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Res. 31711-2023 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 06/12/2023
OutcomeResultado
The Chamber summarily rejected both the action and the supporting intervention because the petitioner lacked direct diffuse-interest standing and identified no underlying proceeding supporting incidental standing.La Sala rechazó de plano la acción y la coadyuvancia porque el accionante carecía de legitimación directa por intereses difusos y no acreditó un asunto previo que sustentara legitimación incidental.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber summarily rejected an action challenging, as an unconstitutional omission, the 2021 amendment to the Disability, Old Age and Death Insurance Regulation, particularly its failure to create a transitional regime that would phase in changes concerning early retirement, retirement age, and pension calculations. The Chamber did not examine the substantive constitutionality of the reform or decide whether it violated acquired rights, consolidated legal situations, legitimate expectations, or the cited international conventions. It held that IVM-insured persons and contributors form an easily identifiable group and that the regulation can affect their rights individually and directly. The dispute therefore did not concern a diffuse interest capable of supporting a direct constitutional action under Article 75, second paragraph, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law. Potentially affected persons instead had to bring an administrative or judicial claim first, thereby creating the pending underlying proceeding required to establish incidental standing for a constitutional challenge.La Sala Constitucional rechazó de plano una acción que cuestionaba, por omisión, la reforma de 2021 al Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte, particularmente la ausencia de un régimen transitorio que aplicara gradualmente los cambios sobre jubilación anticipada, edad de retiro y cálculo de las pensiones. La Sala no examinó la constitucionalidad material de la reforma ni decidió si esta vulneraba derechos adquiridos, situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, la confianza legítima o los convenios internacionales invocados. Determinó que las personas aseguradas y cotizantes del IVM constituyen un grupo fácilmente identificable y que la normativa puede incidir individual y directamente en sus derechos; por ello, la controversia no involucra un interés difuso que permita presentar directamente la acción conforme al artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Los posibles afectados debían formular primero un reclamo administrativo o judicial que sirviera como asunto previo para obtener legitimación incidental.
Key excerptExtracto clave
The petitioner bases his standing to bring this action on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, expressly stating that “(…) direct standing is held to file this action through the diffuse interests of my clients, as well as of all persons who belong to the IVM regime and are affected by the omission challenged in these proceedings.” Nevertheless, this Chamber considers that the petitioner lacks direct standing to come before this Court through a constitutional action based on the defense of an alleged diffuse interest, not only because he fails to specify the diffuse interest invoked, but also because the amendment to the Disability, Old Age and Death Insurance Regulation—which he seeks to challenge for allegedly lacking a transitional provision phasing in its provisions—clearly permits individual and direct application to an easily identifiable group, namely insured persons who contribute or pay into this particular regime. Consequently, under the precedents cited in the preceding consideration, the defense of diffuse interests cannot be invoked in the circumstances presented by the petitioner. Rather, this regulation may give rise to different individual or collective claims through formally organized groups, which could provide the basis for a constitutional action and confer standing. Those who believe that their acquired rights, consolidated legal situations, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, or other fundamental principles or rights have been violated through direct application of the challenged regulation may assert their rights—individually or collectively—in the appropriate administrative or judicial forum and thereby obtain the pending underlying matter required by Article 75, first paragraph, of the law governing this jurisdiction. However, the petitioner did not identify any prior matter pending in administrative-exhaustion proceedings or before the courts that would permit admission of this action on the basis of incidental standing. The Chamber therefore finds that the petitioner lacks active standing to bring this action, and the application must be summarily rejected. VI.- CONCLUSION. In view of the foregoing, the action is inadmissible for lack of direct standing. THEREFORE: The action, as well as the intervention in support filed by Nombre14525, is summarily rejected.Ahora bien, el accionante fundamenta su legitimación para interponer esta acción en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, pues expresamente indica que “(…) se ostenta la legitimidad directa para interponer la presente acción, mediante la figura de intereses difusos de mis representados, así como de todas aquellas personas que se pertenecen al régimen del IVM y que se ven afectas por la omisión que se impugna en esta vía”. No obstante, considera esta Sala que el actor carece de legitimación directa para acudir ante este Tribunal por la vía de acción de inconstitucionalidad, con base en la defensa de un supuesto interés difuso, no solo porque omite precisar cuál es el interés difuso invocado, sino, también, porque la reforma al Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte -que pretende impugnar por supuestamente carecer de un transitorio que gradúe la vigencia de sus disposiciones- es evidente que admite una aplicación individual y directa, a un grupo de personas fácilmente identificables, como lo son las personas aseguradas que cotizan o aportan a este régimen en particular. En consecuencia, conforme a los antecedentes jurisprudenciales citados en el considerando anterior, no es admisible alegar la defensa de intereses difusos en las circunstancias que plantea el accionante. Por el contrario, se trata de una normativa que puede dar lugar a diferentes reclamos individuales o colectivos a través de grupos formalmente organizados; que puedan servir de base a la acción de inconstitucionalidad y otorgar legitimación para actuar. En este sentido, quienes estimen vulnerados sus derechos adquiridos o situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, el principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad u otros principios o derechos fundamentales, en virtud de la aplicación directa del reglamento impugnado, bien pueden reclamar sus derechos -en forma individual o colectiva- en la vía administrativa o judicial correspondiente y así contar con el asunto previo pendiente de resolver que exige el artículo 75, párrafo primero, de la ley que rige a esta jurisdicción. Sin embargo, la parte accionante no mencionó la existencia de algún caso previo pendiente de resolver en procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa o ante tribunales de justicia que permita admitir esta acción con base en la legitimación incidental. Por ende, estima esta Sala que el accionante carece de legitimación activa para promover esta acción, por lo que procede rechazar de plano su gestión. VI.- CONCLUSIÓN. En virtud de lo expuesto, la acción resulta inadmisible por falta de legitimación directa. POR TANTO: Se rechaza de plano la acción, así como la coadyuvancia de Nombre14525 .
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"Se reitera que el interés difuso no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional (lo que supondría la instauración tácita de acción popular no contemplada por la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional); pero tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues, en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de ese reclamo."
"The Chamber reiterates that a diffuse interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with a right to safeguard constitutional legality—which would tacitly establish a popular action not contemplated by the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law—but neither can it be so specific as to permit an individual claim, because standing would then arise from that claim."
Considerando IV, cita de la sentencia n.° 2021-011994
"Se reitera que el interés difuso no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional (lo que supondría la instauración tácita de acción popular no contemplada por la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional); pero tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues, en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de ese reclamo."
Considerando IV, cita de la sentencia n.° 2021-011994
"Así, ejemplos de tales intereses son el derecho a un ambiente sano y armonioso, la defensa del patrimonio histórico, la materia electoral, la defensa del derecho a la salud y la fiscalización de los fondos públicos."
"Examples of such interests include the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, protection of historical heritage, electoral matters, defense of the right to health, and oversight of public funds."
Considerando IV
"Así, ejemplos de tales intereses son el derecho a un ambiente sano y armonioso, la defensa del patrimonio histórico, la materia electoral, la defensa del derecho a la salud y la fiscalización de los fondos públicos."
Considerando IV
"Alega que, a partir de la entrada en vigor de la reforma, el 11 de enero de 2024, todas las personas, sin excepción alguna, se verán afectadas por esta."
"He alleges that, once the reform enters into force on January 11, 2024, every person, without exception, will be affected by it."
Considerando V
"Alega que, a partir de la entrada en vigor de la reforma, el 11 de enero de 2024, todas las personas, sin excepción alguna, se verán afectadas por esta."
