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Res. 17138-2024 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 21/06/2024
OutcomeResultado
The Chamber denied the amparo because SINAC’s order was based on an opinion classifying the source as a permanent public-domain spring, while review of that opinion, alteration of the protection radius, and any compensation or expropriation must be pursued through ordinary proceedings.La Sala rechazó el amparo porque la orden del SINAC se sustentó en un dictamen que calificó la fuente como naciente permanente de dominio público, mientras que la revisión del dictamen, la modificación del radio protector y cualquier indemnización o expropiación corresponden a la vía ordinaria.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber denied an amparo challenge to a SINAC administrative order suspending tree and vegetation removal, agrochemical application, earthmoving, material stockpiling, and infrastructure construction within the protected area surrounding a spring on private property. MINAE’s Water Directorate had determined in a technical opinion that the water source was a permanent spring in the public domain, making the 100-meter horizontal protection radius established by Article 33 of the Forestry Law applicable. The Chamber found that, prima facie, the administrative order was lawful. It further explained that the summary nature of amparo proceedings precludes reviewing the technical or legal correctness of the Water Directorate’s opinion, setting a different protection radius, or resolving claims for compensation or expropriation. Those issues require evidentiary and ordinary-legality determinations and must therefore be brought before the competent ordinary jurisdiction.La Sala Constitucional rechazó el recurso de amparo interpuesto contra una orden administrativa del SINAC que suspendió la corta o eliminación de árboles y vegetación, la aplicación de agroquímicos, los movimientos de tierra, el acopio de materiales y la construcción de infraestructura dentro del área de protección de una naciente situada en una propiedad privada. La Dirección de Aguas del MINAE había determinado mediante dictamen técnico que el cuerpo de agua era una naciente permanente de dominio público, por lo que resultaba aplicable el radio horizontal de cien metros previsto por el artículo 33 de la Ley Forestal. La Sala consideró que, prima facie, la orden se ajustaba a derecho. También señaló que el amparo, por su naturaleza sumaria, no permite revisar la corrección técnica o legal del dictamen, fijar un radio de protección distinto ni resolver solicitudes de indemnización o expropiación. Tales controversias deben plantearse ante la jurisdicción ordinaria competente.
Key excerptExtracto clave
III.- ON THE MERITS. From the established facts, it follows that there is an opinion issued by MINAE’s Water Directorate—Official Letter DA-UHTPSOG-0014-2020—which conclusively establishes that the captured spring at coordinate CRTM05: 619681-973646, at issue here, is a “permanent spring in the public domain”; therefore, as the respondent authority correctly indicates, Article 33 of the current Forestry Law applies to this case. Accordingly, prima facie, the content of Administrative Order SINAC-ACLA-PSRCB-133-2021, which the petitioner seeks to challenge through amparo proceedings, would be lawful, since Article 34 of the same law provides as follows: Consequently, the appeal must be denied.III.- SOBRE EL FONDO. Del elenco de hechos probados, se colige que existe un dictamen de la Dirección de Aguas del MINAE —el Oficio DA-UHTPSOG-0014-2020—, en el que se establece cabalmente que la naciente captada en la coordenada CRTM05: 619681-973646, que aquí interesa, es una "naciente permanente del dominio público", de manera que, como bien lo indica la Autoridad recurrida, al caso le es aplicable lo dispuesto en el artículo 33 de la Ley Forestal vigente. De esta suerte, prima facie, el contenido de la orden administrativa SINAC-ACLA-PSRCB-133-2021, que el recurrente pretende cuestionar por la vía del amparo, estaría a Derecho, puesto que el artículo 34 de la misma ley establece lo siguiente: Así las cosas, procede declarar sin lugar el recurso.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"A ello se le suma que la Sala Constitucional tampoco es un contralor de la legalidad de las actuaciones o resoluciones de la Dirección de Aguas del MINAE."
"Moreover, the Constitutional Chamber is not a supervisory body charged with reviewing the legality of the acts or decisions of MINAE’s Water Directorate."
Considerando III
"A ello se le suma que la Sala Constitucional tampoco es un contralor de la legalidad de las actuaciones o resoluciones de la Dirección de Aguas del MINAE."
Considerando III
"En todo caso, de persistir en su disconformidad, se le hace ver al amparado que, conforme este Tribunal ha declarado en el pasado, la vía del amparo no es la idónea para establecer, en el plano de la legalidad ordinaria, cuál debería ser el radio de protección de una naciente."
