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Res. 31711-2023 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 06/12/2023
OutcomeResultado
The Constitutional Chamber summarily dismissed the unconstitutionality action and denied the joinder, due to the petitioner's lack of direct standing based on diffuse interests, as the norm is susceptible to individual application.La Sala Constitucional rechazó de plano la acción de inconstitucionalidad y denegó la coadyuvancia, por falta de legitimación directa del accionante al fundamentarse en intereses difusos cuando la norma es de aplicación individual.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber summarily dismissed an unconstitutionality action filed against the reform of the Disability, Old Age, and Death (IVM) Pension Regulation of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (CCSS), published in January 2022. The petitioner argued that the reform was unconstitutional by omission because it lacked a transitional provision allowing for gradual implementation, thereby affecting acquired rights, early retirement, and various constitutional principles. He claimed standing based on the defense of diffuse interests of IVM contributors. The Chamber held that the action was inadmissible for lack of direct standing, since the challenged regulation is susceptible to individual and direct application to an identifiable group (insured persons under the regime), making the invocation of diffuse interests improper. It noted that affected individuals could pursue their claims through ordinary administrative or judicial channels, where they could raise the constitutional issue incidentally. An active joinder was also denied.La Sala Constitucional rechazó de plano una acción de inconstitucionalidad presentada contra la reforma al Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte (IVM) de la CCSS, publicada en enero de 2022. El accionante alegaba que la reforma era inconstitucional por omisión al no incluir un transitorio que permitiera una aplicación gradual, afectando derechos adquiridos, el retiro anticipado y diversos principios constitucionales. Fundamentó su legitimación en la defensa de intereses difusos de los cotizantes del IVM. La Sala determinó que la acción era inadmisible por falta de legitimación directa, ya que la normativa impugnada admite una aplicación individual y directa a un grupo identificable de personas (los asegurados del régimen), por lo que no procede invocar intereses difusos. Señaló que los afectados pueden reclamar sus derechos por las vías administrativa o judicial ordinarias, donde sí podrían plantear la inconstitucionalidad de manera incidental. También se denegó una coadyuvancia activa presentada.
Key excerptExtracto clave
V.- INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION FOR LACK OF DIRECT STANDING. In the specific case, the petitioner seeks that this Chamber declare the unconstitutionality by omission of the reform to articles 5, 23, and 24, and the repeal of transitory provisions XII, XIII, XIV, and XV of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Insurance Regulation, published in La Gaceta No. 5 on Tuesday, January 11, 2022, since, in his view, no transitory provision was established to allow gradual implementation of such reform. (...) this Chamber considers that the petitioner lacks direct standing to appear before this Court through an unconstitutionality action, based on the defense of an alleged diffuse interest, not only because he fails to specify which diffuse interest is invoked, but also because the reform to the Disability, Old Age, and Death Insurance Regulation—which he seeks to challenge for allegedly lacking a transitory provision to phase in its provisions—clearly admits individual and direct application to an easily identifiable group of persons, namely the insured persons who contribute to this particular regime. Consequently, pursuant to the jurisprudential precedents cited in the previous recital, it is inadmissible to plead the defense of diffuse interests under the circumstances raised by the petitioner. On the contrary, this is a regulation that may give rise to various individual or collective claims through formally organized groups; which may serve as the basis for an unconstitutionality action and confer standing to act. In this regard, those who consider their acquired rights or consolidated legal situations, the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, or other fundamental principles or rights violated by the direct application of the challenged regulation may well assert their rights—individually or collectively—in the corresponding administrative or judicial venue and thus have a prior pending case as required by Article 75, first paragraph, of the law governing this jurisdiction. However, the petitioner did not mention the existence of any prior case pending resolution in administrative proceedings or before courts of justice that would allow admission of this action based on incidental standing. Therefore, this Chamber finds that the petitioner lacks active standing to bring this action, and thus his petition must be summarily dismissed.V.- INADMISIBILIDAD DE LA ACCIÓN POR FALTA DE LEGITIMACIÓN DIRECTA. En el caso concreto, el accionante pretende que esta Sala declare la inconstitucionalidad por omisión de la reforma a los artículos 5, 23 y 24, y la derogatoria de los transitorios XII, XIII, XIV y XV del Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte; publicada en La Gaceta n.° 5 del martes 11 de enero de 2022, toda vez que, en su criterio, no se estableció transitorio alguno que permitiera la gradualidad en la aplicación de tal reforma. (...) considera esta Sala que el actor carece de legitimación directa para acudir ante este Tribunal por la vía de acción de inconstitucionalidad, con base en la defensa de un supuesto interés difuso, no solo porque omite precisar cuál es el interés difuso invocado, sino, también, porque la reforma al Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte -que pretende impugnar por supuestamente carecer de un transitorio que gradúe la vigencia de sus disposiciones- es evidente que admite una aplicación individual y directa, a un grupo de personas fácilmente identificables, como lo son las personas aseguradas que cotizan o aportan a este régimen en particular. En consecuencia, conforme a los antecedentes jurisprudenciales citados en el considerando anterior, no es admisible alegar la defensa de intereses difusos en las circunstancias que plantea el accionante. Por el contrario, se trata de una normativa que puede dar lugar a diferentes reclamos individuales o colectivos a través de grupos formalmente organizados; que puedan servir de base a la acción de inconstitucionalidad y otorgar legitimación para actuar. En este sentido, quienes estimen vulnerados sus derechos adquiridos o situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, el principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad u otros principios o derechos fundamentales, en virtud de la aplicación directa del reglamento impugnado, bien pueden reclamar sus derechos -en forma individual o colectiva- en la vía administrativa o judicial correspondiente y así contar con el asunto previo pendiente de resolver que exige el artículo 75, párrafo primero, de la ley que rige a esta jurisdicción. Sin embargo, la parte accionante no mencionó la existencia de algún caso previo pendiente de resolver en procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa o ante tribunales de justicia que permita admitir esta acción con base en la legitimación incidental. Por ende, estima esta Sala que el accionante carece de legitimación activa para promover esta acción, por lo que procede rechazar de plano su gestión.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"El interés difuso no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional (…); pero tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues, en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de ese reclamo."
"A diffuse interest cannot be so broad and generic that it blends with the right to oversee constitutional legality (…); but neither can it be so concrete that it allows an individual claim, for in such case standing would derive from that claim."
Considerando IV
"El interés difuso no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional (…); pero tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues, en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de ese reclamo."
Considerando IV
"La reforma al Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte (…) es evidente que admite una aplicación individual y directa, a un grupo de personas fácilmente identificables, como lo son las personas aseguradas que cotizan o aportan a este régimen en particular."
"The reform to the Disability, Old Age, and Death Insurance Regulation (…) clearly admits individual and direct application to an easily identifiable group of persons, namely the insured persons who contribute to this particular regime."
Considerando V
"La reforma al Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte (…) es evidente que admite una aplicación individual y directa, a un grupo de personas fácilmente identificables, como lo son las personas aseguradas que cotizan o aportan a este régimen en particular."
Considerando V
Full documentDocumento completo
Protected Sentence, in accordance with current regulations Content of Interest:
Type of content: Majority vote Branch of Law: 3. CONSTITUTIONALITY CONTROL MATTERS Topic: PENSION Subtopics:
NOT APPLICABLE.
PENSION. REFORM OF THE CCSS PENSION REGIME Sentence: 031711-23 of December 6, 2023 Type of matter: Unconstitutionality action Challenged norm: Reform to the IVM Pension Regime of the CCSS, for omission in the inclusion of a transitional provision, that allows for gradualness in the application of the norm.
Operative part: The action is rejected outright, as well as the joinder of Nombre49491.
VCG12/2023 “(…) III.- REGARDING THE PROCEDURE. This action lacks several formal admissibility requirements, since the petitioner did not provide the receipt for payment of the Costa Rica Bar Association (Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica) stamp, in the amount of two hundred seventy-five colones, corresponding to the authentication of the initial brief, nor did he provide the special judicial power of attorney that legitimizes him to act on behalf of those he claims to represent. However, for procedural economy, the prevention provided in Article 80 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional is omitted, since the action is inadmissible for the reasons that will be analyzed below.
The petitioner bases his legitimation on the defense of diffuse interests; however, this Sala, by majority, has considered that when a norm is susceptible to individual application, invoking the defense of diffuse interests to admit the action is not appropriate. Thus, in vote no. 2021-002185 of 12:51 p.m. on February 3, 2021, this Constitutional Court stated the following:
“(…) II.- Regarding diffuse interests and the legitimation of the petitioners in the case under study. The petitioners indicate that their legitimation comes from the defense of diffuse interests regarding the protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. In this regard, it should be noted that, as already mentioned, the assumptions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional constitute exceptions to the rule contained in the first paragraph of the same article, which must be carefully analyzed in each specific case. Diffuse interest has been understood as that interest related to a right or legal situation of a special and particular nature, which can be shared by other persons, with all interested parties forming a specific group or category. Thus, the violation of that right can affect everyone in general or each one in particular, hence any member of the community can file the action to protect the right deemed injured. On this matter, the reiterated jurisprudence of the Sala indicates that:
\"It has been pointed out that it is a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of the collective interest just defined in the preceding recital, but which cannot become so broad and generic that it is confused with that recognized to all members of society to ensure constitutional legality, since the latter -as has been repeatedly stated- is excluded from the current constitutional review system. It is therefore an interest distributed in each of the administered, mediate if you will, and diluted, but no less verifiable, for the defense, in this Sala, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. It is the special characteristics of these rights in themselves and not the particular situation before them of the subjects who may hold them, the key to the distinction and determination of the presence of the so-called diffuse interests as has been manifested in different resolutions such as 03705-93 of three o'clock in the afternoon on July thirtieth for the right to the environment, number 05753-93 of two forty-five in the afternoon on November ninth of that same year for the defense of historical heritage and number 00980-91 of one thirty in the afternoon on May twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-one for electoral matters.\" –see sentence number 360-90- From this definition, it is possible to estimate that the diffuse interest is composed of an eminently subjective element, relating to its belonging or ownership of the interest, and another objective element, related to the incidence of the good in society, which distinguishes it from other legal situations.
In relation to the first -the subjective element-, it is clear that it is diffused in a non-individualized human group, which co-participates in the enjoyment of the legal good object of the interest, but whose conformation does not result from an identifiable, encompassable set of subjects with relatively clear contours, as does occur in collective interest. And from the objective perspective, it must be clarified that not every \"diffused\" interest acquires the legal category of \"diffuse interest\", but only those imbued with a profound social relevance, whose assessment results from the circumstances of each case –see, among others, sentences numbers 2006-15960 and 2014-4904-. In this sense, just as it has been said that this interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality -which would imply the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional-, nor can it be so concrete that it allows individual claim, since in such a case, legitimation would derive from that claim –see, among others, sentences numbers 2008-13442, 2009-300 and 2009-9201-.
