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Res. 22483-2024 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 07/08/2024
OutcomeResultado
The Chamber annulled Article 135(c), held Articles 1, 2, 68, 69, and 70 unconstitutional as applied to ICE, restored the special regime under Law 8660, and denied the challenge to Article 134(d).La Sala anuló el artículo 135 inciso c), declaró inconstitucionales los artículos 1, 2, 68, 69 y 70 en cuanto se aplicaban al ICE, restauró el régimen especial de la Ley 8660 y rechazó la acción respecto del artículo 134 inciso d).
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber partially granted the challenge against provisions of the General Public Procurement Law that subjected the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) to the general procurement regime. The majority annulled Article 135(c), which had repealed provisions of the special regime created by Law 8660, and held Articles 1, 2, 68, 69, and 70 unconstitutional insofar as they applied to ICE. The Chamber deemed it necessary to preserve the legal conditions of agility and competitiveness granted to ICE in connection with the opening of the telecommunications market and Costa Rica’s commitments under the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement. The challenge to Article 134(d) was denied. The judgment was given declaratory and retroactive effect, subject to good-faith vested rights, and restored the relevant provisions of Law 8660. The dissent argued that the union lacked standing because ICE’s competitiveness was not a diffuse interest and the challenged rules did not affect its members’ collective interests.La Sala Constitucional declaró parcialmente con lugar la acción contra varias disposiciones de la Ley General de Contratación Pública que sometían al Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad al régimen general. La mayoría anuló el artículo 135 inciso c), que había derogado normas del régimen especial establecido por la Ley 8660, y declaró inaplicables al ICE, por inconstitucionales, los artículos 1, 2, 68, 69 y 70. Consideró necesario preservar las condiciones legales de agilidad y competitividad otorgadas al ICE en el contexto de la apertura de las telecomunicaciones y de los compromisos asumidos por Costa Rica mediante el TLC República Dominicana-Centroamérica-Estados Unidos. La acción fue rechazada respecto del artículo 134 inciso d). El fallo otorgó efectos declarativos y retroactivos, respetando los derechos adquiridos de buena fe, y dispuso que recobraran vigencia las normas pertinentes de la Ley 8660. El voto salvado sostuvo que el sindicato accionante carecía de legitimación, pues la competitividad del ICE no constituía un interés difuso ni afectaba los intereses colectivos de sus afiliados.
Key excerptExtracto clave
By majority vote, the action is partially granted and, consequently, Article 135(c) of Law 9986 of May 27, 2021, the General Public Procurement Law, is annulled as unconstitutional. Articles 1, 2, 68, 69, and 70 of that law are declared unconstitutional insofar as they apply to the Costa Rican Electricity Institute. The action against Article 134(d) of Law 9986 is denied. This judgment has declaratory and retroactive effects from the effective date of the annulled provision, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. Pursuant to Article 91, second paragraph, of the law governing this Jurisdiction, the effects of this declaration are tailored so that Articles 12, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 of Law 8660, Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector, of August 8, 2008, which were repealed by Article 135(c) of Law 9986, regain force.Por mayoría se declara parcialmente con lugar la acción y, en consecuencia, se anula por inconstitucional el artículo 135 inciso c) de la Ley 9986 del 27 de mayo de 2021, Ley General de Contratación Pública. Respecto de los artículos 1, 2, 68, 69 y 70 de la misma ley, se declara que son inconstitucionales en cuanto a su aplicación al Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad. Sobre el artículo 134 inciso d) de la Ley 9986 se declara sin lugar la acción. Esta sentencia tiene efectos declarativos y retroactivos a la fecha de vigencia de la disposición anulada, sin perjuicio de derechos adquiridos de buena fe. Conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo 91 párrafo 2 de la Ley que rige esta Jurisdicción, se dimensionan los efectos de esta declaratoria de forma que recobran su vigencia los artículos 12, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 y 29 de la Ley 8660, Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones, de 8 de agosto de 2008, derogados por el artículo 135 inciso c) de la Ley 9986.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"Un daño ambiental no afecta apenas a los vecinos de una región o a los consumidores de un producto, sino que lesiona o pone en grave riesgo el patrimonio natural de todo el país e incluso de la Humanidad."
"Environmental harm does not affect only the residents of a region or the consumers of a product; it injures or seriously endangers the natural heritage of the entire country and even of humanity."
Voto salvado: intereses difusos
"Un daño ambiental no afecta apenas a los vecinos de una región o a los consumidores de un producto, sino que lesiona o pone en grave riesgo el patrimonio natural de todo el país e incluso de la Humanidad."
Voto salvado: intereses difusos
"No se trata por ende de que cualquier persona pueda acudir a la Sala Constitucional en tutela de cualesquiera intereses (acción popular), sino que todo individuo puede actuar en defensa de aquellos bienes que afectan a toda la colectividad nacional, sin que tampoco en este campo sea válido ensayar cualquier intento de enumeración taxativa."
"It does not follow that any person may appear before the Constitutional Chamber to protect any interest whatsoever through a popular action; rather, every individual may defend those interests that affect the national community as a whole, and no exhaustive enumeration of such interests is permissible."
Voto salvado: alcance de la legitimación difusa
"No se trata por ende de que cualquier persona pueda acudir a la Sala Constitucional en tutela de cualesquiera intereses (acción popular), sino que todo individuo puede actuar en defensa de aquellos bienes que afectan a toda la colectividad nacional, sin que tampoco en este campo sea válido ensayar cualquier intento de enumeración taxativa."
Voto salvado: alcance de la legitimación difusa
"Recordemos que para que un interés sea considerado “difuso”, no solo debe afectar una colectividad, sino también debe difuminarse, difundirse en esa colectividad. Si no produce tal efecto, no puede ser considerado un interés difuso."
"For an interest to be considered “diffuse,” it must not only affect a community but must also be dispersed throughout that community. If it does not produce that effect, it cannot be considered a diffuse interest."
Voto salvado: criterio sobre intereses difusos
"Recordemos que para que un interés sea considerado “difuso”, no solo debe afectar una colectividad, sino también debe difuminarse, difundirse en esa colectividad. Si no produce tal efecto, no puede ser considerado un interés difuso."
Voto salvado: criterio sobre intereses difusos
"En este caso, la mera cuestión relativa a la competitividad y eficiencia de una empresa pública que se encuentra en régimen de competencia no conlleva per se una lesión a intereses diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés."
"In this case, the mere issue of the competitiveness and efficiency of a public enterprise operating in a competitive market does not, in itself, entail injury to interests dispersed among more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest."
Voto salvado: legitimación del sindicato
"En este caso, la mera cuestión relativa a la competitividad y eficiencia de una empresa pública que se encuentra en régimen de competencia no conlleva per se una lesión a intereses diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés."
Voto salvado: legitimación del sindicato
Full documentDocumento completo
Decision No. 2024-022483 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at twelve hundred hours on August 7, 2024.
Constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) being processed under expediente nro. 23-007251-0007-CO, filed by [Nombre01 001], identity card [CED01], in his capacity as president of the Engineers’ Union of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), seeking a declaration that Articles 1, 2, 68, 69, 70, Article 134, subsection d), and Article 135, subsection c), of Law No. 9986, entitled ‘General Public Procurement Law (Ley General de Contratación Pública),’ are unconstitutional.
Background (Resultando):
With respect to this legislative obligation as part of the country’s commitments for the FTA to enter into force, the Procuraduría General de la República, in Legal Opinion (Opinión Jurídica) OJ-O11-2008 of 15 de febrero de 2008, stated: “… In the case of the opening of the telecommunications market, the Treaty establishes general obligations aimed at liberalizing the telecommunications market in Central America. However, in the case of Costa Rica, its commitments are set forth in Annex 13 to Chapter 13. This Annex notes that, pursuant to Article IV of Annex 13 to Chapter 13, Costa Rica must issue a new regulatory framework for telecommunications services by 1 de enero de 2006. It was also required to have approved a new Ley para el Fortalecimiento del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad by 31 de diciembre de 2004, a date explained by the fact that the Treaty was to enter into force on 1 de enero de 2005...” (Emphasis not in the original).
As the Procuraduría concludes, this Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización del ICE is a requirement for the Treaty’s effectiveness and full implementation, as stated in the same legal opinion: “… The opening of the telecommunications market derives from the Treaty. Nevertheless, Costa Rica is exempted from the general and common provisions of the Treaty. The obligation not to apply Chapter 13 in its entirety and as of the Treaty’s entry into force is subject to the exception set forth in Annex 13 to Chapter 13, point IV, which clearly establishes the Costa Rican State’s obligation to issue a new regulatory framework for telecommunications services that guarantees the participation of telecommunications service providers in that market. The treaty provision even establishes the principles that must govern this regulatory framework. In addition, section III.2 establishes the corresponding timetable for the opening process.
It cannot be overlooked thatthat (sic), in the case of telecommunications, full compliance with this obligation requires the approval of a statute… …. For the opening of the telecommunications market under the terms agreed upon by Costa Rica to become a reality, the country must enact a statute that meets the requirements imposed by the statutory reservation (reserva de ley) referred to above and also respects the commitments undertaken by the country in the Treaty. The Procuraduría does not purport to provide an exhaustive analysis of the Treaty provisions and the State’s obligations, but merely to note that the Treaty’s effectiveness in certain matters is (sic) contingent upon the enactment of a statute by the Asamblea Legislativa. “That is, such effectiveness is indeed contingent upon the enactment of the statutes in question.” (Emphasis not in the original).
Historical and Social Context of the FTA in Costa Rica As all Costa Ricans know, the Free Trade Agreement between Central America—the Dominican Republic and the United States has been one of the trade agreements that has generated the greatest social protest, analysis, and debate in our country, precisely because the people did not want the FTA to threaten public services provided by the State or lead to their privatization, potentially resulting in a higher future cost of providing those services and a possible loss of jobs. This demonstrated, in part, that one of the principal pillars of the controversy generated by that trade agreement was the opening of the Telecommunications Sector (ICE) and the Insurance Sector (INS), which had been State monopolies for many years, since their creation. Indeed, one of the major ideological debates that arose nationwide was whether the FTA would entail the privatization of institutions emblematic of Costa Rica, such as ICE or INS.
This gave rise to the commitments undertaken by the State of Costa Rica to protect those institutions through the enactment and prompt approval of special statutes that would permit an appropriate opening of those markets and enable the institutions involved to compete on equal terms with telecommunications, insurance, and other operators under the implemented FTA. Those regulatory conditions for implementing the FTA were always core and fundamental aspects of the Treaty, a situation that cannot now be changed by the approval and operational entry into force of Ley 9986. The fact cannot be overlooked that the Treaty would place the country in competition across several sectors with companies from the world’s largest economy, the United States. Accordingly, the implementation of various statutes enabling the country to “level” the competitive framework was always part of the very spirit of the trade agreement. Therefore, another statute cannot now be used to undermine what was regulated during the Treaty negotiations for competing companies, as occurs with statute 9886 in the case of ICE.
Against this background and in response to an open telecommunications market, Costa Rica enacted a special statute for ICE and its companies, as well as for the Telecommunications Sector, to satisfy the provision and the commitment concerning the effectiveness of the public institutions entering into competition. This was always a commercial, practical, and legal matter that was extensively discussed and agreed upon for approval of the Treaty, bearing in mind that a fundamental part of the new regulation had to apply to ICE and provide that Institute with a rule and regulatory framework for facing the Treaty’s entry into operation. That statute included a special section on administrative procurement (contratación administrativa) that differed from the framework governing the remainder of the Costa Rican State’s Public Sector, because the administrative procurement procedures and deadlines established under the State’s general procurement framework would prevent ICE and its companies from competing on equal terms with foreign or domestic companies marketing telecommunications services that would enter the country as a result of the opening approved in the trade agreement for that strategic business sector.
Ley 8660, “Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones,” arose from compliance with the spirit and requirements of the additional statutes intended to strengthen the State institutions in sectors that would enter into competition as a result of the FTA. It constituted a fundamental part of the spirit of the trade agreement and of the commitments undertaken by the State of Costa Rica for the FTA’s entry into force and effectiveness. An important and necessary component was the special administrative procurement framework established in Ley 8660 for ICE and its companies;, (sic) without which ICE faces a high risk of regulatory regression in this area, as well as a serious and direct violation of efficiency, effectiveness, and competitiveness in the Institution’s administrative procurement of the goods and services needed to carry out its strategy, programs, operating plans, and goals and, consequently, the National Development Plan of which it forms part. This is because Ley 8660 was an essential and fundamental component for fulfilling the Free Trade Agreement commitment, which is no longer being fulfilled under the new Ley General de Contratación Pública.
As is known and can be verified from the ultimate time frames by which an administrative procurement procedure is delayed, both at ICE and at a State entity, it also bears mentioning that the general rules are tedious because of the number of formalities involved, cumbersome, and slow in the execution of the public procurement procedures established and regulated by the general legislation governing Costa Rica’s entire Public Sector. Although that legislation was recently amended through the Ley General de Contratación Pública, based on ICE’s procurement experience it does not appear sufficiently efficient in terms of deadlines and processes to allow a State institution operating in a competitive market to compete on equal terms with private companies.
Moreover, depriving ICE of the procurement instrument contemplated for it by the FTA—namely, its own administrative procurement regulatory framework—would, as stated, undermine an essential part of Ley 8660 and the Institution’s effectiveness and efficiency and, more seriously still, the commitments undertaken by the State of Costa Rica in the FTA, as will be discussed at length below.
Fulfillment of the State’s Commitments for the Treaty’s Full Effectiveness through the Enactment of Ley 8660, “Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Empresas de Telecomunicaciones” For the purpose of fulfilling the Development and Implementation Agenda, as well as the State’s political and legislative commitments that would give full effect to the will of the Costa Rican people through the approval and ratification of the FTA, Bill No. 16.397 was drafted. It proposed providing ICE and its companies with a special administrative procurement regime that would specifically enable the Institution to compete and provide it with a more streamlined mechanism for acquiring goods and services. The Bill stated: “… Finally, based on recognition of the work performed by ICE and its companies in the telecommunications field, the Government of the Republic considers it an unavoidable commitment to provide that entity with the legal and operational mechanisms necessary so that, without altering its public nature, it may operate on equal terms with the private operators participating in the market.
To that end, this Bill proposes developing a regulatory framework complementary to Ley N.º 449, Ley de creación del ICE, that will: - Strengthen the capacity of ICE and its companies to provide and market electricity and telecommunications products and services within and outside the national territory. - Provide ICE and its companies with legislation enabling them to adapt to changes in electricity and telecommunications…”.
This Bill was submitted for constitutional review (consulta de constitucionalidad), in which that Honorable Chamber, in decision number 11210 of 16 de julio de 2008, stated: “… An analysis of the consulted Bill reveals the legislature’s clear intention to provide the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad with the conditions necessary for greater administrative, financial, and technological efficiency and effectiveness. This, of course, occurs within the framework of a process of opening the telecommunications market—already determined by the people through approval in the referendum on the U.S., Central America, and Dominican Republic FTA (Referendum Law No. 8622 of 21 de noviembre de 2007)—which seeks to strengthen public operators in anticipation of potential competition. Indeed, the following may be inferred from the considerations of those issuing the committee report on the Bill: ‘(...) The Bill at issue proposes a special administrative procurement regime for ICE’s acquisition of goods and services.
Regarding this matter, the Bill under consideration states among its objectives the provision to ICE of a streamlined, efficient, and effective administrative procurement system as part of the efforts to strengthen and modernize that entity, as well as the establishment of a body of rules adapted to its particular circumstances. Both the Sala Constitucional and the Contraloría General have noted that special regimes may exist whenever required by the nature and particular characteristics of the public activity concerned and insofar as the circumstances contemplated in the general legislation are not applicable to it.
As intended in that opinion, that framework must therefore regulate the particular conditions governing the administrative procurement (contratación administrativa) of ICE and its companies and must necessarily take into account the constitutional principles enshrined in Articles 182 and 184. On this issue, the legislature has been entrusted with the task of clearly specifying the particular rules and parameters that justify regulations departing from the general regulatory framework, developing their content in the law, and incorporating the constitutional principles governing the State’s administrative procurement activities, as proposed in the present text. Within the framework of those objectives, it was emphasized that one of the principal difficulties historically faced by the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and its companies in administrative procurement matters is that the financial thresholds for determining the applicable procurement procedures do not necessarily meet their requirements.
By virtue of the foregoing, it may be inferred that the legislature’s intent in the legislation under review is to adjust the financial thresholds for administrative procurement to the circumstances and scale of ICE. The analytical opinion stated the following: “(...) Along the same lines, ICE and its companies currently use the procedures of public tendering (licitación pública), abbreviated tendering (licitación abreviada), and direct contracting (contratación directa), based on the financial thresholds established in Article 27 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa and its amendments. That methodology is not in itself problematic; however, because the reference budget applicable to ICE represents slightly more than 10% of the Institution’s budget, it became necessary to establish a methodology allowing the financial procurement thresholds to be adjusted to the circumstances and scale of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and its companies, without losing sight of the fact that the competent body for setting those thresholds is the Contraloría General de la República.
(...)” (emphasis not in the original). The text under review does not therefore seek to disregard administrative procurement procedures, but rather to establish amounts more consistent with the budgetary particularities of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, which is legitimate in light of Constitutional Law (Derecho de la Constitución)...” (underlining not in the original). Accordingly, consistent with the legislature’s intent and following completion of the constitutional review (análisis de Constitucionalidad), Ley 8660 was enacted, which identifies the following among its objectives: “… a) To strengthen, modernize, and provide the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), its companies, and its affiliated bodies with legislation enabling them to adapt to all changes in the legal framework governing the generation and provision of electricity services, as well as telecommunications, infocommunications, information products and services, and other convergent services. e) To make more flexible and expand the public procurement mechanisms and procedures available to ICE and its companies. f) To guarantee and reaffirm the administrative and financial autonomy of ICE and its companies ...” To achieve those objectives, Article 20 establishes a special administrative procurement framework (régimen de contratación administrativa especial) intended to provide greater speed and efficiency in the acquisition of goods and services, in accordance with the provisions of the FTA (TLC); this is borne out by the years during which the special framework has operated within the Institution (ICE), enabling competitiveness and responsiveness in addressing the services, resources, and other needs of the telecommunications system, given the opportunity afforded by having a special framework for acquiring goods and services to meet its goals and obligations.
“… CHAPTER IV SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCUREMENT FRAMEWORK ARTICLE 20.- Procurement regulations The acquisition of goods and services by ICE shall be subject to the special provisions contained in this Law and its Regulations. The Ley de Contratación Administrativa, N. 0 7494, of 1 0 May 1996, as amended, and its Regulations shall apply on a supplementary basis. The acquisition of goods and services by ICE companies incorporated as corporations (sociedad anónima) shall be excluded from the Ley de Contratación Administrativa …” These special regulations allowed ICE and its companies to acquire goods and services more quickly, efficiently, and with greater administrative autonomy, all of which were necessary to respond appropriately in a competitive market. Unconstitutionality (Inconstitucionalidad) of Articles 1, 2, and 135(c) of the Ley General de Contratación Pública: Article 1 of the Ley General de Contratación Pública states: “…
ARTICLE 1-Scope of application This law applies to all contractual activity using public funds in whole or in part ...” Superior hierarchy of international treaties and conventions. As Article 7 of our Constitution provides, public treaties, international conventions, and concordats duly approved by the Asamblea Legislativa shall, from the time of their enactment or from the date specified therein, have authority superior to that of statutes. In this particular case, it is clear that the TLC, approved by popular vote and ratified by the Asamblea Legislativa, ranks above statutes and below only the Constitución Política. On this point, the Procuraduría General de la República, in the same Legal Opinion (Opinión Jurídica) OJ-O11-2008 of 15 February 2008, stated the following regarding domestic laws in relation to the provisions of an international treaty: “… In the case of Costa Rica, constitutional case law has already indicated that international treaties, upon their approval and ratification, take effect within the country, unless their implementation requires the approval of subsequent implementing measures: ‘In accordance with the doctrine derived from Article 7º of our Constitution, international treaties or conventions, as a source of law within our legal system, occupy a position superior to that of ordinary statutes.
This means that, when confronted with the provision of a treaty or convention—a designation that is equivalent for purposes of international law—an internal statutory provision must yield, which is precisely the legal issue before us. Indeed, international rules do not arise from the legislative authority inherent in each country’s congress or parliament, in which popularly elected representatives (in representative democracies) participate as active parties in the lawmaking process, particularly at the stage when the bill in question is introduced, with the executive subsequently intervening as an oversight mechanism. The opposite occurs in international law, where the executive, in exercising its exclusive and autonomous function of conducting the State’s international relations, defines the content of negotiations and thereby binds or obligates the other internal bodies. Here, the legislature does not play a predominant role in determining the content of the negotiations, but instead acts as a body providing subsequent approval by approving or rejecting the instrument, without modifying it.
Once the treaty—in this case, the Convention—has been signed by the executive (President and Minister of Foreign Affairs), approved by the Asamblea Legislativa, and ratified by the Executive, it becomes part of our country’s domestic legal framework and prevails over any other ordinary rule that conflicts with it, unless, by the very content of its clauses, its implementation has been made conditional upon its completion through subsidiary agreements or protocols, as the Constitution designates them.’ (Voto N. 0503-96 de las 10:21 horas del 26 de enero de 1996). An approved and ratified international convention becomes part of the national legal system with authority superior to that of statutes, which must conform to the provisions of the treaty as the superior rule. Any inconsistency between a statutory provision and a treaty incorporated into the legal system is resolved by applying the rules of interpretation (criterios hermenéuticos) for resolving conflicts between legal rules (antinomias normativas); it may, however, entail a constitutional issue insofar as it violates Article 7 of the Constitución Política. …” As has been demonstrated in this Action, the challenged articles disregard ICE’s special administrative procurement framework in a competitive market—a framework that, as explained, formed part of the content of the TLC, as set forth in its Development Agenda (Agenda de Desarrollo), Implementation Agenda (Agenda de Implementación), and the State’s and legislature’s commitments to give effect and force to the Tratado de Libre Comercio—and are manifestly contrary to its purpose by placing ICE’s administrative procurement procedure within the State’s general Public Procurement (Compras Públicas) framework, in complete contradiction to the legislature’s enactment of an agile, efficient legislative framework for ICE and its companies that was suited to their specific budgetary needs, since, upon the entry into force of the TLC, ICE had to prepare for competition in the telecommunications sector.
The bill, Expediente Número 21.546, on which the Ley General de Contratación Pública was based, is absolutely clear that one of its objectives was precisely to eliminate every special administrative procurement framework: “… A comprehensive scope of application … With regard to the application of the currently effective Ley de Contratación Administrativa, a phenomenon has arisen whereby government entities (Administraciones) quite frequently seek to take advantage of any statutory amendment to their powers in order to remove their procurement arrangements from the scope of that law. Such is the case of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles, Instituto Nacional de Seguros, Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia, Junta Administrativa Servicios Eléctricos de Cartago, Radiográfica Costarricense S.A., Sistema Nacional de Radio y Televisión, and Correos de Costa Rica.
This has resulted in the existence of different laws containing particular regulations that, far from providing a straightforward public procurement mechanism, create a landscape that is difficult to understand, tangled, and detrimental to legal certainty (seguridad jurídica). Although it is recognized that certain matters within the current Ley de Contratación Administrativa are capable of improvement, which is the reason this initiative is being introduced, the fact remains that, in practice, the fragmentation affecting public procurement as a result of the proliferation of special regulatory instruments for certain government entities has not proved effective. On the contrary, because different procurement frameworks coexist, the contracting authority (Administración contratante), legal practitioner, and general public are currently subject to a dense regulatory web that fosters legal uncertainty and makes it difficult to gain a comprehensive command of the legal system in this area.
Accordingly, this bill seeks to establish a single scope of application based on the objective criterion of the use of public funds. Thus, the provision establishes that its scope shall encompass the entire Public Administration, so that it is intended to apply to the procurement activities of all bodies or entities, whether public or private, whenever they use public funds (objective element). For that reason, it is understood to constitute a comprehensive scope of application.
Consequently, as previously mentioned, the regulation of entities that are “governed by principles” or that have special regulations for the procurement of goods, works, and services is eliminated. This principle-based regulation is not clearly defined or delimited and, in practice, it has been found that different regulations exist...” (emphasis not in the original). This legislative objective places ICE on the same footing as other State-owned companies, Ministries, and institutions, without analyzing or assessing the very origin of these special administrative procurement (contratación administrativa) regulations. In the case of ICE, these arose as a legislative commitment by the State, for the effective implementation of the TLC, to provide the public enterprises entering into competition with legal instruments having the force of law so that they could address the telecommunications sector with greater operational, financial, and administrative efficiency; accordingly, it is contrary to constitutional law (derecho de la Constitución) for a subsequent law to disregard legislation implementing an international treaty or convention and mandatorily establish the use of a general legislative framework that conflicts with it.
This is because it not only repeals the special administrative procurement regime applicable to ICE, which enables it to operate more effectively and efficiently in order to face competition, but in doing so also harms and jeopardizes the very existence of ICE and its companies by including them within a general procurement regime that does not take into account their particular administrative, budgetary, and competitive needs. This is a serious omission for the Institution, because it is once again confined within a State regime applicable to institutions—whether Ministries, decentralized bodies, or other public entities—that do not compete in the domestic market with other operators for their services and revenues, as ICE does as an autonomous Institution (sic) in the telecommunications sector. Upon deeper analysis, the electricity sector is likewise competitive as of this date. Similarly, Article 2 of the Ley General de Contratación Pública states: “...
ARTICLE 2—Exclusions from the application of the law. The following activities are excluded from the scope of this law: a) The ordinary activities of the Administration. b) Public employment relationships. c) Public borrowing. The procurement procedures arising therefrom shall be governed by this law, unless the law approving the loan provides for another procurement regime. d) Procurement conducted outside the country for the construction, installation, or provision of offices and for the procurement of goods, works, and services that must be used and consumed entirely abroad. e) Agreements of a humanitarian nature entered into with other States or subjects of public international law, which are governed by public international law. f) Cooperation agreements between public-law entities, understood as agreements entered into within the scope of each party’s legal authority, under which the parties’ obligations are equivalent and a shared common purpose is pursued, without any payment being made. g) Procurement conducted by the Comisión Nacional de Emergencias by virtue of the extraordinary activity defined in Article 4 of Ley 8488, Ley Nacional de Emergencias y Prevención del Riesgo, dated 22 de noviembre de 2005.
All other procurement shall be governed by the provisions of this law. h) The acquisition of fuel...” As a consequence of the foregoing, this challenged article is also contrary to the provisions of Article 7 of the Political Constitution, disregarding the superior legal authority of a public international treaty such as the TLC with respect to matters excluded from the application of this law. Article 135(c) of the challenged Law gives effect to the matters stated above and specifically repeals the articles of Ley 8660 that establish the special administrative procurement regime for ICE and its companies: “ARTICLE 135—Repeals. The following provisions are repealed: c) Articles 12, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 of Ley 8660, Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones, dated 8 de agosto de 2008, are repealed...” Conflict between Ley 9986, “Ley General de Contratación Pública,” and the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement (TLC).
As stated in the preceding section, this law repeals the special administrative procurement regime that was necessary to fulfill the very spirit of the TLC and the actions taken by the previous Legislators (sic) to comply with the provisions of the aforementioned Addenda (sic) and to open the telecommunications market gradually, strengthening ICE and its companies through more agile and efficient administrative procurement and greater administrative autonomy. These elements are lost under the current provision, because the current legislators disregard the premises underlying the creation of that special regime for procuring goods and services for the telecommunications system and business operated by ICE as a State-owned enterprise, thereby contravening the obligations established in the Free Trade Agreement. The following demonstrates how Ley 9986 represents a regression in this area, rendering the legislators’ actions unconstitutional in approving that provision, dismantling ICE’s regulatory framework that provided the agility and administrative and financial efficiency required by the telecommunications sector, and replacing it with simplistic, lengthy administrative procurement procedures that once again add more steps to the procurement process.
ICE and its companies thereby lose the administrative autonomy they require to provide services in a competitive environment, through the repeal of the legal framework contemplated by the TLC—a modern and strengthened legal framework enabling them to enter into competition in a Telecommunications Sector that, by virtue of its service technology, is inherently subject to rapid change: Contents of the TLC. Chapter 9, Annex 13: Preamble. The Government of the Republic of Costa Rica: recognizing the unique nature of Costa Rican social policy regarding telecommunications and reaffirming its decision to ensure that the process of opening its telecommunications services sector is based on its Political Constitution; emphasizing that this opening process shall benefit users and shall be founded on the principles of gradualism, selectivity, and regulation, in strict conformity with the social objectives of universality and solidarity in the provision of telecommunications services; and recognizing its commitment to strengthen and modernize the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) as a participant in a competitive telecommunications market, ensuring that the use of its infrastructure is compensated, and further developing a regulatory entity to oversee the development of the market; hereby assumes, through this Annex, the following specific commitments regarding telecommunications services.
II. Modernization of ICE. Costa Rica shall enact a new legal framework to strengthen ICE through its appropriate modernization no later than 31 de diciembre del 2004...” There can be no doubt that, merely by repealing this special administrative procurement regime at ICE, the Ley General de Contratación Pública conflicts not only with the legislative obligations of the Costa Rican State, but also with their purpose, which is to ensure the proper implementation of the TLC by strengthening and modernizing ICE and its companies. Without prejudice to the foregoing, the following are examples of how this general law imposes constraints and limits the actions of ICE and its companies, clearly conflicting with the objective of the TLC: Thresholds and time limits: As stated in this Action (sic) l (sic), the bill for the enactment of Ley 8660 and the constitutional review (consulta de constitucionalidad) indicated that one of the most significant problems faced by ICE consisted precisely of thresholds that did not take its specific needs into account and were not suited to its budgetary circumstances.
Ley 8860 established: “ARTICLE 22.—Ordinary competitive procedures. ICE shall use the ordinary public bidding (licitación pública) and abbreviated bidding (licitación abreviada) procedures in accordance with the provisions of this chapter; it may also apply the special direct procurement (contratación directa) regime. The Regulations to this Law may establish special rules concerning the structure and requirements of the aforementioned ordinary competitive procedures, provided that the constitutional principles governing administrative procurement are respected. ICE, considered individually, shall use the public-bidding procedure for procurements whose value is equal to or greater than the amount obtained by multiplying the entity’s budget for the procurement of goods and non-personal services by the factor resulting from dividing the amount specified for public bidding in Article 27(a) of the Ley general de contratación administrativa (sic) by the reference budget applicable to ICE, considered individually, as provided in that same article.
If application of this paragraph results in limits lower than those established in Article 27 of Ley N.º 7494, Contratación administrativa, the limits specified in that Law shall apply. The abbreviated-bidding procedure shall apply to contracts whose value falls between the direct-procurement amount specified in Article 27(a) of Ley N.º 7494, Contratación administrativa, and the public-bidding amount resulting from application of the formula set forth in the preceding paragraph. The reference budget shall be the budget applicable to ICE, considered individually, pursuant to Article 27 of Ley N.º 7494, Contratación administrativa, with its current adjustments...” Under the application of the preceding article, the procurement thresholds for 2022 were as follows. II.—Procurement limits applicable to ICE and JASEC.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCUREMENT LIMITS FOR 2022 Calculation pursuant to Article 22 of Ley Nº 8660 Institutions Public Tender Abbreviated Tender Direct Procurement Reference tier1 Equal to or greater than Less than Equal to or greater than Less than Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) 6 041 595 408,00 6 041 595 408,00 101 100 000,00 101 100 000,00 A Junta Administrativa del Servicio Eléctrico de Cartago (JASEC) 697 414 414,00 697 414 414,00 28 260 000, 00 28 260 000,00 C 1Determined according to the average budgeted amount, in millions of colones, for the 2020-2022 period, for the acquisition of non-personal goods and services indicated as a reference in section X of this resolution. Source: R-DC-00020-2022. CONTRALORÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA. Office of the Comptroller General. San José, at nine o’clock on the sixteenth of February, two thousand twenty-two. For its part, the Ley General de Contratación Pública provides: “ARTICLE 36—Thresholds for determining the procurement procedure.
The procurement procedure shall be determined in accordance with the following thresholds: i) Procurement conducted by national nonfinancial public enterprises, municipal nonfinancial public enterprises, public banking financial institutions, and public nonbanking financial institutions listed in the Institutional Classifier of the Public Sector issued by the Ministerio de Hacienda shall use the major tender procedure (licitación mayor) for procurements of goods and services whose estimated value exceeds two hundred eighty-five million eight hundred sixty-eight thousand seven hundred fifty-two colones (¢ 285 868 752), the minor tender procedure (licitación menor) for procurements of goods and services whose estimated value is equal to or less than two hundred eighty-five million eight hundred sixty-eight thousand seven hundred fifty-two colones (¢ 285 868 752) but greater than seventy-one million four hundred sixty-seven thousand one hundred eighty-eight colones (CRC 71 467 188), and the reduced tender procedure (licitación reducida) in those cases whose estimated value is equal to or less than seventy-one million four hundred sixty-seven thousand one hundred eighty-eight colones ( 71 467 188)…”. Following the recent update issued by the Contraloría General de la República, the amounts in effect for 2023 are:
Thresholds for 2023 (amounts in colones) Regime Type of procurement Major Tender Minor Tender Reduced Tender Equal to or greater than Less than Equal to or greater than Less than Ordinary Goods and Services 264.519.083 264.519.083 66.129.771 66.129.771 Works 712.166.540 712.166.540 178.041.690 178.041.690 Differentiated Goods and Services 317.422.900 317.422.900 79.355.725 79.355.725 Works 1.139.466.819 1.139.466.819 284.866.705 284.866.705 Source: R-DC-00132-2022. CONTRALORÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA. Office of the Comptroller General. San José, at thirteen hours and forty-three minutes on the twelfth of December, two thousand twenty-two. Under the special regime established by Ley 8660, ICE was required to use the tender procedure with the most stringent stages and time limits—the public tender procedure (licitación pública)—for acquisitions of goods and services estimated at amounts equal to or greater than CRC 6 041 595 408,00, an amount that specifically takes into account the budgetary conditions applicable to the Institution.
By contrast, following the repeal of this special regime, ICE is required to use the procedure with the most stringent time limits and stages—the major tender procedure—for acquisitions estimated at an amount equal to or greater than CRC 317 422 900,00. This is wholly disproportionate and burdensome for the Institution because it slows down administrative and financial management by lengthening the time required to acquire goods and services and undermines the agility needed to respond adequately to the competitive market in which it operates in conducting its telecommunications and electricity businesses. Likewise, under its special regime ICE was required to use the abbreviated tender procedure (licitación abreviada)—an ordinary procedure that is shorter and more streamlined than the public tender procedure—for acquisitions between CRC 101 100 000,00 and CRC 6 041 595 408,00, whereas under the current threshold it must use the minor tender procedure for acquisitions between 79 355 725,00 CRC and 317 422 900,00 CRC, once again potentially affecting the results of the Institution’s Supply Chain and weakening its position vis-à-vis its competitors.
To demonstrate the foregoing, a comparative table of time limits is attached, covering the period from publication of the tender specifications (pliego de condiciones) through any final award, according to the types of ordinary procedures under Ley 9986 and Ley 8660:
Ley General Contratación Pública Major Tender* Minimum time limit Minor Tender *Maximum Reduced Tender *Maximum time limit Receipt of bids 15 15 5 Award 30 30 10 Objection proceeding (recurso de objeción) 24 8 5 Revocation/appeal proceeding (recurso de revocatoria/apelación) 62 28 12 Total 131 81 32 Ley de Fortalceimiento (sic) y Modernización Public Tender *Minimum Time Limit Abbreviated Tender *Maximum time limit Low-value Direct Procurement (Contratación Directa de escasa cuantía) *Maximum time limit Receipt of bids 10 20 5 Award 20 40 10 Objection proceeding 12 15 0 Revocation/appeal proceeding 45 27 0 Total 87 102 15 Source: Prepared in-house by SIICE—March 2023. *The time limit for proceedings includes the periods for filing, admissibility, resolution, and finality of the administrative act (acto administrativo). As can be seen, for example, a procurement that was previously conducted under Ley 8660 through a Low-value Direct Procurement procedure took only 15 days from publication to final award, whereas for the same amount, ICE’s Administration, pursuant to Ley 9986, will take 32 business days for the range up to CRC 79 355 725,00 and 81 business days for the range from CRC 79 355 725,00 to CRC 101 100 000.00, taking into account the objection and revocation proceedings.
This period may be extended further by extensions of the deadline for making the award or by a possible new award requiring a second round of challenges; this situation will make the administrative procurement process (proceso de contratación administrativa) lengthy and cumbersome for ICE, in a context in which competing Operators can make acquisitions using private-enterprise methods, placing the state-owned Institution at a clear disadvantage. In the case of the minor tender procedure, the threshold range corresponding to the abbreviated tender procedure shows a reduction in time (the range from CRC 101 100 000.00 to CRC 317 422 900,00); however, the major tender procedure must be used for higher amounts, extending the process by 29 business days, with the possibility of further extensions due to extensions of the deadline for making the award or a possible new award requiring a second round of challenges.
In addition to the foregoing, the differentiated regime under the Ley General de Contratación Pública seeks to place ICE on an equal footing with enterprises such as CNP, RECOPE, Banco de Costa Rica, INS, among others, even though its procurement budget is substantially higher, thereby conflicting with the purpose of Ley 8660, which, as previously stated, is to establish thresholds consistent with the Institution’s budgetary circumstances. To demonstrate the foregoing, the following information was published in SICOP based on the 2023 Annual Procurement Plan of each of the entities mentioned, showing that ICE’s circumstances are very different from those of the enterprises falling within that category:
Institution Estimated budget in colones ICE 147 189 177 163,83 INS 54 035 081 067,81 CPN 61 663 059,40 RECOPE 15 493 823 808,00 Banco de Costa Rica 18 680 634 070,36 Source: Prepared in-house using SICOP Annual Procurement Plans System of review remedies (régimen recursivo): Article 26 of Ley 8660 established the following regarding the system of review remedies: “… ARTICLE 26.- Review remedies. A challenge to the bidding terms (recurso de objeción contra el cartel) of a public or abbreviated tender shall be filed within the first quarter of the period for submitting bids, before the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic in cases involving public tenders and, in all other cases, before the contracting authority. This challenge shall be decided within ten business days following its filing. Once the stated period has elapsed, the challenge shall be deemed granted. In the case of ICE, an appeal (recurso de apelación) shall be available only for public tenders.
In all other cases, a motion for reconsideration (recurso de revocatoria) shall apply. … No motion for reconsideration shall be available against low-value direct procurements (contrataciones directas de escasa cuantía)…” The foregoing allowed the ICE Administration, in furtherance of its administrative and financial autonomy and procedural flexibility, to hear review remedies concerning procurements between CRC 101 100 000,00 and CRC 6 041 595 408,00. Ley General de Contratación Pública provides: “ARTICLE 95- Challenge to the bidding terms. Filing of the challenge and body with jurisdiction to hear it: The tender specifications (pliego de condiciones de licitación) may be challenged by any potential bidder or by any legally constituted organization responsible for safeguarding the interests of the community where the procurement will be carried out or upon which it will have effects. a) In the case of a major tender (licitación mayor), the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic shall have jurisdiction to hear the challenge, which shall be filed through the unified digital system within eight business days following publication of the tender specifications.
ARTICLE 97- Appeal. Processing of the appeal. An appeal shall be available against the award decision (acto de adjudicación) or a decision declaring a major tender deserted or unsuccessful. Within eight business days following notice of the final decision, any person who participated in the competitive procedure may file an appeal through the unified digital system. The Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic shall process the appeal in accordance with the following stages:…” In other words, Ley General de Contratación Pública grants the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic jurisdiction to hear challenges and appeals in major-tender procedures, which, as indicated, are currently defined under the differentiated regime (régimen diferenciado) as procurements equal to or greater than CRC 317 422 900,00. The foregoing weakens ICE’s administrative, financial, and procedural autonomy—an objective of the TLC and Ley 8660—because it is now the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic that decides the review remedies which, based on their value, the Institute previously decided itself under the former thresholds, up to CRC 6 041 595 408,00.
This also affects the efficiency of ICE’s administrative procurement (Contratación Administrativa) procedures, because the oversight body must hear all review remedies filed by the Public Administration arising from major-tender procedures, which, as stated, do not take into account the type, nature, and budget of the institutions—apart from the distinction established between the differentiated and ordinary regimes, which places ICE companies on an equal footing with companies such as Consejo Nacional de la Producción, INCOFER, RECOPE, INS, and CONAPE, to cite a few examples—thereby placing a company such as ICE at a clear disadvantage. As has been extensively explained, ICE must meet demand for telecommunications services within the highly competitive environment currently known to exist in the domestic market. Elimination of the special “Low-Value Direct Procurement” regime. Ley General de Contratación Pública establishes simplified tendering (licitación reducida), minor tendering (licitación menor), and major tendering as ordinary procedures; it also eliminates low-value direct procurement from the exceptions.
Ley 8660 provided: “… ARTICLE 22.- Ordinary competitive procedures. ICE shall use the ordinary public-tender and abbreviated-tender procedures in accordance with the provisions of this chapter; it may also apply the special direct-procurement regime. The Regulations to this Law may establish special rules concerning the structure and requirements of the aforementioned ordinary competitive procedures, provided that the constitutional principles governing administrative procurement are observed…” By virtue of the foregoing, ICE could process procedures with an estimated value below CRC 100 100 000,00 through low-value direct procurement, an expedited procedure that was administratively and financially streamlined, regulated by law and regulation, and reduced procedural requirements in the strict sense by allowing neither challenges nor motions for reconsideration against the final award decision, thereby enabling goods and services to be procured within 15 days after publication of the competitive procedure.
Eliminating these review stages was specifically intended to expedite the Institution’s procurement of lower-value goods and services and respond rapidly to market demands. With the elimination of this type of procedure, these procurements must be processed under the simplified-tendering procedure—up to CRC 79 355 725,00—which gives participants the right to challenge the bidding terms and seek reconsideration of the final decision, potentially resulting in the competitive procedure being Re-awarded (sic). From the standpoint of ICE’s budget implementation, these procedural stages for a lower-value procurement, far from simplifying matters, extend the time required for the competitive stage and execution of a contract, affecting the availability of the goods and services required by an efficient and effective supply chain of a state-owned telecommunications company competing with private operators under unequal conditions.
