clarified that “the conditions contained in the 2nd paragraph of Article 75 constitute an exception to the rule established in the 1st paragraph (incidental channel) which must be carefully assessed” (Judgment No. 2018-008413 of 9:20 a.m. on May 30, 2018).
It must be noted—in the first place—that this Chamber has explained that:
“(…) given the formalism legally prescribed for constitutionality review proceedings (...) the argumentative burden in the processing of an acción de inconstitucionalidad falls on the plaintiff, who must explain, without ambiguity, the existing contradiction between an infra-constitutional norm and the constitutional framework, as well as the standing (legitimación) that assists them” (Voto No. 2020-000319 of 12:15 p.m. on January 8, 2020; emphasis is not from the original).
In the filing brief for this action, it is indicated that the plaintiffs' standing (legitimación) is based on the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, and express mention is made of both the defense of diffuse interests and the defense of corporate interests. By resolution of 10:43 a.m. on October 9, 2023, the plaintiffs were warned to clarify “what the concrete basis of their standing (legitimación) is, in particular, to clarify whether the action is brought in defense of corporate interests or diffuse interests, as well as to substantiate and prove the respective standing (legitimación) condition.” In response to this warning, Mr. Denis Rodríguez Araya, attorney directing the proceeding and special judicial representative of some of the plaintiff organizations (Asociación Servicio Jesuita para Migrantes de Costa Rica, HIAS Costa Rica, Asociación Reflexión y Acción por la Vida y los Derechos Humanos, [...] and [Name 009]), affirms that these “can be classified into two types: i) those whose corporate purpose is the protection of the rights of migrants, but which are not formed or constituted by persons necessarily displaced or with international protection needs, and ii) those that are formed by foreign persons who have been forced to displace themselves due to the serious political situation present in their country.” He adds that the “first group of organizations, which in the present case is composed of the entirety of the plaintiff organizations, appear in defense of the diffuse interests of the persons previously indicated, regardless of their membership base.
Ergo, the second group of organizations (Asociación Pro-Defensa del Movimiento Campesino de Nicaragua, [...] and Asociación Reflexión y Acción para la Vida y Derechos Humanos) appear in defense of the interests of their members (corporate interests), as well as in protection of other persons who have been forcibly displaced, and whose rights are clearly harmed and threatened by the norms under this challenge. For this latter group, there is a dual standing (legitimación).” He notes that “the defense of diffuse interests is invoked for those organizations whose corporate purpose is the protection of the rights of migratory persons and/or those in need of international protection.” He adds that the “Asociación Pro-Defensa del Movimiento Campesino de Nicaragua, [...] and the Asociación Reflexión y Acción por la Vida y los Derechos Humanos enjoy dual direct standing (legitimación) due to diffuse interests and due to corporate interests, given that in addition to being responsible for the defense of human rights, the membership base of said organizations is constituted by the common interests of their members.” Now then, this Chamber concludes that the plaintiffs lack the alleged standing (legitimación) for the reasons that will be developed in the following recitals.
Regarding this association, the fact is that it has not been duly proven that the action was filed by its legal representative. Despite the warning issued, by resolution of 10:43 a.m. on October 9, 2023, to date it has not been demonstrated that [Name 001] has the capacity to act in representation of such association, to exercise—formally and on its behalf—this procedural action. On this point, this Court has indicated—as relevant—that:
"It must be kept in mind that this Chamber has indicated that the acción de inconstitucionalidad is a proceeding with certain formalities, which must necessarily be fulfilled so that this Court can validly rule on the merits of the matter. As part of such formalities, this Chamber has resolved, repeatedly, that whoever intends to file an acción de inconstitucionalidad on behalf of or in representation of a third party must prove that they are duly authorized to formulate the action on their behalf....
Regarding this issue, in Voto No. 2022-016953 of 10:25 a.m. on July 20, 2022 this Chamber resolved that:
"Regarding standing (legitimación) and powers to act in representation of third parties, whoever files an acción de inconstitucionalidad must, inevitably, do so in accordance with the rules established in the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional in Articles 73 to 79, and demonstrate in a formal and reliable manner that they have standing (legitimación) to act, whether in their own name or on behalf of third parties, through certifications of legal representation and previously granted mandates, to file the action. This means that when the plaintiff acts in representation of third parties—legal or natural person—they must not only demonstrate their standing (legitimación) regarding the underlying matter, they must also be previously authorized or empowered by the interested parties to file the action in their name, otherwise the action is inadmissible (see in a similar sense Judgments No. 2002-1334 of 10:18 a.m. on February 8, 2002; 2014-16169 of 3:40 p.m. on October 1, 2014, 2021019742 of 11:50 a.m. on September 1, 2021 and 2021021203 of 09:30 a.m. on September 22, 2021).
(...)
By virtue of the foregoing, it is evident to this Chamber that, when the plaintiff filed the present action on May 30, 2022, she was not duly authorized (legitimada) to act in the name and representation of Mr. (...), as she did not have a formal and sufficient mandate to file this proceeding on his behalf. Thus, it is clear that the plaintiff appeared before this Court to formulate an action in the name of a third party, without being previously authorized or empowered to do so, as required by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, as indicated in the preceding recital.” Meanwhile, more recently, by means of Voto No. 2022-023911 of 9:20 a.m. on October 12, 2022, this Chamber resolved that:
“I.- ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION.- ADMISSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD.- On repeated occasions this Court has indicated that the acción de inconstitucionalidad is the technical jurisdictional remedy to challenge laws and other general provisions, when these infringe, by action or omission, any constitutional norm or principle. Unlike the amparo appeal, which is less demanding regarding the conditions for its filing, the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes the necessary compliance with the formal and substantive requirements contained in Articles 78 and 79, and it is necessary that the complaint satisfies them before its admissibility is decreed before this Court. The issue of standing (legitimación) is fundamental to filing this proceeding, not only with respect to the conditions established in Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, but also, regarding the capacity to act in the name of another person. Thus, this Court has indicated:
“Sole: Every acción de inconstitucionalidad, to be admissible, must comply with the requirements established to that effect by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. The acción de inconstitucionalidad, unlike the amparo and habeas corpus appeal, requires certain formalities; demonstrating the standing (legitimación) to act is an unavoidable act…” (Judgment No. 2002-1334 of 10:18 a.m. on February 8, 2002)” (Voto No. 2022-027255 of 9:45 a.m. on November 16, 2022).
Considerations applicable to the case under study. Which constitutes sufficient reason to reject the action with respect to such association.
V.ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD WITH RESPECT TO [Name 010], [Name 007], [Name 009], [...] AND THE [...]. As already noted, the attorney directing the proceeding and special judicial representative of such organizations affirms that all of them have standing (legitimación), for acting in defense of diffuse interests. He adds that, in the specific case of the [...] and the Asociación Reflexión y Acción por la Vida y los Derechos Humanos, the action is also brought in defense of corporate interests. Nevertheless, this Chamber concludes that, in the specific case, these conditions of direct standing (legitimación) are not configured.
A.- REGARDING THE ALLEGED DEFENSE OF DIFFUSE INTERESTS. Concerning the defense of diffuse interests, this Chamber has been refining in its jurisprudence its object, content, and scope and has resolved that:
“Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our Law—as this Chamber has already stated—merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that against them, determined persons, or personalized groups, are identified or easily identifiable, whose standing (legitimación) would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones or those that concern a community as a whole. It concerns, then, individual interests, but, at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous sets of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive a benefit or harm, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, for which it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the sets of people who find themselves in certain situations and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, since they are at once collective—for being common to a generality—and individual, for which they can be claimed in such character” (Judgment No. 1993-3705-93 of 3:00 p.m. on July 30, 1993).
Likewise, in Judgment No. 2007-02958 of 9:23 a.m. on March 2, 2007, this Court added:
“In relation to diffuse interests, which is the standing (legitimación) adduced by the plaintiff, this Court has stated that it concerns that personal interest related to a right or legal situation of a special and particular nature, which can be shared by other persons, all the interested parties forming a determined group or category. Thus, the violation of that right can affect everyone in general and/or each one in particular, hence any member of that group can file the action to protect the right that is deemed harmed. The interest, in these cases, is found diffused, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. Judgment No. 03705-93, of 3:00 p.m. on July 30, 1993, illustrates what has been understood as diffuse interests; as does judgment 360-99 of 3:51 p.m. on January 20, 1999:
"It has been indicated that it involves a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of the collective interest just defined in the preceding recital, but which cannot become so broad and generic that it is confused with the right recognized to all members of society to oversee constitutional legality, since this latter—as has been repeatedly stated—is excluded from the current system of constitutional review. It concerns, then, an interest distributed among each of the administered, mediate if you will, and diluted, but no less verifiable for that reason, for the defense, before this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. It is the special characteristics of these rights themselves and not the particular situation concerning them of the subjects who may hold them, that is the key to distinguishing and determining the presence of the so-called diffuse interests, as has been stated in various resolutions such as 03705-93 of three o'clock in the afternoon on July thirtieth for the right to the environment, number 05753-93 of two forty-five in the afternoon on November ninth of that same year for the defense of the historical heritage and number 00980-91 of one thirty in the afternoon on May twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-one for electoral matters." In this sense, although that interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to oversee constitutional legality (which would imply the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), neither can it be so concrete that it permits an individual claim, because in such a case, the standing (legitimación) would derive from that claim.
Examples of such interests are the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, the defense of the historical heritage, electoral matters, the defense of the right to health, and the oversight of public funds. This enumeration is nothing more than a simple description inherent to its obligation—as a jurisdictional body—to limit itself to hearing the cases submitted to it, without it being possible in any way to be understood that only those rights that the Chamber has expressly recognized as such can be considered diffuse rights. The foregoing would imply an undesirable overturning of the scope of the Rule of Law, and of its correlative "State of rights," which—as in the case of the Costa Rican model—starts from the premise that what must be express are the limits to freedoms, since these underlie the human condition itself and therefore do not require official recognition.” Finally, this Court, by majority, has considered that when a norm is susceptible to individual application, one cannot invoke diffuse interests to admit the action. On this point, in Voto No. 2022-011649 of 9:20 a.m. on May 25, 2022, this Chamber resolved that:
“III.- ON DIRECT STANDING (LEGITIMACIÓN). The plaintiff, in turn, claims to have direct standing (legitimación), because he states that the challenged norm not only harms the fundamental rights of an individual character of his represented party, but also violates broad collective and diffuse rights, due to the effects it produces. Nevertheless, this Chamber, by majority, has considered that when the norm being challenged is susceptible to individual application, one cannot invoke the defense of diffuse interests to admit the action. Thus, in Voto No. 2021-002185 of 12:51 p.m. on February 3, 2021, this Constitutional Court indicated the following:
“(…) II.- On diffuse interests and the standing (legitimación) of the plaintiffs in the case under study. The plaintiffs indicate that their standing (legitimación) comes from the defense of diffuse interests regarding the protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. In this regard, it is worth indicating that, as already mentioned, the conditions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional constitute exceptions to the rule contained in the first paragraph of the same article, which must be carefully analyzed in each specific case. The diffuse interest has been understood as that interest related to a right or legal situation of a special and particular nature, which can be shared by other persons, all the interested parties forming a determined group or category. Thus, the violation of that right can affect everyone in general or each one in particular, hence any member of the community can file the action to protect the right that is deemed harmed. On this matter, the reiterated jurisprudence of the Chamber indicates that:
"It has been indicated that it involves a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of the collective interest just defined in the preceding recital, but which cannot become so broad and generic that it is confused with the right recognized to all members of society to oversee constitutional legality, since this latter—as has been repeatedly stated—is excluded from the current system of constitutional review. It concerns, then, an interest distributed among each of the administered, mediate if you will, and diluted, but no less verifiable for that reason, for the defense, before this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. It is the special characteristics of these rights themselves and not the particular situation concerning them of the subjects who may hold them, that is the key to distinguishing and determining the presence of the so-called diffuse interests, as has been stated in various resolutions such as 03705-93 of three o'clock in the afternoon on July thirtieth for the right to the environment, number 05753-93 of two forty-five in the afternoon on November ninth of that same year for the defense of the historical heritage and number 00980-91 of one thirty in the afternoon on May twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-one for electoral matters." –see judgment number 360-90- From this definition it is possible to estimate that the diffuse interest is composed of an eminently subjective element, related to its belonging or ownership of the interest, and an objective one, related to the incidence of the good on society, which distinguishes it from other legal situations.
In relation to the first—the subjective—it is clear that the same is found diffused in a non-individualized human group, which co-participates in the enjoyment of the legal good object of the interest, but whose composition does not result from an identifiable, encompassable set of subjects with relatively clear contours, as does occur in the collective interest. And from the objective perspective, it must be clarified that not every "diffused" interest acquires the legal category of "diffuse interest," but only those imbued with a profound social relevance, whose assessment results from the circumstances of each case –see, among others, judgments numbers 2006-15960 and 2014-4904-. In this sense, just as it has been said that this interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to oversee constitutional legality—which would imply the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional—neither can it be so concrete that it permits an individual claim, because in such a case, standing (legitimación) would derive from that claim –see, among others, judgments numbers 2008-13442, 2009-300 and 2009-9201-.
Thus, examples of such interests are the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, the defense of the historical heritage, electoral matters, the defense of the right to health, and the oversight of public funds. In this way, in the case under study, where the plaintiffs refer their standing (legitimación) regarding the defense of diffuse interests in matters of protection of a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, what is appropriate is to rule as indicated in the following recitals.
