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Res. 32259-2023 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 13/12/2023
OutcomeResultado
The majority upheld Transitional Provision VI of Law No. 9544 and its eighteen-month period for qualifying under the former pension rules, while the minority would have extended it to twenty-four months because it considered the technical justification insufficient.La mayoría mantuvo el Transitorio VI de la Ley n.º 9544 y su plazo de dieciocho meses para acogerse a las condiciones jubilatorias anteriores, mientras la minoría propuso ampliarlo a veinticuatro meses por considerar insuficiente su sustento técnico.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber reviewed Transitional Provision VI of Law No. 9544, which preserved the former Judicial Branch pension conditions only for employees who satisfied the retirement requirements within eighteen months after the reform was enacted. The claimants argued that this period abruptly changed their employment conditions, frustrated legitimate expectations built through decades of service and contributions, and lacked sufficient technical support. The majority denied the constitutional challenge and maintained the legislatively selected period, reasoning that employees who had not yet satisfied the retirement requirements held an expectation of a right rather than a vested right or consolidated legal situation. The minority disagreed, finding the period insufficient because the actuarial studies had contemplated twenty-four months and because departing from that benchmark without technical justification impaired legitimate expectations, social-security rights, and ILO Convention No. 102. The minority would have preserved the former pension rules for employees who qualified within twenty-four months after enactment.La Sala Constitucional examinó el Transitorio VI de la Ley n.º 9544, que permitió conservar las condiciones jubilatorias anteriores únicamente a quienes cumplieran los requisitos dentro de los dieciocho meses posteriores a la promulgación de la reforma del régimen de pensiones del Poder Judicial. Los accionantes alegaron que ese plazo alteraba abruptamente sus condiciones laborales, frustraba expectativas legítimas construidas durante décadas de servicio y cotización, y carecía de respaldo técnico suficiente. La mayoría rechazó la acción y mantuvo la aplicación del plazo legislativo, partiendo de que quienes todavía no habían cumplido los requisitos jubilatorios tenían una expectativa de derecho y no un derecho adquirido o una situación jurídica consolidada. El voto de minoría sostuvo, en cambio, que el plazo era insuficiente porque los estudios actuariales habían contemplado veinticuatro meses y que apartarse de ese parámetro sin justificación técnica vulneraba las expectativas legítimas, la seguridad social y el Convenio n.º 102 de la OIT. La minoría propuso conservar el régimen anterior durante veinticuatro meses.
Key excerptExtracto clave
Accordingly, we consider the establishment of an eighteen-month period unconstitutional by omission because that state measure was more restrictive and departed from the actuarial study, which had weighed a twenty-four-month period and thereby measured the extent and adequacy of its economic impact on future benefits granted against the impairment of rights in transition. We therefore conclude with a judgment granting the claim due to the provision’s unconstitutional and treaty-inconsistent omission, arising from the partially insufficient coverage of the provision approved by the Legislative Assembly insofar as it established eighteen months as the transitional period, and from that insufficient coverage despite an actuarial study that clearly supported a longer, technically grounded period reflecting both the fund’s need for reasonable financial balance and the need to secure the fundamental rights of expectant workers while respecting judicial employees’ legitimate expectations. In conclusion, the transitional provision is unconstitutional by omission because it departed from the actuarial record supporting a duly substantiated twenty-four-month transition. Consequently, pursuant to Articles 89 and 91 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, we tailor this declaration and its retroactive effects by establishing that judicial employees retain their retirement and/or pension rights under the text predating the reform introduced by Law No. 9544 of April 24, 2018, if they qualify within twenty-four months following its enactment.De ahí que, estimamos que resulta inconstitucional por omisión, la fijación de un plazo de dieciocho meses, porque con esa medida estatal fue más restrictiva y desfasada del estudio actuarial, que había ponderado un plazo de veinticuatro meses, con lo que se había medido el grado y adecuación de su impacto económico sobre las prestaciones futuras concedidas, frente a la afectación de los derechos en transición. Por ello concluimos con una sentencia estimatoria por la omisión inconstitucional e inconvencional de la norma, por la insuficiencia parcial en la cobertura de la disposición aprobada por la Asamblea Legislativa, en cuanto fijó dieciocho meses como período transitorio; y, por la insuficiente cobertura pese al estudio actuarial que permitía establecer con claridad un plazo mayor que podía sustentarse técnicamente, que reflejara las necesidades de un equilibrio financiero razonable del fondo, con el de otorgar los derechos fundamentales de los trabajadores expectantes, respetando las expectativas legitimas de los servidores judiciales. En conclusión, la norma transitoria es omisa -inconstitucionalmente- al haberse apartado de los antecedentes actuariales que establecían veinticuatro meses de transitorio, cuyo sustento actuarial fue debidamente establecido. En consecuencia de todo lo anterior, de conformidad con los artículos 89 y 91, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, dimensionamos esta declaratoria para graduar y dimensionar los efectos retroactivos de esta declaratoria, para establecer que los funcionarios judiciales conservan los derechos a la jubilación y/o pensión conforme al texto anterior a la reforma operada por Ley N° 9544 del 24 de abril de 2018, dentro de los veinticuatro meses posteriores a su promulgación.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"Consideramos que en esta materia, no hay simples expectativas de derecho, en atención a una relación de larga duración (muchas veces de toda una vida) que incluye el tiempo servido y la cotización, pero al amparo de las seguridades y garantías de un régimen de empleo público, que en este caso se corresponde a un Poder de la República."
"We consider that this matter does not involve mere expectations of rights, given a long-term relationship—often lasting an entire working life—that includes both service and contributions under the safeguards and guarantees of a public-employment system belonging, in this case, to a branch of government."
Voto de minoría
"Consideramos que en esta materia, no hay simples expectativas de derecho, en atención a una relación de larga duración (muchas veces de toda una vida) que incluye el tiempo servido y la cotización, pero al amparo de las seguridades y garantías de un régimen de empleo público, que en este caso se corresponde a un Poder de la República."
Voto de minoría
"El derecho sustantivo, además de requerir un sustento razonable debe resguardarse con estudios técnicos que deberán velar por un equilibrio financiero, también, al hacerlo, debía proteger en la medida posible las prestaciones en transición."
"In addition to requiring a reasonable basis, the substantive right must be safeguarded through technical studies concerned with financial balance; in doing so, transitional benefits also had to be protected to the extent possible."
Voto de minoría
"El derecho sustantivo, además de requerir un sustento razonable debe resguardarse con estudios técnicos que deberán velar por un equilibrio financiero, también, al hacerlo, debía proteger en la medida posible las prestaciones en transición."
Voto de minoría
"La Sala ha sostenido que la libertad de configuración del legislador se encuentra limitada al cumplimiento de los estudios técnicos que exija una disposición concreta, sea en temas ambientales, o según la materia que se trate, como es la obligación internacional que nos ocupa."
"The Chamber has held that the legislature’s policymaking discretion is limited by compliance with the technical studies required by a specific provision, whether in environmental matters or in the relevant field, as with the international obligation at issue here."
Voto de minoría
"La Sala ha sostenido que la libertad de configuración del legislador se encuentra limitada al cumplimiento de los estudios técnicos que exija una disposición concreta, sea en temas ambientales, o según la materia que se trate, como es la obligación internacional que nos ocupa."
Voto de minoría
Full documentDocumento completo
A Res: 2023032259 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at fifteen hours on trece de diciembre de dos mil veintitrés.- Constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) brought by JAVIER CARVAJAL MOLINA, of legal age, attorney, identity card number 106960859, acting in substitution for KAROL MONGE MOLINA, as special judicial attorney-in-fact for ADALGISA DEL CARMEN GUILLÉN FLORES ET AL., seeking a declaration that TRANSITORY PROVISION VI OF THE LAW REFORMING THE JUDICIAL BRANCH RETIREMENT AND PENSION SYSTEM, NO. 9544, is unconstitutional because it is deemed contrary to Articles 11, 18, 27, 28, 34, 40, 41, 45, 51, 65, 73, 74, 121, 152, 154, 156, 177, 188, 189 and 190 of the Constitución Política, Conventions 102, 118, 128 and 157 of the Organización Internacional del Trabajo, as well as the principles of democracy, solidarity, legal certainty, good faith, legitimate expectations, transparency, relative inviolability of property, non-confiscation, respect for vested rights (derechos adquiridos), and consolidated legal situations (situaciones jurídicas consolidadas). The Procurador General de la República, the Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa, and the Presidente de la Corte Suprema de Justicia participate in the proceedings.
Statement of Facts:
“Admissibility:
Unanimously, the following are summarily dismissed:
With respect to constitutional challenge 19-1720-0007-CO, pursuant to article 75 paragraph 1) of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the claims seeking protection for public servants generally, officials, pension recipients, and retirees are summarily dismissed for lack of standing in those matters in which the petitioner cannot obtain protection or relief for her own right because they are not a reasonable means of protecting that right.
Defects in the legislative procedure:
By majority vote (Castillo Víquez, Rueda Leal, Hernández López, Araya García, and Garro Vargas), the consolidated challenges (acciones acumuladas) are denied with respect to the alleged procedural defects. Justice Castillo Víquez provides additional reasons concerning the violation of the principle of publicity (principio de publicidad). Justices Hernández López and Garro Vargas issue separate opinions. Regarding the alleged defects in the session of the Comisión Especial held on 27 de julio de 2017, Justice Garro Vargas provides different reasons.
Justices Salazar Alvarado and Hernández Gutiérrez dissent and find that the challenged law contains the fundamental procedural defect of failing to consult the Poder Judicial regarding the text approved by Parliament by an absolute rather than qualified majority, a defect affecting the law in its entirety (article 167, of the Constitución Política), because it affects the organization, structure, operation, and independence of the Poder Judicial. They therefore consider it unnecessary to examine the other procedural and substantive defects raised by the petitioners, except those on which a position must be taken in order to reach a fully concurring vote (article 60.2, Código Procesal Civil).
With respect to the substantive claims:
The consolidated constitutional challenges are partially granted, and the following is therefore ordered:
First: By majority vote (Castillo Víquez, Salazar Alvarado, Araya García, Garro Vargas, and Hernández Gutiérrez), the contribution percentage (porcentaje de cotizaciones) and the special solidarity and redistributive contribution (contribución especial solidaria y redistributiva) are annulled insofar as they exceed 50% of the gross pension amount payable to the retiree or pension recipient. Nevertheless, pursuant to article 91 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, and to avoid serious disruptions to security, justice, or social peace, the Chamber modulates and defines the scope of the effects of this decision so that, beginning in the month following service of the judgment, the competent authorities must make the corresponding adjustment in accordance with this judgment, such that the tax burdens imposed on retirement and pension benefits do not exceed 50% of the gross amount received by the retiree or pension recipient.
Justice Castillo Víquez provides different reasons. For her own reasons, Justice Garro Vargas grants this portion of the constitutional challenge and orders the partial annulment of articles 236 and 236 bis of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial; she further states that her declaration of unconstitutionality applies to the portion of the special solidarity contribution exceeding that 5%, and not to the remaining deductions imposed by law on all pension recipients and retirees of the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial. Justice Hernández Gutiérrez provides additional reasons. Justice Rueda Leal and Justice Hernández López dissent and would deny this portion, as they did in judgment n.? 2020-19274 issued at 16:30 on 7 de octubre de 2020, because, according to the express text of article 67 of the OIT C102 de 1952 Convenio sobre la Seguridad Social (norma mínima), a pension or retirement benefit may be reduced provided that 40% of a reference salary is preserved, and it has not been shown that the challenged provisions automatically and manifestly violate that threshold.
Second: By majority vote (Castillo Víquez, Rueda Leal, Hernández López, Araya García, and Garro Vargas), the paragraph contained in article 239 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, as amended by the challenged Ley número 9544, is declared unconstitutional and consequently annulled. It states: “Based on the results of the actuarial studies (estudios actuariales), and with authorization from the Superintendencia de Pensiones, the Junta Administrativa may modify the initial parameters established in this law concerning eligibility requirements, the benefit profile, and the contributions of judicial employees and the retirement and pension benefits provided for by law, whenever necessary to guarantee the actuarial balance (equilibrio actuarial) of the Regime.” Third. By majority vote (Castillo Víquez, Rueda Leal, Hernández López, Araya García, and Garro Vargas), the phrase “(...) this reform shall not be applied to their detriment,” contained in Transitorio II of Ley 9544 of 24 de abril de 2018, is construed as referring exclusively to persons whose right to retirement or right to a pension has vested (consolidado).
Fourth: By majority vote (Castillo Víquez, Rueda Leal, Hernández López, Araya García, and Garro Vargas), the 20-year service requirement for obtaining a survivor’s pension (pensión por sobrevivencia), derived from article 229 of Ley 9544 of 24 de abril de 2018, is declared unconstitutional. Accordingly, the 10-year requirement for acquiring that right remains in effect pursuant to article 230 of Ley 7333 of 5 de mayo de 1993, in the version preceding the reform.
The consolidated constitutional challenges are denied, and the following is therefore ordered:
First: By majority vote (Castillo Víquez, Salazar Alvarado, Araya García, Garro Vargas, and Hernández Gutiérrez), the challenges are denied with respect to the arguments concerning the failure to account for gender-based differences between women and men in retirement age. Justices Salazar Alvarado and Hernández Gutiérrez deny this portion of the challenge solely on procedural grounds because of the absence of technical studies. Justice Garro Vargas provides different reasons. Justice Rueda Leal and Justice Hernández López dissent and would partially grant the consolidated challenges on the ground that Ley 9544 contains an unconstitutional omission (omisión inconstitucional), because it does not provide gender-based criteria for establishing a differentiated age so that women who contribute to the Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial may retire or receive a pension after a shorter period of service.
Justice Hernández López also dissents and would partially grant the consolidated challenges because:
Second: By majority vote (Castillo Víquez, Rueda Leal, Hernández López, Araya García, and Garro Vargas), the consolidated challenges are denied in all other respects.
Justices Castillo Víquez, Rueda Leal, Hernández López, and Garro Vargas issue separate opinions.
The declarations of unconstitutionality, except as stated in the first point concerning the substantive claims in this operative portion—which takes effect beginning in the month following service of the judgment—have declaratory and retroactive effect as of the date on which the law took effect, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith and vested legal situations (situaciones jurídicas consolidadas). Notice shall be given to the Poderes Legislativo y Judicial and to the Junta Administradora del Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial. A summary of this ruling shall be published in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta, and the full text shall be published in the Boletín Judicial. Let notice be given.
In view of the foregoing, the Superior Council of the Judiciary, at session number 46-18, held on May 22, 2018, Article VI, resolved that, as a result of the entry into force of Ley número 9544, which amended the Judiciary Retirement and Pension System (Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial), beginning on May 22, 2018, deductions would be applied for the employee contribution (aporte obrero) (13%) and the administrative-expense commission (comisión por gastos de administración) (5 per thousand) from the salaries earned by judicial personnel, as well as from the retirement benefits and pensions paid out of the Judiciary Retirement and Pension Fund (Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial), and likewise the special, solidarity-based, and redistributive contribution would be applied to retirees and pensioners, as prescribed by Article 236 bis. Nevertheless, as mentioned in the report submitted to the honorable Constitutional Chamber regarding Constitutional Challenge (Acción de Inconstitucionalidad) number 18-007819-0007-CO, in which the constitutionality of the aforementioned provision was debated, it must be taken into account that, upon retiring, judicial personnel continue contributing to the Judiciary Retirement and Pension Fund (an employee contribution of thirteen percent (13%) pursuant to Article 236), unlike under other retirement and pension systems; consequently, the amount of their retirement benefit would be reduced.
In addition, there are other deductions, such as the deduction for the administrative expenses of the Administrative Board of the Judiciary Retirement and Pension Fund (Junta Administrativa del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial) (Article 239), which establishes an administrative-expense commission of five per thousand of the salaries earned by judicial personnel, as well as of the retirement benefits and pensions charged to the Fund. This could become confiscatory (Article 40 of the Constitution) or violate the principle of non-retroactivity of the law (principio de irretroactividad de la ley) (Article 34 of our Constitution), given the existence of vested and consolidated property rights (derechos patrimoniales adquiridos y consolidados) under a prior law. Accordingly, the report approved by the Full Court (Corte Plena) at session number 26-17, of August 7, 2017, Article XXX, stated the following: “It bears repeating that this Court has respected, and will continue to respect, the technical studies issued to ensure the sustainability of the Fund.
Nevertheless, it cannot be overlooked that fundamental rights are at stake, and the reform therefore also warrants a study grounded in actuarial methodology but also informed by a human-rights perspective. In this regard, it should be noted that ILO Recommendation No. 43, ‘Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ Insurance Recommendation,’ in point 13), subparagraphs a) and b), provides that: ‘(a) In order to guarantee workers an old age free from want, the pension should cover essential needs. It is therefore advisable that the pension guaranteed to every pensioner who has completed a specified qualifying period be fixed with due regard to the cost of living. (b) Under systems involving contributions proportional to wages, insured persons who have contributions credited to their accounts corresponding to the average duration of active working life should receive a pension corresponding to their social position during the period of occupational activity.
To this end, the pension guaranteed to insured persons credited with thirty actual years of contributions should not be less than one-half of the wage insured since entry into the insurance system or during a specified period immediately preceding the determination of the pension’ (Emphasis added). It is therefore clear that both Convention No. 102 and Recommendation No. 43 of the International Labour Organization are in agreement in establishing that retirement benefits and pensions must meet people’s essential needs in old age, and that the amount must therefore be fixed by taking into account the ‘cost of living and social position during the period of occupational activity.’ In other words, the standard of living that the worker enjoyed during active working life must be respected. The need to reform the Retirement and Pension Fund in order to ensure its sustainability is not disputed, but such reforms must satisfy the requirements of suitability and reasonableness, as stated by the Constitutional Chamber in judgment No. 2010-1625 at 9:30 a.m. on January 27, 2010, when it declared unconstitutional the pension cap established in Article 234 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial).
The foregoing is consistent with the position of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which, when analyzing the admissibility of the case ‘Admissibility and Merits, National Association of Former Employees of the Peruvian Social Security Institute and Others v. Peru’[[]1], indicated that the aforementioned Article 26 does not preclude a State from imposing certain restrictions on the exercise of the rights incorporated into that provision, provided that a joint analysis has been conducted of the individual impairment of the right (in this case, the right to retirement benefits and a pension) in relation to the collective implications of the measure.” In addition to the foregoing, Article 225 of the provision establishes a retirement-benefit cap (tope de jubilación) that may be neither greater than ten times nor less than one-third of the base salary for the lowest-paid position in the Judiciary.
Thus, the provision did not contemplate that the imposed cap should be applied after the legally required and income-tax deductions and the contributions that retirees continue to make toward the sustainability of the Judiciary Retirement and Pension Fund, including the contributions and the administrative-expense commission. For that reason, it was concluded with respect to that article that merely imposing a retirement-benefit cap for the sole purpose of limiting the highest retirement benefits is insufficient; rather, it must be suitable and proportionate and must be supported by a technical and legal explanation justifying the reduction in the benefit. The benefit had to remain sufficient in cases involving retirement benefits arising from contributions three or four times greater than those of the other contributors; otherwise, the cap would once again become unconstitutional, and there would again be a risk that this prerequisite would be found lacking.
To avoid that outcome, the report proposed adding the phrase “after legally required and income-tax deductions” in order to comply with the applicable treaty provisions and constitutional analysis, but this was omitted from Ley 9544. Lastly, Transitory Provision VI (transitorio VI), challenged herein, established a period of 18 months for judicial personnel who meet the requirements for retirement eligibility to exercise their right to retire under the provisions established by the reform. However, the resolutions of the Full Court or the Superior Council contain no evidence that the Executive or Legislative Branches conducted technical studies to define that period, which could be inconsistent with the Constitutional Chamber’s repeated rulings, including judgment number 2017-11714, issued at twelve o’clock on July 26, 2017, which stated that a fundamental requirement for making changes to retirement and pension systems is that they must be supported by technical criteria regarding the impact of those statutory changes; otherwise, Article 73 of our Political Constitution could be violated.
Moreover, it should be mentioned that, as stated in repeated Amparo Proceedings (Recursos de Amparo) and Constitutional Challenges filed by judicial personnel against Ley número 9544, the institution’s staff have been subjected to a very severe transitional provision, never before applied to any group in retirement matters, which has discouraged them from continuing to work at the institution. This has resulted in a continuing loss of talent, since several resignations have been received from judicial personnel who preferred to continue their careers in other fields because of the constant changes in both retirement and salary conditions resulting from the reforms applied in recent years. They have also complained that some individuals with twenty or more years of service, who had contributed to the Judiciary Retirement and Pension Fund for so many years, had already developed future life plans for the time when they would exercise their right to retire.
However, they experienced a drastic change as a result of the reform introduced by the challenged Transitory Provision, which has significantly affected them and has even required medical intervention because of the impact of this reform on their lives and the lives of their family members. They believe that their rights should have been protected through a reasonable and fair transitional provision supported by technical and objective criteria. In this regard, there is no doubt that the institution has also suffered the consequences of this and other reforms approved in recent years, with respect to which the Judiciary has consistently stated that they do affect its organization and operation, as reflected in repeated resolutions. It is therefore necessary to review this and other provisions also from the standpoint of the impact they have had on the performance of the duties constitutionally assigned to this Branch of the Republic, including not only the judiciary but also the auxiliary bodies of the administration of justice (órganos auxiliares de la administración de Justicia), such as the Fiscalía, OIJ and Defensa Pública, where competent and qualified personnel are required to provide high-quality service and fulfill the constitutional mandate of prompt and effective justice. d).
Criteria of the Full Court regarding the consultations conducted by the Legislative Assembly: It should be mentioned that, at the cited sessions, the Full Court issued an unfavorable opinion regarding the consultations conducted by the Legislative Assembly, stating that they did affect the operation and organization of the Judiciary, as reflected in the resolution adopted at session number 26-17, held on August 7, 2017, Article XXX. In addition to the foregoing, it is important to refer to the new Administrative Board of the Judiciary Retirement and Pension Fund, created pursuant to Article 239 of the recently approved reform as a Judiciary body with complete functional, technical, and administrative independence. It is assigned a series of functions that previously belonged to the Superior Council of the Judiciary in its capacity as administrator of the Judiciary Retirement and Pension Fund, pursuant to subparagraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of Article 81 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary, repealed by Article 2 of Ley 9544.
The foregoing modifies certain functions of the Superior Council of the Judiciary and creates an internal unit of the institution that, although it possesses limited-purpose legal personality (personería jurídica instrumental), maintains an organic relationship with the Judiciary; that is, it remains subordinate to the Judiciary in all matters not inherent to the function entrusted to it on a deconcentrated basis (de manera desconcentrada), as well as in matters arising from its limited-purpose legal personality. It is worth emphasizing that ley 9544 contains many ambiguities that will have to be addressed through regulations, some of which have already been approved by the Full Court and must not exceed the scope of that Law, at the risk of departing from the legislature’s intent. This problem was also noted during the consideration of legislative file 19.922, which gave rise to ley 9544.
The foregoing is due to the existence of a conflict or clash of rules concerning the regulation of per diem payments (dietas) to the persons serving on the Administrative Board (Junta Administradora), whereby, pursuant to Article 239, paragraph 5, the administrative-expense commission (5 x 1000) shall be used to pay the per diems of the members of the Administrative Board, the salaries of its staff, and its administrative expenses; yet Article 240, paragraph 4, also provides that “the members of the Administrative Board shall not receive any per diem.” For its part, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in Judgment No. 2008-5179, de las once horas del cuatro de abril de dos mil ocho, conducted an extensive analysis concerning the effect on the operation and organization of the Judicial Branch and the aforementioned Article 167 of the Constitution. Furthermore, and of particular importance, it bears reiterating that the procedure for approving Ley 9544 is the procedure established in Article 167 of our Political Constitution, which refers to the mandatory consultation (consulta obligatoria) that the Legislative Assembly must conduct with the Supreme Court of Justice when a bill concerns the organization or operation of the Judicial Branch and further provides that, in order to depart from the Court’s opinion, “the vote of two-thirds of all members of the Assembly shall be required.” In this manner, the legislature safeguarded the “democratic principle,” whose function is to ensure that bills considered under those conditions are afforded sufficient “opportunity for reflection and debate,” as the Constitutional Chamber has stated (Judgment 3671-2006).
However, as Justices Luis Fernando Salazar Alvarado and Roberto Garita Navarro held in their dissenting opinion (voto salvado) in Decision No. 2022-8712, de las nueve horas diez minutos del veinte de abril de dos mil veintidós, Law No. 9544 contains an “essential procedural defect (vicio esencial de procedimiento) consisting of the failure to consult the Judicial Branch regarding the text approved by Parliament by an absolute rather than a qualified majority, which affects the law in its entirety (Article 167 of the Political Constitution), because it affects the Branch’s organization, structure, operation, and independence, for which reason they deem it unnecessary to analyze the other procedural and substantive defects raised by the petitioners…”; accordingly, because the cited law contains the aforementioned constitutional procedural defect, the entire provision, including the challenged transitional provision (transitorio impugnado), would be unconstitutional.
Lastly, the Judicial Branch Retirement and Pension Fund (Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial) has the same characteristics as a social security fund (Articles 73 and 177 of the Constitution), and its nature was analyzed by that Chamber in Judgment No. 2014-20474, de las quince horas y cuarenta y cinco minutos del dieciocho de diciembre de dos mil catorce. It must not be overlooked that the creation and nature of the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial reflect considerations of stability, independence, training, and suitability, as established in Article 192 of the Political Constitution, for the purpose of encouraging trained and qualified personnel to remain with the institution; however, the reduction in retirement benefits (goce jubilatorio), changes to the retirement age, the challenged Transitional Provision VI, and other reforms discourage valuable professionals from joining the institution because, upon considering the future financial outcome, they would prefer to pursue their professional careers in another field of employment.
This adversely affects the judicial, prosecutorial, Public Defense, and general staff career services because their members, despite bearing heavier salary deductions—four times those under other systems—would receive a smaller benefit. Moreover, the renewal of the staff who manage to remain is adversely affected, and the Judicial Branch would have older officials who continued working solely because of the reduction in income they would suffer upon retirement. Consequently, the judicial workforce faces a dilemma: although its members wish to exercise that right and are motivated to retire and rest, they are placed in a position in which they must assess their financial circumstances, probably compelling them to seek new sources of income to cover their regular expenses or obligations undertaken before retirement, as well as the expenses that naturally arise with age. However, that process also has restrictions: from a legal perspective, the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) prohibits retirees from taking another job, while, as a social reality, persons over the age of forty face practical limitations on reentering the workforce.
The regulation of the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial must not be assessed solely from an economic perspective, because fundamental rights—inalienable rights (derechos irrenunciables)—of every worker are at stake. Throughout their working years, these workers contributed to a system at a rate higher than the general rate, with the expectation of receiving a pension at a certain point in their lives that would enable them to meet their needs and peacefully enjoy their retirement years with those around them and with a good quality of life. The imposition of these statutory amendments adversely affects vulnerable population groups—such as older adults—harming the weaker party, precisely the party requiring greater protection from the State. The foregoing also entails a retroactive application of the law (aplicación retroactiva de la ley), which is prohibited by Article 34 of the Political Constitution.
It cannot be disregarded that this is generally the stage of life when persons require greater medical attention, special care, and other assistance, and that, during their working lives, they contributed to the system in greater or lesser amounts, depending on the income they earned, with the expectation of having the anticipated resources to address these circumstances. Thus, many of these persons had future life plans based on when they expected to be able to retire, but those plans changed drastically as a result of the approved reforms and the challenged transitional provision. This causes a significant social impact because, upon retirement, persons unexpectedly lose a substantial portion of their income while retaining a pre-established level of expenses, resulting in repercussions not only for their finances but also for their health. This is contrary to the intended purpose of a pension system, which is to provide sufficient income during life after employment; in this context, it is important to remember that retirees often remain responsible for the care and support of other older adults or minors.
Specifically, the matters reviewed by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) during the processing of this law through the optional consultation (consulta facultativa) concerned changes to the requirements for obtaining pension rights and the right to retirement, and the Chamber found no defect whatsoever. The claim by the petitioners that Ley 9544 and its Transitory Provision VI violated Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is categorically rejected. As for the claim concerning Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a detailed reading of the content of that Article 14, compared with the processing or content of Ley 9945, does not support an inference of any type of infringement; accordingly, this argument is rejected. The claim that the principles of transparency and legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), good faith, legitimate expectations, the relative inviolability of property, freedom from confiscation, and respect for acquired rights (derechos adquiridos) and consolidated legal situations (situaciones jurídicas consolidadas) are affected is without merit.
The alleged infringement of the principle of legal certainty is rejected; neither the processing nor the content of the law provides any basis for asserting that any manifestation of this principle was affected. As the Chamber itself stated, the processing of Ley 9544 established a broad procedure for submitting motions (mociones) which, although it did indeed establish certain particular rules concerning the number of motions, the time allowed to argue in their defense, and the stage at which they could be submitted, did not necessarily entail an infringement of principles and rights. Likewise, the alleged infringement of the right to private property is rejected. The enactment of Ley 9544 does not violate the right to private property, nor does it entail the application of confiscatory or regressive measures. It does not affect the right of older adults to receive special protection in the enjoyment and exercise of their rights, particularly their right to social security in the form of retirement or a retirement pension.
Nor does it violate the right to enjoy a dignified life or the right to pursue a dignified life plan. It should be borne in mind that, with respect to the technical studies, the Constitutional Chamber ruled out the existence of any defect. There is no violation of legal certainty in terms of the retroactive application of the law to consolidated legal situations and acquired property rights (derechos patrimoniales adquiridos). In legislative proceedings and pursuant to constitutional case law (jurisprudencia constitucional), it has been recognized and construed as constitutionally valid that, in pension matters, there is neither an acquired right nor a consolidated legal situation that may be preserved over time to the detriment of other potential pensioners under the various systems. This would violate the principle of nondiscrimination and the Principle of Legality (Principio de Legalidad), which must prevail in the various pension systems.
Regarding the term consolidated legal situation, it has been understood that, although no one has a “right to the immutability of the legal system,” the constitutional provision means that, if the triggering condition has occurred, a legal reform that changes or eliminates the rule cannot prevent the expected conditional effect from arising under the authority of the previous rule. RELIEF SOUGHT (PETITORIA) In accordance with the report submitted, it is requested that the action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) be dismissed.
ERIC GIOVANNI JACAMO JIMENEZ, FANNY MARCELA SOTO DELGADO, FRANCISCO ALEJANDRO CURLING MARTINEZ, FRANZ ADOLFO PANIAGUA MEJIA, FREDDY GUILLERMO RAM BLANCO MORA, GABRIELA EUGENIA NAVARRO MATA, GABRIELA MARIA FERNANDEZ MONGE, GERALD YENKIS CAMPOS OBANDO, GERARDINA ELENA GUERRERO GONZALEZ, GERARDO ALBERTO MONTERO JIMENEZ, GIOVANNI HENRY CHACON VALVERDE, GISSELLE PATRICIA BONILLA CORDERO, HAYDIS MARIA CUBERO RAMIREZ, HECTOR OSVALDO ELIZONDO MARIN, HENNER REIVIN SALAZAR NAVARRO, HUGO JAVIER VARGAS QUIROS, JORGE ALBERTO BARQUERO UMAÑA, JORGE ARTURO TABASH FORBES, JOSE AIDER GUTIERREZ GOMEZ, JOSE ORLANDO FERNANDEZ CORDOBA, KATTIA YANORY MUÑOZ ZAMORA, LILLIANA PATRICIA AZOFEIFA AZOFEIFA, LUIS ALBERTO CAMPOS MOLINA, LUZ MARINA JIMENEZ VARELA, MAINOR ALBERTO MORALES MORERA, MARIA CECILIA CORDERO MARTINEZ, MARIA DE LOS ANGELES MIRANDA MATARRITA, MARIA DEL ROSARIO DOMINGUEZ ESTRADA, MARIA JOSE CASTRO RODRIGUEZ, MARIANELA PERALTA ELIZONDO, MARIANELLA BARQUERO UMAÑA, MARLENE DIAZ NAVAS, MARTIN JAVIER PEREZ RODRIGUEZ, MARVIN SOLORZANO SOLIS, MILANIA MOLINA VILLALOBOS, MONICA DEL SOCORRO MONGE OBANDO, PAOLA ANDREA DELGADO ROBLES, PEDRO JOSE FALLAS HIDALGO, RAYMOND LEONARDO TOSSO TORRES, ROCIO DEL CARMEN MOREIRA SANCHEZ, RODRIGO ESTEBAN VARGAS SALAZAR, ROGER REYES ESPINOZA, RONALD CASTILLO BARRIA, ROSAURA GARCIA AGUILAR, RUBEN ROBERTO DE JESUS MORALES BRENES, RUTH VILLALOBOS CHINCHILLA, SANDRA DE LOS ANGELES CAMPOS OBANDO, SILVIA LORENA DE LA TRINIDAD SEVILLA GUENDEL, SUSANA MARIA PORRAS CASCANTE, VANESSA EUGENIA CID GOMEZ, VERONICA MARINA CALDERON MORALES, VICTOR MANUEL ORTEGA JIMENEZ,VINICIO ALBERTO CHAVARRIA QUIROS, WILKER CARLOS SALAZAR ELIZONDO, YADELI MARIA JAEN CASTELLON, YAMILETH RAMIREZ RODRIGUEZ, JENNY GEORGINA FALLAS UREÑA, CARLOS EDUARDO DURAN MENA, DINO DE JESUS LEZCANO GOMEZ, GUILLERMO ANTONIO MEJIAS VILLALOBOS, HELLEN DE LOS ANGELES CARVAJAL CHAVES, MONICA MARCELA MORA VILCHEZ, CARLOS EUGENIO JESUS LEWIS MONTERO, must justify and substantiate the legitimate interest (interés legítimo) they claim to have in this matter, since they omitted any statement in that regard.
Likewise, Karla Patricia Jiménez Mora, as the authenticating attorney responsible for submitting the revenue stamp corresponding to her authentication, is ordered to clarify and identify, clearly, systematically, and expressly, to whom the 10 complete Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica revenue stamps bearing numbers 465330126, 465330134, 465330142, 465330150, 465330169, 465330177, 465330185, 465330193, 465330207, 465330215 correspond, as those stamps were submitted repeatedly for two or more pleadings seeking intervention as supporting parties, and to affix and cancel the Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica revenue stamp in the amount of doscientos setenta y cinco colones corresponding to the authentication of each of the remaining pleadings seeking intervention as supporting parties. Notice is given that, pursuant to the aforementioned law, one revenue stamp must be canceled for each authenticated signature.
In addition to the foregoing, CARLOS EDUARDO DURAN MENA, GUILLERMO ANTONIO MEJIAS VILLALOBOS, HELLEN DE LOS ANGELES CARVAJAL CHAVES, and MONICA MARCELA MORA VILCHEZ must submit a duly signed and authenticated pleading because they omitted to do so or because the digital signature could not be verified; and DINO DE JESUS LEZCANO GOMEZ and CARLOS EUGENIO JESUS LEWIS MONTERO must submit a complete pleading, duly signed and authenticated and bearing the corresponding Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica revenue stamp, since the pleading entered in the record (autos) is incomplete and illegible. The applicant ADRIANA DE LA TRINIDAD OROCU CHAVARRIA must provide evidence of her status as legal representative of the Asociación Costarricense de la Judicatura(ACOJUD), the type of power of attorney she holds, and the period for which it remains valid, for which purpose she must submit a current certificate of legal representation (certificación de personería jurídica) for that association.
Likewise, she must affix and cancel the Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica revenue stamp in the amount of doscientos setenta y cinco colones, corresponding to the authentication of the pleading seeking intervention as a supporting party, pursuant to artículo 4 de la Ley No. 3245 de 3 de diciembre de 1963. The applicants ADRIANA ISABEL CASTRO RIVERA, GERALD ADOLFO HUERTAS ORTEGA, GERARDO ALONSO SALAS MONTERO, JACQUELINE CHAVES MEJIAS 23-8-2022, JOSE ANGEL JIMENEZ TORRENTES, KARLA ALEXANDRA MADRIZ MARTINEZ, MARIA DE LA CRUZ ARROYO BRAVO, ROBERTO ANTONIO CERDAS QUIROS, and JOSE RAMON DE LA TRINIDAD HIDALGO HIDALGO must justify and substantiate the legitimate interest they claim to have in this matter, since they omitted any statement in that regard. Likewise, they must affix and cancel the Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica revenue stamp in the amount of doscientos setenta y cinco colones, corresponding to the authentication of the pleading seeking intervention as a supporting party, for each signature authenticated, in accordance with Article 4 of Ley No. 3245 of 3 de diciembre de 1963.
The applicant NIXIA ZAIDA MORA VARGAS must establish her capacity as legal representative of the Asociación de Jubilados y Pensionados del Poder Judicial (ASOJUPEN) and the Asociación Nacional de Empleados Judiciales (ANEJUD), the type of power of attorney (poder) she holds, and the period for which it remains valid; for this purpose, she must submit the respective current certificates of legal capacity (certificaciones de personería jurídica) for those associations. She must also explain and substantiate ASOJUPEN’s legitimate interest (interés legítimo) in this case. Finally, she must affix and cancel the Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica stamp in the amount of doscientos setenta y cinco colones, corresponding to authentication of the intervention brief (escrito de coadyuvancia). The applicant REBECA PATRICIA HIDALGO DUARTE must establish her capacity as legal representative of the Asociación Nacional de Empleados Judiciales (ANEJUD), the type of power of attorney she holds, and the period for which it remains valid; for this purpose, she must submit the respective current certificates of legal capacity for those associations or, alternatively, clarify whether she is appearing in her personal capacity, in which case she must explain the legitimate interest on which she relies.
The applicant KAROL MONGE MOLINA, in her capacity as special litigation attorney-in-fact (apoderada especial judicial) for ALLEN LUBANSKI MORA GAMBOA, CARLOTA EDUVIGES ARAUZ GARCIA, CATALINA ROCIO CONEJO VALVERDE, ETHEL ROSARIO CHINCHILLA SANCHEZ, GREDY JAVIER DE LA TRINIDAD HERRERA MORALES, INGRID ETHEL BUITRAGO SANCHEZ, JUAN CARLOS RIVERA RODRIGUEZ, LUIS FERNANDO CHAVES HERNANDEZ, LUIS GUILLERMO FALLAS GONZALEZ, LUIS RAMON DE LA TRINIDAD GAMBOA ROJAS, OSVALDO RODRIGUEZ FLORES, ROLANDO ARTURO OBANDO VARGAS, TONY ALEJANDRO ACUÑA PANIAGUA, YAMILETTE COTO GRANADOS, PAULO FERNANDO HERNANDEZ MURILLO, and ALVARO GUERRERO MORA, must affix and cancel the Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica stamp in the amount of doscientos setenta y cinco colones, corresponding to authentication of the intervention brief, in accordance with Article 4 of Ley No. 3245 of 3 de diciembre de 1963. She must also provide the legally required stamps (timbres de ley) for each power of attorney submitted, namely, a tax stamp in the amount of ciento veinticinco colones, an Archivo Nacional stamp in the amount of veinte colones, and a Colegio de Abogados stamp in the amount of doscientos setenta y cinco colones.
In the case of the principals (poderdantes) CARLOTA EDUVIGES ARAUZ GARCIA, YAMILETTE COTO GRANADOS, and JUAN CARLOS RIVERA RODRIGUEZ, the power of attorney is not duly signed because the signatures could not be verified; the power of attorney for INGRID ETHEL BUITRAGO SANCHEZ is digitally signed only by Karol Monge, and therefore lacks the signatures of the attorney-in-fact and the authenticating attorney. Accordingly, she must submit the powers of attorney duly signed and bearing the respective stamps. Finally, she must establish her capacity as legal representative of PAULO FERNANDO HERNANDEZ MURILLO and ALVARO GUERRERO MORA for these proceedings, the type of power of attorney she holds, and the period for which it remains valid; for this purpose, she must submit the respective powers of attorney and certificates establishing that status, duly signed and bearing the legally required stamps.
The applicant RICHARD WILLIAM HOCKE GONZALEZ must explain and substantiate the legitimate interest he claims to have in this matter, as he omitted any statement in that regard. He must also submit a duly signed brief and comply with the requirement that the intervention brief be authenticated by an attorney, including affixing and canceling the Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica stamp in the amount of doscientos setenta y cinco colones, corresponding to authentication of the brief in which active intervention (coadyuvancia activa) is requested. The applicants TATIANA RODRIGUEZ RODRÍGUEZ, ANGELA PATRICIA GUZMAN BALLESTERO, LUIS GUILLERMO DE JESUS OBANDO ARAYA, MARIA GABRIELA BUSTAMANTE SEGURA, MARIBEL DE LOS ANGELES BURGOS MATA, and MARIO ALBERTO ALVARADO AVILA must explain and substantiate the legitimate interest they claim to have in this matter, as they omitted any statement in that regard.
The applicants ERICK JOSE ZAMORA CHAVES, LAURA PATRICIA MEZA PEÑA, LIZZETH GERARDINA CRUZ TORRES, MARIA MILENA VEGA CERVANTES, and THELMO MAURICIO DE JESUS FLORES LEON must explain and substantiate the legitimate interest they claim to have in this matter, as they omitted any statement in that regard. They must also comply with the requirement that the intervention brief be authenticated by an attorney, including affixing and canceling the Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica stamp in the amount of doscientos setenta y cinco colones, corresponding to authentication of the brief in which active intervention is requested. The applicant JIMMY ALEXANDER ROBLES HERNANDEZ must explain and substantiate the legitimate interest he claims to have in this matter, as he omitted any statement in that regard. He must also submit a duly signed brief, because the digital signature could not be verified due to an error, and affix and cancel the Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica stamp in the amount of doscientos setenta y cinco colones, corresponding to authentication of the brief in which active intervention is requested.
The applicant MARVIN ROBERTO LEON SALAZAR must explain and substantiate the legitimate interest he claims to have in this matter, as he omitted any statement in that regard. He must also submit a duly signed brief and comply with the requirement that the intervention brief be authenticated by an attorney, including affixing and canceling the Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica stamp in the amount of doscientos setenta y cinco colones, corresponding to authentication of the brief in which active intervention is requested.
It is the balanced combination of the principles of legal certainty (certeza), legality (legalidad), hierarchy and publication of regulations (jerarquía y publicidad normativa), non-retroactivity of unfavorable provisions (irretroactividad de lo no favorable), and prohibition of arbitrariness (interdicción de la arbitrariedad). For its part, the principle of solidarity (principio de solidaridad), which governs social security (seguridad social) in our country and specifically the Judiciary’s retirement system (sistema jubilatorio del Poder Judicial) (based on the provisions of Articles 1, 50, 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution), is also infringed, insofar as it is unreasonable to afford discriminatory and unequal treatment to a category of workers who have contributed a significant portion of their salary to a Fund for 25 years or more, treating them in the same manner as a person who has worked at the institution for, for example, one or five years.
For those who have contributed and worked for 25 years or more under a specific employment contract (contrato de trabajo), the abrupt and severe changes that occurred logically have a greater impact on matters such as retirement age, years of service, and calculation of the benefit to be received periodically, thereby even impairing their property and becoming confiscatory, since their expectations were maintained over a longer period and, from one moment to the next, they saw their conditions worsen, including a reduction in the retirement amount to be received and an extension of the term that, depending on the age at which they began working at the institution or the years recognized at other institutions, may amount to 8 years or more. The situation is extremely burdensome for those who are close to retirement because they have already developed a life plan, from the standpoint of family, finances, aspirations, or goals, based on those legal rules, and suddenly, abruptly and arbitrarily, they saw the conditions changed, with severe effects on their interests and on their financial, physical, psychological, emotional, and even motivational well-being.
They add that ILO Convention 102 establishes and develops the basis of the right to retirement by providing in Articles 25 et seq. that every member for which the Convention is in force must guarantee protected persons the provision of old-age benefits (prestaciones de vejez). ILO Convention 128, Articles 19 et seq., provides likewise. The petitioners state that it is true that, in their case, they had not yet completed 30 years of service when the law entered into force, nor had they reached the age required for retirement, but they did have an expectancy of a right (expectativa de derecho), or a right in the process of acquisition (derecho en vías de adquisición), because they had contributed to the system for more than 25 years under the principles of good faith (buena fe) and legitimate expectations (confianza legítima). Article 118 of the ILO Convention states in its Article 7 that Member States must endeavor to participate in a system for preserving acquired rights (derechos adquiridos) and rights in the process of acquisition.
ILO Convention 157, Articles 6 et seq., provides likewise. Therefore, protection is not afforded solely to the right to retirement once the factual requirements established by the rules have been met; rights in the process of acquisition are also recognized and protected and, depending on how close they are to vesting, require safeguarding or protection by the State to ensure that no abrupt or unexpected changes occur unless they are absolutely indispensable to achieve an objective of compelling necessity. This follows from a harmonious, pro homine interpretation of the international rules cited. In the case presented, the challenged provision is contrary to the rules set forth above, which constitute a standard of constitutionality (parámetro de constitucionalidad) because they are international human-rights instruments, insofar as the challenged transitional provision (transitorio) was enacted without protecting rights in the process of acquisition in a graduated and proportionate manner, specifically those of persons who had contributed to the Judiciary Pension and Retirement System (Régimen de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial) for 25 years or more.
In that regard, although alternatives existed that could have caused less serious harm to those who had contributed for so long, the decision was made to include only an 18-month transitional period, without any technical studies establishing that such a period was necessary to achieve the objectives of the Fund’s financial sustainability, a legislative decision that is manifestly arbitrary. They assert that, when the challenged provision is compared with their circumstances as Judiciary workers who, at the time of the Reform of the Retirement and Pension System, had worked for this branch of the State for 25 years or more, and with the content of the aforementioned rules and principles, it is evident that the provision is contrary to the Law of the Constitution (Derecho de la Constitución). They state that all the petitioners developed a life plan based on the working conditions they had within the institution and, specifically, on the rules for accessing and enjoying the right to retirement, which, pursuant to the aforementioned Law No. 7333, could be enjoyed when certain circumstances arose, namely, upon completing 30 years of service or 60 years of work (early retirement), under either scenario; although their retirement amount would not be set at 100%, it would be set at a proportional percentage that would allow them to retire and receive a dignified income ensuring their own well-being and that of their family.
Those were the circumstances that gave rise to an expectancy of a right or, as the ILO and the Constitutional Court of Colombia have termed them, “rights in the process of acquisition” (T-631-2002 and T-235-2002). In accordance with the principle of legitimate expectations, which must prevail in a Democratic State under the Rule of Law (Estado Democrático de Derecho), where legal certainty, transparency, and good faith are protected, those conditions could be changed only for reasons of public interest or constitutionally acceptable grounds. Article 28 of the Political Constitution establishes that fundamental rights may be restricted only by law, provided that doing so is strictly necessary to protect public order, morals, or the rights of third parties. In this case, their life plans were altered drastically, abruptly, and without a progressive or graduated process, even though they had placed their legitimate expectations and good faith in the employer (the State) and in the rules governing the employment contract and had contributed a significant portion of their salaries to the capitalization fund (Fondo de capitalización) for 25 years or more.
They argue that, in this case, there were indeed technical studies—specifically, actuarial studies—which determined that the Judiciary Pension and Retirement Fund had sustainability problems. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Justice entered into an agreement with the Instituto de Investigaciones en Ciencias Económicas de la Universidad de Costa Rica for actuarial studies to be conducted. This was Convenio R-CONV-005-2016 between the Poder Judicial and the Universidad de Costa Rica, in which several interdisciplinary teams participated, including one from the Poder Judicial. The Executive Director of the Poder Judicial (folio 1322 et seq. of volume 6 of legislative expediente 19922) stated that, since the last Melinsky actuarial study, the actuarial deficit (déficit actuarial) had grown from 2.48 million to “a scenario of around 5 mil millones de millones,” which, according to that official, resulted from the failure to make decisions.
During the appearance of Dr. Max Soto Jiménez of the Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la Universidad de Costa Rica (IICE), he and part of his team informed the Legislative Committee that they had found an actuarial deficit equal to 9.7 times the accumulated reserves and 36% of the present value of the system’s total liabilities. The same assertion appears in IICE Report 3. During the appearance of Dr. José Antonio Peña of the IICE, he also addressed the seriousness of the Fund’s situation and the need to take measures (volume 10, folios 2274 and 2275). The reports submitted by the Comisión Permanente de Asuntos Económicos and presented at the various hearings held show that there were different alternatives for providing the Fund with financial sustainability and that several possible scenarios were studied. Furthermore, folio 2443 of the legislative expediente shows that a graduated transitional provision had been drafted, which was also included in the Committee’s Majority Affirmative Opinion (Dictamen Afirmativo de Mayoría) of July 27, 2017; nevertheless, without reasonable justification, the legislature declined to adopt any technical proposal that would have been less burdensome, proportionate, or graduated for workers who were close to their retirement date while likewise satisfying the interest in balancing the Pension and Retirement Fund as a legitimate objective of the reform.
Instead, it adopted the 18-month approach, a period that the Chamber has used in different scenarios in which no other possible alternatives existed or were asserted and no technical studies were conducted in that regard. They argue that, in those cases, the Chamber had to devise that 18-month benchmark because no other benchmark existed. Examples include the following judgments: In judgment 846-92 at 13:30 on March 27, 1992, the Chamber decided an optional legislative consultation (consulta legislativa facultativa) concerning the “Bill Creating the General Pension System Chargeable to the National Budget, Other Special Systems, and Reform of Law Number 7092 of April 21, 1988, as amended, Income Tax Law.” In that case, the Chamber was specifically asked what would happen if, contrary to ILO Convention 102, workers who had not yet reached the required age or contribution period were deemed to have an expectancy of a right rather than an acquired right, in the event that legislation modified those requirements for obtaining retirement.
The Chamber responded that the issue lacked relevance because the bill under consultation recognized preservation of the retirement status of public servants who had met the requirements for receiving the benefit and “also extends it to those who belong or have belonged to the excluded systems so that they may acquire it within a period of eighteen months, which appears reasonably sufficient to guarantee any rights held in good faith.” This was an assessment by the Chamber that did not consider specific matters such as which changes would occur or what their effects would be, nor did it refer to any proportionality analysis (análisis de proporcionalidad) or technical study. The justices simply considered that, upon that law’s entry into force, eighteen months would be sufficient to guarantee it, without any basis for that judgment other than that they deemed it prudent. Judgment 6491-98 at 9:45 hrs. on September 10, 1998, decided an action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) against Articles 224 and 225 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) and its Transitional Provision XIII, Law 7333 of May 5, 1993.
It distinguished between membership in the system and the right to retirement itself, which arises when the statutory requirements are met, regardless of whether it has been claimed, adding that this right to retirement had been extended to the eighteen months preceding fulfillment of the requirements for acquiring the right because the persons concerned were very close to their retirement date, and stating with respect to those persons that “they not only have an expectancy, but also take irreversible measures to prepare for their change of status.” Judgment 1633-93 at 14:43 hrs. is cited in this regard.
of April 13, 1993, which alludes to the Chamber having held that, when a repealing statutory amendment takes effect, the vested rights (derechos adquiridos) of those who had already met the requirements for retirement must be respected, as must those of persons who would meet the requirements eighteen months after the repeal, which, it states, “the Chamber has accepted as reasonable in previous decisions.” Once again, this is not based on objective, quantifiable reasons grounded in considerations of proportionality, but rather on a reasonable period. In judgment 3551-14, issued at 9:05 hrs. on March 14, 2014, the Chamber decided a petition for constitutional relief (recurso de amparo) filed against the CCSS concerning a change in the conditions for qualifying for retirement. That judgment, in turn, cited decision 1633-93, issued at 14:33 hrs. on April 13, 1993 (which cites decisions 1147-90 and 2136-91), stating that, when a retirement system is repealed, the rights of all persons who had retired and of those who met the requirements, even if they had not formally applied, must be preserved, and adding that this also applies “even eighteen months after the repeal of the law, a period that the Chamber has accepted as reasonable in previous decisions.” Consequently, applying that parameter, the petition was granted because it was found that there was no evidence that, in calculating the pension projection for the petitioner, account had been taken of the reasonable period of eighteen months preceding the amendment, during which vested rights are already recognized because “these are persons who are very close to their retirement date.” Judgment 12606-14, issued at 9:05 hrs. on August 1, 2014, also decided a petition for constitutional relief against the CCSS, citing the same arguments to affirm that, where regulatory changes are made to the requirements, the eighteen-month period must be considered when determining vested pension rights.
Judgment 1214-15 concerned a petition for constitutional relief against the CCSS and cited several precedents likewise holding that, when conditions or requirements are changed or repealed, vested rights must be respected, including those of persons who meet the requirements as late as eighteen months after the amendment. Judgment 2655-15, issued at 14:30 hrs. on February 24, 2015, decided a petition for constitutional relief against the CCSS, referred to the aforementioned case law, and stated that “it is recognized that such systems are governed by statute, which may be amended or repealed by another statute, and to contend that their conditions can never be modified would entail creating a limitation upon every existing pension and retirement system, which has constitutional status as regards its creation in general, but not as regards its particular specifications. (To the same effect, see decisions number 1341-93, issued at 10:30 hours on March 29, 1993, and 3063-95, issued at 15:30 hours on June 13, 1995.) This concept was subsequently expanded as a result of legislative decisions and decisions of this Court, in which a reasonable period—eighteen months—before fulfillment of the requirements for acquiring the right was recognized, since the person is very close to the retirement date and not only has an expectation, but also takes irreversible measures to prepare for the change in status.” The matter was resolved by directing compliance with the judgment discussed above.
They argue that, consequently, the Chamber has established the 18-month period in circumstances where no other parameters are available, because, when a retirement system is repealed or amended, protection must be afforded to workers who meet the requirements for retirement, even if they have not applied for it, and also to those who are only 18 months away from retirement, a period that is already treated as a vested right. These judicial precedents show that there are no other parameters or technical studies establishing different outcomes. Indeed, in other amendments to pension laws, the legislature has opted for longer periods when regulating the transitional provision (transitorio) or the continued effectiveness of the repealed rule, as was clearly explained in constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) number 19-024589-0007-CO, which cites the following statutes: Law number 8536, enacted on July 27, 2006, which adds to Article 2 of Law number 7531; Law number 7946, enacted on November 18, 1999; Law number 8721, enacted on March 18, 2009; Law number 8777, enacted on October 7, 2009, among others.
The 18 months constitute a judicially guaranteed minimum during which vested rights are recognized, although this does not derive from any constitutional, treaty-based, or statutory provision or principle. It is a reasonable period, like many others established by constitutional case law in the absence of other factors. Nevertheless, in this case, the legislators had access to actuarial studies that produced different scenarios when certain variables were modified, and several of the texts debated by the Committee and approved in the Affirmative Majority Report of July 27, 2017, included a graduated transitional provision (pages 2453 to 2485 of the cited legislative file); despite this, when amending the pension and retirement system, the legislature did not conduct a proportionality test in the broad sense to determine what transitional period was appropriate, necessary, suitable, and proportionate and would impair rights or expectations as little as possible without jeopardizing the Fund’s sustainability, which is the legitimate purpose of the amendment.
In cases where a fundamental right is restricted or limited, the burden of proof does not lie with the person harmed by the restriction or limitation, but with the Administration—in this case, the legislative branch of the State. It is for the State to provide the evidence demonstrating that the statutory measures or amendments in this case are not disproportionate. It must also be understood that the changes made to the legislation were not minor, because their magnitude is such that many persons who were only days away from becoming eligible for retirement must now, as a result of the statutory change, work, for example, an additional 8 or 10 years, depending on their age bracket, the date on which they began working for the institution, or their total years of service. These changes are far from insignificant, particularly at ages when individuals no longer have the same energy or physical, mental, psychological, or emotional condition, when it is no longer possible to find comparable sources of employment because they are no longer competitive in the labor market, and because the worker had previously chosen to pursue a career within the Administration of Justice, supported by the legitimate expectation (confianza legítima) that the fundamental terms of the employment contract would not be abruptly changed to their detriment.
It should be noted that the 18-month period was not shown to be relevant for purposes of actuarial solvency. The Superintendent of Pensions referred to 18 months solely because, he said, the Constitutional Chamber had so ruled, without providing any basis for finding that such case law applied to this amendment (page 1711 of the legislative file); similarly, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic stated that an 18-month transitional provision should be enacted because the Constitutional Chamber had so ruled, without analyzing whether that case law applied to the factual circumstances or whether those circumstances were different. Nor did it conduct a proportionality assessment. It should be noted that, during one of the appearances by the technicians or experts who prepared the study, Dr. Max Jiménez merely stated, “logically, a transitional period longer than 18 months negatively affects the Fund’s actuarial solvency” (page 2945 of the legislative file), but did not explain why or conduct an in-depth study of the various possible transitional periods so as to cause the lesser harm to a particular group of workers whose expectations were closer to realization and who would be more seriously affected.
Beginning in volume 9, page 2230, the legislative file contains different scenarios for adjustments that, according to the researchers from the Instituto de Investigaciones en Ciencias Económicas de la Universidad de Costa Rica, could be made to various aspects of retirement in order to achieve the pension system’s stability. Product 6 of the project “Actuarial Study of the Judiciary Retirement and Pension Fund” is presented as the final report entitled “Compilation and Final Report: Conclusions and Recommendations,” dated July 19, 2017. That report consists of 8 chapters and includes information on the broader environment, the Judiciary Fund, the participating populations, legal aspects of the system, and other matters. It addresses the current framework, the substitute text, the Corte Plena text, and the alternative frameworks presented by the researchers themselves. As to the first three—the current framework, the substitute text, and the Corte Plena text—they concluded that none passed an actuarial solvency test.
Page 2242 contains a comparative table establishing four possible frameworks or scenarios: the IICE 1 framework, IICE 2, IICE 3, and IICE 4. The requirements and promised benefits are analyzed in each scenario. They emphasize that, although the Chamber has established in various decisions that an 18-month period must be respected when a retirement system is repealed or amended, it did so because, in those cases, no technical studies had been conducted that would have allowed other periods to be assessed in relation to their effect on the system’s sustainability. In this case, by contrast, the burden of proof rested with the legislature to establish that those 18 months were necessary, the only possible option, and indispensable, so that public servants who were close to retirement would be affected in the least burdensome manner—that is, so that the impact on that segment of the population would be minimized.
Accordingly, it is not for them to prove that those 18 months are unreasonable or disproportionate; rather, the burden of proving that the amendment and the approved transitional provision were the least restrictive lies with the legislature when enacting provisions that restrict or eliminate the requirements or conditions for enjoying the right. They reiterate that the changes introduced by the amendment are substantial and mean that persons who were very close to retirement because they were approaching 30 years of service must now work up to 10 additional years to reach the minimum age of 65, whereas under the repealed legislation they could have retired—not with 100% of the amount, but with a proportionate amount depending on each person’s age and the contributions they still needed to make to retire with 100%. This is because the previous rules allowed early retirement (jubilación anticipada) on terms much more favorable than those currently in force.
The impact on workers with more than 25 years of service at the institution should certainly have been considered not only in the actuarial study, which it was not, but also through an assessment of the general impact on workers, including the considerable physical and psychological strain and other factors, none of which were considered at all. No technical studies produced during the processing of legislative file 19922 demonstrated that the Fund’s finances would face a danger or significant adverse impact if persons who had worked and contributed for 25 years or more were allowed to retire under the previous rules.
It is not even apparent from the legislative record (expediente legislativo) that any assessment was made of how many people were in this situation. Note that, in the minutes of ordinary session number 20 of 19 de julio de 2017 (folios 2265 to 2267 of the legislative record), Dr. Max Jiménez Soto, who was part of the team that prepared the actuarial studies (estudios actuariales) of the Instituto de Investigación en Ciencias Económicas de la Universidad de Costa Rica, stated the following in response to an intervention by Representative Sandra Piszk, who said: “Our objective is for this amendment to enter into force, just as other pension reforms have entered into force after 18 months, as established by the Sala Constitucional”: “Indeed, the initial products—the one for the current system, the one for the professional associations, and the one for the Court—included transitional provisions (transitorios) covering different groups that would retire under the current system, or a phased transition under which the new system would apply to them.
The estimates included that; in fact, IICE I, as Mr. Ronald explained, was basically the Court’s proposal without the transitional provision and, therefore, more or less measures the effect of the transitional provision on solvency.” They assert that he then made an entirely unsupported assessment, without providing specific figures: “Logically, the longer the postponement, the more it affects solvency. The last frameworks recommended here, 3 and 4, contemplate exclusively what you have indicated: eighteen months.” At folio 2267, Dr. Ronald Cartín Carranza’s intervention appears, in which he states: “Basically, the IICE frameworks specifically sought to model a period as close as possible to eighteen months. In fact, to be frank with you, for modeling purposes it will be two years. In other words, for those with twenty-eight or more years of service, the mathematical model assumed that a transitional provision would preserve their status; that is, it was not measured with complete precision, but because of the modeling of life probabilities, these are calculated for a reason, not for every half-year, and there are reasons for that.
One could, in theory, devote half a year to doing that, but, to answer your question, the closest possible approximation was estimated, and the simulation assumed that all those with more than twenty-eight years of service would retain the right to keep their pension under the current system. That is what you see there where it says ‘participation with years of service greater than or equal to twenty-eight.’ As for incorporating it into the regulations, what I would recommend—and what we recommend—is approving it at eighteen months, as ordered by the Sala Constitucional.” As can be seen, despite having conducted the actuarial study, they did not examine in depth the technical reasons for the transitional provision; instead, they essentially followed a model that, according to them, had to conform to the Sala Constitucional’s order that the period be 18 months, even though the Sala has not, in fact, established that period as a rule, but has used it when no other parameter exists.
Indeed, in the Affirmative Majority Opinion approved at the session of 27 de julio de 2017 (folios 2443 to 2451), the Commission designed a staggered transitional provision that better protected rights in the process of vesting (derechos en vías de adquisición) or legitimate expectations of rights (expectativas de derecho). The Sala Constitucional itself has held that, given how close individuals may be to retirement, all workers cannot be treated alike; it has therefore set the 18-month period in cases where no other parameters or technical studies existed. This category was included within the recognition of vested rights (derechos adquiridos). In judgment 5758-18 of the Sala Constitucional, it was held that, although the right to retirement (derecho a la jubilación) is not unrestricted and may therefore be subject to certain limitations, such changes are permissible provided they are established by a formal statute, are reasonable, and do not impair its essential content.
In repeated rulings, the Sala has stated that the principles of reasonableness and proportionality constitute a standard for determining the constitutionality of acts governed by public law (statutes, regulations, and administrative acts generally). Following German doctrine, the Sala Constitucional has held that the basic components of proportionality are legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense. They cite judgments no. 3933-1998 of 09:50 hrs. on 12 de junio de 1998 and 8858-98 of 16:33 hrs. on 15 de diciembre de 1998. Consequently, when certain fundamental rights are restricted, the principle of proportionality requires that the limitation be justified by a sufficiently compelling reason to legitimize its conflict with the general principle of equality. An act restricting rights is reasonable when it satisfies three conditions: it must be necessary, suitable, and proportionate.
The necessity of a measure refers directly to the existence of a factual basis requiring the protection of some interest, or set of interests, of the community—or of a particular group—through the adoption of a measure establishing differentiated treatment. In other words, if the measure is not adopted, important public interests will be harmed. If the limitation is not necessary, it cannot be considered reasonable and, therefore, constitutionally valid. Suitability, in turn, entails determining whether the type of restriction adopted fulfills the purpose of meeting the identified need. Assessing the suitability of the measure would reveal whether other mechanisms could better address the existing need, some of which might achieve the proposed purpose without restricting the enjoyment of the right in question. Proportionality in the strict sense, meanwhile, requires a comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction imposed or sought to be imposed, so that the limitation is not markedly more burdensome than the benefit it is intended to secure for the community.
Of the latter two elements, it could be said that the first is based on a qualitative assessment, while the second rests on a quantitative comparison of the two matters under examination. To conduct the proportionality analysis in the broad sense, or assess the reasonableness of the regressive measure affecting the right to retirement, it must first be determined whether the reforms made to the Régimen de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial pursued a legitimate aim. Based on the actuarial studies, reports, and testimony contained in the legislative record, it is clear that the system did face sustainability problems and that, in this regard, the reform did pursue a legitimate aim. With specific regard to the duration of the transitional period—the sole issue addressed by this action—they consider it disproportionate, unnecessary, and unsuitable because the legislature had sufficient technical and scientific information to devise a reasonable, staggered transition that would not so severely affect their pension rights (derechos jubilatorios), given that this group consisted of workers who, when the reform was enacted, had worked and contributed to the system for 25 years or more under the rules then in force.
They request that this action be granted and that the challenged provision be partially annulled insofar as it excludes judicial employees who, when the reform entered into force, had 60 months or less remaining before retirement, and that they be allowed to exercise their right under the conditions established by Law no. 7333 before the reform. To establish their standing (legitimación), the petitioners state that they bring this action pursuant to Article 75, first paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. They cite as the underlying cases the amparo proceedings (recursos de amparo) pending in the following case files: 22-013966-0007-CO (María Ester Brenes Villalobos), 22-013963-0007-CO (Carmen Violeta Cerdas Cisneros), 22-013961-0007-CO (Álvaro Jesús Valverde Rojas), 22-013981-0007-CO (Blanca Luz Jiménez Chaves), 22-013982-0007-CO (Hermes de los Ángeles Zamora Atencio), 22-013980-0007-CO (Mario Alberto Sáenz Rojas), 22-013973-0007-CO (Luis Rodolfo Chaves Cordero), 22-013978-0007-CO (Paula Esmeralda Guido Howell), 22-013969-0007-CO (Robert Camacho Villalobos), 22-013977-0007-CO (Cristia María Carballo Solano), 22-013971-0007-CO (Rolando Alberto Brenes Mora), 22-013970-0007-CO (María Auxiliadora Madrigal León), 22-013960-0007-CO (German Brenes Montero), and 22-013959-0007-CO (Juan Carlos Cubillo Miranda). They state that, in those proceedings, the unconstitutionality of the challenged provision was invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest they consider to have been infringed.
Solvency is currently below one; therefore, any improvement in benefits would cause solvency to decline further. With respect to the foregoing table and information, it should be clarified that the figures are expressed in billions of colones. Accordingly, the final scenario, involving a 10-year period and 2,759 persons, should be read as three hundred twenty-four billion eleven million colones, equivalent to an increase in the deficit of approximately six hundred three million dollars compared with the open scenario using a 1% growth rate, which was used as the baseline under that actuarial valuation methodology. It must be made clear that any extension of the period in Transitory Provision VI would increase the expenditures and/or obligations to which this scheme is subject; consequently, all scenarios show a deterioration in the corresponding indicators. The relief sought in this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) would increase the deficit of the Régimen del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial–FJPPJ by amounts ranging from 13.31% to 87.65% of that deficit.
Likewise, when the solvency-ratio indicator (razón de solvencia) is assessed, it deteriorates by between 1.57% and 9.40%; both indicators display the same trend toward deterioration in the scheme’s financial soundness if any extension is granted. Nevertheless, the esteemed Sala Constitucional must assess whether such deterioration in these indicators is significant when compared with the rights asserted by the petitioners. Accordingly, all scenarios analyzed by that professional show significant increases in the scheme’s deficit, causing its financial soundness and long-term actuarial stability to deteriorate; therefore, it is not considered possible to extend the period in Transitory Provision VI without adversely affecting the scheme. In the opinion of the undersigned, it is respectfully suggested that the analysis go beyond the scheme’s actuarial solvency and consider not only the impact of assuming retirement benefits under the conditions predating the reform, but also other factors, such as the statements of the Organización Internacional del Trabajo in the convenio sobre la seguridad social (norma mínima), 1952 (núm. 102), article 29 subsection 1, as well as the vested rights (derechos adquiridos) of judicial employees, social peace, the expectations and life plans of judicial officials, the working conditions in effect when they were hired, and the physical and mental strain experienced by officials, among other factors.
According to the actuarial report submitted, the rules applicable to the FJPPJ scheme, and the pro-fund principle (principio pro-fondo) established in article 226 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, any extension of Transitory Provision VI is deemed to pose a latent danger to the sustainability of the Régimen del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial from a financial and actuarial standpoint. Nevertheless, it is likewise considered that, in deciding this constitutional challenge, other nonfinancial factors must be assessed, such as the principles of vested rights, reasonableness of the adjustment, and life plans, among others.
Justice Castillo Víquez writes; and, Whereas (Considerando):
During the processing of the case file, various grounds for recusal (causales de inhibitoria) arose and were raised by both the permanent and alternate Justices, because most of them were employees or retirees of the Poder Judicial. All such motions were duly processed and decided by the Presidency of the Sala Constitucional, as provided by law. As has been held, however, in proceedings before this Sala concerning the pension and retirement scheme of the Poder Judicial, both the permanent Justices and the alternate Justices would, for various reasons, be unable to hear such matters, resulting in the impossibility of constituting a Sala of seven Justices to decide them. Nevertheless, this Sala is constitutionally obligated to decide the matters submitted for its consideration, and circumstances such as those now presented—the absence of the permanent and alternate Justices needed to constitute the Sala—do not negate that obligation or relieve this Tribunal of compliance with it.
Therefore, pursuant to article 14 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional and numeral 29, subsection 2), of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial—“When the ground applies to both permanent and alternate members, the case shall be heard by the permanent members, notwithstanding that ground and without disciplinary liability on their part”—the permanent Justices are required by law to hear those matters, without thereby incurring disciplinary liability. The foregoing thus constitutes a statutory ground of justification (causal de justificación normativa) that releases from all liability, including criminal liability, those Justices who hear a matter in which the alternate Justices needed to constitute the Tribunal have grounds for recusal or a disqualification (impedimento) from hearing that same matter. Permanent Justices Castillo Víquez, Cruz Castro, Salazar Alvarado, and Araya García are therefore deemed authorized.
In the case of Justice Garro Vargas, her recusal was granted for other reasons, and Justice Alejandro Delgado Faith was appointed by lot. In the case of Justice Rueda Leal, his recusal was granted for the reasons stated, and Justice Aracelly Pacheco Salazar was appointed by lot. In the case of the recently appointed Justice Hess Herrera, her recusal was granted for the reasons stated, and Justice Ana María Picado Brenes was appointed by lot.
The petitioners challenge Transitory Provision VI of Ley n°9544, namely, “Reforma del Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, contenido en la Ley n° 7333, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, de 05 de mayo de 1993 y sus reformas,” which provides as follows:
“Transitory Provision VI.- Judicial employees who satisfy the requirements for acquiring pension entitlement under the text of Title IX of Ley N.º 7333, de 5 de mayo de 1993, within the eighteen months following the enactment of this law may retire pursuant to the provisions established in that text.” The petitioners allege that this provision contains several constitutional defects (vicios inconstitucionales), both procedural and substantive. In this regard, because this Sala, through decision number 2022-008712 issued at 09:10 hours on 20 de abril del 2022, dismissed several of those claims on the merits (rechazar por el fondo), the following whereas clause identifies the claims on which this Jurisdicción Constitucional must now rule.
III.Regarding the dismissal on the merits of several allegations of unconstitutionality through decision 2022-008712, and the allegations to be examined in this action.-
In this same case file, this Sala issued decision number 2022-008712 at 09:10 hours on 20 de abril del 2022, dismissing several allegations on the merits because it had already ruled on them in decision number 2021-011957 issued at 17:00 hours on 25 de mayo del 2021. To delimit the allegations for which this Sala admitted this action, the matters already decided are set forth below.
A. DISMISSAL OF THE ALLEGATIONS ON THE MERITS Through decision number 2022-008712 issued at 09:10 hours on 20 de abril del 2022, this Sala allowed the present action to proceed and, at the same time, dismissed it on the merits as follows: “The action is dismissed on the merits with respect to the violation of articles 9, 33, and 167; the principles of publicity, equality, proportionality and reasonableness, and progressivity; article 208 bis of the Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa; and article 26 of the Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos.” Thus, of all the allegations appearing in the filing, the following have already been decided:
Violation of Constitutional art.167 and article 208 bis of the Asamblea Legislativa, due to the failure to consult the Poder Judicial concerning the amended text and the failure to publish it.
Violation of Constitutional article 167 and article 208 bis of the Asamblea Legislativa, because it was enacted without a qualified majority (mayoría calificada).
Violation of the principle of judicial independence (independencia judicial), arts. 9, 154, 167 and 177 of the Constitution, due to the creation of the Fund’s Administrative Board.
Violation of Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights and the principle of progressive realization (principio de progresividad).
Violation of the right to a dignified, proportional, and reasonable pension.
Violation of the principle of equality (principio de igualdad).
It can be observed that the basis for the dismissal was that those arguments had already been resolved in a prior constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad), which addressed the challenge to the entirety of Law n°9544 in general, through judgment n°2021-11957. The dismissal on the merits (rechazo por el fondo) was therefore based on the following considerations previously expressed by this Chamber in that latter decision.
In the applicants’ view, the text ultimately approved in the first debate underwent amendments, yet it was neither resubmitted to the Judiciary for consultation nor published. They consider that all of this violates Article 167 of the Constitution and the principle of publicity (principio de publicidad) (see the findings in decision n°2018-5758 and n°2005-398, n°2012-4621, n°2017-19636). They state that the matter of the Judiciary’s Retirement and Pension Fund is part of the institution’s organization and operation and, therefore, consultation was mandatory. Regarding publication, that same defect was identified in judgment n°2018-5758, which resolved the optional legislative consultation (consulta legislativa facultativa), stating that the omission of the publication of the substitute text constituted an essential defect in the legislative procedure. The mechanism of curing or validating the defect (saneamiento o convalidación) cannot be used (on the basis that the text was published after approval in the first debate) because this was an expedited procedure (procedimiento abreviado), as this Chamber held in judgment n°2012-4621 (“when the Legislative Assembly … creates a special procedure, its application and observance must be absolutely rigorous and strict.”).
They add that the unpublished and approved text changed essential aspects such as the retirement age, years of service, employee contributions, the transitional period, among others; hence the imperative need to comply with the publicity requirement.
In this regard, this Chamber stated, in resolution n°2022-008712 (referring to the ruling in resolution n°2021-011957), the following in summary:
Regarding the use of Article 208 bis (now 234 bis) of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Assembly:
It was stated that, pursuant to Article 208 bis (now 234 bis) of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Assembly, the legislators approved a special procedure for the bill in legislative expediente n°19.992. This special procedure requires approval of a procedural motion (moción de orden) by two-thirds of all members of the Legislative Assembly, solely for bills whose approval requires an absolute majority, provided that the democratic principle is respected. The aforementioned procedural motion for this bill was approved at ordinary session n°37 of the Plenary of the Legislative Assembly on 30 de junio del 2016, with 39 legislators voting in favor and 10 against. Following the Chamber’s examination in resolution n°2018-005758, which reviewed the bill when it came before this Chamber by way of an optional constitutional consultation (consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad), it stated: “that the Chamber considers that there is no new reason or argument concerning those specific points that would entail a change in the position already expressed and, therefore, with respect to those specific issues, the procedure provided for in Article 208 bis of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Assembly (now 234 bis) complies with Constitutional Law (Derecho de la Constitución).” Moreover, because the claim that this provision of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Assembly was violated is related to publication, since the approved motion so provided (“…h) If, during consideration of the expediente in committee proceedings, a motion proposing a substitute text is approved, or when or when the committee agrees upon changes that substantially modify the bill, the Committee Chair shall request that the Legislative Directorate arrange for its publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta in order to safeguard the Constitutional Principle of Publicity, and consideration of the bill shall be suspended…”), reference is made to the following section regarding publication.
Regarding the failure to publish the text approved by the Special Committee on 13 de septiembre del 2016:
It was stated that, although this Chamber verified that the new text approved by the Special Committee on 13 de septiembre de 2016 had indeed not been published, when it said: “That Special Committee was convened on the following 13 de septiembre and, on that same date, at its ordinary session Nº 1, considered motion Nº 2 (3-01 CE), submitted by several legislators to formalize what had already been decided on the preceding 30 de junio, namely, that the substitute text contained in expediente Nº 19.651 would serve as the basis for discussion, as had been decided by the Plenary when it approved processing the expediente under Article 208 bis of the Rules of Procedure; that motion was unanimously approved by the members of the Special Committee (see folio 1957 of legislative expediente No. 19.922). As is apparent from the legislative expediente, and as asserted by certain applicants, this new text approved by the Special Committee on 13 de septiembre de 2016 was indeed not published, as this Chamber recorded in advisory opinion number 2018-005758 at 15 horas 40 minutos on 12 de abril de 2018, when it considered the Optional Legislative Consultation filed in connection with this bill.” Nevertheless, the Chamber found that publicity is not an end in itself and that, therefore, a failure to publish at a particular procedural stage does not always constitute a defect invalidating the legislative procedure.
Accordingly, and because that text was subsequently abandoned in favor of another text and was not the text ultimately approved, it ruled: “In the view of the majority of this Court, the alleged defect does not warrant classification as an essential or substantive defect, or even as a relative one, because it did not violate any procedures essential to the parliamentary process; rather, it is a defect of minor importance.” Regarding the late publication of the amended text approved in the first debate:
The Chamber stated that the specific case of expediente 19.992 did not involve a failure to publish, but rather a late or untimely publication. This was because it was established that the text of the Majority Favorable Report (Dictamen Afirmativo de Mayoría), accepted by the Special Committee on 27 de julio de 2017 and constituting the fourth text, was approved in the First Debate at extraordinary session No. 014 of the legislative Plenary held on 30 de octubre de 2017 (see folio 4000 of Volume 17). That text contained certain amendments (resulting from the approval of substantive motions and motions for reconsideration). Publication thus occurred after approval in the first debate, in Digital Gazette No. 212, Supplement No. 268 of 9 de noviembre de 2017 (see folio 4368 of Volume 18 of the legislative expediente). However, this Chamber found that this did not violate the principle of publicity, based on the following considerations: “It must first be reiterated that the aforementioned publication did occur in this case; what is challenged is the allegedly late or untimely publication of the text in question.
It must therefore be recalled that this Chamber has recognized that a failure to publish at a particular procedural stage does not always constitute a defect invalidating the legislative procedure. (…) Accordingly, the Chamber considers that, in this case, the alleged late or untimely publication of the substitute text did not actually hinder public participation or seriously impair the transparency of the parliamentary procedure.” Regarding the claim that the Judiciary was not consulted:
The Chamber likewise found no procedural defect in the claim that the Judiciary was not consulted regarding the text approved in the first debate, because it stated that the Supreme Court was formally consulted on the contents of the bill processed under legislative expediente No. 19.922 on 3 occasions and was able to issue its opinion on all 3 occasions (official letter CE208-BI-02-2016 of 14 de septiembre de 2016, see folios 169 and 172 of Volume 1; official letter AL-20035-OFI-0029-2017 of 17 de abril de 2017, see folio 1757 of Volume 8; and official letter AL-20035-OFI-0043-2017 of 31 de julio de 2017, see folio 2625 of Volume 11). The Chamber therefore found that a fourth consultation with the Judiciary was unnecessary, particularly in light of the point discussed in the following section, namely, that the bill in question did not have to be submitted to the Judiciary for consultation because it concerned a matter that is typically administrative, namely the administration of the Pension Fund, which does not fall within the constitutional requirement governing modifications to the organization and operation of the Supreme Court of Justice that concern its typical and exclusive function, namely its jurisdictional function and the essential administrative functions supporting its primary function.
The applicants state that, pursuant to art.167 of the Constitution, the Legislative Assembly required a qualified majority in order to depart from the Judiciary’s position. However, the challenged law was approved with 31 votes in favor. They add that, on the three occasions when the Court was consulted, it emphatically expressed its opposition, which required the Legislative Assembly to approve the law by a qualified majority. Furthermore, this constituted a violation of the Rules of Procedure because art.208 bis of the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure provides that the only bills subject to an expedited procedure are those requiring a simple majority, which is not the situation in this case. They argue that the first debate, at extraordinary session n°14 of 30 de octubre del 2017, was approved with 31 votes, and the second debate, at ordinary session n°163 of 19 de abril del 2018, was approved with 34 votes in favor. Thus, neither met the requirement of 38 votes.
In this regard, this Chamber stated in resolution n°2022-008712 (referring to the ruling in resolution n°2021-011957) that the bill did not have to be submitted to the Court for consultation and that, therefore, art.167 of the Constitution and the majority requirement established therein were inapplicable:
“In advisory opinion n.° 2018-005758 at 15 horas 40 minutos on 12 de abril de 2018, we stated the following:…
Now, in view of the foregoing, this Court considers that the subject matter addressed in legislative expediente number 19.922 does not fall within the circumstances established by Article 167 of the Political Constitution and, therefore, there was no obligation to consult the Supreme Court of Justice.
… whose functions are typically administrative, namely the administration of the aforementioned Fund, which does not fall within the constitutional requirement governing modifications to the organization and operation of the Supreme Court of Justice that concern its typical and exclusive function, namely its jurisdictional function and the essential administrative functions supporting its primary function.” (…) For the majority of this Tribunal, there are no grounds justifying a departure from the position already expressed in that advisory opinion (opinión consultiva), to the effect that the subject matter addressed in expediente legislativo nro. 19.922 and ultimately enacted as Ley nro. 9544 does not fall within the circumstances established or contemplated by article 167 of the Political Constitution and, consequently, there was neither a constitutional obligation to consult the Corte Suprema de Justicia nor—as a corollary—an obligation for the aforementioned bill to be approved by two thirds of all members of the Asamblea Legislativa in light of the Corte Suprema de Justicia’s unfavorable opinion of the bill.
Ergo, the action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) must also be dismissed with respect to this issue.” It thus concludes that, although it is true that the bill in question was approved by 31 votes in the first debate and 34 votes in the second debate, the 38 votes required by constitutional article 167 were not necessary because the bill concerns an administrative matter and does not relate to the organization and/or operation of the Poder Judicial.
The petitioners (accionantes) state that the creation of a structure within the Poder Judicial that is nevertheless entirely independent from it, and that modifies the powers and functions of both the Corte Plena and the Consejo Superior, constitutes interference with the independence and separation of powers established in articles 9 and 154 of the Political Constitution.
In this regard, this Chamber stated in ruling n°2022-008712 (referring to the decision in ruling n°2021-011957) that: “the majority of this Tribunal concludes that those matters are not affected within the meaning of constitutional article 167. The fact that a Junta Administrativa del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial is created does not per se entail the creation of a body that substantially alters the administrative functions of the Poder Judicial; the same applies to the removal of the functions that the Corte Suprema de Justicia and the Consejo Superior previously exercised in this area, and therefore the circumstances contemplated in article 167 of the Fundamental Charter did not arise. In other words, essential administrative powers connected with the adjudicative function (función jurisdiccional) were not being withdrawn.” It thus concludes by stating that the legislature’s initiative to make changes to the Poder Judicial pension regime (régimen de pensiones) does not amount to stripping judicial independence of its essential content; accordingly: “Based on the foregoing considerations, a qualified majority (mayoría calificada) was not required for its approval, and given that the bill contained in expediente legislativo No. 19.922 was approved in the First Debate with 31 deputies voting in favor and 7 against (folio 4173 Tomo 17 del expediente legislativo), while in the Second Debate it was approved with 34 deputies voting in favor and 9 against (folios 4437, 4608 y 4637 Tomo 18 del expediente legislativo), the alleged violation of the principle of judicial independence is not deemed to have occurred.”
The petitioners state that social rights include the right to work and, with it, the right to retirement. This right is a social-security right (derecho de seguridad social) that has been affirmed not only by various international instruments but also by domestic legal provisions, and that once certain conditions have been attained, they may not be altered to the detriment of the human rights of those holding the right or a vested legal status (situación jurídica consolidada). They argue that this transitional provision (transitorio) becomes a restrictive rule that is not progressive with respect to their human rights because it failed to respect the considerable number of years during which they have belonged and contributed to the regime, and the benefit arising from those years should have been protected by a reasonable and fair transitional provision supported by technical and objective criteria. Regarding the application of art.26 of the CADH, see voto n°1995-3932.
In this regard, this Chamber stated in ruling n°2022-008712 (referring to the decision in ruling n°2021-011957) that: “there are no elements of judgment supporting the conclusion that the period established in transitorio VI de la Ley 9544 is unreasonable or disproportionate in relation to the purpose sought by the provision; instead, the legislative decision is justified in light of the changes made. Likewise, there is no violation of a treaty-based right (derecho convencional) to declare and, therefore, the action must be denied in this respect.” It follows that, if the Chamber had elements of judgment with which to assess the reasonableness and proportionality of the period established in Transitorio VI, this could also be deemed a violation of the principle of progressivity of human rights. Accordingly, this issue will be examined on the merits (por el fondo) later in this ruling.
The petitioners state that transitorio VI is a disproportionate and unreasonable measure because the harm imposed upon them by increasing the period from a few months to more than ten years is excessive. They state that they planned their lives based on the working conditions offered to them, including the opportunity to enjoy a dignified retirement through the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial after reasonably satisfying the applicable service and age requirements, under which they could retire with a dignified income after devoting an entire productive lifetime to serving the community and the Poder Judicial. They insist that membership in and eventual receipt of retirement benefits from the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial forms part of the employment contract and the working conditions initially established for the petitioners, which have remained in place throughout twenty, twenty-five, and twenty-eight years of service.
They contend that subjecting them to a change as drastic as that established by transitorio VI de la ley 9544 is contrary to constitutional law and human rights, as well as to the right to work and retirement established in article 73 of the Political Constitution. In judgment number 5758-2018, this Chamber stated that changes to pension rights were permissible provided that they were established by a formal statute (ley formal), were reasonable, and did not impair the essential content of those rights.
In this regard, this Chamber stated in ruling n°2022-008712 (referring to the decision in ruling n°2021-011957) that retirement benefits constitute the financial benefit received after working and contributing to a particular regime for a specified period, the purpose of which is to guarantee a dignified life after a person’s working life ends. It declared that every worker generally has a constitutional and fundamental right to retirement; as such, this right belongs to and must be recognized for every human being under conditions of equality and without discrimination of any kind, pursuant to articles 33 and 73 of the Constitution; articles 25, 28, 29 and 30 of Convenio sobre la Seguridad Social, No. 102 de la OIT; article 16 of Convención Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre; articles 22 and 25 of Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos; article 31 of Carta Internacional Americana de Garantías Sociales; article 5 of Convención sobre Igualdad de Trato en Materia de Seguridad Social, número 118 de la O.I.T.; and article 9 of Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, an international instrument that, pursuant to constitutional article 7, forms part of our legal system.
The Sala Constitucional further stated that because the right to a pension is not absolute, the State has the authority to regulate, organize, and limit the scope of that right. In this regard, it was concluded that the State, through its competent authorities, may adjust the specific conditions governing the exercise of workers’ right to retirement, not only by establishing requirements that must be satisfied for its effective enjoyment but also by specifically modifying the characteristics of that enjoyment, in order to balance the sustainability of the regime, provided that the changes are established by a formal statute, are reasonable, and do not impair its essential content. The Chamber thus concludes that: “upon finding that the change in requirements established by … transitorio VI del proyecto de ley has the ultimate purpose of guaranteeing the retirement rights of judicial employees, the Chamber dismisses the alleged defect.” It follows that, if the Chamber had elements of judgment with which to assess the reasonableness of the period established in Transitorio VI, this could also be deemed a violation of the right to a dignified, proportionate, and reasonable pension. Accordingly, this issue will be examined on the merits later in this ruling.
The petitioners state that other pension reforms and the persons subject to them have had a phased transitional provision (transitorio escalonado) that enabled them to adjust their living arrangements and retirement expectations, whereas this opportunity has not been afforded within the Poder Judicial. They add that judicial employees have gone from expecting to retire soon, within a few years, to having to work for more than another decade, only thereafter to receive a pension amounting to less than fifty percent of their salary, despite having contributed a substantial portion of their monthly salary income for more than 20 years. They therefore consider it entirely discriminatory and violative of the fundamental rights established in our Political Constitution to directly affect such a vulnerable population with limited employment opportunities in our country. No retirement group affected by reforms has endured a transitional provision as stringent as the one my clients are experiencing.
Without any objective reason justifying different treatment between the petitioners and those who work at the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, the latter were granted an unrestricted right to recognition of their retirement conditions, even though the applicable provisions had been repealed, regardless of how long they might take to satisfy those requirements (see Transitorio II de Ley n°9544).
In this regard, this Chamber stated in ruling n°2022-008712 (referring to the decision in ruling n°2021-011957) that: “a declaration of unconstitutionality in this case requires the submission of elements of judgment demonstrating that it is disproportionate and unreasonable to apply the period of 18 months from the effective date of the reform, as established by constitutional case law, for extending the scope of coverage of the previous pension regime.” It follows that, if the Chamber had elements of judgment with which to assess the reasonableness and proportionality of the period established in Transitorio VI, this could also be deemed a violation of the principle of equality. Accordingly, this issue will be examined on the merits later in this ruling.
“This constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) against Transitorio VI of the Law Reforming the Judicial Branch Retirement and Pension System, No. 9544, is hereby admitted for consideration on the grounds of the alleged violation of Articles 11, 18, 27, 28, 34, 40, 41, 45, 51, 65, 73, 74, 121, 152, 154, 156, 177, 188, 189 and 190 of the Political Constitution; ILO Conventions 102, 118, 128 and 157; the principles of democracy, solidarity, legal certainty, good faith, legitimate expectations, transparency, relative inviolability of property, non-confiscation, and respect for vested rights (derechos adquiridos) and settled legal situations (situaciones jurídicas consolidadas); Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” Furthermore, for the reasons stated in the preceding sections, it must be understood that this Chamber has admitted this challenge with respect to the period established in the contested Transitorio VI, insofar as the necessary evidence or grounds for judgment are available for this Chamber to assess the possible violation of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the principle of progressivity, the principle of equality, and the right to receive a dignified, reasonable, and proportionate pension.
In summary, this challenge and the consolidated challenge (acción acumulada) were admitted for examination of the allegations grouped under the following points:
In view of the foregoing, the preceding arguments must now be examined.
Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regulates the prerequisites determining the admissibility of constitutional challenges (acciones de inconstitucionalidad), requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution in administrative or judicial proceedings in which unconstitutionality is invoked; this requirement is not necessary in the cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when, due to the nature of the provision, there is no individual or direct injury; when the challenge is based on the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or interests concerning the community as a whole; or when it is filed by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, or the Defensor de los Habitantes, in the latter cases within their respective spheres of authority. Under the first circumstance provided for in paragraph 2° of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the challenged provision must not be susceptible to specific application that would subsequently permit the implementing act to be challenged and consequently used as the underlying proceeding (asunto base).
Second, the possibility of seeking relief in defense of “diffuse interests” is contemplated; these are interests held by groups of persons who are not formally organized but are united by a particular social need, physical characteristic, ethnic origin, particular personal or ideological orientation, consumption of a certain product, etc. In these cases, the interest is dispersed or diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of persons. This Chamber has listed various rights that it has characterized as “diffuse,” such as the environment, cultural heritage, the defense of the country’s territorial integrity, the proper management of public expenditure, and the right to health, among others. Moreover, the enumeration made by the Sala Constitucional is not exhaustive. Finally, when paragraph 2° of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional refers to interests “concerning the community as a whole,” it means the legally protected interests (bienes jurídicos) explained above, that is, those held by the very holders of sovereignty, each of the inhabitants of the Republic.
This therefore does not mean that any person may petition the Sala Constitucional to protect any interest whatsoever through a citizen action (acción popular); rather, every individual may act in defense of those interests that affect the entire national community, and no attempt to provide an exhaustive list is valid in this area either. Based on the foregoing paragraph, and taking into account that the underlying proceeding is the amparo proceeding (recurso de amparo) processed under expediente n°19-006391-0007-CO of the first petitioner, and that the joined action comprises amparo proceedings n°22-013966-0007-CO (María Ester Brenes Villalobos), 22-013963-0007-CO (Carmen Violeta Cerdas Cisneros), 22-013961-0007-CO (Álvaro Jesús Valverde Rojas), 22-013981-0007-CO (Blanca Luz Jiménez Chaves), 22-013982-0007-CO (Hermes de los Ángeles Zamora Atencio), 22-013980-0007-CO (Mario Alberto Sáenz Rojas), 22-013973-0007-CO (Luis Rodolfo Chaves Cordero), 22-013978-0007-CO (Paula Esmeralda Guido Howell), 22-013969-0007-CO (Robert Camacho Villalobos), 22-013977-0007-CO (Cristia María Carballo Solano), 22-013971-0007-CO (Rolando Alberto Brenes Mora), 22-013970-0007-CO (María Auxiliadora Madrigal León), 22-013960-0007-CO (German Brenes Montero), and 22-013959-0007-CO (Juan Carlos Cubillo Miranda), this Chamber finds that the petitioners have sufficient standing (legitimación) to seek a declaration that the challenged provision is unconstitutional.
Furthermore, this is indeed a matter whose constitutionality may properly be reviewed through these proceedings. In addition, the petitioners satisfied the requirements established in sections 78 and 79 of the applicable procedural law (Ley de rito). In conclusion, the present action is admissible, and the merits of the matter must therefore be addressed immediately.
The Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial is one of the basic pension systems. It was created by Ley No. 34 del 9 de julio de 1939. That Fund later became part of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial No. 8 de 29 de noviembre de 1937, constituting Title XI: “Judicial Retirement and Pensions.” In the following years (1959, 1961,1962, 1963, 1964, 1971, 1983), several amendments were made to its articles concerning age and years-of-service requirements for retirement, as well as the determination of beneficiaries. Subsequently, Ley No. 7333 de 5 de mayo de 1993 comprehensively amended the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial No. 8, and the title concerning Judicial Retirement and Pensions became Title IX; thereafter, Ley 7605 del 2 de mayo de 1996 amended several articles of that title.
In 2012 and 2013, following the findings disclosed by actuarial studies, the Poder Judicial began an internal process aimed at preparing a reform proposal. This concern, together with others relating to all pension systems, led to the filing, on 05 de abril del 2016, of legislative expediente No. 19.922, “Bill for Comprehensive Reform of the Various Pension Systems and Related Legislation.” That initiative was promoted because several legislative caucuses were interested in “(…) carrying out a comprehensive reform of the entire pension system, with the aim of eliminating abusive provisions, rationalizing expenditure, and providing stability to the various special pension systems and to the Disability, Old Age and Death System of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. The foregoing is based on the principles of solidarity, equality, redistributive justice, and efficiency, which are pillars of our social state under the rule of law.” The legislative expediente shows that the initial bill was intended to reform all pension systems; subsequently, however, the Poder Legislativo focused on processing the reform of the Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial separately.
Thus, legislative expediente n°19.922 came to address solely the reform of the Poder Judicial retirement and pension system. The bill subsequently had 3 substitute texts (textos sustitutivos). The original dates from 05 de abril del 2016 (published in Alcance 110 of La Gaceta of jueves 30 de junio de 2016); subsequently, during ordinary Session No. 37 del 20 de junio de 2016 of the Plenario Legislativo, a motion under Article 208 bis of the Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa was approved. That motion established the special procedure applicable to this bill, and the same motion created Comisión Especial No. 20035, which would be responsible for processing the bill. The first substitute text is dated 30 de junio del 2016 and was ratified by the Comisión Especial at its session of 13 de setiembre del 2016 (this text was not published, as stated in this Chamber’s ruling n°2018-005758, but this was not found to constitute a substantial defect); based on that text, the bill’s name was formally changed to “Reform of Title IX of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, concerning Judicial Retirement and Pensions, No. 7333 del 5 de mayo de 1993, as amended” (pages 1674 and 1717 of Volume 7 of the legislative expediente).
The motion proposing the substitute text was approved by 7 deputies in favor and 1 against (page 1731, Volume 7). The second substitute text is dated 29 de marzo del 2017 (published in Alcance No. 91 of jueves 27 de abril de 2017; see page 2126); the third substitute text was approved by the Comisión Especial in session n°23 del 27 de julio del 2017 (the Favorable Majority Report was published in La Gaceta n°147, Alcance No. 189 of viernes 4 de agosto de 2017, and likewise the Minority Report was published in La Gaceta n°148, Alcance No. 190 of lunes 7 de agosto de 2017). In all those prior versions, the Corte Plena issued an unfavorable opinion on each of the three occasions when it was consulted, as follows:
-1° (2016): Corte Plena Session No. 29-16 del 26 de septiembre de 2016, Article XVIII, communicated to the Asamblea Legislativa through official letter SP-288-16 del 28 de septiembre de 2016, expressly stating that the bill submitted for consultation affects the organization and operation of the Poder Judicial (page 284, Volume 2 of the legislative expediente).
-2° (2017, third substitute text): in Session No. 9-17 del 24 de abril de 2017, Article XXIX, the Corte Plena considered the consultation submitted to it and, through official letter SP-118-17 de 26 de abril de 2017, signed by the Secretaria General de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, agreed to inform the Comisión Especial Legislativa that the Corte Plena had issued an unfavorable opinion on the bill submitted for consultation and had also concluded that it affects the organization and operation of the Poder Judicial (page 1829, Volume 8 of the legislative expediente).
-3° (2018, fourth substitute text): in Session 26-17 de 7 de agosto de 2017, Article XXX, the Corte Plena considered the consultation submitted by the aforementioned Comisión Especial concerning the Favorable Majority Report and, for the third time, issued an unfavorable opinion on the bill, stating that the bill processed under expediente No. 19.922 affects the organization, structure, and operation of the Poder Judicial; that decision was communicated to the Asamblea Legislativa through official letter SP-253-17 de 10 de agosto de 2017 (page 2759 of Volume 12 of the legislative expediente).
Finally, after several substantive motions amending it and motions for reconsideration were approved, the bill was approved on first reading during extraordinary Session n°14 del 30 de octubre del 2017, with 31 votes in favor, 7 votes against, and 8 abstentions. Following approval on first reading, it was published in a document appearing in La Gaceta Digital No. 212, Alcance No. 268 de 9 de noviembre de 2017 (see page 4368 of Volume 18 of the legislative expediente). It was subsequently approved on second reading during ordinary Session n°163 del 19 de abril del 2018, with 34 votes in favor.
Thus, Ley n°9544, whose Transitory Provision VI (transitorio VI) is challenged here, entered into force on 22 de mayo del 2018. That law introduced several changes, one of which was to change the administration of the Fondo de Pensiones del Poder Judicial by creating the Junta Administradora del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial (JA-FJPPJ), in addition to changing the retirement conditions (the retirement age was raised, the required number of years of service was increased, the calculation of the pension amount was modified, and the conditions for early retirement were modified).
After its approval on first reading, however, the bill was submitted for an optional constitutional consultation (consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad), decided by resolution n°2018-005758 de las quince horas con cuarenta minutos del doce de abril de dos mil dieciocho[1]; after it became law, a constitutional challenge was filed contesting the law in its entirety (decided by resolution n°2021-11957 de las nueve horas quince minutos del veinticinco de mayo de dos mil veintiuno[2]). These two judicial precedents were previously cited in the resolution admitting this action for processing (resolution n°2022-008712 las nueve horas y diez minutos del veinte de abril de dos mil veintidós[3]).
In light of all the foregoing, the specific chronology followed by Transitory Provision VI challenged here, from the original text through the text ultimately approved, shows that the underlying bill, n°19922, referred to a single transitory provision, Transitory Provision XIII of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, which proposed:
“Transitory Provision XIII.- The amendments to this law shall not apply to those judicial employees (servidores y servidoras judiciales) who, when these amendments enter into force, have worked for the Poder Judicial for twenty years or more; they shall be entitled to retire under the provisions established prior to this amendment, provided that they meet all the requirements established under the previous legal regime (régimen jurídico anterior). As for all other persons who, upon the entry into force of this law, hold permanent positions (cargos en propiedad) in the Poder Judicial, they shall be granted the benefit of a differentiated calculation when they meet the requirements for retirement (jubilación), based on their length of service and the contributions made to the Fondo de Jubilaciones before this amendment, applying the following parameters: 1.- For those with between 0 and 10 years of service, retirement benefits shall be calculated based on the average of their last ninety-six salaries (8 years). 2.- For those with more than 10 and up to 15 years of service, retirement benefits shall be calculated based on the average of their last seventy-two salaries (6 years). 3.- For those with more than 15 and less than 20 years of service, retirement benefits shall be calculated based on the average of their last forty-eight salaries (4 years).” Subsequently, in this Committee Opinion (Dictamen de la Comisión), dated 27 de julio del 2017, the amendment initially proposed for Transitory Provision XIII was set aside, and six transitory provisions were included, among them Transitory Provision VI, which read as follows:
“TRANSITORY PROVISION VI.- Judicial employees who, within the eighteen months following the promulgation of this law, meet the requirements to acquire pension entitlement (derecho a la pensión) as established by the text of Title IX of Ley N°7333 del 5 de mayo de 1993 may retire under the provisions established in that text.
Once the eighteen months have elapsed, judicial employees may opt for transitional ordinary retirement (jubilación ordinaria transitoria), which shall be governed by the following table:
Age on the effective date of the law Years of service on the effective date of the law Required age Required years of service Number of months for the reference salary % of the reference salary Years-months Years-months Years-months Years-months 58-5 28-5 60-1 30-1 63 99,50% 58-4 28-4 60-2 30-2 66 99,00% 58-3 28-3 60-3 30-3 69 98,50% 58-2 28-2 60-4 30-4 72 98,00% 58-1 28-1 60-5 30-5 75 97,50% 58-0 28-0 60-6 30-6 78 97,00% 57-11 27-11 60-7 30-7 81 96,50% 57-10 27-10 60-8 30-8 84 96,00% 57-9 27-9 60-9 30-9 87 95,50% 57-8 27-8 60-10 30-10 90 95,00% 57-7 27-7 60-11 30-11 93 94,50% 57-6 27-6 61-0 31-0 96 94,00% 57-5 27-5 61-1 31-1 99 93,50% 57-4 27-4 61-2 31-2 102 93,00% 57-3 27-3 61-3 31-3 105 92,50% 57-2 27-2 61-4 31-4 108 92,00% 57-1 27-1 61-5 31-5 111 91,50% 57-0 27-0 61-6 31-6 114 91,00% 56-11 26-11 61-7 31-7 117 90,50% 56-10 26-10 61-8 31-8 120 90,00% 56-9 26-9 61-9 31-9 123 89,50% 56-8 26-8 61-10 31-10 126 89,00% 56-7 26-7 61-11 31-11 129 88,50% 56-6 26-6 62-0 32-0 132 88,00% 56-5 26-5 62-1 32-1 135 87,50% 56-4 26-4 62-2 32-2 138 87,00% 56-3 26-3 62-3 32-3 141 86,50% 56-2 26-2 62-4 32-4 144 86,00% 56-1 26-1 62-5 32-5 147 85,50% 56-0 26-0 62-6 32-6 150 85,00% 55-11 25-11 62-7 32-7 153 84,50% 55-10 25-10 62-8 32-8 156 84,00% 55-9 25-9 62-9 32-9 159 83,50% 55-8 25-8 62-10 32-10 162 83,00% 55-7 25-7 62-11 32-11 165 82,50% 55-6 25-6 63-0 33-0 168 82,00% 55-5 25-5 63-1 33-1 171 81,50% 55-4 25-4 63-2 33-2 174 81,00% 55-3 25-3 63-3 33-3 177 80,50% 55-2 25-2 63-4 33-4 180 80,00% 55-1 25-1 63-5 33-5 183 79,50% 55-0 25-0 63-6 33-6 186 79,00% 54-11 24-11 63-7 33-7 189 78,50% 54-10 24-10 63-8 33-8 192 78,00% 54-9 24-9 63-9 33-9 195 77,50% 54-8 24-8 63-10 33-10 198 77,00% 54-7 24-7 63-11 33-11 201 76,50% 54-6 24-6 64-0 34-0 204 76,00% 54-5 24-5 64-1 34-1 207 75,50% 54-4 24-4 64-2 34-2 210 75,00% 54-3 24-3 64-3 34-3 213 74,50% 54-2 24-2 64-4 34-4 216 74,00% 54-1 24-1 64-5 34-5 219 73,50% 54-0 24-0 64-6 34-6 222 73,00% 53-11 23-11 64-7 34-7 225 72,50% 53-10 23-10 64-8 34-8 228 72,50% 53-9 23-9 64-9 34-9 231 72,50% 53-8 23-8 64-10 34-10 234 72,50% 53-7 23-7 64-11 34-11 237 72,50% 53-6 23-6 65-0 35-0 240 72,50% Once the eighteen months have elapsed, judicial employees may opt for transitional early retirement (jubilación anticipada transitoria), which shall be governed by the following provisions:
For purposes of early retirement without the required years of service, the required age in the preceding table shall apply, based on the person’s age or years of service on the effective date of the law.
This retirement benefit shall be calculated by multiplying the pension obtained according to the age or years of service corresponding to the effective date of the law in the preceding table by the number of years served, and dividing the product by the required years of service according to the age or years of service corresponding to the effective date of the law; the result shall be the amount of the early retirement benefit.
For purposes of early retirement without having reached the required age, the required years of service in the preceding table shall apply, based on the person’s age or years of service on the effective date of the law.
For purposes of the minimum age, the following table shall apply:
Age on the effective date of the law Years of service on the effective date of the law Minimum age Years-months Years-months Men Women 58-5 28-5 57-1 55-1 58-4 28-4 57-2 55-2 58-3 28-3 57-3 55-3 58-2 28-2 57-4 55-4 58-1 28-1 57-5 55-5 58-0 28-0 57-6 55-6 57-11 27-11 57-7 55-7 57-10 27-10 57-8 55-8 57-9 27-9 57-9 55-9 57-8 27-8 57-10 55-10 57-7 27-7 57-11 55-11 57-6 27-6 58-0 56-0 57-5 27-5 58-1 56-1 57-4 27-4 58-2 56-2 57-3 27-3 58-3 56-3 57-2 27-2 58-4 56-4 57-1 27-1 58-5 56-5 57-0 27-0 58-6 56-6 56-11 26-11 58-7 56-7 56-10 26-10 58-8 56-8 56-9 26-9 58-9 56-9 56-8 26-8 58-10 56-10 56-7 26-7 58-11 56-11 56-6 26-6 59-0 57-0 56-5 26-5 59-1 57-1 56-4 26-4 59-2 57-2 56-3 26-3 59-3 57-3 56-2 26-2 59-4 57-4 56-1 26-1 59-5 57-5 56-0 26-0 59-6 57-6 55-11 25-11 59-7 57-7 55-10 25-10 59-8 57-8 55-9 25-9 59-9 57-9 55-8 25-8 59-10 57-10 55-7 25-7 59-11 57-11 55-6 25-6 60-0 58-0 55-5 25-5 60-1 58-1 55-4 25-4 60-2 58-2 55-3 25-3 60-3 58-3 55-2 25-2 60-4 58-4 55-1 25-1 60-5 58-5 55-0 25-0 60-6 58-6 54-11 24-11 60-7 58-7 54-10 24-10 60-8 58-8 54-9 24-9 60-9 58-9 54-8 24-8 60-10 58-10 54-7 24-7 60-11 58-11 54-6 24-6 61-0 59-0 54-5 24-5 61-1 59-1 54-4 24-4 61-2 59-2 54-3 24-3 61-3 59-3 54-2 24-2 61-4 59-4 54-1 24-1 61-5 59-5 54-0 24-0 61-6 59-6 53-11 23-11 61-7 59-7 53-10 23-10 61-8 59-8 53-9 23-9 61-9 59-9 53-8 23-8 61-10 59-10 53-7 23-7 61-11 59-11 53-6 23-6 62-0 60-0 This retirement benefit shall be calculated by multiplying the pension obtained according to the age or years of service corresponding to the effective date of the law in the second preceding table by the person’s age, and dividing the product by the required age according to the age or years of service corresponding to the effective date of the law; the result shall be the amount of the early retirement benefit.
These pensions shall be subject to the cap provided for in Article 225 of the law.” With regard to that text, Corte Plena stated, by official letter SP-118-17, in the resolution adopted at session n°09-17 del 24 de abril del 2017, that: “the eighteen-month period following publication of the Law has no technical basis.” Subsequently, through the approval of substantive motions (mociones de fondo), the new text approved on First Reading, and later approved on Second Reading, provided as follows in Transitory Provision VI:
“TRANSITORY PROVISION VI- Judicial employees who, within the eighteen months following the promulgation of this law, meet the requirements to acquire pension entitlement as established by the text of Title IX of Ley N.° 7333, de 5 de mayo de 1993, may retire under the provisions established in that text.”
This constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad), like previous ones, concerns, at its core, economic, social, and cultural rights—highly concrete human rights—which constitute matters that must be carefully assessed by this Tribunal Constitucional, particularly because they are rights that accompany older adults at very important times in their lives. Indeed, as the doctrine concerning State entitlements (derechos prestacionales del Estado) began to gain strength, reference was commonly made to the efforts undertaken by several countries as early as 1930 to seek greater protection for workers and a larger role for the State in guaranteeing certain social rights, such as social security, health, and housing. This Sala has had occasion to examine pension matters on other occasions. Based on what it has stated in previous decisions (n°2018-5758 y 2021-11957), the following COROLLARIES are summarized:
-Articles 50, 56, and 74 of the Constitución Política establish the model of a social and democratic State governed by the rule of law (Estado social y democrático de Derecho). As part of this same model, the principle of social solidarity (principio de solidaridad social) serves as a guiding axis for the State’s domestic policy because the Social State under the Rule of Law “entails orienting our political system toward social solidarity, that is, toward fairness in societal relations, the advancement of social justice, and equality for all citizens in the exercise of their rights, excluding arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination.” Accordingly, and on the basis of the Social State under the Rule of Law, our Constitución Política provides for a set of entitlement rights (derechos prestacionales) relating to the protection of workers, including the right to retirement. (see judgments n° 2004-9255 de las 16:03 horas del 25 de agosto del 2004, n°2005-13205 de las 15:13 horas del 27 de septiembre del 2005, n°2018-19030 del 14 de noviembre de 2020).
-The model of a Social State under the Rule of Law and the concept of social security adopted by our Constitución Política include the right of workers to obtain retirement benefits after fulfilling certain legally established conditions. This is one form of expression of the fundamental right to social security enshrined in our constitutional law, which also encompasses health insurance, the various types of contributory and non-contributory retirement benefits, among others.
-Retirement benefits constitute the financial benefit (prestación económica) obtained after working and contributing to a particular system for a specified period, the purpose of which is to guarantee a dignified life for the person after the end of their working life.
-The right to a pension must be classified as a fundamental right; thus, the Sala declares that a constitutional and fundamental right to retirement does exist for every worker in general—a right which, as such, belongs to and must be recognized for every human being under conditions of equality and without any discrimination, in accordance with Articles 33 and 73 of the Constitution. In addition, Articles 25, 28, 29, and 30 of ILO Convention n°102 provide as follows:
" Article 25 Every Member for which this Part of the Convention is in force shall guarantee the protected persons the provision of old-age benefits (prestaciones de vejez), in accordance with the following Articles of this Part” “Article 28 The benefit shall consist of a periodic payment, calculated as follows...” “Article 29 1. The benefit referred to in Article 28 shall be guaranteed, in the covered contingency, at least:
(a) to protected persons who, prior to the contingency and in accordance with prescribed rules, have completed a qualifying period (período de calificación), which may consist of thirty years of contributions or employment, or twenty years of residence...
“2. Where entitlement to the benefit referred to in paragraph 1 is conditional upon completion of a minimum period of contributions or employment, a reduced benefit shall be guaranteed at least:
“(a) To protected persons who, prior to the contingency and in accordance with prescribed rules, have completed a qualifying period of fifteen years of contributions or employment...” “Article 30 “The benefits referred to in Articles 28 and 29 shall be granted throughout the duration of the contingency” -Other international instruments recognizing the right to retirement include, for example: Article 16 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; Articles 22 and 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 31 of the Inter-American Charter of Social Guarantees; Article 5 of the Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention, No. 118 of the ILO; or, generally, the right to social security, within which retirement is universally understood to be included, for example Article 11 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
-Membership in a particular pension or retirement scheme (régimen de pensiones o jubilaciones) is acquired from the moment a person begins contributing to that scheme, but the specific right to retirement is not acquired until the person concerned satisfies all the requirements established by law.
-Like any other fundamental right, the right to a pension is not unrestricted, since it may be subject to certain limitations, provided that they are established by a formal law (ley formal), are reasonable, and do not prevent its exercise (or affect its essential content). The right to retirement, like any other right, is subject to conditions and limitations, but only insofar as they are provided for by the rules that recognize and guarantee that right and are also reasonably necessary for the exercise of the right itself, in accordance with its nature and purpose. This is simply an expression of a well-known principle of human rights law, which may be called the principle of proportionality (principio de proporcionalidad) and which is generally recognized as a sine qua non condition for limitations and restrictions on such rights that are exceptionally authorized by the very instruments enshrining them (see decisions n°2018-19030, n°2379-96, n°1147-90).
-The right to retirement may be subject to limitations, like any other fundamental right. Accordingly, a person has no right to retire under specific conditions, since those conditions may be modified when necessary to ensure the continued existence of a specific pension and retirement scheme; otherwise, conditions could arise that render the system financially unsustainable, which would ultimately cause the right to retirement to be severely affected or make its exercise entirely impossible because insufficient funds would prevent payment of the retirement benefit to the person concerned. Of course, such limitations must be established by a formal law, must be reasonable, and cannot prevent the exercise of the right (or affect its essential content).
-Furthermore, if amendments to pension conditions entail regression (regresión), this Sala has indicated that such a measure requires a prior technical study (estudio técnico). It was thus established: “if an administrative authority needs to adopt regressive measures affecting the right to a pension and retirement, it must have a technical study concerning the effects that such measures may have on the rights of the affected persons and on the scheme, as well as establishing that there are no less burdensome measures that could have been adopted...” (see decision n°2021-11957).
Having established the foregoing, the specific admitted claims will now be reviewed to determine whether the state authorities exceeded the foregoing parameters, all in accordance with the issues and specific arguments presented by the various applicants (accionantes).
As indicated, this action and the consolidated action (acción acumulada) were admitted for review of Transitory Provision VI (Transitorio VI) of the Ley de Reforma del Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, No. 9544, based on the alleged violation of Articles 11, 18, 27, 28, 34, 40, 41, 45, 51, 65, 73, 74, 121, 152, 154, 156, 177, 188, 189 and 190 of the Constitución Política; ILO Conventions 102, 118, 128 and 157; and the principles of democracy, solidarity, legal certainty, good faith, legitimate expectations, transparency, the relative inviolability of assets, non-confiscation, and respect for vested rights (derechos adquiridos) and consolidated legal situations (situaciones jurídicas consolidadas); Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In addition, it was admitted regarding the violation of the principle of progressivity, the right to a dignified, proportionate, and reasonable pension, and the principle of equality, provided the necessary evidence is available. All these arguments were summarized above. Now, because the claim of unconstitutionality based on the absence of a technical assessment for measures that are regressive with respect to the right to a pension and retirement is a procedural claim, it will be examined first.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TRANSITORIO VI OF THE LEY DE REFORMA DEL RÉGIMEN DE JUBILACIONES Y PENSIONES DEL PODER JUDICIAL, LEY N.° 9544. DRAFTED BY MAGISTRADO CASTILLO VÍQUEZ.
The applicants state that there is no legal basis supporting the eighteen-month period granted as a transitory provision for application of the new reform, which they consider irrational and arbitrary. They further state that the former president of the Junta Administradora del Fondo, Mr. Carlos Montero, appearing before the Corte Plena del Poder Judicial (session n.°08-2021, dated February 22, 2021, Article XVIII), stated that the Fondo was capable of assuming responsibility for retirements under the conditions predating the reform for persons who, when Transitorio VI entered into force, had completed 20 or more years of service in the Poder Judicial. They further argue that, in cases in which a fundamental right is restricted or limited—as in this case—the burden of proof does not rest with the person adversely affected by the restriction or limitation, but with the administrative authority, in this case the State acting as legislator, which had no technical assessment on the matter.
The Procuraduría General de la República (PGR) states that, if the legislature considers it appropriate and decides to regulate the matter through transitional law (derecho transitorio), the 18-month period is sufficient for modifying the specific conditions without affecting an individual subject to the administration (administrado) who meets the requirements within that period (see Sala Constitucional decision n.°1992-846, issued at 13:30 on March 27, 1992). It considers that although, in contributory pension schemes, payment of contributions gives rise to a right of membership, this does not make the rules of the system unalterable (see Sala Constitucional decisions n.°2018-19030 and n.°2021-11957). Furthermore, the mere existence of a transitory provision leads to the conclusion that the changes to the scheme were neither abrupt nor sudden and did not drastically alter the applicants’ retirement conditions.
It therefore disagrees with the grounds of unconstitutionality asserted in this action and recommends dismissing the action. For his part, the Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa states that, in processing and drafting this law, the Asamblea always respected the principles of reasonableness, rationality, and proportionality and made its decisions following extensive discussion, with technical reports and the participation of the sectors involved. Specifically regarding the transitory provision, he reports that the 18-month period is reasonable because it is neither excessively short nor excessively long; he further states that setting this period falls within the authority of the Asamblea Legislativa in exercising its function of enacting laws in both the formal and substantive sense, in which it enjoys broad legislative discretion (libertad de conformación). In the opinion of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, on each of the three occasions when the Corte was consulted, it issued an unfavorable opinion and opposed the bill under consultation because it affects the organization and operation of the Poder Judicial.