To demonstrate the adverse impact on the speed of the Institute’s procurements, certified information from RACSA, as coordinator of the Sistema Integrado de Compras Públicas (SICOP), is attached, showing that in 2022 ICE published 919 Low-Value Direct Procurement procedures; under Ley 9986, these procurements would take at least twice as long to become final. This time variable will inevitably be reflected in the services and new telecommunications businesses provided by ICE and, therefore, in its revenues. Unilateral contract modification (modificación unilateral de contrato): Article 178 of Reglamento a la Ley 8660 empowered ICE to modify contracts under performance in order to procure the same goods, or even goods of a similar nature, for up to 100% of the awarded amount. Article 101 of Ley General de Contratación Pública provides that this authority is limited to a maximum of 20% and, exceptionally, up to 50%; if a larger quantity is required, the Administration must initiate a new competitive procedure.
The foregoing also undermines the speed of procurement achieved through the implementation of Ley 8660 and its regulations as part of the implementation of the TLC. Special procedure for companies operating in competitive markets: Ley General de Contratación Pública establishes a special procedure for companies operating in competitive markets, expressly identifying ICE, for the purpose of providing a less rigorous method than the ordinary procedures when the subject matter of the contract is the procurement of goods, works, and services intended to generate, install, and operate networks; provide, acquire, and market telecommunications and infocommunications products and services; and provide other information products and services and other convergent products and services. Nevertheless, although this procedure is more flexible than the ordinary regime, it is neither more streamlined nor more advantageous than the special regime established in Ley 8660, because its use is limited exclusively to such goods and services; moreover, it establishes a series of requirements for its use and therefore provides no guarantee of administrative and financial flexibility or efficiency consistent with the legislation enacted for that purpose, namely Ley 8660, which represented a commitment and safeguard enabling the state-owned company to enter into competition under the TLC.
“… ARTICLE 168 Reglamento a la Ley 9986: For the application of the preceding paragraph, the following shall be understood as: a) Great complexity or specialized nature: subject matters which, because of their particular characteristics and infrequent demand, are exceptional from a technical standpoint. The great complexity or specialized nature shall be substantiated by means of a reasoned administrative act (acto administrativo motivado) issued by the competent technical unit. b) Limited number of suppliers: a procurement for which the market does not offer more than five potential bidders capable of supplying the required subject matter, which shall be substantiated in the unified digital system by the competent technical unit. c) Economy and efficiency: where, in accordance with the value-for-money principle (principio de valor por el dinero), the economic advantages are reliably substantiated and it is demonstrated that the proposed objectives will be achieved using the fewest resources…”.
Administrative and financial autonomy. During the legislative consideration of the bill that became Ley 8660, the Special Committee for the expediente, through its affirmative majority report, stated in section 3.3.4. Disapplication of laws (folio 5234 of expediente 16.397): “To strengthen their autonomy and enable them to fulfill their special purposes, ICE and its companies are exempted from the application of certain statutory provisions that have represented a serious obstacle to the imperative of fulfilling their historic mission in the present era. The members of the Legislative Assembly voting in favor of the bill consider that, for ICE and its companies to remain an engine and source of national progress and thereby continue installing infrastructure that enables the country to pursue a successful strategy for attracting foreign direct investment through the availability of optimal, timely, high-quality, and low-cost services, the bill addressed in this report provides that the following laws shall not apply to ICE and its companies: B) Ley de Administración Financiera de la república y de Presupuestos Públicos No. 8131 de 18 de setiembre de 2001 and its amendments, except for Articles 57 and 94…” Accordingly, Ley 8660 provides in Article 17: “…
Disapplication of laws in force. b) Ley N. 8131, Administración financiera de la República y presupuestos públicos, de 18 de setiembre de 2001, and its amendments, except for Articles 57 and 94…” Contrary to what lawmakers assessed and approved as an optimal means of freeing ICE and its companies from statutory constraints, Articles 133 and 134(j) and (k) of Ley General de Contratación Pública reinstate the duty of ICE and its companies to apply Ley 8131 Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos in matters arising from public procurement, once again limiting the administrative and financial autonomy necessary to achieve their objectives and properly implement the TLC.
In addition to the foregoing, it bears mentioning that the stated constitutional objections were timely raised during the legislative proceedings for Ley 9986 through official letter GG-1015-2020 of 9 de julio del 2020 (folios 5784 al 5798 del expediente de la ley 9986) and DJR-141-2021 of 23 de marzo de 2021 (folios 7677 al 7693 del expediente de la ley 9986), issued by Radiográfica Costarricense (RACSA S.A.), and official letters 256-115-2020 of 21 de julio de 2020 (folios 5812 al 5836 del expediente de la ley 9986) and 256-41-2021 of 5 de abril de 2021 (folios 7695 al 7720 del expediente de la ley 9986), issued by ICE as part of the institutional consultation conducted by the Asamblea Legislativa regarding bill 21.546; however, these objections were not submitted to that Honorable Chamber for constitutional review. Other articles challenged as unconstitutional: On the same grounds, the following articles of the Ley General de Contratación Pública governing administrative procurement (contratación administrativa) by ICE and its companies are challenged:
Article 68 Special Procedure for INS, ICE and Its Companies Operating in Competition, JASEC and ESPH Article 69 Open Contracting of Services for Institutions and Companies Operating in Competition Article 70 Technology Procurement for Institutions and Companies Operating in Competition Article 134, subsection d) Amends Article 11 of Law 8660, Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector (…)”. It states the following request for relief: “In light of the foregoing, pursuant to Articles 73, subsection d), and 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law and Article 7 of the Political Constitution, the following is requested: • That this constitutional challenge (Acción de Inconstitucionalidad) be admitted. • That Articles 1, 2, 68, 69, 70, 134, subsection d), and 135, subsection c), of the General Public Procurement Law be declared unconstitutional with respect to ICE and its companies, because they are contrary to Article 7 of the Political Constitution”.
Implementation agenda (Agenda de Implementación): The implementation agenda for an FTA (TLC) is nothing more than a domestic process that the country must undertake in order to comply with the commitments assumed under that instrument. In the particular case of this trade agreement, this process entails taking action in both the legislative and institutional fields. In the legislative field, this agenda consists of the (sic) following bills: (…) Law on the Modernization and Strengthening of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector. The Complementary Agenda, for its part, consists of projects aimed specifically at benefiting various sectors of the country in order to improve their competitiveness and integration into the global market. This segment includes projects aimed at strengthening financing mechanisms for productive sectors, processes to improve the Costa Rican education system, trade management, support for small and medium-sized enterprises, technological development, rural roads, promotion of agricultural production, implementation of programs to improve productive investment in less-developed areas, and modernization of the State treasury.
(…)” (Emphasis not in the original). 8.- CONTENTS OF THE FTA: RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATION. (…) “8.10 Telecommunications • It was agreed to open certain services to competition, particularly private network, Internet, and cellular telephone services. • It was agreed that the process of opening these services would be gradual and regulated and that the principles of universality and solidarity in the provision of services in Costa Rica must be respected. The Costa Rican government’s commitment to strengthen and modernize ICE during this process is also recognized. • The process of opening these services will be carried out in stages according to the following schedule: ⸰It was agreed that Costa Rica would enact a law to modernize and strengthen ICE and would put modern legislation into effect to regulate the sector, including the establishment of a regulatory authority. ⸰ It was agreed that private data network services and Internet services would be opened to competition. o It was agreed that cellular services would be opened to competition.
(Emphasis not in the original). 9.- RESPONSES TO THE MAIN CONCERNS REGARDING THE FTA. “9.18 Telecommunications (…) With respect to the FTA, Chapter 13 of that Treaty contains the telecommunications commitments undertaken by the United States and the other Central American countries, with the exception of Costa Rica. In the case of our country, only the specific commitments undertaken in this area and contained in Annex 13 of the Treaty apply. Regarding those specific commitments, there have been various reactions from the groups that have addressed the issue before this Commission, and one of the principal arguments advanced by those opposing the FTA concerns the claim that the commitments undertaken by Costa Rica in telecommunications entail the privatization of ICE and, more generally, the privatization of the sector. The ICE labor unions and others, such as Grupo Pensamiento Solidario, have taken this position.
In this regard, after analyzing the provisions of Annex 13 of the FTA, we have concluded that no provision of the FTA, particularly Annex 13, entails such a commitment. In the case of Costa Rica, a country with a state monopoly, the commitment undertaken relates solely to opening three sectors to competition: Internet, cellular services, and private networks. Under the FTA, Costa Rica undertakes a commitment not to privatize, but to open three sectors—Internet, cellular services, and private networks—to competition, so that, as with banks, the State (ICE and RACSA) and private companies may provide these services. All of this will be subject to oversight by a State regulatory body, again as with banks, which will regulate, among other matters, rates and service quality and preserve the principles of solidarity and universality. The FTA would not place ICE at a disadvantage relative to private competitors.
Annex 13 of the FTA imposes on Costa Rica the obligation to enact a legal framework to strengthen ICE. This obligation was established in the best interests of ICE and Costa Ricans, given the undeniable need to enact a modernization law as soon as possible so that the institution may adequately prepare to face competition and have the instruments necessary to act with the agility required to provide the highest-quality service. Regarding this matter, there is no doubt that the FTA will also benefit ICE in three ways:
Although there may be different solutions regarding the manner in which public international law (Derecho internacional público) relates to the domestic legal system (ordenamiento jurídico nacional), the manner in which it is incorporated reveals much, and even more so does the place assigned to it within the hierarchy of legal norms (jerarquía normativa) of the legal order by both the original and the amending constituent authority, with the intention of granting it a particular legal force and resilience—emphasis added in some cases—for the coexistence of international law with domestic law, which may be: suprastatutory (supralegal), where the legal practitioner encounters a rule with cascading force and authority that displaces the lower-ranking rule; or of equal rank, where the judicial authority interprets international legislation as having force and authority equivalent to that of statutes, applying the criteria governing validity in time and space, and where, in order to avoid unnecessary conflicts between rules, international law must be interpreted together with customary international law (Derecho internacional consuetudinario).
In such cases, the domestic rule is set aside or interpreted in accordance with the international obligation, except in those jurisdictions where the legislature claims the preeminent role of expressly rendering it ineffective, at the risk of violating the international legal order. In our case, which is monist in origin, international law is incorporated once the legislative procedures for enacting a statute that receives it into domestic law have been completed: legislative approval is followed by enactment and publication, and finally by the exchange of diplomatic notes or the deposit of instruments required to perfect the international obligation—the act of ratification (acto de ratificación). The manner in which domestic law is affected will logically depend on the nature of the commitments or international obligations agreed upon by States or legal persons with the capacity to act at the international level” (emphasis in the original).
In the same judgment, in the context of that amendment to Article 7 of the Political Constitution, and quoting the legislator who commented on the relationship between International and Domestic Law, the Chamber stated: “This article enshrined the conservative view of the majority of the 1949 constituent assembly members, who felt profound hostility toward every form of rapprochement with the Central American countries. That nationalist zeal went too far when the first paragraph stated that anyone who entered into ‘pacts, treaties, or agreements contrary to the sovereignty and independence of the Republic’ would be considered a traitor to the Nation. Every treaty, pact, or agreement constitutes a limitation on the sovereignty or independence of any country. […] If treaties and concordats are not accorded authority superior to ordinary legislation, we will constantly face conflicts—legal antinomies, as clashes between rules are called—rules that provide for contradictory outcomes and would constantly force us to raise the unconstitutionality or inapplicability of one of those rules before our courts.
This would undermine the Central American common market and place us in a difficult position.” The legislative history of the amendment provides insight into how our country changed its legal and political position, adopted the best legal technique for integrating public international law into the domestic legal system, overcame the isolationist distrust associated with Central American integration movements, and moved toward amending Article 7 of the Constitution by establishing the principle of supremacy of public international law, as recognized in the current Article 7, such that, by decision of the amending constituent authority itself, international treaties have authority superior to statutes, including those referred to as Protocols in the terminology used by our constituent authority…”. Under Article 7 of the Political Constitution, the Treaties and Agreements that our country has negotiated, approved, and ratified constitute binding international obligations that, while in force, must be observed and fulfilled by the legislature when debating and enacting ordinary legislation.
Accordingly, these are negotiations conducted by the Executive Branch at the international level in the exercise of its exclusive and autonomous function of directing the State’s international relations, because they require legislative approval. Once such approval has been granted and the instruments of ratification deposited, compliance with the Treaties or Agreements rests upon the fundamental pillar of pacta sunt servanda—the obligation to honor agreements—as well as the obligation to apply them in good faith, which ultimately preserves the coherence of the entire system of public international law. To that extent, this also means that the State may not act contrary to the international obligations agreed upon in treaties or agreements, and this, of course, includes enacting legislation that may conflict with those obligations.” (Emphasis not in the original) In other words, during the ordinary legislative process (proceso ordinario de formación de leyes), the Legislative Assembly is prohibited from legislating contrary to a public treaty or international agreement.
III.ON THE ENACTMENT OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW, N°9986, CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF CAFTA-DR AND LEY 8660, AS A CONDITION FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THAT TREATY AGREED UPON BY THE GOVERNMENT OF COSTA RICA.
Given the existence and legal nature of CAFTA-DR, as well as the origins and justification of the Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector, N°8660, as one of the requirements that enabled that Treaty to take effect, it is indisputable that, by enacting the General Public Procurement Law, N°9986, the Legislative Assembly disregarded the protection afforded by Public International Law and, with it, the inviolable constitutional mandate which, as developed by the Constitutional Chamber in the aforementioned decision, includes that the country may not “act contrary to the international obligations agreed upon in treaties or agreements, and this, of course, includes enacting legislation that may conflict with those obligations.” The Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector, N°8660, based on the particular characteristics of the competitive telecommunications market enabled by CAFTA-DR, provided ICE with a regulatory framework for public procurement (contratación administrativa) that reflected the principles of reasonableness, efficiency, responsibility, and accountability (oversight), since the country understood that the overriding objective was to allow ICE to participate in a competitive market on equal terms with private operators, to guarantee that the country’s residents would enjoy high-quality, timely telecommunications services, and to ensure the proper use of public resources.
That public-procurement regulatory framework was implemented in compliance with the principles specific to that field and, in turn, with the applicable constitutional guarantees, with the aim of ensuring that ICE had the tools necessary to properly manage and control its supply chain, ultimately resulting in competitive and timely service for customers in a competitive market.
Meanwhile, the General Public Procurement Law, N°9986, which was introduced as an initiative purportedly intended to organize public procurement based on the unifying principle governing the use of public funds, contrary to the provisions of CAFTA-DR and its implementation agenda, abolished the special public-procurement regime established by Ley N°8660, arbitrarily disregarding the particular characteristics of the market, the size of its budgets, and the nature of the business in which ICE participates. Through the overwhelmingly negative effect caused to ICE’s supply chain, it deprived ICE of the ability to enter the market as a competitive operator, condemning ICE to an inability to meet the demands of the market and all that this entails in relation to private companies.
In a competitive market such as the telecommunications market, the agile management of processes associated with internal procurement or with provisioning for customers or end users of services is critical to the business. For greater clarity, the opening of the telecommunications market created a dynamic and competitive market in which delays in investment, network deployment, and the timely provision of services unquestionably lead to loss of customers; immediate harm to the operator’s reputation vis-à-vis its competitors, to brand value, and, of course, to market share, which is a long-term and irreparable effect, with the resulting financial impact.
The following details of the constitutional defects (roces de inconstitucionalidad) present in the General Public Procurement Law, N°9986, are submitted to the Constitutional Chamber in its capacity as guarantor of the Political Constitution and of the international law in force in the country, pursuant to the Constitution.
a. Article 1 establishes the following scope of application: “This law applies to all contractual activity that uses public funds in whole or in part. (…)” This entirely disregards the special rules governing ICE in an openly competitive market.
b. Article 2, which regulates exclusions from the application of the Law, does not include procurement undertaken by ICE in accordance with Ley 8660.
c. Article 68 established a special procedure for INS, ICE and its companies operating in competitive markets, JASEC, and ESPH, which bears little resemblance to the streamlined frameworks of Ley N°8660 and in no way places public entities operating in competitive markets on an equal footing with private companies, thereby placing ICE at a real disadvantage with direct effects on market share and, consequently, on the financial sustainability of the business.
d. Article 69 established what was termed open procurement of services (contratación abierta de servicios) for institutions and companies operating in competitive markets, but it does not come close to resolving the serious problem they face.
e. Article 70 established technology procurement (contratación de tecnología) for institutions and companies operating in competitive markets.
f. Article 133 established additions to the Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets Law, N°8131.
g. Article 134, subsections d, j, and k, amended the Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets Law, N°8131.
h. Article 135, subsection c), provided for repeals, stating: “The following provisions are repealed: (…) c) Articles 12, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 of Ley 8660, Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector, of 8 August 2008, are repealed. (…)”
In addition to the constitutional defects developed by the petitioner and with which ICE agrees, and in response to the request set forth at the beginning of this filing that the institution be recognized as an INTERVENOR IN SUPPORT (COADYUVANTE) in this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad), the grounds of unconstitutionality are expanded below pursuant to Article 83 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, based on the following:
The Constitutional Chamber, in its consistent case law (jurisprudencia), has clarified that equal treatment is not required in every case irrespective of possible differentiating factors of legal relevance. One such instance was Voto 11957-2021, in which the Constitutional Chamber stated as follows: “(…) This Chamber recalls that the content of the principle of equality established in Article 33 of the Political Constitution means that distinctions between two or more persons who are in the same legal situation or under identical conditions are prohibited, while equal treatment cannot be demanded when the conditions or circumstances are unequal; thus, in principle, equal treatment is accorded to equal situations, and different treatment is permitted for different situations and categories of persons. It has also been stated that the requirement of equality does not invalidate differential treatment; however, to determine whether a distinction is truly justified, it is necessary to analyze whether the reason giving rise to it is reasonable—that is, whether, in light of the particular circumstances of the case, different treatment is justified (see, to this effect, Judgment No. 5061-94 at 17 hours 34 minutes on 6 de septiembre de 1994).
It follows that equal treatment is not required in every case irrespective of possible differentiating factors of legal relevance that may exist (…).” (Emphasis not in the original) Furthermore, in decision 03288-2021, it stated: “(…) A provision established in Article 33 of our Political Constitution, which entails equal treatment among equals and differential treatment among those who are unequal. The Chamber has consistently stated that this is summarized in the right to be treated in the same manner as others in each and every legal relationship that is established. Likewise, equality has been defined as, at the same time, a constitutional obligation consisting of treating in the same manner those who are in equal factual circumstances, thereby constituting a limit on the exercise of public authority. However, it has also been established that the principle of equality is not absolute, since it does not, strictly speaking, grant a right to be placed on an equal footing with any individual regardless of the circumstances, but rather the right to demand that the law make no distinctions between two or more persons who are in the same legal situation or under identical conditions.
In that regard, equal treatment cannot be demanded when the conditions or circumstances are unequal (…) In accordance with these considerations, for the constitutional jurisdiction to determine whether or not the right to equality has been violated, a comparator must be established to ascertain whether or not discriminatory treatment has occurred (see Judgment N°2010-1025). (…)” VCG04/2021 The General Public Procurement Law, N°9986, disregarded the technical, legal, and financial differences existing within the Public Administration, transforming a purported procedural motion into arbitrary and, in turn, clearly discriminatory treatment to the detriment of the telecommunications services provided by ICE. The legislature afforded equal treatment to entities having different powers and conditions of participation in the country’s development. The challenged articles show that the legislature applied the same treatment to everyone who contracts using public funds, without assessing the circumstances that an entity operating in competition may face, thereby violating the premises of the aforementioned Free Trade Agreement.
It is enough to analyze the legislative rationale to identify that all those subject to the proposed legislation were being accused of attempting to circumvent the Administrative Procurement Law and of having fostered an environment of legal uncertainty. Nothing could be more conceptually mistaken than determining that an enterprise such as ICE, which conducts a highly distinctive line of business under which it competes in an open market for services and revenue, should subject its procurement processes to the same rules as a ministry, municipality, or other State institutions, which, in addition to operating in entirely different areas of public service, were not subject to the commitments undertaken by the country through the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), as ICE was. Treating them as equivalent solely on the basis of the “use of public funds” violates the principle of equality by failing to consider the differentiating factors of legal relevance present in the administrative procurement (contratación administrativa) carried out by ICE.
In this section, it is appropriate to emphasize that the provisions contained in Articles 133 and 134, subsections d, j, and k, of the General Public Procurement Law, N°9986, are amendments to the Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets Law, N°8131, from the application of which ICE was expressly exempted through the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Telecommunications-Sector Entities Law, N°8660, which, as noted, is the legislative reform enacted in response to the guarantee declared by the Costa Rican State so that ICE could face competition under more equal conditions within the context of CAFTA-DR. The same action of stripping away the legislative intent that promoted the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Telecommunications-Sector Entities Law, N°8660, as a requirement for the effectiveness of CAFTA-DR, and of failing to recognize differentiating factors of legal relevance, was embodied in Article 135, subsection c), of the General Public Procurement Law, N°9986, which repealed the administrative procurement framework that had been lawfully authorized by the Legislative Assembly for ICE in compliance with the governing principles in this area (Articles 12, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 of Law N°8660).
The differentiating factors of the administrative procurement framework granted to ICE were analyzed by the Constitutional Chamber when it considered the optional legislative consultation on constitutionality concerning the draft Strengthening and Modernization of Public Telecommunications-Sector Entities Law, N°16.397 (expediente 08-007913-0007-CO, decision 2008-011210). Its conformity with the Political Constitution was stated in the following terms: “XVIII.—ON THE AMOUNT ESTABLISHED FOR USING THE PUBLIC-TENDER PROCEDURE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCUREMENT. The consulting legislators consider the amounts established for resorting to a public tender in the third paragraph of Article 19, namely Article 22 of the final text, to be extremely high and disproportionate. They assert that the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad would use public tendering only when the procurement amount exceeds 2.500.000.000.00, which they consider entirely irrational.
They object that this undermines the oversight powers of the Contraloría General de la República. They also consider it unconstitutional because it contravenes the public-tender procedure established in Article 182 of the Constitution, since practically no ICE tendering process would be conducted through that procedure. (…) Article 182 of the Political Constitution recognizes that contracts for the performance of public works, as well as purchases made by autonomous institutions, shall be carried out through the public-tender procedure, in accordance with the law regarding the applicable amount. Accordingly, it is for the legislature to define, in each case, the administrative procurement procedures, including special systems and differentiated thresholds based on the characteristics of the activity and institution concerned, with the amount being precisely the distinguishing parameter used in designing the various types of administrative procurement procedures.
This Constitutional Court so held in Judgment No. 2007-001557 at 15:36 hrs. on 7 de febrero de 2007, which stated as follows: “(...) However, for the Chamber, this line of reasoning contradicts Article 182 of the Constitution, which, as has been stated, serves as the basis for developing the principles of the administrative procurement system, since that provision adopts tendering as the ordinary means of procurement ‘in accordance with the law regarding the applicable amount,’ whereby the Constituent Assembly selected the amount as the distinguishing parameter in designing the various types of administrative procurement processes, which may be governed by different regulations depending on their amounts, but must always respect the essential substance of constitutional law. Thus, with the exception of the amount, our constitutional text does not expressly recognize any other parameter for applying an attenuation of the constitutional principles governing administrative procurement.
(...)” An analysis of the draft law under consultation reveals the legislature’s clear intention to provide the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad with the conditions necessary for greater administrative, financial, and technological efficiency and effectiveness. This, of course, within the framework of a telecommunications-market liberalization process already decided by the people through approval in the referendum on the United States–Central America–Dominican Republic FTA (Referendum Law No. 8622 of 21 de noviembre de 2007), which seeks to strengthen public operators in anticipation of potential competition. Indeed, the following can be inferred from the considerations of those issuing the committee report on the draft law: “(...) The draft in question proposes a special administrative procurement regime for ICE’s acquisition of goods and services. Regarding this matter, the draft under consideration states among its objectives that ICE should be provided with an agile, efficient, and effective administrative procurement system as part of the efforts to strengthen and modernize that entity, as well as to establish a body of rules adapted to its particular characteristics.
Both the Constitutional Chamber and the Contraloría General have recognized the possibility of special regimes, provided that the nature and particular characteristics of the public activity concerned so require and insofar as the circumstances contemplated in the general regulations are not applicable to it. As intended in this committee report, that regime must therefore govern the particular conditions of the administrative procurement of ICE and its companies and must necessarily take into account the constitutional principles enshrined in Articles 182 and 184. In this matter, the legislature is entrusted with clearly specifying the particular rules and parameters that justify regulations departing from the general regulatory framework, developing their content in the law, and incorporating the constitutional principles governing the State’s administrative procurement activity, as proposed in this text.
(...)” Within the framework of those objectives, it was emphasized that one of the principal difficulties historically faced by the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and its companies in the area of administrative procurement is that the financial thresholds used to determine the applicable procurement procedures do not necessarily conform to their requirements. In view of the foregoing, it follows that the legislature’s intention in the legislation under consultation was to adapt the financial thresholds for administrative procurement to ICE’s circumstances and scale.
The analysis opinion stated as follows: “(...) Along the same lines, ICE and its companies currently use the procedures of public bidding (licitación pública), abbreviated bidding (licitación abreviada), and direct contracting (contratación directa), according to the financial thresholds established by Article 27 of the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), as amended. That methodology is not in itself objectionable; however, because the reference budget applicable to ICE represents just over 10% of the Institution’s budget, it became necessary to establish a methodology allowing the financial procurement thresholds to be adjusted to the circumstances and scale of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and its companies, without losing sight of the fact that the body with authority to set those thresholds is the Contraloría General de la República. (emphasis not in the original).
The text under review therefore does not seek to disregard administrative procurement (contratación administrativa) procedures, but rather to establish amounts more consistent with the particular budgetary characteristics of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, which is legitimate in light of Constitutional Law. The purpose is to establish a differentiated mechanism for public bidding and abbreviated bidding, precisely because of the nature of ICE and the demands for dynamism imposed by the opening of the market and the provision of services under competitive conditions. (…) It must be taken into consideration that the bill under review establishes a singular and specific procurement regime (régimen de contratación); it is not an amendment to the Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, because its purpose is to enable ICE to compete in an open telecommunications market in accordance with the popular mandate expressed in the referendum that approved the United States–Central America–Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (TLC EE.UU, Centroamérica y República Dominicana) (Referendum Law No. 8622 of 21 de noviembre de 2007).
(…) Accordingly, this Court does not find the proposed formula unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, because the legislature’s intent is to adapt the parameters of administrative procurement to the particular budgetary characteristics of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad. (…)” B) On the other hand, an additional ground for declaring Articles 128, 129, 130, 131, and 132 unconstitutional is asserted based on their clear violation of Article 188 of the Political Constitution. Article 188 of the Constitution provides as follows: “The autonomous institutions (instituciones autónomas) of the State enjoy administrative independence and are subject to the law in matters of governance. Their directors are accountable for their management.” The provisions of the General Public Procurement Law (Ley General de Contratación Pública), N°9986 (Articles 128, 129, 130, 131, 132), which subjected ICE, as an autonomous institution, to the conditions imposed by the Autoridad de Contratación Pública and the Dirección de Contratación Pública for acting in matters of public procurement (contratación pública) (procurement plan; standardization of goods; consolidated procurement; accreditation of procurement units; personnel training; formulas for maintaining the financial equilibrium of contracts; catalog of goods; price database; supplier registry; performance indicators, among others), deprive the administrative autonomy (autonomía administrativa) constitutionally mandated for autonomous institutions of its substance.
In other words, far from constituting guidance or governance of public policy (goals or objectives), these are orders pertaining to ICE’s administrative operations, specifically its management of internal procurement or procurement for the customer or end user of the services it provides, where, as indicated, timely market entry (“time to market”) is decisive for the business. In that regard, they directly conflict with Article 188 of the Political Constitution, because they do not regulate or guide action in a particular direction, but instead compel the autonomous entity to act or prevent it from acting. The Sala Constitucional has addressed the administrative independence of autonomous institutions in extensive case law. For example, in decision 330994, it stated as follows: “(…) III.- The administrative autonomy of the decentralized institutions established under Title XIV of the Constitution is a safeguard against actions by the Central Executive Branch, but not against the law in matters of governance.
Before the amendment to Article 188 of the Constitution, autonomous institutions could not be made subject to the State’s general policy with respect to matters placed within their jurisdiction, because the Constitution provided: “Article 188: The autonomous institutions of the State enjoy independence in matters of governance and administration, and their directors are accountable for their management.” Following the amendment introduced by Ley #4123 of 30 de mayo de 1968, the text reads as follows: “Article 188: The autonomous institutions of the State enjoy administrative independence and are subject to the law in matters of governance. Their directors are accountable for their management.” This means that autonomous institutions do not enjoy a guarantee of unrestricted constitutional autonomy, since the law, in addition to defining their jurisdiction, may subject them to directives arising from development policies that the law itself (sic) entrusts to the Central Executive Branch, provided, of course, that this does not encroach upon either the sphere of administrative autonomy itself or the jurisdiction of the Legislative Assembly or other constitutional bodies such as the Contraloría General de la República.
It should be noted that the background and effects of the amendment itself, by reserving to those entities matters relating to their own administration, excluded from their management the power of governance, which entails: a) setting objectives, goals, and types of means for achieving them; b) issuing autonomous regulations governing services or activities, in accordance with provisions commonly referred to as general policy. Thus, the amendment made it constitutionally possible to subject autonomous entities generally to national planning criteria and, in particular, to subject them to general directives issued by the Central Executive Branch or by bodies of the Central Administration (charged with supplementing or overseeing that general policy). As one of those policymaking bodies, the Autoridad Presupuestaria was established for the purpose of formulating and implementing general directives concerning salaries, among other matters, issued by the Executive Branch or bodies of the Central Administration.
IV.- By transferring administrative functions from the Central Executive Branch to the jurisdiction of autonomous institutions, the law reserved to them: A) the initiative in their management; that is, the Central Executive Branch may not directly order them to act. A directive may provide that, if the entity acts, it must do so in a particular direction, but it may not compel the entity to act or prevent it from acting. B) Autonomy to perform their duties and fulfill legal obligations, which must include compliance with directives lawfully adopted by the Executive Branch. In this regard, as stated, neither the Executive Branch nor any other administrative agency may be authorized to compel autonomous institutions to act subject to conditions such that, without its authorization, they cannot perform their functions. This is the concept embodied in the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) when it establishes the Executive Branch’s power of direction, allowing officials of the autonomous entity to be replaced or removed for failure to comply with directives when those directives (sic) have been repeatedly disobeyed and after 3 formal demands for compliance.
(Article 98.5) It follows that requiring prior authorization or approval before the exercise of its particular or specific administrative action is unconstitutional. C) The setting of objectives, goals, and types of means for achieving them also falls within the concept of autonomy. In this regard, direction by the Executive Branch must establish general conditions for action that extend beyond the individual sphere of action of each institution. (…) The general nature of this function means that the Autoridad Presupuestaria may not, within the scope of its authority, issue specific orders or subject specific implementing acts—which form part of the administrative autonomy of those entities—to approval (…) Regulations concerning public budgets, financial administration, and the public treasury within the Central Administration, whose scope does not extend to autonomous institutions such as ICE, even though they share the management of public funds, have also been the subject of rulings by the Sala Constitucional.
In that regard, Voto 2019012175 may be cited, which held: “V.- Regarding the principle of the State’s single treasury account (principio de caja única del Estado). - The so-called principle of the State’s single treasury account derives from the interpretation of Article 185 of the Political Constitution, which appears in the chapter concerning the existence and functions of the Tesorería Nacional. This constitutional provision expressly states: “Article 185.- The Tesorería Nacional is the operations center for all national revenue offices; this body alone has the legal authority to make payments in the Name01 of the State and to receive amounts that, as revenue or for any other reason, must be paid into the national treasury.” The practical effects of this constitutional provision are developed in the Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets Law (Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos), a body of law that serves as the special regulatory framework governing public revenues and expenditures.
In this regard, in implementing Article 185 of the Constitution, Article 66 of the law identifies and explains which revenues must be received by the Tesorería Nacional, thereby specifying what is meant by a single treasury account and thus establishing the aforementioned principle of the State’s single treasury account. Article 66 of the Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos clearly provides: “ARTICLE 66.- Single treasury account All revenues received by the Government, understood as the bodies and entities included in subsections a) and b) of Article 1º of this Law, regardless of their source, shall form part of a single fund administered by the Tesorería Nacional. For their administration, it may arrange for the opening of one or more accounts in colones or another currency. Funds collected pursuant to special laws that specify their intended use shall be deposited into accounts opened by the Tesorería Nacional at the Banco Central de Costa Rica. As provided by the respective law, these funds shall finance, in whole or in part, the expenditure budget of the entity responsible for executing the expenditure.
The National Treasury shall transfer resources to the bodies and entities in accordance with their financial needs, as established in the annual budget schedule.” Thus, the constitutional provision requiring the National Treasury to receive revenue is specified and supplemented by Article 66 of the cited law, which expressly provides that the revenue to be received by that office—the National Treasury—and constituting “a single fund administered by the Treasury” is revenue received by the government as such, that is, the Executive Branch and its agencies—the central administration (administración central), as defined in subsection a) of Article 1 of the same law—the Legislative and Judicial Branches, and the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, together with their agencies and auxiliary bodies—subsection b) of Article 1 of the cited law. In other words, this encompasses only revenue pertaining to what is regarded as the Central Administration, and not to the decentralized administration (administración descentralizada).
It is therefore absolutely clear that revenue earmarked for decentralized institutions, such as autonomous institutions (instituciones autónomas), although likewise constituting public funds, does not enter through the State’s single account or Single Treasury Account (Caja Única del Estado). This has repeatedly been recognized in the case law of this Chamber. In judgment number 2018-15357—which in turn partially cites judgments 2011-15760 and 2017-10865—the Chamber stated: “II.- THE SPECIFIC CASE. This Chamber previously heard a constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) against Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Ley de Impuesto a los Moteles y Lugares Afines, Ley No. 9326 de 19 de octubre de 2015, and, through judgment 2017-010865 at 9:20 on 12 de julio de 2017, ruled as follows: “III.- Merits. To resolve the issues raised in the challenge, each shall be analyzed as alleged. A.- The principle of the State Single Treasury Account.- In its case law, the Chamber has clearly interpreted and applied the constitutional principle of the State Single Treasury Account differently from the manner proposed by the petitioner.
In this regard, when the 1949 Constituent Assembly established administrative decentralization in the Political Constitution, it also adopted constitutional measures to establish controls over, audit, and approve the corresponding budgets. Accordingly, it has been held: “Principle of the State Single Treasury Account. Based on the single-treasury principle (the accounting expression of the principle against earmarking resources), which derives from Article 185 of the Political Constitution, such resources must be included in the ordinary budget of the Republic. The constitutional principle of the Single Treasury Account requires all revenue of the central State, as well as its monetary expenditures, to be channeled through an office specializing in matters pertaining to the Ministry of Finance, namely, the National Treasury, so that the authorities responsible for overseeing the Public Treasury, particularly the Contraloría General de la República, may more effectively monitor the proper use made (sic) of public funds.” Judgment 15760-11.
The cited case law shows that the State Single Treasury Account is interpreted as a constitutional institution intended to control the revenue received and the expenditures incurred by the State. It therefore channels funds through the National Treasury under the oversight of the Contraloría General de la República. In that judgment, the State refers to the principal public entity, possessing its own legal personality and assets. Outside the State, however, there is administrative decentralization, clearly structured by the 1949 Political Constitution, which authorizes the legislature to create autonomous institutions (subordinate State entities) to fulfill specific public objectives and purposes. It should be noted that, in providing for this administrative decentralization, the Constituent Assembly also established a control and supervisory mechanism in subsection 2) of Article 184 of the Political Constitution.
The Contraloría General de la República was thereby vested with the powers and authority to examine, approve, and reject the budgets of Municipalities and autonomous institutions, and to audit their implementation and settlement. The claimed unconstitutionality must be rejected on this point because, although the Constituent Assembly granted autonomous institutions a series of administrative powers and prerogatives for fulfilling specific public purposes, it also entrusted oversight of the public funds they administer to the Contraloría General de la República (as a constitutionally established body responsible for supervising those resources).” —emphasis added— In this regard, it is clearly established that the so-called State Single Treasury Account applies specifically to the bodies and entities comprising the Central Administration, as well as the other Branches of the Republic, the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, and its agencies.
Decentralized entities, autonomous institutions, and municipalities are excluded from that “single treasury account”; with respect to them, the Contraloría General de la República continues at all times to have the duty to approve, audit, and verify budget implementation. VI.- Legal nature (naturaleza jurídica) of the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social.- In accordance with the preceding recital (considerando), autonomous institutions fall outside the scope of the so-called principle of the State Single Treasury Account precisely because they possess their own legal personality and legal capacity, which are necessary to fulfill their purposes. Autonomous institutions have their constitutional foundation in Article 188 of the Political Constitution, which recognizes their “administrative independence” and provides that they are “subject to the law in matters of governance.” Although the creation of certain institutions is contemplated in the constitutional text itself—such as the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social—subsection 3 of Article 189 of the Political Constitution recognizes that there may be other autonomous institutions “created by the Asamblea Legislativa by a vote of no fewer than two thirds of all its members.” Based on this constitutional authorization, the Asamblea Legislativa adopted Law number 4760, entitled Ley de Creación del Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, which was approved by a qualified majority, that is, by the vote required under the aforementioned subsection 3) of Article 189 of the Political Constitution.
Article 1 of this Law 4760 provides for the creation of the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social as an institution possessing its own legal personality and governed by that law and its regulations. In furtherance of this statutory provision, Article 1 of the Reglamento Orgánico del Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social expressly provides that the institution is “governed by public law, possesses its own legal personality and assets, and has administrative autonomy.” Accordingly, it must be clearly understood that the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social is an autonomous institution that enjoys the constitutional protection granted to it by Title XIV of the Political Constitution and that, as such, it falls outside the scope of the aforementioned principle of the State Single Treasury Account, precisely because it possesses its own legal personality, its own assets, and administrative autonomy.” The Ley General de Contratación Pública, N°9986 established a “legal framework” based on the public nature of its addressees, in direct violation of the constitutional mandate, which did distinguish, within the public sector, the creation of autonomous institutions and, consequently, their indisputable administrative independence in managing their affairs. In view of the foregoing concerning the constitutional challenge filed against the Ley General de Contratación Pública, N°9986:
The conflict between the legal provision and the treaty incorporated into the legal system (ordenamiento jurídico) is resolved by applying the hermeneutic criteria (criterios hermenéuticos) for resolving conflicts between legal rules (antinomias normativas); it may, however, involve a constitutional issue insofar as the provisions of Article 7 of the Political Constitution are violated.” (Legal Opinion N° OJ-011-2008 of February 15, 2008) In light of the foregoing, it is clear that, under our constitutional system, the superior rank of the legal provisions adopted pursuant to an international agreement and duly approved by the Legislative Assembly must be respected. Accordingly, and by virtue of the rule established in Article 7 of our Fundamental Charter, any ordinary statute that conflicts with and violates the terms of an international treaty certainly becomes unconstitutional for contravening that constitutionally established hierarchy of norms (jerarquía normativa).
Thus, regardless of the subject matter addressed by an international treaty of this nature, if Congress enacts a statute that contradicts or disregards its terms—under our centralized system of constitutional review (sistema de control concentrado)—only that Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide that possible unconstitutionality, as requested in the action before us. Now, in the specific case of the TLC and with respect to telecommunications, this Office of the Attorney General stated: “1.- The need for legislative development It is not for the Office of the Attorney General to determine which provisions of the Treaty are self-executing (auto ejecutables) and which require further development for their direct application, since that exceeds the scope of the consultation. Nevertheless, in our view, the Treaty contains a series of provisions that, upon entering into force, would constitute obligations to legislate, compliance with which would become enforceable both domestically and internationally.
In other words, for Costa Rica, the Treaty contains non-self-executing provisions. In such cases, the provision requires subsequent legislative development. This means that the international provision is not directly applicable but, in order to be applied, requires the enactment of a statute at the domestic level. (…) The opening of the telecommunications market derives from the Treaty. Nevertheless, Costa Rica is exempted from the general and common provisions of the Treaty. The obligation to apply Chapter 13 in its entirety upon the Treaty’s entry into force is subject to an exception in Annex 13 to Chapter 13, section IV, which clearly establishes the Costa Rican State’s obligation to enact a new regulatory framework for telecommunications services that guarantees the participation of telecommunications service providers in that market. The treaty provision even establishes the principles that must govern this regulatory framework.
Additionally, section III.2 establishes the corresponding timetable for the market-opening process. It cannot be overlooked that, in the case of telecommunications, full compliance with this obligation requires the enactment of a statute. As is well known, Article 121, subsection 14, of the Political Constitution establishes that the electromagnetic spectrum is a public-domain asset (bien demanial) and subjects its use and exploitation to a special legal regime. The constitutional protection afforded to the spectrum means that it may not be freely used and exploited by private parties or by the Administration. Instead, a concession (concesión) is required. Such a concession may be granted by the Legislative Assembly or, failing that, by the Administration pursuant to a framework statute regulating such concessions. This subject matter is governed by the principle of statutory reservation (principio de reserva de ley), which ensures that it is the Legislative Assembly—either by directly granting concessions or by enacting a statute authorizing action by the Executive Branch—that determines the terms, conditions and specifications, procedures, time limits, and methods to be observed in granting concessions for the use and exploitation of the public-domain asset, as well as the powers vested in the granting authority, among which oversight and sanctioning powers are fundamental, the rights of service users, and the system of rates and fees payable to the State for the use of the public domain and, where applicable, for the oversight exercised over it (consistent case law of the Office of the Attorney General beginning with opinions C-031-1990 of February 5, 1990 and C-145-1991 of September 9, 1991).