(…)
In the action now being heard, the same plaintiffs challenge the same norms of Articles 50 and 51 of the Regulation in question, as well as Article 52 of the same instrument, and although, beyond the sustainability of breeding farms, in this action they focus on issues of ex situ conservation and environmental education—which was also indicated in that prior action—the fact is that this Chamber's own definition on standing (legitimación), as provided in the cited judgment, is fully applicable in this new action. Note that, certainly, as the Attorney General's Office clearly indicates and the Minister of Environment and Energy emphatically states, the regulation being challenged is indeed totally susceptible to individual application and to directly influencing the legal sphere of singular and identifiable persons, who carry out a determined activity, subject to the regulation indicated in the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre and its regulation.
In this way, it is clear that contrary to the adduced defense of diffuse interests, what is at issue is some degree of disagreement with the subjection to which they must submit for the regulation of the activity they carry out or intend to carry out; see that as the report of the Minister of Environment and Energy rightly states, the plaintiffs are directly related as founders, managers, or employees of various companies related to the exhibition of wildlife or its tourism promotion. Thus, it is unfeasible to adduce alleged conservation and environmental education problems, in order to use the figure of diffuse interests and thereby promote a direct acción de inconstitucionalidad, bypassing the strict admissibility requirements indicated in the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, as indicated in recitals II and III of this resolution.
Under this understanding, and taking into consideration the identical plaintiffs and challenged regulation, it is clear that the precedent of Judgment 2018-18563 is fully applicable to this action now being heard, from which it must necessarily be concluded that, as on that previous occasion, the plaintiffs lack standing (legitimación) to file this proceeding, and therefore it is improper to hear and rule on the issues raised. Consequently, the appropriate course is to declare this action without merit” (the underlining does not correspond to the original).
In a similar sense, in Judgment No. 2021-011994 of 4:30 p.m. on May 26, 2021, this Chamber ruled that:
“(…) It is reiterated that the diffuse interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to oversee constitutional legality (which would imply the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional); but neither can it be so concrete that it permits an individual claim, because, in such a case, standing (legitimación) would derive from that claim (…)” (see in this same sense, among others, Votos No. 2021-025373 of 9:20 a.m. on November 10, 2021 and No. 2022-007466 of 9:45 a.m. on March 30, 2022).
Considerations fully applicable in the sub judice.
Prima facie, this is not a case of diffuse interests, as recognized in this Chamber's jurisprudence. In fact, this Court has resolved that immigration matters do not constitute, per se, a matter where a diffuse interest exists (Voto No. 2020-001339).
It is also verified that one is in the presence of norms susceptible to being concretized in cases of individual application under the responsibility of specific persons and that directly affect the legal sphere of singular and fully identifiable persons, who are enabled to raise the corresponding administrative or judicial claim. In fact, the plaintiffs themselves cite various habeas corpus appeals processed and granted by this Chamber, referring to the application of the challenged regulation to the detriment of specific persons.
Consequently, and in accordance with the aforementioned jurisprudential precedents, it cannot be considered that, in the sub lite, the referred condition of direct standing (legitimación), for the defense of diffuse interests, is configured.
B.- REGARDING THE ALLEGED DEFENSE OF CORPORATE INTERESTS. The defense of corporate interests is also expressly adduced, with respect to the [...] and the Asociación Reflexión y Acción por la Vida y los Derechos Humanos, since it is alleged that “the norm under examination is detrimental to the human rights and legitimate interests of the groups of people that constitute them” and that the “foreign persons who seek and request asylum in Costa Rica form part of the membership bases” of such associations.
In the face of such claim, it must be indicated that, indeed, this Chamber has stated in its jurisprudence that the expression “interests that concern the community as a whole,” contained in Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, encompasses or includes the:
“standing (legitimación) held by a corporate entity, when it acts through its representatives in defense of the rights and interests of the persons that make up its membership base and always provided that it concerns the challenge of norms or provisions that affect that core of rights or interests that constitutes the raison d'être and the unifying factor of the group” (Judgment No. 2014-20446 of 09:30 a.m. on December 17, 2014; in the same sense—among several—Votos No. 2017-000152 of 9:05 a.m. on January 11, 2017 and No. 2020-020839 of 9:20 a.m. on October 28, 2020).
Even more, in Judgment No. 2018-018164 of 11:05 a.m. on October 31, 2018, this Court stated the following:
“II.- CONCERNING THE DIRECT ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD IN DEFENSE OF CORPORATE INTERESTS OR THOSE THAT CONCERN THE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE. The Constitutional Chamber, on some occasions, has developed what should be understood by the concept of interests that concern the community as a whole, or indeed, corporate interests. Particularly illustrative is what was resolved by this Constitutional Court in Judgment No.
00360-99 of 3:51 p.m. on January 20, 1999, an opportunity in which the following was indicated:
“III.- In relation to another of the possible sources of standing in the second paragraph of Article 75 indicated, that embodied in the expression “interests that concern the community as a whole,” the Chamber has already specified that with it the legislator refers to the standing held by a corporate group, when it acts as such through its representatives, in defense of the rights and interests of the persons who make up its membership base, but, in addition to the foregoing, always and provided that it involves the questioning of norms or provisions that affect that core of rights or interests that constitutes the raison d'être and the unifying factor of the group; this even when, in some cases, the effects of such norms could have an individualized impact on each one of its members (see, for all, ruling number 1631-91 of three fifteen p.m. on August twenty-first, nineteen ninety-one).” Likewise, in Judgment No. 13323-2006 of 5:26 p.m. on September 6, 2006, the following was set forth:
“(…) Indeed, as this Court has previously recognized (in Judgments number 6433-98, 7615-98, 0467-99, 1313-99, 1830-99, 2289-99, 2745-99, 6644-99, 7975-99, 0877-2000, 2856-2000, 5565-2000, 6973-2000, 7160-2000, and 2001-9677) corporate interests are those characterized \"[...] by the representation and defense of a core of interests belonging to the members of the specific community or common activity, and, insofar as it represents and defends them, the Chamber acts in favor of its associates, the community of merchants. Thus, we are faced with an interest of that Chamber and, at the same time, of each one of its members, in a non-individualized, but individualizable form, which constitutes a corporate interest or one that concerns that legally organized community, which is why this action is admissible under the terms of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.-\" (Judgment number 1631-91, of three fifteen p.m. on August twenty-first, nineteen ninety-one).
It is thus that in these cases, the existence of a pending matter (in the administrative or jurisdictional venue) is not necessary, as required by the first paragraph of the cited Article 75 to accredit the standing of the petitioner, since by the very essence of the matter, it involves the defense of corporate interests. The Chamber considers that it is not legitimate to disregard this type of interest, since that would imply disregarding an important function of corporate entities, which have been created according to the guidelines of the law, and in the case of Chambers, professional associations (colegios profesionales), associations, or unions it would imply distorting their mediating function with respect to the defense of the interests of their members, a function that has been recognized as essential to these entities by this Court's own jurisprudence (…).” Consequently, this Chamber has concluded that “corporate entities are authorized to directly request the declaration of unconstitutionality of a norm, when it directly affects the sphere of action of the entity and its members” (Voto N° 2017-002275), as long as action is taken in defense of the “direct” and “common” interests of their associates or members (Votos N° 2007-02410 and N° 2011-015395, respectively).
In accordance with the foregoing, this Court has also specified that such standing “is solely for the purpose of seeking the defense of the interests and rights of its members, with which the challenge they make must be circumscribed to the matter relating to the affiliates of these organizations” (Voto N° 2006-13323). Therefore, there must necessarily exist an effective link between the norm challenged by the corporate entity and a direct impact on a substantial legal situation of its members. In Voto N° 1994-5967 of 3:57 p.m. on October 11, 1994, this Chamber resolved that:
“(…) In this case, as the standing is based on the existence of a corporate interest, it must first be defined whether the Colegio de Contadores constitutes an entity characterized by the representation and defense of a core of interests belonging to the members of a specific community or to subjects who exercise a common activity. It is indisputable that the Colegio de Contadores represents and defends the community of accountants and that, faced with this collective interest of the entity, there is the interest of each one of the members that form it, which is considered non-individualized but individualizable. Once the existence of a corporate interest on the part of the Colegio de Contadores for the representation and defense of its members has been defined, it is appropriate to relate that interest to the content of the norms whose unconstitutionality is claimed. In this sense, it is important to indicate that the collective nature of the interest does not seek to disregard the elements that are characteristic of the interest, among which the need for a relationship or impact between what is questioned or challenged and a modification or affectation of what corresponds or belongs to the corporate entity and each one of its members, whether goods, rights, obligations, powers, or faculties, stands out.
To accredit standing for collective interests, in addition to a group situation that forms a unit of interests, trades, or neighborhoods that can be considered as a community, an interest in the declaration of unconstitutionality of the challenged norms is required, that is, a relationship between what is questioned and what effectively pertains to the guild. Based on the foregoing, the Chamber observes the absence of that necessary correlation between the norms challenged as unconstitutional and the content of the interest held by the Colegio de Contadores with respect to the challenge of the regulatory power of the Comisión Nacional de Valores. The petitioner states that in subparagraphs k) and ñ) of Article 10 of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, the Comisión Nacional de Valores is empowered to issue executive regulations (reglamentos ejecutivos) that harm the functions or interests of the Corporation and its affiliates and violate the provisions of Article 140, subparagraphs 3) and 18) of the Political Constitution, which determine that the Executive Branch is the only one that can regulate laws.
However, that generic power that the law confers on the Comisión Nacional de Valores to issue norms and regulations, regardless of their content, does not attain the level of directly affecting the assets, freedom, or relations of the members of the Colegio de Contadores, necessary to confer standing on the corporate entity in relation to the challenge of these norms, for which reason, regarding Article 10 subparagraphs k) and ñ) of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores y Reformas al Código de Comercio, the action is rejected outright for lack of standing. On the other hand, regarding Article 142 of the cited Law, the Chamber considers that in this case there is a collective interest that provides the basis for standing to challenge the norm through this venue, since its content directly affects the sphere of corporate interests by affecting the exercise of the accounting profession” (emphasis does not correspond to the original).
Along these same lines, Voto N° 1997-3688 of 3:00 p.m. on July 1, 1997, can be cited, in which this Court resolved that:
“(…) It is indisputable that the Cámara Nacional de Armadores y Agentes de Vapores was created to protect the interests of a determinable group of persons -natural and legal- who are dedicated to the activity of maritime transport. Thus, the existence of a corporate interest on the part of the Cámara Nacional de Armadores y Agentes de Vapores is defined. It is now appropriate to relate that interest to the content of the challenged norms, with the objective of determining whether an eventual declaration of unconstitutionality would have an impact, in some way, on the situation pertaining to the members of that organization. In that sense, for the collective interest to confer standing on the party filing the action of unconstitutionality, it is not only required that it be alleged by an organization that represents the interests of a determinable group of persons, but there must be at least the possibility that the eventual declaration of unconstitutionality would favorably modify the current situation (understood as goods, rights, obligations, powers, or faculties) of the members of that community.
That is, to accredit standing for a collective interest, in addition to the existence of a common core of interests among the members of the organization, it is required that the declaration of unconstitutionality of the challenged norms has a relationship—of impact or affectation—with the situation of the community. Hence, it is essential that the party basing its standing on the existence of a collective interest provide an explanation about the relationship that the claim of unconstitutionality has with the community's own situation, specifically with its corporate purpose and assets. The foregoing is lacking in this case, in which the omission of the petitioner to specify the existing relationship between the purpose of the organization it represents and the content of the norms it challenges prevents accrediting in its favor the existence of a corporate interest for the declaration of unconstitutionality it requests.
This is aggravated by the fact that such a relationship is not easily inferred from the corporate purpose of the organization—the protection of businesspersons engaged in maritime transport activity—and the content of the challenged Reglamento, which establishes a regime for the temporary admission of land vehicles for the commercial transport of goods and persons. The provisions of the Reglamento do not appear to directly affect the legal situation of the members that make up the Chamber because the establishment of that regime has no relationship with the activity of maritime transport, except insofar as the vehicles that enter the country temporarily based on that regulation may be transported by sea, a relationship that is not sufficient to attribute to the Chamber the standing that would allow it to access constitutional review (in that sense, see resolution No.5967-94 of 3:57 p.m. on October 11, 1994). Hence, this action must be rejected outright” (emphasis does not correspond to the original).
Now then, it must be reiterated what was previously indicated, in the sense that “the assumptions contained in the 2nd paragraph of Article 75 constitute an exception to the rule established in the 1st paragraph (incidental route) that must be carefully assessed.” Hence, this Chamber has endeavored to duly frame this assumption of standing, so as not to disrupt the system of constitutional justice provided for in our legal system with regard to constitutional review.
It is for the foregoing reason that this Chamber has pointed out that, in this hypothesis of defense of corporate interests, a person cannot “arrogate to themselves, without more, the de facto representation of one person or several persons or professional organizations” (Voto N° 2022-005038 of 9:20 a.m. on March 2, 2022; see, likewise, Voto N° 2020-012323 of 9:05 a.m. on July 1, 2020). It has also rejected those actions in which the necessary link between the object of the action and a direct and effective impact on the generality of the members of the corporate entity is not accredited, or, rather, an attempt is made to take action in favor of a different collective. Thus, for example, in Voto N° 2018-018564 of 9:20 a.m. on November 7, 2018, this Chamber resolved:
“IV.- CONCERNING THE OUTRIGHT REJECTION OF THE ACTION, IN THE ABSENCE OF CORPORATE INTERESTS OR THOSE THAT CONCERN THE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE, IN THE SUB JUDICE. After evaluating the arguments outlined by the actor, in the specific case, in his capacity as Secretario General of the Sindicato de Trabajadoras y Trabajadores de la Universidad Nacional, aimed at defending his standing to bring this action of unconstitutionality (in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction) due to the apparent existence of interests that concern the community as a whole, also called corporate, considering that what is provided for by the challenged norms constitutes an “obvious and manifest” violation of the claim of the researchers of the Universidad Nacional to carry out their activities without external interference, the Constitutional Chamber, on the contrary, reaches a different conclusion and, therefore, rejects this matter outright.