Specifically regarding the 18-month period established by the challenged transitory provision, it considered that the agreements of the Corte Plena or the Consejo Superior contain no indication that the Poder Ejecutivo or Poder Legislativo conducted the technical studies needed to define that period, which could conflict with what the Sala Constitucional has stated in repeated rulings (judgment n.°2017-11714): that a fundamental requirement for making changes to pension and retirement schemes is that those changes be supported by technical assessments of the impact of the statutory amendments; otherwise, Article 73 of our Constitución Política could be violated. It further adds that the institution’s personnel have been subjected to a very severe transitory provision, unprecedented in its application to any group in retirement matters, which has discouraged them from continuing to work at the institution.
This has resulted in a steady loss of talent, as several judicial employees have resigned, preferring to continue their careers in other fields. Judicial employees have also required medical intervention because of the impact of this reform and its transitory provision on their lives and the lives of their family members. They consider that their rights should have been protected through a reasonable and fair transitory provision supported by technical and objective criteria.
The majority of this Chamber is of the opinion that the action brought must be dismissed, based on the reasons set forth below. For the proper examination and resolution of this action, a series of introductory considerations will first be presented (section A), which must necessarily be taken into account in order to address adequately the issues raised in these constitutional review proceedings (proceso de control de constitucionalidad). Then, section B will specifically analyze the 18-month period in light of the case law of the Constitutional Chamber and the technical report prepared by the Instituto de Investigaciones en Ciencias Económicas de la Universidad de Costa Rica (dated 4 de julio de 2017 and entitled Product 6, “Compilation and Final Report: Conclusions and Recommendations”). Unavoidable reference will also be made to the status of the Régimen de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial prior to its reform through Ley n.°9544, its current financial situation, and the consequences that would follow if this action were granted (sections C, D, and E), because these are matters that must necessarily be weighed for the proper resolution of this action. Finally, the specific challenges raised by the petitioners will be resolved in the following sections.
In the opinion of the majority of the Court, the actions of the Asamblea Legislativa are based on its case law and on a technical study; consequently, its conduct has been neither arbitrary nor senseless. On the contrary, it has helped make a special pension scheme (régimen especial) sustainable, as will be explained below.
A worldwide phenomenon is affecting retirement and pension schemes (regímenes de jubilaciones y pensiones). This is population aging, which has significant effects because, on the one hand, there are more older adults and they live longer, while, on the other, the economically active population is not growing at the rate it did in the past. In this regard, the United Nations report on the subject—World Social Report 2023—provides the following data:
“In 2021, 761 million people worldwide were aged 65 or older, a figure that will increase to 1600 million in 2050. The number of people aged 80 or older is growing even faster.
People are living longer because of improvements in health and medical treatments, greater access to education, and declining fertility.
Worldwide, a child born in 2021 can expect to live, on average, to age 71, and women will live longer than men. This is almost 25 years longer than a baby born in 1950.
North Africa, Western Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa are on track to experience the fastest growth in the number of older persons over the next 30 years. Europe and North America together currently have the largest proportion of this population.” There can be no doubt that this global phenomenon reflects a general improvement in people’s health. However, it also entails a number of additional challenges.
This fact has a significant impact on retirement and pension schemes, particularly pay-as-you-go schemes (regímenes de reparto), because fewer and fewer workers are contributing while more retirees and pensioners require the corresponding payments. The report referred to above states the following:
“One of the principal challenges is maintaining the fiscal sustainability of public pension systems while ensuring income security for all older persons, including workers in the informal sector.” The fact is that the population is undergoing an accelerated aging process; the population pyramid has been inverted and, consequently, significant changes must be introduced into retirement and pension schemes to guarantee their sustainability and equity. When retirees and pensioners are few and active workers are many, the system can support generous retirement and pension benefits in the short and even the medium term; however, this situation cannot be sustained when the reverse occurs. This is why, throughout the world, retirement and pension benefits are being reduced—for example, by increasing contributions and the retirement age and reducing the amounts used to calculate retirement or pension benefits.
These changes in retirement and pension schemes are not a whim of the legislature or of those who govern or administer a scheme; they are a necessity imposed by reality, in which actuarial studies (estudios actuariales) demonstrate that the adjustments are necessary, fair, and logical if the fundamental right to retirement or a pension is to be guaranteed to present and future generations. Acting otherwise, or doing nothing, would condemn thousands of older adults to live in destitution in the not-too-distant future. Accordingly, responsibility, timeliness, and consistency require the legislature and public administration to act promptly to guarantee the financial sustainability of retirement and pension schemes.
In this matter, it must not be overlooked that serving the general interest requires the legislature and administrators always to be guided by that interest, rather than by private or group interests. In retirement and pension schemes, the scheme’s financial sustainability represents the general interest, against which the satisfaction of private interests cannot be invoked when doing so would impair the former. Anyone who fails to understand this maxim acts contrary to elementary rules of justice, logic, science and technology, and sound timing, which is inadmissible in a social and democratic state governed by the rule of law (Estado social y democrático de derecho). The interests of the greatest number must always prevail over individual or group interests.
A third issue in this general framework concerns legislative discretion (discrecionalidad legislativa). This Court has repeatedly held that the legislature enjoys a broad margin of discretion when exercising the power to legislate (potestad de legislar). One reason for this position—though not the only one—is that the legislature possesses democratic legitimacy and is therefore called upon to choose among various possible alternatives when determining the content of a law, in order to provide an effective solution to a problem or create an institution that will promote the well-being of the population. The fact that this Court has held that the legislature requires technical studies in retirement and pension matters does not entail its absolute subordination to those studies, because, using the data yielded by those studies as a reference, it may adopt solutions falling within the bounds of reasonableness.
In this regard, a legislative act (acto legislativo) cannot be equated with an administrative act (acto administrativo), for which it is clear that the public administration’s margin of discretion is much narrower. Legislative discretion means that the legislature has broad latitude to determine the content and timing of a law. A legislative act expresses or gives concrete form to Parliament’s sovereignty. In this respect, sight must not be lost of what constitutional Article 105 provides when it states that the power to legislate resides in the people, who delegate it to the Asamblea Legislativa through suffrage. That power is not subject, directly or indirectly, to limitations by agreement or contract, and the Sovereign may even exercise it through a referendum, except with respect to certain matters. This means that the Asamblea Legislativa enjoys independence when exercising the power to legislate, meaning that the body of constitutional law (Derecho de la Constitución)—its values, principles, and rules—grants it broad discretion to determine the content and timing of laws.
This is a margin of appreciation, which German legal scholarship has termed “the legislature’s freedom to shape the law” (gesetzgeberichen Freiheit). Thus, in exercising the power to legislate, the legislature is called upon to serve the public interest and, for that purpose, may innovate and update the law, as well as provide timely and appropriate solutions to social problems. However, the legislature’s discretion is not unlimited. First, when legislating, it must comply with the body of constitutional law and respect the fundamental rights enshrined therein and in the international human rights instruments in force in Costa Rica. Second, it must observe the essential forms and procedures of the legislative process (iter legislativo). Third, however discretionary it may be, a parliamentary act (acto parlamentario) must satisfy the requirements of reasonableness and proportionality, such that the body of constitutional law and the principle prohibiting arbitrariness (principio de la interdicción de la arbitrariedad) prevent the legislature from enacting irrational, arbitrary, or illogical measures.
It must also be borne in mind that, when several reasonable options exist, the body of constitutional law permits the legislature to choose among them—not necessarily the one considered best or optimal, because that question cannot be settled without replacing the legislature, which would violate its independence or, worse still, usurp a power constitutionally assigned to it, something manifestly inconsistent with the democratic system.
Finally, it must be borne in mind that the fundamental right to retirement or a pension is the right to receive that benefit once the requirements established by the legal system have been met. The right to receive specific benefits is therefore not part of its essential content, because such benefits are contingent upon the solvency of the respective scheme.
The first point to emphasize is that the challenged statutory provision (disposición normativa impugnada) is fully compatible and consistent with the position repeatedly and consistently maintained by this Chamber: namely, that a period of 18 months is reasonably sufficient to protect persons who have not yet met the requirements for acquiring the right to a pension or retirement benefit—and whose actual or specific right to receive it has therefore not yet vested (consolidado)—but who are close to having that right vest, against potential statutory changes to the requirements or conditions for obtaining the respective pension or retirement benefit as a result of changes in the objective law (derecho objetivo) governing the scheme in question. This takes into account the impact that such a change could have on persons who were only a few months away from acquiring the specific right to a pension or retirement benefit.
On this issue, reference may first be made to decision n.°846-92 issued at 13:30 hours on 27 de marzo de 1992, in which this Chamber considered an optional legislative consultation on constitutionality (consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad) concerning the “Bill Creating the General Pension Scheme Charged to the National Budget, Other Special Schemes, and Reforming Law Number 7092 of 21 de abril de 1988 and Its Amendments, Income Tax Law” (expediente legislativo n.°11168). On that occasion, the Chamber ruled:
“C) They likewise ask, in the event it is deemed that, before reaching the required age and contribution period, a person has only an expectation of a right (expectativa de derecho) and not an acquired right (derecho adquirido), what would become of a provision legislating on that basis, in contrast to Convention N 102 of the I.L.O., which recognizes rights from a different perspective.
In this regard, the Chamber considers that the question lacks relevance, since the bill—in its transitory articles—recognizes the preservation of the retirement status (situación jubilatoria) of public servants who have met the requirements for entitlement to the benefit, and further extends it to those who belong or have belonged to the excluded schemes, allowing them to acquire it within a period of eighteen months, which appears reasonably sufficient to safeguard any potential rights acquired in good faith.” Subsequently, in ruling n.°914-92 issued at 14:40 hours on 8 de abril de 1992, this Court revisited the issue and explained its position in the following terms:
“(...) In judgment número 846-92 issued at trece horas treinta minutos on veintisiete de marzo del año en curso, this Chamber, in considering a legislative consultation on constitutionality (consulta legislativa de constitucionalidad), deemed the provision contained in the Bill Creating the General Pension Scheme Charged to the National Budget, contained in legislative expediente número 11168, to be reasonable and sufficient to safeguard any potential rights acquired in good faith, insofar as it establishes a prior period of dieciocho meses for preserving the retirement-related legal status created under a particular pension system. In the present case, the appellant seeks recognition of that right of preservation for a period exceeding dos años. In reaching its decision in the aforementioned consultation, the Chamber took into account the need to protect the imminent rights of persons covered by the various pension schemes, but recognized that mere membership does not create a vested legal status (situación jurídica consolidada). This particular case does not involve the situation previously identified by the Chamber, because the appellant still has sufficient time to make the necessary arrangements and adapt his expectations to the new circumstances; accordingly, his application for amparo relief (amparo) is unfounded and must be so declared. According to his own application, the petitioner had not met all the requirements for approval of his retirement on the date he submitted his request; rather, he would have met them in mil novecientos noventa y tres but for the amendment to the Disability, Old Age, and Death Scheme (régimen de Invalidéz Vejez y Muerte). At the time of filing the request, he had no more than an expectation of acquiring the right, rather than a vested right as he claims; therefore, under those circumstances, there can be no violation of the provisions of artículo 34 Constitucional. Furthermore, the decision adopted by Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social when it amended the scheme was based on actuarial studies and technical recommendations; thus, it was neither an irrational whim nor arbitrary in any respect. On the contrary, as reported by the representative of the respondent, the decision was adopted to preserve the scheme so that it could cover all pensioners in the future. Accordingly, because no constitutional violation has been found in the present case, as previously stated, the appeal must be dismissed.” (emphasis not in the original).
Along the same lines, reference may be made to ruling n.°5476-93 issued at 18:03 hours on 27 de octubre de 1993, which reiterates:
“(...) Before discussing whether or not the appellant met the requirements established by the regulations governing the Régimen de Comunicaciones for recognition or actual enjoyment of the right to retirement benefits, it is necessary to reiterate two fundamental concepts identified by the Chamber in Voto N °1147-90 issued at 16:00 hours on 21 de setiembre de 1990. The first is this Court’s declaration that retirement is a constitutional and fundamental right of every worker and, as such, must be recognized for every human being under conditions of equality and without any discrimination. The second is a concept derived from the first and specifically mentioned both in Recital XI (Considerando XI) of the cited ruling and in the report submitted to this Chamber by the Ministro de Gobernación (see folios 16 vuelto y 17 of the appeal): namely, that the right to retirement is acquired upon entry into the respective retirement scheme, at least as a general right of membership in that scheme, and is acquired as a right to the present payment of the benefit from the moment the interested party satisfies the factual conditions prescribed for receiving it, without it being necessary for the party to have previously claimed the benefit or obtained formal recognition thereof. In accordance with the foregoing, it must be noted that the petitioner acquired the right to belong to the Régimen de Comunicaciones and the right to retire someday under that scheme, should he so desire, merely by entering it; this occurred pursuant to artículo 108 de la Ley N 7015, which included the employees of the Administración Central del Ministerio de Gobernación within that scheme. Within this framework, it is important to indicate that the scheme’s specific conditions, including the age and length-of-service requirements, may change in the future and may affect beneficiaries who are more than 18 meses away from meeting the requirements of the regulations being amended...”.
It was then added that:
“The period of 18 meses during which an amendment to the scheme’s specific conditions may not affect a person subject to the administration (administrado) who expected to meet the retirement requirements during that period has been reiterated by the Chamber in several of its rulings. Its purpose is to protect the beneficiary of a particular pension scheme from sudden changes to the specific requirements necessary to obtain formal recognition of the retirement benefit—changes that may make the conditions for obtaining the pension more burdensome when the interested party was only a few months away from acquiring the specific right to the benefit under the amended provision.” For its part, in ruling n.°06491-98 issued at 9:45 hours on 10 de setiembre de 1998, the position of this Chamber was systematized as follows:
“V.- A) ON THE MODIFICATION OF THE RETIREMENT AGE AND LENGTH OF SERVICE: In addressing acquired rights in pension matters, the Chamber has emphasized in previous rulings a fundamental distinction between the right of membership in the scheme and the specific right to receive the pension. Regarding these two aspects of the acquired right to retirement, the Chamber stated:
“In this regard, it should be observed that this right ceases to be a mere expectation and is acquired upon entry into the retirement scheme, at least as a general right of membership therein, and, from the moment the beneficiary satisfies the factual conditions prescribed for receiving the benefit, as a right to the present payment thereof, without it being necessary for the beneficiary to have claimed it, much less for its recognition to have been declared or for payments to have begun... in the same way that the right to an inheritance is acquired upon the decedent’s death, not upon the commencement of probate proceedings, much less upon the award of inheritance rights or delivery of the assets to the heir.” (sentencia Nº1147-90 issued at 16:00 hours on 21 de setiembre de 1990).
VI.In the first case, the right of membership in a retirement scheme is more abstract and consists essentially of the right to the continued existence of the pension scheme specific to the institution where the person works, as well as its defining elements or conditions. The right to belong to the scheme means the right not to be excluded and to have its general parameters maintained, such as a tripartite contribution—a condition which, incidentally, in similar proportions is itself a constitutional right, without prejudice to the State contribution being equal under all schemes. Given its characteristics, this right is acquired merely by entering the scheme; however, as previously stated, its consequences are far more limited than those described below with respect to the specific right to a pension.
VII.The specific right to enjoy retirement benefits is the right traditionally used as an example to explain the concept of an acquired right. Under that same understanding, it was always considered to arise when the worker satisfied the requirements established by the law then in force for entitlement to retirement benefits. The consequence of this reasoning and of the distinction in degree described above is set forth in resolution número 6124-93 issued at 14:30 hours on 23 de noviembre de 1993:
“As regards the actual enjoyment thereof, once the right has been acquired as such, it may not be irrationally limited, conditioned, or abolished in any manner, thereby constituting an absolute right of enjoyment. The same is not true, however, of the expectations of workers who contribute to a particular scheme, since that right is obtained only upon fulfillment of all statutory prerequisites—age, years of contributions, amount, etc.
Thus, membership in a particular pension or retirement scheme is acquired from the moment contributions to that scheme begin, but the specific right to retirement is acquired when the interested party satisfies all the prerequisites established by law, and not before, as the petitioners claim in asserting that modification of the conditions for obtaining this right is unconstitutional. They hold a right of membership in a pension scheme, which in this case is the régimen de Hacienda, because what the challenged legislation—Ley Marco de Pensiones, número 7302—did was unify the various existing schemes and create a ‘common framework,’ without altering in the slightest the public employees’ pension scheme membership. Indeed, it is recognized that such schemes are governed by statute, which may be amended or repealed by another statute; to claim that the prerequisites can never be modified would entail creating a limitation upon every existing pension and retirement scheme, which holds constitutional rank with respect to its creation in general, but not with respect to its particular specifications. (In this same regard, see rulings número 1341-93, issued at 10:30 hours on 29 de marzo de 1993, and 3063-95, issued at 15:30 hours on 13 de junio de 1995).
VIII.This concept was subsequently expanded as a result of legislative decisions and decisions of this Court recognizing a reasonable period—dieciocho meses—before fulfillment of the requirements for acquiring the right, because the person is very close to the retirement date and not only has an expectation but also takes irreversible measures in preparation for the change in status.” (emphasis not in the original)
Position confirmed by this Court in multiple judgments, namely: n.°1633-93 at 14:33 hours on 13 de abril de 1993; n.°2765-93 at 15:09 hours on 15 de junio de 1993; n.°3933-93 at 15:21 hours on 12 de agosto de 1993; n.°0846-94 at 17:18 hours on 9 de febrero de 1994; n.°1060-94 at 15:42 hours on 22 de febrero de 1994; n.°1805-94 at 11:03 hours on 15 de abril de 1994; n.°1879-94 at 17:30 hours on 20 de abril de 1994; n.°0337-96 at 9:51 hours on 19 de enero de 1996; n.°4682-96 at 11:15 hours on 6 de setiembre de 1996; n.°2617-97 at 15:54 hours on 14 de mayo de 1997; n.°6097-98 at 15:33 hours on 26 de agosto de 1998; n.°1999-04808 at 14:30 hours on 22 de junio de 1999; n.°2000-00331 at 17:54 hours on 11 de enero del 2000; n.°2014-003551 at 9:05 hours on 14 de marzo de 2014; n.°2014-12606 at 9:05 hours on 1 de agosto de 2014; and n.°2015-1214 at 14:45 hours on 27 de enero de 2015.
This holding was reiterated once again by the majority of this Court precisely when reviewing the provision challenged in this constitutional action (Transitory Provision VI of Ley n.°9544). It did so in judgment n.°2018-5758 at 15:40 hours on 12 de abril de 2018, when hearing the optional legislative consultation on constitutionality (consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad) processed with respect to then-bill n.°19.222, reforming the Judicial Branch Retirement and Pension Scheme (expediente n.°17-017148-0007-CO), as well as in judgment n.°2021-11957 at 17:00 hours on 25 de mayo de 2021, issued in the constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) n.°18-007819-0007-CO. In the latter case, the Court ruled:
“LXVII.- Justice Castillo Víquez writing. Regarding the challenge to Transitory Provision VI of Ley número 9544. As explained supra, the other transitory provision of Ley número 9544 challenged by the petitioners is Transitory Article VI, which provides:
“TRANSITORY PROVISION VI.- Judicial employees who satisfy the requirements for acquiring the right to a pension, as established by the text of Title IX of Ley No. 7333, de 5 de mayo de 1993, within eighteen months following the enactment of this law, may retire under the provisions established in the aforementioned text.” The petitioners argue that this is a disproportionate and arbitrary provision and that the stipulated 18 months constitute an unreasonable period that the Chamber established at some point and that the legislature has now adopted without any technical study to justify it. They believe that vested rights (derechos consolidados) and acquired rights (derechos adquiridos) are impaired, and they contend that legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) is violated and trust in the system is undermined; that it harms individuals’ expectations and the life plans of those who were close to retirement, and undermines solidarity (solidaridad), which is a principle related to social security (seguridad social).
They further consider that it contradicts Article 224 of the same law, because that article recognizes an acquired right for employees with 20 or more years of service in the Poder Judicial, whereas this transitory provision does not recognize that period for employees with more than 20 years of service and instead grants it only to those who have 28 years and 6 months of service when the law enters into force. The Procuraduría stated that the right to receive retirement benefits is acquired when all regulatory requirements have been met and that, before then, there is merely an expectancy of a right (expectativa de derecho), which cannot be equated with a vested legal position (situación jurídica consolidada). It is asserted that the Chamber has held that a period of 18 months is sufficient to ensure that a modification of the conditions does not adversely affect an individual subject to the administration (administrado) who satisfies the requirements within that period, and that the misnamed membership right (derecho de pertenencia) amounts to no more than a mere expectancy for only those who succeed in satisfying the requirements within the 18 months.
Transitory Provision VI means that the changes were neither untimely nor sudden. The Asamblea Legislativa states that, when dealing with expectancies of rights relating to pension or retirement schemes, the governing legislation and constitutional precedents must be followed, with the understanding that modification of a specific scheme is feasible and does not, in itself, entail a constitutional violation. The period granted satisfies the parameters required to safeguard the potential rights of persons who meet the requirements established in the regulations and to ensure that the provision is not modified abruptly. The Corte Suprema de Justicia explained that, in its responses to the Asamblea, it had always expressed the need for gradual implementation of the regulatory change in order to respect the legitimate expectations of persons with more years of service.
LXVIII.- Justice Castillo Víquez continuing. The question of the possible unconstitutionality of the challenged Transitory Provision VI of Ley 9544 was also analyzed as part of the response given to the Asamblea Legislativa concerning the consultation conducted on then-bill número 19922 reforming the Judicial Branch Retirement and Pension Scheme. In judgment número 2018-5758, cited so many times, the Chamber stated:
“XVII.- Regarding changes to the requirements for obtaining pension rights. The requesting legislators consider that Article 224 of the bill violates the principles of proportionality and reasonableness because it increases the retirement age and the number of years that an official must work, while reducing the percentage of money that the official will receive as a pension relative to the salary previously earned. They also challenge Transitory Provision VI of the bill, which provides that only persons who are within 18 months of satisfying the requirements for acquiring pension rights may do so under Ley N° 7333. The challenged provisions state as follows:” Article 224- Judicial employees with twenty or more years of service in the Poder Judicial may take ordinary retirement (jubilación ordinaria) at an amount equal to eighty-two percent (82%) of the average ordinary monthly salaries earned during the last twenty years of their working lives, adjusted according to the consumer price index (IPC), as defined by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INEC), provided that they have reached sixty-five years of age and have worked for at least thirty-five years.
TRANSITORY PROVISION VI- Judicial employees who satisfy the requirements for acquiring pension rights, as established by the text of Title IX of Ley N.° 7333, de 5 de mayo de 1993, within eighteen months following the enactment of this law, may retire under the provisions established in the aforementioned text.
Before analyzing the merits of the argument raised, it must be borne in mind that the right to retirement (derecho de jubilación) constitutes the financial benefit obtained after working and contributing to a particular scheme for an established period, and its purpose is to guarantee a dignified life after a person withdraws from the labor market because of age or disability. This right, which derives from Article 73 of the Constitution, is obtained when the person satisfies all the requirements established by the legislation then in force, since it is at that time that the factual situation contemplated by the provision for granting the benefit occurs. It should be noted that the right to retirement is not unrestricted, since it may be subject to certain limitations, provided that these are established by a formal law, are reasonable, and do not affect its essential content (contenido esencial). Thus, the Chamber has held that the legislature has the authority to impose restrictions on the right to retirement when it can be shown that certain circumstances jeopardize the sustainability of a scheme and, consequently, threaten the nature of the system as such. On this matter, judgment número 2379-96 at 11:06 on 17 de mayo de 1996 established the following: […]
Furthermore, the Chamber has also held that there is a substantial difference between the right to belong to a particular pension scheme and the specific right to receive a pension. On this matter, judgment número 98-6491 at 9:45 on 10 de septiembre de 1998 provided as follows:
“In this regard, it must be observed that this right ceases to be a mere expectancy and is acquired upon entry into the retirement scheme, at least as a general right of membership therein, and, as a right to the current benefit, from the moment when the beneficiary meets the factual conditions prescribed for receiving that benefit, without any need to have claimed it, much less for its recognition to have been declared or for the beneficiary to have begun receiving it... just as the right to an inheritance is acquired at the time of the decedent’s death, not when probate proceedings are opened, and much less when the inheritance right is awarded or the assets are delivered to the heir.” (judgment Nº1147-90 at 16:00 hours on 21 de setiembre de 1990).
I.In the first case, the membership right in a retirement scheme has a greater degree of abstraction and consists, essentially, of the right to have the pension scheme of the institution where one works remain in place, together with its defining elements or conditions. The right to belong to the scheme means the right not to be excluded and to have its general parameters maintained, such as the requirement that contributions be tripartite—a condition which, incidentally, in similar proportions is itself a constitutional right, without prejudice to the state contribution being equal across all schemes. Because of its characteristics, this right is acquired merely by entering the scheme; however, as already stated, its consequences are much more limited than those discussed below in the case of the specific pension right.
II.The specific right to receive retirement benefits is the right traditionally used as an example to explain the concept of an acquired right. In those same terms, it has always been considered to arise when the employee satisfies the requirements imposed by the law then in force for accessing the retirement benefit. The consequence of this reasoning and of the distinction in degree that has been made is set forth in decision número 6124-93 at 14:30 hours on 23 de noviembre de 1993:
“As for its actual enjoyment, it is a right that cannot in any way be irrationally limited, conditioned, or eliminated once the right as such has been acquired, thus becoming an absolute right of enjoyment. The same does not apply, however, to the expectancy of employees who contribute to a particular scheme, since that right is obtained only when all statutory requirements—age, years of paying contributions, amount, etc.—have been satisfied.
Thus, membership in a particular pension or retirement scheme (régimen de pensiones o jubilaciones) is acquired from the moment a person begins contributing to that scheme, but the specific right to retirement benefits (derecho concreto a la jubilación) is acquired when the interested party satisfies all the requirements established by law, and not before, as the petitioners claim in asserting that modification of the conditions for obtaining this right is unconstitutional. They hold a right of membership (derecho de pertenencia) in a pension scheme, which in this case is the Ministry of Finance scheme, since what the challenged legislation—Framework Pension Law (Ley Marco de Pensiones), number 7302—did was to unify the various existing schemes and create a “common framework,” without altering in the slightest the pension-scheme membership of public employees. Indeed, it is recognized that such schemes are governed by statute, which may be amended or repealed by another statute, and to contend that the requirements can never be modified would entail creating a limitation on every existing pension and retirement scheme, which has constitutional status with respect to its creation in general, but not with respect to its particular specifications. (To the same effect, see decisions number 1341-93, at 10:30 a.m. on March 29, 1993, and 3063-95, at 3:30 p.m. on June 13, 1995).
It is clear from the foregoing that the right to retirement benefits may be subject to limitations, like any other fundamental right. Accordingly, a person has no right to retire under specific conditions, since those conditions may be changed when necessary to ensure the continued existence of a specific pension and retirement scheme; otherwise, conditions could arise that would render the system financially unsustainable, which would ultimately result in the right to retirement benefits being severely affected or becoming altogether impossible to exercise because of insufficient funds to pay the interested party the amount of the retirement benefit. Under these circumstances, the Chamber considers that the challenged provisions are not unconstitutional insofar as their purpose is precisely to ensure the continued existence of the Judiciary Pension and Retirement Scheme (Régimen de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial).
To that end, parameters and requirements were established based on the opinions of experts heard by the Special Committee that issued its report on legislative expediente number 19.922, as well as on technical studies that confirmed the existence of a problem capable of affecting the sustainability of the aforementioned Scheme and issued a series of recommendations to address it. Accordingly, having found that the change in requirements provided for in section 224 and the period established by transitional provision VI of the bill ultimately seek to guarantee the judicial employees’ right to retirement benefits, the Chamber rejects the alleged defect.” LXIX.—Justice Castillo Víquez continues drafting the opinion. In the foregoing quotation, this Court addressed precisely the claim now reiterated by the petitioners regarding the reasonableness and proportionality of transitional provision VI insofar as it established an 18-month period for satisfying the requirements and retiring or obtaining a pension under the repealed scheme.
The reasoning on that occasion was based on the distinction between the right to actually receive retirement benefits—which is acquired only upon satisfaction of the established requirements—and the right of membership held by participants in the scheme who have not satisfied those requirements, which constitutes merely an expectation regarding the established conditions for receiving benefits. Therefore, changes made to the structure of the scheme may apply to all those who hold only a right of membership, provided that such a decision is justified in light of the purpose and objectives of the scheme and of the proposed amendments—that is, provided that it is reasonable and proportionate. Regarding this last point, it is appropriate to reinforce the arguments previously offered by this Chamber, since the petitioners persist in challenging that transitional period on the ground that 18 months is unreasonable, arbitrary, and unfair to a number of persons who, by a matter of days or weeks, were excluded from the possibility of retiring despite having many years of service or having reached retirement age.
In this context, the majority of the Chamber begins by emphasizing that the establishment of 18 months as the transitional period is grounded in this Court’s specific case law concerning changes to social-security schemes (regímenes previsionales), as held, among other decisions, in judgment number 1993-5476, issued at 6:03 p.m. on October 27, 1993, which addressed the claim of a person who alleged vested rights (derechos adquiridos) to retire under the rules of a repealed scheme. The decision explained the specific issue as follows:
“II. (…) Within this framework, it is important to note that the specific conditions of the scheme, including the age and length-of-service requirements, may indeed change in the future and may affect beneficiaries who are more than 18 months away from satisfying the requirements of the legislation being amended; however, their right to belong to the scheme and to retire under the same general conditions of the scheme cannot be modified because it has vested as an acquired right. The 18-month period during which modification of the scheme’s specific conditions cannot affect a person subject to the administration who expected to satisfy the requirements for obtaining a pension within that period has been reiterated by the Chamber in several of its decisions, in order to protect beneficiaries of a particular pension scheme from sudden changes in the specific requirements necessary to obtain formal recognition of the retirement benefit; changes that may make the conditions for obtaining the pension more burdensome when the interested party was only a few months away from acquiring the specific right to the benefit under the amended provision.” (emphasis not in the original) Thus, by providing that the previous scheme would apply to those who satisfied the requirements within an 18-month period, the legislature followed this Court’s position on the specific issue of the appropriate period for balancing the need to reform and update pension and retirement schemes against the necessary protection of a certain group of contributors from “…sudden changes in the specific requirements necessary to obtain formal recognition of the retirement benefit; changes that may make the conditions for obtaining the pension more burdensome when the interested party was only a few months away from acquiring the specific right to the benefit under the amended provision,” in the Court’s own words.
The foregoing supports the constitutional validity of the measure adopted by the legislature; therefore, a declaration of unconstitutionality in this case requires the submission of grounds capable of demonstrating that it was disproportionate and unreasonable to use the 18-month period established by constitutional case law, running from the effective date of the reform, to extend the scope of coverage of the previous social-security scheme.
In this particular case, however, the petitioners fail to accomplish the foregoing, and the characteristics of the reform instead support the legislature’s action. First, the Chamber has weighed the magnitude of the changes concerning eligibility conditions and concluded not only that the changes have a technical basis in actuarial models, as explained when that issue was addressed, but also that, in general terms, the changes introduced do not represent an extremely abrupt or sweeping departure from the previous requirements. Consider, for example, the ordinary retirement of a contributor who has worked only in the Judiciary: under the new scheme, an employee who entered service between the ages of 18 and 30 must work 3 years longer than under the previous system in order to retire ordinarily, while for a person who entered service after age 30, the required period of continued active employment increases by 5 years compared with the previous retirement system.
A similar situation exists in general cases of early retirement; comparison shows that, in the vast majority of cases, the required period of continued active employment increases by 5 years compared with the previous retirement system. The Chamber finds only one exception, in the case of early retirement based on years of service, because the previous legislation did not establish a minimum retirement age, whereas a minimum age of 60 years for women and 62 years for men is now required. In that case, although the changes may exceed 7 years, it is nonetheless true that the minimum limits (60 and 62 years for women and men, respectively) do not in themselves constitute an excessive requirement in terms of human dignity and effort. In short, based on all the foregoing information, the Court finds that the changes made to the eligibility requirements are not disproportionate, as the petitioners contend, and therefore did not make a transitional scheme different from the one selected by the legislature constitutionally necessary.
It should be added that, contrary to the assertions made in some of the challenges, the technical studies did contemplate the need for a brief transitional system in the interest of the sustainability of the reform under discussion. In this regard, the four options developed by the technical authority, particularly scenarios IICE 3 and IICE 4 (from which the guidelines for the final text of the reform were drawn), specify that the sustainability calculations include the assumption that the amendments would apply generally to all contributors, excluding only those who had more than 28 years of service as of the effective date of the change. This can be confirmed by the presentations and documents submitted in the legislative expediente and appearing at pages 2218 and 2230. Thus, the legislature’s final decision to grant only contributors with 28 and a half years of service the opportunity to retire under the previous scheme did form part of the necessary technical requirements taken into account in designing the amendments that would provide financial support for the Judiciary Pension and Retirement Scheme.
Likewise, the 18-month period was amply supported by technical opinion, not only for reasons of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) in accordance with constitutional case law, but also for reasons of actuarial solvency. Thus, during his appearance, the Superintendent of Pensions, Dr. Alvaro Ramos (see page 1691 et seq. of the legislative expediente), referred to the need for an 18-month transition in deference to constitutional case law (see page 1711). The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (page 2115) and the Universidad de Costa Rica (pages 2264, 2265, and 2942 et seq.) expressed the same view, stating:
“The final frameworks recommended here, 3 and 4, contemplate exclusively what you have indicated regarding 18“The final frameworks recommended here, 3 and 4, contemplate exclusively what you have indicated regarding 18 months” (Dr. Max Soto Jiménez) Basically, with regard specifically to the IICE frameworks, an effort was made to model a period as close as possible to eighteen months. In fact, to be candid with you, for modeling purposes it will be two years. In other words, for those with 28 or more years of service, the mathematical model assumed that a transitional provision (transitorio) would preserve their situation; that is, it was not measured with complete precision, but that is due to the modeling of life probabilities themselves, which are calculated for a reason, not for every six-month period, and there are rationales for this.
A theorist could devote half a year to that, but, to answer your question, it was estimated as closely as possible, and the simulation assumed that all those with more than twenty-eight years of service would retain the right to keep their pension under the current system.
That is what you see there where it says, “participation based on years of service, greater than or equal to twenty-eight.” When translating it into regulations, what I would recommend—and what we recommend—is setting it at eighteen months, as the Constitutional Chamber ruled.” (Dr. Ronald Cartín Carranza) Representative Pisk: Just so I am clear. Despite that window for those with more than twenty-eight years, you recommend that this take effect for everyone. Regardless of the number of years worked, it takes effect after eighteen months. Is that correct? Perfect.
Dr. Max Soto Jiménez: Those who retire within the following eighteen months retain their rights under the current law:” (…)
“Logically, a transitional period longer than 18 months adversely affects the fund’s actuarial solvency” (folio 2945) With respect to another aspect related to this issue, some petitioners (accionantes) have alleged a violation of Convention 157 of the International Labour Organization. In that regard, it must first be noted that this instrument does not appear to have been ratified by our country; therefore, its value as a standard of review (parámetro) for this Chamber will depend on whether its content establishes clear and specific guidelines—validated by a significant number of States—regarding the particular issue under consideration here, namely, guidelines for protecting rights “in the process of being acquired.” However, the text of the convention contains no provision that would allow the Chamber to conclude that the Costa Rican State has acted contrary to the international trend in the protection of human rights, since that instrument is limited to regulating conditions under which States may recognize and protect workers who, for various reasons, have accumulated rights under the laws of different States. The foregoing is not applicable to this particular case, and this claim must therefore be rejected.
Finally, in connection with this specific claim, some petitioners have alleged a violation of the American Convention on Human Rights, noting that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, as the interpreter of that instrument, has already established the minimum conditions required of States to respect the right to social security (derecho a la seguridad social) within the Inter-American human rights system. The interested parties state that the case of “Muelle Flores v. Peru” established guidelines that are contradicted by the enactment of Ley 9544 in general and, in particular, by transitional provision VI, which affects the treaty rights of persons who had fewer than 28 years and six months of service on the date the reform entered into force. On this issue, a review of the cited decision allows the Chamber to conclude that the judgment contains elements relevant to interpreting the fundamental right to social security, but that they are neither relevant nor pertinent to resolving this claim or these proceedings in general.
In that judgment, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights decided the case of a person who had already retired and whose periodic payment, which he had previously been receiving, was discontinued because of the privatization of the public enterprise responsible for making that payment. The case was even more serious because the interested party had obtained at least two final judgments in his favor from the Peruvian courts; nevertheless, when he filed his complaint with the international judicial body, he had been unable to secure the effective resumption of his retirement payments. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights described the factual essence of the case as follows:
“191. (…(T)he Court notes that the present case does not concern the obligations of progressive realization arising from Article 26 of the Convention, but rather the failure to give material effect to Mr. Muelle Flores’s right to a pension, as an integral part of the right to social security, owing to the failure to comply with and enforce judgments issued in his favor domestically in the context of the privatization of the state-owned enterprise, which took place after his retirement. Mr. Muelle Flores acquired his right to a pension under a contribution-based system administered by the State; that is, he acquired the right to receive a pension after making contributions for several years. The legality of his admission into that system was confirmed domestically (supra para. 74)” It then provides a valuable summary of its effort to review and interpret the various sources it deemed relevant to its task of defining the scope of the right to social security in the particular case:
“192. In this regard, based on the criteria and constituent elements of the right to social security, and taking into account the facts and particular circumstances of the present case, the State’s obligations concerning the right to a pension are as follows: a) the right to access a pension upon reaching the statutory age and satisfying the requirements established by domestic law, for which purpose there must be a functioning social security system that guarantees benefits. This system must be administered or supervised and monitored by the State (if it is privately administered); b) to ensure that benefits are sufficient in amount and duration to allow retirees to enjoy adequate living conditions and sufficient access to healthcare, without discrimination; c) pensions must be accessible, meaning that reasonable, proportionate, and transparent conditions must be provided for obtaining them.
Likewise, contribution costs must be affordable, and beneficiaries must receive clear and transparent information about the right, especially if any measure that could affect it is to be adopted, such as the privatization of an enterprise; d) retirement pension benefits must be guaranteed in a timely manner and without delay, taking into account the importance of this criterion for older persons; and e) effective complaint mechanisms must be available in the event of a violation of the right to social security, in order to guarantee access to justice and effective judicial protection, which also encompasses giving material effect to the right through the effective enforcement of favorable decisions issued domestically.” (bold emphasis not in the original) As may be observed, none of the points cited by the international court was disregarded by the Costa Rican legislature in its effort to adopt general measures to modify and adjust the retirement and pension system (régimen de jubilaciones y pensiones) of the Judiciary; on the contrary, the situation of persons who had already acquired the right to enjoy their retirement or pension by satisfying the established requirements is clearly respected, while the timely funding of an old-age pension is ensured for those who have yet to satisfy the legally established conditions.
In conclusion, the Chamber understands from the foregoing that there are no grounds for finding that the period established in transitional provision VI of Ley 9544 is unreasonable or disproportionate to the purpose sought by the provision; rather, the legislative decision is justified in light of the changes made. Likewise, there is no violation of treaty rights to declare, and the action must therefore be dismissed in this respect.” The following points from the precedent transcribed above warrant emphasis: a) a person has no right to retire under specific conditions, since those conditions may be changed when necessary to ensure the continued existence of a specific pension and retirement system; otherwise, conditions could arise that would make the system financially unsustainable, which would ultimately cause the right to retirement to be severely impaired or make its exercise altogether impossible because of insufficient funds to pay the interested party’s retirement benefit; b) in this particular case, the reform of the Judiciary’s Pension and Retirement System seeks precisely to ensure its continued existence, for which purpose parameters and requirements were established on the basis of expert opinions received by the Special Committee that reported favorably on legislative expediente n.°19.922, as well as technical studies incorporated into the expediente; and c) the 18-month period established in transitional provision VI is grounded not only in this Court’s specific—and consistent—case law concerning changes to pension systems, but also has adequate technical support for reasons of actuarial solvency, as was already emphasized in that ruling.
It must be emphasized once again that the 18-month period provided for in the challenged transitional provision is grounded not only in this Court’s extensive case law on the subject, but also falls within the bounds of reasonableness in light of the technical criteria incorporated into the legislative expediente. On this point, it is particularly relevant to refer to the report issued by the Instituto de Investigaciones en Ciencias Económicas de la Universidad de Costa Rica (IICE) on 4 de julio de 2017, entitled Product 6, “Compilation and Final Report: Conclusions and Recommendations,” as the principal technical assessment incorporated into the legislative expediente.
Of relevance to this action, the study first analyzes three scenarios corresponding to three different regulatory frameworks: the one in effect at the time of the study and two proposed reforms (“substitute text” and the “Corte Plena” proposal). The study concludes that all three frameworks are insolvent. In this regard, the table appearing on page 5 may be consulted:
The relevant point is that both the “substitute text” and the “Corte Plena” proposal provided for participation based on years of service of “>=20,” as shown in the table included on page 43:
Hence, in the letter signed by the acting Superintendent of Pensions, letter SP-1240-2023 of October 19, 2023 (added to this case file on October 20, 2023), it was stated that both the substitute text and the Full Court text established “a transitional provision (transitorio) under which persons with twenty or more years of service retained the previous eligibility requirements and benefits profile (ley 7333). Consequently, neither proposal would have produced an impact of the magnitude and within the timeframe required, given the actuarial condition of the system.” This relates primarily to constitutional challenge (acción) n.°19-024589-0007-CO, which seeks—in substance—to extend the transitional regime to persons with 20 or more years of service, even though the cited technical study had already concluded that this was not viable.
Moreover, the aforementioned lack of viability of the proposed texts led the IICE to submit four new scenarios, which are described in the table appearing on page 57:
One of the principal changes highlighted in these scenarios is that participation based on years of service is changed to “>=28”.
It is particularly noteworthy that, when comparing or contrasting these new scenarios with the original proposals (which were not viable), the IICE itself makes the following statement (page 71):
“Comparison of the different results obtained under each of the Regulatory Frameworks (IICE_1 vs IICE_2 vs IICE_3 vs IICE_4) shows that:
-the principal actuarial solvency indicators quantified here (the Actuarial Balance and the corresponding ‘Insolvency Level’ indicator) under the IICE_2, IICE_3, and IICE_4 FRAMEWORKS improve significantly relative to the indicators obtained for the same economic scenario under the IICE_1 FRAMEWORK (which, it should be recalled, is a regulatory framework similar to that of the Full Court, but with a much more limited transitional provision and a 15% contribution from workers and retirees).” From this, it may be inferred that one of the changes the IICE had to make in seeking to offer a solvent scenario was to include a “much more limited transitional provision.” Finally, the IICE concludes (page 71) that:
“7.5 Final assessment of the results obtained The analysis conducted indicates that, under any of the first five benefits and contributions structures studied thus far by the IICE (that is, under 1-CURRENT FRAMEWORK, 2-SUBSTITUTE TEXT FRAMEWORK, 3-FULL COURT FRAMEWORK, 4-IICE_1 FRAMEWORK, and 5-IICE_2 FRAMEWORK), the Fund would NOT be able to guarantee its long-term commitments using only the resources allocated under the Framework in question.
In contrast, under either of the last two benefits and contributions structures proposed by the IICE (that is, under the IICE_3 FRAMEWORK or the IICE-4 FRAMEWORK), the Fund would be actuarially solvent and would be able to guarantee its long-term commitments using only the resources allocated under the Framework in question (that is, it would be self-sufficient).
Based on the premise that the Fund must itself guarantee the benefits it promises (without creating additional burdens for the State or other Costa Rican workers), this IICE report recommends that the Poder Judicial choose between one of the two regulatory frameworks, IICE_3 or IICE_4). These regulatory frameworks are insolvent only under a ‘Pessimistic’ economic and financial scenario.” In this regard, it bears repeating that these two proposed scenarios (IICE_3 and IICE_4) contemplated participation based on years of service “>=28”. On this point, in the cited letter SP-1240-2023, the acting Superintendent of Pensions explains: “Thus, the ‘IICE_4 FRAMEWORK’ scenario states that ‘Partic. with years of service > = 28 (...) Current Framework Rules Apply,’ which means that all persons with 28 or more years of service as of the valuation cutoff date remain subject to the conditions in effect before the reform.” This would have entailed, or amounted to proposing, a 24-month transitional provision.
Returning now to the IICE study, its final considerations section (page 74) states:
“b. Regarding the ‘transitional provision’ that would cover persons retiring within two years and the possibility of extending that transitional provision to persons retiring within five years.
An extension of the ‘transitional provision’ postpones the adjustments and therefore negatively affects the Fund’s income. A full actuarial analysis would be required to properly assess the effect of extending that transitional provision.
Furthermore, a decision in this direction could induce administrators and political actors to undertake efforts to include successively larger groups, such that a two-year ‘transitional provision’ would ultimately become a transitional provision of five, six, or even more years.
Finally, extending the transitional provision postpones some of the adjustments, and therefore analyses of the Fund’s profitability and solvency may create the impression that the adjustments that were implemented were ineffective.” Reference was also made (on pages 74 and 75) to the issue of gradually implementing the adjustments, as follows:
“f. Gradual implementation.
Questions have sometimes been raised as to whether the proposed adjustments, both to contributions and retirement ages, can be implemented gradually. The idea underlying these questions is to mitigate the cost of the adjustment for the participating population.
Having determined that the retirement and pension system currently in force for the Poder Judicial is insolvent, the IICE working team has considered it essential that the adjustments be made as soon as possible. As previously indicated, the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial is currently insolvent, and each day that the adjustment is postponed worsens the insolvency. In light of these guidelines, the IICE technical team does not consider the gradual implementation of adjustments appropriate.” The following conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing: a) the technical study did analyze scenarios that included the possibility of maintaining the eligibility requirements and benefits profile existing before the proposed reform for persons with 20 or more years of service, but concluded that this was not viable; b) this created the need to propose new scenarios that limited application of the previous profile to persons with 28 or more years of service (which would amount to a 24-month transitional provision); and c) regarding the possibility of extending that transitional provision to persons retiring within 5 years (which relates particularly to the claims asserted in constitutional challenge n.°22-0014613-0007-CO), the study itself does not recommend such an extension.
Additionally, it must be taken into account that the aforementioned IICE report—deliverable 6—used a cutoff date of December 2015, such that the 24-month transitional regime recommended in the study was intended to cover those persons who, by December 2017, had satisfied the requirements established in Ley N°7333; nevertheless, it should be noted that Ley N°9544 was enacted in 2018 and entered into force in May of that year, which means that, de facto, there was a 47-month transitional period (taking into account the time elapsed between the technical study’s cutoff date and the date on which the law was actually promulgated, as well as the 18-month period ultimately established in transitional provision VI). Likewise, that final adjustment from 24 to 18 months in the challenged transitional provision may be understood as justified because it partially offset the time elapsed between the cutoff date of the actuarial study conducted by the IICE—deliverable number 6—and the date on which Ley n.°9544 was enacted and promulgated. The foregoing was intended to ensure the effectiveness of the reform of the system.
When it enacted the transitional provision challenged as unconstitutional, the Asamblea Legislativa adhered to this Court’s consistent precedents and acted within reasonable parameters, with due and sufficient support from the technical criteria incorporated into the legislative record.
According to the 2015 actuarial study, there was an actuarial deficit of 6.37 trillion, which jeopardized its sustainability. Moreover, a first critical point for the system was projected for 2029, when the interest generated by the Fund’s reserves would begin to be used to meet its payment commitments. A second critical point was projected for 2040, as the first year in which it would be necessary to use the reserves to meet the Fund’s commitments; and a third critical point was projected for 2048, when the Fund would no longer be able to meet its commitments. This demonstrates the critical condition of the system at that time.
It must be emphasized that the crisis affecting pension systems is due to the inversion of the population pyramid, which particularly affects pay-as-you-go systems (regímenes de reparto).
The most recent actuarial study of the system, with a cutoff date of December 31, 2022 (entitled “Actuarial Valuation of the Poder Judicial Retirement and Pension System, 2022 Period” and available on the Superintendencia de Pensiones website), presents the following conclusions:
This even led the same study to recommend proposing a bill that would reduce the cost of benefits in payment, as follows:
Reduce the replacement rate from 80% to 50% for future survivorship benefits.
For 10 years, recognize 50% of inflation for benefits in payment.
It follows—and this is relevant to this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad)—that, although a reduction in the actuarial deficit (déficit actuarial) has been confirmed, the deficit has not yet been eliminated; consequently, the adoption of additional measures is even recommended to increase the Fund’s solvency and extend its payment capacity.
It must not be overlooked that this is a pay-as-you-go scheme (régimen de reparto), in which active workers—through their contributions—finance the payment of current retirement and pension benefits. It is therefore unreasonable and inconsistent with actuarial rules to draw on the Fund’s returns, because doing so means that there is a financial imbalance—the monthly payments of current retirement and pension benefits exceed the Fund’s contribution income—and, moreover, the Fund shrinks every day, resulting in a crisis that could lead to the scheme’s closure—an actuarial deficit.
Finding 33 provides the answer. In this regard, the president of Fondo de Pensiones refers to the actuarial study conducted by MBA Raúl Hernández González, which concludes:
“The following table summarizes the findings from each of the runs performed. The results shown include the number of additional persons who may benefit, as well as the total increase in the deficit. The corresponding balance sheet is included in the annexes:
(...) it is important to indicate that ... solvency is currently below one; therefore, any improvement in benefits would cause solvency to decline further.” Moreover, the president of Fondo de Pensiones clarifies that the figures are expressed in billions of colones; accordingly, for the final scenario involving a 10-year period and 2759 persons, the figure should be read as three hundred twenty-four billion eleven million colones, equivalent to an increase in the deficit of approximately six hundred three million dollars compared with the open scenario using a 1% growth rate, which served as the baseline under that actuarial valuation methodology. He also states that it must be clear that any extension of the period established in Transitory Provision VI (transitorio VI) would increase the expenditures and/or obligations borne by this scheme; accordingly, all scenarios show a deterioration in the relevant indicators, and the relief sought in this challenge would increase the deficit of the Régimen del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial –FJPPJ-, with relative increases ranging from 13.31 % to 87.65 % of that deficit.
He adds that, when the solvency-ratio indicator is assessed, it deteriorates relatively by between 1.57 % and 9.40 %. Finally, he concludes that both indicators show the same trend toward deterioration in the scheme’s financial health if any extension is granted.
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that, unlike judgments of the ordinary courts, whose effects are between the parties (inter-partes), judgments of the Constitutional Court have effects against all persons (erga omnes). The Court must therefore exercise extreme caution when deciding an issue, since it must give considerable weight to the effects in the political, economic, social, cultural, and other spheres. In this regard, judgment n.° 2000-7730 held as follows:
“Constitutional-law scholarship also observes that, when interpreting the content of a provision: ‘1) the purposive content of the Constitution, which is to guarantee human freedom and dignity, must prevail; 2) it must be interpreted according to a broad, liberal, and practical criterion; 3) the words of the Constitution must be interpreted in their general and ordinary sense, unless it is clear that the drafter of the provision intended a technical legal meaning; 4) it must be interpreted as a whole, as a harmonious body; 5) account must be taken of the social, economic, and political circumstances existing at the time the interpretation is made; 6) exceptions and privileges must be interpreted restrictively; and 7) public acts are presumed constitutional if they can be harmonized with the Fundamental Law through interpretation.’” (Boldface not in the original).
In light of the foregoing analysis, it may be concluded that the 18-month period established in the challenged transitory provision was reasonably based on the data produced by the relevant technical studies. By contrast, if this Chamber were to extend that period—as sought in this challenge—it would cause deterioration in the scheme’s financial health, which, even today, continues to show an actuarial deficit despite the favorable effects produced by the reform enacted through Ley nro. 9544.
Following the most authoritative scholarship on the subject, the Constitutional Chamber has a clear and precise understanding of consolidated legal situations (situaciones jurídicas consolidadas) and how they differ from vested rights (derechos adquiridos). Indeed, a situation is considered legally consolidated when the person satisfies the factual predicates—requirements—for obtaining a right; before that point, the person has only an expectancy of a right (expectativa de derecho). It differs from a vested right because the income has entered the person’s estate. Thus, under a retirement and pension scheme, a consolidated legal situation exists when the person meets all the statutory requirements for the retirement entitlement or pension to be granted. A vested right, in turn, exists with respect to income that enters the estate of retirees and pensioners. On this issue, the Constitutional Chamber has held as follows:
“The concepts of ‘vested right’ and ‘consolidated legal situation’ appear closely related in constitutional-law scholarship. It may be stated that, in general terms, the former denotes a consummated circumstance in which something—tangible or intangible, whether property previously belonging to another or a right that did not previously exist—has entered into (or affected) the person’s estate, such that the person experiences an ascertainable advantage or benefit. A ‘consolidated legal situation,’ in turn, represents not so much an increase in assets as a state of affairs fully defined in terms of its legal characteristics and effects, even if those effects have not yet come to an end. What matters with respect to a consolidated legal situation is not whether those effects continue, but rather that—by virtue of a statutory mandate or a judgment so declaring—a clear and defined rule has already come into legal existence connecting a factual predicate (conditioning fact) with a given consequence (conditioned effect).
From this perspective, the person’s situation is expressed through a logical proposition of the form ‘if..., then...’; that is, if the conditioning fact has occurred, then the ‘consolidated legal situation’ necessarily entails that the conditioned effect must also occur. In both cases (a vested right or a consolidated legal situation), the legal system protects—and renders inviolable—the position of the person who obtained the right or enjoys the situation, for reasons of equity and legal certainty. In this case, the constitutional guarantee of non-retroactivity of the law (irretroactividad de la ley) translates into the certainty that a change in the legal system cannot have the consequence of removing property or a right already vested from the person’s estate or of preventing the consequence—the beneficial consequence, it is understood—that the interested party expected from the consolidated legal situation from arising where the factual predicate occurred before the statutory reform.
Now, specifically with respect to the latter, it has also been understood that no one has a ‘right to the immutability of the legal system’; that is, a right to have the rules never change. Accordingly, the constitutional provision does not mean that, once it has come into legal existence, the rule connecting the fact to the effect cannot be amended or even repealed by a subsequent provision; rather, it means that—as explained—if the conditioning predicate has occurred, a statutory reform that changes or eliminates the rule cannot prevent the conditioned effect expected under the prior provision from arising. This is so because, as stated, what matters is that the state of affairs enjoyed by the person had already been defined as to its elements and effects, even if those effects are still occurring or have not yet begun to occur. Thus, what the person is entitled to is the consequence, not the rule.” (votos n.° 7331-97 y n.° 2765-97) (Emphasis not in the original) Accordingly, it is not legally appropriate to invoke a consolidated legal situation in this litigation, for the elementary reason that those who do not satisfy the retirement requirements do not fall within that category. At most, one may speak of a right in the process of being acquired (derecho en vía de adquisición), as will be discussed below.
Therefore, where there is an objective and reasonable justification supported by a technical study, the legislature is authorized under the Law of the Constitution (Derecho de la Constitución) to modify retirement and pension requirements, even by reducing the range of benefits, in order to ensure the financial and actuarial sustainability of the relevant scheme, because the collective interest must at all times prevail over individual interests.
Accordingly, the majority of the Constitutional Chamber concludes that there has been no violation of consolidated legal situations, for the simple reason that no such situations exist and, therefore, constitutional provision 34 has not been infringed.
As is well known, legitimate expectations (confianza legítima) is a concept coined in German Law (Vertrauensschutz), where it has constitutional status, deriving from the principle of legal certainty and, in other legal systems, also from the principle of good faith. This principle is longstanding. Indeed, as early as 1973, the Court of Justice of the European Community (CJEC), although it was not enshrined in the Founding Treaties, recognized it in matters concerning the civil service (As. 81/1972 del 5 de junio). According to legal scholarship, its proper interpretation and application require certain conditions:
In an instructive decision, judgment no. 5236-99, the Constitutional Court identified the following components of reasonableness:
“…this Court considers it appropriate to refer to what is understood as the ‘reasonableness of the law as a standard of constitutionality.’ It should first be recalled that the ‘reasonableness of the law’ arose as part of ‘substantive due process of law,’ a guarantee created by the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States of America in connection with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In its original conception, ‘due process’ was directed toward the procedural review of legislative acts and their effects on substantive rights. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, it had moved beyond the procedural conception from which it originated and had become an axiological mechanism limiting the actions of the legislative body. From that point onward, due process may be described as a general guarantee of liberty; that is, as a substantive guarantee. The evolution of ‘due process’ beyond a procedural guarantee is based primarily on the fact that even a law that has complied with the established procedure and is valid and effective may violate the Law of the Constitution.
To conduct the reasonableness inquiry, United States legal scholarship calls first for an examination of so-called ‘technical reasonableness,’ under which the specific provision—law, regulation, etc.—is examined. Once it has been established that the chosen provision is appropriate for regulating a particular subject matter, it must be determined whether the means selected are proportionate to the objective sought. After the ‘technical reasonableness’ criterion has been satisfied, ‘legal reasonableness’ must be analyzed. For this purpose, this body of scholarship proposes examining: a) balancing reasonableness (razonabilidad ponderativa), a type of legal assessment applied when a particular obligation (e.g., a tax) is required on the basis of a given antecedent (e.g., income), in which case it must be determined whether the obligation is equivalent or proportionate; b) equality-based reasonableness (razonabilidad de igualdad), a type of legal assessment based on the premise that equal antecedents must have equal consequences, without arbitrary exceptions; and c) purpose-based reasonableness (razonabilidad en el fin): at this stage, it is assessed whether the objective sought is inconsistent with the purposes established in the Constitution.
Within this same analysis, it is not enough to state that a means is reasonably suited to an end; it is also necessary to determine the nature and extent of the limitation that a personal right must bear as a result of that means. Thus, if the same end can be achieved through another means that imposes a less burdensome limitation on personal rights, the means chosen is not reasonable (to similar effect, see judgments numbers 1738-92, de las once horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del primero de julio de mil novecientos noventa y dos and 08858-98 de las dieciséis horas con treinta y tres minutos del quince de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y ocho). German legal scholarship made an important contribution to the subject of ‘reasonableness’ by clearly identifying its components: legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense. It develops these concepts by stating that ‘...Legitimacy refers to the requirement that the objective pursued by the challenged act or provision must not, at the very least, be legally prohibited; suitability means that the challenged State measure must be capable of effectively achieving the intended objective; necessity means that, among several measures equally capable of achieving that objective, the competent authority must choose the one that interferes as little as possible with the person’s legal sphere; and proportionality in the strict sense provides that, in addition to the requirement that the provision be suitable and necessary, what it mandates must not be disproportionate to the intended objective; that is, it must not impose an ‘unreasonable demand’ on the individual...” (judgment of this Chamber number 3933-98 de las nueve horas cincuenta y nueve minutos del doce de junio de mil novecientos noventa y ocho).
Consistent with the foregoing standard, this Chamber has applied the doctrine in its case law. We now turn to the analysis of the specific case. Regarding the ‘reasonableness’ test: To undertake a reasonableness review of a provision, the Constitutional Court requires the party to submit evidence, or at least grounds for judgment, supporting its argument. The same procedural burden rests upon the party contesting the arguments raised in the action, and failure to satisfy these requirements renders the claims of unconstitutionality inadmissible. This is because it is not possible to conduct a ‘reasonableness’ analysis without a coherent line of argument supported by evidence. This applies, of course, except in cases where the ‘unreasonableness’ is evident and manifest. Returning to the claim that the eighteen-month period for applying for an ordinary pension is unreasonable, the Chamber notes that the claimants not only fail to state the reasons leading them to conclude that the challenged provision is unreasonable, but also fail to submit any evidence that would permit this Court to reach that conclusion, thereby reducing the dispute to an exposition of subjective views.
Furthermore, the case does not constitute a situation of evident and manifest ‘unreasonableness’ that is also readily apparent. Rather, it may be stated in the abstract that the provision is consistent with the purpose of the legislative reform, namely, to correct the distortions in the repealed pension system while simultaneously creating a new system that safeguards the ‘right to belong to the National Teachers’ Pension Scheme,’ which this Chamber has recognized as a right of contributors.” (The bold text does not appear in the original).
For its part, the second principle, proportionality, entails that a legislative act must be appropriate for achieving its underlying purposes (principle of suitability); it must be necessary, meaning that it must impose the fewest possible restrictions on the fundamental rights of the inhabitants of the Republic. This presupposes that the means employed by the legislature must be appropriate and necessary to achieve the proposed objective and can be considered necessary only when the legislature could not have chosen another equally effective means that did not restrict the fundamental right or restricted it to a lesser degree. Finally, it must be proportionate in the strict sense; that is, a legislative act precisely tailored to its purpose. (See, among other decisions of the Constitutional Court, judgment no. 1739-92 and judgment no. 5236-99).
Taking the foregoing as a frame of reference, it must be borne in mind that the law enacted by the Legislative Assembly is supported by an objective and reasonable justification—preventing the special system from becoming insolvent. For that purpose, it relied on a technical actuarial study, the sixth deliverable of which did not support a transitional provision lasting 5 or more years. There is no doubt that the measures adopted by the Legislative Assembly, including Transitional Provision VI, were suited to the objective—resolving the actuarial deficit of the Judiciary’s retirement and pension system. Proof of this is the fact that the deficit was substantially reduced, although, according to the latest actuarial study, it still persists. This means that the challenged provision proved effective—the parliamentary legislative act was appropriate for achieving the intended objective. Finally, the fact that the legislature chose a period of 18 months instead of 24 does not, in itself, render the challenged provision unconstitutional, for the basic reason that this legislative act falls within a reasonable parameter according to the actuarial study—deliverable six—and therefore it cannot be maintained that the most burdensome solution was chosen for those who had a right in the process of vesting (derecho en vía de adquisición).
This is so much the case that, nearly six years after the law entered into force, the actuarial deficit has still not been eliminated; instead, the new study proposes the adoption of a series of measures, as described above, to achieve the system’s sustainability.
The Colombian Constitutional Court has held that the “replacement of one provision by another requires a transitional regime (régimen de transición). The existence of transitional provisions is indispensable in pension-related social-security legislation because there are rights in the process of vesting. This is a statutory right (derecho ex lege) because it arises from a provision that expressly establishes it and sets reasonable criteria for benefiting from the exception. Once the provision establishing the transitional regime enters into force, persons who meet the requirements for obtaining that benefit consolidate a specific legal position (situación jurídica concreta) that cannot be impaired. It is also a genuine subjective right (derecho subjetivo) that entitles its holder to have the benefit recognized under the conditions established in the prior legislation and to seek relief before the courts in the event of noncompliance.
Moreover, because rights arising from social security are inalienable (irrenunciables), (articles 48 and 53 of the Political Constitution), a transitional regime is all the more necessary” (judgment T-235/02). By establishing Transitional Provision VI—a period of eighteen months from the law’s entry into force—the Legislative Assembly respects the rights in the process of vesting of officials who were approaching retirement, since they may qualify for the fundamental right to retirement under the rules of the amended legislation. It should be noted that the foreign court’s judgment does not set a period for protecting these rights in the process of vesting, nor could such a period be set, because the analysis must be conducted on a case-by-case basis. In the case at hand (sub lite), the actuarial studies—deliverable number 6—consistently established that a transitional period of neither ten nor five years was sustainable, but at most one of twenty-four months.
Accordingly, based on a technical criterion, it cannot be maintained that rights in the process of vesting are being infringed. It must be borne in mind that rights of this kind are conditional upon a technical criterion, which, in this case, does not support granting them. Nor is the argument persuasive that, based on the technical criterion, the transitional period had to be twenty-four months rather than eighteen. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that a legislative act, unlike an administrative act, is one in which the legislature enjoys, by express mandate of Constitutional Law (Derecho de la Constitución), a broad margin of discretion. Accordingly, it would be unreasonable and undemocratic to argue that parliamentary discretion is subject to the rules governing administrative discretion, namely, general principles of law, determinative facts, and indeterminate legal concepts.
Such a thesis would be contrary to the most elementary rules of democracy and would therefore lead us into the “tyranny of technocracy.” Those who exercise legislative power, as provided in numeral 105, have broad latitude to adopt fundamental policy decisions through legislative acts, provided that they respect Constitutional Law; this is the limit—there is no other, much less the one designed for the exercise of administrative discretion. The foregoing means that although this Chamber has held that the legislature must rely on technical studies in matters involving retirement and pensions, those studies, in all their dimensions, are not binding upon it; it may choose other solutions that are reasonable and constitute a valid response to the problem addressed by the bill. In the case at hand, when exercising its legislative power, the legislature faced a problem of enormous proportions—the insolvency of the retirement and pension system—and, in legislating, enacted the provisions it considered most appropriate for resolving it.
Indeed, time has shown that the measures adopted have almost entirely resolved the problem, since the actuarial deficit has been substantially reduced, as demonstrated by the latest study. Therefore, the assertion that the legislature acted unconstitutionally by adopting the eighteen-month period rather than the twenty-four-month period is not persuasive. It should be noted that the legislature’s action was neither irrational nor disproportionate, given how close the two periods were. Moreover, reference should be made to the point previously stated: the adjustment from twenty-four to eighteen months may be understood as justified by the time elapsed between the cutoff date of the actuarial study conducted by IICE—deliverable number 6—and the date on which Law No. 9544 was ultimately passed and enacted. Accordingly, the majority of the Court finds that the rights in the process of vesting of Judiciary employees who had belonged to the special system for twenty or more years were not infringed, because those rights were respected to the extent reasonably possible.
It is alleged that the challenged provision violates several international human-rights treaties and ILO conventions. To properly understand the majority’s position, a number of basic concepts concerning the international commitments undertaken by the State of Costa Rica must be considered. Otherwise, a distorted view of the issue may result. First, it must be emphasized that treaties concerning economic, social, and cultural rights (derechos económicos, sociales y culturales)—hereinafter ESCR—make their effectiveness conditional upon each State’s economic capacity and the principle of progressive realization (principio de progresividad). This follows from Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights, which provides as follows:
Article 26 Progressive Development The States Parties undertake to adopt measures, both domestically and through international cooperation, especially economic and technical cooperation, with a view to progressively achieving the full realization of the rights derived from the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, to the extent of available resources, through legislation or other appropriate means.
For its part, Article 1 of the protocol to the aforementioned convention—the Protocol of San Salvador—provides as follows:
Article 1 Obligation to Adopt Measures The States Parties to this Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights undertake to adopt the necessary measures, both domestically and through cooperation among the States, especially economic and technical cooperation, to the fullest extent allowed by their available resources and taking into account their degree of development, in order to progressively achieve, in accordance with domestic legislation, the full realization of the rights recognized in this Protocol.
As may be observed, with respect to ESCR, international human-rights instruments do not impose immediate obligations upon States that must be fulfilled, because international commitments are to be achieved progressively and according to the availability of each State’s resources. Accordingly, when these provisions are invoked, these conditions must be clearly understood. Indeed, a closer analysis of the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights shows that, taking the above-mentioned conditions as its frame of reference, the intent of the contracting parties makes only the rights to unionization and education justiciable before the inter-American human-rights system, precisely to prevent States from being subjected to judgments that would contradict the principles of progressive realization and availability of resources. Accordingly, the majority of the Court emphasizes that merely citing an international provision or convention is insufficient unless the aforementioned prerequisites have also been taken into account.
This way of viewing the issue is consistent with the position adopted by this Court in the advisory opinion issued in response to the consultation regarding the bill for the Strengthening of Public Finances (file No. 18-016546-0007-CO), in which the Constitutional Chamber articulated the concept of the feasible social rule-of-law State (Estado social de derecho posible), meaning one that the State can finance with the resources available at a particular historical moment. These positions—both those of the international instruments and that of the Constitutional Chamber—are especially relevant to the sustainability of retirement and pension systems. In this area, under the fund-protection principle (principio pro fondo), the rights of the community take precedence over any individual or group interest. Hence, the State and its institutions have a duty to design, adopt, and implement public policies to ensure the financial and actuarial sustainability of these systems, so that all retirees and pensioners are effectively guaranteed their monthly income in accordance with the respective laws or resolutions of collegial bodies—as occurs with the IVM.
This means that the financial and actuarial sustainability of retirement and pension systems is fully consistent with international instruments because, through such sustainability, the fundamental right to retirement or a pension is guaranteed as a safeguard of a broader social and economic right: the right to social security.
In another vein, it is also necessary to bear in mind that international human rights instruments may be invoked as binding on the State of Costa Rica only if they satisfy a sine qua non requirement: that they have been ratified, which, under the Law of the Constitution (Derecho de la Constitución), entails their negotiation and signature by the Poder Ejecutivo, their approval by the Asamblea Legislativa, their ratification by the Poder Ejecutivo, and their entry into force in accordance with the provisions of the international agreement. It is important to bear in mind the provisions of section 1° of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, to the effect that it protects the human rights arising from international instruments in force in the State of Costa Rica. In this regard, the provision is clear and precise; no different conclusion can be drawn from it unless one intends to act contrary to its ethos.
This issue is of the utmost importance to the State of Costa Rica in several respects. First, the State of Costa Rica cannot be accused of violating an international human rights instrument when that instrument has not been ratified. A contrary position would not be accepted by any international tribunal and would run counter to the most basic doctrine of public international law (derecho internacional público). Second, where no international obligation exists, treaties not ratified by the State of Costa Rica cannot be invoked as the source of a particular right. This Court would be ill-advised to accept such a position, because it would be usurping the powers granted by the Law of the Constitution to the Poder Ejecutivo and the Legislativo; consequently, it cannot be asserted that a provision of an unratified treaty is being violated, and therefore, as regards this argument, the majority of this Court considers that it must be rejected.
Finally, it must be borne in mind that when the Constitution assigns the Asamblea Legislativa the power to approve international treaties, except for lower-ranking protocols derived from them, it establishes a legal institution (instituto jurídico) connected to democracy, since what fundamentally underlies it is that the Asamblea Legislativa, a fundamental body of the social and democratic state governed by the rule of law (Estado social y democrático de derecho)—there is no democracy without a parliament—exercise democratic oversight over the commitments undertaken by the Costa Rican State before the international community. In a matter of such significance, the aim is to ensure that it is debated by a pluralistic, representative, and open body, in full view of the country’s inhabitants, and thereby to adopt the best decision for the national interest. Only after this parliamentary decision and the Poder Ejecutivo’s sanction and order of publication may this Court apply the provisions of international human rights agreements, not before.
Another aspect that the majority of the Court cannot disregard is that merely invoking a series of international instruments ratified by Costa Rica and citing their provisions while alleging a possible violation is insufficient; whoever does so must demonstrate that the provision actually says what they claim it says. Nor is it legally appropriate to cite provisions of international agreements that concern or regulate other subject matters, because the provisions cited must relate to the subject matter of the dispute (litis), since the principle of specialty (principio de especialidad) governs in these areas.
In the case at hand (sub lite), action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) n.°19-024589-0007-CO alleges a violation of articles 26 of the Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, 14 of the Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, and 9 of the Pacto Internacional de los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales. However, when the respective claims of unconstitutionality are developed, express reference is made only to section 26 of the Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos and not to the other two provisions, regarding which no further argument is presented apart from a general reference to the right to social security. As to article 26 of the Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, the proper understanding thereof in the matter under adjudication (sub judice) has already been explained—in this same section. Regarding the right to social security, it bears reiterating what has already been stated—also in this section and in the preceding ones—to the effect that the challenged provision—as part of the reform of the Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, and with the effective and demonstrated purpose of ensuring its financial and actuarial sustainability, supported by the relevant technical criteria—far from violating that right, effectively guarantees it. The same must be said with respect to action n.°22-014613-0007-CO, which also alleges a violation of article 9 of the Pacto Internacional de los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales.
Moreover, both the filing instituting action of unconstitutionality n.°19-024589-0007-CO and that instituting action of unconstitutionality n.°22-014613-0007-CO allege a violation of Conventions 102, 118, 128, and 157 of the Organización Internacional del Trabajo. In the case of the first action, however, no further duly individualized analysis or argument is presented concerning the alleged violation of those conventions. It merely states in general terms that the Organización Internacional de Trabajo has indicated the need for an adequate technical assessment before changes may be made to a pension scheme. A similar situation arises with the second action because, despite a general allegation that those instruments were violated, the applicants’ objections are ultimately limited—essentially—to claiming that Conventions 102 and 128 establish the right to retirement and that Conventions 118 and 157 provide that States must “endeavor to participate in a system for preserving acquired rights and rights in the process of being acquired.” It is argued, in this respect, that the challenged transitional provision (transitorio) was enacted without protecting rights in the process of being acquired in a graduated and proportionate manner and without a technical study requiring such action, thereby rendering the legislative decision arbitrary.
All these objections have already been duly resolved in the preceding sections. As stated, the right to participate in a pension scheme cannot be confused with a right to prevent changes to the retirement and pension benefits granted to a person at a particular time, which may reasonably be modified when actuarial studies so require. In the case at hand, both the general reform of the Régimen de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial through Ley n.°9544 and, specifically, the period of 18 months provided for in its transitorio VI had an objective and reasonable justification, supported by a technical study, for the purpose of ensuring the financial and actuarial sustainability of the relevant scheme.
As a corollary to the foregoing, the action must also be dismissed with respect to this section.
The principle of equality (principio de igualdad) entails, as the Sala Constitucional has recognized in numerous decisions, that all persons in the same situation must be treated equally. Moreover:
“The principle of equality, enshrined in Article 33 of the Constitución Política, does not mean that equal treatment must be afforded in every case without regard to any potentially distinguishing factors of legal relevance; in other words, not every inequality necessarily constitutes discrimination. As the Sala has stated, equality is violated only when the inequality lacks an objective and reasonable justification. Moreover, the justification for the act considered unequal must be evaluated in relation to its purpose and effects, such that there must necessarily be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the purpose itself. That is, equality must be understood in light of the circumstances present in each specific case in which it is invoked; accordingly, the universal application of the law does not prohibit different solutions for different situations by means of differential treatment. All the foregoing means that equality before the law cannot entail substantive equality or genuine and effective economic equality” (see decisions n.°1770-94 and n.°1045-94).
The issue is to determine whether this difference in treatment is based on constitutionally legitimate purposes; whether it is objective—that is, whether it is supported by a different factual premise; whether it is based on relevant differences (tertium comparationis); whether there is proportionality between the constitutional purpose and the differential treatment applied, as well as between the grounds for and the content of the act; and whether that treatment is suitable for achieving the objective pursued.
In the first scenario, the difference in treatment must be based on constitutionally legitimate objectives, which entails three consequences concerning the purpose pursued. First, laws may not pursue purposes that contradict the Law of the Constitution or the provisions contained in international human rights instruments. Second, when purposes that are not constitutionally protected but do not contradict constitutional values and principles are pursued, the difference in treatment must be strictly scrutinized in relation to the factual premises justifying it and the purpose pursued. Finally, when a constitutionally protected purpose is pursued, the difference in treatment will be valid provided that it satisfies the criteria of reasonableness and proportionality and is necessary.
In decision n.°4883-97, the Sala Constitucional stated the following regarding this principle:
“The principle of equality, enshrined in Article 33 of the Constitución Política, does not mean that equal treatment must be afforded in every case without regard to any potentially distinguishing factors of legal relevance; in other words, not every inequality necessarily constitutes discrimination. As this Sala has stated, equality is violated only when the inequality lacks an objective and reasonable justification. Moreover, the justification for the act considered unequal must be evaluated in relation to its purpose and effects, such that there must necessarily be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the purpose itself. That is, equality must be understood in light of the circumstances present in each specific case in which it is invoked; accordingly, the universal application of the law does not prohibit different solutions for different situations through differential treatment. All the foregoing means that equality before the law cannot entail substantive equality or genuine and effective economic equality.’ (Decision number 6832-95 of 16:15 hours on 13 de diciembre de 1995).” (Boldface not in the original).
There are sufficient grounds to conclude that there is no violation of the principle of equality and nondiscrimination (principio de igualdad y no discriminación), as alleged. First, there is no doubt that, through the challenged provision, the legislature seeks to fulfill a legitimate constitutional purpose, namely, to ensure the sustainability of the special retirement and pension scheme (régimen especial de jubilaciones y pensiones) of the Poder Judicial and thereby guarantee the fundamental right of individuals to a dignified retirement or pension. Second, as established by the actuarial study (estudio actuarial) in deliverable six, there is an objective and reasonable justification for the Asamblea Legislativa’s adoption of the provision now being challenged; consequently, it cannot be legally maintained that the principle of equality and nondiscrimination has been violated. Third, there is no doubt that those who fall within the eighteen-month period following the entry into force of the law are in a different situation from those who do not; therefore, because the factual situations are different, the legal treatment must also be different.
Finally, consistent with the case law of this Chamber, under which a person alleging a violation of the principle of equality and nondiscrimination bears the burden of performing the reasonableness test (test de razonabilidad), nothing in the arguments submitted by the petitioners demonstrates a violation in this regard.
In particular, the petitioners (action n.°19-024589-0007-CO) allege that amendments to other retirement schemes existing in Costa Rica included transitional provisions (normas transitorias) with longer or staggered periods, unlike Transitional Provision VI of Law n.°9544, which established a single period of 18 months that they consider excessively short. They allege that this is discriminatory. However, it must be reiterated, as explained in the preceding sections, that the aforementioned period of 18 months was reasonably established in view of the specific financial condition of the Régimen de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial. Nor can it be expected that the different pension schemes and any amendments thereto will be regulated in an entirely identical manner, wholly irrespective of or abstracted from the particular characteristics of each scheme. On this subject, this Chamber has stated that:
“(...) the existence of various pension schemes—including, specifically, the pension and retirement scheme of the Poder Judicial—is not unconstitutional, each having ‘its own special regulations—in an effort to guarantee the very existence of the scheme, as well as its own administration—’ (judgment no. 2020-02841 at 9:40 horas on 12 de febrero de 2020) and its ‘own legal rules and criteria for granting the constitutional right to retirement and a pension’ (judgment no. No. 2084-96 at 14:30 hrs. on 07 de mayo de 1996). This criterion was recently reiterated in judgment no. 2021-011957 at 17:00 horas on 25 de mayo de 2021, which upheld the constitutional validity of an exclusive scheme for employees of the Poder Judicial as a special scheme that is independent of and different from the basic scheme, with its own eligibility requirements intended to guarantee its solvency and operation. This does not entail a violation of the principle of equality.” (judgment n.° 2022-010593).
The petitioners (action n.°19-024589-0007-CO) also claim that they were subjected to discriminatory treatment relative to employees of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones because—according to the allegation—the latter were granted an unrestricted right to recognition of their retirement conditions, even though the applicable regulations had been repealed, regardless of how long it might take them to fulfill those requirements. This was established in Transitional Provision II of Law n.°9544. However, this Chamber already ruled on this issue in the above-cited judgment n.°2021-11957, which held that:
“LXIII.—Justice Hernández López, authoring. Regarding the challenge to Transitional Provision II of Law No. 9544.—Transitional Provision II of Law number 9544 provides as follows:
“TRANSITIONAL PROVISION II—The employees of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones referred to in article 242 of Ley N° 7333 Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, of 5 de mayo de 1993, as amended, who contributed to the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial before the entry into force of this law shall not be adversely affected by this amendment, and their rights acquired in good faith (derechos adquiridos de buena fe) shall be respected at all times. Nevertheless, they are authorized to request, under the terms set forth in articles 226 and 234 of this law, reimbursement of the employee, State, and employer contributions made to the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, so that they may transfer to the Régimen de Pensiones, Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS), should they so desire.” The petitioners argue that judicial employees are subjected to discriminatory treatment concerning the treatment of acquired rights (derechos adquiridos), as compared with employees of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones who contribute to the Régimen de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial.
They contrast the different treatment adopted by the legislature concerning acquired rights because, without any objective reason justifying it, preferential and advantageous treatment was provided to those employees who, although belonging to the Régimen de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial, work for the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, since they were granted an unrestricted right to remain in that scheme, but under the repealed regulations, regardless of how long it might take them to fulfill those requirements. It is argued that the transitional provision is wholly discriminatory because it distinguishes among members of the Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, some of whom work for the Poder Judicial and others for the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, while the latter will receive greater benefits than the former. With respect to that distinction, the petitioners question the need for such differential treatment and therefore request that Transitional Provision II of Law number 9544 be declared unconstitutional for violating the principle of equality and nondiscrimination contained in article 33 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). Regarding this specific issue, the reporting parties in this action have expressed no opinion.
LXIV.—Justice Hernández López continues authoring. The issue raised here was reviewed by the Chamber in connection with the optional legislative consultation (consulta legislativa facultativa) submitted at the time by members of the Asamblea Legislativa concerning the bill that became Law number 9544. In judgment 2018-5758, which answered that consultation, the Chamber stated as follows:
“XX.—Regarding Transitional Provision II of the bill under consultation. Finally, the consulting parties consider Transitional Provision II of the bill under consultation to be contrary to constitutional article 33 because it establishes a privilege for employees of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. That provision states as follows:
TRANSITIONAL PROVISION II—The employees of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones referred to in article 242 of Ley N.°7333, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, of 5 de mayo de 1993, as amended, who contributed to the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial before the entry into force of this law shall not be adversely affected by this amendment, and their rights acquired in good faith shall be respected at all times. Nevertheless, they are authorized to request, under the terms set forth in articles 226 and 234 of this law, reimbursement of the employee, State, and employer contributions made to the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, so that they may transfer to the Régimen de Pensiones, Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS), should they so desire.
Before analyzing the alleged defect, the Chamber considers it necessary to address the concepts of acquired rights and vested legal situations (situaciones jurídicas consolidadas). In this regard, judgment number 2765-97 at 15:03 on 20 de mayo de 1997 stated, insofar as relevant, as follows:
“The concepts of ‘acquired rights’ and ‘vested legal situations’ are closely related in constitutional doctrine. It may be said that, in general terms, the former denotes a completed circumstance in which something—whether tangible or intangible, and whether an asset previously belonging to another or a previously nonexistent right—has entered into or affected a person’s patrimonial sphere, such that the person obtains a demonstrable advantage or benefit. A ‘vested legal situation,’ in turn, represents not so much an increase in assets as a state of affairs fully defined in terms of its legal characteristics and effects, even if those effects have not yet ceased. What matters with respect to a vested legal situation is not whether those effects continue, but rather that—by virtue of a statutory mandate or a judgment so declaring—a clear and definite rule has already come into legal existence connecting a factual predicate (conditioning event) with a given consequence (conditioned effect).
From this perspective, the person’s situation is expressed by a logical proposition of the form ‘if..., then...’; that is, if the conditioning event has occurred, then the ‘vested legal situation’ necessarily entails that the conditioned effect must also occur. In both cases—acquired rights or vested legal situations—the legal system protects the situation of the person who obtained the right or enjoys the situation, rendering it inviolable for reasons of equity and legal certainty (certeza jurídica).” An examination of the challenged provision shows that it does not contain the alleged defect because, contrary to what the consulting parties appear to understand, it is not intended to create a situation for employees of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones that differs from that of the other contributors to the Fund, but solely to protect rights acquired in good faith. Accordingly, the transitional provision does not in any way establish that the amendment to the Régimen de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial is inapplicable to the employees to whom it refers, as they too will be affected by it.
This is demonstrated by the fact that the article itself gives them the option of transferring to the Régimen de Pensiones, Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, should they so desire. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber rejects the contention that the challenged provision grants employees of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones an acquired right to remain under the current conditions of the Régimen de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial and therefore rejects the consulting parties’ allegation.” (2018-5758 of 12 de abril de 2018) This time, those bringing the challenge represent a large number of participants in the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial and provide reasons and arguments supporting the position that, contrary to the Chamber’s understanding at that time, the text does create differential treatment that warrants renewed review because it is understood to contravene the principle of equality.
LXV.- Justice Hernández López is the author of this opinion. Regarding Transitory Provision II of Ley 9544 and the principles of equality and non-discrimination. As an initial important element supporting this decision, it must be borne in mind what Article 242 of Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial number 7333 provided prior to its amendment, since the challenged Transitory Provision II refers to that article:
“ARTICLE 242.- The Justices of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and the Director of the Registro Civil who, prior to their election, were attorneys serving as judicial officers, with more than five years of service, may remain covered by the Retirement and Pension Plan (Plan de Jubilaciones y Pensiones) under this Law, and the time they serve in those institutions shall be credited as though it had been served in the Poder Judicial. Those officials shall continue contributing as required by Article 236 of this Law. Said Justices shall receive the same benefits as the Justices of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, and the Director of the Registro shall receive the benefits provided for judges, under equal circumstances. In such cases, the State must pay on behalf of those officials the contribution specified in subsection 2 of the aforementioned Article 236, calculated on the amount allocated in the general expenditure budget for their salaries at the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and the Registro Civil.
This contribution shall be deposited as indicated in the aforementioned subsection 2.” A review of the legislative history shows that this provision was included in the general amendment made in 1993 to the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial and established an exception for attorney judicial officers who, after at least five years of service in the Poder Judicial and contributions to the Poder Judicial retirement and pension system (régimen de jubilaciones y pensiones), were appointed as Justices of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones or to the position of Director of the Registro Civil. That exception consisted of allowing the aforementioned public servants to remain participants in the Poder Judicial Retirement and Pension System—to which they had contributed for at least five years—provided that they continued paying their corresponding contribution; it was also established that they would receive the same benefits as the Justices of the Poder Judicial and, in the case of the Director of the Registro Civil, those of a judge.
The State was also ordered to budget and deposit the funds corresponding to its contribution, based on the salaries received at the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. It follows from that text that those who chose at the time to remain participants in the Poder Judicial system did so under the same terms and conditions as the other participants; that is, on the one hand, “those officials shall continue contributing as required by Article 236 of this Law…,” in the words of the provision, and, on the other hand, regarding the system’s benefits, it ordered that: “Said Justices shall receive the same benefits as the Justices of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, and the Director of the Registro shall receive the benefits provided for judges, under equal circumstances.” Now, when Ley number 9544 was enacted, extensively modifying the Poder Judicial Retirement and Pension System, the Legislature, among other things, increased the burdens on participants and reduced the benefits to be received, all in the interest of the system’s sustainability.
Transitory Provision II was also introduced, preserving the option granted in 1993 for the aforementioned public servants either to transfer their contributions to the Disability, Old Age, and Death System (Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte) of the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social or to remain participants in the Poder Judicial system. Nevertheless, if they decided to remain participants in the Poder Judicial Fund (Fondo del Poder Judicial), a condition not applicable to the Fund’s other participants was added in their favor: “this amendment shall not be applied to their detriment, and their rights acquired in good faith (derechos adquiridos de buena fe) must be respected at all times.” It is on this last point that the petitioners find a discriminatory provision, because they contend that, as judicial employees, they are governed by Transitory Provision VI of Ley number 9544, which defines the status of active judicial employees who have been contributing to the Fund and distinguishes between those covered by the repealed law (that is, those to whom the new rules will not be applied to their detriment) and those to whom the new rules will apply without qualification:
“TRANSITORY PROVISION VI- Judicial employees who satisfy the requirements for acquiring the right to a pension under the text of Title IX of Ley N.º 7333, of 5 de mayo de 1993, within eighteen months following the promulgation of this Law may retire under the provisions set forth in the aforementioned text.” It follows from the foregoing that, for purposes of determining the applicable rules, two separate categories of active employees participating in the Fund were created: one comprising judicial employees who “satisfy the requirements for acquiring the right to a pension under the text of Title IX of Ley N.º 7333, of 5 de mayo de 1993, within eighteen months following the promulgation of this Law,” who may retire under the requirements of the former system; and the other comprising all other judicial employees who do not satisfy that condition, to whom the new rules apply. However, the interested parties assert that the employees mentioned in Article 242 of the repealed Law who decide to remain in the Poder Judicial Retirement and Pension System will receive different treatment, because they were placed in a different third category, reflected in the following language of Transitory Provision II of Ley number 9544: “this amendment shall not be applied to their detriment, and their rights acquired in good faith must be respected at all times.” LXVI.- Justice Hernández López continues as the author of this opinion.
Under the terms set forth above, the Sala concludes that the provision is not necessarily unconstitutional, but it is unclear and must therefore be interpreted in accordance with the Sala’s precedent contained in judgment number 2018-5758, in which the Tribunal held that no difference in treatment could be afforded in favor of the employees mentioned in Article 242 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, because:
“…contrary to what those requesting the consultation appear to understand, it is not intended to create, for the benefit of officials of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, a situation different from that of the other contributors to the Fund, but only to protect those rights acquired in good faith. In that regard, the Transitory Provision does not provide in any way that the amendment to the Poder Judicial Pension and Retirement System (Régimen de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial) is inapplicable to the officials to whom it refers, because they too will be affected by it, as demonstrated by the fact that the article itself gives them the option, should they so wish, to transfer to the Pension, Disability, Old Age, and Death System (Régimen de Pensiones, Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte) of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.” (Cited judgment number 2018-5758) Thus, the majority of this Tribunal agrees that the correct interpretation of the phrase “this amendment shall not be applied” would mean that it refers to persons who have vested their right to retirement or a pension, but not to active persons who have not fulfilled the retirement requirements, since the amendments introduced by the challenged Law apply to the latter in their entirety. Accordingly, persons falling within this latter situation are under the same conditions as active employees of the Poder Judicial, and there is therefore no violation of the principle of equality.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the mere mention of and reference to acquired rights in the aforementioned Transitory Provision II is not constitutionally illegitimate or contrary to the principle of equality, provided that the expression is understood within the context and meaning described in the relevant recital (considerando) of judgment 2018-5758; namely, that the employees mentioned in the disputed Transitory Provision II enjoy acquired rights as participants in the Poder Judicial Retirement and Pension Fund (Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial), but to the same extent and on an equal footing with the other participants who work directly for the Poder Judicial. Therefore, the mere statement that the acquired rights of the employees mentioned in the disputed Transitory Provision II will be respected has not created a different category from that of the Fund’s other participants, because, as a constitutional imperative, the acquired rights of all participants without exception, as applicable and even if not expressly stated, must be respected under the terms and conditions established by this Tribunal through its case law on pension matters.
In that specific sense, the mere abstract reference to respecting the acquired rights of one group of participants in no way entails an actual change in their rights and obligations that distinguishes them from the other participants, as explained in legislative consultation 2018-5758.” L) VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY, SOLIDARITY, LEGAL CERTAINTY, GOOD FAITH, EQUITY, TRANSPARENCY, RELATIVE INVIOLABILITY OF PROPERTY, NON-CONFISCATION, AND EQUALITY IN THE BEARING OF PUBLIC BURDENS. The petitioners also allege an infringement of those principles. Nevertheless, a comprehensive reading of the two initiating submissions shows that their arguments ultimately revolve around the same objection: they allege that there was an abrupt, severe, discriminatory, and arbitrary change in the retirement requirements and benefits, gravely affecting their life plans even though they were only a few years away from acquiring the concrete right to a pension.
However, that argument has already been analyzed and rejected in the preceding sections, which concluded that the conduct of the Asamblea Legislativa was neither arbitrary nor senseless but, on the contrary, validly contributed to the sustainability of the Poder Judicial retirement system, in due compliance with the constitutional principles of proportionality and reasonableness and through the timely protection of the right to social security itself. It has also been determined that the principles of legitimate expectations (confianza legítima) were not infringed, nor were the rights in the process of being acquired (derechos en vías de adquisición) of judicial employees who had participated in the special system for 20 or more years violated, because, in establishing the 18-month period in Transitory Provision VI, the Asamblea Legislativa adhered to this Tribunal’s consistent precedents and acted within reasonable parameters, with due and sufficient support from the technical criteria incorporated into the legislative record (expediente legislativo).
Ultimately, it must be reiterated that the majority of this Court, in the above-cited judgment no.2021-11957, already ruled that the reform of the retirement system (régimen jubilatorio) of the Poder Judicial—implemented through Law no. 9544 of April 24, 2018—and, in general, the modification of the requirements and conditions imposed on judicial employees to qualify for ordinary and early retirement, far from being arbitrary, capricious, unfounded, or discriminatory, responded to the genuine need to ensure the solvency of the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, and that such changes were made “within the legitimate constitutional framework for legislative action in retirement matters,” based on “adequate technical support.” The majority of this Court concluded that those modifications to the requirements and parameters for granting retirement benefits—both ordinary and early—to judicial employees were constitutionally valid as reasonable and proportionate measures to ensure the fund’s solvency, stability, and permanence, in light of the technical criteria submitted to the respective legislative record (expediente legislativo). In summary, it stated:
“(...) the changes made were necessary precisely to ensure the sustainability of the special retirement and pension system for judicial employees, the collapse of which would genuinely have posed a serious threat to the economic stability of the administrators of justice. Equally important in rejecting the claim is the fact that the legislatively established modifications were not the product of unfounded arbitrariness on the part of legislators, but were adopted on the basis of technical criteria, with broad participation by the interested persons, and were neither sudden nor capricious, and were based on technical criteria. In that regard, the Chamber considers that the new pension system, as the first pillar of the broader social security framework covering administrators of justice in a manner similar to other workers, ensures them a measure of economic security.”
Fully consistent with the foregoing, it must be emphasized—once again—that the 18-month period provided for in the challenged transitional provision (transitorio) is not only reasonably grounded in this Court’s extensive case law on the subject, but also in the technical criteria incorporated into the legislative record and, ultimately, is consistent with the reform’s final objective of ensuring the system’s financial soundness and judicial employees’ right to retirement.
VIII.DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE CRUZ CASTRO.- Any change to the conditions of the retirement system must be based on criteria of reasonableness and proportionality, in accordance with technical criteria.
For the reasons stated below, I consider that this action should be granted. I believe that, in order to comply with Constitutional Law (Derecho de la Constitución), the transitional regime (régimen transitorio) should have covered judicial employees with twenty or more years of service in the Poder Judicial. I further consider that the bill giving rise to the law at issue contains substantial procedural and substantive defects.
A. The absence of technical criteria in the legislative decision violates the constitutional principle of technical reasonableness.
The petitioners are correct in their arguments. In this case, a procedural violation occurred because there were no technical criteria supporting the adoption of a time period in a transitional provision restricting the right to a pension (a violation of the constitutional principle of technical reasonableness), thereby also violating the principles of the right to a pension, progressivity, and equality, as explained below. The legislative branch must exercise prudence and sound judgment when reforming retirement systems because they are a crucial component of the social state.
It has been established that, in certain matters, legislative powers must be bound by the unambiguous rules of science or technology and by fundamental principles of justice, logic, or expediency. This constitutes a limit on the arbitrary exercise of legislative powers. To be clear, a technical study is not required in every instance of legislative action, because that would deprive the principle of legislative freedom of configuration (principio de libre configuración del legislador) of its substance. Not every legislative decision must be supported by a technical study, because that would eliminate the legislative body’s discretion by subjecting it to the judgment of third parties lacking democratic representation. Nevertheless, this Chamber has specified that such a technical or scientific study is necessary in certain matters and, therefore, has understood the requirement of such technical support to be part of the constitutional principle of technical reasonableness.
Accordingly, this Chamber has stated that “Technical studies are necessary when an express provision so requires (for example, in environmental matters) or when the subject matter requires them, lest discretion be transformed into arbitrariness.” (see decision n°2018-00230[[]13] at 10:40 on January 19, 2018). As to the fields in which such studies are required, in addition to environmental matters, one example is the application of the principle of technical reasonableness in pension matters; in this regard, see decision n°2017-11714, which established the following concerning the bill “Reform of the National Teachers’ Pension and Retirement System,” legislative record number 17.561:
“In this matter, the Legislative Assembly must have technical studies demonstrating that the entry into force of the Law will not adversely affect (…)” (emphasis not in the original) Likewise, since decision n°2379-96, this Chamber had already applied the mandatory requirement of technical support for modifications to pension systems:
“… that authority to make modifications conferred upon the State is subject to limits arising not only from the Political Constitution, but also from International Law, foremost among them those established in Convention number 102 of the International Labour Organization concerning minimum standards of social security. As relevant here, it provides that benefits granted pursuant to that Convention and administrative expenses must be supported by technical studies and must not be introduced or modified through a political, arbitrary, or capricious decision by the Administration. Those benefits include the amount of contributions to the pension system by the employee and by the State, both in its sovereign capacity and as employer, requiring such variations to be based on actuarial studies concerning the solvency of the affected system.”[[]14] (emphasis not in the original) Furthermore, this Chamber has stated that all regressive measures affecting the right to a pension and retirement require technical studies and that the burden of proving the existence and adequacy of those studies rests with public authorities. It has repeatedly stated in its case law:
“XV. (…) public authorities bear the burden of proving that the reductions are justified in light of the full range of socioeconomic rights and that, if an administration must adopt regressive measures affecting the right to a pension and retirement, it must have a technical study concerning the effects those measures may have on the rights of the affected persons and on the system, as well as demonstrating that no less burdensome measures could have been adopted, (…)” (see decision n°2018-5758[[]15], a criterion reaffirmed in decisions n°2021-11957[[]16], n°2022-8712[[]17], n°2022-10593[[]18]).
As this Chamber stated (see decision n°2019-00234[[]19]), all of the foregoing is also supported by article 71.3 of Convention 102 of the International Labour Organization (ILO), which provides that each State is responsible for ensuring that any modification to social security benefits is preceded by an actuarial study:
“Article 71 (…)
3. The Member shall accept general responsibility for the proper provision of the benefits provided in compliance with this Convention and shall take all measures required for this purpose; it shall ensure, where appropriate, that the necessary actuarial studies and calculations concerning financial equilibrium are made periodically and, in any event, prior to any change in benefits, the rate of insurance contributions, or the taxes allocated to covering the contingencies in question.” Likewise, this Chamber referred to the decisions of the European Committee of Social Rights of the Council of Europe and the Colombian Constitutional Court in circumstances in which the adoption of regressive measures in the area of ESCR (economic, social and cultural rights) is permitted, stating that:
“XXVIII.—Justice Araya García continues drafting. (…) the constitutional conformity of measures that reduce or modify pension conditions requires that, prior to their determination and as an indispensable part of their grounds, there must be a technical basis (sustento técnico) regarding the effects of the measures, and the affected persons must have been heard, because this concerns the income they are currently receiving as their means of subsistence, on which a large part of their life plan and their right to a dignified old age is based.” (decision n°2021-11957) Further supporting this Chamber’s statements regarding the technical burden of proof (carga de la prueba técnica) as an obligation of the State is the Miranda Cortez case, n°12.249, before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which stated:
“105. It should be emphasized that the progressive realization of economic, social, and cultural rights (ESCR) entails an obligation on the States Parties to the American Convention not to adopt retrogressive measures (medidas regresivas) concerning such rights. In particular, the United Nations Committee on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) has indicated that retrogressive measures adopted in relation to the right to health are impermissible. (…) The Committee likewise held that the State in question bears the burden of proving that such measures are duly justified by reference to the totality of the rights set forth in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum resources available to the State Party.” (see United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, paragraph 1 of article 2 of the Covenant, adopted at the Fifth Session, 1990)
—First, the technical basis to which the Chamber refers concerned a bill that was NOT the one ultimately enacted. Consider the dates of each of the six opinions in the “Estudio actuarial del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial” conducted by the Instituto de Investigaciones en Ciencias Económicas (IICE): opinion 1 dated 04 de agosto del 2016, opinion 2 dated 14 de noviembre del 2016, opinion 3 dated 01 de febrero del 2017, opinion 4 dated 24 de marzo del 2017, opinion 5 dated 22 de mayo del 2017, and opinion 6 dated 04 de julio del 2017. This should be compared with the date of the first debate, held during special session n°14 of 30 de octubre del 2017, the text of which incorporated several substantive and renewed motions (mociones de fondo y de reiteración) that altered its content.
—Second, this Chamber has made NO SPECIFIC assessment of the technical opinion supporting Transitional Provision VI (Transitorio VI) of the challenged law, concerning those who could remain covered by the scheme in effect before the reform. Accordingly, that IICE actuarial study (estudio actuarial) does NOT specifically address the retrogressive measure adopted in the transitional provision challenged in this action, since it states in that regard: “An increase in the transitional provision postpones the adjustments and therefore negatively affects the Fund’s revenue. A full actuarial analysis would be necessary to properly assess the effect of an increase in this transitional provision.” (see page 73 of product n°6, IICE). It is thus established that no technical study was conducted to assess the increase in the transitional provision, which made it impossible to determine whether there was another measure less burdensome than the one adopted in that provision. Therefore, this Chamber’s statement that the law in question was supported by a technical study does NOT apply specifically to the transitional provision.
Furthermore, what occurred at the hearing held in this action (on 05 de octubre del 2023) demonstrated that the challenged Transitional Provision was not supported by any technical opinion whatsoever. This is evident from the following:
“The IICE study analyzed the actuarial condition of the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial (FPJPJ) based on the situation in effect as of 31 de diciembre de 2015” (official letter IICE-103-2023 of 9 de junio de 2023, submitted to the Chamber on 9 de junio de 2023). “The results of the study by the IICE of the Universidad de Costa Rica present the possible actuarial effects of various proposals, using information through diciembre de 2015. However, the reform enacted through Ley 9544 was not evaluated in any of these analyses” (official letter containing the minutes of the Ad Hoc Commission, EMat-50-2023, of 11 de agosto de 2023, submitted to the Chamber on 25 de agosto de 2023). An official letter from the UCR submitted to the Chamber on 5 de octubre de 2023 states:
“In that regard, we wish to reaffirm the statement made by the Escuela de Matemática that, at the time, the aforementioned law did not adhere to any actuarial model for establishing the transitional provision being challenged. Therefore (Por tanto), modeling would be necessary if certainty were sought regarding the technical soundness of establishing that transitional provision.”
“Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. San José, at ten forty-five a.m. on veintiséis de mayo de dos mil veintitrés.
As evidence to assist in adjudication (prueba para mejor resolver), the following is requested:
(…)
The undersigned … in my capacity as President of the Asamblea Legislativa de la República de Costa Rica, hereby timely submits the requested report.
(…)
In the specific case of Transitional Provision VI of Ley 9544, the legislature establishes an 18-month period, … following the legislature’s extensive analysis in the discussion of the bill recorded in the minutes … the 18-month period is considered reasonable because it is neither excessively short nor excessively long. // The establishment of this period derives from the authority of the Legislative Assembly in exercising its lawmaking function … in which it enjoys broad discretion in shaping legislation (libertad de conformación) to develop the constitutional program established by the Constituent Power.
(…)
It is considered that, in the matter under consultation, the Assembly took into account that this was not an arbitrary, capricious, or abrupt period, but rather a reasonable period….” This must be understood in this manner, notwithstanding that this Chamber stated in decision n°2021-11957 that: “the legislature’s final decision to grant only contributors with 28 and a half years of service the possibility of retiring under the previous scheme was indeed among the necessary technical requirements taken into account in designing the amendments that would provide financial support for the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial. // Likewise, the 18-month period was amply supported by the technical opinion, not only for reasons of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) in accordance with constitutional case law, but also for reasons of actuarial solvency (solvencia actuarial).” It must therefore be understood, because it follows from the evidence requested and from the legislative record, that there was NO technical opinion supporting the period in the challenged transitional provision; rather, the legislative body itself considered the established period reasonable because it was “neither excessively short nor excessively long,” based on legislative discretion (discrecionalidad legislativa).
It is evident that stating that it is neither excessively short nor excessively long is a judgment based solely on an assessment that appears to reflect common sense but falls far short of a technical opinion grounded in an analysis of all the variables involved, particularly in a case involving the restriction or modification of rights in the process of vesting (derechos en vías de consolidación).
—It must precede approval of the provision.
—It must demonstrate the effects that the retrogressive measures may have on the rights of the affected persons.
—It must demonstrate that no less burdensome measures could have been adopted.
It should also be noted that the Chamber has established the following additional substantive criteria as benchmarks for examining the constitutional legitimacy of a measure that rolls back ESCR (economic, social, and cultural rights):
*analyze whether the restriction of rights is “suitable” or “appropriate,” *analyze whether it is “necessary” or “indispensable,” *analyze whether it is “proportionate” in the strict sense or “balanced” *determine that there are no other means of achieving the intended purpose with the same effectiveness that are less burdensome in terms of sacrificing the constitutional rights that may be limited in each case or, in other words, that there is no other means capable of achieving the purpose while sacrificing the constitutional principles affected by the use of those means to a lesser degree. In the words of the Corte Interamericana, it must be determined whether “(…) the restriction of the affected rights is commensurate with the benefits generated by the provision. If the harm caused to citizens’ legal rights and interests is greater than the constitutional benefit that the rule is capable of achieving, then it is disproportionate (…)”.
Furthermore, the majority opinion’s assertion that the 18-month period had technical support in the report issued by the Instituto de Investigaciones en Ciencias Económicas de la Universidad de Costa Rica (IICE) on 4 de julio de 2017, entitled Producto 6 “Compilation and Final Report: Conclusions and Recommendations,” is likewise unacceptable, because:
a. That report (dated julio 2017) provided technical support for the text in force at that time, which is NOT the text ultimately approved in octubre del 2017 (where it underwent significant substantive amendments in the Plenario through motions, including the establishment of the 18-month transitional period).
b. That report can only be understood as supporting the version of the bill (proyecto de ley) that existed at that time, not the one ultimately approved. If the text of the bill changed (with respect to conditions, age, amount, and other matters), it logically follows that the Fund’s solvency would be greater than when the technical report was issued. Accordingly, the conclusions it would reach with a 20-year transitional provision would be different.
c. That report is inconsistent with the statements made by the representatives of the Junta de Pensiones del Poder Judicial, both in the submitted report and at the hearing (vista), where they expressly state that “there is no risk whatsoever of the Fund becoming insolvent if the transitional provision includes those with 20 years, given that the Fund would have a solvency ratio of nearly 80% with an open population, compared with the CCSS’s IVM, which has 50%, thus making the Poder Judicial Fund the most solvent.” The majority opinion ignores this updated information and adopts the conclusions of a report that did not reflect the circumstances at the time or the Fund’s current financial position.
d. The official letter (oficio) signed by the Superintendencia de Pensiones in octubre del 2023 cannot be cited in an opinion because SUPEN is not an intervening party (interviniente) in the action, and its assertions therefore could not be contextualized or even rebutted at the hearing. It is an opinion that could not be challenged and debated in the proceedings concerning the action. The majority opinion relies on an advisory opinion (dictamen) that was not challenged or rebutted in the action or at the oral hearing.
e. Report 6 itself states in its conclusions (page 73) that “To properly assess the effect of extending this transitional period, a complete actuarial analysis would be necessary.”
-The number of resignations from 2018 to date totals 750.
-The total number of persons affected by the Law Reforming the Poder Judicial Retirement and Pension System (Ley de Reforma del régimen de jubilaciones y pensiones del Poder Judicial) is 1292, representing 9,68% of judicial personnel.
-The impact of the resignations within the Poder Judicial, in terms of the costs associated with hiring and training new personnel, is indisputable.
-The longest-serving employees must assume additional tasks to cover the responsibilities of vacant positions, increasing their workload and potentially affecting their performance.
-The change in retirement conditions has unquestionably had a negative impact on the physical and emotional health of employees who were already planning and prepared to retire. The additional stress and the physical and mental demands of prolonged employment may increase the risk of chronic illnesses and mental health problems.
-The summary table shows an increase in anxiety diagnoses during the years surrounding the reform; likewise, attention should be drawn to the increase in diagnoses associated with depression that emerged after the reform under review was implemented. In connection with this issue, employees have reported feelings of frustration, demotivation, distress, sadness, apathy, hopelessness, anguish, among others. Cases of anxiety, depression, occupational stress, burnout syndrome (síndrome de la persona trabajadora quemada), among others, are also treated.
In this regard, it is clear that the established period has not been shown to be the least burdensome period that could have been established, rendering it unreasonable and disproportionate, as well as unsuitable and unnecessary. This is particularly so when it is compared with other periods established in the transitional provisions of other laws, namely:
Transitional periods 1) MAGISTERIO NACIONAL *20 years of membership in the system Ley n°8536 del 2006:
Those who, as of 18 de mayo de 1993 or 13 de enero de 1997, had served for at least 20 years in the Magisterio Nacional shall retain the right to receive a pension or retire under ley n° 2248 and n°7268.
Those who are 55 years of age or older shall retain the right to a pension under the conditions in force before this reform.
The reform shall take effect as of 1° de setiembre del 2016. Once 54 months have elapsed since its entry into force, no person may take early retirement.
ARTICLE 8.- Amendment of transitorio III of Ley N.° 7302. Transitorio III of Ley N.° 7302, Creation of the General Pension System Charged to the National Budget, Other Special Systems, and Amendment of Ley N.° 7092 of 21 de abril de 1988, and its Amendments, Income Tax Law, of 8 de julio de 1992, is hereby amended. The text shall read as follows:
“Transitorio III.- Within a period of five years from the entry into force of this law, persons who are entitled to do so may receive a pension or retire under the original terms set forth in Ley N.° 7302, Creation of the General Pension System Charged to the National Budget, Other Special Systems, and Amendment of Ley N.° 7092, of 21 de abril de 1988, and its amendments, Income Tax Law, of 8 de julio de 1992, both with respect to the percentage granted as the replacement rate (tasa de reemplazo) and the possibility of reducing the retirement age by one year for every two years served and contributed for the Administración Pública.
During the period specified in the preceding paragraph, eligibility for a pension or retirement shall require a minimum age of fifty-five and the years of service and contributions prescribed by the applicable system.
Once this period has ended, the minimum retirement age shall be set at sixty years, the same age contemplated in Article 4 of Ley N.° 7302.”
B.-) On How Rights in the Process of Acquisition Were Violated The petitioners state that the automatic application of such a severe transitional provision, never before applied to any group with consolidated legal situations (situaciones jurídicas consolidadas) in retirement matters, is contrary to Constitutional Law; they therefore request that it be declared unconstitutional and that the persons they represent be allowed to retire under the conditions in effect before that reform, given the length of time they have belonged to the regime in question. They further add that other retirement reforms have included phased transitional provisions that have allowed those affected to adjust their retirement expectations, an opportunity that was not afforded within the Poder Judicial. They also state that other constitutional courts recognize the right to differentiated treatment for persons who are close to satisfying the retirement requirements and who face a legislative amendment, and therefore request the application of comparative law.
Thus, they consider that protection is afforded not only to the retirement entitlement that arises when the factual prerequisites established by the rules have been met, but also to rights in the process of acquisition (derechos en vías de adquisición), which, depending on how close they are to vesting, require safeguarding or protection by the State. The Procuraduría General de la República (PGR) states that, in our legal system, an acquired right (derecho adquirido) to retirement is recognized only when all requirements have been met, whereas the improperly named “membership right” (“derecho de pertenencia”) is merely an expectation that is extinguished by the amendment or repeal introduced by newly enacted legislation. It adds that although constitutional case law has recognized that, in the case of contributory pension schemes (regímenes contributivos de pensión), the payment of contributions gives rise to a “membership right,” this does not render the system’s rules immutable.
For his part, the Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa states that the petitioners’ argument that ley 9544 conflicts with the provisions of the conventions of the Organización Internacional de Trabajo is unfounded. He adds that, when ruling on the optional consultation (consulta facultativa), the Sala Constitucional did not find that ley 9544 affected acquired rights or consolidated legal situations. Nor does he consider that there was any violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, because the law does not affect social security rights. The alleged infringement of the principles of transparency, legal certainty, good faith, legitimate expectations, relative inviolability of property, non-confiscation, and respect for acquired rights and consolidated legal situations is also rejected. In the opinion of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, on all three occasions when the Corte was consulted, it issued an unfavorable opinion and opposed the bill under consultation because it affects the organization and operation of the Poder Judicial. It considers that the right to retirement should have been safeguarded through a reasonable and fair transitional provision based on technical and objective criteria.
In this regard, I consider that the petitioners are correct in their arguments and that, in this case, there has been a violation of the pension right in the process of acquisition, a right derived from International Human Rights Law, as explained below. The significance of retirement requires specific protection when that right is in the process of vesting. That status cannot be ignored by protecting only the acquired right while leaving unprotected the gradual process through which, after years, the official will attain that status.
Traditionally, Article 34 of the Constitution has been understood to protect “acquired rights” and “consolidated legal situations.” However, in light of the provisions of International Human Rights Law relating to the right to work, another constitutionally protected concept may be added: “rights in the process of acquisition.” In general terms, these concepts may be defined as follows:
Acquired rights (Article 34 of the Constitution) These refer to a completed circumstance in which something—tangible or intangible, whether property previously belonging to another or a previously nonexistent right—has entered into, or affected, a person’s estate, such that the person experiences a demonstrable advantage or benefit.
(see judgment n° 2765-97)
Consolidated legal situations (Article 34 of the Constitution) This represents not so much an increase in assets as a state of affairs fully defined in terms of its legal characteristics and effects, even if those effects have not yet been extinguished. What is relevant with respect to a consolidated legal situation is not whether those effects still persist, but whether—by virtue of a statutory mandate or a judgment so declaring—a clear and defined rule has already come into legal existence, linking a factual prerequisite (triggering event) to a given consequence (conditioned effect). From this perspective, the person’s situation is expressed by a logical proposition of the form “if..., then...” That is, if the triggering event has occurred, then the “consolidated legal situation” necessarily entails that the conditioned effect must also occur.
(see judgment n° 2765-97)
Rights in the process of acquisition (Article 34 of the Constitution and ILO regulations) Rights of those who are close to becoming entitled to a specific right under a previous regime.
Rights that would have vested soon had the established conditions remained in effect.
Rights occupying an intermediate position between acquired rights or consolidated legal situations and mere expectations, and which therefore merit a certain degree of protection that is also afforded by Article 34 of the Constitution.
Comparative Law: see judgment C-789 of the Corte Constitucional de Colombia of 24 de setiembre del 2002: The transitional regime may not be eliminated for persons who had completed 75% of the period of service required to obtain the benefit before the pension reform entered into force, because doing so would disregard the legitimate expectation recognized by the State.
In all these cases, the constitutional standard protects—and renders beyond the legislature’s power to alter—the situation of a person who has obtained the right (acquired right), who enjoys the situation (consolidated legal situation), or who will soon enjoy it (right in the process of acquisition), for reasons of equity and legal certainty. Various international instruments address rights in the process of acquisition.
Thus, Article 27 of the Convenio Multilateral Centroamericano de Seguridad Social (San José), approved by Costa Rica through ley n°5333 del 22 de agosto de 1973, provides:
“Article 27:
1º.- In the event of denunciation of this Convention, every right acquired under its provisions shall be maintained.
2º.- Rights in the process of acquisition relating to periods completed before the date on which the denunciation becomes effective shall not be extinguished merely by reason of the denunciation; their preservation shall be determined by agreement or, in the absence of an agreement, by the legislation applicable to the competent institution.” The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, approved by Costa Rica through ley n°6079-A del 29 de agosto de 1977, provides in Article 24:
“Article 24:
1. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect to the following matters:
(…)
(b) Social security (statutory provisions concerning employment injury, maternity, sickness, disability, old age, death, unemployment, family responsibilities, and any other contingency which, under national laws or regulations, is covered by a social security scheme), subject to the following limitations: (i) Appropriate arrangements may be made for the maintenance of acquired rights and rights in the process of acquisition; (…).” This is also recognized as a principle under Article 7 of ILO Convention 118, entitled Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention, 1962, which provides:
“Article 7 1. The Member States for which this Convention is in force shall endeavor to participate, (…) in a system for the maintenance of acquired rights and rights in the process of acquisition recognized under their legislation for nationals of the Member States (…)” (emphasis not in the original) Likewise, Article 30 of ILO Convention 128, entitled Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ Benefits Convention, 1967, provides:
“Article 30:
National legislation shall, under prescribed conditions, provide for the maintenance of rights in the course of acquisition with respect to contributory invalidity, old-age, and survivors’ benefits.” (emphasis not in the original) In addition, Article 6 of ILO Convention 157, entitled Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention, 1982 (No. 157), provides:
“Article 6 Subject to the provisions of Article 4, paragraph 3(a), of this Convention, each Member shall endeavor to participate with every other Member concerned in a system for the maintenance of rights in the course of acquisition with respect to every branch of social security referred to in Article 2, paragraph 1, of this Convention for which the legislation of each of these Members is in force, for the benefit of persons who have been subject successively or alternatively to the legislation of those Members.” (emphasis not in the original).
Regarding the legal force of international conventions not ratified by Costa Rica, the significance of international human rights instruments must be recalled. In its early case law from the 1990s, the Sala Constitucional stated that Article 48 of the Constitution—as amended in 1989—had created a new category of rules: international human rights instruments, which rank not only above statutes (by virtue of Article 7) but also above the Constitución Política insofar as they provide greater protection for human rights (see judgments 1147-90, 3805-92, as well as 1739-92, 3435-92, 2313-95, 2002-10693)[[]20]. Indeed, even international human rights instruments that have not been approved by Costa Rica have been considered part of the constitutional standard or body of constitutional law (bloque de constitucionalidad). Thus, it has been stated:
“In this regard, attention must be drawn to the specific reference that the Constitution now makes to ‘international instruments,’ meaning that not only conventions, treaties, or agreements formally signed and approved in accordance with the constitutional procedure itself … but any other instrument having the inherent nature of protecting Human Rights, even if it has not undergone that procedure, is in force and applicable in the country. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris, 10 de diciembre de 1948), by virtue of its character and nature, has not required the constitutional approval procedures in order to be deemed in force and to possess the normative force conferred upon it by the subject matter it regulates. The same may be said of the United Nations ‘Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,’ which, although they may be the product of meetings of experts or the work of a department of that organization, have the same force as any international rules formally incorporated into Costa Rican domestic law because our country belongs to that organization and because they concern fundamental rights.” (judgment n°2000-9685.