For telecommunications to be opened under the terms agreed upon by Costa Rica, the country must enact a statute that meets the requirements imposed by the statutory reservation referred to above and also respects the commitments undertaken by the country in the Treaty.” (emphasis added) (Legal Opinion N° OJ-011-2008 of February 15, 2008) Based on the foregoing, we consider the action before us to have been properly brought insofar as it is grounded in the superior rank of the Treaty’s terms (Article 7 of the Constitution) relative to provisions of an ordinary statute (in this case, the LGCP’s repeal of the ICE’s special procurement regime), which, it is alleged, entails a breach and disregard of the commitments undertaken by Costa Rica in the Treaty, specifically the TLC. Under this reasoning, the action is admissible insofar as it seeks an analysis of the scope and implications of the challenged statutory provisions in relation to the superior provisions of the TLC concerning the opening of the telecommunications market, taking into account the specific commitments applicable to Costa Rica because of its former special telecommunications monopoly regime, as well as the nature of the ICE and the public purposes it serves.
This case may be regarded as having special nuances because it involves an action requiring not only a direct comparison with the text of the Treaty, but also consideration of the nature and scope of the commitments undertaken regarding the enactment of domestic legal provisions that must fully comply with the terms of that international agreement. It is useful to make a brief digression to note that international instruments of this kind belong to a field that may entail technical complexity in the various subject matters they address and that their proper interpretation and implementation ordinarily require a high degree of specialization in international law and other fields. Indeed, under certain circumstances, their interpretation is entrusted to international bodies. Nevertheless, we consider it important to distinguish between interpreting their scope for full and proper substantive implementation by the different parties (application, entry into force, non-application, implementation procedures and acts, resulting practices, obligations, benefits, cooperation, and dispute resolution) and interpreting whether they may have been violated by some type of domestic legislation enacted by a State Party.
In the first case, there are competent and specialized bodies, both in international law and in the various subject matters that may be covered by the treaty or convention, that can play an important role in determining the correct interpretation of its scope (e.g., international trade). Quite different, however, is the interpretive exercise of determining—as in this case—whether an ordinary statute conflicts with the terms of the Treaty, because that exercise belongs to the field of constitutional review of statutes (through Article 7), which falls within the exclusive and centralized jurisdiction of that Constitutional Chamber. In the latter case, the issue is not strictly to determine the best or most appropriate technical or legal interpretation or implementation of the convention, but rather the scope and consequences of a statute in relation to the international provision. Although this source-related interpretation entails addressing the scope of the convention or treaty, it is undertaken exclusively from the perspective of the hierarchy of norms, determining the statute’s scope in relation to the order of precedence established in Article 7 of the Fundamental Charter.
For the foregoing reasons, we consider the action admissible through this proceeding and that the Constitutional Chamber has sole and exclusive authority to determine whether the ordinary statute being challenged may violate the terms of the Treaty. 2.- Relationship between the administrative procurement regime (régimen de contratación administrativa) under Ley 8660 and the principles and specific provisions of the TLC In view of the terms of the action filed, the first matter that must be clarified, in our view, is the scope of the TLC regarding the procurement regime granted to the ICE. To that extent, the underlying factor that appears decisive is the origin of and reason for the negotiations conducted within the framework of the TLC that culminated in the opening of the telecommunications market. The foregoing entails a marked difference from the situation of other countries that participated in signing that international instrument, because the trade negotiations conducted under the TLC entailed free-market conditions for the commercialization and provision of telecommunications services.
This required the adoption of specific provisions for Costa Rica because, at that time, our country still (sic) provided those services under a state monopoly regime vested in the ICE, under which private domestic or foreign operators could not enter the market to compete. That was the reason for including special provisions (such as Annex 13 to Chapter 13), which were indispensable for ensuring the market opening sought by the TLC. Nevertheless, given the profound institutional change this entailed for Costa Rica, it warranted the negotiation, acceptance, and formalization of special provisions concerning the Costa Rican market, specifically regarding the institution that, until then, had been the country’s sole service provider. As was publicly and widely known, the negotiations were always transparent in establishing that the objective pursued was not privatization but the progressive and regulated opening of the market, on the understanding that, alongside the establishment of a free-competition regime, the strengthening and modernization of state service provision would be guaranteed and would remain in the hands of the national entity that would continue participating in that market.
It is important to keep the foregoing frame of reference in mind because it explains the terms in which the negotiations and the specific legal provisions applicable to Costa Rica in this area were embodied. Therefore, it is no coincidence that a special annex (applicable exclusively to Costa Rica) was included to ensure the manner in which the market would be opened and the competitive position the state institution would occupy in that market. This is no small matter because, in a dispute such as the one before us, the intent expressed in the Treaty is decisive in guiding the analysis and the conclusion to be reached, following an interpretive method consistent with logic and, above all, with the spirit and intent of the signatories to the international agreement at issue.
Likewise, the terms of the favorable opinion that were embodied in decreto legislativo N° 8622 must be borne in mind when interpreting the meaning of any provision of the Treaty, because an analysis concerning the application and scope of any of its provisions must not and cannot depart from that framework or contravene, disregard, or distort the intent that inspired and guided (sic) the ratification of that international instrument. It should be recalled that said opinion contains explanations specifically concerning what was agreed and how it must be applied; hence, in our view, no interpretation of the scope of this agreement may disregard or depart from those explanations, which are inherent to that body of supranational law. With that understanding, it is therefore essential to refer to the contents of the FTA, specifically Annex 13 contained in Chapter 13, which—as recounted in the action—expressly established that the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica, recognizing the unique nature of Costa Rican social policy on telecommunications and reaffirming its decision to ensure that the opening process in its telecommunications services sector is based on its Constitución Política; emphasizing that said opening process will be for the benefit of users and will be founded on the principles of gradualism, selectivity, and regulation, and in strict conformity with the social objectives of universality and solidarity in the provision of telecommunications services; and recognizing its commitment to strengthen and modernize the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) as a participant in a competitive telecommunications market, assumes through this Annex the following specific commitments regarding telecommunications services: “11.
Modernization of ICE Costa Rica shall enact a new legal framework to strengthen ICE through its appropriate modernization, no later than 31 de diciembre del 2004...” With that understanding, the legislative decree approving the FTA, in section 9 thereof, concerning telecommunications, stated that said Treaty would not leave ICE at a disadvantage vis-à-vis private competitors. Annex 13 of the FTA includes Costa Rica’s obligation to enact a legal framework to strengthen ICE, which was established in the best interests of ICE and Costa Ricans, given the undeniable need for a modernization law to be enacted as soon as possible so that the institution can adequately prepare to face competition and have the instruments necessary to act with the agility required to provide the highest-quality service. It follows from the foregoing that the negotiation and provisions of the FTA included preparing ICE for the change that was approaching with the opening of the market, ensuring that it would not be at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the private operators it would have to confront, and equipping it with the instruments necessary to act with sufficient and necessary agility when facing competition.
In our view, this is the framework within which the legislative change imposed by Ley N° 9986 must therefore be analyzed. Indeed, the question that must be answered is whether that legislative amendment contravened, disregarded, weakened, distorted, or rendered inoperative those expressly agreed commitments, because, if so, the provision would indeed be unconstitutional due to a violation of the terms of the FTA in this area. 3.- Impairment of the special procurement regime negotiated and agreed in the Treaty by virtue of the LGCP Within the framework of the commitments expressly agreed in the FTA, which required the Costa Rican State to follow the Development Agenda and the Implementation Agenda as fundamental and indispensable actions for bringing that international treaty into force, Ley N° 8860 was enacted. Said law, in direct and specific compliance with the terms of the Treaty, established a special administrative procurement framework (contratación administrativa) for ICE.
This is undoubtedly a more flexible model, with the latitude appropriate to an entity that must be able to operate swiftly and efficiently in its process of procuring goods and services. This is the only alternative for attaining sufficient conditions to face the challenges of a fiercely competitive market. Let us recall that when a commercial service provider falls behind in that competition, sooner or later it will be destined to be eliminated from that market. In this area, technological changes advancing at breakneck speed, as well as modern marketing and customer-acquisition tactics, mean that any competitor that falls behind, however slight the delay may seem, risks losing its ability to act at the opportune time, which in turn may cause a loss of customers and ultimately its inevitable displacement by more agile service providers. From that perspective, it is reasonable to conclude that the special procurement regime under Ley 8660 reflected those FTA commitments concerning the participation of the sole state-owned enterprise in that market.
That said, it is also clear that Ley 8660 has the same hierarchical status as any other Law of the Republic. To that extent, it is subject to the sovereign powers of the legislature arising from the Constitution itself (subparagraph one of Article 121), and therefore that law plainly cannot be understood as enjoying a form of permanent immutability vis-à-vis the ordinary legislature. Ergo, some type of amendment or adjustment could eventually be made if necessary as circumstances evolve. We therefore consider that the crux of the matter lies in determining whether the complete repeal (derogación íntegra)—rather than a mere partial amendment—of the entire special regime granted to ICE as an inseparable instrument of the FTA constituted an exercise of that sovereign legislative power that may ultimately be unconstitutional, insofar as it exceeded the bounds of a reasonable amendment and consequently overstepped the framework of the FTA and ultimately disregarded its substantive commitments.
Accordingly, the next step in the reasoning is limited to determining the effect and scope of the amendments introduced by Ley 9986. Let us recall that, by virtue of Article 135(c) thereof, Articles 12, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 of Ley 8660, Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones, dated 8 de agosto de 2008, were repealed. That said, as we stated, it became clear that the special regime under Ley 8860 arose from the FTA. But note that this is not an amendment of that regime, but rather its total and absolute elimination. It may therefore be concluded that the framework and commitment arising from the FTA were indeed breached by that total repeal of special legislation designed and enacted to fulfill the purposes, principles, and spirit of the Treaty negotiations by providing effective and genuine tools for competitiveness, modernization, and agility in ICE’s operations in the free market.
The next step in this analysis would be to determine whether that total repeal effected by Ley 9986 was accompanied by the introduction of new provisions that replaced, with some other model, the special regime contemplated by the FTA for ICE. Such a model would need to satisfactorily respect the spirit of the commitments embodied in the Treaty. Nevertheless, as explained in the action, the legislative debates—and the text of the LGCP itself—make clear that it was intended as a uniform and comprehensive law for the entire public sector. To that extent, no special instrument for ICE was preserved, contemplated, considered, or guaranteed. On the contrary, it was expressly stated that the intention was to put an end to its special regime (as was done with all the other institutions) so as to bring it within the general rules applicable to other entities. Admittedly, in view of this situation, it could be argued that the FTA did not specifically guarantee a special administrative procurement regime.
That is true in principle. However, it cannot be disregarded that this Treaty did agree upon and guarantee the commitment to enact domestic legislation providing the tools necessary for ICE to participate in the new market under conditions of adequate competitiveness and agility vis-à-vis the other operators, a commitment that was honored through the enactment of Ley 8660. Ergo, taking a step backward toward an administrative procurement regime that hinders, weakens, and diminishes that market competitiveness does constitute a breach of this international commitment. A second point that could be argued is that the new LGCP contains a section of special regulations for enterprises operating in competitive markets, which includes ICE. Nevertheless, this has several facets suggesting that it is likewise insufficient to deem the FTA commitments fulfilled. This is because that special section of provisions is also generally applicable to various public enterprises that do not share ICE’s characteristics and circumstances, either in the scope and coverage of their services or in the amount of the overall budget available to them for acquiring goods and services.
Likewise, said special regime does not cover all administrative procurement processes that such public enterprises may undertake; instead, its application is subject to a series of conditions and requirements entailing restrictions, which therefore continues to create a substantial difference from the tools provided by Ley 8660. That said, the argument that repealing the special regime under Ley 8660 in order to subject ICE to the general LGCP regime violates the scope of the FTA by diminishing its level of market competitiveness must necessarily be accompanied by tangible and specific references establishing that effect; otherwise, it would remain an argument lacking sufficient technical and legal support within the constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) at issue here. In view of the foregoing, it can be seen that the action filed provides a series of specific and detailed parameters and examples regarding aspects of agility and efficiency—and therefore competitiveness—under the administrative procurement rules that are adversely affected and substantially diminished by subjecting ICE to the general rules of the new LGCP.
Thus, it details matters such as the abrupt and significant reduction in the threshold established for becoming subject to the most burdensome tendering procedure (procedimiento licitatorio) (which changes from 6.000 million 317 million under the new law). The same is true of the threshold established for the application of the simplified tender (licitación menor), since under the previous regime the upper limit was 101 million colones, whereas under the new regime it falls to 79 million colones. Likewise, in the case of direct contracting (contratación directa), the types of purchases, based on amount, that may be made through this mechanism are also significantly reduced. In addition to the foregoing, there is the issue of time limits and appeals, because, in light of the explanations set forth in the action, the new LGCP rules entail following lengthier and more cumbersome procedures, thereby reducing ICE’s competitiveness vis-à-vis its private rivals, which now have an advantage over it in flexibility and agility when undertaking the procurement necessary for its timely operation in the free market.
Another aspect cited as adversely affecting its competitive standing concerns the appeals regime (régimen recursivo) to which ICE was subjected under this new legislation, since the sharp reduction in the thresholds established for such purposes meant that many more procurement procedures (contrataciones) became subject to an appeals regime that entails a longer delay before award decisions (actos de adjudicación) become final. Moreover, a substantial part of this appeals regime passed into the hands of the Contraloría General, thereby stripping ICE of the powers it had previously exercised since the market was opened to hear appeals filed against a significant percentage of the decisions made in procurement matters, a circumstance that likewise reduced the speed and timeliness with which it could implement its decisions in this area. Other examples were also offered that technically demonstrate a decline in ICE’s market competitiveness, such as the removal of the mechanism allowing it to modify a contract unilaterally in order to expand it by up to 100% under the same procedure already conducted.
The loss of this mechanism, which afforded it broad latitude to acquire additional supplies through an expedited process by taking advantage of a procurement procedure already formalized with a supplier, eliminates competitive conditions because the procedure already completed cannot be used when additional goods or services beyond those already contracted for are needed. Thus, the obligation to initiate and conduct a new procurement procedure in such cases becomes more cumbersome and entails delays that could prove significant and decisive when participating in the market. It is important to bear in mind that the special administrative procurement regime (régimen especial de contratación administrativa) established by Ley 8660 in fulfillment of the commitments agreed upon in the TLC, although it departed from the more rigid rules applicable to other public entities, did not in any way violate constitutional principles because of its special characteristics.
It is therefore appropriate to recall what that Sala Constitucional stated in this regard when reviewing the bill that became Ley 8660, in the following terms: “XVIII.- REGARDING THE AMOUNT ESTABLISHED FOR USING THE PUBLIC TENDER PROCEDURE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCUREMENT. The consulting legislators consider that the amounts established in the third paragraph of article 19, namely article 22 of the final text, for resorting to a public tender (licitación pública) are extremely high and disproportionate. They assert that Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad would use public tenders only when the procurement amount exceeds 2.500.000.000.00, which they consider wholly irrational. They object that this undermines the oversight powers of Contraloría General de la República. They likewise consider it unconstitutional because it conflicts with the public tender procedure established in article 182 of the Constitution, since virtually no ICE tendering process would be conducted through that procedure.
The text under consultation states as follows: “ARTICLE 22. Ordinary competitive procedures (...) ICE, considered individually, shall use the public tender procedure for procurements whose value is equal to or greater than the amount obtained by multiplying the entity’s budget for acquisitions of goods and non-personal services by the factor resulting from dividing the amount specified for public tenders in subsection a) of article 27 of the Ley general de contratación administrativa by the reference budget applicable to ICE, considered individually, set forth in that same provision. If application of this paragraph results in thresholds lower than those established in article 27 of Ley N.º 7494, Contratación administrativa, the thresholds specified in that Law shall be used. (...)” In this regard, it should first be emphasized that article 99 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional provides that optional legislative consultations on constitutionality (consultas legislativas de constitucionalidad) must be submitted in a reasoned pleading, identifying the challenged aspects of the bill and the reasons for doubts or objections concerning their constitutionality.
In this Court’s view, that requirement has not been fully satisfied with respect to this specific issue. Indeed, it should be noted that the consulting legislators proceed from a mere assumption when stating that the established amount is very high, without providing any specific evaluative or comparative criterion that would enable this Court to assess the reasonableness and proportionality of the provision. Accordingly, we must refer to the assessments contained in the legislative record, specifically the affirmative majority report prepared within the Comisión Especial, in order to analyze the purpose of this special provision. Article 182 of the Constitución Política recognizes that contracts for the execution of public works, as well as purchases made by autonomous institutions, shall be carried out through the public tender procedure, in accordance with the law as regards the applicable amount.
Accordingly, it falls to the legislature to define, in each case, the administrative procurement procedures, including special systems and differentiated amounts based on the characteristics of the activity and the institution concerned, with the amount being precisely the distinguishing criterion in the design of the various types of administrative procurement procedures. This was held by this Constitutional Court in judgment No. 2007-001557 of 15:36 hrs. on 7 de febrero de 2007, which stated as follows: “(...) However, in the Sala’s view, this line of reasoning contradicts article 182 of the Constitution, which, as stated, provides the basis for developing the principles of the administrative procurement system, since that provision adopts tendering as the ordinary means of procurement ‘in accordance with the law as regards the applicable amount,’ whereby the Constituent Assembly selected the amount as the distinguishing criterion in designing the various types of administrative procurement procedures, which may be governed by different rules depending on their amount, but must always respect, in essence, the law of the Constitution.
Thus, apart from the amount, our constitutional text does not expressly recognize any other criterion for applying a relaxation of the constitutional principles governing administrative procurement. (...)” Analysis of the bill under consultation reveals the legislature’s clear intention to provide Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad with the conditions necessary for greater administrative, financial, and technological efficiency and effectiveness. This is, of course, within the framework of a process to open the telecommunications market—already decided by the people through approval of the referendum on the TLC EE.UU., Centroamérica y República Dominicana (Ley referendaria No. 8622 de 21 de noviembre de 2007)—which seeks to strengthen public operators in the face of potential competition. Indeed, the following may be inferred from the considerations of those who issued the report on the bill: “(...) The bill in question proposes a special administrative procurement regime for ICE’s acquisition of goods and services.
In this regard, the bill under review states among its objectives that ICE should be provided with an agile, efficient, and effective administrative procurement system as part of the efforts to strengthen and modernize that entity, as well as to establish a body of rules adapted to its particular circumstances. Both Sala Constitucional and Contraloría General have recognized that special regimes may exist, provided that the nature and particular features of the public activity concerned so require and that the circumstances contemplated in the general regulations are not applicable to it. As proposed in this report, that regime must therefore regulate the particular conditions governing administrative procurement by ICE and its companies and must necessarily take into account the constitutional principles enshrined in articles 182 and 184. In this area, the legislature has been entrusted with clearly specifying the particular rules and parameters that justify regulations departing from the general legal framework, developing their content in legislation, and incorporating the constitutional principles governing the State’s administrative procurement activities, as proposed in the present text.
(...)” Within the framework of these objectives, it was emphasized that one of the principal difficulties historically faced by Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and its companies in administrative procurement matters is that the financial thresholds used to determine the applicable procurement procedures do not necessarily correspond to their needs. In light of the foregoing, it may be inferred that the legislature’s intention in the regulations under consultation is to adjust the financial thresholds for administrative procurement to ICE’s circumstances and scale. The analytical report stated as follows: “(...) In the same vein, ICE and its companies currently use public tender, abbreviated tender (licitación abreviada), and direct contracting (contratación directa) procedures according to the financial thresholds established in article 27 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa and its amendments.
That methodology is not in itself problematic; however, because the reference budget applicable to ICE represents slightly more than 10% of the Institution’s budget, it became necessary to establish a methodology allowing the financial procurement thresholds to be adjusted to the circumstances and scale of Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and its companies, while bearing in mind that the body with authority to set those thresholds is Contraloría General de la República. (...)” (emphasis not in the original). The text under consultation therefore does not seek to disregard administrative procurement procedures but rather to establish amounts more consistent with the particular budgetary circumstances of Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, which is legitimate in light of the Law of the Constitution. The purpose is to establish a differentiated mechanism for public tenders and abbreviated tenders, precisely because of ICE’s nature and the need for responsiveness imposed by the opening of the market and the provision of services under competitive conditions.
It should be added that the original Constituent Assembly, in article 182 of the Constitución Política, referred to the general concept of tendering without specifying whether it was public or otherwise and, moreover, left outside the constitutional framework—assigning it to the ordinary legislature—the definition of the amounts at which the different tendering methods, whether public or abbreviated, would apply; this is therefore clearly a matter left to legislative discretion. Consequently, in cases where the quantitative threshold or amount defined in article 22 of the bill is not reached, although a public tender is excluded, another form of tendering, such as an abbreviated tender—a procedure that also guarantees the proper and regular use of public funds—must be used, and it therefore cannot be understood that direct contracting will be the rule.
Note that Article 22, paragraph 3, provides at the end that “If the application of this paragraph results in thresholds lower than those established in Article 27 of Ley No. 7494, Contratación administrativa, those specified in that law shall be used.” It must be taken into consideration that the bill under review establishes a unique and specific procurement regime (régimen de contratación); it is not an amendment to Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, because its purpose is to enable ICE to compete in an open telecommunications market in accordance with the popular mandate expressed in the referendum that approved the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement (TLC EE.UU, Centroamérica y República Dominicana) (Ley referendaria No. 8622 de 21 de noviembre de 2007). In financial terms, and in accordance with the budget studies conducted by the legislators, the reference budget currently used by ICE for the purpose of applying the public tender (licitación pública), abbreviated tender (licitación abreviada), or direct procurement (contratación directa) procedures established in Article 27 of Ley de Contratación Administrativa and pursuant to updates issued by the Contraloría General de la República represents barely 10% of its procurement budget.
Furthermore, the financial thresholds are stated as fixed amounts rather than as percentages of its budget. In practice, this means that ICE’s thresholds, in real terms, constitute one-tenth of the base percentage established by the oversight body (órgano contralor). That is, the threshold expressed as a percentage of ICE’s budget is 0.06% in the case of public tendering, whereas the threshold expressed as a percentage of the base budget in all other cases is 0.6%. The formula proposes correcting this situation so that the threshold will also be 0.6% as the parameter for selecting a public-tender procedure (see affirmative majority report (dictamen afirmativo de mayoría) at folios 5196-5308, Tomo XVI). Accordingly, this Tribunal does not find that the proposed formula is unconstitutional for violating the principles of reasonableness and proportionality (principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad), since the legislature’s intent is to adapt the administrative-procurement parameters to the specific budgetary characteristics of Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad.” (Sentencia N° 11210-2008 de las 15:00 horas del 16 de julio de 2008).
In light of the foregoing, the constitutional conformity of the legislation approved by the country to ensure effective, genuine, and satisfactory compliance with the commitments established by the TLC for purposes of opening the market in the activities in which ICE participates was upheld by that Tribunal Constitucional. This is because the aim is not to exempt ICE from all controls or limits governing the actions of public entities, but rather to provide it with substantive tools for procuring goods and services as a condition sine qua non for its survival in the domestic market following its opening to competition from private operators. In conclusion, it must be emphasized that Costa Rica’s specific commitments agreed upon in Anexo 13 of Chapter 13 of the TLC with respect to ICE undeniably took into account—as has been shown—the unique nature of Costa Rican social policy in the field of telecommunications.
This is directly related to the principles of accessibility and universal service coverage (cobertura universal de los servicios) that inspired its creation and govern the public purposes assigned to it as a state institution within the social State under the rule of law (Estado social de Derecho), governed by the supreme principles of constitutional Article 50. That particular nature, which also led to the inclusion of a specific annex in the TLC (anexo 13), is precisely what gave rise to the special and differentiated procurement regime embodied in Ley 8660 (Articles 22-29), ordinary legislation enacted to implement and give effect to the Treaty. Therefore, that regime is special, distinct, enhanced, and consistent with an international regulatory instrument entered into by the Costa Rican State. Consequently, the elimination of that special statutory regime brought about by Ley 9986 (Ley General de Contratación Pública) constituted a breach of the commitment arising from the TLC to enact a special law guaranteeing ICE’s competitiveness in the newly opened telecommunications market.
That breach is not remedied by the LGCA regulations governing companies operating under competitive conditions (empresas en régimen de competencia). First, those provisions remain general rules applicable to a sector—companies operating under competitive conditions—whereas ICE is guaranteed special conditions regarding competitiveness that are recognized in the international Treaty. Second, the general rules of the LGCP are less favorable—in terms of the efficiency of the system for acquiring goods and services—than the regime established in Ley 8660; moreover, that regime is subject to certain requirements and does not apply in all circumstances, thereby weakening and impairing the flexible regulatory tools provided to ICE under Ley 8660. 4.- Additional observation It is worth noting that the action stated that, as part of implementing the TLC commitments intended to provide ICE with greater flexibility and efficiency in operating within the new free market, Ley 8660 exempted it from compliance with the requirements of Ley 8131 (Ley de Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos).
Thus, it is asserted that once again subjecting ICE to these administrative rules entails a setback in terms of efficiency and competitiveness, which also undermines the commitments undertaken in the TLC and implemented through the aforementioned provisions of Ley 8660. However, the matter concerning the amendments to Ley 8131, as the action itself acknowledges, is addressed in subsections j) and k) of Article 134 of Ley 9986, as well as in Article 133 of that same Law—which is mentioned only briefly in the action—but ultimately was not included in the relief sought (petitoria). We therefore consider that those provisions could not be annulled because they were not properly challenged. In any event, the content of those provisions is not analyzed in detail. Likewise, Article 134 subsection d), which is included in the relief sought, concerns trusts (fideicomisos), an issue that was not developed in the claimant’s arguments.
Indeed, that provision was merely mentioned at the end of the filing, with the statement that it was challenged for the same reasons previously set forth. Nevertheless, because this concerns the specific legal mechanism of a trust, the action should have explained the extent to which this particular provision was considered to impair ICE’s competitiveness—which it did not do. Since this point therefore lacks support, we consider that it must be dismissed for lack of substantiation (falta de fundamentación), as such substantiation is a requirement imposed by Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional for actions of this kind. V.- REGARDING THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN THE ACTION In light of the analysis conducted, our position regarding the terms in which the relief sought in the action before us was formulated is as follows: • If the action is granted on the merits, the declaration of unconstitutionality (declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad) would have to apply to Article 135 subsection c) of Ley 9986.
In doing so, the judgment would have to define the scope of the effects of that declaration (dimensionar la sentencia los efectos de tal declaratoria) so that Articles 12, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 of Ley N° 8660 would be understood to regain their validity and applicability. • With respect to Articles 68, 69 and 70 of that same Ley 9986, the declaration of unconstitutionality would apply solely to the reference made to ICE in those provisions. In other words, they would remain valid and applicable as their text provides, except with respect to ICE. • Articles 1 and 2 of the LGCP do not warrant a declaration of unconstitutionality, since it would be sufficient to understand that they do not apply to ICE under the principle that a special law prevails over a general law (ley especial prevalece sobre la general), even when the latter was enacted later. This, of course, would apply if the action were granted with respect to Article 135 subsection c), which repealed ICE’s special procurement regime established in Ley 8660 (Articles 20 and following), upon the latter regaining validity as a special law. • With respect to Article 134 subsection d), the action would have to be denied because no specific argument was developed to support the request to annul that provision.
VI.- CONCLUSION In accordance with the reasons stated above, the Procuraduría considers the present action admissible. On the merits, we consider that the complete elimination of ICE’s special administrative-procurement regime (régimen especial de contratación administrativa) by virtue of Article 135 subsection c) of Ley 9986 (Ley General de Contratación Pública) is unconstitutional because it violates the commitments agreed upon in Anexo 13 of Chapter 13 of Tratado de Libre Comercio con República Dominicana, Centroamérica y Estados Unidos de América (approved by Decreto Legislativo N° 8622 de 21 de noviembre de 2007)”.
Thus, the different stages must be viewed through that philosophy, within which we find principles such as value for money, the further development of strategic public procurement (contratación pública estratégica), and the introduction of innovative public procurement (compra pública innovadora) into the regulatory framework. f) Concentration of oversight on stages that generate value The challenged law eliminates a series of external ex ante controls that the legislature determined did not generate value. Such is the case of certain powers assumed by the Office of the Comptroller General in connection with authorizations to initiate a procedure without budgetary allocation, assign contracts, modify contracts, process an exceptional procedure, conduct emergency procedures, and settle contract terminations. Accordingly, this not only empowers the Administration to assume responsibility for decision-making, but also allows the Office of the Comptroller General to concentrate its resources and efforts on controls that generate greater added value, specifically, the adjudication of challenges to the tender specifications (pliego de condiciones) and appeals against the final decision in the procedures. 2.
Regulation of public procurement in international trade agreements (free trade agreements) Public procurement has been affected by international agreements, a phenomenon replicated internationally across different States; Costa Rica is therefore not a special or isolated case in this regard. This has given rise to the concept of International Public Procurement Law (Derecho Internacional de la Contratación Pública), which encompasses a series of principles inherent in procurement and constituting the minimum elements that must be addressed at the regulatory level to allow foreign bidders to participate appropriately and compete effectively in public procurement procedures. Accordingly, the fundamental objective of these international instruments is generally to apply the basic principle of non-discrimination and ensure that foreign products, services, and suppliers have access to contracts; they therefore emphasize the existence of procedures intended to guarantee the transparency of laws, regulations, procedures, and practices relating to public procurement.
Hence, provided that the governing principles in this area are respected, the aim is for the regulations to be sufficiently flexible to respond to the specific circumstances of each party, while ensuring that transparent public procurement measures are available, that procurement is conducted transparently and impartially, and that conflicts of interest and corrupt practices are prevented, consistently with applicable international instruments such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption. As stated above, in this area, the fundamental purpose and focus of the provisions in the public procurement chapters of the trade agreements currently in force are to create and maintain a single public procurement market in order to maximize suppliers’ business opportunities and reduce the commercial costs borne by the public and private sectors of the signatory parties. At the same time, in order to perform its public-interest functions and fulfill the purposes entrusted to it, the State must acquire increasingly greater quantities and varieties of goods and services each day; consequently, provisions influencing how it operates in the market are highly relevant.
Trade agreements contain regulations that are consistent with national legislation. The trade agreements entered into by the country that regulate public procurement in a specific chapter provide for the application of principles such as publicity, simplicity, transparency, and non-discrimination, as well as equal access and opportunities for suppliers to participate. All of these principles are already established in our domestic legislation and have also been recognized as having constitutional status under the extensive case law of the Constitutional Chamber on this subject. In that connection, it is important to emphasize that our legal system provides free access to the market for the acquisition of goods and services by the State—understood in broad terms—such that there are no provisions imposing restrictions per se on the participation of non-national bidders in the competitive procedures instituted for that purpose.
This significantly reduces the possibility that an international trade agreement might conflict with national legislation and require it to be amended. It is beyond the scope of treaties to impose on a signatory party an obligation to establish a special procurement regime for one of its enterprises, since this is understood to be a matter governed by each party’s national legislation. 3. Absence of a specific commitment to establish a special procurement regime The applicants’ central argument is that the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) required an implementation agenda that would enable ICE to compete following the opening of the market, which led to the ICE Strengthening Law, including the special procurement regime provided for therein (Article 20), which theoretically afforded it greater agility. In this regard, it should be noted that international trade agreements do not expressly incorporate an obligation to establish a special regime for ICE or any other state institution or public enterprise.
Such is the case with the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), which contains no provision to that effect, nor does the party cite one. The applicant contends that the implementation agenda was a necessary condition for approval of the treaty. In response, it should first be noted that the implementation agenda is not part of the trade agreement itself or of the obligations assumed vis-à-vis the other signatory parties; instead, it constitutes a domestic commitment concerning national legislation. Second, a distinction must be drawn between the implementation agenda, which established the need to enact a modernization law, and the creation of a special procurement regime. This is because the treaty nowhere establishes an obligation relating to the creation of a special procurement regime for ICE. In that regard, it should be noted that the regulations incorporated into the ICE Strengthening Law, particularly the resulting public procurement regime, reflected a decision made by the ordinary legislature at the time, as was also the case with the LGCP.
In general terms, for public procurement purposes under the trade agreements, ICE is covered under Section C, List B, of all our trade instruments, with a lower threshold and an indication that the time limits in the corresponding chapter do not apply; instead, prospective bidders must be given adequate periods for submitting bids, and ICE must give suppliers at least 3 business days to file challenges. The regulations therefore do not support the inference that the text of the agreement contained a specific commitment to enact any special law. The special regime regulated by Law No. 8660 formed part of an implementation law related to a trade agreement, but it was subject to amendment by statute because it fell within the ordinary legislature’s sphere of authority. In other words, it must be stated categorically that Law No. 8660 does not have the status of a treaty, but rather that of an ordinary law.
This was confirmed by the Constitutional Chamber in Decision No. 2008-011210, issued at 15:00 on July 16, 2008, when ruling on the optional legislative consultation concerning Law No. 8660, as follows: “(...) The text submitted for consultation therefore does not seek to disregard administrative procurement procedures (procedimientos de contratación administrativa), but rather to establish amounts more consistent with the particular budgetary characteristics of Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, which is legitimate under Constitutional Law. The purpose is to establish a differentiated mechanism for public tendering (licitación pública) and abbreviated tendering (licitación abreviada), precisely because of the nature of ICE and the need for dynamism imposed by the opening of the market and the provision of services under competitive conditions. It must be added that the original Constituent Assembly, in Article 182 of the Political Constitution, refers to the general mechanism of tendering without characterizing it as public or otherwise; moreover, it removed from the constitutional sphere—assigning to the ordinary legislature—the matter of defining the amounts at which the different tendering methods—public or abbreviated—apply, which clearly leaves this issue to the legislature’s freedom to shape the law.
Accordingly, in cases where the quantitative parameter or amount defined in section 22 of the bill is not reached, although public tendering is excluded, another form of tendering, such as abbreviated tendering, must be used—a procedure that also guarantees the proper and regular use of public funds—and it therefore cannot be understood that direct procurement (contratación directa) will be the rule (...)” (emphasis added; not in the original). Thus, the Constitutional Chamber itself has expressly recognized that defining the procurement regime applicable to ICE falls within the ordinary legislature’s discretion. The legislature exercised that discretion through the special regime set forth in Law No. 8660 and subsequently by repealing it and bringing ICE within the scope of the LGCP. In addition, the greater agility sought was never achieved, since the processing times for ICE procurements were similar to, and even longer than, those of the largest institutions when applying the procedures.
In other words, in approximately 10 years of implementing the special law 1, the claimed benefits of efficiency, effectiveness, and economy have not been realized. Rather, the opposite is true, while the proposed regime is a more modern instrument than that used by ICE and its corporate group to acquire goods and services. It should be noted that the applicant provides no data or figures supporting its 2 arguments concerning efficiency. By way of example, public banks participate in a competitive and aggressive market without considering themselves adversely affected by complying with public procurement procedures. An important point to bear in mind is that operating in a competitive market does not mean that procurement should not be subject to rules, which, it should also be noted, have not been alleged to be unreasonable in terms of time limits and procedures. 4. Special regimes at the international level Regarding international best practices in this area, the OECD, in its Recommendation of the Council on Public Procurement, has determined that: “IV. RECOMMENDS that Adherents facilitate access to procurement opportunities for potential competitors of all sizes.
To that end, Adherents shall: i) Have reasonable and sound institutional, legal, and regulatory frameworks, as these constitute the fundamental environment for enhancing participation in business with the public sector and are the only possible starting point for ensuring sustainable and efficient public procurement systems. These elements shall:
5. Specific regulations under the LGCP The petitioners allege that the LGCP contains differences that make them less competitive, first stating that the thresholds and time limits are detrimental to them because the thresholds are lower and the time limits longer, particularly with respect to the threshold for goods and services. In this regard, it must be noted that the thresholds per se do not make ICE less competitive, because, provided procurement is managed efficiently, the regulations will instead benefit ICE and its management. This is because it will benefit from greater bidder participation, a larger pool of bidders from which to select the most suitable one, greater use of economies of scale, fewer procedures as a result of consolidated procurement, simplicity, and greater legal certainty in the procedures. Nor does it appear that the petitioners have performed any analysis regarding the practical effects of the thresholds, for example, with respect to the budget executed during the previous year through ordinary procedures or through an estimated scenario based on future effects, even though those data are available after six months of application of the LGCP.
Likewise, regarding time limits, it should be noted that, according to the statistics and records available to the Contraloría, ICE’s special procurement regime did not yield results demonstrating savings in procedure processing times. Quite the contrary: as stated above, the execution time frames under the special regime are equal to or longer than those of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. It should also be borne in mind that, precisely in response to the need to grant ICE and other competing public enterprises certain flexibility, a differentiated threshold regime with higher amounts was created specifically to address that need for flexibility in ICE’s management of public procurement, setting reasonable and proportionate amounts based on budget execution.
Furthermore, regarding the appeals framework (régimen recursivo), it must be considered that, in any event, decisions under both the special regime and now the LGCP could and can be challenged in contentious-administrative proceedings (vía contencioso administrativa), whose processing times for providing a response are longer, and thus this makes no difference. In any event, the special procedures incorporated into the LGCP that concern matters connected with ICE’s substantive duties are not subject to an appeal (recurso de apelación) before the Contraloría, making the situation even more favorable for ICE than under the special regime. Moreover, the guarantee of the right to challenge (garantía de impugnación) should be viewed as a positive element that, far from delaying procurement management, provides important support because it serves as an element that instills confidence in potential bidders and may contribute to increased bidder participation in the procedures.
They further argue that eliminating low-value direct procurement (contratación directa de escasa cuantía), which was not subject to any type of challenge, causes harm because the abbreviated tender procedure (licitación reducida) now provided for is subject to a motion for reconsideration (recurso de revocatoria). In this regard, it should be noted that, in any event, low-value procurement could be challenged in contentious-administrative proceedings. In turn, the guarantee of the right to challenge should not be viewed as a negative element; rather, it constitutes a safeguard for bidders, providing them with certainty and confidence regarding the existence of a mechanism for reviewing objections, promoting transparency, and potentially serving as an effective filter to prevent disputes from reaching the courts. Curtailing the possibility of raising challenges does nothing but diminish the transparency of the process.
Regarding contract modification (modificación contractual), the claim arises from the setting of the percentage up to which a contract may be modified. This is based on the fact that the special regime provides for a modification percentage of 100%, whereas the LGCP establishes a percentage of 20% and up to 50% in exceptional cases. In this regard, what should instead be questioned is the reasonableness and proportionality of a contract modification amounting to 100% of the original amount and term—that is, doubling the initial conditions—which instead suggests poor planning and weak management, shortcomings that increase the final cost and are unacceptable in these times of severe economic constraints. In this regard, it must be noted that the defined percentage falls within the reasonable limits established internationally. We could therefore state that it is a percentage within the Latin American average and proportionate to the European Union’s rules on the matter. It bears noting that some legal systems have more stringent percentage-based regulations, while in others the reasonableness of percentages lower than those contained in the LGCP is debated.
It should not be overlooked that the new model established by the LGCP and the principles that apply across the regulations include a series of tools aimed at preventing the need to make contract modifications of that magnitude. Examples include strengthening governance, a strong commitment to fostering planning, approval by stages, empowering the Administration and imposing a duty to assume responsibility, the need to fully develop the tender specifications (pliegos de condiciones) before issuing a call for bids, and eliminating incentives that encourage a lack of rigor and certainty during the preliminary stages of tender procedures.
Additionally, regarding the special procedures available to ICE under the LGCP, they state that these are not as efficient as the previous special regime. However, it should be noted that these procedures arise from the provisions of the special regime, concern the same subject matters, and include conditions related to those provided for under the previous regime, without any showing that they are less efficient. On the contrary, they introduce conditions—such as those associated with the purchase of technology—from which ICE could benefit when processing its acquisitions. It must be emphasized that these special procedures arise precisely from the idea of granting ICE and competing companies specific flexibility that allows them to compete in the relevant market.
The action also briefly states that Articles 133 and 134, subsections j) and k), reinstate the application of Ley n.° 8131 to ICE, alleging a restriction on its administrative and financial autonomy. Nevertheless, Article 134, in both subsection j) and subsection k), refers primarily to adjustments in nomenclature and in the internal structure of the Dirección de Contratación Pública. It also makes clear that the public procurement subsystem being incorporated will seek to ensure that the Central Administration’s public procurement procedures are managed in accordance with the LGCP (Article 98 of Ley n.° 8131).
It is appropriate to note that all the specific objections raised regarding the content of the LGCP are associated with the applicants’ disagreement with what was debated and approved by the ordinary legislature, without the presence of any constitutional defect, because, as noted, this is a matter falling within its discretionary authority. In view of the foregoing, this Contraloría General finds no grounds whatsoever for declaring the provisions challenged in this action unconstitutional, and the grounds asserted amount to a general argument devoid of supporting reasons. To the contrary, it must be stressed that the LGCP aims to ensure that all contractual activity of contracting parties is governed by the same regulatory framework, leaving behind the previous fragmented system, under which a wide variety of special regimes existed, consisting of scattered regulations with variations that failed to achieve their intended objective.
It is also important to reiterate that international trade agreements do not expressly include an obligation to establish a special regime for ICE or for any other state institution or public enterprise. Such is the case with the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), which contains no provision to that effect. The implementation agenda does not form part of the trade agreement as such or of the obligations undertaken toward the other signatory parties; instead, it could be regarded as a domestic commitment.
A distinction must be drawn between the implementation agenda (agenda de implementación), which established the need to enact modernization legislation, and what would constitute the creation of a special procurement regime (régimen especial de contratación), given that the treaty at no point establishes any obligation related to establishing a special procurement regime for the benefit of ICE. The regulations incorporated into the ICE Strengthening Law (Ley de Fortalecimiento del ICE), and particularly the public procurement regime (régimen de contratación pública) arising therefrom, reflect a decision made at the time by the ordinary legislature, as was also the case with the LGCP. Contrary to the petitioner’s assertions, and in response to the need to afford ICE and other public enterprises operating in competitive markets certain flexibility, a differentiated threshold system (régimen diferenciado de umbrales) with higher amounts was created specifically to address the need for greater flexibility in ICE’s public-procurement management, establishing reasonable and proportionate parameters based on budget execution.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the arguments concerning the efficiency of the previous special regime for ICE’s acquisition of goods and services, as well as the delays or obstacles that, in the petitioners’ view, result from ICE’s application of the LGCP, are based exclusively on assumptions or mere conjecture lacking evidentiary support. Furthermore, as stated above, international trade agreements do not at any point establish the need to create a special regime for ICE’s acquisition of goods and services. On the contrary, this is a determination entrusted to the ordinary legislature, as the Constitutional Chamber itself has held. In the case of the LGCP, the legislature has specifically created for ICE a special regime with certain flexibilities, consisting of higher thresholds and special procedures—some applicable to all entities operating in competitive markets and some exclusive to ICE—intended to facilitate that institution’s management of public procurement, in recognition of the fact that it operates in a competitive market.