This is not, the sub judice, a case in which there exists an interest that affects, in a direct and indisputable manner, the aforementioned Sindicato or each one of its members, but rather, one of the biomedical researchers, in health sciences, who may or may not belong to that University and, therefore, to that union group, to challenge the regulations that require them to be accredited before CONIS, or to expose themselves to the sanctions of Law No. 9234. Note that the questioned provisions do not exclusively involve the generality of the members of the aforementioned Sindicato, such that it is these researchers and not this group who can resort, individually or collectively, to the Constitutional Chamber, in defense of the rights and interests they allege have been violated, specifically, academic freedom (libertad de cátedra) and university autonomy, whose protection does not constitute a guild effort of that organization, despite the content of the articles that the plaintiff party mentions, with respect to the Estatuto of the mentioned Sindicato.
This is not, in the present case, an interest that corporately unites all and each one of its members, or members of it, but rather the researchers in biomedical sciences, which constitutes a different collective. We are not, in the sub examine, faced with an interest of the generality of the members of the aforementioned Sindicato that would legitimize its Secretario to bring this direct action of unconstitutionality, in accordance with what is contemplated in paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, but rather, an individual one of the biomedical researchers affected by the application of that regulation. It is evident that those provisions do not directly affect the members of the referred Sindicato, but rather the biomedical researchers, hence it is these, and not those, who have the interest to file the present action. The foregoing, because, upon analyzing the various provisions of the Estatuto of the Sindicato de Trabajadoras y Trabajadores de la Universidad Nacional, SITUN, in which, although the defense of university autonomy is contemplated as a purpose of that group (see, in this regard, subparagraph l) of Article 4 of the Estatuto), it is evident that it does not fall to that union group to defend the interests of biomedical science researchers, in particular, their apparent refusal to be accredited before CONIS in order to perform their functions and their experiments, in that area of knowledge, using, for example, human beings as research subjects.
In sum, it is a particular, very specific interest, the defense of which concerns that reduced collective, but not the representatives of the petitioning union.” Meanwhile, in Voto N° 2023-001018 of 11:20 a.m. on January 18, 2023, it was resolved that:
“II.-Now then, in the specific case, the petitioners, in their capacity as members of the Consejo de Mayors Bröran of the Territorio Indígena Térraba, Consejo de Mayores Organización Tradicional de Derecho Propio of the Territorio Indígena Quitirrisi, Consejo Iriria Sätkök of the Territorio Indígena Yäbamï Dí Katá, and of the Pueblo Cabécar group of the Territorio Indígena China Kichá, question the constitutionality of the challenged regulations, mentioning that their standing comes from the defense of collective interests. Now then, regarding the possibility that the representatives of certain indigenous organizations may arrogate to themselves the representation of all the indigenous persons of the country, this Chamber provided in its judgment number 2022-14850 of 8:40 on June 29, 2022, in what is relevant, the following:
“I.- ON THE PARTIAL ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION.- The action is brought by the Asociación Multiétnica y Pluricultural de Buenos Aires (AMPBA), and the Coordinadora General Autoridad Étnica Tradicional de Mayores de Buenos Aires (Salitre, Ujarrás y Cabagra) and representative of the Autoridades Ancestrales de Mesoamérica, based on Article 75, paragraph 2 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, in their capacity, as they state, as representatives of the indigenous peoples of Costa Rica. AMPBA is a civil association, whose objectives are entirely academic, social, and cultural. It is not recorded, as one of its purposes, the national defense of the indigenous community or of any particular indigenous group. In a similar sense, it was resolved in judgment No. 20-24182 of 9:30 a.m. on December 16, 2020:
“III.- On the standing of the petitioner in this proceeding. The petitioner here files this action on behalf of the Asociación Vecinos Unidos por la Paz y la Justicia de Cocles, as he indicates that among its purposes is the protection of the rights and interests of the inhabitants of Cocles when they have been affected by judicial judgments and by administrative acts, which he demonstrates with the legal capacity (personería jurídica) provided. For such purposes, he invokes the existence of corporate interests, to appear in defense of Costa Rican Afro-descendant ethnic groups, for a situation related to the establishment of the boundaries of their territory that, as he indicates, affects their property rights, due to the boundaries demarcated by the State for the Kekoldi (Cocles) indigenous reserve; and he invokes for such purposes, the right of consultation that the Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, No. 169, recognizes as a “Tribal People.” However, the petitioning association encompasses, by its own name, any inhabitant of Cocles, a population that does not necessarily constitute the autochthonous Afro-descendant people with the required rootedness, nor did it demonstrate that its purposes are properly the defense of the autochthonous Afro-descendant people.
It must be noted that the concept of “People” protected in the international sphere alludes to that which shares ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or religious identity, while population is a group of people who, regardless of those identity conditions, simply cohabit a specific territory. Under that thesis, if the association seeks to establish standing under the rights of a “Tribal People,” it must, firstly, demonstrate that its purpose is precisely that and not the generic defense of the entire population, as well as previously accredit the ethnic and cultural conditions of its members in a specific area and their rootedness to that place to demand such consultation, which is not appropriate to be elucidated and verified via an action of unconstitutionality, but rather in the contentious-administrative venue, where such identity condition and the delimitation that the petitioner intends to be reviewed by this jurisdiction can be resolved in an adversarial proceeding, with greater clarity and evidence, based on the provided historical literature and an expert witness offered.
Without a doubt, other tribal peoples have the same rights as indigenous peoples to reclaim their territories and to defend their autochthonous rights. Such claims are pressing and legitimate, therefore such “Peoples” must be clearly determined and delimited by the competent authorities of the State, so that they can demand their rights in that capacity, as has been done in the case of indigenous peoples and their representativeness. It is for this reason that, in the sub examine, such a condition must be accurately accredited and the action of unconstitutionality is not the suitable means for doing so.” What was set forth in the partially cited judgment is applicable in this case, because the Asociación Multiétnica y Pluricultural de Buenos Aires (AMPBA) does not have among its purposes the defense of the autochthonous rights of the indigenous peoples of Costa Rica. Likewise, its scope of action is reduced to the territories of Buenos Aires de Puntarenas, such that it cannot, without more, attempt to challenge a law that affects all the indigenous peoples of the country.
(…)
For its part, the Coordinadora General, although a representative of the Autoridades Ancestrales de Mesoamérica, cannot, by that fact alone, attribute to itself the legal representation of the entire indigenous population of Costa Rica as they claim in the action. By reason of the foregoing, the action must be rejected.”
III.Now then, taking into account what is provided in the cited precedent, the Chamber considers that in the case under study the petitioners lack standing to bring the present action of unconstitutionality, since, just as was explained in the preceding considerando, they are part of indigenous groups that inhabit a specific territory, such that it is not possible for them to attempt to arrogate to themselves the representation of all the indigenous persons of the country, in which case, we would indeed be in the presence of the defense of collective interests. In this way, the Chamber considers that the action must be rejected, as is hereby done.”
Finally, this Chamber has also clarified—repeatedly—that the expression “interests that concern the community as a whole” cannot be interpreted as referring to the national community (Voto N° 1993-4113), nor can it be extended to those who only hold an interest in ensuring constitutional legality (Voto N° 1995-2621) or in guaranteeing the principle of constitutional supremacy (Voto N° 1991-2233), since this would be equivalent to accepting a popular action (acción popular) that is not recognized and regulated in our legislation.
Considerations applicable to the sub lite. Regarding the mentioned associations ([...] and Asociación Reflexión y Acción por la Vida y los Derechos Humanos), the fully generic and abstract assertions made by their special judicial attorney-in-fact (in response to the warning issued by resolution of 10:43 a.m. on October 9, 2025), to the effect that “the norm under examination is to the detriment of the human rights and legitimate interests of the groups of persons that make them up” or that “foreign persons who seek and apply for asylum in Costa Rica form part of the membership bases” of such associations, are insufficient to establish with certainty that, indeed, such entities associate or group foreign persons who seek or intend to seek refuge. No concrete or specific data, nor any documentary evidence, is provided that would allow establishing such a fact. This cannot be inferred from the reading of the respective articles of incorporation (actas constitutivas)—which are attached to the expediente—either, since although it is clear that some foreign persons appeared to constitute such associations, it is not possible to deduce that they are in a situation requiring refuge, nor can it be deduced that the challenged regulation generates a direct and effective impact on the generality of the members of such corporate entities.
In the specific case of the [...], what its estates (estatuto) indicates is the following:
“The superior object of ASOCIACIÓN COMISIÓN PERMANENTE DE DERECHOS HUMANOS FILIAL COSTA RICA is to contribute to the strengthening of the Rule of Law and Democracy in Costa Rica, which guarantees full respect for and effective exercise of human rights. ARTICLE FOUR: For the fulfillment of its purposes, the Association shall carry out, among others, the following activities: a) Educate the population on the promotion and defense of human rights. b) Train the authorities responsible for public administration, branches of the State of Costa Rica, and organized sectors of the population on how to guarantee, protect, defend, and promote human rights. c) Influence the formation of laws, public budgets, and public policies by promoting the human rights approach in their formation, formulation and/or implementation, monitoring, and evaluation processes. d) Raise awareness, inform, and organize communities for the negotiated solution of conflicts as well as for the promotion and defense of their human rights. e) Strengthen the human rights movement through outreach to other national and international organizations that have related missions, both inside and outside of Costa Rica. f) Contribute to eradicating practices that violate human rights and seek their sanction, through reporting, investigation, criminal and strategic litigation, and legal intervention in case proceedings when pertinent. g) Keep the national and international community informed about the development of the human rights situation in the country. h) Facilitate assistance for the psychosocial recovery of victims of human rights violations. i) Facilitate legal assistance and representation to persons in vulnerable situations for the search for and management of guarantees and/or restitution actions thereof. j) Achieve organizational and financial self-sustainability. k) Collect contributions among associates and the general citizenry, to finance the achievement of its essential objectives. l) Manage donations in money or in kind from public and private entities, both national and international, for the development of its activities. m) Manage, receive, administer, and distribute donations in favor of persons in vulnerable situations as a result of massive violations of their human rights, natural disasters, and/or social, political, and military conflicts. n) Promote citizen participation, gender equity, non-discrimination based on age, race, religion, political opinion or option, sexual preference or orientation. o) Promote the coordination, articulation, and/or support of State institutions for the achievement of its purposes. p) The association may acquire all kinds of goods, always within the limitations of article forty-three of the Civil Code, may enter into contracts of all kinds, and carry out all types of lawful operations aimed at achieving its purposes.” From which it is derived that it has an excessively broad corporate purpose, for the protection of human rights. It does not have as its specific purpose or objective the grouping and protection of foreign persons who require refuge.
Finally, in the case of the Asociación Reflexión y Acción por la Vida y los Derechos Humanos, the estates (estatutos) establish the following:
“ARTICLE THREE: The purposes of the Association are: A) To promote and manage the restoration of the citizen, economic, and social rights of persons who are victims of inhuman and degrading treatment by authoritarian and dictatorial governments, with primary emphasis on Nicaragua, but also in the rest of Latin America and the world. B) To protect the interests of the associates and of persons who are victims of violations of their human rights, through actions before human rights defense organizations, at the national and international level. C) To contribute constantly to the development and strengthening of the capacities of the members of the association and of the victims linked to it, through the implementation and management of academic alternatives for formation, training, self-learning, entrepreneurship, and on topics that promote democratic values, transitional justice, and historical memory.
ARTICLE FOUR: The Association may use all means that the law permits for the fulfillment of its purposes. To this end, the Association shall carry out, among others, the following activities: A) Manage donations from public entities and non-governmental organizations, both national and foreign. B) Carry out participatory activities with its associates and national communities to promote local and regional sustainable development processes.” C) To foster state support and that of other non-governmental organizations, as well as to manage donations from public and private entities, both national and international, to facilitate educational, training, advocacy, and human rights promotion activities for the members of the Association and sectors related to it. D) To request, collect, generate, and channel financial, human, material, and technical resources to develop research on the Association's topics.
In short, in the sub lite, no effective defense of corporate interests is evident. In fact, admitting this action on the terms in which it has been formulated would entail tacitly recognizing the existence of an actio popularis (acción popular), which, as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has indicated in its reiterated jurisprudence (see Judgment No. 2016-000787 of 9:05 a.m. on January 20, 2016), does not conform to the framework of procedural competences that this Constitutional Court has for such purposes, in its functions as ultimate interpreter and guardian of the Constitution.
C.- Finally, it must be noted that the fact that the plaintiffs include in their statutes or constitutive covenants, as part of their purposes, the defense of human or fundamental rights, does not imply a sort of generic or unconditional standing (legitimación), legitimizing them to bring actions against any rules or acts, with total abstraction from the due compliance with the procedural requirements and prerequisites established in articles 75 and following of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), including, specifically, the effective configuration of any of the grounds for standing (legitimación) expressly provided for in our legal system.
As a corollary to the foregoing, it is appropriate to reject the action under study outright, as is hereby ordered.
VII.DIFFERENT REASONS OF JUDGES CRUZ CASTRO, RUEDA LEAL, AND FERNÁNDEZ ARGÜELLO, regarding diffuse interests (intereses difusos), with drafting by the second. As we have expressed in other cases, we consider that a quality of the diffuse interest consists precisely in that its impact is general—that is, it affects an entire population or broad sectors thereof—within a context where it is not required that the injured subjects know each other (they could even lack any nexus or legal relationships among themselves), but the presence of the same situation of damage or danger to a constitutional good is required, which, equally and without the need for any individualization, encompasses and aggregates an entire society in the abstract. Its defense has the purpose of satisfying a need of society as such; therefore, it transcends that of a human being considered individually or collectively. In Judgment No. 2019-17397 of 12:54 p.m. on September 11, 2019, this Court reiterated the following:
“(…) Secondly, the possibility of resorting in defense of 'diffuse interests' is contemplated; this concept, whose content has been gradually delineated by the Chamber, could be summarized in the terms used in the judgment of this court number 3750-93, of three o'clock in the afternoon on July thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three: '… Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our law—as this Chamber has already stated—merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that identified or easily identifiable determined persons, or personalized groups, are identified before them, whose standing (legitimación) would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones that concern a community as a whole. It is, then, a matter of individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive actual or potential harm, more or less equal for all, so it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the groups found in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them.