Considerando V
Full documentDocumento completo
Document Review Decision No. 2023031711 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine thirty hours on seis de diciembre de dos mil veintitres. Action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) filed by Nombre14517, identity card n.° CED11565, attorney bar card n.° CED11566, in his capacity as special judicial attorney-in-fact (apoderado especial judicial) for [Nombre62 026], [Nombre 002], [Nombre 003], [Nombre 004], [Nombre 005], [Nombre 006], [Nombre 007], [Nombre 008], [Nombre 009], [Nombre 010], [Nombre 011], [Nombre 012], [Nombre 013], [Nombre 014], [Nombre 015], [Nombre 016], and [Nombre 017]; challenging “the reform of the CCSS IVM Pension Scheme due to the omission of a transitional provision that would have allowed the reform to be implemented gradually.” BACKGROUND: 1.- In a written submission received by the Office of the Clerk of the Constitutional Chamber at 10:20 on 9 de noviembre de 2023, the petitioner alleges that “the reform of the CCSS IVM Pension Scheme due to the omission of a transitional provision that would have allowed the reform to be implemented gradually” is unconstitutional.
He states that, through this action of unconstitutionality, he seeks to challenge, on the grounds of omission, the reform of the Regulations Governing the IVM Pension Scheme, specifically Articles 5, 23, and 24, together with the repeal of transitional provisions XII, XIII, XIV, and XV, concerning the effective date of previous reforms, benefit amounts, sums, and ages. He states that the reform was approved by the CCSS Board of Directors in resolution n.° 12 adopted at session n.° 9198 of 12 de agosto de 2021, and that it provides for three amendments to the disability, old-age, and death pension scheme:
IVM Strengthening Plan Dimension Retirement AgeThe right to an Old-Age Pension (Pensión por Vejez) for men and women remains at 65 years of age. The right to early retirement on grounds of old age for men is eliminated. The right to early retirement on grounds of old age for women is maintained, adjusting the minimum age for such retirement to 63 years with 405 contributions for higher ages, in accordance with Article 50 of the IVM Regulations (Reglamento del IVM). It takes effect 24 months after publication of the regulations in Diario La Gaceta.Calculation FormulaEstablish the Average Reference Salary (Salario Promedio de Referencia, SPR) as the average of the best 300 inflation-indexed salaries over the entire contribution history. Use the SPR as the Placement Salary (Salario de Ubicación, SU) to define the contributor’s basic benefit range. The additional amount is calculated beginning with the 300 contributions made to the IVM.
It takes effect 24 months after publication of the regulations in Diario La Gaceta.Regulatory ContributionsThe current conditions are maintained It alleges that the approved reform is deficient because it did not establish a transitional provision (transitorio) allowing for its gradual implementation. It considers that this omission is contrary to Constitutional Law (Derecho de la Constitución). It argues that an action of unconstitutionality by omission (acción de inconstitucionalidad por omisión) permits constitutional review in cases involving normative omissions (omisiones normativas) that violate a provision expressly or manifestly contained in the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), as well as those that infringe constitutional principles or fundamental rights. In this case, it alleges that the amendment is contrary to Conventions 102, 118, 128 and 157 of the International Labour Organization, as well as Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights; Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Articles 11, 18, 28, 33, 34, 40, 41, 45, 50, 51, 65, 73, 74, 177, 188, 189 and related provisions of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica.
It also contravenes the following principles: democracy, equality, publicity, solidarity, legal certainty, good faith, legitimate expectations, transparency, protection against impairment of property, non-confiscation, vested rights, and consolidated legal situations. Similarly, the Chamber (Sala) has held (e.g., judgment n.° 003911-2005) that the admissibility requirements for an action of unconstitutionality against a provision must also be observed when bringing an action by omission. In this regard, it states that the subject matter of the action must be specified, which requires the petitioner to establish, first, which provision is lacking and, second, that there is a mandate—even if only implicit—to enact it. In this specific case, a provision is lacking that establishes a transitional arrangement allowing for the gradual implementation of the IVM reform, as is compliance with the CCSS’s constitutional obligation to regulate social security and the pension system, in this case the IVM.
The petitioner sets forth the following facts: through resolution n.° 12 adopted at session n.° 9198 of 12 de agosto de 2021, the CCSS Board of Directors approved the reform of Articles 5, 23 and 24 of the Regulations of the IVM Pension Scheme (Reglamento del Régimen de Pensiones del IVM), together with the repeal of transitional provisions XII, XIII, XIV and XV, concerning the effective date of prior reforms, benefit amounts, sums, and ages. That reform was published on 11 de enero de 2022 in La Gaceta n.° 5 and established the following amendments:
So, I say, why are we making things so complicated by looking for those loopholes—and forgive the expression, but that is how I feel—if there is an action that is wanted, the only one I agree with is men at 65, women at 63, which is what you put here, without the need for any procedure; that is the retirement age (edad de jubilación) from the moment this Board approves it, and then we are done, that is it (...) Director Rodríguez González: Nombre14518, since you are talking about that, explain to me whether you conducted any study and that is indeed the case, or whether you are speculating, because the first thing you refer to is the perception concerning the economic recovery based on the data presented, but the situation that has been developing with the pandemic is not consistent with what you are putting there; that is the first point. Second, regarding what experts such as Nombre14520 have considered—which is why I am asking whether you have already conducted a study to make that assertion or whether it is mere speculation—there will instead be a decline in the mortality rate (tasa de mortalidad); no, rather, there will be a higher mortality rate as a result of the pandemic, and, from Nombre14520’s perspective—I am not the one asserting this—it could instead be the case that those rates are much higher or more accurately reflect the pandemic situation and that we have a greater number of deaths.
Therefore, I would like to know whether you conducted a study concerning the pandemic and its impacts, taking mortality rates and birth rates (tasas de natalidad) into consideration, as this is one of the issues that has been discussed in this matter, at least by demographers and other experts. I wanted you to explain the basis for making such a categorical assertion. Director Rodríguez González: Nombre14518, what strikes me is that you are saying that the measure having the greatest impact and the longest-term effect is the amendment agreed upon at the 2017 roundtable. So, if the Board of Directors agreed to adopt all the amendments, why was that alternative not implemented at that time? I still have not understood that. We began discussing it years later, without having implemented all the measures. We are therefore now in a situation where one of the most important and consequential aspects, based on what you have just said, arose from an agreement reached at the 2017 roundtable that was never implemented.
That is what I cannot understand, because, had it been implemented, we would not be in this situation. Given how difficult it is for the sectors at a roundtable to reach agreement, with each sector having its own positions and expectations, how was it not implemented at the time? That is not at all clear to me. The Board of Directors approved all the measures from the 2017 roundtable, so I want to understand this clearly, because I do not know what happened. Director Rodríguez González: Nombre14518, two questions. In the scenarios that you presented later as well—well, and in the proposal itself—where you refer to a transition that is not actually a transition, it is really only what the Chamber had indicated pursuant to ILO Convention 102 regarding pension reforms. Thus, there is no transition period (período de transición). Then, under the affirmative action (acción afirmativa) in the next chart you presented, which you called “other quantification exercises,” you also refer to affirmative action benefiting women who are at least 60 years of age when the reform enters into force.
In other words, that action applies only to those women who are 60 years of age when it enters into force. That is what you are proposing: affirmative action only for that small group of 60-year-old women. You are considering whether this affirmative action could be implemented, but it is not affirmative action for women generally; it is only for that limited group of women. I want to make an observation, Nombre14518, because, first, saying that the opinions of the social sectors were incorporated is not true—not one period or comma from any sector was incorporated. And, more generally, there is the 2018 actuarial study (estudio actuarial), which dates from late 2018, and that is what workers do not understand. In early 2018, following the dialogue roundtable, the Board of Directors approved a reform that, for them, represented some peace of mind. Then, that same year, an actuarial study covering a 100-year horizon was conducted, and they were immediately told—in the very year in which a reform was approved, notwithstanding all the qualifications you mention, and indeed that is why it was said that an accounting should quickly be conducted to determine who complied and who did not—that tripartite efforts had been made and matters had been agreed upon.
The Board of Directors learned of them in 2018 after the proposal was submitted on November 6, 2017; it approved them in 2018, and in late 2018, through this long-term actuarial study, the workers were then told that the plan was insolvent and that there was no option other than to impose a change of this magnitude on them. That is what is difficult for workers to understand. And the other matter, Nombre14518, is what I asked you about: how can there be affirmative action for a particular small group of 60-year-old women? That seems entirely illogical to me. Director Rodríguez González: (...) Only one of the formulas that have been proposed reduces people’s pension amount (monto de la pensión) by 5%, and by as much as 15% overall. No gradual implementation (gradualidad) is being proposed in the proposals supported by the majority, and I believe that the proposals advanced by the Pensions Division did not adopt any of the social sectors’ proposals, placing the cost of the reform exclusively on workers’ shoulders and imposing measures that are so regressive and [sic] of the right to a decent pension in the event of the member’s disability, old age, and death (invalidez, vejez y muerte).