"In any event, should his disagreement persist, the petitioner is advised that, as this Court has previously held, amparo is not the appropriate proceeding for determining, as a matter of ordinary legality, what the protection radius of a spring should be."
Considerando III
"En todo caso, de persistir en su disconformidad, se le hace ver al amparado que, conforme este Tribunal ha declarado en el pasado, la vía del amparo no es la idónea para establecer, en el plano de la legalidad ordinaria, cuál debería ser el radio de protección de una naciente."
Considerando III
"Por último, de estar a derecho el citado dictamen, si el recurrente juzga que tal cosa podría dar pie para que se le otorgue una indemnización o, inclusive, se apruebe una eventual expropiación de los terrenos de su propiedad, se le aclara que tal determinación debe ser efectuada, igualmente, en sede de legalidad ordinaria."
"Lastly, if the cited opinion is lawful and the petitioner considers that it could support an award of compensation or even the eventual expropriation of his land, he is advised that such a determination must likewise be made in ordinary legal proceedings."
Considerando III
"Por último, de estar a derecho el citado dictamen, si el recurrente juzga que tal cosa podría dar pie para que se le otorgue una indemnización o, inclusive, se apruebe una eventual expropiación de los terrenos de su propiedad, se le aclara que tal determinación debe ser efectuada, igualmente, en sede de legalidad ordinaria."
Considerando III
"Se declara SIN LUGAR el recurso."
"The appeal is DENIED."
Por tanto
"Se declara SIN LUGAR el recurso."
Por tanto
Full documentDocumento completo
20240007010444-28555328-1.rtf Decision No. 2024017138 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at nine twenty a.m. on June twenty-first, two thousand twenty-four.
Application for amparo (recurso de amparo) being processed under expediente number 24-010441-0007-CO, filed by [Nombre01 001], identity card [Valor CED05], against the SISTEMA NACIONAL DE ÁREAS DE CONSERVACIÓN (SINAC).- Findings of Fact:
In the challenged administrative order, SINAC, as well as any other competent institution, is under a legal obligation to prevent any action that could adversely affect the spring (naciente); Mr. [mbre01 0 001] was merely ordered to comply with the existing regulations governing protection areas (áreas de protección), and at no time was his status as owner of the property revoked, as he claims in his appeal. It is important to clarify that protection areas constitute a restriction on the right to private property, in accordance with Articles 45 and 50 of the Political Constitution; however, the mbre02 l restriction does not entail the complete loss of the owners’ rights and obligations with respect to such lands. Furthermore, as stated in Biodiversity Law No. 7788, Article 8.—Environmental function of real property: As part of their economic and social function, real properties must fulfill an environmental function.
In accordance with this social and environmental function, the protection areas surrounding surface water bodies constitute a restriction on private property in the social and environmental interest, duly established by law. Restrictions on property rights in protection areas do not entail the loss of the owners’ rights and obligations with respect to these spaces; rather, they entail (a) the elimination of certain powers, (b) the conditional exercise of legal powers, and (c) the mandatory performance of certain duties. The right to private property cannot be exercised without limitation; it is constrained by respect for the right to a healthy environment, the effectiveness of which depends on the proper exercise of the right to private property. Opinion 063-del 01 de abril de 1998, issued by the Procuraduría General de República, addresses the social and environmental function of private property in order to clarify the matter as it applies to this particular case.
Over time, the so-called restrictions on property began to coalesce around a single concept, giving rise to the principle of the social function of property... The validity of this principle within the substantive content of Article 45 of the Constitution has also been affirmed by our Sala Constitucional... It is on the basis of the principle of social function that property is no longer understood as a static and uniform institution, but rather as a dynamic one that adapts to the changes promoted by society. It is therefore appropriate to speak of properties, rather than property, according to the rational use and economic purpose of the asset. Under this conception, introduced several decades ago by Prof. Salvatore Pugliatti (see the essay ‘La proprietá e le proprieté, con reguardo particolare alla proprietá terriera’ in ‘La proprietá nel nuovo diritto’. mbre05, , Milano, 1964, p. 299 et seq.), property may take different forms according to its function or productive nature: agricultural property, urban property, forest property, etc., and this, in turn, will determine the set of rights and obligations characterizing the respective owner.