Thus, examples of such interests are the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, the defense of historical heritage, electoral matters, the defense of the right to health and the oversight of public funds. Therefore, in the case under study, where the petitioners refer their legitimation regarding the defense of diffuse interests in matters of protection of a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, what corresponds is to rule as indicated in the following recitals.
(…)
In the action now known, the same petitioners challenge the same norms of Articles 50 and 51 of the Regulation in question, as well as Article 52 of the same instrument, and although, beyond the sustainability of breeding farms (zoocriaderos), in this action they focus on issues of ex situ conservation and environmental education -which was also pointed out in that action-, the truth is that this Sala's own definition of legitimation, as provided in the cited sentence, is fully applicable in this new action. Note that, certainly, as clearly indicated by the Procuraduría General de la República and emphatically referred to by the Minister of Environment and Energy, the regulation that is challenged is indeed totally susceptible to individual application and to directly affecting the legal sphere of singular and identifiable persons, who exercise a specific activity, subject to the regulation indicated in the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre and its regulation.
Thus, it is clear that contrary to the alleged defense of diffuse interests, what is at stake is some degree of disagreement with the subjection to which they must submit for the regulation of the activity they exercise or intend to exercise; see that as the report of the Minister of Environment and Energy well refers, the petitioners are directly related as founders, managers or employees of various companies related to the exhibition of wild fauna or its tourism promotion. Thus, it is unfeasible to allege presumed conservation and environmental education problems, to use the figure of diffuse interests and thereby promote a direct unconstitutionality action bypassing the strict admissibility requirements indicated in the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, as indicated in recitals II and III of this resolution.
Under this understanding, and taking into consideration the identity of the petitioners and the challenged regulation, it is clear that the precedent of sentence 2018-18563 is fully applicable to this action now known, from which it must necessarily be concluded that, as on that previous occasion, the petitioners lack legitimation for the filing of this process, so it is inappropriate to hear and rule on the aspects raised. Accordingly, the appropriate course is to dismiss this action” (the underlining does not correspond to the original).
In a similar sense, in sentence no. 2021-011994 of 4:30 p.m. on May 26, 2021, this Sala ordered that:
“(…) It is reiterated that diffuse interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to ensure constitutional legality (which would imply the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional); but neither can it be so concrete that it allows individual claim, since, in such a case, legitimation would derive from that claim (…)”.
In the specific case, the petitioner seeks that this Sala declare the unconstitutionality by omission of the reform to Articles 5, 23 and 24, and the repeal of Transitional Provisions XII, XIII, XIV and XV of the Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte; published in La Gaceta no. 5 of Tuesday, January 11, 2022, since, in his opinion, no transitional provision was established that would allow gradualness in the application of such reform. He alleges that, as of the entry into force of the reform, on January 11, 2024, all persons, without any exception, will be affected by it. He considers that the foregoing is injurious to acquired rights and consolidated legal situations, the principles of certainty, reasonableness, proportionality, legal certainty, good faith, legitimate expectations (confianza legítima), non-confiscation, equality, publicity and patrimonial inviolability (intangibilidad patrimonial).
As well as contrary to the provisions of the ILO in Conventions 102, 118, 128 and 157; Article 16 of the American Declaration on Human Rights, Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Article 14 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and, finally, Articles 11, 18, 28, 33, 34, 40, 41, 45, 50, 51, 65, 73, 74, 177, 188, 189 and concordant articles of the Constitución Política de Costa Rica.
Now then, the petitioner bases his legitimation to file this action on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, as he expressly indicates that “(…) direct legitimacy is held to file the present action, through the figure of diffuse interests of my represented parties, as well as of all those persons who belong to the IVM regime and who are affected by the omission challenged in this way”. However, this Sala considers that the actor lacks direct legitimation to appear before this Court by way of an unconstitutionality action, based on the defense of an alleged diffuse interest, not only because he omits specifying which diffuse interest is invoked, but also because the reform to the Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte -which he intends to challenge for allegedly lacking a transitional provision that grades the validity of its provisions- clearly admits individual and direct application, to a group of easily identifiable people, such as the insured persons who contribute or pay into this particular regime.
Consequently, in accordance with the jurisprudential precedents cited in the previous recital, it is not admissible to allege the defense of diffuse interests under the circumstances raised by the petitioner. On the contrary, it is a regulation that can give rise to different individual or collective claims through formally organized groups; which can serve as a basis for the unconstitutionality action and grant legitimation to act. In this sense, those who consider their acquired rights or consolidated legal situations, the principle of reasonableness and proportionality or other fundamental principles or rights violated, by virtue of the direct application of the challenged regulation, may well claim their rights -individually or collectively- in the corresponding administrative or judicial channel and thus have the prior pending matter to be resolved that is required by Article 75, first paragraph, of the law governing this jurisdiction.
However, the petitioner did not mention the existence of any prior case pending resolution in a procedure to exhaust the administrative channel or before courts of justice that would allow admitting this action based on incidental legitimation. Therefore, this Sala considers that the petitioner lacks active legitimation to promote this action, so his petition must be rejected outright.
By virtue of the foregoing, the action is inadmissible due to lack of direct legitimation. (…)” ... See more Related Sentences Content of Interest:
Type of content: Majority vote Branch of Law: 6. LEY DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL ANNOTATED WITH JURISPRUDENCE Topic: 083- Joinders Subtopics:
NOT APPLICABLE.
ARTICLE 83 OF THE LEY DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL “(…) I.- REGARDING THE JOINDER. Regarding the active joinder petition filed by Nombre49491, identity card no. 1-576-298, Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes, to that effect, that within fifteen days following the first publication of the notice referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81, the parties appearing in matters pending as of the date of filing the action, or those with a legitimate interest, may appear within it, to join in the allegations that could justify its appropriateness or inappropriateness, or to expand, where appropriate, the grounds for unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that interests them. Given that joinder implies an accessory procedural intervention and its fate follows that of the main intervention, for the reasons detailed below regarding the inadmissibility of the action, the joinder formulated must be denied. (…)” VCG12/2023 ... See more Content of Interest:
Type of content: Majority vote Branch of Law: 6. LEY DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL ANNOTATED WITH JURISPRUDENCE Topic: 075- Prior matter pending resolution in judicial or administrative channel Subtopics:
NOT APPLICABLE.
ARTICLE 75 OF THE LEY DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL “(…) II.- REQUIREMENTS AND FORMALITIES OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTION. This Sala has repeatedly indicated that the unconstitutionality action is a process with certain formalities, which, if not met, make it impossible to rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes the admissibility requirements for unconstitutionality actions and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a pending matter to be resolved, whether in a judicial venue –including habeas corpus or amparo appeals– or in an administrative venue –in the procedure for exhausting this channel, that is, in the administrative challenge procedure against the final act–, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked, as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest deemed injured in the main matter.
The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action –the base matter is not required–, in the following cases: a) when due to the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury; b) it concerns the defense of diffuse interests or those that pertain to the community as a whole and c) when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República and the Defensor de los Habitantes. Regarding the requirement of a pending matter to be resolved, this Sala, through Sentence no. 04190-95 of 11:33 a.m. on July 28, 1995, stated the following:
“(…) In the first place, it is a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a pending matter to be resolved -whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative channel- is required to access the constitutional channel, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on said pending process to be resolved, since it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter; and only by exception does the legislation allow direct access to this channel -assumptions of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (…)” .
Likewise, there are other formalities that must be fulfilled, namely: the filing brief must be authenticated and contain an explicit determination of the challenged regulation, duly substantiated, with specific citation of the components of the constitutionality block considered infringed (Article 78 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). It must also accredit the conditions of legitimation (powers of attorney and certifications), proceed with the payment of the Costa Rica Bar Association (Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica) stamp and provide a literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms was invoked in the base matter (Article 79 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). (…)” VCG12/2023 ... See more SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at nine thirty hours on December sixth, two thousand twenty-three.
Unconstitutionality action brought by Nombre14517, identity card no. CED11565, attorney license no. CED11566, in his capacity as special judicial attorney-in-fact for [Nombre62 026], [Nombre 002], [Nombre 003], [Nombre 004], [Nombre 005], [Nombre 006], [Nombre 007], [Nombre 008], [Nombre 009], [Nombre 010], [Nombre 011], [Nombre 012], [Nombre 013], [Nombre 014], [Nombre 015], [Nombre 016] and [Nombre 017]; against “the reform to the IVM Pension Regime of the CCSS for omission in the inclusion of a transitional provision that would allow gradualness in the application of the reform”.
WHEREAS:
| Dimension | IVM Strengthening Plan |
|---|---|
| Retirement age | The right to an Old Age Pension for men and women is maintained at age 65. The right to early retirement due to old age for men is eliminated. The right to early retirement due to old age for women is maintained, adjusting the minimum age for this retirement starting at age 63 with 405 contributions for higher ages in accordance with Article 50 of the Reglamento del IVM. Effective 24 months after the regulation is published in the Diario La Gaceta. |
| Calculation formula | Establish the Average Reference Salary (Salario Promedio de Referencia, SPR) as the average of the best 300 inflation-indexed salaries of the entire contributory career. Use the SPR as the Placement Salary (Salario de Ubicación, SU) to define the basic benefit range of the contributor. The additional amount is counted starting from the 300 contributions made to the IVM. Effective 24 months after the regulation is published in the Diario La Gaceta. |
| Regulatory contributions | Current conditions are maintained |
He alleges that the approved reform is omission-prone in that a transitional provision was not established that would allow gradualness in its application. He considers that said omission is contrary to Constitutional Law. He argues that, through the unconstitutionality action by omission, constitutionality control is permitted in cases where there are normative omissions that infringe a provision contained expressly or manifestly in the Constitución Política, as well as those that violate constitutional principles or fundamental rights. In this case, he alleges that the modification is contrary to Conventions 102, 118, 128 and 157 of the International Labor Organization, as well as Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights; Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Articles 11, 18, 28, 33, 34, 40, 41, 45, 50, 51, 65, 73, 74, 177, 188, 189 and concordant articles of the Constitución Política de Costa Rica.
Furthermore, it contravenes the following principles: democratic, equality, publicity, solidarity, legal certainty, good faith, legitimate expectations (confianza legítima), transparency, patrimonial inviolability (intangibilidad patrimonial), non-confiscation, acquired rights and consolidated legal situations. In the same sense, the Sala has indicated (e.g., sentence no. 003911-2005) that the admissibility requirements of an unconstitutionality action against a norm must also be observed when bringing an action by omission. To this effect, it points out that the object of the action must be determined, which requires that the petitioner prove which norm is lacking and, on the other hand, that there is a mandate, even if only tacit, to enact it. In the specific case, a norm is lacking that provides a transitional provision allowing gradualness in the application of the IVM reform, as well as the constitutional obligation for the CCSS, to regulate the issue of social security and the pension regime, in this case, of the IVM.