Por tanto, in keeping with the vision and mandate (or of the labor-union and social-sector representatives who met yesterday, I will vote against every one of those proposals (…) Director Rodríguez González: (...) What I said is that the additional amount (cuantía adicional), which Nombre14518 said was what weighed most heavily in this reform—that 5% less that people will receive as a pension—was indeed agreed upon at the social-dialogue roundtable. Early retirement (jubilación anticipada) was not even considered at the 2017 roundtable; there was no agreement. We do have a tripartite agreement (acuerdo tripartito) regarding the additional amount, within the overall framework of what was proposed, and there is indeed an agreement signed by all three sectors stating that the requirement for that amount would be raised to 300 contributions (cuotas), reducing the pension by 5%. That, doña Nombre14521, I accept, because the labor movement indeed affirms it as well (...)” Director Alfaro Murillo: Don Nombre14522, you should see that the first point, where it says retirement age and partial elimination of early retirement, creates confusion, because, if I were a man, I would ask how it affected me and how they did it.
I would state both elements very clearly: complete elimination of early retirement for men and partial elimination of early retirement for women, and, just like that, specify when it enters into force. In other words, the general title alone does not make things as clear to me as I would like. Director Loría Chaves: Nombre14521, moreover, the word “elimination” alone is very jarring; it is a modification of retirement. It is better to say “modification” than “elimination”; “elimination” is a very harsh word in itself. We must be careful even about that (...) Director Alfaro Murillo: Then let us make it more direct, as was just said: the right to retirement (derecho a jubilación) for men begins at—state it immediately—the right to retirement for men, and then state that for women it begins at age 63. All the women are going to say, “How wonderful.” Moreover, this is a matter of communication.
I would say that the same wording should be used: the right to retirement for men begins at age 65 and is maintained. I think we must be clear: it is maintained. Then women will start asking what happens if they do not have them, and so on and so forth, you understand? The rule must be very clear; the agreement must be absolutely clear. Thus, for men it begins at age 65, and, separately, the right to retirement for women begins at age 63 (...)”. The petitioner (accionante) states that, from the partially transcribed minutes, he concludes that the amendment to the IVM Regulations (Reglamento del IVM) was approved by the CCSS Board of Directors without technical and scientific clarity. This is reflected in the following issues, which directly affect the pension rights (derecho jubilatorio) of the persons he represents and of everyone who contributes to the IVM, namely:
The petitioner states that, pursuant to a dialogue held in 2017, it had been agreed to include a transitional provision (transitorio) of up to five years, to be implemented gradually, to modify matters relating to the retirement age (edad de retiro), particularly the possibility of early retirement (retiro anticipado); however, that possibility was excluded for men, and for women the early-retirement age was increased without any substantial technical basis. Thus, no transitional provision is included for that possibility, which means that, without considering the years of service or the number of contributions (cuotas) made as of the effective date of the reform to the IVM, persons such as several of those represented by him might be short by one contribution or one day, or by one or a few months, of meeting the new requirements and therefore would be unable to claim the pension rights (derechos jubilatorios) available before the reform took effect, which were the rights under which they began their working lives.
Thus, in many cases, including those of the persons he represents, the period before they may become eligible for retirement is increased by as much as three years, contrary to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality (principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad). 2) Less burdensome reforms were not considered. The petitioner asserts that, as a consequence of the lack of a graduated system (sistema escalonado), there is no reform providing for less burdensome measures based on workers’ circumstances. For example, it is disregarded that, in order to strengthen the pension scheme (régimen de pensiones), the institution could improve its collection efforts, whether by providing conditions that enable persons to avoid informal employment and register for insurance coverage with the CCSS, and also by enabling those with outstanding accounts before the institution, including the Costa Rican State itself, to bring their accounts up to date.
In this regard, the findings of a study on coverage by insurance category (modalidad de aseguramiento) for the 2020-2021 period are relevant: Insurance statusYear 2020Year 2020Year 2021Year 2021Social Insurance (employees and agreements, Ley 17)2.444.16347,8%2.436.81647,2%Self-employed (Independent and voluntary insured persons, Ley 7983)740.55614,5%722.14514%Pensioners (Ley 5905)604.97011,8%616,40711,9%State (Other special laws and students)902.57717,7%918.17417,8%Uninsured persons (constitutional Art. 21)419.1398,2%469.8719,1%Total population5.111.405 100,0%5.163.413 100,0% He explains that the attached table demonstrates a deficiency in the CCSS’s administration of social security (seguridad social), insofar as, if the CCSS were to properly regulate contributions from self-employed insured persons and uninsured persons, it could increase the collection of contributions by more than 20%.
This is an obligation of the CCSS under a constitutional mandate, as stated in Article 73 of the Political Constitution. This is compounded by the State’s failure to make its contributions to finance the arrangements established by special laws for the various forms of funding, which has led the CCSS itself to draw funds from the Social Insurance to finance the resource shortfalls resulting from those special laws. As stated in a report issued by the Pension Management Office itself, by the end of 2023 the State will owe an amount close to ₡600.000.000.000,00, and the 2024 budget reflects a shortfall of ₡71.630.000.000,00, amounts corresponding to State contributions. This has clearly affected the pension scheme, but the persons he represents will unfairly be required to bear that burden under the reform adopted by the CCSS Board of Directors. The foregoing is reinforced by information held by the CCSS Pension Management Office showing IVM coverage: Insurance categoryContributorsCoverage of EAPSocial Insurance1.220.25148,2%Private enterprise973.68838,4%Domestic service15.6800,6%Agreements34.7851,4%Public sector196.0987,7%Independent workers148.4125,9%Voluntarily insured persons78.5173,1%Total IVM1.447.18057,1%Did not contribute1.086,55142,9%Total EAP (CCP)2.533.731100,0% He argues that the preceding table reflects the CCSS’s poor collection and insurance-coverage policy, showing that more than one million persons do not contribute to social security and are protected by special laws without the State having assumed the cost.
These factors affect the IVM scheme. Another point to consider is that the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund establishes a model for distributing funds to finance the IVM. According to a study conducted by the CCSS Workers’ Movement, the insurance contribution for salaried employees is 7,0%; therefore, because the contribution collected by the CCSS for insurance is 26,16%, pursuant to sections 32 and 43 of the aforementioned law, the surplus is 19,16%, an amount that should be allocated to financing the IVM; however, only 11,16% of salaries is transferred to the IVM. This also has a definite bearing on the standards of reasonableness and proportionality, particularly considering that poor collection and the improper distribution of revenue are imposing a burden on the persons he represents, who must endure a longer period before becoming eligible to exercise their pension rights.
This may also affect the provision of services by the CCSS, where the persons he represents work, as they are exposed to age-related syndromes, years of service, occupational wear and tear, among other factors. He considers that the CCSS has failed to perform functions intended to strengthen the IVM pension scheme and that the reform seeks to require contributors—in this case, his clients—to bear the consequences of the administrative omissions of the CCSS and the State. He further reiterates that no transitional provision was established to allow the proposed reforms to be applied gradually, particularly the reform relating to early retirement. 3) Consolidated legal situations (situaciones jurídicas consolidadas) were not addressed. Persons who have made social-security contributions for more than 30 years are required, once the reform takes effect, to remain in the workforce longer and wait more years for their pensions, despite having exceeded both the number of contributions required by law and the required years of service.