Emphasis not in the original. See also judgment n°2000-7498)[4] As this Chamber has stated in ruling on another action related to pensions, underlying this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) are economic, social, and cultural rights—very concrete human rights—which constitute matters that must be carefully analyzed and protected by this Constitutional Court, particularly because they concern the rights that accompany older adults at very important moments in their lives (see decision n.º 2020-19274, issued at 16:30 on 07 de octubre del 2020[[]22]). In Judgment N° 2012-16628, issued at 16:30 on 28 de noviembre de 2012 (reaffirmed in prior judgment n°2020-19274), this Chamber held, with respect to international social-security rules as a floor or minimum:
“The fact is that international rules establish what social-security terminology refers to in certain ILO documents as the social floor or social protection floor, as a minimum set of fundamental obligations that could indeed be justiciable where there are unfulfilled legal obligations enforceable domestically or, once domestic remedies have been exhausted, internationally. […]” The Chamber has stated that “there is a right to the continued protection that the insured person receives under national legislation by virtue of belonging to a scheme, particularly once that right has been declared upon fulfillment of the necessary conditions and requirements, so as to enjoy a right of peaceful enjoyment.” (see judgment n°2020-19274). This right to continued protection may extend not only to the enjoyment of a declared right, but also to the right to belong to a scheme subject to the conditions and requirements agreed upon from the outset.
This is also related to the constitutional principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima), which is connected to the principle of legal certainty (principio de seguridad jurídica) and the principle of good faith (principio de buena fe), because it operates as a limitation on public authority that prevents the legitimate expectations of those subject to the administration from being violated without a substantiated reason, thereby protecting the stability of legal situations, vested rights (derechos adquiridos), and rights in the process of being acquired (derechos en vías de adquisición). Applied to this case, that principle means that although retirement conditions and requirements may be changed by decision of the legislature (since there is certainly no right to the immutability of the legal system), unlike the conclusion reached in the majority opinion, I consider that such a change must respect the rights in the process of being acquired of those who are close to meeting those conditions and requirements.
On a matter so consequential in the life of a working citizen, a legal distinction is required that reflects the particular nature of such a significant situation, namely, the scheme governing the retirement process.
Furthermore, this Chamber has already stated that “a financial crisis is neither in itself nor can it be a justification for adopting regressive decisions.” Moreover, “a lack of resources cannot serve as a pretext for failing to fulfill them [social rights].” (see judgment n°2020-19274). I therefore do not consider it appropriate for the majority opinion to base the regression of conditions associated with pension rights on the crisis affecting the pension scheme. Consistent with what this Chamber stated in the referenced decision (judgment n°2020-19274), the legislature’s authority to change the conditions of a pension scheme must be understood as subject to a limit concerning the so-called “right of membership” (derecho de pertenencia), which also protects rights in the process of being acquired. As stated regarding this concept, the aforementioned Article 7 of ILO Convention 118, Article 30 of ILO Convention 28, and Article 6 of ILO Convention 157 are conventions that, although not approved by Costa Rica, form part of international human rights law and, therefore, part of our body or standard of constitutional review (bloque o parámetro de constitucionalidad).
This does not entail giving precedence to private interests over general interests, as the majority opinion states; rather, the general interest, properly understood, includes respect for rights in the process of being acquired. I do not consider it admissible to accept the argument that financial crises take precedence over fundamental rights. If we were to consider this to be so, we would be accepting the imminent demise of Constitutional Law, because nowadays virtually anything can be justified by invoking a fiscal crisis. It is not that I am unaware that such crises exist; rather, fundamental rights must always prevail over them, and the proper course is to hold accountable those who have brought about such crises, but not at the expense of social rights. In this regard, I cannot but disagree with the concept that the majority of this Chamber has been advancing concerning the “possible social State governed by the rule of law” (Estado social de derecho posible), a concept that clearly represents a regression from what must be understood as a social State governed by the rule of law.
Indeed, the Italian Constitutional Court understood it this way in recital 11 of judgment 275/2016, holding that budgetary balance cannot condition the fulfillment of human rights. Likewise, the Colombian Constitutional Court held in judgment 140/19 that no public authority may invoke fiscal sustainability to undermine fundamental rights. It is troubling to advance such a vague and imprecise concept as the “possible social State governed by the rule of law”; that horizon, which appears to be an abstraction, comes to condition the entire social State. There is no State governed by the rule of law if we assume that social rights are admissible only if they are possible. In other words, based on strictly fiscalist or economic assessments, sectors with less economic and political power see their social rights reduced, restricted, or eliminated. Considerable reflection is needed regarding these horizons, which open the door to the devaluation and curtailment of the social State, undoubtedly including the issue of the retirement scheme. It is even more serious if such rights are restricted without a specific technical standard appropriate to the particular case.
In comparative law (Derecho Comparado), consideration may be given, for example, to the observations made in this regard by the Colombian Constitutional Court, which has stated that the legitimate expectations of those seeking to retire under a particular scheme must receive some measure of protection from the legislature, one means of protecting legitimate expectations being the establishment of transitional schemes (regímenes de transición), which extend protection beyond vested rights alone (see judgments C-147 of 19 de marzo de 1997 and C-428 of 01 julio 2009). Contrary to the majority opinion, which errs in stating that Colombia does not establish a threshold to safeguard rights in the process of being acquired, a threshold of 75% of the contributions required under the previous scheme has been established, as shown by the following passage from Colombian Constitutional Court judgment C-789 of 24 de setiembre del 2002:
“3.3. Protection of workers’ legitimate expectations and the most favorable interpretation (…) By virtue of such protection, legislative transitions must be reasonable and proportionate; therefore, subsequent legislation may not disregard the protection granted to those who, when the pension system entered into force, had contributed for more than fifteen years of employment.
(…)
Accordingly, it would be contrary to this principle of proportionality, and would violate the constitutional recognition of work, if those who, when the pension system entered into force pursuant to Article 151 of Law 100 of 1993 (abril 1º de 1994), had completed 75% or more of the period of employment required to qualify for a pension were ultimately to lose the conditions under which they expected to receive their pension.
To that extent, the Court shall hold that paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 36 of Law 100 of 1993 are constitutional, provided that they are understood not to apply to persons who had contributed for 15 years or more of employment when the pension system established in Law 100 of 1993 entered into force, in accordance with Article 151 of that statute.
(…)
Accordingly, persons who had contributed for 15 years or more when the pension system entered into force and who are covered by the defined-benefit average-premium scheme (régimen de prima media con prestación definida) shall be entitled to have the conditions concerning length of service, age, and pension amount established under the previous scheme applied to them, provided that: (…)” (emphasis added) With respect to the right to retirement benefits or a pension, the following applies:
The right to retirement benefits or a pension is a consolidated legal situation (situación jurídica consolidada), acquired when the interested party satisfies all the requirements established by law.
The right of membership in a retirement scheme (derecho de pertenencia a un régimen jubilatorio) is the right to remain in a pension scheme specific to the institution where one works, together with its defining elements or conditions. The right to belong to the scheme entails the right not to be excluded and to have its general parameters maintained. The right to a pension in the process of being acquired may be situated within this category. This right ceases to be a mere expectancy of a right (expectativa de derecho) and is acquired upon entry into the retirement scheme (see judgments n°1147-90[[]23] and n°6491-98[[]24]). The case law has recognized that contributing to a pension scheme gives rise to a “right of membership in the scheme,” as stated above, but does not render the system’s rules unamendable” (see judgment n°5236-99[[]25]). Thus, it is not a mere expectancy of a right, but instead enjoys a higher degree of protection.
The scheme to which a person belongs may certainly be reformed, but such reforms are subject to certain limitations: essentially, they must have a technical basis and must also respect rights in the process of being acquired. The relevant points regarding the former have already been addressed supra; as to the latter, the legislature must take those rights in the process of being acquired into account in its transitional provisions (disposiciones transitorias).
This Chamber has previously stated as follows:
“… the right to retirement first manifests itself under the name and in the form of a ‘right of membership in the pension scheme’ (derecho de pertenencia al régimen), from the time the official enters the system until the event consisting of fulfillment of the requirements necessary to obtain the benefit occurs. It then sheds that guise and becomes known as the ‘right to the current benefit’ (derecho a la prestación actual), once the aforementioned eventuality has occurred.” (see decision n°2379-96[[]26]).
It is important to emphasize the constitutional protection of the right to a pension (derecho a la pensión), in its essential content. Constitutional review (control de constitucionalidad) of parliamentary activity and, consequently, of statutes is appropriate when they violate the principles of reasonableness and proportionality in connection with a fundamental right, because this also deprives that right of its essential content. This Chamber has already indicated (see decision n°2019-00234[[]27]) that the right to retirement or a pension constitutes a vested legal status (situación jurídica consolidada), and that rights in the process of being acquired (derechos en vías de adquisición) are violated in the case of those officials who technically could have been included within the transitional provision (transitorio) but nevertheless were not. This does not mean that all contributors or all persons belonging to the pension scheme of the Judicial Branch had a vested legal status in this case; rather, it concerns the protection of the rights in the process of being acquired—derived from the right of membership—of those who technically could have been included within the transitional provision but were not.
The right of membership gives rise, in favor of contributors who were close to retiring, to protection of their rights in the process of being acquired under the more favorable conditions of the former scheme, rights constitutionally protected under Article 34 of the Constitution and also under international human rights law. The challenged provision allowed the rights in the process of being acquired of this group of officials to be violated, including their right to retire under the former scheme, which was more favorable to them.
Clearly, persons who have only recently begun contributing to the Pension Fund are not in the same situation and do not enjoy the same constitutional protection as those who have contributed for many years and are even only a few years away from retirement. This highly significant distinction in the protection of the right to retirement is entirely absent from the transitional provision at issue in this action. All of this also violates the principle of progressive realization of fundamental rights (principio de progresividad de los derechos fundamentales), because the democratic legislature is constrained by fundamental rights, as this Chamber has stated:
“Fundamental Rights bind the legislature both negatively and positively. In a negative sense, the legislature must respect them in order to achieve their full effectiveness; that is, they operate as a barrier or limit. In a positive sense, fundamental rights constitute a mandate, guiding principle, or program for the constituted legislature, which must therefore develop and define them while respecting their essential content—that is, the minimum and non-disposable core, the limit upon limits, of each such right. When developing fundamental rights, the constituted legislature must ensure the progressive intensification and expansion of their effectiveness and, in general, their full realization, so as to prevent any regressive and restrictive regulation.” (see decision n°2003-2794[[]28]).
All of this is grounded in Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights and in what this Chamber has held in that regard:
“Article 26 obligates the signatory States to take measures domestically, as well as through international cooperation, for the purpose of progressively achieving the full realization of the rights derived from the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards contained in the Charter of the Organization of American States.” Decision n°1995-03932.
C.-) Regarding the effect that the declaration of unconstitutionality of the challenged transitional provision should have had In this dispute, I consider that the declaration of unconstitutionality (declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad) cannot have the sole effect of invalidating the entire provision, since what is unconstitutional is not the establishment of a transitional provision, but rather the establishment of a time period without technical support. I am therefore inclined to invalidate only the “eighteen-month” period established in Transitional Provision VI of the challenged provision. It is evident, however, that invalidating that period is insufficient to protect the fundamental rights involved here, and the additional effects of this declaration of unconstitutionality must therefore be specified. Although this Chamber has previously stated that it does not have “the authority to devise, using the technical elements provided, a solution to the actual problem presented by the financial condition of the Judicial Branch Retirement and Pension Fund,” because this action and the hearing held in connection with it contain technical elements that make it possible to formulate a solution, it is appropriate to specify the period that must be understood to apply to Transitional Provision VI of the challenged statute.
The period established for eligibility for early retirement (pensión anticipada) is adopted as a reasonable benchmark—namely, 20 years or more of contributions to the scheme—because that would be equivalent to having contributed for 66% of the total period (which was 30 years). That period makes it possible to respect the rights in the process of being acquired and the right of membership of those who had contributed for most of the total period and were close to retirement. It is also proportionate to their life plan (plan de vida), reasonable in light of the Pension Fund’s financial sustainability, and respectful of the principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima) (the expectation that conditions will not be changed abruptly, the expectation that the established rules will be respected and that, if they change, the change will be gradual[[]29]). Thus, I consider that the challenged Transitional Provision VI should read as follows:
“Transitional Provision VI.- Judicial employees who, upon the entry into force of this statute, have twenty years or more of service in the Judicial Branch may retire pursuant to the provisions set forth in the text of Title IX of Law N.º 7333, of 5 de mayo de 1993, under the conditions in effect before this reform.” The technical basis supporting the specified period of 20 years is the following technical assessment:
-The former President of the Fund’s Administrative Board, Mr. Carlos Montero, stated during an appearance before the Full Court of the Judicial Branch (session n° 08-2021, of 22 de febrero de 2021, Article XVIII) that the Fund was capable of covering retirements under the conditions in effect before the reform for persons who, when Transitional Provision VI entered into force, had 20 years or more of service in the Judicial Branch.
-Article 29 of ILO Convention n°102 establishes a minimum period of 20 years of residence for the award of a pension. This Chamber initially interpreted that provision (see judgments n°6842-99[[]30] and n°00-673[[]31]) by understanding “residence” to mean membership in a scheme, but later changed its position, stating in judgment n°2000-2091[[]32] that “residence” means habitual residence within the territory of the Member and that the term “resident” denotes a person who habitually resides within the territory of the Member. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the 20-year benchmark is also a valid and reasonable criterion for understanding that 20 years may be the period of protected membership in a scheme to which contributions are made.
-The Ibero-American Social Security Code (Código Iberoamericano de Seguridad Social) (of the Organización Iberoamericana de Seguridad Social O.I.S.S., signed by Costa Rica in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina, in octubre de 1995) establishes in Article 50.1 a contribution period of twenty years as the minimum period for guaranteeing a benefit amount.
-Examination of the periods established in the transitional provisions of other statutes concerning Pension Funds yields an average. For example, the Ley del Magisterio Nacional established a period of 20 years of membership in the scheme (law n°8536), while other statutes establish a longer transitional period: 5 years for pensions charged to the National Budget (law n°9388), 54 months for the CCSS IVM (regulation n°8856); or, in the case of TSE officials, merely having begun to contribute places them under the protection of the former regulations (see Transitional Provision II of law n°9544).
-The percentage of contributions corresponding to 20 years of membership in the scheme is 66% of the former total period (30 years), which constitutes a majority percentage, exceeds one half, and is reasonable in light of the life plan of someone who has already spent most of their years of service contributing to a particular scheme under particular conditions.
-The Transitional Provision, in its previous version (see Committee report of 27 de julio del 2017), established a period of 23 years and 6 months of service for phased coverage under the former pension regulations.
-According to the evidence obtained to assist in adjudication (prueba para mejor resolver), submitted by the current Board of the Judicial Branch Retirement and Pension Fund, an increase of 10 years of service would cover 2759 persons, and the Fund’s solvency ratio would decline from 86,29% to 79,43%, a decrease of 7 percentage points, while remaining within a reasonable range, which, as indicated, is the case so long as the percentage remains at or above 70%.
-Having regard to criteria that extend beyond economic and financial considerations to encompass social rights, this would be the largest possible number of officials whom the Pension Fund could cover under the pension conditions in effect before the reform, which would therefore be more favorable to the individual (pro personae principle (principio pro personae), worker-protective principle (principio pro operario)).
Finally, unlike the approach taken in the majority opinion, I consider that Constitutional Courts must rule on the basis of Constitutional Law, without ignoring the consequences of their judgments but taking into account the effects on other fundamental rights. The consequences of a judgment are a matter of imprecise content and must be more clearly defined, together with their implications, in the judgment itself. In this case, although there is an important issue concerning the consequences of the decision for the financial health of the retirement scheme, such an assessment requires a broader and more detailed analysis, which, from my perspective, the majority opinion does not provide. The consequences of a decision cannot eclipse the analysis and protection of other rights. In that balancing exercise (ponderación), I favor the primacy of the rights asserted over the consequences of the decision, without ignoring, as I have explained, that a decision favorable to the petitioners does not endanger the financial health of the Judicial Branch Pension Fund. In the case under review, it is necessary to assess not only the financial health of the scheme but also the effects of the challenged legislative decision on the fundamental rights of those involved and on the democratic principles of the institution where they work.
D.-) Regarding the remaining procedural defects (vicios de procedimiento) In the same vein as the dissenting opinion (voto salvado) to decision number 2018-5758, signed by Justice Cruz Castro and other justices, and notwithstanding that Justice Cruz did not participate in the vote resolving specific allegations of violations of legislative procedure in judgment n°2021-11957, nor in decision n°2022-008712, which admitted this action for consideration, the procedural defects (vicios de procedimiento) found therein to exist in challenged law n°9544 are hereby reaffirmed.
“XXIII.- Dissenting opinion of Justices Cruz Castro, Salazar Alvarado, and Hernández Gutiérrez.
Drafted by Justice Salazar Alvarado; and, Contrary to the opinion of the majority of the Sala, we consider that the bill entitled “Comprehensive Reform Law for the Various Pension Systems and Related Legislation” (“Ley de Reforma Integral a los Diversos Regímenes de Pensiones y Normativa Conexa”), legislative expediente N° 19.922, contains defects of unconstitutionality (vicios de inconstitucionalidad) that invalidate the bill under review, based on the following considerations:
SOLE.- Defects in the legislative procedure.
a.- Text of the bill not submitted to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation. Among the constitutional doubts raised by those requesting the consultation is the failure to consult the Poder Judicial regarding the substitute text (texto sustitutivo) approved at the Comisión Especial session of 27 de julio de 2017. In the opinion of the male and female legislators who submitted the consultation, that bill contains a series of provisions affecting the organization and operation of the Poder Judicial, thereby requiring it to be submitted to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation, in accordance with Article 167 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). Specifically, they contend that Article 239 of the bill creates an Administrative Board of the Pension and Retirement Fund of the Poder Judicial (Junta Administradora del Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial), which it defines as a body of the Poder Judicial possessing functional, technical, and administrative independence in exercising the powers and duties conferred upon it by law.
That Board is granted functional independence and assigned a series of responsibilities, such as increasing employees’ contributions to the Pension Fund and considering retirement applications, to name a few; in their view, this modifies the structure of the Poder Judicial. Likewise, powers are taken away from the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, and, in addition, Article 240 of the bill imposes upon the Corte Plena the obligation to issue regulations governing the election of the members of that Administrative Board, thereby assigning it a power that it does not currently possess. By contrast, they clarify that the previous substitute texts were submitted to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation; they therefore consider the failure to do so with respect to this latest text contrary to the Law of the Constitution (Derecho de la Constitución).
At the heart of the discussion, precisely as the majority opinion correctly states, is the determination of whether, under Article 167 of the Political Constitution, the legislative body was required to submit the aforementioned bill to the Poder Judicial for consultation, a duty that has also been incorporated into Articles 126 and 127 of the Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, which establish the procedure to be followed for that purpose. It follows from the constitutional text that mandatory consultation (consulta obligatoria) with the Corte Suprema de Justicia is required only if the bill concerns the organization or operation of the Poder Judicial. Thus, the crux of the matter is what is to be understood by the “organization or operation of the Poder Judicial.” In this regard, the majority opinion maintains that, when the Fundamental Political Charter (Carta Política Fundamental) refers to the organization and operation of the Poder Judicial, it refers solely to an impact on its jurisdictional function (función jurisdiccional), and not on its strictly administrative function.
In support of this position, it cites Judgments N° 1998-5958 de las 14:54 del 19 de agosto de 1998, N° 2001-013273 de las 11:44 horas del 21 de diciembre de 2001 and N° 2008-5179 de las 11:00 horas del 4 de abril de 2008. Likewise, concerning the specific issue of the Pension and Retirement Fund of the Poder Judicial and the obligation of the Asamblea Legislativa to consult the Corte Suprema de Justicia on bills concerning that Fund, the majority opinion cites Judgments N° 1995-3063 de las 15:30 del 13 de junio de 1995 and N° 2002-4258 de las 9:40 del 10 de mayo de 2002, on the basis of which it concludes that, in such cases, the Asamblea Legislativa is not required to submit the bill to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation under Article 167 of the Constitution. In the opinion of the undersigned, however, such an interpretation of the constitutional provision, limited solely to the jurisdictional function, follows neither from the text of the Fundamental Charter nor from the case law (jurisprudencia) of this Sala.
Indeed, with regard to the precedents cited, it should be emphasized that the proposition asserted by the majority in its opinion cannot be inferred from the first three judgments. Thus, Judgment N° 1998-5958 de las 14:54 del 19 de agosto de 1998 addresses only the term “operation”—from the paired expression “organization or operation”—of the Poder Judicial, without addressing the organization of that Branch of the Republic. Specifically, in the passage quoted from that opinion, the Sala clearly states that “…the matters that mandatorily require consultation with the Corte Suprema de Justicia are those concerning ‘the organization or operation of the Poder Judicial,’ where the term ‘operation’ refers not only to aspects of the internal administrative system of judicial offices, but also to the procedural matters governing the handling of the various cases brought before those courts” (emphasis added).
This makes it clear that the issue of organization—which is the relevant issue here—was not addressed in that decision, simply because the case did not require it, as it involved a mandatory legislative consultation on constitutionality (consulta legislativa preceptiva de constitucionalidad) concerning the bill entitled “Addition of a New Chapter IV, Entitled ‘On the Writ of Habeas Data,’ to Title III of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, ley Nº 7185 del 19 de octubre de 1989” (“Adición de un nuevo Capítulo IV, denominado ‘Del recurso de hábeas data’, al Título III de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, ley Nº 7185 del 19 de octubre de 1989”), which was processed under legislative expediente number 12.827, where the issue under discussion was that the amendment affected the jurisdictional function of the Poder Judicial. That this is so follows from the judgment’s own text, which is not quoted at sufficient length in the majority opinion: “…the matters that mandatorily require consultation with the Corte Suprema de Justicia are those concerning ‘the organization or operation of the Poder Judicial,’ where the term ‘operation’ refers not only to aspects of the internal administrative system of judicial offices, but also to the procedural matters governing the handling of the various cases brought before those courts.
And, in Costa Rica, constitutional jurisdiction (jurisdicción constitucional) is unquestionably judicial, since both the Political Constitution and the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional place this Sala within the structure of the Corte.” When the passage is read in context, it cannot be inferred that the Sala restricted the paired expression “organization or operation” merely to jurisdictional matters; rather, in the cited case, this Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) addressed only the jurisdictional function of the Poder Judicial because that was the issue under discussion, without excluding or addressing the administrative organization of that Branch of the Republic. The same may be said regarding Judgment N° 2001-013273 de las 11:44 horas del 21 de diciembre de 2001, to which the majority refers. That case involved an optional legislative consultation on constitutionality (consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad) concerning the bill entitled “Amendment to the Código Penal, Ley número 4573 and Its Amendments” (“Modificación del Código Penal, Ley número 4573 y sus reformas”), legislative expediente number 14.158.
Once again, the amendment directly affected the jurisdictional function of the Poder Judicial, not its administrative organization. Consequently, the Sala did not address the latter issue in that case either, because doing so would have served no purpose. The substantive discussion therefore focused and concluded entirely on aspects of the jurisdictional function of the Poder Judicial: “…such consultation [that required under Article 167 of the Political Constitution] is mandatory when the matter under discussion in the Asamblea is a bill intended to establish rules governing the operation and organization of the Poder Judicial, understood not merely as provisions regulating the creation of courts of justice or jurisdictional powers (competencias jurisdiccionales), but also as provisions concerning how such powers are exercised—that is, the manner in which the Poder Judicial performs its jurisdictional function—including strictly procedural rules” (emphasis not in the original).
Clearly, this statement was limited to examining the exercise of the jurisdictional powers of the Courts of Justice, since that was the specific subject of the consultation. But the Sala did not state that this was the only circumstance in which consultation under Article 167 of the Political Constitution is mandatory; rather, it stated that consultation was mandatory in that case, without addressing other cases in which it is likewise mandatory, such as those concerning the administrative organization and powers of the Poder Judicial.
Judgment N° 2008-5179 of 11:00 on 4 de abril de 2008 warrants separate comment because here, unlike the majority’s reading, it was indeed established that matters concerning the administrative organization of the Poder Judicial fall within the mandatory consultation (consulta obligatoria) stipulated by the aforementioned Article 167 of the Constitution. On that occasion, this Constitutional Court, as the highest interpreter of the Constitución Política, in addressing the terms “organization or operation” of the Poder Judicial contained in Article 167 of the Carta Política as a condition for mandatory consultation with that Branch of the Republic by the Asamblea Legislativa, held “…that a bill concerns such matters when its provisions contain explicit rules providing for the creation, substantial alteration, or abolition of strictly adjudicative bodies or administrative bodies attached to the Poder Judicial, or when it creates ex novo, substantially modifies, or eliminates functions that are substantively adjudicative or administrative…” (emphasis added).
This does not represent a change in this Court’s position on the matter but, within the line of precedent already established, a more precise definition of the terms “organization or operation” used in Article 167 of the Constitución Política to identify the circumstances in which bills under legislative consideration must be submitted—mandatorily—to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation. This judgment did not in any way expand the circumstances requiring mandatory consultation; rather, it defined them more broadly and precisely. It therefore clearly determined that consultation is mandatory in those cases, but only in those cases. Thus, the following statement in that same judgment must be understood accordingly: “[i]t should be noted that such an interpretation is necessary in order to maintain the balance of powers, without favoring one constitutional body over another, so that each may exercise its functions independently and separately, as required by the constitutional text itself (Article 9 of the Constitution).
In other words, defining these concepts precisely prevents any conflict, overreach, or undue expansion of the respective functions, so as to maintain the balance and restraint of powers, because the purpose of the provision is not only the functional independence and budgetary autonomy of the Poder Judicial, but also the balance between the Legislative and Judicial Branches. Indeed, a broad interpretation by the Corte Plena of the terms used by the original constituent authority could result in certain matters that, strictly speaking, do not concern the organization and operation of the Poder Judicial unjustifiably requiring a supermajority law (ley reforzada), thereby unnecessarily slowing or hindering the legislative function. Conversely, the Asamblea Legislativa’s failure to apply the constitutional provision, based on the mistaken view that the bill does not concern the organization and operation of the Poder Judicial, could impair the functional independence and budgetary autonomy of the Poder Judicial.” It follows from the foregoing that everything concerning the organization and operation of the Poder Judicial—but only and strictly those matters, in order to preserve the balance between the functional independence and budgetary autonomy of the Poder Judicial, on the one hand, and the ordinary legislature’s freedom to shape legislation, on the other—is what requires the legislative body to consult the Corte Suprema de Justicia, and this requirement may not be extended to other matters.
In this regard, there is no doubt that the Sala Constitucional has understood that matters concerning the administrative organization of the Poder Judicial—and not merely those directly or indirectly affecting the adjudicative function (función jurisdiccional)—require the legislative body to request consultation under the terms set forth in Article 167 of the Constitución Política. Nor could it be otherwise, since an impact upon or modification of the administrative organization of the Poder Judicial generally—and not only matters pertaining to adjudicative or judicial bodies in the strict sense—also affects the administration of justice (Administración de Justicia) service it provides and the independence constitutionally guaranteed to that Branch and to judges as officials charged with administering justice.
Moreover, Judgments N° 1995-3063 of 15:30 on 13 de junio de 1995 and N° 2002-4258 of 9:40 on 10 de mayo de 2002, cited in the majority opinion as grounds for concluding that bills concerning the specific subject of the Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial need not be submitted to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation, likewise do not provide the support that the majority of the Sala claims they provide in relation to this matter.
In the first of those judgments, the Sala heard consolidated constitutional challenges (acciones de inconstitucionalidad) brought against the Ley Marco de Pensiones, Ley N° 7302 de 8 de julio de 1992. On that occasion, this Court stated only that, in the case of the Ley Marco de Pensiones, there was no constitutional obligation to submit the corresponding bill to the Poder Judicial for consultation, for the simple reason that the bill did not affect judicial employees and therefore did not fall within the provisions of Article 167 of the Constitución Política. Likewise, the cited opinion states that operation refers to the adjudicative function, but makes no reference whatsoever to the organization of the Poder Judicial, which is the matter at issue here.
Similarly, in Judgment N° 2002-4258 of 9:40 on 10 de mayo de 2002, the Sala heard consolidated constitutional challenges filed against Article 4 of Ley N° 7605, de 2 de mayo de 1996, insofar as it amended Articles 224, 226, and 236, subsections 1) and 2), of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, N° 7333 de 5 de mayo de 1993, and, by connection and consequence, against Article 33, subsection a), of the Reglamento de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Among the alleged violations, the Sala rejected the claimed violation of Article 167 of the Constitución Política because the challenged reform of the pension system for judicial employees bore no relation to the organization or operation of the Poder Judicial. In defining those concepts, it referred to the relevant discussion in Judgment N° 1995-3063 of 15:30 on 13 de junio de 1995, which, as already noted, addressed only the term “operation” of the Poder Judicial and made no reference whatsoever to its organization.
Thus, contrary to the majority’s stated view, those judgments do not exclude matters concerning the Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial from mandatory consultation with the Corte Suprema de Justicia, except insofar as the corresponding bill has no direct connection with the “organization or operation of the Poder Judicial,” matters that were indeed not involved in the challenges brought before this Sala and resolved in the cited judgments. Accordingly, matters concerning the Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial are not excluded from mandatory consultation with the Corte Suprema de Justicia, as the majority understands them to be, because this subject, considered in itself, is not excluded from such consultation. Rather, whether consultation is required will depend on whether the bill in question contains provisions concerning the organization or operation of that Branch, a matter that must be determined in advance in each case in order to establish whether such consultation is mandatory.
At this point, it is important to clarify that the functional independence of the Poder Judicial, established in Article 9 and reinforced in Article 154, both of the Constitución Política, necessarily entails that Branch of the Republic’s authority to establish its own organization, particularly to prevent political interests from interfering with its function. This organizational independence, both administrative and adjudicative, is also protected by Article 167 of the Constitution. In this regard, in the view of the undersigned, it is a serious conceptual error to confuse or equate the adjudicative function in a broad sense, including functions auxiliary to adjudication, with the strictly administrative function. The adjudicative function is a special function distinct from the administrative function performed by officials of the Poder Ejecutivo or the decentralized sector. The administration of justice is one thing, while public administration (Administración Pública) is quite another, given the particular characteristics of the adjudicative function as compared with the merely administrative function, even though judges and judicial assistants are also public officials.
One such characteristic, without which it would be impossible to perform the adjudicative function properly, is independence in its dual dimension: that of the Poder Judicial itself and that of judges and other personnel assisting the adjudicative function. To understand the delicate work performed by the judges of the Republic, with the cooperation of the officials who assist and support them in their duties and without whom they could not properly perform their function, it is enough to bear in mind that they decide the cases submitted to them with the force of res judicata (cosa juzgada); that is, in each case they determine what is true with the binding force of law, and once their decision has acquired that status, it may not, in principle, be reviewed. This entails an extremely delicate function and a great responsibility, which could not be carried out unless the functional independence of the Poder Judicial and of the judges who comprise it were guaranteed.
In this regard, there can be no true independence if the salaries, pensions, and retirement benefits of judges and judicial assistants are not commensurate with their responsibilities, which are far more serious than those of any other official performing a merely administrative public function. Therefore, the two groups cannot in any way be equated in terms of their responsibilities, functions, salaries, or retirement rights (derechos jubilatorios).
There is consensus in administrative-law scholarship that the judicial function is, if not the most complex, one of the most complex and difficult functions to perform in a Constitutional State governed by the rule of law in modern societies. This is because, unlike decisions made by the Legislative and Executive Branches, decisions of the Poder Judicial, in the exercise of the judicial function, are final and unappealable; that is, they have the force or authority of res judicata (cosa juzgada). This entails not only great responsibility, but also the need for a series of principles and safeguards that permit the proper exercise of that function. In this context, the independence of the Poder Judicial, both organizational and functional, is a sine qua non for the exercise of this delicate function. It is for the judge to determine the sole permissible interpretation of the law, the Constitution, and the conventionality-review standard (parámetro de convencionalidad), which would be impossible without due independence.
Yet this independence would be illusory if it did not necessarily entail adequate remuneration and retirement benefits commensurate with their functions and responsibilities, both for judges themselves and for the personnel who assist and support them in their duties. Accordingly, in matters of remuneration and retirement, they cannot be treated in the same manner as the administrative sector. The need to compensate for the complexity and difficulty involved in exercising the judicial function justifies, with respect to the subject of this consultation, judicial employees receiving retirement benefits or pensions different from those of the rest of the public administrative sector. Decisions having the force of res judicata in judicial proceedings have far-reaching effects on legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) and the law in force within a society and, consequently, on social peace. Judicial independence plays a leading role in all of this because, in a Constitutional State governed by the rule of law—that is, in a Democratic State—this principle has an institutional dimension within the Poder Judicial itself in relation to any of the other Branches of Government.
This also necessarily entails the personal and functional independence of judges, not only in relation to those other Branches of Government, but even in relation to the senior authorities of the Poder Judicial. Today, there can be no rule of law unless the Poder Judicial—including all its employees—enjoys real and effective independence. Judicial independence is an institutional guarantee (garantía institucional) established at the constitutional level—that is, at the highest level in the hierarchy of legal norms—to the extent that it is also enshrined as a Human Right. Indeed, the American Convention on Human Rights has established the right to be heard by an impartial judge as a human right. In this regard, Article 8.1 provides:
“Article 8. Judicial Guarantees.
1. Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal previously established by law, in the substantiation of any criminal accusation made against that person, or for the determination of that person’s rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.” (Boldface does not appear in the original).
Judicial independence is a fundamental principle within the Constitutional State governed by the rule of law. For that independence to be real, however, it must be not only organizational and functional, but also economic. This economic independence is also guaranteed by Article 177 of the Constitución Política, which provides that the proposed ordinary budget must allocate to the Poder Judicial at least 6% of the ordinary revenues projected for the fiscal year. In enacting this provision—which establishes a constitutionally earmarked expenditure—the intention of the original Constituent Assembly was, among other things, to ensure that judges and other personnel assisting in the administration of justice received compensation appropriate to the complexity and difficulty of the judicial function. This also entails retirement benefits or pensions appropriate to those factors and to the special restrictions that this function imposes on judicial employees, which do not apply to public employees of the other Branches of Government.
The constitutional provision prevents budgetary allocations from becoming an instrument of political interference in the judicial function. This must, however, be viewed in its full scope, because the salaries of judges and support personnel, as well as the pension and retirement system applicable to them, must bear a strict relationship to the work they perform, lest the principle of judicial independence be rendered ineffective. Thus, the economic, personal, functional, organizational, and institutional independence of both the Poder Judicial itself and judges and judicial officers is essential in a Constitutional State governed by the rule of law. Accordingly, one way to guarantee the independence of the Poder Judicial, the Judges of the Republic, and judicial officers is through dignified retirement benefits or pensions commensurate with their constitutional functions.
In the explanatory statement that led to the enactment of the Ley de Jubilaciones y Pensiones Judiciales as an addition to the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, legislator Teodoro Picado Michalski stated on 2 de junio de 1938:
“The Poder Judicial is one of the three principal pillars supporting the Government of the Republic; and because its employees perform functions of great sensitivity for the very life of Society, they are required, more than other employees, to possess greater learning and integrity and to undertake more work. And it is surely for this reason—because judicial employees are asked to devote themselves completely, for many years, to the vitally important task of administering justice, with the noble purpose of ensuring their livelihood when they reach old age or can no longer work because of physical ailments—that Congress has been repeatedly urged, during different legislative terms, to enact a law addressing this difficult situation faced by the officials and employees of the Poder Judicial.” It must not be overlooked that judges and judicial officials in general are subject to a system of restrictions and incompatibilities (régimen de prohibiciones y de incompatibilidades) that is far more stringent and rigorous than the system of incompatibilities and restrictions applicable to other public officials, making it entirely different in nature.
The regulations applicable to administrative officials throughout the public sector cannot also be applied to judicial officials. In this regard, the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality require that this asymmetrical system of incompatibilities and restrictions, which reflects the very nature of judicial and administrative functions, be economically compensated, both through salary and upon termination of employment. The principle of equality, enshrined in Article 33 of the Constitución Política, also prohibits treating unlike persons as though they were alike, because doing so results in discrimination contrary to Constitutional Law (Derecho de la Constitución). In the case of judges and judicial officials, there are objective, reasonable, justified grounds inherent in the very nature of the judicial function they perform for treating them differently from other public employees in the various administrations.
Far from constituting discrimination, this protects the principle of equality established in the aforementioned constitutional provision. This means that if a differentiated retirement system exists for the judicial sector, it is not the result of an arbitrary, subjective, or capricious decision by the legislature, but rather of the specific and distinct nature of the judicial function, which objectively and constitutionally justifies it.
The foregoing derives not only from our own Constitución Política and the values and principles underlying it, but is also contained in various international instruments. Thus, for example, Principle 11 of the “Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary,” adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in Milán from 26 de agosto to 6 de septiembre de 1985, and endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 40/32 of 29 de noviembre de 1985 and 40/146 of 13 de diciembre de 1985, states:
“11. The law shall guarantee judges’ tenure in office for the established periods, their independence and security, as well as adequate remuneration, pensions, conditions of service, and retirement.” (Emphasis does not appear in the original).
Accordingly, the United Nations recommends that all countries of the world ensure through their laws that judges receive remuneration, pensions, conditions of service, and retirement benefits that are adequate and proportionate to the complexity and difficulty of the judicial function they perform. This must also be understood as extending to judicial support officials, since otherwise such independence would be impossible.
Likewise, paragraphs 6.1 and 6.4 of the “European Charter on the Statute for Judges,” adopted in Estrasburgo between 8 and 10 de julio de 1998, provide as follows in pursuit of the real and effective independence of the Poder Judicial and the officials who administer justice, as well as their staff and assistants:
“6.1 The professional exercise of judicial duties entitles a judge to remuneration, the level of which shall be determined so as to shield the judge from pressures intended to influence judicial decisions and, more generally, the performance of judicial duties, thereby impairing the judge’s independence and impartiality.
6.4 In particular, the statute shall ensure that a judge who has reached the statutory age for leaving office, after performing judicial duties professionally for a specified period, is paid a retirement pension in an amount as close as possible to the judge’s last remuneration for judicial service.” (Emphasis does not appear in the original).
The aforementioned instrument seeks to achieve a genuinely and effectively independent Poder Judicial, which is a guarantee benefiting the public. Thus, adequate remuneration and pensions for judges and judicial officers, on the terms expressed therein, constitute the proper and reasonable consequence of performing a delicate function involving great difficulty and responsibility.
Similarly, the “Statute of the Ibero-American Judge,” approved at the VI Ibero-American Summit of Presidents of Supreme Courts and Supreme Courts of Justice, held in Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Islas Canarias, España, on 23, 24 y 25 de mayo de 2001, echoes the same principles already cited in Article 32, providing:
“Art. 32. Remuneration.
Judges must receive sufficient and non-reducible remuneration commensurate with the importance of the function they perform and with the demands and responsibilities it entails.” (Emphasis does not appear in the original).
And Article 33 provides:
“Art. 33. Social Security.
The State must provide judges with access to a social security system, guaranteeing that, upon completing their years of service due to retirement, illness, or other legally established contingencies, or in the event of personal injury or harm to their families or property arising from the performance of their office, they will receive a dignified pension or adequate compensation.” (Emphasis does not appear in the original).
It must be borne in mind that retirement and pensions form part of the Economic, Social, and Benefit Rights set forth in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 2200 A (XXI), of 16 de diciembre de 1966. These provisions were also endorsed in Report No. 1 of 23 de noviembre del 2001, issued by the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE), when examining the independence and security of tenure (inamovilidad) of judges. With respect to judges’ salaries, that Council recommended:
“…it is generally important (and especially in the case of new democracies) to establish specific legal provisions guaranteeing judges’ salaries against reductions and ensuring, in practice, ‘salary increases in line with the cost of living.’” These recommendations are fully applicable to the pensions and retirement benefits of judges and judicial personnel in general, since they are closely related to the principle of independence of the Poder Judicial, as already explained.
This matter has been regulated in the terms described not only internationally, but also internally within the Poder Judicial, based on similar considerations.
Indeed, the Corte Plena approved the Estatuto de Justicia y Derechos de las Personas Usuarias del Sistema Judicial, Articles 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 of which refer to the independence of the Poder Judicial and of judges in its various aspects. Article 24, concerning the material conditions of judicial independence, provides that the State must guarantee “the economic independence of the Poder Judicial by allocating an adequate budget to meet its needs and through the timely disbursement of budgetary appropriations,” which is closely related to the provisions of the aforementioned Article 177 of the Constitución Política regarding the constitutionally mandated allocation of a minimum portion of the Ordinary Budget to the Poder Judicial as an expression of that independence.
Likewise, Article 49 of the aforementioned Estatuto, like the international instruments examined, also enshrines the principle of judges’ irreducible salary (salario irreductible): “Judges must receive sufficient and irreducible remuneration commensurate with the importance of the function they perform and with the demands and responsibilities it entails.” As already explained, this special provision is grounded in the independence of the Poder Judicial, and it must also extend to the pensions or retirement benefits of judges and auxiliary justice personnel, since otherwise the principle of judicial independence would not be possible.
Respect for judicial independence, which is one of the purposes pursued by Article 167 of the Constitución Política, was also expressly regulated in Article 20 of the Estatuto, which provides that “[t]he other Branches of Government and, in general, all national or international authorities, institutions, and bodies must respect and give effect to the independence of the judiciary.” And, precisely, the legislative body’s unconsulted interference in the organization and operation of the Poder Judicial, whether by creating, modifying, or abolishing judicial or administrative bodies or powers, is constitutionally impermissible because it constitutes a flagrant violation of the principle of judicial independence.
Lastly, it should be noted that the independence of the Poder Judicial is a principle of a particular and specific nature, distinct from that of the other Branches of Government, because it serves as a protective shield against interference by political power, protection that the other Branches of Government do not enjoy. This is because the Poder Judicial administers justice, which must be impartial and free from any external pressure. In this regard, economic pressure—whether through the salary or stipend, or through the amount and conditions of the retirement benefits or pensions of judges and other auxiliary justice personnel—plays a decisive role in achieving the real and effective independence of the Poder Judicial.
Based on the foregoing considerations, it is therefore appropriate to examine the contents of the bill under consultation in order to determine whether it affects the organization or operation of the Poder Judicial in the terms stated.
In this vein, as stated supra, the consulting parties allege that Article 239 of the bill in question creates a Junta Administradora del Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial, which it defines as a body of the Poder Judicial with functional, technical, and administrative independence to exercise the powers and duties conferred upon it by law. That body is granted functional independence and assigned a series of responsibilities, including, among others, increasing employees’ contributions to the Fondo de Pensiones and deciding retirement applications, which entails a modification of the structure of the Poder Judicial. Likewise, powers are removed from the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial; furthermore, Article 240 of the bill imposes upon the Corte Plena the obligation to issue regulations governing the election of the members of that Junta Administradora, thereby assigning it a power that it does not currently possess. The aforementioned provisions of the bill state:
“Article 239—The Junta Administrativa del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial is hereby created as a body of the Poder Judicial, with complete functional, technical, and administrative independence to exercise the powers and duties conferred upon it by law.
The Junta shall be responsible for:
Based on the results of the actuarial studies, and with authorization from the Superintendencia de Pensiones, the Junta Administrativa may modify the initial parameters established in this law concerning eligibility requirements, the benefit structure, and the contributions of judicial personnel and the retirement benefits and pensions provided for by law, whenever necessary to guarantee the actuarial balance (equilibrio actuarial) of the Régimen.
The Junta shall have instrumental legal personality (personalidad jurídica instrumental) to exercise the powers assigned to it by law and to represent the Fondo in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings.
It shall be financed through an administrative-expense commission obtained by deducting five per thousand from the salaries earned by judicial personnel and from the retirement benefits and pensions payable by the Fondo. These resources shall be used to pay the per diem allowances of the members of the Junta Administrativa, the salaries of its personnel, and its administrative expenses in general. Idle funds shall be invested in accordance with Article 237 of this law.
Article 240—The Junta Administradora shall consist of three members democratically elected by the judicial workforce and three members appointed by the Corte Plena, applying a gender perspective in both cases. Each principal member shall have an alternate to replace that member during absences, and the alternate must meet the same requirements as the principal member.
The members of the Junta shall serve five-year terms, after which they may be reelected, all in accordance with the regulations to be issued for that purpose by the Corte Plena after granting a hearing to the professional associations of the Poder Judicial.
At its first ordinary session, the Junta shall appoint the person who will preside over its sessions. This appointment shall be for a period of one year, and the presidency shall alternate each year between the representatives of the judicial workforce and those of the Corte Plena. A person shall also be appointed to act as a substitute in the event of absence. The presiding person shall have a casting vote in the event of a tie.
The members of the Junta Administradora shall not receive any per diem allowance, but they shall be granted the necessary leave to attend its sessions. To serve as a member of the Junta, a person must meet the following requirements, which must be documented and demonstrated before the Superintendencia de Pensiones (Supén):
The following persons may not serve as members of the Junta:
The composition of the body must guarantee equal representation of both sexes, ensuring that the difference between the total number of men and women does not exceed one.” From a reading of Article 239, transcribed above, it is clear that it creates a new body within the structure of the Poder Judicial, called the “Junta Administrativa del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial,” which is granted complete functional, technical, and administrative independence to exercise the powers, competencies, and authority conferred on it by law, as enumerated in subsections a), b), c), d), e), f), g), h), and i) of that same article, for the fulfillment of its duties, for which purpose it shall have instrumental legal personality (personalidad jurídica instrumental). Thus, an administrative body is created ex novo and placed within the structure of the Poder Judicial, with specified competencies and authority; concomitantly, competencies and authority previously conferred—by formal statute—on the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial are withdrawn and eliminated.
This circumstance alone, for the reasons stated, necessarily requires the legislative body to consult the Poder Judicial concerning the bill, under the terms established in Article 167 of the Constitución Política, because it modifies the administrative organization of the Poder Judicial by creating a new administrative body and transferring competencies of the Consejo Superior to that newly created body, which clearly affects the independence of that Branch of the Republic.
The same applies to Article 240 of the bill under consultation, insofar as it addresses matters concerning the administrative organization of the Poder Judicial, including the composition and appointment of the members of the Junta Administradora del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, their terms of office, the designation of the person who is to preside over it, and the requirements for membership on that Board, among others. It should be emphasized that, although the Corte Plena is empowered by the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial to issue the internal regulations necessary for the proper functioning of the Poder Judicial, the fact that the bill under consultation imposes upon it the obligation to regulate matters concerning the terms of office of the members of the Junta Administradora del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, without the substitute text (texto sustitutivo) of the bill that was ultimately approved in First Debate having been submitted to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation, constitutes a serious intrusion into the competencies of the highest-ranking body of the Poder Judicial, affecting the organization of that Branch of the Republic, in contravention of the mandatory consultation prescribed by Article 167 of the Constitución Política and, consequently, impairing judicial independence.
At first glance, the cited provisions, now submitted for consultation by the representatives of the people, deprive the Presidente de la Corte Suprema de Justicia and, consequently, the Presidente del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, of the authority granted to him by the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial to administer the Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial, specifically in accordance with the investment policies established by the Corte Plena, as currently provided in Article 81, subsection 12.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the objection raised by the parties requesting consultation (consultantes) is that the substitute text of the bill, which was adopted by the Comisión Especial at its session of 27 de julio de 2017, was not submitted to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation, despite containing a series of provisions affecting the organization and operation of the Poder Judicial. However, as stated in the majority opinion (voto de mayoría), folio 2625 of the legislative record shows that, pursuant to a motion approved on 27 de julio de 2017 by the Comisión Especial, through official letter number AL-20035-OFI-0043-2017 of 31 de julio de 2017, the Jefa del Área de Comisiones de la Asamblea Legislativa afforded the Poder Judicial an opportunity to be heard regarding the affirmative majority report (dictamen afirmativo de mayoría), on the basis of which the Corte Suprema de Justicia issued its opinion through official letter number SP-253-17 of 10 de agosto de 2017, as shown at folios 2759 to 2807 of the legislative record. This means, therefore, that the Poder Judicial was indeed consulted and expressed its opinion regarding the substitute text approved by the Comisión Especial on 27 de julio de 2017, which occurred even before that text was considered by the Plenario.
Nevertheless, that was not the text approved in First Debate by the Plenario Legislativo on 30 de octubre de 2017 and published in Alcance N° 268 to Gaceta Digital N° 212 of 9 de noviembre de 2017, because the text approved in First Debate was a substitute text introduced by a motion pursuant to Article 137 of the Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa. This latter text was not submitted to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation, as was required, according to the analysis supra, under Article 167 of the Constitución Política.
Although this issue was not expressly raised by the parties requesting consultation, this does not prevent the Sala from examining it sua sponte (de oficio), because it constitutes a material defect (vicio esencial) in the legislative procedure followed in processing the bill under consultation. In this regard, it should be emphasized that this Tribunal Constitucional has jurisdiction to consider and rule sua sponte on any constitutional issue it identifies when reviewing a legislative record in which a particular bill is being processed through the legislative constitutional consultation procedure (consulta legislativa de constitucionalidad), regardless of whether that specific issue was submitted for consultation. This follows from the text of Article 101 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which provides:
“Article 101.- The Sala shall answer the consultation within the month following its receipt and, in doing so, shall issue an opinion on the issues and grounds submitted for consultation or on any others it considers relevant from a constitutional standpoint.
The opinion of the Sala shall be binding only insofar as it establishes the existence of unconstitutional procedural steps in the bill under consultation.
In all cases, the opinion shall not preclude the possibility that the challenged provision or provisions may subsequently be contested through constitutional review procedures.” (Emphasis not in the original).
In this regard, national legal scholarship has also stated:
“With respect to the content of the opinion issued by the Sala Constitucional, there is no absolute and rigid correspondence between the grounds or issues submitted for consultation and the opinion expressed by the Sala, since the Sala Constitucional may, ex officio, issue its opinion ‘on any others it considers relevant from a constitutional standpoint’ (Article 101, paragraph 1°, LJC), which include, of course, both formal defects in the legislative procedure that were not submitted for consultation and substantive issues contained in the bill that were not identified by the parties requesting consultation.” (Jinesta Lobo, Ernesto. Derecho Procesal Constitucional, Primera Edición, Editorial Guayacán, San José, Costa Rica, p. 334).
Thus, if, as in this case, the Sala, upon examining the legislative record, determines that a material defect occurred in the lawmaking procedure for a bill, or that its content is contrary to the Law of the Constitution (Derecho de la Constitución), it may properly rule on the matter sua sponte, not only because the law governing its operation so provides, but also because doing so is reasonable and consistent with sound procedural economy (economía procesal). It would make no sense for the Sala to disregard an instance of unconstitutionality detected in the bill merely because the parties requesting consultation did not identify it, only to wait for it later to be challenged through an action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad), at which point it would have to rule on the matter and declare unconstitutional a law already in force, with the harmful consequences that this could entail for the legal system.
In this regard, it would be absurd to permit the legislative approval of a law containing an unconstitutional defect, whether in the legislative procedure or in the substantive provisions, that ultimately would have to be declared unconstitutional. This is especially so where, as here, the defect occurred in the processing of the bill under consultation and is binding on the legislative body. Accordingly, the defect identified in the legislative procedure for the bill entitled “Ley de Reforma Integral a los Diversos Regímenes de Pensiones y Normativa Conexa,” legislative file number 19.922, arising from the failure to submit to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation the substitute text approved in First Debate, must be declared sua sponte, since this violates Article 167 of the Constitución Política by affecting the administrative organization of the Poder Judicial through the creation of a new administrative body within its structure, the granting to that body of substantial competencies in pension and retirement matters, and, at the same time, the elimination of competencies previously conferred by law on the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial (Articles 239 and 240 of the bill).
In further support of the foregoing, this Sala, in Judgment N° 2001-13273, at 11:44 hours on 21 de diciembre de 2001, when answering a legislative constitutional consultation concerning a bill amending the Código Penal insofar as it modified matters relating to the merely administrative organization or operation of the Archivo Judicial, unanimously held:
“Likewise, they modify the scope of the functions of the Archivo Judicial by increasing the amount of data it must record. All of the foregoing undoubtedly entails changes to various rules concerning the operation and organization of the Poder Judicial. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Asamblea Legislativa failed to carry out the corresponding consultation with the Corte Suprema de Justicia (at least, no such consultation appears in the certified copy of the record submitted by the Presidente del Directorio), and those matters had not previously been included in the texts submitted to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation. The Sala therefore finds that there was a violation of the duty imposed by Article 167 of the Constitución Política with respect to the functional independence granted by the constituent authority (constituyente) to the Poder Judicial and, accordingly, the procedure followed prior to the approval of the amended report must be deemed constitutionally null and void and must be so declared.” (Emphasis added).
It should be noted, in light of the foregoing, that the defect identified would not be cured even if, at the second debate (segundo debate), the bill were approved by a qualified majority (mayoría calificada), since this would be the case only if a text subject to mandatory consultation with the Judicial Branch—because it affects its organization, structure, and operation, as in this case—were approved and, after consultation with the Corte Suprema de Justicia, the legislative body persisted in approving it in departure from the judicial body’s technical opinion. What is at issue here, however, is the approval—at the First Debate (Primer Debate)—of a text that was not submitted for consultation, in contravention of Article 167 of the Constitución Política, a procedural defect (vicio de procedimiento) that cannot be remedied or cured. This is because, although the substitute text (texto sustitutivo) of the bill adopted by the Comisión Especial at its session of 27 de julio de 2017 was submitted to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation, that was not the text ultimately approved at the First Debate; instead, a new substitute text was approved without having first been submitted for consultation, notwithstanding its direct relationship to the organization, structure, and operation of the Judicial Branch, as explained above.
Moreover, although the previous text approved by the Comisión Especial at its session of 27 de julio de 2017 was indeed submitted to the Court for consultation, because the Court expressed disagreement with the text, a qualified vote (votación calificada) by the Plenary was mandatory under Article 167 of the Fundamental Charter (Carta Fundamental), and that was not done either.
The Corte Plena, at Session N° 27 of 7 de agosto de 2017, Article XXX, in responding to the consultation submitted by the Asamblea Legislativa concerning the Affirmative Majority Report (Dictamen Afirmativo de Mayoría) approved by the aforementioned Comisión Especial, ruled:
“It is considered to concern the structure and operation of the Judicial Branch because it directly affects the life plans of all judicial employees, as it entails a reduction in retirement benefits even when they have fulfilled all legal requirements for full enjoyment of the right to retirement. This includes payment of the necessary and corresponding contributions; payment of income tax; contributions both to the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial and to the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social system; and a further series of charges that, if the text were approved exactly as proposed by the reporting committee (Comisión dictaminadora), would result in confiscatory measures.
It cannot be overlooked that the creation and nature of the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial reflect criteria of stability, independence, training, and suitability, as established in Article 192 of the Constitución Política, for the purpose of encouraging trained and qualified personnel to remain with the institution; a reduction in retirement benefits would discourage valuable professionals from joining, as they might, based on an economic assessment of their future prospects, prefer to pursue their professional careers in another field of employment.
It affects the judicial career service, the prosecutorial career service, the Defensa Pública, and staff in general, who, despite bearing salary deductions four times greater than those under other systems, would receive a smaller benefit.
Furthermore, the renewal of the staff members who manage to remain is affected. The Judicial Branch would have older officials who continued working solely because of the reduction in income they would suffer if they retired.
Judicial personnel would face a dilemma: although they may wish to exercise that right and be motivated to retire and rest, they would be placed in a position in which they must assess their financial situation, probably forcing them to seek new sources of income to maintain their ordinary expenses or obligations incurred before retirement, as well as the expenses naturally associated with age. However, that process is also subject to restrictions: from a legal standpoint, the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial prohibits retired persons from taking other employment, and it is a social reality that, after the age of forty, people face practical limitations on reentering the workforce.
It is closely related to structure and operation because it makes the Judicial Branch less competitive in the labor market, to the detriment of the quality of the Administration of Justice. Compensation for positions is reduced by the contribution to the pension and retirement system, which is four times greater than the contribution under other systems. This makes it more difficult to recruit human resources and harms the public service.
Moreover, the regulation of the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial should not be assessed solely from an economic perspective, because fundamental rights—which cannot be waived—of every worker are at stake. During their working years, those workers contributed at a higher percentage than the general rate to a system in the expectation of receiving a pension that would enable them to meet their needs and peacefully enjoy their retirement years, together with those around them, with a good quality of life.
The imposition of this new tax burden affects vulnerable population groups—such as older adults—harming the weaker party, which is precisely the one requiring greater protection from the State.
The proposed tax is imposed at a stage in retired persons’ lives when they are most vulnerable, as they are approaching or have already reached old age. It cannot be overlooked that this is the stage during which people generally require more medical attention, special care, and other assistance, and that during their working lives they contributed to the system—to a lesser or greater extent, according to the income received—in the expectation of having the anticipated resources to face this process; approval of this bill would thwart that life plan.
It would cause a significant social impact because retirees would unexpectedly lose a substantial portion of their income while retaining a pre-established level of expenses, resulting not only in economic repercussions but also repercussions for their health, contrary to the intended purpose of a pension system, which is to provide sufficient income during post-employment life. In this context, it is important to remember that retired persons often continue to be responsible for the care and support of other older adults or minors.
Taking into account the observations raised concerning the bill processed under expediente 19922 (20035), which are consistent with and supported by the actuarial study (estudio actuarial) conducted by the IICE, and pursuant to the powers conferred by Articles 167 of the Constitución Política and 59 subsection 1) of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, it is considered that the text submitted for consultation does affect the structure, organization, and operation of the Judicial Branch. Accordingly, the Asamblea Legislativa must take into account the statements made by the Corte Plena regarding each aspect of the bill under consultation, unless it has the qualified majority required to depart from that binding opinion.
This has been communicated to that Legislative Branch in connection with other bills submitted for consultation, such as those considered at Corte Plena sessions Nos. 57-14 of 08 de diciembre de 2014, Article XVIII; 13-15 of 23 de marzo de 2015, Article XXXVII; 2-16 of 18 de enero de 2016, Article XVIII; and 14-17 of 30 de mayo de 2017, Article XIX, among others, in which the Corte Plena deemed it necessary to identify the impact of the bills on the internal structure of the Judicial Branch.
Consequently, an unfavorable opinion must be issued regarding the bill processed under expediente N° 19922 because it affects the structure, organization, and operation of the Judicial Branch.” (Boldface does not appear in the original).
The final portion of the cited constitutional article (167) states verbatim that “to depart from its [the Court’s] opinion, the vote of two-thirds of the total membership of the Asamblea Legislativa shall be required”; yet that final text—which, in any event, had not been submitted for consultation—was approved by the Asamblea Legislativa on 30 de octubre de 2017 with only thirty-one votes (folios 4000 and 4173 of the legislative record).
b.- Failure to publish the substitute text approved by the Comisión Especial at its session of 13 de septiembre de 2016. A review of the legislative history (iter legislativo) establishes that the substitute text of the bill under consultation, approved by the Comisión Especial at its session of 13 de septiembre de 2016, was not published, as asserted by the consulting deputies and duly established by the evidence submitted by the Director Ejecutivo de la Asamblea Legislativa on 12 de marzo de 2018. Furthermore, under the rules established by the special procedure (procedimiento especial) approved by the Asamblea Legislativa for expediente number 19.922 at Ordinary Session N° 37 of 30 de junio de 2016, pursuant to Article 208 bis of the Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, such publication was mandatory. This is clear from subsection h of item 2, “Substantive Motions (Mociones de Fondo),” of the procedure in question, which states verbatim:
“h.- If, while the expediente is under consideration during committee proceedings, a motion proposing a substitute text is approved, or if the committee agrees to changes that substantially modify the bill, the Chair of the Committee shall request that the Directorio Legislativo order its publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta in order to safeguard the Constitutional Principle of Publicity (Principio Constitucional de Publicidad), and consideration of the bill shall be suspended….” (Emphasis does not appear in the original).
The majority of the Chamber considers that this failure to publish—an undisputed fact—does not affect the processing of the bill and, therefore, does not constitute a material procedural defect (vicio esencial del procedimiento), because ultimately that was not the text approved by the Comisión Especial on 27 de julio de 2017; the latter substitute text was published in Supplement N° 189 of the digital edition of La Gaceta N° 147 of 4 de agosto de 2017.
In the opinion of the undersigned, however, that reasoning cannot be accepted. First, the rules adopted by the Legislative Plenary for processing the bill under consultation through the special procedure pursuant to Article 208 bis of the Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa are subject to mandatory and strict compliance, given that this procedure is considerably more restrictive than the ordinary procedure and requires particular observance of the democratic principle and the principle of publicity. Moreover, regardless of whether the text in question was ultimately the text approved by the Comisión Especial on 27 de julio de 2017—which was published—the failure to publish is itself a material defect. Therefore, the fact that the text was later replaced by another text that was published does not cure the defect identified.
This Chamber has already so held when responding to the Optional Legislative Consultations on Constitutionality (Consultas Legislativas Facultativas de Constitucionalidad) submitted regarding the approval of the bill entitled “Ley de Solidaridad Tributaria,” which was processed under legislative expediente N° 18.261. On that occasion, in Judgment N° 2012-004621 of 16:00 hours on 10 de abril de 2012, it stated:
“VII.- This Constitutional Court notes that when the Legislative Assembly, through a procedural motion (moción de orden) under Article 208 bis of the Rules of Procedure, creates a special procedure (procedimiento especial), its application and observance must be absolutely rigorous and strict. The special procedure created through Article 208 bis is, as such, an exception to the rules governing ordinary legislative procedures (procedimientos legislativos ordinarios), consented to by a qualified majority (mayoría calificada), but, as such, it will always remain an exception. The duty of the various legislative bodies to adhere vigilantly and scrupulously to the previously designed special procedure prevents any infringement of the principles of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) (emphasized by this Court in Voto No. 398-2005 of 12:10 hrs. on 21 de enero de 2005) and democracy. Consequently, in the case of a special and expedited legislative procedure, the previously established time limits, stages, and requirements must be interpreted restrictively and rigorously, since the degree of flexibility permissible with respect to ordinary procedures through broad interpretations decreases considerably, in order to prevent an exception to the exception and, in general, a departure from the procedural course (iter) exceptionally created by a supermajority (mayoría agravada).
VIII.OBVIOUS AND MANIFEST MATERIAL PROCEDURAL DEFECT RESULTING FROM THE FAILURE TO PUBLISH A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF SUBSTANTIVE MOTIONS APPROVED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE THAT, TAKEN TOGETHER, SUBSTANTIALLY MODIFIED THE ORIGINAL BILL. The consulting deputies further state that, notwithstanding the provisions of section I.2.h. of the special legislative procedure, during its consideration there was a failure to publish a series of changes made to the bill that reduced the projected revenue, which was originally estimated at 2% and subsequently fell to between 0.5% and 1% of GDP. Specifically, they indicated that motions Nos. 92, 128, 221, 222, 225, 227, 262, 267, 623, 624, 639, 5189-208 bis, 650, 661, 662, 674, 761, 778, 1717, 1786, 1843, 3767, 2325, 3771, 3879, 3991, 4128, 4129, 4157, 4241, 4242, 4243, 4244, 4245, 1375-208 bis, 1378-208 bis, 1379-208 bis, 1382-208 bis, 1383-208 bis, 1384-208 bis, 1388-208 bis, 4940-208 bis, 5142-208 bis, 5143-208 bis, 5144-208 bis, 5145-208 bis, 5146-208 bis, 5165-208 bis, 5166-208 bis, 5190-208 bis, 5193-208 bis, 5194-208 bis, 5215-208 bis, 5219-208 bis, and 5428-208 bis were not published.
However, it is appropriate to clarify at the outset that this Chamber will not consider matters concerning motions Nos. 92, 225, 639, 5189-208 bis, and 4245. It should be noted that the content of motion No. 92 does not concern what the consulting deputies claim. Although those legislators argue that the motion concerns an exemption for fishing inputs from payment of sales tax, it actually concerns the deadline for filing income-tax returns. Motion 225, for its part, merely clarified that the full amount of the school-year salary payment exempt from income tax includes both public- and private-sector employees. Similarly, motion 639 does not concern what the consulting deputies assert in this matter. The motion concerns the exemption from sales tax of commissions charged for withdrawing money from automated teller machines and not, as the legislators maintain, a 50% exemption from profits tax for State-owned business entities.
In any event, the consulting deputies themselves state that this benefit was subsequently eliminated through motion 5189-208 bis. Likewise, motion 4245 merely clarifies that the tax treatment of pension systems established in the Ley de Protección al Trabajador will be maintained. As for the remaining motions, it must be noted that the principle of publicity (principio de publicidad) in legislative proceedings is of particular and special significance in tax matters, given that all amendments made to a bill on that subject must be completely transparent, in view of the general scope of the taxing power (potestad tributaria) and the principle of equality in bearing public burdens (principio de igualdad en el sostenimiento de las cargas públicas). Thus, any substantial amendment to a bill of this nature must be subject to thorough and scrupulous publicity. Pursuant to section I.2.h. of the special procedure approved pursuant to Article 208 bis: “If, while the matter is under consideration during committee proceedings, a substitute-text motion (moción de texto sustitutivo) is approved, or if the committee agrees to changes that substantially modify the bill, the Committee Chair shall request that the Legislative Directorate approve its publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta in order to safeguard the Constitutional Principle of Publicity.” In the present consultation, it is evident that the large number of approved substantive motions, taken together, substantially altered the original bill, beginning with the modification and reduction of the rates of certain taxes for certain taxpayers, goods, and services, as well as the establishment of tax exemptions for various persons governed by public and private law and various activities, the introduction of certain tax benefits, the establishment of special transitional regimes, etc. Those substantive motions do indeed concern the subject matter governed by the original, duly published bill; nevertheless, their cumulative effect produces a substantial change of such a nature and magnitude that, because it concerns tax matters, it requires heightened and qualified publicity, given that citizens have the right to know and understand why certain sectors, groups, persons, activities, goods, and services are exempted, subjected to a reduced or differentiated rate, or placed under a regime of tax benefits or exemptions or under a different transitional regime, unlike other taxpayers.
Publicity in tax matters is of greater importance because of the generality and equality that must prevail in the imposition of tax burdens. It should be noted that it has been a public and notorious fact, requiring no proof, that the projected revenue contained in the original bill was substantially reduced by the approved substantive motions. As is apparent from the comprehensive review of the two hundred fourteen volumes of the legislative record and the letter from the President of the Legislative Assembly No. Pal-1612-2012 of 10 de abril de 2012, received by this Court on 10 de abril last, those substantive motions were not published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta. Specifically, on this point, the President of the Legislative Assembly stated the following in the cited letter:
“With respect to the request made in the notice of service dated 9 de abril de 2012 at 16:50 horas concerning expediente No. 12-003518-0007-CO, an optional legislative consultation (consulta legislativa facultativa) filed by Messrs. Adonay Enríquez Guevara and others, we respond as follows. As Lic. Marcos William Quesada Bermúdez certifies to us in letter SD-98-11-12 of 9 de abril del año presente, which we attach, the record of proceedings for bill # 18.261 Ley de Solidaridad Tributaria shows only the publication of its base text, or initial text, in Gaceta 187, Alcance 70 of 29 de septiembre de 2011. No other updated text was published because neither the corresponding Committee adopted any resolution requesting the Legislative Directorate to publish it, nor did the Committee Chair do so. Furthermore, the procedural motions submitted in the Legislative Plenary seeking approval of its publication were systematically rejected by a majority of the deputies, and therefore such publication did not take place.” Consequently, after reviewing the content of the substantive motions approved by the special committee, this Constitutional Court unanimously finds that there was an obvious and manifest material defect in the legislative procedure that infringed the principles of publicity and equality because the motions were not published, given that, taken together, they substantially modified the original text.” Accordingly, because the special procedure established through Article 208 bis of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Assembly was not strictly observed in the consideration of the bill under consultation, owing to the failure to publish the substitute text of the bill under consultation approved by the Special Committee at its session of 13 de setiembre de 2016, a material defect occurred in the legislative procedure for enactment of the law, in violation of the democratic principle and the principle of publicity, and the subsequent replacement of that text cannot cure the procedure.
This Chamber likewise held in Judgment N° 2015-001241, issued at 11:31 horas on 28 de enero de 2015, when it declared several articles of the Ley de Impuesto a las Personas Jurídicas, N° 9024 of 23 de diciembre de 2011, unconstitutional for violating the principle of publicity, stating:
“The foregoing analysis, and particularly the highlighted portions, show that the unpublished substitute text introduced two penalties that render any corporation inoperative, namely, the non-issuance of certificates of legal representation and the cancellation of the registration of documents submitted by delinquent taxpayers. In this regard, it is likewise apparent that the substitute text approved essential aspects of the tax relating to penalties that were not contemplated in the original bill and that therefore warranted protection of the constitutional principle of publicity. As a corollary to the foregoing examination, it is concluded that Articles 1, 3, and 5 of Ley No. 9124, Impuesto a las Personas Jurídicas, are unconstitutional in light of Article 73, subsection c), of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. This is because, in the enactment of the law at issue, material requirements or procedures relating to publication of the bill were violated—a principle that, as has repeatedly been stated, is fundamental in a Constitutional State governed by the rule of law, particularly where tax matters are concerned.
Indeed, the failure to republish the bill in order to ensure publicity of the text and to promote the broadest possible public and institutional participation violated an essential aspect of parliamentary procedure, the omission of which gives rise to a constitutional defect in the legislative procedure.” (Emphasis not in the original).
c.- Late publication of the substitute text (texto sustitutivo) of the bill approved on First Reading (Primer Debate) by the Plenario Legislativo. The legislative record (expediente legislativo) N° 19.922 shows that the substitute text approved on First Reading by the Plenario Legislativo on 30 de octubre de 2017 was published in Supplement 268 to the Gaceta Digital N° 212 of 9 de noviembre de 2017, whereas this consultation was filed on 1 de noviembre de 2017. In other words, not only was that text published out of time, after being approved on First Reading, but when the consultation was submitted to this Sala, it had not been published, which also resulted in another violation of the principle of publicity (principio de publicidad) and, consequently, of an essential step in the legislative procedure (procedimiento legislativo). The substitute text of the bill should have been published before its approval on First Reading because, by being published afterward, the democratic principle (principio democrático) was likewise violated, as the public was prevented from learning the substitute text of the bill before its approval.
Under these circumstances, late publication has the same effects on the legislative procedure as nonpublication, because the purpose of publication—namely, for the public to learn the final text of the bill before its approval and to exercise proper oversight of legislative work—was rendered ineffective, constituting an essential defect (vicio esencial) in the legislative procedure that cannot be cured by subsequent publication. Thus, what was stated in the preceding recital (considerando) regarding the nonpublication of the text approved by the Comisión Especial at its session of 13 de setiembre de 2016 is fully applicable to the late publication of the substitute text after its approval on First Reading, because the late publication of a bill is equivalent to nonpublication of the bill.
Based on the foregoing considerations, we find that the bill submitted for consultation to the Sala Constitucional suffers from several essential procedural defects (vicios esenciales de procedimiento) that affect it in its entirety and render it contrary to the Law of the Constitution (Derecho de la Constitución); accordingly, there is no need to analyze the substantive arguments raised by the requesting parties against the material content of the bill at issue. On the terms stated above, we dissent from the majority’s view and thus conclude this legislative consultation concerning the bill entitled “Ley de Reforma Integral a los Diversos Regímenes de Pensiones y Normativa Conexa,” expediente legislativo N° 19.922.
Because this was an expedited legislative procedure (procedimiento legislativo abreviado), the principle of publicity for the provisions debated or approved had to be observed with even greater rigor. The shortcomings of an expedited procedure require more rigorous application of the publicity requirement, without permitting validation (convalidación) of a requirement as important as publicity. Furthermore, publication of bills is the only means by which the activities of the people’s representatives reach the entire population. It projects parliamentary activity outward and operates as a constitutional guarantee (garantía constitucional) preventing parliament from acting behind the public’s back. Unlike other matters in which I have found that a failure to publish did not constitute an essential defect, I find that it does here for three reasons: because the rule governing the procedure so provides; because this was a substitute text; and because the failure to publish prevented the public from learning the text being debated at that time and also prevented the public from expressing its views on what parliament intended to accomplish through the bill.
Nor is this a case involving the omission of publication of provisions that did not alter the essence of the bill; rather, in this matter, publicity was entirely omitted during the conduct of an expedited legislative procedure, which, as I have stated, wholly weakens the constitutional principles (principios constitucionales) governing parliamentary procedure.” E.-) Regarding how article 167 of the Constitution was violated Furthermore, consistent with the dissenting opinion from decision number 2022-10593 by Justices Salazar, Garita, and Jara, drafted by the first of them, I find that article 167 of the Constitution was violated:
“…the legislative procedure involved a gross, manifest, and evident violation of article 167 of the Constitución Política, which, because of its significance, requires that Ley N° 9544, entitled “Reforma del Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, contenido en la Ley No. 7333, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial de 5 de mayo de 1993, y sus Reformas,” be declared unconstitutional in its entirety.
It must first be noted that the Comisión Especial responsible for processing expediente legislativo N° 19.922 submitted the respective bills as they were approved to the Corte Plena for its consideration, in order to comply with the provisions of the aforementioned article 167. The Corte Suprema de Justicia was consulted on three occasions, as follows:
In each and every consultation submitted, the Corte Plena determined that the bills affected its organization and operation. Accordingly, based on that unfavorable opinion and pursuant to article 167 of the Constitución Política and the principles of coordination, mutual respect, and equality governing relations between constitutional bodies, including two branches of government [system of checks and balances, checks and balances], the law was required to be approved by a qualified majority (mayoría calificada). It should also be noted that the last of the bills—the Affirmative Majority Report accepted by the Comisión Especial on 27 de julio de 2017—was not the final text. On the contrary, the text of the bill was amended through substantive motions (mociones de fondo) and motions for reconsideration (mociones de reiteración) accepted by the Comisión Especial, on which the Plenario Legislativo subsequently voted on First Reading at extraordinary session N° 14 of 30 de octubre de 2017 (folios 4000, 4306 a 4327 del expediente legislativo).
Thus, the text voted on by the Plenario Legislativo on First Reading was the amended text, which retained some of the provisions on which the Corte Plena had issued its unfavorable opinion, including the establishment of a Junta Administradora del Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial to the detriment of the authority of the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial. It must also be noted that the text contained other substantial amendments to the bill, including amendments that made certain conditions more onerous for judicial officials regarding the exercise and enjoyment of pension and retirement rights, a matter on which the Corte Plena was required to issue an opinion—with respect to article 167 of the Constitution—because of its significance under the Law of the Constitution. These amendments were voted on during the First Reading and approved on the Second Reading (Segundo Debate).
This occurred without the bill approved by the Comisión and subsequently voted on by the Plenario at extraordinary session N° 14 of 30 de octubre de 2017 having been submitted for institutional consultation (consulta institucional).
Although the Asamblea Legislativa considered it unnecessary to submit to the Poder Judicial for consultation the final text approved by the Comisión Especial on 27 de julio, together with the subsequent amendments made through substantive motions and motions for reconsideration, and proceeded with the legislative process in accordance with the Sala’s position in Judgment (Sentencia) N° 2018-005758 of 15:40 hours on 12 de abril de 2018, on the grounds that those amendments to the Poder Judicial pension system did not affect the structure and operation of the Poder Judicial or the essential content of judicial independence (independencia judicial), that reasoning is unacceptable to the undersigned judges, as will be explained below. Furthermore, there was a pattern of making the conditions applicable to Poder Judicial officials more onerous, as may be illustrated by certain provisions amended through the substantive motions and motions for reconsideration incorporated into the text approved by the Comisión, which entailed a substantial change to the bill previously submitted for consultation. As noted, this last text was approved on First Reading on 30 de octubre de 2017. A comparison reveals, among others, the following substantial amendments worthy of consideration:
Thus, contrary to the position of the majority of the Sala, which relies substantially on the doctrine of Judgment N° 2018-005758 at 15:40 on 12 de abril de 2018, a precedent in which the undersigned joined magistrate Cruz Castro in a dissenting opinion (voto salvado), we consider that Law N° 9544, entitled “Reform of the Poder Judicial Retirement and Pension System, contained in Law No. 7333, Organic Law of the Poder Judicial of 5 de mayo de 1993, and its Amendments,” contains a material defect in the legislative procedure (vicio sustancial del procedimiento legislativo), due to the violation of the constitutional provision requiring constitutional consultation (consulta constitucional), based on the arguments set forth below.
A.- Text of the law not submitted to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation.
At the heart of the discussion, as the majority opinion correctly states, is the determination of whether, pursuant to the provisions of Article 167 of the Constitución Política, the legislative body was required to submit the aforementioned bill to the Poder Judicial for consultation, a duty that has also been incorporated into Articles 126 and 157 of the Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, which stipulate the procedure to be followed for that purpose. It follows from the constitutional text that mandatory consultation (consulta obligatoria) with the Corte Suprema de Justicia is required only if the bill concerns the organization or operation of the Poder Judicial. Thus, the crux of the matter lies in what is to be understood by “organization or operation of the Poder Judicial.” In this regard, the majority opinion maintains that when the Carta Política Fundamental refers to the organization and operation of the Poder Judicial, it refers solely to an impact on the adjudicative function (función jurisdiccional), and not on the administrative function as such.
In support of this position, it cites Judgments N° 1998-5958 at 14:54 on 19 de agosto de 1998, N° 2001-013273 at 11:44 on 21 de diciembre de 2001, and N° 2008-5179 at 11:00 on 4 de abril de 2008. Likewise, concerning the specific issue of the Poder Judicial Pension and Retirement Fund and the obligation of the Asamblea Legislativa to consult the Corte Suprema de Justicia on bills concerning that fund, the majority opinion cites Judgments N° 1995-3063 at 15:30 on 13 de junio de 1995 and N° 2002-4258 at 9:40 on 10 de mayo de 2002, based on which it concludes that, in such cases, the Asamblea Legislativa is not required to submit the bill to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation under the terms of Article 167 of the Constitución Política. However, in the opinion of the undersigned, such an interpretation of the constitutional provision, restricted solely to the adjudicative function, derives neither from the text of the Carta Fundamental nor from the case law (jurisprudencia) of this Sala.
Indeed, regarding the cited precedents, it should be emphasized that the proposition maintained by the majority in its opinion cannot be inferred from the first three judgments. Thus, Judgment N° 1998-5958 at 14:54 on 19 de agosto de 1998 addresses only the term “operation”—from the phrase “organization or operation”—of the Poder Judicial, without addressing the organization of that branch of the Republic. Specifically, in the passage quoted from that opinion, the Sala clearly states that “…the matters that mandatorily require consultation with the Corte Suprema de Justicia are those concerning ‘the organization or operation of the Poder Judicial,’ where the term ‘operation’ refers not only to aspects of the internal administrative governance (régimen interno administrativo) of judicial offices, but also to the procedural matters governing the adjudication of the various cases brought before those courts.” This makes it clear that the issue of organization—which is the relevant issue here—was not addressed in that decision, simply because the case did not require it, since it concerned a mandatory legislative consultation on constitutionality (consulta legislativa preceptiva de constitucionalidad) regarding the bill titled “Addition of a New Chapter IV, Entitled ‘The Habeas Data Remedy,’ to Title III of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, Law Nº 7185 of 19 de octubre de 1989,” which was processed under legislative expediente number 12.827, where the issue in dispute was that the reform affected the adjudicative function of the Poder Judicial.
That this is so follows from the text of the judgment itself, which is not quoted with sufficient breadth in the majority opinion: “…the matters that mandatorily require consultation with the Corte Suprema de Justicia are those concerning ‘the organization or operation of the Poder Judicial,’ where the term ‘operation’ refers not only to aspects of the internal administrative governance of judicial offices, but also to the procedural matters governing the adjudication of the various cases brought before those courts. And, in Costa Rica, constitutional jurisdiction (jurisdicción constitucional) is unquestionably judicial, given that both the Constitución Política and the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional incorporate this Sala into the structure of the Corte.” When the quotation is considered in context, it cannot be inferred that the Sala restricted the phrase “organization or operation” merely to adjudicative matters; rather, in the cited case, this Tribunal Constitucional referred only to the adjudicative function of the Poder Judicial because that was the issue under discussion, without excluding or addressing the administrative organization of that branch of the Republic.
The same may be said regarding Judgment N° 2001-013273 at 11:44 on 21 de diciembre de 2001, to which the majority refers. That case involved an optional legislative consultation on constitutionality (consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad) regarding the bill entitled “Amendment of the Criminal Code, Law number 4573 and its amendments,” legislative expediente number 14.158. Once again, the reform directly affected the adjudicative function of the Poder Judicial, not its administrative organization. Accordingly, in that case the Sala likewise did not address the latter issue, because doing so would have been unnecessary. For that reason, the substantive discussion focused on and was exhausted by aspects of the adjudicative function of the Poder Judicial: “…such consultation [that under Article 167 of the Constitución Política] is mandatory when what is being discussed in the Asamblea is a bill intended to establish rules governing the operation and organization of the Poder Judicial, understood not merely as provisions regulating the creation of courts of justice or adjudicative jurisdiction (competencias jurisdiccionales), but also as provisions concerning the manner in which such jurisdiction is exercised, that is, the manner in which the Poder Judicial performs its adjudicative function, including procedural rules as such.” Certainly, it is evident that this statement was limited to examining matters concerning the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction by the Courts of Justice, since that particular aspect was the subject of the consultation.
But the Sala did not state that this was the only circumstance in which the consultation prescribed by Article 167 of the Constitución Política is mandatory; rather, it stated that consultation is mandatory in that circumstance, without addressing other circumstances in which it is also mandatory, such as matters relating to the administrative organization and authority (competencias administrativas) of the Poder Judicial.
Sentencia N° 2008-5179 de las 11:00 horas del 4 de abril de 2008 warrants separate comment because here, contrary to the majority’s reading, it was indeed established that matters relating to the administrative organization (organización administrativa) of the Poder Judicial fall within the mandatory consultation (consulta obligatoria) stipulated in the aforementioned Article 167 of the Constitución Política. On that occasion, this Tribunal Constitucional, as the highest interpreter of the Constitución Política, when addressing the terms “organization or operation” (“organización o funcionamiento”) of the Poder Judicial contained in Article 167 of the Carta Política as a condition for mandatory consultation with that branch of the Republic by the Asamblea Legislativa, held “…that a bill concerns such matters when its provisions contain explicit rules providing for the creation, substantial modification, or elimination of strictly adjudicative bodies (órganos estrictamente jurisdiccionales) or administrative bodies attached to the Poder Judicial, or when it creates ex novo, substantially modifies, or eliminates functions that are substantively adjudicative or administrative…”.
This does not represent a change in this Tribunal’s position on the matter, but rather, within the line of precedent already established, a more precise definition of the terms “organization or operation” used in Article 167 of the Constitución Política to identify those cases in which bills under legislative consideration (corriente legislativa) must mandatorily be submitted to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation. This judgment did not in any way expand the circumstances requiring mandatory consultation; rather, it defined them more broadly and precisely. It therefore clearly determined that, in those cases, but only in those cases, consultation is mandatory. Accordingly, that same judgment stated: “[i]t should be noted that such an interpretation is required in order to maintain the balance of powers, without favoring one constitutional body over another, so that each may exercise its functions independently and separately, as required by the constitutional text itself (Article 9 of the Constitución).
In other words, clarifying these concepts prevents any conflict, overreach, or undue expansion of the respective functions, in order to preserve the balance and restraint of powers, since the purpose of the provision is not only the functional independence (independencia funcional) and budgetary autonomy (autonomía presupuestaria) of the Poder Judicial, but also the balance between the Poder Legislativo and the Poder Judicial. Indeed, a broad interpretation by the Corte Plena of the terms used by the original constituent authority could lead to certain matters that, strictly speaking, do not concern the organization and operation of the Poder Judicial unjustifiably requiring an enhanced-majority law (ley reforzada), thereby unnecessarily slowing or hindering the legislative function. Conversely, the failure of the Asamblea Legislativa to apply the constitutional provision, based on the mistaken view that the bill does not concern the organization and operation of the Poder Judicial, could impair the functional independence and budgetary autonomy of the Poder Judicial.” It follows from the foregoing that everything relating to the organization and operation of the Poder Judicial—but only and strictly those matters, so as to preserve the balance between the functional independence and budgetary autonomy of the Poder Judicial, on the one hand, and the ordinary legislature’s freedom to shape legislation (libertad de configuración), on the other—is what requires the legislative body to consult the Corte Suprema de Justicia, without extending that requirement to other matters.
In this regard, there can be no doubt that the Sala Constitucional has understood that matters relating to the administrative organization of the Poder Judicial, and not merely those directly or indirectly affecting its adjudicative function (función jurisdiccional), require the legislative body to seek consultation under the terms set forth in Article 167 of the Constitución Política. Nor could it be otherwise, because an impact upon or modification of the administrative organization of the Poder Judicial generally—and not only matters pertaining strictly to adjudicative or judicial bodies—also affects the administration of justice (Administración de Justicia) that it provides and the independence constitutionally guaranteed to that branch and to judges as officials charged with dispensing justice.
Moreover, Sentencias N° 1995-3063 de las 15:30 del 13 de junio de 1995 y N° 2002-4258 de las 9:40 del 10 de mayo de 2002, cited in the majority opinion as the basis for concluding that bills relating specifically to the Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial need not be submitted to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation, likewise do not provide the support that the majority of the Sala claims they provide regarding this matter.
In the first of those judgments, the Sala heard joined constitutional challenges (acciones de inconstitucionalidad acumuladas) brought against the Ley Marco de Pensiones, Ley N° 7302 de 8 de julio de 1992. On that occasion, this Tribunal merely held that, in the case of the Ley Marco de Pensiones, there was no constitutional obligation to submit the corresponding bill to the Poder Judicial for consultation, for the simple reason that the bill did not affect judicial employees and therefore did not fall within the scope of Article 167 of the Constitución Política. Likewise, the cited opinion states that operation refers to the adjudicative function, but makes no reference whatsoever to the organization of the Poder Judicial, which is the issue here.
Similarly, in Sentencia N° 2002-4258 de las 9:40 del 10 de mayo de 2002, the Sala heard joined constitutional challenges filed against Article 4 of Ley N° 7605, de 2 de mayo de 1996, insofar as it amended Articles 224, 226, and 236, subsections 1) and 2), of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, N° 7333 de 5 de mayo de 1993, as well as, by connection and consequence, Article 33, subsection a), of the Reglamento de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Among the claims raised, the Sala rejected the alleged violation of Article 167 of the Constitución Política on the ground that the challenged reform of the pension system (régimen de pensiones) for judicial employees was unrelated to the organization or operation of the Poder Judicial. In defining those concepts, it referred to the findings in Sentencia N° 1995-3063 de las 15:30 del 13 de junio de 1995, which, as already stated, addressed only the term operation of the Poder Judicial, without making any reference whatsoever to its organization.
Thus, contrary to the position expressed by the majority, those judgments do not exclude matters relating to the Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial from mandatory consultation with the Corte Suprema de Justicia; they exclude them only insofar as the corresponding bill has no direct relationship with the “organization or operation of the Poder Judicial,” matters that were indeed not implicated in the challenges brought before this Sala and decided in the cited judgments. Consequently, matters concerning the Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial are not excluded from mandatory consultation with the Corte Suprema de Justicia, as the majority understands them to be, because this subject, considered in itself, is not excluded from such consultation. Rather, the issue depends on whether the bill in question contains provisions concerning the organization or operation of that branch, a matter that must first be determined in each case in order to establish whether such consultation is mandatory.
At this point, it is important to clarify that the functional independence of the Poder Judicial, established in Article 9 and reinforced in Article 154, both of the Constitución Política, necessarily entails the authority of that branch of the Republic to determine its own organization, particularly in order to prevent political interests from interfering with its function. This organizational independence (independencia organizativa), both administrative and adjudicative, is also protected by Article 167 of the Constitución Política. In this regard, in the opinion of the undersigned, it is a serious conceptual error to confuse or equate the adjudicative function in the broad sense, including functions auxiliary to adjudication (función auxiliar a la jurisdiccional), with the strictly administrative function. The adjudicative function is a special function distinct from the administrative function performed by officials of the Poder Ejecutivo or the decentralized sector (sector descentralizado).
The administration of justice is one thing, and the Administración Pública is quite another, given the distinctive characteristics of the adjudicative function as compared with a merely administrative function. One of those characteristics, without which the adjudicative function could not be properly exercised, is precisely independence in its two dimensions: that of the Poder Judicial itself and that of judges and other personnel who assist the adjudicative function. To understand the sensitive task performed by the judges of the Republic, with the cooperation of the officials who assist and support them in their duties and without whom they could not properly perform their function, it is enough to bear in mind that they decide the cases submitted to them with the force of res judicata (cosa juzgada); that is, in each case they determine the truth with the authoritative force of law, and, once their decision has acquired that status, it cannot, in principle, be reviewed.
This entails an extremely sensitive function and a great responsibility that could not be fulfilled without guaranteeing the functional independence of the Poder Judicial and of the judges who comprise it. In this regard, there can be no true independence if the salaries, pensions, and retirement benefits of judges and judicial officers (auxiliares de justicia) are not commensurate with their responsibilities, which are far more serious than those of any other official performing a merely administrative public function. For that reason, the two groups cannot in any way be equated in terms of responsibilities, functions, salaries, or retirement rights (derechos jubilatorios).
There is consensus in administrative-law scholarship that the judicial function (función jurisdiccional) is, if not the most complex, one of the most complex and difficult functions to perform in a constitutional state governed by the rule of law (Estado Constitucional de Derecho) in modern societies. This is because, unlike decisions made by the Legislative and Executive Branches, decisions of the Judicial Branch, in the exercise of the judicial function, are final and unappealable; that is, they have the force or authority of res judicata (cosa juzgada). This entails not only great responsibility, but also the need for a series of principles and safeguards that permit the proper exercise of that function. In this context, the independence of the Judicial Branch, both organizational and functional, is a sine qua non for the exercise of this delicate function. It is for the judge to decide on the sole possible interpretation of the law, the Constitution, and the conventionality standard (parámetro de convencionalidad), which would be impossible without due independence.
But this independence would be illusory if it did not necessarily entail adequate remuneration and a right to retirement benefits (derecho jubilatorio) commensurate with their functions and responsibilities, both for judges themselves and for the personnel who assist and support them in their work. Therefore, for purposes of remuneration and retirement, they cannot be equated with the administrative sector. The need to compensate for the complexity and difficulty involved in exercising the judicial function justifies, with respect to the subject matter of this action, a retirement benefit or pension for judicial personnel that differs from that of the rest of the public administrative sector. Decisions having the force of res judicata in judicial proceedings have far-reaching effects on legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) and on the law in force in a society and, consequently, on social peace.
In all of this, judicial independence plays a leading role because, in a constitutional state governed by the rule of law—that is, in a democratic state—this principle has an institutional dimension within the Judicial Branch itself vis-à-vis any of the other Branches of Government. This also necessarily entails the personal and functional independence of judges, not only in relation to those other Branches of Government, but even in relation to the senior authorities of the Judicial Branch. Today, there is no rule of law if the Judicial Branch—including all of its personnel—does not enjoy genuine and effective independence. Judicial independence is an institutional safeguard (garantía institucional) established at the constitutional level, that is, at the highest level in the hierarchy of legal norms, to the extent that it is also recognized as a Human Right. Indeed, the American Convention on Human Rights has established the right to be heard by an impartial judge as a human right. In this regard, Article 8.1 provides:
“Article 8. Judicial Guarantees.
1. Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal previously established by law, in the substantiation of any criminal accusation made against that person, or for the determination of that person’s rights and obligations of a civil, labor, tax, or any other nature.” Judicial independence is a fundamental principle within the constitutional state governed by the rule of law. But for that independence to be genuine, it must be not only organizational and functional, but also economic. This economic independence is also guaranteed by Article 177 of the Political Constitution, which establishes that the proposed ordinary budget must allocate to the Judicial Branch at least 6% of the ordinary revenues calculated for the fiscal year. In enacting this provision—which establishes a constitutionally earmarked expenditure (egreso constitucional atado)—the intent of the original Constituent Assembly was, among other things, to ensure that judges and other auxiliary justice personnel received compensation appropriate to the complexity and difficulty of the judicial function.
This also entails a retirement benefit or pension commensurate with that function and with the special restrictions that it imposes on judicial personnel, restrictions that do not apply to public employees in the other Branches of Government. The constitutional provision prevents the budgetary allocation from becoming an instrument of political interference in the judicial function. But this must be understood in its full breadth, because the salaries of judges and auxiliary personnel, as well as the pension and retirement scheme (régimen de pensiones y jubilaciones) applicable to them, must bear a strict relationship to the work they perform, lest the principle of judicial independence be rendered ineffective. Accordingly, the economic, personal, functional, organizational, and institutional independence of both the Judicial Branch itself and judges and auxiliary justice personnel is essential in a constitutional state governed by the rule of law.
Thus, one way of guaranteeing the independence of the Judicial Branch, the Judges of the Republic, and auxiliary justice personnel is by providing a dignified retirement benefit or pension commensurate with their constitutional functions.
In the statement of reasons that led to the enactment of the Ley de Jubilaciones y Pensiones Judiciales, as an addition to the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, Deputy Teodoro Picado Michalski stated on June 2, 1938:
“The Judicial Branch is one of the three principal pillars upon which the Government of the Republic rests; and because its personnel perform functions of great delicacy for the very life of Society, greater learning, integrity, and dedication are required of them than of other employees. And it is surely for this reason—because judicial personnel are required to devote themselves fully, for many years, to the profoundly important task of administering justice, with the noble aim of ensuring their livelihood when they reach old age or when physical ailments leave them unable to work—that Congress has been urged, during different legislative terms, to enact a law addressing this difficult situation faced by the officials and employees of the Judicial Branch.” It must not be overlooked that judges and judicial officials in general are subject to a system of restrictions and incompatibilities (régimen de prohibiciones y de incompatibilidades) that is far more stringent and rigorous than the system of incompatibilities and restrictions applicable to other public officials, making it entirely different in nature.
The regulations applicable to administrative officials throughout the public sector cannot also be applied to judicial officials. In this regard, the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality require that this asymmetrical system of incompatibilities and restrictions—which reflects the inherent nature of judicial and administrative functions—be accompanied by economic compensation, both in salary and upon termination of employment. The principle of equality, enshrined in Article 33 of the Political Constitution, also prohibits treating unequal persons as though they were equal, because doing so results in discrimination contrary to the Law of the Constitution (Derecho de la Constitución). In the case of judges and judicial officials, objective, reasonable, justified conditions, grounded in the very nature of the judicial function they perform, warrant treating them differently from other public employees in the various administrative bodies.
Far from constituting discrimination, this protects the principle of equality governed by the aforementioned constitutional provision. This means that if there is a differentiated retirement scheme (régimen jubilatorio diferenciado) for the judicial sector, it is not the result of an arbitrary, subjective, or capricious decision by the legislature, but rather of the specific and distinct nature of the judicial function, which objectively and constitutionally justifies it.
The foregoing derives not only from our own Political Constitution and the values and principles that inform it, but is also contained in various international instruments. Thus, for example, the “Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary,” adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in Milan from August 26 to September 6, 1985, and endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 40/32 of November 29, 1985 and 40/146 of December 13, 1985, states the following in principle 11:
“11. The law shall guarantee the tenure of judges for the established terms, their independence and security, as well as adequate remuneration, pensions, conditions of service, and retirement.” Accordingly, the United Nations recommends that every country in the world adopt legal rules guaranteeing judges remuneration, pensions, conditions of service, and retirement that are adequate and proportionate to the complexity and difficulty of the judicial function they perform. This must also be understood to extend to auxiliary justice officials, since otherwise such independence would be impossible.
Likewise, the “European Charter on the Statute for Judges,” adopted in Strasbourg between July 8 and 10, 1998, establishes the following in paragraphs 6.1 and 6.4, with the aim of achieving genuine and effective independence for the Judicial Branch and the officials who administer justice, as well as their collaborators and auxiliary personnel:
“6.1 The professional exercise of judicial functions entitles a judge to remuneration, the level of which shall be determined so as to shield the judge from pressures intended to influence the judge’s decisions and, more generally, the performance of the judge’s judicial duties, thereby impairing the judge’s independence and impartiality.
6.4 In particular, the statute shall ensure that a judge who has reached the statutory age for ceasing to perform judicial functions, after having performed them professionally for a specified period, receives a retirement pension whose amount shall be as close as possible to the judge’s final remuneration for judicial service.” The aforementioned instrument seeks to achieve a genuinely and effectively independent Judicial Branch, which constitutes a safeguard for the public. Thus, adequate remuneration and pensions for judges and auxiliary justice personnel, under the terms expressed therein, constitute the proper and reasonable consequence of performing a delicate function entailing great difficulty and responsibility.
The “Statute of the Ibero-American Judge,” approved at the VI Ibero-American Summit of Presidents of Supreme Courts and Supreme Tribunals of Justice, held in Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Islas Canarias, España, on May 23, 24, and 25, 2001, likewise echoes the principles already cited, providing in Article 32:
“Article 32. Remuneration.
Judges must receive sufficient and irreducible remuneration commensurate with the importance of the function they perform and with the demands and responsibilities it entails.” And Article 33 provides:
“Article 33. Social Security.
The State must provide judges with access to a social security system, guaranteeing that, upon completion of their years of service due to retirement, illness, or other legally prescribed contingencies, or in the event of personal, family, or property damage arising from the performance of their office, they will receive a dignified pension or adequate compensation.” It must be borne in mind that retirement benefits (jubilación) and pensions (pensión) form part of the Economic, Social, and Benefit Rights contained in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by the United Nations General Assembly in its Resolution 2200 A (XXI), of 16 de diciembre de 1966. These rules were also endorsed in Report N° 1 of 23 de noviembre del 2001, issued by the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE), when examining the issue of judicial independence and security of tenure (inamovilidad). With regard to judges’ salaries, that Council recommended:
“…it is generally important (and especially in the case of new democracies) to establish specific legal provisions guaranteeing judges’ salaries against reduction and ensuring, in practice, ‘salary increases in line with the cost of living.’” These recommendations are fully applicable to the pensions and retirement benefits of judges and judicial employees generally, since they are closely related to the principle of independence of the Poder Judicial, as already explained.
This matter has been regulated in the terms stated not only at the international level, but also internally within the Poder Judicial, based on considerations similar to those set forth above.
Indeed, the Corte Plena approved the Estatuto de Justicia y Derechos de las Personas Usuarias del Sistema Judicial, Articles 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 of which refer to the independence of the Poder Judicial and of judges in its various dimensions. Article 24, concerning the material conditions of judicial independence (independencia judicial), establishes that the State must guarantee “the economic independence of the Poder Judicial by allocating an adequate budget to meet its needs and by promptly disbursing the budget appropriations,” which is closely related to the provisions of the aforementioned Article 177 of the Constitución Política concerning the constitutionally mandated allocation of a minimum portion of the Ordinary Budget to the Poder Judicial as an expression of that independence.
Likewise, Article 49 of the aforementioned Estatuto, like the international instruments examined, also enshrines the principle that a judge’s salary may not be reduced (salario irreductible): “Judges must receive sufficient and irreducible remuneration commensurate with the importance of the duties they perform and with the demands and responsibilities they entail.” As already explained, this special regulation is founded on the independence of the Poder Judicial, which must also extend to the pensions or retirement benefits of judges and auxiliary justice personnel (personal auxiliar de la justicia), since otherwise the principle of judicial independence would not be possible.
Respect for judicial independence, which is one of the purposes pursued by Article 167 of the Constitución Política, was also expressly regulated in Article 20 of the Estatuto, which provides that “[t]he other Branches of Government and, in general, all national or international authorities, institutions, and bodies must respect and give effect to the independence of the judiciary.” And, specifically, the legislature’s unconsulted interference in the organization and operation of the Poder Judicial, whether by creating, modifying, or eliminating judicial or administrative bodies or jurisdictional powers (competencias), is constitutionally impermissible because it constitutes a flagrant violation of the principle of judicial independence.
Lastly, it should be noted that the independence of the Poder Judicial is a principle of a particular and specific nature, distinct from that applicable to the other Branches of Government, because it serves as a protective shield against interference by political power, protection that the other Branches of Government do not enjoy. This is because the Poder Judicial administers justice, which must be impartial and free from any external pressure. In this respect, economic pressure, whether relating to the salary or stipend or to the amount and conditions of the retirement benefits or pensions of judges and other auxiliary justice personnel, plays a crucial role in achieving the genuine and effective independence of the Poder Judicial.
Based on the foregoing considerations, the content of the law must therefore be examined to determine whether it affects the organization or operation of the Poder Judicial in the terms stated.
In this regard, as when the legislative consultation (consulta legislativa) concerning the proposed Ley de Reforma Integral a los Diversos Regímenes de Pensiones y Normativa Conexa—now enacted as Ley N° 9544 de 24 de abril de 2018, entitled “Reforma del Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, contenido en la Ley N° 7333, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, de 5 de mayo de 1993, y sus reformas”—was considered, the grounds stated in the dissenting opinion (voto salvado) are maintained. That legislative consultation was decided by Sentencia N° 2018-005758 a las 15:40 horas del 12 de abril de 2018, which addressed the various objections concerning Article 239 of the law now at issue. On that occasion, the legislative procedure was reviewed insofar as it created a Junta Administradora del Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial, defined as a body of the Poder Judicial with functional, technical, and administrative independence to exercise the powers and duties conferred on it by law.
That body was granted functional independence and assigned several responsibilities, including increasing employee contributions to the Fondo de Pensiones and deciding retirement applications, which entails a modification of the structure of the Poder Judicial. Likewise, powers were removed from the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial; moreover, Article 240 of the bill imposes on the Corte Plena the obligation to issue regulations for the election of the members of that Junta Administradora, thereby assigning it a power it does not currently have. The aforementioned provisions of the Law state:
“Article 239—The Junta Administrativa del Fondo del Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial is hereby created as a body of the Poder Judicial, with complete functional, technical, and administrative independence to exercise the powers and duties conferred upon it by law.
The Junta shall be responsible for:
Based on the results of the actuarial studies and with authorization from the Superintendencia de Pensiones, the Junta Administrativa may modify the initial parameters established in this law concerning eligibility requirements, the benefit profile, and the contributions of judicial employees and the retirement benefits and pensions provided for by law, whenever necessary to guarantee the actuarial balance (equilibrio actuarial) of the Régimen.
The Junta shall possess limited legal personality (personalidad jurídica instrumental) to exercise the powers assigned to it by law and to represent the Fondo in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings.
It shall be financed through an administrative-expense commission obtained by deducting five per thousand from the salaries earned by judicial employees and from the retirement benefits and pensions paid by the Fondo. These resources shall be used to pay the per diem allowances of the members of the Junta Administrativa, the salaries of its personnel, and its administrative expenses generally. Idle funds shall be invested in accordance with Article 237 of this law.
Article 240—The Junta Administradora shall consist of three members democratically elected by the judicial workforce and three members appointed by the Corte Plena, with a gender perspective in both cases. Each principal member shall have an alternate who shall replace that member during absences and who must meet the same requirements as the principal member.
The members of the Junta shall serve five-year terms, after which they may be reelected, all in accordance with the regulations to be issued for that purpose by the Corte Plena after giving the labor organizations of the Poder Judicial an opportunity to be heard.
At its first regular meeting, the Junta shall designate the person who will preside over its meetings. That person shall be appointed for a period of one year, and the office shall alternate each year between representatives of the judicial workforce and representatives of the Corte Plena. A person shall also be designated to serve as a replacement in the event of absence. The presiding person shall have a casting vote in the event of a tie.
The members of the Junta Administradora shall not receive any per diem allowance, but shall be granted the necessary leave to attend meetings. Membership on the Junta shall be subject to the following requirements, which must be documented and demonstrated before the Superintendencia de Pensiones (Supén):
The following persons may not serve as members of the Junta:
The composition of the body must guarantee equal representation of both sexes, ensuring that the difference between the total numbers of men and women is no greater than one.” From a reading of Article 239, transcribed above, it is clear that it creates a new body (órgano) within the structure of the Poder Judicial, called the “Junta Administrativa del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial,” which is granted complete functional, technical, and administrative independence to exercise the powers, competencies, and functions conferred upon it by law, as enumerated in subsections a), b), c), d), e), f), g), h), and i) of that same Article, for the fulfillment of its duties, for which purpose it shall have limited-purpose legal personality (personalidad jurídica instrumental). Thus, an administrative body is created ex novo and attached to the structure of the Poder Judicial, with specified competencies and functions; and, concomitantly, competencies and functions previously granted—by formal law (ley formal)—to the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial are withdrawn and eliminated.
This circumstance alone, for the reasons stated, necessarily requires the legislative body to consult the Poder Judicial regarding the bill, under the terms established in Article 167 of the Constitución Política, since it modifies the administrative organization of the Poder Judicial by creating a new administrative body and transferring competencies from the Consejo Superior to that newly created body, which clearly affects the independence of that Branch of the Republic.
The same may be said with respect to Article 240 of the law, insofar as it addresses matters pertaining to the administrative organization of the Poder Judicial concerning the composition and appointment of the members of the Junta Administradora del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, their terms of office, the designation of the person who is to chair it, and the requirements for membership on that Board, among other matters. It should be emphasized that, even though the Corte Plena is empowered under the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial to issue the internal regulations necessary for the proper operation of the Poder Judicial, the fact that the law imposes upon it the obligation to regulate matters concerning the terms of office of the members of the Junta Administradora del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, without the substitute text (texto sustitutivo) of the bill that was ultimately approved on First Reading having been submitted to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation, constitutes a serious intrusion into the competencies of the highest-ranking body of the Poder Judicial, affecting the organization of that Branch of the Republic, in contravention of the mandatory consultation (consulta obligatoria) prescribed in Article 167 of the Constitución Política and, consequently, impairing judicial independence (independencia judicial).
On its face, the cited legislation removes from the Presidente de la Corte Suprema de Justicia—and therefore from the Presidente del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial—the authority conferred upon him by the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial to administer the Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial, specifically in accordance with the investment policies established by the Corte Plena, as currently provided in Article 81, subsection 12.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the substitute text of the bill adopted by the Comisión Especial at its session of 27 de julio de 2017 was not submitted to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation, despite containing a series of provisions affecting the organization and operation of the Poder Judicial. However, as stated in the majority opinion (voto de mayoría), folio 2625 of the legislative record shows that, pursuant to a motion approved on 27 de julio de 2017 by the Comisión Especial, through official letter number AL-20035-OFI-0043-2017 of 31 de julio de 2017, the Jefa del Área de Comisiones de la Asamblea Legislativa granted the Poder Judicial an opportunity to be heard regarding the affirmative majority report (dictamen afirmativo de mayoría). On that basis, the Corte Suprema de Justicia issued its opinion through official letter number SP-253-17 of 10 de agosto de 2017, as recorded at folios 2759 to 2807 of the legislative record. This means, then, that the Poder Judicial was indeed consulted and expressed its opinion concerning the substitute text approved by the Comisión Especial on 27 de julio de 2017, which occurred even before that text was considered by the Plenario.
Nevertheless, that was not the text approved on First Reading by the Plenario Legislativo on 30 de octubre de 2017 and published in Alcance N° 268 to Gaceta Digital N° 212 of 9 de noviembre de 2017, because the text approved was a substitute text introduced by a motion pursuant to Article 137 of the Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa. This latter text was not submitted to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation, as was required under the foregoing analysis and pursuant to Article 167 of the Constitución Política.
As the petitioners (accionantes) argue, a constitutional violation occurred in the legislative procedure (procedimiento legislativo). In this regard, it should be emphasized that this Tribunal Constitucional has jurisdiction to hear and rule upon defects in the enactment of laws (vicios en la formación de las leyes) when any substantive requirement or procedural step established in the Constitución or the Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa has been breached. This is pursuant to Article 73, subsection c), of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, which states:
“Article 73.- An action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) may be brought:
…
…”.
Thus, under the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, where the matter under review is a formal law approved by the Asamblea Legislativa, it involves ex post review (control posterior) of laws or legislative resolutions through examination of the legislative record to determine whether any essential defect occurred during the lawmaking procedure. Accordingly, the defect identified in the legislative procedure for Ley N° 9544, entitled “Reforma del Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, contenido en la Ley No. 7333, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial de 5 de mayo de 1993, y sus Reformas,” must be declared on account of the failure to submit to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation the substitute text approved on First Reading, since this violates Article 167 of the Constitución Política by affecting the administrative organization of the Poder Judicial through the creation of a new administrative body within its structure, granting it substantial competencies in pension and retirement matters, and simultaneously eliminating competencies previously granted by law to the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial (Articles 239 and 240 of the bill).
In support of the foregoing, this Sala, in Sentencia N° 2001-13273 at 11:44 hours on 21 de diciembre de 2001, when responding to a legislative consultation on constitutionality (consulta legislativa de constitucionalidad) concerning a bill to amend the Código Penal insofar as it modified aspects relating to the merely administrative organization or operation of the Archivo Judicial, unanimously held:
“Likewise, they modify the scope of the functions of the Archivo Judicial, increasing the amount of data it must record. All of the foregoing unquestionably entails changes to various rules concerning the operation and organization of the Poder Judicial. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Asamblea Legislativa failed to conduct the corresponding consultation with the Corte Suprema de Justicia (at least, no such consultation appears in the certified copy of the record forwarded by the Presidente del Directorio), and those matters had not previously been included in the texts submitted to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation. The Sala therefore finds that the duty imposed by Article 167 of the Constitución Política with respect to the functional independence recognized by the constituent authority (constituyente) for the Poder Judicial was violated and that, accordingly, the proceedings conducted prior to the approval of the amended report must be deemed constitutionally void and must be so declared.” It should be noted from the foregoing that the identified defect was not cured on Second Reading, even if the Law had been approved by a qualified majority (mayoría calificada), since this would be the case only if the matter involved the approval of a text mandatorily subject to consultation with the Poder Judicial because it affected its organization, structure, and operation—as in this case—and if, once the Corte Suprema de Justicia had been consulted, the legislative body persisted in approving it despite departing from the technical opinion of the judicial body.
None of this occurred during the legislative procedure, since Ley N° 9544 of 24 de abril de 2018 did not even receive the qualified vote on Second Reading and, worse still, the approved text had not undergone institutional consultation (consulta institucional). The crux of the matter before us is, in fact, the approval—on First Reading—of a text that had not been submitted for consultation, in contravention of Article 167 of the Constitución Política, a procedural defect that cannot be remedied or cured. This is because, although the substitute text of the bill adopted by the Comisión Especial at its session of 27 de julio de 2017 was submitted to the Corte Suprema de Justicia for consultation, that was not the text ultimately approved on First Reading; rather, a new substitute text was approved without having first been submitted for consultation, despite its direct relationship to the organization, structure, and operation of the Poder Judicial, as explained above.
Moreover, although the earlier text approved by the Comisión Especial at its session of 27 de julio de 2017 was indeed submitted to the Corte for consultation, the Corte’s disagreement with that text made a qualified vote by the Pleno mandatory under Article 167 of the Carta Fundamental, which likewise did not occur.
It bears recalling that institutional consultation is intended to protect judicial independence, which is a far more complex matter than merely protecting a jurisdictional sphere of authority (fuero jurisdiccional). Mandatory institutional consultation must be timely; otherwise, it would be a merely nominal obligation that would not provide the genuine safeguards the constitutional text seeks to establish among coequal Branches of the Republic. The majority of the Tribunal cannot sustainably maintain the contrary position indefinitely, because even under these circumstances of a turning point and implosion in the functional and budgetary independence of the Poder Judicial, the impact falls primarily upon the safeguards afforded to citizens that the Constituent Assembly sought to guarantee in Article 167 and later strengthened through the amendment to Article 177 of the Constitución Política.
The Corte Plena, at Sesión N° 27 of 7 de agosto de 2017, Article XXX, when responding to the consultation from the Asamblea Legislativa concerning the Dictamen Afirmativo de Mayoría approved by the aforementioned Comisión Especial, resolved:
“It is considered to concern the structure and operation of the Poder Judicial because it directly affects the life plans of all judicial personnel, as it entails a reduction in retirement benefits even when they have fulfilled all the legal requirements for full enjoyment of their retirement entitlement. This includes payment of the necessary and corresponding contributions; payment of income tax; contributions both to the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial and to the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social system; and a further series of charges which, if the text were approved as proposed by the reporting Comisión, would result in confiscatory measures.
It cannot be overlooked that the creation and nature of the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial respond to criteria of stability, independence, training, and suitability, as established in article 192 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), for the purpose of encouraging trained and qualified personnel to remain with the institution; a reduction in retirement benefits (goce jubilatorio) would discourage valuable professionals from joining, as they might prefer to pursue their professional careers in another field of employment after considering the economic outcome of a future assessment.
The judicial, prosecutorial, Public Defense, and general staff career paths would be affected, since personnel subject to greater salary deductions—four times those under other systems—would receive a smaller benefit.
Furthermore, staff renewal would be affected among those who do manage to remain. The Poder Judicial would have older officials who continued working solely because of the reduction in income they would suffer if they retired.
Judicial personnel would face a dilemma: although they may wish to exercise that right and be motivated to retire and rest, they would find themselves in a position in which they must assess their financial situation, probably forcing them to seek new sources of income to cover their ordinary expenses or obligations assumed before retirement, as well as those naturally arising from their age. However, that process also has limitations: from a legal standpoint, the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial prohibits retired persons from taking other employment, and it is a social reality that, after the age of forty, there are practical limitations on reentering the workforce.
This bears significantly on structure and operation, because it makes the Poder Judicial less competitive in the labor market, to the detriment of the quality of the Administration of Justice. Salaries for these positions are diminished by the contribution to the pension and retirement system (régimen de pensiones y jubilaciones), which is four times higher than the contribution under other systems. This makes recruiting human resources more difficult and harms the public service.
Moreover, the rules governing the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial should not be assessed solely from an economic perspective, since fundamental rights—which cannot be waived—are at stake and attach to every worker who, throughout their working years, contributed to a system at a rate higher than the general rate, with the expectation of receiving a pension that would allow them to meet their needs and enjoy their retirement years peacefully and with a good quality of life alongside those around them.
The imposition of this new tax burden affects vulnerable population groups—such as older adults—and harms the weaker party, precisely the one requiring greater protection from the State.
The proposed tax is imposed at a point in retirees’ lives when they are most vulnerable, as they are approaching or have already reached old age. It cannot be overlooked that this is generally the stage at which people require greater medical attention, special care, and other assistance. During their working lives, they contributed to the system in lesser or greater amounts according to the income they received, expecting to have the anticipated resources to face this stage; if this Bill were enacted, that life plan would be thwarted.
It would cause a significant social impact, because retirees would unexpectedly lose a substantial portion of their income while retaining a pre-established level of expenses. This would have repercussions not only for their finances but also for their health, contrary to the intended purpose of a pension system, which is to provide sufficient income during life after employment. In this context, it is important to remember that retirees often remain responsible for the care and support of other older adults or minors.
Taking into account the observations made regarding the Bill processed under expediente 19922 (20035), which are supported by and consistent with the actuarial study conducted by the IICE, and based on the powers granted by articles 167 of the Political Constitution and 59 subsection 1) of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, it is considered that the text submitted for consultation does affect the structure, organization, and operation of the Poder Judicial. Accordingly, the Asamblea Legislativa must take into account what the Corte Plena stated regarding each aspect of the Bill under consultation, unless it has the qualified majority (mayoría calificada) required to depart from that binding opinion.
This has been communicated to that Legislative Branch with respect to other bills submitted for consultation, including those considered during Corte Plena sessions numbers 57-14 of 08 de diciembre de 2014, article XVIII; 13-15 of 23 de marzo de 2015, article XXXVII; 2-16 of 18 de enero de 2016, article XVIII; and 14-17 of 30 de mayo de 2017, article XIX, among others, in which the Corte Plena has deemed it necessary to point out the impact of the bills on the internal structure of the Poder Judicial.
Consequently, a negative opinion must be issued regarding the Bill processed under expediente n° 19922, because it affects the structure, organization, and operation of the Poder Judicial.” The final portion of the cited constitutional article (167) states verbatim that “to depart from its [the Corte’s] opinion, the vote of two thirds of the total membership of the Asamblea Legislativa shall be required”; nevertheless, that final text—which was not submitted for consultation in any event—was approved by the Asamblea Legislativa on 30 de octubre de 2017, with thirty-one votes (folios 4000 and 4173 of the legislative expediente). At the second debate, it did not obtain the qualified majority, receiving thirty-four votes (folios 4437, 4608 and 4637 of the legislative expediente).
B.- The legal and social dynamics underlying the amendment to Constitutional article 177. It is necessary to address the majority’s position and, respectfully but with equal emphasis, the reasons why we consider that it employs an overly broad interpretation of the institutional-consultation requirement (consulta institucional) established in Constitutional article 167, in addition to what has already been stated. It is clear that, generally, the constitutional doctrine underlying institutional consultation rests on similar grounds: ensuring that lawmakers have the best firsthand information available for legislating, that is, the specific technical opinion. This reflects the Constituent Assembly’s recognition of institutional autonomy and, to an even greater degree, the protection of the independence vested in a Branch of Government or a fundamental constitutional body of the State. In complex legislative proceedings, such as those involving an opposing opinion from the Poder Judicial, a qualified majority of lawmakers is especially necessary to advance significant legislative changes through genuine consensus.