The petitioner sets forth the following facts: the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of the CCSS, through agreement no. 12 of session no. 9198 of August 12, 2021, approved the reform to the Reglamento del Régimen de Pensiones del IVM, in its Articles 5, 23 and 24, together with the elimination of Transitional Provisions XII, XIII, XIV and XV, referring to the validity of previous reforms, amounts, sums and ages. Said reform was published on January 11, 2022, in La Gaceta no. 5, providing the following modifications:
I want to place on record that and how difficult it is to think that only the workers have to assume the costs of Social Security, when there are other different financing alternatives that should be discussed, including the agreement of the previous Board of Directors that established the appointment of an external participation commission, I don't know if that commission was formed and what external participation means (...) Director Alfaro Murillo: Let's see, I would like us to start from how the Board views the issue, how to view the different topics, without necessarily seeing what Nombre14518 is proposing, and I want my position to be on record. Regarding the reform, I do not agree with the credit for children, nor with the one-year credit, nor those measures that are somewhat arbitrary, right, and that do not resolve the issue for me, so, on top of it arising at the last moment because here today we see a third option which is the INAMU proposal, which arose recently, but has not been discussed at all and has some problems for me, as Mrs.
Nombre14519 said, a dreadful discrimination among women, I already raised it last time, so, I don't even understand why we are looking at it. I don't want to enter into that discussion, I am not going to discriminate among women, agreed, I am not going to discriminate among women, so, I would like to know if any of my colleagues find this proposal timely, in order to then say we must continue discussing, because there are Board members who like it, what I want to know is just a little bit to start discarding what we don't like. Second, if an affirmative action is desired, let it be complete, but again this reform about over 60, no, no, no, if what we want is an affirmative action let's take it equally, men at 65, women at 63, not as an early pension advance with 405 quotas, no, no, no, retirement age and we change what has existed since nineteen forty-something, no, no, no, that is the complete affirmative action for all, for all women to change what comes from back then, the early pension is eliminated, but inequalities are recognized in relation to access to the labor market, in relation to the excess of different work possibilities, in dedication to the home, and so women retire at 63 and men at 65 equally, but where I have to start explaining that this is for over 60, people will feel absolutely discriminated against within the same group of men and women.
So, I say, why are we complicating things so much looking for those nooks and crannies, and forgive the expression, but that's how I feel, if there is an action that is desired, the only one I agree with is men at 65, women at 63, what they put here without any need for any procedure, that is the retirement age from the moment this Board approves it and we move on, done (...) Director Rodríguez González: Nombre14518, since you are talking about that, explain to me, if you conducted any study and that is so, or you are speculating, because the first thing you refer to about the perception of economic recovery based on the data you presented, regarding the situation that has been occurring with the pandemic, is not congruent with what you are stating there, that in the first place and in the second place; what experts like Nombre14520 have considered, that is why I ask if you already conducted a study to make a statement or it is mere speculation, is that rather there will be a drop in the mortality rate, no, rather, there will be a higher mortality rate due to the pandemic, and that from the perspective of Nombre14520 - I am not the one raising it - it could rather happen that those rates are much higher or reflect the pandemic situation more, and we have a greater number of deaths, so, I would like to see if there is a study that you conducted regarding the pandemic and the impacts, considering mortality rates and birth rates, which is one of the aspects that have been discussed on this topic, at least by demographers and other experts, to make that statement with such forcefulness I wanted you to explain it to me.
Director Rodríguez González: Nombre14518, what catches my attention is that you are stating that the measure with the greatest impact and that is the most long-term is the modification agreed upon at the 2017 dialogue table, so, if the Board of Directors agreed to adopt all the modifications, why wasn't that alternative applied at that time, I still haven't understood that, we started discussing years later, without having applied all the measures, so now we are in a situation where one of the most important aspects and the one that has the most impact, according to what you just said, was an agreement from the 2017 dialogue table that was never applied, that's what I can't understand, that if it had been applied we wouldn't be in this situation, with how difficult it is at a dialogue table to reach agreements among sectors, each sector has its points, its expectations, how was it not applied at the time, I don't have that very clear, the Board of Directors agreed to all the measures from the 2017 dialogue table, so, I want to have it clear, because I don't know what happened.
Director Rodríguez González: Nombre14518, two questions, in the scenarios that you presented, later as well, well, and in the same proposal, where you speak of a transition that is not a transition, it is actually just what the Chamber had indicated, based on Convention 102 of the ILO regarding pension reforms. So, it is not that there is a transition period; later in the affirmative action in the following chart you presented, which you called "other quantification exercises," you also speak of an affirmative action that benefits women who, at the time the reform enters into force, are at least 60 years of age, that is, that action only applies to these women, those who are 60 years of age at the time it enters into force, that is what you are proposing, affirmative action only for that small group of women, who are 60 years old, and you are seeing that this affirmative action could be done, but it is not an affirmative action for women, but only for that reduced small group of women.
I want to make an observation Nombre14518, because, first, to say that the opinions of the social sectors were incorporated, that is not true, not a single dot or comma from any sector, and on the topic, in general, about the 2018 actuarial study, which is from late 2018, that's what the workers don't understand. That in 2018, at the beginning of 2018, the Board of Directors, based on the dialogue table, agrees on a reform that for them meant a space of tranquility, and then they conduct an actuarial study with a 100-year horizon, in the same year, and they immediately tell them, in the same year that a reform is approved, which may have all the caveats that you mention, and indeed, that's why it was said quickly that there had to be an accountability review to see who complies and who doesn't, there was a tripartite effort, things were agreed upon, the Board of Directors became aware of them in 2018, after the proposal was delivered on November 6, 2017, in 2018 it was approved, and in that same 2018, at the end of 2018, with this long-term actuarial study, they come to tell the workers that no, that the regime is bankrupt and that there is nothing else to do but generate a change of this magnitude for the workers, that is what is hard for the workers to understand.
And the other thing, Nombre14518, that I was asking you about, how is that affirmative action for a certain small group of women who are 60 years old, because it seems to me that makes no sense. Director Rodríguez González: (...) Only one of the formulas that have been proposed decreases the amount of the person's pension by 5% and up to 15% in total, that no gradualness is being proposed in the proposals that are being mostly supported, and I believe that the proposals promoted by the Pensions Management did not adopt any of the proposals from the social sectors, unloading exclusively on the workers' shoulders the cost of the reform and the measures that are so regressive and damaging to the right to a decent retirement in case of disability, old age, and death of the affiliate. Therefore, heeding the vision and mandate (or of the union and social representations, gathered yesterday, my vote will be against any of those proposals (...) Director Rodríguez González: (...) what I said is that the additional amount that Nombre14518 said weighed most heavily on this reform, that 5% less that people will receive in their pension, that additional amount, with that weight, was indeed agreed upon at the social dialogue table, early retirement was not even considered at the 2017 dialogue table, there was no agreement.
If we have a tripartite agreement on the topic of the additional amount within the framework of everything that was proposed, and there is an agreement signed by the three sectors effectively stating that this amount will be applied after 300 quotas, reducing the pension by 5%, that is so, Mrs. Nombre14521, I assume it because indeed the union movement also affirms it (...)" Director Alfaro Murillo: Mr. Nombre14522, you see, when in that first point where it says retirement age, partial elimination of early retirement, that creates confusion because, then, if I were a man I would ask how it affected me, how they did it, I would put the two elements very clearly, total elimination of early retirement for men and partial elimination of early retirement for women, bang, bang, and it takes effect on such and such a date, that is, the general title alone, tells me, tells me things as clearly as I would like.
Director Loría Chaves: Nombre14521, besides, the mere word elimination is very jarring, it is a modification of retirement, it is better to put modification than elimination, elimination is a very coarse word itself, even in that one must be careful (...) Director Alfaro Murillo: So let's make it more direct, as the right to retirement for men was just said, it starts from, directly, the right to retirement for men, and put, and for women from 63, all women will say what a wonder, besides, it's a communication issue, I would say that we have to put the same thing, the right to retirement for men from 65 years of age and it is maintained, it seems to me that we must be clear, it is maintained, then women will start asking what happens if I don't meet them, rat-a-tat, rat-a-tat, rat-a-tat, you understand me, the rule must be very clear, the agreement must be very clear, so, for men it is from 65 and separately the right to retirement, for women from 63 years of age (...)".
The plaintiff states that, from the partially transcribed minutes, it can be inferred that the reform to the IVM Regulation was approved by the Board of Directors of the CCSS without technical and scientific clarity existing. This is manifested in the following issues that directly affect the retirement right of his represented parties and of all persons who contribute to the IVM, namely:
| Insurance Condition | Year<br>2020 | Year 2020 | Year<br>2021 | Year 2021 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Social Security (employees and agreements, Law 17) | 2,444,163 | 47.8% | 2,436,816 | 47.2% |
| Self-employed (Independent and voluntary, Law 7983) | 740,556 | 14.5% | 722,145 | 14% |
| Pensioners (Law 5905) | 604,970 | 11.8% | 616,407 | 11.9% |
| State (Other special laws and students) | 902,577 | 17.7% | 918,174 | 17.8% |
| Uninsured (Art. 21 constitutional) | 419,139 | 8.2% | 469,871 | 9.1% |
| Total Population | 5,111,405 | 100.0% | 5,163,413 | 100.0% |
He explains that the attached table shows a deficiency of the CCSS in the management of social security, given that, if the CCSS manages to regulate what corresponds to the contributions of self-employed insured persons as well as those uninsured, it could improve the collection of contributions by over 20%. This is an obligation of the CCSS by constitutional mandate, as indicated in Article 73 of the Political Constitution. This is accompanied by the fact that the State has failed to comply with its contributions to finance what is provided for by special laws for the various forms of financing, which has led the CCSS itself to take funds from Social Security to finance the shortfalls of resources allocated by those special laws. As recorded in a report issued by the Pensions Management itself, the State will owe, by the end of 2023, an amount close to ₡600,000,000,000.00, and for the 2024 budget, a shortfall of ₡71,630,000,000.00 is reflected, amounts that refer to state contributions. This has evidently caused an impact on the pension regime, but one that his represented parties will unjustly have to bear with the reform enacted by the Board of Directors of the CCSS. The foregoing is reinforced by the information recorded in the Pensions Management of the CCSS, which shows the IVM coverage:
| Insurance Modality | Contributors | Coverage over EAP |
|---|---|---|
| Social Security | 1,220,251 | 48.2% |
| Private Company | 973,688 | 38.4% |
| Domestic Service | 15,680 | 0.6% |
| Agreements | 34,785 | 1.4% |
| Public Sector | 196,098 | 7.7% |
| Independent Workers | 148,412 | 5.9% |
| Voluntary Insured | 78,517 | 3.1% |
| Total IVM | 1,447,180 | 57.1% |
| Did Not Contribute | 1,086,551 | 42.9% |
| Total EAP (CCP) | 2,533,731 | 100.0% |
He argues that the previous table reflects the poor collection and insurance coverage policy by the CCSS, in which it is seen that there are more than one million people who do not contribute to social security and who are protected by special laws, without the State having assumed their cost. These factors have an impact on the IVM regime. Another point to consider is that, in accordance with the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, a model is established for the distribution of funds to finance the IVM. As recorded in a study carried out by the CCSS Workers' Movement, the insurance contribution for employees is 7.0%, so since the contribution that the CCSS collects for insurance is 26.16%, in accordance with numerals 32 and 43 of the regulation in question, the surplus is 19.16%, an amount that should be allocated to the financing of the IVM; however, only a transfer to the IVM of 11.16% on salaries is made.