That is to say, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, since they are at once collective—for being common to a generality—and individual, for which reason they can be claimed in such character.'" In summary, diffuse interests (intereses difusos) are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united based on a specific social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a specific personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is blurred, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. In these cases, of course, the challenge that a member of one of these sectors could file, supported by paragraph 2 of article 75, must necessarily refer to provisions that affect them as such. This Chamber has listed various rights to which it has given the qualifier of 'diffuse,' such as the environment, cultural heritage, defense of the territorial integrity of the country, and proper management of public spending, among others.
In this regard, two clarifications must be made: on the one hand, the referred goods transcend the sphere traditionally recognized for diffuse interests, since they refer in principle to aspects affecting the national community and not particular groups thereof; environmental damage does not merely affect the neighbors of a region or the consumers of a product, but injures or seriously endangers the natural heritage of the entire country and even of Humanity; likewise, the defense of proper management of the public funds authorized in the Budget of the Republic is an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not only of any particular group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration made by the Constitutional Chamber is merely a simple description proper to its obligation—as a jurisdictional body—to confine itself to hearing the cases submitted to it, without it being possible in any way to be understood that only those rights the Chamber has expressly already recognized as such can be considered diffuse rights; the foregoing would imply an undesirable overturning of the scope of the Rule of Law, and of its correlative 'State of rights,' which—as in the case of the Costa Rican model—starts from the premise that what must be express are the limits to freedoms, since these underlie the very human condition and therefore do not require official recognition.
Finally, when paragraph 2 of article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law speaks of interests 'that concern the community as a whole,' it refers to the legal goods explained in the preceding lines, that is, those whose ownership rests in the very holders of sovereignty, in each of the inhabitants of the Republic.
It is not, therefore, that any person can resort to the Constitutional Chamber in protection of any interests (actio popularis), but that every individual can act in defense of those goods that affect the entire national community, without it being valid in this field either to attempt any exhaustive enumeration” (see Judgment No. 2007-01145).” In accordance with what has been set forth and sustained by this Court in its jurisprudence, it is then a matter of individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive actual or potential harm, more or less equal for all, so it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the groups found in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. It is for this reason, precisely, that, starting from Judgment No. 2021-2185 of 12:51 p.m. on February 3, 2021, we consider, unlike the Majority of this Court, that some of these interests may be embodied in a specific particular case, without thereby losing their condition as a diffuse interest, as occurs with environmental protection, whose impact affects a person and everyone in general; and such impact can be individualized in a particular situation, such as, for example, the construction of a factory in a specific neighboring sector, without the respective environmental studies, whose negative effects impact the planet's ozone layer.
Undoubtedly, the result of a claim or process that a neighbor may bring against that factory will not only affect their own interests but also those of the rest of the community. Therefore, it constitutes a diffuse interest (interés difuso); and, nevertheless, it is also the object of a particular individualized situation. Now, this does not mean, in any way, that in every invoked situation the existence of a diffuse interest can be alleged, even if it may be the object of a particular situation. Let us remember that for an interest to be considered “diffuse,” it must not only affect a community, but it must also blur, become diffused within that community. If it does not produce such an effect, it cannot be considered a diffuse interest. In the case of the plaintiffs, as the Majority states, the challenged regulation does not produce a socially diffused impact, but rather a determined one.
So, in this case, what is glimpsed is a situation that, although it may be shared by some group of people, that effect is not of such magnitude as to consider it a diffuse interest. For the stated reason, we agree with the Majority in dismissing this action.
The parties are warned that if they have provided any document on paper, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional device of an electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic nature or produced by new technologies, these must be removed from the office within a maximum period of thirty business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not removed within this period will be destroyed, as provided in the “Electronic Case File Regulation before the Judicial Branch (Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial),” approved by the Full Court (Corte Plena) in Session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in Judicial Bulletin No. 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), in Session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.
Therefore (Por tanto):
The action is rejected outright. Judges Cruz Castro, Rueda Leal, and Fernández Argüello give different reasons regarding standing (legitimación) for diffuse interests (intereses difusos).
Fernando Cruz C. Acting Presiding Judge (Presidente a.i.) Paul Rueda L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G.
Hubert Fernández A.
Ana Cristina Fernández A.
Rosibel Jara V. CASE FILE (EXPEDIENTE) N° 23-018267-0007-CO Observations from SALA CONSTITUCIONAL voted by ballot It is a faithful copy of the original - Taken from Nexus.PJ on: 08-05-2026 10:19:56.
Sentencia con nota separada Sentencia con datos protegidos, de conformidad con la normativa vigente 1 *CO* Res. Nº 2025-014306 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas y treinta minutos del catorce de mayo de dos mil veinticinco.
Acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por [Nombre 001], documento de identidad migratorio para extranjeros N° [Valor 001], quien dice ser el coordinador de la [...], con cédula de persona jurídica N° [Valor 002], [Nombre 002], con documento de identidad migratorio para extranjeros N° [Valor 003], en su condición de apoderado de la [...], con cédula de persona jurídica N° [Valor 004], [Nombre 003], con documento de identidad migratorio para extranjeros N° [Valor 005], en su condición de Vicepresidente y representante legal de la [...], con cédula de persona jurídica N° [Valor 006], [Nombre 004], portador del pasaporte N° [Valor 007], en su condición de director país y apoderado de [Nombre 005], con cédula de persona jurídica N° [Valor 008], [Nombre 006], portadora de la cédula de identidad número [Valor 009], en su condición de directora nacional y representante legal de la [Nombre 007], con cédula de persona jurídica N° [Valor 010] y [Nombre 008], portadora del pasaporte N° [Valor 011], en su condición de directora y apoderada de la [Nombre 009], con cédula de persona jurídica N° 3-[Valor 012]; contra los artículos 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 y 6, del Decreto Ejecutivo N° 43810-MGP, en cuanto reforman, por su orden, los artículos 14, 54, 58, 59, 121 y 140, del Reglamento de Personas Refugiadas (Decreto Ejecutivo N° 36831-G), así como el artículo 7, del Decreto Ejecutivo N° 43810-MGP, que deroga los artículos 15, 16, 18 y 139, del Reglamento de Personas Refugiadas (Decreto Ejecutivo N° 36831-G), y el artículo 8, del Decreto Ejecutivo N° 43810-MGP, que incluye un Transitorio único al Reglamento de Personas Refugiadas (Decreto Ejecutivo N° 36831-G).
Resultando:
Redacta el magistrado Salazar Alvarado; y,
Considerando:
Los accionantes impugnan los artículos 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 y 6, del Decreto Ejecutivo N° 43810-MGP, en cuanto reforman -por su orden- los artículos 14, 54, 58, 59, 121 y 140, del Reglamento de Personas Refugiadas, así como el artículo 7, del Decreto Ejecutivo N° 43810-MGP, que deroga los artículos 15, 16, 18 y 139, del Reglamento de Personas Refugiadas, y el artículo 8, del Decreto Ejecutivo N° 43810-MGP, que incluye un transitorio único al Reglamento de Personas Refugiadas.
Esta Sala ha señalado, de forma reiterada, que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso con determinadas formalidades, que necesariamente deben cumplirse para que este Tribunal pueda pronunciarse válidamente sobre el fondo del asunto. En lo atinente específicamente al tema de la legitimación para acceder a este proceso de control de constitucionalidad, el artículo 75, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, prevé distintos supuestos. En el párrafo primero regula la acción de inconstitucionalidad por la vía incidental, que exige la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sea en sede judicial -incluyendo los recursos de hábeas corpus o de amparo- o en la administrativa -en el procedimiento de agotamiento de esta vía-, en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado en el asunto principal. En los párrafos segundo y tercero se regula la acción directa -no se requiere del asunto base-, en los siguientes casos: a) cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa; b) se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto; y c) cuando la acción sea promovida por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes.
Ahora, en Sentencia N° 1995-04190 de las 11:33 horas del 28 de julio de 1995, este Tribunal destacó que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es:
“(…) un proceso de naturaleza incidental, y no de una acción directa o popular, con lo que se quiere decir que se requiere de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver -sea ante los tribunales de justicia o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa- para poder acceder a la vía constitucional, pero de tal manera que, la acción constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho considerado lesionado en el asunto principal, de manera que lo resuelto por el Tribunal Constitucional repercuta positiva o negativamente en dicho proceso pendiente de resolver, por cuanto se manifiesta sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas que deberán ser aplicadas en dicho asunto; y únicamente por excepción es que la legislación permite el acceso directo a esta vía -presupuestos de los párrafos segundo y tercero del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional …”.
En Voto N° 1998-6366 de las 16:27 horas del 2 de setiembre de 1998, esta Sala reiteró que:
“(…) La acción de inconstitucionalidad es, en esencia, incidental. Es decir, su interposición debe analizarse, primero que nada, desde el punto de vista de un asunto principal, respecto del cual es un instrumento para el efectivo respeto de los derechos o intereses en él reclamados. Uno de los aspectos medulares de ese estudio inicial es el de la legitimación con la que se actúa. La fundamentación en un asunto principal es el primero de los supuestos tratados en el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, norma básica en relación con el tema. Las restantes hipótesis deben comprenderse restringidamente, no con el ánimo de cercenar el derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva, sino de respetar la lógica del sistema de justicia constitucional en lo que toca al control de constitucionalidad, pues de nada valdría la construcción del legislador de un esquema relativamente formal para el inicio de la acción de inconstitucionalidad, si en la práctica se dejara de lado toda forma y se admitieran los asuntos, como si se tratara de un sistema regido por la denominada acción popular. Pueden, de este modo, calificarse como especiales y excepcionales los casos del párrafo segundo del artículo 75 citado, que eximen al actor de vinculación alguna con un asunto principal”.
En consonancia con lo anterior, esta Sala ha indicado que “el proceso de acción es, principalmente, de naturaleza incidental, por lo que se requiere de un asunto pendiente de resolver en vía administrativa –en el procedimiento administrativo de impugnación contra el acto final- o judicial, para que prospere la acción. De esta manera, solo en casos excepcionales que la ley establece, no será necesaria la existencia de ese requisito” (Sentencia N° 2018-018560 de las 9:20 horas del 7 de noviembre de 2018). También ha aclarado que “los supuestos contenidos en el párrafo 2o. del artículo 75, constituyen una excepción a la regla establecida en el párrafo 1o. (vía incidental) que deben ser valorados cuidadosamente” (Sentencia N° 2018-008413 de las 9:20 horas del 30 de mayo de 2018).
Debe señalarse -en primer lugar- que esta Sala ha explicado que:
“(…) dado el formalismo dispuesto legalmente para los procesos de control de constitucionalidad (...) la carga argumentativa en el trámite de una acción de inconstitucionalidad recae en el accionante, quien debe explicar, sin ambages, la contradicción existente entre una normativa infraconstitucional y el bloque de constitucionalidad, así como la legitimación que le asiste” (Voto N° 2020-000319 de las 12:15 horas del 8 de enero de 2020; el destacado no corresponde al original).
En el escrito de interposición de esta acción, se indica que la legitimación de las accionantes se sustenta en el párrafo segundo, del artículo 75, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, y se hace expresa mención tanto a la defensa de intereses difusos como a la defensa de intereses corporativos. Mediante resolución de las 10:43 horas del 9 de octubre de 2023, se previno a las accionantes que aclararan “cuál es el sustento concreto de su legitimación, en particular, aclarar si se acciona en defensa de intereses corporativos o de intereses difusos, así como fundamentar y acreditar el respectivo supuesto de legitimación”. En respuesta a tal prevención, el licenciado Denis Rodríguez Araya, abogado director del proceso y apoderado especial judicial de algunas de las organizaciones accionantes (Asociación Servicio Jesuita para Migrantes de Costa Rica, HIAS Costa Rica, Asociación Reflexión y Acción por la Vida y los Derechos Humanos, [...] y [Nombre 009]), afirma que estas “pueden ser clasificadas en dos tipos: i) aquellas que tienen por objeto social la protección de los derechos de las personas migrantes, pero que no están formadas o constituidas por personas necesariamente desplazadas o con necesidades de protección internacional y, ii) aquellas que son formadas por personas extranjeras que se han visto obligadas a desplazarse debido a la grave situación política presente en su país”.
Agrega que el “primer grupo de organizaciones, y que en la presente es conformado por la totalidad de organizaciones accionantes, acuden en la defensa de los intereses difusos de las personas antes señaladas, independientemente de su base asociativa. Ergo, el segundo grupo de organizaciones (Asociación Pro-Defensa del Movimiento Campesino de Nicaragua, [...] y Asociación Reflexión y Acción para la Vida y Derechos Humanos) acuden en defensa de los intereses de sus afilados (intereses corporativos), así como en resguardo de otras personas que han debido desplazarse de manera forzosa, y cuyos derechos se ven claramente lesionados y amenazados por las normas objeto de esta impugnación. Para este último grupo, existe una doble legitimación”. Apunta que se “invoca la defensa de intereses difusos para aquellas organizaciones cuyo objeto social es la protección de los derechos de las personas migratorias y/o en necesidad de protección internacional”.