Although this Chamber has held in some of its judgments that institutional consultation is not required for bills of a national or general nature, that judicial precedent alone cannot suffice to rule out the need for a heightened legislative procedure (procedimiento legislativo agravado) in the Asamblea Legislativa when the qualified majority established in Constitutional article 167 is involved. This must be assessed not only in relation to matters concerning the institutional autonomy of the Poder Judicial, but especially in relation to matters having a direct or indirect impact on judicial independence, which is guaranteed by the Constitution through the State’s fundamental organizational structure. This is particularly true where, as in the case before us, the legislative procedure involved several defects, which are discussed below.
It is clear that the criteria used to deny institutional consultation on the ground that a bill is national or general in nature cannot be applied indiscriminately, especially because that classification would encompass a large number of bills affecting the national budget. In such circumstances, a substantial majority would have a national impact relevant to the protection of public objectives viewed from an economic perspective. By contrast, this minority considers that the precedent cited by the majority does not apply to bills that could affect the organization of the Poder Judicial as a fundamental body of the State. Judicial scrutiny must clearly be more exacting because of the more lasting effects on the judicial function—which is universal and exercises full jurisdiction over all legal disputes—thereby embodying fundamental oversight functions at least as important as those of semi-autonomous and autonomous institutions, because it concerns the functional specialization and independence of a Branch of the Republic.
The paramount weight of the State’s fundamental institutional framework must shape the standards of review and scrutiny applied by this Constitutional Court. It therefore cannot be examined under the same standards applied to other autonomous institutions, because the consequences for the State and the population as a whole are plainly very different. It is sufficient to cite Judgment N° 2017-009551 at 11:40 hours on 12 de junio de 2017, which held:
“…in general, the judicial function is universal and has full jurisdiction over all legal disputes arising in the country. Universality refers to jurisdiction over all disputes submitted to the Courts of Justice, including those not expressly addressed therein or by statute, under the principle of hermeneutic completeness (principio de plenitud hermenéutica) (article 153 of the Political Constitution). Universality entails jurisdiction over all individuals involved in disputes, including in accordance with the general principles of Public International Law and Private International Law. The Poder Judicial has jurisdiction to decide all disputes definitively, directing matters in accordance with the corresponding procedural course (iter procesal), generally concluding with a judgment—the ordinary means of terminating proceedings—having the status of res judicata (cosa juzgada). This is an expression of the power and function of full, universal jurisdiction and entails a prohibition against reopening the same dispute, in order to prevent conflicts from continuing indefinitely and threatening peaceful coexistence in society.
It is the gravestone that prohibits reopening discussion of the same facts.” The Constituent Assembly, of course, assigned a specific sphere of action to the Poder Judicial so that it would operate independently, drawing upon and participating in the entirety of Western thought inspired by the principles of impartiality and justice. It simply cannot be compared or equated with the State’s lesser entities. On the contrary, it is clear that article 167 of the Political Constitution is situated within the broader framework of the institution’s importance and its functional autonomy in the overall structure of the State.
Earlier in this same judgment, it was also held that:
“This leads to the principle of functional legality (legalidad funcional), which entails the exercise of the State’s constitutional powers, the attainment of the core objectives of each branch without encroaching upon those of the other independent and coequal Branches, and it is through each one’s exercise of checks and balances that they may control and limit the other Branches, as authorized by the Political Constitution. In accordance with the distribution of the State’s fundamental functions, when the Legislature enacts laws, it is subject to the supremacy of the Political Constitution and to the limits enshrined therein, which ultimately determine their regularity and continued validity over time; moreover, it may not apply them directly. As for the Executive Branch, it may neither fail to apply and implement the provisions enacted by the Legislative Branch nor fail to observe the provisions of the fundamental Charter.
Finally, the Judicial Branch may not rule contrary to the rules applicable to a specific case, except where there is a conflict involving the principle of normative hierarchy (principio de jerarquía normativa) or the principle of the supremacy of legal rules, statutes, treaties, and the Political Constitution, to which it remains subject. Pursuant to Articles 10 and 152 et seq. of the Political Constitution, it must safeguard the regularity of all legislation and therefore may not apply invalid or unconstitutional rules, since, in addition to its fundamental function of administering justice, it must ensure that no act or omission infringes the essential principles of every social and democratic State governed by the rule of law, including the principles of legality and normative hierarchy and respect for the population’s fundamental rights and freedoms. Consequently, the Judicial Branch ultimately interprets and applies the Political Constitution and exercises constitutional review (control de constitucionalidad) over rules and omissions—the exclusive authority to invalidate them—when legislation is contrary to the Constitution or infringes fundamental rights, because it is naturally the ultimate guarantor of the principle of legality, the final defender of the State’s purposes and objectives, and the means by which, through the application of law on a case-by-case basis, human well-being is achieved.” The judgment addresses the general characteristics of the Fund and its legal development since the beginning of the last century, in line with Judgment No. 2018-5758 issued at 15:40 hours on April 12, 2018, in order to explain the legal development of social security and the Judicial Branch pension system (régimen previsional).
However, it should have noted that the system’s shortcomings also served as an impetus at the constitutional level, since other measures were developed to guarantee greater institutional stability and promote judicial independence. Accordingly, reference must be made to the achievement of one of the country’s most important advances in institutional governance, which was secured through the amendment of Article 177 of the Constitution, guaranteeing the economic independence of the Judicial Branch. It should therefore be recognized that, although the institutional and social dynamics of that time were important, those surrounding the amendment to the Political Constitution were even more so and were by no means insignificant, since they were intended to strengthen the Judicial Branch and, with equal force, provide protection to its officials. The economic and legal dynamics are equally or even more telling because, despite the legal advances and the numerous problems that existed before the constitutional amendment, a substantial enhancement of the Judicial Branch’s economic independence within the Political Constitution itself originated in the Full Court (Corte Plena) and was embraced by the Legislative Assembly.
There can be no doubt that the protections established by the amending constituent authority (Constituyente derivado) through the amendment extend equally to the job security of judicial officials. Thus, consideration was given to limitations in facilities and infrastructure, the provision of better work tools, salary improvements, additional resources for the Judicial Branch Retirement and Pension System (Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial), among other matters. The claimants’ arguments should have been upheld in these constitutional challenge proceedings (acción de inconstitucionalidad), some of which are listed at the beginning of this dissenting opinion (voto salvado). Judicial independence is defended through the very instruments provided by the constituent authority; among these, the world’s most firmly established democracies devote themselves to creating instruments that protect judicial and economic independence, one such instrument being a qualified vote (votación calificada) when a bill affects the organization and operation of the Judicial Branch.
In Judgment No. 2006-07965 issued at 16:58 hours on May 31, 2006, this Chamber held:
“VI.- EXCEPTIONAL NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH’S SUBSTANTIVELY ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION. Although the Judicial Branch is quintessentially entrusted with the exclusive exercise of the adjudicative function (función jurisdiccional)—as stated in the preceding consideration—it is also true that, on an exceptional or extraordinary basis, it performs administrative functions. In this regard, it should be noted that the administrative function is not constitutionally or legally assigned exclusively to any one body or entity, nor does it have a characteristic substantive content, since, as legal scholarship has aptly observed, it is easier to describe the public administration than to define the administrative function, given its heterogeneous nature. It is clear that the exercise of the substantively adjudicative function requires an entire administrative infrastructure that allows it to be performed in accordance with the constitutional mandate, that is, promptly and fully.
This is what has been called the ‘public service of administering justice’ (servicio público de administración de justicia). Thus, that service comprises the auxiliary administrative support or apparatus that enables judges and courts to issue their decisions; the concept therefore refers to the administrative aspects of the adjudicative function, such as the organization and operation of the courts; logistics—provisioning and supplies; the efficient and effective operation, management, or administration of judicial offices to prevent undue or unjustified delays in processing cases; the administrative function exercised by the Judicial Branch’s administrative bodies (e.g., administrative decisions of the Full Court, the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, the Judicial Council, and, in general, the various administrative departments—the Executive Directorate, Procurement Department, Personnel Department, etc.); and its affiliated auxiliary bodies, such as the law-enforcement police function performed through the Judicial Investigation Agency, the prosecution of public criminal actions by the Public Prosecution Service, and the provision of free legal defense through the Public Defense Service.
Nevertheless, although this substantively administrative function is performed by the apparatus or organization that supports the adjudicative function, it must be understood in a strictly exceptional sense; that is, only a function that is necessary and appropriate to assist in the exercise of the substantively adjudicative function is permissible, and no other. Accordingly, application of the constitutional principle of the reservation or exclusivity of jurisdiction (reserva o exclusividad de jurisdicción) requires the Judicial Branch to use and allocate most of its resources to the exercise of a substantively adjudicative function.
One of the great historical achievements of Costa Rica’s constitutional State governed by the rule of law was the Judicial Branch’s economic autonomy, attained through the partial amendment of the Political Constitution of November 7, 1949, by Law No. 2122 of May 22, 1957. That law added a second paragraph to the original version of Article 177 of the Political Constitution, providing as follows:
“(…)
The proposed budget shall allocate to the Judicial Branch an amount of no less than six percent of the ordinary revenues calculated for the fiscal year. However, when this amount exceeds that required to cover the fundamental needs budgeted by that Branch, the aforementioned department shall include the difference as a surplus, together with a national investment plan, so that the Legislative Assembly may determine the appropriate disposition thereof (…)”.
This partial amendment to the Constitution strengthened the independence of that Branch of the Republic, consistently with Article 9°, which proclaims the separation of functions. The constitutional amendment arose from the proposal submitted to the Full Court on September 6, 1956, by then-Justice Evelio Ramírez, which that collegiate body approved at the session held that same day. In explaining the constitutional amendment—which would later become the statement of reasons for the amendment during the legislative proceedings—Justice Evelio Ramírez emphasized the need to allocate to the Judicial Branch a minimum, or an ‘amount of no less than six percent of the ordinary revenues calculated for the fiscal year,’ in order to remedy the deplorable situation of that Branch of the Republic, which in the seven years preceding 1956 had received an average of only 2.75% of the General Revenue Budget.
The express purpose of Justice Evelio Ramírez, who initiated the constitutional amendment, and of the Full Court in adopting his proposal was to secure greater financial resources to diversify and strengthen the various jurisdictions, increase the number of trial and appellate courts and the personnel needed to meet service demand, reform and improve proceedings, provide trial and appellate courts with adequate infrastructure and material resources, and improve the salaries of those engaged in the delicate and difficult task of administering justice, as well as their retirement or pension system, all with a view to ensuring swifter and more effective justice. In this regard, Justice Evelio Ramírez made observations including the following:
“(…) the Supreme Court of Justice, knowing better than anyone the true needs of the Judicial Branch, would prepare its own preliminary Budget proposal, taking into account those factors which, in its judgment, require financial adjustments under honest, rational, and fair criteria. It would not only provide for the proper installation of its numerous offices—which today are in nearly ruinous condition throughout the Nation—but would also supply them with typewriters, suitable furniture, and the other material resources essential for working as efficiently as possible. In addition, all judicial employees could be paid more equitably (…) The Retirement and Pension Fund itself—whose stability is seriously threatened—could be strengthened from that overall appropriation (…) The average percentage allocated to the Judicial Branch over the past seven years has been 2.75 percent of the General Revenue Budget (…) Experience has shown that the stated percentage is wholly insufficient for the proper operation of the Judicial Branch.
To appreciate this, one need only consider the unsuitable buildings occupied by nearly all the courts of the Republic; the slowness with which various judicial matters are processed, owing to the small number of courts and the limited staffing of those currently operating; the insufficient number of typewriters and other urgently needed furnishings; the low salaries of judicial employees; etc. etc. (…)”.
For its part, the special legislative committee appointed to issue a report on the bill to amend Article 177 of the Constitution, during the first legislative session, stated the following in its report of October 9, 1956 (appearing at folios 20-21 of the legislative record):
“This constitutional reform—which will definitively strengthen the financial autonomy of the Poder Judicial—will make it possible in the future to find appropriate solutions to the many problems currently faced by that Branch due to the limited financial resources allocated to it in the national budgets. Those problems date back many years and worsen daily as a consequence of population growth and development, which create an ever-increasing demand for the administration of justice. The judicial offices lack sufficient personnel to address the many problems that arise each day and, in material terms, with very few exceptions, they are housed in wholly inadequate premises and lack sufficient furniture and equipment (…) Moreover, the compensation of judicial personnel is so meager that the judicial career offers no incentive or encouragement whatsoever to those wishing to enter it, and this often drives away individuals with the vocation and abilities who, under different conditions, could provide their services as Alcaldes, Judges, or Magistrates.” Consequently, the guiding principle that inspired the 1957 constitutional reform was to strengthen the organization and operation of the Poder Judicial so that it could efficiently and effectively perform its essential function of dispensing or administering justice.
Under this understanding, any provision enacted by the ordinary legislature that seeks to attach to the organizational structure of the Poder Judicial bodies exercising substantively administrative powers that are unrelated or do not pertain to the judicial function (función jurisdiccional) is unconstitutional, insofar as it infringes financial autonomy (autonomía financiera) and, consequently, the independence of the Poder Judicial, by diverting the use and application—even if only by a small percentage—of the minimum budget guaranteed to it toward other purposes. It may therefore be stated that paragraph 2 of Article 177 of the Constitución Política, added by Law No. 2122 of May 22, 1957, constitutes a clear institutional guarantee (garantía institucional), since, by consolidating the financial autonomy and independence of the Poder Judicial, it guarantees the effective exercise by any person of the fundamental right established in Article 41 of the Constitución Política to access the courts (acceder la jurisdicción) and obtain prompt and full justice.” The assertion that essential administrative powers relating to organization and connected with the judicial function are not being removed is highly relative if, as explained above, an aspect of the organization and personnel administration of the Poder Judicial is being modified.
This disregards the history of the constitutional amendment, in which that matter was indeed contemplated as justification for proceeding with the reform of Article 177. The majority asserts that the essential content of a legal institution (instituto jurídico) remains the same, but in doing so the law removes the administration of pensions from the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial and grants it to a Junta Administradora del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial. It is true that it remains within the Poder Judicial, but now within a deconcentrated body (órgano desconcentrado), which plainly affects an essential part of the governance of the Poder Judicial (Articles 152 and 156 of the Constitution). A schism arises that affects the organization of the Poder Judicial—broadly speaking, if one prefers—its capacity to organize itself and its management and administration of the fund for the exercise of the social security rights of Poder Judicial personnel.
This, it bears noting, is contrary to the position of the Corte Plena because of the failure to conduct an institutional consultation and the disregard of its opinion, in violation of the principle of the functional legality (legalidad funcional) of a Branch of the Republic. It should be recalled that the reform of Article 177 of the Constitution was conceived with a view to strengthening judicial independence, including the independence of its officials, which would encompass administration of the pension fund. In fact, the recognition of something so important, which was subsequently and timidly incorporated into the Constitución Política de 1949, did not go so far as to include—explicitly—the non-reduction of judicial officials’ salaries (irreductibilidad de los salarios de los funcionarios judiciales), as occurred in other jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it did function in our country, because it has enabled Costa Rica to enjoy levels of judicial independence that compare favorably worldwide and are clearly the result of the financial independence of the Poder Judicial.
This has been possible in part because of the recognition of the public employment system (régimen de empleo público), which was gradually consolidated throughout the republican history of this country.
Judgment No. 1996-03575 at 11:18 on July 12, 1996, stated regarding:
“… the Public Employment System, it may be concluded that the state body having jurisdiction over this matter is each Branch of the Republic, because they—the Executive, Legislative, Judicial, and Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones—are best equipped to determine their needs and understand their particular circumstances.” Judgment No. 1998-005795 at 16:12 on August 11, 1998, established that:
“From the provisions of Article 154 of the Constitución Política—which states:
‘The Poder Judicial is subject only to the Constitution and the law, and the decisions it issues in matters within its jurisdiction impose upon it no responsibilities other than those expressly prescribed by legislative provisions’ arises the principle of the independence of the Poder Judicial, which encompasses both the body or institution as a whole and the Judge in deciding the matters submitted for adjudication. With respect to that official, it must also be recognized that judicial office enjoys dual protection, since the judge’s independence—as a guarantee for the parties involved in the matter sub judice—operates both externally and internally, in the sense that the judge is protected from influences and interference—both external and internal—that might sway the decision in one direction or another in a specific case submitted for adjudication, so that judgments are rendered in strict accordance with the applicable legal framework.
In other words, the judge is protected so that neither the parties participating in the proceedings, third parties, higher-ranking judges, nor ‘influential’ members of the Branches of the State, including the Judicial Branch itself, may influence the decision. Still less could there be an obligation—imposed by a higher-ranking authority—to decide a specific case in a particular manner or to coerce the adjudicator to that effect. The guarantee of the independecia (sic) of judges, more than a guarantee for those officials—which it indeed is—constiuye (sic) a guarantee for private individuals (the parties to the proceedings), in the sense that their cases will be decided in strict accordance with the Constitution and the laws.” Judgment No. 1998-005798 at 16:21 on August 11, 1998, established that:
“The independence of the Poder Judicial is constitutionally guaranteed in Articles 9 and 154 (sic). The Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, an international legal instrument directly applicable in our country, also addresses the subject. The Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos establishes judicial independence as a human right by providing in Article 8.1 that:
‘1.- Every person has the right to be heard, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal previously established by law, in the determination of any criminal charge brought against that person, or in the determination of that person’s rights and obligations of a civil, labor, or any other nature.
The independence of the Organo (sic) Judicial is external in nature. The Organo (sic) Judicial is independent from the other Branches of the State, whereas the judge’s independence must be analyzed in a more complex manner. But when a Poder Judicial is said to be independent, the same must be said of its judges, because they are the ones who must give effect to the function entrusted to it; this is the independence to which I shall now refer. The independence that should truly concern us—without diminishing the importance of that of the Organo (sic) Judicial—is the independence of the judge in relation to the specific case, because that is what serves as a guarantee for citizens under the Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. The effective independence of the Poder Judicial helps ensure that the judges comprising it may also be independent; nevertheless, it is entirely possible for the body as a whole to have its independence guaranteed by law while its members are not independent, for many reasons.” This is no small matter, because the organization and administration of the judicial function must not merely be confined to its adjudicative component, as the majority understands it; rather, that component is complemented by other organizational functions that should be respected as belonging to a Branch of the Republic.
As stated above, the amendment to the Constitución Política contemplated not only the adjudicative aspects of the Poder Judicial but also its operational aspects, and this would therefore fall within what the original Constituent Assembly contemplated in Article 167, because, from within the Corte Plena in 1956 and in the Asamblea Legislativa in 1957, a decision was made during that foundational period of the Second Republic to address officials’ needs regarding their salaries and pension system (régimen previsional), a fundamental precept of Costa Rican democracy.
It is evident that the Judicial Branch Pension and Retirement Fund formed an essential part of the economic independence of the Judicial Branch at that time, and it must continue to do so in our time, pursuant to the doctrine of the progressive, evolutionary, and non-regressive development of social rights. In adopting the Full Court’s position, the derivative constituent power (Constituyente derivado) took a decisive step toward ensuring that the Fund would be managed independently and autonomously from the other political branches, which, in turn, allowed such management and governance to be carried out in accordance with the legal and constitutional purposes of the administration of justice. Nor can it be asserted, as the majority does, that recognition of the constitutional allocation of 6% was straightforward and entirely unproblematic; on the contrary, relations among the branches have been rocky, difficult, and contentious, such that every budget has been secured through great effort or timely negotiation by the representatives and authorities of the Judicial Branch.
Indeed, the constituent power anticipated the possibility of such negotiation and consideration by establishing, among other things, a second possibility involving additional revenues for investment plans. Article 177 of the Political Constitution, with its allocation of 6% of the ordinary revenues for the Republic’s fiscal year, has served as an incentive for the legislature to use the sphere of the Judicial Branch as a means of incorporating administrative institutions unrelated to the judicial function. Specifically, Judgment No. 2006-07965 of 16:58 hours on May 31, 2006, cited above, concludes by declaring provisions of the Notarial Code unconstitutional because they established a body of an administrative nature, namely the Directorate of Notarial Affairs, within the Judicial Branch, in violation of the constitutional principles of separation of functions, reservation or exclusivity of jurisdiction, and the financial independence and autonomy of the Judicial Branch, as well as the right of the Republic’s inhabitants to prompt and effective justice.
Continuing the reasoning of Judgment No. 2017-09551 of 11:40 hours on June 21, 2017, it was also stated that:
“For all these reasons, we must recognize that, in order to organize work rationally, effectively, efficiently, simply, and expeditiously, every primary function must be accompanied by the other, non-primary functions of the constitutional body and must be aligned with the primary function. Accordingly, it must be recognized that both legislative and judicial functions require an administrative support structure to accomplish their essential or primary function, namely, an administrative function that helps channel all their activity; logically, this extends to the human resources or personnel of the Branches of the Republic, since behind the fundamental function lies the administration of personnel, public officials and public servants, etc. Evidently, in the Costa Rican context, it would be seriously contradictory to depart from a longstanding legislative tradition of entrusting powers to a single Branch—a practice that does not exist in other jurisdictions—while seeking to guarantee those horizontal checks within an independent Judicial Branch.” Therefore, if matters relating to Judicial Branch pensions and retirements were included as part of the Judicial Branch’s economic independence as a substantive issue beginning in 1956, this provides the undersigned with an additional reason to seek application of Article 167 of the Political Constitution, because the organizational scheme was changed to provide for administrative deconcentration (desconcentración) of the administering body through a subsequent law. This establishes the harmful precedent that, in the future, temporary majorities in the Legislative Assembly may intrude into other aspects of Judicial Branch personnel management.
Another reason is that a supermajority (mayoría reforzada) safeguards judicial independence not only from an institutional standpoint, but also for each individual judge, where economic, social, and cultural rights established through a social-security and pension system are affected. Although it cannot be denied that the Judicial Branch forms part of the whole that is the “State,” its strategic and essential position within the State’s organization must also be recognized, given the public functions performed by its officials, which are highly specialized and governed by law, as previously described in the precedents of this Court, and whose function is final in resolving disputes and bringing peace to them. This clearly entails costs and sacrifices for its personnel, which must be compensated by the “State,” particularly in a functioning democracy such as Costa Rica’s, which must assume responsibility not only for the economic aspect of sustaining the Judicial Branch but also for protecting it.
The purpose of judicial independence is to ensure judicial impartiality, a position we share with the majority of the Court, although not with the degree of clarity this minority would desire, because the issue underlying the amendment of Article 177 of the Political Constitution crystallized the deeply felt need to protect, in general terms, the institutional framework and administration—including everything relating to Judicial Branch personnel—which should be zealously safeguarded. Nor can the legal opposition of the head of the Judicial Branch be dispensed with in the face of potentially regressive effects of future legislation. In this regard, it is appropriate to recall the consistent rule concerning the importance, in the world’s leading legal systems, of protecting judges’ compensation and matters relating to the pension system applicable to judges and other officials.
Accordingly, we, the undersigned justices, consider that Law No. 9544 of April 24, 2018, contains fundamental defects in the legislative procedure that invalidate it in its entirety, consisting of the failure to consult the Judicial Branch regarding the text approved by Parliament by an absolute rather than qualified majority, which invalidates the Law in its entirety (Article 167 of the Political Constitution), because it affects the Judicial Branch’s organization, structure, operation, and independence; consequently, it is contrary to Constitutional Law (Derecho de la Constitución). In light of the foregoing, the undersigned adjudicators consider it unnecessary to analyze the remaining substantive arguments raised by the claimants against the substantive content of the Law, except in those circumstances in which it was necessary to take a position so that a fully concurring vote could be reached (Article 60.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure), as reflected in the judgment of the majority of this Chamber.” Accordingly, we, the undersigned Justices Cruz Castro, Salazar Alvarado, and Garita Navarro, hereby place our additional reasons on the record.— F.-) Use of Article 208 bis (currently 234 bis) as a procedural defect In addition to the procedural defects identified in the dissenting opinion (voto salvado) referenced in the preceding recital (considerando), I have concluded that the application of Article 208 bis (currently 234 bis) of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Assembly to the law challenged in this constitutional action (acción) also renders it unconstitutional.
Consistent with the position I expressed in Vote No. 2011-015749 of 09:32 hours on November 16, 2011 (based on the considerations set forth in Judgments No. 2005-398, 2007-2901, and 2008-7687), and in Vote No. 2012-004151 of 16 hours on March 27, 2012, I have dissented from the majority’s view because I consider that Article 208 bis of the legislative rules violates the Political Constitution, since the possibility of applying a special, ad hoc procedure to a bill infringes the principle of legal certainty, the rights of political participation and representation, the democratic principle, and the right of amendment (derecho de enmienda).
“Accepting the possibility that the Assembly may apply special procedures to amendments of its Rules of Procedure and to bills, under the terms established in Article 208 bis, without first defining the rules governing the procedure to be followed, constitutes a clear violation of the principle of legal certainty and the democratic principle, since prior definition would be the only means by which legislators could know, sufficiently far in advance, the procedure to which they would be subject and thus exercise the corresponding mechanisms of participation and oversight. I have stated that if the legislature failed to establish clear procedural rules for applying the mechanism contemplated in Article 208 bis, omitting the establishment of legislative regulations or practices, it would be evading or failing to perform its constitutionally assigned duties. As drafted, Article 208 bis means that whenever the majorities so decide, they may—as is already occurring—use a procedural motion (moción de orden) to subject a bill under consideration to an exceptional procedure, and its debate would then be governed by procedures not established in the Rules of Procedure—that is, conducted amid legal uncertainty.
Leaving the procedure to be applied in each specific case to the discretion of a majority, without disclosing it beforehand to all members of Parliament, violates the democratic principle to the detriment of minorities, insofar as nothing guarantees that, under the proposed arrangement, minorities will not be impaired in exercising the constitutional rights of their representatives in Congress.
What occurred in the procedure approved for considering the bill submitted for consultation is a clear example of the foregoing, because, as a procedural motion, it does not, in principle, have to be publicized sufficiently far in advance, regardless of its complexity. Nor may motions be submitted to amend it, since that would have to take the form of a new proposal, for which the other caucuses have an extremely short, virtually immediate period of time; and once the motion has been approved by the majorities, they have no option other than to submit to the limited participation afforded to them under the newly created procedure. I have also concluded that, under this scenario, the right of amendment is violated.
Every legislator holds the constitutional right to participate in the lawmaking process and thereby influence the law’s final content. The Legislative Assembly certainly has the authority to establish its own rules, including special procedures; however, the manner in which such procedures are being authorized violates the principle of legal certainty, the rights of political participation and representation, the democratic principle, and legislators’ right of amendment, insofar as the failure to regulate those procedures sufficiently in advance and with the necessary participation of all legislators renders those rights ineffective. For further support, the dissenting opinion that I joined in the aforementioned 2012 judgment is reproduced below:
“IX.—DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE CALZADA AND JUSTICES ARMIJO AND CRUZ, AUTHORED BY THE SECOND-NAMED JUSTICE. The unconstitutionality of Article 208 bis of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Assembly, as well as its application to various legislative proceedings, has been repeatedly challenged before this Chamber. By majority, beginning with Judgment 2008-7687, this Chamber has found it consistent with the Constitution. That judgment was adopted over the dissenting opinions of Justice Calzada, Justice Cruz, and Justice Armijo, which we reiterate on this occasion, and we would grant the action for the following reasons:
As a starting point, it is necessary to reiterate what this Chamber stated in judgment number 2011-04778 of catorce horas treinta y un minutos del trece de abril de dos mil once regarding the nature of Parliamentary Law (Derecho Parlamentario) and the limits of the Chamber’s jurisdiction over legislative procedure:
“Nature of Parliamentary Law and limits of the Chamber’s jurisdiction over legislative procedure. The fundamental mission of parliaments is to make decisions with the participation of all political forces representing the various sectors of civil society. Parliamentary Law serves an instrumental function toward that end—although it also has a political function—by facilitating and organizing that process. This body of law is characterized by arising from interna corporis, from parliaments’ capacity for self-regulation (autonormatividad) and their own internal dynamics. In that sense, it is not law that is deliberately created, but rather law that is discovered and emerges from practice; therefore, its customary aspect (custom) and interpretation are highly significant. Accordingly, parliaments’ power of self-government has a solid historical tradition and justification. Parliamentary Law is characterized by being spontaneous, dynamic, and flexible.
It draws upon everyday practice and the political reality in which it operates, where constant transformations occur that require normative responses, often contrary to the classical doctrines of other branches of law. One example is the principle prohibiting individual derogation from regulations (principio de inderogabilidad singular del reglamento), which is treated differently than in administrative law and, on some occasions within the parliamentary sphere, gives way to the dynamism required by parliamentary procedures. Its limit, of course, lies in the Constitution and in the principles and values of the ideological system within which it operates. For that reason, this Chamber has recognized that its role concerning legislative procedure is solely to declare the existence of substantial defects (vicios sustanciales) that violate the constitutional principles and values applicable to the matter; otherwise, it would impair Parliament’s self-regulatory and functional capacity (interna corporis), distorting its role as guardian of constitutional supremacy by turning it into a kind of ad hoc senate (judgment number 2007-9699, of las diez horas del cuatro de julio de dos mil siete). Thus, as this Court stated in judgment 2005-07961, of las diecisiete horas cincuenta minutos del veintiuno de junio de dos mil cinco:
“Parliament’s self-determination over its internal conduct—repeatedly recognized by this Court—its interna corporis, is one of its essential powers expressly recognized by the Political Constitution in Article 121, subsection 22), and is inherent to the democratic system. The purpose of granting the Assembly the authority to organize itself is to enable it to regulate its procedures, organization, and operation and, consequently, its internal organization, within the parameters required by the principles of democracy, equality, and non-discrimination, together with all principles derived from them. This power is exercised with complete independence from the other organs of the State—by virtue of the principle established in Article 9 of the Fundamental Charter—and is subject to the following limits: compliance with Constitutional Law (Derecho de la Constitución), meaning the body of constitutional values, principles, and rules, including those mentioned supra; and respect for the principles of reasonableness, rationality, and proportionality, such that those exercising public powers may not, through action, omission, or mere material conduct not founded upon an effective administrative act (acto administrativo eficaz), violate or threaten fundamental rights.
This is because a democratic State has a constitution of liberty whose purpose is to guarantee individuals the full enjoyment and exercise of human rights, which are currently recognized in the Political Constitutions of most countries and in international human-rights treaties (International Human Rights Law (Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos)). It is therefore illegitimate to use those powers for purposes other than those assigned by the legal system—a defect involving misuse of powers (vicio de desviación de poder)—or to exercise them to an unreasonable degree or beyond what is reasonable—a defect involving excess of power (vicio de exceso de poder). Having said this, the Chamber considers that it should not interfere with Parliament’s right of self-regulation unless, as explained above, one of the stated principles is violated, which in this particular case would entail impairment of the right of amendment (derecho de enmienda), understood as the mechanism through which legislators participate and exert influence during the lawmaking process.
Accordingly, the Chamber’s powers in this area are exercised from the perspective of an arbiter that moderates and restrains excesses but does not interfere with an intrinsic constitutional power conferred upon another constitutional body; its intervention would therefore be legitimate only in the face of evident or gross violations of the constitutional principles governing Parliamentary Law. In exercising its own power of self-regulation, Parliament is entitled, in specific situations, to reconcile or balance not only the right of amendment, but also the other constitutional principles that govern its conduct, such as respect for majorities and reasonableness. In other words, harmonizing each and every constitutional principle that must coexist during the legislative procedure is a power belonging to Parliament itself and, specifically, to the presiding officer (Director del debate) and the legislators, and it may be presumed that those functions are performed in accordance with the legal system and its principles […].” (Emphasis not in the original).
That judgment emphasizes that, in accordance with the foregoing, the Chamber should intervene in matters of legislative procedure only:
“[…] where these powers are used with an evident abuse of power that results in the nullification of a right, rather than in its harmonization with the other constitutional principles of Parliamentary Law [...] In our view, holding otherwise would entail a failure to respect the power of self-regulation and the democratic principle. The Chamber must not, therefore, become a forum that substitutes its judgment for the exercise of constitutional powers or for political debate and dialogue, unless, as stated… the substance of a fundamental right is eliminated or nullified.” The democratic principle. Our dissenting vote finds in favor of the claimant, on the same grounds already expressed in the dissenting opinions (votos salvados) regarding judgments number 2005-398, 2008-07687 and 2007-2901 of 17:30 hrs. de 28 de febrero de 2007, beginning with the democratic principle, respect for which is essential to any examination of whether any rule or act conforms to or conflicts with the Constitution. In this regard, this Chamber has unanimously stated that:
“what the legislative procedure seeks is to ensure compliance with the democratic principle within a society that has adopted it as a defining feature of its political institutions. Because perfect democracy is an unattainable ideal, the democratic principle constitutes the standard by which the degree of proximity attained by a particular society, at a particular historical moment, to that ideal and to its aspiration to come as close to it as possible may be determined. At a minimum, the democratic principle requires respect for the principles of political participation and representation—including everything concerning respect for minorities—which form the foundation of our political system. The latter principle encompasses aspects such as the legitimacy of the means used to select the various representatives and—no less importantly—the ability of groups representing minorities to oppose the will of the majority through legitimate means.
Based on the foregoing observations, violations of procedure that infringe the democratic principle, an indispensable guide for parliamentary activity, may be deemed unconstitutional. Likewise, legislative proceedings that, because they are rushed or impetuous, produce debates lacking a measured process of quality and reflection and that also lack broad public dissemination of legislative activity, as guaranteed by Article 117 of the Political Constitution, constitute substantial violations. The failure to publish and the failure to conduct constitutionally mandated consultations (consultas obligatorias) have also been deemed substantial procedural defects. Regarding the first issue, because the Legislative Assembly is a body representing the national community, the public nature of parliamentary proceedings is essential, since sovereignty resides in the people and legislators are merely their representatives (Article 105 of the Constitution).
Its activity must therefore necessarily extend to the entire community, to such an extent that some specialists in Constitutional Law define it as an organ of publicity” (judgment number 2012002675 of once horas y cincuenta y dos minutos del veinticuatro de febrero del dos mil doce).- Costa Rica is a representative democracy (democracia representativa), which does not mean that the officials governing at a given historical moment may make their decisions without hearing the voice of those who have given them that mandate, that is, the will of the people as the sovereign power. This clarification is warranted because, in the absence of any mechanism that might have been used to ascertain the will of the citizenry, the only possible mechanism in a democracy is to open the doors to dialogue and measured, thoughtful, open discussion; otherwise, we would risk falling into a “democratic tyranny,” grossly violating the democratic principle (principio democrático), which guarantees the inhabitants of our country that the interests of the Nation will be zealously protected for the good of all.
For purposes of this reasoning, it must be noted that one thing is a reform of the Rules of Procedure (Reglamento) intended to organize and adapt its day-to-day operations to the times (two-party system–multiparty system), so that the Legislative Branch may regulate situations arising in the country more effectively, and another is to introduce amendments to a specific article for the processing of a particular case. Our Fundamental Charter does not regulate how the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Assembly must be amended; consequently, this body of rules itself has had to regulate the procedures deemed appropriate and consistent with Constitutional Law (Derecho de la Constitución), which is essential to guaranteeing legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), the right to representation (derecho de representación), and the protection of the democratic principle within the legislative procedure (procedimiento legislativo).
The power of that body to issue its internal rules (interna corporis) is beyond dispute; that power is provided for not only in the Fundamental Charter, in subsection 22) of Article 121, but is also inherent in the democratic system and specific to the Legislative Assembly as a constitutional branch of government. Accordingly, the Chamber has also recognized this self-regulatory authority (potestad autorreguladora), and from that perspective it has clearly held that Parliament has the authority to establish special procedures (procedimientos especiales), should it deem fit, but that such procedures must be expressly and thoroughly defined. Otherwise, accepting that the Assembly may apply special procedures to the processing of amendments to its Rules of Procedure and bills, under the terms established in Article 208 bis, without first defining the rules governing the procedure to be followed, constitutes a clear infringement of the principle of legal certainty and the democratic principle.
According to the view expressed, prior and sufficiently timely knowledge by the deputies of the procedure to which they will be subject is the only way they can exercise the corresponding mechanisms of participation and oversight.
Legal certainty. If the legislature did not clearly establish the procedural rules (reglas procedimentales) for applying what was contemplated in Article 208 bis, or failed to establish legislative regulations or practices, it was evading or failing to perform its constitutionally assigned duties. The incorporation of the cited provision into the Rules of Procedure, in the terms in which it was approved, means that whenever the majorities so decide, they may—as is already occurring—use a procedural motion (moción de orden) to subject the bill under consideration to an exceptional procedure, leaving its debate governed by procedures not established in the Rules of Procedure; that is, amid a situation of legal uncertainty.
Principle of publicity (principio de publicidad). Regarding the principle of publicity, as correctly stated in the majority opinion, the procedure is created through a procedural motion, which, under Article 153 of the Rules of Procedure, may be introduced at any point during the debate and must be discussed immediately. They need not be announced before that very moment, which does not afford the deputies sufficient opportunity to review them before their adoption. Therefore, leaving the procedure to be applied in each specific case to the discretion of a majority, without informing all members of Parliament beforehand, infringes the democratic principle to the detriment of minorities, insofar as nothing guarantees that, under the regime and application of Article 208 bis of the Legislative Rules of Procedure, minorities will not be impaired in exercising the constitutional rights of their representatives in Congress. Once the motion has been approved by the majorities, the minority caucuses (fracciones minoritarias) have no option other than to submit to the limited participation afforded to them under the procedure created.
Unreasonable restriction of the right of amendment (derecho de enmienda) and other rights. Every deputy holds the constitutional right to participate in the lawmaking process (proceso de formación de la ley) and thereby influence the law’s final content. Although the Legislative Assembly’s authority to establish its own rules, including special procedures, is recognized, the manner in which this is authorized nevertheless infringes the principle of legal certainty, the right to political participation (derecho de participación política), the right to representation, the democratic principle, and the deputies’ right of amendment, insofar as the failure to regulate such procedures sufficiently in advance and with the necessary participation of all deputies renders those rights ineffective.
In summary, Article 208 bis of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Assembly constitutes a complete break with the foregoing principles and allows the Legislative Branch, through a motion approved by two-thirds of the deputies, to undermine its status as the body that guarantees popular representation (representación popular), in accordance with the structure established in Title Nine of the Political Constitution of 1949, substantially impairing the democratic principle.- The undersigned are aware of the implications of annulling that provision, pursuant to which numerous laws have been enacted, some of particular importance to the country. However, because that procedural provision has been applied under a constitutionally consolidated practice established through this Chamber’s own case law, it is appropriate to apply to the present case the “ex nunc” effect of the ruling granting relief, by virtue of the doctrine expressed in Judgment 1-92 at 14:00 hrs. on 7 de enero de 1992, and reiterated in Judgment 2-92, at 14:15 hrs. on the same day, to the effect that:
“...the interpretation that, as of the cited decision, the Chamber gives to Article 195 subsections 4 and 7 of the Political Constitution, in its role as interpreter of the Fundamental Charter, whose precedents and case law are recognized as having binding force ‘erga omnes,’ does not ‘per se’ render unconstitutional the other amendments approved before that judgment that had not obtained a qualified majority (mayoría calificada) in the three debates of the two legislative terms. On the contrary, all of them were incorporated into the Fundamental Charter under a consolidated constitutional practice, beginning with the President’s unchallenged decision in the session of 29 de octubre de 1962, which must be understood as corrected from the time of the new interpretation established by the Chamber. Its effects are therefore confined exclusively to amendments made in the future and can never be understood to affect prior amendments, since doing so would violate the principle of ‘legal certainty.’ Consequently, the corrective criteria issued by this Chamber regarding constitutional amendments in the exercise of preventive constitutional review (control preventivo de constitucionalidad) must be understood as having ex nunc rather than ex tunc effects, all within the philosophy embodied in the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), in the chapter concerning legislative consultations on constitutionality (consultas legislativas de constitucionalidad) and the aforementioned principle of legal certainty.” Although the foregoing criterion has been maintained by the Chamber in relation to corrective criteria concerning constitutional amendments issued in the exercise of prior constitutional review (control previo de constitucionalidad), it is not only valid but necessary to apply it to the present case, now not in the exercise of consultative review (control consultivo), but in a contentious case, for two reasons.
First, because the Constitution and, derived from it, the Chamber’s case law are the foundation and root of legal certainty for the Supreme Branches of Government, all public entities, private persons, and even third-party States through the adoption of agreements and treaties, legal certainty would collapse if, after the Legislative Branch adopted agreements and enacted laws by applying procedural rules that were constitutionally valid at the time of their application and supported by the Constitutional Court, a case such as this one—where the prevailing view concerning the constitutionality of a procedural provision applied repeatedly and in good faith by the Legislative Branch over time is reversed—were to have ex tunc effect, as declarations that substantive provisions are unconstitutional generally do, including declarations concerning constitutional amendments themselves. Second, the second paragraph of Article 91 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction provides that: “A constitutional judgment of annulment may calibrate and delimit, with respect to space, time, or subject matter, its retroactive effect, and shall issue the rules necessary to prevent that effect from causing serious disruption to social security, justice, or peace.” Accordingly, in this case, to prevent such serious disruption, it is necessary to delimit the effects of the ruling granting relief, a power that this Chamber has already exercised on various occasions (see, for example, Judgment number 01698-12 at doce horas doce minutos on cinco de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, 3410-92 at catorce horas cuarenta y cinco minutos on diez de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y dos, and 2010-021258 at catorce horas on veintidós de diciembre de dos mil diez.).
Therefore, the claim of deputies Manrique Oviedo, Jeannette Ruiz, Ana Eugenia Venegas, and Gustavo Arias Navarro that, should Article 208 bis of the Legislative Rules of Procedure be declared unconstitutional, all laws enacted through the special procedure provided for in that provision also be declared unconstitutional is denied. Instead, the effects of the judgment are delimited such that the finding of unconstitutionality does not, in this case, affect laws and agreements approved through procedures conducted pursuant to the challenged provision, except for those legislative proceedings that had not been approved in either the first or second debate as of the date of publication of the corresponding notice.-” Thus, because I have concluded that Article 208 bis of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Assembly is unconstitutional, it follows that bills approved pursuant to that provision would likewise be unconstitutional on procedural grounds, as is the case with the challenged law.
Conclusion.- In accordance with the procedural grounds stated (violation of the principle of technical reasonableness [principio de razonabilidad técnica]) and the additional procedural grounds (violation of Article 167 of the Constitution, the principle of judicial independence [principio de independencia judicial], and the use of the expedited procedure [procedimiento abreviado]), I consider that the short time limit established in the challenged provision violates the right to obtain a dignified, proportionate, and reasonable pension, the principle of equality (principio de igualdad), the principle of progressive realization of social rights (principio de progresividad de los derechos sociales), the principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima), vested legal situations (situaciones jurídicas consolidadas), and international law.
The parties are hereby advised that, if they submitted any document in paper form, as well as any objects or evidence contained on any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, or telematic device, or produced using new technologies, such items must be retrieved from the court office within a maximum period of 30 business days from the date notice of this judgment is served. Otherwise, any material not retrieved within that period shall be destroyed, pursuant to the “Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial,” approved by the Corte Plena at session N° 27-11 of 22 de agosto del 2011, Article XXVI, and published in Boletín Judicial number 19 of 26 de enero del 2012, as well as the resolution approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial at session N° 43-12 held on 3 de mayo del 2012, Article LXXXI.
Por tanto:
By majority vote, the consolidated actions are declared WITHOUT merit. Justice Cruz Castro dissents, would grant the action, and considers that, to comply with the Law of the Constitution (Derecho de la Constitución), the transitional regime (régimen transitorio) should have covered judicial employees with twenty or more years of service in the Poder Judicial. Justices Salazar Alvarado and Picado Brenes dissent and would grant the action in part, finding an unconstitutional omission (omisión inconstitucional) in the failure to provide for a twenty-four-month transitional period in accordance with the actuarial record.- Fernando Castillo V.
Chief Justice Fernando Cruz C. Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G. Aracelly Pacheco S.
Alejandro Delgado F. Ana María Picado B.
Dissenting opinion (voto salvado) of Justice Salazar Alvarado and Justice Picado Brenes.
With due respect, we join this dissenting opinion and depart from the majority opinion on the following grounds:
A.- Regarding the reference to the legislative procedure followed in enacting Ley N° 9544, insofar as it concerns the failure to consult the Poder Judicial and the omission of the institutional consultation required under Article 167 of the Constitución Política, as well as Article 208 bis of the Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa.
On these points, we consider it unnecessary to repeat the arguments concerning the legislative procedure followed in enacting Ley N° 9544 of 24 de abril de 2018, which were addressed in Judgment N° 2018-005758 at 15:40 hours on 12 de abril de 2018 (dissenting opinion of Justices Cruz Castro, Salazar Alvarado, and Hernández Gutiérrez), and reiterated in Judgment N° 2021-11957 at 17:00 hours on 25 de mayo de 2021 (dissenting opinion of Justices Salazar Alvarado and Hernández Gutiérrez). Likewise, those arguments are already part of the case record, specifically in interlocutory ruling (resolución interlocutoria) N° 2022-008712 at 9:10 hours on 20 de abril de 2022; we therefore refer to the reasons duly stated and recorded therein. For clarity, however, we summarize those judgments as holding that the procedural defect (vicio de procedimiento) affected Bill N° 19.922 because Article 167 of the Constitución Política had been violated and, consequently, affected Ley N° 9544 in its entirety, and that only the adoption of a position was necessary for there to be a unanimous decision (Article 60.2, Código Procesal Civil).
Thus, on the merits, we address the legislature’s failure to consider the factors of length of service, gender, and age when establishing different pension eligibility for men and women, and the rejection of those claims due to the absence of technical studies concerning Costa Rica’s specific circumstances.
B.- The issue of reasonableness and proportionality.
From the standpoint of Constitutional Law (Derecho Constitucional), it is clear that all legislation enacted by the Asamblea Legislativa must be grounded in the Social State under the Rule of Law (Estado Social de Derecho). To assume otherwise would mean accepting that the state apparatus is authorized and empowered to adopt unjust and arbitrary measures that, by definition, would be contrary to fundamental rights (derechos fundamentales) and the common good. Fortunately, by virtue of the hierarchy of the Law of the Constitution, its provisions—through the force and resistance of the higher-ranking rules of the legal system—are enforceable; this has formal implications for the lawmaking process and substantively safeguards the content of fundamental rights. Accordingly, all actions by public authorities—laws and public acts generally—must conform to the ideology of the Constitución Política and to the binding obligations established by international human-rights law, including international labor law, and the general principles of International Law.
The issue raised against the challenged Transitional Provision (Transitorio) is whether it lacks a technical basis supporting the eighteen-month period granted for implementation of the new reform. This involves the technical reasonableness of the provision, specifically the proportionality between the means employed and the purpose pursued by the provision within the context of pension schemes.
Indeed, for these purposes, we must refer to advisory opinion N° 2017-0011714 of this Sala Constitucional, issued at 12:00 hours on 26 de julio de 2017, in which it analyzed a bill allowing persons insured under the Disability, Old-Age, and Death Scheme (Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte), administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, to transfer to the Magisterio Nacional; on that occasion, it held:
“In this area, the Asamblea Legislativa must have technical studies demonstrating that the entry into force of the Law will not affect the financial sustainability of the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social scheme, particularly in the current circumstances, in which its sustainability has been questioned, as is publicly known. In the absence of technical studies addressing this issue, and it having been established that the bill entails an adverse effect on the scheme’s Reserve, there can be no doubt that Article 73 of the Constitution has been violated. The situation would be very different if technical studies existed because, if it were demonstrated that the financial sustainability of the Disability, Old-Age, and Death Scheme would not be adversely affected, the legislature, constitutionally speaking, would face no impediment to exercising its legislative authority. As is well known, in environmental matters this Court has required technical studies before protected areas may be reduced, and it has concluded that the omission of such studies constitutes a material defect in the legislative procedure (see advisory opinion n.° 2012-13367).
Following that same doctrine, this optional legislative consultation on constitutionality (consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad) is answered by finding that the bill entitled ‘Reforma del Sistema de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Magisterio Nacional,’ legislative file number 17.561, is unconstitutional because it violates Article 73 of the Constitución Política, since it lacks a study determining, technically and scientifically, the actual impact on the Reserve of the Disability, Old-Age, and Death Scheme of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, a defect that is material to the legislative procedure.” In addition to the interpretation given by the Sala, we consider it important to add to the preceding reasoning that specific international obligations require the country to provide technical support for changes and reforms affecting pension schemes. In this regard, technical studies are indispensable to demonstrate that the means employed are appropriate to the proposed statutory objectives, without leaving unprotected those persons who may retain vested rights and legitimate expectations (expectativas legítimas).
When a statutory amendment or reform of a pension scheme is pursued, it logically centers on the interest in achieving a positive impact on the fund and its benefits. However, as occurred in the case quoted above, the absence of a technical actuarial study (estudio técnico actuarial) was manifest and evident, affecting the determination of the “… actual impact on the Reserve of the Disability, Old-Age, and Death Scheme, a defect that is material to the legislative procedure.” It is clear that, when the Social State under the Rule of Law undertakes an initiative to reform a pension scheme, the central basis must be financial balance, as established in international legislation, which will be addressed below. In this regard, when eliminating risks, it must be demonstrated that there will be a positive impact on the reserve, thereby ensuring sustainability and financial balance, as well as the future provision of benefit entitlements (derechos prestacionales). Thus, it is the technical study that must chart the course and support the measures that legislation must adopt for a reform to be adequate to sustain current and future benefits.
In Judgment N° 2020-19274 at 16:30 hours on 7 de octubre de 2020, the Sala had the opportunity to determine the normative force of Article 71 of Convention N° 102 of the Organización Internacional del Trabajo with respect to the distribution of contributions and taxes, as well as employer and state contributions, and held:
“… at the international level, the right to social security must be characterized by a minimum level of benefits comprising at least basic healthcare, cash sickness benefits, unemployment benefits, old-age benefits, employment-injury and occupational-disease benefits, family benefits, maternity benefits, disability benefits, and survivors’ benefits, all in accordance with Convention N° 102 of the Organización Internacional del Trabajo. The right to social security and social protection encompasses the right not to be denied social-security coverage arbitrarily or unreasonably, and the right to equal enjoyment of adequate protection in the event of unemployment, illness, old age, or lack of means of subsistence under circumstances beyond the person’s control.” It further stated:
“… the Convention constitutes a mandatory framework of reference for States; that is, it contains provisions forming the basis for regulations that States may subsequently adopt according to the various types of coverage they have undertaken to provide. It bears noting, as has been stated on other occasions, that States may improve upon those standards. Consistent with that regulatory framework, Part XIII of the aforementioned Convention sets forth other ‘Common Provisions’ governing the coverage offered to insured persons, including grounds for suspension, the possibility of judicially contesting matters relating to the rights involved, and the rules generally governing administration. In other words, these rules consolidate and connect certain aspects of coverage; consequently, some administrative matters must be considered as a whole.
Accordingly, it contains two central principles: the principle of financial solidarity (principio de la solidaridad financiera)—referred to as collective financing and financial solidarity in documents of the Organización Internacional de Trabajo—and the principle of state responsibility (principio de la responsabilidad del Estado). The former sets forth the obligation contained in paragraph 1) of Article 71 of the aforementioned Convention N° 102 (…).
(…) the principle of state responsibility for the provision of benefit obligations (obligaciones prestacionales) is set forth in that same Article 71, but in paragraph 3) of the aforementioned Convention N° 102. That provision states:
“The Member shall assume general responsibility for the due provision of the benefits (prestaciones) provided in pursuance of this Convention and shall take, where appropriate, all measures required for this purpose; it shall ensure, where appropriate, that the necessary actuarial studies and calculations concerning financial equilibrium are made periodically and, in any event, prior to any change in benefits, the rate of insurance contributions, or the taxes allocated to covering the contingencies in question.” It is clear that the State is the guarantor of the country’s pensions. This provision establishes a series of guarantee obligations incumbent upon the State, particularly regarding its leadership in the provision of granted benefits, including the formalities it must observe when discharging its implicit obligation to oversee and implement all measures involved in preserving pension funds (fondos de pensiones), including corrective measures.” The international obligation established in Article 71.3 of Convention No. 102 of the International Labour Organization, the rules governing the issue of surpluses and deficits in pension and retirement funds, requires the State—as the party primarily responsible for maintaining pension funds—to supervise and monitor them, with technical support.
The provision gives rise to a general responsibility that applies both when the State administers the funds directly and when it does so indirectly. In this regard, it always assumes the international commitment to ensure and monitor the effective provision of the benefits—present and future—granted under the Convention. It must therefore play an active role in supervising and monitoring the measures that enable those benefits to be provided.
Because pension funds are not static, the principle of State responsibility entails ongoing supervision and monitoring of benefits, their fluctuations, and whether the rights can be maintained over time. In other words, sufficient resources must be maintained so that benefit levels can be sustained through premiums and/or contributions, taxes, and administrative expenditures, an obligation incumbent upon the State or upon the party responsible for maintaining them over time.
It is important to mention that Article 71 of the aforementioned Convention No. 102 was central to the judgment of this Chamber that resolved the issue of solidarity taxes and contributions imposed on high-value pensions, by applying the Convention’s limit of 50% of salaries/benefits to such contributions. The provision was thereby deemed binding upon the Costa Rican State; accordingly, by parity of reasoning, it must also serve as a rule defining and determining everything that must be resolved in this matter.
In the case before us, when the reduction of the rights and benefits afforded by pension schemes (regímenes de pensiones) begins, we consider that there is a risk that some of them may be lost in the process without clear justification and that international standards may be breached when these rights cannot be made effective. The Social State under the Rule of Law (Estado Social de Derecho) must permit a proper understanding of the loss of benefit rights (derechos prestacionales), which, although occurring within an economic context, must be subject to limits, including the prohibition against disregarding the time during which contributions were made based on salaries and contribution rates. Article 71 under discussion should be treated as protection against the arbitrary reduction of benefits and the unjustified dismantling of protection, whether through insufficient or omitted actuarial studies, all of which would be incompatible with the Convention because it contravenes the international obligation and because rights must also be carefully safeguarded to prevent the unjustified loss of rights to social protection.
The question arises whether only benefits currently being paid or already granted are protected. The answer should be no; reform bills must therefore include a transitional provision (norma transitoria), since, although the economic sphere must not be viewed in isolation from the implications that its decisions have for economic, social, and cultural rights—which are also reasonably enforceable entitlements—neither sphere may be regarded as isolated from the other, nor may one dominate the other except through a reasonable balancing of the rights and interests involved. The legislature’s freedom to shape legislation (libertad de configuración del legislador) is not denied; however, it is important to recall that this freedom is subject to the limits established by Constitutional Law (Derecho de la Constitución)—its values, principles, and rights—particularly when it is subject to legally required technical studies, as established by the Chamber’s case law.
We consider that the obligations arising from Article 71.3 of Convention No. 102 require proposed legal reforms to reflect the performance and sufficiency of the funds and require such amendments to follow precise and correct technical methods at two points in time: a) when appropriate, to exercise periodic oversight of the operational and management-related movements of the funds; and b) in every event, “prior to any change in benefits, the rate of insurance contributions, or the taxes allocated to covering the contingencies in question.” The provisions of this rule safeguard the protections afforded to the agreed benefit rights, particularly those already granted, by requiring reforms or amendments to the pension system to adhere to a mathematical methodology tied to actuarial studies and calculations that reflect a state of resource equilibrium, which is the international obligation assumed by the Costa Rican State.
As was done in Judgment No. 2020-19274, cited above, which relied upon the General Survey concerning social security instruments, conducted in light of the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (Articles 19, 22 and 35 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization), Report III (Part 1B), presented at the International Labour Conference, 100th Session, 2011, it is likewise important on this occasion to reproduce the following:
“465. The Committee wishes to emphasize that the proper financial and legal management of social security systems undergoing reform could be considerably facilitated if an actuarial assessment (evaluación actuarial) were required before reforms are submitted to parliaments. The Committee has observed that, all too often, changes to social security legislation are made hastily in response to immediate interests, without first conducting a substantive financial and economic analysis of the reform’s effects and the potential costs that society will have to bear. Noting that this is a fairly common situation even in developed countries, it considers it likely to extend to developing countries as well. There is no doubt that social security must be governed by legal rules; however, when laws are amended, the clarity provided by independent actuarial assessments regarding the corresponding repercussions is essential, not only from the short-term perspective governments commonly use to evaluate such effects, but also from a long-term perspective concerning the impact any new law may have on the system’s financial sustainability.
466. If social security legislators were to engage with actuaries to work together to the greatest extent possible, actuaries, in turn, should do the same by adopting a proactive approach to social security legislation. An actuarial study should include clear and objective observations concerning every matter affecting the financial condition of a social security scheme, identifying deficiencies in the legal provisions governing the operation of that scheme. Such deficiencies in national legislation could be identified by comparing that legislation with the minimum standards of Convention No. 102 and, through the formulation of alternative assumptions regarding future developments, determining the likelihood that a national social security scheme will be sustainable. Actuarial studies and reports are important tools enabling legislators and national policymakers to adopt measures aimed at complying with ILO social security standards; such tools are useful when reforms are intended to improve levels of social protection, but otherwise they become vital” (emphasis in the original).
In this manner, the need to provide fund-protective safeguards in accordance with actuarial methods is addressed, and we further maintain that sufficient scope must be afforded to resolve the relevant issues arising from changes to the economic and social rights granted. Opportunistic and hasty approaches to reform are completely ruled out because of their social cost. It must be clear, however, that every legal reform of the pension system requires, on the one hand, a substantive analysis from an economic and financial perspective and, on the other, immediate consideration of the implications for protecting present and future rights. It may be said that all of this derives from Article 71.3 of ILO Convention No. 102, which establishes the other international obligation.
From all the foregoing, we conclude that one of the principal purposes of the aforementioned Article 71 is to serve as a safeguard against the erosion of social security benefit rights within the broader category of economic, social, and cultural rights, since it seeks equilibrium in two respects: protecting those who require assistance when the specified contingency occurs and serving as a principle favoring the rationality of measures intended to ensure the fund’s perpetuity without resulting in arbitrariness or a lack of protection. It must be clear, as has been stated by bodies overseeing economic, social, and cultural rights in Europe, that both reductions and costs should be borne collectively and equitably by society, first to avoid adversely affecting persons with fewer resources, while taking into account the country’s economic situation and the category of persons protected. In our country, Article 73 of the Constitución Política largely establishes mandatory contributions by the State, employers, and workers, among other forms of financing.
Compliance with Article 71 ensures the fundamental purpose of pension systems (sistemas previsionales): to grant rights from an actuarial standpoint and, once granted, to maintain them as acquired rights (derechos adquiridos) and vested legal situations (situaciones jurídicas consolidadas), especially when they have become part of a person’s private estate. In such cases, measures must be adopted to ensure sufficient resources for the pension fund; that is, through legislative reforms enabling it to operate at optimal levels of protection, while maintaining a balance that favors Social Security protection. The same should be understood, from the standpoint of granting rights, as meaning that such grants must not be divorced from the substantive aspects of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in order to prevent the unnecessary deprivation and restriction of potential rights when the aim is to adjust, limit, or even slow the granting of benefit rights (derechos prestacionales), provided that this is adequately supported by technical studies. Of course, it must be emphasized that this should not be understood as a dismantling of the Social Rule of Law (Estado Social de Derecho).
By virtue of the pro-persona protective principles (principios protectores pro-persona), which prioritize, prefer, and favor the application of the rules offering the greatest protection for the rights of the human person, whether contained in statutory law, constitutional law, or Human Rights law, we believe it advisable for a reform of the pension system to protect those who are in the strongest position in terms of contributions, length of service, and age, based on a sufficient technical foundation that assigns weight to these factors. A reform of the pension system—even applying the pro-fund principle (principio pro-fondo)—would be unreasonable if it failed to take these factors into account. Specific premium contributions made by a worker to a particular pension and social security system, consistently over time and generally throughout a very long period of service, must be addressed by these actuarial studies. Only in cases of national economic collapse could severe measures be taken against these rights in the process of vesting (derechos en vías de consolidación).
Accordingly, we believe that the actuarial study must reflect not only the fund’s financial condition; it must also address another aspect: accommodating workers who are in the strongest position in terms of contributions, length of service, and age, based on a sufficient technical foundation that gives precedence to the duration of their contributions, a factor closely related to the fund’s financial condition. We believe that this increases and maximizes the possibility of recognizing benefit rights, even when they have not yet become acquired rights.
Regarding the technical reasonableness of the rules enacted by the legislature, this Chamber has stated: “As to the former, it must be noted that, strictly speaking, reasonableness is equivalent to justice; thus, for example, a law establishing scientifically or technically absurd benefits would be a technically irrational or unreasonable law and would therefore also be legally unreasonable. In this regard, it should be noted that saying that an act is reasonable is not the same as saying that an act is not unreasonable, because reasonableness is a point within a range of possibilities or options, with an upper and a lower limit, beyond which the choice becomes unreasonable due to excess or deficiency, respectively” (Judgment N° 1994-00486 at 16:03 hours on January 25, 1994). Accordingly, we do not deny that the legislature has broad powers and discretion in shaping the law, such that the reasonableness of a rule would fall at a point of greater or lesser intensity within a constitutionally permissible or reasonable regulatory range; it must therefore also be concluded that anything falling outside that range is unconstitutional because it falls short of or exceeds the standard.
We maintain that Article 71.3 of I.L.O. Convention N° 102 provides legal protection for legitimate expectations (expectativas legítimas), unless an economic debacle exists that would justify denying benefits to those who would otherwise be entitled to them. We must recall that State decisions must respect social security rights, and failure to do so places the provision outside that permissible or reasonable regulatory range. Any reduction of the standard examined must be clearly justified, since it concerns Human Rights that would, in fact, be denied to those in the strongest position to obtain retirement or pension benefits through the passage of time.
C.- The problem of legitimate expectations without the proper use of an actuarial study.
In Judgment N° 2020-023789 at 19:00 hours on December 10, 2020, the Chamber established the following regarding international obligations:
“Now, pursuant to Article 1 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, this Chamber is responsible for safeguarding not only the supremacy of Constitutional Law but also that of International Law. Accordingly, this Chamber is responsible not only for establishing the supremacy of the law contained in the Law of the Constitution when treaties necessarily concern human-rights matters, but also for establishing the supremacy of International Law over statutory law when such supremacy must be declared through its interpretation and application, by virtue of Article 7 of the Political Constitution. (…) In this regard, from the time our country ratifies them, the international obligations it assumes should produce enduring legal effects, as should be standard practice for Human Rights treaties that seek to advance human dignity and whose obligations consist of protecting, safeguarding, and ensuring respect for those rights.
The same applies to other treaties whose purpose is to legally regulate and eradicate other national practices that endanger those rights, especially when they are connected to life, human health, and the environment. Such treaties also seek effet utile—that is, legally enduring effects—because they involve shared efforts and international cooperation in a particular field and therefore acquire special international importance. It is thus logical to associate binding commitments with mechanisms for monitoring the agreed objectives, since such mechanisms are integral to those commitments.” The binding legal force of international obligations in Costa Rica is clearly demonstrated in Judgment N° 2016-006728 at 9:05 hours on May 18, 2016, which provides:
“The manner in which International Law shapes the domestic legal system was decided by the constituent authority when it established the normative hierarchy of the rules of International Law. Although there may be different approaches to the relationship between public international law and the domestic legal system, the manner in which it is incorporated is highly revealing, and even more so is the place assigned to it within the normative hierarchy of the legal system by both the original and derivative constituent authority, with the intent of granting it a particular degree of legal force and resilience—an emphasis added in some cases to govern the coexistence of International Law and domestic rules. This may be suprastatutory, where the legal decision-maker encounters a rule whose cascading force and effect displaces the lower-ranking rule; or of equal rank, where the judicial authority interprets international legislation as having force and effect equivalent to that of statutes, applying the criteria of validity in time and space and, to avoid generating unnecessary conflicts among rules, interpreting International Law together with customary international law.
In such cases, the authority sets aside the domestic rule or interprets it consistently with the international obligation, except in jurisdictions where the legislature reserves to itself the paramount task of expressly rendering it ineffective, at the risk of violating the international legal order. In our country, the constitutional provision was designed to have very specific effects within the domestic legal system. Under our monist system, International Law is incorporated once the legislative procedures have been completed for enactment of the law adopting it: legislative approval is followed by enactment and publication, and finally by the exchange of diplomatic notes or deposit of the instruments perfecting the international obligation—the act of ratification. The manner in which domestic law is affected would logically depend on the nature of the commitments or international obligations agreed upon among States or legal persons with capacity to act internationally.
For example, the object of Human Rights Treaties is the human person, and they are therefore subject to their own interpretive mechanisms, such as the pro homine principle (principio pro homine), which, insofar as it operates in conjunction with the principle of constitutional supremacy, supplements and surpasses the constitutional text by providing protection additional to, or even omitted from, the constitutional rule, while increasing its legitimacy through human dignity (see Judgment No. 1995-2313, among others).” Article 71.3 of Convention N° 102 of the International Labour Organization forms part of international labor law, which must guide the resolution of this matter because the international provision establishes a very specific standard that must be observed, since the State “shall ensure, where appropriate, that the necessary actuarial studies and calculations concerning financial equilibrium are made periodically and, in any event, prior to any change in benefits” (underlining and emphasis not in the original).
We believe it is obvious that changes in benefits include both current and future benefits. By virtue of its legislative discretion (libertad de configuración), the legislature may establish new terms supported by the aforementioned studies, while ensuring—except during periods of severe crisis and economic collapse—mechanisms that protect those persons with the greatest expectations, who would be in transition as a matter of equity in interpretation, which must also be fair and balanced.
The positive international obligation accepted by States imposes both the obligation to take certain actions and the obligation not to act against rights without reasonable justification, so as not to violate the rule. In the first of these situations, upon finding an imbalance in pension funds, as occurred with the Poder Judicial, there is no doubt that the State is required to adopt appropriate rules and policies to safeguard social security benefits (prestaciones sociales). However, in this regard, we must be clear that when decisions are made that mark a watershed in a Social State governed by the rule of law (Estado Social de Derecho), there are always obligations both to act and to refrain from acting with respect to rights that remain within a transition period. In such cases, it is valid to use age, contribution period, and length of service as reference points, always with a view to maintaining the balance of a fund, without failing to consider rights that could properly have been protected because they were in transition.
We therefore reiterate that the State has a twofold duty to ensure the protection of those who contribute toward future benefits and, with greater intensity, to safeguard the legitimate interests (intereses legítimos) of those who are gradually approaching fulfillment of the requirements concerning time and service and, to an even greater degree, those who would be in transition. The transitional provision (norma transitoria) must accommodate these factors in order to protect these rights in the process of consolidation.
We believe that Convention N° 102 of the Organización Internacional del Trabajo does not authorize decisions devoid of technical reasonableness; on the contrary, it imposes on the party responsible for the funds—the State—the principles of reasonableness and proportionality (principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad), requiring that any decision that makes eligibility more difficult be supported by a technical basis, because otherwise it infringes the substantive rights (derechos sustantivos) to a future and intergenerational benefit of those who have contributed more. The transitional provision must be tailored to the rights of those participating in the fund, protecting a set of substantive rights based on length of service, age, and contributions, all considered together in a fair and equitable manner, with a legitimate interest that is unquestionably more compelling.
The question that arises here is whether the legislature may support the reform without any consideration whatsoever of the consequences it may have for all affected persons by further restricting their substantive rights. We consider that, in light of the international obligation, the answer must be no.
In the legislative record (folio 4164), Deputy Natalia Díaz Quintana stated:
“Another important issue in the text on which we are issuing a committee report today, which I believe is also part of its far-reaching reforms, concerns the transitional provision; a transitional provision that was handled responsibly in the committee; a transitional provision that even allows public servants (sic)—and I will read it to you verbatim—this is the sixth transitional provision, who meet the ….
The Procuraduría had even told us that this transitional provision was unnecessary and that the rule or the law could take effect immediately for purposes of its application; however, also because of rulings (sic) of the Sala Constitucional regarding the IVM system, which establish an eighteen-month transitional period, we took this into consideration when establishing it, thus giving those who are within eighteen months of retirement the right to be governed by the rules currently in force rather than by the law we are approving, in order to respect these benefits as well.
Let us recall that pensions are not vested rights (derechos adquiridos), but rather an expectancy of a right (expectativa de derecho); for that reason, the transitional provision could have been eliminated. Nevertheless, we left it in the bill to open that eighteen-month window for those who wish to retire or are about to retire within these eighteen months, so that they may therefore be governed by the current rules.” At this point, it must be established that the international obligation under article 71.3. of Convention N° 102 of the Organización Internacional del Trabajo is legal in nature because it is an instrument that has consequences due to its normative rank within the domestic legal order—including for the legislature and the courts—insofar as it requires compliance with the agreement reached between subjects of international law and, as such, must be applied in accordance with the principle of pacta sunt servanda and good faith.
Given this legal content, it is consequently binding on the Costa Rican State and constitutes the basic floor of the international obligation, which would confer legitimacy when grounded in technically balanced actions mandated by rules of higher rank and hierarchy. This requires, first, that adjustments not adversely affect pension funds and that rights not be impaired in the name of maintaining the fund’s balance without reasonable justification based on economic difficulties that may be corrected in the future. In this regard, we consider it clear that any improvement is preferable. The legitimacy conferred by the international instrument applies not only to the matter of resources but must also extend to the granting of and respect for rights in transition. It would make no sense for action to be based solely on mathematical considerations without taking Economic, Social and Cultural Rights into account.
By Judgment N° 2018-000230 at 10:40 on January 10, 2018, the Sala held that:
“… the legislature has discretion, within the framework of its right of legislative freedom (libre configuración), to establish the requirements governing the activity in order to protect human health, without having to justify each decision through a technical study, except where an express rule so requires (for example, in environmental matters) or where the subject matter requires such studies.” In this regard, the final actuarial studies provided for a twenty-four-month transitional period for the consolidation of rights in transition. Accordingly, we consider it necessary to conclude that technical actuarial criteria are the objective instrument for supporting pension-fund reforms and must justify modifications and limitations affecting benefits. They must also support the transitional treatment following the reform’s entry into force. However, a modification that makes a transitional provision more restrictive must be based on a duly established need.
The majority of the Sala refers to the final observations of the actuarial study entitled “Product 6 final report: ‘Compilation and Final Report: Conclusions and Recommendations’ (Final Version).” In it, the actuarial team discusses several relevant points from the reports and includes the following assertions concerning the prospective one-hundred-year actuarial calculations performed for the Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial:
“b. Regarding the ‘transitional provision’ that would cover persons who would retire within two years and the possibility of extending that transitional provision to persons who would retire within five years.
An extension of the ‘transitional provision’ postpones the adjustments and therefore adversely affects the Fund’s revenue. To properly assess the effect of extending this transitional provision, a complete actuarial analysis would be necessary.
Moreover, a decision in this direction may induce administrators and political actors to take steps to include successively larger groups, such that, in the end, a two-year ‘transitional provision’ would be transformed into a transitional provision of five, six, or even more years.
Finally, extending the transitional provision postpones some of the adjustments, and therefore analyses of the Fund’s profitability and solvency may create the impression that the adjustments that were made had no effect” (page 73 of the report).
It is important to mention that the most recent Regulatory Frameworks (Marcos Normativos) analyzed, IICE3 and IICE4, were considered solvent in the tests performed on them; that is, under the “baseline or intermediate” and “optimistic” scenarios. Moreover, they also refer to Product 5, stating that they “proved solvent whether the additional revenue from abandoned proceedings was included or excluded. These proposed new Regulatory Frameworks are self-sufficient, and their operation does not require imposing burdens on the State or on Costa Ricans.” All of the foregoing allows us to conclude that it is clear that the two-year (twenty-four-month) transitional rules were already “budgeted” or “included” within the actuarial solvency presented to the Asamblea Legislativa.
Legislation must preserve the adjustments and tailor the modifications to individuals’ circumstances, beginning with newly hired workers, who start accruing time in the system until they reach the required period of participation, at which point a general interest becomes a specific legitimate expectation (expectativa legítima) based on the workers’ age, contribution period, and length of service, for as long as they remain in the system. Pension systems are long-term in nature, and during that period of participation, this interest will continue to increase into a legitimate expectation leading to recognition of the right.
Not all reforms intended to safeguard the balance of pension funds are alike. We consider that safeguarding public pension resources charged directly to the national budget cannot operate in the same manner as safeguarding funds financed by workers’ contributions under pension systems that also receive employer and State contributions and that, it bears noting, arise from the international obligations undertaken with the Organización Internacional del Trabajo. Nevertheless, both must include mandatory contributions from the worker, the employer, and principally the State, whose participation reflects the need for it to make contributions on behalf of the national community, as it did in the case of pensions charged directly to the national budget and their five-year transitional period.
The Social Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202), which sets forth matters relating to social security principles, is closely connected to Convention No. 102. It defines social protection floors as “nationally defined sets of basic social security guarantees” (point I.2); moreover, point I.3 sets forth the principles of adequacy and predictability of benefits (c); respect for the rights and dignity of people covered by social security guarantees (f); sound, accountable, and transparent financial management and administration (j); and financial, fiscal, and economic sustainability, with due regard to social justice and equity (k). In addition to the other stated principles, it is clear that a rational balance must always exist between short- and long-term costs and benefits. To achieve this, we believe that actuarial studies are required to ensure that any necessary reforms and adjustments are necessary, justified, and based on technical criteria.
We therefore believe that transparency, consultation, and social dialogue are important in all cases, but especially when schemes are administered directly or indirectly by the State, insofar as employers’ and workers’ organizations are involved. In this regard, the previously cited General Survey concerning the social security instruments of the International Labour Organization states that confidence in actuarial studies should be expected to be broad and widespread, particularly among decision-makers, so that “…governments will find it easier to obtain the support of the social partners and reach consensus on the changes that need to be made if those changes are based on objective recommendations made by an independent actuary” (emphasis added).
There is also no doubt that the recognition of inchoate and transitional rights (derechos en vías de constitución y transición) should be closely linked to the foregoing and grounded in social justice and equity, because of the social, rather than economic, cost involved and because it is already recognized by the technical studies concerning the fund at issue, which studies are required by the international legal system itself.
From this point onward, we must examine the existence of legal doctrines developed by the case law of the courts of justice in our country, including the Constitutional Chamber itself, which serve to rationalize the application of changes in the law on the basis of considerations of equity and justice, particularly when such changes have unjust and arbitrary effects on individuals.
The doctrine of legitimate expectations (confianza legítima), estoppel, and the doctrine precluding the Public Administration from contradicting its own acts (actos propios de la Administración Pública) all serve to protect and build the law as a true bulwark against injustice and arbitrariness, while the courts become a structuring force for justice in society.
When reforms are enacted, there must be a minimum standard ensuring an environment of predictability, which is itself a consequence of the democratic principle requiring rational decision-making, as well as the publication of valid public acts and their effectiveness. Publication gives rise to the obligation of private parties to comply with the rules and provisions issued by public authorities once those rules and provisions have satisfied the formal and substantive requirements allowing them to be deemed valid; the courts also recognize acts that appear valid and become effective upon their official publication.
At the European Union level, the principle of legitimate expectations (principio de la confianza legítima) derives from the general principle of legal certainty (principio general de seguridad jurídica), all of which derives from the principle of legality (principio de legalidad). This reflects recognition that this legal doctrine originates in national laws. It is understood as the obligation of authorities to be bound not only by what the law expressly provides, but also by their promises and by the heightened expectations they create. In this sense, legitimate expectations arise when persons act in good faith, because their legitimate expectations must be protected: they act on the basis of the wording of laws and should not have the legitimate expectations created by those laws frustrated.
For example, it was recognized that dairy producers who voluntarily agreed to suspend production in response to Community measures encouraging them to do so could expect that, once the period had elapsed, the measures would cease to apply and they could resume the economic activity they had suspended. In the Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of April 28, 1988, Mulder v. Minister van Landbouw en Visserij, it held:
“26 Contrary to the Commission’s assertions, such total and permanent exclusion, for as long as the rules governing the additional levy remain in force, which has the effect of preventing the producers concerned from resuming the marketing of milk at the end of the five-year period, was not foreseeable to those producers when they temporarily undertook not to supply milk. Indeed, neither the provisions nor the recitals of Regulation No. 1078/77 indicate that the non-marketing undertaking entered into pursuant to that Regulation could, upon its expiration, make it impossible to resume the activity in question. Such an effect therefore infringes the legitimate expectations that producers could have regarding the limited nature of the effects of the scheme to which they had subjected themselves.
27 It follows that the rules governing the additional levy on milk were adopted in violation of the principle of legitimate expectations. Since those rules must be declared invalid for that reason, there is no need to examine the other grounds challenging their validity that were raised during the proceedings.” For its part, that judge-made character, which has spread across many countries, is also applied by the Constitutional Chamber from the standpoint of national case law. In Judgment No. 2016-008000 at 11:52 a.m. on June 10, 2016, the Chamber established that doctrine of legitimate expectations. The decision states:
“Now, we are dealing with a principle of clearly jurisprudential origin, manifestly linked to considerations of equity, which is why its application must be analyzed in each specific case. Let us recall that it was conceived as a response by the judge to safeguard the legitimate expectations of the person subject to administrative action (Administrado) when the Administration surprises that person with an unexpected change in its conduct. As the Supreme Court of Spain (Chamber 3) held in its judgment of May 17, 2013: ‘Ultimately, as stated in the Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Communities of 12-5-1998, in order to annul an unlawful act adopted within the domestic law of a State, the judge must weigh the competing interests in each case and decide whether to give precedence to the principle of legality by revoking the act, as required by the public interest, or to protect legitimate expectations in defense of the individual interest.’ Regarding the scope of the principle, the Supreme Court of Spain, in its judgments of February 21, 2006 (RC 5959/2001) and December 15, 2007 (RC 1830/2005), concluded that ‘the legal effect of the principle invoked may entail the annulment of an act or rule and, at the very least, requires a response, within the Community framework, to the alteration of customary and stable circumstances that have generated well-founded expectations of continuity (where there was no advance notice, no sufficient transitional measures allowing the persons concerned to adapt their conduct that were proportionate to the public interest at stake, and no appropriate corrective or compensatory measures).’ In those same judgments, regarding the limits of the principle, it stated:
‘Nevertheless, the principle of legitimate expectations does not guarantee the perpetuation of the existing situation; that situation may be modified within the discretionary authority of public institutions and authorities to impose new regulations in light of the needs of the public interest.’ Moreover, the STS of 1-2-99 Az 1633 recalls that ‘this principle may not be invoked to create, maintain, or extend, within the sphere of public law, situations contrary to the legal system, or where a prior act conflicts with the purpose or interest protected by a legal rule that, by its nature, cannot support discretionary conduct by the Administration entailing recognition of rights and/or obligations arising from its own acts. In other words, without the limitation just described, the invoked doctrine of “acts of one’s own” could introduce into public-law relationships the principle of freedom of contract as a means of governing matters regulated by mandatory rules, in which the public interest safeguarded by the principle of legality prevails; that principle would be violated if effect were given to an action by the Administration that was contrary to the legal system merely because the Administration had so decided or because it was consistent with one of its precedents.
One matter is the irrevocability of one’s own acts declaring rights outside the review procedures established by law (Arts. 109 and 110 of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1958, 102 and 103 of the Act on the Legal Regime of Public Administrations and Common Administrative Procedure, Act 30/1992 [RCL 1992 \2512, 2775 and RCL 1993\246], amended by Act 4/1999 [RCL 1999\114]); another is respect for the legitimate expectations generated by the Administration’s own conduct, which must necessarily operate within the sphere of discretion or autonomy, and not within the sphere of regulated matters or statutory requirements against which, in Administrative Law, no decision or precedent contrary to them may prevail.’ In summary, the principle of legitimate expectations rests on the premise that a citizen engages in conduct in reliance on the belief that the citizen is acting correctly, because the Administration’s consistent and stable conduct over time reasonably creates such an expectation; in other words, the Administration has issued outward indications that have guided the citizen toward certain conduct and caused the citizen to believe in good faith that the situation will persist.
As Meza Valencia (2013) states, ‘the private party’s trust arises when a statement or promise made by the Administration enters the legal realm, but it is strengthened and takes root through the chain of subsequent conduct undertaken by the Administration, insofar as such conduct is directed toward reinforcing and carrying forward the previously given statement. Without such subsequent consistent and coherent acts, the prior promise loses its capacity to consolidate legitimate expectations.’” The foregoing does not imply that the Public Administration (Administración) is compelled to maintain indefinitely an act contrary to the regulations in force. On the contrary, in the exercise of its public powers, the Administration may remedy the improper application of the regulations or impose new regulations in light of the needs of the general interest. However, to do so, the State must respect the doctrine of one’s own acts (doctrina de los actos propios), or else—particularly when new measures or a sudden decision are involved—act reasonably; that is, it must give due advance notice of its new course of action and provide sufficient transitional measures so that the persons concerned may adjust their conduct, proportionate to the public interest at stake, without excluding other corrective or compensatory provisions addressing the customary and stable circumstances that have given citizens well-founded expectations that a particular situation would continue.
Costa Rican constitutional case law (jurisprudencia constitucional) has already recognized this principle, as shown by the following precedents:
“(...) Regarding the development of this principle and its deep constitutional roots, national legal scholarship has stated the following: ‘This principle originated in the Federal Republic of Germany and was subsequently adopted by the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Community to define a situation worthy of protection when the trust placed in the actions of the Public Administration has been violated. In its judgment of 1º de febrero de 1990, the Spanish Supreme Court held that this principle must be applied not merely whenever any type of psychological conviction arises in the individual beneficiary, but rather when it is based on external indications produced by the Administration that are sufficiently conclusive to reasonably induce that person to trust in the lawfulness of the administrative action, together with the fact that, given the weighing of the interests at stake—the individual interest and the general interest—the revocation or nullification of the act causes the beneficiary, who reasonably relied on that administrative situation, to incur losses that the beneficiary should not have to bear, arising from expenses or investments that can be recovered only at great cost to the beneficiary’s assets. Regarding the requirements of the principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima), Spanish legal scholarship, following the case law of the Spanish Supreme Court, has established the following: There must be an act 1) of the Administration that is sufficiently conclusive to give rise in the affected person to one of the following three types of trust: a) the affected person’s trust that the Public Administration is acting correctly; b) the affected person’s trust that the conduct maintained in dealings with the Public Administration is lawful, where there may be a mistake of law (error de prohibición); c) the affected person’s trust that their expectations as an interested party are reasonable. 2) The Public Administration must produce external indications (acts or facts) that, even without necessarily being legally binding, guide the person subject to the Administration toward particular conduct that the person would not have undertaken but for the appearance of legality created. 3) An act of the Public Administration (e.g., a regulation that recognizes or establishes an individualized legal situation whose stability the person subject to the Administration trusts will continue. 4) The legitimate expectations of the affected person cannot properly arise merely from the negligence, tolerance, or ignorance of the Public Administration, or from the irrational nature of what the person subject to the Administration seeks. 5) The person subject to the Administration must fulfill the applicable duties and obligations. A breach of the principle of legitimate expectations undoubtedly produces several significant legal effects, namely: 1) It operates as a limit on the exercise of discretionary powers. 2) It serves as a safeguard of the principle of equality. 3) It gives rise to the Public Administration’s duty to compensate for the frustration of legitimate expectations and the infringement of subjective rights (derechos subjetivos). The principle of legitimate expectations, together with that of good faith in legal-administrative relations (relaciones jurídico-administrativas), derives from the principle of legal equality—that is, certainty in relations with public authorities, so that persons subject to the Administration know where they stand with those authorities, which must avoid objectively confusing situations and preserve legal situations even when they are not entirely consistent with the legal system. This principle is embodied, among other circumstances, in the theory of the inviolability of an Administration’s own acts declaring rights in favor of persons subject to it, the limitation of burdensome acts (actos de gravamen), and non-retroactivity. It also applies when a public administration issues and carries out a series of acts and actions that, although legally incorrect, generate a series of expectations in the person subject to the Administration, who believes that they hold a legal status consistent with the legal system (...)’ (see judgment N° 2010-010171 at 9:58 hours on 11 de junio de 2010)” (emphasis in the original).
In another judgment, the Chamber ruled on an amparo appeal (recurso de amparo) filed by a sixty-one-year-old person who had begun working at the Ministerio de Hacienda many years earlier and who, because of modifications and new requirements for the cleaning service—through outsourcing—was excluded from continuing to work at the Ministerio de Hacienda, thereby harming his individual and specific circumstances and his opportunity to obtain a pension. It was also taken into account that he is a person with a disability and that, under his most recent employment contract, he was excluded because of the introduction of the educational requirement that he have completed primary school. This Chamber decided the case as follows:
“In light of the foregoing circumstances, it can be seen how the Public Administration caused the affected person to trust that it was acting correctly throughout the entire period he worked, thereby creating expectations for the protected party that were considered reasonable, since from 1996 to 2017 the protected party worked for all the cleaning-service companies awarded contracts by the Ministerio de Hacienda. This became a common practice under which every successful bidder hired him so that he could continue performing that cleaning work, subject to the same requirements for 30 years, as stated. Although the change in the tender specifications (cartel) is based on the minimum requirements for the use of products and the activities inherent to the work, the protected party has demonstrated over nearly thirty years that he is qualified and capable of properly performing the duties of the position.
As to the Administration’s conduct, it can be shown that it provided the protected party with stability and continuity in his employment relationship, since there is no evidence of any rejection or complaint made to the successful bidders. Considering that the petitioner is a person with special needs and is approaching older adulthood, it may be affirmed that the change in the position’s requirements would adversely affect his circumstances because of the stated difficulty in obtaining employment due to his disability and age, particularly now that he needs only a few more contributions to qualify for retirement. By virtue of the foregoing, this Chamber considers that, in the particular case of the protected party, the Administration contributed to establishing a situation of trust and support through the requirements imposed on the contracted companies for the performance of their functions, the stability of which the protected party trusted would continue. Accordingly, this appeal must be granted on the terms set forth in the por tanto of this judgment” (2018-02910 at 9:15 hours on 23 de febrero de 2018).
In another Judgment, N° 2023-014857 at 13:11 hours on 21 de junio de 2023, this Chamber held that certain economic benefits obtained under a Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva) had to be maintained over time, given the failure to act by a public institution, and that it was not until the end of an employment proceeding that an attempt was made to correct the economic situation, despite the existence of res judicata (cosa juzgada). The decision stated:
“It must be reiterated that Judgment N° 2021-001157 at 12:42 hours on 20 de enero de 2021 addressed another similar matter concerning the reasonableness of a provision in a collective bargaining agreement, but, as indicated above, it had been challenged in a timely manner. In the case now before us, however, the failure to act allowed a situation to become settled, and it would now be improper for this Chamber to rule on it, based on the doctrine of ‘estoppel.’ In Judgment N° 1992-00746 at 11:20 hours on trece de marzo de 1992, this Chamber defined it as follows: ‘This position is known in legal scholarship as administrative estoppel, which prevents an interested party from benefiting from its own fraud or errors, or from those of the Administration, and subsequently alleging the nullity of the acts from which it benefited.’ In this respect, based on the foregoing, protection is owed to the party that benefited in procedural good faith and in safeguarding the values of reliability in legal dealings, which in this case would be legal certainty and res judicata.” As is clear from all the foregoing, the Chamber has indeed upheld, through various legal doctrines, the principle of legal certainty (principio de seguridad jurídica), particularly its derivative, the principle of legitimate expectations, as a mechanism for preserving the continuing effects of regulations and administrative acts as an extension of subjective rights that should have been protected despite the repeal of the regulations, where the individual placed trust in the actions of public authorities.
We believe that the individual conduct of Poder Judicial employees has complied with the rules that raised legitimate expectations for them, expectations generated with a degree of reliability and good faith through their pension system, to which they contributed while working loyally for the Poder Judicial. It is therefore recognized that, when regulatory changes occur, “the State must respect the doctrine of one’s own acts, or else—particularly when new measures or a sudden decision are involved—act reasonably; that is, it must give due advance notice of its new course of action and provide sufficient transitional measures so that the persons concerned may adjust their conduct, proportionate to the public interest at stake, without excluding other corrective or compensatory provisions addressing the customary and stable circumstances that have given citizens well-founded expectations that a particular situation would continue.” We therefore believe it is evident that preference must be given to options consistent with the principles protecting the human person in the field of human rights, because of the inherent need to respect human dignity, particularly with respect to those who have been subject for a longer period to a specific legal regime that had remained unchanged for more than twenty or thirty years.
In that area, for reasons of equity, justice, and legal certainty, corrective or compensatory transitional provisions suited to their specific circumstances and proportionate to the strength of their legitimate expectations should have been considered.
D.- Conclusion.
As a corollary to all the foregoing, we consider that the State, in exercising and weighing its decision-making regarding retirement funds, must pursue a twofold aim in order to safeguard: a) the fund’s economic balance, based on demographic factors, population mortality, the country’s economic situation, and other objective elements; and also b) the rights and legitimate interests of its beneficiaries. It is clear that pension schemes must periodically be subjected to the respective actuarial studies, and only in the event of devastating economic collapses in an economy could measures be taken that severely affect all persons who have not formally acquired that right. But when this is not the situation, the State and the funds administering pension schemes must seek solutions that do not condemn workers who are on the verge of having the right declared. We consider that, in this matter, there are no mere expectations of a right, given a long-term relationship (often lasting an entire lifetime) that includes time served and contributions made, under the protections and guarantees of a public-employment system, which in this case corresponds to a Branch of the Republic; consequently, a formula should be established for workers that apportions the rights of those who have legitimate expectations based on their years of service and the contributions made to the corresponding pension and retirement fund.
The actuarial studies conducted by the IICE had contemplated a two-year (twenty-four-month) transitional period as part of the analysis of corrective measures for the pension fund. However, it is clear that this information had no effect on Transitory Provision VI, ultimately approved with a period of eighteen months, because it failed to consider the entirety of the economic information and the rights of those public servants who would be left unprotected and who, consequently, were afforded no protection whatsoever despite having been quantified and possessing rights in the process of vesting. Although it could be argued against our conclusion that persons will always be excluded by any temporal cutoff established by a transitional provision in this area, it is appropriate to cite the majority’s reasoning in Judgment No. 2021-11957 (cited above), where it stated that: “… the constitutional conformity of measures reducing or modifying pension conditions requires that, before their determination and as an indispensable part of their rationale, technical support regarding the effects of the measures must be available,” an interpretation that is correct and constitutes an obligation incumbent upon the Legislative Assembly.
Recognition of the benefit rights analyzed for those who did not yet have vested rights in the actuarial studies—which, it bears noting, are calculated over one hundred years—might only have constituted a factor of actuarial distortion during the period between completion of the studies and approval of the reform, but it would not have derailed the solvency or insolvency calculations performed, when added to the other measures introduced, and any distortion could have been corrected administratively over such a lengthy period.
Accordingly, we consider the establishment of an eighteen-month period unconstitutional by omission because, through that state measure, it was more restrictive and out of step with the actuarial study, which had weighed a twenty-four-month period and had thereby measured the degree and adequacy of its economic impact on future benefits granted, as against the impairment of rights in transition.
We consider that the two-year transitional period that had been established was the means of protecting benefit rights in the process of vesting, and that it was altered by the legislature (as illustrated by the intervention of Deputy Díaz Quintana). The President of the Legislative Assembly emphatically states that the legislature’s discretionary judgment was used. In this regard, he invokes a prerogative that would entail merely bringing parliamentary acts into conformity with the legislature’s freedom to determine policy. Therefore, if only this prerogative was used, and there was no other substantive criterion, when measured against Article 71.3 of Convention No. 102 of the International Labour Organization, it is clear that the resulting provision is illegitimate because it falls short of the previously established technical standard, given that the Chamber has held that the legislature’s freedom to determine policy is limited by compliance with the technical studies required by a specific provision, whether in environmental matters or according to the subject matter involved, as is the case with the international obligation at issue here.
In addition to requiring a reasonable basis, the substantive right must be safeguarded by technical studies that ensure financial balance; in doing so, the benefits in transition also had to be protected to the extent possible. Moreover, it must be recognized that there is a special relationship of subordination and a genuine long-term legal relationship involving a basic pension plan for judicial officials, with economic implications such as those affecting workers whose situations might be eligible for protection, who remained in their positions while envisioning life plans and projects, with particular health conditions; and it is logical to think that their considerations would have included better social-security conditions and the right to retirement, all within a context extending from day one of their employment with the Judiciary.
For all these reasons, one may observe the irregular conduct alleged by the petitioners, as a result of which the means used and the objectives pursued were not properly crystallized, particularly in a case involving the diminution of rights.
At this point, the minority position should not remain an abstract decision, because it would plainly acknowledge that an international obligation contained in Article 71.3 of Convention No. 102 of the International Labour Organization, as well as workers’ economic, social, and cultural rights, has indeed been infringed. We therefore conclude by issuing a judgment granting the claim on the ground of the provision’s unconstitutional and convention-incompatible omission, due to the partially insufficient coverage of the provision approved by the Legislative Assembly insofar as it established eighteen months as the transitional period; and due to that insufficient coverage notwithstanding the actuarial study, which made it possible to establish clearly a longer period that could be technically supported, one that would reflect the need to maintain the fund’s reasonable financial balance while granting the fundamental rights of workers awaiting vesting and respecting the legitimate expectations of judicial public servants. In conclusion, the transitional provision is deficient—unconstitutionally so—because it departed from the actuarial background establishing a twenty-four-month transitional period, the actuarial basis for which had been duly established.
Consequently, in light of all the foregoing and pursuant to Articles 89 and 91 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, we tailor this declaration in order to calibrate and define its retroactive effects, establishing that judicial officials retain their retirement and/or pension rights under the text in force before the reform enacted by Law No. 9544 of April 24, 2018, within the twenty-four months following its promulgation. - Luis Fdo. Salazar Alvarado Ana María Picado Brenes [[]1] IACHR. Report No. 38/09, Case No. 12.670. Admissibility and Merits, National Association of Former Employees of the Peruvian Social Security Institute and Others v. Peru, March 27, 2009.
[1] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-743320 [2] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-1033446 [3] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-1100699 [[][1] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-83512 [[][2] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-855812 [[][3] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-1070372 [[][4] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-146437 [[][5] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-551124 [[][6] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-743319 [[][7] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-1170949 [[][8] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-1116679 [[][9] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-469338 [[][10] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-551124 [[][11] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-577456 [[][12] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-750387 [[][13] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-858306 [[][14] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-81978 [[][15] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-743320 [[][16] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-1070372 [[][17] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-1100699 [[][18] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-1100702 [[][19] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-994090 [[]20] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-80098 https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-121546 [4] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-141162 [[]22]Action of unconstitutionality against the Law Establishing a Special Contribution by Pension Schemes. https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-1027847 [[][23] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-80098 [[][24] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-82623 [[][25] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-193759 [[][26] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-81978 [[][27] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-994090 [[][28] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-256862.
[[][29] Resolución n°2010-10171. https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-481193 [[][30] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-184045 [[][31] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-133687 [[][32] https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-138896
A Res: 2023032259 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las quince horas del trece de diciembre de dos mil veintitrés.- Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por JAVIER CARVAJAL MOLINA, mayor, abogado, cédula de identidad número 106960859, actuando en sustitución de KAROL MONGE MOLINA, como apoderado especial judicial de ADALGISA DEL CARMEN GUILLÉN FLORES Y OTROS, para que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del TRANSITORIO VI DE LA LEY DE REFORMA DEL RÉGIMEN DE JUBILACIONES Y PENSIONES DEL PODER JUDICIAL, NO. 9544, por estimarlo contrario a los artículos 11, 18, 27, 28, 34, 40, 41, 45, 51, 65, 73, 74, 121, 152, 154, 156, 177, 188, 189 y 190 de la Constitución Política, Convenios 102, 118, 128 y 157 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, así como a los principios democráticos, solidaridad, seguridad jurídica, buena fe, confianza legítima, transparencia, intangibilidad relativa del patrimonio, no confiscatoriedad, respeto a los derechos adquiridos y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas. Intervienen el Procurador General de la República, el Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa y el Presidente de la Corte Suprema de Justicia.
Resultando:
“Admisibilidad:
Por unanimidad, se rechazan de plano:
a)los agravios de vicios de procedimientos referidos a la violación de la autonomía de los bancos del Estado y de la autonomía de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social por falta de legitimación.
b)el análisis del agravio sobre la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad por conexidad de la ley 9796 del 5 de diciembre de 2019, por ser motivo de análisis en la acción de inconstitucionalidad 20-007715-0007-CO.
En cuanto a la acción de inconstitucionalidad 19-1720-0007-CO, se rechazan de plano por falta de legitimación, de conformidad con el artículo 75 párrafo 1) de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, los reclamos que buscan tutelar a la generalidad de servidores, funcionarios, pensionados y jubilados, en aquellos temas en los que la accionante no puede derivar una tutela o amparo de su derecho por no ser medio razonable para amparar su derecho.
Vicios de procedimiento legislativo:
Por mayoría (Castillo Víquez, Rueda Leal, Hernández López, Araya García y Garro Vargas) se declaran sin lugar las acciones acumuladas en cuanto a los alegados vicios de procedimiento. El magistrado Castillo Víquez da razones adicionales en cuanto a la violación del principio de publicidad. Las magistradas Hernández López y Garro Vargas ponen notas separadas. En cuanto al tema de los vicios alegados de la sesión de la Comisión Especial del 27 de julio de 2017, la magistrada Garro Vargas da razones diferentes.
Los magistrados Salazar Alvarado y Hernández Gutiérrez salvan el voto y declaran que la ley impugnada presenta el vicio esencial de procedimiento consistente en la falta de consulta al Poder Judicial del texto aprobado por el Parlamento por mayoría absoluta y no calificada, que lo afecta en su totalidad (artículo 167, de la Constitución Política), por afectar su organización, estructura, funcionamiento e independencia, razón por la cual estiman innecesario entrar a analizar otros vicios de procedimiento y de fondo planteados por los accionantes; excepto aquellos en los que se requiera tomar posición para que exista voto de toda conformidad (artículo 60.2, Código Procesal Civil).
En cuanto a los agravios de fondo:
Se declaran parcialmente con lugar las acciones de inconstitucionalidad acumuladas y en consecuencia se dispone:
Primero: Por mayoría (Castillo Víquez, Salazar Alvarado, Araya García, Garro Vargas y Hernández Gutiérrez) se anula el porcentaje de cotizaciones y la contribución especial solidaria y redistributiva en cuanto excedan el 50% del monto bruto de la pensión que corresponde a la persona jubilada o pensionada. Sin embargo, de conformidad con el artículo 91 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, para evitar graves dislocaciones de la seguridad, la justicia, o la paz social, la Sala gradúa y dimensiona los efectos de esta resolución, de modo que, a partir del mes siguiente de la notificación de la sentencia, las autoridades competentes deberán realizar el ajuste correspondiente conforme a esta sentencia, de manera tal que las cargas tributarias que pesan sobre el monto de las jubilaciones y pensiones no exceda el 50% del monto bruto que recibe el jubilado o pensionado. El magistrado Castillo Víquez da razones diferentes.
La magistrada Garro Vargas, por sus propias razones, declara con lugar este extremo de la acción de inconstitucionalidad, ordenando anular parcialmente lo dispuesto en los artículos 236 y 236 bis de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial; asimismo, advierte que la inconstitucionalidad que declara afecta los excesos de la contribución especial solidaria respecto de ese 5% y no el resto de las deducciones que se apliquen por ley a todos los pensionados y jubilados del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial. El magistrado Hernández Gutiérrez da razones adicionales. El magistrado Rueda Leal y la magistrada Hernández López salvan el voto y declaran sin lugar este extremo, tal y como lo hicieron en la sentencia n.? 2020-19274 de las 16:30 horas de 7 de octubre de 2020, por cuanto, según el texto expreso del artículo 67 del de la OIT C102 de 1952 Convenio sobre la Seguridad Social (norma mínima), la pensión o jubilación puede reducirse siempre y cuando se respete el 40% de un salario de referencia, lo que no consta que se vea transgredido automática y evidentemente con el contenido de las normas impugnadas.
Segundo: Por mayoría (Castillo Víquez, Rueda Leal, Hernández López, Araya García y Garro Vargas) se declara inconstitucional y en consecuencia se anula el párrafo contenido en el artículo 239 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial reformado por la Ley número 9544 impugnada, que dice: "Con base en el resultado de los estudios actuariales, y con autorización de la Superintendencia de Pensiones, la Junta Administrativa podrá modificar los parámetros iniciales establecidos en esta ley respecto de los requisitos de elegibilidad, el perfil de beneficios, así como los aportes y las cotizaciones de los servidores judiciales y de las jubilaciones y las pensiones previstos en la ley, siempre que esto sea necesario para garantizar el equilibrio actuarial del Régimen".
Tercero. Por mayoría (Castillo Víquez, Rueda Leal, Hernández López, Araya García y Garro Vargas), se interpreta la frase "(...) la presente reforma no les será aplicada en su perjuicio", contenida en el Transitorio II de la Ley 9544 de 24 de abril de 2018, en el sentido de que se refiere exclusivamente a las personas que han consolidado el derecho a la jubilación o el derecho a la pensión.
Cuarto: Por mayoría (Castillo Víquez, Rueda Leal, Hernández López, Araya García y Garro Vargas), se declara inconstitucional el requisito de los 20 años de servicio exigido para efectos de obtener la pensión por sobrevivencia que se deriva del artículo 229 de la Ley 9544 de 24 de abril de 2018, en cuyo caso se mantiene vigente el requisito de 10 años para adquirir ese derecho, según el artículo 230 de la Ley 7333 de 5 de mayo de 1993 en la versión anterior a la reforma.
Se declaran sin lugar las acciones de inconstitucionalidad acumuladas, y en consecuencia se dispone:
Primero: Por mayoría (Castillo Víquez, Salazar Alvarado, Araya García, Garro Vargas y Hernández Gutiérrez) en cuanto a los alegatos relativos a la omisión de tomar en cuenta la diferenciación de género en la edad de jubilación entre mujeres y hombres, se declara sin lugar las acciones. Los magistrados Salazar Alvarado y Hernández Gutiérrez declaran sin lugar este extremo de la acción, únicamente por razones de forma ante la ausencia de estudios técnicos. La magistrada Garro Vargas da razones diferentes. El magistrado Rueda Leal y la magistrada Hernández López salvan el voto y declaran parcialmente con lugar las acciones acumuladas por la existencia de una omisión inconstitucional en la Ley 9544, al no contemplar criterios de género para fijar una edad diferenciada a fin de que las mujeres que cotizan al Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial se puedan jubilar o pensionar con un tiempo menor de servicio.
La magistrada Hernández López también salva el voto y declara con lugar parcialmente las acciones acumuladas por cuanto:
a)considera que es contrario al Derecho de la Constitución excluir de los beneficios que otorgaba la Ley 7333 a las personas que, al momento de promulgarse la Ley 9544 aquí impugnada, contaban con 25 años o más de cotizar para el Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial.
b)por la existencia de una inconstitucionalidad por omisión en la Ley 9544 impugnada, debido a que el legislador no le da el mismo trato frente a la ley, a los trabajadores del Poder Judicial en cuanto a la posibilidad de tener incentivos para postergar su derecho a la jubilación, según las características de su propio régimen.
Segundo: Por mayoría (Castillo Víquez, Rueda Leal, Hernández López, Araya García y Garro Vargas), se declaran sin lugar las acciones acumuladas en todos los demás extremos reclamados.
Los magistrados Castillo Víquez y Rueda Leal y las magistradas Hernández López y Garro Vargas consignan notas separadas.
La declaratoria de las inconstitucionalidades, con excepción de lo indicado en el punto primero de los agravios de fondo de esta parte dispositiva -que rige partir del mes siguiente de la notificación de la sentencia- tienen efectos declarativos y retroactivos a la fecha de vigencia de la ley, todo sin perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos de buena fe y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas. Comuníquese a los Poderes Legislativo y Judicial y a la Junta Administradora del Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial. Reséñese este pronunciamiento en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta y publíquese íntegramente en el Boletín Judicial. Notifíquese.
ERIC GIOVANNI JACAMO JIMENEZ, FANNY MARCELA SOTO DELGADO, FRANCISCO ALEJANDRO CURLING MARTINEZ, FRANZ ADOLFO PANIAGUA MEJIA, FREDDY GUILLERMO RAM BLANCO MORA, GABRIELA EUGENIA NAVARRO MATA, GABRIELA MARIA FERNANDEZ MONGE, GERALD YENKIS CAMPOS OBANDO, GERARDINA ELENA GUERRERO GONZALEZ, GERARDO ALBERTO MONTERO JIMENEZ, GIOVANNI HENRY CHACON VALVERDE, GISSELLE PATRICIA BONILLA CORDERO, HAYDIS MARIA CUBERO RAMIREZ, HECTOR OSVALDO ELIZONDO MARIN, HENNER REIVIN SALAZAR NAVARRO, HUGO JAVIER VARGAS QUIROS, JORGE ALBERTO BARQUERO UMAÑA, JORGE ARTURO TABASH FORBES, JOSE AIDER GUTIERREZ GOMEZ, JOSE ORLANDO FERNANDEZ CORDOBA, KATTIA YANORY MUÑOZ ZAMORA, LILLIANA PATRICIA AZOFEIFA AZOFEIFA, LUIS ALBERTO CAMPOS MOLINA, LUZ MARINA JIMENEZ VARELA, MAINOR ALBERTO MORALES MORERA, MARIA CECILIA CORDERO MARTINEZ, MARIA DE LOS ANGELES MIRANDA MATARRITA, MARIA DEL ROSARIO DOMINGUEZ ESTRADA, MARIA JOSE CASTRO RODRIGUEZ, MARIANELA PERALTA ELIZONDO, MARIANELLA BARQUERO UMAÑA, MARLENE DIAZ NAVAS, MARTIN JAVIER PEREZ RODRIGUEZ, MARVIN SOLORZANO SOLIS, MILANIA MOLINA VILLALOBOS, MONICA DEL SOCORRO MONGE OBANDO, PAOLA ANDREA DELGADO ROBLES, PEDRO JOSE FALLAS HIDALGO, RAYMOND LEONARDO TOSSO TORRES, ROCIO DEL CARMEN MOREIRA SANCHEZ, RODRIGO ESTEBAN VARGAS SALAZAR, ROGER REYES ESPINOZA, RONALD CASTILLO BARRIA, ROSAURA GARCIA AGUILAR, RUBEN ROBERTO DE JESUS MORALES BRENES, RUTH VILLALOBOS CHINCHILLA, SANDRA DE LOS ANGELES CAMPOS OBANDO, SILVIA LORENA DE LA TRINIDAD SEVILLA GUENDEL, SUSANA MARIA PORRAS CASCANTE, VANESSA EUGENIA CID GOMEZ, VERONICA MARINA CALDERON MORALES, VICTOR MANUEL ORTEGA JIMENEZ,VINICIO ALBERTO CHAVARRIA QUIROS, WILKER CARLOS SALAZAR ELIZONDO, YADELI MARIA JAEN CASTELLON, YAMILETH RAMIREZ RODRIGUEZ, JENNY GEORGINA FALLAS UREÑA, CARLOS EDUARDO DURAN MENA, DINO DE JESUS LEZCANO GOMEZ, GUILLERMO ANTONIO MEJIAS VILLALOBOS, HELLEN DE LOS ANGELES CARVAJAL CHAVES, MONICA MARCELA MORA VILCHEZ, CARLOS EUGENIO JESUS LEWIS MONTERO, deberán: justificar y fundamentar el interés legítimo que indican tener en este asunto, toda vez que, omitieron toda indicación al respecto.
Asimismo, se le previene a Karla Patricia Jiménez Mora, como abogada autenticante y responsable de aportar el timbre correspondiente a su autenticación, aclarar e identificar en forma clara, ordenada y expresa, a quienes corresponden los 10 enteros de timbres del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica, con las numeraciones 465330126, 465330134, 465330142, 465330150, 465330169, 465330177, 465330185, 465330193, 465330207, 465330215, los cuales fueron aportados en forma repetida para dos o más escritos de coadyuvancia y agregar y cancelar el timbre del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica por la suma de doscientos setenta y cinco colones, correspondiente a la autenticación de los demás escritos de coadyuvancia. Se advierte que conforme a la citada ley, deberá cancelarse un timbre por cada firma autenticada. Además de lo anterior, en el caso de CARLOS EDUARDO DURAN MENA, GUILLERMO ANTONIO MEJIAS VILLALOBOS, HELLEN DE LOS ANGELES CARVAJAL CHAVES, MONICA MARCELA MORA VILCHEZ, deberán aportar escrito debidamente firmado y autenticado, por haber omitido hacerlo o bien, porque la firma digital no se pudo comprobar; y a DINO DE JESUS LEZCANO GOMEZ y CARLOS EUGENIO JESUS LEWIS MONTERO, deberán aportar escrito completo, debidamente firmado y autenticado con el respectivo timbre del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica, dado que el escrito aportado a los autos se encuentra incompleto e ilegible.
La gestionante: ADRIANA DE LA TRINIDAD OROCU CHAVARRIA, deberá acreditar su condición de representante legal de la Asociación Costarricense de la Judicatura(ACOJUD), el tipo de poder que ostenta y el plazo por el cual se encuentra vigente, para lo cual deberá aportar la certificación de personería jurídica vigente de esa asociación. Asimismo, deberá agregar y cancelar el timbre del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica por la suma de doscientos setenta y cinco colones, correspondiente a la autenticación del escrito de coadyuvancia, de conformidad con el artículo 4 de la Ley No. 3245 de 3 de diciembre de 1963. Los gestionantes: ADRIANA ISABEL CASTRO RIVERA, GERALD ADOLFO HUERTAS ORTEGA, GERARDO ALONSO SALAS MONTERO, JACQUELINE CHAVES MEJIAS 23-8-2022, JOSE ANGEL JIMENEZ TORRENTES, KARLA ALEXANDRA MADRIZ MARTINEZ, MARIA DE LA CRUZ ARROYO BRAVO, ROBERTO ANTONIO CERDAS QUIROS y JOSE RAMON DE LA TRINIDAD HIDALGO HIDALGO; deberán, justificar y fundamentar el interés legítimo que indican tener en este asunto, toda vez que, omitieron toda indicación al respecto.
Asimismo, deberá agregar y cancelar el timbre del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica por la suma de doscientos setenta y cinco colones, correspondiente a la autenticación del escrito de coadyuvancia, por cada firma autenticada, de conformidad con el artículo 4 de la Ley No. 3245 de 3 de diciembre de 1963. La gestionante NIXIA ZAIDA MORA VARGAS, deberá acreditar su condición de representante legal de la Asociación de Jubilados y Pensionados del Poder Judicial (ASOJUPEN) y de la Asociación Nacional de Empleados Judiciales (ANEJUD), el tipo de poder que ostenta y el plazo por el cual se encuentra vigente, para lo cual deberá aportar las respectivas certificaciones de personería jurídica vigente de esas asociaciones. Asimismo, deberá justificar y fundamentar el interés legítimo que tiene la ASOJUPEN en este caso. Finalmente, deberá agregar y cancelar el timbre del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica por la suma de doscientos setenta y cinco colones, correspondiente a la autenticación del escrito de coadyuvancia.
La gestionante: REBECA PATRICIA HIDALGO DUARTE, deberá acreditar su condición de representante legal de la Asociación Nacional de Empleados Judiciales (ANEJUD), el tipo de poder que ostenta y el plazo por el cual se encuentra vigente, para lo cual deberá aportar las respectivas certificaciones de personería jurídica vigente de esas asociaciones, o bien, aclare si acude en forma personal para lo cual deberá justificar cuál es el interés legítimo que le asiste. La gestionante: KAROL MONGE MOLINA, en calidad de apoderada especial judicial de ALLEN LUBANSKI MORA GAMBOA, CARLOTA EDUVIGES ARAUZ GARCIA, CATALINA ROCIO CONEJO VALVERDE, ETHEL ROSARIO CHINCHILLA SANCHEZ, GREDY JAVIER DE LA TRINIDAD HERRERA MORALES, INGRID ETHEL BUITRAGO SANCHEZ, JUAN CARLOS RIVERA RODRIGUEZ, LUIS FERNANDO CHAVES HERNANDEZ, LUIS GUILLERMO FALLAS GONZALEZ, LUIS RAMON DE LA TRINIDAD GAMBOA ROJAS, OSVALDO RODRIGUEZ FLORES, ROLANDO ARTURO OBANDO VARGAS, TONY ALEJANDRO ACUÑA PANIAGUA, YAMILETTE COTO GRANADOS, PAULO FERNANDO HERNANDEZ MURILLO y ALVARO GUERRERO MORA, deberá agregar y cancelar el timbre del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica por la suma de doscientos setenta y cinco colones, correspondiente a la autenticación del escrito de coadyuvancia, de conformidad con el artículo 4 de la Ley No. 3245 de 3 de diciembre de 1963.
Asimismo, debe aportar los timbres de ley para cada uno de los poderes que aportó, sea, timbre fiscal por ciento veinticinco colones, timbre del archivo nacional por veinte colones y el timbre del Colegio de Abogados por la suma de doscientos setenta y cinco colones. En el caso de los poderdantes CARLOTA EDUVIGES ARAUZ GARCIA, YAMILETTE COTO GRANADOS y JUAN CARLOS RIVERA RODRIGUEZ, el poder no se encuentra debidamente firmado, dado que las firmas no se lograron comprobar; el poder INGRID ETHEL BUITRAGO SANCHEZ se encuentra firmado digitalmente, solo por Karol Monge, por lo que falta la firma del mandatario y del abogado auténticamente, por lo que deberá aportar los poderes debidamente firmados y con los respectivos timbres. Finalmente, deberá acreditar su condición de representante legal de PAULO FERNANDO HERNANDEZ MURILLO y ALVARO GUERRERO MORA, para este proceso, el tipo de poder que ostenta y el plazo por el cual se encuentra vigente, para lo cual deberá aportar los respectivos poderes y certificaciones que así lo acrediten, debidamente firmados y con los timbres de ley.
El gestionante: RICHARD WILLIAM HOCKE GONZALEZ, deberá justificar y fundamentar el interés legítimo que indican tener en este asunto, toda vez que, omitió toda indicación al respecto. Asimismo, deberá remitir escrito debidamente firmado y cumplir con el requisito de autenticación del escrito de coadyuvancia, por parte de un Abogado o Abogada, incluyendo agregar y cancelar el timbre del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica por la suma de doscientos setenta y cinco colones, correspondiente a la autenticación del escrito en el que solicitan coadyuvancia activa. Los gestionantes: TATIANA RODRIGUEZ RODRÍGUEZ, ANGELA PATRICIA GUZMAN BALLESTERO, LUIS GUILLERMO DE JESUS OBANDO ARAYA, MARIA GABRIELA BUSTAMANTE SEGURA, MARIBEL DE LOS ANGELES BURGOS MATA, MARIO ALBERTO ALVARADO AVILA, deberán justificar y fundamentar el interés legítimo que indican tener en este asunto, toda vez que, omitieron toda indicación al respecto.
Los gestionantes: ERICK JOSE ZAMORA CHAVES, LAURA PATRICIA MEZA PEÑA, LIZZETH GERARDINA CRUZ TORRES, MARIA MILENA VEGA CERVANTES, THELMO MAURICIO DE JESUS FLORES LEON, deberán justificar y fundamentar el interés legítimo que indican tener en este asunto, toda vez que, omitieron toda indicación al respecto. Asimismo, deberán cumplir con el requisito de autenticación del escrito de coadyuvancia, por parte de un Abogado o Abogada, incluyendo agregar y cancelar el timbre del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica por la suma de doscientos setenta y cinco colones, correspondiente a la autenticación del escrito en el que solicitan coadyuvancia activa. El gestionante: JIMMY ALEXANDER ROBLES HERNANDEZ, deberá justificar y fundamentar el interés legítimo que indica tener en este asunto, toda vez que, omitió toda indicación al respecto. Asimismo, deberá remitir escrito debidamente firmado, por cuanto no se pudo verificar la firma digital en virtud de un error, así como, agregar y cancelar el timbre del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica por la suma de doscientos setenta y cinco colones, correspondiente a la autenticación del escrito en el que solicitan coadyuvancia activa.
El gestionante: MARVIN ROBERTO LEON SALAZAR, deberá justificar y fundamentar el interés legítimo que indican tener en este asunto, toda vez que, omitieron toda indicación al respecto. Asimismo, deberá remitir escrito debidamente firmado y cumplir con el requisito de autenticación del escrito de coadyuvancia, por parte de un Abogado o Abogada, incluyendo agregar y cancelar el timbre del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica por la suma de doscientos setenta y cinco colones, correspondiente a la autenticación del escrito en el que solicitan coadyuvancia activa.
Actualmente la solvencia es inferior a uno, por lo tanto, cualquier mejora de los beneficios provocaría que la solvencia disminuya más. Con respecto al cuadro e información anterior, conviene aclarar que las cifras están expresadas en miles de millones de colones, en razón de lo cual debe leerse para el último escenario de 10 años plazo y 2,759 personas, trescientos veinticuatro mil once millones de colones, equivalente aproximadamente a seiscientos tres millones de dólares de incremento en el déficit en comparación con el escenario abierto con una tasa de crecimiento del 1% que se utilizó como base bajo dicha metodología de valoración actuarial. Debe quedar claro que, cualquier incremento de tiempo en el transitorio VI, provocaría un incremento en los egresos y / u obligaciones a los que este régimen se ve sometido, por lo cual todos los escenarios arrojan una desmejora en los indicadores correspondientes; la pretensión de esta acción objeto de análisis constitucional, provocaría un incremento en el déficit del Régimen del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial –FJPPJ, incrementos relativos entre el 13.31 % y el 87.65 % de dicho déficit.