This, furthermore, has a certain impact on the criteria of reasonableness and proportionality, especially if it is taken into consideration that, in the face of poor collection and poor distribution of income, a detriment is being imposed on his represented parties, who must see the period to be able to opt for their retirement right extended. This, additionally, with a possible incidence on the provision of services offered at the CCSS, a place where his represented parties work, who are exposed to syndromes linked to age, years of service, wear and tear due to their function, among others. He considers that the CCSS has failed to carry out functions pertinent to strengthening the IVM pension regime, and that the reform seeks to burden the contributors, in this case his clients, with bearing the administrative omissions of the CCSS and the State. On the other hand, he reiterates that no transitional provision was established that would allow gradualness in the application of the proposed reforms, especially the one related to early retirement. 3) Consolidated legal matters were not addressed.
People who have contributed their payments to social security for over 30 years, with the entry into force of the reform, are forced to a longer permanence in their working life, having to wait a greater number of years for their pension, despite having exceeded the number of contributions required by law, as well as having widely exceeded the number of years of service. Thus, a person will have to wait three years and 36 additional quotas to be able to opt for their retirement right, even though there are those who, like several of his represented parties, have more than 400 or 500 quotas. Thus, regarding the fact that the change in the parameters to access the right to retirement constitutes a violation of the principles of equality, proportionality, and reasonableness. This is because persons who contribute to the IVM regime have subjected themselves, for the purpose of opting for a pension and a dignified life after retirement, to a special, solidarity-based, and retributive contribution, but subsequently the conditions have been varied for them abruptly, in a trampled manner, in a non-progressive way, and to the detriment of acquired rights and consolidated legal situations.
Regarding consolidated legal situations and acquired rights, the Constitutional Chamber, among others, in ruling No. 2765-97 stated: “(...) The concepts of 'acquired rights' and 'consolidated legal situations' appear closely related in constitutionalist doctrine. It is feasible to affirm that, in general terms, the former denotes that consummated circumstance in which a thing - material or immaterial, whether it be a previously foreign good or a previously non-existent right - has entered (or had an impact upon) the person's patrimonial sphere, such that the person experiences an advantage or verifiable benefit. For its part, the 'consolidated legal situation' represents not so much a patrimonial gain, but rather a state of affairs fully defined as to its legal characteristics and its effects, even if these have not yet been extinguished. The relevant aspect regarding the consolidated legal situation, precisely, is not whether those effects still endure or not, but rather that —by virtue of a legal mandate or a judgment that has so declared it— a rule, clear and defined, has already arisen in legal life connecting a factual presupposition (conditioning fact) with a given consequence (conditioned effect).
From this perspective, the person's situation is given by a logical proposition of the type 'if..., then...,' meaning, if the conditioning fact has occurred, then the 'consolidated legal situation' implies that, necessarily, the conditioned effect must also occur. In both cases (acquired rights or consolidated legal situations), the legal system protects - making it intangible - the situation of the person who obtained the right or enjoys the situation, for reasons of equity and legal certainty(...)”. In addition to the above, the reform is harmful to the provisions of Article 34 of the Political Constitution, which indicates: "No law shall be given retroactive effect to the detriment of any person, or of their acquired patrimonial rights or consolidated legal situations." Regarding this article, the Chamber, among others, in rulings 03551-14 and 01214-15, has pointed out that the right to retire, although it may undergo changes regarding the regulations of each regime, the truth is that such right cannot be limited, conditioned, or suppressed irrationally.
In the specific case, by not contemplating a transitional provision in the reform approved by the Board of Directors of the CCSS, the right of access to a pension for contributors to the IVM regime is being limited. In line with the foregoing, the position of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic is relevant, an entity that, in legal opinion OJ-104-2017, pointed out, in the pertinent part, the following: “Article 34 of the Political Constitution establishes that no law shall be given retroactive effect to the detriment of any person or of their acquired patrimonial rights or consolidated legal situations. In the case of a pension or retirement, the right to enjoy it is acquired when all the requirements provided for in the regulations governing the matter are met, requirements including age, years of service, etc. Before those requirements are met, what exists is a mere expectation of a right, which is not even comparable to a consolidated legal situation.” Despite the foregoing, the Constitutional Chamber has validated that, to protect the eventual beneficiary of a specific special retirement or pension regime from sudden changes that could aggravate the requirements for obtaining recognition of the benefit, if the legislator deems it convenient and decides to regulate it through transitional law, a period of at least 18 months is sufficient so that the modification of the specific conditions does not affect the administered party who meets the requirements within that period.
In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber, through its ruling No. 846-92 of 1:30 p.m. on March 27, 1992, referring to the then bill creating the General Pension Regime charged to the National Budget, ordered - among other things - that: "- in its transitional articles - it recognizes the conservation of the retirement situation of the servers who had fulfilled the requirements to enjoy the benefit, and also extends it to those who belong or have belonged to the excluded regimes to acquire it, within a period of eighteen months, which seems reasonably sufficient to guarantee any eventual rights in good faith.” With this, the Chamber considered that not only was the right of persons who, upon the law entering into force, had fulfilled the requirements to retire or receive a pension under the legislation intended to be modified guaranteed, but it extended it to those located at a close age that would allow them to do so (18 months after the reform), provided that the factual assumptions established by said norms had been met, despite their repeal.
(See also ruling No. 5476-93 of 6:03 p.m. on October 27, 1993, from that same Chamber) (…)”. The plaintiff alleges that, from the partially transcribed criteria, it follows that the Constitutional Chamber itself has established the need to apply transitional provisions to the application of any reform involving acquired rights and consolidated legal situations, as in this specific case, it is necessary to dilute the effects of the reform over time, in order not to harm the situations to which people are entitled, in this case, to access their retirement right. However, in the reform to the IVM pension regime, agreement No. 12 of session No. 9198 of August 12, 2021, of the Board of Directors of the CCSS, no transitional provision was established whatsoever, and it is intended that, from the entry into force of the reform, as of January 11, 2024, all persons, without any exception, will be affected by it, harming acquired rights and consolidated legal situations.
Furthermore, contradicting principles of proportionality and reasonableness. In addition to the above, the plaintiff claims that the reform proposed by the Board of Directors of the CCSS lacks a solid scientific and technical basis, given that it only stems from a 2017 actuarial study and a consultation on a unilateral proposal by the CCSS, in which the diverse involved sectors did not participate. Thus, it is necessary to question the ways in which the reform was carried out, as well as some substantial issues, such as the lack of a transitional provision that allows its implementation in a gradual manner. Contrary to this, as noted, a reform is applied that enters into force abruptly without considering extremes necessary to not render the retirement right nugatory. He indicates that, as the ILO has pointed out based on its Conventions 102 (minimum standard) and 128 (old-age, invalidity, and survivors' benefits), pension regimes are an instrument implemented to guarantee the socioeconomic security of older adults and thereby prevent this population from falling into situations of poverty, inequality, and exclusion.
The ILO itself has pointed out that social security pension regimes are the means to guarantee adequate benefit levels for the population reaching the end of their working life, which is determined by various factors, including age, number of quotas, and years of service. This is because, in pension systems, individuals receive a regular income when they have reached retirement age and are no longer receiving a stable income. The ILO itself points out that pension systems differ from country to country, but generally consist of regimes for different categories of people, from basic social pensions for low-income people to complementary voluntary savings for higher-income people. Thus, it can be inferred that each country has a model/engineering in pension matters, and in the case at hand, the model is given by the IVM system. In the specific case, a deficiency in the engineering and administration of the regime is evident, but the Administration, in this case the CCSS, cannot impose the burdens of its administrative insufficiency and ineffectiveness on the administered parties.
As indicated, there are state deficiencies, such as: -The State has a debt with the IVM regime for an amount close to ₡600,000,000,000.00, and for the 2024 budget a budget shortfall of ₡71,630,000,000 is reflected. -Regarding the distribution of fund income in accordance with the Constitutive Law of the CCSS and the provisions of numeral 73 of the Political Constitution, the institution must transfer a percentage of 19.16% to the pension fund, an amount derived from the sum collected by the CCSS for insurance, which is less the 7% contributed by workers. However, only an amount of 11.16% is transferred, creating a gap of 8%. -Furthermore, there is poor administrative management regarding collection, as shown in the attached table:
| Insurance Condition | Year 2020 | Year 2020 % | Year 2021 | Year 2021 % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Social Security (employees and agreements, Ley 17) | 2,444,163 | 47.8% | 2,436,816 | 47.2% |
| Self-employed (Independent and voluntary, Ley 7983) | 740,556 | 14.5% | 722,145 | 14.0% |
| Pensioners (Ley 5905) | 604,970 | 11.8% | 616,407 | 11.9% |
| State (Other special laws and students) | 902,577 | 17.7% | 918,174 | 17.8% |
| Uninsured (Art. 21 constitutional) | 419,139 | 8.2% | 469,871 | 9.1% |
| Total Population | 5,111,405 | 100.0% | 5,163,413 | 100.0% |
It is estimated that the deficiency of the CCSS in managing social security is demonstrated, given that, as noted, if the institution manages to regularize the corresponding contributions from self-employed insured persons as well as those uninsured, it could improve contribution collection by over 20%. Added to this, if the State assumes the actual payment of its burdens, the regime's outlook would be more robust and thereby not transfer the regime's deficiencies to the administered parties, making early retirement impossible through a reform that lacks a transitional provision, harming the fundamental rights of all contributors. It must be pointed out that other pension regimes contemplate a transitional provision when a reform has occurred, such as that of the Judicial Branch (currently under discussion regarding its constitutionality) and the National Teachers' Union. Thus, not contemplating such possibility in the reform discussed here violates the principle of equality, set forth in numeral 33 of the Political Constitution, from which it derives that it requires not making differences between two or more persons who are in the same legal situation (in this case seeking a transitional provision in the application of the pension regime reform) or in identical conditions (see in this regard, among others, judgment of Placa2100).