Thus, a person would have to wait three years and make 36 additional contributions before becoming eligible to exercise their pension rights, even though some persons, including several of those represented by him, have made more than 400 0 500 contributions. Accordingly, the change in the eligibility criteria for pension rights violates the principles of equality, proportionality, and reasonableness. This is because persons who contribute to the IVM scheme have, in order to obtain a pension and a dignified life after retirement, subjected themselves to a special, solidarity-based, and contributory payment; nevertheless, the conditions were subsequently changed abruptly, hastily, and non-progressively, to the detriment of acquired rights (derechos adquiridos) and consolidated legal situations. Regarding consolidated legal situations and acquired rights, the Constitutional Chamber stated, among other decisions, in judgment n.° 2765-97: “(...) The concepts of ‘acquired rights’ and ‘consolidated legal situations’ appear to be closely related in constitutional legal scholarship.
It may be stated that, in general terms, the former denotes a consummated circumstance in which something—material or immaterial, whether property previously belonging to another or a previously nonexistent right—has entered into (or affected) a person’s patrimonial sphere, such that the person experiences a demonstrable advantage or benefit. A ‘consolidated legal situation,’ for its part, represents not so much a patrimonial gain as a state of affairs fully defined in terms of its legal characteristics and effects, even if those effects have not yet been extinguished. What is relevant to a consolidated legal situation is precisely not whether those effects continue, but rather that—by virtue of a statutory mandate or a judgment so declaring—a clear and defined rule has already come into legal existence connecting a factual predicate (conditioning event) to a specified consequence (conditioned effect).
From this perspective, the person’s situation is defined by a logical proposition of the form ‘if..., then...’; that is, if the conditioning event has occurred, then the ‘consolidated legal situation’ necessarily entails that the conditioned effect must also occur. In both cases (acquired rights or consolidated legal situations), the legal system protects and renders intangible the situation of the person who acquired the right or enjoys the situation, for reasons of equity and legal certainty (...)”. In addition to the foregoing, the reform violates Article 34 of the Political Constitution, which provides: “No law shall be given retroactive effect (efecto retroactivo) to the detriment of any person, or of that person’s acquired patrimonial rights or consolidated legal situations.” Regarding this article, the Chamber has stated, among other decisions, in judgments 03551-14 and 01214-15, that although pension rights may be subject to changes in the rules governing each scheme, such rights may not be irrationally limited, conditioned, or abolished.
In this specific case, because the reform approved by the CCSS Board of Directors does not provide for a transitional provision, it limits the right of contributors to the IVM scheme to access a pension. In this connection, the position of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic is relevant; in legal opinion OJ-104-2017, it stated, insofar as relevant: “Article 34 of the Political Constitution provides that no law shall be given retroactive effect to the detriment of any person or of that person’s acquired patrimonial rights or consolidated legal situations. In the case of a pension or retirement benefit, the right to receive it is acquired when all the requirements established by the rules governing the matter have been met, including age, years of service, and so forth. Before those requirements are met, there is merely an expectation of a right (expectativa de derecho), which is not even comparable to a consolidated legal situation.” Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Constitutional Chamber has recognized that, in order to protect a prospective beneficiary of a particular special retirement or pension scheme from sudden changes that could make the requirements for recognition of the benefit more burdensome, if the legislature deems it appropriate and decides to regulate the matter through transitional law, a period of at least 18 months is sufficient to ensure that changes to the specific conditions do not affect persons subject to the administration who satisfy the requirements within that period.
In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber, in judgment n.° 846-92 at 13:30 on March 27, 1992, referring to the then-pending bill creating the General Pension Scheme Charged to the National Budget, held—among other matters—that it: “—in its transitional articles—recognizes the preservation of the pension status of public servants who have satisfied the requirements for receiving the benefit and, in addition, extends it to those who belong or formerly belonged to the excluded schemes so that they may acquire it within a period of eighteen months, which appears reasonably sufficient to safeguard any potential rights acquired in good faith.” Accordingly, the Chamber held that this guaranteed not only the rights of persons who, when the law entered into force, had met the requirements to retire or receive a pension under the legislation that was to be amended, but also extended that protection to those who were close to an age that would allow them to do so (18 months after the reform), provided that the factual conditions established by those provisions had been met, despite their repeal.
(See also judgment no. 5476-93 of 18:03 hours on 27 October 1993, issued by that same Chamber) (…)”. The petitioner argues that the partially transcribed criteria show that the Constitutional Chamber itself has established the need to include transitional provisions (transitorios) in the application of any reform involving acquired rights (derechos adquiridos) and consolidated legal situations (situaciones jurídicas consolidadas). As in this specific case, the effects of the reform must be spread over time so as not to impair the situations to which persons are entitled, in this case, access to their retirement rights. Nevertheless, the reform of the IVM pension system, resolution no. 12 adopted by the CCSS Board of Directors at session no. 9198 of 12 August 2021, included no transitional provision whatsoever, and it is intended that, once the reform enters into force on 11 January 2024, all persons, without exception, will be subject to it, thereby impairing acquired rights and consolidated legal situations.
It also contravenes the principles of proportionality and reasonableness. In addition, the petitioner complains that the reform proposed by the CCSS Board of Directors lacks a sound scientific and technical basis, since it relies solely on a 2017 actuarial study and consultation on a unilateral CCSS proposal in which the various sectors concerned did not participate. Thus, it is necessary to question the manner in which the reform was carried out, as well as certain substantive matters, such as the absence of a transitional provision allowing its gradual implementation. Instead, as noted above, a reform is being applied that enters into force categorically, without considering the factors necessary to avoid rendering the right to retirement ineffective. He states that, as the International Labour Organization (OIT) has indicated in its Conventions 102 (minimum standard) and 128 (old-age, invalidity and survivors’ benefits), pension systems are an instrument implemented to ensure the socioeconomic security of older adults and thereby prevent this population from falling into poverty, inequality, and exclusion.
OIT itself has stated that social-security pension systems are the means of ensuring adequate benefit levels for persons reaching the end of their working lives, which are determined by various factors, including age, number of contributions, and years of service. This is because, under pension systems, individuals receive a regular income once they have reached retirement age and are no longer receiving a stable income. OIT itself notes that pension systems differ from one country to another, but generally comprise schemes for different categories of persons, ranging from basic social pensions for low-income persons to supplementary voluntary savings for higher-income persons. Accordingly, it follows that each country has its own pension model or architecture, and, in the case at issue, that model is provided by the IVM system. In this specific case, deficiencies in the system’s architecture and administration are evident, but the Administration—in this case, the CCSS—may not impose on those subject to its authority the burdens arising from its administrative shortcomings and inefficiency.
As stated above, there are governmental deficiencies, such as: -The State owes the IVM system approximately ₡600.000.000.000,00, and the 2024 budget reflects a shortfall of ₡71.630.000.000. -With respect to the distribution of the fund’s income, pursuant to the CCSS Founding Law and the provisions of Article 73 of the Political Constitution, the institution must transfer 19,16% to the pension fund, an amount derived from the sum collected by the CCSS for insurance, which is less than the workers’ 7% contribution. Nevertheless, only 11,16% is transferred, creating an 8% gap. -Moreover, there is administrative mismanagement with respect to collection, as shown in the attached table: Insurance statusYear 2020Year 2020 %Year 2021Year 2021 %Social Security (employees and agreements, Law 17)2.444.16347,8%2.436.81647,2%Own-account workers (Independent and voluntary contributors, Law 7983)740.55614,5%722.14514,0%Pensioners (Law 5905)604.97011,8%616,40711,9%State (Other special laws and students)902.57717,7%918.17417,8%Uninsured persons (Art. 21 of the Constitution)419.1398,2%469.8719,1%Total population5.111.405100,0%5.163.413100,0% He considers that the CCSS’s deficient management of social security has been demonstrated, since, as noted above, if the institution were to properly regulate contributions from own-account insured persons and uninsured persons, it could increase the collection of contributions by more than 20%.
If, in addition, the State were to actually pay the obligations it owes, the system’s outlook would be more robust, and the system’s deficiencies would not be shifted to those subject to its authority by making early retirement impossible through a reform that contains no transitional provision and impairs the fundamental rights of all contributors. It should be emphasized that other pension systems include a transitional provision when a reform is adopted, such as those of the Poder Judicial (currently under discussion as to its constitutionality) and the Magisterio Nacional. Thus, by failing to provide for such a possibility in the reform at issue here, the principle of equality, established in Article 33 of the Political Constitution, is infringed. This principle requires that no distinctions be made between two or more persons who are in the same legal situation (in this case, seeking a transitional provision for the application of the pension-system reform) or in identical circumstances (see, to that effect, among others, judgment of Placa2100).