De igual forma al valorar el indicador de la razón de solvencia, este indicador desmejora relativamente entre un 1.57 % y un 9.40 %, ambos indicadores coinciden en su tendencia hacia el desmejoramiento de la salud financiera del régimen, en caso de acogerse cualquier ampliación. No obstante, a lo anterior se debe valorar por la estimable Sala Constitucional, si dichas desmejoras en estos indicadores son o no significativas en comparación con los derechos que persiguen los recurrentes. Así las cosas, la totalidad de los escenarios analizados por dicho profesional, arrojan incrementos significativos en el déficit del régimen, provocando un deterioro en sus condiciones de salud financiera y estabilidad actuarial en el largo plazo, por lo cual no se considera posible incrementar el plazo del transitorio VI sin que exista afectación al régimen. A criterio de quien suscribe, respetuosamente se sugiere analizar más allá de la solvencia actuarial del régimen, hacerlo no únicamente desde el punto de vista de la afectación que implicaría asumir las jubilaciones con las condiciones anteriores a la reforma, sino que se estima necesario tomar en consideración otros elementos tales como lo dicho por la Organización Internacional del Trabajo en el convenio sobre la seguridad social (norma mínima), 1952 (núm. 102), artículo 29 inciso 1, así como los derechos adquiridos por las personas servidoras judiciales, paz social, expectativas y planes de vida de las personas funcionarias judiciales, así como condiciones de trabajo al momento de contratación, el desgaste físico y mental que han experimentado las personas funcionarias, entre otros factores.
Según el informe actuarial aportado, la normativa aplicable al régimen del FJPPJ, así como el principio pro-fondo que establece la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial en su artículo 226, se estima que cualquier ampliación al Transitorio VI supondría un peligro latente para la sostenibilidad del régimen del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, desde su óptica financiera y actuarial, no obstante de igual forma se considera que en el análisis de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, se deben valorar otros elementos no financieros para su resolución, como los principios de derecho adquirido, razonabilidad en el ajuste, planes de vida, entre otros.
Redacta el Magistrado Castillo Víquez; y,
Considerando:
Durante la tramitación del expediente, surgieron diferentes causales de inhibitoria que fueron planteadas tanto por los magistrados y magistradas propietarios como por los magistrados y magistradas suplentes, por ser en su mayoría, funcionarios o jubilados del Poder Judicial. Todas esas gestiones fueron debidamente tramitadas y resueltas por la Presidencia de la Sala Constitucional, según lo indica la ley. Ahora bien, según se ha venido resolviendo, la situación de que en los procesos tramitados ante esta Sala, relacionados con el régimen de pensiones y jubilaciones del Poder Judicial, tanto los magistrados titulares como los magistrados suplentes, por diversos motivos, no podrían conocer de dichos asuntos, lo cual daría como resultado la imposibilidad de integrar una Sala con siete magistrados para su resolución. No obstante, esta Sala está obligada constitucionalmente a resolver los asuntos sometidos a su conocimiento, sin que circunstancias como las que ahora se presentan -falta de los Magistrados Titulares y suplentes necesarios para integrar Sala- enerve esa obligación o releve a este Tribunal de su cumplimiento.
Por ello, según lo dispuesto en el artículo 14 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y el numeral 29, inciso 2), de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial -“Cuando la causal cubra a propietarios y suplentes, el caso deberá ser conocido por los propietarios, no obstante la causal y sin responsabilidad disciplinaria respecto de ellos”-, corresponde a los magistrados propietarios el conocimiento de esos asuntos por imperativo de ley, sin que les alcance responsabilidad disciplinaria por esto. Lo anterior constituye, entonces, una causal de justificación normativa que libera de toda responsabilidad, incluida la penal, a los magistrados que conozcan de un asunto en el cual los magistrados suplentes, necesarios para integrar el Tribunal, tengan alguna causal de inhibitoria o impedimento para conocer del mismo asunto. Así se tienen por habilitados a los Magistrados propietarios Castillo Víquez, Cruz Castro, Salazar Alvarado y Araya García.
En el caso de la magistrada Garro Vargas se admitió su inhibitoria, por otras razones, nombrándose por sorteo al magistrado Alejandro Delgado Faith. En el caso del magistrado Rueda Leal se admitió su inhibitoria, por las razones expuestas, nombrándose por sorteo a la magistrada Aracelly Pacheco Salazar. En el caso de la recién nombrada magistrada Hess Herrera se admitió su inhibitoria, por las razones expuestas, nombrándose por sorteo a la magistrada Ana María Picado Brenes.
Los accionantes impugnan el Transitorio VI de la Ley n°9544, que es “Reforma del Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, contenido en la Ley n° 7333, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, de 05 de mayo de 1993 y sus reformas”, el cual dispone lo siguiente:
“Transitorio VI.- Los servidores judiciales que cumplan con los requisitos para adquirir el derecho a la pensión según lo establecía el texto del título IX de la Ley N.º 7333, de 5 de mayo de 1993, dentro de los dieciocho meses posteriores a la promulgación de la presente ley, podrán pensionarse al amparo de las disposiciones establecidas en el mencionado texto”.
Alegan los accionantes que dicha norma contiene varios vicios inconstitucionales, tanto de procedimiento como de fondo. Al respecto, dado que mediante resolución número 2022-008712 de las 09:10 horas del 20 de abril del 2022 esta Sala procedió a rechazar por el fondo varios de dichos alegatos, se indica en el siguiente considerando sobre cuáles alegatos corresponde que ahora se pronuncie esta Jurisdicción Constitucional.
III.Sobre el rechazo por el fondo de varios alegatos de inconstitucionalidad realizados mediante resolución 2022-008712, y sobre los alegatos que corresponde examinar en esta acción.-
Esta Sala, dentro de este mismo expediente, dictó la resolución número 2022-008712 de las 09:10 horas del 20 de abril del 2022, donde procedió al rechazo por el fondo de varios alegatos. Lo anterior por cuanto ya se había pronunciado sobre ellos en resolución número 2021-011957 de las 17:00 horas del 25 de mayo del 2021. A efectos de acotar los alegatos sobre los cuales esta Sala admitió esta acción, se indica a continuación lo ya resuelto.
A. RECHAZO POR EL FONDO DE LOS ALEGATOS Esta Sala, por resolución número 2022-008712 de las 09:10 horas del 20 de abril del 2022, le da curso a la presente acción, y al mismo tiempo, pero rechaza por el fondo cuando se indica lo siguiente: “Se rechaza por el fondo la acción en relación con la violación a los artículos 9, 33 y 167, principios de publicidad, igualdad, proporcionalidad y razonabilidad y progresividad, así como el artículo 208 bis del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa y el artículo 26 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos.” Así entonces, de todos los alegatos que se observan en el escrito de interposición, ya se resolvieron los siguientes:
Violación al art.167 Constitucional y al artículo 208 bis de la Asamblea Legislativa, por falta de consulta del texto modificado al Poder Judicial y por falta de publicación.
Violación al artículo 167 Constitucional y al artículo 208 bis de la Asamblea Legislativa, por aprobarse sin mayoría calificada.
Violación al principio de independencia judicial, arts. 9, 154, 167 y 177 Constitucional, por la creación de la Junta Administradora del Fondo.
Violación al artículo 26 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos y el principio de progresividad.
Violación al derecho a una pensión digna, proporcional y razonable.
Violación al principio de igualdad.
Se puede observar que el fundamento del rechazo obedeció a que, dichos alegatos fueron resueltos ya en acción de inconstitucionalidad anterior, que resolvió sobre la impugnación de toda la ley n°9544 en general, mediante sentencia n°2021-11957. El rechazo por el fondo obedeció entonces a las siguientes consideraciones ya expresadas por esta Sala en este último voto.
En criterio de los accionantes, el texto finalmente aprobado en primer debate sufrió modificaciones, y pese a ello, no fue consultado nuevamente al Poder Judicial, ni tampoco se publicó. Consideran que todo ello viola el artículo 167 Constitucional y del principio de publicidad (ver lo indicado en el voto n°2018-5758 y n°2005-398, n°2012-4621, n°2017-19636). Indican que el tema del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial es parte de la organización y funcionamiento institucional, por ello, debía ser obligatoriamente consultado. En cuanto a la publicación, ese mismo vicio fue indicado en la sentencia n°2018-5758 que resolvió la consulta legislativa facultativa cuando se indica que constituyó un vicio esencial del procedimiento legislativo por omitirse la publicación del texto sustitutivo. Siendo que no puede utilizarse la figura del saneamiento o convalidación (por el hecho de publicar el texto luego de aprobado en primer debate) por tratarse de un procedimiento abreviado, así lo indicó esta Sala en sentencia n°2012-4621 (“cuando la Asamblea Legislativa … crea un procedimiento especial, la aplicación y observancia de éste debe ser absolutamente rigurosa y estricta.”).
Agregan que, el texto no publicado y aprobado varió aspectos esenciales como la edad de retiro, los años de servicio, el aporte obrero, el espacio transitorio, entre otros; de ahí la necesidad imperiosa de cumplir con el requerimiento de la publicidad.
Al respecto, esta Sala indicó en resolución n°2022-008712 (haciendo referencia a lo resuelto en resolución n°2021-011957) en resumen lo siguiente:
Sobre la utilización del artículo 208 bis (ahora 234 bis) del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa:
Se indicó que, con fundamento en el artículo 208 bis (ahora 234 bis) del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa los diputados aprobaron un trámite especial para el proyecto del expediente legislativo n°19.992. Trámite especial que requiere de la aprobación de una moción de orden, aprobada por dos tercios de los votos de la totalidad de miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa, únicamente para proyectos de ley cuya aprobación requiera mayoría absoluta, siempre que se respete el principio democrático. La moción de orden indicada, para este proyecto de ley, fue aprobada en sesión ordinaria n°37 del Plenario de la Asamblea Legislativa del 30 de junio del 2016, aprobada por 39 diputados a favor y 10 en contra. Luego del examen que hiciera la Sala en la resolución n°2018-005758 que conoció del proyecto de ley cuando fue conocido por esta Sala por la vía de una consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad, se indicó: “que la Sala considera que no existe ningún motivo o argumento nuevo en relación con esos puntos en concreto, que implicara una modificación del criterio ya externado y, por tanto, en consecuencia, en cuanto a esos extremos puntuales, el procedimiento previsto en el artículo 208 bis del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa (ahora 234 bis), se ajusta al Derecho de la Constitución.”.
Por lo demás, como el alegato de violación a esta norma del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa está relacionado con la publicación, pues la moción aprobada así lo indicaba (“…h) Si durante el conocimiento del expediente en su trámite en comisión fuese aprobada una moción de texto sustitutivo o cuando o cuando la comisión acuerde cambios que modifiquen en forma sustancial el proyecto de ley, la Presidencia de la Comisión solicitará al Directorio Legislativo acordar su publicación en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta con el fin de salvaguardar el Principio Constitucional de Publicidad y se suspenderá el conocimiento del proyecto…”), se remite a lo indicado en el punto siguiente sobre la publicación.
Sobre la falta de publicación del texto aprobado en Comisión Especial el día 13 de septiembre del 2016:
Se indicó que, pese a que esta Sala constató que ciertamente el nuevo texto aprobado por la Comisión Especial el 13 de septiembre de 2016 no fue publicado, cuando dijo: “Tal Comisión Especial, se instala el 13 de septiembre siguiente, siendo que, en esa misma fecha, en su sesión ordinaria Nº 1, se conoció la moción Nº 2 (3-01 CE) de varios diputados para formalizar lo que ya se había decidido el 30 de junio anterior, es decir, que se tomara como base de discusión el texto sustitutivo que constaba en el expediente Nº 19.651 conforme se había dispuesto en el Plenario cuando se aprobó darle trámite al expediente por la vía del 208 bis del reglamento; moción que se aprobó por unanimidad de los miembros de la Comisión Especial (véase folio 1957 del expediente legislativo No. 19.922). Según se desprende del expediente legislativo, y conforme se manifiesta por algunos accionantes, ciertamente este nuevo texto aprobado por la Comisión Especial el 13 de septiembre de 2016, no fue publicado y así lo consignó esta Sala en la opinión consultiva número 2018-005758 de las 15 horas 40 minutos del 12 de abril de 2018 al conocer Consulta Legislativa Facultativa que se interpuso en relación con este proyecto de ley.” Pese a ello, la Sala consideró que la publicidad no es un fin en sí mismo y por tanto, no siempre la falta de publicación, en un determinado momento procesal, constituye un vicio invalidante del procedimiento legislativo.
Debido a ello, y a que luego dicho texto fue abandonado por otro texto y no fue el finalmente aprobado, se resolvió que: “A juicio de la mayoría de este Tribunal, el vicio que se invoca no tiene el mérito para ser subsumido dentro de los esenciales o sustanciales, e incluso en uno relativo, toda vez que con él no se han vulnerado trámites sustanciales al procedimiento parlamentario; se trata más bien de un vicio de poca importancia.” Sobre la publicación extemporánea del texto modificado aprobado en primer debate:
La Sala indicó que no se trataba en el caso concreto del expediente 19.992 de una falta de publicación, sino de una publicación tardía o extemporánea. Ello por cuanto se constató que se aprueba en Primer Debate el texto del Dictamen Afirmativo de Mayoría aceptado por la Comisión Especial el 27 de julio de 2017, que correspondía al cuarto texto, en sesión extraordinaria No. 014 del Plenario legislativo correspondiente al 30 de octubre de 2017 (ver folio 4000 del Tomo 17). Dicho texto contenía ciertas modificaciones (por aprobación de mociones de fondo y mociones de reiteración). Así entonces, la publicación se da luego de aprobado en primer debate, en la Gaceta Digital No. 212, Alcance No. 268 de 9 de noviembre de 2017 (ver folio 4368 del Tomo 18 del expediente legislativo). Sin embargo, esta Sala consideró que ello no violentaba el principio de publicidad en consideración de lo siguiente: “Debe reiterarse, en primer lugar, que en este caso sí se realizó la mencionada publicación, pero se cuestiona una presunta publicación tardía o extemporánea de tal texto en cuestión.
Por lo que debe recordarse que esta Sala ha admitido que no siempre, la falta de publicación, en un determinado momento procesal, constituye un vicio invalidante del procedimiento legislativo. (…) En cuyo caso, considera la Sala que en la especie, con la acusada publicación tardía o extemporánea del texto sustitutivo no ha ocurrido una verdadera obstaculización a la participación popular o se ha afectado gravemente la transparencia del procedimiento parlamentario”.
Sobre el alegato de falta de consulta al Poder Judicial:
Tampoco encontró la Sala vicio de procedimiento alguno en cuanto al alegato de falta de consulta al Poder Judicial del texto aprobado en primer debate, pues se indicó que la Corte Suprema sí fue formalmente consultada sobre el contenido del proyecto de ley que se tramitó en el expediente legislativo No. 19.922, en 3 ocasiones y sí pudo emitir su opinión en esas 3 oportunidades (oficio CE208-BI-02-2016 de 14 de septiembre de 2016, ver folios 169 y 172 del Tomo 1; oficio AL-20035-OFI-0029-2017 de 17 de abril de 2017, ver folio 1757 del Tomo 8; y oficio AL-20035-OFI-0043-2017 de 31 de julio de 2017, ver folio 2625 del Tomo 11). Así entonces, consideró la Sala que no era necesaria una cuarta consulta al Poder Judicial, en especial, tomando en cuenta lo que se indica en el punto siguiente, a saber, que el proyecto de ley en cuestión no debía ser consultado al Poder Judicial por ser típicamente materia administrativa, como lo es la administración del Fondo de Pensiones, lo que no es subsumible en la exigencia constitucional de modificaciones a la organización y el funcionamiento de la Corte Suprema de Justica que atañen a su función típica, exclusiva, sea la jurisdiccional y aquellas administrativas esenciales que dan soporte a su función primaria.
Indican los accionantes que, según dispone el art.167 Constitucional, para poder separarse del criterio del Poder Judicial la Asamblea Legislativa requería de mayoría calificada. Sin embargo, la ley impugnada se aprobó con 31 votos a favor. Agregan que, en las tres ocasiones en que la Corte fue consultada fue enfática en indicar su posición negativa, por lo que ello obligaba a la Asamblea Legislativa a aprobar la ley con mayoría calificada. Además, se trató de una violación al Reglamento pues el art.208 bis del Reglamento de la Asamblea establece que los únicos proyectos sometidos a procedimiento abreviado son aquellos que requieran una mayoría simple, escenario que no acontece en este caso. Argumentan que, el primer debate en sesión extraordinaria n°14 del 30 de octubre del 2017 se aprobó con 31 votos y el segundo debate en sesión ordinaria n°163 del 19 de abril del 2018 se aprobó con 34 votos a favor. Así que ninguno cumplió con los 38 votos requeridos.
Al respecto, esta Sala indicó en resolución n°2022-008712 (haciendo referencia a lo resuelto en resolución n°2021-011957) que el proyecto no debía ser consultado a la Corte, y por lo tanto, no resultaba de aplicación del art.167 Constitucional, ni la mayoría allí establecida:
“En la opinión consultiva n.° 2018-005758 de las 15 horas 40 minutos del 12 de abril de 2018, expresamos lo siguiente:…
Ahora bien, con vista en lo expuesto anteriormente, este Tribunal considera que la materia sobre la que versa el expediente legislativo número 19.922 no se encuentra dentro de los supuestos fijados por el artículo 167 de la Constitución Política y, por ende, no existía la obligación de realizar una consulta a la Corte Suprema de Justicia.
… cuya funciones son típicamente administrativas, sea la administración del citado Fondo, lo que no es subsumible en la exigencia constitucional de modificaciones a la organización y el funcionamiento de la Corte Suprema de Justica que atañen a su función típica, exclusiva, sea la jurisdiccional y aquellas administrativas esenciales que dan soporte a su función primaria.” (…) Para la mayoría de este Tribunal no existen motivos que justifiquen variar el criterio ya vertido en dicha opinión consultiva, en el sentido que la materia sobre la que versó el expediente legislativo nro. 19.922 y que, finalmente, se aprobó como Ley nro. 9544, no se enmarca dentro de los supuestos fijados o contemplados por el artículo 167 de la Constitución Política y, por ende, ni existía la obligación constitucional de realizar una consulta a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, ni -como corolario- existía la obligación de que el citado proyecto se aprobara mediante dos terceras partes del total de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa, ante el criterio negativo de la Corte Suprema de Justicia sobre el proyecto.
Ergo, también procede desestimar la acción de inconstitucionalidad respecto a este punto.” Así concluye que, aunque es correcto que el proyecto de ley en cuestión fue aprobado por 31 votos en primer debate y 34 votos en segundo debate, no se requerían los 38 votos que manda el artículo 167 Constitucional, porque la materia del proyecto es administrativa y no se refiere a la organización y/o funcionamiento del Poder Judicial.
Indican los accionantes que la creación de una estructura en el Poder Judicial pero independiente de este en todo sentido, que modifica las competencias y funciones tanto de la Corte Plena, como del Consejo Superior, se constituye en una intromisión a la independencia y separación de Poderes establecida en los artículos 9 y 154 de la Constitución Política.
Al respecto, esta Sala indicó en resolución n°2022-008712 (haciendo referencia a lo resuelto en resolución n°2021-011957) que: “la mayoría de este Tribunal, concluye que no hay una afectación a esos extremos en los términos del artículo 167 constitucional. El hecho de que cree una Junta Administrativa del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial per se no conlleva la creación de un órgano que varíe sustancialmente las funciones de carácter administrativos del Poder Judicial; igual ocurre con la eliminación de esas funciones que tenían la Corte Suprema de Justicia y el Consejo Superior en relación con la materia, de ahí que no se estaba en el supuesto del numeral 167 de la Carta Fundamental. Es decir, no se estaban sustrayendo competencias administrativas esenciales conexas con la función jurisdiccional.” Así concluye indicando que, la iniciativa del legislador de realizar cambios al régimen de pensiones del Poder Judicial no significa un vaciamiento del contenido esencial de la independencia judicial; por ello: “Según las consideraciones anteriores, no se requería de mayoría calificada para su aprobación, y dado que el proyecto del expediente legislativo No. 19.922 se aprobó en Primer Debate con 31 diputados y diputadas a favor y 7 en contra (folio 4173 Tomo 17 del expediente legislativo), en tanto que en Segundo Debate se aprobó con 34 diputados y diputadas a favor y 9 en contra (folios 4437, 4608 y 4637 Tomo 18 del expediente legislativo), no se estima que se da el vicio alegado al principio de independencia judicial.”
Indican los accionantes que, dentro de los derechos sociales se encuentra el derecho al trabajo y con ello a una jubilación. Este derecho corresponde a un derecho de seguridad social que ha sido ratificado no solo por diferentes instrumentos internacionales sino por normas jurídicas nacionales y que ya teniendo ciertas condiciones, esta no pueden ser variadas en perjuicio de los derechos humanos de quienes ostentan el derecho o la situación jurídica consolidada. Argumentan que este transitorio se torna en una norma restrictiva, no progresiva de sus derechos humanos, pues no se respetó la enorme cantidad de años que han pertenecido y cotizado al régimen y cuyo beneficio debió haberse resguardado con un transitorio razonable, justo, sustentado en criterios técnicos y objetivos. Sobre la aplicación del art.26 de la CADH véase el voto n°1995-3932.
Al respecto, esta Sala indicó en resolución n°2022-008712 (haciendo referencia a lo resuelto en resolución n°2021-011957) que: “no existen elementos de juicio que permitan afirmar que el plazo establecido en el transitorio VI de la Ley 9544, es irrazonable o desproporcionado respecto de la finalidad que se pretende con la disposición, y más bien, la decisión legislativa resulta justificada frente a los cambios realizados. De igual forma, no hay infracción al derecho convencional que declarar y por ende la acción debe declararse sin lugar en este aspecto”.
De lo cual se entiende que, de contar la Sala con elementos de juicio para valorar la razonabilidad y proporcionalidad del plazo establecido en el Transitorio VI, se podría considerar también ello como violatorio del principio de progresividad de los derechos humanos. Por ello, este aspecto se examinará por el fondo más adelante en esta resolución.
Indican los accionantes que, el transitorio VI es una medida desproporcional e irrazonable, pues es demasiado el perjuicio que se les impuso al pasar de unos meses a más de diez años. Indican que se contempló un proyecto de vida, dadas las condiciones de trabajo que les fueron ofrecidas, dentro de las cuales se encontraba el disfrute a una jubilación digna a través del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, previo cumplimiento razonable de años de servicio y edad, conforme a los cuales se podrían retirar con un ingreso digno, después de haber otorgado toda una vida productiva al servicio de la comunidad y del Poder Judicial. Insisten en que, la pertenencia y eventual goce de una jubilación con cargo al Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, forma parte del contrato de trabajo y de las condiciones laborales que en su momento se establecieron para los accionantes, las cuales se han mantenido durante veinte, veinticinco y veintiocho años de servicio y resulta contrario al derecho de la constitución y de los derechos humanos, que reciban una modificación tan drástica como la que se estableció el transitorio VI de la ley 9544, lo que resulta contrario al derecho al trabajo y a la jubilación establecida en el artículo 73 de la Constitución Política.
Esta Sala, en su sentencia número 5758-2018, indicó que las variaciones al derecho de pensión eran permitidas siempre y cuando estas sean establecidas mediante una ley formal, sean razonables y no se afecte su contenido esencial.
Al respecto, esta Sala indicó en resolución n°2022-008712 (haciendo referencia a lo resuelto en resolución n°2021-011957) que la jubilación constituye la prestación económica que se obtiene luego de laborar y cotizar para un determinado régimen por un plazo determinado, y cuyo fin es garantizar una vida digna para la persona, luego de que finalice su etapa como trabajador. Declarando que sí existe un derecho constitucional y fundamental a la jubilación, a favor de todo trabajador, en general; derecho que, como tal, pertenece y debe ser reconocido a todo ser humano, en condiciones de igualdad y sin discriminación alguna, de conformidad con los artículos 33 y 73 de la Constitución; y además, en los artículos 25, 28, 29 y 30 del Convenio sobre la Seguridad Social, No. 102 de la OIT; el artículo 16 de la Convención Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre; los artículos 22 y 25 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos; el artículo 31 de la Carta Internacional Americana de Garantías Sociales; el artículo 5 de la Convención sobre Igualdad de Trato en Materia de Seguridad Social, número 118 de la O.I.T.; el artículo 9 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, ámbito internacional, que de conformidad con el artículo 7 Constitucional, está integrado a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico.
Indicó además la Sala Constitucional que, como el derecho a la pensión no es un derecho absoluto, el Estado tiene la potestad de regular, ordenar y limitar los alcances de tal derecho. En este sentido, se concluyó que, el Estado, a través de sus autoridades competentes, pueda ajustar las condiciones concretas de ejercicio del derecho de jubilación del que gozan los trabajadores, no solo a través del establecimiento de requisitos a cumplir para su efectivo disfrute, sino mediante la modificación precisa de las características de ese disfrute, con el fin de equilibrar la sostenibilidad de dicho régimen y respetando la exigencia de que los cambios sean establecidas mediante una ley formal, sean razonables y no su afecten su contenido esencial. Así concluye la Sala que: “al comprobar que la variación de requisitos dispuesta por … el transitorio VI del proyecto de ley tienen como fin último garantizar el derecho de jubilación de los(as) servidores(as) judiciales, la Sala descarta el vicio alegado.” De lo cual se entiende que, de contar la Sala con elementos de juicio para valorar la razonabilidad del plazo establecido en el Transitorio VI, se podría considerar también ello como violatorio del derecho a una pensión digna, proporcional y razonable. Así entonces, este aspecto se examinará por el fondo más adelante en esta resolución.
Indican los accionantes que, las otras reformas jubilatorias y las personas que han sido objeto de estas han tenido un transitorio escalonado que les ha permitido modular sus condiciones de vida y sus expectativas jubilatorias, situación que no se ha permitido en el Poder Judicial. Agregan que, los servidores judiciales han pasado de tener una expectativa de jubilación pronta, a unos pocos años, a pasar a más de una década de trabajo, para qué recibir posteriormente una jubilación que no responde ni a un cincuenta por ciento de su salario y por la cual se ha cotizado por más de 20 años una suma cuantiosa de su ingreso salarial mensual. Por ello consideran que resulta completamente discriminatorio y violatorio a los derechos fundamentales estipulados en nuestra Constitución Política, afectar directamente a una población tan vulnerable y con escasas fuentes de trabajo en nuestro país. Ningún grupo jubilatorio que ha sufrido reformas ha soportado un transitorio tan ajustado como los están viviendo mis representados.
Sin ninguna razón objetiva que justifique una diferencia de tratamiento de los accionantes, con los que laboran en el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, es que a estos últimos, se les declaró un derecho irrestricto de reconocimiento de sus condiciones jubilatorias, aun y cuando se está en presencia de normativa derogada, sin importar el tiempo que durasen en cumplir aquellos requisitos (ver el Transitorio II de Ley n°9544).
Al respecto, esta Sala indicó en resolución n°2022-008712 (haciendo referencia a lo resuelto en resolución n°2021-011957) que: “una declaración de inconstitucionalidad en este caso, requiere de la aportación de elementos de juicio que logren demostrar la ausencia de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad de emplear el plazo de 18 meses fijado por la jurisprudencia constitucional a partir de la vigencia de la reforma, para la extensión del ámbito de cobertura del régimen previsional anterior.” De lo cual se entiende que, de contar la Sala con elementos de juicio para valorar la razonabilidad y proporcionalidad del plazo establecido en el Transitorio VI, se podría considerar también ello como violatorio del principio de igualdad. Por ello, este aspecto se examinará por el fondo más adelante en esta resolución.
“Se da curso a la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad contra el Transitorio VI de la Ley de Reforma del Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, No. 9544, por la presunta violación a los artículos 11, 18, 27, 28, 34, 40, 41, 45, 51, 65, 73, 74, 121, 152, 154, 156, 177, 188, 189 y 190 de la Constitución Política, Convenios 102, 118, 128 y 157 de la OIT, y los principios democrático, solidaridad, seguridad jurídica, buena fe, confianza legítima, transparencia, intangibilidad relativa del patrimonio, no confiscatoriedad y respeto a los derechos adquiridos y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, artículos 14 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Político y 9 del Pacto Internacional de los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales.” Además, por lo dicho en puntos anteriores, se debe entender que esta Sala ha admitido esta acción, al plazo establecido en el Transitorio VI impugnado, en tanto se cuenten con elementos de prueba o elementos de juicio necesarios para que esta Sala realice su valoración respecto de la posible violación a los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, del principio de progresividad, del principio de igualdad y del derecho a gozar de una pensión digna, razonable y proporcional.
En síntesis, se admitió esta acción y la acumulada, para el examen de los alegatos que se agrupan en los puntos siguientes:
En vista de lo anterior, procede el examen de los argumentos anteriores.
El artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regula los presupuestos que determinan la admisibilidad de las acciones de inconstitucionalidad, exigiendo la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver en sede administrativa o judicial en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad, requisito que no es necesario en los casos previstos en los párrafos segundo y tercero de ese artículo, es decir, cuando por la naturaleza de la norma no haya lesión individual o directa; cuando se fundamente en la defensa de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto, o cuando sea presentada por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República o el Defensor de los Habitantes, en estos últimos casos, dentro de sus respectivas esferas competenciales. De acuerdo con el primero de los supuestos previstos por el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, la norma cuestionada no debe ser susceptible de aplicación concreta, que permita luego la impugnación del acto aplicativo y su consecuente empleo como asunto base.
En segundo lugar, se prevé la posibilidad de acudir en defensa de "intereses difusos", que son aquellos cuya titularidad pertenece a grupos de personas no organizadas formalmente, pero unidas a partir de una determinada necesidad social, una característica física, su origen étnico, una determinada orientación personal o ideológica, el consumo de un cierto producto, etc. El interés, en estos casos, se encuentra difuminado, diluido (difuso) entre una pluralidad no identificada de sujetos. Esta Sala ha enumerado diversos derechos a los que les ha dado el calificativo de "difusos", tales como el medio ambiente, el patrimonio cultural, la defensa de la integridad territorial del país, el buen manejo del gasto público, y el derecho a la salud, entre otros. Por otra parte, la enumeración que ha hecho la Sala Constitucional no es taxativa. Finalmente, cuando el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional habla de intereses "que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto", se refiere a los bienes jurídicos explicados en las líneas anteriores, es decir, aquellos cuya titularidad reposa en los mismos detentadores de la soberanía, en cada uno de los habitantes de la República.
No se trata por ende de que cualquier persona pueda acudir a la Sala Constitucional en tutela de cualesquiera intereses (acción popular), sino que todo individuo puede actuar en defensa de aquellos bienes que afectan a toda la colectividad nacional, sin que tampoco en este campo sea válido ensayar cualquier intento de enumeración taxativa. A partir de lo dicho en el párrafo anterior, y tomando en cuenta que se tiene como asunto base el recurso de amparo tramitado bajo el expediente n°19-006391-0007-CO del primer accionante y de la acción acumulada los amparos n°22-013966-0007-CO (María Ester Brenes Villalobos), 22-013963-0007-CO (Carmen Violeta Cerdas Cisneros), 22-013961-0007-CO (Álvaro Jesús Valverde Rojas), 22-013981-0007-CO (Blanca Luz Jiménez Chaves), 22-013982-0007-CO (Hermes de los Ángeles Zamora Atencio), 22-013980-0007-CO (Mario Alberto Sáenz Rojas), 22-013973-0007-CO (Luis Rodolfo Chaves Cordero), 22-013978-0007-CO (Paula Esmeralda Guido Howell), 22-013969-0007-CO (Robert Camacho Villalobos), 22-013977-0007-CO (Cristia María Carballo Solano), 22-013971-0007-CO (Rolando Alberto Brenes Mora), 22-013970-0007-CO (María Auxiliadora Madrigal León), 22-013960-0007-CO (German Brenes Montero) y 22-013959-0007-CO (Juan Carlos Cubillo Miranda).
Esta Sala considera que los accionantes ostentan legitimación suficiente para demandar la inconstitucionalidad de la norma impugnada. Por lo demás, se trata en efecto, de materia cuya constitucionalidad procede revisar en esta vía. Además, los actores cumplieron los requisitos estipulados en los numerales 78 y 79 de la Ley de rito. En conclusión, la presente acción es admisible, por lo que debe entrarse de inmediato a discutir el fondo del asunto.
El Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial pertenece a uno de los regímenes básicos. Fue creado mediante Ley No. 34 del 9 de julio de 1939. Luego dicho Fondo pasó a formar parte de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial No. 8 de 29 de noviembre de 1937, constituyendo el título XI: “De las Jubilaciones y Pensiones Judiciales”. En los años siguientes (1959, 1961,1962, 1963, 1964, 1971, 1983) se hicieron varias reformas a su articulado, en cuanto a requisitos de edad y años de servicio para jubilarse, así como la determinación de los beneficiarios. Posteriormente con la Ley No. 7333 de 5 de mayo de 1993 se reformó integralmente la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial No. 8 y el título correspondiente a las Jubilaciones y Pensiones Judiciales pasó a ser el IX; posteriormente la Ley 7605 del 2 de mayo de 1996 reformó varios artículos de este título.
En los años 2012 y 2013, producto de las revelaciones hechas por estudios actuariales, el Poder Judicial inició un proceso interno tendente a elaborar una propuesta de reforma. Esta preocupación, junto a otras referidas a todos los regímenes de pensiones, llevaron a que en fecha 05 de abril del 2016 se presentada el expediente legislativo No. 19.922 “Proyecto de Ley de Reforma Integral a los Diversos Regímenes de Pensiones y Normativa Conexa”, la promoción de esa iniciativa se dio ante el interés de varias bancadas legislativas de “(…) realizar una reforma integral a todo el régimen de pensiones, con el objetivo de eliminar disposiciones abusivas, racionalizar el gasto, dar estabilidad a los diversos regímenes especiales de pensiones y al Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Lo anterior, con fundamento en los principios de solidaridad, igualdad, justicia redistributiva y eficiencia, los cuáles son pilares dentro de nuestro estado social de Derecho”.
A partir del expediente legislativo, se observa que el proyecto inicial estaba dirigido a reformar todos los regímenes de pensiones; sin embargo, posteriormente el Poder Legislativo se centró en tramitar por separado la reforma al Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial. Así el expediente legislativo n°19.922 pasó a abocarse únicamente a la reforma del régimen de jubilaciones y pensiones del Poder Judicial. El proyecto tuvo 3 textos sustitutivos más. El original es del 05 de abril del 2016 (publicado en el Alcance 110 de La Gaceta del jueves 30 de junio de 2016), posteriormente en Sesión ordinaria No. 37 del 20 de junio de 2016 del Plenario Legislativo se aprueba una moción vía artículo 208 bis del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, Esa moción estableció el procedimiento especial aplicado a este proyecto de Ley y en misma moción se creó una Comisión Especial No. 20035 que sería la encargada de tramitar el proyecto.
El primer texto sustitutivo es del 30 de junio del 2016, ratificado en la sesión del 13 de setiembre del 2016 por la Comisión Especial (este texto no fue publicado, según consta en el voto de esta Sala n°2018-005758, pero no se encontró que ello fuera un vicio sustancial), y a partir del cual se cambia formalmente el nombre del proyecto para denominarse “Reforma del Título IX de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, de las Jubilaciones y Pensiones Judiciales No. 7333 del 5 de mayo de 1993 y sus reformas” (folios 1674 y 1717 del Tomo 7 del expediente legislativo); moción de texto sustitutivo que fue aprobada con 7 diputados a favor y 1 en contra (folio 1731 tomo 7). El segundo texto sustitutivo es del 29 de marzo del 2017 (publicado en el Alcance No. 91 del jueves 27 de abril de 2017, ver folio 2126); el tercer texto sustitutivo es aprobado por la Comisión Especial en sesión n°23 del 27 de julio del 2017 (Dictamen Afirmativo de Mayoría fue publicado en la Gaceta n°147, Alcance No. 189 del viernes 4 de agosto de 2017 y, de igual manera, en la Gaceta n°148, el Alcance No. 190 del lunes 7 de agosto de 2017, se publicó el Dictamen de Minoría). En todas esas versiones anteriores, la Corte Plena emitió criterio negativo en las tres ocasiones en que fue consultada, mediante:
-1° (2016): Sesión de Corte Plena No. 29-16 del 26 de septiembre de 2016, artículo XVIII, comunicándose a la Asamblea Legislativa mediante oficio SP-288-16 del 28 de septiembre de 2016 con la indicación expresa de que el proyecto de ley consultado, incide en la organización y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial (folio 284 Tomo 2 del expediente legislativo).
-2° (2017, tercer texto sustitutivo): la Corte Plena en sesión No. 9-17 del 24 de abril de 2017, artículo XXIX, conoció la consulta que se le planteó y mediante oficio SP-118-17 de 26 de abril de 2017 suscrito por la Secretaria General de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, acordó hacer del conocimiento de la Comisión Especial Legislativa que Corte Plena emitió criterio negativo al proyecto de ley consultado, a la vez que estimó que incide en la organización y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial (folio 1829 Tomo 8 del expediente legislativo).
-3° (2018, cuarto texto sustitutivo): la Corte Plena en sesión 26-17 de 7 de agosto de 2017, artículo XXX, conoció la consulta planteada por la Comisión Especial de cita sobre el Dictamen Afirmativo de Mayoría y, por tercera vez, emitió criterio negativo respecto proyecto e indicando que el proyecto de ley tramitado bajo expediente No. 19.922, incide en la organización, estructura y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial; decisión que se comunica a la Asamblea Legislativa mediante oficio SP-253-17 de 10 de agosto de 2017 (folio 2759 del Tomo 12 del expediente legislativo).
Finalmente, luego de aprobarse varias mociones de fondo que lo modificaron y de aprobarse mociones de reiteración, dicho proyecto recibió aprobación en primer debate, mediante sesión extraordinaria n°14 del 30 de octubre del 2017 donde se aprobó con 31 votos, 7 votos en contra y 8 abstenciones. La publicación se da luego de aprobado en primer debate, en documento publicado en la Gaceta Digital No. 212, Alcance No. 268 de 9 de noviembre de 2017 (véase folio 4368 del Tomo 18 del expediente legislativo). Luego, en segundo debate, mediante sesión ordinaria n°163 del 19 de abril del 2018 se aprobó con 34 votos a favor.
Así, la Ley n°9544, cuyo transitorio VI está aquí impugnado, entró en vigencia el 22 de mayo del 2018. Dicha ley implicó varios cambios, uno de ellos fue cambiar la administración del Fondo de Pensiones del Poder Judicial, creando la Junta Administradora del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial (JA-FJPPJ), además de cambios en las condiciones de jubilación (se aumentó la edad para jubilarse, se aumentó la cantidad de años de servicio, se modificó el cálculo del monto de la pensión, se modificaron las condiciones de la jubilación anticipada).
Ahora bien, luego de aprobarse en primer debate, el proyecto de ley fue llevado a consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad (resuelta mediante resolución n°2018-005758 de las quince horas con cuarenta minutos del doce de abril de dos mil dieciocho[1]), y al convertirse en ley, fue presentada una acción de inconstitucionalidad que conoció de la impugnación total de la ley (resuelva mediante resolución n°2021-11957 de las nueve horas quince minutos del veinticinco de mayo de dos mil veintiuno[2]). Estos dos antecedentes jurisprudenciales ya fueron referenciados en la resolución que le dio curso a esta acción (resolución n°2022-008712 las nueve horas y diez minutos del veinte de abril de dos mil veintidós[3]).
De todo lo anterior, se tiene en concreto, sobre la cronología que siguió el transitorio VI aquí impugnado, desde el texto original hasta el finalmente aprobado, que el proyecto de ley base, n°19922 hacía referencia a un único transitorio, el XIII de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial donde se proponía:
“Transitorio XIII.- Las reformas a esta ley no serán aplicables a aquellos servidores y servidoras judiciales que al momento de la entrada en vigencia de estas reformas tengan veinte años o más de laborar en el Poder Judicial, los cuales tendrán derecho a jubilarse, conforme a las disposiciones previamente establecidas a esta reforma, siempre que cumplan con todos los requisitos establecidos en el régimen jurídico anterior. En lo que respecta a las demás personas que a la entrada en vigencia de la presente ley ocupen cargos en propiedad en el Poder Judicial, se les otorgará el beneficio de cálculo diferenciado al momento en que alcancen los requisitos para acogerse a la jubilación, en atención al tiempo servido y los aportes realizados al Fondo de Jubilaciones antes de esta reforma, aplicando los siguientes parámetros: 1.-A quienes tengan entre 0 y 10 años de servicio, la jubilación se les calculará con base en el promedio de los últimos noventa y seis salari os (8 años). 2.-A quienes tengan más de 10 y hasta 15 años de servicio, la jubilación se les calculará con base en el promedio de los últimos setenta y dos salarios (6 años). 3.- A quienes tengan más de 15 y hasta menos de 20 años de servicio, la jubilación se les calculará con base en el promedio de los últimos cuarenta y ocho salarios (4 años).” Posteriormente, en este Dictamen de la Comisión, del 27 de julio del 2017, se deja de lado la reforma que inicialmente se planteaba al transitorio XIII; y se incluyen seis transitorios, entre ellos el Transitorio VI, cuya redacción era la siguiente:
“TRANSITORIO VI.- Los servidores judiciales que cumplan con los requisitos para adquirir el derecho a la pensión según lo establecía el texto del Título IX de la Ley N°7333 del 5 de mayo de 1993, dentro de los dieciocho meses posteriores a la promulgación de la presente ley, podrán pensionarse al amparo de las disposiciones establecidas en el mencionado texto.
Una vez pasados los dieciocho meses, los servidores judiciales podrán acogerse a una jubilación ordinaria transitoria, la cual se regirá por la siguiente tabla:
Edad a la fecha de rige de la ley Años de servicio a la fecha de rige de la ley Edad requerida Años de servicio requeridos Cantidad de meses para el salario de referencia % del salario de referencia Años-meses Años-meses Años-meses Años-meses 58-5 28-5 60-1 30-1 63 99,50% 58-4 28-4 60-2 30-2 66 99,00% 58-3 28-3 60-3 30-3 69 98,50% 58-2 28-2 60-4 30-4 72 98,00% 58-1 28-1 60-5 30-5 75 97,50% 58-0 28-0 60-6 30-6 78 97,00% 57-11 27-11 60-7 30-7 81 96,50% 57-10 27-10 60-8 30-8 84 96,00% 57-9 27-9 60-9 30-9 87 95,50% 57-8 27-8 60-10 30-10 90 95,00% 57-7 27-7 60-11 30-11 93 94,50% 57-6 27-6 61-0 31-0 96 94,00% 57-5 27-5 61-1 31-1 99 93,50% 57-4 27-4 61-2 31-2 102 93,00% 57-3 27-3 61-3 31-3 105 92,50% 57-2 27-2 61-4 31-4 108 92,00% 57-1 27-1 61-5 31-5 111 91,50% 57-0 27-0 61-6 31-6 114 91,00% 56-11 26-11 61-7 31-7 117 90,50% 56-10 26-10 61-8 31-8 120 90,00% 56-9 26-9 61-9 31-9 123 89,50% 56-8 26-8 61-10 31-10 126 89,00% 56-7 26-7 61-11 31-11 129 88,50% 56-6 26-6 62-0 32-0 132 88,00% 56-5 26-5 62-1 32-1 135 87,50% 56-4 26-4 62-2 32-2 138 87,00% 56-3 26-3 62-3 32-3 141 86,50% 56-2 26-2 62-4 32-4 144 86,00% 56-1 26-1 62-5 32-5 147 85,50% 56-0 26-0 62-6 32-6 150 85,00% 55-11 25-11 62-7 32-7 153 84,50% 55-10 25-10 62-8 32-8 156 84,00% 55-9 25-9 62-9 32-9 159 83,50% 55-8 25-8 62-10 32-10 162 83,00% 55-7 25-7 62-11 32-11 165 82,50% 55-6 25-6 63-0 33-0 168 82,00% 55-5 25-5 63-1 33-1 171 81,50% 55-4 25-4 63-2 33-2 174 81,00% 55-3 25-3 63-3 33-3 177 80,50% 55-2 25-2 63-4 33-4 180 80,00% 55-1 25-1 63-5 33-5 183 79,50% 55-0 25-0 63-6 33-6 186 79,00% 54-11 24-11 63-7 33-7 189 78,50% 54-10 24-10 63-8 33-8 192 78,00% 54-9 24-9 63-9 33-9 195 77,50% 54-8 24-8 63-10 33-10 198 77,00% 54-7 24-7 63-11 33-11 201 76,50% 54-6 24-6 64-0 34-0 204 76,00% 54-5 24-5 64-1 34-1 207 75,50% 54-4 24-4 64-2 34-2 210 75,00% 54-3 24-3 64-3 34-3 213 74,50% 54-2 24-2 64-4 34-4 216 74,00% 54-1 24-1 64-5 34-5 219 73,50% 54-0 24-0 64-6 34-6 222 73,00% 53-11 23-11 64-7 34-7 225 72,50% 53-10 23-10 64-8 34-8 228 72,50% 53-9 23-9 64-9 34-9 231 72,50% 53-8 23-8 64-10 34-10 234 72,50% 53-7 23-7 64-11 34-11 237 72,50% 53-6 23-6 65-0 35-0 240 72,50% Una vez pasados los dieciocho meses, los servidores judiciales podrán acogerse a una jubilación anticipada transitoria, la cual se regirá por las siguientes disposiciones:
Para efectos de la jubilación anticipada sin tener los años de servicio, se tomará la edad requerida de la tabla anterior, según la edad o años de servicio a la fecha de rige de la ley.
El cálculo de esta jubilación se hará multiplicando la pensión obtenida según la edad o años de servicio correspondiente a la fecha de rige de la ley de la tabla anterior, por el número de años servidos, y el producto se dividirá entre los años de servicio requeridos según la edad o años de servicio correspondiente a la fecha de rige de la ley; el resultado será el monto de la jubilación anticipada.
Para efectos de la jubilación anticipada sin tener la edad, se tomará los años de servicio requeridos de la tabla anterior, según la edad o años de servicio a la fecha de rige de la ley.
Para efectos de la edad mínima, se regirá por la siguiente tabla:
Edad a la fecha de rige de la ley Años de servicio a la fecha de rige de la ley Mínimo de edad Años-meses Años-meses Hombres Mujeres 58-5 28-5 57-1 55-1 58-4 28-4 57-2 55-2 58-3 28-3 57-3 55-3 58-2 28-2 57-4 55-4 58-1 28-1 57-5 55-5 58-0 28-0 57-6 55-6 57-11 27-11 57-7 55-7 57-10 27-10 57-8 55-8 57-9 27-9 57-9 55-9 57-8 27-8 57-10 55-10 57-7 27-7 57-11 55-11 57-6 27-6 58-0 56-0 57-5 27-5 58-1 56-1 57-4 27-4 58-2 56-2 57-3 27-3 58-3 56-3 57-2 27-2 58-4 56-4 57-1 27-1 58-5 56-5 57-0 27-0 58-6 56-6 56-11 26-11 58-7 56-7 56-10 26-10 58-8 56-8 56-9 26-9 58-9 56-9 56-8 26-8 58-10 56-10 56-7 26-7 58-11 56-11 56-6 26-6 59-0 57-0 56-5 26-5 59-1 57-1 56-4 26-4 59-2 57-2 56-3 26-3 59-3 57-3 56-2 26-2 59-4 57-4 56-1 26-1 59-5 57-5 56-0 26-0 59-6 57-6 55-11 25-11 59-7 57-7 55-10 25-10 59-8 57-8 55-9 25-9 59-9 57-9 55-8 25-8 59-10 57-10 55-7 25-7 59-11 57-11 55-6 25-6 60-0 58-0 55-5 25-5 60-1 58-1 55-4 25-4 60-2 58-2 55-3 25-3 60-3 58-3 55-2 25-2 60-4 58-4 55-1 25-1 60-5 58-5 55-0 25-0 60-6 58-6 54-11 24-11 60-7 58-7 54-10 24-10 60-8 58-8 54-9 24-9 60-9 58-9 54-8 24-8 60-10 58-10 54-7 24-7 60-11 58-11 54-6 24-6 61-0 59-0 54-5 24-5 61-1 59-1 54-4 24-4 61-2 59-2 54-3 24-3 61-3 59-3 54-2 24-2 61-4 59-4 54-1 24-1 61-5 59-5 54-0 24-0 61-6 59-6 53-11 23-11 61-7 59-7 53-10 23-10 61-8 59-8 53-9 23-9 61-9 59-9 53-8 23-8 61-10 59-10 53-7 23-7 61-11 59-11 53-6 23-6 62-0 60-0 El cálculo de esta jubilación se hará multiplicando la pensión obtenida según la edad o años de servicio correspondiente a la fecha de rige de la ley de la tabla tras anterior, por la edad; y el producto se dividirá entre la edad requerida según la edad o años de servicio correspondiente a la fecha de rige de la ley; el resultado será el monto de la jubilación anticipada.
Estas pensiones estarán sujetas al tope previsto en el artículo 225 de la ley.” En cuanto a dicho texto, la Corte Plena indica mediante oficio SP-118-17 el acuerdo adoptado en sesión n°09-17 del 24 de abril del 2017 que: “el plazo de los dieciocho meses posteriores a la publicación de la Ley no tiene bases técnicas”. Posteriormente, por medio de la aprobación de mociones de fondo, el nuevo texto aprobado en Primer Debate, y luego aprobado en Segundo Debate, la disposición Transitoria VI señala lo siguiente:
“TRANSITORIO VI- Los servidores judiciales que cumplan con los requisitos para adquirir el derecho a la pensión según lo establecía el texto del título IX de la Ley N.° 7333, de 5 de mayo de 1993, dentro de los dieciocho meses posteriores a la promulgación de la presente ley, podrán pensionarse al amparo de las disposiciones establecidas en el mencionado texto.”
Esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, al igual que otras anteriores, tiene en el trasfondo los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales, derechos humanos muy concretos, que se constituyen en temas que deben ser cuidadosamente calibradas por este Tribunal Constitucional, especialmente, al tratarse de los derechos que acompañan a las personas adultas mayores en momentos muy importantes de su vida. Precisamente, cuando empieza a tomar vigor la doctrina de los derechos prestacionales del Estado, se suele citar lo que ya desde 1930 se impulsaba por parte de varios países, al buscar mayor protección para las personas trabajadoras y un mayor papel del Estado en garantizar ciertos derechos sociales, como lo son la seguridad social, la salud y vivienda. Esta Sala ha tenido oportunidad de examinar temas de pensiones en otras ocasiones. A partir de lo ha señalado en resoluciones anteriores (n°2018-5758 y 2021-11957), se resumen los siguientes COROLARIOS:
-Los artículos 50, 56 y 74 de la Constitución Política configuran el modelo de Estado social y democrático de Derecho. Como parte de este mismo modelo el principio de solidaridad social actúa como un eje orientador de política interna del Estado, porque el Estado Social de Derecho “entraña una orientación de nuestro régimen político hacia la solidaridad social, esto es, hacia la equidad en las relaciones societarias, la promoción de la justicia social y la igualdad de todos los ciudadanos en el ejercicio de sus derechos, descartando discriminaciones arbitrarias e irrazonables”. En forma consecuente y con sustento en el Estado Social de Derecho, nuestra Constitución Política contempla un conjunto de derechos prestacionales relativos a la protección de los trabajadores, como es el caso del derecho de jubilación. (ver sentencias n° 2004-9255 de las 16:03 horas del 25 de agosto del 2004, n°2005-13205 de las 15:13 horas del 27 de septiembre del 2005, n°2018-19030 del 14 de noviembre de 2020).
-El modelo de Estado Social de Derecho y el concepto de seguridad social que adopta nuestra Constitución Política, incluye el derecho en favor de las personas trabajadoras de obtener una jubilación luego del cumplimiento de determinadas condiciones normativamente establecidas. Es ésta una de las formas de expresión del derecho fundamental a la seguridad social recogido en nuestra normativa constitucional, al que se suman el seguro de salud, los distintos tipos de jubilaciones contributivas, así como las no contributivas, entre otros.
-La jubilación constituye la prestación económica que se obtiene luego de laborar y cotizar para un determinado régimen por un plazo determinado, y cuyo fin es garantizar una vida digna para la persona, luego de que finalice su etapa como trabajador.
-El derecho a la pensión debe ser catalogado como un derecho fundamental, así la Sala declara que sí existe un derecho constitucional y fundamental a la jubilación, a favor de todo trabajador, en general; derecho que, como tal, pertenece y debe ser reconocido a todo ser humano, en condiciones de igualdad y sin discriminación alguna, de conformidad con los artículos 33 y 73 de la Constitución. Además, de los artículos 25, 28, 29 y 30 del Convenio n°102 de la OIT, según los cuales:
" Artículo 25 Todo Miembro para el cual esté en vigor esta parte del Convenio deberá garantizar a las personas protegidas la concesión de prestaciones de vejez, de conformidad con los artículos siguientes de esta parte" " Artículo 28 La prestación consistirá en un pago periódico, calculado en la forma siguiente... " " Artículo 29 1. La prestación mencionada en el artículo 28 deberá garantizarse, en la contingencia cubierta, por lo menos:
"2. Cuando la concesión de la prestación mencionada en el párrafo 1 esté condicionada al cumplimiento de un período mínimo de cotización o de empleo, deberá garantizarse una prestación reducida por lo menos:
"a) A las personas protegidas que hayan cumplido, antes de la contingencia, de conformidad con reglas prescritas un período de calificación de quince años de cotización o de empleo... " " Artículo 30 "Las prestaciones mencionadas en los artículos 28 y 29 deberán concederse durante todo el transcurso de la contingencia" -Otros textos internacionales que reconocen el derecho a la jubilación son por ejemplo: el art.16 Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre; los artículos 22 y 25 Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos; el art. 31 Carta Internacional Americana de Garantías Sociales; 5o Convención sobre Igualdad de Trato en Materia de Seguridad Social, No. 118 OIT, o, en general, el Derecho a la Seguridad Social, dentro de la cual se tiene universalmente por comprendida la jubilación, por ejemplo el art.11 Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre; y 9 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales.
-La pertenencia a un régimen determinado de pensiones o jubilaciones se adquiere desde el momento en que se comienza a cotizar en dicho régimen, no así el derecho concreto a la jubilación, que se adquiere cuando el interesado cumple con todos los presupuestos establecidos en la ley.
-Al igual que cualquier otro derecho fundamental, el derecho a la pensión no es irrestricto, ya que puede ser sometido a determinadas limitaciones, siempre y cuando estas sean establecidas mediante una ley formal, sean razonables y no impidan su ejercicio (o afecten su contenido esencial). El derecho de jubilación, como cualquier otro derecho está sujeto a condiciones y limitaciones pero unas y otras solamente en cuanto se encuentren previstas por las normas que las reconocen y garantizan y resulten además razonablemente necesarias para el ejercicio del derecho mismo, de acuerdo con su naturaleza y fin. Esto no es otra cosa que expresión de un conocido principio del Derecho de los Derechos Humanos, que puede denominarse de proporcionalidad y que se recoge en general como condición sine qua non de las limitaciones y restricciones a tales derechos autorizados excepcionalmente por los propios textos que los consagran (ver resoluciones n°2018-19030, n°2379-96, n°1147-90).
-El derecho a la jubilación puede ser sometido a limitaciones, al igual que cualquier otro derecho fundamental. Lo anterior, conlleva a que no exista un derecho de la persona a jubilarse bajo condiciones específicas, pues éstas pueden ser variadas cuando resulte necesario para garantizar la existencia de un régimen de pensiones y jubilaciones específico, pues de no ser así, podrían crearse condiciones que hagan insostenible financieramente al sistema, lo que, finalmente, conllevaría a que el derecho a la jubilación se vea afectado severamente, o que su ejercicio no sea del todo posible, ante la inexistencia de fondos que impidan el pago al interesado el monto de su jubilación. Claro está, tales limitaciones deben ser establecidas mediante una ley formal, deben ser razonables y no pueden impedir su ejercicio (o afecten su contenido esencial).
-Además, si las modificaciones a las condiciones de pensión implican una regresión, esta Sala ha indicado que dicha medida requiere de previo un estudio técnico. Así se estableció: “en caso de que una administración tenga la necesidad de adoptar medidas regresivas para el derecho a la pensión y la jubilación, debe contar con un estudio técnico con respecto a los efectos que éstas puedan tener en los derechos de los afectados y el régimen, así como que no existen medidas menos gravosas que pudieran haber sido tomadas…” (ver resolución n°2021-11957).
Establecido lo anterior, se procede a continuación a revisar los alegatos concretos admitidos, para determinar si las autoridades estatales han excedido los parámetros anteriores, todo ello según los temas y la argumentación concreta ofrecida por los diversos accionantes.
Conforme se indicó, esta acción y la acumulada, han sido admitidas para el examen del Transitorio VI de la Ley de Reforma del Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, No. 9544, por la presunta violación a los artículos 11, 18, 27, 28, 34, 40, 41, 45, 51, 65, 73, 74, 121, 152, 154, 156, 177, 188, 189 y 190 de la Constitución Política, Convenios 102, 118, 128 y 157 de la OIT, y los principios democrático, solidaridad, seguridad jurídica, buena fe, confianza legítima, transparencia, intangibilidad relativa del patrimonio, no confiscatoriedad y respeto a los derechos adquiridos y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, artículos 14 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Político y 9 del Pacto Internacional de los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales. Además, sobre la violación al principio de progresividad, al derecho a una pensión digna, proporcional y razonable y al principio de igualdad, esto en caso de contar con la prueba necesaria. Argumentos todos que se sintetizaron supra. Ahora bien, como el alegato de inconstitucionalidad de falta de criterio técnico frente a medidas regresivas para el derecho a la pensión y la jubilación, es un alegato de procedimiento, se examinará éste en primer lugar.
DE LA CONSTITUCIONALIDAD DEL TRANSITORIO VI DE LA LEY DE REFORMA DEL RÉGIMEN DE JUBILACIONES Y PENSIONES DEL PODER JUDICIAL, LEY N.° 9544. REDACTA EL MAGISTRADO CASTILLO VÍQUEZ.
Los accionantes indican que no existe ningún fundamento jurídico que respalde el plazo de dieciocho meses otorgado como Transitorio para la aplicación de la nueva reforma, el cual consideran resulta irracional y antojadizo. Incluso indican que, el anterior presidente de la Junta Administradora del Fondo, señor Carlos Montero, ante una comparecencia en la Corte Plena del Poder Judicial (sesión n.°08-2021, del 22 de febrero de 2021, artículo XVIII) manifestó que el Fondo se encontraba en condiciones de asumir las jubilaciones con las condiciones anteriores a la reforma, de personas que al momento de la entrada en vigencia del Transitorio VI, contaban con 20 años o más de servicio en el Poder Judicial. Siendo además que, en los casos en que se restringe o limita un derecho fundamental -como es este caso-, la carga de la prueba no la tiene el perjudicado con la restricción o limitación, sino la Administración, en este caso, el Estado legislador, el cual no contó con criterio técnico al respecto.
La Procuraduría General de la República (PGR) indica que, si el legislador así lo estima conveniente y decide regularlo por derecho transitorio, es suficiente el plazo de 18 meses para que la modificación de las condiciones específicas, las cuales no afecten al administrado que cumpla los requisitos dentro de ese lapso (ver resolución de la Sala Constitucional n.°1992-846 de las 13:30 horas del 27 de marzo de 1992). Considera que, si bien en los regímenes contributivos de pensión la cotización origina un derecho de pertenencia, ello no hace inmodificable las reglas del sistema (ver resolución de la Sala Constitucional n.°2018-19030 y n.°2021-11957). Además, el solo hecho de existir un transitorio lleva a la conclusión de que los cambios en el régimen no fueron intempestivos, repentinos, ni variaron drásticamente las condiciones jubilatorias de los accionantes, por lo que no comparten las razones de inconstitucionalidad aducidas en esta acción, y así sugiere declarar sin lugar la acción.
Por su parte, el Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa manifiesta que la Asamblea en la tramitación y formulación de esta ley siempre respetó los principios de razonabilidad, racionalidad, proporcionalidad y tomó sus decisiones sobre una base de una amplia discusión, con informes técnicos y participación de los sectores involucrados. En concreto, sobre el transitorio, se informa que el plazo de 18 meses es razonable ya que no se trata de un plazo excesivamente corto, ni excesivamente largo; además que, la fijación de este plazo responde a la atribución que la Asamblea Legislativa en el ejercicio de la función de dictar leyes en sentido formal y material, donde goza de una amplia libertad de conformación. En criterio de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en las tres ocasiones en que la Corte fue consultada se emitió criterio negativo y se opuso al proyecto de ley consultado, debido a que incide en la organización y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial.
En concreto sobre el plazo de 18 meses del transitorio impugnado, consideró que no consta en acuerdos de Corte Plena o del Consejo Superior que el Poder Ejecutivo o Legislativo hayan realizado los estudios técnicos para definir ese rango, lo que podría resultar contradictorio con lo señalado por la Sala Constitucional en reiterados votos (la sentencia n.°2017-11714), que señaló como un requisito fundamental para poder realizar variaciones en los regímenes de jubilaciones y pensiones, que estos deben contar con los criterios técnicos sobre el impacto de esas modificaciones legales, de lo contrario se podría vulnerar el numeral 73 de nuestra Constitución Política. Agrega, además, que el personal de la institución ha sufrido la aplicación de una disposición transitoria muy severa y nunca antes aplicada a ningún grupo en materia jubilatoria, lo que ha causado un desestimulo para continuar laborando en la institución.
Con ello se ha dado una constante fuga de talento, ya que se han recibido varias renuncias de personas servidoras judiciales que prefirieron continuar su carrera en otros ámbitos. Asimismo, servidores judiciales han requerido intervención médica dado el impacto de esta reforma y su transitorio en su vida y en la vida de sus familiares. Consideran que debió haberse resguardado su derecho, con un transitorio razonable, justo, sustentado en criterios técnicos y objetivos.
Es criterio de la mayoría de esta Sala que la acción incoada debe ser declarada sin lugar, con fundamento en las razones que se desarrollarán a continuación. Ahora bien, para el debido examen y resolución de esta acción, en un primer momento se expondrán una serie de consideraciones introductorias (apartado A) que necesariamente han de tenerse en cuenta, para el adecuado abordaje de los temas planteados en este proceso de control de constitucionalidad. Luego, en el apartado B, se analizará propiamente el plazo de 18 meses a la luz de la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional y del informe técnico elaborado por el Instituto de Investigaciones en Ciencias Económicas de la Universidad de Costa Rica (del 4 de julio de 2017, denominado Producto 6 “Recopilación e informe final: conclusiones y recomendaciones”). También se hará una ineludible referencia a cuál era la situación del Régimen de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial antes de su reforma mediante Ley n.°9544, cuál es su actual situación financiera y cuáles serían las consecuencias de acoger la presente acción (apartados C, D y E), por ser aspectos que imperiosamente deben ponderarse para la debida resolución de esta acción. Finalmente, en los siguientes apartados se resolverán los reproches concretos formulados por los accionantes.
Para la mayoría del Tribunal el actuar de la Asamblea Legislativa está basado en su jurisprudencia y en un estudio técnico, por lo que su actuación no ha sido ni arbitraria ni carente de sentido. Todo lo contrario, ha contribuido a darle sostenibilidad a un régimen especial, tal y como se explicará más adelante.
Hay un fenómeno a nivel mundial que está impactando los regímenes de jubilaciones y pensiones. Se trata del envejecimiento de la población, lo que tiene efectos importantes, pues, por un lado, las personas adultas mayores son más y viven más y, por el otro, la tasa de la población económicamente activa no crece al ritmo que lo venía haciendo en el pasado. Al respecto, en el informe de las Naciones Unidas -Informe Social Mundial 2023- sobre el tema encontramos los siguientes datos:
“En 2021, 761 millones de personas en todo el mundo tenían 65 años o más, cifra que aumentará a 1600 millones en 2050. El número de personas de 80 años o más está creciendo aún más rápido.
Las personas viven más tiempo gracias a las mejoras en la salud y las terapias médicas, un mayor acceso a la educación y la reducción de la fertilidad.
En todo el mundo, un niño nacido en 2021 puede esperar vivir, de media, hasta los 71 años, y las mujeres vivirán más que los hombres. Esto supone casi 25 años más que un bebé nacido en 1950.
El norte de África, Asia occidental y el África subsahariana están en vías de experimentar el crecimiento más rápido del número de personas mayores en los próximos 30 años. En la actualidad, Europa y Norteamérica juntas, tienen la mayor proporción de esta población”.
No hay duda alguna que este fenómeno global refleja una mejora general de la salud de las personas. Empero, también conlleva una serie de retos adicionales.
Este hecho tiene un impacto importante en los regímenes de jubilaciones y pensiones, en especial en los de reparto, ya que cada vez son menos los trabajadores que aportan y más los jubilados y pensionados que requieren los pagos respectivos. En el informe ut supra se establece lo siguiente:
“Uno de los principales retos es mantener la sostenibilidad fiscal de los sistemas públicos de pensiones, garantizando al mismo tiempo la seguridad de los ingresos de todas las personas mayores, incluidos los trabajadores del sector informal.” Lo cierto del caso es que se vive un proceso acelerado de envejecimiento de la población; se ha invertido la pirámide poblacional y, por consiguiente, se hace necesario introducir en los regímenes de jubilaciones y pensiones cambios importantes, con el fin de garantizar su sostenibilidad y equidad. Cuando son pocos los jubilados y los pensionados y muchos los trabajadores activos, el sistema soporta que los beneficios jubilatorios y pensionales sean generosos en el corto y aun en el mediano plazo; sin embargo, no es posible sostener esta situación cuando se da la situación inversa. Es por ello, que, en todas partes del mundo, asistimos al fenómeno de recortes de los beneficios jubilatorios y pensionales -tales como: aumentar los aportes, edad de retiro, recorte en el cálculo de jubilación o pensión, etc.-.
Esta situación de cambio en los regímenes de jubilaciones y pensiones no es una ocurrencia del legislador o de quienes gobiernan o administran un régimen, es una necesidad que impone una realidad, en la que los estudios actuariales comprueban que los ajuste son necesarios, justos y lógicos, si es que se quiere garantizar a las actuales y futuras generaciones el derecho fundamental a la jubilación o la pensión. Actuar en sentido contrario, o no hacer nada, significa condenar a miles de adultos mayores en un futuro no muy lejano a vivir en la indigencia, de ahí que el sentido de responsabilidad, oportunidad y coherencia impone al legislador y la administración pública actuar de manera oportuna para garantizar la sostenibilidad financiera de los regímenes de jubilaciones y pensiones.
En esta cuestión no hay que perder de vista que la satisfacción de los intereses generales obliga al legislador y los administradores a tener siempre como norte esos intereses, y no los intereses particulares o de grupos. En los regímenes de jubilaciones y pensiones la sostenibilidad financiera del régimen representa el interés general, frente al cual no es posible alegar la satisfacción de intereses particulares, cuando ello conlleva la afectación del primero. Quien no tiene claro esta máxima, actúa en contra de reglas elementales de justicia, de lógica, de la ciencia y técnica y de oportunidad, lo que no es admisible en un Estado social y democrático de derecho. La satisfacción de los intereses del mayor número siempre debe estar por encima de los intereses individuales o de grupo.
Una tercera cuestión de este planteamiento general atañe al tema de la discrecionalidad legislativa. Ha sido tesis reiterada de este Tribunal que el legislador goza de un amplio margen de discrecionalidad cuando ejerce la potestad de legislar. Una de las razones de esta postura -no la única-, es que él está dotado de una legitimad democrática y, por ende, llamando a escoger entre varias alternativas posibles el contenido de la ley con el fin de dar una solución efectiva a un problema o crear una institución que venga a dar bienestar a la población. Ahora bien, el hecho de que este Tribunal haya sostenido que en la materia de jubilaciones y pensiones el legislador requiere de estudios técnicos, no conlleva una absoluta subordinación a estos, pues bien puede este, adoptando como referencia los datos que arrojan esos estudios dar soluciones que encuadren dentro de lo razonable. En esta dirección, no es posible asimilar el acto legislativo al administrativo, donde es claro que el margen de discrecionalidad de la administración pública es mucho menor.
La discrecionalidad legislativa implica que el legislador tiene un amplio margen para definir el contenido y la oportunidad de la ley. El acto legislativo expresa o concretiza la soberanía del Parlamento, en esta dirección no se puede perder de vista lo que estatuye el artículo 105 constitucional, cuando afirma que la potestad de legislar reside en el pueblo, el cual la delega en la Asamblea Legislativa por medio del sufragio. Tal potestad no está sujeta a limitaciones mediante convenio ni contrato, directa o indirectamente, e incluso el Soberano la puede ejercer a través del referéndum con exclusión de ciertas materias. Lo anterior significa que la Asamblea Legislativa goza de independencia cuando ejerce la potestad de legislar, lo cual significa que el Derecho de la Constitución (valores, principios y normas) le otorgan una amplia discrecionalidad para disponer el contenido y la oportunidad de las leyes; se trata de un margen de apreciación, lo que la doctrina alemana ha denominado como “la libertad de configuración del legislador” (gesetzgeberichen Freiheit).
Esta, pues, llamado el legislador, en ejercicio de la potestad de legislar, a satisfacer los intereses públicos, y para ello, puede innovar y actualizar el Derecho, así como dar soluciones oportunas y adecuadas a los problemas sociales. Ahora bien, esta discrecionalidad que goza el legislador no es ilimitada. En primer lugar, cuando el legislador legisla debe observar el Derecho de la Constitución y respetar los derechos fundamentales que se encuentran en ese derecho y en los instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos vigentes en Costa Rica. En segundo término, debe observar las formas y procedimientos sustanciales que están presentes en el iter legislativo. En tercer lugar, el acto parlamentario, por más discrecional que sea, debe estar revestido de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, de forma tal que el Derecho de la Constitución y el principio de la interdicción de la arbitrariedad, imposibilitan al legislador a dictar actos irracionales, arbitrarios o ilógicos.
Ahora bien, no hay que perder de vista de que entre varias opciones razonables el Derecho de la Constitución le permite al legislador escoger una de estas; no necesariamente la que se considere mejor o la más óptima, pues determinar este extremo es un asunto que no es posible zanjar, salvo que se sustituya al legislador, lo cual implicaría vulnerar su independencia o peor aún, usurpar una atribución que constitucionalmente tiene asignada, lo que, a todas luces, no es acorde con el sistema democrático.
Finalmente, hay que tener presente que el derecho fundamental a la jubilación o la pensión es el derecho a recibir esta cuando se cumplen los requisitos que establece el ordenamiento jurídico, por lo que no forma parte de su contenido esencial el derecho a recibir unos determinados beneficios, pues estos están condicionados a la solvencia del régimen respectivo.
Lo primero que debe destacarse es que la disposición normativa impugnada resulta plenamente compatible o congruente con la posición que esta Sala ha venido sosteniendo, de forma reiterada y consistente, en el sentido que un plazo de 18 meses resulta razonablemente suficiente para proteger a aquellas personas que aún no han cumplido los requisitos para adquirir el derecho a la pensión o jubilación –por lo que aún no se ha consolidado el derecho efectivo o concreto a gozar de la misma–, pero que estarían en una situación próxima o cercana a consolidar tal derecho, frente a eventuales modificaciones normativas en los requisitos o condiciones para acceder a la respectiva pensión o jubilación, en razón de cambios del derecho objetivo que regula el régimen en cuestión. Lo anterior, tomando en consideración el impacto que tal modificación podría tener para aquellas personas que les faltaban pocos meses para adquirir el derecho concreto a la pensión o jubilación.
Sobre este tema, se puede remitir -en primer lugar- al voto n.°846-92 de las 13:30 horas del 27 de marzo de 1992, en que esta Sala conoció de una consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad, referida al “Proyecto de Ley de Creación del Régimen General de Pensiones con Cargo al Presupuesto Nacional, Otros Regímenes Especiales y Reforma a la Ley Número 7092 del 21 de abril de 1988 y sus Reformas Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta” (expediente legislativo n.°11168). Oportunidad en que se resolvió:
“C) De igual forma consultan en caso de considerarse que antes de cumplir la edad y el período de cotización, sólo se tiene una expectativa de derecho y no un derecho adquirido, que suerte corre una disposición que legisle esta base, esto por contraposición al Convenio N 102 del O.l.T. que reconoce derechos desde otra perspectiva.
En este sentido, la Sala considera que carece de interés, toda vez que el proyecto - en sus artículos transitorios reconoce la conservación de la situación jubilatoria de los servidores que hubieren cumplido los requisitos para gozar del beneficio, y además lo extiende a los que pertenezcan o hayan pertenecido a los regímenes excluidos para adquirirlo, en un lapso de dieciocho meses, el cual parece razonablemente suficiente para garantizar cualesquiera eventuales derechos de buena fe.” Luego, en el voto n.°914-92 de las 14:40 horas del 8 de abril de 1992, este Tribunal retomó el tema y justificó su posición, en los siguientes términos:
“(...) En sentencia número 846-92 de las trece horas treinta minutos del veintisiete de marzo del año en curso, esta Sala, conociendo una consulta legislativa de constitucionalidad tuvo como razonable y suficiente para garantizar cualesquiera eventuales derechos adquiridos de buena fe, la norma contenida en el Proyecto de Ley de Creación del Régimen General de Pensiones con Cargo al Presupuesto Nacional, contenido en el expediente legislativo número 11168, en cuanto fija en dieciocho meses el plazo previo para conservar la situación jurídica jubilatoria creada en un determinado sistema de pensiones. En el presente caso el recurrente pretende se le reconozca ese derecho de conservación en un plazo superior a los dos años. La Sala para pronunciarse conforme lo hizo en la citada consulta, tomó en consideración la necesidad de proteger derechos inminentes de las personas cubiertas por los diversos regímenes de pensión, pero reconoció que la simple pertenencia no crea una situación jurídica consolidada. No se está en el caso particular ante la situación ya señalada por la Sala, pues resta al recurrente un plazo suficiente para que pueda tomar las previsiones del caso y adaptar sus expectativas a la nueva situación, por lo que no resulta procedente su amparo y así debe declararse. El accionante -según manifiesta en el propio escrito de interposición-, no había cumplido todos los requisitos para que se acordara su jubilación en la fecha en que formuló su solicitud, sino que los cumpliría en mil novecientos noventa y tres de no ser por la modificación que sufrió el régimen de Invalidéz Vejez y Muerte. No tenía en el momento de hacer la solicitud más que una expectativa de adquirirlo y no un derecho consolidado como lo pretende, de tal forma que en esos términos, no puede hablarse de una violación a lo dispuesto en el artículo 34 Constitucional. Por otra parte, la decisión que tomó la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social al modificar el régimen, estuvo basada en estudios actuariales y recomendaciones técnicas, de tal forma que no obedece a un capricho irracional ni a arbitrariedad alguna, por el contrario, según lo informa el representante de la recurrida, la decisión se tomó con el fin de salvar el régimen para poder cubrir a todos los pensionados en un futuro. Así las cosas, por no encontrarse violación constitucional alguna en el presente caso, conforme ya se dijo, procede declarar sin lugar el recurso.” (el destacado no corresponde al original).
En esta misma línea, se puede citar el voto n.°5476-93 de las 18:03 horas del 27 de octubre de 1993, en que se reitera:
“(...) Antes de discutir si el recurrente cumplía o no los requisitos que establecía la normativa que regulaba el Régimen de Comunicaciones, para el reconocimiento o goce efectivo del derecho al beneficio jubilatorio, es necesario reiterar dos conceptos fundamentales señalados por la Sala en el Voto N °1147-90 de las 16:00 horas del 21 de setiembre de 1990. El primero, consiste en la declaratoria que hace este Tribunal de la jubilación como derecho constitucional y fundamental de todo trabajador y que como tal debe ser reconocido a todo ser humano en condiciones de igualdad y sin discriminación alguna. El segundo, es un concepto que se desprende del anterior y que específicamente se menciona, tanto en el Considerando XI del Voto citado, como en el informe que remite a esta Sala el Ministro de Gobernación (ver folios 16 vuelto y 17 del recurso), al determinarse que el derecho a la jubilación se adquiere desde que se ingresa al respectivo régimen jubilatorio, al menos como derecho general de pertenencia al mismo, y se adquiere como derecho a la prestación actual del beneficio, desde el instante en que el interesado se encuentra en las condiciones de hecho previstas para recibirlo; sin que sea necesario, que se haya reclamado previamente u obtenido su reconocimiento. De conformidad con lo expuesto, es necesario señalar que el accionante adquirió el derecho a pertenecer al Régimen de Comunicaciones y el derecho a pensionarse algún día bajo ese régimen, si así lo desea, con el sólo ingreso; lo cual se operó mediante el artículo 108 de la Ley N 7015, que incluyó dentro del citado régimen a los trabajadores de la Administración Central del Ministerio de Gobernación. Dentro de este orden de ideas, es importante indicar que las condiciones específicas del régimen, entre las que se cuentan los requisitos de edad y tiempo laborado, si pueden variar en el futuro y podrán afectar a los beneficiarios que les falten más de 18 meses para cumplir con los requisitos de la normativa que se modifica...”.
Luego, se agregó que:
“El plazo de los 18 meses, durante el cual la modificación de las condiciones específicas del régimen no puede afectar al administrado, que proyectaba cumplir con los requisitos para pensionarse durante ese plazo, ha sido reiterado por la Sala en varios de sus pronunciamientos, con el objeto de proteger al beneficiario de un determinado régimen de pensión, de cambios repentinos en los requisitos específicos necesarios para obtener el reconocimiento concreto del beneficio jubilatorio; cambios que pueden agravar las condiciones para obtener la pensión, cuando le faltaban al interesado pocos meses para adquirir el derecho concreto al beneficio, con base en la norma modificada.” Por su parte, en el voto n.°06491-98 de las 9:45 horas del 10 de setiembre de 1998, se sistematizó la posición de esta Sala de la siguiente manera:
“V.- A) SOBRE LA MODIFICACION DE LA EDAD Y EL TIEMPO DE SERVICIO PARA JUBILARSE: Al tratar el tema de los derechos adquiridos en materia de pensiones, la Sala ha insistido en anteriores pronunciamientos en una diferencia medular entre el derecho de pertenencia al régimen y el derecho concreto a disfrutar de la pensión. Sobre estos dos matices del derecho adquirido a la jubilación señaló la Sala:
"En este sentido, es preciso observar que ese derecho deja de ser una simple expectativa y se adquiere desde que se ingresa al régimen jubilatorio, al menos como derecho general de pertenencia al mismo, y desde el instante en que el beneficiario se encuentra en las condiciones de hecho previstas para recibir el beneficio, como derecho a la prestación actual, sin que sea necesario que la haya reclamado, ni mucho menos declarado el reconocimiento o comenzado a percibirla... de la misma manera que el derecho a la herencia se adquiere en el momento de la muerte del causante, no en el de la apertura del juicio sucesorio, ni, mucho menos, en el de la adjudicación del derecho hereditario o de la entrega de los bienes al heredero." (sentencia Nº1147-90 de las 16:00 horas del 21 de setiembre de 1990).
VI.En el primero de los casos, el derecho de pertenencia a un régimen jubilatorio guarda un mayor grado de abstracción y consiste, en esencia, en el derecho a que permanezca el régimen de pensiones propio de la institución en que se labora, así como sus elementos o condiciones definitorias. El derecho a pertenecer al régimen significa a no ser excluido, a que se mantengan sus parámetros generales, como podría ser que la contribución sea tripartita —condición, que, por cierto, en proporciones similares es por sí misma un derecho constitucional, sin perjuicio de que la contribución estatal sea igual en todos los regímenes—. Por sus características, este derecho se adquiere por el solo ingreso a él, sin embargo, como ya se dijo, sus consecuencias son mucho más restringidas que las que se expondrán para el caso del derecho concreto a la pensión.
VII.El derecho concreto a gozar de la jubilación es aquél que tradicionalmente se ha utilizado como ejemplo para explicar el concepto de derecho adquirido. En esos mismos términos siempre se consideró que nacía en el momento en que el trabajador cumplía los requisitos exigidos por la ley vigente en ese momento para acceder al beneficio jubilatorio. Consecuencia de este razonamiento y de la diferencia de grado que se ha hecho es la indicada en la resolución número 6124-93 de las 14:30 horas del 23 de noviembre de 1993:
"En cuanto al goce efectivo del mismo, es un derecho que no puede limitarse, condicionarse o suprimirse en forma irracional en modo alguno, cuando se ha adquirido el derecho como tal, constituyéndose así en un derecho absoluto de disfrute. Sin embargo, no sucede del mismo modo con la expectativa de los trabajadores que cotizan para un régimen determinado, de manera que es hasta que se cumple con todos los presupuestos de ley -edad, años de pagar las cuotas, monto, etc.- que se obtiene dicho derecho.
Así, la pertenencia a un régimen determinado de pensiones o jubilaciones se adquiere desde el momento en que se comienza a cotizar en dicho régimen, pero el derecho concreto a la jubilación se adquiere cuando el interesado cumple con todos los presupuestos establecidos por ley, y no antes, como lo reclaman los accionantes, al considerar que la modificación de las condiciones para obtener este derecho es inconstitucional. Los mismos ostentan un derecho a la pertenencia de un régimen de pensiones, que en este caso es el régimen de Hacienda, ya que lo que la normativa impugnada -Ley Marco de Pensiones, número 7302- lo que hizo fue unificar los diferentes regímenes existentes y crear un "marco común", sin alterar en lo más mínimo el régimen de pertenencia de pensión de los empleados públicos. En efecto, es reconocido que tales regímenes están regulados mediante ley, la cual puede ser modificada o derogada en virtud de otra ley, y pretender que los presupuestos no pueden ser modificados nunca implicaría crear una limitación a cada régimen de pensiones y jubilaciones ya existente, que tiene rango constitucional en cuanto a su creación en general, pero no en cuanto a las especificaciones en particular. (En este mismo sentido, ver los pronunciamientos número 1341-93, de las 10:30 horas del 29 de marzo de 1993 y 3063-95 de las 15:30 horas del 13 de junio de 1995).
VIII.Este concepto se ha visto ampliado posteriormente a raíz de decisiones legislativas y de este Tribunal, en las que se reconoció un tiempo prudencial —dieciocho meses— anterior al cumplimiento de los requisitos para adquirir el derecho, pues se trata de una persona muy cercana a la fecha de jubilación, quien no sólo tiene una expectativa, sino que adopta medidas irreversibles para prepararse para su cambio de estado.” (el destacado no corresponde al original)
Posición confirmada por este Tribunal en múltiples votos, a saber: n.°1633-93 de las 14:33 horas del 13 de abril de 1993; n.°2765-93 de las 15:09 horas del 15 de junio de 1993; n.°3933-93 de las 15:21 horas del 12 de agosto de 1993; n.°0846-94 de las 17:18 horas del 9 de febrero de 1994; n.°1060-94 de las 15:42 horas del 22 de febrero de 1994; n.°1805-94 de las 11:03 horas del 15 de abril de 1994; n.°1879-94 de las 17:30 horas del 20 de abril de 1994; n.°0337-96 de las 9:51 horas del 19 de enero de 1996; n.°4682-96 de las 11:15 horas del 6 de setiembre de 1996; n.°2617-97 de las 15:54 horas del 14 de mayo de 1997; n.°6097-98 de las 15:33 horas del 26 de agosto de 1998; n.°1999-04808 de las 14:30 horas del 22 de junio de 1999; n.°2000-00331 de las 17:54 horas del 11 de enero del 2000; n.°2014-003551 de las 9:05 horas del 14 de marzo de 2014; n.°2014-12606 de las 9:05 horas del 1 de agosto de 2014; y n.°2015-1214 de las 14:45 horas del 27 de enero de 2015.
Criterio que fue reiterado una vez más por la mayoría de este Tribunal, justamente al conocer de la norma que se impugna en la presente acción (transitorio VI de la Ley n.°9544). Así lo hizo en el voto n.°2018-5758 de las 15:40 horas del 12 de abril de 2018, al conocer de la consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad que se tramitó respecto del entonces proyecto de ley n.°19.222, de reforma al régimen de Jubilación y Pensiones del Poder Judicial (expediente n.°17-017148-0007-CO), así como en la sentencia n.°2021-11957 de las 17:00 horas del 25 de mayo de 2021, emitida en la acción de inconstitucionalidad n.°18-007819-0007-CO. En este último caso, se resolvió:
“LXVII.- Redacta el Magistrado Castillo Víquez. Sobre el reclamo contra el Transitorio VI de la Ley número 9544. Según se explicó supra, la otra norma transitoria de la Ley número 9544 que los accionantes impugnan es el artículo Transitorio VI, que establece:
“TRANSITORIO VI.- Los servidores judiciales que cumplan con los requisitos para adquirir el derecho a la pensión según lo establecía el texto del título IX de la Ley No. 7333, de 5 de mayo de 1993, dentro de los dieciocho meses posteriores a la promulgación de la presente ley, podrán pensionarse al amparo de las disposiciones establecidas en el mencionado texto”.
Los accionantes argumentan que se trata de una disposición desproporcionada y arbitraria, y que los 18 meses fijados son un lapso irrazonable que en algún momento estableció la Sala y que ahora se adoptó por el legislador sin contar con estudio técnico que lo justifique. Estiman que se lesionan derechos consolidados y derechos adquiridos, y sostienen que se vulnera la seguridad jurídica y se quebranta la confianza en el sistema; que lesiona las expectativas de las personas y el proyecto de vida de los que estaban cerca de jubilarse y lesiona la solidaridad que es un principio relacionado con la seguridad social. Estiman que además se contradice con el artículo 224 de la misma ley pues en éste se reconoce un derecho adquirido a los servidores con 20 o más años de servicio en el Poder Judicial, en tanto que en este transitorio no se reconoce ese lapso a los trabajadores con más de 20 años de servicio y en su lugar, se los otorga únicamente a quienes cuentan con 28 años y 6 meses al momento de entrar en vigencia la ley.
La Procuraduría señaló que el derecho a disfrutar la jubilación se adquiere cuando se cumplen todos los requisitos previstos en la normativa y antes de eso lo que hay es una simple expectativa de derecho que no es asimilable a una situación jurídica consolidada. Se afirma que la Sala ha dicho que es suficiente un plazo de 18 meses para que la modificación de las condiciones no afecte al administrado que cumpla con los requisitos dentro de ese plazo y el mal llamado derecho de pertenencia no pasa de ser una simple expectativa que exclusivamente a quienes lleguen a alcanzar los requisitos en los 18 meses. El Transitorio VI implica que los cambios no fueron intempestivos ni repentinos. La Asamblea Legislativa indica que, tratándose de la expectativa de derechos referentes a régimen de pensiones o jubilaciones, deben atenerse a la legislación vigente y precedentes constitucionales, entendiendo que la modificación a un régimen específico es factible y no implica, en sí misma, una vulneración constitucional.
El plazo otorgado atiende a los parámetros requeridos para garantizar los eventuales derechos de las personas que cumplan con los requisitos dispuestos en la normativa y que con ello no se realice una modificación súbita a la norma. La Corte Suprema de Justicia expuso que en sus respuestas a la Asamblea siempre manifestó la necesidad de una gradualidad en la implementación del cambio normativo para respetar las expectativas válidas de las personas con más años de servicio.
LXVIII.- Continúa redactando el Magistrado Castillo Víquez. La cuestión de la posible inconstitucionalidad del transitorio VI de la Ley 9544 impugnado también fue analizada como parte de la respuesta dada a la Asamblea Legislativa con ocasión de la consulta realizada al entonces proyecto de ley número 19922 de reforma del régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial. En la sentencia número 2018-5758 tantas veces citada, la Sala dijo:
“XVII.- Sobre los cambios en los requerimientos para obtener el derecho de pensión. Los(as) consultantes consideran que el artículo 224 del proyecto de ley lesiona los principios de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad por cuanto se aumenta la edad de retiro y el número de años que el funcionario debe laborar, pero se reduce el porcentaje de dinero que recibirá por concepto de pensión con respecto al salario que devengaba. Asimismo, cuestionan el transitorio VI del proyecto, que dispone que solamente aquellas personas que estén a 18 meses de cumplir los requisitos para adquirir el derecho de pensión, podrán hacerlo al amparo de lo establecido por la Ley N° 7333. Las normas cuestionadas disponen lo siguiente:" Artículo 224- Los servidores judiciales con veinte o más años de servicio en el Poder Judicial podrán acogerse a una jubilación ordinaria igual a un ochenta y dos por ciento (82%) del promedio de los últimos veinte años de salarios mensuales ordinarios devengados en su vida laboral, actualizados según el índice de precios al consumidor (IPC), definido por el Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INEC), siempre y cuando hayan cumplido sesenta y cinco años de edad y hayan trabajado al menos treinta y cinco años.
TRANSITORIO VI- Los servidores judiciales que cumplan con los requisitos para adquirir el derecho a la pensión según lo establecía el texto del título IX de la Ley N.° 7333, de 5 de mayo de 1993, dentro de los dieciocho meses posteriores a la promulgación de la presente ley, podrán pensionarse al amparo de las disposiciones establecidas en el mencionado texto.
Previo a entrar a analizar el fondo del alegato planteado, hay que tener presente que el derecho de jubilación constituye la prestación económica que se obtiene luego de laborar y cotizar para un determinado régimen por un plazo establecido, y cuyo fin es garantizar una vida digna a la persona luego de que por razones de edad o invalidez se retira del mercado de trabajo. Dicho derecho, que se deriva del numeral 73 constitucional, se obtiene a partir del momento en que la persona cumple con todos los requisitos establecidos por la legislación vigente, pues en ese momento se da la situación de hecho que prevé la norma para otorgarse el beneficio. Cabe destacar, que el derecho a la jubilación no es irrestricto, ya que puede ser sometido a determinadas limitaciones, siempre y cuando estas sean establecidas mediante una ley formal, sean razonables y no su afecten su contenido esencial. Así, la Sala ha sostenido que el legislador tiene la potestad de establecer restricciones al derecho a la jubilación, cuando se logre comprobar que existen ciertas situaciones que ponen en riesgo la sostenibilidad de un régimen y, por ende, atenten contra la naturaleza del sistema como tal. Sobre el particular, en el voto número 2379-96 de las 11:06 del 17 de mayo de 1996, se estableció lo siguiente: […]
Por otra parte, la Sala también ha sostenido que existe una diferencia sustancial entre el derecho de pertenencia a un determinado régimen de pensiones, y el derecho concreto a disfrutar de una pensión. Sobre el particular, en el voto número 98-6491 de las 9:45 del 10 de septiembre de 1998, se dispuso sobre el particular lo siguiente:
"En este sentido, es preciso observar que ese derecho deja de ser una simple expectativa y se adquiere desde que se ingresa al régimen jubilatorio, al menos como derecho general de pertenencia al mismo, y desde el instante en que el beneficiario se encuentra en las condiciones de hecho previstas para recibir el beneficio, como derecho a la prestación actual, sin que sea necesario que la haya reclamado, ni mucho menos declarado el reconocimiento o comenzado a percibirla... de la misma manera que el derecho a la herencia se adquiere en el momento de la muerte del causante, no en el de la apertura del juicio sucesorio, ni, mucho menos, en el de la adjudicación del derecho hereditario o de la entrega de los bienes al heredero." (sentencia Nº1147-90 de las 16:00 horas del 21 de setiembre de 1990).
I.En el primero de los casos, el derecho de pertenencia a un régimen jubilatorio guarda un mayor grado de abstracción y consiste, en esencia, en el derecho a que permanezca el régimen de pensiones propio de la institución en que se labora, así como sus elementos o condiciones definitorias. El derecho a pertenecer al régimen significa a no ser excluido, a que se mantengan sus parámetros generales, como podría ser que la contribución sea tripartita —condición, que, por cierto, en proporciones similares es por sí misma un derecho constitucional, sin perjuicio de que la contribución estatal sea igual en todos los regímenes—. Por sus características, este derecho se adquiere por el solo ingreso a él, sin embargo, como ya se dijo, sus consecuencias son mucho más restringidas que las que se expondrán para el caso del derecho concreto a la pensión.
II.El derecho concreto a gozar de la jubilación es aquél que tradicionalmente se ha utilizado como ejemplo para explicar el concepto de derecho adquirido. En esos mismos términos siempre se consideró que nacía en el momento en que el trabajador cumplía los requisitos exigidos por la ley vigente en ese momento para acceder al beneficio jubilatorio. Consecuencia de este razonamiento y de la diferencia de grado que se ha hecho es la indicada en la resolución número 6124-93 de las 14:30 horas del 23 de noviembre de 1993:
"En cuanto al goce efectivo del mismo, es un derecho que no puede limitarse, condicionarse o suprimirse en forma irracional en modo alguno, cuando se ha adquirido el derecho como tal, constituyéndose así en un derecho absoluto de disfrute. Sin embargo, no sucede del mismo modo con la expectativa de los trabajadores que cotizan para un régimen determinado, de manera que es hasta que se cumple con todos los presupuestos de ley -edad, años de pagar las cuotas, monto, etc.- que se obtiene dicho derecho.
Así, la pertenencia a un régimen determinado de pensiones o jubilaciones se adquiere desde el momento en que se comienza a cotizar en dicho régimen, pero el derecho concreto a la jubilación se adquiere cuando el interesado cumple con todos los presupuestos establecidos por ley, y no antes, como lo reclaman los accionantes, al considerar que la modificación de las condiciones para obtener este derecho es inconstitucional. Los mismos ostentan un derecho a la pertenencia de un régimen de pensiones, que en este caso es el régimen de Hacienda, ya que lo que la normativa impugnada -Ley Marco de Pensiones, número 7302- lo que hizo fue unificar los diferentes regímenes existentes y crear un "marco común", sin alterar en lo más mínimo el régimen de pertenencia de pensión de los empleados públicos. En efecto, es reconocido que tales regímenes están regulados mediante ley, la cual puede ser modificada o derogada en virtud de otra ley, y pretender que los presupuestos no pueden ser modificados nunca implicaría crear una limitación a cada régimen de pensiones y jubilaciones ya existente, que tiene rango constitucional en cuanto a su creación en general, pero no en cuanto a las especificaciones en particular. (En este mismo sentido, ver los pronunciamientos número 1341-93, de las 10:30 horas del 29 de marzo de 1993 y 3063-95 de las 15:30 horas del 13 de junio de 1995).
Ahora bien, de lo expuesto se desprende, con claridad, que el derecho a la jubilación puede ser sometido a limitaciones, al igual que cualquier otro derecho fundamental. Lo anterior, conlleva a que no exista un derecho de la persona a jubilarse bajo condiciones específicas, pues éstas pueden ser variadas cuando resulte necesario para garantizar la existencia de un régimen de pensiones y jubilaciones específico, pues de no ser así, podrían crearse condiciones que hagan insostenible financieramente al sistema, lo que, finalmente, conllevaría a que el derecho a la jubilación se vea afectado severamente, o que su ejercicio no sea del todo posible, ante la inexistencia de fondos que impidan el pago al interesado el monto de su jubilación. Ante dicho panorama, la Sala considera que las normas cuestionadas no resultan inconstitucionales, en el tanto su fin es, precisamente, garantizar la permanencia del Régimen de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial, para lo cual se fijaron parámetros y requerimientos a partir de la opinión de expertos que fueron recibidos por la Comisión Especial que dictaminó el expediente legislativo número 19.922, así como de estudios de naturaleza técnica que constataron la existencia de una problemática que puede llegar a afectar la sostenibilidad del Régimen mencionado, y para lo cual emitieron una serie de recomendaciones.
En ese sentido, al comprobar que la variación de requisitos dispuesta por el numeral 224 y el plazo fijado por el transitorio VI del proyecto de ley tienen como fin último garantizar el derecho de jubilación de los(as) servidores(as) judiciales, la Sala descarta el vicio alegado.” LXIX.- Continúa redactando el Magistrado Castillo Víquez. En la cita anterior, este Tribunal abordó precisamente el reclamo que ahora reiteran los accionantes en relación con la razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de la disposición transitoria VI en cuanto fijó en 18 meses el plazo para cumplir requisitos y jubilarse o pensionarse con el régimen derogado. La base del razonamiento en esa ocasión se apoyó en la diferencia entre el derecho al disfrute efectivo de la jubilación -que solamente se adquiere con el cumplimiento de los requisitos establecidos- y el derecho de pertenencia que tienen los participantes en el régimen que no han cumplido requisitos y que constituye solamente una expectativa respecto de las condiciones de disfrute establecidas.
Por esto, los cambios que se realicen en la estructura del régimen pueden aplicarse a todos los que solo ostentan un derecho de pertenencia, siempre que tal decisión se justifique frente a la finalidad y objetivos del régimen y de las modificaciones planteadas, es decir, que se presente como razonable y proporcionada. Sobre este último aspecto se estima apropiado reforzar los argumentos dados por esta Sala en su momento, pues los accionantes insisten en atacar ese plazo de transición por entender que 18 meses es un lapso irrazonable, arbitrario e injusto con una cantidad de personas que por días o semanas quedaron por fuera de la posibilidad de jubilarse a pesar de tener una gran cantidad de años servidos o bien, la edad para el retiro.
En este contexto, la mayoría de la Sala, inicia acentuando el hecho de que la fijación del plazo de 18 meses como plazo de transición, encuentra su fundamento en la jurisprudencia específica de este Tribunal para el tema de los cambios en los regímenes previsionales, tal y como se ha sostenido -entre varias- en la sentencia número 1993-5476 de las 18:03 horas del 27 de octubre de 1993 que conoció el reclamo de una persona que alegaba derechos adquiridos para jubilarse con las reglas de un régimen derogado. En su decisión se explicó sobre el tema concreto:
“II. (…) Dentro de este orden de ideas, es importante indicar que las condiciones específicas del régimen, entre las que se cuentan los requisitos de edad y tiempo laborado, si pueden variar en el futuro y podrán afectar a los beneficiarios que les falten más de 18 meses para cumplir con los requisitos de la normativa que se modifica, pero su derecho a pertenecer al régimen y a jubilarse en las mismas condiciones generales del régimen, no puede ser modificado por haberse consolidado como derecho adquirido. El plazo de los 18 meses, durante el cual la modificación de las condiciones específicas del régimen no puede afectar al administrado, que proyectaba cumplir con los requisitos para pensionarse durante ese plazo, ha sido reiterado por la Sala en varios de sus pronunciamientos, con el objeto de proteger al beneficiario de un determinado régimen de pensión, de cambios repentinos en los requisitos específicos necesarios para obtener el reconocimiento concreto del beneficio jubilatorio; cambios que pueden agravar las condiciones para obtener la pensión, cuando le faltaban al interesado pocos meses para adquirir el derecho concreto al beneficio, con base en la norma modificada.” (el destacado no es del original) De tal manera, al disponer la aplicación del régimen anterior a quienes cumplieran los requisitos en un plazo de 18 meses, el legislador se ha guiado por la posición de este Tribunal en este tema específico del lapso adecuado para equilibrar la necesidad de reforma y actualización de regímenes de jubilaciones y pensiones, con el necesario resguardo de cierto grupo de cotizantes en frente “…de cambios repentinos en los requisitos específicos necesarios para obtener el reconocimiento concreto del beneficio jubilatorio; cambios que pueden agravar las condiciones para obtener la pensión, cuando le faltaban al interesado pocos meses para adquirir el derecho concreto al beneficio, con base en la norma modificada” según la propia expresión del Tribunal.
Lo anterior cuenta en favor de la validez constitucional de la medida tomada por el legislador, por lo que una declaración de inconstitucionalidad en este caso, requiere de la aportación de elementos de juicio que logren demostrar la ausencia de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad de emplear el plazo de 18 meses fijado por la jurisprudencia constitucional a partir de la vigencia de la reforma, para la extensión del ámbito de cobertura del régimen previsional anterior.
En el caso concreto sin embargo, no logran los accionantes cumplir con el cometido anteriormente descrito y más bien las características de la reforma apuntan a sostener lo actuado por el legislador, pues en primer término, la Sala ha sopesado la magnitud de los cambios ocurridos en lo que se refiere a las condiciones de elegibilidad, para concluir que su variación no solo tiene un sustento técnico en los esquemas actuariales, tal y como se explicó al abordar dicha cuestión, sino que -adicionalmente- los cambios introducidos no representan -en términos generales- un cambio extremadamente brusco y amplio respecto a lo que se exigía anteriormente. Tómese como ejemplo el caso de una jubilación ordinaria de un cotizante que solo ha laborado en el Poder Judicial, donde se aprecia que para jubilarse ordinariamente con el nuevo régimen, el servidor que ingresó con una edad entre los 18 y los 30 años, deberá laborar 3 años más que con el sistema anterior, mientras que para una edad de ingreso por encima de 30 años, la obligada permanencia como trabajador activo se eleva 5 años respecto del sistema jubilatorio anterior.
Parecida situación se aprecia para los casos generales de retiro anticipado, cuya comparación permite concluir que, en la gran mayoría de los casos, la obligación de permanencia como trabajador activo se eleva en 5 años respecto del sistema jubilatorio anterior; solo encuentra la Sala una excepción en el caso del retiro anticipado por años de servicio, en razón de que la normativa anterior no contenía una edad mínima para el retiro, mientras que ahora se exige una edad mínima de 60 años para mujeres y 62 años para hombres, caso en el cual, sin bien los cambios pueden sobrepasar los 7 años no es menos cierto que los límites mínimos (60 y 62 años para mujeres y varones respectivamente) no significan en sí mismo una exigencia excesiva en términos de dignidad humana y esfuerzo. En fin, de todos los datos anteriores el Tribunal entiende que el cambio operado en los requisitos de elegibilidad, no resultan desproporcionados como se plantea por parte de los accionantes y por ende no hacían constitucionalmente necesario un régimen de transición diferente del que fue elegido por el legislador.
Agréguese a lo anterior que contrario a lo sostenido en algunos de los escritos de impugnación, los estudios técnicos sí contemplaron la necesidad de un sistema de transición breve, en aras de la sostenibilidad de la reforma discutida. Al respecto, en las cuatro opciones desarrolladas por la autoridad técnica, y en particular en los escenarios IICE 3 e IICE 4, (de los cuales se tomaron las guías para el texto final de la reforma) se especifica que los cálculos de sostenibilidad incluyen el supuesto de que las modificaciones se aplicarán de forma general a todos los cotizantes, excluyendo únicamente a quienes tuvieran más de 28 años de servicio a la fecha de entrada en vigor del cambio. Esto puede comprobarse con las exposiciones y documentos aportados al expediente legislativo y visibles en los folios 2218 y 2230, de modo que la decisión legislativa final de reconocerle únicamente a los cotizantes con 28 años y medio de servicio la posibilidad de jubilarse bajo el régimen anterior, sí formó parte de los requerimientos técnicos necesarios que se tomaron en cuenta para diseñar las modificaciones que darían sustento financiero al régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial.
Asimismo, el plazo de 18 meses estuvo ampliamente apoyado por el criterio técnico, no sólo por razones de seguridad jurídica de acuerdo a la jurisprudencia constitucional, sino también por razones de solvencia actuarial. Así, en su comparecencia el Superintendente de Pensiones, Dr. Alvaro Ramos (ver folio 1691 y ss del expediente legislativo), se refirió a la necesidad de hacer una transición de 18 meses en respeto a la jurisprudencia constitucional (ver folio1711). En el mismo sentido, se manifestó la Procuraduría General de la República (folio 2115) y la Universidad de Costa Rica (folios 2264, 2265 y 2942 y ss), al señalar:
“Los últimos marcos que se recomiendan aquí, es el 3 y 4, contemplan exclusivamente lo que usted ha señalado de 18“Los últimos marcos que se recomiendan aquí, es el 3 y 4, contemplan exclusivamente lo que usted ha señalado de 18 meses” (Dr. Max Soto Jiménez) Básicamente los marcos específicamente del IICE, se pasó a tratar de modelar lo más cercano posible a dieciocho meses. En realidad, para serles sincero, a nivel de modelamiento va a ser dos años. O sea, los que tienen 28 años de antigüedad para arriba, el modelo matemático asumió que a ellos se les iba a respetar un transitorio, es decir, no se midió en forma completamente precisa pero eso es por el mismo modelamiento de las probabilidades de vida, se tienen por algo, no para cada medio año y hay razonamientos.
Si uno es teórico, puede dedicarse medio año a eso, pero digamos para contestarle se estimuló lo más cercano posible y la simulación asumió que todos los que tengan más de veintiocho de antigüedad, a ellos sí se les iba a respetar el derecho de mantenerse su pensión con el régimen vigente.
Es lo que usted ve ahí cuando dice “ participación con años de servicio, mayor o igual a veintiocho”. A nivel de paasarlo a reglamento, lo que recomendaría -y recomendamos nosotros-es votarlo a dieciocho meses, lo que la Sala Constitucional dictó.” (Dr. Ronald Cartín Carranza) Diputada Pisk: Nada más para estar clara. A pesar de esa ventana a los que tienen más de veintiocho años, ustedes recomiendan que esto entre en vigencia para todos. Independientemente de los años laborados, entra en vigencia a los dieciocho meses. ¿Es así? Perfecto Dr. Max Soto Jiménez: Los que se pensionan dentro de los dieciocho meses siguientes, mantengan el derecho de la ley vigente:” (…)
“lógicamente, un transitorio superior a los 18 meses afecta negativamente la solvencia actuarial del fondo” (folio 2945) En otro aspecto relacionado con este tema, algunos accionantes han señalado una infracción al Convenio 157 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo. Sobre ello debe indicarse primero que dicho instrumento no aparece ratificado por nuestro país, por lo que su valor como parámetro para esta Sala, va a depender de que en su contenido se hayan establecido lineamientos claros y específicos -validados por un buen número de Estado- sobre el tema concreto que aquí se valora a saber, guías para proteger los derechos “en proceso de adquisición”. Sin embargo, en el texto del convenio no se incluye ninguna disposición que permita a la Sala entender que el Estado costarricense ha actuado a contrapelo de la tendencia internacional en la protección de derechos humanos, dado que el mencionado instrumento se limita a regular condiciones para que los Estados puedan dar reconocimiento y protección a trabajadores que por diferentes razones han acumulado derechos al amparo de diversas legislaciones estatales. Lo anterior no resulta aplicable al caso concreto por lo que este reclamo debe descartarse.
Finalmente, algunos de los accionantes han mencionado dentro de este reclamo concreto, la existencia de una lesión a la Convención Americana Sobre Derechos Humanos, señalando que ya la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, como intérprete de dicho instrumento, fijó las condiciones mínimas exigidas a los Estados para el respeto del derecho a la seguridad social en el ámbito del sistema americano de Derechos Humanos. Refieren los interesados que en el caso “Muelle Flores contra Perú” se dejaron establecidas unas pautas que se ven contradichas con la emisión de la Ley 9544 en general y en particular con la disposición transitoria VI con la que se afectan derechos convencionales de las personas con menos de 28 años y seis meses de servicio a la fecha de entrada en vigencia de la reforma. Sobre el tema, la revisión de texto de la decisión citada permite a la Sala concluir que dicha sentencia contiene elementos relevantes para la interpretación del derecho fundamental a la seguridad social, pero que no resultan relevantes ni pertinentes para la solución de este reclamo ni de este proceso en general.
En la sentencia mencionada, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos resolvió el caso de una persona ya jubilada, a quien se le dejó de pagar la suma periódica correspondiente que había venido percibiendo, debido a la privatización de la empresa pública que cubría dicho pago. El caso resultó más grave aún, por cuanto el interesado obtuvo por parte de la justicia peruana, al menos dos sentencias firmes en su favor y sin embargo, al momento de plantear su queja ante el órgano de justicia internacional, no había logrado que se hiciera efectiva la reanudación del pago efectivo de su jubilación. La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, expuso la esencia fáctica del caso así:
“191. (…(L)a Corte nota que el presente caso no versa sobre las obligaciones de progresividad derivadas del artículo 26 de la Convención, sino que se refiere a la falta de concretización material del derecho a la pensión, como parte integrante del derecho a la seguridad social, del señor Muelle Flores, debido a la falta de cumplimiento y ejecución de sentencias dictadas a su favor a nivel interno en el marco de la privatización de la empresa estatal, efectuado luego de su jubilación. El señor Muelle Flores adquirió su derecho a la pensión bajo un régimen de contribuciones administrado por el Estado, es decir que adquirió el derecho a recibir una pensión luego de haber realizado aportes durante varios años. La legalidad de su incorporación a dicho régimen fue confirmado a nivel interno (supra párr. 74)” Y seguidamente, emite un valioso resumen de su esfuerzo de revisión e interpretación de las distintas fuentes que estimó pertinentes a su tarea de delimitación del derecho a la seguridad social en el caso concreto:
“192. En este sentido, con base en los criterios y elementos constitutivos del derecho a la seguridad social, y tomando en cuenta los hechos y particularidades del presente caso, las obligaciones del Estado en relación con el derecho a la pensión son las siguientes: a) el derecho a acceder a una pensión luego de adquirida la edad legal para ello y los requisitos establecidos en la normativa nacional, para lo cual deberá existir un sistema de seguridad social que funcione y garantice las prestaciones. Este sistema deberá ser administrado o supervisado y fiscalizado por el Estado (en caso de que sea administrado por privados); b) garantizar que las prestaciones sean suficientes en importe y duración, que permitan al jubilado gozar de condiciones de vida adecuadas y de accesos suficiente a la atención de salud, sin discriminación; c) debe haber accesibilidad para obtener una pensión, es decir que se deberán brindar condiciones razonables, proporcionadas y transparentes para acceder a ella.
Asimismo, los costos de las cotizaciones deben ser asequibles y los beneficiarios deben recibir información sobre el derecho de manera clara y transparente, especialmente si se tomara alguna medida que pueda afectar el derecho, como por ejemplo la privatización de una empresa; d) las prestaciones por pensión de jubilación deben ser garantizadas de manera oportuna y sin demoras, tomando en consideración la importancia de este criterio en personas mayores, y e) se deberá disponer de mecanismos efectivos de reclamo frente a una violación del derecho a la seguridad social, con el fin de garantizar el acceso a la justicia y la tutela judicial efectiva, lo cual abarca también la concretización material del derecho a través de la ejecución efectiva de decisiones favorables dictadas a nivel interno.” (el destacado en negrita no está en el original) Como puede observarse, ninguno de los puntos citados por el tribunal internacional ha sido desatendido por parte del legislador costarricense en su esfuerzo de generar medidas de orden general para la modificación y ajuste del régimen de jubilaciones y pensiones del Poder Judicial; al contrario, se respeta claramente la situación de las personas que ya habían adquirido el derecho al disfrute de su jubilación o pensión por haber cumplido con los requisitos fijados y por otra se asegura la oportuna financiación de una jubilación por vejez a aquellos a los quienes aún les falta cumplir con las condiciones legalmente fijadas.
En conclusión, la Sala entiende de lo expuesto que no existen elementos de juicio que permitan afirmar que el plazo establecido en el transitorio VI de la Ley 9544, es irrazonable o desproporcionado respecto de la finalidad que se pretende con la disposición, y más bien, la decisión legislativa resulta justificada frente a los cambios realizados. De igual forma, no hay infracción al derecho convencional que declarar y por ende la acción debe declararse sin lugar en este aspecto.” Del precedente previamente transcrito interesa resaltar: a) que no existe un derecho de la persona a jubilarse bajo condiciones específicas, pues éstas pueden ser variadas cuando esto resulte necesario para garantizar la existencia de un régimen de pensiones y jubilaciones específico, pues de no ser así, podrían crearse condiciones que hagan insostenible financieramente al sistema, lo que, finalmente, conllevaría a que el derecho a la jubilación se vea afectado severamente, o que su ejercicio no sea del todo posible, ante la inexistencia de fondos que impidan el pago al interesado del monto de su jubilación; b) en este caso en particular, la reforma al Régimen de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial justamente procura garantizar su permanencia, para lo cual se fijaron parámetros y requerimientos a partir de la opinión de expertos que fueron recibidos por la Comisión Especial que dictaminó el expediente legislativo n.°19.922, así como de estudios de naturaleza técnica que fueron incorporados al expediente; y c) respecto del plazo de 18 meses fijado en el transitorio VI, no solo encuentra su fundamento en la jurisprudencia específica –y reiterada– de este Tribunal para el tema de los cambios en los regímenes provisionales, sino que también tiene debido sustento técnico, por razones de solvencia actuarial, como ya se destacó en tal voto.
Debe insistirse, una vez más, que el plazo de 18 meses previsto en el transitorio impugnado, no solo se fundamenta en la amplia jurisprudencia de este Tribunal sobre este tema, sino que se encuadra dentro de lo razonable, a la luz de los criterios técnicos incorporados al expediente legislativo. En cuanto a este punto, resulta de particular interés remitir al informe emitido por el Instituto de Investigaciones en Ciencias Económicas de la Universidad de Costa Rica (IICE), el 4 de julio de 2017, denominado Producto 6 “Recopilación e informe final: conclusiones y recomendaciones”, como principal criterio técnico incorporado al expediente legislativo.
De relevancia para esta acción, destaca que en el estudio se hace un primer análisis de tres escenarios, que corresponden a tres marcos normativos distintos: el vigente al momento del estudio y dos reformas propuestas (“texto sustitutivo” y propuesta de “Corte Plena”). En el estudio se concluye que los tres marcos resultan insolventes. Al respecto, se puede observar la tabla visible en la página 5:
Lo relevante es que tanto el “texto sustitutivo” como el de “Corte Plena”, contemplaban una participación con años de servicio de “>=20”, tal y como se constata en la tabla agregada en la página 43:
De allí, que en el oficio suscrito por el superintendente de pensiones a. i., oficio SP-1240-2023 del 19 de octubre de 2023 (asociado a este expediente el 20 de octubre de 2023), se haya afirmado que tanto el texto sustitutivo como el texto de Corte Plena establecían “un transitorio donde se le mantenía el perfil de requisitos y beneficios anterior (ley 7333) a las personas con veinte años o más de servicios. Lo anterior redundaba en que ambas propuestas no generaban el impacto en la magnitud y oportunidad requerida, dada la situación actuarial del régimen”.
Esto se relaciona, principalmente, con la acción n.°19-024589-0007-CO, en que se pretende –en el fondo– extender el régimen transitorio, para personas con 20 años o más de servicio, pero en el citado estudio técnico ya se concluyó que esto no era viable.
Por lo demás, la mencionada falta de viabilidad de los textos propuestos provocó que el IICE presentara cuatro escenarios nuevos, que se describen en la tabla visible en la página 57:
Entre los principales cambios que destacan en estos escenarios es que se modifica la participación con años de servicio a “>=28”.
Incluso, llama la atención que, al comparar o contrastar estos nuevos escenarios, con las propuestas originales (que no eran viables), el mismo IICE haga la siguiente afirmación (página 71):
“De la comparación de los diferentes resultados obtenidos en cada uno de los Marcos Normativos (IICE_1 vs IICE_2 vs IICE_3 vs IICE_4), se observa que:
-los principales indicadores de solvencia actuarial aquí cuantificados (el Balance Actuarial y el respectivo indicador de “Nivel de Insolvencia”) bajo los MARCOS IICE_2, IICE_3 e IICE_4, mejoran significativamente con respecto a los indicadores obtenidos para el mismo escenario económico bajo el MARCO IICE_1 (que recordemos, es un marco normativo similar al de Corte Plena pero con un transitorio mucho más limitado y un aporte obrero y del jubilado del 15%).” De lo que se puede interpretar que una de las modificaciones que tuvo que realizar el IICE, en procura de ofrecer un escenario solvente, fue incluir un “transitorio mucho más limitado”.
Finalmente, el IICE concluye (página 71) que:
“7.5 Valoración final de los resultados obtenidos El análisis desarrollado indica que bajo cualquiera de los primeros cinco esquemas de beneficios y aportes hasta ahora estudiados por el IICE (o sea, bajo 1-MARCO VIGENTE, 2-MARCO TEXTO SUSTITUTIVO, 3-MARCO CORTE PLENA, 4-MARCO IICE_1 y 5-MARCO IICE_2), el Fondo NO podría garantizar sus promesas en el largo plazo utilizando sólo los propios recursos asignados por el Marco en cuestión.
En contraste, bajo cualquiera de los últimos dos esquemas de beneficios y aportes propuestos por el IICE (o sea, bajo el MARCO IICE_3 o el MARCO IICE-4), el Fondo tendría solvencia actuarial y sí podría garantizar sus promesas en el largo plazo utilizando sólo los propios recursos asignados por el Marco en cuestión (o sea, sería autosuficiente).
Bajo la premisa de que el Fondo debe garantizar por sí mismo los beneficios que promete (sin crear cargas adicionales al Estado o al resto de los trabajadores costarricenses), la recomendación del presente informe del IICE al Poder Judicial consiste en escoger entre uno de los dos marcos normativos IICE_3 o IICE_4). Estos marcos normativos solamente resultan insolventes en un escenario económico financiero “Pesimista”.” En cuyo caso, cabe reiterar que estos dos escenarios propuestos (IICE_3 e IICE_4) contemplaban una participación con años de servicio “>=28”. Sobre este punto, en el citado oficio SP-1240-2023, el superintendente de pensiones a. i. explica: “Así, en el escenario “MARCO IICE_4” se indica que “Partic. con años servicio > = 28 (...) Aplican Reglas Marco Vigente”, lo que significa que todas las personas con 28 años de servicio o más a la fecha de corte de la valuación se mantienen bajo las condiciones previas a la reforma”. Lo que suponía o se traducía a proponer un transitorio de 24 meses.