The form, as proposed, approved, and entering into force, is contrary to the indicated situations and principles, as well as contrary to: Principles of certainty, reasonableness, proportionality, and legal certainty, Principles of good faith and legitimate expectations. Principle of non-confiscation. Principle of equality. Principle of publicity. Principle of patrimonial inviolability. The provisions of the ILO in Conventions 102, 118, 128, and 157. Article 16 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Article 14 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights -PIDESC-. Articles 11, 18, 28, 33, 34, 40, 41, 45, 50, 51, 65, 73, 74, 177, 188, 189 and concordant articles of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica. For the foregoing reasons, the reform approved by the Board of Directors of the CCSS and that will take effect in January 2024, of the IVM Pension Regime presents an omission that renders it unconstitutional, such that a transitional provision was not indicated to permit its gradual implementation.
The aspects that must be considered when analyzing whether or not the circumstance of unconstitutional omission occurs include, among others, whether the omission renders the rule or any fundamental right ineffective. Based on the above, the claimant requests that the unconstitutionality by omission of the reform challenged herein be declared.
Drafted by Magistrate Cruz Castro; and,
CONSIDERING:
Regarding the active joinder proceeding filed by Nombre14525 , identity card no. 1-576-298, Article 83 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes, to that effect, that within fifteen days following the first publication of the notice referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81, the parties appearing in matters pending on the date of filing the action, or those with a legitimate interest, may appear within it, to coadjuvate in the allegations that could justify its admissibility or inadmissibility, or to expand, as applicable, the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that concerns them. Given that joinder supposes an accessory procedural intervention and its fate follows that of the principal intervention, for the reasons detailed below regarding the inadmissibility of the action, the joinder formulated must be denied.
This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the action of unconstitutionality is a process with certain formalities, which, if not met, make it impossible to rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the prerequisites for admissibility for actions of unconstitutionality and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, either in a judicial venue – including habeas corpus or amparo remedies – or in the administrative venue – in the procedure for exhausting this avenue, i.e., in the administrative challenge proceeding against the final act – in which the unconstitutionality of the questioned norm is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered harmed in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate direct action – a base matter is not required – in the following cases: a) when by the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct harm; b) it concerns the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Attorney General of the Republic, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, and the Ombudsman. Regarding the requirement of a pending matter to resolve, this Chamber, through Judgment No. 04190-95 of 11:33 hours on July 28, 1995, stated the following:
“(…) Firstly, it is a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, meaning that the existence of a matter pending resolution is required - whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure for exhausting the administrative route - in order to access the constitutional venue, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered harmed in the main matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on said pending process, as it manifests on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter; and only by exception does the legislation allow direct access to this venue - prerequisites of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (…)”.
Likewise, there are other formalities that must be fulfilled, namely: the filing brief must be authenticated and contain an explicit determination of the challenged norm, duly grounded, with specific citation of the components of the constitutional framework that are considered infringed (Article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction). It must also accredit the conditions of standing (powers and certifications), proceed to pay the stamp of the Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica, and provide a literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms was invoked in the base matter (Article 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction).
This action lacks several formal requirements for admissibility, since the claimant did not provide the receipt for payment of the stamp of the Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica, in the sum of two hundred seventy-five colones, corresponding to the authentication of the initial brief, nor did he provide the special judicial power of attorney that legitimizes him to act in Nombre62 of those he claims to represent. However, for procedural economy, the preliminary notice provided in Article 80 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction is omitted, since the action is inadmissible for the reasons that will be discussed below.
The claimant bases his standing on the defense of diffuse interests; however, this Chamber, by majority, has considered that when a norm is susceptible to individual application, the defense of diffuse interests cannot be invoked to admit the action. Thus, in vote no. 2021-002185 of 12:51 hours on February 3, 2021, this Constitutional Court stated the following:
“(…) II.- On the diffuse interests and the standing of the claimants in the case under study. The claimants state that their standing comes from the defense of diffuse interests regarding the protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. In this regard, it should be noted that, as already mentioned, the cases of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction constitute exceptions to the rule contained in the first paragraph of the same article, which must be carefully analyzed in each specific case. The diffuse interest has been understood as that interest related to a right or legal situation of a special and particular nature, which may be shared by other persons, all interested persons forming a specific group or category. Thus, the violation of that right can affect everyone in general or each one in particular, hence any member of the community can file the action to protect the right considered harmed. On this matter, the reiterated jurisprudence of the Chamber indicates that:
\"It has been noted that it is a special type of interest, whose manifestation is less concrete and individualizable than that of the collective interest just defined in the preceding considering, but which cannot become so broad and generic as to be confused with the right recognized for all members of society to watch over constitutional legality, since this latter - as has been repeatedly stated - is excluded from the current system of constitutional review. It is, therefore, an interest distributed in each of the administered parties, mediate if you will, and diluted, but no less verifiable for the defense, in this Chamber, of certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate and harmonious development of society. It is the special characteristics of these rights themselves, and not the particular situation before them of the subjects who may hold them, that is the key to distinguishing and determining the presence of so-called diffuse interests, as stated in different resolutions such as 03705-93 of fifteen hours on July thirtieth for the right to the environment, number 05753-93 of fourteen forty-five hours on November ninth of that same year for the defense of historical heritage, and number 00980-91 of thirteen thirty hours on May twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-one for electoral matters.\" –see ruling number 360-90- From this definition, it is possible to estimate that the diffuse interest is composed of an eminently subjective element, relating to its belonging or ownership of the interest, and another objective element, related to the incidence of the good on society, which distinguishes it from other legal situations.
Regarding the former - the subjective element - it is clear that it is diffused in a non-individualized human group, which co-participates in the enjoyment of the legal good that is the object of the interest, but whose composition does not result from an identifiable, encompassable set of subjects with relatively clear contours, as occurs with the collective interest. And from the objective perspective, it should be clarified that not every \"diffused\" interest acquires the legal category of \"diffuse interest,\" but only those imbued with profound social relevance, whose assessment results from the circumstances of each case –see, among others, rulings number 2006-15960 and 2014-4904-. In this sense, just as it has been said that this interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to watch over constitutional legality - which would imply the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction - it also cannot be so concrete as to allow an individual claim, since in such case, standing would derive from that claim –see, among others, rulings number 2008-13442, 2009-300, and 2009-9201-.
Thus, examples of such interests are the right to a healthy and harmonious environment, the defense of historical heritage, electoral matters, the defense of the right to health, and the oversight of public funds. Therefore, in the case under study, where the claimants refer their standing regarding the defense of diffuse interests in the matter of protecting a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, what corresponds is to rule as indicated in the following considerings.
(…)
In the action now being examined, the same claimants challenge the same norms of Articles 50 and 51 of the Regulation in question, as well as Article 52 of the same instrument, and although, beyond the sustainability of animal husbandry facilities (zoocriaderos), this action focuses on issues of ex situ conservation and environmental education - which was also pointed out in that previous action - the fact is that this Chamber's own definition of standing, as ordered in the cited ruling, is fully applicable in this new action. Note that, certainly, as clearly indicated by the Attorney General of the Republic and emphatically referenced by the Minister of Environment and Energy, the challenged norm is indeed entirely susceptible to individual application and to directly affecting the legal sphere of singular and identifiable persons, who exercise a specific activity, subject to the regulation established in the Wildlife Conservation Law and its regulation.
Thus, it is clear that contrary to the asserted defense of diffuse interests, what is at stake is some degree of disagreement with the subjection to which they must submit for the regulation of the activity they carry out or intend to carry out; see that, as the report of the Minister of Environment and Energy correctly points out, the claimants are directly related as founders, managers, or employees of various companies related to the exhibition of wildlife or its tourism promotion. Thus, it is unfeasible to claim alleged conservation and environmental education problems to use the figure of diffuse interests and thereby file a direct action of unconstitutionality, bypassing the strict admissibility requirements set forth in the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, as indicated in considerings II and III of this resolution.
Under this understanding, and taking into consideration the identity of the claimants and the norm challenged, it is clear that the precedent of ruling 2018-18563 is fully applicable to this action now being examined, from which it must necessarily be concluded that, just as in that previous occasion, the claimants lack standing to file this process, and therefore it is inadmissible to hear and rule on the aspects raised. Consequently, the proper course is to dismiss this action” (the underlining does not belong to the original).
In a similar vein, in ruling no. 2021-011994 of 16:30 hours on May 26, 2021, this Chamber ordered that:
“(…) It is reiterated that the diffuse interest cannot be so broad and generic that it is confused with the right to watch over constitutional legality (which would imply the tacit establishment of a popular action not contemplated by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction); but it also cannot be so concrete as to allow an individual claim, since, in such case, standing would derive from that claim (…)”.
In the specific case, the claimant seeks for this Chamber to declare the unconstitutionality by omission of the reform to Articles 5, 23, and 24, and the repeal of transitional provisions XII, XIII, XIV, and XV of the Regulation of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Insurance; published in La Gaceta No. 5 on Tuesday, January 11, 2022, since, in his view, no transitional provision whatsoever was established to allow for gradualness in the application of such reform. He argues that, upon the reform's entry into force on January 11, 2024, all persons, without any exception, will be affected by it. He considers that the foregoing is harmful to acquired rights and consolidated legal situations, the principles of certainty, reasonableness, proportionality, legal certainty, good faith, legitimate expectations, non-confiscation, equality, publicity, and patrimonial inviolability. As well as contrary to the provisions of the ILO in Conventions 102, 118, 128, and 157; Article 16 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Article 14 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and, finally, Articles 11, 18, 28, 33, 34, 40, 41, 45, 50, 51, 65, 73, 74, 177, 188, 189 and concordant articles of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica.
Now, the claimant bases his standing to file this action on Article 75, second paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, as he expressly states that “(…) direct legitimacy to file this action is held, through the figure of diffuse interests of my represented parties, as well as all those persons who belong to the IVM regime and who are affected by the omission challenged through this avenue”. However, this Chamber considers that the actor lacks direct standing to appear before this Court through the avenue of action of unconstitutionality, based on the defense of an alleged diffuse interest, not only because he fails to specify what the invoked diffuse interest is, but also because the reform to the Regulation of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Insurance - which he intends to challenge for allegedly lacking a transitional provision to phase in the validity of its provisions - clearly admits an individual and direct application, to a group of easily identifiable persons, such as the insured persons who contribute or pay into this particular regime.
Consequently, in accordance with the jurisprudential precedents cited in the preceding considering, it is not admissible to claim the defense of diffuse interests under the circumstances raised by the claimant. On the contrary, it is a norm that can give rise to different individual or collective claims through formally organized groups; which can serve as the basis for the action of unconstitutionality and grant standing to act. In this sense, those who consider their acquired rights or consolidated legal situations, the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, or other fundamental principles or rights violated by virtue of the direct application of the challenged regulation, can well claim their rights - individually or collectively - in the corresponding administrative or judicial venue and thus have the prior pending matter to resolve that is required by Article 75, first paragraph, of the law governing this jurisdiction.