Although it is acknowledged that the right to private property has, over time, lost its former character of immutability, it must not be overlooked that its basic substance remains intact... Protection Areas (AP) are safeguarded under Ley Forestal No. 7575 of 1996, based on a forward-looking concept of conserving water resources and their associated ecosystems. They constitute a special property regime intended to prevent pollution and manage risk. Their origins lie in a tradition inherited over decades and embodied in Water Law No. 276 of 1942, as well as in the former Ley Forestal; we can therefore affirm that this is one of the oldest and most important protection regimes in the country. The preceding paragraphs more than demonstrate that protection areas enjoy extensive protection in our country. In the present case, SINAC, in fulfillment of its duty to protect the environment, issued an administrative order to guarantee and promote the greatest well-being of all the country’s inhabitants and the protection of the environment.
With respect to the appellant’s assertion that he received no compensation whatsoever from the challenged authority, it is important to clarify that the only circumstance in which SINAC or the State compensates private parties for land is when a protected wildlife area (área silvestre protegida) is created in accordance with the management categories already established by law, which is not the situation in the present case... The appellant is incorrect... in asserting that the spring referred to is not in the public domain (bien público) and is not registered as a permanent spring (naciente permanente). As shown in administrative case file [Valor 003] maintained by the Oficina Subregional de Coto Brus, pages 21 to 24 contain the Opinion of the Dirección de Aguas of MINAE, official letter , which determines that the water body is a permanent spring in the public domain (dominio público) and that, pursuant to the applicable regulations, Ley Forestal N° 7575, Article 33(a), this water body must have a protection area with a radius of 100 metros.
As previously stated, the issuance of determinations concerning water bodies falls to the Dirección de Aguas, which is the competent authority for that purpose; its determinations are duly published on the SINIGIRH website, a map viewer through which any citizen may consult and verify the information. As for the appellant’s statement concerning whether the flow rate is too low for use by an ASADA or similar entity, I reiterate that it is the responsibility of the Dirección de Aguas to determine the status of the water body and, on that basis, whether it may be used for various needs; therefore, SINAC is not responsible for issuing a determination on this matter. Furthermore, Article 34 of Ley Forestal N° 7575 establishes an implicit prohibition that precludes the cutting or felling of trees or vegetation within the protection areas established in Article 33 of the same body of law. Opinion C-148-2012, dated 12 de junio de 2012, issued by the Procuraduría General de la Republica, extensively addresses the protection areas established in Ley Forestal N° 7575 and the restrictions and encumbrances (afectaciones) applicable to them; SINAC therefore acted in compliance with the existing regulations, which state as follows: ‘The protection areas provided for in Articles 33 and 34 of the Ley Forestal.
Accordingly, in the case of private properties lawfully registered through the exercise of ten-year possession prior to their designation for public use (afectación demanial), if the springs do not supply water to any population or it is not advisable to reserve them for that purpose, the protection area extending 100 m around permanent springs and the corresponding prohibition under Articles 33 and 34 of the Ley Forestal apply (opinion OJ-21-2008). That prohibition is not limited to preventing the cutting of trees, because those provisions must be interpreted harmoniously with Article 58 thereof within protected wildlife areas or, in general, within the Patrimonio Natural del Estado, insofar as Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias does not apply; in that event, they would also be in the public domain and would be covered by the prohibition set forth in Articles 1 and 18 of Ley 7575 (C-42-99 and OJ-64-2002).
In the case of non-permanent springs (nacientes no permanentes), Article 149 of the Water Law establishes a restricted radius of 60 m for springs originating in hills and 50 m for those on flat land. With respect to the appellant’s statements regarding the sale of lots located within the protection area of a permanent spring, under the environmental regulations currently in force, the existence of such lots within the protection area would result in actions constituting an environmental offense (delito ambiental), because the protection area of 100 metros established by the Law would not be respected... The appellant is incorrect in stating that he is turning to the Chamber in search of a sensible solution, because his right to dispose of the property is not being revoked. As demonstrated in the preceding paragraphs, SINAC, in the lawful exercise of its functions and authority as the entity responsible for the comprehensive management of the conservation and sustainable management of wildlife, forest resources, protected wildlife areas, watersheds, and water systems, is carrying out its duty to protect the environment for the well-being of present and future generations and may, by law, issue any administrative orders necessary to guarantee that environmental protection...” It requests that the appeal be dismissed.