Añade que la “Asociación Pro-Defensa del Movimiento Campesino de Nicaragua, [...] y la Asociación Reflexión y Acción por la Vida y los Derechos Humanos, gozan de doble legitimación directa por intereses difusos y por intereses corporativos, en vista de que además de responder por la defensa de los derechos humanos, la base asociativa de dichas organizaciones está constituida por los intereses comunes a sus agremiados”.
Ahora bien, esta Sala concluye que las accionantes carecen de la alegada legitimación por los motivos que se desarrollarán en los siguientes considerandos.
En lo referente a esta asociación, lo cierto es que no se ha acreditado debidamente que la acción haya sido interpuesta por su representante legal. Pese a la prevención realizada, mediante resolución de las 10:43 horas del 9 de octubre de 2023, a la fecha no se ha demostrado que [Nombre 001] tenga la capacidad de actuar en representación de tal asociación, para ejercer -formalmente y en su nombre- esta acción procesal. Sobre este punto, este Tribunal ha indicado -en lo que interesa- que:
“Debe tenerse presente que esa Sala ha señalado que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso con determinadas formalidades, que necesariamente deben cumplirse para que este Tribunal pueda pronunciarse válidamente sobre el fondo del asunto. Como parte de tales formalidades, esta Sala ha resuelto, de forma reiterada, que quien pretenda interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad a favor o en representación de un tercero, debe acreditar que está debidamente habilitado para formular la acción a nombre de este....
En cuanto a este tema, en el voto nro. 2022-016953 de las 10:25 horas del 20 de julio de 2022 esta Sala resolvió que:
“En cuanto a la legitimación y los poderes para actuar en representación de terceros, quien interpone una acción de inconstitucionalidad, debe, ineludiblemente, hacerlo conforme a las reglas establecidas en la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional en los artículos 73 a 79, y demostrar de manera formal y fehaciente, que se encuentra legitimado para actuar, sea en nombre propio o a favor de terceros, a través de las certificaciones de personería y mandatos previamente concedidos, para interponer la acción. Esto quiere decir, que cuando el accionante actúe en representación de terceros -persona jurídica o física- no solo debe demostrar su legitimación en cuanto al asunto base, además, debe estar previamente autorizado o habilitado por los interesados para interponer la acción en su nombre, de lo contrario la acción resulta inadmisible (véanse en similar sentido las sentencias números 2002-1334 de las 10:18 horas del 8 de febrero de 2002; 2014-16169 de las 15:40 horas del 1 de octubre de 2014, 2021019742 de las 11:50 horas del 1 de septiembre de 2021 y 2021021203 de las 09:30 horas del 22 de setiembre de 2021).
(...)
En virtud de lo anterior, resulta evidente para esta Sala que, cuando la accionante interpuso la presente acción el 30 de mayo de 2022, no se encontraba debidamente legitimada para actuar en nombre y representación del señor (...), pues no contaba con un mandato formal y suficiente para interponer este proceso a su favor. Así las cosas, queda claro, que la actora acudió ante este Tribunal, a formular una acción en nombre de una tercera persona, sin estar previamente, autorizada o apoderada para hacerlo, tal como lo exige la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, según lo señalado en el considerando anterior.” Mientras que, de forma más reciente, mediante voto nro. 2022-023911 de las 9:20 horas del 12 de octubre de 2022, este Sala resolvió que:
“I.- SOBRE LA ADMISIBILIDAD DE LA ACCIÓN.- REQUISITOS DE ADMISIBILIDAD DE LA ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD.- En reiteradas ocasiones este Tribunal ha señalado que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es el remedio jurisdiccional técnico para impugnar leyes y otras disposiciones generales, cuando estas infringen por acción u omisión, alguna norma o principio constitucional. A diferencia del recurso de amparo, que es menos exigente en cuanto a los presupuestos para su presentación, la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece el necesario cumplimiento de los requisitos formales y de fondo contenidos en los artículos 78 y 79, siendo necesario que la demanda los satisfaga antes de decretarse su admisibilidad ante este Tribunal. El tema de la legitimación es fundamental para interponer este proceso, no solo respecto de los supuestos establecidos en el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, sino también, respecto de la capacidad de actuar en nombre de otra persona. Así lo ha indicado este Tribunal:
“Único: Toda acción de inconstitucionalidad para que resulte admisible debe cumplir con los requisitos que establece al efecto la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. La acción de inconstitucionalidad a diferencia del recurso de amparo y de hábeas corpus requiere de ciertas formalidades, demostrar la legitimación para actuar es un acto ineludible…” (Sentencia n.° 2002-1334 de las 10:18 horas del 8 de febrero de 2002)” (Voto N° 2022-027255 de las 9:45 horas del 16 de noviembre de 2022).
Consideraciones aplicables al caso en estudio. Lo que constituye motivo suficiente para rechazar la acción respecto de tal asociación.
V.DE LA INADMISIBILIDAD DE LA PRESENTE ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD RESPECTO DE [Nombre 010], [Nombre 007], [Nombre 009], [...] Y LA [...]. Como ya se apuntó, el abogado director del proceso y apoderado especial judicial de tales organizaciones afirma que todas estas ostentan legitimación, por accionar en defensa de intereses difusos. Añade que, en el caso específico de la [...] y la Asociación Reflexión y Acción por la Vida y los Derechos Humanos, también se acciona en defensa de intereses corporativos. No obstante, concluye esta Sala que, en la especie, no se configuran estos supuestos de legitimación directa.
A.- EN CUANTO A LA ALEGADA DEFENSA DE INTERESES DIFUSOS. En lo atinente a la defensa de intereses difusos, esta Sala ha venido precisando en su jurisprudencia su objeto, contenido y alcances y ha resuelto que:
“Los intereses difusos, aunque de difícil definición y más difícil identificación, no pueden ser en nuestra Ley -como ya lo ha dicho esta Sala- los intereses meramente colectivos; ni tan difusos que su titularidad se confunda con la de la comunidad nacional como un todo, ni tan concretos que frente a ellos resulten identificadas o fácilmente identificables personas determinadas, o grupos personalizados, cuya legitimación derivaría, no de los intereses difusos, sino de los corporativos o que atañen a una comunidad en su conjunto. Se trata, entonces, de intereses individuales, pero, a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y, por ende, reciben un beneficio o un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos igual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que se trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos de personas que se encuentran en determinadas situaciones y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas. Es decir, los intereses difusos participan de una doble naturaleza, ya que son a la vez colectivos -por ser comunes a una generalidad- e individuales, por lo que pueden ser reclamados en tal carácter” (Sentencia N° 1993-3705-93 de las 15 horas del 30 de julio de 1993).
Asimismo, en Sentencia N° 2007-02958 de las 9:23 horas del 02 de marzo de 2007, este Tribunal agregó:
“En relación con los intereses difusos, que es la legitimación aducida por el accionante, este Tribunal ha dicho se que se trata de aquel interés personal relacionado con un derecho o situación jurídica de naturaleza especial y particular, que puede ser compartido por otras personas, formando todos los interesados un grupo o categoría determinada. Así, la vulneración de ese derecho puede afectar a todos en general y/o a cada uno en particular, de ahí que cualquier miembro de esa agrupación puede interponer la acción para proteger el derecho que se estima lesionado. El interés, en estos casos, se encuentra difuminado, diluido (difuso) entre una pluralidad no identificada de sujetos. La sentencia número 03705-93, de las 15:00 horas del 30 de julio de 1993, ilustra lo que se ha entendido como intereses difusos; así como también la sentencia 360-99 de las 15:51 horas del 20 de enero de 1999:
"Se ha señalado que se trata un tipo especial de interés, cuya manifestación es menos concreta e individualizable que la del colectivo recién definido en el considerando anterior, pero que no puede llegar a ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el reconocido a todos los miembros de la sociedad de velar por la legalidad constitucional, ya que éste último -como se ha dicho reiteradamente- está excluido del actual sistema de revisión constitucional. Se trata pues de un interés distribuido en cada uno de los administrados, mediato si se quiere, y diluido, pero no por ello menos constatable, para la defensa, en esta Sala, de ciertos derechos constitucionales de una singular relevancia para el adecuado y armónico desarrollo de la sociedad. Son las especiales características de éstos derechos por sí mismas y no la particular situación frente a ellos de los sujetos que puedan ostentarlos, la clave para la distinción y determinación de la presencia de los llamados intereses difusos tal y como se manifestado en distintas resoluciones como la 03705-93 de las quince horas del treinta de julio para el derecho al ambiente, la número 05753-93 de las catorce horas cuarenta y cinco del nueve de noviembre de ese mismo año para la defensa del patrimonio histórico y la número 00980-91 de las trece y treinta del veinticuatro de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y uno para la materia electoral." En este sentido, si bien ese interés no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional (lo que supondría la instauración tácita de acción popular no contemplada por la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de éste.
Ejemplos de tales intereses son el derecho a un ambiente sano y armonioso, la defensa del patrimonio histórico, la materia electoral, la defensa del derecho a la salud y la fiscalización de los fondos públicos. Esta enunciación no pasa de una simple descripción propia de su obligación -como órgano jurisdiccional- de limitarse a conocer de los casos que le son sometidos, sin que pueda de ninguna manera llegar a entenderse que solo pueden ser considerados derechos difusos aquellos que la Sala expresamente haya reconocido como tales. Lo anterior implicaría dar un vuelco indeseable en los alcances del Estado de Derecho, y de su correlativo "Estado de derechos", que -como en el caso del modelo costarricense- parte de la premisa de que lo que debe ser expreso son los límites a las libertades, ya que éstas subyacen a la misma condición humana y no requieren por ende de reconocimiento oficial”.
Finalmente, este Tribunal, por mayoría, ha estimado que cuando una norma es susceptible de aplicación individual, no cabe invocar los intereses difusos para admitir la acción. Sobre este punto, en el Voto N° 2022-011649 de las 9:20 horas del 25 de mayo de 2022, esta Sala resolvió que:
“III.- SOBRE LA LEGITIMACIÓN DIRECTA. El accionante, a su vez, dice ostentar legitimación directa, porque refiere que la norma impugnada no solo lesiona los derechos fundamentales de carácter individual de su representado, sino que vulnera sendos colectivos y difusos, por los efectos que produce. No obstante, esta Sala, por mayoría, ha estimado que cuando la norma que se impugna es susceptible de aplicación individual, no cabe invocar la defensa de intereses difusos para admitir la acción. Así, en el voto n° 2021-002185 de las 12:51 horas del 3 de febrero de 2021 este Tribunal Constitucional señaló lo siguiente:
“(…) II.- Sobre los intereses difusos y la legitimación de los accionantes en el caso bajo estudio. Las accionantes señalan que su legitimación proviene de la defensa de los intereses difusos respecto de la protección al derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado. Al respecto, cabe indicar que, como ya se mencionó, los supuestos del párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional constituyen excepciones a la regla contenida en el párrafo primero del mismo artículo, que deben ser analizados cuidadosamente en cada caso concreto. El interés difuso ha sido entendido como aquel interés relacionado con un derecho o situación jurídica de naturaleza especial y particular, que puede ser compartido por otras personas, formando todos los interesados un grupo o categoría determinada. Así, la vulneración de ese derecho puede afectar a todos en general o a cada uno en particular, de ahí que cualquier miembro de la colectividad puede interponer la acción para proteger el derecho que se estima lesionado. Sobre el particular, la reiterada jurisprudencia de la Sala indica que:
"Se ha señalado que se trata un tipo especial de interés, cuya manifestación es menos concreta e individualizable que la del colectivo recién definido en el considerando anterior, pero que no puede llegar a ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el reconocido a todos los miembros de la sociedad de velar por la legalidad constitucional, ya que éste último -como se ha dicho reiteradamente- está excluido del actual sistema de revisión constitucional. Se trata pues de un interés distribuido en cada uno de los administrados, mediato si se quiere, y diluido, pero no por ello menos constatable, para la defensa, en esta Sala, de ciertos derechos constitucionales de una singular relevancia para el adecuado y armónico desarrollo de la sociedad. Son las especiales características de éstos derechos por sí mismas y no la particular situación frente a ellos de los sujetos que puedan ostentarlos, la clave para la distinción y determinación de la presencia de los llamados intereses difusos tal y como se manifestado en distintas resoluciones como la 03705-93 de las quince horas del treinta de julio para el derecho al ambiente, la número 05753-93 de las catorce horas cuarenta y cinco del nueve de noviembre de ese mismo año para la defensa del patrimonio histórico y la número 00980-91 de las trece y treinta del veinticuatro de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y uno para la materia electoral." –ver sentencia número 360-90- De esta definición es posible estimar que el interés difuso está conformado por un elemento eminentemente subjetivo, relativo a su pertenencia o titularidad del interés, y otro objetivo, relacionado con la incidencia del bien en la sociedad, que lo distingue de otras situaciones jurídicas.
En relación con el primero -el subjetivo-, es claro que la misma se encuentra difuminada en un grupo humano no individualizado, que coparticipa en el disfrute del bien jurídico objeto del interés, pero cuya conformación no resulta de un conjunto de sujetos identificable, abarcable y de contornos relativamente nítidos, como sí ocurre en el interés colectivo. Y desde la perspectiva objetiva, debe aclararse que no todo interés "difuminado" adquiere la categoría jurídica de "interés difuso", sino únicamente aquellos impregnados de una profunda relevancia social, cuya valoración resulta de las circunstancias de cada caso –ver, entre otras, sentencias números 2006-15960 y 2014-4904-. En este sentido, así como se ha dicho que ese interés no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional -lo que supondría la instauración tácita de una acción popular no contemplada por la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional-, tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de ese reclamo –ver, entre otras, sentencias números 2008-13442, 2009-300 y 2009-9201-.