However, the claimant did not mention the existence of any prior case pending resolution in a procedure for exhausting the administrative venue or before courts of justice that would allow admitting this action based on incidental standing. Therefore, this Chamber considers that the claimant lacks active standing to bring this action, and his proceeding is rejected outright.
By virtue of the foregoing, the action is inadmissible for lack of direct standing.
The parties are warned that if they have provided any document on paper, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, according to the provisions of the \"Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial\", approved by the Full Court in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI and published in the Judicial Bulletin number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judiciary, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.
THEREFORE:
The action is rejected outright, as well as the joinder of Nombre14525 .
Nombre9290 . President a.i Luis Fdo. Salazar A. Jorge Araya G. Ingrid Hess H. Nombre6376 B. Aracelly Pacheco S. Alexandra Alvarado P.
Clasificación elaborada por SALA CONSTITUCIONALdel Poder Judicial. Prohibida su reproducción y/o distribución en forma onerosa.
Sentencia con datos protegidos, de conformidad con la normativa vigente Contenido de Interés:
Tipo de contenido: Voto de mayoría Rama del Derecho: 3. ASUNTOS DE CONTROL DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD Tema: PENSIÓN Subtemas:
NO APLICA.
PENSIÓN. REFORMA DEL RÉGIMEN DE PENSIONES DE LA CCSS Sentencia: 031711-23 de 06 de diciembre de 2023 Tipo de asunto: Acción de inconstitucionalidad Norma impugnada: Reforma al Régimen de Pensiones del IVM de la CCSS, por omisión en la inclusión de un transitorio, que permita la gradualidad en la aplicación de la norma.
Parte dispositiva: Se rechaza de plano la acción, así como la coadyuvancia de Nombre49491.
VCG12/2023 “(…) III.- SOBRE EL TRÁMITE. Esta acción carece de varios requisitos formales de admisibilidad, toda vez que el accionante no aportó el recibo del pago del timbre del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica, por la suma de doscientos setenta y cinco colones, correspondientes a la autenticación del escrito inicial, ni, tampoco aportó el poder especial judicial que lo legitima para actuar en nombre de quienes dice representar. No obstante, por economía procesal, se omite la prevención prevista en el artículo 80 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, toda vez que la acción resulta inadmisible por los motivos que se analizarán a continuación.
El accionante fundamenta su legitimación en la defensa de intereses difusos; no obstante, esta Sala, por mayoría, ha estimado que cuando una norma es susceptible de aplicación individual, no cabe invocar la defensa de intereses difusos para admitir la acción. Así, en el voto n° 2021-002185 de las 12:51 horas del 3 de febrero de 2021 este Tribunal Constitucional señaló lo siguiente:
“(…) II.- Sobre los intereses difusos y la legitimación de los accionantes en el caso bajo estudio. Las accionantes señalan que su legitimación proviene de la defensa de los intereses difusos respecto de la protección al derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado. Al respecto, cabe indicar que, como ya se mencionó, los supuestos del párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional constituyen excepciones a la regla contenida en el párrafo primero del mismo artículo, que deben ser analizados cuidadosamente en cada caso concreto. El interés difuso ha sido entendido como aquel interés relacionado con un derecho o situación jurídica de naturaleza especial y particular, que puede ser compartido por otras personas, formando todos los interesados un grupo o categoría determinada. Así, la vulneración de ese derecho puede afectar a todos en general o a cada uno en particular, de ahí que cualquier miembro de la colectividad puede interponer la acción para proteger el derecho que se estima lesionado. Sobre el particular, la reiterada jurisprudencia de la Sala indica que:
"Se ha señalado que se trata un tipo especial de interés, cuya manifestación es menos concreta e individualizable que la del colectivo recién definido en el considerando anterior, pero que no puede llegar a ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el reconocido a todos los miembros de la sociedad de velar por la legalidad constitucional, ya que éste último -como se ha dicho reiteradamente- está excluido del actual sistema de revisión constitucional. Se trata pues de un interés distribuido en cada uno de los administrados, mediato si se quiere, y diluido, pero no por ello menos constatable, para la defensa, en esta Sala, de ciertos derechos constitucionales de una singular relevancia para el adecuado y armónico desarrollo de la sociedad. Son las especiales características de éstos derechos por sí mismas y no la particular situación frente a ellos de los sujetos que puedan ostentarlos, la clave para la distinción y determinación de la presencia de los llamados intereses difusos tal y como se manifestado en distintas resoluciones como la 03705-93 de las quince horas del treinta de julio para el derecho al ambiente, la número 05753-93 de las catorce horas cuarenta y cinco del nueve de noviembre de ese mismo año para la defensa del patrimonio histórico y la número 00980-91 de las trece y treinta del veinticuatro de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y uno para la materia electoral." –ver sentencia número 360-90- De esta definición es posible estimar que el interés difuso está conformado por un elemento eminentemente subjetivo, relativo a su pertenencia o titularidad del interés, y otro objetivo, relacionado con la incidencia del bien en la sociedad, que lo distingue de otras situaciones jurídicas.
En relación con el primero -el subjetivo-, es claro que la misma se encuentra difuminada en un grupo humano no individualizado, que coparticipa en el disfrute del bien jurídico objeto del interés, pero cuya conformación no resulta de un conjunto de sujetos identificable, abarcable y de contornos relativamente nítidos, como sí ocurre en el interés colectivo. Y desde la perspectiva objetiva, debe aclararse que no todo interés "difuminado" adquiere la categoría jurídica de "interés difuso", sino únicamente aquellos impregnados de una profunda relevancia social, cuya valoración resulta de las circunstancias de cada caso –ver, entre otras, sentencias números 2006-15960 y 2014-4904-. En este sentido, así como se ha dicho que ese interés no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional -lo que supondría la instauración tácita de una acción popular no contemplada por la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional-, tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de ese reclamo –ver, entre otras, sentencias números 2008-13442, 2009-300 y 2009-9201-.
Así, ejemplos de tales intereses son el derecho a un ambiente sano y armonioso, la defensa del patrimonio histórico, la materia electoral, la defensa del derecho a la salud y la fiscalización de los fondos públicos. De tal forma, en el caso bajo estudio, donde las accionantes refieren su legitimación respecto de la defensa de intereses difusos en materia de protección a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, lo que corresponde es pronunciarse conforme se indica en los considerandos siguientes.
(…)
En la acción que ahora se conoce, los mismos accionantes cuestionan las mismas normas de los artículos 50 y 51 del Reglamento en cuestión, así como el artículo 52 del mismo instrumento, y si bien, más allá de la sostenibilidad de los zoocriaderos, en esta acción se centran sobre temas de conservación ex situ y educación ambiental -que también fue señalado en aquella acción-, lo cierto es que la misma definición de esta Sala sobre la legitimación, tal como se dispuso en la sentencia de cita, resulta de plena aplicación en esta nueva acción. Nótese que, ciertamente, tal como lo señala claramente la Procuraduría General de la República y de manera enfática lo refiere el Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, la normativa que se cuestiona sí es totalmente susceptible de aplicación individual y de incidir directamente en la esfera jurídica de personas singulares e identificables, que ejercen una determinada actividad, sujeta a la regulación señalada en la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre y su reglamento.
De tal manera, es claro que contrario a la aducida defensa de intereses difusos, lo que se encuentra de por medio es algún grado de inconformidad con la sujeción a que deben someterse para la regulación de la actividad que ejercen o pretenden ejercer; véase que como bien refiere el informe del Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, los accionantes se encuentran directamente relacionados como fundadores, gerentes o servidores de diversas empresas relacionadas con la exhibición de fauna silvestre o su promoción turística. Así, resulta inviable aducir presuntos problemas de conservación y de educación ambiental, para utilizar la figura de los intereses difusos y promover con ello una acción de inconstitucionalidad directa obviando los estrictos requisitos de admisibilidad señalados en la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, tal como se indicó en los considerandos II y III de esta resolución.
Bajo esta inteligencia, y tomando en consideración la identidad de accionantes y de la normativa cuestionada, es claro que el precedente de la sentencia 2018-18563 resulta plenamente aplicable a esta acción que ahora se conoce, de donde debe necesariamente concluirse que al igual que en aquella anterior ocasión, los accionantes carecen de legitimación para la interposición de este proceso, por lo que resulta improcedente conocer y pronunciarse sobre los aspectos planteados. De tal manera, lo procedente es declarar sin lugar esta acción” (el subrayado no corresponde al original).
En similar sentido, en la sentencia n° 2021-011994 de las 16:30 horas del 26 de mayo de 2021 esta Sala dispuso que:
“(…) Se reitera que el interés difuso no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional (lo que supondría la instauración tácita de acción popular no contemplada por la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional); pero tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues, en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de ese reclamo (…)”.
En el caso concreto, el accionante pretende que esta Sala declare la inconstitucionalidad por omisión de la reforma a los artículos 5, 23 y 24, y la derogatoria de los transitorios XII, XIII, XIV y XV del Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte; publicada en La Gaceta n.° 5 del martes 11 de enero de 2022, toda vez que, en su criterio, no se estableció transitorio alguno que permitiera la gradualidad en la aplicación de tal reforma. Alega que, a partir de la entrada en vigor de la reforma, el 11 de enero de 2024, todas las personas, sin excepción alguna, se verán afectadas por esta. Estima que lo anterior es lesivo de los derechos adquiridos y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, los principios de certeza, razonabilidad, proporcionalidad, seguridad jurídica, buena fe, confianza legítima, no confiscatoriedad, igualdad, publicidad e intangibilidad patrimonial. Así como contrario a lo dispuesto por la OIT en los convenios 102, 118, 128 y 157; artículo 16 de la Declaración Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, artículo 25 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, artículo 26 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, artículo 14 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales; y, finalmente, los artículos 11, 18, 28, 33, 34, 40, 41, 45, 50, 51, 65, 73, 74, 177, 188, 189 y concordantes de la Constitución Política de Costa Rica.
Ahora bien, el accionante fundamenta su legitimación para interponer esta acción en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, pues expresamente indica que “(…) se ostenta la legitimidad directa para interponer la presente acción, mediante la figura de intereses difusos de mis representados, así como de todas aquellas personas que se pertenecen al régimen del IVM y que se ven afectas por la omisión que se impugna en esta vía”. No obstante, considera esta Sala que el actor carece de legitimación directa para acudir ante este Tribunal por la vía de acción de inconstitucionalidad, con base en la defensa de un supuesto interés difuso, no solo porque omite precisar cuál es el interés difuso invocado, sino, también, porque la reforma al Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte -que pretende impugnar por supuestamente carecer de un transitorio que gradúe la vigencia de sus disposiciones- es evidente que admite una aplicación individual y directa, a un grupo de personas fácilmente identificables, como lo son las personas aseguradas que cotizan o aportan a este régimen en particular.