On the terms set forth above, the requested report is hereby submitted, with the expectation of prompt processing given the significance of this matter and, principally, because, in the opinion of this Office of the Comptroller General, the petitioner’s objections lack evidentiary support for the relief sought. VI. RELIEF REQUESTED Based on the foregoing factual and legal considerations, it is respectfully requested that the present constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) brought against Articles 1°, 2, 68, 69, 70, 134, subsection d), and 135, subsection c), of the LGCP be dismissed in its entirety (sin lugar).”
The Board shall be governed by its autonomous regulations (reglamento autónomo).
Rulings with suspensive effect (efecto suspensivo) issued in administrative proceedings (sede administrativa) or by the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda) in matters of administrative procurement (contratación administrativa) shall be exceptional. To protect the public interest, when a stay of the act is requested, the applicant shall be required to post security (caución), without prejudice to ICE and its companies, as applicable, providing such counter-security or guarantee (contracautela o garantía) as may be set. Once the counter-security or guarantee has been provided, the stay of the act shall be lifted ex officio.
The Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) shall exercise its powers through ex post oversight (control posterior). “ARTICLE 21.- Contracting capacity. ICE shall have full capacity to enter into lawful contracts of every kind for the purpose of purchasing, selling, or leasing goods and services, establishing trusts (fideicomisos), and, in general, using any other means or undertaking any other activity necessary for the proper fulfillment of its purposes. It may also enter into loan agreements, provide financing, mortgage property, and grant guarantees or suretyships (avales). ICE shall be authorized to lease its networks and other available scarce resources to third parties. Public-domain property (bienes de dominio público) may not be encumbered.” ARTICLE 22.- Ordinary competitive procedures. ICE shall use the ordinary procedures of public bidding (licitación pública) and abbreviated bidding (licitación abreviada), in accordance with the provisions of this chapter; it may also apply the special direct-procurement regime (régimen especial de contratación directa).
The Regulations to this Law may establish special rules concerning the structure and requirements of the aforementioned ordinary competitive procedures (procedimientos ordinarios de concurso), provided that the constitutional principles of administrative procurement are observed.
ICE, considered individually, shall use the public-bidding procedure for procurements whose value is equal to or greater than the amount obtained by multiplying the entity’s budget for the acquisition of goods and nonpersonal services by the factor resulting from dividing the threshold specified for public bidding in subsection a) of Article 27 of the Ley general de contratación administrativa by the reference budget applicable to ICE, considered individually, as provided in that same article. If application of this paragraph results in thresholds lower than those established in Article 27 of Ley N.° 7494, Contratación administrativa, the thresholds specified in that Law shall be used.
The abbreviated-bidding procedure shall apply to contracts whose value falls between the direct-procurement amount specified in subsection a) of Article 27 of Ley N.° 7494, Contratación administrativa and the public-bidding threshold resulting from application of the formula set forth in the preceding paragraph.
The reference budget is the budget that must be applied to ICE, considered individually, in accordance with Article 27 of Ley N.° 7494, Contratación administrativa, as currently adjusted. ARTICLE 23.- Exceptions to ordinary competitive procedures. In addition to the exceptions to ordinary competitive procedures provided for in the general regulatory framework governing administrative procurement, ICE may apply the following grounds for exclusion (causales de exclusión): a) Agreements entered into with public enterprises of other countries. b) The sale, in the domestic and international markets, of advisory, consulting, training, and any other products or services related to its powers. c) Procurement activities which, for reasons of security, urgency, emergency, or expediency, are necessary to ensure service continuity or to introduce improvements or new technologies into its products or services. d) Gratuitous-assistance contracts (contratos de ayuda desinteresada) with natural persons, nongovernmental organizations, or private or public entities, whether domestic or foreign. e) The acquisition of goods, works, or services that, because of their great complexity or specialized nature, can be obtained only where there is a limited number of suppliers or contractors, such that, for reasons of economy and efficiency, use of the ordinary procedures would be inappropriate. f) Cases in which the Administration, having acquired technological equipment, decides to acquire additional products from the same contractor for reasons of standardization or the need to ensure compatibility, taking into account whether the original contract adequately met the needs of the procuring Administration, whether the price is reasonable, and, especially, whether the existence of better alternatives on the market was ruled out. g) The procurement of trusts.
The application of the foregoing grounds shall be the exclusive responsibility of the Administration, and authorization from external bodies or entities shall not be required. In the case file (expediente) for each specific case, the Administration shall place on record the reasons supporting application of the ground for exclusion from the ordinary competitive procedures; this shall be subject to the discretionary ex post oversight of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. ARTICLE 24.- Reverse auction. ICE may use award by reverse auction (subasta a la baja) to acquire any type of product or service. Before using this procedure, ICE shall establish the terms for participation in the auction, which shall define, at a minimum, the technical and quality parameters of the goods or services to be acquired. The regulations governing this procedure shall ensure observance of the principles of administrative procurement and, in particular, safeguard the transparency of the negotiation.
ARTICLE 25.- Special rules for competitive procedures. The competitive procedure shall commence with the administrative decision to initiate it, which shall be issued by the competent official and shall contain the justification for proceeding, a description of the subject matter, an estimate of its cost, the estimated duration of the procedure, and sufficient human, administrative, and budgetary resources for performance of the contract. In exceptional cases, ICE may, to meet a highly qualified need, initiate administrative-procurement procedures under its own responsibility without available budgetary funding (contenido presupuestario); for this purpose, it shall guarantee the budget appropriation. In the tender specifications (cartel), the Administration shall expressly state that the validity of the procurement is contingent upon the availability of budgetary funding. For procurements whose performance extends over more than one budget period, the necessary provisions shall be adopted to guarantee payment of the obligations.
ARTICLE 26.- Challenges. An objection to the tender specifications (recurso de objeción contra el cartel) for a public or abbreviated bidding process shall be filed within the first quarter of the period for submitting bids, before the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic in public-bidding cases and, in all other cases, before the procuring Administration. This challenge shall be decided within ten business days following its filing. Upon expiration of that period, the challenge shall be deemed granted.
In the case of ICE, an appeal (recurso de apelación) shall be available only for public bidding. In all other cases, a motion for reconsideration (recurso de revocatoria) shall apply.
Every appeal shall be processed by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic in accordance with the rules established for abbreviated bidding in Ley N.° 7494, Contratación administrativa, de 1° de mayo de 1996, and its amendments. In the case of awards comprising several line items, the awarded amounts for the challenged line items shall be added together. In the case of continuing contracts (contratos continuados), the amount awarded for the initial term shall be taken into account, without considering any potential extensions. In bidding procedures of indeterminate value (licitaciones de cuantía inestimable), an appeal may be filed before the oversight body.
Without prejudice to the provisions of Ley N.° 7494, Contratación administrativa concerning disqualification sanctions (sanciones de inhabilitación), when it is demonstrated that an appeal was filed in bad faith to obstruct or impede the normal course of the procurement procedure initiated, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, ex officio or at ICE’s request, following due process and by means of a reasoned ruling, shall sanction the appellant by disqualifying it from contracting with the affected Administration or enterprise for a period of two (2) to five (5) years. The sanction may exceptionally be lifted for the purpose of procuring goods or services for which proven technological dependence exists or for which the bidder is the sole supplier. The sanction shall be set according to the loss and harm caused to ICE and to the provision of the services it supplies.
When an appeal is unavailable under the applicable procedure, reconsideration of the award decision may be requested before the same body that issued the decision, within five (5) business days following the date on which notice was given.
No motion for reconsideration shall be available against low-value direct procurements (contrataciones directas de escasa cuantía).
When it is demonstrated that a motion for reconsideration was filed in bad faith to obstruct or impede the normal course of the procurement procedure initiated, the procuring Administration shall apply the provisions of the second paragraph of the preceding article. ARTICLE 27.- Open contracting methods. ICE is hereby authorized to use such open methods of administrative procurement (tipos abiertos de contratación administrativa) as are duly incorporated into the Regulations to this Law. ARTICLE 28.- Limits on assignment. The contractor’s rights and obligations may not be assigned (cederse) without ICE’s prior express authorization through a duly reasoned act. Under no circumstances may an assignment contravene the prohibitions established in Ley N.° 7494, Contratación administrativa. ICE may authorize the assignment provided that the terms of the previous contract are not impaired. ARTICLE 29.- Approval. The approval process (trámite de refrendo) for ICE public-bidding contracts shall be decided by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic within a period not exceeding twenty (20) business days from the date on which the application was submitted to the oversight body.
The requirements for an approval application shall be established in the Reglamento de refrendo de las contrataciones issued by the oversight body, in accordance with the special provisions established for ICE in this Law.
Contracts and agreements that do not require approval by the Comptroller (refrendo contralor) shall be subject to approval by ICE’s Institutional Legal Advisory Unit (Unidad de Asesoría Jurídica Institucional del ICE), which shall decide independently of the opinion of the Procurement Office (Proveeduría) and Internal Audit Office (Auditoría Interna). The internal approval procedure shall be established by regulation.
Contract amendments made by ICE shall not be subject to approval. Ensuring the legality of such amendments shall be the exclusive responsibility of the Administration, and that matter shall be subject to the discretionary ex post oversight of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic.” As will be seen, Articles 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 were indeed repealed by Ley 9986, Ley General de Contratación Pública; nevertheless, it is incorrect to state that ICE’s Special Administrative Procurement Regime (Régimen Especial de Contratación Administrativa) was eliminated, because the Ley de Contratación Publica created a Section III, consisting of Articles 68, 69, and 70 and entitled Servicios en competencia, within Chapter IV, Procedimientos especiales, which forms part of Title II, Procedimientos de contratación pública.
What the legislature did was create a single body of rules governing public procurement (Contratación Pública), called Ley General de Contratación Pública, which included rules governing special procedures related to services provided under competitive conditions, expressly including ICE. 3.- Ley 9986 Ley General de Contratación Pública. The Ley General de Contratación Pública was processed as Bill File No. 21546 and was considered by a Special Committee created for that purpose: “Special Committee 21.563 tasked with analyzing, studying, proposing, and issuing a report on Expediente N°21.546 Ley General de Contratación Pública.” The Committee sought comments on Bill No. 21546 from several public institutions, including the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (sic), ICE, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Officials from the aforementioned institutions were also heard. The bill received a unanimous favorable committee report on 26 de junio del 2020.
Once before the Plenary, substantive motions were submitted pursuant to Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Assembly; these motions were considered by the reporting Committee, which approved several of them. Subsequently, on 20 de abril del 2021, the Bill was approved on First Reading by the Plenary and was then approved on Second Reading on 18 de mayo del 2021. Finally, Ley 9986, Ley General de Contratación Pública, was enacted and published in Supplement 100 of La Gaceta 103, dated 31 de mayo de 2021. It was established that the Law would enter into force eighteen months after its publication; accordingly, the Law entered into force on 01 de diciembre de 2022. Article 134(d) of the Ley General de Contratación Pública, Ley No. 9986, amended Article 11 of Ley 8660, Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones: “Article 134… d) Article 11 of Ley 8660, Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones, of 8 de agosto de 2008, is amended.
The text shall read as follows: Article 11—Trust agreements (contratos de fideicomiso). To fulfill their purposes, ICE and its companies are authorized to enter into agreements establishing trusts of any kind, both within and outside the national territory.// In addition, trusts established in the country shall be subject to the supervision and regulation of the corresponding financial superintendency, while trusts established outside the national territory shall, in this regard, be governed by the laws of the country in which they were established.” Article 135(c) of Ley 9986 also repealed Articles 12, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 of Ley 8660, Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones. “ARTICLE 135—Repeals.- The following provisions are repealed: “… c) Articles 12, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 of Ley 8660, Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones, of 8 de agosto de 2008, are repealed.
(…). Articles 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 formed part of Chapter IV of Ley 8660, entitled Special Administrative Procurement Regime (Régimen Especial de Contratación Administrativa). These articles provided as follows: “ARTICLE 20.- Regulation of procurement. ICE’s acquisition of goods and services shall be subject to the special provisions contained in this Law and its Regulations. Ley de Contratación Administrativa, N.° 7494, of 1° de mayo de 1996, as amended, and its Regulations shall apply on a supplementary basis.// The acquisition of goods and services by ICE companies incorporated as corporations shall be excluded from Ley de Contratación Administrativa.// ICE and its companies shall have a Corporate Procurement Board whose purpose is to conduct the corresponding administrative procurement procedures (procedimientos de contratación administrativa), including awards and challenges.
The Board shall be governed by its autonomous regulations.// Rulings with suspensive effect issued in administrative proceedings or by the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Court for Treasury Matters in administrative procurement matters shall be exceptional. To protect the public interest, when suspension of the act is requested, the applicant shall be required to post security (caución), without prejudice to ICE and its companies, as applicable, providing any countersecurity or guarantee required of them. Once the countersecurity or guarantee has been provided, the suspension of the act shall be lifted sua sponte.// The Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic shall exercise its powers through ex post oversight. ARTICLE 22.- Ordinary competitive procedures. ICE shall use the ordinary procedures of public bidding (licitación pública) and abbreviated bidding (licitación abreviada), in accordance with the provisions of this chapter; it may also apply the special direct-procurement regime (régimen especial de contratación directa).// The Regulations to this Law may establish special rules concerning the structure and requirements of the aforementioned ordinary competitive procedures, provided that the constitutional principles governing administrative procurement are observed.// ICE, considered individually, shall use the public-bidding procedure for procurements whose amount is equal to or greater than the sum obtained by multiplying the entity’s budget for acquiring goods and nonpersonal services by the factor resulting from dividing the threshold specified for public bidding in Article 27(a) of Ley general de contratación administrativa by the reference budget applicable to ICE, considered individually, as established in the same provision.
If application of this paragraph results in thresholds lower than those established in Article 27 of Ley N.° 7494, Contratación administrativa, the thresholds specified in that Law shall apply.// The abbreviated-bidding procedure shall apply to contracts whose amount falls between the direct-procurement amount specified in Article 27(a) of Ley N.° 7494, Contratación administrativa, and the public-bidding threshold resulting from application of the formula set forth in the preceding paragraph.// The reference budget shall be the budget applicable to ICE, considered individually, pursuant to Article 27 of Ley N.° 7494, Contratación administrativa, with its current adjustments. ARTICLE 23.- Exceptions to ordinary competitive procedures. In addition to the exceptions to ordinary competitive procedures provided for in the general regulatory framework governing administrative procurement, ICE may apply the following grounds for exclusion: a) Agreements entered into with public enterprises of other countries. b) The sale, in the domestic and international markets, of advisory, consulting, and training services and any other product or service related to its areas of authority. c) Procurement activities that, for reasons of security, urgency, emergency, or opportunity, are necessary to ensure service continuity or to introduce improvements or new technologies into its products or services. d) Agreements for gratuitous assistance with natural persons, nongovernmental organizations, or private or public entities, whether domestic or foreign. e) The acquisition of goods, works, or services that, because of their great complexity or specialized nature, can be obtained only when there is a limited number of suppliers or contractors, such that applying ordinary procedures would be inappropriate for reasons of economy and efficiency. f) Cases in which the Administration, having acquired technological equipment, decides to purchase additional products from the same contractor for reasons of standardization or the need to ensure compatibility, taking into account whether the original contract adequately met the contracting Administration’s needs, whether the price is reasonable, and, in particular, whether the existence of better alternatives on the market was ruled out. g) The procurement of trusts. // Application of the foregoing grounds shall be the exclusive responsibility of the Administration, without requiring authorization from external bodies or entities.
The Administration shall place on record, in the case file for each specific case, the reasons supporting application of the ground for exclusion from ordinary competitive procedures; this shall be subject to discretionary ex post oversight by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. ARTICLE 24.- Reverse auction (subasta a la baja). ICE may use award by reverse auction to acquire any type of product or service. Before using this procedure, ICE shall establish the terms for participation in the auction, which shall define, at a minimum, the technical and quality parameters of the goods or services to be acquired. The regulations governing this procedure shall ensure compliance with the principles of administrative procurement and shall specifically safeguard the transparency of the negotiation. ARTICLE 25.- Special rules for competitive procedures. The competitive procedure shall begin with the administrative decision to initiate it, which shall be issued by the competent official and shall contain a justification of its appropriateness, a description of the subject matter, an estimate of the cost of the subject matter, the estimated duration of the procedure, and sufficient human, administrative, and budgetary resources to perform the contract.
In exceptional cases, to address a highly qualified need, ICE may, under its own responsibility, initiate administrative procurement procedures without an available budget appropriation; for this purpose, it shall guarantee the budgetary allocation. In the solicitation documents (cartel), the Administration shall expressly state that the validity of the procurement is subject to the availability of a budget appropriation. For procurements whose performance extends over more than one budget period, the necessary arrangements shall be made to guarantee payment of the obligations. ARTICLE 26.- Administrative remedies (recursos). A challenge to the solicitation documents for a public or abbreviated bidding procedure shall be filed within the first quarter of the period for submitting bids, before the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic in public-bidding cases and, in all other cases, before the contracting Administration.
This challenge shall be decided within ten business days following its filing. Upon expiration of that period, the challenge shall be deemed granted.// In the case of ICE, an appeal (recurso de apelación) shall be available only in public-bidding proceedings. In all other cases, a motion for reconsideration (recurso de revocatoria) shall apply.// Every appeal shall be processed by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic in accordance with the rules established for abbreviated bidding in Ley N.° 7494, Contratación administrativa, of 1° de mayo de 1996, as amended. In cases involving awards comprising multiple line items, the amounts awarded for the challenged line items shall be added together. For continuing contracts, the amount awarded for the initial term shall be taken into account, without considering any extensions.
In procurements of an unquantifiable value, an appeal (recurso de apelación) may be filed with the oversight body.// Without prejudice to the provisions of Ley N.° 7494, Contratación administrativa, regarding disqualification sanctions (sanciones de inhabilitación), when it is demonstrated that an appeal has been filed in bad faith to obstruct or prevent the normal course of the initiated procurement procedure, the Contraloría General de la República, acting on its own initiative or at the request of ICE, following due process and by means of a reasoned decision, shall sanction the appellant by disqualifying it from contracting with the affected administration or company for a period of two (2) to five (5) years. The sanction may exceptionally be lifted for the purpose of procuring goods or services for which there is proven technological dependence or when the bidder is the sole supplier of such goods or services.
The sanction shall be determined according to the damage and losses caused to ICE and to the provision of the services it provides.//When, because of the applicable procedure, an appeal is unavailable, a motion for reconsideration (recurso de revocatoria) of the award decision may be requested before the same body that issued the decision, within five (5) business days following the date on which notice thereof was given.// No motion for reconsideration shall be available against low-value direct procurements.// When it is demonstrated that a motion for reconsideration has been filed in bad faith to obstruct or prevent the normal course of the initiated procurement procedure, the contracting administration shall apply the provisions of the second paragraph of the preceding section. ARTICLE 27.- Open types. ICE is hereby authorized to use such open types of administrative procurement as are duly incorporated into the regulations implementing this Law.
ARTICLE 28.- Limits on assignment. The contractor’s rights and obligations may not be assigned without the prior express authorization of ICE, issued through a duly reasoned decision. Under no circumstances may an assignment contravene the prohibitions established in Ley N.° 7494, Contratación administrativa. ICE may authorize the assignment provided that the terms of the previous contract are not impaired. ARTICLE 29.- Endorsement (refrendo). The endorsement process for ICE public tenders shall be decided by the Contraloría General de la República within a period not exceeding twenty (20) business days from the date on which the request was submitted to the oversight body.// The requirements for an endorsement request shall be established in the Reglamento de refrendo de las contrataciones, issued by the oversight body in accordance with the special provisions established for ICE in this Law.// Contracts and agreements that do not require endorsement by the oversight body shall be subject to approval by the Unidad de Asesoría Jurídica Institucional del ICE; the latter shall rule independently of the opinion of the Proveeduría and the Auditoría Interna.
The internal approval procedure shall be established by regulation.// Contract amendments made by ICE shall not be subject to endorsement. The administration shall bear sole responsibility for ensuring the legality of those amendments, which shall be subject to optional ex post oversight by the Contraloría General de la República.” It should also be noted that subsection d) of Article 135 of Ley 9986 repeals Articles 14, 61 subsection h), 100, 101, 102, 103 and 104 of Ley 8131, Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos, of 18 de setiembre de 2001. Regarding the trust arrangement (fideicomiso), although Article 14 of Ley 8131, Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos, is repealed, Chapter VI, Articles 79 to 82, governing the public trust agreement (Contrato de fideicomiso público), is created in the Ley de Contratación Pública. As already indicated, Article 21 on Contracting Capacity was retained in Ley 8660.
This allows ICE to retain broad discretion to use all procurement methods. ARTICLE 21.- Contracting capacity. ICE shall have full capacity to enter into lawful contracts of every kind for the purpose of purchasing, selling, or leasing goods and services, establishing trusts and, in general, using any other means or instrument necessary for the proper fulfillment of its purposes. It may also enter into loans, provide financing, grant mortgages, and provide guarantees or suretyships. ICE shall be authorized to lease its networks and other available scarce resources to third parties. Public-domain property may not be encumbered.” With respect to Articles 68, 69, 70 of Ley 9986, these articles form part of Section III, entitled Competitive Services, of Chapter IV, Special Procedures, contained in Title II, Public Procurement Procedures. “ARTICLE 68- Special procedure for INS, ICE and their companies operating under competitive conditions, JASEC and ESPH.
The Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS) and its corporations operating under competitive conditions, the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) and its companies operating under competitive conditions, the Junta Administrativa del Servicio Eléctrico de Cartago, and the Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia may use the special procedure governed by this article, regardless of the procurement amount, for the following: a) The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and its companies operating under competitive conditions, as well as the Junta Administrativa del Servicio Eléctrico de Cartago and the Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia, may use this special procedure solely to acquire goods, works, and services intended to generate, install, and operate networks and to provide, acquire, and market telecommunications and infocommunications products and services, as well as other information products and services and other convergent products and services, when, because of their great complexity or specialized nature, such goods, works, and services can be obtained only where there is a limited number of suppliers or contractors, or for duly substantiated reasons of economy and efficiency in properly serving the public interest, and the application of ordinary procedures is unsuitable. b) In the case of INS and its corporations operating under competitive conditions, when procuring insurance-intermediation services and the ancillary services provided for in Article 18 of Ley 8653, Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, of 22 de julio de 2008.// The special procedure shall include the following: i) An initial decision adopted pursuant to Article 37 of this Law and the availability of budgetary resources to cover the expenditure, in accordance with this Law.
It shall also be demonstrated that the qualified human, technical, and financial resources necessary to verify performance of the procurement contract are available. ii) Tender specifications (pliego de condiciones) and an invitation, through the unified digital system, to a minimum of five qualified bidders to participate. If the minimum number of qualified bidders is not reached, all suppliers listed in the unified digital system shall be invited. iii) The period for receiving bids shall be between five and fifteen business days, depending on the complexity of the subject matter, calculated from the day following notice of the invitation to participate through and including the day on which bids are opened. iv) This procedure shall be subject to the rules governing the correction of defects in a bid, the bid-validity period, the possibility of improving prices, the successful bidder’s obligation to provide a performance bond (garantía de cumplimiento), and the duty to state the reasons for the final decision, in accordance with the regulations governing a lower-value tender (licitación menor). v) The tender specifications may be challenged, and the procuring Administration itself shall have jurisdiction to hear the objection, in accordance with the rules governing a lower-value tender.vi) The final decision in the procedure may be challenged, and the procuring Administration shall have jurisdiction to hear the challenge through a motion for reconsideration, in accordance with Article 99 of this Law. vii) If the final decision in the procedure is annulled as a result of a motion for reconsideration, there shall be an obligation to award the contract again or declare the competitive procedure deserted (desierto) or unsuccessful (infructuoso), within a maximum period of ten business days from notice of the annulment decision.// Under this special procedure, the prequalification method, a phased process, or a financed competitive procedure may be used, subject to the provisions of this Law.
ARTICLE 69- Open procurement of services for institutions and companies operating under competitive conditions. Institutions and companies operating under competitive conditions may openly procure services from natural or legal persons that meet the requirements previously established by the Administration when, because of the particular characteristics of the subject matter of the contract, doing so is more advantageous to the public interest and when the commission payable has been established in advance by the contracting Administration.// To apply this procedure, the general requirements to be met shall be established and made available in the unified digital system. Those who meet the requirements may provide the services concerned, subject to compliance with the parameters to be defined by regulation. ARTICLE 70- Procurement of technology for institutions and companies operating under competitive conditions.
Institutions and companies operating under competitive conditions may use the special procedure governed by Article 68 of this Law when procuring the acquisition, maintenance, upgrading, or leasing of technological equipment for information technology, hardware and software, and information-system development.” At a hearing granted by the Comisión especial dictaminadora to Ms. Marta Acosta Zúñiga, Contralora General de la República, concerning Expediente 21.546, Ley General de Contratación Pública, she gave the following presentation. “ … the result of a major effort involving months of work by you, your advisers, officials of the Ministerio de Hacienda and various public institutions, as well as officials of the Contraloría. All of them contributed their knowledge in an exercise that I consider admirable, involving consensus and communication to arrive at a refined version of the bill in terms of quality, effectiveness, and clarity.
(…) New special procurement procedures were incorporated to address the requirements of public entities operating under competitive conditions, most notably a model for the insurance and telecommunications sectors that maintains and improves the purchasing conditions for those entities; this model was discussed and adjusted when necessary using data supplied by the institutions themselves. It must be made clear, however, that proposals seeking to include adjustments inconsistent with sound procurement-management practices were not accepted. It was possible to include improvements that strengthen the entities’ ability to discharge their responsibilities without adversely affecting them. For that purpose, information was shared that provided a basis for decision-making, and insofar as the bill’s regulation was not distorted, it was retained. In the other cases, important improvements were included for the benefit of the bill itself.
Likewise, observations concerning processes of great importance to the country were addressed, including currency procurements, electoral procurements, the service framework for the Sistema de Banca para el Desarrollo, and, in particular, the procurement of medicines for the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. All of this, as I have indicated, took into account the input of the highest-ranking officials of each of the entities involved, while respecting a fundamental pillar of this bill: effective competition.
For such cases, procedures allowing for competitive bidding were always promoted, while preserving speed and timeliness; for extreme cases, the emergency procedure was reviewed so that it could assist in genuinely unforeseeable situations, with the requirement that the results of purchases be made transparent when these procedures are used….” Special Committee tasked with analyzing, studying, proposing, and reporting on Expediente 21.546, Ley General de Contratación Pública. Expediente Nº 21.546 Minutes of extraordinary session N° 11; viernes 19 de junio de 2020. Regarding the principal argument advanced by the petitioner, namely, the issue of international trade agreements and the existence of an undertaking to grant ICE a special regime, in connection with the discussion of this matter during the consideration of the bill, ICE raised the issue before the Special Committee as part of the hearing granted to it, as may be seen in the Minutes of Session N° 6 of lunes 11 de noviembre de 2019, at which señora Irene Cañas Díaz, Executive President of Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, and señor Andrés Domian Astorga were heard.
Officials from Ministerio de Comercio Exterior also participated in a hearing before the Committee that studied (sic) the bill, and Minister Dyalá Jiménez expressly and precisely confirmed that the trade agreements contain no undertaking to grant ICE special regulations. The agreements do establish exceptions from application, for example regarding time limits, which do not apply to ICE. The Special Committee tasked with analyzing, studying, proposing, and reporting on Expediente 21.546 “Ley General de Contratación Pública” also granted a hearing to Señoras Dyalá Jiménez Figueres, Minister of Comercio Exterior, and Victoria Hernández Mora, Minister of Economía, Industria y Comercio; their participation may be seen in the Committee minutes for session N° 5 of lunes 28 de octubre de 2019. Señora Dyalá Jiménez Figueres, Minister of Comercio Exterior, made the following statement: “The first point we set out in our opinion is the relationship between this subject matter and the trade instruments signed by Costa Rica.
We are observers to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement. Consequently, our obligations in this area are instead found in the various trade agreements, rather than in that plurilateral agreement, because we are only observers.” (…) “We merely wish to indicate that, in general, this law is consistent with the trade agreements we have signed and that concern us, including the agreement with Korea, which will enter into force shortly, and the agreement with the United Kingdom, which will replace the Agreement with the European Union.” Likewise, the unanimous affirmative committee report (Dictamen afirmativo unánime) of 26 de junio 2020 on Expediente N.° 21.546 “Ley General de Contratación Pública,” issued by Special Committee 21.563, tasked with analyzing, studying, proposing, and reporting on expediente N°21.546 “Ley General de Contratación Pública,” stated as follows: “(…) SPECIAL REGULATIONS FOR STRATEGIC MATTERS: The bill provides specific regulations for certain institutions whose operating dynamics warrant differentiated rules, whether because they operate in strategic sectors, because they are the sole entity purchasing a particular good, or because the public procurement falls within a broader project pursuing a specific purpose.
Thus, Article 68 of the bill establishes a special procedure for procuring telecommunications and insurance goods, works, and services in competitive markets. In the case of Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), this statutory authorization is limited to the procurement of goods or services that, because of their great complexity or specialization, may be obtained only from a limited number of suppliers. In the case of Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS), the special procedure applies only when contracting for the acquisition, maintenance, updating, or leasing of technological equipment, hardware and software, the development of information systems, insurance-intermediation services, and the ancillary services provided for in Article 18 of ley N°8653, Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros. It must be borne in mind that both ICE and INS currently maintain a special administrative-procurement regime (régimen especial de contratación administrativa), which the bill seeks to eliminate so that the entire state apparatus makes purchases under a single statute, thereby achieving a more uniform, streamlined, and efficient system.
On that basis, it was considered appropriate that, for certain specific subject matters, both institutions should have a procedure that, while regulated in the same statute—and therefore subject to the remaining provisions of the law—would serve as a mechanism that, with shorter time limits but always observing competitive bidding (concurso), would allow them to meet the response times required by those administrations operating under a competitive regime.” There were also several statements by male and female members of the Legislative Assembly upon the approval of Expediente N.° 21.546, Ley General de Contratación Pública, in the Second Debate. In the Minutes of Ordinary Plenary Session N.º 6 of martes 18 de mayo de 2021. (see pages 8248, 8247, 8246, 8239 and 8231). Some relevant excerpts concerning the views and interpretations expressed by the members of the Legislative Assembly regarding Ley de Contratación Pública and ICE are transcribed below.
Member Ana Lucia Delgado: (…) Therefore, it is necessary to move forward with a bill that places all institutions using public funds, in whole or in part, for their procurement under a single, efficient public-procurement regime, without this becoming a straitjacket for institutions that have a significant need for greater efficiency because they are competing in markets. (…) We also need public-procurement procedures that are less cumbersome, faster, and more effective. To that end, the proposal is to adopt procedures with shorter time frames and a more effective review regime (régimen recursivo), so that matters may be resolved more quickly. It also incorporates the possibility of resorting to a committee of experts to resolve disputes during the contract-performance stages, ensuring speed in the proceedings. (…) On another matter, I wish to use this opportunity to make the legislature’s intent clear regarding two key issues; the first concerns strategic alliances (alianzas estratégicas).
Strategic alliances are mechanisms that allow efforts and resources to be combined to achieve a particular purpose, with similar benefits for those participating in the undertaking. This is an arrangement that fosters competitive advantages, promotes comparative advantages, and maximizes human capital, as well as technological, financial, logistical, and other resources, in this case to serve the best public interest. Under this bill, strategic alliances are regulated as an exception to the established procedures, but the only strategic alliances exempted are those authorized by law for the purpose of attaining competitive advantages, all in accordance with each party’s line of business and the provisions governing them in the law authorizing them. This means that institutions such as Incofer, ICE, Sinart, and Correos de Costa Rica may continue to use this mechanism as authorized in their organic laws or special laws: Ley 7001, 8660, 8653, 7761.
It has never been the intention of this bill or of its sponsoring members to restrict this mechanism, which enables those institutions to better carry out their related activities. Therefore, nothing prevents them from continuing to observe and comply with the provisions on strategic alliances, as regulated by the law authorizing them, and it must accordingly be made clear that this bill does not repeal any provision authorizing their development. (…) “Member José María Villalta Flórez-Estrada: (…) The creation of special procedures applicable to institutions such as INS, ICE, and their companies operating within a competitive framework is also regulated. A single procurement system is created, and exceptions and ordinary procedures are reduced; regulations governing different procurement methods are also included, such as public works, trusts, leases, purchases of real property, and donations of movable and immovable property among institutions of the Public Administration, with the objective of extending the use of Sicop, the Electronic Procurement System, throughout the country.
Every institution in this country that contracts using public funds must use the Centralized Electronic Procurement System and digitize its administrative-procurement procedures. There is no longer any justification for excluding any public institution from this procurement system, in which transparency, publicity, and the optimal use of resources must prevail. This law also seeks to simplify administrative-procurement procedures. And I wish to emphasize this point: any interpretation of this law that results in more cumbersome time limits than those currently in place, or in more cumbersome and bureaucratic procedures or formalities, is incorrect, because the purpose of this law is to simplify, expedite, and make administrative-procurement procedures transparent. (…) Another matter that has prompted discussion and controversy is the regulation of public enterprises currently operating within a competitive framework; for example, ICE.
The bill amends or repeals certain articles of Ley 8660. During the legislative debate, we fought to prevent the repeal of certain articles, such as Article 21, which empowers and grants broad authority to ICE and its companies within the competitive context in which they operate. That was challenged by an institution such as ICE, which argued that, within the framework of market liberalization and the commitments undertaken in the Free Trade Agreement, the institution could not be denied the possibility of having a special procurement regime so that it could compete effectively, a claim with which we fully agree. After lengthy discussions in the committee, a consensus was reached, along with the conviction—and this law must be interpreted accordingly—that this law does not seek to deprive ICE or any institution operating in competition of the special procedures or mechanisms available to it.
In the case of ICE, the objective is to transfer those mechanisms, which are contained in Ley 8660, into this law while preserving the rationale for the exceptions, for example in Article 68. In other words, the objective is to preserve the exceptions under a special administrative-procurement regime that allows ICE and its companies operating in competition to remain competitive and continue participating in that competition, while preventing abuses of those exceptions but not eliminating them. This legislation must be interpreted accordingly. For example, Article 68, which establishes a special procedure for companies operating in competition, must be understood as reflecting the legislature’s intent to provide the institutions covered by it with the speed and flexibility in procurement matters that they currently have under Ley 8660, and that their private-sector competitors possess, so that they may acquire goods, works, and services intended to generate, install, and operate networks; provide, acquire, and market telecommunications and infocommunications products and services; and provide other information products and services and other convergent products and services.
It is vitally important to take the reference to convergence into account because, given ongoing research, innovation, and technological development, new services, new products, and new processes are created. Today, for example, there is discussion of smart or digital cities and the Internet of Things, as the provision of services increasingly requires the convergence of different sectors, products, or other services, with extensive use of information and communication technologies, telecommunications, and the electric power sector. Convergence enables interconnectivity ranging from urban transportation to medical devices, including electrical and power systems, applications responsible for environmental monitoring, water supply, electricity, energy management, and even intelligent transportation systems that assist drivers, as well as applications in security, agriculture, industry, and education, and education that would improve quality of life and efficiency in the provision of these services.
Thus, it is clear that these exceptions also apply throughout the telecommunications sector when ICE or its companies develop convergent projects or services. I likewise endorse the conforming interpretation (interpretación conforme) offered by Deputy Delgado Orozco, to the effect that this law does not seek to limit the ability of ICE, or of other competing public enterprises, to enter into strategic alliances under their governing legislation and enabling statutes; that could not be the purpose of this bill. With respect to Article 68, it is also important to emphasize that what is done there is to summarize in that article the exceptions currently available to ICE for procurement. It states that those exceptions apply when, because of their great complexity or specialized nature, the goods or services can only be obtained where there is a limited number of suppliers, or, as a second exception encompassing several of those currently in existence, for duly substantiated reasons of economy and efficiency in order to properly serve the public interest.
That “or” must not be understood as an “and”; we had a lengthy discussion about this. They are two distinct exceptions and must be correctly interpreted as such, because both exceptions may arise in connection with the activities of competing public enterprises—for example, for duly substantiated reasons of economy and efficiency when those institutions must conduct procurement quickly—without excluding other exceptions that are also provided for, such as those relating to information systems and the entire field of infocommunications and information technology. Deputy Carolina Delgado (…) Something very important, which also bears witness to that genuine desire among our colleagues to contribute, was that it has an approved consensus motion that made it possible to resolve the final concerns related, of course, to Instituto Costarricense de Energía regarding strategic alliances and other matters.
(…) Deputy Pablo Heriberto Abarca Mora: (…) There will be a single procurement procedure (procedimiento de contratación) that, obviously, recognizes particular circumstances. Those particular circumstances have also been developed through discussions of other bills and within the framework of free trade agreements; they are also found in specific circumstances recognized by the law, which additionally seeks to simplify them and subject them to the principles of transparency and reasonableness. No deputy participating in this process—and I am certain we will vote for it unanimously—believes that this will make the procurement process longer. Quite the contrary, we are supporting this initiative so that it will be interpreted in the future as a complete and swift simplification of the procedure and so that it will not create loopholes for circumventing the general law. (…) Deputy Luis Ramón Carranza Cascante: (…) I, for one, would be happy to see ICE building, because we went from one extreme to the other: from a State that built everything to leaving everything in the hands of private enterprise, as though they were all saints, and we all know that is not the case.
(…) Deputy Welmer Ramos González: So I do not buy that story about the public and private sectors. If the State has capabilities, it must use them. And I will say this here in no uncertain terms: if ICE had held the trust (fideicomiso) for building public educational infrastructure, it would already have done so, it would have done so on time, and it would have done so to a high standard. But for purely ideological reasons, there it remains. The money has already been spent; in fact, what remains are debts, et cetera, et cetera, and it has not been completed. (…) And there we have a very serious problem involving trusts that were supposedly in the best hands and which, a few years ago, we were told were indeed proceeding well because they involved private enterprise and trusts, et cetera; today, we realize what has become of all that. (…) President: Forty-eight deputies; voting shall begin at this time.
Voting is now closed. Forty-eight votes in favor, zero against. Approved.” CONCLUSIONS. The petitioners’ arguments that Articles 1, 2, 68, 69, 70, 134 subsection d), and 135 subsection c) of Ley 9986, Ley General de Contratación Pública, violate Article 7, first paragraph, of the Constitución Política are rejected. First, because, to the contrary, pursuant to Section III, Application of International Instruments in Public Procurement (Aplicación de instrumentos internacionales en compras públicas), (Article 9), of Ley 9986, Contratación Pública, the Costa Rican State confirms its commitment to faithfully comply with the obligations and rights established in the international rules that Costa Rica has formally incorporated into our domestic law. The cited provision expressly requires effective implementation of the public procurement chapters of the international trade instruments in force in Costa Rica.
Second, because it is incorrect to state that the Special Administrative Procurement Regime (Régimen Especial de Contratación Administrativa) for ICE was eliminated. Although Ley 9986, Contratación Pública, repealed the articles relating to the special procurement regime under Ley 8660, Fortalecimiento del ICE, at the same time this Ley de Contratación Pública incorporated, as a special provision, a special Procurement Regime for Competitive Services (régimen especial de Contratación para Servicios en Competencia). It did so by creating Section III, comprising Articles 68, 69, and 70, entitled Competitive Services (Servicios en competencia), contained in Chapter IV, Special Procedures (Procedimientos especiales), which forms part of Title II, Public Procurement Procedures (Procedimientos de Contratación Pública). Third, Article 21, concerning the Procurement Authority (Capacidad de contratación) of ICE, of Ley 8660, Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones, remains in force: “ARTICLE 21.- Procurement Authority ICE shall have full authority to enter into lawful contracts of every kind for the purpose of purchasing, selling, or leasing goods and services, establishing trusts, and, in general, using any other means or instrument necessary for the proper fulfillment of its purposes.
It may also enter into loan agreements, provide financing, grant mortgages, and provide guarantees or suretyships.// ICE shall be authorized to lease its networks and other available scarce resources to third parties. Public-domain assets shall not be subject to encumbrance.” Fourth, throughout the debate on the bill, as demonstrated by the documents cited below that form part of the legislative record (expediente legislativo) of Ley 9986, the legislators had information from authorities of institutions such as Contraloría General de la Republica and Ministerio de Comercio Exterior confirming that the bill complies with the international commitments undertaken by Costa Rica through treaties and/or international agreements formally incorporated into our domestic law. Fifth, the legislative records clearly show that the legislature’s intent was to provide institutions operating under conditions of open competition, such as ICE, with the necessary agility and flexibility in procurement matters. III.- RELIEF REQUESTED (PETITORIA) In accordance with the report submitted, it is requested that the constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) be dismissed”.
11- The statutory requirements have been complied with in the proceedings.
Justice Castillo Víquez drafts the opinion; and,
Considering:
An action of unconstitutionality is subject to specific formal requirements that must be satisfied for the Chamber validly to adjudicate the merits of a challenge brought through that procedural avenue.
Specifically, Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional governs standing (legitimación) to bring actions of unconstitutionality and provides for distinct circumstances. First, it requires a prior matter pending resolution, whether through judicial or administrative channels—in the proceeding for exhausting the latter—in which unconstitutionality has been invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest alleged to have been infringed. The second and third paragraphs of that provision contemplate circumstances in which, exceptionally, no prior matter is required, such as where, because of the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury; where diffuse or collective interests (intereses difusos o colectivos) are being defended; or where the action is brought directly by the contralor general de la República, the procurador general de la República, the fiscal general de la República, or the defensor de los Habitantes.
In this regard, the petitioner states that ICE belongs to the State and that every citizen or organized group therefore has an interest in its remaining strong and providing its services efficiently and effectively. He bases standing on the existence of diffuse interests, in connection with the interest “that ICE, as a national public enterprise, remain strong for the purpose of carrying out the objectives for which it was created, as stated above, and not be potentially threated (sic) by laws that would weaken it.” Based on the foregoing, the Presidency of the Chamber, in the resolution admitting this action for consideration issued at 10:28 hours on 13 de julio de 2023, determined that the petitioner’s standing arises under paragraph 2º of Article 75 because he appears in defense of diffuse interests. The majority of this Court agrees with that determination and therefore holds that these proceedings are admissible with respect to the petitioner’s standing.