The manner in which the reform was proposed, approved, and will enter into force is contrary to the situations and principles cited, as well as to the following: Principles of certainty, reasonableness, proportionality, and legal certainty. Principles of good faith and legitimate expectations. Principle of non-confiscation. Principle of equality. Principle of publicity. Principle of patrimonial inviolability. The provisions of OIT Conventions 102, 118, 128 and 157. Article 16 of the American Declaration on Human Rights. Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Article 14 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights -ICESCR-. Articles 11, 18, 28, 33, 34, 40, 41, 45, 50, 51, 65, 73, 74, 177, 188, 189 and related provisions of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica. For the foregoing reasons, the reform of the IVM Pension System approved by the CCSS Board of Directors, which will enter into force in January 2024, contains an omission that renders it unconstitutional, namely, the failure to include a transitional provision allowing for its gradual implementation.
The matters that must be considered when determining whether an unconstitutional omission (omisión inconstitucional) has occurred include whether the omission renders the provision or any fundamental right ineffective. Based on the foregoing, the petitioner requests a declaration that the reform challenged herein is unconstitutional by omission. 2.- The petitioner states that his standing is based on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction, since, in his view, he has direct standing through the diffuse interests (intereses difusos) of those he represents, as well as those of all persons belonging to the IVM system who are affected by the omission challenged in these proceedings. He thus states that those he represents work for the CCSS under the following particular conditions: “[Nombre62 004], Total Monthly Contributions: 391, [Nombre 024] Total Monthly Contributions: 381, [Nombre 009] Total Monthly Contributions: 341, Nombre14523 Total Monthly Contributions: 466, [Nombre 014], Total Monthly Contributions: 441, [Nombre 018] Total Monthly Contributions: 418, [Nombre 024] Total Monthly Contributions: 382, [Nombre 011], Total Monthly Contributions: 412, [Nombre 016], Total Monthly Contributions: 425, [Nombre62 019], Total Monthly Contributions: 361, [Nombre62 025], Total Monthly Contributions: 464, [Nombre62 021] Total Monthly Contributions: 430, Nombre14524 Total Monthly Contributions: 451, [Nombre62 022] Total Monthly Contributions: 416, [Nombre 010] Total Monthly Contributions: 377, [Nombre62 023] Total Monthly Contributions: 409, [Nombre62 003] Total Monthly Contributions: 441, [Nombre62 027] Total Monthly Contributions: 376”. 3.- In a filing received through Gestión en Línea at 23:33 hours on 30 November 2023, Nombre14525, identity card no. CED11567, filed a request for active intervention as a supporting party (coadyuvancia activa), in his capacity as a person affected by the entry into force of the New Regulations Amending the Invalidity, Old-Age, and Death System as of 12 January 2024.
He also requests the issuance of an immediate interim measure (medida cautelar) suspending the application of Articles 5, 23, 24, and IX of the challenged regulations concerning the 2002 reform approved at session 7699 of 24 October 2002. 4.- Article 9 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction authorizes the Chamber, at any time, including upon initial filing, to summarily dismiss or dismiss on the merits any application submitted for its consideration that is manifestly inadmissible, when it considers that sufficient grounds exist to dismiss it, or when it is merely a reiteration or reproduction of a previously dismissed identical or similar application. Justice Cruz Castro drafts the decision; and,
WHEREAS:
With respect to the request for active intervention as a supporting party filed by Nombre14525, identity card no. 1-576-298, Article 83 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction provides that, within fifteen days following the first publication of the notice referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81, parties appearing in matters pending on the date the action was filed, or persons with a legitimate interest, may enter an appearance therein to support the arguments that may justify its admissibility or inadmissibility or, where appropriate, to expand the grounds of unconstitutionality relating to the matter in which they have an interest. Because intervention as a supporting party entails an ancillary procedural intervention and its disposition follows that of the principal intervention, the request for intervention must be denied for the reasons set forth below regarding the inadmissibility of the action. II.- REQUIREMENTS AND FORMALITIES OF AN ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. This Chamber has repeatedly held that an action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) is a proceeding subject to certain formalities which, if not satisfied, preclude a ruling on the merits. Article 75 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the admissibility requirements for actions of unconstitutionality and governs different situations.
The first paragraph requires the existence of a pending matter (asunto pendiente de resolver), whether in judicial proceedings—including habeas corpus or amparo proceedings—or in administrative proceedings—within the procedure for exhausting administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa), that is, within the administrative procedure challenging the final act—in which the unconstitutionality of the contested provision is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest alleged to have been infringed in the principal matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate a direct action (acción directa)—no underlying matter (asunto base) is required—in the following cases: a) when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury; b) when it concerns the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or interests affecting the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, or the Defensor de los Habitantes.
Regarding the requirement of a pending matter, this Chamber, in Judgment No. 04190-95, issued at 11:33 on 28 de julio de 1995, stated as follows: “(…) First, this is an incidental proceeding (proceso incidental), rather than a direct or popular action (acción directa o popular), meaning that a pending matter must exist—whether before the courts of justice or within the procedure for exhausting administrative remedies—in order to access constitutional jurisdiction (vía constitucional); the action must, however, constitute a reasonable means of protecting the right alleged to have been infringed in the principal matter, such that the Constitutional Court’s decision has a positive or negative effect on that pending proceeding, since it rules on the constitutionality of the provisions that must be applied in that matter; and it is only by way of exception that the legislation permits direct access to this jurisdiction—the circumstances set forth in the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (…)”.
Likewise, other formalities must be satisfied, namely: the filing instituting the action must be authenticated and contain an explicit identification of the challenged provisions, duly substantiated, with specific citation to the components of the body of constitutional law (bloque de constitucionalidad) deemed to have been violated (Article 78 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). In addition, the conditions for standing (legitimación) must be established (powers of attorney and certifications), the Costa Rican Bar Association stamp fee must be paid, and a verbatim certification of the pleading in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions was invoked in the underlying proceeding must be submitted (Article 79 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).
This action fails to satisfy several formal admissibility requirements, since the petitioner did not submit the receipt for payment of the Costa Rican Bar Association stamp fee in the amount of two hundred seventy-five colones, corresponding to authentication of the initial filing, nor did he submit the special judicial power of attorney authorizing him to act on behalf62 of those whom he claims to represent. Nevertheless, in the interest of procedural economy (economía procesal), the order to cure deficiencies provided for in Article 80 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional is omitted, since the action is inadmissible for the reasons analyzed below.
The petitioner bases his standing on the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos); nevertheless, this Chamber, by majority, has held that when a provision is capable of individual application, the defense of diffuse interests may not be invoked to secure admission of the action. Thus, in judgment no. 2021-002185 at 12:51 on February 3, 2021, this Constitutional Court stated as follows:
“(…) II.- Concerning diffuse interests and the petitioners’ standing in the case under consideration. The petitioners state that their standing derives from the defense of diffuse interests relating to protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. In this regard, it should be noted that, as already mentioned, the circumstances set forth in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional constitute exceptions to the rule contained in the first paragraph of that same Article and must be carefully analyzed in each specific case. A diffuse interest has been understood as an interest relating to a right or legal situation of a special and particular nature that may be shared by other persons, with all interested parties forming a particular group or category. Thus, violation of that right may affect everyone generally or each person individually, and therefore any member of the community may bring the action to protect the right alleged to have been infringed. On this point, the Chamber’s settled case law states that:
‘It has been noted that this is a special type of interest, the manifestation of which is less concrete and individually identifiable than that of the collective interest just defined in the preceding whereas clause (considerando), but which cannot be so broad and generic as to be confused with the interest recognized in all members of society to safeguard constitutional legality, since the latter—as has repeatedly been stated—is excluded from the current system of constitutional review. It is therefore an interest distributed among each of the governed, indirect if one wishes, and diffuse, but no less ascertainable for that reason, for the purpose of defending before this Chamber certain constitutional rights of singular importance to the proper and harmonious development of society. The special characteristics of these rights themselves, rather than the particular position in relation to them of the persons who may hold them, are the key to distinguishing and determining the presence of so-called diffuse interests, as expressed in various decisions, such as 03705-93 at fifteen hours on July thirtieth, regarding the right to the environment; number 05753-93 at fourteen hours forty-five on November ninth of that same year, regarding defense of the historical heritage; and number 00980-91 at thirteen thirty on May twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-one, regarding electoral matters.’ –see judgment number 360-90– From this definition, it may be concluded that a diffuse interest consists of an eminently subjective element, relating to membership in or ownership of the interest, and an objective element, relating to the impact of the protected interest on society, which distinguishes it from other legal situations.