Justice Garro Vargas writes for the Court; and,
Considering:
The applicant alleges that, because of the existence of a natural water flow—a spring (naciente)—within a property belonging to him, which had been inspected on January 24, 2020, by a MINAE official in the San Vito area, administrative order SINAC-ACLA-PSRCB-133-2021 was issued, ordering him as follows: “... IMMEDIATELY SUSPEND any activity involving the cutting, girdling, or poisoning of trees; removal of vegetation; application of agrochemicals; earthworks (movimientos de tierra); stockpiling of materials; and construction of infrastructure within the protection areas (áreas de protección) established by Article 33 of Ley Forestal 7575, as of service of this order, on properties belonging to you located in the province of Puntarenas, canton of Coto Brus, Sabalito district, Dirección01 …” The applicant alleges that he had noted the following: “..., the water flow is intermittent, flowing naturally and continuously along its channel during some months and drying up naturally during other months...” and, accordingly, objects to administrative order SINAC-ACLA-PSRCB-133-2021 requiring him to comply with the foregoing within a horizontal radius of 100 meters from its location.
He asserts that the spring at issue is not public property and is not registered as a permanent spring in SENARE, but is entirely for private use because its flow rate is very low and it could not be used publicly as an ASADA or similar entity. He adds that, during the winter of 2020, there was a landslide at the site and the existence of that water source was established; however, it is so small that it became completely covered. The responsible institution was therefore asked to reinspect the flow rate so that he could appeal for a shorter distance radius measured from the spring’s location. Nevertheless, that official decided not to reverse his decision, even though Nombre02 determination greatly harms the applicant because, as that land is his only asset, he is unable to dispose of the property in its entirety, since the many people interested in buying it want to do so to build their homes.
In this regard, he asserts that administrative order SINAC-ACLA-PSRCB-133-2021 prevents him from disposing of 100% of his property, depriving his ownership rights of their substance without his receiving any compensation from the respondent authority. He further clarifies that he has never intended to deforest the area where the spring is located, but insists that protecting it in this manner makes it impossible for him to sell lots, since the imposed demarcation leaves him with less than 100 square meters of land. He considers Article 45 of the Political Constitution to have been violated to his detriment.
The following facts are deemed duly established and relevant to the determination of this matter, either because they have been substantiated or because the respondent failed to address them as directed in the initial order:
“...1. A developed spring (naciente captada) was located at coordinate Dirección08: 619681-973646, with two concrete tanks. Both are connected to the spring and, according to inquiries, supply approximately six families in the area. They use the water for human consumption because these homes are not served by AyA.
2. A newly constructed water-catchment well was located 35 meters from the developed spring. The date of construction and the owner of the property where it is located are unknown.
3. A house under construction, at least 50% complete, was located. From its center, this house is located approximately 60 meters from the spring.
4. No tree cutting or cleared construction sites (planteles) were found near the spring’s protection area. Nor has the MINAE Water Directorate issued a determination concerning this spring.
Conclusions and recommendations.
Based on the foregoing, the following is recommended:
1. Inform Mr. [Nombre01 003] that this office will request the cooperation of other institutions in order to resolve the matter properly and that he will be notified of the outcome of his request in due course.
2. Enter the complaint against an unknown person for violation of Ley Forestal 7575 into SITADA in order to continue the corresponding proceedings.
3. Issue and serve an administrative precautionary measure (medida cautelar administrativa) or warning upon the legal representative of the Municipalidad de Coto Brus and the head of that municipality’s Tax Administration Department, requesting that they refrain from granting construction permits within the 100 meters prescribed by Article 33 of Ley Forestal 7575 for permanent springs until the MINAE Water Directorate issues its determination concerning the status of the water source. It is important to mention that, according to local residents, these families have drawn water from this spring for more than 40 years. The foregoing is based on the observations made in this oficio and because the complaint for violation of Ley Forestal is under review.
4. In the precautionary measure, set a date with the Municipalidad de Coto Brus for a joint site visit to determine whether the recent buildings located within the spring’s 100-meter protection area have or had construction permits. If it is confirmed that they had municipal permits, copies of those permits shall be requested in order to identify the possible violators.
5. Urgently request that the MINAE Water Directorate issue a determination concerning the status of the water source located at coordinate CRTM05: 619681-973646 and accompany us during the site inspection to assess the uses of water from the developed springs at the site.” (see report and Oficio SINAC-ACLA-P-SRCB-376-2019).