THE CHALLENGED CONDUCT AND THE STANDARD OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW. Among the procedural prerequisites (presupuestos procesales) that this Chamber must assess during the admissibility stage of an action of unconstitutionality is the challenged subject matter. This refers both to the challenged conduct and to the standard of review (parámetro de control).
In the sub lite matter, the petitioner expressly alleges that the action “is based on articulo 73 inciso d) of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional and Article 7 of our Magna Carta, in view of the fact that the challenged articles conflict with the Free Trade Agreement (TLC), República Dominicana – Centroamérica – Estados Unidos, signed and ratified by our country...” It must therefore be noted that this Court, unanimously—although with a composition partially different from its current one—had held that constitutional review may not be conducted using a free trade agreement or bilateral investment treaty as the standard. Specifically:
“VIII.- The third allegation: Violation of the Free Trade Agreement. JUSTICE JINESTA LOBO DRAFTS THE OPINION. CONCERNING THE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE TRATADO DE LIBRE COMERCIO REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA, CENTROAMERICA Y LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA. The central issue to be resolved in this regard is whether the aforementioned Free Trade Agreement forms part of the standard of constitutionality (parámetro de constitucionalidad) against which this Court must assess the validity of a provision or act subject to Public Law that is challenged as unconstitutional. That instrument is what is known as a regional trade or investment agreement, which, per se, is subject to dynamic changes in the market, the economy, and free trade and could therefore even be renegotiated and amended. Certainly, in the Costa Rican case, in light of ordinal 7° of the Political Constitution, the aforementioned regional trade agreement assumed the legal form of a ‘Treaty’ and therefore clearly has a rank below the Constitution but above statutes.
In principle, the international treaties or conventions forming part of the standard of constitutionality are those belonging to Public International Law that concern human rights, as follows from the language and doctrine underlying Articles 48 of the Political Constitution and 38, paragraph 2°, and 74 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Such instruments of Public International Human Rights Law may even, under certain circumstances, have constitutional or supra-constitutional rank, for example, when they afford persons a higher threshold of protection than constitutional provisions do—the doctrine of the primacy of the more favorable clause or the principles in dubio pro homine or pro libertate. Under this interpretation, this Constitutional Court is deemed to lack jurisdiction to determine whether a statutory provision violates a regional trade agreement that assumed the legal form of a treaty.
All matters concerning whether a given statute violates a regional trade agreement having a rank above statutes but below the Constitution must be heard and decided by the ordinary courts, not by constitutional judges. This Court obviously does have jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of the aforementioned regional trade agreements, as it has done in the past” (judgment no. 2017-002791, reiterated—among others—in judgment no. 2020-007684).
Nevertheless, this Sala Constitucional considers that it does have jurisdiction to hear actions against statutory or sub-statutory provisions (normas legales o infralegales) in which a violation of a free trade agreement is alleged, based on the following considerations.
First, Article 7, first paragraph, of the Political Constitution makes no distinction whatsoever regarding the subject matter of the treaty, providing:
Article 7º.- Public treaties, international agreements, and concordats, duly approved by the Asamblea Legislativa, shall, from the date of their promulgation or from the date they designate, have authority superior to statutes.
For its part, Article 1 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional provides:
Article 1. The purpose of this law is to regulate constitutional jurisdiction (jurisdicción constitucional), the object of which is to guarantee the supremacy of constitutional rules and principles and of the International or Community Law in force in the Republic; their uniform interpretation and application; and the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution or in the international human rights instruments in force in Costa Rica.
Meanwhile, Article 2 inciso b) of the Law governing this jurisdiction states as follows:
Article 2. Constitutional jurisdiction is specifically responsible for:
(…)
And, in keeping with the foregoing, in the specific chapter on the action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad), that law provides for the possibility of exercising a form of indirect constitutional review (control de constitucionalidad indirecto), that is, review of the conformity of statutory or substatutory provisions with the international treaties and conventions referred to in Article 7 of the Constitution when there is an evident and manifest contradiction between the international convention and domestic law, such that the constitutional defect arises from comparing the subject matter regulated—which in both cases is the same—and determining that an irreconcilable contradiction exists. Specifically, it provides:
Article 73. An action of unconstitutionality shall lie:
(...)
Accordingly, the Chamber is called upon to hear this action using the cited Free Trade Agreement as the standard of review because—as already stated—the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, in Articles 2(b) and 73(d), expressly grants it jurisdiction to review the conformity of statutory provisions or general provisions with the international treaties and conventions mentioned in Article 7 of the Constitution; and, as can be seen, there is an irreconcilable contradiction between international and domestic law, such that the latter conflicts with the former.
Now, the Chamber is certainly not called upon to assess matters relating to the application and interpretation of an FTA, much less minor or technical potential contradictions, which must be resolved through the dispute-settlement mechanisms (mecanismos de resolución de controversias) of the treaty itself. What does fall within its jurisdiction, as in this case, is to determine whether the challenged statutory provisions conflict with that international treaty when the contradiction is evident and manifest.
Ergo, this proceeding is also admissible with respect to its subject matter.
Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes that, within 15 days following the first publication of the notice contemplated in the second paragraph of Article 81, the parties appearing in matters pending on the date the action was filed, or persons with a legitimate interest, may enter an appearance to support the arguments that could justify granting or denying the action, or to expand the grounds of unconstitutionality (motivos de inconstitucionalidad) in connection with the matter in which they have an interest.
In this regard, the Presidency of the Chamber, by decision issued at 14:03 hours on 21 de agosto de 2023, recognized Ermen Prado Arroyo, president of Asdeice, as a supporting party in favor of the action (coadyuvante activo), since he entered an appearance on 9 de agosto de 2023; that is, within the period referred to ut supra (the first publication in the Boletín Judicial occurred on 18 de julio de 2023).
Furthermore, on 7 de agosto de 2023, the ICE’s attorneys-in-fact not only responded to the hearing granted in the order admitting the action for processing, but also sought supporting intervention. Consequently, because the latter was filed within the period established for that purpose in the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the ICE is recognized as a supporting party in favor of the action.
Now, both supporting interventions, based on the existence of a diffuse interest (interés difuso) in the matter at hand, must be limited to the provisions challenged in the filing that initiated the action, since their nature is ancillary to the declaration of unconstitutionality sought by the petitioner. Ergo, pursuant to Article 83 eiusdem, it is appropriate only to analyze new arguments that justify granting the action or expand the grounds of unconstitutionality, but not those challenging other articles. As this Court has held on other occasions, a supporting party—insofar as its procedural intervention is ancillary—may “expand the grounds of unconstitutionality but may not challenge other provisions” (voto nro. 2017002791), nor “alter the subject matter of the action” (voto nro. 2022002238).
Therefore, the ICE’s request, in its capacity as a supporting party, to add to or expand this action with respect to Articles 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, and 134(j) and (k) of the Ley General de Contratación Pública must be denied, since those provisions were not formally challenged by the petitioner.
The petitioner brings an action of unconstitutionality against Articles 1, 2, 68, 69, 70, 134(d), and 135(c) of Law No. 9986, entitled “Ley General de Contratación Pública,” on the ground that they are contrary to the first paragraph of Article 7 of the Constitución Política and subsection (d) of Article 73 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. The petitioner states that the challenged provisions violate the “Tratado de Libre Comercio República Dominicana - Centroamérica - Estados Unidos (TLC).” The petitioner asserts that legislative file No. 21.546, which formed the basis for the Ley General de Contratación Pública, shows that one of its objectives was to eliminate every special administrative-procurement regime (régimen especial de contratación administrativa). The petitioner states that the challenged provisions place the ICE on the same footing as other State-owned enterprises without analyzing or assessing the origin of the special administrative-procurement regime that it previously enjoyed.
The petitioner argues that the existence of the ICE and its companies is placed at risk by subjecting them to a general procurement regime that does not account for their particular administrative and budgetary needs or the competitive conditions of the telecommunications sector, which changes so rapidly because of technology. The petitioner states that the special regime implemented through the TLC sought more agile and efficient administrative procurement, with greater administrative autonomy; however, the current law disregards those principles and is unconstitutional because it represents a regression. The petitioner adds that the ICE and its companies lose agility, efficiency, and administrative autonomy by being subjected to lengthy procurement procedures and additional steps in the acquisition process. The petitioner submits the following request for relief: “In light of the foregoing, pursuant to Articles 73(d) and 75 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional and Article 7 of the Constitución Política, the following is requested: • That this Action of Unconstitutionality be admitted. • That Articles 1, 2, 68, 69, 70, 134(d), and 135(c) of the Ley General de Contratación Pública be declared unconstitutional with respect to the ICE and its companies because they are contrary to Article 7 of the Constitución Política.” The ICE, in its capacity as a supporting party in favor of the action, expands the grounds of unconstitutionality with respect to Articles 1, 2, 68, 69, 70, 134(d), and 135(c) of the Ley General de Contratación Pública. It states that they violate Article 33 of the Constitución Política and the principle of equality (principio de igualdad).
Articles 1, 2, 68, 69, 70, 134(d), and 135(c) of the Ley General de Contratación Pública provide:
“ARTICLE 1—Scope of application This law applies to all contracting activity that uses public funds in whole or in part.
Private parties engaged in contracting activity, when they administer or hold public funds in custody or when they receive gratuitous financial benefits or benefits without any consideration from components of the Public Treasury, pursuant to Article 5 of Law No. 7428, Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, dated 4 de noviembre de 1994, shall apply this law only when the procurement exceeds 50% of the lower threshold established for minor tendering (licitación menor) under the ordinary regime. In cases where private parties do not apply this law, they shall comply with the disqualification regime (régimen de prohibiciones), the constitutional and statutory principles of public procurement, and Article 128(d) of this law.
This law shall not apply to non-State public entities whose financing comes, by more than fifty percent (50%), from their own resources or from the payments or contributions of their members, or to public enterprises in which the majority of the share capital is owned by private parties rather than by the public sector.
Whenever the term “Administration” or “contracting entity” is used in this law, it shall be understood to refer to parties engaged in public-procurement activities under this law.
ARTICLE 2—Exclusions from the application of the law The following activities are excluded from the scope of this law:
All other procurements shall be governed by this law.
ARTICLE 68—Special procedure for the INS, the ICE and their companies operating in competitive markets, JASEC, and ESPH. The Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS) and its corporations operating in competitive markets; the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) and its companies operating in competitive markets; the Junta Administrativa del Servicio Eléctrico de Cartago; and the Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia may use the special procedure governed by this Article, regardless of the procurement amount, for the following:
The special procedure shall include the following:
Under this special procedure, the prequalification method (modalidad de precalificación), phased procedure (por etapas), or financed tender (concurso con financiamiento) may be used, subject to the provisions of this law.
ARTICLE 69—Open Procurement of Services for Institutions and Enterprises Operating in Competitive Markets Institutions and enterprises operating in competitive markets may procure services on an open basis from natural or legal persons that meet the requirements previously established by the Administration when doing so is more advantageous to the public interest, in view of the particular characteristics of the subject matter of the contract, and when the commission payable has been predetermined by the contracting Administration.
To apply this procedure, the general requirements to be met shall be established and made available in the unified digital system. Those meeting the requirements may provide the services concerned, subject to the parameters to be defined by regulation.
ARTICLE 70—Procurement of Technology for Institutions and Enterprises Operating in Competitive Markets Institutions and enterprises operating in competitive markets may use the special procedure governed by Article 68 of this law when procuring the acquisition, maintenance, and updating or leasing of information technology equipment, hardware and software, and information-system development.
ARTICLE 134—Amendments The statutory provisions indicated below are amended:
(…)
Article 11—Trust Agreements For the fulfillment of their purposes, ICE and its companies are authorized to enter into agreements establishing trusts (contratos de constitución de fideicomisos) of any kind, within and outside the national territory.
Furthermore, trusts established in the country shall be subject to the supervision and regulation of the corresponding financial superintendency, while trusts established outside the national territory shall, in this respect, be governed by the laws of the country in which they were established.
ARTICLE 135—Repeals The following provisions are repealed:
(...)
The petitioning party brings a constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) against Articles 1, 2, 68, 69, 70, 134 subsection d), and 135 subsection c) of Law No. 9986, entitled “General Public Procurement Law,” on the grounds that they are contrary to the first paragraph of Article 7 of the Political Constitution. It states that the “Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR)” imposed on Costa Rica the obligation to conduct an internal process to fulfill the commitments undertaken, including the enactment of a “Law on the Modernization and Strengthening of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector.” It notes that, for that reason, Law No. 8660, entitled “Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector,” was enacted, establishing a special administrative procurement (contratación administrativa) regime for ICE and its companies; however, that regime was subsequently repealed by the General Public Procurement Law.
It asserts that the challenged articles conflict with CAFTA-DR and that the action is therefore based on subsection d) of Article 73 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law and Article 7 of the Constitution. It states that the agreement recognized the government’s commitment to strengthen and modernize ICE, for which purpose it was agreed that modern legislation would be established in connection with opening the private-network, internet-service, and cellular-service markets to competition. It argues that section “8.10 Telecommunications” states: “It was agreed that Costa Rica shall enact a law for the modernization and strengthening of ICE and shall have in effect modern legislation to regulate the sector, including the establishment of a regulatory authority.” It maintains that Annex 13 of CAFTA-DR includes Costa Rica’s obligation to enact a legal framework to strengthen ICE so that it can face competition and have the instruments necessary to provide high-quality service promptly.
It contends that matters regulated within the framework of the treaty negotiations cannot be weakened by a subsequent law. It states that the law enacted in connection with CAFTA-DR was both a commercial matter of expediency and a legal matter that was extensively discussed and agreed upon, without which ICE and its companies are exposed to a high risk of regulatory regression and to violations of efficiency, effectiveness, and competitiveness in administrative procurement. It indicates that the General Public Procurement Law is not efficient in terms of time frames and procedures for a State institution that competes with private companies. It states that depriving ICE of the procurement instrument contemplated by CAFTA-DR undermines an essential part of Law No. 8660 and the commitments undertaken by the State to ensure its full effectiveness. It adds that the Chamber, in Decision No. 11210 of July 16, 2008, stated: “…
An analysis of the bill under review reveals the legislature’s clear intention to provide the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad with the conditions necessary for greater administrative, financial, and technological efficiency and effectiveness. This, of course, is within the framework of a process of opening the telecommunications market—already decided by the people through approval in the referendum of the United States–Central America–Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (Referendum Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007)—which seeks to strengthen public operators in the face of potential competition. Indeed, the following may be inferred from the considerations of those who issued the committee report on the bill: ‘(...) The bill at issue proposes a special administrative procurement regime for ICE’s acquisition of goods and services. Regarding this matter, one of the stated objectives of the bill under consideration is to provide ICE with agile, efficient, and effective administrative procurement as part of the efforts to strengthen and modernize that entity, as well as to establish a body of rules adapted to its particular characteristics.
Both the Constitutional Chamber and the Office of the Comptroller General have recognized the possibility of special regimes, provided that the nature and particular characteristics of the public activity in question so require and insofar as the circumstances contemplated in the general regulations are not applicable. As proposed in that report, such a regime must therefore regulate the specific conditions governing the administrative procurement of ICE and its companies and must necessarily take into account the constitutional principles enshrined in Articles 182 and 184. In this area, the legislature is entrusted with clearly specifying the particular rules and parameters that justify regulation outside the general legal framework, developing their content in the law, and incorporating the constitutional principles governing the State’s administrative procurement activities, as proposed in the present text.
Within the framework of those objectives, it was emphasized that one of the principal difficulties historically faced by the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and its companies in administrative procurement is that the financial thresholds used to determine the applicable procurement procedures do not necessarily conform to their requirements. Accordingly, it may be inferred that the legislature’s intent in the legislation under review is to adapt the financial thresholds for administrative procurement to ICE’s circumstances and scale. The analytical report stated as follows: “(...) Along the same lines, ICE and its companies currently use the procedures of public bidding (licitación pública), abbreviated bidding (licitación abreviada), and direct procurement (contratación directa), according to the financial thresholds established in Article 27 of the Administrative Procurement Law and its amendments.
That methodology is not in itself problematic; however, because the reference budget applicable to ICE represents slightly more than 10% of the Institution’s budget, it became necessary to establish a methodology that would allow the financial procurement thresholds to be adapted to the circumstances and scale of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and its companies, without losing sight of the fact that the body competent to establish those thresholds is the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. (...)” (emphasis not in the original). Accordingly, the text under review does not seek to disregard administrative procurement procedures but instead to establish amounts more consistent with the particular budgetary characteristics of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, which is legitimate under the Law of the Constitution...’ (underlining not in the original).” It argues that, once the constitutional review had been completed, Law No. 8660 was enacted, and its objectives include: “… a) To strengthen, modernize, and provide the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), its companies, and its affiliated bodies with legislation enabling them to adapt to all changes in the legal regime governing the generation and provision of electricity services, as well as telecommunications, infocommunications, information products and services, and other convergent services. e) To make more flexible and expand the public procurement mechanisms and procedures available to ICE and its companies. f) To guarantee and reaffirm the administrative and financial autonomy of ICE and its companies ...” It states that the special regime established by that law enabled greater speed and efficiency in the acquisition of goods and services, in accordance with the provisions of CAFTA-DR.
It alleges that Articles 1, 2, and 135 subsection c) of the General Public Procurement Law are unconstitutional. It notes that, pursuant to Article 7 of the Constitution, public treaties and international agreements ratified by the Legislative Assembly have authority superior to that of statutes. It maintains that CAFTA-DR, approved by popular vote, ranks only below the Political Constitution. It states that the challenged articles disregard ICE’s special administrative procurement regime, which formed part of the content of CAFTA-DR. It asserts that Legislative File No. 21.546, which served as the basis for the General Public Procurement Law, shows that one of its objectives was to eliminate every special administrative procurement regime. It contends that this legislation places ICE on the same footing as other State-owned enterprises without analyzing or assessing the origin of the special administrative procurement regime it previously enjoyed.
It considers it contrary to the Law of the Constitution for a subsequent provision to disregard legislation implementing an international treaty and to impose the obligation to use a general framework that conflicts with the special regime, which is more effective and efficient for facing competition. It asserts that the continued existence of ICE and its companies is jeopardized by subjecting them to a general procurement regime that does not address their particular administrative, budgetary, and competitive needs in the telecommunications sector, which changes so rapidly because of technology. It states that the special regime implemented through CAFTA-DR sought more agile and efficient administrative procurement with greater administrative autonomy; nevertheless, the current law disregards those principles and is unconstitutional because it constitutes a regression. It adds that ICE and its companies lose administrative autonomy by being subjected to lengthy procurement procedures and additional steps in the acquisition process.
It argues that Chapter 9 of Annex 13 to CAFTA-DR provides: “II. Modernization of ICE. Costa Rica shall enact a new legal framework to strengthen ICE through its appropriate modernization no later than December 31, 2004….” It explains that, following the repeal of the special regime, ICE is required to use a procedure with more stringent time frames and stages in cases involving major competitive bidding (licitación mayor), which is disproportionate and burdensome because it further slows administrative and financial management; moreover, it undermines the agility required to respond to a competitive market in conducting its telecommunications and electricity businesses. It adds that, under the special regime, ICE had both higher thresholds and shorter time frames. It states that ICE could also adjudicate appeals (recursos) in certain circumstances; however, the General Public Procurement Law assigned this authority to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, thereby weakening ICE’s administrative, financial, and procedural autonomy.
It adds that this also impairs the effectiveness of administrative procurement procedures for ICE because the oversight body must adjudicate appeals in procedures that do not take account of the institutions’ type, nature, and budget (notwithstanding the establishment of a differentiated regime for companies). It challenges the General Public Procurement Law’s elimination of the low-value direct procurement exception (contratación directa de escasa cuantía)—an agile and expedited procedure, not subject to appeal, with a time frame of 15 days—and its imposition of reduced competitive bidding (licitación reducida), which establishes the right to object to the tender specifications (cartel) and to seek revocation of the final decision. It states that the regulations implementing Law No. 8660 allowed ICE to amend contracts under performance in order to acquire the same or similar goods for up to 100% of the awarded amount; however, Article 101 of the General Public Procurement Law limits that possibility and makes it exceptional. It states that the General Public Procurement Law, in Articles 133 and 134 (subsections j and k), reinstates the obligation to apply Law No.
8131 entitled “Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos,” which limits the administrative and financial autonomy necessary to achieve its objectives and adequately implement the TLC. It asserts that, based on the same arguments, it challenges Articles 68, 69, 70, and 134(d) of the Ley General de Contratación Pública. It submits the following request for relief (petitoria): “In light of the foregoing, pursuant to Articles 73(d) and 75 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional and Article 7 of the Constitución Política, the following is requested: • That this constitutional challenge (Acción de Inconstitucionalidad) be admitted. • That Articles 1, 2, 68, 69, 70, 134(d), and 135(c) of the Ley General de Contratación Pública be declared unconstitutional with respect to ICE and its companies, as they are contrary to Article 7 of the Constitución Política.”
ARTICLES 1, 2, 68, 69, 70, AND 135, SUBSECTION C), OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW, LAW 9986. In the opinion of the majority of this Court, the constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) should be granted with respect to articles 1, 2, 68, 69, 70, and 135, subsection c), of the General Public Procurement Law, Law no. 9986, insofar as they completely and absolutely eliminate the special administrative procurement regime (régimen especial de contratación administrativa) previously established for the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) and its companies under Law no. 8660, the Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector, because this is contrary to the provisions of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter, CAFTA-DR), approved by Legislative Decree no. 8622 of 21 de noviembre de 2007.
In the case at hand (sub lite), indirect unconstitutionality (inconstitucionalidad indirecta) is established, that is, the violation by a statute of the provisions of an international treaty and, therefore, of article 7 of the Constitution, insofar as the provisions of the latter are clear and precise and the former plainly and manifestly contradicts them, as occurs in the matter under adjudication (sub judice). This conclusion is based on the following considerations.
As already noted, the petitioner alleges that the aforementioned articles 1, 2, 68, 69, 70, and 135, subsection c), of the General Public Procurement Law (LGCP) are unconstitutional insofar as they conflict with CAFTA-DR by repealing the special administrative procurement regime established for ICE and its companies under the aforementioned Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector. It is alleged that, as a central and fundamental component of the aforementioned international treaty, Costa Rica undertook to enact legislation for the modernization and strengthening of public entities in the telecommunications sector so that they could properly enter and participate in an open competitive market. Indeed, in keeping with the spirit of the trade agreement and in fulfillment of Costa Rica’s commitments, the aforementioned Law no. 8660 was enacted as a legal framework that would enable ICE to compete on equal terms with private telecommunications operators.
As a central component of Law no. 8660, a special administrative procurement regime was included precisely to enable the institution and its companies to compete by providing them with a more agile and efficient mechanism for acquiring goods and services. The petitioner therefore argues that depriving ICE of its own administrative procurement framework—as the challenged provisions do—and subjecting it to the general administrative procurement regime, whose procedures and time frames are not sufficiently agile, efficient, and appropriate, prevents effective competition in the market on equal terms with private companies, in clear violation of Costa Rica’s commitments under CAFTA-DR. Finally, the petitioner states that the challenge is based on article 73, subsection d), of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, in conjunction with article 7 of the Political Constitution, given that the challenged provisions plainly conflict with the content and purpose of CAFTA-DR, which was signed and ratified by our country.
The petitioner reiterates that the challenged articles repeal the special administrative procurement regime previously enacted by the legislature to provide ICE and its companies with an agile and efficient legislative framework suited to their specific needs, thereby allowing them to participate in a competitive telecommunications market in accordance with CAFTA-DR and the commitments undertaken by the Costa Rican State.
In this regard, the assessments and objections raised by the petitioner are fully supported not only by ICE itself (when responding to the hearing granted to it), but also by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic in its report. The latter identifies several matters that should be highlighted for the proper adjudication of this challenge:
(i) That an ordinary statute that conflicts with the provisions of an international treaty or convention would indeed violate article 7° of the Fundamental Charter, given the hierarchy of sources clearly established by that constitutional provision. This is relevant here because the General Public Procurement Law is alleged to violate the provisions of CAFTA-DR and the specific commitments made by Costa Rica in that international instrument concerning the competitive conditions guaranteed to ICE following the opening of the telecommunications market, insofar as that law repeals ICE’s special procurement regime.
(ii) That the negotiations conducted within the framework of CAFTA-DR, which ultimately led to the opening of the market for the sale and provision of telecommunications services in Costa Rica, did in fact require the enactment of specific provisions for Costa Rica because, at that time, our country still provided those services under a state monopoly operated by ICE. This required the negotiation, acceptance, and formalization of special provisions (such as Annex 13 to Chapter 13) concerning the Costa Rican market, which were indispensable to ensuring the market opening sought by CAFTA-DR. Moreover, the purpose of the negotiations was not the privatization of ICE, but the progressive and regulated opening of the market, on the understanding that, alongside the establishment of a free-competition regime, the strengthening and modernization of the State’s provision of services would be guaranteed and would remain in the hands of the national entity that would continue participating in that market.
This explains why a special annex—applicable exclusively to Costa Rica—was devoted to ensuring the manner in which the market would be opened and the position from which the State institution would compete in that market. It demonstrates the intent of the parties that signed that international agreement. In particular, the aforementioned Annex 13 to Chapter 13 provides: “Costa Rica shall enact a new legal framework to strengthen ICE through its appropriate modernization.” To this must be added the favorable committee report on the legislative decree approving CAFTA-DR (Legislative Decree no. 8622), which reflects the intent underlying the ratification of that international instrument, as it also states that the treaty “would not place ICE at a disadvantage vis-à-vis private competitors. Annex 13 of CAFTA-DR includes Costa Rica’s obligation to enact a legal framework to strengthen ICE, which was established in the best interests of ICE and Costa Ricans, given the undeniable need for a modernization law to be enacted as soon as possible so that the institution can adequately prepare to face competition and have the instruments necessary to act with the agility required to provide the highest-quality service.” It follows that the CAFTA-DR negotiations and provisions included preparing ICE for the impending change brought about by the opening of the market, guaranteeing that it would not be placed at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the private operators it would face, and providing it with the instruments necessary to act with sufficient and necessary agility when confronting competition.
(iii) That Law no. 8660 was enacted within the framework of the commitments expressly agreed upon in CAFTA-DR, which required the Costa Rican State to pursue the Development Agenda and the Implementation Agenda as fundamental and indispensable measures for bringing that international treaty into force. That law, “in direct and specific fulfillment of the terms of the Treaty, established a special administrative procurement framework for ICE.” This entailed a more flexible model, affording the latitude appropriate for an entity that had to be able to operate in an agile and efficient manner when procuring goods and services. This was “the only alternative for ensuring conditions sufficient to meet the challenges of a fiercely competitive market. We should recall that when a commercial service provider falls behind in such competition, sooner or later it is destined to be eliminated from that market.
In this field, technological changes advancing at breakneck speed, as well as modern marketing and customer-acquisition tactics, mean that any competitor that falls behind, however slight the delay may appear, risks losing its ability to seize opportunities in its market participation, which may in turn cause a loss of customers and ultimately its inevitable displacement by more agile service providers. From that perspective, it is reasonable to conclude that the special procurement regime under Law 8660 fulfilled those CAFTA-DR commitments concerning the participation of the sole state-owned company in that market.” (iv) That the foregoing does not mean disregarding the fact that Law no. 8660 has the same hierarchical rank as any other Law of the Republic and, to that extent, is subject to the legislature’s sovereign powers derived from the Constitution itself (the first subsection of article 121); consequently, that law cannot be understood as possessing a kind of permanent immutability vis-à-vis the ordinary legislature.
Ergo, some type of amendment or adjustment could eventually be made if changing circumstances rendered it necessary. However, the “crux of the matter is determining whether the complete repeal—not merely a partial amendment—of the entire special regime granted to ICE as an inseparable instrument of CAFTA-DR constituted an exercise of that sovereign legislative power that may ultimately prove unconstitutional, insofar as it exceeded the bounds of a reasonable amendment and consequently overstepped the CAFTA-DR framework and ultimately disregarded its substantive commitments.” (v) That, in this case, article 135, subsection c), of Law no. 9986 expressly repealed articles 12, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 of Law no. 8660; this is therefore not an amendment to the special procurement regime established in fulfillment of CAFTA-DR, but rather “its complete and absolute elimination.” Accordingly, “it may be concluded that the framework and commitment arising from CAFTA-DR were indeed breached by the complete repeal of special regulations that had been designed and enacted to fulfill the purposes, principles, and spirit of the Treaty negotiations with respect to providing effective and genuine tools for competitiveness, modernization, and agility in ICE’s operations in the free market,” insofar as that complete repeal “was not accompanied by the introduction of new provisions supplying some other model to replace the special regime contemplated by CAFTA-DR for ICE.
Such a model would have satisfactorily respected the spirit of the commitments embodied in the Treaty.” On the contrary, the “legislative debates—and the text of the LGCP itself—make clear that it was intended to be a uniform and comprehensive law for the entire public sector. To that extent, no special instrument for ICE was preserved, contemplated, considered, or guaranteed. On the contrary, it was expressly stated that the intent was to abolish its special regime (as was done with all other institutions) in order to bring it within the general rules applicable to other entities.” (vi) That it could be argued that the TLC did not specifically guarantee a special administrative procurement regime (régimen especial de contratación administrativa), which is in principle true, but “it cannot be ignored that this Treaty did establish and guarantee the commitment to enact domestic legislation providing the tools necessary for ICE to participate in the new market under conditions of adequate competitiveness and agility vis-à-vis the other operators, a commitment that was honored through the enactment of Ley 8660.
Ergo, taking a step backward toward an administrative procurement regime (régimen de contratación administrativa) that hinders, weakens, and diminishes that competitiveness in the market does constitute a breach of this international commitment.” (vii) That a second point that could be argued is that the new LGCP contains a section of special regulations for companies operating under competitive conditions (empresas en competencia), among which ICE is included; nevertheless, this has several facets suggesting that it is likewise insufficient to deem the TLC commitments fulfilled, because: a) that special section of rules is also generally applicable to various public enterprises (empresas públicas), which do not share the same characteristics and circumstances as ICE, either in the scope and coverage of their services or in the amount of the overall budget available to them for procuring goods and services; and b) that special regime does not cover all administrative procurement processes that such public enterprises may conduct, but rather makes them subject to a series of conditions and requirements entailing restrictions, which therefore continues to create a significant difference from the tools provided by Ley 8660.
(viii) That, in this case, the petitioners (accionantes) provide a series of parameters and specific, detailed examples concerning aspects of agility and efficiency—and therefore competitiveness—in the administrative procurement rules that are adversely affected and substantially diminished by subjecting ICE to the general rules of the new LGCP.
(ix) That the special administrative procurement regime established by Ley 8660, in fulfillment of the commitments agreed upon in the TLC, although it departed from the more rigid rules applicable to other public entities, did not in any way violate constitutional principles, in view of its special characteristics, as this Chamber recognized in advisory opinion (opinión consultiva) no. 11210-2008 at 15:00 hours on July 16, 2008. Accordingly, this Chamber upheld the constitutional conformity of the regulations approved by the country to give effective, genuine, and satisfactory effect to the commitments established in the TLC for purposes of opening the market in the activities in which ICE participates. This was because the purpose was not to exempt ICE from all controls or limits governing the conduct of public entities, but rather to provide it with substantial tools for the procurement of goods and services, as a sine qua non condition for its survival in the domestic market following its opening to competition from private operators.
(x) That Costa Rica’s specific commitments agreed upon in Anexo 13 of Chapter 13 of the TLC with respect to ICE undeniably took into account “the unique nature of Costa Rican social policy regarding telecommunications. This is directly related to the principles of accessibility and universal service coverage that inspired its creation and govern the public purposes assigned to it as a state institution, within the social rule-of-law State governed by the supreme principles of article 50 of the Constitution.” That particular nature, which also led to a specific annex within the TLC (Anexo 13), “is precisely what gave rise to the special and differentiated procurement regime embodied in Ley 8660 (articles 22-29), ordinary legislation enacted to implement and give operative effect to the Treaty. Ergo, that regime is special, distinct, enhanced, and consistent with an international legal instrument agreed upon by the Costa Rican State.” Therefore, “the elimination of that special statutory regime brought about by Ley 9986 (Ley General de Contratación Pública) constituted a breach of the commitment arising from the TLC to enact a special law guaranteeing ICE’s competitiveness in the newly opened telecommunications market.” (xi) That this “breach is not remedied by the LGCA regulations for companies operating under competitive conditions.
First, because those remain rules of general applicability to a sector (companies operating under competitive conditions), while ICE is guaranteed special conditions regarding competitiveness, as recognized in the international Treaty. Second, because the general LGCP rules are less favorable (in terms of the agility of the system for procuring goods and services) than the regime established in Ley 8660, and are also subject to certain requirements and do not apply in all circumstances, thereby weakening and diminishing the flexible regulatory tools established for ICE in Ley 8660.” For the majority of the Court, the assessments developed by the Procuraduría General de la República are correct.
First, it is undeniable that Anexo 13 to Chapter 13 of the TLC, concerning the “Specific Commitments of Costa Rica Regarding Telecommunications Services,” establishes that:
“recognizing the unique nature of Costa Rican social policy regarding telecommunications and reaffirming its decision to ensure that the process of opening its telecommunications services sector is based on its Constitución Política; emphasizing that this opening process will benefit users and will be based on the principles of gradual implementation, selectivity, and regulation, and in strict conformity with the social objectives of universality and solidarity in the provision of telecommunications services; and recognizing its commitment to strengthen and modernize the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) as a participant in a competitive telecommunications market...” (emphasis not in the original) The Government of Costa Rica expressly undertakes, as part of its specific commitments regarding telecommunications services, that:
“II. Modernization of ICE Costa Rica shall enact a new legal framework to strengthen ICE through its appropriate modernization no later than December 31, 2004.” This is fully embraced and reflected in the affirmative majority report (dictamen afirmativo de mayoría) contained in the aforementioned legislative decree no. 8622, which states:
“With respect to the TLC, Chapter 13 of that Treaty contains the telecommunications commitments undertaken by the United States and the other Central American countries, except Costa Rica. In the case of our country, only the specific commitments undertaken in this area and contained in Anexo 13 of the Treaty apply.
Regarding those specific commitments, the groups that have addressed the issue before this Commission have expressed varying reactions, and one of the principal arguments advanced by those opposing the TLC concerns the claim that the commitments undertaken by Costa Rica regarding telecommunications entail the privatization of ICE and, in general, the privatization of the sector. This position has been expressed by the ICE labor unions and others, such as Grupo Pensamiento Solidario.
In this regard, after analyzing the provisions of Anexo 13 of the TLC, we have concluded that no provision of the TLC, particularly of Anexo 13, entails such a commitment. In the case of Costa Rica, a country with a state monopoly, the commitment undertaken relates solely to opening three sectors to competition: Internet, cellular services, and private networks.
Through the TLC, Costa Rica undertakes a commitment not to privatize, but to open three sectors to competition: Internet, cellular services, and private networks, so that, as with banks, both the State (ICE and RACSA) and private companies may provide these services. All of this will be subject to the oversight of a State regulatory body, also as with banks, which will regulate, among other matters, aspects such as rates and service quality and will preserve the principles of solidarity and universality.
The TLC would not place ICE at a disadvantage vis-à-vis private competitors. Anexo 13 of the TLC includes an obligation for Costa Rica to enact a legal framework to strengthen ICE. This obligation was established in the best interests of ICE and the Costa Rican people, given the undeniable need to enact modernization legislation as soon as possible so that the institution can adequately prepare to face competition and have the instruments necessary to act with the agility required to provide the highest-quality service.
Regarding this issue, there is no doubt that the TLC will also benefit ICE in three ways: 1) ICE will no longer bear the exclusive burden of financing or subsidizing any telecommunications service, because private operators will be required to contribute to the universal service system that Costa Rica decides to establish, and thus this burden will be shared; 2) operators will be required to pay ICE for any use of its network; and 3) the TLC entails modernizing ICE so that, under a competitive regime, ICE strives to provide the public with more and better services.” (emphasis not in the original) This ultimately prompted the enactment of the aforementioned Ley 8660. In decision no. 2010-008672 at 9:36 hours on May 14, 2010, this Chamber expressly referred to the need to modify the legal regime governing various public entities, including ICE, as a result of the execution of the TLC. As relevant here, it stated:
“(...) NEW LEGAL REGIME GOVERNING CERTAIN PUBLIC ENTITIES THAT PROVIDE INDUSTRIAL OR COMMERCIAL SERVICES. There can be no doubt that certain public entities, such as the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, which traditionally performed certain functions or provided public services of an economic or industrial nature through a de facto or de jure monopoly, have undergone substantial changes in their operations and applicable legal regime. Indeed, that change began with the signing of the Tratado de Libre Comercio Centroamérica-Estados Unidos-República Dominicana on 5 de agosto de 2004 and its subsequent approval through Ley Referendaria No. 8622, del 21 de noviembre del 2007. Subsequently, as part of the so-called “implementation agenda” for that multilateral trade agreement, several legislative instruments relevant to opening sectors such as telecommunications and insurance were enacted, including Ley General de Telecomunicaciones, No. 8642 de 30 de junio de 2008, Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, No. 8653 de 22 de julio de 2008 and Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones, No. 8660 de 8 de agosto de 2008. It should be noted that, during that process, this Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of the aforementioned Free Trade Agreement and of the three legislative instruments that formed part of the “implementation agenda,” respectively, in Votos Nos. 9469-2007 de las 10 hrs. de 3 de julio de 2007, 4569-2008 de las 14:30 hrs. de 26 de marzo de 2008, 10450-2008 de las 9 hrs. de 23 de junio de 2008 and 11210-2008 de las 15 hrs. de 16 de julio de 2008. As part of that new body of law, Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades del Sector Telecomunicaciones introduced a series of necessary and appropriate compensatory measures to prevent the opening of that sector’s market to free competition from causing serious harm or disadvantages to the public entities engaged in that line of business because of their public status and nature, as compared with competitors that adopt more flexible forms of collective organization under private law. One of the national community’s chief concerns, which was reflected and given normative expression in the aforementioned legislative instrument, was to strengthen those public entities and public enterprises so as to prevent their weakening, given the historic and leading role they have played in building the national State and meeting national demand. With the endorsement of this Constitutional Court, the legislature found it neither timely nor advisable for the opening of markets to entail the weakening or even the eventual extinction of those public entities; accordingly, to balance their position, which is subject to the rigid forms of public law, they were granted a series of compensatory measures and arrangements, insofar as they engage in business, commercial, or industrial activity, such measures being natural and expected among private-law entities. In conclusion, this new statutory and case-law framework brought about significant substantive changes in the legal regime governing public entities that provide industrial or commercial services now operating under conditions of competition.”
As the parties point out, this Chamber has already ruled specifically on the special public-procurement regime (régimen especial de contratación administrativa) applicable to ICE, in connection with the optional legislative consultation on constitutionality (consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad) submitted regarding the approval of the then-bill “Ley de fortalecimiento y modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector de Telecomunicaciones,” which was being considered under expediente legislativo nro. 16.397. On that occasion, it held:
“XVIII.- REGARDING THE THRESHOLD ESTABLISHED FOR USING THE PUBLIC-TENDER PROCEDURE IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT. The consulting legislators believe that the thresholds established for selecting a public tender (licitación pública) in the third paragraph of Article 19—that is, Article 22 of the final text—are extremely high and disproportionate. They assert that the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad would use a public tender only when the amount of the procurement exceeds 2.500.000.000.00, which they consider entirely irrational. They object that this undermines the oversight powers of the Contraloría General de la República. They likewise consider it unconstitutional because it contravenes the public-tender procedure established in Article 182 of the Constitution, since virtually no ICE tendering process would be conducted through that procedure. The text under review states as follows:
“ARTICLE 22. Ordinary competitive procedures (...)
ICE, considered individually, shall use the public-tender procedure for procurements whose value is equal to or greater than the amount obtained by multiplying the entity’s procurement budget for goods and non-personal services by the factor resulting from dividing the threshold specified for public tenders in subsection a) of Article 27 of Ley general de contratación administrativa by the reference budget applicable to ICE, considered individually, established in the same provision. If application of this paragraph results in thresholds lower than those established in Article 27 of Ley N.º 7494, Contratación administrativa, the thresholds specified in that Law shall be used. (...)” In this regard, it should first be emphasized that Article 99 of Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional provides that optional legislative consultations on constitutionality must be submitted in a reasoned brief identifying the challenged aspects of the bill and stating the grounds for the doubts or objections concerning their constitutionality.
In this Court’s view, that requirement has not been fully satisfied with respect to this specific issue. Indeed, it should be noted that the consulting legislators proceed from a mere assumption when stating that the established threshold is very high, without providing a specific criterion for assessment or comparison that would enable this Court to evaluate the reasonableness and proportionality of the provision. Accordingly, we must refer to the assessments contained in the legislative record, specifically the affirmative majority report prepared within the Special Commission, in order to analyze the purpose of this special provision. Article 182 of the Constitución Política provides that contracts for the performance of public works, as well as purchases made by autonomous institutions, shall be carried out through the public-tender procedure in accordance with the law governing the applicable amount.
Consequently, it is for the legislature to define, in each case, the public-procurement procedures, including special systems and differentiated thresholds based on the characteristics of the activity and institution concerned, with value being precisely the distinguishing parameter used in designing the various types of public-procurement procedures. This Constitutional Court so held in sentencia No. 2007-001557 de las 15:36 hrs. del 7 de febrero de 2007, which stated as follows:
“(...) For the Chamber, however, this line of reasoning contradicts Article 182 of the Constitution, which, as stated, provides the basis for developing the principles of the public-procurement system, since that provision adopts tendering as the ordinary means of procurement ‘in accordance with the law governing the applicable amount,’ thereby showing that the Constituent Assembly selected value as the distinguishing parameter in designing the various types of public-procurement processes, which may be governed by different rules depending on their value, but must always respect, in essence, constitutional law. Thus, apart from value, our constitutional text does not expressly recognize any other parameter for attenuating the constitutional principles governing public procurement. (...)”