Así, ejemplos de tales intereses son el derecho a un ambiente sano y armonioso, la defensa del patrimonio histórico, la materia electoral, la defensa del derecho a la salud y la fiscalización de los fondos públicos. De tal forma, en el caso bajo estudio, donde las accionantes refieren su legitimación respecto de la defensa de intereses difusos en materia de protección a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, lo que corresponde es pronunciarse conforme se indica en los considerandos siguientes.
(…)
En la acción que ahora se conoce, los mismos accionantes cuestionan las mismas normas de los artículos 50 y 51 del Reglamento en cuestión, así como el artículo 52 del mismo instrumento, y si bien, más allá de la sostenibilidad de los zoocriaderos, en esta acción se centran sobre temas de conservación ex situ y educación ambiental -que también fue señalado en aquella acción-, lo cierto es que la misma definición de esta Sala sobre la legitimación, tal como se dispuso en la sentencia de cita, resulta de plena aplicación en esta nueva acción. Nótese que, ciertamente, tal como lo señala claramente la Procuraduría General de la República y de manera enfática lo refiere el Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, la normativa que se cuestiona sí es totalmente susceptible de aplicación individual y de incidir directamente en la esfera jurídica de personas singulares e identificables, que ejercen una determinada actividad, sujeta a la regulación señalada en la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre y su reglamento.
De tal manera, es claro que contrario a la aducida defensa de intereses difusos, lo que se encuentra de por medio es algún grado de inconformidad con la sujeción a que deben someterse para la regulación de la actividad que ejercen o pretenden ejercer ; véase que como bien refiere el informe del Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, los accionantes se encuentran directamente relacionados como fundadores, gerentes o servidores de diversas empresas relacionadas con la exhibición de fauna silvestre o su promoción turística. Así, resulta inviable aducir presuntos problemas de conservación y de educación ambiental, para utilizar la figura de los intereses difusos y promover con ello una acción de inconstitucionalidad directa obviando los estrictos requisitos de admisibilidad señalados en la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, tal como se indicó en los considerandos II y III de esta resolución.
Bajo esta inteligencia, y tomando en consideración la identidad de accionantes y de la normativa cuestionada, es claro que el precedente de la sentencia 2018-18563 resulta plenamente aplicable a esta acción que ahora se conoce, de donde debe necesariamente concluirse que al igual que en aquella anterior ocasión, los accionantes carecen de legitimación para la interposición de este proceso, por lo que resulta improcedente conocer y pronunciarse sobre los aspectos planteados. De tal manera, lo procedente es declarar sin lugar esta acción” (el subrayado no corresponde al original).
En similar sentido, en la sentencia n° 2021-011994 de las 16:30 horas del 26 de mayo de 2021 esta Sala dispuso que:
“(…) Se reitera que el interés difuso no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional (lo que supondría la instauración tácita de acción popular no contemplada por la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional); pero tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues, en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de ese reclamo (…)” (véase en este mismo sentido, entre otros, los Votos N° 2021-025373 de las 9:20 horas del 10 de noviembre de 2021 y N° 2022-007466 de las 9:45 horas del 30 de marzo de 2022).
Consideraciones plenamente aplicables en el sub judice.
Prima facie, no se está ante un caso que intereses difusos, así reconocido en la jurisprudencia de esta Sala. De hecho, este Tribunal ha resuelto que la materia migratoria no constituye, per se, materia en donde exista un interés difuso (Voto N° 2020-001339).
Se verifica, además, que se está en presencia de normas susceptibles de concretizarse en casos de aplicación individual en cabeza de personas específicas y que inciden directamente en la esfera jurídica de personas singulares y plenamente identificables, quienes están habilitadas para plantear la correspondiente reclamación administrativa o judicial. De hecho, las propias accionantes citan diversos recursos de hábeas corpus tramitados y acogidos por esta Sala, referentes a la aplicación de la normativa impugnada en perjuicio de personas concretas.
En consecuencia, y conforme a los antecedentes jurisprudenciales precitados, no puede estimarse que, en el sub lite, se configure el referido supuesto de legitimación directa, por defensa de intereses difusos.
B.- EN CUANTO A LA ALEGADA DEFENSA DE INTERESES CORPORATIVOS. También se aduce expresamente la defensa de intereses corporativos, respecto de la [...] y la Asociación Reflexión y Acción por la Vida y los Derechos Humanos, por cuanto, se alega que “la norma sujeta a examen va en detrimento de los derechos humanos e intereses legítimos de los grupos de personas que las conforman” y que las “personas extranjeras que buscan y solicitan asilo en Costa Rica conforman parte de las bases asociativas” de tales asociaciones.
Ante tal alegato, debe indicarse que, efectivamente, esta Sala ha señalado en su jurisprudencia que la expresión “intereses que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto”, contenida en el ordinal 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, abarca o comprende la:
“legitimación que ostenta una entidad corporativa, cuando actúa por intermedio de sus representantes en defensa de los derechos e intereses de las personas que conforman su base asociativa y siempre y cuando se trate del cuestionamiento de normas o disposiciones que incidan en aquel núcleo de derechos o intereses que constituye la razón de ser y el factor aglutinante de la agrupación” (Sentencia N° 2014-20446 de las 09:30 horas del 17 de diciembre de 2014; en igual sentido -entre varios- Votos N° 2017-000152 de las 9:05 horas del 11 de enero de 2017 y N° 2020-020839 de las 9:20 horas del 28 de octubre de 2020).
Más aún, en Sentencia N° 2018-018164 de las 11:05 horas del 31 de octubre de 2018, este Tribunal expuso lo siguiente:
“II.- TOCANTE A LA ACCIÓN DIRECTA DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD EN DEFENSA DE LOS INTERESES CORPORATIVOS O QUE ATAÑEN A LA COLECTIVIDAD EN SU CONJUNTO. La Sala Constitucional, en algunas ocasiones, ha desarrollado qué se debe entender por el concepto de los intereses que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto, o bien, los intereses corporativos. Particularmente ilustrativo es lo resuelto por este Tribunal Constitucional en la Sentencia No. 00360-99 de las 15:51 horas de 20 de enero de 1999, oportunidad en la que se indicó lo siguiente:
“III.- En relación con otra de las posibles fuentes de legitimación del párrafo segundo del artículo 75 señalado, la recogida en la expresión “intereses que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto”, ya la Sala ha precisado que con ella se refiere el legislador a la legitimación que ostenta un grupo corporativo, cuando actúa como tal por intermedio de sus representantes, en defensa de los derechos e intereses de las personas que conforman su base asociativa, pero, además de lo anterior, siempre y cuando se trate del cuestionamiento de normas o disposiciones que inciden en aquel núcleo de derechos o intereses que constituye la razón de ser y el factor aglutinante de la agrupación; ello incluso cuando, en algunos casos, los efectos de tales normas pudieran repercutir de manera individualizada en cada uno de sus miembros (véase por todos el pronunciamiento número 1631-91 de las quince horas quince minutos del veintiuno de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y uno)”.
Igualmente, en la Sentencia No. 13323-2006 de las 17:26 horas de 6 de septiembre de 2006, se expuso lo siguiente:
“(…) En efecto, como lo ha reconocido con anterioridad este Tribunal (en Sentencias número 6433-98, 7615-98, 0467-99, 1313-99, 1830-99, 2289-99, 2745-99, 6644-99, 7975-99, 0877-2000, 2856-2000, 5565-2000, 6973-2000, 7160-2000, y 2001-9677) los intereses corporativos son aquellos que se caracterizan "[...] por la representación y defensa de un núcleo de intereses pertenecientes a los miembros de la determinada colectividad o actividad común, y, en cuanto los representa y defiende, la Cámara actúa en favor de sus asociados, la colectividad de comerciantes. De manera que estamos frente a un interés de esa Cámara y, al mismo tiempo, de cada uno de sus miembros, de forma no individualizada, pero individualizable, lo que constituye un interés corporativo o que atañe a esa colectividad jurídicamente organizada, razón por la que esta acción es admisible en los términos del párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.-" (Sentencia número 1631-91, de las quince horas con quince minutos del veintiuno de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y uno).
Es así como en estos casos, no resulta necesaria la existencia de un asunto pendiente (en la vía administrativa o jurisdiccional) como lo exige el párrafo primero del citado artículo 75 para acreditar la legitimación del accionante, pues por la misma esencia del asunto, se trata de la defensa de intereses corporativos. Considera la Sala que no resulta legítimo desconocer este tipo de interés, toda vez que ello implicaría desconocer una importante función de los entes corporativos, que han sido creados según los lineamientos de la ley, y en el caso de las Cámaras, colegios profesionales, asociaciones, o sindicatos implicaría desnaturalizar su función mediadora en lo que respecta a la defensa de los intereses de sus agremiados, función que ha sido reconocida como esencial de estos entes por la propia jurisprudencia de este Tribunal (…)”.
En consecuencia, esta Sala ha concluido que los “entes corporativos están autorizados para solicitar en forma directa la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de una norma, cuando esta afecte directamente la esfera de acción del ente y de sus integrantes” (Voto N° 2017-002275), en tanto se accione en defensa de los intereses “directos” y “comunes” de sus asociados o agremiados (Votos N° 2007-02410 y N° 2011-015395, respectivamente). De consuno con lo anterior, este Tribunal también ha especificado que tal legitimación “únicamente lo es para pretender la defensa de los intereses y derechos de sus agremiados, con lo cual la impugnación que hacen debe de circunscribirse a la materia relativa a los afiliados a estas organizaciones” (Voto N° 2006-13323). Por lo que, necesariamente, debe existir un vínculo efectivo entre la norma impugnada por la entidad corporativa y una afectación directa a una situación jurídica sustancial de sus integrantes. En Voto N° 1994-5967 de las 15:57 horas del 11 de octubre de 1994, esta Sala resolvió que:
“(…) En este caso, al fundamentarse la legitimación en la existencia de un interés corporativo, debe definirse primeramente si el Colegio de Contadores constituye una entidad caracterizada por la representación y defensa de un núcleo de intereses pertenecientes a los miembros de una determinada colectividad o a sujetos que ejercen una actividad común. Es indiscutible que el Colegio de Contadores representa y defiende a la colectividad de contadores y que frente a este interés colectivo de la entidad, se encuentra el de cada uno de los miembros que la forman, que se considera no individualizado pero individualizable. Una vez definida la existencia de un interés corporativo a cargo del Colegio de Contadores para la representación y defensa de sus agremiados, corresponde relacionar ese interés con el contenido de las normas cuya inconstitucionalidad se reclama. En este sentido, es importante indicar que la naturaleza colectiva del interés no pretende desconocer los elementos que son propios del interés, entre los que destaca la necesidad de que exista una relación o incidencia entre lo que se cuestiona o impugna y una modificación o afectación de lo que corresponde o pertenece a la entidad corporativa y a cada uno de sus miembros, sean bienes, derechos, obligaciones, potestades o facultades.
Para acreditar la legitimación por intereses colectivos además de una situación de grupo que conforma una unidad de intereses, oficios o vecindades que pueda considerarse como una colectividad, se requiere un interés en la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas, o sea, una relación entre lo cuestionado y lo que efectivamente hace al gremio. Partiendo de lo expuesto, la Sala observa la ausencia de esa necesaria correlación entre las normas cuestionadas por inconstitucionales y el contenido del interés que ostenta el Colegio de Contadores en lo que respecta a la impugnación de la potestad reglamentaria de la Comisión Nacional de Valores. El promovente manifiesta que en los incisos k) y ñ) del artículo 10 de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, se faculta a la Comisión Nacional de Valores a emitir reglamentos ejecutivos que lesionan las funciones o intereses de la Corporación y sus afiliados y violentan lo dispuesto en el artículo 140 incisos 3) y 18) de la Constitución Política, que determina que el Poder Ejecutivo es el único que puede reglamentar las leyes.
Sin embargo, esa facultad genérica que la ley confiere a la Comisión Nacional de Valores para emitir normas y reglamentos, independientemente de su contenido, no alcanzar a afectar directamente el patrimonio, la libertad o las relaciones de los miembros del Colegio de Contadores, necesaria para legitimar a la entidad corporativa en relación con la impugnación de estas normas, por lo que en cuanto al artículo 10 incisos k) y ñ) de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores y Reformas al Código de Comercio, se rechaza de plano la acción por falta de legitimación. Por otra parte, en cuanto al artículo 142 de la citada Ley, considera la Sala que en este caso sí existe un interés colectivo que fundamenta la legitimación para impugnar la norma en esta vía, toda vez que su contenido incide directamente en el ámbito de los intereses corporativos afectando el ejercicio de la profesión de contador” (el destacado no corresponde al original).
En esta misma línea, se puede citar el Voto N° 1997-3688 de las 15 horas del 01 de julio de 1997, en que este Tribunal resolvió que:
“(…) Es indiscutible, que la Cámara Nacional de Armadores y Agentes de Vapores se creó para proteger los intereses de un grupo determinable de personas -físicas y jurídicas- que se dedican a la actividad del transporte marítimo. Así queda definida la existencia de un interés corporativo a cargo de la Cámara Nacional de Armadores y Agentes de Vapores. Corresponde ahora relacionar ese interés con el contenido de las normas impugnadas, con el objeto de determinar si una eventual declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad incidiría, de alguna forma, en la situación que corresponde a los integrantes de esa organización. En ese sentido, para que el interés colectivo legitime a la parte que interpone la acción de inconstitucionalidad, no solo se requiere que lo alegue una organización que representa los intereses de un grupo determinable de personas, sino que debe existir al menos la posibilidad de que la eventual declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad modifique de manera favorable, la situación actual (entendida como bienes, derechos, obligaciones, potestades o facultades) de los miembros de esa colectividad.