As to the former—the subjective element—it is clear that ownership is dispersed throughout an unidentified group of persons who jointly enjoy the legally protected interest, but whose composition does not arise from an identifiable, manageable group of persons with relatively clear boundaries, as does occur with a collective interest (interés colectivo). From the objective perspective, it should be clarified that not every ‘dispersed’ interest acquires the legal status of a ‘diffuse interest,’ but only those imbued with profound social importance, the assessment of which depends on the circumstances of each case –see, among others, judgments numbers 2006-15960 and 2014-4904–. In this regard, just as it has been said that such an interest cannot be so broad and generic as to be confused with the right to safeguard constitutional legality—which would entail the tacit establishment of a public action (acción popular) not contemplated by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional—neither can it be so specific as to permit an individual claim, because in that event standing would derive from that claim –see, among others, judgments numbers 2008-13442, 2009-300 and 2009-9201–.
Examples of such interests include the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, defense of the historical heritage, electoral matters, defense of the right to health, and oversight of public funds. Accordingly, in the case under consideration, in which the petitioners assert standing with respect to the defense of diffuse interests concerning protection of a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the appropriate course is to rule as indicated in the following whereas clauses.
(…)
In the action now under consideration, the same petitioners challenge the same provisions of Articles 50 and 51 of the Regulation in question, as well as Article 52 of that same instrument; and although, beyond the sustainability of wildlife breeding facilities (zoocriaderos), this action focuses on issues of ex situ conservation and environmental education—which were also raised in that action—the fact remains that this Chamber’s determination regarding standing, as set forth in the cited judgment, is fully applicable to this new action. It should be noted that, as the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic clearly states and the Minister of Environment and Energy emphatically observes, the challenged provisions are indeed fully capable of individual application and of directly affecting the legal sphere of specific, identifiable persons who engage in a particular activity subject to the regulations established in the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre and its regulations.
Thus, it is clear that, contrary to the asserted defense of diffuse interests, what is at issue is some degree of dissatisfaction with the requirements to which they must submit for regulation of the activity they conduct or intend to conduct; indeed, as the report of the Minister of Environment and Energy aptly states, the petitioners are directly involved as founders, managers, or employees of various companies connected with the exhibition of wildlife or its tourism-related promotion. It is therefore untenable to allege purported conservation and environmental-education problems in order to invoke the concept of diffuse interests and thereby bring a direct action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad), while circumventing the strict admissibility requirements established in the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, as stated in whereas clauses II and III of this decision.
Under this interpretation, and taking into account the identity of the petitioners and the challenged provisions, it is clear that the precedent established in judgment 2018-18563 is fully applicable to the action now under consideration. It must therefore necessarily be concluded that, as on that prior occasion, the petitioners lack standing to institute this proceeding, making it improper to consider and rule on the matters raised. Accordingly, this action must be denied” (underlining not in the original).
Similarly, in judgment no. 2021-011994 at 16:30 on May 26, 2021, this Chamber held that:
“(…) It is reiterated that a diffuse interest cannot be so broad and generic as to be confused with the right to safeguard constitutional legality (which would entail the tacit establishment of a public action not contemplated by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional); but neither can it be so specific as to permit an individual claim, because in that event standing would derive from that claim (…)”.
In this specific case, the petitioner seeks a declaration by this Chamber that the amendment to Articles 5, 23 and 24 and the repeal of Transitory Provisions XII, XIII, XIV and XV of the Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte, published in La Gaceta No. 5 on Tuesday, January 11, 2022, are unconstitutional by omission, because, in his view, no transitory provision was established to allow the amendment to be implemented gradually. He alleges that, once the amendment enters into force on January 11, 2024, everyone, without exception, will be affected by it. He considers the foregoing to violate vested rights (derechos adquiridos) and consolidated legal situations (situaciones jurídicas consolidadas), as well as the principles of certainty, reasonableness, proportionality, legal certainty, good faith, legitimate expectations, non-confiscation, equality, publicity, and inviolability of property.
He further considers it contrary to the provisions established by the ILO in Conventions 102, 118, 128 and 157; Article 16 of the American Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Article 14 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and, finally, Articles 11, 18, 28, 33, 34, 40, 41, 45, 50, 51, 65, 73, 74, 177, 188, 189 and related provisions of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica.
The petitioner bases his standing (legitimación) to bring this constitutional challenge (acción de inconstitucionalidad) on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, expressly stating that “(…) direct standing is held to bring this action through the concept of the diffuse interests (intereses difusos) of those I represent, as well as of all persons who belong to the IVM system and who are affected by the omission challenged through these proceedings.” Nevertheless, this Chamber finds that the petitioner lacks direct standing to bring a constitutional challenge before this Court based on the defense of an alleged diffuse interest, not only because he fails to specify the diffuse interest invoked, but also because it is evident that the amendment to the Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte—which he seeks to challenge on the alleged ground that it lacks a transitory provision phasing in the effectiveness of its provisions—is susceptible to individual and direct application to an easily identifiable group of persons, namely, insured persons who make contributions to this particular system.
Consequently, in accordance with the judicial precedents cited in the preceding recital (considerando), the defense of diffuse interests cannot be invoked under the circumstances presented by the petitioner. On the contrary, these are provisions that may give rise to various individual or collective claims brought through formally organized groups, which may serve as the basis for a constitutional challenge and confer standing to act. In this regard, persons who consider their vested rights or consolidated legal situations, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, or other fundamental principles or rights to have been infringed by the direct application of the challenged regulation may assert their rights—individually or collectively—through the appropriate administrative or judicial proceedings and thereby have the pending underlying matter (asunto previo pendiente de resolver) required by Article 75, first paragraph, of the law governing this jurisdiction.
However, the petitioner did not mention the existence of any prior case pending resolution in proceedings to exhaust administrative remedies (agotar la vía administrativa) or before the courts that would allow this challenge to be admitted on the basis of incidental standing (legitimación incidental). Accordingly, this Chamber finds that the petitioner lacks standing to bring this challenge and therefore dismisses his filing outright.
In view of the foregoing, the challenge is inadmissible due to lack of direct standing.
The parties are hereby advised that, if they submitted any paper document, as well as any objects or evidence contained on any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, or telematic device, or produced using new technologies, these must be collected from the Court within no more than 30 business days from service of this judgment. Otherwise, any material not collected within this period shall be destroyed, pursuant to the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", approved by the Corte Plena at session N° 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI, and published in Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as the resolution approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial at session N° 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.
POR TANTO:
The challenge is dismissed outright, as is the intervention in support (coadyuvancia) filed by Nombre14525.
Nombre9290. Acting President Luis Fdo. Salazar A. Jorge Araya G. Ingrid Hess H. Nombre6376 B. Aracelly Pacheco S. Alexandra Alvarado P.