Ahora, volviendo nuevamente al estudio del IICE, en su apartado de consideraciones finales (página 74) se afirma:
“b. Sobre el “transitorio” que permitiría a las personas que se jubilarían en un plazo de dos años y la posibilidad de ampliar ese transitorio para las personas que se jubilarían en un plazo de cinco años.
Un aumento en el “transitorio” pospone los ajustes y por lo tanto afecta negativamente los ingresos del Fondo. Para valorar adecuadamente el efecto de un aumento de ese transitorio sería necesario realizar un análisis actuarial completo.
Por otra parte, una decisión en esta dirección puede inducir a los administradores y agentes políticos a realizar gestiones para incluir a grupos sucesivamente más numerosos, de forma que al final un “transitorio” de dos años terminaría transformándose en un transitorio de cinco, seis o incluso más años.
Finalmente, la ampliación del transitorio pospone parte de los ajustes, por lo que análisis de rentabilidad y solvencia del Fondo pueden generar la impresión de que los ajustes que sí se realizaron no surtieron efecto.” También se hizo una referencia (en la página 74 y 75) al tema de la gradualidad en la aplicación de los ajustes y se indicó:
“f. Gradualidad.
En algunas ocasiones se ha consultado si los ajustes planteados, tanto en los aportes como en las edades de retiro, pueden aplicarse en forma gradual. La idea detrás de estas consultas es atenuar el costo del ajuste para la población participante.
El equipo de trabajo del IICE, habiendo determinado que el régimen de jubilaciones y pensiones vigente para el Poder Judicial es insolvente, ha considerado fundamental que los ajustes se realicen a la mayor brevedad posible. Como se indicó anteriormente, el Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial es insolvente en este momento, y cada día que se pospone el ajuste se agudiza la situación de insolvencia. Es tomando en consideración estos lineamientos que el equipo técnico del IICE no considera adecuada la aplicación de ajustes en forma gradual.” De lo expuesto, se pueden obtener las siguientes conclusiones: a) en el estudio técnico sí se analizaron escenarios que incluían la posibilidad de mantener el perfil de requisitos y beneficios existentes con anterioridad a la reforma propuesta, respecto de personas con 20 años o más de servicio, pero se concluyó que esto no era viable; b) esto provocó la necesidad de proponer nuevos escenarios, que reducían la aplicación del perfil anterior a personas con 28 años o más de servicio (lo que se traduciría en un transitorio de 24 meses); y c) en cuanto a la posibilidad de ampliar ese transitorio a las personas que se jubilarían en un plazo de 5 años (lo que se refiere, particularmente, a las pretensiones formuladas en la acción n.°22-0014613-0007-CO), lo cierto es que en el propio estudio no se aconseja tal ampliación.
Adicionalmente, debe tomarse en consideración que el mencionado informe del IICE -producto 6- se realizó con corte a diciembre de 2015, de forma tal, que el plazo de 24 meses de régimen transitorio recomendado en el estudio estaba proyectado para amparar a aquellas personas que a diciembre de 2017 cumplieron los requisitos previstos en la Ley N°7333; sin embargo, nótese que la Ley N°9544 se aprobó en el año 2018 y entró a regir en mayo de ese año, lo que supone que, de facto, se dio un transitorio de 47 meses (si se toma en consideración el plazo transcurrido entre la fecha de corte del estudio técnico y la fecha de efectiva promulgación de la ley, así como el plazo de 18 meses finalmente dispuesto en el transitorio VI). Asimismo, ese ajuste final de 24 a 18 meses, en el caso del transitorio impugnado, puede entenderse como justificado, en tanto vino a compensar, parcialmente, el tiempo transcurrido entre la fecha de corte del estudio actuarial realizado por el IICE –producto número 6– y la fecha en que se aprobó y promulgó la Ley n.°9544. Lo anterior, en aras de procurar por la efectividad de la reforma al régimen.
La Asamblea Legislativa, en el momento de aprobar el transitorio que se cuestiona de inconstitucional, se apegó a los reiterados antecedentes de este Tribunal y actuó dentro de parámetros razonables, con debido y suficiente sustento en los criterios técnicos incorporados al expediente legislativo.
De acuerdo con el estudio actuarial del 2015 se tenía un déficit actuarial de 6.37 billones, lo que ponía en riesgo su sostenibilidad. Es más, se proyectaba, para el año 2029, un primer punto crítico para el régimen, pues se comenzarían a usar los intereses generados por las reservas del Fondo para poder hacer frente a sus promesas de pago. Para el año 2040 se proyectaba un segundo punto crítico, por ser el primer año en que sería necesario utilizar las reservas con el fin de hacer frente a las promesas del Fondo y, para el año 2048, se proyectaba un tercer punto crítico, momento en que el Fondo ya no podría hacer frente al pago de sus promesas. Lo que evidencia la situación crítica en que se encontraba el régimen.
Debe insistirse que la crisis de los regímenes de pensiones obedece a que se invirtió la pirámide poblacional, lo que afecta especialmente a los regímenes de reparto.
En el último estudio actuarial realizado al régimen, con corte al 31 de diciembre de 2022 (denominado "Valuación actuarial del Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, periodo 2022” y visible en la página web de la Superintendencia de Pensiones), se exponen las siguientes conclusiones:
Lo que provoca, incluso, que en ese mismo estudio se recomiende plantear un proyecto de ley que permita disminuir el costo de los derechos en curso de pago, en el sentido de:
Reducir el porcentaje de la tasa de reemplazo del 80% al 50% en los futuros derechos sucesorios.
Por 10 años, reconocer un 50% de inflación a los derechos en curso de pago.
De lo que se deriva –y que resulta de interés para esta acción– que, si bien se constata una reducción en el déficit actuarial, este aún no se ha podido eliminar, por lo que incluso se recomienda la adopción de medidas adicionales, para aumentar la solvencia del Fondo y prolongar su capacidad de pago.
No hay que perder de vista que este régimen es uno de reparto, en el que los trabajadores activos -con sus cotizaciones- financian el pago de las jubilaciones y pensiones en curso. De ahí que no resulta razonable y no es acorde con las reglas actuariales, echar mano a los rendimientos del fondo, pues ello significa que hay un desequilibrio financiero -los pagos de las jubilaciones y pensiones en curso (mes a mes) superan los ingresos por cotizaciones del fondo- y, además, el fondo cada día decrece, con lo que se entra en una crisis que puede conllevar al cierre del régimen -déficit actuarial-.
En el resultado 33 tenemos la respuesta. Al respecto el presidente de Fondo de Pensiones remite al estudio actuarial realizado por el MBA Raúl Hernández González, en el que se concluye:
“En el siguiente cuadro se presenta un resumen de lo determinado en cada una de las corridas efectuadas. Los resultados mostrados incluyen el número de personas adicionales que pueden beneficiarse, como el incremento total del déficit. En los anexos se incluye el balance respectivo:
(...) es importante indicar que ... actualmente la solvencia es inferior a uno, por lo tanto, cualquier mejora de los beneficios provocaría que la solvencia disminuya más”.
Por lo demás, el presidente del Fondo de Pensiones aclara que las cifras están expresadas en miles de millones de colones, en razón de lo cual debe leerse para el último escenario de 10 años plazo y 2759 personas, trescientos veinticuatro mil once millones de colones, equivalente aproximadamente a seiscientos tres millones de dólares de incremento en el déficit en comparación con el escenario abierto con una tasa de crecimiento del 1% que se utilizó como base bajo dicha metodología de valoración actuarial. También señala que debe quedar claro que, cualquier incremento de tiempo en el transitorio VI, provocaría un incremento en los egresos y/u obligaciones a los que este régimen se ve sometido, por lo cual todos los escenarios arrojan una desmejora en los indicadores correspondientes y la pretensión de esta acción provocaría un incremento en el déficit del Régimen del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial –FJPPJ-, con incrementos relativos entre el 13.31 % y el 87.65 % de dicho déficit. Agrega que, al valorar el indicador de la razón de solvencia, este indicador desmejora relativamente entre un 1.57 % y un 9.40 %. Concluye, finalmente, que ambos indicadores coinciden en su tendencia hacia el desmejoramiento de la salud financiera del régimen, en caso de acogerse cualquier ampliación.
En esta dirección, hay que tener presente que, a diferencia de las sentencias de los tribunales ordinarios, cuyos efectos son inter-partes, la sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional tiene efectos erga omnes, de ahí que el Tribunal debe ser sumamente cauto a la hora resolver una cuestión, pues debe tomar muy en cuenta los efectos en el ámbito político, económico, social, cultural, etc. Al respecto, en la sentencia n.° 2000-7730, se estableció lo siguiente:
“También la doctrina del Derecho constitucional observa que al hacer una interpretación del contenido de una norma: “1) debe prevalecer el contenido finalista de la Constitución, que es garantizar la libertad y la dignidad humanas; 2) debe ser interpretada con un criterio amplio, liberal y práctico; 3) las palabras de la Constitución deben ser interpretadas en su sentido general y común, a menos que sea claro que el creador de la norma se refirió a un significado técnico-legal; 4) debe ser interpretada como un todo, como un conjunto armónico; 5) hay que tener en cuenta las situaciones sociales, económicas y políticas que existen al momento de realizarse la interpretación; 6) las excepciones y privilegios deben interpretarse con criterio restrictivo, y 7) los actos públicos se presumen constitucionales si mediante la interpretación pueden ser armonizados con la Ley Fundamental.” (Las negritas no corresponden al original).
En atención a lo analizado hasta este momento, se puede concluir que el plazo de 18 meses previsto en el transitorio impugnado se sustentó, de forma razonable, en los datos arrojados por los respectivos estudios técnicos. En cambio, el que esta Sala disponga ampliar tal plazo –tal y como se pretende en la presente acción–, supondría generar un desmejoramiento en la salud financiera del régimen, que aún, al día de hoy, presenta un déficit actuarial –pese a los efectos favorables que ha provocado la reforma realizada mediante Ley nro. 9544–.
La Sala Constitucional, siguiendo la más autorizada doctrina sobre el tema, tiene un concepto claro y preciso sobre las situaciones jurídicas consolidadas y su diferencia con los derechos adquiridos. En efecto, se considera que se ha consolidado una situación desde la óptica jurídica cuando la persona cumple con los supuestos de hecho -requisitos- para obtener un derecho, antes solo se tiene una expectativa de derecho. Se diferencia de un derecho adquirido, porque los ingresos han entrado en el patrimonio de la persona, de ahí que en un régimen de jubilaciones y pensiones se entiende por la situación jurídica consolidada cuando la persona cumple con todos los requisitos establecidos por ley para que se le otorgue el derecho jubilatorio o la pensión. Por su parte, se está frente a un derecho adquirido en lo referente a los ingresos que ingresan al patrimonio de los jubilados y pensionados. Sobre el particular, la Sala Constitucional ha establecido lo siguiente:
“Los conceptos de "derecho adquirido" y "situación jurídica consolidada" aparecen estrechamente relacionados en la doctrina constitucionalista. Es dable afirmar que, en términos generales, el primero denota a aquella circunstancia consumada en la que una cosa –material o inmaterial, trátese de un bien previamente ajeno o de un derecho antes inexistente– ha ingresado en (o incidido sobre) la esfera patrimonial de la persona, de manera que ésta experimenta una ventaja o beneficio constatable. Por su parte, la "situación jurídica consolidada" representa no tanto un plus patrimonial, sino un estado de cosas definido plenamente en cuanto a sus características jurídicas y a sus efectos, aun cuando éstos no se hayan extinguido aún. Lo relevante en cuanto a la situación jurídica consolidada, precisamente, no es que esos efectos todavía perduren o no, sino que –por virtud de mandato legal o de una sentencia que así lo haya declarado– haya surgido ya a la vida jurídica una regla, clara y definida, que conecta a un presupuesto fáctico (hecho condicionante) con una consecuencia dada (efecto condicionado).
Desde esta óptica, la situación de la persona viene dada por una proposición lógica del tipo «si..., entonces...»; vale decir: si se ha dado el hecho condicionante, entonces la "situación jurídica consolidada" implica que, necesariamente, deberá darse también el efecto condicionado. En ambos casos (derecho adquirido o situación jurídica consolidada), el ordenamiento protege –tornándola intangible– la situación de quien obtuvo el derecho o disfruta de la situación, por razones de equidad y de certeza jurídica. En este caso, la garantía constitucional de la irretroactividad de la ley se traduce en la certidumbre de que un cambio en el ordenamiento no puede tener la consecuencia de sustraer el bien o el derecho ya adquirido del patrimonio de la persona, o de provocar que si se había dado el presupuesto fáctico con anterioridad a la reforma legal, ya no surja la consecuencia (provechosa, se entiende) que el interesado esperaba de la situación jurídica consolidada.
Ahora bien, específicamente en punto a ésta última, se ha entendido también que nadie tiene un "derecho a la inmutabilidad del ordenamiento", es decir, a que las reglas nunca cambien. Por eso, el precepto constitucional no consiste en que, una vez nacida a la vida jurídica, la regla que conecta el hecho con el efecto no pueda ser modificada o incluso suprimida por una norma posterior; lo que significa es que –como se explicó– si se ha producido el supuesto condicionante, una reforma legal que cambie o elimine la regla no podrá tener la virtud de impedir que surja el efecto condicionado que se esperaba bajo el imperio de la norma anterior. Esto es así porque, se dijo, lo relevante es que el estado de cosas de que gozaba la persona ya estaba definido en cuanto a sus elementos y a sus efectos, aunque éstos todavía se estén produciendo o, incluso, no hayan comenzado a producirse. De este modo, a lo que la persona tiene derecho es a la consecuencia, no a la regla.” (votos n.° 7331-97 y n.° 2765-97) (Lo resaltado no es del original) Vistas, así las cosas, no resulta jurídicamente procedente invocar una situación jurídica consolidada en esta litis, por la elemental razón de que quienes no cumplen con los requisitos jubilatorios no se encuentran en ese supuesto. A lo sumo, se puede hablar de un derecho en vía de adquisición como se analizará más adelante.
Ergo, cuando hay una justificación objetiva y razonable, sustentada en un estudio técnico, el legislador está autorizado por el Derecho de la Constitución a modificar los requisitos jubilatorios y de pensiones, incluso recortando el cuadro de beneficios, con el fin de darle sostenibilidad financiera y actuarial al respectivo régimen, pues el interés colectivo, en todo momento, debe privar sobre el interés particular.
Así las cosas, la mayoría de la Sala Constitucional concluye que no hay ninguna violación a las situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, por la sencilla razón de que estas no existen y, por ende, no se vulnera el numeral 34 constitucional.
Como es bien sabido, la confianza legítima es un concepto acuñado en el Derecho Alemán (Vertrauensschutz), donde tiene rango constitucional, derivado del principio de seguridad jurídica y en otros ordenamientos jurídicos también del principio de buena fe. Este principio es de vieja data. En efecto, ya el Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Europea (TJCE), pese a que no estaba recogido en los Tratados Constitutivos, lo reconoció en 1973 en materia de función pública (As. 81/1972 del 5 de junio). Para su correcta interpretación y aplicación, según la doctrina, se exigen ciertos requisitos:
El Tribunal Constitucional, en una interesante resolución, el voto n.° 5236-99, estableció los siguientes componentes de la razonabilidad:
“…este Tribunal estima prudente hacer referencia a lo que se considera es la ‘razonabilidad de la ley como parámetro de constitucionalidad’. Conviene recordar, en primer término, que la ‘razonabilidad de la ley’ nació como parte del ‘debido proceso sustantivo’ (substantive due process of law), garantía creada por la jurisprudencia de la Suprema Corte de los Estados Unidos de América, al hilo de la Enmienda XIV a la Constitución Federal. En la concepción inicial ‘debido proceso’ se dirigió al enjuiciamiento procesal del acto legislativo y su efecto sobre los derechos sustantivos. Al finalizar el siglo XIX, sin embargo, superó aquella concepción procesal que le había dado origen y se elevó a un recurso axiológico que limita el accionar del órgano legislativo. A partir de entonces podemos hablar del debido proceso como una garantía genérica de la libertad, es decir, como una garantía sustantiva.
La superación del ‘debido proceso’ como garantía procesal obedece, básicamente, a que también la ley que se ha ajustado al procedimiento establecido y es válida y eficaz, puede lesionar el Derecho de la Constitución. Para realizar el juicio de razonabilidad la doctrina estadounidense invita a examinar, en primer término, la llamada ‘razonabilidad técnica’ dentro de la que se examina la norma en concreto (ley, reglamento, etc.). Establecido que la norma elegida es la adecuada para regular determinada materia, habrá que examinar si hay proporcionalidad entre el medio escogido y el fin buscado. Superado el criterio de ‘razonabilidad técnica’ hay que analizar la ‘razonabilidad jurídica’. Para lo cual esta doctrina propone examinar: a) razonabilidad ponderativa, que es un tipo de valoración jurídica a la que se concurre cuando ante la existencia de un determinado antecedente (ej. ingreso) se exige una determinada prestación (ej. tributo), debiendo en este supuesto establecerse si la misma es equivalente o proporcionada; b) la razonabilidad de igualdad, es el tipo de valoración jurídica que parte de que ante iguales antecedentes deben haber iguales consecuencias, sin excepciones arbitrarias; c) razonabilidad en el fin: en este punto se valora si el objetivo a alcanzar, no ofende los fines previstos en la constitución.
Dentro de este mismo análisis, no basta con afirmar que un medio sea razonablemente adecuado a un fin; es necesario, además, verificar la índole y el tamaño de la limitación que por ese medio debe soportar un derecho personal. De esta manera, si al mismo fin se puede llegar buscando otro medio que produzca una limitación menos gravosa a los derechos personales, el medio escogido no es razonable (en similar sentido pueden consultarse las sentencias números 1738-92, de las once horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del primero de julio de mil novecientos noventa y dos y 08858-98 de las dieciséis horas con treinta y tres minutos del quince de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y ocho). La doctrina alemana hizo un aporte importante al tema de la ‘razonabilidad‘ al lograr identificar, de una manera muy clara, sus componentes: legitimidad, idoneidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad en sentido estricto, ideas que desarrolla afirmando que ‘...La legitimidad se refiere a que el objetivo pretendido con el acto o disposición impugnado no debe estar, al menos, legalmente prohibido; la idoneidad indica que la medida estatal cuestionada deber ser apta para alcanzar efectivamente el objetivo pretendido; la necesidad significa que entre varias medidas igualmente aptas para alcanzar tal objetivo, debe la autoridad competente elegir aquella que afecte lo menos posible la esfera jurídica de la persona; y la proporcionalidad en sentido estricto dispone que aparte del requisito de que la norma sea apta y necesaria, lo ordenado por ella no debe estar fuera de proporción con respecto al objetivo pretendido, o sea, no le sea ‘exigible’ al individuo..." (sentencia de esta Sala número 3933-98 de las nueve horas cincuenta y nueve minutos del doce de junio de mil novecientos noventa y ocho).
En el sentido del criterio anteriormente expuesto, esta Sala ha venido aplicando la institución en su jurisprudencia. Veamos, ahora, el análisis del caso concreto. Sobre la prueba de ‘razonabilidad’: Para emprender un examen de razonabilidad de una norma, el Tribunal Constitucional requiere que la parte aporte prueba o al menos elementos de juicio en los que sustente su argumentación e igual carga procesal le corresponde a quien rebata los argumentos de la acción y la falta en el cumplimiento de estos requisitos, hace inaceptables los alegatos de inconstitucionalidad. Lo anterior, debido a que no es posible hacer un análisis de ‘razonabilidad’ sin la existencia de una línea argumentativa coherente que se encuentre probatoriamente respaldada. Ello desde luego, cuando no se trate de casos cuya ‘irrazonabilidad’ sea evidente y manifiesta. Retomando el alegato sobre la irrazonabilidad del plazo de dieciocho meses para optar por una pensión ordinaria, la Sala advierte que los accionantes no sólo no indican lo motivos que les llevan a concluir que la norma cuestionada es irrazonable, sino que tampoco aportan prueba alguna que permita a este Tribunal llegar a esa conclusión, transformando el debate en la exposición de conceptos subjetivos.
Por otra parte, el caso no presenta las características de ser una situación de ‘irrazonabilidad’ evidente y manifiesta que además sea fácilmente perceptible, antes bien, de manera abstracta se puede indicar que la norma se ajusta al fin de la reforma legislativa, cual es corregir las distorsiones del sistema de pensiones derogado, creando de manera paralela un nuevo sistema que resguarda el "derecho de pertenencia al régimen del Magisterio Nacional" que esta Sala ha reconocido como un derecho de los cotizantes.” (Lo que está en negritas no corresponde al original).
Por su parte, el segundo principio, el de proporcionalidad, implica que el acto legislativo deber ser apropiado para la realización de los fines que en él subyacen (principio de adecuación); debe ser necesario, es decir, que debe imponer la menor cantidad posible de restricciones a los derechos fundamentales de los habitantes de la República, lo que supone que el medio empleado por el legislador debe ser adecuado y necesario para alcanzar el objetivo propuesto y, sólo puede ser necesario, cuando el legislador no podía haber elegido otro medio, igualmente eficiente, pero que no limitase o lo hiciere de forma menos sensible el derecho fundamental y; por último, proporcional en sentido estricto, es decir, un acto legislativo justo a la medida. (Véanse, entre otras resoluciones del Tribunal Constitucional, el voto n.° 1739-92 y el voto n.° 5236-99).
Adoptando como marco de referencia lo anterior, hay que tener presente que la ley que promulgó la Asamblea Legislativa está dotada de una justificación objetiva y razonable –evitar que el régimen especial cayera en un estado de insolvencia–. Para tal propósito se basó en un estudio técnico-actuarial, cuyo producto sexto no avalaba que la norma transitoria tuviese un periodo de 5 o más años. No hay duda alguna que las medidas que adoptó la Asamblea Legislativa, incluyendo el transitorio VI, se adecuó al fin –resolver el déficit actuarial del régimen de jubilaciones y pensiones del Poder Judicial–. Prueba de lo que se afirma es el hecho de su reducción sustancial, aunque con base en el último estudio actuarial todavía subsiste. Lo anterior significa que la norma impugnada resultó efectiva –el acto normativo parlamentario fue el adecuado para resolver el fin perseguido–. Finalmente, el hecho de que el legislador se haya decantado por un plazo de 18 meses en vez de 24, en sí mismo no provoca la inconstitucionalidad de norma cuestionada, por la elemental razón de que dicho acto normativo está dentro de un parámetro razonable según el estudio actuarial –producto seis–, de ahí que no es posible sostener que se haya optado por la solución más gravosa para aquellos que tenían un derecho en vía de adquisición.
Tan es así, que después de casi seis años de que entró en vigencia la ley aún no se ha podido eliminar el déficit actuarial, y más bien el nuevo estudio propone que se adopten una serie de medidas, tal y como se reseñó ut supra, para lograr la sostenibilidad del régimen.
La Corte Constitucional colombiana ha establecido que la “sustitución de una norma por otra exige la necesidad de un régimen de transición. La existencia de normas transitorias es indispensable en la legislación sobre seguridad social en pensiones porque hay derechos en vía de adquisición. Se trata de un derecho ex - lege porque nace de una norma que expresamente lo establece y que señala criterios razonables para gozar de la excepcionalidad. Una vez entre en vigencia la norma que establece el régimen transitorio, las personas que reúnen los requisitos para adquirirlo consolidan una situación jurídica concreta que no puede ser menoscabada. Es además un auténtico derecho subjetivo que le da a su titular el derecho a que se le reconozca la prestación en las condiciones establecidas en la normatividad anterior y a acudir ante la jurisdicción en caso de incumplimiento. Como además los derechos provenientes de la seguridad social son irrenunciables, (artículos 48 y 53 C.P.), con mayor razón se requiere un régimen de transición” (sentencia T-235/02).
La Asamblea Legislativa al establecer el transitorio VI –plazo de dieciocho meses a partir de la entrada en vigencia de la ley– respeta los derechos en vías de adquisición de los funcionarios que estaban próximos a jubilarse, pues ellos pueden optar al derecho fundamental a la jubilación con base en las reglas de la legislación modificada. Nótese que la sentencia del tribunal extranjero no fija un plazo para garantizar estos derechos en vía de adquisición, ni podría fijarse, pues el análisis debe ser casuístico. En el sub lite, tenemos que los estudios actuariales –producto número 6–, en todo momento, estableció que no era sostenible un transitorio de diez ni de cinco años, a lo sumo de veinticuatro meses. De ahí que con base en un criterio técnico no es posible sostener que se están vulnerados los derechos en vías de adquisición. Hay que tener presente que este tipo de derechos están condicionados a un criterio técnico, situación que no se presenta en este caso para concederlos.
Tampoco es de recibo el argumento de que con base en el criterio técnico el transitorio tenía que ser de veinticuatro meses y no dieciocho. En esta dirección, hay que tener presente que el acto legislativo, a diferencia del administrativo, es uno en el que el legislador goza, por mandato expreso del Derecho de la Constitución, de un amplio margen de discrecionalidad. En esa dirección, sería irrazonable y antidemocrático argumentar que la discrecionalidad parlamentaria está sometida a las reglas de la discrecionalidad administrativa, sea: los principios generales de derecho, los hechos determinantes y los conceptos jurídicos indeterminados. Una tesis en esa dirección sería contraria a las más elementales reglas de la democracia y, por consiguiente, caeríamos en la “tiranía de la técnica”. Quienes ejercen la potestad legislativa, según reza el numeral 105, tienen un amplio margen para adoptar las decisiones políticas fundamentales a través del acto legislativo, siempre y cuando respeten el Derecho de la Constitución; este es el límite, no otro, ni mucho menos el que está diseñado para el ejercicio de la discrecionalidad administrativa.
Lo anterior significa que, si bien esta Sala ha establecido que en materia de jubilaciones y pensiones el legislador debe contar con estudios técnicos, estos, en todas sus dimensiones, no resultan vinculante para él; bien puede optar por otras soluciones que resultan razonables y que constituyen una respuesta válida para resolver el problema objeto del proyecto de ley. En el sub lite tenemos que legislador, al momento de ejercer la potestad de legislar, se enfrenta con un problema de enormes dimensiones –la insolvencia del régimen de jubilaciones y pensiones– y al momento de legislar dicta las normas que considera más adecuada para resolverlo –de hecho, el tiempo ha demostrado que las medidas adoptadas casi han resuelto el problema en su totalidad, pues se ha reducido de manera sustancial el déficit actuarial, tal y como lo demuestra el último estudio–, de ahí que no es de recibo el afirmar que hay una inconstitucionalidad porque el legislador adoptó el plazo de los dieciocho meses, y no el de los veinticuatro.
Nótese que no existe una irracionalidad ni desproporcionalidad en la actuación del legislador a causa de la proximidad entre un plazo y otro. Incluso, debe traerse a colación lo previamente indicado, en el sentido que ese ajuste de veinticuatro a dieciocho meses puede entenderse como justificado, en razón del tiempo transcurrido entre la fecha de corte del estudio actuarial realizado por el IICE –producto número 6– y la fecha en que finalmente se aprobó y promulgó la Ley n.°9544. De ahí que para la mayoría del Tribunal no se han vulnerado los derechos en vías de adquisición de los trabajadores judiciales que tenían veinte o más años de pertenecer al régimen especial, pues se respetaron esos derechos hasta donde era razonablemente posible.
Se alega que la norma cuestionada violenta varios tratados internacionales de derechos humanos y de la O.I.T. Para una correcta comprensión de la tesis de la mayoría hay que tener en cuenta una serie de conceptos básicos en relación con los compromisos internacionales que ha asumido el Estado de Costa Rica. De lo contrario, se puede caer en una versión distorsionada de la cuestión. En primer término, hay que puntualizar que los tratados relativos a los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales –en adelante DESC– condiciona su efectividad a las posibilidades económicas de cada Estado y al principio de progresividad. Así se desprende del artículo 26 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, cuando dispone lo siguiente:
Artículo 26 Desarrollo Progresivo Los Estados Partes se comprometen a adoptar providencias, tanto a nivel interno como mediante la cooperación internacional, especialmente económica y técnica para lograr progresivamente la plena efectividad de los derechos que se derivan de las normas económicas, sociales y sobre educación, ciencia y cultura, contenidas en la Carta de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, reformada por el Protocolo de Buenos Aires, en la medida de los recursos disponibles, por vía legislativa u otros medios apropiados.
Por su parte, el artículo 1 del protocolo a la citada convención –Protocolo de San Salvador– establece lo siguiente:
Artículo 1 Obligación de Adoptar Medidas Los Estados partes en el presente Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos se comprometen a adoptar las medidas necesarias tanto de orden interno como mediante la cooperación entre los Estados, especialmente económica y técnica, hasta el máximo de los recursos disponibles y tomando en cuenta su grado de desarrollo, a fin de lograr progresivamente, y de conformidad con la legislación interna, la plena efectividad de los derechos que se reconocen en el presente Protocolo.
Como puede observarse, en lo que atañe a los DESC, los instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos no le imponen a los Estados obligaciones inmediatas que deban satisfacer, pues los compromisos internacionales se han de alcanzar de manera progresiva y de acuerdo con la disponibilidad de los recursos con que cuente cada uno de estos. De ahí que cuando se invocan estas normas es menester tener claro estos condicionantes. Incluso, si se analiza con mayor detenimiento el Protocolo a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, la voluntad de las partes contratantes, adoptando como marco de referencia los condicionantes ut supra, solo establece como justiciables ante el sistema interamericano de derechos humanos, los derechos de sindicalización y educación, precisamente, para evitar que los Estados fuesen objeto de condenas que contradijesen los principios de progresividad y disponibilidad de recursos.
De ahí que la mayoría de Tribunal enfatiza que no basta con citar una norma internacional o convenio, si a la par de esa invocación no se ha tomado en cuenta los citados presupuestos. Esta forma de visualizar la cuestión engarza con la postura de este Tribunal en la opinión consultiva que evacuó la consulta sobre el proyecto de ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas (expediente n.° 18-016546-0007-CO), en la que la Sala Constitucional sentó el concepto del Estado social de derecho posible, es decir, aquel que el Estado puede financiar de acuerdo con los recursos disponibles en un momento histórico determinado. Estas posturas -tanto de los instrumentos internacionales como de la Sala Constitucional-, resultan especialmente relevantes cuando se trata de la sostenibilidad de los regímenes de jubilaciones y pensiones. En este ámbito el principio pro fondo, es decir, los derechos de la colectividad, están por encima de cualquier interés particular o de grupo, de ahí el deber del Estado y sus instituciones en diseñar, adoptar y ejecutar políticas públicas para darle sostenibilidad financiera y actuarial a estos regímenes, de forma tal que se le garantice de manera efectiva a todos los jubilados y pensionados sus ingresos mes a mes conforme a lo dispuesto en las respectivas leyes o acuerdos de los órganos colegiados –como sucede con el IVM–.
Quiere esto decir, que la sostenibilidad financiera y actuarial de los regímenes de jubilaciones y pensiones está en plena sintonía con los instrumentos internacionales, pues gracias a esto se garantiza el derecho fundamental de la jubilación o de la pensión como garantía de un derecho social y económico mayor, como lo es el de la seguridad social.
En otro orden de ideas, también es necesario tener presente que la invocación de instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos para que sean vinculantes para el Estado de Costa Rica pasan por un requisito sine qua non: que estén ratificados, lo que supone, con base en el Derecho de la Constitución, su negociación y firma por parte del Poder Ejecutivo, su aprobación por parte de la Asamblea Legislativa, su ratificación por el Poder Ejecutivo y su entrada en vigencia de acuerdo con las normas del convenio internacional. Es importante tener presente lo que dispone el numeral 1° de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en el sentido de que en esta se tutelan los derechos humanos que se derivan de los instrumentos internacionales vigentes en el Estado de Costa Rica. En esta dirección, la norma es clara y precisa; de esta no se puede derivar una conclusión diferente, salvo que se quiera actuar a contrapelo de su ethos.
Esta cuestión tiene la mayor relevancia para el Estado de Costa Rica en múltiples vertientes. En primer lugar, al Estado de Costa Rica no se le puede achacar la vulneración de un instrumento internacional de derechos humanos cuando este no ha sido ratificado. Una posición en sentido contrario no tendría ninguna acogida en ningún tribunal internacional, e iría en contra de la doctrina más básica del derecho internacional público. En segundo término, cuando no existe ninguna obligación internacional no es posible invocar tratados no ratificados por el Estado de Costa Rica, derivando de estos un determinado derecho. Mal haría este Tribunal en acoger una tesis en esa dirección, pues estaría usurpando las atribuciones que el Derecho de la Constitución le otorga al Poder Ejecutivo y al Legislativo, de ahí que no es posible afirmar que se está vulnerando una norma de un tratado no ratificado, por lo que en lo que atañe a este argumento, la mayoría de este Tribunal considera que debe ser rechazado.
Finalmente, hay que tener presente que cuando la Constitución le atribuye a la Asamblea Legislativa la aprobación de los tratados internacionales, con excepción de los protocolos de menor rango que se derivan de estos, lo que está sentado es un instituto jurídico vinculado a la democracia, ya que lo que en fondo subyace es que la Asamblea Legislativa, órgano fundamental del Estado social y democrático de derecho –no hay democracia sin parlamento– ejerza un control democrático sobre los compromisos que asume el Estado costarricense ante la comunidad internacional. Lo que se busca en un asunto de tanto calado, es que se discuta en un órgano plural, representativo, abierto, de cara a los habitantes del país, y de esa forma, adoptar la mejor decisión para los intereses nacionales. A partir de esta decisión del parlamento y de la sanción y publíquese por el Poder Ejecutivo es que este Tribunal puede adoptar las normas de los convenios internacionales de derechos humanos, no antes.
Otro aspecto que no puede dejar de lado la mayoría del Tribunal es el hecho de que no basta con hacer una invocación de una serie de instrumentos internacionales ratificados por Costa Rica y con citar sus normas, alegando una eventual violación, pues es necesario que quien tal cosa hace, demuestre que efectivamente la norma dice lo que dice. Tampoco resulta jurídicamente procedente el citar normas de convenios internacionales que se refieren o que regulan otras materias, pues las que se citan han de referirse a la materia objeto de la litis, ya que en estos ámbitos rige el principio de especialidad.
En el sub lite, en la acción de inconstitucionalidad n.°19-024589-0007-CO se acusa una infracción a los artículos 26 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, 14 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos y 9 del Pacto Internacional de los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, aunque luego, al momento de desarrollarse los respectivos agravios de inconstitucionalidad, únicamente se hace expresa referencia al ordinal 26 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, no así en cuanto a los otros dos numerales, respecto de los que no se realiza mayor desarrollo argumentativo, salvo una mención genérica al derecho a la seguridad social. En cuanto al artículo 26 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, ya se expuso –en este mismo apartado– cuál debe ser su debida comprensión en el sub judice. Respecto al derecho a la seguridad social, debe reiterarse lo ya indicado –también en este apartado, así como en los anteriores–, en el sentido que la norma impugnada –como parte de la reforma realizada al Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, y con el efectivo y comprobado propósito de garantizar su sostenibilidad financiera y actuarial, con sustento en los respectivos criterios técnicos–, lejos de infringir tal derecho lo garantiza efectivamente. Lo mismo debe indicarse respecto de la acción n.°22-014613-0007-CO, en la que también se acusa la infracción al artículo 9 del Pacto Internacional de los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales.
Por otra parte, tanto en el escrito de interposición de la acción de inconstitucionalidad n.°19-024589-0007-CO, como de la acción de inconstitucionalidad n.°22-014613-0007-CO, se alega una infracción a los Convenios 102, 118, 128 y 157 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo. Sin embargo, en el caso de la primera acción, lo cierto es que no se realiza mayor análisis o desarrollo argumentativo, debidamente individualizado, relativo a la supuesta infracción de tales convenios. Tan solo se hace una mención genérica a que la Organización Internacional de Trabajo ha indicado la necesidad de contar con el adecuado criterio técnico para poder realizar una variación en un régimen de pensiones. Similar situación se da respecto de la segunda acción, pues, pese a un alegato genérico a la infracción de tales instrumentos, finalmente los reproches de los accionantes se limitan –esencialmente– a alegar que los Convenios 102 y 128 contemplan el derecho a la jubilación y que los Convenios 118 y 157 prevén que los Estados deben “esforzarse en participar en un sistema de conservación de derechos adquiridos y derechos en vía de adquisición”.
Se argumenta, al efecto, que el transitorio cuestionado se dictó sin tutelar los derechos en vías de adquisición de una manera escalonada y proporcionada y sin un estudio técnico que así lo exigiera, por lo que la decisión legislativa resulta arbitraria. En cuyo caso, todos estos reproches ya fueron debidamente resueltos en los apartados anteriores. Según se indicó, el derecho de pertenencia a un régimen de pensiones no puede confundirse con la no modificación de los beneficios jubilatorios y de pensiones que en un momento determinado se otorga a la persona, lo cuales, pueden ser modificados razonablemente cuando los estudios actuariales así lo exigen. En el sub lite, tanto la reforma general al Régimen de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial mediante Ley n.°9544, así como, específicamente, el plazo de 18 meses previsto en su transitorio VI, contó con una justificación objetiva y razonable, sustentada en un estudio técnico, a fin de darle sostenibilidad financiera y actuarial al respectivo régimen.
Como corolario de lo anterior, también procede desestimar la acción en cuanto a este apartado.
El principio de igualdad implica, tal y como lo ha reconocido la Sala Constitucional en múltiples resoluciones, que todas las personas que se encuentran en una misma situación deben ser tratadas en forma igual. Por otra parte:
“El principio de igualdad, contenido en el Artículo 33 de la Constitución Política, no implica que en todos los casos, se deba dar un tratamiento igual prescindiendo de los posibles elementos diferenciadores de relevancia jurídica que pueda existir; o lo que es lo mismo, no toda desigualdad constituye necesariamente una discriminación. La igualdad, como lo ha dicho la Sala, sólo es violada cuando la desigualdad está desprovista de una justificación objetiva y razonable. Pero además, la causa de justificación del acto considerado desigual, debe ser evaluada en relación con la finalidad y sus efectos, de tal forma que deba existir, necesariamente, una relación razonable de proporcionalidad entre los medios empleados y la finalidad propiamente dicha. Es decir, que la igualdad debe entenderse en función de las circunstancias que concurren en cada supuesto concreto en el que se invoca, de tal forma que la aplicación universal de la ley, no prohibe que se contemplen soluciones distintas ante situaciones distintas, como tratamiento diverso. Todo lo expresado quiere decir, que la igualdad ante la ley no puede implicar una igualdad material o igualdad económica real y efectiva” (véanse los votos n.°1770-94 y n.°1045-94).
El punto está en determinar si esta diferenciación de trato está fundada en fines legítimos constitucionalmente, en si es objetiva –es decir, si está sustentada en un supuesto de hecho diferente–, si está basada en diferencias relevantes (tertium comparationis), si existe proporcionalidad entre el fin constitucional y el trato diferenciado que se ha hecho y el motivo y el contenido del acto y si ese trato es idóneo para alcanzar el fin que se persigue.
En el primer supuesto, la diferencia de trato supone que esté basada en objetivos constitucionalmente legítimos, lo que conlleva tres consecuencias en la finalidad perseguida. En primer lugar, las leyes no pueden perseguir fines que contradigan el Derecho de la Constitución o las normas que se encuentran en los instrumentos internacionales de Derechos Humanos. En segundo término, cuando se persiguen fines no tutelados constitucionalmente, pero que no contradicen sus valores y principios, la diferenciación de trato debe ser estrictamente vigilada en relación con los supuestos de hecho que la justifican y la finalidad que persigue. Por último, cuando se persigue un fin constitucionalmente tutelado la diferenciación de trato será válida siempre y cuando respete los criterios de razonabilidad, proporcionalidad y sea necesaria.
La Sala Constitucional, en el voto n.°4883-97, expresó sobre este principio, lo siguiente:
“El principio de igualdad, contenido en el Artículo 33 de la Constitución Política, no implica que en todos los casos, se deba dar un tratamiento igual prescindiendo de los posibles elementos diferenciadores de relevancia jurídica que puedan existir; o lo que es lo mismo, no toda desigualdad constituye necesariamente una discriminación. La igualdad, como lo ha dicho esta Sala, sólo es violada cuando la desigualdad está desprovista de una justificación objetiva y razonable. Pero además, la causa de justificación del acto considerado desigual, debe ser evaluada en relación con la finalidad y sus efectos, de tal forma que debe existir, necesariamente, una relación razonable de proporcionalidad entre los medios empleados y la finalidad propiamente dicha. Es decir, que la igualdad debe entenderse en función de las circunstancias que concurren en cada supuesto concreto en el que se invoca, de tal forma que la aplicación universal de la ley, no prohibe que se contemplen soluciones distintas ante situaciones distintas, con tratamiento diverso. Todo lo expresado quiere decir, que la igualdad ante la ley no puede implicar una igualdad material o igualdad económica real y efectiva.’ (Sentencia número 6832-95 de 16:15 horas del 13 de diciembre de 1995).” (Las negritas no corresponden al original).
Existen motivos suficientes para sostener que no hay un quebranto al principio de igualdad y no discriminación, tal y como se alega. En primer lugar, no hay duda alguna que con la norma impugnada el legislador busca satisfacer un fin constitucional legítimo, como lo es el darle sostenibilidad al régimen especial de jubilaciones y pensiones del Poder Judicial y con ello garantizar el derecho fundamental de las personas a una jubilación o pensión digna. En segundo lugar, tal y como lo establece el estudio actuarial en el producto seis, hay una justificación objetiva y razonable para que la Asamblea Legislativa adoptara la norma que ahora se cuestiona, de ahí que tampoco se puede sostener jurídicamente que se quebrante el principio de igualdad y no discriminación. En tercer término, no hay duda alguna de quienes están dentro del supuesto de los dieciocho meses a partir de la entrada en vigencia de la ley están en una situación diferentes de quienes no lo están, por ello, al estar ante situaciones fácticas diferentes el trato jurídico debe ser diferente.
Finalmente, siguiendo la tesis jurisprudencial de esta Sala, en el sentido de quien invoca la violación al principio de igualdad y no discriminación le corresponde realizar el test de razonabilidad, de los argumentos que aportan los accionantes no se desprende, por ninguna parte, de que se demuestra una vulneración en esta dirección.
En particular, los accionantes (acción n.°19-024589-0007-CO) alegan que en el caso de modificaciones normativas a otros regímenes jubilatorios existentes en Costa Rica se habían incluido normas transitorias con plazos mayores o escalonados, a diferencia de lo sucedido en el caso del VI de la Ley n.°9544, en el que se estableció un único plazo de 18 meses, que estiman excesivamente corto. Alegan que esto resulta discriminatorio. Sin embargo, debe reiterarse lo previamente señalado en los apartados anteriores, en el sentido que el citado plazo de 18 meses se fijó de forma razonable en atención a la situación financiera específica del Régimen de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial. Tampoco puede pretenderse que en el caso de los distintos regímenes de pensiones y sus eventuales modificaciones se regulen de forma estrictamente idéntica, con total independencia u abstracción de las particularidades de cada régimen. Esta Sala ha precisado -sobre este tema- que:
“(...) no resulta inconstitucional la existencia de diversos regímenes de pensiones –incluido, específicamente, el régimen de pensiones y jubilaciones del Poder Judicial-, con “su normativa especial –en procura de garantizar la existencia misma del régimen, así como su propia administración-” (voto nro. 2020-02841 de las 9:40 horas del 12 de febrero de 2020) y con sus “propias reglas y criterios legales para el otorgamiento del derecho constitucional a la jubilación y a la pensión” (voto nro. No. 2084-96 de las 14:30 hrs. del 07 de mayo de 1996). Criterio reiterado, recientemente, en el voto nro. 2021-011957 de las 17:00 horas del 25 de mayo de 2021, en que se confirmó la validez constitucional de la existencia de un régimen exclusivo para los trabajadores del Poder Judicial, como un régimen especial, independiente y diferente al básico, con sus propios requisitos de elegibilidad a fin de garantizar su solvencia y funcionamiento. Lo que no implica una infracción al principio de igualdad.” (voto n.° 2022-010593).
Los accionantes (acción n.°19-024589-0007-CO) también reclaman que se les dio un trato discriminatorio, respecto de los funcionarios que laboran en el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, en tanto -según se alega- a estos últimos se les declaró un derecho irrestricto de reconocimiento de sus condiciones jubilatorias, aun y cuando se está en presencia de normativa derogada, sin importar el tiempo que durasen en cumplir aquellos requisitos. Lo anterior, en el Transitorio II de Ley n.°9544. Sin embargo, esta Sala ya se pronunció sobre este tema en el supra citado voto n.°2021-11957, en el que se resolvió que:
“LXIII.-Redacta la Magistrada Hernández López. Sobre el reclamo contra el Transitorio II de la Ley No. 9544.- La norma transitoria II de la Ley número 9544 estipula lo siguiente:
“TRANSITORIO II- Las personas funcionarias del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones a los que hacía referencia el artículo 242 de la Ley N° 7333 Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, de 5 de mayo de 1993, y sus reformas, que hayan cotizado al Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial de previo a la entrada en vigencia de esta ley, la presente reforma no les será aplicada en su perjuicio y en todo momento se les deberá respetar sus derechos adquiridos de buena fe. No obstante, quedan facultados para solicitar, en los términos dispuestos en los artículos 226 y 234 de esta ley, la devolución de las cotizaciones obreras, estatales y patronales realizadas al Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, a fin de que puedan trasladarse al Régimen de Pensiones, Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte, administrado por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS), si así lo desean”.
Los accionantes argumentan que se da un trato discriminatorio en perjuicio de los servidores judiciales en lo que se refiere al tratamiento de los derechos adquiridos frente a los funcionarios del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones que cotizan al Régimen de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial. Contrastan el distinto tratamiento que hizo el legislador en relación al tema de los derechos adquiridos pues, sin ninguna razón objetiva que lo justifique, se dispuso un trato diferenciado y ventajoso para aquellos servidores que, perteneciendo al Régimen de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial, trabajen en el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, pues a ellos se les declaró un derecho irrestricto de pertenencia a aquel régimen, pero sobre la base de la normativa derogada, sin importar el tiempo que durasen en cumplir aquellos requisitos. Se dice que la norma transitoria es totalmente discriminatoria al distinguir entre los afiliados del Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, de modo que algunos de ellos son los que laboran para el Poder Judicial y otros son los que trabajan para el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, pero estos últimos contarán con mayores beneficios que los otros.
En relación con esa diferenciación, los accionantes se cuestionan la necesidad de esta diferencia solicitando entonces que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del Transitorio II de la Ley número 9544 por violación del principio de igualdad y no discriminación contenido en el artículo 33 de la Constitución Política. En relación con este específico aspecto no existe pronunciamiento por parte de los informantes en esta acción.
LXIV.- Continúa redactando la Magistrada Hernández López. La cuestión que aquí se plantea, fue revisada por la Sala con ocasión de la consulta legislativa facultativa presentada en su momento por integrantes de la Asamblea Legislativa en relación con el proyecto que dio origen a la Ley número 9544. En la sentencia 2018-5758, en la que se dio respuesta a dicha consulta, la Sala expuso lo siguiente:
“XX.- Sobre el transitorio II del proyecto de ley consultado. Finalmente, los(as) consultantes estiman que el transitorio II del proyecto consultado resulta contrario al numeral 33 constitucional, en tanto establece un privilegio para los(as) funcionarios(as) del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Dicha norma dispone lo siguiente:
TRANSITORIO II- Las personas funcionarias del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones a los que hacía referencia el artículo 242 de la Ley N.°7333, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, de 5 de mayo de 1993, y sus reformas, que hayan cotizado al Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial de previo a la entrada en vigencia de esta ley, la presente reforma no les será aplicada en su perjuicio y en todo momento se les deberá respetar sus derechos adquiridos de buena fe. No obstante, quedan facultados para solicitar, en los términos dispuestos en los artículos 226 y 234 de esta ley, la devolución de las cotizaciones obreras, estatales y patronales realizadas al Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, a fin de que puedan trasladarse al Régimen de Pensiones, Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte, administrado por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS), si así lo desean.
Previo a analizar el vicio cuestionado, la Sala considera necesario hacer referencia a los conceptos de derechos adquiridos y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas. Sobre el particular, en la sentencia número 2765-97 de las 15:03 del 20 de mayo de 1997, se dispuso, en lo que interesa, lo siguiente:
“Los conceptos de ‘derechos adquiridos’ y ‘situaciones jurídicas consolidadas’ aparecen estrechamente relacionadas en la doctrina constitucionalista. Es dable afirmar que, en términos generales, el primero denota a aquella circunstancia consumada en lo que una cosa –material o inmaterial, trátese de un bien previamente ajeno o de un derecho antes inexistente- ha ingresado (o incidido sobre) la esfera patrimonial de la persona, de manera que ésta experimenta una ventaja o beneficio constatable. Por su parte, la ‘situación jurídica consolidada’ representa no tanto un plus patrimonial, sino un estado de cosas definido plenamente en cuanto a sus características jurídicas y a sus efectos, aun cuando éstos no se hayan extinguido aún. Lo relevante en cuanto a la situación jurídica consolidada, precisamente, no es que esos efectos todavía perduren o no, sino que –por virtud de mandato legal o una sentencia que así lo haya declarado- haya surgido ya a la vida jurídica una regla, clara y definida, que conecta a un presupuesto fáctico (hecho condicionante) con una consecuencia dada (efecto condicionado).
Desde esta óptica, la situación de la persona viene dada por una proposición lógica del tipo ‘si…, entonces…M, vale decir: si se ha dado el hecho condicionante, entonces la ‘situación jurídica consolidada’ implica que, necesariamente, deberá darse también el efecto condicionado. En ambos casos (derechos adquiridos o situaciones jurídicas consolidadas), el ordenamiento protege –tornándola intangible – la situación de quien obtuvo el derecho o disfruta de la situación, por razones de equidad y certeza jurídica”.
Ahora bien, del estudio de la norma cuestionada se desprende que no presenta el vicio alegado, pues, contrario a lo que parecen entender los(as) consultantes, ésta no pretende crear a favor de los(as) funcionarios(as) del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones una situación diferenciada con respecto a los demás cotizantes del Fondo, sino únicamente tutelar aquellos derechos adquiridos de buena fe. En ese sentido, el transitorio no dispone de modo alguno que la reforma que se hace al Régimen de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial no les sea aplicable a los(as) funcionarios(as) a los que hace referencia, pues éstos también se verán afectados por ésta, siendo prueba de ello el hecho de que el propio artículo les otorga la posibilidad de trasladarse al Régimen de Pensiones, Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, en caso de que lo deseen. En virtud de lo anterior, la Sala descarta que el numeral cuestionado otorgue a los(as) servidores(as) del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones un derecho adquirido a permanecer bajo las condiciones actuales del Régimen de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial, por lo que se descarta el alegato de los(as) consultantes.” (2018-5758 del 12 de abril de 2018) Esta vez, quienes plantean el reclamo representan a gran cantidad de los participantes del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial y aportan razones y argumentos para sostener que, contrario a lo entendido por la Sala en aquel momento, el texto sí crea un tratamiento diferente que amerita ser revisado de nuevo por entender que contraviene el principio de igualdad.
LXV.- Redacta la Magistrada Hernández López. Sobre el Transitorio II de la Ley 9544 y los principios de igualdad y no discriminación. Como un primer elemento importante para sustentar esta decisión, debe tenerse presente lo que disponía el artículo 242 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial número 7333 previo a su reforma, toda vez que el transitorio II impugnado hace referencia a ese numeral:
“ARTICULO 242.- Los Magistrados del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y el Director del Registro Civil que antes de su elección hayan sido abogados funcionarios judiciales, con un servicio mayor de cinco años, podrán permanecer protegidos con el Plan de Jubilaciones y Pensiones de esta Ley, y el tiempo que sirvieren en esos organismos se les computará como si lo fuera en el Poder Judicial. Continuarán esos funcionarios contribuyendo en la forma que lo exige el artículo 236 de esta Ley. Dichos Magistrados tendrán los mismos beneficios que los Magistrados de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, y el Director del Registro, los beneficios señalados para los jueces, en igualdad de circunstancias. El Estado, en esos casos, debe pagar por esos funcionarios la cuota que señala el inciso 2 del artículo 236 citado, sobre la suma destinada en el presupuesto general de gastos para atender sus sueldos en el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y en el Registro Civil. Esta cuota será depositada conforme se indica en el referido inciso 2”.
La revisión de los antecedentes muestra que esta norma se incluyó en la reforma general realizada en el año 1993 a la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y recogió un caso de excepción para aquellos abogados funcionarios judiciales que, con al menos cinco años de servicio en el Poder Judicial y cotización para el régimen de jubilaciones y pensiones del Poder Judicial, fueran nombrados como Magistrados del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones o en el cargo de Director del Registro Civil. Esa excepción consistió en abrir la opción para que los citados servidores públicos pudieran mantenerse como participantes en el régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial -para el cual habían estado cotizando por al menos cinco años- siempre que siguieran pagando su cuota correspondiente y se estableció que tendrían los mismos beneficios de los Magistrados del Poder Judicial y de un juez para el caso del Director del Registro Civil.
También se ordenó al Estado presupuestar y depositar los dineros correspondientes a su contribución, según los sueldos percibidos en el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Se concluye de aquel texto que quienes optaran en su momento por permanecer como participantes del régimen del Poder Judicial, lo hacían en los mismos términos y condiciones que los demás participantes es decir, por una parte “(c)ontinuarán esos funcionarios contribuyendo en la forma que lo exige el artículo 236 de esta Ley…” en palabras de la norma, y por otra, en lo que se refiere a los beneficios del régimen, se ordenó que: “Dichos Magistrados tendrán los mismos beneficios que los Magistrados de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, y el Director del Registro, los beneficios señalados para los jueces, en igualdad de circunstancias” Ahora, al emitirse la Ley número 9544 donde se modificó extensamente el régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, el Legislativo, y entre otras cosas, aumentó las cargas de los participantes y redujo los beneficios a percibir, todo en favor de la sostenibilidad del régimen.
Y se introdujo además una norma transitoria II en donde mantiene abierta la posibilidad otorgada en 1993 para que los servidores supra citados puedan trasladar sus cuotas al régimen de Invalidez Vejez y Muerte de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, o bien permanecer como participantes en el régimen del Poder Judicial; no obstante, si decidieran permanecer como participantes del Fondo del Poder Judicial, se agrega una condición que no existe para los demás participantes del Fondo y es que tendrían en su favor el hecho de que: “ la presente reforma no les será aplicada en su perjuicio y en todo momento se les deberá respetar sus derechos adquiridos de buena fe.”.
Es en este último punto donde los accionantes encuentran un disposición discriminatoria, pues sostienen que para ellos, como servidores judiciales, rige el transitorio VI de la Ley número 9544 que define la situación de los funcionarios judiciales activos que han venido cotizando del Fondo y en el que se deslinda quienes quedan cubiertos por la ley derogada (o sea aquellos a quienes la nueva normativa no les será aplicada en su perjuicio) y a quienes se les aplicará la nueva normativa sin atenuaciones:
“TRANSITORIO VI- Los servidores judiciales que cumplan con los requisitos para adquirir el derecho a la pensión según lo establecía el texto del título IX de la Ley N.º 7333, de 5 de mayo de 1993, dentro de los dieciocho meses posteriores a la promulgación de la presente ley, podrán pensionarse al amparo de las disposiciones establecidas en el mencionado texto.” Se concluye de lo anterior que -para efectos de determinar la normativa aplicable, se crearon dos categorías separadas de servidores en activo participantes del fondo: una compuesta por los servidores judiciales que “ cumplan los requisitos para adquirir el derecho a la pensión según lo establecía el texto del título IX de la Ley N.º 7333, de 5 de mayo de 1993, dentro de los dieciocho meses posteriores a la promulgación de la presente ley” y que podrán jubilarse con los requisitos del régimen anterior, y la otra compuesta por los demás servidores judiciales que no cumplan esa condición, para quienes procede la aplicación de la nueva normativa.
Sin embargo, afirman los interesados, los servidores mencionados en el artículo 242 de la Ley derogada que decidan permanecer en el régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, recibirán un tratamiento distinto pues se les ubicó en una tercera categoría diferente reflejada en la frase del transitorio II de la Ley número 9544: “la presente reforma no les será aplicada en su perjuicio y en todo momento se les deberá respetar sus derechos adquiridos de buena fe” LXVI.- Continúa redactando la Magistrada Hernández López. En los términos expuestos, la Sala concluye que la norma no es necesariamente inconstitucional pero sí es confusa y por lo tanto, debe interpretarse según lo establecido en el precedente de la Sala establecido recogido en la sentencia número 2018-5758, pues allí el Tribunal entendió que no podía darse una diferencia de tratamiento en favor de los servidores mencionados en el artículo 242 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, ya que:
“…contrario a lo que parecen entender los(as) consultantes, ésta no pretende crear a favor de los(as) funcionarios(as) del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones una situación diferenciada con respecto a los demás cotizantes del Fondo, sino únicamente tutelar aquellos derechos adquiridos de buena fe. En ese sentido, el transitorio no dispone de modo alguno que la reforma que se hace al Régimen de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial no les sea aplicable a los(as) funcionarios(as) a los que hace referencia, pues éstos también se verán afectados por ésta, siendo prueba de ello el hecho de que el propio artículo les otorga la posibilidad de trasladarse al Régimen de Pensiones, Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, en caso de que lo deseen.” (Sentencia número 2018-5758 citada) Así, pues, la mayoría de este Tribunal coincide en que la interpretación correcta de la frase “esta reforma no se aplicará” llevaría a entender que se refiere a las personas que han consolidado su derecho a la jubilación o la pensión, mas no así cuando la persona activa no ha cumplido los requisitos jubilatorios, pues a estos últimos se les aplica en toda su extensión las reformas introducidas en la ley que se impugnada, de ahí que las personas que caen en este último supuesto están en la mismas condiciones que los trabajadores activos del Poder Judicial, por lo que no hay un quebranto al principio de igualdad.
A mayor abundamiento, debe señalarse que la simple mención y referencia a derechos adquiridos en el citado transitorio II no resulta constitucionalmente ilegítima o contraria al principio de igualdad si se entiende que dicha expresión debe comprenderse en el contexto y sentido descritos en el considerando pertinente de la sentencia 2018-5758, es decir, que los servidores mencionados en el Transitorio II discutido gozan de derechos adquiridos como participantes en el Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, pero con el mismo alcance y en pie de igualdad con los demás participantes que laboran directamente para el Poder Judicial. Por ello, la simple afirmación de que a los servidores mencionados en el artículo transitorio II disputado se les respetarán sus derechos adquiridos, no ha creado una categoría diferente frente a los demás participantes del fondo, porque por imperativo constitucional a todos los participantes sin excepción, según sea el caso y aunque no se diga de forma expresa, se les deben respetar sus derechos adquiridos en los términos y condiciones que este Tribunal ha señalado a través de su jurisprudencia, para la materia previsional.
En ese específico sentido, la mera mención en abstracto del respeto de los derechos adquiridos para un grupo de participantes no conlleva en absoluto un cambio real en sus derechos y obligaciones que los distinga de los demás participantes, tal y como se expuso en la consulta legislativa 2018-5758.” L) VIOLACIÓN DE LOS PRINCIPIOS DEMOCRÁTICO, SOLIDARIDAD, SEGURIDAD JURÍDICA, BUENA FE, EQUIDAD, TRANSPARENCIA, INTANGIBILIDAD RELATIVA DEL PATRIMONIO, NO CONFISCATORIEDAD E IGUALDAD ANTE LA CARGAS PUBLICAS. Los accionantes también alegan una infracción a tales principios; no obstante, de la lectura integral de los dos escritos de interposición, se puede verificar que, finalmente, sus alegatos gravitan en un mismo reproche, en cuanto alegan que se dio un cambio abrupto, severo, discriminatorio y arbitrario en cuantos los requisitos y beneficios de la jubilación, que afecta gravemente su proyecto de vida, pese que estaban a pocos años de adquirir el derecho concreto a la pensión.
Sin embargo, tal alegato ya ha sido analizado y desestimado en los anteriores apartados, al concluirse que el actuar de la Asamblea Legislativa no ha sido arbitrario ni carente de sentido, sino que, todo lo contrario, ha contribuido válidamente a darle sostenibilidad al régimen jubilatorio del Poder Judicial, en debido apego a los principios constitucionales de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad y en oportuno resguardo del propio derecho a la seguridad social. También se ha estimado que no se han infringido los principios de confianza legítima, ni se han vulnerado los derechos en vías de adquisición de los trabajadores judiciales que tenían 20 o más años de pertenecer al régimen especial, dado que al fijarse el plazo de 18 meses en el Transitorio VI, la Asamblea Legislativa se apegó a los reiterados antecedentes de este Tribunal y actuó dentro de parámetros razonables, con debido y suficiente sustento en los criterios técnicos incorporados al expediente legislativo.
En definitiva, debe reiterarse que la mayoría de este Tribunal, en la supra citada sentencia nro.2021-11957, ya resolvió que la reforma al régimen jubilatorio del Poder Judicial –realizado mediante Ley nro. 9544 del 24 de abril de 2018– y, en general, la modificación a los requisitos y condiciones impuestas a los servidores judiciales para acogerse a la jubilación ordinaria y anticipada, lejos de resultar arbitraria, caprichosa, infundada o discriminatoria, obedeció a la necesidad real de garantizar la solvencia del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, así como que tales cambios fueron realizados dentro “dentro del marco constitucional legítimo de acción del legislador en materia jubilatoria”, con fundamento en un “adecuado sustento técnico”. Concluyó, la mayoría de este Tribunal, que tales modificaciones en los requisitos y parámetros para el otorgamiento de las jubilaciones -tanto ordinarias como anticipadas- de los servidores judiciales eran constitucionalmente válidas, como medidas razonables y proporcionadas para garantizar la solvencia, estabilidad y permanencia del fondo, en atención a los criterios técnicos aportados al respectivo expediente legislativo. Indicó, en síntesis:
“(...) los cambios operados resultaban necesarios justamente para lograr el sostenimiento del régimen de jubilaciones y pensiones especial para los servidores judiciales y cuya debacle realmente hubiera significado una seria amenaza a la estabilidad económica de los administradores de justicia. Igual de importante para desechar el reclamo resulta ser el hecho de que las modificaciones legislativamente establecidas no resultan de arbitrios infundados de los legisladores, sino que fueron tomadas con fundamento en criterios técnicos, con amplia participación de las personas interesadas y no fueron ni intempestivos caprichosos y se basan en criterios técnicos. En ese aspecto, la Sala considera que el nuevo régimen previsional, en cuanto primer pilar del más amplio entramado de seguridad social que cubre a los administradores de justicia de forma similar a los demás trabajadores, les asegura un espacio de seguridad económica.”
En plena consonancia con lo anterior, debe insistirse -una vez más- que el plazo de 18 meses previsto en el transitorio impugnado, no solo se fundamenta -de forma razonable- en la amplia jurisprudencia de este Tribunal sobre este tema, sino que también en los criterios técnicos incorporados al expediente legislativo y, en definitiva, resulta coherente o congruente con el fin último de la reforma, de garantizar la solidez financiera del régimen y el derecho a la jubilación de los servidores judiciales.
VIII.VOTO SALVADO DEL MAGISTRADO CRUZ CASTRO.- La variación de las condiciones del régimen jubilatorio, debe responder a criterios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, conforme a criterios técnicos.
Conforme a las razones que se indican a continuación, considero que esta acción debe declararse con lugar. Considero que para ser conforme al Derecho de la Constitución, el régimen transitorio debió cubrir a los servidores judiciales que contaran con veinte años o más de servicio en el Poder Judicial. Estimo, además, que el proyecto de ley que dio origen a la ley en cuestión contiene vicios sustanciales de procedimiento y de fondo.
A. La ausencia de criterio técnico en la decisión legislativa, conculca el principio constitucional de razonabilidad técnica.
Los accionantes llevan razón en sus alegatos, en este caso se ha dado una violación procedimental por la falta de criterio técnico para proceder con un plazo en una norma transitoria restrictiva del derecho a la pensión (violación al principio constitucional de razonabilidad técnica), y además con ello, una violación a los principios de derecho a la pensión, principio de progresividad y principio de igualdad; todo conforme se explica a continuación. Debe existir prudencia y buen criterio del poder legislativo al reformar los sistemas de jubilación, porque se trata de uno de los componentes neurálgicos del estado social.
Se ha establecido que, en ciertas materias, las potestades legislativas deben estar vinculadas con las reglas unívocas de la ciencia o la técnica, principios elementales de justicia, lógica o conveniencia. Se trata de un límite al ejercicio arbitrario de las potestades legislativas. Claro está, no es que se requiera de un estudio técnico en cualesquiera casos de la función legislativa, pues ello vaciaría de contenido el principio de libre configuración del legislador. No todas las decisiones del legislador deben contemplar un estudio técnico, toda vez que dicha situación anularía la discrecionalidad del órgano legislativo, sometiéndolo al criterio de terceros que carecen de representación democrática. Sin embargo, esta Sala ha precisado que en ciertas materias ese estudio técnico o científico es necesario y por tanto, se ha entendido que la exigencia de tal sustento técnico, es parte del principio constitucional de razonabilidad técnica.
Así ha dicho esta Sala que “Los estudios técnicos son necesarios, cuando existe norma expresa al respecto (verbigracia en cuestiones ambientales) o cuando la materia los exige, so pena de transformar la discrecionalidad en arbitrariedad.” (ver resolución n°2018-00230[[]13] de las 10:40 horas del 19 de enero del 2018). Ahora bien, sobre las materias en donde se exige, además de la ambiental, se puede indicar, por ejemplo, la aplicación del principio de razonabilidad técnica en materia de pensiones, ver al respecto la resolución n°2017-11714, donde se estableció lo siguiente, respecto del proyecto de ley "Reforma del Sistema de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Magisterio Nacional", expediente legislativo número 17.561:
“En esta materia, es menester que la Asamblea Legislativa cuente con estudios técnicos que demuestren que la entrada en vigencia de la Ley no afectará (…)” (resaltado no corresponde al original) Asimismo, desde la resolución n°2379-96 ya esta Sala venía aplicando la obligatoriedad de sustento técnico para las modificaciones a los regímenes de pensiones:
“… esa posibilidad de modificación que tiene acordada a su favor el Estado, encuentra límites no sólo provenientes de la Constitución Política, sino del Derecho Internacional, entre los que se destacan los fijados en el Convenio número 102 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo relativo a la norma mínima de seguridad social, que señala, en lo que aquí interesa, que las prestaciones concedidas en aplicación del citado Convenio y los gastos de administración se encuentren respaldados en estudios técnicos y no que sean implantados o modificados por una decisión política, arbitraria o antojadiza de la Administración, prestaciones entre las cuales se encuentra el monto de cotización para el régimen de pensiones por parte del empleado y el Estado como tal y como patrono y que obliga a fundamentar esas variaciones en estudios actuariales relacionados con la solvencia del régimen por afectar.”[[]14] (resaltado no corresponde al original) Además, esta Sala ha indicado que todas las medidas regresivas para el derecho a la pensión y la jubilación requieren de estudios técnicos y además, que la carga de la prueba de dichos estudios corresponde a los poderes públicos. Así se ha indicado en reiterada jurisprudencia:
“XV. (…) son los poderes públicos quienes soportan la carga de probar que los recortes se justifican a la luz del conjunto de derechos socioeconómicos, y que en caso de que una administración tenga la necesidad de adoptar medidas regresivas para el derecho a la pensión y la jubilación, debe contar con un estudio técnico con respecto a los efectos que éstas puedan tener en los derechos de los afectados y el régimen, así como que no existen medidas menos gravosas que pudieran haber sido tomadas, (…)” (ver resolución n°2018-5758[[]15], criterio ratificado en las resoluciones n°2021-11957[[]16], n°2022-8712[[]17], n°2022-10593[[]18]).
Según lo indicó esta Sala (ver resolución n°2019-00234[[]19]), todo lo anterior encuentra además sustento, en el artículo 71.3 del Convenio 102 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT) cuando se indica que cada Estado tiene la responsabilidad de garantizar que cualquier modificación a las prestaciones de la seguridad social tenga de previo un estudio actuarial:
“Artículo 71 (…)
3. El Miembro deberá asumir la responsabilidad general en lo que se refiere al servicio de prestaciones concedidas en aplicación del presente Convenio y adoptar, cuando fuere oportuno, todas las medidas necesarias para alcanzar dicho fin; deberá garantizar, cuando fuere oportuno, que los estudios y cálculos actuariales necesarios relativos al equilibrio se establezcan periódicamente y, en todo caso, previamente a cualquier modificación de las prestaciones, de la tasa de las cotizaciones del seguro o de los impuestos destinados a cubrir las contingencias en cuestión.” Asimismo, esta Sala hizo referencia a lo resuelto por el Comité de Derechos Sociales del Consejo de Europa y al Tribunal Constitucional Colombiano, en los supuestos donde se admita la adopción de medidas regresivas en el ámbito de DESC (derechos económicos, sociales y culturales), indicando que:
“XXVIII.-Continúa redactando el Magistrado Araya García. (…) la conformidad constitucional de medidas de recorte o modificación de condiciones en materia de pensiones requiere que previo a la determinación y como parte ineludible de su fundamentación, se debe contar con el sustento técnico sobre los efectos de las medidas debe haberse escuchado a los afectados porque se trata del ingreso que reciben en curso, como medio de subsistencia y en el cual se basa la gran parte de su proyecto de vida y de su derecho a una vejez digna.” (resolución n°2021-11957) En reforzamiento de lo indicado por esta Sala sobre la carga de la prueba técnica como obligación del Estado, se tiene además el caso Miranda Cortez, n°12.249 de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, donde se dijo:
“105. Cabe destacar que el desarrollo progresivo de los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales (DESC) conlleva para los Estados partes en la Convención Americana la obligación de no tomar medidas regresivas en lo relativo a tales derechos. En particular, el Comité del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales de Naciones Unidas (PIDESC) ha indicado que no son permisibles las medidas regresivas adoptadas en relación con el derecho a la salud. (…) Asimismo, el Comité sostuvo que el Estado en cuestión tiene la carga de probar que esas medidas están debidamente justificadas por referencia a la totalidad de los derechos enunciados en el Pacto en relación con la plena utilización de los recursos máximos disponibles del Estado Parte”. (ver Naciones Unidas, Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, Observación General 3: La índole de las obligaciones de los Estados Partes, párrafo 1 del artículo 2 del Pacto, adoptada en el Quinto Período de Sesiones, 1990)
-En primer lugar, el sustento técnico al que alude la Sala lo fue para un proyecto que NO fue el finalmente aprobado. Véase las fechas de cada uno de los seis dictámenes del “Estudio actuarial del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial” realizado por el Instituto de Investigaciones en Ciencias Económicas (IICE): dictamen 1 del 04 de agosto del 2016, dictamen 2 del 14 de noviembre del 2016, dictamen 3 del 01 de febrero del 2017, dictamen 4 del 24 de marzo del 2017, dictamen 5 del 22 de mayo del 2017 y dictamen 6 del 04 de julio del 2017. Lo anterior, en comparación con la fecha del primer debate que se dio mediante sesión extraordinaria n°14 del 30 de octubre del 2017, cuyo texto incorporó varias mociones de fondo y de reiteración que variaron su contenido.
-En segundo lugar, esta Sala NO ha realizado ninguna consideración PARTICULAR sobre el criterio técnico que sustenta el Transitorio VI de la ley impugnada, referido a quienes podrían seguir cubiertos por el régimen anterior a la reforma. Así entonces, tal estudio actuarial del IICE NO se refiere en particular a la medida regresiva adoptada en el transitorio cuestionado en esta acción, pues al respecto indica: “Un aumento en el transitorio pospone los ajustes y por lo tanto afecta negativamente los ingresos del Fondo. Para valorar adecuadamente el efecto de un aumento de este transitorio sería necesario realizar un análisis actuarial completo.” (ver página 73 del producto n°6, IICE). De modo tal que se constata que no se hizo ningún estudio técnico para valorar el aumento en el transitorio, situación que impidió verificar si existía otra medida menos gravosa que la adoptada en dicho transitorio. Por lo tanto, lo indicado por esta Sala, en el sentido de que la ley en cuestión contaba con estudio técnico, NO se aplica en concreto al transitorio.
Además, de lo acontecido en la vista realizada para esta acción (en fecha 05 de octubre del 2023), quedó demostrado que el Transitorio cuestionado no contó con criterio técnico alguno. Así se evidencia de lo siguiente:
“El estudio del IICE analizó la situación actuarial del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial (FPJPJ) según la situación vigente al 31 de diciembre de 2015” (oficio IICE-103-2023 de 9 de junio de 2023 entregado en la Sala el 9 de junio de 2023). “Los resultados del estudio del IICE de la Universidad de Costa Rica presentan los posibles efectos actuariales de diversas propuestas, con información hasta diciembre de 2015. No obstante, la reforma en la Ley 9544 no fue evaluada en ninguno de estos análisis” (Oficio Acta de Comisión Adhoc EMat-50-2023 de 11 de agosto de 2023 aportado a la Sala el 25 de agosto de 2023). En oficio de la UCR entregado a la Sala el 5 de octubre de 2023 se indica:
“En ese sentido queremos reafirmar lo dispuesto por la Escuela de Matemática en el sentido que la citada ley no se apegó en su momento a ningún modelo actuarial para establecer el transitorio que se está accionando. Por tanto, habría que modelar si se quisiera tener certeza de la seguridad técnica para establecer dicho transitorio”
“Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. San José, a las diez horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintiséis de mayo de dos mil veintitrés.
Como prueba para mejor resolver, solicítese:
(…)
Quien suscribe… en mi condición de Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa de la República de Costa Rica, presento, en tiempo, el informe requerido (…)
En el caso concreto del Transitorio VI de la Ley 9544, el legislador dispone un plazo de 18 meses, … luego del amplio análisis que el legislador realiza conforme la discusión del proyecto de ley que consta en las actas… se considera que el plazo de 18 meses es razonable ya que no se trata de una plazo excesivamente corto, ni excesivamente largo. // La atribución de este plazo responde a la atribución que la Asamblea Legislativa en el ejercicio de la función de dictar leyes… donde goza de una amplia libertad de conformación para desarrollar el programa constitucional fijado por el Poder Constituyente.
(…)
Se considera que en el caso consultado la Asamblea tomó en consideración que no se trataba de un plazo arbitrario, ni antojadizo, ni intempestivo, sino que se trata de un plazo razonable…” Ello debe entenderse así, pese a que esta Sala en resolución n°2021-11957 indicara que: “la decisión legislativa final de reconocerle únicamente a los cotizantes con 28 años y medio de servicio la posibilidad de jubilarse bajo el régimen anterior, sí formó parte de los requerimientos técnicos necesarios que se tomaron en cuenta para diseñar las modificaciones que darían sustento financiero al régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial. // Asimismo, el plazo de 18 meses estuvo ampliamente apoyado por el criterio técnico, no sólo por razones de seguridad jurídica de acuerdo a la jurisprudencia constitucional, sino también por razones de solvencia actuarial.” Así que debe entenderse, porque se desprende de la prueba solicitada y del expediente legislativo que, NO hubo criterio técnico para sustentar el plazo del transitorio cuestionado, sino que, el propio órgano legislativo fue quien consideró razonable el plazo establecido por “no ser excesivamente corto ni excesivamente largo”, bajo el sustento de la discrecionalidad legislativa.
Es evidente que afirmar que no es ni excesivamente corto ni excesivamente largo, es un juicio que sólo responde a una apreciación que parece de sentido común, pero que está lejos de un criterio técnico que responda a un análisis de todas las variables en juego, máxime en un caso en que se restringen o modifican derechos en vías de consolidación.
-Sea previo a la aprobación de la norma.
-Demuestre los efectos que las medidas regresivas puedan tener en los derechos de los afectados.
-Demuestre que no existen medidas menos gravosas que pudieran haber sido tomadas.
Nótese además que, la Sala ha establecido como parámetro de referencia para examinar la legitimidad constitucional de una medida regresiva de DESC (derechos económicos, sociales y culturales) estos otros criterios de fondo:
*analizar si la restricción de derechos es “idónea” o “adecuada”, *analizar si es “necesaria” o “indispensable”, *analizar si es “proporcionada” en estricto sentido o “ponderada” *determinar que no existan otros medios para alcanzar con la misma eficacia el fin perseguido que sean menos onerosos en términos de sacrificio de los derechos constitucionales susceptibles de limitación en cada caso o, en otras palabras, que no exista otro medio que pueda conducir al fin y que sacrifique en menor medida los principios constitucionales afectados por el uso de esos medios. En palabras de la Corte Interamericana, se debe verificar si “(…) la restricción de los derechos afectados es equivalente a los beneficios que la disposición genera. Si el daño que se produce sobre el patrimonio jurídico de los ciudadanos es superior al beneficio constitucional que la norma está en capacidad de lograr, entonces es desproporcionada (…)”.
Por otro lado, tampoco es de recibo lo que se indica en el voto de mayoría sobre que el plazo de los 18 meses contó con sustento técnico en el informe emitido por el Instituto de Investigaciones en Ciencias Económicas de la Universidad de Costa Rica (IICE), el 4 de julio de 2017, denominado Producto 6 “Recopilación e informe final: conclusiones y recomendaciones”, puesto que:
a. Dicho informe (de fecha julio 2017) fue el sustento técnico del texto vigente a ese momento, que NO es el texto finalmente aprobado en octubre del 2017 (donde en el Plenario sufrió modificaciones de fondo importantes mediante mociones, en cuenta, allí fue donde se estableció el transitorio de 18 meses).
b. Dicho informe solo puede entenderse como sustento para el texto del proyecto de ley de ese momento y no el que finalmente se aprobó. Si el texto del proyecto cambió (en cuanto a condiciones, edad, monto y demás), es lógico que la solvencia del Fondo sería mayor que la que existía cuando el informe técnico se rindió. Así entonces, las conclusiones a las que arribaría con un transitorio de 20 años, serían diferentes.
c. Dicho informe es incompatible con lo indicado por los representantes de la Junta de Pensiones del Poder Judicial, tanto en el informe rendido como en la vista, donde se indica expresamente “no hay ningún riesgo de insolvencia del Fondo con incluir en el transitorio a los que cuenten con 20 años, tomando como base que el Fondo tendría una solvencia de casi 80% con población abierta, en comparación con el IVM de la CCSS que tiene un 50%, siendo así el Fondo del Poder Judicial los que mayor solvencia tienen.” El voto de mayoría ignora este dato actualizado y asume el criterio de un informe que no respondía a la realidad de la época y a la situación financiera del fondo en la actualidad.
d. El oficio suscrito por la Superintendencia de Pensiones de octubre del 2023 no se puede citar en un voto porque la SUPEN no es interviniente en la acción, y por lo tanto, sus afirmaciones no pudieron ser contextualizadas o incluso rebatidas en la vista. Se trata de un criterio que no pudo ser confrontado y discutido en el proceso de la acción. El voto de mayoría toma en cuenta un dictamen que no fue confrontado y rebatido en la acción o en la audiencia oral.
e. El mismo informe 6 indica en las conclusiones (página 73), que “Para valorar adecuadamente el efecto de un aumento de este transitorio sería necesario realizar un análisis actuarial completo.”
-La cantidad de renuncias que se han dado desde el 2018 hasta la fecha suman 750.
-La cantidad total de personas que se vieron afectas por la Ley de Reforma del régimen de jubilaciones y pensiones del Poder Judicial es de 1292, lo cual representa un 9,68% del personal judicial.
-Es indiscutible el impacto de las renuncias que se han dado en el Poder Judicial en términos de los costos asociados con la contratación y capacitación de nuevo personal.
-Las personas trabajadoras más antiguas tienen que asumir tareas adicionales para cubrir las responsabilidades del puesto vacante, aumentando su carga de trabajo y potencialmente afectando su desempeño.
-Es ineludible que el cambio en las condiciones para jubilarse ha tenido un impacto negativo en la salud física y emocional de una persona trabajadora que ya estaba planificando su retiro y estaba preparada para hacerlo. El estrés adicional y la exigencia física y mental del trabajo prolongado puede aumentar el riesgo de enfermedades crónicas y problemas de salud mental.
-Se observa en el cuadro resumen durante los años cercanos a la reforma se observa un repunte de los diagnósticos por ansiedad, igualmente debe llamar la atención el incremento de los diagnósticos relacionados a cuadros de depresión que emergen posterior a implementada la reforma en análisis. En relación con ese tema, las personas trabajadoras han manifestado sentimientos de frustración, desmotivación, malestar, tristeza, apatía, desesperanza, angustia, entre otros. Además, se atienden cuadros de ansiedad, depresión, estrés laboral, síndrome de la persona trabajadora quemada, entre otros.
En este sentido, resulta claro que no se ha demostrado que el plazo establecido fuera el menos gravoso del que pudo haberse establecido, tornándolo irrazonable y desproporcionado, además de ser un plazo inidóneo e innecesario. Máxime si se compara con otros plazos establecidos en transitorios de otras leyes, a saber:
Plazos de transitorios 1) MAGISTERIO NACIONAL *20 años de pertenencia al régimen Ley n°8536 del 2006:
Quienes al 18 de mayo de 1993 o al 13 de enero de 1997 hayan servido al menos durante 20 años en el Magisterio Nacional, mantendrán el derecho de pensionarse o jubilarse al amparo de la ley n° 2248 y n°7268.
Quienes cuenten con 55 años o más, conservarán el derecho a pensión según las condiciones vigentes antes de la presente reforma.
La reforma entra a regir a partir del 1° de setiembre del 2016. Una vez transcurridos 54 meses desde la entrada envigencia, ninguna persona podrá acceder a un retiro anticipado.
ARTÍCULO 8.- Reforma del transitorio III de la Ley N.° 7302. Se reforma el transitorio III de la Ley N.° 7302, Creación del Régimen General de Pensiones con Cargo al Presupuesto Nacional, de Otros Regímenes Especiales y Reforma a la Ley N.° 7092, del 21 de abril de 1988, y sus Reformas, Ley de Impuesto sobre la Renta, de 8 de julio de 1992. El texto es el siguiente:
"Transitorio III.- Dentro del plazo de cinco años, contado a partir de la entrada en vigencia de la presente ley, las personas que tengan derecho podrán pensionarse bajo los términos originales contemplados en la Ley N.° 7302, Creación del Régimen General de Pensiones con Cargo al Presupuesto Nacional, de Otros Regímenes Especiales y Reforma a la Ley N.° 7092, de 21 de abril de 1988, y sus reformas, Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, de 8 de julio de 1992, tanto en lo que respecta al porcentaje a otorgar en la tasa de reemplazo como la posibilidad de descontar de la edad de retiro un año por cada dos de los años servidos y cotizados para la Administración Pública.
En el plazo citado en el párrafo anterior, para poder pensionarse o jubilarse se requerirá tener un mínimo de cincuenta y cinco años de edad y los años servidos y cotizados que determine su régimen.
Finalizado este plazo, la edad mínima de retiro quedará establecida en los sesenta años, igual a la edad contemplada en el artículo 4 de la Ley N.° 7302."
B.-) Sobre cómo se violentaron los derechos en vías de adquisición Los accionantes indican que, la aplicación automática de una disposición transitoria tan severa y nunca antes aplicada a ningún grupo con situaciones jurídicas consolidadas en materia jubilatoria, resulta contrario al Derecho de la Constitución, por lo que solicita se declare la inconstitucionalidad y se permita a sus representados poder jubilarse con las anteriores condiciones a dicha reforma, dada la cantidad de tiempo que han pertenecido al régimen en cuestión. Agregan además que, otras reformas jubilatorias han tenido un transitorio escalonado que les ha permitido modular sus expectativas jubilatorias, situación que no se ha permitido en el Poder Judicial. Indican además que, otros tribunales constitucionales reconocen el derecho a un tratamiento diferenciado a las personas que se encuentran cercanas a adquirir los requisitos jubilatorios y que se encuentran frente a una modificación legislativa, por lo que se solicita la aplicación del derecho comparado.
Así consideran que, no solo se parte de una tutela al derecho jubilatorio que se da cuando se cumplen los presupuestos fácticos que establecen las normas, sino que, además, se reconocen y protegen los derechos en vías de adquisición, que, conforme a la cercanía con el momento de alcanzar el derecho, requieren de una tutela o protección del Estado. La Procuraduría General de la República (PGR) indica que, en nuestro medio se reconoce únicamente el derecho adquirido a la jubilación cuando se han cumplido todos los requisitos, mientras que el mal denominado “derecho de pertenencia” no es más que una simple expectativa, que se extingue con la reforma o derogación introducida por la nueva normativa que sea promulgada. Agrega que, si bien la jurisprudencia constitucional ha reconocido que, en el caso de los regímenes contributivos de pensión, la cotización origina un “derecho de pertenencia”, ello no hace inmodificable las reglas del sistema.
Por su parte, el Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa manifiesta que, no resulta pertinente lo alegado por los accionantes, en cuanto a que la ley 9544 entre en contradicción con lo establecido en los convenios de la Organización Internacional de Trabajo. Agrega que, la Sala Constitucional al resolver la consulta facultativa no encontró que en la ley 9544 afectación a los derechos adquiridos y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas. Tampoco considera que se haya dado violación a Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, ni al Pacto Internacional de los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, pues la ley no afecta los derechos a la seguridad social. Se rechaza además la lesión a los principios de trasparencia, seguridad jurídica, buena fe, confianza legítima, intangibilidad relativa del patrimonio, no confiscatoriedad y respeto de los derechos adquiridos y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas.
En criterio de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en las tres ocasiones en la Corte fue consultada se emitió criterio negativo y se opuso al proyecto de ley consultado, debido a que incide en la organización y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial. Consideran que debió haberse resguardado el derecho a la jubilación, con un transitorio razonable, justo, sustentado en criterios técnicos y objetivos.
Al respecto considero que los accionantes llevan razón en sus alegatos, y se ha dado en este caso una violación al derecho de pensión en vías de adquisición, derecho derivado del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos; todo conforme se explica a continuación. La trascendencia de la jubilación requiere una tutela específica, cuando ese derecho está en vías de consolidación. No puede ignorarse esa condición tutelando sólo el derecho adquirido y dejando sin tutela el lento proceso en que el funcionario alcanzará, después de años, tal condición.
Tradicionalmente se ha entendido que, el artículo 34 Constitucional protege los “derechos adquiridos” y las “situaciones jurídicas consolidadas”. Sin embargo, en razón de lo que establece el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos relacionados con el derecho al trabajo, podemos agregar otro concepto constitucionalmente tutelado, el concepto de “derechos en vías de adquisición”. En términos generales, se pueden definir los conceptos de la siguiente manera:
Derechos adquiridos (art.34 constitucional) Se refieren a aquella circunstancia consumada en lo que una cosa -material o inmaterial, trátese de un bien previamente ajeno o de un derecho antes inexistente- ha ingresado (o incidido sobre) la esfera patrimonial de la persona, de manera que ésta experimenta una ventaja o beneficio constatable.
(ver sentencia n° 2765-97)
Situaciones jurídicas consolidadas (art.34 constitucional) Representa no tanto un plus patrimonial, sino un estado de cosas definido plenamente en cuanto a sus características jurídicas y a sus efectos, aun cuando éstos no se hayan extinguido aún. Lo relevante es cuanto a la situación jurídica consolidada, precisamente, no es que esos efectos todavía perduren o no, sino que —por virtud de mandato legal o una sentencia que así lo haya declarado- haya surgido ya a /a vida jurídica una regla, clara y definida, que conecta a un presupuesto fáctico (hecho condicionante) con una consecuencia dada (efecto condicionado). Desde esta óptica, la situación de la persona viene dada por una proposición lógica de/tipo 'si..., entonces.. .M, vale decir si se ha dado el hecho condicionante, entonces la 'situación jurídica consolidada' implica que, necesariamente, deberá darse también el efecto condicionado.
(ver sentencia n° 2765-97)
Derechos en vías de adquisición (art.34 constitucional y normativa de la OIT) Derechos de quienes están cerca de acceder a un derecho específico bajo un régimen anterior.
Derechos que están prontos a consolidarse de haberse mantenido las condiciones establecidas.
Derechos que se ubican en una posición intermedia entre los derechos adquiridos o situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, y las meras expectativas, por lo tanto son merecedores de una cierta protección, que también encuentra cobijo en el art.34 Constitucional.
Derecho Comparado, ver sentencia de Corte Constitucional de Colombia C-789 del 24 de setiembre del 2002: No es posible eliminar el régimen de transición de aquellas personas que hubieren logrado el 75% del tiempo de servicio necesario para adquirir la prestación antes de la entrada en vigencia de la reforma de pensiones, pues ello desconocería la expectativa legítima del estado.
En todos estos casos, el parámetro constitucional protege, tornando intangible para el legislador, la situación de quien obtuvo el derecho (derecho adquirido), de quien disfruta de la situación (situación jurídica consolidada) o de quien estará pronto a disfrutarlo (derecho en vías de adquisición), por razones de equidad y certeza jurídica. Sobre los derechos en vías de adquisición existe diversa normativa internacional.
Así, el Convenio Multilateral Centroamericano de Seguridad Social (San José), aprobado por Costa Rica mediante ley n°5333 del 22 de agosto de 1973, artículo 27 establece:
“Artículo 27:
1º.- En caso de denuncia del presente Convenio, será mantenido todo derecho adquirido en virtud de sus disposiciones.
2º.- Los derechos en vías de adquisición, relativos a períodos cumplidos con anterioridad a la fecha en que la denuncia sea efectiva, no se extinguirán por el mero hecho de la denuncia, su conservación se determinará por vía de acuerdo o, a falta de acuerdo, por la legislación correspondiente a la Institución competente.” La Convención sobre el Estatuto de los Refugiados, aprobado por Costa Rica mediante ley n°6079-A del 29 de agosto de 1977, en el artículo 24:
“Artículo 24:
1. Los Estados Contratantes concederán a los refugiados que se encuentren legalmente en el territorio de tales Estados el mismo trato que a los nacionales en lo concerniente a las materias siguientes:
(…)
“Artículo 7 1. Los Estados Miembros para los que el presente Convenio esté en vigor deberán esforzarse en participar, (…) en un sistema de conservación de derechos adquiridos y de derechos en vías de adquisición, reconocidos en virtud de su legislación a los nacionales de los Estados Miembros (…)” (resaltado no corresponde al original) Asimismo, el artículo 30 del Convenio 128 de la OIT, denominado Convenio sobre las prestaciones de invalidez, vejez y sobrevivientes, 1967, según el cual:
“Artículo 30:
La legislación nacional deberá, bajo condiciones prescritas, prever la conservación de los derechos en curso de adquisición respecto de las prestaciones contributivas de invalidez, vejez y sobrevivientes.” (resaltado no corresponde al original) Además, del artículo 6 del Convenio 157 de la OIT, denominado Convenio sobre la conservación de los derechos en materia de seguridad social, 1982 (núm. 157):
“Artículo 6 A reserva de las disposiciones del apartado a) del párrafo 3 del artículo 4 del presente Convenio, todo Miembro deberá esforzarse en participar con cada uno de los demás Miembros interesados en un sistema de conservación de los derechos en curso de adquisición respecto de toda rama de seguridad social mencionada en el párrafo 1 del artículo 2 del presente Convenio para la cual esté en vigor una legislación de cada uno de estos Miembros, en favor de las personas que hayan estado sujetas sucesiva o alternativamente a las legislaciones de dichos Miembros.” (resaltado no corresponde al original).
Sobre el valor de los convenios internacionales no ratificados por Costa Rica, debe recordarse el valor de los instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos. La Sala Constitucional, desde temprana jurisprudencia de los años 90 indicó que el artículo 48 Constitucional -reformado en 1989-, había creado una nueva categoría de normas: los instrumentos internacionales sobre derechos humanos, lo cuales, tienen un rango, no solo superior a las leyes (en virtud del artículo 7) sino además superior a la Constitución Política, en la medida es que protejan más los derechos humanos (ver sentencias 1147-90, 3805-92, y además 1739-92, 3435-92, 2313-95, 2002-10693)[[]20]. Ahora bien, incluso se han considerado como parte del parámetro o bloque de constitucionalidad, aquellos instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos que no hayan sido aprobados por Costa Rica. Así se ha dicho:
“En este aspecto hay que rescatar la referencia específica que hoy la Constitución hace de los "instrumentos internacionales", significando que no solamente convenciones, tratados o acuerdos, formalmente suscritos y aprobados conforme al trámite constitucional mismo … sino cualquier otro instrumento de tenga la naturaleza propia de la protección de los Derechos Humanos, aunque no hay sufrido ese trámite, tiene vigencia y es aplicable en el país. Así, la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos (París, 10 de diciembre de 1948), por su carácter y naturaleza, no ha necesitado de los trámites constitucionales de aprobación, para entenderse como vigente y con la fuerza normativa que le otorga la materia que regula. Otro tanto cabe decir de las "Reglas Mínimas para el tratamiento de los reclusos", de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas, que aunque sean producto de reuniones de expertos o el trabajo de algún departamento de esa organización, por pertenecer nuestro país a ella, y por referirse a derechos fundamentales, tienen tanto el valor de cualquier normativa internacional que formalmente se hubiera incorporado al derecho interno costarricense.” (sentencia n°2000-9685.
Resaltado no corresponde al original. Ver además sentencia n°2000-7498)[4] Tal como lo ha dicho esta Sala resolviendo otra acción relacionada con el tema de pensiones, esta acción de inconstitucionalidad tiene en el trasfondo los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales, derechos humanos muy concretos, que se constituyen en temas que deben ser cuidadosamente analizados y tutelados por este Tribunal Constitucional, especialmente, al tratarse de los derechos que acompañan a las personas adultas mayores en momentos muy importantes de su vida (ver resolución n.º 2020-19274, de las 16:30 horas del 07 de octubre del 2020[[]22]). Por Sentencia N° 2012-16628 de las 16:30 horas del 28 de noviembre de 2012 (ratificado en sentencia anterior n°2020-19274), esta Sala estableció, sobre la normativa internacional en materia de seguridad social como un piso o mínimo:
“Lo cierto es que la normativa internacional establece lo que la jerga de la seguridad social denomina en algunos de los documentos de la OIT el piso social o piso de protección social como un mínimo de obligaciones fundamentales que sí podrían ser justiciables, sí existen obligaciones jurídicas no cumplidas y exigibles en forma doméstica, o agotada ésta, a nivel internacional. […]” La Sala ha indicado que “hay un derecho al mantenimiento de la protección que el asegurado recibe conforme a la legislación nacional, al pertenecer a un régimen y especialmente declarado al cumplir con las condiciones y requisitos necesarios, para el disfrute de un derecho de goce pacífico.” (ver sentencia n°2020-19274). Derecho al mantenimiento de la protección que se puede extender, no sólo al disfrute de un derecho declarado, sino además, al derecho a pertenecer a un régimen con las condiciones y requisitos pactados desde el inicio.
Lo cual está relacionado también con el principio constitucional de confianza legítima relacionado con el principio de seguridad jurídica y el principio de buena fe, pues opera como un límite al poder público que impide vulnerar la confianza de los administrados en el sentido de que no sea vulnerada sin razón fundamentada, protegiendo la estabilidad de las situaciones jurídicas, de derechos adquiridos y de derechos en vías de adquisición. Dicho principio, aplicado a este caso significa que, el cambio en las condiciones y requisitos jubilatorios si bien pueden cambiar por decisión del legislador (pues ciertamente no es que exista un derecho a la inmutabilidad del ordenamiento jurídico), pero, a diferencia de lo que se consideró en el voto de mayoría, estimo que dicho cambio debe respetar los derechos en vías de adquisición de aquellos que estén prontos a cumplir dichas condiciones y requisitos.
En tema tan trascendental en la vida del ciudadano trabajador, se requiere una distinción jurídica que recoja la particularidad de una situación tan relevancia, cuál es el régimen que regula el proceso jubilatorio.
Por otro lado, ya lo ha dicho esta Sala “la crisis financiera ni es en sí misma ni puede ser una justificación para la toma de decisiones regresivas”. Además, “la falta de recursos no puede servir de pretexto para el incumplimiento de ellos [los derechos sociales]”. (ver sentencia n°2020-19274). Por ello, no considero procedente que el voto de mayoría sustente la regresión de condiciones asociadas al derecho de pensión, en la crisis del régimen de pensión. En el mismo sentido en que esta Sala lo dijo en la resolución de referencia (sentencia n°2020-19274) debe entenderse un tope a la potestad legislativa para cambiar las condiciones de un régimen de pensiones, referido al denominado “derecho de pertenencia” que protege además los derechos en vías de adquisición. Tal como se dijo, sobre este concepto de derechos en vías de adquisición, los mencionados artículos 7 del Convenio 118 de la OIT, artículo 30 del Convenio 28 OIT y artículo 6 del Convenio 157 de la OIT, convenios que, aunque no aprobados por Costa Rica, constituyen parte del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos, y por tanto, parte de nuestro bloque o parámetro de constitucionalidad.
Y es que ello no se trata de darle preponderancia a intereses particulares frente a los generales, como se indica en el voto de mayoría, sino que, el interés general en su adecuada dimensión incluye el respeto de los derechos en vías de adquisición. No considero admisible aceptar el argumento que asume que las crisis financieras están por encima de los derechos fundamentales, en cuanto consideremos ello así, estaríamos admitiendo la muerte inminente del Derecho de la Constitución, pues en nuestros días, prácticamente todo cabe justificarse por una crisis fiscal. Y, no es que desconozca que tales crisis existan, sino que, los derechos fundamentales siempre deben tener supremacía frente a ellas, siendo lo procedente responsabilizar a quienes han llevado a tales crisis pero no a costa de los derechos sociales. En este sentido no puedo menos que estar en desacuerdo con el concepto que ha venido indicando la mayoría de esta Sala, en cuanto al Estado social de derecho posible, concepto que viene a constituir una clara regresión de lo debe entenderse como Estado social de derecho, incluso así lo ha entendido la Corte Constitucional Italiana en el considerando 11 de la sentencia 275/2016 cuando se entiende que el equilibrio presupuestario no puede condicionar la satisfacción de los derechos humanos.
Asimismo, la sentencia de la Corte Constitucional Colombiana (140/19) cuando se indica que ninguna autoridad pública podrá invocar la sostenibilidad fiscal para socavar derechos fundamentales. Es preocupante que se postule un concepto tan vago e inexacto como “Estado social de derecho posible”, ese horizonte, que luce como una entelequia, viene a condicionar todo el estado social. No hay Estado de derecho si asumimos que los derechos sociales sólo son admisibles, si son posibles. Es decir, que en función de valoraciones estrictamente fiscalistas o economicistas, los sectores con menos poder económico y político, ven reducidos, restringidos o suprimidos, los derechos sociales. Hay que reflexionar mucho sobre estos horizontes que abren la puerta a la devaluación y reducción del Estado social, que incluye, sin duda alguna, el tema del régimen jubilatorio. Más grave aún si se restringen sin un criterio técnico específico y adecuado al caso concreto.
En Derecho Comparado, se observa por ejemplo las consideraciones que al respecto ha hecho la Corte Constitucional Colombiana, indicando que, las expectativas legítimas de quienes aspiran a pensionarse bajo un régimen determinado, deben ser objeto de alguna consideración protectora por el legislador, siendo una de las maneras de protección de las expectativas legítimas el establecimiento de regímenes de transición, que amplían el ámbito de protección más allá de sólo los derechos adquiridos (ver sentencias C-147 del 19 de marzo de 1997 y C-428 del 01 julio 2009). A diferencia de lo que se indica en el voto de mayoría, que yerra al indicar que en Colombia no se fija un plazo para garantizar los derechos en vías de adquisición, estableciéndose en un 75% de cotización del régimen anterior, véase lo que se indicó en la sentencia de Corte Constitucional de Colombia C-789 del 24 de setiembre del 2002:
“3.3. La protección de las expectativas legítimas de los trabajadores y la interpretación más favorable (…) En virtud de dicha protección, los tránsitos legislativos deben ser razonables y proporcionales, y por lo tanto, la ley posterior no podría desconocer la protección que ha otorgado a quienes al momento de entrada en vigencia del sistema de pensiones llevaban más de quince años de trabajo cotizados.
(…)
Por lo tanto, resultaría contrario a este principio de proporcionalidad, y violatorio del reconocimiento constitucional del trabajo, que quienes han cumplido con el 75% o más del tiempo de trabajo necesario para acceder a la pensión a la entrada en vigencia del sistema de pensiones, conforme al artículo 151 de la Ley 100 de 1993 (abril 1º de 1994), terminen perdiendo las condiciones en las que aspiraban a recibir su pensión.
En tal medida, la Corte establecerá que los incisos 4º y 5º del artículo 36 de la Ley 100 de 1993 resultan exequibles en cuanto se entienda que los incisos no se aplican a las personas que tenían 15 años o más de trabajo cotizados para el momento de entrada en vigor del sistema de pensiones consagrado en la Ley 100 de 1993, conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo 151 del mismo estatuto.
(…)
Por lo tanto, las personas que hubieran cotizado durante 15 años o más al entrar en vigencia el sistema de pensiones, y se encuentren en el régimen de prima media con prestación definida, tendrán derecho a que se les apliquen las condiciones de tiempo de servicios, edad y monto de la pensión, consagradas en el régimen anterior, siempre y cuando: (…)” (resaltado propio) En el caso del derecho a la jubilación o a la pensión se tiene lo siguiente:
El derecho a la jubilación o la pensión es una situación jurídica consolidada, el cual se adquiere cuando el interesado cumple con todos los presupuestos establecidos por ley.
El derecho de pertenencia a un régimen jubilatorio que es el derecho a permanecer en un régimen de pensiones propio de la institución en que se labora, así como sus elementos o condiciones definitorias. El derecho a pertenecer al régimen implica el derecho a no ser excluido, a que se mantengan sus parámetros generales. Se puede ubicar aquí el derecho de pensión en vías de adquisición. Este derecho deja de ser una simple expectativa de derecho y se adquiere desde que se ingresa al régimen jubilatorio (ver sentencia n°1147-90[[]23] y n°6491-98[[]24]). La jurisprudencia ha reconocido que la cotización para un régimen de pensiones origina un "derecho de pertenencia al régimen", como queda dicho, pero no hace inmodificable las reglas del sistema" (ver sentencia n°5236-99[[]25]). Así que no se trata de una simple expectativa de derecho, sino que tiene un grado mayor de protección. El régimen al que se pertenece puede ciertamente sufrir reformas, pero ellas están sujetas a ciertas limitaciones, básicamente, esas reformas deben tener un sustento técnico y además, deben respetar los derechos en vías de adquisición. De lo primero ya se ha indicado lo correspondiente supra, y de lo segundo, se trata que el legislador tome en cuenta esos derechos en vías de adquisición en sus disposiciones transitorias.
Así lo ha indicado antes esta Sala:
“… el derecho de jubilación se manifiesta primeramente bajo el nombre y la forma de "derecho de pertenencia al régimen" desde el ingreso del funcionario al sistema y hasta que acontece el evento consistente en el cumplimiento de los requisitos necesarios para la obtención del beneficio. Luego, deja ese ropaje para pasar a llamarse "derecho a la prestación actual", una vez que ha ocurrido aquella señalada eventualidad.” (ver resolución n°2379-96[[]26]).
Es importante poner énfasis en la protección constitucional del derecho a la pensión, en su contenido esencial. Procede ejercer el control de constitucionalidad de la actividad parlamentaria y, por consiguiente, de las leyes, por vulnerar los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad cuando están vinculados a un derecho fundamental pues ello, además, vació su contenido esencial. Esta Sala ha indicado ya (ver resolución n°2019-00234[[]27]) que el derecho a la jubilación o la pensión es una situación jurídica consolidada, violentándose los derechos en vías de adquisición, para el caso de aquellos funcionarios que pudieron técnicamente incluirse dentro del transitorio y que pese a ello no se hizo. Ello no quiere decir que todos los cotizantes o que todos los que pertenezcan al régimen de pensiones del Poder Judicial tuvieran en este caso una situación jurídica consolidada, sino que se trata de la protección de los derechos en vías de adquisición -derivados del derecho de pertenencia- de aquellos que, pudiendo técnicamente incluirse dentro del transitorio, no se les incluyó.
El derecho de pertenencia hace surgir en favor de los cotizantes que estuvieren prontos a acogerse a la jubilación, una protección de sus derechos en vías de adquisición, bajo las condiciones más favorables del régimen anterior, derechos protegidos constitucionalmente al amparo del artículo 34 Constitucional, pero además, bajo el amparo del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos. A este grupo de funcionarios, la norma cuestionada permitió que se les violentara su derecho en vías de adquisición, y con ello, de pensionarse bajo el régimen anterior que les resultaba más favorable.
Claramente, no es la misma situación, ni el mismo amparo constitucional, que tienen las personas que recién inician su cotización en el Fondo de Pensiones y aquellas que llevan muchos años e incluso, están a pocos años de pensionarse. Esta distinción tan importante en la tutela del derecho a la jubilación, no se hace, de ninguna manera, en el transitorio que se discute en esta acción. Todo lo cual violenta además el principio de progresividad de los derechos fundamentales, pues el legislador democrático está limitado por los derechos fundamentales, tal como lo ha indicado esta Sala:
“Los Derechos Fundamentales vinculan negativa y positivamente al legislador. En un sentido negativo, debe respetarlos para lograr su plena efectividad, esto es, funcionan como una barrera o un límite. En un sentido positivo, los derechos fundamentales son para el legislador constituido un mandato, un principio rector o un programa por lo que debe desarrollarlos y configurarlos pero con respeto de su contenido esencial, esto es, del núcleo mínimo e indisponible – límite de límites- de cada uno de estos. El legislador constituido al desarrollar los derechos fundamentales debe velar por su progresiva intensificación y extensión de su eficacia y, en general, por su plena efectividad, para evitar cualquier regulación regresiva y restrictiva”. (ver resolución n°2003-2794[[]28]).
Todo lo cual encuentra fundamento en el artículo 26 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, y lo que esta Sala ha establecido al respecto:
“El artículo 26 obliga a los Estados signatarios a tomar providencias a nivel interno así como de cooperación internacional, con el propósito de lograr progresivamente la plena efectividad de los derechos que se derivan de las normas económicas, sociales, de educación, ciencia y cultura, contenidas en la Carta de la Organización de los Estados Americanos.” Resolución n°1995-03932.
C.-) Sobre el efecto que debió tener la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad del transitorio cuestionado En esta controversia, considero que la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad no puede tener por único efecto el anular toda la norma, pues lo inconstitucional no es haber establecido un transitorio sino un plazo sin sustento técnico. Por ello me inclino por anular únicamente el plazo de “dieciocho meses” establecido en el Transitorio VI de la norma impugnada. Ahora bien, es evidente que el anular dicho plazo es insuficiente para la protección de los derechos fundamentales aquí involucrados, corresponde indicar los efectos adicionales que tendría esta declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad. Si bien esta Sala ha indicado en anteriores oportunidades que no le corresponde “la potestad de elaborar, con los elementos técnicos aportados, una solución al problema real presentado por la situación financiera del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial.” Debido a que consta en esta acción, y en la vista realizada, elementos técnicos que permiten poder elaborar una solución, se procede a indicar cuál es el plazo que debe entenderse aplica para el Transitorio VI de la ley impugnada.
Estableciéndose como parámetro razonable el plazo establecido para acogerse a la pensión anticipada, a saber, el plazo de 20 años o más de cotización para el régimen, pues ello equivaldría a haber cotizado un 66% del plazo total (que eran 30 años). Dicho plazo permite respetar los derechos en vías de adquisición y el derecho de pertenencia de quienes habían cotizado la mayoría del plazo total, y que estaban prontos a jubilarse. Además, de resultar proporcional al plan de vida, razonable conforme a la sostenibilidad financiera del Fondo de Pensiones, en respeto del principio de confianza legítima (confianza en que condiciones no serán variadas de forma abrupta, confianza en que las reglas establecidas se respetarán y si cambian, el cambio sea gradual[[]29]). Así, considero que debe leerse el transitorio VI impugnado de la siguiente manera:
“Transitorio VI.- Los servidores judiciales que cuenten al momento de entrada en vigencia esta ley con, veinte años o más de servicio en el Poder Judicial, podrán pensionarse al amparo de las disposiciones establecidas en el texto del título IX de la Ley N.º 7333, de 5 de mayo de 1993, según las condiciones vigentes antes de esta reforma.” El fundamento técnico para el plazo indicado de 20 años lo sustento en el siguiente criterio técnico:
-El anterior Presidente de la Junta Administradora del Fondo, señor Carlos Montero, ante una comparecencia en la Corte Plena del Poder Judicial (sesión n° 08-2021, del 22 de febrero de 2021, artículo XVIII) manifestó que el Fondo se encontraba en condiciones de asumir las jubilaciones con las condiciones anteriores a la reforma, de personas que al momento de la entrada en vigencia del Transitorio VI, contaban con 20 años o más de servicio en el Poder Judicial.
-El artículo 29 del Convenio n°102 de la OIT establece un plazo mínimo de 20 años de residencia para la concesión de una pensión. En un inicio esta Sala interpretó dicha norma (ver votos n°6842-99[[]30] y n°00-673[[]31]) entendiendo “residencia” como pertenencia a un régimen, para luego, cambiarse de criterio, indicándose en el voto n°2000-2091[[]32] que “residencia” significa la residencia habitual en el territorio del Miembro y el término “residente” designa la persona que reside habitualmente en el territorio del Miembro. Sin embargo, es lo cierto que, el parámetro de 20 años constituye un criterio válido y razonable para entender también que 20 años puede ser el plazo de protección de pertenencia a un régimen al que se cotiza.
-El Código Iberoamericano de Seguridad Social (de la Organización Iberoamericana de Seguridad Social O.I.S.S., suscrito por Costa Rica en San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina, en octubre de 1995) establece en su artículo 50.1, un período de veinte años de cotización como periodo mínimo para garantizar una cuantía.
-Observando el plazo establecido en el transitorio de otras leyes relacionadas con Fondo de Pensiones, se tiene una media. Así por ejemplo la Ley del Magisterio Nacional estableció un plazo de 20 años de pertenencia al régimen (ley n°8536), mientras que otras leyes establecen un plazo mayor de transitorio: en 5 años las pensiones con cargo al Presupuesto Nacional (ley n°9388), 54 meses el IVM de la CCSS (reglamento n°8856); o incluso, con solo haber empezado a cotizar quedan al amparo de normativa anterior en el caso de funcionarios del TSE (ver transitorio II de ley n°9544).
-El porcentaje de cotización que corresponden a 20 años de pertenencia al régimen es de un 66% del plazo total anterior (30 años), lo cual resulta en un porcentaje mayoritario, que sobrepasó la mitad y que resulta razonable atendiendo al plan de vida de quien ya pasó la mayoría de sus años de servicio cotizando para un determinado régimen bajo unas determinadas condiciones.
-El Transitorio, en su versión anterior (ver dictamen de la Comisión del 27 de julio del 2017) establecía un plazo de 23 años y 6 meses de servicio para cobijarse, de forma escalonada, en la normativa anterior de pensiones.
-Según la prueba para mejor resolver, aportada por la Junta actual del Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial, se indica que un incremento de 10 años de servicio albergaría a 2759 personas, y cuya razón de solvencia del fondo pasaría de un 86,29% a un 79,43%, bajando 7 puntos porcentuales, manteniéndose siempre el porcentaje dentro de lo razonable, el cual según se indicó ello es así siempre que el porcentaje se mantenga igual o por arriba de 70%.
-Atendiendo a criterios, más allá de los económico-financieros, sino del orden de los derechos sociales, esta sería la mayor cantidad de funcionarios posibles que el Fondo de Pensiones pudiera acoger con las condiciones de pensión anteriores a la reforma, y con ello, más favorables a la persona (principio pro personae, principio pro operario).
Finalmente, a diferencia de como se hace en el voto de mayoría, considero que los Tribunales Constitucionales deben resolver con base en el Derecho de la Constitución, sin ignorar las consecuencias de los fallos, pero tomando en consideración los efectos sobre otros derechos fundamentales. El tema de las consecuencias del fallo, es una materia de contenido impreciso, debe precisarse más en su contenido y en sus derivaciones en la misma sentencia. En este caso, si bien existe un tema importante respecto de las consecuencias de la decisión en la salud financiera del régimen jubilatorio, tal evaluación requiere un análisis más amplio y detallado, situación que desde mi perspectiva no se cumple en el voto de mayoría. Las consecuencias de una decisión no pueden eclipsar el análisis y tutela de otros derechos. En esa ponderación me inclino más en la preeminencia de los derechos reclamados que en las consecuencias de la decisión, sin ignorar, como lo he expuesto, que la decisión favorable a los recurrentes, no pone en peligro la salud financiera del fondo de pensiones del Poder Judicial. En el caso en examen, no sólo debe evaluarse la salud financiera del régimen, sino además, los efectos de la decisión legislativa que se cuestiona, en la esfera de los derechos fundamentales de los involucrados y en los principios democráticos de la institución donde laboran.
D.-) Sobre el resto de vicios de procedimiento En el mismo sentido que el voto salvado a la resolución número 2018-5758, suscrito por el Magistrado Cruz Castro y otros magistrados, y pese a no haber participado el Magistrado Cruz en la votación que resolvió sobre alegatos concretos de violaciones de procedimiento legislativo en sentencia n°2021-11957, ni tampoco en la resolución que le dio curso a esta acción, n°2022-008712, se procede a ratificar los vicios de procedimiento que se consideraron allí existen en la ley impugnada n°9544.
“XXIII.- Voto salvado de los Magistrados Cruz Castro, Salazar Alvarado y Hernández Gutiérrez.
Redacta el Magistrado Salazar Alvarado; y, Al contrario del criterio de la mayoría de la Sala, consideramos que el proyecto de ley denominado “Ley de Reforma Integral a los Diversos Regímenes de Pensiones y Normativa Conexa”, expediente legislativo N° 19.922, presenta vicios de inconstitucionalidad, que invalidan el proyecto consultado, según las siguientes consideraciones:
ÚNICO.- Vicios en el procedimiento legislativo.
a.- Texto del proyecto de ley no consultado a la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Dentro de las dudas de constitucionalidad que plantean los consultantes, está la falta de consulta al Poder Judicial del texto sustitutivo aprobado en la sesión del 27 de julio de 2017 de la Comisión Especial. A juicio de los diputados y diputadas que plantean la consulta, ese proyecto de ley contiene una serie de regulaciones que afectan la organización y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, lo que obliga a consultarlo a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, de conformidad con lo preceptuado en el artículo 167, de la Constitución Política. En concreto, aducen que el artículo 239, del proyecto de ley, crea una Junta Administradora del Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial, la que define como un órgano del Poder Judicial, con independencia funcional, técnica y administrativa, para ejercer las facultades y atribuciones que la ley le otorga.
A dicha Junta, se le otorga independencia funcional y se le asigna una serie de competencias, tales como elevar el aporte obrero al Fondo de Pensiones, conocer solicitudes de jubilación, por citar algunas, con lo cual, a su entender, se produce una modificación en la estructura del Poder Judicial. De igual modo, al Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, se le restan competencias, y, además, el artículo 240, del proyecto de ley, confiere a la Corte Plena la obligación de dictar un reglamento para la elección de los miembros de esa Junta Administradora, fijándole así una competencia que actualmente no tiene. Por el contrario, aclaran que los textos sustitutivos anteriores sí fueron consultados a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, por lo que estiman contrario al Derecho de la Constitución que ello no se diera con respecto a este último texto.
Precisamente, a la base de la discusión, tal y como bien se afirma en el voto de mayoría, está la determinación de si, al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 167, de la Constitución Política, el órgano legislativo estaba o no en la obligación de consultar el citado proyecto de ley al Poder Judicial, deber que, por lo demás, ha sido incorporado en los artículos 126 y 127, del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, en los cuales se estipula el procedimiento que ha de observarse al efecto. Del texto constitucional se colige, que la consulta obligatoria a la Corte Suprema de Justicia solo es tal si el proyecto de ley se refiere a la organización o funcionamiento del Poder Judicial. De modo, que el meollo del asunto está en lo que se ha de entender por “organización o funcionamiento del Poder Judicial”.
Al respecto, el voto de mayoría sostiene, que cuando la Carta Política Fundamental hace referencia a la organización y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, se refiere -únicamente- a la afectación de la función jurisdiccional, y no de la propiamente administrativa. En abono de esta posición, se citan las Sentencias N° 1998-5958 de las 14:54 del 19 de agosto de 1998, N° 2001-013273 de las 11:44 horas del 21 de diciembre de 2001 y N° 2008-5179 de las 11:00 horas del 4 de abril de 2008. Asimismo, en relación con el tema concreto del Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial y la obligación de la Asamblea Legislativa de consultar a la Corte Suprema de Justicia los proyectos de ley que versan sobre aquel, el voto de mayoría cita las Sentencias N° 1995-3063 de las 15:30 del 13 de junio de 1995 y N° 2002-4258 de las 9:40 del 10 de mayo de 2002, con base en las cuales concluye, que en esos casos, la Asamblea Legislativa no está obligada a consultar el proyecto de ley a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en los términos dispuestos en el artículo 167, Constitucional.