Es decir, que para acreditar la legitimación por interés colectivo, además de la existencia de un núcleo común de intereses entre los integrantes de la organización, se requiere que la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas tenga relación -de incidencia o afectación- con la situación de la colectividad. De ahí que sea imprescindible por parte del que fundamenta su legitimación en la existencia de un interés colectivo, una explicación acerca de la relación que la pretensión de inconstitucionalidad tiene con la situación propia de la colectividad, específicamente con su objeto y patrimonio. Lo anterior se echa de menos en este caso, en el que la omisión del promovente de especificar la relación existente entre el fin de la organización que representa y el contenido de las normas que impugna, impide que se acredite a su favor la existencia de un interés corporativo para la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad que solicita.
Esto se agrava por el hecho de que tal relación no se desprende fácilmente del objeto de la organización -la protección de los empresarios que se dedican a la actividad del transporte marítimo-, y del contenido del Reglamento cuestionado, que establece un régimen de admisión temporal de vehículos terrestres para el transporte comercial de mercancías y personas. Lo dispuesto en el Reglamento no parece afectar directamente la situación jurídica de los miembros que integran la Cámara porque el establecimiento de ese régimen no tiene relación con la actividad de transporte marítimo, salvo en cuanto los vehículos que ingresen temporalmente al país con base en esa normativa, puedan ser transportados vía marítima, relación que no resulta suficiente para atribuir a la Cámara la legitimación que le permita acceder al contralor de constitucionalidad (en ese sentido, véase la resolución No.5967-94 de las 15:57 horas del 11 de octubre de 1994). De ahí, que se deba rechazar de plano esta acción” (el destacado no corresponde al original).
Ahora bien, debe reiterarse lo previamente señalado, en el sentido que “los supuestos contenidos en el párrafo 2o. del artículo 75, constituyen una excepción a la regla establecida en el párrafo 1o. (vía incidental) que deben ser valorados cuidadosamente”. De allí, que esta Sala ha procurado enmarcar debidamente este supuesto de legitimación, a fin de no trastocar el sistema de justicia constitucional previsto en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico en lo que toca al control de constitucionalidad.
Es por lo anterior, que esta Sala ha puntualizado que, en esta hipótesis de defensa de intereses corporativos, una persona no “puede arrogarse, sin más, la representación de hecho de una persona o varias personas u organizaciones profesionales” (Voto N° 2022-005038 de las 9:20 horas del 2 de marzo de 2022; véase, igualmente, Voto N° 2020-012323 de las 9:05 horas del 1 de julio de 2020). También ha rechazado aquellas acciones en que no se acredita el necesario vínculo entre el objeto de la acción y una afectación directa y efectiva a la generalidad de los miembros de la entidad corporativa, o bien, se pretende accionar en favor de un colectivo distinto. Así, por ejemplo, en Voto N° 2018-018564 de las 9:20 horas del 7 de noviembre de 2018, esta Sala resolvió:
“IV.- ACERCA DEL RECHAZO DE PLANO DE LA ACCIÓN, ANTE LA INEXISTENCIA DE INTERESES CORPORATIVOS O QUE ATAÑEN A LA COLECTIVIDAD EN SU CONJUNTO, EN EL SUB JUDICE. Tras valorar los argumentos esbozados por el actor, en el caso concreto, en su condición de Secretario General del Sindicato de Trabajadoras y Trabajadores de la Universidad Nacional, dirigidos a defender su legitimación para promover la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad (con arreglo al párrafo 2°, del artículo 75, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) por la aparente existencia de intereses que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto, también llamados corporativos, al considerarse que lo dispuesto por las normas impugnadas constituye una violación “ evidente y manifiesta” de la pretensión de los investigadores de la Universidad Nacional, de realizar sus actividades sin injerencias externas, la Sala Constitucional, al contrario, arriba a una conclusión distinta y, por ende, rechaza de plano este asunto.
No es, el sub judice, un caso en el cual exista un interés, que afecte, de manera directa e indiscutible, al Sindicato supra aludido o, a cada uno de sus integrantes, sino, más bien, uno de los investigadores biomédicos, en ciencias de la salud, quienes pueden pertenecer o no a esa Universidad y, por ende, a esa agrupación sindical, de impugnar la normativa que les exige acreditarse ante el CONIS, o exponerse a las sanciones de la Ley No. 9234. Nótese que las disposiciones cuestionadas no involucran, con exclusividad, a la generalidad de los miembros del Sindicato aludido, de modo que son estos investigadores y no esta agrupación, quienes pueden acudir, por vía singular o colectiva, ante la Sala Constitucional, en defensa de los derechos e intereses que alegan vulnerados, en concreto, la libertad de cátedra y la autonomía universitaria, cuya tutela no constituye un esfuerzo gremial, de esa organización, pese al contenido de los artículos que menciona la parte actora, con respecto al Estatuto del Sindicato mencionado.
No es, el presente, un interés que aglutine de manera corporativa a todos y a cada uno de los miembros, o integrantes de ésta, sino a los investigadores en ciencias biomédicas, lo que constituye un colectivo distinto. No nos encontramos, en el sub examine, frente a un interés de la generalidad de los miembros del Sindicato aludido, que legitime a su Secretario para promover esta acción directa de inconstitucionalidad, con arreglo a lo contemplado en el párrafo 2°, del artículo 75, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, sino, más bien, uno individual de los investigadores en ciencias biomédicas afectados por la aplicación de esa normativa. Es evidente que esas disposiciones no afectan, de manera directa, a los miembros del Sindicato referido, sino a los investigadores en ciencias biomédicas, de ahí que son éstos, y no aquellos, quienes tienen el interés de plantear la presente acción.
Lo anterior, por cuanto, al analizar las diversas disposiciones del Estatuto del Sindicato de Trabajadoras y Trabajadores de la Universidad Nacional, SITUN, en el cual, si bien se contempla como un fin de esa agrupación la defensa de la autonomía universitaria (véase, al respecto, el inciso l), del artículo 4°, del Estatuto), es evidente que no le corresponde, a esa agrupación sindical, la defensa de los intereses de los investigadores en ciencias biomédicas, en particular, su aparente negativa de acreditarse ante el CONIS para poder realizar sus funciones y sus experimentaciones, en esa área del conocimiento, utilizándose como objetos de investigación, por ejemplo, a los seres humanos. Se trata, en suma, de un interés particular, muy específico, cuya defensa le atañe a ese reducido colectivo, no así, a los representantes del sindicato accionante”.
Mientras que, en Voto N° 2023-001018 de las 11:20 horas del 18 de enero de 2023, se resolvió que:
“II.-Ahora bien, en el caso concreto, los accionantes, en su calidad de miembros del Consejo de Mayors Bröran de Territorio Indígena Térraba, Consejo de Mayores Organización Tradicional de Derecho Propio del Territorio Indígena Quitirrisi, Consejo Iriria Sätkök del Territorio Indígena Yäbamï Dí Katá y de la agrupación Pueblo Cabécar del Territorio Indígena China Kichá, cuestionan la constitucionalidad de la normativa impugnada, mencionando que se legitimidad proviene de la defensa de intereses colectivos. Ahora bien, sobre la posibilidad de que los representantes de determinadas organizaciones indígenas se arroguen la representación de la totalidad de las personas indígenas del país, esta Sala dispuso en su sentencia número 2022-14850 de las 8:40 del 29 de junio de 2022, en lo que interesa lo siguiente:
“I.- SOBRE LA ADMISIBILIDAD PARCIAL DE LA ACCIÓN .- La acción es interpuesta por la Asociación Multiétnica y Pluricultural de Buenos Aires (AMPBA), y la Coordinadora General Autoridad Étnica Tradicional de Mayores de Buenos Aires (Salitre, Ujarrás y Cabagra) y representante de las Autoridades Ancestrales de Mesoamérica, con sustento en el artículo 75, párrafo 2° de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en su condición, según manifiestan, de representantes de los pueblos indígenas de Costa Rica. AMPBA, es una asociación civil, cuyos objetivos son totalmente académicos, sociales y culturales. No está consignado, como uno de sus fines, la defensa nacional de la comunidad indígena o de algún grupo indígena en particular. En sentido similar, se resolvió en la sentencia No. 20-24182 de las 9:30 horas del 16 de diciembre de 2020:
“III.- Sobre la legitimación del accionante en este proceso. El aquí gestionante plantea esta acción en representación de la Asociación Vecinos Unidos por la Paz y la Justicia de Cocles, pues indica que entre sus fines está la protección de los derechos y los intereses de los habitantes de Cocles cuando hayan sido afectados por sentencias judiciales y por actos administrativos, lo cual demuestra con la personería jurídica aportada. Para tales efectos, invoca la existencia de intereses corporativos, para acudir en defensa de los grupos étnicos afrodescendientes costarricenses, por una situación relativa al establecimiento de límites de su territorio que, según indica, afecta su derecho de propiedad, por los límites demarcados por el Estado para la reserva indígena Kekoldi (Cocles); e invoca para tales efectos, el derecho de consulta que como “Pueblo Tribal” reconoce el Convenio sobre pueblos indígenas y tribales, n.° 169.
Sin embargo, la asociación accionante abarca, por su propia denominación, a cualquier habitante de Cocles, población que no configura necesariamente al pueblo autóctono afrodescendiente con el arraigo requerido, ni demostró que sus fines sean propiamente la defensa del pueblo afrodescendiente autóctono. Debe advertirse que el concepto de “Pueblo” tutelado en el ámbito internacional, alude a aquel que comparte identidad étnica, cultural, idiomática o religiosa, mientras que población es un grupo de personas que con independencia de esas condiciones de identidad simplemente cohabitan en un territorio determinado. Bajo esa tesis, si la asociación pretende legitimarse bajo los derechos de un “Pueblo Tribal”, debe, primeramente, demostrar que su fin es precisamente ese y no la defensa genérica de toda la población, así como acreditar previamente las condiciones étnicas y culturales de sus agremiados en una zona determinada y su arraigo a ese lugar para exigir tal consulta, lo que no es propio de ser dilucidado y verificado vía acción de inconstitucionalidad, sino en la vía contenciosa, donde pueda dirimirse en un proceso contradictorio, con mayor claridad y prueba, tal condición de identidad y la delimitación que pretende el accionante sea revisada por esta jurisdicción, con base en la literatura histórica aportada y de un perito que ofrece.
Sin duda alguna, otros pueblos tribales tienen iguales derechos que los pueblos indígenas a rescatar sus territorios y a defender sus derechos autóctonos. Tales reivindicaciones son apremiantes y legítimas, por ello deben estar claramente determinados y delimitados tales “Pueblos” por parte de las autoridades competentes del Estado, a fin de que puedan exigir sus derechos en esa condición, tal como se ha hecho en el caso de los indígenas y su representatividad. Es por ello que, en el sub examine tal condición debe ser acreditada certeramente y la acción de inconstitucionalidad no es el medio idóneo para ello”.
Lo expuesto en la sentencia parcialmente citada, es aplicable en este caso, pues la Asociación Multiétnica y Pluricultural de Buenos Aires (AMPBA), no tiene entre sus fines, la defensa de los derechos autóctonos de los pueblos indígenas de Costa Rica. Asimismo, su marco de actuación, se reduce a los territorios de Buenos Aires de Puntarenas, de manera que no puede, sin más, pretender impugnar una ley que afecta a la totalidad de los pueblos indígenas del país.
(…)
Por su parte, la Coordinadora General, si bien representante de las Autoridades Ancestrales de Mesoamérica, no puede atribuirse, por ese solo hecho, la representación legal de toda la población indígena de Costa Rica como pretenden en la acción. En razón de lo expuesto, la acción debe ser rechazada”.
III.Ahora bien, tomando en cuenta lo dispuesto en el precedente de cita, la Sala considera que en el caso en estudio los accionantes carecen de legitimación para interponer la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, pues tal y como se explicó en el considerando anterior, forman parte de grupos indígenas que habitan en un determinado territorio, por lo que no es posible que pretendan arrogarse la representación de la totalidad de las personas indígenas del país, en cuyo caso, sí estaríamos en presencia de la defensa de intereses colectivos. De esta forma, la Sala considera que la acción debe rechazarse, como en efecto se hace”.
Finalmente, esta Sala también ha aclarado -de forma reiterada- que la expresión “intereses que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto”, no puede interpretarse que se refiera a la colectividad nacional (Voto N° 1993-4113), ni puede extenderse a quienes sólo ostenten un interés en velar por la legalidad constitucional (Voto N° 1995-2621) o por garantizar el principio de supremacía constitucional (Voto N° 1991-2233), pues esto equivaldría a aceptar una acción popular que no está reconocida y regulada en nuestra legislación.
Consideraciones aplicables al sub lite. En lo referente a las mencionadas asociaciones ([...] y Asociación Reflexión y Acción por la Vida y los Derechos Humanos), las afirmaciones plenamente genéricas y abstractas formuladas por su apoderado especial judicial (en respuesta a la prevención realizada por resolución de las 10:43 horas del 9 de octubre de 2025), en el sentido que “la norma sujeta a examen va en detrimento de los derechos humanos e intereses legítimos de los grupos de personas que las conforman” o que las “personas extranjeras que buscan y solicitan asilo en Costa Rica conforman parte de las bases asociativas” de tales asociaciones, son insuficientes para establecer con certeza, que, efectivamente, tales entidades asocien o agrupen personas extranjeras que busquen o pretendan refugio. No se brindan datos concretos o específicos, ni prueba documental alguna, que permita establecer tal hecho. Esto tampoco puede derivarse de la lectura de las respectivas actas constitutivas -que están agregadas al expediente-, pues si bien es claro que comparecieron algunas personas extranjeras a constituir tales asociaciones, no es posible deducir que las mismas se encuentren en una situación en que requieran refugio, ni puede derivarse que la normativa impugnada genere una afectación directa y efectiva a la generalidad de los miembros de tales entidades corporativas.