An analysis of the bill under review reveals the legislature’s clear intention to provide the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad with the conditions necessary for greater administrative, financial, and technological efficiency and effectiveness. This, of course, takes place within the framework of opening the telecommunications market—a course already determined by the people through approval of the referendum on the TLC EE.UU., Centroamérica y República Dominicana (Ley referendaria No. 8622 de 21 de noviembre de 2007)—which seeks to strengthen public operators in anticipation of possible competition. Indeed, the following may be inferred from the observations of those who issued the report on the bill: (emphasis not in the original)
“(...) The bill at issue proposes a special public-procurement regime for ICE’s acquisition of goods and services.
Regarding this matter, the bill under consideration states among its objectives that ICE should be provided with an expeditious, efficient, and effective public-procurement system as part of the efforts to strengthen and modernize that entity, as well as to establish a body of law adapted to its particular characteristics.
Both the Sala Constitucional and the Contraloría General have recognized the possibility of special regimes, provided that the nature and particular characteristics of the public activity concerned so require and insofar as the circumstances contemplated in the general regulations are not applicable to it.
As proposed in this report, that regime must therefore govern the particular conditions of public procurement by ICE and its companies and must necessarily take into account the constitutional principles enshrined in Articles 182 and 184.
In this area, the legislature is entrusted with clearly specifying the particular rules and parameters that justify regulation departing from the general legal framework, developing its content by statute, and incorporating the constitutional principles governing the State’s public-procurement activities, as proposed in the present text. (...)” Within the framework of those objectives, it was emphasized that one of the principal difficulties historically faced by the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and its companies in the area of public procurement is that the financial thresholds used to determine the applicable procurement procedures do not necessarily correspond to their needs. Consequently, it may be inferred that the legislature’s intention in the regulations under review is to align public-procurement financial thresholds with ICE’s actual circumstances and scale. The analytical report stated as follows:
“(...) Along the same lines, ICE and its companies currently use public tender (licitación pública), abbreviated tender (licitación abreviada), and direct contracting (contratación directa) procedures, based on the financial thresholds established in Article 27 of the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), as amended. That methodology is not in itself problematic; however, because the reference budget applicable to ICE represents slightly more than 10% of the Institution’s budget, it became necessary to establish a methodology allowing the procurement financial thresholds to be adjusted to the circumstances and scale of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and its companies, while remaining mindful that the body with authority to set those thresholds is the Contraloría General de la República. (...)” (emphasis not in the original).
Thus, the text under review is not intended to disregard public procurement (contratación administrativa) procedures, but rather to establish amounts more consistent with the particular budgetary characteristics of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, which is legitimate under Constitutional Law (Derecho de la Constitución). The purpose is to establish a differentiated mechanism for public and abbreviated tenders, precisely because of the nature of ICE and the need for agility imposed by the opening of the market and the provision of services under competitive conditions. (emphasis not in the original) It should be added that the original Constituent Assembly, in Article 182 of the Constitución Política, refers to the general concept of tendering (licitación), without characterizing it as public or otherwise, and, moreover, removed from the constitutional sphere—assigning to the ordinary legislature—the matter of defining the amounts at which the various tendering procedures—public or abbreviated—apply; this is therefore clearly a matter left to legislative discretion (libertad de configuración legislativa).
Accordingly, in cases where the quantitative parameter or amount defined in section 22 of the bill is not reached, although public tendering is excluded, another form of tendering, such as abbreviated tendering—a procedure that also guarantees the proper and regular use of public funds—must be used; therefore, it cannot be understood that direct contracting will be the rule. Note that Article 22, paragraph 3, provides at the end that “If application of this paragraph results in thresholds lower than those established in Article 27 of Law No. 7494, Administrative Procurement, the thresholds indicated in that law shall be used.” It must be borne in mind that the bill under review establishes a unique and specific procurement regime; it is not an amendment to the Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, since its purpose is to enable ICE to compete in an open telecommunications market in accordance with the popular mandate expressed in the referendum approving the U.S.–Central America–Dominican Republic FTA (Referendum Law No. 8622 of 21 November 2007).
(emphasis not in the original) In financial terms and in accordance with the budget studies conducted by the legislators, the reference budget currently used by ICE for the purpose of applying the public tender, abbreviated tender, or direct contracting procedures established in Article 27 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, as updated by the Contraloría General de la República, represents barely 10% of its procurement budget. Moreover, the financial thresholds are expressed as fixed amounts rather than as percentages of its budget. In practice, this means that ICE’s thresholds, in real terms, constitute one-tenth of the baseline percentage established by the oversight body (órgano contralor). In other words, the threshold expressed as a percentage of ICE’s budget is 0.06% in the case of public tendering, whereas the threshold expressed as a percentage of the baseline budget for all other cases is 0.6%.
The formula proposes correcting this situation so that the threshold will also be 0.6%, as the parameter for selecting a public tender procedure (see affirmative majority report at folios 5196-5308, Volume XVI). Accordingly, this Court does not find the proposed formula unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, since the legislature’s intent is to adapt the public-procurement parameters to the particular budgetary characteristics of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad. (emphasis not in the original)” (advisory opinion no. 2008-011210 issued at 15:00 on 16 July 2008) Thus, several relevant conclusions may be drawn from what has been stated so far, namely: a) that, unquestionably, the commitments undertaken by the Costa Rican State under the FTA included the specific obligation to enact a “new legal framework to strengthen ICE through its appropriate modernization”; b) it is logical and reasonable to conclude that providing ICE with a special, streamlined, efficient, and effective public-procurement regime adapted to its particular needs constitutes a fundamental and essential component of that new legal framework—in keeping with the content and spirit of the FTA; c) this Chamber has already found that, prima facie, providing ICE with a unique and specific procurement regime tailored to its particular budgetary characteristics, so as to allow it to “compete in an open telecommunications market in accordance with the popular mandate expressed in the referendum approving the U.S.–Central America–Dominican Republic FTA (Referendum Law No. 8622 of 21 November 2007),” is not incompatible with Constitutional Law; and c) repealing or eliminating that special public-procurement regime, thereby substantially impairing ICE’s competitiveness, ultimately amounts to acting contrary to the meaning or content of the treaty.
As the Procuraduría General de la República emphasizes, the petitioner does not merely argue in the abstract that the challenged provisions purportedly impair ICE’s competitiveness, but instead provides specific examples. Among other points, it is emphasized that ICE must now resort to procedures that are more stringent in terms of deadlines and stages, thereby delaying the acquisition of goods and services. The petitioner provides a table showing the type of procurement that the institution could have used in 2022 under the special regime established in Law no. 8660:
PUBLIC-PROCUREMENT THRESHOLDS FOR 2022 Calculation under Article 22 of Law Nº 8660 Institutions Public Tender Abbreviated Tender Direct Contracting Reference tier1 Equal to or more than Less than Equal to or more than Less than Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) 6 041 595 408,00 6 041 595 408,00 101 100 000,00 101 100 000,00 A Junta Administrativa del Servicio Eléctrico de Cartago (JASEC) 697 414 414,00 697 414 414,00 28 260 000, 00 28 260 000,00 C The petitioner also provides a table showing the procedure that the institution would have to use in 2023 under the challenged provisions:
2023 thresholds (amounts in colones) Regime Type of procurement Major Tender Minor Tender Reduced Tender Equal to or more than Less than Equal to or more than Less than Ordinary Goods and Services 264.519.083 264.519.083 66.129.771 66.129.771 Differentiated Goods and Services 317.422.900 317.422.900 79.355.725 79.355.725 Works 1.139.466.819 1.139.466.819 284.866.705 284.866.705 This demonstrates that, with lower thresholds, it must now resort to more complex procedures.
Finally, the petitioner provides a table illustrating the impact that the foregoing may have on the time required to resolve the various types of procedures:
Ley General Contratación Pública Major Tender* Minimum period Minor Tender *Maximum Reduced Tender *Maximum period Receipt of bids 15 15 5 Award 30 30 10 Objection proceeding 24 8 5 Motion for reconsideration/appeal 62 28 12 Total 131 81 32 Ley de Fortalceimiento (sic) y Modernización Public Tender *Minimum Period Abbreviated Tender *Maximum period Low-value Direct Contracting *Maximum period Receipt of bids 10 20 5 Award 20 40 10 Objection proceeding 12 15 0 Motion for reconsideration/appeal 45 27 0 Total 87 102 15 The foregoing demonstrates the effect on the processing of procurement procedures for the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, since lower thresholds require it to resort to more complex and, prima facie, more protracted procedures.
Moreover, although it is argued that the challenged law includes a section containing special rules for companies operating under competitive conditions, expressly including ICE, as the Procuraduría General de la República rightly points out, this “special section of rules likewise applies generally to various public enterprises that do not share ICE’s characteristics and circumstances, either in the scope and coverage of their services or in the amount of the overall budget available to them for acquiring goods and services. Likewise, that special regime does not cover all public-procurement processes that such public enterprises may carry out; instead, its application is subject to a series of circumstances and requirements that entail restrictions, which therefore continues to create a material difference from the mechanisms provided by Law 8660.” Ultimately, this Court concludes that the action under review must be granted with respect to the provisions previously identified, since a general impairment of ICE’s competitiveness has been established and there is no valid justification for repealing or eliminating the special and differentiated public-procurement regime established for that institution in Law no. 8660. This amounts to acting contrary to the meaning or content of the aforementioned international treaty.
As a corollary to the foregoing, Article 135(c) of Law no. 9986 of 27 May 2021, Ley General de Contratación Pública, must be annulled insofar as it repealed sections 12, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 of Law no. 8660, Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones, of 8 August 2008, and, consequently, those sections regain their force and effect. This Chamber cannot, however, overlook the fact that Article 20 of Law no. 8660 establishes, as a general rule, that the “Ley de Contratación Administrativa, N.° 7494, of 1° May 1996, as amended, and its Regulations shall apply on a supplementary basis,” but that law has been repealed by Law no. 9986; consequently, such supplementary application must now be understood to refer to the Ley General de Contratación Pública and its regulations, with respect to matters not addressed by, and insofar as they do not conflict with, Law no. 8660 and its regulations.
With respect to Articles 1, 2, 68, 69 and 70 of the same Law no. 9986, they are declared unconstitutional insofar as they apply to the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad.
9986. With respect to Article 134, subparagraph d), the constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) must be dismissed because this particular claim is not adequately substantiated. The filing initiating the proceedings does not contain precise, sufficient, and properly detailed arguments concerning the grievances and grounds underlying the alleged violation of the Law of the Constitution as it relates to that statutory provision. On this point, consideration must be given to what this Court has held on various occasions regarding the duty of substantiation incumbent upon the petitioner. This Chamber has stated:
“REGARDING THE NECESSARY SUBSTANTIATION OF A FILING ASSERTING A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE. As stated above, a constitutional challenge is a proceeding subject to certain formalities which, if not satisfied, prevent the Chamber from hearing the intended challenge. One such requirement is the necessary substantiation of the filing asserting the constitutional challenge. The Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, in Article 3, provides that ‘The Political Constitution shall be deemed violated when such violation results from comparing the text of the challenged provision or act, its effects, or its interpretation or application by public authorities, with constitutional rules and principles.’ Now, for this Court to deem the violation established and declare the challenged provision or act unconstitutional, thereby annulling and removing it from the legal system, the person bringing a constitutional challenge bears the burden of demonstrating how that provision violates the Law of the Constitution and must also explain why the claim should be upheld.
This is referred to by this Chamber as the burden of argumentation (carga de la argumentación); that is, ‘a provision that is facially (sic) contrary to the Constitution shifts the burden of argumentation to those who maintain that there is in fact no conflict between that provision and the Political Constitution; the opposite occurs when a challenge is brought against a provision that, upon initial examination, does not appear contrary to the Constitution, in which case it is the petitioner who must present arguments establishing its unconstitutionality’ (see judgment No. 0184-95 at 16:30 hours on January 10, 1995). In a subsequent judgment, regarding the failure to present arguments of unconstitutionality in constitutional-challenge proceedings, this Chamber stated:
‘The constitutional challenge is brought on the grounds that the challenged Executive Decree is harmful and impairs and violates the fundamental rights to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the right to health, and the international commitments undertaken through the Kyoto Protocol. Despite the opportunity afforded to the petitioners, the assertion by the Procuraduría General de la República is confirmed: there is no specific analysis of the provisions of the challenged Executive Decree that are considered unconstitutional. Instead, the filing merely sets forth generic and abstract disagreements with the Regulation as a whole and, moreover, with all activities carried out by sugar mills and estates, on the grounds that they cause adverse effects on the quality of life and health of neighboring residents, without specifying which constitutional arguments should be considered against each provision or group of provisions of the challenged Regulation. […] The first paragraph of Article 78 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes the obligation to have filings initiating constitutional challenges authenticated, because it is considered necessary for arguments to be presented by a legal professional; this does not preclude this Court from undertaking a serious examination of the technical and scientific substance of a particular subject, given the diversity and universality of the provisions comprising the legal system.
Unlike proceedings for the protection of constitutional rights (procesos de garantías)—namely, habeas corpus and amparo proceedings—which any interested person may file directly before the constitutional jurisdiction to defend fundamental rights, generally against acts or omissions that impair that person’s individual legal sphere (although this is not always the case, as in environmental matters), in proceedings for the defense of the Political Constitution (such as a constitutional challenge), the legislature entrusted the authenticating attorney with a task whose demands are even greater and whose analysis, one might say, must be more elaborate and exhaustive. By virtue of the attorney’s professional role, that analysis must be embodied in the initiating pleading to demonstrate to the Court that a lower-ranking provision violates a constitutional provision, thereby undermining the principle of constitutional supremacy set forth in Article 10 of the Political Constitution.
Indeed, the substantive and formal drafting of a law, as well as other secondary provisions, entails an extremely costly process for the State, in which organized civil society has participated in many ways, either in favor or against, and whose procedures for formulation, approval, and promulgation should not be analyzed lightly. In this regard, this Chamber must acknowledge that this Court has only limited scope to remedy manifest omissions by legal professionals who authenticate filings before this constitutional jurisdiction without compromising the impartiality and analysis owed to each constitutional challenge.’ (judgment No. 2012-05285 at 15:03 hours on April 25, 2012).’ (decision No. 2023-031744 at 9:30 hours on December 6, 2023) These considerations apply to the matter sub judice; accordingly, the challenge must be dismissed as to this point.
By majority vote, the challenge is partially upheld and, consequently, Article 135, subparagraph c), of Ley 9986 of May 27, 2021, Ley General de Contratación Pública, is annulled as unconstitutional. Articles 1, 2, 68, 69, and 70 of the same law are declared unconstitutional insofar as they apply to the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad. The challenge concerning Article 134, subparagraph d), of Ley 9986 is denied. Justice Rueda Leal dissents and would deny the challenge, finding it inadmissible for procedural reasons concerning standing (legitimación).
The parties are hereby advised that, if they submitted any paper documents, objects, or evidence contained on any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, or telematic device, or produced using new technologies, they must retrieve them from the Court within a maximum period of 30 business days following notice of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not retrieved within that period shall be destroyed, pursuant to the “Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial,” approved by the Corte Plena at session N° 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI, and published in Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as the resolution approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial at session N° 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.-
Por tanto:
By majority vote, the challenge is partially upheld and, consequently, Article 135, subparagraph c), of Ley 9986 of May 27, 2021, Ley General de Contratación Pública, is annulled as unconstitutional. Articles 1, 2, 68, 69, and 70 of the same law are declared unconstitutional insofar as they apply to the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad. The challenge concerning Article 134, subparagraph d), of Ley 9986 is denied. Justice Rueda Leal dissents and would deny the challenge, finding it inadmissible for procedural reasons concerning standing. This judgment has declaratory and retroactive effect as of the effective date of the annulled provision, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. Pursuant to Article 91, paragraph 2, of the law governing this Jurisdiction, the effects of this declaration are tailored so that Articles 12, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 of Ley 8660, Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones, of August 8, 2008, repealed by Article 135, subparagraph c), of Ley 9986, regain their force.
With respect to Article 20, supplementary application (supletoriedad) must be understood as referring to the Ley General de Contratación Pública. A summary of this ruling shall be published in Diario Oficial La Gaceta, and the ruling shall be published in full in Boletín Judicial. Notice shall be given to the Executive President of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad and the President of the Asamblea Legislativa. The Procuraduría General de la República and the parties shall be notified.
Fernando Castillo V.
President Paul Rueda L. Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G. Anamari Garro V.
Ingrid Hess H. Alexandra Alvarado P.
Res. 2024022483 Dissenting opinion of Justice Rueda Leal. As I have stated in other cases, I consider that a defining feature of a diffuse interest (interés difuso) is precisely that its impairment is general—that is, it affects an entire population or broad sectors thereof—within a context in which the affected persons need not know one another (and may even have no connection or legal relationships among themselves), although there must be a common situation involving harm or danger to a constitutional interest that, equally and without any need for individual identification, encompasses and brings together an entire society in the abstract. Its defense is intended to satisfy a need of society as such and therefore transcends the need of a human being considered individually or collectively. In judgment No. 2019-17397 at 12:54 hours on September 11, 2019, this Court reiterated the following:
“(…) Second, the possibility of seeking relief in defense of ‘diffuse interests’ is provided for; this concept, whose content has gradually been delineated by the Chamber, may be summarized in the terms used in judgment number 3750-93 of this Court, issued at fifteen hours on July thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three): ‘… Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and even more difficult to identify, cannot under our law—as this Chamber has already stated—be merely collective interests; nor may they be so diffuse that their ownership becomes indistinguishable from that of the national community as a whole, or so specific that particular persons or defined groups are identified or readily identifiable in relation to them, whose standing would derive not from diffuse interests but from corporate interests pertaining to a community as a whole. They are, therefore, individual interests that are simultaneously dispersed among more or less extensive and amorphous groups of persons who share an interest and consequently sustain actual or potential harm that is more or less equal for all.
It is therefore rightly said that they are the equal interests of groups in particular circumstances and, at the same time, of each individual within them. In other words, diffuse interests have a dual nature, since they are both collective—because they are common to a broad class—and individual, and they may therefore be asserted in that capacity.’” In summary, diffuse interests (intereses difusos) are those held by groups of persons who are not formally organized but are united by a particular social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a particular personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. In such cases, the interest is dispersed, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of persons. In these cases, of course, any challenge that a member of one of these sectors might bring under paragraph 2° of Article 75 must necessarily concern provisions affecting that person in such capacity.
This Sala has identified various rights as “diffuse,” including the environment, cultural heritage, the protection of the country’s territorial integrity, and the proper management of public expenditure, among others. Two clarifications must be made in this regard: on the one hand, the aforementioned interests extend beyond the sphere traditionally recognized as pertaining to diffuse interests, because they generally concern matters affecting the national community rather than particular groups within it; environmental harm does not merely affect the residents of a region or the consumers of a product, but instead harms or places at serious risk the natural heritage of the entire country and even of Humanity; similarly, safeguarding the proper management of public funds authorized in the Budget of the Republic is an interest shared by all inhabitants of Costa Rica, not merely by any particular group among them.
On the other hand, the list provided by the Sala Constitucional amounts to no more than a simple description arising from its duty—as a judicial body—to confine itself to hearing the cases submitted to it, and under no circumstances may it be understood to mean that only those rights expressly recognized as such by the Sala may be regarded as diffuse rights; such an interpretation would entail an undesirable reversal in the scope of the rule of law (Estado de Derecho) and its corresponding “State of rights” (Estado de derechos), which—as in the Costa Rican model—is based on the premise that restrictions on freedoms must be express, because those freedoms are inherent in the human condition itself and therefore require no official recognition. Finally, when paragraph 2° of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional refers to interests “that concern the community as a whole,” it means the legally protected interests (bienes jurídicos) explained above, namely, those held by the very bearers of sovereignty, by each of the inhabitants of the Republic.
This does not mean, therefore, that any person may apply to the Sala Constitucional to protect any interest whatsoever through a public action (acción popular); rather, every individual may act in defense of those interests affecting the entire national community, and no attempt to provide an exhaustive list is valid in this area either” (see Judgment No. 2007- 01145).” Consistent with the foregoing and with this Tribunal’s holdings in its case law, these are therefore individual interests that are simultaneously diluted among more or less extensive and amorphous groups of persons who share an interest and consequently sustain actual or potential harm that is more or less equal for all. It is therefore rightly said that these are equal interests held by groups of persons in particular circumstances and, at the same time, by each of those persons. It is precisely for this reason that, beginning with Judgment no. 2021-2185 of 12:51 on 3 de febrero de 2021, I have considered, unlike the Majority of this Tribunal, that some of these interests may be embodied in a specific individual case without thereby losing their status as diffuse interests, as occurs with environmental protection, whose impact affects one person and everyone generally; and that impact may be individualized in a particular situation, such as the construction of a factory in a particular neighboring area without the corresponding environmental studies, where its adverse effects affect the planet’s ozone layer.
Undoubtedly, the outcome of a claim or proceeding that a resident might bring against that factory will affect not only that resident’s own interests but also those of the rest of the community. It therefore constitutes a diffuse interest, even though it is also the subject of a particular individualized situation. This does not mean, however, that the existence of a diffuse interest may be alleged in every situation invoked, even though such an interest may be the subject of a particular situation. It should be recalled that for an interest to be considered “diffuse,” it must not only affect a community but must also be dispersed or diffused throughout that community. If it does not produce that effect, it cannot be considered a diffuse interest.
Specifically, in the present case, I do not observe the existence of a diffuse interest, because the challenged regulations do not result in socially dispersed harm but rather in specific harm. In this case, the mere issue of the competitiveness and efficiency of a public enterprise operating under a competitive regime does not per se entail injury to interests diluted among more or less extensive and amorphous groups of persons who share an interest and consequently sustain actual or potential harm that is more or less equal for all. Thus, these are not equal interests held by groups of persons in particular circumstances and, at the same time, by each of those persons. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that such matters cannot be regarded as diffuse interests, which means that the petitioner (Sindicato de Ingenieros del ICE) lacks standing (legitimación) to bring this action.
In addition, although this constitutional review proceeding (proceso de control de constitucionalidad) was brought by a labor union (sindicato), the challenged provisions do not affect the obligations, powers, or authority of the organization’s members, and I therefore do not find that the action was brought in defense of collective interests (intereses colectivos). Specifically, in Judgment no. 2010014785 of 14:48 on 1º de setiembre de 2010, the Sala held:
“III.- Regarding the Union’s standing to act in defense of collective interests. Concerning the standing of labor unions to act in defense of their members’ interests, the Sala has stated that they may do so provided that a potential declaration of unconstitutionality (declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad) of the challenged provisions would affect the obligations, powers, or authority of the members of that group (see Judgment number 02765-98 of 10:51 on 24 de abril de 1998). In a recent judgment of this Tribunal, number 3688-97 of fifteen hours on día primero de julio de mil novecientos noventa y siete, the following was stated verbatim:
“...for a collective interest to confer standing upon the party bringing an action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad), it is not sufficient that the interest be asserted by an organization representing the interests of an identifiable group of persons; there must also be at least a possibility that a potential declaration of unconstitutionality would favorably modify the obligations, powers, or authority of the members of that group. In other words, to establish standing based on a collective interest, in addition to the existence of a common core of interests among the organization’s members, the declaration of unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions must bear a relationship—through its impact or effect—to the group’s circumstances. Accordingly, anyone who bases standing on the existence of a collective interest must provide an explanation of the relationship between the claim of unconstitutionality and the group’s own circumstances, specifically its purpose and assets...”.
Consequently, I respectfully dissent and would dismiss the action as inadmissible on procedural grounds relating to standing.
Paul Rueda L.
1 CASE FILE N° 23-007251-0007-CO Telephone numbers: Telf01/ ALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: Telf02 / Telf03. Website: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Dirección01, Dirección02, 100 mts south of the Perpetuo Socorro church). Intake of matters involving vulnerable groups: Dirección03, San José, Distrito Catedral, Dirección04, streets 19 and 21, Dirección05
Res. Nº 2024-022483 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las doce horas del siete de agosto de dos mil veinticuatro.
Acción de inconstitucionalidad que se tramita en el expediente nro. 23-007251-0007-CO planteada por [Nombre01 001], cédula de identidad [CED01], en su condición de presidente del Sindicato de Ingenieros del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), para que se declaren inconstitucionales los artículos 1, 2, 68, 69, 70, 134 inciso d) y 135 inciso c) de la ley nro. 9986 denominada ‘Ley General de Contratación Pública’.
Resultando:
LÍMITES DE CONTRATACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA AÑO 2022 Cálculo según artículo 22 de la Ley Nº 8660 Instituciones Licitación Pública Licitación abreviada Contratación Directa Estrato de referencia1 Igual a o más de Menos de Igual o más de Menos de Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) 6 041 595 408,00 6 041 595 408,00 101 100 000,00 101 100 000,00 A Junta Administrativa del Servicio Eléctrico de Cartago (JASEC) 697 414 414,00 697 414 414,00 28 260 000, 00 28 260 000,00 C 1Determinado según el momento presupuestado promedio, en millones de colones del periodo 2020-2022, para la adquisición de bienes y servicios no personales indicado como referencia en el punto X de esta resolución. Fuente: R-DC-00020-2022. CONTRALORÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA. Despacho Contralor General. San José a las nueve horas del dieciséis de febrero del dos mil veintidós. Por su parte, la Ley General de Contratación Pública establece: “ARTÍCULO 36- Umbrales para determinar el procedimiento de contratación.
El procedimiento de contratación se determinará de acuerdo con los siguientes umbrales: i) Las contrataciones que realicen las empresas públicas no financieras nacionales, empresas públicas no financieras municipales, las instituciones públicas financieras bancarias y las instituciones públicas financieras no bancarias, enlistadas en el Clasificador Institucional del Sector Público que emite el Ministerio de Hacienda, realizarán el procedimiento de licitación mayor en las contrataciones de bienes y servicios cuya estimación sea superior a doscientos ochenta y cinco millones ochocientos sesenta y ocho mil setecientos cincuenta y dos colones (¢ 285 868 752), licitación menor en las contrataciones de bienes y servicios cuya estimación sea igual o inferior a doscientos ochenta y cinco millones ochocientos sesenta y ocho mil setecientos cincuenta y dos colones (¢ 285 868 752) pero superior a setenta y un millones cuatrocientos sesenta y siete mil ciento ochenta y ocho colones (CRC 71 467 188) y licitación reducida en aquellos casos cuya estimación sea igual o menor a setenta y un millones cuatrocientos sesenta y siete mil ciento ochenta y ocho colones ( 71 467 188)…”. Con la recién actualización realizada por la Contraloría General de la República, los montos vigentes para el año 2023 son:
Umbrales año 2023 (montos en colones) Régimen Tipo de contratación Licitación Mayor Licitación Menor Licitación reducida Igual a o más de Menos de Igual o más de Menos de Ordinario Bienes y Servicios 264.519.083 264.519.083 66.129.771 66.129.771 Obras 712.166.540 712.166.540 178.041.690 178.041.690 Diferenciado Bienes y Servicios 317.422.900 317.422.900 79.355.725 79.355.725 Obras 1.139.466.819 1.139.466.819 284.866.705 284.866.705 Fuente: R-DC-00132-2022. CONTRALORÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA. Despacho Contralor General. San José a las trece horas con cuarenta y tres minutos del doce de diciembre de dos mil veintidós Con el régimen especial de la Ley 8660, el ICE debía utilizar el procedimiento licitatorio más riguroso en etapas y plazos (licitación pública) para adquisiciones de bienes y servicios estimados en sumas iguales o superiores a CRC 6 041 595 408,00, monto que considera precisamente las condiciones presupuestarias aplicables a la Institución.
En cambio, al derogarse este régimen especial, el ICE se ve obligado a utilizar el procedimiento más riguroso en plazos y etapas (licitación mayor), para adquisiciones estimadas en una suma igual o superior a CRC 317 422 900,00. Lo anterior resulta totalmente desproporcionado y gravoso para la Institución, debido a que hace más aletargada la gestión administrativa y financiera, con la acción de alargar el plazo para la adquisición de bienes y servicios y desvirtúa la agilidad que requiere para responder adecuadamente al mercado en competencia en el cual se encuentra, para atender sus negocios de telecomunicaciones y electricidad. De igual manera, el ICE con su régimen especial debía utilizar la licitación abreviada (procedimiento ordinario más breve y ágil que la licitación pública), para adquisiciones entre CRC 101 100 000,00 y CRC 6 041 595 408,00, mientras que, con el umbral actual, debe utilizar la licitación menor para adquisiciones entre los 79 355 725,00 CRC y 317 422 900,00 CRC, nuevamente afectando, potencialmente, los resultados de la Cadena de Abastecimiento de la Institución y debilitándolo ante la competencia.
Para demostrar lo anterior, se adjunta un cuadro comparativo de plazos desde la publicación del pliego de condiciones hasta su eventual adjudicación en firme acorde con los tipos de procedimientos ordinarios de la Ley 9986 y la Ley 8660:
Ley General Contratación Pública Licitación Mayor* Plazo mínimo Licitación menor *Máximo Licitación reducida *Plazo máximo Recepción de ofertas 15 15 5 Adjudicación 30 30 10 Recurso de objeción 24 8 5 Recurso de revocatoria/apelación 62 28 12 Total 131 81 32 Ley de Fortalceimiento (sic) y Modernización Licitación Pública *Plazo Mínimo Licitación Abreviada *Plazo máximo Contratación Directa escasa cuantía *Plazo máximo Recepción de ofertas 10 20 5 Adjudicación 20 40 10 Recurso de objeción 12 15 0 Recurso de revocatoria/apelación 45 27 0 Total 87 102 15 Fuente: Elaboración propia SIICE- marzo-2023. *El plazo de los recursos incluye el plazo de interposición, admisibilidad, resolución y firmeza del acto administrativo. Como se puede apreciar, por ejemplo, lo que utilizando anteriormente, la Ley 8660 se adquiría a través de un procedimiento de Contratación Directa de escasa cuantía, tardaba únicamente 15 días desde su publicación hasta su adjudicación en firme, mientras que por ese mismo monto la Administración del ICE, en aplicación de la Ley 9986, tardará de 32 días hábiles en el rango hasta los CRC 79 355 725,00 y 81 días hábiles en el rango de CRC 79 355 725,00 a CRC 101 100 000.00 considerando el trámite del recurso de objeción y revocatoria.
Este plazo incluso puede alargarse ante prórrogas en el plazo para adjudicar o una eventual readjudicación donde se debe dar una segunda ronda recursiva; situación que hará un proceso de contratación administrativa largo y engorroso para el ICE, en un marco donde los Operadores de la competencia pueden adquirir con el método de empresa privada, en franca desventaja para la Institución estatal. En el caso de la licitación menor, para el rango del umbral de la licitación abreviada, presenta una disminución en tiempo (rango de CRC 101 100 000.00 a CRC 317 422 900,00), sin embargo, para montos superiores debe utilizarse la licitación mayor, ampliando los tiempos en 29 días hábiles, con la posibilidad que se amplíe ante prórrogas en el plazo para adjudicar o una eventual readjudicación donde se debe dar una segunda ronda recursiva. Aunado a lo anterior, con el régimen diferenciado de la Ley General de Contratación Pública, se pretende dar igualdad de condiciones al ICE en comparación a empresas como el CNP, RECOPE, Banco de Costa Rica, INS, entre otros, cuando su presupuesto en materia de adquisiciones es muy superior, con lo cual se contrapone al propósito de la Ley 8660, como se indicó anteriormente de dotar umbrales acordes con la realidad presupuestaria de la Institución.
Para demostrar lo anterior, según información publicada en SICOP, según el Plan Anual de Adquisiciones 2023, de cada una de las entidades mencionadas con lo que se evidencia que la realidad del ICE es muy distinta a las empresas que entran en esa categoría:
Institución Presupuesto estimado en colones ICE 147 189 177 163,83 INS 54 035 081 067,81 CPN 61 663 059,40 RECOPE 15 493 823 808,00 Banco de Costa Rica 18 680 634 070,36 Fuente: Elaboración propia con Planes Anuales de Adquisiciones- SICOP Régimen recursivo: El artículo 26 de la Ley 8660 en cuanto el régimen recursivo estableció: “… ARTICULO 26.- Recursos El recurso de objeción contra el cartel de una licitación pública o abreviada se interpondrá dentro del primer cuarto del plazo para presentar ofertas ante la Contraloría General de la República, en los casos de licitación pública y, en los demás casos, ante la administración contratante. Este recurso deberá resolverse dentro de los diez días hábiles siguientes a su presentación. Transcurrido el plazo señalado, se tendrá por acogido el recurso. En el caso del ICE, solo cabrá recurso de apelación cuando se trate de licitación pública. En los demás casos, se aplicará recurso de revocatoria. …
No procederá recurso de revocatoria contra las contrataciones directas de escasa cuantía…” Lo anterior permitía a la Administración del ICE, en fortalecimiento de su autonomía administrativa, financiera y flexibilidad procedimental, atender los recursos para adquisiciones entre CRC 101 100 000,00 y CRC 6 041 595 408,00. En la Ley General de Contratación Pública se señala: "ARTÍCULO 95- Recurso de objeción Interposición del recurso de objeción y órgano competente para conocerlo: Podrán objetar el pliego de condiciones de licitación todo potencial oferente o cualquier organización legalmente constituida para velar por los intereses de la comunidad donde vaya a ejecutarse la contratación o sobre la cual surta efectos. a) Tratándose de licitación mayor, la Contraloría General de la República ostenta la competencia para conocer del recurso, el cual deberá ser interpuesto en el sistema digital unificado dentro del plazo de los ocho días hábiles siguientes a la publicación del pliego de condiciones ARTÍCULO 97- Recurso de apelación Trámite del recurso de apelación El recurso de apelación procederá contra el acto de adjudicación, el que declara desierta o infructuosa una licitación mayor.
Dentro de los ocho días hábiles siguientes a la comunicación del acto final, quien haya participado en el procedimiento concursal podrá interponer en el sistema digital unificado recurso de apelación. La Contraloría General de la República tramitará el recurso según las siguientes etapas:…” Es decir, la Ley General de Contratación Pública establece la competencia de la Contraloría General de la República para atender los recursos de objeción y de apelación en procedimientos de licitación mayor, que como se indicó actualmente para el régimen diferenciado se definió para adquisiciones iguales o mayores a CRC 317 422 900,00. Lo anterior debilita la autonomía administrativa, financiera y procedimental del ICE (objetivo del TLC y la Ley 8660), ya que ahora es la Contraloría General de la República, quien resuelve los recursos que por cuantía resolvía por sí mismo el Instituto, con los umbrales anteriores hasta CRC 6 041 595 408,00.
Esto también afecta la eficiencia de los procedimientos de Contratación Administrativa para el ICE, pues el Órgano Contralor debe atender todos los recursos de la Administración Pública, derivados de procedimientos de Licitación Mayor, que como se dijo, no consideran el tipo, naturaleza y presupuesto de las Instituciones (más allá de lo que establece el régimen diferenciado del ordinario, que pone en igualdad, empresas del ICE, empresas como el Consejo Nacional de la Producción, INCOFER, RECOPE, INS, CONAPE, por citar algunos ejemplos; dejando en franca desventaja una empresa como el ICE, que ampliamente se ha explicado, debe atender las demandas de servicios de telecomunicaciones, en un marco competencial fuerte, como se conoce a la fecha en el mercado nacional. Eliminación del régimen especial de "Contratación Directa de Escasa Cuantía" La Ley General de Contratación Pública establece como procedimientos ordinarios la licitación reducida, la licitación menor y la licitación mayor, asimismo, elimina dentro de las excepciones la contratación directa de escasa cuantía.
La Ley 8660 establecía: “… ARTÍCULO 22.- Procedimientos ordinarios de concurso El ICE utilizará los procedimientos ordinarios de licitación pública y de licitación abreviada, de conformidad con las disposiciones de este capítulo; asimismo, podrá aplicar el régimen especial de contratación directa. En el Reglamento de esta Ley, podrán fijarse reglas especiales relativas a la estructura y los requisitos de los procedimientos ordinarios de concurso citados, en el tanto se respeten los principios constitucionales de la contratación administrativa…” En virtud de lo anterior, el ICE podía tramitar los procedimientos cuya estimación estuviera por debajo de los CRC 100 100 000,00 a través de una contratación directa de escasa cuantía, procedimiento expedito, ágil administrativa y financieramente, normado y reglamento; que tenía la disminución de trámites en el "sentido limpio" de no tener recursos de objeción ni revocatorita contra el acto final de adjudicación, logrando adquirir los bienes y servicios en un plazo de 15 días, a partir de la publicación del concurso.
Eliminar estas fases recursivas precisamente tenían el objetivo de agilizar la adquisición de bienes y servicios de menor cuantía de la Institución y responder rápidamente a las exigencias del mercado. Con la eliminación de este tipo de procedimiento, estas adquisiciones deben tramitarse bajo el procedimiento de licitación reducida (hasta los CRC 79 355 725,00), que impone el derecho de los participantes de objetar el cartel y revocar el acto final, pudiendo Re (sic) adjudicarse el concurso. Etapas procesales, para una menor cuantía, desde el ejercicio presupuestal del ICE, que lejos de simplificar, alargan los plazos de la etapa de concurso y concreción de un contrato, afectando la disponibilidad de los bienes y servicios que requiere una eficiente y eficaz cadena de suministros, de una empresa de telecomunicaciones estatal, que compite con operadores privados en desigualdad de condiciones.
Para la demostración del impacto negativo, en la agilidad en las adquisiciones del Instituto, se adjunta la información certificada de parte de RACSA como coordinador del Sistema Integrado de Compras Públicas (SICOP), donde se evidencia que en el año 2022 el ICE publicó 919 procedimientos de Contratación Directa de Escasa Cuantía; adquisiciones que según la Ley 9986 tardarían como mínimo el doble del tiempo para adquirir firmeza. Variable tiempo que se verá ineludiblemente reflejada en los servicios, nuevos negocios de telecomunicaciones que brinda el ICE, y por ende en sus ingresos. Modificación unilateral de contrato: En el artículo 178 del Reglamento a la Ley 8660, se establecía la potestad de que el ICE modificara sus contratos en ejecución, con el propósito de adquirir los mismos bienes o incluso de similar naturaleza hasta por el 100% del monto adjudicado. El artículo 101 de la Ley General de Contratación Pública, establece que esta potestad está limitada como máximo a un 20% y de forma excepcional, hasta un 50%, debiendo la Administración, en caso de requerir mayor cantidad, promover un nuevo concurso.
Lo anterior también viene en menoscabo de la agilidad en las adquisiciones que se logró con la implementación de la Ley 8660 y su reglamento como parte de la implementación del TLC. Procedimiento especial para empresas en competencia: La Ley General de Contratación Pública establece un procedimiento especial para empresas en competencia, en la cual se identifica al ICE, con el propósito de establecer una manera menos rigurosa que los procedimientos ordinarios, cuando el objeto del contrato sea para adquirir bienes, obras y servicios destinados a generar, instalar y operar redes, prestar, adquirir y comercializar productos y servicios de telecomunicaciones e infocomunicaciones, así como otros productos y servicios de información y otros en convergencia, sin embargo este procedimiento, aunque más flexible que el régimen ordinario, no es más ágil ni conveniente que el régimen especial establecido en la Ley 8660, pues limita su uso únicamente a este tipo de bienes y servicios; además, establece una serie de requisitos para su utilización, por lo que no representa ninguna garantía de flexibilidad y agilidad administrativa y financiera, conforme a la legislación emitida a ese efecto, como lo es la Ley 8660, que fue un compromiso y previsión para la empresa estatal poder entrar en competencia con el TLC.
“… ARTÍCULO 168 Reglamento a la Ley 9986: Para la aplicación de lo previsto en el párrafo anterior, se entenderá a) Gran complejidad o carácter especializado, aquellos objetos que, en función de sus características particulares y su demanda poco frecuente, les den un carácter excepcional desde el punto de vista técnico. La gran complejidad o carácter especializado deberá ser acreditado mediante acto administrativo motivado, emitido por la unidad técnica competente. b) Número limitado de proveedores, aquella adquisición donde el mercado no ofrezca un número mayor de cinco potenciales oferentes con capacidad de ofrecer el objeto requerido, lo cual deberá ser acreditado en el sistema digital unificado por la unidad técnica competente. c) Economía y eficiencia, cuando de acuerdo con el principio de valor por el dinero se acrediten fehacientemente las ventajas económicas y se demuestre que se van a conseguir las metas propuestas con el menor empleo de recursos…”.
Autonomía administrativa y financiera Dentro del trámite legislativo del proyecto de Ley a la 8660, la Comisión Especial del expediente, mediante el dictamen afirmativo de mayoría, en el apartado 3.3.4. Desaplicación de leyes (folio 5234 del expediente 16.397), señaló: “En aras de robustecer la autonomía y permitirles cumplir sus fines especiales, se exceptúa la aplicación al ICE y sus empresas de determinadas disposiciones legales, las cuales han significado un serio escollo a ese imperativo de cumplir su cometido histórico en la época actual. Los diputados y diputadas que determinan afirmativamente el proyecto, consideran que para que el ICE y sus empresas sigan siendo motor y fuente de progreso nacional y, de esa manera, continúen instalando infraestructura, que le permita al país una exitosa estrategia para atraer inversión extranjera directa, al contar con servicios óptimos, oportunos, de calidad y a bajo costo, la iniciativa que se dictamina determina la inaplicación al ICE y a sus empresas de las siguientes leyes: B) Ley de Administración Financiera de la república y de Presupuestos Públicos No. 8131 de 18 de setiembre de 2001 y sus reformas, excepto los artículos 57 y 94…” De esta manera, la Ley 8660 señala en su artículo 17: “…
Desaplicación de leyes vigentes b) La Ley N. 8131, Administración financiera de la República y presupuestos públicos, de 18 de setiembre de 2001. y sus reformas excepto los artículos 57 y 94…” Contrario a lo valorado y aprobado por los legisladores como una manera óptima de liberar al ICE y sus empresas de amarres legislativos, la Ley General de Contratación Pública en sus artículos 133, 134 incisos j) y k) reinstala el deber de aplicar la Ley 8131 Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos derivado de la Contratación Pública al ICE y sus empresas, nuevamente limitando la autonomía administrativa y financiera que resulta necesaria para el logro de sus objetivos y una adecuada implementación del TLC. Aunado a lo anterior, vale mencionar que los argumentos de inconstitucionalidad señalados fueron advertidos oportunamente dentro del trámite legislativo de la Ley 9986 mediante oficio GG-1015-2020 del 9 de julio del 2020 (folios 5784 al 5798 del expediente de la ley 9986) y DJR-141-2021 del 23 de marzo de 2021 (folios 7677 al 7693 del expediente de la ley 9986) emitidos por la empresa Radiográfica Costarricense (RACSA S.A.) y oficios 256-115-2020 del día 21 de julio de 2020 (folios 5812 al 5836 del expediente de la ley 9986) y 256-41-2021 del 5 de abril de 2021 (folios 7695 al 7720 del expediente de la ley 9986) emitidos por el ICE como parte de la consulta institucional promovida por la Asamblea Legislativa del proyecto de ley 21.546, sin embargo éstos no fueron puestos en consulta constitucional ante esa honrable Sala.