Sin embargo, a criterio de los suscritos, tal interpretación del numeral constitucional, restringida únicamente a la función jurisdiccional, no se deriva ni del texto de la Carta Fundamental, ni de la jurisprudencia de esta Sala. En efecto, en cuanto a los precedentes de cita, es de destacar, que con respecto a las tres primeras sentencias, de ellas no se infiere lo que, en su voto, sostiene la mayoría. Así, en la Sentencia N° 1998-5958 de las 14:54 del 19 de agosto de 1998, lo que se desarrolla es solo el término “funcionamiento” -del binomio “organización o funcionamiento”- del Poder Judicial, sin referirse al tema de la organización de ese Poder de la República. En concreto, en la cita que se hace de ese voto, la Sala claramente indica que “…los asuntos que preceptivamente requieren de una consulta a la Corte Suprema de Justicia son aquellos que se refieran "a la organización o funcionamiento del Poder Judicial", donde el término "funcionamiento" alude no sólo a los aspectos de régimen interno administrativo de los despachos judiciales, sino también a las cuestiones procesales que rigen la sustanciación de los diversos asuntos sometidos a esos estrados” (el destacado es agregado), con lo cual se hace evidente, que el tema de la organización -que es el que aquí interesa- no fue desarrollado en dicha resolución, simplemente, porque el caso no lo requería, ya que se trató de la consulta legislativa preceptiva de constitucionalidad sobre el proyecto de “Adición de un nuevo Capítulo IV, denominado “Del recurso de hábeas data”, al Título III de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, ley Nº 7185 del 19 de octubre de 1989”, que se tramitó en el expediente legislativo número 12.827, donde el tema en discusión era que la reforma afectaba la función jurisdiccional del Poder Judicial.
Que esto es así, se desprende del propio texto de la sentencia que no se cita con la debida amplitud en el voto de mayoría: “…los asuntos que preceptivamente requieren de una consulta a la Corte Suprema de Justicia son aquellos que se refieran "a la organización o funcionamiento del Poder Judicial", donde el término "funcionamiento" alude no sólo a los aspectos de régimen interno administrativo de los despachos judiciales, sino también a las cuestiones procesales que rigen la sustanciación de los diversos asuntos sometidos a esos estrados. Y, en Costa Rica, la jurisdicción constitucional es indudablemente judicial, desde que tanto la Constitución Política como la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional integran a esta Sala dentro de la estructura de la Corte”. Hecha la cita en su contexto, no se puede inferir, que la Sala haya restringido el binomio “organización o funcionamiento” meramente a lo jurisdiccional, sino que, en el caso de cita, este Tribunal Constitucional únicamente se refirió al aspecto de la función jurisdiccional del Poder Judicial, porque era el tema en discusión, sin hacer exclusión, ni referirse al tópico de la organización administrativa de dicho Poder de la República.
Lo mismo cabe decir en relación con la Sentencia N° 2001-013273 de las 11:44 horas del 21 de diciembre de 2001 a la que alude la mayoría. Se trata de una consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad respecto del proyecto de ley de “Modificación del Código Penal, Ley número 4573 y sus reformas”, expediente legislativo número 14.158. Nuevamente, se trató de una reforma que afectaba directamente la función jurisdiccional del Poder Judicial, no su organización administrativa. De allí que, en este caso, tampoco la Sala desarrolló este último tema, por resultar ocioso. Es por ello, que la discusión de fondo se centró y agotó en los aspectos de la función jurisdiccional del Poder Judicial: “…dicha consulta [la del artículo 167, de la Constitución Política] resulta obligatoria cuando lo discutido en la Asamblea es un proyecto de ley que pretenda establecer reglas de funcionamiento y organización del Poder Judicial, entendido esto no apenas como las disposiciones que regulen la creación de tribunales de justicia o competencias jurisdiccionales, sino incluso aquellas que dispongan sobre modo de ejercicio de dichas competencias, es decir, sobre la forma en que el Poder Judicial lleva a cabo su función jurisdiccional, incluidas normas propiamente procesales” (el resaltado no pertenece al original).
Ciertamente, es evidente que lo expresado se limitó a examinar lo relativo al ejercicio de las competencias jurisdiccionales de los Tribunales de Justicia, toda vez que era sobre ese aspecto en particular que versó la consulta. Pero, la Sala no dijo que este sea el único extremo en que la consulta del numeral 167, de la Constitución Política, sea obligatoria, sino que lo que dijo es que, en ese caso, es obligatoria, sin referirse a otros casos en que también lo sea, como lo es lo referente a la organización y competencias administrativas del Poder Judicial.
Comentario separado merece la Sentencia N° 2008-5179 de las 11:00 horas del 4 de abril de 2008, puesto que aquí, a diferencia de la lectura que hace la mayoría, sí se establece que lo relativo a la organización administrativa del Poder Judicial cae dentro de la consulta obligatoria que estipula el citado artículo 167, Constitucional. En esa ocasión, este Tribunal Constitucional, como intérprete máximo de la Constitución Política, al referirse a los términos de “organización o funcionamiento” del Poder Judicial, contenidos en el artículo 167, de la Carta Política, como condición de la consulta obligatoria a ese Poder de la República por parte de la Asamblea Legislativa, consideró “…que un proyecto de ley versa sobre tales extremos cuando contiene en su articulado normas explícitas que disponen la creación, la variación sustancial o la supresión de órganos estrictamente jurisdiccionales o de naturaleza administrativa adscritos al Poder Judicial o bien crea, ex novo, modifica sustancialmente o elimina funciones materialmente jurisdiccionales o administrativas…” (el resaltado es agregado).
No se trata de un cambio de criterio de este Tribunal en la materia, sino, dentro de la línea jurisprudencial ya trazada, de una mayor determinación de los términos “organización o funcionamiento” que emplea el artículo 167, de la Constitución Política, para establecer los casos en los cuales los proyectos de ley que estén en la corriente legislativa deben ser consultados -obligatoriamente- a la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Esta sentencia no amplió, en modo alguno, los supuestos de consulta obligatoria; por el contrario, lo que hizo fue definirlos de una manera más amplia y precisa. Por ello, allí claramente se determinó, que en esos casos, pero solo en estos, la consulta es obligatoria. Así se entiende que, en esa misma sentencia, se expresara: “[c]abe apuntar que tal exégesis se impone en aras de mantener el equilibrio de poderes, sin privilegiar a uno u otro órgano constitucional, de manera que cada uno pueda ejercer sus funciones de manera independiente y separada como lo impone el propio texto constitucional (artículo 9° de la Constitución).
En otros términos, la precisión de tales conceptos evita cualquier colisión, extralimitación o exacerbación de las respectivas funciones, en aras de mantener el equilibrio y la contención de los poderes, por cuanto, el fin de la norma lo constituye no sólo la independencia funcional y la autonomía presupuestaria del Poder Judicial, sino, también, el equilibrio entre el Poder Legislativo y Judicial. En efecto, una interpretación amplia de los términos empleados por el constituyente originario, por parte de la Corte Plena, podría conducir a que determinadas materias que, en sentido estricto no están referidas a la organización y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, ameriten, injustificadamente, de una ley reforzada, con lo cual se ralentiza o entorpece, innecesariamente, la función legislativa. De otra parte, la desaplicación por la Asamblea Legislativa de la norma constitucional, al considerar, equívocamente, que el proyecto no versa sobre organización y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, podría provocar una lesión a la independencia funcional y autonomía presupuestaria del Poder Judicial”.
De lo anterior se colige, que todo lo relativo a la materia de organización y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, pero solo y estrictamente esto -para guardar el equilibrio entre independencia funcional y autonomía presupuestaria del Poder Judicial, por un lado, y la libertad de configuración del legislador ordinario, por otro-, es lo que obliga al órgano legislativo a realizar la consulta ante la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sin que se pueda extender a otras materias. En este sentido, no hay la menor duda, de que la Sala Constitucional ha entendido que lo relativo a la organización administrativa del Poder Judicial, y no solo lo concerniente a la afectación, directa o indirecta, de la función jurisdiccional, obliga al órgano legislativo a plantear la consulta en los términos expresados en el artículo 167, de la Constitución Política. Y no podría ser de otra manera, ya que la afectación o modificación de la organización administrativa del Poder Judicial en general -y no solo lo atinente a los órganos jurisdiccionales o judiciales en sentido estricto- también repercute en el servicio de Administración de Justicia que presta, y en la independencia que constitucionalmente se garantiza a ese Poder y a los jueces como funcionarios llamados a impartir justicia.
Por otra parte, las Sentencias N° 1995-3063 de las 15:30 del 13 de junio de 1995 y N° 2002-4258 de las 9:40 del 10 de mayo de 2002, que se citan en el voto de mayoría como fundamento para concluir que los proyectos de ley relativos al tema específico del Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial no necesitan ser consultados a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, tampoco tienen la virtud de dar el fundamento que, en relación con esta materia, afirma que tienen la mayoría de la Sala.
En la primera de dichas sentencias, la Sala conoció unas acciones de inconstitucionalidad acumuladas planteadas contra la Ley Marco de Pensiones, Ley N° 7302 de 8 de julio de 1992. Este Tribunal, en aquella ocasión, lo único que afirmó es que, en el caso de la Ley Marco de Pensiones, no existió la obligación constitucional de consultar al Poder Judicial el proyecto de ley respectivo, por la sencilla razón, de que dicho proyecto no afecta a los servidores judiciales; y, por lo tanto, no cae dentro de lo preceptuado por el artículo 167, de la Constitución Política. Asimismo, en el voto de cita, se indica que el funcionamiento está referido a la función jurisdiccional, pero no hace alusión alguna al tema de la organización del Poder Judicial, que es de lo que aquí se trata.
De igual modo, en la Sentencia N° 2002-4258 de las 9:40 del 10 de mayo de 2002, la Sala conoció de acciones de inconstitucionalidad acumuladas interpuestas contra el artículo 4, de la Ley N° 7605, de 2 de mayo de 1996, en cuanto reforma los artículos 224, 226 y 236, incisos 1) y 2), de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, N° 7333 de 5 de mayo de 1993, así como, por conexidad y consecuencia, contra el artículo 33, inciso a), del Reglamento de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. La Sala descartó, entre otros temas alegados, la violación al artículo 167, de la Constitución Política, por el hecho de que la reforma al régimen de pensiones de los servidores judiciales que se impugnó, no tenía relación con la organización ni el funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, para cuya definición hizo referencia a lo dicho al respecto en la Sentencia N° 1995-3063 de las 15:30 del 13 de junio de 1995, que, como ya se dijo, solo se refirió al término del funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, sin hacer referencia alguna al tema de su organización.
De modo tal, que, a diferencia del criterio externado por la mayoría, dichas sentencias no excluyen la materia relativa al Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial de la consulta obligatoria a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sino solo en el tanto y en el cuanto el respectivo proyecto de ley no tenga relación directa con la “organización o funcionamiento del Poder Judicial”, temas que, ciertamente, no estaban involucrados en las acciones que se plantearon ante esta Sala y que fueron resueltas en las sentencias de cita. Con ello, no se excluye la materia concerniente al Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial de la consulta obligatoria a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, como lo entiende la mayoría, ya que este tema, en sí mismo considerado, no está excluido de dicha consulta, sino que ello dependerá de si el proyecto de ley en cuestión contiene o no regulaciones relativas a la organización o el funcionamiento de ese Poder, aspecto que habrá que determinar de previo en cada caso para así establecer la obligatoriedad o no de dicha consulta.
En este punto, es importante aclarar, que la independencia funcional del Poder Judicial, establecida en el artículo 9, y reforzada en el artículo 154, ambos de la Constitución Política, implica, necesariamente, la potestad de dicho Poder de la República de darse su propia organización, con el fin de evitar, en especial, la intromisión de intereses políticos en su función. Y esta independencia organizativa, tanto administrativa como jurisdiccional, es la que también se tutela en el numeral 167, Constitucional. En este sentido, a criterio de los suscritos, es un grave error conceptual confundir o asimilar la función jurisdiccional en sentido amplio, con inclusión de la función auxiliar a la jurisdiccional, con la función estrictamente administrativa. La función jurisdiccional es una función especial y diferente a la función administrativa que prestan los funcionarios del Poder Ejecutivo o del sector descentralizado.
Una cosa es la Administración de Justicia y otra muy distinta la Administración Pública, dadas las particularidades de la función jurisdiccional frente a la función meramente administrativa, aun cuando los jueces y los auxiliares judiciales sean también funcionarios públicos. Precisamente, una de esas características, sin la cual sería imposible ejercer correctamente la función jurisdiccional, es la independencia, en su doble vertiente, tanto de Poder Judicial en sí mismo considerado, como la del juez y demás auxiliares de la función jurisdiccional. Basta para comprender la delicada tarea que realizan los jueces de la República, con la colaboración de los funcionarios que los asisten y los auxilian en sus funciones y sin los cuales aquellos no podrían ejercer debidamente su función, con tener presente que ellos deciden los casos sometidos a su conocimiento con fuerza de cosa juzgada; es decir, deciden cuál es la verdad con fuerza de autoridad de ley en cada caso, sin que su decisión, una vez alcanzada esa condición, pueda ser, en principio, revisada.
Esto implica una función sumamente delicada y una gran responsabilidad, la cual no podría llevarse a cabo si no se garantiza la independencia funcional del Poder Judicial y de los juzgadores que lo conforman. Y, en este sentido, no pude haber verdadera independencia, si los salarios y las pensiones y jubilaciones de los jueces y auxiliares de justicia no estuvieran acordes con sus responsabilidades, muchísimo más graves que las de cualquier otro funcionario que ejerza una función pública meramente administrativa. De allí, que unos y otros, de modo alguno, se puedan equiparar, ni en responsabilidades, ni en funciones, ni en salarios, ni en los derechos jubilatorios.
Existe consenso en la doctrina administrativa, en que la función jurisdiccional es, si no la más compleja, una de las más complejas y difíciles de llevar a cabo en el Estado Constitucional de Derecho en las sociedades modernas. Esto por cuanto, a diferencia de lo que se decida en los Poderes Legislativo y Ejecutivo, las decisiones del Poder Judicial, en ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional, son inapelables; es decir, tiene fuerza o autoridad de cosa juzgada. Esto no solo implica una gran responsabilidad, sino la necesidad de contar con una serie de principios y garantías que permitan el adecuado ejercicio de esa función. En este contexto, la independencia del Poder Judicial, tanto orgánica como funcional, se presenta como una condición sine qua non para el ejercicio de esa delicada función. Corresponde al juez decidir sobre la única y posible interpretación de la ley, de la Constitución y del parámetro de convencionalidad, lo cual sería imposible si no cuenta con la debida independencia.
Pero esta independencia sería ilusoria si no implica, necesariamente, una adecuada remuneración y un derecho jubilatorio acorde con sus funciones y responsabilidades, tanto para el juzgador propiamente dicho, como para el personal que le auxilia y asiste en su función. Por ello, en materia de remuneración y jubilación, no puede equipararse con el sector administrativo. La necesidad de compensar la complejidad y dificultad que implica el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional justifica, en torno al tema objeto de esta consulta, que la jubilación o pensión de los servidores judiciales no sea igual a la del resto del sector público administrativo. Lo que se decida con fuerza de cosa juzgada en las instancias judiciales, tiene efectos trascendentales en la seguridad jurídica y en el derecho vigente en una sociedad; y, por ende, en la paz social. En todo esto, la independencia judicial juega un papel protagónico, pues en un Estado Constitucional de Derecho, es decir, en un Estado Democrático, ese principio tiene una proyección institucional en el Poder Judicial propiamente dicho, frente a cualesquiera de los otros Poderes del Estado, lo que también implica, indispensablemente, la independencia personal y funcional de la figura del juez, no solo en relación con esos otros Poderes del Estado, sino, incluso, frente a los jerarcas del Poder Judicial.
Hoy por hoy, no hay Estado de Derecho si el Poder Judicial -con todos sus servidores incluidos-, no cuenta con una real y efectiva independencia. La independencia judicial es una garantía institucional establecida a nivel constitucional, sea, en el rango más elevado de la jerarquía de las normas, al punto que también se encuentra estipulada como un Derecho Humano. En efecto, la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos ha establecido, como derecho humano, el ser oído por un juez imparcial. Al respecto, en el artículo 8.1, se establece:
“Artículo 8. Garantías Judiciales.
1. Toda persona tiene derecho a ser oída, con las debidas garantías y dentro de un plazorazonable, por un juez o tribunal competente, independiente e imparcial, establecido conanterioridad por la ley, en la sustanciación de cualquier acusación penal formulada contraella, o para la determinación de sus derechos y obligaciones de orden civil, laboral, fiscal ode cualquier otro carácter”. (La negrita no es del original).
La independencia judicial constituye un principio fundamental dentro del Estado Constitucional de Derecho. Pero esa independencia, para ser real, no solo debe ser organizativa y funcional, sino también económica. Esa independencia económica está también garantizada en el artículo 177, de la Constitución Política, al establecer que el proyecto de presupuesto ordinario deberá asignar al Poder Judicial al menos un 6% de los ingresos ordinarios calculados para el año económico. La intención del Constituyente originario, con la promulgación de esta norma -que establece un egreso constitucional atado-, es garantizar, entre otras cosas, que los jueces y el resto del personal auxiliar de la justicia, tuvieran una retribución adecuada a la complejidad y dificultad de la función jurisdiccional, lo que implica, una jubilación o pensión adecuada también a ello y a las prohibiciones especiales que dicha función implica para los servidores judiciales, las cuales no pesan sobre los servidores públicos de los otros Poderes del Estado.
La norma constitucional previene que la asignación presupuestaria pueda convertirse en un instrumento de intervención política en la función jurisdiccional. Pero esto debe verse en toda su amplitud, ya que los salarios de los juzgadores y del personal auxiliar, así como el régimen de pensiones y jubilaciones que les es aplicable, tiene que guardar estricta relación con la labor que realizan, so pena de tornar nugatorio el principio de independencia judicial. De allí, que la independencia económica, personal, funcional, orgánica e institucional, tanto del Poder Judicial en sí mismo, como de los jueces y auxiliares de la justicia, es esencial en un Estado Constitucional de Derecho. Así las cosas, una forma de garantizar la independencia del Poder Judicial, de los Jueces de la República y de los auxiliares de justicia, es con una jubilación o pensión digna, acorde con sus funciones constitucionales.
En la exposición de motivos que dio lugar a la promulgación de la Ley de Jubilaciones y Pensiones Judiciales, como adición a la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, el diputado Teodoro Picado Michalski, en fecha 2 de junio de 1938, expresó:
“Es el Poder Judicial uno de los tres principales sostenes en que descansa el Gobierno de la República; y es a sus servidores, a los que por ejercer muy delicadas funciones para la vida misma de la Sociedad, se exige, más que a otros empleados, mayor ilustración, probidad y trabajo. Y es por eso, seguramente, que al pedirse a los servidores judiciales una completa dedicación, durante largos años, a la importantísima tarea de administrar justicia, -con el noble fin de asegurarles su subsistencia al llegar a la vejez o cuando por padecimientos físicos ya no puedan trabajar,- que se ha venido instando ante el Congreso, en distintos períodos legislativos, la promulgación de una ley que contemple esa difícil situación de los funcionarios y empleados del Poder Judicial”.
No se debe soslayar, que las personas juzgadoras y el funcionariado judicial en general, está sometido a un régimen de prohibiciones y de incompatibilidades de mucha mayor intensidad y rigurosidad que el régimen de incompatibilidades y prohibiciones que afecta al resto de los funcionarios públicos, lo que lo hace de una naturaleza completamente distinta. Las regulaciones que se aplican al funcionariado administrativo de todo el sector público no pueden aplicarse también a los funcionarios judiciales. En este sentido, los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad constitucional obligan a que ese régimen de incompatibilidades y prohibiciones asimétrico, que responde a la propia naturaleza de las funciones jurisdiccional y administrativa, deba tener una compensación económica, tanto salarial como al término de la relación laboral. Pero también el principio de igualdad, recogido en el artículo 33, de la Constitución Política, implica la prohibición de tratar como iguales a los desiguales, porque de ello se deriva una discriminación contraria al Derecho de la Constitución.
En el caso de los jueces y funcionarios judiciales, existen condiciones objetivas, razonables, justificadas y fundadas en la propia naturaleza de la función jurisdiccional que se ejerce, para darles un trato diferente al del resto de los servidores públicos de las distintas administraciones, con lo cual, lejos de incurrirse en una discriminación, se tutela el principio de igualdad regulado en el citado numeral constitucional. Lo cual quiere decir, que si existe un régimen jubilatorio diferenciado para el sector jurisdiccional, ello no obedece a una decisión arbitraria, subjetiva o antojadiza del legislador, sino a la propia naturaleza específica y diferente de la función jurisdiccional que, objetiva y constitucionalmente, lo justifican.
Lo anterior no solo se deriva de nuestra propia Constitución Política y de los valores y principios que la informan, sino que está contenido en diversos instrumentos internacionales. Así, por ejemplo, en los “Principios básicos relativos a la independencia de la judicatura”, adoptados por el Séptimo Congreso de las Naciones Unidas sobre Prevención del Delito y Tratamiento del Delincuente, celebrado en Milán del 26 de agosto al 6 de septiembre de 1985, y confirmados por la Asamblea General en sus resoluciones 40/32 de 29 de noviembre de 1985 y 40/146 de 13 de diciembre de 1985, en el principio 11, se dice lo siguiente:
“11. La ley garantizará la permanencia en el cargo de los jueces por los períodos establecidos, su independencia y su seguridad, así como una remuneración, pensiones y condiciones de servicio y de jubilación adecuadas”. (El resaltado no es del original).
Con lo cual, las Naciones Unidas recomienda a todos los países del mundo, que las normas jurídicas deben garantizar a los jueces una remuneración, pensiones, condición de servicios y de jubilación adecuadas y proporcionadas a la complejidad y dificultad de la función jurisdiccional que ejercen. Lo cual debe entenderse, también, extensivo a los funcionarios auxiliares de la justicia, pues, de otro modo, tal independencia sería imposible.
De igual modo, en la “Carta Europea sobre el Estatuto de los Jueces”, adoptada en Estrasburgo, entre el 8 y el 10 de julio de 1998, en aras de lograr una independencia real y efectiva del Poder Judicial y de los funcionarios que administran justicia, así como de sus colaboradores y auxiliares, en los párrafos 6.1 y 6.4, se establece lo siguiente:
“6.1 El ejercicio profesional de las funciones judiciales da derecho a la remuneración del / de la juez, cuyo nivel será determinado con el fin de preservarle de las presiones destinadas a influir en sus resolucionesy en general en su actuación jurisdiccional, alterando de ese modo su independencia e imparcialidad.
6.4 En particular, el estatuto asegurará al / a la juez que haya alcanzado la edad legal de cese en sus funciones, después de desarrollarlas a título profesional durante un período determinado, el pago de una pensión de jubilación cuyo importe se aproximará en lo posible al de su última retribución de actividad judicial”. (El destacado no es del original).
El citado instrumento pretende lograr un Poder Judicial real y efectivamente independiente, lo que es una garantía a favor de la ciudadanía. De modo tal, que la adecuada remuneración y pensión de los jueces y de los auxiliares de justicia, en los términos allí expresados, constituye la debida y razonable consecuencia del ejercicio de una función delicada y de mucha dificultad y responsabilidad.
También, el “Estatuto del Juez Iberoamericano”, aprobado en la VI Cumbre Iberoamericana de Presidentes de Cortes Supremas y Tribunales Supremos de Justicia, celebrada en Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Islas Canarias, España, los días 23, 24 y 25 de mayo de 2001, en el artículo 32, se hace eco de los mismos principios ya citados, al estatuir:
“Art. 32. Remuneración.
Los jueces deben recibir una remuneración suficiente, irreductible y acorde con la importancia de la función que desempeñan y con las exigencias y responsabilidades que conlleva”. (El destacado no es del original).
Y, en el artículo 33, dispone:
“Art. 33. Seguridad Social.
El Estado debe ofrecer a los jueces su acceso a un sistema de seguridad social, garantizando que recibirán, al concluir sus años de servicio por jubilación, enfermedad u otras contingencias legalmente previstas o en caso de daños personales, familiares o patrimoniales derivados del ejercicio del cargo, una pensión digna o una indemnización adecuada”. (El destacado no es del original).
Debe tenerse presente, que la jubilación y la pensión forman parte de los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Prestacionales contenidos en el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, adoptado y abierto a la firma, ratificación y adhesión por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidad, en su resolución 2200 A (XXI), de 16 de diciembre de 1966. Estas regulaciones también han sido acogidas en el Informe N° 1 del 23 de noviembre del 2001, rendido por el Consejo Consultivo de Jueces Europeos (CCJE), al examinar el tema de la independencia e inamovilidad de los jueces. Con respecto al tema de los salarios de los jueces, dicho Consejo recomendó:
“…es generalmente importante (y especialmente en el caso de las nuevas democracias) fijar disposiciones legales específicas que garanticen unos salarios de jueces protegidos contra reducciones y que aseguren de facto “el aumento de los salarios en función del coste de vida”.
Estas recomendaciones son de total aplicación al tema de las pensiones y jubilaciones de los jueces y de los servidores judiciales en general, ya que están íntimamente relacionadas con el principio de independencia del Poder Judicial, tal y como ya ha quedado expuesto.
Pero no solo en el ámbito internacional se ha regulado esta materia en los términos dichos, sino que también ha sido objeto de regulación a lo interno del Poder Judicial, con consideraciones semejantes a las dichas.
En efecto, la Corte Plena aprobó el Estatuto de Justicia y Derechos de las Personas Usuarias del Sistema Judicial, en cuyos artículos 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 y 24, se hace referencia a la independencia del Poder Judicial y de los jueces, en sus diferentes facetas. En el artículo 24, relativo a las condiciones materiales de la independencia judicial, se establece que el Estado debe garantizar “la independencia económica del Poder Judicial, mediante la asignación del presupuesto adecuado para cubrir sus necesidades y a través del desembolso oportuno de las partidas presupuestarias”, lo cual está íntimamente relacionado con lo dispuesto en el ya citado artículo 177, de la Constitución Política, en cuanto a la asignación constitucional de un mínimo del Presupuesto Ordinario para el Poder Judicial, como manifestación de esa independencia.
Asimismo, el artículo 49, del citado Estatuto, consagra también, al igual que los instrumentos internacionales examinados, el principio del salario irreductible del juez: “Los jueces deben recibir una remuneración suficiente, irreductible y acorde con la importancia de la función que desempeñan y con las exigencias y responsabilidades que conlleva”. Como ya se explicó, esta especial regulación tiene su fundamento en la independencia del Poder Judicial, lo cual debe ser también extendido al tema de la pensión o jubilación de los jueces y del personal auxiliar de la justicia, pues de otro modo, el principio de independencia judicial no sería posible.
El respeto a la independencia judicial, que es uno de los fines que persigue el artículo 167, Constitucional, también fue objeto de regulación expresa en el Estatuto, artículo 20, al disponer que “[l]os otros Poderes del Estado y, en general, todas las autoridades, instituciones y organismos nacionales o internacionales, deben respetar y hacer efectiva la independencia de la judicatura”.Y, precisamente, la intromisión inconsulta del órgano legislativo en la organización y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, sea creando, modificando o suprimiendo órganos o competencias, judiciales o administrativos, es constitucionalmente inadmisible, por constituir esto una flagrante violación al principio de independencia judicial.
Por último, cabe indicar, que la independencia del Poder Judicial es un principio que tiene una naturaleza particular y específica, distinta al de los otros Poderes del Estado, ya que consiste en un escudo de protección contra la intromisión del poder político, de lo cual no están protegidos los otros Poderes del Estado. Esto, debido a que el Poder Judicial es el que administra justicia y esta debe ser imparcial y libre de cualquier presión externa. Y, en este punto, la presión económica, bien por el salario o estipendio, bien por el monto y condiciones de la jubilación o pensión de los jueces y demás auxiliares de la justicia, juega un papel trascendente en la consecución de una independencia real y efectiva del Poder Judicial.
Con base en las consideraciones precedentes, corresponde, entonces, examinar el contenido del proyecto de ley en consulta con el fin de determinar si este afecta o no la organización o el funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, en los términos expresados.
En este orden de ideas, los consultantes, según se dijo supra, alegan que el artículo 239, del proyecto de ley en cuestión, crea una Junta Administradora del Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial, la cual define como un órgano del Poder Judicial, con independencia funcional, técnica y administrativa, para ejercer las facultades y atribuciones que la ley le otorga, órgano al que se le otorga independencia funcional y se le asigna una serie de competencias, entre otras, elevar el aporte obrero al Fondo de Pensiones y conocer de las solicitudes de jubilación, lo cual implica una modificación en la estructura del Poder Judicial. De igual modo, se restan competencias al Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial; y, además, en el artículo 240, del proyecto de ley, se confiere a la Corte Plena la obligación de dictar un reglamento para la elección de los miembros de esa Junta Administradora, fijándole así una competencia que actualmente no tiene. Los mencionados numerales del proyecto disponen:
“Artículo 239- Se crea la Junta Administrativa del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial como un órgano del Poder Judicial, que contará con completa independencia funcional, técnica y administrativa, para ejercer las facultades y atribuciones que le otorga la ley.
Le corresponde a la Junta:
Con base en el resultado de los estudios actuariales, y con autorización de la Superintendencia de Pensiones, la Junta Administrativa podrá modificar los parámetros iniciales establecidos en esta ley respecto de los requisitos de elegibilidad, el perfil de beneficios, así como los aportes y las cotizaciones de los servidores judiciales y de las jubilaciones y las pensiones previstos en la ley, siempre que esto sea necesario para garantizar el equilibrio actuarial del Régimen.
La Junta contará con personalidad jurídica instrumental para ejercer las atribuciones que la ley le asigna, así como para ejercer la representación judicial y extrajudicial del Fondo.
Se financiará con una comisión por gastos administrativos que surgirá de deducir un cinco por mil de los sueldos que devenguen los servidores judiciales, así como de las jubilaciones y las pensiones a cargo del Fondo. Con estos recursos se pagarán las dietas de los miembros de la Junta Administrativa, los salarios de su personal y, en general, sus gastos administrativos. Los recursos ociosos serán invertidos de conformidad con lo previsto en el artículo 237 de esta ley.
Artículo 240- La Junta Administradora estará conformada por tres miembros que serán electos democráticamente por el colectivo judicial, así como por tres miembros designados por la Corte Plena, con perspectiva de género en ambos casos. Cada integrante titular tendrá un suplente para que lo sustituyan en sus ausencias, quien deberá cumplir con los mismos requisitos del titular.
Quienes integran la Junta durarán en sus cargos cinco años, luego de los cuales podrán ser reelectos, todo conforme con la reglamentación que al efecto habrá de dictarse por la Corte Plena, previa audiencia conferida a las organizaciones gremiales del Poder Judicial.
En la primera sesión ordinaria, la Junta designará a la persona que habrá de presidir las sesiones, esta designación se hará por un espacio temporal de un año, debiendo alternarse cada año entre los representantes del colectivo judicial y de la Corte Plena. Además, se designará a quien le sustituya en caso de ausencia. La persona que preside tendrá voto calificado en caso de empate.
Los miembros de la Junta Administradora no devengarán ninguna dieta pero sí contarán con los permisos necesarios para atender las sesiones. Para ser miembro de la Junta se deberá cumplir con los siguientes requisitos, los cuales deberán ser documentados y demostrados ante la Superintendencia de Pensiones (Supén):
No podrán ser miembros de la Junta:
La integración del órgano deberá garantizar la representación paritaria de ambos sexos, asegurando que la diferencia entre el total de hombres y mujeres no sea superior a uno”.
De la lectura del artículo 239, transcrito, es claro que en él se crea un nuevo órgano dentro de la estructura del Poder Judicial, denominado “Junta Administrativa del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial”, al que se le confiere completa independencia funcional, técnica y administrativa, para ejercer las facultades, competencias y atribuciones que le otorga la ley, enumeradas en los incisos a), b), c), d), e), f), g), h) e i), del propio artículo, para el cumplimiento de sus cometidos, para lo cual contará con personalidad jurídica instrumental. De tal manera, que se crea, ex novo, un órgano administrativo y se adscribe dentro de la estructura del Poder Judicial, con competencias y atribuciones determinadas; y, concomitantemente, se sustraen y eliminan competencias y atribuciones previamente otorgadas -por ley formal- al Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial. Esta sola circunstancia, por las razones dichas, obliga al órgano legislativo a consultar -necesariamente- el proyecto al Poder Judicial, en los términos dispuestos en el artículo 167, de la Constitución Política, ya que ello modifica la organización administrativa del Poder Judicial, con la creación de un nuevo órgano administrativo, y la supresión de competencias del Consejo Superior en favor de ese órgano de nueva creación, lo que, claramente, afecta la independencia de ese Poder de la República.
Lo mismo cabe decir en relación con el artículo 240, del proyecto de ley consultado, en el tanto en él se abordan temas propios de la organización administrativa del Poder Judicial, en torno a la conformación y designación de los miembros de la Junta Administradora del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, su duración en los cargos, la designación de la persona que ha de presidirla y los requisitos para poder ser miembro de esa Junta, entre otros. Es de destacar, que aun cuando la Corte Plena está facultada, por la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, para dictar los reglamentos internos que sean necesarios para el buen funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, el hecho de que, por medio del proyecto de ley en consulta, se le imponga la obligación de reglamentar lo relativo a la duración en los cargos de los miembros de la Junta Administradora del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, sin que el texto sustitutivo del proyecto, que fue finalmente aprobado en Primer Debate, haya sido consultado a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, implica una grave intromisión en las competencias del órgano máxima jerarquía del Poder Judicial, con afectación de la organización de ese Poder de la República, en contravención de la consulta obligatoria preceptuada en el artículo 167, de la Constitución Política; y, por ende, una lesión a la independencia judicial.
A simple vista, la citada normativa, ahora consultada por los representantes del pueblo, le quita, al Presidente de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, y por consiguiente, al Presidente del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, la competencia que le da la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, de administrar el Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial, precisamente de acuerdo con las políticas de inversión establecidas por la Corte Plena, tal y como actualmente está contemplado en el artículo 81, inciso 12.
No obstante lo anterior, el reparo de los consultantes es que el texto sustitutivo del proyecto de ley, que fue acogido por la Comisión Especial en la sesión del 27 de julio de 2017, no fue consultado a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, a pesar de contener una serie de regulaciones que afectan la organización y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial. Sin embargo, tal y como se afirma en el voto de mayoría, a folio 2625 del expediente legislativo consta que, en atención a una moción aprobada el 27 de julio de 2017, por la Comisión Especial, por oficio número AL-20035-OFI-0043-2017 del 31 de julio de 2017, la Jefa del Área de Comisiones de la Asamblea Legislativa confirió audiencia al Poder Judicial con respecto al dictamen afirmativo de mayoría, con base en lo cual, la Corte Suprema de Justicia emitió su criterio mediante el oficio número SP-253-17 del 10 de agosto de 2017, según consta a folios 2759 a 2807 del expediente legislativo. Esto significa, entonces, que el Poder Judicial sí fue consultado y externó su criterio en relación con el texto sustitutivo aprobado por la Comisión Especial el 27 de julio de 2017, lo que se produjo incluso antes de que dicho texto fuera conocido por el Plenario.
A pesar de ello, dicho texto no fue el que se aprobó en Primer Debate por el Plenario Legislativo el 30 de octubre de 2017, publicado en el Alcance N° 268 a la Gaceta Digital N° 212 del 9 de noviembre de 2017, ya que el que se aprobó en Primer Debate es un texto sustitutivo introducido por moción vía artículo 137, del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa. Este último texto no fue consultado a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, tal y como correspondía, según lo analizado supra, al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 167, de la Constitución Política.
Este punto, si bien no fue alegado de manera expresa por los consultantes, no es óbice para que la Sala, de oficio, entre a examinarlo, ya que se trata de un vicio esencial en el procedimiento legislativo en la tramitación del proyecto de ley consultado. Al respecto, cabe destacar, que este Tribunal Constitucional tiene competencia para conocer y pronunciarse -de oficio- sobre cualquier aspecto de constitucionalidad que detecte al revisar un expediente legislativo en el que se tramite un determinado proyecto de ley, en vía de consulta legislativa de constitucionalidad, sin importar si ese determinado aspecto no fue objeto de consulta. Esto se deriva del texto del artículo 101, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que indica:
“Artículo 101.- La Sala evacuará la consulta dentro del mes siguiente a su recibo, y, al hacerlo, dictaminará sobre los aspectos y motivos consultados o sobre cualesquiera otros que considere relevantes desde el punto de vista constitucional.
El dictamen de la Sala sólo será vinculante en cuanto establezca la existencia de trámites inconstitucionales del proyecto consultado.
En todo caso, el dictamen no precluye la posibilidad de que posteriormente la norma o normas cuestionadas puedan ser impugnadas por las vías de control de constitucionalidad”. (El destacado no es del original).
Al respecto, también la doctrina nacional ha expresado:
“En lo relativo al contenido del parecer emitido por la Sala Constitucional, no existe un congruencia absoluta y rígida entre los motivos o aspectos consultados y la opinión vertida por la Sala, puesto que, la Sala Constitucional bien puede, ex officio, emitir su parecer “sobre cualesquiera otros que considere relevantes desde el punto de vista constitucional” (artículo 101, párrafo 1°, LJC), los que incluyen, desde luego, tanto los vicios formales del procedimiento legislativo no consultados como cuestiones sustanciales o de fondo contenidas en el proyecto y no observadas por los consultantes”. (Jinesta Lobo, Ernesto. Derecho Procesal Constitucional, Primera Edición, Editorial Guayacán, San José, Costa Rica, pág. 334).
De manera, que, si como en este caso, la Sala, al examinar el expediente legislativo, determina que en el procedimiento de formación de la ley de un proyecto se incurrió en algún vicio esencial, o si su contenido resulta contrario al Derecho de la Constitución, bien puede pronunciarse de oficio al respecto, no solo porque la ley que regula su funcionamiento así lo contempla, sino también por resultar ello razonable y conforme con una sana economía procesal, pues no tendría sentido que la Sala pasara por alto la inconstitucionalidad detectada en el proyecto de ley por el solo hecho de que los consultantes no la hayan advertido, a la espera de que luego, por vía de acción de inconstitucionalidad sea reclamada y tenga que pronunciarse al respecto, con la correspondiente declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de una ley ya vigente, con las consecuencias perjudiciales que ello podría implicar para el ordenamiento jurídico.
En este sentido, sería absurdo permitir la aprobación legislativa de una ley que contiene una inconstitucionalidad, sea en el trámite legislativo o en la normativa de fondo, que a la postre tendrá que ser declarada. Máxime si se trata, como en este caso, de un vicio en la tramitación del proyecto consultado, que resulta vinculante para el órgano legislativo. Por ello, el vicio detectado en el procedimiento legislativo del proyecto de “Ley de Reforma Integral a los Diversos Regímenes de Pensiones y Normativa Conexa”, expediente legislativo número 19.922, por la omisión de consultar a la Corte Suprema de Justicia el texto sustitutivo aprobado en Primer Debate, debe ser declarado de oficio, toda vez que esto viola lo dispuesto en el artículo 167, de la Constitución Política, al afectar la organización administrativa del Poder Judicial, por la creación de un nuevo órgano administrativo dentro de su estructura, otorgarle competencias sustanciales en materia de pensiones y jubilaciones; y, a la vez, suprimir competencias otorgadas previamente por ley al Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial (artículos 239 y 240 del proyecto).
Esta Sala, en abono de lo anterior, en la Sentencia N° 2001-13273, de las 11:44 horas del 21 de diciembre de 2001, al evacuar una consulta legislativa de constitucionalidad sobre un proyecto de ley de reforma al Código Penal, en cuanto modifica aspectos relativos a la organización o funcionamiento -meramente administrativa- del Archivo Judicial, sostuvo, por unanimidad, que:
“De la misma forma, modifican el ámbito de funciones del Archivo Judicial, aumentando la cantidad de datos que debe registrar. Todo lo anterior implica sin duda, la variación de diversas reglas concernientes al funcionamiento y organización del Poder Judicial. A pesar de lo anterior, la Asamblea Legislativa omitió efectuar la respectiva consulta a la Corte Suprema de Justicia (al menos la misma no consta en la copia certificada del expediente remitida por el Presidente del Directorio), sin que anteriormente dichos aspectos hayan estado incluidos en los textos consultados a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, por lo que estima la Sala que se incurrió en una violación al deber impuesto en el artículo 167 de la Constitución Política respecto de la independencia funcional reconocida por el constituyente al Poder Judicial, y en ese sentido debe entenderse que el trámite seguido con anterioridad a la aprobación del dictamen modificado es nulo desde el punto de vista constitucional y así debe ser declarado”. (El resaltado es agregado).
Nótese por lo dicho, que el vicio apuntado no se subsanaría aun cuando, en segundo debate, el proyecto sea aprobado por mayoría calificada, pues esto solo sería así si se tratase de la aprobación de un texto de obligada consulta al Poder Judicial, por afectar su organización, estructura y funcionamiento -como en este caso-, y, una vez consultado a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, el órgano legislativo persistiera en aprobarlo apartándose del criterio técnico del órgano judicial. Pero de lo que aquí se trata, es de la aprobación -en Primer Debate- de un texto inconsulto, en contravención de lo preceptuado en el artículo 167, de la Constitución Política, vicio de procedimiento que resulta insalvable e insubsanable. Esto por cuanto, si bien es cierto, el texto sustitutivo del proyecto de ley, que fue acogido por la Comisión Especial en la sesión del 27 de julio de 2017, fue consultado a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, este texto no fue el que, finalmente, se aprobó en Primer Debate, sino un nuevo texto sustitutivo que, de previo, no fue consultado, no obstante tener relación directa con la organización, estructura y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, según ha quedado expuesto.
Y aún más, si bien el anterior texto aprobado por la Comisión Especial en la sesión del 27 de julio de 2017 sí fue consultado a la Corte, al haber esta mostrado disconformidad con el texto, hacía obligada una votación calificada por el Pleno, al tenor del artículo 167, de la Carta Fundamental, lo que tampoco se hizo así.
La Corte Plena, en Sesión N° 27, del 7 de agosto de 2017, Artículo XXX, al evacuar la consulta a la Asamblea Legislativa sobre el Dictamen Afirmativo de Mayoría, aprobado por la citada Comisión Especial, dispuso:
“Se considera que tiene que ver con la estructura y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, debido a que afecta directamente el proyecto de vida de todas las personas servidoras judiciales porque significa una disminución de la jubilación, aun y cuando han cumplido con todos los requisitos legales para gozar del derecho jubilatorio de manera plena. Esto incluye la cotización de las cuotas necesarias y correspondientes; el pago de renta; aportes tanto al Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial como al sistema de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social y otra serie de cargas que de aprobarse el texto tal cual ha sido planteado por la Comisión dictaminadora, redundaría en acciones confiscatorias.
No puede dejarse de lado que la creación y naturaleza del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial responde a criterios de estabilidad, independencia, preparación e idoneidad, tal como lo establece el artículo 192 de la Constitución Política, con el objeto de promover la permanencia de un personal formado y capacitado en la institución y la disminución del goce jubilatorio representa un desestimulo para el ingreso de personas profesionales valiosas, que atendiendo al resultado económico de una futura valoración, preferirían hacer su carrera profesional en otro ámbito laboral.
Se afecta la carrera judicial, fiscal, de la Defensa Pública y del personal en general que teniendo más cargas en su salario -de cuatro veces más que en otros regímenes-, recibirían un beneficio menor.
Por otra parte, la renovación del personal que logra permanecer se afecta. El Poder Judicial contaría con personas funcionarias de edad avanzada, que se mantuvieron laborando únicamente por la disminución que sus ingresos sufrirían en caso de jubilarse.
La población judicial estaría ante una encrucijada, donde si bien es cierto, se tiene el deseo de optar por ese derecho y la motivación de retirarse a descansar, se ve colocada en una condición donde debe valorar su situación económica, probablemente, obligándola a buscar nuevas fuentes de ingresos para mantener sus gastos normales o adquiridos previos a la pensión, y los naturales por razones propias de la edad. Sin embargo, ese proceso también tiene sus restricciones, desde el punto de vista legal la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial prohíbe a las personas jubiladas optar por otro trabajo, y socialmente es una realidad que después de los cuarenta años se tienen limitaciones fácticas en cuanto a la reincorporación laboral.
Tiene gran relación con la estructura y funcionamiento, ya que se le resta competitividad al Poder Judicial en el mercado laboral, con perjuicio para la calidad de la Administración de Justicia. El salario de los puestos se ve disminuido por el aporte al régimen de pensiones y jubilaciones que es cuatro veces mayor que la contribución de otros regímenes. Esto dificulta la captación de recurso humano y se ve perjudicado el servicio público.
Además, la regulación del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial no debe valorarse únicamente desde la perspectiva económica, pues nos encontramos ante derechos fundamentales -irrenunciables- asociados a toda persona trabajadora, quien durante sus años laborales contribuyó en un porcentaje superior al general, a un régimen con la expectativa de contar con una pensión, que le permita satisfacer sus necesidades y gozar junto con su entorno, sus años de retiro de forma tranquila y con calidad de vida.
La imposición de esta nueva carga tributaria, afecta a grupos de población vulnerable -como las personas adultas mayores- perjudicándose a la parte más débil, la que precisamente requiere mayor protección por parte del Estado.
El impuesto propuesto se impone en un momento de la vida de la persona jubilada donde está más vulnerable, cercanas o ya son de la tercera edad. No se puede obviar que es en esta etapa, donde por lo general las personas requieren mayores atenciones médicas, cuidados especiales, entre otros, siendo que durante su vida laboral, unos en menor o mayor cantidad, de acuerdo con los ingresos percibidos, cotizaron para el régimen con la expectativa de contar con los recursos previstos para afrontar este proceso y de aprobarse este Proyecto de Ley, se vería truncado dicho plan de vida.
Causaría un impacto social importante, por cuanto las personas en su retiro pierden, de forma sorpresiva, una parte importante de sus ingresos, pero conservan un estatus de gastos preestablecidos, lo que se convierte en una repercusión, no solo económica, sino también en su salud, siendo contrario al objetivo previsto para un sistema de pensiones, el cual es contar con ingresos suficientes durante la vida posterior a la laboral, escenario dentro del cual es importante recordar que en muchas ocasiones, la persona jubilada, continúa teniendo bajo su cuidado y manutención a otras personas adultas mayores o menores de edad.
Tomando en cuenta las observaciones planteadas al Proyecto de Ley tramitado bajo el expediente 19922 (20035), las cuales encuentran apego y sustento en el estudio actuarial realizado por el IICE y con base en las potestades que los artículos 167 de la Constitución Política y 59 inciso 1) de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial se estima que el texto consultado sí incide en la estructura, organización y el funcionamiento del Poder Judicial y en ese sentido deberá la Asamblea Legislativa, tomar en cuenta lo dicho por la Corte Plena en relación a cada aspecto del Proyecto en consulta, salvo que se cuente con la mayoría calificada para separarse de dicha opinión vinculante.
Así se ha hecho saber a ese Poder Legislativo en otros proyectos de ley consultados tales como los vistos en las sesiones de Corte Plenas números 57-14 del 08 de diciembre de 2014, artículo XVIII; 13-15 del 23 de marzo de 2015, artículo XXXVII; 2-16 del 18 de enero de 2016, artículo XVIII y 14-17 del 30 de mayo de 2017, artículo XIX, entre otros, en los que la Corte Plena ha estimado necesario señalar la incidencia de los proyectos de Ley en la estructura interna del Poder Judicial.
Corolario, respecto del proyecto de Ley tramitado bajo el expediente n° 19922, debe emitirse criterio negativo pues incide en la estructura, organización y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial”. (La negrita no es del original).
La parte final, del citado artículo constitucional (167), expresa literalmente que “para apartarse del criterio de ésta [La Corte], se requerirá el voto de las dos terceras partes del total de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa”; y, dicho texto final, -no consultado en todo caso- se aprobó por la Asamblea Legislativa el 30 de octubre de 2017, con solo treinta y un votos (folios 4000 y 4173 del expediente legislativo).
b.- Falta de publicidad del texto sustitutivo aprobado por la Comisión Especial en sesión del 13 de setiembre de 2016. Del estudio del iter legislativo, ha quedado establecido, que el texto sustitutivo del proyecto de ley en consulta, aprobado por la Comisión Especial en sesión del 13 de setiembre de 2016, no fue publicado, tal y como lo plantean los diputados consultantes y quedó debidamente acreditado por la prueba rendida por el Director Ejecutivo de la Asamblea Legislativa el 12 de marzo de 2018. Por otra parte, de conformidad con las reglas fijadas por el procedimiento especial aprobado por la Asamblea Legislativa para el expediente número 19.922, en Sesión Ordinaria N° 37 del 30 de junio de 2016, con base en lo dispuesto en el artículo 208, bis, del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, esa publicación era obligatoria, lo cual se desprende claramente del inciso h, del punto 2, “Mociones de Fondo”, del procedimiento en cuestión, que a la letra dice:
“h.- Si durante el conocimiento del expediente en su trámite en comisión fuese aprobada una moción de texto sustitutivo o cuando la comisión acuerde cambios que modifiquen en forma sustancial el proyecto de ley, la Presidencia de la Comisión solicitará al Directorio Legislativo acordar su publicación en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta con el fin de salvaguardar el Principio Constitucional de Publicidad y se suspenderá el conocimiento del proyecto…”. (El resaltado no es del original).
La mayoría de la Sala estima que esa falta de publicidad -hecho sobre el que no hay discusión- no afecta el trámite del proyecto de ley; y, por ende, no constituye un vicio esencial del procedimiento, toda vez que, en definitiva, ese no fue el texto que aprobó la Comisión Especial el 27 de julio de 2017, texto sustitutivo, este último, que sí fue publicado en el Alcance N° 189 de la Gaceta Digital N° 147 del 4 de agosto de 2017.
Sin embargo, a juicio de los suscritos, tal razonamiento no es de recibo; esto por cuanto, en primer lugar, las reglas que acordó el Plenario Legislativo para la tramitación por procedimiento especial del proyecto de ley en consulta, vía artículo 208, bis, del Reglamento Legislativo, resultan de obligado y estricto cumplimiento, habida cuenta de que se trata de un procedimiento mucho más restrictivo que el ordinario, donde, de modo particular, deben observarse los principios democrático y de publicidad. Además, independientemente de que el texto en cuestión fuese o no el que, finalmente, fue aprobado por Comisión Especial el 27 de julio de 2017 -que sí fue publicado-, la falta de publicación es un vicio esencial en sí mismo considerado, por lo que el hecho de que, con posterioridad, dicho texto fuera sustituido por otro que sí se publicó, no tiene la virtud de subsanar el vicio apuntado.
Lo anterior ya ha sido sostenido por esta Sala, al evacuar las Consultas Legislativas Facultativas de Constitucionalidad presentadas con respecto a la aprobación del proyecto de ley denominado “Ley de Solidaridad Tributaria”, que se tramitó en el expediente legislativo N° 18.261, ocasión en la que, por Sentencia N° 2012-004621 de las 16:00 horas del 10 de abril de 2012, dijo:
“VII.- Este Tribunal Constitucional advierte que cuando la Asamblea Legislativa, vía moción de orden del artículo 208 bis del Reglamento, crea un procedimiento especial, la aplicación y observancia de éste debe ser absolutamente rigurosa y estricta. El procedimiento especial creado a través del artículo 208 bis, como tal, es una excepción a las reglas de los procedimientos legislativos ordinarios que es consentida por una mayoría calificada, pero, como tal, será, siempre, una excepción. El deber de las diversas instancias legislativas de ceñirse, celosa y escrupulosamente, al procedimiento especial previamente diseñado, evita cualquier infracción a los principios de la seguridad jurídica (enfatizado por este Tribunal en el Voto No. 398-2005 de las 12:10 hrs. de 21 de enero de 2005) y democrático. Consecuentemente, ante un procedimiento legislativo especial y rápido, los plazos, etapas y requisitos previamente establecidos deben ser objeto de una interpretación restrictiva y rigurosa, siendo que el margen de flexibilidad admisible frente a los procedimientos ordinarios, a través de interpretaciones extensivas, decrece notablemente para evitar una excepción de la excepción y, en general, un apartamiento del iter creado, excepcionalmente, por una mayoría agravada.
VIII.VICIO ESENCIAL DEL PROCEDIMIENTO DE CARÁCTER EVIDENTE Y MANIFIESTO AL OMITIRSE LA PUBLICACIÓN DE UN NÚMERO SIGNIFICATIVO DE MOCIONES DE FONDO APROBADAS EN LA COMISIÓN ESPECIAL QUE, EN CONJUNTO, MODIFICARON SUSTANCIALMENTE EL PROYECTO ORIGINAL. De otra parte, los diputados consultantes manifiestan que, pese a lo estipulado en el apartado I.2.h., del procedimiento legislativo especial, durante su trámite se omitió publicar una serie de cambios realizados al proyecto que mermaron la expectativa recaudatoria, la cual, originalmente, fue planteada en un 2% y que, posteriormente, bajó entre un 0.5% y un 1% del PIB. Específicamente, indicaron que se omitieron publicar las mociones Nos. 92, 128, 221, 222, 225, 227, 262, 267, 623, 624, 639, 5189-208 bis, 650, 661, 662, 674, 761, 778, 1717, 1786, 1843, 3767, 2325, 3771, 3879, 3991, 4128, 4129, 4157, 4241, 4242, 4243, 4244, 4245, 1375-208 bis, 1378-208 bis, 1379-208 bis, 1382-208 bis, 1383-208 bis, 1384-208 bis, 1388-208 bis, 4940-208 bis, 5142-208 bis, 5143-208 bis, 5144-208 bis, 5145-208 bis, 5146-208 bis, 5165-208 bis, 5166-208 bis, 5190-208 bis, 5193-208 bis, 5194-208 bis, 5215-208 bis, 5219-208 bis y 5428-208 bis.
No obstante, de previo, resulta oportuno aclarar que esta Sala no entrará a conocer lo referente a las mociones Nos. 92, 225, 639, 5189-208 bis y 4245. Debe observarse que el contenido de la moción No. 92, no hace referencia a lo que manifiestan los diputados consultantes. Si bien los citados legisladores argumentan que dicha moción versa sobre la exoneración a los insumos de pesca del pago del impuesto sobre las ventas, lo cierto es que la misma guarda relación con el plazo para presentar las declaraciones del impuesto sobre la renta. Por su parte, la moción 225, únicamente, aclaró que el monto total del salario escolar que se encuentra exento del pago del impuesto de la renta comprende tanto a los trabajadores públicos como a los privados. De igual forma, la moción 639 no versa sobre lo que los consultantes señalan en el presente asunto. La moción se encuentra referida a la exención del pago del impuesto sobre las ventas al cobro de comisión por retiro de dinero en cajeros automáticos y no, como lo sostienen los legisladores, a la exoneración de un 50% del impuesto a las utilidades a las entidades empresariales del Estado.
En todo caso, los mismos consultantes señalan que dicho beneficio fue eliminado, posteriormente, mediante la moción 5189-208 bis. Asimismo, la moción 4245, únicamente, aclara que se mantendrá el tratamiento fiscal para los sistemas de pensiones establecido en la Ley de Protección al Trabajador. Ahora bien, en cuanto al resto de mociones, resulta menester señalar que el principio de publicidad en el trámite legislativo resulta de significativa y especial relevancia tratándose de la materia tributaria, habida cuenta que debe existir una absoluta transparencia de todas las modificaciones que sufra un proyecto sobre la materia, dado el carácter general de la potestad tributaria y del principio de igualdad en el sostenimiento de las cargas públicas. Es así como cualquier modificación sustancial de un proyecto de ley de tal naturaleza debe estar sometida a una intensa y escrupulosa publicidad.
De conformidad con el apartado I.2.h. del procedimiento especial aprobado ex artículo 208 bis “Si durante el conocimiento del expediente en su trámite en comisión fuese aprobada una moción de texto sustitutivo o cuando la comisión acuerde cambios que modifiquen en forma sustancial el proyecto de ley, la Presidencia de la Comisión solicitará al Directorio Legislativo acordar su publicación en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta con el fin de salvaguardar el Principio Constitucional de Publicidad”. En la presente consulta, es evidente que el abundante número de mociones de fondo aprobadas, en su conjunto, produjeron un cambio sustancial del proyecto original, empezando por la modificación y reducción de las tarifas de algunos de los impuestos para ciertos sujetos, bienes y servicios, así como el establecimiento de exoneraciones o exenciones a distintos sujetos de derecho público y privado y actividades, la introducción de algunos beneficios fiscales, el establecimiento de regímenes transitorios especiales, etc. Tales mociones de fondo, ciertamente, versan sobre la materia regulada por el proyecto original y debidamente publicado, pero, su sumatoria, produce una cambio sustancial de tal entidad y magnitud que, por tratarse de la materia tributaria, exige una publicidad acentuada y calificada, habida cuenta que los ciudadanos tienen derecho a saber y conocer las razones por las cuales determinados sectores, grupos, sujetos, actividades, bienes y servicios son exonerados, sometidos a una tarifa reducida o diferenciada o a un régimen de beneficios fiscales o exenciones o a uno transitorio diferente, de manera diversa al resto de los contribuyentes.
La publicidad en materia tributaria tiene mayor importancia por la generalidad e igualdad que debe existir en materia de imposición de las cargas impositivas. Nótese que ha sido un hecho público y notorio, exento de prueba, que la expectativa recaudatoria contenida en el proyecto original, fue, sustancialmente, reducida con las mociones de fondo aprobadas. Según se desprende de la revisión integral de los doscientos catorce tomos del expediente legislativo y del oficio del Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa No. Pal-1612-2012 de 10 de abril de 2012, recibido por este Tribunal el 10 de abril pasado, tales mociones de fondo no fueron publicadas en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta. Específicamente, sobre este punto en el oficio citado, el Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa manifestó lo siguiente:
“Respecto de la solicitud que se hace en la cédula de notificación del 9 de abril de 2012 de las 16:50 horas respecto del expediente No. 12-003518-0007-CO, consulta legislativa facultativa interpuesta por señores Adonay Enríquez Guevara y otros, respondemos lo siguiente. Tal y como nos lo certifica el Lic. Marcos William Quesada Bermúdez en el oficio SD-98-11-12 del 9 de abril del año presente y que adjuntamos, del proyecto # 18.261 Ley de Solidaridad Tributaria, sólo se registra en el trámite la publicación de su texto base, o texto inicial del mismo en la Gaceta 187, Alcance 70 del 29 de septiembre de 2011. Ningún otro texto actualizado fue publicado ya que, ni la Comisión respectiva tomó ningún acuerdo para solicitárselo al Directorio Legislativo, ni lo hizo así la Presidencia de la Comisión propiamente. Por otra parte las mociones de orden en el Plenario Legislativo tendientes a aprobar su publicación, fueron sistemáticamente rechazadas por la mayoría de los señores y señoras diputadas, por todo lo cual no se llevó a cabo dicha publicación”.
Consecuentemente, de la lectura del contenido de las mociones de fondo aprobadas en la comisión especial, este Tribunal Constitucional estima, por unanimidad, que hubo un vicio esencial del procedimiento legislativo de carácter evidente y manifiesto que quebrantó los principios de publicidad y de igualdad al omitirse su publicación, dado que, en conjunto, provocaron una modificación sustancial del texto original”.
De manera tal, que al no haberse observado, de forma estricta, el procedimiento especial establecido vía artículo 208, bis, del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, en la tramitación del proyecto de ley en consulta, por haberse omitido la publicación del texto sustitutivo del proyecto de ley en consulta, aprobado por la Comisión Especial en sesión del 13 de setiembre de 2016, se incurrió en un vicio esencial en el procedimiento legislativo de formación de la ley, con violación del principio democrático y de publicidad, sin que la sustitución, en definitiva, de dicho texto, pueda convalidar el procedimiento.
Así lo determinó también esta Sala en la Sentencia N° 2015-001241, de las 11:31 horas del 28 de enero de 2015, al declarar inconstitucional varios artículos de la Ley de Impuesto a las Personas Jurídicas, N° 9024 del 23 de diciembre de 2011, por violación al principio de publicidad, al disponer:
“Del análisis anterior y, particularmente de lo resaltado, se desprende que el texto sustitutivo no publicado introdujo dos sanciones que inmovilizan cualquier sociedad, tales como la no emisión de certificaciones de personería jurídica y la cancelación de inscripción de documentos a los morosos. En tal sentido se aprecia, igualmente, que en el texto sustitutivo se aprobaron cuestiones esenciales del impuesto, relativas a las sanciones, que no estaban previstas en el proyecto de ley original y que, por lo tanto, ameritaban garantizar el principio constitucional de publicidad. Como corolario del examen realizado, se concluye que los artículos 1, 3 y 5 de la Ley No. 9124, Impuesto a las Personas Jurídicas, son inconstitucionales a la luz de lo dispuesto en el artículo 73, inciso c), de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Lo anterior, por cuanto, en la formación de la ley en cuestión se violentaron requisitos o trámites sustanciales relativos a la publicidad del proyecto, principio que, como se ha venido reiterando, es básico en un Estado Constitucional de Derecho, más aún, cuando de materia tributaria se trata.
En efecto, la omisión de realizar una nueva publicación del proyecto de ley, a fin de garantizar la publicidad del texto, así como, procurar la más amplia participación ciudadana e institucional, violentó un aspecto esencial en el procedimiento parlamentario, cuya omisión acarrea un vicio de inconstitucionalidad sobre el procedimiento legislativo”. (El resaltado no es del original).
c.- Publicación tardía del texto sustitutivo del proyecto de ley aprobado en Primer Debate por el Plenario Legislativo. Del expediente legislativo N° 19.922, se desprende que el texto sustitutivo aprobado en Primer Debate por el Plenario Legislativo el 30 de octubre de 2017, fue publicado en el Alcance 268 a la Gaceta Digital N° 212 del 9 de noviembre de 2017, en tanto esta consulta fue planteada el 1 de noviembre de 2017. Es decir, que no solo dicho texto fue publicado en forma extemporánea, luego de ser aprobado en Primer Debate, sino que al momento de la presentación de la consulta ante este Sala no había sido publicado, con lo cual se produjo, también, otra violación al principio de publicidad; y, por ende, a un trámite esencial del procedimiento legislativo. La publicación del texto sustitutivo del proyecto de ley debió haberse producido antes de su aprobación en primer debate, ya que, al haberse hecho con posterioridad, se violó, asimismo, el principio democrático, al impedir, a la ciudadanía, conocer, de previo a su aprobación, el texto sustitutivo del proyecto.
En tales circunstancias, la publicación tardía tiene, sobre el procedimiento legislativo, los mismos efectos que la no publicación, ya que la finalidad de la publicación -sea, que la población conozca, de previo a su aprobación, el texto final del proyecto de ley y pueda fiscalizar debidamente la labor legislativa- se tornó en nugatoria, vicio esencial en el procedimiento legislativo que no puede ser salvado por la publicación posterior. Así, lo dicho en el considerando anterior, con respecto a la no publicación del texto aprobado por la Comisión Especial en sesión del 13 de setiembre de 2016, es de plena aplicación a la publicación tardía del texto sustitutivo, una vez aprobado en Primer Debate, debido a que una publicación tardía de un proyecto de ley, equivale a la no publicación del proyecto.
Con base en las anteriores consideraciones, estimamos que el proyecto de ley consultado a la Sala Constitucional adolece de varios vicios esenciales de procedimiento que lo afectan en su totalidad y que lo tornan contrario al Derecho de la Constitución, razón por la cual, resulta inconducente entrar a analizar los alegatos de fondo planteados por los consultantes contra el contenido sustancial del proyecto de ley en cuestión. En los términos dichos, diferimos del criterio de la mayoría y dejamos así evacuada esta consulta legislativa relativa al proyecto de ley denominado “Ley de Reforma Integral a los Diversos Regímenes de Pensiones y Normativa Conexa”, expediente legislativo N° 19.922.
Por tratarse de un procedimiento legislativo abreviado, con mayor rigor debe respetarse el principio de publicidad de las normas discutidas o aprobadas. La debilidad de un procedimiento abreviado requiere una aplicación más rigurosa de la exigencia de publicidad, sin admitir una convalidación respecto de un requisito tan importante como la publicidad. Por otro lado, la publicidad de los proyectos de ley es la única forma en que la actividad de los representantes populares trasciende a toda la población. Es la proyección de la actividad parlamentaria hacia el exterior, operando como una garantía constitucional que impide que el parlamento actué de espaldas a la ciudadanía. A diferencia de otros asuntos en donde he considerado que la falta de publicación no ha sido un vicio esencial, en este caso considero que lo es, por tres razones: porque la norma que regula el procedimiento así lo indica, porque se trata de un texto sustitutivo, y además porque, la falta de publicación no permitió el conocimiento de la población del texto que se estaba discutiendo en ese momento, impidiendo, además, que la ciudadanía pudiera realizar manifestaciones sobre lo que pretendía el parlamento con el proyecto de ley.
En este caso, tampoco se discute si se omitió la publicación de unas normas que no variaban la esencia del proyecto, es que en este asunto, se omitió, totalmente, la publicidad durante el desarrollo de un procedimiento legislativo abreviado, que como lo expresé, debilita totalmente los principios constitucionales que rigen el procedimiento parlamentario.” E.-) Sobre cómo se violentó el artículo 167 Constitucional Luego, en el mismo sentido que el voto salvado a la resolución número 2022-10593, de los Magistrados Salazar, Garita y Jara, con redacción del primero, considero que hay una violación al artículo 167 Constitucional:
“… en el procedimiento legislativo se incurrió en una violación grosera, manifiesta y evidente del artículo 167, de la Constitución Política, y que, por su relevancia, demanda la inconstitucionalidad de la totalidad de la Ley N° 9544 denominada “Reforma del Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, contenido en la Ley No. 7333, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial de 5 de mayo de 1993, y sus Reformas”.
Debe empezarse por señalar, que la Comisión Especial encargada para la tramitación del expediente legislativo N° 19.922, puso en conocimiento de la Corte Plena los respectivos proyectos de ley que se iban aprobando, para cumplir con lo establecido en el citado numeral 167. Las consultas a la Corte Suprema de Justicia ocurrieron en tres ocasiones; a saber:
En todas y cada una de las consultas formuladas, la Corte Plena estableció que se trataba de proyectos de ley que afectaban su organización y funcionamiento, de modo que, con base en ese criterio negativo, de conformidad con el artículo 167, de la Constitución Política, y los principios de coordinación, respeto mutuo e igualdad, que informa las relaciones entre órganos constitucionales, entre dos poderes del Estado [sistema de frenos y contrapesos, checks and balances], se debía aprobar la ley con mayoría calificada. Además, se debe mencionar que el último de los proyectos que fue el Dictamen Afirmativo de Mayoría aceptado por la Comisión Especial el 27 de julio de 2017, no fue ese el final. Por el contrario, el texto del proyecto fue objeto de mociones de fondo y reiteración aceptadas por la Comisión Especial, sobre las que votó posteriormente el Plenario Legislativo en Primer Debate, en la sesión extraordinaria N° 14 del 30 de octubre de 2017 (folios 4000, 4306 a 4327 del expediente legislativo).
De este modo, el texto votado por el Plenario Legislativo en Primer Debate fue el texto modificado manteniendo algunos de los puntos sobre los cuales la Corte Plena había emitido su criterio negativo, entre ellos, la instalación de una Junta Administradora del Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial en perjuicio de las competencias del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial. Pero además, debe indicarse que contenía otros cambios sustanciales al proyecto de ley, entre ellos los que agravaron algunas condiciones para los funcionarios judiciales, para el goce y disfrute del derecho a la pensión y jubilación, situación que la Corte Plena debía pronunciarse -respecto del artículo 167, Constitucional- por su relevancia en el Derecho de la Constitución. Estas modificaciones fueron votadas en el Primer Debate, y quedaron aprobadas en el Segundo Debate. Lo anterior, sin haberse hecho la consulta institucional al proyecto aprobado en Comisión y que posteriormente fue votado por el Plenario en la sesión extraordinaria N° 14 del 30 de octubre de 2017.
Si bien, la Asamblea Legislativa consideró era innecesario hacer la consulta al Poder Judicial del texto final, aprobado en Comisión Especial del 27 de julio y las subsiguientes modificaciones realizadas por mociones de fondo y reiteración, y continuar con el trámite legislativo siguiendo el criterio de la Sala la Sentencia N° 2018-005758 de las 15:40 horas del 12 de abril de 2018, dado que esas modificaciones al régimen de pensiones del Poder Judicial no afectaban la estructura y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, ni el contenido esencial de la independencia judicial, ello no es de recibo para los suscritos juzgadores, como se desarrollará más adelante. Además, hay un patrón de agravamiento a las condiciones de los funcionarios del Poder Judicial que se pueden enumerar de algunas disposiciones que fueron modificadas por las mociones de fondo y de reiteración que quedaron plasmados en el texto aprobado en Comisión, que implicaban un cambio sustancial en el proyecto anteriormente consultado. Como se indicó, este último texto fue aprobado en Primer Debate el 30 de octubre de 2017, según el cual, con un ejercicio de comparación, se observan algunas de las siguientes modificaciones sustanciales de consideración, como por ejemplo las siguientes:
De este modo, al contrario del criterio de la mayoría de la Sala, que se sustenta de forma importante en la doctrina de la Sentencia N° 2018-005758 de las 15:40 horas del 12 de abril de 2018, antecedente en el cual los suscritos suscribimos un voto salvado junto al magistrado Cruz Castro, consideramos que la Ley N° 9544 denominada “Reforma del Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, contenido en la Ley No. 7333, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial de 5 de mayo de 1993, y sus Reformas”, contiene el vicio sustancial del procedimiento legislativo, por la violación a la norma constitucional que impone la consulta constitucional, con base en los argumentos que se exponen a continuación.
A.- Texto de la ley no consultado a la Corte Suprema de Justicia.
A la base de la discusión, tal y como bien se afirma en el voto de mayoría, está la determinación de si, al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 167, de la Constitución Política, el órgano legislativo estaba o no en la obligación de consultar el citado proyecto de ley al Poder Judicial, deber que, por lo demás, ha sido incorporado en los artículos 126 y 157, del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, en los cuales se estipula el procedimiento que ha de observarse al efecto. Del texto constitucional se colige, que la consulta obligatoria a la Corte Suprema de Justicia sólo es tal si el proyecto de ley se refiere a la organización o funcionamiento del Poder Judicial. De modo, que el meollo del asunto está en lo que se ha de entender por “organización o funcionamiento del Poder Judicial”.
Al respecto, el voto de mayoría sostiene, que cuando la Carta Política Fundamental hace referencia a la organización y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, se refiere -únicamente- a la afectación de la función jurisdiccional, y no de la propiamente administrativa. En abono de esta posición, se citan las Sentencias N° 1998-5958 de las 14:54 del 19 de agosto de 1998, N° 2001-013273 de las 11:44 horas del 21 de diciembre de 2001 y N° 2008-5179 de las 11:00 horas del 4 de abril de 2008. Asimismo, en relación con el tema concreto del Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial y la obligación de la Asamblea Legislativa de consultar a la Corte Suprema de Justicia los proyectos de ley que versan sobre aquel, el voto de mayoría cita las Sentencias N° 1995-3063 de las 15:30 del 13 de junio de 1995 y N° 2002-4258 de las 9:40 del 10 de mayo de 2002, con base en las cuales concluye, que en esos casos, la Asamblea Legislativa no está obligada a consultar el proyecto de ley a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en los términos dispuestos en el artículo 167, Constitucional.
Sin embargo, a criterio de los suscritos, tal interpretación del numeral constitucional, restringida únicamente a la función jurisdiccional, no se deriva ni del texto de la Carta Fundamental, ni de la jurisprudencia de esta Sala. En efecto, en cuanto a los precedentes de cita, es de destacar, que con respecto a las tres primeras sentencias, de ellas no se infiere lo que, en su voto, sostiene la mayoría. Así, en la Sentencia N° 1998-5958 de las 14:54 del 19 de agosto de 1998, lo que se desarrolla es solo el término “funcionamiento” -del binomio “organización o funcionamiento”- del Poder Judicial, sin referirse al tema de la organización de ese Poder de la República. En concreto, en la cita que se hace de ese voto, la Sala claramente indica que “…los asuntos que preceptivamente requieren de una consulta a la Corte Suprema de Justicia son aquellos que se refieran "a la organización o funcionamiento del Poder Judicial", donde el término "funcionamiento" alude no sólo a los aspectos de régimen interno administrativo de los despachos judiciales, sino también a las cuestiones procesales que rigen la sustanciación de los diversos asuntos sometidos a esos estrados”, con lo cual se hace evidente, que el tema de la organización -que es el que aquí interesa- no fue desarrollado en dicha resolución, simplemente, porque el caso no lo requería, ya que se trató de la consulta legislativa preceptiva de constitucionalidad sobre el proyecto de “Adición de un nuevo Capítulo IV, denominado “Del recurso de hábeas data”, al Título III de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, ley Nº 7185 del 19 de octubre de 1989”, que se tramitó en el expediente legislativo número 12.827, donde el tema en discusión era que la reforma afectaba la función jurisdiccional del Poder Judicial.
Que esto es así, se desprende del propio texto de la sentencia que no se cita con la debida amplitud en el voto de mayoría: “…los asuntos que preceptivamente requieren de una consulta a la Corte Suprema de Justicia son aquellos que se refieran "a la organización o funcionamiento del Poder Judicial", donde el término "funcionamiento" alude no sólo a los aspectos de régimen interno administrativo de los despachos judiciales, sino también a las cuestiones procesales que rigen la sustanciación de los diversos asuntos sometidos a esos estrados. Y, en Costa Rica, la jurisdicción constitucional es indudablemente judicial, desde que tanto la Constitución Política como la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional integran a esta Sala dentro de la estructura de la Corte”. Hecha la cita en su contexto, no se puede inferir, que la Sala haya restringido el binomio “organización o funcionamiento” meramente a lo jurisdiccional, sino que, en el caso de cita, este Tribunal Constitucional únicamente se refirió al aspecto de la función jurisdiccional del Poder Judicial, porque era el tema en discusión, sin hacer exclusión, ni referirse al tópico de la organización administrativa de dicho Poder de la República.
Lo mismo cabe decir en relación con la Sentencia N° 2001-013273 de las 11:44 horas del 21 de diciembre de 2001 a la que alude la mayoría. Se trata de una consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad respecto del proyecto de ley de “Modificación del Código Penal, Ley número 4573 y sus reformas”, expediente legislativo número 14.158. Nuevamente, se trató de una reforma que afectaba directamente la función jurisdiccional del Poder Judicial, no su organización administrativa. De allí que, en este caso, tampoco la Sala desarrolló este último tema, por resultar ocioso. Es por ello, que la discusión de fondo se centró y agotó en los aspectos de la función jurisdiccional del Poder Judicial: “…dicha consulta [la del artículo 167, de la Constitución Política] resulta obligatoria cuando lo discutido en la Asamblea es un proyecto de ley que pretenda establecer reglas de funcionamiento y organización del Poder Judicial, entendido esto no apenas como las disposiciones que regulen la creación de tribunales de justicia o competencias jurisdiccionales, sino incluso aquellas que dispongan sobre modo de ejercicio de dichas competencias, es decir, sobre la forma en que el Poder Judicial lleva a cabo su función jurisdiccional, incluidas normas propiamente procesales”.
Ciertamente, es evidente que lo expresado se limitó a examinar lo relativo al ejercicio de las competencias jurisdiccionales de los Tribunales de Justicia, toda vez que era sobre ese aspecto en particular que versó esa consulta. Pero, la Sala no dijo que este sea el único extremo en que la consulta del numeral 167, de la Constitución Política, sea obligatoria, sino que lo que dijo es que, en ese caso, es obligatoria, sin referirse a otros casos en que también lo sea, como lo es lo referente a la organización y competencias administrativas del Poder Judicial.
Comentario separado merece la Sentencia N° 2008-5179 de las 11:00 horas del 4 de abril de 2008, puesto que aquí, a diferencia de la lectura que hace la mayoría, sí se establece que lo relativo a la organización administrativa del Poder Judicial cae dentro de la consulta obligatoria que estipula el citado artículo 167, Constitucional. En esa ocasión, este Tribunal Constitucional, como intérprete máximo de la Constitución Política, al referirse a los términos de “organización o funcionamiento” del Poder Judicial, contenidos en el artículo 167, de la Carta Política, como condición de la consulta obligatoria a ese Poder de la República por parte de la Asamblea Legislativa, consideró “…que un proyecto de ley versa sobre tales extremos cuando contiene en su articulado normas explícitas que disponen la creación, la variación sustancial o la supresión de órganos estrictamente jurisdiccionales o de naturaleza administrativa adscritos al Poder Judicial o bien crea, ex novo, modifica sustancialmente o elimina funciones materialmente jurisdiccionales o administrativas…”.
No se trata de un cambio de criterio de este Tribunal en la materia, sino, dentro de la línea jurisprudencial ya trazada, de una mayor determinación de los términos “organización o funcionamiento” que emplea el artículo 167, de la Constitución Política, para establecer los casos en los cuales los proyectos de ley que estén en la corriente legislativa deben ser consultados -obligatoriamente- a la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Esta sentencia no amplió, en modo alguno, los supuestos de consulta obligatoria; por el contrario, lo que hizo fue definirlos de una manera más amplia y precisa. Por ello, allí claramente se determinó, que en esos casos, pero solo en estos, la consulta es obligatoria. Así se entiende que, en esa misma sentencia, se expresara: “[c]abe apuntar que tal exégesis se impone en aras de mantener el equilibrio de poderes, sin privilegiar a uno u otro órgano constitucional, de manera que cada uno pueda ejercer sus funciones de manera independiente y separada como lo impone el propio texto constitucional (artículo 9° de la Constitución).
En otros términos, la precisión de tales conceptos evita cualquier colisión, extralimitación o exacerbación de las respectivas funciones, en aras de mantener el equilibrio y la contención de los poderes, por cuanto, el fin de la norma lo constituye no sólo la independencia funcional y la autonomía presupuestaria del Poder Judicial, sino, también, el equilibrio entre el Poder Legislativo y Judicial. En efecto, una interpretación amplia de los términos empleados por el constituyente originario, por parte de la Corte Plena, podría conducir a que determinadas materias que, en sentido estricto no están referidas a la organización y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, ameriten, injustificadamente, de una ley reforzada, con lo cual se ralentiza o entorpece, innecesariamente, la función legislativa. De otra parte, la desaplicación por la Asamblea Legislativa de la norma constitucional, al considerar, equívocamente, que el proyecto no versa sobre organización y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, podría provocar una lesión a la independencia funcional y autonomía presupuestaria del Poder Judicial”.
De lo anterior se colige, que todo lo relativo a la materia de organización y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, pero solo y estrictamente esto -para guardar el equilibrio entre independencia funcional y autonomía presupuestaria del Poder Judicial, por un lado, y la libertad de configuración del legislador ordinario, por otro-, es lo que obliga al órgano legislativo a realizar la consulta ante la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sin que se pueda extender a otras materias. En este sentido, no hay la menor duda, de que la Sala Constitucional ha entendido que lo relativo a la organización administrativa del Poder Judicial, y no sólo lo concerniente a la afectación, directa o indirecta, de la función jurisdiccional, obliga al órgano legislativo a plantear la consulta en los términos expresados en el artículo 167, de la Constitución Política. Y no podría ser de otra manera, ya que la afectación o modificación de la organización administrativa del Poder Judicial en general -y no solo lo atinente a los órganos jurisdiccionales o judiciales en sentido estricto- también repercute en el servicio de Administración de Justicia que presta, y en la independencia que constitucionalmente se garantiza a ese Poder y a los jueces como funcionarios llamados a impartir justicia.
Por otra parte, las Sentencias N° 1995-3063 de las 15:30 del 13 de junio de 1995 y N° 2002-4258 de las 9:40 del 10 de mayo de 2002, que se citan en el voto de mayoría como fundamento para concluir que los proyectos de ley relativos al tema específico del Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial no necesitan ser consultados a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, tampoco tienen la virtud de dar el fundamento que, en relación con esta materia, afirma que tienen la mayoría de la Sala.
En la primera de dichas sentencias, la Sala conoció unas acciones de inconstitucionalidad acumuladas planteadas contra la Ley Marco de Pensiones, Ley N° 7302 de 8 de julio de 1992. Este Tribunal, en aquella ocasión, lo único que afirmó es que, en el caso de la Ley Marco de Pensiones, no existió la obligación constitucional de consultar al Poder Judicial el proyecto de ley respectivo, por la sencilla razón, de que dicho proyecto no afecta a los servidores judiciales; y, por lo tanto, no cae dentro de lo preceptuado por el artículo 167, de la Constitución Política. Asimismo, en el voto de cita, se indica que el funcionamiento está referido a la función jurisdiccional, pero no hace alusión alguna al tema de la organización del Poder Judicial, que es de lo que aquí se trata.
De igual modo, en la Sentencia N° 2002-4258 de las 9:40 del 10 de mayo de 2002, la Sala conoció de acciones de inconstitucionalidad acumuladas interpuestas contra el artículo 4, de la Ley N° 7605, de 2 de mayo de 1996, en cuanto reforma los artículos 224, 226 y 236, incisos 1) y 2), de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, N° 7333 de 5 de mayo de 1993, así como, por conexidad y consecuencia, contra el artículo 33, inciso a), del Reglamento de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. La Sala descartó, entre otros temas alegados, la violación al artículo 167, de la Constitución Política, por el hecho de que la reforma al régimen de pensiones de los servidores judiciales que se impugnó, no tenía relación con la organización ni el funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, para cuya definición hizo referencia a lo dicho al respecto en la Sentencia N° 1995-3063 de las 15:30 del 13 de junio de 1995, que, como ya se dijo, solo se refirió al término del funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, sin hacer referencia alguna al tema de su organización.
De modo tal, que, a diferencia del criterio externado por la mayoría, dichas sentencias no excluyen la materia relativa al Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial de la consulta obligatoria a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sino solo en el tanto y en el cuanto el respectivo proyecto de ley no tenga relación directa con la “organización o funcionamiento del Poder Judicial”, temas que, ciertamente, no estaban involucrados en las acciones que se plantearon ante esta Sala y que fueron resueltas en las sentencias de cita. Con ello, no se excluye la materia concerniente al Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial de la consulta obligatoria a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, como lo entiende la mayoría, ya que este tema, en sí mismo considerado, no está excluido de dicha consulta, sino que ello dependerá de si el proyecto de ley en cuestión contiene o no regulaciones relativas a la organización o el funcionamiento de ese Poder, aspecto que habrá que determinar de previo en cada caso para así establecer la obligatoriedad o no de dicha consulta.
En este punto, es importante aclarar, que la independencia funcional del Poder Judicial, establecida en el artículo 9, y reforzada en el artículo 154, ambos de la Constitución Política, implica, necesariamente, la potestad de dicho Poder de la República de darse su propia organización, con el fin de evitar, en especial, la intromisión de intereses políticos en su función. Y esta independencia organizativa, tanto administrativa como jurisdiccional, es la que también se tutela en el numeral 167, Constitucional. En este sentido, a criterio de los suscritos, es un grave error conceptual confundir o asimilar la función jurisdiccional en sentido amplio, con inclusión de la función auxiliar a la jurisdiccional, con la función estrictamente administrativa. La función jurisdiccional es una función especial y diferente a la función administrativa que prestan los funcionarios del Poder Ejecutivo o del sector descentralizado.
Una cosa es la Administración de Justicia y otra muy distinta la Administración Pública, dadas las particularidades de la función jurisdiccional frente a la función meramente administrativa. Precisamente, una de esas características, sin la cual sería imposible ejercer correctamente la función jurisdiccional, es la independencia, en su doble vertiente, tanto de Poder Judicial en sí mismo considerado, como la del juez y demás auxiliares de la función jurisdiccional. Basta para comprender la delicada tarea que realizan los jueces de la República, con la colaboración de los funcionarios que los asisten y los auxilian en sus funciones y sin los cuales aquellos no podrían ejercer debidamente su función, con tener presente que ellos deciden los casos sometidos a su conocimiento con fuerza de cosa juzgada; es decir, deciden cuál es la verdad con fuerza de autoridad de ley en cada caso, sin que su decisión, una vez alcanzada esa condición, pueda ser, en principio, revisada.
Esto implica una función sumamente delicada y una gran responsabilidad, la cual no podría llevarse a cabo si no se garantiza la independencia funcional del Poder Judicial y de los juzgadores que lo conforman. Y, en este sentido, no puede haber verdadera independencia, si los salarios y las pensiones y jubilaciones de los jueces y auxiliares de justicia no estuvieran acordes con sus responsabilidades, muchísimo más graves que las de cualquier otro funcionario que ejerza una función pública meramente administrativa. De allí, que unos y otros, de modo alguno, se puedan equiparar, ni en responsabilidades, ni en funciones, ni en salarios, ni en los derechos jubilatorios.
Existe consenso en la doctrina administrativa, en que la función jurisdiccional es, si no la más compleja, una de las más complejas y difíciles de llevar a cabo en el Estado Constitucional de Derecho en las sociedades modernas. Esto por cuanto, a diferencia de lo que se decida en los Poderes Legislativo y Ejecutivo, las decisiones del Poder Judicial, en ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional, son inapelables; es decir, tiene fuerza o autoridad de cosa juzgada. Esto no solo implica una gran responsabilidad, sino la necesidad de contar con una serie de principios y garantías que permitan el adecuado ejercicio de esa función. En este contexto, la independencia del Poder Judicial, tanto orgánica como funcional, se presenta como una condición sine qua non para el ejercicio de esa delicada función. Corresponde al juez decidir sobre la única y posible interpretación de la ley, de la Constitución y del parámetro de convencionalidad, lo cual sería imposible si no cuenta con la debida independencia.
Pero esta independencia sería ilusoria si no implica, necesariamente, una adecuada remuneración y un derecho jubilatorio acorde con sus funciones y responsabilidades, tanto para el juzgador propiamente dicho, como para el personal que le auxilia y asiste en su función. Por ello, en materia de remuneración y jubilación, no puede equipararse con el sector administrativo. La necesidad de compensar la complejidad y dificultad que implica el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional justifica, en torno al tema de la acción, que la jubilación o pensión de los servidores judiciales no sea igual a la del resto del sector público administrativo. Lo que se decida con fuerza de cosa juzgada en las instancias judiciales, tiene efectos trascendentales en la seguridad jurídica y en el derecho vigente en una sociedad; y, por ende, en la paz social. En todo esto, la independencia judicial juega un papel protagónico, pues en un Estado Constitucional de Derecho; es decir, en un Estado Democrático, ese principio tiene una proyección institucional en el Poder Judicial propiamente dicho, frente a cualesquiera de los otros Poderes del Estado, lo que también implica, indispensablemente, la independencia personal y funcional de la figura del juez, no solo en relación con esos otros Poderes del Estado, sino, incluso, frente a los jerarcas del Poder Judicial.
Hoy por hoy, no hay Estado de Derecho si el Poder Judicial -con todos sus servidores incluidos-, no cuenta con una real y efectiva independencia. La independencia judicial es una garantía institucional establecida a nivel constitucional, sea, en el rango más elevado de la jerarquía de las normas, al punto que también se encuentra estipulada como un Derecho Humano. En efecto, la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos ha establecido, como derecho humano, el ser oído por un juez imparcial. Al respecto, en el artículo 8.1, se establece:
“Artículo 8. Garantías Judiciales.
1. Toda persona tiene derecho a ser oída, con las debidas garantías y dentro de un plazo razonable, por un juez o tribunal competente, independiente e imparcial, establecido con anterioridad por la ley, en la sustanciación de cualquier acusación penal formulada contra ella, o para la determinación de sus derechos y obligaciones de orden civil, laboral, fiscal o de cualquier otro carácter”.
La independencia judicial constituye un principio fundamental dentro del Estado Constitucional de Derecho. Pero esa independencia, para ser real, no solo debe ser organizativa y funcional, sino también económica. Esa independencia económica está también garantizada en el artículo 177, de la Constitución Política, al establecer que el proyecto de presupuesto ordinario deberá asignar al Poder Judicial al menos un 6% de los ingresos ordinarios calculados para el año económico. La intención del Constituyente originario, con la promulgación de esta norma -que establece un egreso constitucional atado-, es garantizar, entre otras cosas, que los jueces y el resto del personal auxiliar de la justicia, tuvieran una retribución adecuada a la complejidad y dificultad de la función jurisdiccional, lo que implica, una jubilación o pensión adecuada también a ello y a las prohibiciones especiales que dicha función implica para los servidores judiciales, las cuales no pesan sobre los servidores públicos de los otros Poderes del Estado.
La norma constitucional previene que la asignación presupuestaria pueda convertirse en un instrumento de intervención política en la función jurisdiccional. Pero esto debe verse en toda su amplitud, ya que los salarios de los juzgadores y del personal auxiliar, así como el régimen de pensiones y jubilaciones que les es aplicable, tiene que guardar estricta relación con la labor que realizan, so pena de tornar nugatorio el principio de independencia judicial. De allí, que la independencia económica, personal, funcional, orgánica e institucional, tanto del Poder Judicial en sí mismo, como de los jueces y auxiliares de la justicia, es esencial en un Estado Constitucional de Derecho. Así las cosas, una forma de garantizar la independencia del Poder Judicial, de los Jueces de la República y de los auxiliares de justicia, es con una jubilación o pensión digna, acorde con sus funciones constitucionales.
En la exposición de motivos que dio lugar a la promulgación de la Ley de Jubilaciones y Pensiones Judiciales, como adición a la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, el diputado Teodoro Picado Michalski, en fecha 2 de junio de 1938, expresó:
“Es el Poder Judicial uno de los tres principales sostenes en que descansa el Gobierno de la República; y es a sus servidores, a los que por ejercer muy delicadas funciones para la vida misma de la Sociedad, se exige, más que a otros empleados, mayor ilustración, probidad y trabajo. Y es por eso, seguramente, que al pedirse a los servidores judiciales una completa dedicación, durante largos años, a la importantísima tarea de administrar justicia, -con el noble fin de asegurarles su subsistencia al llegar a la vejez o cuando por padecimientos físicos ya no puedan trabajar,- que se ha venido instando ante el Congreso, en distintos períodos legislativos, la promulgación de una ley que contemple esa difícil situación de los funcionarios y empleados del Poder Judicial”.
No se debe soslayar, que las personas juzgadoras y el funcionariado judicial en general, está sometido a un régimen de prohibiciones y de incompatibilidades de mucha mayor intensidad y rigurosidad que el régimen de incompatibilidades y prohibiciones que afecta al resto de los funcionarios públicos, lo que lo hace de una naturaleza completamente distinta. Las regulaciones que se aplican al funcionariado administrativo de todo el sector público no pueden aplicarse también a los funcionarios judiciales. En este sentido, los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad constitucional obligan a que ese régimen de incompatibilidades y prohibiciones asimétrico, que responde a la propia naturaleza de las funciones jurisdiccional y administrativa, deba tener una compensación económica, tanto salarial como al término de la relación laboral. Pero también el principio de igualdad, recogido en el artículo 33, de la Constitución Política, implica la prohibición de tratar como iguales a los desiguales, porque de ello se deriva una discriminación contraria al Derecho de la Constitución.
En el caso de los jueces y funcionarios judiciales, existen condiciones objetivas, razonables, justificadas y fundadas en la propia naturaleza de la función jurisdiccional que se ejerce, para darles un trato diferente al del resto de los servidores públicos de las distintas administraciones, con lo cual, lejos de incurrirse en una discriminación, se tutela el principio de igualdad regulado en el citado numeral constitucional. Lo cual quiere decir, que si existe un régimen jubilatorio diferenciado para el sector jurisdiccional, ello no obedece a una decisión arbitraria, subjetiva o antojadiza del legislador, sino a la propia naturaleza específica y diferente de la función jurisdiccional que, objetiva y constitucionalmente, lo justifican.
Lo anterior no solo se deriva de nuestra propia Constitución Política y de los valores y principios que la informan, sino que está contenido en diversos instrumentos internacionales. Así, por ejemplo, en los “Principios básicos relativos a la independencia de la judicatura”, adoptados por el Séptimo Congreso de las Naciones Unidas sobre Prevención del Delito y Tratamiento del Delincuente, celebrado en Milán del 26 de agosto al 6 de septiembre de 1985, y confirmados por la Asamblea General en sus resoluciones 40/32 de 29 de noviembre de 1985 y 40/146 de 13 de diciembre de 1985, en el principio 11, se dice lo siguiente:
“11. La ley garantizará la permanencia en el cargo de los jueces por los períodos establecidos, su independencia y su seguridad, así como una remuneración, pensiones y condiciones de servicio y de jubilación adecuadas”.
Con lo cual, las Naciones Unidas recomienda a todos los países del mundo, que las normas jurídicas deben garantizar a los jueces una remuneración, pensiones, condición de servicios y de jubilación adecuadas y proporcionadas a la complejidad y dificultad de la función jurisdiccional que ejercen. Ello debe entenderse, también, extensivo a los funcionarios auxiliares de la justicia, pues, de otro modo, tal independencia sería imposible.
De igual modo, en la “Carta Europea sobre el Estatuto de los Jueces”, adoptada en Estrasburgo, entre el 8 y el 10 de julio de 1998, en aras de lograr una independencia real y efectiva del Poder Judicial y de los funcionarios que administran justicia, así como de sus colaboradores y auxiliares, en los párrafos 6.1 y 6.4, se establece lo siguiente:
“6.1 El ejercicio profesional de las funciones judiciales da derecho a la remuneración del / de la juez, cuyo nivel será determinado con el fin de preservarle de las presiones destinadas a influir en sus resoluciones y en general en su actuación jurisdiccional, alterando de ese modo su independencia e imparcialidad.
6.4 En particular, el estatuto asegurará al / a la juez que haya alcanzado la edad legal de cese en sus funciones, después de desarrollarlas a título profesional durante un período determinado, el pago de una pensión de jubilación cuyo importe se aproximará en lo posible al de su última retribución de actividad judicial”.
El citado instrumento pretende lograr un Poder Judicial real y efectivamente independiente, lo que es una garantía a favor de la ciudadanía. De modo tal, que la adecuada remuneración y pensión de los jueces y de los auxiliares de justicia, en los términos allí expresados, constituye la debida y razonable consecuencia del ejercicio de una función delicada y de mucha dificultad y responsabilidad.
También, el “Estatuto del Juez Iberoamericano”, aprobado en la VI Cumbre Iberoamericana de Presidentes de Cortes Supremas y Tribunales Supremos de Justicia, celebrada en Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Islas Canarias, España, los días 23, 24 y 25 de mayo de 2001, en el artículo 32, se hace eco de los mismos principios ya citados, al estatuir:
“Art. 32. Remuneración.
Los jueces deben recibir una remuneración suficiente, irreductible y acorde con la importancia de la función que desempeñan y con las exigencias y responsabilidades que conlleva”.
Y, en el artículo 33, dispone:
“Art. 33. Seguridad Social.
El Estado debe ofrecer a los jueces su acceso a un sistema de seguridad social, garantizando que recibirán, al concluir sus años de servicio por jubilación, enfermedad u otras contingencias legalmente previstas o en caso de daños personales, familiares o patrimoniales derivados del ejercicio del cargo, una pensión digna o una indemnización adecuada”.
Debe tenerse presente, que la jubilación y la pensión forman parte de los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Prestacionales contenidos en el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, adoptado y abierto a la firma, ratificación y adhesión por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidad, en su resolución 2200 A (XXI), de 16 de diciembre de 1966. Estas regulaciones también han sido acogidas en el Informe N° 1 del 23 de noviembre del 2001, rendido por el Consejo Consultivo de Jueces Europeos (CCJE), al examinar el tema de la independencia e inamovilidad de los jueces. Con respecto al tema de los salarios de los jueces, dicho Consejo recomendó:
“…es generalmente importante (y especialmente en el caso de las nuevas democracias) fijar disposiciones legales específicas que garanticen unos salarios de jueces protegidos contra reducciones y que aseguren de facto “el aumento de los salarios en función del coste de vida”.
Estas recomendaciones son de total aplicación al tema de las pensiones y jubilaciones de los jueces y de los servidores judiciales en general, ya que están íntimamente relacionadas con el principio de independencia del Poder Judicial, tal y como ya ha quedado expuesto.
Pero no solo en el ámbito internacional se ha regulado esta materia en los términos dichos, sino que también ha sido objeto de regulación a lo interno del Poder Judicial, con consideraciones semejantes a las dichas.
En efecto, la Corte Plena aprobó el Estatuto de Justicia y Derechos de las Personas Usuarias del Sistema Judicial, en cuyos artículos 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 y 24, se hace referencia a la independencia del Poder Judicial y de los jueces, en sus diferentes facetas. En el artículo 24, relativo a las condiciones materiales de la independencia judicial, se establece que el Estado debe garantizar “la independencia económica del Poder Judicial, mediante la asignación del presupuesto adecuado para cubrir sus necesidades y a través del desembolso oportuno de las partidas presupuestarias”, lo cual está íntimamente relacionado con lo dispuesto en el ya citado artículo 177, de la Constitución Política, en cuanto a la asignación constitucional de un mínimo del Presupuesto Ordinario para el Poder Judicial, como manifestación de esa independencia.
Asimismo, el artículo 49, del citado Estatuto, consagra también, al igual que los instrumentos internacionales examinados, el principio del salario irreductible del juez: “Los jueces deben recibir una remuneración suficiente, irreductible y acorde con la importancia de la función que desempeñan y con las exigencias y responsabilidades que conlleva”. Como ya se explicó, esta especial regulación tiene su fundamento en la independencia del Poder Judicial, lo cual debe ser también extendido al tema de la pensión o jubilación de los jueces y del personal auxiliar de la justicia, pues de otro modo, el principio de independencia judicial no sería posible.
El respeto a la independencia judicial, que es uno de los fines que persigue el artículo 167, Constitucional, también fue objeto de regulación expresa en el Estatuto, artículo 20, al disponer que “[l]os otros Poderes del Estado y, en general, todas las autoridades, instituciones y organismos nacionales o internacionales, deben respetar y hacer efectiva la independencia de la judicatura”. Y, precisamente, la intromisión inconsulta del órgano legislativo en la organización y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, sea creando, modificando o suprimiendo órganos o competencias, judiciales o administrativos, es constitucionalmente inadmisible, por constituir esto una flagrante violación al principio de independencia judicial.
Por último, cabe indicar, que la independencia del Poder Judicial es un principio que tiene una naturaleza particular y específica, distinta al de los otros Poderes del Estado, ya que consiste en un escudo de protección contra la intromisión del poder político, de lo cual no están protegidos los otros Poderes del Estado. Esto, debido a que el Poder Judicial es el que administra justicia y esta debe ser imparcial y libre de cualquier presión externa. Y, en este punto, la presión económica, bien por el salario o estipendio, bien por el monto y condiciones de la jubilación o pensión de los jueces y demás auxiliares de la justicia, juega un papel trascendente en la consecución de una independencia real y efectiva del Poder Judicial.
Con base en las consideraciones precedentes, corresponde, entonces, examinar el contenido de la ley con el fin de determinar si este afecta o no la organización o el funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, en los términos expresados.
En este orden de ideas, al igual que cuando se conoció la consulta legislativa relacionada al proyecto de Ley de Reforma Integral a los Diversos Regímenes de Pensiones y Normativa Conexa, hoy aprobada por Ley N° 9544 de 24 de abril de 2018, denominada como “Reforma del Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, contenido en la Ley N° 7333, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, de 5 de mayo de 1993, y sus reformas”, se mantienen las razones del voto salvado. Esa consulta legislativa fue evacuada por Sentencia N° 2018-005758 a las 15:40 horas del 12 de abril de 2018, en la que abordó las diferentes quejas sobre el artículo 239, de la ahora ley en cuestión. En esa oportunidad, se revisó el trámite legislativo en cuanto crea una Junta Administradora del Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial, la cual define como un órgano del Poder Judicial, con independencia funcional, técnica y administrativa, para ejercer las facultades y atribuciones que la ley le concede, órgano al que se le otorga independencia funcional y se le asigna una serie de competencias, entre otras, elevar el aporte obrero al Fondo de Pensiones y conocer de las solicitudes de jubilación, lo cual implica una modificación en la estructura del Poder Judicial.
De igual modo, se restan competencias al Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial; y, además, en el artículo 240, del proyecto de ley, se confiere a la Corte Plena la obligación de dictar un reglamento para la elección de los miembros de esa Junta Administradora, fijándole así una competencia que actualmente no tiene. Los mencionados numerales de la Ley disponen:
“Artículo 239- Se crea la Junta Administrativa del Fondo del Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial como un órgano del Poder Judicial, que contará con completa independencia funcional, técnica y administrativa, para ejercer las facultades y atribuciones que le otorga la ley.
Le corresponde a la Junta:
Con base en el resultado de los estudios actuariales, y con autorización de la Superintendencia de Pensiones, la Junta Administrativa podrá modificar los parámetros iniciales establecidos en esta ley respecto de los requisitos de elegibilidad, el perfil de beneficios, así como los aportes y las cotizaciones de los servidores judiciales y de las jubilaciones y las pensiones previstos en la ley, siempre que esto sea necesario para garantizar el equilibrio actuarial del Régimen.
La Junta contará con personalidad jurídica instrumental para ejercer las atribuciones que la ley le asigna, así como para ejercer la representación judicial y extrajudicial del Fondo.
Se financiará con una comisión por gastos administrativos que surgirá de deducir un cinco por mil de los sueldos que devenguen los servidores judiciales, así como de las jubilaciones y las pensiones a cargo del Fondo. Con estos recursos se pagarán las dietas de los miembros de la Junta Administrativa, los salarios de su personal y, en general, sus gastos administrativos. Los recursos ociosos serán invertidos de conformidad con lo previsto en el artículo 237 de esta ley.
Artículo 240- La Junta Administradora estará conformada por tres miembros que serán electos democráticamente por el colectivo judicial, así como por tres miembros designados por la Corte Plena, con perspectiva de género en ambos casos. Cada integrante titular tendrá un suplente para que lo sustituyan en sus ausencias, quien deberá cumplir con los mismos requisitos del titular.
Quienes integran la Junta durarán en sus cargos cinco años, luego de los cuales podrán ser reelectos, todo conforme con la reglamentación que al efecto habrá de dictarse por la Corte Plena, previa audiencia conferida a las organizaciones gremiales del Poder Judicial.
En la primera sesión ordinaria, la Junta designará a la persona que habrá de presidir las sesiones, esta designación se hará por un espacio temporal de un año, debiendo alternarse cada año entre los representantes del colectivo judicial y de la Corte Plena. Además, se designará a quien le sustituya en caso de ausencia. La persona que preside tendrá voto calificado en caso de empate.
Los miembros de la Junta Administradora no devengarán ninguna dieta pero sí contarán con los permisos necesarios para atender las sesiones. Para ser miembro de la Junta se deberá cumplir con los siguientes requisitos, los cuales deberán ser documentados y demostrados ante la Superintendencia de Pensiones (Supén):
No podrán ser miembros de la Junta:
La integración del órgano deberá garantizar la representación paritaria de ambos sexos, asegurando que la diferencia entre el total de hombres y mujeres no sea superior a uno”.
De la lectura del artículo 239, transcrito, es claro que en él se crea un nuevo órgano dentro de la estructura del Poder Judicial, denominado “Junta Administrativa del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial”, al que se le confiere completa independencia funcional, técnica y administrativa, para ejercer las facultades, competencias y atribuciones que le otorga la ley, enumeradas en los incisos a), b), c), d), e), f), g), h) e i), del propio artículo, para el cumplimiento de sus cometidos, para lo cual contará con personalidad jurídica instrumental. De tal manera, que se crea, ex novo, un órgano administrativo y se adscribe dentro de la estructura del Poder Judicial, con competencias y atribuciones determinadas; y, concomitantemente, se sustraen y eliminan competencias y atribuciones previamente otorgadas -por ley formal- al Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial. Esta sola circunstancia, por las razones dichas, obliga al órgano legislativo a consultar -necesariamente- el proyecto al Poder Judicial, en los términos dispuestos en el artículo 167, de la Constitución Política, ya que ello modifica la organización administrativa del Poder Judicial, con la creación de un nuevo órgano administrativo, y la supresión de competencias del Consejo Superior en favor de ese órgano de nueva creación, lo que, claramente, afecta la independencia de ese Poder de la República.
Lo mismo cabe decir en relación con el artículo 240, de la ley, en el tanto en él se abordan temas propios de la organización administrativa del Poder Judicial, en torno a la conformación y designación de los miembros de la Junta Administradora del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, su duración en los cargos, la designación de la persona que ha de presidirla y los requisitos para poder ser miembro de esa Junta, entre otros. Es de destacar, que aun cuando la Corte Plena está facultada, por la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, para dictar los reglamentos internos que sean necesarios para el buen funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, el hecho de que, por medio de la ley, se le imponga la obligación de reglamentar lo relativo a la duración en los cargos de los miembros de la Junta Administradora del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, sin que el texto sustitutivo del proyecto, que fue finalmente aprobado en Primer Debate, haya sido consultado a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, implica una grave intromisión en las competencias del órgano máxima jerarquía del Poder Judicial, con afectación de la organización de ese Poder de la República, en contravención de la consulta obligatoria preceptuada en el artículo 167, de la Constitución Política; y, por ende, una lesión a la independencia judicial.
A simple vista, la citada normativa, le quita, al Presidente de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, y por consiguiente, al Presidente del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, la competencia que le da la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, de administrar el Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial, precisamente de acuerdo con las políticas de inversión establecidas por la Corte Plena, tal y como actualmente está contemplado en el artículo 81, inciso 12.
No obstante lo anterior, el texto sustitutivo del proyecto de ley, que fue acogido por la Comisión Especial en la sesión del 27 de julio de 2017, no fue consultado a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, a pesar de contener una serie de regulaciones que afectan la organización y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial. Sin embargo, tal y como se afirma en el voto de mayoría, a folio 2625 del expediente legislativo consta que, en atención a una moción aprobada el 27 de julio de 2017, por la Comisión Especial, por oficio número AL-20035-OFI-0043-2017 del 31 de julio de 2017, la Jefa del Área de Comisiones de la Asamblea Legislativa confirió audiencia al Poder Judicial con respecto al dictamen afirmativo de mayoría, con base en lo cual, la Corte Suprema de Justicia emitió su criterio mediante el oficio número SP-253-17 del 10 de agosto de 2017, según consta a folios 2759 a 2807 del expediente legislativo. Esto significa, entonces, que el Poder Judicial sí fue consultado y externó su criterio en relación con el texto sustitutivo aprobado por la Comisión Especial el 27 de julio de 2017, lo que se produjo incluso antes de que dicho texto fuera conocido por el Plenario.
A pesar de ello, dicho texto no fue el que se aprobó en Primer Debate por el Plenario Legislativo el 30 de octubre de 2017, publicado en el Alcance N° 268 a la Gaceta Digital N° 212 del 9 de noviembre de 2017, ya que el que se aprobó es un texto sustitutivo introducido por moción vía artículo 137, del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa. Este último texto no fue consultado a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, tal y como correspondía, según lo analizado supra, al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 167, de la Constitución Política.
Conforme lo argumentan los accionantes, se incurrió en una violación constitucional en el procedimiento legislativo. Al respecto, cabe destacar, que este Tribunal Constitucional tiene competencia para conocer y pronunciarse sobre los vicios en la formación de las leyes cuando se quebrante algún requisito o trámite sustancial previsto en la Constitución o en el Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa. Esto es conforme al artículo 73, inciso c), de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que indica:
“Artículo 73.- Cabrá la acción de inconstitucionalidad:
…
…”.
De manera que, conforme a la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional si lo que se analiza es una ley formal aprobada por la Asamblea Legislativa, se trataría del control posterior de las leyes o acuerdos legislativos, mediante el examen del expediente legislativo, para determinar que en el procedimiento de formación de la ley no se incurrió en algún vicio esencial. Por ello, el vicio detectado en el procedimiento legislativo de la Ley N° 9544, denominada “Reforma del Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, contenido en la Ley No. 7333, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial de 5 de mayo de 1993, y sus Reformas”, debe declararse por la omisión de consultar a la Corte Suprema de Justicia el texto sustitutivo aprobado en Primer Debate, toda vez que esto viola lo dispuesto en el artículo 167, de la Constitución Política, al afectar la organización administrativa del Poder Judicial, por la creación de un nuevo órgano administrativo dentro de su estructura, otorgarle competencias sustanciales en materia de pensiones y jubilaciones; y, a la vez, suprimir competencias otorgadas previamente por ley al Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial (artículos 239 y 240 del proyecto).
Esta Sala, en abono de lo anterior, en la Sentencia N° 2001-13273, de las 11:44 horas del 21 de diciembre de 2001, al evacuar una consulta legislativa de constitucionalidad sobre un proyecto de ley de reforma al Código Penal, en cuanto modifica aspectos relativos a la organización o funcionamiento -meramente administrativa- del Archivo Judicial, sostuvo, por unanimidad, que:
“De la misma forma, modifican el ámbito de funciones del Archivo Judicial, aumentando la cantidad de datos que debe registrar. Todo lo anterior implica sin duda, la variación de diversas reglas concernientes al funcionamiento y organización del Poder Judicial. A pesar de lo anterior, la Asamblea Legislativa omitió efectuar la respectiva consulta a la Corte Suprema de Justicia (al menos la misma no consta en la copia certificada del expediente remitida por el Presidente del Directorio), sin que anteriormente dichos aspectos hayan estado incluidos en los textos consultados a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, por lo que estima la Sala que se incurrió en una violación al deber impuesto en el artículo 167 de la Constitución Política respecto de la independencia funcional reconocida por el constituyente al Poder Judicial, y en ese sentido debe entenderse que el trámite seguido con anterioridad a la aprobación del dictamen modificado es nulo desde el punto de vista constitucional y así debe ser declarado”.
Nótese por lo dicho, que el vicio apuntado no quedó subsanado, en segundo debate, aún si la Ley hubiera sido aprobado por mayoría calificada, pues esto solo sería así si se tratase de la aprobación de un texto de obligada consulta al Poder Judicial, por afectar su organización, estructura y funcionamiento -como en este caso-, y, una vez consultado a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, el órgano legislativo persistiera en aprobarlo apartándose del criterio técnico del órgano judicial. Nada de esto ocurrió en el procedimiento legislativo, toda vez que la Ley N° 9544 del 24 de abril de 2018, no obtuvo siquiera la votación calificada en el segundo debate, y peor aún, el texto aprobado fue sin consulta institucional. El meollo del problema que nos ocupa, realmente, es de la aprobación -en Primer Debate- de un texto inconsulto, en contravención de lo preceptuado en el artículo 167, de la Constitución Política, vicio de procedimiento que resulta insalvable e insubsanable.
Esto por cuanto, si bien es cierto, el texto sustitutivo del proyecto de ley, que fue acogido por la Comisión Especial en la sesión del 27 de julio de 2017, fue consultado a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, este texto no fue el que, finalmente, se aprobó en Primer Debate, sino un nuevo texto sustitutivo que, de previo, no fue consultado, no obstante tener relación directa con la organización, estructura y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, según ha quedado expuesto. Y aún más, si bien el anterior texto aprobado por la Comisión Especial en la sesión del 27 de julio de 2017 sí fue consultado a la Corte, al haber esta mostrado disconformidad con el texto, hacía obligada una votación calificada por el Pleno, al tenor del artículo 167, de la Carta Fundamental, lo que tampoco se hizo así.
Conviene recordar, que la consulta institucional tiene como fin la protección de la independencia judicial, que es mucho más complejo que reducirlo a la protección de un fuero jurisdiccional. La consulta institucional obligatoria debe ser oportuna, pues de otro modo, sería una obligación de papel que no surtiría las verdaderas salvaguardias que el texto constitucional procura establecer entre iguales Poderes de la República. El sostenimiento de una tesitura contraria, y de modo permanente, por parte de la mayoría del Tribunal no podrá ser sostenible en el tiempo, pues aún en estas circunstancias de inflexión e implosión en la independencia funcional y presupuestaria del Poder Judicial, lo es mayoritariamente, al de las garantías ciudadanas que el Constituyente quiso garantizar en el 167, y luego, mejoró con la reforma al numeral 177, de la Constitución Política.
La Corte Plena, en Sesión N° 27, del 7 de agosto de 2017, Artículo XXX, al evacuar la consulta a la Asamblea Legislativa sobre el Dictamen Afirmativo de Mayoría, aprobado por la citada Comisión Especial, dispuso:
“Se considera que tiene que ver con la estructura y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, debido a que afecta directamente el proyecto de vida de todas las personas servidoras judiciales porque significa una disminución de la jubilación, aun y cuando han cumplido con todos los requisitos legales para gozar del derecho jubilatorio de manera plena. Esto incluye la cotización de las cuotas necesarias y correspondientes; el pago de renta; aportes tanto al Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial como al sistema de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social y otra serie de cargas que de aprobarse el texto tal cual ha sido planteado por la Comisión dictaminadora, redundaría en acciones confiscatorias.
No puede dejarse de lado que la creación y naturaleza del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial responde a criterios de estabilidad, independencia, preparación e idoneidad, tal como lo establece el artículo 192 de la Constitución Política, con el objeto de promover la permanencia de un personal formado y capacitado en la institución y la disminución del goce jubilatorio representa un desestimulo para el ingreso de personas profesionales valiosas, que atendiendo al resultado económico de una futura valoración, preferirían hacer su carrera profesional en otro ámbito laboral.
Se afecta la carrera judicial, fiscal, de la Defensa Pública y del personal en general que teniendo más cargas en su salario -de cuatro veces más que en otros regímenes-, recibirían un beneficio menor.
Por otra parte, la renovación del personal que logra permanecer se afecta. El Poder Judicial contaría con personas funcionarias de edad avanzada, que se mantuvieron laborando únicamente por la disminución que sus ingresos sufrirían en caso de jubilarse.
La población judicial estaría ante una encrucijada, donde si bien es cierto, se tiene el deseo de optar por ese derecho y la motivación de retirarse a descansar, se ve colocada en una condición donde debe valorar su situación económica, probablemente, obligándola a buscar nuevas fuentes de ingresos para mantener sus gastos normales o adquiridos previos a la pensión, y los naturales por razones propias de la edad. Sin embargo, ese proceso también tiene sus restricciones, desde el punto de vista legal la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial prohíbe a las personas jubiladas optar por otro trabajo, y socialmente es una realidad que después de los cuarenta años se tienen limitaciones fácticas en cuanto a la reincorporación laboral.
Tiene gran relación con la estructura y funcionamiento, ya que se le resta competitividad al Poder Judicial en el mercado laboral, con perjuicio para la calidad de la Administración de Justicia. El salario de los puestos se ve disminuido por el aporte al régimen de pensiones y jubilaciones que es cuatro veces mayor que la contribución de otros regímenes. Esto dificulta la captación de recurso humano y se ve perjudicado el servicio público.
Además, la regulación del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial no debe valorarse únicamente desde la perspectiva económica, pues nos encontramos ante derechos fundamentales -irrenunciables- asociados a toda persona trabajadora, quien durante sus años laborales contribuyó en un porcentaje superior al general, a un régimen con la expectativa de contar con una pensión, que le permita satisfacer sus necesidades y gozar junto con su entorno, sus años de retiro de forma tranquila y con calidad de vida.
La imposición de esta nueva carga tributaria, afecta a grupos de población vulnerable -como las personas adultas mayores- perjudicándose a la parte más débil, la que precisamente requiere mayor protección por parte del Estado.
El impuesto propuesto se impone en un momento de la vida de la persona jubilada donde está más vulnerable, cercanas o ya son de la tercera edad. No se puede obviar que es en esta etapa, donde por lo general las personas requieren mayores atenciones médicas, cuidados especiales, entre otros, siendo que durante su vida laboral, unos en menor o mayor cantidad, de acuerdo con los ingresos percibidos, cotizaron para el régimen con la expectativa de contar con los recursos previstos para afrontar este proceso y de aprobarse este Proyecto de Ley, se vería truncado dicho plan de vida.
Causaría un impacto social importante, por cuanto las personas en su retiro pierden, de forma sorpresiva, una parte importante de sus ingresos, pero conservan un estatus de gastos preestablecidos, lo que se convierte en una repercusión, no solo económica, sino también en su salud, siendo contrario al objetivo previsto para un sistema de pensiones, el cual es contar con ingresos suficientes durante la vida posterior a la laboral, escenario dentro del cual es importante recordar que en muchas ocasiones, la persona jubilada, continúa teniendo bajo su cuidado y manutención a otras personas adultas mayores o menores de edad.
Tomando en cuenta las observaciones planteadas al Proyecto de Ley tramitado bajo el expediente 19922 (20035), las cuales encuentran apego y sustento en el estudio actuarial realizado por el IICE y con base en las potestades que los artículos 167 de la Constitución Política y 59 inciso 1) de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial se estima que el texto consultado sí incide en la estructura, organización y el funcionamiento del Poder Judicial y en ese sentido deberá la Asamblea Legislativa, tomar en cuenta lo dicho por la Corte Plena en relación a cada aspecto del Proyecto en consulta, salvo que se cuente con la mayoría calificada para separarse de dicha opinión vinculante.
Así se ha hecho saber a ese Poder Legislativo en otros proyectos de ley consultados tales como los vistos en las sesiones de Corte Plenas números 57-14 del 08 de diciembre de 2014, artículo XVIII; 13-15 del 23 de marzo de 2015, artículo XXXVII; 2-16 del 18 de enero de 2016, artículo XVIII y 14-17 del 30 de mayo de 2017, artículo XIX, entre otros, en los que la Corte Plena ha estimado necesario señalar la incidencia de los proyectos de Ley en la estructura interna del Poder Judicial.
Corolario, respecto del proyecto de Ley tramitado bajo el expediente n° 19922, debe emitirse criterio negativo pues incide en la estructura, organización y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial”.