You are hereby warned that, should you engage in the same conduct again or fail to comply with the order issued herein, criminal proceedings will be brought against you for the offense of ‘Disobedience to Authority’ established in Article 314 of the Código Penal and for any other offenses established under national law. It is hereby recorded that this administrative warning was duly read to Mr./Ms. [mbre01 0 001] by the serving official. An identical original is hereby delivered, and a copy is retained in the records of the Coto Brus Subregional Office” (see Administrative Order N° SINAC-ACLA-P-SRCB-133-2021).
It may be inferred from the established facts that there is an opinion issued by the MINAE Water Directorate—Official Communication DA-UHTPSOG-0014-2020—which conclusively establishes that the spring (naciente) captured at coordinate CRTM05: 619681-973646, which is at issue here, is a “permanent spring in the public domain.” Therefore, as the respondent authority correctly states, Article 33 of the Ley Forestal currently in force applies to this case, as follows:
“ARTICLE 33.- Protection areas The following are hereby declared protection areas:
Accordingly, prima facie, the content of Administrative Order SINAC-ACLA-PSRCB-133-2021, which the petitioner seeks to challenge through an amparo proceeding (recurso de amparo), would be lawful, since Article 34 of the same law provides as follows:
“ARTICLE 34.- Prohibition against cutting trees in protected areas The cutting or removal of trees in the protection areas described in the preceding article is prohibited, except for projects declared by the Executive Branch to be in the national interest.
The setback determinations (alineamientos) that must be processed in connection with these areas shall be made by the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo.” Moreover, the Constitutional Chamber is not a body charged with reviewing the legality of the actions or decisions of the MINAE Water Directorate; consequently, it is not called upon to determine whether the opinion contained in “Official Communication DA-UHTPSOG-0014-2020,” on which that order is based, is consistent with the facts and the legal regulations currently in force. This is because an amparo proceeding is inherently summary in nature—that is, brief and straightforward—and its processing is incompatible with slow and complex evidentiary proceedings or with the need first to examine—in declaratory proceedings—whether the rights of a subconstitutional nature cited by the parties as part of the factual basis of the amparo petition or the legally required report (informe de ley), as applicable, actually exist.
In any event, should his disagreement persist, the amparo petitioner is advised that, as this Court has held in the past, an amparo proceeding is not the proper avenue for determining, as a matter of ordinary legality, what the protection radius of a spring should be (see Judgment Nº 2023006362 at 09:15 hours on 17 de marzo de 2023).
Lastly, if the aforementioned opinion is lawful and the petitioner believes that it could provide grounds for awarding him compensation or even approving a possible expropriation of his property, he is advised that such a determination must likewise be made in ordinary legal proceedings. Accordingly, when considering an analogous situation in Judgment Nº 2021024817 at 09:20 hours on 5 de noviembre de 2021, the Chamber held as follows:
“In the case under review, the petitioner alleges that she owns real property in Santa Bárbara de Heredia; however, it is affected by the regulations governing the protection of aquifers, and she is therefore unable to exercise her property rights... Consequently, it may be inferred that what the petitioner seeks is for the Chamber, through the amparo petition, to order the respondent municipalities either to have one of them expropriate her land or to remove the property’s protected designation and grant water availability. Accordingly, it must be reiterated that, in general, an amparo petition may proceed only if the existence of an interference, or threat of interference, with one of the rights or guarantees set forth in the Political Constitution or in the international human-rights instruments signed by the country is established. It is a summary proceeding whose processing is not compatible with slow and complex evidentiary proceedings or with the need first to examine—in declaratory proceedings—whether the rights of a subconstitutional nature cited by the parties as part of the factual basis of the amparo petition or the legally required report, as applicable, actually exist.
It is evident that this Chamber lacks such jurisdiction. As for the request that removal of the protected designation or the consequent expropriation of the land be ordered, the competent jurisdiction must determine whether such relief is appropriate under the subconstitutional legal system. The petitioner must therefore bring her claims through ordinary proceedings, where she may fully litigate the merits of the matter and assert those claims. Consequently, the petition must be dismissed, as ordered herein.” Accordingly, the petition must be denied.