CASE FILE N° 23-027825-0007-CO Telephone numbers: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2295-3712 / 2549-1633. Website: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Dirección12, Dirección13, 100 meters south of the Perpetuo Socorro church). Filing office for matters involving vulnerable groups: Dirección14, San José, Dirección15, Dirección16, streets 19 and 21, Dirección17
Revisión del Documento SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas treinta minutos del seis de diciembre de dos mil veintitres . Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por Nombre14517 , cédula de identidad n.° CED11565, abogado carné n.° CED11566, en su condición de apoderado especial judicial de [Nombre62 026], [Nombre 002], [Nombre 003], [Nombre 004], [Nombre 005], [Nombre 006], [Nombre 007], [Nombre 008], [Nombre 009], [Nombre 010], [Nombre 011], [Nombre 012], [Nombre 013], [Nombre 014], [Nombre 015], [Nombre 016] y [Nombre 017]; contra “la reforma al Régimen de Pensiones del IVM de la CCSS por omisión en la inclusión de un transitorio que permitiera la gradualidad en la aplicación de la reforma”. RESULTANDO: 1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala Constitucional a las 10:20 horas del 9 de noviembre de 2023, el accionante alega la inconstitucionalidad de “la reforma al Régimen de Pensiones del IVM de la CCSS por omisión en la inclusión de un transitorio que permitiera la gradualidad en la aplicación de la reforma”.
Manifiesta que, por medio de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, pretende impugnar, por omisión, la reforma al Reglamento del Régimen de Pensiones del IVM, en sus artículos 5, 23 y 24, junto con la eliminación de los transitorios XII, XIII, XIV y XV, referidos a vigencia de reformas anteriores, cuantías, montos y edades. Indica que dicha reforma fue aprobada por la Junta Directiva de la CCSS en acuerdo n.° 12 de la sesión n.° 9198 de 12 de agosto de 2021, la cual contempla tres modificaciones al régimen de pensiones de invalidez, vejez y muerte:
Dimensión Plan de Fortalecimiento IVM Edad de retiroEl derecho de Pensión por Vejez para los hombres y mujeres se mantiene a los 65 años. Se elimina et derecho de retiro anticipado por vejez para los hombres. Se mantiene el derecho de retiro anticipado por vejez para las mujeres ajustando la edad mínima para este retiro a partir de los 63 años con 405 cuotas ara edadessuperiores de conformidad con el artículo 50 del Reglamento del IVM. Rige a partir de los 24 meses de publicado el reglamento en el Diario la Gaceta.Fórmula de cálculoEstablecer el Salario Promedio de Referencia (SPR) como el promedio de los mejores 300 salarios indexados por inflación de toda la carrera contributiva. Utilizar el SPR como Salario de Ubicación (SU) para definir el rango de beneficio básico del cotizante. La cuantía adicional se contabiliza a partir de las 300 cuotas aportadas al IVM. Rige a partir de los 24 meses de publicado el reglamento en el Diario La Gaceta.Aportes reglamentariosSe mantienen las condiciones actuales Alega que la reforma aprobada es omisa en cuanto a que no se estableció un transitorio que permitiera la gradualidad en la aplicación de esta.
Estima que dicha omisión resulta contraria al Derecho de la Constitución. Aduce que, por la vía de la acción de inconstitucionalidad por omisión, se permite el control de constitucionalidad en los casos que existen omisiones normativas que infringen una disposición contenida de forma expresa o manifiesta en la Constitución Política, al igual que aquellas que lesionen principios constitucionales o derechos fundamentales. En este caso, alega que la modificación resulta contraria a los Convenios 102, 118, 128 y 157 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, así como del artículo 26 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos; artículo 14 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos; artículo 9 del Pacto Internacional de los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales; artículos 11, 18, 28, 33, 34, 40, 41, 45, 50, 51, 65, 73, 74, 177, 188, 189 y concordantes de la Constitución Política de Costa Rica.
Además, contraría los siguientes principios: democrático, de igualdad, publicidad, solidaridad, seguridad jurídica, buena fe, confianza legítima, transparencia, intangibilidad patrimonial, no confiscatoriedad, derechos adquiridos y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas. En igual sentido, la Sala ha indicado (v. gr., sentencia n.° 003911-2005) que los requisitos de admisibilidad de una acción de inconstitucionalidad contra una norma deben observarse también al promover una acción por omisión. Al efecto, señala que el objeto de la acción debe estar determinado, lo que exige que el accionante compruebe qué norma hace falta y, por otro, que existe un mandato, aunque solo sea tácito, de dictarla. En el caso concreto, hace falta una norma que disponga un transitorio que permita la gradualidad en la aplicación de la reforma al IVM, así como la obligación constitucional para la CCSS, de regular el tema de la seguridad social y el régimen de pensiones, en este caso, del IVM.
El accionante expone los siguientes hechos: la Junta Directiva de la CCSS, mediante acuerdo n.° 12 de la sesión n.° 9198 de 12 de agosto de 2021, aprobó la reforma al Reglamento del Régimen de Pensiones del IVM, en sus artículos 5, 23 y 24, junto con la eliminación de los transitorios XII, XIII, XIV y XV, referidos a vigencia de reformas anteriores, cuantías, montos y edades. Dicha reforma se publicó el 11 de enero de 2022, en La Gaceta n.° 5, disponiendo las siguientes modificaciones:
Asimismo, existen otras formalidades que deben ser cumplidas, a saber: el escrito de interposición debe estar autenticado y contener una determinación explícita de la normativa impugnada, debidamente fundamentada, con cita concreta de los componentes del bloque de constitucionalidad que se consideren infringidos (artículo 78 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Debe, además, acreditarse las condiciones de legitimación (poderes y certificaciones), procederse al pago del timbre del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica y aportarse certificación literal del escrito en el que se invocó la inconstitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas en el asunto base (artículo 79 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). III.- SOBRE EL TRÁMITE. Esta acción carece de varios requisitos formales de admisibilidad, toda vez que el accionante no aportó el recibo del pago del timbre del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica, por la suma de doscientos setenta y cinco colones, correspondientes a la autenticación del escrito inicial, ni, tampoco aportó el poder especial judicial que lo legitima para actuar en Nombre62 de quienes dice representar.
No obstante, por economía procesal, se omite la prevención prevista en el artículo 80 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, toda vez que la acción resulta inadmisible por los motivos que se analizarán a continuación. IV.- SOBRE LA LEGITIMACIÓN DERIVADA DE LA DEFENSA DE INTERESES DIFUSOS. El accionante fundamenta su legitimación en la defensa de intereses difusos; no obstante, esta Sala, por mayoría, ha estimado que cuando una norma es susceptible de aplicación individual, no cabe invocar la defensa de intereses difusos para admitir la acción. Así, en el voto n° 2021-002185 de las 12:51 horas del 3 de febrero de 2021 este Tribunal Constitucional señaló lo siguiente: “(…) II.- Sobre los intereses difusos y la legitimación de los accionantes en el caso bajo estudio. Las accionantes señalan que su legitimación proviene de la defensa de los intereses difusos respecto de la protección al derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado.
Al respecto, cabe indicar que, como ya se mencionó, los supuestos del párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional constituyen excepciones a la regla contenida en el párrafo primero del mismo artículo, que deben ser analizados cuidadosamente en cada caso concreto. El interés difuso ha sido entendido como aquel interés relacionado con un derecho o situación jurídica de naturaleza especial y particular, que puede ser compartido por otras personas, formando todos los interesados un grupo o categoría determinada. Así, la vulneración de ese derecho puede afectar a todos en general o a cada uno en particular, de ahí que cualquier miembro de la colectividad puede interponer la acción para proteger el derecho que se estima lesionado. Sobre el particular, la reiterada jurisprudencia de la Sala indica que: "Se ha señalado que se trata un tipo especial de interés, cuya manifestación es menos concreta e individualizable que la del colectivo recién definido en el considerando anterior, pero que no puede llegar a ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el reconocido a todos los miembros de la sociedad de velar por la legalidad constitucional, ya que éste último -como se ha dicho reiteradamente- está excluido del actual sistema de revisión constitucional.