En consecuencia, conforme a los antecedentes jurisprudenciales citados en el considerando anterior, no es admisible alegar la defensa de intereses difusos en las circunstancias que plantea el accionante. Por el contrario, se trata de una normativa que puede dar lugar a diferentes reclamos individuales o colectivos a través de grupos formalmente organizados; que puedan servir de base a la acción de inconstitucionalidad y otorgar legitimación para actuar. En este sentido, quienes estimen vulnerados sus derechos adquiridos o situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, el principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad u otros principios o derechos fundamentales, en virtud de la aplicación directa del reglamento impugnado, bien pueden reclamar sus derechos -en forma individual o colectiva- en la vía administrativa o judicial correspondiente y así contar con el asunto previo pendiente de resolver que exige el artículo 75, párrafo primero, de la ley que rige a esta jurisdicción.
Sin embargo, la parte accionante no mencionó la existencia de algún caso previo pendiente de resolver en procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa o ante tribunales de justicia que permita admitir esta acción con base en la legitimación incidental. Por ende, estima esta Sala que el accionante carece de legitimación activa para promover esta acción, por lo que procede rechazar de plano su gestión.
En virtud de lo expuesto, la acción resulta inadmisible por falta de legitimación directa. (…)” ... Ver más Sentencias Relacionadas Contenido de Interés:
Tipo de contenido: Voto de mayoría Rama del Derecho: 6. LEY DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL ANOTADA CON JURISPRUDENCIA Tema: 083- Coadyuvancias Subtemas:
NO APLICA.
ARTÍCULO 83 DE LA LEY DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL “(…) I.- SOBRE LA COADYUVANCIA. Respecto a la gestión de coadyuvancia activa interpuesta por Nombre49491, cédula de identidad n.° 1-576-298, el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece, al efecto, que en los quince días posteriores a la primera publicación del aviso a que alude el párrafo segundo del artículo 81, las partes que figuren en los asuntos pendientes a la fecha de la interposición de la acción, o aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, para coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia, o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa. Dado que la coadyuvancia supone una intervención procesal accesoria y su suerte sigue a la de la intervención principal, por los motivos que se detallan infra en cuanto a la inadmisibilidad de la acción, debe denegarse la coadyuvancia formulada. (…)” VCG12/2023 ... Ver más Contenido de Interés:
Tipo de contenido: Voto de mayoría Rama del Derecho: 6. LEY DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL ANOTADA CON JURISPRUDENCIA Tema: 075- Asunto previo en vía judicial o administrativa pendiente de resolución Subtemas:
NO APLICA.
ARTÍCULO 75 DE LA LEY DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL “(…) II.- REQUISITOS Y FORMALIDADES DE LA ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. Esta Sala ha señalado, de forma reiterada, que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso con determinadas formalidades, que, si no se reúnen, imposibilitan pronunciarse sobre el fondo del asunto. En el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional se establecen los presupuestos de admisibilidad para las acciones de inconstitucionalidad y se regulan situaciones distintas. En el párrafo primero se exige la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sea en sede judicial –incluyendo los recursos de hábeas corpus o de amparo– o en la administrativa –en el procedimiento de agotamiento de esta vía, sea, en el procedimiento administrativo de impugnación contra el acto final–, en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado en el asunto principal.
En los párrafos segundo y tercero se regula la acción directa –no se requiere del asunto base–, en los siguientes supuestos: a) cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa; b) se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto y c) cuando la acción sea promovida por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes. En cuanto a la exigencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, esta Sala, mediante Sentencia n° 04190-95 de las 11:33 horas del 28 de julio de 1995, señaló lo siguiente:
“(…) En primer término, se trata de un proceso de naturaleza incidental, y no de una acción directa o popular, con lo que se quiere decir que se requiere de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver -sea ante los tribunales de justicia o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa- para poder acceder a la vía constitucional, pero de tal manera que, la acción constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho considerado lesionado en el asunto principal, de manera que lo resuelto por el Tribunal Constitucional repercuta positiva o negativamente en dicho proceso pendiente de resolver, por cuanto se manifiesta sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas que deberán ser aplicadas en dicho asunto; y únicamente por excepción es que la legislación permite el acceso directo a esta vía -presupuestos de los párrafos segundo y tercero del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (…)”.
Asimismo, existen otras formalidades que deben ser cumplidas, a saber: el escrito de interposición debe estar autenticado y contener una determinación explícita de la normativa impugnada, debidamente fundamentada, con cita concreta de los componentes del bloque de constitucionalidad que se consideren infringidos (artículo 78 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Debe, además, acreditarse las condiciones de legitimación (poderes y certificaciones), procederse al pago del timbre del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica y aportarse certificación literal del escrito en el que se invocó la inconstitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas en el asunto base (artículo 79 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). (…)” VCG12/2023 ... Ver más SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas treinta minutos del seis de diciembre de dos mil veintitres .
Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por Nombre14517 , cédula de identidad n.° CED11565, abogado carné n.° CED11566, en su condición de apoderado especial judicial de [Nombre62 026], [Nombre 002], [Nombre 003], [Nombre 004], [Nombre 005], [Nombre 006], [Nombre 007], [Nombre 008], [Nombre 009], [Nombre 010], [Nombre 011], [Nombre 012], [Nombre 013], [Nombre 014], [Nombre 015], [Nombre 016] y [Nombre 017]; contra “la reforma al Régimen de Pensiones del IVM de la CCSS por omisión en la inclusión de un transitorio que permitiera la gradualidad en la aplicación de la reforma”. RESULTANDO: 1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala Constitucional a las 10:20 horas del 9 de noviembre de 2023, el accionante alega la inconstitucionalidad de “la reforma al Régimen de Pensiones del IVM de la CCSS por omisión en la inclusión de un transitorio que permitiera la gradualidad en la aplicación de la reforma”.
Manifiesta que, por medio de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, pretende impugnar, por omisión, la reforma al Reglamento del Régimen de Pensiones del IVM, en sus artículos 5, 23 y 24, junto con la eliminación de los transitorios XII, XIII, XIV y XV, referidos a vigencia de reformas anteriores, cuantías, montos y edades. Indica que dicha reforma fue aprobada por la Junta Directiva de la CCSS en acuerdo n.° 12 de la sesión n.° 9198 de 12 de agosto de 2021, la cual contempla tres modificaciones al régimen de pensiones de invalidez, vejez y muerte:
Dimensión Plan de Fortalecimiento IVM Edad de retiroEl derecho de Pensión por Vejez para los hombres y mujeres se mantiene a los 65 años. Se elimina et derecho de retiro anticipado por vejez para los hombres. Se mantiene el derecho de retiro anticipado por vejez para las mujeres ajustando la edad mínima para este retiro a partir de los 63 años con 405 cuotas ara edadessuperiores de conformidad con el artículo 50 del Reglamento del IVM. Rige a partir de los 24 meses de publicado el reglamento en el Diario la Gaceta.Fórmula de cálculoEstablecer el Salario Promedio de Referencia (SPR) como el promedio de los mejores 300 salarios indexados por inflación de toda la carrera contributiva. Utilizar el SPR como Salario de Ubicación (SU) para definir el rango de beneficio básico del cotizante. La cuantía adicional se contabiliza a partir de las 300 cuotas aportadas al IVM. Rige a partir de los 24 meses de publicado el reglamento en el Diario La Gaceta.Aportes reglamentariosSe mantienen las condiciones actuales Alega que la reforma aprobada es omisa en cuanto a que no se estableció un transitorio que permitiera la gradualidad en la aplicación de esta.
Estima que dicha omisión resulta contraria al Derecho de la Constitución. Aduce que, por la vía de la acción de inconstitucionalidad por omisión, se permite el control de constitucionalidad en los casos que existen omisiones normativas que infringen una disposición contenida de forma expresa o manifiesta en la Constitución Política, al igual que aquellas que lesionen principios constitucionales o derechos fundamentales. En este caso, alega que la modificación resulta contraria a los Convenios 102, 118, 128 y 157 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, así como del artículo 26 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos; artículo 14 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos; artículo 9 del Pacto Internacional de los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales; artículos 11, 18, 28, 33, 34, 40, 41, 45, 50, 51, 65, 73, 74, 177, 188, 189 y concordantes de la Constitución Política de Costa Rica.
Además, contraría los siguientes principios: democrático, de igualdad, publicidad, solidaridad, seguridad jurídica, buena fe, confianza legítima, transparencia, intangibilidad patrimonial, no confiscatoriedad, derechos adquiridos y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas. En igual sentido, la Sala ha indicado (v. gr., sentencia n.° 003911-2005) que los requisitos de admisibilidad de una acción de inconstitucionalidad contra una norma deben observarse también al promover una acción por omisión. Al efecto, señala que el objeto de la acción debe estar determinado, lo que exige que el accionante compruebe qué norma hace falta y, por otro, que existe un mandato, aunque solo sea tácito, de dictarla. En el caso concreto, hace falta una norma que disponga un transitorio que permita la gradualidad en la aplicación de la reforma al IVM, así como la obligación constitucional para la CCSS, de regular el tema de la seguridad social y el régimen de pensiones, en este caso, del IVM.
El accionante expone los siguientes hechos: la Junta Directiva de la CCSS, mediante acuerdo n.° 12 de la sesión n.° 9198 de 12 de agosto de 2021, aprobó la reforma al Reglamento del Régimen de Pensiones del IVM, en sus artículos 5, 23 y 24, junto con la eliminación de los transitorios XII, XIII, XIV y XV, referidos a vigencia de reformas anteriores, cuantías, montos y edades. Dicha reforma se publicó el 11 de enero de 2022, en La Gaceta n.° 5, disponiendo las siguientes modificaciones:
Asimismo, existen otras formalidades que deben ser cumplidas, a saber: el escrito de interposición debe estar autenticado y contener una determinación explícita de la normativa impugnada, debidamente fundamentada, con cita concreta de los componentes del bloque de constitucionalidad que se consideren infringidos (artículo 78 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Debe, además, acreditarse las condiciones de legitimación (poderes y certificaciones), procederse al pago del timbre del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica y aportarse certificación literal del escrito en el que se invocó la inconstitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas en el asunto base (artículo 79 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). III.- SOBRE EL TRÁMITE. Esta acción carece de varios requisitos formales de admisibilidad, toda vez que el accionante no aportó el recibo del pago del timbre del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica, por la suma de doscientos setenta y cinco colones, correspondientes a la autenticación del escrito inicial, ni, tampoco aportó el poder especial judicial que lo legitima para actuar en Nombre62 de quienes dice representar.