Otros artículos impugnados de inconstitucionalidad: Por los mismos argumentos se impugnan los siguientes artículos de la Ley General de Contratación Pública que regulan la contratación administrativa del ICE y sus empresas:
Artículo 68 Procedimiento especial para el INS, el ICE y sus empresas en competencia, JASEC y ESPH Artículo 69 Contratación abierta de servicios para instituciones y empresas en competencia Artículo 70 Contratación de tecnología para instituciones y empresas en competencia Artículo 134 inciso d) Reforma el artículo 11 de la Ley 8660, Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones (…)”. Formula la siguiente petitoria: “Por lo anterior, conforme el artículo 73 inciso d) y 75 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional y articulo 7 de la Constitución Política se solicita lo siguiente: • Se admita la presente Acción de Inconstitucionalidad. • Se declare la inconstitucionalidad respecto al ICE y sus empresas de los artículos 1, 2, 68, 69, 70, 134 inciso d) y 135 inciso c) de la Ley General de Contratación Pública, por ser contrarios al artículo 7 de la Constitución Política”.
11- En los procedimientos se ha cumplido las prescripciones de ley.
Redacta el Magistrado Castillo Víquez; y,
Considerando:
La acción de inconstitucionalidad reviste específicas formalidades, que deben ser satisfechas a efectos de que la Sala válidamente pueda conocer por el fondo una impugnación en tal vía procesal.
Justamente, el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regula la legitimación para interponer acciones de inconstitucionalidad y prevé supuestos distintos. En primer término, exige un asunto previo pendiente de resolver, sea en vía judicial o administrativa (en el procedimiento para agotarla), en que se haya invocado la inconstitucionalidad como medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado. En los párrafos segundo y tercero de esa norma, se contemplan supuestos, en los que de manera excepcional no se exige el asunto previo, tales como la inexistencia de una lesión individual y directa por la naturaleza del asunto, defensa de intereses difusos o colectivos, o cuando la acción es formulada directamente por el contralor general de la República, el procurador general de la República, el fiscal general de la República o el defensor de los Habitantes.
Al respecto, la parte accionante menciona que el ICE pertenece al Estado, por lo que todo ciudadano o grupo organizado tiene interés en que permanezca fortalecido y brinde sus servicios con eficiencia y eficacia. Sustenta la legitimación en la existencia de intereses difusos, en relación con el interés “que el ICE, como empresa pública nacional, se mantenga fortalecido con el propósito de llevar a cabo los fines por los cuales fue creado, como se señaló anteriormente y no verse potencialmente amanezado (sic) mediante leyes que impliquen un debilitamiento”.
A partir de lo anterior, la Presidencia de la Sala, en la resolución de curso de esta acción de las 10:28 horas de 13 de julio de 2023, dispuso que la legitimación del accionante proviene del párrafo 2º del artículo 75, por cuanto acude en defensa de intereses difusos. Tal consideración es compartida por la mayoría de este Tribunal y, por ello, se dispone que este proceso es admisible en cuanto a la legitimación del accionante.
SOBRE LA CONDUCTA IMPUGNADA Y EL PARÁMETRO DE CONTROL DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD. Dentro de los presupuestos procesales que esta Sala debe valorar en fase de admisibilidad de una acción de inconstitucionalidad se encuentra el objeto impugnado. Lo que hace referencia tanto a la conducta impugnada, como al parámetro de control.
En el sub lite, el accionante expresamente se alega la acción “se fundamenta en el articulo 73 inciso d) de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y el artículo 7 de nuestra carta Magna, en visto que los artículos impugnados se oponen al Tratado de Libre Comercio (TLC), República Dominicana – Centroamérica – Estados Unidos, firmado y ratificado por nuestro país...”. Por lo que debe señalarse que este Tribunal, por unanimidad –aunque con una integración parcialmente diferente a la actual–, había sostenido que no cabe hacer control de constitucionalidad estableciendo como parámetro un tratado de libre comercio o un tratado bilateral de inversión. En concreto:
“VIII.- Sobre el tercer alegato: Violación al Tratado de Libre Comercio. REDACTA EL MAGISTRADO JINESTA LOBO. RESPECTO DE LAS PRESUNTAS INFRACCIONES AL TRATADO DE LIBRE COMERCIO REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA, CENTROAMERICA Y LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA. El punto medular a dilucidar sobre este particular es si el referido Tratado de Libre Comercio forma parte del parámetro de constitucionalidad con el que este Tribunal debe contrastar la validez de una norma o acto sujeto al Derecho Público que es impugnado por inconstitucional. Ese instrumento es lo que se denomina un acuerdo regional de comercio o de inversión, que, per se, está sujeto a los cambios dinámicos del mercado, la economía y libre comercio, por lo que, incluso, podría ser renegociado y modificado. Ciertamente, en el caso costarricense, a la luz del ordinal 7° de la Constitución Política, el referido acuerdo regional de comercio asumió la forma jurídica de un “Tratado”, por lo que, claramente, tiene rango infra constitucional pero supra legal.
En principio, los tratados o convenios internacionales que forman parte del parámetro de constitucionalidad son aquellos propios del Derecho Internacional Público referidos a los derechos humanos, así se desprende de los términos y doctrina que informa los artículos 48 de la Constitución Política, 38, párrafo 2°, y 74 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Incluso, tales instrumentos del Derecho Internacional Público de los derechos humanos, pueden tener, eventualmente, un rango constitucional o supra constitucional, por ejemplo, cuando le ofrecen a las personas un umbral de protección superior a los preceptos constitucionales (doctrina de la primacía de la cláusula más favorable o de los principios in dubio pro homine o pro libertate). Bajo esa inteligencia, se estima que este Tribunal Constitucional no tiene competencia para entrar a determinar si una norma legal violenta o no un acuerdo regional de comercio que asumió la forma jurídica de tratado.
Todos los extremos relativos a si una ley determinada infringe o no un acuerdo regional de comercio con rango supra legal, pero infra constitucional, le corresponde conocerlos y resolverlos al juez ordinario y no a los jueces constitucionales. Obviamente, este Tribunal sí tiene competencia para examinar la constitucionalidad de los referidos acuerdos regionales de comercio, tal y como la ha ejercido en el pasado” (sentencia nro. 2017-002791, reiterada -entre otras- en la sentencia nro. 2020-007684).
No obstante, esta Sala Constitucional estima que sí es competente de conocer de acciones contra normas legales o infralegales en las que se aduzca la violación de un tratado de libre comercio, bajo las siguientes consideraciones.
En primer lugar, el artículo 7, párrafo primero, de la Constitución Política, no hace distinción alguna respecto de la materia del tratado, al disponer:
Artículo 7º.- Los tratados públicos, los convenios internacionales y los concordatos, debidamente aprobados por la Asamblea Legislativa, tendrán desde su promulgación o desde el día que ellos designen, autoridad superior a las leyes.
Por su parte, el artículo 1 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece:
Artículo 1. La presente ley tiene como fin regular la jurisdicción constitucional, cuyo objeto es garantizar la supremacía de las normas y principios constitucionales y del Derecho Internacional o Comunitario vigente en la República, su uniforme interpretación y aplicación, así como los derechos y libertades fundamentales consagrados en la Constitución o en los instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos vigentes en Costa Rica.
Mientras que el artículo 2 inciso b) de la Ley que rige esta jurisdicción señala lo siguiente:
Artículo 2. Le corresponde específicamente a la jurisdicción constitucional:
(…)
Y, de consuno con lo anterior, en el capítulo específico sobre la acción de inconstitucionalidad, dicha ley habilita la posibilidad de ejercer una suerte de control de constitucionalidad indirecto, es decir, un control sobre la conformidad de las normas legales o infralegales respecto los tratados y convenios internacionales a que se refiere el artículo 7 constitucional cuando hay una contradicción evidente y manifiesta entre el convenio internacional y la normativa interna, de forma tal que el vicio de inconstitucionalidad surge de confrontar la materia regulada -que ambos casos se trata de la misma- y que exista una contradicción insalvable. En específico, se establece:
Artículo 73. Cabrá la acción de inconstitucionalidad:
(...)
Entonces, la Sala está llamada a conocer de la presente acción, utilizando como parámetro el Tratado de Libre Comercio citado, porque –según lo ya indicado– la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en sus artículos 2 inciso b) y 73 inciso d) le otorga expresamente la competencia de controlar la conformidad de las normas legales o disposiciones generales respecto a los tratados y convenios internacionales mencionados en el artículo 7 de la Constitución y entre la normativa internacional y la interna, según se aprecia, hay una contradicción insalvable, de forma tal que la segunda se opone a la primera.
Ahora bien, ciertamente la Sala no está llamada a calibrar aspectos relativos a la aplicación e interpretación de un TLC, ni muchos menos eventuales contradicciones menores o técnicas, que corresponden ser dirimidos mediante los mecanismos de resolución de controversias del propio tratado. Lo que sí le compete, como en este caso, es enjuiciar si las normas legales impugnadas se oponen a tal tratado internacional cuando se trata de una contradicción evidente y manifiesta.
Ergo, este proceso también es admisible respecto de su objeto.
El artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece que dentro de los 15 días posteriores a la primera publicación del edicto contemplado en el párrafo segundo del numeral 81, las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha de la interposición de la acción o aquellos con interés legítimo podrán apersonarse a fin de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o bien, para ampliar los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa.
Al respecto, la Presidencia de la Sala, mediante resolución de las 14:03 horas de 21 de agosto de 2023, tuvo como coadyuvante activo a Ermen Prado Arroyo, presidente de Asdeice, ya que se apersonó el 9 de agosto de 2023; es decir, dentro del plazo referido ut supra (la primera publicación en el Boletín Judicial se dio el 18 de julio de 2023).
Por otra parte, el 7 de agosto de 2023, las apoderadas judiciales del ICE, no solo contestaron la audiencia otorgada en la resolución de curso de la acción, sino que plantearon coadyuvancia. En consecuencia, como esta última fue formulada dentro del plazo establecido para tales efectos en la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, se tiene al ICE como coadyuvante activo.
Ahora, ambas coadyuvancias, sustentadas en la existencia de un interés difuso en el asunto de marras, se deben limitar a los numerales impugnados en el escrito de interposición de la acción, ya que su naturaleza es accesoria con respecto a la inconstitucionalidad pretendida por la parte accionante. Ergo, de acuerdo con el ordinal 83 eiusdem, solo resulta procedente analizar los alegatos novedosos que justifiquen la procedencia de la acción o amplíen los motivos de inconstitucionalidad, más no aquellos que impugnen otros artículos. Como ya ha resuelto este Tribunal, en otras ocasiones, el coadyuvante –en tanto intervención procesal accesoria– puede “ampliar los motivos de inconstitucionalidad pero no impugnar otras normas” (voto nro. 2017002791), ni “modificar el objeto de la acción” (voto nro. 2022002238).
Por lo tanto, la pretensión de ICE, en su condición de coadyuvante, en el sentido de adicionar o ampliar la presente acción, respecto de los artículos 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133 y 134 incisos j) y k) de la Ley General de Contratación Pública, debe rechazarse, toda vez que tales numerales no fueron formalmente impugnados por la parte accionante.
La parte accionante plantea acción de inconstitucionalidad contra los artículos 1, 2, 68, 69, 70, 134 inciso d) y 135 inciso c) de la Ley nro. 9986, denominada “Ley General de Contratación Pública”, por estimarlos contrarios al párrafo primero del artículo 7 de la Constitución Política y el inciso d) del ordinal 73 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Señala que los numerales impugnados transgreden el “Tratado de Libre Comercio República Dominicana - Centroamérica - Estados Unidos (TLC)”. Asevera que el expediente legislativo nro. 21.546, que sustentó la Ley General de Contratación Pública, evidencia que uno de sus objetivos fue eliminar todo régimen especial de contratación administrativa. Menciona que los numerales impugnados equiparan al ICE con otras empresas del Estado sin analizar ni valorar el origen del régimen especial de contratación administrativa que ostentaba. Afirma que se pone en peligro la existencia del ICE y sus empresas al someterlo a un régimen de contratación general que no contempla sus necesidades particulares administrativas, presupuestarias y de competencia en el sector de telecomunicaciones que es tan cambiante debido a las tecnologías.
Manifiesta que el régimen especial implementado con el TLC procuró una contratación administrativa más ágil, eficiente y con mayor autonomía administrativa; empero, la ley actual desconoce tales preceptos y es inconstitucional al representar un retroceso. Añade que el ICE y sus empresas pierden agilidad, eficiencia y autonomía administrativa al estar sometidas a largos procedimientos de contratación y más pasos en el proceso de adquisiciones. Formula la siguiente petitoria: “Por lo anterior, conforme el artículo 73 inciso d) y 75 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional y articulo 7 de la Constitución Política se solicita lo siguiente: • Se admita la presente Acción de Inconstitucionalidad. • Se declare la inconstitucionalidad respecto al ICE y sus empresas de los artículos 1, 2, 68, 69, 70, 134 inciso d) y 135 inciso c) de la Ley General de Contratación Pública, por ser contrarios al artículo 7 de la Constitución Política”.
El ICE, en su condición de coadyuvante activo, amplía los motivos de inconstitucionalidad con respecto a los artículos 1, 2, 68, 69, 70, 134 inciso d) y 135 inciso c) de la Ley General de Contratación Pública. Indica que transgreden el numeral 33 de la Constitución Política y el principio de igualdad.
Los artículos 1, 2, 68, 69, 70, 134 inciso d) y 135 inciso c) de la Ley General de Contratación Pública, disponen:
“ARTÍCULO 1-Ámbito de aplicación La presente ley resulta de aplicación para toda la actividad contractual que emplee total o parcialmente fondos públicos.
La actividad contractual de los sujetos privados cuando administren o custodien fondos públicos o cuando sean receptores de beneficios patrimoniales gratuitos o sin contraprestación alguna provenientes de componentes de la Hacienda Pública, conforme al artículo 5 de la Ley N.º 7428, Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República de 4 de noviembre de 1994, deberán aplicar esta ley únicamente cuando la contratación supere el 50% del límite inferior del umbral fijado para la licitación menor del régimen ordinario. En los casos en que los sujetos privados no apliquen esta ley deberán respetar el régimen de prohibiciones, los principios constitucionales y legales de la contratación pública, y lo dispuesto en el artículo 128, inciso d) de esta ley.
A los entes públicos no estatales cuyo financiamiento provenga en más de un cincuenta por ciento (50%) de recursos propios, los aportes o las contribuciones de sus agremiados, y las empresas públicas cuyo capital social pertenezca, en su mayoría, a particulares y no al sector público, no les resultará aplicable la presente ley.
Cuando en esta ley se utilice el término "Administración" o "entidad contratante" ha de entenderse que corresponde a los sujetos que desarrollan actividad de contratación pública al amparo de la presente ley.
ARTÍCULO 2- Exclusiones de la aplicación de la ley Se excluyen del alcance de la presente ley las siguientes actividades:
Las restantes contrataciones se regirán por lo previsto en la presente ley.
ARTÍCULO 68- Procedimiento especial para el INS, el ICE y sus empresas en competencia, JASEC y ESPH. El Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS) y sus sociedades anónimas en competencia y el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) y sus empresas en competencia, la Junta Administrativa del Servicio Eléctrico de Cartago y la Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia podrán utilizar el procedimiento especial regulado en este artículo, con independencia del monto de la contratación para lo siguiente:
El procedimiento especial deberá contar con lo siguiente:
En este procedimiento especial existirá la posibilidad de utilizar la modalidad de precalificación, por etapas o concurso con financiamiento, aplicando lo establecido en esta ley.
ARTÍCULO 69- Contratación abierta de servicios para instituciones y empresas en competencia Las instituciones y empresas en competencia podrán contratar servicios de manera abierta con personas físicas o jurídicas que cumplan con los requisitos previamente establecidos por la Administración, cuando ello resulte más conveniente al interés público, por las particularidades que presenta el objeto contractual y cuando el pago de la comisión se encuentre previamente tasado por la Administración contratante.
Para aplicar este procedimiento deberán establecerse los requisitos generales a cumplir, los cuales estarán disponibles en el sistema digital unificado. Aquellos que cumplan con los requisitos podrán brindar los servicios de que se trate, debiendo respetarse los parámetros que se definirán reglamentariamente.
ARTÍCULO 70- Contratación de tecnología para instituciones y empresas en competencia Las instituciones y empresas en competencia podrán utilizar el procedimiento especial regulado en el artículo 68 de la presente ley cuando contraten la adquisición, el mantenimiento y la actualización o el arrendamiento de equipos tecnológicos para la informática, hardware y software y desarrollos de sistemas informáticos.
ARTÍCULO 134- Reformas Se reforman las disposiciones normativas que se indican a continuación:
(…)
Artículo 11- Contratos de fideicomiso Para el cumplimiento de sus fines, el ICE y sus empresas están facultados para suscribir contratos de constitución de fideicomisos de cualquier índole, dentro del territorio nacional y fuera de él.
Además, los fideicomisos constituidos en el país tendrán la supervisión y regulación de la superintendencia financiera correspondiente, mientras que a los constituidos fuera del territorio nacional se les aplicarán, en esta materia, las disposiciones de la legislación del país donde fueron constituidos.
ARTÍCULO 135- Derogatorias Se derogan las disposiciones que se indican:
(...)
La parte accionante plantea acción de inconstitucionalidad contra los artículos 1, 2, 68, 69, 70, 134 inciso d) y 135 inciso c) de la Ley nro. 9986 denominada “Ley General de Contratación Pública”, por estimarlos contrarios al párrafo primero del artículo 7 de la Constitución Política. Señala que el “Tratado de Libre Comercio República Dominicana - Centroamérica - Estados Unidos (TLC)” estableció a Costa Rica la obligación de llevar a cabo un proceso interno para dar cumplimiento a los compromisos asumidos, entre ellos, la emisión de una “Ley de modernización y fortalecimiento de las entidades públicas del sector telecomunicaciones”. Refiere que, en razón de lo anterior, se emitió la Ley nro. 8660, denominada “Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones”, que contempló un régimen especial de contratación administrativa para el ICE y sus empresas; sin embargo, este fue derogado posteriormente por la Ley General de Contratación Pública.
Asevera que los artículos cuestionados se oponen al TLC, por lo que la acción se fundamenta en el inciso d) del ordinal 73 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y el numeral 7 de la Carta Magna. Menciona que en tal tratado se reconoció el compromiso del gobierno de fortalecer y modernizar al ICE, para lo cual se acordó el establecimiento de una legislación moderna a los efectos de la apertura a competencia del mercado de redes privadas, servicios de internet y servicios celulares. Arguye que el apartado “8.10 Telecomunicaciones” señala: “Se acordó que Costa Rica aprobará una ley de modernización y fortalecimiento del ICE, y tendrá en efecto una legislación moderna para regular el sector, incluyendo el establecimiento de una autoridad reguladora”. Sostiene que el anexo 13 del TLC incluye la obligación de Costa Rica de promulgar un marco jurídico para fortalecer al ICE, a los efectos de que pueda enfrentar la competencia y tenga los instrumentos necesarios para brindar con agilidad un servicio de calidad.
Aduce que no se puede desmejorar mediante una ley posterior lo regulado en el marco de la negociación del tratado. Menciona que la ley aprobada con ocasión del TLC fue un aspecto comercial tanto de oportunidad como jurídico ampliamente discutido y consensuado, sin la cual se expone al ICE y sus empresas a un alto riesgo de retroceso en la regulación y a una violación a la eficiencia, eficacia y competitividad en la contratación administrativa. Indica que la Ley General de Contratación Pública no es eficiente en plazos y procesos para una institución del Estado que está en competencia con empresas privadas. Señala que despojar al ICE del instrumento de contratación previsto por el TLC atenta contra una parte esencial de la ley nro. 8660 y los compromisos adquiridos por el Estado para su eficacia plena. Añade que la Sala, en el voto nro. 11210 de 16 de julio de 2008, señaló: “… Del análisis del proyecto de ley consultado, se deduce la clara intención del legislador de dotar al Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad de las condiciones necesarias para una mayor eficiencia y eficacia administrativa, financiera y tecnológica.
Lo anterior, claro está, en el marco de un proceso de apertura del mercado de telecomunicaciones -ya definido por el pueblo con la aprobación del referéndum del TLC EE.UU., Centroamérica y República Dominicana (Ley referendaria No. 8622 de 21 de noviembre de 2007)- que procura fortalecer a los operadores públicos frente a su eventual competencia. En efecto, de las consideraciones de los dictaminadores del proyecto de ley se colige lo siguiente: " (...) En el proyecto de marras, se plantea un régimen especial de contratación administrativa para la adquisición de bienes y servicios del ICE. En cuanto a este tema, el proyecto en estudio enuncia entre sus objetivos el dotar al ICE de una contratación administrativa ágil, eficiente eficaz como arte de los esfuerzos de fortalecer modernizar dicha entidad: así como de establecer un cuerpo normativo adaptado a sus particularidades. Tanto la Sala Constitucional como la Contraloría General, han señalado la posibilidad que existan regímenes especiales siempre y cuando la naturaleza y particularidades de la actividad pública de que se trate, así lo exijan y en tanto los supuestos contemplados en la normativa genérica no le resulten aplicables.
Tal como se pretende en ese dictamen, dicho régimen debe regular entonces las condiciones particulares de la contratación administrativa del ICE y sus empresas, e ineludiblemente considerar los postulados constitucionales consagrados en los artículos 182 y 184. En este tema el legislador tiene encomendada la tarea de señalar de manera clara cuáles han de ser las reglas y parámetros específicos que justifiquen una regulación apartada del marco normativo general, desarrollar su contenido en la ley e incorporar los principios constitucionales que atienden la actividad de contratación administrativa del Estado, tal como se propone en el presente texto. En el marco de dichos objetivos, se resaltó que uno de los principales inconvenientes que, históricamente, han tenido el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad y sus empresas en materia de contratación administrativa, es que los límites económicos para determinar los procedimientos de contratación aplicables no necesariamente se ajustan a sus requerimientos.
En virtud de lo anterior, se colige que la intención del legislador en la normativa consultada es ajustar los límites económicos de la contratación administrativa a la realidad y las dimensiones del ICE. En el dictamen de análisis se señaló lo siguiente: “(...) En el mismo orden de ideas, actualmente el ICE y sus empresas utilizan los procedimientos de licitación pública, licitación abreviada y contratación directa según los límites económicos que establece el artículo 27 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y sus reformas. Dicha metodología por sí misma no es inconveniente, sin embargo, siendo que el presupuesto de referencia aplicable al ICE representa poco más del 10% del presupuesto de la Institución, se hizo necesario establecer una metodología que permita ajustar los limites (sic) económicos de la contratación a la realidad y dimensiones del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad y sus empresas, sin que con ello se pierda de vista que el órgano competente para fijar dichos límites es la Contraloría General de la República.
(...)" (lo resaltado no corresponde al original). El texto consultado no pretende, entonces, desconocer los procedimientos de contratación administrativa, sino, más bien, establecer montos más acordes a las particularidades presupuestarias del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, lo que resulta legítimo a la luz del Derecho de la Constitución... " (el subrayado no es del original)”. Arguye que, una vez superado el análisis de constitucionalidad, se promulgó la ley nro. 8660, que contempla entre sus objetivos: “… a) Fortalecer, modernizar y dotar al Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), a sus empresas y a sus órganos adscritos, de la legislación que le permita adaptarse a todos los cambios en el régimen legal de generación y prestación de los servicios de electricidad, así como de las telecomunicaciones, infocomunicaciones, productos y servicios de información y demás servicios en convergencia. e) Flexibilizar y ampliar los mecanismos y procedimientos de contratación pública que tienen el ICE y sus empresas. f) Garantizar y reafirmar la autonomía administrativa y financiera del ICE y sus empresas ...”.
Manifiesta que el régimen especial establecido en esa ley permitía mayor agilidad y eficiencia en la adquisición de bienes y servicios en concordancia con lo establecido en el TLC. Alega la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 1, 2 y 135 inciso c) de la Ley General de Contratación Pública. Acota que, de acuerdo con el numeral 7 de la Carta Magna, los tratados públicos y convenios internacionales ratificados por la Asamblea Legislativa tienen autoridad superior a las leyes. Sostiene que el TLC aprobado por voluntad popular solo se encuentra por debajo de la Constitución Política. Refiere que los artículos impugnados ignoran el régimen especial de contratación administrativa del ICE, el cual fue parte del contenido del TLC. Asevera que el expediente legislativo nro. 21.546 que sustentó la Ley General de Contratación Pública evidencia que uno de sus objetivos fue eliminar todo régimen especial de contratación administrativa.
Aduce que tal cuerpo normativo equipara al ICE con otras empresas del Estado sin analizar ni valorar el origen del régimen especial de contratación administrativa que ostentaba. Estima contrario al Derecho de la Constitución que una norma posterior ignore legislación de implementación de un tratado internacional y establezca la obligación de utilizar un marco general que se opone al régimen especial que es más eficaz y eficiente para enfrentarse a la competencia. Afirma que se pone en peligro la existencia del ICE y sus empresas al someterlo a un régimen de contratación general que no contempla sus necesidades particulares administrativas, presupuestarias y de competencia en el sector de telecomunicaciones que es tan cambiante debido a las tecnologías. Manifiesta que el régimen especial implementado con el TLC procuró una contratación administrativa más ágil, eficiente y con mayor autonomía administrativa; empero, la ley actual desconoce tales preceptos y es inconstitucional al representar un retroceso.
Añade que el ICE y sus empresas pierden autonomía administrativa al estar sometidas a largos procedimientos de contratación y más pasos en el proceso de adquisiciones. Arguye que el capítulo 9 anexo 13 del TLC contempla: “II. Modernización del ICE Costa Rica promulgará un nuevo marco jurídico para fortalecer al ICE, a través de su modernización apropiada, a más tardar el 31 de diciembre del 2004…”. Explica que, al derogarse el régimen especial, el ICE se ve obligado a utilizar un procedimiento más riguroso en plazos y etapas en los supuestos de licitación mayor, lo cual resulta desproporcionado y gravoso, porque hace más aletargada la gestión administrativa y financiera; además, se desvirtúa la agilidad que se requiere para responder al mercado en competencia a los efectos de atender sus negocios de telecomunicaciones y electricidad. Añade que, con el régimen especial, el ICE tenía tanto umbrales más amplios como plazos más reducidos.
Refiere que el ICE también podía atender recursos en determinados supuestos; sin embargo, la Ley General de Contratación Pública le otorgó esta competencia a la Contraloría General de la República, lo que debilita la autonomía administrativa, financiera y procedimental del ICE. Agrega que lo anterior también afecta la eficacia de los procedimientos de contratación administrativa para el ICE, ya que el órgano contralor debe atender los recursos en procedimientos que no consideran el tipo, la naturaleza y el presupuesto de las instituciones (más allá de que se establece un régimen diferenciado para las empresas). Cuestiona que la Ley General de Contratación Pública haya eliminado la excepción de contratación directa de escasa cuantía (procedimiento ágil y expedito sin recursos que tenía un plazo de 15 días) e imponga la licitación reducida que establece el derecho de objeción al cartel y la revocatoria sobre el acto final.
Señala que el reglamento de la ley nro. 8660 permitía establecer la potestad del ICE de modificar sus contratos en ejecución para adquirir los mismos bienes o similares hasta por el 100% del monto adjudicado; empero, el artículo 101 de la Ley General de Contratación Pública limita tal posibilidad y establece su excepcionalidad. Refiere que la Ley General de Contratación Pública, en sus artículos 133 y 134 (incisos j y k) reinstala el deber de aplicar la ley nro. 8131 denominada “Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos”, lo cual limita la autonomía administrativa y financiera que resulta necesaria para el logro de sus objetivos y una adecuada implementación del TLC. Asevera que por los mismos argumentos impugna los numerales 68, 69, 70 y 134 inciso d de la Ley General de Contratación Pública. Formula la siguiente petitoria: “Por lo anterior, conforme el artículo 73 inciso d) y 75 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional y articulo 7 de la Constitución Política se solicita lo siguiente: • Se admita la presente Acción de Inconstitucionalidad. • Se declare la inconstitucionalidad respecto al ICE y sus empresas de los artículos 1, 2, 68, 69, 70, 134 inciso d) y 135 inciso c) de la Ley General de Contratación Pública, por ser contrarios al artículo 7 de la Constitución Política”.
DE LOS ARTÍCULOS 1, 2, 68, 69, 70 Y 135 INCISO C) DE LA LEY GENERAL DE CONTRATACIÓN PÚBLICA, LEY 9986. A criterio de la mayoría de este Tribunal, procede declarar con lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad, respecto de los artículos 1, 2, 68, 69, 70 y 135 inciso c) de la Ley General de Contratación Pública, Ley nro. 9986, en cuanto se suprime de forma total y absoluta el régimen especial de contratación administrativa dispuesto previamente para el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) y sus empresas en la Ley nro. 8660, de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones, pues esto supone oponerse al contenido del Tratado de Libre Comercio con la República Dominicana, Centroamérica y Estados Unidos de América (en adelante, TLC), aprobado mediante decreto legislativo nro. 8622 del 21 de noviembre de 2007.
En el sub lite, se constata la figura de la inconstitucionalidad indirecta, esto es, la violación de una ley al contenido de un tratado internacional y, por ende, del numeral 7 constitucional, en tanto el contenido del segundo es claro y preciso y la primera lo contradice de manera evidente y manifiesta, tal y como ocurre en el sub judice. Lo anterior, con sustento en las siguientes consideraciones.
Como ya se apuntó, el accionante alega que los citados artículos 1, 2, 68, 69, 70 y 135 inciso c) de la Ley General de Contratación Pública (LGCP) son inconstitucionales, en cuanto se oponen al TLC, al derogar el régimen especial de contratación administrativa establecido para el ICE y sus empresas, previsto en la referida Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones. Se alega que, como parte medular y fundamental del contenido del mencionado tratado internacional, Costa Rica asumió el compromiso de aprobar una ley para la modernización y fortalecimiento de las entidades públicas del sector telecomunicaciones, de forma que pudiera incorporarse y participar adecuadamente en un mercado de competencia abierta. Justamente, de conformidad con el espíritu del tratado comercial y en cumplimiento de los compromisos adquiridos por Costa Rica, se aprobó la mencionada Ley nro. 8660, como marco jurídico que permitiera al ICE competir en igualdad de condiciones con operadores privados de telecomunicaciones.
Como aspecto medular de la Ley nro. 8660, se incluyó un régimen especial de contratación administrativa que precisamente le permitiera a la institución y a sus empresas competir, al tener un mecanismo más ágil y eficiente para la adquisición de bienes y servicios. Por lo que argumenta, el accionante, que despojar al ICE de su propio marco normativo de contratación administrativa –como se hace con la normativa impugnada–, así como someterlo al régimen general de contratación administrativa, cuyos procedimientos y plazos no resultan lo suficientemente ágiles, eficientes y adecuados, impide una efectiva competencia en el mercado en igualdad de condiciones con empresas privadas, en clara infracción de los compromisos adquiridos por Costa Rica en el TLC. Finalmente, el accionante señala que la acción se fundamenta en el artículo 73 inciso d) de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en relación con el ordinal 7 de la Constitución Política, en vista de que las normas cuestionadas se oponen a todas luces al contenido y propósito del TLC, firmado y ratificado por nuestro país.
Se insiste que los artículos impugnados derogan el régimen especial de contratación administrativa previamente promulgado por el legislador para dotar al ICE y a sus empresas de un marco legislativo ágil, eficiente y adecuado a sus necesidades específicas, para así poder participar en un mercado en competencia en el sector de telecomunicaciones, en atención al contenido del TLC y a los compromisos asumidos por Estado costarricense.
En cuyo caso, las apreciaciones y reproches formulados por la parte accionante, no solo son plenamente respaldados por el propio ICE (al momento de contestar la audiencia que le fue otorgada), sino que por la Procuraduría General de la República en su informe. Esta última expone varios aspectos que resultan de interés destacar, para la debida resolución de esta acción:
(i) Que, ciertamente, una ley ordinaria que se oponga a los postulados de un tratado o convenio internacional estaría infringiendo el artículo 7° de la Carta Fundamental, dado el orden jerárquico de las fuentes que claramente establece esa norma constitucional. Lo que resulta de interés, en la especie, en tanto se acusa la infracción que comete la Ley General de Contratación Pública (en cuanto dispone la derogatoria del régimen especial de contratación del ICE) en contra de los postulados del TLC y de los compromisos específicos pactados por Costa Rica en tal instrumento internacional, en materia de las condiciones de competitividad garantizadas al ICE a raíz de la apertura del mercado de telecomunicaciones.
(ii) Que, efectivamente, las negociaciones efectuadas en el marco del TLC, que finalmente desembocaron en la apertura del mercado de comercialización y prestación de servicios de telecomunicaciones en Costa Rica, imponían la aprobación de específicas disposiciones para el caso costarricense, toda vez que, para ese momento, nuestro país aún prestaba dichos servicios bajo un régimen de monopolio estatal en cabeza del ICE. Lo que implicó negociación, aceptación y formalización de disposiciones especiales (como el anexo 13 del capítulo 13) respecto del mercado costarricense, que resultaban indispensables para asegurar esa apertura de mercado que el TLC perseguía. Asimismo, la finalidad perseguida en la negociación no era la privatización del ICE, sino la apertura progresiva y regulada del mercado, bajo el entendido de que, a la par de la instauración de un régimen de libre competencia, se garantizaría el fortalecimiento y la modernización de la prestación estatal de los servicios, que se conservaría en manos de la entidad nacional que quedaría participando en tal mercado.
Lo que explica que se haya dedicado un anexo especial (y exclusivo para Costa Rica) para dejar asegurada la forma en que se abriría el mercado y la posición en que quedaría compitiendo la institución estatal en dicho mercado. En este se evidencia la voluntad de las partes firmantes de tal pacto internacional. En particular, el citado anexo 13 del capítulo 13 establece que: “Costa Rica promulgará un nuevo marco jurídico para fortalecer al ICE, a través de su modernización apropiada”. A lo que debe añadirse el dictamen afirmativo correspondiente al decreto legislativo que aprobó el TLC (decreto legislativo nro. 8622), pues en este quedó plasmada la voluntad que inspiró la ratificación de ese instrumento internacional, ya que en este también se consigna que dicho tratado “no dejaría al ICE en una situación de desventaja frente a los competidores privados. El Anexo 13 del TLC incluye para Costa Rica la obligación de promulgar un marco jurídico para fortalecer al ICE, lo que fue establecido en el mejor interés del ICE y de los costarricenses, dado que resulta innegable la necesidad de que una ley de modernización sea promulgada lo más pronto posible, para que la institución pueda prepararse adecuadamente para enfrentar la competencia y tenga los instrumentos necesarios para actuar con la agilidad necesaria para poder dar un servicio de la mejor calidad”.
De lo que se concluye que la negociación y disposiciones del TLC incluyeron preparar al ICE para el cambio que se avecinaba con la apertura del mercado, garantizando que no quedara en desventaja frente a los operadores privados que habría de enfrentar, dotándolo de los instrumentos necesarios para actuar con la suficiente y necesaria agilidad al enfrentar la competencia.
(iii) Que, en el marco de los compromisos expresamente pactados en el TLC, que obligaron al Estado costarricense a seguir la Agenda de Desarrollo y la Agenda de Implementación como acciones fundamentales e indispensables para poner en vigor ese tratado internacional, se promulgó la Ley nro. 8660. Dicha ley, “en directo y específico cumplimiento de los términos del Tratado, instauró un marco especial de contratación administrativa para el ICE”. Lo que supuso un modelo más flexible, con una soltura propia de una entidad que debía estar en condiciones para desenvolverse de una forma ágil y eficiente en su proceso de aprovisionamiento de bienes y servicios. Esto, “como única alternativa para tener las condiciones suficientes que le permitan enfrentar los retos de un feroz mercado. Recordemos que cuando un prestador comercial de servicios queda regazado en esa competencia, tarde o temprano estará destinado a quedar eliminado de ese mercado.
En esta materia, los cambios tecnológicos que avanzan a velocidad vertiginosa, así como las tácticas modernas de mercadeo y captura de clientes, provocan que aquel competidor que sufra un rezago, por pequeño que pueda parecer, corre el riesgo de perder el sentido de oportunidad en su participación, lo que a su vez puede causar la pérdida de clientela y a la postre su inevitable desplazamiento frente a otros prestadores de servicios más ágiles. Bajo esa perspectiva, es congruente pensar que el régimen especial de contratación de la Ley 8660 respondió a esos compromisos del TLC para la participación de la única empresa estatal en ese mercado”.
(iv) Que, lo anterior no supone desconocer que la Ley nro. 8660 tiene el mismo rango jerárquico de cualquier otra Ley de la República y, en tal medida, queda sujeta a las potestades soberanas del legislador derivadas de la propia Constitución (inciso primero del artículo 121), por lo que no podría entenderse que esa ley ostenta una especie de inmutabilidad permanente frente al legislador ordinario. Ergo, es posible que se produjera eventualmente algún tipo de reforma o ajuste si ello resultara necesario con el devenir de los tiempos; sin embargo, el “quid del asunto reside en determinar si la derogación íntegra –que no una simple reforma parcial– de todo el régimen especial que se había otorgado al ICE como herramienta inseparable del TLC constituyó un ejercicio de esa potestad legislativa soberana que pueda a la postre resultar inconstitucional, en la medida en que rebasó los márgenes de una reforma razonable y consecuentemente desbordó el marco del TLC y terminó desconociendo sus compromisos sustantivos”.
(v) Que, en este caso, la Ley nro. 9986, en su artículo 135 inciso c), derogó expresamente los artículos 12, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 y 29 de la Ley nro. 8660, por lo que no se está ante una modificación del régimen especial de contratación previsto en cumplimiento del TLC, sino ante “su supresión total y absoluta”. Entonces, “puede estimarse que el marco y el compromiso derivado del TLC sí fue quebrantado con esa total derogatoria de una normativa especial que estaba diseñada y aprobada para dar cumplimiento a los fines, principios y espíritu de las negociaciones del Tratado, en orden a la dotación de herramientas efectivas y reales de competitividad, modernización y agilidad para el desempeño del ICE en el libre mercado”, en tanto que tal derogatoria total no “estuvo acompañada de la introducción de nuevas normas que suplieran con algún otro modelo el régimen especial que el TLC previó para el caso del ICE.
Un modelo que respetara satisfactoriamente el espíritu de los compromisos plasmados en el Tratado” y, por el contrario, de las “discusiones legislativas –y del texto mismo de esta LGCP– queda claro que se trató de una ley uniformadora y omnicomprensiva para todo el sector público. En esa medida, no se resguardó, contempló, consideró ni garantizó una herramienta especial para el ICE. Al contrario, se manifestó expresamente que se quería acabar con su régimen especial (como se hizo con todas las demás instituciones) a fin de incluirlo en los cánones generales que se aplican a otras entidades”.
(vi) Que, podría argumentarse que el TLC no garantizó concretamente un régimen especial de contratación administrativa, lo que en principio resulta cierto, pero “no puede desconocerse que este Tratado sí dejó pactado y garantizado el compromiso de dictar una ley interna que proporcionara las herramientas necesarias para la participación del ICE en el nuevo mercado en condiciones de adecuada competitividad y agilidad frente a los demás operadores, compromiso que se honró con la promulgación de la Ley 8660. Ergo, el dar un paso atrás hacia un régimen de contratación administrativa que dificulta, debilita y disminuye esa competitividad en el mercado, sí genera un rompimiento de este compromiso internacional”.
(vii) Que, un segundo aspecto que podría argumentarse es que la nueva LGCP contiene un apartado de regulaciones especiales para las empresas en competencia, dentro de las cuales queda comprendido el ICE; no obstante, ello tiene varias aristas que llevan a suponer que esto tampoco es suficiente para tener por satisfechos los compromisos del TLC, por cuanto: a) ese apartado especial de normas igualmente resulta de aplicación general para diversas empresas públicas, las cuales no comparten las mismas características y condiciones del ICE, tanto en el alcance y cobertura de sus servicios, como en el monto del presupuesto global del que disponen para efectuar adquisiciones de bienes y servicios; y b) dicho régimen especial no cubre todos los procesos de contratación administrativa que puedan llevar a cabo este tipo de empresas públicas, sino que ello queda sometido a una serie de supuestos y requisitos que implican restricciones, lo cual entonces sigue provocando una diferencia sensible con las herramientas que brindaba la Ley 8660.
(viii) Que, en la especie, los accionantes aportan una serie de parámetros y de ejemplos concretos y detallados sobre aspectos de agilidad y eficiencia –y por ende de competitividad– en las reglas de contratación administrativa que resultan afectados negativamente y disminuidos en forma sensible con el sometimiento del ICE a las reglas generales de la nueva LGCP.
(ix) Que, el régimen especial de contratación administrativa que había instaurado la Ley 8660, en cumplimiento de los compromisos pactados en el TLC, si bien se distanció de las reglas más rígidas aplicables a las demás entidades públicas, no violentaba en forma alguna los principios constitucionales, en razón de sus especiales características, como así lo reconoció esta Sala, en la opinión consultiva nro. 11210-2008 de las 15:00 horas del 16 de julio de 2008. De forma tal, que la conformidad constitucional de la normativa que el país aprobó para dar efectivo, real y satisfactorio cumplimiento a los compromisos que el TLC previó para efectos de la apertura de mercado en las actividades donde participa el ICE, fue avalada por esta Sala. Ello, por cuanto, no se trataba de relevar al ICE de todos los controles o límites que rigen la actuación de los entes públicos, pero sí proporcionarle herramientas sustanciales en materia de aprovisionamiento de bienes y servicios, como condición sine qua non para su supervivencia en el mercado nacional a partir de su apertura a la competencia con operadores privados.