Se trata pues de un interés distribuido en cada uno de los administrados, mediato si se quiere, y diluido, pero no por ello menos constatable, para la defensa, en esta Sala, de ciertos derechos constitucionales de una singular relevancia para el adecuado y armónico desarrollo de la sociedad. Son las especiales características de éstos derechos por sí mismas y no la particular situación frente a ellos de los sujetos que puedan ostentarlos, la clave para la distinción y determinación de la presencia de los llamados intereses difusos tal y como se manifestado en distintas resoluciones como la 03705-93 de las quince horas del treinta de julio para el derecho al ambiente, la número 05753-93 de las catorce horas cuarenta y cinco del nueve de noviembre de ese mismo año para la defensa del patrimonio histórico y la número 00980-91 de las trece y treinta del veinticuatro de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y uno para la materia electoral." –ver sentencia número 360-90- De esta definición es posible estimar que el interés difuso está conformado por un elemento eminentemente subjetivo, relativo a su pertenencia o titularidad del interés, y otro objetivo, relacionado con la incidencia del bien en la sociedad, que lo distingue de otras situaciones jurídicas.
En relación con el primero -el subjetivo-, es claro que la misma se encuentra difuminada en un grupo humano no individualizado, que coparticipa en el disfrute del bien jurídico objeto del interés, pero cuya conformación no resulta de un conjunto de sujetos identificable, abarcable y de contornos relativamente nítidos, como sí ocurre en el interés colectivo. Y desde la perspectiva objetiva, debe aclararse que no todo interés "difuminado" adquiere la categoría jurídica de "interés difuso", sino únicamente aquellos impregnados de una profunda relevancia social, cuya valoración resulta de las circunstancias de cada caso –ver, entre otras, sentencias números 2006-15960 y 2014-4904-. En este sentido, así como se ha dicho que ese interés no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional -lo que supondría la instauración tácita de una acción popular no contemplada por la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional-, tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de ese reclamo –ver, entre otras, sentencias números 2008-13442, 2009-300 y 2009-9201-.
Así, ejemplos de tales intereses son el derecho a un ambiente sano y armonioso, la defensa del patrimonio histórico, la materia electoral, la defensa del derecho a la salud y la fiscalización de los fondos públicos. De tal forma, en el caso bajo estudio, donde las accionantes refieren su legitimación respecto de la defensa de intereses difusos en materia de protección a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, lo que corresponde es pronunciarse conforme se indica en los considerandos siguientes. (…) En la acción que ahora se conoce, los mismos accionantes cuestionan las mismas normas de los artículos 50 y 51 del Reglamento en cuestión, así como el artículo 52 del mismo instrumento, y si bien, más allá de la sostenibilidad de los zoocriaderos, en esta acción se centran sobre temas de conservación ex situ y educación ambiental -que también fue señalado en aquella acción-, lo cierto es que la misma definición de esta Sala sobre la legitimación, tal como se dispuso en la sentencia de cita, resulta de plena aplicación en esta nueva acción.
Nótese que, ciertamente, tal como lo señala claramente la Procuraduría General de la República y de manera enfática lo refiere el Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, la normativa que se cuestiona sí es totalmente susceptible de aplicación individual y de incidir directamente en la esfera jurídica de personas singulares e identificables, que ejercen una determinada actividad, sujeta a la regulación señalada en la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre y su reglamento. De tal manera, es claro que contrario a la aducida defensa de intereses difusos, lo que se encuentra de por medio es algún grado de inconformidad con la sujeción a que deben someterse para la regulación de la actividad que ejercen o pretenden ejercer; véase que como bien refiere el informe del Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, los accionantes se encuentran directamente relacionados como fundadores, gerentes o servidores de diversas empresas relacionadas con la exhibición de fauna silvestre o su promoción turística.
Así, resulta inviable aducir presuntos problemas de conservación y de educación ambiental, para utilizar la figura de los intereses difusos y promover con ello una acción de inconstitucionalidad directa obviando los estrictos requisitos de admisibilidad señalados en la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, tal como se indicó en los considerandos II y III de esta resolución. Bajo esta inteligencia, y tomando en consideración la identidad de accionantes y de la normativa cuestionada, es claro que el precedente de la sentencia 2018-18563 resulta plenamente aplicable a esta acción que ahora se conoce, de donde debe necesariamente concluirse que al igual que en aquella anterior ocasión, los accionantes carecen de legitimación para la interposición de este proceso, por lo que resulta improcedente conocer y pronunciarse sobre los aspectos planteados. De tal manera, lo procedente es declarar sin lugar esta acción” (el subrayado no corresponde al original).
En similar sentido, en la sentencia n° 2021-011994 de las 16:30 horas del 26 de mayo de 2021 esta Sala dispuso que: “(…) Se reitera que el interés difuso no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional (lo que supondría la instauración tácita de acción popular no contemplada por la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional); pero tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues, en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de ese reclamo (…)”.
En el caso concreto, el accionante pretende que esta Sala declare la inconstitucionalidad por omisión de la reforma a los artículos 5, 23 y 24, y la derogatoria de los transitorios XII, XIII, XIV y XV del Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte; publicada en La Gaceta n.° 5 del martes 11 de enero de 2022, toda vez que, en su criterio, no se estableció transitorio alguno que permitiera la gradualidad en la aplicación de tal reforma. Alega que, a partir de la entrada en vigor de la reforma, el 11 de enero de 2024, todas las personas, sin excepción alguna, se verán afectadas por esta. Estima que lo anterior es lesivo de los derechos adquiridos y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, los principios de certeza, razonabilidad, proporcionalidad, seguridad jurídica, buena fe, confianza legítima, no confiscatoriedad, igualdad, publicidad e intangibilidad patrimonial. Así como contrario a lo dispuesto por la OIT en los convenios 102, 118, 128 y 157; artículo 16 de la Declaración Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, artículo 25 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, artículo 26 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, artículo 14 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales; y, finalmente, los artículos 11, 18, 28, 33, 34, 40, 41, 45, 50, 51, 65, 73, 74, 177, 188, 189 y concordantes de la Constitución Política de Costa Rica.
Ahora bien, el accionante fundamenta su legitimación para interponer esta acción en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, pues expresamente indica que “(…) se ostenta la legitimidad directa para interponer la presente acción, mediante la figura de intereses difusos de mis representados, así como de todas aquellas personas que se pertenecen al régimen del IVM y que se ven afectas por la omisión que se impugna en esta vía”. No obstante, considera esta Sala que el actor carece de legitimación directa para acudir ante este Tribunal por la vía de acción de inconstitucionalidad, con base en la defensa de un supuesto interés difuso, no solo porque omite precisar cuál es el interés difuso invocado, sino, también, porque la reforma al Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte -que pretende impugnar por supuestamente carecer de un transitorio que gradúe la vigencia de sus disposiciones- es evidente que admite una aplicación individual y directa, a un grupo de personas fácilmente identificables, como lo son las personas aseguradas que cotizan o aportan a este régimen en particular.
En consecuencia, conforme a los antecedentes jurisprudenciales citados en el considerando anterior, no es admisible alegar la defensa de intereses difusos en las circunstancias que plantea el accionante. Por el contrario, se trata de una normativa que puede dar lugar a diferentes reclamos individuales o colectivos a través de grupos formalmente organizados; que puedan servir de base a la acción de inconstitucionalidad y otorgar legitimación para actuar. En este sentido, quienes estimen vulnerados sus derechos adquiridos o situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, el principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad u otros principios o derechos fundamentales, en virtud de la aplicación directa del reglamento impugnado, bien pueden reclamar sus derechos -en forma individual o colectiva- en la vía administrativa o judicial correspondiente y así contar con el asunto previo pendiente de resolver que exige el artículo 75, párrafo primero, de la ley que rige a esta jurisdicción.
Sin embargo, la parte accionante no mencionó la existencia de algún caso previo pendiente de resolver en procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa o ante tribunales de justicia que permita admitir esta acción con base en la legitimación incidental. Por ende, estima esta Sala que el accionante carece de legitimación activa para promover esta acción, por lo que procede rechazar de plano su gestión. VI.- CONCLUSIÓN. En virtud de lo expuesto, la acción resulta inadmisible por falta de legitimación directa. VII.- DOCUMENTACIÓN APORTADA AL EXPEDIENTE. Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia.
De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI. POR TANTO: Se rechaza de plano la acción, así como la coadyuvancia de Nombre14525 .
Nombre9290 . Presidente a.i Luis Fdo. Salazar A. Jorge Araya G. Ingrid Hess H. Nombre6376 B. Aracelly Pacheco S. Alexandra Alvarado P.
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