No obstante, por economía procesal, se omite la prevención prevista en el artículo 80 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, toda vez que la acción resulta inadmisible por los motivos que se analizarán a continuación. IV.- SOBRE LA LEGITIMACIÓN DERIVADA DE LA DEFENSA DE INTERESES DIFUSOS. El accionante fundamenta su legitimación en la defensa de intereses difusos; no obstante, esta Sala, por mayoría, ha estimado que cuando una norma es susceptible de aplicación individual, no cabe invocar la defensa de intereses difusos para admitir la acción. Así, en el voto n° 2021-002185 de las 12:51 horas del 3 de febrero de 2021 este Tribunal Constitucional señaló lo siguiente: “(…) II.- Sobre los intereses difusos y la legitimación de los accionantes en el caso bajo estudio. Las accionantes señalan que su legitimación proviene de la defensa de los intereses difusos respecto de la protección al derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado.
Al respecto, cabe indicar que, como ya se mencionó, los supuestos del párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional constituyen excepciones a la regla contenida en el párrafo primero del mismo artículo, que deben ser analizados cuidadosamente en cada caso concreto. El interés difuso ha sido entendido como aquel interés relacionado con un derecho o situación jurídica de naturaleza especial y particular, que puede ser compartido por otras personas, formando todos los interesados un grupo o categoría determinada. Así, la vulneración de ese derecho puede afectar a todos en general o a cada uno en particular, de ahí que cualquier miembro de la colectividad puede interponer la acción para proteger el derecho que se estima lesionado. Sobre el particular, la reiterada jurisprudencia de la Sala indica que: "Se ha señalado que se trata un tipo especial de interés, cuya manifestación es menos concreta e individualizable que la del colectivo recién definido en el considerando anterior, pero que no puede llegar a ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el reconocido a todos los miembros de la sociedad de velar por la legalidad constitucional, ya que éste último -como se ha dicho reiteradamente- está excluido del actual sistema de revisión constitucional.
Se trata pues de un interés distribuido en cada uno de los administrados, mediato si se quiere, y diluido, pero no por ello menos constatable, para la defensa, en esta Sala, de ciertos derechos constitucionales de una singular relevancia para el adecuado y armónico desarrollo de la sociedad. Son las especiales características de éstos derechos por sí mismas y no la particular situación frente a ellos de los sujetos que puedan ostentarlos, la clave para la distinción y determinación de la presencia de los llamados intereses difusos tal y como se manifestado en distintas resoluciones como la 03705-93 de las quince horas del treinta de julio para el derecho al ambiente, la número 05753-93 de las catorce horas cuarenta y cinco del nueve de noviembre de ese mismo año para la defensa del patrimonio histórico y la número 00980-91 de las trece y treinta del veinticuatro de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y uno para la materia electoral." –ver sentencia número 360-90- De esta definición es posible estimar que el interés difuso está conformado por un elemento eminentemente subjetivo, relativo a su pertenencia o titularidad del interés, y otro objetivo, relacionado con la incidencia del bien en la sociedad, que lo distingue de otras situaciones jurídicas.
En relación con el primero -el subjetivo-, es claro que la misma se encuentra difuminada en un grupo humano no individualizado, que coparticipa en el disfrute del bien jurídico objeto del interés, pero cuya conformación no resulta de un conjunto de sujetos identificable, abarcable y de contornos relativamente nítidos, como sí ocurre en el interés colectivo. Y desde la perspectiva objetiva, debe aclararse que no todo interés "difuminado" adquiere la categoría jurídica de "interés difuso", sino únicamente aquellos impregnados de una profunda relevancia social, cuya valoración resulta de las circunstancias de cada caso –ver, entre otras, sentencias números 2006-15960 y 2014-4904-. En este sentido, así como se ha dicho que ese interés no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional -lo que supondría la instauración tácita de una acción popular no contemplada por la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional-, tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de ese reclamo –ver, entre otras, sentencias números 2008-13442, 2009-300 y 2009-9201-.
Así, ejemplos de tales intereses son el derecho a un ambiente sano y armonioso, la defensa del patrimonio histórico, la materia electoral, la defensa del derecho a la salud y la fiscalización de los fondos públicos. De tal forma, en el caso bajo estudio, donde las accionantes refieren su legitimación respecto de la defensa de intereses difusos en materia de protección a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, lo que corresponde es pronunciarse conforme se indica en los considerandos siguientes. (…) En la acción que ahora se conoce, los mismos accionantes cuestionan las mismas normas de los artículos 50 y 51 del Reglamento en cuestión, así como el artículo 52 del mismo instrumento, y si bien, más allá de la sostenibilidad de los zoocriaderos, en esta acción se centran sobre temas de conservación ex situ y educación ambiental -que también fue señalado en aquella acción-, lo cierto es que la misma definición de esta Sala sobre la legitimación, tal como se dispuso en la sentencia de cita, resulta de plena aplicación en esta nueva acción.
Nótese que, ciertamente, tal como lo señala claramente la Procuraduría General de la República y de manera enfática lo refiere el Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, la normativa que se cuestiona sí es totalmente susceptible de aplicación individual y de incidir directamente en la esfera jurídica de personas singulares e identificables, que ejercen una determinada actividad, sujeta a la regulación señalada en la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre y su reglamento. De tal manera, es claro que contrario a la aducida defensa de intereses difusos, lo que se encuentra de por medio es algún grado de inconformidad con la sujeción a que deben someterse para la regulación de la actividad que ejercen o pretenden ejercer; véase que como bien refiere el informe del Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, los accionantes se encuentran directamente relacionados como fundadores, gerentes o servidores de diversas empresas relacionadas con la exhibición de fauna silvestre o su promoción turística.
Así, resulta inviable aducir presuntos problemas de conservación y de educación ambiental, para utilizar la figura de los intereses difusos y promover con ello una acción de inconstitucionalidad directa obviando los estrictos requisitos de admisibilidad señalados en la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, tal como se indicó en los considerandos II y III de esta resolución. Bajo esta inteligencia, y tomando en consideración la identidad de accionantes y de la normativa cuestionada, es claro que el precedente de la sentencia 2018-18563 resulta plenamente aplicable a esta acción que ahora se conoce, de donde debe necesariamente concluirse que al igual que en aquella anterior ocasión, los accionantes carecen de legitimación para la interposición de este proceso, por lo que resulta improcedente conocer y pronunciarse sobre los aspectos planteados. De tal manera, lo procedente es declarar sin lugar esta acción” (el subrayado no corresponde al original).
En similar sentido, en la sentencia n° 2021-011994 de las 16:30 horas del 26 de mayo de 2021 esta Sala dispuso que: “(…) Se reitera que el interés difuso no puede ser tan amplio y genérico que se confunda con el derecho a velar por la legalidad constitucional (lo que supondría la instauración tácita de acción popular no contemplada por la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional); pero tampoco puede ser tan concreto que permita el reclamo individual, pues, en tal caso, la legitimación derivaría de ese reclamo (…)”.
En el caso concreto, el accionante pretende que esta Sala declare la inconstitucionalidad por omisión de la reforma a los artículos 5, 23 y 24, y la derogatoria de los transitorios XII, XIII, XIV y XV del Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte; publicada en La Gaceta n.° 5 del martes 11 de enero de 2022, toda vez que, en su criterio, no se estableció transitorio alguno que permitiera la gradualidad en la aplicación de tal reforma. Alega que, a partir de la entrada en vigor de la reforma, el 11 de enero de 2024, todas las personas, sin excepción alguna, se verán afectadas por esta. Estima que lo anterior es lesivo de los derechos adquiridos y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, los principios de certeza, razonabilidad, proporcionalidad, seguridad jurídica, buena fe, confianza legítima, no confiscatoriedad, igualdad, publicidad e intangibilidad patrimonial. Así como contrario a lo dispuesto por la OIT en los convenios 102, 118, 128 y 157; artículo 16 de la Declaración Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, artículo 25 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, artículo 26 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, artículo 14 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales; y, finalmente, los artículos 11, 18, 28, 33, 34, 40, 41, 45, 50, 51, 65, 73, 74, 177, 188, 189 y concordantes de la Constitución Política de Costa Rica.
Ahora bien, el accionante fundamenta su legitimación para interponer esta acción en el artículo 75, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, pues expresamente indica que “(…) se ostenta la legitimidad directa para interponer la presente acción, mediante la figura de intereses difusos de mis representados, así como de todas aquellas personas que se pertenecen al régimen del IVM y que se ven afectas por la omisión que se impugna en esta vía”. No obstante, considera esta Sala que el actor carece de legitimación directa para acudir ante este Tribunal por la vía de acción de inconstitucionalidad, con base en la defensa de un supuesto interés difuso, no solo porque omite precisar cuál es el interés difuso invocado, sino, también, porque la reforma al Reglamento del Seguro de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte -que pretende impugnar por supuestamente carecer de un transitorio que gradúe la vigencia de sus disposiciones- es evidente que admite una aplicación individual y directa, a un grupo de personas fácilmente identificables, como lo son las personas aseguradas que cotizan o aportan a este régimen en particular.
En consecuencia, conforme a los antecedentes jurisprudenciales citados en el considerando anterior, no es admisible alegar la defensa de intereses difusos en las circunstancias que plantea el accionante. Por el contrario, se trata de una normativa que puede dar lugar a diferentes reclamos individuales o colectivos a través de grupos formalmente organizados; que puedan servir de base a la acción de inconstitucionalidad y otorgar legitimación para actuar. En este sentido, quienes estimen vulnerados sus derechos adquiridos o situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, el principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad u otros principios o derechos fundamentales, en virtud de la aplicación directa del reglamento impugnado, bien pueden reclamar sus derechos -en forma individual o colectiva- en la vía administrativa o judicial correspondiente y así contar con el asunto previo pendiente de resolver que exige el artículo 75, párrafo primero, de la ley que rige a esta jurisdicción.
Sin embargo, la parte accionante no mencionó la existencia de algún caso previo pendiente de resolver en procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa o ante tribunales de justicia que permita admitir esta acción con base en la legitimación incidental. Por ende, estima esta Sala que el accionante carece de legitimación activa para promover esta acción, por lo que procede rechazar de plano su gestión. VI.- CONCLUSIÓN. En virtud de lo expuesto, la acción resulta inadmisible por falta de legitimación directa. VII.- DOCUMENTACIÓN APORTADA AL EXPEDIENTE. Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia.
De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI. POR TANTO: Se rechaza de plano la acción, así como la coadyuvancia de Nombre14525 .
Nombre9290 . Presidente a.i Luis Fdo. Salazar A. Jorge Araya G. Ingrid Hess H. Nombre6376 B. Aracelly Pacheco S. Alexandra Alvarado P.
Clasificación elaborada por SALA CONSTITUCIONALdel Poder Judicial. Prohibida su reproducción y/o distribución en forma onerosa.
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