The parties are hereby advised that, if they submitted any paper documents, as well as objects or evidence contained on any additional electronic, computing, magnetic, optical, or telematic device, or produced using new technologies, those materials must be collected from the court office within a maximum period of 30 business days from service of this judgment. Otherwise, any material not collected within that period shall be destroyed, pursuant to the “Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial,” approved by the Full Court at Session N° 27-11 of 22 de agosto del 2011, Article XXVI, and published in Boletín Judicial number 19 of 26 de enero del 2012, as well as the resolution approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial at Session N° 43-12 held on 3 de mayo del 2012, Article LXXXI.
Por tanto:
The petition is DENIED.
Fernando Castillo V.
Presiding Judge Paul Rueda L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Anamari Garro V.
Ingrid Hess H.
Ana Cristina Fernandez A.
Alexandra Alvarado P.
CASE FILE N° 24-010441-0007-CO Telephone numbers: Telf01/ ALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: Telf02 / Telf03. Website: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Dirección03, Dirección04, 100 meters south of the Perpetuo Socorro church). Filing office for matters involving vulnerable groups: Dirección05, San José, Catedral District, Dirección06, between 19th and 21st Streets, Dirección07
20240007010444-28555328-1.rtf SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas veinte minutos del veintiuno de junio de dos mil veinticuatro .
Recurso de amparo que se tramita en expediente número 24-010441-0007-CO, interpuesto por [Nombre01 001], cédula de identidad [Valor CED05], contra el SISTEMA NACIONAL DE ÁREAS DE CONSERVACIÓN (SINAC).-
Resultando:
Redacta la Magistrada Garro Vargas; y,
Considerando:
El recurrente acusa que, a causa de la existencia de un flujo de agua natural (naciente) dentro de un inmueble de su propiedad —el cual había sido inspeccionado, el 24 de enero de 2020, por un funcionario del MINAE en la zona de San Vito—, se emitió la orden administrativa SINAC-ACLA-PSRCB-133-2021, ordenándole lo siguiente: "... SUSPENDER de inmediato toda actividad que implique, corta, anillamiento o envenenamiento de árboles, eliminación de vegetación, aplicación de agroquímicos, movimientos de tierra, acopio de materiales y establecimiento de infraestructuras dentro de las áreas de protección que declara el artículo 33 de la Ley Forestal 7575 a partir de la notificación de la presente, lo anterior en terrenos de su propiedad localizados en la provincia de Puntarenas, cantón de Coto Brus, distrito Sabalito, Dirección01 …”. El recurrente alega haber anotado lo siguiente: "..., el flujo de agua es intermitente, el cual escurre en su cause en forma natural continua durante algunos meses y se seca de forma natural en otros meses..." y, por ello, objeta que en la orden administrativa SINAC-ACLA-PSRCB-133-2021 se le exija cumplir lo anterior con un rango de 100 metros horizontales desde donde esta se encuentra, pues afirma que la naciente que interesa no es un bien público, ni se encuentra registrada como naciente permanente en el SENARE, sino que es totalmente de uso privado, debido a que su caudal es muy bajo y no se podría utilizar públicamente como ASADA o sus similares.
Agrega que, durante el invierno de 2020, hubo un deslizamiento de tierra en el lugar y se determinó la existencia de dicho nacimiento de agua, siendo que la misma es tan pequeña que quedó totalmente cubierta, por lo que se le pidió a la institución encargada que realizara nuevamente la inspección del caudal, para así poder apelar por un rango de distancia menor, demarcado desde donde se encuentra la naciente. No obstante, ese funcionario decidió no dar vuelta atrás su decisión, pese a que Nombre02 determinación perjudica grandemente al recurrente, por cuanto, al ser ese terreno su único patrimonio, se le hace imposible de disponer de la propiedad en su totalidad, ya que la gran cantidad de personas interesadas en comprar, quieren hacerlo para construir su casa. En este sentido, asegura que la orden administrativa SINAC-ACLA-PSRCB-133-2021 le impide disponer del 100% de su propiedad, vaciando de contenido sus derechos de propietario sin recibir ningún tipo de indemnización por parte de la autoridad recurrida.
Además, aclara que en ningún momento ha sido su interés el deforestar la zona en la que la naciente se encuentra, pero insiste en que, al estar protegida de esa manera, se le hace imposible vender lotes, ya que con la demarcación impuesta no le quedan ni 100 metros cuadrados de terreno. Considera violado en su perjuicio el artículo 45 de la Constitución Política.