(x) Que, los compromisos específicos de Costa Rica pactados en Anexo 13 del Capítulo 13 del TLC con respecto al ICE innegablemente tomaron en cuenta “la naturaleza única de la política social costarricense en materia de telecomunicaciones. Ello se encuentra en relación directa con los principios de accesibilidad y cobertura universal de los servicios que inspiraron su creación y rigen los fines públicos que como institución estatal tiene asignados, dentro del Estado social de Derecho regido por los postulados supremos del artículo 50 constitucional”. Esa particular naturaleza, que llevó también a un anexo específico dentro del TLC (anexo 13), “es justa y precisamente lo que dio lugar al régimen de contratación especial y diferenciado que quedó plasmado en la Ley 8660 (artículos 22-29), legislación ordinaria que se promulgó para dar cumplimiento y operatividad al Tratado. Ergo, ese régimen es especial, diferente, acentuado y acorde a un instrumento normativo de carácter internacional pactado por el Estado costarricense.” Por lo anterior, “la desaparición de ese régimen legal especial que propició la Ley 9986 (Ley General de Contratación Pública) implicó una infracción a ese compromiso derivado del TLC de promulgar una ley especial que garantizara la competitividad del ICE en el nuevo mercado abierto de las telecomunicaciones”.
(xi) Que, dicha “infracción no queda solventada con las regulaciones de la LGCA para las empresas en régimen de competencia. Primero, porque esas siguen siendo normas con carácter de generalidad para un sector (empresas en competencia), y el ICE tiene garantizadas condiciones especiales dentro de esa materia de competitividad, reconocidas en el Tratado internacional. Y en segundo término, porque las normas generales de la LGCP son menos favorables (para la agilidad del sistema de adquisición de bienes y servicios) que el régimen previsto en la Ley 8660 y además está sujeto a ciertos requerimientos y no resulta aplicable a todos los supuestos, con lo cual debilita y desmejora las herramientas normativas flexibles previstas para el ICE en la Ley 8660”.
Para la mayoría de Tribunal, resultan acertadas las apreciaciones desarrolladas por la Procuraduría General de la República.
En primer lugar, resulta innegable que en el Anexo 13 al Capítulo 13 del TLC, atinente a los “Compromisos Específicos de Costa Rica en Materia de Servicios de Telecomunicaciones”, se establece que:
“reconociendo la naturaleza única de la política social costarricense en materia de telecomunicaciones y reafirmando su decisión de asegurar de que el proceso de apertura en su sector de servicios de telecomunicaciones se base en su Constitución Política; enfatizando que dicho proceso de apertura será en beneficio del usuario y se fundamentará en los principios de gradualidad, selectividad y regulación, y en estricta conformidad con los objetivos sociales de universalidad y solidaridad en el suministro de los servicios de telecomunicaciones; y reconociendo su compromiso de fortalecer y modernizar el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) como un participante en un mercado competitivo de telecomunicaciones...” (el destacado no corresponden al original) El Gobierno de Costa Rica expresamente asume, como parte de sus compromisos específicos en materia de servicios telecomunicaciones, que:
“II. Modernización del ICE Costa Rica promulgará un nuevo marco jurídico para fortalecer al ICE, a través de su modernización apropiada, a más tardar el 31 de diciembre del 2004.” Lo que encuentra plena acogida y reflejo en el dictamen afirmativo de mayoría, contenido en el mencionado decreto legislativo nro. 8622, en que se expresa que:
“En lo que respecta al TLC, es el Capítulo 13 de dicho Tratado el que contiene los compromisos adquiridos por Estados Unidos y el resto de países centroamericanos en telecomunicaciones, con excepción de Costa Rica. En el caso de nuestro país, únicamente aplican los compromisos específicos asumidos en esta materia y que se encuentran contenidos en el Anexo 13 del Tratado.
En relación con dichos compromisos específicos, han sido diversas las reacciones de los grupos que se han referido al tema ante esta Comisión y uno de los principales argumentos que han esgrimido aquellos que se oponen al TLC de refiere al hecho que los compromisos asumidos por Costa Rica en materia de telecomunicaciones implican la privatización del ICE y, en general, la privatización del sector. En esta línea se han pronunciado los Sindicatos del ICE y otros, como el Grupo Pensamiento Solidario.
Al respecto, luego de un análisis de lo dispuesto en el Anexo 13 del TLC, hemos podido concluir que ninguna disposición del TLC, y en particular de dicho Anexo 13, implica este compromiso. En el caso de Costa Rica, que es un país que tiene monopolio estatal, el compromiso que se adquiere se refiere únicamente a la apertura a la competencia de tres sectores: Internet, celulares y redes privadas.
Con el TLC, Costa Rica adquiere el compromiso, no de privatización, sino de abrir a la competencia tres sectores: Internet, celulares y redes privadas, para que al igual que con los bancos, puedan prestar estos servicios el Estado (el ICE y RACSA) y las empresas privadas. Todo bajo la supervisión de un órgano regulador del Estado, también al igual que con los bancos, que regule, entre otros, aspectos como las tarifas y la calidad de los servicios y preserve los principios de solidaridad y universalidad.
El TLC no dejaría al ICE en una situación de desventaja frente a los competidores privados. El Anexo 13 del TLC incluye para Costa Rica la obligación de promulgar un marco jurídico para fortalecer al ICE. Esta obligación fue establecida en el mejor interés del ICE y de los costarricenses, dado que resulta innegable la necesidad de que una ley de modernización sea promulgada lo más pronto posible, para que la institución pueda prepararse adecuadamente para enfrentar la competencia y tenga los instrumentos necesarios para actuar con la agilidad necesaria para poder dar un servicio de la mejor calidad.
En relación con este tema, no cabe duda que el TLC también beneficiará al ICE de tres maneras: 1) el ICE ya no tendrá la carga exclusiva de financiar o subsidiar ningún servicio de telecomunicaciones, pues los operadores privados deberán contribuir al sistema de servicio universal que Costa Rica decida tener, es así que esta carga será compartida; 2) los operadores deberán pagarle al ICE por cualquier uso de su red; y 3) el TLC implica modernizar al ICE para que, en un régimen de competencia, el ICE se esfuerce por dar más y mejores servicios al público.” (el destacado no corresponde al original) Lo que, finalmente, motivó la aprobación de la citada Ley 8660. En el voto nro. 2010-008672 de las 9:36 horas del 14 de mayo de 2010, esta Sala hizo expresó referencia a la necesidad de modificar el régimen jurídico de distintos entes públicos, incluido el ICE, como producto de la suscripción del TLC. En lo que interesa, se indicó:
“(...) NUEVO RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO QUE REGULA ALGUNOS ENTES PÚBLICOS QUE PRESTAN SERVICIOS INDUSTRIALES O COMERCIALES. No cabe la menor duda que algunos entes públicos, tales como el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad y el Instituto Nacional de Seguros, que, tradicionalmente, ejercieron ciertas funciones o prestaron servicios públicos de carácter económico o industrial a través de un monopolio de hecho o de derecho, se han visto, sustancialmente, modificados en su actuación y régimen jurídico aplicable. En efecto, esa modificación arranca con la suscripción del Tratado de Libre Comercio Centroamérica-Estados Unidos-República Dominicana el 5 de agosto de 2004 y su posterior aprobación mediante la Ley Referendaria No. 8622, del 21 de noviembre del 2007. Ulteriormente, como parte de la denominada “agenda de implementación” de ese acuerdo multilateral de comercio, fueron dictados varios instrumentos legislativos de relevancia para el logro de la apertura de sectores de actividad como las telecomunicaciones y los seguros, tales como como la Ley General de Telecomunicaciones, No. 8642 de 30 de junio de 2008, Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, No. 8653 de 22 de julio de 2008 y la Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones, No. 8660 de 8 de agosto de 2008. Cabe apuntar que, en ese proceso, este Tribunal Constitucional avaló la constitucionalidad del referido Tratado de Libre Comercio y de los tres instrumentos legislativos que formaron parte de la “agenda de implementación”, respectivamente, en los Votos Nos. 9469-2007 de las 10 hrs. de 3 de julio de 2007, 4569-2008 de las 14:30 hrs. de 26 de marzo de 2008, 10450-2008 de las 9 hrs. de 23 de junio de 2008 y 11210-2008 de las 15 hrs. de 16 de julio de 2008. Como parte de ese nuevo conjunto normativo, la Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades del Sector Telecomunicaciones, introdujo una serie de medidas compensatorias necesarias y adecuadas para evitar que la apertura del mercado de ese sector a la libre competencia, le cause a los entes públicos dedicados a ese giro serios perjuicios o desventajas, por su condición y naturaleza pública frente a los competidores que asumen formas de organización colectiva del Derecho privado más flexibles. Una de las grandes preocupaciones de la colectividad nacional que quedó reflejada y cristalizada normativamente en el instrumento legislativo señalado, fue fortalecer a tales entes públicos y empresas públicas para evitar su debilitamiento ante el papel histórico y protagónico que han tenido en la construcción del Estado nacional y la satisfacción de la demanda nacional. El legislador, con el aval de este Tribunal Constitucional, estimó que no resultaba oportuno y conveniente que la apertura de los mercados supusiera un debilitamiento y hasta la eventual extinción de tales entes públicos, de ahí que para equilibrar su posición sometida a las rígidas formas del Derecho público se le otorgaron una serie de compensaciones y medidas, en el tanto desplieguen una actividad empresarial, mercantil o industrial, las que son naturales y esperables entre sujetos del Derecho privado. En conclusión, este nuevo entramado normativo y jurisprudencial determinó cambios materiales de importancia en el régimen jurídico de los entes públicos que prestan un servicio industrial o comercial ahora en régimen de competencia.”
Como señalan las partes, esta Sala ya se pronunció específicamente sobre el régimen especial de contratación administrativa aplicable al ICE, en razón de la consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad formulada respecto a la aprobación del entonces proyecto “Ley de fortalecimiento y modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector de Telecomunicaciones”, que se tramitaba en el expediente legislativo nro. 16.397. Ocasión en que se resolvió que:
“XVIII.- SOBRE EL MONTO ESTABLECIDO PARA EMPLEAR EL PROCEDIMIENTO DE LA LICITACIÓN PÚBLICA PARA LA CONTRATACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA. Consideran los legisladores consultantes que los montos para optar por una licitación pública establecidos en el párrafo tercero del artículo 19, sea el artículo 22 del texto final, son extremadamente altos y desproporcionados. Aseveran que el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad estaría utilizando la licitación pública, únicamente, cuando el monto de la contratación sobrepase los 2.500.000.000.00, lo cual, consideran que es totalmente irracional. Reprochan que eso atenta contra las potestades de fiscalización de la Contraloría General de la República. Asimismo, consideran que es inconstitucional por contrariar el procedimiento de licitación pública establecido en el artículo 182 constitucional, ya que, prácticamente, ningún proceso licitatorio del ICE, se tramitará por esa vía. El texto consultado indica lo siguiente:
“ARTÍCULO 22. Procedimientos ordinarios de concurso (...)
El ICE, considerado individualmente, utilizará el procedimiento de licitación pública para contrataciones, cuya cuantía sea igual o superior a la suma derivada de multiplicar el presupuesto de adquisiciones de bienes y servicios no personales de la entidad, por el factor que resulte de dividir la cuantía señalada para la licitación pública en el inciso a) del artículo 27 de la Ley general de contratación administrativa, entre el presupuesto de referencia aplicable al ICE, considerado individualmente, dispuesto en el mismo numeral. Si de la aplicación de este párrafo resultan límites inferiores a los establecidos en el artículo 27 de la Ley N.º 7494, Contratación administrativa, se utilizarán los indicados en dicha Ley. (...)” Sobre el particular, en primer término, cabe resaltar que la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional en el artículo 99 dispone que las consultas legislativas de constitucionalidad, de carácter facultativo, deberán formularse en memorial razonado, con expresión de los aspectos cuestionados del proyecto, así como de los motivos por los cuales se tuvieren dudas u objeciones sobre su constitucionalidad.
En criterio de este Tribunal, dicho requisito no se cumple a cabalidad en el extremo concreto. En efecto, nótese que los legisladores consultantes parten de una mera suposición al indicar que la cuantía establecida es muy alta, sin brindar al efecto, un criterio de valoración o comparación concreta, que le permita a este Tribunal valorar la razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de la norma. Así las cosas, nos debemos remitir a las valoraciones que constan en el expediente legislativo, específicamente, en el dictamen afirmativo de mayoría elaborado en el seno de la Comisión Especial, para analizar el propósito de esta norma especial. El artículo 182 de la Constitución Política reconoce que los contratos de ejecución de obras públicas, así como, las compras que realicen las instituciones autónomas, se realizarán mediante el procedimiento de licitación pública, de acuerdo con la ley en relación al monto correspondiente.
De conformidad con lo anterior, le corresponderá al legislador definir, en cada caso, los procedimientos de contratación administrativa, disponiendo, incluso, de sistemas especiales y cuantías diferenciadas, en relación a las características de la actividad y de la institución de la que se trate, siendo, precisamente, la cuantía, el parámetro discriminante en el diseño de diversos tipos de procedimientos de contratación administrativa. Así lo sostuvo este Tribunal Constitucional en la sentencia No. 2007-001557 de las 15:36 hrs. del 7 de febrero de 2007, en la que se indicó lo siguiente:
“(...) Sin embargo, para la Sala esta línea de razonamiento contradice el artículo 182 Constitucional, que como ha sido dicho, sirve de base para el desarrollo de los principios del sistema de contratación administrativa, pues en dicha disposición se acoge la licitación como medio normal de contratación 'de acuerdo con la ley en cuanto al monto respectivo' con lo cual el Constituyente se decanta por la cuantía como parámetro discriminante en el diseño de diversos tipos de procesos de contratación administrativa que según la cuantía podrán tener regulaciones diversas, pero siempre respetando en su esencia el derecho de la Constitución. De tal forma, con excepción de la cuantía, no reconoce de forma expresa nuestro texto constitucional ningún otro parámetro para la aplicación de una atenuación de los principios constitucionales relativos a la contratación administrativa. (...)”
Del análisis del proyecto de ley consultado, se deduce la clara intención del legislador de dotar al Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad de las condiciones necesarias para una mayor eficiencia y eficacia administrativa, financiera y tecnológica. Lo anterior, claro está, en el marco de un proceso de apertura del mercado de telecomunicaciones -ya definido por el pueblo con la aprobación del referéndum del TLC EE.UU., Centroamérica y República Dominicana (Ley referendaria No. 8622 de 21 de noviembre de 2007)- que procura fortalecer a los operadores públicos frente a su eventual competencia. En efecto, de las consideraciones de los dictaminadores del proyecto de ley se colige lo siguiente: (el destacado no corresponde al original)
“(...) En el proyecto de marras, se plantea un régimen especial de contratación administrativa para la adquisición de bienes y servicios del ICE.
En cuanto a este tema, el proyecto en estudio enuncia entre sus objetivos el dotar al ICE de una contratación administrativa ágil, eficiente y eficaz como parte de los esfuerzos de fortalecer y modernizar dicha entidad, así como de establecer un cuerpo normativo adaptado a sus particularidades.
Tanto la Sala Constitucional como la Contraloría General, han señalado la posibilidad de que existan regímenes especiales siempre y cuando la naturaleza y particularidades de la actividad pública de que se trate, así lo exijan y en tanto los supuestos contemplados en la normativa genérica no le resulten aplicables.
Tal como se pretende en este dictamen, dicho régimen debe regular entonces las condiciones particulares de la contratación administrativa del ICE y sus empresas, e ineludiblemente considerar los postulados constitucionales consagrados en los artículos 182 y 184.
En este tema el legislador tiene encomendada la tarea de señalar de manera clara cuáles han de ser las reglas y parámetros específicos que justifiquen una regulación apartada del marco normativo general, desarrollar su contenido en la ley e incorporar los principios constitucionales que atienden la actividad de contratación administrativa del Estado, tal como se propone en el presente texto. (...)” En el marco de dichos objetivos, se resaltó que uno de los principales inconvenientes que, históricamente, han tenido el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad y sus empresas en materia de contratación administrativa, es que los límites económicos para determinar los procedimientos de contratación aplicables no necesariamente se ajustan a sus requerimientos. En virtud de lo anterior, se colige que la intención del legislador en la normativa consultada es ajustar los límites económicos de la contratación administrativa a la realidad y las dimensiones del ICE. En el dictamen de análisis se señaló lo siguiente:
“(...) En el mismo orden de ideas, actualmente el ICE y sus empresas utilizan los procedimientos de licitación pública, licitación abreviada y contratación directa según los límites económicos que establece el artículo 27 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y sus reformas. Dicha metodología por sí misma no es inconveniente, sin embargo, siendo que el presupuesto de referencia aplicable al ICE representa poco más del 10% del presupuesto de la Institución, se hizo necesario establecer una metodología que permita ajustar los limites económicos de la contratación a la realidad y dimensiones del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad y sus empresas, sin que con ello se pierda de vista que el órgano competente para fijar dichos límites es la Contraloría General de la República. (...)” (lo resaltado no corresponde al original).
El texto consultado no pretende, entonces, desconocer los procedimientos de contratación administrativa, sino, más bien, establecer montos más acordes a las particularidades presupuestarias del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, lo que resulta legítimo a la luz del Derecho de la Constitución. El propósito es establecer un mecanismo diferenciado en la licitación pública y en la licitación abreviada, precisamente, por la naturaleza del ICE y las exigencias de dinamismo impuestas por la apertura del mercado y la prestación de servicios en competencia. (el destacado no corresponde al original) Es preciso añadir que el Constituyente originario, en el ordinal 182 de la Constitución Política, se refiere a la figura general de la licitación, sin calificarla de pública o no, de otra parte desconstitucionalizó -asignándole al legislador ordinario- el tema de la definición de los montos para que procedan las distintas modalidades de licitación -pública o abreviada- con lo cual se trata, claramente, de un extremo librado a libertad de configuración legislativa.
Por lo anterior, en los casos en que no se alcance el parámetro cuantitativo o monto definido en el numeral 22 del proyecto, si bien resulta excluida la licitación pública deberá acudirse a otra forma de licitación como la abreviada -procedimiento que también garantiza el correcto y regular uso de los fondos públicos-, por lo que no cabe entender que la regla será la contratación directa. Nótese que el artículo 22, párrafo 3°, preceptúa, al final, que “Si de la aplicación de este párrafo resultan límites inferiores a los establecidos en el artículo 27 de la Ley No. 7494, Contratación administrativa, se utilizarán los indicados en dicha ley”. Debe tomarse en consideración que el proyecto de ley consultado establece un régimen de contratación singular y específico, no se trata de una reforma a la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, por cuanto, el fin es permitirle al ICE competir en un mercado abierto de las telecomunicaciones conforme al mandato popular dispuesto en el referéndum que aprobó el TLC EE.UU, Centroamérica y República Dominicana (Ley referendaria No. 8622 de 21 de noviembre de 2007).
(el destacado no corresponde al original) En términos financieros y de conformidad con los estudios presupuestarios realizados por los legisladores, tenemos que el presupuesto de referencia que utiliza actualmente el ICE a efecto de aplicar los procedimientos de licitación pública, licitación abreviada o contratación directa establecido en el artículo 27 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y según actualizaciones de la Contraloría General de la República, representa apenas un 10% de su presupuesto de compras. Además, los límites económicos están representados por montos fijos y no en expresiones porcentuales de su presupuesto. Ello implica en la práctica que los límites del ICE en términos reales, constituyen una décima parte del porcentaje base establecido por el órgano contralor. Es decir, el límite expresado como porcentaje del presupuesto del ICE es de un 0.06% en el caso de la licitación pública, mientras que el límite expresado como porcentaje del presupuesto base para todos los demás casos es de un 0.6%.
La fórmula propone ajustar esta situación, para que el límite también sea de un 0.6%, como parámetro para optar por un procedimiento de licitación pública (ver dictamen afirmativo de mayoría a folios 5196-5308, Tomo XVI). Así las cosas, no observa este Tribunal que la fórmula propuesta sea inconstitucional por violatoria de los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, pues, la intención del legislador es adecuar los parámetros de la contratación administrativa a las propias particularidades presupuestarias del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad. (el destacado no corresponde al original)” (opinión consultiva nro. 2008-011210 de las 15 horas del 16 de julio de 2008) De esta forma, de lo dicho hasta ahora, se pueden obtener varias conclusiones de interés, a saber: a) que, indudablemente, como parte de los compromisos adquiridos por el Estado costarricense en el TLC, se incluyó la obligación especifica de emitir un “nuevo marco jurídico para fortalecer al ICE, a través de su modernización apropiada”; b) resulta lógico y razonable estimar que dotar al ICE de un régimen especial de contratación administrativa ágil, eficiente y eficaz, adaptado a sus particulares necesidades, constituye un componente fundamental y esencial de ese nuevo marco jurídico -de consuno con el contenido y espíritu del TLC-; c) esta Sala ya estimó que, prima facie, no resulta incompatible con el Derecho de la Constitución dotar al ICE de un régimen de contratación singular y específico, que se ajuste a sus propias particularidades presupuestarias, de forma que se le permita “competir en un mercado abierto de las telecomunicaciones conforme al mandato popular dispuesto en el referéndum que aprobó el TLC EE.UU, Centroamérica y República Dominicana (Ley referendaria No. 8622 de 21 de noviembre de 2007)”; y c) derogar o suprimir tal régimen especial de contratación administrativa, afectando sustancialmente con esto la competitividad del ICE, supone -en definitiva- oponerse el sentido o contenido del tratado.
Como así lo resalta la Procuraduría General de la República, la parte accionante no se limita a argumentar en abstracto una presunta afectación a la competitividad del ICE, como producto de la normativa impugnada, sino que aporta ejemplos concretos. Entre otros aspectos, se destaca que ahora el ICE deberá recurrir a procedimientos más rigurosos en cuantos a plazos y etapas, lo que dilata la adquisición de bienes y servicios. El accionante aporta una tabla que demuestra el tipo de contratación a la que podría recurrir la institución, en el 2022, en aplicación del régimen especial previsto en la Ley nro. 8660:
LÍMITES DE CONTRATACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA AÑO 2022 Cálculo según artículo 22 de la Ley Nº 8660 Instituciones Licitación Pública Licitación abreviada Contratación Directa Estrato de referencia1 Igual a o más de Menos de Igual o más de Menos de Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) 6 041 595 408,00 6 041 595 408,00 101 100 000,00 101 100 000,00 A Junta Administrativa del Servicio Eléctrico de Cartago (JASEC) 697 414 414,00 697 414 414,00 28 260 000, 00 28 260 000,00 C También aporta una tabla, que muestra el procedimiento al que debería recurrir la institución en el 2023, en aplicación de la normativa cuestionada:
Umbrales año 2023 (montos en colones) Régimen Tipo de contratación Licitación Mayor Licitación Menor Licitación reducida Igual a o más de Menos de Igual o más de Menos de Ordinario Bienes y Servicios 264.519.083 264.519.083 66.129.771 66.129.771 Obras 712.166.540 712.166.540 178.041.690 178.041.690 Diferenciado Bienes y Servicios 317.422.900 317.422.900 79.355.725 79.355.725 Obras 1.139.466.819 1.139.466.819 284.866.705 284.866.705 Lo que acredita que, con umbrales menores, ahora debe recurrir a procedimientos más complejos.
Finalmente, el accionante aporta una tabla que refleja el impacto que lo anterior puede tener en términos de plazos para resolver los distintos tipos de procedimientos:
Ley General Contratación Pública Licitación Mayor* Plazo mínimo Licitación menor *Máximo Licitación reducida *Plazo máximo Recepción de ofertas 15 15 5 Adjudicación 30 30 10 Recurso de objeción 24 8 5 Recurso de revocatoria/apelación 62 28 12 Total 131 81 32 Ley de Fortalceimiento (sic) y Modernización Licitación Pública *Plazo Mínimo Licitación Abreviada *Plazo máximo Contratación Directa escasa cuantía *Plazo máximo Recepción de ofertas 10 20 5 Adjudicación 20 40 10 Recurso de objeción 12 15 0 Recurso de revocatoria/apelación 45 27 0 Total 87 102 15 Lo anterior evidencia el efecto en la tramitación de los procedimientos de contratación para el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, pues, ante umbrales menores, debe recurrir a procedimientos más complejos, así como prima facie más prolongados.
Por lo demás, aunque se argumente que la ley impugnada prevé un apartado de regulaciones especiales para las empresas en competencia, incluido expresamente el ICE, como bien hace ver la Procuraduría General de la República, este “apartado especial de normas igualmente resulta de aplicación general para diversas empresas públicas, las cuales no comparten las mismas características y condiciones del ICE, tanto en el alcance y cobertura de sus servicios, como en el monto del presupuesto global del que disponen para efectuar adquisiciones de bienes y servicios. Asimismo, dicho régimen especial no cubre todos los procesos de contratación administrativa que puedan llevar a cabo este tipo de empresas públicas, sino que ello queda sometido a una serie de supuestos y requisitos que implican restricciones, lo cual entonces sigue provocando una diferencia sensible con las herramientas que brindaba la Ley 8660”.
En definitiva, concluye este Tribunal que debe acogerse la acción en análisis respecto de los artículos previamente indicados, por cuanto, se constata una afectación general en detrimento de la competitividad del ICE y no se observa una justificación válida para derogar o suprimir el régimen especial y diferenciado de contratación administrativa dispuesto para esa institución en la Ley nro. 8660. Lo que implica oponerse el sentido o contenido del referido tratado internacional.
Como corolario de lo anterior, debe anularse el artículo 135 inciso c) de la Ley nro. 9986 del 27 de mayo de 2021, Ley General de Contratación Pública, en cuanto se dispuso la derogatoria de los 12, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 y 29 de la Ley nro. 8660, de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones, de 8 de agosto de 2008, y, en consecuencias, estos numerales recobran su vigencia. Ahora bien, no puede pasar inadvertido para esta Sala que el artículo 20 de la Ley nro. 8660, establece como -regla general- que la “Ley de Contratación Administrativa, N.° 7494, de 1° de mayo de 1996, sus reformas, y su Reglamento se aplicarán de manera supletoria”, pero la citada ley ha sido derogada por la Ley nro. 9986; en consecuencia, ahora debe entenderse que tal supletoriedad está referida a la Ley General de Contratación Pública y su reglamento, en lo no previsto y en lo que no se oponga a la Ley nro. 8660 y su reglamento.
Respecto de los artículos 1, 2, 68, 69 y 70 de la misma ley nro. 9986, se declara que son inconstitucionales en cuanto a su aplicación al Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad.
9986. Respecto del artículo 134, inciso d), debe desestimarse la acción, pues, en cuanto a este reproche en particular, no existe una adecuada fundamentación. El escrito de interposición no contiene una argumentación precisa, suficiente y debidamente circunstanciada sobre los agravios y fundamentos de la alegada infracción al Derecho de la Constitución en lo que se refiera a tal disposición normativa. Sobre este punto, de tenerse presente lo que ha resuelto en este Tribunal en diversas ocasiones, sobre el deber de fundamentación que recae en la parte accionante. Esta Sala ha indicado que:
“SOBRE LA NECESARIA FUNDAMENTACIÓN DEL ESCRITO EN EL QUE SE FORMULE LA ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. Según se indicó, la acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso con determinadas formalidades, que, si no se reúnen, imposibilitan a la Sala conocer de la impugnación que se pretende. Uno de esos requisitos corresponde a la necesaria fundamentación del escrito en el que se formule la acción de inconstitucionalidad. La Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en su artículo 3, dispone que “Se tendrá por infringida la Constitución Política cuando ello resulte de la confrontación del texto de la norma o acto cuestionado, de sus efectos, o de su interpretación o aplicación por las autoridades públicas, con las normas y principios constitucionales”. Ahora bien, para que este Tribunal tenga por configurada la infracción y pueda declarar la inconstitucionalidad de la norma o acto impugnado, con la consecuente anulación y expulsión del ordenamiento jurídico, quien promueva una acción de inconstitucionalidad tiene la carga de demostrar cómo esa disposición infringe el Derecho de la Constitución y, además, debe indicar por qué debe estimarse la demanda.
Esto es denominado por esta Sala como la carga de la argumentación, es decir, que “una norma que facialmente (sic) sea contraria a la Constitución, vuelca la carga de la argumentación a quienes sostengan que en realidad no hay conflicto entre esa norma y la Constitución Política; lo contrario sucede si se acciona contra una norma que en primer examen no parece contraria a la Constitución, en cuya hipótesis es el accionante el que debe avanzar con los argumentos que convenzan acerca de la inconstitucionalidad” (véase la sentencia nro. 0184-95 de las 16:30 horas del 10 de enero de 1995). En una sentencia posterior, esta Sala expuso, en cuanto a la falta de exposición de los argumentos de inconstitucionalidad en materia de acciones de inconstitucionalidad, lo siguiente:
“La acción de inconstitucionalidad se interpone con el argumento de que el Decreto Ejecutivo impugnado es nocivo, lesiona e infringe los derechos fundamentales a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, el derecho a la salud y a los compromisos internacionales suscritos con el Protocolo de Kyoto. Pese a la oportunidad otorgada a los accionantes, se confirma lo que indica la Procuraduría General de la República, de que no existe un análisis concreto de las disposiciones del Decreto Ejecutivo impugnado que se consideran inconstitucionales, sino que el mismo se limita a establecer discrepancias de forma genérica y en abstracto contra la totalidad del Reglamento, más aún contra toda actividad que desempeñan los ingenios Azucareros y Haciendas, pues sostienen que causan inconvenientes en la calidad de vida y en la salud de los habitantes circunvecinos, sin concretar qué argumentos de constitucionalidad se deben tomar en cuenta en contra de cada una de las disposiciones o grupos del normas del Reglamento impugnado. […] El párrafo primero del artículo 78 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece la obligación de autenticar los escritos de interposición de acciones de inconstitucionalidad, toda vez que se estima necesario que existan argumentos esgrimidos por un profesional en Derecho, que no descarta este Tribunal responda a un serio estudio del fondo técnico y científico de una determinada materia, dada la diversidad y universalidad de las normas del ordenamiento jurídico.
A diferencia de los procesos de garantías, es decir, los recursos de hábeas corpus y de amparo, que los puede interponer directamente cualquier interesado ante la jurisdicción constitucional en defensa de sus derechos fundamentales, generalmente contra actos u omisiones que le lesionan en su esfera particular (aunque no siempre como en los casos ambientales), en los procesos de defensa de la Constitución Política (como la acción de inconstitucionalidad), el legislador confió al abogado autenticante una labor cuya exigencia es aún mayor, si se quiere más elaborada y exhaustiva que debe plasmar en el libelo de interposición en razón de su oficio profesional, para demostrar al Tribunal la lesión a la norma constitucional por parte de una norma de menor rango, socavando el principio de supremacía constitucional contenida en el artículo 10 de la Constitución Política. Precisamente la elaboración material y formal de la Ley, así como de las demás disposiciones secundarias, suponen un proceso sumamente costoso para el Estado, en la que de muchas maneras para su elaboración ha participado la sociedad civil organizada a favor o en contra, y cuyos procedimientos de formación, aprobación y promulgación no debe analizarse a la ligera.
En este sentido, debe reconocer esta Sala que existe un reducido espacio para este Tribunal para socorrer las ausencias manifiestas de los profesionales en derecho que autentican los escritos en esta jurisdicción constitucional, sin exponer la imparcialidad y análisis que se debe a cada una de las acciones de inconstitucionalidad.” (sentencia nro. 2012-05285 de 15:03 horas de 25 de abril de 2012).” (voto nro. 2023-031744 de las 9:30 horas del 6 de diciembre de 2023) Consideraciones aplicables al sub judice, por lo que procede desestimar la acción en cuanto a este punto.
Por mayoría se declara parcialmente con lugar la acción y, en consecuencia, se anula por inconstitucional el artículo 135 inciso c) de la Ley 9986 del 27 de mayo de 2021, Ley General de Contratación Pública. Respecto de los artículos 1, 2, 68, 69 y 70 de la misma ley, se declara que son inconstitucionales en cuanto a su aplicación al Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad. Sobre el artículo 134 inciso d) de la Ley 9986 se declara sin lugar la acción. El magistrado Rueda Leal salva el voto y declara sin lugar la acción por considerarla inadmisible debido a razones procesales de legitimación.
Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.-
Por tanto:
Por mayoría se declara parcialmente con lugar la acción y, en consecuencia, se anula por inconstitucional el artículo 135 inciso c) de la Ley 9986 del 27 de mayo de 2021, Ley General de Contratación Pública. Respecto de los artículos 1, 2, 68, 69 y 70 de la misma ley, se declara que son inconstitucionales en cuanto a su aplicación al Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad. Sobre el artículo 134 inciso d) de la Ley 9986 se declara sin lugar la acción. El magistrado Rueda Leal salva el voto y declara sin lugar la acción por considerarla inadmisible debido a razones procesales de legitimación. Esta sentencia tiene efectos declarativos y retroactivos a la fecha de vigencia de la disposición anulada, sin perjuicio de derechos adquiridos de buena fe. Conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo 91 párrafo 2 de la Ley que rige esta Jurisdicción, se dimensionan los efectos de esta declaratoria de forma que recobran su vigencia los artículos 12, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 y 29 de la Ley 8660, Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones, de 8 de agosto de 2008, derogados por el artículo 135 inciso c) de la Ley 9986.
Respecto del artículo 20 la supletoriedad debe entenderse referida a la Ley General de Contratación Pública. Reséñese este pronunciamiento en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta y publíquese íntegramente en el Boletín Judicial. Comuníquese al presidente ejecutivo del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad y al presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa. Notifíquese a la Procuraduría General de la República y a las partes.
Fernando Castillo V.
Paul Rueda L. Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G. Anamari Garro V.
Ingrid Hess H. Alexandra Alvarado P.
Res. 2024022483 Voto salvado del magistrado Rueda Leal. Tal como lo he expresado en otros casos, estimo que una cualidad del interés difuso consiste precisamente, en que su afectación es general -esto es, incide en toda una población o en amplios sectores de ella- dentro de un contexto, donde no se precisa que los sujetos perjudicados se conozcan entre sí (incluso podrían carecer de nexo o relaciones jurídicas entre ellos), pero sí se requiere de la presencia de una misma situación de daño o peligro a un bien constitucional que, por igual y sin necesidad de individualización alguna, comprende y aglomera a toda una sociedad en abstracto. Su defensa tiene como finalidad satisfacer una necesidad de la sociedad como tal, por ello, es trascendente a la de un ser humano individual o colectivamente considerado. En sentencia nro. 2019-17397 de las 12:54 horas del 11 de setiembre de 2019, este Tribunal reiteró lo siguiente:
“(…) En segundo lugar, se prevé la posibilidad de acudir en defensa de "intereses difusos"; este concepto, cuyo contenido ha ido siendo delineado paulatinamente por parte de la Sala, podría ser resumido en los términos empleados en la sentencia de este tribunal número 3750-93, de las quince horas del treinta de julio de mil novecientos noventa y tres) "… Los intereses difusos, aunque de difícil definición y más difícil identificación, no pueden ser en nuestra ley -como ya lo ha dicho esta Sala los intereses meramente colectivos; ni tan difusos que su titularidad se confunda con la de la comunidad nacional como un todo, ni tan concretos que frente a ellos resulten identificados o fácilmente identificables personas determinadas, o grupos personalizados, cuya legitimación derivaría, no de los intereses difusos, sino de los corporativos que atañen a una comunidad en su conjunto. Se trata entonces de intereses individuales, pero a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y, por ende reciben un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos igual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que se trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos que se encuentran en determinadas circunstancias y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas.
Es decir, los intereses difusos participan de una doble naturaleza, ya que son a la vez colectivos -por ser comunes a una generalidad- e individuales, por lo que pueden ser reclamados en tal carácter".
En síntesis, los intereses difusos son aquellos cuya titularidad pertenece a grupos de personas no organizadas formalmente, pero unidas a partir de una determinada necesidad social, una característica física, su origen étnico, una determinada orientación personal o ideológica, el consumo de un cierto producto, etc. El interés, en estos casos, se encuentra difuminado, diluido (difuso) entre una pluralidad no identificada de sujetos. En estos casos, claro, la impugnación que el miembro de uno de estos sectores podría efectuar amparado en el párrafo 2° del artículo 75, deberá estar referida necesariamente a disposiciones que lo afecten en cuanto tal. Esta Sala ha enumerado diversos derechos a los que les ha dado el calificativo de "difusos", tales como el medio ambiente, el patrimonio cultural, la defensa de la integridad territorial del país y del buen manejo del gasto público, entre otros.
Al respecto deben ser efectuadas dos precisiones: por un lado, los referidos bienes trascienden la esfera tradicionalmente reconocida a los intereses difusos, ya que se refieren en principio a aspectos que afectan a la colectividad nacional y no a grupos particulares de ésta; un daño ambiental no afecta apenas a los vecinos de una región o a los consumidores de un producto, sino que lesiona o pone en grave riesgo el patrimonio natural de todo el país e incluso de la Humanidad; del mismo modo, la defensa del buen manejo que se haga de los fondos públicos autorizados en el Presupuesto de la República es un interés de todos los habitantes de Costa Rica, no tan solo de un grupo cualquiera de ellos. Por otra parte, la enumeración que ha hecho la Sala Constitucional no pasa de una simple descripción propia de su obligación –como órgano jurisdiccional- de limitarse a conocer de los casos que le son sometidos, sin que pueda de ninguna manera llegar a entenderse que solo pueden ser considerados derechos difusos aquellos que la Sala expresamente haya reconocido como tales; lo anterior implicaría dar un vuelco indeseable en los alcances del Estado de Derecho, y de su correlativo "Estado de derechos", que –como en el caso del modelo costarricense- parte de la premisa de que lo que debe ser expreso son los límites a las libertades, ya que éstas subyacen a la misma condición humana y no requieren por ende de reconocimiento oficial.
Finalmente, cuando el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional habla de intereses "que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto", se refiere a los bienes jurídicos explicados en las líneas anteriores, es decir, aquellos cuya titularidad reposa en los mismos detentadores de la soberanía, en cada uno de los habitantes de la República.
No se trata por ende de que cualquier persona pueda acudir a la Sala Constitucional en tutela de cualesquiera intereses (acción popular), sino que todo individuo puede actuar en defensa de aquellos bienes que afectan a toda la colectividad nacional, sin que tampoco en este campo sea válido ensayar cualquier intento de enumeración taxativa” (véase la sentencia No. 2007- 01145).” En consonancia con lo expuesto y sostenido por este Tribunal en su jurisprudencia, se trata entonces de intereses individuales, pero a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y, por ende, reciben un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos igual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que se trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos que se encuentran en determinadas circunstancias y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas. Es por ello, precisamente, que, a partir de la sentencia nro. 2021-2185 de las 12:51 horas de 3 de febrero de 2021, considero, a diferencia de la Mayoría de este Tribunal, que algunos de estos intereses pueden estar plasmados en un caso particular en concreto, sin perder por ello su condición de interés difuso, tal como ocurre con la protección al ambiente, cuyo impacto afecta a una persona y a todos en general; y puede ser individualizada tal afectación en una situación en particular, como por ejemplo, la construcción de una fábrica en un sector vecino determinado, sin los estudios ambientales respectivos, cuyos efectos negativos incidan en la capa de ozono del planeta.
Indudablemente el resultado de un reclamo o proceso que pueda plantear un vecino contra esa fábrica no solo incidirá en sus intereses propios, sino también en el resto de la colectividad. Por ello, constituye un interés difuso; y, sin embargo, también es objeto de una situación particular individualizada. Ahora bien, ello no quiere decir, en modo alguno, que en toda situación invocada se pueda alegar la existencia de un interés difuso, aunque este pueda ser objeto de una situación particular. Recordemos que para que un interés sea considerado “difuso”, no solo debe afectar una colectividad, sino también debe difuminarse, difundirse en esa colectividad. Si no produce tal efecto, no puede ser considerado un interés difuso.
Justamente, en el caso concreto no observo la presencia de un interés difuso, ya que la normativa impugnada no se traduce en una afectación socialmente difuminada, sino que es determinada. En este caso, la mera cuestión relativa a la competitividad y eficiencia de una empresa pública que se encuentra en régimen de competencia no conlleva per se una lesión a intereses diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y, por ende, reciben un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos igual para todos, de modo que no se trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos que se encuentran en determinadas circunstancias y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas. A partir de lo anterior, es claro que tales aspectos no pueden ser considerados como intereses difusos, lo que implica que la parte accionante (Sindicato de Ingenieros del ICE) carece de legitimación para interponer esta acción.
En adición, aun cuando es un sindicato el que plantea este proceso de control de constitucionalidad, las normas impugnadas no inciden en las obligaciones, potestades o facultades de los miembros de la organización, por lo que tampoco observo que se recurra en defensa de intereses colectivos. Justamente, en la sentencia nro. 2010014785 de las 14:48 horas del 1º de setiembre de 2010, la Sala dispuso:
“III.- Sobre la legitimación del Sindicato para acudir en defensa de intereses colectivos. En relación con la legitimación de los sindicatos para acudir en defensa de los intereses de sus agremiados, la Sala ha indicado que pueden hacerlo siempre y cuando la eventual declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas, incida en las obligaciones, potestades o facultades de los miembros de esa colectividad (ver sentencia número 02765-98 de las 10:51 horas del 24 de abril de 1998). En una sentencia reciente de este Tribunal, la número 3688-97 de las quince horas del día primero de julio de mil novecientos noventa y siete, se dijo textualmente:
"...para que el interés colectivo legitime a la parte que interpone la acción de inconstitucionalidad, no solo se requiere que lo alegue una organización que representa los intereses de un grupo determinable de personas, sino que debe existir al menos la posibilidad de que la eventual declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad modifique de manera favorable, las obligaciones, potestades o facultades de los miembros de esa colectividad. Es decir, que para acreditar la legitimación por interés colectivo, además de la existencia de un núcleo común de intereses entre los integrantes de la organización, se requiere que la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas tenga relación -de incidencia o afectación- con la situación de la colectividad. De ahí que sea imprescindible por parte del que fundamenta su legitimación en la existencia de un interés colectivo, una explicación acerca de la relación que la pretensión de inconstitucionalidad tiene con la situación propia de la colectividad, específicamente con su objeto y patrimonio...”.
En consecuencia, salvo el voto y declaro sin lugar la acción por considerarla inadmisible debido a razones procesales de legitimación.
Paul Rueda L.
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