En el caso de específico de la [...], lo que señala su estatuto es lo siguiente:
“El objeto superior de ASOCIACIÓN COMISIÓN PERMANENTE DE DERECHOS HUMANOS FILIAL COSTA RICA es contribuir al fortalecimiento del Estado de Derecho y la Democracia en Costa Rica, que garantice el respeto pleno y ejercicio efectivo de los derechos humanos. ARTICULO CUARTO: Para el cumplimiento de sus fines la Asociación realizará entre otras, las siguientes actividades: a) Educar a la población sobre promoción y defensa de los derechos humanos. b) Capacitar a las autoridades responsables de la administración pública, poderes del Estado de Costa Rica y sectores organizados de la población sobre la manera de garantizar, proteger, defender y promover los derechos humanos. c) Incidir en la formación de leyes, presupuestos públicos y políticas públicas promoviendo el enfoque de derechos humanos en sus procesos de formación, formulación y/o implementación, monitoreo y evaluación. d) Sensibilizar, informar y organizar a las comunidades para la solución negociada de conflictos así como para la promoción y defensa de sus derechos humanos. e) Fortalecer el movimiento de derechos humanos a través del acercamiento con otros organismos nacionales e internacionales que tengan misiones afines, tanto dentro como fuera de Costa Rica. f) Contribuir a erradicar las prácticas violatorias de los derechos humanos y procurar la sanción de las mismas, mediante la denuncia, investigación, el litigio penal y estratégico, la intervención jurídica en los procesos de casos cuando sea pertinente. g) Mantener informada a la comunidad nacional e internacional sobre el desarrollo de la situación de los derechos humanos en el país. h) Facilitar asistencia para la recuperación sico social a víctimas de violaciones de derechos humanos. i) Facilitar asistencia y representación legal a las personas en situación de vulnerabilidad para la búsqueda y gestión de garantías y/o acciones de restitución de los mismos. j) Alcanzar la autosostenibilidad organizacional y financiara. k) Recaudar contribuciones entre los asociados y la ciudadanía en general, para financiar la consecución de sus objetivos esenciales. l) Gestionar donaciones en dinero o en especie de entidades públicas y privadas tanto nacionales como internacionales, para el desarrollo de sus actividades. m) Gestionar, recibir, administrar y distribuir donaciones a favor de las personas en situación vulnerabilidad como resultado de violaciones masivas a sus derechos humanos, desastres naturales y/o conflictos sociales, políticos y militares. n) Promover la participación ciudadana, la equidad de género, la no discriminación por razones de edad, raza, religión, opinión u opción política, preferencia u orientación sexual. o) Propiciar la coordinación, articulación y/o el apoyo de instituciones del Estado para el logro de sus fines. p) Podrá la asociación adquirir toda clase de bienes, siempre dentro de las limitaciones del articulo cuarenta y tres del Código Civil, podrá celebrar contratos de toda índole y realizar todo tipo de operaciones lícitas encaminadas al logro de sus fines”.
De lo que se deriva que tiene un objeto excesivamente amplio, en protección de derechos humanos. No tiene como fin u objetivo específico el agrupar y proteger a las personas extrajeras que requieren refugio.
Finalmente, en el caso de la Asociación Reflexión y Acción por la Vida y los Derechos Humanos, los estatutos establecen lo siguiente:
“ARTÍCULO TERCERO: Los fines de la Asociación son: A) Promover y gestionar el restablecimiento de los derechos ciudadanos, económicos y sociales de las personas víctimas de tratos inhumanos y degradantes de parte de gobiernos autoritarios y dictatoriales, con énfasis principal en Nicaragua, pero también en el resto de América Latina y el mundo. B) Proteger los intereses de los asociados y de las personas víctimas de violación a sus derechos humanos, a través de gestiones ante los organismos defensores de derechos humanos, a nivel nacional e internacional. C) Contribuir constantemente al desarrollo y fortalecimiento de las capacidades de los miembros de la asociación y de las victimas vinculadas a la misma, a través de la implementación y gestión de alternativas académicas de formación, capacitación, autoaprendizaje, emprendedurismo y en temáticas que fomenten los valores democráticos, justicia transicional y memoria histórica.
ARTÍCULO CUARTO: La Asociación podrá usar todos los medios que la ley le permite para el cumplimiento de sus fines. Para ello, la Asociación realizará, entre otras, las siguientes actividades: A) Gestionar donaciones de entidades públicas y organizaciones no gubernamentales, tanto nacionales como extranjeras. B) Realizar actividades participativas con sus asociados y comunidades nacionales para promover procesos de desarrollo local y regional sustentable. C) Propiciar el apoyo estatal y de otras organizaciones no gubernamentales, así como gestionar donaciones de entidades públicas y privadas, tanto nacionales como internacionales para facilitar las actividades educativas, formativas, reivindicativas y de promoción de los derechos humanos de los miembros de la Asociación y sectores afines a la misma. D) Solicitar, recaudar, generar y canalizar los recursos financieros, humanos, materiales y técnicos, para desarrollar investigaciones en los temas de la Asociación.
En este caso, los fines de la asociación están un poco más acotados y pueden relacionarse con la situación de las personas “exiliadas”. Aunque, nuevamente, no puede establecerse con certeza que algún asociado en particular, menos aún la generalidad de sus miembros, estén efectivamente en una situación en que requieran o pretendan refugio, ni puede sostenerse que este sea el fin específico de la asociación.
En definitiva, en el sub lite no se evidencia una efectiva defensa de intereses corporativos. De hecho, admitir esta acción en los términos en que se ha sido formulada, supondría reconocer tácitamente la existencia de una acción popular, la cual, como lo ha indicado la Sala Constitucional en su reiterada jurisprudencia (ver Sentencia N° 2016-000787 de las 9:05 hrs. del 20 de enero de 2016), no se adecua al marco de las competencias procesales que al efecto tiene este Tribunal Constitucional, en sus funciones de intérprete último y guardián de la Constitución.
C.- Finalmente, debe advertirse que el hecho que las accionantes incluyan en sus estatutos o pactos constitutivos, como parte de sus fines, la defensa de derechos humanos o fundamentales, no supone una suerte de legitimación genérica o incondicional, que las legitime para formular acciones contra cualesquiera normas o actos, con total abstracción del debido cumplimiento de los requerimientos y recaudos procesales establecidos en los artículos 75 y siguientes de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, incluido, específicamente, la efectiva configuración de alguno de los supuestos de legitimación expresamente previstos en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico.
Como corolario de lo anterior, procede rechazar de plano la acción en estudio, como así se dispone.
VII.RAZONES DIFERENTES DE LOS MAGISTRADOS CRUZ CASTRO, RUEDA LEAL Y FERNÁNDEZ ARGÜELLO, en lo que respecta a intereses difusos, con redacción del segundo. Tal como lo hemos expresado en otros casos, estimamos que una cualidad del interés difuso consiste precisamente, en que su afectación es general -esto es, incide en toda una población o en amplios sectores de ella- dentro de un contexto, donde no se precisa que los sujetos perjudicados se conozcan entre sí (incluso podrían carecer de nexo o relaciones jurídicas entre ellos), pero sí se requiere de la presencia de una misma situación de daño o peligro a un bien constitucional que, por igual y sin necesidad de individualización alguna, comprende y aglomera a toda una sociedad en abstracto. Su defensa tiene como finalidad satisfacer una necesidad de la sociedad como tal, por ello, es trascendente a la de un ser humano individual o colectivamente considerado. En Sentencia N° 2019-17397 de las 12:54 horas del 11 de setiembre de 2019, este Tribunal reiteró lo siguiente:
“(…) En segundo lugar, se prevé la posibilidad de acudir en defensa de "intereses difusos"; este concepto, cuyo contenido ha ido siendo delineado paulatinamente por parte de la Sala, podría ser resumido en los términos empleados en la sentencia de este tribunal número 3750-93, de las quince horas del treinta de julio de mil novecientos noventa y tres) "… Los intereses difusos, aunque de difícil definición y más difícil identificación, no pueden ser en nuestra ley -como ya lo ha dicho esta Sala los intereses meramente colectivos; ni tan difusos que su titularidad se confunda con la de la comunidad nacional como un todo, ni tan concretos que frente a ellos resulten identificados o fácilmente identificables personas determinadas, o grupos personalizados, cuya legitimación derivaría, no de los intereses difusos, sino de los corporativos que atañen a una comunidad en su conjunto. Se trata entonces de intereses individuales, pero a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y, por ende reciben un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos igual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que se trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos que se encuentran en determinadas circunstancias y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas.
Es decir, los intereses difusos participan de una doble naturaleza, ya que son a la vez colectivos -por ser comunes a una generalidad- e individuales, por lo que pueden ser reclamados en tal carácter".
En síntesis, los intereses difusos son aquellos cuya titularidad pertenece a grupos de personas no organizadas formalmente, pero unidas a partir de una determinada necesidad social, una característica física, su origen étnico, una determinada orientación personal o ideológica, el consumo de un cierto producto, etc. El interés, en estos casos, se encuentra difuminado, diluido (difuso) entre una pluralidad no identificada de sujetos. En estos casos, claro, la impugnación que el miembro de uno de estos sectores podría efectuar amparado en el párrafo 2° del artículo 75, deberá estar referida necesariamente a disposiciones que lo afecten en cuanto tal. Esta Sala ha enumerado diversos derechos a los que les ha dado el calificativo de "difusos", tales como el medio ambiente, el patrimonio cultural, la defensa de la integridad territorial del país y del buen manejo del gasto público, entre otros.
Al respecto deben ser efectuadas dos precisiones: por un lado, los referidos bienes trascienden la esfera tradicionalmente reconocida a los intereses difusos, ya que se refieren en principio a aspectos que afectan a la colectividad nacional y no a grupos particulares de ésta; un daño ambiental no afecta apenas a los vecinos de una región o a los consumidores de un producto, sino que lesiona o pone en grave riesgo el patrimonio natural de todo el país e incluso de la Humanidad; del mismo modo, la defensa del buen manejo que se haga de los fondos públicos autorizados en el Presupuesto de la República es un interés de todos los habitantes de Costa Rica, no tan solo de un grupo cualquiera de ellos. Por otra parte, la enumeración que ha hecho la Sala Constitucional no pasa de una simple descripción propia de su obligación –como órgano jurisdiccional- de limitarse a conocer de los casos que le son sometidos, sin que pueda de ninguna manera llegar a entenderse que solo pueden ser considerados derechos difusos aquellos que la Sala expresamente ha ya reconocido como tales; lo anterior implicaría dar un vuelco indeseable en los alcances del Estado de Derecho, y de su correlativo "Estado de derechos", que –como en el caso del modelo costarricense- parte de la premisa de que lo que debe ser expreso son los límites a las libertades, ya que éstas subyacen a la misma condición humana y no requieren por ende de reconocimiento oficial.
Finalmente, cuando el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional habla de intereses "que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto", se refiere a los bienes jurídicos explicados en las líneas anteriores, es decir, aquellos cuya titularidad reposa en los mismos detentadores de la soberanía, en cada uno de los habitantes de la República.
No se trata por ende de que cualquier persona pueda acudir a la Sala Constitucional en tutela de cualesquiera intereses (acción popular), sino que todo individuo puede actuar en defensa de aquellos bienes que afectan a toda la colectividad nacional, sin que tampoco en este campo sea válido ensayar cualquier intento de enumeración taxativa” (véase la sentencia No. 2007- 01145).” En consonancia con lo expuesto y sostenido por este Tribunal en su jurisprudencia, se trata entonces de intereses individuales, pero a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y, por ende, reciben un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos igual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que se trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos que se encuentran en determinadas circunstancias y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas. Es por ello, precisamente, que, a partir de la sentencia nro. 2021-2185 de las 12:51 horas del 3 de febrero de 2021, consideramos, a diferencia de la Mayoría de este Tribunal, que algunos de estos intereses pueden estar plasmados en un caso particular en concreto, sin perder por ello su condición de interés difuso, tal como ocurre con la protección al ambiente, cuyo impacto afecta a una persona y a todos en general; y puede ser individualizada tal afectación en una situación en particular, como por ejemplo, la construcción de una fábrica en un sector vecino determinado, sin los estudios ambientales respectivos, cuyos efectos negativos incidan en la capa de ozono del planeta.
Indudablemente el resultado de un reclamo o proceso que pueda plantear un vecino contra esa fábrica, no solo incidirá en sus intereses propios, sino también en el resto de la colectividad. Por ello, constituye un interés difuso; y, sin embargo, también es objeto de una situación particular individualizada. Ahora bien, ello no quiere decir, en modo alguno, que en toda situación invocada se pueda alegar la existencia de un interés difuso, aunque este pueda ser objeto de una situación particular. Recordemos que para que un interés sea considerado “difuso”, no solo debe afectar una colectividad, sino también debe difuminarse, difundirse en esa colectividad. Si no produce tal efecto, no puede ser considerado un interés difuso. En el caso de los accionantes, tal como refiere la Mayoría, la normativa impugnada no produce una afectación socialmente difuminada, sino determinada. De modo que, en este caso, lo que se vislumbra es una situación que, si bien puede ser compartida por algún grupo de personas, ese efecto no es de tal magnitud como para considerarlo un interés difuso. Por el motivo expuesto coincidimos con la Mayoría en desestimar esta acción.
Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de treinta días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en Sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial N° 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la Sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.
Por tanto:
Se rechaza de plano la acción. Los magistrados Cruz Castro, Rueda Leal y Fernández Argüello dan razones diferentes en cuanto a la legitimación por intereses difusos.
Fernando Cruz C.
Presidente a.i.
Paul Rueda L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G.
Hubert Fernández A.
Ana Cristina Fernández A.
Rosibel Jara V.
Observaciones de SALA CONSTITUCIONAL votado con boleta
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