De importancia para la decisión de este asunto, se estiman como debidamente demostrados los siguientes hechos, sea porque así han sido acreditados o bien porque el recurrido haya omitido referirse a ellos según lo prevenido en el auto inicial:
"...1. Se ubicó una naciente captada en la coordenada Dirección08: 619681-973646 con dos tanques construidos en concreto. Ambos están captados y según las averiguaciones abastecen a unas seis familias del lugar. Utilizan el agua para consumo humano, ya que estas casas no son atendidas por el AyA.
2. Se ubicó un pozo para captación de agua recién construido a una distancia de 35 metros del punto de la naciente captada. Se desconoce la fecha de construcción y propietario del predio donde se ubica.
3. Se ubicó una casa en construcción con al menos un 50% de avance. Esta casa se uibca (sic) desde su centro hasta la naciente a 60 metros de distancia aproximadamente.
4. No se ubicó corta de árboles o planteles cerca del área de protección de la naciente. Tampoco se tiene pronunciamiento de la Dirección de Aguas del Minae con respecto a esta naciente.
Conclusiones y recomendaciones.
Con base en lo anterior se recomienda lo siguiente:
1. Comunicar al señor [Nombre01 003] que esta oficina estará solicitando la colaboración de otras instituciones para mejor resolver y se le notificará los resultados de su solicitud en su momento.
2. Incorporar al SITADA la denuncia por infracción a la Ley Forestal 7575 contra ignorado para continuar con el trámite respectivo.
3. Dictar y notificar media cautelar administrativa o apercibimiento al representante legal de la Municipalidad de Coto Brus y al jefe del departamento de administración tributaria de esta municipalidad solicitando se abstengan de otorgar permisos de construcción dentro de los 100 metros que señala el artículo 33 de la Ley Forestal 7575 para nacientes permanentes, hasta tanto se cuente con el pronunciamiento de la Dirección de Aguas del MIinae, sobre la condición de la fuente de agua. Es importante mencionar que estas familias tienen más de 40 años de captar agua de esta naciente según lo indican los vecinos. Lo anterior por las observaciones hechas en este oficio y por encontrarse en trámite la denuncia por infracción a la Ley Forestal.
4. Fijar fecha en la medida cautelar, a la municipalidad de Coto Brus para realizar visita conjunta al sitio, a fin de valorar si las construcciones recientes que se ubican dentro de los 100 metros de área de protección de la naciente, cuentan o contaron con los permisos de construcción. Si se confirma que contaban con los permisos municipales se requerirá copia de los permisos para determinar los nombres de los posibles infractores.
5. Solicitar con carácter de urgencia a la dirección de agua del Minae para que se pronuncie sobre la condición de la fuente de agua ubicada en la coordenada CRTM05: 619681-973646 y para que nos acompañe en la inspección al sitio para valorar los usos al agua de las nacientes. captadas en el sitio". (ver informe y Oficio SINAC-ACLA-P-SRCB-376-2019).
Sin embargo, el acta de clausura de la construcción elaborada por la Municipalidad de Coto Brus (documento oficial CED04) establecía que la vivienda tanía un área de 112 m², estaba construida con concreto prefabricado y su techo era de metal (perling). Además, aunque el día que se confeccionó el acta el dueño era desconocido, según el acta N° 0972, el dueño del terreno era Nombre04, cédula de identidad CED02 (informe y prueba que obra en el expediente).
Se le previene en este mismo acto que de volver a incurrir en la misma conducta o incurrir en el incumplimiento de la orden aquí emitida se le seguirá causa penal por el delito de 'Desobediencia a la Autoridad' establecido en el artículo 314 del Código Penal y por aquellas otras que establezca la normativa nacional. Se hace constar que la presente advertencia administrativa fue debidamente leída al señor(a) [mbre01 0 001] por el funcionario que notifica, En este acto se hace entrega de un original idéntico y se conserva copia en los registros de la Oficina Subregional de Coto Brus" (ver orden administrativa N° SINAC-ACLA-P-SRCB-133-2021).