La parte final, del citado artículo constitucional (167), expresa literalmente que “para apartarse del criterio de ésta [La Corte], se requerirá el voto de las dos terceras partes del total de los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa”; y, dicho texto final, -no consultado en todo caso- se aprobó por la Asamblea Legislativa el 30 de octubre de 2017, con treinta y un votos (folios 4000 y 4173 del expediente legislativo). Y, para el segundo debate, no obtuvo la mayoría calificada, al alcanzar treinta y cuatro votos (folios 4437, 4608 y 4637 del expediente legislativo).
B.- Las dinámicas jurídicas y sociales que informaron la reforma al artículo 177, Constitucional. Es necesario abordar el criterio de la mayoría, el cual, consideramos con respeto -pero con igual vehemencia-, las razones por las que se considera que utilizan una laxa interpretación de la obligación de la consulta institucional establecida en el artículo 167, Constitucional, además de lo dicho anteriormente. Es claro que, en general, la doctrina constitucional de base para la consulta institucional se basa en similares razones: garantizar que el legislador tenga de primera mano la mejor información para legislar, es decir, cuente con el criterio técnico especifico. Se trata del reconocimiento del Constituyente de las autonomías institucionales, así como en su mayor grado, de la defensa de la independencia que le corresponde a un Poder del Estado u órgano constitucional fundamental del Estado. En los trámites de leyes complejos, como serían aquellas que tuvieran criterio encontrado del Poder Judicial, es cuando más se requiere que una mayoría calificada de los legisladores para promover aquellos cambios significativos en la legislación mediante un verdadero consenso.
Si bien esta Sala, en algunas de sus sentencias, ha establecido que no procede la consulta institucional en proyectos de ley que tienen un carácter nacional o general, este solo criterio jurisprudencial no puede bastarse para descartar la necesidad de agravar el procedimiento legislativo en la Asamblea Legislativa, cuando se trata de la mayoría calificada establecida en el numeral 167, Constitucional. Esto tiene que ser dimensionado no solo referidos a temas que tienen relación con la autonomía institucional del Poder Judicial, sino especialmente, a los referidos a la incidencia directa o indirecta en la independencia judicial, que se garantiza en la Constitución, a través de la estructura orgánica fundamental del Estado. Esto, especialmente, si como en el caso que nos ocupa, ha habido diversos vicios en el procedimiento legislativo, referidos más adelante.
Es claro, que criterios para negar la consulta institucional por considerar que un proyecto de ley sea de carácter nacional o general no puede ser utilizado de forma indiscriminada, especialmente porque con dicha calificación entraría gran cantidad de proyectos de ley que tengan incidencia en el presupuesto nacional, en esta situación una gran mayoría tendrían incidencia nacional que se ocupa para establecer la defensa de objetivos públicos vistos desde criterios economicistas. Al contrario, esta minoría estima que no aplica el criterio jurisprudencial citado por la mayoría, cuando se trata de proyectos de ley que podrían incidir en la organización del Poder Judicial, como órgano fundamental del Estado. Es claro que el escrutinio judicial debe ser más demandante, por los alcances más permanentes sobre la función judicial (que es universal y con plena jurisdicción sobre todas las controversias jurídicas), lo que expresa las funciones fundamentales de control, tanto y más que de las instituciones semi-autónomas y autónomas, porque tiene relación con la especialidad funcional e independencia de un poder de la República.
El peso absoluto de la institucionalidad fundamental del Estado debe trazar los criterios del examen y escrutinio que debe hacer este Tribunal Constitucional, de modo que no se puede examinar en los mismos términos que se hace para otras instituciones autónomas, pues evidentemente las consecuencias son muy diferentes para el Estado y la población en general. Basta con señalar la Sentencia N° 2017-009551 de las 11:40 horas del 12 de junio de 2017, que estableció que:
“…en general, la función judicial es universal y tiene plena jurisdicción sobre todas las controversias jurídicas que se suscitan en el país. Universalidad se refiere a la competencia sobre todas las disputas que se sometan a los Tribunales de Justicia, y aun las que no figuran en ella o en la ley por el principio de plenitud hermenéutica (artículo 153 de la Constitución Política). Universalidad supone jurisdicción sobre todos los individuos en controversia, incluso de conformidad con los principios generales del Derecho Internacional Público y del Derecho Internacional Privado. El Poder Judicial tiene competencia para decidir definitivamente sobre todas las controversias, encausando las cuestiones de conformidad con el procedimiento respectivo del iter procesal, finalizando, por lo general, con una sentencia -forma normal de terminar el proceso- con el estado de cosa juzgada, que es una expresión del poder y función de la plena jurisdicción, universal, y que implica la prohibición de abrir de nuevo a la discusión la misma controversia, para evitar la perpetuación de los conflictos y su amenaza sobre la convivencia pacífica en sociedad. Es la lápida que prohíbe abrir de nuevo la discusión sobre los mismos hechos”.
El Constituyente por supuesto asignó un campo concreto de acción al Poder Judicial para que funciones con independencia, que se nutre y participa de todo el pensamiento occidental, inspirado en los principios de la imparcialidad y la justicia, sencillamente no se puede comparar, o asimilar a la de los entes menores del Estado, por el contrario, es claro que el artículo 167, de la Constitución Política, se ubica en consideración a la importancia institucional y su autonomía funcional en el gran esquema del Estado.
Anteriormente en esta misma sentencia, se estableció también que:
“Esto lleva al principio de legalidad funcional, que conlleva el ejercicio de las competencias constitucional del Estado, el logro de los objetivos torales de cada poder sin extenderse a los de los otros Poderes independientes y de igual rango, y al ejercer cada uno las funciones de peso y contrapeso es que pueden controlar y limitar a los otros Poderes, según lo autoriza la Constitución Política. De conformidad con la distribución de las funciones fundamentales del Estado, cuando el Legislativo dicta las leyes, está sujeto a la supremacía de la Constitución Política y a los límites consagrados por la Constitución Política, que condiciona definitivamente su regularidad y permanencia en el tiempo, además de no poder aplicarlas directamente; en cuanto al Poder Ejecutivo, no podría dejar de aplicar e implementar las disposiciones que le dicta el Poder Legislativo, ni dejar de observar las disposiciones de la Carta fundamental; finalmente, el Poder Judicial no podría resolver a contra-pelo de las normas aplicables a un caso concreto, salvo por el conflicto con el principio de jerarquía normativa, el principio de la supremacía de las normas, de las leyes, tratados y de la Constitución Política, quedando sujeto a éstas.
De conformidad con los artículos 10 y 152 y siguientes de la Constitución Política debe velar por la regularidad de toda la legislación, por lo que no podría aplicar normativa inválida o inconstitucional, pues aunado a la función fundamental de impartir justicia, debe velar para que toda acción u omisión no vulnere los principios esenciales de todo Estado social y democrático de Derecho, entre ellos: los principios de legalidad, jerarquía normativa, el respeto de los derechos y libertades fundamentales de la población. En consecuencia, el Poder Judicial interpreta y aplica finalmente la Constitución Política, teniendo el control de constitucionalidad de las normas y omisiones -el monopolio del rechazo- cuando la legislación es contraria a ésta, así cuando vulneran los derechos fundamentales, porque naturalmente es el último garante del principio de legalidad, el defensor último de los fines y objetivos del Estado y de la realización, por el Derecho caso por caso, del bienestar del ser humano”.
Ahora bien, la sentencia aborda las generalidades del Fondo y su desarrollo legal a partir de los inicios del Siglo pasado, en sintonía con la Sentencia N° 2018-5758 de las 15:40 horas del 12 de abril de 2018, para explicar el desarrollo legal de la seguridad social y del régimen previsional del Poder Judicial. Sin embargo, se debió hacer referencia a que las falencias del sistema sirvieron de acicate también a nivel constitucional, pues hubo otras que se gestaron para garantizar mayor estabilidad institucional y a favor de la independencia judicial. De este modo, debe hacerse referencia a la materialización de una de las conquistas más importantes para la institucionalidad del país, la que se obtuvo con la reforma al artículo 177, Constitucional, con la que se garantizó la independencia económica del Poder Judicial. Cabe entonces plantear, que si las dinámicas institucionales y sociales de ese entonces fueron importantes, aún lo fueron más las de la enmienda a la Constitución Política, las que no son nada despreciables, pues estuvieron dirigidas a fortalecer el Poder Judicial, y con el mismo peso, producir protección dentro del funcionariado.
Las dinámicas económicas y jurídicas dicen tanto o más, pues pese a las conquistas legales y por la cantidad de problemas que existían en la época previa a la reforma constitucional, se gestó desde el seno de la Corte Plena, y fue acogido por la Asamblea Legislativa, el mejoramiento sustancial de aquella independencia económica del Poder Judicial en la propia Constitución Política. No cabe duda que las protecciones que el Constituyente derivado estableció en la reforma, se distribuyen igualmente sobre la estabilidad del funcionariado judicial. Así, fueron contempladas las limitaciones en las instalaciones e infraestructura, dotar de mejores herramientas de trabajo, mejoramiento de los salarios, más recursos para el Régimen de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial, entre otros. Los reclamos de los accionantes debieron encontrar eco en esta vía de la acción de inconstitucionalidad, las que al inicio de este voto salvado se enumeran algunas.
La independencia judicial se defiende con las herramientas que precisamente dotó el Constituyente, dentro de la cual las democracias más consolidadas del mundo se dedican a producir los instrumentos de protección a la independencia judicial y económica, siendo una de ellas la votación calificada en caso de que un proyecto de ley incida en la organización y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial.
En la Sentencia N° 2006-07965 de las 16:58 horas del 31 de mayo de 2006, esta Sala estableció que:
“VI.- CARÁCTER EXCEPCIONAL DE LA FUNCIÓN MATERIALMENTE ADMINISTRATIVA DEL PODER JUDICIAL. Si bien al Poder Judicial le corresponde, por antonomasia, el ejercicio exclusivo de la función jurisdiccional –tal y como se señaló en el considerando anterior-, lo cierto es que, también, ejerce de forma excepcional o extraordinaria funciones de índole administrativo. En ese sentido, resulta menester apuntar que la función administrativa no está constitucional ni legalmente asignada de forma exclusiva a un órgano o ente y, tampoco, posee un contenido típico que la caracterice, puesto que, como bien ha apuntado la doctrina es más fácil describir a la administración pública que definir la función administrativa por su carácter heterogéneo. Resulta claro que el ejercicio de la función materialmente jurisdiccional, requiere y precisa de toda una infraestructura administrativa que permita ejercerla de consuno con el precepto constitucional, esto es, de forma pronta y cumplida.
Esto es lo que se ha denominado el “servicio público de administración de justicia”. Así, el soporte o aparato administrativo auxiliar que le permite a los jueces y tribunales dictar sus resoluciones, conforman dicho servicio, con lo cual el concepto está referido a los perfiles administrativos de la función jurisdiccional, tales como la organización y funcionamiento de los tribunales, la logística, -avituallamiento y suministros-, el manejo, gestión o administración eficiente y eficaz de los despachos judiciales para evitar las dilaciones indebidas o injustificadas en la tramitación de la causa, la función administrativa ejercida por los órganos administrativos del Poder Judicial (v. gr. resoluciones administrativas de la Corte Plena, del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, del Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, del Consejo de la Judicatura y, en general, de los diversos departamentos administrativos -Dirección Ejecutiva, Proveeduría, Personal, etc.-) y auxiliares adscritos a éste como la policía represiva ejercida a través del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, el ejercicio de la acción pública por el Ministerio Público y la provisión de una defensa gratuita por medio de la Defensa Pública.
No obstante, si bien esa función materialmente administrativa es desplegada por el aparato u organización de apoyo o de soporte a la jurisdiccional, debe entenderse en un sentido estrictamente excepcional, es decir, resulta admisible aquella que sea, únicamente, necesaria e idónea para coadyuvar en el ejercicio de la función, materialmente, jurisdiccional y no otra. En razón de lo anterior, por aplicación del principio constitucional de la reserva o exclusividad de jurisdicción se impone que el Poder Judicial debe utilizar y destinar la mayoría de sus recursos al ejercicio de una función, materialmente, jurisdiccional.
Una de las grandes conquistas históricas del Estado Constitucional de Derecho costarricense, lo fue la autonomía económica del Poder Judicial lograda por vía de la reforma parcial a la Constitución Política del 7 de noviembre de 1949, mediante la Ley No. 2122 del 22 de mayo de 1957. Esta ley le adicionó a la versión original del artículo 177 de la Constitución Política un párrafo segundo, en el cual se dispuso lo siguiente:
“(…)
En el proyecto se le asignará al Poder Judicial una suma no menor del seis por ciento de los ingresos ordinarios calculados para el año económico. Sin embargo, cuando esta suma resultare superior a la requerida para cubrir las necesidades fundamentales presupuestadas por ese Poder, el departamento mencionado incluirá la diferencia como exceso, con un plan de inversión nacional, para que la Asamblea Legislativa determine lo que corresponda (…)”.
Esta reforma parcial a la Constitución fortaleció, de modo congruente con el ordinal 9° que proclama la separación de funciones, la independencia de ese Poder de la República. La enmienda constitucional partió de la propuesta formulada el 6 de septiembre de 1956 por el Magistrado de entonces Evelio Ramírez a la Corte Plena, órgano colegiado que la aprobó en la sesión celebrada ese mismo día. En la justificación de la modificación constitucional -que posteriormente pasaría a ser la exposición de motivos de la reforma en el procedimiento legislativo-, el Magistrado Evelio Ramírez, insistió en la necesidad de asignarle al Poder Judicial un mínimo o “suma no menor del seis por ciento de los ingresos ordinarios calculados para el año económico”, para superar la situación lamentable de ese Poder de la República al haber recibido en los siete años precedentes a 1956 tan solo un porcentaje promedio del 2.75% en relación con el Presupuesto General de Ingresos.
El propósito manifiesto del Magistrado gestor de la reforma constitucional y de la Corte Plena al acoger su propuesta, fue contar con mayores recursos financieros para diversificar y fortalecer los distintos ordenes (sic) jurisdiccionales, incrementar el número de juzgados y tribunales y del personal necesario para atender la demanda del servicio, reformar y mejorar los procesos, dotar de una adecuada infraestructura y recursos materiales a los juzgados y tribunales, mejorar los salarios de quienes se dedican a la delicada y difícil tarea de administrar justicia y su régimen de jubilaciones o pensiones, todo en aras de procurar una justicia más pronta y cumplida. En ese sentido, el Magistrado Evelio Ramírez efectuó consideraciones tales como las siguientes:
“(…) la Corte Suprema de Justicia, conociendo mejor que nadie las verdaderas necesidades del Poder Judicial, elaboraría su propio anteproyecto de Presupuesto tomando en cuenta los factores que, a su juicio, exijan variaciones económicas dentro de un criterio honesto, racional y justo. Y no sólo atendería a la debida instalación de sus múltiples oficinas –que hoy ofrecen un aspecto casi ruinoso en toda la Nación-, sino que también les suministraría las máquinas de escribir, muebles adecuados y los demás medios materiales, indispensables para laborar con la mayor eficiencia posible. Además se podría pagar en forma más equitativa a todos los servidores judiciales (…) El mismo fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones –cuya estabilidad está seriamente amenazada- podría ser reforzado de esa partida global (…) El porcentaje promedio que ha correspondido al Poder Judicial en los últimos siete años, ha sido de un 2.75 por ciento, en relación con el Presupuesto General de Ingresos (…) La experiencia ha venido a demostrar que el indicado porcentaje resulta del todo insuficiente para el adecuado funcionamiento del Poder Judicial.
Para darse cuenta de ello, basta reparar en los edificios inadecuados que ocupan casi todos los tribunales de la República, en la lentitud con que se tramitan los diversos asuntos judiciales, debido al escaso número de tribunales y del personal que tienen los que funcionan en la actualidad, en el insuficiente número de máquinas de escribir y de otros muebles que son de imperiosa necesidad, en las bajas dotaciones de los servidores judiciales, etc. etc. (…)”.
Por su parte, la Comisión legislativa especial nombrada para dictaminar el proyecto de reforma al artículo 177 de la Constitución, en primera legislatura, en su informe del 9 de octubre de 1956 (visible a folios 20-21 del expediente legislativo), estimó lo siguiente:
“Esta reforma constitucional –con la cual se afianzará definitivamente la autonomía del Poder Judicial en el aspecto económico hará posible que en el futuro encuentren solución adecuada los múltiples problemas que en la actualidad confronta dicho Poder por la limitación de los recursos económicos asignados a él en los presupuestos nacionales. Esos problemas vienen de muy atrás y se agravan día con día como consecuencia del crecimiento y desarrollo de la población que demanda cada vez más servicios de administración de justicia. Las oficinas judiciales no cuentan con personal suficiente para atender los muchos problemas a diario surgidos y en lo material, se hallan con muy pocas excepciones, alojadas en locales totalmente inadecuados y sin mobiliario ni equipos suficientes (…) Las remuneraciones de los servidores judiciales son, por otra parte, exiguas de tal modo que la carrera judicial no ofrece estímulo ni aliciente alguno a quienes deseen iniciarse en ella y esto aleja en muchos casos a elementos de vocación y capacidades que podrían prestar, en otras condiciones, sus servicios como Alcaldes, Jueces o Magistrados”.
Consecuentemente, la idea rectora que inspiró la reforma constitucional de 1957 lo fue fortalecer la organización y funcionamiento del Poder Judicial, para que ejerciera de forma eficiente y eficaz su función esencial de impartir o administrar justicia. Bajo esta inteligencia, cualquier disposición del legislador ordinario tendiente a adscribir en la organización del Poder Judicial órganos que ejercen competencias materialmente administrativas ajenas o que no atañen a la función jurisdiccional, resulta inconstitucional, en cuanto vulnera la autonomía financiera y, por consiguiente, la independencia del Poder Judicial, al desviar el uso y empleo, aunque lo sea en un pequeño porcentaje, del mínimo presupuestario garantizado a éste para otros fines. Se puede afirmar, entonces, que el párrafo 2° del artículo 177 de la Constitución Política, adicionado por la Ley No. 2122 del 22 de mayo de 1957, es una clara garantía institucional, puesto que, al consolidar la autonomía e independencia financiera del Poder Judicial garantiza un ejercicio efectivo, por parte de cualquier persona, del derecho fundamental establecido en el artículo 41 de la Constitución Política de acceder la jurisdicción y de obtener una justicia pronta y cumplida”.
La afirmación de que no se estén sustrayendo competencias administrativas esenciales de organización y conexas con la función jurisdiccional es muy relativo, si como se explicó atrás, se está modificando un aspecto organizativo y de la administración del personal del Poder Judicial. Con ello, se ignora la historia de la enmienda constitucional, donde sí fue contemplado como justificación para pasar la reforma al artículo 177. La mayoría afirma que se trata del mismo contenido esencial de un instituto jurídico, pero al hacerlo la ley elimina la administración de las pensiones en el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, para otorgarla a una Junta Administradora del Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial. Es cierto, que se mantiene dentro del Poder Judicial, pero ahora en un órgano desconcentrado, lo que, evidentemente, toca una parte esencial del gobierno del Poder Judicial (artículos 152 y 156, Constitucionales).
Hay un cisma que produce afectación a la organización del Poder Judicial, si se quiere en forma lata, en la capacidad de organizarse, en el manejo y administración del fondo, para el ejercicio de los derechos de la seguridad social del personal del Poder Judicial, que vale decir, es contrario al criterio de la Corte Plena, por la forma omisa de realizar una consulta institucional, y por ignorar su opinión en contra del principio de la legalidad funcional de un Poder de la República. Recuérdese que la reforma al artículo 177, Constitucional, venía atribuida con la visión de reforzar la independencia judicial, incluida la de sus funcionarios, dentro de la cual estaría incluida la administración de fondo de pensiones. De hecho, el reconocimiento de algo tan importante, que tímidamente fue incardinado posteriormente en la Constitución Política de 1949, no llegó tan lejos para incluir -explícitamente- la irreductibilidad de los salarios de los funcionarios judiciales, como en otras latitudes, sin embargo si funcionó en nuestro país porque le permite gozar de los índices de independencia judicial que Costa Rica ha disfrutado comparativamente a nivel global, que es fruto claramente de la independencia económica del Poder Judicial. Esto ha sido en parte gracias al reconocimiento del régimen de empleo público que se fue consolidando a lo largo de la vida republicana de este país.
La Sentencia N° 1996-03575 de las 11:18 horas del 12 de julio de 1996, indicó sobre:
“… el Régimen del Empleo Público, es posible concluir que el órgano estatal competente en esta materia es cada poder de la República, dado que son estos- Ejecutivo, Legislativo, Judicial y Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones- los más capacitados para determinar sus necesidades y conocer sus particularidades condiciones”.
Por Sentencia N° 1998-005795 de las 16:12 horas del 11 de agosto de 1998, que estableció que:
“De lo dispuesto en el artículo 154 de la Constitución Política, -que dice-:
"El Poder Judicial sólo está sometido a la Constitución y a la ley, y las resoluciones que dicte en los asuntos de su competencia no le imponen otras responsabilidades que las expresamente señaladas por los preceptos legislativos" deriva el principio de la independencia del Poder Judicial, el cual comprende tanto al órgano o institución como un todo, como al Juez en el conocimiento de los asuntos que le son sometidos a su juicio. En relación con este funcionario, también debe reconocerse que existe una doble protección a su investidura, ya que la independencia del juez -como garantía de las partes involucradas en el asunto sub judice- es hacia lo externo y lo interno, en el sentido de que se le protege de las influencias e incidencias -tanto externas como internas-, que pueda tener en uno u otro sentido en la decisión de un caso concreto sometido a su conocimiento, para que fallen con estricto apego a lo dispuesto en la normativa vigente; en otros términos, se protege al juez para que ni las partes que intervienen en el proceso, terceros, jueces superiores en grado, miembros "influyentes" de los Poderes del Estado, aún el Judicial, puedan, influir en su decisión, por lo que mucho menos cabría, la obligación -impuesta por parte del superior en grado- de fallar en una determinada manera un caso concreto o coaccionar al juzgador en ese sentido.
La garantía de independecia (sic) de los jueces más que una garantía para estos funcionarios -que efectivamente si lo es-, constiuye (sic) una garantía para los particulares (partes del proceso), en el sentido de que sus casos se decidirán con apego estricto a la Constitución y las leyes”.
Por Sentencia N° 1998-005798 de las 16:21 horas del 11 de agosto de 1998, esta Sala estableció que:
“La independencia del Poder Judicial se encuentra garantizada constitucionalmente en los artículoss 9 y 154 (sic). También la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, normativa de rango internacional de aplicación directa en nuestro país se refiere al tema. La Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos establece la independencia del juez como un derecho humano, al disponer en el artículo 8.1 que:
"1.- Toda persona tiene derecho a ser oída, con las debidas garantías y dentro de un plazo razonable, por un juez o tribunal competente, independiente e imparcial, establecido con anterioridad por la ley, en la sustanciación de cualquier acusación penal formulada contra ella, o para la determinación de sus derechos y obligaciones de orden civil, laboral o de cualquier otro carácter.
La independencia del Organo (sic) Judicial se plantea hacia lo externo. El Organo (sic) Judicial es independiente frente a los otros Poderes del Estado, no así el juez cuya independencia debe ser analizada de una forma más compleja. Pero cuando se asegura que un Poder Judicial es independiente, lo mismo se debe predicar de sus jueces, pues éstos son los que deben hacer realidad la función a aquél encomendada, a esta independencia es a la que me referiré de seguido. La independencia que verdaderamente debe interesar -sin restarle importancia a la del Organo (sic) Judicial- es la del juez, relacionada con el caso concreto, pues ella es la que funciona como garantía ciudadana, en los términos de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. La independencia efectiva del Poder Judicial coadyuva a que los jueces que lo conforman también puedan serlo, pero bien puede darse que el Órgano como un todo tenga normativamente garantizada su independencia, pero que sus miembros no sean independientes, por múltiples razones”.
Esto no es poca cosa, toda vez que la organización y administración de la función judicial no solo no debe limitarse a la parte jurisdiccional como lo entiende la mayoría, sino que esta está complementada por otras funciones de organización, que le deberían ser respetadas como Poder de la República. Como se dijo línea atrás, la enmienda a la Constitución Política contempló no solo los aspectos jurisdiccionales, también operativos del Poder Judicial, por lo que estaría contemplado por el Constituyente originario en el artículo 167, porque desde el seno de la Corte Plena en 1956, y en la Asamblea Legislativa de 1957, adoptó desde esa época fundacional de la Segunda República, responder a las necesidades de los funcionarios en sus salarios y régimen previsional, un precepto toral para la democracia costarricense.
Es evidente, que el Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Poder Judicial formaba parte esencial de la independencia económica del Poder Judicial de aquella época, y debe seguir siendo en la nuestra, según la doctrina del desarrollo progresivo, evolutivo y no regresivo de los derechos sociales. El Constituyente derivado, al acoger la visión de la Corte Plena, tomó un paso decisivo para receptar la gestión de forma independiente y autónoma del resto de los poderes políticos, lo que a su vez, permitió que dicha gestión y gobierno se hiciera dentro de los fines legales y constitucionales de la administración de justicia. Tampoco se puede afirmar, como lo dice la mayoría, que el reconocimiento del porcentaje constitucional del 6% haya sido llano y sin problema alguno; por el contrario, lo propio de ello es que la relación entre poderes ha sido pedregoso, áspero, abrupto, de modo que todo presupuesto se ha obtenido con gran esfuerzo o negociación oportuna de los representantes y autoridades del Poder Judicial.
De hecho que el Constituyente previó tal posibilidad de negociación y consideración al establecer una segunda posibilidad de las rentas adicionales para los planes de inversión, entre otras cosas. El artículo 177, de la Constitución Política, con el 6% de los ingresos ordinarios del ejercicio económico de la República es un aspecto que ha servido de estímulo para el legislador para utilizar la órbita del Poder Judicial como un factor agregador de instituciones administrativas ajenas a la función judicial. Precisamente, la Sentencia N° 2006-07965 de las 16:58 horas del 31 de mayo de 2006, antes citada, termina con la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de normas del Código Notarial, por establecer un órgano de naturaleza administrativa como la Dirección de Notariado dentro del Poder Judicial con violación a los principios constitucionales de separación de funciones, reserva o exclusividad de jurisdicción, independencia y autonomía financiera del Poder Judicial, y el derecho a una justicia pronta y cumplida de los habitantes de la República.
En continuidad con la Sentencia N° 2017-09551 de las 11:40 horas del 21 de junio del 2017, se indicó también que:
“Por todo ello debemos reconocer que con el objeto de organizar racionalmente el trabajo, con eficacia, eficiencia, simplicidad y celeridad, toda función primaria debe estar acompañada de las otras funciones -no primarias del órgano constitucional-, y estar alineadas hacia la función primaria; es así como debe reconocerse que, tanto las funciones legislativas como las judiciales requieren de una estructura administrativa de apoyo para la consecución de su función esencial o primaria, como lo es la función administrativa que le ayuda a canalizar toda su actividad; la que, lógicamente, alcanza al recurso humano o del personal de los Poderes de la República, entretanto, detrás de la función fundamental está la administrativa del personal, agentes y servidores (as) públicos (as), etc. Evidentemente, en el contexto costarricense sería un serio contrasentido transitar en contra de una larga tradición legislativa de confiar las atribuciones a un único Poder (que en otras latitudes no existe), pero pensando en garantizar esos controles horizontales en un Poder Judicial independiente”.
Entonces, si lo relacionado a las pensiones y jubilaciones del Poder Judicial fueron incluidos como parte de esa independencia económica del Poder Judicial como tema de fondo desde 1956, es para los suscritos una razón adicional para procurar la aplicación del artículo 167, de la Constitución Política, pues el cambio de esquema para una desconcentración del órgano administrador se vino a modificar por una ley posterior. Esto abre el mal antecedente de que, en el futuro, mayorías transitorias en la Asamblea Legislativa incursionen en otros aspectos del manejo del personal del Poder Judicial.
Otra razón es que una mayoría reforzada garantiza no solo la independencia judicial desde el punto de vista institucional, sino para la persona del juez y jueza individualmente considerado, en el que se afectan los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales, establecidos a través de un régimen de la seguridad social y previsional. No se puede negar que el Poder Judicial forma parte de un todo, el “Estado”, también se debe hacer sentir su posición estratégica y clave dentro de su organización, con las funciones públicas de sus funcionarios que son altamente especializadas y apegadas al Derecho, según se describía antes en los antecedentes de este Tribunal, y cuya función es última en la solución de los conflictos y como pacificador de ellos. Esto claramente tiene un costo y sacrificio para su personal, que debe ser compensado por el “Estado”, pero más en una democracia funcional como la costarricense, que debe asumir no sólo la parte económica de su sostenimiento, sino de su protección.
La independencia judicial tiene como fin garantizar la imparcialidad judicial, lo que se comparte con la mayoría del Tribunal, aunque no con la claridad que desearía esta minoría, toda vez que el problema de la reforma al artículo 177, de la Constitución Política, cristalizó la necesidad muy sentida de proteger en términos generales la institucionalidad y la administración -también- de todo lo relativo al personal del Poder Judicial, lo cual debería ser resguardado celosamente, y de las cuales no puede dispensarse la oposición jurídica de la cabeza del Poder Judicial, de frente a los efectos regresivos de la legislación que se puedan producir en un futuro. Se debe traer a colación, la regla constante de la importancia de proteger la parte de la remuneración y lo relativo al régimen de pensiones de los jueces y juezas, de sus funcionarios, en ordenamientos jurídicos más importantes del mundo.
De este modo, los suscritos magistrados consideramos que la Ley N° 9544 del 24 de abril de 2018, contiene vicios esenciales en el procedimiento legislativo que lo afectan en su totalidad, consistente en la falta de consulta al Poder Judicial del texto aprobado por el Parlamento por mayoría absoluta y no calificada, que lo afecta en su totalidad (artículo 167, de la Constitución Política), por afectar su organización, estructura, funcionamiento e independencia; y, con ello, es contrario al Derecho de la Constitución. En razón de lo anterior, resulta inconducente -para los suscritos juzgadores- entrar a analizar el resto de los alegatos de fondo formulados por los accionantes contra el contenido sustancial de la ley, salvo en aquellos supuestos en los que se requirió tomar posición para que existiera voto de toda conformidad (artículo 60.2, del Código Procesal Civil), lo cual está reflejado en la sentencia de la mayoría de esta Sala”.
De este modo, los suscritos magistrados Cruz Castro, Salazar Alvarado y Garita Navarro, dejamos consignado nuestras razones adicionales.- F.-) Sobre la utilización del artículo 208 bis (234 bis actual) como un vicio de procedimiento Además de los vicios de procedimiento señalados en voto salvado indicado en el anterior considerando, he considerado que además, la aplicación del art.208 bis (234 bis actual) del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, a la ley impugnada en esta acción, la hace inconstitucional.
En el mismo sentido en que lo he expresado mediante el voto número 2011-015749 de las 09:32 horas del 16 de noviembre del 2011 (con base en las consideraciones dadas en las sentencias No. 2005-398, 2007-2901 y 2008-7687), y el voto número 2012-004151 de las 16 horas del 27 de marzo del 2012, he disentido del criterio de la mayoría porque estimo que el artículo 208 bis del reglamento legislativo, lesiona la Constitución Política, toda vez que la la posibilidad de aplicar un procedimiento especial, ad hoc, a un proyecto de ley, infringe el principio de seguridad jurídica, el derecho de participación política, representación, así como el principio democrático y el derecho de enmienda.
“Aceptar la posibilidad que la Asamblea aplique procedimientos especiales a la tramitación de reformas a su Reglamento y proyectos de ley, en los términos establecidos en el artículo 208 bis, sin que de previo se definieran las reglas del procedimiento a seguir, constituye una clara lesión al principio de seguridad jurídica y al principio democrático, pues esta sería la única forma en que los diputados conocieran previamente y con suficiente antelación el procedimiento al cual se iban a sujetar y así ejercer los mecanismo de participación y control correspondientes. He señalado que, si el legislador no establecía de manera clara las reglas procedimentales para aplicar lo pretendido en el artículo 208 bis, omitiendo establecer regulaciones o prácticas legislativas, incurría en una evasión o incumplimiento de sus deberes constitucionalmente asignados. El artículo 208 bis, en los términos en que está redactado, supone que cada vez que las mayorías lo decidan pueden, como ya está sucediendo, por vía de moción de orden, darle un trámite de excepción al proyecto de ley que se tramite y su discusión quedaría a la luz de procedimientos no establecidos en el Reglamento, es decir, en medio de una situación de inseguridad jurídica.
Dejar al arbitrio de una mayoría el procedimiento que se quiera aplicar en cada caso concreto, sin que de antemano sea puesto en conocimiento de la totalidad de los miembros del Parlamento, causa una lesión al principio democrático en perjuicio de las minorías, en el tanto nada garantiza que bajo el panorama propuesto las minorías no se vean afectadas en cuanto al ejercicio de los derechos constitucionales de sus representantes en el Congreso.
Lo sucedido en el procedimiento aprobado para conocer el proyecto consultado, es un claro ejemplo de lo ya señalado, ya que por tratarse de una moción de orden, en principio, no requiere ser publicitada con suficiente antelación, independientemente de su complejidad. Tampoco proceden las mociones para modificarla, ya que tendría que tratarse de una propuesta nueva, para lo cual las otras fracciones cuentan con un tiempo sumamente corto, casi inmediato y una vez aprobada la moción por las mayorías, no tiene otra opción que sujetarse a la limitada participación que se les concedió en el procedimiento creado. También he considerado en esta hipótesis, que se conculca el derecho de enmienda.
Todo diputado ostenta el derecho constitucional de participar en el proceso de formación de la ley, y así, influir en el contenido definitivo de ésta. Ciertamente la Asamblea Legislativa tiene potestad para disponer su reglamentación, como lo sería establecer procedimientos especiales, sin embargo, la forma en que se están autorizando resulta lesiva del principio de seguridad jurídica, el derecho de participación política, el de representación, así como el principio democrático y el derecho de enmienda de los diputados, en el tanto la omisión de reglamentar dichos procedimientos con la antelación y la participación necesaria por parte de todos los diputados hace nugatorios los mismos. A mayor abundamiento se transcribe el voto salvado que he suscrito en la sentencia mencionada, del año 2012:
“IX.-VOTO SALVADO DE LA MAGISTRADA CALZADA Y LOS MAGISTRADOS ARMIJO Y CRUZ, CON REDACCION DEL SEGUNDO. La inconstitucionalidad el artículo 208 bis del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, así como su aplicación a diversos procedimientos legislativos, ha sido objeto de reiterados cuestionamientos ante esta Sala, en los cuales esta Sala, por mayoría, ha considerado su conformidad con la Constitución, a partir de la sentencia 2008-7687, adoptada con el voto salvado de la Magistrada Calzada, el Magistrado Cruz y el magistrado Armijo, que reiteramos en esta ocasión y declaramos con lugar la acción por las siguientes razones:
Como punto de partida, es preciso reiterar lo expresado por esta Sala en la sentencia número 2011-04778 de catorce horas treinta y un minutos del trece de abril de dos mil once, en cuanto a la naturaleza del Derecho Parlamentario y los límites de la competencia de la Sala en materia de procedimiento legislativo:
“Naturaleza del Derecho Parlamentario y límites a la competencia de la Sala en materia de procedimiento legislativo. La misión fundamental de los parlamentos es la de adoptar decisiones con la participación del conjunto de fuerzas políticas que representan los diversos sectores de la sociedad civil. El derecho parlamentario cumple una función instrumental a ese fin -aunque tiene también una función política-, de facilitar y ordenar ese proceso. Este derecho tiene la característica de que surge producto de la “interna corporis”, de la capacidad de autonormatividad y dinámica propia de los parlamentos. En ese sentido no es un derecho que se crea premeditadamente, sino que se descubre, que nace de la práctica, por lo tanto el aspecto consuetudinario (la costumbre) e interpretador tienen gran importancia. En ese sentido, la potestad de autogobierno de los Parlamentos tiene una sólida tradición y justificación histórica.
El derecho parlamentario se caracteriza por ser espontáneo, dinámico y flexible. Se nutre de la cotidianeidad, de la realidad política en que opera y donde se producen transformaciones constantes que hacen necesarias respuestas normativas, muchas veces contrarias a los dogmas clásicos de otras ramas jurídicas, como es el caso por ejemplo, del principio de inderogabilidad singular del reglamento, que tiene un tratamiento distinto al del derecho administrativo, y cede –en algunas ocasiones- en el ámbito parlamentario a la dinamicidad que exigen los procedimientos parlamentarios. Su límite, desde luego, está en la Constitución, en los principios y valores del régimen ideológico en el que opera. Por esa razón esta Sala ha reconocido que su función en materia de procedimiento legislativo es únicamente la de declarar, aquellos vicios sustanciales, que violen los principios y valores constitucionales aplicables a la materia, pues de lo contrario estaría afectando la capacidad autonormativa y funcional del parlamento (interna corporis), distorsionando su papel de guardián de la supremacía constitucional, por el de una especie de senado Ad hoc (sentencia número 2007-9699, de las diez horas del cuatro de julio de dos mil siete). De esta forma, como lo señaló este Tribunal en la sentencia 2005-07961, de las diecisiete horas cincuenta minutos del veintiuno de junio de dos mil cinco:
“La autodeterminación del Parlamento sobre su accionar interno -reconocida en forma reiterada por este Tribunal-, "interna corporis", es una de sus potestades esenciales expresamente reconocida por la Constitución Política en su artículo 121 inciso 22), y que resulta consustancial al sistema democrático. El objeto perseguido con la atribución de la competencia para autoorganizarse de la Asamblea, es la de que por su medio sean regulados sus procedimientos de actuación, organización y funcionamiento y en consecuencia su organización interna dentro de los parámetros que exigen los principios, democrático, de igualdad y no discriminación, con todos sus derivados. Esta potestad se desarrolla con absoluta independencia de los otros órganos del Estado –en virtud del principio establecido en el artículo 9 de la Carta Fundamental-, y tiene como límites: el acatamiento del Derecho de la Constitución, es decir, al conjunto de valores, principios y normas constitucionales, dentro de los que están los mencionados supra, el respeto a los principios de razonabilidad, racionabilidad y proporcionalidad, de tal forma que quienes ejerzan potestades públicas no pueden por acción, omisión o simple actuación material no fundada en un acto administrativo eficaz, violentar o amenazar los derechos fundamentales, toda vez que en un Estado democrático existe una constitución de la libertad, cuyo objeto es garantizarle al individuo el disfrute y goce pleno de los derechos humanos los que se encuentran actualmente reconocidos en las Constituciones Políticas de la mayoría de los países y en los tratados internacionales de derechos humanos (Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos).
No es legítimo entonces, utilizar las potestades para otros fines no asignados por el ordenamiento jurídico (vicio de desviación de poder) igual o más allá de lo razonable (vicio de exceso de poder). Dicho lo anterior, estima la Sala que no debe interferir con el derecho de autorregulación del Parlamento, salvo que, según se expuso, se viole alguno de los principios señalados, que en este caso concreto, implicarían la afectación del derecho de enmienda, entendido como el mecanismo de participación que tienen los diputados para influir durante el proceso formativo de la ley. De esta forma, las potestades de la Sala en esta materia son ejercidas bajo la perspectiva de un árbitro, que modera y contiene excesos pero no interfiere con una potestad constitucional intrínseca otorgada a otro órgano constitucional, de modo que sólo frente a violaciones evidentes o groseras, de los principios constitucionales que rigen el derecho parlamentario, sería legítima su intervención.
El parlamento tiene derecho en ejercicio de su propia potestad de autorregulación, de conciliar o equilibrar, frente a situaciones concretas, no sólo el derecho de enmienda, sino también los otros principios de rango constitucional que también vinculan su actuar, como el de respeto a las mayorías y el de razonabilidad, es decir, que la armonización de todos y cada uno de los principios constitucionales que deben coexistir durante el procedimiento legislativo, es una competencia propia del Parlamento y concretamente del Director del debate y de los diputados, y cabe suponer que tales funciones se realizan con apego al ordenamiento y sus principios […]”. (El resaldado no es del original).
Dicha sentencia enfatiza que la intervención de la Sala en materia de procedimiento legislativo, conforme a lo señalado, sólo debe darse:
“[…] en caso de la utilización de estas potestades con evidente abuso de poder, que resulte en la anulación de un derecho y no en su armonización con el resto de los principios constitucionales del derecho parlamentario [...] Lo contrario implicaría a nuestro juicio un irrespeto a la potestad de autorregulación y al principio democrático. No debe entonces la Sala constituirse en una instancia de sustitución del ejercicio de potestades constitucionales y del debate y diálogo político, salvo que, como se indicó… se suprima, o anule el contenido de algún derecho fundamental.” El principio democrático. Nuestro voto minoritario da la razón al accionante, por los mismos fundamentos ya expresados en los votos salvados a la sentencias número 2005-398, 2008-07687 y 2007-2901 de 17:30 hrs. de 28 de febrero de 2007, partiendo del principio democrático, cuyo respeto resulta esencial para cualquier examen de la conformidad o disconformidad con la Constitución, de cualquier norma o acto. Sobre el particular, esta Sala ha expresado, en forma unánime, que:
“lo que el procedimiento legislativo pretende es asegurar el cumplimiento del principio democrático dentro de una sociedad que lo ha adoptado como propio de sus instituciones políticas. Por ser la democracia perfecta un ideal inalcanzable, el principio democrático se constituye en el parámetro que permite deducir el grado de proximidad que alcanza una determinada sociedad, en un momento histórico determinado, respecto del ideal y de su vocación, por acercarse al máximo posible al mismo. Como mínimo, el principio democrático exige respeto de los principios de participación y representación política –incluyendo todo lo que concierne al respeto de las minorías - base de nuestro sistema político. Este último se desdobla en aspectos tales como la legitimidad de los medios empleados para la designación de los diversos representantes y – no menos importante -, la posibilidad de oponerse, mediante el uso de medios legítimos, a la voluntad mayoritaria por parte de los grupos que representan las minorías.
A partir de las anteriores observaciones, puede decirse que son inconstitucionales las violaciones del procedimiento que constituyan lesiones al principio democrático, dirección ineludible de la actividad parlamentaria. Asimismo, constituyen infracciones sustanciales, los trámites legislativos que por acelerados o impetuosos, provoquen debates que quedan ayunos de un proceso reposado en calidad y reflexión, que además, adolezca de una amplia proyección de la actividad legislativa, tal como lo garantiza el artículo 117 de la Constitución Política. Además, se han considerado vicios sustanciales del procedimiento, la omisión de publicación y la omisión de realizar las consultas obligatorias establecidas constitucionalmente. En cuanto al primer aspecto, al ser la Asamblea Legislativa un órgano representativo de la comunidad nacional, la publicidad de los procedimientos parlamentarios es esencial, pues la soberanía reside en el pueblo y los diputados solamente son sus representantes (artículo 105 constitucional), por ello su actividad debe, necesariamente, trascender a toda la comunidad, a tal punto que algunos especialistas en Derecho constitucional lo definen como un órgano de publicidad” (sentencia número 2012002675 de once horas y cincuenta y dos minutos del veinticuatro de febrero del dos mil doce).- Costa Rica es una democracia representativa, lo cual no implica que los gobernantes de un determinado momento histórico, puedan tomar sus decisiones, sin escuchar la voz de quien les ha dado tal mandato, es decir, la voluntad del pueblo como poder soberano.
Valga esta aclaración, puesto que al no existir un mecanismo que se hubiere utilizado para intuir la voluntad ciudadana, el único mecanismo posible en una democracia, es abrir las puertas del diálogo, de la discusión pausada, reposada, con apertura, pues de lo contrario, correríamos el riesgo de caer en una “tiranía democrática”, violando de forma grosera el principio democrático, que es el que garantiza a los habitantes de nuestro país que los intereses de la Nación serán resguardados con celo y para el bien de todos. Es menester indicar, para los efectos de este razonamiento, que una cosa es una reforma del Reglamento, que busca ordenar y ajustar a los tiempos (bipartidismo-multipatidismo) en su quehacer cotidiano, para que el Poder Legislativo sea más efectivo en la regulación de las situaciones que acontecen en el país, y otra, generar reformas a un artículo específico, para la tramitación de un caso concreto.
Nuestra Carta Fundamental no regula la forma en que debe ser reformado el reglamento la Asamblea Legislativa, por lo que este mismo texto normativo es el que ha tenido que ir reglamentando los procedimientos que se han estimado convenientes y acordes con el Derecho de la Constitución, lo que resulta esencial para garantizar la seguridad jurídica, el derecho de representación y la tutela del principio democrático dentro del procedimiento legislativo. Resulta indiscutible la potestad que tiene ese órgano para dictar las normas de su interna corporis, prevista no solo en la carta Fundamental en el inciso 22) del artículo 121, sino también consustancial al sistema democrático y específico de la Asamblea Legislativa como poder constitucional. Por ende, también la Sala ha reconocido esta potestad autorreguladora y por ello, desde esa perspectiva, se ha considerado, claramente, que el Parlamento tiene potestad para establecer procedimientos especiales, si a bien lo tiene, pero que éstos deben ser definidos de manera expresa y detallada, ya que, de lo contrario, aceptar la posibilidad de que la Asamblea aplique procedimientos especiales a la tramitación de reformas a su Reglamento y proyectos de ley, en los términos establecidos en el artículo 208 bis, sin que de previo se definan las reglas del procedimiento a seguir, constituye una clara lesión al principio de seguridad jurídica y al principio democrático, pues según el criterio externado, es la única forma en que los diputados conozcan previamente y con suficiente antelación el procedimiento al cual se van a sujetar y así ejercer los mecanismos de participación y control correspondientes.
Seguridad jurídica. Si el legislador no establecía de manera clara las reglas procedimentales para aplicar lo pretendido en el artículo 208 bis, u olvidaba establecer regulaciones o prácticas legislativas, incurría en una evasión o incumplimiento de sus deberes constitucionalmente asignados. La introducción de la norma citada al Reglamento, en los términos en que se aprobó, supone que cada vez que las mayorías lo decidan pueden, como ya está sucediendo, por vía de moción de orden, darle un trámite de excepción al proyecto de ley que se tramite y su discusión queda a la luz de procedimientos no establecidos en el Reglamento, es decir, en medio de una situación de inseguridad jurídica.
Principio de publicidad. Respecto del principio de publicidad, como bien se indicó en el voto de mayoría, el procedimiento se crea mediante una moción de orden, las cuales, según el artículo 153 del Reglamento, pueden ser presentadas en cualquier momento del debate, procediendo a su discusión inmediatamente. No requieren ser anunciadas más que en el mismo momento, lo que resulta insuficiente para que sea revisado previamente a su adopción por parte de los diputados. Es por eso, que dejar al arbitrio de una mayoría el procedimiento que se quiera aplicar en cada caso concreto, sin que de antemano sea puesto en conocimiento de la totalidad de los miembros del Parlamento, causa una lesión al principio democrático en perjuicio de las minorías, en el tanto nada garantiza que bajo el régimen y aplicación del artículo 208 bis del Reglamento Legislativo, las minorías no se vean afectadas en cuanto al ejercicio de los derechos constitucionales de sus representantes en el Congreso. Una vez aprobada la moción por las mayorías, las fracciones minoritarias no tienen otra opción que sujetarse a la limitada participación que se les concedió en el procedimiento creado.
Restricción irrazonable del derecho de enmienda y otros. Todo diputado ostenta el derecho constitucional de participar en el proceso de formación de la ley, y así, influir en el contenido definitivo de ésta. Aunque se reconoce la potestad que tiene la Asamblea Legislativa para disponer su reglamentación, como lo sería establecer procedimientos especiales, sin embargo, la forma en que lo autoriza resulta lesiva del principio de seguridad jurídica, el derecho de participación política, el de representación, así como el principio democrático y el derecho de enmienda de los diputados, en el tanto la omisión de reglamentar dichos procedimientos con la antelación y la participación necesaria por parte de todos los diputados hace nugatorios los mismos.
En síntesis, el artículo 208 bis del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, constituye un elemento de ruptura total con los principios señalados y permite que, mediante una moción aprobada por dos tercios de los diputados, el Poder Legislativo pueda atentar contra su condición de órgano que garantiza la representación popular, según el diseño estructurado el Título Noveno de la Constitución Política de 1949, en detrimento sustancial del principio democrático.- Los suscritos son conscientes de las implicaciones de la anulación de esa norma, mediante la cual se han aprobado numerosas leyes, algunas de especial trascendencia para el país. Sin embargo, como la aplicación de esa norma procedimental se ha realizado al amparo de una práctica constitucionalmente consolidada por efecto de la propia jurisprudencia de esta Sala, resulta procedente aplicar, al presente caso, la eficacia “ex nunc” de la estimatoria, en virtud de la doctrina expresada en la sentencia 1-92 de 14:00 hrs. de 7 de enero de 1992, y repetida en la sentencia 2-92, de 14:15 hrs. del mismo día, en el sentido de que:
"...la interpretación que a partir de la citada resolución da la Sala al artículo 195 incisos 4 y 7 de la Constitución Política, en su función de intérprete de la Carta Fundamental y a cuyos precedentes y jurisprudencia se les reconoce fuerza vinculante "erga omnes", no genera "per se" la inconstitucionalidad de las demás reformas aprobadas con anterioridad a esa sentencia y que no hubiesen obtenido mayoría calificada en los tres debates de las dos legislaturas. Por el contrario, todas ellas se incorporaron a la Carta Fundamental al amparo de una práctica constitucional consolidada, desde la decisión no impugnada del Presidente en sesión del 29 de octubre de 1962, que debe entenderse corregida a partir de la nueva interpretación establecida por la Sala, por lo que sus efectos se circunscriben exclusivamente a las que se produzcan en el futuro, pero nunca entender que por su medio pueden ser afectadas otras anteriores, pues de ser así se violentaría el principio de "seguridad jurídica".
Por consiguiente, los criterios correctivos que en materia de reformas constitucionales emita esta Sala en ejercicio del control preventivo de constitucionalidad, deben entenderse con efectos ex nunc y no ex tunc, todo ello dentro de la filosofía que recoge la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en el capítulo referente a las consultas legislativas de constitucionalidad y el principio de seguridad jurídica, antes referido".
Aunque el anterior criterio ha sido sostenido por la Sala con relación a criterios correctivos en materia de reformas constitucionales emitidas en el ejercicio del control previo de constitucionalidad, no solamente es válido, sino necesario, aplicarlo al presente caso, ya no en el ejercicio del control consultivo, sino en un caso contencioso, por dos razones: la primera, porque en virtud de que la Constitución y, derivada de ella, la jurisprudencia de la Sala, son el fundamento y raíz de la seguridad jurídica, tanto para los Poderes Supremos como para todos los entes públicos, los particulares e incluso, para terceros Estados mediante la adopción de acuerdos y tratados, cuando el Poder Legislativo ha adoptado acuerdos y aprobado leyes mediante la aplicación de reglas de procedimiento constitucionalmente válidas en el momento de su aplicación y con el respaldo del Tribunal Constitucional, se derrumbaría la seguridad jurídica si en casos como el presente, al invertirse la prevalencia de un criterio sobre la constitucionalidad de una norma procedimental aplicada de buena fe por el Poder Legislativo, en forma reiterada, a lo largo del tiempo, tuviera un efecto ex tunc, como en principio lo suelen tener las declaratorias de inconstitucionalidad de normas sustantivas, incluso de las propias reformas constitucionales.
En segundo lugar, el párrafo segundo del artículo 91 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional prevé que: “La sentencia constitucional de anulación podrá graduar y dimensionar en el espacio, el tiempo o la materia, su efecto retroactivo, y dictará las reglas necesarias para evitar que éste produzca graves dislocaciones de la seguridad, la justicia o la paz sociales”, por lo que en este caso resulta necesario, a fin de evitar esas graves dislocaciones, dimensionar los efectos de la estimatoria, potestad de la cual ya ha hecho uso esta Sala en diversas ocasiones (v. por ejemplo, la sentencia número 01698-12 de doce horas doce minutos del cinco de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, 3410-92 de catorce horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del diez de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y dos y 2010-021258 de catorce horas del veintidós de diciembre de dos mil diez.). Por lo anterior, no ha lugar a la pretensión de los diputados Manrique Oviedo, Jeannette Ruiz, Ana Eugenia Venegas y Gustavo Arias Navarro para que, en el evento de que se declare inconstitucional el artículo 208 bis del Reglamento Legislativo, se declaren inconstitucionales todas las leyes aprobadas mediante el procedimiento especial previsto en esa norma sino que se dimensionan los efectos de la sentencia en el sentido de que la inconstitucionalidad no afecta, en este caso, las leyes y acuerdos aprobados mediante procedimientos realizados en aplicación de la norma impugnada, salvo aquellos procedimientos legislativos que no han sido aprobados en primero ni en segundo debate a la fecha de publicación del aviso respectivo.-“ Así entonces, siendo que he considerado que el artículo 208 bis del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa es inconstitucional, se deriva de ello que también lo sería, por la forma, los proyectos de ley que se hayan aprobado en aplicación de dicha norma, tal como sucede con la ley impugnada.
En conclusión.- Conforme a las razones de procedimiento indicadas (violación al principio de razonabilidad técnica) y en las razones adicionales de procedimiento (violación al artículo 167 constitucional, al principio de independencia judicial y por utilización del procedimiento abreviado) considero que el plazo breve establecido en la norma impugnada es violatorio del derecho a obtener una pensión digna, proporcional y razonable, del principio de igualdad, del principio de progresividad de los derechos sociales, del principio de confianza legítima y de situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, además de normativa internacional.
Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.
Por tanto:
Por mayoría se declaran SIN lugar las acciones acumuladas. El magistrado Cruz Castro salva el voto, declara con lugar la acción y considera que para ser conforme al Derecho de la Constitución el régimen transitorio debió haber cubierto a los servidores judiciales que contaran con veinte años o más de servicio en el Poder Judicial. Los magistrados Salazar Alvarado y Picado Brenes salvan el voto y declaran parcialmente con lugar la acción, al estimar que existe una omisión inconstitucional de no atender un transitorio de veinticuatro meses conforme a los antecedentes actuariales.- Fernando Castillo V.
Fernando Cruz C. Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G. Aracelly Pacheco S.
Alejandro Delgado F. Ana María Picado B.
Voto salvado del magistrado Salazar Alvarado y de la magistrada Picado Brenes.
Con el debido respeto, suscribimos este voto salvado y nos separamos del voto de mayoría, con los siguientes argumentos:
A.- Sobre la referencia al procedimiento legislativo seguido en la Ley N° 9544, en cuanto a la falta de consulta al Poder Judicial y a la omisión de consulta institucional del artículo 167, de la Constitución Política, así como del artículo 208 bis, del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa.
Sobre estos puntos, consideramos innecesario repetir los argumentos, en cuanto al procedimiento legislativo seguido a la Ley N° 9544 del 24 de abril de 2018, que fueron abordados en la Sentencia N° 2018-005758 de las 15:40 horas del 12 de abril de 2018 (voto salvado de los magistrados Cruz Castro, Salazar Alvarado y Hernández Gutiérrez), reiterado en la Sentencia N° 2021-11957, de las 17:00 horas del 25 de mayo de 2021 (voto salvado de los magistrados Salazar Alvarado y Hernández Gutiérrez). De igual manera, esos argumentos ya constan en el expediente, específicamente en la resolución interlocutoria N° 2022-008712 de las 9:10 horas del 20 de abril de 2022, por lo que hacemos remisión a las razones ahí debidamente expresadas y consignadas. Sin embargo, para una mejor comprensión, dejamos como epítome de esas sentencias, que el vicio de procedimiento afectaba al Proyecto de Ley N° 19.922, respecto a la violación del artículo 167, de la Constitución Política; y, en consecuencia, en su totalidad la Ley N° 9544, y que, solo era necesario la toma de una posición para que existiera voto de toda conformidad (artículo 60.2, Código Procesal Civil).
Así, por el fondo, abordamos lo relacionado a la omisión del legislador de no haber tomado en cuenta los factores de tiempo servido, género y edad, para la asignación diferenciada de pensión entre hombre y mujer, y la desestimación de esos reclamos por la ausencia de estudios técnicos en el contexto concreto costarricense.
B.- El problema de la razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.
Desde el punto de vista del Derecho Constitucional, es claro que toda legislación que apruebe la Asamblea Legislativa debe estar amparada al Estado Social de Derecho. Asumir lo contrario implicaría aceptar que el aparato estatal estaría autorizado y legitimado para adoptar medidas injustas y arbitrarias, que por definición serían contrarias a los derechos fundamentales y al bien común. Afortunadamente, por jerarquía del Derecho de la Constitución, su normativa, por la potencia y resistencia de normas superiores del ordenamiento jurídico, son exigibles y esto tiene implicaciones formales en el proceso de formación del derecho, y materialmente resguardando el contenido de los derechos fundamentales. Es así, que la conformidad de todas las actuaciones del poder público (leyes y actos públicos en general) requieren estar en conformidad con la ideología de la Constitución Política, y las obligaciones vinculantes de la normativa internacional sobre derechos humanos, incluida aquella legislación internacional laboral, y los principios generales del Derecho Internacional.
El problema que se endilga al Transitorio impugnado es si carece de fundamento técnico que respalde el plazo de dieciocho meses otorgado para la aplicación de la nueva reforma, lo que involucra la razonabilidad técnica de la norma en cuanto a la proporcionalidad entre el medio utilizado y el fin buscado con la norma, dentro del contexto de regímenes de pensiones.
En efecto, para lo anterior, debemos traer a colación, el dictamen de esta Sala Constitucional, N° 2017-0011714 de las 12:00 horas del 26 de julio de 2017, en cuanto analizó un proyecto de ley que permitía el traslado de personas aseguradas bajo el Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte administrado por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social al Magisterio Nacional; y, en esa ocasión, se estableció que:
“En esta materia, es menester que la Asamblea Legislativa cuente con estudios técnicos que demuestren que la entrada en vigencia de la Ley no afectará la sostenibilidad financiera del régimen de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, máxime en la situación actual, donde se ha cuestionado su sostenibilidad, tal y como ha sido de conocimiento de la opinión pública. A falta de estudios técnicos en esta dirección, y teniendo por demostrado que el proyecto de ley conlleva una afectación a la Reserva del régimen, no cabe duda que se ha producido una vulneración al numeral 73 constitucional. Muy distinta sería la situación si existieran los estudios técnicos, pues en caso de que se demuestre la no afectación a la sostenibilidad financiera del régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte, el legislador, constitucionalmente hablando, no tendría impedimento para ejercer la potestad de legislar. Como es bien sabido, este Tribunal ha exigido en materia ambiental la necesidad de que haya estudios técnicos para reducir áreas protegidas, y ha concluido que esta omisión constituye un vicio de carácter esencial en el procedimiento legislativo (véase la opinión consultiva n.° 2012-13367).
Siguiendo esa misma doctrina, se evacua la consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad, en el sentido que el Proyecto de Ley denominado: "Reforma del Sistema de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Magisterio Nacional", expediente legislativo número 17.561, es inconstitucional por violación al artículo 73 de la Constitución Política, toda vez que carece de un estudio que determine técnica y científicamente cuál es el impacto real sobre la Reserva del régimen del Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, vicio que es de carácter esencial del procedimiento legislativo”.
Aunado a la interpretación dada por la Sala, estimamos que es importante agregar, al anterior razonamiento, que hay obligaciones internacionales concretas que obligan al país a sustentar técnicamente los cambios y reformas que afecten los regímenes de pensiones. En este sentido, los estudios técnicos son imprescindibles para demostrar que los medios utilizados son adecuados a los fines legales propuestos, sin desamparar a las personas que pudieran mantener sus derechos y expectativas legítimas.
Cuando se procura una modificación o reforma legal a un régimen de pensiones, lógicamente esta gira alrededor del interés de buscar un impacto positivo en el fondo y sus prestaciones. Pero, como sucedió con el caso anteriormente transcrito, la ausencia de un estudio técnico actuarial fue manifiesto y evidente, lo que afectó la determinación del “… impacto real sobre la Reserva del régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte, vicio que es de carácter esencial del procedimiento legislativo”. Es claro, que cuando el Estado Social de Derecho debe ejercer la iniciativa para la reforma de un régimen de pensiones, el fundamento toral es el equilibrio financiero, como está establecido en la legislación internacional, lo que se abordará en adelante. En este sentido, al eliminar los riesgos se debe demostrar que habrá un impacto positivo en la reserva, para garantizar sustentabilidad y equilibrio financiero, y la concesión futura de los derechos prestacionales. Así, corresponde al estudio técnico marcar los derroteros para sustentar las medidas que debe tomar la legislación para que una reforma sea adecuada para sustentar actuales y futuras prestaciones.
Por Sentencia N° 2020-19274 de las 16:30 horas del 7 de octubre de 2020, la Sala tuvo oportunidad para asignar la fuerza normativa del artículo 71, del Convenio N° 102, de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, en la distribución de cotizaciones e impuestos, así como en la contribución patronal y estatal, y sostuvo que:
“… el derecho a la seguridad social a nivel internacional se debe caracterizar porque se compone de un nivel mínimo de prestaciones que comprendan al menos una atención básica de la salud, prestaciones pecuniarias de enfermedad, de desempleo, prestaciones de vejez, en caso de accidente del trabajo y enfermedades profesionales, prestaciones familiares, prestaciones de maternidad, de invalidez y de supervivencia, todo esto de conformidad con el Convenio N° 102, de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo. El derecho a la seguridad social y a la protección social se refiere al derecho a que no se pueda denegar la cobertura de la seguridad social, de manera arbitraria o no razonable, y el derecho a la igualdad en el disfrute de la adecuada protección en caso de desempleo, enfermedad, vejez o falta de medios de subsistencia, en circunstancias que escapan al control de la persona”.
Además, se indicó que:
“… el Convenio constituye un marco obligatorio de referencia para los Estados; es decir, contiene disposiciones que son la base de las regulaciones que posteriormente pueden aprobar según los diferentes tipos de coberturas a las que se obligaron. No está demás, como se ha indicado en otras ocasiones, que los Estados pueden mejorar esos estándares. Apegado a ese marco regulatorio, la Parte XIII del mencionado Convenio, contempla otras “Disposiciones Comunes” a las coberturas ofrecidas a los asegurados, entre ellas las causas de suspensión, la posibilidad de discutir judicialmente lo referido a los derechos involucrados, así como las reglas que gobiernan en general la administración. Lo que quiere decir que son reglas que amalgaman y unen algunos aspectos de las coberturas; y, en consecuencia, deben considerarse en conjunto algunos de los aspectos administrativos.
De este modo, contiene dos principios torales, el principio de la solidaridad financiera (financiación colectiva y solidaridad financiera en documentos de la Organización Internacional de Trabajo) y el principio de la responsabilidad del Estado, donde el primero enuncia la obligación contenida en el inciso 1), del artículo 71, del Convenio N° 102 indicado (…).
(…) el principio de responsabilidad del Estado en la provisión de las obligaciones prestacionales, estaría presente en el mismo artículo 71, pero en el inciso 3), del mencionado Convenio N° 102. Dicha disposición dispone:
“El Miembro deberá asumir la responsabilidad general en lo que se refiere al servicio de prestaciones concedidas en aplicación del presente Convenio y adoptar, cuando fuere oportuno, todas las medidas necesarias para alcanzar dicho fin; deberá garantizar, cuando fuere oportuno, que los estudios y cálculos actuariales necesarios relativos al equilibrio se establezcan periódicamente y, en todo caso, previamente a cualquier modificación de las prestaciones, de la tasa de las cotizaciones del seguro o de los impuestos destinados a cubrir las contingencias en cuestión”.
Es claro cómo el Estado es garante de las pensiones del país. Este numeral establece una serie de obligaciones de garantía del Estado, especialmente el referido al liderazgo en lo que se refiere al servicio de prestaciones concedidas, lo que incluye las formalidades que debe observar cuando ejerce la obligación implícita de vigilar y materializar todas las medidas que involucra la preservación de los fondos de pensiones, incluyendo aquellas correctivas”.
La obligación internacional establecida en el artículo 71.3, del Convenio N° 102, de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, normativa que gobierna el tema de los balances y desbalances de los fondos de pensiones y jubilaciones, obliga al Estado -como principal responsable al mantenimiento de los fondos de pensiones- a la vigilancia y control, pero referenciado con respaldo técnico.
De la norma se desprende la responsabilidad general que implica tanto cuando el Estado asume la administración de los fondos, como cuando lo hace indirectamente. En este sentido, siempre asume el compromiso internacional por velar y controlar la materialización efectiva de las prestaciones -presentes y futuras- concedidas en el Convenio. De este modo, debe ser sujeto activo en la vigilancia y control de medidas que permitan esas prestaciones.
Como los fondos de pensiones no son estáticos, el principio de responsabilidad del Estado se traduce en la permanente vigilancia y control sobre las prestaciones, de sus fluctuaciones y si los derechos se puedan mantener en el tiempo. Es decir, que se requiere mantener la suficiencia de recursos, para que el nivel de las prestaciones se pueda mantener con las primas y/o los aportes, impuestos, y con las erogaciones administrativas, obligación que le corresponde al Estado, o responsable de mantenerlas en el tiempo.
Es importante mencionar, que el artículo 71, del citado Convenio N° 102, fue toral en la sentencia de esta Sala que resolvió el problema de los impuestos solidarios y contribuciones a las pensiones de alto perfil, al aplicar el límite convencional a esas contribuciones en un 50% sobre los salarios/prestaciones. Con ello, se consideró vinculante el numeral para el Estado Costarricense, de modo que por paridad de razón, también debe ser una norma que defina y determine todo lo que debe resolverse en este asunto.
En el caso que nos ocupa, cuando se inicia la reducción de los derechos y beneficios de los regímenes de pensiones, consideramos que se corre un riesgo de que en el proceso se puedan perder algunos de ellos sin justificación clara, y que se vaya en contra de los estándares internacionales, cuando no se pueden hacer efectivos estos derechos. El Estado Social de Derecho debe permitir una lectura adecuada a la pérdida de derechos prestacionales, que si bien opera dentro de un contexto económico, debe encontrar límites, entre los cuales debe estar que no puede desconocer el tiempo transcurrido de aportes basados en los salarios y las cotizaciones. El artículo 71, de comentario, debería tratarse como una protección contra la disminución arbitraria de las prestaciones, al desmantelamiento de la protección de forma injustificada, ya sea con estudios actuariales insuficientes u omitidos, todo lo cual sería inconvencional por ir contrario a la obligación internacional, y porque los derechos también deben estar defendidos cuidadosamente para impedir la pérdida de derechos a la protección social de forma injustificada.
Nos cabe la pregunta, si sólo protegen las prestaciones en curso u otorgadas? La respuesta debería ser no, para ello se requiere que los proyectos de reforma contengan una norma transitoria, pues bien el campo económico no debe estar abstraído de las implicaciones que sus decisiones tienen sobre los derechos económicos, sociales, y culturales, que también son prestaciones exigibles, razonablemente. Tanto no pueden considerarse estancos aislados entre sí, como dominado uno respecto del otro si no es a través de un ejercicio razonable y de ponderación de los derechos e intereses involucrados. No se niega la libertad de configuración del legislador; sin embargo, es importante recordar que tiene los límites establecidos en el Derecho de la Constitución (valores, principios y derechos), y más cuando se encuentra sujeto a los estudios técnicos que jurídicamente son exigibles, como lo ha establecido la jurisprudencia de la Sala.
Consideramos que las obligaciones que se desprenden de este numeral 71.3, del Convenio N° 102, exigen que la formulación de reformas legales respondan al comportamiento de los fondos y su suficiencia, y que esas enmiendas respondan a la técnica precisa y correcta en dos momentos: a) cuando fuere oportuno para ejercer un control periódico por los movimientos propios de funcionamiento y gestión, y b) en todo caso, “previamente a cualquier modificación de las prestaciones, de la tasa de las cotizaciones del seguro o de los impuestos destinados a cubrir las contingencias en cuestión”.
Lo establecido en esta norma permite asegurar las protecciones en favor de los derechos prestacionales convenidos, especialmente las otorgadas, para ceñir las reformas o enmiendas al sistema de pensiones a una técnica matemática ligada a los estudios y cálculos actuariales que reflejen la condición de un equilibrio de recursos, que es la obligación internacional que adquiere el Estado costarricense.
Al igual que se hizo en la Sentencia N° 2020-19274 anteriormente citada, en el que se acudió al Estudio General relativo a los instrumentos de la seguridad social, realizado a la luz de la Declaración de 2008 sobre la Justicia Social para una Globalización Equitativa, Informe de la Comisión de Expertos en Aplicación de Convenios y Recomendaciones (artículos 19, 22 y 35, de la Constitución de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo), Informe III (Parte 1B), sostenida en la Conferencia Internacional del Trabajo, 100a reunión, 2011, y que en esta oportunidad, también es importante transcribir lo siguiente:
“465. La Comisión desea subrayar que la correcta gestión financiera y jurídica de los sistemas de seguridad social que son objeto de reformas podría facilitarse considerablemente, si debiese realizarse una evaluación actuarial antes de su presentación ante los parlamentos. La Comisión ha observado que, con demasiada frecuencia, los cambios en la legislación de seguridad social se realizan apresuradamente teniendo en cuenta intereses inmediatos sin haber realizado previamente un análisis sustancial de carácter financiero y económico de los efectos de la reforma y de los posibles costos que deberá afrontar la sociedad. Al observar que esta es una situación más bien común incluso en los países desarrollados, considera probable que también se extienda a los países en desarrollo. No cabe duda de que la seguridad social debe regirse por normas jurídicas, pero si las leyes se modifican, la claridad que aportan las evaluaciones actuariales independientes respecto de las repercusiones correspondientes resulta esencial no sólo desde una perspectiva a corto plazo con la que los gobiernos suelen evaluar tales efectos, sino también desde una perspectiva a largo plazo en lo que se refiere al impacto que toda nueva ley puede tener sobre la sostenibilidad financiera del sistema.
466. Si los legisladores en materia de seguridad social se aproximaran a los actuarios para trabajar en común en la medida posible, estos últimos, a su vez deberían hacer lo mismo adoptando un enfoque proactivo en lo que respecta a la legislación en materia de seguridad social. En un estudio actuarial deberían figurar observaciones claras y objetivas sobre todo asunto que afecte el estado financiero de un régimen de la seguridad social, señalándose las deficiencias de las disposiciones legales que rigen el funcionamiento de dicho régimen. Estas deficiencias de la legislación nacional podrían advertirse si se comparase dicha legislación con las normas mínimas del Convenio núm. 102 y, a través de la formulación de hipótesis alternativas de desarrollo futuro, determinar las probabilidades de que un régimen de seguridad social nacional sea sostenible. Los estudios y los informes actuariales constituyen herramientas importantes para que los legisladores y los encargados de formular políticas nacionales puedan adoptar medidas tendientes al cumplimiento de las normas de la OIT relativas a la seguridad social; tales herramientas resultan útiles en caso de que las reformas tengan como finalidad mejorar los niveles de protección social, pero en caso contrario, pasan a ser vitales” (lo resaltado es del original).
De este modo, se aborda la necesidad de otorgar una protección pro-fondo conforme a la técnica actuarial, y sostenemos también, que debe permitir un espacio necesario para resolver las cuestiones relevantes sobre cambios a los los derechos económicos y sociales que concede. Se descarta, por completo, por el costo social que tiene, abordajes oportunistas y apresurados a las reformas. Pero debe quedar claro, que toda reforma legal al sistema de pensiones requiere, por un lado, del análisis sustancial de una perspectiva económica y financiera, también el otro lado inmediato, en las implicaciones sobre la protección de derechos presentes y futuros. Todo ello, es posible afirmar que se deriva del artículo 71.3, del Convenio N° 102, de la O.I.T., la cual se establece como la otra obligación internacional.
De todo lo anterior, concluimos que uno de los principales cometidos del citado artículo 71, es servir como un mecanismo de seguridad contra la erosión de los derechos prestacionales de la seguridad social, dentro del gran apartado de los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales, pues busca el equilibrio en un doble sentido: la protección en favor de quienes requieren de la asistencia cuando la contingencia prevista sucede, y la otra, servir de postulado en favor de la racionalidad de las medidas para asegurar perpetuidad del fondo sin incurrir en la arbitrariedad y desprotección. Deber quedar claro, como se ha afirmado en los órganos de control de derechos económicos, sociales y culturales en Europa, donde se afirma que tanto los recortes como los costos, deberían ser soportados de forma colectiva, de una forma equitativa por la sociedad para evitar primero la afectación de las personas de menores recursos, tomar en cuenta la situación económica del país y la clase de personas protegidas. En nuestro país, el artículo 73, de la Constitución Política, establece en buena medida la contribución forzosa del Estado, patronos y trabajadores, entre otras formas de financiación.
La observancia del artículo 71 asegura el propósito fundamental de los sistemas previsionales: otorgar derechos desde el punto de vista actuarial, y mantenerlos una vez concedidos como derechos adquiridos y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, en especial cuando sean ingresados al patrimonio privado. En tales casos, debe adoptarse medidas para propiciar la suficiencia de recursos en favor del fondo de pensiones; es decir, a través de reformas legales para que pueda operar en los niveles óptimos de protección, con equilibrio en favor de la protección de la Seguridad Social. Lo mismo debería entenderse, desde el punto de vista de la concesión de derechos de que no debe estar desligado de los aspectos sustanciales de los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, con el fin de prevenir de la privación y restricción innecesaria de los potenciales derechos, cuando de lo que se trata, es de ajustarlos, limitarlos e incluso ralentizar el otorgamiento de derechos prestacionales, pero cuando se sustente adecuadamente mediante estudios técnicos. Por supuesto, se debe insistir que esto no debe entenderse como un desmantelamiento del Estado Social de Derecho.
En virtud de los principios protectores pro-persona, que privilegian, prefieren y favorecen la aplicación de las normas que ofrezcan mayor protección a los derechos de la persona humana, sea en una norma legal, constitucional, o de los Derechos Humanos, estimamos que aconseja que una reforma al sistema de pensiones debería amparar a quienes estuvieran en mejores condiciones de cotización, de tiempo de servicio, y de edad, y con una base técnica suficiente que le concede estos factores. Una reforma al sistema de pensiones -aun aplicando el principio pro-fondo- sería irrazonable si no tomara en consideración estos factores. Ignorar cotizaciones concretas de las primas de un trabajador entregadas a un sistema de pensiones y de seguridad social concreto, de forma sostenida en el tiempo, generalmente, por un servicio de muy larga trayectoria, debe ser tratado por estos estudios actuariales. Solo en casos de descalabro económico nacional podrían tomarse medidas graves en contra de estos derechos en vías de consolidación.
Entonces, estimamos que el estudio actuarial no solo debe reflejar la condición económica del fondo, también debe contar con otra vertiente, como es el acomodamiento de los trabajadores que estuvieran en mejores condiciones de cotización, de tiempo de servicio, y de edad, y con una base técnica suficiente que le concede preeminencia al tiempo de la cotización, factor que tiene íntima relación con la parte económica del fondo. Creemos que esto acreciente y maximiza las posibilidades del reconocimiento de los derechos prestacionales, aún cuando no han llegado a ser aún derechos adquiridos.
Sobre la razonabilidad técnica de las normas aprobadas por el legislador, esta Sala ha indicado que: “En cuanto a lo primero, debe advertirse que en sentido estricto la razonabilidad equivale a justicia, así, por ejemplo, una ley que establezca prestaciones científicas o técnicamente disparatadas, sería una ley técnicamente irracional o irrazonable, y por ello, sería también jurídicamente irrazonable. En este sentido cabe advertir que no es lo mismo decir que un acto es razonable, a que un acto no es irrazonable, por cuanto la razonabilidad es un punto dentro de una franja de posibilidades u opciones, teniendo un límite hacia arriba y otro hacia abajo, fuera de los cuales la escogencia resulta irrazonable, en razón del exceso o por defecto, respectivamente” (Sentencia N° 1994-00486 de las 16:03 horas del 25 de enero de 1994). Entonces, no negamos que el legislador tiene amplias facultades y libertades en la conformación de la ley, de manera que la razonabilidad de una norma estaría dentro de un punto de mayor o menor intensidad que haría de un rango de regulación permisible o razonable constitucionalmente, por lo que, se debe concluir, también que lo que cae fuera de él, es inconstitucional por deficiencia o por exceso del estándar.
Sostenemos que el artículo 71.3, de la Convención N° 102, de la O.I.T. da cobertura normativa a las expectativas legítimas, salvo que se estuviera frente a una debacle económica, para desconocer beneficios a quienes de otro modo si lo tendrían. Debemos recordar, que las decisiones estatales deben respeto a los derechos de seguridad social, y hace caer la disposición fuera de aquel rango de regulación permisible o razonable. Reducir lo establecido en el standard estudiado debe quedar claramente justificado, al tratarse de Derechos Humanos que, en efecto, estarían siendo negados a quienes estuvieran en mejores condiciones para obtener una jubilación o pensión por el paso del tiempo.
C.- El problema de las expectativas legítimas sin el empleo adecuado de un estudio actuarial.
En Sentencia N° 2020-023789 de las 19:00 horas del 10 de diciembre de 2020, la Sala estableció, para las obligaciones internacionales, que:
“Ahora bien, de conformidad con el artículo 1°, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, corresponde a esta Sala garantizar además de la supremacía del Derecho Constitucional, también la del Derecho Internacional. De modo que, le corresponde a esta Sala no solo establecer la supremacía del derecho contenido en el Derecho de la Constitución cuando los tratados se refieren necesariamente a temas de derechos humanos, como también del Derecho Internacional, cuando por su interpretación y aplicación corresponde declarar su supremacía a las de las leyes, en virtud del artículo 7, de la Constitución Política. (…) En este sentido, desde su ratificación por nuestro país, las obligaciones internacionales que asume deberían estar produciendo efectos jurídicos duraderos, lo que debe ser práctica usual en aquellos tratados de Derechos Humanos que buscan elevar la dignidad humana, y cuyas obligaciones consisten en proteger, resguardar y hacer respetar esos derechos.
En otros tratados también, cuando tienen como fin regular -jurídicamente- y erradicar otras prácticas nacionales que ponen en peligro esos derechos, especialmente si están vinculados a la vida, la salud humana y al medio ambiente. Este tipo de tratados también buscan el effet utile o lo que sería lo mismo lograr efectos duraderos, jurídicamente hablando, al tratarse de esfuerzos comunes y de cooperación internacional en una determinada área, porque adquieren especial interés internacional. Por ello, es lógico asociar los compromisos vinculantes a mecanismos de control de los objetivos pactados, porque no le son ajenos”.
La fuerza jurídica vinculante de las obligaciones internacionales en Costa Rica queda prístinamente revelada en la Sentencia N° 2016-006728 de las 9:05 horas del 18 de mayo de 2016, en cuanto establece que:
“El modo en que el Derecho internacional moldea al ordenamiento jurídico nacional lo decidió el constituyente cuando estableció la jerarquía normativa de las normas del Derecho internacional. Aunque pueden haber diferentes soluciones a la forma en que se relaciona el Derecho internacional público con el ordenamiento jurídico nacional, revela mucho la forma en que éste es incorporado, más aún el lugar que el constituyente originario como derivado le ubica en la jerarquía normativa del orden jurídico, con la intención de asignarle una determinada potencia y resistencia jurídica, énfasis agregado en algunos casos, para la convivencia del Derecho internacional con la norma nacional, que sería: supralegal donde el operador jurídico se enfrenta a una norma con fuerza y potencia en cascada que desplaza la norma inferior; o de igual rango, donde la autoridad judicial interpreta a la legislación internacional con una fuerza y potencia equivalente al de las leyes, operando los criterios de vigencia en el tiempo y el espacio, y que, para no generar conflictos innecesarios entre las normas, debe interpretar el Derecho internacional con el Derecho internacional consuetudinario.
En estos casos, descarta la norma nacional o la interpreta conforme a la obligación internacional, salvo en aquellas jurisdicciones donde el legislador se atribuye su labor preeminente de dejarla expresamente sin efecto, bajo riesgo de violentar el orden internacional. En nuestro país el diseño que se le dio a la disposición constitucional fue pensado para que tuviera efectos muy concretos en el ordenamiento jurídico nacional. En nuestro caso, de origen monista, el Derecho internacional es incorporado una vez que se cumplan con los procedimientos legislativos para el dictado de una ley que lo recepta, con la aprobación legislativa, sigue la sanción y publicación, y finalmente el canje de notas diplomáticas o el depósito de los instrumentos para el perfeccionamiento de la obligación internacional -acto de ratificación-. La forma en que se impacta el derecho nacional lógicamente dependería de la naturaleza de los compromisos o las obligaciones internacionales pactadas entre los Estados o personas jurídicas con capacidad para actuar a nivel internacional.
Por ejemplo, el objeto en los Tratados de Derechos Humanos es la persona humana, de ahí que le siguen mecanismos propios de interpretación como el principio pro homine, que, en el tanto se conjuga con el principio de supremacía constitucional, integra y supera el texto constitucional en cuanto produce una protección adicionada o incluso omitida por la norma constitucional, pero incrementando su legitimidad, en la dignidad humana (véase sentencia No. 1995-2313, entre otras)”.
El artículo 71.3, del Convenio N° 102, de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, forma parte del derecho internacional laboral, y este debe guiar la resolución de este asunto, toda vez que el canon internacional establece un estándar muy concreto, que se debe observar, pues el Estado: “deberá garantizar, cuando fuere oportuno, que los estudios y cálculos actuariales necesario relativos al equilibrio se establezcan periódicamente y, en todo caso, previamente a cualquier modificación de las prestaciones” (subrayado y lo resaltado no es del original). Estimamos que es obvio, que el cambio de las prestaciones incluye las actuales y las futuras. El legislador está en posibilidad, por la libertad de configuración, de establecer los nuevos términos amparados en los mencionados estudios, pero asegurando -salvo momentos de grave crisis y descalabros económicos- mecanismos que guarden, aquellas personas en mayor posición de expectativa, las que estarían en transición por una cuestión de equidad en la interpretación, la que debe ser también justa y balanceada.
La obligación internacional positiva aceptada por los Estados impone tanto la obligación de hacer determinadas cosas, como también -de no hacer- en contra de los derechos sin una justificación razonable para no vulnerar la norma. En el primero de los supuestos, constatando el desequilibrio de los fondos de pensiones como ocurrió con el Poder Judicial, donde no hay duda que el Estado requiere aprobar las normas y políticas adecuadas, para salvaguardar de las prestaciones sociales. Pero, en tal arista, debemos estar claros que cuando se toman decisiones que parten aguas en un Estado Social de Derecho, siempre se tienen obligaciones de hacer como de no hacer respecto de los derechos que quedan en un período de transición. En tales casos, es válido tomar de referencia la edad, el tiempo de cotizaciones y servicio, siempre en aras de mantener un equilibrio de un fondo, sin dejar de considerar derechos que bien pudieron protegerse por estar en transición.
De este modo, insistimos que corresponde al Estado velar doblemente por la protección de quienes cotizan para las prestaciones futuras, y con mayor intensidad, acordar el amparo de los intereses legítimos de quienes gradualmente están en cercanía con el cumplimiento de los requisitos de tiempo y servicio, y en un grado mayor, a quienes estarían en transición. La norma transitoria debe adecuar estos factores en aras de proteger estos derechos en consolidación.
Creemos que el Convenio N° 102, de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, no autoriza la toma de decisiones ayunas de razonabilidad técnica, al contrario, impone al responsable de los fondos -el Estado- los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, previendo que toda decisión se haga más difícil de alcanzar sin un sustento técnico, porque con ello lesiona los derechos sustantivos a una prestación futura e intergeneracional de quien ha aportado más. La norma transitoria debe estar adecuada a los derechos de quienes estuvieran en el fondo amparando un conjunto de derechos sustantivos por el tiempo de servicio, edad y cotizaciones, todo ello visto en conjunto de manera justa y equitativa, con un interés legítimo que indudablemente es de mayor intensidad.
La pregunta que cabe aquí, es si el legislador puede sustentar la reforma, sin consideración alguna a las consecuencias que puede generar sobre todas las personas afectadas, al agravar los derechos sustantivos. Estimamos que la respuesta debe ser negativa frente a la obligación internacional.
En el expediente legislativo (folio 4164), la diputada Natalia Díaz Quintana manifestó que:
“Otro tema importante en este texto que estamos dictaminando el día de hoy, que creo que también es parte de las reformas trascendentales del mismo, tienen que ver con el transitorio; un transitorio que se manejó de forma responsable en la comisión; un transitorio que inclusive lo que permite es que los servidores serviciales (sic) y les leo textualmente, es el transitorio sexto, que cumplan con los ….
La Procuraduría nos había dicho inclusive que este transitorio no era necesario, que inclusive la norma o la ley podía regir inmediatamente para la aplicación del mismo; sin embargo, también por fallas (sic) de la Sala Constitucional con respecto al régimen de IVM, donde se establecen dieciocho meses de transitorio, tomamos esta consideración para establecerlo y entonces darle derecho aquellos que estén a dieciocho meses de pensiones que se acojan a la normativa vigente y no a la ley que estamos aprobando, para también respetar estos beneficios.
Recordemos que las pensiones no son derechos adquiridos, sino es una expectativa de derecho, entonces por ese motivo se podía eliminar el transitorio; sin embargo lo dejamos en el proyecto de ley para abrir esa ventana de dieciocho meses aquellos que deseen pensionarse o que estén a punto de pensionarse en estos dieciocho meses y que por lo tanto puedan acogerse a la normativa actual”.
En este punto, hay que establecer que la obligación internacional del artículo 71.3., del Convenio N° 102, de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, tiene un carácter jurídico, por ser un instrumento que trae consecuencias por su jerarquía normativa en el orden nacional -incluido el legislador y juez- en la medida que obliga a ajustar la voluntad otorgada entre sujetos de derecho internacional, y como tales, tiene que ser aplicado de conformidad con el principio pacta sunt servanda y de buena fe. Con este contenido jurídico, por consecuencia, es vinculante para el Estado costarricense, que adquiere el carácter de piso básico de la obligación internacional, que daría legitimidad al sustentarse en actuaciones técnicamente equilibradas, ordenadas por normas de mayor rango y jerarquía, que obliga en un primer orden que los ajustes no afecten negativamente a los fondos de pensiones, y que los derechos no sean abusados en el nombre del equilibrio del fondo, sin una justificación razonable en dificultades económicas que pueden ser corregidas en el futuro.
En tal sentido, consideramos que es claro que todo mejoramiento es preferido. La legitimidad que da el instrumento internacional no es solo para el tema de los recursos, sino que, debe ser extensivo para el otorgamiento y el respeto de los derechos en transición. No tendría sentido que la actuación estuviera basada únicamente en consideraciones matemáticas sin considerar los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales.
Por Sentencia N° 2018-000230 de las 10:40 horas del 10 de enero de 2018, la Sala estableció que:
“… el legislador cuenta con discrecionalidad, en el marco de su derecho a la libre configuración, para establecer los requisitos de la actividad, a fin de proteger la salud de las personas, sin que deba justificar cada decisión mediante un estudio técnico, salvo cuando existe norma expresa al respecto (verbigracia en cuestiones ambientales) o cuando la materia los exige”.
En este sentido, los estudios actuariales finales procuraron un transitorio de veinticuatro meses para la consolidación de los derechos en transición. Así, estimamos que es obligado concluir, que los criterios técnicos actuariales son el instrumento objetivo para sustentar las reformas de los fondos de pensiones, las que deben justificar las modificaciones y limitaciones a las prestaciones. También, el tratamiento transicional después de la entrada en vigencia de la reforma. Pero, una modificación que hace más restrictiva una norma transitoria, debe estar basada en una necesidad debidamente constatada.
La mayoría de la Sala hace referencia a las consideraciones finales del estudio actuarial denominado “Producto 6 informe final: “Recopilación e informe final: Conclusiones y Recomendaciones” (Versión Final)”, el equipo actuarial discute algunos puntos relevantes de los informes, e incluyen las siguientes aseveraciones de los cálculos actuariales prospectivos a cien años realizados al Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Poder Judicial:
“b. Sobre el “transitorio” que permitiría a las personas que se jubilarían en un plazo de dos años y la posibilidad de ampliar ese transitorio para las personas que se jubilarían en un plazo de cinco años.
Un aumento en el “transitorio” pospone los ajustes y por lo tanto afecta negativamente los ingresos del Fondo. Para valorar adecuadamente el efecto de un aumento de este transitorio sería necesario realizar un análisis actuarial completo.
Por otra parte, una decisión en esta dirección puede inducir a los administradores y agentes políticos a realizar gestiones para incluir a grupos sucesivamente más numerosos, de forma que al final un “transitorio” de dos años terminaría transformándose en un transitorio de cinco, seis o incluso más años.
Finalmente, la ampliación del transitorio pospone parte de los ajustes, por lo que análisis de rentabilidad y solvencia del Fondo pueden generar la impresión de que los ajustes que sí se realizaron no surtieron efecto” (página 73 del informe).
Es importante mencionar, que de los últimos Marcos Normativos analizados IICE3 e IICE4, se consideraron solventes en las pruebas que se les realizaron; es decir, en los escenarios “base o intermedio” y “optimista”. Más aún, se refieren también al Producto 5, que “resultaron solventes tanto si se incluyen como si se excluyen los ingresos adicionales procedentes de procesos abandonados. Estos nuevos Marcos Normativos propuestos resultan autosuficientes y su funcionamiento no requiere imponer cargas al Estado o a los costarricenses”. Todo lo anterior, nos permite concluir que es claro que dentro de la solvencia actuarial que fue presentada a la Asamblea Legislativa, ya estaba “presupuestada” o “contenida” la normativa transitoria por dos años (veinticuatro meses).
La legislación debe mantener los ajustes y la adecuación de las modificaciones a las circunstancias individuales de las personas, desde los trabajadores de recién ingreso, quienes empiezan hasta alcanzar el periodo de pertenencia y que se transforma de un interés general a una expectativa legitima concreta por edad, tiempo de cotización y servicio de las personas trabajadoras, mientras pertenezcan al régimen. Los regímenes de pensiones son de larga duración, y que durante dicho periodo de pertenencia se incrementará más ese interés, a la de una expectativa legítima que conduce a la declaratoria del derecho.
No todas las reformas que resguarden el equilibrio de los fondos de pensiones son iguales. Estimamos que el resguardo de los recursos públicos en pensiones con cargo directo al presupuesto nacional no puede comportarse de la misma manera que con aquellos con fondos aportados por las cotizaciones de los trabajadores en regímenes de pensiones que reciben el aporte patronal y del Estado, y que valga decir, nacen de las obligaciones internacionales adquiridas con la Organización Internacional del Trabajo. Sin embargo, en ambas, debe existir el aporte forzoso del trabajador, el patronal y principalmente del Estado, cuya participación es parte de la necesidad de que haga sus aportes en nombre de la colectividad nacional, como sí lo hizo en el caso de las pensiones con cargo directo al presupuesto nacional y su transitorio de cinco años.
La Recomendación sobre los Pisos de Protección Social, 2012 (N° 202), que recoge lo relacionado a los principios relativos a la seguridad social, mantiene una íntima relación con el Convenio N° 102. En él, define a los pisos de protección social como los “conjuntos de garantías básicas de seguridad social definidos a nivel nacional” (punto I.2), pero además en el I.3, recoge los principios sobre adecuación y previsibilidad de las prestaciones (c); respetar los derechos y la dignidad de las personas cubiertas por las garantías de seguridad social (f); gestión financiera y administración sanas, responsables y transparentes (j); sostenibilidad financiera, fiscal y económica, teniendo debidamente en cuenta la justicia social y la equidad (k). Además de otros principios enunciados, es claro que debe existir siempre un equilibrio racional en lo que se refiere a los costos y beneficios a corto y largo plazo.
Para llegar a ello, estimamos que se quiere de los estudios actuariales que permitan garantizar que las reformas y ajustes que se requieran, sean necesarias, justificadas y que respondan a criterios técnicos. De ahí que, creemos que es importante la transparencia, consulta y dialogo social en cualquier caso, pero más cuando se trata de regímenes administrados directa o indirectamente por el Estado, en el tanto están involucradas las organizaciones de los empleadores y trabajadores. En este sentido, el Estudio General relativo a los instrumentos de la seguridad social de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, citada con anterioridad, menciona que se debería esperar que la confianza que se deposita en los estudios actuariales debe ser amplia y difundida, especialmente entre los tomadores de decisión, de modo que “…a los gobiernos les resultará más fácil obtener el apoyo de los interlocutores sociales y lograr un consenso sobre los cambios que deben realizarse, si dichos cambios se basan en recomendaciones objetivas formuladas por un actuario independiente” (el resaltado es agregado).
No hay duda, también, que el reconocimiento de los derechos en vías de constitución y transición debería estar estrechamente ligado a lo anterior, basado en la justicia social y equidad, por el costo social no económico que tiene, y porque ya está reconocido por los estudios técnicos al fondo de interés, cuyos estudios son establecidos por el mismo ordenamiento jurídico internacional.
A partir de este punto, es necesario que examinemos la existencia de instituciones jurídicas desarrolladas por la jurisprudencia de los tribunales de justicia en nuestro país, incluida la misma Sala Constitucional, que responden a la racionalización de la aplicación de los cambios de derecho, basadas en consideraciones de equidad y justicia, especialmente cuando tiene efectos injustos y arbitrarios sobre las personas.
La doctrina de la confianza legítima, del estoppel, y la doctrina de los actos propios de la Administración Pública, responden todos a la protección y construcción del derecho como un verdadero valladar en contra de la injusticia y la arbitrariedad, y los tribunales se convierten en un vertebrador de la justicia en la sociedad.
Al producirse las reformas, debe existir un estándar mínimo que garantice un ambiente de predictibilidad que no es más que también una consecuencia del principio democrático que obliga a tomar decisiones racionales, además de la publicidad de los actos públicos válidos, y de su eficacia. De la publicidad deriva la obligación de los particulares de ajustarse a las normas y disposiciones emitidas por las autoridades públicas, por haber cumplido los requisitos formales y materiales que permiten considerarlas válidas, admitiendo los tribunales -también- aquellos en apariencia válidos, y eficaces cuando reciben su publicidad de forma oficial.
A nivel de la Unión Europea, el principio de la confianza legítima se deriva del principio general de seguridad jurídica (derivado todo del principio de legalidad). Es el reconocimiento de que esta institución jurídica proviene de las leyes nacionales. Se entiende como la obligación de las autoridades de estar no solo constreñidos por lo que la ley expresamente dispone, sino que también por sus promesas y por las elevadas expectativas que crea. En tal sentido, se tiene confianza legítima cuando se actúan con un componente de buena fe, pues a las personas se les debe proteger sus expectativas legítimas, porque actúan sobre la base de los textos de las leyes, y no deben ver frustradas sus expectativas legítimas creadas con base en ellas.
Por ejemplo, se reconoció que las medidas comunitarias que incentivaron dejar de producir lácteos, y cuyos productores se sometieron voluntariamente a ese aplazamiento en Europa, podían esperar que una vez superado el período, dejarían de tener efecto y podrían volver a ejercer la actividad económica que suspendieron. En Sentencia de la Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea del 28 de abril de 1988, Mulder v. Minister van Landbouw en Visserij, estableció que:
“26 Contrariamente a las afirmaciones de la Comisión, tal exclusión total y permanente, en tanto permanezca en aplicación de la normativa en materia de tasa suplementaria, que tiene como efecto impedir a los productores afectados reanudar la comercialización de la leche al término del período de cinco años, no era previsible para dichos productores en el momento en que asumían, temporalmente, el compromiso de no suministrar leche. En efecto, ni las disposiciones ni los considerandos del Reglamento n° 1078/77 ponen de manifiesto que el compromiso de no comercialización contraído en virtud de este Reglamento podría suponer a su vencimiento, la imposibilidad de reanudar la actividad en cuestión. Tal efecto vulnera, por consiguiente, la confianza legítima que los productores podían tener en el carácter limitado de los efectos del régimen al cual se sometían.
27 De ello se sigue que la normativa en materia de tasa suplementaria sobre la leche fue dictada en violación del principio de confianza legítima. Dado que esta normativa debe ser declaradas inválida por esta razón, no ha lugar a examinar los demás motivos expuestos en el curso del procedimiento contra su validez”.
Por su parte, ese carácter pretoriano que se ha difundido en muchos países, también tiene, desde el punto vista de la jurisprudencia nacional, aplicación en la Sala Constitucional. Esta ha establecido, en la Sentencia N° 2016-008000 de las 11:52 horas del 10 de junio de 2016, esa doctrina de la confianza legítima. En la decisión se indica que:
“Ahora bien, estamos ante un principio de origen jurisprudencial evidentemente ligado a cuestiones de equidad, motivo por el que su aplicación debe ser analizada en cada caso concreto. Recordemos que el mismo ha sido concebido como una reacción del juez para resguardar la confianza del Administrado, cuando la Administración lo sorprende con un cambio inesperado en su proceder. Como resolvió el Tribunal Supremo de España (Sala 3) en sentencia de 17 de mayo de 2013: “En definitiva, como señala la STJCE de 12-5-1998, para anular un acto irregular recaído en el seno del derecho nacional de un Estado, el Juez deberá ponderar los intereses en conflicto en cada caso, y resolver dando primacía, bien al principio de legalidad, revocando el acto, lo que demanda el interés general, bien dando protección a la confianza legítima, en defensa del interés individual”.
Atinente a los alcances del principio, el Tribunal Supremo de España, en sus votos de 21 de febrero de 2006 (RC 5959/2001) y 15 de diciembre de 2007 (RC 1830/2005), ha concluido que “la virtualidad del principio invocado puede suponer la anulación de un acto o norma y, cuando menos, obliga a responder, en el marco comunitario de la alteración (sin conocimiento anticipado, sin medidas transitorias suficientes para que los sujetos puedan acomodar su conducta y proporcionadas al interés público en juego, y sin las debidas medidas correctoras o compensatorias) de las circunstancias habituales y estables, generadoras de esperanzas fundadas de mantenimiento”.
En esas mismas sentencias, respecto de los límites al principio, ha señalado que:
“Sin embargo, el principio de confianza legítima no garantiza la perpetuación de la situación existente; la cual puede ser modificada en el marco de la facultad de apreciación de las instituciones y poderes públicos para imponer nuevas regulaciones apreciando las necesidades del interés general". Por otra parte, en la STS de 1-2-99 Az 1633, se recuerda que "este principio no puede invocarse para crear, mantener o extender, en el ámbito del Derecho público, situaciones contrarias al ordenamiento jurídico, o cuando del acto precedente resulta una contradicción con el fin o interés tutelado por una norma jurídica que, por su naturaleza, no es susceptible de amparar una conducta discrecional por la Administración que suponga el reconocimiento de unos derechos y/u obligaciones que dimanen de actos propios de la misma. O, dicho en otros términos, la doctrina invocada de los «actos propios» sin la limitación que acaba de exponerse podría introducir en el ámbito de las relaciones de Derecho público el principio de la autonomía de la voluntad como método ordenador de materias reguladas por normas de naturaleza imperativa, en las que prevalece el interés público salvaguardado por el principio de legalidad; principio que resultaría conculcado si se diera validez a una actuación de la Administración contraria al ordenamiento jurídico por el solo hecho de que así se ha decidido por la Administración o porque responde a un precedente de ésta.
Una cosa es la irrevocabilidad de los propios actos declarativos de derechos fuera de los cauces de revisión establecidos en la Ley ( arts. 109 y 110 de la Ley de Procedimiento Administrativo de 1958 , 102 y 103 de la Ley de Régimen Jurídico de las Administraciones Públicas y Procedimiento Administrativo Común, Ley 30/1992 [RCL 1992 \2512, 2775 y RCL 1993\246], modificada por Ley 4/1999 [RCL 1999\114]), y otra el respeto a la confianza legítima generada por actuación propia que necesariamente ha de proyectarse al ámbito de la discrecionalidad o de la autonomía, no al de los aspectos reglados o exigencias normativas frente a las que, en el Derecho Administrativo, no puede prevalecer lo resuelto en acto o en precedente que fuera contrario a aquéllos".
En resumen, el principio de confianza legítima descansa sobre la base de que el ciudadano asume un comportamiento confiando en que actúa de manera correcta, toda vez que la conducta constante, estable y a lo largo del tiempo de la Administración le genera razonablemente tal expectativa; dicho de otra forma, la Administración ha emitido signos externos que han venido a orientar al ciudadano hacia una cierta conducta y le han hecho confiar de buena fe en que tal situación persistirá. Como señala Meza Valencia (2013), “la confianza del particular surge con ocasión del nacimiento en el mundo jurídico de una palabra dada o promesa de la administración, pero se fortalece y arraiga con la cadena de conductas posteriores asumidas por la administración, toda vez que estas vayan orientadas a fortalecer y desarrollar la palabra emitida previamente. Sin la existencia de dichos actos posteriores armónicos y coherentes, la promesa dada previamente pierde su vocación de consolidación de la confianza legítima”.
Lo anterior no implica que la Administración se encuentre conminada a mantener irreversible un acto contrario a la normativa vigente. Por el contrario, en el ejercicio de sus potestades públicas, la Administración bien puede remediar la mala aplicación de la normativa o imponer nuevas regulaciones apreciando las necesidades del interés general. Empero, para ello el Estado debe respetar la doctrina de los actos propios, o bien -sobre todo cuando se trata de nuevas medidas o de una decisión de improviso- proceder de manera razonable, es decir, con la debida anticipación comunicar su nueva actuación, con medidas transitorias suficientes para que los sujetos puedan acomodar su conducta y proporcionadas al interés público en juego, sin excluir otro tipo de disposiciones correctoras o compensatorias de las circunstancias habituales y estables, que le forjen al ciudadano esperanzas fundadas del mantenimiento de determinada situación.
La jurisprudencia constitucional costarricense ya ha reconocido este principio, como se advierte en los siguientes antecedentes:
"(...) Sobre el desarrollo de este principio y su profunda raigambre constitucional, la doctrina nacional ha manifestado lo siguiente: "Este principio surge en la República Federal de Alemania y, luego, es recogido por la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Europea, para definir una situación digna de ser amparada al haber sido violada la confianza puesta en la acción de la Administración Pública. El Tribunal Supremo Español, en su sentencia del 1º de febrero de 1990, consideró que este principio ha de ser aplicado, no tan sólo cuando se produzca cualquier tipo de convicción psicológica en el particular beneficiado, sino más bien cuanto se basa en signos externos producidos por la Administración lo suficientemente concluyentes para que le induzcan razonablemente a confiar en la legalidad de la actuación administrativa, unido a que, dada la ponderación de intereses en juego interés individual e interés general- la revocación o dejación sin efectos del acto, hace crecer en el patrimonio del beneficiado que confió razonablemente en dicha situación administrativa, unos perjuicios que no tiene por qué soportar derivados de unos gastos o inversiones que solo pueden serle restituidos con graves perjuicios en su patrimonio. En cuanto a los requisitos del principio de confianza legítima, la doctrina española, siguiendo la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo Español, ha establecido los siguientes: Debe mediar un acto 1) de la administración lo suficientemente concluyente para provocar en el afectado uno de los tres tipos siguientes de confianza: a) confianza del afectado en que la Administración Pública actúa correctamente; b) confianza del afectado en que es lícita la conducta que mantiene en su relación con la Administración Pública, al existir un eventual error de prohibición; c) confianza del afectado en que sus expectativas como interesado son razonables. 2) La Administración Pública debe provocar signos (actos o hechos) externos que, incluso, sin necesidad de ser jurídicamente vinculantes, orienten al administrado hacia una determinada conducta que de no ser por la apariencia de legalidad creada no hubiere efectuado. 3) Un acto de la Administración Pública (v. gr. un reglamento que reconoce o constituye una situación jurídica individualizada en cuya estabilidad confía el administrado. 4) La causa idónea para provocar la confianza legítima del afectado no puede provocarse por la mera negligencia, tolerancia, ignorancia de la Administración Pública o lo irracional de lo pretendido por el administrado. 5) El administrado debe cumplir los deberes y obligaciones que le competen. El quebranto del principio de la confianza legítima provoca, indudablemente, varios efectos jurídicos de importancia, veamos: 1) Actúa como límite al ejercicio de las potestades discrecionales. 2) Opera como una garantía del principio de igualdad. 3) Provoca el deber de la Administración pública de resarcir la frustración de las expectativas legítimas y los derechos subjetivos lesionados. El principio de la confianza legítima, junto con el de la buena fe en las relaciones jurídico-administrativas, dimana del principio de igualdad jurídica, esto es, la certidumbre de las relaciones con los poderes públicos, saber, el administrado, a qué atenerse con éstos, quienes deben evitar las situaciones objetivamente confusas y mantener las situaciones jurídicas aunque no sean absolutamente conformes con el ordenamiento jurídico. Este principio, se concreta, entre otros supuestos, con la teoría de la intangibilidad de los actos propios declarativos de derechos para el administrado, la limitación de los actos de gravamen y la irretroactividad. Encuentra aplicación, también, cuando una administración pública dicta y realiza una serie de actos y de actuaciones, que aunque jurídicamente incorrectas, generan una serie de expectativas en el administrado creyendo que ostenta una situación jurídica conforme con el ordenamiento jurídico (...)" (ver sentencia N° 2010-010171 de las 9:58 horas del 11 de junio de 2010)” (lo resaltado es del original).
En otra sentencia, la Sala resuelve un recurso de amparo de una persona de sesenta y un años de edad que había iniciado, desde hacía muchos años, labores en el Ministerio de Hacienda, que debido a modificaciones y nuevos requisitos para el servicio de limpieza -a través del outsourcing- quedó excluido de continuar con sus labores en el Ministerio de Hacienda, perjudicando su situación individual y concreta, y su oportunidad de adquirir una pensión. Además, se toma en cuenta que es una persona que forma parte de la población discapacitada, y que, en su último contrato laboral, quedó excluido por la instauración del requisito académico de tener la escuela primaria concluida. Esta Sala resolvió el caso, de la siguiente manera:
“Ante el anterior panorama, se puede observar como la Administración Pública generó una confianza del afectado en que esta actuaba correctamente, durante todo ese tiempo laborado, generando expectativas al amparado, consideradas razonables, ya que desde el año 1996 al 2017 el tutelado laboró para todas las empresas de servicios de limpieza que fueron adjudicadas por el Ministerio de Hacienda, convirtiéndose esto en una práctica común, donde todas las empresas adjudicadas lo contrataban para mantenerlo realizando esa labor de limpieza, con los mismos requisitos durante 30 años como se señaló. Si bien el cambio en los requisitos del cartel se sustenta en los requerimientos mínimos para el uso de productos y actividades propias de la labor, el amparado ha demostrado durante sus casi treinta años que es una persona idónea y que puede manejar bien las labores del puesto. Sobre la actuación de la administración, se puede demostrar que esta ha estado representándole estabilidad y continuidad en su relación laboral al amparado, pues no se acredita ninguna situación de rechazo o queja ante las empresas adjudicadas.
Considerando que el petente es una persona con capacidades especiales y cerca de su adultez mayor, se puede afirmar que el cambio de requisito para el puesto le ocasionaría un agravio a su condición, por la dificultad que se menciona, para conseguir empleo, debido a su discapacidad y la edad, y además ahora que le faltan pocas cuotas para poder pensionarse. En virtud de lo anterior, esta Sala considera, que en el caso particular del amparado, la administración contribuyó a constituir una situación de confianza y respaldo, por los requisitos exigidos a las empresas contratadas, para realizar sus funciones, en cuya estabilidad confiaba el tutelado, por lo cual corresponde declarar con lugar este recurso en los términos que se disponen en el por tanto de esta sentencia” (2018-02910 de las 9:15 horas del 23 de febrero de 2018).
En otra Sentencia, N° 2023-014857 de las 13:11 horas del 21 de junio de 2023, esta Sala acordó que era necesario sostener en el tiempo ciertas ventajas económicas obtenidas en una Convención Colectiva, dado el comportamiento omisivo de una institución pública, y que no fue sino hasta el final de un proceso laboral, que se quiso corregir la situación económica, pese a la existencia de cosa juzgada. En la resolución, se indicó que:
“Se debe reiterar que, en la Sentencia N° 2021-001157 de las 12:42 horas del 20 de enero de 2021, se conoció otro asunto similar que abordó la razonabilidad de una norma convencional, pero como se indicó anteriormente, fue denunciada oportunamente. Ahora, en este caso que nos ocupa, la conducta omisiva hizo consolidar una situación que ahora sería impropio de esta Sala pronunciarse, con fundamento en la doctrina del “estoppel”. Por Sentencia N° 1992-00746 a las 11:20 horas del trece de marzo de 1992, esta Sala lo define con lo siguiente: “Esta posición es conocida en la doctrina como el estoppel administrativo que impide al interesado beneficiarse de su propio dolo o errores o de la administración y luego acusar la nulidad de los actos por lo que se benefició”. En este sentido, según lo anterior, se debe una protección a la parte que se benefició de buena fe procesal y en resguardo de los valores de la confiabilidad del tráfico jurídico, que en este caso serían la seguridad jurídica y la cosa juzgada”.
Como es claro de todo lo anterior, la Sala, en efecto, ha observado, a través de diferentes instituciones jurídicas, el principio de la seguridad jurídica, especialmente su derivación, el principio de la confianza legítima, como un mecanismo de conservación de los efectos continuados de las normas y actos administrativos como una extensión de derechos subjetivos que debieron protegerse, pese a la derogación normativa cuando el particular haya depositado su confianza en las actuaciones públicas. Estimamos que el comportamiento individual de los trabajadores del Poder Judicial se ha ajustado a las normas que les elevaron expectativas legítimas, las que se han generado con un grado de confiabilidad y de buena fe, en su régimen de pensiones cotizando y trabajando lealmente en el Poder Judicial. Se reconoce, entonces, que cuando hay cambios normativos “el Estado debe respetar la doctrina de los actos propios, o bien -sobre todo cuando se trata de nuevas medidas o de una decisión de improviso- proceder de manera razonable, es decir, con la debida anticipación comunicar su nueva actuación, con medidas transitorias suficientes para que los sujetos puedan acomodar su conducta y proporcionadas al interés público en juego, sin excluir otro tipo de disposiciones correctoras o compensatorias de las circunstancias habituales y estables, que le forjen al ciudadano esperanzas fundadas del mantenimiento de determinada situación”.
Entonces, creemos que es evidente, que se debe preferir opciones que sean acordes a los principios protectores de la persona humana en el campo de los derechos humanos, por la necesidad intrínseca y respeto de la dignidad de las personas, especialmente aquellas que han tenido mayor tiempo de estar sujetos a un régimen jurídico concreto, que no había variado por más de veinte o treinta años, y que, en ese campo, por razones de equidad, justicia y de seguridad jurídica, debieron considerarse disposiciones transitorias correctoras o compensatorias adecuadas a sus situaciones concretas, y acorde a la intensidad de las expectativas legítimas que tuvieran.
D.- Conclusión.
Como corolario de todo lo anterior, estimamos que el Estado, en el ejercicio y ponderación de la toma de sus decisiones sobre fondos de jubilación, debe ser doble para resguardar: a) el equilibrio económico del fondo, con fundamentos en los aspectos demográficos, mortalidad de la población, y situación económica del país, entre otros elementos objetivos; y también, b) los derechos e intereses legítimos de sus destinatarios. Es claro, que hay que someter periódicamente los regímenes de pensiones a los respectivos estudios actuariales, y salvo descalabros económicos devastadores en una economía es que se podrían tomar medidas que afecten severamente a todas las personas que formalmente no han alcanzado ese derecho. Pero, cuando no es esta situación, el Estado y los fondos que administran los regímenes de pensiones, deben procurar soluciones que no anatematicen a los trabajadores en las puertas de la declaratoria del derecho.
Consideramos que en esta materia, no hay simples expectativas de derecho, en atención a una relación de larga duración (muchas veces de toda una vida) que incluye el tiempo servido y la cotización, pero al amparo de las seguridades y garantías de un régimen de empleo público, que en este caso se corresponde a un Poder de la República; en consecuencia, se debería definir para los trabajadores una forma que gradúe los derechos de quienes tienen expectativas legítimas por los años de servicio prestado y lo cotizado al correspondiente fondo de pensiones y jubilaciones.
Los estudios actuariales realizados por el IICE habían contemplado un transitorio de dos años (veinticuatro meses) como parte del análisis de las medidas correctivas del fondo de pensiones. Sin embargo, es claro que dicha información no tuvo consecuencia en el Transitorio VI finalmente aprobado de dieciocho meses, al no considerar la integralidad de la información económica y de los derechos en favor de aquellas personas servidoras que quedarían al descubierto, y a quienes, por consecuencia, no se le otorgó protección alguna pese a estar cuantificados y contar con derechos en vías de consolidación. Si bien, se nos podría argumentar en contra de nuestra conclusión, que siempre quedarán personas excluidas con cualquier fijación temporal que hiciere una disposición transitoria en esta materia, es claro traer el criterio de la mayoría en la Sentencia N° 2021-11957 (antes citada), en cuanto señaló que: “… la conformidad constitucional de medidas de recorte o modificación de condiciones en materia de pensiones requiere que previo a la determinación y como parte ineludible de su fundamentación, se debe contar con el sustento técnico sobre los efectos de las medidas”, interpretación que es correcta y es una obligación que estaría a cargo de la Asamblea Legislativa.
El reconocimiento de los derechos prestacionales analizados, a quienes no estaban aún con derechos consolidados en los estudios actuariales, que vale decir, se calculan a cien años, pudo apenas haberse constituido en un factor de distorsión actuarial entre el tiempo en que fueron finalizados los estudios y la aprobación de la reforma, pero que no hubiera descarrilado los cálculos de solvencia o insolvencia realizados, sumadas las otras medidas introducidas, y que, se hubieran podido corregir administrativamente durante tal largo plazo.
De ahí que, estimamos que resulta inconstitucional por omisión, la fijación de un plazo de dieciocho meses, porque con esa medida estatal fue más restrictiva y desfasada del estudio actuarial, que había ponderado un plazo de veinticuatro meses, con lo que se había medido el grado y adecuación de su impacto económico sobre las prestaciones futuras concedidas, frente a la afectación de los derechos en transición.
Consideramos, que el transitorio por dos años que se había establecido era la forma de establecer protección a los derechos prestacionales en vías de consolidación, el cual fue variado por el legislador (como se ilustró con la intervención de la diputada Díaz Quintana). El presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa es enfático en señalar que se utilizó el criterio discrecional del legislador. En este sentido, invoca una prerrogativa que implicaría una simple adecuación de los actos parlamentarios a la libertad de configuración. Por ello, si solo se usó esta prerrogativa, y no hubo otro criterio de fondo, contrastado con el artículo 71.3, del Convenio N° 102, de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, es claro que el producto es ilegítimo al quedarse corto del estándar técnico previamente establecido, y dado que la Sala ha sostenido que la libertad de configuración del legislador se encuentra limitada al cumplimiento de los estudios técnicos que exija una disposición concreta, sea en temas ambientales, o según la materia que se trate, como es la obligación internacional que nos ocupa.
El derecho sustantivo, además de requerir un sustento razonable debe resguardarse con estudios técnicos que deberán velar por un equilibrio financiero, también, al hacerlo, debía proteger en la medida posible las prestaciones en transición. Además, hay que reconocer que existe una relación de sujeción especial y una verdadera relación jurídica de larga duración con un plan básico de pensiones para los funcionarios judiciales, con implicaciones económicas como podría ser la de los trabajadores que pudieran estar en situaciones amparables, quienes se mantuvieron en sus puestos visualizando planes y proyectos de vida, con ciertas condiciones de salud, y es lógico, pensar que estaría dentro de sus consideraciones, las mejores condiciones de seguridad social y el derecho a la jubilación, todos en un contexto desde el día uno en que se inicia la labor con el Poder Judicial.
Por todo ello, se puede observar una actuación irregular reclamado por los accionantes, que hacen que los medios utilizados y los fines, no quedaran bien cristalizados, especialmente, en tratándose del caso de la desmejora de derechos.
La posición de minoría no debe quedar en este punto en una decisión en abstracto, pues evidentemente, se estaría reconociendo que sí hay afectación a una obligación internacional contenida en el artículo 71.3, del Convenio N° 102, de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, así como los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales de los trabajadores. Por ello concluimos con una sentencia estimatoria por la omisión inconstitucional e inconvencional de la norma, por la insuficiencia parcial en la cobertura de la disposición aprobada por la Asamblea Legislativa, en cuanto fijó dieciocho meses como período transitorio; y, por la insuficiente cobertura pese al estudio actuarial que permitía establecer con claridad un plazo mayor que podía sustentarse técnicamente, que reflejara las necesidades de un equilibrio financiero razonable del fondo, con el de otorgar los derechos fundamentales de los trabajadores expectantes, respetando las expectativas legitimas de los servidores judiciales. En conclusión, la norma transitoria es omisa -inconstitucionalmente- al haberse apartado de los antecedentes actuariales que establecían veinticuatro meses de transitorio, cuyo sustento actuarial fue debidamente establecido.
En consecuencia de todo lo anterior, de conformidad con los artículos 89 y 91, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, dimensionamos esta declaratoria para graduar y dimensionar los efectos retroactivos de esta declaratoria, para establecer que los funcionarios judiciales conservan los derechos a la jubilación y/o pensión conforme al texto anterior a la reforma operada por Ley N° 9544 del 24 de abril de 2018, dentro de los veinticuatro meses posteriores a su promulgación. - Luis Fdo. Salazar Alvarado Ana María Picado Brenes [[]1] CIDH. Informe No. 38/09, Caso No. 12.670. Admisibilidad y Fondo Asociación Nacional de ex Servidores del Instituto Peruano de Seguridad Social y Otras contra Perú, del 27 de marzo de 2009.
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