Del elenco de hechos probados, se colige que existe un dictamen de la Dirección de Aguas del MINAE —el Oficio DA-UHTPSOG-0014-2020—, en el que se establece cabalmente que la naciente captada en la coordenada CRTM05: 619681-973646, que aquí interesa, es una "naciente permanente del dominio público", de manera que, como bien lo indica la Autoridad recurrida, al caso le es aplicable lo dispuesto en el artículo 33 de la Ley Forestal vigente, a saber:
"ARTICULO 33.- Areas de protección Se declaran áreas de protección las siguientes:
De esta suerte, prima facie, el contenido de la orden administrativa SINAC-ACLA-PSRCB-133-2021, que el recurrente pretende cuestionar por la vía del amparo, estaría a Derecho, puesto que el artículo 34 de la misma ley establece lo siguiente:
"ARTICULO 34.- Prohibición para talar en áreas protegidas Se prohíbe la corta o eliminación de árboles en las áreas de protección descritas en el artículo anterior, excepto en proyectos declarados por el Poder Ejecutivo como de conveniencia nacional.
Los alineamientos que deban tramitarse en relación con estas áreas, serán realizados por el Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo".
A ello se le suma que la Sala Constitucional tampoco es un contralor de la legalidad de las actuaciones o resoluciones de la Dirección de Aguas del MINAE, por lo que no está llamada a revisar si el dictamen "Oficio DA-UHTPSOG-0014-2020", que le da pie a esa orden, se ajusta o no a los hechos y a la normativa legal vigente, puesto que el proceso de amparo es de carácter eminentemente sumario —es decir, breve y sencillo— y su tramitación no es compatible con la práctica de diligencias probatorias lentas y complejas, o con la necesidad de entrar previamente a examinar —con carácter declarativo— si los derechos de rango infra constitucional que las partes citan como parte del elenco fáctico del recurso de amparo o del informe de ley, según sea el caso, existen en realidad.
En todo caso, de persistir en su disconformidad, se le hace ver al amparado que, conforme este Tribunal ha declarado en el pasado, la vía del amparo no es la idónea para establecer, en el plano de la legalidad ordinaria, cuál debería ser el radio de protección de una naciente (ver la sentencia Nº 2023006362 de las 09:15 horas del 17 de marzo de 2023).
Por último, de estar a derecho el citado dictamen, si el recurrente juzga que tal cosa podría dar pie para que se le otorgue una indemnización o, inclusive, se apruebe una eventual expropiación de los terrenos de su propiedad, se le aclara que tal determinación debe ser efectuada, igualmente, en sede de legalidad ordinaria. Por ello, al conocer de una situación análoga en sentencia Nº 2021024817 de las 09:20 horas del 5 de noviembre de 2021, la Sala declaró lo siguiente:
"En el caso bajo estudio, la recurrente alega que tiene un inmueble en Santa Bárbara de Heredia, sin embargo, este se encuentra afectado por la normativa relativa a la protección de los mantos acuíferos, razón por la cual no puede ejercer su derecho a la propiedad... En consecuencia, se extrae que la recurrente lo que pretende es que, por vía del recurso de amparo, la Sala ordene a los municipios recurridos, que alguno de ellos le expropie su terreno, o que se desafecte la propiedad y se conceda la disponibilidad de agua. Así las cosas, debe recalcarse que en general, la procedencia del recurso de amparo está condicionada a que se acredite la existencia de una turbación, o amenaza de turbación, a uno de los derechos o garantías contemplados en la Carta Política o los instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos suscritos por el país. Se trata de un proceso de carácter sumario cuya tramitación no se aviene bien con la práctica de diligencias probatorias lentas y complejas, o con la necesidad de entrar previamente a examinar –con carácter declarativo– si existen en realidad o no derechos de rango infra constitucional que las partes citen como parte del elenco fáctico del recurso de amparo o del informe de ley, según sea el caso.
Es evidente que esa es una competencia de la que esta Sala carece. En cuanto a la pretensión de que se ordene la desafectación o la consecuente expropiación del terreno, debe determinarse en la jurisdicción competente su procedencia, de acuerdo con el ordenamiento infraconstitucional, por lo que las pretensiones de la recurrente debe plantearlas en la vía ordinaria, en la cual podrá en forma amplia, discutir el fondo del asunto y hacerlas valer. En consecuencia, el recurso debe ser desestimado, como se dispone".
Así las cosas, procede declarar sin lugar el recurso.
Se previene a las partes que, de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, éstos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.
Por tanto:
Se declara SIN LUGAR el recurso.
Fernando Castillo V.
Paul Rueda L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Anamari Garro V.
Ingrid Hess H.
Ana Cristina Fernandez A.
Alexandra Alvarado P.
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